Planen und Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit (Salewski

Transcription

Seminar SUSTAINING THE CITY (FS 2011)
Planen und Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit (Salewski 4.4.2011)
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
©Mark Michaeli, Christian Salewski
TU München / ETH Zürich
Planen und Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit
1. Was ist Unsicherheit?
2. Was sind Szenarien?
3. Entscheidungsfindung unter Unsicherheit
Dr. Christian Salewski
Institut für Städtebau
ETH Zürich
Seminar Handlungskompetenz FS 2011, Universität St. Gallen
Sustaining the City - Nachhaltige räumliche Entwicklung weiterdenken: die offene Stadt
4. April 2011
Ohne die Erwartung, dass die Zukunft teilweise machbar
und kontrollierbar ist, wofür man keine anderen Mittel als
das heutige Wissen hat, ist jedes Planen sinnlos. Wenn das
Ziel der Planung das Erreichen einer höheren Lebensqualität
für zukünftige Generationen ist, dann muss man optimistisch
sein bezüglich der Möglichkeiten, dieses Ziel zu erreichen.
Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, 1981.
1. Was ist Unsicherheit?
Unsicherheit: Prognosen und Varianten
Das vorliegende Material dient allein internen Lehrzwecken an der Universität St.Gallen.
Jede (auch auszugsweise) Veröffentlichung, Vervielfältigung, Hosting oder Weitergabe,
sowie artfremde Verwendung sind untersagt. Bei Fragen bitte wenden an: [email protected]
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Bevölkerungsentwicklung 1990-2020 (Prognose ab 2002), aus: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin:
Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Metropolregion Berlin 2002-2020, Berlin o.D.
04.04.2011
Hauptbahnhof Berlin, Aussenansicht. Foto DB AG/ Henkelmann
6 Millionen Einwohner 2020: Prognose 1991
Unsicherheit: Ziele und Mittel
3.45 Millionen Einwohner 1990
3.3 - 3.5 Millionen Einwohner 2020: Prognose 2002
Bevölkerungsentwicklung 1990-2020 (Prognose ab 2002), aus: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung
Berlin:Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Metropolregion Berlin 2002-2020, Berlin o.D., Ergänzung von Christian
Salewski, Januar 2008
Christensen, Karen S. "Coping with Uncertainty in Planning." Journal of the American Planning Association 51,
no. 1 (1985): 63 - 73.
no. 1 (1985): 63 - 73.
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no. 1 (1985): 63 - 73.
04.04.2011
no. 1 (1985): 63 - 73.
known
(means-ends
relations and
quantities)
unknown
(means-ends
relations and
quantities)
low impact
high impact
known
(by decision makers)
Unsicherheit: eigenes und fremdes Wissen
unknown
(by decision makers)
types of knowledge
high probability
Unsicherheit: Wahrscheinlichkeit und Wirksamkeit
low probability
types of events
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04.04.2011
Unsicherheit: Betrachtungszeitraum
Forecast of power consumption in The Netherlands, Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios - The Art of Strategic
Conversation, Seite 90 und 92, 1996
2. Was sind Szenarien?
Forecasts - Scenarios - Hopes; Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios - The Art of Strategic Conversation, Seite 90 und
92, 1996
Fünf Typen von Zukunftsbildern
Zukunftsbilder
Orakel
Prophezeiung
Utopien
Prognosen
Szenarien
Minois, Georges. Geschichte der Zukunft Orakel, Prophezeiungen, Utopien, Prognosen. Düsseldorf Zürich: Artemis & Winkler, 1998.
