Issues Presented in Some Civil Cases Pending Before the Second

Transcription

Issues Presented in Some Civil Cases
Pending Before the Second Court of Appeals
Updated Through November 26, 2014
Copyright© Steven K. Hayes 2014
NOTICE OF OTHER SECOND COURT REFERENCES
Please visit the “Second Court Update” page on my website, which will have: (1) links to
the pages on the Second Court’s website showing cases set for submission, and opinions recently
released; and (2) a compilation of summaries prepared by the Court regarding opinions it has issued.
See Second Court Update.
Issues Presented in Some Civil Cases
The following compilations and summaries concern some, but not all, civil cases pending
before the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth, Texas. The compilations and summaries will
not include cases in which the Court has disposed of a case. I make no representation as to the
significance of the cases in which briefs and replies profiled below were filed.
The Second Court of Appeals had no input or involvement in selecting briefs or replies
profiled below or in compiling any of the information set forth below, and does not sponsor or
endorse these compilations or summaries.
These compilations and summaries are in two major sections: Section A, for issues
compiled from Briefs since the last updating of this paper; and Section B, which is a cumulative
compilation of issue summaries previously profiled in this paper from cases not yet decided by the
Court. The following compilations and summaries are grouped by subject matter, as discerned from
the issues presented, and indicate my best judgment as to the major thrust of most of the issues. I
make no representations that these groupings accurately characterize the briefs or the cases in which
they are filed. Within each subject group, I have tried to group all briefs from a given case together.
I have tried to arrange the cases in a grouping in reverse chronological order, with the most recently
filed cases presented first.
If you detect any erroneous transcription or summary of information, or know of a brief not
profiled below, please inform Steve Hayes at the following addresses or phone number:
Steven K. Hayes
Law Office of Steven K. Hayes
201 Main Street
Suite 600
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: 817/371-8759
________________________________________
ISSUES PRESENTED TO THE 2nd COURT OF APPEALS
11/26/14
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION A. ISSUES FROM BRIEFS, ETC., FILED SINCE THIS PAPER WAS LAST
UPDATED: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Brand FX, LLC d/b/a Brand FX Body Company v. Curtis Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Villa De Leon Condiminiums, LLC, Patten Sales and Marketing, LLC and Bill
Bridges, Jr., v. Michael Stewart and Carrie Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Ensign Group, inc., Savoy Healthcare, Inc. and Xavier Pruitt, Individually, v. Erica
Mammen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Certificate of Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Childress Engineering Services, Inc., v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, as
Subrogee to Meritage Homes of Texas, L.L.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Henry Rahmani and Rahmani Management, LLC v. Dan Banet . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Derailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Hulcher Services, Inc. v. Emmert Industrial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Guardianship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Frances Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Edwin Wooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Habeas Corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
In the Matter of N.H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Illinois Union Insurance Company v. Sabre Holdings Corporation, Site 59.Com
LLC, Travelocity.Com LP, Travelocity.Com LLC and Sabre, Inc. . . . . 18
Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Banatex, LLC & Fix It Today, LLC v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. . . . . . . . 19
Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Michael Campbell v. Cesar Pérez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Danny and Rhonda Griswold v. EOG Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Orca Assets, G.P., L.L.C., Orca/ICI Development, Orca Petroleum, Ltd., and Allen
Berry v. Louis Dorfman, et al, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Parent Child Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
In the Interest of B.H.S. and B.C.S., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
IN the Interest of G.H., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
In the Interest of C.W., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
In the Interest of A.S., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
R v. A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
In the Interest of M.D. and B.D., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Property Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Shellie K. Smith v. Tarrant County, et al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Recission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Peter Payne, Mary Beth Payne, David Howard, and Oksama Howard v. Highland
Homes, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Carolyn Ann Butler v. Robert Skebrud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Summary Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Bryan Gaydos v. Bank of America N.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Hal Sauls v. Munir Bata, LLC William J. Baldwin, Americn National Development,
Chicago Title Company and the Colony Assets Development, LLC . . . 22
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Hal Sauls v. Munir Bata, LLC William J. Baldwin, Americn National Development,
Chicago Title Company and the Colony Assets Development, LLC . . . 22
Michael Reynolds v. SW McCart, L.L.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Jack County Appraisal District v. Jack County Hospital District . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Tax Foreclosure Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Americn Homeowner Preservation Fund, LP v. Brian J. Pirkle, Tarrant County,
Tarrant County Hospital District, City of Sansom Park, Tarrant County
Community College District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
SECTION B. ISSUES FROM BRIEFS, ETC., WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROFILED
IN THIS PAPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Anti SLAPP Act: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Villa De Leon Condiminiums, LLC, Patten Sales and Marketing, LLC and Bill
Bridges, Jr., v. Michael Stewart and Carrie Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Southwest Fenter, Inc. d/b/a Lambert’s Ornamental Iron Work v. Florentino Barajas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Southwest Fenter, Inc. d/b/a Lambert’s Ornamental Iron Work v. Florentino Barajas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Mary Cummins v. Amanda Lollar BWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Mary Cummins v. Amanda Lollar BWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Farukh Aslam v. Touchstone Communications-II, Touchstone Communications
(Private) Ltd., Thomas Slone, Michael Meyer, TRS Family, Ltd., MDM
Ram, Ltd., Carl Caruso, Newmark Investments Partnership, Ltd., Farrah
Karmally, Burgundy Holdings, Ltd., Joe Seringer, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Farukh Aslam v. Touchstone Communications-II, Touchstone Communications
(Private) Ltd., Thomas Slone, Michael Meyer, TRS Family, Ltd., MDM
Ram, Ltd., Carl Caruso, Newmark Investments Partnership, Ltd., Farrah
Karmally, Burgundy Holdings, Ltd., Joe Seringer, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Lynda W. Tomlinson and husband David Tomlinson v. John McComas, Cynthia
“Cissy” Wilson, Marvin Jensen, Tom Roman and Mike Robinius . . . . . 26
Lynda W. Tomlinson and husband David Tomlinson v. John McComas, Cynthia
“Cissy” Wilson, Marvin Jensen, Tom Roman and Mike Robinius . . . . . 26
Attorney’s Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Biltex Enterprises, Inc. N/K/A Lesikar Oil and Gas Company, and Lynwood Lesikar
v. A.J. Myers D/B/A Myers Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Fabian A. Thomas v. Denise Daniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Grover C. Gibson v. Lehoma J. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Grover C. Gibson v. Lehoma J. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Michael Cade and Billie Cade v. Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee
of the Charles and Barbara Cosgrove Family Revocable Living Trust . . 27
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Bond Forfeiture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Bill of Review: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Building Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Certificate of Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC, v. Starwood Homeowner’s Association, Inc. . . . . 28
Class Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Todd Brennan, Valerie Smith, Frank Gallison, Nanette Gallison, Rebecca Hanley, Gordon
Hiebert, Kimberly Hiebert, William Hood, Leonila Hood, Layne Kasper, Jessica
Kasper, James Kitchen, Martha Kitchen, Shaun Kretzschmar, Natalie Kretzschmar,
Scott Mitchell, Leslie Mitchell, Evan Peterson, Gayle Peterson, Brian Stagner, Amy
Stagner, Steven Tomhave, Jetty Tomhave, Robert Wood, and Mary Frances Wood,
v.. City of Willow Park, Texas, City of Aledo, Texas, Parker County Appraisal
District, Parker County Appraisal Review Board, and Larry Hammonds In His
Official Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Concealed Handgun License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Collateral Estoppel: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Collections and Repossession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Collective Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Kenneth Russell and Teresa Russell v. The State of Texas and Tarrant County, Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Kenneth Russell and Teresa Russell v. The State of Texas and Tarrant County, Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
City of Justin, Texas, v. Rimrock Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
City of Justin, Texas, v. Rimrock Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC v. Carl Brockriede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC v. Carl H. Brockriede . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Confidential Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Construction Contract: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Construction and Engineering: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Continuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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Azzam Hussami v. Clear Sky MRI and Dignostice Centr at Denton, Inc. . . . . . 33
AZZ Incorporated and AZZ Group, L.P., v. Michael Coleman Morgan, Boyce
Galvanizing, LLC, and Big Spring Holdings, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
AZZ Incorporated and AZZ Group, L.P., v. Michael Coleman Morgan, Boyce
Galvanizing, LLC, and Big Spring Holdings, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
John Hawkins v. Angela Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
John Hawkins v. Angela Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Inova Renovations, L.L.C., v. Mindy and David Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Keith B. Alexander v. Eddie Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Larry Cabelka v. Kelly Eugene Schmaltz, Eric Schmaltz and Kyle Schmaltz . . 34
Ally Financial, Inc., v. Sandra Gutierrez and Homeward Residential, Inc. . . . . 35
Ally Financial, Inc., v. Sandra Gutierrez and Homeward Residential, Inc. . . . . 35
Frontier Communications Northwest Inc. v. D.R. Horton, Inc; D.R. Horton Los
Angeles Holding Company, Inc; Western Pacific Housing, Inc, SSHI, LLC;
and D.R. Horton Inc - Portland, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Kim Kyongnam and Isis A to Z Bridal Formal, Inc. v. Antonio Sanchez d/b/a as D
& C Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Ronald B. “Bud” Forman, Arbors Development, LLC, nnd the Rosebud
Development, Ltd., v. Classic Century Homes, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Ronald B. “Bud” Forman, Arbors Development, LLC, and the Rosebud
Development, Ltd., v. Classic Century Homes, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Kenneth P. Gross and Besty L. Gross v. WB Texas Resort Communities, L.P.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Kenneth P. Gross and Besty L. Gross v. WB Texas Resort Communities, L.P.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Main Street Schools, L.L.C., d/b/a Montessori Country Day School and William J.
Versterman v. Jason and Lori Bimmerle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Main Street Schools, L.L.C., d/b/a Montessori Country Day School and William J.
Versterman v. Jason and Lori Bimmerle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Thomas G. McCoy v. Alden Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Thomas G. McCoy v. Alden Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Mohammed Alsheikh v. Murjan Altawil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Mohammed Alsheikh v. Murjan Altawil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Wesley Henson v. Allen Reddin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Corporate Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Court Costs: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Covenant Not to Compete: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Plains Capital Bank v. Nitin Jani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Plains Capital Bank v. Nitin Jani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
American Hat Company v. Wise Electric Cooperative, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
GM Metal, Inc., v. JP Environmental Recycling, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
David E. Williams, II, P.C., v. Fort Worth Texas Magazine Venture . . . . . . . . . 40
Declaratory Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Deed Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Defamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Gail Rigsby v. EECU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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Tim Hotchkin v. Glen Bucy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Default Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Harvest Ridge Homeowners Association, Inc., v. Travis Ryan And Elizabeth Ryan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Deficiency Judgment: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Directed Verdict: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
In the Interest of F.M.B. and P.W.B., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Dismissal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Disqualification of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Equitable Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Walter Wallace Johnson v. Lloyd Doughlas Enterprises I, Ltd. D/b/a Sunflower Park
Health Care, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Jerry Hudgeons, Individually and in his Capacity as Stockholder’s Representative
for the Former Stockholders of Total Electrical Service & Supply Co. v.
Darrell Hallmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Sylvia Marie Ortiz v. Plano Independent School District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Sylvia Marie Ortiz v. Plano Independent School District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell, et al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell, et al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Expunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Ex Parte S.B.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Ex Parte S.B.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
S.J. v. The State of Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
S.J. v. The State of Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Family Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Deborah Kay Logsdon and Mark Allen Logsdon v. Mark Edward Logsdon . . . 48
Deborah Kay Logsdon and Mark Allen Logsdon v. Mark Edward Logsdon . . . 48
In the Interest of B.T., Jr. And S.T., Minor Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Keitha Thayer v. Mark Thayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
In the Matter of the Marriage of Selene Peregrino Ruiz and Ramon Ruiz . . . . . 49
Jerry Dwayne Lee, Jr. v. Danell Charlene Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Jerry Dwayne Lee, Jr. v. Danell Charlene Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Kalsoom Ahmad v. Ishfaq Ahmad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Debra F. Pemberton v. Robert C. Pemberton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Peggy M. Blackburn v. Gilden B. Blackburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Jessica Jackson Hill v. Steven Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
D. Paul Prevallet v. Rena Jane Prevallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
D. Paul Prevallet v. Rena Jane Prevallet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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Eugene Williams v. Marcellina Williams, and in the Interest of the Children . . 52
Family Violence: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
D. M. v. M. G. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Fiduciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Findings and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Forcible Detainer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Sunny Obgomo and Joan Kyangungu v. American Homes 4 Rent Properties Two,
LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Sunny Obgomo and Joan Kyangungu v. American Homes 4 Rent Properties Two,
LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Amy L. Murry v. Bank of America, N.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Foreclosure: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Sunset Hills Homeowners Association, inc., v. Frank Carroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Brian K. Haren and Susan K. Haren f/k/a Susan C. Carley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Sheryl Buchanan v. Compass Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Sheryl Buchanan v. Compass Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Foreign Cost Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Foreign Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Xtra Lease LLC v. Genesis Truckyard LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Fraud: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C., v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C., v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C. v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Richard Clifford v. Shari McCall-Gruesen, as Trustee of the Gruesen Family Trust
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Richard Clifford v. Shari McCall-Guesen, as Trustee of the Gruesen Family Trust
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
William D. Layton v. City of Fort Worth, City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement
Fund and Board of City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement Fund . . 57
William D. Layton v. City of Fort Worth, City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement
Fund and Board of City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement Fund . . 57
Governmental Immunity: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Arlington Independent School District v. Sandra Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Fort Worth Independent School District v. Joseph Palazzolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Fort Worth Independent School District v. Joseph Palazzolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Richard A. Myers v. Southwest Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Richard A. Myers v. Southwest Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Guardianship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Halfway Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Hauling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Healthcare Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
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D.W., as Next Friend of M.M.W. and T.F.W., Minor Children, and the Independent
Administrator of the Estate of K. H., Deceased, and Deborah Harris and
Clarence Haynes, v. Raja Sawhney, M.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
D.W., as Next Friend of M.M.W. and T.F.W., Minor Children, and the Independent
Administrator of the Estate of K. H., Deceased, and Deborah Harris and
Clarence Haynes, v. Raja Sawhney, M.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Wendy Kritzer v. Scott E. Kasden, M.D., and Scott E. Kasden, M.D., P.A. . . . . 59
Columbia Medical Center of Denton Subsidiary, L.P. d/b/a Denton Regional
Medical Center and Columbia North Texas Subsidiary G.P., L.L.C., v.
Wanda Braudrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Southwest Surgical Hospital v. Larry G. Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P. d/b/a Cityview Care Center v. Francesca D. Foster
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P. d/b/a Cityview Care Center v. Francesca D. Foster
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Laura Hatchel, as Next Friend of Chance Hatchel, a Minor, v. Michelle Hacker,
FNP-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Laura Hatchel, as next friend of Chance Hatchel, a Minor Plaintiff, v. Michelle
Hacker, FNP-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Laura Hatchel, as next friend of Chance Hatchel, a Minor Plaintiff, v. Michelle
Hacker, FNP-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Weatherford Texas Hosptial Company, L.L.C. d/b/a Weatherford Regional Medical
Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Weatherford Texas Hospital Company, L.L.C. d/b/a Weatherford Regional Medical
Center v. Katherine Smart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Michael J. McQuade, D.D.S., M.S., v. Richard Brooks Berry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Legend Healthcare Gainesville, LP d/b/a Pecan Tree Manor v. Josephine Barnes,
Terri Baize, and Marie Hauser, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of
Theresa Sue Macri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Home Equity Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Homeowners’ Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Indemnity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Independent Contractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Injunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Robert G. Becker and Harold Scott Perdue v. DFE Development Corp. D/b/a FBE
Water Company, Richard Bourland, and BFE Homeowners Assoc., Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Inmate Litigation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Michael Lou Garrett v. Barry L. Macha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Michael Lou Garrett v. Barry L. Macha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Instructed Verdict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Texas Farmers Insurance Company and Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Frank
Kurosky and Pamela Rust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
City of Carrollton v. Fred Loya Insurance Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Fire Insurance Exhcange v. Judy Kenedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Invasion of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Inverse Condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Joint Use Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
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Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc., v. GTE Southwest Incorporate, d/b/a Verizon
Southwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Judicial Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Giovanni Homes Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
ACT Trading F.Z.E. v. Triple Canopy, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
ACT Trading F.Z.E. v. Triple Canopy, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Professional Association of Golf Officials v. Phillips Campbell & Phillips, L.L.P.
and Patrick C. Campbell, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Jury Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Teri Anglim v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Justice of the Peace Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Juvenile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
In the Matter of M. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
In the Matter of M. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
In the Matter of C. H., a Juvenile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Landlord/Tenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Lawyer Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Lease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Just for Fun Grapevine, Inc., John Lemley, and Laura Lemley v. Tejas Fun, L.P. and
Peter J. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Just for Fun Grapevine, Inc., John Lemley, and Laura Lemley v. Tejas Fun, L.P. and
Peter J. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Legal Malpractice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John Aflatouni v. Mark Anthony Montoya and Enid
Montoya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John Aflatouni, v. Mark Anthony Montoya and Enid
Montoya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Limited Liability Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Lost Profits: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Local Option Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Mental Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
In the Matter of C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
In the Matter of C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
In the Matter of S.C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
In the Matter of S.C.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
In the Matter of A.S.K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
In the Matter of A.S.K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Mortgages: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Necessary Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
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New Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Hest Technologies, Inc., Trip Wire Entertainment, LLC, and Chris Canard, v. PC
Connection Sales Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Noncompetition Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., Michael A. Saul, Timothy J. Palus, Peter D.
