MEGA² I.13: Karl Marx, Artikel · Entwürfe. Januar

Transcription

I
KARL MARX
FRIEDRICH ENGELS
GESAMTAUSGABE
(MEGA)
ERSTE ABTEILUNG
WERKE · ARTIKEL · ENTWÜRFE
B A N D 13
Herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus
beim Zentralkomitee der
Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion
und vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus
beim Zentralkomitee der
Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands
KARL MARX
FRIEDRICH ENGELS
WERKE · ARTIKEL
ENTWÜRFE
JANUAR BIS DEZEMBER
1854
TEXT
DIETZ VERLAG BERLIN
1985
Redaktionskommission der Gesamtausgabe:
Günter Heyden und Anatoli Jegorow (Leiter),
Erich Kundel und Alexander Malysch (Sekretäre),
Georgi Bagaturija, Rolf Dlubek, Heinrich Gemkow, Lew Golman,
Michail Mtschedlow, Richard Speri
Redaktionskommission der Ersten Abteilung:
Rolf Dlubek (Leiter),
Erich Kundel, Alexander Malysch, Richard Speri, Inge Taubert
Bearbeitung des Bandes:
Manfred Neuhaus (Leiter),
Helmut Findeisen, Karl-Frieder Grube, Giesela Neuhaus und Klaus-Dieter Neumann
Gutachter: Brigitte Rieck, Walentina Smirnowa und Galina Woitenkowa
Text und Apparat
Mit 13 Abbildungen, 9 Karten sowie 3 Kartenskizzen von Friedrich Engels
© Dietz Verlag Berlin 1985
Lizenznummer 1
LSV0046
Technische Redaktion: Friedrich Hackenberger, Heinz Ruschinski
und Waltraud Schulze
Korrektur: Hanna Behrendt, Marlies Fischer und Jutta Knopp
Einband: Albert Kapr
Typografie: Albert Kapr/Horst Kinkel
Schrift: Times-Antiqua und Maxima
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Best.-Nr.: 7448152
13500
Inhalt
Text
Einleitung
13*
Editorische H i n w e i s e
41 "
Apparat
625
Verzeichnis d e r Abkürzungen, Siglen und Z e i c h e n
KARL MARX · FRIEDRICH ENGELS: ARTIKEL
ENTWÜRFE · JANUAR BIS DEZEMBER 1 8 5 4
Friedrich Engels • T h e European W a r
3
657
Karl Marx · T h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s and T u r k e y
8
661
Karl Marx • T h e W a r in t h e East
18
668
Friedrich Engels • T h e Last Battle in Europe
27
675
France—Fortification of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
30
677
Karl Marx • T h e C z a r ' s Views—Prince Albert
35
680
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parliament—Crop Failure in Europe
39
683
Karl Marx • C o u n t Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during
the War
46
688
Karl Marx • Blue Books—Parliamentary D e b a t e s on February 6—Count Orlov's Mission—Operations of t h e Allied Fleet—
T h e Irish Brigade—Concerning t h e C o n v o c a t i o n of t h e Labour
Parliament
50
692
Karl Marx • T h e Fighting in t h e East—Finances of Austria and
5*
Inhalt
Text
Apparat
Eastern Q u e s t i o n — M o n t e n e g r o
56
699
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h e W a r Q u e s t i o n in Europe
63
703
Plans—Prussia's Policy
67
705
Karl Marx • D e b a t e s in Parliament
69
706
Borgo's Dispatch—The Policy of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s
Karl Marx • English and French W a r Plans—Greek Insurrection—Spain—China
81
713
88
717
Karl Marx · Austrian Bankruptcy
94
723
Budget
100
728
Karl Marx • Letter to t h e Labour Parliament
107
731
Karl Marx • T h e Labour Parliament
111
732
Friedrich Engels • Retreat of t h e Russians from Kalafat
116
734
Karl Marx · T h e G r e e k Insurrection
120
740
Karl Marx • T h e D o c u m e n t s on t h e Partition of Turkey
123
742
Karl Marx • T h e S e c r e t Diplomatic C o r r e s p o n d e n c e
136
747
Question
150
752
Friedrich Engels · T h e Fortress of Kronstadt
158
756
Karl Marx • British Finances—The T r o u b l e s at Preston
168
765
Friedrich Engels • T h e Russian Army
173
769
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h e European W a r
178
772
Karl Marx • T h e W a r D e b a t e in Parliament
181
775
Karl Marx • Russia and t h e G e r m a n P o w e r s - C o r n Prices
192
780
Friedrich Engels • Position of t h e Armies in Turkey
198
785
202
787
207
794
Karl Marx
·
Russian
Diplomacy—The
Blue
Book on t h e
Karl Marx • Declaration of t h e Prussian Cabinet—Napoleon's
Karl Marx • Parliamentary D e b a t e s of February 22—Pozzo di
Karl Marx · O p e n i n g of t h e Labour Parliament—English W a r
Karl Marx • Declaration of War—On t h e History of t h e Eastern
Karl Marx • Reshid Pasha's Note—An Italian N e w s p a p e r on
t h e Eastern Q u e s t i o n
Karl Marx • G r e e c e and Turkey—Turkey and t h e W e s t e r n
Powers—Falling off in W h e a t Sales in England
6*
Inhalt
Text
211
Apparat
796
214
798
mation of Prince Daniel of Montenegro—Manteuffel's S p e e c h
221
806
Friedrich Engels • N e w s from t h e European C o n t e s t
228
814
Karl Marx • British Finances
230
816
Friedrich Engels • A Famous Victory
237
822
Scotland
241
827
Friedrich Engels • T h e W a r
246
829
Army—Tactics, Uniform, C o m m i s s a r i a t , e t c .
Friedrich Engels • Ships and Forts
253
259
833
836
Karl Marx • T h e Treaty b e t w e e n Austria and Prussia—Parliam e n t a r y D e b a t e s of May 29
264
840
Karl Marx • T h e Formation of a Special Ministry of W a r in
Britain—The W a r on t h e Danube—The Economic Situation
269
843
Karl Marx • Reorganisation of t h e British W a r Administration—The Austrian Summons—Britain's Economic Situation—
St. Arnaud
275
846
Friedrich Engels • T h e Siege of Silistria
281
851
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • State of t h e Russian W a r
290
856
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h e Russian R e t r e a t
296
860
Karl Marx · T h e W a r - D e b a t e in Parliament
300
862
T r e a t y - M o l d a v i a and Wallachia
308
866
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h e W a r on t h e D a n u b e
316
871
Karl Marx · T h e Details of t h e Insurrection at Madrid—The
Austro-Prussian Summons—The N e w Austrian Loan—Wallachia
321
874
Karl Marx • Excitement in Italy—The Events in Spain—The
Position of t h e G e r m a n States—British M a g i s t r a t e s
329
881
Friedrich Engels • T h e Turkish W a r
Karl Marx • T h e G r e e k Insurrection—The Polish Emigration—The Austro-Prussian Treaty—Russian D o c u m e n t s
Karl Marx • T h e B o m b a r d m e n t of O d e s s a — G r e e c e - P r o c l a -
Karl Marx · Attack upon Sevastopol—Clearing of Estates in
Friedrich Engels
· T h e P r e s e n t Condition of t h e English
Karl Marx • T h e Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Turkish
7*
Inhalt
Text
Apparat
Karl Marx • A C o n g r e s s at Vienna—The Austrian Loan—Proclamations of Dulce and O'Donnell—The Ministerial Crisis in
Britain
342
886
Karl Marx • T h e Spanish Revolution—Greece and T u r k e y
348
891
Karl Marx • T h e W a r D e b a t e s in Parliament
354
896
H o u s e of C o m m o n s
361
899
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h a t Bore of a W a r
370
903
Karl Marx • Espartero
375
906
Friedrich Engels • T h e Attack on t h e Russian Forts
381
910
383
912
390
916
T h e Madrid Press
396
920
Karl Marx · Revolution in Spain—Bomarsund
403
928
Friedrich Engels • T h e C a p t u r e of Bomarsund (First Article)
408
932
Friedrich Engels • T h e C a p t u r e of Bomarsund (Second Article)
412
935
Karl Marx · Revolutionary Spain
First Article
S e c o n d Article
Third Article
Fourth Article
Fifth Article
Sixth Article
S e v e n t h Article
Eighth Article
Ninth Article
416
416
422
427
431
436
439
448
452
458
938
Karl Marx • Centraljunta (Draft)
466
962
Karl Marx • Spain-Intervention (Draft)
473
969
Karl Marx • T h e Reaction in Spain
476
979
Karl Marx • P r o g r e s s of t h e War. S e p t e m b e r 8 , 1 8 5 4
482
983
490
986
Karl Marx • T h e Policy of Austria—The W a r D e b a t e s in t h e
Karl Marx • Evacuation of t h e Danubian Principalities—The
Events in Spain—A N e w Danish Constitution—The C h a r t i s t s
Karl Marx • Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—PolandD e m a n d s of t h e Spanish People
Karl Marx · T h e Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain—
Karl Marx • T h e Rumours a b o u t Mazzini's Arrest—The Austrian
C o m p u l s o r y Loan—Spain—The Situation in Wallachia
8*
Inhalt
Text
Apparat
Karl Marx • T h e Actions of t h e Allied Fleet—The Situation in
t h e Danubian Principalities—Spain—British Foreign T r a d e
495
989
Friedrich Engels • T h e Attack on Sevastopol
503
993
Friedrich Engels • T h e N e w s from t h e C r i m e a
509
997
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels · T h e Sevastopol Hoax
514
1000
Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels · T h e Sevastopol Hoax—General
News
518
1003
Friedrich Engels · T h e Battle of t h e Alma
522
1007
Friedrich Engels • T h e Military P o w e r of Russia
527
1012
Friedrich Engels • T h e S i e g e of Sevastopol
533
1016
Friedrich Engels • T h e C a m p a i g n in t h e C r i m e a
537
1019
Friedrich Engels • T h e W a r in t h e East
544
1022
Friedrich Engels • T h e Battle of Inkerman
551
1029
Friedrich Engels • T h e C r i m e a n C a m p a i g n
556
1034
Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • P r o g r e s s of t h e W a r . D e c e m b e r
1 4 / 1 5 , 1854
562
1039
Friedrich Engels • T h e Military P o w e r of Austria
568
1042
Dubiosa
575
1047
The War
577
1049
T h e English Middle Class (First Article)
579
1051
T h e English Middle Class (Second Article)
583
1054
wurden
585
1057
Wilhelm Pieper • T h e C o b u r g s
587
1059
Ernest Jones • Different F e a t u r e s of Popular Feeling
589
1061
Ernest Jones · Discoveries M a d e T o o Late
592
1063
ANHANG
Artikel, d i e mit Hilfe v o n M a r x und E n g e l s v e r f a ß t
9*
Inhalt
Von M a r x und Engels m i t u n t e r z e i c h n e t e D o k u m e n t e
P r o g r a m m e of t h e Labour Parliament
Text
597
Apparat
1065
599
1067
Verzeichnis nicht ü b e r l i e f e r t e r Arbeiten
1069
REGISTER
Literaturregister
I. A r b e i t e n von Marx und Engels
II. Arbeiten a n d e r e r Autoren
III. Periodica
1075
1075
1077
1118
Namenregister
1124
G e o g r a p h i s c h e s Register
1168
Sachregister
1184
Verzeichnis der Abbildungen
The People's Paper. London. Nr. 98, 18. März 1854. Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Marx' „Letter to the Labour Parliament"
109
New-York Weekly Tribune. Nr. 656, 8. April 1854. Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Marx' Artikel „The Documents on the Partition of
Turkey"
125
Friedrich Engels: The Fortress of Kronstadt. Seite 1
159
Kartenskizze von Engels aus seinem Artikel „The Fortress of Kronstadt". Seite 6
163
The People's Paper. London. Nr. 108, 27. Mai 1854. Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Engels' Artikel „The War"
247
Notizen von Jenny und Karl Marx über das Absenden einiger
Artikel an die „New-York Tribune" im Mai und Juni 1854
261
New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune. Nr.957, 28.Juli 1854. Titelseite
(Ausschnitt) mit Marx' Artikel „Excitement in Italy..."
331
Titelseiten (Ausschnitte) von drei Ausgaben der„New-YorkTribune",
in denen Marx' Artikel „Excitement in Italy" erschien
Karl
Marx:
Central
junta
(Draft).
335
Seite
Karl Marx: Spain-Intervention (Draft). Seite 3
Notizen von Marx über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „NewYork Tribune" im August, September und Oktober 1854
10*
1
467
471
486
Inhalt
Text
Notizen von Marx über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „NewYork Tribune" im Oktober und November 1854
Apparat
529
Kronstat. From the Russian Survey. London 1853
757
Cronstadt in the Baltic with the Fortifications, Batteries & Range
of the Guns 6c. London 1854
761
Town & Harbour of Odessa. London 1854
823
The Town & Harbour of Sevastopol with the Batteries & Approaches.
London 1854
Plan der Belagerung von Silistria 1828/1829. Nach: [Helmut Karl
Bernhard] von Moltke: Der russisch-türkische Feldzug in der europäischen Türkei 1828 und 1829. Berlin 1845
837
853
Map of the Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Greece, and the Russian
Provinces on the Black Sea. Nach: The Illustrated London News.
Ν
r.
697,
12.
August
1854
Seite aus Marx' Exzerpten zur spanischen Geschichte
921
941
Plan of the Battle of the Alma. Nach: The Illustrated London News.
Ν
r.
709,
28.
Oktober
1854
1009
Kartenskizze von Engels aus seiner Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The
Military Power of Russia"
1013
Gefechtsskizze von Engels aus seiner Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The
War in the East"
1023
Seite aus Engels' Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The War in the East"
1027
The Environs of Sevastopol with the Batteries & Approaches. London
1854
Sebastopol and Balaklava. Shewing the Position of the Allied Forces.
Nach: The Illustrated London News. Nr.716, 9. Dezember 1854
1 031
1 037
11*
KARL M A R X
FRIEDRICH
ENGELS
W E R K E · ARTIKEL · E N T W Ü R F E
J A N U A R BIS D E Z E M B E R
1854
Friedrich Engels
The European War
New-York Daily Tribune.
Nr. 3992, 2. Februar 1854
The European War.
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At last, the long-pending question of T u r k e y a p p e a r s to h a v e r e a c h e d a stage
w h e r e diplomacy will n o t m u c h longer be able to monopolize t h e g r o u n d for
its ever-shifting, ever-cowardly, and ever-resultless m o v e m e n t s . T h e F r e n c h
and British fleets h a v e entered t h e B l a c k S e a in order to p r e v e n t t h e R u s s i a n
N a v y from doing h a r m either to t h e T u r k i s h fleet or the T u r k i s h coast. T h e
C z a r Nicholas long since declared t h a t s u c h a step would b e , for him, t h e
signal for a declaration of w a r . Will he n o w stand it quietly?
It is n o t to. be e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e c o m b i n e d fleets will at o n c e attack and
d e s t r o y either t h e R u s s i a n s q u a d r o n or t h e fortifications a n d n a v y - y a r d s of
Sevastopol. O n t h e contrary, w e m a y r e s t a s s u r e d t h a t the instructions w h i c h
diplomacy has p r o v i d e d for t h e t w o admirals are so contrived as to e v a d e ,
as m u c h as possible, t h e c h a n c e of a collision. B u t naval and military m o v e m e n t s , o n c e o r d e r e d , are subject n o t to t h e desires a n d plans of diplomacy,
b u t to laws of their o w n w h i c h c a n n o t be violated without endangering the
safety of t h e whole expedition. D i p l o m a c y n e v e r intended t h e R u s s i a n s to
be b e a t e n at Oltenitza; b u t a little latitude o n c e given to O m e r P a s h a , and
military m o v e m e n t s o n c e begun, t h e action of t h e t w o hostile c o m m a n d e r s
w a s carried on in a sphere w h i c h w a s to a great e x t e n t uncontrollable by the
E m b a s s a d o r s at Constantinople. T h u s , t h e fleets o n c e r e m o v e d from their
moorings in the Beicos r o a d s , t h e r e is no telling h o w s o o n t h e y m a y find
t h e m s e l v e s in a position from which L o r d A b e r d e e n ' s prayers for p e a c e , or
L o r d P a l m e r s t o n ' s collusion with R u s s i a c a n n o t d r a w them, and w h e r e t h e y
will h a v e to c h o o s e b e t w e e n an infamous r e t r e a t or a resolute struggle. A
n a r r o w land-locked sea like the E u x i n e , w h e r e the opposing navies can
hardly contrive to get out of sight of e a c h other, is precisely the locality in
w h i c h conflicts u n d e r such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , m a y b e c o m e n e c e s s a r y almost
daily. A n d it is n o t to be e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e C z a r will allow, without opposition,
his fleet to be b l o c k a d e d in Sevastopol.
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Friedrich Engels
If, t h e n , a E u r o p e a n w a r is to follow from this step, it will be in all likelihood
a w a r b e t w e e n Russia on one h a n d , a n d England, F r a n c e a n d T u r k e y on t h e
o t h e r . T h e e v e n t is p r o b a b l e e n o u g h to w a r r a n t us in comparing the c h a n c e s
of s u c c e s s and striking t h e b a l a n c e of active strength on e a c h side, so far
as w e c a n d o so.
B u t will Russia stand alone? W h a t p a r t will Austria, P r u s s i a and the
G e r m a n and Italian S t a t e s , their d e p e n d a n t s , t a k e in a general w a r ? It is
r e p o r t e d that L o u i s B o n a p a r t e has notified the A u s t r i a n G o v e r n m e n t t h a t
if in c a s e of a conflict with Russia, Austria should side with t h a t p o w e r , the
F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d avail itself of t h e elements of insurrection w h i c h
in Italy a n d H u n g a r y only require a spark to be kindled again into a raging
fire, and that t h e n t h e restoration of Italian a n d H u n g a r i a n nationality w o u l d
be a t t e m p t e d by F r a n c e . S u c h a threat m a y h a v e its effect u p o n A u s t r i a ; it
m a y c o n t r i b u t e to k e e p h e r neutral as long as possible, b u t it is not to be
e x p e c t e d t h a t Austria will long be enabled to k e e p aloof f r o m s u c h a struggle,
should it c o m e to p a s s . T h e v e r y fact of the t h r e a t having b e e n u t t e r e d , m a y
call forth partial insurrectionary m o v e m e n t s in Italy, w h i c h could n o t b u t
m a k e A u s t r i a a still m o r e d e p e n d a n t and still m o r e subservient vassal of
Russia. A n d t h e n , after all, h a s not this N a p o l e o n i c g a m e b e e n played o n c e
a l r e a d y ? Is it to be e x p e c t e d t h a t the m a n w h o r e s t o r e d the P o p e to his
t e m p o r a l t h r o n e , and w h o h a s a candidate c u t and dried for the Neapolitan
m o n a r c h y , will give to the Italians w h a t t h e y w a n t as m u c h as i n d e p e n d e n c e
from A u s t r i a — unity? Is it to be e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e Italian people will r u s h
headlong into such a snare? No d o u b t t h e y are sorely o p p r e s s e d by A u s t r i a n
rule, b u t t h e y will n o t be v e r y anxious to contribute to t h e glory of an E m p i r e ,
w h i c h is already tottering in its native soil of F r a n c e , a n d of a m a n w h o w a s
t h e first t o c o m b a t their o w n revolution. T h e Austrian G o v e r n m e n t k n o w s
all this, and therefore we m a y a s s u m e that it will be m o r e influenced by its
o w n financial e m b a r r a s s m e n t s t h a n b y t h e s e Bonapartistic t h r e a t s ; w e m a y
also be certain t h a t at t h e decisive m o m e n t , t h e influence of the Czar will
be p a r a m o u n t at Vienna, a n d will entangle A u s t r i a on t h e side of Russia.
P r u s s i a is attempting t h e same game w h i c h she p l a y e d in 1780,1800 and
1805. H e r plan is to form a league of neutral Baltic, or N o r t h G e r m a n S t a t e s ,
at t h e h e a d of w h i c h she c a n perform a p a r t of s o m e i m p o r t a n c e , a n d t u r n
to w h i c h e v e r side offers her t h e greatest a d v a n t a g e s . T h e almost comical
uniformity with w h i c h all these attempts h a v e e n d e d by throwing t h e greedy,
vacillating a n d pusillanimous Prussian G o v e r n m e n t into t h e a r m s of Russia,
belongs to history. It is n o t be e x p e c t e d that P r u s s i a will n o w e s c a p e her
habitual fate. S h e will p u t out feelers in every direction, offer herself at public
auction, intrigue in b o t h c a m p s , swallow camels and strain at g n a t s , lose
w h a t e v e r c h a r a c t e r m a y p e r c h a n c e y e t be left to her, get b e a t e n , a n d at last
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The European War
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b e k n o c k e d d o w n t o t h e l o w e s t bidder, w h o , i n this a n d i n e v e r y o t h e r
instance, will be Russia. S h e will n o t be an ally, b u t an i n c u m b r a n c e to
Russia, for she will t a k e c a r e to h a v e h e r a r m y d e s t r o y e d b e f o r e h a n d , for
h e r o w n a c c o u n t a n d gratification.
Until at least o n e of the G e r m a n P o w e r s is involved in a E u r o p e a n w a r ,
t h e conflict c a n only rage in T u r k e y , on t h e B l a c k S e a and in t h e Baltic. T h e
naval struggle m u s t , during this period, be the m o s t important. T h a t t h e allied
f l e e t s c a n d e s t r o y Sevastopol a n d t h e R u s s i a n Black S e a fleet; t h a t t h e y c a n
t a k e and hold the Crimea, o c c u p y O d e s s a , close the S e a of Azoff, a n d let
loose t h e m o u n t a i n e e r s of t h e C a u c a s u s , t h e r e is no doubt. W i t h rapid and
energetic action nothing is m o r e e a s y . Supposing this to o c c u p y the first
m o n t h of active o p e r a t i o n s , a n o t h e r m o n t h might bring t h e steamers of the
combined fleets to the British C h a n n e l , leaving the sailing vessels to follow;
for t h e T u r k i s h fleet w o u l d t h e n be capable of doing all t h e w o r k w h i c h might
be required in t h e B l a c k Sea. To coal in t h e C h a n n e l and m a k e other preparations, might t a k e another fortnight; a n d t h e n , united to t h e Atlantic and
C h a n n e l fleets of F r a n c e and Britain, t h e y might a p p e a r before the e n d of
M a y in t h e r o a d s of C r o n s t a d t in s u c h a force as to assure t h e s u c c e s s of
an attack. T h e m e a s u r e s to be t a k e n in t h e Baltic are as self-evident as those
in t h e Black Sea. T h e y consist in an alliance, at any price, with S w e d e n ; an
act of intimidation against D e n m a r k , if n e c e s s a r y ; an insurrection in Finland,
w h i c h w o u l d b r e a k o u t u p o n landing a sufficient n u m b e r of t r o o p s a n d a
g u a r a n t e e that no p e a c e w o u l d be c o n c l u d e d e x c e p t u p o n t h e condition of
this province being reunited to S w e d e n . T h e t r o o p s landed in Finland w o u l d
m e n a c e P e t e r s b u r g , while t h e fleets should b o m b a r d Cronstadt. This place
is certainly v e r y strong by its position. T h e c h a n n e l of d e e p w a t e r leading
up to the r o a d s will hardly admit of t w o men-of-war a b r e a s t presenting their
b r o a d s i d e s t o the batteries, w h i c h are established n o t only o n the main island,
b u t on smaller r o c k s , b a n k s a n d islands a b o u t it. A certain sacrifice, n o t only
of m e n , b u t of ships, is unavoidable. B u t if this be t a k e n into a c c o u n t in the
v e r y plan of t h e attack, if it be o n c e resolved t h a t s u c h a n d s u c h a ship m u s t
be sacrificed, a n d if t h e plan be carried out vigorously a n d unflinchingly,
C r o n s t a d t m u s t fall. T h e m a s o n r y of its b a t t l e m e n t s c a n n o t for a n y length
of time withstand t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d fire of h e a v y Paixhans guns, t h a t m o s t
destructive of all a r m s w h e n e m p l o y e d against stone walls. L a r g e screws t e a m e r s , with a full c o m p l e m e n t of s u c h guns amidships, would v e r y soon
p r o d u c e an irresistible effect, t h o u g h of c o u r s e t h e y w o u l d in t h e a t t e m p t
risk their o w n existence. B u t w h a t are t h r e e or four screw-ships of t h e line
in c o m p a r i s o n with C r o n s t a d t , the k e y of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e , w h o s e p o s s e s sion w o u l d leave St. P e t e r s b u r g without defense.
W i t h o u t O d e s s a , C r o n s t a d t , Riga, S e v a s t o p o l , with Finland e m a n c i p a t e d ,
5
Friedrich Engels
a n d a hostile a r m y at the gates of the capital, w i t h all her rivers a n d h a r b o r s
closed u p , w h a t would R u s s i a b e ? A giant without a r m s , w i t h o u t e y e s , with
n o o t h e r r e s o u r c e t h a n trying t o c r u s h h e r o p p o n e n t s u n d e r t h e weight o f h e r
c l u m s y t o r s o , t h r o w n h e r e and t h e r e at r a n d o m w h e r e v e r a hostile battle-cry
w a s h e a r d . If the maritime p o w e r s of E u r o p e should act t h u s resolutely a n d
vigorously, t h e n P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a might so far be relieved from the control
of R u s s i a t h a t t h e y might e v e n join t h e allies. F o r b o t h t h e G e r m a n p o w e r s ,
if secure at h o m e , w o u l d be r e a d y to profit by t h e e m b a r r a s s m e n t s of Russia.
B u t i t i s n o t t o b e e x p e c t e d that L o r d A b e r d e e n a n d M . D r o u y n d e L ' H u y s
should a t t e m p t s u c h energetic steps. T h e p o w e r s t h a t be are n o t for striking
their b l o w s home, and if a general w a r b r e a k s out, t h e energy of t h e c o m m a n d e r s will be shackled so as to r e n d e r t h e m i n n o c u o u s . If n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
decisive victories occur, care will be t a k e n t h a t it is by m e r e c h a n c e , and t h a t
their c o n s e q u e n c e s are as harmless as possible for t h e e n e m y .
T h e w a r on the Asiatic shore of the Black S e a might at o n c e be p u t an e n d
t o b y t h e f l e e t s ; t h a t o n t h e E u r o p e a n side w o u l d g o o n comparatively
u n i n t e r r u p t e d . T h e Russians, b e a t e n o u t of t h e Black Sea, deprived of O d e s s a
a n d Sevastopol, could not c r o s s t h e D a n u b e without g r e a t risk, (except in
t h e direction of Servia, for insurrectionary p u r p o s e s , ) b u t t h e y might v e r y
well hold t h e Principalities, until superior forces a n d t h e risk of large bodies
of t r o o p s being landed on their flank and r e a r should drive t h e m o u t of
Wallachia. Moldavia they n e e d n o t e v a c u a t e without a general action, for
flank a n d rear d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w o u l d t h e r e be of little i m p o r t a n c e , as long
as C h o t i n a n d Kishenieff offered t h e m a safe c o m m u n i c a t i o n with Russia.
B u t as long as t h e w a r is confined to the W e s t e r n P o w e r s and T u r k e y on
t h e o n e h a n d , a n d R u s s i a on t h e other, it will not be a E u r o p e a n w a r s u c h
as we h a v e seen since 1792. H o w e v e r , let it o n c e c o m m e n c e , and the indolence of the W e s t e r n P o w e r s , and t h e activity of R u s s i a will s o o n c o m p e l
A u s t r i a and Prussia to decide for the A u t o c r a t . P r u s s i a will p r o b a b l y be of
no great a c c o u n t , as it is m o r e t h a n likely t h a t h e r a r m y , w h a t e v e r its capacities m a y b e , will b e w a s t e d b y p r e s u m p t i o n a t s o m e second J e n a . Austria,
notwithstanding h e r b a n k r u p t condition, notwithstanding t h e insurrections
t h a t m a y o c c u r in Italy and H u n g a r y , will be no contemptible o p p o n e n t . R u s sia herself obliged to k e e p up h e r a r m y in t h e Principalities, a n d on t h e Caucasian frontier, to o c c u p y Poland, to h a v e an a r m y for the defense of the
Baltic coast, a n d especially of St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d Finland, will h a v e v e r y few
t r o o p s to spare for offensive o p e r a t i o n s . If Austria, R u s s i a a n d Prussia, (alw a y s supposing t h e latter not y e t p u t to rout,) c a n m u s t e r five or six h u n d r e d
t h o u s a n d m e n o n t h e Rhine and the A l p s , i t will b e m o r e t h a n c a n b e r e a s o n ably e x p e c t e d . A n d for five h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d allies, t h e F r e n c h alone are a
m a t c h , supposing t h e m to be led by Generals n o t inferior to t h o s e of their
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The European War
o p p o n e n t s , a m o n g w h o m the A u s t r i a n s alone p o s s e s s c o m m a n d e r s w o r t h y o f
the n a m e . T h e R u s s i a n Generals are n o t formidable, a n d a s t o the P r u s s i a n s ,
t h e y h a v e no Generals at all; their officers are hereditary subalterns.
B u t we m u s t n o t forget t h a t t h e r e is a sixth p o w e r in E u r o p e , w h i c h at given
5 m o m e n t s asserts its s u p r e m a c y over t h e w h o l e of t h e five so-called " g r e a t "
p o w e r s and m a k e s t h e m t r e m b l e , e v e r y o n e of t h e m . T h a t p o w e r is the
Revolution. L o n g silent and retired, it is n o w again called to action by t h e
commercial crisis, and by t h e scarcity of food. F r o m M a n c h e s t e r to R o m e ,
from Paris to W a r s a w a n d P e s t h , it is omnipresent, lifting up its h e a d a n d
10 awaking from its slumbers. Manifold are t h e s y m p t o m s of its returning life,
e v e r y w h e r e visible in t h e agitation a n d disquietude w h i c h h a v e seized t h e
proletarian class. A signal only is w a n t e d , and this sixth and greatest E u r o p e a n p o w e r will c o m e forward, in shining armor, a n d sword in h a n d , like
M i n e r v a from the h e a d of t h e Olympian. This signal the impending E u r o p e a n
15
w a r will give, a n d t h e n all calculations as to t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r will be u p s e t
by t h e addition of a n e w element w h i c h , e v e r b u o y a n t and youthful, will as
m u c h baffle the plans of t h e old E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , a n d their Generals, as
it did from 1792 to 1800.
7
Karl Marx
The Western Powers and Turkey
Nr. 3988, 28. Januar 1854
From Our Own Correspondent.
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , J a n . 10, 1854.
T h e charge against Mr. S z e m e r e of having revealed the place w h e r e the
H u n g a r i a n c r o w n w a s concealed, w a s first b r o u g h t f o r w a r d b y t h e V i e n n a
Soldatenfreund, the a v o w e d organ of the Austrian police, and this single fact
should h a v e sufficed to p r o v e t h e falsehood of t h e accusation. T h e police
is n o t u s e d to gratuitously d e n o u n c e its o w n accomplices, while it is o n e of
its habitual tricks to t h r o w suspicion on t h e innocent, in o r d e r to c o v e r t h e
culpable. A m a n of t h e standing and the influence of M r . S z e m e r e w o u l d be
t h e v e r y last to be spontaneously sacrificed by t h e A u s t r i a n police, h a d t h e y
b e e n able to secure his cooperation. If the secret w a s n o t b e t r a y e d by t h e
indiscretion of o n e of t h e agents of Mr. Kossuth—a c a s e by no m e a n s improbable—I c a n n o t b u t suspect the C o u n t K . B a t t h y a n y , n o w resident a t
Paris, of having b e e n t h e traitor. He w a s o n e of t h e v e r y f e w p e r s o n s initiated
into the secret of the place w h e r e the regalia w e r e hidden, and he is the only
m a n a m o n g t h e m w h o has applied to the V i e n n a C o u r t for an amnesty. This
last fact I h a v e r e a s o n to s u p p o s e , he will n o t d e n y .
L o r d H a r d i n g e , t h e British Commander-in-Chief, h a s b e e n prevailed u p o n
to w i t h d r a w his resignation. As to t h e D u k e of Norfolk, we are informed by
t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Dublin Evening Mail, t h a t "a bit of p a l a c e gossip
h a s got w i n d . A certain noble D u k e , w h o holds an office at court, in commendam, with t h e highest hereditary feudal dignity in t h e S t a t e , m a d e a little
t o o free, it is said, with t h e c h a m p a g n e at t h e royal table, t h e result of w h i c h
w a s the loss of his m o s t noble equilibrium in t h e dining-room, and the inv o l v e m e n t of Majesty itself in t h e c a t a s t r o p h e . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e of this
annoying contretemps h a s b e e n the resignation of the noble D u k e and the
a p p o i n t m e n t of E a r l S p e n c e r as L o r d H i g h S t e w a r d of h e r M a j e s t y ' s
Household."
M r . Sadleir, t h e b r o k e r of the Irish brigade, h a s again t e n d e r e d his resigna-
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tion of his ministerial post, w h i c h h a s this t i m e b e e n a c c e p t e d by L o r d
A b e r d e e n . This position h a s b e c o m e u n t e n a b l e after the public disclosures
m a d e before an Irish c o u r t of law as to t h e scandalous m e a n s by w h i c h he
h a d contrived to get into Parliament. T h e control of t h e Cabinet of all t h e
T a l e n t s over t h e Irish brigade will n o t be strengthened by this u n t o w a r d
event. T h e bread-riots w h i c h o c c u r r e d o n F r i d a y and S a t u r d a y a t C r e d i t t o n ,
D e v o n s h i r e , w e r e a sort of popular a n s w e r to t h e glowing descriptions of
prosperity w h i c h t h e ministerial and free t r a d e p a p e r s thought fit to a m u s e
their r e a d e r s with at t h e obsequies of t h e y e a r 1853.
T h e Patrie states from T r e b i z o n d t h a t t h e R u s s i a n " C h a r g é d'Affaires at
T e h e r a n , having d e m a n d e d t h e dismissal of t w o of t h e most popular Ministers of the S h a h of Persia, the p e o p l e b e c a m e excited, and the C o m m a n d e r
of t h e G u a r d said he would n o t a n s w e r for public tranquillity if this d e m a n d
w e r e complied with. A c c o r d i n g to this a c c o u n t , it w a s the dread of an e x plosion from t h e dislike of t h e people for R u s s i a t h a t i n d u c e d t h e S h a h to
r e n e w his relations with the Chargé d'Affaires of E n g l a n d . "
To the huge m a s s of diplomatic p a p e r s , c o m m u n i c a t e d to the public, are
n o w a d d e d a Note of the Four Powers d a t e d t h e 12th of D e c e m b e r a n d jointly
a d d r e s s e d b y their respective E m b a s s a d o r s a t Constantinople t o t h e P o r t e ,
a n d a n e w circular of Mr. D r o u y n de T H u y s to t h e F r e n c h diplomatic agents,
dated Paris, D e c . 30. O n perusing t h e n o t e o f the F o u r P o w e r s , w e u n d e r s t a n d
t h e e x t r e m e agitation which prevailed at Constantinople after t h e a c c e p t a n c e
o f the N o t e b y t h e P o r t e b e c a m e k n o w n , t h e insurrectionary m o v e m e n t
occurring on the 21st., and t h e necessity t h e T u r k i s h Ministry w a s placed
in, solemnly to proclaim that t h e o p e r a t i o n s of the w a r w o u l d not be interr u p t e d nor interfered with by t h e r e n e w e d p e a c e negotiations. Just nine d a y s
after the intelligence of the t r e a c h e r o u s and c o w a r d l y b u t c h e r y at Sinope
h a d r e a c h e d Constantinople and a r o u s e d t h r o u g h o u t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
o n e t r e m e n d o u s cry for r e v e n g e , the F o u r P o w e r s coolly invite, and t h e
E m b a s s a d o r s of G r e a t Britain a n d F r a n c e force t h e P o r t e to enter into
negotiations with t h e C z a r , t h e b a s e of w h i c h is t h a t all t h e ancient treaties
shall be renewed; t h a t t h e firmans relative to t h e spiritual privileges o c t r o y e d
by the Sultan to his Christian subjects, shall be a c c o m p a n i e d by n e w assura n c e s given to e a c h of t h e s e p o w e r s , c o n s e q u e n t l y to t h e C z a r ; t h a t t h e P o r t e
shall n a m e a plenipotentiary to establish an armistice: t h a t it shall allow
R u s s i a to e r e c t a c h u r c h and a hospital at J e r u s a l e m a n d pledge itself to the
P o w e r s , consequently to the Czar, to ameliorate its internal administrative
system. T h e P o r t e shall n o t only n o t receive any indemnity at all for t h e h e a v y
losses it has u n d e r g o n e c o n s e q u e n t on t h e piratical acts of the M u s c o v i t e ;
all t h e chains in w h i c h R u s s i a h a s m a d e T u r k e y d a n c e for a quarter of a
c e n t u r y , shall n o t only be forged a n e w , b u t the prisoner shall be k e p t closer
9
Karl Marx
t h a n b e f o r e ; t h e P o r t e shall lay itself at t h e m e r c y of t h e A u t o c r a t by giving
him humble a s s u r a n c e s with regard to t h e firmans relative to the spiritual
privileges of its Christian subjects, and pledging itself to h i m with regard to
its internal administrative s y s t e m ; t h u s surrendering at o n c e the religious
p r o t e c t o r a t e a n d t h e dictation over its civil g o v e r n m e n t to t h e Czar. In
c o m p e n s a t i o n for such a surrender the P o r t e receives t h e p r o m i s e of " t h e
m o s t speedy evacuation possible of t h e Principalities," t h e invasion of w h i c h
L o r d Clanricarde declared to be " a n act of p i r a c y , " a n d t h e a s s u r a n c e that
t h e p r e a m b l e of the treaty of July 13,1841 — w h i c h h a s p r o v e d so t r u s t w o r t h y
a safeguard against Russia — shall be formally confirmed.
Although the unfathomable abjectness of t h e s e pitiful " P o w e r s " r e a c h e d
its highest possible pitch in frightening, s o m e d a y s after t h e e v e n t of Sinope,
the Porte into a negotiation on s u c h b a s e s , t h e y will n o t get rid of their
e m b a r r a s s m e n t in this sneaking way. T h e Czar h a s g o n e t o o far to suffer e v e n
t h e a p p e a r a n c e of his p r e t e n d e d exclusive p r o t e c t o r a t e over t h e Christian
subjects of T u r k e y to be supplanted by a E u r o p e a n o n e , a n d already we are
informed by the V i e n n a c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times t h a t " A u s t r i a h a s
d e m a n d e d w h e t h e r t h e Russian Court w o u l d object to a E u r o p e a n protectorate o v e r t h e Christians in T u r k e y . T h e reply, in m o s t positive language, w a s
t h a t R u s s i a would permit no other P o w e r to meddle in t h e question of t h e
G r e e k C h u r c h . R u s s i a had treaties with t h e P o r t e a n d .would settle t h e
question w i t h h e r a l o n e . " We are also informed by The Standard t h a t
" N i c h o l a s will n o t a c c e p t any proposition n o t p r o c e e d i n g directly from the
T u r k i s h sovereign individually, t h u s rejecting any right of mediation or
interference on the p a r t of the E u r o p e a n Powers—an insult to t h o s e P o w e r s
w h i c h n o n e c a n regard as u n m e r i t e d . "
T h e only important passage of the circular of M o n s i e u r D r o u y n de l ' H u y s
is t h a t announcing the e n t r a n c e of t h e united s q u a d r o n s into t h e Black Sea,
with a view to " c o m b i n e their m o v e m e n t s in s u c h a m a n n e r as to p r e v e n t
t h e territory or t h e flag of T u r k e y from being t h e object of any fresh attack
on t h é p a r t of t h e naval forces of R u s s i a . " Non bis in idem. Lamoutarde après
la viande. The Morning Chronicle of y e s t e r d a y p u b l i s h e d a telegraphic disp a t c h from its c o r r e s p o n d e n t at Constantinople, d a t e d t h e 30th, stating t h a t
t h e c o m b i n e d fleets h a d entered t h e Black Sea. " T h e fleets m a y enter t h e
B l a c k S e a , " says The Daily News, " o n l y to do w h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n doing
in t h e Bosphorus—nothing." According to The Press, " O r d e r s h a v e already
b e e n sent o u t for o n e ship from the English a n d o n e from t h e F r e n c h fleet
to enter t h e Black Sea, a n d u n d e r flag of truce to enter Sevastopol. W h e n
t h e r e t h e y are to inform the Russian Admiral t h a t if he leaves the p o r t of
S e v a s t o p o l he will be immediately fired i n t o . " Although t h e R u s s i a n fleet,
at this n o t v e r y propitious season, and after their glorious exploit at Sinope,
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h a v e nothing w h a t e v e r to call t h e m out into t h e Black Sea, t h e Czar will n o t
allow England and F r a n c e to exclude him, e v e n temporarily, from w a t e r s
from which he h a s s u c c e e d e d in excluding t h e m e v e r since 1833. His prestige
w o u l d be gone w e r e he n o t to a n s w e r this c o m m u n i c a t i o n by a declaration
of war. "A declaration of w a r of R u s s i a against F r a n c e and E n g l a n d , " says
t h e Neue Preussische Zeitung, " i s m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n a speedy p e a c e b e t w e e n Russia and T u r k e y . "
At N e w r y (Ulster), a great meeting w a s held for the p u r p o s e of taking into
consideration the u n p r o v o k e d aggression of R u s s i a against T u r k e y . I am glad
to be enabled, t h r o u g h t h e friendly c o m m u n i c a t i o n from Mr. U r q u h a r t of t h e
N e w r y report, to give y o u r r e a d e r s t h e m o s t r e m a r k a b l e passages of t h a t
gentleman's speech. H a v i n g explained, o n several o c c a s i o n s , m y o w n views
of t h e Oriental question, I n e e d n o t point out t h o s e topics on w h i c h I m u s t
disagree from Mr. U r q u h a r t . L e t me only r e m a r k t h a t his views are confirmed
by t h e intelligence t h a t " t h e p e a s a n t s of L e s s e r Wallachia, assisted by t h e
Wallachian soldiery, h a v e r i s e n against t h e R u s s i a n s . T h e whole c o u n t r y i n
t h e environs of Kalefat and along t h e left shore of t h e D a n u b e , is in motion.
T h e R u s s i a n functionaries h a v e e v a c u a t e d T u r m a l . "
After some introductory r e m a r k s M r . U r q u h a r t said:
. . . " I n those m a t t e r s w h i c h affect our g r a v e s t interests and intercourse
with foreign States, t h e r e is neither restraint of law, nor guidance of system,
t h e r e is no responsibility to the nation, no penalties for the omission of a n y
duty, or for t h e p e r p e t r a t i o n of any c r i m e ; y o u are entirely destitute of all
Constitutional m e a n s of restraint, b e c a u s e y o u are either k e p t in ignorance
or y o u are misinformed. This s y s t e m is, t h e r e f o r e , o n e calculated to p e r v e r t
the nation, to corrupt t h e G o v e r n m e n t and to e n d a n g e r the State. M e a n w h i l e ,
y o u are o p p o s e d to a G o v e r n m e n t , t h e m o s t crafty a n d systematic, t h e most
hostile and u n s c r u p u l o u s , and w h i c h h a s w o r k e d its w a y t o t h a t p r e e m i n e n c e
of p o w e r by which it t h r e a t e n s t h e world, t h r o u g h the u s e which it h a s b e e n
enabled to m a k e of the v e r y G o v e r n m e n t s w h i c h it labors to overthrow—and
t h e r e is this peculiarity in our condition, as t h e r e w a s formerly in t h a t of
Athens—that R u s s i a has found or formed t h e chief instruments of her greatn e s s in t h e b r e a s t of t h a t S t a t e , w h o s e public councils m o s t o p p o s e d h e r
policy. T h e r e is for this a substantive r e a s o n t h a t England in such m a t t e r s
is t h e black spot of ignorance. T h e U n i t e d States has a President, and he
exercises the due prerogatives of r o y a l t y ; t h e r e is a S e n a t e w h i c h controls
the executive, and has prior k n o w l e d g e of its a c t s ; ( h e a r , h e a r and c h e e r s . )
In F r a n c e , t h e r e h a v e b e e n r e p e a t e d l y C o m m i t t e e s of Parliament, to investigate t h e national transactions, calling for d o c u m e n t s , and bringing
b e f o r e t h e m the Foreign Minister for examination. T h e r e , t o o , the nation is
alert, according, at least, to its k n o w l e d g e , a n d so is t h e G o v e r n m e n t ; for
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on s u c h m a t t e r s hinge the existence of ministries and of dynasties. In Austria,
t h e r e is at least a m o n a r c h , a n d he h a s k n o w l e d g e of t h e acts of his s e r v a n t s .
In T u r k e y and in Russia, y o u see t h a t in o n e c o u n t r y t h e feeling of the p e o p l e
c o n s t r a i n s t h e G o v e r n m e n t , a n d i n t h e other t h e G o v e r n m e n t r e p r e s e n t s t h e
will of the nation. England alone r e m a i n s w i t h a c r o w n , w i t h o u t authority,
w i t h a G o v e r n m e n t without s y s t e m , with a Parliament w i t h o u t control, a n d
a nation without k n o w l e d g e . ( H e a r , H e a r . ) Reverting n o w to the application
of this state of things, to the facts before u s , I h a v e first to tell you—and it
is the salient matter—that R u s s i a has no force to effect her t h r e a t s , and t h a t
she h a s calculated merely u p o n t h e facility of terrifying y o u by groundless
f e a r s , t h a t she h a s h a d n o p u r p o s e w h a t e v e r o f m a k i n g w a r o n T u r k e y , t h a t
she h a s no m e a n s for doing so, t h a t she h a s n o t e v e n m a d e disposition for
s u c h an object, t h a t she has calculated u p o n y o u restraining T u r k e y , so t h a t
she might o c c u p y her p r o v i n c e s , and calculates further u p o n y o u for forcing
from t h a t State such compliance w i t h insolent d e m a n d s as shall b r e a k up the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e . (Hear, hear.) It is by y o u r E m b a s s a d o r in Constantinople
a n d by y o u r s q u a d r o n in the B o s p h o r u s t h a t she is a b o u t to achieve her e n d s .
A n d h e r e I must a d v e r t to a statement m a d e by my gallant friend Colonel
C h e s n e y , and a t t h e same time supply a n omission w h i c h h e has m a d e . H e
stated, t h a t as matters stood before t h e P r u t h w a s c r o s s e d , T u r k e y w a s m o r e
t h a n a m a t c h for Russia, b u t he did not give y o u the high estimate he entertains and h a s e x p r e s s e d of t h e military qualities of t h e T u r k s . He stated,
e v e n a t the p r e s e n t m o m e n t , and w i t h all the i m m e n s e a d v a n t a g e s w h i c h y o u
h a v e enabled R u s s i a t o acquire, h e w a s still i n d o u b t w h e t h e r T u r k e y w a s
n o t a m a t c h for Russia. On this point I h a v e n o t the s h a d o w of a doubt, if
y o u grant m e t w o conditions—the first, t h a t y o u r E m b a s s a d o r a n d y o u r
s q u a d r o n are w i t h d r a w n , the second, t h a t T u r k e y r e c o v e r s its emasculating
reliance on foreigners. B u t after t h a t c a m e a n o t h e r statement, doubtingly
indeed m a d e , b u t w h i c h from his high authority, and t h e r e is no higher
authority in t h e s e matters—may carry an u n d u e weight or b e a r an u n justifiable interpretation. He said t h a t the m o m e n t might be at p r e s e n t favorable for Russia, b e c a u s e the D a n u b e w a s frozen, a n d she might p u s h her
f o r c e s across into Bulgaria. B u t w h a t forces h a s she got to p u s h into Bulgaria? E u r o p e h a s for m a n y m o n t h s given h e e d t o exaggerated s t a t e m e n t s ; w e
h a v e b e e n industriously informed of the v a s t a c c u m u l a t i o n s of her forces
p r e p a r e d to c o m e in action. T h e y w e r e currently r a t e d for 150,000 m e n , a n d
t h e people w e r e r e a d y to believe that 150,000 m e n sufficed for the c o n q u e s t
of T u r k e y . I r e c e i v e d some time ago an official s t a t e m e n t w h i c h r e d u c e d to
80,000 m e n , the w h o l e n u m b e r that h a d crossed the P r u t h , of w h i c h b e t w e e n
20,000 or 30,000 h a d already perished by disease or w e r e in hospital. T h e
s t a t e m e n t w a s sent b y m e t o o n e o f the n e w s p a p e r s , b u t w a s n o t inserted,
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being considered incredible. R u s s i a has n o w published her o w n statement,
reducing the entire n u m b e r to 70,000 m e n . (Cheers.) Putting aside t h e n t h e
relative strength of b o t h E m p i r e s , if all their forces w e r e brought up it m u s t
be clear t h a t R u s s i a h a d no intention of making w a r with s u c h an a m o u n t
of force as this. N o w w h a t w a s t h e force w h i c h T u r k e y h a d to o p p o s e ? No
less t h a n , at t h e time referred t o , 180,000 m e n b e t w e e n the Balkan and t h e
D a n u b e , n o w increased to 200,000 m e n in strong, fortified positions, with
a Russian force r e d u c e d to 50,000 m e n at t h e outside, a n d t h e s e demoralized
b y defeat a n d infected b y desertion. A s t o t h e qualities o f t h e T u r k i s h t r o o p s
and their superiority to the R u s s i a n s , y o u h a v e heard the t e s t i m o n y of
General Bern; y o u h a v e t h e living t e s t i m o n y of Colonel Chesney—confirmed
b y t h e e v e n t s w h i c h h a v e filled E u r o p e w i t h a s t o n i s h m e n t a n d admiration.
O b s e r v e we are n o t n o w u p o n t h e point of t h e relative p o w e r of t h e t w o
E m p i r e s b u t of t h a t of the intention a n d m o d e of proceeding of t h e one—
Russia. My argument is t h a t she did n o t p r o p o s e making w a r ; b e c a u s e , on
the o n e hand, she h a d n o t u p o n the spot t h e requisite force, a n d , o n t h e o t h e r ,
t h a t she could r e c k o n on t h e Cabinet of England. R u s s i a h a d no intention
of making war—she has no intention n o w . This is w h a t I h a v e stated b e f o r e
t h e war—that she w o u l d enter and o c c u p y t h e Principalities by t h e aid of
England. H o w h a v e I b e e n able to prognosticate? N o t , certainly, by t h e
knowledge of R u s s i a ' s designs, w h i c h t h o u s a n d s k n o w as well or b e t t e r t h a n
m e , b u t by the knowledge of E n g l a n d ' s c h a r a c t e r . B u t let us reconsider t h e
case—it is t o o important to p a s s it over. Colonel C h e s n e y said t h a t the real
question w a s t h e r e s e r v e w h i c h R u s s i a h a d b e h i n d the P r a t h . O f t h a t r e s e r v e
he h a d h e a r d lately a great deal. O s t e n S a c k e n , with his 50,000 m e n , w a s on
full m a r c h on the D a n u b e to retrieve the disaster of Oltenitza. N o w , t h e
50,000 m e n dwindled to 18,000, a n d t h e b e s t of all is, that e v e n t h e y h a v e
not arrived. ( L a u g h t e r and cheering.) Taking t h e n Colonel C h e s n e y ' s
n u m b e r , 75,000, r e d u c e d by d e a t h s a n d sickness to 50,000, a n d throwing into
t h e s e the 18,000 of ubiquitous r e s e r v e , we shall only h a v e , after all,
70,000 m e n to o p e r a t e against 200,000 strongly e n t r e n c h e d a n d in a m o u n tainous region, and at a s e a s o n of t h e y e a r w h e n , h i t h e r t o , t h e Russians h a v e
invariably retired from t h e field. N o w let me recall t h e e v e n t s of the late w a r
in 1828 and '29. T u r k e y w a s t h e n in convulsions. T h e n M u s s u l m a n ' s sword
w a s t u r n e d against M u s s u l m a n ' s ; t h e p r o v i n c e s w e r e in revolt, G r e e c e in
insurrection, the old military force annihilated, t h e n e w conscripts scarcely
disciplined, a n d amounting only to 33,000 m e n . T h e c o m m a n d of t h e B l a c k
Sea w r e n c h e d from T u r k e y by British b r o a d s i d e s , delivered in full force in
t h e harbor of N a v a r i n o ; and t h e n it w a s t h a t Russia, b a c k e d by England and
F r a n c e , m a d e a spring u p o n T u r k e y and r e a c h e d t h e center of her p r o v i n c e s
b e f o r e she k n e w t h a t w a r w a s declared. A n d h o w m a n y m e n d o y o u think
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she t h e n judged i t p r u d e n t t o e m p l o y ? T w o h u n d r e d and sixteen t h o u s e n d .
( C h e e r s . ) A n d y e t it w a s only by deception a n d t h r o u g h t h e influence of t h e
English E m b a s s a d o r , w h o unfortunately h a d r e t u r n e d , t h a t she w a s seduced
to sign t h a t t r e a t y of Adrianople t h a t w a s surprised from her. ( H e a r , h e a r . )
L o o k at T u r k e y n o w , united in h e a r t and feeling, with a heroism inspired at
o n c e by t h e love of country and detestation of outrages—with united authority, ample r e s o u r c e s , able to dispose of 300,000 v o l u n t e e r s , of the m o s t
martial c h a r a c t e r to be found on t h e face of t h e earth—of 250,000 disciplined
troops—victorious in Asia—with the c o m m a n d of t h e B l a c k Sea—not lost, be
it o b s e r v e d , as I shall presently show, at Sinope—with steam to c o n v e y ,
w i t h o u t loss of m e n or time, her contingents to t h e scene of action from the
r e m o t e s t p r o v i n c e s of the E m p i r e , from t h e s n o w y hights of the C a u c a s u s
to the arid deserts of Arabia, from the w a s t e s of Africa to the Persian
Gulf—one spirit of indignation prevails—of m a n h o o d has b e e n a r o u s e d . ( H e a r
and c h e e r s . ) Y e s , b u t as in the former w a r , a N a v a r i n o b r o u g h t t h e C o s s a c k s
a c r o s s t h e Balkan; so n o w m a y t h e screw propellers of Britain, e v e n without
w a r , bring Russian hulks to the Dardanelles. B u t I am speaking of R u s s i a n
intentions, t h a t is t h e point. It is in Downing-st. t h a t this victory is to be
achieved, and n o t i n the E a s t . M e a n w h i l e , are y o u u n s c a t h e d ? I s t h e r e a m a n
b e f o r e me w h o d o e s n o t suffer in s u b s t a n c e ? Is t h e r e o n e the price of w h o s e
b r e a d is not e n h a n c e d , w h o s e e m p l o y m e n t , or the e m p l o y m e n t of his capital
is not curtailed? ( H e a r , hear. ) W h o s e t a x e s are n o t i n c r e a s e d ? Is not Changealley c o n v u l s e d ? H a v e we n o t seen by this m o v e m e n t of Russian t r o o p s a
d i s t u r b a n c e of t h e m o n e y m a r k e t p r o d u c e d equal to two-thirds of t h a t
e x p e r i e n c e d in 1847—and yet R u s s i a has n e v e r intended w a r . H a v e we n o t
seen t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of E u r o p e degraded a n d t h e g r o u n d w o r k laid of
insurrections and convulsions—and yet R u s s i a n e v e r intended w a r . H a v e w e
n o t seen the O t t o m a n E m p i r e exhausting itself by an e n o r m o u s military
establishment of half a million of m e n , b e c a u s e R u s s i a has displaced 70,000
t r o o p s to feed at her e x p e n s e a n d at the e x p e n s e of t h e operatives of Great
Britain? And—all this b e c a u s e you h a v e believed p e o p l e e a s y of belief t h a t
R u s s i a w a s so strong t h a t she could not be resisted—Turkey so w e a k t h a t
she could n o t be supported. Really we live in an age of d r e a m s and of fables;
w e are m e n not t o believe this only, w e are m e n t o believe t h a t R u s s i a i s more
powerful t h a n all t h e p o w e r s of the world b a n d e d against her. The Times
m a k e s light of t h e a r m y of M o s l e m s , m a k e s equally light of t h e armies of
F r a n c e a n d the navies of England, and gravely tells us t h a t all E u r o p e and
T u r k e y to b o o t m a y as soon attempt to k e e p t h e R u s s i a n s o u t of Constantinople, as to k e e p the n o r t h winds from blowing a c r o s s the Sarmatian
Plains. A n d t h e argument as regards E u r o p e is j u s t as g o o d as respecting
T u r k e y ; yet T u r k e y will fall, if y o u p e r s e v e r e . R u s s i a has displaced
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70,000 m e n , and in c o n s e q u e n c e T u r k e y is m o v e d with terror and indignation—England convulsed with fear and panic—Russia, t o o , c o n v u l s e d
with shouts of laughter. ( L a u g h t e r a n d prolonged cheering.) I h a v e said I
w o u l d r e v e r t to the affair of Sinope, or as it h a s b e e n justly t e r m e d , t h e little
N a v a r i n o . I d o n ' t refer to t h a t ungraceful e v e n t in reference to our conduct—
for we h a v e d o n e in this nothing m o r e disgraceful t h a n in the rest—but I refer
to it as bearing u p o n t h e relative strength of t h e t w o parties. So considered,
it has a d d e d nothing to R u s s i a ' s p o w e r , and t a k e n nothing from that of
T u r k e y , b u t the r e v e r s e . It has placed in the m o s t unmistakable light the
justifiable fears of the R u s s i a n s of T u r k i s h p r o w e s s . H e r e we h a v e seen a
fact without parallel e v e n in our o w n naval annals—frigates laying t h e m s e l v e s
alongside line-of-battle ships, and c o m m a n d e r s casting the t o r c h into t h e
p o w d e r magazine, and offering t h e m s e l v e s up for h o l o c a u s t on their c o u n t r y ' s shrine. W h a t m a y n o t be achieved against a G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h in e v e r y
act, a n d especially in this, is t h e object of a b h o r r e n c e and disgust to e v e r y
h u m a n being. O b s e r v e t h a t t h e maritime force of T u r k e y is u n t o u c h e d ; n o t
a line-of-battle ship, n o t a steamer has b e e n sacrificed. N o w she is doubly
insured in the c o m m a n d of t h e Black S e a if the diplomatists are w i t h d r a w n ;
and it is t h e y , a n d t h e y alone, w h o h a v e p r o d u c e d t h e so-called disaster of
Sinope. B u t that disaster w a s p r e p a r e d for another e n d ; it w a s as a rod a n d
a goad to urge the lagging b e a s t s of b u r d e n in Paris a n d in L o n d o n , and to
drive t h e m into enforcing t h e t e r m s of settlement u p o n t h e belligerents.
Before I e n t e r e d this meeting, I h e a r d it stated by a gentleman of t h e C o m mittee, that it w a s perfectly c o m p e t e n t for E n g l a n d and F r a n c e to interpose
b e t w e e n t h e m if t h e y e x p e c t e d by so doing to secure p e a c e . I k n o w t h a t w h a t
he h a s stated is t h e general impression t h r o u g h o u t this land, b u t I did not
t h e less on that a c c o u n t listen to h i m with horror. W h o g a v e y o u t h e right
to go a b o u t the world enforcing p e a c e by a r m s ? It is o n e thing to resist
aggression, it is another thing to c o m m i t it. ( H e a r , h e a r ! ) Y o u c a n n o t interp o s e even to save T u r k e y , save by declaring w a r against Russia. Y o u r interposition, h o w e v e r , will be for R u s s i a ' s behoof, a n d at h e r dictation, a n d with
the effect of imposing conditions on T u r k e y w h i c h m u s t bring h e r fall . . .
In y o u r negotiations y o u will p r o p o s e to T u r k e y to relieve her from h e r p a s t
treaties with R u s s i a in consideration of a E u r o p e a n settlement. T h i s h a s ,
indeed, b e e n already p u t forward, a n d h a s b e e n received with acclamation
by a nation w h i c h h a s acclaims r e a d y for e v e r y perversion. G o o d H e a v e n s !
a E u r o p e a n settlement! T h a t is w h a t T u r k e y has to rely upon. Surely your
treaty of V i e n n a w a s a E u r o p e a n settlement, and w h a t w a s the result? T h a t
settlement w a s important by its establishment of Poland; a n d what befell
P o l a n d ? W h e n Poland h a d fallen, w h a t did your Minister tell y o u respecting
t h a t t r e a t y ? W h y , it w a s this: " T h a t it h a d given to England the right to
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e x p r e s s an opinion regarding the e v e n t s of P o l a n d . " After going on to state
t h a t h e h a d r e m o n s t r a t e d o n t h e subject b e f o r e t h e event, h e s a y s : " B u t
R u s s i a t o o k another view of the c a s e . " A n d so it will be with your p r e s e n t
settlement; she will t a k e another view of t h e c a s e . ( L o u d c h e e r s . ) T h e s e
w o r d s w e r e stated in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s ; t h e y w e r e uttered by the very
Minister (Lord Palmerston) w h o h a s n o w in his h a n d s t h e fate of T u r k e y ,
as he h a d of Poland. B u t n o w you are w a r n e d ; t h e n y o u w e r e u n c o n s c i o u s .
. . . L e t me refer to a piece of intelligence recently published in The Times
n e w s p a p e r . It is t h e r e stated that o u r Minister in Persia had had a difference
with t h e G o v e r n m e n t of t h e S h a h , w h o w a s on t h e point of yielding, w h e n
the Minister of Russia interposed to e x a s p e r a t e the quarrel. T h u s t h e r e y o u
h a v e at the o n e and at the s a m e m o m e n t R u s s i a driving England out of Persia,
a n d England imposing Russia on T u r k e y . This s a m e letter mentions that an
e m b a s s y h a d r e a c h e d T e h e r a n ; that t h e Affghans w e r e in t h e greatest state
of ferment, and that D o s t M a h o m e d , the implacable e n e m y of Russia, had
m u c h at h e a r t the success of his e m b a s s y w h i c h w a s to m o v e P e r s i a to
s u p p o r t T u r k e y . N o w , y o u will recollect t h a t sixteen y e a r s ago, England
m a d e w a r against t h e Affghans, with t h e p u r p o s e of dethroning D o s t Mah o m e d , b e c a u s e he w a s the e n e m y of England and t h e firm ally of Russia.
N o w , p e r h a p s your G o v e r n m e n t believed this. If it did, it is v e r y strange t h a t
i t w a s not u p o n R u s s i a t h e y m a d e war, b u t u p o n t h e Affghans, w h i c h w a s
exactly the c o u r s e to throw t h e m into t h e a r m s of Russia. B u t y o u r G o v e r n m e n t entertained no such belief; it t h e n perfectly k n e w t h a t D o s t M a h o m e d ,
as n o w a p p e a r s , was t h e implacable foe of Russia, a n d it was on t h a t v e r y
a c c o u n t that it had attacked him. T h e fact has b e e n established, and in the
H o u s e of C o m m o n s it has b e e n t h e r e p r o v e d , t h a t d o c u m e n t s h a d b e e n
absolutely forged representing D o s t M a h o m e d falsely as the ally of Russia.
T h e E n v o y of England himself sent h o m e t h e original for publication.
( S h a m e . ) This is b u t the legitimate result of the secrecy in the G o v e r n m e n t
a n d t h a t ignorance in the nation to which I already referred. T h e r e is n o t a
m a n i n this a s s e m b l y u p o n w h o m m y e y e s c a n r e s t , w h o i s not b y sufferance
a participator in this crime, a n d w h o by this indifference to his c o u n t r y ' s acts
and h o n o r is n o t degraded to the position of a slave, while u n d e r the delusion
t h a t he is a freeman. ( H e a r , h e a r . ) May I tell y o u something of w h a t is
thought of y o u by strangers? Y o u h a v e h e a r d recently m u c h of G e r m a n
influences at Court. P e r h a p s y o u would like to h e a r something of t h e opinions
of G e r m a n cousins of the Q u e e n ; and let me tell y o u , if G e r m a n y is Russian,
it is E n g l a n d t h a t has made her so. Listen n o w to. t h e s e w o r d s :
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"If T u r k e y is not interfered with by England and F r a n c e she will conquer.
If, on the contrary, the W e s t e r n P o w e r s , in their infatuated subservience 40
c a n n o t refrain from 'mediating,' or from meddling w i t h t h e affairs of the E a s t ,
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T u r k e y is d o o m e d , and universal dominion of the M u s c o v y C o s s a c k s will
soon sway the destinies of this world! Y e t h o w noble has hitherto b e e n t h e
position and attiude of poor T u r k e y , in spite of all diplomatic e m b e z z l e m e n t ,
and though she mistook a b a n d of assassins for her friends. M a t t e r s look,
indeed, gloomy! and I h a v e hourly b e e n expecting a b o m b a r d m e n t by t h e
allied fleets of her capital in o r d e r to b e n d her moral heroism to disgraceful
submission. T h e T u r k s m a y truly s a y : 'Longa est injuria, longae ambages,
sed summa sequar fastigia rerum/'What a c o n t r a s t in their p r e s e n t b e h a v i o r
as c o m p a r e d with that of England on similar occasions ! they ' m a k e war'—
England carries on piracy. Recollect only t h e 'Declaration of L i m a ' and t h e
invasion of Affghanistan, the b o m b a r d m e n t of C o p e n h a g e n and t h e battle
of N a v a r i n o and then think of T u r k e y as it stands there at present—abased
and threatened, e v e n invaded and p r o v o k e d by the 'civilized world;' she
remains amid all her trials, calm and judicious, firm and resolute, b u t serene.
Y o u m a y judge by this t h a t there are t h o s e in the loftiest station w h o m a y
sigh in vain for the privilege w h i c h y o u r indulgence affords to me of finding
a v e n t for my indignation, a n d the opportunity of warning of coming e v e n t s .
Suffer me then to tell y o u t h e position in w h i c h y o u stand. Britain p r e s e n t s
t w o features, she is an idiot at h o m e , she is a m a n i a c abroad, an armed
m a n i a c , endangering h e r o w n life and the lives of o t h e r s . Y o u are n o t so
individually though y o u are so collectively. A w a k e n t h e n your individual
intelligence and restrain the c o r p o r a t e m a n i a c until y o u have time to treat
the disordered brain—this system from w h i c h all the evil p r o c e e d s . " ( L o u d
and long continued c h e e r i n g ) .
I m a y add to Mr. U r q u h a r t ' s s p e e c h t h a t L o r d P a l m e r s t o n ' s last coup
d'éclat and the favor of the people b e s t o w e d u p o n him, h a v e m a d e him Prime
Minister in reality, if n o t in n a m e .
Karl M a r x .
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The War in the East
The Zuid Africaan.
Kapstadt, 6. März 1854
L o n d o n , J a n u a r y 14, 1854.
At last, this long pending " E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n " a p p e a r s to h a v e r e a c h e d a step
w h e r e diplomacy will not m u c h longer be enabled to m o n o p o l i z e this ground
for its e v e r shifting a n d e v e r resultless m o v e m e n t s . On t h e 3rd inst. the
F r e n c h a n d British fleets h a v e entered the Black Sea, in o r d e r to p r e v e n t
t h e R u s s i a n n a v y from doing h a r m either to the T u r k i s h fleet or t h e T u r k i s h
coast. O n c e b e f o r e the C z a r Nicholas h a s declared t h a t s u c h a step w o u l d
b e , for him, the signal for a declaration of w a r . Will he n o w stand it quietly?
T h e r e is a r e p o r t to-day that the combined F r e n c h a n d English fleets, together
w i t h t h e first division of the T u r k i s h n a v y , are transporting 17,000 T u r k s to
B a t o u m . If this be correct, it is as m u c h an act of w a r as if t h e y m a d e a direct
a t t a c k u p o n S e b a s t o p o l , and the Czar c a n n o t b u t declare w a r a t o n c e .
B u t w o u l d Russia stand alone? W h i c h p a r t w o u l d A u s t r i a and Prussia t a k e
in a general w a r ?
It is reported that Louis B o n a p a r t e has notified to t h e A u s t r i a n g o v e r n m e n t
t h a t , if in c a s e of a conflict with Russia, A u s t r i a sided w i t h this p o w e r , t h e
F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d avail itself of the e l e m e n t s of insurrection, w h i c h ,
in Italy and Poland, only required a spark to be kindled again into a raging
fire, a n d that t h e n the restoration of Italian and Polish nationality w o u l d be
a t t e m p t e d by F r a n c e . T h e Austrian g o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , we m a y confidently a s s u m e , will be m o r e influenced by its o w n financial e m b a r r a s s m e n t s t h a n by the threats of B o n a p a r t e .
T h e state of the Austrian E x c h e q u e r m a y be inferred from t h e late augm e n t a t i o n of its depreciated n o t e s a n d from t h e r e c e n t e x p e d i e n t of the
g o v e r n m e n t enacting a discount of 15 pet. u p o n t h e p a p e r m o n e y issued by
t h e m s e l v e s . This device, working t h e depreciation of their o w n p a p e r , perh a p s carries tax-making ingenuity to its perfection, it is putting a t a x on the
p a y m e n t o f t a x e s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e G e r m a n p a p e r s , t h e Austrian b u d g e t for
1854 will show a deficit of 45,000,000 firs, on the ordinary service, and
50,000,000 firs, on the extraordinary. F o r t h e 100th time A u s t r i a is moving
t o w a r d s a loan, b u t in a m a n n e r w h i c h p r o m i s e s no s u c c e s s . It is n o w
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p r o p o s e d to raise a loan of 50,000,000 firs, for t h e m o s t ostensible p u r p o s e
of paying interest d u e and s o m e other pressing d e m a n d s .
W h e n t h e n e w s of t h e intended e n t r a n c e of the united s q u a d r o n into the
Black S e a r e a c h e d Vienna, the m o n e y c h a n g e r s h a d e n o u g h t o d o t o change
p a p e r c u r r e n c y for silver coin. P e o p l e with 100 and 200 florins t h r o n g e d to
their counting h o u s e s with a view to secure their endangered t r e a s u r e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , on t h e decisive m o m e n t , the influence of St. P e t e r s b u r g at
V i e n n a will be p a r a m o u n t a n d entangle Austria, on the side of Russia, into
t h e coming struggle. As to Prussia she is attempting the same game as in 1780,
in 1800 and 1805, to form a league of neutral Baltic or N o r t h e r n G e r m a n
S t a t e s , at the head of w h i c h she might play a p a r t of some i m p o r t a n c e and
t u r n to w h i c h side w a s to offer h e r the greatest a d v a n t a g e s .
T h a t t h e T u r k o - E u r o p e a n f l e e t s c a n d e s t r o y Sebastopol and t h e Russian
Black S e a fleet, t h a t t h e y c a n t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of, and hold the K r y m , o c c u p y
Odessa, close t h e sea of Azoff a n d let loose t h e mountaineers of t h e C a u c a s u s , t h e r e is no doubt. T h e m e a s u r e s to be t a k e n in the Baltic a r e as selfevident as t h o s e in t h e Black S e a : an alliance at a n y price with S w e d e n ; an
act of intimidation against D e n m a r k , if n e c e s s a r y ; an insurrection in Finland,
w h i c h would b r e a k o u t u p o n landing a sufficient n u m b e r of t r o o p s , a n d a
g u a r a n t e e that no p e a c e w o u l d be c o n c l u d e d e x c e p t u p o n the condition of
this province being re-united to S w e d e n : t h e t r o o p s landed in Finland, to
m e n a c e P e t e r s b u r g while t h e fleet b o m b a r d s C r o n s t a d t .
All will d e p e n d on the maritime p o w e r s of E u r o p e acting resolutely and
vigorously.
T h e New Prussian Gazette of t h e 29th ult. confirms t h e a c c o u n t of the
E m p e r o r of R u s s i a having o r d e r e d t h a t all t h e forces in his empire to be
placed on a war-footing. N o t only h a s he w i t h d r a w n his deposits from the
b a n k s of England and F r a n c e , b u t also o r d e r e d v o l u n t a r y collections to be
raised on the p a r t of his nobility, and the railways in progress to be susp e n d e d , in order to d e v o t e to w a r all t h e m e n a n d m o n e y required for their
construction.
On the other hand a r m a m e n t s in F r a n c e are going on m o r e actively t h a n
e v e r , t h e s e c o n d m o i e t y of the contingent of 80,000 m e n of t h e class of 1852
having b e e n called out. In F r a n c e , t o o , a loan of 200,000,000 frs. (about
£8,000,000) has long b e e n c o n t e m p l a t e d , b u t , t h e d e a r t h of food, t h e failure
in t h e w i n e and silk c r o p s , t h e prevailing c o m m e r c i a l a n d industrial distress,
t h e great a p p r e h e n s i o n s entertained a b o u t t h e p a y m e n t s t o b e m a d e a t t h e
e n d of F e b r u a r y , t h e d o w n w a r d t e n d e n c y of t h e funds and railway shares,
all t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t e n d by no m e a n s to facilitate such a transaction.
It is the intention of the British g o v e r n m e n t , as we are informed by the
Times, to raise the n u m b e r of s e a m e n a n d marines for the c u r r e n t y e a r to
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53,000 m e n , w h i c h is an increase of a b o u t 8,000 on t h e n u m b e r v o t e d for last
year, a n d a further addition to t h e 5,000 men«raised u n d e r t h e o r d e r s of
L o r d D e r b y ' s administration. T h e total increase in t h e N a v y since 1852 m a y
t h e r e f o r e be stated of about 13,000 m e n . F o r t h e force n o w to be raised
for the service of t h e fleet 38,000 will be s e a m e n a n d b o y s , and 15,000
marines.
At last the m u r d e r is out, as regards t h e affair of Sinope. T h e s t a t e m e n t s
published of the relative strength of R u s s i a a n d T u r k e y at t h a t p l a c e , show
t h a t t h e Russians had 3 steam t w o - d e c k e r s , o n e three-decker and 680 guns
on their side m o r e t h a n the Turkish forces. So considered the e v e n t of Sinope
h a s a d d e d nothing to R u s s i a ' s p o w e r , and t a k e n nothing from t h a t of T u r k e y ,
b u t the r e v e r s e . H e r e we h a v e seen a fact w i t h o u t parallel e v e n in o u r o w n
annals—frigates laying themselves alongside line-of-battle ships, and c o m m a n d e r s casting the t o r c h into t h e p o w d e r m a g a z i n e and offering themselves
up for holocaust on their c o u n t r y ' s shrine. T h e real maritime force of T u r k e y
is u n t o u c h e d ; n o t a line-of-battle ship, n o t a steamer having b e e n sacrificed.
This is n o t all. According to the last intelligence r e c e i v e d , o n e of the finest
t h r e e - d e c k e r s of the R u s s i a n fleet, the Rostislav, a 120-gun ship, h a s b e e n
sunk b y the T u r k s . This fact, k e p t b a c k hitherto u n d e r t h e specious p r e t e x t
t h a t the Rostislav did n o t sink during the action, b u t immediately afterwards,
is n o w admitted by the R u s s i a n s , and forms a good set-off against the
d e s t r o y e d T u r k i s h ships. If o n e three-decker w a s actually sunk, we m a y
e x p e c t t h a t the other Russian vessels received v e r y serious h a r m indeed
during the action, and after all the victory of Sinope m a y h a v e m o r e disabled
t h e Russian t h a n t h e T u r k i s h fleet. W h e n the P a s h a of E g y p t h e a r d of the
disaster at Sinope, he o r d e r e d the immediate a r m a m e n t of 6 frigates, 5 corv e t t e s a n d 3 brigs, destined to fill up the c h a s m w h i c h has b e e n p r o d u c e d
in t h e material of the T u r k i s h fleet.
T h e Egyptian steam-frigate Pervaz-Bahri disabled and t a k e n after nearly
five h o u r s struggle by the far larger Russian steam-frigate Vladimir, w a s so
riddled w i t h shot that she could hardly be b r o u g h t into S e b a s t o p o l , and w h e n
t h e r e , sank at o n c e . T h e Pervaz-Bahri w a s only carried into the h a r b o u r of
S e b a s t o p o l by the aid of its chief-engineer, M r . Bell, an Englishman, w h o w a s
p r o m i s e d on t h e p a r t of the Admiral Kornüoff, if he s u c c e e d e d in taking it
t h e r e in safety, to be set immediately at liberty. W h e n arrived at Sebastopol,
instead of being released, M r . Bell and his sub-engineers a n d stokers w e r e
p u t into close confinement, with the miserable allowance of 3d. a-day for
their m a i n t e n a n c e and given t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o m a r c h
80 miles on foot, at this inclement season, into t h e interior. Prince M e n s h i kof f, w h o c o m m a n d s at Sebastopol, w a s a p p r o v e d by t h e Czar and his minist e r s , w h o t u r n e d a deaf ear to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of o u r C o n s u l at O d e s s a
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and the British A m b a s s a d o r at St. P e t e r s b u r g . It w a s already k n o w n t h a t at
the battle of Sinope t w o English m e r c h a n t - m e n , following private t r a d e , w e r e
heedlessly and ruthlessly involved in the general destruction. T h e following
is the simple narrative of t h e destruction of o n e of t h e s e vessels as given
by a F r e n c h p a p e r :
" O n the 30th N o v e m b e r the brigantine H o w a r d , belonging t o Bideford,
a seaport in the S o u t h of E n g l a n d , had finished the discharge of a cargo of
coals to t h e Austrian C o n s u l , Mr. Pirentz, at Sinope, and w a s then at a n c h o r
taking in ballast with a view of sailing to F a t s a h for a cargo of c o r n , w h i c h
she had engaged to carry to E n g l a n d , w h e n the Russian fleet suddenly c a m e
in sight, and without giving a n y notice w h a t e v e r , or affording any o p p o r t u n i t y
for foreign vessels to r e m o v e o u t of danger, c o m m e n c e d a h e a v y fire of shot
and shells on the T u r k i s h fleet lying at a n c h o r and in a few m i n u t e s entirely
d e s t r o y e d the H o w a r d and other m e r c h a n t vessels in the h a r b o u r . " This
atrocious infraction on international law is p a r a d e d in the O d e s s a bulletin,
while the Russian journals simultaneously a n n o u n c e d in insulting language
that, while the English fleets d a r e d n o t enter the Black Sea, t h e English
g o v e r n m e n t d a r e d n o t refuse the u s e of its d o c k y a r d s to repair a R u s s i a n
man-of-war.
T h e latest mails h a v e b r o u g h t us m o r e supplementary n e w s with regard
to the military e v e n t s w h i c h lately t o o k place in Asia. It a p p e a r s that t h e
T u r k s h a v e b e e n compelled entirely t o e v a c u a t e t h e R u s s o - A r m e n i a n territory, b u t the precise result of t h e e n g a g e m e n t s , w h i c h determined this retreat,
i s n o t y e t k n o w n . O n e T u r k i s h c o r p s h a d p e n e t r a t e d o n t h e direct r o a d t o
Akkalzikhe from A r d a h a n , while a n o t h e r b o d y t o o k the m o r e southern r o a d
from K a r s by A l e x a n d r o p o l (in Georgian Giimri) to Tiflis. B o t h t h e s e c o r p s ,
it a p p e a r s , w e r e m e t by the R u s s i a n s . A c c o r d i n g to the Russian a c c o u n t s the
T u r k s w e r e r o u t e d on either line and lost a b o u t 40 pieces of c a n n o n ; as to the
T u r k i s h a c c o u n t s we h a v e nothing official b u t in private c o r r e s p o n d e n c e the
retreat is explained by t h e necessity of going into winter q u a r t e r s . Certain
it is, that the T u r k s h a v e e v a c u a t e d the R u s s i a n territory with the exception
of F o r t St. N i c h o l a s , that t h e R u s s i a n s followed t h e m , and that their adv a n c e d guard e v e n v e n t u r e d to within a mile of K a r s , w h e r e it w a s repulsed.
We k n o w b e s i d e s , t h a t t h e T u r k i s h a r m y of Anatolia, recruited as it is from
the Asiatic p r o v i n c e s , the seat of old M o s l e m barbarism, a n d counting in its
r a n k s a great n u m b e r of irregulars, unreliable t h o u g h generally b r a v e soldiers of a d v e n t u r e , fancy w a r r i o r s , a n d filibusters of Kurdistan—that t h e
a r m y of Anatolia, is nothing like t h e staid, disciplined and drilled a r m y of
Roumelia, w h e r e t h e c o m m a n d e r k n o w s h o w m a n y a n d w h a t m e n h e has from
day to d a y u n d e r his c o m m a n d , a n d w h e r e t h e thirst for i n d e p e n d e n t adv e n t u r e and private plunder is held u n d e r c h e c k by articles of w a r and courts
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martial. W e k n o w t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s , v e r y h a r d u p for t r o o p s i n t h e beginning
of the Asiatic campaign, h a v e b e e n reinforced by the 13th division of infantry
(16,000 m e n ) u n d e r L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Obrucheff II, and by a b o d y of
C o s s a c k s from t h e D o n ; w e k n o w t h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n able t o k e e p the
m o u n t a i n e e r s in b o u n d s , to maintain their c o m m u n i c a t i o n as well across the
C a u c a s u s b y Vladikavkaz a s b y sea t o O d e s s a a n d Sebastopol. U n d e r t h e s e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and considering t h a t the T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r A b d i P a s h a w a s
either a traitor or a d u n c e (he has b e e n recalled since and A h m e d P a s h a h a s
b e e n sent in his stead), we should n o t w o n d e r at all if t h e T u r k s had b e e n
w o r s t e d , although t h e r e c a n be no d o u b t of t h e exaggeration prevailing in
t h e R u s s i a n bulletins.
On t h e D a n u b e , the Russians h a v e s o m e time ago attacked Matchin, a fort
situated on an arm of t h e D a n u b e . A steamer c a m e up with t w o gun b o a t s ;
t h e y w e r e m e t by a hot fire; t h e gun b o a t s , it is said, w e r e sunk, and the
s t e a m e r so far damaged that it had to m a k e the b e s t of its w a y h o m e . T h r e e
or four skirmishes o c c u r r e d , partly b e t w e e n t h e o u t p o s t s at Kalafat, partly
b e t w e e n the Russian p o s t s o n the D a n u b e a n d small T u r k i s h parties w h o
c r o s s e d t h e river in order to surprise t h e m . T h e T u r k s ascribe to t h e m s e l v e s
t h e advantage in all the e n c o u n t e r s . It is to be regretted t h a t t h e T u r k i s h
irregulars, fit m o r e for this duty t h a n for a n y other, h a v e n o t long since b e e n
o r d e r e d to carry on this w a r on a small scale with the greatest activity. T h e y
w o u l d h a v e p r o v e d m o r e t h a n a m a t c h for the C o s s a c k s , disorganized the
necessarily faulty system of o u t p o s t s of the e n e m y , faulty b e c a u s e extending
o v e r a line 300 miles in length: t h e y w o u l d h a v e disturbed the Russian
p l a n s , obtained a perfect knowledge of t h e e n e m y ' s m o v e m e n t s a n d
might w i t h p r o p e r caution and boldness h a v e b e e n victorious in e v e r y
encounter.
F r o m telegraphic n e w s , received this m o m e n t , it a p p e a r s t h a t " o n the 6th
of this m o n t h , a Turkish division, 15,000 strong, with 15 pieces of artillery,
a t t a c k e d the e n t r e n c h e d position of Citale, n o t far from Kalafat, and t o o k
it with s t o r m ; that the Russians lost 2,500 m e n a n d that a reinforcement of
18,000 R u s s i a n s marching from K a r a k a l , w a s forced to retire with a loss of
250 m e n . " A c c o r d i n g to another report, t h e great majority of the population
of L e s s e r Wallachia has risen against, and K r a j o v a b e e n placed in a state
of siege by, the R u s s i a n s .
M e a n w h i l e Russia e x h a u s t e d herself in efforts to s e d u c e or alarm in all
q u a r t e r s of t h e world, on o u r Indian frontiers, in Persia, Servia, S w e d e n ,
D e n m a r k , etc. In Persia t h e British minister h a d h a d a difference with t h e
G o v e r n m e n t of t h e Shah, w h o w a s on the point of yielding, w h e n the R u s s i a n
A m b a s s a d o r interposed not only to e x a s p e r a t e t h e S h a h against England, b u t
to drive him into active hostility t o o , a n d a declaration of w a r against the
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Porte. This intrigue, h o w e v e r , is said to h a v e b e e n baffled by t h e British
C h a r g é d'Affaires, M r . T h o m p s o n ' s m e n a c e of withdrawing from T e h e r a n ,
by the d r e a d of an immediate explosion from t h e dislike of t h e Persian p e o p l e
for Russia, and by the arrival of an Affghan E m b a s s y threatening, if Persia
formed an alliance w i t h Russia, an invasion of the Persian territory by t h e
Affghans.
A c r o w d of R u s s i a n agents w a s simultaneously o v e r r u n n i n g Servia—
seeking o u t and applying t h e m s e l v e s to t h e places a n d p e r s o n s formerly
k n o w n by their a t t a c h m e n t to the b a n i s h e d family of the Obrenovich—speaking to some of the y o u n g Prince Michael—to o t h e r s of his old father Milosh—
now making t h e m h o p e , t h r o u g h the p r o t e c t i o n of Russia, [for] the extension
of t h e limits of Servia—the formation of a n e w kingdom of Illyria, w h i c h
should unite all t h o s e w h o s p o k e t h e Servian language actually u n d e r t h e
domination of T u r k e y and Austria,—and n o w announcing to t h e m , in c a s e
of r e s i s t a n c e , innumerable armies and utter subjugation. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
t h e s e intrigues, in opposite s e n s e s , t h a t R u s s i a c e a s e d not to c a r r y on, she
has not succeeded i n breaking the b o n d s b e t w e e n t h e Servians and t h e Sultan,
but, o n t h e contrary, t w o firmans w e r e e x p e c t e d from Constantinople a t
Belgrad, t h e one suppressing all t h e relations existing b e t w e e n Servia a n d
Russia, a n d the other confirming all t h e privileges c o n c e d e d , at different
e p o c h s , t o t h e Servian p e o p l e . T h e n , t h e R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a s actively
p u r s u e d negotiations at Stockholm and C o p e n h a g e n , for the p u r p o s e of
inducing t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of S w e d e n and D e n m a r k to side with h e r in t h e
approaching E u r o p e a n struggle; the great object she has in securing their
alliance, being to obtain the closing of the p a s s a g e s of the S o u n d a n d Belts
against the W e s t e r n P o w e r s . All she has effected till n o w , is the conclusion
of a treaty b e t w e e n S w e d e n , D e n m a r k a n d P r u s s i a concerning an a r m e d
neutrality, and p r e p a r a t i o n s of a r m a m e n t s , ostensibly directed against herself. Private letters from S w e d e n exult in the possibility of the D u c h y of
Finland, so shamefully seized by R u s s i a w i t h o u t a declaration of w a r , being
restored to the Scandinavian K i n g d o m . As to D e n m a r k , the attitude, n o t of
the people, b u t of t h e court, is m o r e equivocal. It is e v e n r u m o u r e d that t h e
p r e s e n t D a n i s h Minister of Foreign Affairs will resign a n d be replaced by
C o u n t Reventlow-Criminil, a m a n k n o w n to be intimately c o n n e c t e d w i t h
t h e C o u r t of St. P e t e r s b u r g . In F r a n c e t h e " f u s i o n " of t h e Orleanists and
Legitimists o w e s to Russia t h e sort of s u c c e s s it h a s m e t with, while t h a t s a m e
p o w e r is stirring up h e a v e n a n d e a r t h to d e s t r o y t h e entente cordiale existing
b e t w e e n the G o v e r n m e n t s of England and F r a n c e a n d to sow distrust b e t w e e n t h e m . A t t e m p t s are being m a d e by s o m e of the Paris journals, in t h e
p a y of Mr. Kisseleff, to create a belief that t h e English g o v e r n m e n t is n o t
sincere, a n d we see that in E n g l a n d a journal, in t h e p a y of Mr. de B r u n n o w ,
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in r e t u r n casts d o u b t s on the sincerity of the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t . A n o t h e r
b l o w , principally aimed against the W e s t e r n p o w e r s , is the Russian prohibition relative to the exportation of Polish corn.
In the m e a n time the m o v e m e n t s of W e s t e r n diplomacy w e r e by no m e a n s
hostile to Russia, b u t exhibited, on the contrary, rather too anxious a tende n c y to temporise w i t h justice and to c o m p r o m i s e w i t h crime. It is n o w
o b v i o u s to e v e r y o n e that their c o u r s e has b e e n a mistaken and mischievous
o n e . T h e resurrection of the V i e n n a c o n f e r e n c e and the p r o t o c o l d r a w n up
by t h e m on the 5th ult., the letter of the F r e n c h and British A m b a s s a d o r s
at Constantinople to Reshid Pasha, the collective n o t e of t h e 4 great p o w e r s
p r e s e n t e d to the P o r t e on the 15th, and a c c e p t e d by t h e Sultan on the 31st
ult., the circular of M r . D r o u y n De l ' H u y s , a n n o u n c i n g the e n t r a n c e of the
united fleets into the Black Sea, to the F r e n c h diplomatic agents, dated 30th
ult., s u c h are the principal e v e n t s of the diplomatic history of the last 6 w e e k s .
As to the protocol of the V i e n n a conference your r e a d e r s will h a v e b e e n
informed of its c o n t e n t s before n o w . C a n t h e r e be anything m o r e ludicrous
t h a n its assertion that " t h e a s s u r a n c e s given on several occasions by t h e
E m p e r o r of R u s s i a exclude the idea that t h a t august S o v e r e i g n entertains
a n y w i s h to interfere with the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , " and anything
m o r e mischievous t h a n its urging on T u r k e y the propriety of consenting to
a 3 m o n t h s ' armistice? T w o days after the n e w s of the disgraceful b u t c h e r y
at Sinope h a d r e a c h e d Constantinople on t h e 5th ult., Reshid P a s h a add r e s s e d a letter to L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe and G e n e r a l B a r a g u a y D ' H i l liers, c o m m u n i c a t i n g the n e w s from Sinope and asking that t h e fleets might
enter t h e Black Sea. On t h e 12th, a w e e k after t h e d a t e of Reshid P a s h a ' s
n o t e , he received a v e r y indifferent a n s w e r on the p a r t of t h e t w o A m b a s s a d o r s , intimating to him that " t h e p r e s e n c e of the U n i t e d S q u a d r o n had 'a
political signification,' c o n s e q u e n t l y no military o n e , a n d t h a t it w a s 'a moral
support,' c o n s e q u e n t l y no naval o n e . " T h u s the P o r t e w a s c o e r c e d into the
a c c e p t a n c e of the joint N o t e of the 4 p o w e r s p r e s e n t e d to her on the
15th D e c e m b e r . This note grants the P o r t e n o t only no c o m p e n s a t i o n w h a t e v e r for the losses she has u n d e r g o n e c o n s e q u e n t u p o n t h e piratical acts of
t h e A u t o c r a t ; it insists n o t only u p o n the r e n e w a l of all the ancient treaties
of Kainardji, Adrianople, Unkiar Skellessi, etc., w h i c h h a v e furnished, for
a c e n t u r y and a half, the arsenal from w h i c h R u s s i a has d r a w n her w e a p o n s
of fraud, interference, progress and incorporation; b u t it allows the Czar to
c a r r y t h e point of the religious p r o t e c t o r a t e and administrative dictation over
T u r k e y by stipulating that " t h e communication of the firmans relative to the
spiritual privileges o c t r o y e d by the Sublime P o r t e to all its subjects n o t
M u s u l m e n , should be m a d e to all the p o w e r s , a n d a c c o m p a n i e d by suitable
a s s u r a n c e s given to e a c h of t h e m , " and t h a t the P o r t e shall declare on its
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p a r t its firm resolution to d e v e l o p m o r e efficaciously its administrative
system and internal r e f o r m s .
T h e s e n e w propositions, while in their letter, investing the 5 p o w e r s of
E u r o p e with a joint p r o t e c t o r a t e o v e r the Christian subjects of T u r k e y , give
in reality, t h e p r o t e c t o r a t e to R u s s i a alone. T h e a r r a n g e m e n t is to b e , t h a t
F r a n c e and Austria being R o m a n Catholic countries, a r e t o h a v e t h e p r o t e c torate over the R o m a n Catholic Christians in T u r k e y , a n d England a n d
P r u s s i a being P r o t e s t a n t countries, are t o h a v e the p r o t e c t o r a t e over t h e
P r o t e s t a n t subjects of the Sultan, while R u s s i a is to h a v e the p r o t e c t o r a t e
over those professing t h e G r e e k faith. N o w , as the R o m a n Catholics do n o t
n u m b e r 800,000, nor the P r o t e s t a n t s 200,000, while t h o s e w h o profess t h e
G r e e k religion a m o u n t to nearly 10,000,000, it is plain that the Czar w o u l d
indeed acquire the p r o t e c t o r a t e o v e r the Christian subjects in T u r k e y . T h e s e
proposals of the 4 p o w e r s w e r e n o t a c c e p t e d by the P o r t e till on the 19th
ult., w h e n Riza P a s h a and Halil P a s h a h a d e n t e r e d the ministry, t h e s u c c e s s
of the P e a c e or R u s s i a n p a r t y having b e e n t h u s assured.
On the 21st ult., w h e n it b e c a m e k n o w n that the Council of Ministers h a d
notified to t h e F o u r A m b a s s a d o r s t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e propositions t h e y h a d
suggested, the Sofias (students) a s s e m b l e d to p r e s e n t a petition against t h e
resolution t a k e n by the g o v e r n m e n t , a n d the o u t b r e a k of disturbances w a s
only prevented by the arrest of the ringleaders. So g r e a t w a s the e x a s p e r a tion, which prevailed at Constantinople, t h a t t h e Sultan did not v e n t u r e to
repair o n . t h e following d a y to the Divan, nor p r o c e e d , as usual, amidst the
t h u n d e r of the c a n n o n , and t h e h u r r a h s of t h e foreign w a r c r e w , to t h e m o s q u e
of T o p h a n a ; and that Reshid P a s h a fled for refuge from his o w n palace in
Stamboul to the palace contiguous to t h e r e s i d e n c e of the Sultan. On t h e
following d a y the public mind w a s s o m e w h a t calmed by a proclamation on
the part of the Sultan, that no stop should be p u t to the military o p e r a t i o n s .
T h e s e t o r t u o u s , pusillanimous and inexplicable m o v e m e n t s of the W e s t e r n
diplomacy, w h i c h , t h r o u g h o u t the d r e a r y history of the last 9 m o n t h s , almost
e x h a u s t e d public patience, h a v e t h r o w n d o u b t s u p o n the sincerity of the
British G o v e r n m e n t , and as the public feel t h e m s e l v e s at a loss to u n d e r s t a n d
the motives t h a t m a y h a v e c a u s e d the long e n d u r a n c e on the p a r t of the
W e s t e r n p o w e r s , secret influences are s p o k e n of, and r u m o u r s are industriously spread, that Prince Albert, t h e h u s b a n d of the Q u e e n , is interfering in t h e affairs of t h e E x e c u t i v e ; t h a t he is not only attending on his
Sovereign L a d y at the meetings of her Council, b u t is using his influence to
control the advice of the responsible a d v i s e r s ; that, while exercising his
opportunity to be p r e s e n t at the meeting of the Q u e e n with her ministers,
he is in c o n s t a n t and direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h foreign c o u r t s , including t h e
Russian o n e , b u t e x c e p t t h a t of F r a n c e . A n o t h e r tale is, t h a t the " f u s i o n "
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Karl Marx
of the Orleans and elder B o u r b o n b r a n c h e s of the late royal family of F r a n c e
r e c e i v e s almost as m u c h c o u n t e n a n c e from o u r c o u r t as it d o e s from that
of Russia, and the visit of the D u k e of N e m o u r s at the court of Q u e e n
Victory, fresh from the meeting with " H e n r y the F i f t h , " is pointed at as a
proof. A fourth report, that the negotiations in t h e E a s t e r n Question, h a v e ,
5
with the a s s e n t of Russia, b e e n delegated to t h e sole intermediation of C o u n t
Buol-Schauenstein, brother-in-law of C o u n t Meyendorf, is cited as evidence
t h a t this g o v e r n m e n t has never desired i n d e p e n d e n t or effective negotiations,
b u t h a s , from t h e first, sought to aid t h e designs of R u s s i a a n d h e r allies, while
seeming to o p p o s e her. Mr. R o e b u c k , it is confidently stated, will bring the 10
whole question of C o b u r g influence b e f o r e the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , while
L o r d B r o u g h a m is said to intend bringing it b e f o r e t h e H o u s e of L o r d s . T h e r e
is no d o u b t t h a t t h e Coburg influences form, at this m o m e n t , the almost
exclusive topic of conversation in the metropolis. Parliament will r e a s s e m b l e
on the 31st instant.
15
So stern a winter as the p r e s e n t o n e h a s n o t b e e n k n o w n since 1809. T h e
intensity of the cold has b e e n by no m e a n s t h e m o s t trying incident; the
i n c e s s a n t changes b o t h of t e m p e r a t u r e and of the c h a r a c t e r of the w e a t h e r
h a v e b e e n far w o r s e . T h e trains r u n on the railway w i t h t h e greatest difficulty; in some parts transit a p p e a r s to be quite cut off; a n d in the m e a n s
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n England is t h r o w n b a c k to times forgotten. T h e electric
telegraph h a s b e e n u s e d to mitigate the inconvenience of c o m m e r c i a l d o c u m e n t s , intercepted by snow drifts, and to p r e v e n t t h e noting of bills for
unexplained n o n - p a y m e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s the noting of m o r e t h a n 500 bills
in L o n d o n illustrates the social a n a r c h y o c c a s i o n e d by t h e u n c o m m o n inc l e m e n c y of the season. T h e p a p e r s are filled with r e c o r d s of the fearful
s h i p w r e c k s c a u s e d by the s n o w s t o r m s and gales, particularly on the E a s t e r n
coast. Although the recently published tables of trading, navigation a n d
r e v e n u e show a continuance of the prosperity w i t h w h i c h 1853 began, the
severity of the season, coupled with the rising prices of the first necessaries,
principally of c o r n , coals and tallow, acts as a h a r d p r e s s u r e u p o n the condition of the lower classes. N u m e r o u s c a s e s of starvation h a v e o c c u r r e d .
B r e a d riots in t h e W e s t are n o w forming an a c c o m p a n i m e n t to t h e lock-outs
in the N o r t h .
T i m e , h o w e v e r , compels to defer a detailed a c c o u n t of t r a d e and c o m m e r c e
to a following letter.
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Friedrich Engels
The Last Battle in Europe
Nr.3997, 8. Februar 1854
The Last Battle in Europe.
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T h e letters of o u r L o n d o n c o r r e s p o n d e n t s a n d the E u r o p e a n journals enable
us at last to appreciate in all its bearings t h e prolonged struggle b e t w e e n t h e
T u r k s and R u s s i a n s , of w h i c h T s h e t a l e , a small village nine miles n o r t h of
Kalefat, w a s the arena. N e x t to the fact t h a t the series of sanguinary actions
in question w a s characterized by great b r a v e r y a n d that the T u r k s c a m e off
victors, the m o s t striking feature of the w h o l e is that it is w i t h o u t practical
result, so far as the expulsion of the R u s s i a n s from Wallachia is c o n c e r n e d .
This c o m e s from a mistake on the p a r t of the T u r k s to w h i c h we h a v e m o r e
t h a n o n c e h a d occasion to direct the attention of our r e a d e r s . We allude to
their sending a separate a r m y to Kalefat, in order to shut up the r o a d to
Servia, while the p r e s e n c e of a strong a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d force n e a r R u s t c h u k
and H i r s o v a would h a v e b e e n the b e s t g u a r a n t e e against the Russians venturing into t h a t p r o v i n c e . S u c h a force w o u l d h a v e m e n a c e d the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
of any Russian a r m y marching w e s t w a r d , while a bridge and bridge-head at
Oltenitza or s o m e w h e r e t h e r e a b o u t s , fortified like that of Kalefat, could h a v e
maintained a footing for t h e m on t h e left b a n k of t h e D a n u b e . B u t e v e n
w i t h o u t that, the R u s s i a n s could n o t c r o s s t h e U p p e r D a n u b e and m a r c h into
Servia, without leaving the T u r k s t o c r o s s t h e L o w e r D a n u b e and m a r c h u p o n
B u c h a r e s t . Of c o u r s e , in saying this, we r e c k o n the relative strength of the
parties to be w h a t it is in reality, and ascribe a decided superiority of n u m b e r s
to the T u r k i s h a r m y of Roumelia, o v e r the R u s s i a n a r m y of Wallachia.
N o w the fact is t h a t t h e T u r k s h a v e u s e d their superiority in the v e r y w a y
to nullify it and provide for being finally b e a t e n . T h e y did n o t c o n c e n t r a t e
their forces on t h e L o w e r D a n u b e , b u t divided t h e m . While 30,000 to
35,000 m e n occupied Widdin and Kalefat, the r e s t of the a r m y r e m a i n e d on
the Middle a n d L o w e r D a n u b e . T h e y o c c u p y t h e a r c of a circle, while t h e
R u s s i a n s o c c u p y t h e c h o r d of this a r c . T h u s t h e latter h a v e less space to
t r a v e r s e in order to c o n c e n t r a t e all their t r o o p s on a given spot. M o r e o v e r ,
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Friedrich Engels
t h e shorter r o a d s of t h e Russians are t h r o u g h a level c o u n t r y , while t h e longer
o n e s of t h e T u r k s p a s s over hills and c r o s s m a n y m o u n t a i n t o r r e n t s . T h e
T u r k i s h position is, then, as disadvantageous as c a n b e , a n d yet it has b e e n
t a k e n in order to satisfy t h e old prejudice t h a t t h e r e is no b e t t e r w a y of barring
a r o a d against an e n e m y than by placing yourself across it.
On the 20th of D e c e m b e r O m e r P a s h a knew at Shumla, t h a t the Russians
w e r e preparing a general a t t a c k u p o n Kalefat for the 13th of J a n u a r y . He
h a d t w e n t y - t w o d a y s ' time; y e t such is the position of Kalefat with regard
to t h e other stations of the T u r k i s h a r m y , t h a t it d o e s n o t a p p e a r that he could
bring on any re-enforcements e x c e p t a few r e s e r v e s from Sofia. On t h e other
h a n d , t h a t the R u s s i a n s , w i t h o u t having received a n y considerable re-enf o r c e m e n t s from home—on J a n u a r y 3rd O s t e n - S a c k e n ' s ubiquitous c o r p s
w a s n o t y e t at Bucharest—should v e n t u r e u p o n a c o n c e n t r a t i o n so far w e s t ,
s h o w s t h a t either the state of t h e w e a t h e r and of t h e D a n u b e did n o t allow
t h e T u r k s to cross the river lower d o w n , or that Gorchakoff h a d o t h e r r e a s o n s
to be assured of their inactivity in that quarter. T h e T u r k s at Kalefat w e r e
o r d e r e d to attack the Russians while y e t in t h e act of concentrating t h e m selves. T h e b e s t w a y to do this w a s to r e p e a t the e x p e r i m e n t of Oltenitza.
W h y w a s not this d o n e ? T h e bridge at Kalefat s t a n d s , in spite of winter and
floating ice, and t h e r e w a s no position lower d o w n w h e r e a similar bridge
and bridge-head could be erected. Or had O m e r P a s h a b e e n o r d e r e d to k e e p
on the right b a n k of the river? T h e r e is so m u c h of a contradictory n a t u r e
in the T u r k i s h proceedings, bold and clever m e a s u r e s are so regularly followed by t h e m o s t palpable sins of omission and c o m m i s s i o n t h a t diplomatic
agency m u s t be at the b o t t o m of it. At all e v e n t s , Gorchakoff w o u l d n o t h a v e
stirred an inch t o w a r d Kalefat, h a d he n o t b e e n certain t h a t the T u r k s w o u l d
not r e p e a t t h e Oltenitza m o v e m e n t .
Altogether some 30,000 Russians m u s t h a v e b e e n sent against Kalefat, for
w i t h a lesser force t h e y would hardly h a v e v e n t u r e d to attack a fortified
position, defended by a garrison of 10,000 m e n , w i t h at least 10,000 m o r e for
p u r p o s e s of r e s e r v e or sally. At least one-half, then, of the Russian active
a r m y i n Wallachia w a s concentrated t h e r e . W h e r e a n d h o w could the other
half, spread over a long line, h a v e resisted a T u r k i s h force crossing at Oltenitza, Silistria or H i r s o v a ? And if the c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n Widdin and
Kalefat could be k e p t up without difficulty, t h e n t h e r e w a s a possibility of
crossing at other points. T h u s t h e Russians by their position on the c h o r d
of the a r c , the periphery of w h i c h w a s held by the T u r k s , w e r e enabled to
bring a superior force to the field of battle at T s h e t a l e , while the T u r k s could
not re-enforce their corps at Kalefat, though a w a r e of t h e intended a t t a c k
long b e f o r e h a n d . T h e T u r k s deprived of that m o v e m e n t of diversion which
w o u l d h a v e p r e v e n t e d the w h o l e battle, deprived of the c h a n c e of succor,
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w e r e r e d u c e d to their b r a v e r y and to the h o p e of cutting up the e n e m y in
detail before his c o n c e n t r a t i o n w a s c o m p l e t e d . B u t e v e n this h o p e w a s slight,
for t h e y could not m o v e v e r y far from Kalefat, and e v e r y hostile corps of
inferior strength could retire o u t of t h e circle of their operations. T h u s they
5 fought for five d a y s , generally w i t h s u c c e s s , b u t at last h a d to retire again
to their e n t r e n c h m e n t s in the villages a r o u n d Kalefat, the Russian forces
being decidedly superior in strength at the e n d , w h e n n e w r e - e n f o r c e m e n t s
arrived. T h e result is t h a t the R u s s i a n a t t a c k u p o n Kalefat is m o s t p r o b a b l y
averted or delayed, and that [the] T u r k s h a v e s h o w n that in the o p e n field,
10 no less t h a n behind r a m p a r t s and ditches, t h e y c a n fight well. T h e m u r d e r o u s
character of the e n c o u n t e r s m a y be inferred from the statement of a letter
from Bucharest, to the effect that in the e n g a g e m e n t s o n e w h o l e regiment
of Russian rifles, and all but 465 m e n of a regiment of lancers, w e r e c o m pletely annihilated.
15
At Oltenitza the T u r k s w e r e a t t a c k e d in their e n t r e n c h e d positions by the
R u s s i a n s ; at Tshetale the Russians w e r e a t t a c k e d in their e n t r e n c h e d positions b y t h e T u r k s . O n b o t h o c c a s i o n s the T u r k s h a v e p r o v e d victorious, b u t
without reaping a n y positive results from their victory. T h e battle of Oltenitza h a p p e n e d just w h e n t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n of an armistice w a s on its w a y
20 from Constantinople to the D a n u b e . A n d t h e battle of Tshetale curiously
coincides with the n e w s of the D i v a n having a c c e p t e d the last proposals of
p e a c e , imposed u p o n t h e m b y their W e s t e r n allies. I n the o n e instance t h e
machinations of diplomacy are nullified in the clash of a r m s , while, in t h e
other, the bloody w o r k of w a r is simultaneously frustrated by some secret
25 diplomatic agency.
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The Fighting in the East—Finances of Austria and F r a n c e Fortification of Constantinople
Nr. 3997, 8. Februar 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , J a n . 20, 1854.
T h e latest mails h a v e brought u s some s u p p l e m e n t a r y n e w s w i t h regard t o
t h e military e v e n t s which lately t o o k place in Asia. It a p p e a r s that the T u r k s
h a v e b e e n compelled entirely to e v a c u a t e t h e R u s s o - A r m e n i a n territory, b u t
t h e precise result of the engagements w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d their r e t r e a t , is n o t
k n o w n . T h e T u r k s h a d p e n e t r a t e d o n the direct r o a d t o Akhaltzik from
A r d a h a n , while a n o t h e r b o d y t o o k the m o r e s o u t h e r n r o a d from K a r s b y
A l e x a n d r o p o l (in Georgian, Giimri) to Tiflis. B o t h t h e s e c o r p s , it a p p e a r s ,
w e r e m e t by the R u s s i a n s ; according to the Russian a c c o u n t s , the T u r k s w e r e
r o u t e d on either line and lost a b o u t forty pieces of c a n n o n ; as to the T u r k i s h
a c c o u n t s , we h a v e nothing official, b u t in private c o r r e s p o n d e n c e the r e t r e a t
is explained by the necessity of going into winter q u a r t e r s .
T h e only thing certain is this, that the T u r k s h a v e e v a c u a t e d t h e R u s s i a n
territory with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e F o r t St. N i c h o l a s ; t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s
followed t h e m , and that their advanced guard e v e n v e n t u r e d to within a mile
o f K a r s , w h e r e i t w a s repulsed. W e k n o w , b e s i d e s , t h a t t h e T u r k i s h a r m y
of Anatolia, recruited as it is from the Asiatic p r o v i n c e s , t h e seat of the old
M o s l e m b a r b a r i s m , a n d counting in its r a n k s a great n u m b e r of irregulars,
unreliable, though generally b r a v e , soldiers of a d v e n t u r e , fancy w a r r i o r s and
fülibusters, t h a t this a r m y of Anatolia is nothing like t h e stern, disciplined
a n d drilled a r m y o f Roumelia, w h o s e c o m m a n d e r k n o w s h o w m a n y and w h a t
m e n h e h a s from day t o day u n d e r his c o m m a n d , a n d w h e r e t h e thirst for
i n d e p e n d e n t a d v e n t u r e and private plunder is held u n d e r c h e c k by articles
of w a r and c o u r t s martial. We k n o w t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s , w h o w e r e v e r y h a r d
up for t r o o p s in the beginning of t h e Asiatic campaign, h a v e b e e n reenf o r c e d
by 16,000 m e n u n d e r Lieut. Gen. Obrutscheff I I , a n d by a b o d y of C o s s a c k s
from the D o n ; w e k n o w t h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n able t o k e e p the m o u n t a i n e e r s
within b o u n d s , to maintain their c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as well a c r o s s t h e C a u s a s u s
by Vladikavkaz, as by sea to O d e s s a and Sevastopol.
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U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and considering t h a t the T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r
Abdi P a s h a w a s either a traitor or a d u n c e (he h a s b e e n recalled since a n d
placed u n d e r arrest a t K a r s ; A h m e d P a s h a w a s sent i n his place) w e should
n o t w o n d e r at all if t h e T u r k s h a d b e e n w o r s t e d , although t h e r e c a n be no
d o u b t of the exaggeration prevailing in t h e R u s s i a n bulletins. We r e a d in t h e
Augsburger Zeitung t h a t " t o w a r d s t h e e n d of N o v e m b e r , S h a m y l m a d e a
d e s p e r a t e a t t e m p t to force his w a y to the south, in order to effect a direct
c o m m u n i c a t i o n with t h e T u r k s . T h e strength of his c o r p s w a s estimated at
from 10,000 to 16,000 m e n , a n d it is affirmed t h a t the M u r i d e s , t h e flower
of his t r o o p s , w e r e cut to p i e c e s . " This h o w e v e r w a n t s confirmation.
At last the m u r d e r is out, as r e g a r d s the affair at Sinope. O n e of t h e finest
t h r e e - d e c k e r s of the R u s s i a n fleet—the Rostislav, 120-gun ship—was sunk
t h e r e b y t h e T u r k s . T h i s fact—kept b a c k hitherto u n d e r the specious p r e t e x t
that the Rostislav did n o t sink during t h e action, b u t immediately afterward—
is n o w admitted by t h e R u s s i a n s , a n d f o r m s a good set-off against t h e
d e s t r o y e d T u r k i s h ships. If o n e t h r e e - d e c k e r w a s actually sunk, we m a y
suppose t h a t the other R u s s i a n vessels received v e r y serious h a r m indeed
during the action—and, after all, t h e v i c t o r y of Sinope m a y h a v e m o r e disabled the Russian t h a n t h e T u r k i s h fleet. Altogether, the T u r k s a p p e a r to fight
like T u r k s w h e n on t h e water. T h e E g y p t i a n steam frigate P e r v a z Bahri,
disabled and t a k e n after nearly five h o u r s struggle by the far larger R u s s i a n
steam-frigate Vladimir, w a s so riddled with shot t h a t she could hardly be
b r o u g h t into Sevastopol, a n d w h e n t h e r e , s a n k at o n c e . So far, t h e n , t h e prizes
carried off by the Russians a m o u n t to nothing, a n d indeed t h e impossibility
for t h e m to carry off a single prize from Sinope s h o w s b o t h the o b s t i n a c y
of t h e T u r k i s h defense a n d t h e mutilated state of t h e R u s s i a n fleet after t h e
action.
T h e r e is a r e p o r t t h a t the c o m b i n e d F r e n c h and English fleets, together
with t h e first division of the T u r k i s h N a v y , are transporting 17,000 T u r k s
to B a t u m . If this be t r u e , it is as m u c h an a c t of w a r as if t h e y m a d e a direct
attack u p o n Sevastopol, a n d t h e C z a r c a n n o t b u t declare w a r a t o n c e .
Immediately prior to t h e e n t r a n c e of the c o m b i n e d fleets into t h e B l a c k Sea,
t h e Czar is said to h a v e sent his m a n d a t e for the withdrawal of all his vessels
of w a r from the w a t e r s of the E u x i n e to Sevastopol. A letter dated Odessa,
D e c e m b e r 24, r e p o r t s t h a t " t h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e Russian flotilla in the sea
of Azoff h a d sent o n e of his aides-de-camp to Sevastopol to explain h o w
critical his position w a s . T w o c o r p s of 12,000 m e n e a c h w e r e r e a d y to be
e m b a r k e d at Sevastopol, w h e n this o p e r a t i o n of w a r w a s p a r a l y z e d by the
n e w s of t h e imminent e n t r a n c e of t h e u n i t e d fleets into t h e E u x i n e . "
F r o m the last telegraphic n e w s r e c e i v e d it a p p e a r s t h a t the R u s s i a n s int e n d e d attempting a general a t t a c k on t h e T u r k i s h lines at Kalefat, on the
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13th inst., t h e Russian N e w - Y e a r ' s day. T h e y h a d already p u s h e d f o r w a r d
a b o u t 10,000 m e n in e n t r e n c h m e n t s at T s h e t a l e , a village nine English miles
n o r t h of Kalefat, b u t w e r e p r e v e n t e d from concentrating their whole available force by t h e Turkish General's getting t h e start of t h e m , storming t h e
e n e m y ' s e n t r e n c h m e n t s with 15,000 or 18,000 m e n , proving victorious in a
5
series of most m u r d e r o u s e n c o u n t e r s t h a t t o o k place on t h e 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th
a n d 10th inst., and finally forcing t h e Russians to retire in t h e direction of
K r a j o v a . T h e Russians themselves confess a loss of 1,000 killed and
4,000 w o u n d e d . General A n r e p , we are told by the telegraph, " w h o c o m m a n d e d t h e R u s s i a n s , w a s severely w o u n d e d , as well as General T u i n o n t . " 10
On the 10th, it is stated, the T u r k s w h o w e r e c o m m a n d e d by Selim P a s h a ,
(the Pole Zedlinsky,) again retired to Kalefat. T h u s far t h e telegraphic n e w s ,
hitherto the only source of information a b o u t t h e s e m o s t important e v e n t s .
T h e r e p o r t winding u p , on t h e one h a n d , with t h e r e t i r e m e n t of t h e R u s s i a n s
on K r a j o v a , and of the T u r k s , on the other, to Kalefat, e v o k e s a suspicion 15
t h a t great strategical faults h a v e again b e e n c o m m i t t e d o n b o t h sides. T h e r e
is o n e report afloat that O m e r P a s h a c a u s e d a w h o l e corps to p a s s t h e
[Danube] b e t w e e n the Aluta and t h e Shyl, t h u s menacing t h e c o m munications of the Russian corps at K r a j o v a . B u t h o w could the T u r k s c r o s s
the D a n u b e , w h i c h is filled with floating m a s s e s of ice, at any other point 20
t h a n Kalefat, w h e r e alone t h e y w e r e p r e p a r e d for such an e m e r g e n c y ?
T h e defeats t h e Russians m e t with a t Kalefat are p e r h a p s m o r e i m p o r t a n t
in a political t h a n a military view. Coupled with t h e e n t r a n c e of the united
fleets into the Black Sea, they cut off the last probability of the C z a r ' s
yielding to the h u m b l e supplication for p e a c e f o r w a r d e d by t h e courier of
the V i e n n a conference t o St. Petersburg. O n t h e other h a n d t h e y m u s t
p r o d u c e t h e immediate effect on neighboring Servia of strengthening t h e
N a t i o n a l p a r t y and intimidating the Russian o n e , w h o h a v e lately b e e n lifting
up their h e a d s with amazing i m p u d e n c e at Belgrade. P r i n c e Alexander, it is
t r u e , and the m a s s of the Servian p e o p l e , could n o t be prevailed u p o n to b r e a k
t h e b o n d s b e t w e e n their c o u n t r y a n d t h e Sultan, although a c r o w d of Russian
agents is simultaneously overrunning Servia, carrying on their intrigues in
opposite senses—seeking out and applying t h e m s e l v e s to the places a n d
p e r s o n s formerly k n o w n for their a t t a c h m e n t to the banished family of t h e
Obrenovich—speaking to some of the y o u n g P r i n c e Michael—to o t h e r s of his
old father Milosh—now making t h e m h o p e , t h r o u g h t h e protection of Russia,
for t h e extension of the limits [of] Servia—the f o r m a t i o n of a n e w kingdom
of Illyria, which would unite all those w h o speak t h e Servian language n o w
u n d e r t h e domination of T u r k e y a n d Austria—and n o w announcing to t h e m ,
in c a s e of resistance, innumerable armies and u t t e r subjugation. Y o u are
a w a r e t h a t Prince Milosh, residing at Vienna, is t h e old protégé of Metternich,
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while Michael, his son, is a m e r e c r e a t u r e of Russia, w h o in 1842 r e n d e r e d
t h e princedom v a c a n t by flying from Servia. T h e R u s s i a n defeat at Kalefat
will, at the same time, relieve A u s t r i a from the fear of a R u s s i a n a r m y
appearing b e f o r e Belgrade a n d evoking a m o n g t h e subjects of Austria, of
c o m m o n origin a n d faith w i t h herself, t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of their o w n
strength a n d of t h e degradation t h e y e n d u r e in t h e domination of t h e Germans.
As to Austria, I m a y state en passant, t h a t she h a s at last, r e n o u n c e d t h e
long-cherished h o p e of raising a n e w loan. T h e state of her E x c h e q u e r m a y
be inferred from t h e e x p e d i e n t h e r G o v e r n m e n t h a s recently r e s o r t e d to, of
exacting a discount of 15 per cent, u p o n its o w n p a p e r money—a financial
m a n e u v e r only to be c o m p a r e d with t h e devises of the swindling ingenuity
of t h e F r e n c h Rois Faux Monnayeurs, w h o a p p r e c i a t e d t h e coin w h e n t h e y
h a d to pay, and depreciated it w h e n t h e y h a d to receive m o n e y . A c c o r d i n g
to t h e G e r m a n p a p e r s , the Austrian b u d g e t for 1854 will show a deficit of
45,000,000 florins on t h e ordinary service, and 50,000,000 florins on t h e
extraordinary. W h e n e v e r n e w s of warlike c h a r a c t e r r e a c h e s Vienna, p e o p l e
t h r o n g to the banking-houses, in o r d e r to c h a n g e p a p e r currency for silver
coin.
F r a n c e , t o o , it is k n o w n , has long b e e n moving for a loan of
200,000,000 francs, (£8,000,000 sterling), b u t t h e dearth of food, t h e failure
of the wine and silk c r o p s , the prevailing c o m m e r c i a l a n d industrial distress,
t h e great a p p r e h e n s i o n s entertained a b o u t t h e p a y m e n t s t o b e m a d e a t t h e
end of F e b r u a r y , the d o w n w a r d t e n d e n c y of t h e public funds and railway
s h a r e s , all t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a v e by no m e a n s t e n d e d to facilitate such
a transaction. B o n a p a r t e could not s u c c e e d in finding t a k e r s at the B o u r s e ,
for t h e n e w loan. T h e r e r e m a i n e d n o r e s o u r c e s a v e t h a t r e c u r r e d t o o n t h e
e v e of the c o u p d'état—the sending Persigny to t h e B a n k of F r a n c e , forcing
out of it 50,000,000 francs, ($10,000,000), and leaving in their place t h a t
a m o u n t of treasury b o n d s , u n d e r the head of " s e c u r i t i e s . " This was actually
d o n e on N e w - Y e a r ' s day. T h e fall of t h e funds to 69 hailed this financial c o u p
d'état. T h e G o v e r n m e n t will, as we are n o w officially informed, obtain a l o a n
from t h e B a n k of F r a n c e of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 francs, against t r e a s u r y
b o n d s . T h o s e not acquainted w i t h w h a t p a s s e d o n N e w - Y e a r ' s d a y i n the
parlor of t h e B a n k of F r a n c e , will be at a loss to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e b a n k
has b e e n prevailed u p o n to a c c e p t a loan rejected at the B o u r s e .
As to Persia the n e w s continues to be contradictory. According to o n e
r e p o r t t h e Persian a r m y is marching u p o n E r z e r u m and Bagdad ; according to
another t h e Russian intrigue h a s b e e n baffled by t h e British Chargé d'Aff aires, M r . T h o m p s o n , w h o m e n a c e d w i t h d r a w a l from T e h e r a n , by t h e d r e a d
of an immediate explosion of t h e dislike of t h e Persian people for Russia,
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a n d by the arrival of an Affghan E m b a s s y , threatening, if Persia f o r m e d an
alliance with Russia, an invasion of the P e r s i a n territory by t h e Affghans.
A c c o r d i n g to private c o r r e s p o n d e n c e from Constantinople, published in
t h e Patrie, the D i v a n has resolved to f ortity Constantinople on t h e land side.
A mixed commission, consisting of E u r o p e a n a n d O t t o m a n officers, is said
to h a v e already c o m m e n c e d the p r e p a r a t o r y s u r v e y of the localities. T h e
fortification of Constantinople would altogether c h a n g e the c h a r a c t e r of
R u s s o - T u r k i s h warfare, a n d p r o v e t h e heaviest b l o w e v e r dealt t o t h e
eternal d r e a m s of t h e self-styled heir of t h e B y z a n t i n e E m p e r o r s .
T h e r u m o r of Austria's concentrating a c o r p s d'armée in t h e B a n a t , to be
placed u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of General C o u n t Schlick, is contradicted by t h e
German Press.
T h e Correspondenz, of Berlin, states t h a t general o r d e r s h a v e b e e n given
to t h e authorities to hold t h e m s e l v e s p r e p a r e d , in c a s e of a mobilization of
the L a n d w e h r .
O v e r t u r e s have b e e n m a d e from St. P e t e r s b u r g to the Cabinet of C o p e n h a g e n for t h e cession of t h e Island of B o r n h o l m to Russia. " B o r n h o l m , " as it
is justly r e m a r k e d by The Daily News, " m i g h t be a M a l t a or Gibraltar of t h e
Baltic. It is within a d a y ' s sail of the S u n d and C o p e n h a g e n , a n d placed by
n a t u r e at t h e v e r y throat of the Baltic."
In t h e m e s s a g e sent by L o r d Redclif f e to the G o v e r n o r of S e v a s t o p o l , and
intimating to h i m t h e a p p e a r a n c e of t h e united s q u a d r o n in t h e Black Sea,
the only object of the m o v e m e n t is stated to be " t h e protection of t h e
Ottoman territoryîrom all aggression or hostile a c t s , " no mention being m a d e
of t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Ottoman flag.
As all the a c c o u n t s received from P a r i s , V i e n n a , Berlin, Constantinople
a n d St. Petersburg, indicate t h e p r o s p e c t of war, prices h a v e generally declined in all stock m a r k e t s on b o t h sides of the C h a n n e l .
Karl Marx.
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Nr. 4000, 11. Februar 1854
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , Jan. 24, 1854.
T h e a t t e m p t s of the R u s s i a n a r m y to c r o s s t h e D a n u b e simultaneously on
t h e whole line of operations—at Matshin, Giurgevo and Kalefat—are to be
5 considered as reconnoitering m a n e u v e r s rather t h a n as serious a t t a c k s ,
w h i c h c a n hardly b e v e n t u r e d u p o n w i t h t h e p r e s e n t forces General G o r c h a koff h a s to dispose of.
L a s t S a t u r d a y ' s Press—the Disraeli paper—published a n o t e of a conversation v e r y recently held at G a t c h i n a b e t w e e n t h e Czar a n d a " d i s io tinguished" Englishman. A l m o s t t h e w h o l e of t h e daily L o n d o n p r e s s h a s
reprinted this n o t e , which, besides t h e k n o w n a n d worn-out c o m m o n - p l a c e s
of R u s s i a n diplomacy, contains s o m e interesting statements. T h e C z a r
"distinctly stated t h a t t h e u l t i m a t u m of Menchikoff h a d not b e e n disa p p r o v e d of in L o n d o n , b u t t h a t t h e English Ministry, having been informed
15
that it would probably be accepted by the Porte, h a d recognized it as a
satisfactory settlement." This would only p r o v e t h a t p o o r J o h n Russell w a s
falsely informed by B a r o n de B r u n n o w as to t h e " p r o b a b l e " intentions of
t h e Sublime P o r t e , a n d t h a t t h e P o r t e ' s refusing to yield to t h e Menchikoff
ultimatum at o n c e , w a s by no m e a n s t h e fault of the Coalition Cabinet. T h e
20 C z a r goes on informing " t h e individual of distinction" that " w h e n t h e n e w s
of t h e victory of Sinope arrived, General Castelbajac (the F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r ) a d d r e s s e d him a letter beginning something in this w a y : ' A s a
Christian and as a soldier, p e r m i t me to congratulate your Imperial Majesty
on the glorious victory obtained by y o u r M a j e s t y ' s fleet.' " L e t me r e m a r k
25 t h a t General Castelbajac, an old Legitimist a n d a relative of L a r o c h e j a c quelein's, gained his generalship, n o t by services in the c a m p , b u t by less
dangerous service in t h e a n t e - c h a m b e r s of t h e Court, and t h e a r d e n t confession of exalted royalist principles. B o n a p a r t e appointed him as E m b a s s a d o r to the C o u r t of St. P e t e r s b u r g , with a view to give t h e Czar a proof
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of deference to his personal w i s h e s , although he w a s fully a w a r e that Castelbajac w a s to conspire with t h e Czar for t h e restoration of t h e B o u r b o n s r a t h e r
t h a n further the interests of his nominal m a s t e r . This Castelbajac, t h e n , is
t h e v e r y m a n to h a v e congratulated t h e Czar " a s a soldier and a Christian"
on the resultless b u t c h e r y of Sinope. " H e did n o t b e l i e v e , " t h e C z a r is stated
to h a v e said, " t h a t England, with a Bourgeois Parliament, could c a r r y on a
w a r with glory." T h e r e is no d o u b t that the C z a r k n o w s his C o b d e n s a n d his
Brights, and estimates at its just value the m e a n a n d abject spirit of t h e
E u r o p e a n middle classes. Finally, the Czar is quite right in stating that, on
t h e o n e hand, he h a d not b e e n p r e p a r e d for war—fully c o n v i n c e d as he w a s
that he should obtain all he cared for by t h e simple act of bullying—and t h a t ,
on t h e other hand, if war w e r e brought about, it would be t h e " w a r of inc a p a c i t i e s , " making it inevitable by their anxious efforts to p r e v e n t it, and
plunging into it finally in order to cover their b l u n d e r s a n d save their places.
"Public opinion is half inclined to sacrifice Prince Albert at t h e shrine of
r u m o r . A whisper, which w a s first insinuated for party u s e s , h a s g r o w n into
a roar, and a constructive hint h a s swelled into a positive and m o n s t r o u s
fiction. T h a t t h o s e w h o seek t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e Q u e e n should find Prince
Albert with her Majesty, is a fact w h i c h r a t h e r w o n the s y m p a t h y and e s t e e m
of the English public; b u t t h e n it w a s said t h a t he a t t e n d e d meetings of t h e
Q u e e n with h e r Ministers; next, that Ministers w e r e m a d e a w a r e of his
presence—that, h o w e v e r reluctant to p r o c e e d w i t h business b e f o r e a third
p a r t y , t h e y found it n e c e s s a r y to do so—that it e v e n b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y to
defend their opinions before t h e Prince—that t h e Prince, in fact, interfered
with their counsel to their Sovereign—that he n o t only influenced the R o y a l
mind, b u t possessing the p o w e r of free c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h foreign C o u r t s ,
he constituted an unlicensed channel for information b e t w e e n the confidential council of t h e Q u e e n and t h e Cabinets of foreign p o t e n t a t e s , p e r h a p s
of the enemies of England—that in short, Prince Albert w a s a traitor to his
Q u e e n , that he had b e e n i m p e a c h e d for high t r e a s o n , a n d finally, t h a t on a
charge of high treason he had b e e n arrested and c o m m i t t e d to the T o w e r .