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links: Thomas Morus: Utopia, Frontispiz, 1516
rechts: Jakov Tschernichow: Maschinenstadt, 1930
links: Arup, Dongtan Eco-City, China, 2007
rechts: Léon Krier, Atlantis, 1988
04.04.2011
Ridley Scott: Blade Runner, 1982. http://www.wallpaperbase.com/wallpapers/movie/bladerunner/
blade_runner_7.jpg, Januar 2008
visions
options
scenarios
forecasts
onefold
manyfold
manyfold
ranged/ hedged
linear/ progressive
adaptive
static
dynamic
desirable
all desirable
un-/desirable, neutral
neutral
agreeable
convincing
plausible
mathematically correct
guiding
decision making
exploring
predicting
sufficiently vague
sufficiently detailed
sufficiently vivid
sufficiently stringent
aspiration
convention
new horizons
certainty
hopes
information
knowledge
assumptions
mid/long range
short/mid range
mid/long range
short/mid/long range
inspiring
binding
narrative
accurate
"cloudy"
"clear"
"transparent"
"firm"
Christian Salewski, indicative criteria for the nature of plans: visions, options, scenarios, forecasts, 2008
Szenarien: Herkunft
Superstudio, Continuous Monument, 1971: storyboard (detail)
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04.04.2011
Ein Szenario ist das Ergebnis des Versuchs,
eine hypothetische Abfolge von Ereignissen
mehr oder weniger detailliert zu beschreiben.
Herman Kahn (1922 - 1983)
Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, 1962
Wenn ein Szenario glaubwürdig sein soll,
dann muss es sich natürlich am Anfang auf
eine sinnvolle Version der Gegenwart
beziehen, und es muss sich im Ablauf
vernünftig an mögliche Verhaltensweisen von
Menschen halten, obwohl es wichtig ist, sich
nicht nur auf die glaubwürdigsten,
konventionellen oder wahrscheinlichen
Situationen und Verhaltensweisen zu
beschränken.
links: Plumbbomb/Botlzmann Detonation. May 28, 1957, Nevada Test Site. http://www.aracnet.com/~pdxavets/
plumbbob.htm, Januar 2008; rechts: Nagasaki, Japan, before and after the atomic bombing of August 9, 1945.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Nagasaki_1945_-_Before_and_after_(adjusted).jpg, Januar 2008
Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, 1962
Kerndefinition von Szenarien
Szenarien gehen immer von Hypothesen über die Zukunft
Kriterien für den Erkenntniswert von Szenarien
aus und entwickeln eine Geschichte. Die Kombination von
Abwägung zwischen Imagination und Vernunft
Imagination und Vernunft, von synchroner und diachroner
Forschungsfrage, Modelle, Daten
Beschreibung, und der Fokus auf das Glaubwürdige sind
Zeit: gealterte Gegenwart oder offene Zukunft
die wichtigsten Eigenschaften von Szenarien.
Fokus: Vorhersage oder Gedankenexperiment
Über die Zeit haben sich Ziele, Methoden und Formen von
Massstab: räumliche Entwicklung und politische Werte
Szenarien erheblich verändert und angepasst.
core definition of scenarios, Christian Salewski, Dutch New Worlds. Scenarios in Physical Planning and Design
in the Netherlands, 1970-2000, 2010
criteria for the cognitive value of scenarios, Christian Salewski, Dutch New Worlds. Scenarios in Physical
Planning and Design in the Netherlands, 1970-2000, 2010
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Szenarien: Typen
DATAR, Le cône de development. La méthode des scénarios, 1972
type of
scenario
aim(s) of scenario
trend
scenario
tries to determine a
possible future
framing
scenario
normative
scenario
contrast
scenario
premise(s) of scenario used pathway
goals:
exploratory
or
pre-policy research
process
or
product
descriptive
or
predictive
issue-/area based
or
institution based
intuitive
or
analytical
qualitative
or
quantitative
participatory
or
model-based
group composition:
inclusive
or
exclusive
scenario content:
complex
or
simple
chain
or
snapshot
heterogeneous
or
homogeneous
integrated
or
isolated
function:
supposes the permanence examines the future
and predomination of
progress of these trends
heavy trends
and their explanatory
mechanisms
wants to delimit the space supposes the permanence makes extreme variations
of possible futures
and predomination of
of the hypotheses
heavy trends
regarding the evolution of
these trends
tries to produce one image
of a possible and
"desirable" future;
establishes a path
connecting this future
with the present
sketches a "desirable"
future at the limits of the
possible
supposes that one can
define right from the start
a set of possible objectives
for realisation
makes a synthesis of these
objectives and connects
this image of the future to
the present
inclusion of norms:
subject:
process design:
input:
method:
temporal nature:
supposes that one can
define right from the start
a set of objectives for
realisation, getting rid of
objectives of reference
four types of scenarios, DATAR, La Methode des scénarios, 1975
makes a synthesis of these
objectives for realisation
and connects this image of
the future to the present
factors:
interconnection:
Summary of scenario typology. in: van Notten, Philip: Writing on the Wall. Development in Times of
Discontinuity. dissertation.com: Boca Raton, Florida, 2005; p.36
Szenarien: Methoden
General Electric, Long-term environmental forecast, 1971
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Jay Forrester: World Dynamic, 1968
04.04.2011
Donatella Meadows et.al., The Limits to Growth, 1972
contextual environment
transactual environment
Um sich gänzlich über die Form der Wirklichkeit
bewusst zu werden ist es notwendig, an allen
self
Seiten über ihre Grenzen hinauszublicken.