Ulasewicz, Barbara H. Bayma, and John M Piechocki v. Horizon Health
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Michael J. Boyzuick and Garda Security Inc. v. Brink’s Incorporated . . . . . . . . 74
Nuisance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Jimmy and Karen Lewis v. Bell Helicopter Textrox, Inc., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Jimmy and Karen Lewis v. Bell Helicopter Textrox, Inc., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Offset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Danny and Rhonda Griswold v. EOG Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Conglomerate Gas II, L.P. and Vancouver Sky Management, L.L.C., v. Gregg Gibb
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Conglomerate Gas II, L.P. and Vancouver Sky Management, L.L.C. . . . . . . . . 76
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Trustee of the Red Crest Trust v. Louis Dorfman, et al,
Frank Moravits et al, and Petrohawk Properties, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Lakota Energy Limited Partnership v. Merit Management Partners I, L.P.; Merit
Energy Partners III, L.P.; and Merit Energy Company, LLC . . . . . . . . . 77
Ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ACE Cash Express, Inc., v. The City of Denton, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Harry Bizios v. Town of Lakewood Village, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Parent Child Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
In the Interest of S.G., I.G., III, and B.G., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
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In the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Minor Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
In the Interest of A. R., a Minor Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
In the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Minor Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
In the Interest of A. R., a Minor Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
In the Interest of D.Z. and E.Z., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
In the Interest of Z.B., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
In the Interest of S.D., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Chad Lee S. v. Melinda A.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
In the Interest of B.M., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
In the Interest of S.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
In the Interest of A.S.M.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
In the Interest of M.N.P., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
In the Interest of D.A., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
In the Interest of S.N.C., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
In the Interest of E.M. and F.M. (F/KA.F.G.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
In the Interest of R.M.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
In the Interest of R.M.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
In the Interest of B.D.M. and S.P.M., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
In the Interest of E.L.C., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
In the Interest of B.D.M. and S.P.M., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
In the interest of D.W. and K.W., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
In the interest of N.F.A., a Minor Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
In the interest of M.L.A. and A.S.A., the Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
In the interest of D.T., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
In the Interest of A.A.N., I.G.N., and N.L.N., II, Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
In the Interest of K.K.J. and D.K.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Christopher Robert Weast v. Office of the Attorney General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Christopher Robert Weast v. Office of the Attorney General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
In re F.M.-T. & E.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
In the Interest of C.N.T. and R.J.T., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
In the Interest of C.N.T. and R.J.T., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
In the Interest of K.J.L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
In re C.R.A. and S.A.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
In re C.R.A. and S.A.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
In re C.R.A. and S.A.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
In the Interest of J.P., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
In the Interest of A.K.M.., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
In the Interest of A.K.M.., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
In the Interest of J.P., A Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
In the Interest of M.C.D. and J.N.D., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
In the Interest of M.C.D. II and J.N.D., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
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In the Intersest of A.E.A., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
In the Interest of C.L.C. and B.D.S., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
In the Interest of A. H., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Christopher S. Crago v. Cheri Aziza Crago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
In the Interest of T.G.-S.L., a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
In the Interest of K.G.B, a Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
In the Interest of J.G., D.G., and C.G., Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Personal Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Pets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Possession of Premises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Pre-Judgment Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Premises Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, v. Kimberly G. Sparkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, v. Kimberly G. Sparkman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Prescriptive Easements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Principal and Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Prisoner Litigation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Mark Walters v. Management & Training Corporation (MTC), Ricky Denny,
Charlotte Walker, & Brenda Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Mark Walters v. Management & Training Corporation (MTC), Ricky Denny,
Charlotte Walker, & Brenda Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Probate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
In re the Estate of Robert R. Cole, Deceased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Mary T. Ard v. Edward R. Hudson, Jr., and William A. Hudson, II, Individually, as
Co-Executors of the Estate of Josephine T. Hudson, Deceased, and as CoTrustees of the Edward R. Hudson Trust No. One, Frost National Bank, and
Josephine Terrell Ard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Mary T. Ard v. Edward R. Hudson, Jr., and William A. Hudson, II, Individually, as
Co-Executors of the Estate of Josephine T. Hudson, Deceased, and as CoTrustees of the Edward R. Hudson Trust No. One, Frost National Bank, and
Josephine Terrell Ard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Lonnie Boylan v. Cooper Boylan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
In re the Estate of Robert R. Cole, Deceased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Products Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Professional Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Parker County Appraisal District v. James D. Francis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Parker County Appraisal District v. James D. Francis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Stacy Family Enterprises, Inc., v. Tarrant Appraisal District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Stacy Family Enterprises, Inc., v. Tarrant Appraisal District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Public Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Terry Ross v. N. Lane Akin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Public Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
The Orchards on the Brazos, LLC v. Buron Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Pro Se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Paul Lair, Jr., v. R.M., et al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Real Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Jerald Miller v. Sheree Lucas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Jerald Miller v. Sheree Lucas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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Receivership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Green Diesel, LLC and Fuel Streamers, Inc. V. VicNRG, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Trans Global Resources, LLC and Charles W. Perry v. Chem Source, LLC, n/k/a
Frac Tech Chemical Company, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Rescission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Recusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Reparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Replevy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Res Judicata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Restrictive Covenants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Roads and Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Sanctions: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Buron Stinson v. The Orchards on the Brazos, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Kip H. Allison v. Conglomerate Gas II L.P., et al, and Clifford W. Ginn . . . . 103
Settlement Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Sex Offender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Service Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Kodak Products Co., Inc. v. Charles H. Deegear, Jr. And Deemaxx Components, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Sovereign Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
The State of Texas and Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of
the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., and Valirie Saxion, Individually
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Special Appearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
State Acquisition: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Statute of Frauds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Subdivisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Summary Judgment: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Michael Reynolds v. SW McCart, L.L.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Allegiance Exploration, LLC, Enexco, Inc., Centennial Group, LLC, Kingswood
Holdings, LLC v. Charles Chander Davis, FABDA, Inc., Thomas M.
McMurray, as Trustee of the TMM Family Trust, and Nasa Energy Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Wenatchee 1308 Land Trust, v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee,
Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee
as Successor by Merger to Lasalle Bank, National Association, as Trustee for
Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I, L.l.c., Asset________________________________________
11/26/14
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backed Certificates, Series 2007- He3 , and Mckissack Residential Partners
I, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Jack Brewer, Individually and d/b/a/ Resolution Trust Co., v. Green Lizard
Holdings, LLC, Series SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Jack Brewer, Individually and d/b/a/ Resolution Trust Co., v. Green Lizard
Holdings, LLC, Series SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Supersedeas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Ray Bell v. Rick Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Surety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Sworn Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Putz Farms, A Joint Venture; Dr. Herbert R. Putz; and Sign Putz v. Crop Production
Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Putz Farms, A Joint Venture; Dr. Herbert R. Putz; and Sign Putz v. Crop Production
Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Jack County Appraisal District v. Jack County Hospital District . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Lewisville Independent School District v. CH Townhomes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Lewisville Independent School District v. CH Townhomes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Temporary Injunction: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John Aflatouni, v. Mark Anthony Montoya and Enid
Montoya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Steven M Johnson, P.C., dba The Johnson Law Firm and Steven M. Johnson v. Mary
McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Texas Citizens’ Participation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Neal Rauhauser v. James McGibney and Viaview, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Neal Rauhauser v. James McGibney and Viaview, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Tim Bilbrey and Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Tort Claims Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Trade Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Turnover Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Keith M. Jensen, P.C., Roger M Briggs, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Unemployment Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Voluntary Payment Rule: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Whistleblower Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Nina Lopez v. Tarrant County, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Nina Lopez v. Tarrant County, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Workers Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
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SECTION A. ISSUES FROM BRIEFS, ETC., FILED SINCE THIS PAPER WAS LAST UPDATED:
Arbitration
Appellants reply that: 1. This Court May Consider Brand FX’s Motion to Reconsider
and Supporting Evidence Raising New Grounds for Arbitration; 2. Alternatively, the Record
Existing at the Time of Brand FX’s Original Motion to Compel Arbitration Proves the FAA Applies;
and 3. Rhine’s Unconscionability Defenses Are Not Supported by Texas Case Law or Any Record
Evidence No. 02-14-00249-CV, Brand FX, LLC d/b/a Brand FX Body Company v. Curtis Rhine,
from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Matthew D. Stayton, Russell D. Cawyer, Kelly
Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant.
10/27/14.
Appellees contend that: 1: Michael and Carrie Stewart never agreed or accepted an
agreement to arbitrate disputes with Appellants related to the condominium at issue (Unit 130), and,
therefore, cannot be compelled to arbitrate. The arbitration clause Appellants seek to enforce was
set forth in a prospective contract for Unit 530, which is an entirely different unit than the unit
ultimately purchased by Michael and Carrie Stewart which forms the basis of this dispute (Unit
130). The contract for Unit 130 does not contain an arbitration clause and it specifically cancels the
prospective contract for Unit 530. After weighing the evidence, the trial court correctly denied the
Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. There is more than ample evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s determination that there was no agreement to arbitrate disputes related to
Unit 130. 2: The evidence supports a finding by the trial court that Michael and Carrie Stewart never
“acquiesced” to the terms of a contract containing an arbitration agreement. Therefore, under Texas
law, Michael and Carrie Stewart could not be compelled to arbitrate. 3: Michael Stewart cannot be
estopped from opposing arbitration, because the contract at issue does not contain an arbitration
agreement. 4: The dispute at issue regarding Unit 130 does not fall within the scope of an arbitration
clause because the contract at issue does not contain an arbitration agreement. After weighing the
evidence, the trial court correctly denied the Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. 5: The trial
court correctly determined that the Stewarts’ claims were not subject to arbitration. As such, a stay
was and remains unnecessary and improper under Texas law. No. 02-14-00271-CV, Villa De Leon
Condiminiums, LLC, Patten Sales and Marketing, LLC and Bill Bridges, Jr., v. Michael Stewart and
Carrie Stewart, from the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by James M. Stanley Jesse J.
Lotspeich, The Law Offices of James M. Stanley, 2200 Hemphill Street FortWorth Texas 76110,
and Evan Lane (Van) Shaw Law Offices of Van Shaw, 2723 Fairmount Dallas, Texas 75201, for
Appellees. 10/20/14.
Appellants address whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants’ motion to compel
arbitration. No. 02-14-00317-CV, Ensign Group, inc., Savoy Healthcare, Inc. and Xavier Pruitt,
Individually, v. Erica Mammen, from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by Jay M. Wallace,
Alana K Ackels, Bell Nunnally & Martin LLP, 3232 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1400, Dallas, Texas
75204, for Appellants. 11/5/14.
Certificate of Merit
Appellant addresses: ISSUE 1: Is a Certificate of Merit required when the Plaintiff has sued
a licensed professional for indemnity? ISSUE 2: If a party to an indemnity agreement, such as
Nationwide, is required to file a Certificate of Merit, did the trial court abuse its discretion in
denying Childress Engineering, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Cause of Action? No. 0214–00332-CV, Childress Engineering Services, Inc., v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
as Subrogee to Meritage Homes of Texas, L.L.C., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by
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Richard Schellhammer, Cara D. Kennemer, Underwood Law Firm, P.C., 1008 Macon Street, Suite
101, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 11/12/14.
Contract
Appellant contends that: Issue 1. The trial court erred when it admitted a copy of the alleged
contract into evidence instead of the original and Dan Banet failed to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 1004 of the Texas Rules of Evidence for admission of a copy. Issue 2. The evidence is both
legally and factually insufficient to support the judgment against Rahmani Management, LLC for
$200,000 under Dan Banet’s version of the alleged contract because the plain language does not
obligate Rahmani Management, LLC for such payment. Issue 3. The trial court erred when it denied
the Appellants’ plea in abatement and refused to order that a joint owner of the Dan Banet’s cause
of action be made a party to this action. In the alternative, Dan Banet’s recovery on his contract
action should be reduced to reflect deletion of the part of the claim still owned by his ex-wife. Issue
4. The trial court erred when it rendered judgment against Henry Rahmani and Rahmani
Management, LLC because the great weight and preponderance of the credible evidence established
that the alleged contract was usurious, that the statutory usury penalty exceeds the amount of Dan
Banet’s claim under the alleged contract and that an offset for the usury penalty results in no
recovery by Dan Banet. Issue 5. The evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support
the award of attorney fees to Dan Banet. Issue 6. The evidence is both legally and factually
insufficient to support the judgment against Henry Rahmani for the additional sum of $35,000
because the plain language of the agreement does not obligate Henry Rahmani to personally make
any payment of such sum and there was a lack of consideration for the alleged agreement of Henry
Rahmani to pay that amount to Dan Banet. Evidence No. 02-14-00240-CV, Henry Rahmani and
Rahmani Management, LLC v. Dan Banet, from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County, by David
R. Sweat, 3705 W. Green Oaks Blvd., Ste. C, Arlington, Texas 76016, for Appellant. 10/13/20.
Derailment
Appellant contends that: 1. Emmert derailed a railcar carrying a transformer owned by
Oncor. Hulcher accidentally damaged the transformer while attempting to re-rail the car. Emmert
sued Hulcher for economic losses resulting from the damage to Oncor’s property. The jury found
for Emmert on its claims for negligence, violations of the DTPA, breach of contract, and breach of
warranty. a. Is Emmert’s negligence claim—for economic losses resulting from damage to the
property of another—barred by the economic loss rule? b. Is there legally and factually sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s DTPA findings? c. Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence
of a contract? d. Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence that Hulcher breached an express
or implied warranty? 2. Oncor sued Emmert for damage to the transformer. Emmert initially refused
to settle and, as part of a litigation strategy, Oncor temporarily stopped doing business with Emmert.
The strategy worked and Emmert settled, after which they started doing business again. Emmert then
sued Hulcher for lost business with Oncor. a. Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s award of $2,000,000 in lost profits? Does Emmert’s claim require proof of intent
to interfere? Were the lost profits too remote and unforeseeable? Is Emmert’s damage model entirely
speculative? b. Is there legally and factually insufficient evidence that Hulcher committed any act
“knowingly,” thus precluding the $1,000,000 in additional damages? c. Is there legally and factually
insufficient evidence that Hulcher was grossly negligent, thus precluding the $1,500,000 in punitive
damages? At a minimum, should the award be capped? d. Should the award of $572,149.89 in
attorney’s fees be set aside or, at a minimum, be reversed for a redetermination? e. Are there legal
reasons to set aside the jury’s other damages findings? No. 02-14-00110-CV, Hulcher Services, Inc.
v. Emmert Industrial Corp., from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Thomas C. Wright,
Wanda McKee Fowler, Bradley W. Snead, Natasha N. Taylor, Wright & Close, LLP, One Riverway,
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Suite 2200, Houston, Texas 77056, for Appellant. 11/5/14.
Guardianship
Appellant Department of Aging and Disability Services addresses: I. Whether the probate
court erred in denying DADS’s plea to the jurisdiction, because no valid waiver of sovereign
immunity exists in this matter. II. Whether the probate court lacks jurisdiction to issue an order
appointing DADS as permanent guardian in this matter because: (1) the probate court’s authority
is circumscribed by statute, and (2) the Human Resources Code bars issuance of an order appointing
DADS as permanent guardianship under the circumstances presented here. No. 02-14-00291-CV,
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Frances Phillips, from the Probate Court No. 2 of Tarrant
County, by Greg Abbott, Daniel T. Hodge, David C. Mattax, Erika M. Kane, Office of the Attorney
General, General Litigation Division-019, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711, for Appellant.
11/17/14.
Appellant Department of Aging and Disability Services addresses: I. Whether the probate
court erred in denying DADS’s plea to the jurisdiction, because no valid waiver of sovereign
immunity exists in this matter. II. Whether the probate court lacks jurisdiction to issue an order
appointing DADS as permanent guardian in this matter because: (1) the probate court’s authority
is circumscribed by statute, and (2) the Human Resources Code bars issuance of an order appointing
DADS as permanent guardianship under the circumstances presented here. No. 02-14-00315-CV,
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Edwin Wooley, from the Probate Court No. 2 of Tarrant
County, by Greg Abbott, Daniel T. Hodge, David C. Mattax, James “Beau” Eccles, Erika M. Kane,
Office of the Attorney General, General Litigation Division-019, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas
78711, for Appellant. 11/17/14.
Habeas Corpus
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s
application for writ of habeas corpus because his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. No. 02-14-00277-CV, In the Matter of N.H., from the Denton County Court at Law
No. 1 of Denton County, by Henry C. Paine, Jr., Marsh & Paine, P.C., 101 S. Woodrow, Denton,
Texas 76205, for Appellant. 11/13/14.
Insurance
Appellees contend that: I. Sabre Acquired Primary and Excess Insurance on a “Claims
Made” Basis II. The Primary Insurer Provided Defense Coverage for Claim No. 656-000351-001
III. Under the Excess Policy, Sabre Was Required to Notify Illinois Union Once the Primary Policy
Was Exhausted IV. Illinois Union Denied Coverage Based Solely on Its Contention That Sabre
Provided Late Notice V. Sabre Filed This Suit to Enforce the Excess Policy. No. 02-14-00130-CV,
Illinois Union Insurance Company v. Sabre Holdings Corporation, Site 59.Com LLC,
Travelocity.Com LP, Travelocity.Com LLC and Sabre, Inc., from the 48th District Court of Tarrant
County, by David E. Keltner, Brian S. Stagner Derek W. Anderson, Brian K. Garrett, Kelly Hart &
Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 for Appellees. 10/15/14.
Liens
Appellants address the following issues: Issue No. 1: Was the trial court de novo wrong to
Order Declaratory Judgments and conclusions of law which are duplicative of pending issues, are
incorrect declarations of the law, and/or which provide relief beyond that requested by Appellee?
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Issue No. 2: Was there sufficient evidence to support the Court’s damages calculation where the
calculation is premised on an estimated fair market value of the Vehicles, but there is materially
limited evidence of the condition or merchantability of the Vehicles at issue, and the only evidence
of vehicle values are pages from an anonymous book and an NADA website which provide no
information about the condition, location or merchantability of the vehicles that their valuations
would apply to? Issue No. 3: Was it reversible error to award monetary damages for the value of
the Vehicles in addition to awarding possession of the vehicles, thus constituting an impermissible
double recover and a windfall to Appellee? Issue No. 4: Was it reversible error to award Appellee
100% of its attorney’s fees where attorney’s fees are unavailable for three of its five prevailing
claims, and Appellee failed to segregate any of its time for those three claims? Issue No. 5: Was
there sufficient evidence to support a claim for conspiracy where the only relationship between the
alleged conspirators was one’s provision of advertising and marketing services to the other for an
agreed fee? No. 02-14-00191-CV, Banatex, LLC & Fix It Today, LLC v. Santander Consumer USA,
Inc., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Jesse D. Hoffman, Blair M. Green,
McCathern, PLLC, 3710 Rawlins, Ste. 1600, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellants. 11/13/14.
Negligence
Appellant addresses the following: Issue No. 1: Legal insufficiency challenge. Did the
evidence introduced at trial establish that Cesar Pérez was negligent, and that his negligence
proximately caused the occurrence in question, as a matter of law? Issue No. 2: Factual insufficiency
challenge. Was the jury’s finding that Cesar Pérez was not negligent and/or did not cause the
occurrence in question, against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence? No.
02-14-00248-CV, Michael Campbell v. Cesar Pérez, from the 96th Judicial District Court of Tarrant
County, by Rosalyn R. Tippett, Tippett Law Office, 110 W. Sandy Lake Road, Suite 102 (PMB
194), Coppell, Texas 75019, for Appellant. 11/20/14,
Oil and Gas
Appellee contends that: 1. The trial court correctly granted EOG’s motion for summary
judgment and denied the Griswolds’ motion for summary judgment because the Griswolds only own
an one-half interest in the mineral estate at issue, as a matter of law. 2. The trial court correctly
construed and gave effect and meaning to deed language evidencing an intent to convey only
one-half of the mineral estate which, therefore, precluded one-half of the mineral estate from
subsequently passing to the Griswolds, as a matter of law. No. 02-14-00200-CV, Danny and
Rhonda Griswold v. EOG Resources, Inc., from the 97th Judicial District Court of Montague County,
by Russell R. Barton, James E. Key, Harris, Finley & Bogle, P.C., 777 Main Street, Suite 1800, Fort
Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 10/31/14.