This w a s t h e story n o t only told in all parts of E n g l a n d a day or t w o b a c k ,
b u t b y some b e l i e v e d . "
I q u o t e the a b o v e passage from The Spectator, in o r d e r to show your
r e a d e r s h o w public r u m o r has b e e n induced by t h e Palmerstonian p r e s s to
m a k e a poor stupid young m a n the scapegoat of the responsible Ministers.
Prince Albert is a G e r m a n Prince, c o n n e c t e d with most of t h e absolute and
despotic G o v e r n m e n t s of the Continent. Raised to the r a n k of Prince-Consort
in G r e a t Britain, he has devoted his time partly to fattening pigs, to inventing
ridiculous hats for the army, to planning m o d e l lodging h o u s e s of a peculiarly
t r a n s p a r e n t a n d uncomfortable kind, to the H y d e Park Exhibition, and to
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a m a t e u r soldiery. He h a s b e e n considered amiable and harmless, in point of
intellect b e l o w the general average of h u m a n beings, a prolific father a n d
an obsequious h u s b a n d . Of late, h o w e v e r , he has b e e n deliberately magnified
into the most influential m a n a n d t h e m o s t dangerous c h a r a c t e r of t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom, said to dispose of the w h o l e State machinery at the secret dictation
of Russia. N o w t h e r e c a n exist b u t little d o u b t that t h e Prince exercises a
direct influence in Court affairs, and, of c o u r s e , in the interest of d e s p o t i s m .
T h e Prince c a n n o t b u t act a Prince's p a r t , a n d w h o was ever silly e n o u g h
to suppose he w o u l d n o t ? B u t I need n o t inform your r e a d e r s of the utter
i m p o t e n c y to which British Royalty itself has b e e n r e d u c e d by t h e British
oligarchy, so that, for instance, K i n g William I V , a decided foe to Russia,
w a s forced by his Foreign Minister—a m e m b e r of t h e Whig oligarchy—to
act as a foe to T u r k e y . H o w p r e p o s t e r o u s , t h e n , to s u p p o s e Prince Albert
to be able to c a r r y o n e single point in defiance of t h e Ministry, e x c e p t so
far as little C o u r t affairs, a dirty riband, or a tinsel star, are c o n c e r n e d ! U s e
is m a d e of his absolutist penchants to blind t h e p e o p l e ' s e y e s as to the plots
and treacheries of the responsible Ministers. If the o u t c r y and attack m e a n s
anything it m e a n s an a t t a c k on royalist institutions. If t h e r e w e r e no Q u e e n
t h e r e would be no Prince—if there w e r e no t h r o n e there would be no C o u r t
influences. Princes would lose their p o w e r if t h r o n e s w e r e n o t t h e r e to b a c k
t h e m , and for them to lean u p o n . But, n o w m a r k ! the p a p e r s w h i c h go the
farthest in their "fearful b o l d n e s s , " w h i c h cry t h e loudest and try to m a k e
a sort of political capital o u t of Prince Albert, are t h e m o s t eager in their
assertions of loyalty to the t h r o n e and in fulsome adulation of t h e Q u e e n .
As to the T o r y p a p e r s this proposition is self-evident. As to the radical
Morning Advertiser, it is t h e s a m e j o u r n a l w h i c h hailed B o n a p a r t e ' s c o u p
d'état, and recently attacked an Irish p a p e r for having d a r e d to find fault w i t h
t h e Q u e e n , on the occasion of her p r e s e n c e at Dublin, which r e p r o a c h e s t h e
F r e n c h Revolutionists with professing Republicanism, and continues to
designate L o r d P a l m e r s t o n as t h e savior of England. T h e whole is a Palmerstonian trick. P a l m e r s t o n , by the revelations of his Russianism and his
opposition to the n e w R e f o r m Bill, has b e c o m e unpopular. T h e latter act h a s
t a k e n t h e liberal gilding off his m u s t y gingerbread. N e v e r t h e l e s s , he w a n t s
popularity in order to b e c o m e Premier, or at least Foreign Minister. W h a t
an admirable opportunity to stamp himself a Liberal again a n d to play the
part of B r u t u s , p e r s e c u t e d by secret C o u r t influences. A t t a c k a PrinceConsort—how taking for the p e o p l e . He'll be the m o s t popular s t a t e s m a n of
t h e age. W h a t an admirable opportunity of casting obloquy on his p r e s e n t
colleagues, of stigmatizing t h e m as the tools of Prince Albert, and of convincing t h e Court that P a l m e r s t o n must be a c c e p t e d on his o w n t e r m s . T h e
T o r i e s , of c o u r s e , join in t h e cry, for c h u r c h and c r o w n are little to t h e m
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Karl Marx
c o m p a r e d with p o u n d s and a c r e s , and t h e s e t h e cotton-lords are winning
from t h e m fast. A n d if the T a r i e s , in the n a m e of " c o n s t i t u t i o n " a n d " l i b e r t y "
t a l k daggers against a Prince, w h a t enlightened Liberal would n o t t h r o w
himself worshiping at their feet!
At t h e annual meeting of the M a n c h e s t e r C o m m e r c i a l Association the
5
President, Mr. Aspinall T u r n e r , declared with regard to t h e strikes and looko u t s a n d the general agitation of t h e w o r k i n g m e n , w h i c h he justly described
as " t h e civil w a r going on b e t w e e n m a s t e r s a n d operatives in L a n c a shire"—that, " a s M a n c h e s t e r h a d p u t d o w n r o y a l t y r a n n y and aristocratic
t y r a n n y , so it w o u l d also deal with t h e t y r a n n y of D e m o c r a c y . "
10
" H e r e we h a v e , " exclaims The Press, " a n involuntary avowal of the policy
of t h e M a n c h e s t e r school. T h e c r o w n is in E n g l a n d supreme—then diminish
t h e royal p o w e r . T h e aristocracy stands before us—sweep it from our p a t h .
W o r k i n g m e n agitate—crush t h e m t o t h e e a r t h . "
Karl Marx.
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Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels
Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's NeutralityComposition of British ParliamentCrop Failure in Europe
Nr. 4004, 16. Februar 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , Jan. 27, 1854.
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T h e fortification of Constantinople w o u l d b e , as I stated in my last letter,
t h e m o s t important step t h e T u r k s could t a k e . Constantinople o n c e fortified,
with suitable strengthening of t h e forts on t h e B o s p h o r u s and Dardanelles,
the i n d e p e n d e n c e of T u r k e y , or of a n y p o w e r holding t h a t capital, w o u l d
require no foreign g u a r a n t e e . T h e r e is no t o w n m o r e e a s y to be fortified t h a n
Constantinople. O n e single side of t h e triangle only—the o n e t o w a r d t h e
land—would require a c o n t i n u o u s r a m p a r t ; the s e c o n d , t o w a r d t h e S e a of
M a r m o r a , a n d t h e third, t o w a r d t h e G o l d e n H o r n , require no fortifications.
A line of d e t a c h e d forts, at a c o n v e n i e n t distance from the enceinte, a n d
continued e a s t w a r d s o a s t o p r o t e c t Pera, Galata a n d t h e n o r t h - e a s t e r n b a n k
of t h e G o l d e n H o r n , w o u l d b o t h strengthen t h e enceinte and p r e v e n t an
e n e m y from turning it and carrying on w o r k s of siege on t h e hills c o m m a n d i n g
the t o w n from behind P e r a and Galata.
S u c h a fortress w o u l d be almost impregnable. Its c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c a n n o t
be c u t off, unless t h e Dardanelles or t h e B o s p h o r u s is forced, and if t h a t w e r e
t h e c a s e t h e City w o u l d b e a t o n c e lost. B u t t w o s u c h n a r r o w passages m a y
easily be fortified so strongly t h a t no hostile fleet c a n p a s s through. A R u s s i a n
a r m y coming from the land side w o u l d h a v e to rely u p o n perilous sea c o m munication with S e v a s t o p o l a n d O d e s s a , a n d could hardly hold o u t for t h e
time required to t a k e t h e t o w n , while its c o n t i n u o u s falling off in n u m b e r s
w o u l d e x p o s e it to defeats from t h e garrison of t h e t o w n a n d t h e r e s e r v e s
arriving from Asia.
T h e reply of R u s s i a to t h e declaration of neutrality on the p a r t of D e n m a r k
arrived at C o p e n h a g e n on t h e 20th inst. R u s s i a is stated to refuse to c o n s e n t
to t h e neutrality, calling on D e n m a r k to t a k e o n e side or t h e other. Immediately after this notification, t h e E m b a s s a d o r s of F r a n c e , England and
Prussia, are said to h a v e h a d a c o n f e r e n c e w i t h t h e D a n i s h Ministers. N o w , I
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am informed from a v e r y t r u s t w o r t h y source, although I c a n , of c o u r s e , n o t
v o u c h for the correctness of the information, t h a t t h e p r o t e s t is b u t a feint
on t h e part of t h e Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u r g calculated to drive t h e other
p o w e r s the faster into a formal a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of the t e r m s on w h i c h the
D a n i s h neutrality is p r o p o s e d . I am a s s u r e d t h a t r e c e n t negotiations w e r e
going o n b e t w e e n D e n m a r k o n the o n e side, and F r a n c e and England o n the
other, according to which, in the c a s e of war, England w a s to o c c u p y t h e
S o u n d with her men-of-war, and F r a n c e the D u c h y of Schleswig, w i t h a corps
d ' a r m é e . T o t h w a r t this combination, c o m m u n i c a t e d t o N e s s e l r o d e b y t h e
Minister Oerstedt, Russia is said to h a v e intimated to the C o p e n h a g e n
Cabinet to p r o p o s e t h e declaration of neutrality. He n o w feigns to o p p o s e ,
a n d w h i c h , if adhered to by F r a n c e and England, Will n o t only b r e a k up their
original plan, b u t also, by exempting from t h e l a w s of war, goods carried in
neutral vessels, will secure the e x p o r t of R u s s i a n m e r c h a n d i s e by the Baltic.
T h e C z a r ' s p r o t e s t against the p u r c h a s e , on t h e p a r t of Prussia, of an
O l d e n b u r g p o r t in t h e N o r t h Sea, is a bona fide p r o t e s t , a s t o n i s h e d as t h e
Berlin public is said to h a v e b e e n at this other s y m p t o m of the ubiquitous
intermeddling of Timour T a m e r l a n e ' s successor.
T h e great " M a n c h e s t e r R e f o r m m e e t i n g " h a s " c o m e off, a n d a great piece
of h u m b u g it w a s , " as The Englishman justly r e m a r k s . T h e A b e r d e e n policy
extolled, T u r k e y insulted, Russia glorified, all interference b e t w e e n foreign
states disclaimed—these few topics which, as far as foreign policy is conc e r n e d , form the regular stock-in-trade of the M a n c h e s t e r school—have again
b e e n expatiated on by Messrs. C o b d e n , Bright and t h e other " 'umble and
'omely m e n , " w h o w a n t t o h a v e a " m a n o f p e a c e " a t the " H o r s e G u a r d s , "
a n d a " l o o k o u t " at t h e H o u s e of L o r d s to sell t h e English and to undersell
all o t h e r nations.
Mr. C o b d e n ' s s p e e c h w a s a m e r e repetition, a n d a disingenuous one t o o ,
of t h e s p e e c h he m a d e at t h e closing of Parliament. T h e only luxury of novelty
he indulged in consisted of t w o arguments—the o n e directed against F r a n c e ,
t h e o t h e r against America. It looks rather suspicious t h a t the same m a n w h o
t o o k so p r o m i n e n t a p a r t in bringing a b o u t t h e alliance with F r a n c e at the
t i m e w h e n t h e exploits of t h e D e c e m b r i s t s had a r o u s e d a cry of indignation
in E n g l a n d , is n o w busied in undoing his o w n w o r k by sneering at t h a t alliance, a n d denouncing it as " i n c o n s i d e r a t e " and " u n t i m e l y . " As to America,
M r . C o b d e n declares that it is from the g r o w t h of its m a n u f a c t u r e s and
c o m m e r c e , and n o t from the warlike policy of Russia, t h a t England m a y fear
to see e n d a n g e r e d t h e g r a n d e u r of h e r commercial a n d national prosperity.
H o w d o e s this tally with his professional free t r a d e c a n t , according to which
t h e commercial prosperity of o n e people d e p e n d s on t h e growth of t h e
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Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parliament
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c o m m e r c e and industry of all other p e o p l e s , t h e notion of any d a n g e r o u s
rivalry b e t w e e n t w o industrial p e o p l e s being disclaimed as a fallacy of
protectionist " q u a c k s ? " H o w d o e s this tally with " E n g l a n d ' s , b y t h e magic
of her machinery, having united forever two r e m o t e h e m i s p h e r e s in t h e
b o n d s of p e a c e , by placing E u r o p e a n d A m e r i c a in absolute and inextricable
dependence on each other?" It is n o t t h e first t i m e t h a t M r . C o b d e n , in o r d e r
to divert from Russia the suspicions and t h e animosity of t h e English people,
is anxious to turn t h e m against the U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a . In 1836, t h e
seizure of an English vessel on t h e Circassian c o a s t by a R u s s i a n man-of-war,
and the fiscal regulations of the St. P e t e r s b u r g Cabinet with regard to t h e
navigation of the D a n u b e , together with t h e revelations published in The
Portfolio, having e v o k e d t h e w r a t h of t h e English p e o p l e , and, a b o v e all,
t h e commercial classes, against Russia,—Mr. C o b d e n , at t h a t e p o c h y e t " a n
infant in literary life a n d unlearned in public s p e a k i n g , " published a small
a n o n y m o u s p a m p h l e t , entitled "Russia: A Cure for Russophobia. By a
Manchester Manufacturer. " In this p a m p h l e t it is argued t h a t "in less t h a n
t w e n t y y e a r s t h i s " ( n a m e l y , t h e fear of t h e g r o w t h of American p r o s p e r i t y ,
a n d not of Russian aggrandizement, ) "will be the sentiment of the people
of E n g l a n d generally; a n d t h e s a m e c o n v i c t i o n s will be forced upon the
Government of the country." In t h e s a m e p a m p h l e t he professed that, "in
examining the various g r o u n d s u p o n which t h o s e w h o discuss t h e subject
t a k e up their hostile attitude t o w a r d the R u s s i a n nation, we h a v e d i s c o v e r e d ,
with infinite surprise a n d a d e e p conviction of t h e t r u t h , t h a t a c e n t u r y of
aristocratic G o v e r n m e n t in E n g l a n d h a s impregnated all classes with the
haughty and arrogant spirit of their r u l e r s ; " (against m e e k Russia!) that "if
the G o v e r n m e n t of St. P e t e r s b u r g w e r e transferred to the shores of t h e
B o s p h o r u s , a splendid a n d substantial E u r o p e a n city would, in less t h a n
t w e n t y y e a r s , spring up in the place of t h o s e h u t s which n o w constitute t h e
capital of T u r k e y ; noble buildings would arise, learned societies flourish, a n d
the arts p r o s p e r . If R u s s i a ' s G o v e r n m e n t should attain to t h a t actual p o w e r ,
she w o u l d cease the w a r s of t h e s w o r d and begin t h e battle with t h e wildern e s s , by constructing railroads, building bridges, by fostering the a c c u m u l a t i o n of capital, the growth of cities, and the increase of civilization
and freedom... T h e slavery w h i c h pollutes Constantinople w o u l d instantly
disappear, and c o m m e r c e and laws protecting life and property"—(as n o w
exemplified in Moldo-Wallachia)—"take its p l a c e . "
" A s a proof of R u s s i a ' s civilization and c o n s e q u e n t l y her right to appropriate T u r k e y , Mr. C o b d e n told his astonished r e a d e r s that t h e Russian merc h a n t possessed of 10-15,000 r o u b l e s , n o t only engages in foreign c o m m e r c e ,
b u t is "exempt from corporal punishment, and qualified to drive about in
a carriage and pair. " A r e we t h e n to be a s t o n i s h e d at t h e R u s s i a n E m p e r o r ' s
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r e c e n t l y e x p r e s s e d conviction that " E n g l a n d , with a Bourgeois Parliament
could n o t c a r r y on a w a r with g l o r y ? " So deeply i m b u e d w a s Mr. C o b d e n
in 1836, with t h e " w i c k e d n e s s of the public writers and s p e a k e r s , " w h o
v e n t u r e d to find fault with the A u t o c r a t of all t h e R u s s i a s , t h a t he w o u n d
up his p a m p h l e t with t h e question: " A n d w h o a n d w h a t are t h o s e writers a n d
5
s p e a k e r s ? H o w long shall political q u a c k s be permitted, without fear of
p u n i s h m e n t , to inflame the minds a n d disorder t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of a w h o l e
n a t i o n ? " T h o s e "public writers and s p e a k e r s , " w e p r e s u m e , w h o p o s s e s s
10,000 to 15,000 roubles and are able to drive a b o u t in a carriage a n d pair,
to be e x e m p t e d at least from " c o r p o r a l punishment." Till n o w , M r . C o b d e n ' s
10
Philo-Russian m a n i a h a d b e e n considered, by s o m e , as o n e of t h e multifarious c r o t c h e t s he u s e s to t r a d e in, by o t h e r s as the n e c e s s a r y offspring of
his p e a c e doctrine. Of late, h o w e v e r , t h e public h a s b e e n informed by o n e
w h o justly describes himself as the "literary h o r s e , or ass if y o u l i k e , " of
t h e late Anti-Corn L a w L e a g u e , that, w h e n Mr. C o b d e n w r o t e his first 15
p a m p h l e t , " h e h a d b e e n to Russia on a commercial e r r a n d of his o w n , in
1834-35, and w a s successful," t h a t his " h e a r t and calico w e r e b o t h in R u s s i a
in 1836;" a n d that his anger at t h e " E n g l i s h w r i t e r s , s p e a k e r s , a u t h o r s and
r e v i e w e r s , " originated from their criticising his n e w c u s t o m e r , Nicholas of
Russia.
20
As t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s is to r e a s s e m b l e in a few d a y s , it seems p r o p e r
to give, in a c o n d e n s e d form, the statistics of British representation:
Seats.
The relations of Peers possess
Irish Peers
The country gentlemen
Men of letters and science
The army and navy
The commercial and moneyed interest
The lawyers
The workingmen's interest
Total seats occupied
103 -1
266
20
30
109
107
None.
641
Percentage
of the actual
Representation.
25
17,0
41,3
3,0
4,6
17,1
17,0
30
T h e ttsh Peers in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s a r e : V i s c o u n t P a l m e r s t o n , for 35
T i v e r t o n ; V i s c o u n t Barrington, for B e r k s h i r e ; E a r l A n n e s l e y , for G r i m s b y ;
V i s c o u n t M o n c k , for P o r t s m o u t h ; V i s c o u n t G a l w a y , for R e t f o r d ; a n d L o r d
H o t h a m , for E a s t Y o r k s h i r e . T h e m e n of literature and science a r e : Benjamin
Disraeli, for B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ; T h o m a s M a c a u l a y , t h e historian, for E d i n b u r g h ; M a c G r e g o r , t h e commercial statist, for Glasgow; William Stirling, 40
a u t h o r of Annals of the Artists of Spain, e t c . , for P e r t h s h i r e ; W m . G l a d s t o n e ,
a u t h o r of The State in its Relation to the Church, a n d o t h e r w o r k s , for Oxford
42
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20
25
30
35
40
U n i v e r s i t y ; Dr. A u s t e n H. L a y a r d , a u t h o r of Nineveh and its Remains, e t c . ,
for A y l e s b u r y ; J a m e s Wilson, t h e E d i t o r of The Economist, for W e s t b u r y ;
Sir William M o l e s w o r t h , the E d i t o r of H o b b e s ' w o r k s , etc., for S o u t h w a r k ;
Sir E. L. Bulwer L y t t o n , poet, dramatist, novelist, for H e r t f o r d s h i r e ; William
J o h n s o n F o x , A n t i - C o r n - L a w L e a g u e writer, for Oldham ; W. A. M a c k i n n o n ,
a u t h o r of a (very pitiful) History of Civilization, etc., for R y e ; R. M o n c k t o n
M i l n e s , a u t h o r of Memorials of Travel, e t c . , a n d Benjamin Oliveira, a u t h o r
of a Tour in the East, b o t h for P o n t e f r a c t ; E d w a r d Miall, a u t h o r of several
theological and political w o r k s , for R o c h d a l e ; William M u r e , a u t h o r of a
History of Grecian Literature, for R e n f r e w s h i r e , Scotland; W. P. U r q u h a r t ,
a u t h o r of The Life of Francisco Sforza, for W e s t m e a t h C o u n t y , I r e l a n d ;
R o b e r t S t e p h e n s o n , t h e celebrated railway engineer, for W h i t b y ; William
Micheli, physician, for B o d m i n ; J o h n B r a d y , surgeon, for Leitrim. W h e t h e r
L o r d J o h n Russell m a y be safely classed u n d e r t h e h e a d of literary gentlemen
I d a r e n o t decide.
T h e r e a r e , at least, 100 s e a t s , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of w h i c h are nominally
elected b y t h e constituencies, b u t really appointed b y D u k e s , E a r l s , M a r q u i s e s , ladies and other p e r s o n s , w h o t u r n their local influence to political
account. T h e Marquis of W e s t m i n s t e r , for instance, disposes of t w o seats
for C h e s t e r , a t o w n mustering 2,524 e l e c t o r s ; the D u k e of N o r f o l k of o n e
seat for Arundel; the D u k e of S u t h e r l a n d of t w o seats for Newcastle-underL y n e ; t h e Marquis of L a n s d o w n e of o n e seat for Calne ; the E a r l Fitz-William
of t w o seats for M a l t ó n ; t h e D u k e of R i c h m o n d of t w o seats for Chichester;
Miss Pierse of o n e seat for N o r t h a l l e r t o n , e t c .
T h e disproportion on o n e side of t h e electoral b o d y , a n d on the other of
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w h e n c o m p a r e d with t h e entire population, m a y b e
s h o w n b y s o m e few i n s t a n c e s :
In B e r k s h i r e t h e entire population a m o u n t s to 170,065, and the n u m b e r of
electors to 7,980. It c h o o s e s nine r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s for the H o u s e , while
L e i c e s t e r s h i r e , w i t h an entire population of 230,308, and a constituency of
13,081 disposes of six seats only; Lincolnshire, with a population of 407,222,
a n d 24,782 electors, disposes of thirteen seats in t h e H o u s e , while Middlesex, with an entire population of 1,886,576, a n d a constituency of
113,490 elects only f o u r t e e n m e m b e r s . L a n c a s h i r e , w i t h a population of
2,031,236, h a s a c o n s t i t u e n c y of only 81,786 electors, a n d disposes of b u t
twenty-six seats in the H o u s e , while B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e , with an entire population of 163,723, a n d with 8,125 electors, is r e p r e s e n t e d by eleven m e m b e r s .
S u s s e x , with an entire population of 336,844, a n d with 18,054 electors, elects
eighteen m e m b e r s , while Staffordshire, w i t h a population of 678,716, a n d
w i t h 29,667 electors, elects only s e v e n t e e n .
T h e relation of t h e Electoral b o d y to t h e population is:
43
In England o n e C o u n t y Elector r e p r e s e n t s 20,7 p e r s o n s of the C o u n t y
population.
In W a l e s o n e C o u n t y Elector r e p r e s e n t s 20,0 p e r s o n s of the C o u n t y
population.
In Scotland o n e C o u n t y Elector r e p r e s e n t s 34,4 p e r s o n s of the C o u n t y
population.
In E n g l a n d o n e B o r o u g h Elector r e p r e s e n t s 18,0 p e r s o n s of t h e b o r o u g h
population.
In W a l e s o n e B o r o u g h Elector r e p r e s e n t s 24,4 p e r s o n s of the b o r o u g h
population.
In Scotland o n e B o r o u g h Elector r e p r e s e n t s 23,8 p e r s o n s of the b o r o u g h
population.
T h e d a t a for Ireland are not so c o m p l e t e as for E n g l a n d and Scotland; b u t
t h e following m a y be t a k e n as a fair a p p r o x i m a t i o n for t h e same period,
1851-52.
O n e Elector in an Irish C o u n t y r e p r e s e n t s 36 p e r s o n s of the C o u n t y
population.
O n e Elector in an Irish b o r o u g h r e p r e s e n t s 23 p e r s o n s of the b o r o u g h
population.
T h e general deficiency of the E u r o p e a n Grain m a r k e t s m a y be stated as
follows: t h e deficiency of grain in F r a n c e in place of being t e n millions of
hectolitres, as stated by the Moniteur, to calm t h e alarm, greatly e x c e e d s
t w e n t y millions, t h a t is, more t h a n eight million q u a r t e r s of English m e a s u r e ;
and the deficiency of p o t a t o e s is not less t h a n one-fourth of the average of
t h e last five y e a r s , while t h e deficiency in w i n e , oil a n d c h e s t n u t s is yet
greater. T h e deficiency in the p r o d u c e of c o r n in Belgium and Holland is
a b o u t four millions of hectolitres; that of t h e R h i n e P r o v i n c e s , Prussia a n d
Switzerland, at a m o d e r a t e estimate, is t a k e n to e x c e e d ten million hectolit r e s . T h e estimated deficiency in Italy is k n o w n to be v e r y great, b u t t h e r e
is greater difficulty in arriving at e v e n a p r o x i m a t e result. T h e lowest estim a t e , h o w e v e r , gives t e n millions of hectolitres of grain, or a deficiency
t h r o u g h o u t the great grain producing districts of W e s t e r n E u r o p e of n o t less
t h a n forty-four millions of hectolitres, ( s e v e n t e e n million quarters.) T h e
deficiency in England is k n o w n to e x c e e d five million q u a r t e r s of grain, and
calculations w o r t h y of grave consideration give t h a t a m o u n t as the deficiency
in w h e a t alone. T h u s there is a fatal deficiency in t h e last h a r v e s t in W e s t e r n
E u r o p e alone of no less t h a n t w e n t y - t w o million q u a r t e r s , without taking into
a c c o u n t t h e great inferiority a n d short-coming of other cereals, and t h e
general p r e v a l e n c e of the potato-rot—a deficiency w h i c h , if valued in w h e a t ,
m u s t be equal to at least five million q u a r t e r s , or a grand total of t w e n t y - s e v e n
million q u a r t e r s of grain.
44
5
10
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20
25
30
35
40
As to the supplies that m a y be e x p e c t e d from foreign m a r k e t s , it is asserted
b y v e r y c o m p e t e n t commercial authority:
" I n Poland the c r o p s h a v e b e e n v e r y short; in R u s s i a , deficient, as seen
by t h e high prices a s k e d for grain at t h e Baltic p o r t s before our deficiencies
5 w e r e k n o w n . A n d t h o u g h in the D a n u b i a n p r o v i n c e s the h a r v e s t has n o t
failed, yet t h e stocks t h e r e , as well as at O d e s s a , are greatly lessened by t h e
i m m e n s e exportations t o t h e M e d i t e r a n e a n a n d t o F r a n c e . A s t o A m e r i c a , i t
is unable to supply t w o million of q u a r t e r s . All t h e ships of t h e world are
inadequate to the supply of a quantity n e a r , or e v e n approaching a m o i e t y
10 of t h e deficiency, w h i c h at p r e s e n t is k n o w n to all E n g l a n d to exist."
Karl Marx.
45
Karl Marx
Count Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during the War
Nr.4007, 20. Februar 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , F e b . 3, 1854.
I w a s able to see the State procession of the Q u e e n to o p e n Parliament, as
i t p a s s e d t h e H o r s e G u a r d s . T h e T u r k i s h E m b a s s a d o r w a s r e c e i v e d with loud
c h e e r s and h u r r a h s . Prince Albert, w h o s e c o u n t e n a n c e w a s deadly pale, w a s
furiously hissed by t h e c r o w d s on b o t h sides of t h e streets, while t h e Q u e e n
w a s sparing of her usual salutes and morbidly smiled at the u n w o n t e d
manifestations of popular discontent. In a previous letter I h a v e r e d u c e d t h e
anti-Albert m o v e m e n t to its true dimensions, proving it to be a m e r e p a r t y
trick. T h e public d e m o n s t r a t i o n is, n e v e r t h e l e s s , of a v e r y grave character,
as it p r o v e s the ostensible loyalty of t h e British p e o p l e to be a m e r e conventional formality, a c e r e m o n i o u s affectation w h i c h c a n n o t withstand the
slightest shock. Probably it m a y induce t h e C r o w n to dismiss a Ministry, the
anti-national policy of w h i c h t h r e a t e n s to e n d a n g e r its o w n security.
W h e n t h e r e c e n t mission of C o u n t Orloff to t h e V i e n n a Cabinet b e c a m e
k n o w n The Times informed its credulous r e a d e r s t h a t Orloff w a s the v e r y
m a n t h e C z a r used to employ on pacific e r r a n d s . N o w I n e e d not inform you
t h a t this same Orloff a p p e a r e d in the spring of 1833 at Constantinople to
s q u e e z e o u t of the Porte the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. W h a t he n o w asks
from t h e Cabinet at V i e n n a is the permission to send a R u s s i a n c o r p s from
W a r s a w , by w a y of H u n g a r y , to t h e D a n u b i a n seat of w a r . It m a y be considered as t h e first result of his p r e s e n c e at Vienna, t h a t A u s t r i a n o w insists
u p o n t h e P o r t e ' s dismissing its p r e s e n t c o m m a n d e r s on t h e Danube—Selim
P a s h a , Ismail P a s h a and O m e r Pasha—on t h e plea t h a t t h e y are r e n e g a d e s
a n d revolutionists. E v e r y o n e acquainted w i t h t h e pasjt history of T u r k e y
k n o w s t h a t from t h e beginning of t h e O s m a n p o w e r all h e r great generals,
admirals, diplomatists and ministers h a v e always b e e n Christian r e n e g a d e s ,
S e r b s , G r e e k s , Albanians, e t c . W h y not ask R u s s i a t o dismiss t h e forty o r
fifty m e n she has bought from all parts of E u r o p e , a n d w h o constitute her
46
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10
15
20
25
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
w h o l e stock of diplomatic ingenuity, political intelligence a n d military
ability? In t h e m e a n t i m e A u s t r i a h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d 80,000 m e n on t h e T u r k i s h
frontiers in Transylvania a n d H u n g a r y , a n d o r d e r e d a B o h e m i a n c o r p s
mustering some 30,000 m e n t o join t h e m . T h e P r u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t o n its
part is stated to h a v e declined to c o m p l y with t h e c o m m a n d of t h e C z a r
ordering F r e d e r i c k William IV to send a c o r p s of 100,000 m e n to o c c u p y
Poland in t h e n a m e a n d interest of Russia, a n d t h u s set t h e garrisons t h e r e
at liberty to m a r c h to t h e s o u t h for t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e c a m p a i g n in t h e
Principalities.
In a previous letter I called y o u r attention to t h e r e c e n t financial e x p e d i e n t
r e s o r t e d to by t h e Austrian G o v e r n m e n t of exacting a discount of 15 p e r cent,
u p o n their o w n p a p e r m o n e y , w h e n paid for t a x e s . This ingenious " t a x u p o n
t h e p a y m e n t of t a x e s " is n o w e x t e n d e d to Italy also. T h e Milan Gazette of t h e
22d inst. publishes a d e c r e e from t h e A u s t r i a n Minister of F i n a n c e , a n n o u n c ing that " i n c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e fall in t h e value of p a p e r m o n e y it will n o t
be received at the C u s t o m H o u s e unless at a discount of 17 per c e n t . "
As to the Russian E x c h e q u e r , I h a d on a previous occasion, at the b e ginning of w h a t is called t h e E a s t e r n complication, to w a r n y o u r r e a d e r s
against t h e industriously circulated s t a t e m e n t of the " h i d d e n " t r e a s u r e s
slumbering in t h e vaults of t h e B a n k of St. P e t e r s b u r g , and the ridiculous
exaggeration of t h e v a s t m o n e t a r y p o w e r t h a t R u s s i a c a n wield at a given
m o m e n t . M y views are fully confirmed b y w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d since. N o t only
h a s the Czar b e e n forced to w i t h d r a w his metallic deposits from t h e b a n k s
of E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , b u t , m o r e o v e r , to c o m m i t an act of fraudulent
confiscation. Prince P a s h k e w i t c h h a s informed the W a r s a w mortgage or
discount B a n k t h a t its capital will be t a k e n as a forced loan, although t h e
statutes of that b a n k forbid its advancing m o n e y u p o n a n y security b u t landed
property. We are also informed t h a t t h e R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d s issuing
a sum of 60,000,000 r o u b l e s in inconvertible p a p e r , to defray the e x p e n s e s
of t h e war. This c o n t r i v a n c e is no n e w o n e on t h e p a r t of t h e P e t e r s b u r g
Cabinet. At the close of 1768, C a t h e r i n e II, in o r d e r to m e e t the e x p e n s e s
of t h e w a r with T u r k e y , f o u n d e d a b a n k of assignats, ostensibly instituted
o n t h e principle o f issuing convertible n o t e s p a y a b l e t o t h e b e a r e r . B u t b y
a well-managed oversight, she forgot to tell t h e public in w h a t sort of m o n e y
t h e s e n o t e s w e r e to be p a y a b l e , a n d s o m e m o n t h s later t h e p a y m e n t s w e r e
only m a d e i n c o p p e r coin. B y a n o t h e r u n t o w a r d " a c c i d e n t " i t h a p p e n e d t h a t
t h e s e c o p p e r coins w e r e o v e r v a l u e d b y 5 0 p e r cent, w h e n c o m p a r e d with t h e
u n c o i n e d metal, a n d only circulated at their nominal value in c o n s e q u e n c of
their great scarcity a n d t h e w a n t of small m o n e y for retail p u r p o s e s . T h e
convertibility of the n o t e s w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a m e r e trick.
In t h e first instance Catherine limited t h e w h o l e issue to 40,000,000 roubles,
47
Karl Marx
in 25 rouble n o t e s , the rouble representing a silver coin varying from 38 to
40 d. British m o n e y , according to t h e rate of e x c h a n g e , being equivalent to
s o m e w h a t a b o v e 100 c o p p e r c o p e k s . At t h e d e a t h of Catherine, in 1796, t h e
m a s s of this p a p e r m o n e y h a d risen to 157,000,000, nearly four times its
original a m o u n t . T h e e x c h a n g e on L o n d o n h a d c o m e d o w n from 4 I d . in 1787
to 31d. in 1796. During the t w o s u b s e q u e n t g o v e r n m e n t s , a rapid increase
of issues having t a k e n place, in 1810 the p a p e r circulation r e a c h e d
577,000,000, and t h e p a p e r rouble w a s only w o r t h 2 5 / c o p e k s , i.e., o n e q u a r t e r of its value in 1788; a n d e x c h a n g e on L o n d o n , in t h e a u t u m n of 1810,
sunk to 1 lVzd. the rouble, instead of representing 38-40d. In 1817 the a m o u n t
of n o t e s in circulation w a s 836,000,000, according to t h e s t a t e m e n t of C o u n t
Gurieff ..As the c u s t o m - h o u s e duties and other t a x e s w e r e calculated in silver
r o u b l e s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t n o w declared t h e s e assignats t o b e receivable i n t h e
p r o p o r t i o n of 4 to 1, thus avowing a depreciation of 75 p e r cent. During the
p r o g r e s s of the depreciation, t h e prices of c o m m o d i t i e s r o s e proportionably,
subject to v e r y great fluctuations, which c o m m e n c e d troubling the Cabinet
itself, a n d forced it to c o n t r a c t foreign loans in order to w i t h d r a w from
circulation a portion of the n o t e s . On the 1st of J a n u a r y , 1821, their a m o u n t
w a s a n n o u n c e d t o h a v e b e e n r e d u c e d t o 640,000,000. T h e s u b s e q u e n t wars
w i t h T u r k e y , Persia, Poland, Chiva, etc., again swelled t h e m a s s of the b a n k
assignats, lowered the e x c h a n g e s a n e w , and subjected all commodities to
e x t e n s i v e and irregular oscillations of prices. It w a s n o t till the 1st July, 1839,
t h a t t h e r a t e of e x c h a n g e , being ameliorated in c o n s e q u e n c e of an e n o r m o u s
e x p o r t of grain to England, t h e Czar issued a m a n i f e s t o , according to w h i c h ,
from t h e 1st of July, 1840, t h e huge m a s s of b a n k assignats w a s to be conv e r t e d into b a n k n o t e s payable on d e m a n d in silver r o u b l e s at t h e full a m o u n t
of 38d. T h e Czar Alexander h a d declared t h e assignats to be receivable, on
t h e p a r t of the tax-gatherer, at the p r o p o r t i o n of 4 to 1 ; b u t the C z a r Nicholas
is said to h a v e restored t h e m , by his c o n v e r s i o n , to their full original value
again. T h e r e w a s , h o w e v e r , a curious little clause a n n e x e d , ordering t h a t for
e v e r y one of such n e w n o t e s t h r e e a n d a half of t h e old o n e s should be
delivered u p . T h e old note w a s not declared to be d e p r e c i a t e d to 28 p e r cent,
of its original a m o u n t , b u t 3 V2 of the old n o t e s w e r e declared to be equivalent
to a full new n o t e . H e n c e we may infer, on t h e o n e h a n d , t h a t t h e Russian
Cabinet is as conscientious and punctilious in financial as in diplomatic
distinctions; and on t h e other, t h a t t h e m e r e danger of an approaching w a r
suffices to throw it b a c k into all the m o n e t a r y difficulties w h i c h N i c h o l a s
h a s tried for about t w e n t y y e a r s to emerge from.
O n e o f t h e E u r o p e a n G o v e r n m e n t s after the o t h e r c o m e s f o r w a r d appealing to t h e p o c k e t s of its b e l o v e d subjects. E v e n t h e King of sober-minded
H o l l a n d d e m a n d s of the States General 600,000 rix-dollars for w o r k s of
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AL
fortification a n d defense, adding " t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s may d e t e r m i n e him to
mobilize a portion of the a r m y and to send o u t his fleets."
If it w e r e possible to m e e t real w a n t s and to fill the general v a c u u m of
m o n e y chests by any ingenious art of book-keeping, the contriver of t h e
5
F r e n c h budget, as published s o m e d a y s ago in t h e Moniteur, w o u l d h a v e d o n e
the thing; b u t t h e r e is n o t t h e smallest s h o p k e e p e r at Paris u n a w a r e of t h e
fact that, by t h e m o s t skilfull grouping of figures, o n e c a n n o t get o u t of t h e
b o o k s of his creditor, and t h a t the h e r o of t h e 2d of D e c e m b e r , deeming t h e
public p o c k e t to be inexhaustible, has recklessly run into the nation's debt.
10
T h e r e c a n be imagined nothing m o r e naif t h a n t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of t h e
D a n i s h Ministry at the sitting of the Folkething, on the 17th inst., that the
G o v e r n m e n t intended postponing to a m o r e expedient season t h e proposition
to change the fundamental institutions of D e n m a r k , and introduce their m u c h
cherished Whole State Constitution. (Gesammtstaatsverfassung.)
15
Karl Marx.
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Karl Marx
Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6—
Count Orlov's Mission—Operations of the Allied FleetThe Irish Brigade—Concerning the Convocation
of the Labour Parliament
Nr. 4008, 21. Februar 1854
F r o m Our O w n C o r r e s p o n d e n t .
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , F e b . 7, 1854.
T h e "Rights and Privileges of the G r e e k a n d L a t i n C h u r c h e s , " as the ministerial b l u e - b o o k o n t h e E a s t e r n Question h a s b e e n ingeniously baptized, h a v e
b e e n subjected by m e , to a scrutinizing perusal, and I intend shortly to give
y o u r r e a d e r s a c o n d e n s e d survey of this diplomatic labyrinth. F o r t h e
p r e s e n t , I c o n t e n t myself with the simple a s s u r a n c e t h a t a m o r e m o n s t r o u s
m o n u m e n t of G o v e r n m e n t a l infamies and imbecility h a s , p e r h a p s , n e v e r
b e e n b e q u e a t h e d to history. A n d , let us r e m e m b e r , w h a t M r . Baülie said in
t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s on t h e value of t h e s e b l u e - b o o k s : " A s for information, t h e y h a d quite as m u c h on this subject as t h e y required—not, he
admitted, official information—but quite as m u c h as t h e y w e r e likely to
r e c e i v e from a blue-book t h a t had b e e n carefully prepared, and had concealed all that a Government might desire. He s p o k e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e , ('hear,
h e a r , ' a n d laughter from the ministerial b e n c h e s , ) from a knowledge of h o w
b l u e - b o o k s relating to Foreign Affairs h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d for this H o u s e . "
I k n o w v e r y well t h a t L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , w h e n o n c e a c c u s e d of having perv e r t e d t h e d o c u m e n t s relating to t h e Af f g h a n war, of having s u p p r e s s e d m o s t
i m p o r t a n t passages in d i s p a t c h e s , and e v e n of having deliberately falsified
o t h e r s , m a d e t h e following ingenious reply: "Sir, if a n y such thing h a d b e e n
d o n e , w h a t w a s t o p r e v e n t the two a d v e r s e G o v e r n m e n t s , w h o succeeded
us in p o w e r , o n e of w h i c h e n d u r e d for five years—from proclaiming t h e fact
a n d p r o d u c i n g t h e real d o c u m e n t s ? " B u t I k n o w equally well t h a t the secret
of t h e s e b l u e - b o o k dodges is t h e v e r y secret of t h e alternate Whig a n d T o r y
succession in g o v e r n m e n t , e a c h p a r t y having a greater interest to maintain
t h e capability of its o p p o n e n t for succession, t h a n by ruining their mutual
political " h o n o r " to c o m p r o m i s e the g o v e r n m e n t of t h e ruling classes altogether. This is w h a t t h e British are pleased to call t h e o p e r a t i o n of their
glorious constitution.
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Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6—Count Orlov's Mission
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L o r d Clanricarde h a d given notice that he w o u l d m o v e a discussion of t h e
E a s t e r n question in t h e H o u s e of L o r d s , y e s t e r d a y . Consequently, great
expectations w e r e entertained, and t h e H o u s e almost c r o w d e d . Mr. U r q u h a r t
did n o t hesitate e v e n to designate, in y e s t e r d a y ' s Morning Advertiser, L o r d
Clanricarde as t h e future leader of t h e national p a r t y , r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t he
w a s the only m a n w h o o p p o s e d , in 1829, t h e Russians in crossing t h e Balkan,
b u t forgetting, n o doubt, t h a t t h e same noble Marquis w a s , during the
m o m e n t o u s e p o c h of 1839-40, L o r d P a l m e r s t o n ' s E m b a s s a d o r at t h e C o u r t
of St. Petersburg, and his chief i n s t r u m e n t in bringing a b o u t t h e separate
t r e a t y of 1840 a n d the r u p t u r e w i t h F r a n c e .
T h e public has b e e n decidedly disappointed b y the d e b a t e s , a s t h e Marquis
of Clanricarde, inferring from t h e r e p o r t s in t h e public p a p e r s , t h a t " t h e r e
a p p e a r e d to be something of t h e s e m b l a n c e of negotiations still going on at
Vienna, w a s extremely sorry to occasion a n y discussion which might p r e v e n t
a peaceful termination to t h o s e n e g o t i a t i o n s . " Accordingly, he g a v e notice
of his intention to bring f o r w a r d a m o t i o n on t h e s a m e subject this d a y w e e k .
T h e noble Marquis c o n t e n t e d himself w i t h asking L o r d Clarendon " w h e t h e r
any a n s w e r h a d y e t b e e n received from t h e E m p e r o r o f R u s s i a t o t h e V i e n n a
p r o p o s a l s ? " and " w h a t instructions h a d b e e n given to the British Minister
at St. P e t e r s b u r g ? " L o r d C l a r e n d o n ' s reply w a s , " t h a t he h a d only received
this afternoon an official s t a t e m e n t of the facts from V i e n n a . " T h e E m p e r o r
of R u s s i a h a d rejected t h e V i e n n a n o t e , a n d offered, in its stead, a c o u n t e r
project. O n t h e 2 d inst. t h e C o n f e r e n c e h a d b e e n called together, and h a d
rejected o n its p a r t the c o u n t e r project. " T h e n e w proposals put f o r w a r d b y
R u s s i a w e r e wholly unacceptable—they could n o t be transmitted to C o n stantinople, and, therefore, t h e r e w a s a n e n d o f t h e m . H e h a d n o r e a s o n t o
think t h a t fresh negotiations o n t h e subject w o u l d b e r e n e w e d . A s t o t h e
p r e s e r v a t i o n of p e a c e , he held out no s u c h e x p e c t a t i o n at all." W i t h regard
t o t h e other question p u t b y L o r d Clanricarde, h e stated t h a t " o n S a t u r d a y
evening B a r o n B r u n n o w called on him at t h e Foreign Office and placed in his
h a n d s a n o t e , in w h i c h he a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e a n s w e r he h a d received from
h i m t o t h e inquiry h e w a s instructed t o m a k e b y his G o v e r n m e n t , w a s not
of a kind that permitted him to continue diplomatic relations, and that,
therefore, diplomatic relations b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d England w e r e suspended.
B a r o n B r u n n o w h a d t a k e n l e a v e of h i m on S a t u r d a y evening, b u t it w a s t h e n
t o o late t o depart from L o n d o n , a n d h e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t h e w a s t o leave early
this m o r n i n g . "
M. de Kisseleff, we are informed by telegraph, left Paris y e s t e r d a y a n d
is g o n e to Brussels. T h e official or G o v e r n m e n t journals state t h a t all t h e
E m b a s s y at L o n d o n w o u l d be b r o k e n u p , a n d e v e r y R u s s i a n leave England.
B u t I h a p p e n to k n o w , from an excellent s o u r c e , t h a t , on t h e contrary, t h e
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Karl Marx
n u m b e r of Russians in England will only be diminished by the p e r s o n of the
E m b a s s a d o r , and t h a t t h e whole personnel remains at L o n d o n u n d e r t h e
s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e of M. de Berg, First S e c r e t a r y of t h e E m b a s s y . As to t h e
position of the British E m b a s s a d o r at t h e C o u r t of St. Petersburg, L o r d
Clarendon declared that " a s it w a s half past 6 o'clock on S a t u r d a y w h e n 5
B a r o n B r u n n o w called u p o n him, a n d as it w a s n e c e s s a r y to h a v e previous
c o m m u n i c a t i o n with t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t , it w a s n o t possible at the
m o m e n t to send instructions to t h e British Minister at St. P e t e r s b u r g , b u t t h e y
had already held communication with the F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r on the subject,
and instructions w o u l d be sent to Sir G. S e y m o u r a n d General de Çastelbajac 10
t o m o r r o w , w h i c h w o u l d place t h e m o n exactly t h e same footing a s t h e
R u s s i a n E m b a s s a d o r h e r e , and diplomatic relations b e t w e e n the t w o c o u n tries and Russia would be s u s p e n d e d . "
L o r d J o h n Russell r e p e a t e d in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s the declaration of
L o r d C l a r e n d o n in t h e U p p e r H o u s e , and L o r d P a l m e r s t o n a n n o u n c e d t h a t 15
" h e would bring forward a m e a s u r e to consolidate t h e militia laws, in w h i c h
it w a s his intention that a militia force should be organized for Scotland a n d
Ireland, the period of enrollment depending u p o n t h e v o t e s of the H o u s e . "
T h e English a r m y is to be a u g m e n t e d immediately by 11,000 m e n ; 1,500 c o a s t
guards are also to be e m b a r k e d forthwith, intended to form a stock for t h e 20
c r e w s of t h e newly commissioned ships. A royal proclamation has b e e n
issued forbidding the exportation of any vessels of w a r , military stores and
a m m u n i t i o n to Russia. E m b a r g o has b e e n laid by t h e naval authorities visiting
t h e private dock-yards on the T h a m e s on t w o vessels in c o u r s e of construction for Russian account. A contract, on behalf of t h e British G o v e r n - 25
m e n t , for coal sufficient for steamers of the aggregate a m o u n t of
11,000 h o r s e - p o w e r , has b e e n concluded at C o p e n h a g e n . Admiral Sir Charles
N a p i e r is to h a v e c o m m a n d of t h e Baltic fleet a b o u t to be formed.
T h e official Wiener Zeitung a n n o u n c e s t h a t " t h e G o v e r n m e n t h a s received
notice t h a t Russia has expressly declared to t h e F o u r P o w e r s that she regards 30
herself as released from the promise m a d e at O l m ü t z to remain on t h e
defensive in t h e Principalities."
Concerning t h e object of the mission of C o u n t Orloff at V i e n n a a n u m b e r
of conflicting r u m o r s are afloat; t h e m o s t credible of w h i c h a p p e a r s to be
contained in t h e Berlin c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of to-day's Times. " R u s s i a , " says 35
this c o r r e s p o n d e n t , "invites Austria and Prussia to enter with her into a t r e a t y
of neutrality for all contingencies; suggests to t h e m to m a k e the declaration
of their neutrality the c o m m o n expression of t h e neutrality of t h e G e r m a n
B u n d ; u n d e r t a k e s to c o m e to the assistance of t h e B u n d should any of its
m e m b e r s be a t t a c k e d ; and binds herself, in t h e c a s e of a n y territorial changes 40
having to be arranged at the end of the w a r , to conclude no p e a c e without
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having d u e consideration for t h e interests of t h e G e r m a n P o w e r s in s u c h
territorial changes. In this p r o p o s a l for a t r e a t y of neutrality distinct
reference is m a d e to t h e principles a n d provisions of the Holy Alliance of
1815."
As to the decision p r o b a b l y c o m e to by A u s t r i a and Prussia, I can only
r e p e a t t h e convictions already r e c o r d e d by me on this question. Austria will
e n d e a v o r by e v e r y m e a n s to maintain her position of neutrality as long as
she will be permitted to do so, a n d will declare for Russia w h e n t h e p r o p e r
time has arrived. Prussia, on t h e other h a n d , is likely again to miss t h e p r o p e r
t i m e for abandoning her neutrality a n d will e n d by calling u p o n herself t h e
fate of another J e n a .
We learn from Constantinople t h a t the combined fleet h a v e r e t u r n e d to
their anchorage at Beicos, notwithstanding t h e following order, sent out to
t h e m , o n behalf o f the E m b a s s a d o r s , b y t h e S a m s o n : " T h e E m b a s s a d o r s are
surprised at t h e s u d d e n resolution of t h e Admirals, m o r e particularly at the
p r e s e n t m o m e n t , w h e n a T u r k i s h steam-flotilla is on t h e point of starting with
ammunition and other stores for t h e a r m y of Anatolia. T h e orders of t h e
F r e n c h and British G o v e r n m e n t s w e r e formal and precise, ( t h e y w e r e indeed, b u t not t h e original o r d e r s with which t h e Admirals w e r e dispatched,
b u t only those just r e c e i v e d , ) respecting the protection to be afforded by
t h e combined fleets to t h e O t t o m a n flag and territory, and t h e attention of
b o t h Admirals is again called to the stringent n a t u r e of t h e s e instructions
which h a d b e e n duly notified to t h e m . T h e Admirals, it would appear, consider that the m e a s u r e s entrusted to their e x e c u t i o n m a y be equally well
effected, w h e t h e r the force u n d e r their c o m m a n d be stationed at Beicos or
Sinope, ( i n this c a s e , it w o u l d a p p e a r to o t h e r s , that the same instructions
might h a v e b e e n carried out by t h e fleets quietly remaining at Malta a n d
T o u l o n . ) This is a m a t t e r which m u s t entirely depend u p o n their judgment,
and on t h e m t h e responsibility will r e s t . "
T h e Russian fleet is k n o w n to be at Kaffa near the Strait of Yenikale,
w h e n c e t h e distance to B a t u m is only o n e third of the distance b e t w e e n
B a t u m a n d Beicos. Will the admirals be able to p r e v e n t a Sinope at B a t u m ,
" w h e t h e r they b e stationed a t Beicos o r e l s e w h e r e ? "
Y o u will r e m e m b e r t h a t t h e C z a r ' s first proclamation a c c u s e d t h e Sultan
of enlisting u n d e r his b a n n e r the revolutionary dregs of. all E u r o p e . N o w ,
while L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe declares to L o r d D u d l e y Stuart that he
could n o t assist him in organizing a n y of t h o s e dregs as a voluntary legion, t h e
Czar has himself b e e n t h e first to establish a revolutionary c o r p s , the socalled Greco-Slavonian L e g i o n w i t h t h e direct intention of provoking t h e Sult a n ' s subjects to revolt. T h e c o r p s is being organized in Wallachia a n d n u m b e r s already, according to R u s s i a n s t a t e m e n t s , a b o v e 3,000 m e n , n o t to be
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paid in bons à perpétuité, as t h e Wallachians t h e m s e l v e s , colonels b e i n g
p r o m i s e d 5 ducats p e r d a y ; majors 3 d u c a t s ; captains 2; subaltern officers 1,
a n d soldiers 2 zwanzigers, t h e a r m s to be supplied by Russia.
M e a n w h i l e the a r m a m e n t s of F r a n c e seem no longer to be intended to
r e m a i n on paper. As you k n o w , the r e s e r v e s of 1851 h a v e b e e n called out
and in t h e last few d a y s i m m e n s e military stores h a v e b e e n sent from A r r a s
to M e t z a n d Strasburg. General Pélissier h a s left for Algiers with o r d e r s to
select t h e different corps w h i c h are to form the expedition to Constantinople,
for w h i c h Sir J . B u r g o y n e and Colonel A r d a n t h a v e g o n e to p r e p a r e
quarters.
T h e r u m o r e d p a s s a g e of O m e r P a s h a at the head of a large a r m y , t h o u g h
if a t t e m p t e d it could hardly be e x e c u t e d at a m o r e o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t , since
t h e R u s s i a n s are k n o w n t o b e c o n c e n t r a t e d a t K r a j o v a , b e t w e e n B u c h a r e s t
and Kalafat, yet n e e d s confirmation.
To r e t u r n to the doings of t h e British Parliament, t h e r e is, of c o u r s e , n o t
m u c h to be mentioned, with the exception of t h e proposition of a bill for
throwing o p e n the coast-trade to foreign vessels, a proposition which has
n o t met with a single protest. Protestation m u s t be decidedly dead, since it
s h o w s no capacity to m a k e the slightest stand against the universal invasion
of t h e m o d e r n principle of c o m m e r c e : to b u y in t h e c h e a p e s t m a r k e t whate v e r y o u require. H o w far t h e c h e a p e s t c r e w is qualified to p r o t e c t life and
p r o p e r t y , t h e late c a t a s t r o p h e of t h e " T a y l e u r " h a s shown.
M r . I. Butt, in y e s t e r d a y ' s sitting of t h e C o m m o n s , gave notice " t h a t
t o - m o r r o w he should m o v e t h a t t h e r e should be r e a d by the Clerk, at the table
of the H o u s e , an article published in The Times of to-day, and t h e previous
s t a t e m e n t s of The Dublin Freeman's Journal, i m p u t i n g to t h e (Irish) m e m b e r s
of the H o u s e a trafficking in places for m o n e y . He should also m o v e for a
Select C o m m i t t e e to inquire into t h e allegations of s u c h trafficking as contained in t h e s e p u b l i c a t i o n s . " W h y Mr. B u t t is indignant only at t h e trafficking for m o n e y will be u n d e r s t o o d by t h o s e w h o r e m e m b e r t h a t t h e legality
of a n y other m o d e of trafficking w a s settled during last session. Since 1830
Downing-st. has b e e n placed at t h e mercy of t h e Irish Brigade. It is t h e Irish
m e m b e r s w h o h a v e created and k e p t in place the Ministers to their mind.
In 1834 t h e y d r o v e from t h e Cabinet Sir J. G r a h a m and L o r d Stanley. In 1835
t h e y compelled William TV to dismiss the Peel Ministry and to r e s t o r e the
M e l b o u r n e Administration. F r o m the general election of 1837 d o w n to that
of 1841, while t h e r e w a s a British majority in t h e L o w e r H o u s e o p p o s e d to
t h a t Administration, t h e votes of t h e Irish Brigade w e r e strong e n o u g h to
t u r n t h e scale and k e e p it in office. It w a s t h e Irish Brigade again w h o installed
t h e Coalition Cabinet. With all this p o w e r of Cabinet-making, t h e Brigade
h a v e n e v e r p r e v e n t e d any infamies against their o w n c o u n t r y nor any in-
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justice to t h e English people. T h e period of their greatest p o w e r w a s at t h e
time of O'Connell, from 1834—1841. To w h a t a c c o u n t w a s it t u r n e d ? T h e Irish
agitation w a s n e v e r anything b u t a c r y for t h e Whigs against the Tories, in
order t o extort places from the W h i g s . N o b o d y w h o k n o w s anything a b o u t
t h e so-called Lichfield-house c o n t r a c t , will differ from this opinion—that
contract by w h i c h O'Connell w a s to v o t e for, b u t licensed to s p o u t against,
t h e Whigs on condition t h a t he should n o m i n a t e his o w n Magistrates in
Ireland. It is time for the Irish Brigade to p u t off their patriotic airs. It is time
for t h e Irish people to p u t off their d u m b h a t r e d of the English a n d call their
o w n representatives to an a c c o u n t for their w r o n g s .
T h e " S o c i e t y o f A r t s a n d T r i c k s " h a v e lately v e n t u r e d o n a n e s c a m o t a g e
of the L a b o r Parliament by a c o u n t e r m o v e i n t e n d e d to " s e t t l e " the still
enduring struggle b e t w e e n t h e capitalists a n d w o r k i n g m e n of England. T h e
meeting w a s presided over by a noble L o r d , and delegates from b o t h parties
h a d b e e n invited to discuss their grievances after the fashion of t h e L u x e m b o u r g c o n f e r e n c e s of M. Louis Blanc. T h e h u m b u g w a s protested against by
Mr. E r n e s t J o n e s , in the n a m e of the w o r k i n g classes, and old R o b e r t O w e n
told t h e s e enlightened gentlemen t h a t no arbitration n o r device, nor art of
any kind, could ever fill the gulf dividing the t w o great fundamental classes
of this or any country. It is superfluous to a d d t h a t t h e meeting dissolved
u n d e r an ample cover of ridicule. T h e Chartists of L o n d o n a n d the Provincial
Delegates held a public meeting on t h e following day, w h e n t h e p r o p o s a l of
the L a b o r Parliament w a s u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d , and t h e 11th M a r c h n a m e d
for its opening at Manchester.
Karl M a r x .
55
Karl Marx
Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book
on the Eastern Question—Montenegro
Nr.4013, 27. Februar 1854
A t t h e time w h e n the treaty o f neutrality w a s c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n D e n m a r k
and S w e d e n , I stated my conviction, c o n t r a r y to t h e c u r r e n t opinion in
E n g l a n d and F r a n c e , that it w a s not by a n y m e a n s to be looked u p o n as a
t r i u m p h of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s , and t h a t t h e p r e t e n d e d p r o t e s t of R u s s i a
against t h a t treaty w a s nothing b u t a feint. T h e Scandinavian p a p e r s , and The
T i m e s ' c o r r e s p o n d e n t , quoting from t h e m , are n o w u n a n i m o u s in recording
the s a m e opinion, declaring the whole t r e a t y to be t h e w o r k of Russia.
T h e propositions submitted by C o u n t Orloff to the V i e n n a C o n f e r e n c e ,
a n d rejected b y t h e m , w e r e a s follows:
1. R e n e w a l of the old treaties.
2. P r o t e c t o r a t e of R u s s i a over t h e G r e e k Christians of T u r k e y .
3. Expulsion of all political refugees from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
4. Refusal to admit the mediation of any o t h e r P o w e r , and to negotiate
o t h e r w i s e t h a n directly with a T u r k i s h E n v o y , to be sent to St. P e t e r s burg.
On t h e latter point C o u n t Orloff declared his r e a d i n e s s to c o m p r o m i s e , b u t
t h e Conference refused. W h y did the Conference refuse? Or w h y did the
E m p e r o r of R u s s i a refuse the last t e r m s of t h e C o n f e r e n c e ? T h e propositions
are the same on b o t h sides. T h e r e n e w a l of t h e old treaties h a d b e e n stipulated, t h e R u s s i a n P r o t e c t o r a t e admitted with only a modification in t h e f o r m ;
and, as t h e last point h a d b e e n a b a n d o n e d by R u s s i a herself, t h e Austrian
d e m a n d for the expulsion of the refugees could n o t h a v e b e e n t h e c a u s e of
a r u p t u r e b e t w e e n Russia and the West. It is evident, t h e n , that t h e position
of the E m p e r o r of Russia is n o w such as to p r e v e n t him from accepting any
t e r m s a t t h e h a n d s o f E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , and t h a t h e m u s í bring T u r k e y
to his feet either with or without the c h a n c e of a E u r o p e a n w a r .
In military circles the latter is n o w regarded as inevitable, and the p r e p a r a -
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tions for it are going on in e v e r y quarter. Admiral B r u a t h a s already left Brest
for Algiers, w h e r e he is to e m b a r k 10,000 m e n a n d sixteen English Regiments
stationed in Ireland are o r d e r e d to hold t h e m s e l v e s r e a d y to go to Constantinople. T h e expedition c a n only h a v e a twofold object: either to c o e r c e
t h e T u r k s into submission to Russia, as Mr. U r q u h a r t a n n o u n c e s , or to c a r r y
on the w a r against Russia in real earnest. In b o t h c a s e s the fate of the T u r k s
is equally certain. O n c e more h a n d e d over to Russia, not indeed directly, b u t
to her dissolving agencies, the p o w e r of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d s o o n
be r e d u c e d , like t h a t of the L o w e r E m p i r e , to t h e precincts of the capital.
T a k e n u n d e r the absolute tutorship of F r a n c e a n d England the sovereignty
of t h e O t t o m a n s over their E u r o p e a n e s t a t e s would be no less at an end. If
we are to take the w a r into our h a n d s , o b s e r v e s The Times,v/e m u s t h a v e t h e
control over all the operations. In this c a s e t h e n , t h e T u r k i s h Ministry would
be placed under the direct administration of the W e s t e r n E m b a s s a d o r s , t h e
T u r k i s h W a r Office u n d e r t h e W a r Offices of England and F r a n c e , and t h e
Turkish armies under the c o m m a n d of F r e n c h and English G e n e r a l s . T h e
T u r k i s h E m p i r e , in its ancient conditions of existence, has c e a s e d to b e .
After his complete " f a i l u r e " at V i e n n a , C o u n t Orloff is n o w gone b a c k to
St. Petersburg—"with t h e a s s u r a n c e of t h e A u s t r i a n a n d Prussian neutrality,
u n d e r all c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " On the other h a n d , the telegraph r e p o r t s from
V i e n n a that a change has t a k e n place in t h e T u r k i s h Ministry, the Seraskier
and K a p u d a n P a s h a having resigned. The Times c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d how the
w a r p a r t y could h a v e b e e n defeated a t the v e r y t i m e t h a t F r a n c e and England
w e r e going to w a r . F o r my p a r t , if the n e w s be t r u e , I c a n v e r y well u n d e r s t a n d
the " g o d - s e n t " o c c u r r e n c e as t h e w o r k of t h e English Coalition r e p r e s e n t a tive at Constantinople, w h o m we find so repeatedly regretting, in his b l u e b o o k dispatches, t h a t " h e could hardly yet go so far in his p r e s s u r e on t h e
T u r k i s h Cabinet as it might be d e s i r a b l e . "
T h e blue b o o k s begin with d i s p a t c h e s relating to the d e m a n d s put forward
on t h e part of F r a n c e with r e s p e c t to t h e H o l y Shrines—demands n o t wholly
b o r n e out by the ancient capitulations, and ostensibly m a d e with t h e view to
enforce t h e s u p r e m a c y of t h e L a t i n over the G r e e k C h u r c h . I am far from
participating in t h e opinion of Mr. U r q u h a r t , according to w h i c h the Czar h a d ,
by secret influences at Paris, seduced B o n a p a r t e to r u s h into this quarrel in
o r d e r to afford Russia a p r e t e x t for interfering herself in behalf of the privileges of t h e G r e e k Catholics. It is well k n o w n t h a t B o n a p a r t e wanted to b u y ,
coûte que coûte, t h e s u p p o r t of t h e Catholic p a r t y , w h i c h he regarded from
t h e v e r y first as t h e main condition for t h e s u c c e s s of his usurpation. Bonap a r t e w a s fully a w a r e of t h e a s c e n d a n c y of the Catholic C h u r c h over t h e
p e a s a n t population of F r a n c e , and t h e p e a s a n t r y w e r e to m a k e him E m p e r o r
in spite of the bourgeoisie and in spite of the proletariat. M. de Falloux, t h e
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Jesuit, w a s the most influential m e m b e r of t h e first ministry he formed, and
of w h i c h Odilon Barrot, the soi-disant Voltairian, w a s t h e nominal head. T h e
first resolution a d o p t e d by this ministry, on t h e v e r y day after t h e inauguration of B o n a p a r t e as President, w a s the f a m o u s expedition against the
R o m a n Republic. M. de Montalembert, the chief of the Jesuit p a r t y , w a s his
m o s t active tool in preparing the o v e r t h r o w of t h e parliamentary régime and
t h e coup d'état of t h e 2d D e c e m b e r . In 1850, t h e Univers, t h e official o r g a n
of the Jesuit p a r t y , called day after day on the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t to t a k e
active steps for t h e protection of t h e interests of t h e L a t i n C h u r c h in t h e East.
Anxious to cajole and win over the P o p e , and to be c r o w n e d by him, B o n a p a r t e h a d r e a s o n s t o a c c e p t the challenge a n d m a k e himself a p p e a r t h e " m o s t
C a t h o l i c " E m p e r o r of F r a n c e . The Bonapartist usurpation, therefore, is the
true origin of the present Eastern complication. It is t r u e t h a t B o n a p a r t e
wisely w i t h d r e w his prentensions as s o o n as he p e r c e i v e d the E m p e r o r
Nicholas r e a d y to m a k e t h e m t h e p r e t e x t for excluding h i m from t h e conclave of E u r o p e , and Russia w a s , as usual, eager to utilise the e v e n t s w h i c h
she h a d n o t t h e p o w e r to create, as Mr. U r q u h a r t imagines. B u t it r e m a i n s
a m o s t curious p h e n o m e n o n in history, that t h e p r e s e n t crisis of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e h a s b e e n p r o d u c e d b y t h e same conflict b e t w e e n t h e L a t i n and
G r e e k C h u r c h e s w h i c h o n c e gave rise to the foundation of t h a t E m p i r e in
Europe.
It is not my intention to investigate the whole c o n t e n t s of t h e "Rights and
Privileges of the L a t i n and G r e e k C h u r c h e s , " b e f o r e having considered a
most important incident entirely s u p p r e s s e d in t h e s e blue b o o k s , viz: T h e
A u s t r o - T u r k i s h quarrel about M o n t e n e g r o . T h e necessity to previously treat
this affair is t h e m o r e urgent, as it will establish t h e existence of a c o n c e r t e d
plan b e t w e e n Russia and Austria for the subversion and division of the
T u r k i s h E m p i r e , a n d as t h e very fact of E n g l a n d ' s putting t h e s u b s e q u e n t
negotiations b e t w e e n the Court of St. P e t e r s b u r g and the P o r t e into t h e h a n d s
of Austria, c a n n o t fail to t h r o w a m o s t curious light on t h e c o n d u c t of t h e
English Cabinet throughout this E a s t e r n question. In the a b s e n c e of a n y
official d o c u m e n t s on t h e Montenegro affair, I refer to a b o o k , which has
only j u s t b e e n published, on this subject, and is entitled the " H a n d b o o k of
t h e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n , " b y L . F . Simpson.
T h e T u r k i s h fortress of Zabliak (on t h e frontiers of M o n t e n e g r o and
Albania) w a s stormed by a band of Montenegrins in D e c e m b e r , 1852. It is
r e m e m b e r e d t h a t O m e r P a s h a w a s o r d e r e d b y t h e P o r t e t o repel t h e agg r e s s o r s . T h e Sublime Porte declared t h e w h o l e c o a s t of Albania in a state
of b l o c k a d e , a m e a s u r e which apparently could be directed only against
Austria a n d her navy, and which indicated t h e conviction of t h e T u r k i s h
Ministry t h a t Austria had p r o v o k e d the Montenegrin revolt.
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T h e following article, u n d e r date of Vienna, D e c e m b e r 29,1852, a p p e a r e d
t h e n in the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung;
"If Austria wished to assist the M o n t e n e g r i n s , t h e blockade could n o t
p r e v e n t it. If t h e Montenegrins d e s c e n d e d from their m o u n t a i n s , Austria
5 could provide t h e m w i t h a r m s and a m m u n i t i o n by C a t t a r o , in spite of t h e
p r e s e n c e of the T u r k i s h fleet in t h e Adriatic. Austria d o e s n o t a p p r o v e either
of t h e p r e s e n t incursion of t h e M o n t e n e g r i n s , nor of the revolution which
is on the eve of breaking out in Herzegovina and Bosnia among the Chris10
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tians. She h a s constantly p r o t e s t e d against t h e p e r s e c u t i o n s of the Christians,
and that in t h e n a m e of h u m a n i t y ; A u s t r i a is obliged to o b s e r v e neutrality
t o w a r d t h e E a s t e r n C h u r c h . T h e last n e w s from Jerusalem will h a v e s h o w n
h o w fiercely religious h a t r e d b u r n e d t h e r e . T h e agents of A u s t r i a must,
therefore, e x e r t all their efforts to maintain p e a c e b e t w e e n the G r e e k Christians and t h e Latin Christians of t h e E m p i r e . "
F r o m this article we glean, firstly, that coming revolutions of the T u r k i s h
Christians w e r e anticipated as certain, t h a t t h e w a y for t h e R u s s i a n c o m plaints concerning the oppression of the G r e e k C h u r c h w a s paved by Austria,
a n d that t h e religious complication about the H o l y Shrines w a s e x p e c t e d
to give occasion for A u s t r i a ' s " n e u t r a l i t y . "
In the same m o n t h a n o t e w a s a d d r e s s e d to the P o r t e by Russia, w h o
offered her mediation in M o n t e n e g r o , w h i c h w a s declined on t h e g r o u n d t h a t
t h e Sultan w a s able himself to uphold his o w n rights. H e r e we see R u s s i a
operating exactly as she did at t h e t i m e of t h e G r e e k revolution—first offering
to p r o t e c t the Sultan against his subjects, with t h e view of protecting afterw a r d his subjects against t h e Sultan, if h e r assistance should not be accepted.
T h e fact that t h e r e existed a c o n c e r t b e t w e e n R u s s i a and Austria for the
o c c u p a t i o n of t h e Principalities, e v e n at this early time, m a y be gleaned from
a n o t h e r e x t r a c t from t h e Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, of 30th D e c e m b e r ,
1852:
"Russia, w h i c h has only recently a c k n o w l e d g e d the i n d e p e n d e n c e of
M o n t e n e g r o , c a n scarcely r e m a i n an idle spectator of e v e n t s . M o r e o v e r ,
commercial letters and travelers, from M o l d a v i a a n d Wallachia, m e n t i o n t h a t
from Wolhynia d o w n t o the m o u t h o f t h e P r a t h , t h e c o u n t r y s w a r m s with
R u s s i a n t r o o p s , and t h a t r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s are continually arriving."
Simultaneously the V i e n n a journals a n n o u n c e d t h a t an A u s t r i a n a r m y of
observation w a s assembling o n t h e A u s t r o - T u r k i s h frontiers.
O n D e c e m b e r 6 , 1 8 5 2 , L o r d Stanley interpellated L o r d M a l m e s b u r y w i t h
r e s p e c t to t h e affairs of M o n t e n e g r o , and B o n a p a r t e ' s noble friend m a d e t h e
following declaration:
" T h e noble lord intimated his desire to ask w h e t h e r a n y change had r e -
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Karl Marx
cently t a k e n place in the political relations of t h a t wild c o u n t r y bordering
on Albania, called M o n t e n e g r o . I believe t h a t no c h a n g e w h a t e v e r has t a k e n
place with r e s p e c t to its political relations. T h e chief of that c o u n t r y b e a r s
a double title; he is head of the G r e e k C h u r c h in that c o u n t r y , and he is also
t h e t e m p o r a l sovereign. B u t with r e s p e c t to his ecclesiastical position he is
5
under the jurisdiction of the Emperor of Russia, who is considered to be the
head of the whole Greek Church. T h e chief of M o n t e n e g r o h a s b e e n " (as
I believe all his ancestors w e r e before him) " a c c u s t o m e d to r e c e i v e from the
sanction and recognition of the E m p e r o r his Episcopal jurisdiction and titles.
W i t h r e s p e c t to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h a t c o u n t r y , w h a t e v e r t h e opinion of 10
different p e r s o n s m a y be as to t h e advantage of s u c h a position, t h e fact is
that
Montenegro
has
been an independent country for something like
150 years, a n d t h o u g h various attempts h a v e b e e n m a d e by t h e P o r t e to bring
it into subjection, t h o s e attempts h a v e failed o n e after another, and the
c o u n t r y is in the same position n o w t h a t it w a s s o m e 200 y e a r s a g o . "
15
I n this s p e e c h L o r d M a l m e s b u r y , the t h e n T o r y S e c r e t a r y for Foreign
Affairs, quietly dissects t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e by separating from it a c o u n t r y
t h a t had e v e r belonged to it, recognising at the s a m e time the E m p e r o r of
R u s s i a ' s spiritual pretensions over subjects of t h e P o r t e . W h a t are we to say
of t h e s e two sets of Oligarchs, e x c e p t that t h e y rival e a c h o t h e r in imbecility?
T h e P o r t e w a s , of c o u r s e seriously alarmed at this s p e e c h of a British
Minister, a n d t h e r e a p p e a r e d , shortly afterward, in an English n e w s p a p e r
t h e following letter from Constantinople, dated J a n u a r y 5, 1853:
" T h e P o r t e has experienced the greatest irritation owing to L o r d M a l m e s b u r y ' s declaration in the H o u s e of L o r d s t h a t M o n t e n e g r o w a s i n d e p e n d e n t .
He t h u s played into the h a n d s of R u s s i a and Austria, by w h i c h E n g l a n d will
lose t h a t influence and confidence which she has h i t h e r t o enjoyed. In the
first article of the t r e a t y of Sistow, concluded b e t w e e n the P o r t e and A u s t r i a
in 1791, (to which treaty England, Holland a n d P r u s s i a w e r e mediating
parties) it is expressly stipulated t h a t an a m n e s t y should be granted to the
subjects of b o t h P o w e r s w h o h a d t a k e n p a r t against their rightful sovereigns,
viz: the Servians, Montenegrins, Moldavians and Wallachians, n a m e d as
rebel subjects of t h e Porte. T h e Montenegrins w h o reside in Constantinople,
of w h o m t h e r e are 2,000 to 3,000, p a y t h e haratch or capitation-tax, and in
judicial p r o c e d u r e with subjects of o t h e r P o w e r s at Constantinople, the
M o n t e n e g r i n s are always considered and t r e a t e d as T u r k i s h subjects w i t h o u t
objection."
In the beginning of J a n u a r y , 1853, the A u s t r i a n G o v e r n m e n t sent B a r o n
Kellner v o n Köllenstein, an aide-de-camp of t h e E m p e r o r , to C a t t a r o to
w a t c h t h e c o u r s e of e v e n t s , while M r . d'Ozeroff, t h e R u s s i a n E n v o y at C o n -
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stantinople h a n d e d in a p r o t e s t to t h e D i v a n against t h e c o n c e s s i o n s m a d e
to t h e L a t i n s in t h e question of the H o l y Shrines. At t h e e n d of J a n u a r y , C o u n t
Leiningen arrived at Constantinople, a n d was admitted on t h e 3d F e b r u a r y ,
to a private audience with the Sultan, to w h o m he delivered a letter from
5 t h e Austrian E m p e r o r . T h e P o r t e refused to c o m p l y with his d e m a n d s , a n d
C o u n t Leiningen t h e r e u p o n g a v e in an ultimatum, allowing the Porte four
d a y s to answer. T h e P o r t e immediately placed itself u n d e r t h e protection of
England a n d F r a n c e , which did n o t p r o t e c t her, while C o u n t Leiningen
refused their mediation. On F e b r u a r y 15, he had obtained everything he h a d
10 asked for (with t h e e x c e p t i o n of A r t . I l l ) and his ultimatum w a s a c c e p t e d .
It contained the following articles:
" I . I m m e d i a t e evacuation of M o n t e n e g r o and the establishment of the
status quo ante bellum.
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II. A declaration by w h i c h the P o r t e is to engage herself to maintain the
status quo of t h e territories of K l e c k a n d Sutorina, and to recognize t h e mare
clausum in favor of Austria.
III. A strict inquiry to t a k e p l a c e concerning t h e acts of M u s s u l m a n fanaticism c o m m i t t e d against t h e Christians of B o s n i a and Herzegovina.
I V . Removal of all the political refugees and r e n e g a d e s at p r e s e n t in the
provinces adjoining t h e Austrian frontiers.
V. Indemnity of 200,000 florins to certain A u s t r i a n m e r c h a n t s , w h o s e
c o n t r a c t s h a d b e e n arbitrarily annulled, a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h o s e contracts for all the time t h e y w e r e agreed on.
V I . Indemnity of 56,000 florins to a m e r c h a n t w h o s e ship and cargo had
b e e n unjustly confiscated.
V I I . E s t a b l i s h m e n t of n u m e r o u s consulates in Bosnia, Servia, H e r z e g o v i n a and all over Roumelia.
V I I I . Disavowal of t h e c o n d u c t maintained in 1850, in the affair of t h e
refugees."
Before acceding to this ultimatum, t h e O t t o m a n P o r t e , as Mr. S i m p s o n
s t a t e s , a d d r e s s e d a n o t e to t h e E m b a s s a d o r s of England a n d F r a n c e ,
demanding a promise from t h e m of positive assistance in t h e e v e n t of a
w a r with Austria. " T h e t w o Ministers n o t being able t o pledge t h e m s e l v e s
in a definite m a n n e r , " t h e T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t yielded to the energetic
proceedings of C o u n t Leiningen.
O n F e b r u a r y 28th, C o u n t L e i n i n g e n arrived a t V i e n n a , and Prince M e n c h i koff at Constantinople. On t h e 3d of M a r c h , L o r d J o h n Russell h a d t h e
i m p u d e n c e to declare, in a n s w e r to an interpellation of L o r d D u d l e y Stuart,
that
" I n answer to representations m a d e to the Austrian G o v e r n m e n t , assura n c e h a d b e e n given t h a t t h e latter held t h e s a m e views as the English
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G o v e r n m e n t o n the subject; and, t h o u g h h e could n o t state the precise t e r m s
of the arrangement that had b e n m a d e , the intervention of F r a n c e and E n g l a n d h a d b e e n successful, and he t r u s t e d t h e late differences w e r e n o w over.
T h e c o u r s e a d o p t e d b y England h a d b e e n t o give T u r k e y s u c h advice a s
w o u l d maintain her h o n o r and her i n d e p e n d e n c e . ***. F o r his o w n part, he
thought t h a t on grounds of right, of international l a w , of faith t o w a r d o u r
ally, a n d also on grounds of general policy a n d e x p e d i e n c y , the maintenance
of the integrity and independence of Turkey was a great and ruling point of
the foreign policy of England."
Karl Marx.
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T h o u g h the arrival of the Nashville p u t s us in p o s s e s s i o n of no decisive n e w s
from the seat of w a r , it p u t s us in p o s s e s s i o n of a fact of great significance
in the p r e s e n t state of affairs. This is t h a t n o w , at the eleventh hour, w h e n
t h e Russian E m b a s s a d o r s at Paris and L o n d o n h a v e left, w h e n t h e British
and F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r s at St. P e t e r s b u r g are recalled, w h e n the naval a n d
military strength of F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d is being already c o n c e n t r a t e d for
immediate action—at this v e r y last m o m e n t , t h e t w o W e s t e r n G o v e r n m e n t s
are making fresh proposals to negotiate by w h i c h they c o n c e d e almost
everything that R u s s i a w a n t s . It will be r e m e m b e r e d that the m a i n point
claimed by Russia w a s h e r right of settling directly with t h e P o r t e , a n d
w i t h o u t t h e interference of the o t h e r P o w e r s , a quarrel which, it w a s p r e t e n d e d , c o n c e r n e d R u s s i a a n d T u r k e y only. This point has n o w b e e n conc e d e d to Russia. T h e p r o p o s a l s are contained in t h e letter of N a p o l e o n , w h i c h
we c o p y in another place, a n d are to the effect t h a t R u s s i a shall t r e a t with
T u r k e y direct, while the t r e a t y to be c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n the t w o parties shall
be g u a r a n t e e d by the four P o w e r s . This g u a r a n t e e is a d r a w b a c k u p o n t h e
concession, as it gives the W e s t e r n P o w e r s a r e a d y p r e t e x t to interfere in
any future quarrel of t h e kind. B u t it d o e s n o t m a k e matters w o r s e for R u s s i a
t h a n t h e y are n o w , w h e n the E m p e r o r N i c h o l a s m u s t see that any a t t e m p t
of his at a d i s m e m b e r m e n t of T u r k e y c a n n o t be carried out without the risk
of a w a r with England and F r a n c e . A n d t h e n , t h e actual gain to R u s s i a will
d e p e n d u p o n the n a t u r e of the t r e a t y w h i c h is n o t y e t c o n c l u d e d ; and Russia,
having seen in how cowardly a m a n n e r the W e s t e r n P o w e r s n o w shrink from
t h e necessity of war, will b u t h a v e to k e e p h e r armies c o n c e n t r a t e d , and to
continue her system of intimidation in o r d e r to gain e v e r y point during t h e
negotiations. Besides, R u s s i a n diplomacy n e e d hardly be afraid of a c o n t e s t
w i t h those egregious E m b a s s a d o r s w h o m a n u f a c t u r e d the f a m o u s , blundering first V i e n n a n o t e .
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W h e t h e r , h o w e v e r , the Czar will a c c e p t this p r o p o s a l , or t r u s t to his army,
r e m a i n s to be seen. He c a n n o t afford to go t h r o u g h s u c h a r m a m e n t s and
dislocations of troops over his v a s t E m p i r e o n c e in e v e r y five y e a r s . T h e
p r e p a r a t i o n s h a v e b e e n m a d e on such a scale, t h a t a v e r y great material gain
only c a n r e p a y their cost. T h e Russian population are thoroughly r o u s e d to
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warlike enthusiasm. We h a v e seen a c o p y of a letter from a Russian merchant—not o n e of the m a n y G e r m a n , English, or F r e n c h t r a d e r s , w h o h a v e
settled in Moscow—but a real old M u s c o v i t e , a genuine son of Sviatala Russ,
w h o holds s o m e goods on consignment for English a c c o u n t , a n d h a d b e e n
a s k e d w h e t h e r in case of w a r t h e s e goods would r u n t h e risk of confiscation.
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T h e old R u s s , quite indignant at the imputation thus cast u p o n his G o v e r n m e n t , and perfectly well acquainted with the official phraseology, according
to w h i c h R u s s i a is the great c h a m p i o n of " o r d e r , p r o p e r t y , family, and
religion," in contrast to t h e revolutionary and socialist countries of t h e W e s t ,
retorts that " H e r e in Russia, God be praised, the distinction b e t w e e n mine 15
a n d thine is yet in full force, and your p r o p e r t y h e r e is as safe as a n y w h e r e .
I w o u l d even advise y o u to send over as m u c h of your p r o p e r t y as y o u can,
for it will p e r h a p s be safer here t h a n w h e r e it is n o w . As to your countrymen,
you may perhaps have reason to fear, as to y o u r p r o p e r t y , n o t at all."
In the m e a n t i m e , the a r m a m e n t s p r e p a r e d in England and F r a n c e are u p o n
a m o s t extensive scale. T h e F r e n c h o c e a n s q u a d r o n h a s b e e n ordered from
B r e s t to T o u l o n in order to t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s to the L e v a n t . F o r t y or sixty
t h o u s a n d , according to different s t a t e m e n t s , are to be sent, a large portion
of t h e m to be drafted from the African a r m y ; the expedition will be v e r y
strong in riflemen, a n d be c o m m a n d e d either by B a r a g u a y d'Hilliers or by
St. A r n a u d . T h e British G o v e r n m e n t will send a b o u t 18,000 m e n , (22 regim e n t s of 850 each.) and, at the date of our last advices, a portion of t h e m
h a d already e m b a r k e d for Malta, w h e r e the general r e n d e z v o u s is to b e . T h e
infantry go in s t e a m e r s , and sailing vessels are e m p l o y e d for t h e c o n v e y a n c e
of cavalry. T h e Baltic fleet, w h i c h is to be c o n c e n t r a t e d off S h e e r n e s s , in
the T h a m e s , by the 6th of March, will consist of fifteen ships of t h e line, eight
frigates, and s e v e n t e e n smaller vessels. It is t h e largest fleet t h e British h a v e
got together since t h e last w a r ; a n d as o n e half of it will consist of paddle
or screw s t e a m e r s , and as the rating and weight of metal is at p r e s e n t about
50 per cent, higher t h a n fifty y e a r s ago, this Baltic fleet m a y prove to be t h e
strongest a r m a m e n t ever turned out by any c o u n t r y . Sir Charles N a p i e r is
to c o m m a n d it; if t h e r e is to be war, he is t h e m a n to bring his guns to b e a r
at o n c e u p o n the decisive point.
On t h e D a n u b e , the battle of T s h e t a t e has evidently had the effect of
delaying t h e R u s s i a n attack u p o n Kalafat. T h e R u s s i a n s h a v e b e e n convinced
by t h a t five d a y s ' struggle that it will be no e a s y m a t t e r to t a k e an intrenched
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c a m p w h i c h c a n send o u t s u c h sallies. I t s e e m s t h a t e v e n the positive c o m m a n d of the A u t o c r a t himself is n o t sufficient, after s u c h a foretaste, to drive
his t r o o p s to a r a s h attempt. T h e p r e s e n c e of General Schilder, Chief of t h e
E n g i n e e r s , w h o w a s sent from W a r s a w o n p u r p o s e , seems e v e n t o h a v e h a d
a result contrary to the Imperial o r d e r , for i n s t e a d of hurrying on t h e attack,
an inspection of the fortifications from a distance w a s sufficient to c o n v i n c e
him t h a t m o r e t r o o p s a n d m o r e h e a v y guns w e r e n e e d e d t h a n could a t o n c e
b e brought u p . Accordingly the R u s s i a n s h a v e b e e n concentrating w h a t e v e r
forces t h e y could a r o u n d Kalaf at, a n d bringing up their siege guns, of which,
it s e e m s , t h e y b r o u g h t s e v e n t y - t w o into Wallachia. The London Times
estimates their forces at 65,000 m e n , which is r a t h e r high, if we consider t h e
strength of the w h o l e R u s s i a n a r m y in t h e Principalities. This a r m y n o w
consists of six divisions of infantry, t h r e e divisions of cavalry, a n d a b o u t
t h r e e h u n d r e d field-guns, besides C o s s a c k s , riflemen, and other special
c o r p s , of a total nominal strength b e f o r e t h e beginning of the war, of
120,000 m e n . A s s u m i n g their l o s s e s , by sickness and on t h e batüe-f ield, to
be 30,000 m e n , t h e r e remain a b o u t 90,000 c o m b a t a n t s . Of t h e s e , at least
35,000 are required to guard the line of the D a n u b e , to garrison the principal
t o w n s , and t o maintain t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . T h e r e would remain, t h e n , a t
t h e v e r y outside, 55,000 m e n for an a t t a c k u p o n Kalafat.
N o w look at t h e r e s p e c t i v e positions of the t w o armies. T h e R u s s i a n s
neglecting t h e w h o l e line of t h e D a n u b e , disregarding t h e position of O m e r
P a s h a at Shumla, direct their m a i n b o d y , a n d e v e n their h e a v y artillery, to
a point on their e x t r e m e right, w h e r e t h e y are further from B u c h a r e s t , their
immediate b a s e of o p e r a t i o n s , than the T u r k s are. Their r e a r is therefore as
m u c h e x p o s e d as it possibly c a n b e . W h a t is w o r s e still is that, in order to
get some slight p r o t e c t i o n for their rear, t h e y are obliged to divide their
forces, a n d to a p p e a r b e f o r e Kalafat with a force which by no m e a n s has
that evident superiority w h i c h , by insuring s u c c e s s , might justify s u c h a
m a n e u v e r . T h e y leave from thirty to forty per cent, of their a r m y scattered
behind the main b o d y , and t h e s e t r o o p s are certainly n o t capable of repelling
a resolute attack. T h u s , neither is t h e c o n q u e s t of Kalafat a s s u r e d , nor t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of the besieging a r m y placed o u t of the r e a c h of danger.
T h e blunder is so evident, so colossal, t h a t nothing short of absolute certainty
of the fact can m a k e a military m a n believe t h a t it has b e e n committed.
If O m e r P a s h a , w h o still h a s a superior force disposable, p a s s e s the D a n u b e
at any point b e t w e e n R u s t c h u k and Hir sova, with say s e v e n t y t h o u s a n d m e n ,
the Russian a r m y m u s t either be annihilated to t h e last m a n or t a k e refuge
in Austria. He h a s h a d a full m o n t h for c o n c e n t r a t i n g such a m a s s . W h y d o e s
he not cross a river w h i c h is n o w no longer o b s t r u c t e d by floating ice? W h y
does he n o t e v e n r e t a k e his tête-de-pont at Oltenitza, in order to be able to
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m o v e at a n y m o m e n t ? T h a t O m e r P a s h a is ignorant of the c h a n c e s t h e
R u s s i a n s h a v e given h i m b y their unheard-of blunder i s impossible. H e m u s t ,
it w o u l d seem, be tied by diplomatic action. H i s inactivity m u s t be i n t e n d e d
to f o r m an offset against t h e naval p r o m e n a d e of t h e c o m b i n e d fleets in t h e
B l a c k Sea. T h e Russian a r m y m u s t n o t be annihilated or driven to t a k e refuge
i n Austria, b e c a u s e t h e n p e a c e w o u l d b e e n d a n g e r e d b y fresh complications.
A n d in order to suit the intrigues and the sham-action of diplomatic j o b b e r s ,
O m e r P a s h a m u s t allow t h e Russians t o b o m b a r d Kalafat, t o place their
w h o l e a r m y , all their siege artillery at his m e r c y , w i t h o u t his being allowed
to profit by t h e occasion. It would indeed s e e m t h a t if t h e R u s s i a n c o m m a n d e r h a d n o t h a d a material, positive g u a r a n t e e t h a t his flanks and r e a r
w o u l d n o t b e attacked, h e w o u l d n e v e r h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o m a r c h u p o n
Kalafat. O t h e r w i s e , in spite of all stringent instructions, he would d e s e r v e
t o b e tried a t t h e d r u m h e a d a n d shot. A n d u n l e s s , b y t h e steamer n o w d u e
h e r e , or at furthest within a few d a y s , we h e a r t h a t O m e r P a s h a h a s c r o s s e d
t h e D a n u b e a n d m a r c h e d u p o n Bucharest, it will be scarcely possible to avoid
t h e conclusion t h a t a formal agreement of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s has b e e n m a d e
to t h e effect t h a t in order to satisfy t h e military point of h o n o r of Russia,
Kalafat is to be sacrificed without the T u r k s being allowed to defend it by
t h e only w a y it c a n be effectually defended—by an offensive m o v e m e n t lower
d o w n the D a n u b e . O u r L o n d o n c o r r e s p o n d e n t i n a n o t h e r column intimates
his unwillingness to believe in such t r e a c h e r y , b u t facts are s t u b b o r n things,
a n d t h e mind m u s t at last be affected by their f o r c e . After having g o n e the
d e s p e r a t e lengths t h e y h a v e a v o w e d l y d o n e to avoid w a r , it is h a r d to think
of anything t h e y w o u l d shrink from.
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Declaration of the Prussian Cabinet—Napoleon's PlansPrussia's Policy
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T h e following information, which, if t r u e , is of t h e highest i m p o r t a n c e , a n d
a p o r t i o n only of w h i c h h a s a p p e a r e d in t h e E u r o p e a n j o u r n a l s , a n d t h a t in
a partial and disguised form, we h a v e r e c e i v e d from a m o s t t r u s t w o r t h y
s o u r c e at L o n d o n :
I. On the 3d of F e b r u a r y the following declaration on the p a r t of t h e
Prussian Cabinet w a s dispatched t o Paris a n d L o n d o n :
" 1 . T h e explanations o f C o u n t Orloff leaving n o d o u b t w h a t e v e r a s t o t h e
u s e l e s s n e s s of a n y further a t t e m p t at mediation w i t h t h e St. P e t e r s b u r g
Cabinet, Prussia h e r e b y w i t h d r a w s h e r mediation, the opportunity for w h i c h
c a n no longer be said to exist.
2. C o u n t Orloff's p r o p o s a l s of a formal a n d binding treaty of neutrality,
h a v e met with an absolute refusal, c o m m u n i c a t e d to him in a n o t e , P r u s s i a
being decided u p o n observing e v e n w i t h o u t t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of Austria, t h e
m o s t strict neutrality on h e r part, w h i c h she is determined to enforce by
suitable armaments, as s o o n as t h e p r o p e r m o m e n t shall h a v e arrived.
3. W h e t h e r Prussia shall p r o p o s e , in c o m m o n w i t h Austria, a general
arming of t h e G e r m a n Confederation, will d e p e n d on t h e c o n d u c t of t h e
maritime p o w e r s t o w a r d G e r m a n y . "
II. L o u i s N a p o l e o n h a s sent a confidential agent (Mr. Brennier) to Turin,
with t h e following m e s s a g e for t h e K i n g of P i e d m o n t and Mr. C a v o u r : At
a given time insurrectionary m o v e m e n t s are to b r e a k o u t in P a r m a , P i a c e n z a ,
Guastalla, a n d M o d e n a . Sardinia m u s t t h e n o c c u p y t h o s e countries, from
w h i c h t h e n o w reigning princes are to be expelled. N a p o l e o n is to g u a r a n t e e
to the King the incorporation with Sardinia of t h e t h r e e f o r m e r principalities,
a n d p e r h a p s of M o d e n a , also, in c o m p e n s a t i o n for w h i c h territories t h e
C o u n t y o f Savoy i s t o b e c e d e d t o F r a n c e . This a r r a n g e m e n t E n g l a n d m a y
be said to h a v e as good as agreed t o , although reluctantly and with v e r y b a d
grace. Mr. Brennier t h e n p r o c e e d e d further on his t o u r t h r o u g h Italy till he
r e a c h e d N a p l e s , w h e r e his arrival e v o k e d t h e " m o s t painful sensation." H i s
mission is t h a t of preparing an Italian insurrection, as N a p o l e o n is seriously
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c o n v i n c e d that he is the m a n , n o t only to set Italy on fire, b u t also to d r a w
the e x a c t line which the flame shall be forbidden to cross. He p r o p o s e s to
c o n c e n t r a t e the following armies:
1 — 100,000 m e n on the frontier of S a v o y .
2 - 60,000 m e n at M e t z .
3 - 80,000 m e n at Strasburg.
III. Prussia d o e s not object to the assembling of a F r e n c h a r m y of
100,000 m e n on t h e frontier of S a v o y , b u t she considers t h e concentration
of an a r m y at M e t z , and of another at Strasburg, to be a direct m e n a c e against
herself. She already fancies B a d e n , H e s s e , W u r t e m b e r g , etc., in full insurrection a n d s o m e 100,000 p e a s a n t s marching from t h e south of G e r m a n y
o n her o w n frontiers. She h a s , therefore, p r o t e s t e d against t h e s e t w o m e a s u r e s , and it is this eventuality w h i c h is alluded to in section 3 of the P r u s s i a n
declaration. At all e v e n t s , Prussia will put h e r a r m y on a w a r footing by, a n d
p e r h a p s before, the end of M a r c h . She intends calling o u t a force of 200,000
to 300,000 m e n , according to c i r c u m s t a n c e s . B u t if N a p o l e o n insists on
concentrating the two armies at M e t z and Strasburg, t h e Prussian G o v e r n m e n t has already resolved to augment its force to 500,000 men. In the Berlin
Cabinet, w h e r e the King, with the great majority of his Ministers, h a d c h o s e n
to side with Russia, and Manteuffel alone, b a c k e d by t h e Prince of Prussia,
carried the declaration of neutrality, (Manteuffel originally p r o p o s e d a formal alliance with England,) fear and confusion are a s s e r t e d to reign s u p r e m e .
T h e r e exists already a formal resolution of t h e Cabinet (Cabinets-Beschluss)
according to which, u n d e r certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , all t h e m o r e notorious
d e m o c r a t s of the m o n a r c h y , and, a b o v e all, of R h e n i s h Prussia, are to be
arrested o n t h e same night, and t o b e t r a n s p o r t e d t o t h e e a s t e r n fortresses,
in o r d e r to p r e v e n t t h e m from favoring t h e subversive p l a n s of N a p o l e o n ,
(die Umsturzpläne Napoleons!!) or from getting up p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s
generally. This m e a s u r e , it is p r o p o s e d , shall be e x e c u t e d instantly in the c a s e
of Italian disorders breaking out, or if N a p o l e o n c o n c e n t r a t e s t h e t w o armies
at M e t z and Strasburg. This resolution, we are a s s u r e d , has b e e n t a k e n
unanimously, although all t h e eventualities are n o t p r o v i d e d for, u n d e r w h i c h
the Cabinet might think fit to p u t it into execution.
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Debates in Parliament
Nr.4022, 9. März 1854
Debates in Parliament.
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , F e b . 2 1 , 1854.
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T h e military and naval estimates h a v e b e e n laid before Parliament. In t h e
a r m y , the total n u m b e r of m e n a s k e d for t h e c u r r e n t y e a r is 112,977, an
increase u p o n last year of 10,694. T h e total cost of t h e land forces for service
at h o m e and abroad, for t h e y e a r ending on t h e 31st of M a r c h , 1855, e x clusively of the Australian Colonies, and of the charge transferred to the E a s t
India C o m p a n y , is £3,923,288. T h e gross total a m o u n t is £4,877,925, w h i c h
will provide for 5,719 officers, 9,956 non-commissioned officers,
126,925 r a n k and file. T h e naval estimates for t h e y e a r ending M a r c h 31,1855,
show a total for the effective service, of £5,979,866, an increase u p o n last
y e a r of £1,172,446. T h e charge for t h e c o n v e y a n c e of t r o o p s and o r d n a n c e
stands £225,050, an increase of £72,100. T h e grand total for the y e a r a m o u n t s
to £7,487,948. T h e force will consist of 41,000 s e a m e n , 2,000 b o y s ,
15,500 m a r i n e s ; t h e total, including 116 m e n in t h e p a c k e t service, 58,616.
Mr. L a y a r d h a d given notice t h a t he should call attention to t h e E a s t e r n
question o n last F r i d a y evening, a n d h e seized u p o n t h e v e r y m o m e n t w h e n
t h e S p e a k e r w a s t o leave t h e Chair, i n o r d e r t h a t t h e H o u s e might consider
the n a v y e s t i m a t e s . Shortly after 4 o'clock all the galleries w e r e o v e r c r o w d e d ,
a n d at 5 o'clock t h e H o u s e w a s full. T w o long h o u r s , to the visible mortification of t h e m e m b e r s a n d t h e public, w e r e killed w i t h indifferent conversation on minor topics. So intensely excited w a s the curiosity of t h e
honorables themselves t h a t they delayed dinner till 8 o'clock, to assist at t h e
opening of t h e great debate—a r a r e o c c u r r e n c e this in t h e parliamentary Ufe
of the C o m m o n e r s .
Mr. L a y a r d , w h o s e s p e e c h w a s continually interrupted b y c h e e r s , began
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by stating that t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d placed t h e m in so extraordinary a position
t h a t t h e y w e r e at a loss to k n o w h o w they really stood. Before t h e y could
v o t e t h e d e m a n d e d a d v a n c e s , it w a s t h e duty of t h e g o v e r n m e n t to state what
their intentions were. B u t b e f o r e asking [the] g o v e r n m e n t w h a t t h e y w e r e
a b o u t to d o , he wished to k n o w n what they had already done. He h a d said
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last year t h a t if the g o v e r n m e n t h a d a d o p t e d a t o n e m o r e w o r t h y of this
c o u n t r y , t h e y w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n plunged into w a r ; n o r , after a careful
p e r u s a l of the voluminous blue b o o k s lately issued, h a d he found c a u s e to
c h a n g e his opinions. Comparing t h e c o n t e n t s of v a r i o u s dispatches on various sides, he argued that the Ministry h a d overlooked the m o s t o b v i o u s 10
facts, h a d misunderstood t h e m o s t u n m i s t a k e a b l e t e n d e n c i e s , a n d t r u s t e d t o
t h e m o s t evidently fallacious a s s u r a n c e s . Declaring t h a t the tragedy of
S i n o p e i m p e a c h e d t h e h o n o r of England, a n d r e q u i r e d ample explanation,
he d r e w evidence from the published d o c u m e n t s to show that t h e Admirals
of the united fleets might h a v e p r e v e n t e d the c a t a s t r o p h e , or that t h e T u r k s 15
by t h e m selves h a v e averted it, if it had not b e e n for t h e timorous a n d vacillating instructions sent out by t h e British g o v e r n m e n t . He inferred from their
r e c e n t language t h a t t h e y w o u l d still treat on t h e basis of the status quo ante
bellum, w h i c h p r e s u m e d step he c o n d e m n e d . He called u p o n the g o v e r n m e n t
to do their d u t y , in the certainty t h a t the people of England would do theirs.
20
Sir J a m e s G r a h a m , with his notorious effrontery, a n s w e r e d him t h a t t h e y
m u s t either p u t their confidence in Ministers or t u r n t h e m out. B u t " m e a n while d o n ' t let us potter over blue b o o k s . " T h e y h a d b e e n deceived by Russia,
w h o w a s an old and faithful ally of G r e a t Britain, b u t " d a r k , malignant
suspicions did n o t easily t a k e r o o t in g e n e r o u s m i n d s . " This old fox, Sir
R o b e r t Peel's " d i r t y little b o y , " the m u r d e r e r of t h e B a n d i e r a s , w a s quite
c h a r m i n g with his " g e n e r o u s m i n d " and his " s l o w n e s s to s u s p e c t . "
T h e n c a m e L o r d Jocelyn a n d L o r d D u d l e y Stuart, w h o s e s p e e c h e s filled
t h e p a p e r s t h e n e x t day, b u t emptied the h o u s e o n this evening. Mr. R o e b u c k
n e x t c o m m e n c e d by defending t h e ministers for their c o n d u c t in a delicate
situation, b u t e n d e d by declaring t h a t it w a s n o w time for t h e ministry to
declare clearly what they intended to do. L o r d J o h n R u s s e l l , on t h e p l e a of
a n s w e r i n g this question, r o s e , gave an apologetic recapitulation of the
history of t h e late differences, and w h e n he h a d c o n v i n c e d himself t h a t
this w o u l d n o t d o , feigned to be willing to tell t h e m " w h a t t h e y intended
to d o ; " a thing he himself m a y n o t h a v e b e e n quite sure of. A c c o r d i n g to
his s t a t e m e n t t h e y h a d entered into s o m e vague sort of alliance w i t h F r a n c e ,
n o t by m e a n s of a t r e a t y concluded, b u t of n o t e s interchanged. E n g l a n d and
F r a n c e w e r e n o w proposing to T u r k e y also a sort of t r e a t y , by virtue of
w h i c h t h e P o r t e should n o t sue for p e a c e w i t h o u t their c o n s e n t . T h e y h a d
b e e n cruelly o v e r c o m e by the incredible perfidy of the C z a r . He (Russell)
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despaired o f p e a c e being p r e s e r v e d . T h e y w e r e likely t o enter o n war. H e
c o n s e q u e n t l y w a n t e d s o m e £3,000,000 m o r e t h a n last year. S e c r e c y w a s
t h e condition of s u c c e s s in w a r a n d t h e r e f o r e he could n o t tell t h e m j u s t
n o w w h a t t h e y w e r e to do in t h a t w a r . As t h e latter, or theatrical p a r t of his
5 s p e e c h w a s p e r f o r m e d w i t h g r e a t f o r c e a n d w i t h m u c h m o r a l indignation at
t h e Czar " t h e b u t c h e r , " the applause w a s i m m e n s e , a n d t h e H o u s e , i n thenenthusiasm, w e r e on t h e point of voting t h e estimates, w h e n Mr. Disraeli
interceded and s u c c e e d e d in adjourning t h e discussion to M o n d a y evening.
T h e d e b a t e s w e r e r e s u m e d y e s t e r d a y evening a n d only c o n c l u d e d a t
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2 o'clock, A . M .
First r o s e M r . C o b d e n , promising to confine himself strictly to the practical
question i n hajid. H e t o o k great pains t o p r o v e from t h e blue b o o k s , w h a t
w a s denied b y n o b o d y , that t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t h a d originated "this
melancholy d i s p u t e , " by t h e mission of Mr. L a v a l e t t e respecting t h e H o l y
Places a n d the c o n c e s s i o n s it w r u n g from the P o r t e . T h e F r e n c h President,
w h o , at that time, h a d s o m e e x p e c t a t i o n of b e c o m i n g E m p e r o r , might h a v e
h a d some wish to m a k e a little political capital by m a k i n g t h e s e d e m a n d s u p o n
T u r k e y on behalf of t h e L a t i n Christians. T h e first m o v e m e n t of Russia,
t h e r e f o r e , w a s traceable to t h e proceedings of F r a n c e , in this matter. T h e
non-signature of t h e V i e n n a n o t e h a d b e e n t h e fault of t h e allies, n o t of t h e
T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t , b e c a u s e , if it h a d b e e n t h r e a t e n e d w i t h the w i t h d r a w a l
of t h e fleet from B e s i k a B a y , t h e P o r t e w o u l d immediately h a v e signed it.
W e w e r e going t o w a r b e c a u s e w e insisted u p o n T u r k e y refusing t o d o t h a t
by a n o t e to R u s s i a w h i c h we i n t e n d e d to a s k h e r to do for ourselves, viz.:
to give us a guarantee for the b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t of the Christians. T h e v a s t
majority of t h e population in t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e w a s looking with e a g e r n e s s
to the s u c c e s s of t h a t v e r y policy w h i c h R u s s i a w a s n o w prosecuting, (as
n o w exemplified i n Moldo-Wallachia). F r o m t h e blue b o o k s t h e m s e l v e s h e
could show t h a t the evils and o p p r e s s i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h a t Christian p o p u l a tion lived, could n o t be tolerated—referring principally to dispatches of L o r d
Clarendon, ostensibly w r i t t e n with t h e view to m a k e o u t a c a s e for the Czar.
In o n e of t h e s e dispatches L o r d C l a r e n d o n w r i t e s : " T h e P o r t e m u s t decide
b e t w e e n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of an e r r o n e o u s religious principle and t h e loss of
t h e s y m p a t h y a n d support of its allies." Mr. C o b d e n w a s t h e r e f o r e enabled
to a s k : " W h e t h e r the H o u s e did think it possible that a population like t h e
fanatical M u s s u l m a n population of T u r k e y w o u l d a b a n d o n its religion? A n d
w i t h o u t total a b a n d o n m e n t of the law of t h e Koran, it w a s absolutely
impossible to put t h e Christians of T u r k e y u p o n an equality with t h e T u r k s . "
W e m a y a s well a s k M r . C o b d e n , w h e t h e r w i t h t h e existing State C h u r c h a n d
laws of England, it is possible to p u t h e r w o r k i n g - m e n u p o n equality w i t h
the C o b d e n s and the Brights? M r . C o b d e n p r o c e e d e d t h e n with a view to
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s h o w from t h e letters of L o r d Stratford de Redcliff e a n d t h e British Consular
agents, t h a t t h e r e reigns a general dissatisfaction t h r o u g h the Christian
population in T u r k e y threatening to e n d in a general insurrection. N o w , let
us again a s k Mr. C o b d e n w h e t h e r t h e r e d o e s n o t exist a general dissatisfaction with their g o v e r n m e n t s and their ruling classes, a m o n g all p e o 5
pies of E u r o p e , w h i c h discontent s o o n t h r e a t e n s to t e r m i n a t e with a general
revolution? If G e r m a n y , Italy, F r a n c e or e v e n G r e a t Britain h a d b e e n inv a d e d , like T u r k e y , by a foreign army, hostile to their G o v e r n m e n t s and
appealing to their insurrectionary p a s s i o n s , w o u l d a n y of t h e s e countries
h a v e as long r e m a i n e d quiet, as the Christian population of T u r k e y h a v e 10
done?
In entering u p o n a w a r in defense of T u r k e y , M r . C o b d e n c o n c l u d e s ,
E n g l a n d w o u l d be fighting for t h e domination of t h e O t t o m a n population of
T u r k e y and against t h e interest of the great b o d y of t h e people of that
c o u n t r y . This is merely a religious question b e t w e e n t h e R u s s i a n a r m y on
t h e o n e side and the T u r k i s h on t h e other. T h e British interests w e r e all on
t h e side of Russia. T h e extent pf their t r a d e with R u s s i a w a s e n o r m o u s . If
t h e e x p o r t trade to R u s s i a a m o u n t e d to only £2,000,000, this w a s b u t the
transitory result from Russia still laboring u n d e r t h e Protectionist delusion.
H o w e v e r their imports from R u s s i a a m o u n t e d to £13,000,000. With the
e x c e p t i o n of the U n i t e d States, t h e r e w a s no o n e foreign c o u n t r y with which
their t r a d e w a s so important as w i t h Russia. If E n g l a n d w a s going to w a r ,
w h y w e r e t h e y sending land forces to T u r k e y , i n s t e a d of exclusively using
their n a v y ? If the time had c o m e for the c o n t e s t b e t w e e n C o s s a c k i s m and
Republicanism, w h y w e r e Prussia, Austria, t h e rest of t h e G e r m a n S t a t e s ,
Belgium, Holland, S w e d e n , and D e n m a r k remaining neutral, while F r a n c e
a n d England h a d to fight single h a n d e d ? If this w e r e a question of E u r o p e a n
i m p o r t a n c e , w a s i t n o t t o b e supposed that t h o s e w h o w e r e n e a r e s t t o t h e
danger w o u l d be t h e first to fight? Mr. C o b d e n c o n c l u d e d by declaring t h a t
" h e w a s o p p o s e d t o the w a r with R u s s i a . " H e t h o u g h t " t h e b e s t thing w a s
t o fall b a c k u p o n the V i e n n a n o t e . "
L o r d J o h n M a n n e r s considered t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t w e r e t o b l a m e for
their supineness a n d false security. T h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s originally m a d e by
L o r d C l a r e n d o n to t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of Russia, F r a n c e and T u r k e y , in which,
i n s t e a d of acting in a c c o r d a n c e with F r a n c e , L o r d C l a r e n d o n persisted in
refusing so to c o o p e r a t e , a n d m a d e k n o w n to the G o v e r n m e n t of R u s s i a that
E n g l a n d would not c o o p e r a t e with F r a n c e , h a d i n d u c e d t h e E m p e r o r of
R u s s i a to give Prince Menchikoff t h e o r d e r s w h i c h led to t h e w h o l e
c a t a s t r o p h e . I t w a s n o w o n d e r t h a t w h e n E n g l a n d a t last a n n o u n c e d her
intention to interfere actually at Constantinople, t h e G o v e r n m e n t of F r a n c e
should entertain s o m e d o u b t as to t h e sincerity of h e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
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It w a s n o t England t h a t advised t h e P o r t e to reject Prince Menchikoff's
ultimatum, but, on the c o n t r a r y , t h e Ministers of the Sultan acted u p o n their
o w n responsibility, and w i t h o u t any h o p e of the assistance of England. After
t h e occupation of the Principalities by t h e R u s s i a n s , t h e prolonged diplomatic
5 negotiations of the British G o v e r n m e n t h a d b e e n v e r y prejudicial to t h e
interests of T u r k e y , and v e r y serviceable to t h o s e of Russia. R u s s i a h a d t a k e n
possession of the Principalities without a declaration of w a r , in order to
p r e v e n t t h o s e treaties w h i c h w e r e h e r real i n s t r u m e n t s of oppression t o w a r d
T u r k e y from falling to t h e ground. C o n s e q u e n t l y , after T u r k e y h a d declared
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war, it w a s n o t wise to insist u p o n t h e r e n e w a l of t h e s e treaties as a basis
o f negotiation. T h e m a i n question really i n h a n d n o w w a s , w h a t w e r e t h e
objects w h i c h t h e G o v e r n m e n t c o n t e m p l a t e d in entering u p o n this t r e m e n d o u s struggle? It w a s generally a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e h o n o r and the i n d e p e n d e n c e of T u r k e y w e r e to be m a i n t a i n e d ; b u t it w a s essential t h a t t h e r e
should be some u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a far m o r e specific n a t u r e as to w h a t w a s
m e a n t b y this a n n o u n c e m e n t .
M r . H o r s m a n e n d e a v o r e d t o refute the fallacies p r o p o u n d e d b y
Mr. C o b d e n . T h e real question w a s n o t w h a t T u r k e y is, b u t w h a t R u s s i a
w o u l d b e c o m e w i t h T u r k e y a b s o r b e d in h e r dominions—a question w h e t h e r
t h e E m p e r o r w a s to be E m p e r o r also of T u r k e y ? With R u s s i a t h e r e w a s b u t
o n e object recognized, t h e a d v a n c e m e n t o f t h e political p o w e r b y w a r . H e r
aim w a s territorial aggrandizement. F r o m t h e m o n s t r o u s mendacity of t h e
first step t a k e n in this m a t t e r by t h e R u s s i a n A u t o c r a t , d o w n to the atrocious
m a s s a c r e of Sinope, his c o u r s e h a d b e e n o n e of ferocity and fraud, of crimes
t h a t w o u l d be c o n s p i c u o u s e v e n in t h e annals of Russia, a c o u n t r y w h o s e
history w a s all crime, and w h i c h w e r e r e n d e r e d still m o r e fearful by t h a t
b l a s p h e m y w h i c h dared to i n v o k e t h e Christianity w h o s e laws it so flagrantly
violated. On the other h a n d , the c o n d u c t of the intended victim h a d b e e n
admirable. Mr. H o r s m a n t h e n t o o k great pains t o e x c u s e t h e oscillating
c o u r s e of the G o v e r n m e n t by t h e difficulties w h i c h t h e y found their position
s u r r o u n d e d with. H e n c e their diplomatic hesitation. If all the Cabinets of
E u r o p e , if t h e m o s t e x p e r i e n c e d diplomatists h a d b e e n engaged in opposition
to the A u t o c r a t , it w o u l d h a v e b e e n impossible to place him in a position
of greater difficulty a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t a n d from which he could n o t extrícate himself w i t h o u t difficulty a n d loss, t h a n t h a t in w h i c h either by t h e
blunders of our o w n Ministers or t h e adroitness of his o w n , he w a s n o w
placed. Six m o n t h s ago the E m p e r o r N i c h o l a s w a s t h e chief supporter of t h e
order a n d legitimacy o f E u r o p e ; n o w h e stood forward, u n m a s k e d a s t h e
greatest revolutionist. Foiled in his political intrigues, unsuccessful in the w a r
in Asia, a n d well t h r a s h e d by t h e T u r k s on t h e D a n u b e , t h e Czar h a d really
s h o w n an alacrity in sinking w h i c h w a s quite refreshing. It w a s n o w the d u t y
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of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , if hostilities should c o m m e n c e , to t a k e c a r e n o t to secure
p e a c e e x c e p t u p o n s u c h t e r m s as w o u l d involve ample and certain security
against a n y future repetition of similar aggression. He t r u s t e d t h a t o n e of
the conditions for t h e restoration of p e a c e w o u l d be t h a t R u s s i a should
indemnify T u r k e y for t h e e x p e n s e s to w h i c h she h a d b e e n put, a n d t h a t
T u r k e y should r e c e i v e , as a material g u a r a n t e e , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of territories
of w h i c h she h a d b e e n deprived.
Mr. D r u m m o n d believed that we are going to engage in a religious w a r ,
a n d are a b o u t to enter into another c r u s a d e for t h e t o m b of Geoffrey de
Bouillon, w h i c h is already so b r o k e n t h a t it c a n n o t be sat u p o n . It a p p e a r s
t h a t t h e a u t h o r of t h e mischief from t h e v e r y beginning h a s b e e n t h e P o p e .
E n g l a n d h a d n o t the least interest in t h e T u r k i s h question, a n d a w a r b e t w e e n
this c o u n t r y a n d R u s s i a could n o t be b r o u g h t to a successful termination,
b e c a u s e t h e y will fight e a c h other for e v e r and n e v e r do e a c h other any h a r m .
"All t h a t y o u will gain in t h e p r e s e n t w a r will be h a r d k n o c k s . " Mr. C o b d e n
h a d s o m e time ago offered to c r u m p l e R u s s i a u p , a n d if he w o u l d do so n o w it
w o u l d s a v e t h e m a world of trouble. In fact, t h e p r e s e n t dispute w a s , w h e t h e r
t h e milliners should c o m e from Paris or from St. P e t e r s b u r g to dress t h e
idols of t h e H o l y Sepulchre. T h e y h a d n o w found o u t t h a t T u r k e y w a s their
ancient ally, a n d quite n e c e s s a r y to the b a l a n c e of p o w e r of E u r o p e . H o w
in t h e w o r l d did it h a p p e n t h a t t h e y n e v e r found t h a t out b e f o r e t h e y t o o k
t h e w h o l e kingdom of G r e e c e from her, and b e f o r e t h e y fought t h e battle
of N a v a r i n o , which he r e m e m b e r e d L o r d St. H e l e n s having described as a
capital battle, only t h a t t h e y k n o c k e d d o w n the w r o n g m e n . H o w c a m e t h e y
n o t to think of this w h e n the Russians p a s s e d t h e B a l k a n a n d w h e n t h e y might
h a v e given T u r k e y effectual aid by their fleet? B u t n o w , after t h e y h a d
r e d u c e d t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e to t h e last stage of d e c r e p i t u d e , t h e y thought
to be able to uphold this tottering p o w e r on the p r e t e n s e of t h e b a l a n c e of
p o w e r . After s o m e sarcastic r e m a r k s on t h e s u d d e n e n t h u s i a s m for Bonap a r t e , M r . D r u m m o n d asked w h o w a s to be Minister of W a r ? All of t h e m h a d
s e e n e n o u g h to show t h e m t h a t t h e r e w a s a feeble h a n d at t h e helm. He did
n o t believe t h a t the character of a n y general or of a n y admiral w a s safe in
t h e h a n d s of t h e p r e s e n t Administration. T h e y w e r e capable of sacrificing
either to please any faction in the H o u s e . If t h e y w e r e d e t e r m i n e d to go to
war, t h e y m u s t strike their blow at the h e a r t of Russia, a n d n o t go wasting
their shots in t h e Black Sea. T h e y m u s t begin by proclaiming the reëstablishm e n t of t h e kingdom of Poland. A b o v e all, he w a n t e d to be informed w h a t
the G o v e r n m e n t w a s about. " T h e h e a d o f the G o v e r n m e n t , " said M r . D r u m m o n d , " p r i d e s himself on his p o w e r s of c o n c e a l m e n t , a n d stated in another
p l a c e t h a t he should like to see any o n e e x t r a c t information from him w h i c h
he w a s n o t inclined to afford. T h a t s t a t e m e n t r e m i n d e d h i m of a s t o r y which
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he h e a r d o n c e in Scotland—a H i g h l a n d m a n h a d gone to India, a n d on his
r e t u r n to England b r o u g h t h o m e a p a r r o t as a p r e s e n t to his wife, w h i c h talked
r e m a r k a b l y well. A neighbor, n o t wishing to be o u t d o n e , w e n t to E d i n b u r g h
a n d b r o u g h t his wife h o m e a large owl. On its being r e m a r k e d to h i m t h a t
the owl could n e v e r be taught to s p e a k : ' V e r y t r u e , ' he replied; ' b u t consider
the p o w e r o' t h o c h t he has in him.' "
Mr. B u t t stated that this w a s the first time since the revolution t h a t a
Ministry h a d c o m e d o w n to t h e H o u s e a n d a s k e d for a w a r supply without
stating distinctly a n d fully t h e grounds for such a proposition. In the legal
sense of t h e w o r d , t h e y w e r e not y e t at w a r , a n d t h e H o u s e h a d a right to
k n o w , o n voting t h e s e supplies, w h a t w a s delaying t h e declaration o f w a r
against Russia? In w h a t an equivocal position w a s their fleet at t h e B l a c k
S e a p u t ! Admiral D u n d a s h a d o r d e r s to send b a c k R u s s i a n vessels to a
R u s s i a n port, and if, in t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s e o r d e r s , he d e s t r o y e d a
R u s s i a n ship, while being at p e a c e w i t h Russia, w e r e Ministers p r e p a r e d to
justify such a state of things? He h o p e d it w o u l d be explained w h e t h e r
assistance w a s t o b e given u p o n t h o s e humiliating terms—that T u r k e y w a s
to place herself in the h a n d s of E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e in making p e a c e w i t h
R u s s i a ? If that w a s to be t h e policy of E n g l a n d , t h e n Parliament w a s n o w
called u p o n to v o t e an additional force, n o t for t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of T u r k e y ,
b u t for h e r subjugation. M r . B u t t b e t r a y e d s o m e d o u b t w h e t h e r Ministers
w e r e not merely making a p a r a d e of t h o s e military p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e
p u r p o s e of arriving at a dishonorable p e a c e .
Mr. S. H e r b e r t , the Minister of W a r , m a d e t h e m o s t vulgar and silly s p e e c h
t h a t could possibly be e x p e c t e d e v e n f r o m a Coalition Minister at s u c h a
m o m e n t o u s crisis. T h e G o v e r n m e n t w a s p l a c e d b e t w e e n t w o fires, a n d t h e y
could not find any m e a n s of ascertaining w h a t opinion t h e H o u s e itself really
entertained u p o n the question. T h e h o n o r a b l e gentlemen opposite had t h e
advantage of coming to facts; t h e y w e r e criticising t h e p a s t ; b u t t h e G o v e r n m e n t h a d no facts to deal with—they h a d only to speculate as to t h e future.
T h e y w e r e inclined to e m b a r k in this w a r n o t so m u c h for t h e p u r p o s e of
defending T u r k e y as of opposing Russia. This w a s all the information t h e
H o u s e could get from p o o r Mr. H e r b e r t , " a s t o t h e f u t u r e . " B u t n o ; h e told
t h e m something v e r y n e w . " M r . C o b d e n i s , " according t o Mr. H e r b e r t , " t h e
representative of t h e feeling of t h e largest class of t h e people of this
c o u n t r y . " This assertion being d e n i e d in all p a r t s of t h e H o u s e , M r . H e r b e r t
p r o c e e d s to state: "If n o t t h e largest class, the honorable m e m b e r w a s a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , at a n y r a t e , of a great portion of the working classes of this
c o u n t r y . " P o o r Mr. H e r b e r t . It w a s quite refreshing to see Mr. Disraeli rise
after him, and t h u s to h a v e t h e b a b b l e r supplanted by a real d e b a t e r .
Mr. Disraeli, alluding to the theatrical declamations with w h i c h L o r d J o h n
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Russell h a d terminated his speech on Friday evening, c o m m e n c e d with this
s t a t e m e n t : "I h a v e always b e e n of opinion t h a t any nation, and this o n e in
particular, would be m u c h m o r e p r e p a r e d and m u c h m o r e willing to b e a r the
b u r d e n s which a state of warfare m u s t induce a n d occasion, if t h e y really
k n e w for w h a t t h e y w e r e going to war, t h a n if t h e y should be h u r r i e d into
a c o n t e s t by inflammatory appeals to t h e p a s s i o n s , a n d be carried a w a y by
an e x c i t e m e n t w h i c h at t h e first m o m e n t might be c o n v e n i e n t to a Minister,
b u t w h i c h in a few m o n t h s after would be followed by the inevitable reaction
of ignorance, or p e r h a p s ignorance and disaster c o m b i n e d . " T h u s it h a d b e e n
with t h e w a r of 1828—29, w h e n t h e y t o o k p a r t on t h e side of R u s s i a a n d not
on t h a t of T u r k e y . T h e p r e s e n t perplexed position a n d the r e c e n t p r o s t r a t e
condition of T u r k e y , w e r e entirely to be ascribed to the e v e n t s of that w a r ,
i n w h i c h England and F r a n c e w e r e united against T u r k e y . A t that time t h e r e
w a s n o t a m e m b e r of the H o u s e w h o really h a d a n y idea w h y t h e y w e n t to
w a r , or w h a t w a s t h e object t h e y intended to accomplish, w h e n t h e y leveled
a blow at the p o w e r of T u r k e y . Therefore they m u s t clearly c o m p r e h e n d the
c a u s e and t h e object of t h e p r e s e n t war. This k n o w l e d g e w a s only to be
obtained from the blue b o o k s . W h a t had b e e n the origin of the p r e s e n t state
of affairs t h e y must learn from t h e w o r d s written in t h e s e v e r y dispatches
lying on the table. T h e policy t h e r e developed w a s preparing t h a t future
w h i c h , according t o Ministers, alone w a s t o a b s o r b their attention. H e
p r o t e s t e d , therefore against the doctrine of Sir J a m e s G r a h a m . M r . H e r b e r t
h a d j u s t p r o t e s t e d against t h e reading of isolated pages from t h o s e disp a t c h e s . H e h o w e v e r could n o t p r o m i s e t o r e a d t h e s e blue b o o k s through
to t h e H o u s e ; yet if t h e y admitted the validity of the right h o n o r a b l e gentlem a n ' s objection, this would seem to be the only c o u r s e o p e n to him. It w a s
t h e received opinion of all t h a t w e r e well acquainted with t h e E a s t e r n q u e s tion, a n d his o w n opinion, that R u s s i a h a d no intention w h a t e v e r of forcibly
c o n q u e r i n g t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; b u t that, b y adroit policy a n d b y i m p r o v e d
m e a n s , she intended to obtain and to exercise s u c h an influence over the
Christian population of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e , t h a t she w o u l d obtain all that
authority which would h a v e b e e n the result of her possessing, p e r h a p s , t h e
seat of t h e Sultan's empire. At the outset of t h e s e negotiations C o u n t Nesselr o d e himself, in his dispatches dated J a n u a r y , 1853, a n d J u n e , 1853, distinctly
a n d explicitly described t h e policy of Russia. A s c e n d a n c y to be obtained over
t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e by exercising a peculiar influence o v e r 12,000,000, w h o
c o m p o s e t h e large majority of t h e Sultan's subjects. By t h e R u s s i a n disp a t c h e s a d d r e s s e d to t h e British G o v e r n m e n t , n o t merely is t h a t policy defined, b u t the British G o v e r n m e n t is no less candidly informed of t h e m o d e by
w h i c h it is to be accomplished—not by c o n q u e s t , b u t by maintaining treaties
t h a t exist, a n d by extending t h e spirit of t h o s e treaties. T h u s , from t h e v e r y
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beginning of this i m p o r t a n t c o n t r o v e r s y , t h e b a s e of the diplomatic c a m p a i g n
w a s found in a treaty—the t r e a t y of Kainardji. By t h a t t r e a t y t h e Christian
subjects of the P o r t e are p l a c e d u n d e r t h e especial protection of t h e Sultan;
a n d Russia, in interpreting t h a t treaty, states t h a t t h e Christian subjects of
t h e Sultan are placed specially u n d e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Czar. U n d e r t h e
s a m e t r e a t y representations m a y b e m a d e b y R u s s i a i n favor o f her n e w
church—a building in t h e street called B e y Oglu—the R u s s i a n interpretation
of t h a t article of t h e t r e a t y is, t h a t R u s s i a h a s the p o w e r of interfering in favor
of e v e r y c h u r c h of the G r e e k d e n o m i n a t i o n , a n d , of c o u r s e , in favor of all
the communities of t h a t faith in t h e Sultan's dominions, w h o h a p p e n to be
the large majority of his subjects. This w a s t h e a v o w e d Russian interpretation of t h e treaty of Kainardji. On t h e other hand t h e y might s e e , from a
dispatch of the 8th of J a n u a r y , 1853, from Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r , t h a t C o u n t
N e s s e l r o d e informed Sir Hamilton, w h o informed L o r d Clarendon, " t h a t it
w a s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e diplomacy of R u s s i a should be supported by a d e m o n stration of f o r c e . " According to this s a m e dispatch, C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e ' s
belief that this question w o u l d be b r o u g h t to a satisfactory conclusion, r e s t e d
u p o n the " e x e r t i o n s w h i c h w e r e t o b e m a d e b y H e r M a j e s t y ' s Ministers a t
Paris and C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . " Russia, t h e n , a t o n c e declared that t h e d e m o n stration of force w a s only a d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; b u t t h a t t h e object w a s to be
peaceably attained by t h e exertions of the English Ministers at Paris and
Constantinople. " N o w , Sir," continued Mr. Disraeli, " I w a n t t o k n o w , with
that object e x p r e s s e d , with those m e a n s detailed, and w i t h t h a t diplomacy
to deal with, h o w t h e Ministers e n c o u n t e r e d s u c h a c o m b i n a t i o n ? " It w a s
u n n e c e s s a r y to t o u c h on the question of t h e H o l y P l a c e s . T h a t w a s , in fact,
soon settled at Constantinople. E v e n C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e , at a v e r y early
period of t h e s e negotiations, e x p r e s s e d his surprise and satisfaction, and
stated his a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of t h e conciliatory spirit of F r a n c e . B u t all t h a t
time the forces of Russia w e r e accumulating on the T u r k i s h frontiers, a n d
all that time C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e w a s telling L o r d Clarendon t h a t his G o v e r n m e n t would ask an equivalent for the privileges w h i c h t h e G r e e k C h u r c h h a d
lost at Jerusalem, b u t in t h e settlement of which his G o v e r n m e n t h a d not b e e n
disturbed. E v e n the mission of Prince Menchikoff w a s mentioned at t h a t
time, as p r o v e d by various d i s p a t c h e s from Sir Hamilton S e y m o u r . L o r d
J o h n Russell had told t h e m t h e other night t h a t t h e c o n d u c t of C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e w a s fraudulent. O n t h e other h a n d L o r d J o h n Russell confessed himself
that C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e k e p t saying t h a t his Imperial m a s t e r w o u l d ask an
equivalent for t h e G r e e k C h u r c h ; b u t o n t h e other h e complained t h a t C o u n t
N e s s e l r o d e never told t h e m w h a t he w a n t e d . " W i c k e d C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e !
