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German Studies Association
Adolf Hitler vs. Henry Ford: The Volkswagen, the Role of America as a Model, and the Failure
of a Nazi Consumer Society
Author(s): Wolfgang König
Source: German Studies Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 249-268
Published by: German Studies Association
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TheVolkswagen,
AdolfHitlervs.HenryFord:
the Role of America as a Model, and the
Failureof a Nazi ConsumerSociety
WolfgangKinig
TechnischeUniversitat Berlin
theconsumersocietyoftheUnitedStates,NaziGermanyplannedto
Abstract:Modeling
launchits own brandof consumerismwitha familyof "people'sproducts,"the most
spectacularof whichwas the Volkswagen.Thisarticledemonstrateshowandwhythe
Naziinitiatives
forconsumerproductsfailed.
On 24 April 1936, the New YorkcorrespondentforKolnischeZeitungpublishedan
articlewith the headline "TheFatherof the Volkswagen,"which discussed Henry
Fordandhis contributionto mass motorization.1It concluded:"TheFordformula
of massproduction,low prices,andhighwagescreatedtoday's concept'America'."2
The article evoked protests from the Reichsverband der Automobilindustrie
whichhadpreparedthedesign
(RDA),theGermanassociationof carmanufacturers,
and productionof the Volkswagenand possessed the rights to the brandname.3
The RDA addressedits complaintsto Goebbels' Ministryof Propaganda:Ford's
work and that of the Fuihrershould not be considered equal as they represented
"materialisticversusidealisticpointsof view." Goebbels'ministryreactedpromptly
and reprimandedthe newspaper:"Such a presentationis completely impossible.
.. .in the future,only Adolf Hitlershouldbe called the creatorof the Volkswagen."4
This episode demonstratesthatthe Volkswagenprojectwas widely identified
with Americanmass motorizationandspecifically withHenryFord'sModel T. Yet
Nazi leaders were determined to disassociate the two. The Volkswagen was
promotedas the chief example of a groupof "people'sproducts"being preparedor
realized in orderto raise consumption.The more or less concealed model for the
desiredhigh level of consumptionwas the United States,whereconsumerismwas
fairly developed in the interwarperiod.Historiansagreethatthe United Stateshas
been a "consumersociety"since the interwarperiod,butthey disagreewhetherthe
term can be appliedto earliersocieties.5
The case of Volkswagensuggests thatthe Nazis' attemptsto promotetheirown
peculiar consumer society failed. They failed because they focused on mass
productionandneglectedtheprerequisitesof a massmarket.6HenryFordformulated
the relationshipbetween mass productionandmass consumptionin a ghostwritten
articleforEncyclopaediaBritannica:"Thenecessary,precedentconditionof mass
productionis a capacity, latent or developed, of mass consumption,the ability to
absorblarge production.The two go together,and in the lattermay be tracedthe
250
German Studies Review 27/2 (2004)
reasonsfor the former."7It was in this respect,namely in the inabilityto generate
mass consumption,that Hitler's Volkswagenand the other "people's products"
missed the model of Americaand of Ford.
U.S. mass motorizationaffectedthe Volkswagenstoryin two ways. The firstis
symbolic and ideological. It was shaped by the Nazi views on American mass
motorizationand its proponents like Henry Ford. The second is concrete and
practical.It relatesto the questionwhetherthe Volkswagenandits factoryimitated
AmericancarcultureandAmericanproductionmethods.HeretheroleAmericancar
producersin Germany,namely GeneralMotors's Opel CompanyandFordMotor
Company,played in the Volkswagenprojectwas critical.When Hitler's Germany
startedthe war,the Volkswagenprojectcame to a halt andthe Volkswagenfactory
was transformedinto a military productionplant, which turnedout to be very
inefficient.8Recent research strongly suggests that the Volkswagenwould have
failedunderpeacetimeconditionsas well. Thefinalpartof thearticlewill explorethe
probablereasonsfor the failureof Hitler's car.
GermanMotorizationin the InterwarPeriod
In theinterwarperiod,motorizationin Germanyclearlylagged behindthatin Great
BritainandFrance,not to mentionthe United States.9Nevertheless,the numberof
cars increased, except during the years 1931 to 1933, and differences with the
WesternEuropeancountriesdiminishedespeciallyin theNazi years.Carpricesand
operatingcosts decreasedas a result of efficiency measures.Public opinion held
Americanproductionmethodsandthe Fordmodel in particularin high esteem. But
carmanufacturers
strategies,
recognizedthattheGermanmarketrequiredappropriate
whichmeantthatabroaderrangeof models,especiallysmaller,moreeconomicalcars
hadto be offeredandproductiontechnologyneededto be adaptedto smallerseries.
In this transformationprocess, a numberof companies merged, leaving only 10
producersby 1933.
Yet even with these economies, automobileswere out of reachfor most people
duringthe difficult times afterWorldWarI. Germansinsteadturnedto the more
affordablemotorcycles, which thus increasedtheir marketshare, while in Great
Britainand the United States motorcycles sales experienced a relative decline.10
Fromthe mid-twentieson, the numberof motorcyclesin Germanysurpassedthat
of cars-by 1938 at a ratioof 1.3 million carsto 1.5 million motorcycles,over twothirdsof whichwerelightermodels.1 In 1936,35 percentof theworld'smotorcycles
wererunninginGermany,in1939even45 percent,l2promptingoneeconomicjournal
to comment,"TheGermanpeopleof theless affluentclasseshavethrownthemselves
on two wheels to become motorizedbecause they are unable to pay for four."13
In 1939, approximately20 millionbicycles
Bicycles wereeven morewidespread."4
were counted.Statistically,every Germanfamily owned slightly morethanone.
We do not know exactly how the cars and motorcycles were used. Estimates
stated that approximately80 percent of the automobiles were used in trade and
industryfor transportationand deliveries or visiting customers.15Only a minority
wereprivatecarsfor going to work,excursions,andvacationtravel.Carswere thus
primarilyan investmentand not a consumergood in Germany.
Wolfgang Konig
251
Fromtheearlytwentiethcentury,hopesto motorizeGermanywereexpressedin
terms like Volksautomobil, Volksauto, and Volkswagen, meant to describe
inexpensive cars for the broadmasses.16In the 1920s, such cars were envisaged to
cost around2,000 Reichsmarks(RM),whichwasprettymuchoutof thereachof even
the middle classes. The Volkswagenwas in fact more a vision and a claim than a
reality.
Between the wars, the Germanpublic arguedaboutwhich companywould be
able to createa real Volkswagen.Muchhope focused on the FordMotorCompany,
which fed on the Ford myth, spreadby Ford's ghostwrittenautobiographyand
manyotherpublications.Onewell-knownautomobileexpertspelledout alternative
approaches in a brochurecalled Das Volksauto,published in 1931.17 German
companies might merge to build a Volkswagen,it suggested. Since the German
marketcould not absorbthe minimumproductionof one to two hundredthousand
cars a year alone, the writersuggested to design the Volkswagenfor the European
market.His favorite candidatefor the productionof this car was the Ford Motor
Company,which at the time was erectinga new factoryin Cologne. WhenGeneral
Motors acquired the Opel Company in 1929, others pent their hopes on the
Rtisselsheim factory. While the acquisition was much criticized in the German
economic press, tradeunionists welcomed the deal as it might result in the "long
desired cheap Volkswagen."18
The Idea of the Volkswagenand American Car Manufacturers in Germany
Whenthe Hitlergovernmentwas establishedin January1933, the carindustrywas
in a deep crisis in spite of some signs of recovery. Less than two weeks after his
appointment,the new chancellorappearedat the openingof the BerlinAutomobile
Show to proclaimthatthe motorcarhadintroducedthe second greattransportation
revolution(Verkehrsumwdlzung)
afterthe railroad."Theluxurycarof formerdays
has become the ordinarymeans of transportationof today."'9He announcedthe
end of restrictionsand political supportfor the car. He outlined four government
tasksfor the future:specific managementof cartraffic,a reductionof importduties
on cars, constructionof new roads, and state subsidies for car racing.
Thereis no doubtthatHitlerwas a motorcarenthusiast.The automobilelobby
used to quote his phrase:"I like the motorcar more than anythingelse because it
openedGermanyup to me."20ForHitler,the numberof carsandmiles of roadwere
a measureof one's nation's culturalstandards.His personaladvisor,the DaimlerBenz managerJakobWerlin,calledthe"ideaof motorizationthesymbolof nationalsocialist revolutionarydevelopment."21Hitler'sgoal was, so Werlin,"torestoreto
the Germanpeople the positionin the worldto which its race,character,andhistory
give it aninalienableright."22Beyondthis, Hitler'svision of massmotorizationwas
anappropriate
meansto winrecognitionfromtheGermanpopulation.Carmanufacture
was considereda meansto achieveeconomicrebirthandovercomeunemployment.