Appellees address: Whether the trial court properly decided, as a matter of law, that: I. The
1944 Judgment was not void but did include all necessary parties; and II. The 1944 Judgment is not
rendered invalid, void, or ineffective due to any alleged reversion of rights from H.J. McMullen to
his estate. No. 02-14-00056-CV, Orca Assets, G.P., L.L.C., Orca/ICI Development, Orca
Petroleum, Ltd., and Allen Berry v. Louis Dorfman, et al,, from the 342nd District Court of Tarrant
County, by G. Michael Gruber, Michael J. Lang, Gruber Hurst Johansen Hail Shank LLP, 1445
Ross Ave., Suite 2500, Dallas, Texas 75202, for Appellees. 11/24/14.
Parent Child Relationship
Appellees contend that: 1. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish that
T.S. committed an act under Texas Family Code §161.001(1) and that termination of the
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parent-child relationship is in the best interest of B.H.S. and B.C.S. 2. A bench warrant for T.S. was
unnecessary because T.S. was allowed to fully participate in the trial by telephone. 3. There is no
basis for T.S.’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. No. 02-14-00004-CV, In the Interest of
B.H.S. and B.C.S., Children, from the 231st District Court of Tarrant County, by David R. Sweat,
3705 Green Oaks Blvd., Ste. C, Arlington, Texas 76016, for Appellees. 11/21/14.
Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
findings that termination of Appellant Father's parental rights is in the best interest of the child: The
trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment to BofA because there was sufficient summary
judgment evidence to permit BRIEF OF APPELLANT 6 Gaydos to proceed to trial on one or more
of his claims. 2. The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment to BofA, since BofA was
acting, on the face of the summary judgment record, without capacity at all relevant times. No.
02-14-00261-CV, IN the Interest of G.H., A Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County,
by Felipe Calzada, Attorney at Law, 2724 Kimbo Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76111, for Appellant.
10/28/14.
Appellant contends that: 1. There was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the
court's finding that the mother endangered her child under section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas
Family Code. 2. There was no evidence or sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the
mother endangered her child under section 161.001(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code. 3. There was
no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the mother constructively
abandoned her child. No. 02-14-00274-CV, In the Interest of C.W., A Child, from the 323rd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Richard A. Gladstone, 1515 8th Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for
Appellant. 10/7/14.
Appellant addresses 2hether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 161.001 that termination of AF’s
parental rights is in the best interest of the child? No. 02-14-00272-CV, In the Interest of A.S., A
Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Adler, 2501 Avenue J, Suite 100,
Arlington, Texas 76006, for Appellant. 10/17/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the parties joint
managing conservators of the children because credible evidence was presented of a history or
pattern of past or present physical abuse by A against R as well as against A's former husband. No.
02-14-00202-CV, R v. A, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Jimmy L. Verner, Jr.,
Verner BrumleyMcCurley P.C., 3710 Rawlins St., Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellant.
11/5/14.
Appellant addresses: 1. Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(D) of the family code that R.D. knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed M.D. and B.D. to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endanger the emotional or physical well-being of M.D. and B.D.? 2. Whether the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(E) of the
family code that R.D. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of M.D. and B.D.? 3.
Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant
to Section 161.001(1)(O) of the family code that R.D. failed to comply with the provisions of a court
order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child
who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family
and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the
parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child? 4. Whether the evidence is factually
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sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(2) of the family code that
termination of the parent-child relationship between R.D. and the children is in the children’s best
interests? No. 02-14-00 305-CV,In the Interest of M.D. and B.D., Children, from the 323rd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Clifford D. MacKenzie, The Law Office of Clifford D. MacKenzie,
1515 8th Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellant R.D. 11/21/14.
Property Tax
“Appellees provide the following Re-Statement of what is believed to be the Appellant’s
actual Issues Presented (see Brief at 9-10): 1.. Did the District Court err by failing to consider a
timely and properly made Motion for Order to Show Cause why the Plaintiff should not dismiss?
2. Did the District Court err by failing to take notice of a Self-Authenticating Third Party Record
of Payment? 3. Did the District Court err by asserting that Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial was
not timely filed, when in fact the record shows it was filed in compliance of the time requirements
of TRCP Rule 329(b)? 4. Did the District Court err by failing to ratify into the public record a
private record of settlement between the parties? 5. Did the District Court err by failing to order
the Plaintiff to return the Original Tender of Payment, after promising to do so in open court, and
upon the Plaintiff asserting that same Tender was insufficient? 6. Did the District Court err
procedurally by failing Defendant in her right to Due Process?” No. 02-14-00207-CV, Shellie K.
Smith v. Tarrant County, et al, from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Edward J. (Nick)
Nicholas, Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP, 4828 Loop Central Drive, Suite 600, Houston,
Texas 78701, for Appellees. 11/13/14.
Recission
Appellee addresses the following: 1. After severing out a number of claims and parties into
a separate cause, the district court granted summary judgment on all remaining claims. Was the
November 25, 2013, summary judgment order final and appealable as of that date? 2. Does
Plaintiffs’ request for rescission as a remedy preclude the summary judgment order from being final
and appealable? 3. Did the Fourth Amended Petition, which was filed without leave of court and
never served on Highland Homes, revive the claims of plaintiffs who had been severed and
dismissed? 4. Did Plaintiffs timely file their notice of appeal from the November 25, 2013, summary
judgment order? No. 02-14-00067-CV, Peter Payne, Mary Beth Payne, David Howard, and
Oksama Howard v. Highland Homes, Ltd., from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by
Marcy Hogan Greer, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, 515 Congress Avenue, Suite
2350, Austin, Texas 7701, Charles T. Frazier, Jr., Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP,
4925 Greenville Avenue, Suite 510, Dallas, Texas 75206, Brad Gahm, General Counsel, Highland
Homes, Ltd., 5601 Democracy Drive, Suite 300, Plano, Texas 75024, Brandon L. Starling,
Shakelford, Melton & McKinley, 3333 Lee Parkway, 10th, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellee.
11/12/14.10/28/14.
Service
Appellant contends that: POINT OF ERROR1: The Constable's Office must show diligence
of service efforts used to execute a Citation. POINT OF ERROR 2: Appellant raises the fact issue
regarding her due diligence used to effect service, on Robert Skegrud. No.____________, Carolyn
Ann Butler v. Robert Skebrud, from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County, by Carolyn Ann
Butler, 300 E. South Street, Arlington, Texas 76004, for Appellant Pro Se. 10/28/14.
Summary Judgment
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Appellant contends: The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment to BofA because
there was sufficient summary judgment evidence to permit BRIEF OF APPELLANT 6 Gaydos to
proceed to trial on one or more of his claims. 2. The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment
to BofA, since BofA was acting, on the face of the summary judgment record, without capacity at
all relevant times. No. 02-14-00221-CV, Bryan Gaydos v. Bank of America N.A., from the 236th
District Court of Tarrant County, by Michael Brinkley, Brinkley Law PLLC, P.O. Box 820711 Fort
Worth, Texas 76182, for Appellant. 10/27/14.
Appellant contends that the trial Court improperly granted the Colony Assets' No- Evidence
Motion for Summary Judgment because: A. The Trial Court committed an abuse of discretion in
sustaining Appellee's objections to Sauls' evidence supporting his Response to the No-Evidence
Motion for Summary Judgment; and B. Sufficient evidence existed in the Court's record to create
a question of fact. No. 02-14-00208 and 00214-CV, Hal Sauls v. Munir Bata, LLC William J.
Baldwin, Americn National Development, Chicago Title Company and the Colony Assets
Development, LLC, from the 431st District Court of Dento County, by Lacie Friday, Lenora M.
Reece, Friday & Reece, PLLC, 1170 Corporate Drive W. #101 Arlington, Texas 76006, for
Appellant. 10/20/14.
Appellees address 1. Whether the trial court improperly granted Appellees’ No-Evidence
Motion for Summary Judgment (A) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining
Appellees’ objections to Sauls’ summary judgment evidence (B) Whether Sauls produced
competent summary judgment evidence to raise a fact issue as to all of the challenged elements of
his three counterclaims and two agency theories of liability asserted against Appellees (C) Whether
Sauls’ late-filed summary judgment evidence was properly before the trial court and whether such
evidence
should be considered (D) Whether sufficient summary judgment evidence existed in the trial court’s
record to create a question of fact on all of the challenged elements of Sauls’ three counterclaims
and two agency theories of liability asserted against Appellees. No. 02-14-00208 and 00214-CV,
Hal Sauls v. Munir Bata, LLC William J. Baldwin, Americn National Development, Chicago Title
Company and the Colony Assets Development, LLC, from the 431st District Court of Dento County,
by Michael Y. Kim, Scott Viscuso, PLLC, 408 W. 8th Street, Suite 205, Dallas, Texas 75208, for
Appellees. 11/19/14.
Appellee contends that: I. The trial court correctly granted the no-evidence motion for
summary judgment because Reynolds failed to file any evidence on the challenged elements; and
II. Considering the record as a whole, the trial court correctly applied Chapter 95 in granting the
traditional motion for summary judgment and in denying Reynolds additional time to conduct
discovery. No. 02-14-00161-CV, Michael Reynolds v. SW McCart, L.L.C., from the 342nd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Daryl W. Bailey, Gray Reed & McGraw, P.C., 1300 Post Oak Blvd.,
Suite 2000, Houston, Texas 77056, for Appellee. 10/22/14.
Taxation
Appellee contends that: 1. The Property is Exempt from Property Taxation under § 11.11(h)
of the Property Tax Code; 2. The Hospital District Was Denied Due Process, Thereby Voiding the
Tax Assessment No. 02-14-00188-CV, Jack County Appraisal District v. Jack County Hospital
District, from the 271st District Court of Jack County, by Robert J. Myers, John J. Shaw,
MyerspHill, 2525 Ridgmar Blvd., Ste. 150, Fort Worth, Texas 76116, for Appellee. 11/3/14.
Tax Foreclosure Sale
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Appellant addresses: Issue One: Whether the Trial Court erred in granting Appellee, Lewis
Pirkle’s, Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Appellant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment—effectively ruling that a tax foreclosure sale extinguishes an existing lien against real
property despite the fact that the lienholder of record was not a party to, nor provided notice of, the
underlying delinquent tax lawsuit. Issue Two: If the Trial Court was correct in granting Appellee,
Lewis Pirkle’s, Motion for Summary Judgment and Appellant’s Promissory Note and Deed of Trust
were extinguished by the tax foreclosure sale, are the Taxing Authorities liable for an
unconstitutional taking of the lienholder’s rights in property that were extinguished in violation of
its due process rights? Issue Three: Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney’s fees when
no evidence was presented concerning the segregation of the attorney’s fees between the various
parties involved and the causes of action asserted. Code; 2. The Hospital District Was Denied Due
Process, Thereby Voiding the Tax Assessment No. 02-14-00293-CV, Americn Homeowner
Preservation Fund, LP v. Brian J. Pirkle, Tarrant County, Tarrant County Hospital District, City
of Sansom Park, Tarrant County Community College District, from the 236th District Court of
Tarrant County, by John Ivie, Baseden & Ivie, 17300 Dallas Parkway, Suite 3160, Dallas, Texas
75248, for Appellant. 11/17/14.
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SECTION B. ISSUES FROM BRIEFS, ETC., WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROFILED IN
THIS PAPER
Abatement:
Admissions:
Administrative Law:
Adverse Possession:
Agency:
Alcoholic Beverage Code:
Animal Regulations:
Annexation:
Anti SLAPP Act:
Arbitration:
Appellants address the following: Did the trial court err in denying arbitration where a valid,
enforceable arbitration agreement covering the scope of the claims at issue exists between Brand FX
and Rhine? No. 02-14-00249-CV, Brand FX, LLC d/b/a Brand FX Body Company v. Curtis Rhine,
from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Matthew D. Stayton, Russell D. Cawyer, Kelly
Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant.
9/17/14.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s
motion to abate and compel arbitration. No. 02-14-00249-CV, Brand FX, LLC d/b/a Brand FX Body
Company v. Curtis Rhine, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Rod Tanner, Matt Pierce,
Tanner and Associates, PC, 6300 Ridglea Place, 407, Fort Worth, Texas 76116.
Appellants address the following: 1. Are Michael and Carrie Stewart bound by their repeated
acceptance of the agreement to arbitrate all disputes? 2. The Stewarts acquiesced to the terms of the
Condominium Sales Contract by performing and accepting performance under that contract. Are the
Stewarts bound by the arbitration clause in that contract? 3. Carrie Stewart executed the contract
containing the arbitration clause, and both Carrie and Michael Stewart have enjoyed and seek the
benefits of that contract in litigation and otherwise. Is Michael Stewart estopped from opposing
arbitration of his claims? 4. This arbitration clause applies to “any other matter relating in any
manner to the Property.” Does this dispute fall within the scope of the arbitration clause? 5. The
Stewarts have asserted claims that are subject to arbitration and that cannot be severed from the
remaining claims. Must the trial court order that all other disputes be stayed pending the result of
the
arbitration proceeding? No. 02-14-00271-CV, Villa De Leon Condiminiums, LLC, Patten Sales and
Marketing, LLC and Bill Bridges, Jr., v. Michael Stewart and Carrie Stewart, from the 153rd
District Court of Tarrant County, by Douglas Pritchett, Jr., Casey T. Wallace, Benjamin W. Allen,
Johnson, Trent, West & Taylor, L.L.P., 919 Milam, Suite 1700, Houston, Texas 77002, for
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Appellants. 9/30/14.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Motion
To Compel Arbitration, and also whether the Appellee proved any of its alleged defenses against
enforcing the Arbitration provision. No. 02-13-00189-CV, Southwest Fenter, Inc. d/b/a Lambert’s
Ornamental Iron Work v. Florentino Barajas, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant
County, by James McCoy, The McCoy Law Firm, PC, 12400 Coit Road, Suite 560, Dallas, Texas
75206, for Appellant.
Appellee contends that the Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration Because Appellee Presented Sufficient Evidence to Show that the
Arbitration Clause was Procedurally Unconscionable or Substantively Unconscionable. No. 02-1300189-CV, Southwest Fenter, Inc. d/b/a Lambert’s Ornamental Iron Work v. Florentino Barajas,
from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, by Jamshyd (Jim) Zadeh, Law Office of Jim
Zadeh, P.C. , 115 W. 2nd Street, Suite 201, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 7/19/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) Ample evidence supports the trial court's judgment that Cummins
maliciously defamed Lollar and Bat World; (2) Ample evidence supports the trial court's judgment
that Cummins breached her internship contract with Bat World and that Bat World and Lollar were
damaged as a result of that breach; (3) Ample evidence supports the trial court's awards of
compensatory and punitive damages resulting from Cummins' defamation of Lollar and Bat World;
(4) The trial court properly awarded Appellees reasonable attorney's fees. No. 02-12-00285-CV,
Mary Cummins v. Amanda Lollar BWS, from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Randall
E. Turner, Bailey & Galyen, 1300 Summit Ave., Ste. 650, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee.
Appellant addresses the following questions: Issues from Defamation Claim. 1. Are
Appellees Amanda Lollar, BWS, limited-purpose public figures with respect to their voluntary and
public participation in animal and bat care? 2. Are statements about Appellees, public safety, public
health, government action, statements about matters of public concern? 3. Did Appellees present
"more than a scintilla" of evidence that any of the supposed defamatory statements meets all four
of the following criteria? a. is a verifiable statement of fact; b. is false or not substantially true; c.
is of and concerning Appellees; and d. is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning about
Appellees? 4. Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's judgement against Appellant for
defamation? 5. Were Appellees entitled to the amount of compensatory or exemplary damages
awarded? Issues from Breach of Contract Claim 6. Did Appellees present "more than a scintilla" of
evidence that any of Appellant's actions meet all four of the following criteria for breach of contract?
a. The existence of a valid contract; b. Performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; c.
Breach of the contract by the defendant; and d. Damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the
breach. 7. Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's judgement against Appellant for breach of
contract? 8. Were Plaintiffs entitled to attorneys' fees? 9. Were attorneys' fees reasonable? 10.were
Plaintiffs entitled to liquidated damages? Were they reasonable, legal? No. 02-12-00285-CV, Mary
Cummins v. Amanda Lollar BWS, from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Mary
Cummins, Appellant in Pro Per, 645 W. 9th St. #110-140, Los Angeles, CA 90015-1640, for
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred: (1)in affirming the arbitration award
cancelling Touchstone Texas’ debts to appellant and forefeiting appellant’s ownership interest in
Touchstone Texas and Touchstone Pakistan (a) where such awards exceeded the power and
authority expressly granted the arbitrator in the parties’ arbitration agreement; (b) when such awards
constituted a manifest disregard for the law; and (c) based on a finding that appellant breached a
fiduciary duty, when the parties agreed that appellant did not owe a fiduciary duty to appellees; and
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(2) in affirming the arbitration award ordering appellant to pay money damages to appellees for
conversion when the evidence conclusively shows that appellant had lawful authority to exercise
control over the funds that were allegedly converted. Appellant also addresses whether he waived
his right to appeal the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and
manifestly disregarded the law. No. 02-11-00292-CV, Farukh Aslam v. Touchstone
Communications-II, Touchstone Communications (Private) Ltd., Thomas Slone, Michael Meyer, TRS
Family, Ltd., MDM Ram, Ltd., Carl Caruso, Newmark Investments Partnership, Ltd., Farrah
Karmally, Burgundy Holdings, Ltd., Joe Seringer, et al.,, John H. Cayce, Jr., John T. Wilson, IV,
Mallory A. Beagles, Kelly Hart & Hallman, LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas
76102, for Appellant. 2/29/12.