Herman Kahn, 1963
Szenarien: Funktionen
links: Stanley Kubrick Dr. Strangelove. 1964. Videocover. http://kilby.sac.on.ca/towerslibrary/pages/users/Video
%20-%20Dr.%20Strangelove.jpg, Januar 2008; rechts: Herman Kahn im Gespräch mit DATARs Jérôme Monod,
Revue 2000, 1970
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04.04.2011
sechs Hauptfunktionen von Szenarien
(1) Szenarien als Planungsinstrument
(2) Szenarien als Instrument zum Generieren von Optionen / Form
(3) Szenarien als Instrument der Vorhersage
(4) Szenarien als Analyseinstrument
(5) Szenarien als Kommunikationsinstrument
(6) Szenarien als romantisches Instrument
sechs Hauptfunktionen von Szenarien, Christian Salewski, Dutch New Worlds. Scenarios in Physical Planning
and Design in the Netherlands, 1970-2000, 2010
(1) scenarios as planning device: DATAR, Système d‘Études du Schéma d‘Amenagement S.É.S.A.M.E., 1968
(Revue 2000) (left); DATAR, Un image de la France en l‘an 2000. Scénario de l‘inacceptable, 1971: Zones de
Polarisation 1990-2000 (right)
(1) scenarios as planning device: Erich Jantsch, OECD, Technological Forecasting in Perspective, 1967:
Technology Transfer Space; cone of possibilities, DATAR, Scénarios d‘amenagement du territoire, 1972; cone of
possibility, University of Utrecht, RPD, Manual for Designing Scenarios, 1981: cone of possibility
(2) scenarios as option generation / morphogenetic device: National Planning Agency for the IJsselmeer Polders
(RIJP), Explorations on the development of the new town Almere in Flevoland, 1970; Almere 1985. Approach
towards a development strategy 1970 - 1985 - 2000, 1974; Almere in Regional Frame, 1975
(3) scenarios as predictive device: National Physical Planning Agency (RPD), Scenarios for the Urbanisation
Report, 1974; The Future of Randstad Holland, 1983
(3) scenarios as predictive device: Simon Kretz, Kontrastverstärkung in der Agglomeration. Vision Schlieren
2050. Photocollage, Diplomarbeit Professur Christiaanse, ETH Zürich 2007; Schlieren, GoogleEarth, 2008
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liberal
sozialistisch
konfessionell
Vertrauen in
technokratische,
Misstrauen in
soziokratische
Initiativen
L2
S2
C2
Vertrauen in
soziokratische,
Misstrauen in
technokratische
Initiativen
L3
S3
C3
(4) scenarios as analytic device: Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), Policy-oriented explorations of
the future (BTV), 1980/1983
04.04.2011
(4) scenarios as analytic device: West 8, Wildlife, a thought experiment about the emptiness in the Randstad (for
AIR-Alexander), 1993
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Szenarien, Raumentwicklungsbericht, 2005: Ein stark polarisierter Raum / Ein zerstückelter Raum / Ein
multipolarer Raum und verlassene Gebiete / Gebiete, die ihre Entwicklung selbst gestalten
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"EVÚLKERUNGSWACHSTUM $IE KLEINEN UND MITTLEREN !GGLOMERATIONEN PROFITIEREN
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(6) scenarios as communicative device: Baudirektion Stadt Luzern, Die Stadt Luzern im Jahr 2022. Wohnstadt,
Grossstadt, Tourismusstadt, 2007
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(6) scenarios as communicative device: MVRDV, Stadt um den Zürichsee (für StadtLandSchweiz), 2005
(6) scenarios as romantic device: West 8, Marker Eye (for Eo-Wijers Competition IJmeer/IJsselmeer), 2006
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3. Entscheidungsfindung unter Unsicherheit
04.04.2011
Szenarien und Entscheidungsfindung
Harvard Business Review
86
Exhibit Vllt
139
73
How Royal Dutch/Shell
developed a planning technique