Lastbutnotleast,theNaziswereacutelyawareof themotorcar'smilitarysignificance.
ItbecameroutineforHitlerto delivertheopeningspeechatthe automobileshow
in Berlin each year. One of his phraseswas thatthe automobilehad changedfrom
a luxuryto an ordinarygood.23He referredto the experienceof mass motorization,
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German Studies Review 27/2 (2004)
which had first been made in the United States In his 1936 address,he made this
context explicit: "The Germanpeople have exactly the same need to employ the
motorcaras, let us say, the American."24
Hitler did not use the term Volkswagenin 1933 which had meant cheap cars
generally since the turn of the century.25Especially before the auto exhibitions
people often wonderedwhetherthey could expect a Volkswagento be exhibited.
Even before the Nazis seized power, the journalof the Germanautomobileclub
predicted that the 1933 exhibition would mark the "birth of the European
Volkswagen."26At the exhibition and in advertisements, several companies
presentedtheir cars as Volkswagen.27However, it was not the Nazi motorization
programbutthe introductionof the Volksempfdnger,a cheapradioreceiver,which
revived the Volkswagen-craze.Goebbels' Ministryof Propagandaintroducedthe
Volksempfdnger,which was producedby all 28 Germanradio companies in the
autumnof 1933.28Thusmanymanufacturers,
amongthemtheAmericansubsidiaries
Opel andFord,used the termVolkswagenfortheircarsatthe automobileexhibition
of 1934.29
The governmentonly becameinvolved with the Volkswagenin responseto this
broadpublicresonance.Inearly 1934, intra-governmental
negotiationson the issue
startedunderthe sponsorshipof Goebbels' ministry.30One favorite plan was to
subsidizemini-cars(Kleinstwagen),amongthemthree-wheelersthatweresupposed
to cost around1,000 RM. This was the backgroundfor Hitler's opening speech at
the 1934 auto show.31Even then, Hitler did not use the term Volkswagenbut the
context was obvious. He declaredthat the Germanpeople needed the motorcar.
Industry'stask would be to reduceprices to fit the incomes of millions of buyers.
He mentionedthe Volksempfangerexplicitly as anexampleof whathadto be done.
Hitler's Volkswagen speech resulted in a flood of articles, initiatives, and
proposals.32Automobilejournalstested existing models to see which deservedto
be called Volkswagen.In the case of the 1.2 liter Opel, one journal's answerwas
positive;in thecase of the 1-literFord,anotherone came to a negativeconclusion.33
The fact thatAmerican-ownedsubsidiaries,FordandGeneralMotors'AdamOpel
Company,were consideredprimarycandidatesfor the productionof a "people's
car,"testifies notonly to the importanceof the Americanmodelof mass production
andconsumption,butalso to the leadingpresenceof U.S. companiesin the German
automobile industry since the mid-twenties, including six other American car
manufacturersbesides Ford and GeneralMotors.
The FordMotorCompanyhad establishedits first foreign subsidiaryin Berlin
in 1925 and startedassembling cars and tractorsthere in 1926-since 1931 in
Cologne-primarily becausetariffson partswerelowerthanthoseon fullyassembled
cars.34After 1930, IG Farbenbecame a juniorpartnerin Ford-Germanywith a 35
persentcapital share.
Nazi policy towards Ford was ambivalent. On the one hand, the American
automobile industry-and Ford in particular-was the model for what Hitler
plannedin Germany.35HenryFordwas held in high esteem for his contributionto
mass productionbut also for his resentmentof the Jews and capitalism.36Even
before 1933, theNazi partyhadunsuccessfullytriedto garnerfinancialsupportfrom
WolfgangKonig
253
GermanconsulinDetroitconferred
HenryFord.In 1938,onFord's 75thbirthday,the
one of thehighestNazi decorationson him.37WhenHitlervisited theFordCompany
at the Berlin automobileshow, he praisedthe company andthe man for whatthey
hadachieved.Ontheotherhand,HitlerregardedtheAmericanautomobileindustry
and the FordCompanyas competitorsin his greatplans for Germany.There was
muchopen andhiddendiscriminationagainstFord.Forinstance,Hitlerforbadeall
partyoffices to buyFordcarsin a secretorderin 1936.38In 1938,Goebbels'Ministry
of Propagandastopped newspaperreports on a new cheap car Ford planned to
produce in the United States, because this might degradethe Volkswagenin the
Germanpublic.39In earlyin 1939 it orderedthe press to ignore a ceremonyheld by
Ford's representativeoffice in Munich.40
Like Ford,GeneralMotorshad first opened a sales office in Berlin in 1925 and
briefly assembled cars in Hamburg,then in Berlin.41GM's great coup was the
acquisitionof the Adam Opel Companyin 1929, a companywhich hadoccupied a
strongposition in the Germanmarket,but sufferedfrom a lack of capital.General
Motorsdidmuchto maintainthecompany'simageas Germanby keepinga majority
of Germansin the management,including Wilhelm von Opel, a member of the
foundingdynasty.In 1932, the company'sjournalproclaimedthatOpel cars were
"builtby GermanworkerswithGermanmaterialsin Germany."42
Opelprofitedfrom
Nazi motorizationpoliciesas well as fromthetrendto smallercars.Inthemid-thirties,
its marketsharewas above 40 percent,faroutstrippingleadingGermancompanies
like Auto Union with a bit over 20 percentandAdler,Daimler-BenzandFordwith
less than 10 percenteach.43Governmentrestrictionson transferringprofits to the
United States provided the German subsidiary with the money to modernize
production.Thus,Opelbecamethe most modem automobileproducerin Germany.
Responsiblefor the majorityof Germancarexports,Opel earnedforeigncurrency,
which the Nazi regime needed for its armament.After 1935, much of Opel's truck
productionat its moder factoryin Brandenburgwent to the Germanarmy.In the
war,the OpelBlitzbecamethe army'sstandardtruck.Withits image as German,its
marketshareathomeandabroad,andits roleas a militarysupplier,Opelhelda strong
positionin Nazi Germany.Nazi leadersmaynothaveliked theAmericancompany,
but they needed it to pursuetheirpolicies of motorizationand armament.
In the hype aroundthe "people's car"following Hitler's speech in 1934,44both
FordandOpelenteredtherace.Fordadvertisedits carsextensivelyas Volkswagen.45
TheColognemodel,thepriceforthecheapestversionof whichwasbelow 2,000 RM,
was given the official name Volkstyp.However Ford, which was regardedby the
othercompaniesas an outsider,had to give up the term Volkswagenin 1935 under
pressurefrom the RDA.46
The Opel Company,which led the market,was consideredthe most promising
candidateto build a Volkswagen.The Riisselsheimcompanywas extremelystrong
in the smallcarclass, whichit actuallypresentedas Volkswagenin 1934 and 1935.47
The company journal reportedon Hitler's visit to the Berlin auto shows on the
assumptionthatthe Ftihrerwould acceptOpel's leadingrole in the developmentof
the Volkswagen.In 1934, for example, it wrote:"TheFiihrerwas very interestedin
our Volkswagen,which he inspectedin detail."48In 1935, thejournalquotedhim:
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German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
"Up to now, you have come nearestto the idea of the Volkswagen."49
Opel itself
declaredthattheP4 model,introducedin November1935, was abig steptowardthe
Volkswagen.It caused a sensation when, in September 1936, Opel lowered the
model's priceto 1,450RM. Sometimelater,theOpelsalesmanagerreportedthatthe
P4 had a 61 percentmarketsharein the l-liter class.50This promptedthe Minister
of Transportation
to Hitler'sReichskanzleiin thesummerof 1936:"Thosecompanies
that have manufacturedsmall and cheap cars successfully up to now and have
largelywrittenoff theirplantequipment,suchas for instance,Opel andAuto Union
(DKW),will possiblybe able,by usingtriedandtestedparts,to launchacarto which
the label Volkswagencouldbe conferredwithin 15 months."51
Thatwas, in fact,just
whatthe Opel managersthought.52However,promptedby remarksof Hitler's, the
RDA, by then in chargeof the project,thus stoppedinviting the Opel Companyto
meetings dealing with the Volkswagen.53
In 1934, the governmentwas farfrom agreementabouthow to achieve Hitler's
Volkswagenwishes. Solutionsrangedfromsmallcars(Kleinwagen- four-wheelers
with four-cylinder engines) to mini-cars (Kleinstwagen-three-wheelers with
motorcycle engines). When the government met with the car manufacturers'
association (RDA) in April 1934, this central question remainedunanswered.54
Nonetheless, the participantscommittedthemselves to a maximumprice of 1,000
RM. Lateron, both Hitlerandthe RDA decided for differentreasonsfor the small
caroverthemini-car.55
ForHitler,thefour-wheeledsmallcarwas appropriateforthe
culturallevel of the Germanpeople. He was supportedby a memorandumon the
design of a GermanVolkswagen,whichthe automobiledesignerFerdinandPorsche
had providedto him.56The big Germancar producersalso opted for the small car
because they had no experience with mini-cars. The later difficulties with the
Volkswagenresultedpartiallyfromthe fact thatthe 1,000 RM pricetag, which was
initiallyappliedto the mini-car,was transferredwithoutdiscussionto the smallcar.