Appellant replies that: (1) Aslam did not waive his right to challenge the Arbitration award
on statutory grounds guaranteed by the TAA; (2) the doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel
have no application in this appeal; (3) Aslam's issues were properly preserved; (4) The arbitrator
exceeded his power and authority, and manifestly disregarded the law; and (5) requests that costs
for unnecessary portions of the record be assessed against Appellees. No. 02-11-00292-CV, Farukh
Aslam v. Touchstone Communications-II, Touchstone Communications (Private) Ltd., Thomas
Slone, Michael Meyer, TRS Family, Ltd., MDM Ram, Ltd., Carl Caruso, Newmark Investments
Partnership, Ltd., Farrah Karmally, Burgundy Holdings, Ltd., Joe Seringer, et al.,, John H. Cayce,
Jr., John T. Wilson, IV, Mallory A. Beagles, Kelly Hart & Hallman, LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite
Associations
Appellants address whether the trial court erred in granting the M.B.G.’s motion for
summary judgment and denying the L.T.’s motion for partial summary judgment when the
undisputed facts establish that M.B.G. charged L.T. with unethical conduct and acting in a conflict
of interest knowing that the statements were false. 02-11-00175-CV, Lynda W. Tomlinson and
husband David Tomlinson v. John McComas, Cynthia “Cissy” Wilson, Marvin Jensen, Tom Roman
and Mike Robinius, by J. Shelby Sharpe, 6100 Western Place, Suite 1000, Fort Worth, Texas
76107, Gerald A. Bates, 3200 Riverfront Drive, Suite 204, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for
Appellees contend that the trial court correctly granted Appellees' traditional motion for
summary judgment and correctly denied the Appellants’ traditional motion for partial summary
judgment because: (1) McComas' statements aren't defamatory; (2) Appellees negated and the
Tomlinsons didn't establish actual malice; (3) McComas' statements receive a qualified privilege;
(4) Mrs. Tomlinson invited and consented to the publication of any allegedly defamatory statements;
(5) The Tomlinsons didn't prove falsity; (6) Appellees receive immunity under the Texas Business
Organizations Code; (7) The Tomlinsons waived any argument concerning punitive damages; and
(8) Summary judgment was particularly warranted for Wilson, Jensen, Roman, and Robinius. 02-1100175-CV, Lynda W. Tomlinson and husband David Tomlinson v. John McComas, Cynthia “Cissy”
Wilson, Marvin Jensen, Tom Roman and Mike Robinius, by James J. McConn, Jr., Michael M.
Gallagher, Hays, McConn, Rice & Pickering, 1233 West Loop South, Suite 1000, Houston, Texas
77027, and Grant Liser, Sandra Liser, Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLC, 306 W. 7th Street, Fort
Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees. 8/25/11.
Attorney:
Attorney Client:
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Attorney’s Fees:
Appellee addresses whether the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding attorney’s
fees to Appellee under the Declaratory Judgment Act when Appellee pleaded and maintained a
declaratory judgment action distinct from the parties’ title claims? No. 02-13-00465-CV, Biltex
Enterprises, Inc. N/K/A Lesikar Oil and Gas Company, and Lynwood Lesikar v. A.J. Myers D/B/A
Myers Production, from the County Court at Law No. 2, Parker County, by David L. Spiller, Spiller
& Spiller, P.O. Box 447, Jacksboro, Texas 76458, and Brian S. Stagner, Jody S. Sanders, Kelly
Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee.
7/11/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) awarding attorney’s fees
to appellee’s attorney; and (2) not requiring the parties to swore in [sic.] prior to giving testimony.
No. 02-12-00397-CV, Fabian A. Thomas v. Denise Daniel, from the 431st District Court of Denton
County, by Fabian Thomas, 5732 Woodmoss Lane, The Colony, Texas 75056, for Appellant, Pro
Se. 12/17/12.
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously awarded attorney’s fees to Appellee. No.
02-12-00177-CV, Grover C. Gibson v. Lehoma J. Gibson, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant
County, by Robert D. Hoover, Earl R. Waddell III, 113 North Houston Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102, for Appellant. 12/10/12.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees
as a just and right division of the marital estate after a remand of' the division of the marital estate
by the appellate court, and, in the alternative, whether the trial court had the authority to award
attorney's fees pursuant to Chapter 9 of the Texas Family Code after the divorce was affirmed on
appeal, but the property division was remanded to the trial court. No. 02-12-00177-CV, Grover C.
Gibson v. Lehoma J. Gibson, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Thomas M.
Michel, Griffith, Jay & Michel, LLP, 2200 Forest Park Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76110, for
Appellee. 2/13/13.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment and denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. No. 02-11-00424-CV, Michael
Cade and Billie Cade v. Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee of the Charles and
Barbara Cosgrove Family Revocable Living Trust, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County,
by Jason Babb, Jenkins Babb, LLP, 2727 LBJ Freeway, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75234, 6/4/12.
Cross Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in holding that “it would be
inequitable and unjust to award attorneys' fees based on the facts in this lawsuit.” No. 02-11-00424CV, Michael Cade and Billie Cade v. Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee of the
Charles and Barbara Cosgrove Family Revocable Living Trust, from the 17th District Court of
Tarrant County, by Ralph H. Duggins, John S. Polzer, Cantey Hanger LLP, 600 West 6th Street,
Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Cross-Appellant. 6/4/12.
Cross-Appellee contends that Cosgrove failed to carry her burden to establish that the trial
court abused its discretion in declining to award attorneys' fees to her. No. 02-11-00424-CV,
Michael Cade and Billie Cade v. Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee of the Charles
and Barbara Cosgrove Family Revocable Living Trust, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Jason Babb, Jenkins Babb, LLP, 2727 LBJ Freeway, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75234,
for Cross Appellee.
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Cross-Appellee contends that Cosgrove failed to carry her burden to establish that the trial
court abused its discretion in declining to award attorneys' fees to her.. No. 02-11-00424-CV,
Michael Cade and Billie Cade v. Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee of the Charles
and Barbara Cosgrove Family Revocable Living Trust, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Jason Babb, Jenkins Babb, LLP, 2727 LBJ Freeway, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75234,
for Cross-Appellee. 7/5/12.
Appellee contends that the trial court did not err in granting Appellee's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds of limitations because Appellants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known of the alleged mistake in the deed in October 2006-more than four
years before Appellants filed this lawsuit. No. 02-11-00424-CV, Michael Cade and Billie Cade v.
Barbara Cosgrove, Individually and as the Trustee of the Charles and Barbara Cosgrove Family
Revocable Living Trust, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Ralph H. Duggins, John
S. Polzer, Cantey Hanger LLP, 600 West 6th Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for
Appellee. 7/5/12.
Bond Forfeiture:
Bailment:
Bill of Review:
Briefing:
Building Construction:
Appellee contends the trial court correctly granted Appellee’s amended motion for summary
judgment. 02-08-00502-CV, Traveller’s Lloyds Insurance Company v. Dyna Ten Corporation, from
the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Samuel J. Polak and Shawn Stewart, Plaza of the
Americas, 700 N. Pearl Street, Suite 500, North Tower, LB 393, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellee.
3/16/09.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s amended motion for summary
judgment. 02-08-00502-CV, Traveller’s Lloyds Insurance Company v. Dyna Ten Corporation, from
the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Jeffrey R. Cagle, 1301 E. Collins, Suite 490,
Richardson, Texas 75081, for Appellant. 2/13/09.
Certificate of Merit:
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss
Starwood’s claims, which this Court previously held were not supported by a sufficient Chapter 150
Certificate of Merit when first filed. No. 02-14-00236-CV, CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC, v. Starwood
Homeowner’s Association, Inc., from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by Bryan
Rutherford, Gregory N. Ziegler, MacDonald Devin, PC, 3800 Renaissance Tower, 1201 Elm Street,
Dallas, Texas 75270, for Appellant. 9/15/14.
Class Action:
The trial court erred by denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Action Certification where, as
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demonstrated by the taxpayers at the hearing, A) the facts pleaded to defeat the jurisdictional
argument during the last appeal were proven to be accurate at the hearing below, supporting an
eventual outcome favoring taxpayers; B) the taxpayers were treated identically by the taxing
authorities at the moment of the legal violation, and thus satisfy the requirements of Rule 42(a) as
well as Rule 42(b)(2) and/or (b)(3), with the opt-out provisions of Rule 42 providing sufficient
protection to those taxpayers wishing not to participate in the class; C) when making payments of
the alleged “taxes,” the taxpayers were collectively under implied economic duress as a matter of
law; thus the “voluntary payment rule” would not apply; and D) the taxing authorities’ illegal
actions take this case outside the context of the usual administrative remedy requirement, leaving
no legal or factual barrier to class certification to class certification. No.02-14-00147-CV, Todd
Brennan, Valerie Smith, Frank Gallison, Nanette Gallison, Rebecca Hanley, Gordon Hiebert,
Kimberly Hiebert, William Hood, Leonila Hood, Layne Kasper, Jessica Kasper, James Kitchen,
Martha Kitchen, Shaun Kretzschmar, Natalie Kretzschmar, Scott Mitchell, Leslie Mitchell, Evan
Peterson, Gayle Peterson, Brian Stagner, Amy Stagner, Steven Tomhave, Jetty Tomhave, Robert
Wood, and Mary Frances Wood, v.. City of Willow Park, Texas, City of Aledo, Texas, Parker County
Appraisal District, Parker County Appraisal Review Board, and Larry Hammonds In His Official
Capacity, from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Joshua W. Carden, Davis Miles
McGuire Gardner, PLLC, 545 E. John Carpenter Freeway, Suite 300, Irving, Texas 75062, for
Appellants. 7/1/14.
Appellee/Appellant contends: Pursuant to Rule 38.2(a)(1)(B) of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Aledo is satisfied with the Taxpayers’ statement of the issue presented in the
classcertification appeal, except for the following: (1) The statement states that facts pled to defeat
the Taxing Entities’ jurisdictional argument were proven at the class certification hearing,
“supporting an eventual outcome favoring taxpayers [Taxpayer’s Br. at 10].” This suggests
establishing jurisdiction equals success on the merits. But in the prior appeal, this Court carefully
limited its holding to jurisdiction, reserving questions about the validity of the taxes. Brennan, 376
S.W.3d at 922 n.9. (2) The statement assumes that because the taxpayers were treated the same at
one specific instant, the requirements of Rule 42(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure are automatically satisfied. (3) The statement assumes that the voluntary payment rule
can never apply and there must always be implied economic duress as a matter of law in the context
of taxes. v The issues presented in the summary-judgment appeal are: I. Were taxes for which
Taxpayers seek a refund rendered invalid or void as a result of the specific procedures or timing for
assessing or noticing taxpayers concerning the disputed property taxes? II. Are the Taxpayers’ equal
protection allegations insufficient as a matter of law when there is a rational basis to not pursue
collection against former owners of subject real property? III. Do the Taxpayers’ due process
allegations fail as a matter of law where there was no lack of notice? IV. Did the chief appraiser
correctly follow Section 25.21 of the Texas Tax Code in back-assessing the disputed taxes?2 2This
Court held that this section does not apply to the situation presented in this case. Brennan, 376
S.W.3d at 918-19. This issue is included in this appeal merely to preserve the issue. No.
02-14-00147-CV, Todd Brennan, Valerie Smith, Frank Gallison, Nanette Gallison, Rebecca Hanley,
Gordon Hiebert, Kimberly Hiebert, William Hood, Leonila Hood, Layne Kasper, Jessica Kasper,
James Kitchen, Martha Kitchen, Shaun Kretzschmar, Natalie Kretzschmar, Scott Mitchell, Leslie
Mitchell, Evan Peterson, Gayle Peterson, Brian Stagner, Amy Stagner, Steven Tomhave, Jetty
Tomhave, Robert Wood, and Mary Frances Wood, v.. City of Willow Park, Texas, City of Aledo,
Texas, Parker County Appraisal District, Parker County Appraisal Review Board, and Larry
Hammonds In His Official Capacity, from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Fredrick
“Fritz” Quast, E. Allen Taylor, Jr. , Taylor, Olson, Adkins, Sralla & Elam, L.L.P. 6000 Western
Place, Suite 200 Fort Worth, Texas 76107-4654, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 8/11/14.
Appellee contends that The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Plaintiff’s’ Motion for Class
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Certification. No.02-14-00147-CV, Todd Brennan, Valerie Smith, Frank Gallison, Nanette
Gallison, Rebecca Hanley, Gordon Hiebert, Kimberly Hiebert, William Hood, Leonila Hood, Layne
Kasper, Jessica Kasper, James Kitchen, Martha Kitchen, Shaun Kretzschmar, Natalie Kretzschmar,
Scott Mitchell, Leslie Mitchell, Evan Peterson, Gayle Peterson, Brian Stagner, Amy Stagner, Steven
Tomhave, Jetty Tomhave, Robert Wood, and Mary Frances Wood, v.. City of Willow Park, Texas,
City of Aledo, Texas, Parker County Appraisal District, Parker County Appraisal Review Board,
and Larry Hammonds In His Official Capacity, from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by
Judith A. Hargrove, Hargrove & Evans, LLP, 4425 MoPac South, Building 3, Suite 400, Austin,
Texas 78735, for Appellees City of Willow Park, et al. 8/13/14.
Closing Argument:
Concealed Handgun License:
Collateral Estoppel:
Collections and Repossession:
Appellants contend that: (1) the jury charge on Appellants' unreasonable collection efforts
claim was incorrect because it was based upon an improper definition and therefore increased the
burden of proof required Appellants; (2) Appellants presented sufficient evidence to support a
finding that Appellee's collection efforts met the definition of "efforts which an ordinary person of
ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care on his or her part would not have exercised under
the same or similar circumstances; (3) the Court erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Directed
Verdict against Appellants on their claim for negligent misrepresentation; (4) the Court erred in
granting final judgment in favor of Appellee on all of Appellants' claims since Appellants' claim for
anticipatory breach of contract was not presented to the jury or dismissed via the Motion for
Directed Verdict; (4) the Court erred in submitting the charge to the jury without instructions,
standards, definitions and questions related to Appellants' breach of contract claim regarding waiver.
No. 02-12-00013-CV, Robert Defranceschi and Elena Riedo v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC fka GMAC
Mortgage Corporation, from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by J. B. Peacock, Jr.,
Cynthia K. Shanklin, David M. Vereeke, Tracy M. Turner, Gagnon, Pfacock, Shanklin & Vereeke,
P.C., 4245 N. Central Expressway, Suite 250, Lock Box 104, Dallas, Texas 75205, for Appellants.
4/19/12.
Collective Bargaining:
Condemnation:
Appellants address the following issues: Does the deposit of an award determined in the
administrative phase of a condemnation proceeding allow a condemnor to take possession of the
property sought to be condemned under Tex. Prop. Code § 21.021 during the pendency of the
appellate/litigation phase of the condemnation proceeding where: (A) during the administrative
phase the condemnor did not have the authority to exercise of the power of eminent domain pursuant
to Tex. Transp. Code § 224.003; and (B) the commissioners did not issue a notice setting the hearing
and the condemnee was not served with a notice of hearing in accordance with Tex. Prop. §§ 21.015
and 21.016 of the time and place of the commissioners’ hearing at which evidence was heard and
the award made, although the condemnees were served with notice of a previously set hearing,
which was not convened? No. 02-14-00178-CV, Kenneth Russell and Teresa Russell v. The State
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of Texas and Tarrant County, Texas, from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Tarrant County, by
Ross T. Foster, Foster & Sear, 9001 Airport Freeway, Suite 675, Fort Worth, Texas 76180, for
Appellants. 7/2/14.
Appellees address the following: Did the trial court judge abuse her discretion in denying
a property owner’s application for a temporary injunction to enjoin the State of Texas from taking
possession of condemned property when the evidence showed that: (A) a municipality consented
to the county exercising its power of eminent domain on behalf of the State of Texas within the city
limits both before and after the county initiated the proceedings against the property owner; and (B)
the property owner had been properly served with notice of a commissioners hearing, but the hearing
did not convene because the property owner requested that the commissioners reschedule the hearing
for a later date, and then the property owner chose not to attend the rescheduled hearing even though
the property owner knew the time and place of the hearing? No. 02-14-00178-CV, Kenneth Russell
and Teresa Russell v. The State of Texas and Tarrant County, Texas, from the County Court at Law
No. 3 of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., William T. Higgins V, Tarrant County District
Attorney’s Office, Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center, 401 West Belknap, 9th Floor, Fort Worth,
Appellant contends that: I. The trial court erred in overruling the City's defense that
Appellee's claim of inverse condemnation was barred by the statute of limitations. II. The City
proved as a matter of law that the entire road was impliedly dedicated to the public. III. The
Appellee failed to prove all of the elements necessary to sustain its inverse condemnation claim. IV.
The Trial Court erred in granting the Appellee's Declaratory Judgment Action. V. The award of
damages was against the weight of evidence and the law. VI. The Trial Court improperly presented
questions of law to the jury. VII. Appellee is not entitled, under the pleadings and evidence, to
recover attorney fees. No. 02-13-00461-CV, City of Justin, Texas, v. Rimrock Enterprises, Inc.,
from the Probate Court of Denton County, by Robert E. Hager, Nichols, Jackson, Dillard, Hager &
Smith, L.L.P., 1800 Ross Tower, 500 N. Akard Street, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 5/7/14.
Appellee addresses the following issues: (1) Inverse Condemnation — Did the trial court
properly rule that the City of Justin’s acts in building a concrete road over chip-seal road,
constructing drainage ditches on each side of the road, and installing a water-and-sewer line, across
the eastern side of Rimrock’s 2.17-acre parcel constituted a taking as a matter of law? (2) Implied
Dedication — Where the evidence was that Rimrock and Rimrock’s predecessors at most acquiesced
to their employees’ and neighbors’ use of the portion of Colorado Avenue that ran as a gravel, and,
later, a chip-seal road across the eastern side of Rimrock’s parcel and that Rimrock never had a
donative intent with respect to any portion of its lot, did the jury err in finding that any of the parcel
had been impliedly dedicated to public use? (3) Square Footage of Road Dedicated— Assuming for
argument’s sake that some of Rimrock’s parcel was impliedly dedicated, where the evidence was
that Rimrock’s parcel was 473 feet long on the eastern side, the chip-seal road ran the length of the
parcel and was 12–15 feet wide, did the jury properly find that 7,095 square feet (473’ x 15’ = 7,095
sq. ft.) was impliedly dedicated? (4) Square Footage of Road not so Dedicated— Where the
evidence was that the final, post-taking road and ditches were 473 feet long and 60 feet wide, and
that 7,095 square feet were impliedly dedicated as a public road, did the jury Brief of Appellee
Rimrock Enterprises, Inc. – Page 6 properly find that the remaining 21,285 square feet (473’ x 60’
= 28,380 sq. ft.; 28,380 sq. ft. – 7,095 sq. ft. = 21,285 sq. ft., or 473’ x 45’ = 21,285 sq. ft.) were not
impliedly dedicated as a public road? (5) Date of the Taking — Where the eye-witness testimony
was that the City started construction on the concrete road, ditches, and water-and-sewer line on
June 15, 2009, did the jury properly find that the date of the taking was June 15, 2009? (6) Damages
— Where the trial court asked the jury to find the fair market value of the property taken and the
damages to Rimrock’s remaining property resulting from the taking and the jury’s findings fell
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within the range of the experts’ valuation opinions, was the compensatory-damages award proper?
