South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Cooperation or

South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Cooperation or

Australia and the Asia-Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 10:
South Asia and the Indian Ocean:
Cooperation or Institutionalised Conflict?
Topics: -
1. The Significance of India
2. The Tangled Web of South Asian Affairs
3. India’s Circles of Engagement
4. From Key Bilateral Relations to Multipolarity?
5. India as a Key Player in the Asia-Pacific Region
6. Resources and Further Reading
1. The Significance of India
There will not be time in this subject give due credence to all the countries of South
Asia. For reasons of time, we will focus on India and its regional impact on South
Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. South Asia in its earlier Indus, Aryan, Classical and
Mughal forms (see Wolpert 2004), was a great seminal civilisation, representing one
of the great continuities in Asia, a source of three of the world’s great religions
(Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism), and a major influence on Southeast Asian art, culture
and literature for the last 2,000 years. India and China, mutually, were the great
external influences on Southeast Asian kingdoms down to the 18th century
(indigenous civilisations were also diverse and culturally rich), and formed part of an
extended trade network which reached from eastern Africa to Japan (see Chaudhuri
1990). These Indian travellers brought with them the great religions (Hinduism,
Buddhism, and along with Arabic traders, Islam, often in the more eclectic version of
Islamic Sufism). This traditional impact can be seen in the Hinduism of Bali, the great
architectural temples of central Java, and in the role of the Hindu epic myths, the
Ramayana and the Mahabharata, in shaping Malay dance, shadow theatre (Wayang
Kulit) and story-telling. Brahmanism was the first Indian religion to flourish in Java it was followed in the 5th century by Buddhism (Saksena 1986, p160).
In modern times, India, like China, was the source of a diaspora of traders and
migrants who spread out into the Indo-Pacific and the world. Overseas Indians
(sometimes called Non-Resident Indians, NRIs) are found in Malaysia (comprising 89% of the population), Singapore (comprising 7%), Burma, Hong Kong, and as far
afield as Fiji, Australia, east Africa and South Africa, with small groups found in
Indonesia and Thailand. A small but active Indian population is also found in the
United States, Europe and Australia (Gordon 1993, pp98-9), and form part of an
‘intellectual’ export in many professions as well as scientists, academics and IT
experts. Elsewhere Indians have been labourers, farmers, and merchants, e.g. in parts
of Southeast Asia and Fiji. Most of these groups, of course, like the Chinese diaspora,
are second, third or fourth generation residents, and wish to view themselves as
nationals of Malaysia or Singapore etc. (Suryanarayan 1995, p1207). Investment back
into India by Overseas Indians has been relatively small, though government
programmes in the 1990s have tried to attract this capital into the country (‘FDI
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approvals’ increased from around around $384 million during the late-1980s to
approximately $3 billion during the late 1990s, see Balasubramanyam & Mahambare
2003). However, there have been transnational linkages in IT, software and related
industries: The one notable exception here is the participation of India's Diaspora in the Silicon
Valley and the spectacular growth of India's export-oriented software industry. The
Indian software engineers and entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley appear to have
successfully utilized India's endowments of highly trained but relatively cheap
engineering talent (Balasubramanyam & Mahambare 2003).
Alongside these traditional influences lies the reality of India as a significant nation
in world affairs and especially in the Indo-Pacific region (see lecture 1). India (the
Republic of India (Hindi Bharat), which received its independence from Britain in
1947, emerged as a poor nation greatly in need of economic and industrial
development. In general terms, India has made massive strides in increasing food and
industrial production. However, though poverty has been reduced, some 36% of the
population still lived in extreme poverty through the late 1990s, defined in terms of
minimum calorific intake, therefore suggesting the metaphor of the half-full, halfempty glass in developmental terms, with the poverty rate dropping to around 26% in
these terms by 2000 (Indo-Asian News Service 2006; Kumar 1999). Furthermore, it
has been suggested that the official poverty-line in India does little more than
provide basic calories intake (Rs.368 and Rs.559 per person respectively for rural
and urban areas). If lifted to a higher baseline: "A person spending more than Rs 840 per month does not necessarily have access
to all the fundamental needs of life."
But at the suggested expenditure level, nearly 79 per cent of India's current total
population would be below the poverty line, the study said. . . .
The study [from a Delhi think tank[ gave some grim reminders about Indian poverty:
37.7 per cent of Indian households do not have access to a nearby water source; 49
per cent do not have a proper shelter; 69.5 per cent do not have access to suitable
toilets; 85.2 per cent of Indian villages do not have a secondary school; and 43
percent of the villages do not have an all-weather road connecting them. (Indo-Asian
News 2006)
With a population growth rate of 2.1% and a population of now over 1.08 billion,
these problems remain pressing, especially in supplying meaningful jobs for all levels
of society, and claims that the country has only achieved 21% percent of its
Millennium goals in connection with reducing poverty level (Gordon 1993, p40;
DFAT 2004; DFAT 2005; Xinhua 2007). Thus, in spite of some gradual improvement,
India's Human Development Index rank is 126th in the world through 2006
(DFAT 2007). One of the main aims of Indian policy has always been not just to
increase GDP, but also to ensure through various welfare policies that economic
growth lifts the everyday quality of life of Indians from sub-human conditions
(Arora 1996a, pp1546-7). Thus, the current government has followed the 'Common
Minimum Program (CMP)', which 'indicates that it is committed to economic
reform "with a human face" to stimulate growth, investment and employment while
maintaining support for social programs', but this has led to a combined (central and
states’) fiscal deficit' of around 6.4 per cent of GDP in 2006-07 (DFAT 2007).
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It has been suggested that education, the changing role of women, and growth in
the middle class may already begun to slow population growth rates with serious
demographic changes over the next decade: As a direct result, better education will ease two of India's heaviest burdens. India has
always suffered the compound handicap of overpopulation and the wasted resource
of large numbers of women who are uneducated and confined to the home. Those
problems are likely to ease in the years ahead. According to the 2001 census, 54% of
Indian women and girls can read and write, up from only 40% a decade earlier. In
several relatively prosperous, urbanized states, the official number is higher than
80%. As a result, women are getting out of the house, getting jobs, and winning more
control over their lives. This process invariably reduces fertility in developing
countries. We expect India's birthrate to drop by about 35% over the next decade. As
Indian families shrink, their prosperity will grow. So will the nation's productive
capacity. (Cetron & Davies 2006)
Indian communities form a vigorous part of many Asian and western societies:
Little India, Singapore (Photo Copyright R. James Ferguson 1999)
This is a crucial component of political stability for India, not an option. In India there
is a widespread recognition that poverty exacerbates existing social, religious,
ethnic and class tensions, and that environmental sustainability has to be linked to
human development. The reduction of the suffering of the poor was a key element in
the political and intellectual construction of the modern Indian state, and was
emphasised by both former Prime Minister Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi as a true
measure of independence and legitimacy (Kumar 1999). In spite of strong political
consensus on the need to eradicate poverty, its gradual alleviation has been
exacerbated by the growing gap between expectations and the limited delivery by
governments of an improved quality of life to all sectors of the population, especially
among the young (Singh 1994; Kumar 1999). Further serious reduction of poverty in
India, as suggested by Government policy, will require annual growth of 6%-7%
GDP (sustained over a decade), combined with deepened provision of minimum
services (water, health care, education, public housing assistance, food security, road
and energy infrastructure), and special attention to poor and 'socially disadvantaged
groups' (Kumar 1999; Cetron & Davies 2006). Likewise, AIDS/HIV has emerged as a
major health problem for India, with some 5.7 million suffers making it the country
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the highest number effected through 2006, and with the government committed to the
production of cheap generic drugs for its treatment (Lancet 2006).
Economic growth and reduction of poverty have emerged as the major focus of
PM Singh's government through 2005-2007: India clearly recognizes the dangers of the income gap. Shortly after coming to
power, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the economist who set India on the path to
economic reform in 1991, offered a guarantee that all households will get at least 100
days of work each year. Beyond that, the government has stated that it will not allow
economic growth to fall below 7%-8% annually. With the exception of the employment
guarantee, any social program that threatens to bring growth below that level will be
tossed overboard. But when growth exceeds 7%, Singh promises to increase the
budget for aid to the poor. These guarantees alone are a big advance for India's
poorest. (Cetron & Davies 2006)
The 2003-2007 real GDP growth rates of 6.5-9.2% (8.4% estimated for 2007), with
inflation of around 4-6%, this is not impossible (Cetron & Davies 2006; DFAT 2006;
DFAT 2004), depending on future international trade flows. The total size of the
economy in PPP is estimated at $4,555 billion, compared with 11,206 for PRC in
2007 (DFAT 2007). Indeed, Indian sources have become rather up-beat on the idea of
'outshining China' within 15 years, and have projected hopes of sustained growth
through 2006-2020 (India Times 2005; Cetron & Davies 2006).