( L a u g t h e r . ) F r a u d u l e n t duplicity of R u s s i a n s t a t e s m e n ! ( L a u g h t e r . ) W h y
could the noble L o r d n o t find the information he w a n t e d ? W h y is Sir Hamil-
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t o n S e y m o u r at St. Petersburg, if he is n o t to a s k for t h e information t h a t
is d e s i r e d ? " If C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e n e v e r told Mm w h a t he w a n t e d , it w a s
b e c a u s e t h e noble L o r d n e v e r dared to ask. At this stage of t h e proceedings
it w a s t h e d u t y of the Ministers to p u t categorical q u e s t i o n s to t h e Cabinet
of St. Petersburg. If t h e y could n o t define w h a t t h e y w a n t e d , t h e n it w a s time
to declare that the friendly offices of t h e British G o v e r n m e n t at Paris a n d
Constantinople w e r e t o cease. W h e n L o r d J o h n Russell h a d relinquished t h e
seals of office, and w a s followed by L o r d C l a r e n d o n , t h e r e w a s a different
c h a r a c t e r in t h e diplomatic proceedings—a bias in favor of Russia. W h e n
L o r d C l a r e n d o n w a s m a d e Minister of Foreign Affairs he h a d to d r a w up
instructions for L o r d Stratford d e Redcliffe, t h e Q u e e n ' s E m b a s s a d o r , r e pairing to the seat of action. N o w w h a t w e r e t h e s e instructions? At the
m o m e n t of her u t m o s t need and her u t m o s t exigency, T u r k e y is lectured
a b o u t internal reform and commercial reform. It is intimated to her t h a t the
c o n d u c t of t h e P o r t e must be distinguished by t h e u t m o s t m o d e r a t i o n a n d
p r u d e n c e , viz: that it m u s t comply with the d e m a n d s of Russia. M e a n w h i l e
t h e G o v e r n m e n t continued not to d e m a n d an explicit explanation of w h a t
w a s m e a n t on t h e p a r t of Russia. Prince Menchikoff arrived at C o n stantinople. After having received m o s t agitating missives from Col. R o s e ,
a n d w a r n i n g dispatches from Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r , L o r d C l a r e n d o n
in a letter to L o r d Cowley, t h e British E m b a s s a d o r at P a r i s , d e n o u n c e d
Colonel R o s e ' s order in calling up t h e British fleet, regretted t h e order given
t o t h e F r e n c h Admiral t o sail t o t h e G r e e k w a t e r s , favoring F r a n c e with
c o n t e m p t u o u s d o g m a , " t h a t a policy of suspicion is neither wise nor s a f e , "
a n d declared he placed full reliance on t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a ' s solemn
a s s u r a n c e s t h a t h e w o u l d uphold t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e . T h e n L o r d C l a r e n d o n
writes to his E m b a s s a d o r at Constantinople, t h a t he feels quite sure t h a t t h e
objects o f Prince Menchikoff's mission, " w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y b e , d o n o t
e x p o s e to danger t h e authority of t h e Sultan, or t h e integrity of his domini o n s . " A y e ! L o r d Clarendon w e n t o u t of his w a y to a c c u s e their solitary ally
in E u r o p e , a n d stated t h a t their only g r o u n d s for n o w a p p r e h e n d i n g e m b a r r a s s m e n t i n t h e E a s t , w a s the position for s o m e time o c c u p i e d b y F r a n c e
with r e s p e c t t o t h e H o l y Places. Accordingly C o u n t N e s s e h o d e c o m plimented L o r d A b e r d e e n u p o n t h e b e a u rôle (translated i n t h e blue b o o k
"important role, ") t h a t he h a d played, by h a v i n g left F r a n c e "isolée. " On
t h e 1 st of April, Colonel R o s e informed this c o u n t r y of the secret convention
w h i c h R u s s i a d e m a n d e d from T u r k e y . Only t e n d a y s after L o r d Stratford
arrived at Constantinople and confirmed e v e r y thing that Colonel R o s e h a d
stated. After all this, on the 16th of May, L o r d C l a r e n d o n writes to Sir
H . S e y m o u r , " t h a t the explanations offered by t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a , "
explanations n o t contained i n t h e blue b o o k s , " h a d e n a b l e d t h e m t o disre-
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gard, instead of sharing in t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n s w h i c h t h e proceedings of Prince
Menchikoff coupled with t h e military p r e p a r a t i o n s in t h e s o u t h of R u s s i a h a d
n o t unnaturally p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e . " After this C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e
felt free to a n n o u n c e to L o r d C l a r e n d o n , on t h e 20th of J u n e , t h a t t h e y h a d
occupied the Principalities. In t h a t d o c u m e n t C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e states " t h a t
t h e E m p e r o r will o c c u p y t h e P r o v i n c e s as a deposit until satisfaction; t h a t
in acting as he h a s d o n e , he h a s r e m a i n e d faithful to his declarations to t h e
English G o v e r n m e n t ; t h a t in c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h t h e Cabinet of L o n d o n as
to t h e military p r e p a r a t i o n s coincident w i t h the opening of negotiations, he
did n o t c o n c e a l from it t h a t t h e t i m e might y e t c o m e w h e n he should be
obliged to h a v e r e c o u r s e to t h e m , complimenting the English G o v e r n m e n t
on t h e friendly intentions it h a d s h o w n ; contrasting its c o n d u c t with t h a t of
F r a n c e , and laying all the b l a m e of P r i n c e Menchikoff's s u b s e q u e n t failures
on L o r d S t r a t f o r d . " After all this, on t h e 4th of July, L o r d C l a r e n d o n writes
a circular, in w h i c h he still h o p e s in t h e justice and m o d e r a t i o n of t h e
E m p e r o r , referring t o t h e E m p e r o r ' s r e p e a t e d declaration t h a t h e w o u l d
r e s p e c t the integrity of t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e . On t h e 28th of July he writes
to L o r d Stratford, t h a t " F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d , if t h e y set to w o r k in earnest,
might certainly cripple Russia, b u t T u r k e y m e a n w h i l e might b e irretrievably
ruined, a n d peaceful negotiations are t h e only c o u r s e to p u r s u e . " W h y ? If
t h a t w a s a good a r g u m e n t t h e n , it is a good a r g u m e n t n o w . E i t h e r t h e
G o v e r n m e n t w e r e influenced by a degree of confidence w h i c h a s s u m e d a
morbid character of credulity, or t h e y w e r e influenced by c o n n i v a n c e . T h e
c a u s e of t h e w a r h a d b e e n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e negotiations during t h e last
seven m o n t h s u p o n the p a r t of h e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t . If t h e y h a d b e e n
influenced b y credulity, Russia, b y h e r perfidious c o n d u c t , m a y h a v e p r e cipitated a struggle which, p e r h a p s , will be inevitable, a n d a struggle w h i c h
might secure t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of E u r o p e , t h e safety of England, and t h e
safety of civilization. If their c o n d u c t h a d b e e n suggested by c o n n i v a n c e ,
a t i m o r o u s war, a vacillating w a r , a w a r w i t h no results, or rather with t h e
e x a c t results w h i c h w e r e originally intended. On t h e 25th of April L o r d
C l a r e n d o n h a d m a d e t h e false s t a t e m e n t i n t h e H o u s e o f L o r d s t h a t t h e
Menchikoff mission w a s t o arrange d i s p u t e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e H o l y Places,
although h e k n e w t h e c o n t r a r y t o b e t r u e . Mr. Disraeli n e x t briefly t r a c e d
t h e history of the V i e n n a n o t e to show the u t t e r imbecility of the Ministry
o r their c o n n i v a n c e with t h e C o u r t o f St. P e t e r s b u r g . H e c a m e t h e n t o t h e
third period, t h e period of t h e interval t h a t t o o k p l a c e b e t w e e n t h e failure
of t h e V i e n n a n o t e a n d t h e battle of S i n o p e . At t h a t t i m e Mr. Gladstone, t h e
Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , s p o k e in a public a s s e m b l y in t h e m o s t d e p r e ciating t o n e with r e s p e c t to T u r k e y . A n d so did t h e semi-official p a p e r s . W h a t
c h a n g e d t h e a s p e c t a n d fortunes of T u r k e y , a n d gave a n e w t o n e to the
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Cabinet, w a s t h e energies of t h e T u r k s t h e m s e l v e s . B u t no sooner w a s t h e
battle of Oltenitza fought t h a n the policy of credulity, or the policy of
c o n n i v a n c e , w a s at its dirty w o r k again. H o w e v e r , t h e slaughter of Sinope
o p e r a t e d again in t h e favor of the T u r k s . T h e fleets w e r e o r d e r e d to enter
t h e B l a c k Sea. B u t w h a t did t h e y d o ? R e t u r n to t h e B o s p h o r u s ! As to the
5
future, L o r d J o h n Russell h a d b e e n v e r y v a g u e i n t h e description o f t h e
conditions of their alliance with F r a n c e . Mr. Disraeli disclaimed confounding
t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of the b a l a n c e of p o w e r with t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of the p r e s e n t
territorial distribution of E u r o p e . T h e future of Italy mainly d e p e n d e d u p o n
t h e appreciation of that truth.
10
After M r . Disraeli's splendid speech, of w h i c h I h a v e , of c o u r s e , only given
t h e outlines, L o r d Palmerston rose and m a d e a c o m p l e t e failure. He r e p e a t e d
p a r t of t h e s p e e c h he had m a d e at the close of the last session, defended in
a v e r y inconclusive m a n n e r the ministerial policy, and w a s anxiously cautious n o t to d r o p o n e w o r d of n e w information.
15
On the motion of Sir J. G r a h a m certain v o t e s for the N a v y estimates w e r e
t h e n agreed to without discussion.
After all, the m o s t curious feature of t h e s e agitated d e b a t e s is, t h a t the
H o u s e completely failed in wresting from t h e Ministers either a formal
declaration of w a r with Russia, or a description of the objects for which t h e y
20
are t o plunge into war. T h e H o u s e and the public k n o w n o m o r e t h a n t h e y
k n e w already. T h e y h a v e got no n e w information at all.
Karl M a r x .
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Parliamentary Debates of February 22—
Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch—
The Policy of the Western Powers
Nr. 4025, 13. März 1854
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A good deal of idle talk a b o u t K o s s u t h ' s "warlike p r e p a r a t i o n s " and p r o b a b l e
" m o v e m e n t s " has infested t h e public p r e s s . N o w I h a p p e n to k n o w from a
Polish officer, w h o is setting o u t for Constantinople, and consulted t h e
e x - G o v e r n o r about t h e c o u r s e he should t a k e , t h a t K o s s u t h dissuaded h i m
from leaving L o n d o n , and e x p r e s s e d himself by no m e a n s favorable to t h e
participation of Hungarian a n d Polish officers in t h e p r e s e n t T u r k i s h war,
b e c a u s e they m u s t either enlist t h e m s e l v e s u n d e r t h e b a n n e r of C z a r t o r y s k y
or abjure their Christian faith, the o n e step being contradictory to his policy
and the other to his principles.
S o d e e p w a s the impression p r o d u c e d b y M r . Disraeli's masterly e x p o s u r e
of the Ministerial policy t h a t t h e Cabinet of all t h e talents thought fit to m a k e
a p o s t h u m o u s attempt to b u r k e him in a little c o m e d y arranged b e t w e e n
t h e m s e l v e s a n d Mr. H u m e , a n d p e r f o r m e d in W e d n e s d a y morning's sitting
of the C o m m o n s . L o r d P a l m e r s t o n h a d c o n c l u d e d his l a m e reply to M r . D i s raeli's epigrammatic alternative of a morbid " c r e d u l i t y " or a t r e a c h e r o u s
" c o n n i v a n c e " by appealing from faction to the impartial j u d g m e n t of t h e
country, a n d Mr. H u m e w a s t h e m a n c h o s e n to a n s w e r in t h e n a m e of t h e
country, just as Snug, the joiner, w a s c h o s e n to play the lion's part in " T h e
most cruel d e a t h of P y r a m u s a n d T h i s b e . " Mr. H u m e ' s whole Parliamentary
life has b e e n spent in making opposition pleasant, moving a m e n d m e n t s , in
order to withdraw t h e m afterward—constituting, in fact, t h e so-called indep e n d e n t opposition, the rear-guard of e v e r y W h i g Ministry, sure of coming
forward to r e s c u e it from danger w h e n e v e r its o w n registered partisans m a y
show any signs of vacillation. He is t h e great P a r l i a m e n t a r y " e x t i n g u i s h e r "
p a r excellence. He is not only t h e oldest m e m b e r of Parliament, b u t an
i n d e p e n d e n t m e m b e r ; and n o t only an i n d e p e n d e n t , b u t a radical; and n o t
only a radical, b u t t h e pedantic a n d n o t o r i o u s C e r b e r u s of t h e public p u r s e ,
with the mission of making p o u n d s slip unnoticed by while picking quarrels
a b o u t t h e fractional part of a farthing. F o r t h e first time in his Parliamentary
life, as he himself emphatically stated, M r . H u m e r o s e n o t to c o n d e m n , b u t
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to e x p r e s s his approval of t h e " E s t i m a t e s . " This e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t , as he
did n o t fail to r e m a r k himself, w a s t h e m o s t incontestable proof t h a t t h e Ministry h a d n o t in vain appealed to the s o u n d j u d g m e n t of the c o u n t r y from t h e
u n m e r i t e d slanders of faction, b u t h a d received a s o l e m n acquittal from the
c h a r g e of credulity a n d c o n n i v a n c e . His a r g u m e n t s w e r e characteristic. In
5
o r d e r to r e s c u e the Ministers from the alternative of credulity or c o n n i v a n c e ,
he p r o v e d t h e credulity of t h e Ministers in their t r a n s a c t i o n s with Russia.
H e h a d , t h e n , u n d e r s t o o d the t r u e sense o f L o r d P a l m e r s t o n ' s appeal. All
t h e Ministry a s k e d for w a s t h e discharge from intentional t r e a s o n . As to
credulity, h a d n o t that excellent Sir J a m e s G r a h a m already declared that "a 10
g e n e r o u s mind i s slow t o s u s p e c t ? " B e c a u s e t h e impending w a r w a s brought
a b o u t by the Ministry's o w n diplomatic m i s m a n a g e m e n t , certainly it w a s a
w a r of their o w n , a n d they, therefore, w e r e , of all m e n , as Mr. H u m e thought,
the v e r y m e n to c a r r y it curiningly. T h e relative littleness of t h e p r o p o s e d
w a r estimates w a s , in M r . H u m e ' s opinion, t h e m o s t convincing proof of t h e 15
greatness of t h e w a r intended. L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , of c o u r s e , t h a n k e d
Mr. H u m e for t h e sentence Mr. H u m e h a d p r o n o u n c e d i n t h e n a m e o f t h e
c o u n t r y , a n d , i n c o m p e n s a t i o n , f a v o r e d h i s a u d i e n c e w i t h his o w n doctrine
of state p a p e r s , which p a p e r s , according to him, m u s t n e v e r be laid before
t h e H o u s e a n d the c o u n t r y , until m a t t e r s are sufficiently embroiled to deprive 20
their publication of any u s e w h a t e v e r . S u c h w a s all t h e after-wit t h e coalition
h a d to dispose of after d u e deliberation. L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , their m a n a g e r ,
h a d n o t only to w e a k e n t h e impression of their antagonist's s p e e c h , b u t to
annihilate also his o w n theatrical appeal from the H o u s e to t h e c o u n t r y .
On T u e s d a y night, Mr. Horsfall, t h e M e m b e r for L i v e r p o o l , a s k e d t h e
q u e s t i o n : " W h e t h e r the treaties with foreign nations or the steps w h i c h h e r
Majesty's Government were prepared to take in the event of war were such
as w o u l d effectually p r e v e n t privateers being fitted o u t in neutral p o r t s to
interfere with British shipping?" T h e a n s w e r given b y L o r d P a l m e r s t o n w a s :
" T h a t the honorable gentleman and t h e H o u s e m u s t feel t h a t this w a s a
q u e s t i o n to which, in the p r e s e n t state of things, no e x p l a n a t o r y a n s w e r could
be g i v e n . " In quoting this a n s w e r of its m a s t e r , The Morning Post, P a l m e r s t o n ' s private Moniteur, r e m a r k s : " T h e noble lord could h a v e given no o t h e r
a n s w e r (whatever knowledge the G o v e r n m e n t m a y p o s s e s s o n t h e subject)
w i t h o u t entering u p o n t h e discussion of a m o s t delicate a n d difficult topic,
w h i c h m a y , at the p r e s e n t m o m e n t , form t h e subject of negotiations, a n d
w h i c h , to be b r o u g h t to a satisfactory issue, should be left to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s
sense of justice of t h o s e p o w e r s w h o h a v e no desire to r e v i v e in this civilized
age a s y s t e m of legalized p i r a c y . "
On the o n e h a n d , the P a l m e r s t o n o r g a n d e c l a r e s the "difficult t o p i c " to
form t h e subject of pending negotiations, a n d on t h e other, t h e necessity of
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Parliamentary Debates of February 22—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch
leaving it to the " s p o n t a n e o u s sense of j u s t i c e " of t h e interested p o w e r s . If
t h e m u c h b o a s t e d t r e a t y of neutrality with D e n m a r k and S w e d e n w a s n o t
dictated by the St. P e t e r s b u r g Cabinet, it m u s t , of c o u r s e , h a v e forbidden
privateers being fitted out in their p o r t s ; but, in fact, t h e whole question c a n
5 only be u n d e r s t o o d to refer to t h e U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a , as the Baltic
is to be occupied by English line-of-battle ships, a n d Holland, Belgium,
Spain, Portugal, and t h e Italian p o r t s on t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , are completely
in t h e h a n d s of England a n d F r a n c e . N o w , w h a t is in t h e opinion of t h e
St. P e t e r s b u r g Cabinet a s t o the p a r t t o b e p e r f o r m e d b y t h e U n i t e d States
10
in t h e case t h e T u r k i s h w a r should lead to a w a r b e t w e e n E n g l a n d a n d R u s s i a ?
We m a y answer this q u e s t i o n authentically from a dispatch a d d r e s s e d by
P o z z o di Borgo to C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e in t h e a u t u m n of 1825. At that time
R u s s i a had resolved u p o n invading T u r k e y . As n o w she p r o p o s e d to begin
by a pacific o c c u p a t i o n of t h e Principalities. " I n supposing t h e a d o p t i o n of
15 this p l a n , " says P o z z o di B o r g o , " i t w o u l d be requisite to enter into e x planations with t h e P o r t e in t h e m o s t m e a s u r e d t e r m s , and to a s s u r e it t h a t
if it did n o t wish to precipitate itself into a w a r , t h e E m p e r o r w a s willing to
t e r m i n a t e t h e s e differences by conciliation." After having e n u m e r a t e d all t h e
steps they would be obliged to t a k e , P o z z o di Borgo continues as follows:
20
"It would be advisable to communicate all these acts to the United States
of America as an evidence of the regard of the Imperial Cabinet, and of the
importance which it attaches to enlightening its opinion and even obtaining
its suffrage. " I n case of E n g l a n d ' s siding w i t h T u r k e y and undertaking a w a r
with Russia, P o z z o d i B o r g o r e m a r k s that, " i n blockading o u r p o r t s t h e y
25 (England) w o u l d e x e r c i s e their pretended maritime rights in respect to
neutrals. This the United States would not suffer! thence would arìse bitter
dissensions and dangerous situations."
N o w , a s the R u s s i a n historian K a r a m s i n justly r e m a r k s that " n o t h i n g
changes in our (Russian) external p o l i c y , " we are justified in presuming t h a t ,
30 at the p r e s e n t m o m e n t , and p e r h a p s as long ago as F e b r u a r y , 1853, R u s s i a
h a s " c o m m u n i c a t e d all h e r a c t s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " a n d d o n e h e r b e s t t o
cajole the W a s h i n g t o n Cabinet into at least a n e u t r a l attitude. At the s a m e
time, in t h e c a s e of a w a r with E n g l a n d , she b a s e s her h o p e s u p o n e v e n t u a l
quarrels a b o u t the " m a r i t i m e rights of t h e n e u t r a l s " producing "bitter dis35 sensions a n d d a n g e r o u s situations," a n d involving t h e U n i t e d States in a
m o r e or less a v o w e d alliance w i t h St. P e t e r s b u r g .
As I am quoting t h e m o s t celebrated of P o z z o di B o r g o ' s d i s p a t c h e s , I m a y
as well cite t h e passage respecting Austria, t h e c o n t e n t s of which h a v e
certainly lost nothing of their actuality by t h e e v e n t s t h a t h a v e p a s s e d since
40 1825, in Galicia, Italy, a n d H u n g a r y .
" O u r p o l i c y , " says P o z z o , " c o m m a n d s t h a t w e shall show ourselves t o this
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State u n d e r a terrible aspect, a n d by our p r e p a r a t i o n s to p e r s u a d e it t h a t , if
it m a k e s m o v e m e n t s against u s , the fiercest of storms that it has yet to bear,
will burst upon its head. E i t h e r Prince M e t t e r n i c h will declare to t h e T u r k s
t h a t o u r e n t r y into the Principalities is a resolution that t h e y themselves h a v e
p r o v o k e d , or he will t h r o w himself on other provinces of the Ottoman Empire 5
m o r e to his c o n v e n i e n c e . In the first c a s e we will be agreed, in the second
we will become so. T h e only c h a n c e t h a t we h a v e to r u n is t h a t of an o p e n
declaration against u s . If Prince Metternich is wise he will avoid w a r ; if he
is violent, he will be punished. W i t h a ministry p l a c e d in a situation s u c h as
his, a cabinet such as o u r s , will find in e v e n t s a t h o u s a n d w a y s of terminating 10
differences."
L o r d J o h n ' s stump-oratory, the beating of big d r u m s a b o u t English honor,
t h e show of great moral indignation at R u s s i a n perfidy, t h e vision of Engl a n d ' s floating batteries defiling along the walls of Sevastopol a n d C r o n s t a d t ,
t h e t u m u l t of a r m s and the ostentatious e m b a r k a t i o n of t r o o p s , all t h e s e 15
d r a m a t i c incidents quite bewilder the public u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d raise a mist
b e f o r e its e y e s , w h i c h allowed it to see nothing save its o w n delusions. C a n
t h e r e exist a greater delusion t h a n believing this Ministry, after t h e revelations m a d e by the blue b o o k s , to h a v e b e e n all at o n c e t r a n s f o r m e d n o t only
into a warlike Ministry, b u t into a Ministry t h a t could u n d e r t a k e any w a r 20
against R u s s i a e x c e p t a simulated o n e , or o n e carried on in the v e r y interest
of t h e e n e m y against w h o m it is ostensibly directed? L e t us look at the
c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which the warlike p r e p a r a t i o n s are m a d e .
No formal declaration of w a r is m a d e against Russia. T h e v e r y object of
t h e w a r t h e Ministry is n o t able to a v o w . T r o o p s a r e e m b a r k e d without t h e 25
place of their destination being distinctly described. T h e estimates asked for
are t o o small for a great w a r and too great for a small o n e . T h e coalition,
w h o h a v e g r o w n notorious for ingenuity displayed in hatching p r e t e x t s for
not keeping their most solemn promises a n d r e a s o n s for delaying t h e m o s t
urgent r e f o r m s , all at o n c e feel t h e m s e l v e s b o u n d by o v e r s c r u p u l o u s adher- 30
e n e e to pledges rashly given to complicate this m o m e n t o u s crisis by surprising the c o u n t r y with a n e w reform bill, d e e m e d i n o p p o r t u n e by the m o s t
a r d e n t r e f o r m e r s , imposed by no p r e s s u r e from without, and received on all
sides w i t h the u t m o s t indifference and suspicion. W h a t t h e n can be their plan
b u t to divert public attention from their external policy by getting up a subject
35
of overwhelming domestic interest?
T r a n s p a r e n t efforts are n o w m a d e to misguide the public as to t h e situation
of E n g l a n d in r e s p e c t to foreign States. No binding t r e a t y h a s y e t b e e n
c o n c l u d e d with F r a n c e , b u t a substitute has b e e n p r o v i d e d by " n o t e s exc h a n g e d . " N o w , such n o t e s w e r e e x c h a n g e d in 1839, with t h e cabinet of 40
L o u i s Philippe, by virtue of w h i c h the allied fleets w e r e to enter the D a r d a -
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nelles, and to arrest t h e intervention of R u s s i a in t h e affairs of t h e E a s t , either
singly or collectively w i t h o t h e r p o w e r s , a n d we all k n o w w h a t c a m e o u t of
the n o t e s e x c h a n g e d then—a H o l y Alliance against F r a n c e and t h e T r e a t y
of the Dardanelles. T h e sincerity a n d the e a r n e s t n e s s of the A n g l o - F r e n c h
alliance may be inferred from a Parliamentary incident in y e s t e r d a y ' s sitting
of the C o m m o n s . B o n a p a r t e , as y o u h a v e s e e n in t h e Moniteur, t h r e a t e n s
the G r e e k insurrectionists, a n d h a s sent a similar r e m o n s t r a n c e to t h e
G o v e r n m e n t of King O t h o . Sir J. W a l s h having interrogated the Ministry on
this point, L o r d J o h n Russell declared t h a t " h e w a s a w a r e of no u n d e r s t a n d ing b e t w e e n the F r e n c h and English G o v e r n m e n t s in t h e matter alluded t o ,
and h a d n o t b e e n able to see t h e Minister of Foreign Affairs on t h e subject.
His impression w a s , h o w e v e r , t h a t n o such r e m o n s t r a n c e had b e e n sent b y
t h e G o v e r n m e n t of F r a n c e , a n d certainly n o t with t h e c o n s e n t of, or in
c o n c e r t with, the G o v e r n m e n t of this c o u n t r y . "
If t h e British G o v e r n m e n t intend a real w a r with R u s s i a w h y do t h e y
anxiously e s c h e w the international f o r m s of declaring w a r ? If t h e y intend
a real alliance with F r a n c e , w h y do t h e y studiously s h u n the legalized f o r m s
of international alliances? As to t h e G e r m a n p o w e r s , Sir J a m e s G r a h a m
declares t h a t t h e y h a v e entered an alliance w i t h E n g l a n d , and L o r d J o h n
Russell on t h e same evening contradicts him, stating that t h e relations with
t h o s e p o w e r s are in fact t h e same as at t h e beginning of the E a s t e r n c o m plication. According to t h e v e r y s t a t e m e n t of the ministers, t h e y are just n o w
a b o u t coming to t e r m s with T u r k e y and proposing a t r e a t y w i t h her. T h e y are
embarking t r o o p s , with a view to occupying Constantinople, without having
b e f o r e h a n d concluded a t r e a t y w i t h T u r k e y . We a r e , t h e n , n o t to be surprised
at learning from a Constantinople letter t h a t a secret agent of t h e Porte h a s
b e e n sent from V i e n n a to St. P e t e r s b u r g to p r o p o s e to the Czar a private
settlement. " I t would b e rational," says t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t , " t h a t t h e T u r k s ,
after discovering t h e t r e a c h e r y a n d folly of their p r e t e n d e d friends should
seek to avenge t h e m s e l v e s by contracting an alliance with a wise e n e m y . T h e
t e r m s of settlement, t h e former are e n d e a v o r i n g to settle on T u r k e y , are t e n
times m o r e ruinous t h a n t h e Menchikoff c l a i m s . "
T h e p r o s p e c t of w h a t the e m b a r k e d t r o o p s a r e intended to d o , at least in
t h e opinion of t h e English Ministry, m a y be justly inferred from w h a t t h e
united s q u a d r o n s h a v e d o n e and are doing at the p r e s e n t m o m e n t . T w e n t y
d a y s after having e n t e r e d t h e B l a c k S e a t h e y r e t u r n to t h e B o s p h o r u s . A f e w
d a y s previous, we are informed, " t h e Ministers of the P o r t e , o u t of deference
for t h e r e m o n s t r a n c e s of t h e British E m b a s s a d o r , h a d to put in prison t h e
editor of the G r e e k j o u r n a l , The Telegraph of the Bosphorus, for having said
in his paper that b o t h t h e English a n d F r e n c h fleets w o u l d shortly r e t u r n from
t h e E u x i n e to t h e B o s p h o r u s . T h e E d i t o r of t h e Journal of Constantinople
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w a s authorized t o declare t h a t b o t h f l e e t s w e r e t o c o n t i n u e their stay i n t h e
E u x i n e . " In order to show his deference for t h e intimation received from
t h e British a n d F r e n c h Admirals, t h e R u s s i a n Admiral, on t h e 19th ult., sent
o u t t w o steamers t o b o m b a r d the T u r k s a t Shefketil, and R u s s i a n s t e a m e r s
cruise in sight of Trebizond, while no vessels belonging to t h e united squadr o n s are in the Black Sea, e x c e p t an English a n d a F r e n c h steamer, off
S e v a s t o p o l ; Sinope, t h e n , and t h e b o m b a r d m e n t of Shefketil by R u s s i a n
s t e a m e r s , are the only feats the united s q u a d r o n s h a v e to b o a s t of. T h e
q u a r r e l b e t w e e n t h e E m b a s s a d o r s a n d t h e Admirals all relations b e t w e e n
w h o m h a v e c o m e to a dead stand—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe refusing to
r e c e i v e Admiral D u n d a s and Baraguay d'Hilliers excluding from a state ball
t h e F r e n c h Admiral and his officers—this quarrel is of minor i m p o r t a n c e , as
t h e diplomatic triflers being c o m p r o m i s e d by t h e publication of their disp a t c h e s at L o n d o n and Paris, m a y strive to r e s c u e , at a n y risk of ships and
c r e w s , their lost reputation.
B u t t h e serious side of the question is, t h a t t h e public instructions given
to t h e E m b a s s a d o r s w e r e c o u n t e r m a n d e d by a set of secret instructions
f o r w a r d e d to the Admirals, and t h a t the latter are really incapable of executing instructions which are self-contradictory—and h o w could t h e y be otherw i s e , no declaration of w a r having p r e c e d e d t h e m ? On t h e o n e h a n d t h e y
are o r d e r e d to attack Russian ships in order to enforce their withdrawal from
the E u x i n e t o Sevastopol, and o n the other, n o t t o s w e r v e from t h e m e r e
defensive. Lastly, if a serious w a r be intended, h o w could t h e British
E m b a s s a d o r at Constantinople h a v e regarded it as an important t r i u m p h to
h a v e got t h e leader of t h e w a r p a r t y in t h e T u r k i s h ministry—Mehemed Ali
Pasha—turned o u t of his office as W a r Minister, having him replaced by t h e
peace-mongering R i z a P a s h a , while he intrusted M e h e m e t P a s h a , a c r e a t u r e
of Reshid P a s h a , with the office of G r a n d A d m i r a l ?
N o w look a t another m o s t important point. T h e e m b a r k a t i o n o f the British
a n d F r e n c h t r o o p s is only p r o c e e d e d with after t h e n e w s of a G r e e k insurrection having b r o k e n out in Albania, and being spread over T h e s s a l y and
M a c e d o n i a , h a s r e a c h e d L o n d o n and Paris. This insurrection w a s from the
first anxiously waited for on the p a r t of the English Cabinet, as is p r o v e d
by t h e dispatches of Russell, Clarendon and L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe. It
gives t h e m the b e s t occasion to interfere b e t w e e n the Sultan a n d his o w n
Christian subjects on t h e plea of interfering b e t w e e n t h e Russians a n d the
T u r k s . F r o m the m o m e n t that the Latins interfere w i t h the G r e e k s (I u s e this
w o r d h e r e only in t h e religious sense) y o u m a y be sure of a c o n c e r t b e c o m i n g
established b e t w e e n 11,000,000 inhabitants of E u r o p e a n T u r k e y and the
Czar, w h o will t h e n really a p p e a r as their religious protector. T h e r e exists
no polemical schism b e t w e e n the M u s u l m a n s and their G r e e k subjects, b u t
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t h e religious animosity against t h e Latins m a y be said to form t h e only
c o m m o n b o n d b e t w e e n the different r a c e s inhabiting T u r k e y a n d professing
t h e G r e e k creed. I n this r e s p e c t things h a v e n o t c h a n g e d since t h e period
w h e n M o h a m e d II. laid siege t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , w h e n t h e G r e e k A d m i r a l
L u c a s N o t a r a s , t h e m o s t influential m a n in t h e Byzantine E m p i r e , publicly
declared that he w o u l d prefer seeing t h e T u r k i s h t u r b a n t r i u m p h a n t in t h e
capital r a t h e r t h a n t h e L a t i n h a t , while on t h e other h a n d t h e r e w a s a H u n g a r ian p r o p h e c y afloat t h a t t h e Christians w o u l d n e v e r be f o r t u n a t e till t h e
d a m n e d heretical G r e e k s should b e extirpated and Constantinople d e s t r o y e d
by t h e T u r k s . A n y interference, t h e n , on t h e p a r t of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s ,
b e t w e e n t h e Sultan and his G r e e k subjects, m u s t f a v o r the plans of the C z a r .
A similar result will be b r o u g h t a b o u t should Austria, as she did in 1791,
u n d e r t a k e t o o c c u p y Servia o n t h e p r e t e x t o f thwarting t h e t r e a s o n a b l e
designs of t h e R u s s i a n p a r t y in t h a t Principality. L e t me add t h a t it is r u m o r e d
at L o n d o n that t h e insurged E p i r a t e s w e r e s u p p o r t e d a n d joined by G r e e k s
from t h e Ionian Islands, w h o h a d n o t b e e n c h e c k e d b y t h e English authorities, a n d that the n e w s of t h e G r e e k insurrection w a s a n n o u n c e d by The
Times, t h e coalition organ, in S a t u r d a y ' s n u m b e r , as a m o s t o p p o r t u n e
event.
I, for my part, h a v e no d o u b t at all that t r e a c h e r y lurks b e h i n d t h e clamoro u s w a r preparations of t h e coalition. B o n a p a r t e is of c o u r s e in good e a r n e s t
in embarking in t h e w a r . He has no alternative left b u t revolution at h o m e
o r w a r abroad. H e c a n n o t a n y longer c o n t i n u e , a s h e d o e s , t o couple t h e cruel
despotism of N a p o l e o n I w i t h t h e c o r r u p t p e a c e policy of L o u i s Philippe.
He m u s t stop sending n e w b a t c h e s of prisoners to C a y e n n e if he dare n o t
simultaneously send F r e n c h armies b e y o n d t h e frontiers. B u t t h e conflict
b e t w e e n t h e a v o w e d intentions of B o n a p a r t e a n d t h e secret plans of t h e
coalition c a n only c o n t r i b u t e to further embroil m a t t e r s . W h a t I c o n c l u d e
from all this is, n o t t h a t t h e r e will be no w a r , b u t , on t h e contrary, t h a t it will
a s s u m e such terrible and revolutionary dimensions as are n o t e v e n suspected
by t h e little m e n of t h e coalition. Their v e r y perfidy is t h e m e a n s of t r a n s forming a local conflict into an E u r o p e a n conflagration.
E v e n if the British Ministry w e r e as sincere as t h e y are false, their interv e n t i o n could not b u t accelerate t h e downfall of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e y
c a n n o t interfere w i t h o u t d e m a n d i n g pledges for the Christian subjects of t h e
P o r t e , a n d t h e s e pledges t h e y c a n n o t w r e s t from it without dooming it to ruin.
E v e n t h e Constantinople c o r r e s p o n d e n t I q u o t e d b e f o r e , a n d w h o is an
a v o w e d Turkophile, c a n n o t b u t o w n t h a t " t h e p r o p o s a l o f t h e W e s t e r n
P o w e r s to p u t all t h e subjects of t h e P o r t e on a perfect footing of civil a n d
religious equality, will lead at o n c e to a n a r c h y , intestine w a r f a r e , a n d a final
a n d s p e e d y o v e r t h r o w of t h e e m p i r e . "
Karl Marx.
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English and French War PlansGreek Insurrection—Spain—China
Nr. 4030, 18. März 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , M a r c h 3, 1854.
In my last letter I mentioned that Sir Charles N a p i e r o w e d his a p p o i n t m e n t
as Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic fleet to his public expression of mistrust
in the F r e n c h alliance; to his accusing F r a n c e of having b e t r a y e d England
in 1840, while in fact t h e English G o v e r n m e n t at t h a t time conspired with
N i c h o l a s against Louis Philippe. I ought to h a v e a d d e d that the second
Adrniral in t h e Black Sea, Sir E d m u n d L y o n s , during his stay in G r e e c e as
English Minister, s h o w e d himself the a v o w e d e n e m y of F r a n c e , a n d w a s
r e m o v e d from t h a t office on the representations of L o r d Stratford de R e d cliff e. T h u s in t h e ministerial appointments t h e greatest possible c a r e is t a k e n
to i n s u r e a c r o p of misintelligence, not only b e t w e e n t h e F r e n c h a n d English
c o m m a n d e r s , b u t also b e t w e e n the Admirals a n d the English E m b a s s a d o r a t
Constantinople.
T h e s e facts are n o t denied and certainly n o t refuted by B o n a p a r t e ' s congratulating himself, in t h e opening s p e e c h he a d d r e s s e d to his o w n repres e n t a t i v e s , u p o n his close alliance w i t h E n g l a n d . T h e entente cordiale is
certainly s o m e w h a t older t h a n the restoration of t h e Imperial etiquette. T h e
m o s t r e m a r k a b l e passage in B o n a p a r t e ' s speech is neither this reminiscence
from L o u i s Philippe's h a r a n g u e s , nor his denunciation of t h e C z a r ' s ambitious p l a n s , b u t rather his proclaiming liimself the p r o t e c t o r of G e r m a n y , and
especially of Austria, against t h e foe from without a n d the e n e m y from
within.
T h e ratifications of the treaty entered into by the Porte with the W e s t e r n
P o w e r s , containing t h e clause that it w a s n o t to c o n c l u d e p e a c e with Russia
w i t h o u t their c o n c u r r e n c e , had hardly b e e n e x c h a n g e d at Constantinople on
t h e 5th inst., w h e n negotiations relative to t h e future position of t h e Christians in T u r k e y w e r e also o p e n e d b e t w e e n the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the four
P o w e r s a n d t h e P o r t e . T h e real e n d aimed at in t h e s e negotiations is b e t r a y e d
in the following passage from W e d n e s d a y ' s Times :
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" T h e condition of several p a r t s of t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e w h i c h h a v e already
obtained by firmans and treaties t h e c o m p l e t e internal administration of their
affairs, while t h e y continue to recognize t h e sovereignty of the P o r t e , is a
p r e c e d e n t w h i c h m a y b e e x t e n d e d w i t h o u t prejudice t o either side, a n d w h i c h
w o u l d p e r h a p s afford the b e s t m e a n s of providing for the P r o v i n c e s in their
present state."
In other w o r d s t h e Coalition Cabinet i n t e n d s securing t h e integrity of t h e
T u r k i s h E m p i r e i n E u r o p e b y t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Bosnia, Croatia, H e r z e gowina, Bulgaria, Albania, R u m e l i a a n d T h e s s a l y into so m a n y D a n u b i a n
Principalities. T h e a c c e p t a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e P o r t e of t h e s e conditions
m u s t infallibly lead, if the T u r k i s h armies p r o v e victorious, to a civil w a r
a m o n g the T u r k s t h e m s e l v e s .
It is n o w ascertained t h a t the d i s c o v e r y of t h e conspiracy at Widdin only
h a s t e n e d t h e G r e e k explosion, w h i c h a t B u c h a r e s t w a s considered a s a n
accomplished fact before it h a d b r o k e n out. T h e P a s h a of Scutari is concentrating all his t r o o p s with a v i e w to p r e v e n t t h e Montenegrins from joining
the insurgent G r e e k s .
T h e A n g l o - F r e n c h expedition m a y be set d o w n , as far as t h e present
intentions of the British G o v e r n m e n t go, as a n o t h e r piece of h u m b u g . T h e
landing places are fixed for the F r e n c h , at R o d o s t o , for the British at E n o s .
T h i s latter t o w n lies on a small peninsula at t h e e n t r a n c e of a m a r s h y b a y ,
at the rear of which the extensive m a r s h e s of the valley of the Maritza, will
no doubt greatly contribute to t h e salubrity of t h e c a m p . It lies outside n o t
only of the B o s p h o r u s , b u t of the Dardanelles also, and the t r o o p s , in o r d e r
to get to t h e Black Sea, would h a v e either to r e ë m b a r k a n d enjoy 250 miles
r o u n d - a b o u t sail against the c u r r e n t s of the Straits, or to m a r c h t h r o u g h a
r o a d l e s s c o u n t r y for t h e distance of 160 miles, a m a r c h which no d o u b t could
be completed in a fortnight. T h e F r e n c h are at R o d o s t o , at least on the sea
of M a r m o r a , a n d only a w e e k ' s m a r c h from Constantinople.
B u t w h a t are the t r o o p s to do in this inexplicable position? W h y , t h e y are
either t o m a r c h u p o n Adrianople, t h e r e t o c o v e r t h e capital, o r i n t h e w o r s t
c a s e , to unite at the n e c k of the T h r a c i a n C h e r s o n e s u s , to defend the D a r d a nelles. So says The Times, " b y a u t h o r i t y , " a n d e v e n q u o t e s Marshal Marm o n t ' s strategic o b s e r v a t i o n s in s u p p o r t of t h e w i s d o m of the plan.
O n e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d F r e n c h a n d English t r o o p s to defend a capital
w h i c h is n o t m e n a c e d , which c a n n o t possibly be m e n a c e d for the n e x t
t w e l v e m o n t h ! W h y , t h e y might a s well h a v e s t o p p e d a t h o m e .
This plan, if it is to be carried out, is decidedly the w o r s t t h a t can be
devised. It is b a s e d u p o n t h e v e r y w o r s t sort of defensive warfare, viz: t h a t
w h i c h seeks strength in absolute inactivity. Supposing the expedition w a s
to be of a mainly defensive character, it is evident t h a t this object w o u l d be
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b e s t obtained by enabling the T u r k s , b a s e d u p o n s u c h a r e s e r v e , to p a s s into
t h e offensive, or else, by taking up a position in w h i c h a casual a n d partial
offensive, w h e r e opportunities offer, could b e t a k e n . B u t a t E n o s a n d
R o d o s t o t h e F r e n c h a n d British t r o o p s are entirely u s e l e s s .
T h e w o r s t of it is, t h a t an a r m y of 100,000 m e n , with plenty of steam
t r a n s p o r t s , a n d supported by a fleet of t w e n t y sail of t h e line, is in itself a
force c o m p e t e n t to take the m o s t decided offensive action in any p a r t of the
B l a c k Sea. S u c h a force must either t a k e t h e C r i m e a a n d S e v a s t o p o l , O d e s s a
a n d C h e r s o n , close the S e a of Azof, d e s t r o y t h e R u s s i a n forts on the C a u c a sian c o a s t s , and bring the R u s s i a n fleet safe into t h e B o s p h o r u s , or it h a s
no idea of its strength and its d u t y as an active a r m y . It is affirmed on t h e
p a r t of t h e Ministerial partisans, t h a t w h e n t h e 100,000 m e n are o n c e conc e n t r a t e d in T u r k e y , such operations m a y be u n d e r t a k e n , a n d that t h e landing
of t h e first divisions at E n o s and R o d o s t o is merely c o n t r i v e d to deceive the
e n e m y . B u t e v e n in this c a s e it is an u n n e c e s s a r y loss of time and e x p e n s e
n o t t o land t h e t r o o p s a t o n c e o n s o m e point o n t h e Black Sea. T h e e n e m y
c a n n o t be misled. As s o o n as the E m p e r o r N i c h o l a s h e a r s of this p o m p o u s l y
a n n o u n c e d expedition of 100,000 m e n , he is b o u n d to send every soldier he
c a n s p a r e to Sevastopol, Kaffa, P e r e k o p and Y e n i k a l e . Y o u c a n n o t first
frighten y o u r e n e m y by e n o r m o u s a r m a m e n t s , a n d t h e n t r y to m a k e h i m
believe t h a t t h e y are n o t intended t o d o a n y h a r m . T h e trick w o u l d b e too
shallow; and if it is e x p e c t e d to mislead t h e R u s s i a n s by s u c h paltry p r e t e x t s ,
British diplomacy h a s m a d e another egregious blunder.
I, t h e r e f o r e , believe that those w h o h a v e p l a n n e d the expedition intend
betraying t h e Sultan directly, and, on t h e plea of frightening R u s s i a as m u c h
as possible, will take good care to do her by all m e a n s t h e least possible
harm.
E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e occupying Constantinople a n d p a r t of Rumelia;
A u s t r i a occupying Servia, and p e r h a p s B o s n i a and M o n t e n e g r o , and R u s s i a
being allowed to reënforce herself in Moldo-Wallachia,—this looks like an
e v e n t u a l partition of T u r k e y in E u r o p e rather t h a n anything else. T u r k e y is
placed in w o r s e circumstances t h a n in 1772, w h e n t h e K i n g of Prussia, in
o r d e r t o i n d u c e t h e E m p r e s s Catherine t o retire from t h e D a n u b i a n Principalities, the o c c u p a t i o n of w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d to lead to a E u r o p e a n conflict,
p r o p o s e d t h e first partition of Poland, w h i c h w a s to defray t h e e x p e n s e s of
t h e R u s s o - T u r k i s h war. Be it r e m e m b e r e d that, at t h a t time, the Porte originally r u s h e d into t h e w a r with Catherine with t h e v i e w of defending Poland
from Prussian aggression, and that, at the e n d , Poland w a s sacrificed at the
shrine of t h e " i n d e p e n d e n c e and integrity" of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
T h e t r e a c h e r o u s policy of procrastination p u r s u e d by the Coalition Cabinet, h a s given t h e Muscovite emissaries t h e o p p o r t u n i t y for planning and
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maturing t h e G r e e k insurrection, s o anxiously e x p e c t e d b y L o r d C l a r e n d o n .
T h e insurrection h a d c o m m e n c e d o n t h e 28th J a n u a r y and according t o t h e
last dispatches from V i e n n a a s s u m e d m o r e threatening dimensions o n t h e
13th inst. T h e districts of A c a r n a n i a a n d Aetolia, and circles of Ilussa a n d
Delonia are said to be in a state of revolt. An insurrection is stated to h a v e
b r o k e n out at Egrippo the capital of E u b ö a , equal in gravity to that in Albania.
T h e fact of the t o w n s of A r t a and J a n i n a being quitted by t h e T u r k s a n d
occupied by the G r e e k s is of smaller i m p o r t a n c e , as the domineering citadels
remain in the h a n d s of O t t o m a n t r o o p s and as we k n o w , from the n u m e r o u s
w a r s carried on b e t w e e n t h e Christians a n d t h e T u r k s in Albania t h a t t h e final
possession of t h e s e t o w n s d e p e n d e d always on t h e p o s s e s s i o n of the citadels.
T h e Gulfs of C o n t e s s a and Salónica a n d t h e c o a s t s of Albania will be declared
in a state of siege. I stated in my last letter that o n e of the results of the G r e e k
insurrection t h e m o s t t o b e a p p r e h e n d e d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e P o r t e , would b e
the opportunity it afforded t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s for interfering b e t w e e n t h e
Sultan and his subjects, instead of fighting t h e R u s s i a n s , a n d t h u s driving
t h e G r e e k Christians into alliance with the C z a r . H o w eager t h e s e P o w e r s
are to grasp at this opportunity m a y be inferred from t h e fact of t h e s a m e
p o s t bringing the n e w s of the P o r t e having a c c e p t e d the convention p r o p o s e d
by England and F r a n c e , a n d of t h e F r e n c h a n d English E m b a s s a d o r s
having sent t w o s t e a m e r s to the assistance of t h e T u r k s , while t h e British
minister at A t h e n s h a d informed t h e Cabinet of King O t t o t h a t E n g l a n d w o u l d
interfere in the insurged districts. T h e immediate result of t h e insurrection,
from a military point of view, is clearly described by t h e V i e n n a corr e s p o n d e n t of to-day's Times, as follows:
" D u r i n g the last few d a y s a certain d i s c o u r a g e m e n t h a s b e e n observable
i n h e a d q u a r t e r s a t Widdin, t h e reënf o r c e m e n t s which h a d b e e n a n n o u n c e d
having received c o u n t e r o r d e r s and being o n their w a y t o the south-western
districts of T u r k e y . T h e n e w s of t h e insurrection of t h e Christians in E p i r u s
h a d p r o d u c e d an alarming effect on t h e A r n a u t s and Albanians on t h e
D a n u b e , w h o loudly d e m a n d e d permission t o r e t u r n h o m e . T h e Generals o f
Brigade, H u s s e i n B e y a n d Soliman P a s h a , h a d lost all their influence o v e r
their wild t r o o p s , a n d it w a s feared t h a t if an a t t e m p t w a s m a d e to detain
t h e m by force there w o u l d be an o p e n m u t i n y ; while if they w e r e permitted
to r e t u r n , t h e y would ravage t h e Christian districts on their w a y h o m e . If
t h e hostile m o v e m e n t of the Christian population in t h e W e s t should a s s u m e
m o r e formidable dimensions, the w e s t wing of t h e T u r k i s h a r m y would be
obliged to m a k e a retrograde m o v e m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d m o r e t h a n counterb a l a n c e t h e c h e c k which t h e R u s s i a n s h a d r e c e i v e d by t h e e n t r y of t h e allied
fleets into the Black S e a . "
T h e s e are some of the first results of t h a t policy of procrastination so
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rhetorically praised by G r a h a m , Russell, C l a r e n d o n a n d P a l m e r s t o n in vindication of the ministerial m a n a g e m e n t of E a s t e r n affairs. As t h e y w e r e inf o r m e d , late on last Friday night, t h a t t h e Czar, w i t h o u t having waited for
the recall of Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r , from England, h a d o r d e r e d him off, in
t h e m o s t a b r u p t a n d u n c e r e m o n i o u s m a n n e r , t h e y held t w o Cabinet Councils,
o n e on S a t u r d a y and the other on S u n d a y afternoon—the result of their
consultations being to allow t h e Czar o n c e m o r e a delay of t h r e e or four
w e e k s , w h i c h delay is to be granted u n d e r t h e form of a s u m m o n s , "calling
u p o n t h e Czar to give within six d a y s from t h e receipt of t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n
a solemn pledge a n d engagement that he will c a u s e his t r o o p s to e v a c u a t e
t h e Principalities of the D a n u b e on or b e f o r e t h e 30th of April."
B u t m a r k t h a t this s u m m o n s is n o i followed w i t h t h e m e n a c e of a declaration of war in c a s e of a refusal on t h e part of t h e Czar. It may be said, and
it is said, by The Times, t h a t notwithstanding this n e w delay granted, w a r
p r e p a r a t i o n s are actively p u r s u e d ; b u t y o u will o b s e r v e t h a t on t h e o n e h a n d
all decisive action of the Porte on the D a n u b e is p r e v e n t e d by t h e p r o s p e c t
held o u t of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s being resolved u p o n directly participating
in t h e war—and e v e r y d a y of delay in t h a t q u a r t e r p u t s the T u r k s in a w o r s e
position, as it allows t h e Russians to reënforce t h e m s e l v e s in t h e front, and
t h e G r e e k rebels to grow m o r e d a n g e r o u s in t h e rear of the D a n u b i a n a r m y ;
while, on t h e other hand, t h e e m b a r k a t i o n of t r o o p s for E n o s and R o d o s t o
m a y e m b a r r a s s the Sultan b u t will certainly n o t stop t h e R u s s i a n s .
It h a s b e e n settled that t h e British expeditionary force shall consist of
a b o u t 30,000 and t h e F r e n c h of a b o u t 80,000 men. Should it h a p p e n to a p p e a r ,
in t h e c o u r s e of .events, that Austria, while apparently joining t h e W e s t e r n
P o w e r s , only p r o p o s e d t o m a s k h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g with Russia, B o n a p a r t e
w o u l d h a v e m u c h to regret this m o s t injudicious dispersion of his t r o o p s .
T h e r e is another insurrection which m a y be c o n s i d e r e d as a diversion m a d e
in favor of Russia—the insurrection in Spain. A n y m o v e m e n t in Spain is sure
to p r o d u c e dissension b e t w e e n F r a n c e and England. In 1823, the F r e n c h
intervention in Spain w a s , as we know from C h a t e a u b r i a n d ' s " C o n g r e s s of
V e r o n a , " instigated by Russia. T h a t t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h intervention in 1834,
w h i c h finally b r o k e up t h e entente cordiale b e t w e e n t h e t w o s t a t e s , p r o c e e d ed from t h e s a m e source, we m a y infer from P a l m e r s t o n having b e e n its
a u t h o r . T h e " S p a n i s h m a r r i a g e s " p r e p a r e d the w a y for the downfall of t h e
Orleans dynasty. At t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t , a d e t h r o n e m e n t of t h e " i n n o c e n t "
Isabella would allow a son of Louis Philippe, t h e D u k e of Montpensier, to
bring f o r w a r d his claims on t h e t h r o n e of Spain; while, on t h e other h a n d ,
B o n a p a r t e w o u l d be r e m i n d e d of o n e of his u n c l e s having o n c e resided at
M a d r i d . T h e Orleans w o u l d be supported by t h e C o b u r g s , and resisted by
t h e B o n a p a r t e s . A Spanish insurrection, t h e n , w h i c h is far from meaning
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a popular revolution, m u s t p r o v e a m o s t powerful agency in dissolving so
superficial a combination as w h a t is t e r m e d t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h alliance.
A t r e a t y of alliance is said to h a v e b e e n c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n Russia, K h i v a ,
B o k h a r a a n d Cabul.
As to D o s t M a h o m e d , the A m e e r of Cabul, it w o u l d be quite natural t h a t
after having p r o p o s e d in 1838 to E n g l a n d to place forever a feud of blood
b e t w e e n himself a n d Russia, if t h e English G o v e r n m e n t required it, by
causing t h e agent dispatched t o h i m b y t h e C z a r t o b e killed, a n d being
r e n e w e d in 1839 on the p a r t of England by t h e Affghan expedition, by his
expulsion from t h e t h r o n e a n d by t h e most cruel and u n s c r u p u l o u s devastation of his country—that D o s t M a h o m e d should n o w e n d e a v o r to avenge
himself u p o n his faithless ally. H o w e v e r , as t h e population of K h i v a , B o k h a r a and Cabul, belong to t h e o r t h o d o x M u s u l m a n faith of the Sunni, while
t h e Persians a d h e r e to t h e schismatic t e n e t s of t h e Schii, it is n o t to be
supposed t h a t t h e y will ally t h e m s e l v e s w i t h Russia, being t h e ally of t h e
Persians, w h o m t h e y detest and h a t e , against England, the ostensible ally of
the P a d i s h a h , w h o m t h e y regard as the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r of the faithful.
T h e r e is s o m e probability of R u s s i a having an ally in T h i b e t and t h e T a r t a r
E m p e r o r of China, if t h e latter be forced to retire into M a n c h o u r i a and to
resign the sceptre of C h i n a proper. T h e C h i n e s e rebels, as y o u k n o w , h a v e
u n d e r t a k e n a regular c r u s a d e against B u d d h i s m , destroying its temples and
slaying its B o n z e s . B u t t h e religion of t h e T a r t a r s is B u d d h i s m a n d Thibet,
the seat of the great L a m a , a n d recognizing the suzeranité of China, is the
sanctuary of t h e B u d d h i s t faith. Tae-ping-wang, if he s u c c e e d in driving t h e
M a n d s h u d y n a s t y o u t of China, will, t h e r e f o r e , h a v e to enter a religious w a r
with t h e B u d d h i s t p o w e r s of T a r t a r y . N o w , as on b o t h sides of the H i m a l a y a s
B u d d h i s m is confessed and as England c a n n o t b u t support t h e n e w Chinese
dynasty, t h e Czar is sure to side w i t h t h e T a r t a r tribes, p u t t h e m in motion
against England and a w a k e religious revolts in N e p a u l itself. By the last
Oriental mails we are informed that " t h e E m p e r o r of China, in anticipation
of t h e loss of Pekin, h a d directed t h e G o v e r n o r s of t h e various p r o v i n c e s
to send t h e Imperial r e v e n u e to Getol, their old family seat and p r e s e n t
s u m m e r residence in M a n c h o u r i a , a b o u t 80 miles north-east of the G r e a t
Wall." T h e great religious war b e t w e e n t h e C h i n e s e a n d the T a r t a r s , which
will spread over t h e Indian frontiers, m a y c o n s e q u e n t l y be regarded as n e a r
at h a n d .
Karl M a r x .
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Austrian Bankruptcy
Nr.4033, 22. März 1854
Austrian Bankruptcy.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the imminence of w a r and their pressing n e e d s , t h e F r e n c h
a n d t h e Austrian G o v e r n m e n t s h a v e not y e t s u c c e e d e d i n strengthening t h e
nervus belli, n a m e l y , t h e m o n e y - p o w e r . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e Lucullian
magnificence displayed in t h e dinners given by t h e F r e n c h Minister of Fin a n c e to t h e R e c e i v e r s - G e n e r a l , t h e Crédit Mobilier, and t h e principal b a n k e r s of Paris, t h o s e capitalists p r o v e s t u b b o r n a n d cling to t h a t discreet sort
of patriotism, which, by exacting t h e greatest possible interest from the State,
is w o n t to indemnify its private interests with t h e public o n e s . T h u s t h e t e r m s
of the p r o p o s e d F r e n c h loan of t w o h u n d r e d million francs r e m a i n s still
unsettled.
As to Austria t h e r e c a n exist no d o u b t t h a t o n e of [the] principal m o t i v e s
w h i c h i n d u c e h e r t o profess friendly feelings t o w a r d t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s
is the h o p e of t h u s reviving the confidence of m o n e y e d m e n a n d getting o u t
of h e r financial difficulties. Indeed, the official gazette at V i e n n a h a d hardly
u t t e r e d a few w o r d s a b o u t Austrian neutrality a n d good u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h
F r a n c e , w h e n it surprised the public with t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of an intended
sale of a considerable portion of t h e six million a c r e s of C r o w n L a n d s , and
with a financial rescript, dated F e b . 2 3 , 1854, to t h e effect t h a t t h e whole of
t h e State p a p e r m o n e y , 150,000,000 florins, n o w in circulation, a n d of c o m pulsory c u r r e n c y , w a s t o b e transferred t o t h e N a t i o n a l B a n k , a n d successively c o n v e r t e d into b a n k n o t e s , at the expiration of w h i c h change all
t h e p a p e r issued b y t h e t r e a s u r y will b e w i t h d r a w n f r o m circulation, a n d n o
m o r e State p a p e r m o n e y of a forced c u r r e n c y be issued. In m a k i n g this
c h a n g e t h e Imperial G o v e r n m e n t is g u a r a n t e e to t h e B a n k for t h e p a p e r
m o n e y transferred to it, a n d pledges itself to indemnify it for t h e e x p e n s e s
c o n n e c t e d with t h a t c o n v e r s i o n ; to pay, in extinction of t h e d e b t t h u s created,
a yearly installment of at least 10,000,000 florins; to mortgage t h e c u s t o m s '
r e v e n u e as security for t h e regular p a y m e n t of t h e s e installments, a n d to p a y
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the b a n k in specie in p r o p o r t i o n as t h o s e duties are received. At the s a m e
time t h e G o v e r n m e n t is b o u n d to do its b e s t to enable t h e B a n k to fulfill its
obligations and r e s u m e specie p a y m e n t s . M e a n w h i l e , in order to give t h e
holders of b a n k n o t e s t h e m e a n s of changing their n o t e s at pleasure into a
d e b t bearing interest, p a y a b l e in specie, t h e B a n k u n d e r t a k e s to issue b o n d s
bearing interest, to be in all r e s p e c t s on t h e s a m e footing as State b o n d s or
obligations. T h e G o v e r n m e n t will also call in w h a t are k n o w n as R e d e m p t i o n
n o t e s and Anticipation n o t e s , a n d p u t t h e m entirely o u t of circulation.
T h e conversion of State p a p e r of a forced c o u r s e into inconvertible b a n k
n o t e s will n o t r e d u c e t h e a m o u n t n o r ameliorate t h e quality, b u t only simplify
t h e denominations of t h e p a p e r m o n e y issued. As t h e State is in the p o s s e s sion of t h e same m e a n s w h i c h it grants t h e B a n k for t h e r e d e m p t i o n of t h e
p a p e r m o n e y , it would itself h a v e m a d e u s e of them if not fully a w a r e t h a t
t h e w a n t of confidence in itself w a s s u c h as n o t to allow credit to be r e s t o r e d
save by the help of a B a n k , w h i c h is n o t the p r o p e r t y of t h e State. T h u s t h e
dependence of the Emperor on the Jews of the Vienna Bank grows at the
s a m e p a c e as the military c h a r a c t e r of his G o v e r n m e n t . In J a n u a r y 1852, he
mortgaged t o t h e m t h e salt-works o f G m u n d e n , A u s s e e a n d Hallein. I n
F e b r u a r y 1854, t h e y obtain a lien on the c u s t o m s ' r e v e n u e of t h e w h o l e
m o n a r c h y . S t e p by step t h e B a n k b e c o m e s t h e real a n d t h e G o v e r n m e n t
m e r e l y the nominal o w n e r o f the E m p i r e . T h e m o r e A u s t r i a h a s resisted t h e
d e m a n d s of participation in political p o w e r on t h e p a r t of t h e middle classes,
t h e m o r e she is forced to u n d e r g o t h e unmitigated d e s p o t i s m of o n e fraction
of t h o s e classes—the m o n e y l e n d e r s .
T h e d e c r e e , of w h i c h we h a v e a b o v e given t h e s u b s t a n c e , disguises an
a t t e m p t at a n e w loan u n d e r t h e f o r m of aid t e n d e r e d to t h e holders of
b a n k n o t e s , in changing t h e m into a d e b t bearing interest; t h e latter to be p a i d
in specie. In 1852 t h e G o v e r n m e n t also pledged itself to m e e t in specie various
m i n o r p a y m e n t s and obligations, b u t as it received t h e t a x e s only in S t a t e
p a p e r m o n e y or in b a n k n o t e s t h e Administration w a s forced to c o n t r a c t a
l o a n of thirty-five million florins at L o n d o n a n d F r a n k f o r t . T h e n e w l o a n s ,
of c o u r s e , a u g m e n t t h e old deficits a n d t h e a u g m e n t e d deficits lead to n e w
issues of p a p e r m o n e y , t h e s u p e r a b u n d a n c e a n d c o n s e q u e n t depreciation of
w h i c h t h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d t o p r e v e n t . T h e b r o a d distinction d r a w n o n t h e
p a r t of the G o v e r n m e n t b e t w e e n p a y m e n t s in specie a n d p a y m e n t s in b a n k
n o t e s is as good a m e a n s of rescuing t h e n o t e s from their discredit as t h e
augmentation of t h e circulating m e d i u m of t h e b a n k by 150 millions is a
m e a n s of enabling it to fulfill its e n g a g e m e n t s a n d r e s u m e c a s h p a y m e n t s .
T h e G o v e r n m e n t will p a y t h e b a n k in specie in p r o p o r t i o n as the c u s t o m s
duties are paid in t h e s a m e , b u t it is well k n o w n t h a t n o t only t h e Austrian
p e a s a n t s b u t e v e n t h e citizens in t h e larger t o w n s are as fond of hoarding
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as t h e Chinese a n d t h e I n d i a n s ; that in 1850 s u m s w e r e h o a r d e d e v e n in
c o p p e r , and t h a t in 1854 t h e y are paying all t a x e s in p a p e r , although it is only
a c c e p t e d with a discount of full s e v e n t e e n per cent.
T h o s e c o n v e r s a n t with the p a s t history of t h e Austrian E x c h e q u e r will fail
in discovering any novelty either in r e s p e c t to t h e p r o m i s e s held out in t h e
n e w d e c r e e , or the financial devices resorted t o . T h e first issue of Austrian
p a p e r m o n e y t o o k place u n d e r the E m p r e s s Maria T h e r e s a , t o w a r d t h e end
of the S e v e n Y e a r s ' War. It consists originally of B a n k bills exchangeable
by t h e State authorities for silver. In 1797, in c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e pecuniary
difficulties of the G o v e r n m e n t in the w a r s against F r a n c e , the convertibility
into silver w a s abolished. T h e first issue u n d e r t h e E m p r e s s Maria T h e r e s a
having a m o u n t e d to twelve million florins, t h e total sum of B a n k bills issued
in 1809, a m o u n t e d to 1,060,793,653 florins, their r e d u c t i o n in value having at
t h e s a m e time r e a c h e d its m a x i m u m . On t h e 20th of F e b r u a r y , 1811, the
G o v e r n m e n t published a p a t e n t by which t h e B a n k bills w e r e altogether
w i t h d r a w n from circulation a n d r e d e e m e d , (hence t h e n a m e R e d e m p t i o n
notes) at t h e r a t e of 20 for 100 for a n e w p a p e r called Wiener Währung. T h e
G o v e r n m e n t declared this to be t h e real m o n e y of t h e c o u n t r y , a n d promised
t h a t this n e w p a p e r should n e v e r b e increased b e y o n d the a m o u n t n e c e s s a r y
for exchanging t h e B a n k bills. In M a y 1811 t h e Wiener Währung w a s already
at a discount of 8 per cent., and Anticipation n o t e s w e r e issued, so called
b e c a u s e the p r o c e e d s of a p a r t of the taxes for twelve years w e r e anticipated
by t h e m . T h e first issue of Anticipation n o t e s really a m o u n t e d to only fortyfive million florins, and for their redemption within t w e l v e y e a r s an annual
s u m of 3,750,000 florins w a s destined to be t a k e n from t h e land t a x e s .
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B u t in c o n s e q u e n c e of the war, new issues of Anticipation n o t e s quietly
followed e a c h other, e a c h n e w issue being a t t e n d e d by a r e d u c t i o n of their
value. In 1815 t h e premium for silver r e a c h e d the hight of 400 per cent, against
t h e Wiener Währung. On t h e first of J u n e , 1816, an imperial p a t e n t a p p e a r e d
declaring that t h e State w o u l d in future n e v e r again h a v e r e c o u r s e to an 30
inconvertible p a p e r c u r r e n c y ; that the paper m o n e y in circulation should be
gradually w i t h d r a w n and specie be restored as t h e standard medium of
circulation. In order to fulfill t h e s e p r o m i s e s , t h e privileged National B a n k
w a s constituted definitively, J a n u a r y 18th, 1818, t h e State having m a d e an
a r r a n g e m e n t with the B a n k by which it pledged itself to r e d e e m the incon- 35
vertible p a p e r m o n e y . As late as J u n e , 1852, h o w e v e r , we find again the
F i n a n c e Minister announcing in the official g a z e t t e that, in future, c o m pulsory loans, extraordinary taxation, depreciation of the value of m o n e y ,
w o u l d be absolutely excluded; if not exactly at p r e s e n t , y e t in future, A u s trian p a p e r would be converted into coin w i t h o u t l o s s , a n d t h a t t h e loan n o w 40
c o n t e m p l a t e d would be applied to w i t h d r a w t h e state p a p e r m o n e y a n d for
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the p a y m e n t of the state d e b t s to t h e B a n k . T h e r e c a n be no b e t t e r proof
of the hollowness of s u c h promises t h a n their periodical o c c u r r e n c e .
At the time of M a r i a T h e r e s a the A u s t r i a n G o v e r n m e n t w a s powerful
e n o u g h to issue its o w n b a n k bills, e x c h a n g e a b l e for specie, and e v e n at a
p r e m i u m o v e r silver. In 1818 t h e S t a t e , in o r d e r to r e d e e m its p a p e r m o n e y ,
w a s obliged to recur to t h e establishment of a privileged b a n k , t h e p r o p e r t y
of private capitalists, w h o received a d v a n t a g e s v e r y b u r d e n s o m e to t h e S t a t e ,
b u t w h o w e r e pledged to t h e issue of convertible n o t e s . In 1854 t h e G o v e r n m e n t appeals to the help of a b a n k , w h o s e o w n p a p e r has b e c o m e as d e p r e ciated and inconvertible as t h a t of t h e S t a t e itself.
Although from 1815 to 1846 A u s t r i a enjoyed a period of almost u n interrupted p e a c e and internal tranquility, t h e first s h o c k after t h a t long
period found her altogether u n p r e p a r e d . T h e insurrection at C r a c o w , and t h e
disturbances in Galicia, at t h e e n d of F e b r u a r y , 1846, a u g m e n t e d t h e public
e x p e n d i t u r e s by m o r e t h a n 10,000,000 c o m p a r e d with 1845. T h e a r m y e x p e n s e s w e r e t h e principal c a u s e of this i n c r e a s e d outlay. T h e y a m o u n t e d to
50,624,120 florins, in 1845, b u t in 1846 r o s e 7,000,000 m o r e , while the administrative e x p e n s e s of the P r o v i n c e s r o s e 2,000,000. In 1847 t h e c o m mercial crisis and the b a d h a r v e s t p r o d u c e d a great diminution in t h e excise
r e v e n u e , while the a r m y r o s e to 64,000,000, chiefly in c o n s e q u e n c e of t r o u b les in Italy. T h e deficit of t h a t y e a r w a s 7,000,000. In 1848-49 t h e r e v e n u e of
whole provinces w a s lost, besides t h e w a r e x p e n s e s in Italy and H u n g a r y .
In 1848 the deficit w a s 45,000,000florins and in 1849,121,000,000. State p a p e r
of c o m p u l s o r y c u r r e n c y , to t h e s u m of 76,000,000, Three-per-Cents, w a s
issued in 1849. L o n g before this, the B a n k had stopped specie p a y m e n t s , a n d
its issues w e r e declared by t h e G o v e r n m e n t to be inconvertible. In 1850 t h e r e
w a s a deficit of 54,000,000, and the c h a n c e s of a w a r w i t h P r u s s i a b r o u g h t
d o w n t h e p a p e r m o n e y to a discount of 60 p e r cent. T h e total a m o u n t of State
p a p e r m o n e y issued in the years 1849, '50, a n d '51 w a s 219,000,000. In 1852
t h e deficit w a s 8,000,000 m o r e t h a n in '48, a n d 46,000,000 m o r e t h a n in '47.
In 1851 the w a r b u d g e t w a s 126,000,000, fully d o u b l e w h a t it w a s in '47. In
'52 t h e police e x p e n s e s w e r e 9,000,000, fourfold greater t h a n t h o s e of '48.
B o t h police and w a r e x p e n s e s also increased in 1853.
T h e real question, h o w e v e r , is n o t h o w A u s t r i a got into her financial
cul-de-sac, b u t h o w , w h e n t h u s i m m e r s e d in b a n k p a p e r a n d d e b t she has
avoided o p e n b a n k r u p t c y . In 1850 h e r r e v e n u e a m o u n t e d to one h u n d r e d
arid ninety-six millions [, s e v e n t y - f o u r m i l l i o n s ] m o r e t h a n in 1848; and to
forty-two millions m o r e t h a n in 1849. In 1851 t h e receipts w e r e t w o hundred a n d nineteen millions[, t w e n t y - t h r e e millions] over t h o s e of 1850. In
1852 t h e y r e a c h e d t w o h u n d r e d and twenty-six millions, an increase of six
millions over t h o s e of 1851. T h u s t h e r e h a s b e e n a continual increase of
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r e v e n u e although n o t in the same p r o p o r t i o n in 1852 as in 1851, a n d in 1851
n o t in t h e s a m e proportion as in 1850.
W h e n c e this increase of r e v e n u e ? Putting aside t h e extraordinary receipts
from t h e Sardinian w a r indemnity a n d t h e L o m b a r d o - V e n e t i a n confiscations, the transformation of the Austrian p e a s a n t into a landholder h a s
of c o u r s e increased the tax-paying p o w e r of t h e c o u n t r y a n d t h e r e v e n u e
derived from the land t a x . At the same time the abolition of the patrimonial
c o u r t s brought the income, which the aristocracy h a d formerly enjoyed from
their private administration of justice, into t h e coffers of the State, a n d this
b r a n c h of r e v e n u e has b e e n constantly increasing since 1849. T h e n a considerable increase a r o s e from the income-tax, introduced by the p a t e n t of
O c t o b e r 29, 1849. This t a x has p r o v e d particularly p r o d u c t i v e in t h e Italian
p r o v i n c e s of Austria. In 1852, for instance, t h e increase of the income-tax
in t h e G e r m a n a n d Slavonic provinces, together a m o u n t e d to six h u n d r e d
and o n e t h o u s a n d florins, while in the Italian p r o v i n c e s alone it w a s six
h u n d r e d and thirty-nine. T h e principal c a u s e , h o w e v e r , which h a s saved the
Austrian E m p i r e from a formal b a n k r u p t c y , is the subjugation of H u n g a r y
a n d h e r assimilation with t h e other provinces in r e s p e c t to taxation.
T h e basis of t h e w h o l e Austrian system of taxation m a y be said to be the
land-tax. On the 1st April 1812, a p p e a r e d an imperial p a t e n t , in w h i c h the
E m p e r o r F r a n c i s a n n o u n c e d his resolution to establish uniformity in the
land-tax s y s t e m all over his G e r m a n , Slavonic a n d Italian provinces. In o n e
p a r a g r a p h of this patent it is ordered t h a t no e x e m p t i o n s from the land-tax
should in future " b e m a d e according to t h e p e r s o n a l quality of t h e p o s s e s s o r s
of e s t a t e s or h o u s e s , " and as a w h o l e this view w a s acted u p o n . In t h e
A r c h d u c h y of Austria, the n e w survey w a s introduced in 1834, a n d this w a s
the first hereditary domain in w h i c h the n e w system w a s b r o u g h t into o p e r a tion. A u s t r i a n - L o m b a r d y p o s s e s s e d an excellent s u r v e y from t h e t i m e of
C h a r l e s V I , t h e Censimento Milanese. H u n g a r y a n d T r a n s y l v a n i a , h o w e v e r ,
by no m e a n s contributed to the land-tax and other t a x e s , in t h e s a m e degree
with the other provinces of the E m p i r e . A c c o r d i n g to t h e Hungarian Constitution, t h e Hungarian p o s s e s s o r s of by far the greatest p a r t of all t h e land,
w e r e subject to no kind of direct tax, and e v e n several of t h e indirect t a x e s
i m p o s e d u p o n t h e other provinces, p r e s s e d neither u p o n H u n g a r y nor u p o n
Transylvania. T h e population of H u n g a r y , T r a n s y l v a n i a and the Military
Frontier, together a m o u n t e d , in 1846, to 14,541,958; t h o s e of t h e other
p r o v i n c e s of the M o n a r c h y , to 22,901,675, so that t h e former should h a v e
c o n t r i b u t e d seven-eighteenths of t h e whole r e v e n u e . B u t H u n g a r y and
T r a n s y l v a n i a in 1846 only contributed t w e n t y - t h r e e millions, w h i c h , as the
w h o l e r e v e n u e in t h a t y e a r a m o u n t e d to o n e h u n d r e d and sixty-f our millions
w a s only s o m e w h a t less t h a n o n e - s e v e n t h of the r e v e n u e . T h e Hungarian
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provinces o c c u p y 5,855 of the 12,123 G e r m a n s q u a r e miles, w h i c h form t h e
a r e a of the Austrian M o n a r c h y , c o n s e q u e n t l y one-half of its superficial
extent.
T h e E m p e r o r J o s e p h II, w h o s e great aim w a s the centralization a n d c o m plete Germanization of t h e Austrian M o n a r c h y , h a d arbitrarily introduced
innovations in H u n g a r y intended to place her on the same footing with t h e
other Provinces. B u t this p r o d u c e d s u c h an effect on t h e public mind in t h a t
c o u n t r y that J o s e p h II, at t h e close of his life feared that the H u n g a r i a n s
w o u l d rebel a s t h e N e t h e r l a n d s h a d d o n e . T h e E m p e r o r s L e o p o l d I I , F r a n eis I, and F e r d i n a n d I, did n o t d a r e to r e p e a t t h e h a z a r d o u s experiment. This
cause—the impediments to an equalization of t a x e s existing in t h e H u n g a r i a n
Constitution—ceased to w o r k after the H u n g a r i a n revolution w a s quelled by
R u s s i a n assistance. T h e E m p e r o r F r a n c i s J o s e p h having never s w o r n t o t h e
Hungarian Constitution, and being m a d e E m p e r o r in t h e place of F e r d i n a n d
b e c a u s e he h a d never s w o r n to it, at o n c e i n t r o d u c e d t h e land-tax on t h e s a m e
footing with the o t h e r crown-lands. B e s i d e s , by the abolition of the frontier
of H u n g a r y on t h e 1st of O c t o b e r , 1850, the Austrian M o n a r c h y c a m e to form
o n e single territory with r e s p e c t to c u s t o m s as well as t a x e s . T h e E x c i s e a n d
t h e t o b a c c o monopoly w e r e also i n t r o d u c e d t h e r e on M a r c h 1, 1851. T h e
increase of the direct t a x e s alone in the H u n g a r i a n P r o v i n c e s a m o u n t e d to
11,500,000 florins in 1851, and to a b o u t 8,000,000 florins in 1852.
We arrive then at the irrefragable conclusion, t h a t on the possession of
H u n g a r y and L o m b a r d y d e p e n d s n o t only t h e political b u t t h e e c o n o m i c a l
existence of the Austrian E m p i r e , and t h a t with their loss t h e long-delayed
b a n k r u p t c y of t h a t State b e c o m e s inevitable.
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Opening of the Labour ParliamentEnglish War Budget
Nr. 4035, 24. März 1854
F r o m Our Own C o r r e s p o n d e n t .
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , M a r c h 7, 1854.
T h e delegates t o the L a b o r Parliament m e t y e s t e r d a y a t the P e o p l e ' s Institution, M a n c h e s t e r , at 10 o'clock in t h e f o r e n o o n . T h e first sitting w a s ,
of c o u r s e , applied to preliminary business. It w a s m o v e d by J a m e s Williams
of S t o c k p o r t , s e c o n d e d by J a m e s Bligh of L o n d o n , a n d s u p p o r t e d by E r n e s t
J o n e s , t h a t Dr. M a r x be invited to sit as h o n o r a r y delegate at the L a b o r
Parliament, which motion w a s carried unanimously. Similar resolutions w e r e
p a s s e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o M e s s r s . Blanc a n d N a d a u d . W h a t e v e r m a y b e its
immediate results, t h e m e r e assembling of such a Parliament m a r k s a n e w
e p o c h in the history of labor. T h e meeting at t h e Palais du L u x e m b o u r g at
P a r i s , after the revolution of F e b r u a r y , might p e r h a p s be considered a p r e c e d e n t in a similar direction, but at first sight t h e r e a p p e a r s this great diff e r e n c e , t h a t t h e L u x e m b o u r g w a s initiated b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t , while t h e
L a b o r Parliament is initiated by the people t h e m s e l v e s ; t h a t the L u x e m b o u r g
w a s i n v e n t e d with a view to removing t h e Socialist m e m b e r s of the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t from the center of action and a n y serious participation
in t h e real business of t h e c o u n t r y ; and lastly, t h a t the delegates to t h e
L u x e m b o u r g only consisted of m e m b e r s of t h e various so-called corps
d'états, corporations m o r e or less corresponding to t h e medieval guilds and
the p r e s e n t trades-unions, while the L a b o r Parliament is a true r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of all b r a n c h e s and divisions of labor on a national scale. T h e s u c c e s s of t h e
L a b o r Parliament will principally, if n o t exclusively, d e p e n d on its acting
u p o n t h e principle t h a t it is not t h e so-called organization of labor, b u t the
organization of the laboring classes t h e y h a v e at p r e s e n t to deal with.
T h e privileges of the n o w governing classes, a n d t h e slavery of the working
classes, are equally b a s e d on t h e existing organization of labor, which, of
c o u r s e , will be defended and maintained on t h e p a r t of the f o r m e r by all
m e a n s in their h a n d s , one of t h e s e m e a n s being t h e p r e s e n t State machinery.
To alter then, the existing organization of labor, a n d to supplant it by a n e w
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"•"WW
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o n e , y o u w a n t power—social and political power—power not only of resisting,
b u t also of attacking; and to acquire that p o w e r y o u w a n t to organize yourselves as an a r m y p o s s e s s e d of t h a t m o r a l a n d physical strength w h i c h will
enable it to m e e t t h e fiendly h o s t s . If t h e L a b o r Parliament allows its time
to be absorbed by mere theoretical propositions, instead of preparing t h e w a y
for the actual formation of a national p a r t y , it will p r o v e a failure as the
L u x e m b o u r g did.
A new election of the Chartist E x e c u t i v e having t a k e n place, according
to the statutes of the National Charter Association, E r n e s t J o n e s , J a m e s
Finlen, ( L o n d o n ) , and J o h n S h a w , ( L e e d s ) , w e r e declared duly elected to
serve on t h e E x e c u t i v e of the N . C . A . for t h e n e x t six m o n t h s .
A s B o n a p a r t e ' s intention o f contracting a l o a n a t t h e B o u r s e w a s frustrated
by t h e passive resistance of t h e Paris capitalists, his Minister of F i n a n c e h a s
p r e s e n t e d to the Senate a B u d g e t containing the following article: " T h e
Minister of F i n a n c e is authorized to c r e a t e , for t h e service of t h e T r e a s u r y
and the negotiations with t h e B a n k of F r a n c e , T r e a s u r y b o n d s , bearing
interest a n d payable at fixed periods. T h e T r e a s u r y b o n d s circulation shall
n o t e x c e e d 250,000,000 francs, (£10,000,000;) b u t the b o n d s delivered to the
sinking fund are n o t included within this limit, by virtue of t h e law of J u n e 10,
1833, nor are the b o n d s deposited as a g u a r a n t e e at the B a n k of F r a n c e and
t h e discount e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . " In an additional clause it is provided t h a t " t h e
E m p e r o r r e s e r v e s to himself the right of issuing supplementary emissions
by virtue of m e r e d e c r e e s , " to be registered afterward by t h e Senate. I am
informed by a Paris letter that this p r o p o s a l has struck with horror the whole
of t h e middle classes, as on t h e o n e h a n d t h e t r e a s u r y b o n d s shall n o t e x c e e d
the sum of 250,000,000 and on the o t h e r e x c e e d that identical sum by w h a t e v e r a m o u n t t h e E m p e r o r m a y t h i n k f i t t o d e c r e e , the b o n d s t h u s issued being
n o t e v e n to be d e p o s e d as a g u a r a n t e e at the B a n k of F r a n c e and the other
discount establishments. Y o u k n o w t h a t o n t h e like a m o u n t t a k e n from t h e
Caisses des dépôts et consignations 60,000,000 h a v e b e e n already a d v a n c e d
b y t h e b a n k o n t r e a s u r y b o n d s . T h e m e r e a p p e a r a n c e o f war i s eagerly
grasped a t b y the D e c e m b r i s t s t o r e m o v e t h e last w e a k barriers yet standing
b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s and t h e national t r e a s u r y . While this p r o s p e c t of an
imminent disorganization of the public credit, already m u c h shaken, perplexes t h e middle classes, t h e bulk of t h e p e o p l e will be e x a s p e r a t e d at t h e
p r o p o s e d increase of the salt t a x a n d similar m o s t u n p o p u l a r imposts. T h u s ,
this w a r which is sure to gain for B o n a p a r t e a sort of popularity in foreign
countries, m a y , n e v e r t h e l e s s , accelerate his downfall in F r a n c e .
T h a t I w a s right in p r e s u m i n g t h e p r e s e n t Spanish troubles as likely to
afford t h e occasion for serious misunderstandings b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d
England, o n e m a y infer from the following intelligence of a L o n d o n p a p e r :
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" T h e F r e n c h E m p e r o r has m a d e inquiries o f L o r d Clarendon, t h r o u g h
M r . W a l e w s k i , w h e t h e r the British G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be disposed to aid him
in placing t h e Carlist Pretender to t h e C r o w n of Spain u p o n t h e t h r o n e , in
the e v e n t of Q u e e n Isabella being d e t h r o n e d . L o r d C l a r e n d o n is said to h a v e
declared that, happily, Q u e e n Isabella w a s firmly seated on her t h r o n e , a n d
t h a t a revolution w a s b u t a r e m o t e contingency in a c o u n t r y so d e v o t e d to
monarchial institutions; but that e v e n if a revolution should b r e a k out in
Spain a n d the Q u e e n be d e t h r o n e d , the British C a b i n e t m u s t decline to enter
into a n y engagements.
T h e E m p e r o r ' s p r o p o s a l to place t h e C o m t e de M o n t e m o ü n u p o n t h e
t h r o n e is inspired by his v e r y natural desire to p r e v e n t the D u c h e s s of
M o n t p e n s i e r from inheriting her sister's d i a d e m ; for he thinks it would be
inconvenient that he should h a v e for a neighbor a son of L o u i s Philippe as
h u s b a n d of t h e Q u e e n of S p a i n . "
In F r i d a y ' s sitting of the C o m m o n s L o r d J o h n Russell stated that he w a s
forced to w i t h d r a w his R e f o r m bill for t h e m o m e n t , w h i c h , h o w e v e r , would
be p r o c e e d e d with on the 27th of April if, in the m e a n t i m e , in c o n s e q u e n c e
of t h e n e w proposal m a d e to t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a being a c c e p t e d , t h e
E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n w a s settled. It is true that after t h e publication of the C z a r ' s
manifesto to his subjects and his letter a d d r e s s e d to B o n a p a r t e , s u c h a
settlement has b e c o m e m o r e improbable t h a n e v e r b e f o r e , b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
t h e ministerial declaration p r o v e s the R e f o r m bill to h a v e b e e n brought
f o r w a r d only w i t h a view to a b s o r b and a p p e a s e public opinion in c a s e
t h e coalition diplomacy should succeed in reestablishing t h e Russian status
quo ante bellum. T h e e m i n e n t p a r t t a k e n by L o r d P a l m e r s t o n in his
ministerial intrigue is t h u s described by The Morning Advertiser, o n e of
his m o s t a r d e n t p a r t i s a n s :
" L o r d A b e r d e e n i s t h e nominal, b u t not t h e real P r i m e Minister. L o r d
P a l m e r s t o n is practically the first Minister of the C r o w n . He is the m a s t e r spirit of the Cabinet. E v e r since his return to office, his colleagues h a v e b e e n
in c o n s t a n t fear of his again flying off from t h e m at a tangent, and are
c o n s e q u e n t l y afraid to t h w a r t any of those views to w h i c h he is k n o w n to
a t t a c h i m p o r t a n c e . He has consequently everything his o w n w a y . A striking
instance of his L o r d s h i p ' s a s c e n d e n c y in her M a j e s t y ' s Councils w a s afforded last w e e k . T h e n e w R e f o r m bill w a s t h e n b r o u g h t formally u n d e r t h e
consideration of the Cabinet, and the question c a m e to be w h e t h e r it should
be p r o c e e d e d with this session or a b a n d o n e d . L o r d A b e r d e e n , L o r d J o h n
Russell, Sir J a m e s G r a h a m , and Sir William M o l e s w o r t h , w e r e for proceeding
with t h e m e a s u r e . L o r d Palmerston p r o p o s e d t h a t i t should b e a b a n d o n e d ,
and intimated, in plain terms—as we stated some d a y s ago, t h a t he would vote
for its a b a n d o n m e n t in t h e H o u s e should he be defeated in t h e Cabinet. T h e
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result of the discussion or conversation, w h i c h t o o k p l a c e , w a s , t h a t L o r d
P a l m e r s t o n carried his point. T h o s e o p p o s e d to him—among w h o m w e r e t h e
ministerial leader in the L o r d s and t h e ministerial leader in the Commons—
eventually s u c c u m b e d . A n o t h e r triumph of L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , within t h e last
eight d a y s , has b e e n the a p p o i n t m e n t of Sir Charles N a p i e r to the c o m m a n d
of t h e Baltic fleet. It is no secret t h a t b o t h L o r d J o h n Russell and Sir J a m e s
G r a h a m w e r e o p p o s e d t o that a p p o i n t m e n t ; b u t L o r d P a l m e r s t o n w a s for
it a n d therefore it t o o k place. N o t h i n g , t h e r e f o r e , could be m o r e appropriate
t h a n that the noble L o r d should this evening o c c u p y t h e chair at t h e b a n q u e t
to be given in the R e f o r m Club to t h e gallant A d m i r a l . "
Mr. Gladstone p r e s e n t e d last night to t h e H o u s e a novelty u n k n o w n to the
present generation—a w a r budget. It w a s evident from his s p e e c h that the
r e a s o n w h y t h e G o v e r n m e n t t o o k this early opportunity of submitting his
financial m e a s u r e s to the H o u s e w a s t h a t of giving a preliminary r e c o r d of
the m o s t disagreeable effects p r o d u c e d by w a r on private p u r s e s , t h u s to cool
d o w n the warlike energies of t h e c o u n t r y . A n o t h e r main feature of his s p e e c h
w a s his only asking for the sum w h i c h w o u l d be required to bring back t h e
25,000 m e n about to leave t h e British s h o r e s , should t h e w a r n o w be brought
to a close.
He c o m m e n c e d by explaining t h e actual state of the income and expenditure of the last financial year. This not having y e t closed, he o b s e r v e d
that o n e m o n t h of the a m o u n t of the r e v e n u e could be only an estimate. T h e
total estimate of t h e i n c o m e of t h e y e a r on t h e 18th of April last h a d b e e n
£52,990,000, while the actual receipts of t h e y e a r had r e a c h e d to no less a
sum t h a n £54,025,000; t h u s showing an increase in t h e actual i n c o m e over
the p r e s u m e d expenditure of £1,035,000. On t h e other h a n d there h a d b e e n
a saving in t h e expenditure b e y o n d t h e estimate of £1,012,000. He t h e r e f o r e
calculated, that b u t for t h e peculiar c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h the c o u n t r y w a s
at p r e s e n t placed, t h e r e w o u l d this y e a r be a surplus over t h e e x p e n d i t u r e
amounting to £2,854,000.
M r . G l a d s t o n e t h e n a d v e r t e d to t h e results of the reductions of duty int r o d u c e d by him. T h e receipts of t h e C u s t o m duties, notwithstanding t h e s e
r e d u c t i o n s , h a d b e e n £20,600,000 in 1853-'54, while in 1852-'53 they h a d only
realized £20,396,000, showing an increase in t h e C u s t o m duties of £204,000.
T h e reduction m a d e in the d u t y u p o n t e a h a d p r o d u c e d a loss of only
£375,000. T h e reduction of t h e S t a m p duties from t h r e e p e n c e up to t e n
shillings to o n e uniform d u t y of o n e p e n c e , h a d increased their i n c o m e ,
instead of the anticipated loss taking place, to t h e a m o u n t of £36,000.
Mr. Gladstone p r o c e e d e d , t h e n showing the result of the m e a s u r e s of last
Session for t h e augmentation of the taxes. T h e collection of t h e I n c o m e t a x
in Ireland h a d b e e n delayed by v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b u t it w o u l d yield
103
irr'
Karl Marx
£20,000 m o r e t h a n calculated u p o n . T h e e x t e n s i o n of the t a x u p o n i n c o m e s ,
from £150 to £100, in G r e a t Britain would p r o d u c e £100,000 b e y o n d this
estimate, viz., £250,000. T h e r e v e n u e from t h e additional duty of o n e shilling
a gallon on spirits in Scotland had p r o d u c e d an increase of only £209,000,
he having estimated it at £278,000. On t h e other h a n d , t h e Spirit duty in
Ireland h a d realized an increase of £213,000, while he h a d calculated u p o n
an increase of £198,000 only. T h e operation of t h e S u c c e s s i o n duty on t h e
financial y e a r would p r o d u c e only half a million. So far the s t a t e m e n t of
Mr. G l a d s t o n e on t h e finances of Great Britain during t h e last twelve m o n t h s ,
expiring on the 5th April.
T h e p r o b a b l e estimate of the r e v e n u e for the y e a r 1854-'55 will b e :
5
10
Income.
Customs
Excise
Stamps
Taxes
Income-tax
Post-tax
C r o w n lands
Old stores
Miscellaneous
Total income
£20,175,000
14,595,000
7,090,000
3,015,000
6,275,000
1,200,000
259,000
420,000
320,000
£53,349,000
15
20
T h e probable estimate of e x p e n d i t u r e on the other h a n d is given as
F u n d e d debt
Unfunded debt
Consolidated fund
Army
Navy
Ordnance
Commissariat
Miscellaneous estimates
Militia
P a c k e t service
E a s t e r n service
Total expenditure
Causing a deficit of
£27,000,000
546,000
2,460,000
6,857,000
7,488,000
3,846,000
645,000
4,775,000
530,000
792,000
1,250,000
£56,189,000
2,840,000
Before adverting t o the m e a n s b y w h i c h this deficiency w a s t o b e m a d e
u p , M r . G l a d s t o n e e n u m e r a t e d the m e a s u r e s w h i c h G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d n o t
r e c o m m e n d t h e H o u s e t o adopt. H e should n o t r e t u r n t o t h e re'imposition o f
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30
35
any of t h o s e reductions of duties he h a d p r o p o s e d last year, which h a d
already acquired t h e force of law. He w o u l d n o t assent to t h e re'imposition
of t h e s e t a x e s unnecessarily w h i c h f o r m e r G o v e r n m e n t s h a d released. If
h o w e v e r , t h e struggle t h e y w e r e n o w entering u p o n should b e prolonged for
5
a year, it w o u l d hardly be in their p o w e r to maintain a p e r m a n e n t c o n t i n u a n c e
of t h o s e r e d u c t i o n s . In general, he w o u l d n o t p r o p o s e a n y addition to indirect
taxation. H e should n o t r e s o r t t o state-loans, t h e r e being n o c o u n t r y w h o s e
m e a n s w e r e already so heavily mortgaged as t h o s e of England. At length,
after all t h e s e p r e a m b l e s , Mr. G l a d s t o n e c a m e to t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t w h a t t h e
10
15
G o v e r n m e n t intended to p r o p o s e . This w a s to double t h e I n c o m e - t a x for six
m o n t h s , and to abolish altogether t h e existing distinction b e t w e e n h o m e d r a w n and foreign-drawn bills. T h e average r a t e of duty on p r e s e n t bills of
e x c h a n g e , although unequally distributed, w a s I s . 6d. p e r cent.; h e p r o p o s e d
to equalize it to I s . per cent. This c h a n g e , he calculated, w o u l d p r o d u c e an
increase of r e v e n u e of £60,000. With regard to t h e income-tax, t h e i n c r e a s e
would be from 7 to 107 d. in t h e p o u n d on i n c o m e s of £150 and u p w a r d , a n d
from 5 to 7V2d. on i n c o m e s b e t w e e n £100 a n d £150. Simultaneously he
p r o p o s e d that t h e H o u s e should m a k e a proposition to enable him, before
t h e t a x w a s levied, to issue £1,750,000 e x c h e q u e r bills to be paid o u t of t h e
accruing p r o d u c e of t h e income-tax. In conclusion, M r . G l a d s t o n e e n d e a v ored, not v e r y successfully, to vindicate his late m e a s u r e s for t h e reduction
of t h e public debt, m e a s u r e s w h i c h resulted, as y o u k n o w , in a lamentable
failure.
In the discussion following u p o n this s t a t e m e n t several m e m b e r s p a r t o o k ,
b u t t h e only s p e e c h w o r t h mentioning w a s t h a t of Mr. Disraeli. He declared
t h a t h e should m a k e n o opposition t o a n y v o t e w h i c h G o v e r n m e n t , o n their
o w n responsibility, t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y t o submit t o t h e H o u s e for t h e p u r p o s e
of conducting the impending w a r w i t h vigor, a n d he h o p e d w i t h success. B u t
he protested, in c a s e of t h e w a r being prolonged, against direct taxation being
exclusively h a d r e c o u r s e to for carrying on t h e w a r . As to t h e second p a r t
of Mr. G l a d s t o n e ' s statement, t h a t w h i c h related to t h e actual state of t h e
finances of t h e c o u n t r y , and as to t h e m o n e y in h a n d , it s e e m e d to him
involved in an obscurity which did n o t b e c o m e a financial statement, and
certainly n o t o n e delivered u n d e r such c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h e p r e s e n t o n e . T h e
p r e s e n t state of t h e b a l a n c e in t h e E x c h e q u e r w a s n o t sufficient or satisfactory. W h e n the p r e s e n t G o v e r n m e n t t o o k office, t h e r e had b e e n , o n t h e
3d J a n u a r y , 1853, b a l a n c e s in t h e E x c h e q u e r amounting to £9,000,000, b u t
a y e a r after, in J a n u a r y , 1854, t h e y w e r e r e d u c e d by one-half. He estimated
t h a t t h e b a l a n c e s in t h e E x c h e q u e r on April 5th n e x t would be £3,000,000,
while the e x p e n d i t u r e , consisting of t h e dividends for t h e p a y m e n t of t h e
public creditors a n d t h e e x e c u t i o n of his c o n v e r s i o n s c h e m e would altogether
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105
Karl Marx
require from £9,000,000 to £10,000,000. T h e right honorable gentlemen said
t h e r e w a s no u s e of meeting this with b a l a n c e s in t h e E x c h e q u e r , but that
h e would m a k e u p the sum w a n t e d b y deficiency bills. H e maintained that
it w a s of great importance t h e y should h a v e had at this m o m e n t an ample
b a l a n c e b u t instead of its being a question w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e to h a v e a
5
b a l a n c e , or an excess of b a l a n c e s , it w a s n o w a question w h e t h e r t h e y w e r e
to h a v e a balance at all, or a large deficiency, and in fact, instead of having
any balance, t h e y had an e n o r m o u s deficiency, which h a d b e e n c a u s e d in
t w o w a y s by the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r . First, by having r e d u c e d the
interest on E x c h e q u e r bills to IV2 per cent, w h e n t h e value of m o n e y w a s 10
rising, a n d secondly by his ill-devised c o n v e r s i o n of t h e S o u t h S e a stocks,
a m e a s u r e which h a d not only e a t e n up his balances b u t left him in a p r e s e n t
deficiency of £2,000,000.
S o m e further r e m a r k s of an indifferent c h a r a c t e r having b e e n m a d e by
other m e m b e r s , the R e p o r t on Supply w a s brought up and t h e resolution
agreed t o .
Karl M a r x .
106
15
Karl Marx
Letter to the Labour Parliament
The People's Paper.
Nr. 98, 18. März 1854
28, D e a n Street, S o h o , L o n d o n .
9th M a r c h , 1854.
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I regret deeply to be unable, for the m o m e n t at least, to leave L o n d o n , a n d
t h u s to be p r e v e n t e d from expressing verbally my feelings of pride a n d
gratitude on receiving the invitation to sit as H o n o r a r y Delegate at t h e L a b o u r
Parliament. T h e m e r e assembling of such a Parliament m a r k s a n e w e p o c h
in the history of the world. T h e n e w s of this great fact will arouse the h o p e s
of t h e working classes t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e and America.
G r e a t Britain, of all other countries, has s e e n developed on the greatest
scale, the d e s p o t i s m of Capital a n d t h e slavery of L a b o u r . In no other c o u n t r y
h a v e the intermediate stations b e t w e e n t h e millionaire c o m m a n d i n g w h o l e
industrial armies and t h e wages-slave living only from h a n d to m o u t h so
gradually b e e n s w e p t a w a y from t h e soil. T h e r e exist h e r e no longer, as in
continental countries, large classes of p e a s a n t s a n d artisans almost equally
d e p e n d e n t on their o w n p r o p e r t y a n d their o w n labour. A complete divorce
of p r o p e r t y from labour has b e e n effected in G r e a t Britain. In no other
c o u n t r y , therefore, the w a r b e t w e e n t h e t w o classes t h a t constitute m o d e r n
society h a s a s s u m e d so colossal dimensions a n d features so distinct a n d
palpable.
B u t it is precisely from t h e s e facts t h a t the w o r k i n g classes of G r e a t
Britain, before all o t h e r s , are c o m p e t e n t a n d called for to act as leaders in
the great m o v e m e n t that m u s t finally result in t h e absolute emancipation of
L a b o u r . S u c h t h e y are from t h e c o n s c i o u s clearness of their position, t h e
v a s t superiority of their n u m b e r s , t h e disastrous struggles of their past, and
t h e moral strength of their present.
It is t h e working millions of G r e a t Britain w h o first h a v e laid d o w n t h e
real basis of a n e w society—modern industry, w h i c h transformed t h e
destructive agencies of n a t u r e into t h e p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r of m a n . T h e English
working classes, with invincible energies, by t h e s w e a t of their b r o w s a n d
b r a i n s , h a v e called into life the material m e a n s of ennobling labour itself,
a n d of multiplying its fruits to such a degree as to m a k e general a b u n d a n c e
possible.
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Karl Marx
By creating the inexhaustible productive p o w e r s of m o d e r n industry t h e y
h a v e fulfilled t h e first condition of t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n of labour. T h e y h a v e
n o w to realise its other condition. T h e y h a v e to free t h o s e wealth-producing
p o w e r s from the infamous shackles of m o n o p o l y , a n d subject t h e m to the
joint control of the p r o d u c e r s , w h o , till n o w , allowed t h e v e r y p r o d u c t s of
5
their h a n d s t o t u r n against t h e m and b e t r a n s f o r m e d into a s m a n y i n s t r u m e n t s
of their o w n subjugation.
T h e labouring classes h a v e c o n q u e r e d n a t u r e ; t h e y h a v e n o w t o c o n q u e r
m e n . T o s u c c e e d i n this a t t e m p t t h e y d o n o t w a n t strength, b u t t h e organisation of their c o m m o n strength, organisation of the labouring classes on a 10
national scale—such, I suppose, is t h e great and glorious e n d aimed at by the
L a b o u r Parliament.
If the L a b o u r Parliament p r o v e s true to the idea t h a t called it into life, s o m e
future historian will h a v e to r e c o r d t h a t t h e r e existed in t h e y e a r 1854 t w o
Parliaments in E n g l a n d , a Parliament at L o n d o n , and a Parliament at M a n - 15
Chester—a Parliament of the rich, a n d a Parliament of t h e poor—but that m e n
sat only in the Parliament of the m e n and n o t in t h e Parliament of the
masters.
Y o u r s truly,
Karl Marx.
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20
T h e P e o p l e ' s Paper. London. N r . 9 8 , 1 8 . M ä r z 1854.
Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Marx' „ L e t t e r to t h e Labour P a r l i a m e n t "
Karl Marx
The Labour Parliament
Nr.4039, 29. März 1854
The Labor Parliament.
F r o m Our Own Correspondent.
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Of all countries G r e a t Britain has seen d e v e l o p e d on the grandest scale the
d e s p o t i s m of capital a n d t h e slavery of labor. In no other c o u n t r y h a v e t h e
intermediate degrees b e t w e e n the millionaire, c o m m a n d i n g whole industrial
armies, and t h e wages-slave living only from h a n d to m o u t h , so radically b e e n
s w e p t a w a y from t h e soil. T h e r e exist no longer, as in continental countries,
large classes of p e a s a n t s a n d artizans almost equally d e p e n d e n t on their o w n
p r o p e r t y and their o w n labor. A c o m p l e t e divorce of p r o p e r t y from labor
h a s b e e n effected in Great Britain. In no other c o u n t r y , therefore, has t h e
w a r b e t w e e n the t w o classes t h a t constitute m o d e r n society, assumed s o
colossal dimensions and features so distinct and palpable.
B u t it is precisely from t h e s e facts t h a t the w o r k i n g classes of Britain,
b e f o r e all o t h e r s , are c o m p e t e n t a n d called u p o n to act as leaders in t h e great
m o v e m e n t t h a t m u s t finally result in the absolute emancipation of labor.
S u c h they are from the c o n s c i o u s clearness of their position, the v a s t superiority of their n u m b e r s , the disastrous struggles of their p a s t and the moral
strength of their present.
T h e L o n d o n daily p a p e r s o b s e r v e the "policy of a b s t e n t i o n " with r e s p e c t
to t h e proceedings of t h e L a b o r Parliament. T h e y h o p e to kill it by a v a s t
"conspiration de silence. " H a v i n g for w h o l e m o n t h s fatigued t h e public with
interminable articles on t h e probable c h a n c e s of realization for the s c h e m e
of s u c h a Parliament, n o w they purposely avoid e v e r mentioning that it h a s
actually sprung into life and already b e g u n to work. This w i s d o m of t h e
ostrich, that imagines it avoids dangers by feigning n o t to see t h e m , will n o t
do now-a-days. T h e y will be forced to notice t h e L a b o r Parliament, and,
notwithstanding their simulated indifference, s o m e future historian will
111
Karl Marx
r e c o r d t h a t t h e r e existed in the y e a r 1854 t w o Parliaments in England, a
Parliament in L o n d o n and a Parliament in M a n c h e s t e r , a Parliament of t h e
rich a n d a Parliament of the poor, but that m e n sat only in the Parliament
of the m e n , a n d n o t in the Parliament of the m a s t e r s . T h e following is the
r e p o r t of t h e C o m m i t t e e appointed to d r a w up a plan of action for t h e L a b o r
5
Parliament:
" Y o u r C o m m i t t e e believe the duty of this P a r l i a m e n t to be the r e n d e r ing of t h e existing turn-outs a n d lockouts victorious for the operatives, a n d
t h e adoption of m e a n s w h e r e b y b o t h should be p r e v e n t e d for the f u t u r e ; t h e
securing for t h e working classes fair t r e a t m e n t during w o r k ; t h e rescuing of 10
w o m e n and children from the factory; the m e a n s of education, a n d the
abolition of stoppages and u n d e r h a n d a b a t e m e n t s of w a g e s . Believing further
t h a t it is their d u t y to e n d e a v o r to secure to t h o s e w h o labor a fair participation in t h e profits of their w o r k ; and a b o v e all this, to obtain for t h e m t h e
m e a n s of i n d e p e n d e n t self-employment, w i t h a view to their, emancipation
15
from wages slavery altogether; and, being c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e final step
t h e r e t o is the obtaining the pecuniary leverage for action, r e c o m m e n d for
y o u r consideration:
1. T h e organization of a system for the collection of a national r e v e n u e
for labor.
20
2. A plan for t h e security of the funds t h u s raised.
3. T h e application of t h e same and the securing of t h e rights of t h e w o r k i n g
classes.
4. T h e constitution of the M a s s M o v e m e n t .
I. The Raising of a National Labor Revenue.
25
a. A w e e k l y levy on the w a g e s , graduated according to the price of labor,
as follows:
Up to 4 s . p e r w e e k
l d.
Up to 8s. per w e e k
Uá.
U p t o 12s. per w e e k
I d .
i
2
3
l
l h<i.
2
3
4
d.
d.
d.
b. That t h e officers of the several bodies of w o r k i n g m e n , w h o act in con- 35
j u n c t i o n with the M a s s M o v e m e n t , f o r w a r d t h e m o n e y s t h u s raised t o its
directing head.
II. Security of the Funds,
a. T h a t the local officers f o r w a r d weekly all m o n e y s t h e y receive on behalf
of t h e M a s s M o v e m e n t to t h e directing h e a d of t h e s a m e as shall be further
112
40
r
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specified below. T h e duly appointed officers for the reception thereof to
r e t u r n receipts immediately for t h e m o n e y s t h u s received.
b. T h a t the directing h e a d s shall invest all m o n e y s t h e y receive on behalf
of t h e Mass M o v e m e n t (having p o w e r s to retain in h a n d a sum n o t exceeding
£50) in a b a n k , in their collective n a m e s ; no such sum or s u m s , nor a n y p a r t
of the same, to be d r a w n out of t h e b a n k e x c e p t on presentation of t h e
minute-books of t h e said directing b o d y , containing an order for t h e same
to be d r a w n , signed by s u c h a majority of the m e m b e r s of t h a t b o d y as shall
hereafter be determined.
c. T h a t the m o n e y t h u s d r a w n shall be p a p e r m o n e y , (unless u n d e r £5;)
t h a t t h e n u m b e r s of s u c h n o t e s shall be e n t e r e d in a b o o k , o p e n to inspection
and published in t h e p a p e r s ; that t h e n o t e s t h u s received shall be c u t into
p a r t s , and e a c h p a r t intrusted to a s e p a r a t e m e m b e r of t h e directing b o d y ;
and w h e r e large s u m s are d r a w n , t h a t t h e y b e held i n equal portions b y e a c h
member.
d. T h a t e a c h m e m b e r , t h u s intrusted with a p o r t i o n of the said m o n e y , shall
give a promissory n o t e a m o u n t i n g to his p r o p o r t i o n a t e share of the m o n e y
d r a w n , supposing t h e same divided into equal p a r t s , according to the n u m b e r
of the directing b o d y ; a n d that, should he refuse to apply for t h e p u r p o s e s
for w h i c h the m o n e y w a s d r a w n , s u c h p a r t of n o t e held by him, the d o c u m e n t
t h u s held against h i m shall at o n c e be put in force, b u t be cancelled on his
paying over said p a r t of n o t e ; t h a t the p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s t h u s given shall be
deposited in a chest or safe, w h i c h shall be placed in t h e c u s t o d y of an
i n d e p e n d e n t and responsible p a r t y (not a m e m b e r of the directing b o d y ) , w h o
shall not allow any d o c u m e n t to be t a k e n t h e r e f r o m e x c e p t in p r e s e n c e of
all the directing b o d y .
e . T h a t t h e m o n e y t h u s d r a w n for any p a y m e n t o r p u r c h a s e b e paid b y
t h e directors only in t h e mutual p r e s e n c e of e a c h m e m b e r of their b o d y .
III. Application of the Funds.
30
a. T h e funds collected shall be applied as follows: To support all t o w n s
a n d places n o w on strike, a n d for liquidating all d e b t s c o n t r a c t e d during the
late and p r e s e n t strikes and l o c k o u t s . T h a t equal s u p p o r t shall be afforded
to t o w n s in proportion to the n u m b e r o u t of employ. T h a t on the same
principle as w h e n provisions r u n short on b o a r d of ship, e a c h receives alike;
35 t h u s t h e s a m e relief shall be given without distinction of high or low paid
trader. T h a t , although all existing strikes and lockouts shall be supported,
no future assistance will be given to any b o d y of m e n w h o do not recognize
a n d support the M a s s M o v e m e n t .
b. T h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t be o p e n e d to regulate t h e price of labor. T h a t for
40 this p u r p o s e a monthly s t a t e m e n t be issued for t h e price of t h e r a w material
employed in all t h e t r a d e s in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the M a s s M o v e m e n t ; the price
113
Karl Marx
of labor in the s a m e , and t h e selling price of t h e articles p r o d u c e d , and the
other w o r k i n g charges. T h a t o n t h e e v i d e n c e thus furnished, t h e directing
b o d y shall issue a statement of t h e profits of t h e e m p l o y e r ; being o p e n to
r e c e i v e from the latter a statement of a n y peculiar and additional charges
w h i c h t h e e m p l o y e r s m a y h a v e to meet. T h a t on t h e basis t h u s laid t h e price
of labor shall be regulated, and the tariff of w a g e s be fixed in a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h t h e same. T h a t a similar plan be applied to t h e agricultural interests of
the country.
c. T h a t , while w o r k i n g m e n h a v e an u n d o u b t e d right to participate in the
profits of the employer, he has a right higher still—that of employing himself ;
a n d t h a t , for the p u r p o s e of the self-employment, as also for the p u r p o s e of
m o r e effectually regulating wages, by removing t h e p o w e r of surplus labor
from the e m p l o y e r ' s h a n d s , the funds of the M a s s M o v e m e n t be further
e m p l o y e d in t h e p u r c h a s e of land. T h a t t h e estates be p u r c h a s e d in t h e n a m e s
of individuals n o t being m e m b e r s of the directing b o d y . T h a t t h e estates be
divided into f a r m s , varying in size according to t h e n a t u r e of t h e soil a n d
t h e p u r p o s e s to which t h e y are to be applied, viz: w h e t h e r as individual
t e n a n c i e s or large cooperative undertakings. T h a t t h e said lands be retained
b y a n d n e v e r alienated from the M a s s M o v e m e n t . T h a t the land b e let t o
t e n a n t s on short leases a n d at a fair a n d m o d e r a t e rental. T h a t t h e clause be
inserted in the lease w h e r e b y any t e n a n t making the fault in p a y m e n t of r e n t
shall immediately lose his right of t e n a n c y . T h a t a f o u r t h clause be inserted
w h e r e b y the t e n a n t binds himself to p a y t h e rental to t h e parties appointed
b y t h e d e e d o f assignment hereafter n a m e d . T h a t t h e parties i n w h o s e n a m e s
t h e estates are b o u g h t e x e c u t e a deed of assignment, w h e r e b y t h e t e n a n t shall
p a y t h e rent, not to t h e m , but to t h e individuals t h e n being directors of the
M a s s M o v e m e n t . T h a t t h e directors of the time being shall e x e c u t e a d e e d ,
binding t h e m s e l v e s in a penalty of £5,000 e a c h , to t w o individuals, n o t being
p u r c h a s e r s of any estate ; s u c h penalty to be enforced should t h e y , on leaving
office, not e x e c u t e a deed of assignment of the said rental to their s u c c e s s o r s
i n office; t h o s e s u c c e s s o r s t o b e b o u n d i n t h e s a m e w a y .
d. T h a t i n d e p e n d e n c e of self-employment a n d relief of the labor m a r k e t
from its surplus be still m o r e s e c u r e , y o u r C o m m i t t e e r e c o m m e n d a further
application of the available funds for the establishment of cooperative factories, w o r k s h o p s a n d stores, s u c h to be t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e M a s s M o v e m e n t .
T h o s e employed therein to receive that a m o u n t of w a g e s regulated by t h e
tariff for t h e price of labor previously n a m e d , a n d one-half of t h e net profits
realized on t h e articles p r o d u c e d and sold, t h e o t h e r half of t h e profits to
go to t h e r e v e n u e of t h e Mass M o v e m e n t . T h a t t h e chief manager of e a c h
c o o p e r a t i v e undertaking be elected by the o p e r a t i v e s engaged therein, subj e c t to t h e approbation of t h e directing b o d y . T h a t t h e said manager of e a c h
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respective undertaking regulate t h e p u r c h a s e s a n d sales c o n n e c t e d t h e r e with, and r e t u r n monthly to t h e directing b o d y a s t a t e m e n t of t h e p u r c h a s e s ,
sales, p a y m e n t s , and loss or profit c o n n e c t e d with the s a m e . That, in c a s e
g r o u n d s of complaint at difference arise b e t w e e n t h e operatives a n d m a n 5 ager, the operatives shall h a v e the p o w e r of dismissing the m a n a g e r a n d
electing another by t h e majority of not less t h a n three-fourths of their
n u m b e r . T h a t o n e half of the n e t profits of e a c h cooperative undertaking be
sent b y e a c h respective m a n a g e r t o t h e directing b o d y . T h a t t h e p r o p e r t y for
cooperation p u r p o s e s p u r c h a s e d by t h e M a s s M o v e m e n t be placed u n d e r a
10 s y s t e m of security similar to t h a t applied to t h e landed e s t a t e s . "
After a long discussion, the r e p o r t of the C o m m i t t e e up to e n d of t h e
portion marked " I I " w a s a d o p t e d o n W e d n e s d a y ' s sitting o f t h e L a b o r
Parliament. T h e C o m m i t t e e appointed for drawing up this p r o g r a m m e of
action for t h e M a s s M o v e m e n t consisted of M e s s r s . E r n e s t J o n e s , J a m e s
15 Finlen, J a m e s Williams, A b r a h a m R o b i n s o n and J a m e s Bligh.
Karl M a r x .
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Friedrich Engels
Retreat of the Russians from Kalafat
The People's Paper.
Nr. 98, 18. März 1854
Retreat of the Russians from Kalafat.
T h e R u s s i a n s h a v e retreated from Kalafat, a n d h a v e , it is stated, entirely
remodelled their plan of campaign. This is t h e glorious e n d of t h e efforts and
risks of a t h r e e m o n t h s ' campaign, during w h i c h t h e last r e s o u r c e s of
Wallachia h a v e b e e n completely e x h a u s t e d . This is t h e fruit of that inconceivable m a r c h into Little Wallachia, w h i c h a p p e a r e d to h a v e b e e n u n d e r t a k e n in utter c o n t e m p t of t h e first rules of strategy. In order to t a k e Kalafat,
t h a t only bridgehead held by t h e T u r k s on t h e left b a n k of the D a n u b e , t h e
m a s s of t h e a r m y w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e e x t r e m e right, in a position w h e r e
the w e a k e n e d centre and left a p p e a r e d completely a b a n d o n e d to a n y a t t a c k
t h a t t h e e n e m y might c h a n c e t o u n d e r t a k e , and w h e r e a n indifference w a s
s h o w n to the lines of communications and r e t r e a t w h i c h is w i t h o u t parallel
in t h e history of w a r f a r e . T h a t O m e r P a s h a h a s n o t profited by this blunder
is only to be explained by the interference of o u r A m b a s s a d o r at C o n stantinople. H o w it is that, after all, the Russians h a v e to retreat disgracefully
w i t h o u t having affected their p u r p o s e , we shall h a v e to show presently.
W e say t h e y h a v e t o retreat disgracefully, b e c a u s e a n a d v a n c e p r e c e d e d
by blustering, c r o w n e d by taking up a merely threatening position, a n d ending
in a quiet and m o d e s t retreat, w i t h o u t e v e n an a t t e m p t at serious fighting—
b e c a u s e a m o v e c o m p o s e d of an uninterrupted series of mistakes a n d e r r o r s ,
resulting in nothing b u t t h e G e n e r a l ' s conviction t h a t he h a s m a d e a c o m p l e t e
fool of himself—is the v e r y height of disgrace.
N o w to t h e state of the c a s e .
T h e R u s s i a n s h a d , by t h e end of 1853, t h e following t r o o p s in Wallachia,
Moldavia, and Bessarabia:—
1. 4th corps of t h e a r m y (Dannenberg) t h r e e divisions infantry, o n e division
cavalry, four brigades artillery—total, after deducting l o s s e s , say
45,000 m e n .
2. Of t h e 5th c o r p s (Lüders) o n e division infantry, o n e division cavalry,
t w o brigades artillery—say 15,000 m e n .
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3. 3rd corps (Osten-Sacken) t h r e e divisions infantry, o n e division cavalry,
four brigades artillery—say 55,000 m e n .
Total a b o u t 115,000 m e n , besides n o n - c o m b a t a n t s and o n e division of
L ü d e r s ' corps in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of O d e s s a , w h i c h being w a n t e d for
garrison d u t y , c a n n o t be t a k e n into a c c o u n t .
T h e t r o o p s u n d e r D a n n e n b e r g a n d L ü d e r s w e r e t h e only o n e s t h a t h a d b e e n
in the Principalities up to the beginning of D e c e m b e r . T h e a p p r o a c h of
O s t e n - S a c k e n ' s c o r p s w a s t o b e t h e signal for t h e grand c o n c e n t r a t i o n for
t h e a t t a c k o n Kalafat. H i s place, o n t h e B u g a n d t h e Pruth, w a s t o b e filled
up by the 6th corps (Tsheodayeff), t h e n on the r o a d from M o s c o w . After
t h e junction of this latter c o r p s , t h e D a n u b i a n a r m y w o u l d h a v e c o n s i s t e d
of a b o u t 170,000 m e n , b u t might h a v e t u r n e d o u t to be stronger, if the n e w
levies of recruits from t h e South W e s t e r n p r o v i n c e s w e r e at o n c e directed
to t h e t h e a t r e of w a r .
H o w e v e r , 115,000 to 120,000 m e n a p p e a r e d to the Russian C o m m a n d e r
a sufficient force to defend t h e w h o l e line of t h e D a n u b e from Brailow to
Nicopolis, and spare a sufficient n u m b e r to be c o n c e n t r a t e d , from the e x t r e m e right, for an a t t a c k on Kalafat.
W h e n this m o v e m e n t w a s c o m m e n c e d , t o w a r d s t h e end o f D e c e m b e r ,
Kalafat could hardly h a r b o u r m o r e t h a n 10,000 to 12,000 defenders, with
8,000 m o r e at Widdin, w h o s e support might be considered d u b i o u s , as t h e y
h a d to c r o s s an unruly river in a b a d season. T h e slowness of t h e R u s s i a n
m o v e m e n t s , h o w e v e r , the indecision of Prince Gortschakoff, and a b o v e all
t h e activity a n d b o l d n e s s of Ismail P a s h a , t h e c o m m a n d e r at Kalafat, permitted the T u r k s to c o n c e n t r a t e s o m e 40,000 m e n on t h e m e n a c e d point, and
to change Kalafat from a simple b r i d g e h e a d stormable by a force double t h a t
of its defenders, into a fortification w h i c h could shelter at least 30,000 m e n ,
a n d withstand any b u t a regular siege attack. It h a s b e e n justly said, that t h e
highest t r i u m p h for the c o n s t r u c t o r of a field fortification is the necessity
for t h e e n e m y to o p e n his t r e n c h e s against it; if t h e Russians did n o t actually
o p e n the t r e n c h e s , it is merely b e c a u s e , e v e n w i t h t h a t e x t r e m e m e a n s , t h e y
did see no w a y of taking Kalafat in t h e time t h e y might set apart for t h e
operation. Kalafat will henceforth r a n k with F r e d e r i c k II. 's c a m p at Bunzelwitz, with the lines of T o r r e s V e d r a s , with t h e A r c h d u k e Charles' ent r e n c h m e n t s behind V e r o n a , as o n e of t h o s e efforts of field fortification t h a t
are n a m e d as classical applications of t h e art in warlike history.
N o w let us look to the R u s s i a n m e a n s of attack. T h a t t h e y m e a n t in good
e a r n e s t to t a k e Kalafat, is s h o w n by their p a r k s of siege artillery having b e e n
b r o u g h t forward a s far a s K r a j o v a . T h a t O m e r P a s h a , w e m a y state b y t h e
w a y , allowed t h e s e guns to go a n d r e t u r n freely, is o n e of t h e m a n y military
inconceivabilities of this w a r , to be explained m e r e l y through diplomatic
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influences. T h e only thing, t h e n , for t h e R u s s i a n s , w a s a sufficient m a s s of
t r o o p s t o drive i n t h e T u r k s , a n d t o p r o t e c t the t r e n c h e s a n d b a t t e r i e s , and t o
s t o r m t h e b r e a c h e s a s s o o n a s t h e y should h a v e b e e n o p e n e d . H e r e , again,
Ismail P a s h a acted like an energetic and clever c o m m a n d e r . H i s sally t o w a r d s
Citate on t h e 6th of January—his vigorous a t t a c k ending in t h e defeat of a
5
superior Russian force, and the continued a t t a c k s of a similar n a t u r e he
e x e c u t e d , while t h e Russian concentration w a s still going on, and, until he
w a s fairly b l o c k a d e d on his small D a n u b i a n Peninsula by a superior force—in
short, his system of defending himself by c o n c e n t r a t e d offensive blows
against single points of the Russian line, a n d t h e r e b y destroying his e n e m y , 10
as far as he could, in detail, w a s exactly w h a t a c o m m a n d e r u n d e r his circums t a n c e s should h a v e d o n e , and forms a cheering c o n t r a s t with O m e r P a s h a ' s
p a s s i v e defence at Oltenitza, or his lazy passivity, all this while, on the lower
D a n u b e . F o r the p e t t y attacks carried o n b y him h e r e a n d t h e r e , w h i c h a p p e a r
n e v e r to h a v e b r o k e n off at t h e p r o p e r m o m e n t , b u t carried on for d a y s and 15
d a y s o n the s a m e point with blind obstinacy, e v e n w h e n n o result could b e
e x p e c t e d from t h e m , t h e s e petty attacks do n o t c o u n t , w h e n a m o v e m e n t
a c r o s s the D a n u b e with 40,000 to 60,000 m e n w a s w a n t e d .
After all, the Russians completed, by the e n d of J a n u a r y , their conc e n t r a t i o n a r o u n d Kalafat. T h e y w e r e evidently superior in t h e o p e n field;
t h e y m u s t therefore h a v e had some 30,000 or 40,000 m e n . N o w d e d u c t t h e s e
from 115,000, d e d u c t t h e n , say 20,000 or 25,000 m e n m o r e for the defence
of t h e line from Brailow to t h e sea, and t h e r e r e m a i n e d for t h e w h o l e of
G r e a t e r Wallachia, inclusive of garrisons, from 50,000 to 65,000 men—an
a r m y far from sufficient to defend s u c h a long line of attack, a n d a line of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n running parallel with the line of attack, at a s h o r t d i s t a n c e
b e h i n d it. A vigorous a t t a c k on any point, e v e n with a force inferior to t h e
w h o l e of t h e s e 65,000 m e n , could n o t b u t h a v e e n d e d in t h e u t t e r defeat, in
detail, of all t h e s e dispersed Russian t r o o p s , a n d with t h e c a p t u r e of all t h e
R u s s i a n magazines. O m e r P a s h a will h a v e to explain, s o m e time or other,
his motives for neglecting such an opportunity.
W i t h all their efforts, t h e n , the Russians could m e r e l y c o n c e n t r a t e before
Kalafat a force barely sufficient to drive in t h e o u t p o s t s , b u t not to attack
t h e stronghold itself. T h e y t o o k nearly five w e e k s to effect e v e n this m o m e n t a r y a n d illusory success. General Schilder, of t h e E n g i n e e r s , w a s sent with
positive orders t o take Kalafat. H e c a m e , h e saw, and h e resolved t o d o
nothing until the arrival of Tsheodayeff should allow fresh t r o o p s to c o m e
up from t h e centre and left.
F i v e w e e k s the R u s s i a n s stood in this d a n g e r o u s position, r e a r and flank
e x p o s e d , as if provoking t h a t attack which t h e y could n o t h a v e resisted a
m o m e n t ; and five w e e k s O m e r P a s h a stood m e n a c i n g their flank and rear,
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in a position w h e r e he could see their w e a k n e s s without spectacles or telescopes—and he did nothing. Verily, this system of m o d e r n w a r f a r e , u n d e r
the p a t r o n a g e of the Allied C o u r t s , is a b o v e c o m p r e h e n s i o n !