(7) Declaratory Judgment Action — Did the trial court properly use the Declaratory Judgments Act
and jury questions to determine easement issues and the boundaries of the chip-seal road impliedly
dedicated for public use and the boundaries of the part of Rimrock’s parcel taken by inverse
condemnation? (8) Attorney’s Fees and Expenses — Where the evidence showed that Rimrock
reasonably and necessarily incurred $169,622 in attorney’s fees and expenses on UDJA claims in
over four years of litigation and seven days of trial, did the trial court abuse its discretion in
awarding Rimrock $42,000 in attorney’s fees and $8,400 in expenses? No. 02-13-00461-CV, City
of Justin, Texas, v. Rimrock Enterprises, Inc., from the Probate Court of Denton County, by Michael
F. Pezzulli, Christopher L. Barnes, Pezzulli Barnes, LLP, 17300 Preston Road, Suite 220, Dallas,
Texas 75252, for Appellee. 8/20/14.
Appellees contend that: (1) the court properly found that, based upon the circumstances, the
mailing of notice of filing of the commissioners' award only to a party, pursuant to the direction of
the condemnor, was insufficient and therefore the deadline to file objections was tolled and therefore
the condemnees objections were timely filed. The identity of the condemnees' attorney was known
by the condemnor at all relevant times, and that issue is therefore irrelevant; and (2) the court
properly found that, based upon the circumstances, the mailing of notice of filing of the
commissioners' award only to a party, pursuant to the direction of the condemnor, was insufficient
and therefore the deadline to file objections was tolled and therefore the condemnees objections
were timely filed. No. 02-13-00071-CV, Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC v. Carl
Brockriede, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by John M. Lane, Four Eureka
Circle, Wichita Falls, Texas 76308, for Appellees. 6/10/13.
Appellant replies that Appellees never directly address the issues with respect to construction
of the statutes at issue. Instead, they argue that regardless of what section 21.049 says and the clerk's
compliance with its language, Oncor was responsible for providing notice of the filing awards to
Appellees' counsel and because it failed to do so, this Court should recognize an equitable exception
and hold their objections were timely. Neither the law, nor the facts of this case support their
position. No. 02-13-071-CV, Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC v. Carl H. Brockriede, from
the County Court at Law No. 1, Wichita County, by Joann N. Wilkins/R. Scott Moran, Burford &
Ryburn, L.L.P., 3100 Lincoln Plaza, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 6/28/13.
Confidential Information:
Construction Contract:
Construction and Engineering:
Consumer:
Continuance:
Contracts:
Appellant addresses: 1- Whether The Evidence Is Legally And Factually Insufficient To
Prove That Appellee Has Rendered Services For Client Of Appellant. 2- Whether The Evidence Is
Legally And Factually Insufficient To Support A Finding That The Appellant Has Breached The
Contract And If Appellant Has, Whether the Breach Was Material. 3- Whether Appellee Cannot
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Recover as a Matter of Law As There Was No Finding of Materiality of Breach of Appellant, Nor
Was There A Finding on Material Breach By Appellee Which Would have Excused Performance.
And Whether Conclusion Of Law #19, 21, And 22 Are Supported By Proper Findings And Are
Correct. 4- Whether The Award has No Support in Evidence As No Evidence Was Provided that
Expenses Were Reasonable and Necessary, Or that They Fall Under the Protection of the LOP. 5Whether Appellant is Entitled to Attorney Fees as He Has Made an Excessive Demand on Appellant
Repudiating the Agreed Reduction Not Allowing Appellant Statutory Time to Pay. 6- Whether The
Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The BillingOf The Attorney At Trial. And Whether The
Admission Of Billing Was Harmful And Led To An Improper Judgment and Whether Attorney Fees
Were Not Reasonable. No. 02-14-00140-CV, Azzam Hussami v. Clear Sky MRI and Dignostice
Centr at Denton, Inc., from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Denton County, by Azzam Hussami,
702 Dalworth, Grand Prairie, Dallas, Texas 75247, for Appellant, Pro Se. 7/16/14.
Appellant addresses the following issues: 1. The jury found that Cole Morgan breached
various contractual duties to AZZ, but awarded $0 in damages. Did AZZ conclusively establish
$454,000 in past lost profits? Alternatively, is the jury’s $0 award against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit harmful error
in the court’s charge by refusing to submit the well-accepted general fiduciary duties adopted at
common law in favor of a few narrowly tailored duties of loyalty? 3. Under either the charge as
given or the correct legal standard, did the evidence conclusively establish that Morgan breached
fiduciary duties owed to AZZ? Alternatively, is the jury’s finding that Morgan did not breach
fiduciary duties against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence? No. 02-14-00097-CV,
AZZ Incorporated and AZZ Group, L.P., v. Michael Coleman Morgan, Boyce Galvanizing, LLC, and
Big Spring Holdings, LLC, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Matthew D. Stayton,
Chris E. Howe, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas
Appellees address the following issues: ISSUE ONE: Whether AZZ conclusively
established its damages as a matter of law where AZZ failed to prove any causal connection between
Cole Morgan’s breach of contract and AZZ’s alleged damages and given the fact that AZZ’s
damages expert offered unreliable and incompetent testimony. Alternatively, whether the jury’s zero
damages award is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. ISSUE TWO:
Whether any alleged charge error with respect to the liability instruction on AZZ’s breach of
fiduciary duty claim constitutes harmless error because the jury awarded zero damages. ISSUE
THREE: Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the limited fiduciary duties owed
by an at-will employee to his employer. Alternatively, whether AZZ preserved charge error. ISSUE
FOUR: Whether the jury’s finding that Morgan did not breach any fiduciary duty to AZZ is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. CONDITIONAL CROSS POINT: Whether the
jury’s breach of contract findings are supported by sufficient evidence. No. 02-14-00097-CV, AZZ
Incorporated and AZZ Group, L.P., v. Michael Coleman Morgan, Boyce Galvanizing, LLC, and Big
Spring Holdings, LLC, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr.,
Andrea W. Paris, Brackett & Ellis, P.C., 100 Main Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees.
Appellant replies that: the Summary Judgment Evidence Clearly Defined the Formation,
Terms, Myers’ Agreement To, Hawkins Full Performance Under, and Myers’ Breach Of, the
Contract Between Hawkins and Myers; the Statute of Frauds Does Not Render the Contract
Unenforceable; the Trial Court’s Sanctions Order Against Hawkins must Be Vacated. No.
02-14-00123-CV, John Hawkins v. Angela Myers, from the 158th District Court of Denton County,
by Gregory P. Standerfer, Standerfer Law Firm, P.C., 700 N. Carroll Ave., Suite 140, Southlake,
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Appellee addresses: 1. No Contract Formation; 2. Oral Contract violates Statute of Frauds;
3. Summary Judgment properly decided; and 4. Sanction not abuse of discretion. No.
02-14-00123-CV, John Hawkins v. Angela Myers, from the 158th District Court of Denton County,
by Cameron J. Cox, Elsey & Elsey, 3212 Long Prairie Road, Suite 200, Flower Mound, Texas
75022, for Appellee. 7/14/14.
Appellant contends that: Point of Error No. 1: The Trial Court erred as a matter of law as
there is legally insufficient evidence supporting the Trial Court’s finding that INOVA failed to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, it is owed further payment of monies, and to the contrary
the uncontroverted evidence establishes INOVA’s right to recovery. (see CR 45-46, 47-48, 49-50,
51-58, and 59). Point of Error No. 2: The finding by the Trial Court that INOVA failed to prove, by
preponderance of the evidence, that it is owed any further payment of monies, and which resulted
in a take nothing judgment, (CR 49-50) is not supported by factually sufficient evidence such that
when the entire record and uncontroverted evidence is considered is so against the great weight of
the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. BRIEF OF APPELLANT– Page
3 of 21 Point of Error No. 3: This Court should reverse the take nothing Judgment of the Trial Court
as to INOVA and render Judgment as the Trial Court should have in INOVA’s favor the amount
owed for work done, attorney’s fees and interest (See CR 51-58). No. 02-13-00397-CV, Inova
Renovations, L.L.C., v. Mindy and David Jones, from the Tarrant County Court at Law No. 1, by
Philip D. Collins, Craig J. Luffy, Philip D. Collins & Associates, P.C., 7557 Rambler Road, Suite
930, Dallas, Texas 75231, for Appellant. 4/28/14.
Appellant contends that: Issue No. 1 The pay applications’ verbiage didn’t constitute a false
representation. Issue No. 2 Kent’s equal access to the subcontractor information is fatal to his fraud
claim. Issue No. 3 Kent did not justifiably rely on the pay applications because of his existing
contract rights. Issue No. 4 Kent adduced no evidence of Alexander’s intention at the outset of the
contract not to perform. Issue No. 5 No individual liability for fraud arises because the pay
applications weren’t Keith Alexander’s own statements. Issue No. 6 The evidence supporting the
trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees is both factually and legally insufficient. Issue No. 7 The
evidence supporting the amount of Kent’s actual damages award is factually insufficient. No.
02-13-00469-CV, Keith B. Alexander v. Eddie Kent, from the 141st District Court of Tarrant County,
by Peter Smythe, Peter Smythe, PC, 835 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 264, Arlington, Texas 76011, for
Appellant. 4/14/14.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to promptly
dispose of this case, and by disregarding undisputed evidence. No. 02-13-00143-CV, Larry Cabelka
v. Kelly Eugene Schmaltz, Eric Schmaltz and Kyle Schmaltz, from the 97th District Court of Archer
County, by R. B. Morris, P.O. Box 1065, Archer City, Texas 76351, for Appellant. 8/6/13.
Appellant contends that The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion For summary
judgment in the following respects: (1) at most, Appellees were entitled only to a partial summary
judgment; (2) it determined that Texas law, and not Michigan law, was the appropriate choice of
law; (3) it found Gutierrez's non-solicitation covenant with Ally is unenforceable because it is overly
broad in scope; (4) it found Gutierrez's non-solicitation covenant with Ally is unenforceable because
it does not protect a business interest of Ally; (5) it found that Ally waived its right to enforce the
Non-Solicitation Covenant; (6) it found that Gutierrez did not solicit, and/or "employ," any former
Ally employees; (7) it determined that Homeward and Gutierrez did not tortiously interfere with
employment relations of certain Ally employees; (8) it found that Homeward could not be liable for
tortious interference with a contract that is unenforceable; (9) it found that interference by Gutierrez
was legally justified; and (10) it found that Ally's conspiracy claims against Appellees fail as a
matter of law. No. 02-13-00108-CV, Ally Financial, Inc., v. Sandra Gutierrez and Homeward
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Residential, Inc., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Michael J. DePonte, Allyson L.
Johnson, Jackson Lewis LLP, 500 North Akard, Suite 2500, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant.
7/14/13.
Appellant replies that: (1) Appellees concede that they did not move for summary judgment
on Appellant’s claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition; (2) The trial
court erred when it determined that Texas law, and not Michigan law, was the appropriate choice
of law; (3) Even if Gutierrez’s Agreement is Subject to Texas law, the Agreement is Not Subject to
§ 15.50; (4) Contrary to Appellees’ contentions, Gutierrez’s non-solicitation covenant with Ally is
not overly broad in scope; (5) Gutierrez’s non-solicitation covenant with Ally protects legitimate
business interests of Ally; (6) Ally did not waive its right to enforce the Non-Solicitation Covenant;
(7) At a minimum, Ally has raised a question of fact as to whether Gutierrez solicited, and/or
“employs,” any former Ally employees; (8) Homeward and Gutierrez tortiously interfered with
employment relations of certain Ally employees; (9) Appellant Has Shown Interference with
Contract; (10) Ally’s conspiracy claims remain viable claims and reversal of summary judgment is
appropriate. No. 02-13-00108-CV, Ally Financial, Inc., v. Sandra Gutierrez and Homeward
Residential, Inc., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Michael J. DePonte, Allyson L.
Johnson, Jackson Lewis LLP, 500 North Akard, Suite 2500, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant.
10/16/13.
Appellant addresses whether: (1) Frontier Northwest, a named corporation, had standing to
bring a contract suit when it was a party to the contract and, additionally, the undisputed language
of an assignment gave Frontier Northwest the right to sue and recover from D.R. Horton; (2) the trial
court erred in holding that D.R. Horton did not breach the Marketing Contract in the face of
substantial evidence that D.R. Horton improperly submitted and received commission payments for
vacant lots, unsold homes, and homes sold prior to the execution of the Marketing Contract; (3) the
trial court properly granted summary judgment to D.R. Horton on its affirmative defenses of waiver,
voluntary payment, and course of performance when the evidence showed that Frontier Northwest
did not intentionally or knowingly accept and pay for address submissions that violated the
Marketing Contract; and (4) the trial court rendered an improper judgment by failing to exclude (1)
a witness's testimony based solely upon hearsay, (2) testimony about the internal procedures of a
company for whom the witness never worked, (3) evidence about irrelevant transactions, and (4) a
witness's interpretation of the meaning of the unambiguous Marketing Contract. No. 02-13-00037CV, Frontier Communications Northwest Inc. v. D.R. Horton, Inc; D.R. Horton Los Angeles
Holding Company, Inc; Western Pacific Housing, Inc, SSHI, LLC; and D.R. Horton Inc - Portland,,
from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Darren L. McCarty, Alston & Bird LLP, 2828
N. Harwood St., Suite 1800, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 4/12/13.
Appellant contends that the Trial Court committed error in rendering the final judgment: (1)
by denying Kim's motion to disregard the jury's findings to special issue 17 (damages) as it was
rendered immaterial because the jury found Sanchez failed to comply with two of the agreements,
and then enter judgment on the remaining findings; (2) when it granted Sanchez' motion to disregard
special issues 26 and 29 (findings that Sanchez failed to comply with two of the agreements) and
then entering judgment on the remaining issues; (3) when it awarded Sanchez $1,000 in damages
for removing and relocating a door when no liability questions were asked about whether there was
an agreement between Kim and Sanchez and the jury never found any agreement or breach of such
agreement; and (4) in allowing testimony of attorney's fees as such testimony was required to be
excluded and then in denying Kim's motion to disregard jury finding 19. No. 02-12-00465-CV, Kim
Kyongnam and Isis A to Z Bridal Formal, Inc. v. Antonio Sanchez d/b/a as D & C Construction,
from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Tarrant County, by Steve Snelson, Gerstle, Minissale &
Snelson, LLP, 5005 Greenville Avenue, Suite 200, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellants. 2/19/13.
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Appellants address whether: (1) Appellee's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches when
it filed suit more than 17 months after the final contract closing, even though the purchase contracts
which form the basis of Appellee's claims expressly provide that all representations, warranties,
covenants, and agreements contained in those contracts survived each closing for only one year; (2)
the trial court awarded exemplary damages in this breach of contract case against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence when the alleged representation was not even contained in the
Phase I Contract, when the value of the alleged misrepresentation was a mere fraction of the overall
contract price on the Phase II Contact, and when the record contains uncontroverted evidence of
Appellants' performance up until the point of Appellee's refusal to complete its performance under
the Phase II Contract; and (3) Did the trial court wrongfully deny The Rosebud Development, Ltd.
's breach of contract counterclaim even though the record contains uncontroverted evidence of
Appellee's failure to purchase all of the lots contemplated by the Phase II Contract and
uncontroverted evidence of Appellant's consequent damages. No. 02-12-00362-CV, Ronald B.
“Bud” Forman, Arbors Development, LLC, nnd the Rosebud Development, Ltd., v. Classic Century
Homes, Ltd., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by David L. Pratt, II, Paul C. Goetz, III,
Decker, Jones, McMackin, McClane, Hall & Bates, P.C., Burnett Plaza, Suite 2000, 801 Cherry
Street, Unit 46, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellants. 2/19/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) tile trial court correctly determined that Appellants failed to
establish a defense of laches as to the statutory fraud claim because appellee filed suit within six
months of discovering the fraud and the contractual limitations of remedy does not apply; (2) the
trial court correctly awarded exemplary Damages because appellants, by and through Ronald B.
Foreman, knowingly misrepresented that water tap fees had been paid in order to get "reimbursed"
at each and every closing; the trial court correctly denied rosebud's breach of contract counterclaim
because rosebud failed to prove that the contract was enforceable except as to those lots actually
closed, failed to prove its performance because the lots were not "Substantially complete" and
appellee proved that Rosebud had previously breached the contract and committed fraud. No. 02-1200362-CV, Ronald B. “Bud” Forman, Arbors Development, LLC, and the Rosebud Development,
Ltd., v. Classic Century Homes, Ltd., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Daniel A.
Foster, Anthony N. Pettitt, Joseph R. Kimball II, 5001 Hwy. 287 South, Suite 105, Arlington, Texas
76017, for Appellee.
Appellant contends that: (1) 1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to WB;
(2) WB failed to establish that the merger doctrine bars the breach of contract claim as a matter of
law, and/or the Grosses presented more than a scintilla of evidence that raised genuine issues of
material fact as to whether an exception to the merger doctrine applies to preclude summary
judgment; the Grosses presented more than a scintilla of evidence that raised genuine issues of
material fact as to whether WB breached the lot purchase agreement (the only element challenged
by WB on grounds of no evidence); (3) The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to WB
because it failed to establish as a matter of law that an "as is" clause in the Special Warranty Deed
negated causation for the Grosses' claims. Altematively, the Grosses established that the "as is"
clause did not apply to their claims or is unenforceable, or, at the least, the Grosses presented more
than a scintilla of evidence that raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether the "as is" clause
applied to their claims, based on the totality of the circumstances; (4) The trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to WB on their negligence claims. First, as a matter of law, the
economic loss rule does not bar the negligence or negligent misrepresentation claims. Second, the
Grosses presented more than a scintilla of evidence that raised genuine issues of material fact on the
two elements of their negligent misrepresentation claim challenged by WB (as well as the other
elements). Third, the existence of a written contract does not bar the Grosses' negligent
misrepresentation claim. No. 02-12-00411-CV, Kenneth P. Gross and Besty L. Gross v. WB Texas
Resort Communities, L.P., from the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, by R. Brent Cooper,
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Gordon K. Wright, Michelle E. Roberson, Jana Starling Reist, Cooper & Scully, P.C., 900 Jackson
Street, Suite 100, Dallas, Texas 75202, for Appellants. 1/13/13.
Appellees contend that summary judgment was proper because: (1) the merger doctrine and
parol evidence rule bar the Grosses' breach of contract claim; (2) the contract's "as is" clause negates
causation, and the Grosses failed to raise any genuine, material facts issues; (3) the economic loss
rule bars the Grosses' negligence claims; (4) the Grosses failed to raise genuine, material fact issues
with respect to their negligent misrepresentation claim. No. 02-12-00411-CV, Kenneth P. Gross
and Besty L. Gross v. WB Texas Resort Communities, L.P., from the 141st District Court of Tarrant
County, by John S. Kenefick, Bryan Rutherford, Jason M. Jung, MacDonald Devin, PC, 3800
Renaissance Tower, 1201 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75270, for Appellees. 4/13/13.