The potential of India is enormous if these problems can be met. It is the second
most populous nation on earth, has control of most of an entire subcontinent with
substantial agricultural and economic resources, and had a quite substantial education
and transport infrastructure (largely developed in its modern form on the basis left by
the British), and is now developing selected areas of high technology and research
(computing, nuclear and missile technology, plus new areas of research in medicine
and pharmaceuticals). India also has enormous problems - a large poor population
with a relatively high growth rate, vulnerability to seasonal rains, fluctuating patterns
of poverty and vulnerability, plus ongoing religious and social conflicts. Yet these
negative images should not be taken as a permanent condition. Indian agriculture
has enormous potential - 57.15% of its land is arable (Arora 1996a, p1550). India
has now become largely self-reliant in food production. India's further steps in its
'green revolution' (use of irrigation, balanced use of farm inputs such as seeds,
fertilisers and agricultural credit) could make use of some of China's experience,
while trying to limit negative environmental impact (Wang Hongyu 1995, p552;
Gordon 1993, p39; Ramachandran 1996).
Likewise, there are considerable mineral resources in India (especially coal and
iron), and India has about 40% energy self-sufficiency (Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p173)
though certain imports, including gas and oil, are essential. This reliance imported
oil and gas has led to a new phase of 'energy diplomacy' whereby India has sought to
improve its relations with Persian Gulf countries including Iran (Alam 2000), as well
as sought to gain access to Mynamar's gas fields, though this prospect has slowed
through mid-2007 due to some diversion to PRC. Likewise, there may be future
prospects for China-India cooperation in gaining access to Central Asian
resources, especially after a new round of improving economic relations between the
two countries through 2003-2006 (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004). Through 2004-2008
there have been plans put forward for access to energy via proposed pipelines from
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Iran, Turkmenistan, and perhaps Myanmar. India has also invested in nuclear power
plants, with 15 plants operational and seven more under construction (Strategic
Comments 2005). India has also begun to explore wind power options, and has the
fourth-largest wind power industry globally and the largest for a developing
country (Cetron & Davies 2006)
India (Map courtesy of PCL Map Library)
The other resource is India's population. A growing ‘middle class’, estimated
anywhere between 12% and 40% of the population, 100 to 350 million, (Cetron &
Davies 2006; Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p174, p178) with disposable cash for
commodities has meant that business groups around the world have looked towards an
Indian economic 'miracle', just as there was an economic miracle in East Asia. It is
this class that also provides the main investment and capital saving source within the
country (Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p178). It has been suggested that at 'the current rate
of growth, a majority of Indians will be middle-class by 2025 - a rate of social
progress no one else in the world can match' (Cetron & Davies 2006). However, there
is no guarantee that the middle class can continuously expand in India unless the
rural poor can be engaged in this process and employment expanded in a wide range
of sectors. The 'consuming class' may comprise only 150 million, with only some 6
million with the sustained interest and wealth for expensive foreign brand-named
goods (see Tharoor 1998 pp280-282; For high projections as a neo-colonial desire to
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open Indian markets, see Rayan 2000). Yet, India has some distinct advantages in
global terms. For example, the main business and nation-wide language in use is
English (though Hindi has had a national role, and there are seventeen official state
languages in India, plus hundreds of dialects, Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p175), and
higher levels are educated to a high standard in a system rather similar to Britain’s (for
the need to further bolster primary education to maintain social reform, see Datta-Ray
1998). On this basis, India now produces large numbers of scientists, engineers,
physicians, and technicians each year (Cetron & Davies 2006).
This has resulted in a relatively high technical and scientific research base, which
has since 1947 managed to build a large Indian indigenous industrial capability,
including major steel production abilities from 1966 (Wolpert 2004, pp365-366), and
to develop indigenous weapons systems including tanks, attack helicopters, a light
combat aircraft, a range of short and medium range missiles, and a strong nuclear
power industry. It has developed its own weather and telecommunications satellites.
Indian technology can provide most of its own telecommunication systems (DobbsHigginson 1993, p184). India has since moved in a major role in programming and
software development, as well as beginning to explore a role in cost-effective
research and development centres for medicine and other high technology areas, a
move supported by the Indian government through 2002-2007 (see Bagla 2003). This
move into IT, out-sourcing and service industries has boosted the economy and
selected areas of India's development: While China continues to be largely a manufacturing economy, India leads as an
emerging service economy. India's fastest-growing and most-profitable service sector
is high technology, and yet little more than 1% of India's citizens own a personal
computer; some 50,000 villages lack even a single telephone. India views its skill in
information technology not just as the basis for a profitable export industry, but also
as a force multiplier to improve its military. By making India an indispensable
component of the global high-tech economy, this dominance in IT is a route to greater
influence in world affairs. India wants to be a Great Power, and IT is the tool by which
it hopes to achieve that goal. (Cetron & Davies 2006)
Likewise, India now has around 51 million Internet users, and has put one
'public Internet connection' into most villages, hoping to boost the flow of
information into poorer rural communities (Cetron & Davies 2006), as well as a
strong global presence for its Internet servers, media and entertainment.
India in the past had followed a somewhat socialist and government-guided
economic path, especially under the early leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, who
looked to the Soviet Union and Fabian (evolutionary) socialism to some extent as an
economic model, thus using a series of five-year plans to boost her economy (Wolpert
2004, p354; Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p181; Arora 1996a, pp1548-9). Yet India also has
a strong trading and entrepreneurial tradition, has established stock exchanges, a
strong legal and accounting system (Yahya 1995, p36; Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p174,
p197), and even under the early protected economy, a group of important businessmen
grew rich 'behind the shelter of the world's highest trade barriers' (Dobbs-Higginson
1993, p181). By the mid-1990s its economy was a market-oriented mixed economy
(Arora 1996a, p1549), with a 21st century trajectory towards a more open market
and further privatisation and engagement in the global economy.
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India has also been able to retain a democratic structure, both at state and national
level, in spite of a range of problems ranging from limited literacy (59.5%, Cetron &
Davies 2006) through to corruption and dispersed political violence. There are both
advantages and disadvantages in India's democratic tradition: India, no doubt, is better recognised as far as its political, legal and judicial institutions
and their democratic strengths are concerned; but India has always been slow in
adapting to changes unlike China which has been quick in learning from past
mistakes and adopting changes compatible to future needs. There is no doubt that
the democratic institutions, the Press, the Opposition parties provide checks and
balances by compelling the government in power to modify the ongoing plans to
formulate new people-oriented policies and take preventive measures whenever
required, but the role played by disciplined leadership possessing an ideology
capable of mobilising people - workers, peasants and intellectuals - in the nation's
restructuring and economic modernisation can also not be ignored. How these two
aspects are reconciled would probably determine the course of further progress in
both China and India (Arora 1996a, p1574)
Over the last 10 years India has sought to reduce problems of public and private
corruption through 'vigilance commissions' operating at 'all levels' of government
and business, with the Central Vigilance Commission having successfully cleaned up
parts of the banking industry (Cohen & Davies 2006).
India from 1947 has maintained an independent and critical voice in world affairs.
Beginning in a period when India lacked the wealth and ability to arm itself, Indian
leaders turned to diplomacy to help ensure their country's security (Saksena 1986,
p19). Abutted by China to the north, and having a somewhat socialist orientation
under Nehru, India opted for neutrality and then non-alignment, refusing to enter
the bipolar contest between the superpowers in the Cold War. In spite of some serious
courting by the US, India, though a democracy, resisted the temptation to enter the
fold of the anti-communist US alliances which were ranged against the USSR, China,
North Vietnam and North Korea, as had Pakistan in he 1950s (Wolpert 2004, p376).
This stance meant that India emerged as one of the main leaders of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), nations mainly in the third world which refused to enter into the
networks of the first or second worlds (i.e. the West and the Communist block).
Alongside Egypt and Indonesia, India sought to influence these nations to promote
an independent path to development, and to reduce global tensions. At the same
time, non-alignment also allowed India to receive aid from both sides, with India
receiving over $5 billion in aid during the 1960s from a consortium of Western
nations, plus Japan (Wolpert 2004, p366).
The main aims of India's non-aligned aspirations can be summarised as: (a) the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of
powers, but through an independent approach to each international dispute or conflict
situation; (b) liberation of the people still under colonial rule; (c) the maintenance of
freedom, both national and individual; (d) the elimination of racial discrimination; and
(e) the elimination of hunger, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of
the world's population; and (f) economic development through international
cooperation. (Saksena 1986, p20)
Yet this non-aligned role could not be fully maintained during the heights of the
Cold War. This was largely due to India's strategic position. To her north, India had
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borders with a nuclear-armed Communist China, and even Tibet, taken over by
Chinese forces in stages between 1950 and 1959, represented an armed Chinese
presence to her north. India was forced to accept the reality of China's control of
Tibet, though Nehru had some sympathy for the exiled Tibetans and for the Dali
Lama's position (see Garver 2001; Tenzin Gyatso 1990). Likewise, India and China
had signed a comprehensive treaty in 1954 (Panch Sila or Pancha Sila) designed to
reduce tensions (Wolpert 2004, p367), but this could not be sustained. The 2,640 mile
border between the two countries had not been well delineated, and in 1962 Nehru
ordered that the Indian Army drive the Chinese out of disputed areas (Wolpert 2004,
p368). India and China did engaged in a short, sharp border war in 1962, in part
due to China's need to build a strategic road into Tibet through territory controlled by
India. To India's dismay, Chinese forces proved relatively dominant (Wolpert 2004,
p368), signalling a need for India to improve its military capabilities. Likewise, India
has remained concerned about vulnerable areas to her north-east, and by the troubled
politics of Nepal (Wolpert 2004, pp410-411, p431). By 1970s, the diplomatic relations
with China improved, and ambassadorial relations were resumed in 1981 (Wang
Hongyu 1995, p546). Activist Tibetans and Tibetan sympathisers formed another
irritant in Indian-Chinese relations in the 1990s (see the 'official line' expressed in
Wang Hongyu 1995, pp553-4), though these tensions were reduced through 20032004 (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004, p12).