All at o n c e n e w s r e a c h e s London—"The Russians are in full r e t r e a t from
5 K a l a f a t . " " O h , " says t h e " T i m e s , " " t h a t is t h e effect of our allies, t h e
A u s t r i a n s , having c o n c e n t r a t e d an a r m y in Transylvania, in the r e a r of t h e
R u s s i a n s ; t h a t is t h e effect of t h e glorious Austrian alliance, which is again
the effect of our glorious A b e r d e e n policy. T h r e e c h e e r s for A b e r d e e n ! " B u t
n e x t d a y A u s t r i a n authentic m a n i f e s t o e s show that n o A u s t r i a n Alliance
10 exists, and that the Austrians as y e t h a v e n o t said, and do n o t a p p e a r to k n o w
t h e m s e l v e s , for w h a t p u r p o s e t h e y h a v e sent t h a t a r m y w h e r e it is,—and,
consequently, great uncertainty reigns as to t h e c a u s e of t h e Russian r e treat.
We are n o w told t h a t the R u s s i a n s will t r y to c r o s s the D a n u b e at t h e
15 opposite point, b e t w e e n Brailow a n d Galatz, a n d t h u s p r o c e e d on t h e direct
r o a d to Adrianople, as in 1828-29. If t h e r e d o e s n o t exist a perfect u n d e r s t a n d ing b e t w e e n t h e Russians o n t h e o n e side, and t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h s q u a d r o n
on the other, this m a r c h is strategically impossible. We h a v e another c a u s e
to a c c o u n t for this retreat. Tsheodayeff is said to h a v e b e e n stopped in this
20 m a r c h , in order to form a c a m p of 30,000 or 40,000 m e n a b o v e O d e s s a . If
this b e t r u e , h e c a n n o t relieve a n y t r o o p s o n t h e P r u t h a n d Sereth, n o r
reinforce Gortschakoff before Kalafat. C o n s e q u e n t l y , Prince Gortschakoff
h a s t o retreat i n a s good o r d e r a s h e c a m e , a n d t h u s w o u l d end t h e grand
tragi-comedy of t h e Russian m a r c h against Kalafat.
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The Greek Insurrection
Nr.4039, 29. März 1854
The Greek Insurrection.
T h e insurrection a m o n g the G r e e k subjects of t h e Sultan, w h i c h c a u s e d such
alarm at Paris a n d L o n d o n , h a s n o w b e e n s u p p r e s s e d , but its revival is
t h o u g h t not impossible. With regard to this possibility we are able to say that
after a careful investigation of the d o c u m e n t s relating to t h e whole affair so
far, w e are c o n v i n c e d that the insurgents w e r e f o u n d exclusively a m o n g the
m o u n t a i n e e r s inhabiting t h e southern slope of t h e P i n d u s , a n d t h a t t h e y m e t
with no s y m p a t h y on the p a r t of t h e other Christian r a c e s of T u r k e y , save
t h e pious freebooters of M o n t e n e g r o ; and that t h e o c c u p a n t s of the plains
of T h e s s a l y , w h o form t h e only c o m p a c t G r e e k c o m m u n i t y still living u n d e r
T u r k i s h s u p r e m a c y , are more afraid of their c o m p a t r i o t s t h a n of t h e T u r k s
t h e m s e l v e s . It is n o t to be forgotten t h a t this spiritless a n d c o w a r d l y b o d y
of population did n o t dare to rise e v e n at t h e t i m e of t h e G r e e k w a r of
i n d e p e n d e n c e . As to the remainder of the G r e e k r a c e , n u m b e r i n g p e r h a p s
300,000 souls, distributed throughout the cities of t h e E m p i r e , t h e y are so
thoroughly d e t e s t e d by the other Christian tribes that, w h e n e v e r a popular
m o v e m e n t h a s b e e n successful, as in Servia a n d Wallachia, it h a s resulted
in driving a w a y all t h e priests of G r e e k origin, a n d in supplying their places
b y native p a s t o r s .
B u t although the p r e s e n t G r e e k insurrection, considered w i t h reference
to its o w n merits, is altogether insignificant, it still derives i m p o r t a n c e from
the o c c a s i o n it affords to the w e s t e r n P o w e r s for interfering b e t w e e n the
P o r t e and t h e great majority of its subjects in E u r o p e , a m o n g w h o m t h e
G r e e k s c o u n t only o n e million against ten millions of t h e other r a c e s professing t h e G r e e k religion. T h e G r e e k inhabitants of t h e so-called kingdom as
well as t h o s e living in the Ionian Isles u n d e r British rule consider it, of c o u r s e ,
to be their national mission to expel t h e T u r k s from w h e r e v e r t h e G r e e k
language is spoken, and to a n n e x Thessaly and E p i r u s to a State of their o w n .
T h e y m a y e v e n d r e a m of a Byzantine restoration, although, on t h e whole,
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t h e y are too astute a p e o p l e to believe in s u c h a fancy. B u t t h e s e plans of
national aggrandizement and i n d e p e n d e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e G r e e k s , p r o claimed at this m o m e n t in c o n s e q u e n c e of R u s s i a n intrigues, as is p r o v e d
by the lately detected c o n s p i r a c y of the priest A t h a n a s i u s , a n d proclaimed
t o o by t h e r o b b e r s of t h e m o u n t a i n s w i t h o u t being r e e c h o e d by t h e agricultural population of t h e plain—all h a v e nothing to do with t h e religious rights
of the subjects of T u r k e y w i t h w h i c h an a t t e m p t is m a d e to mix t h e m u p .
As we learn from t h e English journals and from notice given in t h e H o u s e
o f L o r d s b y L o r d Shaftesbury, a n d i n t h e C o m m o n s b y M r . M o n c k t o n
Milnes, the British G o v e r n m e n t is to be called u p o n in connection, partly
a t least, with t h e s e G r e e k m o v e m e n t s t o t a k e m e a s u r e s t o meliorate t h e
condition of t h e Christian subjects of t h e P o r t e . I n d e e d , we are told explicitly
t h a t t h e great e n d aimed at by t h e w e s t e r n P o w e r s is to p u t the Christian
religion on a footing of equal rights with t h e M a h o m e t a n in T u r k e y . N o w ,
either this m e a n s nothing at all, or it m e a n s the granting political and civil
rights, b o t h to M u s s u l m a n s a n d Christians, without any reference to either
religion, a n d without considering religion at all. In other w o r d s , it m e a n s t h e
c o m p l e t e separation of S t a t e a n d C h u r c h , of Religion a n d Politics. B u t t h e
T u r k i s h S t a t e , like all Oriental S t a t e s , is f o u n d e d u p o n the m o s t intimate
connection, we might almost say, t h e identity of State a n d C h u r c h , of Politics
and Religion. T h e K o r a n is the d o u b l e s o u r c e of faith a n d law, for t h a t E m p i r e
a n d its rulers. But h o w is it possible to equalize t h e faithful and t h e Giaour,
the M u s s u l m a n and the Rajah b e f o r e t h e K o r a n ? To do t h a t it is n e c e s s a r y
in fact, to supplant t h e K o r a n by a n e w civil c o d e , in other w o r d s to b r e a k
d o w n t h e f r a m e w o r k of T u r k i s h society a n d c r e a t e a n e w order of things o u t
of its ruins.
O n the other h a n d , t h e m a i n feature that distinguishes the G r e e k confession from all other b r a n c h e s of t h e Christian faith, is the same identification of State a n d C h u r c h , of civil a n d ecclesiastical life. So intimately
i n t e r w o v e n w e r e State and C h u r c h in t h e B y z a n t i n e E m p i r e , that it is impossible to write the history of t h e o n e w i t h o u t writing t h e history of the
other. In R u s s i a t h e s a m e identity prevails, although t h e r e , in contradistinction to the Byzantine E m p i r e , the C h u r c h h a s b e e n transformed into the
mere tool of the State, t h e i n s t r u m e n t of subjugation at h o m e a n d of aggression abroad. In the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in conformity with t h e oriental
notions o f t h e T u r k s , t h e Byzantine t h e o c r a c y h a s b e e n allowed t o develop
itself to such a degree, that the p a r s o n of a parish is at t h e same time the
judge, the mayor, t h e t e a c h e r , t h e e x e c u t o r of t e s t a m e n t s , t h e a s s e s s o r of
t a x e s , the ubiquitous f a c t o t u m of civil life, n o t the servant, but the m a s t e r
of all w o r k . T h e main r e p r o a c h to be c a s t u p o n t h e T u r k s in this regard is
n o t t h a t t h e y h a v e crippled t h e privileges of the Christian priesthood, b u t ,
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on t h e contrary, t h a t u n d e r their rule this all-embracing oppressive tutelage,
control, and interference of the C h u r c h h a s b e e n p e r m i t t e d to a b s o r b t h e
w h o l e sphere of social existence. Mr. Fallmerayer v e r y amusingly tells u s ,
in his Orientalische Briefe, h o w a G r e e k Priest w a s quite astonished w h e n
he informed him t h a t t h e L a t i n Clergy enjoyed no civil authority at all, a n d
5
h a d t o perform n o profane b u s i n e s s . " H o w , " exclaimed t h e Priest, " d o o u r
L a t i n B r e t h r e n contrive to kill t i m e ? "
It is plain t h e n that to introduce a n e w civil c o d e in T u r k e y , a c o d e altog e t h e r abstracted from religion, and b a s e d on a c o m p l e t e separation of State
a n d C h u r c h , would be not only to abolish M a h o m e t a n i s m , b u t also to b r e a k 10
d o w n t h e G r e e k C h u r c h a s n o w established i n t h a t E m p i r e . C a n any o n e b e
c r e d u l o u s e n o u g h to believe in good e a r n e s t t h a t the timid and reactionary
valetudinarians of t h e p r e s e n t British G o v e r n m e n t h a v e e v e r c o n c e i v e d t h e
idea of undertaking s u c h a gigantic task, involving a perfect social revolution,
in a c o u n t r y like T u r k e y ? T h e notion is absurd. T h e y c a n only entertain it 15
for the p u r p o s e of throwing d u s t in the e y e s of t h e English people a n d of
Europe.
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The Documents on the Partition of Turkey
Nr.4045, 5. April 1854
The Documents on the Partition of Turkey.
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , M a r c h 2 1 , 1854.
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A m o s t important e v e n t is the c o m p u l s o r y publication by Ministers of their
secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a during t h e first t h r e e
m o n t h s of their administration, as also of t h e m e m o r a n d u m of the interview
b e t w e e n t h e Czar a n d L o r d A b e r d e e n in 1844, which t h e Journal de St. Pétersbourg challenged t h e latter to p r o d u c e .
I begin with an analysis of the " m e m o r a n d u m " by C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e ,
delivered to her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , a n d f o u n d e d on c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
from the E m p e r o r of Russia, s u b s e q u e n t to bis visit to England in J u n e , 1844.
T h e p r e s e n t status quo of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e is " t h e m o s t compatible with
t h e general interest of t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e . " England and R u s s i a agree
on this principle, a n d t h e r e f o r e unite their efforts to k e e p up t h a t status quo.
" W i t h this object, the essential point is to suffer the P o r t e to live in r e p o s e ,
without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, a n d without interfering, w i t h o u t absolute necessity, in its internal affairs." N o w , h o w is this
" s y s t e m of f o r b e a r a n c e " to be successfully carried o u t ? Firstly, by G r e a t
Britain n o t interfering with the interpretation R u s s i a m a y think fit to p u t u p o n
h e r treaties with t h e P o r t e , b u t forcing it, on the c o n t r a r y , to act in conformity
with t h o s e treaties as interpreted by R u s s i a ; a n d , in t h e second place, by
allowing R u s s i a " c o n s t a n t l y " to meddle b e t w e e n t h e Sultan a n d his Christian
subjects. In a w o r d , the system of f o r b e a r a n c e t o w a r d the Porte m e a n s a
s y s t e m of complicity w i t h Russia. This strange proposition is, h o w e v e r , far
from being e x p r e s s e d in r u d e t e r m s .
T h e m e m o r a n d u m affects to speak of "all the great P o w e r s , " b u t at t h e
s a m e time plainly intimates t h a t t h e r e exist no g r e a t P o w e r s at all besides
R u s s i a and England. F r a n c e , it is said, will "find herself obliged to act in
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conformity with t h e c o u r s e agreed u p o n b e t w e e n St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d L o n d o n . " A u s t r i a is r e p r e s e n t e d as a m e r e a p p e n d a g e to Russia, enjoying no
life of h e r o w n , following no distinct policy, b u t o n e "closely united by the
principle of perfect identity" with t h a t of R u s s i a . P r u s s i a is t r e a t e d as a
nonentity, n o t w o r t h mentioning, a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y is n o t so m u c h as men5
tioned. All the great P o w e r s , t h e n , is only a rhetorical figure for t h e t w o
Cabinets of St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d L o n d o n ; a n d t h e line of c o n d u c t to be agreed
u p o n by all t h e great P o w e r s m e a n s the line of c o n d u c t d r a w n up at St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d t o b e acted u p o n a t L o n d o n . T h e m e m o r a n d u m s a y s :
" T h e P o r t e has a c o n s t a n t t e n d e n c y to extricate itself from the en- 10
g a g e m e n t s i m p o s e d u p o n it by t h e treaties which it h a s c o n c l u d e d with other
p o w e r s . It h o p e s to do so with impunity, b e c a u s e it r e c k o n s on the m u t u a l
j e a l o u s y of t h e Cabinets. It thinks t h a t if it fails in its engagements t o w a r d
o n e of t h e m , the r e s t will e s p o u s e its quarrel, a n d will s c r e e n it from all
responsibility.
15
It is essential n o t to confirm the P o r t e in this delusion. E v e r y time t h a t
it fails in its obligations t o w a r d one of t h e great P o w e r s , it is t h e interest of
all t h e r e s t to m a k e it sensible of its error, and seriously to e x h o r t it to act
rightly t o w a r d t h e Cabinet which d e m a n d s j u s t reparation.
As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other
Cabinets, it will give way, and t h e differences w h i c h h a v e a r i s e n will be
arranged in a conciliatory m a n n e r , w i t h o u t a n y conflict resulting from
them."
This is the formula by w h i c h England is called u p o n to assist R u s s i a in
h e r policy of extorting n e w concessions from T u r k e y , on t h e g r o u n d of her
ancient treaties.
" I n t h e p r e s e n t state of feeling in E u r o p e , t h e C a b i n e t s c a n n o t see w i t h
indifference the Christian populations in T u r k e y e x p o s e d to flagrant acts of
o p p r e s s i o n or religious intolerance. It is n e c e s s a r y c o n s t a n t l y to m a k e the
O t t o m a n Ministers sensible of this truth, a n d to p e r s u a d e t h e m t h a t t h e y c a n
only r e c k o n o n the friendship and o n t h e support o f the great P o w e r s o n the
condition t h a t t h e y t r e a t t h e Christian subjects of t h e P o r t e with toleration
and w i t h mildness.
It will be t h e d u t y of the foreign r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , guided by t h e s e principles,
to act a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s in a perfect spirit of a g r e e m e n t . If t h e y a d d r e s s
r e m o n s t r a n c e s to t h e P o r t e , t h o s e r e m o n s t r a n c e s m u s t b e a r a real c h a r a c t e r
of unanimity, t h o u g h divested of one of exclusive dictation."
In this mild w a y England is taught h o w to b a c k R u s s i a ' s p r e t e n s i o n s to
a religious Protectorate over t h e Christians of T u r k e y .
H a v i n g t h u s laid d o w n the premises of her "policy of f o r b e a r a n c e , " R u s s i a
c a n n o t conceal from her confidante t h a t this v e r y f o r b e a r a n c e m a y p r o v e
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New-York W e e k l y T r i b u n e . Nr. 656, 8. April 1854.
Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit M a r x ' Artikel
„ T h e D o c u m e n t s o n t h e Partition o f T u r k e y "
5
m o r e fatal t h a n any policy of aggression, a n d fearfully contribute to develop
all the " e l e m e n t s of dissolution" the O t t o m a n Empire c o n t a i n s : so t h a t s o m e
fine m o r n i n g "unforeseen circumstances m a y h a s t e n its fall, w i t h o u t its
being in t h e p o w e r of t h e friendly C a b i n e t s to p r e v e n t it." T h e question is
t h e n raised w h a t would h a v e to be d o n e in the e v e n t of such u n f o r e s e e n
c i r c u m s t a n c e s producing a final c a t a s t r o p h e in T u r k e y .
T h e only thing w a n t e d , it is said, in the e v e n t of T u r k e y ' s fall becoming
imminent, is England and Russia's
"coming to a previous understanding
before having recourse to action. " " T h i s n o t i o n , " we are a s s u r e d by t h e
10 m e m o r a n d u m , " w a s in principle agreed u p o n during the E m p e r o r ' s last
residence in L o n d o n , (in the long c o n f e r e n c e s held b e t w e e n t h e A u t o c r a t on
t h e o n e hand, and t h e D u k e of Wellington, Sir R o b e r t Peel, and t h e Earl of
A b e r d e e n on t h e o t h e r hand). T h e result w a s t h e eventual engagementthat,
if anything unforeseen o c c u r r e d in T u r k e y , Russia and England should
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previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in
common."
N o w , w h a t m e a n s this eventual engagement? Firstly, t h a t R u s s i a a n d
England should previously c o m e to a c o m m o n understanding as to t h e
partition of Turkey; and secondly, t h a t in s u c h a c a s e , England w a s to bind
herself to f o r m a Holy Alliance w i t h R u s s i a a n d Austria, described as
R u s s i a ' s alter ego against F r a n c e , w h o w o u l d be "obliged, " i.e., forced to
act in conformity with their views. T h e natural result of s u c h a c o m m o n
understanding would be to involve England in a deadly w a r with F r a n c e , a n d
t h u s to give Russia full sway to c a r r y out h e r o w n policy on T u r k e y .
G r e a t stress is again a n d again laid u p o n t h e " u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s "
t h a t m a y accelerate the downfall of T u r k e y . At t h e conclusion of the m e m o r a n d u m t h e mysterious p h r a s e , h o w e v e r , d i s a p p e a r s , t o b e replaced b y t h e
m o r e distinct formulation: "If w e foresee t h a t t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t
crumble to pieces, England a n d Russia h a v e to e n t e r into a previous c o n c e r t ,
e t c . . . . " T h e only u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e , then, w a s t h e u n f o r e s e e n declaration on the p a r t of Russia t h a t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t n o w crumble to
pieces. T h e main point gained by t h e e v e n t u a l engagement is the liberty
granted to Russia to foresee, at a given m o m e n t , t h e s u d d e n downfall of
T u r k e y , and to oblige England to enter into negotiations, on the c o m m o n
understanding of s u c h a c a t a s t r o p h e being at hand.
Accordingly, a b o u t t e n years after t h e m e m o r a n d u m h a d b e e n d r a w n u p ,
d u e notice is given to England t h a t t h e vitality of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e is gone,
a n d t h a t t h e y had now to e n t e r u p o n their previously arranged c o n c e r t to
t h e exclusion of F r a n c e , i.e. to conspire b e h i n d t h e b a c k s of T u r k e y a n d
F r a n c e . This o v e r t u r e o p e n s t h e series of secret and confidential p a p e r s
e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d t h e Coalition Cabinet.
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Sir G. H. S e y m o u r , the British E m b a s s a d o r at St. P e t e r s b u r g , sends his first
secret a n d confidential dispatch t o L o r d J . Russell, t h e t h e n Foreign Minister, o n J a n u a r y 11,1853. O n t h e evening o f the 9th J a n u a r y h e h a d t h e " h o n o r "
t o see t h e E m p e r o r a t t h e Palace o f t h e G r a n d D u c h e s s H e l e n , w h o h a d
c o n d e s c e n d e d to invite L a d y S e y m o u r and himself to m e e t the Imperial
5
family. T h e E m p e r o r c a m e up to him in his m o s t gracious m a n n e r , expressing
his great pleasure at t h e n e w s of the formation of t h e Coalition Cabinet, to
which he wished long life, desiring t h e E m b a s s a d o r to c o n v e y to old Aberd e e n his congratulation on his part, a n d to b e a t into L o r d J o h n Russell's
brains " t h a t it w a s v e r y essential t h a t t h e t w o Governments—the English io
G o v e r n m e n t and I, and I and t h e English Government—should be on the b e s t
t e r m s ; a n d t h a t t h e necessity w a s n e v e r greater t h a n a t p r e s e n t . "
M a r k t h a t t h e s e w o r d s w e r e s p o k e n i n J a n u a r y , 1853, a t the v e r y time
w h e n Austria, " b e t w e e n w h o m and Russia"—according t o t h e m e m o r andum—"there exists an entire conformity of principles in regard to the 15
affairs of T u r k e y , " w a s openly engaged in troubling t h e w a t e r s at M o n t e negro.
" W h e n we are a g r e e d , " said the C z a r , " i t is immaterial w h a t the o t h e r s
m a y t h i n k or do. T u r k e y , " he continued, in a hypocritical m a n n e r of cond o l e n c e , "is in a v e r y critical state, and m a y give us all a great deal of t r o u b l e . "
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H a v i n g said so m u c h , the Czar p r o c e e d e d to s h a k e h a n d s with Sir
H. S e y m o u r , v e r y graciously, as if about to t a k e l e a v e of h i m ; b u t Sir Hamilton, t o w h o m i t "instantly o c c u r r e d t h a t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n w a s i n c o m p l e t e , "
t o o k " t h e great l i b e r t y " h u m b l y to p r a y t h e A u t o c r a t to " s p e a k a little m o r e
explicitly with regard to t h e affairs of T u r k e y . " " T h e E m p e r o r ' s w o r d s a n d 25
m a n n e r , " r e m a r k s this o b s e r v e r , " a l t h o u g h still v e r y kind, s h o w e d t h a t his
Majesty h a d no intention of speaking to me of t h e demonstration which he
is about to make in the South."
Be it r e m a r k e d that already in his dispatch of J a n . 7, 1853, Sir H a m i l t o n
h a d informed t h e British G o v e r n m e n t t h a t " o r d e r s h a d b e e n dispatched to 30
t h e 5th corps d'armée to a d v a n c e to t h e frontiers of t h e D a n u b i a n p r o v i n c e s ,
a n d t h a t t h e 4th c o r p s would be o r d e r e d to hold itself in readiness to m a r c h
if n e c e s s a r y ; " and in a dispatch dated J a n . 8, 1853, t h a t N e s s e l r o d e h a d
e x p r e s s e d to him his opinion of t h e " n e c e s s i t y t h a t t h e diplomacy of R u s s i a
should be supported by a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of f o r c e . "
35
" T h e E m p e r o r , " Sir H a m i l t o n continues his dispatch, "said, at first w i t h
a little hesitation, but, as he p r o c e e d e d , in an o p e n a n d unhesitating manner:
' T h e affairs of T u r k e y are in a v e r y disorganized condition; the c o u n t r y
itself s e e m s to be falling to pieces (menace ruine); t h e fall will be a great 40
misfortune, and it is v e r y important t h a t E n g l a n d and R u s s i a should c o m e
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to a perfectly good understanding u p o n t h e s e affairs, and that neither should
t a k e any decisive step of w h i c h the o t h e r is n o t apprised.'
'Stay,' he exclaimed, ' w e h a v e on our h a n d s a sick m a n , a v e r y sick m a n :
it will b e , I tell y o u frankly, a great misfortune if, o n e of t h e s e d a y s , he should
slip a w a y from u s , especially b e f o r e all n e c e s s a r y arrangements w e r e m a d e .
But, h o w e v e r , this i s n o t the t i m e t o s p e a k t o y o u o n t h a t m a t t e r . ' "
T h e patient, in this b e a r ' s e y e s , is so w e a k t h a t he must eat him. Sir
Hamilton, s o m e w h a t frightened at this " u n f o r e s e e n " diagnostic of t h e
M u s c o v i t e physician, a n s w e r s in the t r u e spirit of courtesy:
" Y o u r Majesty is so gracious that y o u will allow me o n e further o b s e r v a tion. Y o u r Majesty says t h e m a n is sick; it is v e r y t r u e ; b u t y o u r Majesty
will deign to e x c u s e me if I r e m a r k , that it is t h e p a r t of the g e n e r o u s and
strong to t r e a t with gentleness t h e sick a n d feeble m a n . "
T h e British E m b a s s a d o r c o m f o r t s himself by t h e consideration, t h a t this
c o n c u r r e n c e on his part in t h e C z a r ' s view of T u r k e y a n d sickness and his
appeal to forbearance with the sick m a n did " a t least n o t give o f f e n s e . " T h u s
e n d s Sir H. S e y m o u r ' s r e p o r t on his first confidential conversation with t h e
C z a r ; but, although appearing a perfect courtier in this vis-à-vis, he h a s
sufficient good sense to w a r n his cabinet a n d to tell t h e m w h a t follows:
" A n y o v e r t u r e of this kind only t e n d s to establish a dilemma. T h e dilemma
seems to be this: If her Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t do n o t c o m e to an u n d e r s t a n d ing with R u s s i a as to w h a t is to h a p p e n in t h e e v e n t of the sudden downfall
of T u r k e y , t h e y will h a v e t h e less r e a s o n for complaining if results displeasing
to England should be p r e p a r e d . If, on the c o n t r a r y , her Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t should enter into t h e consideration of s u c h eventualities, t h e y m a k e
themselves in some degree consenting parties to a c a t a s t r o p h e w h i c h t h e y
h a v e so m u c h interest in warding off as long as p o s s i b l e . "
Sir H a m i l t o n w i n d s up his d i s p a t c h w i t h the following epigrammatic sentence:
" T h e sum is probably this, t h a t England h a s to desire a close c o n c e r t w i t h
Russia, with a view to preventing t h e downfall of Turkey—while Russia
would be well pleased t h a t t h e c o n c e r t should apply to the e v e n t s by w h i c h
this downfall is to be followed."
On the 14th of J a n u a r y , as Sir G . H . S e y m o u r informs L o r d J . R u s s e l l , in
his dispatch dated 22d J a n u a r y , 1853, he h a d another confidential interview
with the Czar, w h o m " h e found a l o n e . " T h e A u t o c r a t c o n d e s c e n d e d t o give
t h e English E m b a s s a d o r a lesson in E a s t e r n affairs. T h e d r e a m s and plans
of the E m p r e s s Catherine II w e r e k n o w n , b u t he did n o t indulge in t h e m .
On t h e contrary, in his opinion t h e r e existed, p e r h a p s , only o n e danger for
Russia, that of a further extension of his already too v a s t dominions. (Your
r e a d e r s will recollect t h a t I alluded to this in extracting a passage from t h e
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d i s p a t c h e s of C o u n t P o z z o di Borgo.) T h e status quo of T u r k e y , w a s the m o s t
c o n s o n a n t with Russian interests. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e T u r k s h a d lost their
spirit of military enterprise, a n d on t h e other, "this c o u n t r y w a s strong
e n o u g h , or had hitherto been strong enough, to p r e s e r v e its i n d e p e n d e n c e
a n d to e n s u r e respectful t r e a t m e n t from other c o u n t r i e s . " B u t in t h a t e m p i r e
5
t h e r e h a p p e n e d to be several millions of Christians he m u s t t a k e c a r e of, h a r d
and " i n c o n v e n i e n t " a s the task might b e . T o d o this h e w a s b o u n d a t o n c e
by his right, his duty and his religion. T h e n , all of a sudden, t h e Czar r e t u r n e d
to his p a r a b l e of t h e sick m a n , the v e r y sick m a n , w h o m they m u s t by no
m e a n s allow " t o suddenly die on their h a n d s , " (de leur échapper.) " C h a o s , 10
confusion, a n d the certainty of a E u r o p e a n w a r , m u s t a t t e n d the c a t a s t r o p h e ,
if it should o c c u r u n e x p e c t e d l y , a n d before some ulterior system had been
sketched."
H a v i n g , t h u s , again given notice of t h e impending d e a t h of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e , t h e s u m m o n s to England followed in conformity with t h e " e v e n t u a l
e n g a g e m e n t " to discount the heritage in c o m m o n with Russia. "Still, he
avoids sketching his o w n ulterior s y s t e m , " contenting himself by establishing, in a parliamentary w a y , the m a i n point to be k e p t in view in t h e e v e n t
of a partition.
"I desire to speak to y o u as a friend a n d a gentleman. If England and I
arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards t h e rest, it m a t t e r s little
to m e ; it is indifferent to me w h a t others do or think. F r a n k l y , t h e n , I tell
y o u plainly, t h a t if England thinks of establishing herself o n e of t h e s e days
at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do n o t attribute this intention to you,
b u t it is b e t t e r on t h e s e occasions to s p e a k plainly; for my part, I am equally
disposed to take the engagement n o t to establish myself t h e r e , as proprietor
t h a t is to say, for as occupier I do not say; it might h a p p e n t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
if no previous provision w e r e m a d e , if everything should be left to c h a n c e ,
might place me in the position of occupying C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . "
E n g l a n d , therefore, will be forbidden to establish herself at Constantinople. T h e Czar will do so, if n o t as proprietor, at least in t h e quality
of a t e m p o r a r y occupier. T h e British E m b a s s a d o r t h a n k e d his Majesty for
t h e frankness of this declaration. Nicholas t h e n alluded to his past conv e r s a t i o n w i t h the D u k e of Wellington, of w h i c h t h e m e m o r a n d u m of 1844
is t h e r e c o r d , and, as it w e r e , t h e résumé. Passing to t h e question of the
day—to his claims to the H o l y Places—the British E m b a s s a d o r e x p r e s s e d his
fears:
" T w o c o n s e q u e n c e s that might be anticipated from t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a
R u s s i a n army—the o n e being the c o u n t e r - d e m o n s t r a t i o n w h i c h might be
p r o v o k e d on the p a r t of F r a n c e ; the other, and the m o r e serious, the rising,
on t h e p a r t of t h e Christian population, against t h e Sultan's authority, already
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so m u c h w e a k e n e d by revolts, a n d by a severe financial crisis. T h e E m p e r o r
a s s u r e d me t h a t no m o v e m e n t of his forces h a d y e t t a k e n place (n'ont p a s
bougé), and e x p r e s s e d his h o p e t h a t no a d v a n c e w o u l d be required. With
regard to a French Expedition to the Sultan's dominions, his Majesty in5
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timated t h a t such a step w o u l d bring affairs to an immediate crisis; t h a t a
sense of h o n o r w o u l d c o m p e l him to send his forces into T u r k e y without
delay or hesitation: t h a t if t h e result of such an a d v a n c e should p r o v e to be
t h e o v e r t h r o w of t h e Grear Turk (le Grand Ture,) he should regret t h e e v e n t ,
b u t should feel t h a t h e had acted a s h e w a s compelled t o d o . "
T h e Czar h a s n o w given England t h e t h e m e she h a s to w o r k out, viz: to
sketch a n "ulterior s y s t e m " for superseding t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d " t o
enter into a previous c o n c e r t as to everything relating to the establishment
of a n e w order of things, i n t e n d e d to replace t h a t which n o w e x i s t s . " He
e n c o u r a g e d his pupil by holding forth the prize he might gain from a successful solution of this problem, dismissing h i m with t h e paternal advice:
"A noble triumph w o u l d be obtained by the civilization of the N i n e t e e n t h
century, if the void left by t h e extinction of M a h o m m e d a n rule in E u r o p e
could be filled up without an interruption of t h e general p e a c e , in cons e q u e n c e of t h e p r e c a u t i o n s a d o p t e d by t h e t w o principal G o v e r n m e n t s t h e
m o s t interested in the destinies of T u r k e y . "
England being t h u s s u m m o n e d , L o r d J. Russell a p p e a r s and sends in his
a n s w e r in a secret and confidential dispatch d a t e d F e b . 9,1853. If L o r d J o h n
had b e e n fully a w a r e of the C z a r ' s perfidious plan to p r e s s England into a
false position by t h e m e r e fact of her entering into secret c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
w i t h him, as to the future partition of an allied S t a t e , he w o u l d h a v e acted
like t h e Czar, a n d h a v e c o n t e n t e d himself with making a verbal reply to B a r o n
B r u n n o w , instead of dispatching an official S t a t e p a p e r to St. P e t e r s b u r g .
Before t h e secret p a p e r s w e r e laid b e f o r e t h e H o u s e , The Times h a d described L o r d J o h n ' s dispatch as a m o s t powerful a n d "indignant r e f u s a l " of
the C z a r ' s p r o p o s a l s . In its y e s t e r d a y ' s n u m b e r it w i t h d r a w s its o w n eulogy
of L o r d John, declaring t h a t " t h e d o c u m e n t d o e s not d e s e r v e the praise it
h a d b e e n led, o n imperfect information, t o apply t o i t . " L o r d J o h n incurred
the w r a t h of The Times in c o n s e q u e n c e of his declaration, in F r i d a y ' s sitting
of the C o m m o n s , t h a t he certainly w a s n o t in t h e habit of making c o m munications to that p a p e r , and that he h a d n o t e v e n r e a d the article alluding
to his a n s w e r to Sir G.H. S e y m o u r until t h r e e d a y s after its publication.
A n y o n e acquainted with the h u m b l e a n d abject t o n e a s s u m e d b y e v e r y
English Minister since 1814, Canning not e v e n e x c e p t e d , in their c o m munications with Russia, will b e forced t o o w n t h a t L o r d J o h n ' s dispatch
is to be regarded as a heroic p e r f o r m a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h a t little e a r t h m a n .
T h e d o c u m e n t having t h e c h a r a c t e r of an i m p o r t a n t contribution to history,
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a n d being p r o p e r to illustrate the d e v e l o p m e n t of negotiations, y o u r r e a d e r s
will be glad to be acquainted with it in extenso.
" L o r d J o h n Russell to Sir G . H . S e y m o u r .
(Secret and Confidential)
Foreign Office, F e b r u a r y 9, 1853.
Sir: I h a v e received, and laid before t h e Q u e e n , y o u r secret and confidential
d i s p a t c h of the 22d of J a n u a r y . H e r Majesty, u p o n this as u p o n former
o c c a s i o n s , i s h a p p y t o acknowledge t h e m o d e r a t i o n , t h e f r a n k n e s s , and t h e
friendly disposition of his Imperial Majesty. H e r M a j e s t y has directed me
to reply in t h e same spirit of t e m p e r a t e , candid, a n d amicable discussion. T h e
q u e s t i o n raised by his Imperial Majesty is a v e r y serious o n e . It is, supposing
t h e contingency of the dissolution of t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e to be probable, or
e v e n imminent, w h e t h e r it is not better to be p r o v i d e d b e f o r e h a n d for a
contingency, t h a n to incur the c h a o s , confusion, a n d t h e certainty of an
E u r o p e a n w a r , all of w h i c h m u s t attend the c a t a s t r o p h e if it should o c c u r
u n e x p e c t e d l y , and before some ulterior s y s t e m h a s b e e n s k e t c h e d ; this is
t h e point, said his Imperial Majesty, to w h i c h I am desirous t h a t y o u should
call t h e attention of your G o v e r n m e n t . In considering this grave question,
the first reflection that o c c u r s to her Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t is that no actual
crisis h a s o c c u r r e d which r e n d e r s n e c e s s a r y a solution of this v a s t E u r o p e a n
p r o b l e m . Disputes h a v e arisen respecting t h e H o l y P l a c e s , b u t t h e s e are
without t h e sphere of the internal g o v e r n m e n t of T u r k e y , a n d c o n c e r n R u s s i a
and F r a n c e r a t h e r t h a n the Sublime P o r t e . S o m e d i s t u r b a n c e of t h e relations
b e t w e e n Austria a n d t h e Porte has b e e n c a u s e d b y the T u r k i s h a t t a c k o n
M o n t e n e g r o ; b u t this again relates r a t h e r to dangers affecting the frontier
of Austria, t h a n t h e authority a n d safety of t h e Sultan; so that t h e r e is no
sufficient c a u s e for intimating to the Sultan t h a t he c a n n o t k e e p p e a c e at
h o m e , or p r e s e r v e friendly relations with his neighbors. It o c c u r s further to
her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t to r e m a r k that the e v e n t w h i c h is contemplated
is n o t definitely fixed in point of time. W h e n William III. a n d L o u i s X I V .
disposed, by treaty, of the succession of Charles II. of Spain, t h e y w e r e
providing for an e v e n t which could n o t be far off. T h e infirmities of the
sovereign of Spain, and the certain e n d of any h u m a n life, m a d e the contingency in p r o s p e c t b o t h sure and near. T h e d e a t h of t h e Spanish king w a s
in no w a y h a s t e n e d by the treaty of partition. T h e same thing m a y be said
of t h e provision m a d e in the last c e n t u r y for t h e disposal of T u s c a n y , u p o n
the d e c e a s e of the last prince of t h e h o u s e of Medici. B u t the contingency
of t h e dissolution of t h e O t t o m a n empire is of a n o t h e r kind. It m a y h a p p e n
t w e n t y , fifty, or a h u n d r e d y e a r s h e n c e . In these circumstances it would
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hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings toward the Sultan which 40
animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to
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dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. B e s i d e s this c o n sideration, h o w e v e r , it m u s t be o b s e r v e d , t h a t an a g r e e m e n t m a d e in such
a case t e n d s v e r y surely to h a s t e n t h e contingency for which it is intended
to provide. Austria and F r a n c e could not, in fairness, be k e p t in ignorance
of the transaction, nor would s u c h c o n c e a l m e n t be consistent with the e n d
of preventing an E u r o p e a n w a r . I n d e e d , s u c h c o n c e a l m e n t c a n n o t be int e n d e d by his Imperial Majesty. It is to be inferred that, as soon as G r e a t
Britain and R u s s i a should h a v e agreed on t h e c o u r s e to be p u r s u e d , and h a v e
determined to enforce it, t h e y should c o m m u n i c a t e their intentions to t h e
G r e a t P o w e r s of E u r o p e . An a g r e e m e n t t h u s m a d e a n d t h u s c o m m u n i c a t e d
w o u l d not be v e r y long a secret; a n d while it w o u l d alarm a n d alienate the
Sultan, the knowledge of its existence w o u l d stimulate all his enemies to
increased violence a n d m o r e obstinate conflict. T h e y w o u l d fight with t h e
conviction that t h e y m u s t ultimately t r i u m p h ; while the Sultan's generals and
t r o o p s would feel t h a t no immediate s u c c e s s could save their c a u s e from final
o v e r t h r o w . T h u s would b e p r o d u c e d and strengthened t h a t v e r y a n a r c h y
w h i c h is n o w feared, and t h e foresight of t h e friends of t h e patient would
p r o v e the c a u s e of his d e a t h . H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t n e e d scarcely
enlarge on the dangers a t t e n d a n t on t h e e x e c u t i o n of a n y similar convention.
T h e e x a m p l e of t h e succession w a r is e n o u g h to show how little such agreem e n t s are r e s p e c t e d w h e n a pressing t e m p t a t i o n urges their violation. T h e
position of the E m p e r o r of R u s s i a as depositary, b u t n o t proprietor, of C o n stantinople, would b e e x p o s e d t o n u m b e r l e s s h a z a r d s , b o t h from the long
cherished ambition of his o w n nation and the jealousies of E u r o p e . T h e
ultimate proprietor, w h o e v e r he might b e , would hardly be satisfied with the
inert, supine attitude of the heirs of M a h o m e t II. A great influence on the
affairs of E u r o p e s e e m s naturally to belong to t h e Sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n and the Black Sea. T h a t
influence might be used in favor of Russia; it might be used to control a n d
c u r b her power. H i s Imperial M a j e s t y has justly and wisely said: My c o u n t r y
is so v a s t , so happily c i r c u m s t a n c e d in e v e r y w a y , that it would be unreasonable in me to desire m o r e territory or m o r e p o w e r t h a n I p o s s e s s . On
the contrary, he observed, our great, p e r h a p s our only danger, is that w h i c h
w o u l d arise from an extension given to an E m p i r e already too large. A
vigorous a n d ambitious State, replacing t h e Sublime P o r t e , might, h o w e v e r ,
r e n d e r w a r on t h e p a r t of R u s s i a a necessity for t h e E m p e r o r or his succ e s s o r s . T h u s E u r o p e a n conflict w o u l d arise from t h e v e r y m e a n s t a k e n t o
p r e v e n t it; for neither England n o r F r a n c e , n o r p r o b a b l y Austria, w o u l d be
content to see Constantinople p e r m a n e n t l y in t h e h a n d s of Russia. On t h e
p a r t of G r e a t Britain, H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t at o n c e declare that they
r e n o u n c e all intention or wish to hold Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty
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m a y b e quite secure u p o n this h e a d . T h e y are likewise r e a d y t o give a n
a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e y will enter into no a g r e e m e n t to provide for t h e contingency of t h e fall of T u r k e y without previous c o m m u n i c a t i o n with t h e
E m p e r o r o f Russia. U p o n t h e whole, t h e n , H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t are
p e r s u a d e d that no c o u r s e of policy c a n be a d o p t e d m o r e w i s e , m o r e disintere s t e d , m o r e beneficial t o E u r o p e , t h a n t h a t w h i c h H i s Imperial Majesty has
so long followed, a n d w h i c h will r e n d e r his n a m e m o r e illustrious t h a n t h a t
of t h e m o s t f a m o u s sovereigns w h o h a v e sought immortality by u n p r o v o k e d
c o n q u e s t and e p h e m e r a l glory. W i t h a view to t h e s u c c e s s of this policy, it
is desirable t h a t t h e u t m o s t forbearance should be manifested t o w a r d Turk e y ; t h a t a n y d e m a n d s w h i c h the great P o w e r s o f E u r o p e m a y h a v e t o m a k e
should be m a d e matter of friendly negotiation r a t h e r t h a n of p e r e m p t o r y
d e m a n d ; t h a t military and naval d e m o n s t r a t i o n s to c o e r c e t h e Sultan should
as m u c h as possible be avoided; t h a t differences with r e s p e c t to matters
affecting T u r k e y , within the c o m p e t e n c e of the Sublime P o r t e , should be
decided after mutual c o n c e r t b e t w e e n t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , and n o t b e forced
u p o n the w e a k n e s s of the T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t . To t h e s e cautions her
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t wish to add that, in their view, it is essential t h a t t h e
Sultan should be advised to t r e a t his Christian subjects in conformity with
t h e principles of equity a n d religious freedom w h i c h prevail generally a m o n g
t h e enlightened nations o f E u r o p e . T h e m o r e t h e T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t a d o p t s
t h e rules of impartial law a n d equal administration, t h e less will t h e E m p e r o r
of R u s s i a find it n e c e s s a r y to apply t h a t exceptional p r o t e c t i o n w h i c h his
Imperial Majesty h a s found so b u r t h e n s o m e a n d inconvenient, t h o u g h no
d o u b t prescribed by d u t y and sanctioned by treaty. Y o u m a y r e a d this disp a t c h to C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e , a n d if it is desired y o u m a y yourself place a c o p y
of it in t h e h a n d s of the E m p e r o r . In t h a t c a s e y o u will a c c o m p a n y its present a t i o n with t h o s e a s s u r a n c e s of friendship a n d confidence on t h e part of her
M a j e s t y the Q u e e n , w h i c h the c o n d u c t of his Imperial M a j e s t y w a s so sure
to inspire. I am e t c , J . R u s s e l l . "
I am obliged to p o s t p o n e t h e conclusion of this analysis to my n e x t letter.
Before concluding, h o w e v e r , I will give y o u , in addition to previous c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e m o s t r e c e n t n e w s I h a v e obtained, from a source n o t otherwise accessible to t h e public, regarding t h e attitude a n d plans of Prussia.
W h e n the conflict b e t w e e n R u s s i a on the o n e h a n d , a n d the A n g l o - F r e n c h
Alliance on t h e other, already r e a c h e d a certain climax, t h e E m p e r o r N i c h o las dispatched an autograph letter to his brother-in-law at Berlin, in w h i c h
he stated that t h o u g h England and F r a n c e might do him s o m e d a m a g e at sea
he feared nothing from t h e m on land, having 600,000 soldiers r e a d y to t a k e
t h e field at t h e e n d of April. Of t h e s e he w o u l d place 200,000 at t h e disposition
of F r e d e r i c William, if the letter engaged himself to m a r c h on Paris a n d
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d e t h r o n e Louis N a p o l e o n . T h e imbecile king w a s s o m u c h t a k e n i n b y this
proposition that Manteuffel required t h r e e d a y s ' discussion to dissuade him
from taking t h e pledge. So m u c h for t h e King.
As to Herr von Manteuffel himself, t h e " g r e a t c h a r a c t e r " of w h o m t h e
5 Prussian middle classes are so p r o u d , t h e w h o l e m a n lies open, as in a
nutshell, in his secret instructions sent to Mr. B u n s e n , his E m b a s s a d o r at
L o n d o n , a t t h e same period a s t h e a b o v e R u s s i a n letter w a s received, a n d
w h i c h c a m e into my p o s s e s s i o n t h r o u g h certainly a different m a n n e r t h a n
t h a t by which Mr. B u n s e n p o s s e s s e d himself of my private letters. T h e
10 c o n t e n t s of t h e s e instructions, betraying in the arrogant ambiguity of their
style at o n c e the schoolmaster and t h e drill-sergeant, are nearly as follows:
" L o o k sharp w h e n c e the w i n d b l o w s . If y o u o b s e r v e that England is in
e a r n e s t alliance with F r a n c e , a n d d e t e r m i n e d t o p u s h o n t h e war, t a k e y o u r
stand on t h e 'integrity and i n d e p e n d e n c e ' of T u r k e y . If y o u o b s e r v e her
15 wavering in policy and disinclined to war, out with y o u r lance a n d b r e a k it
cheerfully for the h o n o r and c h a r a c t e r of t h e king, my m a s t e r and y o u r s . "
Is t h e autocrat w r o n g t h e n in treating P r u s s i a as a nonentity?
Karl Marx.
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The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence
Nr. 4050, 11. April 1854
The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence.
Although L o r d J. Russell's dispatch m a y , u p o n t h e w h o l e , be described as a
polite refusal of the C z a r ' s proposition to enter into a previous c o n c e r t on
5
t h e eventual partition of T u r k e y , t h e r e occur s o m e v e r y strange p a s s a g e s ,
to which I call t h e attention of y o u r r e a d e r s . L o r d J o h n s a y s :
"There is no sufficient reason for intimating to the Sultan t h a t he c a n n o t
k e e p p e a c e at h o m e , or p r e s e r v e friendly relations with his n e i g h b o r s . "
N o w , n o w h e r e in the confidential c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of Sir H. S e y m o u r do 10
w e meet a n allusion t o the Czar having p r o p o s e d t o intimate t o t h e Sultan
anything of the sort. We must, therefore, c o n c l u d e either that L o r d Russell,
while stimulating opposition to such a step, m e a n t to insinuate it himself, or
t h a t s o m e of Sir H a m i l t o n ' s confidential c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are s u p p r e s s e d in
t h e p a p e r s laid before t h e H o u s e . T h e m a t t e r l o o k s t h e m o r e suspicious as, 15
only 16 days later, on F e b . 25,1853, L o r d C l a r e n d o n , on his accession to the
Foreign Office, gave the following instructions to L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe:
" Y o u r Excellency will, with all the frankness a n d u n r e s e r v e that m a y be
c o n s i s t e n t with p r u d e n c e , and t h e dignity of t h e Sultan, explain t h e r e a s o n s 20
w h i c h lead H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t t o fear t h a t t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e i s
n o w in a position of peculiar danger. T h e accumulated grievances of foreign
nations w h i c h t h e P o r t e is u n a b l e or unwilling to r e d r e s s , t h e mal-administra-
tion of its own affairs, and the increasing weakness of executive power in
Turkey, h a v e c a u s e d the allies of the Porte latterly to a s s u m e a t o n e alike 25
novel a n d alarming, and which, if p e r s e v e r e d in, m a y lead to a general revolt
of the Christian subjects of the P o r t e , and p r o v e fatal to the i n d e p e n d e n c e
and integrity of t h e E m p i r e , a c a t a s t r o p h e t h a t w o u l d be deeply deplored by
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H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , b u t w h i c h it is their d u t y to r e p r e s e n t to the P o r t e
as considered probable and impending by some of t h e Great E u r o p e a n
P o w e r s . " (See the Blue B o o k s on t h e Rights and Privileges of the L a t i n a n d
G r e e k C h u r c h e s . Vol. 1, pages 81 and 82.)
W a s this n o t "intimating" to the Sultan, on t h e p a r t of England, in plain
w o r d s : " t h a t h e c a n n o t k e e p p e a c e a t h o m e o r p r e s e r v e friendly relations
with his n e i g h b o r s " ? T h e C z a r h a d told Sir H a m i l t o n in a v e r y off-hand w a y
t h a t he would not allow England to establish herself at Constantinople, b u t
that he on his part, intended to establish himself t h e r e , if n o t as proprietor,
at least as depositary. H o w d o e s L o r d J o h n reply to this impertinent ann o u n c e m e n t ? In the n a m e of G r e a t Britain he r e n o u n c e s "all intention or w i s h
t o hold C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . " H e e x a c t s n o similar pledge from t h e Czar. " T h e
position of the E m p e r o r of R u s s i a , " he says " a s depositary, b u t n o t proprietor, of Constantinople, w o u l d be e x p o s e d to n u m b e r l e s s h a z a r d s , b o t h from
the long-cherished ambition of his o w n nation a n d the jealousies of E u r o p e . "
T h e jealousies of E u r o p e , b u t n o t t h e opposition of E n g l a n d ! As to E n g l a n d ,
she w o u l d n o t allow—no—Lord J o h n Russell d a r e s not speak to R u s s i a in the
same t o n e in which R u s s i a speaks to England—she would "not be content
to see Constantinople permanently in the h a n d s of R u s s i a . " She will, t h e n ,
be c o n t e n t to see it temporarily so. In other w o r d s she fully c o n c u r s in t h e
C z a r ' s o w n p r o p o s a l . S h e will n o t allow w h a t he himself r e n o u n c e s , b u t is
p r e p a r e d to suffer w h a t he intends doing.
N o t " c o n t e n t " with installing the Czar as t h e eventual depositary of
Constantinople, L o r d J o h n Russell declares in the n a m e of t h e English
G o v e r n m e n t that " t h e y will enter into no a g r e e m e n t to provide for t h e
contingency of t h e fall of T u r k e y without previous c o m m u n i c a t i o n to R u s sia." T h a t is to say, although the Czar told Sir H. S e y m o u r that he had entered
into an agreement with Austria b e f o r e making a n y previous c o m m u n i c a t i o n
to England, she on her p a r t pledges herself to c o m m u n i c a t e with R u s s i a
previously to entering into an a g r e e m e n t with F r a n c e .
" U p o n t h e w h o l e , " says L o r d J o h n , " n o c o u r s e o f policy c a n b e a d o p t e d
m o r e wise, m o r e disinterested, m o r e beneficial t o E u r o p e t h a n t h a t which his
Imperial Majesty has so long followed."
H i s C o s s a c k M a j e s t y h a p p e n s to h a v e followed, without ever swerving
from it, the policy inaugurated at his a c c e s s i o n to the t h r o n e , and which t h e '
liberal L o r d J o h n declares to h a v e b e e n so disinterested a n d so beneficial
to Europe.
T h e ostensible and m a i n point of dispute in t h e p r e s e n t E a s t e r n c o m plication is R u s s i a ' s claim to a religious p r o t e c t o r a t e over t h e G r e e k Christians in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Czar, far from disguising his p r e t e n t i o n s ,
told Sir Hamilton plainly that " b y t r e a t y he h a s a right to w a t c h over t h o s e
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several millions," t h a t he " m a d e a m o d e r a t e a n d sparing u s e of his right,"
a n d t h a t it w a s " a t t e n d e d with obligations occasionally v e r y i n c o n v e n i e n t . "
D o e s L o r d J o h n Russell give him to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e r e exists no such
t r e a t y , a n d t h a t t h e Czar h a d n o s u c h right? T h a t h e h a d n o m o r e right t o
m e d d l e with the G r e e k subjects of T u r k e y t h a n E n g l a n d with t h e P r o t e s t a n t
5
subjects of Russia, or F r a n c e with t h e I r i s h m e n of G r e a t Britain? L e t him
a n s w e r for himself.
" H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t w i s h to add, t h a t in their view, it is essential
t h a t t h e Sultan should be advised to t r e a t his Christian subjects in conformity
with t h e principles of equity and religious fredom. *** T h e m o r e the T u r k i s h 10
G o v e r n m e n t a d o p t s the rules of equal law a n d impartial administration, t h e
less will the E m p e r o r of Russia find it n e c e s s a r y to apply that exceptional
protection which h i s Imperial Majesty h a s found so b u r d e n s o m e t h o u g h no
doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."
R u s s i a ' s exceptional protectorate o v e r the s u b j e c t s of t h e P o r t e sanctioned
by treaty! No doubt about that, says L o r d J o h n , and L o r d J o h n is an h o n e s t
m a n , a n d L o r d J o h n speaks in the n a m e of H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , and
L o r d J o h n a d d r e s s e s the A u t o c r a t himself. W h a t , t h e n , is E n g l a n d quarelling
a b o u t w i t h Russia, and w h y doubling t h e I n c o m e t a x , and troubling the world
with warlike preparation? W h a t w a s L o r d J o h n ' s business w h e n , s o m e w e e k s
ago, he arose in Parliament, with the a s p e c t s , a n d in t h e t o n e of a C a s s a n d r a ,
screaming a n d bouncing and gesticulating b o m b a s t i c imprecations against
t h e faithlessness a n d perfidy of t h e C z a r ? H a d [he] n o t himself declared to
Caesar t h a t Caesar's claims to t h e exclusive protectorate w e r e " p r e s c r i b e d
by d u t y a n d sanctioned by t r e a t y ? "
W h a t the coalition had to complain of, w a s certainly no dissimulation or
r e s e r v e of t h e C z a r ' s but, on t h e contrary, t h e i m p u d e n t familiarity with
w h i c h h e dared t o u n b o s o m himself before t h e m a n d m a k e t h e m the vessels
of his most secret designs, thus transforming t h e cabinet of Downing-st. into
a p r i v a t e cabinet in the Alexander N e w s k i . A m a n confides to y o u his int e n t i o n to m u r d e r your friend. He e n t r e a t s y o u to enter with him u p o n a
p r e v i o u s c o n c e r t a b o u t t h e b o o t y . If t h e m a n be E m p e r o r of R u s s i a and y o u
an English Minister, y o u will n o t call h i m to t h e b a r , b u t t h a n k h i m in h u m b l e
t e r m s for the great confidence placed in y o u , a n d feel h a p p y " t o acknowledge
his m o d e r a t i o n , frankness and friendly disposition," as L o r d J o h n Russell
did.
L e t u s r e t u r n t o St. Petersburg.
On t h e night of the 20th Feb.—only eight d a y s b e f o r e P r i n c e Menchikoff's
arrival at Constantinople—the A u t o c r a t c a m e up to Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r
at t h e soirée of t h e G r a n d D u c h e s s H e r e d i t a r y ' s , w h e n t h e following conv e r s a t i o n t a k e s place b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o " g e n t l e m e n : "
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The Czar:
"Well, so y o u h a v e got y o u r a n s w e r , and y o u are to bring it to me to-morrow."
Sir H a m i l t o n :
"I am to h a v e that honor, Sire, b u t y o u r M a j e s t y is a w a r e that the n a t u r e
of t h e reply is very exactly w h a t I h a d led y o u to e x p e c t . "
T h e Czar:
" S o I w a s sorry to h e a r ; b u t I think y o u r G o v e r n m e n t d o e s n o t well
u n d e r s t a n d my o b j e c t s . I am n o t so e a g e r about what shall be done when
the sick man dies, as I am to d e t e r m i n e w i t h E n g l a n d what shall not be done
u p o n t h a t e v e n t taking p l a c e . "
Sir H a m i l t o n :
" B u t , Sire, allow me to o b s e r v e that we h a v e no r e a s o n to think t h a t the
sick m a n is dying; countries do n o t die in s u c h a h u r r y . T u r k e y will r e m a i n
for m a n y a year, unless s o m e u n f o r e s e e n crisis should o c c u r . It is precisely,
Sire, for t h e avoidance of all c i r c u m s t a n c e s likely to p r o d u c e such a crisis
that Her Majesty's Government reckons upon your generous assistance."
T h e Czar:
"I will tell y o u t h a t if y o u r G o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n led to believe that Turkey
retains any elements of existence y o u r G o v e r n m e n t m u s t h a v e r e c e i v e d
i n c o r r e c t information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying; and we can
n e v e r allow s u c h a n e v e n t t o t a k e u s b y surprise. W e m u s t c o m e t o some
understanding. A n d r e m e m b e r , I do n o t a s k for a t r e a t y or a p r o t o c o l ; a
general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient.
So no m o r e for the p r e s e n t ; y o u will c o m e to me t o - m o r r o w . "
Sir H a m i l t o n " t h a n k e d His M a j e s t y v e r y cordially," b u t having hardly left
t h e Imperial saloon and r e t u r n e d h o m e , suspicion o v e r c o m e s him, he sits
d o w n a t his desk, r e p o r t s t o L o r d J o h n o n t h e conversation, and s u m s u p
his letter with t h e s e striking marginal n o t e s :
" I t c a n hardly be o t h e r w i s e b u t t h a t t h e Sovereign w h o insists with such
pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighboring State, m u s t h a v e settled
in his o w n mind that the h o u r , if n o t of its dissolution, at all e v e n t s for its
dissolution m u s t be at h a n d . * * This a s s u m p t i o n w o u l d hardly be v e n t u r e d
u p o n unless some, perhaps general, but at all events intimate understanding,
existed between Russia and Austria.
Supposing my suspicion to be well f o u n d e d , the Emperor's object is to
engage Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with his own Cabinet and
that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for
the exclusion of France from the arrangement."
This dispatch arrived at L o n d o n on the 6th of M a r c h , w h e n L o r d Russell
w a s already supplanted i n t h e Foreign Office b y L o r d Clarendon. T h e im-
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p r e s s i o n p r o d u c e d on the mind of this whining lover of T u r k e y by the
E m b a s s a d o r ' s anxious warnings is quite surprising. Being fully a w a r e of the
C z a r ' s t r e a c h e r o u s design to partition T u r k e y to the exclusion of F r a n c e , he
tells C o u n t Walewski, the F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r a t L o n d o n , that " t h e y , " i n
contradistinction to F r a n c e , " w e r e disposed to place reliance in t h e E m p e r o r
of Russia"— t h a t "a policy of suspicion w a s neither wise n o r safe"—and t h a t
"although he h o p e d the G o v e r n m e n t s of England and F r a n c e w o u l d always
act together, when their policy and their interests w e r e identical, yet he m u s t
frankly s a y t h a t the recent proceedings of the French Government were not
5
the best calculated to secure that desirable result." (See Blue B o o k s , vol. 1,
10
p p . 9 3 and 98.)
Be it also r e m a r k e d , en passant, that at the s a m e time w h e n t h e Czar
indoctrinated t h e British E m b a s s a d o r at St. P e t e r s b u r g , The Times w a s
repeating at L o n d o n , day after day, t h a t the state of T u r k e y w a s d e s p e r a t e ,
t h a t t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e w a s crumbling to pieces a n d t h a t t h e r e r e m a i n e d
nothing of it e x c e p t the p h a n t o m of "a T u r k ' s head d r e s s e d up in a t u r b a n . "
T h e morning after t h e interview at t h e Imperial soirée Sir G.H. S e y m o u r ,
according to the invitation received, waits u p o n the Czar and a "dialogue
lasting one h o u r and t w e l v e m i n u t e s " t a k e s place b e t w e e n t h e m , o n w h i c h
he r e p o r t s again in his dispatch to L o r d J . R u s s e l l , d a t e d F e b . 2 2 , 1853.
T h e E m p e r o r began by desiring Sir H a m i l t o n to r e a d to him aloud L o r d
J o h n ' s secret and confidential dispatch of the 9th of F e b r u a r y . T h e declarations c o n t a i n e d in this dispatch he declared, of c o u r s e to be v e r y satisf a c t o r y ; he " c o u l d only desire t h a t t h e y should be a little amplified." He
r e p e a t e d t h a t a T u r k i s h c a t a s t r o p h e w a s constantly impending, and
" t h a t it might be brought about at any m o m e n t , either by an external w a r ,
or by a feud b e t w e e n t h e old T u r k i s h party and t h a t of t h e ' n e w superficial
F r e n c h r e f o r m s , ' or again, by a rising of the Christians, already k n o w n to
be v e r y impatient of shaking off t h e M u s s u l m a n y o k e . "
He d o e s n o t allow the opportunity to slip w i t h o u t bringing forth his
w o r n - o u t b r a v a d o , that "if he h a d n o t stopped t h e victorious progress of
G e n . Diebitch, in 1829, the Sultan's authority w o u l d h a v e b e e n at an
end"—while it is a notorious fact, t h a t of the 200,000 m e n he h a d t h e n m a r c h e d
into T u r k e y 50,000 only r e t u r n e d to their h o m e s , a n d the r e s t of Diebitch's
a r m y would h a v e b e e n annihilated on the plains of Adrianople b u t for the
c o m b i n e d t r e a s o n of T u r k i s h P a s h a s and foreign E m b a s s a d o r s .
He insists on his not requiring a system altogether arranged b e t w e e n
E n g l a n d and Russia, as to t h e previous disposal of t h e p r o v i n c e s ruled by
t h e Sultan, and still less a formal agreement to be c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n the
t w o C a b i n e t s , b u t only some general u n d e r s t a n d i n g or e x c h a n g e of opinions,
e a c h p a r t y confidentially stating w h a t it did n o t w i s h ,
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" w h a t would be c o n t r a r y to English interests, w h a t w o u l d be contrary to
Russian interests, in order that, t h e c a s e occurring, t h e y might avoid acting
in opposition to e a c h o t h e r . "
By such a negative understanding the C z a r would obtain all he cares for:
1st, t h e breaking up of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e settled b e t w e e n E n g l a n d and
R u s s i a as a fait accompli, although in a negative and conditional form, while
it w o u l d rest with h i m so to embroil m a t t e r s as to be able to declare to
E n g l a n d , with some show of r e a s o n , that t h e contingency f o r e s e e n had
arrived. Secondly, a secret plan of action b e t w e e n E n g l a n d and Russia, h o w e v e r vague and negative, b r o u g h t about b e h i n d the b a c k and to the exclusion
of F r a n c e , and thus necessarily setting E n g l a n d and F r a n c e by the ears.
Thirdly, England being restrained by her negative pledges as to w h a t she
w o u l d not d o , he would h a v e liberty to elaborate v e r y tranquilly his o w n plan
of positive action. B e s i d e s , it is evident t h a t t w o parties agreeing as to w h a t
they will nor allow e a c h other to d o , in a given c a s e , are only settling in an
e v a s i v e w a y w h a t t h e y will. T h i s negative sort of understanding gives only
t h e greater facilites to t h e m o r e cunning of t h e t w o parties.
" P e r h a p s your M a j e s t y , " perplexed Sir H a m i l t o n m u t t e r e d , " w o u l d be
good enough to explain your o w n ideas u p o n this negative policy." T h e Czar,
after some show of c o y r e s i s t a n c e , feigns to yield u n d e r the gentle p r e s s u r e
and m a d e the following highly r e m a r k a b l e declaration:
"I will not tolerate the permanent o c c u p a t i o n of Constantinople by the
R u s s i a n s ; having said this, I will say t h a t it n e v e r shall be held by the English,
or F r e n c h , or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an a t t e m p t
at t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a Byzantine e m p i r e , or s u c h an extension of G r e e c e
as w o u l d r e n d e r her a powerful S t a t e ; still less will I p e r m i t the breaking up
of T u r k e y into little republics, asylums for t h e K o s s u t h s and Mazzinis and
other revolutionists of E u r o p e ; r a t h e r t h a n submit to a n y of t h e s e arrangements I would go to war, a n d as long as I h a v e a m a n a n d a m u s k e t left would
c a r r y it o n . "
N o B y z a n t i n e empire, n o powerful e x t e n s i o n o f G r e e c e , n o confederation
of little republics—nothing of t h e sort. W h a t , t h e n , d o e s he w a n t ? T h e r e w a s
no n e e d for t h e British E m b a s s a d o r to g u e s s . T h e E m p e r o r himself, in the
c o u r s e of t h e dialogue, b u r s t s u p o n his interlocutor with t h e following p r o p o sition:
" T h e Principalities are in fact an i n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e u n d e r my p r o t e c t i o n ;
this might so continue. Servia might receive t h e s a m e form of g o v e r n m e n t .
So again w i t h Bulgaria. T h e r e seems to be no r e a s o n w h y this province should
n o t form an i n d e p e n d e n t state. As to E g y p t , I quite u n d e r s t a n d t h e imp o r t a n c e to England of t h a t territory. I can t h e n only say, that if, in the e v e n t
of a distribution of t h e O t t o m a n succession u p o n t h e fall of t h e Empire, y o u
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should t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of Egypt, I shall h a v e no objections to offer. I w o u l d
say t h e same thing of Candía; t h a t island might suit y o u , a n d I do n o t k n o w
w h y it should n o t b e c o m e an English p o s s e s s i o n . "
T h u s he p r o v e s t h a t " i n the e v e n t of t h e dissolution of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,
it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial a r r a n g e m e n t t h a n
5
w a s c o m m o n l y b e l i e v e d . " He declares frankly w h a t he wants—the partition
of Turkey—and he gives t h e clearest possible outlines of t h a t partition; clear
as well from w h a t he reveals as from w h a t his silence c o n c e a l s . E g y p t and
C a n d i a for England. T h e Principalities, Servia a n d Bulgaria to exist as vassal
states of Russia. Turkish Croatia, Bosnia and H e r z e g o v i n a he intentionally 10
abstains from mentioning, t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d with Austria. G r e e c e t o b e
e x t e n d e d in a " n o t powerful way"—say lower T h e s s a l y a n d p a r t of Albania.
Constantinople t o b e temporarily occupied b y t h e C z a r , a n d t h e n t o b e c o m e
t h e capital of a State comprising M a c e d o n i a , T h r a c i a , a n d w h a t remains of
T u r k e y in E u r o p e . B u t w h o is to be t h e definitive p o s s e s s o r of t h a t little 15
e m p i r e , p e r h a p s t o b e aggrandized b y some portions o f Anatolia? H e k e e p s
close u p o n t h a t point, b u t it is no secret that he h a s s o m e o n e in r e s e r v e for
t h a t p o s t , viz: his younger son, w h o longs for an e m p i r e of his o w n . A n d
France—is she to receive nothing at all? P e r h a p s so. B u t n o : she is to be put
off with—who will believe it?—with Tunis. " O n e of her o b j e c t s , " he tells Sir 20
H a m i l t o n , "is t h e possession of T u n i s , " and p e r h a p s , in t h e e v e n t of a partition of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , he might be so m a g n a n i m o u s as to indulge
h e r appetite for Tunis.
T h e C z a r speaks throughout in an affected t o n e of the m o s t h a u g h t y
disdain of F r a n c e . " I t looks v e r y m u c h , " he s a y s , " a s if t h e F r e n c h Govern- 25
m e n t w e r e endeavoring to embroil us all in the E a s t . " As for himself, he
c a r e s n o t a straw a b o u t it:
" F o r his o w n part, he cared v e r y little w h a t line t h e F r e n c h might think
p r o p e r to t a k e in E a s t e r n affairs, and t h a t little m o r e t h a n a m o n t h ago he
h a d apprised the Sultan t h a t if his assistance w a s required for resisting t h e 30
m e n a c e s of t h e F r e n c h , it w a s entirely at t h e service of the Sultan!
In a w o r d , the E m p e r o r w e n t on to o b s e r v e , ' A s I before told you, all I
w a n t is a good understanding with England, and this n o t as to w h a t shall,
b u t as to w h a t shall not be done ; this point arrived at t h e English G o v e r n m e n t
and I, I and t h e English G o v e r n m e n t having entire confidence in o n e anoth- 35
e r ' s v i e w s , I care nothing a b o u t the r e s t . ' "
" B u t y o u r Majesty h a s forgotten A u s t r i a ! " exclaims Sir Hamilton.
" O h ! " replied the E m p e r o r , greatly t o his surprise, " b u t y o u m u s t u n d e r -
stand t h a t when I speak of Russia I speak of Austria as well; what suits
the one suits the other; our interests as r e g a r d s T u r k e y a r e perfectly
identical."
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W h e n h e says Russia, h e says Austria. A s t o M o n t e n e g r o , h e states e x plicitly " t h a t h e a p p r o v e d the attitude t a k e n b y t h e Austrian C a b i n e t . "
H a v i n g treated in a former c o n v e r s a t i o n t h e Sultan as the " G r a n d T u r k "
of t h e Vaudeville, he designs h i m n o w , after t h e f a s h i o n of Paul de Kock,
as "Ce monsieur. " A n d h o w forbearing did he n o t b e h a v e t o w a r d ce monsieur?He has only dispatched a Menchikoff to Constantinople. "If he c h o s e ,
he certainly could send an a r m y there—there is nothing to stop t h e m , " as he
p r o v e d afterward at Oltenitza a n d T s h e t a t e , and by bis o w n a r m y ' s glorious
r e t i r e m e n t from Kalafat.
His C o s s a c k Majesty dismissed Sir H a m i l t o n w i t h the w o r d s : "Well,
induce your G o v e r n m e n t to write again on t h e s e subjects—to write m o r e
fully, and to do so without hesitation."
On t h e 7th of M a r c h , shortly after this curious dialogue, or, rather, m o n o logue, t h e British E m b a s s a d o r is s u m m o n e d to a p p e a r before C o u n t Nesselr o d e , w h o places in his h a n d s "a v e r y confidential m e m o r a n d u m w h i c h his
Imperial Majesty h a d c a u s e d t o b e d r a w n u p , a n d w h i c h w a s intended a s a n
a n s w e r to, or a c o m m e n t u p o n , the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of L o r d J o h n R u s s e l l . "
C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e invites him t o r e a d t h e p a p e r , " w h i c h , i n fact, w a s intended
for his u s e . " Sir Hamilton, accordingly, p e r u s e s the d o c u m e n t , and he w h o
h a d not found a single w o r d of p r o t e s t against t h e M u s c o v i t e ' s elaborate
insults against F r a n c e , all of a s u d d e n t r e m b l e s at discovering t h a t " t h e
impression u n d e r w h i c h it h a s b e e n f r a m e d is an incorrect o n e ; t h a t impression being evidently that, in the disputes carried on b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d
F r a n c e , her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t h a d leant partially t o t h e latter p o w e r . "
T h e v e r y n e x t morning he hastily sends a billet-doux to C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e ,
asserting t h a t , " f a r from having inclined, as h a s b e e n stated, to F r a n c e , in
the c o u r s e of the late critical t r a n s a c t i o n s , it h a s b e e n the desire of t h e
Q u e e n ' s a d v i s e r s , to the full extent permitted (!) to a G o v e r n m e n t compelled
(!!) to o b s e r v e a neutral attitude, t h a t ample satisfaction shall be given to t h e
d e m a n d s which his Imperial M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t w e r e justified in making."
In c o n s e q u e n c e of this begging letter, Sir H a m i l t o n h a s , of c o u r s e , another
" v e r y amicable and satisfactory c o n v e r s a t i o n with t h e Chancellor," w h o
c o m f o r t s the British E m b a s s a d o r with the a s s u r a n c e t h a t h e h a d misunderstood o n e passage of the E m p e r o r ' s m e m o r a n d u m which did not intend
reproaching E n g l a n d with a n y partiality for F r a n c e . " A l l , " said C o u n t
N e s s e l r o d e , " t h a t w a s desired h e r e w a s t h a t , while appealing to the Emperor's magnanimity and feelings of justice, t h e British G o v e r n m e n t should
employ some efforts t o w a r d opening t h e e y e s of t h e F r e n c h Minister." T h e r e
is nothing w a n t e d "here " b u t E n g l a n d ' s creeping and cringing before t h e
K a l m u k , a n d assuming a t o n e of dictatory severity against the F r e n c h m a n .
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To convince the Chancellor of the conscientious m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e British
G o v e r n m e n t h a d e x e c u t e d t h e latter part of their service, Sir H a m i l t o n r e a d s
him an extract from one of L o r d J o h n Russell's d i s p a t c h e s , " a s a specimen
of t h e language held by an English Minister against t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t . "
C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e finds his boldest e x p e c t a t i o n s s u r p a s s e d . He only " r e g r e t t e d that he h a d not long ago b e e n put in p o s s e s s i o n of evidence so
5
conclusive."
T h e R u s s i a n m e m o r a n d u m in answer to L o r d J o h n ' s dispatch is described
by Sir H a m i l t o n as " o n e of the m o s t r e m a r k a b l e p a p e r s w h i c h h a v e b e e n
issued, not from the Russian Chancellery, b u t from the E m p e r o r ' s secret 10
C a b i n e t . " So it is. But it is superfluous to dwell on it, as it merely r e s u m e s
the views of the Czar as developed in his d i a l o g u e . " It i m p r e s s e s u p o n the
British G o v e r n m e n t t h a t " t h e result, w h a t e v e r it might b e , of t h e s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , should r e m a i n a secret b e t w e e n t h e t w o S o v e r e i g n s . " T h e
C z a r ' s system, it o b s e r v e s , h a s , " a s admittedby t h e English Cabinet itself,
15
b e e n always o n e of f o r b e a r a n c e " against the P o r t e . F r a n c e had adopted
a n o t h e r line of c o n d u c t , t h u s compelling R u s s i a a n d A u s t r i a to act in their
turn by intimidation. In the whole m e m o r a n d u m R u s s i a and Austria are
identified. O n e of t h e c a u s e s which might lead to the immediate downfall
of T u r k e y , is expressly stated to be t h e Question of the Holy Shrines, and
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" t h e religious sentiments of t h e o r t h o d o x G r e e k s offended by the concessions m a d e to the L a t i n s . " At the close of t h e m e m o r a n d u m " n o less
p r e c i o u s " t h a n t h e a s s u r a n c e s contained in Russell's dispatch, are declared
to be " t h e proofs of friendship and personal confidence on the part of Her
Majesty the Queen, which Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r h a d b e e n directed on this
o c c a s i o n to impart to the E m p e r o r . " T h e s e "proofs" oí Q u e e n Victoria's
allegiance to the Czar h a v e b e e n wisely withheld from the British public, but
m a y p e r h a p s , o n e of these d a y s , appear in the Journal de St. Pétersbourg.
In c o m m e n t i n g u p o n his dialogue with the E m p e r o r a n d on t h e M u s c o v i t e
m e m o r a n d u m , Sir H a m i l t o n again d r a w s the attention of his Cabinet to the
position of Austria:
" A s s u m i n g , as a certain, and n o w a c k n o w l e d g e d fact, the existence of an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r c o m p a c t b e t w e e n the t w o E m p e r o r s a s t o T u r k i s h affairs,
it b e c o m e s of the d e e p e s t importance to k n o w t h e e x t e n t of the engagements
e n t e r e d into b e t w e e n t h e m . As to the m a n n e r in w h i c h it h a s b e e n concluded,
I conjecture t h a t little d o u b t is to be entertained.
Its basis w a s , no doubt, laid at s o m e of the meetings b e t w e e n the Sovereigns which t o o k place in t h e a u t u m n ; a n d the s c h e m e h a s probably b e e n
w o r k e d o u t since under the m a n a g e m e n t of B a r o n Meyendorff, the R u s s i a n
E n v o y at t h e Austrian Court, w h o has b e e n passing t h e winter at St. P e t e r s burg, and is still h e r e . "
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D o e s the British G o v e r n m e n t on receiving t h e s e revelations, call Austria
to a c c o u n t ? N o , it finds fault with F r a n c e only. After t h e Russian invasion
of the Principalities, it appoints A u s t r i a as mediator, c h o o s e s Vienna, of all
other t o w n s , for t h e seat of t h e c o n f e r e n c e , h a n d s over to C o u n t Buoi t h e
direction of the negotiations, and to this v e r y m o m e n t continues to stultify
F r a n c e into the belief that A u s t r i a is likely to be a sincere ally in a w a r against
the Muscovite a n d for the integrity a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e , although it k n e w for longer t h a n a t w e l v e m o n t h t h a t Austria h a d
agreed to the d i s m e m b e r m e n t of that E m p i r e .
On M a r c h 19, Sir H a m i l t o n ' s r e p o r t on his dialogue with the C z a r
arrived at L o n d o n . L o r d C l a r e n d o n n o w fills t h e place of L o r d J o h n , and
continues to improve u p o n his p r e d e c e s s o r . F o u r d a y s after the receipt of
that startling communication, in which t h e C z a r no longer deigns to dissimulate, b u t frankly reveals his c o n s p i r a c y against T u r k e y and F r a n c e , t h e
noble Earl sends to Sir Hamilton t h e following dispatch:
" H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t regret t h a t t h e alarm and irritation w h i c h
prevail at Paris should h a v e i n d u c e d t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t to order their
fleet to sail for the w a t e r s of G r e e c e ; b u t t h e position in which the F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t stands in m a n y r e s p e c t s is different from t h a t of H e r M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t . T h e y h a v e not, to the knowledge of H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , a s s u r a n c e s from t h e E m p e r o r as to t h e policy he w a s determined to
follow t o w a r d T u r k e y . " (See Blue B o o k s , vol. 1, page 95.)
If the Czar had c o m m u n i c a t e d to F r a n c e also that " t h e sick m a n w a s
dying," and a complete plan for sharing his succession, F r a n c e , of c o u r s e ,
would h a v e felt neither alarm n o r hesitation as to the fate of T u r k e y , the real
objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, a n d t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a ' s imm o v a b l e determination to maintain the integrity and i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e
E m p i r e , which h e averred c o n t a i n e d " n o e l e m e n t s o f e x i s t e n c e . "
On the same 23d of M a r c h , the E a r l of C l a r e n d o n s e n d s another dispatch
to Sir Hamilton S e y m o u r , o n e not " c o o k e d " for t h e Blue B o o k s , but t h e
secret a n s w e r to the secret c o m m u n i c a t i o n from St. Petersburg. Sir Hamilton
h a d closed his report of t h e dialogue with t h e v e r y judicious suggestion:
"I might v e n t u r e to suggest t h a t some expression might be used in the
dispatch to be addressed to me which might have the effect of putting an
35
end to the further consideration, o r , at all e v e n t s , discussion of points w h i c h
it is highly desirable should n o t be r e g a r d e d as offering subject for debate. "
T h e E a r l of Clarendon, w h o feels himself the true m a n to handle hot coals,
acts in strict compliance with the C z a r ' s invitation, and in direct contravention to his o w n E m b a s s a d o r ' s warning. He c o m m e n c e s his dispatch by
40 declaring t h a t " H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t gladly comply with t h e E m p e r o r ' s wish that the subject should be further a n d frankly d i s c u s s e d . " T h e
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E m p e r o r is "entitled" to " t h e m o s t cordial declaration of o p i n i o n " on their
part, b e c a u s e of the "generous c o n f i d e n c e " placed in t h e m that t h e y will help
h i m dismembering T u r k e y , betraying F r a n c e , a n d in t h e contingency of t h e
o v e r t h r o w of the O t t o m a n rule, suppressing all possible efforts on the p a r t
of t h e Christian populations to form free a n d i n d e p e n d e n t States. " H e r
5
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , " continues the freeborn Briton, " a r e fully a w a r e
that, in t h e e v e n t of any understanding with r e f e r e n c e to future contingencies
being expedient, or indeed possible, the word of His ImperialMajesiy would
be preferable to a n y Convention t h a t could be f r a m e d . "
At all e v e n t s , his w o r d m u s t be as good as any C o n v e n t i o n t h a t could be 10
f r a m e d w i t h him, the law advisers of the British Crown having long ago
declared all treaties with Russia at an end, through violations on her part.
" H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t p e r s e v e r e in t h e belief, that T u r k e y still
p r e s e r v e s the elements of e x i s t e n c e . " To p r o v e the sincerity of t h a t belief,
t h e Earl gently a d d s :
"If t h e opinion of the E m p e r o r , t h a t the d a y s of t h e Turkish E m p i r e w e r e
n u m b e r e d , b e c a m e notorious its downfall m u s t o c c u r e v e n sooner t h a n H i s
Imperial Majesty n o w appears to e x p e c t . "
T h e Calmuk, then, has only to divulge his opinion t h a t the sick m a n is
dying, a n d t h e m a n is dead. An enviable sort of vitality this! T h e r e is w a n t e d
no blast of the t r u m p e t s of Jericho. O n e b r e a t h from the E m p e r o r ' s august
m o u t h , and t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e falls to pieces.
" H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t entirely share t h e opinion of the E m p e r o r ,
t h a t t h e occupation of Constantinople by either of t h e great P o w e r s would
be incompatible with the p r e s e n t balance of p o w e r a n d the m a i n t e n a n c e of
p e a c e i n E u r o p e , a n d m u s t a t o n c e b e regarded a s impossible; t h a t t h e r e are
no elements for t h e reconstruction of a B y z a n t i n e E m p i r e ; t h a t t h e systematic m i s g o v e r n m e n t of G r e e c e offers no e n c o u r a g e m e n t to e x t e n d its territorial d o m i n i o n ; a n d that, as rnere are no materials for provincial or communal
government, a n a r c h y would be t h e result of leaving t h e p r o v i n c e s of T u r k e y
to t h e m s e l v e s , or permitting them to form separate r e p u b l i c s . "
O b s e r v e t h a t the British Minister, p r o s t r a t e at t h e feet of his Tartar m a s t e r
a n d servilely reechoing his w o r d s , is n o t a s h a m e d e v e n to r e p e a t t h e monstrous lie t h a t in T u r k e y there are " n o elements for provincial or c o m m u n a l
g o v e r n m e n t , " while it is precisely the great d e v e l o p m e n t of c o m m u n a l and
provincial life t h a t has enabled T u r k e y to w i t h s t a n d till n o w t h e heaviest
s h o c k s b o t h from without a n d from within. By indorsing all t h e C z a r ' s
p r e m i s e s the British Ministry justifies all the conclusions he intends to draw
therefrom.
In t h e contingency of a dissolution of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e , says the gallant
Earl, " t h e only m o d e by which a pacific solution could be a t t e m p t e d would
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be t h a t of a E u r o p e a n C o n g r e s s . " B u t he is afraid of the c o n s e q u e n c e s of
s u c h a Congress—not b e c a u s e of R u s s i a n trickery, which c h e a t e d England
at t h e Congress of V i e n n a to such a d e g r e e , that N a p o l e o n at St. H e l e n a
exclaimed: " H a d h e b e e n victorious a t W a t e r l o o , h e could not h a v e i m p o s e d
5 m o r e humiliating conditions u p o n England"—but from fear of F r a n c e . " T h e
treaties of 1815 m u s t t h e n be o p e n to revision, w h e n F r a n c e might be p r e p a r e d to risk the c h a n c e s of a E u r o p e a n W a r to get rid of the obligations
w h i c h she considers injurious to h e r national h o n o r , a n d which, having b e e n
i m p o s e d by victorious e n e m i e s , are a c o n s t a n t source of irritation to h e r . "
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H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t " d e s i r e to uphold the T u r k i s h E m p i r e " n o t as
a b u l w a r k against Russia, a n d b e c a u s e its downfall w o u l d force E n g l a n d to
fight o u t w i t h R u s s i a her diametrically opposed interests in t h e E a s t . O h , n o ,
s a y s t h e E a r l : "The interests of Russia and England in the East are com-
pletely identical. "
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T h e y desire to uphold the T u r k i s h E m p i r e n o t from a n y E a s t e r n consideration at all, b u t " f r o m their conviction t h a t no great question can be
agitated in t h e E a s t without becoming a source of discord in the West." An
E a s t e r n question, t h e r e f o r e , will n o t bring a b o u t a war of the Western Powers
against Russia, b u t a w a r of the W e s t e r n P o w e r s a m o n g themselves—a war
of England against France. A n d t h e s a m e Minister w h o w r o t e , a n d his
colleagues w h o sanctioned t h e s e lines, w o u l d stultify us into the belief t h a t
t h e y are a b o u t to carry on a serious w a r with F r a n c e against Russia, and this
" o n a question agitated in t h e E a s t , " a n d although " t h e interests of England
a n d R u s s i a in the E a s t are completely identical!"
T h e b r a v e Earl goes further. W h y d o e s he fear a war with France w h i c h
he declares must be t h e " n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t " of the dissolution and dism e m b e r m e n t of t h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e ? A w a r w i t h F r a n c e considered in itself
w o u l d be a v e r y pleasant thing. B u t t h e r e is this delicate c i r c u m s t a n c e
c o n n e c t e d w i t h it,—"that e v e r y great question in the W e s t will a s s u m e a
revolutionary character, and e m b r a c e a revision of t h e entire social system,
for w h i c h t h e Continental G o v e r n m e n t s are certainly in no state of p r e p a r a tion.
T h e E m p e r o r is fully cognizant of the materials t h a t are in c o n s t a n t fermentation b e n e a t h t h e surface of society, and their readiness to b u r s t forth
e v e n in times of p e a c e ; and His Imperial M a j e s t y will probably, t h e r e f o r e ,
n o t dissent from t h e opinion t h a t t h e first c a n n o n shot m a y be t h e signal for
a - s t a t e of things m o r e disastrous e v e n t h a n t h o s e calamities w h i c h w a r
inevitably brings in its train."
H e n c e , exclaims t h e sincere p e a c e m o n g e r , " h e n c e the anxiety of H e r
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t to avert the catastrophe." If t h e r e lurked no w a r w i t h
F r a n c e b e h i n d t h e partition of T u r k e y , a n d no revolution b e h i n d t h e w a r with
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F r a n c e , H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t would be as r e a d y to swallow the Grand
Turc as his C o s s a c k Majesty.
According to the instructions received from the R u s s i a n Chancellery,
t h r o u g h t h e m e a n s of Sir H. Seymour, the gallant C l a r e n d o n winds up his
dispatch with "appealing to the E m p e r o r ' s magnanimity and feelings of
justice."
In a second dispatch of our Earl, dated April 5,. 1853, Sir H a m i l t o n is
directed to instruct the Russian Chancellor that—"Viscount Stratford de
Redcliffe w a s directed to r e t u r n to his post, a n d a special character w a s given
to his mission by an autograph letterfrom H e r Majesty, u n d e r the impression
t h a t t h e P o r t e would be better disposed to listen to moderate councils w h e n
offered by o n e of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's high position and great
k n o w l e d g e and experience of Turkish affairs, to advise t h e P o r t e to t r e a t the
Christian subjects with the u t m o s t leniency."
T h e s a m e C l a r e n d o n w h o gave his particular instructions had written in
his secret dispatch dated 23d March, 1853:
" T h e t r e a t m e n t of Christians is n o t h a r s h , a n d t h e toleration exhibited by
t h e P o r t e t o w a r d this portion of its subjects might serve as an e x a m p l e to
s o m e G o v e r n m e n t s w h o look with c o n t e m p t u p o n T u r k e y as a b a r b a r o u s
power."
In this secret dispatch it is a v o w e d that L o r d Stratford w a s sent to C o n stantinople as t h e most able and willing tool for intimidating t h e Sultan. In
t h e Ministerial p a p e r s , at the time, his errand w a s r e p r e s e n t e d as a strong
d e m o n s t r a t i o n against the C z a r , t h a t n o b l e m a n having long since played the
p a r t of R u s s i a ' s personal antagonist.
T h e series of secret d o c u m e n t s laid before the H o u s e concludes w i t h the
R u s s i a n m e m o r a n d u m wherein Nicholas congratulates himself on perceiving
t h a t his views and those of the English Cabinet entirely coincide on the
subject of t h e political combinations which it w o u l d be chiefly n e c e s s a r y to
avoid in the e x t r e m e case of the contingency occurring in the East.
T h e m e m o r a n d u m is d a t e d t h e 15th April, 1853. It asserts " t h a t t h e b e s t
m e a n s of upholding t h e duration of the Turkish G o v e r n m e n t is not to harass
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it by overwhelming demands supported in a manner humiliating to its independence and its dignity." This w a s exactly t h e time of action of t h e Menchikoff c o m e d y , w h o , on the 19th of April, sent in his i m p u d e n t " v e r b a l 35
n o t e , " a n d u s e d "language fortunately v e r y r a r e in diplomacy"—as declared
by the Earl of Clarendon in t h e H o u s e of L o r d s . T h e m o r e firmly w a s his
lordship convinced of the C z a r ' s determination to gently manage t h e sick
m a n . H i s conviction grows yet stronger w h e n t h e Principalities are invaded
by t h e Cossack.
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T h e Coalition Cabinet have discovered b u t o n e hole to slip t h r o u g h from
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t h e s e branding d o c u m e n t s . T h e ostensible object of Prince Menchikoff's
mission, t h e y say, w a s the question of t h e H o l y Shrines, while the c o m munications about the partition of T u r k e y only related to an u n c e r t a i n a n d
distant e p o c h . B u t the Czar h a d plainly told t h e m in his first m e m o r a n d u m
that t h e question of T u r k e y ' s downfall w a s " b y no m e a n s an idle a n d imagin a r y question, a contingency too r e m o t e ; " t h a t the English Ministry w e r e
w r o n g " i n perceiving in the t w o q u e s t i o n s of M o n t e n e g r o and t h e H o l y
Shrines m e r e disputes w h i c h w o u l d n o t differ in their bearing from difficulties w h i c h form the ordinary b u s i n e s s of d i p l o m a c y , " and that the
question of the H o l y Shrines might " t a k e a m o s t serious t u r n , " and lead to
t h e " c a t a s t r o p h e . " T h e y h a d admitted t h e m s e l v e s , n o t only t h a t h e w a s
w r o n g e d in the affair of t h e H o l y Shrines, b u t t h a t he h a d "a right, sanctioned
by treaty, to the exceptional p r o t e c t i o n " of eleven millions of t h e Sultan's
subjects. W h e n , t h e r e f o r e , t h e y failed in pressing t h e P o r t e into the acc e p t a n c e of the Menchikoff d e m a n d s , t h e Czar acted according to t h e spirit
of the m e m o r a n d u m of 1844, to their o w n a g r e e m e n t with him, a n d to his
verbal declaration to Sir G. H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r , t h a t " h e would not be trifled
w i t h , " w h e n he p r e p a r e d to p u t ce monsieur to d e a t h . T h e r e is no question
as to w h e t h e r he is in t h e right against t h e m ; t h e only question is, w h e t h e r
t h e y be not, e v e n at this m o m e n t , "all r i g h t " w i t h him. So m u c h m u s t be clear
to w h o e v e r closely p e r u s e s t h o s e d o c u m e n t s , t h a t , if this scandalous Ministry
r e m a i n in office, the English p e o p l e m a y be driven, by the m e r e influence
of external complications, into a terrible revolution, sweeping a w a y , at o n c e ,
T h r o n e , Parliament and the governing classes, w h o h a v e lost the faculty and
t h e will to maintain E n g l a n d ' s position in t h e world.
In challenging, by t h e Sr. Petersburg Gazette, t h e Coalition to p r o d u c e t h e
secret proofs of their o w n infamy N i c h o l a s p r o v e d t r u e to his k n o w n dictum:
" J e hais c e u x qui m e résistent: j e méprise c e u x qui m e s e r v e n t . "
Karl Marx.
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Declaration of W a r On the History of the Eastern Question
Nr. 4054, 15. April, 1854
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , M a r c h 28, 1854.
W a r has at length b e e n declared. T h e Royal M e s s a g e w a s read y e s t e r d a y in
b o t h H o u s e s o f Parliament; b y L o r d A b e r d e e n i n t h e L o r d s , a n d b y L o r d
J. Russell in the C o m m o n s . It describes the m e a s u r e s a b o u t to be t a k e n as
" a c t i v e steps to o p p o s e t h e e n c r o a c h m e n t s of Russia u p o n T u r k e y . " T o - m o r r o w The London Gazette will publish the official notification of w a r , and
on Friday the address in reply to t h e message will b e c o m e the subject of t h e
Parliamentary d e b a t e s .
Simultaneously with the English declaration, L o u i s N a p o l e o n has c o m m u n i c a t e d a similar message to his S e n a t e a n d Corps Législatif.
T h e declaration of war against Russia could no longer be delayed, after
Captain Blackwood, the bearer of t h e Anglo-French ultimatissimum to t h e
C z a r , had returned, on Saturday last, with the a n s w e r t h a t Russia would give
to that p a p e r no a n s w e r all. T h e mission of Capt. B l a c k w o o d , h o w e v e r , has
n o t b e e n altogether a gratuitous o n e . It has afforded to Russia the m o n t h of
M a r c h , t h a t most dangerous e p o c h of the year, to Russian arms.
T h e publication of the secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e Czar and the
English G o v e r n m e n t , instead of provoking a b u r s t of public indignation
against t h e latter, has—incredibile dictu—been t h e signal for the p r e s s , b o t h
weekly a n d daily, for congratulating England on t h e p o s s e s s i o n of so truly
national a Ministry. I understand, h o w e v e r , t h a t a meeting will be called
together for t h e p u r p o s e of opening the e y e s of a blinded British public on
the real c o n d u c t of the G o v e r n m e n t . It is to be held on T h u r s d a y n e x t in the
Music Hall, Store-st.; and L o r d P o n s o n b y , Mr. L a y a r d , Mr. U r q u h a r t , etc.,
are e x p e c t e d to take p a r t in the proceedings.
T h e Hamburger Correspondent h a s t h e following:
" A c c o r d i n g to advices from St. Petersburg, w h i c h arrived h e r e on the 16th
inst., t h e Russian G o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e s to publish various other d o c u m e n t s
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Declaration of War—On the History of the Eastern Question
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on the E a s t e r n question. A m o n g the d o c u m e n t s destined for publication are
some letters written by Prince A l b e r t . "
It is a curious fact that the same evening on w h i c h the royal m e s s a g e w a s
delivered in t h e C o m m o n s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t suffered their first defeat in t h e
p r e s e n t session; t h e second reading of the P o o r Settlement and R e m o v a l bill
having, notwithstanding t h e efforts of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , b e e n adjourned to
the 28th of April, by a division of 209 to 183. T h e p e r s o n to w h o m t h e
G o v e r n m e n t is indebted for this defeat, is no other t h a n my L o r d Palmerston.
" H i s l o r d s h i p , " says The Times of this d a y , " h a s managed to p u t himself
a n d his colleagues b e t w e e n t w o fires (the Tories and t h e Irish party) without
m u c h p r o s p e c t of leaving t h e m to settle it b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s . "
We are informed t h a t on t h e 12th i n s t , a t r e a t y of triple-alliance w a s
signed b e t w e e n F r a n c e , E n g l a n d a n d T u r k e y , b u t that, notwithstanding t h e
personal application of the Sultan to the G r a n d Mufti, the latter supported
by t h e corps of t h e U l e m a s , refused to issue his ferva sanctioning the stipulation a b o u t t h e changes in the situation of t h e Christians in T u r k e y , as being
in contradiction with the p r e c e p t s of t h e K o r a n . This intelligence must be
l o o k e d u p o n a s being the m o r e important, a s i t c a u s e d L o r d D e r b y t o m a k e
t h e following observation:
"I will only e x p r e s s my e a r n e s t anxiety t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t will state
w h e t h e r t h e r e is any t r u t h in t h e r e p o r t t h a t h a s b e e n circulated during t h e
last few d a y s , that in this c o n v e n t i o n e n t e r e d into b e t w e e n England, F r a n c e
a n d T u r k e y , t h e r e are articles w h i c h will be of a n a t u r e to establish a p r o t e c t o r a t e on our p a r t as objectionable at least, as t h a t w h i c h , on the p a r t of
Russia, we h a v e p r o t e s t e d against."
The Times of to-day, while declaring t h a t t h e policy of the G o v e r n m e n t
is directly o p p o s e d to t h a t of L o r d D e r b y a d d s : " W e should deeply regret
if the bigotry of the Mufti or the U l e m a s s u c c e e d e d in opposing any serious
resistance to this p o l i c y . "
In order to u n d e r s t a n d b o t h t h e n a t u r e of the relations b e t w e e n t h e T u r k i s h
G o v e r n m e n t and t h e spiritual authorities of T u r k e y , a n d t h e difficulties in
w h i c h the former is at p r e s e n t involved, w i t h r e s p e c t to the question of a
p r o t e c t o r a t e over the Christian subjects of the P o r t e , t h a t question w h i c h
ostensibly lies at t h e b o t t o m of all t h e actual complications in the E a s t , it
is n e c e s s a r y to cast a r e t r o s p e c t i v e glance at its p a s t history a n d development.
T h e K o r a n and the M u s s u l m a n legislation e m a n a t i n g from it r e d u c e t h e
geography a n d e t h n o g r a p h y of t h e v a r i o u s people to t h e simple a n d convenient distinction of t w o nations a n d of t w o c o u n t r i e s ; t h o s e of the Faithful
a n d of the Infidels. T h e Infidel is "harby, " i.e. t h e e n e m y . Islamism p r o scribes the nation of the Infidels, constituting a state of p e r m a n e n t hostility
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b e t w e e n t h e M u s s u l m a n and t h e unbeliever. I n t h a t sense t h e corsair-ships
of the Berber States w e r e the holy fleet of the Islam. H o w , then, is the
e x i s t e n c e of Christian subjects of t h e P o r t e to be reconciled with the
Koran?
"If a t o w n , " says the M u s s u l m a n legislation, " s u r r e n d e r s by capitulation,
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a n d its habitants c o n s e n t to b e c o m e rayahs, t h a t is, subjects of a M u s s u l m a n
prince w i t h o u t abandoning their creed, t h e y h a v e to p a y the kharatch (capitation t a x ) , w h e n t h e y obtain a truce with t h e faithful, a n d it is n o t permitted
any m o r e t o confiscate their estates t h a n t o t a k e a w a y their h o u s e s . . . . I n
this c a s e their old c h u r c h e s form p a r t of their p r o p e r t y , with permission to 10
w o r s h i p therein. B u t they are n o t allowed t o e r e c t n e w o n e s . T h e y h a v e only
authority for repairing t h e m , a n d to r e c o n s t r u c t their d e c a y e d portions. At
certain e p o c h s commissaries delegated by the provincial g o v e r n o r s are to
visit t h e c h u r c h e s a n d sanctuaries of t h e Christians, in order to ascertain t h a t
no n e w buildings have b e e n a d d e d u n d e r p r e t e x t of repairs. If a t o w n is 15
c o n q u e r e d by force, t h e inhabitants retain their c h u r c h e s , b u t only as places
of a b o d e or refuge, without permission to w o r s h i p . "
Constantinople having surrendered by capitulation, as in like m a n n e r has
t h e greater portion of E u r o p e a n T u r k e y , the Christians t h e r e enjoy t h e
privilege of living as rayahs, u n d e r the T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t . This privilege
t h e y h a v e exclusively by virtue of their agreeing to a c c e p t t h e M u s s u l m a n
protection. It is, therefore, owing to this c i r c u m s t a n c e alone, t h a t t h e Christians submit to be g o v e r n e d by the M u s s u l m a n s according to M u s s u l m a n law,
t h a t the patriarch of Constantinople, their spiritual chief, is at t h e same time
their political representative and their Chief Justice. W h e r e v e r , in t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , we find an agglomeration of G r e e k rayahs, the A r c h b i s h o p s
a n d B i s h o p s are by law m e m b e r s of t h e Municipal Councils, and, u n d e r the
direction of the patriarch, [watch] over the repartition of the t a x e s imposed
u p o n t h e G r e e k s . T h e patriarch i s responsible t o t h e P o r t e a s t o the c o n d u c t
of his co-religionists. I n v e s t e d with t h e right of judging the r a y a h s of his
C h u r c h , he delegates this right to the metropolitans and b i s h o p s , in t h e limits
of their d i o c e s e s , their sentences being obligatory for the executive officers,
k a d i s , etc., of t h e Porte to c a r r y out. T h e p u n i s h m e n t s which t h e y h a v e t h e
right to p r o n o u n c e are fines, imprisonment, t h e b a s t i n a d e , and exile. B e sides, their o w n c h u r c h gives t h e m t h e p o w e r of e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n d e p e n d e n t of the p r o d u c e of the fines, t h e y receive variable t a x e s on the civil
and commercial law-suits. E v e r y hierarchic scale a m o n g the clergy h a s its
m o n e y e d price. T h e patriarch p a y s to the Divan a h e a v y tribute in order to
obtain his investiture, b u t he sells, in his t u r n , t h e archbishoprics a n d b i s h o p rics to the clergy of his w o r s h i p . T h e latter indemnify t h e m s e l v e s by the sale
of subaltern dignities and the tribute e x a c t e d from t h e p o p e s . T h e s e , again,
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sell by retail the p o w e r t h e y h a v e b o u g h t from their superiors, and traffic
in all acts of their ministry, s u c h as b a p t i s m s , marriages, divorces, and testaments.
It is evident from this exposé that this fabric of t h e o c r a c y over t h e G r e e k
Christians of T u r k e y , a n d the whole structure of their society, has its k e y stone in the subjection of the r a y a h u n d e r the K o r a n , w h i c h , in its turn, by
treating t h e m as infidels—i.e., as a nation only in areligious sense—sanctioned
the combined spiritual and temporal p o w e r of their priests. Then, if you
abolish their subjection u n d e r t h e K o r a n by a civil emancipation, y o u cancel
at t h e same time their subjection to t h e clergy, and p r o v o k e a revolution in
their social, political a n d religious relations, which, in the first instance, must
inevitably h a n d t h e m over to Russia, If y o u supplant the K o r a n by a code
civil, you m u s t occidentalize t h e entire structure of B y z a n t i n e society.
Having described t h e relations b e t w e e n t h e M u s s u l m a n a n d his Christian
subject, the question arises, w h a t a r e t h e relations b e t w e e n the M u s s u l m a n
a n d t h e unbelieving foreigner?
As the K o r a n treats all foreigners as f o e s , n o b o d y will d a r e to p r e s e n t himself in a M u s s u l m a n c o u n t r y without having t a k e n his precautions. T h e first
E u r o p e a n m e r c h a n t s , therefore, w h o risked the c h a n c e s o f c o m m e r c e w i t h
s u c h a people, contrived to secure t h e m s e l v e s an exceptional t r e a t m e n t a n d
privileges originally p e r s o n a l , b u t afterward e x t e n d e d to their w h o l e nation.
H e n c e the origin of capitulations. Capitulations are imperial diplomas, letters
of privilege, o c t r o y e d by the P o r t e to different E u r o p e a n nations, and authorizing their subjects to freely e n t e r M o h a m m e d a n countries, and t h e r e to pursue in tranquillity their affairs, a n d to practice their w o r s h i p . T h e y differ from
treaties in this essential point t h a t t h e y are not reciprocal acts contradictorily
d e b a t e d b e t w e e n the contracting p a r t i e s , a n d a c c e p t e d b y t h e m o n the
condition of mutual a d v a n t a g e s a n d c o n c e s s i o n s . On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e capitulations are one-sided c o n c e s s i o n s on the p a r t of the G o v e r n m e n t granting
t h e m , in c o n s e q u e n c e of which t h e y m a y be r e v o k e d at its pleasure. T h e Porte
h a s , indeed, at several times nullified the privileges granted to o n e nation,
by extending t h e m to o t h e r s ; or repealed t h e m altogether by refusing to
continue their application. This p r e c a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r of the capitulations
m a d e t h e m an eternal source of d i s p u t e s , of complaints on t h e part of
E m b a s s a d o r s , and of a prodigious e x c h a n g e of contradictory n o t e s and
firmans revived at the c o m m e n c e m e n t of e v e r y n e w reign.
It w a s from t h e s e capitulations t h a t a r o s e t h e right of a protectorate of
foreign p o w e r s , not over the Christian subjects of t h e Porte—the rayahs—but
over their co-religionists visiting T u r k e y or residing t h e r e as foreigners. T h e
first p o w e r that obtained s u c h a P r o t e c t o r a t e w a s F r a n c e . T h e capitulations
b e t w e e n F r a n c e and the O t t o m a n P o r t e m a d e in 1535, u n d e r Soliman the
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G r e a t a n d F r a n c i s I; in 1604 u n d e r A h m e t I, and H e n r i I V ; and in 1673 u n d e r
M o h a m m e d I V and Louis X I V , w e r e r e n e w e d , confirmed, recapitulated, a n d
a u g m e n t e d in the compilation of 1740, called " a n c i e n t a n d r e c e n t capitulations a n d treaties b e t w e e n the C o u r t of F r a n c e a n d t h e O t t o m a n P o r t e ,
r e n e w e d and a u g m e n t e d in the y e a r 1740, A . D . , a n d 1153 of the Hedgra,
translated (the first official translation sanctioned by t h e Porte) at Constantinople by M . D e v a l , Secretary I n t e r p r e t e r of t h e King, a n d his first
D r a g o m a n at the O t t o m a n P o r t e . " Art. 32 of this a g r e e m e n t constitutes t h e
right of F r a n c e to a p r o t e c t o r a t e over all m o n a s t e r i e s professing t h e F r a n k
religion to w h a t e v e r nation t h e y m a y belong, and of the F r a n k visitors of
t h e H o l y Places.
R u s s i a w a s the first p o w e r that, in 1774, inserted the capitulation, imitated
after t h e e x a m p l e of F r a n c e , into a treaty—the t r e a t y of Kainardji. T h u s , in
1802, N a p o l e o n thought fit to m a k e the existence a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of the
capitulation t h e subject of an article of treaty, and to give it the c h a r a c t e r
of synallagmatic contract.
In w h a t relation t h e n d o e s the question of the H o l y Places stand with the
Protectorate?
T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e H o l y Shrines is the question of a p r o t e c t o r a t e over
t h e religious G r e e k Christian communities settled at J e r u s a l e m , and over t h e
buildings p o s s e s s e d by t h e m on the holy ground, a n d especially over the
C h u r c h of t h e H o l y Sepulcher. It is to be u n d e r s t o o d t h a t possession h e r e
d o e s n o t m e a n proprietorship, w h i c h is denied to the Christians by the K o r a n ,
b u t only t h e right of usufruct. This right of usufruct e x c l u d e s by no m e a n s
t h e other communities from worshipping in t h e same p l a c e ; t h e p o s s e s s o r s
having no other privilege besides that of keeping t h e keys, of repairing and
entering t h e edifices, of kindling the holy l a m p , of cleaning t h e r o o m s w i t h
t h e b r o o m , a n d of spreading t h e c a r p e t s , which is an Oriental symbol of
p o s s e s s i o n . In the same m a n n e r n o w , in w h i c h Christianity culminates at the
H o l y P l a c e , the question of the p r o t e c t o r a t e is t h e r e found to h a v e its highest
ascension.
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P a r t s of the H o l y Places and of the C h u r c h of t h e H o l y Sepulcher are
p o s s e s s e d b y t h e L a t i n s , t h e G r e e k s , the A r m e n i a n s , t h e Abyssinians, the
Syrians, a n d t h e C o p t s . B e t w e e n all t h e s e diverse p r e t e n d e n t e there originated a conflict. T h e sovereigns of E u r o p e w h o saw, in this religious quarrel, 35
a question of their respective influences in t h e Orient, a d d r e s s e d t h e m s e l v e s
in t h e first instance to the masters of t h e soil, to fanatic and greedy P a s h a s ,
w h o abused their position. T h e O t t o m a n P o r t e a n d its agents adopting a m o s t
t r o u b l e s o m e système de bascule gave j u d g m e n t in t u r n s f a v o r a b l e to t h e
L a t i n s , G r e e k s , and A r m e n i a n s , asking and receiving gold from all h a n d s , 40
a n d laughing at e a c h of them. H a r d l y had t h e T u r k s g r a n t e d a firman, ac-
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knowledging the right of the L a t i n s to the p o s s e s s i o n of a c o n t e s t e d p l a c e ,
w h e n t h e A r m e n i a n s p r e s e n t e d t h e m s e l v e s with a heavier p u r s e , a n d instantly obtained a contradictory firman. S a m e tactics with r e s p e c t to t h e
G r e e k s , w h o k n e w , b e s i d e s , as officially r e c o r d e d in different firmans of t h e
P o r t e and "hudjets " (judgments) of its agents, h o w to p r o c u r e false a n d
a p o c r y p h titles. On other occasions t h e decisions of t h e Sultan's G o v e r n m e n t
w e r e frustrated by the cupidity and ill-will of the P a s h a s and subaltern agents
in Syria. T h e n it b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y to r e s u m e negotiations, to appoint fresh
commissaries, and to m a k e n e w sacrifices of m o n e y . W h a t the P o r t e formerly
did from pecuniary considerations, in our d a y s it has d o n e from fear, with
a view to obtain p r o t e c t i o n a n d favor. H a v i n g d o n e justice to the r e c l a m a tions of F r a n c e and t h e L a t i n s , it h a s t e n e d to m a k e t h e same conditions to
R u s s i a and the G r e e k s , thus attempting to e s c a p e from a storm which it felt
p o w e r l e s s to encounter. T h e r e is no s a n c t u a r y , no chapel, no stone of t h e
C h u r c h of t h e H o l y Sepulcher, that h a d b e e n left u n t u r n e d for t h e purp o s e of constituting a quarrel b e t w e e n t h e different Christian c o m m u n i ties.
A r o u n d t h e H o l y Sepulcher we find an a s s e m b l a g e of all the various sects
of Christianity, behind the religious pretensions of w h o m are concealed as
m a n y political and national rivalries.
Jerusalem and the H o l y Places are inhabited b y nations professing r e ligions: t h e Latins, the G r e e k s , A r m e n i a n s , C o p t s , Abyssinians, and Syrians.
T h e r e are 2,000 G r e e k s , 1,000 L a t i n s , 350 A r m e n i a n s , 100 C o p t s , 20 Syrians,
a n d 20
Abyssinians—3,490.
In
the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e we find
13,730,000 G r e e k s , 2,400,000 A r m e n i a n s , a n d 900,000 L a t i n s . E a c h of t h e s e
is again subdivided. T h e G r e e k C h u r c h , of w h i c h I t r e a t e d a b o v e , t h e o n e
acknowledging the Patriarch of Constantinople, essentially differs from the
Greco-Russian, w h o s e chief spiritual authority is the C z a r ; and from the
H e l l e n s , of w h o m the K i n g and the S y n o d of A t h e n s are t h e chief authorities.
Similarly, t h e Latins are subdivided into t h e R o m a n Catholics, U n i t e d
G r e e k s , and Maronites ; and the A r m e n i a n s into Gregorian and L a t i n A r m e n i ans—the same distinctions holding g o o d with t h e C o p t s a n d Abyssinians. T h e
t h r e e prevailing religious nationalities at the H o l y Places are the G r e e k s , t h e
L a t i n s , a n d t h e A r m e n i a n s . T h e L a t i n C h u r c h m a y b e said t o r e p r e s e n t
principally L a t i n r a c e s , t h e G r e e k C h u r c h , Slave, T u r k o - S l a v e , and Hellenic
r a c e s ; and t h e other c h u r c h e s , Asiatic a n d African r a c e s .
Imagine all t h e s e conflicting p e o p l e s beleaguering the H o l y Sepulcher, the
battle c o n d u c t e d by t h e m o n k s , and t h e ostensible object of their rivalry
being a star from t h e grotto of B e t h l e h e m , a tapestry, a key of a sanctuary,
an altar, a shrine, a chair, a cushion—any ridiculous p r e c e d e n c e !
In order to u n d e r s t a n d such a monastical c r u s a d e it is indispensable to
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c o n s i d e r firstly the m a n n e r of their living, and secondly, the m o d e of thenhabitation.
"All the religious rubbish of the different n a t i o n s , " says a r e c e n t traveler,
"live at Jerusalem separated from e a c h other, hostile a n d j e a l o u s , a n o m a d
population, incessantly recruited by pilgrimage or d e c i m a t e d by the plague
a n d o p p r e s s i o n s . T h e E u r o p e a n dies o r returns t o E u r o p e after s o m e y e a r s ;
t h e p a s h a s a n d their guards go to D a m a s c u s or C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; a n d the A r a b s
fly to t h e desert. J e r u s a l e m is b u t a place w h e r e e v e r y o n e arrives to pitch
his tent and w h e r e n o b o d y r e m a i n s . E v e r y b o d y in t h e holy city gets his
livelihood from his religion—the G r e e k s or A r m e n i a n s from t h e 12,000 or
13,000 pilgrims w h o yearly visit Jerusalem, and the L a t i n s from the subsidies
a n d alms of their co-religionists of F r a n c e , Italy, e t c . "
B e s i d e s their monasteries a n d sanctuaries, the Christian nations p o s s e s s
at J e r u s a l e m small habitations or cells, a n n e x e d to t h e C h u r c h of t h e H o l y
Sepulcher, a n d occupied by the m o n k s , w h o h a v e to w a t c h d a y a n d night t h a t
holy a b o d e . At certain periods t h e s e m o n k s are relieved in their duty by their
b r e t h r e n . T h e s e cells h a v e b u t one d o o r , opening into t h e interior of t h e
T e m p l e , while t h e m o n k guardians receive their food from without, t h r o u g h
s o m e wicket. T h e d o o r s of the C h u r c h are closed, and g u a r d e d by T u r k s ,
w h o d o n ' t o p e n t h e m e x c e p t for m o n e y , a n d close it according to their caprice
or cupidity.
T h e quarrels b e t w e e n c h u r c h m e n are the m o s t v e n o m o u s , said M a z a r i n .
N o w fancy t h e s e c h u r c h m e n , w h o not only h a v e to live u p o n , b u t live in,
t h e s e sanctuaries together!
To finish the picture, be it r e m e m b e r e d that the fathers of the L a t i n
C h u r c h , almost exclusively c o m p o s e d of R o m a n s , Sardinians, N e a p o l i t a n s ,
Spaniards a n d A u s t r i a n s , are all of t h e m jealous of t h e F r e n c h p r o t e c t o r a t e ,
a n d w o u l d like to substitute t h a t of Austria, Sardinia or N a p l e s , t h e Kings
of t h e t w o latter countries b o t h assuming t h e title of K i n g of J e r u s a l e m ; a n d
t h a t t h e s e d e n t a r y population of Jerusalem n u m b e r s a b o u t 15,500 souls, of
w h o m 4,000 are M u s s u l m a n s and 8,000 J e w s . T h e M u s s u l m a n s , forming
a b o u t a f o u r t h p a r t of the whole, and consisting of T u r k s , A r a b s a n d M o o r s ,
a r e , of c o u r s e , the m a s t e r s in e v e r y r e s p e c t , as t h e y are in no w a y affected
with t h e w e a k n e s s of their G o v e r n m e n t at Constantinople. N o t h i n g equals
t h e m i s e r y and the sufferings of the J e w s at J e r u s a l e m , inhabiting t h e m o s t
filthy q u a r t e r of the t o w n , called hareth-el-yahoud, in t h e q u a r t e r of dirt,
b e t w e e n t h e Zion and the Moriah, w h e r e their synagogues are situated—the
c o n s t a n t objects of M u s s u l m a n o p p r e s s i o n and intolerance, insulted by the
G r e e k s , p e r s e c u t e d by the L a t i n s , and living only u p o n the scanty alms
t r a n s m i t t e d by their E u r o p e a n brethren. T h e J e w s , h o w e v e r , are not natives,
b u t from different and distant countries, and are only attracted to Jerusalem
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by the desire of inhabiting the Valley of J e h o s a p h a t , a n d to die in the v e r y
places w h e r e the r e d e m p t o r is to be e x p e c t e d . " A t t e n d i n g their d e a t h , " says
a F r e n c h author, " t h e y suffer a n d p r a y . Their regards t u r n e d to t h a t m o u n t a i n
of Moriah, w h e r e o n c e r o s e the t e m p l e of S a l o m o n , and w h i c h t h e y d a r e n o t
5
a p p r o a c h , t h e y shed t e a r s on t h e misfortunes of Zion, and their dispersion
o v e r the w o r l d . " T o m a k e t h e s e J e w s m o r e miserable, E n g l a n d and P r u s s i a
appointed, in 1840, an Anglican b i s h o p at J e r u s a l e m , w h o s e a v o w e d object
is their conversion. He w a s dreadfully t h r a s h e d in 1845, and sneered at alike
b y J e w s , Christians a n d T u r k s . H e m a y , i n fact, b e stated t o h a v e b e e n t h e
10 first and only c a u s e of a union b e t w e e n all t h e religions at Jerusalem.
It will n o w be u n d e r s t o o d w h y t h e c o m m o n w o r s h i p of the Christians at
'
t h e H o l y Places resolves itself into a c o n t i n u a n c e of d e s p e r a t e Irish r o w s
b e t w e e n the diverse sections of the faithful; b u t that, on the other hand, t h e s e
sacred r o w s merely c o n c e a l a p r o f a n e battle, n o t only of nations b u t of r a c e s ;
15
and t h a t the P r o t e c t o r a t e of the H o l y Places w h i c h a p p e a r s ridiculous to t h e
Occident b u t all important to t h e Orientals is o n e of t h e p h a s e s of the Oriental
question incessantly r e p r o d u c e d , c o n s t a n t l y stifled, b u t n e v e r solved.
Karl M a r x .
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The Fortress of Kronstadt
| i | The Fortress of Kronstadt.
E v e r since Sir C h a r l e s N a p i e r set sail for t h e Baltic, w i t h t h e F i r s t L o r d of
t h e A d m i r a l t y ' s "full p e r m i s s i o n t o d e c l a r e w a r " , t h e m o r e sanguine p o r t i o n
of t h e British public e x p e c t shortly to h e a r of K r o n s t a d t b o m b a r d e d , t h e
a p p r o a c h e s t o St. P e t e r s b u r g forced, a n d w h o k n o w s ? p e r h a p s e v e n t h e
5
U n i o n J a c k hoisted o n t h e glittering spire o f t h e R u s s i a n A d m i r a l t y P a l a c e .
T h e r e is a v e r y c o r r e c t idea at t h e b o t t o m of t h e s e a n t i c i p a t i o n s ; it is this,
t h a t K r o n s t a d t is t h e decisive point for a n y naval a t t a c k against Russia in
t h e Baltic. T a k e K r o n s t a d t , and St. P e t e r s b u r g i s a t y o u r feet, t h e R u s s i a n
N a v y exists no longer, a n d Russia is r e d u c e d to w h a t s h e w a s before P e t e r
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t h e G r e a t . If E n g l a n d has t h e forces in t h e Baltic r e q u i r e d for s u c h a feat,
a n d if t h e s e forces should fritter a w a y their s t r e n g t h in a t t a c k s against m i n o r
p o i n t s , m o r e t h a n might b e absolutely n e c e s s a r y , t h e y w o u l d c o m m i t a
b l u n d e r of t h e first m a g n i t u d e , decisive in its effects p e r h a p s for t w o or t h r e e
c a m p a i g n s to c o m e . B u t if we k n o w t h e vital i m p o r t a n c e of K r o n s t a d t , t h e
15
R u s s i a n s k n o w it also, a n d h a v e a c t e d up to their k n o w l e d g e . T h a t k e y of
R u s s i a h a s b e e n s u r r o u n d e d b y double ί i d triple a r m o u r , bristling w i t h
s o m e t h i n g like a t h o u s a n d guns.
It is well k n o w n t h a t K r o n s t a d t t a k e s up t h e S o u t h E a s t e r n angle of a small
island, a b o u t five miles in length, w h i c h closes up t h e n a r r o w i n g p o r t i o n of
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t h e Gulf of F i n l a n d , a b o u t 16 miles from t h e m o u t h of t h e N e v a . T h e w a t e r
on b o t h sides of t h e island is generally v e r y shallow, leaving only t w o c h a n
nels navigable for sea-going vessels. T h e o n e p a s s i n g t o t h e n o r t h o f t h e island
h a s a d e p t h of n o t less t h a n four f a t h o m s a b o u t t w o or t h r e e miles distant
from its n o r t h e r n s h o r e , b e n d s r o u n d at four miles from its e a s t e r n e x t r e m i t y ,
a p p r o a c h i n g this latter to within 1400 y a r d s , b u t losing a b o u t a f a t h o m in its
d e p t h of w a t e r . T h u s t h e w h o l e of t h e n o r t h e a s t e r n c o a s t of t h e island is
o u t of c a n n o n r a n g e for a n y men-of-war c o m i n g r o u n d by this c h a n n e l ,
e x c e p t e d t h e w e s t e r n and e a s t e r n extremities only. T h e s e alone are t h e r e f o r e
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fortified, t h e first by t h e F o r t s Katharine, Alexanderand Michael, t h e s e c o n d
by the walls of the t o w n itself a n d by t w o batteries erected on the s a n d s ,
a b o u t 1000 y a r d s in a d v a n c e ; t h e larger o n e of t h e s e batteries, h o w e v e r , is
r e p o r t e d to be in ruins. A b r e a s t of the n o r t h s h o r e of the island, b e t w e e n
5 its eastern a n d w e s t e r n defences, a n d fully a mile from t h e j|2| shore, a n o t h e r
b a t t e r y is c o n s t r u c t e d on the s a n d s , w h i c h h o w e v e r is still out of gun shot
range from t h e four f a t h o m channel.
This n o r t h e r n p a s s a g e , t h e n , from its general distance from the d e f e n c e s ,
from the v e r y intricate navigation it offers, a n d from t h e considerable shal10 lowing of its south e a s t e r n e x t r e m i t y , m a y be considered useless for a serious
a t t a c k u p o n K r o n s t a d t . U n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e a dispersion of forces
is to a certain e x t e n t n o t likely to bring on disastrous r e s u l t s , it m a y serve
for sending a n u m b e r of t h e lighter ships r o u n d t h e island, w h e r e , after
silencing the not v e r y formidable fire of t h e E a s t B a t t e r y , t h e y might t a k e
15 up a very c o n v e n i e n t station for b o m b a r d i n g the t o w n . K r o n s t a d t , containing
n o t only the chief naval magazines and d o c k y a r d s of R u s s i a in the Baltic,
b u t also plenty of timber in private h a n d s , is full of combustible materials,
and a few lucky hits w i t h shell-guns might c r e a t e a conflagration destroying
in one night the naval stores a m a s s e d during y e a r s . W h e t h e r the taking up
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of s u c h a position by a sufficient n u m b e r of light men-of-war is actually
possible, a close survey of t h e state of m a t t e r s on t h e spot, c o m b i n e d with
r e n e w e d soundings, m u s t s h o w ; w h e t h e r it is advisable, will d e p e n d u p o n t h e
b a l a n c e of f o r c e s ; h e r e we c a n only state w h a t m a y , e v e n at a distance,
a p p e a r feasible from a c o m p a r i s o n of t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e t h a t c a n be collected.
T h e main line of attack, t h e n , r e m a i n s t h e S o u t h Channel, leading to the
G r e a t and Little R o a d s , otherwise called t h e N a r r o w s . H e r e t h e four-fathom
channel, several miles wide off the n o r t h - w e s t e r n point of the island, suddenly c o n t r a c t s to a b o u t a mile in width at t w o miles distance from t h e inner
h a r b o u r , and t h e n c e f o r m s an e x t r e m e l y a c u t e angle the a p e x of w h i c h is
situated in front of t h e man-of-war h a r b o u r . H e r e a n a r r o w b a r , passing from
the great sand b a n k of O r a n i e n b a u m to t h e island, cuts the channel off and
r e d u c e s its e x t r e m e d e p t h to 3V2 f a t h o m s . T h e R u s s i a n s h a v e t a k e n good
care to p r e s e r v e this natural fortification for their men-of-war h a r b o u r ,
although a little dredging w o u l d r e m o v e it. This four-fathom channel, t h e n ,
the central passage of which is n o w h e r e less t h a n 4V2 fathoms d e e p , and
admits the largest men-of-war, is t h e line of a p p r o a c h to K r o n s t a d t , and t h e
decisive struggle m u s t t a k e place in its a p e x w h i c h , for a mile and a half, is
n o w h e r e m o r e t h a n 400 y a r d s wide. |]3| T h e fortifications which defend this
channel are of all sorts, from the antediluvian buildings of Peter t h e G r e a t ,
to t h e most m o d e r n and formidable c o n s t r u c t i o n s with t w o or t h r e e tiers of
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guns o n e a b o v e the other. It is r e m a r k a b l e that the m o s t important points
a r e d e f e n d e d by fortifications of old and faulty c o n s t r u c t i o n : this is the weak
side of Kronstadt. T h e old fortifications are small b a s t i o n e d w o r k s , with guns
firing from behind an o p e n parapet, a n d with few or no c a s e m a t e d guns at
all; w i t h exceedingly small and n a r r o w b a s t i o n s , and therefore carrying a
5
n u m b e r of g u n s exceedingly small in proportion to their e x t e n t of frontage.
It m u s t , besides, be stated, that o n e half of their guns is generally directed
t o w a r d s shallow water from w h i c h at t h e v e r y u t m o s t a gun-boat a t t a c k could
b e e x p e c t e d . B u t t o such fortifications e v e n gun-boats w e r e formidable—The
m o d e r n constructions, on t h e c o n t r a r y , are p l a n n e d u p o n t h e system which 10
Montalembert first introduced a n d w h i c h since, w i t h m o r e or less modification, has b e e n generally adopted^ especially for c o a s t and h a r b o u r def e n c e s . Besides K r o n s t a d t , C h e r b o u r g and S e v a s t o p o l m a y b e q u o t e d a s
e x a m p l e s of its extensive application for this latter p u r p o s e . T h e s e constructions are distinguished by their t w o or t h r e e tiers of guns ranging o n e 15
a b o v e t h e other, t h e lower tiers of guns standing in c a s e m a t e s , small vaulted
r o o m s , a s i t w e r e , and w h e r e b o t h guns and m e n are a s m u c h p r o t e c t e d from
t h e e n e m y ' s fire as it c a n be d o n e . T h e u p p e r tier of g u n s alone stands b e h i n d
a p a r a p e t n o t c o v e r e d in, but from their elevated station w h i c h c o m m a n d s
t h e u p p e r decks of t h e largest t h r e e - d e c k e r s , are well p r o t e c t e d against t h e 20
effects of shot. T h e trial of an attack will s h o w , w h e t h e r these forts h a v e
actually b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d solidly e n o u g h to b e a r t h e c o n c u s s i o n of their o w n
a n d the effect of t h e e n e m y ' s fire; b u t if they a r e , t h e y will p r o v e the h a r d e s t
nuts to crack.
We m a y distinguish t h r e e lines of fortifications a r o u n d the K r o n s t a d t
channel.
T h e first, or o u t e r line, e m b r a c e s in a semi-circle t h e m o u t h of the Great
r o a d , or t h a t part of t h e four-fathom c h a n n e l w h i c h is from o n e mile to half
a mile in width. T h e right, or n o r t h e r n , wing of the position is formed by the
Peter Fort, an insignificant lunette on t h e island, a b o u t 1400 y a r d s from t h e
d e e p w a t e r c h a n n e l ; a mortar battery, also on t h e island, half a mile to t h e
east, and which m a y be considered as almost useless, a n d the Fort Constantine, a strong lunette closed to the rear, built on t h e s a n d s , ||4| within
1000 y a r d s from t h e edge of d e e p w a t e r , exactly in front of the m o r t a r battery.
This f o r t is of m o d e r n construction and carries 50 g u n s in t w o tiers. It serves
t o defend t h e outer a p p r o a c h e s , a n d m a y b e c o m e t r o u b l e s o m e t o a f l e e t while
forming; b u t if o n c e p a s s e d , o n e half of its guns b e c o m e useless. T h e centre
of t h e first line is m a d e up by t h e Fort Alexander (not t h e o n e on t h e n o r t h
e n d of t h e island, mentioned before); a semi-circular building e r e c t e d in t h r e e
f a t h o m s w a t e r within four h u n d r e d y a r d s of the d e e p channel w h e r e it narr o w s to half a mile. This fort therefore s w e e p s t h e c h a n n e l from side to side,
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a n d small as it looks on plans and c h a r t s , it carries no less t h a n seventy-two
guns in t h r e e tiers. If it be of sufficiently solid construction, and w i t h wellventilated c a s e m a t e s so as to d r a w off t h e s m o k e , this tower-like fort will
give e n o u g h to do to a couple of t h r e e - d e c k e r s . Behind it lies the old Citadel,
a lunette the insignificance of w h i c h is p r o v e d by t h e v e r y existence of t h e
n e w fort, w h i c h intercepts the fire of o n e half of its guns.—The left or southe r n wing, finally, is f o r m e d by t h e Risbank Fort and Battery, situated s o u t h
of the e n t r a n c e to the G r e a t R o a d . This fort, c o n s t r u c t e d in the last c e n t u r y ,
h a s u n d e r g o n e a modernizing p r o c e s s , in c o n s e q u e n c e of which part of its
guns are disposed in t w o tiers a n d their total n u m b e r is increased to fifty.