Appellants address whether the trial court erred in (1) denying defendants' motion for
judgment on plaintiffs' breach of contract claim at the close of the plaintiffs' case and failing to
render a judgment in favor of the defendants; (2) by awarding a remedy (i.e., rescission) when the
plaintiffs failed to establish the elements of any legal claim that could support such a remedy (e.g.,
fraud, mutual mistake, breach of contract) as a matter of law; and (3) in (1) rescinding a valid
contract and (2) awarding damages to the plaintiffs under an unjust enrichment theory that was not
pleaded, proven, or addressed by either party during the trial. No. 02-12-00471-CV, Main Street
Schools, L.L.C., d/b/a Montessori Country Day School and William J. Versterman v. Jason and Lori
Bimmerle, from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Denton County, by Michael B. Regitz, Dustin M.
Mauck, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800, Dallas, Texas 75201, for
Appellees contend that Appellants waived any complaint regarding sufficiency of the
pleadings, and Appellees demonstrated their right to judgment. No. 02-12-00471-CV, Main Street
Schools, L.L.C., d/b/a Montessori Country Day School and William J. Versterman v. Jason and Lori
Bimmerle, from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Denton County, by Michael Hassett, Jones
Hassett, P.C., 440 North Center, Arlington, Texas 76011, for Appellees. Approx. Week of 3/1/13.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred: (1) in holding as a matter of law that the
parties failed to reach a binding agreement on the material and essential terms for a long-term
insurance-funded redemption agreement for McCoy's remaining shares of stock as part of the
recapitalization transaction in June of 2008; (2) in finding as a matter of law that the short-term,
interim agreements signed by the parties in March 2010 and August 2010 precluded Appellant from
establishing the existence of a binding long-term redemption agreement; (3) when it granted
summary judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of contract based upon Appellee's reduction of
Appellant's compensation package in November 2010 when it was undisputed that Appellant
continued to serve as the Chairman of Appellee's Board of the Directors at the time and Appellee
did not obtain Appellant's consent to the change in his compensation terms as required under
Paragraph 6.7 of the Subordinated Loan Agreement; (4) in dismissing Appellant’s claims for
specific performance, a permanent injunction, and recovery of attorney’s fees; and (5) when it
sustained Appellee’s objections to certain portions of McCoy’s summary judgment affidavits as
“vague and conclusory.” No. 02-12-00200-CV, Thomas G. McCoy v. Alden Industries, Inc., from
the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Marshall Searcy, Kelly, Hart & Hallman, LP, 201
Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and W. Scott Hastings, Brendan Gaffney, Locke
Lord LLP, 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 7/23/12.
Appellant replies that: (1) Alden's Attempt to Avoid the Insurance-Funded Redemption
Agreement is Based on Revisionist History; (2) The Interim, "Temporary" Agreements Do Not Void
the Prior Transaction; and (3) Alden Was Also Bound to Provide McCoy with His Compensation
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Package. No. 02-12-00200-CV, Thomas G. McCoy v. Alden Industries, Inc., from the 48th District
Court of Tarrant County, by Marshall Searcy, Kelly, Hart & Hallman, LP, 201 Main Street, Suite
2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and W. Scott Hastings, Brendan Gaffney, Locke Lord LLP, 2200
Ross Avenue, Suite 2200, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 9/25/12.
Appellant addresses whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether: (1) there
was a fully formed and enforceable contract, and that contract had third-party beneficiaries between;
(2) full or partial performance of that contract takes out of the statute of frauds; (3) Appellee XTO
is estopped to assert the statute of frauds; (4) Appellants are entitled to specific performance or benefit
of the bargain damages for Appellee XTO's breach of its contract; (5) the elements of Appellants’ claim
for the independent tort of promissory estoppel and claim of negligent misrepresentation exist; and (6)
Appellee Eastern Express' property is in SEACTX. Additionally, Appellants address whether, as potential
sellers of mineral interest estates, they have standing to bring a claim under the Texas Free Enterprise &
Antitrust Act. 02-10-00395-CV, 02-10-00396-CV, and NO. 02-10-00377-CV, Eastern Express, L.P., v.
XTO Energy, Inc, et al, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Christopher A. Payne, Law
Offices of Christopher A. Payne, PLLC, 5055 Addison Circle, Unit 428, Addison, TX 75001, Dean A.
Riddle, Riddle & Williams, P.C., 3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1400 - Regency Plaza, Dallas, TX 75219,
Mark M. Donheiser, Randal Mathis, Mathis & Donheiser, P.C., 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2575 Dallas,
TX 75201, Kip Petroff, Petroff & Associates, 3838 Oak Lawn Avenue. Suite 1124, Dallas, TX 75219, for
Appellant. 3/11/11.
Conversion:
Appellants contend that the trial court: (1) did not have subject matter jurisdiction of the
conversion claim that was submitted to the jury because that claim, which belonged to the corporation and
was only the corporation's right to bring, was extinguished as of March 26, 2007, which is three years after
the corporation's charter was forfeited; (2) the trial court should not have granted judgment for damages
of $80,000 for conversion because there was no proper proof of damages, the evidence which was
presented was legally and factually insufficient to prove the actual amount of damages and the fair market
value of the property allegedly converted; (3) the trial court should not have allowed testimony and
exhibits into evidence of the prior proceeding between the parties, the bankruptcy of Appellant, the sale
of Appellant's businesses years later and other events not related to the transaction being tried. No. 02-1200178-CV, Mohammed Alsheikh v. Murjan Altawil, by Bruce L. Mansfield, 1550 N. Norwood Drive, Ste.
107, Hurst, Texas 76054, for Appellant. 9/18/12.
Appellee contends that: (1) Altawil was entitled to bring his claims, they were not barred; (2)
Sufficient Evidence Exists to Support the Award of Damages; and (3) Evidence at trial was properly
admitted. No. 02-12-00178-CV, Mohammed Alsheikh v. Murjan Altawil, by Mike Windsor, Jeffrey N.
Kaitcer, Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs, Windsor, Lawrence & Wo1ffarth, P.C., P.O. Box
100609, Fort Worth, Texas 76185-0609, for Appellee. Week of 10/29/12.
In an amended brief, Appellee addresses whether: (1) the fact that the evidence at trial was
controverted establish a claim for legal or factual sufficiency; and (2) evidence of the recent purchase price
of equipment in the days prior to the conversion of the equipment be sufficient evidence to support a
judgment for damages. 02-11-00029-CV, Wesley Henson v. Allen Reddin, from the County Court at Law
of Wise County, by Jason P. Hartman, Bishop & Bishop, P.O. Box 809, Decatur, Texas 76234, for
Appellee. 8/1/11.
Corporate Capacity:
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Court Costs:
County Commissioners:
Covenant Not to Compete:
Damages:
Appellant contends that: 1. The trial court erred in awarding judgment by subtracting the answer
to one jury question from the answer to another jury question, thus coming up with a judgment of
negative/zero damages when Appellant was actually entitled to judgment for the full amount of the
remaining debt as found by the jury. 2. Upon reversal, Appellant is entitled to recover its attorney's fees
as found by the jury, and they should be rendered as part of this Court's judgment. No. 02-14-00149-CV,
Plains Capital Bank v. Nitin Jani, from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by James A. Pikl,
Patrick J. Schurr, Sheef & Stone, LLP, 2601 Network Blvd., Suite 102, Frisco, Texas 75034, for
Appellant. 8/8/14.
Appellee contends: Issue No. 1: The Trial Court did not err by offsetting Damage Question No.
2 with Damage Question No. 5 because the jury found that PlainsCapital Bank failed to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner; Issue No. 2: PlainsCapital Bank has waived its right to
request the Trial Court disregard Questions Number 2 and Question No. 5 because PlainsCapital failed
to move to disregard either Question until it submitted its Brief in this appeal; Issue No. 3: Attorneys fees
are not properly awarded to PlainsCapital Bank as it was not the prevailing party at trial and has neither
segregated its fees nor demonstrated that its fees are warranted based on the result obtained by
PlainsCapital Bank; Issue No. 4: PlainsCapital Bank’s sole witness as to attorneys fees should not have
been allowed to testify as PlainsCapital Bank failed to fully disclose the basis for the witness’s testimony
and the testimony was timely objected to at trial. No. 02-14-00149-CV, Plains Capital Bank v. Nitin Jani,
from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by Roger M. Yale, Yale Law, 1417 E. McKinney Street,
Suite 220, Denton, Texas 76209. 9/25/14.
Appellants address the following: 1. Under controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent, a
property owner may testify as to the value of his property only if he has a factual basis to support that
testimony. Here, the owner of a hat company testified that the inventory he had purchased for $350,000
two years previously was somehow worth $13.5 million just before .and zero after .smoke from a wildfire
blew into the factory and storage buildings where the inventory had been sitting. The owner’s testimony
was based on his “experience” and on undisclosed “invoices.” Is this legally and factually sufficient
evidence to support a damages finding of over $13 million for lost market value? (Challenging FF # 56,
57, and 64) 2. The proper measure of damages for injury to or destruction of personal property is loss of
market value, unless the property has no ascertainable market value. The trial court found that there was
no evidence of market value, yet also made findings of the inventory’s market value before and after the
fire. The court also made findings about the inventory’s replacement value and concluded that replacement
value was the proper measure of damages. a. Did the trial court apply the correct measure of damages?
(Challenging FF # 64 and CL # 6 and 10) b. Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence to support
the findings regarding market value and replacement value or to support the judgment based on those
findings? (Challenging FF # 36–41, 53, 55–58, 63, and 64, and CL # 6, 7, and 10) c. Are the opinions of
American Hat’s expert, Steve Startz, reliable and do they constitute any evidence to support the damages
findings? Did the trial court err by permitting Startz to testify about market value despite not being
designated to opine on that issue and not being qualified? 3. Lost profits are generally not recoverable for
damage to inventory, and in any event must be proved by one complete calculation with reasonable
certainty. Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the findings and judgment for lost
profits? (Challenging FF # 42–52, and CL # 8 and 11) Does the award of lost profits in this case constitute
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an improper double recovery? 14 4. American Hat recovered approximately $2.6 million from its insurer,
Travelers, and subsequently Wise settled with Travelers and obtained an assignment of Travelers’ priority
claim. The trial court correctly ruled that Wise is entitled to an offset of $2.6 million. Because there is no
evidence of any damages beyond $2.6 million, is Wise entitled to a take-nothing judgment? 5. The trial
court found that the negligence of Wise was the sole cause of the fire and of the damages to American Hat.
Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence to support these findings? (Challenging FF # 12, 13,
15(2)1, 19, 20–25, and 39, and CL # 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8) 6. American Hat sought and obtained an appraisal
award from its insurer that it suffered a “Business Profit Loss” of approximately $330,000 as a result of
the November 2005 fire. This award was later confirmed in a judgment, at American Hat’s request. In an
attempt to enforce this judgment against Wise (who was not a party to the appraisal proceeding), American
Hat unequivocally stated that the damages in this case were essential to the other judgment and were fully
and fairly litigated in that proceeding. Is American Hat estopped from recovering more than the appraisal
award for its lost profits? (Challenging CL # 12 and 13) 7. Did this Court err when it (a) reversed and
remanded an unchallenged jury award of $270,000 for American Hat’s lost profits in the original jury trial,
and (b) reversed and remanded an award of $95,000 for decreased market value based on contrary
evidence that did not constitute any evidence of the inventory’s market value? Is Wise entitled to
reinstatement of these jury findings and a take-nothing judgment because they are less than Wise’s offset?
No. 02-13-00439-CV, American Hat Company v. Wise Electric Cooperative, Inc., from the 97th District
Court of Montague County, by David Keltner, KELLY HART & HALLMAN, LLP. 201 Main Street,
Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, T. B. Nicholas, Jr., DOWNS & STANFORD, P.C., 2001 Bryan
Street, Suite 4000, Dallas, Texas 75201, Michael Choyke, Thomas C. Wright, Andrea G. Tindall,
WRIGHT&CLOSE, LLP, One Riverway, Suite 2200, Houston, TX 77056, for Appellant. 4/25/14.
Appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the monetary
judgment in favor of the Appellee. No. 02-13-00392-CV, GM Metal, Inc., v. JP Environmental Recycling,
LLC, from the 89th District Court of Wichita County, by Stephen R. Bjordammen, 710 Lamar, Ste. 440,
Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for Appellant. 4/16/14.
Debt:
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellee. 02-10-00373-CV, Law Office of David E. Williams, II, P.C., v. Fort Worth Texas Magazine
Venture, L.P., from the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Jerry J. Jarzombek, PLLC, 714 W.
Magnolia Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellant. 2/22/11.
Appellee contends that: (1) the record does not support Appellant's complaint the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because Appellant did not preserve error as it did not obtain a record of the
hearing on its plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the HB affidavit together with its attached exhibits proved that
Appellant owed Appellee $3000 for the advertisement published in Fort Worth Texas magazine; (3)
Appellant proved that it was a party to the advertising agreement; (4) Appellee’s that it published
Appellant’s advertisement sufficed to support the judgment based upon a sworn account; (5) The
alternative theory of recovery under quantum meruit is relevant only if the Court sustains the challenges
to both contract and sworn account theories; (6) the objection to the HB Affidavit based upon lack of
personal knowledge is a defect in form and was not preserved for appeal; (7) the statements made by HB
were not conclusory; (8) the J affidavit fails to create a fact issue and is conclusory; and (9) based upon
the Court's ruling, Appellant cannot maintain its counterclaims as a matter of law. No. 02-10-00373CV, Law Offices of David E. Williams, II, P.C., v. Fort Worth Texas Magazine Venture, LP, from the
153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by John R. Lively, John R. Lively, Jr, David F. Farris, Lively &
Associates, LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 1260, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 5/9/11.
Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
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Declaratory Judgment:
Deeds:
Deed Restrictions:
Defamation:
Appellant addresses the following issues: 1. Did the District Court err in holding that the
Appellant’s defamation claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations and dismissing her
defamation claim on that basis? 2. Did the District Court err in holding that the Appellant’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations and dismissing
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on that basis? 3. Did the District Court err in holding
that the Appellant’s negligence/gross negligence claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and dismissing her negligence/gross negligence claim on that basis? No. 02-14-00074-CV,
Gail Rigsby v. EECU, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Charles S. Cantu, Charles S.
Cantu, Attorney at Law, LLP, P.O. Box 150331, Arlington, Texas 76015, for Appellant. 7/8/14.
Appellant contends: 1. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss Rigsby’s non-defamation claims
because Rigsby failed to present clear and specific admissible evidence on each of the elements of her
prima facie case under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq.
2. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss Rigsby’s non-defamation claims because EECU presented, by
preponderance of the evidence, a valid defense to Rigsby’s claims under the Texas Citizen’s Participation
Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq. 3. The trial court erred in failing to award EECU
attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 27.009. No. 02-14-00074-CV, Gail
Rigsby v. EECU, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Russell D. Cawyer, Ezra R. Kuenzi,
Kelly, Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for CrossAppellant. 7/7/14.
Cross-Appellee Rigsby contends that: 1) her claims should not have been dismissed under any
standards; 2) she established a prima facie case for all her claims; 3) her defamation claims are not timebarred; 4) the trial court did not err when it declined to award EECU its costs and attorney’s fees. No.
02-14-00074-CV, Gail Rigsby v. EECU, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Charles S.
Cantu, Charles S. Cantu, Attorney at Law, LLP, P.O. Box 150331, Arlington, Texas 76015, for CrossAppellee Rigsby. 8/27/14.
Appellee EECU contends that the Appellant’s Defamation Claim is barred by limitations, and the
trial court should have dismissed the non-defamation claims on independent legal grounds instead of on
limitations grounds. No. 02-14-00074-CV, Gail Rigsby v. EECU, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Russell D. Cawyer, Ezra R. Kuenzi, Kelly, Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500,
Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant EECU. 9/5/14.
Appellant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when: (1) it granted Defendant’s motion
to dismiss pursuant to TCPRC 27.003; (2) it denied Plaintiffs Response and Objections to Bucy’s motion
to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with claim for fees; (3) it granted Defendant’s request for an
award of fees pursuant to his motion to dismiss; and (4) it refused to grant Appellant’s motion to
reconsider. No. 02-13-00173-CV, Tim Hotchkin v. Glen Bucy, from the 153rd District Court of Tarrant
County, by Warren V. Norred, 200 E. Abram, Suite 300, Arlington, Texas 76010, for Appellant. 8/28/13.
Default Judgment:
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Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award, as a part of the default judgment,
an order authorizing the Association to foreclose on the subject property, when foreclosure on a lien
created pursuant to the underlying covenant had been contractually agreed to by the parties as a remedy
available under the claims sued upon. No. 02-14-00111-CV, Harvest Ridge Homeowners Association,
Inc., v. Travis Ryan And Elizabeth Ryan, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Michael S.
Truesdale, Law Office of Michael S. Truesdale, PLLC, 801 West Avenue, Suite 201, Austin, Texas
Appellant non-debtors address whether the trial court erred by: (1) entering default judgment
against defendants who were never properly served, and entering said judgment on plaintiff’s substantially
defective petition; (2) entering default judgment against defendants who were not in existence when
plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred; (3) entering default judgment against defendants who were not
provided with notice of the default judgment hearing; and (4) in failing to grant Appellants’ motion for
new trial when Appellants submitted evidence sufficient under Craddick to vacate the default judgment.
02-10-00025-CV, Metro A, LLC, Denar, Restaurants, LLC, Sun Holding, LLC, POP Restaurants, LLC,
Golden Restaurants, Inc., Firebrand Properties, LP, Corral Group, LP, Kansas Corral, LLC, Sunny
Corral Management, LLCD, Guillermo Perales, Frys Management, LLC, TAG Corral, LLC, AN Indy
Corral, LLC v. Jessica Polley, form the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by J. Manuel TorresRodriguez, Thomas J. Urquidez, 2214 Main Street, Dallas, Texas, for Non-Debtor Appellants. 9/3/10.