In the long run, India had to develop special relations with Russia, and then
increasingly with the U.S., plus developed improved trade relations with the
European Union (2000-2007), to secure her domestic and international goals (see
below). Current U.S. policy from mid-2005 seems to accept India as an emerging
'great power' in regional terms, and has accepted that India has a major role to play
in the U.S. global security agenda. India is also Europe's ninth largest-trading partner
(Cetron & Davies 2006). The EU, in turn, is a major trading and investment
partner: The EU is both India's main trading partner and biggest foreign inward investor. The
EU accounted for 23.2% of India's exports and 21.2% of total imports in 2002. Trade
between India and the EU has grown constantly over the past decade, nearly trebling
to today's volume of Euro 27 billion. The EU and its Member States collectively make
the biggest bilateral contribution to India's development programmes. Since 1976, the
European Commission has committed Euro 2 billion to India in development
assistance, and will be devoting some Euro 225 million to development and economic
co-operation with India over the next five years. This is in addition to substantial
humanitarian assistance offered, particularly in response to drought and floods.
(European Report 2003)
Yet for India, one key problem was the Chinese support for Pakistan. Tensions
returned in the India-China relationship with the nuclear tests made by India
and Pakistan in 1998, with a tense exchange of critical comments on both sides (see
Malik 1998, pp204-205). From 2001, even as India modernises and improves its
armed forces, it is still concerned about possible 'containment' to its north, with
China having strong influence in Pakistan and Burma (see further below). At the least,
India feels that she is ringed in the north by states that are either non-democratic or
have limited stability. On this basis India has moved through 2003-2007 to
cautiously improve relations with PRC and Pakistan, sought stronger recognition
from the U.S. and ASEAN, and tried to use regional linkages to boost its influence in
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a non-threatening way (see further below), i.e. using both soft and hard power within
its limited means.
2. The Tangled Web of South Asian Affairs
India's central political problems were caused by the partition in 1947 of the Indian
sub-continent between a Muslim Pakistan and a mainly Hindu India. During that
time, some 10 million people moved and were resettled (Saksena 1986, p18), while
rioting and conflict led to the death of some 500,000. Yet sizeable religious minorities
remained in both the new countries. Pakistan was the new and smaller state created to
India's north-west (Bangladesh became independent of Pakistan in 1971). Here, we
can see once again the effects of a security dilemma. As a less powerful state,
Pakistan turned outwards to find allies, as well as seeking to hinder any tendency for
India to dominate South Asia. In the 1970s geopolitics fulfilled this need. The US
moved closer to China between 1971 and 1979, using her as a 'card' against the
Soviets. In turn, China, and the US for a time, became allies with Pakistan. For the
US, access to Pakistan was extremely important after 1979 as a lever against the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The result was that India felt threatened by this alignment of interests. It felt a need
after the border war with China in 1962 to improve her military and economic
strength, and to build up her armed forces to a level 'commensurate with the needs of
its defence' (Saksena 1986, p51). She had no option but to improve relations with the
USSR as a counter balance, and as a source of cheap weapons (Saksena 1986, p20). A
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed with the Soviets in August
1971. Furthermore, India accepted Soviet aid and trade, which became very
important in the technical and military areas. The Soviet Union, for example, helped
technically in the construction of the large Bilai Steel Plant in the mid-1950s (Saksena
1986, p52; Gordon 1993, p10). By 1971, India signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR (Wolpert 2004, p391), which in the 21st
century would be transformed into a 'strategic partnership' with Russia. This was
based on the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and the
Russian Federation of October 2000, which included trade, political and defence
cooperation (see http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/declaration-3oct2000.html).
India and Pakistan engaged in military conflicts over Kashmir in 1965, in which
India proved victories after three weeks of intensive conflict, and in 1971 over the fate
of East Pakistan which emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh (Wolpert
2004, pp377-390). These issues have been somewhat diffused with the end of the
Cold War. Yet Pakistan-Indian relations remain problematic, in spite of some
promising overtures for dialogue over the last decade, with positive signs from mid2004. Even a small nuclear arsenal (see below) in India combined with the new
generation of Indian IRBMs (medium range missiles) may have a much bigger
ripple effect than intended by Indian planners, with India having at least 106 missiles
with a range of more than 1,500 kilometres and new missiles with a range of 3,000
kilometres being developed after 1999 (see Khan 2003 Srivastava 2000). Nuclear
tests were conducted by both countries in mid-1998 (for detailed analysis, see
Malik 1998; Heisbourg 1998; Chellaney 1998). Earlier on India had in 1974 exploded
a ‘peaceful’ nuclear test as part of its nuclear power research. The tests on both sides
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greatly aided national pride, but do not seem to have been planned as direct mutual
threats (talks between Pakistan and India resumed in late 1998). Rather, the tests
seem to have been a way to declare that both sides had moved from thresholdnuclear status to full nuclear status, and resist international pressures to keep both
countries out of the ‘nuclear club’, and perhaps to establish a crude version of
mutual nuclear deterrence (see further below).
The tensions between India and Pakistan, though real, should not be exaggerated.
Although the disputed control of the Jammu and Kashmir region remains
unsolved, both countries have sought to limit how destructive wars between them
could become. Kashmir, with around 75% of its four million people Muslim, had a
Hindu maharaja, who acceded to join India rather than Pakistan in 1947. The
plebiscite promised by India on this issue was never held, with Nehru saying this
could not be done until the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistani irregular forces (the
region known as Azad, 'free', Kahsmir) was vacated (Wolpert 2004, pp356-357). Thus
from 1971 onwards, neither side has pushed into key territorial heartlands of the
other (the Indians could have in 1971), and both sides have tried to avoid attacking
civilian targets. Since that time, there have been several other agreements, 'not to
attack each other's nuclear installations, reciprocal notification of key military
exercises, and a hot line between the nations' army generals' (Ollapally & Ramanna
1995, p16). Tensions, which reached new heights in 1998, were pushed further in
another short round of conflict over the actual area of control in Kashmir, with serious
artillery and air clashes in May 1999 over the Kargil sector (Anand 1999; Chengppa
1999). Thereafter, both sides managed to pull back after tensions and border
conflicts in 1987, 1990, 1999, and 2002 (Malik 2003a, p42). Likewise, after the
nuclear tests, in spite of some intense negative rhetoric, talks were soon convened to
reduce any immediate escalation of tensions between the two countries. A positive
statement of this aspiration to find accord between Pakistan and India as nuclear
powers is found in the Lahore Declaration of February 1999,1 though there is a
considerable gap between the aspirations of this diplomacy and the reality of
establishing a strategic balance in South Asia. Likewise, steps from 2003 have opened
up the prospects of another round of talks, including good-will tours by Pakistani and
Indian MPs. After major talks in February 1999 and July 2001, from November 2003
there have been efforts to maintain a cease fire in the disputed areas of Jammu and
Kashmir. Likewise, in June 2004 there has been a new round of discussions to
reduce tensions, and new ‘hot line’ installed between the political leaderships of
both countries to deal with ‘nuclear matters’ (Misra 2004), with accords to further
prevent accidental nuclear exchange made through early 2007.
1
The text of this joint statement will be found at:
http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/lahoredeclaration.html
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Disputed areas between India and Pakistan, and India and China (Courtesy PCL Map Library)
Aside from these issues, India has other problems to face. It is true that India is the
world's largest democracy and has remained as a pluralistic society guided by the rule
of law. Yet in a country of this size and history, serious tensions remain. Separatist
and nationalist tensions remain in Assam and north-eastern India, in the Punjab
(Sikh secessionists), Kashmir (Muslim-Hindu disturbances), and for Tamils in the
south (Wolpert 2004; Das 2003b; Das 2003c; Samanta 2003). Likewise, tensions
have emerged in West Bengal that began to pose serious threats to security through
2006: Nearly 300 people were killed by Naxalites (Maoists) in India between January and
April 2006 – a level of violence that outstripped that in Kashmir for the first time. The
recent intensification of violence poses new challenges to India’s security and
stability. In mid-April 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the Naxalites
as India’s ‘single biggest internal security challenge’, associating them with terrorism
following the 11 July Mumbai bombings. Yet, attempts by the central and provincial
governments to tackle this low-intensity guerrilla war lack coherence and focus.
....