The RDA andPorschewere awarethatthis price was impossible, but they did not
want to risk conflict with Hitler.Once the price had been made public it could no
longer be changed.
There was no agreement within the RDA whether or not to take over the
Volkswagenproject.57Most of the industrialistsbelieved economic conditions in
Germanyto be unfavorable.In the end, however,they acceptedthe task.Whatthey
fearedmostwas thatindividualcompaniesorthestatewouldachievethe Volkswagen
beyond their influence. In June 1934, the RDA thus signed an agreementwith
FerdinandPorsche on the design of a Volkswagen.58Porsche, an independentcar
designer,was not the RDA's favorite,but Hitlerheld him in very high esteem. By
appointingPorsche, the RDA believed it was respondingto the Fiihrer'swishes.
Onceincontrol,theRDA appliedfortrademark
protectionof thetermVolkswagen
to stop its members' Volkswagenads.59In the spring of 1935, the patent office
granted protection of the variants RDA Volksautomobil, RDA Deutscher
Volkswagen,andRDADeutsches Volksautomobil.Beforethis, theRDA demanded
that its members declare they would no longer use the term Volkswagen.60The
demandcausedmuchtroublein theautomobileindustry,butmostcarmanufacturers
Wolfgang Konig
255
finally signed. Several,consentedwith restrictions,such as Ford,which stipulated
thatthey be ableto employ the termagainif the Volkswagenwas builtin its works.61
By 1936,however,the Volkswagenprojectranintofinancialtroubles.62Porsche
hadspent 1.75 million RM,butdeliveredonly threeprototypes,whichhadnotbeen
fully tested. More important,Porschehimself had no hope of achieving the 1,000
RM pricetag, which hadbecome Hitler'spromiseto the Germanpeople. The RDA
was neither in a position nor willing to subsidize hundreds of thousands of
Volkswagens.In this difficult situation, BMW's General Director, Franz Popp,
pointed to the Deutsche Arbeitsfront(DAF) as a candidatefor manufacturingthe
Volkswagen.The DAF was the Nazi "laborfront,"which includedbothemployees
and employers. It was supposedto end class struggleand win the workersfor the
regime.Using the propertyof the formertradeunionsandmembers'subscriptions,
it developed into trust that owned housing and insurancecompanies, a banking
house, and tourism facilities. DAF's leader, Robert Ley, was interested in the
Volkswagenas a means of strengtheninghis position within the Nazi leadership.
Hitleragreedin early 1937.
The transferof the Volkswagenprojectfromthe carmanufacturers'association
to the Labor Front was a watershed in its history. The car manufacturershad
accepted the project reluctantly,because they wanted to maintaincontrol of the
Volkswagen.They werepreparedto producethecarin limitedquantitiesthatwould
nottransformthemarketas a whole. Hitler'sambitiousVolkswagenplans,however,
and the enormous numberof cars and low prices involved changed the RDA's
strategy.The carmanufacturersdid notbelieve thattheplanscould be achievedand
fearedfor theirprofitsandvery existence. Consequentlythey decided to withdraw
from the project,accept the loss of control, and bow to futurecompetitionfrom a
Nazi party-ownedcompany.
The transferto the DAF improvedprospectsthat the car would come in good
time.Thecarmakersknewthattheycouldnotcompetewith a cheapstate-subsidized
Volkswagenand that they had to change their own car programs.Opel cut back
productionof its successful P4 model and in 1938 replacedit with the modem but
moreexpensiveOpelKadett.63Anotherresultoftheshiftto theDAF was thatpeople
refrainedfrombuyingcarsin anticipationofthe Volkswagen64TheOpelmanagement
cited this repeatedly in its reports that orders for small and midsize cars had
plummeted.65Since productioncould not be expanded anyway due to material
shortages,this was actuallyno big problemforthecompany.Insteadit concentrated
on moreexpensive carmodels, which yielded greaterprofits.Carbuyerswere left
with the worstof it. Delivery termsfor small andcheapcarsbecame moredifficult
and used-car prices increased.66
The VolkswagenFactory
Inpublic,Hitlerwas consideredthe Volkswagen'sinitiatorsince he hadorderedthe
RDA to develop the car. Overtime, delays in the projectreflectedbackon him. His
remarksat the Berlin automobile shows thus became more and more urgentand
aggressive. In 1935, he still showed understandingfor long preparationtime, but
insistedthat"thejob hasto be done andthereforewill be done."67In 1936,he claimed
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German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
that he would bring the project "to a successful conclusion ... with ruthless
determination."68
In 1937, when the projectwas in a deep crisis, he promisedthat
productionshould startas soon as possible.69He rejected industrialpositions to
createthe Volkswagenby marketcompetition:"Therecan only be one Volkswagen
in Germany,not ten."When he proclaimedthat"so-calledfree tradeand industry
will eitherbe able to solve these problemsor it won't be able to continueto exist as
free,"70he was referringto the productionof substitutematerials,but he couldjust
as well have been discussing the Volkswagen.
The Germanpublic thus naturallyregardedthe Volkswagenas one of Hitler's
"hobbiesand pet ideas."71The idea was to have occurredto him on a trip in the
1920s.72When his car passed a cyclist and his partnerduringa rainstorm,he had
decidedto builda carforthe people. Porschehimself crediteddecisive design ideas
Theobsequiousflatteriesreachedtheirclimaxin thebook,TheAutomobile
to Hitler.73
Conquersthe Worldby a leading official in Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda,
WilfridBade:"Laterworkson the historyof the automobilewill also, like this one,
mention three names above all others: Karl Benz, Gottlieb Daimler, and Adolf
Hitler!"74
Thus bound to the Volkswagenproject,Hitler had no alternativebut to agree
to transferthe projectto the DAF and do his best to achieve it. In May 1937, DAF
foundedthe VolkswagenCompany(Gesellschaftzur Vorbereitungdes Deutschen
Volkswagens).Bodo Lafferentz, a DAF official; FerdinandPorsche; and Jakob
Werlin, Hitler's personal advisor on automobilesand a Daimler-Benz manager,
became the leading managers.By thatsummer,the companyelected to locate the
factory in modernWolfsburg, and Hitler laid the cornerstonepersonally in May
1938. Due to the shortageof constructionworkersandbuildingmaterials,however,
the first section was not yet finished when Hitler attackedPoland. When it was
completed provisionally during the war, the factory was integrated into the
armamentproductionandmanufacturedaircraftparts,bombs,ovens, anda military
versionof the Volkswagen,with a large slave-laborworkforce.Since management
regardedmilitaryproductionas transitoryandcontinuedpreparationsfor civilian
carproduction,theplant'stechnologicalpotentialandcapacitywas nevereffectively
utilized.
In his plans and visions of mass motorizationand mass consumption,Hitler's
model was the United States. He attributedAmerica's prosperityto thatcountry's
vast living space (Lebensraum)with its enormousresourcesand a huge domestic
market,whichGermansstillhadto win.75This,he claimed,madepossible"production
quotasandtherewithproductionfacilities"thatresultedin tremendouslylow prices.
To be sure,the Nazi view of the United Stateswas ambivalent.76Nazi propaganda
and Hitler's private views teemed with resentmentsderived from a blend of old
stereotypesaboutAmericanculturalinferioritywithspecificallyNazi racisthatreds.