that teaches managers
to think about
an uncertain future
Scenarios:
shooting the
rapids
Scenarios:
uncharted waters
ahead
Pierre Wack
It i.s fashionable to downplay and even
denigrate the usefulness of economic forecasting. The reason is obvious: forecasters seem to be more often wrong
than right. Yet most U.S. companies continue to use a variety of forecasting techniques because no one has apparently developed a better way to deal with the future's economic uncertainty
Still, there are exceptions, like Royal
Dutch/Shell. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Shell developed a technique known as "scenario planning." By listening to planners' analysis of the global business environment. Shell's management was prepared for
the eventuality-if not the timing-of the 1973 oil crisis.
And again in 1981, when other oil companies stockpiled reserves in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
war. Shell sold off its excess before the glut became a reality and prices collapsed.
Undoubtedly, many readers believe they
are familiar with scenarios. But the decision scenarios developed by Shell in Europe are a far cry from their usual
U.S. counterparts. In this article and a sequel to come, the
author describes their evolution and ultimate impact on
Shell's management.
Mr. Wack is retired head of the business environment division of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group planning department, which he directed during the turbulent
decade from 1971 to 1981. Wack, an economist, developed
with Edward Newland the Shell system of scenario planning. He now consults and participates in scenario development with management teams around the world. In
1983 and 1984, he was senior lecturer in scenario planning
at the Harvard Business School.
Illustration by Tbm Briggs,
Omnigraphics, inc.
Few companies today would say they
are happy with the way they plan for an increasingly
fluid and turbulent business environment. Traditional
planning was based on forecasts, which worked reasonably well in the relatively stable 1950s and 1960s. Since
the early 1970s, however, forecasting errors have become more frequent and occasionally of dramatic and
unprecedented magnitude.
Forecasts are not always wrong; more
often than not, they can be reasonably accurate. And
that is what makes them so dangerous. They are usually constructed on the assumption that tomorrow's
world will be much like today's. They often work because the world does not always change. But sooner or
later forecasts will fail when they are needed most:
in anticipating major shifts in the business environment that make whole strategies obsolete |see the insert, "Wrong When It Hurts Most").
Most managers know from experience
how inaccurate forecasts can be. On this point, there is
probably a large consensus.
My thesis-on which agreement may
be less general-is this: the way to solve this problem
is not to look for better forecasts by perfecting techniques or hiring more or better forecasters. Too many
forces work against the possibility of getting the right
forecast. The future is no longer stable; it has become
a moving target. No single "right" projection can be
deduced from past behavior.
The better approach, I believe, is to
accept uncertainty, try to understand it, and make it
part of our reasoning. Uncertainty today is not just an
occasional, temporary deviation from a reasonable predictability; it ig a basic structural feature of the business environment. The method used to think about
and plan for the future must be made appropriate to a
changed business environment.