The Naxalites were formed nearly 40 years ago during a peasant uprising in
Naxalbari village in West Bengal (whence they derive their name). Today they are
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well organised and coordinated, ideologically motivated, and possess significant
geographical reach. According to reports, the Naxalites comprise some 9,000 armed
rebels, along with an estimated 40,000 full-time cadres, although the latter are largely
equipped with low-technology arms and equipment. (Strategic Comments 2006)
Likewise, Hindu self-determination movements, including 'fundamentalist' Hindu
movements have gained a strong political following since 1992, and though the BJP
(the Bharatiya Janata Party) was unable to retain government in 1996, soon
dominated sectors of the Indian electorate and managed to maintain government from
1998 under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee down until
elections in 2004. From May 2004 a Congress Party led coalition took power, with
Mr Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister and with foreign born Sonia Gandhi as a
key player in the party but not PM, perhaps because of opposition violence and strong
resistance from her family (Majumder 2004).
Table 1: INDIAN TIME-LINE: SELECTED DATES: 1947- July 2006 (BBC 2005a; 2006a;
2007a)
1947 - End of British rule and partition of sub-continent into mainly Hindu India and Muslimmajority state of Pakistan.
1947-48 - Hundreds of thousands die in widespread communal bloodshed after partition.
1948 - War with Pakistan over disputed territory of Kashmir.
1962 - India loses brief border war with China.
1965 - Second war with Pakistan over Kashmir.
1971 - Third war with Pakistan over creation of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan.
1971 - Twenty-year treaty of friendship signed with Soviet Union.
1974 - India explodes first nuclear device in underground test.
1984 - Troops storm Golden Temple - Sikh's most holy shrine - to flush out Sikh militants
pressing for self-rule.
1984 - Indira Gandhi assassinated by Sikh bodyguards, following which her son, Rajiv, takes
over.
1987 - India deploys troops for peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.
1990 - Indian troops withdrawn from Sri Lanka.
1990 - Muslim separatist groups begin campaign of violence in Kashmir.
1991 - Rajiv Gandhi assassinated by suicide bomber sympathetic to Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers.
1992 - Hindu extremists demolish mosque in Ayodhya, triggering widespread Hindu-Muslim
violence.
1996 - Congress suffers worst ever electoral defeat as Hindu nationalist BJP emerges as largest
single party.
1998 - BJP forms coalition government under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
1998 - India carries out nuclear tests, leading to widespread international condemnation.
1999 February - Vajpayee makes historic bus trip to Pakistan to meet Premier Nawaz Sharif
and to sign bilateral Lahore peace declaration.
1999 May - Tension in Kashmir leads to brief war with Pakistan-backed forces around Kargil.
2000 - US President Bill Clinton makes groundbreaking visit to India to improve ties.
2001 July - Vajpayee meets Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in the major summit
2001 September - US lifts sanctions which it imposed against India and Pakistan after they
staged nuclear tests in 1998. The move is seen as a reward for their support for the US antiterror campaign.
2001 October - India fires on Pakistani military posts in the heaviest firing along the dividing
line of control in Kashmir for almost a year.
2001 December - Suicide squad attacks parliament in New Dehli, killing several police. The
five gunmen die in the assault.
2001 December - India imposes sanctions against Pakistan, to force it to take action against
two Kashmir militant groups blamed for the suicide attack on parliament. Pakistan retaliates
with similar sanctions, and bans the groups in January.
12
2001 December - India, Pakistan mass troops on common border.
2002 February - The worst inter-religious bloodshed in a decade breaks out in western India
after Muslims set fire to a train carrying Hindus returning from pilgrimage to Ayodhya. More
than 800, mainly Muslims, die in revenge killings by Hindu mobs over the next two months.
2002 May - More than 30 people killed in raid on Indian army camp in Kashmir, which India
blames on Pakistani-based rebels. Moderate Kashmiri separatist leader Abdul Gani Lone shot
dead at a meeting in Srinagar.
2002 June - Britain and USA maintain diplomatic offensive to avert war.
2002 October - India says its troops have begun withdrawing from the border with Pakistan;
Islamabad says it wants proof before starting its own pull-back.
2003 June - India, China reach de facto agreement over status of Tibet and Sikkim in
landmark cross-border trade agreement.
2003 August - At least 50 people are killed in two simultaneous bomb blasts in Bombay.
2003 November - India matches Pakistan's declaration of a Kashmir ceasefire.
2003 December - India, Pakistan agree to resume direct air links and to allow overflights.
2004 January - Groundbreaking meeting held between government and moderate Kashmir
separatists.
2004 May - Surprise victory for Congress Party in general elections. Manmohan Singh is
sworn in as prime minister.
2004 May - Landmine attack on bus in Kashmir carrying Indian soldiers and their relatives
kills 33.
2004 September - India, along with Brazil, Germany and Japan, launches an application for a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
2004 November - India begins to withdraw some of its troops from Kashmir.
2004 December - Thousands are killed when tidal waves, caused by a powerful undersea
earthquake off the Indonesian coast, devastate coastal communities in the south and in the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
2005 April - Bus services, the first in 60 years, operate between Srinagar in Indian-controlled
Kashmir and Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
2005 October - Bombs kill 62 people in Delhi. A little-known Kashmiri group says it is
behind the attacks.
2006 February - India's largest-ever rural jobs scheme is launched, aimed at lifting around 60
million families out of poverty.
2006 March - US and India sign a nuclear deal during a visit by US President George W
Bush. The US gives India access to civilian nuclear technology while India agrees to greater
scrutiny for its nuclear programme.
2006 March - 14 people are killed by bomb blasts in the Hindu pilgrimage city of Varanasi.
2006 May - Suspected Islamic militants kill 35 Hindus in the worst attacks in Indianadministered Kashmir for several months.
2006 11 July - More than 180 people are killed in bomb attacks on rush-hour trains in
Mumbai.
2006 8 September - Explosions outside a mosque in the western town of Malegaon kill at
least 31 people.
2006 November - Hu Jintao makes the first visit to India by a Chinese president in a decade.
2006 December - US President George W Bush approves a controversial law allowing India
to buy US nuclear reactors and fuel for the first time in 30 years.
2007 18 February - 68 passengers, most of them Pakistanis, are killed by bomb blasts and a
blaze on a train travelling from New Delhi to the Pakistani city of Lahore.
2007 February - India and Pakistan sign an agreement aimed at reducing the risk of
accidental nuclear war.
2007 April - India's first commercial space rocket is launched, carrying an Italian satellite.
2007 May - At least nine people are killed in a bomb explosion at the main mosque in
Hyderabad. Several others are killed in subsequent rioting.
2007 May - Government announces its strongest economic growth figures for 20 years - 9.4%
in the year to March.
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2007 July - India says the number of its people with HIV or AIDS is about half of earlier
official tallies. Health ministry figures put the total at between 2 million and 3.1 million cases,
compared with previous estimates of more than 5 million.
Likewise, the traditional 'caste' system of India, though counter-balanced by
government efforts to engage positive policies to bring up the 'untouchables', has
meant that India has a complex status system, based on the traditional four varnas and
an overlay of subgroups or jati in part based on occupational affiliation (Milner 1994,
pp46-62) that is very difficult to 'modernise'. Although India has instituted strong
affirmative action, e.g. in extra access to state education and government jobs for
such groups, this has not solved the generally lower socio-economic status of the
lowest groups, especially the ‘Dalits’, the so-called outcast or untouchables (Milner
1994; Wolpert 2004). The Dalits form 20% of the population, while dalits, tribals, and
so-called Other Backward Castes (OBCs) form at least 52% of the population, or
more (Bhattacharya 2006; Ghose 2003). There is still a need from the Dalit point of
view to create a more inclusive vision of a future India, in which social as well as
economic relations have been reshaped (see Guru 2004).
Associated with these trends has been an outbreak of religious tension and violence
from 1989 onwards, which culminated in the destruction in 1992 of the 400 year-old
Muslim Babri Mosque at Ayodhya by some 150,000 Hindu believers, who insisted
that it was the birthplace of the Hindu god, Lord Rama, and that the mosque be
replaced by a temple. These issues have led to sectarian riots (in 1990), and split
Indians into those who favour a 'Hindu state' (the BJP, and more militant groups such
as the National Volunteer Corps and the Shiv Sena, Lord Shiva's Army), and those
who favour a secular state (Wolpert 2004, p435; Dobbs-Higginson 1993, p188), e.g.
the Congress Party and various socialist parties. The BJP’s election in 1998 returned
the debate over the nature of identity politics (Hindu nationalism verses secular
state) to centre place, and has been part of a slightly more assertive foreign policy. On
order from the Supreme Court of India, archaeological excavation under strict court
monitored conditions has begun on the site from 2003 to try and locate the temple,
making it one of the most political ‘digs’ in history (see Ratnagar 2004). Even if the
remains of a temple are found, it may be hard to prove that it was the site associated
with Rama, or to verify that it was destroyed (Chakrabarti 2003; Ratnagar 2004). The
courts also ordered that any temple should be built not over the mosque but on nearby
grounds (Wolpert 2004). Violence over this issue continued through early July 2005,
with an armed attack using a jeep full of explosives near the site (it did not penetrate
to the inner area) leading to widespread Hindu protests in several Indian cities
(Biswas 2005). The attack may have been designed to heighten tensions between
Muslims and Hindus, and Indian police believe there is a link to 'armed militants
fighting Indian rule in Kashmir' (BBC 2005b). It seems unlikely, however, that the
attack by itself will seriously derail improved relations between India and Pakistan
(BBC 2005b).