Appellee contends: (1) the trial court did not err in granting a default judgment on Appellee’s
pleadings which sufficiently set forth facts supporting a claim against Appellants for joint and several
liability in negligence for the sexual assault of Appellee, allowing the trial court to reasonably ascertain
the claims and relief sought; (2) the trial court did not err in awarding damages because there is sufficient
evidence supporting the same; (3) Appellants waived any deficient service complaint by admitting in postdefault pleadings and testimony and in their brief that proper service occurred; (4) the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in impliedly finding that Appellants failure to answer resulted from conscious
indifference, in that there was no evidence as to why there was a failure to timely answer and mistakenly
believing a bankruptcy stay existed does not establish lack of conscious indifference; (5) the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding that Appellants failed to plead and prove a meritorious
defense; and (6) no violation of Appellants’ due process rights occurred in failing to notify Appellants of
a no answer default judgment hearing because they admitted proper service, they appeared post default
in a motion for new trial and they waived the argument by not raising it in the trial court. 02-10-00025CV, Metro A, LLC, Denar, Restaurants, LLC, Sun Holding, LLC, POP Restaurants, LLC, Golden
Restaurants, Inc., Firebrand Properties, LP, Corral Group, LP, Kansas Corral, LLC, Sunny Corral
Management, LLCD, Guillermo Perales, Frys Management, LLC, TAG Corral, LLC, AN Indy Corral,
LLC v. Jessica Polley, form the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Matthew D. Stayton, Adrienne
N. Parham, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for
Appellee. 10/19/10
Appellants reply that Appellee’s efforts to obscure the record with incendiary, but irrelevant,
accusations of wrongful conduct to support her negligence claim is improper and incapable of supporting
her default judgment, and that Appellee’s attempt to rewrite her petition is disingenuous and incapable of
supporting her default judgment. 02-10-00025-CV, Metro A, LLC, Denar, Restaurants, LLC, Sun
Holding, LLC, POP Restaurants, LLC, Golden Restaurants, Inc., Firebrand Properties, LP, Corral Group,
LP, Kansas Corral, LLC, Sunny Corral Management, LLCD, Guillermo Perales, Frys Management, LLC,
TAG Corral, LLC, AN Indy Corral, LLC v. Jessica Polley, form the 48th District Court of Tarrant County,
by David Jeffrie Mizgala, Davor Rukavina, 500 N. Akard Street, 3800 Lincoln Plaza, Dallas, Texas
Appellants reply that: (1) Appellee does not challenge the substantive facts underlying the appeal;
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(2) the length Appellee goes to in illustrating the clarity of her “sufficient-notice” pleading demonstrates
its insufficiency; and (3) the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for new trial was not an affirmative
act, but an abuse of discretion for its failure to act. 02-10-00025-CV, Metro A, LLC, Denar, Restaurants,
LLC, Sun Holding, LLC, POP Restaurants, LLC, Golden Restaurants, Inc., Firebrand Properties, LP,
Corral Group, LP, Kansas Corral, LLC, Sunny Corral Management, LLCD, Guillermo Perales, Frys
Management, LLC, TAG Corral, LLC, AN Indy Corral, LLC v. Jessica Polley, form the 48th District Court
of Tarrant County, by J. Manuel Torres-Rodriguez, Thomas J. Urquidez, 2214 Main Street, Dallas, Texas,
for Non-Debtor Appellants. 11/22/10.
Deficiency Judgment:
Directed Verdict:
Appellant addresses whether the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in denying Appellant's timely
mailed Motion for Continuance of Proceedings, and thereby denied the Appellant both substantive and
procedural due process of law; (3) erred in making a finding of a history of family violence up to May 1,
2010 and issuing a final protective order based on that finding; and (3) abused its discretion in calculating
the amount due and owing as to child support, medical expense, health insurance reimbursement,
responsibility for attorney's fees, accounting and division of assets and liabilities. No. 02-12-00153-CV,
In the Interest of F.M.B. and P.W.B., Children, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by David
Jack Barouch, Pro Se, FCI Seagoville, P.O. Box 9000, Seagoville, TX 75159-9000, for Appellant, Pro Se.
10/16/12.
Appellee contends that the trial court did not err: (1) by denying appellant's second request to delay
signing of final orders; (2) in finding that Appellant committed family violence and issuing a family
violence protective order; (3) in calculating child-support-related arrearages and in awarding attorney fees;
and (4) in issuing interlocutory orders assigning interests in Appellant'S Schwab accounts in compliance
with the final decree of divorce. No. 02-12-00153-CV, In the Interest of F.M.B. and P.W.B., Children,
from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by John R. Stoutimore, 5725 E. Lancaster Ave., Fort
Worth, Texas 76112, for Appellee. Approx. 11/12/12.
Appellant replies that the trial court erred: (1) in granting Appellants’ motion for continuance; (2)
in finding a history of family violence; (3) and in calculating the stock division retroactively. Appellant
also replies that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the amount owed to Appellee. No.
02-12-00153-CV, In the Interest of F.M.B. and P.W.B., Children, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant
County, by David Jack Barouch, Pro Se, FCI Seagoville, P.O. Box 9000, Seagoville, TX 75159-9000, for
Appellant, Pro Se. 11/30/12.
Discovery:
Dismissal:
Disqualification of Counsel:
Driver’s License:
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Due Process:
Eminent Domain:
Education:
Elections:
Electric Rates:
Equitable Subrogation
Employment:
Appellant contends that: ISSUE NO. 1: The trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Traditional
and No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment. ISSUE NO. 2: The trial court erred in granting
Defendant’s Traditional and No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment because Johnson established
a prima facie case of retaliation which was not controverted by the Defendant. ISSUE NO. 3: The trial
court erred in granting Defendant’s Traditional and No Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment because
Johnson was not hired as a temporary employee and the Defendant’s stated reason for discharge is false
and is pretext. ISSUE NO. 4: The trial court erred in ruling that Lloyd Douglas Enterprises I, LTD d/b/a
Sunflower Park Health Care, Inc., was not Johnson’s employer and therefore Johnson’s claims fail as a
matter of law because Johnson presented sufficient evidence to make the issue of who his employer was
a question of fact and under Rule 28 the proper party could be substituted. No. 02-14-00190-CV, Walter
Wallace Johnson v. Lloyd Doughlas Enterprises I, Ltd. D/b/a Sunflower Park Health Care, Inc., from the
153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by John E. Wall, Jr., Law Office of John E. Wall, Jr., 5728
Prospect Avenue, Suite 2001, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellant. 9/24/14.
Appellant addresses the following: A. Whether a shareholder’s representative, following a merger
in which their company was acquired, has standing to sue for an overpayment to a former executive of the
acquired entity when the overpayment directly results in the shareholders fulfilling a contractual obligation
to make the seller and buyer whole at the expense of the shareholders by reducing their merger
consideration? B. Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to provide for declarations regarding a written
contract under the Declaratory Judgment Act which affects the rights of parties to previously filed
litigation when the parties to the present suit are necessary and indispensable parties to the previously filed
suit? C. Whether a trial court in a second suit must grant a plea in abatement when two lawsuits have an
inherent interrelationship of fact and law, and the only claimant in the later suit would be a necessary and
indispensable party under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 in the previously filed lawsuit? D. Whether
a suit in equity that specifically claims unjust enrichment and money had and received, is barred by the
existence of a valid, express contract when the contract is not between the contesting parties, does not
address the subject matter of the litigation, and the claimant seeks return of an overpayment due to a
mistake of fact? E. Whether a release regarding the termination of employment between an entity and an
executive is sufficient to release, waive or estop claims related to overpayment made by the executive’s
previous employer when that entity acquired the previous employer by merger and the release is silent as
to payments made prior to the merger? F. Whether it is equitable and just under the Declaratory Judgment
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Act to award attorney’s fees to a claimant when the claimant’s attorney has represented several similarly
situated claimants in other cases and lawsuits and has relied upon discovery and information obtained
therefrom in prosecuting the suit at bar? No. 02-14-00194-CV, Jerry Hudgeons, Individually and in his
Capacity as Stockholder’s Representative for the Former Stockholders of Total Electrical Service &
Supply Co. v. Darrell Hallmark, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Rick G. Strange,
Aaron M. Dorfner, R. Shaun Rainey, Cotton, Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, P.C., P.O. Box 2776, Midland,
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in granting the school district’s plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissing Appellant’s whistleblower retaliation claim. No. 02-13-00160-CV, Sylvia
Marie Ortiz v. Plano Independent School District, from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by
Bryan D. Perkins, Law Office of Bryan D. Perkins, 6657 Virginia Parkway, Suite 100, McKinney, Texas
Appellee contends that the trial court correctly granted PISD’s plea to the jurisdiction since Ortiz’s
filing of a purely internal grievance with the superintendent’s designee pursuant to a purely internal
employment policy does not satisfy the jurisdictional elements of a viable whistleblower retaliation claim.
No. 02-13-00160-CV, Sylvia Marie Ortiz v. Plano Independent School District, from the 211th District
Court of Denton County, by Charles J. Crawford, Abernathy, Roeder, Boyd & Joplin, P.C., 1700 Redbud
Blvd., Suite 300, McKinney, Texas 75069, for Appellee. 9/4/13.
Appellant addresses whether Appellee waived the right to recover on her Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act claims by failing to file a notice of appeal to challenge the trial court’s denial and/or
omission of that relief in the Final Judgment and, if not waived, whether the evidence supported the jury’s
findings on Williams’ TCHRA claims, including sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and punitive
damages. 02-10-00373-CV, Waffle House, Inc., v. Cathie Williams, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Ralph H. Duggins, Stephen L. Tatum, Mary H. Barkley, Cantey Hanger, L.L.P., 600 West 6th
Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and Mark Emery, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 801
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, for Appellant. 10/25/10.
Appellee contends that she was not required to file her own notice of appeal to preserve her right
to a lesser judgment on her alternative TCHRA sexual harassment claim when the trial court rendered
judgment in her favor on her common law negligence claims, and she is entitled to a judgment on that
sexual harassment claim in accordance with the jury’s findings. Appellee also contends that there was
legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings on the sexual harassment claim. 0205-00373-C, Waffle House, Inc., v. Cathie Williams, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by
Kern Lewis, Susan Hutchison, S. Rafe Foreman, Foreman, Lewis & Hutchison, P.C., 611 S. Main Street,
Suite 700, Grapevine, Texas 78061, for Appellee. 11/24/10.
Appellant replies that the Sexual Harassment and Constructive Discharge Claims are waived,
Appellee’s untimely cross-point completely misses the point of the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion, and
Appellee fails to show that the evidence at trial supported the jury’s sexual harassment and constructive
discharge findings. 02-10-00373-CV, Waffle House, Inc., v. Cathie Williams, from the 67th District Court
of Tarrant County, by Ralph H. Duggins, Stephen L. Tatum, Mary H. Barkley, Cantey Hanger, L.L.P., 600
West 6th Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and Mark Emery, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 801
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004, for Appellant. 12/13/10.
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Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred: (1) by treating the General Release and
Separation as one indivisible contract; (2) in finding that Appellant violated the Separation Agreement by
violating company policy; and (3) by granting Appellee summary judgment given the evidence. 02-1000219-CV, David Bridges v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by
Matthew W. Bobo, Berry, Odom, Rabinowitz & Bobo, LLP, 2800 S. Hulen Street, Suite 115, Fort Worth,
Environment:
Evidence:
Eviction:
Execution:
Appellant addresses whether: (1) the trial court (which was not the court that rendered Appellees’
original divorce judgment) have subject matter jurisdiction to stay execution of the collection of court costs
arising from other courts' judgments; (2) the Appellants had standing to seek an injunction prohibiting the
District Clerk from executing for court costs against themselves and all persons similarly situated; and (3)
the trial court erred in issuing an injunction despite Appellees’ failure to file motions to re-tax costs in their
original divorce proceedings. No. 02-13-00146-CV, Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell,
et al, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Criminal District Attorney of
Tarrant County, Assistant District Attorney, Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center, 401 West Belknap, 9th
Floor, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellant. 5/22/13.
Appellees address whether: (1) the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a temporary
injunction on a petition for writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment enjoining an unlawful policy
and practice of the District Clerk; (2) Indigent Plaintiffs have standing to seek an injunction on a petition
for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment temporarily restraining the District Clerk from
carrying out an unlawful policy and practice; (3) a motion to re-tax costs is an adequate remedy at law for
Indigent Plaintiffs, where as a matter of law no costs were taxed and where such a motion will not restrain
the District Clerk's unlawful policy and practice. No. 02-13-00146-CV, Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk
v. Odell Campbell, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Linda H. Gregory, Thomas J. Stutz,
Legal Aid of North West Texas, 600 E. Weatherford St., Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees.
Appellees address whether: (1) the 17th Judicial District Court lacke subject matter jurisdiction
to Issue a temporary injunction against the District Clerk to prevent Appellees and others similarly situated
from suffering imminent and irreparable injury during the pendency of their litigation when the subject
of Appellees' litigation is whether the District Clerk has properly performed his non-discretionary
ministerial public duty of taxing and collecting court costs and fees; and (2) the filing of a motion to re-tax
court costs is an adequate remedy in a temporary injunction action when the District Clerk is threatening
collection actions against Appellees and others similarly situated and Appellees and others similarly
situated are in danger of suffering imminent and irreparable injury which cannot be adequately
compensated for in damages. No. 02-13-00146-CV, Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk v. Odell Campbell,
from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Lee A. DeFilippo, 210 Lavaca Street #2006, Austin,
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Appellant replies that only the court that rendered judgment may enjoin execution, and the motion
to re-tax is precise remedy for Appellee’s circumstances. No. 02-13-00146-CV, Thomas A. Wilder,
District Clerk v. Odell Campbell, et al, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon,
Jr., Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, Assistant District Attorney, Tim Curry Criminal Justice
Center, 401 West Belknap, 9th Floor, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellant. 7/17/13.
Expunction:
Appellant contends that: I. The trial court erred by failing to consider Article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(i)(c)
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as a basis to grant the expunction. II. The trial court erred in
ruling that the statute of limitations does not apply in Appellant’s second basis for expunction – Article
55.01(a)(2)(B) of Texas Code of Criminal procedure. No. 02-13-00360-CV, Ex Parte S.B.M., from the
362nd District Court of Denton County, by Eric L. McDonald, 2303 RR 620 South #135-443, Lakeway,
Appellee contends that: 1) Appellant Did Not Preserve Error, and Even if This Court Finds That
Appellant Preserved Error, Appellant did not Strictly Comply With article 55.0l(a)(2)(A)(i)(c); 2)
Expunction Under article 55.01 (a)(2)(B) Requires the Statute of Limitations to Run, There is no Statute
of Limitations on a Sexual Assault Offense in Certain Cases, and There was no Statute of Limitations in
this Case, and the Expunction was Rightly Denied. No. 02-13-00360-CV, Ex Parte S.B.M., from the 362nd
District Court of Denton County, by Paul Johnson, Catherine LUft, Lara Tomlin, Lindsey Sheguit, Rick
Daniel, Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Denton County, 1450 East McKinney, Denton, Texas
76209, for Appellee. 10/1/14.
Appellee contends that Appellant is not entitled to an expunction of the complained-of arrest
records because he pled nolo contendre to an offense stemming from the arrest and was placed on
community supervision pursuant to article 42.12. No. 02-13-00462-CV, S.J. v. The State of Texas, from
the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Paul Johnson, Charles E. Orbison, Andrea R. Simmons, Lauri
Frohbieter, Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 1450 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76209, for
Appellee. 3/31/14.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant's Petition for Expunction.
No. 02-13-00462-CV, S.J. v. The State of Texas, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Deric
King Walpole, 5900 S. Lake Forest Dr., Ste. 410, McKinney, Texas 75070, for Appellant. 3/7/14.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding, contrary to the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute, that article 55.01(c) prohibits expunction of an offense that arose out of a criminal
episode, but otherwise meets the requirements of article 55.01(a)(2), when the person is not acquitted of
that offense. Appellant also argues that a “plea in bar” qualifies for expunction and is not an acquittal
under Article 55.02(c), and that Article 55.01(c) limits expunction only in the context of acquittal. 02-1000240-CV, Ex Parte S.M.S., from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by Jonathan M. Bailey,
Kuzmich Law Firm, PC, 335 West Main Street, Lewisville, Texas 75057, for Appellant. 9/30/10.
Appellee contends that Article 55.01(c) prevents the expunction of Appellant’s charge for
possession of a controlled substance because he was ultimately convicted of an offense stemming from
the same criminal episode; or, alternatively, the charge of possession of a controlled substance was neither
dismissed nor quashed after it was “taken into account” per Section 12.45 in the sentencing of his driving
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while intoxicated case, and Appellant has failed to carry his burden of proof that he is entitled to
expunction per article 55.01(a)(2)(A). 02-10-00240-CV, Ex Parte S.M.S., from the 211th District Court
of Denton County, by Paul Johnson, Charles E. Orbison, Andrea R. Simmons and George Mitchum,
Denton County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 1450 East McKinney, Denton, Texas 76209, for
Appellee. 10/29/10.
In an amended brief, Appellee contends that Article 55.01(c) prevents the expunction of
Appellant’s charge for possession of a controlled substance because he was ultimately convicted of an
offense stemming from the same criminal episode; or, alternatively, the charge of possession of a
controlled substance was neither dismissed nor quashed after it was “taken into account” per Section 12.45
in the sentencing of his driving while intoxicated case, and Appellant has failed to carry his burden of
proof that he is entitled to expunction per article 55.01(a)(2)(A). 02-10-00240-CV, Ex Parte S.M.S., from
the 211th District Court of Denton County, by Paul Johnson, Charles E. Orbison, Andrea R. Simmons and
Karen Anders, Denton County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 1450 East McKinney, Denton, Texas
76209, for Appellee. 11/04/10.
Family Law:
Appellant Husband addresses the following: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by dividing
property owned by Mark Allen Logsdon after the trial court granted his motion for directed verdict? 2. Did
the trial court abuse its discretion in divesting Mark Allen Logsdon of his separate property in the divorce
proceedings of his parents? 3. Was there any evidence presented at trial that the disputed property was
community property of Deborah Kay Logsdon and Mark Edward Logsdon? No. 02-14-00045CV,Deborah Kay Logsdon and Mark Allen Logsdon v. Mark Edward Logsdon, from the 233rd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Matthew Kolodoski, Mackoy Hernandez Qualls & Brown, LLP, 6017 W.
Main Street, Second Floor, Frisco, Texas 75034, for Appellant, 9/5/14.
Appellant Wife addresses the following: 1. Did the court make a disproportionate property
division? 2. Did the court abuse its discretion in dividing the community property? 3. Was there evidence
that the wife fraudulently transferred property? 4. If there was a fraudulent transfer, should the trial court
have reconstituted the community estate and divided it under Section 7.009 of Family Code? 5. Must the
appeal be abated to let the trial court make additional findings? 6. Was there any evidence that the property
claimed by the adult son was community property of the marriage? 7. Did the trial court abuse its
discretion by not awarding child support to the wife? 8. Was there evidence to support an award of
attorney’s fees under Rule 167? No. 02-14-00045-CV,Deborah Kay Logsdon and Mark Allen Logsdon
v. Mark Edward Logsdon, from the 233rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Gilstrap, Hill Gilstrap
PC, 1400 West Abram Street, Arlington, Texas 76013, for Appellant Wife. 9/4/14.
Appellant addresses whether the divorce decree is incapable of supporting an arrearage judgment
for child support because it is ambiguous or not sufficiently definite and certain due to its failure to provide
the date child support payments are to begin. No. 02-14-00069-CV, In the Interest of B.T., Jr. And S.T.,
Minor Children, from the 78th District Court of Wichita County, by Holly Crampton, P.O. Box 3609,
Wichita Falls, Txas 76301, for Appellant. 8/7/14.