Royal Dutch/Shell believes that decision scenarios are such a method. As Shell's former
1973 scenarios
TVadltJonal
environment
How medium-term analysis
illuminated the
power of scenarios for
Shell management
The rapids
New
habitat
Oil price
increases
Restraints
on oil
production
Pierre Wack
One of the most constant variables of today's management practices is the notion of change, adaptation, and innovation. Executives willingly embrace
change when solutions can be found for and applied to particular problems. Losing salesf Improve product quality.
Taking too long to get your product to the distributor^
Shake up inventory. Threatened by a takeover^ Make your
management and corporation more lean, mean, and responsive to the shareholders.
In a way, .such change is easy because it
doesn 't challenge the assumptions of good managers.
Faced with a problem, they simply apply yet another formulaic solution. In the end, such easy change won't work
against the kind of economic upheaval that has occurred
in the last 15 years. Some fundamental modifications have
been made in the way we do business. Shouldn't the corporate response be equally fundamentals
In the last issue of HBR, the author described how he and a group of strategic planners at Royal
Dutch/Shell began to put in place a most innovative way to
prepare managers to think more clearly about the futurescenario analysis. What was required was not the application of a new formula for planning but rather a new v/ayof
thinking. Tb show how difficult the transformation, the author described how the company came up with the idea
and developed it in the early 1970s. In this sequel, he carries the story forward to describe the medium-term scenarios constructed in 1975. At a time when management's
attention suddenly became fixed on the next quarter as
opposed to the next decade, effective medium-term analysis
proved vital in translating scenario theory into practice.
The author patiently walks the reader through the development of the 1975 scenarios and then discusses the implications of scenario analysis on the practice of management.
Mr Wack is retired head of the business en
vironment division of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group planning department. Wack, an economist, developed with
Edward Newland the Shell system of scenario planning. He
now consults and participates in scenario development
vi/ith management teams around the world. In 1983 and
1984, he was senior lecturer in scenario planning at the
Harvard Business School.
September-October 1985
I recently discussed scenario analysis
with a well-known futurist. After I had listened to his
presentation of a set of six scenarios, he asked me what
I thought. "It was beautifully written, if complex,"
I repUed. When pressed, I admitted that it was "impenetrable." I added^ "The managers who hear it won't
know what to do with it." To which the consultant responded, "That is not really my concem. I simply lay
out the possibilities for them. It is up to the managers
to know what they should do. I can't possibly tell
them."
This small illustration points up the
key problem with scenario planning: the interface of
scenarios and decision makers is ignored or neglected.
By interface, I mean the point at which the scenario
really touches a chord in the manager's mind-the moment at which it has real meaning for him or her. The
fact that those with the responsibility for preparing
the scenario do not feel any responsibility for the interface is the main reason that-despite the logical appeal
scenarios should have for managers disenchanted
with forecasts - scenario planning has been scarcely
developed.
Scenarios that merely quantify alternative outcomes of obvious uncertainties never inspire a
management team's enthusiasm, even if all the alternatives are plausible. Most executives do not like to
face such alternatives. They yeam for some kind of
"definiteness" when dealing with the uncertainty that
is the business environment, even if they have had
their fingers burned for relying on past forecasts.
The same managers who can easily decide between different courses of action when they
are in control often become unstuck when confronted
witb alternative futures they can't control and don't
really understand. The reason is partly historical: many
managers developed their skills in the 1950s and 1960s,
an era characterized by an unusually high level of economic predictabihty. Being competent then meant
Absorptive
capacity
problems
Balance-ofpayment
problems
Economic
slowdown
Higher
inflation
Phantom
scenarios
+ 5 years ot
surprise-free
evolution..
y
surprise-free
evolution
1973
links: Pierre Wack Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review 1985
rechts: Pierre Wack Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review 1985
Pierre Wack, Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. diagram ‚The 1973 Scenarios‘. Harvard Business Review 1985
tion would be constrained-not because of a real
shortage of oil but for politieal reasons, with producers
taking advantage of the very tight supply-demand relationship. Our next step was to make the disruption into
our surprise-free scenario. We did not know how soon
it would occur, how high the price increase would be,
and how the various players would react. But we knew
it would happen. Shell was like a canoeist who hears
white water around the bend and must prepare to negotiate the rapids.