Although over 80% of India is Hindu of some form, with 11% Muslims and 6%
Sikhs, Jains and Christians (Milner 1994, p47; Pye-Smith 1997), these figures
disguise a more complex reality. It must be remembered that approximately 20% of
the population comprise 2,000 minority 'ethnic groups, castes, tribals, and so on'
(Arora 1996a, p1550). Keeping a balance between regional and national interests,
and between different religious and national groups within India must be the
first priority of any government. Furthermore, these divisions are exacerbated by
14
the growing gap between expectations and the delivery by governments of an
improved quality of life to sectors of the population, especially among the young
(Singh 1994). Indian government officials from 2005 have tried to project a more
inclusive image to reduce some of these tensions: In the course of delivering the Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture in Delhi on Feb.
4, Foreign Minister Singh gave a discourse on the history of India, in particular the
last hundred years, maintaining that, while India is a diverse entity, it nevertheless
possesses an inherent unity. He dismissed the argument that India's Muslims are
intruders, describing them instead as equal contributors with Hindus to the Indian
culture. Taking strong exception to BJP hard-liners who question the loyalty of India's
Muslims, Natwar Singh saw a greater problem with the Hindu caste system that has
kept the country divided and artificially created layers. He urged Indian intellectuals to
help remove caste barriers and assist the country in finding unity among diversity. In
this regard he condemned the incidents of caste differences even in providing
humanitarian assistance to victims of the tsunami disaster. (Ali 2005)
Likewise, regional differences also mean that there can be real tensions between
local needs and national policy, e.g. in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere.
Thus 'India's unique linguistic and ethnic pluralism make the nation . . . vulnerable to
such fragmenting demands '(Wolpert 2004, p431). The Indian government, then,
needs to attend to economic growth and social justice. From this viewpoint, 'India's
primary strategic objective is the socio-economic growth and betterment of the quality
of life of its . . . people' (Singh 1994, p11). Unless this is done, India is unlikely to
survive as a unified, economically developing and democratic state. At the same time,
India has been able to take on a steadily growing role in regional affairs (in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean), in the wider Indo-Pacific, and in its global economic and
political presence.
3. India’s Circles of Engagement
India’s international role has been extended in several circles of engagement that
extend from South Asia (via SAARC, the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation, comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives,
Bhutan and from April 2007, Afghanistan), into the wider Indian Ocean Region
(enhancing IOR-ARC and weak South African and Australian linkages), north and
westwards into Central Asia and the Middle East (in relation to ‘energy politics’
and observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation through 2006-2007), a
strengthening engagement with ASEAN and the East Asian Summit process
through 1995-2007 (see Gaur 2003), and eventually in a wider rapprochement with
East Asia, in part through the ARF and then through involvement in the East Asian
Summit Process (see Rodrigo 1999; Gordon 1993; Singh 1999c). At the global level,
too, India, aside from its traditional involvement with the NAM movement (see
Hewitt 1997, p118), also has a host of critical views which range from reform of the
Security Council (serious efforts to link a bit for permanent membership of the UNSC
with bids by Brazil, Germany and Japan began in late 2004) through to serious efforts
to eradicate, rather than limit, nuclear weapons. Overall, India has engaged a
stronger regional dialogue, and improved relations with the US, EU, Japan, Russia
and China through 2000-2007, though specific tensions with Pakistan have not been
resolved.
15
Strong opportunities exist for India to increase its positive influence with the IndoPacific region via the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
(IOR-ARC) setting (from 1996), through continued dialogue and economic
interaction with ASEAN, through participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and
the East Asian Summit (EAS process), and via selective cooperation with middle
powers such as South Africa and Australia (see Gaur 2004; Ferguson 1997;
Jayakumar 1996; Naidu 1996).
Yet cooperation was at first limited by India-Pakistan tensions, and by the fact that
Iraq, Burma and Somalia have not been effectively involved (Mills 1995, p23). The
political and economic diversity of the region also complicated dialogue. There is a
danger of some players being left out of effective involvement due to their small size.
Ranjan Gupta, for example, has suggested that though there are clear options for
Indian-South African-Australian cooperation, it would take longer for other states to
become more fully involved (Gupta 1995a, p18). Hopes of opening up potential
markets worth $300 billion (Egan 1995a, p3) are therefore still premature.
Australia's trade with the Indian Ocean region in 1994 totalled $7.1 billion, 18.4% of
Australia's total trade, but only 1.5% of the regional market (Egan 1995a, p3). Yet it
was hoped that regional cooperation would allow Australian exports to increase by
several billion dollars by the year 2000 (Walker 1995, p2). Western Australia, in
particular, hoped to benefit from closer trade links with 11 of these countries,
including Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Africa, Kuwait, Mauritius, Sri Lanka
and The United Arab Emirates (Irving 1995, p2). Australia's then foreign minister,
Senator Evans hoped that in due course that an Indian Ocean Economic Co-operation
Council would be established to promote trade and cooperation in the region (such a
Council for the Pacific had been the forerunner of the APEC process). However, the
Australian idea that security issues should also be considered by the Perth conference
was rejected by both South Africa and India as 'pointless' and 'divisive', and security
played a minimal role in the Conference agenda (Egan 1995b, p2).
Full members of IOR-ARC include Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, the Seychelles,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen, while China, Egypt, France, Japan, Egypt and the United Kingdom are
Dialogue Partners. Continued momentum of both track I and track II processes
(formal and informal diplomacy) in IOR-ARC is needed if this circle of
engagement is to effectively benefit South Asia as a whole. Likewise, the addition of
dialogue partners such as Japan and Egypt has strengthened this organisation (Baruah
1999), as has the membership of Iran. However, the formal membership of IOR-ARC
needs to be seriously expanded to include more Middle Eastern states, and must
eventually provide full membership of Pakistan (Jayanth 1999). In the end, if
Pakistan becomes willing to accept the Charter principles of IOR-ARC, including the
provisions for MFN trading status with other members including India, this would
constitute a major diplomatic gain for South Asia as a whole. Although the IOR-ARC
group may need to consolidate itself for some years. At present, the IOR-ARC process
is not very effective in setting regional norms or building trade, but remains one
avenue of dialogue.
From 2003, IOR-ARC in its meeting held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, sought to push
forward progress by adopting task force reports on trade and investment facilitation,
16
decided to establish an IOR-ARC Fisheries Support Unit, sought to push forward
group support for agricultural negotiations in the WTO, has sought liberalisation of
agricultural trade in the region (Anderson 2002), and to engage skills of trade
investment negotiators throughout the region (DFAT 2004a). For IOR-ARC to
become a vital organisation its membership must be expanded, and definite
projects and agendas further developed on a regional basis. It success will also
strongly depend on its ability to cooperate with other regional groupings, (especially
SAARC, which has called for new initiatives and cooperation to revitalise the
economy of South Asia), with African organisations such as the South African
Development Community (SADC), with ASEAN, and in the long run with APEC.
Serious progress on Pakistan-India relations is also central to these processes.
For India, engagement in IOR-ARC is part of a wider regional strategy: India also concentrates on other Regional Economic Groups (REG) in Asia like
Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), Bay of Bengal Community (BOBCOM), the countries of Mekong-Ganga
Initiative and Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) - to
achieve quick interregional trade and commerce, as well as, to strengthen strategic
relations with them. The formation of South Asia Growth Quadrangle comprising of
Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and India (BBNI) keeps the economic and political
relations ticking between these SAARC nations. Strengthened Indo-Myanmar
economic relationship helps to contain drug trafficking along the border. It also
provides for over-land trade via Myanmar to the eastern countries. The growing
economies of South Korea and Japan find India as a potential market. With smooth
trade relations with South Asian regional groups and ASEAN, India looks beyond to
the tiger economy of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). India increases
political and economic collaboration with the APEC. Strong economic and political
relations between India, South East Asia and Asia Pacific, becomes an influential
factor in the Asian regional security. (Waslekar & Bhatt 2004)
One regional organisation which has made moderate progress in recent years is
BIMSTEC, originally formed through 1997-1998 the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar,
Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation process. The BIMSTEC group now
comprises Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal.
Though it has combined population of 1.5 billion people and embraces growing areas
of South and Southeast Asia, the 'trade volume within the group only averages 7.3
billion US dollars, accounting for 4 percent of their total trade' (Xinhua 2004). The
organisation has a number of related regional aims: The inter-regional grouping will serve as a bridge between the five SAARC countries
and two ASEAN countries. BIMST-EC will have a greater potential to increase the
trade among member countries by taking advantage of their geographical location in
the region of the Bay of Bengal and the Eastern coast of the Indian Ocean.
Discussions have already been held with regard to building a TransAsia Highway
linking the five countries and also setting up a BIMST-EC Airline connecting the
capitals and important cities of the member countries. (BIMSTEC 2005)
BIMSTEC has set itself a gradual FTA agenda, but this will be slow process due to
differential sizes and development levels: Under the free trade framework agreement signed at the sixth BIMSTEC ministerial
meeting last February, three developing countries of India, Sri Lanka and Thailand
would cut import tariffs on products on a "fast track" list to zero no later than June 30,
17
2009, while the other four "least developed countries" were given two more years to
realize zero tariffs over products from the same category in the year of 2011.