B u t for all that it occupies a far larger a r e a t h a n the m o d e r n forts, offering
a frontage t o w a r d s the r o a d s of s o m e 300 y a r d s , w h i c h frontage, b e s i d e s ,
is enfiladed, partially from t h e d e e p w a t e r c h a n n e l , and entirely by a position
w h i c h vessels of lighter draft m a y t a k e up in 3V2 to 3 f a t h o m s w a t e r within
half a mile w e s t w a r d s . To obviate this, t h e Risbank Battery has b e e n built
600 y a r d s to the rear, b u t in a position little a d a p t e d for that p u r p o s e . T h e
R i s b a n k F o r t lies exactly a mile s o u t h from Fort Alexander, a n d b o t h s w e e p
t h e e n t r a n c e to the G r e a t R o a d w i t h a crossing fire.
This first line of defences w o u l d n o t in itself p r o v e v e r y formidable, if it
w e r e not materially supported by t h e m o r e distant fire of the second line.
T h e second line p r o t e c t s the w h o l e of the G r e a t R o a d along with the e n t r a n c e
to t h e Little Road. It consists of t h e t w o flanking w o r k s of Fort Peter the
First (old, badly c o n s t r u c t e d , a sort of c r o w n - w o r k situated half a mile E a s t
of t h e Alexander Fort, and carrying on a frontage of 250 y a r d s only 24 guns),
Kronslot (bastioned old-fashioned w o r k of five fronts, two of w h i c h look
t o w a r d s t h e shallow w a t e r a n d are t h e r e f o r e useless, carrying, although 400
y a r d s in its longest diagonal, no m o r e t h a n 36 guns), a n d lastly, the fortified
w e s t e r n wall of t h e Merchant\\S\ Harbour'm t h e c e n t r e . This wall, projecting
from the island of K r o n s t a d t itself, c o m e s d o w n to the v e r y edge of the d e e p
c h a n n e l with w h i c h it forms a right angle, a n d w h i c h is h e r e b u t 300 y a r d s
w i d e . It carries 70 guns and 12 m o r t a r s , p a r t of w h i c h h o w e v e r a p p e a r so
placed as to h a v e little effect u p o n t h e shipping and offers, in conjunction
w i t h b o t h t h e main fronts of Peter I F o r t a n d t w o fronts of Kronslot, a m o s t
effective c r o s s fire over the inner half of t h e G r e a t R o a d , w h e r e from t h e
obstacles created by t h e fire of the first line, a n d t h e n a r r o w n e s s of t h e
channel, it must be extremely difficult for a n y ships b u t screw-steamers to
t a k e up a good position in sufficient f o r c e .
T h e third line, the direct d e f e n c e of the Little or inner R o a d , is f o r m e d ,
on t h e south side of t h e channel, by a third (the N o r t h E a s t ) front of Kronslot,
and on the n o r t h a n d e a s t side by the fortified walls of the M e r c h a n t , Middle,
a n d Man-of-war's h a r b o u r s . T h e latter, projecting at an o b t u s e angle at t h e
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Friedrich Engels
e a s t e r n e n d of t h e Middle H a r b o u r , r a k e s t h e w h o l e of t h e Little R o a d , while
t h e S o u t h Wall of t h e M e r c h a n t and Middle H a r b o u r s p r o t e c t it by a front fire.
B o t h walls are flanked by several bastions, fortified gates and o t h e r p r o j e c t i o n s . T h e width of t h e d e e p w a t e r channel, h e r e , being n o w h e r e greater
t h a n 250 y a r d s , t h e fighting would be v e r y m u r d e r o u s , b u t it is hardly to be
d o u b t e d t h a t before ships could p e n e t r a t e so far, K r o n s t a d t would h a v e to
capitulate. T h e central w o r k of this third line, a n d t h e only o n e w h i c h m a y
e v e r h a v e a n y practical utility, is Fort Menchikoff, t h e first bastion, from
t h e w e s t , o n the M e r c h a n t H a r b o u r S o u t h wall. This b a s t i o n h a s b e e n
r e - c o n s t r u c t e d into a t o w e r of imposing p r o p o r t i o n s , carrying 44 guns in four
tiers a b o v e o n e another one half of w h i c h enfilades t h e greater p a r t of
t h e Little a n d G r e a t r o a d s , the other half appearing, from t h e direction of
their e m b r a s u r e s , almost useless. W h e t h e r the four tiers of g u n s will not
p r o v e too h e a v y for t h e n a r r o w foundation of t h e building, r e m a i n s to be
seen.
We m a y a d d , t h a t on the land-side K r o n s t a d t is fortified by regularly
b a s t i o n e d fronts, requiring a siege in d u e form to be f o r c e d ; a n d s u c h a siege
in the s w a m p y ground of the little island, with o n l y a fleet for b a s e of
o p e r a t i o n s , offers v e r y great difficulties. If K r o n s t a d t is to be t a k e n , it m u s t
be d o n e from the sea.
It is u n d e r s t o o d that we could only describe t h e p e r m a n e n t fortifications
s u c h a s t h e y existed according t o t h e latest s u r v e y s a n d military r e p o r t s .
T h e r e m a y h a v e b e e n some alterations during the last few y e a r s , b u t it is n o t
p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n v e r y important.
To recapitulate. T h e fate of any attack against K r o n s t a d t m u s t be d e cided ||6| in t h e G r e a t R o a d , and h e r e t h e only fortifications t h a t c a n effectually play against t h e attacking fleet, are F o r t s A l e x a n d e r , P e t e r I, Risbank,
t w o fronts of Kronslot, the w e s t e r n H a r b o u r Wall, a n d F o r t Menchikoff.
Altogether t h e y m a y bring 350 guns at o n c e to b e a r u p o n t h e attack, m o s t
of t h e m well p r o t e c t e d by walls and vaults, and firing t h r o u g h n a r r o w
e m b r a s u r e s . T h e other batteries are either directed t o w a r d s other points of
attack, or t h e y are insignificant, or t h e y are n o t within effective range. T h e
q u e s t i o n is: C a n a sufficient naval force be b r o u g h t up this n a r r o w and
intricate channel, to face b o t h t h e n o r t h e r n a n d s o u t h e r n fronts of defence
a n d to silence their fire, while that force is itself e x p o s e d to a raking fire
from t h e H a r b o u r Wall, F o r t Menchikoff a n d K r o n s l o t ? N a v a l m e n m a y
a n s w e r t h a t question, unless they prefer to w a i t till t h e actual trial h a s b e e n
m a d e . F r o m w h a t little w e h a v e h a d occasion t o l e a r n o f naval t a c t i c s , w e
should say t h a t h e r e , if a n y w h e r e , is the point w h e r e t h e superiority of
Screw-Ships of t h e line c a n p r o d u c e results w h i c h to sailing ships and
p a d d l e - s t e a m e r s w o u l d appear equally inattainable.
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T h e great w e a k n e s s of K r o n s t a d t , we r e p e a t it, are the forts of old construction. T h e y o c c u p y t h e b e s t positions a n d t h e largest portion of available
space with t h e least possible effect of fire. If R i s b a n k has b e e n i m p r o v e d ,
Peter I and K r o n s l o t r e m a i n inefficient. T h e y might be silenced with c o m parative e a s e , p e r h a p s e v e n occupied, and i n t h a t c a s e might b e used t o
b o m b a r d t h e t o w n . B u t from the m o m e n t ships h a v e p e n e t r a t e d as far as
b e t w e e n A l e x a n d e r and Risbank, t h e y h a v e the t o w n within shell-range, a n d
c a n do i m m e n s e mischief, unless sufficiently o c c u p i e d by the forts. |
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Karl Marx
British Finances—The Troubles at Preston
New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune.
Nr.929, 21. April 1854
British Finances—
The Troubles at Preston.
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , M a r c h 3 1 , 1854.
T h e I n c o m e T a x bill has b e e n passed. Sir G. Pakington s p o k e against it plainly
a n d justly, although in a dull m a n n e r , observing t h a t t h e r e c e n t publications
of the Blue B o o k s and of the secret and confidential c o r r e s p o n d e n c e had
t h r o w n quite a n e w light on the p a s t financial policy of t h e Chancellor of
t h e E x c h e q u e r . M r . Gladstone brought in a p e a c e b u d g e t on the 18th April,
1853, w h e n he [must] h a v e b e e n quite sure of w a r being imminent. T h r e e d a y s
before he m a d e his s t a t e m e n t the Coalition h a d r e c e i v e d from Colonel R o s e
t h e information t h a t " P r i n c e Menchikoff h a d tried to e x a c t a p r o m i s e from
t h e G r a n d Vizier, before he m a d e k n o w n to him t h e n a t u r e of his mission
a n d of his d e m a n d s , t h a t he should m a k e a formal p r o m i s e t h a t he w o u l d not
r e v e a l t h e m to t h e British and F r e n c h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . " T h e y w e r e also
a w a r e , by t h e secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , of t h e E m p e r o r ' s intention to kill t h e
dying m a n lest he should slip t h r o u g h his fingers. W i t h this information in
his h a n d s t h e u n c t u o u s Puseyite c o m e s f o r w a r d and a d d r e s s e s t h e H o u s e :
"If y o u will a d o p t the income t a x for seven y e a r s , I will only a s k y o u for
7d. in t h e p o u n d for t h e first t w o y e a r s ; I will a s k 6d. in t h e p o u n d for t h e
n e x t t w o y e a r s ; and for t h e last t h r e e y e a r s I will only a s k 5d. in t h e p o u n d ,
a n d t h e n t h e i n c o m e t a x will e x p i r e . " T h e i n c o m e t a x , a s y o u r r e a d e r s will
r e m e m b e r , M r . G l a d s t o n e described as a mighty engine of w a r t h a t m u s t be
got rid of in t h e s e times of p e a c e . This he said with t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t w a r
w a s almost inevitable, and that it would be n e c e s s a r y to double the t a x of
7d. in t h e p o u n d b e f o r e t w e l v e m o n t h s h a d elapsed. It is n o w I s . 2d. in the
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r
p o u n d . If a n y b o d y should tell me t h a t t h e o v e r s c r u p u l o u s Chancellor of
t h e E x c h e q u e r deluded himself as to t h e position of affairs, I reply t h a t only
last M o n d a y w e e k a fall in the funds o c c u r r e d , b e c a u s e the stock j o b b e r s
said t h a t t h e publication of t h e secret p a p e r s p r o v e d to d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t
5
the C z a r h a d determined to p u r s u e his s c h e m e s , a n d t h a t no trust could be
p l a c e d in his m o s t positive assertions. T h e m e m b e r s of t h e " C a b i n e t of all
the T a l e n t s " m u s t b e s u p p o s e d t o p o s s e s s a t least equal perspicacity w i t h
t h e m e m b e r s of t h e S t o c k E x c h a n g e .
At the s a m e time that the Duns Scotus of the [Coalition,] the D o c t o r
10 Subtilissimus, p r o p o s e d his financial s c h e m e s for t h e c o n v e r s i o n of t h e
funds, and thus p r e p a r e d , notwithstanding the warnings he received, an
e m p t i n e s s of the T r e a s u r y at t h e v e r y m o m e n t of t h e " c a t a s t r o p h e " . T h e
balances in the E x c h e q u e r w e r e as follows, in the y e a r s n a m e d :
£6,254,113
1844
8,452,090
1845
T5
1846
9,131,282
1847
8,457,691
1848
8,105,561
1849
9,748,539
9,[245 676]
1850
20
8,[381,637]
1851
8,[841,822]
1852
f
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35
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By t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of 1853 Mr. G l a d s t o n e h a d contrived to r e d u c e it to
£4,485,230, a n d s o o n t h e r e will be no b a l a n c e at all, as this ingenious financier
h a s to t a k e b a c k the r e m a i n d e r of the S o u t h S e a stock at £100, w h e n it c a n
hardly be sold on 'change at £85.
This financial policy of the Coalition perfectly [takes up] with their diplomatic policy, which " t h a n k s " t h e Czar for confiding to t h e m his plans of
partition; w i t h their parliamentary policy, w h i c h always told the H o u s e t h e
[news] c o n t r a r y of their information in h a n d ; a n d with their military policy,
w h i c h forced O m e r P a s h a to inaction till t h e Czar h a d completed his p r e p a r a tions for invasion, w h i c h dispatches t h e t r o o p s b y s t e a m e r s and the h o r s e s
by sail vessels, retains the officers at L o n d o n , and disembarks soldiers at
Constantinople, a n d thinks fit to o c c u p y neither O d e s s a nor the Crimea, n o r
Finland, n o r the m o u t h s of t h e D a n u b e , n o r a n y point threatening the R u s sians, b u t Constantinople, of all other p l a c e s , in order not to c r u s h t h e
C o s s a c k , b u t t o t e a c h a t this m o m e n t o u s crisis b o t h t h e M u s s u l m a n and t h e
B y z a n t i n e priest t h e occidental law and civil equality.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e strong opposition o f t h e Irish m e m b e r s , t h e H o u s e
s e e m s resolved to p r o c e e d with M r . C h a m b e r s ' s motion, a n d to appoint a
C o m m i t t e e of Inquiry for t h e practices a n d h o u s e h o l d a r r a n g e m e n t s of t h e
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Karl Marx
n u n n e r i e s . T h e principal plea o n which Mr. C h a m b e r s ' s motion intends t o
be b a s e d is t h e seclusion of girls forcibly held from their natural and legitim a t e p r o t e c t o r s . T h e middle classes of England s h u d d e r at the probability
of girls being kidnapped for n u n n e r i e s , b u t their justice, s h o w n in a r e c e n t
c a s e , b e c o m e s impotent w h e n girls are k i d n a p p e d for satisfying t h e lust of
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aristocrats or caprice of cotton lords. L a s t w e e k a girl of sixteen had b e e n
lured a w a y from her p a r e n t s , enticed into a L a n c a s h i r e factory, a n d k e p t
t h e r e night a n d day, m a d e to sleep t h e r e , and take her meals t h e r e , locked
up as in a prison. W h e n her father discovered w h a t h a d b e c o m e of his child,
he w a s n o t allowed to see her, but w a s driven a w a y from t h e factory by t h e 10
police. In this c a s e t h e F a c t o r y law w a s violated, t h e law of p e r s o n a l liberty,
t h e law that gives the father the c u s t o d y of his child u n d e r age, the v e r y right
of habeas corpus w a s set at nought. A gross and flagrant c a s e of abduction
h a d b e e n committed. B u t h o w did the Magistrates act in this c a s e , w h e n the
disconsolate father appealed to t h e m for r e d r e s s ? Their a n s w e r w a s : " T h e y 15
could do nothing in the m a t t e r . "
M r . T h o m . D u n c o m b e p r e s e n t e d a petition, signed within 24 h o u r s by
a b o v e 7,600 inhabitants of t h e b o r o u g h of P r e s t o n , complaining of the m a n n e r in which t h e laws for the maintenance of p e a c e a n d order w e r e administered by the local authorities in that b o r o u g h . He g a v e notice t h a t he
should m o v e for a C o m m i t t e e of Inquiry into t h e subject immediately after
the Easter recess.
" T h e agitators of Preston, the great f o m e n t o r s of the strike—the m e n w h o
p r e t e n d e d to form a n e w estate of the realm, a n d to be t h e nursing fathers
of the L a b o r Parliament, h a v e at length received a c h e c k . S o m e d o z e n of
t h e m h a v e b e e n arrested and e x a m i n e d b e f o r e t h e local magistrates on a
c h a r g e of conspiracy, released on bail and sent b e f o r e the L i v e r p o o l assizes."
S u c h are t h e w o r d s in w h i c h The Morning Post a n n o u n c e s an e v e n t w h i c h
I w a s p r e v e n t e d from writing about earlier by t h e p r e s s u r e of other matter.
T h e charge against the leaders rests u p o n t h e fact t h a t t h e m a s t e r s had sent
t o M a n c h e s t e r and induced m e n t o c o m e d o w n t o P r e s t o n . T h e y w e r e mostly
Irishmen. T h e [Preston] people m e t t h e m at the railway station, w h e r e they
p r e s e n t e d a scene of misery a n d w r e t c h e d n e s s . A b o u t fifty-four of t h e m w e r e
p e r s u a d e d to go to t h e F a r m e r ' s A r m s w h e r e t h e y w e r e regaled all day, and,
having c o n s e n t e d to return, were escorted in the evening to the railway
station amidst the exclamations of 15,000 p e r s o n s . T h e e m p l o y e r s got hold
of s e v e n of t h e s e people a n d brought t h e m b a c k to P r e s t o n to convict
M r . Cowell and his colleagues of conspiracy. N o w , if we consider the [real
facts] of the c a s e , t h e r e remains no d o u b t on t h e question w h o are t h e real
conspirators.
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In 1847 the P r e s t o n c o t t o n lords r e d u c e d w a g e s on a solemn promise to
r e s t o r e t h e m as soon as t r a d e should h a v e b e c o m e brisk. In 1853, t h e y e a r
of prosperity, t h e y refused to k e e p their w o r d . T h e w o r k i n g m e n of four mills
struck, and w e r e supported by t h e contributions of the remaining at work.
T h e m a s t e r s n o w conspired together t h a t t h e y w o u l d lock their mills, a n d
entered e a c h into a £5,000 b o n d to enforce their conspiracy. T h e operatives
t h e n appealed for support to the o t h e r t o w n s of L a n c a s h i r e , and that support
w a s given. T h e employers h a d sent emissaries t o p e r s u a d e and incite t h e
cotton lords of other t o w n s to l o c k o u t their h a n d s , and succeeded in their
e n d e a v o r . N o t c o n t e n t w i t h this, a v a s t s u b s c r i p t i o n w a s ] o p e n e d a m o n g
t h e m to counterbalance the [subscriptions] of t h e operatives. W h e n t h e y
found t h a t all t h e s e efforts w e r e of no avail, t h e y sent their agents far a n d
near to induce laborers and their families, n e e d l e w o m e n , and p a u p e r s from
t h e w o r k h o u s e s of England a n d Ir[eland to c o m e ] to P r e s t o n . Finding t h e
surplus did n o t flow in fast e n o u g h for their w i s h e s , t h e y tried to p r o v o k e
t h e people to a b r e a c h of t h e p e a c e . T h e y aggravated t h e m by their insolence.
T h e y forbade meetings in the M a r s h , [but] t h e people held meetings in
Blackstone Edge a n d other interdicted localities. T h e y introduced o n e hunn e w police, t h e y s w o r e in special c o n s t a b l e s , they t u r n e d out t h e firebrigade, t h e y k e p t troops u n d e r a r m s , and w e n t so far as to r e a d the riot
act in order to p r o v o k e a riot. S u c h w a s t h e conspiracy of the m a s t e r s b u t
t h e y w e r e defeated in e a c h of their a t t e m p t s . Notwithstanding t h e s e facts,
an indictment of conspiracy is charged, n o t against t h e m a s t e r s , b u t against
t h e men. B e s i d e s , t h e r e is a special c a s e bringing t h e m a s t e r s u n d e r t h e law
of conspiracy. T h e m e n of a certain factory r e s u m e d the w o r k . T h e m a s t e r s '
c o m m i t t e e a n d t h e m e n ' s c o m m i t t e e alike called for explanations. T h e m e n
published a placard to the effect t h a t t h e y h a d gone to w o r k on condition
of p a y m e n t at a certain rate. T h e m a s t e r s ' c o m m i t t e e t h r e a t e n e d proceedings
against the m a s t e r of t h a t mill to r e c o v e r £5,000 as penalty on a b o n d given
to support t h e m a s t e r s ' strike. T h e mill-owner t h e r e u p o n said something
w h i c h , being a flat contradiction of m e n ' s s t a t e m e n t , occasioned t h e m all to
w i t h d r a w . If [ t h e m a k i n g ] of this b o n d of £5,000 w a s a conspiracy in t h e
t e r m s of t h e law, t h e m e n a c e to enforce it w a s still m o r e so. B u t this is n o t
all. T h e v e r y indictment of the m e n ' s leaders w a s b r o u g h t a b o u t by a
conspiracy c o m m i t t e d by t h e magisterial b e n c h e s at P r e s t o n . A c c o r d i n g
to The Times itself, t h e magistrates got up e v i d e n c e , sought for it, b r o u g h t
up their surplus slaves in c a b s to their council c h a m b e r , dreading t h e
publicity of the t o w n hall, t h e r e to arrange their e v i d e n c e , a n d t h e r e , in t h e
d e a d of night to p o u n c e on their i n t e n d e d victims.
T h e expectations of these little N a p o l e o n s of L a n c a s h i r e [ w e r e , ] h o w e v e r ,
set at naught by t h e good sense of t h e working p e o p l e , w h o neither allowed
dred
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t h e m s e l v e s to be p r o v o k e d into a b r e a c h of p e a c e , n o r to be frightened into
[submission] to t h e dictates of t h e P r e s t o n parvenus.
A public meeting w a s held in L o n d o n on W e d n e s d a y night in St. M a r t i n ' s
Hall, L o n g A c r e , for t h e p u r p o s e of affording t h e w o r k i n g classes of t h e
metropolis an o p p o r t u n i t y of expressing their opinion on t h e c o n d u c t of the
P r e s t o n m a s t e r s . T h e following t w o resolutions w e r e u n a n i m o u s l y accepted:
" T h a t the p r e s e n t L o r d Chancellor of England, w h e n B a r o n Rolfe, [and]
in his capacity of judge, laid d o w n t h e law t h u s : T h a t if t h e r e w e r e no other
object t h a n to p e r s u a d e people that it w a s their i n t e r e s t n o t to w o r k e x c e p t
for certain wages, and not to w o r k u n d e r certain regulations, complied with
in a peaceful m a n n e r , it w a s n o t illegal. T h a t the o p e r a t i v e s of P r e s t o n h a v e
for a period of thirty w e e k s b e e n engaged in a c o n t e s t with their e m p l o y e r s ,
a n d during the whole of that time h a v e c o n d u c t e d t h e m s e l v e s in the m o s t
p e a c e a b l e a n d orderly manner. That, notwithstanding t h e s e facts, four
m e m b e r s of the O p e r a t i v e s ' C o m m i t t e e h a v e b e e n c o m m i t t e d to t a k e their
trial at t h e p r e s e n t Liverpool Assizes on a c h a r g e of c o n s p i r a c y , although
neither violence nor intimidation has b e e n p r o v e d or e v e n charged against
t h e m . This meeting is therefore of opinion t h a t t h e c o n d u c t of t h e manufact u r e r s a n d magistrates of P r e s t o n is reprehensible ; that t h e y h a v e b e e n guilty
of an u n w a r r a n t a b l e a s s u m p t i o n of p o w e r ; t h a t t h e y h a v e d e s t r o y e d at o n c e
t h e equality of the law and personal f r e e d o m ; and t h a t such proceedings
ought to be c o n d e m n e d by the u n a n i m o u s [voice] of t h e p e o p l e .
T h a t the s y m p a t h y a n d help of the entire of t h e w o r k i n g classes of the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m should be devoted to t h e vindication of justice and t h e
m a i n t e n a n c e of right. This meeting, therefore, pledges itself to an e x t r a o r d i n a r y and c o n t i n u o u s support of t h e P r e s t o n o p e r a t i v e s in their p r e s e n t
trying position, and earnestly e x h o r t s all w h o h a v e an interest in the elevation
of labor to join with t h e m in supporting its b e s t i n t e r e s t s . "
[The] L o n d o n p r e s s generally c o n d e m n the p r o c e e d i n g s [of the] P r e s t o n
m a s t e r s , not from a n y sense of justice b u t [from f e a r ] of t h e p r o b a b l e results.
T h e y a p p r e h e n d that [the] working classes will n o w u n d e r s t a n d that the
i n d i v i d u a l ] capitalist w h o o p p r e s s e s t h e m i s b a c k e d b y t h e w h o l e machinery
[of t h e s t a t e , ] and that in order to hit t h e former t h e y [ m u s t ] deal w i t h the
latter.
Karl Marx.
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The Russian Army
The Russian Army.
T o t h e E d i t o r o f t h e Daily N e w s .
Sir,—It is getting high time t h a t we should l o o k o u r e n e m y straight in t h e f a c e ,
t o see w h a t sort o f a n o p p o n e n t h e m a y t u r n o u t t o b e . T h e most c o n t r a d i c t o r y
5
opinions are afloat as to t h e real military s t r e n g t h a n d capabilities of Russia.
O v e r r a t e d b y s o m e , u n d e r r a t e d b y o t h e r s , t h e reality a p p e a r s still t o b e
h i d d e n by a veil, r e m o v a b l e , n o t by a n y " R e v e l a t i o n s of R u s s i a , " b u t by t h e
a c t u a l e v e n t s of w a r only.
Yet t h e r e exists a good deal of valuable m a t t e r in o u r w e s t e r n literatures
10
w h i c h r e q u i r e s nothing b u t sifting a n d combining. R u s s i a herself h a s c o n
tributed plenty of such m a t t e r . F o r R u s s i a n military literature m a k e s as
m u c h , if n o t m o r e , u s e of t h e F r e n c h a n d G e r m a n languages t h a n of its o w n .
Witness Major S m i t t ' s valuable w o r k on t h e Polish c a m p a i g n of 1831, a n d
Colonel Tolstoi's a c c o u n t of t h e i n v a s i o n of H u n g a r y . T h e military w o r k s
15
w r i t t e n in R u s s i a n are decidedly inferior to t h o s e w r i t t e n in foreign languages
by officers of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y . Michailowski-Danilewski's a n d B u t u r l i n ' s
C a m p a i g n s of 1812, L u k i a n o v i t c h ' s C a m p a i g n of 1828-29, a n d similar w o r k s ,
t o o m u c h r e s e m b l e t h e a c c o u n t s o f c a m p a i g n s w h i c h w e generally m e e t with
in second-rate F r e n c h historical w o r k s . T h e sobriety of facts is d r o w n e d in
20
floods of inflated b o m b a s t , e v e n t s a r e d i s t o r t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e exigencies
of national vanity, t h e victories a c h i e v e d on t h e field of battle are p u t into
t h e s h a d e b y greater victories a c h i e v e d o n p a p e r b y t h e a u t h o r s , and de
t r a c t i o n from t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e n e m y , w h o e v e r h e b e , p r e d o m i n a t e s from
beginning to end. T h e r e is little of t h a t soldierly feeling which k n o w s t h a t
25
t h e r e is m o r e merit in defeating a b r a v e t h a n a c o w a r d l y e n e m y , a n d w h i c h
m a k e s , for i n s t a n c e , Sir W. N a p i e r ' s P e n i n s u l a r W a r so pre-eminently t h e
p r o d u c t i o n , n o t only of an "officer," b u t of a " g e n t l e m a n " also. T h e necessity
of keeping up warlike a r d o u r a m o n g s t t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n m a y explain
t h e e x i s t e n c e of s u c h a style of writing history. B u t as s o o n as a w e s t e r n
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language is c h o s e n , t h e thing is different. E u r o p e , t h e n , is to judge, a n d t h e
publicity of the w e s t w o u l d s o o n scatter to the w i n d s assertions w h i c h , in
Russia, pass off for gospel truth, b e c a u s e t h e r e t h e o p p o n e n t has not the right
of reply. T h e t e n d e n c y to glorify H o l y R u s s i a and her C z a r r e m a i n s the s a m e ,
b u t t h e choice of m e a n s b e c o m e s m o r e limited. A c c u r a c y of fact must be
m o r e strictly adhered t o ; a m o r e sedate a n d businesslike diction is a d o p t e d ;
a n d in spite of attempts at distortion which generally b e t r a y t h e m s e l v e s soon
enough, t h e r e r e m a i n s at least e n o u g h of positive information to m a k e s u c h
a b o o k in m a n y c a s e s an important historical d o c u m e n t . If, b e s i d e s , it should
h a p p e n to h a v e b e e n written by a m a n in a relatively i n d e p e n d e n t position,
it m a y e v e n be excellent as a military history, a n d this is actually t h e c a s e
w i t h Smitt's H i s t o r y of the Polish W a r .
T h e composition and organisation of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y is k n o w n well
e n o u g h to military m e n all over E u r o p e . T h e e x t r e m e simplicity of this
organisation, as far at least as the " a r m y of o p e r a t i o n " is c o n c e r n e d , m a k e s
it e a s y to u n d e r s t a n d it. T h e actual difficulty is merely to k n o w h o w far this
organisation h a s b e e n really carried out, h o w m u c h of this a r m y exists not
merely on p a p e r b u t c a n be b r o u g h t forward against a foreign foe. It is on
this point t h a t t h e s e Russian military writings in w e s t e r n languages are
principally important. National pride p r e v e n t s their a u t h o r s , w h e r e v e r t h e
e n e m y has b e e n partially successful and offered a lively r e s i s t a n c e , from
overrating t h e n u m b e r s of c o m b a t a n t s on t h e R u s s i a n side. In order to guard
t h e h o n o u r of the Russian a r m s , t h e y m u s t unveil t h e differences b e t w e e n
t h e real and nominal strength of Russian armies. Smitt's w o r k , w h i c h gives
the official muster-rolls, is particularly useful for this p u r p o s e . Tolstoi's
H u n g a r i a n campaign, on the contrary, quite in h a r m o n y with t h e proceedings
of t h e R u s s i a n s in that c o u n t r y , a p p e a r s to be i n t e n d e d to show off not so
m u c h t h e valour as t h e formidable and overwhelming n u m b e r s of t h e Russian
a r m i e s , r e a d y t o b e launched u p o n the revolutionary w e s t .
B u t if we c a n arrive at something like certainty regarding t h a t p a r t at least
of t h e R u s s i a n army w h i c h m o r e directly m e n a c e s t h e r e s t of E u r o p e , it is far
m o r e difficult to ascertain t h e real state of the fleet. We shall, later on,
collect w h a t e v e r information we h a v e m e t with, b u t m u s t wait for something
m o r e definite until " C h a r l e y " gives a better a c c o u n t of it, or s e n d s a few
specimens over for home-inspection.
T h e f ortif icatory system, the preliminary p r e p a r a t i o n of the theatre of w a r
for defence and attack, is of c o u r s e v e r y difficult of a c c e s s in a c o u n t r y like
Russia. T h e coast defences are to a certain degree delineated in c h a r t s a n d
p l a n s , a n d cannot, from their very n a t u r e , be k e p t entirely hidden. K r o n s t a d t
a n d S e b a s t o p o l , although m a n y details of military i m p o r t a n c e are n o t well
k n o w n , are yet n o t half as mysterious places as t h e y a p p e a r to s o m e parties.
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5
B u t of t h e fortifications of P o l a n d , of t h a t v e r y g r o u p of fortresses t h e v e r y
existence of w h i c h proclaims i n t e n t i o n s of offensive w a r a n d of c o n q u e s t ,
v e r y little i s k n o w n b e s i d e s t h e s p o t s u p o n w h i c h t h e y h a v e b e e n built. S o m e
E u r o p e a n w a r offices m a y h a v e obtained, by dint of gold, plans of t h e s e
fortresses from R u s s i a n employés ; if s o , t h e y h a v e k e p t t h e information for
t h e m s e l v e s . If t h e Polish E m i g r a t i o n could p r o c u r e s u c h p l a n s , w h i c h to t h e m
should not be impossible, t h e y might, by publishing t h e m , do to R u s s i a a great
deal m o r e h a r m t h a n e v e r t h e y did.
T h e R u s s i a n a r m y is m a d e up of four great divisions: t h e great a r m y of
10
operation, t h e r e s e r v e s for it, t h e special a n d local c o r p s , t h e C o s s a c k s
(amongst w h i c h are h e r e c o m p r i s e d all irregular t r o o p s , w h a t e v e r be their
origin.)
T h e peculiar c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h R u s s i a is placed require a military
organisation totally different from that of all o t h e r E u r o p e a n countries.
15 While on t h e south-east, from t h e Pacific to t h e C a s p i a n Sea, her frontiers,
g u a r d e d b y d e s e r t s a n d s t e p p e s , are e x p o s e d t o n o o t h e r irruptions b u t t h o s e
o f n o m a d i c r o b b e r tribes, w h o o n such g r o u n d a r e b e s t m e t b y t r o o p s s o m e w h a t similar to t h e m s e l v e s ; while on t h e C a u c a s u s she h a s to struggle against
a h a r d y r a c e of m o u n t a i n e e r s , b e s t c o m b a t e d by a judicious mixture of
20
regular and irregular f o r c e s ; h e r s o u t h - w e s t e r n a n d w e s t e r n f r o n t i e r s r e q u i r e
t h e immediate p r e s e n c e of a large a r m y organised u p o n t h e m o s t regular
E u r o p e a n footing a n d e q u i p p e d with a r m s e q u a l t o t h o s e o f t h e w e s t e r n
armies it m a y h a v e to fight. B u t as it is impossible to maintain p e r m a n e n t ì y
u p o n t h e w a r footing s u c h an a r m y in a c o u n t r y t h e r e s o u r c e s of w h i c h a r e
25
o n l y v e r y partially d e v e l o p e d , p a r t of the soldiers h a v e to be dismissed on
furlough, to f o r m a r e s e r v e for t h e w a r . T h u s arise t h e four great divisions
of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y .
This organisation of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y , t h e origin of w h i c h m a y be traced
b a c k as far as t h e first partition of P o l a n d , h a s b e e n successively d e v e l o p e d
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by t h e succeeding partitions of t h a t c o u n t r y , t h e c o n q u e s t s on t h e B l a c k S e a ,
t h e great w a r s with F r a n c e ; it h a s b e e n b r o u g h t to its p r e s e n t state of perfection after the Polish revolution of 1830.
T h e G r e a t A r m y of O p e r a t i o n , w h i c h is almost exclusively stationed on
t h e E u r o p e a n frontier of Russia, is m o r e especially a p r o d u c t i o n of t h e
35 partition of Poland, t h e w a r s w i t h F r a n c e , a n d t h e Polish revolution. Its
object is twofold—to maintain in subjection t h e w e s t e r n , m o r e civilised, a n d
non-Russian portions of t h e e m p i r e , a n d to h a n g like a threatening cloud o v e r
t h e w e s t o f E u r o p e , r e a d y t o c o m e d o w n u p o n i t with t h u n d e r a n d lightning
at a m o m e n t ' s notice. H o w far this o b j e c t h a s b e e n , or r a t h e r h a s n o t b e e n ,
40 o b t a i n e d during t h e past, is a m a t t e r of notoriety. H o w far it m a y in t h e
p r e s e n t w a r b e carried out, w e shall h a v e t o consider b y and by.
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T h e grand a r m y of operations or active a r m y (deistvuyushtsheye voisko)
consists of eleven corps d ' a r m é e , t h e corps of g u a r d s , t h e c o r p s of grenadiers,
six c o r p s of infantry, a n d t h r e e corps of cavalry of r e s e r v e .
This w h o l e organisation is imitated from the system i n t r o d u c e d by N a p o leon. T h e eight first n a m e d c o r p s c o r r e s p o n d exactly to t h e a r m y c o r p s of
t h e F r e n c h during the Great w a r . T h e guards and grenadiers a p p e a r specially
destined to f o r m t h e general r e s e r v e s of t h e a r m y , while t h e cavalry c o r p s
are e x p e c t e d to p r o d u c e those special decisive effects for w h i c h N a p o l e o n
always k e p t in r e s e r v e large m a s s e s of that a r m and of artillery. T h u s all the
first n a m e d eight c o r p s , although called infantry c o r p s , are provided by their
v e r y organisation with cavalry a n d a n u m e r o u s artillery. T h e y h a v e e a c h a
c o m p l e t e staff, engineers, p o n t o o n and a m m u n i t i o n trains, p a r k s of artillery,
a n d e v e r y other requisite of an a r m y destined to act independently. T h e
guards and grenadiers are rather w e a k e r in infantry t h a n t h e other c o r p s , thenregiments having e a c h t h r e e battalions only instead of four. T h e guards are,
on the other h a n d , considerably stronger in cavalry and artillery; b u t it m a y
be e x p e c t e d that in order of battle t h e greater part of this will be joined to
the general cavalry and artillery r e s e r v e . T h e first a n d second cavalry corps
consist of h e a v y cavalry and h o r s e artillery exclusively (the light regular
cavalry is attached to the infantry c o r p s ) ; the third cavalry or dragoon corps
h a s an especial organisation, as t h e s e dragoons are intended, s a m e as w a s
the fashion formerly, to fight b o t h as infantry and cavalry, and t h u s to form
a c o r p s of r e s e r v e of all a r m s , having at the s a m e time t h e mobility a n d
rapidity of locomotion exclusively p o s s e s s e d by cavalry. W h e t h e r this will
h a v e b e e n attained remains to be seen; the e x p e r i e n c e of all other armies,
resulting in the almost complete and general c o n v e r s i o n of d r a g o o n s into
simple cavalry, is of no v e r y favourable augury. This idea h a s e v e n b e e n
carried to the extent of attaching b o t h to the d r a g o o n c o r p s and to the guards
battalions of m o u n t e d sappers, miners, a n d pontoniers—an institution highly
lauded by the admirers of the Russian s y s t e m , b u t equally wanting, as yet,
t h e t e s t of actual experience.
It m a y be a d d e d that this organisation in eleven c o r p s , w i t h their divisions,
brigades, regiments composing each, d o e s not merely exist on p a p e r or for
m e r e administrative p u r p o s e s . On the c o n t r a r y , the last T u r k i s h war, the
Polish campaign, t h e Hungarian invasion, and t h e p r e s e n t T u r k i s h war h a v e
s h o w n the dispositions prevailing during p e a c e to be so entirely calculated
for w a r that no division, brigade, or regiment h a s to be s e p a r a t e d from its
c o r p s , and t o b e attached t o another w h e n e v e r the m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s the
frontiers begins. This is a great military advantage, resulting from t h e almost
c o n s t a n t state of impending w a r in w h i c h R u s s i a is a c c u s t o m e d to find
herself. O t h e r more peaceable states find, on a w a r approaching, e v e r y wheel
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and pulley of their w a r - m a c h i n e r y c o v e r e d w i t h r u s t , and the w h o l e gearing
out of trim; t h e organisation of a r m y c o r p s , divisions, brigades, c o m p l e t e as
it m a y appear, has to be revolutionised in o r d e r to bring t r o o p s quick e n o u g h
to the m e n a c e d frontiers; c o m m a n d e r s , generals, a n d staffs are appointed
5 afresh, regiments are shifted from brigade to brigade, from c o r p s to c o r p s ,
until, w h e n t h e a r m y is a s s e m b l e d for active o p e r a t i o n s , y o u h a v e a motley
r e u n i o n of c o m m a n d e r s m o r e or less u n k n o w n to e a c h o t h e r , to their superio r s , and to their t r o o p s ; most of t h e m , p e r h a p s , big with a good deal of
w o u n d e d vanity; and yet you m u s t rely u p o n this brand-new m a c h i n e r y
10 working well together. T h e disadvantage is u n d e n i a b l e , although in an a r m y
like t h o s e of t h e W e s t it h a s far less i m p o r t a n c e t h a n in a R u s s i a n o n e . It is
a disadvantage n o t to be avoided e x c e p t in an a r m y on a p e r m a n e n t w a r
footing (such as t h e Austrian a r m y h a s b e e n since 1848, in c o n s e q u e n c e of
which its c o r p s are also p r e t t y firmly organised); b u t for all t h a t the higher
15 degree of industrial perfection existing in w e s t e r n countries m a k e s u p , e v e n
in a merely military point of view, for this a n d a n y other disadvantage which
the exigencies of their civilisation m a y i m p o s e u p o n t h e m .
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The European War
Nr. 4055, 17.April 1854
The European War.
T h e m o s t important feature of the n e w s from E u r o p e , b r o u g h t by t h e Arctic
w h i c h arrived y e s t e r d a y morning, is the certainty t h a t t h e Russians h a v e
c r o s s e d the L o w e r D a n u b e , some 50,000 strong, in t h r e e corps u n d e r the
immediate c o m m a n d of Prince Gorchakoff, Gen. L ü d e r s a n d Gen. Oushakoff, a n d h a v e occupied a part of the T u r k i s h district of Dobrudja. This district
belongs to t h e province of Bulgaria, a n d is a n a r r o w plain inclosed on the
w e s t a n d n o r t h b y the D a n u b e — w h i c h b e n d s n o r t h w a r d l y a t C h e r n a v o d a ,
a n d m a k e s a large detour before reaching its mouth,—and on t h e e a s t by the
E u x i n e . A large p a r t of the district is m a r s h y a n d liable to be overflowed;
it contains several fortresses, such as t h o s e of B a b a d a g h , I s a k t s h a , Matchin
a n d Tultcha, which it is stated h a v e b e e n c a p t u r e d by t h e R u s s i a n s , b u t this
r e p o r t our well-informed L o n d o n c o r r e s p o n d e n t p r o n o u n c e s a m e r e stockjobbing invention. B e t w e e n the plain of the D o b r u d j a and the interior of
T u r k e y t h e Balkan stretches its protecting chain. T h e R u s s i a n s are no n e a r e r
Constantinople t h a n they w e r e previous to this m o v e m e n t , and h a v e gained
by it no n e w advantage over t h e T u r k s . In fact, it s e e m s perfectly clear t h a t
it is merely a defensive m o v e m e n t , indicating simply their intention to
w i t h d r a w from t h e m o s t w e s t e r n portions of Wallachia. Their entire force
in Wallachia m u s t e r e d seven divisions of infantry, o n e r e s e r v e division at
Ismail, a n d further b a c k t h e c o r p s of Tscheodajeff, n u m b e r i n g t h r e e divisions, w h i c h is now supposed to h a v e r e a c h e d J a s s y . T h e eight divisions,
together with t h e cavalry, are hardly a b o v e 110,000 strong. Considering the
possibility of the landing of an A n g l o - F r e n c h c o r p s on the n o r t h - w e s t e r n
shores of t h e Black Sea, menacing t h e R u s s i a n rear, it is plain t h a t t h e object
[of the] o c c u p a t i o n of the Dobrudja is to secure t h e R u s s i a n flank w i t h the
smallest possible sacrifice of ground. T h e r e w e r e b u t t w o m e a n s of securing
a position w h i c h w o u l d guard them against the danger of being c u t of f,—either
a direct r e t r e a t u p o n t h e Sereth, making t h e L o w e r D a n u b e their line of
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defense, with F o k s h a n i , Galatch a n d Ismail as supporting p o i n t s ; or to d a s h
at t h e Dobrudja, with their front leaning u p o n K u s t e n d j e , Hirsova, Oltenitza
and B u c h a r e s t ; the wall of Trajan, t h e D a n u b e and the Argish to be the first,
B u s e o the s e c o n d a n d t h e Sereth t h e third line of defense. T h e latter plan
w a s decidedly the b e s t , as for t h e terrain a b a n d o n e d on the o n e side a n e w
o n e is gained on t h e opposite flank, w h i c h gives to t h e retreat the c h a r a c t e r
of an a d v a n c e , and saves t h e military point d'honneur oí t h e R u s s i a n s . T h e
possession of t h e D o b r u d j a shortens t h e R u s s i a n front, allowing t h e m , in t h e
w o r s t c a s e , to retire u p o n Chotin on t h e Dniester, e v e n if a landing should
t a k e place at A k e r m a n or Odessa. F o r t h e details of t h e m a n e u v e r s by which
this change in the R u s s i a n position h a s b e e n effected, we h a v e yet to wait.
N e x t in interest is the moral certainty t h a t t h e G r e e k insurrection will be
supported by w h a t influence belongs to t h e m o n a r c h y of G r e e c e , the King
a n d Q u e e n b o t h having gone to t h e frontier to e n c o u r a g e t h e insurgents. In
this e m e r g e n c y , w a r b e t w e e n G r e e c e and T u r k e y , b a c k e d by the allies, is
nearly inevitable, adding to t h e complications if n o t seriously increasing t h e
dangers of the general conflict. On the other hand we h a v e the n e w s of
another proposal of p e a c e from t h e Czar himself, c o m m u n i c a t e d by w a y of
Prussia. Nicholas offers to settle the quarrel if the allies will obtain from
T u r k e y an act of complete emancipation for all her Christian subjects. In
t h a t case he will e v a c u a t e the Principalities w h e n the allied fleet p a s s e s the
Dardanelles. H a d t h e s e t e r m s b e e n openly proffered sooner they might h a v e
greatly diminished the c h a n c e s of t h e w a r , as t h e r e is no d o u b t that t h e allies
m e a n to p r o c u r e just such an emancipation, a n d refusal to admit at least a
p a r t of it h a s already led to the dismissal by the Sultan of two important
m e m b e r s of his g o v e r n m e n t . B u t t h e offer c a n n o t probably n o w p r e v e n t t h e
w a r ; for to the allied fleet a F r e n c h and English a r m y is n o w a d d e d , while
Sir Charles Napier will h a v e p r o b a b l y a t t a c k e d a n d t a k e n Aland before n e w
orders could be sent o u t and r e a c h him. Still this p r o p o s a l m a y h a v e a greater
i m p o r t a n c e t h a n we are inclined to attribute to it; on t h a t h e a d we shall
doubtless h a v e full information by t h e n e x t steamer.
Amid all this confusion and uncertainty, o n e thing alone seems clear, a n d
t h a t is t h e extinction of t h e M o s l e m p o w e r as a distinct polity in E u r o p e . T h e
emancipation of the Christians of T u r k e y , w h e t h e r effected by peaceful
c o n c e s s i o n or by violence, degrades Islamism from a political authority to
a religious sect, and utterly u p r o o t s the old foundations of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e . It n o t only perfectly recognizes t h e t r u t h of the C z a r ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t
t h e O t t o m a n P o r t e is laboring u n d e r a d a n g e r o u s malady, b u t cuts the patient's t h r o a t by w a y of medication. After that operation t h e Sultan m a y
possibly be retained as a political fiction u p o n t h e t h r o n e of his fathers, b u t
t h e real rulers of the c o u n t r y must be l o o k e d for elsewhere. It is clear w h y
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in s u c h a case the Russian autocrat should be willing to settle quietly w i t h
his w e s t e r n antagonists. T h e y will h a v e effected in T u r k e y t h e most c o m p l e t e
revolution conceivable, and effected it wholly in his interest. After such a
dissolution of t h e p r e s e n t ruling authority, his relations to t h e G r e e k C h u r c h
in t h e c o u n t r y , a n d to t h e Slavonians, will really e n d o w h i m with t h e su5
p r e m e p o w e r over it; he will t h e n h a v e the o y s t e r while t h e w e s t e r n governm e n t s are obliged to content t h e m s e l v e s with the shells. S u c h a cons u m m a t i o n , t h o u g h n o w improbable, i s n o t impossible. B u t w e m a y b e sure
t h e r e are plenty of elements, n o t yet d e v e l o p e d , w h i c h will presently r u s h
in to exercise a powerful influence on t h e progress of this great struggle. 10
A m o n g t h e s e h o w far the long-slumbering E u r o p e a n Revolution is to play
a leading part is a question which the s t a t e s m e n of t h a t h e m i s p h e r e affect
to ignore, b u t of which t h e y m a y s o o n be unpleasantly r e m i n d e d .
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Karl Marx
The War Debate in Parliament
Nr. 4055, 17. April 1854
The War Debate in Parliament.
From Our O w n Correspondent.
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , April 4, 1854.
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A singularity of English tragedy, so repulsive to F r e n c h feelings t h a t Voltaire
u s e d to call S h a k s p e r e a d r u n k e n savage, is its peculiar mixture of t h e
sublime and the b a s e , t h e terrible a n d t h e ridiculous, the heroic and t h e
b u r l e s q u e . B u t n o w h e r e d o e s S h a k s p e r e d e v o l v e u p o n t h e Clown t h e t a s k
of speaking the prologue of a heroic d r a m a . This invention w a s r e s e r v e d for
t h e Coalition Ministry. Mylord A b e r d e e n h a s performed, if n o t t h e English
Clown, at least the Italian Pantaloon. All great historical m o v e m e n t s appear,
to t h e superficial o b s e r v e r , finally to subside into the farce, or at least t h e
c o m m o n - p l a c e . B u t to c o m m e n c e w i t h this is a feature peculiar alone to t h e
t r a g e d y entitled, War with Russia, t h e p r o l o g u e of w h i c h w a s recited on
F r i d a y evening in b o t h H o u s e s of Parliament, w h e r e the Ministry's a d d r e s s
in answer to her M a j e s t y ' s m e s s a g e w a s simultaneously discussed a n d
u n a n i m o u s l y adopted, t o b e h a n d e d over t o the Q u e e n y e s t e r d a y afternoon,
sitting u p o n her t h r o n e i n B u c k i n g h a m Palace. T h e proceedings i n t h e H o u s e
of L o r d s m a y be v e r y briefly delineated. L o r d C l a r e n d o n m a d e the Ministerial, and L o r d D e r b y t h e Opposition s t a t e m e n t of the c a s e . T h e o n e s p o k e
as t h e m a n in office, and the other like t h e m a n o u t of it. L o r d A b e r d e e n ,
t h e noble E a r l at the h e a d of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , t h e " a c r i m o n i o u s " confident
of t h e Czar, the " d e a r , good, and e x c e l l e n t " A b e r d e e n of Louis Philippe, t h e
" e s t i m a b l e g e n t l e m a n " of Pio IX although concluding his s e r m o n with his
usual whinings for p e a c e , c a u s e d , during t h e principal p a r t of his perf o r m a n c e , their lordships to be c o n v u l s e d with laughter, by declaring w a r
n o t on Russia, b u t on The Press, a L o n d o n w e e k l y periodical. L o r d M a l m e s b u r y r e t o r t e d o n t h e noble E a r l ; L o r d B r o u g h a m , t h a t " o l d , foolish w o m a n , "
a s h e w a s styled b y William C o b b e t t , d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e c o n t e s t o n w h i c h
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t h e y w e r e engaged w a s n o " e a s y " o n e ; Earl G r e y w h o , i n his Christian spirit,
h a d contrived to m a k e the British Colonies the m o s t miserable a b o d e s of t h e
world, r e m i n d e d the British people that t h e t o n e a n d t e m p e r in w h i c h t h e
w a r w a s referred t o , the feeling of animosity evinced against t h e Czar and
his C o s s a c k s , was not the spirit in which a Christian nation ought to e n t e r
u p o n w a r . T h e E a r l of H a r d w i c k e w a s of opinion t h a t E n g l a n d w a s w e a k in
t h e m e a n s she p o s s e s s e d for dealing with t h e Russian n a v y ; t h a t t h e y ought
n o t to h a v e a less force in the Baltic t h a n 20 sail of t h e line, well a r m e d and
well m a n n e d , with disciplined c r e w s , and not begin, as t h e y h a d d o n e , with
a m o b of newly raised m e n , a m o b in a line-of-battle ship during an action
being t h e w o r s t of all m o b s . T h e Marquis of L a n s d o w n e vindicated t h e
G o v e r n m e n t , and e x p r e s s e d a h o p e as to the s h o r t n e s s and ultimate success
of t h e war, b e c a u s e (and this is a characteristic m a r k of t h e noble lord's
p o w e r s of conception) "it w a s no dynastic w a r , s u c h a w a r involving the
largest c o n s e q u e n c e s , and which it w a s t h e m o s t difficult to p u t an end t o . "
After this agreeable conversazione in w h i c h e v e r y b o d y h a d given his
sentiment, t h e a d d r e s s w a s agreed to nemine contraddente.
All t h e new information to be gathered from this conversazione is limited
to s o m e official declarations on t h e part of L o r d C l a r e n d o n , a n d t h e history
of the secret m e m o r a n d u m of 1844.
L o r d C l a r e n d o n stated that " a t p r e s e n t t h e agreement with France consists
simply of an exchange of notes containing a r r a n g e m e n t s with r e s p e c t to
military o p e r a t i o n s . " C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e exists, at this m o m e n t , no treaty
b e t w e e n England-and F r a n c e . In reference to A u s t r i a and Prussia he stated
, t h a t the former would maintain an a r m e d neutrality, a n d the other a neutral
neutrality; b u t t h a t " w i t h such a w a r as is n o w a b o u t to be waged u p o n t h e
frontiers of both countries, it w o u l d be impossible for either p o w e r to p r e s e r v e a neutrality." Finally he declared t h a t t h e p e a c e to be b r o u g h t a b o u t
by t h e impending^ w a r , w o u l d only be a glorious p e a c e "if t h e y did secure
.equal rights a n d immunities for t h e Christian subjects of T u r k e y . "
N o w w e k n o w t h a t the Sheik-el-Islam h a s already b e e n d e p o s e d for having
refused to s a n c t i o n by a fetva t h e t r e a t y granting this equalization of rights;
t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t e x c i t e m e n t exists on the p a r t of t h e old T u r k i s h population
at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; a n d by a telegraphic dispatch r e c e i v e d to-day we learn
t h a t t h e C z a r h a s declared to P r u s s i a t h a t he is willing to w i t h d r a w his t r o o p s
from t h e Principalities if t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s should succeed in imposing
such a t r e a t y u p o n the P o r t e . All he w a n t s is to b r e a k the O s m a n rule. If the
W e s t e r n P o w e r s p r o p o s e to do it in his stead, he, of c o u r s e , is not the m a d m a n
to w a g e war with t h e m .
N o w to t h e history of the secret m e m o r a n d u m , w h i c h I collect from the
s p e e c h e s of D e r b y , A b e r d e e n , M a l m e s b u r y and Granville. T h e m e m o r a n d u m
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w a s "intended to be a provisional, conditional and secret a r r a n g e m e n t b e t w e e n Russia, Austria and England, to m a k e certain arrangements with
respect t o T u r k e y , which F r a n c e , without any c o n s e n t o n her part, w a s t o
be obliged to c o n c u r i n . " This m e m o r a n d u m , t h u s described in the w o r d s
5 of L o r d M a l m e s b u r y , w a s the result of private conferences b e t w e e n the
Czar, the Earl of A b e r d e e n , t h e D u k e of Wellington and Sir R o b e r t Peel. It
w a s by the advice of A b e r d e e n t h a t the C z a r a d d r e s s e d himself to the D u k e
and to Sir R o b e r t Peel. It r e m a i n s a matter of c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n L o r d
A b e r d e e n and his o p p o n e n t s , w h e t h e r the m e m o r a n d u m w a s d r a w n u p b y
10 C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e , on the r e t u r n of t h e Czar to St. P e t e r s b u r g subsequently
to his visit to England in 1844, or w h e t h e r it w a s d r a w n up by the English
Ministers themselves as a r e c o r d of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m a d e by t h e
Emperor.
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T h e connection of the Earl of A b e r d e e n with this d o c u m e n t w a s distinguished from t h a t of a m e r e Minister with an official d o c u m e n t as proved,
according to t h e s t a t e m e n t of M a l m e s b u r y , by another paper not laid before
the House. T h e d o c u m e n t w a s considered of t h e greatest i m p o r t a n c e , a n d
such as might not be c o m m u n i c a t e d to the o t h e r p o w e r s , notwithstanding
A b e r d e e n ' s a s s u r a n c e that h e had c o m m u n i c a t e d the " s u b s t a n c e " t o F r a n c e .
T h e Czar, at all e v e n t s , w a s not a w a r e of s u c h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n having b e e n
m a d e . T h e d o c u m e n t w a s sanctioned a n d a p p r o v e d b y t h e D u k e o f Wellington a n d Sir R o b e r t Peel. It w a s n o t b r o u g h t u n d e r the cognizance and
consideration of t h e Peel Cabinet, of which L o r d D e r b y w a s at t h a t time a
m e m b e r . It remained not with t h e ordinary p a p e r s of t h e Foreign Office, b u t
in t h e private c u s t o d y of e a c h successive S e c r e t a r y of State, with no c o p y
of it w h a t e v e r in the Foreign Office. W h e n L o r d D e r b y acceded to office,
he k n e w nothing of it, although himself a m e m b e r of t h e Peel Cabinet in 1844.
W h e n the E a r l of A b e r d e e n left office, he h a n d e d it over in a b o x to L o r d
P a l m e r s t o n , w h o h a n d e d t h e b o x o f P a n d o r a over t o his successor, E a r l
Granville, w h o , as he states himself, at the r e q u e s t of B a r o n B r u n n o w , the
Russian E m b a s s a d o r , h a n d e d it over to t h e E a r l of M a l m e s b u r y on his
accession to the Foreign Office. But, in the m e a n t i m e , t h e r e a p p e a r s to h a v e
b e e n an alteration, or rather a falsification in t h e original i n d o r s e m e n t of t h e
d o c u m e n t , since the Earl of Granville sent it to t h e E a r l of M a l m e s b u r y w i t h
a n o t e stating t h a t it w a s a m e m o r a n d u m d r a w n up by Baron Brunnow, as
the result of the conferences b e t w e e n the E m p e r o r of Russia, Sir R o b e r t Peel
a n d L o r d A b e r d e e n , t h e n a m e of t h e D u k e of Wellington not being mentioned
at all. No o t h e r motive can be supposed for this false allegation but the
anxiety to conceal the importance of the m e m o r a n d u m by describing it as
a m e r e annotation of the E m b a s s a d o r , instead of an official d o c u m e n t issued
from t h e Chancellory at St. P e t e r s b u r g .
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S u c h w a s t h e i m p o r t a n c e R u s s i a attached t o this d o c u m e n t t h a t 4 8 h o u r s
after L o r d M a l m e s b u r y h a d b e e n i n office, B a r o n B r u n n o w c a m e a n d a s k e d
him w h e t h e r h e h a d r e a d it; b u t M a l m e s b u r y h a d n o t t h e n d o n e so, i t being
n o t f o r w a r d e d to him till a few d a y s after. B a r o n B r u n n o w u r g e d on him t h e
n e c e s s i t y of reading this d o c u m e n t , w h i c h he stated constituted the key of
all conferences with Russia. F r o m t h a t m o m e n t , h o w e v e r , he n e v e r m e n tioned t h e d o c u m e n t again to the D e r b y i t e s , apparently judging t h e T o r y
Administration t o o powerless or t o o transitory for carrying out t h e Russian
policy. In D e c e m b e r , 1852, the D e r b y G o v e r n m e n t w e n t o u t , and shortly after
t h e intelligence of the formation of t h e Coalition reaching St. P e t e r s b u r g , on
J a n . 11, the Czar again o p e n e d this question—a sufficient e v i d e n c e this t h a t
he t h o u g h t t h e cabinet of all t h e talents r e a d y to act on t h e basis of this
memorandum.
H e r e , t h e n , w e h a v e the m o s t compromising revelations m a d e i n t h e H o u s e
of L o r d s by t h e most irreversible witnesses, all of t h e m having b e e n Prime
or Foreign Ministers of G r e a t Britain. An " e v e n t u a l engagement"—the e x p r e s s i o n u s e d in the memorandum—is secretly e n t e r e d into with R u s s i a by
an English Foreign Minister, n o t only w i t h o u t the sanction of Parliament,
b u t b e h i n d t h e b a c k s of his o w n colleagues, t w o of t h e m only having b e e n
initiated into t h e m y s t e r y . T h e p a p e r is for t e n y e a r s withheld from the F o r eign Office and k e p t in clandestine c u s t o d y by e a c h successive Foreign Minister. W h e n e v e r a ministry disappears from the s c e n e , t h e R u s s i a n E m b a s s a dor a p p e a r s i n Downing-st. a n d intimates t o t h e n e w - c o m e r t h a t h e h a d t o
l o o k closely a t t h e b o n d , t h e secret b o n d , e n t e r e d into n o t b e t w e e n the
nation a s legally r e p r e s e n t e d , b u t b e t w e e n s o m e Cabinet-Minister a n d t h e
C z a r , a n d to act according to the line of c o n d u c t p r e s c r i b e d in a R u s s i a n
m e m o r a n d u m d r a w n up in the Chancellory of St. P e t e r s b u r g .
If this be n o t an o p e n infraction of the Constitution, if n o t a conspiracy
a n d high t r e a s o n , if not collusion with Russia, we are at a loss to u n d e r s t a n d
t h e m e a n i n g of t h e s e t e r m s .
A t t h e same time w e u n d e r s t a n d from t h e s e revelations w h y t h e criminals,
perfectly s e c u r e , are allowed to r e m a i n at t h e h e l m of t h e S t a t e , at t h e v e r y
e p o c h of an ostensible w a r with Russia, with w h o m t h e y are convicted to
h a v e p e r m a n e n t l y conspired, and w h y the P a r l i a m e n t a r y opposition is a m e r e
s h a m , intended to a n n o y b u t n o t to i m p e a c h t h e m . All F o r e i g n Ministers, and
c o n s e q u e n t l y all t h e successive Administrations since 1844 are accomplices,
e a c h of t h e m b e c o m i n g so from t h e m o m e n t he neglected to a c c u s e his
p r e d e c e s s o r a n d quietly a c c e p t e d t h e mysterious b o x . By t h e m e r e affectation of secrecy e a c h of t h e m b e c a m e guilty. E a c h of t h e m b e c a m e a
p a r t y to t h e conspiracy by concealing it from Parliament. By law t h e concealer of stolen goods is as criminal as the thief. A n y legal proceeding,
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therefore, w o u l d ruin n o t only the Coalition, b u t their rivals also, and not
only t h e s e Ministers, b u t the P a r l i a m e n t a r y parties t h e y r e p r e s e n t , and n o t
only t h o s e parties, but t h e governing classes of England.
I m a y r e m a r k , en passant, t h a t the only s p e e c h delivered in the H o u s e of
L o r d s w o r t h mentioning is t h a t of t h e E a r l of D e r b y ; b u t his criticism of t h e
m e m o r a n d u m and t h e secret correspondence—and I m a y say t h e s a m e w i t h
r e s p e c t to t h e d e b a t e in t h e Commons—contains nothing t h a t I h a v e n o t stated
before in the full analysis I g a v e y o u of that fatal m e m o r a n d u m and t h a t
extraordinary c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .
" T h e p o w e r of declaring w a r is a prerogative of the C r o w n , a real p r e rogative; a n d if H e r Majesty s u m m o n s h e r Parliament, a n d informs t h e m t h a t
she has found it n e c e s s a r y to engage herself in w a r , it is n o t an occasion w h e n
the C o m m o n s enter on t h e policy or impolicy of t h e war. It is their duty, u n d e r
such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , to rally r o u n d the t h r o n e , and to take a p r o p e r , s u b s e q u e n t and constitutional occasion of c o m m e n t i n g on the policy which m a y
h a v e led to the w a r . " So said Mr. Disraeli in the sitting of the C o m m o n s , and
so said all t h e C o m m o n e r s , and yet The Times fills s e v e n t e e n columns with
their c o m m e n t s o n t h a t policy. W h y w a s this? E v e n b e c a u s e i t w a s not the
" o c c a s i o n , " b e c a u s e their talk w o u l d r e m a i n resultless. B u t w e m u s t e x c e p t
Mr. L a y a r d , w h o stated plainly: "If it should be the feeling of the H o u s e ,
after w h a t he should state to t h e m , t h a t t h e c o n d u c t of t h e Ministers should
force the subject of a P a r l i a m e n t a r y inquiry, he should n o t shrink from
t h e duty t h u s i m p o s e d u p o n h i m , a n d w o u l d b e r e a d y t o a s k the Ministers
to fix an early d a y on w h i c h t h e m a t t e r might be b r o u g h t f o r w a r d . " Y o u will
c o m p r e h e n d n o w t h e r e a s o n w h y The Times begins to d o u b t the justice of
the Assyrian discoveries of M r . L a y a r d .
L o r d J . R u s s e l l , w h o introduced t h e a d d r e s s in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s ,
distinguished himself from L o r d C l a r e n d o n only by his intonation of t h e
w o r d s integrity, liberty, i n d e p e n d e n c e , civilization, w h e r e b y he secured t h e
c h e e r s of his m o r e c o m m o n audience.
Mr. L a y a r d , w h o r o s e t o reply t o him c o m m i t t e d t w o great b l u n d e r s , w h i c h
disfigured his o t h e r w i s e r e m a r k a b l e speech. In t h e first place, he sought to
establish t h e existence of opposite e l e m e n t s in t h e Coalition, the R u s s i a n
element a n d the English element, t h e A b e r d e e n fraction a n d t h e P a l m e r s t o n
fraction, t h e s e t w o fractions possessing no o t h e r distinction t h a n their language and their m o d e s of subserviency to Russia. T h e one is a p a r t i s a n of
Russia, b e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d her, a n d the other although h e
u n d e r s t a n d s her. T h e former is, t h e r e f o r e , a n o p e n partisan, and t h e other
a secret agent. T h e former, t h e r e f o r e , s e r v e s gratuitously, and the latter is
paid. T h e former is less d a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e placed in o p e n antagonism to t h e
feelings of the English p e o p l e ; the latter is fatal, b e c a u s e he m a k e s himself
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p a s s for t h e incarnation of the national animosity against Russia. With
M r . L a y a r d we m u s t p r e s u m e that it is ignorance of the m a n w h o m he places
in opposition to A b e r d e e n . F o r Mr. Disraeli, w h o e m p l o y e d t h e same contrast, t h e r e is no such e x c u s e . No m a n k n o w s L o r d P a l m e r s t o n better t h a n
t h a t chief of the Opposition, w h o declared already in 1844, t h a t no foreign
5
policy of any Minister had ever b e e n so fatal to British interests as that of
the noble L o r d . T h e second blunder c o m m i t t e d b y Mr. L a y a r d w a s his argum e n t that The Times w a s t h e direct organ of the A b e r d e e n p a r t y b e c a u s e
t h e secret and confidential c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , t w o or t h r e e d a y s after arrival,
furnished materials for its leading articles, w h i c h e n d e a v o r e d to bring the 10
c o u n t r y to c o n s e n t to the nefarious transaction intended at St. Petersburg,
especially its articles during F e b r u a r y a n d M a r c h of last y e a r . L a y a r d w o u l d
h a v e d o n e better t o conclude with L o r d P a l m e r s t o n t h a t t h o s e materials w e r e
furnished b y the Russian E m b a s s y a t L o n d o n , w h e n h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n able
to charge b o t h The Times and t h e Foreign Office with being t h e organs of
15
t h e St. P e t e r s b u r g Cabinet.
Holding the opinion that The Times is, in fact, a greater p o w e r t h a n the
Coalition, n o t as to its opinions b u t as to t h e d a t a w h i c h constitute t h e
t r e a s o n a b l e character of this secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ; I subjoin t h e whole
s t a t e m e n t of Mr. L a y a r d against t h a t p a p e r :
" T h e first of t h e s e secret dispatches w a s received in this c o u n t r y on the
23d of J a n u a r y , 1853, and on the 26th of the same m o n t h a p p e a r e d in The
Times t h e first of t h o s e articles to which he h a d referred. T h e n e x t dispatch
w a s received on the 6th of F e b r u a r y , 1853, a n d on t h e 11th of the s a m e m o n t h ,
four d a y s afterward, t h e r e a p p e a r e d an e x t r a o r d i n a r y article in The Times,
from w h i c h he would n o w quote. In o n e part of t h e article it w a s stated:
' W e do n o t s u p p o s e that it is the intention or the policy of R u s s i a to
accelerate a c a t a s t r o p h e in t h e E a s t , and the g o o d offices of this c o u n t r y will
again be e m p l o y e d to lessen the perils of a situation w h i c h is becoming
critical. We cannot, h o w e v e r , forget t h a t t h e a t t e m p t to prolong t h e brutal
and decrepit authority of the T u r k s in E u r o p e is p u r c h a s e d by the surrender
of fine p r o v i n c e s and a large Christian population to b a r b a r o u s misg o v e r n m e n t ; and we shall rejoice w h e n civilization and Christianity are able
to repair the injuries of the O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t . '
Again, it w a s stated in The Times on the 23d of F e b r u a r y 1853, after various
c o m m e n t s on t h e e x h a u s t e d state of T u r k e y :
'With the u t m o s t political caducity, with a total w a n t of ability and integrity
in t h e m e n w h o are still its rulers, with a declining M u s s u l m a n population, a n d
an e x h a u s t e d treasury, the Porte unites as if by w a y of derisory contrast a
dominion over some of the most fertile regions, t h e finest ports a n d t h e most
enterprising a n d ingenious people of S o u t h e r n E u r o p e . . . . It is h a r d to
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c o m p r e h e n d h o w so great a positive evil c a n h a v e b e e n so long defended
by politicians as a relative g o o d ; and, t h o u g h we are n o t insensible to t h e
difficulties attending any change in t h e territories of so huge an empire, we
are disposed to view with satisfaction r a t h e r t h a n with alarm the a p p r o a c h
of a p e r i o d '
H o w did The Times k n o w t h e p e r i o d w a s a p p r o a c h i n g ?
' w h e n it will be impossible to prolong t h e d o m i n i o n of such a G o v e r n m e n t
as t h a t of t h e Porte over such a c o u n t r y as t h a t w h i c h is n o w subject to its
authority. P e r h a p s t h a t period is less distant t h a n is c o m m o n l y s u p p o s e d ;
a n d it m a y be t h e part of wise s t a t e s m e n to provide against such a conj u n c t u r e , w h i c h it is b e y o n d their p o w e r indefinitely to p o s t p o n e . We do n o t
believe, and we do not m e a n to imply, that a n y combination of A u s t r i a a n d
Russia, hostile to t h e territorial claims of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , is now in
existence, or is likely to be f o r m e d without the knowledge of t h e other
E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . We h a v e strong g r o u n d s to believe'—When The Times
says t h a t , we k n o w w h a t it means—'that P r i n c e Menchikoff is sent from
St. P e t e r s b u r g to Constantinople u p o n a special e m b a s s y , for the e x p r e s s
p u r p o s e of declaring, in t h e n a m e of t h e E m p e r o r Nicholas, t h a t as h e a d of
the G r e e k C h u r c h he c a n n o t submit, or allow the E a s t e r n C h u r c h to submit,
to t h e conditions of t h e firman recently obtained by t h e F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r
w i t h reference t o t h e H o l y Shrines i n t h e H o l y L a n d . '
N o w , the first intimation of Prince Menchikoff's mission w a s contained
in Sir H . S e y m o u r ' s dispatches, received F e b r u a r y 14 and F e b r u a r y 2 1 . It
w a s important to o b s e r v e t h a t on the 6th of M a r c h , 1853, arrived the dispatch
giving t h e w h o l e of t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a ' s plan for t h e partition of T u r k e y .
T h e a n s w e r to it, as he had before said, w a s n o t r e t u r n e d before t h e 23d of
M a r c h , a n d no Cabinet Council w a s held until t h e 13th of M a r c h , though certain m e m b e r s of t h e G o v e r n m e n t h a d s e v e n d a y s previously received t h e E m p e r o r ' s proposal. T h a t p r o p o s a l w a s n o t submitted to their colleagues till t h e
13th of M a r c h , b u t it h a d b e e n previously submitted to The Times, for on
t h e 7th of M a r c h , t h e morning f ollpwing t h e receipt of the dispatch, w h i c h
t h e n could not h a v e b e e n k n o w n t o m o r e t h a n t w o o r t h r e e m e m b e r s o f t h e
Cabinet, a n d which could not t h e n h a v e b e e n seen by a n y clerk in the Foreign
Office, there a p p e a r e d a particular article in The Times. ( H e a r , h e a r . ) T h e
article said, a m o n g other things, that
' T h e state of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e a n d the relations of the E u r o p e a n P o w e r s
to t h e E a s t are subjects on w h i c h it m a y be useful for reflecting politicians
and the i n d e p e n d e n t p r e s s to form a n d e x p r e s s opinions, though t h e cons u m m a t i o n to which t h e s e opinions point be still u n w e l c o m e and r e m o t e .
Statesmen, b o u n d to transact the business of the d a y , and to recognize at
every t u r n t h e obligations of w h a t is called S t a t e necessity, are restrained
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within n a r r o w e r limits, and would probably be u n a b l e to give effect to any
novel or original conception if it had not previously b e e n entertained by the
mind a n d r e a s o n of the p u b l i c '
H e e n t r e a t e d the noble L o r d t o m a r k the w o r d s w h i c h followed, for t h e y
referred to t h e objection which he h a d offered.
' W e are therefore by no m e a n s surprised that, in adverting to the diff e r e n c e s which h a v e recently t a k e n place in T u r k e y , a n d especially on its
E u r o p e a n frontiers, L o r d J o h n Russell should h a v e e x p r e s s e d his dissent
from t h e opinions w h i c h h a v e b e e n recently p u t f o r w a r d o n this subject, a n d
should h a v e r e p e a t e d in his place in Parliament, speaking u n d e r t h e weight
of official responsibility, the old story of t h e integrity a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e of
t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e . W e ourselves, h o w e v e r , are n o t affected b y similar
considerations.'
H o w did the writer know that the noble lord d i s s e n t e d ? ( H e a r . ) T h e article
proceeded:
' W e do not, therefore, c o n c u r in the opinion of L o r d J. Russell that no
greater calamity could occur t o E u r o p e a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h a n t h e n e c e s sity of considering w h a t ought to be d o n e in s u c h a c a s e as t h e d i s m e m b e r m e n t of t h a t empire.'
L e t t h e H o u s e m a r k the following w o r d s , for t h e y w e r e almost identical
with t h o s e of t h e E m p e r o r of Russia:
'It would, we think, be a far greater calamity t h a t the d i s m e m b e r m e n t
c o m m e n c e d b e f o r e any such consideration h a d t a k e n place.'
( H e a r , H e a r . ) T h e y w e r e the very w o r d s . T h e writer w e n t o n t h u s :
' A n d h e r e we m u s t be allowed to e x p r e s s our surprise t h a t any s t a t e s m a n
should, for an instant, confound t h e policy w h i c h it might be p r o p e r to p u r s u e
in the e v e n t of a dissolution of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e with t h a t w h i c h led to
t h e partition of Poland. No doubt the argument of S t a t e necessity still remains to support the integrity and i n d e p e n d e n c e of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e ; b u t
t h a t a r g u m e n t stands alone against a h o s t of evils, a n d it m e a n s , in reality,
no m o r e t h a n the fear of dealing with a m o m e n t o u s and u n c e r t a i n question.
Y e t , s o strange are the p r e p o s s e s s i o n s o n this subject w h i c h h a v e b e e n
fostered, especially of late y e a r s , that an a t t e m p t to discuss this question on
its o w n merits is v i e w e d in some q u a r t e r s as an act of political depravity,
and a violation of all the laws which bind nations together.'
T h e n e x t article a p p e a r e d on t h e 10th of March. T h e H o u s e might, p e r h a p s ,
h a v e b e e n of opinion that hitherto he h a d n o t s h o w n t h a t the writer in The
Times e m p l o y e d t h e exact w o r d s u s e d in t h e d i s p a t c h e s ; b u t t h e article
h e w a s a b o u t t o r e a d w o u l d r e m o v e all d o u b t u p o n t h a t point. O n the
10th of M a r c h an article a p p e a r e d in The Times c o m m e n c i n g with t h e s e
words:
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'Prince Menchikoff arrives in a m o r e strictly diplomatic capacity, a n d we
h a v e r e a s o n to believe t h a t his instructions are m o r e conciliatory t h a n t h o s e
of C o u n t Leiningen.'
A similarity of expression w o u l d be found in Sir H. S e y m o u r ' s dispatch
of t h e 21st of F e b r u a r y :
' H i s Excellency (Count N e s s e l r o d e ) wished to a s s u r e me that the instructions with which Prince Menchikoff would be provided w e r e of a
conciliatory n a t u r e . '
T h e article continued:
' W e m u s t v e n t u r e to say that it implies s o m e p e n u r y of r e s o u r c e s in m o d e r n
s t a t e s m e n t h a t , w h e n t h e y h a v e to deal w i t h a question which involves t h e
civilization of great p r o v i n c e s , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of Christianity itself to t h a t
s u p r e m a c y which it o n c e enjoyed in all p a r t s of E u r o p e , and t h e progressive
welfare of millions of h u m a n beings, the only e x p e d i e n t on which they c a n
agree is to dress up a T u r k ' s h e a d in a t u r b a n , a n d agree to treat it as if it
w a s still a symbol of force and e m p i r e . '
A Cabinet Council w a s held on t h e 19th of M a r c h , at w h i c h the dispatch
received on t h e 6th of t h a t m o n t h w a s discussed, a n d an answer to it w a s
r e t u r n e d on t h e 23d of M a r c h , containing this p a s s a g e :
'Although her M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t feel compelled to adhere to t h e
principles and the policy laid d o w n in L o r d J o h n Russell's dispatch of t h e
9th of F e b r u a r y , yet they gladly c o m p l y w i t h the E m p e r o r ' s wish, that t h e
subject should be further and frankly discussed.'
On the s a m e d a y an article a p p e a r e d in The Times, in w h i c h some of t h e
p h r a s e s u s e d in L o r d C l a r e n d o n ' s dispatch might be found. T h e article
commenced thus:
'The opinions w e h a v e e x p r e s s e d o n t h e p r e s e n t condition and future
p r o s p e c t s of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e do n o t coincide with t h e views entertained
by L o r d J . R u s s e l l , and c o m m u n i c a t e d by him to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s ;
t h e y differ from t h e c o u r s e of policy w h i c h this c o u n t r y has p u r s u e d in
former times and on several o c c a s i o n s ; and t h e y are entirely at variance w i t h
t h e s y s t e m w h i c h a large numerical p r o p o r t i o n of t h e L o n d o n p r e s s is attempting, n o t v e r y brilliantly or successfully, to defend.'
H o n o r to t h e British p r e s s that, t h o u g h w a n t i n g the brilliant epigrammatic
p e n which h a d shaken a Colonial Minister a n d almost u p s e t a Cabinet, it did
n o t s u p p o r t the views of The Times. The Times a d d e d n e a r the e n d of its
article:
' H e (the E m p e r o r ) has said t h a t it is an object of his ambition to stand well
with this c o u n t r y , a n d to d e s e r v e its confidence. H i s proceedings on this
o c c a s i o n will bring t h a t a s s u r a n c e to the test, a n d he c a n give us no greater
proof of m o d e r a t i o n and good faith t o w a r d T u r k e y a n d t h e rest of E u r o p e
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t h a n a willingness to c o o p e r a t e on t h e s e subjects, as he has b e f o r e d o n e , w i t h
t h e British G o v e r n m e n t . '
On t h e same d a y on w h i c h The Times a n n o u n c e d t h a t its e n d e a v o r s to
reconcile t h e British public to t h e partition of T u r k e y h a d failed, t h e a n s w e r
to the dispatch w h i c h h a d b e e n delayed for 16 d a y s w a s sent to St. P e t e r s b u r g .
( H e a r , h e a r . ) He n e e d not trouble t h e H o u s e with further e x t r a c t s from The
5
Times."
Mr. Bright supported the character of M r . C o b d e n , in order to afford
a n o t h e r opportunity to L o r d P a l m e r s t o n to gather popularity by a b u s e of
R u s s i a a n d sham-energetic defense of t h e war-policy. A m o n g other things
P a l m e r s t o n stated:
" N o w , it is k n o w n , I think, to those w h o h a v e given their attention to t h e
affairs of E u r o p e for a considerable time past, t h a t t h e views of R u s s i a u p o n
T u r k e y a r e n o t o f y e s t e r d a y , o r indeed o f any r e c e n t d a t e . ( H e a r . ) I t i s k n o w n
t h a t for a great length of time it h a s b e e n t h e standing a n d established policy
of R u s s i a to e n d e a v o r to obtain possession of at least the E u r o p e a n p a r t of
T u r k e y , and subsequently of Asiatic T u r k e y . This policy h a s b e e n p u r s u e d
with undeviating a n d systematic p e r s e v e r a n c e . It h a s b e e n e v e r k e p t in view.
W h e n opportunities h a v e offered, steps i n a d v a n c e h a v e b e e n m a d e , and
w h e n c h e c k s h a v e b e e n experienced, t h o s e steps h a v e b e e n w i t h d r a w n ; b u t
only for t h e p u r p o s e of taking advantage of t h e n e x t opportunity w h i c h
offers. ( H e a r , h e a r . ) Delay has b e e n no e l e m e n t in mitigating or in inducing
R u s s i a to a b a n d o n its schemes. Its policy has b e e n to k e e p o n e object in
view—not to hurry, not to lose its object by p r e m a t u r e l y grasping at its
possession, b u t to w a t c h the c o u r s e of t h e other G o v e r n m e n t s of E u r o p e ,
and to t a k e advantage of every opportunity w h i c h might p r e s e n t itself, by
w h i c h it could get e v e n the slightest a d v a n c e t o w a r d t h e ultimate object of
its a m b i t i o n . "
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N o w c o m p a r e this declaration of L o r d P a l m e r s t o n w i t h t h o s e he m a d e in
1829, '30, ' 3 1 , ' 3 3 , '36, '40, ' 4 1 , '42, '43, '46, '48, '49, a n d y o u will find that 30
t h e a b o v e is less a reply to Mr. Bright t h a n to his o w n f o r m e r policy. B u t while
this cunning foe, by such onslaughts u p o n Russia, conciliates t h e sympathies
of the public, he on the other hand secures favor with the Czar, by the
following observation:
" N o w , Sir, do I blame the Russian G o v e r n m e n t for entertaining s u c h a 35
policy? A policy of aggrandizement p u r s u e d by legitimate m e a n s is a policy
w h i c h y o u m a y c o n d e m n a s dangerous t o y o u r s e l v e s , w h i c h y o u m a y o p p o s e
as destructive of t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e and t h e liberties of other S t a t e s , b u t w h i c h
is n o t a r e p r o a c h to the G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h p u r s u e s it, p r o v i d e d it be p u r s u e d
by o p e n , undisguised, and a v o w e d m e a n s , without c o n c e a l m e n t , without 40
subterfuge, a n d without fraud. N o w , t h e c o u r s e w h i c h , I am sorry to say,
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t h e Russian G o v e r n m e n t h a s p u r s u e d in all t h e s e r e c e n t transactions h a s n o t
b e e n that o p e n and straightforward c o u r s e w h i c h w o u l d justify it in avowing
a n d in boldly declaring its policy."
B u t t h e only r e p r o a c h t o b e m a d e against the R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t w a s
5 j u s t , as Mr. Disraeli t e r m e d it, h e r fatal frankness. P a l m e r s t o n , accordingly,
by disapproving only of w h a t R u s s i a did n o t d o , justifies entirely t h a t w h i c h
she really h a s done.
M r . Disraeli's criticism of the secret p a p e r s w a s clever, as usual, b u t missed
its effect by his declaration t h a t it w a s o u t of p l a c e , a n d t h a t his only intention
10 in addressing the H o u s e w a s to s u p p o r t the a d d r e s s . It is painful to see a m a n
of his genius cajoling a P a l m e r s t o n , n o t only in t h e H o u s e , b u t also in his
r e p u t e d organ, The Press, from so sordid a m o t i v e as t h e politics of place
a n d party.
In y e s t e r d a y ' s sitting of the H o u s e , Sir J. G r a h a m stated that he had r e 15 ceived intelligence that t h e fleet h a d e n t e r e d t h e Black Sea, and w a s in t h e
n e i g h b o r h o o d of V a r n a .
I n t h e H o u s e o f L o r d s , L o r d A b e r d e e n g a v e notice that o n T u e s d a y , t h e
11th, he should m o v e the adjournment of t h e H o u s e till T h u r s d a y , 27th inst.
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Karl Marx
Russia and the German Powers—Corn Prices
Nr. 4059, 21. April, 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , April 7, 1854.
L o r d C l a r e n d o n declared last night in the H o u s e of L o r d s t h a t " h e had r e a s o n
to b e l i e v e " that t h e n e w s of the landing of 4,000 R u s s i a n s in t h e D o b r o d j a
by m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t s from O d e s s a w a s u n t r u e . He w a s not a w a r e t h a t the
R u s s i a n fleet h a d left Sevastopol which point h a d b e e n w a t c h e d , n o w and
t h e n , by English a n d F r e n c h steamers. W i t h regard to the alleged inactivity
of t h e fleets, he begged to say t h a t a blockade of S e v a s t o p o l a n d O d e s s a could
only be u n d e r t a k e n by the whole of the c o m b i n e d s q u a d r o n , w h i c h w o u l d
h a v e b e e n a d a n g e r o u s undertaking during t h e b a d season. He believed,
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t it had b e e n politic to retain t h e m at B e i k o s . T h e V i e n n a
c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times c o n c u r s in this v i e w of L o r d Clarendon, a n d
m o r e o v e r , states t h e true motives of his policy. T h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of riots
at Constantinople has never b e e n more justified t h a n since t h e negotiations
for "Christian e m a n c i p a t i o n " h a v e b e c o m e k n o w n , and it would h a v e b e e n
highly " i m p o l i t i c " to move the fleets from the B o s p h o r u s before the arrival
of a sufficient land force, i.e., sufficient to p u t d o w n t h e T u r k s .
In t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s L o r d J o h n Russell said the responsibility for
t h e G r e e k insurrections rested with the C o u r t of A t h e n s , w h i c h h a d favored
t h e m at first secretly, and n o w openly.
T h e d e b a t e s of the w e e k offer nothing of interest, e x c e p t t h a t on
Mr. M o o r e ' s motion for a Select C o m m i t t e e to t a k e into consideration t h e
c a s e of the appointment of H. Stonor to the office of a J u d g e in the colony
of Victoria, t h e said S t o n o r having b e e n r e p o r t e d by a C o m m i t t e e of t h e
H o u s e to h a v e b e e n guilty of bribery at the elections in the b o r o u g h of Sligo
in 1853, t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of t h e C o m m i t t e e w a s granted. T h e prosecution of
M r . S t o n o r is, h o w e v e r , a m e r e p r e t e x t for renewing, on fresh ground, the
battle b e t w e e n t h e t w o fractions of the b r o k e n Irish Brigade. To w h a t degree
t h e sanctimonious clique of Mr. Gladstone and his co-Peelites are involved
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a n d c o m p r i s e d in t h e s e Irish scandals, m a y be j u d g e d from t h e following
r e m a r k of The Morning Post:
" I n the letters t h a t h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d , t h e gossip that has b e e n retailed
a n d t h e evidence w h i c h has b e e n given b e f o r e Parliamentary C o m m i t t e e s
within the last few w e e k s , t h e r e is m u c h calculated to give strength to t h e
suspicion t h a t t h e Peelite section of t h e coalition h a v e , for s o m e time past,
systematically e m p l o y e d agents to influence m a n y of the Irish elections, a n d
t h a t t h e y h a v e supplied t h e m largely with m o n e y for t h e p u r p o s e . T h e D u k e
of N e w c a s t l e is especially c o m p r o m i s e d
T h e r e certainly a p p e a r s to h a v e
b e e n a conference of p r e f e r m e n t u p o n individuals conducting election
b u s i n e s s , seemingly u n d e r his instruction."
The Daily News of to-day publishes t h e t r e a t y b e t w e e n F r a n c e , E n g l a n d
a n d T u r k e y , which, h o w e v e r , merely contains t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s for military
action. T h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s are careful n o t to bring t h e real conditions of
their " a s s i s t a n c e to the S u l t a n " into the form of a treaty. T h e s e are i m p o s e d
by L o r d Stratford de Redcliff e and his m i n a t o r y a p p a r a t u s in loco, and m a d e
to a p p e a r as t h e voluntary act of t h e T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t .
T h e peace-mission of the Prince of M e c k l e n b u r g to Berlin had no other
object in view b u t to furnish t h e K i n g of P r u s s i a with a n e w p r e t e x t for
keeping aloof from the W e s t e r n Alliance. I am informed from Berlin t h a t
R u s s i a w o u l d only acknowledge the S w e d i s h declaration of neutrality after
the King h a d b o u n d himself to r e i s s u e to t h e c o m m a n d a n t s of the S w e d i s h
h a r b o r s t h e old regulations, according to w h i c h no m o r e t h a n four foreign
men-of-war are allowed to a n c h o r within t h e range of the guns of any port.
As this order considerably departs from t h e stipulations of neutrality agreed
u p o n b e t w e e n S w e d e n a n d D e n m a r k , n e w negotiations b e t w e e n the Scandinavian p o w e r s o n t h e o n e h a n d , and t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s o n t h e other h a n d ,
are to be anticipated. It is generally believed at S t o c k h o l m that the R u s s i a n s
will a b a n d o n their occupation of Aland, a n d r a z e their fortifications on t h a t
island, carrying a w a y t h e guns and o t h e r material of w a r . A telegraphic
dispatch received to-day states t h a t this step h a d already b e e n carried out.
T h e A u s t r i a n corps d'observation in t h e s o u t h - e a s t e r n p o r t i o n s of H u n g a r y
is n o w on a c o m p l e t e w a r footing, a n d d r a w n up in t h e different positions
allotted to it. T h e concentration required from t e n to twelve d a y s . T h e
G e r m a n p a p e r s generally a s s u m e t h a t this a r m y w o u l d be destined to t a k e
t h e T u r k i s h a r m y in the flank, in c a s e of A u s t r i a joining actively with Russia,
and t h e r e would be no difficulty in doing so. B u t t h e A u s t r i a n s c a n only enter
T u r k e y either by M e h a d i a , w h e n t h e y w o u l d h a v e the T u r k i s h a r m y in their
front, or by Belgrade, w h e n t h e y w o u l d find t h e m s e l v e s in a line with t h e
e x t e n d e d left flank of the T u r k s . It is m u c h m o r e p r o b a b l e , therefore, t h a t
if t h e Austrians enter T u r k e y with hostile intentions, t h e y will m a r c h from
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Karl Marx
Belgrade u p o n Sophia b y K r u s c h e v a t z and N i s s a ; b u t e v e n i n t h a t c a s e the
T u r k s would h a v e a shorter w a y to Sophia, by marching from Widdin in a
direct line s o u t h w a r d .
T h e r e p o r t of t h e Prussian L o a n - C o m m i t t e e in t h e Second C h a m b e r ,
c o n t a i n s an a c c o u n t of the policy p u r s u e d by P r u s s i a in t h e E a s t e r n Question,
and publishes several diplomatic d o c u m e n t s w h i c h h a v e n o t y e t found thenw a y into t h e English p r e s s . I p r o p o s e , therefore, to give y o u some i m p o r t a n t
e x t r a c t s from t h a t r e p o r t .
At t h e end of J a n u a r y the Russian E m b a s s a d o r at Berlin, h a n d e d a p r o p o s i tion to t h e Prussian G o v e r n m e n t , simultaneously with t h e propositions m a d e
by C o u n t Orloff to the Austrian C o u r t , according to w h i c h the t h r e e C o u r t s
of Prussia, Austria and R u s s i a w e r e to sign a joint protocol. In t h e p r e a m b l e
to the draft of this protocol it is stated that the m o t i v e of this c o m m o n
e n g a g e m e n t w a s t h e desire to d r a w closer t h e alliance of t h e t h r e e p o w e r s ,
in v i e w of t h e dangers threatening t h e p e a c e of E u r o p e , and to regulate t h e
relations b o t h b e t w e e n t h e m a n d with the w e s t e r n p o w e r s u n d e r t h e imp e n d i n g j u n c t u r e . This draft contained the following t h r e e p o i n t s :
1. T h e t w o G e r m a n p o w e r s bind t h e m s e l v e s formally, in the c a s e of an
active participation by F r a n c e and England in t h e R u s s o - T u r k i s h war, to
o b s e r v e the strictest neutrality; and declare if t h e y should be again p r e s s e d
o r m e n a c e d b y t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s , t h a t t h e y are r e s o l v e d t o defend their
neutrality, in c a s e of need, with a r m s .
2 . T h e t h r e e p o w e r s will consider a n y a t t a c k b y F r a n c e o r E n g l a n d o n the
r e s p e c t i v e territories of Austria, Prussia, or a n y other G e r m a n State, as a
violation of their o w n territory, and will defend e a c h o t h e r , as circumstances
m a y r e q u i r e , a n d in a c c o r d a n c e to a c o m m o n military understanding (now
arranged b e t w e e n General H e s s and the Prussian Minister of W a r at
Berlin).
3. T h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a r e p e a t s his a s s u r a n c e t h a t he intends to bring
t h e w a r to a close as soon as compatible with his dignity and the well-under-
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stood interests of his empire. Considering, h o w e v e r , that t h e ulterior d e v e l o p m e n t of e v e n t s is likely to alter t h e existing state in T u r k e y , H i s Majesty
obliges himself, if he should c o m e to a n y u n d e r s t a n d i n g on that point with
t h e naval p o w e r s , to take no definitive resolution without previous c o n c e r t
w i t h his German allies.
35
This draft w a s a c c o m p a n i e d by a dispatch from C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e , in
which the Chancellor reminds Prussia a n d A u s t r i a of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of that
triple alliance w h i c h had so long b e e n t h e shield of E u r o p e . In sight of the
impending w a r his imperial master considered himself obliged to earnestly
appeal to his friends and allies. Their c o m m o n interest m a d e it n e c e s s a r y to 40
define t h e position which t h e y h a d n o w t o o c c u p y u n d e r t h e s e grave eventu-
194
alities. Pointing o u t the one-sided a d v a n c e of t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s , he called
attention to their w a n t of consideration for the interests of t h e G e r m a n
p o w e r s . R u s s i a acted differently. She w a s p r e p a r e d to submit alone to t h e
b u r d e n s of war, and w o u l d a s k neither sacrifices nor aid from h e r friends
5 and allies. T h e welfare of b o t h p o w e r s a n d of G e r m a n y d e p e n d e d on their
u n i o n . In this w a y t h e y would succeed in preventing t h e crisis from extending, and p e r h a p s s h o r t e n it. T h e R u s s i a n dispatch n e x t p r o c e e d s to
e x a m i n e t h e t h r e e alternative positions o p e n t o t h e G e r m a n p o w e r s : C o m m o n action with R u s s i a against t h e naval p o w e r s ; alliance with the latter
10 against Russia, or lastly, a strict neutrality. As to an alliance with Russia,
t h e Czar did n o t require it, and as to an action against him, it w a s impossible
if t h e G e r m a n p o w e r s would n o t submit to t h e m e n a c e of the w e s t e r n p o w e r s .
This w o u l d be the a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of a disgraceful necessity to the e n d of
bringing a b o u t a deplorable future. Russia, inattackable in her o w n territory,
15 a p p r e h e n d e d neither military invasions nor t h e m o r e pernicious invasions
of t h e revolutionary spirit. If h e r allies d e s e r t e d her, she k n e w h o w to restrict
herself to her o w n r e s o u r c e s , a n d w o u l d arrange herself so as to dispense
with t h e m in future, (M. de N e s s e l r o d e writes his dispatches in G e r m a n
taking c a r e that translation into a n o t h e r language b e c o m e s a m a t t e r of
20 downright despair. As a s p e c i m e n of his G e r m a n exercises I give you the
last s e n t e n c e in t h e original w o r d s : Wenn seine Alliirten es verliessen, so
würde es sich gesagt sein lassen, sich auf sich selbstzurückzuziehen und sich
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so einrichten, ihrer in Zukunft entbehren zu können.) B u t t h e C z a r h a d full
confidence in t h e k n o w n sentiments of his friends a n d allies, and in their
gallant armies, which had b e e n c o n n e c t e d long since with those of Russia
by t h e b a p t i s m of blood, (Bluttaufe) a n d by an identity of principles n o t to
be denied. T h e third alternative only t h e R u s s i a n Cabinet thinks w o r t h y of
the G e r m a n Courts, as corresponding with their interests, and a p p r o p r i a t e ;
by continuing their p a r t s as m e d i a t o r s , to realize t h e particular desires of
Russia. It must, h o w e v e r , be u n d e r s t o o d t h a t this neutrality could not be an
indefinite o n e , or m e r e l y provisional, or an e x p e c t a n t o n e , b e c a u s e s u c h an
attitude would be c o n s t r u e d as hostile by either belligerent, especially by
Russia. T h a t neutrality should rather be f o u n d e d on the principles (of the
Holy Alliance) which, during m a n y trials, h a d secured t h e general tranquillity
a n d the p e a c e of the world. It w a s the d u t y of the G e r m a n p o w e r s to give
effect to this basis of their policy, if n e e d b e , by a r m s . If the o n e (France)
of the t w o maritime p o w e r s should meditate or v e n t u r e u p o n an attack of
G e r m a n y , t h e other o n e (England) w o u l d instantly c h a n g e her position. At
all instances, if such an e v e n t should o c c u r , R u s s i a w a s r e a d y to c o m e forth
and support t h e m with all t h e forces at h e r c o m m a n d .
This proposition w a s declined at Berlin, and s o m e d a y s later at V i e n n a t o o .
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Manteuffel t h e n still played the i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s m a n , a n d declared in a
dispatch to St. P e t e r s b u r g that, by t h e desire of a r e n e w e d triple alliance,
Russia, which p r e t e n d e d not to require t h e aid of Prussia, y e t asked for it,
t h o u g h in an indirect form. "With regard to the revolutionary spirit, which
R u s s i a did not fear, he would o b s e r v e t h a t Prussia, t o o , h a d subjected it
w i t h o u t foreign aid." T h e independent minister, w h o " s a v e d " P r u s s i a b y
putting himself at t h e h e a d of the counter-revolution, c a n n o t suppress his
irritation at seeing Prussia, w h i c h had no H u n g a r y , p l a c e d in a line with
Austria.
While Prussia thus b o a s t s of her security, t h e o t h e r d o c u m e n t s alluded to
in t h e r e p o r t p r o v e that in the last d a y s of F e b r u a r y A u s t r i a submitted to
P r u s s i a the draft of a convention to be concluded b e t w e e n the four p o w e r s .
P r u s s i a declined it in a dispatch dated the 5th of M a r c h . B u t it is characteristic
of this p o w e r that it declares at the same time that the G o v e r n m e n t of
F r e d e r i c k William IV still considered the c o n c e r t of t h e four p o w e r s as t h e
b e s t m e a n s to arrive at a satisfactory solution of t h e complication. Austria,
c o n s e q u e n t l y , w a s forced also t o drop t h e c o n v e n t i o n w h i c h w o u l d h a v e p u t
an end to the equivocal position of b o t h G e r m a n p o w e r s .
A P r u s s i a n dispatch of M a r c h 16 contains t h e following important p a s sage:
" T h e Prussian Cabinet had noticed the m e a s u r e s t a k e n b y A u s t r i a w i t h
a v i e w to maintain her interests on t h e south-eastern frontiers. It w a s t r u e
t h a t Prussia, like all other G e r m a n S t a t e s , h a d to p r o t e c t its o w n particular
i n t e r e s t s ; b u t this should n o t exclude a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h Austria. O n
t h e c o n t r a r y , Prussia w a s r e a d y to enter into a c o n c e r t , as far as the maint e n a n c e of G e r m a n interests required. F r o m this motive she l o o k e d forward
to c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the following p o i n t s :
1. W h e t h e r Austria w a s p r e p a r e d , in order to secure the tranquillity of her
o w n frontier provinces, to o c c u p y the contiguous T u r k i s h p r o v i n c e s ?
2. W h e t h e r she would t a k e possession of the latter, a n d hold t h e m as a
pledge, till t h e restoration of p e a c e ?
3. W h e t h e r she intended to participate actively in the w a r ? "
It w o u l d wholly d e p e n d on the answer to these several questions for
P r u s s i a to c o m e to a conclusion as to w h a t t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of G e r m a n
interests w o u l d r e q u i r e , and w h e t h e r she could do anything to mitigate the
p r e s s u r e applied to Austria by the western powers, (not by Russia!).
On M a r c h 14, the Prussian G o v e r n m e n t a d d r e s s e d a circular N o t e to the
G e r m a n C o u r t s i n t h e o n e sense, and t h e Austrian G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e o p posite s e n s e . T h e Prussian circulaire says the impending w a r will be of a
purely local character. Austria, on the c o n t r a r y , maintains that t h e struggle
is likely to t a k e a t u r n w h i c h would intimately affect her o w n relations. As
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Russia and the German Powers—Com Prices
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long as c i r c u m s t a n c e s should permit, she w o u l d n o t participate in t h e w a r ;
b u t she h a d to consider also the eventuality of a participation in it. T h e
interests involved in this question w e r e likewise t h o s e of t h e G e r m a n States.
T h e Imperial Cabinet, t h e r e f o r e , t r u s t e d that in s u c h a contingency Prussia
a n d t h e other G e r m a n C o u r t s w o u l d join their forces with t h o s e of Austria.
T h e G e r m a n Confederation w o u l d t h e n b e called u p o n t o show that, b e y o n d
its p r e s e n t defensive attitude, it k n e w also h o w to fill an active p a r t in this
question. Austria w o u l d m a k e a further declaration as soon as the w a r
b e t w e e n t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s a n d R u s s i a should h a v e b e e n actually declared.
If t h e r e w e r e yet any m e a n s to p r e v e n t t h e increase of t h o s e dangers w h i c h
n o w t h r e a t e n e d E u r o p e , it would be found in t h e c o m m o n action of Austria
and Prussia, joined by their G e r m a n c o n f e d e r a t e s .
T h e last, b u t n o t least r e m a r k a b l e information contained in the report, is
t h e melancholy a n s w e r given by M. de Manteuffel to a question of t h e
C o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s , viz: T h a t R u s s i a h a d m a d e no c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h a t e v e r of h e r partition s c h e m e s to t h e Prussian G o v e r n m e n t .
In conclusion, we learn from this d o c u m e n t that the juggle of t h e V i e n n a
C o n f e r e n c e s has not at all c o m e to an end. On t h e contrary, it states, on the
authority of t h e Prussian Premier, t h a t a n e w p r o t o c o l w a s about to be d r a w n
u p , w h i c h w o u l d establish t h e continued understanding between the Four
Powers.
T h e c o r n m a r k e t is again rising. T h e c a u s e of the late fall in F r a n c e and
E n g l a n d w a s the p r e s s u r e acting u p o n speculators w h o , for w a n t of sufficient
capital and in a tight m o n e y m a r k e t , w e r e driven to forced sales which
25 o v e r s t o c k e d the m a r k e t s . A n o t h e r c a u s e w a s t h e fact t h a t t h e dealers, millers
and b a k e r s allowed their supplies to r u n o u t , in the belief that e n o r m o u s
c a r g o e s w e r e on the w a y to t h e E u r o p e a n p o r t s . I am, therefore, still of
opinion t h a t prices are yet far from having r e a c h e d their m a x i m u m . It is
certain t h a t in no previous y e a r w e r e s u c h e r r o n e o u s and illusory specula30 tions a b o u t the p r o b a b l e and possible supply of the corn m a r k e t entertained
as in the p r e s e n t year, illusions w h i c h are to a great e x t e n t encouraged by
the c a n t of the free-trade p a p e r s .
Karl M a r x .
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Position of the Armies in Turkey
Nr.4065, 28. April 1854
Position of the Armies in Turkey.
W h e n t h e intelligence of the Russian o c c u p a t i o n of t h e D o b r o d j a w a s first
received, a n d long before t h e real intentions of t h e R u s s i a n s in passing the
D a n u b e could be developed by their a c t s , we stated o u r opinion that the
leading idea of t h e m o v e m e n t could not be any other t h a n t h e i m p r o v e m e n t
of their defensive position. T h a t this w a s actually the c a s e is s h o w n by all
their steps since, and by t h o s e of their o p p o n e n t s also. T h e R u s s i a n s sent
from 40,000 to 50,000 m e n into the Dobrodja, w h o h a v e not, as far as reliable
information goes, p a s s e d the line from C h e r n a v o d a to K u s t e n d j e . T h e y
a p p e a r to h a v e sent an equal if not a superior n u m b e r to K a l a r a s h , opposite
Silistria, with the intention of menacing, or u n d e r favorable c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
of attacking t h a t fortress. T h e y h a v e w i t h d r a w n all their t r o o p s w e s t of
B u c h a r e s t with t h e e x c e p t i o n of a rear guard, which, incapable of holding
o u t a n y longer in front of Kalafat, h a s , it a p p e a r s , m a d e an e x c u r s i o n u p o n
t h e opposite Servian shore of t h e D a n u b e , for t h e p u r p o s e apparently of
showing the c o n t e m p t of the Russians for Servian neutrality, and trying w h a t
effect t h e p r e s e n c e of a few Russian uniforms w o u l d p r o d u c e a m o n g t h e
S e r v i a n peasantry—or e v e n p e r h a p s to furnish o c c a s i o n for t h e o c c u p a t i o n
of t h e c o u n t r y by Austria.
T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t we shall v e r y shortly h e a r of the w h o l e of L e s s e r
Wallachia being a b a n d o n e d by t h e R u s s i a n s , a n d w h a t , t h e n , will be their
position? Their line will e x t e n d from Tirgovest by Oltenitza a n d K a l a r a s h
t o C h e r n a v o d a a n d the/ice, crossing t h e D a n u b e , t o t h e B l a c k S e a n e a r
K u s t e n d j e . It is in fact, a position which sacrifices m o r e ground t h a n it gains.
T h i s is t h e c a s e notwithstanding this shortening of t h e R u s s i a n front is in
itself an advantage. At the same time it is a m o v e m e n t t o w a r d their left, by
w h i c h their line of retreat, formerly in t h e direction of t h e prolongation of
t h a t front, is n o w placed perpendicularly behind it. T w o m o n t h s ago O m e r
P a s h a could h a v e c u t off their r e t r e a t by m e r e l y passing t h e D a n u b e at any
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point b e t w e e n Silistria a n d H i r s o v a ; b u t n o w t h a t c a n n o t b e d o n e , except,
p e r h a p s , by landing t r o o p s n e a r t h e m o u t h of t h e Dniester. A n d it is in this
that t h e great advantage of t h e m o v e m e n t lies—an advantage not e v e n
b a l a n c e d by the risk e n c o u n t e r e d by placing the c o r p s in t h e Dobrudja in
an oblong rectangle, o n e side of w h i c h is closed by t h e strong position of
the e n e m y , another b y the sea, a n d t h e o t h e r t w o b y t h e t w o b e n d s o f t h e
D a n u b e with n o m o r e t h a n t h r e e bridges for c o m m u n i c a t i o n , r e è n f o r c e m e n t s o r retreat.
B u t h e r e ends t h e advantage gained b y t h e R u s s i a n s . T h e y h a v e obtained
a position from w h i c h they c a n retreat, b u t n o t o n e from w h i c h they c a n
a d v a n c e . Before t h e m , from Oltenitza to C h e r n a v o d a , is t h e D a n u b e , p a s s able at a few points only, and t h o s e points defended either by strong batteries
on a c o m m a n d i n g shore, or, as at Silistria, by a regular fortress. F u r t h e r on,
from C h e r n a v o d a to the sea are the lakes a n d m o r a s s e s of K a r a s u , t h e Wall
of Trajan, (refitted for defense on t h e points of passage) t h e fortress of
K u s t e n d j e , and the allied fleets on their flank in t h e Black Sea. B e y o n d the
D a n u b e , as well as b e y o n d T r a j a n ' s Wall, stretches a comparatively b a r r e n
country, generally of high ground, intersected in e v e r y direction by p r e cipitous ravines f o r m e d by n u m e r o u s rivers, n o n e of which are bridged over.
This c o u n t r y is certainly not impassable for an a r m y , but c a n only be
t r a v e r s e d by a force w h i c h m a y safely e x p e c t to find a good position, a w e a k
e n e m y , a n d plenty of provisions a n d forage on the other side. B u t h e r e just
the r e v e r s e is the c a s e . If the R u s s i a n s a d v a n c e from Trajan's Wall a n d from
Oltenitza o r Turtukai t o w a r d B a z a r d s h i k and R a s g r a d , t h e y m u s t l e a v e
t r o o p s b e h i n d t h e m to b l o c k a d e Silistria a n d to o b s e r v e R u s t s h u k . T h u s
w e a k e n e d , they p a s s the difficult c o u n t r y to Rasgrad and Bazardshik, and
w h e r e do t h e y arrive? W h y , before t h e first a d v a n c e d range of the Balkan,
w h i c h r u n s right across their line of o p e r a t i o n s , and w h i c h m u s t be p a s s e d
in d e t a c h e d corps on different a n d diverging r o a d s . Supposing this to be
a t t e m p t e d , their divided corps risk being b e a t e n in detail by a c o n c e n t r a t e d
force emerging from Shumla, t h e r e t r e a t of w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t in any c a s e
cut off. B u t supposing e v e n t h a t t h e y should o v e r c o m e all t h e s e difficulties,
a n d should appear, say 100,000 m e n strong, in the neighborhood of Shumla
and Varna,—what t h e n ? S h u m l a is a position w h i c h n o t only can be held by
40,000 m e n against 100,000, b u t in w h i c h t h e smaller force c a n n o t be k e p t
in c h e c k by the larger. At the same time, it c o v e r s V a r n a , w h i c h on the o t h e r
flank is c o v e r e d by t h e allied fleets. A n d V a r n a a n d S h u m l a form, c o m b i n e d ,
a line far stronger t h a n V e r o n a and L e g n a g o f o r m e d , in 1848, u p o n t h e Adige
for Field-Marshal R a d e t z k y , w h e n he w a s p r e s s e d on all sides by t h e Piedm ó n t e s e and insurgent Italian t r o o p s . M o r e o v e r , S h u m l a and V a r n a h a v e as
their c o m p l e m e n t s R u s t s h u k a n d Silistria, b o t h of w h i c h are situated in t h e
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Friedrich Engels
direction of the e n e m y ' s flank, and w h i c h , w e a k as t h e y m a y a p p e a r in
t h e m s e l v e s , c a n n o t successfully be a t t a c k e d as long as t h e m a i n force of t h e
T u r k i s h a r m y is capable of a sally from S h u m l a in either direction. B o t h
f o r t r e s s e s are situated on t h e D a n u b e , Silistria in front of the right c e n t e r
of the p r e s e n t Russian position, R u s t s h u k on its right flank. T h e y m u s t be
b l o c k a d e d on the right b a n k of t h e river; t h a t is to say, t h e blockading force
m u s t t a k e its station directly b e t w e e n the f o r t r e s s e s and Shumla, w h e r e ,
according to all a p p e a r a n c e s , O m e r P a s h a is concentrating t h e bulk of his
t r o o p s . A n y force, blockading R u s t s h u k a n d Silistria, m u s t , therefore, be of
sufficient strength to resist at least two-thirds of t h e T u r k i s h a r m y conc e n t r a t e d at Shumla, with the garrisons of t h e s e fortresses besides. On the
other h a n d , if t h e Russian force a d v a n c e s by w a y of B a z a r d s h i k , it m u s t also
be strong e n o u g h to resist two-thirds of t h e a r m y of S h u m l a in o p e n battle.
B e s i d e s , t r o o p s m u s t b e detached t o b l o c k a d e V a r n a a t least o n t h e n o r t h
side, a n d if possible on the s o u t h side also; for unless V a r n a is b l o c k a d e d
it c a n n o t be t a k e n , a n d unless it is t a k e n , t h e R u s s i a n s c a n n o t p a s s t h e Balkan.
If, b e s i d e all t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s , we t a k e into consideration the d e t a c h m e n t s
n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p u p t h e communication b e t w e e n t h e different c o r p s o n the
long line from R u s t s h u k to V a r n a , and to secure the arrival of supplies, t h e r e
is no d o u b t t h a t in order to m a k e a successful a d v a n c e u p o n S h u m l a a n d
V a r n a , the t w o decisive points of the defense of the e a s t e r n Balkan, the
R u s s i a n s m u s t h a v e more t h a n double t h e force which t h e T u r k s c a n conc e n t r a t e at Shumla.
F r o m t h e s e facts w e see t h a t the T u r k s h a v e acted v e r y wisely. T h e
a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e Dobrodja is the first positive a n d undeniable proof of
good generalship on t h e p a r t of O m e r P a s h a . T h e c o u n t r y and its fortresses
are n o t w o r t h holding. I n s t e a d of incurring defeats a n d losses of m e n and
material, t h e T u r k i s h General at o n c e ordered his t r o o p s to a b a n d o n all points
as s o o n as it could be d o n e with safety for t h e r e t r e a t of all, a n d to fall b a c k
on T r a j a n ' s Wall. T h u s the Russians obtained an e a s y a p p a r e n t triumph,
while t h e T u r k s did t h e m serious d a m a g e in t h e p r o c e s s , a n d gained their
t r u e position of defense before t h e e n e m y could retaliate. T h e T u r k s h a v e
n o garrisons e x c e p t i n important p l a c e s , a n d w h e r e t h e main a r m y o r the
fleets in t h e Black Sea c a n support t h e m . T h u s t h e y will be able to bring
t o g e t h e r at least 80,000 or 90,000 m e n in c a s e of n e e d , b e t w e e n Shumla and
V a r n a , a force w h i c h might be increased by the s p e e d y recall of s o m e of the
t r o o p s t h a t a political panic, without any real r e a s o n , sent to Kalafat. A n d
t h a t the R u s s i a n s should bring twice a s m a n y , o r e v e n m o r e m e n , a c r o s s the
D a n u b e is impossible, at least during this campaign. In saying this, we are
supposing t h a t t h e y actually intend to carry f o r w a r d a vigorous offensive,
and we leave o u t of the a c c o u n t the arrival of t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h auxiliary
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t r o o p s , w h o s e p r e s e n c e would m a k e any p a s s a g e of the B a l k a n an act of folly.
We h a v e considered t h e subject in this light, b e c a u s e it is quite as well to
k n o w the real state of the p r e s e n t c o m b a t a n t s . T h e t r u t h is, that if the
Russians and the T u r k s alone h a d to fight t h e matter out, e v e n after the
superiority required for offensive action h a s b e e n lost to the T u r k s by diplomatic delays, Constantinople is for t h e p r e s e n t y e a r at least, safe e n o u g h from
a R u s s i a n invasion.
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Reshid Pasha's Note—An Italian Newspaper
on the Eastern Question
Nr.4068, 2. Mai 1854
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , April 18, 1854.
T h e G o v e r n m e n t s of England and F r a n c e are said to h a v e at last e x c h a n g e d
copies of an offensive and defensive treaty, comprising F i v e Articles. T h e
c o n t e n t s are not yet k n o w n .
T h e t r e a t y b e t w e e n Austria and Prussia is n o t y e t c o n c l u d e d , the point of
dissension being t h e occupation of t h e frontiers t o u c h i n g on R u s s i a n Poland,
w h i c h the Prussian Court partly declines.
On t h e 6th April a Te Deum w a s celebrated at A t h e n s in h o n o r of the
a n n i v e r s a r y of G r e e k I n d e p e n d e n c e . It w a s not a t t e n d e d by t h e E m b a s s a d o r s
of the W e s t e r n P o w e r s . On the same d a y the Observer of A t h e n s registered
sixteen royal ordonnances accepting t h e resignation of t w e n t y - o n e generals,
colonels, a n d other officers, all of w h o m w e r e a b o u t to join the insurgents.
O n the day following t h e n e w s reached A t h e n s t h a t t h e insurgents h a d b e e n
fearfully b e a t e n n e a r Arta. T h e v e r y place w h e r e the battle w a s fought
d e n o t e s that the insurrection had m a d e not the slightest p r o g r e s s , and t h a t
its only victims until now h a v e b e e n the G r e e k p e a s a n t s themselves w h o
inhabit t h e frontier districts of t h e kingdom of G r e e c e .
Y o u will r e m e m b e r t h a t in 1827 the E m b a s s a d o r s of Russia, England a n d
F r a n c e d e m a n d e d that t h e Sublime P o r t e should recall e v e r y T u r k from
G r e e c e , w h e t h e r settled t h e r e or not. T h e T u r k s refusing to a c q u i e s c e ,
o b e d i e n c e w a s enforced by t h e battle of N a v a r i n o . A similar order h a s n o w
b e e n issued against the G r e e k s , on the p a r t of the Sublime P o r t e ; and as
neither t h e letter of Reshid P a s h a to Mr. M e t a x a s , t h e G r e e k E m b a s s a d o r ,
n o r t h e circular of L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe to t h e British C o n s u l s , h a s yet
b e e n published in the L o n d o n p a p e r s , I give y o u a translation of e a c h from
t h e Journal de Constantinople of April 5:
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"Answer of Reshid Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
to the note of M. Metaxas.
Constantinople, 3d R e d j e b , 1270, (1st April, 1854.) 30
I h a v e t a k e n cognizance of the n o t e which y o u a d d r e s s e d to me on M a r c h 26,
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Reshid Pasha's Note—An Italian Newspaper on the Eastern Question
with r e s p e c t to your resolution to quit this capital. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of the
Sublime P o r t e not having obtained from t h a t of G r e e c e due satisfaction in
r e t u r n for its just r e c l a m a t i o n s , with r e s p e c t to the actual e v e n t s , and t h e
C h a r g é d'Affaires of t h e Sublime P o r t e being obliged to quit A t h e n s in
5 conformity to his instructions, it is p r o p e r , Sir, t h a t y o u also quit this city.
I remit y o u , accordingly, in compliance w i t h y o u r d e m a n d , y o u r p a s s p o r t s .
As from this d a y the diplomatic relations as well as the commercial o n e s are
b r o k e n off b e t w e e n the t w o c o u n t r i e s , w e h a v e c o m e t o t h e decision t h a t
the Hellenic Chancelleries established in the different p r o v i n c e s of o u r
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e m p i r e , as well as all t h e G r e e k C o n s u l s , a r e to return immediately to their
c o u n t r y . T h e m e r c h a n t s a n d other Hellenic subjects residing i n T u r k e y m u s t
likewise w i t h d r a w from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; b u t in o r d e r to p r o t e c t t h e interests
of G r e e k c o m m e r c e , we will grant t h e m a delay of fifteen d a y s . As to those
w h o are established in t h e p r o v i n c e s , this delay will only be c o u n t e d from
the d a y of reception of the order for their d e p a r t u r e . It is p r o v e d by positive
s t a t e m e n t s t h a t it is not in c o n s e q u e n c e of any neglect, b u t rather of t h e
tolerance of the G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t , t h a t o u r frontier p r o v i n c e s h a v e b e e n
invaded. Although t h e Imperial G o v e r n m e n t has unquestionably t h e r i g h t t o
stop a n d confiscate all vessels found in our h a r b o r s , as pledges of the v e r y
considerable e x p e n s e s incurred by u s , my august m a s t e r thinks it corr e s p o n d s better w i t h his s e n s e of m o d e r a t i o n n o t to inflict any losses on
G r e e k subjects in a question only regarding t h e G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t . W h e n
that g o v e r n m e n t shall h a v e r e t u r n e d to m o r e equitable sentiments, taking into
its consideration international rights a n d t h e rules of t h e jus gentium, t h e n
the occasion will h a v e arrived for examining the question of the e x p e n s e s
c a u s e d by this insurrection. All Hellenic ships a r e , therefore, allowed to
r e t u r n w i t h o u t any h i n d r a n c e , during t h e term fixed for t h e m , to their o w n
c o u n t r y . It h a s b e e n enjoined on t h e p r o p e r authorities to facilitate the
d e p a r t u r e of those G r e e k subjects w h o are p o o r and destitute, and to u s e
as m u c h indulgence as possible t o w a r d the sick a n d infirm. ( T h e most
Christian and civilized G o v e r n m e n t of Austria m a n a g e s t h e s e things in a
different style—witness t h e expulsion of t h e Ticinese.) I t h i n k it e x p e d i e n t
t o repeat o n c e m o r e that t h e Hellenic G o v e r n m e n t alone has enforced u p o n
us this decision, a n d t h a t all the responsibility c o n s e q u e n t u p o n it m u s t
entirely rest with G r e e c e .
Reshid P a s h a . "
According to this order 3,000 G r e e k s e m b a r k e d at Constantinople on t h e
5th of April, and we h e a r that the P a s h a of S m y r n a h a s already published
t h e o r d e r for the G r e e k s inhabiting t h a t city.
T h e circular a d d r e s s e d by L o r d Stratford de Redcliffe to the British
Consuls in T u r k e y and G r e e c e , r u n s as follows:
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" C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , S a t u r d a y , April 1, 1854.
Sir: I t h a s c o m e t o m y knowledge that t h e Hellenes w h o h a v e invaded t h e
frontier p r o v i n c e s of T u r k e y are exciting the G r e e k subjects of the Sultan
to revolt, by declaring t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d are r e a d y
to s u p p o r t t h e m in overthrowing the authority of t h e Sultan. I am also inf o r m e d t h a t similar m a n e u v e r s are e m p l o y e d with a v i e w to persuading
p e o p l e that the F r e n c h and English E m b a s s a d o r s will give protection to all
t h e Hellenic subjects in T u r k e y , as s o o n as t h e Porte—in c o n s e q u e n c e of its
diplomatic and commercial rupture with Greece—shall notify its intention to
expel t h e m from t h e States of t h e Sultan. W h e r e a s s u c h suppositions h a v e
a t e n d e n c y to encourage false h o p e s , to mislead well-disposed m e n and to
aggravate, criminally, the evils inseparable from a state of war, I h a s t e n to
give y o u the a s s u r a n c e that t h e s e assertions h a v e no f o u n d a t i o n at all. T h o s e
w h o for o n e m o m e n t rely on falsehoods so t r a n s p a r e n t a n d so incompatible
w i t h c o m m o n sense and facts, m u s t be v e r y ignorant a n d credulous indeed.
B u t s u c h is unfortunately t h e case e v e r y w h e r e , in c o u n t r i e s w h e r e the m e a n s
of publicity are only imperfectly developed. Y o u k n o w as well as I d o , t h a t
E n g l a n d and F r a n c e are entirely with t h e Sultan i n t h e noble resistance h e
o p p o s e s to a violent and unjust aggression. It necessarily follows that the
t w o allied G o v e r n m e n t s c a n n o t view, b u t with painful feelings of indignation
a n d r e p r o b a t i o n , a m o v e m e n t calculated only to benefit Russia, without e v e n
having the merit of being s p o n t a n e o u s , and w h i c h m u s t ultimately e m b a r r a s s
t h e P o r t e and its allies, while it offers no other p r o s p e c t b u t the ruin of t h o s e
w h o t h u s e x p o s e their Uves for so chimerical an illusion. We m u s t pity t h e
i n n o c e n t families unfortunately implicated in t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of a brutal
a n d unprincipled policy; b u t on our part t h e r e c a n exist no relations with t h e
l e a d e r s , n o r any dissimulation of the sentiments w h i c h the c o n d u c t of a
senseless p a r t y c a n n o t fail to inspire. I h a v e to r e c o m m e n d to y o u not to
neglect any opportunity of making k n o w n the c o n t e n t s of this circular to all
t h o s e w h o m a y be disposed to allow t h e m s e l v e s to be misled by t h e false
assertions w h i c h it d e n o u n c e s .
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Stratford de Redcliffe."
T h e populations most immediately interested in t h e issue of t h e e a s t e r n
complications a r e , besides the G e r m a n s , t h e H u n g a r i a n s a n d Italians. It is
of s o m e c o n s e q u e n c e , therefore, to k n o w t h e intentions of t h e diverse parties 35
of t h e s e nations with regard to their relations t o w a r d o n e a n o t h e r . T h e
following article from t h e Turin Unione, w h i c h I translate for this p u r p o s e ,
will show y o u t h e views of the constitutional p a r t y in Italy, w h i c h seems to
b e quite p r e p a r e d t o sacrifice H u n g a r y i n o r d e r t o r e c o v e r Italian indep e n d e n c e . T h e secret of the duration of the Austrian E m p i r e is no other t h a n 40
this provincial egotism which blinds e a c h p e o p l e with t h e illusion t h a t t h e y
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Reshid Pasha's Note—An Italian Newspaper on the Eastern Question
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c a n c o n q u e r their liberty at the sacrifice of their fellow-people's independence.
" T h e English journals t a k e great p a i n s t o give t h e impending w a r w i t h
R u s s i a a c h a r a c t e r of liberty a n d E u r o p e a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , while, in fact, t h e y
h a v e nothing in view b u t their o w n c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t s ; in proof of w h i c h
L o r d J o h n Russell r e c o m m e n d s u s Italians t o r e m a i n quiet, a n d gives u s t o
understand that Austria may one day or other become more humane. Thus he
recognizes, at least, t h a t at p r e s e n t she h a s nothing h u m a n e at all a b o u t her.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , philanthropic E n g l a n d is trying to secure her alliance for the
' t r i u m p h of t h e liberty and independence of Europe.' As to t h e F r e n c h p r e s s ,
it is n o t free, and u n d e r the d r e a d of receiving warnings for the first time
a n d being s u s p e n d e d for t h e s e c o n d o n e , it c a n n o t b u t m a k e itself t h e e c h o
of w h a t is desired by t h e G o v e r n m e n t . B e s i d e s , t h e F r e n c h p a p e r s are n o t
a c c u s t o m e d to consider t h e questions of t h e d a y on a grand scale, a n d
u n d e r g o too m u c h the impulse of fashion. T h e G e r m a n liberal p a p e r s write
u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of t h e i m m e n s e fear w h i c h R u s s i a c a u s e s t h e m a n d justly
so, if we consider the influence she has already acquired over' the t w o principal p o w e r s of G e r m a n y . B u t w h a t do we w a n t ? T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of Italy.
As long, h o w e v e r , as t h e r e is talk a b o u t t h e territorial integrity of T u r k e y
a n d E u r o p e a n equilibrium as b a s e d on t h e t r e a t y of Vienna, it is quite natural
t h a t we should continue to enjoy t h a t identical status quo so contradictory
to our wishes. W h a t d o e s R u s s i a p r e t e n d t o ? To get rid of t h e O t t o m a n
E m p i r e and c o n s e q u e n ü y of the equilibrium of t h e status quo and to revise
t h e m a p of E u r o p e . This is the v e r y thing w h i c h we w a n t . B u t it will be said
t h a t R u s s i a w a n t s to revise it in her o w n fashion. It is exactly this w h i c h m a y
t u r n t o our benefit, b e c a u s e neither F r a n c e , n o r E n g l a n d , n o r G e r m a n y c a n
tolerate this n e w aggrandizement of t h e territory or influence of an E m p i r e
t h a t p o s s e s s e s already t o o m u c h of b o t h , a n d t h u s t h e y will be forced to look
o u t for a b u l w a r k against her. This b u l w a r k c a n be no o t h e r State b u t Austria,
t o w a r d w h o m the occidental States are obliged to s h o w generosity and to
give her the w h o l e Valley of the D a n u b e , from O r s o v a to the Black S e a and
below t h e D a n u b e , t h e D o b r o d j a a n d t h e k e y s of t h e Balkans. Austria would
then p o s s e s s :
1. A v a s t territory, w i t h a population kindred to her o w n .
2. T h e w h o l e c o u r s e of a great river, so n e c e s s a r y to t h e c o m m e r c e of
Germany.
In such a c a s e Austria w o u l d no longer w a n t Italy, as far at least as her
defense is c o n c e r n e d , a n d she w o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e a b o u t six millions of S o u t h
Slavonians and four millions of D a c o - R o m a n i a n s , in o r d e r to associate t h e m
with t h r e e other millions of t h e former a n d a b o u t as m a n y of the latter, w h o
are already subject to her dominion.
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Integrity a n d I n d e p e n d e n c e of T u r k e y ! T w o solemn p a r a d o x e s . If y o u
u n d e r s t a n d by i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e liberty enjoyed by a n a t i o n to g o v e r n itself
a c c o r d i n g to its o w n principles, a n d w i t h o u t t h e right of a n y foreigner to
i n t e r m e d d l e , t h a t i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s already m u c h c o m p r o m i s e d b y t h e
t r e a t y of Kainardji, a n d received its death-blow (colpo di grazia) f r o m t h e
5
r e c e n t t r e a t y w i t h t h e O c c i d e n t a l P o w e r s . C o n s e q u e n t l y i t i s n o longer t h e
S u l t a n w h o governs T u r k e y , b u t the E u r o p e a n P o w e r s ; a n d from t h e m o m e n t
t h a t M u s s u l m a n s a n d Christians, c o n q u e r o r s a n d c o n q u e r e d , are subjected
t o a n equality before law; from t h e m o m e n t t h a t t h e rayahs—forming fourfifths of t h e population—are to h a v e a r m s in their h a n d s , T u r k e y no longer
10
exists, b u t a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is set on f o o t t h a t c a n n o t realize itself w i t h o u t
v i o l e n c e a n d t h e m o s t serious disorders, a n d w i t h o u t t h e t w o sects w h o ,
during four c e n t u r i e s , h a v e b e e n a c c u s t o m e d t o d e t e s t e a c h o t h e r , coming
t o b l o w s . T h e n let u s h e a r n o m o r e o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f T u r k e y , e x c e p t
as a fable.