To help reframe our managers' outlook,
we charted the 1973 scenarios [Exhibit VIII). From the
calm upriver of the traditional environment, the company would plunge into the turbulence of the rapids
and have to learn to live in a new habitat.
We could eliminate some of tbe original
scenarios. We could dam off the alternate brancb of the
river (tbe B-family scenarios of 1972). The no-growtbno-prohlem scenario (Bl) was clearly implausible as
economies, fully recovered from the 1971 recession,
boomed. The three-miracles scenario (B3) remained
just tbat—three supply miracles. Finally, our discussions with governments about the impending crisis
had allowed us to conclude that tbeir reaction would
occur only after the fact. (Obviously, we badn't yet
learned how to affect governmental microcosms.)
Because the B-branch of the river was
dammed, we needed to explore other potential streams
that dovetailed with management's current optimism,
an optimism based on the booming economy of late
1972 and early 1973-in whicb growtb exceeded that of
any period since the Korean War. In an oil company
having an affair witb expansion, many executives were
naturally reluctant to slow or suspend the expansion
of refineries, the building of tankers, and so fortb. In
response, we created two "phantom"scenarios-alternatives to our main scenarios but ones we considered
illusions. In Phantom Scenario I, we assumed a delay of
5 years in the onset of the disruption; in Phantom II,
15 years. (These represented typical times needed to
first, bring a new oil facility into service and second,
amortize it.) These phantom scenarios were used to
measure the "regret" Shell would feel if it planned for a
discontinuity tbat never occurred for 5 or even 15 more
years.
Only two developments could delay the
inevitable and both were ruled out: (1) the discovery of
new Middle East-sized oil reserves in an area that
would have no problem in absorbing revenues, or (2)
political or military seizure and control of producers by
consuming countries.
Szenarien zur Darstellung und Einschränkung von Unsicherheit
(Rendering Uncertainty)
Pierre Wack, Scenarios for option creation. Harvard Business Review 1985
Page 11
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
“Rendering” (as used in Urban Design):
(a) coloured perspective drawing that gives an impression of the future;
(b) beyond visualization: making the idea accessible for an audience (stakeholders).
Hauptbahnhof Zürich mit temporären Sihlpostbahnhof, ca. 2007
• On the left, the opaque building envelopes were
frequently misunderstood as building volumes.
• In the middle, the transparent building envelopes were readily
accepted but considered to be too ambiguous about the future
state of the project.
• Right, the eventual model that showed a possible future state of
coloured building volumes and the building envelopes as
wireframes.
KCAP, schrittweise Ermittlung der building envelopes, 2007
KCAP, schrittweise Entwicklung der Darstellung der building envelopes, 2007
Christian Salewski, Felix Werle, Angela Wilkinson, Rendering Uncertainty, 2007
Page 12
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
The nature of wicked problems, Horst Rittel and Mevin Webber, 1973
There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem
Wicked problems have no stopping rule
Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad
There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem
Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly
Rahmenwerke für Unsicherheit: Diversität als Risikominimierung
Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set
of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations
that may be incorporated into the plan
Every wicked problem is essentially unique
Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem
The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's
resolution
The planner has no right to be wrong
The nature of wicked problems. Source: Rittel, Horst W.J., Webber, Melvin M.: Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 1973 (155-169)