Pranpree said the FTA pact is expected to enlarge Thailand's trade with other
BIMSTEC countries. Over the past five years, trade between Thailand and other
BIMSTEC members has been expanding by an average of 18 percent annually with
trade value reaching 2.6 billion US dollars in 2003. (Xinhua 2004a)
India as improved relations with ASEAN over the last two decades. India itself
had become a sectoral (trade) dialogue partner with ASEAN in the early 1990s
(March 1993; there was an earlier abortive attempt to develop observer status in 1980,
Saksena 1986, p60), with cooperation on trade, investment, tourism, science and
technology institutionalised since 1994. In 1995-6 these positive trends culminated in
India achieving full dialogue status (not membership) with ASEAN, and with an
extremely positive correlation of interests being expressed in the July 1996 ASEAN
Post Ministerial Conference (Naidu 1996; Jayakumar 1996), and then full
membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Recently, India has moved to improve
its economic and diplomatic ties with Burma, as well as to deepen cooperation with
the region through the recent Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) accords (Baruah
2001a & 2001b). Through 2003-2004 India has signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) and has set up a framework agreement on comprehensive
economic cooperation that aims to boost trade and investment with ASEAN over the
next decade, and has become one of the key players in the East Asian Summit
(EAS) through 2005-2007 (see Gaur 2003; see further lecture 6). It remains to be seen
whether these overlapping agenda will provide strong linkages either to ASEAN and
East Asia (with now India viewed as engaged in East Asia as a full regional
partner), or to stronger Indian Ocean trade flows.
4. From Key Bilateral Relations to Multipolarity?
These circles of engagement are often shaped by key bilateral relationships sometimes
embedded within, and partly limited regional organisations. This relations with
Pakistan, China, Russia and the US remain keys to India's future, and its future
regional role. Here, India has favoured a multipolar world system, but has also had to
avoid being linked into confrontation with PRC in the changing dynamic of the IndoPacific.
In engaging these regional 'circles', India and Pakistan have worked together to a
limited degree. In fact these two countries have been able to engage in dialogue in
some areas, including limited cooperation through SAARC (South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation), and limited functional cooperation over
water control of the Indus River and its tributaries (Newbill n.d.). Thus, though water
tensions have been partly resolved, they are still a background factor in South Asian
tensions: South Asia’s two main river systems have their headwaters in the Himalayan glaciers
and snow fields. The rivers of the Ganges-Brahmaputra system flow through China,
Nepal, Bhutan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Sacred and symbolic for Hindus, the
Ganges runs across the northern Indian plains before joining the Brahmaputra in
Bangladesh, reaching the Bay of Bengal. The Indus constitutes the largest contiguous
irrigation system in the world. It rises in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and its
18
tributaries run through China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, five of which are
shared between India and Pakistan. . . .
Both rivers and their tributaries are the subject of bitter and protracted bilateral
disputes, characterised by accusations of over-drawing. In 2005, Pakistan claimed
that Indian plans for the construction of the Baglihar dam on the Chenab river
contravened the Indus Waters Treaty. Despite the signing of the Ganges Water
Treaty, disagreements persist between India and Bangladesh about water diversion
at the Farakka barrage on the Ganges, and it does not include the upper riparian
state, Nepal, which makes its own arrangements regarding usage of the Ganges
waters. For Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra, which it shares with India and China, is
potentially more important as it carries much more run-off than the heavily used
Ganges river, yet is not subject to any water-sharing treaty. As well as legislative
issues, bilateral discussions are sometimes complicated by other political difficulties.
For example, during the military stand-off between India and Pakistan in 2001–02
following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, there were calls in India for the
repudiation of the Indus Treaty.
Despite gloomy forecasts, water has not been a cause of conflict in recent history. But
it can be a contributing factor, and tension seems likely to increase. (Strategic
Comments 2007).
Even in the more problematic area of strategic confrontation there have been efforts
to limit the scale of conflict between the two countries (see above). At the same
time, SAARC operations are limited whenever tension rise between Pakistan and
India, e.g. over cross-border insurgency and terrorism in 2001, and also by a fear of
smaller members that India in the end will dominate the organisation or in turn that
these smaller states will ‘gang up’ on India, as well as by some ‘procedural inertia’
(see Tripathi 2003, p176, p183; SAARC members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). Likewise, in the South Asian case, issues
of terrorism as a method are often bound up with the goals of insurgency, selfdetermination and local claims of discrimination (see Mishra & Ghosh 2003, pxv).
SAARC had a more hopeful track in 2004 with efforts to set up ‘the free trade area
(FTA) at a summit which also set poverty reduction and welfare goals and, most
importantly, talks between India and Pakistan over the disputed border territory of
Kashmir’ (Hennock 2004). Through 2006, SAARC moved towards the setting up
of a SAARC Development Fund (SDF) 'which would be formed of 300 million
dollar corpus fund for poverty lessening, out of which India had already announced
contribution of 100 million dollars would be spent on projects outside India" (Singh
2006).
These general steps, of course, need to be taken against the continued momentum of
positive diplomacy in a number of multilateral fora, including NAM, the G15 (a
group of '17 developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America'),2 the
Commonwealth, and continued efforts by India to maintain its credibility for a future
stronger role within the United Nations Security Council. In the end, however, any
recognition that India is a major player in the international system with the ability
(and moral prestige) required to help set norms, is underpinned by enhanced relations
with major global powers. India's strong relationship with Russia has gained some
boost from 2001, and though this has lagged with the economic 'down-sizing' of
Moscow's influence from the late 1980s onward, there have been recent efforts to
Members include Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zimbabwe [see
http://www.photius.com/g15/g15.html]
2
19
reinvigorate this 'friendship' through a summit between President Putin and Prime
Minister Vajpayee, and major weapons acquisitions from Russia were confirmed
through 2000-2003. In October 2000 the two countries signed 'a declaration on
strategic partnership on greater defence and military-technical cooperation and joint
effort to fight international terrorism, while giving a boost to the economic
relationship between the two countries.' (INDOlink 2000) Although the long-term
benefits from this relationship can be debated, the term 'strategic partnership' in
this context is highly significant (Chengappa 2000), since this is the same
terminology used in the crucial Sino-Russian rapprochement since 1996. This
terminology seems, at least from the Russian and Indian point-of-view, to be part of
an emerging emphasis on developing greater multipolarity in the international
system (Singh 1994). From 2007 it was expected that Russia-India trade could be
boosted towards $10 billion by 2010, with a Joint Task Force aiming towards 'the final
goal of signing comprehensive economic cooperation agreement (CECA) and free
trade agreement (FTA) with Russia, once it joins WTO' (Times of India 2007).
Perhaps more crucial in the short to medium term has been the slowly improving
relationship between the U.S. and India. Tensions had existed over India's
leadership in NAM (which opposed the hegemony of the 'North', Western nations),
and then over India's perceived shift to what was viewed as 'soft' alignment with the
Soviets and then Russia. Furthermore, India did not agree with America's stance on
the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However,
after the end of the Cold War, with the reduction of U.S. aid to Pakistan and with the
economic reforms in India post-1992, U.S. policies began to change. There was also a
large expansion of U.S. investment in India, which by the mid-1990s expanded 10
times to reach $US5 billion (Indolink News 1996c). In sum, India-U.S. relations
through the mid 1990s reached a level of practical accommodation in many areas,
though they could not be described as 'warm'. From the late 1990s, there was a sense
in Washington that India might act as 'counterweight' to growing Chinese power
(Malik 2003a, p36).
After a renewed chill in relations during 1998 following the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests, the U.S. administration became willing to invest in new efforts in its
relationships with South Asia, including the possibility that the U.S. might accept
the creation of a 'limited but credible deterrence' but hoped that India was willing to
enter into some kind of international non-proliferation regime (Hewitt 2000). This
shift was signalled by the March 2000 visit by former President Clinton, in which
India's importance to the region and the future of global politics was explicitly
recognised. President Clinton began to speak in terms of a 'new respectful
partnership', of the two countries as 'natural allies', or of a 'true partnership of mutual
respect' (Strategic Digest 2000a; 2000b). Among the most important outcomes of the
meeting was the agreement to hold regular summit meetings, and regular meetings
between ministerial and department heads. Through 2002 there was continued
cooperation between the US and India, some joint training exercises, the sale of some
military equipment to India and the signing of a General Security of Military
Information Agreement to improve such cooperation (Malik 2003a, p44; Khosla
2003, p151). Post September 2001, the importance of India was increased for the
Bush administration, which saw it as one of the states most eager to join in the ‘war
on terror’, and as a source of regional intelligence and cooperation, as spelled out in
the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002: -
20
U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest
democracies, committed to political freedoms protected by representative
Government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a
common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of
the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a
strategically stable Asia. (in Malik 2003b)
These trends were complicated by the U.S. need for cooperation from Pakistan
over its intervention in Afghanistan, and need to control the border from the
Pakistan side as well as gain intelligence and support from a dominantly Muslim
country. Lifting of sanctions and promises of aid and debt rescheduling were extra
inducements for Pakistan cooperation (Malik 2003a, p37). This alignment was
achieved, with the government being more critical of ‘sectarian’ groups, but at a high
price for President (General) Pervez Musharraf, whose actions were strongly criticised
from within the country (see Khosla 2003, pp152-153). Through 2005-2007, President
Musharraf tried to validate himself as one element in a Western pattern of antiterrorism, thereby improving relations with both the U.S. and Australia. At the same
time, this was problematic for India, which had viewed Pakistan (more than
Afghanistan) as the focus of regional terrorism and training camps, and issue that
has been resurrected with US concerns that the Taliban remains operational in
both northwest and northeast Pakistan (Singh 2005; Wolpert 2004). These tensions
erupted in violence through July 2007: The [Pakistan] Government signed a peace agreement with tribal leaders in North
Waziristan in September, following assurances the tribesmen would hunt down
foreign militants.