ButwhentheGermantechnicianswereplanningHitler'sprojectof massmotorization
in 1937, Ford's Model T and his company's modern factories served as the
unacknowledged model.77The Volkswagenimitated Ford's earlier one-model
policy. Inthe beginning,Volkwagenscould only be orderedin a single color, a dark
bluish gray. In the autumnof 1936 andin the summerof 1937, FerdinandPorsche
Wolfgang Konig
257
andotherVolkswagenmanagerstraveledto theUnitedStatesandvisitedautomobile
factories, among them River Rouge. They were deeply impressedby American
manufacturingtechnology. Duringtheirsecond trip,they hiredaway a good dozen
engineersandskilledworkers,mainlyfromFord.Otherleadingpersonnelcamefrom
GeneralMotors'Opel Company.It could be no surprisethatthe Volkswagenworks
bore a very strongresemblanceto the most modem Americancar factories.
Volkswagen managers and Nazi leaders, of course, did not reveal the
Volkswagen's American roots to the public. Nevertheless, the United States
influenced Germanplanning and propagandaas the Nazis attemptedto surpass
Americanproductionfigures.Opelsoldamaximumof 40,000 of its successfulmodels
per annum.78That was what the RDA expected from the Volkswagen.Porsche,
however,imaginedbuilding300,000 Volkswageneachyearalreadyin 1934.79Hitler
wentfarbeyondthis. As a timewhenapproximatelyone millioncarswereoperating
in Germany,he spoke of three to seven million that would exist in future.80The
Volkswagen alone, was to bring millions of new buyers.81The Volkswagen
company orientedits planning towardthe Fihrer's predictions.Its management
intended to construct a productionsite in three sections each with a capacity of
nearly500,000 carsperannum.82Thepropaganda,however,emphasizedthefigure
of 1.5 million cars, which was greaterthanFord's output.DAF-leaderRobertLey
boasted that the Volkswagenplant would be "not only the largest automobile
factory, but the largest factory in the world of any kind."83One report on the
Volkswagenwerk'scornerstoneceremonyassembleda fairnumberof superlatives:
Germanywould have the world's best highways, be the world's leadingcountryin
carracing,andconstructthe world's largestandmost modem carplant."A planof
truly gigantic proportionsis thus made reality on a scale unprecedentedin the
history of humandevelopment."84
The questionremainedwho would be able to buy the Fiihrer'sVolkswagen.In
1937,theGermanBureauof Statisticsestimatedthat80 percentof existingcarswere
used for trade and professional purposes. Only 1.1 percent of car buyers were
workersand 13.7 percentemployees.85In 1936, the Instituteof Business Research
foundthatthetotalcarmarketcouldincreaseto 1.6 million.86Consideredirrelevant,
workerswerenoteven mentionedin theinstitute'sreport.Nonetheless,Nazi leaders
insisted thatthe Volkswagenwas for the broadmasses and workersin particular.87
Price andoperatingexpenses were key factorsfor the futureof the Volkswagen.
Hitlerhadpromiseda price below 1,000 RM. After deciding on the design, testing
the prototypes,and planningproduction,it became clear thatthe car could not be
manufacturedfor this price. Nevertheless, Ley announcedthe Volkswagenin the
summerof1938atapriceof990RM.88Onecommentatorremarked
thatthiswas $200
below thepriceof the cheapestFordcar.89200 RMhadto be addedfor anobligatory
two-yearinsurancepolicy andcartransferfees. Still the price was a sensation.The
problemforthefuturewas thatany suchpricewouldrequireenormousDAF or state
subsidies.
In August 1938, the DAF starteda savings system for the Volkswagen.90With
weekly paymentsof 5 RM over a periodof four anda half years,one could acquire
the car. The project's results were disappointing.91By the beginning of the war,
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German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
270,000 peoplewereparticipatinginthesavingsplan,330,000by 1945.Thatwas less
thanthe firstsection of the Volkswagenwerkcouldproducein a single year.Among
savers, more than 40 percent came from the commercial establishment. They
intendedto increasetheircarfleets withthe Volkswagen.29 percentwereemployees,
17 percent public servants, and only 5 percent workers. Only 5.3 percent were
familieswithfourormorechildren,whichtheNazisregardedastheminimumnumber
for a completefamily.92Itwas evidentthatpeoplewerewilling to buy Volkswagens,
but could not afford to do so.
The Nazis presentedthe Volkswagenas a car for free time and leisure. A DAF
journalexplainedthatHitlerwould now be able "to satisfy the Germans'yearning
for foreign parts, which is demonstratedin history by their urge to travel and
discover."93 Pictures of the Volkswagen showed it in attractive vacation
surroundings.94Happy leisure and vacation travelersgazed at the landscape or
greeted people by the roadside. At the cornerstoneceremony, Hitler gave the
Volkswagenthe official name KdF-Wagen.KdF (Kraftdurch Freude = Strength
throughJoy) was the DAF's leisure time organization.The name symbolized that
the Volkswagenwas interpretedprimarilyas a pleasure car. Bodo Lafferentz,
Volkswagenmanagerandleaderof theKdF,expectedtheVolkswagentorevolutionize
KdF's free time and vacation services.95More and more vacationerswould come
with theirown carsratherthanon specialKdFtrains.Therefore,he concluded,KdF
facilities shouldbe equippedwith parkinglots andgarages.KdFofficers soughtto
develop more kinds of individualizedtravel.96The KdF set aboutto preparemaps
andlodginglists forthecartravelers.TheAutobahnenwereto developintopleasure
and sightseeing roads with KdF-owned roadhouses and lodging.97
The Volkswagen's Failure and Its Causes
If the Volkswagenplanshadsucceeded,thecharacterof the automobilein Germany
would have completely transformed.The Volkswagenwas supposed to shift the
Germancarfromthebusinessto theprivatesector,fromaninvestmentto a consumer
good. The UnitedStateswas not or was seldommentionedin the Nazi vision of free
time andvacations.But it is obvious thattherewere similaritieswith the use of the
car in America. While Nazi propaganda successfully produced consumer
interpretationsandsymbolsof theprivatecar,Nazi policy failedto producea sound
economic basis for the Volkswagen.
Hitler's focus was on the Volkswagenprice. He believed thatby subsidizingit
to decrease the price to 990 RM, the car would be within the reach of millions of
buyers.This conflicted with the findings of many experts,who explainedthatthe
crucialpoint was not the initial cost but operatingexpenses.98Estimateswere that
threequartersof theexpenseof smallcarsconsistedof operatingexpenses, andonly
one quarterof depreciation.99This meantthattotal costs would not change much
with even a considerable decrease in the purchase price, as in the case of the
Volkswagen.
The greatest proportionof the operatingexpense was for gasoline and oil,
followedby thecost of thegarage,andfinallyin equalproportionfortires,insurance,
andrepairs.'1?DuringtheNazi period,all costs decreasedwiththe exceptionof gas,
Wolfgang Konig
259
oil, and tires, which increasedsubstantiallydue to the Nazi autarkypolicy, which
placed high duties on oil, gasoline, and rubberand used the money to constructa
As one commentatorput it: "Thelevel
synthetic gasoline and rubberindustry.10"
of the gas price ... is the crucial factor in determiningwhether importantand
Nazipolicy
comprehensiveprogressin motorizationwill be possiblein Germany."102
did not heed the demandsfor price reductions,but mandatedfurtherincreases at
the end of 1936, around60 percentof which went to the state.103This demonstrates
Nazi policy deemed it more importantto preparefor war throughautarkythanto
supply goods for the people. For a long time, the resulting difficulties for the
Volkswagenprojectwereignoredordownplayed.TheKdFdiscoveredtheimportance
of the Volkswagen's operating costs only in 1938 and tried to lower them by
arrangingspecial rates with insurancecompanies and repair-shops,and building
cheap garages (Volksgaragen). At the beginning of the war, however, these
questions were far from being settled. Gas prices could not be challenged in the
contextof Nazi warpolicy.
The story of gas prices demonstratescontradictionswithin Nazi policy. Nazis
deluded themselves that they could pursue autarkyand armamentand as well
ambitiousprojectslike the Volkswagen.However, economic resourcesin the form
of capital,labor,andmaterialsdidnot suffice to achieve all politicalgoals. TheNazi
economy was even less able to stimulateconsumptionthanproduction.To finance
armament,wages were kept low. Workers'incomes permittedthem to purchasea
motorcyclebutnot a car.In 1938, only 1.3 percentof carbuyersbut48.7 percentof
cycle buyers were workers.104In the 1930s, cycle manufacturersoffered VolksCommentatorsarguedthatonly the motorcycle
motorcycles(Volksmotorrdder).105
could providefor the complete motorizationof the Germanpeople.106 Nazi leaders
ignored these voices. The motorcycle did not meet their standardsof what was
appropriateto theculturallevel of theGermanVolk;andmotorcyclesdidnotfit their
populationpolicies.