Herausforderungen städtebaulicher Aufgaben
-
mehrere Akteure (multi-actorial)
viele Anteilhaber (multi-stakeholder)
überproportionale persönliche Einflussnahmen (agency)
gemeine Probleme (wicked problems)
öffentliches Interesse (public interest)
wertegebunden (value-loaded)
meist sehr langfristig (long-term)
oft sehr grossflächig (large-scale)
> Komplexität (complexity)
> Unsicherheit (uncertainty)
Christian Salewski, Herausforderungen städtebaulicher Aufgaben
Forecasts - Scenarios - Hopes; Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios - The Art of Strategic Conversation, Seite 90 und
92, 1996
Pigeon skulls, as drawn by Darwin, 1868
Charles Darwin, photographed by Julia Margaret Cameron, 1868
Charles Darwin, The Origin of the Species/Diagram representing the divergence of species, 1859
Page 13
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
gross
t=1
rahmengebend
detailliert
Form
Prozess
Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York, 1978; City of the Captive Globe, 1972
t=2
gross
rahmengebend
t=3
Prozess
gross
detailliert
Form
klein
rahmengebend
detailliert
Form
klein
Prozess
klein
Strategisches Entwerfen
Kees van der Heijden, Forecasts - Scenarios - Hopes; Scenarios, The Art of Strategic Conversation, 1996
Page 14
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
1) creating a desirable vision
2) radical questioning of instruments
3) controlling topology and fields of intervention
4) identifying key projects and priorities
5) working with existing structures and qualities
6) designing and testing new typologies
7) adapting to changing requirements
8) providing an applicable set of strategies
ETH Zürich, Institute of Urban Design, Teaching Agenda
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007. Vision
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007.
Übersicht Planungsinstrumente
CONVERSION I
CONVERSION I
"DDFTTTUSFFU
art school
art school
sculpture garden
4)011*/(#06-&
7"3%
#*(´/"(":"´
453&&5
exhibition hall
cinema
Strategy | 215
)"3#03130.
&/"%&
TUSFFUTIBSFEBSFBOFFETUP
CFDMFBSUPHVBSBOUFF
BDDFTTJCJMJUZCZDBSBOZUJNF
Strategy | 159
brewery
storage
4USFFUTIBSFEBSFBOFFET
UPCFDMFBSUPHVBSBOUFFBD
DFTTJCJMJUZCZDBSBOZUJNF
"SFBCFMPOHTUPUIFCVJMEJOH
VTFEGPSQBSLJOHEFQPTJOH
BOEUPBDDFTTUIFCVJMEJOH
exhibition hall
"SFBCFMPOHTUPUIFCVJMEJOH
VTFEGPSQBSLJOHEFQPTJOH
BOEUPBDDFTTUIFCVJMEJOH
brewery
storage
cinema
4IFMUFSFEBSFB
VTFEBTTUPSBHF
swimming hall
swimming hall
"SFBDPOUSPMMFEBOE
PSHBOJ[FECZUIFVTFS
PGUIFCVJMEJOH
$0..&3$*"-
453&&5
CONNECTION ZONE TO
SHINKO PIER
sculpture garden
Strategy | 217
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007. Naka-ku /Yamashita Pier
Page 15
FOLIENAUSZUG
04.04.2011
RESTRUCTURING I
CONVERSION II
CONVERSION II
DETAILING BUILDING RULES
DEVELOPMENT
converted structures
offices
offices
research
research
new structures
multifunctional
public recreation spaces
hall
exposition
hall
clubs
extension of existing traffic
infrastructure by upgrading
infrastructure by public
transport network
exposition
hall
clubs
sports (public)
tramdepot
shop
housing
research
housing
trade
public squares
research
trade / offices
temporarily used areas
shops shops
trade
new traffic infrastructure
trade
squares infront of big program
and border development on
the opposite side of the street
tennis / billiard / cinema
bowling / concert hall
theater
restaurants
housing
natatorium / restaurant / shops
border development
-&(&/%
shops
restaurants
public transport (tram)
infrastructure by comprising
converted structures
shops shops
theater
shops
housing
ice rink
trade / clubs / shops
research
trade
housing
hall
exposition
hall
clubs
1)"4&
1&%&453*"/"9*4
research
trade
trade
theater
shops
restaurants
housing
research
trade / offices
shops shops
theater
restaurants
ice rink
1)"4&
1)"4&
130(3".."5*$70-6.&53*$%*7&34*5:
tramdepot
shop
housing
research
shops
ice rink
ice rink
multifunctional
hall
tramdepot
research
shops shops
theater
shops
restaurants
research
multifunctional
shop
trade
trade / offices
shops shops
trade
ice rink
offices
exposition
hall
clubs
housing
10$,&54"%%*5*0/"-16#-*$130(3".