Western allies and Afghanistan heavily criticised the deal.
But the Taliban Council says it is ending the agreement to protest against new troop
movements, amid sharply heightened tensions after last week's Army attack on
Islamabad's pro-Taliban Red Mosque, which killed 86 people, mostly militants.
After the raid, President Pervez Musharraf vowed to crack down on extremists and
deployed extra troops to areas including the Swat district of North West Frontier
Province and North Waziristan's Dera Ismail Khan area. (ABC Online 2007)
These factors reveal the relative fragility of the overall balance of forces within
South Asia: external pressures and new opportunities can radically heighten the
prospects for conflict. Here both the US and China need to be extremely careful
diffusing conflict, but also in not offering excessive guarantees that might be taken as
a 'green light' for conflict. Improving relations between Indian and the U.S. (20002007), and improving relations between India and China through 2003-2006 (see
above), have somewhat decreased the prospects for large-scale conflict in South
Asia.
However, the issues of Jammu and Kashmir and regional terrorism have not
been resolved, and is repeatedly resurrected as key blockage in South Asian relations.
Thus the Mumbai bombings of July 2006, in which almost 200 people were killed
and 700 wounded, were at least indirectly linked to Kashmiri militant groups (perhaps
Lashkar-e-Taiba, though this was denied by the groups spokesmen), though the exact
linkage is in dispute (Canadian Press 2006). This has once again raised tensions
21
between India and Pakistan, even though Pakistan's President Musharraf promised
cooperation in investigating the attacks (ABC Online 2006a; Canadian Press 2006).
The Indian Foreign Ministry demanded that Pakistan 'dismantle all terrorist networks
on land it controls' (Canadian Press 2006), and PM Singh has stated that 'there will be
no progress in the peace process between India and Pakistan until such elements are
curbed' (ABC Online 2006b). India has also asked 'leaders of the powerful G8 nations
for greater cooperation in fighting terrorism in South Asia' (ABC Online 2006c).
However, the most important area of political gain for India has been a gradual
improvement in its relationship with the PRC. Today, both India and the PRC
are developing nations which are becoming major economic powers, and both
have revisionist concerns over the structure of power and rule-creation in the
international system. Put simply, regional competition aside, in the current period
'China does not, in any direct sense, threaten India' (Halliday 2000). Nor should
Pakistan's importance to China be exaggerated (contra Chellany 1998-1999, p97).
Thus it is no longer productive to speak of China's 'containment' of India. As
suggested by Fred Halliday, the 'greatest challenge facing India is not its position
relative to China, but that of ridding itself of the myth that its major challenge comes
from China at all' and that India will waste its advantages 'by re-entering a world of
strategic and nationalist competition from which its own history and qualitative
strengths have the potential to free it.' (Halliday 2000). Relations between India and
China have oscillated widely over the last fifteen years, but began to improve again
through 2003-2006. Through 2003-2006 there have been signs of improvement in
China-India relations: That led to the formation of joint groups to work on border issues and study economic
cooperation; it has also yielded a border-trade agreement, laying the foundations of a
possible free-trade pact. As part of that agreement, India recognized China’s rule in
Tibet and China dropped its recognition of the disputed India territory of Sikkim as an
independent state, two significant concessions. Most recently, Chinese Defence
Minister Cao Gangchaun visited India last month, and the two sides agreed to hold
joint military exercises laster this year. (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004, p12).
Between 1990 and 1994, India signed 24 contracts to import 'turnkey plants', worth
US$350 million, with the Chinese showing superior expertise in small and medium
steel mills (Wang Hongyu 1995, pp551-2). In return, China too has something to
absorb from Indian structures: 'China has sent high level delegations to India to study
the civil service system, judicial reform, the stock market, and other institutions'
(Wang Hongyu 1995, p551). Likewise, India has a greater expertise in advanced
computer software (Wang Hongyu 1995, p552). Trade flows have increased
between the two countries, worth $6 billion in 2003 and rose towards $10 billion by
2005, with clear complementary areas, e.g. Indian software skills and China’s
production of electronic hardware (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004, p14). Improving IndiaUS relations have also forced PRC to re-assess India’s wider Asian role, and PRC
has become an observer SAARC, while India attended the SCO, Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation, as an observer in 2006 (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004, p14;
.Venkateshwaran 2006). Likewise, China has stated that it no longer wishes to use
Pakistan to ‘check India’, and Chinese diplomats have urged Pakistan to resolve the
Kashmir problem peacefully (Vatikiotis & Hiebert 2004, p14). In spite of these
diplomatic improvements, PRC has been cautious about India's improved missile
capacities, and has also sought to avoid India being linked into a four-way alliance
22
with the US, Japan, and Australia, a prospect which has declined through mid2007.
Moreover, as India and China modernise and grow, they are likely two emerge as
two key powers in the Indo-Pacific region, suggesting future power relations
between these states will be crucial in future decades: Militarily, China and India are working hard to expand their power within the region
and, in the case of China, beyond. Both are modernizing their armies. Both are
building blue-water navies. China is developing nuclear-capable missiles with
intercontinental range. If these two countries achieve their goals, it will represent the
first major shift in the balance of the world's military power since the end of the Cold
War. This also will raise the stakes in any future confrontation between India and
China or China and Japan.
Diplomatically, both countries are currying influence. Both are beginning to provide
aid for poorer lands. India is participating in international military and rescue
operations. China is building bilateral ties with many other lands, using its economic
power to further its political ends. India covets a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council; China recently blocked a move to grant it.
In these changes, some economists, political scientists, and historians see a shift in
the world's center of gravity from the industrialized West to the industrializing East.
According to Goldman Sachs, India's economy could be larger than Japan's by 2032,
while China's could be larger than that of the United States by 2039. (Cetron &
Davies 2006)
Indian nuclear capability can be viewed as much more than a reaction to China's
perceived strategic and nuclear superiority. In large measure, the nuclear tests were
a challenge to the nuclear policies of all the other great powers, and a declaration
of the covert capability that both India and Pakistan already had (Singh 1999a). India
had been unwilling to support the terms of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
based on Western dictates (Saksena 1986, p41), and why India was unable to sign
the latest Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty formulated in June 1996 unless the nuclear
powers undertook to disarm totally within a specified time frame. On this basis,
Pakistan also declined to sign the treaty, i.e. if any threshold state refuses to sign, its
own security could be compromises if it gave up nuclear weapons research (Straits
Times 1996). Efforts to bring India back into the NPT by Japan and US through 19992000 did not succeed. Instead, through 2003-2006 it was suggested that new
agreements limiting future development might be a better approach: Such a protocol might permit Israel, India, and Pakistan to retain their
programs, but inhibit further development. The protocol could also require
cooperation with international nuclear export controls, prohibit the explosive testing of
nuclear devices, and call for the phased elimination of fissile material production.
Israel, India, and Pakistan would sign the agreement along with the Depositary States
(Russia, Britain, and the United States), which since the 1960s have been considered
the general managers of the NPT. By becoming party to such a protocol, the three
could acknowledge their nuclear status through association with the existing
nonproliferation regime. (Cohen & Graham 2004)
A related approach has been to use UNSC resolutions to strengthen national antiproliferation policies by states such as India. Through 2005: -
23
India adopted the measure partly to fulfill its obligations under UN Security Council
Resolution 1540, which was adopted in April 2004. The resolution requires that all
states adopt and enforce "appropriate, effective" laws and measures, such as export
controls, to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and
related delivery vehicles. States are also required to impose controls and safeguards
on sensitive materials that could be used to develop such weapons. (Kerr 2005)
Thus India in March 2005 ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, emphasising
the safety and control of nuclear power production sites (Xinhua 2005). In spite of
efforts to revive the NPT through 2005-2006, the current approach has meant that
India has stayed outside the NPT while allowing inspections of the civil nuclear
power plants by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These factors have led to
the US to consider allowing export of peaceful nuclear technology to India in a
major shift in US policy through July 2005, a move which some seeing as
undermining the stronger NPT agenda (Nason 2005). Thus, through late 2005 the
Bush administration moved to ‘enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and
trade with India’ and PM 'Singh, in turn, said that India would identify and separate
civilian from military nuclear facilities and programmes, and voluntarily place civilian
facilities under safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'
(Strategic Comments 2005). This deal will require further approval from the 'US
Congress and the members of the 44-strong Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)', while
India 'must develop a credible and transparent plan for separating civilian from
military nuclear facilities that is defensible from a non-proliferation standpoint'
(Strategic Comments 2005). Though this deal slowed through mid-2007 due to a fail
on exact details for provision of nuclear fuel for India's civil program (ABC Online
2007b), it suggests that the US views India as a credible partner, and perhaps has
sought to balance growing Chinese power in the 21st century. Likewise, Australia
has been unwilling to export uranium to India (unlike exports to PRC) because it
has not signed the NPT and has not accepted the full range of extended IAEA
inspections.