15
A n d the territorial integrity! W a s i t t h e n n o t F r a n c e a n d E n g l a n d which,
i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h Russia, w r e s t e d f r o m T u r k e y t h e G r e e k K i n g d o m , viz:
t h e P e l o p e n n e s u s , Attica, Boeotia, P h o c i s , A c a r n a n i a , Aetolia, t h e Island of
N e g r o p o n t e , e t c . , with a rnillion of inhabitants? W a s it n o t t h e y ? Is it n o t t h e
F r e n c h w h o t o o k Algiers? W a s it n o t F r a n c e , E n g l a n d a n d R u s s i a w h o gave
20
to E g y p t a half-independence? W a s it n o t t h e E n g l i s h m a n w h o , fifteen y e a r s
ago, seized u p o n A d e n , o n t h e R e d S e a ? I s i t n o t also t h e E n g l i s h m e n w h o
c o v e t E g y p t ? A n d Austria t h a t c o v e t s Bosnia a n d Servia? W h y t h e n s p e a k
of preserving a state of things against w h i c h all c o n s p i r e , a n d w h i c h is u n a b l e
to c o n t i n u e by its o w n force?
25
We c o n c l u d e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Russia, while intending t h e o v e r t h r o w of
T u r k e y , is intending a g o o d thing; t h a t also t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s are justly
inspired, if t h e y intend to o p p o s e the e n c r o a c h m e n t s of Russia, b u t if t h e
latter p o w e r s w a n t t o gain their object, t h e y m u s t d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e diplo
m a t i c h y p o c r i s y in w h i c h t h e y h a v e e n v e l o p e d t h e m s e l v e s , a n d m u s t be
r e s o l v e d t o u n d o T u r k e y a n d revise t h e m a p o f E u r o p e . T h a t i s t h e point t h e y
must come t o . "
Karl Marx.
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Karl Marx
Greece and Turkey—Turkey and the Western P o w e r s Falling off in Wheat Sales in England
Nr. 4072, 6. Mai 1854
L o n d o n , Friday, April 2 1 , 1854.
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We are informed by t h e Prussian Correspondence t h a t t h e f a m o u s Chevalier
B u n s e n is not recalled, b u t has only obtained, on his o w n d e m a n d , a lengthe n e d leave of a b s e n c e . C o u n t A l v e n s l e b e n is designed as his t e m p o r a r y
locum tenens. T h e C o m m i s s i o n of C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e S w e d i s h Diet h a s
decided, by a majority of 12 to 11, t h a t t h e ministers should be i m p e a c h e d
before t h e H i g h C o u r t of t h e K i n g d o m , for their c o n d u c t in t h e affair of t h e
simplification of t h e t a x e s w h i c h has lately b e e n u n d e r consideration.
A c c o r d i n g to a r e p o r t from Mr. M e r o n i , C o n s u l at Belgrade, the Austrians
must be p r e p a r e d to meet t h e a r m e d r e s i s t a n c e of the Servians, in c a s e t h e y
should m a r c h their armies into Servia.
On t h e 3d inst., Mr. M e t a x a s left Constantinople, to be followed, within
a delay of less t h a n f o u r t e e n d a y s , by 40 to 50,000 of his compatriots.
No e m b a s s y w a s willing to act as his t e m p o r a r y substitute for carrying on
the c u r r e n t b u s i n e s s . T h e Austrian E m b a s s a d o r declined, b e c a u s e , E n g l a n d
and F r a n c e being the protecting p o w e r s of G r e e c e , it w a s the d u t y of their
Chancelleries to r e p r e s e n t G r e e c e in the interim. Prussia would n o t accept,
b e c a u s e Austria had declined. T h e E m b a s s a d o r s of England and F r a n c e
declared t h e time rather u n s e a s o n a b l e for constituting themselves t h e representatives of Mr. M e t a x a s . T h e Chargés d'Affaires of the smaller p o w e r s
thought fit anxiously to avoid making any manifestation either of s y m p a t h y
or antipathy. T h u s Mr. M e t a x a s w a s obliged to leave behind an A t t a c h é of
his own. But it w a s s o o n discovered t h a t his substitute, abusing t h e p o w e r
granted to him by the P o r t e , busily engaged himself in distributing p a s s p o r t s
a m o n g t h e G r e e k R a y a h s , in order to enable t h e m to join t h e insurgents in
Albania. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the functions of the G r e e k Chancellery h a v e b e e n
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Karl Marx
altogether s u s p e n d e d , t h e issuing of p a s s p o r t s being n o w d e v o l v e d on a
c o m m i s s i o n consisting of t w o T u r k s and t w o R a y a h s .
Simultaneously, a notice w a s p o s t e d up that a n y subject of the K i n g d o m
of G r e e c e , w h o wished to b e c o m e a subject of t h e Sultan, might be allowed
to do so on finding t w o respectable p e r s o n s to g u a r a n t e e his good c o n d u c t .
5
As t h e Hellenic inhabitants of Constantinople h a d u t t e r e d loud threats of
setting Constantinople on fire and pillaging it b e f o r e their marching off,
extraordinary m e a s u r e s h a v e b e e n t a k e n b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t . T h e T u r k s
p a t r o l by d a y and night, and on the p r o m e n a d e of P e r a fifty c a n n o n s are
m o u n t e d . F r o m sunset to midnight every one walking or riding t h r o u g h t h e 10
streets or the field m u s t be provided with a lantern; after midnight all circulation is forbidden. A n o t h e r edict prohibits t h e e x p o r t of grain. G r e e k s confessing t h e L a t i n religion h a v e b e e n allowed to r e m a i n on t h e responsibility
of t h e L a t i n Bishops of Pera. F o r t h e greater part, t h e s e natives from T e n o s ,
A n d r o s , and S y r o s , belong to the s e r v a n t class. T h e inhabitants of the Isle 15
of H y d r a h a v e a d d r e s s e d a petition to t h e P o r t e , sharply censuring t h e G r e e k
insurrection, a n d entreating t h e G o v e r n m e n t to e x c e p t t h e m from the general
m e a s u r e . T h e r e h a s also arrived a deputation of t h e G r e e k subjects of t h e
P o r t e from Trikala, in Thessaly, requesting it to p r o t e c t t h e m energetically
against the Hellenian r o b b e r s , as whole villages h a d b e e n laid in a s h e s by 20
t h e m , a n d their inhabitants, w i t h o u t distinction of sex or age, dragged to the
frontiers, t h e r e t o b e t o r m e n t e d i n t h e m o s t cruel m a n n e r .
A feeling of d o u b t , mistrust and hostility against their w e s t e r n allies is
gaining p o s s e s s i o n of t h e T u r k s . T h e y begin to look on F r a n c e a n d England
as m o r e d a n g e r o u s enemies t h a n the Czar himself, a n d t h e general cry
is—"they are going to d e t h r o n e the Sultan, a n d divide t h e land—they are going
to m a k e us slaves to the Christian p o p u l a t i o n . " L a n d i n g s o u t h of C o n stantinople instead of n o r t h of V a r n a , the allies are fortifying Gallipoli against
t h e T u r k s t h e m s e l v e s . T h e tract of land on w h i c h t h e village is situated is
a long peninsula joined by a n a r r o w isthmus to t h e c o n t i n e n t a n d admirably
a d a p t e d for a stronghold for invaders. It w a s t h e r e the G e n o e s e of old defied
t h e G r e e k E m p e r o r s of Constantinople. B e s i d e s , t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of the n e w
Sheik-el-Islam fills the o r t h o d o x M o s l e m s with indignation, since t h e y regard
h i m as little better t h a n a tool of t h e G r e e k priesthood, a n d a strong feeling
begins to p e r v a d e the T u r k s that it w a s better to yield the o n e d e m a n d of
N i c h o l a s t h a n be m a d e t h e plaything of a k n o t of g r e e d y p o w e r s .
T h e opposition to the Coalition Ministry and t h e popular indignation at
their m a n n e r of carrying on the w a r has g r o w n so strong t h a t e v e n The Times
is obliged to c h o o s e b e t w e e n damaging its o w n circulation a n d its subserviency to t h e Cabinet of all the Talents, a n d has thought fit to m a k e a
furious onslaught on t h e m in its W e d n e s d a y ' s n u m b e r .
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F
Greece and Turkey—Turkey and the Western Powers
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T h e Q u e b e c c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Morning Post w r i t e s :
" O u r fleet in t h e Pacific is quite strong e n o u g h to c a p t u r e the w h o l e of
t h e Russian forts a n d posts along t h e c o a s t s of R u s s i a n America (and t h e y
h a v e n o n e in t h e interior) and t h o s e w h i c h t h e y p o s s e s s h e r e and there a m o n g
t h e F o x , Aleutian and Kurile Islands, t h e w h o l e forming a chain from t h e
A m e r i c a n c o a s t to J a p a n . W i t h t h e c a p t u r e of t h e s e islands, w h i c h are also
v e r y valuable in furs, c o p p e r , in t h e mildness of their climate and in s o m e
of t h e m containing excellent h a r b o r s near t h e Asiatic m a i n s h o r e , w h e r e no
good harbors exist, a n d of R u s s i a n America, o u r influence in the Pacific
w o u l d be materially increased, at a period w h e n t h e countries of that o c e a n
are likely to b e c o m e of t h a t i m p o r t a n c e which h a s long b e e n their due. T h e
greatest resistance which would be offered to o u r fleet would be at N e w Archangel, in t h e Island of Sitka, which, b e s i d e s being strong by n a t u r e , h a s
b e e n completely fortified, and has n o w s o m e 60 or 70 guns m o u n t e d . T h e r e
a r e about 1,500 p e r s o n s t h e r e , t h e garrison being a b o u t 500, and t h e r e is a
d o c k y a r d w h e r e m a n y vessels of w a r h a v e b e e n built. At m o s t of the o t h e r
p o s t s t h e r e are b u t from 50 to 300 p e r s o n s , a n d few of t h e m h a v e w o r k s of
any i m p o r t a n c e . Should F r a n c e desire to acquire territory as a set-off to this
c o n q u e s t , should we m a k e it, she might be allowed to p o s s e s s herself of
K a m s c h a t k a and the neighboring c o a s t . "
The Gazette's r e t u r n s of w h e a t sold in t h e m a r k e t t o w n s of England and
W a l e s , exhibit a r e m a r k a b l e falling off as c o m p a r e d with t h o s e of the corr e s p o n d i n g period of 1853, and this m a y be t a k e n as a criterion of the quantity
g r o w n in e a c h of t h e preceding h a r v e s t s . T h e sales w e r e , in
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January.
February.
March.
1853
qrs. 532,282
345,329
358,886
256,061
227,556
1854
qrs. 266,477
T h e last w e e k l y r e t u r n is 36,628 q u a r t e r s against 88,343 q u a r t e r s in the
corresponding w e e k of 1853. T h e s e r e t u r n s , t h e n , s h o w for t h e t h r e e m o n t h s
a falling off of about half a million of q u a r t e r s , w h e n c o m p a r e d with the
corresponding m o n t h s of 1853, afford t h e m o s t striking proof of t h e d e ficiency in the last c r o p .
The Mark Lane Express s a y s :
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" T h e liberal character of the foreign supply h a s t h u s far p r e v e n t e d t h e
shortness of t h e h o m e deliveries being severely felt, a n d t h e r e are still
considerable quantities of w h e a t and flour on p a s s a g e from different q u a r t e r s
to this c o u n t r y ; but c a n we e x p e c t t h a t the i m p o r t a t i o n s during t h e time which
m u s t necessarily elapse before the n e x t c r o p c a n be r e n d e r e d available, will
be on an equally liberal scale? A m e r i c a h a s drained h e r ports on t h e seaboard
t o furnish w h a t w e h a v e received from t h e n c e ; a n d , though w e d o n o t d o u b t
t h a t she has still considerable stores in t h e far west, it will n e e d high prices
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to c o v e r the e x p e n s e s of transporting t h e same to the e a s t coast, and from
t h e n c e to England. T h e n o r t h e r n p o r t s of E u r o p e h a v e b e e n nearly cleared of
p r e v i o u s accumulations, and the w a r w i t h R u s s i a cuts off further supplies
from t h e Black S e a and Azoff. We offer the foregoing for t h e consideration
of o u r r e a d e r s , w i t h o u t further c o m m e n t . "
Karl Marx.
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Friedrich Engels
The Turkish War
Nr. 4080, 16. Mai 1854
The Turkish War.
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T h e Atlantic arrived y e s t e r d a y , bringing intelligence of t h e first actual
a t t a c k o n t h e R u s s i a n s b y t h e British a n d F r e n c h fleet i n the Black Sea.
It seems t h a t the British w a r - s t e a m e r F u r i o u s w e n t to O d e s s a with a flag
of truce to bring a w a y t h e British and F r e n c h C o n s u l s , from t h a t p l a c e ,
a n d t h a t after having got t h e m on b o a r d , she w a s fired at from t h e shore.
T h e British r e p r e s e n t this act as a w a n t o n violation of t h e rights of t h e
flag of t r u c e , for w h i c h s u m m a r y v e n g e a n c e m u s t be taken. T h e R u s s i a n s
on t h e other h a n d say that after t h e Consuls w e r e e m b a r k e d , t h e ship
r e m a i n e d in t h e h a r b o r to enable t h e officers to t a k e sketches of t h e
fortifications, and that she w a s fired at simply to p u t an e n d to s u c h
impropriety. H o w e v e r this m a y b e , t h e British a n d F r e n c h Admirals agreed
t h a t something m u s t be d o n e , a n d accordingly a large force w a s sent to
b o m b a r d t h e place. This operation d o e s n o t s e e m t o h a v e b e e n accomplished in a v e r y brilliant w a y , for t h o u g h t h e official details h a v e n o t
y e t r e a c h e d u s , t h e r e is a r e p o r t t h a t several British ships w e r e badly
d a m a g e d in the p r o c e s s of silencing t h e shore batteries, burning a f e w
m e r c h a n t ships in port, a n d knocking to pieces a palace belonging to Prince
Woronzoff, not far from the w a t e r ' s e d g e . T h e t o w n of O d e s s a t h e y
did not h a r m , as it is situated on t h e t o p of a hill comparatively out of
the w a y . H a v i n g thus t a k e n v e n g e a n c e , t h e y sailed a w a y again. Admiral
D u n d a s h a s apparently a d o p t e d for his rule of action t h e advice of a
letter from o n e of his officers, w h i c h h a s b e e n published at L o n d o n , a n d
m e a n s t o t a k e anything e a s y , b u t t o l e a v e difficult a n d dangerous enterprises alone.
On the D a n u b e t h e r e is nothing n e w e x c e p t t h e c o m p l e t e evacuation of
L e s s e r Wallachia b y t h e R u s s i a n s , a n d their p r e p a r a t i o n s t o storm t h e fortress of Silistria. W i t h a view to this t h e y h a d c o n c e n t r a t e d a large force of
artillery on t h e opposite b a n k , and w e r e , as it is r e p o r t e d , about to f ling across
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s o m e 30,000 m e n for the assault. It r e m a i n s to be s e e n h o w far this r e p o r t
is t r u e , b u t at any rate such a plan is not i m p r o b a b l e . I t s success is another
q u e s t i o n . It is certain that Silistria is the w e a k e s t of all t h e great T u r k i s h
f o r t r e s s e s , c o m m a n d e d within comfortable dismounting a n d b r e a c h i n g range
by hights w h i c h h a v e not, that we are a w a r e , b e e n fortified since the last w a r .
But this same Silistria, which fell in 1810 after four d a y s ' attack, sustained
in 1828-29 two blockades of ten m o n t h s ' duration, and held o u t thirty-five
d a y s after t h e opening of a regular siege, and nine days after t h e completion
of a practicable b r e a c h in the main wall. A fortress w h i c h h a s u n d e r g o n e such
varying fates m a y well be said to be b e y o n d any reasoning as to its strength
a n d defensibility.
B u t supposing Silistria to be carried by storm by an o v e r w h e l m i n g superiority of force, it by no m e a n s follows that t h e r o a d to Constantinople is clear
for t h e m . In order to a d v a n c e on Shumla and V a r n a , t h e y m u s t leave at least
6,000 m e n b e h i n d at Silistria, which would t h e n h a v e to s e r v e t h e m as bridgeh e a d for another and m o r e conveniently situated bridge. S h u m l a t h e y could
hardly attack; for e v e n if they t o o k this f a m o u s i n t r e n c h e d c a m p , t h e y w o u l d
simply deprive the e n e m y of a good position w i t h o u t gaining o n e for t h e m selves. S h u m l a shuts against the Russians t h e p a s s a g e of t h e Balkan, b u t if
t a k e n it d o e s not o p e n that passage to t h e m .
T h e i m p o r t a n c e of Shumla consists in the fact t h a t V a r n a is the key to the
L o w e r Balkan, a n d Shumla i s the key t o V a r n a . W h a t e v e r m a y b e t h e defects
of the fortifications of Varna—and they are many—if fully garrisoned it
r e q u i r e s a siege-corps of 20,000 to 30,000 m e n ; a n d unless t h e r e r e m a i n t r o o p s
e n o u g h , after deducting t h e s e , to cover the siege against any sallies from the
i n t r e n c h e d c a m p of Shumla, w h e r e t h e T u r k s c a n c o n c e n t r a t e all their forces,
the siege c a n n o t be carried on successfully. V a r n a held o u t , in 1828, three
weeks after t w o practicable b r e a c h e s h a d b e e n m a d e in its r a m p a r t s , a n d t h a t
at a time w h e n the Russian fleet c o m m a n d e d t h e Black Sea, and the T u r k s
h a d hardly the s h a d o w of an a r m y to a t t e m p t an a t t a c k u p o n the besiegers.
N o w , supposing Silistria taken, the various and v e r y difficult river-lines
b e f o r e V a r n a and Shumla forced, and V a r n a b l o c k a d e d , is t h e r e a c h a n c e
that e n o u g h Russian troops would remain to neutralize Shumla? F o r the
T u r k s at Shumla could act not only against t h e besiegers of V a r n a , b u t in
t h e direction of the D a n u b e , and at least o n e of the lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n
of the R u s s i a n s , so as to force t h e m to d e t a c h m o r e a n d m o r e t r o o p s from
their main b o d y , which ultimately might be w e a k e n e d to a d a n g e r o u s e x tent.
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A n d if V a r n a should fall w h a t w o u l d P a s h k i e w i t c h do if O m e r P a s h a
sullenly r e m a i n e d in his stronghold of Shumla, r e a d y to profit by the v e r y 40
first mistake t h e Russians m a d e ? Would h e d a r e t o p u s h o n t o w a r d C o n -
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stantinople with b u t a single line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , which at the same t i m e
w o u l d b e h e m m e d i n a n d m e n a c e d b y the S h u m l a a r m y o n o n e side, and b y
t h e allied fleets in t h e Black S e a on t h e o t h e r ? N o t h e , indeed, if we are to
judge from his exploits in A s i a and Poland. He is an almost over-cautious
5 general, a sort of military slow-coach, with nothing of t h e R a d e t z k y in him.
A n d if he had he would find t h a t m a n e u v e r e x t r e m e l y h a z a r d o u s , for he
k n o w s v e r y well what a plight his p r e d e c e s s o r Diebitch was in w h e n he
arrived, in 1829, at Adrianople. T h u s , e v e n w i t h o u t taking into account t h e
A n g l o - F r e n c h t r o o p s landing in T h r a c e , a n d making no m o r e of t h e allied
10 fleets t h a n w h a t t h e y h a v e justified us in, namely, supposing t h e y will do
n e x t to nothing, we find that it is n o t s u c h an easy thing for the R u s s i a n s
to m a r c h straight a h e a d to Constantinople with b a n n e r s displayed a n d b a n d s
playing. T h a t against T u r k e y unaided they w e r e sure ultimately to get t h e r e
no o n e ever denied e x c e p t t h o s e new-fangled military writers w h o form their
15 judgment n o t from facts b u t f r o m a conviction t h a t "right against might" is
necessarily victorious, and that in a " g o o d c a u s e " no blunders c a n possibly
b e committed.
—We m a y add that the British forces in the Baltic h a v e d o n e e v e n less so
far t h a n t h o s e in t h e Black Sea.
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The Greek Insurrection—The Polish Emigration—
The Austro-Prussian Treaty—Russian Documents
Nr. 4079, 15. Mai 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , April 28, 1854.
T h e last authentic n e w s from T u r k e y fully confirms the views of The
Tribune, with r e s p e c t to the retreat of the Russians from Kalafat, t h e occupation by the R u s s i a n s of the Dobrodja, and the c h a r a c t e r of the G r e e k insurrection.
T h e Lloyd confirms the r e p o r t that the R u s s i a n s h a v e raised the inv e s t m e n t of Kalafat, and t h a t the evacuation of L e s s e r Wallachia is n o w
c o m p l e t e . T h e latest n e w s received at Constantinople states that the Russians
do n o t a d v a n c e , b u t , on the contrary, are fortifying t h e Dobrodja.
W i t h regard to the G r e e k insurrection, the following letter from Vienna,
of t h e 21th April, a p p e a r e d in y e s t e r d a y ' s Moniteur:
" T h e G r e e k insurrection does n o t m a k e any p r o g r e s s i n E p i r u s , b u t begins
to s h o w itself in its true character. If a n y b o d y could h a v e thought that the
interests of Christianity and nationality w e r e anything else than a vain p r e text, t h e acts of t h e chiefs of the Hellenic b a n d s from the kingdom of G r e e c e
m u s t dissolve all such d o u b t s . T h e altercations w h i c h , since the c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e struggle, h a v e t a k e n place b e t w e e n Grivas and Xavellas,
with r e s p e c t to the chief c o m m a n d of the insurgents, are k n o w n . T h e s e t w o
chiefs continue to act separately, and m a k e no scruple of taking advantage
of any opportunity to injure e a c h other. G r i v a s , especially, has only carried
pillage and incendiarism to t h e Christian R a y a h s , of w h o m he p r e t e n d s to
be the liberator. T h e Suliotes, w h o h a v e c o m e to the resolution to interdict
t h e access to their territory to several Hellenic chiefs, particularly d e n o u n c e
G r i v a s . At the beginning of last m o n t h , this chief w e n t to d e m a n d hospitality
of t h e G r e e k Primate, Deventzista, and left t h e day after, b u t n o t until he
h a d pillaged his h o u s e , and carried off his wife by force. T h e Primate has
g o n e to Abdi P a s h a and asked permission to serve u n d e r his orders with a
view to revenge himself of this savage act. It is, h o w e v e r , at M e z z o v o w h e r e
Grivas distinguished himself by his skill in plundering. T h a t t o w n , misled by
the Russian p r o p a g a n d a , spontaneously o p e n e d its gates to 'generalissimus'
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Grivas. His first act w a s to i m p o s e u p o n t h e Christian population a 'patriotic'
contribution of 200,000 piasters. T h e sum n o t being extravagant, it w a s paid.
But Grivas did not stop there. He called by t u r n s , individually, on all t h e
principal inhabitants, and all t h o s e in comfortable c i r c u m s t a n c e s residing in
the t o w n , asking t h e m to deposit, likewise as an offering, all articles of luxury
in gold or silver w h i c h might be at their disposal. This m o d e of extortion
excited m u r m u r s , a n d it a p p e a r e d neither expeditious nor very productive.
It w a s then that Grivas took into his mind an idea w h i c h seems to us a
masterpiece of brigandage. Taking as a p r e t e x t t h e a p p r o a c h of the O t t o m a n
troops w h i c h w e r e marching on M e z z o v o , he a n n o u n c e d that the defense
of t h e place necessitated t h e almost general burning of t h e t o w n , and, in
c o n s e q u e n c e , he invited the inhabitants to a s s e m b l e with their families in
the principal c h u r c h of M e z z o v o , w h e r e nearly 4,000 p e r s o n s s o o n after
collected. Grivas had anticipated that t h e y w o u l d bring their m o n e y w i t h
t h e m , as also their jewels and their most valuable articles, a n d t h u s he would
get into his p o w e r all the wealth of M e z z o v o . He t h e n let t h e m o u t in small
n u m b e r s , and h a n d e d t h e m over t o his followers, w h o r o b b e d t h e m without
c e r e m o n i e s . Such are the exploits of the G r e e k chief, w h o h a s , up to this
m o m e n t , played the most p r o m i n e n t part in t h e insurrection of E p i r u s . Grivas
t h e n only o p p o s e d a feeble resistance to t h e T u r k s . After setting the t o w n
on fire, he retired t o w a r d A c h e l o u s , in t h e direction of Rodovizzi. M e z z o v o ,
previously the m o s t flourishing city of E p i r u s , n e x t to Jannina and Buat, is
n o w a mere h e a p of ruins, and t h e inhabitants are r e d u c e d to misery. Only
about 100 h o u s e s remain standing."
Reshid P a s h a h a s declared, on t h e u n f o u n d e d r u m o r t h a t K o s s u t h and
Mazzini p r o p o s e d t o c o m e t o Constantinople, t h a t h e would not permit t h e m
to enter the Turkish territory.
T h e formation of a Polish Legion is said to h a v e found no opposition from
the E m b a s s a d o r s of F r a n c e and England, b u t to h a v e m e t with obstacles of
a different n a t u r e . General W y s o c k i submitted to the P o r t e and to L o r d
Redcliffe a d o c u m e n t c o v e r e d with several t h o u s a n d s of signatures, authorizing him to act in the n a m e of a large portion of the Polish Emigration. On
the other hand, Colonel C o u n t Zamoiski, n e p h e w of Prince Czartoryski,
p r e s e n t e d a similar d o c u m e n t , also c o v e r e d with m a n y signatures, by which
another fraction of the same Emigration authorize him to act on its behalf.
In consideration of their divisions, in order to conciliate the alternative
pretensions and rivalries, and in order to c o m b i n e t h e services of b o t h
W y s o c k i and Zamoiski, the E m b a s s a d o r of England advised the formation
of t w o Polish Legions instead of one.
Marshal Pashkiewitch arrived on the 17th April at Jassy, and p r o c e e d e d
o n t h e same day o n his j o u r n e y t o B u c h a r e s t .
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A c c o r d i n g to t h e Hannoversche Zeitungthe following a r e t h e main stipulations of t h e treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded b e t w e e n
A u s t r i a a n d Prussia.
" 1 . A u s t r i a a n d Prussia guarantee t o e a c h o t h e r their G e r m a n dominions
a n d others (in u n d a u s s e r d e u t s c h e n Besitzungen) in such m a n n e r that an
a t t a c k directed against either of the t w o p o w e r s shall be considered as an
a t t a c k directed against itself.
2. Austria and Prussia mutually oblige themselves to support e a c h other,
a n d if n e e d b e , to p r o c e e d to a c o m m o n aggression, as s o o n as o n e or t h e
other of the contracting parties shall consider t h e interests of G e r m a n y as
c o m p r o m i s e d , in which view t h e y will agree with e a c h other. T h e particular
c a s e s in w h i c h support is to be given, are provided in a separate stipulation,
forming an integral portion of t h e convention. In order to secure its efficacy,
the a d e q u a t e military r e s o u r c e s shall be placed on the n e c e s s a r y footing at
certain provided e p o c h s . T h e time, the extent a n d t h e e m p l o y m e n t of the
t r o o p s , are r e s e r v e d for special arrangement.
3. All the m e m b e r s of t h e G e r m a n Bund are invited to a c c e d e to this
offensive a n d defensive alliance, and to support it in conformity with t h e
obligations imposed u p o n t h e m by the federal a c t . "
On c o m p a r i s o n , y o u will find that t h e s e stipulations closely r e s e m b l e the
t e r m s in which C o u n t N e s s e l r o d e m a d e his propositions of neutrality to t h e
P r u s s i a n C o u r t . It is to be o b s e r v e d also that, practically, t h e c o n v e n t i o n is
only a d a p t e d to t h e exigencies of a defensive policy, while, with regard to
t h e eventuality of an offensive policy, everything is r e s e r v e d to the several
Courts.
T h e F i r s t C h a m b e r of Prussia p a s s e d , on t h e 25th inst., a v o t e of credit
for thirty millions of dollars, in conformity with t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
of its C o m m i t t e e . T h e ministerial explanations given on this o c c a s i o n by H e r r
v o n Manteuffel are so characteristic of t h a t Prussian diplomacy which affects to conceal its intrinsic impotency under patriotic flourishes and nonsensical sublimity, that I will give you the d o c u m e n t in extenso. H e r r v o n
Manteuffel s a y s :
" T h e complications which h a v e o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n R u s s i a and T u r k e y , and
t h e n e x t e n d e d t o the Occidental p o w e r s , are generally k n o w n . T h e Prussian
G o v e r n m e n t thought it expedient, in view of its position and interest, to
u n r a v e l t h e s e complications a n d to arrange this difference. All its efforts and
labors h a v e p r o v e d abortive. S o m e fatality s e e m s to h a v e controlled this
affair. M a n y a t t e m p t s which w e r e likely to contribute to t h e reëstablishment
of p e a c e , h a v e resulted in nothing—perhaps b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e n o t m a d e at
the o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t and in a suitable m a n n e r . T h u s the difficulties h a v e
b e e n p u s h e d to the extremity of war. T h e efforts of Prussia and of Austria
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to insure t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e afford, as it w e r e , a leading-string to
w h i c h to tie again n e w negotiations. S u c h w a s the great e n d aimed at by t h e
V i e n n a Conference. In this Conference t h e G o v e r n m e n t has not c e a s e d to
m a k e the u t m o s t efforts for the m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e . It h a s acted in a spirit
of conciliation ( a s t h e " A n g e l of P e a c e " of t h e E m p e r o r N i c h o l a s ) b u t alw a y s in a firm and decided m a n n e r , a n d w i t h the c o n s c i o u s n e s s of its position
as a great p o w e r ( i n t h e s a m e m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a exp r e s s e d it in his secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ) . It is precisely b e c a u s e it is uninterested ( about its b e c o m i n g a R u s s i a n p r o v i n c e a n d changing d e c o r a t i o n s ) a n d
b e c a u s e its disinterested (uninteressirt) position has b e e n acknowledged by
t h e other p o w e r s , that it w a s able to s p e a k frankly and energetically. Its offers
and its efforts h a v e b e e n received by the t w o parties alternately with gratit u d e and with regret. B u t t h e G o v e r n m e n t did not allow itself to be d r a w n
from its career. T h e first condition for t h e existence of a great p o w e r is
i n d e p e n d e n c e . This i n d e p e n d e n c e t h e P r u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t has k n o w n to
uphold, by taking steps in the interest of p e a c e , without troubling itself by
a doubt w h e t h e r they would be agreeable to this or t h a t p o w e r , (altogether
a fine definition of w h a t is to be u n d e r s t o o d by the i n d e p e n d e n c e of a great
p o w e r . ) W h e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s b e c a m e m o r e threatening, the G o v e r n m e n t
thought that, besides its g e n e r o u s efforts for the preservation of p e a c e , it
w a s its duty to consider, a b o v e all, t h e P r u s s i a n a n d G e r m a n interests. With
this view, a C o n v e n t i o n has b e e n entered into with Austria. T h e other States
of t h e G e r m a n Confederation will a d h e r e to this alliance. C o n s e q u e n t l y , we
m a y be sure of a c o o p e r a t i o n with A u s t r i a a n d the whole of G e r m a n y .
According to t h e G o v e r n m e n t , t h e m o s t certain and efficient g u a r a n t e e of
t h e G e r m a n p o w e r s , consists in this c o o p e r a t i o n . B e s i d e s this intimate union,
t h e anterior c o n c e r t of Prussia a n d A u s t r i a with t h e Occidental p o w e r s on
the basis of the V i e n n a C o n f e r e n c e , will c o n t i n u e . P r u s s i a h a s not estranged
itself from t h e Occidental p o w e r s , notwithstanding t h e assertions of t h e
c o n t r a r y in t h e English p r e s s . This c o n c e r t w i t h t h e Occidental p o w e r s
still exists. T h e p r o t o c o l manifesting this c o n c e r t , h a s already b e e n signed
by t h e E m b a s s a d o r of P r u s s i a ; b u t this p r o t o c o l c a n n o t be laid before
t h e C h a m b e r . T h e r e s p e c t i v e positions o f t h e four p o w e r s u p t o this d a y ,
and their efforts for the restoration of p e a c e , will c o n t i n u e , although t w o
of t h e s e p o w e r s h a v e c o m m e n c e d o p e r a t i o n s of war—(a proof that t h e
w a r is a sham, a n d peace-negotiations t h e real business of the w e s t e r n
C a b i n e t s . ) As far as R u s s i a is c o n c e r n e d , t h e Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u r g
h a s recently m a d e m o r e favorable and m o r e conciliatory o v e r t u r e s , a n d
t h o u g h t h e y hold o u t only w e a k h o p e s of p e a c e at present, t h e y give,
nevertheless, the point of issue for n e w negotiations of p e a c e . T h e P r u s sian G o v e r n m e n t has s h o w n its r e a d i n e s s to h o p e in p e a c e until the last
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m o m e n t . As long as t h e r e will r e m a i n only a spark of h o p e for p e a c e , Prussia
will continue its efforts and pains (Mühen). W h e n the decisive m o m e n t shall
arrive for Prussia, ( T r e m a , B y z a n t i u m ! ) the Government will act w i t h o u t
delay, w i t h o u t hesitation, and with energy. P r u s s i a m u s t p r e p a r e for t h a t
m o m e n t . Its w o r d s will h a v e the greater weight, b e c a u s e it will be r e a d y to
d r a w the sword. W h e n the conflict b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d T u r k e y b r o k e out,
t h e Occidental p o w e r s exhibited firmness and strengthened t h e O t t o m a n
P o r t e . Prussia had not t h e n the mission to play the p a r t of an u m p i r e . It
considered, besides t h e violated right of a third p o w e r , a b o v e all t h e welfare
of its o w n subjects. Its o w n interest in the oriental question is m o r e r e m o t e
t h a n t h a t of Austria, which h a s a more direct interest in it, and Austria h a s
urgently begged of Prussia not to refuse her cooperation. P r u s s i a and A u s t r i a
h a v e p u r s u e d t h e object of moderating, on b o t h sides, t h e pretensions p u s h e d
t o o far, and rendering difficult the w o r k of pacification. It w a s their efforts
t h a t led to t h e V i e n n a Conference, justly c o n s i d e r e d as a f o r t u n a t e event.
O u r G o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t a b a n d o n a situation w h i c h still permits it to exercise
a salutary influence (for R u s s i a ) on t h e Occidental p o w e r s . It is t h e mediating link for those p o w e r s , and m a y serve as a s u p p o r t for the h o p e s of p e a c e .
As to the project of n o t e c o m m u n i c a t e d by the four p o w e r s to the R u s s i a n
G o v e r n m e n t , y o u m u s t n o t forget that R u s s i a n e v e r acknowledged the
c o n f e r e n c e , and also that this project, in c o n s e q u e n c e of n e w c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
c e a s e d to be acceptable to T u r k e y . T h e n e w V i e n n a p r o t o c o l ( a n d this is a
v e r y i m p o r t a n t revelation on the p a r t of Herr von Manteuffel, ) affords n e w
m e a n s t o w a r d a general p e a c e , and at all events to k e e p t h e w a r aloof from
P r u s s i a a n d G e r m a n y . With regard to t h e anterior d e m a n d on t h e part of
A u s t r i a to p r o p o s e to the G e r m a n Diet a strict neutrality, binding for Prussia,
t o o , the g o v e r n m e n t acting spontaneously w a s unable to c o n s e n t to it. It w a s
u n a b l e to c o m p r o m i s e its position as a great i n d e p e n d e n t p o w e r , and the
liberty of its resolutions. Besides, by such a neutrality we should h a v e afforded to the other p o w e r s a p r e t e x t for assuming a hostile attitude, if t h e s e
p o w e r s should consider such an attitude c o n s o n a n t with their interests.
T o - d a y the situation of the Occidental p o w e r s is essentially altered by their
engagement, ( V i e n n a Protocol.) I n t h e m o s t unfavorable c a s e p e a c e will not
be o b t a i n e d , b u t in t h e m o s t favorable case all t h e great calamities w h i c h are
t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of w a r will be diverted from our fatherland; and this is
a n i m m e n s e and inappreciable advantage, (if a n y b o d y c a n m a k e anything
o u t of this alternative, I congratulate him on his a c u t e n e s s . ) T h e military
e v e n t s w h i c h m a y t a k e place in the Baltic and Black S e a s b e t w e e n Russia
and t h e Occidental p o w e r s h a v e forced Prussia, in c o n s e q u e n c e of her
geographical position as a great p o w e r ( r a t h e r longer t h a n g r e a t ) to p r e p a r e
t h e m e a n s required for the defense, if n e e d b e , of its interests with a r m s in
218
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h a n d . At all e v e n t s , the g o v e r n m e n t has n o t s h r u n k before the past, ( m e a n i n g ,
p e r h a p s , if anything, t h a t it is n o t a s h a m e d of its p a s t , ) a n d is glad to h a v e
found an occasion for publicly explaining its v i e w s . "
T h e C o m m i t t e e , it is needless to say, found t h e s e explanations exceedingly
gratifying.
T h e following n e w d o c u m e n t s h a v e b e e n published by the Journal de
St. -Pétersbourg:
"Ordre du Jour of the Commissioner of Police.
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15
April 15, 1854.
H i s Majesty, t h e E m p e r o r , h a s b e e n pleased to order t h e extension to t h e m e n
retired from the M a r i n e , and the train of t h e G u a r d s w h o feel yet able-bodied
and zealous to enter a s e c o n d period of service the advantages granted to
the p e n s i o n e r s of the G u a r d s a n d of the a r m y , e t c .
A i d e - d e - c a m p - G e n e r a l Galakhoff."
" Ukase addressed to the Directing Senate.
In order to increase the m e a n s of defense of t h e coasts of the Gulf of Finland,
we h a v e thought fit to form a reserve-fleet of oar-boats, a n d order:
1. T h e organization of four n e w legions of r o w e r s .
2. T h e s e troops will be f o r m e d by an appeal for voluntary service, m a d e
20 in t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of Petersburg, N o w g o r o d , Olonez a n d Twer.
3. T h e m e a s u r e s to be t a k e n for the organization of this corps are intrusted
to a C o m m i t t e e c o m p o s e d of H i s Imperial H i g h n e s s , t h e G r a n d D u k e Constantine, Director of the Ministry of the M a r i n e , and of the Ministers of t h e
Imperial domains and apanages [and] of t h e interior, e t c .
25 April 14, 1854.
Nicholas."
"A Regulation concerning the Maritime Armament.
I. Object of the institution a n d c o m p o s i t i o n of the maritime a r m a m e n t :
I. T h e maritime a r m a m e n t is m a d e w i t h a view to c o m p l e t e the r e s e r v e flotilla
of oar-boats destined to defend t h e c o a s t s of t h e Gulf of Finland.
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2. This a r m a m e n t is c o m p o s e d of four legions, t h e formation and organization
of which are left to t h e Minister of Marine.
3. Individuals of all conditions are allowed to enter t h e corps of this a r m a ment.
II. E n l i s t m e n t :
35 4. P e r s o n s desirous of entering t h e maritime c o r p s m u s t be provided w i t h
legal p a s s p o r t s , a n d serfs m u s t h a v e a special authorization from their p r o prietors.
5. At St. P e t e r s b u r g the volunteers h a v e to p r e s e n t themselves to the d e p a r t m e n t of inspection of t h e Ministry of Marine, in g o v e r n m e n t t o w n s to
40 the G o v e r n o r s , and in district t o w n s to t h e police authorities.
6. T h e p a s s p o r t s will be deposited in e x c h a n g e for a ticket of an appointed
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form. T h e p a s s p o r t s will be transmitted to t h e d e p a r t m e n t of inspection,
w h e r e the b e a r e r s h a v e t o p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s . A t t h e s a m e time t h e y will
r e c e i v e , if t h e y d e m a n d it, one m o n t h ' s pay, to be m a r k e d on t h e ticket.
7. T h e police are to w a t c h the d e p a r t u r e of t h e v o l u n t e e r s for St. P e t e r s b u r g ,
a n d to give t h e m all aid and protection for facilitating their j o u r n e y . In c a s e
5
of sickness of a volunteer, he is to be t a k e n c a r e of.
(8 a n d 9 are without interest.)
I I I . Conditions of service:
10. T h o s e w h o w i s h to enter t h e oar-marine shall r e c e i v e from t h e day of
their inspection:
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A. Eight rubles silver p e r m o n t h .
B. A m m u n i t i o n and provisions like the regular soldiers of t h e m a r i n e .
C. A p e a s a n t ' s suit of clothes. T h e volunteers m a y w e a r their b e a r d s and hair
à la paysanne.
11. T h e t e r m of expiration of the service is to be t h e 1st N o v e m b e r , 1854.
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12. After this day no volunteer will be retained for service.
13. T h o s e w h o shall distinguish themselves will be r e w a r d e d like the regular
troops.
14. In c a s e of ' p r i z e s ' being m a d e with the assistance of t h e gun-boats the
oar-volunteers are to h a v e their shares according to t h e laws of dis- 20
tribution.
15. In c a s e of their being w o u n d e d the volunteers acquire the rights enjoyed
b y t h e soldiers.
16. Their families are to be provided for by t h e local authorities and corporations.
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Constantine.
Count Kisseleff.
Count Perowski.
Dimitri Bibbikoff."
It w o u l d h a v e b e e n impossible to give a b e t t e r bird's-eye v i e w of R u s s i a 30
t h a n i s offered b y t h e preceding d o c u m e n t s : the E m p e r o r , t h e b u r e a u c r a c y ,
t h e serfs, t h e b e a r d s à la paysanne, the police, t h e oar-marine, t h e corporations, t h e lands and the seas—"all the R u s s i a s . "
Karl Marx.
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The Bombardment of Odessa—GreeceProclamation of Prince Daniel of Montenegro—
Manteuffel's Speech
Nr. 4080, 16. Mai 1854
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , M a y 2, 1854.
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T h e b o m b a r d m e n t of O d e s s a , so m a n y t i m e s p e r f o r m e d by a boastful imagination, h a s at length b e e n realized. B u t t h e telegraphic dispatches hitherto
received are too m e a g e r and deficient in detail to d e s e r v e a c o m m e n t a r y .
According t o t h e most t r u s t w o r t h y n e w s , t h e b o m b a r d m e n t b e g a n o n t h e 22d,
w a s s u s p e n d e d on the 23d, (a s u m m o n s to s u r r e n d e r being sent to t h e
G o v e r n o r of the place,) a n d r e c o m m e n c e d on t h e 24th April. On o n e side
it is affirmed that a great p o r t i o n of t h e t o w n w a s laid in r u i n s ; on t h e other,
t h a t only t h e forts w e r e d e s t r o y e d by r o c k e t s a n d shells. In s o m e q u a r t e r s
it is e v e n asserted t h a t t h e b o m b a r d m e n t h a d r e m a i n e d w i t h o u t a n y effect
w h a t e v e r . Several dispatches a n n o u n c e t h e destruction of eight R u s s i a n
vessels—merchant vessels, of c o u r s e , as t h e r e w e r e no R u s s i a n men-of-war
at Odessa. T h e latest dispatch—dated O d e s s a , 26th April—states t h a t t h e
w h o l e of the combined fleet h a d t a k e n its d e p a r t u r e on t h a t morning.
I n order t o p r e p a r e t h e public mind for this e v e n t , the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
h a d j u s t published in t h e Moniteur an e x t r a c t from Admiral H a m e l i n ' s latest
r e p o r t to the Minister of the M a r i n e , in w h i c h he s t a t e s :
" T h e English steam-frigate F u r i o u s had g o n e on the 6th of April to O d e s s a ,
in order to claim a n d t a k e on b o a r d t h e Consuls a n d s u c h F r e n c h and English
subjects as might w i s h to quit t h a t t o w n on t h e a p p r o a c h of hostilities . . .
t h a t , in spite of t h e flag of t r u c e w h i c h she h a d hoisted, a n d which h e r landingb o a t also b o r e , the R u s s i a n batteries t r e a c h e r o u s l y fired seven shots u p o n
this b o a t a few m o m e n t s after it h a d left t h e pier. Admiral D u n d a s and himself
w e r e deliberating on t h e m e a s u r e s of retribution required by s u c h a b a r barous proceeding."
T h e Russians give a different version of the affair. T h e y allege that t h e
sending of a flag of t r u c e w a s only a p r e t e x t for examining their w o r k s of
d e f e n s e . T h e fact of the ship Retribution having e n t e r e d t h e p o r t of S e v a s -
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topol, s o m e t i m e ago, u n d e r pretext of remitting d i s p a t c h e s , b u t with t h e real
object of making drawings of the interior batteries, h a d highly irritated the
Czar—the m o r e so, as the noise m a d e a b o u t this a c h i e v e m e n t by t h e English
p r e s s had confirmed this supposition. O r d e r s had c o n s e q u e n t l y b e e n given
to t h e effect that in future all vessels presenting t h e m s e l v e s before a Russian
p o r t should be received with c a n n o n - s h o t s . T h e Indépendance Belge p u b lishes a letter illustrating t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , apparently by a Russian
officer at O d e s s a , b u t probably having no other a u t h o r t h a n M. de Kisseleff
himself.
" O n the 27th of M a r c h (8th of April) at 6 o'clock A . M . , the F u r i o u s , a
s t e a m e r of t h e English royal fleet, a p p r o a c h e d to t h e pier of t h e quarantinep o r t of O d e s s a without hoisting the flag of t r u c e . A l t h o u g h the captain of
t h e p o r t h a d orders to fire a r o c k e t over any English man-of-war, he resolved
n e v e r t h e l e s s to abstain from executing his o r d e r s at o n c e , admitting t h a t the
s t e a m e r might n o t yet be a w a r e of t h e English declaration of war. T h e
F u r i o u s c a s t anchor, lowered her boat, and sent it on shore with a flag of
t r u c e . T h e captain of t h e port immediately dispatched his Aide-de-camp to
m e e t t h e officer of the boat. This officer declared t h a t he c a m e with t h e
mission t o fetch t h e Consuls o f F r a n c e a n d England. H e w a s a n s w e r e d t h a t
t h e s e gentlemen had quitted O d e s s a a long time since, and w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y
invited t o r e m o v e instantly; w h e r e u p o n t h e b o a t w a s t a k e n o n b o a r d the
p y r o s c a p h e , the flag of truce being r e m o v e d . B u t instead of weighing a n c h o r ,
t h e officers of t h e steamer set about taking drawings of t h e batteries. It w a s
t h e n that, in order to p r e v e n t the F u r i o u s from doing this, blind shots w e r e
fired over her. T h e Furious taking no notice of t h e m , a ball w a s sent into
o n e of her w h e e l s . T h e F u r i o u s immediately w i t h d r e w . "
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It is certainly ridiculous that the English and F r e n c h fleets had to wait to
b e furnished with " r e a s o n s " b y t h e Russians b e f o r e entering u p o n the
hostilities n o w directed against a Russian p o r t , and n o t t h e n e v e n to t a k e it
b u t merely to l a u n c h a few broadsides into it.
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A b o u t the same time w h e n the F u r i o u s w a s dispatched o n her mission,
t h e letters received from O d e s s a at Constantinople affirmed t h a t t h e Russian
G o v e r n m e n t had seized all grain in b o n d , without a n y r e s p e c t for the private
p r o p e r t y of foreign m e r c h a n t s . T h e quantity confiscated a m o u n t e d to
800,000 c h e t w e r t s . B e s i d e s , the Russian G o v e r n m e n t h a d enjoined the for- 35
eign m e r c h a n t s to supply 150,000 sacks a n d 15,000 w a g o n s for transporting
to the interior the confiscated grain. All reclamations w e r e m e t by the
G o v e r n o r with t h e declaration t h a t t h e policy of t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s r e d u c e d
t h e R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t to such extremities, and t h a t in seizing their
p r o p e r t y t h e y only saved it from t h e plunder of an e x a s p e r a t e d population. 40
On t h e reclamations of the neutral consuls remaining at O d e s s a , the G o v e r -
222
The Bombardment of Odessa—Greece—Proclamation of Prince Daniel of Montenegro
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nor at last consented—not to p a y for t h e seized goods—but to issue simple
receipts to the o w n e r s .
T h e following is an e x t r a c t from a Stockholm p a p e r :
" T h e w h o l e t o w n s w a r m s with fugitives from Finland; m a n y , t o o , c o m e
from Aland, (which s e e m s to be still o c c u p i e d by t h e Russians,) in order to
e s c a p e the Russian press-gangs. T h e R u s s i a n fleet is i n g r e a t w a n t o f s e a m e n ,
a n d t h e authorities lay [violent] h a n d s on y o u n g a n d old. In t h e d e a d of t h e
night fathers of families are hurried off w i t h o u t a m o m e n t ' s grace, and t h e
result is t h a t whole h o u s e h o l d s fly to S w e d e n , with bag and baggage, in order
to e s c a p e from such t y r a n n y . "
T h e Journal of St. Petersburg of t h e 23d ult. contains a p r o c l a m a t i o n from
t h e Czar to his subjects, representing t h e w a r against t h e Occidental p o w e r s
as a w a r of the o r t h o d o x c h u r c h against the h e r e t i c s , and aiming at t h e liberation of its suppressed b r e t h r e n in t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
T h e Paris Presse of to-day h a s t h e following article:
" O n e of our c o r r e s p o n d e n t s at Constantinople has sent us important
details on t h e Russian c o m p l o t w h i c h w a s discovered some time ago, a n d
the inquiry into w h i c h has just terminated. This inquiry clearly p r o v e s t h a t
R u s s i a has long b e e n preparing the crisis w h i c h w a s to c a r r y off t h e sick m a n
u n d e r the v e r y h a n d s of his physicians. T h e inquiry p r o v e s that B a r o n
Oelsner h a d feigned to place himself at t h e service of t h e T u r k i s h Police in
o r d e r the better to deceive his surveillants. He w a s in the receipt of
1,000 piasters per month. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his a s t u t e n e s s , his double g a m e
w a s detected i n t h e following m a n n e r : H e h a d e n t e r e d into relations w i t h
Mr. A s k a , a physician in t h e T u r k i s h service, and believing that he could trust
him, he a v o w e d to him that, although paid by the T u r k i s h Police, he h a d n e v e r
c e a s e d to serve Russia. According to Mr. Oelsner, R u s s i a p r o p o s e d to recruit
a m o n g the G r e e k s and t h e Slavs in T u r k e y an a r m y of 60,000 conspirators
r e a d y to rise at a given signal. T h e decisive b l o w w a s to be struck at Constantinople. T h e chief of the c o m p l o t in t h a t city w a s an Englishman, a certain
Plantagenet Harrison. Mr. A s k a feigned to enter into t h e views of Oelsner,
and g a v e a hint to the T u r k i s h Police. T h e police, having suspected Oelsner
for a considerable time, c a u s e d him to be w a t c h e d with increased c a r e , a n d
discovered t h a t he w a s in t h e habit of sending regular r e p o r t s to Prince
Gorchakoff. Finally t h e y s u c c e e d e d in intercepting o n e of t h e s e r e p o r t s .
Oelsner, though v e r y cautious on the w h o l e , h a d t h e u n l u c k y idea of showing
t h e a b o v e r e p o r t t o Mr. Aska, w h o immediately informed Mr. Palamari, t h e
secret agent of the T u r k i s h Police, a n d contrived to give it in his p r e s e n c e
t o R a d s c h i s k z , a n Austrian Slavonian w h o w a s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n with
Oelsner and his accomplices. T h e letter w a s seized u p o n this individual and
forms o n e of t h e pieces of conviction. It w a s also a v e r r e d t h a t Oelsner h a d
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established a c o n c e r t w i t h C o n s t a n t i n o s , captain of a G r e e k m e r c h a n t ship,
a n d t h a t t h e y h a d arranged for t h e affiliation of forty other captains of G r e e k
ships w h o , at a given d a y , w e r e to arrive at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , provided w i t h
a m m u n i t i o n a n d furnishing the materials for raising in rebellion the G r e e k
population of the metropolis. Constantinos w a s in p e r m a n e n t relation n o t
only w i t h Oelsner, b u t also with Mr. M e t a x a s , t h e G r e e k E m b a s s a d o r a t t h e
P o r t e . Bodinaroff, a Russian Colonel, afforded the m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n
b e t w e e n Oelsner a n d Prince Gorchakoff."
T h e r e h a s a p p e a r e d in t h e Augsburger Zeitung a series of articles extremely hostile t o w a r d Russia, which h a v e c r e a t e d a g r e a t sensation in
G e r m a n y , as that journal w a s , until n o w , the m o s t a r d e n t partisan of Russian
i n t e r e s t s , a n d is k n o w n , at the same time, to r e c e i v e its inspirations from t h e
A u s t r i a n Cabinet. A u s t r i a is r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e s e articles as released from
h e r obligations t o w a r d Russia, in c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e revelations contained
in t h e confidential c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of Sir H. S e y m o u r . In o n e of t h e s e articles
it is said:
" W h e n t h e proceedings of Russia r e n d e r e d it n e c e s s a r y to m a k e r e p r e sentations at St. Petersburg, t h e y w e r e received in so p e r e m p t o r y a manner,
a n d t h e V i e n n a Cabinet w a s t r e a t e d s o u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y , t h a t e v e r y n e w
dispatch from Constantinople e v o k e d painful p r e s e n t i m e n t s . This w a n t of
r e s p e c t , of consideration, engaged C o u n t Mensdorff to a s k [for] the c o m m a n d of a brigade, in order to be relieved from his p o s t at St. P e t e r s b u r g ,
although personally he h a d no cause for c o m p l a i n t s . "
C o n s e q u e n t l y h e w a s replaced b y C o u n t E s t e r h á z y . I n a n o t h e r article t h e r e
o c c u r s this p a s s a g e :
" W h e n the E m p e r o r of Russia c a m e to Olmiitz, his c o n d u c t t o w a r d C o u n t
B u o l - S c h a u e n s t e i n w a s so improper, n o t to say offending, t h a t it w a s rem a r k e d b y e v e r y b o d y , and that N e s s e l r o d e and Meyendorff w e r e e m b a r r a s s e d by it. ( L e t me remind y o u r r e a d e r s t h a t it is a habit of N e s s e l r o d e
to p r o v o k e s u c h arrogant behavior of his august m a s t e r in order to deplore
it afterward.) T h e y o u n g E m p e r o r , witnessing t h e s e proceedings against his
minister, has n o t forgot them. T h e letters of Sir H . S e y m o u r could only
accelerate t h e fixed resolution of His Majesty ( t o o p p o s e the e n c r o a c h m e n t s
of R u s s i a u p o n A u s t r i a herself.) ****** During his stay at V i e n n a , C o u n t
Orloff refused to engage himself, in t h e n a m e of his sovereign, to r e s p e c t
u n d e r all c i r c u m s t a n c e s the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . "
T h e Constantinople c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times lays a special accent u p o n
t h e s t a t e m e n t that t h e G r e e k insurrection would infallibly lead to a revolution
in G r e e c e , t h a t is a struggle b e t w e e n the national p a r t y and the partisans of
Russia. On t h e other h a n d , it a p p e a r s that t h e cruelties of t h e P a s h a ' s b a y o n e t s in Bulgaria are disposing t h e population in f a v o r of Russia. L e t me
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illustrate by a few facts the position of G r e e c e t o w a r d s t h e Occidental
p o w e r s . We r e a d in t h e Nouvelliste de Marseüle, d a t e d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,
April 17:
" T h e E u r o p e a n residents at A t h e n s h a v e to undergo all sorts of insults.
T h e y are e v e n assailed with sticks, no obstacle being o p p o s e d by t h e G r e e k
gens d'armerie. On t h e 15th ult. M r . G a s p a r i , a m e m b e r of the F r e n c h
E m b a s s y , and t h e son of an old F r e n c h Consul at A t h e n s , received blows
and w a s k n o c k e d d o w n in the p r e s e n c e of t h r e e gens d'armes, w h o r e m a i n e d
indifferent witnesses of this scene. On t h e s a m e day other F r e n c h m e n r e ceived warnings t h a t a list of ninety-six Franchi destined for 'chastisement'
w a s dressed. In c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e s e e x c e s s e s a collective note of the
F r e n c h and English R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w a s a d d r e s s e d to the G o v e r n m e n t of
King O t h o , informing him t h a t any violence c o m m i t t e d against the p e r s o n s
of F r e n c h and English residents w o u l d immediately give occasion for an
indemnity of 23,000 d r a c h m a s . On the 12th of April a n e w ultimatum w a s
transmitted to the G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t , in w h i c h a delay of only five d a y s w a s
given, expiring on t h e 17th. This ultimatum calls u p o n King O t h o to r e d r e s s
the w r o n g s suffered by t h e F r e n c h , to p r o n o u n c e in a categorical m a n n e r
against t h e insurrection, a n d t o retrieve t h e evils d o n e a n d permitted. N o
satisfactory answer w a s e x p e c t e d on t h e p a r t of the King. In c a s e of a
negative answer, the E m b a s s a d o r s h a d resolved to b r e a k off completely all
relations with the G o v e r n m e n t , and at the same time to constitute t h e m selves, in t h e collective n a m e of F r a n c e a n d England, as the Administrators
of Greece, according to the provisions of the protocol establishing t h a t
kingdom."
T h e G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t has a d r e s s e d circulars to its foreign agents, in
apology of its c o n d u c t during its r e c e n t q u a r r e l with the P o r t e , t h e latest
m e a s u r e s of which, against G r e e k subjects, says M r . P a i k o s , arise from t h e
r e s e n t m e n t of T u r k e y at having no longer t h e privilege of considering G r e e c e
as a T u r k i s h p r o v i n c e , and which form m e r e l y t h e k e y s t o n e of t w e n t y y e a r s '
intrigues against G r e e c e , with t h e insurrections in T h e s s a l y and Epirus as
pretexts.
T h e Wiener Presse of 28th April publishes the following p r o c l a m a t i o n of
Prince Daniel to t h e Montenegrin chiefs:
"I w i s h that y o u , t o o , C z e r n a g o r a s , (Montenegrins,) n o w as before p r o v e
yourselves as heroic as the G r e e k s a n d o t h e r nations, after the example of
our, victorious ancestors w h o b e q u e a t h e d us the liberty of w h i c h we are so
p r o u d in t h e e y e s of t h e world. It is, therefore, t h a t I desire to a d d r e s s t h e
soldiers w h o h a v e already entered their service, in order t h a t I m a y k n o w
w h e t h e r I c a n depend u p o n t h e m , a n d I o r d e r t h e chiefs to assemble e a c h
his tribe. E a c h soldier is to declare s p o n t a n e o u s l y w h e t h e r he is r e a d y to
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m a r c h with me against t h e T u r k , t h e c o m m o n e n e m y of o u r faith a n d of our
land. Y o u , Captain, are to receive e v e r y volunteer, and r e p o r t to me at
Cettinie. B u t I conjure all t h o s e w h o are n o t r e a d y to b r a v e death, to stay
a t h o m e . W h o e v e r wishes t o m a r c h w i t h m e m u s t forget his wife and his
children, and all he loves in this world. I tell y o u , my b r a v e p e o p l e , and y o u ,
5
m y b r e t h r e n , that w h o e v e r desires n o t t o die with m e , n e e d n o t stir; b e c a u s e
I k n o w t h a t w h o e v e r m a r c h e s with me into w a r is w o r t h m o r e t h a n fifty
c o w a r d s . T h u s I invite all gallant m e n w h o s e hearts are not cold, and w h o
do not hesitate to spill their blood for their c o u n t r y , t h e o r t h o d o x c h u r c h a n d
t h e holy c r o s s , to share with me in the glory a n d the h o n o r . We a r e , indeed, 10
t h e s o n s of t h e old Montenegrins w h o v a n q u i s h e d t h r e e T u r k i s h viziers,
defeated F r e n c h t r o o p s , and stormed the fortresses of t h e Sultan. L e t us n o t
b e t r a y our fatherland, nor disown t h e glory of our a n c i e n t friends, and let
us m e e t to fight, in t h e holy n a m e of G o d .
Cettinie, M a r c h 16, 1854.
Daniel."
We r e a d in t h e Agramer Zeitung t h a t in c o n s e q u e n c e of this appeal to t h e
pious freebooters of M o n t e n e g r o , the chiefs called together, in e a c h of the
Montenegrin clans, t h e y o u n g warriors and c o m m u n i c a t e d this proclamation,
w h e n 4,000 m e n s w o r e , at the altar, to c o n q u e r or die u n d e r the flag " F o r
F a i t h and F a t h e r l a n d . " It is impossible n o t to recognize t h e interesting
affinity of this m o v e m e n t with the p h r a s e s and h o p e s of the Prussian w a r
of i n d e p e n d e n c e , w h o s e m e m o r y is so faithfully k e p t up by Gen. D o h n a at
Königsberg, and the Prussian Treubund generally. T h e a t t a c k of the M o n t e negrins against t h e Herzegovina, by w a y of Nixitshy, will be c o m m a n d e d
by Prince Daniel himself. T h e attack in the s o u t h (toward Albania), by w a y
of Zabliak, will be led by t h e W o y w o d e George Petrowitch. " T h e mountaine e r s , " s a y s t h e Agramer Zeitung, " a r e well p r o v i d e d w i t h a m m u n i t i o n , and
e a c h of t h e t w o corps will h a v e twelve three-and-a-half-pounders at their
d i s p o s a l . " T h e signal for opening the hostilities will be given by Col. K o v a leffsky, w h o receives his instructions direct from St. Petersburg.
Herr von Manteuffel having got his $30,000,000 h a s s e n t t h e C h a m b e r s
h o m e with a s p e e c h from which I e x t r a c t t h e following eminently characteristic p a s s a g e :
" G e n t l e m e n : B y granting the credit y o u h a v e given the G o v e r n m e n t the
m e a n s to p r o c e e d on t h e w a y it h a s hitherto p u r s u e d , in entire u n i o n (in voller
Einigkeit) with Austria and the whole of G e r m a n y , a n d in c o n c e r t with the
other great p o w e r s , and to p r e s e r v e to Prussia the position due to her in t h e
solution of t h e great E u r o p e a n question of the d a y . "
L e t me o b s e r v e , t h a t [in] the telegraphic r e p o r t of this speech, given by
t h e English p a p e r s , t h e " c o n c e r t with all t h e other great p o w e r s " w a s falsely
translated into a " c o n c e r t with Occidental p o w e r s . " Prussia has c h o s e n a
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higher aim. She w a n t s , in c o n c e r t with b o t h parties apparently at war, to
arrange m e a s u r e s of peace—with w h o m ?
H e r r v o n Manteuffel, o n t h e same day o n w h i c h h e dismissed t h e C h a m b e r s , h a d t h e good fortune to deliver a s e c o n d speech, in a reunion of his
5 p a r t y , a s p e e c h far m o r e precise a n d e l o q u e n t t h a n t h e a b o v e official slang.
T h a t speech is t h e most eminently P r u s s i a n p r o d u c t i o n of m o d e r n times. It
is as it w e r e , Prussian statesmanship in nuce:
" G e n t l e m e n , " said h e , " t h e r e is a w o r d which h a s b e e n m u c h abused—this
w o r d b e a r s t h e n a m e of liberty. I do not d i s o w n t h e w o r d , b u t my m o t t o is
10 another o n e ; my m o t t o is t h e w o r d service. (Dienst.) G e n t l e m e n , all of us
w h o meet h e r e h a v e t h e duty to s e r v e G o d and t h e King, and it is my pride
t h a t I am able to serve t h a t King. T h a t w o r d service holds together t h e
Prussian State, scattered as it lies t h r o u g h o u t G e r m a n lands (in deutschen
Gauen). This w o r d m u s t unite us all in t h e different situations we hold. T h e
15 w o r d service to the King is my standard,' it is t h e b a n n e r of all t h o s e w h o
h a v e m e t h e r e , and in this lies the salvation of t h e s e times. Gentlemen, the
service of t h e King shall live."
Manteuffel is right: t h e r e is no other Prussia t h a n that w h i c h lives u p o n
t h e service of the King.
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News from the European Contest
Nr.4084, 20. Mai 1854
News from the European Contest.
O u r journals and letters by the E u r o p a contain a positive confirmation of
t h e r e p o r t e d b o m b a r d m e n t of Odessa. T h e p r e s e n t advices on t h a t subject
are official and leave no possibility of d o u b t as to the e v e n t . T h e w o r k s of
t h e h a r b o r h a v e b e e n destroyed, t w o p o w d e r magazines b l o w n u p , twelve
small Russian vessels-of-war sunk and thirteen t r a n s p o r t s c a p t u r e d , all with
t h e loss of eight m e n killed a n d eighteen w o u n d e d in t h e allied fleet. This
trifling loss of m e n p r o v e s that it w a s [by] no m e a n s a formidable achievem e n t . After it w a s d o n e t h e fleet sailed a w a y for S e v a s t o p o l , t h e destruction
of w h i c h we fancy t h e y will find to be a different sort of w o r k .
F r o m the D a n u b e there is a n e w r e p o r t of a decisive victory gained by
O m e r P a s h a over General L ü d e r s , b u t of this affair we h a v e nothing b e y o n d
a telegraphic dispatch by w a y of Vienna, the great m a n u f a c t o r y of stockjobbing h o a x e s . T h e story r u n s t h a t t h e T u r k s , 70,000 strong, overhauled
L ü d e r s s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n Silistria and R a s s o v a , t h e latter being a place
o n t h e D a n u b e some ten miles a b o v e C h e r n a v o d a , and t h a t while O m e r P a s h a
w a s pressing the Russians in front, another c o r p s , s e n t a r o u n d for the purp o s e , fell u p o n their flank, a n d so b e t w e e n the t w o fires t h e y w e r e u s e d u p .
This is n o t an impossible thing, b u t we do n o t see h o w O m e r P a s h a could
c o n c e n t r a t e so large a force at any point below Silistria with such rapidity
a s t o t a k e L ü d e r s u n p r e p a r e d . According t o t h e last p r e v i o u s advices, the
g r o s s of his army,—which altogether c a n n o t be m o r e t h a n 120,000 strong,
including the garrisons that m u s t be p r o v i d e d for along his e x t e n d e d
line,—was being collected at Shumla, s o m e h u n d r e d miles from t h e scene of
t h e r e p o r t e d battle, and it is not an e a s y thing to surprise an e n e m y at s u c h
a distance w h e r e 70,000 m e n h a v e to be brought u p o n t h e field to do it. Still
we r e p e a t , it is possible; the n e x t steamer will p r o b a b l y inform us w h e t h e r
it is t r u e .
T h e G r e e k insurrection has suffered another defeat, but that it is extinguished by t h e disaster it would be impossible to believe. M e n a n d leaders
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will no d o u b t appear to r e n e w the c o n t e s t a n d c a r r y on a harassing guerrilla
w a r at least against t h e T u r k i s h forces on t h e frontiers. W h e t h e r it will
b e c o m e anything m o r e serious m u s t d e p e n d u p o n c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; a s o u r
r e a d e r s will see in another c o l u m n an e x t e n s i v e conspiracy of G r e e k s a n d
Russians c a m e near exploding in the midst of T u r k e y ; accident p u t the w h o l e
into the h a n d s of t h e P o r t e , b u t o t h e r s u c h conspiracies m a y occur without
a n y interposing e v e n t to hinder their c o u r s e . M e a n w h i l e the allied p o w e r s
ply t h e G r e e k Court with m e n a c e s , and land t r o o p s in T u r k e y as if to t a k e
final possession of t h e c o u n t r y for t h e m s e l v e s . M o s t of t h e s e forces still
r e m a i n n e a r Constantinople, t h o u g h at t h e instance of t h e F r e n c h E m b a s s a d o r , a d e t a c h m e n t has gone n o r t h to V a r n a , w h e r e t h e r e is likely to be
fighting any day. It is doubtful, h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r the b o d y of t h e allied
forces will so soon engage in the active w o r k of t h e campaign. This point
c a n n o t be determined till t h e c o m m a n d i n g generals arrive at C o n stantinople.
In the Baltic Sir Charles Napier still r e m a i n s in the vicinity of Stockholm,
attacking n o n e of the R u s s i a n strongholds on t h e coast. It a p p e a r s t h a t he
is anxious w i t h r e s p e c t to the gun-boat flotilla with w h i c h the Russians
p r o p o s e to o p e r a t e against him in t h e shallow w a t e r s and among t h e islands
of the Gulf of Finland, and has sent to E n g l a n d for small steamers of light
draught, which c a n p u r s u e t h e s e b o a t s to their places of refuge. On t h e other
h a n d , it is r e p o r t e d by the St. P e t e r s b u r g c o r r e s p o n d e n t of a journal of Berlin,
t h a t the Russian Court is fearful t h a t C r o n s t a d t c a n n o t stand the onslaught
w h i c h is expected from the British R o u g h and R e a d y , t h a t the men-of-war
in t h e h a r b o r do not succeed well in m a n e u v e r i n g a n d firing e v e n for t h e
p u r p o s e s of a r e v i e w ; and that p r e p a r a t i o n s are e v e n making to resist t h e
d e b a r k a t i o n of a hostile land force at that place.
It is n o t likely, h o w e v e r , t h a t any a t t a c k will t a k e place in the Baltic until
t h e F r e n c h fleet has also arrived, and t h e n C r o n s t a d t will very probably
receive t h e honor of the first b o m b a r d m e n t . Its c a p t u r e or destruction is
another question; b u t b e f o r e s u c h m e a n s of d e s t r u c t i o n as t h e allies will bring
against it, its fall w o u l d not be surprising.
T h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s flatter t h e m s e l v e s that A u s t r i a is coming o v e r to their
side, a n d derive e n c o u r a g e m e n t from agreeable things said to the D u k e of
Cambridge at the festivities of the E m p e r o r ' s wedding. B u t from P r u s s i a
t h e r e is no s u c h pleasing intelligence. Altogether, G e r m a n y stands j u s t w h e r e
she did b e f o r e , a n d the allies h a v e no p r o s p e c t of drawing her into a n y
engagement in their favor. T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t Austria will be r e a d y to
o c c u p y Serbia and Montenegro,—where a positive rebellion h a s b r o k e n o u t
against t h e Sultan,—but such an occupation, as we h a v e previously s h o w n ,
w o u l d only be another step t o w a r d the partition of T u r k e y , and w o u l d b e ,
in fact, m o r e favorable to R u s s i a t h a n to her antagonists.
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British Finances
Nr. 4086, 23. Mai 1854
British Finances.
A l t h o u g h the b o m b a r d m e n t of O d e s s a , w h i c h a p p e a r s , after all, to h a v e b e e n
a v e r y indifferent affair, highly excites t h e public mind, t h e r e is another
b o m b a r d m e n t w h i c h , at this v e r y m o m e n t , w o r k s u p o n it still m o r e p o w e r fully—namely, t h e b o m b a r d m e n t of t h e public p u r s e . Before entering into an
analysis of t h e financial statement m a d e by Mr. G l a d s t o n e in y e s t e r d a y ' s
sitting of t h e C o m m o n s , we must c a s t a retrospective glance at his official
transactions hitherto.
Mr. Disraeli, w h e n in office, had r e d u c e d the interest of E x c h e q u e r Bills
to l /4d. a day, w h i c h w a s lower t h a n it h a d ever b e e n b e f o r e ; b u t M r . Gladstone, anxious to i m p r o v e u p o n his p r e d e c e s s o r , w e n t on further, reducing
it to Id., neglecting to notice the circumstance t h a t w h e n M r . Disraeli r e d u c e d
t h e interest of E x c h e q u e r Bills m o n e y w a s a b u n d a n t a n d c h e a p , while it w a s
scarce a n d dear w h e n M r . Gladstone u n d e r t o o k to surpass his rival. C o n sequently, t h e great m a n was called u p o n to pay t h r e e millions of m o n e y for
E x c h e q u e r Bills, which, if left alone, would h a v e floated at the rate of interest
at w h i c h he found them. This w a s not all. H a v i n g hardly paid off the
E x c h e q u e r Bills at great public inconvenience, t h e y h a d to be r e i s s u e d again
at a higher r a t e of interest. This w a s the first proof of the t r a n s c e n d e n t genius
of t h e Oxford casuist, w h o w a s supposed to unite, as it w e r e , all t h e talents
in his single p e r s o n , the coalition of all the talents having ejected t h e T o r y
G o v e r n m e n t u p o n their financial s c h e m e , a n d t h u s proclaimed finances t h e
strong point of their policy.
M r . G l a d s t o n e , n o t c o n t e n t w i t h dealing w i t h t h e floating debt, m a d e a still
m o r e curious experiment u p o n the funded debt. I n April, 1853, h e w e n t d o w n
!
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to t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s w i t h a v e r y complicated s c h e m e for the conversion of t h e S o u t h S e a stock a n d other funds, with an a r r a n g e m e n t which
might c o m p e l him to p a y off nine and a half millions at the e n d of six m o n t h s
and t w e l v e m o n t h s . I t h a s b e e n v e r y justly r e m a r k e d t h a t w h e n h e did s o
he h a d before him the secret dispatches of Sir H a m i l t o n S e y m o u r , and the
warnings of Col. R o s e a n d Consul C u n n i n g h a m , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s which
could leave no d o u b t of t h e hostile intention of t h e Russian G o v e r n m e n t a n d
t h e proximity of a E u r o p e a n war. B u t y o u r r e a d e r s will recollect t h a t at t h e
v e r y period w h e n M r . G l a d s t o n e p r o p o s e d his s c h e m e I foretold its failure,
and t h e necessity in which it w o u l d place t h e G o v e r n m e n t of borrowing, at
the e n d of the financial year, to t h e a m o u n t of five or six millions. I m a d e
this s t a t e m e n t without a n y r e s p e c t t o t h e E a s t e r n complication. Besides, t h e
scholastic air of M r . G l a d s t o n e ' s s c h e m e n o t being likely to s e d u c e the stockjobbing m o b o f t h e E x c h a n g e , t h e r e w a s w a n t e d n o great sagacity t o foretell
t h a t the h a r v e s t m u s t p r o v e af ailure, b e c a u s e t h e e x t e n t s o w e d w a s far below
t h e average on a c c o u n t of t h e v e r y w e t s e a s o n ; t h a t a b a d h a r v e s t would
c a u s e a drain of bullion; that a drain of bullion could certainly n o t c o u n t e r a c t
the already existing t e n d e n c y to a rise of interest in the m o n e y market, and
that, with the general m o n e y m a r k e t rising, it w a s a b s u r d to suppose that the
public creditor w o u l d allow t h e interest of his stock to be r e d u c e d or n o t
eagerly grasp at t h e opportunity afforded him by M r . G l a d s t o n e ' s e x p e r i m e n t
to insist on t h e r e p a y m e n t of his s t o c k at p a r in o r d e r to invest it the following
d a y at a net profit. I n d e e d , at the close of t h e financial year, M r . G l a d s t o n e
w a s obliged to p a y off at par six millions of S o u t h S e a annuities which,
without his intermeddling, w o u l d at this m o m e n t only c o m m a n d £85 for every
£100 of stock at t h e E x c h a n g e . T h u s he n o t only m a d e needlessly a w a y with
six millions of the public f u n d s , b u t t h e public incurred by this brilliant
operation an actual loss of at least o n e million, while t h e b a l a n c e in t h e
E x c h e q u e r , w h i c h w a s in April, 1853, £7,800,000, has b e e n r e d u c e d in April,
1854, at a t i m e o f war, t o o n l y £2,778,000, b e i n g a l o s s o f morethan£5,000,00O.
T h e abortive conversion s c h e m e of Mr. G l a d s t o n e is at the foundation of all
t h e m o n e t a r y difficulties against which t h e G o v e r n m e n t h a s n o w to c o n t e n d .
On t h e 6th of M a r c h , only 24 d a y s before t h e declaration of w a r , M r . Gladstone laid d o w n as t h e v e r y basis of all bis o p e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e supplies should
be p r o v i d e d within t h e y e a r to p a y t h e c u r r e n t e x p e n s e s , a n d declared he
h a d t a k e n m e a s u r e s to cast t h e b u r d e n s of w a r only u p o n t h e present, a n d
that a r e s o r t to the m o n e y m a r k e t for a loan w a s o u t of question. He r e p e a t e d
his s t a t e m e n t again on t h e 22d of M a r c h , a n d e v e n on the 12th of April. Y e t
on the 21st of April, w h e n Parliament w a s not sitting, an official notice
a p p e a r e d t h a t a loan w o u l d be required, a n d t h a t E x c h e q u e r B o n d s to t h e
a m o u n t of six millions w o u l d c o n s e q u e n t l y be issued. T h e E x c h e q u e r B o n d s ,
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y o u will r e m e m b e r , are an invention of Mr. G l a d s t o n e , c o t e m p o r a n e o u s l y
i n t r o d u c e d w i t h his conversion s c h e m e .
T h e ordinary E x c h e q u e r bill is a security for 12 m o n t h s , and is generally
e x c h a n g e d or paid off at t h e end of t h a t t i m e , and its rate of interest fluctuates
with t h e m a r k e t rate of interest. T h e E x c h e q u e r b o n d s , on t h e c o n t r a r y , bear
a fixed r a t e of interest for y e a r s , and are a terminable annuity, transferable
from h a n d to hand by a simple indorsement, w i t h o u t a n y c o s t w h a t e v e r to
either b u y e r o r seller. U p o n the whole, t h e y m a y b e described a s imitations
of railway d e b e n t u r e s . W h e n Mr. Gladstone first invented t h e m in 1853, he
t o o k p o w e r to issue 30,000,000, and so p r o u d he w a s of his invention t h a t
he t h o u g h t t h e 30,000,000 w o u l d n o t be sufficient to a n s w e r the public
d e m a n d , a n d that they would be at a high p r e m i u m . H o w e v e r , " t h e public
w e r e glutted by v e r y little m o r e t h a n £400,000, or a b o u t o n e - s e v e n t h of the
a m o u n t he e x p e c t e d would be r e q u i r e d . " In order to raise his loan of
6,000,000, M r . Gladstone brought out t h r e e sorts of E x c h e q u e r b o n d s , such as
h a v e four y e a r s to run, s u c h as h a v e five y e a r s to r u n , and s u c h as h a v e six
y e a r s t o run. T o m a k e t h e m m o r e acceptable t o the E x c h a n g e , h e decided that
the interest would b e allowed o n installments n o t y e t paid. H e p r e t e n d e d
to issue t h e m at p a r , with an interest of t h r e e a n d one-half p e r cent., considering t h e extraordinary advantages belonging to t h e n e w f o r m of securities
as being equivalent to from 10 to 16 p e r cent., on t h e a m o u n t of the dividend.
W h e n t h e t e n d e r s w e r e o p e n e d , i t w a s found that t h e a m o u n t bid for w a s
b u t £800,000 of b o n d s of the first series, to be paid off in 1858; while with
r e s p e c t to t h e other series of b o n d s of 1859 and 1860 no offers w e r e m a d e
at all. T h i s is not all. He w a s forced to issue his c o m m o d i t i e s at a discount,
selling t h e m at t h e minimum of ninety-eight and three-fourths, a n d throwing
in a few m o n t h s interest, so that he is simply b o r r o w i n g at four per cent, in
e x c h a n g e for t h e S o u t h S e a S t o c k s , w h i c h w e r e at t h r e e per cent, annuity,
t h u s losing on the capital fifteen p e r cent., and on t h e interest twenty-five
p e r cent. Notwithstanding all t h e s e c o n c e s s i o n s , his failure w a s c o m p l e t e ,
he being obliged to e x t e n d the period for receiving t e n d e r s to t h e 8th inst.,
a n d to c o m e d o w n from his d e m a n d of 6,000,000 to t h e "ridiculously small
s u m " of 2,000,000. T h e failure w a s n e c e s s a r y , b e c a u s e his c o m m o d i t y w a s
neither well a d a p t e d for p e r m a n e n t i n v e s t m e n t n o r for t e m p o r a r y use,
b e c a u s e the r e p a y m e n t in 1858 and 1860 a p p e a r s , u n d e r the p r e s e n t circums t a n c e s , to be v e r y problematical, and, finally, b e c a u s e , with a rising market,
b o n d s with a fixed rate of interest for y e a r s c a n n o t be as acceptable as
E x c h e q u e r bills, of which the interest is sure to be raised if t h e value of
m o n e y increases.
M r . G l a d s t o n e , n o t c o n t e n t to throw u p o n the m a r k e t t h r e e different sorts
of E x c h e q u e r commodities, felt himself obliged to bring to t h e H o u s e of
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C o m m o n s n o t o n e b u t t w o , a n d p e r h a p s t h r e e o r four b u d g e t s . F o r contradistinction to t h e former Chancellors of [the] E x c h e q u e r he m a d e his financial
s t a t e m e n t on M a r c h 6, before the termination of the financial year with t h e
v i e w , a s h e said, t o m a k e t h e c o u n t r y clearly u n d e r s t a n d its position. T h e
5 H o u s e w e r e then told t h a t there w a s a surplus of £3,000,000, b u t that in
c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e perilous position in w h i c h t h e y w e r e placed, t h e y h a d
to incur an increased expenditure of £6,000,000, so that t h e y w e r e to be
p r e p a r e d for a deficiency of t h r e e millions this year. Before eight w e e k s h a v e
passed, he c o m e s d o w n to the H o u s e and a s k s for a b o u t seven millions m o r e ,
10 although certainly in M a r c h he ought to h a v e f o r m e d m o r e correct estimates
o f the d e m a n d s t o b e m a d e u p o n t h e public r e s o u r c e s .
T h e n e w s u p p l e m e n t a r y estimates h e a s k s for a r e :
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The Navy
Army
Ordnance
S u p p l e m e n t a r y militia v o t e
U n k n o w n charges
Total
£4,550,000
300,000
650,000
500,000
2,100,000
£8,100,000
T h e navy, a r m y and o r d n a n c e estimates h a v e already b e e n v o t e d without
division on F r i d a y evening, and I shall give a short r e s u m é of the different
items on a c c o u n t of w h i c h t h e y w e r e a s k e d for, viz: £300,000 w e r e voted
for addition of t h e a r m y by 14,799 m e n of all r a n k s , w h i c h would raise t h e
n u m b e r of land forces to 40,493 a b o v e that v o t e d last year, or 142,000 m e n .
T h e supplementary o r d n a n c e estimates a m o u n t i n the whole t o £742,132. T h e
s u p p l e m e n t a r y n a v y estimates, a m o u n t i n g to £4,553,731 and including a p a r t
of t h e supplementary o r d n a n c e estimates, m a y be classed u n d e r the following h e a d s :
I.
1. On a c c o u n t of w a g e s to s e a m e n and m a r i n e s , 11,000 of
w h o m w e r e a d d e d t o the navy, 2,500 from t h e C o a s t G u a r d
and 8,500 by voluntary enlistment
£461,700
(a.) To defray t h e charges of w a g e s which will c o m e in
c o u r s e of p a y m e n t in the y e a r ending the 31st of
M a r c h , 1855, for 5,000 s e a m e n to be e m p l o y e d for
6 m o n t h s additional
110,000
(b.) To meet t h e e x t r a pay, b e y o n d s e a m e n ' s pay, of the
2,500 c o a s t guard m e n and s e a m e n riggers n o w e m ployed afloat
51,700
(c.) F o r raising 5,000 r e s e r v e s e a m e n
220,000
(d.) F o r provisions of 5,000 m e n , for an additional period
of 6 m o n t h s to t h e 31st of M a r c h , 1855
80,000
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Karl Marx
(e.) F o r additional victualing stores required, for freight
[£]
of provisions, a n d for increase in the prices of several
species of stores and provisions
50,000
(f.) F o r provisions, victualing, stores etc., for an additional
s u m of 5,000 m e n to be employed in the fleet for o n e
year
100,000
(g.) To provide for an additional n u m b e r of clerks n e c e s sary in c o n s e q u e n c e of the w a r at the e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
a t Whitehall and S o m e r s e t H o u s e
5,000
(h.) F o r t h e additional e x p e n s e to be incurred for salaries
in t h e several naval, victualing and medical establish2,000
ments at home
(i.) F o r additional wages to artificers and o t h e r s in t h e
1,000
naval establishments a b r o a d
2. £697,331 for naval stores:
(a.) F o r the p u r c h a s e of coal and other fuel for steam
160,000
vessels
(b.) F o r t h e p u r c h a s e of stores required to replace t h o s e
40,000
issued to t h e fleet
(c.) F o r t h e p u r c h a s e a n d repair of s t e a m m a c h i n e r y , it
having b e e n decided that the r e s e r v e fleet should h a v e
252,674
t h e advantage of steam
244,657
(d.) F o r t h e p u r c h a s e of steam vessels, gun b o a t s , e t c .
7,000
3 . F o r n e w w o r k s , i m p r o v e m e n t s a n d repairs i n t h e y a r d s
30,000
4. F o r medicines a n d medical stores
6,000
5. F o r miscellaneous services
£1,457,031
S u m total
II.
I t e m s w h i c h , although included in t h e n a v y estimate refer r a t h e r to t h e a r m y
t h a n t h e n a v y . U n d e r this h e a d d e m a n d e d :
1. F o r freight of t r a n s p o r t s on monthly p a y including s t e a m
vessels, a n d for the p u r c h a s e of t h e same, covering t h e hire
of eight n e w steam vessels and 86 sailing t r a n s p o r t s , of
w h i c h 75 w e r e frigates with cavalry
£2,610,200
2. F o r t h e freight of ships hired for the c o n v e y a n c e of t r o o p s
including rations, the G o v e r n m e n t having t a k e n up 18
steam vessels and 86 sailing t r a n s p o r t s for the entire y e a r
108,000
S u m total
£3,096,700
G r a n d total
£4,553,731
Mr. G l a d s t o n e p r o p o s e s t o raise n e w t a x e s b y continuing t h e double i n c o m e
t a x to the e n d of the w a r , by increasing the malt d u t y from 2s. 9d. to 4s., by
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augmenting t h e duty on spirits I s . p e r gallon in Scotland a n d 8d. p e r gallon
in Ireland, and by putting off the fall u p o n t h e d u t y on sugar, w h i c h w a s to
o c c u r on t h e 5th of n e x t July. T h e resolutions respecting spirits, malt a n d
sugar w e r e p a s s e d immediately.
T h e d u t y on spirits will cancel itself, b e c a u s e it will greatly r e d u c e t h e
c o n s u m p t i o n of spirits. T h e d u t y on malt is a p u n i s h m e n t inflicted on t h e
licensed victualers and their c u s t o m e r s , b e c a u s e their official organ, The
Morning Advertiser, signalised itself by sounding t h e t r u m p e t of w a r . T h e
d u t y on sugar is calculated to embitter t h e pickles and p r e s e r v e s of t h e
c u r r e n t year. As to the income t a x , it is well-known t h a t on t h e 18th of April,
M r . Gladstone proclaimed its d e a t h at the e n d of seven y e a r s , only t h r e e d a y s
after having received the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s from Col. R o s e and Consul
Cunningham describing the R u s s i a n p r e p a r a t i o n s for w a r . It is no less k n o w n
t h a t on t h e 6th of M a r c h he declared it sufficient to double t h e i n c o m e t a x
for half a y e a r only. Mr. Gladstone is either the m o s t improvident a n d shortsighted Chancellor of [ t h e ] E x c h e q u e r t h a t e v e r existed, or it w a s his d e liberate plan to grope in the dark, to mislead, to bewilder and to mystify t h e
public.
T h e British public has n o t only to p a y for the w a r against Russia, a n d also
for t h e q u a c k e r y a n d t h e hair splitting ingenuity of Mr. Gladstone, b u t b e s i d e s
it h a s to furnish the Czar with t h e m e a n s of carrying on t h e w a r against itself,
a s L o r d J o h n Russell declared o n F r i d a y evening, t h a t t h e British G o v e r n m e n t would continue to p a y t h e principal a n d t h e interest of the d e b t called
t h e R u s s o - D u t c h loan, inserted in t h e t r e a t y of V i e n n a , o n e of w h o s e principal arrangements is t h a t Poland should r e m a i n an I n d e p e n d e n t Constitutional
K i n g d o m , t h a t C r a c o w should be p r o t e c t e d as a free t o w n , and t h a t t h e
navigation of all E u r o p e a n rivers, c o n s e q u e n t l y of the D a n u b e , should be
free.
T h e distrust in Irish loyalty m u s t be v e r y great, as L o r d P a l m e r s t o n d e clared that during t h e p r e s e n t y e a r h e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t did n o t intend
to enrol the Irish militia; the same P a l m e r s t o n having b r o k e n up t h e Russell
Cabinet o n t h e p r e t e x t t h a t L o r d J o h n e x a s p e r a t e d Ireland b y excluding i t
from his Militia bill. Ministers h a v e sustained a virtual defeat on their
Railway bill, which contained only s o m e e n a c t m e n t s r e c o m m e n d e d by a
Parliamentary C o m m i t t e e sitting on t h a t subject. As t h e railway interest is
powerfully organized, the gallant Mr. Cardwell preferred in t h e n a m e of t h e
Ministry, to withdraw his original bill and to substitute for it o n e framed by
t h e railway directors t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h enforces nothing n o r a d d s anything
to the stringency of already existing e n a c t m e n t s . W h e n the bill w a s discussed
t h e r e w a s n o b o d y p r e s e n t i n t h e H o u s e e x c e p t t h o s e railway directors w h o
are M . P . s . " I t a p p e a r s , " says a w e e k l y p a p e r , " t h a t Ministers and Parliament
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Karl Marx
are n o t strong e n o u g h to p r o t e c t t h e p r o p e r t y of s h a r e h o l d e r s and the
p o c k e t s of travelers, or t h e life and limb of t h e public, against the right
[with] w h i c h t h e railway c o m p a n i e s claim to dispose of t h o s e valuables at
pleasure."
Karl M a r x .
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Friedrich Engels
A Famous Victory
Nr.4098, 6.Juni 1854
A Famous Victory.
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T h e English journals indulge in liberal b u r s t s of derision at t h e fact t h a t the
Czar h a s r e w a r d e d Gen. O s t e n - S a c k e n for his s h a r e in t h e late fight b e t w e e n
t h e allied fleets and the fortifications that defend the p o r t of O d e s s a . This
fight they claim as altogether a victory of their o w n , p r o n o u n c i n g t h e opposite
exultations of their e n e m y as b u t a n e w s p e c i m e n of M u s c o v i t e braggadocio
and imperial lying. N o w , while we h a v e no special s y m p a t h y with t h e Czar
or with O s t e n - S a c k e n , t h o u g h the latter is no d o u b t a clever and resolute m a n ,
(he is the b r o t h e r of t h e General of t h e s a m e n a m e c o m m a n d i n g an armyc o r p s in the Principalities,) it m a y p e r h a p s be w o r t h while to look a littìe m o r e
carefully into the merits of this victory at O d e s s a and ascertain, if possible,
on w h i c h side the braggadocio and h u m b u g really figure, especially as this
is t h e first and only battle b e t w e e n t h e allies and t h e R u s s i a n s , of which we
h a v e y e t received any r e p o r t .
As a p p e a r s by t h e official d o c u m e n t s on b o t h sides, t h e object of t h e allied
f l e e t i n appearing before O d e s s a w a s t o s u m m o n t h e G o v e r n o r t o deliver u p ,
as reparation for the r o u n d shot fired at a British flag of t r u c e , all British,
F r e n c h and R u s s i a n vessels i n t h e harbor. N o w t h e y m u s t h a v e k n o w n t h a t
he would not m a k e a n y reply to such a s u m m o n s , and m u s t therefore h a v e
b e e n p r e p a r e d to t a k e by force w h a t they h a d a s k e d for in vain, and if t h e y
failed in this object t h e y suffered a genuine defeat, w h a t e v e r d a m a g e t h e y
may have done to the enemy.
W h a t , t h e n , w e r e the o d d s ? T h e v e r y d e c r e e o f the Russian G o v e r n m e n t ,
w h i c h appointed O s t e n - S a c k e n to t h e c o m m a n d of t h e v a s t territory he
g o v e r n s , situated immediately on the rear of the a r m y of the D a n u b e , a n d
t h e fact of his selecting for his r e s i d e n c e t h e t o w n of Odessa, shows t h e
i m p o r t a n c e naturally and justly attributed by t h e R u s s i a n s to this point.
O d e s s a is t h e place, of all o t h e r s , w h e r e a hostile landing might do t h e m t h e
m o s t h a r m . T h e r e the e n e m y w o u l d find n o t only all the r e s o u r c e s of a large
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Friedrich Engels
t o w n , b u t t h o s e , t o o , of the granary of all E u r o p e ; a n d t h e r e t h e y would be
n e a r e s t to the line of communication and r e t r e a t of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y in
T u r k e y . U n d e r t h e s e circumstances, t h e t w o Admirals m u s t h a v e k n o w n t h a t
t h e y w o u l d find the place defended by a n u m e r o u s garrison, a n d that any
a t t e m p t at landing, with what sailors and marines t h e y might h a v e to s p a r e
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for t h a t p u r p o s e , w o u l d at o n c e be repelled. B u t w i t h o u t landing a n d taking
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e harbor, if n o t the t o w n , at least for a m o m e n t , t h e y could
n o t e x p e c t to liberate the British and F r e n c h ships n o w confined t h e r e . Their
only remaining c h a n c e for accomplishing their object w o u l d h a v e b e e n to
b o m b a r d the t o w n itself m o s t furiously, so as to m a k e it u n s a f e for a n y b o d y
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of t r o o p s to r e m a i n in it, and t h e n to attempt a r e s c u e of t h e ships. B u t it
is doubtful w h e t h e r that p u r p o s e could h a v e b e e n effected by a b o m b a r d m e n t
u p o n a large t o w n with v e r y wide streets a n d e x t e n s i v e s q u a r e s , w h e r e
c o m p a r a t i v e l y little r o o m is occupied by combustible buildings. T h e Admirals, t h e n , m u s t h a v e k n o w n that if their d e m a n d on O s t e n - S a c k e n w a s 15
refused, t h e y h a d no m e a n s of enforcing it. T h e y thought, h o w e v e r , t h a t after
t h e firing on a flag of t r u c e , something m u s t be u n d e r t a k e n against Odessa,
a n d s o t h e y w e n t o n their errand.
T h e a p p r o a c h e s to O d e s s a , on the seaside, w e r e d e f e n d e d by six batteries,
which m u s t h a v e b e e n a r m e d with some forty or fifty g u n s of 24 and
48 p o u n d s caliber. Of these batteries only t w o or t h r e e w e r e engaged, the
attacking force keeping out of range of t h e r e m a i n d e r . Against t h e s e batteries
eight steam frigates carrying about 100 guns w e r e b r o u g h t to act; b u t as from
t h e n a t u r e of t h e m a n e u v e r , t h e guns of only o n e side of t h e ships could be
u s e d , t h e superiority in the n u m b e r of the guns on t h e p a r t of the allies w a s
considerably diminished. In respect of the caliber, t h e y m u s t h a v e b e e n a b o u t
equal, for if a 24 p o u n d gun is inferior to a long 32 p o u n d e r , a 48 p o u n d e r
of h e a v y metal m u s t certainly be equal to 56 or 68 p o u n d shell g u n s , which
c a n n o t stand full charges of p o w d e r . Finally, the vulnerable n a t u r e of ships,
as c o m p a r e d with b r e a s t - w o r k s , and the insecurity of aim p r o d u c e d by t h e
ship's m o t i o n , are such that e v e n a still greater numerical superiority in t h e
artillery of a fleet over t h a t of strand-batteries will l e a v e s o m e o d d s in favor
of the latter. W i t n e s s the affair at E c k e r n f ö r d e in Schleswig (1849) w h e r e
t w o b a t t e r i e s with 10 guns b e t w e e n t h e m d e s t r o y e d an 84 gun-ship, disabled
and c a p t u r e d a 48 gun-frigate, and b e a t off t w o heavily a r m e d s t e a m e r s .
T h e fight, as long as it w a s confined to artillery a n d to t h e eight s t e a m e r s ,
m a y t h e r e f o r e be considered a p r e t t y equal o n e , e v e n allowing for the superiority of range and a c c u r a c y which, during t h e struggle, t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h
guns w e r e found to p o s s e s s . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e w a s that the w o r k of
destruction w e n t on v e r y slowly. T w o R u s s i a n g u n s d i s m o u n t e d w e r e t h e
only result of several h o u r s firing. At length the allies c a m e up closer and
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A Famous Victory
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c h a n g e d their tactics. T h e y a b a n d o n e d t h e s y s t e m of firing against t h e stone
walls of the batteries in order to send shells a n d r o c k e t s into the R u s s i a n
shipping a n d t h e military establishments in a n d a r o u n d t h e harbor. This told.
T h e object aimed at w a s large e n o u g h to m a k e e v e r y shell hit s o m e vulnerable
p a r t , a n d t h e w h o l e w a s s o o n on fire. T h e p o w d e r - m a g a z i n e b e h i n d t h a t
b a t t e r y on the mole-head, w h i c h h a d offered the m o s t effective resistance
a n d h a d b e e n principally attacked, blew u p ; this a n d t h e spreading of the fire
all a r o u n d , forced its garrison at length to retire. T h e R u s s i a n artillery-men
h a d s h o w n on this point, as usual, v e r y little skill b u t v e r y great b r a v e r y . Their
g u n s and shot m u s t h a v e b e e n v e r y defective a n d their p o w d e r e x t r e m e l y
weak.
This w a s t h e only result of t h e w h o l e action. F o u r R u s s i a n guns h a d b e e n
silenced in t h e b a t t e r y on t h e mole-head; all t h e other batteries hardly r e ceived any d a m a g e at all. T h e explosion of t h e p o w d e r magazine c a n n o t h a v e
b e e n v e r y s e v e r e ; from its situation close b e h i n d t h e b a t t e r y , it is evident
t h a t it w a s t h e special m a g a z i n e of this b a t t e r y containing merely t h e a m munition for a single day, say 60 or 100 r o u n d s for e a c h of t h e four g u n s ;
n o w , if we d e d u c t t h e p r o b a b l e n u m b e r of r o u n d s already u s e d in t h e c o u r s e
of t h e day, t h e r e c a n hardly h a v e r e m a i n e d m o r e t h a n 300 weight of p o w d e r .
W h a t the d a m a g e d o n e to other establishments m a y a m o u n t to we h a v e no
m e a n s of judging; the allies of c o u r s e could n o t ascertain it, while t h e
R u s s i a n s p u t it d o w n at the v e r y l o w e s t figure. F r o m the Russian r e p o r t ,
h o w e v e r , it would a p p e a r t h a t t h e vessels b u r n t w e r e not men-of-war, as t h e
A n g l o - F r e n c h r e p o r t s state t h e m t o h a v e b e e n ; p r o b a b l y t h e y w e r e , b e s i d e s
s o m e m e r c h a n t m e n , t r a n s p o r t s a n d g o v e r n m e n t passenger steamers. We
h a v e , besides, n e v e r received any p r e v i o u s information t h a t any R u s s i a n
men-of-war w e r e at Odessa.
T w o F r e n c h and o n e o r two English m e r c h a n t m e n s u c c e e d e d during t h e
action in escaping from t h e h a r b o r ; seven British merchantmen r e m a i n
confined t h e r e to the p r e s e n t d a y . T h u s t h e " g a l l a n t " Admirals h a v e n o t
s u c c e e d e d in enforcing their d e m a n d , and as t h e y h a d to retreat w i t h o u t
obtaining a n y positive result, without e v e n silencing m o r e t h a n o n e out of
six batteries, t h e y m a y consider t h e m s e l v e s fairly b e a t e n off. T h e y lost v e r y
f e w m e n ; b u t several ships' hulls w e r e d a m a g e d and t h e F r e n c h steamer
V a u b a n w a s o n c e set on fire by a red-hot ball, a n d h a d to retire for a while
from t h e action.
This is the sum of w h a t the British p r e s s calls "Glorious n e w s from
O d e s s a , " a n d which in British e y e s h a s w i p e d out all the former shortcomings
of Admiral D u n d a s . N a y , this action h a s so m u c h raised the public e x pectations in England t h a t we are seriously told, t h e Admirals having n o w
ascertained t h e excessive superiority of t h e range of their guns over t h e
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Friedrich Engels
R u s s i a n o n e s , h a v e positively resolved to t r y a b o m b a r d m e n t of S e v a s t o p o l ;
indeed, t h e y did go t h e r e and fire a few s h o t s . B u t this is t h e p u r e s t h u m b u g ,
for w h o e v e r has o n c e looked u p o n a plan of Sevastopol, k n o w s t h a t an attack,
b o m b a r d m e n t or not, u p o n t h a t t o w n and h a r b o r , unless it be a m e r e shamfight outside t h e b a y , must t a k e place in n a r r o w w a t e r s and within range e v e n
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of field guns.
—We m a y properly add to this simple e x p o s é , that the g a s c o n a d e of o u r
English friends a b o u t this action,—in which t h e y suffered a c o m p l e t e repulse
a n d totally failed of their object—does n o t v a r y m u c h from the general t o n e
of their previous discussions a n d s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e war. W h a t e v e r 10
be t h e result of the struggle, impartial history m u s t , we think, place u p o n her
r e c o r d , t h a t its early stages w e r e m a r k e d by quite as m u c h h u m b u g , p r e varication, deception, diplomatic bad faith, military bragging and lying on
t h e side of E n g l a n d as on t h a t of Russia.
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Karl Marx
Attack upon Sevastopol—Clearing of Estates in Scotland
Nr.4095, 2. Juni 1854
F r o m Our Own Correspondent.
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , M a y 19, 1854.
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T h e "first a t t a c k u p o n S e v a s t o p o l , " of w h i c h we h a v e a telegraphic ann o u n c e m e n t i n to-day's p a p e r s , s e e m s t o b e a b o u t t h e same glorious exploit
as the b o m b a r d m e n t of O d e s s a , w h e r e b o t h parties claimed t h e victory. T h e
a t t a c k is described as having b e e n m a d e by m e a n s of shells projected from
"long-ranging" guns, a n d directed against t h e o u t w a r d fortifications. T h a t
y o u c a n n o t attack the h a r b o r of Sevastopol or t h e t o w n itself by g u n s of a n y
range without going up the b a y a n d coming to close q u a r t e r s w i t h the protecting b a t t e r i e s , and that y o u c a n n o t t a k e it at all w i t h o u t the assistance of a
considerable landing army, is evident from a glance at the m a p , and is,
m o r e o v e r , c o n c e d e d by every military authority. T h e operation, if it h a s
really t a k e n p l a c e , is therefore to be considered as a sham exploit, for the
edification of the same gobe-mouches w h o s e patriotism is elated by t h e
laurels of O d e s s a .
T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t has sent M . B o u r r é e o n a n extraordinary mission
to G r e e c e . He goes a c c o m p a n i e d by a brigade u n d e r c o m m a n d of G e n e r a l
F o r e y , and has orders to claim from King O t h o immediate p a y m e n t of t h e
w h o l e interest of t h e o n e h u n d r e d millions of francs a d v a n c e d by F r a n c e to
t h e G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t in 1828. In c a s e of refusal, the F r e n c h are to o c c u p y
A t h e n s and divers other points of t h e kingdom.
Y o u r r e a d e r s will r e m e m b e r my description of the p r o c e s s of clearing
e s t a t e s in Ireland and Scotland, which within t h e first half of this c e n t u r y
s w e p t a w a y so m a n y t h o u s a n d s of h u m a n beings from the soil of their fathers.
T h ç p r o c e s s still c o n t i n u e s , a n d with a vigor quite w o r t h y of t h a t v i r t u o u s ,
refined, religious, philanthropic aristocracy of this m o d e l c o u n t r y . H o u s e s
a r e either fired or k n o c k e d to pieces over t h e h e a d s of t h e helpless i n m a t e s .
At N e a g a a t in K n o y d a r t , the h o u s e of Donald M a c d o n a l d , a r e s p e c t a b l e ,
h o n e s t , hard-working m a n , was a t t a c k e d last a u t u m n by t h e landlord's order.
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His wife w a s confined to b e d unfit to be r e m o v e d , y e t t h e factor and his
ruffians t u r n e d out M a c d o n a l d ' s family of six children, all u n d e r 15 y e a r s
of age, and demolished the h o u s e with t h e e x c e p t i o n of o n e small bit of the
roof o v e r his wife's bed.
T h e m a n w a s so affected t h a t his brain gave w a y . He has b e e n declared
i n s a n e by medical m e n , and he is n o w w a n d e r i n g a b o u t looking for his
children a m o n g the ruins of the b u r n t and b r o k e n c o t t a g e s . H i s starving
children are crying a r o u n d him, b u t he k n o w s t h e m not, a n d he is left roaming
at large u n a i d e d a n d u n c a r e d for, b e c a u s e his insanity is h a r m l e s s .
T w o married females in an a d v a n c e d stage of p r e g n a n c y had their h o u s e s
pulled d o w n a b o u t their ears. T h e y h a d to sleep in t h e o p e n air for many
nights, a n d the c o n s e q u e n c e w a s that, amid excruciating sufferings, t h e y had
p r e m a t u r e births, their r e a s o n b e c a m e affected, a n d t h e y are wandering
a b o u t w i t h large families, helpless and hopeless imbeciles, dreadful w i t n e s s e s
against t h a t class of p e r s o n s called t h e British aristocracy.
E v e n children are driven m a d b y terror and p e r s e c u t i o n . A t D o u n e , i n
K n o y d a r t , t h e cottagers w e r e evicted a n d t o o k refuge in an old s t o r e h o u s e .
T h e agents of t h e landlord s u r r o u n d e d t h a t s t o r e h o u s e in t h e dead of night
a n d set fire to it as t h e poor outcasts w e r e cowering b e n e a t h its shelter.
F r a n t i c t h e y r u s h e d from the flames, and some w e r e driven m a d by terror.
The Northern Ensign n e w s p a p e r s a y s : " T h a t o n e b o y is d e r a n g e d ; t h a t he
will require to be placed in confinement; he j u m p s o u t of b e d crying, ' F i r e !
fire!' a n d a s s u r e s t h o s e near him that t h e r e are m e n a n d children in the
burning s t o r e h o u s e . W h e n e v e r night a p p r o a c h e s he is terrified at the sight
of fire. T h e awful sight at D o u n e , w h e n t h e s t o r e h o u s e w a s in flames, ilruminating the district—when m e n , w o m e n a n d children r a n a b o u t half frantic
w i t h fear, g a v e s u c h a s h o c k to his r e a s o n . "
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S u c h is t h e c o n d u c t of the aristocracy to the able-bodied p o o r w h o m a k e
t h e m rich. L i s t e n n o w to their parochial mercies. I e x t r a c t t h e following c a s e s
from t h e w o r k of Mr. Donald R o s s , of Glasgow, and from The Northern 30
Ensign:
" 1 . W i d o w M a t h e r s o n , aged 96, has only 2s. 6d. p e r m o n t h from the parish
of Strath, S k y e .
2. M u r d o Macintosh, aged 36 y e a r s , is totally disabled, by r e a s o n of a cart
falling on h i m f o u r t e e n m o n t h s ago. He h a s a wife a n d s e v e n children; t h e 35
oldest 11 y e a r s , the youngest 1 year, and all t h a t t h e p a r i s h of Strath allows
h i m is 5 s. p e r month.
3. W i d o w Samuel Campbell, aged 77, residing at B r o a d f o r d , S k y e , in a
w r e t c h e d h o u s e , h a d I s . 6d. a m o n t h from the p a r i s h of Strath. S h e c o m plained t h a t it w a s inadequate, and the parochial authorities, after m u c h 40
grudging, i n c r e a s e d it to 2s. per month.
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4. W i d o w M ' K i n n o n , aged 72, parish of Strath, S k y e , has 2s. 6d. p e r
month.
5. Donald M'Dugald, aged 102 y e a r s , resides at K n o y d a r t . His wife is aged
77 y e a r s , a n d b o t h are v e r y frail. T h e y only r e c e i v e 3s. 4d. e a c h in t h e m o n t h
from the parish of Glenelg.
6. M a r y M ' D o n a l d , a w i d o w , aged 93 y e a r s , and confined to b e d . H e r
h u s b a n d w a s i n t h e a r m y , a n d t h e r e h e lost a n arm. H e died 2 0 y e a r s ago.
S h e h a s 4s. 4d. in t h e m o n t h from t h e parish of Glenelg.
7. A l e x a n d e r M ' I s a a c , aged 53 y e a r s , totally disabled, h a s a wife aged
40 y e a r s ; has a blind son aged 18 y e a r s ; a n d four children u n d e r 14 y e a r s
of age. T h e parish of Glenelg allows this w r e t c h e d family only 6s. 6d. p e r
m o n t h b e t w e e n t h e m , j u s t a b o u t I s . e a c h per month.
8. A n g u s M ' K i n n o n , aged 72, has a r u p t u r e d wife aged 66 y e a r s . T h e y h a v e
2s. 2d. e a c h per month.
9. M a r y M ' I s a a c , aged 80 y e a r s , frail a n d stone blind, has 3s. 3d. a m o n t h
from t h e parish of Glenelg. W h e n she a s k e d m o r e , t h e I n s p e c t o r said: ' Y o u
should be a s h a m e d to a s k m o r e w h e n o t h e r s h a v e less ;' and refused to listen
t o her.
10. J a n e t M ' D o n a l d , or M'Gillivray, aged 77 y e a r s , and totally disabled,
h a s only 3s. 3d. per month.
11. Catherine Gillies, aged 78 y e a r s , and totally disabled, has only 3s. 3d.
from t h e parish of Glenelg.
12. M a r y Gillies, or G r a n t , aged 82 y e a r s , a n d for the last eight y e a r s
confined to b e d , gets twenty-eight p o u n d s of meal a n d 8d. in t h e m o n t h from
t h e parish of A r d n a m u r c h a n . T h e I n s p e c t o r of p o o r did not visit h e r for t h e
last t w o y e a r s ; a n d she gets no medical aid, no clothing, no nutrition.
13. J o h n M ' E a c h a n , aged 86 y e a r s , a n d b e d - r i d d e n , resides at Auchachraig,
parish of A r d n a m u r c h a n , h a s just o n e p o u n d of meal a day, a n d 8d. of m o n e y
in t h e m o n t h from said parish. He h a s no clothing n o r anything else.
14. E w e n M'Callum, aged 93 y e a r s , and has sore e y e s , I found begging on
t h e b a n k s of the Crinan Canal, parish [of] K n a p d a l e , Argyllshire. He has j u s t
4s. 8d. in the m o n t h ; nothing w h a t e v e r in the w a y of clothing, medical aid,
fuel or lodgings. He is n o w a moving collection of rags, a n d a most w r e t c h e d looking p a u p e r .
15. K a t e M a c a r t h u r , aged 74, a n d bed-ridden, lives alone at D u n a r d y ,
parish of K n a p d a l e . S h e has 4s. 8d. p e r m o n t h from t h e parish, b u t nothing
else. No d o c t o r visits her.
16. J a n e t K e r r , or M ' C a l l u m ; a w i d o w , aged 78 y e a r s , in b a d health; h a s
6s. a m o n t h from t h e parish of Glassary. S h e h a s no h o u s e , and h a s no aid
b u t t h e m o n e y allowance.
17. Archibald M ' L a u r i n , aged 7 3 , parish of A p p i n , totally disabled; wife
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Karl Marx
also disabled; h a v e 3s. 4d. e a c h p e r m o n t h in the n a m e of parish relief—no
fuel, clothing or lodging. T h e y live in a w r e t c h e d hovel, unfit for h u m a n
beings.
18. W i d o w Margaret M ' L e o d , aged 81 y e a r s ; lives at Coigach, parish of
L o c h b r o o m ; h a s 3s. a month.
19. W i d o w J o h n M a c k e n z i e , 81 y e a r s , resided at Ullapool, parish of
L o c h b r o o m . S h e is stone blind and in v e r y b a d health, a n d h a s just 2 s . a
month.
20. W i d o w Catherine M ' D o n a l d , aged 87 y e a r s , Island of Luing, parish of
K i l b r a n d o n ; stone blind and confined to bed. Is allowed 7s. a m o n t h in n a m e
of aliment; o u t of w h i c h she has to p a y a n u r s e . H e r h o u s e fell to the ground,
a n d y e t t h e parish refused to provide a lodging for her, a n d she is lying in
an o p e n o u t - h o u s e on the e a r t h e n floor. T h e I n s p e c t o r declines doing
anything for h e r . "
B u t t h e ruffianism e n d s not h e r e . A slaughter h a s b e e n p e r p e t r a t e d at
S t r a t h c a r r o n . Excited to frenzy by the cruelty of t h e evictions a n d t h e further
o n e s t h a t w e r e e x p e c t e d , a n u m b e r of w o m e n g a t h e r e d in the streets on
hearing t h a t a n u m b e r of sheriff's officers w e r e coming to clear out t h e
tenantry. T h e latter, h o w e v e r , w e r e E x c i s e m e n , and n o t sheriff's officers;
b u t on hearing t h a t their real c h a r a c t e r w a s mistaken, t h e s e m e n instead of
correcting t h e m i s t a k e , enjoyed it—gave t h e m s e l v e s o u t for sheriff's officers,
a n d said t h e y c a m e t o t u r n t h e people o u t a n d w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o d o so. O n
t h e group of w o m e n becoming excited, t h e officers p r e s e n t e d a l o a d e d pistol
at t h e m . W h a t followed we extract from t h e letter of Mr. Donald R o s s , w h o
w e n t o v e r from Glasgow to Strathcarron, and spent t w o d a y s in the district,
collecting information and examining t h e w o u n d e d . H i s letter is d a t e d R o y a l
H o t e l , T a i n , April 15, 1854, and states as follows:
" M y information goes to show a shameful c o u r s e of c o n d u c t on the p a r t
of t h e sheriff. He did not w a r n t h e people of t h e intention on his part to let
t h e police loose on t h e m . He read no Riot Act. He did not give t h e m time
t o d i s p e r s e ; b u t , o n t h e contrary, t h e m o m e n t h e a p p r o a c h e d with his force,
stick in h a n d , cried out: 'Clear the w a y , ' a n d in t h e n e x t b r e a t h said: ' K n o c k
t h e m d o w n , ' and immediately a scene e n s u e d which baffles description. T h e
p o l i c e m e n laid their h e a v y batons on the heads of the unfortunate females
a n d leveled t h e m to the ground, j u m p e d a n d t r a m p l e d u p o n t h e m after t h e y
w e r e d o w n , a n d kicked t h e m in every p a r t of their b o d i e s w i t h savage
brutality. T h e field w a s soon c o v e r e d with blood. T h e cries of t h e w o m e n
and of the b o y s and girls, lying weltering in their b l o o d , w a s rending the v e r y
h e a v e n s . S o m e of the females, p u r s u e d by t h e policemen, j u m p e d into the
d e e p and rapid-rolling C a r r ó n , trusting to its m e r c i e s m o r e t h a n to t h a t of
t h e policeman or t h e sheriff. T h e r e w e r e females w h o h a d parcels of their
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hair torn o u t by the b a t o n s of the policemen, and o n e girl had a piece of t h e
flesh, a b o u t seven inches long by o n e a n d a q u a r t e r b r o a d , and m o r e t h a n
a q u a r t e r of an inch thick, t o r n off h e r shoulder by a violent b l o w with a b a t o n .
A y o u n g girl, w h o w a s only a m e r e spectator, w a s r u n after by t h r e e policem e n . T h e y struck her on t h e f o r e h e a d , c u t o p e n h e r skull, and after she fell
d o w n t h e y kicked her. T h e doctor a b s t r a c t e d from t h e w o u n d a portion of
the cap sunk into it by the b a t o n of the savage police. T h e m a r k s of their
hobnails are still visible in h e r b a c k shoulders. T h e r e are still in S t r a t h c a r r o n
thirteen females in a state of great distress, o w i n g to t h e brutal beating t h e y
received at the hands of the police. T h r e e of t h e s e are so ill t h a t their medical
a t t e n d a n t has no h o p e s w h a t e v e r of their r e c o v e r y . It is my o w n firm conviction, from the a p p e a r a n c e of t h e s e females a n d t h e dangerous n a t u r e of
their w o u n d s , coupled w i t h medical r e p o r t s w h i c h I h a v e p r o c u r e d , that n o t
one-half of t h e s e injured p e r s o n s will r e c o v e r ; a n d all of t h e m , should t h e y
linger on for a time, will b e a r a b o u t on their p e r s o n s sad proofs of the horrid
brutality t o which t h e y h a d b e e n subjected. A m o n g t h e n u m b e r seriously
w o u n d e d is a w o m a n a d v a n c e d in p r e g n a n c y . S h e w a s n o t a m o n g t h e c r o w d
w h o met t h e Sheriff, b u t at a considerable distance, j u s t looking o n ; but she
w a s violently struck a n d kicked by the policemen, a n d she is in a v e r y
d a n g e r o u s condition."
W e m a y further add t h a t t h e w o m e n w h o w e r e assailed n u m b e r e d only
eighteen. T h e n a m e of t h e sheriff is Taylor.
S u c h is a picture of t h e British aristocracy in the y e a r 1854.
T h e authorities and G o v e r n m e n t h a v e c o m e t o a n a r r a n g e m e n t that t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n against Cowell, G r i m s h a w a n d t h e o t h e r P r e s t o n leaders shall
be w i t h d r a w n , if the investigation against the magistrates a n d c o t t o n lords
of P r e s t o n is w i t h d r a w n also. T h e latter w a s accordingly d o n e , p u r s u a n t to
this arrangement.
M r . D u n c o m b e ' s p o s t p o n e m e n t for a fortnight of his m o t i o n for a C o m mittee of Inquiry into t h e c o n d u c t of t h e P r e s t o n magistrates, is said to be
in p u r s u a n c e of the a b o v e arrangement.
Karl M a r x .
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Friedrich Engels
The War
The People's Paper.
Nr. 108, 27. Mal 1854
The War.
At last, t h e n , we h a v e to report an exploit of the "British T a r . " T h e fleet of
Admiral Napier has destroyed, after eight h o u r s ' b o m b a r d m e n t , the fort of
G u s t a v s v a e r n (which translated from the Swedish m e a n s " G u s t a v ' s d e f e n c e " or " s t r o n g h o l d , " " G u s t a v ' s W e h r " ) and t a k e n t h e garrison prisoners
of w a r , to t h e n u m b e r of 1,500. This is the first serious a t t a c k u p o n Imperial
R u s s i a n p r o p e r t y , a n d c o m p a r e d with t h e d r o w s y a n d t o r p i d affair at Odessa,
s h o w s at least that Charles Napier is not going to sacrifice his o w n r e n o w n
a n d t h a t of his family if he c a n help it. T h e fort of G u s t a v s v a e r n is situated
on the extremity of a peninsula, forming the south-west c o r n e r of Finland,
close to t h e lighthouse of H a n g o - U d d , well k n o w n as a l a n d m a r k to all
skippers going up t h e Finnic Gulf. Its military i m p o r t a n c e is n o t v e r y great;
it defends a v e r y small a r e a either of land or w a t e r , a n d might h a v e b e e n left
in t h e r e a r by the attacking fleet without a n y risk w h a t e v e r . T h e fort itself
c a n n o t h a v e b e e n large, as is evident from the n u m b e r s of its garrison. B u t
in the p r e s e n t blessed ignorance existing e v e n in the British Admiralty and
W a r Office as to t h e real strength a n d i m p o r t a n c e of t h e Baltic C o a s t def e n c e s of Russia, we m a y be excused if we delay a n y c o m m e n t s u p o n the
tactical merits of t h e affair until fuller particulars h a v e arrived. We can, for
t h e p r e s e n t , only say this m u c h : the eight h o u r s ' d u r a t i o n of t h e c a n n o n a d e
p r o v e s a b r a v e , if n o t over-skilful defence on t h e p a r t of t h e R u s s i a n s , and
f o r e b o d e s a greater obstinacy t h a n m a y h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d , in t h e defence
of t h e first class fortresses in t h a t same gulf. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , the fifteen
h u n d r e d prisoners of w a r are no appreciable loss at all to R u s s i a (they m a k e
up a b o u t t w o average d a y s ' loss by sickness on t h e D a n u b e ) , while t h e y m u s t
p r o v e a serious e m b a r r a s s m e n t to N a p i e r . W h a t in t h e world will he do with
t h e m ? H e c a n n o t release t h e m o n p a r o l e ; o r without p a r o l e ; a n d t h e r e i s n o
p l a c e n e a r e r to bring t h e m to t h a n England. F o r a safe t r a n s p o r t of t h e s e
1,500 m e n he would require at least t h r e e ships of t h e line or twice t h a t
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Titelseite (Ausschnitt) m i t Engels' Artikel „ T h e W a r "
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n u m b e r of steam frigates. T h e v e r y effects of his victory cripple him for a
fortnight or t h r e e w e e k s . Lastly, as he h a s no landing t r o o p s , can he hold
t h e ground he has c o n q u e r e d ? I do n o t see h o w he could, w i t h o u t again
crippling his thinly-manned fleets by a further w e a k e n i n g of e a c h ship's
contingent of sailors and m a r i n e s . This c i r c u m s t a n c e brings us to a subject
w h i c h is discussed with great v e h e m e n c e in t h e British p r e s s , although far
t o o late as usual. T h e British p r e s s h a s , all at o n c e , found o u t t h a t a fleet,
h o w e v e r powerful, is of v e r y little avail unless it h a s t r o o p s on b o a r d , strong
e n o u g h to go on shore and c o m p l e t e the victory w h i c h ships' g u n s , in t h e
b e s t c a s e , c a n obtain only v e r y incompletely against land defences. It a p p e a r s
t h e r e w a s n o t a m a n in t h e British official w o r l d directing t h e w a r , nor in
t h e official world directing British public opinion—who w a s ever struck by
this idea up to t h e e n d of last m o n t h . N o w , all available t r o o p s a n d m e a n s
of t r a n s p o r t are engaged for t h e Black Sea, and t h e whole land force u n d e r
o r d e r s for the Baltic, of w h i c h not a m a n has b e e n sent off, the v e r y staff
of which h a s n o t y e t b e e n organised, consists of o n e brigade of 2,500 m e n !
As to the F r e n c h , t h e y are woefully limping b e h i n d . Their Baltic fleet—you
recollect t h e p o m p o u s report of s e c r e t a r y D u c o s : " Y o u r majesty ordered
the e q u i p m e n t of a third fleet; the o r d e r s of your m a j e s t y are executed"—this
splendid a r m a m e n t which w a s to be r e a d y for t h e sea by t h e middle of M a r c h
to the t u n e of ten ships of the line, h a s n e v e r consisted of m o r e t h a n five
ships of t h e line, w h i c h with frigates a n d small v e s s e l s , are at p r e s e n t creeping
slowly along the m o u t h of the G r e a t Belt, to r e a c h w h i c h from B r e s t , it h a s
t a k e n t h e m fully t h r e e w e e k s , westerly w i n d s prevailing all the time. T h e
grand C a m p of Saint O m e r , to contain 150,000, in c a s e of n e e d , 200,000 t r o o p s
p r e t e n d e d for [a] Baltic expedition, h a s b e e n f o r m e d , on paper, t h r e e or four
w e e k s ago, and n o t a brigade is, as yet, c o n c e n t r a t e d . T h e F r e n c h , h o w e v e r ,
might easily spare s o m e t e n to 15,000 infantry a n d field artillery from their
coast-garrisons, without t h e fuss a n d p o m p of a large theatrical c a m p d e m o n stration; b u t w h e r e are t h e m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t ? British m e r c h a n t m e n would
h a v e to be c h a r t e r e d ; t h e y would, according to the r a t e of sailing of the
F r e n c h fleet, require from four t o six w e e k s t o arrive, o n e b y o n e , o n t h e
scene of action; and w h e r e should the t r o o p s be landed, t h e brigade and
division c o n c e n t r a t e d , the staffs a n d c o m m i s s a r i a t s organised? T h a t is t h e
vicious circle in w h i c h t h e allies m o v e ; in o r d e r to h a v e a land-army in t h e
Baltic, t h e y must first c o n q u e r an island or peninsula w h e r e to c o n c e n t r a t e
arid organise it for a t t a c k ; and in order to c o n q u e r this desideratum, t h e y m u s t
first h a v e a landing force on t h e spot. T h e r e is no difficulty in getting out
of this scrape, as s o o n as y o u h a v e a good admiral w h o k n o w s as m u c h of
land-warfare as is n e c e s s a r y to enable h i m to c o m m a n d a land-force; a n d
t h e r e is no d o u b t Charles N a p i e r is quite up to that, as he h a s fought a great
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deal on shore. B u t with an A b e r d e e n reigning s u p r e m e , with four different
ministries meddling with t h e fighting force, with t h e eternal antagonism of
a r m y a n d n a v y , a n d with F r e n c h a n d English forces c o m b i n e d , a n d jealous
of e a c h o t h e r ' s glory and comforts, h o w c a n y o u e x p e c t anything like unity
of action? T h e n , t h e r e c a n n o t n o w be brought up any effective land-force
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to t h e Baltic b e f o r e the end of J u n e ; and unless the w a r is decided and p e a c e
c o n c l u d e d in four m o n t h s , t h e whole of t h e c o n q u e s t s m a d e will h a v e to be
given u p , t r o o p s , g u n s , ships, provisions, all will h a v e to be w i t h d r a w n , or
a b a n d o n e d , a n d for seven winter m o n t h s t h e R u s s i a n s will be again in
p o s s e s s i o n of all their Baltic territory. This s h o w s clear e n o u g h , that all 10
serious a n d decisive attacks u p o n Baltic R u s s i a are o u t of t h e question for
the p r e s e n t y e a r ; it is too late. Only w h e n S w e d e n joins t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s ,
h a v e t h e y a b a s e of operations in the Baltic which will admit of their carrying
on a w i n t e r campaign in Finland. B u t h e r e again we h a v e a vicious circle,
t h o u g h vicious only, as t h e former o n e , to t h e pusillanimous. H o w can y o u 15
e x p e c t the S w e d e s to join you, unless you show t h e m by sending a land-force,
a n d taking part of Finland, t h a t y o u are in e a r n e s t ? A n d , on t h e other side,
h o w c a n y o u send that force thither w i t h o u t having m a d e sure of S w e d e n
as a b a s e of operations?
Verily, N a p o l e o n the Great, the " b u t c h e r " of so m a n y millions of m e n ,
w a s a m o d e l of h u m a n i t y in his bold, decisive, home-striking w a y of warfare,
c o m p a r e d to the hesitating " s t a t e s m a n - l i k e " directors of this R u s s i a n w a r ,
w h o c a n n o t b u t eventually sacrifice h u m a n life a n d h a r d c a s h to a far greater
a m o u n t if t h e y go on as they d o .
T u r n i n g to the Black Sea, we find the combined fleets b e f o r e Sebastopol
a m u s i n g t h e m s e l v e s with a little harmless long-range exercise against some
paltry o u t w o r k s of t h a t fortress. This innocent g a m e , we are informed, has
b e e n carried on for four d a y s by the majority of the ships, and during all this
t i m e t h e R u s s i a n s , having only twelve ships of the line r e a d y for Sea, did n o t
show their faces outside the harbour, to t h e great a s t o n i s h m e n t of A d m i r a l
Hamelin—(vide his report, M a y 1—5.) T h a t heroic sailor is, h o w e v e r , old
e n o u g h t o recollect t h e t i m e w h e n F r e n c h s q u a d r o n s w e r e n o t only blocked
u p , b u t e v e n attacked in h a r b o u r by English s q u a d r o n s of far inferior
strength; a n d certainly it is expecting a little t o o m u c h , t h a t t h e inferior
Russian s q u a d r o n should c o m e out of Sebastopol to be shattered and sunk
by twice their n u m b e r of ships, a n d t h u s offer t h e m s e l v e s up in expiation
for the " h i d e o u s c r i m e " of Sinope!
In t h e m e a n t i m e , two ships of the line (screws), a n d s e v e n steam-frigates
a r e on their r o a d to Circassia. T h e y w e r e to explore t h e c o a s t s of t h e Crimea,
a n d t h e n to d e s t r o y the forts on the Circassian coast. B u t in this latter attack
only t h r e e steam-frigates w e r e to participate, t h e remaining four being in-
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structed to r e t u r n to the fleet as s o o n as t h e C r i m e a w a s duly reconnoitred.