housing
1)"4&
1)"4&
offices
..."45&31-"/#-0$,
Strategy | 295
Strategy | 297
Strategy | 149
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007. Minato Mirai
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007. Mizuho Pier
VISIONS FOR YOKOHAMA
U R B A N I T Y O N T H E WAT E R F R O N T
CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
Yokohama: a model for Japan?
Snapshots
11
12-31
VISIONS FOR YOKOHAMA
URBANITY ON THE WATERFRONT
A N A LY S I S
INVENTORY
Prominent Port City
evolution of the city
infrastructure
waterfront
urban programs
typological references
33-83
CONCLUSIONS
treasure map (potentials)
treasure map (deficits).
catalysts
85-93
S T R AT E G Y
OVERALL GUIDELINES
strategic plan
connectors plan
RESTRUCTURING CONCEPTS
MinatoMirai
Shinko
CONVERSION STRATEGIES
Yamashita Pier
Yamanouchi / Mizuho Pier
NIGHT IMPRESSIONS
URBAN DESIGN SPECIAL RESEARCH STUDIO HS07
CHAIR OF URBAN DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE, ETH ZÜRICH, PROF: KEES CHRISTIAANSE
TEACHING ASSISTANT NICOLAS KRETSCHMANN; MARK MICHAELI
URBAN DYNAMICS AND PROCESSES
CREDITS
95-115
117-193
195-309
314-321
323
ETH Zürich, Urbanity on the Waterfront, Visions for Yokohama, 2007
ETH Zürich, Institute of Urban Design, Teaching Agenda
Literatur
Kahn, Herman. Thinking about the Unthinkable. New York: Avon, 1962.
Julien, Pierre-André, Pierre Lamonde, and Daniel Latouche. "La méthode des scénarios, une réflexion sur la démarche et la théorie
de la prospective." In Travaux et recherches de prospective, Coll. Schéma général d’aménagement de la France, edited by DATAR.
Paris: La documentation française, 1975.
Fowles, Jib. Handbook of futures research. Westport - Conn.& London: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Wack, Pierre. "Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead." Harvard Business Review 63, no. 5 (1985): 73-89.
———. "Scenarios: shooting the rapids." Harvard Business Review 63, no. 6 (1985): 139-50.
van der Heijden, Kees. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. 2nd ed. Chichester: John Wiley, 2005.
Rittel, Horst W. J., and Melvin M. Webber. "Dilemmas in a general theory of planning." Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973): 155-69.
Christensen, Karen S. "Coping with Uncertainty in Planning." Journal of the American Planning Association 51, no. 1 (1985): 63 - 73.
Sieverts, Thomas. "Was leisten Städtebauliche Leitbilder?" In Ohne Leitbild? Städtebau in Deutschland und Europa, edited by
Heidede Becker, Johann Jessen and Rober Sander. Stuttgart, Zürich: Krämer, 1998.
Hall, Peter Geoffrey. Cities of Tomorrow: an intellectual history of urban planning and design in the twentieth century. 3rd ed.
Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
Wilkinson, Angela, Christian Salewski, and Felix Werle. "Rendering Uncertainty: Lessons from Scenario Planning and Urban
Design." In 1st EIASM Workshop on Imagining Business, Oxford University. Oxford, 2008.
Salewski, Christian. "Die Kunst des Konsenses. Städtebauliches Entwerfen in der offenen Gesellschaft." werk, bauen + wohnen, no.
Mai (2010): 34-41.
Salewski, Christian. "Dutch New Worlds. Scenarios in Physical Planning and Design in the Netherlands, 1970-2000", Dissertation,
ETH 2010
Page 16

Planen und Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit (Salewski

Transcription

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