India has since moved to develop a declared nuclear doctrine designed to both
legitimate its possession of nuclear weapons, but also avoid a sustained nuclear arms
race in South Asia. The evolution of this doctrine has been controversial, and certain
elements of the August 1999 Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on
Indian Nuclear Doctrine (DND) led to a sustained debate on whether India could
realistically move to a triad of launch platforms, and whether a 'minimal deterrence'
could be combined with a strong second strike doctrine (Srivastava 2000).3
Nonetheless, the emerging outline of the doctrine does contain elements of restraint
that need to be further calibrated. This is based on three core concepts (Singh 1999a),
including the development of a minimalist theory of deterrence, with the smallest
degree of weaponisation and deployment combined with the real ability to launch a
punitive counter-strike. India has also explicitly developing a doctrine of no-first use,
with nuclear weapons not being deployed against states without nuclear weapons or
nuclear-armed allies, and not deployed against non-nuclear threats (Singh 1999a),
with this approach being formally adopted from 2003 nuclear command structure
under civilian control. Likewise, agreements from the 1980s stated that neither side
would target nuclear plants or installations (Wolpert 2004, p428). It must be
emphasised that India's nuclear force need not be based on numerical parity with
China's nuclear force, but on the basis of creating a credible launch base, perhaps
3
A copy of the report will be found on the Indian Embassy (Washington) Website at:
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html
24
of between 86 and 350 warheads, including tactical weapons (Srivastava 2000, p318;
Chellany 1998-1999, p97; Strategic Comments 1998). Short term problems include an
early stage before the development of second-strike abilities, when deployed weapons
will be potentially vulnerable to a first strike, the question of the evolution of nuclear
doctrine in the triad of regional players (India-Pakistan-PRC), the maintenance of
political command and control, and the fact that in the conventional theatre all sides
have a culture of 'offensive defence' (Hewitt 2000). The Indian position has also not
fully considered the possibility of Pakistan deploying very small tactical nuclear
weapons (TNW's, less than five kilotons) along parts of its border, weapons so small
that they might be used against mobile armoured forces, and might not be viewed as
worthy of a strategic counter-strike (Malik 2003a, p41). However, in the long run, this
nuclear capacity on both sides has also had a symbolic and nationalist function, and
has not directly increased bilateral tensions. India was thereby staking its claim as a
virile, modern, technically and scientifically able nation (Das 2003), fit to compete
with China and to assert it claims before the great powers of the international
community (Sheth 2000). Through 2007 India has extended the range of its missiles,
plus added the ability to operate the 'submarine-based cruise missile Sagarika', which
could deploy a nuclear payload if needed (Thapar 2007).
Through 2000-2007, Australia attempted to repair its rather weak relationship with
India, with ministerial and sector dialogue across a number of areas. e.g. agro-science
and environmental protection cooperation. The relationship has been partly pushed
forward through the regular rounds of the Australia- Indian Foreign Ministers'
Framework Dialogue, with the 2003 meeting leading to the ‘Memorandum of
Understanding on Co-operation in Combating International Terrorism’ forging "closer
cooperation between our respective security, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies" (Minister Downer in Xinhua 2003a). There has also been some limited
cooperation between the countries on supporting the development agenda within
the Doha Development Agenda, including ‘their commitment to retaining special and
differential treatment for developing countries’, as well as agricultural reform and
reduction of subsidies by developed countries (Xinhua 2003b; Panitchpakdi 2003).
Through 2003-2006 there have been extended opportunities for tourism, scientific and
technological cooperation, and cooperation in education. However, it is not certain
that Australia has yet been viewed as a key player within India's vision of regional
cooperation, though this may begin to change through shared cooperation in the ARF
and the EAS processes. It is perhaps in this context that Foreign Minister Downer has
sought to strengthen Australia's profile with India over the last three years. For
2005 total trade with India was 8.1 billion with India ranking 6 th as an export
destination, with gold, coal, copper ores and wool being major exports, with this trend
continuing in 2006 up to $8.8 of exports leading to a rank of 5th in exports, but in
turn India only exported $1.2 billion to Australia (DFAT 2006-2007).
A more balanced approach needs to set these tensions against the changing global
environment. India and China have important global agendas on which they can
cooperate. This includes cooperation with ASEAN (via both signing on to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation, plus both setting up improved trade agenda with ASEAN
through 2003-2007; see lectures 4 and 6), growing bilateral trade now reaching
approximately 8% of India's total trade, an effort to sustain some multipolar leverage
on the international system, shared concerns over international terrorism, efforts to
improve energy security, and concerns over the security of sea-lanes of
25
communication through the Indo-Pacific zone. Moreover, India has many credentials
that may prepare it for such a path: its commitment to NAM, its desire for a totally
nuclear weapons-free world, its understanding of the problems facing the developing
countries, its highly educated academic and bureaucratic elites, its national use of the
de facto global language (English), its open and active news media, and its skills in
computing and communications capabilities (Natarajan 2000), that will help it keep
up with the new media-oriented diplomacy.
5. India as a Key Player in the Asia-Pacific Region
There have been repeated hopes that India will rediscover its historic role in a reempowered Asia. This was expressed by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
in a broadcast on 7 September 1946: We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India
is so situated that she is the pivot of western, southern and south-east Asia. In the
past, her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in many ways.
Those contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union
between India and Southeast Asia, on the one side, and Afghanistan, Iran and the
Arab world, on the other. To the furtherance of that close association of free countries
we must devote ourselves. (in Saksena 1986, p47).
Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian, even though in their infancy, are a good sign of
improving relations in the wider region. This in turn, will allow a greater participation
of South Asia in renewed Asia-Pacific growth. Yet these hopes will not be easily
fulfilled so long as the disputes between Pakistan and India remain outstanding, or
while China and India veer between cooperation and competition.. At present, the
strongest trends have been enhanced interactions with ASEAN (1995-2007), and
prospects for improved relations with China (2003-2007). In general terms, steady
and stable growth for both India and PRC are a key basis for a peaceful Indo-Pacific
region: The question underlying the analysis is very simple. China and India account
for about 37.5 percent of world population and 6.4 percent of the value
of world output and income at current prices and exchange rates; as their per
capita production and consumption approach levels similar to those of today's
developed economies - a standard to which, broadly speaking, both Giants
aspire - major effects on global markets and global commons seem inevitable.
We ask whether a continued rapid expansion of economic activity through
2020 is feasible, whether there are any hints about the form it will take, and
how any such expansion will impinge on other countries. (Winters & Yusuf 2007)
India has validated it importance to the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, while the EU is
a growing trading partner. Combined with a strong regional diplomacy, India has also
been able to challenge and engage some norms of the international system, even
while having to deal with enormous domestic pressures. Although India is
establishing powers and capabilities in the international system, it also has serious
national and regional constraints that need careful development and attention.
Although an emerging 'great power', this role seems a combination of soft and
hard power elements that may threaten some South Asian neighbours, and pose
serious challenges for China and secondarily Southeast Asia.
26
8. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
A wide range of article abstracts on South Asia and Asia generally will be found
on the Homepage of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New
Delhi, at http://www.idsa-india.org
Articles on Indian foreign policy and key developments can be found on the
webpage of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, at
http://www.ipcs.org/
A wide range of current news on India will be found on the IndoLink webpage,
at http://www.indolink.com:80/index.html
A profile of the BIMSTEC organisation will be found http://www.bimstec.org
Further Reading
CETRON, Marvin J. & DAVIES, Owen "Dragon vs. the Tiger: China and India Reshape
the Global Economy", The Futurist, 40 no. 4, July-August 2006, pp38-46 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
GARVER, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle,
University of Washington Press, 2001
GAUR, Seema “Framework agreement on comprehensive economic co-operation
between India and ASEAN: first step towards economic integration”, ASEAN
Economic Bulletin, 20 issue 3, December 2003, pp283-291 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
GURU, Gopal “Dalit Vision of India: From Bahishkrut to inclusive Bharat”, Futures, 36
nos. 6-7, August-Sept 2004, pp757-763 [Access via Infotrac Database]
MISHRA, Omprakash & GHOSH, Sucheta (eds.) Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in
South Asian Region, New Delhi, Manak, 2003
NORTON, James H.K. India and South Asia, Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2005
SMITH, David The dragon and the elephant: China, India and the new world order, London,
Profile Books, 2007
WINTERS, Alan L. & YUSUF, Shahid (eds) Dancing with giants: China, India, and the global
economy, Washington, DC, World Bank, Institute of Policy Studies, 2007
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