During the war, allied airplanesdispersed leaflets claiming that savings for
Inreality,the savingswerenotdrawn
Volkswagenwerebeingusedfor armament.107
upon. Nazi leadersand Volkswagenmanagersnever stoppedenvisioning the car's
success aftera victoriouswar. Victory would supplyGermanywith cheap foreign
laborandunlimitedresources,it was argued.This showed thatthe planningbefore
the war had been unrealistic.Hitlercontinuedto speak of productionfigures of 1
to 1.5million Volkswagenperyear,butnow referredto a "EuropeanVolkswagen."'08
His Ministerof Armament,AlbertSpeer,latersaidthatHitlerplannedto manufacture
only the Volkswagenandno othercarsafterthe war.109In his speeches at the Berlin
autoexhibitions,HitlerhaddeclaredthatGermanywas able to motorizejust as the
UnitedStateshaddone.Duringthewar,commentatorsgave a differentinterpretation
of America's motorization.It supposedlyresultedfrom the people's high income
andthecountry'svastresourcesalone.Similarly,thewarwouldprovideGermany's
motorizationandthe Volkswagenwitha newbasis:"avasthomogeneouscontinental
economic space thatincludesEurope,Africa, andthe connectingareasof the Near
East."110
260
German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
Conclusion
Consumersocietiesin themoreaffluentcountries,inparticulartheUnitedStatesand
Ford's Model T, provided the material model for the Nazi conception for the
Volkswagenandotherpeople's products.Nazi policy, however,hadto takevarious
other, to some extent self-made, conditions into account. The Germanpeople's
incomewas verylow following theDepression.Hitlerrefusedto increasewages and
insteadused productivitygains for autarkyandarmament.His hopes concentrated
on reducingpricesthroughextremerationalization- a kindof miracleweaponbased
on faith in the Fuhrer.Furthermore,the people's products and other consumer
goods were to have been manufacturedby industriesthat did not seek profits.111
Nazi demands,however, were so extensive thatcompaniesfearedthatthey would
fail andrefusedto cooperate.As a result,Germancarmanufacturers,includingthe
American-ownedcompanies,withdrewfromthe Volkswagenproject.The shift of
the Volkswagenprojectto DAF did not changetheessentialproblemsof production
costs and affordability for consumers. It just concealed them under a veil of
propaganda.
Theconceptof people's productsremainedablendof propagandaandillusionary
politics. In orderto win the supportof the people, the Nazis propagatedconsumer
goods thatwere much sought after.They symbolized what the regime would give
the people in a future Nazi society. In his illusion, Hitler actually believed that
Germanycould be transformedinto a consumer society under the conditions of
autarkyandarmament- andin contraventionto Ford'sformulaof massproduction,
low prices, andhigh wages. It was not until the FederalRepublicof Germanythat
the consumersociety became a realityin the economic context of an open andfree
worldmarket. 12
This essay is partof a researchproject,"NationalsozialistischeVolksprodukte,"sponsored
by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.
"DerVaterdes Volkswagens,"in: HansBohrmannandGabrieleToepser-Ziegert,ed. ,NSPresseanweisungender Vorkriegszeit.EditionundDokumentation,7 vols. (Munich, 19842001), vol. 4,469.
2 "Die Ford-Formulader Massenherstellung,der niedrigenPreise und hohen Lohne schuf
denheutegiiltigenBegriff'Amerika',"inBohrmann/Toepser-Ziegert,NS-Presseanweisungen,
vol. 4,469.
3Untemehmensarchiv
Volkswagen (UVA), VDA-Depositum 73/27/1, Ford, 30 April and
25 May 1936.
4 "Eine derartigeDarstellung ist vollig unmoglich. ... kann als Schopfer des deutschen
Volkswagens in spaterer Zeit nur Adolf Hitler genannt werden." Bohrmann/ToepserZiegert,NS-Presseanweisungen,vol. 4,468.
5The literatureon Americanconsumer
society is massive, startingwith early classics like
Hazel Kyrk,A Theoryof Consumption(Gettingand Spending:TheConsumer'sDilemma)
(Boston/New York, 1923) andDavid M. Potter,PeopleofPlenty: EconomicAbundanceand
WolfgangKonig
261
the American Character (Chicago, 1954) to more recently: Susan Strasser,Satisfaction
Guaranteed:TheMakingof theAmericanMass Market(New York, 1989);William Leach,
Land of Desire: Merchants,Power and the Rise of a New American Culture(New York,
1993);DavidE. Nye, ConsumingPower.A SocialHistoryofAmericanEnergies(Cambridge/
Massachusetts/London,
1998);GaryCross,AnAll-Consuming
Century:WhyCommercialism
Won in Modern America (New York, 2000); Wolfgang K6nig, Geschichte der
Konsumgesellschaft(Stuttgart,2000). Proponentsfor an earlieruse of the concept go back
to JoanThirsk,Economic Policy and Projects. TheDevelopmentof a ConsumerSociety in
Early ModernEngland (Oxford, 1978) and GrantMcCracken,Cultureand Consumption.
NewApproachesto theSymbolicCharacterof ConsumerGoodsandActivities(Bloomington/
Indianapolis,1988); andrecentlyNeil McKendrick/JohnBrewer/J.H. Plump, TheBirthof
a ConsumerSociety: The Commercializationof Eighteenth-CenturyEngland (London,
1998).
6 Classic works on the history of mass productionare:Alfred D. ChandlerJr., The Visible
Hand. TheManagerialRevolutionin AmericanBusiness (Cambridge,MA/London, 1977);
David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932. The
DevelopmentofManufacturingTechnologyin the UnitedStates (Baltimore/London,31987);
MichaelJ.Piore/CharlesF. Sabel, TheSecondIndustrialDivide: PossibilitiesforProsperity
im19.Jahrhundert.
(New York,1984);VolkerBenad-Wagenhoff,IndustriellerMaschinenbau
Werkstattpraxisund Entwicklung spanabhebender Werkzeugmaschinenim deutschen
Maschinenbau1870-1914 (Stuttgart,1993); Philip Scranton,Endless Novelty: Specialty
Production and American Industrialization1865-1925 (Princeton/New York, 1997). A
helpful reader:Steven Tolliday, ed., TheRise and Fall of Mass Production (Cheltenham/
Northampton, 1998).
7HenryFord,"MassProduction,"EncyclopaediaBritannica13thedition,vol. 2 (1926): 821.
8 The older literatureis superseded by the monumental work by Hans Mommsen and
ManfredGrieger,Das Volkswagenwerkund seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich (Disseldorf,
1996). This articleowes much to this book, but goes beyond it by treatingthe Volkswagen
more in the context of the Germanautomobileindustryand culture.
9Thebest overviews are:HeidrunEdelmann,VomLuxusgutzumGebrauchsgegenstand:Die
Geschichte der Verbreitungvon Personenkraftwagenin Deutschland (Schriftenreihedes
VerbandesderAutomobilindustriee.V. [VDA] 60) (FrankfurtamMain, 1989);ReinerFlik,
VonFord lernen?AutomobilbauundMotorisierunginDeutschland bis 1933 (Koln, 2001).
10The best source on the history of motorcycles in Germanyto date is the unpublished
master'sthesis by FrankSteinbeck,"Die Motorisierungdes StraBenverkehrs
im Deutschen
Reich 1918 bis 1939 unterbesondererBeriicksichtigungdes Motorrades,"M.A. Thesis, TU
Berlin, 2001.
I Flik, VonFord lernen?, 280.
12Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,5 (1936): 182;Kraftfahrzeug.HandelundBewirtschaftung
(1939): 543.
13"Das deutscheVolk der weniger zahlungsfahigenSchichtenhat eben, weil es vier Rader
nichtbezahlenkann,sich aufdie zwei Radergeworfen,ummotorisiertzu sein."Die Deutsche
Volkswirtschaft5 (1936): 182.
14HellmuthWolff, Die Fahrrad-Wirtschaft(Schriftendes SeminarsfurVerkehrswesenan
der MartinLuther-UniversitatHalle-Wittenberg15) (Halle, 1939), 10.
262
German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
15HerbertWeinberger,Der Inlandsmarktder deutschenAutomobilindustrie,Ph.D. Diss.
(Munich, 1936), 16-17; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,6 (1937): 1030-31.