N o w the t h r e e forts t h e Russians still o c c u p y o n the Circassian coast,
viz.—Anapa, S u k h u m K a l e h , a n d R e d u t K a l e h , a r e , as far as we k n o w of
considerable strength, built u p o n heights w h i c h entirely c o m m a n d t h e offing
(except R e d u t Kaleh), and it m a y be d o u b t e d w h e t h e r the force sent will be
sufficient to effect their p u r p o s e s , especially as it is not a c c o m p a n i e d by
landing t r o o p s . T h e squadron, which is c o m m a n d e d by Rear-Admiral L y o n s ,
is at the same time to c o m m u n i c a t e with t h e Circassians, a n d especially with
their chief, Shamyl. W h a t Rear-Admiral L y o n s is to c o m m u n i c a t e to him t h e
report telleth not, b u t t h e r e is this certain t h a t he c a n n o t bring him w h a t he
w a n t s m o s t , viz—arms a n d ammunitions, for men-of-war on active service
h a v e no r o o m to spare for goods shipped to order. T w o paltry m e r c h a n t brigs
or s c h o o n e r s freighted with t h e s e valuable articles w o u l d be far m o r e a c ceptable t h a n all t h e moral b u t perfectly useless support of five men-of-war.
At the same time we learn that the T u r k i s h fleet has sailed for t h e same
destination, this time carrying along with it t h e articles required for arming
the Circassians. T h u s two allied fleets are going on the same errand, the o n e
not knowing of t h e other. This is unity of p l a n a n d of action with a v e n g e a n c e .
M a y b e , e a c h m a y take the other for R u s s i a n s , a n d a f a m o u s sight it will be
for t h e Circassians, t h e s e t w o s q u a d r o n s firing o n e into t h e other.
T h e allied land-forces, in the m e a n t i m e , fraternise at Gallipoli and Scutari
in their o w n w a y , annihilating e n o r m o u s quantities of t h e strong a n d sweet
w i n e of the country. T h o s e w h o h a p p e n to be sober, are employed u p o n the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of field-works, so situated a n d so c o n s t r u c t e d , that t h e y will
be either never attacked, or n e v e r defended, If a proof w a s w a n t e d , that
neither the British or F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t h a v e a n y intention of doing Friend
Nicholas a n y serious harm, it is given to the v e r y blindest in their w a y of
spending t h e time of the t r o o p s . In order to h a v e a p r e t e n c e to k e e p their
t r o o p s a w a y from the field of action, t h e allied c o m m a n d e r s set t h e m to dig
a continous line of field-works a c r o s s t h e n e c k of t h e T h r a c i a n C h e r s o n e s u s .
E v e r y b o d y , and particularly e v e r y F r e n c h engineer, k n o w s that continuous
lines of defence are u n d e r almost all c i r c u m s t a n c e s to be rejected in field
fortification; b u t it w a s reserved to t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h a r m y of Gallipoli to
employ continuous lines u p o n a ground, two-thirds of which are c o m m a n d e d
by heights, situated on the side w h e r e the e n e m y is e x p e c t e d from. H o w e v e r ,
as t h e slow-coach s y s t e m c a n n o t be carried on without making at least a
snail-like sort of p r o g r e s s , we are informed t h a t 15,000 F r e n c h are to go to
Varna, t h e r e t o f o r m w h a t ? T h e garrison o f t h e place. And t o d o w h a t ? T o
die of fever and ague. N o w , if t h e r e is any sense in this w a r f a r e , t h e chiefs
must k n o w that w h a t t h e T u r k s are deficient in, is the art of manoeuvring
in t h e o p e n field, in which again t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h t r o o p s are m a s t e r s , a n d
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t h a t , on t h e other h a n d , t h e T u r k s are fit for t h e d e f e n c e of walls, r a m p a r t s ,
a n d e v e n b r e a c h e s , against stormers, in a degree w h i c h neither the British
n o r t h e F r e n c h c a n lay any claim t o . T h e r e f o r e , a n d b e c a u s e V a r n a , with a
T u r k i s h garrison, did t h a t w h i c h no fortress before it h a d e v e r d o n e , t h a t is,
held o u t for twenty-nine d a y s after t h r e e practical b r e a c h e s h a d b e e n laid
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in t h e rampart—therefore the half-disciplined Turks, a r e t a k e n o u t of V a r n a
a n d sent to m e e t t h e Russians in the o p e n field, while t h e well-drilled F r e n c h ,
brilliant in attack, b u t u n s t e a d y in lengthy d e f e n c e , a r e sent to guard the
r a m p a r t s of V a r n a .
O t h e r r e p o r t s inform us t h a t all t h e s e m o v e m e n t s are m e r e g a m m o n . T h e y 10
say t h a t g r e a t things are in preparation. T h e c o m b i n e d t r o o p s are not i n t e n d e d
to act on the B a l k a n s , b u t t h e y are to e x e c u t e , with the help of the fleets,
t r e m e n d o u s exploits on t h e rear of the Russians. T h e y a r e to land at Odessa,
to c u t off the retreat of the e n e m y , and to c o m b i n e on his r e a r with t h e
A u s t r i a n s in Transylvania. T h e y a r e , b e s i d e s , to send d e t a c h m e n t s to Circas- 15
sia; t h e y a r e , finally, to furnish 15 to 20,000 m e n for the a t t a c k of S e b a s t o p o l
on t h e land-side, while t h e fleets are to force t h e h a r b o u r . If y o u c a s t a glance
at t h e w h o l e past history of the w a r a n d the diplomatic t r a n s a c t i o n s preceding
it, y o u will no d o u b t v e r y s o o n dispose of t h e s e r u m o u r s . T h e y c a m e from
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , shortly after the arrival of M a r s h a l L e r o y , c o m m o n l y called 20
Saint-Arnaud. W h o e v e r k n o w s t h e past history of this w o r t h y , recognises
i n t h e s e b r a v a d o e s the m a n w h o blustered himself u p t o t h e r a n k h e o c c u p i e s ,
although t h r e e times cashiered as an officer of t h e a r m y .
T h e long and the short of this w a r is this: E n g l a n d , a n d particularly F r a n c e ,
are being dragged, "unavoidably, t h o u g h r e l u c t a n t l y , " into engaging the 25
greater p a r t of their forces in the E a s t a n d the Baltic, t h a t is, u p o n t w o
a d v a n c e d wings of a military position which h a s no c e n t r e n e a r e r t h a n
F r a n c e . R u s s i a sacrifices her c o a s t s , her fleets, a n d p a r t of her t r o o p s , to
i n d u c e t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s to engage t h e m s e l v e s completely into this antistrategical m o v e . As soon as this is d o n e , as soon as the n e c e s s a r y n u m b e r 30
of F r e n c h t r o o p s are sent off to countries far from their o w n , Austria and
P r u s s i a will declare in favour of Russia, and at o n c e m a r c h with superior
n u m b e r s u p o n Paris. If this plan s u c c e e d s , t h e r e is no force at t h e disposal
of L o u i s N a p o l e o n to resist t h a t shock. B u t t h e r e is a force w h i c h c a n
" m o b i l i s e " itself u p o n a n y e m e r g e n c y , and which c a n also " m o b i l i s e " L o u i s
35
B o n a p a r t e and his minions as it h a s mobilised m a n y a ruler before this. T h a t
force is able to resist all t h e s e invasions, a n d it h a s s h o w n it o n c e b e f o r e to
c o m b i n e d E u r o p e ; and that force, the Revolution, b e a s s u r e d , will not b e
wanting t h e day its action is required.
K.M.
40
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The Present Condition of the English A r m y Tactics, Uniform, Commissariat, etc.
Nr.4102, 10. Juni .1854
The Present Condition of the English ArmyTactics, Uniform, Commissariat, etc.
From Our O w n Correspondent.
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , M a y 26, 1854.
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If the w a r in the E a s t is good for nothing else it will at least demolish a portion
of t h e military r e n o w n of t h e late D u k e of Wellington. W h o e v e r k n e w
E n g l a n d during t h e life-time of this m u c h over-estimated General, will recollect t h a t it w a s c o n s i d e r e d an insult to t h e British nation to s p e a k e v e n of
N a p o l e o n as of a soldier approaching in a n y w a y t h e invincible I r o n D u k e .
This glorious D u k e is n o w d e a d a n d buried, after having h a d t h e c o m m a n d
of t h e British a r m y , at least virtually, for t h e last forty y e a r s . N e v e r w a s a
m a n m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t or irresponsible in t h e exercise of c o m m a n d . T h e
" D u k e " w a s a n authority a b o v e all authorities, neither king n o r q u e e n daring
to contradict him in professional m a t t e r s . Well, after enjoying m a n y a y e a r
of t h o s e h o n o r s and comforts w h i c h usually fall to the lot of h a p p y m e d i o crity, and w h i c h so strongly c o n t r a s t with t h e tragic revulsions generally
belonging to the career of genius—Napoleon for instance—the I r o n D u k e died,
a n d the c o m m a n d of t h e British a r m y fell into o t h e r h a n d s . A b o u t eighteen
m o n t h s after his death, the British a r m y is called u p o n to enter on a campaign
against t h e R u s s i a n s , a n d b e f o r e t h e first regiment is r e a d y to e m b a r k , it is
found that the Iron D u k e has left t h e a r m y in a state entirely unfit for active
service.
T h e " D u k e " , in spite of his generally sound English s e n s e , h a d b u t a small
and n a r r o w mind in m a n y r e s p e c t s . T h e unfairness with w h i c h he habitually
alluded to t h e p a r t his G e r m a n allies b o r e in t h e decision of t h e struggle
at W a t e r l o o , taking to himself all the credit of a victory w h i c h w o u l d
h a v e b e e n a defeat b u t for the timely a p p e a r a n c e of Blücher, is well-known.
T h e p e t t i s h n e s s with w h i c h he stuck to all a b u s e s a n d absurdities in t h e
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English a r m y , replying to all criticism: " T h o s e a b u s e s a n d absurdities m a d e
us victorious in Spain a n d Portugal"—perfectly agrees with his c o n s e r v a t i v e
notion t h a t a certain degree of traditional absurdity a n d corruption w a s
essential to a p r o p e r working of the " d e m o n s t r a b l y b e s t " of Constitutions.
B u t while in politics he k n e w h o w to give w a y u p o n i m p o r t a n t points in
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critical m o m e n t s , in military matters he clung all t h e m o r e stubbornly to
antiquated notions a n d traditional T o r y fooleries. T h e r e w a s not o n e single
i m p o r t a n t i m p r o v e m e n t introduced into the British a r m y during his life-time,
unless it w a s in the purely technical d e p a r t m e n t of the artillery. H e r e it w a s
simply impossible that the rapid progress of manufacturing industry a n d 10
m e c h a n i c a l science should h a v e b e e n left entirely u n n o t i c e d . T h e cons e q u e n c e is, that though the British a r m y has t h e b e s t artillery material in
e x i s t e n c e , the organization of that artillery is as c l u m s y as t h a t of the other
a r m s ; a n d t h a t in t h e d r e s s , general a r m a m e n t , and organization of t h e British
f o r c e s t h e r e is n o t a single item in w h i c h it is n o t inferior to a n y civilized 15
army in Europe.
I m u s t again call the attention of your r e a d e r s to t h e f a c t t h a t the direction
of military affairs is not confided, as in other c o u n t r i e s , to a single b r a n c h
of the administration. T h e r e are four d e p a r t m e n t s , e a c h clashing with and
i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e other. T h e r e is t h e Secretary of W a r , a m e r e p a y m a s t e r
and a c c o u n t a n t . T h e r e i s t h e Commander-in-Chief a t the H o r s e G u a r d s , w h o
h a s t h e infantry a n d cavalry u n d e r him. T h e r e is t h e M a s t e r - G e n e r a l of t h e
O r d n a n c e , w h o c o m m a n d s the Artillery E n g i n e e r s , a n d i s s u p p o s e d t o h a v e
t h e general direction of t h e matériel of t h e army. T h e n t h e r e is t h e Colonial
S e c r e t a r y , w h o apportions the troops to the various foreign p o s s e s s i o n s , and
regulates t h e distribution of war-material to each. B e s i d e t h e s e , t h e r e is t h e
C o m m i s s a r i a t D e p a r t m e n t ; and lastly, for the t r o o p s in India, the C o m mander-in-Chief of t h e A r m y in t h a t empire. It is only since t h e d e a t h of
Wellington t h a t the absurdity of such an a r r a n g e m e n t h a s b e e n publicly
alluded t o , t h e r e p o r t of the Parliamentary C o m m i t t e e of 1837 having b e e n
s u p e r s e d e d b y the D u k e ' s authority. N o w that w a r has b e g u n , its inefficiency
is felt e v e r y w h e r e ; b u t change is d e p r e c a t e d as being liable to u p s e t all
possibility of o r d e r and regularity in the transaction of t h e b u s i n e s s .
As an instance of the confusion c r e a t e d by this s y s t e m , I m e n t i o n e d , on
a f o r m e r occasion, that t h e r e are hardly t w o articles for w h i c h a regiment
is n o t obliged to apply to different and i n d e p e n d e n t administrations. T h e
clothing is supplied by t h e Colonel, b u t the great-coats by t h e O r d n a n c e ; t h e
belts and k n a p s a c k s b y t h e H o r s e G u a r d s ; b u t t h e fire-arms again b y the
O r d n a n c e . On any foreign station, military officers, o r d n a n c e officers, storek e e p e r s and commissariat employers are all m o r e or less i n d e p e n d e n t of e a c h
other, a n d responsible t o distinct and i n d e p e n d e n t b o a r d s a t h o m e . T h e n
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t h e r e is the nuisance of the "clothing c o l o n e l s . " E v e r y regiment has a titular
colonel, a general officer, w h o s e d u t y it is to p o c k e t a certain g o v e r n m e n t
allowance for clothing his regiment, and to spend a portion only for the
p u r p o s e . T h e b a l a n c e is c o n s i d e r e d as his w a g e s for t h e trouble.
T h e r e is t h e sale of c o m m i s s i o n s , w h i c h p u t s all the higher p o s t s in t h e
a r m y at t h e almost exclusive disposal of t h e aristocracy. After a f e w y e a r s '
service in the capacity of lieutenant, captain, and major, an officer is entitled,
o n t h e first v a c a n c y occurring, t o b u y u p t h e n e x t r a n k which b e c o m e s
v a c a n t , unless t h e r e should be an officer of t h e same rank, and of older
standing, inclined to anticipate him. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e is, t h a t a m a n with
r e a d y m o n e y c a n a d v a n c e v e r y rapidly, as m a n y of his seniors h a v e not t h e
m e a n s to b u y the v a c a n c y as s o o n as it o c c u r s . It is clear t h a t such a system
greatly n a r r o w s the class of useful m e n from w h i c h the corps of officers is
recruited, a n d t h e a d v a n c e m e n t or active e m p l o y m e n t of general officers
being subject almost exclusively to seniority or aristocratic connection, t h e
circle from which t h e s e are d r a w n m u s t necessarily exclude a large m a s s of
talent and knowledge from the higher c o m m a n d s . It is, no doubt, attributable
to this system chiefly t h a t t h e m a s s of British officers are so lamentably
deficient in t h e general and m o r e theoretical b r a n c h e s of military science.
T h e n u m b e r of officers is disproportionately large for t h a t of t h e men. Gold
lace and epaulettes a b o u n d in a British r e g i m e n t to an e x t e n t u n k n o w n
a n y w h e r e else. Consequently, t h e officers h a v e nothing to do, and their esprit
de corps hardly admitting of any degree of study, t h e y p a s s their time in all
sorts of extravagant a m u s e m e n t s , trusting that if it c o m e s to fight, native
b r a v e r y and " H e r M a j e s t y ' s r e g u l a t i o n s " will be quite sufficient to carry
t h e m t h r o u g h all difficulties. Y e t w h e n t h e C h o b h a m c a m p w a s formed, t h e
helplessness of v e r y m a n y of the officers w a s c o n s p i c u o u s enough to anyb o d y w h o could judge a little b e t t e r of t h e m a n e u v e r s t h a n the p o o r enthusiastic penny-a-liners w h o , w i t h t r u e c o c k n e y spirit, admired everything
in t h e strange spectacle which t h e y saw for t h e first t i m e of their lives.
T h e drill regulations and system of exercise are of the m o s t old-fashioned
character. T h e maneuvering is exceedingly c l u m s y , all t h e m o v e m e n t s being
complicated, slow, and p e d a n t i c . T h e old system of m o v e m e n t s i n l i n e , w h i c h
has b e e n maintained in t h e British longer t h a n in t h e Austrian army, as t h e
grand form of all tactical m a n e u v e r s , h a s a few w e l l - k n o w n advantages w h e r e
t h e ground allows of its application; b u t t h e r e is m o r e t h a n one w a y to
c o u n t e r b a l a n c e this, and a b o v e all it is applicable u n d e r v e r y exceptional
c i r c u m s t a n c e s only. T h e s y s t e m of evolutions in c o l u m n , especially in small
c o l u m n s of c o m p a n i e s , as introduced into the b e s t regulated continental
armies, insures a far greater mobility and an equally rapid formation of lines
w h e n required.
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T h e a r m a m e n t of t h e British soldier is of good material a n d capital workm a n s h i p , b u t disfigured i n m a n y c a s e s b y old-fashioned regulations. T h e old
m u s k e t s of s m o o t h b o r e are well m a d e , of large caliber, b u t r a t h e r m o r e
h e a v y t h a n is n e c e s s a r y . T h e old B r u n s w i c k rifle w a s g o o d of its kind, b u t
h a s b e e n s u p e r s e d e d by better a r m s . T h e recently i n t r o d u c e d Pritchett rifle,
5
c o n s i d e r e d an i m p r o v e m e n t u p o n t h e F r e n c h Minié rifles, a p p e a r s to be a
capital w e a p o n , b u t it has only b e e n after a hard struggle t h a t this arm has
b e e n forced u p o n the authorities. As it is, it is very irregularly and u n systematically introduced; one-half of a regiment carries m u s k e t s , a n d t h e
other half rifles, t h e r e b y deranging t h e w h o l e a r m a m e n t . T h e s w o r d s of t h e 10
cavalry are good, of a better shape for t h r u s t a n d sharp e d g e b l o w s t h a n t h o s e
of Continental armies. T h e h o r s e s are also first-rate, b u t t h e m e n a n d equipm e n t s are too h e a v y . T h e / n a t e n e / o f the field artillery is the b e s t in the world,
admirably simplified in some r e s p e c t s , b u t indulging in t o o great a variety
of calibers and g u n s of different weight, by w h i c h different charges of 15
p o w d e r are necessitated.
T h e d r e s s , on the contrary, and the general a c c o u t r e m e n t of t h e British
soldier is t h e greatest nuisance in existence. A high, tight, stiff stock r o u n d
t h e n e c k ; a shabby-looking, close-fitting c o a t e e w i t h swallow-tails, badly c u t
a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l e ; tight t r o w s e r s ; disgraceful looking g r e a t - c o a t s ; an ugly
c a p , or s h a k o ; a system of strapping and belting, of carrying a m m u n i t i o n a n d
k n a p s a c k , t h e like of which e v e n t h e Prussians c a n n o t show—all this h a s b e e n
of late the t h e m e of so m a n y n e w s p a p e r c o m m e n t s t h a t a m e r e allusion to
it is sufficient. Besides t h e almost intentional discomfort of t h e d r e s s , it must
n o t be forgotten that the British soldier carries a far heavier weight than any
other in t h e w o r l d ; and, as if to m a k e mobility t h e ruling principle of t h e a r m y ,
it h a s a far m o r e considerable train of impediments dragging along with it
t h a n any other. T h e clumsiness of the c o m m i s s a r i a t a r r a n g e m e n t s contributes a great deal to this, b u t e v e n t h e regimental train, a n d particularly
t h e great a m o u n t of officers' luggage, s u r p a s s e s anything k n o w n out of
T u r k e y and India.
N o w see h o w this a r m y m a n a g e d w h e n the t r o o p s r e a c h e d T u r k e y . T h e
F r e n c h soldiers, having p e r m a n e n t l y incorporated into their a r m y - s y s t e m all
the a r r a n g e m e n t s found to be of practical utility in their Algerian c a m p a i g n s ,
h a d no s o o n e r landed t h a n t h e y made t h e m s e l v e s comfortable. T h e y carried
everything with t h e m which t h e y w a n t e d , little as it w a s , a n d w h a t e v e r w a s
deficient w a s soon supplied by t h e inborn ingenuity of t h e F r e n c h soldier.
E v e n u n d e r the joint-stock swindling Administration of L o u i s B o n a p a r t e a n d
Saint A r n a u d , t h e system w a s found t o w o r k s m o o t h l y enough. B u t t h e
English! T h e y c a m e to Gallipoli before their c o m m i s s a r i a t stores had arrived;
t h e y c a m e i n n u m b e r s four times greater t h a n could e n c a m p ; t h e r e w e r e n o
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preparations for disembarking, no portable o v e n s for baking, no properly
responsible administration. O r d e r s a n d c o u n t e r - o r d e r s s u c c e e d e d e a c h
other, clashing m o s t fearfully, or rather ludicrously. T h e r e w a s m a n y an old
sergeant or corporal w h o h a d m a d e himself comfortable in t h e Kaffir B u s h ,
5 or in t h e burning plains of the I n d u s ; b u t h e r e he w a s helpless. T h e improved
arrangements w h i c h e a c h foreign c o m m a n d e r on a c a m p a i g n might h a v e
introduced, w e r e m a d e for the duration of the campaign only; the different
regiments o n c e separated her M a j e s t y ' s old-fashioned regulations w e r e again
the only rule, and the administrative e x p e r i e n c e of the campaign w a s totally
10 lost.
S u c h is the glorious system to w h i c h the I r o n D u k e stuck with iron tenacity,
and which w a s necessarily the b e s t , b e c a u s e with it he h a d b e a t e n N a p o l e o n ' s
generals in the Peninsula. T h e British soldier, w h e n strapped in his leather
cuirasse, with 60 or 70 p o u n d s weight to c a r r y o v e r t h e steppes of Bulgaria,
15 creeping along u n d e r occasional attacks of a g u e , b a d l y supplied by neglectful
and unbusinesslike commissariat officers, m a y well be p r o u d of his glorious
Iron D u k e , w h o h a s p r e p a r e d all t h e s e benefits for him.
T h e mischievous results naturally flowing from the D u k e ' s traditionary
routine are still aggravated by the oligarchic c h a r a c t e r of t h e English Ad20 ministration, which intrusts the m o s t important offices to m e n , w h o , although
their parliamentary support m a y be n e e d e d by t h e set of place-hunters just
in p o w e r , are altogether destitute e v e n of e l e m e n t a r y professional knowledge
a n d fitness. T a k e for instance Mr. Bernal O s b o r n e , t h e Coalition Clerk of
O r d n a n c e . M r . Bernal O s b o r n e ' s nomination w a s a c o n c e s s i o n m a d e to the
25 Mayfair Radicals, r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e ministry by Sir W. Molesworth, the
" h u m b l e " editor of H o b b e s . Mr. Bernal O s b o r n e
30
" P i c k s up wit, as pigeons p e a s ,
A n d u t t e r s i t again w h e n J o v e d o t h p l e a s e ;
He is wit's peddler, and retails his w a r e s
At w a k e s and wassails, meetings, m a r k e t s , f a i r s . "
B u t although a small trader in stale j o k e s , M r . B e r n a l O s b o r n e is hardly
c o m p e t e n t to distinguish a c o m m o n m u s k e t from a Minié rifle, and, n e v e r t h e less, he is H e r Majesty's Parliamentary Clerk of O r d n a n c e .
Y o u r r e a d e r s will r e m e m b e r that s o m e time ago he applied to Parliament
35 for a grant of m o n e y to enable the B o a r d of O r d n a n c e to manufacture all
the small a r m s required for the a r m y and n a v y . He asserted that in the U n i t e d
States of America, G o v e r n m e n t manufactories supplied t h e a r m s at a
c h e a p e r rate than could be d o n e by private industry, and that on several
occasions serious difficulties had arisen from the c o n t r a c t o r s failing to
40 deliver the a r m s at the time agreed u p o n .
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Friedrich Engels
T h e v o t e of the H o u s e w a s , h o w e v e r , p o s t p o n e d on t h e m o t i o n of
M. M u n t z , to appoint a Select Committee " t o inquire as to t h e c h e a p e s t , t h e
m o s t expeditious, and the m o s t sufficient m o d e of obtaining fire-arms for
H e r Majesty's s e r v i c e . " T h e report of this C o m m i t t e e is n o w before the
public, a n d w h a t are the conclusions it h a s c o m e t o ? T h a t t h e private m a n u facturers h a d failed to supply t h e a r m s at t h e time c o n t r a c t e d for, " b e c a u s e
of the vexatious m a n n e r of the view of their w o r k , as r e q u i r e d by the B o a r d
of O r d n a n c e , a n d its habit of employing different c o n t r a c t o r s for e a c h individual p a r t of t h e n u m e r o u s pieces w h i c h c o m p o s e a m u s k e t . " T h e r e p o r t
states further t h a t " t h e B o a r d of O r d n a n c e h a d scarcely a n y k n o w l e d g e of
either t h e price at which m u s k e t s w e r e m a d e in A m e r i c a , or the e x t e n t to
w h i c h m a c h i n e r y was u s e d in their m a n u f a c t u r e , a n d h a d n e v e r seen any
fire-arms which had b e e n m a d e at any of the G o v e r n m e n t manufactories of
that country."
Finally, we learn from the r e p o r t t h a t "from t h e m a n u f a c t o r y the G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d e d to build, n o t a m u s k e t could be issued for eighteen m o n t h s . "
T h e s e e x t r a c t s from the Parliamentary R e p o r t m a y suffice to characterize
t h e professional abilities of Mr. O s b o r n e , t h e Coalition's o w n Clerk of
O r d n a n c e . Ex ungue leonem.
Karl Marx.
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Ships and Forts
Nr.4104, 13. Juni 1854
Ships and Forts.
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In view of the fact t h a t the success of the allied F r e n c h a n d English and t h e
defeat of R u s s i a in t h e p r e s e n t w a r d e p e n d s on t h e result of t h e conflict
b e t w e e n t h e fleets of the former a n d the g r e a t f ortif ied sea-ports of the latter,
an u n u s u a l degree of attention is n o w paid to t h e relative p o w e r of t h e s e
opposing m e a n s of attack and defense. It is admitted to be an o p e n question
w h e t h e r places of such strength as C r o n s t a d t a n d Sevastopol c a n be t a k e n
by any n u m b e r of ships with any n u m b e r of guns that c a n be b r o u g h t against
t h e m . But, without expressing an opinion on t h a t question at present, we w i s h
to suggest t h a t so far, t h e Russian military and n a v a l r e s o u r c e s h a v e not b e e n
found, w h e n brought t o the test, exactly s o contemptible a s w e u s e d t o b e
told t h e y w e r e before the war. T h e R u s s i a n armies w e r e said to exist on p a p e r
only; we h a v e found t h e m excessively slow in marching, as t h e y always w e r e ,
b u t after all they arrived on the scene of action in p r e t t y good condition a n d
p r e t t y full n u m b e r s . T h e Russian ships in t h e B l a c k Sea, especially, w e r e said
to be badly built and miserably m a n n e d ; and y e t , in the chase of the F u r y
t w o R u s s i a n frigates, Russian built, nearly outsailed an English steamer, a n d
b o t h their build and handling w e r e admired by t h e "rulers of the w a v e s . "
If t h e c a s e m a t e s without ventilation, and t h e stone walls w h i c h c a n n o t stand
the concussion c a u s e d by their o w n guns being fired, w h i c h we are led to
e x p e c t at Sevastopol a n d C r o n s t a d t , should p r o v e to be of t h e same n a t u r e
as the ships and soldiers, m a n y a true J o h n Bull will be d o o m e d to awful
disappointment w h e n i t c o m e s t o a n a t t a c k u p o n t h e m .
C r o n s t a d t and Sevastopol, the t w o c e n t e r s of the Russian naval establishm e n t , are fortified in t h e strongest m a n n e r k n o w n to m o d e r n military science.
B o t h of t h e m o w e their formidable a p p e a r a n c e mainly to the system of C o u n t
Montalembert, a F r e n c h engineer of t h e last century. Montalembert
p r o p o s e d to strengthen b o t h land and sea fortresses by erecting, in the place
of simple r a m p a r t s , with guns forming o n e single line of fire, large stone
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buildings of t w o , t h r e e , a n d in some c a s e s e v e n six stories, e v e r y o n e of t h e m
to be vaulted in bomb-proof, a n d to contain an equal n u m b e r of guns firing
o u t of n a r r o w e m b r a s u r e s . T h e details of his system—the partial exaggeration
of its principles by t h e author—the objections urged against it, c a n n o t , of
c o u r s e , be h e r e debated. H o w e v e r , the evident superiority of a fire from a
double or triple line, disposed in as m a n y tiers of guns o n e a b o v e t h e other,
h a s c a u s e d its application in almost all m o d e r n c o n s t r u c t i o n s w h e r e v e r it
could be d o n e . C h e r b o u r g in F r a n c e , Alessandria in Italy, Ehrenbreitstein,
L i n z , K ö n i g s b e r g , U l m in G e r m a n y , are m o r e or less modified applications
of s o m e of M o n t a l e m b e r t ' s fundamental principles. L a r g e c a s e m a t e d buildings with two or three tiers of guns h a v e b e e n found admirably a d a p t e d for
d e t a c h e d forts, a n d especially for strand fortifications, w h e r e it is essential
to o p p o s e an equivalent fire to the m a s s of iron p o u r e d o u t from the broadsides of t w o and t h r e e - d e c k e r s . T h u s C h e r b o u r g , B r e s t , a n d almost all extensive fortified h a r b o r s , are provided with c a s e m a t e d batteries of at least t w o
tiers ; S e v a s t o p o l h a s almost all its batteries disposed in t h r e e tiers ; C r o n s t a d t
has o n e , t w o , t h r e e tiers, and in t w o forts e v e n as m a n y as four tiers.
T h e fact t h a t t h e s e new-fashioned constructions h a v e n o t as y e t in any
c a s e u n d e r g o n e t h e test of real attack, would be alone sufficient to k e e p alive
a d o u b t as to their actual defensive strength. B u t t h e s e n e w forts shock so
m u c h in e v e r y detail of their composition all the n o t i o n s of m e n w h o admit
in fortifications of no possible progress b e y o n d V a u b a n a n d C o r m o n t a i g n e ,
t h a t e v e n at t h e p r e s e n t day t h e r e are h u n d r e d s of g o o d soldiers a n d sailors,
n a y , e v e n engineers, w h o hold them in utter c o n t e m p t . This is p a r ü y the c a s e
e v e n in F r a n c e , w h e r e t h e Cormontaigne p a r t y carried their point w h e n t h e
plan of the fortifications of Paris w a s discussed. B u t n o w h e r e do those
prejudices prevail m o r e t h a n in England, w h e r e t h e large majority of officers
are e x t r e m e l y deficient in theoretical knowledge, a n d dreadfully a v e r s e to
study. Their old h a n d - b o o k s do not go b e y o n d C o r m o n t a i g n e ; t h e y t h e m selves, p e r h a p s , n e v e r heard the n a m e of M o n t a l e m b e r t p r o n o u n c e d ; t h e
organization of t h e British a r m y is v e r y unfavorable to a n y i m p r o v e m e n t ,
either material or educational; the D u k e m a d e it a point n o t to alter an iota
in t h e service if he could help it; a n d w h a t w o n d e r t h a t d r e s s , m a n e u v e r s ,
n o t i o n s , are m o r e old-fashioned in the British a r m y t h a n in a n y o t h e r ? T h u s
it is that a m o n g British officers especially t h e r e will be found a great m a n y
w h o cherish the idea that J o h n Bull can do anything, a n d a British fleet t a k e
C r o n s t a d t be it e v e r so strong, c o m b i n e d with the other notion that C r o n s t a d t
is n o t v e r y strong after all, b e c a u s e it is built according to t h a t b o r e of a
s y s t e m w h i c h t h r e a t e n s to spread confusion in all authorized treatises, a n d
to m a k e gallant gentlemen begin their studies afresh.
N o w t h e r e is no d o u b t that with a good plan, a little knowledge of the
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Notizen von Jenny und Karl Marx
ü b e r d a s A b s e n d e n e i n i g e r Artikel a n d i e „ N e w - Y o r k T r i b u n e "
im Mai und Juni 1854
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ground, and an inspection of t h e r a m p a r t s and ditches of a b a s t i o n e d fortress
on t h e old system, it is not v e r y difficult to m a k e a p r e t t y fair estimate of
its strength; but this is not the c a s e with t h e n e w fortifications, not only
b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e not y e t b e e n tried in w a r , b u t b e c a u s e there are so m a n y
considerations of detail in their c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t a m e r e o u t w a r d inspection
gives b u t a p o o r clue as to the point in question. T h e r e is, a b o v e all, the
strength of t h e m a s o n r y , as far as regards b o t h t h e effect of t h e e n e m y ' s s h o t
and of the concussion c a u s e d by the fire of t h e c a s e m a t e s . T h e r e is t h e
ventilation of the c a s e m a t e s , which, if not properly provided, m a y silence
w h o l e batteries at the m o s t decisive m o m e n t by choking the m e n with s m o k e .
T h e r e is t h e construction of t h e e m b r a s u r e s , which is v e r y essential; t h e hight
of the lowest tier a b o v e the level of the w a t e r , and other points. A minute
knowledge of a whole fortress is required b e f o r e , with the p r e s e n t w a n t of
practical experience, any opinion as to its real defensive efficiency can be
p r o n o u n c e d . But this m u c h is certain, e v e n if t h e r e be some considerable
faults in the plan and execution of t h e s e w o r k s , b o t h C r o n s t a d t a n d S e v a s topol must, u n d e r all t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , be c o n s i d e r e d first-rate f o r t r e s s e s ,
w h i c h it will t a k e an exceedingly strong, well-handled and resolute naval
force to carry. An attack u p o n either of t h e m is, therefore, an e v e n t of t h e
highest military interest, and, w h a t e v e r m a y be its result, some of t h e m o s t
important questions n o w remaining o p e n for d e b a t e in military science will
t h e n a p p r o a c h their solution.
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The Treaty between Austria and PrussiaParliamentary Debates of May 29
Nr. 4103, 12. Juni 1854
The Times is highly indignant that the British general h a s issued an order
prohibiting its " o w n c o r r e s p o n d e n t s " to a c c o m p a n y the British army. If the
w a r w e r e a bona fide w a r , it would be absurd to object to this m e a s u r e , since
t h e dispatches of t h e D u k e of Wellington repeatedly complain of the information about his intended m o v e m e n t s and dispositions w h i c h N a p o l e o n
w a s able to transmit to his peninsular generals t h r o u g h t h e c o l u m n s of t h e
English n e w s p a p e r s . As it is, the object of t h e order can only be to k e e p t h e
English public in t h e dark a b o u t the t r e a c h e r o u s designs of their expeditionary t r o o p s , and receives a suitable c o m p l e m e n t in the order just
enforced u p o n t h e Sultan by t h e h e r o e s of t h e 2d of D e c e m b e r to forbid, by
a d e c r e e r e a d in all m o s q u e s , any political c o n v e r s a t i o n to t h e T u r k s . B u t
w h y should t h e T u r k s be b e t t e r off in this r e s p e c t t h a n t h e English public
itself?
In y e s t e r d a y ' s sitting of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s Mr. Blackett a s k e d L o r d
J. Russell w h e t h e r , by t h e last V i e n n a protocol, G r e a t Britain h a d given any
recognition or sanction to the first article of the t r e a t y of 20th April, 1854,
b e t w e e n Austria and Prussia, w h e r e b y t h e contracting p o w e r s "reciprocally
g u a r a n t e e to e a c h other the possession of their G e r m a n and n o n - G e r m a n
territories, so t h a t any attack m a d e upon t h e territory of the o n e , no matter
w h e n c e it m a y c o m e , shall be regarded as a hostile a t t a c k on the territory
of t h e o t h e r . " L o r d J o h n Russell a n s w e r e d t h a t " t h e p r o t o c o l does not
contain any special recognition or sanction of t h a t first article of the t r e a t y
b e t w e e n Austria a n d P r u s s i a . " Special, or n o t special, we r e a d in t h e F r e n c h
Moniteur of y e s t e r d a y that " t h e last protocol of V i e n n a c o n n e c t s the AngloF r e n c h C o n v e n t i o n for the p r e s e n t w a r with t h e Austro-Prussian t r e a t y for
t h e e v e n t u a l w a r , " i.e. c o n n e c t s the actual A n g l o - F r e n c h w a r against R u s s i a
with t h e eventual Austro-Prussian w a r for Russia, a n d is at all instances a
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guarantee given by the w e s t e r n p o w e r s to Prussia and Austria for their
u n d i s t u r b e d possession of P o s e n , of Galicia, of H u n g a r y , a n d of Italy. L o r d
J o h n Russell further a v o w s t h a t this p r o t o c o l " h a s a t e n d e n c y to confirm
and maintain the principles which are constituted by t h e V i e n n a protocols—
n a m e l y the integrity of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e , and the evacuation of t h e Principalities by t h e Russian f o r c e s . " In fact, it is a fresh engagement to maintain
t h e status quo ante bellum. T h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s c a n n o t p r e t e n d to h a v e
gained any advantage over R u s s i a by this p r o t o c o l ; for, the Austro-Prussian
treaty expressly stipulates: " A n offensive and defensive action o n the p a r t
of t h e t w o contracting p o w e r s w o u l d be o c c a s i o n e d : firstly, by t h e incorporation of the Principalities; a n d in t h e s e c o n d p l a c e , by an attack o n ,
or a passage of, the Balkans by the R u s s i a n s . " T h e s e two conditions h a v e
manifestly b e e n dictated by R u s s i a herself. F r o m the v e r y first, she declared
t h a t it w a s not her intention to i n c o r p o r a t e , b u t to k e e p t h e Principalities as
a "material g u a r a n t y " for the satisfaction of her d e m a n d s . To c r o s s t h e
Balkans in the face of some 29,000 F r e n c h t r o o p s , is an idea which n e v e r
e n t e r e d into the R u s s i a n plan of campaign, the only object of w h i c h is to
secure some of t h e fortresses on t h e right b a n k of t h e D a n u b e as t ê t e s de-pont for her army, and as c o n s t a n t facilities for an inroad into Bulgaria.
Be it r e m a r k e d , en passant, that The Times in noticing this n e w protocol,
is c o n t e n t at the b e s t to h o p e that A u s t r i a m a y h a v e b e e n gained over to t h e
w e s t e r n p o w e r s , P r u s s i a being " n o t o r i o u s l y " n o w g o v e r n e d b y " R u s s i a n
a g e n t s ; " while The Morning Chronicle e v e n d e s p a i r s of a n y sincere adhesion
of Austria. T h e great N a p o l e o n w o u l d h a v e forced Austria and Prussia into
o p e n alliance with Russia; t h e little o n e p e r m i t s R u s s i a to i m p o s e u p o n him
an alliance with the G e r m a n P o w e r s which r e m o v e s his a r m y to the greatest
possible distance from its basis of o p e r a t i o n s .
On the interpellation of M r . Milnes, L o r d J o h n Russell declared that "a
force consisting of a b o u t 6,000 m e n h a d b e e n sent from F r a n c e , with instructions to o c c u p y t h e Piraeus. An English regiment of infantry, which h a d
left this c o u n t r y a b o u t a w e e k ago, should likewise be p o s t e d in o c c u p a t i o n
of t h e Piraeus." T h e c a u s e of this m e a s u r e w a s the conspiracy of t h e G r e e k
G o v e r n m e n t w i t h Russia. T h e t r o o p s w e r e t o o c c u p y A t h e n s only i n certain
contingencies. We r e a d in the F r e n c h p a p e r s of to-day that " K i n g O t h o h a s
a c c e p t e d t h e ultimatum, and promised t h e r e t u r n of the M a u r o c o r d a t o s
Ministry, in case the o c c u p a t i o n w e r e s u s p e n d e d . If not, he w a s decided to
transfer his G o v e r n m e n t to the interior, a n d t h e r e to c o n c e n t r a t e his t r o o p s . "
T h a t this alternative will not r e m a i n altogether a gratuitous offer, follows
from a further declaration by L o r d J. Russell:
"If the King of G r e e c e disapproves of t h e a t t e m p t s of his people to violate
t h e duties of a neutral p o w e r , he will find p r o t e c t i o n in t h e forces which h a v e
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b e e n sent, a n d the m e a n s of compelling his people to o b s e r v e those duties.
If, on t h e other h a n d , t h e protestations which we h a v e r e c e i v e d from the
G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t should turn o u t n o t t o b e sincere, t h o s e forces might
p r o v e useful in another w a y . "
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e G r e e k G o v e r n m e n t m a y do as it p l e a s e s , G r e e c e will
b e occupied.
The Times m e n t i o n s with a certain m o r o s e n e s s that " F r e n c h troops form
at this m o m e n t t h e larger portion of the garrisons of R o m e , A t h e n s and
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , t h e t h r e e great capitals of the ancient w o r l d . " Old N a p o l e o n
was in t h e habit of occupying the capitals of t h e n e w world. N a p o l e o n the
Little, c o n t e n t with the theatrical show of g r e a t n e s s , disperses his armies
over insignificant countries, a n d locks up the b e t t e r portion of his t r o o p s in
so m a n y culs de sac.
T h e withdrawal of the Bribery P r e v e n t i o n bill in last night's H o u s e gave
o c c a s i o n to a highly amusing t o u r n a m e n t b e t w e e n Little J o h n n y , Disraeli,
a n d Bright. M r . Disraeli r e m a r k e d that
" T h e G o v e r n m e n t had introduced, during the session, s e v e n important
bills. O u t of t h e seven, t h e y h a d b e e n defeated on t h r e e ; t h r e e h a d b e e n
w i t h d r a w n , and on the seventh, they had suffered considerable, though
partial, defeats. T h e y h a d b e e n defeated on a bill on t h e entire c h a n g e of the
law of settlement—on a bill for the public e d u c a t i o n for Scotland—and on a
bill on t h e total r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of parliamentary o a t h s . T h e y h a d w i t h d r a w n
the p r e s e n t Bribery P r e v e n t i o n bill; they h a d w i t h d r a w n a m o s t important
m e a s u r e for t h e c o m p l e t e c h a n g e of the civil service, a n d t h e y h a d w i t h d r a w n
a m e a s u r e for Parliamentary Reform. T h e Oxford University Reform bill
would c o m e o u t of the H o u s e in a very mutilated s t a t e . "
If t h e y h a d not h a d a fair p r o s p e c t of carrying t h e s e m e a s u r e s they ought
n o t t o h a v e b e e n introduced
T h e y w e r e told t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t had
no principles, b u t "all the talents," and o n e might h a v e e x p e c t e d that, as
e v e r y minister h a d made a sacrifice of his private opinions, s o m e public
a d v a n t a g e should at least have accrued from s u c h heroism.
L o r d J o h n ' s answer w a s not r e n d e r e d less w e a k b y his great indignation.
He exalts the merits of t h e bills defeated as well as of t h e bills withdrawn.
At all e v e n t s , he a d d s , the H o u s e w a s not for M r . Disraeli and his friends.
T h e latter h a d a c c u s e d the G o v e r n m e n t of credulity or c o n n i v a n c e in the
c o n d u c t of their foreign policy, but he had n e v e r d a r e d to t a k e the opinion
of t h e H o u s e on t h a t point. He h a d pretended an unwillingness to disturb
the G o v e r n m e n t in their arrangements for the w a r ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , he had
b r o u g h t f o r w a r d a motion to deprive t h e m of t h e m e a n s of carrying on the
w a r . T h a t m o t i o n had b e e n defeated by a majority of m o r e than 100 v o t e s .
W i t h regard t o t h e J e w s , w h o s e emancipation h e p r e t e n d e d t o a d v o c a t e , h e
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gave or withheld his support to that m e a s u r e according to the conveniences
of t h e hour.
This answer d r e w u p o n the p o o r leader of the C o m m o n s a fresh onslaught
of his antagonist, m u c h fiercer t h a n t h e first.
" T h e noble l o r d , " said Mr. Disraeli, " s e e m s to think that I am surprised
t h a t he has n o t quitted office; on t h e c o n t r a r y I should h a v e b e e n i m m e n s e l y
surprised if he had. ( L o u d laughter.) M a n y m o r e defeats, if possible m o r e
humiliating, and, if possible, more c o m p l e t e , m u s t o c c u r before t h e noble
lord will feel the necessity of taking s u c h a step as that. ( C h e e r s . ) I k n o w
t h e noble lord t o o well; I h a v e sat opposite to him too long; I h a v e s e e n him
t o o often in the s a m e position. M a n y a time h a v e I s e e n him experience t h e
m o s t signal defeats and I h a v e seen him a d h e r e to office with a patriotism
a n d a pertinacity which c a n n o t be too m u c h admired. ( C h e e r s and laughter.)
W i t h regard to the war, they h a d a n n o u n c e d to Parliament that they w o u l d
lay on the table all the p a p e r s on t h e subject, while in fact t h e y k e p t b a c k
t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t part, a n d t h e c o u n t r y w o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d in total ignor a n c e of w h a t w a s going on, e x c e p t for the revelations in the St. Petersburg
Gazette. After t h e s e revelations he h a d to modify his opinion only so far as
to dispense with any h y p o t h e s i s , a n d to positively declare that the G o v e r n m e n t can only h a v e b e e n guilty of c o n n i v a n c e or credulity. He w a s quite
convinced that before long t h a t would be the general opinion of t h e
country."
M r . Disraeli then p r o c e e d e d to defend t h e G o v e r n m e n t of L o r d D e r b y , a n d
t o show t h a t L o r d J o h n ' s opposition t o i t h a d b e e n " f a c t i o u s . " L o r d J o h n
h a d m a d e great sacrifices:
" H e parted from the colleagues of his life, w h o had b e e n faithful to him,
to t a k e into his b o s o m t h e ancient foes, w h o h a d p a s s e d their lives in depreciating his
and decrying his career. H e gave u p the confidence—I m a y
say, he almost b r o k e up the being of t h a t historic p a r t y , the confidence of
w h i c h to a m a n like the noble lord ought n o t to h a v e b e e n less precious t h a n
t h e favor of his sovereign. ( C h e e r s . ) A n d for w h a t did he do it? B e c a u s e
he w a s devoted to great principles and w a s r e s o l v e d to carry great m e a s u r e s .
But n o w t h a t every one of his m e a s u r e s h a d foundered, he still r e m a i n e d in
office. As to his c o n d u c t u p o n the J e w i s h question, Mr. Disraeli g a v e to the
s t a t e m e n t of the noble lord a m o s t unequivocal and most unqualified denial."
In fact, he left no other r e s o u r c e to L o r d J o h n Russell b u t to plead his
" m i s f o r t u n e , " and to r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of the coalition as an indispensable evil.
Mr. Bright thought t h a t
" T h e noble lord c a m e o u t of the discussion w i t h s o m e scars. T h e elements
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of t h e G o v e r n m e n t w e r e such, that, from t h e day of its formation, it w a s n o t
v e r y likely t h a t it could act for the benefit of the c o u n t r y . He recollected
an ingenious gentleman in the H o u s e , and a g r e a t friend of t h e noble lord
and of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , saying t h a t the Cabinet w o u l d get on admirably if
t h e y could only avoid politics. T h a t a p p e a r e d to be a b o u t the c o u r s e t h a t the
5
G o v e r n m e n t had p u r s u e d . U p o n e v e r y o t h e r m a t t e r e x c e p t free trade the
G o v e r n m e n t a p p e a r e d altogether unable t o advise, t o lead, o r t o control t h e
H o u s e . I t w a s quite clear that the noble lord, w h o w a s b y c o u r t e s y called
t h e L e a d e r of t h e H o u s e , did not lead the H o u s e , a n d t h a t t h e H o u s e did not
follow the noble lord, and that their m e a s u r e s w e r e kicked o v e r b o a r d in a 10
v e r y u n c e r e m o n i o u s manner. Y o u h a v e got us into a war, and you m u s t get
us o u t of it. We will n o t u n d e r t a k e the responsibility. This w a s the condition
t h a t t h e y w e r e n o w driven t o b y the G o v e r n m e n t . While t h e y w e r e undermining and destroying the Constitution of T u r k e y , t h e y w e r e also doing
something to u n d e r m i n e and destroy t h e Parliamentary s y s t e m of this 15
country."
It m a y be a s k e d of w h a t use this system is? D o m e s t i c q u e s t i o n s m u s t n o t
be agitated b e c a u s e the c o u n t r y is at war. B e c a u s e the c o u n t r y is at w a r , w a r
m u s t not b e discussed. T h e n w h y r e m a i n s Parliament? Old C o b b e t t has
r e v e a l e d t h e secret. As a safety-valve for t h e effervescing passions of the 20
country.
Karl M a r x .
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The Formation of a Special Ministry of War in Britain—
The War on the Danube—The Economic Situation
Nr. 4105, 14.Juni 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , J u n e 2, 1854.
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T h e formation of a special Ministry of W a r having n o w b e e n determined
u p o n , the great question of t h e m o m e n t is to k n o w w h o m a y be selected to
fill t h a t office. T h e D u k e of N e w c a s t l e , w h o has hitherto combined b o t h t h e
functions of Colonial a n d W a r Secretary, has long s h o w n a great disinclination to relinquish either of his t w o p o s t s , and seems disposed, if we m a y
j u d g e from t h e t o n e of The Morning Chronicle, to stick at all e v e n t s to t h e
Administration of the W a r D e p a r t m e n t . The Times of to-day r e c o m m e n d s
for t h e third time t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of L o r d P a l m e r s t o n . " L o r d P a l m e r s t o n
would certainly s e e m m o r e in his place as Minister of W a r , directing t h e
f o r c e s of this c o u n t r y against what we may call his old enemy, Russia, t h a n
engaged in a series of squabbles w i t h parochial vestries and sewers c o m m i s s i o n s . " The Daily News likewise r e c o m m e n d s L o r d P a l m e r s t o n . Y e s t e r d a y ' s Morning Herald b r o u g h t a d e n u n c i a t i o n of this intrigue from t h e p e n
of Mr. U r q u h a r t . At all instances, t h e s e m o v e m e n t s in Downing-st. are of
greater i m p o r t a n c e for the " w a r " t h a n all the military d e m o n s t r a t i o n s at
Gallipoli or Scutari.
P e r h a p s y o u will r e m e m b e r that great e x p e c t a t i o n s w e r e held o u t to t h e
public of immediate a n d energetic m e a s u r e s as s o o n as the c o m m a n d e r s of
t h e expeditionary forces should h a v e arrived a t Constantinople. O n t h e
18th May, Marshal St. A r n a u d , L o r d Raglan and t h e T u r k i s h Sereskier p r o c e e d e d to V a r n a w h e r e a council of w a r w a s to t a k e place w i t h O m e r P a s h a
a n d t h e Admirals on t h e 20th. Y e s t e r d a y a telegraphic dispatch arrived in
L o n d o n stating t h a t " a t the military council, held at V a r n a , it w a s decided
that the allied t r o o p s should p r o c e e d from Gallipoli to A d r i a n o p l e . " Simultan e o u s l y The Times published a leading article in w h i c h the whole plan of
t h e c a m p a i g n as settled on at t h e V a r n a c o n f e r e n c e , w a s revealed. " T h i s
c o n f e r e n c e , " says The Times, " m u s t h a v e t a k e n place at the v e r y time w h e n
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t h e R u s s i a n s , u n d e r Prince Pashkiewitsch, w e r e directing their fiercest att a c k s against t h e fortress of Silistria, and c o n s e q u e n t l y the principal officers
of t h e allied a r m y w e r e in the b e s t position to decide on the m e a s u r e s which
might be t a k e n for the relief of that p l a c e . " A n d consequently t h e y o r d e r e d
their forces to c o m e up from Gallipoli to Adrianople—for t h e relief of
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Silistria; and consequently t h e y arrived at t h e following heroic d e t e r m i n a t i o n : " T h a t it is n o t expedient to e x p o s e t h e T u r k i s h a r m y to t h e risk
of a general action for the sake of repelling the a t t a c k of t h e Russians on
t h e fortresses which c o v e r t h e right b a n k o f the D a n u b e ; . . . n o r t o t h r o w
any considerable portion of the allied armies on the coast, so as to c o m e into 10
i m m e d i a t e collision with t h e p r e s e n t a d v a n c e d p o s t s of t h e R u s s i a n s . " In
o t h e r w o r d s , the allied generals h a v e resolved n o t to o p p o s e anything to t h e
exertions of the Russians to c a r r y the fortresses on t h e right b a n k of the
D a n u b e . The Times confesses that this plan of o p e r a t i o n s " m a y disappoint
t h e natural impatience of t h e p u b l i c ; " but, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , it discovers 15
t h a t " t h e s e fortified places are in reality the o u t w o r k s of t h e T u r k i s h position,
a n d do not constitute its principal strength." F o r m e r l y we w e r e told t h a t
M o l d a v i a and Wallachia w e r e the outworks of T u r k e y , and t h a t t h e latter
could n o t be a great loser by surrendering t h e m to R u s s i a n occupation. N o w
we learn that T u r k e y m a y , w i t h the same tranquility, a b a n d o n Bulgaria to 20
the Russians.
" T h e Balkan is the real bulwark of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , and it c a n profit
t h e R u s s i a n s nothing to carry t h e outer line of circumvallation with h e a v y
l o s s , if fresh obstacles of incalculably greater m a g n i t u d e rise up b e f o r e t h e m
as t h e y p r o c e e d . T h e further t h e y a d v a n c e within this region n o r t h of t h e
Balkan, the w o r s e their position b e c o m e s . . . . T h e invading a r m y e x h a u s t s
its strength against t h e fortified places on the river a n d t h e scattered det a c h m e n t s of the e n e m y ; but in the m e a n t i m e the forces in defense of the
main position remain comparatively fresh and u n b r o k e n . " T h e r e is no d o u b t
that if the beef-eating allies c a n only avoid e n c o u n t e r i n g an e n e m y their
forces will remain v e r y fresh. B u t h o w will it be if t h e R u s s i a n s do n o t further
a d v a n c e within t h e region n o r t h of the Balkan, contenting t h e m s e l v e s w i t h
t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e fortresses, the k e y s of Bulgaria, a n d with t h e Principalities? H o w will their evacuation be effected? " B e h i n d the lines of the Balkan
the E u r o p e a n a r m y is preparing to advance, at the p r o p e r time, w i t h irresistible force, and the concluding m o n t h s of the c a m p a i g n ought to effect
t h e annihilation of the e n e m y . "
This irresistible a d v a n c e will, of c o u r s e , be greatly facilitated by t h e
R u s s i a n p o s s e s s i o n of the D a n u b e fortresses, a n d w h a t m a y not be achieved
by the allied armies, t h e season will h a v e no difficulty to finish.
T h e Moniteur, it is true, a n n o u n c e s that O m e r P a s h a w a s preparing to c o m e
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The Fortnation of a Special Ministry of War in Britain—The War on the Danube
to t h e relief of Silistria; and The Morning Cftroni'cie finds fault with t h e a b o v e
article of The Times, observing: " T h e a u t h o r of this project p r o b a b l y hopes
t h a t Austrian diplomacy may i n d u c e , in t h e m e a n while, t h e Czar to w i t h d r a w
his t r o o p s , w i t h the satisfaction of having o b t a i n e d uninterrupted and u n r e 5 sisted s u c c e s s ; and on t h e other h a n d , it is, p e r h a p s , imagined that, in t h e
alternative of an a d v a n c e on the B a l k a n s , t h e r e m o t e contingency cont e m p l a t e d in t h e Austro-Prussian t r e a t y w o u l d at o n c e c o m e into o p e r a t i o n . "
T h e n e w s of the Moniteur, h o w e v e r , is notoriously so arranged as to k e e p
t h e Parisians in good h u m o r ; and the m a n n e r in w h i c h The Chronicle coitilo m e n t s on the plan of The Times only increases t h e probability t h a t it is the
plan of t h e coalition. Other s o u r c e s of information further confirm this
assumption. T h e Constantinople c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Chronicle, u n d e r d a t e
of 18th May, o b s e r v e s : "A c a m p a i g n will scarcely be u n d e r t a k e n on t h e
D a n u b e in m i d s u m m e r , as more m e n would be lost by fever and disease t h a n
15 o t h e r w i s e . "
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B e s i d e s , the ministerial Globe of last evening publishes an article conceived entirely in t h e same spirit as t h a t of The Times. It tells u s , firstly, t h a t
t h e r e are at this m o m e n t "on/y "45,000 allied t r o o p s in Turkey—29,000 F r e n c h
a n d 16,000 English, the same Globe stating, in another column, t h a t t h e
R u s s i a n s h a v e only 90,000 m e n b e f o r e a n d a r o u n d Silistria, and that t h e
regular T u r k i s h a r m y in t h e field a m o u n t s to 104,000 men. B u t this aggregate
of nearly 150,000 Turkish, F r e n c h a n d English t r o o p s is n o t d e e m e d sufficient by The Globe to p r e v e n t 90,000 R u s s i a n s from taking the Bulgarian
f o r t r e s s e s , n o t to mention the c o o p e r a t i o n w h i c h might be given by t h r e e
powerful fleets. The Globe thinks it sheer superfluity that either T u r k s or
allies should fight against the R u s s i a n s , as " t i m e is fighting against t h e m . "
In revealing the plan of campaign c o n c o c t e d by t h e allied c o m m a n d e r s , The
Globe e v e n goes a step further than The Times, for it s a y s : " W h a t e v e r
b e c o m e s of the fortresses on the D a n u b e , a d e q u a t e force must be brought
up to r e n d e r hopeless the invader's further p r o g r e s s , and punish his audac i o u s a d v a n c e . " H e r e we have the clear proof t h a t the Austro-Prussian treaty
h a s b e e n a c c e d e d t o i n t h e last V i e n n a P r o t o c o l , b y E n g l a n d and F r a n c e .
T h e fortresses on the D a n u b e and Bulgaria are to be given up to Russia,
and a c a s e of w a r will only be constituted by her further a d v a n c e .
W h e n the 15,000 Russians w h o first invaded M o l d a v i a crossed t h e P r a t h ,
T u r k e y w a s advised n o t to stir, as she w o u l d be unable to p r e v e n t such a
formidable force of 15,000 m e n from o c c u p y i n g Wallachia also. T h e Russians
t h e n occupied Wallachia. W h e n w a r h a d b e e n declared b y the Porte n o
operations could be u n d e r t a k e n against t h e R u s s i a n s b e c a u s e it w a s winter.
On t h e arrival of spring, O m e r P a s h a received o r d e r s to abstain from a n y
offensive m o v e m e n t , b e c a u s e the allied forces had not arrived. W h e n t h e y
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arrived nothing could be d o n e b e c a u s e it w a s n o w s u m m e r , a n d s u m m e r [is]
an u n w h o l e s o m e season. L e t a u t u m n arrive, and it will be " t o o late to o p e n
a c a m p a i g n " . This proceeding The Times calls a c o m b i n a t i o n in strategics
with tactics, the e s s e n c e of tactics, in its opinion, being the sacrifice of t h e
a r m y in order to k e e p " f r e s h " t h e r e s e r v e s . O b s e r v e also t h a t all the time
since this juggle is going on under the v e r y n o s e s and e y e s of the opposition
j o u r n a l s and t h e British public at large, The Morning Advertiser rivals with
The Times in expressions of angry denunciation against Prussia, against
D e n m a r k a n d S w e d e n , for n o t " j o i n i n g " t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s ! T h a t t h e
m o t i v e s w h i c h determine the tendencies of all the smaller C o u r t s to side w i t h
R u s s i a are not without a very good foundation, is s e e n from the t o n e , for
i n s t a n c e , of the D a n i s h G o v e r n m e n t journals. T h u s t h e C o p e n h a g e n corr e s p o n d e n t of The Morning Chronicle w r i t e s :
" T h e threat, by holding out which the Ministerial p a r t y m a n a g e to k e e p
t h e National p a r t y quiet and discouraged, is t h a t E n g l a n d has e v e r b e e n
perfidious t o w a r d D e n m a r k , a n d that if the latter n o w joined with the w e s t e r n
p o w e r s , 100,000 Prussians, p e r h a p s with a corps of A u s t r i a n s , would ravage
Jutland d o w n to the Eider, and o c c u p y the w h o l e D a n i s h c o n t i n e n t . "
I t might b e e x p e c t e d , and certainly w a s e x p e c t e d , b y the coalition, t h a t
t h e delicate services—diplomatic, military a n d otherwise—rendered by t h e m
to the " g o o d c a u s e " of R u s s i a would at least m e e t w i t h a certain delicate
gratitude from t h e Autocrat. So far from this, t h e y r e c e i v e a great deal of
a b u s e from him b e y o n d the understanding, and in e x c e s s of the exigencies
of t h e c a s e . In illustration of t h e m a n n e r of expressing this sovereign cont e m p t of the Russian Court for their s h a m - a d v e r s a r i e s , I will give y o u a
translation of a fable lately published by t h e Nordische Biene, by s o m e
a n o n y m o u s T y r t a e u s of Russia. Its child-like simplicity of language and
structure m u s t be a c c o u n t e d for as an exigency of t h e semi-barbarian u n d e r standing to w h i c h the p o e t a d d r e s s e s himself, exactly as the ironical urbanity
of criticism to w h i c h t h e late O d e s s a r e p o r t of Admiral H a m e l i n h a s b e e n
s u b j e c t e d by t h e St. Petersburg Gazette, is to be explained by t h e circumstance of its being addressed to t h e diplomatists of E u r o p e . T h e fable is
h e a d e d : T h e Eagle, the Bull-Dog, the C o c k , a n d the H a r e . " A royal eagle,
great a n d strong, sat on t h e summit of a r o c k , and from his lofty seat s u r v e y e d
t h e w h o l e w o r l d , far behind t h e Baltic, (Weit hinterm Belt die ganze Welt;)
t h e r e he sat quietly a n d contently, satisfied by his m o d e s t meal, scorning to
store up provisions from the valley b e n e a t h him, since he c o m m a n d s everything at e v e r y hour. A bull-dog viewed him with e n v i o u s mien, and t h u s he
s p o k e to the c o c k : ' B e my ally, we will c o m b i n e , from v e n g e a n c e thou, myself
from e n v y , a n d p u t d o w n yonder eagle.' So said, so d o n e . T h e y m a r c h e d on,
and taking council on the r o a d how t h e y w o u l d b e s t subdue the eagle, the
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c o c k said: ' S t o p ! look at his t a l o n s , his wings—may G o d assist him w h o w o u l d
try them ! M o r e than o n c e heard I the c u r s e s of my a n c e s t o r s , lamenting their
sad fate w h e n b e a t e n by his wings.' 'Tis t r u e , ' said the bull-dog; ' b u t we will
devise a plan to catch the eagle. L e t ' s send a h a r e near him; he will clutch
t h e h a r e . Meanwhile do t h o u t u r n his attention by crowing and jumping, as
thou always k n o w ' s t h o w to d o , affecting to begin a fight with him. W h e n
t h u s we shall h a v e diverted his attention and his talons, I will attack him in
the b a c k , so that he c a n n o t defend himself, and s o o n he will be torn to pieces
by my sharp teeth.' T h e s c h e m e pleased t h e c o c k , and he t o o k his stand at
a near post. T h e bull-dog e n t e r s a w o o d and b a r k s , driving a h a r e t o w a r d the
eagle, w h o w a t c h e s quietly. T h e h a r e , stupid and blind, falls quickly into the
eagle's clutch. T h e cock, faithful to his a g r e e m e n t , leaves his p o s t a n d j u m p s
after t h e h a r e ; b u t lo! w h a t disgrace! T h e eagle without stirring from his seat,
lifts b u t his wings and, disdaining to take hold of the h a r e , drives him away
with one and with the other, just t o u c h e s the c o c k , w h o neither stirs nor
c r o w s any m o r e . O n e k n o w s the t e n d e n c y of h a r e s to fly; behold him r u n ,
senseless and u n c o n s c i o u s into t h e sea, and t h e r e expires. T h e eagle saw t h e
fat bull-dog at a distance conducting the intrigue—for, w h a t e s c a p e s the
eagle's e y e s ? He has discovered the h e r o c o n c e a l e d behind a bush. T h e eagle
spreads his large and sturdy wings, and rises up in majesty. T h e bull-dog
b a r k s and flies with hasty leaps. In vain, it is t o o late. T h e eagle r u s h e s d o w n
u p o n him and plunges his talons into the traitor's back, and t h e r e he lies, t o r n
in p i e c e s . "
In c o n s e q u e n c e of the favorable h a r v e s t p r o s p e c t s , and t h r o u g h the a b sence of speculative b u y e r s , the prices of grain h a v e experienced a small
decline during the w e e k . A reaction, h o w e v e r , is inevitable, b e c a u s e "all the
evidence w h i c h c a n be brought to b e a r on t h e subject t e n d s to lead to the
belief that the stocks in f a r m e r s ' h a n d s , are r e d u c e d to a m u c h smaller
c o m p a s s t h a n is usual at the c o r r e s p o n d i n g period of the season."—(Mark
L a n e E x p r e s s . ) T h e advices from D a n t z i c , Stettin, R o s t o c k , etc., c o n c u r in
t h e statement t h a t t h e stocks o n h a n d are v e r y small, t h a t t h e surrounding
farmers had little or nothing m o r e to deliver, and that assistance from those
quarters could not be expected b u t at v e r y high prices. T h e deliveries from
the grower i n F r a n c e appear, also, n o t t o h a v e increased, a n d t h e w h e a t
b r o u g h t f o r w a r d at t h e m a r k e t s of t h e interior is described as scarcely
sufficient to m e e t the d e m a n d for c o n s u m p t i o n .
I have also learned from a private source of information that The Times
r e p o r t s of the state of t r a d e in t h e manufacturing districts a r o u n d M a n c h e s t e r
are generally misrepresentations, and t h a t t r a d e is e v e r y w h e r e in a declining condition e x c e p t at Birmingham. The Manchester Guardian confirms
this, and a d d s t h a t the r e s u m p t i o n of w o r k by so large a n u m b e r of o p e -
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ratives on strike could not be expected to act o t h e r w i s e t h a n to depreciate
prices.
F o r t h e m e a s u r e a n n o u n c e d by Sir J. G r a h a m in last M o n d a y ' s H o u s e of
C o m m o n s , viz: T h e non-blockade of t h e p o r t of Archangel, The Morning
Herald a c c o u n t s in the following laconic p a r a g r a p h : " T h e r e is a h o u s e at
Archangel which b e a r s the n a m e of the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r . "
Karl Marx.
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Reorganisation of the British War Administration—
The Austrian Summons—Britain's Economic Situation—
St. Arnaud
Nr.4114, 24. Juni 1854
L o n d o n , Friday, J u n e 9, 1854.
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T h e s p e e c h delivered by K o s s u t h , at Sheffield, is the m o s t substantial e v e r
h e a r d from him during his stay in England. N e v e r t h e l e s s o n e c a n n o t help
finding fault with it. Its historical expositions are partly incorrect. To d a t e
t h e decline of T u r k e y from t h e support given by Sobieski to t h e Austrian
capital, is a proposition for which no g r o u n d s w h a t e v e r exist. T h e r e s e a r c h e s
of H a m m e r p r o v e b e y o n d dispute t h a t t h e organization of the Turkish
E m p i r e w a s at that period already in a state of dissolution, a n d that the e p o c h
of O t t o m a n grandeur and strength h a d b e e n rapidly disappearing for s o m e
time before. Similarly incorrect w a s t h e proposition t h a t N a p o l e o n discarded
t h e idea of attacking R u s s i a by sea for other r e a s o n s t h a n t h o s e suggested
by his having no fleet, and his being excluded from t h e c o m m a n d of the o c e a n
by t h e British. T h e m e n a c e t h a t if E n g l a n d e n t e r e d into alliance with Austria,
H u n g a r y might ally herself with Russia, w a s an act of i m p r u d e n c e . In t h e
first place it furnished a w e a p o n to t h e ministerial j o u r n a l s , of which The
Times has n o t failed to m a k e ample u s e by " c o n v i c t i n g " all revolutionists
as agents of Russia. Secondly, it c a m e with a singular propriety from the lips
of the m a n w h o s e ministry already in 1849, had offered the H u n g a r i a n c r o w n
to a Cesarewitch. Lastly, h o w could he deny t h a t if ever his t h r e a t should
be carried into execution, either at his o w n or o t h e r s ' instigation, the national
existence of the Magyar r a c e w o u l d be d o o m e d to annihilation, t h e major
p a r t of the population of H u n g a r y being Slavonians ? It w a s equally a mistake
to describe t h e w a r against R u s s i a as a w a r b e t w e e n liberty and despotism.
A p a r t from the fact t h a t if s u c h be the c a s e , liberty w o u l d be for t h e n o n c e ,
r e p r e s e n t e d by a B o n a p a r t e , t h e whole a v o w e d object of the w a r is the
m a i n t e n a n c e of the balance of p o w e r , and of t h e V i e n n a treaties—those v e r y
treaties w h i c h annul t h e liberty a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e of nations.
A m o r e t h a n usually vigorous s p e e c h h a s also b e e n delivered by
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Mr. U r q u h a r t at Birmingham, w h e r e he developed again his charge of treache r y against t h e Coalition. H o w e v e r , as M r . U r q u h a r t is strictly o p p o s e d to
t h e only p a r t y p r e p a r e d t o o v e r t h r o w the rotten Parliamentary basis o n which
t h e Coalition G o v e r n m e n t of the Oligarchy r e s t s , all his s p e e c h e s are as m u c h
to t h e p u r p o s e as if t h e y w e r e addressed to the clouds.
5
In t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s , last night, L o r d J o h n Russell a n n o u n c e d the
formation of a special Ministry of W a r , w h i c h ministry, h o w e v e r , is not to
a b s o r b t h e various d e p a r t m e n t s at p r e s e n t constituting t h e administration of
war, b u t only to h a v e a nominal superintendence o v e r all. T h e only merit
of the change is t h e erection of a n e w ministerial place. W i t h regard to the 10
a p p o i n t m e n t , The Morning Post of y e s t e r d a y stated t h a t t h e Peelite section
of the C a b i n e t h a d b e e n victorious, and that the D u k e of N e w c a s t l e w o u l d
b e c o m e t h e n e w Secretary of W a r , while t h e Colonies w o u l d be offered to
L o r d J o h n Russell. The Globe of last evening confirmed this statement,
adding t h a t , as L o r d J o h n w a s n o t likely to a c c e p t , Sir George G r e y would 15
be n o m i n a t e d Colonial Secretary. Although the Peelite journals affect still
to be ignorant of a final decision, t h e Palmerstonian j o u r n a l of to-day ann o u n c e s in positive t e r m s that the D u k e of N e w c a s t l e a n d Sir George G r e y
h a v e b e e n appointed.
The Morning Post has the following in r e f e r e n c e to the A u s t r i a n " p e r emptory summons:"
" W e h a v e r e a s o n to believe that R u s s i a will n o t t r e a t the Austrian c o m munication with silence, nor meet it by a refusal, a n d we shall not be surprised
if we shortly learn t h a t R u s s i a is disposed to a c c e p t t h e A u s t r i a n p r o p o s a l
for t h e c o m p l e t e evacuation of t h e T u r k i s h territory, on condition t h a t
A u s t r i a shall arrange an armistice with a view to negotiation."
The Morning Chronicle of to-day likewise grants t h a t " t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
m a y be of the greatest i m p o r t a n c e . " It a d d s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , that it m u s t not
be c o n s i d e r e d as an ultimatum, t h a t it is c o u c h e d in the u s u a l c o u r t e o u s
language, a n d t h a t a rupture w a s only held out in c a s e t h a t R u s s i a should
ignore t h e communication altogether. If R u s s i a g a v e an e v a s i v e a n s w e r , or
m a d e a partial concession, n e w suggestions a n d negotiations might follow.
L e t us s u p p o s e , for a m o m e n t , that the a s s u m p t i o n of The Post w a s just,
a n d a b o u t to be realized; it will be seen that t h e service r e n d e r e d by Austria
w o u l d be only to p r o c u r e another armistice in favor of Russia. It is highly
p r o b a b l e t h a t something like this m a y h a v e b e e n c o n t e m p l a t e d , f o u n d e d on
t h e supposition t h a t Silistria, in the m e a n t i m e , w o u l d fall, a n d the " c h a r a c t e r
and h o n o r o f the C z a r " b e guaranteed. T h e whole s c h e m e , h o w e v e r , m u s t
fall to the ground, if Silistria holds out, and the valor of t h e T u r k s should
at last force t h e allied t r o o p s to enter into the campaign, m u c h as it m a y be
against the inclination of their c o m m a n d e r s and G o v e r n m e n t s .
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If t h e r e be anything fit to r e n d e r the f r e q u e n t gaps and omissions in this
g r e a t w a r less u n e n d u r a b l e , it is t h e amusing uncertainty of t h e English
p r e s s and public a b o u t the value a n d the reality of the alliance b e t w e e n the
w e s t e r n a n d the G e r m a n p o w e r s . Scarcely i s t h e " p e r e m p t o r y s u m m o n s "
of Austria started to the satisfaction of all the world, w h e n all t h e w o r l d is
distressed by t h e n e w s of a meeting b e t w e e n t h e Austrian and Prussian
m o n a r c h s , a meeting w h i c h , in t h e w o r d s of The Times, " f o r b o d e s no good
to the western powers."
T h e B o a r d of T r a d e tables for the last m o n t h h a v e b e e n published. T h e
results are less favorable t h a n t h o s e of t h e preceding m o n t h s . T h e declared
value of e x p o r t s has fallen off £747,527, as c o m p a r e d with t h e corresponding
m o n t h of 1853. T h e articles chiefly affected h a v e b e e n t h o s e c o n n e c t e d with
the M a n c h e s t e r m a r k e t s ; b u t linen, w o o l e n a n d silk m a n u f a c t u r e s likewise
exhibit a decline.
In the usual monthly circular of M e s s r s . Sturge of Birmingham, we r e a d
that t h e wheat-plant has not tillered nor stooled well, and this is a c c o u n t e d
for in the following w a y :
" T h e high price of seed c a u s e d a smaller quantity to be u s e d per acre t h a n
in ordinary y e a r s , and the inferiority of t h e w h e a t of last y e a r ' s g r o w t h
committed to the soil m a y n o t h a v e d o n e so well as would h a v e b e e n the case
if it h a d b e e n better h a r v e s t e d . "
In regard to this s t a t e m e n t , The Mark Lane Express o b s e r v e s :
" T h i s inference a p p e a r s to us exceedingly probable and deserving of
attention, as u n s o u n d seed c a n scarcely be e x p e c t e d to p r o d u c e so healthy
a plant as t h a t gathered u n d e r m o r e auspicious c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e progress
of t h e growing c r o p will be w a t c h e d with m o r e t h a n ordinary interest, it
being an admitted fact that s t o c k s , not only in this c o u n t r y b u t almost in all
parts of t h e world, h a v e , owing to the e x t r e m e deficiency of the h a r v e s t of
1853, b e e n r e d u c e d into a v e r y n a r r o w c o m p a s s . T h e future range of prices
will d e p e n d mainly on t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e w e a t h e r ; the p r e s e n t value of
w h e a t is too high to encourage speculation, a n d t h o u g h it is m o r e t h a n
probable t h a t t h e supplies from a b r o a d will, during t h e n e x t t h r e e m o n t h s ,
be on a m u c h less liberal scale t h a n they h a v e hitherto b e e n , still, if nothing
should o c c u r to give rise to u n e a s i n e s s in r e s p e c t to the probable result of
the n e x t h a r v e s t , t h o s e having anything to dispose of will naturally be anxious
to clear o u t old s t o c k s , while millers a n d o t h e r s a r e likely to act on t h e
h a n d - t o - m o u t h system. . . . A t the same t i m e , i t m u s t b e b o r n e i n mind t h a t
t h e country generally is b a r e of w h e a t . "
Y o u c a n n o t at p r e s e n t p a s s through t h e streets of L o n d o n without being
stopped by c r o w d s assembled before patriotic pictures exhibiting the interesting group of the Sultan, B o n a p a r t e and Victoria—"the three saviors of
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civilization." To help y o u to a full appreciation of t h e c h a r a c t e r s of t h e
p e r s o n a g e s w h o are n o w charged with saving civilization, after having
" s a v e d society," I r e s u m e my sketch of their generalissimo, M a r s h a l St. Arnaud.
T h e f a m o u s d a y s of July r e s c u e d J a c q u e s L e r o y , (old style,) or J a c q u e s
Achille L e r o y de St. A r n a u d , (new style,) from t h e g r a s p of his creditors.
T h e grave question t h e n a r o s e h o w t o improve t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e o f F r e n c h
society being t h r o w n into a general confusion by t h e s u d d e n fall of t h e old
regime. Achille had not participated in the battle of the t h r e e d a y s , n o r could
he p r e t e n d to h a v e d o n e so, the fact being t o o notorious t h a t at t h e m e m o r a b l e
e p o c h he found himself carefully locked up in a cell at St. Pélagie. He w a s
t h e r e f o r e unable to claim, like m a n y other a d v e n t u r e r s of t h e day, any
r e m u n e r a t i o n u n d e r the false p r e t e n s e of having b e e n a combattant of July.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e success of t h e bourgeois régime a p p e a r e d by no m e a n s
favorable for this notorious o u t c a s t of the Parisian B o h e m i a , w h o h a d always
professed an implicit faith in Legitimacy, and n e v e r belonged to the Society
of t h e " A i d e - T o i , " (a w a n t of foresight w h i c h he has m e n d e d by b e c o m i n g
o n e of t h e first m e m b e r s of the Society of the "Dix-mille,")—nor played any
p a r t w h a t e v e r in the great " c o m e d y of fifteen y e a r s . " Achille, h o w e v e r , h a d
learned something from his ancient master, M . E . de P., in t h e art of extemporization. He boldly p r e s e n t e d himself at t h e W a r Office, pretending
to be a non-commissioned officer w h o , from political m o t i v e s , h a d t e n d e r e d
his resignation at the time of the Restoration. H i s b a n i s h m e n t from the
Gardes du Corps, his expulsion from t h e C o r s i c a n Legion, his a b s e n c e from
the r a n k s of the 51st Regiment setting o u t for the colonies, w e r e easily turned
into as m a n y proofs of his eccentric patriotism, a n d of t h e persecution he
h a d suffered at the h a n d s of the B o u r b o n s . T h e conduct-list g a v e his assertions t h e lie, b u t t h e W a r Office feigned to believe in their truth. T h e withdrawal of n u m e r o u s officers refusing to t a k e the o a t h u n d e r L o u i s Philippe
h a d c a u s e d a great void which must be filled u p , and e v e r y public a p o s t a s y
from Legitimacy, w h a t e v e r might h a v e b e e n the m o t i v e s of t h e conversion,
w a s a c c e p t e d as a valuable support to the u s u r p e r ' s g o v e r n m e n t . Achille,
c o n s e q u e n t l y , w a s commissioned in the 64th Regiment of the L i n e , b u t n o t
without undergoing the humiliation of being simply rehabilitated in his p o s t
of non-commissioned officer, instead of being p r o m o t e d to a higher grade,
like t h e o t h e r s , w h o h a d resigned u n d e r t h e Restoration.
T i m e and his b r e v e t , a d v a n c e d him at last to t h e r a n k of lieutenant. At the
same time he w a s given an opportunity to m a k e valid his special talents of
servile a p o s t a s y . In 1832 his regiment w a s q u a r t e r e d at P a r t h e n a y , in the
midst of t h e Legitimist insurrection of the V e n d é e . H i s former c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h s o m e former gardes du corps, rallied a r o u n d t h e D u c h e s s of B e r r y ,
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e n a b l e d h i m to c o m b i n e t h e offices of soldier a n d of police-spy—a combina
tion singularly agreeing with t h e genius m a t u r e d in t h e gaming h o u s e s of
L o n d o n a n d t h e cafés borgnes of Paris. T h e D u c h e s s of Berry having b e e n
sold b y t h e Jew D e u t z t o M ö n s . Thiers w a s arrested a t N a n t e s , and Achille
b e c a m e intrusted with t h e mission of a c c o m p a n y i n g her to Blaye, w h e r e he
w a s to act as o n e of her jailers u n d e r t h e o r d e r s of G e n . B u g e a u d . A n x i o u s
not to let slip t h e occasion of exhibiting a c o n s p i c u o u s zeal for t h e dynastic
interest, h e o v e r - s h o t t h e m a r k , and contrived t o scandalize e v e n B u g e a u d
himself by t h e abject services he allowed t h e police to i m p o s e u p o n him, a n d
t h e brutal t r e a t m e n t to w h i c h he subjected the D u c h e s s . B u g e a u d , h o w e v e r ,
h a d not t h e p o w e r t o dismiss a n aid-de-camp w h o m t h e police h a d selected
for t h e special d u t y of guarding t h e D u c h e s s , w h o w a s u n d e r the particular
s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e of M. Joly, t h e C o m m i s s a r y of Police, a n d w h o , after all,
d e p e n d e d m o r e on t h e Ministry of t h e Interior t h a n on t h a t of W a r . T h e future
generalissimo of t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h t r o o p s played t h e part of t h e mid-wife,
it being his special mission to state and p r o v e by w i t n e s s e s the p r e g n a n c y
of t h e D u c h e s s , t h e discovery of w h i c h dealt t h e death-blow to t h e partisans
of t h e old régime. It w a s in this s a m e quality t h a t t h e n a m e of M. de
St. A r n a u d figured for t h e first time in t h e Moniteur, in w h o s e c o l u m n s of
M a y 1833, we r e a d that " M . Achille de St. A r n a u d , thirty-four years old,
habitually residing at Paris, Officer of O r d n a n c e to Gen. Bugeaud, w a s
s u m m o n e d to sign, in his official capacity, t h e act of birth of the child of
w h i c h t h e D u c h e s s w a s delivered a t her p r i s o n o n M a y 10,1833." T h e gallant
St. A r n a u d continuing to play his p a r t of a jailer, a c c o m p a n i e d t h e D u c h e s s
on b o a r d t h e corvette which d i s e m b a r k e d her at P a l e r m o .
H a v i n g r e t u r n e d to F r a n c e , Achille b e c a m e t h e laughing stock and t h e
scape-goat of his regiment. Disliked by t h e other officers, excluded f r o m
their réunions, h a r a s s e d by undisguised p r o o f s of their utter c o n t e m p t , p u t
a s i t w e r e i n quarantine b y t h e whole regiment, h e w a s forced t o t a k e refuge
in t h e Foreign Legion at Algiers, w h i c h w a s t h e n organizing at Paris u n d e r
t h e c a r e of Colonel B e d e a u . T h i s F o r e i g n L e g i o n may be fairly c h a r a c t e r i z e d
as t h e Society of t h e T e n t h D e c e m b e r of t h e E u r o p e a n armies. N o t o r i o u s
d e s p e r a d o e s , a d v e n t u r e r s of b r o k e n fortune, d e s e r t e r s from all c o u n t r i e s ,
the general offal of the E u r o p e a n a r m i e s , c o n s t i t u t e d t h e nucleus of this corps
d'élite, w h i c h w a s p r o p e r l y called t h e refugium peccatorum. T h e r e w a s no
situation that could h a v e better suited t h e genius of Achille than t h e fellowship of such a c o r p s , t h e official mission of w h i c h p r e s e r v e d it from t h e fangs
of t h e police, while t h e c h a r a c t e r of its constituting m e m b e r s r e m o v e d all
t h e c h e c k s weighing on t h e officers of t h e regular a r m y . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
Achille's habitual prodigality, he gave such slender proofs of military c o u r a g e
a n d capacity that he continued to vegetate during four y e a r s in t h e subaltern
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p l a c e of lieutenant in t h e 1st battalion of the Foreign Legion, until on the
15th August, 1837 w h e n a n e w b r e v e t conferred u p o n him t h e r a n k of captain.
It is an u n h a p p y circumstance that the c o m p a n y ' s c h e s t is placed u n d e r the
control of t h e captains in t h e F r e n c h army, w h o are a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e pay
of t h e m e n and their provisions. Chests w e r e exactly t h e spot in w h i c h the
m o d e r n Achille w a s most vulnerable ; and t h u s it h a p p e n e d t h a t s o m e m o n t h s
after his p r o m o t i o n a terrible deficit w a s discovered in his. T h e InspectorGeneral, M. de Ruiniere, having detected this e m b e z z l e m e n t , insisted on the
p u n i s h m e n t of t h e captain. T h e report to the Ministry w a s r e a d y , it w a s on
t h e point of being c o m m i t t e d to t h e post, and M. de St. A r n a u d would h a v e
b e e n lost forever, if M. B e d e a u , his lieutenant-colonel, affected by t h e
despair of his inferior, h a d not interfered and a p p e a s e d the w r a t h of G e n .
Ruiniere.
St. A r n a u d has quite a m a n n e r of his o w n of showing his gratitude for p a s t
obligations. A p p o i n t e d to t h e ministry of w a r , on t h e e v e of t h e coup d'état,
he c a u s e d G e n . B e d e a u to be arrested, and struck the n a m e of G e n . Ruiniere
from the lists. Ruiniere addressed to him the following letter, which he
circulated a m o n g his friends at Paris, and published in t h e Belgian journals :
" I n 1837, t h e General Ruiniere refused to b r e a k t h e sword of t h e Captain
L e r o y de St. A r n a u d , unwilling to dishonor him ; in 1851, t h e Minister of W a r ,
L e r o y de St. A r n a u d , unable to dishonor t h e G e n e r a l Rulhière, h a s b r o k e n
his s w o r d . "
Karl Marx.
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The Siege of Silistria
Nr.4115, 26. Juni 1854
The Siege of Silistria.
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After an interval of time filled up by military m o v e m e n t s below criticism,
b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e m a d e , not u p o n strategical a n d tactical, b u t u p o n diplomatic and parliamentary g r o u n d s , the i n v e s t m e n t a n d attack of Silistria
affords at last an event of military interest.
This attack s h o w s t h a t the Russians still k e e p the initiative, and that, up
to t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t , t h e T u r k s , allied armies a n d allied fleets, are directed
by an impulse received from the e n e m y . T h e allied fleets are instinctively,
irresistibly attracted by the R u s s i a n fleet in its safe r e t r e a t at Sevastopol;
being unable to attack that stronghold w i t h o u t a land force, t h e y are t h u s
held in c h e c k and p a r a l y z e d by a fleet far inferior in quality and n u m b e r of
ships. E v e n the evacuation of the forts on the C a u c a s i a n coast, carried o u t
in p r o p e r t i m e a n d u n d e r the n o s e of t h e British a n d F r e n c h s t e a m e r s , shows
the determination of t h e Russians to hold t h e lead as long as possible. A n d
in w a r this is a great thing. It is a proof of superiority—whether in n u m b e r s ,
in quality of t r o o p s , or in generalship. It k e e p s up t h e morale of t h e soldier
u n d e r all c h e c k s a n d retreats short of t h e loss of a decisive battle. It was this
initiative w h i c h held together Wellington's little a r m y in the midst of hurtd r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of F r e n c h t r o o p s in Spain, a n d which m a d e it t h e center
a r o u n d which all the e v e n t s of that five y e a r s ' w a r grouped t h e m s e l v e s . Y o u
m a y be forced to retreat, y o u m a y suffer a repulse, b u t as long as y o u are
able to give the impulse to the e n e m y instead of receiving it from him, y o u
are still to a degree his superior; a n d w h a t is m o r e , y o u r soldiers will feel
t h e m s e l v e s , individually and collectively, superior to his m e n . T h e a t t a c k
u p o n Silistria is, b e s i d e s , t h e first real f o r w a r d m o v e m e n t of the R u s s i a n s
since they completed the o c c u p a t i o n of t h e D a n u b e . T h e e n t r a n c e into t h e
Dobrodja w a s eminently defensive; a shortening of their front line, a n d a
step to secure the m o u t h s of the D a n u b e . B u t t h e a t t a c k u p o n Silistria is n o t
only a bold, b u t an extremely well calculated m o v e m e n t .
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In 1828-'29 the Russians, t h e n m a s t e r s of the B l a c k S e a , v e r y properly
neglected Silistria in order to secure V a r n a first, b e c a u s e V a r n a o p e n e d a
n e w line of sea-communication with their o w n c o u n t r y . Y e t Silistria w a s
i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h t o induce t h e m t o t a k e i t b e f o r e t h e y c r o s s e d t h e Balkan.
At p r e s e n t , w h e n the allied fleets c o m m a n d the B l a c k S e a , V a r n a loses m o s t
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of its i m p o r t a n c e to the Russians, and Silistria a n d S h u m l a are t h e main points
of attack. To t h e m V a r n a can n o w h a v e b u t a negative v a l u e ; if t h e y t a k e
it, t h e y gain no i m p r o v e d b a s e of operations, b u t merely deprive t h e e n e m y
of w h a t m a y be called a maritime bridge-head, u n d e r c o v e r of w h i c h he c a n
suddenly c o n c e n t r a t e , by his ships, a n u m b e r of t r o o p s for a special opera- 10
tion. T h u s the D a n e s in 1849, after enticing the P r u s s i a n a r m y into Jutland,
suddenly transshipped a strong b o d y of t r o o p s to their maritime bridge-head
of Fredericia, a n d , in a sally, destroyed the fine, b u t far w e a k e r SchleswigHolstein c o r p s left before it to c o n d u c t the siege. If t h e r e f o r e t h e R u s s i a n s ,
driven from the Black Sea, c a n n o t u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s p a s s t h e B a l k a n 15
b e f o r e t h e y h a v e secured Varna, t h e y c a n n o t a d v a n c e against V a r n a before
t h e y a r e m a s t e r s at least of Silistria.
B u t t h e s e are considerations of s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c e for the p r e s e n t ;
Russia, unaided by Austria, c a n n o t think of passing t h e Balkan in t h e face
of her p r e s e n t e n e m i e s . T h e defensive i m p o r t a n c e of Silistria to the Russians
is at this m o m e n t p a r a m o u n t ; it is such t h a t unless t h e y t a k e it, t h e y m a y
consider their campaign of the year as lost. Silistria is situated exactly in front
of t h e c e n t e r of t h e Russian position, extending from Giurgevo by K a l a r a s h
a n d T s h e r n a v o d a to K u s t e n d j e . With a strong system of fortresses before
this position, with O m e r P a s h a in Shumla, like a spider in the center of its
w e b , watching e v e r y m o v e m e n t of its intended p r e y , w i t h allied forces
e x p e c t e d on t h e K a m t c h i k a n d Devna, t h e r e is v e r y little c h a n c e t h a t t h e
force R u s s i a can spare for the Danubian w a r , single-handed, will e v e r get
a glimpse of t h o s e Thracian valleys w h o s e v e r d u r e c h a r m e d t h e fatigued
soldiers of Diebitch from the hights of the Balkan. R u s s i a m u s t calculate,
for this y e a r at least, u p o n a simple defense of h e r p r e s e n t c o n q u e s t s , until
either A u s t r i a joins her, or some circumstance disables or d r a w s a w a y h e r
m o s t formidable o p p o n e n t , t h e Anglo-French a r m y . A defensive w a r p r e s u p p o s e s a system of field, or, if possible, of p e r m a n e n t , fortifications. N o w ,
Silistria being in t h e h a n d s of the e n e m y , t h e R u s s i a n s h a v e no p e r m a n e n t
fortifications at h a n d b u t the small forts of the D o b r o d j a , w h i c h will be
entirely useless as soon as Wallachia is lost. T h e y m a y h a v e r e c o n s t r u c t e d
s o m e of the fortifications of Ibrail and R u s t c h u k and f o r m e d an e n t r e n c h e d
c a m p at B u c h a r e s t , b u t as long as Silistria is n o t t h e i r s , their first line of
serious defense lies as far b a c k as the Sereth, F o k s h a n i , G a l a t c h and I s mail.
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B u t s u p p o s e Silistria in the h a n d s of the R u s s i a n s , t h e a s p e c t of t h e w a r
changes at o n c e . Silistria is a splendid point for a Russian bridge-head on
the D a n u b e . It is situated in a reentering angle f o r m e d by a b e n d in t h e
D a n u b e , just t h e situation b e s t fitted for t h e p u r p o s e . T h e r e is a large island
to the n o r t h and west, w h i c h is c r o s s e d by the d y k e to K a l a r a s h , and w h i c h
c o m m a n d s t h e plains w e s t of t h e fortress, at a distance of 1,000 yards—quite
n e a r e n o u g h to enfilade t r e n c h e s or to shell c o l u m n s . T h e r e are t w o little
islands t o t h e east t h a t s w e e p t h e e a s t e r n a p p r o a c h , a n d t e m p o r a r y batteries
e r e c t e d there at low w a t e r w o u l d a n n o y a besieger v e r y materially. T h u s p a r t
of t h e g r o u n d which the T u r k s , attacked from t h e north, c a n n o t u s e in t h e
defense and m u s t therefore a b a n d o n to the e n e m y , w o u l d give the R u s s i a n s
excellent positions for batteries flanking an a t t a c k coming from t h e south.
T h e front o p e n to an attack w o u l d t h u s be confined to the b a s e of the triangle,
at t h e a p e x of which Silistria is situated, or in o t h e r w o r d s to its s o u t h e r n
or land front; and a T u r k i s h or allied a r m y could n o t think of seriously
attacking Silistria before Wallachia at least, w a s t a k e n from t h e Russians.
T h e m a i n a d v a n t a g e s , h o w e v e r , w o u l d be not so m u c h of a tactical as of
a strategical nature. With the D o b r o d j a a n d Silistria, R u s s i a c o m m a n d s t h e
D a n u b e , and can, according to c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e b o u c h for m o m e n t a r y
offensive action either from Trajan's Wall, or from Silistria. T h e e n e m y
w o u l d n o t b e able, unless h e w e r e twice a s strong a s t h e Russians, t o cross
at a n y point higher up without exposing Shumla. As to his crossing lower
d o w n t h a n Silistria, it is o u t of t h e question; t h e r e is no crossing point nearer
t h a n H i r s o v a to r e a c h which he must first t a k e t h e position of K a r a s u a n d
then H i r s o v a itself, which is as strong against an a t t a c k from the land side
as it is w e a k against o n e from t h e river side. T h u s by the possession of
Silistria, the forts of the D ö b r o d j a b e c o m e of great i m p o r t a n c e to the R u s sians. Their a r m y obtains a double pivot a r o u n d w h i c h it c a n freely m a n e u v e r
w i t h o u t exposing its c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and e v e n if a superiority of t w o to o n e
should enable t h e e n e m y to c r o s s at Oltenitza or Giurgevo to t a k e B u c h a r e s t
and to repel the R u s s i a n s behind the Jalomitza, t h e siege of Silistria would
be an indispensable operation before a n y decisive a d v a n c e into Bessarabia
could be considered safe. Until Silistria h a d actually fallen, the R u s s i a n s ,
therefore, might consider t h e m s e l v e s as p o s s e s s o r s of Wallachia e v e n if t h e y
h a d n o t a soldier in t h a t p r o v i n c e . Silistria, in a w o r d , w o u l d be equivalent,
to Russia, to six m o n t h s t e n u r e of Wallachia a n d six m o n t h s , bringing us to
t h e w i n t e r w h e n n o sieges c a n b e carried o n a t all i n t h a t country, w o u l d b e
equivalent to four m o n t h s m o r e . Silistria would be t h e winning, and a repulse
from Silistria would almost be the loss, of the campaign.
F o r o n c e , t h e n , in spite of diplomacy, bribery, c o w a r d i c e a n d irresolution,
we are c o m e , t h r o u g h t h e inherent necessities of t h e war, to a decisive turning
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point. E i t h e r Silistria is a b a n d o n e d to its fate, a n d t h e n its fall is a m a t t e r of
m o r e t h a n mathematical certainty; or t h e allies a d v a n c e to its relief, a n d t h e n
t h e r e will be a decisive battle; for without demoralizing their a r m y a n d losing
all their prestige, t h e Russians c a n n o t r e t r e a t from b e f o r e Silistria without
fighting, nor do t h e y a p p e a r willing to do so.
Silistria has u n d e r g o n e m o r e varied fates t h a n any o t h e r fortress. In 1810
t h e R u s s i a n s t o o k it after nine d a y s ' i n v e s t m e n t a n d five of serious attack.
In 1828, t h e fortress being exactly in the same state as b e f o r e , t h e y invested
it on t h e 21st of July with their land forces, a n d on t h e 10th of August with
thirty-six gun-boats also. B u t their siege-artillery did n o t arrive till S e p t e m b e r , a n d t h e n t h e r e w a s no ammunition with it, so t h a t a regular a t t a c k could
n o t be m a d e . On the 10th of N o v e m b e r t h e y h a d to raise the siege, t h e winter
having set in, and t h e D a n u b e having begun to drift ice. T h e r e t r e a t of t h e
disorganized and disheartened Russians w a s followed up m o s t vigorously
by t h e garrison; part of t h e Russian siege-artillery h a d b e e n left in t h e batteries and the remainder w a s t a k e n by the T u r k s in t h e pursuit t o w a r d
R a s s o v a . I n t h e n e x t y e a r Diebitch r e n e w e d t h e a t t a c k , invested t h e fortress
on t h e 17th M a y by driving the T u r k s o u t of t h e lines a n d r e d o u b t s constructed b y t h e Russians t h e y e a r before, a n d o p e n e d fire from thirty-one
h e a v y guns placed, it w o u l d seem without a n y p r e p a r a t i o n , on an elevation
a b o u t 900 y a r d s from the t o w n . On t h e 26th, dismounting batteries w e r e
o p e n e d at a b o u t 600 y a r d s from the wall. At the s a m e time the second parallel
w a s o p e n e d ; the third w a s o p e n e d on the 4th of J u n e , a n d on t h e 12th t h e
a d v a n c e t o w a r d the crowning of t h e glacis w a s b e g u n . T h e glacis w a s
c r o w n e d at o n e point on t h e 17th, b u t this o p e r a t i o n w a s c o m p l e t e d on t h e
26th only, w h e n five batteries w e r e o p e n e d at t h e v e r y e d g e of the ditch, thirty
y a r d s from the main wall. At t h e same time Gen. Schilder, t h e s a m e w h o n o w
directs the engineering p a r t of the siege, had carried on his favorite extensive
mining operations. L a r g e mines laid u n d e r t h e c o u n t e r s c a r p a n d t h e main
wall h a d b e e n sprung on the 21st, (effecting at o n c e a practicable breach,)
on t h e 25th, 27th, 28th and 29th, w h e n at last t h e f o r t r e s s surrendered. E v e n
t h e n t h e r e a p p e a r s n o t to h a v e b e e n any urgent necessity for a surrender,
save t h e terror p r o d u c e d by the s u b t e r r a n e a n explosions a m o n g a superstitious and irregular soldiery. Behind the whole a t t a c k e d front and second
r a m p a r t a coupure or n e w i n t r e n c h m e n t h a d b e e n m a d e , which w o u l d of
c o u r s e h a v e required fresh mining or artillery o p e r a t i o n s b e f o r e it could h a v e
b e e n t a k e n . T h u s this singular fortress, in no w a y i m p r o v e d u p o n its state
in 1810, had yet held out thirty-five days after t h e opening of the t r e n c h e s ,
a n d nine d a y s after a practicable b r e a c h had b e e n effected in t h e main wall;
it h a d forced t h e Russians to e x p e n d 30,000 s h o t a n d shell in t h e artillery
a t t a c k , a n d 336 h u n d r e d w e i g h t of p o w d e r in t h e mining attack.
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Financial difficulties a n d t h e E g y p t i a n w a r s compelled t h e T u r k s t o neglect
this important point after the p e a c e of Adrianople to s u c h a degree t h a t e v e n
in 1836 t h e b r e a c h e s of 1829 w e r e n o t only n o t completely repaired and t h e
ditches cleared, b u t the t r a c e s of t h e a t t a c k of 1810 e v e n , w e r e still visible.
T h e Sultan intended to c o n s t r u c t d e t a c h e d forts t h e n , b u t for some time this
intention w a s not carried out. At t h e p r e s e n t day, Silistria is in a far different
s t a t e , owing mostly to the exertions of a P r u s s i a n officer in the T u r k i s h
service, Col. G r a c h . T h e original faulty c o n s t r u c t i o n of the place, p e r h a p s
hardly admits of m u c h i m p r o v e m e n t , b u t t h e d e t a c h e d forts constructed on
t h e hights h a v e already p r o v e d their utility. T h e fortress f o r m s a semi-circle,
t h e diameter of w h i c h , a b o u t 1,800 y a r d s long, r u n s along t h e shore of t h e
D a n u b e . It h a s t e n bastioned fronts of an average length of 500 y a r d s . T h e
construction, as with all Turkish fortresses of the sixteenth a n d s e v e n t e e n t h
centuries, t e e m s with all the imperfections of t h e old Italian fortifications;
long curtains, small and n a r r o w bastions, short flanks offering hardly a n y
defense of t h e ditch, t h e ditch itself shallow (not a b o v e eight feet deep,) no
c o v e r e d w a y , b u t a m e r e glacis, the c r ê t e or highest p a r t of w h i c h w a s hardly
four feet a b o v e t h e t o p of the c o u n t e r s c a r p . T h e r a m p a r t itself w a s eight feet
high by t w e n t y feet in thickness, and c o n s t r u c t e d of e a r t h ; scarp and counterscarp w e r e riveted to the hight of t h e ditch, viz., eight feet. T h e ditch itself
is from the hight of its level necessarily d r y . T h e r e w e r e not e v e n lunettes
in front of t h e curtains. S u c h w a s Silistria up to 1836; and t h e s e w e a k n e s s e s
of its defenses w e r e c r o w n e d by the fact, t h a t within 600 y a r d s from the wall,
t h e fortress is c o m m a n d e d by a range of hights extending to t h e south of it.
T h e s e hights are the a b u t m e n t of the Bulgarian Plateau, which, perfectly flat
at t h e t o p , e x t e n d s within 1,500 y a r d s of t h e t o w n , a n d t h e n slopes d o w n
t o w a r d the river, offering a splendid e m p l a c e m e n t for t e r r a c e d batteries for
front or enfilading fires, with t h e n a r r o w a r m of t h e river on one side a n d
t h e hights on t h e other. Major M o l t k e , w h o s u r v e y e d t h e place in 1836, and
to w h o s e w o r k on the c a m p a i g n of 1829 we are indebted for t h e a b o v e
particulars, gives it as his opinion " t h a t Silistria c a n n o t be m a d e capable of
a serious defense without four d e t a c h e d forts on t h e hights, a n d a bridge-head
o n t h e large island o p p o s i t e . " T h e bridge-head w a s a n impossibility, t h e
island belonging to Wallachia, from w h i c h t h e T u r k s w e r e excluded by t r e a t y ;
b u t t h e forts are t h e r e , and if we are well informed, almost on the identical
spots pointed out by Major Moltke.
W h a t Col. G r a c h m a y h a v e b e e n able t o d o w i t h the faulty main wall, w e
c a n n o t tell. T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , hardly a d o u b t t h a t he m u s t h a v e c o n s t r u c t e d
at least a c o v e r e d w a y a n d introduced loop-holes for enfilading the ditch at
t h e middle of the curtain in e a c h of t h e m o s t m e n a c e d and least defended
fronts. A s t o the four d e t a c h e d forts, w e k n o w nothing a s yet respecting their
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m o d e of construction, but from Col. G r a c h ' s being a Prussian, a n d c h e a p n e s s
being a great object with the P o r t e , we should say t h e y m u s t m o s t likely be
c o n s t r u c t e d u p o n t h e system w h i c h is n o w almost generally a d o p t e d on t h e
continent, and especially in Prussia, viz: plain s q u a r e or octagonal r e d o u b t s
with loop-holes on every alternate corner. Their situation is pointed out by
the four p r o m o n t o r i e s which form the final projections of the plateau t o w a r d
t h e t o w n , a n d w h i c h are separated b y t h r e e ravines. Their distance from t h e
m a i n wall m u s t b e , on an average, 1,500 y a r d s , so t h a t t h e y c a n n o t be v e r y
effectually p r o t e c t e d by the fire from t h e fortress. B u t t h e r e is no absolute
necessity for this; and there appear to be no spots n e a r e r the t o w n , on t h e
slope, w h e r e a fort could be well defiladed against t h e c o m m a n d i n g edge of
t h e plateau.
B e s i d e t h e s e p e r m a n e n t w o r k s , Col. G r a c h has c o n s t r u c t e d o n the plateau
itself an e a r t h w o r k , n o t of a p e r m a n e n t n a t u r e , called A r a b Tabiassi, (Fort
Arabia,) situated in front of the two central forts, at a b o u t 1,000 y a r d s dist a n c e . S o m e r e p o r t s would lead t o the conclusion t h a t other field-redoubts
h a v e b e e n e r e c t e d so as to form an outer line of f o r t s , t h u s giving t h r e e lines
of successive defense. A r a b Tabiassi, h o w e v e r , r e m a i n s t h e k e y of this
position, and m u s t be t a k e n before the inner line of forts c a n be a p p r o a c h e d .
This disposition of t h e w o r k s e n d o w s Silistria with great defensive a n d
offensive strength. As the regular attack can lead to decisive results on its
s o u t h e r n front only, a garrison from 15,000 to 18,000 strong c a n spare a g r e a t
n u m b e r of m e n for sallies. T h e sally t r o o p s find a splendidly c o v e r e d position
o n t h e slope behind the d e t a c h e d forts, from w h i c h t h e y c a n a d v a n c e u n s e e n
up the ravines, until near the e n e m y . In a storm u p o n A r a b Tabiassi, t h e r e fore, it w o u l d n o t be so m u c h the garrison of t h a t fort as t h e sallying t r o o p s
from Silistria w h o w o u l d decide the battle. N o w to the siege itself.
F r o m t h e e n d of April the Russians had occasionally fired across the
D a n u b e into Silistria. In May they b e g a n to c o n s t r u c t a regular a p p r o a c h on
the large island opposite the t o w n , close to the d y k e leading to K a l a r a s h , and
by t h e 10th t h e y h a d their batteries c o m p l e t e d along t h e shore of t h e river.
A violent b o m b a r d m e n t against the t o w n as well as horizontal firing against
t h e n o t h e r n front t o o k place on t h e 11th. It w a s r e p e a t e d on t h e 12th, w h e n
Lieut. N a s m y t h , Bengal Artillery, w h o had just arrived, witnessed it, a n d
gives his r e p o r t in The London Times. T h e main point of aim w a s t h e northe a s t e r n or Tshengel Bastion, from w h i c h the T u r k s replied m o s t vigorously,
a n d with great steadiness of aim. T h e practice of t h e R u s s i a n s , on t h e cont r a r y , is described as v e r y indifferent. N u m b e r s of shells w e r e found in the
t o w n w h i c h h a d b e e n fired without taking off t h e c a p s of t h e fuses, so t h a t
t h e y could n o t t a k e fire and explode. S u c h an oversight, t h o u g h c o m m o n in
rapid field-practice in t h e beginning of a campaign, is u n h e a r d of in siege-
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firing, w h e r e the fire is always comparatively slow. It p r o v e s w h a t a h u r r y
t h e Russians must h a v e b e e n in to get rid of their ammunition. T h e Russians
h a d , besides, e r e c t e d batteries during the night on the island of Shiblak, to
t h e east of Silistria. (They h a d t w o batteries on t h e s a m e spot in 1829.) T h e
four guns of this b a t t e r y m u s t h a v e b e e n intended to enfilade the w h o l e of
t h e n o r t h e r n front.
F r o m the 13th to the 16th nothing m u c h a p p e a r s to h a v e b e e n d o n e ; t h e
r e p o r t s at least are entirely silent. It is n o t i m p r o b a b l e t h a t the R u s s i a n
generals, finding, as t h e y might well h a v e e x p e c t e d , a b o m b a r d m e n t of no
avail against a Turkish fortress, p r e p a r e d for an a t t a c k on t h e right b a n k of
t h e river. Accordingly on the 16th a bridge w a s completed below Silistria;
20,000 m e n c r o s s e d on it, and w e r e shortly afterward joined, it is said, by
20,000 m o r e from the Dobrodja. A general m o v e m e n t of concentration
t o w a r d Silistria and Turtukai t o o k place a m o n g t h e R u s s i a n s ; for as soon as
the attack w a s to be carried on u p o n the right b a n k , a force w a s n e c e s s a r y
to c o v e r it against O m e r P a s h a at Shumla, and any Anglo-French t r o o p s
w h i c h might be landed at V a r n a .
On the 19th the first reconnoitering t o o k place against A r a b Tabiassi; large
m a s s e s of t r o o p s w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d j u s t out of gun-range, while a line of
skirmishers a d v a n c e d . After a short c a n n o n a d e , M u s s a P a s h a sent some
Bashi B u z o u k s u p o n t h e plateau, w h o d r o v e the skirmishers in. On t h e 20th,
another Russian a d v a n c e took p l a c e , w h i c h l o o k s too serious for a m e r e
reconnoitering—not serious e n o u g h for a real attack. On t h e 21st t h e first
assault u p o n A r a b Tabiassi w a s carried o u t ; the details are wanting, b u t t h e
R u s s i a n s w e r e repulsed with great loss. T w o R u s s i a n officers p a s s e d o v e r
to t h e T u r k s , and r e p o r t e d the e n e m y to be 90,000 strong, c o m b i n e d from
t h r e e army-corps (this is correct, t h e 3d, 4th and 5th,) and to be c o m m a n d e d
by the G r a n d D u k e Constantine. This latter s t a t e m e n t is evidently a m i s t a k e ,
as Constantine is notoriously c o m m a n d i n g the fleet, t r o o p s a n d c o a s t defenses in Finland. T h e r e p o r t of an intended r e n e w a l of the attack on t h e
following day was not confirmed by the event. T h e R u s s i a n s w e r e u n d e r
a r m s , b u t did not a p p r o a c h the fort. We a r e , t h e n , again without n e w s of w h a t
h a p p e n e d u p t o t h e 26th; b u t a t d a y b r e a k o n t h e 27th the Russians assaulted
the A r a b Tabiassi again with v e r y considerable f o r c e s . T h r e e times w a s t h e
assault r e n e w e d , and t h r e e times the assailants w e r e repulsed with i m m e n s e
loss. T h e T u r k i s h r e p o r t s speak of 1,500 killed, a n d 3,000 w o u n d e d R u s s i a n s ,
w h i c h m a y be a little exaggerated, b u t is not m u c h b e y o n d probability.
D e t e r m i n e d to take the fort, à la S u w a r o w , t h e n e x t morning Pashkiewitch
h a d his columns again r e a d y for t h e attack. T h e m a s s a c r e a p p e a r s to h a v e
b e e n fearful; Gen. Selvan w a s killed. Col. C o u n t Orloff, Jr., w a s shot in t h e
e y e a n d died afterward. A n o t h e r colonel w a s severely w o u n d e d . T h e R u s -
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sians themselves admit a loss of 186 dead a n d 379 w o u n d e d ; b u t this is
evidently not one-third of w h a t t h e y must h a v e lost; with t h e m a s s e s t h e y
b r o u g h t to the attack, a loss of 2,000 is the least t h e y c a n h a v e suffered.
In the night following the T u r k s m a d e a sortie in m a s s , fell suddenly into
the R u s s i a n lines and drove the Russians b a c k with great loss (1,500 to 1,800,
as t h e r e p o r t s go.) This successful sally, and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e that on t h e
last assault the t r o o p s could not be brought up too close, although t h e cavalry
w a s e m p l o y e d in driving t h e m up and cutting off their retreat, m a d e Prince
Pashkiewitch resign the attempt t o c a r r y the place w i t h t h e b a y o n e t . T h e r e
is no d o u b t t h a t t h e defense of this r e d o u b t is o n e of t h e m o s t glorious feats
of a r m s , not only in this, b u t e v e n in all the R u s s o - T u r k i s h campaigns. T h e
g r o u n d admitted of an attack by very large n u m b e r s , and t h e Russians are
n o t the m e n to omit sending as m a n y t h o u s a n d s to a storm as they possibly
can. The-superiority of n u m b e r s on their p a r t must, t h e r e f o r e , h a v e b e e n v e r y
great, and required n o t only brilliant gallantry, b u t also well p l a n n e d and
harmoniously e x e c u t e d sally operations on t h e part of t h e T u r k s to repulse
it. T h e r e is hardly a d o u b t t h a t against the T u r k s of 1829 t h e R u s s i a n s w o u l d
h a v e carried t h e place. Their p r e s e n t r e p e a t e d defeat s h o w s that t h e T u r k s ,
at least p a r t of t h e m , h a v e improved in tactical proficiency and military
science, without losing any of their b r a v e r y . In this r e s p e c t t h e defense of
A r a b Tabiassi a n d t h e engagement of T s h e t a t e are t h e m o s t r e m a r k a b l e
affairs of t h e campaign.
As to the R u s s i a n attack, we c a n n o t say m u c h good of it. Pashkiewitch
a p p e a r s to be in such a hurry to t a k e Silistria t h a t he h a s n o t e v e n time for
m e a s u r e s the m o s t indispensable to effect his object. H i s irresolution is
plainly b e t r a y e d . First he tried a b o m b a r d m e n t , t h o u g h he might h a v e k n o w n
h o w useless that is against a Turkish t o w n . A b o m b a r d m e n t c a n lead to
nothing b u t a great loss of a m m u n i t i o n to t h e R u s s i a n s , with p e r h a p s a b r e a c h
in t h e wall on t h e river front, w h e r e the vicinity of the D a n u b e , a natural ditch
of 1,000 y a r d s w i d e , p r e v e n t s all idea of a storm. T h e n t h e land front is
a t t a c k e d , b u t the fire of A r a b Tabiassi a p p e a r s n e v e r to h a v e b e e n silenced
nor any serious a t t e m p t m a d e to ruin its defenses. All t h a t is t o o circumstantial for a successor of S u w a r o w . As said that arch-Russian general, " T h e
bullet is a foolish girl, the b a y o n e t is a b r a v e fellow," a n d if this is t r u e with
regard to the R u s s i a n b a y o n e t , which, according to t h e same gallant authority, pierces t h r o u g h the Alps, it is certainly still m o r e t r u e w i t h regard
to Russian bullets, which h a v e an invariable and irresistible t e n d e n c y to
deviation. So the storm is ordered, e x e c u t e d , r e p e a t e d , and again r e p e a t e d ,
in vain. It a p p e a r s that the e a r t h e n parapets of a small but strongly built
T u r k i s h fort are h a r d e r t h a n t h e Alpine granite, against w h i c h S u w a r o w
fought, a n d that t h e balls and bullets of the T u r k s are n o t so foolish as those
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of t h e Russians. After all, Pashkiewitch will h a v e to r e t u r n to the old m a x i m :
N e v e r storm a w o r k before silencing its fire and ruining its defenses. T h u s ,
a b o u t t h e 30th or 31st of M a y the regular siege begins, and Pashkiewitch at
last has r e c o u r s e to the "foolish bullet."
B u t , n o ! this e v e n is a m e r e show. H e r e is Gen. Schilder of 1829 notoriety,
w h o promises to bring d o w n the p l a c e with his eternal mines; and in a few
d a y s too. Mines against a field-work are the last expression of military
despair, of ignorant rage brought to b a y . If mines are to be employed, t h e n ,
in order to be able to w o r k t h e m w i t h effect, t h e primary condition is t h a t
t h e glacis be crowned. Before t h e glacis c a n be c r o w n e d , t h e e n e m y ' s fire
m u s t be silenced; that is, o n e , t w o , t h r e e parallels laid, with all their r e spective batteries. In fact, mines are the concluding operation of a siege, n o t
its beginning. U n l e s s Schilder p r o p o s e s to u n d e r m i n e some t w e n t y square
miles of ground, or lay a tunnel u n d e r t h e D a n u b e , he c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e
necessity of a regular siege. In spite of S u w a r o w , t h e bullets are indispensable.
N o w , a regular siege against A r a b Tabiassi might be certainly c o n c l u d e d
in a very few d a y s , as the w o r k h a s almost completely fulfilled its p u r p o s e
a n d a prolonged defense would w e a k e n the garrison too m u c h . B u t this would
be a regular siege against at least t w o forts, a n d t h e n a n o t h e r against the t o w n .
F i v e w e e k s is certainly the v e r y shortest time in w h i c h the Russians c a n
c o m p l e t e this, slovenly as t h e y are in siege o p e r a t i o n s . If, t h e n , t h e T u r k s
should h a v e plenty of provisions and ammunition, and no unforeseen a c cidents should occur, t h e fortress may be c o n s i d e r e d as safe up to t h e
beginning of July. We s u p p o s e , of c o u r s e , that the forts are of an average
strength and that t h e walls are not t o o m u c h out of repair. But if Silistria stood
35 days of o p e n e d t r e n c h e s in 1829, surely with t h e new additions, with a
b r a v e and intelligent c o m m a n d e r , an e x p e r i e n c e d director of artillery, a n d
a first-rate garrison, it will be able to stand at least as long in 1854. If it w e r e
possible to rely on t h e allies, we might safely say, therefore, that t h e c a m paign m u s t p r o v e a total failure for the R u s s i a n s , if not a great deal w o r s e .
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Karl Marx/F ri ed ri eh Engels
State of the Russian War
Nr.4125, 8.Juli 1854
State of the Russian War.
O u r E u r o p e a n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e and files of journals r e c e i v e d last evening by
t h e arrival of t h e A m e r i c a ' s mail, fully confirm t h e r e p o r t e d expulsion of t h e
R u s s i a n s from their t r e n c h e s before Silistria and their s u b s e q u e n t w i t h d r a w a l
from Wallachia b a c k to t h e line of the Sereth. We l e a r n also t h a t t h e r e is no
d o u b t of the immediate entrance of the Austrians into t h e e v a c u a t e d province
of Wallachia, u n d e r the treaty concluded at Constantinople on t h e 14th
ult.—an e v e n t u n d e r t h e circumstances of no small value to the Czar, b r o u g h t
a b o u t t o o , as we learn, u n d e r the immediate direction of Prince Metternich,
w h o , in fact, again controls the foreign policy of the H a p s b u r g s .
B e s i d e s the curious coincidence of t h e Russians evacuating a n d of the
Austrians occupying Wallachia, t h e v e r y m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e siege of
Silistria w a s u n d e r t a k e n , carried o n , a n d finally a b a n d o n e d , indicates that
agencies w e r e at w o r k altogether distinct from m e r e military considerations.
F r o m t h e official R u s s i a n report, w h i c h c o m e s d o w n to t h e night of M a y 28,
a n d w h i c h differs from the Turkish bulletins only with regard to t h e respective n u m b e r s of killed and w o u n d e d , it a p p e a r s t h a t the operations w e r e
of a strangely precipitate c h a r a c t e r ; t h a t t h e r u d e s t efforts to dismount t h e
o u t w o r k s w e r e not m a d e until the impossibility of taking t h e place by storm
w a s practically ascertained, and that t h e a t t a c k w a s m o r e wild a n d unscientific t h a n any k n o w n e v e n in the annals of R u s s i a n sieges. As to the
o p e r a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e 28th of M a y and t h e 15th of J u n e , t h e r e p o r t s which
we h a v e received are yet too fragmentary to allow of a detailed description;
t h e fact, h o w e v e r , t h a t during the r e p e a t e d d e s p e r a t e assaults, nearly all t h e
c o m m a n d i n g officers w e r e w o u n d e d a n d disabled—Pashkiewitch, Schilder,
w h o s e leg has since b e e n a m p u t a t e d , Gorchakoff, L ü d e r s a n d Orloff w h o
w a s s h o t t h r o u g h the e y e , clearly p r o v e s t h a t the R u s s i a n s w e r e u n d e r o r d e r s ,
n o t merely to t a k e the place at any cost, b u t to t a k e it within a certain fixed
t i m e . I n d e e d the w h o l e w a s c o n d u c t e d on their p a r t in a m a n n e r w h i c h
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r e m i n d s us m o r e of t h e b a r b a r i a n m e t h o d of carrying t h e cities of K o o r d i s t a n
by T i m o u r T a m e r l a n e , t h a n of the proceedings of regular m o d e r n w a r f a r e .
On t h e other h a n d , it is evident t h a t t h e heroic a n d able defense of Silistria
c r e a t e d equal surprise with t h e allied p o w e r s a n d t h e O t t o m a n Divan. O u r
r e a d e r s m a y r e m e m b e r t h a t a b o u t six w e e k s ago t h e allied c o m m a n d e r s m e t
at V a r n a , t h a t they discovered that t h e B a l k a n line f o r m e d the natural defense
of T u r k e y , and t h a t n o w m a n y of t h e British journals not only confess, b u t
glory in t h e avowal, t h a t Silistria w a s n o t relieved by a single F r e n c h or
English soldier. L a s t l y , it c a n n o t be denied that Silistria w a s a point of great
military i m p o r t a n c e , that t h e fate of this fortress decides t h e fate of t h e
campaign, a n d that with the a b a n d o n m e n t of its siege and t h e s u d d e n r e t r e a t
of t h e Russians u p o n t h e Sereth, t h e w h o l e of t h e R u s s i a n c o n q u e s t s of
territory m a d e this y e a r as well as the last are lost.
Still it m u s t be said that our English c o t e m p o r a r i e s , m a n y of t h e m , greatly
exaggerate t h e extent of t h e p r e s e n t M u s c o v i t e r e v e r s e s . It certainly requires
a high degree of credulity to believe that t h e sortie m a d e by t h e garrison of
Silistria on J u n e 13, and the succor of 2,000 m e n t h e y are said to h a v e received
from O m e r Pasha, resulted in the total defeat of the R u s s i a n s , a n d forced
90,000 to 100,000 m e n to fly before 15,000. T h e s u d d e n retreat of the Russians
is, so far as we c a n judge, quite as m y s t e r i o u s as their s u d d e n attack. It is
only to be explained by a previous u n d e r s t a n d i n g with Austria, involving t h e
o c c u p a t i o n of Wallachia by A u s t r i a n t r o o p s . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the
following p a s s a g e w h i c h we find in a letter of The Morning Chronicle's
Constantinople c o r r e s p o n d e n t , revealing this plot on J u n e 10, as early as f o u r
d a y s before the conclusion of t h e Austro-Turkish treaty, is of a peculiarly
interesting c h a r a c t e r :
" T h e T u r k s think t h a t diplomacy is playing w i t h t h e m , and that it is their
intention to allow Silistria to fall into t h e h a n d s of Russia. T h e s e suspicions
receive confirmation from the n e w s that has b e e n received h e r e of t h e
preparation of a new protocol at Vienna, in w h i c h t h e fall of Silistria i s , I
l e a r n , s p o k e n of as if it were accomplished; a n d , the military honor of Russia
being satisfied, Austria would c o n s i d e r t h e t i m e to h a v e arrived for h e r a r m e d
intervention to bring a b o u t an a r r a n g e m e n t by t h e m e a n s of her co-opera-
tion—occupying the Danubian Principalities, which would be evacuated by
the armies of Russia."
A c c o r d i n g to this, if t h e Russians h a d t a k e n Silistria in d u e time, all w o u l d
h a v e b e e n right. B u t t h o u g h t h e y did not s u c c e e d in satisfying t h e military
h o n o r of the Czar, they m u s t , according to t h e c o m p r o m i s e with Austria, b e a t
b a c k in a s o m e w h a t inglorious m a n n e r . T h e R u s s i a n s receding behind t h e
40 S e r e t h , the Austrians a d v a n c e to the S e r e t h a n d D a n u b e , and t h u s place
t h e m s e l v e s b e t w e e n t h e Muscovites and t h e T u r k s a n d their allies. In this
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position t h e y are arbiters of t h e quarrel, preventing b o t h parties from moving
forward. T h e R u s s i a n s r e m a i n in Moldavia, while t h e V i e n n a C o n f e r e n c e will
be m o r e t h a n e v e r b u s y itself with protocols, a n d t h u s the winter will be
gained. If t h e Conferences e n d in nothing—a result w h i c h is sure since t h e
E m p e r o r of R u s s i a has got the m o n e y on his n e w loan of $37,000,000 from
H o p e & C o . of Amsterdam—the position of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y behind t h e
D a n u b e and the Sereth will be twice as strong as w a s its line b e t w e e n
B u c h a r e s t and Kustendje. Besides, if we look at t h e relative strength of t h e
R u s s i a n s before Silistria and in Bulgaria, n o w on their r e t r e a t b e h i n d the
S e r e t h , a n d of t h e allied armies as far as t h e y c a n , t h a n k s to their ingenious
a r r a n g e m e n t s , be t h r o w n at all into the b a l a n c e , it is plainly s e e n that, with
e v e n t h e b e s t intentions, t h e latter would not be c a p a b l e of baffling this
combination of Austria with Russia.
T h e Russian forces employed against T u r k e y and the allies on the E u r o p e a n shores of the Black S e a a m o u n t to thirteen divisions of infantry, t h r e e
of the third, t h r e e of the fourth, o n e of the fifth, t h r e e of t h e sixth a r m y c o r p s ,
and t h r e e r e s e r v e divisions. Besides t h e s e , t h e third, fourth, fifth and sixth
divisions of light cavalry, and the third, fourth a n d fifth divisions of artillery.
T h e s e t r o o p s , making up nearly one-half of t h e grand a r m y of o p e r a t i o n s ,
should a m o u n t , according to the official s t a t e m e n t s , to 16,000 m e n per division of infantry, 5,000 per division of cavalry, a n d 160 g u n s per division of
artillery; altogether something like 250,000 to 260,000 m e n , inclusive of train
a n d c a m p followers. But, if we m e a s u r e t h e strength of a Russian a r m y by
w h a t it actually w a s in the Hungarian w a r , we c a n n o t estimate a division of
R u s s i a n infantry at more t h a n 13,000 to 14,000 m e n , a n d t h e cavalry and
artillery m u s t be r e d u c e d in proportion. T h e actual f o r c e s , t h e n , w h i c h the
R u s s i a n s h a v e successively m a r c h e d into t h e Principalities w o u l d b e r e d u c e d
to a b o u t 210,000 m e n , and e v e n from this n u m b e r m u s t be d e d u c t e d , on
a c c o u n t of loss in battle and by sickness, at least 20,000 to 25,000 m o r e .
Recollecting t h e ravages m a d e by the marsh-fever in t h e r a n k s of the R u s s i a n
a r m y during 1828-29, and comparing t h e letters of a R u s s i a n surgeon in t h e
V i e n n a Medical Journal, we c a n n o t consider a loss of from eight to t e n p e r
cent, u p o n t h e total of t h e a r m y as exaggerated. T h u s a b o u t 180,000 Russians
are left as the disposable n u m b e r of their a r m y .
It is interesting to learn w h a t portion of this force c a n h a v e b e e n e m p l o y e d
in t h e operations against Silistria. A large b o d y of t r o o p s w a s required to
guard the communications and magazines established in the rear of the line
of battle. B u c h a r e s t a n d t h e line of t h e D o b r o d j a h a d to be occupied. D e t a c h m e n t s w e r e indispensable to cover the flanks, a n d partly the front of t h e
a r m y ; a n d if we d e d u c t 60,000 m e n for t h e s e various duties we obtain a net
result of 130,000 m e n available for the siege of Silistria a n d the covering of
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t h a t operation. This i s rather a b o v e t h a n b e l o w t h e mark. N o w t h e position
of Silistria on a large river m a d e it u n a v o i d a b l e t h a t the besieging a r m y should
divide itself, with a v i e w to inclose t h e f o r t r e s s from all sides. It further
necessitated the establishment of strong r e s e r v e s on the n o r t h e r n b a n k , in
5 order to receive t h e t r o o p s p u s h e d f o r w a r d from t h e s o u t h e r n b a n k in c a s e
of a defeat. Finally t h e s e t r o o p s o c c u p y i n g t h e s o u t h e r n or right b a n k h a d
to divide t h e m s e l v e s again into a double a r m y , t h e o n e to c a r r y on t h e siege
a n d to repel any sallies of the besieged, t h e o t h e r to c o v e r the siege a n d defeat
a n y a r m y marching to t h e relief of t h e fortress. A b o u t 35,000 to 40,000 m e n
10 w e r e required to o c c u p y the left b a n k a n d c a r r y on t h e siege on t h e right.
T h u s an a r m y of 80,000 R u s s i a n s w o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d available for active
field-operations against a relieving a r m y , a n d this w a s the u t m o s t the R u s sians could bring to battle on Bulgarian g r o u n d within from ten to t w e n t y
miles of Silistria.
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N o w let us see w h a t force t h e allies h a v e to o p p o s e to the 180,000 R u s s i a n
total at this moment. T h e T u r k i s h a r m y at S h u m l a w a s stated, s o m e t i m e ago,
to be a b o u t 80,000 strong, b u t short of everything required for action in t h e
o p e n field, and is, according to t h e latest r e p o r t of L o r d Raglan a n d F r e n c h
staff officers, badly officered, altogether in a condition w h i c h peremptorily
forbids offensive operations. It is neither o u r p u r p o s e n o r within o u r p r e s e n t
m e a n s to d e t e r m i n e the accuracy of this r e p o r t . Suffice it to say t h a t such
is the c h a r a c t e r of t h e T u r k i s h main a r m y in t h e official opinion of its allies.