16 Anette
Gudjons, Die Entwicklungdes "Volksautomobils"von 1904 bis 1945 unter
besondererBerucksichtigungdes 'Volkswagens':Ein Beitrag zu Problemen der Sozial-,
Wirtschafts- und Technikgeschichtedes Automobils (Diss. Hannover, 1988); Bernd
Wiersch,Die Vorbereitungdes Volkswagens (Diss. Hannover,1974); HeidrunEdelmann,
"DerTraumvom 'Volkswagen',"in GeschichtederZukunftdesVerkehrs:Verkehrskonzepte
von der Fruhen Neuzeit bis zum 21. Jahrhundert (Deutsches Museum. Beitrage zur
Historischen Verkehrsforschung 1), ed. Hans-Liudger Dienel and Helmuth Trischler
(Frankfurtand New York, 1997), 280-88.
17L(ouis) Betz,Das Volksauto:Rettungoder Untergangder deutschenAutomobilindustrie?
(Automobilia.GrundlegendeSchriftenuiberAutomobilbauundAutomobilwesen1) (Stuttgart,
1931).
18
"... langst erwiinschten wohlfeilen Volkswagen." Edelmann, Vom Luxusgut, 118.
19"AusdemLuxusfahrzeugvon einst ist dasntichtemeVerkehrsmittelvon heutegeworden."
Kraftfahrttutnot!ZweiRedenzurEroffnungderInternationalenAutomobil-undMotorradAusstellungBerlinam 11.2.1933 gehaltenv.R.AllmersundA.Hitler,ed. Reichsverbandder
Automobilindustrie(Berlin, 1933), 8.
20"Ichliebe den Kraftwageniiberalles, denn er hat mirDeutschlanderschlossen!"J(akob)
Werlin,"FiinfJahreMotorisierungim nationalsozialistischenDeutschland:Ein Riickblick
und Ausblick,"Der Vierjahresplan,2 (1938): 79-80.
21 "... Motorisierungsgedankeals Symbol der nationalsozialistischenrevolutionierenden
Zukunftsentwicklung...."JakobWerlin,"AchtJahreMotorisierung- achtJahreVorsprung,"
Der Vierjahresplan,5 (1941): 315-17, 316.
22"... demdeutschenVolke wieder
diejenigeStellungin derWelt zu schaffen,aufdie es nach
Rasse, Charakterund Geschichte einen unabdingbarenAnspruch hat." J(akob) Werlin,
"Forderungdes Fiihrers:Motorisierung,"Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,10 (1941): 122832, 1228.
23SchrittmacherderWirtschaft:VierRedenzurInternationalenAutomobil-undMotorradAusstellung Berlin 1936 (Berlin, 1936), 13-14; Das Kraftfahrzeug:Verkehrsmitteldes
Automobil-undMotorrad-Ausstellung
Berlin
ganzenVolkes.VierRedenzurInternationalen
1938 (Berlin, 1938), 19; Krafte sammeln, Krdfte lenken, Krdftesparen. Drei Reden zur
Internationalen Automobil- und Motorrad-Ausstellung, ed. Reichsverband der
Automobilindustrie(Berlin, 1939), 15.
24"DasdeutscheVolk hatgenaudasselbeBedurfnis,sich des Kraftwagenszu bedienen,wie,
sagen wir, das amerikanische."Schrittmacherder Wirtschaft,15.
25 See note 16 above.
26 "Geburtsstundedes
europaischen Volkswagens," Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung,14
January1933, 4.
27Edelmann,Vom
Luxusgut,157;Betz,Das Volksauto,75; Mitteilungendes Reichsverbandes
des Kraftfahrzeughandelsund-gewerbes E.V. 1933: 137.
28On the Volksempfangerand its context in NS radiopolitics: Heinz Pohle,DerRundfunk
als InstrumentderPolitik:ZurGeschichtedes deutschenRundfunksvon 1923/38 (Hamburg,
imDrittenReich (Munich,1980);Inge MarBolekand
1955);AnsgarDiller,Rundfunkpolitik
Wolfgang Konig
263
Adelheid von Salder, eds., Radiozeiten: Herrschaft, Alltag, Gesellschaft (1924-1960)
(Potsdam, 1999).
29Edelmann,"Der Traumvom 'Volkswagen',"284; Kraftverkehrs-Wirtschaft,
25 January
1934.
30
Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,56-60.
31
Vollgas voraus! Drei Reden, gehalten aus Anlafi der InternationalenAutomobil-und
Motorrad-Ausstellung1934, ed.,ReichsverbandderAutomobilindustrie(Berlin, 1934), 713.
32 Allgemeine Automobil-Zeitung35 (1934), #14, 13, 17, 3; ibid. 36 (1935), #7, 13;
Kraftverkehrs-Wirtschaft, 10 and 17 May, and 21 June 1934; Mitteilungen des
Reichsverbandesdes Kraftfahrzeughandelsund -gewerbes E.V. 1934: 650, 770; W. E.
Fauner,"ZurFrage des Volkswagens,"Zeitschriftdes VereinesDeutscherIngenieure, 78
(1934): 1243-45; Erwin Gottschalk,"Volksautound Autobahn,"Die Autobahn: 15 July
1934,522-23; BundesarchivBerlin (BA) R 6/8000, 305-6; R 4311/753, 15-25, 36 and 93;
Heiber,Aktender Parteikanzlei,#124 01143-4; Motor und Sport, 11/12 (1934): 7; 11/24
(1934): 21; Der deutsche Volkswirt8 (1933-34): 1228.
33 Motor und
Sport, 11/23 (1934): 23-24: AllgemeineAutomobil-Zeitung,35/29 (1934): 89, and 35/33: 13-14 respectively.
34OnFordin Germany:SimonReich, TheFruitsof Fascism:PostwarProsperityinHistorical
Perspective (Cornell Studies in Political Economy; Ithaca/London,1990); Hanns-Peter
Rosellen, "... undtrotzdemvorwarts":Die dramatischeEntwicklungvonFordinDeutschland
1903 bis 1945 (Frankfurt,1986); Stephan H. Lindner,Das Reichskommissariatfiir die
Behandlungfeindlichen VermogensimZweitenWeltkrieg:EineStudiezur Verwaltungs-und
Wirtschaftsgeschichtedes nationalsozialistischenDeutschlands(Stuttgart,1991): 121-22;
Flik, VonFord lernen?, 169-82,187-90. Accordingto its Inventoryof Contentstransmitted,
the FordMotorCompanyArchives has no importantmaterialon Fordandthe Volkswagen.
35Cf. PaulRoggatz, "Die Automobilisierung:IhreUrsachenam Beispiel derUSA undihre
Auswirkungen auf den Raumbedarfder Wohnstrassen,"Der soziale Wohnungsbauin
Deutschland, 2 (1942): 463-74 and 489-501.
36 Philipp Gassert,Amerikaim Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung
1933-1945 (Stuttgart, 1997); Rudiger Hachtmann,"Die Begriinderder amerikanischen
Techniksindfast lauterschwabisch-alemannischeMenschen":Nazi-Deutschland,derBlick
aufdie USA unddie 'Amerikanisierung'derindustriellenProduktionsstrukturen
im' Dritten
Reich'," in Amerikanisierung:TraumundAlptraumim Deutschlanddes 20. Jahrhunderts
(TransatlantischeHistorische Studien. Veroffentlichungendes Deutschen Historischen
Instituts Washington, DC 6), ed. Alf Ltidtke,Inge MarBolek,and Adelheid von Saldern
(Stuttgart,1996), 37-66; AlbertLee,Henry Fordand theJews (New York, 1980). Heinrich
Himmler,leaderof the SS, also admiredHenryFord.See MichaelThadAllen, TheBusiness
of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the ConcentrationCamps (London, 2002), 14.
37Das Archiv 52 (1938): 522. Reich, The Fruits of Fascism, 116 and Tilman Harlander,
ZwischenHeimstdtteund Wohnmaschine:Wohnungsbauund Wohnungspolitikin der Zeit
des Nationalsozialismus (Basel, 1995): 130, falsely, say thatFordreceived the decoration
in Berlin. Lee, Henry Ford, 113, falsely, states that this was in 1933.
38 H(elmut) Heiber,
comp., Akten der Parteikanzlei der NSDAP. Rekonstruktioneines
verlorengegangenen Bestandes. Sammlung der in anderen Provenienzen iiberlieferten
264
German Studies Review 27/2(2004)
Korrespondenzen,Niederschriften von Besprechungen usw. mit dem Stellvertreterdes
FuhrersundseinemStabbez.d. Partei-Kanzlei,ihrenAmtern,Referaten
u. Unterabteilungen
sowie mit Heft und Bormannpersonlich, ed., Institutfiir Zeitgeschichte. Part I, 3 vols.,
RegestenundRegister,PartII,2 vols.,Microfiches (Vienna/Munichetal. 1983-1985),#1 17
03911.