Since then the troops from Kalafat h a v e b e e n d r a w n to R u s t c h u k , w h e r e a
c a m p of 40,000 m e n is said to be establishing. It w o u l d be difficult to c o n c e i v e
the policy of thus rendering idle a corps of s u c h strength, which, if it h a d
m a r c h e d u p o n B u c h a r e s t instead of R u s t c h u k , might h a v e compelled t h e
Russians to raise immediately the i n v e s t m e n t of Silistria, b u t for the c o n d u c t
of t h e war being entirely in t h e h a n d s of diplomacy. Setting apart t h e p r e s e n t
garrison at R u s t c h u k a n d the garrison and r e s e r v e at Shumla, it m a y well be
d o u b t e d w h e t h e r the T u r k s c a n muster 50,000 m e n in the o p e n field in a
condition fit for the w o r k before t h e m . An A n g l o - F r e n c h soldier being equal,
in t h e estimation of w e s t e r n military authorities, to at least t w o R u s s i a n s ,
t h e r e would still be required a force of 65,000 allies to balance the strength
of t h e Russian a r m y of occupation. U n l e s s , t h e r e f o r e , t h e y c a n muster t h a t
force at V a r n a t h e y w o u l d hardly go to battle, t h e case of e x t r e m e necessity
excepted.
T h e y h a v e h o w e v e r b e e n m o s t careful n o t to d r o p at o n c e into the field
in s u c h force as would leave no further p r e t e x t for abstaining from active
o p e r a t i o n s . T h e whole A n g l o - F r e n c h force n o w i n T u r k e y d o e s n o t a m o u n t
to m o r e t h a n 80,000 m e n , b e s i d e s from 15,000 to 20,000 m o r e n o w on their
w a y thither, including almost the entire cavalry and artillery. T h e a m o u n t
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of t r a n s p o r t s at h a n d in the B o s p h o r u s is, w h e t h e r intentionally or not, v e r y
limited, so t h a t it w o u l d t a k e m a n y a j o u r n e y t h e r e a n d b a c k , if t h e y w e r e
t o b e t r a n s p o r t e d t o V a r n a b y sea alone. B u t , " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e latest a n d
m o s t a c c u r a t e accounts"—says the c o r r e s p o n d e n t w e h a v e already quoted—
" t h e r e are at p r e s e n t b u t 12,000 British and F r e n c h t r o o p s w h o h a v e b e e n
t r a n s p o r t e d by sea, while t h e bulk of the F r e n c h a r m y is slowly advancing
from Gallipoli t o w a r d Constantinople and A d r i a n o p l e . " T h e r o a d s being
notoriously bad and the difficulty of victualling e x t r e m e , an a r r a n g e m e n t
w h i c h allows their famous General—St. Arnaud—to be p e r m a n e n t l y u n d e r
s t e a m b e t w e e n V a r n a and Constantinople, w h e r e we m a y be sure he d o e s
n o t lose an opportunity for turning every intrigue in t h e Divan to a solid
a d v a n t a g e for his unfathomable purse. As to the t w o British divisions still at
Scutari, w e are informed b y t h e same c o r r e s p o n d e n t t h a t " t h e y d o n o t s e e m
r e a d y to start yet, though there is a whole fleet of t r a n s p o r t s and s t e a m e r s
at anchor, waiting to e m b a r k t h e m . "
F r o m all t h e s e facts it is sufficiently clear to e v e r y b o d y that the allied
p o w e r s h a v e t a k e n full care n o t to be in a state to frustrate directly t h e p r e s e n t
a r r a n g e m e n t b e t w e e n R u s s i a and Austria. F o r , if it w e r e intended to p u r s u e
t h a t object, a v e r y simple alternative for doing so offers itself either by an
Anglo-Swedish alliance in the Baltic, w h i c h w o u l d give a basis of operations
for auxiliary t r o o p s by facilitating an invasion of Finland a n d a turning on
the land-side of the fortresses of S w e a b o r g and C r o n s t a d t ; or by a c o m b i n e d
a t t a c k by sea a n d land on t h e Crimea a n d Sevastopol. W i t h regard to t h e first
supposition, it is amusing to see h o w The London Times w h i c h , n o t t h r e e
w e e k s b e f o r e p r e a c h e d t h e necessity of sending t h e B l a c k S e a s q u a d r o n to
t h e Baltic, n o w r e c o m m e n d s a simple b l o c k a d e of t h e h a r b o r s of t h e Baltic
a n d an immediate r e t u r n of the greater portion of t h e Baltic fleet to t h e Black
S e a , w h e r e it suddenly a d v o c a t e s the o c c u p a t i o n of the Crimea. This is the
s a m e journal which affected t o regret t h a t nothing could b e u n d e r t a k e n b y
N a p i e r before t h e F r e n c h fleet should h a v e joined him. N o w t h a t it h a s d o n e
so, it is supposed t h a t nothing will be d o n e , after all, and t h a t b o t h t h e F r e n c h
and English fleet h a d better t a k e another e x c u r s i o n t h r o u g h the Cattegat, the
C h a n n e l , a n d t h e straits of Gibraltar r o u n d to t h e E u x i n e . Reflecting on t h e
time w h i c h the j u n c t u r e of t h e s e fleets has r e q u i r e d , a n d again on the time
which their junction with t h e forces u n d e r Admiral D u n d a s would require,
it b e c o m e s plain t h a t to do nothing either in the Baltic or in the Black S e a
is t h e great object of t h e s e propositions.
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T h e only point on which the Russians—apart from their u n f o r e s e e n and
u n e x p e c t e d defeat at Silistria—have u n d e r g o n e substantial losses a n d are
s u r r o u n d e d with d a n g e r s , is the Causasus—though this is n o t altogether 40
certain. T h e y h a d a b a n d o n e d nearly all their f o r t r e s s e s on t h e e a s t e r n shore
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of the Black Sea, n o t from any fear of the allied fleets, b u t in order to
strengthen their Georgian a r m y . On their r e t r e a t a c r o s s t h e Dariel P a s s t h e y
are stated to h a v e b e e n suddenly a t t a c k e d by a large force of m o u n t a i n e e r s ,
in t h e v a n a n d rear, to h a v e h a d their a d v a n c e d guard cut to pieces, while
their center and r e a r w e r e compelled to retire w i t h severe loss. At the same
time t h e a r m y of Selim P a s h a a d v a n c e d from St. Nicholas u p o n Ussurgheti,
w h e n c e the Russians had frequently molested a n d m e n a c e d the T u r k s , a n d
n o w forced the Russians to e v a c u a t e t h a t fortress, a result by w h i c h t h e
communications b e t w e e n Selim P a s h a and t h e m a i n T u r k i s h a r m y a t K a r s ,
h a v e b e e n secured. W h e n it is recollected t h a t e v e n this a r m y w a s t h r o u g h o u t
the winter and spring in the m o s t deplorable state of inefficiency, t h e m a n e u ver of t h e Russians indicates at least t h a t t h e y felt their position in Georgia
to be no less p r e c a r i o u s , and t h a t t h e y w e r e sadly in w a n t of r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s
from t h e coast. If, n o w , this reported defeat at Dariel be t r u e or e v e n partially
so, the c o n s e q u e n c e is t h a t the a r m y of Woronzoff is cut off, and m u s t t r y
either to p r o c u r e a tenable basis at Tiflis with a view to hold out until n e x t
winter—a m a t t e r of no slight difficulty—or it m u s t a t t e m p t to m a k e its w a y
at any loss t h r o u g h t h e p a s s . This o p e r a t i o n w o u l d at all e v e n t s be preferable
to a retreat u p o n t h e Caspian Sea, t h e p a s s leading thither being of infinitely
greater danger t h a n t h a t of Dariel. On this point, h o w e v e r , we shall be b e t t e r
able to s p e a k positively on the receipt of m o r e c o m p l e t e and authentic
information from t h a t quarter. So far we m a y set d o w n Russia as having
certainly gained t w o victories by the r e c e n t operations,—one in the loan from
H o p e & Co., and one in t h e Austrian t r e a t y with t h e P o r t e ; and as having
suffered o n e defeat—that of Silistria. W h e t h e r t h e former will h a v e p e r m a n e n t advantages e n o u g h to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e disgrace of the latter, t h e
future only c a n d e c i d e .
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The Russian Retreat.
T h e r e t r o g r a d e m o v e m e n t of the Russians in T u r k e y is m u c h m o r e complete
t h a n we h a d supposed it could b e , and m o r e t h a n , e v e n in t h e w o r s t c a s e ,
n o w s e e m s n e c e s s a r y in a military point of view. It a p p e a r s t h a t the pledge
of the C z a r to t h e E m p e r o r of Austria and his o r d e r s to his Generals include
the total evacuation of Moldavia as well as Wallachia, leaving not a Russian
soldier on T u r k i s h ground, while a powerful A u s t r i a n force will instantly
c o m e f o r w a r d to t a k e their place and enforce a separation b e t w e e n the r e c e n t
c o m b a t a n t s . B u t i t would b e a n error t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s withdraw
b e c a u s e of their defeat at Silistria or to a c c e p t for t r u t h the blustering assertions of t h e English journals, which give to t h a t defeat t h e c h a r a c t e r of a rout,
and w o u l d fain m a k e the world believe that 15,000 or at the u t m o s t
17,000 m e n , sallying from the fortress, could drive a w a y 100,000 or at the
least 90,000. T h e Russians w e r e repulsed b e y o n d a d o u b t , bloodily and utterly
repulsed again and again, as their precipitate, ill c o n s i d e r e d , unscientific,
confused attacks d e s e r v e d t o b e , bravely a s t h e y w e r e e x e c u t e d ; the T u r k s
fought with heroic courage that never was s u r p a s s e d , a n d with a degree of
military skill t h a t m u s t m a k e this siege m e m o r a b l e in all history; b u t we h a v e
y e t to see any r e a s o n for believing that t h e y compelled t h e e n e m y to raise
the siege. Indeed, our best information is to the effect that the Russian
batteries on t h e left b a n k w e r e still held a n d e m p l o y e d against t h e fortress
after t h a t last m u r d e r o u s sortie, in w h i c h s o m e exaggerated d i s p a t c h e s affirm
t h a t t h e s e batteries w e r e c a p t u r e d by the garrison. T h e t r u t h evidently is t h a t
t h e R u s s i a n s finally withdrew from before Silistria simply b e c a u s e the C z a r
h a d agreed with Austria that on a certain day his t r o o p s should all be out
of the Principalities. He had ordered t h e m to t a k e Silistria b e f o r e h a n d , in
o r d e r to leave T u r k e y with the prestige of at least o n e victory; in that t h e y
failed, and had to m a r c h a w a y u n d e r the disgrace of the failure; b u t their
m a r c h w a s n o t a flight with a pursuing e n e m y in their rear. T h e y might not,
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and probably would not, h a v e b e e n able to t a k e Silistria e v e n by a regular
siege; t h e y probably could n o t h a v e gained anything from t h e campaign, a n d
in t h a t e v e n t might h a v e retired u p o n the S e r e t h ; b u t they w e r e still stronger
t h a n the allies, T u r k s and all, and, for defensive p u r p o s e s at least, far
stronger. B e s i d e s , the allies had n o t y e t b e e n b r o u g h t against t h e m , and no
decisive battle h a d b e e n fought. It is, therefore, certain t h a t this r e t r e a t to
the Pruth is dictated by diplomatic considerations, and n o t by any military
necessity growing o u t of t h e superior p o w e r or b e t t e r strategy of O m e r P a s h a
and the allies in T u r k e y .
B u t while it would be a mistake to s u p p o s e the R u s s i a n s w e r e actually
driven from b e f o r e Silistria, it would be equally a mistake n o t to see that t h e
w a r generally is going against t h e m , and t h a t the A u s t r i a n intervention offers
the b e s t m e a n s of mending their f o r t u n e s . We do n o t h e r e allude to their
successive r e v e r s e s at Oltenitza, T s h e t a t e , K a r a k a l , or Silistria, c o m paratively small affairs, in which the T u r k s b e a t t h e m , and which t h e y h a v e
n o w h e r e m a t c h e d with successes of equal brilliancy. All of these conflicts
together had no decisive or d e s p e r a t e results; b u t in Asia their g a m e has
steadily b e e n a losing o n e , and the loss n o w t h r e a t e n s to b e c o m e final. Of
their n u m e r o u s forts on t h e Black S e a only t w o r e m a i n ; while inland Shamyl
and his mountaineers h a v e n o t only freed their immediate hills and valleys
from the h a t e d Muscovite, b u t h a v e cut off the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of Prince
Woronzoff with Russia, and, acting with the T u r k s on t h e south, are marching
u p o n Tiflis with a strength which m a y possibly c o m p e l the s u r r e n d e r of t h e
Prince w i t h all the hard-got and painfully-held T r a n s c a u c a s i a n p o s s e s s i o n s
of Russia. To lose t h e s e p r o v i n c e s , which h a v e c o s t such v a s t a m o u n t s of
blood and t r e a s u r e , would b e , if possible, a greater mortification to the Czar
t h a n defeat in a pitched battle in T u r k e y ; and t h e r e is no d o u b t that, so soon
as his armies are b a c k a c r o s s the Pruth, he will at o n c e d e v o t e all the forces
he c a n spare from the defense of t h e C r i m e a and of Sevastopol, to t h e w o r k
of regaining the p a s s e s of the C a u c a s u s and relieving Woronzoff. T h e succ e s s of Shamyl h a s in all probability contributed m u c h t o w a r d t h e Russian
compliance with t h e Austrian s u m m o n s to e v a c u a t e t h e Principalities.
In this important transaction, w h i c h so changes and complicates t h e a s p e c t
of t h e war, Austria holds the p o s t of h o n o r a n d of advantage. It is a great
triumph for her diplomacy, and testifies to the r e s p e c t in w h i c h her military
r e s o u r c e s are held by all the c o n t e n d i n g parties. S h e i n t e r v e n e s as t h e friend
of b o t h sides ; the Russians go quietly o u t to m a k e r o o m for h e r ; and t h e Porte
only follows t h e advice of F r a n c e and England in signing t h e t r e a t y which
gives the Principalities to her o c c u p a t i o n . She is t h e r e , t h e n , as an armed
arbitrator intervening b e t w e e n t h e c o m b a t a n t s by their joint consent, b e c a u s e e a c h believes the intervention to be for his benefit. T h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s
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openly proclaim t h a t it is an act in their favor—and the c o n c e r t with regard
to it, which the facts p r o v e to h a v e existed b e t w e e n St. P e t e r s b u r g and
Vienna, b e f o r e it w a s k n o w n to t h e world t h a t such an e v e n t w o u l d t a k e place,
a n d b e f o r e the a r m y u n d e r Pashkiewitch had m e t w i t h t h e repulse at Silistria,
r e n d e r s it impossible to doubt t h a t Russia also regards it as an act in her favor.
W h i c h , t h e n , is the d u p e ? and to which p a r t y will A u s t r i a p r o v e treacherous?
Of c o u r s e , like e v e r y other p o w e r , A u s t r i a p u r s u e s her o w n interest alone.
T h a t interest requires o n t h e one hand t h a t R u s s i a should n o t hold t h e
Principalities and control the m o u t h s of the D a n u b e and t h e Black Sea,
b e c a u s e a large a n d increasing part of Austrian c o m m e r c e g o e s in t h a t direction. B e s i d e , for R u s s i a to a n n e x T u r k e y or any p a r t of it might b r e e d disturba n c e in t h e Slavonic tribes of t h e Austrian e m p i r e , a m o n g w h o s e m e m b e r s
Panslavism, or a union with Russia, already h a s n u m e r o u s p a r t i s a n s . It is
therefore plain that Austria never c a n c o n s e n t to the a b s o r p t i o n of T u r k e y
by Russia, unless she receives at the same time an equivalent addition of
territory and p o w e r elsewhere, which is impossible. B u t on t h e other h a n d ,
the sympathies of Austrian policy are all with the C z a r a n d o p p o s e d to F r a n c e
and E n g l a n d , and her real leanings will always be against t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s .
T h a t R u s s i a should be humiliated as a p u n i s h m e n t for making a needless w a r ,
c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as a c a u s e of mourning at V i e n n a ; b u t t h a t she should
be seriously crippled Austria will never suffer, b e c a u s e in t h a t c a s e t h e
H a p s b u r g s would be left without a friend to help t h e m o u t of t h e n e x t revolutionary slough. This brief statement a p p e a r s to us to c o m p r i s e the motives
t h a t must g o v e r n t h e V i e n n e s e Cabinet throughout t h e further d e v e l o p m e n t s
of t h e w a r . It will be t r e a c h e r o u s to either of the belligerents or to b o t h , j u s t
so far as the interest of Austria and t h e imperial d y n a s t y shall s e e m to require,
and no farther.
N o w b y the fact t h a t Russia w i t h d r a w s a n d c e a s e s from her enc r o a c h m e n t s , a n d t h a t t h e e v a c u a t e d provinces are h a n d e d over to Austria,
the latter is at o n c e enlisted to p r e v e n t any further injury being d o n e to the
former. Austria m a y remain in nominal friendship with t h e allies, b u t it is
for h e r interest t h a t they should fail in any ulterior a t t a c k s on the Czar, a n d
we m a y be sure t h a t she will do everything to m a k e t h e m fail, short of an
actual declaration of w a r , w h i c h in any case she d a r e n o t r e s o r t t o . S h e m u s t
t h e n b e t r e a c h e r o u s t o t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s ; t h e y are t h e d u p e s i n t h e t r e a t y
w h i c h allows an Austrian a r m y to o c c u p y the T u r k i s h p r o v i n c e s ; and t h a t
t h e y will in d u e time discover as the w a r goes on.
It w a s apparently t h e plan of L o r d A b e r d e e n , t h e English P r i m e Minister,
t h a t it should n o t go on, b u t t h a t t h e quarrel should n o w be settled according
to the w i s h of Austria, on the basis of the status quo, with possibly a transfer
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of t h e p r o t e c t o r a t e of t h e Principalities from R u s s i a to t h e h o u s e of H a p s burg. This plan w e m a y , h o w e v e r , n o t set d o w n a s defeated through t h e
self-exposures of L o r d A b e r d e e n ' s notorious s p e e c h , and t h e s u b s e q u e n t
d e b a t e in Parliament, of w h i c h we give a full r e p o r t in this p a p e r . T h e British
p e o p l e , excited by t h e s e revelations, will not c o n s e n t , at least n o t at present,
t o m a k e p e a c e without having for t h e e n o r m o u s s u m s the w a r costs t h e m ,
s o m e result m o r e substantial t h a n t h e m e r e r e s t o r a t i o n of things as t h e y were.
T h e y hold t h e crippling of R u s s i a to be indispensable, so that she c a n n o t s o o n
again t h u s u p s e t t h e world; and t h e y e x p e c t impatiently s o m e brilliant feat
of a r m s , such as the c a p t u r e of C r o n s t a d t or Sevastopol. W i t h o u t such a
tangible achievement to p a y for going to w a r , t h e y will n o t n o w agree to m a k e
p e a c e . This disposition of theirs will p r o b a b l y lead at o n c e to a change in
t h e ministry and to a prolongation of t h e war. B u t it by no m e a n s follows
that, b e c a u s e the w a r is prolonged, any h a r d e r blow will be struck at R u s s i a
t h a n she h a s already suffered,—except it be the c o n q u e s t of her T r a n s c a u c a sian provinces by the T u r k s and Circassians without a n y W e s t e r n h e l p . A n d ,
judging t h e m e n , w h o will probably r e m a i n in p o w e r at L o n d o n after L o r d
A b e r d e e n has retired to private life, by their acts hitherto since the beginning
of t h e war, it would be no o c c a s i o n for surprise if at some future day we
should see t h e m signing a treaty of p e a c e on the v e r y basis for favoring w h i c h
L o r d A b e r d e e n is n o w driven from office. So far Austrian diplomacy h a s
carried the day, and it is v e r y likely to win at last.
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The War—Debate in Parliament
Nr.4126, 10. Juli 1854
The War—Debate in Parliament.
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , J u n e 27, 1854.
T h e R u s s i a n Moniteur of B u c h a r e s t officially declares that, in obedience to
o r d e r s sent from St. Petersburg, t h e siege of Silistria is raised, Giurgevo
e v a c u a t e d , and the whole Russian a r m y a b o u t to r e c r o s s t h e P r u t h . The
Times, in a third edition of y e s t e r d a y , published a telegraphic dispatch from
its V i e n n a c o r r e s p o n d e n t to a similar effect, viz: t h a t " t h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a
a c c e p t s t h e Austrian s u m m o n s out of high consideration for his ancient ally,
a n d h a s ordered his t r o o p s to r e c r o s s the P r u t h . " L o r d J o h n Russell in last
night's H o u s e of C o m m o n s confirmed t h e s t a t e m e n t with regard to t h e
a b a n d o n m e n t of the siege of Silistria, b u t h a d received no official information
a b o u t t h e answer given b y Russia t o the Austrian s u m m o n s .
T h e result of t h e Austrian intervention will be to interpose a barrier
b e t w e e n t h e T u r k s and t h e Russians, to secure t h e r e t r e a t of t h e latter from
all molestation, to enable t h e m to reënforce the garrison of S e v a s t o p o l and
t h e Crimea, and p e r h a p s t o reestablish their c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with t h e a r m y
of Woronzoff. Besides the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the H o l y Alliance b e t w e e n
Russia, Austria and Prussia m u s t b e looked u p o n a s certain t h e m o m e n t t h e
allied p o w e r s refuse to acquiesce in the simple r e s t o r a t i o n of the status quo
ante bellum, with p e r h a p s some slight c o n c e s s i o n s m a d e by t h e C z a r in favor
of Austria.
T h e w h o l e fabric of this fine " s o l u t i o n , " devised, it is said, by Metternich,
is n o w , h o w e v e r , shattered to pieces by t h e indiscretion of old A b e r d e e n and
t h e intrigues of P a l m e r s t o n .
It will be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t in the late ministerial r e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e endeav o r to place L o r d P a l m e r s t o n in t h e War-Office, t h e cry for t h e establishment
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of w h i c h w a s mainly raised by the P a l m e r s t o n i a n p r e s s , h a d failed, and t h e
Peelite D u k e of N e w c a s t l e supplanted t h e noble L o r d in his c o n t e m p l a t e d
new office. This failure seems to h a v e r e m i n d e d L o r d P a l m e r s t o n t h a t it w a s
high time to b r e a k up t h e w h o l e Cabinet, and accordingly he h a s raised a
perfect storm against its chief, t h e o c c a s i o n for w h i c h w a s afforded by L o r d
A b e r d e e n ' s inconsiderate s p e e c h i n reply t o L o r d L y n d h u r s t . T h e w h o l e
English p r e s s immediately laid hold of t h a t s p e e c h . It is, h o w e v e r , i m p o r t a n t
to add, t h a t The Morning Herald d e n o u n c e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y
against L o r d A b e r d e e n before the speech w a s delivered. M r . L a y a r d r o s e
in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s on F r i d a y last, a n d g a v e notice t h a t on T h u r s d a y
n e x t he should m o v e a resolution t h a t " t h e language held by the first Minister
of t h e C r o w n w a s calculated to raise grave d o u b t s in t h e public mind as to
the objects and e n d s of the w a r , a n d to lessen t h e p r o s p e c t s of an h o n o r a b l e
a n d durable p e a c e . " T h e r e are t w o w e a k points in this resolution: firstly, its
being unconstitutional and apt to be set aside for being in contradiction to
t h e Parliamentary rule which forbids t h e criticism of a speech delivered in
the L o r d s by a m e m b e r of the C o m m o n s ; a n d , secondly, b e c a u s e it p r e t e n d s
to distinguish b e t w e e n the occasional language of the Premier and t h e whole
acts of the coalition Cabinet. N e v e r t h e l e s s , its result w a s to give such serious
a p p r e h e n s i o n s to L o r d A b e r d e e n that, t w o h o u r s after t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t
of the a b o v e resolution, he r o s e in his p l a c e and gave notice, in an unusually
excited t o n e , that " o n M o n d a y next, (thus anticipating Mr. L a y a r d b y t h r e e
days,) he should m o v e for a c o p y of the dispatch he h a d addressed to Russia,
after t h e t r e a t y of Adrianople, and t h a t he w o u l d t a k e t h e opportunity of
alluding to the misconstructions w h i c h h a d b e e n placed on the r e m a r k s he
h a d recently a d d r e s s e d to their L o r d s h i p s on t h e subject of the w a r . "
So strong w a s the belief that M r . L a y a r d ' s m o t i o n would result in the
expulsion of L o r d A b e r d e e n from t h e Cabinet, t h a t The Morning Advertiser,
for instance, has published already t h e list of the Ministry which is to succeed
him; a list including the n a m e s of L o r d J o h n Russell as Premier, and of L o r d
P a l m e r s t o n as Minister of W a r . It m a y be imagined, t h e n , t h a t the sitting of
the L o r d s of last night attracted an u n u s u a l n u m b e r of t h e curious and excited
intrigants of the aristocracy, anxious to w i t n e s s in w h a t m a n n e r L o r d A b e r d e e n w o u l d clear himself from his s o m e w h a t difficult and intricate position.
Before giving a resumé of the speech of L o r d A b e r d e e n , and of the attack
m a d e u p o n him by the Marquis of Clanricarde, I m u s t recur to t h e e p o c h
and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , to w h i c h b o t h speakers particularly referred, in t h e
year 1829, w h e n L o r d A b e r d e e n found himself at t h e head of t h e British
Foreign Office. At that time a Russian fleet u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Admiral
H e y d e n w a s blockading the D a r d a n e l l e s , t h e Gulfs of Saros and E n o s , as well
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as t h o s e of A d r a m y t i and S m y r n a , notwithstanding an a g r e e m e n t concluded
b e t w e e n t h e Cabinets of St. Petersburg a n d L o n d o n in 1815, t h a t Russia
should n o t exercise any belligerent rights in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e s e blocka d e s threatening t o injure t h e British c o m m e r c e i n t h e L e v a n t , a r o u s e d t h e
o t h e r w i s e dull opinion of the English of that time into v e h e m e n t declamations
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against R u s s i a a n d against t h e Ministry. I n t e r v i e w s , accordingly, t o o k place
b e t w e e n the R u s s i a n E m b a s s a d o r s , Prince L i e v e n and C o u n t M a t u s z e v i c h
on the o n e side, a n d Wellington and A b e r d e e n on t h e o t h e r side. In a dispatch
u n d e r d a t e of L o n d o n 1st (13th) J u n e , 1829, P r i n c e L i e v e n r e p o r t s as follows
on t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e interviews:
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" T h e c o n v e r s a t i o n with L o r d A b e r d e e n which t o o k p l a c e s o m e h o u r s later,
( t h a n t h a t with t h e D u k e of Wellington, which h a d n o t b e e n altogether very
satisfactory t o t h e R u s s i a n diplomatist) w a s n o t less r e m a r k a b l e . A s h e w a s
acquainted only imperfectly with our c o n v e r s a t i o n with t h e first Minister,
he labored, w h e n he learned the details of it, to soften t h e disagreeable 15
impressions t h a t might h a v e b e e n left u p o n us by his language at t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of it, by the reiterated a s s u r a n c e that at no period had it entered
into the intentions of England to seek a quarrel with Russia; t h a t if t h e
ministry had sought to induce us not to insist on t h e b l o c k a d e of E n o s , it
w a s in t h e full desire to prevent i m p o r t u n a t e r e c l a m a t i o n s , and to c e m e n t 20
t h e g o o d intelligence b e t w e e n the t w o c a b i n e t s , that we should have to
congratulate ourselves more than perhaps we were aware on the benefits we
received from that happy and constant concurrence. He w a s flattered t h a t
he could p l a c e t h e maintainance of t h a t h a r m o n y higher t h a n t h e m o m e n t a r y
advantages t h a t the blockade of t h e Gulf of E n o s w o u l d h a v e offered u s ; 25
b u t he feared t h a t t h e position of the English Ministry w a s n o t well understood at St. P e t e r s b u r g . T h e y attributed to m a l e v o l e n t intentions, and to
hostile v i e w s , t h e difficulties t h a t he sometimes raised, as in t h e matter t h a t
h a d j u s t b e e n t e r m i n a t e d , while these intentions and t h e s e arrières pensées
w e r e v e r y far from his spirit and from his policy. B u t , on t h e other h a n d , 30
he found himself in a delicate situation. Public opinion w a s always ready to
b u r s t forth against Russia. The British Government could not constantly
brave it, and it would be d a n g e r o u s to excite it on q u e s t i o n s (of maritime
l a w ) t h a t t o u c h e d so nearly t h e national prejudices. On t h e o t h e r side, we
could r e c k o n u p o n the well-disposed and friendly dispositions of the English 35
Ministry which struggled against them ( t h e national p r e j u d i c e s . )
I k n o w , I replied, the weight of public opinion in E n g l a n d , and I h a v e seen
it c h a n g e in a few d a y s . It is against us in our w a r b e c a u s e it thinks us
aggressors, while w e h a v e b e e n a t t a c k e d ; b e c a u s e i t i m p u t e s t o u s the idea
of o v e r t h r o w i n g t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , while we declare t h a t such is n o t our 40
o b j e c t ; b e c a u s e , finally, it believes t h a t we p u r s u e an ambitious policy against
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w h i c h we ourselves protest.
w a y to c o r r e c t it.
L o r d A b e r d e e n replied to
sented; public opinion w a s
5 England it t o o k w i t h ardor
To enlighten it on this pointwould be t h e surest
me t h a t t h e m a t t e r w a s n o t exactly as I r e p r e p r o n o u n c e d against u s , b e c a u s e generally in
the side of the Whigs—but au reste, the British
Cabinet was far from not wishing us success; on t h e c o n t r a r y , it wished us
success, prompt and decisive, b e c a u s e it k n e w t h a t it w a s t h e only m e a n s
of terminating t h e w a r , which could n o t be regarded e x c e p t as a great misf o r t u n e , since it w a s impossible to foresee its r e s u l t s ! In conclusion, the
10 English Minister entered into long d e d u c t i o n s to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t we lent
to him intentions that he could n o t h a v e , and e n d e d by saying t h a t the Cabinet
of L o n d o n desired t h a t t h e war should be terminated to the honor and
advantage
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of Russia."
It is strange that n o n e of the o p p o n e n t s of L o r d A b e r d e e n have t h o u g h t
p r o p e r to r e c u r to this dispatch, so conclusive against his c o n d u c t at t h e time
before the treaty of Adrianople, that it would h a v e b e e n impossible to attach
any i m p o r t a n c e to anything contained in a secret dispatch of his L o r d s h i p ,
written after the conclusion of that treaty. T h e production of t h e a b o v e
dispatch would h a v e demolished at o n e stroke t h e only a r g u m e n t of defense
w h i c h Lord A b e r d e e n could bring forward in his speech of yesterday. H i s
true defense would h a v e b e e n an o p e n recrimination against L o r d Palmerston, since the whole " r o w " w a s exclusively b e t w e e n these two old rival
servants of Russia.
L o r d A b e r d e e n b e g a n by saying t h a t he had nothing either to r e t r a c t or
to contradict, b u t only to " e x p l a i n . " He h a d b e e n falsely accused of having
claimed the honor of having framed the treaty of Adrianople. Instead of
having framed it, he h a d p r o t e s t e d against it, as their lordships would see
from the dispatch for the production of w h i c h he n o w m a d e a motion. Such
h a d b e e n t h e alarm p r o d u c e d on his mind, a n d on his colleagues' mind, by
t h a t treaty, t h a t the w h o l e policy of the G o v e r n m e n t had b e e n changed in
a m o s t material point in c o n s e q u e n c e of its existence. Which w a s this change
of policy? Before the treaty of Adrianople w a s signed, h e , L o r d A b e r d e e n
a n d the D u k e of Wellington, therein following t h e policy of Canning, h a d
n e v e r contemplated constituting G r e e c e an i n d e p e n d e n t kingdom, b u t only
as a vassal state u n d e r t h e suzeraineté of t h e P o r t e , s o m e w h a t similar to
Wallachia and Moldavia. After the treaty of Adrianople had b e e n signed, t h e
condition of t h e Turkish E m p i r e a p p e a r e d to t h e m so perilous, and its existe n c e so p r e c a r i o u s , that t h e y p r o p o s e d to c o n v e r t G r e e c e from a vassal state
into an i n d e p e n d e n t kingdom. In other w o r d s , it w a s resolved, since t h e treaty
of Adrianople did so m u c h to w e a k e n T u r k e y , to c o u n t e r a c t its perilous
c o n s e q u e n c e s by dismembering whole p r o v i n c e s from it. This w a s t h e
"change."
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A l t h o u g h their alarm for the c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h a t t r e a t y h a d b e e n exaggerated, L o r d A b e r d e e n w a s far from not considering it as in t h e highest degree
disastrous and prejudicial. He had said t h a t " R u s s i a had n o t acquired great
territorial acquisitions b y t h a t t r e a t y , " a n d e v e n n o w h e c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e
R u s s i a n empire had not greatly increased in E u r o p e within the last fifty y e a r s ,
as L o r d L y n d h u r s t h a d asserted (Bessarabia, Finland, and t h e kingdom of
Poland, a p p e a r not to be any significant acquisitions in the view of the noble
lord.) B u t , as he h a d stated in his dispatch of D e c e m b e r , 1829, if t h e territorial
acquisitions of R u s s i a had b e e n small, t h e y h a d b e e n i m p o r t a n t in their
character—the o n e giving Russia "exclusive authority o v e r t h e navigation of
the D a n u b e , and the other ports in Asia w h i c h , t h o u g h small in extent, yet
h a d t h e c h a r a c t e r of high political i m p o r t a n c e . " (The v a s t territory acquired
in t h e C a u c a s u s is again n o t p r e s e n t to L o r d A b e r d e e n ' s mind.) Starting from
this point of view, he asserts that t h e t r e a t y of Adrianople w a s t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of a change of policy on the p a r t of Russia, w h i c h , since the time
of t h a t treaty, h a d looked to an extension of political influence rather t h a n
to the acquisition of territory. This change of policy h a d n o t b e e n a change
of intention. " S a t a n h a d only g r o w n wiser t h a n in d a y s of y o r e . " T h e fact
that R u s s i a c o n c e r t e d a plan with Charles X for the acquisition of Turkey—
not t h r o u g h alarming c o n q u e s t s , b u t t h r o u g h a series of treaties—is p a s s e d
over in silence. N o r did L o r d A b e r d e e n think fit to m e n t i o n t h a t e v e n before
t h e t r e a t y of Adrianople and t h e t r e a t y of U n k i a r Skelessi, which he quotes
in proof of the change in Russian policy, R u s s i a h a d b o u n d herself to F r a n c e
and England already, in 1827, not to seek to derive any further territory from
the w a r against T u r k e y , and that, b u t for the permission of England, she
would n e v e r h a v e b e e n able to a d v a n c e an a r m y u p o n Constantinople in
1833.
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L o r d A b e r d e e n n e x t stated that his e x p r e s s i o n t h a t "if we could obtain
a p e a c e which should last twenty-five y e a r s , as h a d b e e n t h e c a s e by the
treaty of Adrianople, we should n o t h a v e d o n e a m i s s , " h a d b e e n falsely 30
c o n s t r u e d into t h e meaning t h a t he would r e t u r n to a t r e a t y similar to t h a t
of Adrianople. He had only m e a n t to say t h a t "if by a n y t r e a t y w h i c h the
fortune of w a r might enable t h e m to m a k e , t h e y could secure a p e a c e for
twenty-five y e a r s , considering t h e instability of h u m a n affairs t h e y would
n o t h a v e d o n e a m i s s . He had never recommended a return to the status quo,
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nor did he n o t o b j e c t to t h e status quo. Before t h e declaration of w a r t h e
status quo h a d b e e n all they h o p e d for or desired, and all t h a t t h e y a t t e m p t e d
to attain, and it w a s that which the T u r k i s h G o v e r n m e n t c o n s e n t e d to give,
and it w a s m u c h m o r e t h a n t h e y h a d a right to expect. B u t , from t h e instant
w a r h a d b e e n declared, the whole question w a s changed entirely, and e v e r y - 40
thing d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e w a r itself . . . H o w far t h e y might ultimately deviate
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from the status quo no m a n could say, as it d e p e n d e d on e v e n t s n o t in their
p o w e r absolutely to control. This he w o u l d say, t h a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e and
integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t be secured, effectually s e c u r e d . " H o w
it is to be secured L o r d A b e r d e e n could n o t say, as this, again, d e p e n d e d on
the e v e n t s of the w a r .
He h a d b e e n u n d e r s t o o d to e x p r e s s s o m e d o u b t or disbelief as to the danger
of R u s s i a n aggression, b u t , in fact, he h a d t h e greatest alarm at R u s s i a n
aggression on T u r k e y , although he did n o t feel great alarm w i t h r e s p e c t to
t h e danger of Russian aggression on E u r o p e , a n d " h e w a s inclined to feel less
so e v e r y d a y . " He considered F r a n c e m o r e powerful t h a n Russia and Austria
p u t together. T h e noble L o r d t h e n complained of t h e " e x t r a o r d i n a r y a b surdity and malignity of the p e r s o n a l imputations to w h i c h he h a d b e e n
e x p o s e d . " I t w a s t r u e t h a t t h e r e w a s n o greater p e a c e m o n g e r i n the c o u n t r y
t h a n himself, b u t his v e r y love of p e a c e peculiarly fitted him to carry on t h e
w a r in the most vigorous manner.
" H i s colleagues would admit t h a t h e personally h a d b e e n m o r e u r g e n t t h a n
p e r h a p s any other m a n in exhorting a s p e e d y a d v a n c e a n d concentration of
the allied forces b e y o n d the B a l k a n s , in o r d e r to support the gallant a r m y
of O m e r P a s h a , a n d to e x t e n d a h a n d to Austria, in order to enable her to
take a m o r e active p a r t in the o p e r a t i o n s of the w a r . " This w a s the c o u r s e
he invariably urged. On t h e interpellation of L o r d B e a u m o n t , he declared
that "intimate as he formerly w a s with Prince M e t t e r n i c h , since he h a d b e e n
in office, for the last eighteen m o n t h s , he h a d n o t c o m m u n i c a t e d with him,
directly or indirectly, until a few d a y s ago, w h e n a friend told him she w a s
a b o u t to write to Metternich, and a s k e d him w h e t h e r he h a d anything to say
t o t h e P r i n c e ; w h e r e u p o n h e said: ' P r a y , m a k e m y b e s t r e m e m b r a n c e s t o
him.'"
A b e r d e e n ' s s p e e c h w a s , o n the w h o l e , favorably received b y the H o u s e ;
b u t it is a curious fact t h a t t h e acrimonious a n s w e r t h a t he m e t with from
the Marquis of Clanricarde—a disappointed place-hunter, a n d L o r d Palmerston's old E m b a s s a d o r at St. Petersburg—was n o t replied to by any m e m b e r
of the Cabinet, and t h a t n o n e of t h e m c a m e f o r w a r d to certify to his having
b e e n t h e foremost in urging a vigorous war.
T h e M a r q u i s of Clanricarde principally dwelt u p o n A b e r d e e n ' s participation in the t r e a t y of Adrianople; the general c h a r a c t e r of his political past,
and on the shortcomings of his p r e s e n t administration. He said t h a t L o r d
A b e r d e e n h a d p r o d u c e d n o w , for his o w n p e r s o n a l c o n v e n i e n c e a n d from
a m e r e l y personal m o t i v e , a dispatch w h i c h he h a d s o m e m o n t h s ago refused
to other m e m b e r s of either H o u s e . It w a s , h o w e v e r , quite different from w h a t
t h e noble L o r d h a d written to St. P e t e r s b u r g in D e c e m b e r , 1829, w h e n t h e
t r e a t y of Adrianople h a d b e e n signed in S e p t e m b e r . T h e real question w a s
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w h a t instructions he had given to their E m b a s s a d o r at t h a t t i m e , and w h a t
steps he h a d t a k e n to prevent the signing of t h e t r e a t y . T h e Russian General
c o m m a n d i n g at Adrianople had not h a d a b o v e 15,000 m e n , and t h a t a m o u n t
h a d to be diminished by some 5,000 or 6,000, w h o , either from disease or
w o u n d s , w e r e literally hors de combat. T h e T u r k i s h G e n e r a l , on t h e o t h e r
5
h a n d , w a s within a short distance with 25,000 Albanians. T h e Russian
G e n e r a l gave a v e r y short respite to T u r k e y to sign or n o t to sign, for he k n e w
t h a t his real position might be discovered if he g a v e a l o n g o n e . C o n s e q u e n t l y
he did n o t give b e y o n d five or eight d a y s . At Constantinople the Minister
of T u r k e y s u m m o n e d to his council the F r e n c h a n d English E m b a s s a d o r s and
1o
the P r u s s i a n Minister, and asked for their advice. T h e English E m b a s s a d o r ,
u n d e r instructions from L o r d A b e r d e e n , t e n d e r e d t h e advice to sign as soon
a s possible t h a t t r e a t y which the noble L o r d n o w told t h e m w a s s o disastrous.
T h e noble Marquis did n o t like to allude to t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e , t h a t it w a s
exactly t h e v e h e m e n t denunciation which his friend P a l m e r s t o n , t h e n in
opposition, directed against L o r d A b e r d e e n , w h e n he charged him with being
y e t t o o Anti-Russian, which induced t h e latter to give t h e o r d e r for t h e signing
of the treaty.
T h e M a r q u i s p r o c e e d e d to r e p r o a c h t h e P r e m i e r w i t h having b e e n alw a y s t h e m o s t zealous, t h e most constant, a n d t h e m o s t powerful supporter
of the arbitrary G o v e r n m e n t s of E u r o p e , in proof of w h i c h he r e v i e w e d the
history of Portugal, Belgium, and Spain, alluding to A b e r d e e n ' s opposition
to the f a m o u s quadruple alliance of 1834. It certainly w a n t e d all the cool
i m p u d e n c e of an old Whig L o r d to exult, at this m o m e n t , in t h e glory of
Belgium, the constitutionalism in Portugal and Spain, and t h e general blessings E u r o p e derives from t h e Quadruple Alliance w h i c h P a l m e r s t o n , in his
d e f e n s e , falsely stated to h a v e b e e n devised n o t by himself b u t by Talleyrand.
As to the operations of the p r e s e n t w a r , Clanricarde said t h a t the plan of
the c a m p a i g n h a d b e e n d r a w n up by t h e highest military authorities in Russia,
in D e c e m b e r last, and that t h e British G o v e r n m e n t h a d b e e n informed of t h a t
plan, aiming not at t h e mere occupation of the Principalities, b u t at crossing
the D a n u b e , seizing Silistria, masking Shumla, and m a r c h i n g on t h e Balkan.
T h e noble L o r d , with such information in his possession, h a d c o m e d o w n
to this H o u s e talking of p e a c e , and neglecting to give t h o s e o r d e r s which w e r e
at t h e time given by the Cabinet to t h e Ministry of W a r until t h e e n d of
F e b r u a r y or the beginning of M a r c h .
I f L o r d Clanricarde h a d c h o s e n t o r e m e m b e r the a n s w e r s given b y L o r d
P a l m e r s t o n to Mr. Disraeli in t h e C o m m o n s a n d by L o r d C l a r e n d o n to himself in the L o r d s , he w o u l d h a v e abstained from the ridicule of charging with
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t h o s e neglects of duty only L o r d A b e r d e e n , a n d exempting his Whig friends
from a b l a m e equally attaching to t h e w h o l e Cabinet. "If," exclaimed the
Marquis—"if a proper, he w o u l d almost say an h o n e s t , c o u r s e h a d b e e n t a k e n
b y the G o v e r n m e n t fifteen m o n t h s ago, t h e r e n e v e r would h a v e b e e n a w a r . "
N o w , t h e s e are t h e v e r y s a m e w o r d s w h i c h Mr. Disraeli a d d r e s s e d to L o r d
J o h n Russell.
Finally, the Marquis has the absurdity to charge also L o r d A b e r d e e n ,
individually a n d exclusively, with all the failures of the coalition, a n d their
continuous defeat in Parliament on all i m p o r t a n t questions. It does n o t o c c u r
to his m e m o r y t h a t at the v e r y formation of t h e Cabinet it w a s declared by
e v e r y judicious m a n , t h a t it could n o t hold together for six w e e k s e x c e p t it
left all legislation an o p e n question, and abstained from politics.
After a silly s p e e c h from L o r d B r o u g h a m , w h o e x p r e s s e d himself v e r y
m u c h c o n t e n t e d with L o r d A b e r d e e n ' s first speech, b u t still m o r e so with
his s e c o n d o n e , t h e subject [ w a s ] d r o p p e d .
T h e serious result of this w h o l e incident is the baffling of t h e secret
protocol d r a w n up at Vienna, and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of hostilities,
and of a w a r , the s p e e d y cessation of w h i c h w a s so confidently anticipated
t h a t consols r o s e 3 per cent, notwithstanding h e a v y loans in the market, a n d
t h a t any b e t s w e r e t a k e n at t h e military clubs against t h e prolongation of w a r
b e y o n d four w e e k s .
Karl M a r x .
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The Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Turkish TreatyMoldavia and Wallachia
Nr.4134, 19. Juli 1854
L o n d o n , T u e s d a y , July 4, 1854.
T h e long e x p e c t e d military insurrection at Madrid h a s at length b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d u n d e r the leadership of Generals O'Donnell a n d Dulce. T h e
F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t journals h a s t e n to inform us that, according to their
d i s p a t c h e s , t h e Spanish G o v e r n m e n t h a s already o v e r c o m e t h e danger a n d
t h a t t h e insurrection is suppressed. B u t t h e Madrid c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The
Morning Chronicle, w h o gives a detailed a c c o u n t of t h e rising a n d c o m m u n i c a t e s the proclamation of the insurgents, says t h a t t h e y h a v e only
w i t h d r a w n from t h e capital in order to join the garrison of Alcalá, a n d that
in c a s e of Madrid remaining passive t h e y w o u l d h a v e no difficulty in reaching
Saragossa. Should t h e m o v e m e n t b e m o r e successful t h a n t h e last rebellion
in that t o w n , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s w o u l d be to c a u s e a diversion in the military
action of F r a n c e , to afford a subject for dissent b e t w e e n F r a n c e a n d England,
a n d p r o b a b l y also to affect t h e pending complication b e t w e e n Spain and the
U n i t e d States G o v e r n m e n t .
I t a p p e a r s n o w t h a t the n e w Russian loan h a s n o t b e e n positively cont r a c t e d for by t h e M e s s r s . H o p e of A m s t e r d a m , as I w a s led to believe from
a n n o u n c e m e n t s m a d e a t the L o n d o n and M a n c h e s t e r E x c h a n g e s ; and that
t h e s e b a n k e r s h a v e not a d v a n c e d any portion of t h e m o n e y to t h e Russian
t r e a s u r y . T h e y merely u n d e r t o o k to bring it o u t at t h e different E u r o p e a n
E x c h a n g e s , b u t at no risk of their own. T h e s u c c e s s of t h e loan is r e p o r t e d
to be very doubtful, and we h a v e n e w s t h a t at Berlin and F r a n k f o r t it has
m e t with v e r y little favor. T h e H a m b u r g S e n a t e h a s prohibited its official
q u o t a t i o n , and t h e English diplomatic agents and C o n s u l s , according to The
Morning Chronicle, h a v e issued warnings to British subjects n o t to b e c o m e
subscribers to a loan "intended for carrying on w a r against the Q u e e n . "
T h e intelligence of the m o v e m e n t s of t h e Russian t r o o p s since t h e aband o n m e n t of t h e siege of Silistria is contradictory. T h e Moniteur having
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r
The Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Turkish Treaty—Moldavia and Wallachia
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a n n o u n c e d t h e retreat of t h e Russians b e h i n d t h e P r u t h , t h e V i e n n a Presse
states that t h e r e w a s n o t the slightest r e a s o n to believe in t h e fact of s u c h
a m o v e . It a p p e a r s , on the c o n t r a r y , t h a t n o t e v e n Wallachia is i n t e n d e d to
be e v a c u a t e d , General Liprandi having t a k e n up a position at Plojesti a n d
Kimpina, with his o u t p o s t s stationed at t h e e n t r a n c e of t h e Rothenthurm
Pass, while the main a r m y , retiring by Slobodzic and along the left b a n k of
t h e D a n u b e , is stated to h a v e halted at Brailow. On t h e other hand, t h e c o r p s
of L ü d e r s occupying t h e D o b r o d ja, h a s n o t yet a b a n d o n e d t h e line of Trajan's
Wall, and it is n o t likely that, e v e n in c a s e of further retreat, they will surrend e r M a t s h i n and Isaktsha. F r e s h t r o o p s are said to be pouring into Moldavia,
w h e r e it s e e m s to be t h e plan of t h e Russians to c o n c e n t r a t e a large force.
T h e corps of General Paniutin has e n t e r e d from Podolia, and additional
r e s o u r c e s are being d r a w n in from Bessarabia. T h e entire force of t h e
Russians in U p p e r Moldavia, b e t w e e n J a s s y , R o m a n and Botushani, is said
to a m o u n t to 60,000; and a division of 20,000 is e n c a m p e d near K a m e n i c z .
" P a s h k i e w i t c h , " says the Ostdeutsche Post, " h a s declared that in no c a s e
will he a b a n d o n t h e m o u t h s of t h e D a n u b e . " T h e retreat is explained by t h e
Russians to be only a c o n s e q u e n c e of the plague having b r o k e n o u t on t h e
Higher D a n u b e .
T h e m o v e m e n t s of the Austrians are still quite undefined. T h e corps of
Coronini is stated to h a v e orders to e m b a r k on steamers at O r s o v a , and to
go d o w n the river to Giurgevo, t h e n c e to m a r c h u p o n B u c h a r e s t . T h e Corriere
Italiano, an Austrian G o v e r n m e n t organ, a n n o u n c e s that t h e object of this
m o v e is only to t a k e up a neutral position in Wallachia, a n d yet at the s a m e
time we h e a r t h a t t h e Austrian " u l t i m a t u m " h a s b e e n declined by Russia.
" T h e R u s s i a n E m p e r o r , " says t h e dispatch published in The Morning
Chronicle, " i n his a n s w e r to t h e A u s t r i a n s u m m o n s , e x p r e s s e s his r e a d i n e s s
to negotiate with the four p o w e r s on all p o i n t s , e x c e p t on the privileges of
t h e Christian subjects of t h e Sultan. On this subject he will only t r e a t
directly with the P o r t e , and he refuses to admit t h e interference of the four
p o w e r s . He also refuses to give a n y g u a r a n t e e s for t h e e v a c u a t i o n of t h e
Principalities."
N o w , it is quite possible t h a t in c o n s e q u e n c e of this refusal, a sham w a r
b e t w e e n Austria and Russia m a y occur, to e n d in s o m e such famous
rencontre as the r e m a r k a b l e affair at Bronzell, w h i c h e n d e d the sham w a r
b e t w e e n Austria and Prussia in 1850, while t h e n e w s p a p e r s w e r e y e t lost in
conjectures on t h e terrible eventualities of that "middle E u r o p e a n crisis."
In lieu of similar speculations on t h e possible m e a n i n g of Austria's p r e s e n t
policy, we shall b e t a k e ourselves to the fact of the Austro-Turkish treaty of
J u n e 14, which is n o w fully and officially m a d e k n o w n .
T h e r e are t w o points to be considered—the relations b e t w e e n Austria and
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T u r k e y a n d t h e relations of the Moldo-Wallachian p e o p l e to T u r k e y a n d
A u s t r i a or other foreign p o w e r s , the latter point being, strange to say, entirely
neglected by t h e diplomacy-ridden opinion of E u r o p e .
By the first article of the treaty, " t h e E m p e r o r of A u s t r i a u n d e r t a k e s to
e x h a u s t e v e r y m e a n s of negotiation and o t h e r s , to obtain t h e evacuation of
t h e D a n u b i a n Principalities by the foreign a r m y n o w o c c u p y i n g t h e m , and
e v e n to employ, in c a s e of need, t h e n u m b e r of t r o o p s calculated for t h a t
o b j e c t . " T h e E m p e r o r of Austria is t h e r e b y entitled to m a r c h a n y n u m b e r
of t r o o p s into Wallachia, without a previous declaration of w a r on his part
against Russia. T h u s a Turkish d e p e n d e n c y is subjected to an operation
converting it into a neutral possession u n d e r A u s t r i a against T u r k e y . By the
second article it is agreed that "it shall belong exclusively to the Imperial
commander-in-chief to direct t h e operations of his a r m y . He shall, h o w e v e r ,
be careful to inform in proper time the commander-in-chief of t h e O t t o m a n
armies of his o p e r a t i o n s . " By this agreement t h e A u s t r i a n s e s c a p e not only
from all control, on t h e p a r t of T u r k e y , over a n y m o v e m e n t t h e y m a y think
fit, b u t obtain a perfect control of all t h e operations possibly intended on
Wallachian ground by the Turkish c o m m a n d e r , w h o m t h e y h a v e only to
inform t h a t t h e y w a n t to o c c u p y such and such a point, w h e n t h e T u r k s will
be p r e v e n t e d from marching t h e r e . Considering, n o w , t h a t t h e Principalities,
b e s i d e s t h e n a r r o w territory of the Dobrodja, a r e t h e only possible battlefield b e t w e e n the T u r k s and the R u s s i a n s , the A u s t r i a n intervention simply
forbids T u r k e y to follow up her victories a n d p u n i s h t h e invader.
By virtue of Article 3, " t h e E m p e r o r of Austria engages to reestablish, in
c o m m o n a c c o r d with t h e O t t o m a n G o v e r n m e n t , in t h e Principalities, as soon
as possible, the legal state of things s u c h as results from the privileges
secured by t h e Sublime P o r t e relative to t h e g o v e r n m e n t of t h e s e countries.
T h e local authorities thus reconstituted c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , e x t e n d their action
so far as to exercise any control over the Imperial a r m y . " T h u s t h e E m p e r o r
of A u s t r i a r e s e r v e s to himself full liberty of restoring the legal state w h e n
he shall think it possible, and e v e n t h e n , he m a y r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e local authorities only in o r d e r to place them u n d e r A u s t r i a n martial law, quite after
t h e fashion of t h e Russian General Budberg.
A c c o r d i n g to Article 4, " t h e Imperial Court of A u s t r i a engages not to enter
into any plan of a c c o m m o d a t i o n with t h e Imperial C o u r t of R u s s i a which
shall n o t h a v e for its starting point the sovereign rights of t h e Sultan and the
integrity of his e m p i r e . " Article 5 a d d s , " t h a t as soon as t h e object of t h e
p r e s e n t convention shall h a v e b e e n attained by the conclusion of a treaty
of p e a c e b e t w e e n the Sublime Porte and the C o u r t of Russia, t h e E m p e r o r
of A u s t r i a will m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s to w i t h d r a w his f o r c e s as soon as possible.
T h e details c o n n e c t e d with t h e withdrawal of t h e Austrian t r o o p s will form
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the object of a special a r r a n g e m e n t with t h e Sublime P o r t e . " By t h e former
of t h e s e articles Austria r e s e r v e s to herself t h e right to an arrangement with
R u s s i a based simply on t h e status quo, as e m b o d i e d in the V i e n n a n o t e . By
t h e latter Austria promises not to w i t h d r a w her t r o o p s after an a r r a n g e m e n t
b e t w e e n herself and Russia, b u t only after the conclusion of a treaty b e t w e e n
Russia a n d T u r k e y . T h e "material g u a r a n t y , " n o longer safe i n t h e direct
keeping of Russia, is transferred to Austria, a n d A u s t r i a e m p o w e r e d to hold
it for her—with t h e c o n s e n t of t h e Porte—until T u r k e y shall h a v e a d h e r e d to
the " a c c o m m o d a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o Imperial C o u r t s . " Article 6 entitles
t h e Austrians to feed, without e v e n a s e m b l a n c e of p a y m e n t , u p o n t h e
remainder left by t h e R u s s i a n s in t h e Principalities. T h e advantages of this
a r r a n g e m e n t can only be appreciated in G e r m a n y , w h e r e t h e people are w o n t
to receive Austrian garrisons for the p u n i s h m e n t of their revolutionary sins,
and w h e r e t h e y grazed off whole districts in 1849-50.
T h e t r e a t y is a virtual surrender of t h e Principalities to Austria, and an
a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e T u r k i s h suzerainty over t h e m . T h e T u r k s h a v e c o m mitted t h e r e b y as flagrant a violation of t h e rights of t h e Moldo-Wallachian
people as any previously c o m m i t t e d by the Russians. T h e T u r k s h a v e as little
right to surrender the Principalities to A u s t r i a n o c c u p a t i o n as t h e y h a v e to
declare t h e m Russian provinces.
T h e claims of the Porte to the suzerainty of Moldo-Wallachia are founded
on t h e treaties of 1393,1460 a n d 1511. T h e t r e a t y concluded in 1393 b e t w e e n
Wallachia and T u r k e y contains the following articles:
" A r t . I . W e , Bajazet, e t c . d e t e r m i n e , b y o u r e x t r e m e c o n d e s c e n d e n c e
t o w a r d Wallachia, which has m a d e its submission to o u r invincible E m p i r e ,
with its reigning Prince, t h a t t h a t c o u n t r y is to continue to govern itself by
its o w n laws, and that t h e Prince of Wallachia shall h a v e t h e entire liberty
of declaring w a r or making p e a c e with his neighbors, h o w and w h e n it m a y
please him.
Art. III. T h e Princes (Christians) will be elected by the Metropolitans and
Boyards.
Art. I V . T h e Prince of Wallachia will h a v e to p a y annually to our Imperial
T r e a s u r y 500 piasters of our m o n e y . "
T h e treaty concluded in 1460 b e t w e e n Vlad V, Prince of Wallachia, a n d
M a h o m e d II stipulates:
" A r t . I. T h e Sultan c o n s e n t s and engages, for himself and s u c c e s s o r s , to
protect Wallachia and to defend it against e v e r y e n e m y , without exacting
anything b u t t h e suzerainty over this sovereign Principality, of which t h e
V o y v o d e s will be e x p e c t e d to p a y to t h e Sublime Porte a tribute of
10,000 d u c a t s .
Art. II. T h e Sublime P o r t e will in no w a y interfere in the local ad-
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ministration of t h e said Principality, and no T u r k will be allowed to c o m e
into Wallachia without an ostensible m o t i v e .
Art. III. T h e V o y v o d e s will continue to be elected by t h e Metropolitan
A r c h b i s h o p , the Bishops and B o y a r d s , and the election will be recognized
by t h e P o r t e .
A r t . I V . T h e Wallachian nation will continue to enjoy the free excercise
of its o w n laws, and t h e V o y v o d e s will h a v e t h e right of life and d e a t h over
their subjects, as also t h a t of making p e a c e or w a r , w i t h o u t being subjected
for any of their acts to any kind of responsibility t o w a r d t h e Sublime
Porte."
T h e third treaty is that of 1511, in which M o l d a v i a acknowledged the
suzerainty of t h e P o r t e , obtaining e v e n better conditions in e x c h a n g e t h a n
Wallachia had obtained.
T h e treaties w h i c h intervened b e t w e e n R u s s i a and T u r k e y could not of
c o u r s e invalidate the treaties concluded by the Moldo-Wallachians t h e m selves with the P o r t e , since this people never t r e a t e d with the R u s s i a n s nor
g a v e t h e P o r t e p o w e r t o treat for t h e m . I t may b e stated, b e s i d e s , t h a t R u s s i a
herself recognized the above-mentioned capitulations in the treaty of Adrianople, art. V of which s a y s : " T h e Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia,
having placed themselves by capitulation u n d e r t h e suzerainty of the Sublime
P o r t e , and Russia having w a r r a n t e d their prosperity, (!) it is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t
t h e y continue to enjoy all t h o s e privileges a n d immunities w h i c h h a v e b e e n
granted to t h e m in virtue of their capitulation."
It follows, t h e n , from t h e above-cited capitulations, which, not having b e e n
s u p e r s e d e d by any subsequent treaty, still r e m a i n in vigor, t h a t the Principalities form t w o sovereign States u n d e r t h e suzerainty of t h e P o r t e , to which
t h e y p a y a tribute on the condition that the P o r t e shall defend t h e m against
e v e r y a n d a n y external e n e m y , and not interfere at all in their internal
administration. So far from being entitled to s u r r e n d e r Wallachia to foreign
occupation, the T u r k s themselves are forbidden from entering Wallachia
w i t h o u t a n ostensible m o t i v e . N a y , m o r e : Since the T u r k s h a v e t h u s violated
their capitulations with the Wallachians a n d forfeited t h e claims of suzerainty, t h e Russians might e v e n , w h e n appealed to by the Wallachians, found
their right of driving t h e Austrians out of t h e Principalities on t h e show of
b r o k e n treaties. A n d this would be by no m e a n s surprising, as it has b e e n
t h e c o n s t a n t policy of Russia to encourage, a n d e v e n oblige t h e T u r k s to
violate t h e rights of the Wallachians, so as to p r o d u c e hostilities b e t w e e n
t h e m , and create for herself a p r e t e x t for intervention. W h a t h a p p e n e d , for
instance, in 1848? S o m e B o y a r d s in t h e spring of t h a t y e a r had p r e s e n t e d
a petition to t h e Prince of Moldavia, demanding certain reforms, which
r e q u e s t w a s , by the influence of the Russian Consul, n o t only refused but
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c a u s e d its a u t h o r s t o b e t h r o w n into prison. T h e c o m m o t i o n p r o d u c e d b y
this act furnished the Russians with a p r e t e x t to c r o s s the frontier, on J u n e 25,
a n d to m a r c h u p o n Jassy. Simultaneously the h o s p o d a r of Wallachia, like
the other continental g o v e r n m e n t s , granted a n u m b e r of reforms d e m a n d e d
5 by t h e Liberal party of t h e Wallachian B o y a r d s . This w a s on J u n e 23. It is
scarcely n e c e s s a r y to r e m a r k that t h e s e r e f o r m s infringed in no w a y u p o n
t h e suzerainty of the Porte. But t h e y h a p p e n e d to d e s t r o y entirely all the
influence Russia h a d obtained through the fundamental law, d e c r e e d during
their o c c u p a t i o n of 1829, which t h e r e f o r m s abolished. T h e constitution
10 replacing it suppressed serfdom, and a portion of the land occupied by t h e
p e a s a n t w a s c e d e d to him as p r o p e r t y , while t h e landlord w a s to be indemnified by the State for t h e land given up a n d for t h e loss of his p e a s a n t s '
labor. T h e reigning Prince w a s t h e n i n d u c e d b y t h e R u s s i a n s t o r e m o v e , a n d
a Provisional G o v e r n m e n t t o o k up t h e m a n a g e m e n t of the public affairs. T h e
15 Porte which, as we h a v e s h o w n , had no right to interfere in the internal affairs
of the Principalities, and had omitted to p r o t e s t against the Russian e n t r a n c e
into Moldavia, dispatched Soliman P a s h a w i t h a T u r k i s h a r m y into Wallachia, and published a v e r y threatening a d d r e s s of t h e Sultan to t h e inhabitants, t h e m e a s u r e s of the D i v a n being t a k e n of c o u r s e u n d e r the in20 f luence of Russia. T h e Wallachians w e n t o u t to m e e t t h e P a s h a and t h e T u r k s ,
and fraternised with t h e m . A n a g r e e m e n t w a s m a d e that t h e Provisional
G o v e r n m e n t should be replaced by a Lieutenance Princière, c o m p o s e d at
first of six, and afterward of t h r e e m e m b e r s . This G o v e r n m e n t w a s t h e n
recognized by t h e Pasha, a n d at t h e P a s h a ' s desire, by the foreign Consuls.
25
A modification w a s introduced into t h e n e w constitution after w h i c h t h a t also
w a s confirmed by the Sultan.
Meanwhile the Russian G o v e r n m e n t fulminated against t h e Wallachian
people in manifestoes addressed to E u r o p e , wherein t h e y w e r e charged to
h a v e established a republic, and proclaimed c o m m u n i s m . On t h e 1st August,
30 1848, a large Russian force c r o s s e d t h e P r u t h on its m a r c h to B u c h a r e s t .
Suddenly Soliman P a s h a w a s recalled by the P o r t e ; the Sultan refused to
receive t h e Wallachian deputies w h o had g o n e to Constantinople in a n s w e r
to his o w n invitation; and on S e p t e m b e r 25, F u a d Effendi, at the head of a
T u r k i s h a r m y , p r e s e n t e d himself before B u c h a r e s t , declaring that he had only
35 c o m e to deprive R u s s i a of all p r e t e x t for entering the Principality. Confiding
in t h e w o r d of t h e T u r k s , m o r e t h a n 100,000 inhabitants w e n t out from
B u c h a r e s t and the surrounding c o u n t r y , u n a r m e d , in festive g a r m e n t s , and
with the clergy at their h e a d to w e l c o m e t h e m . F u a d Effendi, t h e n invited
t h e m to send a deputation to his c a m p , so t h a t he might c o m m u n i c a t e to t h e m
40 his instructions. " N o s o o n e r , " says M. Bratiano in his a c c o u n t of t h e s e
e v e n t s , " n o sooner did the deputation p r e s e n t themselves before F u a d
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Effendi, t h a n t h e y w e r e m a d e prisoners, and at t h e s a m e time t h e T u r k i s h
a r m y precipitated itself in a forced m a r c h u p o n B u c h a r e s t , trampling d o w n
u n d e r t h e h o o f s of his cavalry t h e peaceful inhabitants w h o h a d g o n e out
to m e e t the T u r k s as friends, tearing d o w n their b a n n e r s , destroying their
c r o s s e s , b o m b a r d i n g a military b a r r a c k which it found on its p a s s a g e , as well
as a w h o l e q u a r t e r of the town, firing grape-shot at t h e Wallachian soldiers
w h o o c c u p i e d t h o s e b a r r a c k s , inducing t h e m t o capitulate a n d lay d o w n their
a r m s , putting to d e a t h the sick, and after having r e a c h e d t h e t o w n giving
t h e m s e l v e s u p t o pillage, m a s s a c r e and other horrible d e e d s ! " I t w a s h e r e
t h a t G e n . D u h a m e l , the Russian Commissioner, a c c o m p a n i e d , and in fact
c o m m a n d e d t h e T u r k i s h army. H e w a s followed b y t h e R u s s i a n a r m y , and
the result w a s the treaty of Balta L i m a n , i.e. a m o n g other things the restoration of t h e Russian fundamental law, or statute which is nothing else t h a n
the status quo as to which Austria engages [to] r e d u c e Wallachia.
It is clear that if O m e r P a s h a should n o w enter Wallachia with his victorious a r m y , the T u r k s with all their late e x p e r i e n c e a n d at w a r with Russia,
w o u l d [have] re-established the Constitution of 1848, w i t h t h e " r e p u b l i c ,
c o m m u n i s m , " a n d t h e revival of all t h e creations of 1848 following in its
w a k e . N o b o d y will believe that Austria would h a v e b e e n less displeased with
t h a t contingency t h a n Russia. On t h e other h a n d , it is equally clear, t h a t t h e
P o r t e m u s t h a v e b e e n subject to extraordinary p r e s s u r e to allow itself to be
dragged into another violation of its treaties with t h e Wallachians, the cons e q u e n c e s of w h i c h it k n o w s by experience. T h a t p r e s s u r e c a n h a v e p r o c e e d ed from no q u a r t e r b u t t h e English E m b a s s a d o r . It is, t h e r e f o r e , interesting
to r e c o r d , h o w the same L o r d Redcliffe and his superiors in Downing-st.
b e h a v e d in 1848 a n d '49 with regard to t h e violations of t h e rights of MoldoWallachia b y b o t h Russians and T u r k s .
W h e n t h e Russian a r m y first crossed the Moldavian frontier, in J u n e 1848,
L o r d P a l m e r s t o n declared in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s , in a n s w e r to t h e inevitable D u d l e y Stuart: " t h a t the Russian t r o o p s entered M o l d a v i a w i t h o u t
any o r d e r s from t h e Cabinet of St. Petersburg, t h a t t h e y only aimed at the
m a i n t e n a n c e or establishment of order, t h a t they w o u l d be w i t h d r a w n w h e n
t h e o c c a s i o n h a d ceased, that the e n t r y w a s o n t h e authority o f the H o s p o d a r ,
and t h e r e w a s no disposition for the acquisition of t e r r i t o r y . "
In A u g u s t 1848, w h e n the Russian a r m y again c r o s s e d t h e P r u t h , on their
m a r c h to B u c h a r e s t , and w h e n t h e Moldo-Wallachians h a d sent a deputation
to Constantinople, the Divan applied to the E m b a s s a d o r s of England and
F r a n c e for advice, and w a s r e c o m m e n d e d b y L o r d Redcliffe t o a d o p t t h e
line of policy enjoined by Russia.
In O c t o b e r , w h e n the T u r k s and Russians in c o m m o n o c c u p i e d Wallachia,
a Wallachian officer w a s pursued by t h e R u s s i a n s into t h e dwelling of t h e
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c o m m a n d e r of the T u r k i s h t r o o p s at B u c h a r e s t , O m e r P a s h a , w h o in c o m m o n
with F u a d Effendi protested. T h e P o r t e , informed of this insult, declared it
w o u l d h a v e no m o r e to do with the R u s s i a n s and o r d e r its t r o o p s to r e c r o s s
t h e D a n u b e , in order to c e a s e to be the accomplice of t h e R u s s i a n s in t h e
5 Principalities, and threatened to a d d r e s s to the great p o w e r s a solemn p r o t e s tation, a c c o m p a n i e d by a detailed m e m o r a n d u m of all that h a d o c c u r r e d in
t h e Principalities. T h e same E m b a s s a d o r interfered again and baffled t h e s e
intentions of the Porte.
L a s t l y , at t h e time w h e n the c o m b i n e d R u s s o - T u r k i s h occupation in 1848
10 h a d a s s u m e d the c h a r a c t e r of a reign of terror, a n d w h e n Maghiero, t h e
c o m m a n d e r of t h e Wallachian irregulars alone resisted, he w a s induced to
w i t h d r a w b e y o n d t h e Carpathian m o u n t a i n s " b y t h e p e r s u a s i o n of t h e British
Consul-General, w h o r e p r e s e n t e d to him t h a t the p r e s e n c e of his a r m y w o u l d
p a r a l y z e t h e action of diplomacy, b u t t h a t his c o u n t r y would soon be
15 r i g h t e d . "
Karl M a r x .
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The War on the Danube
Nr.4139, 25. Juli 1854
The War on the Danube.
A b o u t eighty y e a r s ago w h e n the victorious armies of Catherine II. w e r e
severing from T u r k e y province after province, prior to their transformation
into w h a t is n o w called S o u t h Russia, the p o e t D e r z h a v i n , in o n e of the bursts
of lyrical enthusiasm in which he w a s w o n t to celebrate the glories, if n o t t h e
virtues of that E m p r e s s , and the destined g r a n d e u r of h e r e m p i r e , u t t e r e d
a m e m o r a b l e couplet in which we m a y still find c o n d e n s e d t h e scornful
b o l d n e s s and self-reliance of the Czarian policy:
" A n d w h a t to t h e e , O R u s s , is any ally?
A d v a n c e and the whole U n i v e r s e is t h i n e ! "
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T h i s m a y be true enough, e v e n n o w , if the R u s s only could a d v a n c e , b u t
on t h a t p r o c e s s a p r e t t y decided c h e c k h a s b e e n p u t . C o n s e q u e n t l y he is
constrained for t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t at least, to p o s t p o n e the p o s s e s s i o n of
t h e U n i v e r s e . B u t w h a t is very bitter to his pride is t h a t in retracing his steps
he n o t only fails to carry with him the pledge of universal dominion, b u t is 15
e v e n obliged to leave behind t h e keys of the simple fortress of Silistria, on
the D a n u b e , which he had sworn to h a v e . And still m o r e painful, he leaves
b e h i n d him also t h e remains of s o m e fifty t h o u s a n d of his b r e t h r e n , w h o h a v e
perished by disease and battle in this single campaign.
T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t in a military point of view t h e siege of Silistria is 20
t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a m o n g all the military e v e n t s since t h e beginning of t h e
w a r . It is the failure to take that fortress which r e n d e r s t h e campaign a failure
for t h e Russians and adds disgrace and t h e C z a r ' s disfavor to t h e retreat
behind the Sereth, in w h i c h t h e y are now engaged. Of the earlier stages of
t h e siege we h a v e already laid before our r e a d e r s a careful, and, we h o p e , 25
a clear analysis; a n d n o w , at last, having received by t h e Pacific t h e official
Russian r e p o r t s , we are able to follow t h e whole affair to its conclusion
w i t h o u t doing any injustice to either p a r t y . Besides the R u s s i a n r e p o r t s ,
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w h i c h are distinct, clear and business-like in w h a t t h e y state, b u t a b o u n d in
faults of omission, we n o w h a v e L i e u t e n a n t N a s m y t h ' s (Bengal Artillery,)
r e p o r t to The London Times, a c o m p l e t e j o u r n a l of t h e siege, giving s o m e
interesting particulars, b u t m a d e up in r a t h e r a slovenly w a y , and sometimes
incorrect in t h e dates. It is only p r o p e r to say t h a t t h e views a n d conclusions
we h a v e previously e x p r e s s e d concerning t h e siege, are altogether confirmed
by t h e s e later and m o r e detailed narratives, e x c e p t in t h e particular t h a t t h e
T u r k s did n o t a b a n d o n the defense of the fort A r a b Tabiassi a s , in t h e latter
part of the siege, we supposed t h e y would be c o n s t r a i n e d to d o . It a p p e a r s
t o o , that t h e Russians w e r e still m o r e e x t r a v a g a n t in their operations t h a n
we suspected. First t h e y m a d e a regular a t t a c k on t h e fortress on its e a s t e r n
side, on the low lands of the D a n u b e , hoping to be able to t u r n the d e t a c h e d
forts altogether and to m a k e a b r e a c h in t h e main wall of Silistria at o n c e .
If this a t t e m p t had the merit of originality, it certainly had no other. It affords,
p e r h a p s , the first instance of t r e n c h e s a n d a p p r o a c h e s being t h r o w n up
against a fortress, on ground w h i c h w a s n o t only flanked, b u t actually c o m m a n d e d in t h e rear by hights fortified by t h e e n e m y . B u t t h e n a second, an
irregular attack w a s directed against t h e s e v e r y hights, and so cleverly
combined, t h a t after t h e loss of a fortnight on reconnoitering and storming,
in which t h o u s a n d s of Russians w e r e killed or disabled; a regular siege
against t h e m h a d also to be e m p l o y e d . So m u c h for t h e skill displayed by
t h e R u s s i a n s . L e t us n o w p a s s to the details of the period of the siege.
On the 1st of J u n e the Russians got a fresh train of siege-artillery, b r o u g h t
over from t h e left b a n k of the D a n u b e , which t h e y arranged in b a t t e r y against
A r a b Tabiassi. T h e T u r k s sank shafts and p u s h e d mines u n d e r the counterscarps and glacis of this fort. On J u n e 2, M u s s a P a s h a , c o m m a n d e r of Silistria
w a s killed by a shell. T o w a r d evening t h e R u s s i a n s exploded a mine u n d e r
o n e of the bastions of A r a b Tabiassi. As at that time t h e y could not yet h a v e
arrived at the c r e s t of the glacis, this mine could not h a v e b e e n very a c curately laid. T h e distances, as well as t h e line of shortest resistance, m u s t
h a v e b e e n wrongly calculated, and, accordingly, w h e n the mine sprung, so
far from injuring t h e T u r k i s h defenses, it exploded b a c k w a r d and overw h e l m e d the Russian t r e n c h e s with a hail of stones and earth. But here t h e
storming columns w e r e assembled r e a d y for an assault, and t h e effect of this
hail of stones a m o n g t h e m m a y be readily imagined. H o w far the R u s s i a n s
s u c c e e d e d in effectually blockading t h e fortress, is s h o w n by the fact t h a t
on this day 5,000 Turkish irregulars from R a s g r a d w e s t of Silistria m a d e their
w a y into t h e besieged t o w n .
F r o m the 4th to the 8th of J u n e t h e t r e n c h e s against the A r a b Tabiassi w e r e
continued. T h e Russians arrived at t h e glacis, [and] p u s h e d a sap boldly
f o r w a r d t o w a r d its crest, which w a s very poorly supported h o w e v e r b y t h e
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fire of their artillery. T h e y c o m m e n c e d sinking a mine b e l o w t h e ditch and
p u s h e d it u n d e r t h e scarp of the bastion. While this w a s going on M a r s h a l
P a s h k i e w i t c h on t h e 9th again m a d e o n e of his inexplicable displays of a r m e d
force in a grand r e c o n n o i s s a n c e against the fortress, consisting of 31 battalions, 40 s q u a d r o n s , and 114 field pieces. W h a t he e x p e c t e d to gain by this
exhibition n o b o d y c a n tell. It looks like o n e of t h o s e displays volunteered
only in t h e h o p e of some c h a n c e offering itself for doing something serious,
or at least to impress your e n e m y with the notion t h a t y o u are irresistible.
B u t n o such effect w a s produced u p o n t h e T u r k s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e y sent
forth 4,000 cavalry, w h o , according to the R u s s i a n bulletin w e r e dreadfully
b e a t e n ; N a s m y t h , h o w e v e r , asserts that t h e y b r o u g h t in sixty Russian horses
t a k e n in the affray. At the same time, Pashkiewitch instead of reconnoitering
something to his advantage, w a s , according to t h e r e p o r t , himself r e c o n noitered by a T u r k i s h cannon-ball, which p u t him hors de combat and n e c e s sitated his being t r a n s p o r t e d to Jassy.
On t h e 10th t h e siege w a s at its crisis. T h e g r a n d m i n e , Schilder's last h o p e ,
w a s sprung. It p r o d u c e d indeed a practicable b r e a c h in the front bastion of
A r a b Tabiassi. T h e Russian columns a d v a n c e d t o t h e assault; but, a s t h e y
might h a v e e x p e c t e d , t h e T u r k s had long since m a d e a coupure or s e c o n d
p a r a p e t with a ditch, a little to the rear of the main wall, and the Russians
o n coming u p found themselves arrested and e x p o s e d t o m u r d e r o u s fire.
N o w , w h e n the a d v a n c e on an assaulting c o l u m n is o n c e b r o u g h t to a stand,
that c o l u m n is b e a t e n ; for the fire of the e n e m y c o v e r e d behind ramparts
and supported by artillery, at a distance w h e r e e v e r y s h o t tells, forces it to
r e t r e a t in a v e r y few minutes. T h e Russians, t h e r e f o r e , h a d to m a k e the b e s t
o f the w a y b a c k across the b r e a c h , and w e r e followed b y the T u r k s , w h o
p u r s u e d t h e m as far as t h e Russian t r e n c h e s a n d d e s t r o y e d p a r t of t h e siege
w o r k s . This assault w a s the last serious enterprise of t h e R u s s i a n s against
Silistria. If t h e siege w a s apparently a n d nominally c o n t i n u e d until o r d e r s
for the raising of it arrived, it w a s merely to save a p p e a r a n c e s . On t h e 12th
t h e b l o c k a d e w a s so little sustained t h a t E u r o p e a n officers from Shumla h a d
no difficulty in entering the fortress.
T h e Russians had o p e n e d their t r e n c h e s in the low ground on the 19th of
M a y . Their batteries against A r a b Tabiassi, s e v e n in n u m b e r , c o m m e n c e d
w o r k on the 22d. Fifteen m o r e guns w e r e b r o u g h t up against t h a t fort on the
following day. Still t h e regular attack against A r a b Tabiassi did not t a k e
p l a c e , according to the Russian account, until t h e 31st of M a y . This a p p e a r s
to indicate t h a t t h e batteries e r e c t e d on t h e 21st a n d 22d merely did t h e office
of a first parallel, and w e r e armed with h e a v y field p i e c e s , for the p u r p o s e
of enfilading t h e fort. F r o m M a y 31 to J u n e 10 t h e R u s s i a n b a t t e r i e s a d v a n c e d
within o n e h u n d r e d y a r d s of the fort, t h a t is from the first to t h e third parallel,
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at the foot of the glacis. Neither was t h e glacis c r o w n e d , n o r w e r e trenching
batteries e r e c t e d ; b u t , as before stated, a sap w a s p u s h e d up the slope of the
glacis, in o r d e r to sink t h e shaft of t h e mine at its t o p . As we learn from all
r e p o r t s that A r a b Tabiassi w a s hardly m o r e t h a n a field fortification, of large
proportions b u t little p e r m a n e n t strength, t h e c o n d u c t of its defenders,
c o m p o s e d of four battalions and 500 irregulars u n d e r H u s s e i n P a s h a , certainly deserves the highest praise. N i n e d a y s of distant cannonading, eleven
d a y s of o p e n t r e n c h e s , t w o mines and four or five assaults, all ending in t h e
discomfiture of t h e e n e m y , we r e m e m b e r no other instance in t h e history
of w a r w h e r e a m e r e o u t w o r k , of such c o n s t r u c t i o n as A r a b Tabiassi, h a s
stood so much. T h e instances coming n e a r e s t to it are t h e defense of Colberg
by t h e Prussians in 1807, and of Danzig by the F r e n c h in 1813.
It has seemed v e r y surprising t h a t during the w h o l e siege nothing w a s d o n e
by O m e r P a s h a to support or relieve so i m p o r t a n t a place. F r o m his letter
a d d r e s s e d to Sami P a s h a , the G o v e r n o r of Widdin, we learn, h o w e v e r , t h a t
he w a s actually preparing to succor Silistria w h e n t h e R u s s i a n s withdrew to
the left side of the D a n u b e . " Y o u k n o w , " says this letter, " t h a t I had collected
all o u r forces in front of Shumla, and t h a t I w a s preparing to m a r c h to t h e
relief of the place. Six regiments of cavalry a n d t h r e e batteries had already
left S h u m l a for this destination. T h e R u s s i a n s , having gained information of
this m o v e m e n t , h a v e w i t h d r a w n precipitately o v e r to the left b a n k , with the
whole of their artillery. During the forty d a y s t h e y invested the place, the
Russians lost 25,000 m e n killed."
W h a t the Russians are n o w a b o u t to do it is impossible to decide. A c cording to s o m e V i e n n a p a p e r s , t h e y p u r p o s e to t a k e up a position behind
the B u s e o , b u t the same p a p e r s p r e t e n d t h a t it is the fear of Austria which
drives t h e m b a c k , and t h e B u s e o is equally outflanked by Austria. If t h e
Russians t r y to hold Moldavia, they w o u l d be outflanked by Austria from
Galicia and t h e Bukovina. B u t a timely j u n c t i o n of t h e Russian t r o o p s in
Poland with the late D a n u b i a n a r m y in Podolia a n d V o l h y n i a w o u l d again
outflank A u s t r i a a n d e x p o s e t h e n o r t h - e a s t e r n p a r t of Galicia as far as t h e
S a a n and the Dniester.
Abstaining, for a m o m e n t , from political considerations, and supposing
A u s t r i a to be r e a d y to join with t h e allied forces in an a t t a c k u p o n Russia,
m a t t e r s would stand t h u s : A u s t r i a could bring into the field from 200,000 to
250,000 m e n to join t h e allies, w h o t h e m s e l v e s dispose of a b o u t 100,000 to
120,000 T u r k s , and 60,000 A n g l o - F r e n c h t r o o p s . To t h e s e forces R u s s i a could
o p p o s e the four c o r p s of t h e D a n u b i a n a r m y , with their r e s e r v e s , amounting,
after d u e d e d u c t i o n on a c c o u n t of l o s s e s , to a b o u t 200,000 m e n . T h e second
c o r p s , c o m m a n d e d by Paniutin, a n d the t h r e e cavalry r e s e r v e c o r p s , with
some further infantry r e s e r v e s , and r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s by fresh levies, might
319
t o g e t h e r a m o u n t to 180,000 m e n ; so t h a t t h e entire military strength of R u s s i a
w o u l d be c o m p o s e d of 350,000 m e n , from w h i c h t h e garrisons n e c e s s a r y for
guarding t h e Crimea and parts of S o u t h e r n R u s s i a w o u l d h a v e to be deducted.
This would still leave the guards, the grenadiers, and t h e first a r m y c o r p s
disposable for the defense of Poland and the Baltic provinces—not to s p e a k
5
of the Finnish corps of a b o u t 15,000 m e n . E v e r y t h i n g considered, the disc r e p a n c y b e t w e e n the relative belligerent forces w o u l d n o t b e s o great a s
to forbid R u s s i a from calculating on m o d e r a t e s u c c e s s , if she w o u l d restrict
herself to a p r o p e r defense.
If Austria, as the latest diplomatic n e w s and her total inactivity on t h e 10
Moldavian frontier appear to indicate, has no other intention but to interfere
b e t w e e n the belligerents, then we m a y safely a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e is no c h a n c e
of anything occurring in t h e c o u r s e of t h e y e a r in either M o l d a v i a or B e s s a r a bia.
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Karl Marx
The Details of the Insurrection at MadridThe Austro-Prussian Summons—
The New Austrian Loan—Wallachia
Nr. 4136, 21. Juli 1854
From. O u r O w n C o r r e s p o n d e n t .
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , July 7, 1854.
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T h e n e w s we receive of the military insurrection at Madrid continues to be
of a v e r y contradictory and fragmentary c h a r a c t e r . All t h e Madrid telegraphic dispatches a r e , of c o u r s e , G o v e r n m e n t s t a t e m e n t s , a n d of the same
questionable faith as t h e bulletins published in t h e Gaceta. A r e v i e w of t h e
scanty materials at hand is c o n s e q u e n t l y all I c a n give you. It will be recollected t h a t O'Donnell w a s o n e of t h e generals b a n i s h e d by t h e Q u e e n in
F e b r u a r y ; that he refused to o b e y , secreted himself in Madrid, and from his
hiding place k e p t up secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with t h e garrison of Madrid, a n d
particularly with G e n . D u l c e , the I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l of the Cavalry. T h e
G o v e r n m e n t were a w a r e of his sojourn at Madrid, a n d on t h e 27th J u n e , at
night, Gen. Blaser, the Minister of W a r , a n d G e n . L a r a , t h e Captain-General
of N e w Castile, received warnings of an i n t e n d e d o u t b r e a k u n d e r t h e
leadership of Gen. Dulce. N o t h i n g , h o w e v e r , w a s d o n e to p r e v e n t or stifle
the insurrection in its germ. On the 28th, t h e r e f o r e , Gen. Dulce found no
difficulty in assembling a b o u t 2,000 cavalry u n d e r p r e t e x t of a review, a n d
to m a r c h with t h e m out of t h e t o w n , a c c o m p a n i e d by O'Donnell, with t h e
intention of kidnapping the Q u e e n , t h e n staying at the Escurial. T h e design
failed, h o w e v e r , a n d the Q u e e n arrived at M a d r i d on t h e 29th, attended by
C o u n t San L u i s , the President of the Council, a n d held a review, while the
insurgents t o o k up quarters in the environs of the capital. T h e y w e r e joined
by Colonel E c h a g u e and 400 m e n of t h e R e g i m e n t " P r i n c e , " w h o b r o u g h t
along t h e regimental cash-bag containing 1,000,000 francs. A c o l u m n c o m p o s e d of seven battalions of infantry, o n e regiment of cavalry, o n e d e t a c h m e n t of m o u n t e d gendarmerie, a n d t w o batteries of artillery left Madrid
on the evening of the 29th ins t., u n d e r c o m m a n d of G e n e r a l L a r a , in order
to m e e t t h e rebels q u a r t e r e d at t h e Venta del Espíritu Santo and t h e village
of Vicalvaro. A battle t o o k place on the 30th b e t w e e n the t w o armies, of
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w h i c h we h a v e received t h r e e accounts—the official o n e a d d r e s s e d by
G e n e r a l L a r a to t h e Minister of W a r , published in t h e Gaceta ; the second
published by t h e Messager de Bayonne, and t h e third a r e p o r t from t h e
Madrid c o r r e s p o n d e n t of the Indépendance Belge, an eye-witness of the
affair. T h e first n a m e d report, which m a y be found in all t h e L o n d o n p a p e r s ,
is easily disposed of, General L a r a stating at o n e time t h a t he attacked t h e
insurgents, and at another t h a t t h e y charged him, making prisoners in o n e
place a n d losing t h e m in another, claiming the victory a n d returning to
Madrid— enfin, leaving the insurgents m a s t e r s of the field, b u t covering it
w i t h t h e d e a d of t h e " e n e m y , " while pretending himself to h a v e only thirty
wounded.
T h e following is the version of t h e Messager de Bayonne:
" O n t h e 30th J u n e , at 4 A.M., G e n . Q u e s a d a left M a d r i d at the head of
t w o brigades, in order to attack the rebel t r o o p s . T h e affair lasted b u t a short
t i m e , G e n . Q u e s a d a being vigorously repulsed. G e n . Blaser, t h e Minister of
W a r , having assembled t h e whole garrison of Madrid"—which, by t h e w a y ,
consists of a b o u t 7,000 or 8,000 men—"made a sortie, in his turn at 7 o'clock
in t h e evening. A c o m b a t immediately c o m m e n c e d , a n d lasted almost without
interruption until evening. T h e infantry, t h r e a t e n e d b y t h e n u m e r o u s cavalry
of t h e insurgents, f o r m e d in squares. Col. Garrigó, at t h e h e a d of s o m e
escadrons, charged o n e of t h e s e squares so vigorously as to b r e a k it through,
b u t w a s received by t h e fire of a m a s k e d b a t t e r y of five guns, t h e grapeshot
of w h i c h dispersed his escadrons. Col. Garrigó fell into t h e h a n d s of the
Q u e e n ' s t r o o p s , b u t Gen. O'Donnell lost not a m o m e n t in rallying his squadr o n s , a n d t h r e w liimself so v e h e m e n t l y on the infantry t h a t he shook their
r a n k s , delivered Col. Garrigó, a n d seized t h e five pieces of artillery. T h e
Q u e e n ' s t r o o p s having suffered this c h e c k , retired to M a d r i d , w h e r e t h e y
arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening. O n e of their G e n e r a l s , Messina, w a s
slightly w o u n d e d . T h e r e w a s a great n u m b e r of dead and w o u n d e d on b o t h
sides in their m u r d e r o u s e n g a g e m e n t s . "
We c o m e n o w to the r e p o r t of t h e Indépendance, d a t e d M a d r i d , 1st July,
w h i c h s e e m s t o b e t h e most t r u s t w o r t h y :
" T h e V e n t a del Espíritu Santo and Vicalvaro w e r e t h e t h e a t e r of a m u r d e r o u s c o m b a t , in which the t r o o p s of t h e Q u e e n w e r e repulsed this side t h e
Fonda de la Alegría. T h r e e squares successively f o r m e d on different p o i n t s ,
w e r e spontaneously dissolved by o r d e r of the Minister of War. A fourth w a s
f o r m e d b e y o n d t h e Retiro. T e n s q u a d r o n s of insurgents c o m m a n d e d by
Generals O'Donnell and Dulce in p e r s o n , a t t a c k e d it in t h e c e n t e r (?) while
guerrillas t o o k it in the flank (?).—(it is difficult to c o n c e i v e w h a t this corr e s p o n d e n t u n d e r s t a n d s by center] and flanki a t t a c k s on a square).—Twice
t h e insurgents c a m e to close fighting w i t h the artillery b u t w e r e repulsed by
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The Details of the Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Prussian Summons
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the grape-shot poured u p o n t h e m . T h e insurrectionists evidently intended
seizing s o m e pieces of artillery placed in e a c h of the corners of the square.
Night having a p p r o a c h e d in t h e m e a n t i m e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l forces retired
in échelons on the gate of Alcalá, w h e r e a s q u a d r o n of the cavalry t h a t h a d
remained faithful w a s suddenly surprised by a d e t a c h m e n t of insurrectionist
lancers w h o had concealed t h e m s e l v e s behind t h e Plaza de toros. In t h e midst
of t h e confusion p r o d u c e d by this u n e x p e c t e d attack, the insurrectionists
seized four pieces of artillery t h a t h a d remained behind. T h e loss w a s nearly
equal on b o t h sides. T h e insurgent cavalry suffered m u c h from t h e grapeshot, b u t their lances h a v e almost exterminated the regiment de la R e i n a
G o b e r n a d o r a , and t h e m o u n t e d gendarmerie. L a t e s t a c c o u n t s inform us t h a t
the insurrectionists received r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s from Toledo and Valladolid.
T h e r e is e v e n a r u m o r afloat t h a t General N a r v a e z is expected to-day at
Vallecas w h e r e he is to be received by G e n e r a l s Dulce, O'Donnell, R o s de
Olano and A r m e r o . T r e n c h e s h a v e b e e n o p e n e d at t h e gate of Atocha.
C r o w d s of curious are thronging t h e railway station w h e n c e the a d v a n c e
posts of General O'Donnell m a y be perceived. All t h e gates of Madrid are,
h o w e v e r , rigorously watched.****.
Three O'Clock P.M., same Day—The insurgents o c c u p y t h e place of
Vallecas, three English miles from Madrid, in considerable force. T h e
G o v e r n m e n t expected t o d a y the t r o o p s from the provinces, especially t h e
battalion del Rey. If we are to believe the m o s t r e c e n t information, this force
had joined the insurgents.
Four P.M.—At this m o m e n t almost t h e w h o l e garrison leaves Madrid in t h e
direction of Vallecas, in order to meet t h e insurgents w h o s h o w the greatest
confidence. T h e shops are closed. T h e G u a r d of the jReiiroand generally of
all G o v e r n m e n t offices h a v e b e e n a r m e d in h a s t e . I h e a r at this m o m e n t t h a t
some c o m p a n i e s of the garrison y e s t e r d a y joined t h e insurgents. T h e Madrid
garrison is c o m m a n d e d by Gen. C a m p u z a n o , w h o was falsely stated to h a v e
gone over to the insurgents, G e n . V i s t a H e r m o s a , and Blaser, the Minister
of War. Till n o w no r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s have c o m e to t h e support of t h e G o v e r n m e n t ; but the 4th Regiment of the line a n d the 1st Cavalry are said to have
left Valladolid and to be marching in all haste u p o n Madrid. T h e same is
assured with r e s p e c t to the garrison of B u r g o s , c o m m a n d e d by G e n . T u r o n .
Lastly, Gen. Rivero h a s left Saragossa with imposing forces. M o r e bloody
e n c o u n t e r s are, therefore, t o b e e x p e c t e d . "
Up to t h e 6th inst. no p a p e r s or letters h a d arrived from Madrid. T h e
Moniteur alone h a s t h e following laconic dispatch, dated Madrid, t h e 4th of
July:
"Tranquillity continues to reign at Madrid and in t h e p r o v i n c e s . "
A private dispatch states t h a t the insurgents are at Aranjuez. If t h e battle
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anticipated for t h e 1st inst, by t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t of t h e Indépendance, h a d
resulted in a victory of the G o v e r n m e n t , t h e r e w o u l d be wanting neither
letters, n o r p a p e r s , n o r bulletins. Notwithstanding t h a t t h e state of siege h a d
b e e n p r o c l a i m e d at M a d r i d , the Clamor Público, t h e Nación, t h e Diario, t h e
España, and t h e Época h a d r e a p p e a r e d w i t h o u t p r e v i o u s notice to t h e
G o v e r n m e n t , w h o s e fiscal informed t h e m of this dismal fact. A m o n g the
p e r s o n s arrested at Madrid are n a m e d M e s s r s . A n t o n i o Guillermo M o r e n o
and J o s é M a n u e l Collado, b a n k e r s . A w a r r a n t w a s issued against Sijora
Sevillano, M a r q u é s de F u e n t e s de D u e r o , a particular friend of Marshal
N a r v a e z . M e s s r s . M o n and Pidal are placed u n d e r surveillance.
It would be p r e m a t u r e to form an opinion on the general c h a r a c t e r of this
insurrection. I m a y say, however, that it d o e s n o t s e e m to p r o c e e d from t h e
Progressista p a r t y , as Gen. S a n Miguel, their soldier, r e m a i n s quiet at Madrid.
F r o m all t h e r e p o r t s it seems, on t h e contrary, t h a t N a r v a e z is at the b o t t o m
of it, and t h a t Q u e e n Christina, w h o s e influence h a d of late m u c h d e c r e a s e d
t h r o u g h t h e Q u e e n ' s favorite C o u n t San L u i s , is n o t entirely a stranger to
it.
T h e r e is p e r h a p s no country, e x c e p t T u r k e y , so little k n o w n t o , and so
falsely judged by E u r o p e as Spain. T h e n u m b e r l e s s local p r o n u n c i a m e n t o s
and military rebellions h a v e a c c u s t o m e d E u r o p e to view it on a level w i t h
Imperial R o m e at t h e e r a of t h e praetorians. T h i s is quite as superficial an
error as w a s committed in the case of T u r k e y , by t h o s e w h o fancied the life
of t h e nation extinct b e c a u s e its official history for t h e last c e n t u r y consisted
only of palace-revolutions and Janissary émeutes. T h e secret of this fallacy
lies in the simple fact that historians, instead of viewing t h e r e s o u r c e s and
strength of t h e s e peoples in their provincial and local organization, h a v e
d r a w n at the source of their C o u r t almanacs. T h e m o v e m e n t s of w h a t we
are used to call the S t a t e , h a v e so little affected t h e Spanish p e o p l e , t h a t t h e y
w e r e quite c o n t e n t to leave t h a t restricted domain to t h e alternative passions
and p e t t y intrigues of C o u r t minions, soldiers, a d v e n t u r e r s , and a few
so-called statesmen, and t h e y h a v e had little c a u s e to r e p e n t t h e m s e l v e s of
their indifference. T h e character of m o d e r n Spanish history deserving to
receive a very different appreciation t h a n it h a s until n o w experienced. I will
t a k e an opportunity to treat this subject in o n e of my n e x t letters. This m u c h
I m a y yet r e m a r k in this place, t h a t little surprise ought to be felt, if a general
m o v e m e n t should n o w arise in the Peninsula from a m e r e military rebellion,
since t h e late financial decrees of t h e G o v e r n m e n t h a v e c o n v e r t e d t h e t a x gatherer into a m o s t efficient revolutionary propagandist.
Austria holds at this m o m e n t the balance of war. If she has n o t yet m a r c h e d
h e r t r o o p s into Wallachia, it is only b e c a u s e she awaited t h e reply of t h e
E m p e r o r of Russia. T h e electric telegraph r e p o r t s t h a t Gorchakoff has n o w
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arrived at Vienna, t h e b e a r e r of a disagreeable a n s w e r . F o r the first time t h e
Austro-Prussian s u m m o n s , dispatched on J u n e 3d, h a s b e e n published in t h e
Kölnische Zeitung. T h e principal p a s s a g e s in t h e A u s t r i a n s u m m o n s are t h e
following: " T h e E m p e r o r of R u s s i a weighing in his w i s d o m all t h e s e considerations, will appreciate t h e value which t h e E m p e r o r of Austria must
attach to a discontinuance of the a d v a n c e of the Russian a r m y in the T r a n s danubian countries, and to the obtaining from him positive indications as to
the e p o c h , it is to be h o p e d not v e r y distant, w h e n t h e o c c u p a t i o n of t h e
Principalities shall c o m e to an end. T h e E m p e r o r Nicholas, we are far from
doubting it, desires p e a c e ; he will therefore consider the m e a n s of bringing
to an end a state of things tending every day m o r e to b e c o m e a source of
internal trouble to Austria and G e r m a n y . We are sure that he will n o t drive
t h e E m p e r o r Francis J o s e p h to t h e necessity of considering for himself t h e
m e a n s of saving his interests, so m u c h c o m p r o m i s e d by the p r e s e n t situation,
by prolonging indefinitely this occupation, or by attaching such conditions
to the evacuation w h i c h it w o u l d be impossible for us to o b t a i n . "
T h e Prussian n o t e destined t o support the A u s t r i a n " s u m m o n s " t e r m i n a t e s
as follows:
" T h e King h o p e s that the E m p e r o r will c o n s e n t to place the question at
dispute on a ground offering a practical issue, in order to facilitate a satisfactory solution, by abridging and circumscribing the general action of b o t h
parties. O u r august master h o p e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e p r e s e n t step will meet,
on t h e p a r t of the E m p e r o r of Russia, with a r e c e p t i o n similar in spirit to
t h a t which inspired it, and t h a t t h e a n s w e r which we and the Cabinet of
V i e n n a expect, with an interest corresponding to its i m p o r t a n c e , will be of
a c h a r a c t e r to allow t h e King to w i t h d r a w from t h e painful necessities which
would be imposed u p o n him by his d u t y and by his e n g a g e m e n t s . "
H e s s , the generalissimo of the Oriental a r m y , will establish his h e a d q u a r t e r s at Czeraswitz. T h e Soldatenfreund of V i e n n a gives the following
biography of General H e s s :
"Feldzeugmeister von Hess w a s b o r n at V i e n n a in 1788; in 1805 he e n t e r e d
t h e regiment Gyulay as ensign, w a s lieutenant of t h e staff at the end of 1815,
and appointed lieutenant-colonel and military c o m m i s s a r y at Turin in 1822.
Colonel since 1829, he b e c a m e in 1831 q u a r t e r m a s t e r of t h e mobile corps of
U p p e r Italy. In 1842 he obtained t h e r a n k of lieutenant-marshal, and w a s
chief of t h e staff of R a d e t z k y ' s a r m y in 1848. To him must be ascribed t h e
plan of the m a r c h u p o n M a n t u a , C u r t a t o n e and V i c e n z a in 1848, a n d that
of the short campaign of 1849, terminating with t h e b a t ü e of N o v a r a . "
W i t h regard to the a v o w e d intentions of Austria in t h e o c c u p a t i o n of
Wallachia, I will q u o t e from Austrian journals.
T h e Oherpostamts-Zeitung of Frankfurt, organ of t h e Austrian e m b a s s y
at the B u n d e s t a g r e m a r k s :
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" B y its geographical position, A u s t r i a is obliged to w o r k in the m o s t
effective m a n n e r at t h e reëstablishment of p e a c e , by actually separating,
t h r o u g h the o c c u p a t i o n of the Principalities, the belligerent parties, and
interposing b e t w e e n t h e m at t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t place. If t h e R u s s i a n s retire
b e h i n d t h e P r u t h , the T u r k s and their allies c a n n o t t h e n c r o s s the D a n u b e .
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If we t a k e further into account t h a t b o t h parties h a v e gained o n e experience
and lost o n e illusion—the Russians having lost t h e delusion of their military
p r e d o m i n a n c e and the maritime p o w e r s that of t h e o m n i p o t e n c e of their
fleets—it is clear t h a t the actual situation r e n d e r s the r e s u m p t i o n of p e a c e
negotiations almost inevitable."
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T h e Lloyd, in its turn, o b s e r v e s :
" T h e disputed Territory, viz. the Principalities, w o u l d be left to the p r o t e c tion of a neutral power. A Turkish a r m y could n o t t a k e up a position on t h e
b a n k s of the P r u t h . An a r m e d mediator would stand b e t w e e n t h e forces of
t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s and t h o s e of Russia, and w o u l d p r e v e n t a collision in
t h e D a n u b i a n Principalities. T h u s there would b e , in point of fact, an armistice on t h e most important theater of war. If, indeed, t h e possibility of p e a c e
still exists, this m e a s u r e might p r o m o t e it. T h e r e c a n be no d o u b t entertained
either at St. P e t e r s b u r g or elsewhere, b u t t h a t t h e determination of Austria
to o c c u p y the Principalities has b e e n adopted with a view to p e a c e , and that
at t h e s a m e t i m e it is t h e last step which c a n be t a k e n for t h e prevention of
a general w a r . "
T h e last and m o s t curious article in this line o c c u r s in the Spenersche
Zeitung published at Berlin:
" I t is confirmed that t h e e m b a s s a d o r s of t h e four great p o w e r s will hold
a n e w C o n f e r e n c e at Vienna, firstly with a v i e w to t a k e cognizance of t h e
c o n v e n t i o n of A u s t r i a with the P o r t e , and to declare it to be in c o n f o r m a n c e
with t h e anterior protocols of t h e C o n f e r e n c e ; a n d secondly to c o m e to a
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g as to the m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e principles established
by t h e V i e n n a P r o t o c o l of 9th April m a y be so modified as to serve for t h e
positive basis of the future preliminaries, n o t of w a r , b u t of p e a c e . "
In the m e a n t i m e Austria has profited by t h e s e contingencies to project a
n e w loan, of w h i c h t h e following are t h e t e r m s of its official a n n o u n c e ment:
" 1. T h e a m o u n t of the loan is provisionally fixed at from 350 to 500 millions
of florins. If t h e subscriptions r e a c h this sum, t h e p a y m e n t s are to be effected
during t h r e e , four, or five y e a r s , according to t h e a m o u n t of the subscription.
2. T h e rate of emission is fixed at 95 in b a n k p a p e r .
3. T h e interest to be at 5 p e r cent., paid in real coin.
4. T h e subscription is no forced o n e , t h e Imperial G o v e r n m e n t being a b o u t
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to appeal, t h r o u g h the constituted authorities of all p r o v i n c e s , to t h e patriotism of t h e subjects of t h e S t a t e .
5. T h e loan will be e m p l o y e d to p a y t h e State d e b t to the B a n k , to t h e
a m o u n t of 80 millions, with a view of t h u s restoring t h e value of t h e B a n k
paper. T h e surplus (it is v e r y ingenious to call four-fifths of the w h o l e a
surplus) will be employed as r e s o u r c e for t h e b u d g e t s of coming y e a r s . "
T h e Lloyd, of c o u r s e , assures t h a t this g r a n d financial operation n o w
c o n t e m p l a t e d (and almost for the first time!) m u s t and will do away with t h e
existing depreciation of the Austrian c u r r e n c y . Y o u r r e a d e r s will n o t h a v e
forgotten t h a t it w a s this p r e t e x t which i n t r o d u c e d almost every Austrian
loan in this century. T h e r e are some p o i n t s , h o w e v e r , in this grand operation
which t h e y might not hit upon, as t h e y are carefully omitted from t h e a b o v e
a n n o u n c e m e n t . On this score The Globe of last evening r e m a r k s :
" T h i s loan will be national; i.e. e v e r y t a x - p a y e r will be called u p o n to
subscribe in proportion of t h e a m o u n t of t a x e s he p a y s . F o r t h e p r e s e n t some
moral compulsion will be employed to p r e c e d e positive compulsion. In point
of fact, therefore, the m e a s u r e a m o u n t s to t h e raising of an additional s u m
of t a x e s at o n c e , with t h e promise t h a t this particular sum shall be r e p a i d . "
It is curious w h a t r e s e m b l a n c e this grand operation b e a r s in point of its
p r e t e x t s as well as in point of execution, with t h e late Spanish d e c r e e s t h a t
n o w prelude to a revolution.
In my last letter I called your attention to t h e rights and position of the
Wallachian people, in opposition to the diplomatic quarrels pretending to
originate in their violation. A r e p o r t has j u s t a p p e a r e d in t h e Paris Siècle,
of M. B a r b u Bibescu, prefect of Mehedintzi, in Little Wallachia, a d d r e s s e d
to t h e Foreign Minister of t h e P o r t e , in w h i c h at length we hear a voice
raised for t h e people of t h e Principalities t r e a t e d with such shameful indifference by the " d e f e n d e r s of civilization." It c o m m e n c e s w i t h stating t h a t
" T h e Russians, to avenge t h e m s e l v e s of t h e p a s s i v e resistance of a c o m pletely disarmed p e o p l e , a b a n d o n e d t h e m s e l v e s to the m o s t abominable acts
of cruelty a n d dilapidation on their retreat from Little Wallachia. T h e y h a v e
carried away the c a s h in the public c h e s t s , the seals a n d t h e archives of t h e
Administration, and t h e sacred vessels of t h e c h u r c h e s . W h e n retiring t h e y
slaughtered the cattle w h i c h the n u m b e r l e s s requisitions h a d spared; and
t h e s e cattle they t o o k not a w a y , b u t left to rot, merely to m a k e t h e people
feel their cruelty and h a t r e d . " M. Bibescu r e m a r k s with r e s p e c t to the t h e n
r u m o r e d e n t r a n c e of t h e Austrians into Wallachia, t h a t " e v e n a b e n e v o l e n t
foreign a r m y is always b u r d e n s o m e for the c o u n t r y it o c c u p i e s . " He says
t h a t Wallachia d o e s n o t w a n t t h e A u s t r i a n s ; t h a t it is able to furnish a c o n tingent of 50,000 m e n , drilled in a r m s and disciplined. In e a c h of the sevent e e n d e p a r t m e n t s of Wallachia t h e r e are at this m o m e n t 3,000 gendarmerie,
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w o o d - k e e p e r s , game-keepers and ancient soldiers, w h o require only a r m s
and t o h e a r t h e d r u m s beat, w h e n t h e y would b u r s t u p o n t h e Russians. H e
c o n c l u d e s in the following w o r d s :
" I t is a r m s we w a n t ; if there be not e n o u g h in y o u r arsenals, the m a n y
factories in F r a n c e , England and Belgium do n o t w a n t t h e m , a n d we are ready
to p a y for t h e m . A r m s ! and again a r m s , E x c e l l e n c y , a n d b e f o r e t h r e e m o n t h s
t h e r e will n o t r e m a i n o n e single Russian in the Principalities, and t h e Sublime
Porte will find a force of 100,000 R o u m a n s as eager as t h e Osmanlis to p u r s u e
a n d punish their c o m m o n and implacable e n e m y . "
T h e p o o r Prefect of Mehedintzi does not u n d e r s t a n d t h a t it is precisely
for preventing t h e m to h a v e a r m s , and along with t h e Osmanlis to p u r s u e
and p u n i s h the Russians that Austria subjects the Wallachians to her o c c u p a tion.
Sir Charles N a p i e r , say t h e C o c k n e y p a p e r s , is trying to m a k e the C z a r ' s
Admirals c o m e out from Cronstadt, and to leave t h e p r o t e c t i o n of the granitewalls behind w h i c h t h e y " t r e m b l e " before the A n g l o - F r e n c h fleet. B u t w h y
d o n ' t t h e English sailors c o m e out from their w o o d e n walls a n d fight the
R u s s i a n s on their element, the land? Be it o b s e r v e d , t h a t in spite of the
English b r a v a d o e s , t h e Russians c a m e out from S e v a s t o p o l , and " d a m a g e d "
the Fury.
Baraguay d'Hilliers has b e e n appointed c o m m a n d e r of a division of troops
to be e m b a r k e d for the Baltic, t h e d e p a r t u r e of which is fixed for t h e 14th
inst. ; England is to furnish the transports for 6,000 m e n . An equal n u m b e r
of t r o o p s with o n e field battery will be e m b a r k e d on b o a r d t h e F r e n c h ships.
If we add to t h e s e n u m b e r s that of the marine-soldiers c o m m a n d e d by
Col. Fieron, t h e effective of the whole Baltic division will a m o u n t to from
13,000 to 14,000 m e n , while at the same time the e m b a r k a t i o n of troops for
t h e Black S e a from Marseilles has not yet c e a s e d ; t h e p r o c e s s of disarming
F r a n c e having apparently not yet reached the desired point of " s a f e t y . "
Karl Marx.
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Excitement in Italy—The Events in Spain—
The Position of the German States—British Magistrates
Nr.4142, 28. Juli 1854
L o n d o n , F r i d a y , July 14, 1854.
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Sir Charley has quietly r e t u r n e d from C r o n s t a d t , with no other killed or
w o u n d e d t h a n some of his gallant t a r s carried off by t h e cholera. To k e e p
the public in good h u m o r , the same farce is n o w to be r e p e a t e d before
Sevastopol, fifty sail of t h e c o m b i n e d fleets having b e e n seen at Odessa,
" m a k i n g d i r e c t " for that place.
T h e e m b a r k a t i o n of the F r e n c h t r o o p s from Calais, fixed for this day, has
b e e n adjourned until the 20th inst., in order, it is said, to await the dev e l o p m e n t of e v e n t s in Spain.
General B u d b e r g h a s forced u p o n the inhabitants of the Principalities an
a d d r e s s expressing their t h a n k s t o t h e E m p e r o r Nicholas for t h e o c c u p a t i o n
of their c o u n t r y , and for its defense against the " c r u e l and b a r b a r o u s T u r k . "
T h e E u p h r a t e s , which left Constantinople on t h e 5th a n d arrived at Marseilles
on the 13th inst., brings the important n e w s t h a t t h e D o b r o d j a has n o t at all
b e e n e v a c u a t e d b y the R u s s i a n s , a n d t h a t the "illustrious" Reshid
(wretched) P a s h a h a s r e s u m e d t h e office of F o r e i g n Minister.
It is stated from C r a c o w , July 8, t h a t Prince P a s h k i e w i t c h has arrived at
Castle Hornel, on his estates in Lithuania, a n d t h a t he is not to t a k e any more
p a r t in the p r e s e n t campaign. It is added that n o t only himself, b u t also his
plan of campaign, h a s b e e n given u p , a n d this is t h e m o r e probable as t h e
Russian t r o o p s already in r e t r e a t to M o l d a v i a h a v e b e e n ordered forward
again by Prince Gorchakoff, w h o is said to be collecting a strong force in
front of B u c h a r e s t . T h e p r e s e n t position of the Russian troops is, t h e r e f o r e ,
as follows : their right wing on t h e U p p e r J a l o m n i t z a , leaning with its e x t r e m e
o n the Transylvanian Alps, w h e r e t h e y o c c u p y the T e m e s h e r P a s s w i t h
twenty-four pieces of h e a v y artillery; their c e n t e r extending from F o k s h a n i
to B u c h a r e s t ; their left, u n d e r L ü d e r s , at B r a i l o w ; and their e x t r e m e left,
u n d e r Uschakoff, in t h e Dobrodja.
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T h e latest n e w s from the theater of w a r states t h a t t h e T u r k s h a v e crossed
t h e D a n u b e in force, (40,000, including 12,000 allies,) a n d t h a t t h e y h a v e
occupied Giurgevo. F r e n c h journals r e p o r t that t h e R u s s i a n establishment
a t t h e Sulina m o u t h has b e e n b o m b a r d e d and d e s t r o y e d b y t h e steamers
d e t a c h e d from the combined fleet, b u t this n e w s is p r o b a b l y to be classed
with t h e h o a x a b o u t t h e second b o m b a r d m e n t a n d d e s t r u c t i o n of B o m a r s u n d
in t h e Baltic. T h e operations of M a r s h a l St. A r n a u d in t h e E a s t s e e m to h a v e
inspired the Tuileries with some dread, lest t h e y might be on t o o grand a scale.
At least, it is said that the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t has dispatched a special
superintendent—of c o u r s e , a financial one—to c o n t r o l his e x c e s s of zeal (son
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excès de zèle).
In Italy, a strange excitement has t a k e n hold b o t h of t h e G o v e r n m e n t s a n d
t h e people. G e n . L a M a r m o r a , the P i e d m o n t e s e Minister o f W a r , has o r d e r e d
t h e f o r m a t i o n of military c a m p s in Savoy, at St. M a u r i c e , at Alessandria, and
e v e n in t h e Island of Sardinia. A great n u m b e r of soldiers on unlimited leave
h a v e b e e n recalled u n d e r a r m s . Simultaneously the f o r t r e s s e s of Alessandria
and Casale are being provisioned. Marshal R a d e t z k y , on t h e other h a n d , h a s
likewise o r d e r e d t h e formation of a c a m p b e t w e e n V e r o n a and Volta, w h e r e
m o r e t h a n 20,000 t r o o p s are daily exercised in t h e o p e r a t i o n s of w a r on a
small scale, (petite guerre.) T r o u b l e s occasioned by t h e d e a r n e s s of provisions h a v e t a k e n place at C o d o g n o , Casale, P u s t e r l e n g o , and in s o m e L o m b a r d i a n t o w n s . A b o u t t w o h u n d r e d p e r s o n s h a v e b e e n a r r e s t e d and c o n v e y e d
t o M a n t u a . According t o letters from N a p l e s , n u m e r o u s arrests h a d b e e n
m a d e t h e r e as well as in Sicily, w h e r e the son of C o u n t Caraffa has b e e n
imprisoned. King B o m b a is taking extraordinary m e a s u r e s for a r m a m e n t s
by land and sea. He has ordered the fortress of G a e t a to be p u t in r e a d i n e s s
for all eventualities. All E u r o p e has b e e n declared pestiferous by him, and
a strict quarantine is established for all vessels arriving. All shipping from
Portugal, Glasgow and the Sardinian States, are subjected to a quarantine
of ten d a y s ; that of T u s c a n y a n d the R o m a n S t a t e s , s e v e n d a y s . A l m o s t e v e r y
other c o u n t r y being already subject to similar restrictions, t h e free arrival
of any ship at all is a rare exception. Foreign c o r r e s p o n d e n c e by land is
subjected to all t h e m e a s u r e s of precaution o b s e r v e d with regard to arrivals
from pestiferous countries. C o m m u n i c a t i o n with t h e P a p a l States is still
carried on by M o n t e Casino a n d Sora, and by t h e A b r u z z i , b u t a sanitary
c o r d o n is a b o u t to be established along the w h o l e frontier.
T h e last mail d u e from Madrid, via B o r d e a u x , h a d n o t arrived at Paris up
to y e s t e r d a y evening. T h e royal t r o o p s are stated to be still in pursuit of t h e
r e b e l s , to h a v e r e a c h e d t h e m , and to be on the point of cutting t h e m to pieces.
We w e r e told in t h e first instance, that t h e rebels w e r e on their flight to
E s t r e m a d u r a , i n o r d e r t o gain t h e P o r t u g u e s e frontier. N o w w e h e a r they are
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New-York S e m i - W e e k l y T r i b u n e . N r . 9 5 7 , 28. Juli 1854.
T i t e l s e i t e (Ausschnitt) mit M a r x ' Artikel „ E x c i t e m e n t in I t a l y . . . "
Excitement in Italy—The Events in Spain—The Position of the German States
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on t h e w a y to Andalusia, a c i r c u m s t a n c e w h i c h s h o w s no v e r y great determination on their p a r t to expatriate t h e m s e l v e s so soon. According to
private letters Gen. S e r r a n o has joined t h e m with 300 cavalry, while t h e
Gaceta p r e t e n d s t h a t he joined t h e m single-handed. At Madrid it w a s
r u m o r e d t h a t t h e K i n g ' s regiment (del Rey,) h a d g o n e o v e r to the insurgents.
T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Morning Chronicle a d d s t h a t t h e y w e r e joined
besides by 200 officers of all a r m s , several c o m p a n i e s of t h e regiments
stationed at T o l e d o , and t w o battalions of v o l u n t e e r s from Madrid. T h e
Gaceta a n n o u n c e s t h a t the division o r d e r e d to p u r s u e t h e rebels left Madrid
on the evening of the 5th, being c o m p o s e d of t h r e e brigades of infantry, o n e
of cavalry, t w o batteries of artillery, o n e c o m p a n y of engineers, a n d o n e
d e t a c h m e n t of the w o r k m e n of the military administration. It set o u t u n d e r
c o m m a n d of Gen. Vista H e r m o s a , w h o w a s replaced, h o w e v e r , on t h e following d a y by G e n . Blaser, the Minister of W a r . A royal d e c r e e of 7th July
intrusts t h e ministry of War to Gen. San R o m a n during t h e a b s e n c e of Blaser.
T h e Gaceta states t h a t the division a b o v e m e n t i o n e d w a s at T e m b l e q u e , and
p r o c e e d i n g in the direction of Ciudad R e a l by t h e valley of the G u a d i a n a .
On t h e same day, Blaser published a p r o c l a m a t i o n to the soldiers a n d n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers in t h e rebel a r m y , inviting t h e m to return to their
s t a n d a r d s , and promising t h e m full p a r d o n in t h e n a m e of the Queen. We
r e a d t h e following in t h e Messager de Bayonne:
" A c c o r d i n g to t h e latest n e w s we h a v e received, G e n . O'Donnell m a d e a
m o v e m e n t in the direction of V a l d e p e ñ e s . T h e v a n g u a r d of t h e royal a r m y
w a s assembled at T e m b l e q u e . G e n . O'Donnell is employing his leisure in
exercising his little a r m y , c o m p o s e d of 2,000 h o r s e , six pieces of artillery,
and 800 infantry."
T h e proclamations of O'Donnell and D u l c e are of a different character,
t h e o n e appealing to t h e Constitution of 1837, t h e other to t h e ancient
Castilian right of insurrection against m o n a r c h s guilty of having b r o k e n t h e
coronation-oath. A n e w feature is t h e formation of republican guerrillas in
Valencia. U n d e r date of 6th inst., a c o m m u n i c a t i o n has b e e n received to t h e
effect t h a t some t o w n s and villages h a v e risen against t h e G o v e r n m e n t ,
a m o n g others Alcira, X a t i v a and Carlet. O r o z c o , a retired Colonel, has
e n t e r e d t h e last-named t o w n at t h e head of an a r m e d b a n d , confiscated all
fire-arms, and invited the inhabitants by p r o c l a m a t i o n to join the m o v e m e n t .
T h e G o v e r n m e n t sent off d e t a c h m e n t s of cavalry, infantry and civil guard,
to suppress the insurrections in Valencia.
T h e Indépendance Belge gives quite a n e w v e r s i o n of t h e R u s s i a n n o t e
a d d r e s s e d t o Austria a n d Prussia. According t o this p a p e r , w h i c h m a y b e
regarded as the private Moniteur of t h e retired R u s s i a n diplomatists at
Brussels, t h e Russian n o t e w a s not a d d r e s s e d directly t o t h e Austrian Cabi-
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Karl Marx
n e t , b u t to Prince Gorchakoff, w h o left a copy with M. de B u o i , expressing
t h e belief t h a t Austria, while demanding the e v a c u a t i o n of t h e Principalities
by t h e R u s s i a n s , only m e a n t to p r o p o s e an armistice, since it could n o t be
h e r wish to e x p o s e t h e retreating Russian armies to an a t t a c k of t h e allied
f o r c e s . T h e A u s t r i a n meaning, accordingly, m u s t h a v e b e e n a suspension of
a r m s . T u r k s , English and F r e n c h would t h e n h a v e to abstain from all forward
m o v e m e n t s and from every act of fresh hostility to Russia. As to t h e evacuation of t h e Principalities by t h e Russian t r o o p s , t h e n o t e dwells on t h e
absolute necessity for Russia of maintaining certain strategical points in
t h o s e p r o v i n c e s while attending the conclusion of p e a c e , as she w o u l d otherw i s e be placed in t o o disadvantageous a position with regard to the armies
of t h e allies. On t h e other h a n d , t h e n o t e p r o t e s t s against any s u p p o s e d
intention of threatening Austria by the said strategical o c c u p a t i o n . P r o c e e d ing from t h e s e p r o m i s e s , t h e n o t e e x p r e s s e s t h e disposition of R u s s i a t e enter
u p o n n e w negotiations of p e a c e , to be on the following b a s i s : T h e integrity
of t h e O t t o m a n empire, which the Russian G o v e r n m e n t h a s never intended
to injure; the equality b e t w e e n the Christian and M u s s u l m a n subjects of t h e
P o r t e , s u c h as it is u n d e r s t o o d in the protocol of April 9; finally, t h e revision
of t h e c o n v e n t i o n s referring to the Straits. T h e n o t e admits a c o m m o n p r o t e c t o r a t e of t h e p o w e r s over t h e Christians of T u r k e y ; b u t with regard to the
R u s s i a n p r o t e c t o r a t e of the G r e e k Christians, the article in t h e Indépendance
c o n f e s s e s t h a t s o m e vague p h r a s e s are a t t a c h e d to it w h i c h w o u l d give
sufficient latitude for diverging interpretations. Prince Gorchakoff, it is said,
s p e a k s e v e n in a m o r e s u b d u e d t o n e t h a n t h e n o t e itself. H i s dispatch d o e s
n o t contain the last word of Russia; he m a y be authorized to go further, with
a view of enabling Austria to enter into fresh negotiations. On t h e 9th inst.,
h o w e v e r , the V i e n n a Cabinet had n o t yet c o m e to a decision. " N o w , " says
t h e Indépendance, or rather B a r o n B r u n n o w , " w e m u s t n o t conceal from
o u r s e l v e s t h a t w h a t e v e r t h e dispositions at St. P e t e r s b u r g might b e , a single
incident, an actual act of war, an a t t a c k against C r o n s t a d t , or w h a t is more
p r o b a b l e , against Sevastopol, and e v e n the o c c u p a t i o n of t h e Aland Isles by
the A n g l o - F r e n c h , m u s t necessarily modify t h o s e dispositions, a n d give
m o r e force t o t h e p a r t y o p p o s e d t o any c o n c e s s i o n . "
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At all e v e n t s , this Russian n o t e has satisfied Prussia, w h i c h considers it
as a sort of e s c a p e into n e w negotiations, and as a m e a n s of preventing t h e 35
A u s t r i a n s from entering Wallachia. T h e Moniteur itself admits t h a t t h e
objections raised by Prussia against this Austrian e n t r a n c e h a v e p r o d u c e d
t h e fresh hesitation evinced b y the C o u r t o f V i e n n a . O n t h e other h a n d , w e
a r e told in t h e sanctimonious Morning Chronicle t h a t "it w a s u r g e d from
Berlin, t h a t the contingent d u t y with which the C o u r t of Berlin charged itself,
40
of protecting t h e Austrian territory from invasion, entitled it to p r o t e s t
334
Titelseiten (Ausschnitte) v o n drei A u s g a b e n d e r „ N e w - Y o r k T r i b u n e " ,
In d e n e n M a r x ' Artikel „ E x c i t e m e n t in Italy" e r s c h i e n
Excitement in Italy—The Events in Spain—The Position of the German States
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against any fresh p r o v o c a t i o n of R u s s i a . " It is k n o w n , b e s i d e s , that t h e treaty
b e t w e e n Austria a n d P r u s s i a w a s arranged in precisely such a m a n n e r as to
allow either of the p o w e r s to stop its military o p e r a t i o n s as long as it should
n o t be convinced of the necessity of t h e warlike steps c o n t e m p l a t e d by t h e
other. T h u s Austria m a y a p p e a r anxious to act with t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s ,
while it finds itself stopped by t h e r e m o n s t r a n c e s of Prussia. I, for my part,
am sure that all t h e s e eventualities w e r e arranged for long ago by t h e t h r e e
n o r t h e r n p o w e r s i n c o m m o n , a n d t h a t e v e n t h e n e w difficulties raised against
A u s t r i a are only intended to give her o c c u p a t i o n of Wallachia the a p p e a r a n c e
of a heroic opposition to Russia. A little s h a m w a r , after t h e fashion of t h e
Austro-Prussian w a r of 1850, m a y n o t be e x c l u d e d from that arrangement,
as it would only contribute to give A u s t r i a a m o r e decisive v o t e at t h e
conclusion of p e a c e . Be it o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e Austrian Correspondence
expressly a n n o u n c e s t h a t A u s t r i a c o n s e n t s in e v e r y point to t h e policy of
the w e s t e r n p o w e r s , except as to any e v e n t u a l infringement on the p r e s e n t
territories of Russia.
In judging the position of Austria, it is i m p o r t a n t to notice the " P r o t e s t
of t h e Servian G o v e r n m e n t against Austrian o c c u p a t i o n , " dated J u n e 22,
w h i c h has n o w b e e n laid before the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . This p r o t e s t is
a d d r e s s e d by t h e Servian G o v e r n m e n t to t h e Sublime P o r t e . It begins with
stating that " a c c o r d i n g as Austria believed the Servian G o v e r n m e n t to be
more or less well disposed t o w a r d Russia or t o w a r d T u r k e y , she held to it
a language corresponding to t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s , and constantly promised i t h e r
support for t h e defense of t h e frontiers of t h e Principality against all hostile
aggression." T h e n t o o k place a v e r y considerable concentration of t r o o p s
on t h e frontiers of Servia. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of Servia a s k e d for information
"directly from the Cabinet of V i e n n a , and indirectly from the Sublime P o r t e ,
as to t h e object a n d meaning of this military m o v e m e n t of A u s t r i a . " A u s t r i a
gave evasive declarations, while the P o r t e and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e
w e s t e r n p o w e r s at Constantinople professed to k n o w nothing a b o u t t h e
object of the Austrian d e

MEGA² I.13: Karl Marx, Artikel · Entwürfe. Januar

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