39Bohrmann/Toepser-Ziegert,
ed., NS-Presseanweisungen,vol. 6,787-8 and 957.
40Ibid., vol. 7, 29.
41 On General Motors' Opel Company: Reich, The Fruits of Fascism; Lindner, Das
Reichskommissariat, 122-24; Flik, Von Ford lernen?, 172-73, 180-87; Hans-Jiirgen
Schneider,Autos und Technik:125 Jahre Opel (Cologne, 1987); GunterNeliba, Die OpelWerkeim Konzernvon General Motors (1929-1948) in Riisselsheim und Brandenburg:
Produktionfir Aufrustungund Krieg ab 1935 unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft
(Frankfurtam Main, 2000). General Motors did not answer my requests for information
on GM and the Volkswagen.
42 "...
von deutschen Arbeitem aus deutschem Material in Deutschland hergestellt...." Der
Opel-Geist, 3/7 (1932): 3.
43FiguresinRundschauTechnischerArbeit,21 October1936; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft
5 (1936): 677; Wilhelm Dohrn, "Der deutsche Personenkraftwagenmarktnach der
Wirtschaftskrisis,"WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv, 44 (1936): 613-32, 620; Tatsachen und
Zahlen 1938: 40.
44Motor und Sport, 11/24 (1934): 21.
45 Rosellen,"... und trotzdem vorwdrts," 93 and 107; Edelmann, "Der Traum vom
'Volkswagen',"284; UVW, VDA-Depositum 73/27/1, Ford.
46UVW,VDA-Depositum73/26: 21 and22 June,2 July 1934; 73/27/1, Ford,29 May 1934.
47 Der Opel-Geist 4 (1933): no. 2, 4; 5 (1934): no. 1, 3; StadtarchivRiisselsheim (StA
Riisselsheim) (MunicipalArchives Riisselsheim), Opel Collection I, 3.3.3.
48"GroBesInteressebei demFuhrerfandunserVolkswagen,dener genauestensbesichtigte."
Opel-Werksgemeinschaft,5 (1934): no. 4, 2.
49"Sie sindderIdee des Volkswagensbisheramnachstengekommen."Der Opel-Kamerad,
7/2 (1936): 2.
50Stadtarchiv(StA) Riisselsheim, Opel Collection I, 14.1.
51
"Diejenigen Firmen, welche bisher kleine und billige Wagentypenmit gutem Erfolge
hergestellthabenundiiberweitgehendabgeschriebeneFabrikationseinrichtungen
verfiigen,
also etwa Opel und Auto-Union (DKW), wiirden moglicherweise unter Verwendung
bewahrterAggregatein 15Monatenin derLage sein,einenWagenherauszubringen,demdas
Pradikat'Volkswagen' zugebilligt werdenkonnte."BA, R 43 II/ 753,41-42.
52Paul Kluke, "Hitlerunddas Volkswagenprojekt,"VierteljahrsheftefiirZeitgeschichte,8
(1960): 341-83,355; Mommsen/Grieger,DasVolkswagenwerk,100;HansPohl, Stephanie
Habeth,andBeate Briinighaus, eds., Die Daimler-BenzAG in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945:
Eine Dokumentation(Stuttgart,1986): 52.
53Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,107.
54 DaimlerChryslerKonzernarchiv(DCK), Kissel files, 11.15 "Aktenvermerk
iber die
Besprechungam 11. April 1934, betreffendSchaffungeines Volkswagens";cf. Mommsen/
Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,56-60.
Wolfgang Konig
265
55BA, R 43 11/753,6; DCK, Kissel files, 11.15, 4
April 1934, Allmers, "Gedankenzum
Problem Volkswagen";cf. Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,69.
56"ExposebetreffenddenBaudes deutschenVolkswagens":Wiersch,Die Vorbereitung,1517; Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,76-77.
57 DCK,Kissel files, 11.15,4
April 1934, Allmers, "Gedankenzum ProblemVolkswagen";
KarlRothandMichael Schmid,DieDaimler-BenzAG 1916-1948, Schliisseldokumentezur
Konzerngeschichte(Nordlingen,1987), 153-54;Mommsen/Grieger,DasVolkswagenwerk,
70.
58Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,78-84.
59UVW, VDA-Depositum 73/26: 11 December 1934, 3 April 1935; cf. Edelmann,"Der
Traumvom 'Volkswagen',"285.
60UVW, VDA-Depositum 73/26: 13 October 1934; 73/27/1.
61 Ibid., 73/27/1: Ford, 20 November 1934.
62 Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,83-93.
63 P4 productionfigures in: StA Riisselsheim, Opel Collection I, 4; cf. Der Opel-Kamerad
9(1938): 7,12; JohannHeinrichv. Brunn,EinMannmachtAuto-Geschichte:DerLebensweg
desRobertAllmers(Stuttgart,1972),257, 266;DieDeutsche Volkswirtschaft7(1938): 619.
64Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft4 (1935): 82; Der deutsche Volkswirt13 (1938-39): 759.
65Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv(HWA), 112/548 "MonthlyReports ...,"in particularMay
1937, June, August, and September 1938.
66DieDeutsche Volkswirtschaft8(1939): 530; Kraftfahrzeug.Handel undBewirtschaftung
(1940): 417.
67"dieAufgabemuBgelost werdenunddaherwirdsie auchgel6st."WillewirktWunder.Drei
RedenzurInternationalenAutomobil-undMotorrad-Ausstellung
Berlin1935 (Berlin,1935),
14.
68"...mitriicksichtsloserEntschlossenheit
...."In:Schrittmacher
...zumerfolgreichenAbschluB
der Wirtschaft,16.
69 "Es kann ... in Deutschlandnur einen Volkswagen geben und nicht zehn." In:
Kraftdes
Motors. Kraft des Volkes. Sechs Reden zur InternationalenAutomobil- und MotorradAusstellungBerlin 1937 (Berlin, 1937), 16.
70"Entwederdie sogenanntefreie Wirtschaftist fihig, diese Problemezu losen, oder sie ist
nicht fihig, als freie Wirtschaftweiterzubestehen."Ibid., 20.
71 "Steckenpferdeund Lieblingsideen." Klaus Behnken, ed., Deutschland-Berichteder
SozialdemokratischenPartei Deutschlands (Sopade) 1934-1940, 7 vols. (Salzhausen/
Frankfurtam Main, 1980), 1939: 488.
72 For instance: Motor-Schau2 (1938): 494; J(akob) Werlin, "ZurGrundsteinlegungder
deutschenVolkswagenfabrik"VolkischerBeobachter,NorthGermanedition,26 May 1938:
1.
73FerdinandPorsche,"DerKdF-Wagenals konstruktiveAufgabe."VolkischerBeobachter,
17 February1939, 1.
74 "Auch spatereWerke werden wie dieses in der Geschichte des Automobils drei Namen
vorallenanderennennen:KarlBenz, GottliebDaimler,Adolf Hitler!"WilfridBade,Das Auto
erobertdie Welt:Biographie des Kraftwagens(Berlin, 1938), 362.
75
Gassert,Amerikaim Dritten Reich, 91-92; RainerZitelmann,Hitler: Selbstverstandnis
eines Revolutionars(Hamburget al, 1987), 321-24; Hachtmann,"Die Begrunder."
266
German Studies Review 27/2 (2004)
76Gassert,,,Amerikaim DrittenReich",In: DanDiner,VerkehrteWelten:Antiamerikanismus
in Deutschland: Ein historischer Essay (Frankfurtam Main, 1993), 89-116; Hans Dieter
Schafer,Das gespaltene Bewusstsein:Deutsche KulturundLebenswirklichkeit1933-1945
(Munich,Wien, 21982), 114-37; Hans Dieter Schafer,"Amerikanismusim DrittenReich,"
Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann, eds.
(Darmstadt,1991), 199-215; JamesV. Compton,Hitler und die USA:Die Amerikapolitik
des Dritten Reiches und die Urspriingedes zweiten Weltkrieges(Oldenburg,Hamburg,
1968), 9-27.
77Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,167-71, 250-66; Manfred Grieger, "River
Rouge am Mittellandkanal.Das Volkswagenwerkwahrenddes Nationalsozialismus."In:
Zukunftaus Amerika:Fordismusin der Zwischenkriegszeit:Siedlung-Stadt-Raum, ed.,
StiftungBauhausDessau undderRheinisch-WestfalischenTechnischenHochschuleAachen
(Dessau, 1995), 163-73. At the Society for the History of Technology's conference in
Munich in 2000, KarlE. Ludvigsen delivered a paperwith the title Considerationsin the
Creation and Survival of the VW Worksat Wolfsburg.He argued, without convincing
evidence, however, that Ford's English factory in Dagenhamwas more the model for the
Volkswagen Works than River Rouge. Cf. on the Americancar plants:Lindy Biggs, The
RationalFactory: Architecture,Technology,and WorkinAmerica'sAge ofMassProduction
(Studies in Industryand Society, 11; Baltimore,London, 1996).
78StA Russelsheim, Opel Collection I, Opel Production1929-1944.
79Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,81-82.
80Schrittmacherder Wirtschaft,15;Max Domarus,ed., Hitler: RedenundProklamationen
1932-1945,Kommentiertvon einemdeutschenZeitgenossen,2 vols., (Wiesbaden,1973[first
published 1962-63]), 867.
81
Kraftfahrzeug.Handel undBewirtschaftung1939, 18.
82
Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,166, 173, 190, 251-52.
83 "... nicht nurdie
groBteAutomobilfabrik,sonderndie groBteFabrikder Welt iiberhaupt
..." Das Archiv, 53 (1938): 625.
84
"Damitist eine PlanungwahrhaftgigantischenAusmaBesin die Tat umgesetzt worden,
wie sie in derEntwicklungsgeschichtederMenschheitbisherohne Beispiel ist."Deutsches
Nachrichtenbiiro,second morningedition: 27 May 1938.
85 Die Deutsche
Volkswirtschaft6 (1937): 1030-31; Weinberger,DerInlandsmarkt,16-17.
86 Wochenberichtdes Instituts
9/19 (1936): 1-6.
fiir Konjunkturforschung,
87
Vollgas voraus!, 11; Wille wirkt Wunder, 14; Schrittmacher der Wirtschaft, 16;
Kraftfahrzeug.Handel undBewirtschaftung1939, 19; Domarus,Hitler: Reden, 867; Das
Archiv 53 (1938): 625-26; 59 (1939): 1798.
88Das Archiv 53
(1938): 26.
89
Kraftfahrzeug.Handel undBewirtschaftung1938,605.
90Mommsen/Grieger,Das Volkswagenwerk,189-202.
91
Ibid., 1024.
92Wiersch,Die Vorbereitung,164.
93 "... die Sehnsucht der Deutschen nach der Feme, die sich in ihrem Wander- und
Entdeckertriebin der Geschichte immer wieder zeigt ...." Der soziale Wohnungsbauin
Deutschland2 (1942): 83.
Wolfgang Konig
267
94ErnestineBennersdorfer,"'Social Advertising'im Nationalsozialismus:amBeispiel der
DeutschenArbeitsfront1933-1939,"Relation.Medien-Gesellschaft-Geschichte 2(1995):
87-136, 118-19; AllgemeineAutomobil-Zeitung41 (1940): 650; Die Woche,7 September
1938,24-25.
95BA, R 43 II/556 b: 19.
96 Ibid. NS 22/ 333, OrganizationPlan: 22 January1941 and no. 10.
97 ErhardSchiitz and EckhardGruber,MythosReichsautobahn:Bau undInszenierungder
"Strafiendes Fiihrers" 1933-1941 (Berlin, 1996), 122-50.
98 Some examples: E. v. Mickwitz, "Einkommensgestaltungund Automobilabsatz,"
ZeitschriftfiirdeutscheWirtschaftspolitik
Wirtschaftsdienst.
WeltwirtschaftlicheNachrichten,
19 (1934): 235-37, 236; Helmut Kienlen, "Der 'Volkswagen' - ein klarungsbedurftiges
Problem," Wirtschaftsdienst.WeltwirtschaftlicheNachrichten. Zeitschriftfir deutsche
Wirtschaftspolitik19 (1934): 237-39,239;Derdeutsche Volkswirt10 (1936): 945; 12(193738): 965; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft5 (1936): 135; 7 (1938): 1150; Der Angriff, 16
February 1936, 5; Haltungskostenvon Personenkraftfahrzeugen.Bearb. im Institut fur
Konjunkturforschung, Verkehrswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen. Schriftenreihe des
VerkehrswissenschaftlichenForschungsrats beim Reichsverkehrsministerium7 (Jena,
undihreWerbung:Eine
1938), 3; Helm Wienk6tter,"DiedeutscheKraftfahrzeugwirtschaft
Vorschauzur Interat. Automobil-AusstellungBerlin 1935," Die deutsche Werbung.Die
Zeitschriftfiir Wirtschaftswerbungund Werbefachwelt28 (1935): 725-29,726.
99Flik, VonFord lernen?, 300; Dohr, "Der deutsche Personenkraftwagenmarkt,"
628.
100
Flik, Von Ford lernen?, 300; cf. 55-61.
'1 Flik, VonFord lernen?, 300; Edelmann,VomLuxusgut,180; Der Angriff, 16 February
1936,5; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft7 (1938): 1150.
102 "Die H6he des Treibstoffpreises ... entscheidet iiber die Frage, ob in Deutschland
gewichtige und umfassende Fortschrittein der Motorisierungerzielt werden k6nnen."
Kienlen, "Der 'Volkswagen'," 239.
103 Franz Angelberger, "Der Treibstoffpreis," Wirtschaftsdienst. Weltwirtschaftliche
Nachrichten.Zeitschriftfiirdeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik19 (1934): 246-48,247; Flik, Von
Ford lernen?, 76, 78; Haltungskosten,82.
104Kraftfahrzeug.Handel undBewirtschaftung1939,543.
105DerAngriff, 20 February1933,2nd supplement;20 March 1934; Kraftfahrzeug.Handel
undBewirtschaftung1939, 863.
'06DasMotorrad16 (1936),479-80; Kraftfahrzeug.HandelundBewirtschaftung1939,6056
107 Heinz Boberach,ed., Meldungenaus demReich 1938-1945. Die geheimenLageberichte
des Sicherheitsdienstesder SS, 18 vols. (Herrsching,1984-85), 854-55.
108HenryPicker,Hitlers Tischgespracheim Fuhrerhauptquartier1941-1942. Vollstandig
uberarbeiteteund erweiterteNeuausgabe mit bisher unbekanntenSelbstzeugnissenAdolf
Hitlers,Abbildungen,AugenzeugenberichtenundErliuterungen des Autors:Hitler, wie er
wirklich war (Stuttgart,1983), 374.
109Following Edelmann,VomLuxusgut,215.
10"... ein gewaltiges, einheitlicheskontinentalesWirtschaftsgebiet,das Europa,Afrikaund
die verbindendenTeile des nahenOstensumschlieBt...."Roggatz,"DieAutomobilisierung,"
471.
268
11
German Studies Review 27/2 (2004)
Concerning the relationshipbetween industry and NS politics, one can differentiate
typologically between the producersof investmentgoods and the producersof consumer
goods. Producersof investment goods profited from the Nazi politics of armamentand
autarky,producersof consumergoods sufferedfrom it. Well-known examples for the first
arethe chemical, aircraft,automobileindustries,andiron and steel. Examplesfor the latter
arethe textile andleatherindustriesandthe manufacturersof musical instruments.For the
first groupsee for instance:PeterHayes, Industryand Ideology. IG Farben in the Nazi Era
(Cambridge,2001); Neil Gregor,Stern und Hakenkreuz.Daimler Benz im Dritten Reich
(Berlin, 1997);LutzBudraB,FlugzeugindustrieundLuftristungin Deutschland1918-1945
(Dusseldorf, 1998);for the second:HartmutBerghoff,ZwischenKleinstadtundWeltmarkt.
HohnerunddieHarmonika1857-1961. Unternehmensgeschichteals
Gesellschaftsgeschichte
(Paderbom,1997);PetraBriiutigam,MittelstandischeUnternehmerimNationalsozialismus.
inderSchuh-undLederindustrie
Wirtschaftliche
EntwicklungenundsozialeVerhaltensweisen
BadensundWurttembergs
(Miinchen,1997);AnneSudrow,"Das'deutscheRohstoffwunder'
unterdenBedingungendernationalsozialistischen
unddie Schuhindustrie.Schuhproduktion
in
Autarkiepolitik," Blatterfiir Technikgeschichte60 (1998): 63-92.
112 Continuitiesanddiscontinuitiesbetween Volkswagenin theNazi periodandin theFederal
Republic are discussed by Steven Tolliday, "Enterpriseand State in the West German
Wirtschaftswunder:Volkswagen and the Automobile Industry, 1939-1962, " Business
History Review 69 (1995): 273-350.