Appellant addresses the following issues: 1. Whether the trial court erred in limiting Keitha
Thayer’s visitation to two supervised weekends per month with the parties’ youngest daughter? 2. Whether
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding commercial goodwill from the valuation of Thayer and
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Associates? 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the community property deferred
compensation account to Mark Thayer with the restriction that the funds be put toward the children’s
education? 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its division of property by awarding Mark
Thayer the only valuable assets in the community estate and awarding Keitha Thayer only debt? 5.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering spousal maintenance be paid to Keitha Thayer in
the limited amount of $1,250 per month and only for one year? 6. Whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering Keitha Thayer to pay child support? 7. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny
Keitha Thayer’s motions to recuse Judge David Cleveland? No. 02-14-00044-CV, Keitha Thayer v. Mark
Thayer, from the 90th District Court of Young County, by Thomas M. Michel, Robley E. Sicard, Griffith,
Jay & Michel, LLP, 2200 Forest Park Blvd., Fort worth, Texas 76110, for Appellant. 8/4/14.
Appellee contends that the Trial Court correctly denied the Motion for New Trial as Appellant
failed to present clear and convincing evidence concerning the error committed in the division of the
community estate of the parties; (2) the Trial Court correctly denied the Appellant's oral request for a
continuance during the trial as Appellant voluntarily opted to represent himself without the aid of counsel;
(3) the Trial Court correctly divided the community estate of the parties based on the evidence presented
at trial and evidence requested in Appellant's discovery responses; and (4) the Trial Court correctly
permitted counsel for Appellant to withdraw the day of trial as Appellant requested the Court to grant the
motion for withdrawal of counsel by signing the Order granting the withdrawal. No. 02-14-00047-CV,
In the Matter of the Marriage of Selene Peregrino Ruiz and Ramon Ruiz, from the 211th District Court
of Denton County, by Erika Patino, 1414 W. Randol Mill Rd., Suite 118, Arlington, Texas 76012, for
Appellee. 5/12/14.
Appellant contends that: Issue 1: The Final Decree of Divorce’s term for spousal maintenance
was an agreement for spousal maintenance as defined by Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Issue 2:
The Final Decree of Divorce’s term for spousal maintenance was not an agreement for contractual
alimony. Issue 3: A genuine issue of material fact was raised by the pleadings of Petitioner, Jerry Dwayne
Lee, Jr, and Danelle Charlene Lee is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No. 02-14-00064-CV,
Jerry Dwayne Lee, Jr. v. Danell Charlene Lee, from the 97th District Court of Clay County, by Chad D.
Petross, The Petross Law Firm, 106 Austin Ave., Suite 203, Weatherford, Texas 76086, for Appellant.
5/1/2014.
Appellee contends that: Issue 1 The Final Decree of Divorce’s section regarding Spousal
Maintenance was a contractual agreement for Spousal Maintenance and not an award of Spousal
Maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Issue 2 There was no genuine issue of material
fact raised by the pleadings of Appellant, Jerry Dwayne Lee, Jr., thereby entitling Appellee, Danelle
Charlene Lee, judgment as a matter of law.No. 02-14-00064-CV, Jerry Dwayne Lee, Jr. v. Danell
Charlene Lee, from the 97th District Court of Clay County, by Seth C. Slagle, Law Office of Seth C.
Slagle, 111 South Main, Henrietta, Texas 76365, for Appellee. 7/2/14.
Appellant contends without giving me the opportunity to respond the trial court decided in favor
of Mr. SanjaMathur. 02-13-00314-CV, Kalsoom Ahmad v. Ishfaq Ahmad, from the 324th District Court
of Tarrant County, by Kalsoom Ahmad, P.O. Box 150311, Arlington, Texas 76015, Pro Se. 1/21/14.
Appellee contends that the court must affirm the summary judgment because Appellant did not
provide an adequate response to the motion for summary judgment, waived the issue of service of
summary judgment, and there was sufficient evidence in Appellee’s motion for summary judgment for
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the court to grant the motion. No. 02-13-00314-CV, Kalsoom Ahmad v. Ishfaq Ahmad, from the 324th
District Court of Tarrant County, by Sanjay S. Mathur, John Cameron Stevenson, Mathur Law Offices,
P.C., 2989 N. Stemmons Freeway, Suite 1000, Dallas, Texas 75247, for Appellee. 3/24/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court ordered that lakefront property be sold and that, after
expenses, all of the proceeds be divided between the attorneys, regardless of the sales price of the property
or the amount of attorneys' fees owed. Because there is no evidence (or insufficient evidence) to support
a combined award of attorneys' fees of greater than approximately $105,000, the trial court committed
reversible error in not capping the award of attorneys' fees at approximately $105,000. No. 02-13-00098CV, Debra F. Pemberton v. Robert C. Pemberton, from the 43rd District Court of Parker County, by
Debra F. Pemberton, 1432 FM 193, Floydada, Texas 79235, Appellant Pro Se. 9/10/13.
Appellee contends that: I. Debra's "no evidence" point must fail; II. Debra's complaint does not
constitute reversible error; and III. Any error does not require remand. No. 02-13-00098-CV, Debra F.
Pemberton v. Robert C. Pemberton, from the 43rd District Court of Parker County, by Mike Windsor, Loe,
Warren, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs, Windsor, Lawrence & Folffarth, P.C., P.O. Box 100609, Fort Worth,
Texas 76185-0609, for Appellee.
In surreply, Appellant contends that: Debra takes Robert's assertion out of context. II. Debra
failed to preserve any error regarding the security interest. III. Debra attempts to defeat the rights of thirdparty creditors. . No. 02-13-00098-CV, Debra F. Pemberton v. Robert C. Pemberton, from the 43rd
District Court of Parker County, by Mike Windsor, Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs, Windsor,
Lawrence & Folffarth, P.C., P.O. Box 100609, Fort Worth, Texas 76185-0609, for Appellee. 11/20/13.
Appellee addresses whether: (1) a party waives any arguments regarding the validity of an oral
pronouncement of divorce and a subsequent final decree of divorce where the party requests the court
grant the divorce and later seeks affirmative relief on the basis of the pronouncement, including
post-divorce enforcement; (2) where a party asks the court to grant the divorce, the court states "I'm going
to grant the divorce," and a docket notation states "Divorce granted," the court has made an effective
rendition of divorce of the parties; (3) a final decree of divorce that states it is based upon the agreements
made in mediation and reflected in a mediated settlement agreement constitutes a full and final judgment
of all issues where the mediated settlement agreement states that it constitutes a full and final division of
property and determination of child custody issues; (4) the failure of a final decree to include an agreement
incident to divorce, where it references a mediated settlement agreement that makes a full division of
property, or the signatures of the parties renders such agreement ambiguous and/or void such that it is open
to collateral attack; (5) where parties agree to the division of certain accounts in a mediated settlement
agreements, the trial court abuses its discretion where it applies the agreed to division to the increases in
the accounts occurring after the agreement was entered into; (6) where a party has an available remedy of
breach of contract for a party's failure to make periodic payments as agreed to, they may also seek specific
performance of a provision providing for a security agreement to secure such payments; (7) a trial court
abuses its discretion in refusing to award attorney's fees to a party where it is presented with evidence that
such party was at least partly responsible for the failure to effectuate the agreements in the mediated
settlement agreement; (8) a party waives a complaint regarding the payment of child support to them
directly as opposed to the Texas Child Support Disbursement Unit where they accept the direct payments
of child support; (9) a party waives any claim to healthcare reimbursements where she has failed to plead
them, present evidence on them, or argue them to the trial court. No. 02-12-00369-CV, Peggy M.
Blackburn v. Gilden B. Blackburn, from the 43rd District Court of Parker County, by Thomas M. Michel,
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Robley E. Sicard, Griffith, Jay & Michel, LLP, 2200 Forest Park Blvd, Fort Worth, Texas 76110, for
Appellee.
Appellant contends abuse of discretion in awarding Chinese Apartment to Appellee without
sufficient information rooted in substantive and probative evidence. No. 02-13-00038-CV, Kalsoom
Ahmad v. Ishfaq Ahmad, from the 324th District Court of Tarrant County, by Mark Whitburn, Sean
Pevsner, Whitburn & Pevsner, PLLC, 2000 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 600, Arlington, Texas 76006, for
Appellant. 6/24/13.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court's awarding of the Chinese Apartment to husband as part
of the division of the marital estate was an abuse of discretion when there was available to the court
sufficient information at the time of trial to exercise its discretion in dividing the marital estate and the
division was not manifestly unjust or unfair. No. 02-13-00038-CV, Kalsoom Ahmad v. Ishfaq Ahmad,
from the 324th District Court of Tarrant County, by P. Michael Schneider, Melissa K. Swan, Schneider
Law Firm, P.C., 400 E. Weatherford St., Ste. 106, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 8/26/13.
Appellant addresses whether: (1)the trial court abused its discretion in valuing and dividing
Appellee’s interest in KPMG, LLP; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by committing an error that
materially affected the just and right division of the community estate. No. 02-12-00332-CV, Jessica
Jackson Hill v. Steven Hill, from the 393rd District Court of Denton County, by Jeffrey N. Kaitcer, Mike
Windsor, Loe, Warrent, Rosenfield, Kaitcer, Hibbs, Windsor, Lawrence & Wolffarth, P.C., P.O. Box
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion: (1) when it awarded indefinite
spousal maintenance to the Appellee when the law requires the Appellee to prove that she was disabled,
she had diminished earning capacity and she had an inability to meet her "minimum reasonable needs"
even though the Appellant provided controverting evidence that showed the Appellee's mental and
physical ability to enter the labor market; (2) when it awarded half of the Appellant's entire Retirement
Benefits Plan to the Appellee when the court found that the entire retirement plan was community property
even though the Appellant began making contributions to the plan prior to marriage of the parties; (3)
when it awarded 100% of the 401K account to the Appellee even though this account was the Appellant's
separate property; (4) when it deemed the Roth IRA 7430 and 7448 to be community property subject to
division even though these accounts were created by the Appellant's father, funded solely by the
Appellant's father and intended to be a gift solely to the Appellant from this father; (5) when it classified
the Roth IRA 7430 and 7448 as community property in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law when
these accounts were shown to be the Appellant's separate property at trial and these accounts were
previously classified as the Appellant's separate property in the Final Decree of Divorce; (6) when it
deemed the Morgan Stanley account to be community property even though this account belonged to the
Appellant's father, was completely funded by the Appellant's father and contained no commingled funds
from the Appellant or Appellee; (7) when it classified the VKEAFE account as community property in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law even though this account belonged to the Appellant's father,
the account was classified as the Appellant's separate property in the Final Decree of Divorce and there
was no evidence to support the community property finding; (8) when it did not allow the Appellant to call
rebuttal witnesses on two separate occasions when the calling of these witnesses could not have been
anticipated prior to trial even though the rebuttal witnesses would not have prejudiced the Appellee.
Appellant also contends the trial court erred: (1) when it divested the Appellant's father of his property
rights by accounting as community property the Morgan Stanley account by mischaracterizing this
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property when it believed the Appellant's father should have filed a separate action to preserve his rights;
and (2) when it awarded the VKEAFE account to the Appellee even thought this account was simply a
capital gain already accounted for in the Morgan Stanley account. No. 02-12-00260-CV, D. Paul
Prevallet v. Rena Jane Prevallet, from the 231st District Court, by Lisa Hoobler, 400 E. Weatherford
Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 12/17/12.
Appellee contends that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Prevallet
indefinite spousal maintenance based on a finding of diminished eaming capacity to meet
minimum reasonable needs; (2) the trial court did not err when it awarded Prevallet attorneys' fees based
on a disparity of income even though the court awarded Prevallet spousal maintenance; (3) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Prevallet fifty percent of Appellant's Computer Sciences
Corporation retirement; (4) the trial court did not err when it awarded Prevallet 100% of the Investacorp
401(k) account; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the Wells Fargo Roth IRA
7430 and 7448 to be community property; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it classified
in the Findings the Wells Fargo Roth IRA 7430 and 7448 as community property; (7) the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it deemed the Morgan Stanley account to be community property; (8) the
trial court did not err when it did not vest or confirm to Don Prevallet property rights in the Morgan
Stanley account; (9) the trial court did not err in its treatment of the proceeds from the sale of VKEAFE;
(9) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it classified in the Findings the proceeds from VKEAFE
as community property; (10) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow the Appellant
to call rebuttal witnesses on two separate occasions. No. 02-12-00260-CV, D. Paul Prevallet v. Rena Jane
Prevallet, from the 231st District Court, by W. Weir Wilson, 900 Monroe Street, Ste. 400, Fort Worth,
Texas 76102, for Appellee.
Appellant contends that the parties reached an agreement for custody based on manipulation from
the Appellee directed to the Appellant. 02-12-00091-CV, Eugene Williams v. Marcellina Williams, and
in the Interest of the Children, from the 393rd District Court of Denton County, by Eugene Williams, 9109
King Ranch Drive, Crossroads, Texas 76227, Pro Se. 5/23/12.
Family Violence:
Appellant contends that: Issue Number One: The evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to support the finding that family violence had occurred because the act in question was not shown to have
been committed because of the victim's marriage to or dating relationship with an individual with whom
the actor is or has been in a dating relationship or marriage; Issue Presented Number Two: The evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that family violence was likely to occur in the
future. No. 02-14-00192-CV, D. M. v. M. G. Y., from the 324th District Court of Tarrant County, by Jeff
McKnight, The Law Offices of Jeff McKnight, P.C., 900 8th Street, Suite 815, Wichita Falls, Texas
Fiduciary:
Findings and Conclusions:
Forcible Detainer:
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Appellants contends that: 1. The trial court erred in hearing the case and rendering judgment on
December 12, 2013, because at such time the Appellee’s pleading then on file was not a valid pleading
on which judgment could have been granted 2. The trial court erred in granting judgment for Appellee,
because the evidence before the court at trial was not sufficient to support a valid pre-suit statutory notice
to vacate. No. 02-14-00105-CV, Sunny Obgomo and Joan Kyangungu v. American Homes 4 Rent
Properties Two, LLC, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, by Michael Brinkley,
Brinkley Law PLLC, P.O. Box 820711, Fort Worth, Texas 76182, for Appellants. 8/25/14.
Appellee contends that: A. The trial court did not err in hearing and rendering verdict in favor of
Appellee because the invalidity of the verification, if invalid, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; B.
The trial court did not err in granting judgment for Appellee; the evidence was sufficient for the Court to
determine possession. No. 02-14-00105-CV, Sunny Obgomo and Joan Kyangungu v. American Homes
4 Rent Properties Two, LLC, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, by Keith A.
Wlfshohl, Barry & Sewart, PLLC, 4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 680, Houston, Texas 77027, for
Appellee. 9/23/14.
Appellee contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by: (1) failing to impanel the
awaiting jury, failing to allow the jury trial to proceed and deciding the case from the bench; (2) failing
to take judicial notice of the Tarrant county Deed Records and give all properly filed and certified copies
of documents the same weight; (3) refusing to admit Appellant's Notice of Rescission; (4) sustaining
objections made by BOA under Appellant's Offer of Proof and failing to allow Appellant to tender
exhibits; and (4) by failing to grant Murry's Special Exceptions and Motion to Strike the Business Records
Affidavit and Motion to Dismiss. Appellee also contends that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction after
a clear title dispute was presented to the court. No. 02-13-00211-CV, Amy L. Murry v. Bank of America,
N.A., from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, by Janna Clarke, 309 West Seventh Street,
1100 Oil and Gas Building, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 2/11/14.
Foreclosure:
The trial court erred in refusing to award, as a part of the default judgment, an order authorizing
the Association to foreclose on the subject property, when foreclosure on a lien created pursuant to the
underlying covenant had been contractually agreed to by the parties as a remedy available under the claims
sued upon. No. 02-14-00184-CV, Sunset Hills Homeowners Association, inc., v. Frank Carroll, from the
236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Adam Pugh, Slater Pugh, LLP, 8400 N. Mopac Expressway,
Suite 100, Austin, Texas 78759, for Appellant. 7/28/14.
Appellant contends: Issue No. 1: Judicial Estoppel does not bar the Harens’ claims. Issue No. 2:
Res Judicata is inappropriate in this case Issue No. 3: Wells Fargo’s violations of the TDCA. Sub-Issue
3a: The Statute of Frauds does not apply to the TDCA. Sub-Issue 3b: The Economic Loss Doctrine does
not bar the Harens’ TDCA claim. Sub-Issue 3c: The FCRA does not preempt the Harens’ TDCA claim.
Sub-Issue 3d: The Harens provided ample evidence of Wells Fargo’s violations of the TDCA. Issue No.
4: Wells Fargo breached the Texas Property Code, Deed of Trust, and Violated the Standing Bankruptcy
Order. Issue No. 5: Wells Fargo violated the Deed of Trust Contract. Issue No. 6: Suit to Quiet Title and
Trespass to Try Title. No. 02-14-00148-CV, Brian K. Haren and Susan K. Haren f/k/a Susan C. Carley
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by J. B. Peacock, Jr., David
M. Vereeke, Laura L. Pickens, Gagnon, Peacock & Vereeke, P.C., 4245 N. Central Expressway, Suite
250, Lock Box 104, Dallas, Texas 75205, for Appellants. 8/5/14.
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Appellant contends: 1. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellee on Appellant's breach of contract claim due to Appellant's lack of evidence of an alleged breach
or causation of damages. 2. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
on Appellant's Texas Debt Collection Act claim due to Appellant's lack of evidence of an alleged deceptive
means to collect the debt, misrepresentation of the debt, threat to take action prohibited by law, failure to
calculate delinquencies on the reinstatement notice or other violation of the Texas Financial Code to
support this claim. 3. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee on
Appellant's negligent misrepresentation claim due to Appellant's lack of evidence of a false representation
or causation of damages. 4. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
on Appellant's invasion of privacy claim due to Appellant's lack of evidence that Appellee intentionally
intruded on Appellant's solitude, seclusion or private affairs in a highly offensive manner or causation of
damages. 5. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee on Appellant's
wrongful foreclosure claim due to Appellant's lack of evidence a defect in the foreclosure sale proceeding,
an grossly inadequate sale price, or a causal connection between an alleged defect and an alleged grossly
inadequate sales price. 6. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
on Appellant's negligence and gross negligence claims due to Appellant's lack of evidence of that Appellee
owed Appellant a duty outside the contractual duties of the loan documents, a breach of any duties, an act
or omission of Appellee that involved an extreme degree of risk or causation of damages. 7. The trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee on Appellant's trespass to try title and suit
to quiet title due to Appellant's lack of evidence of that Appellant had a legitimate claim to the property
following Appellee's foreclosure on the property and the court's granting of Appellee's Motion to Expunge
Lis Pendens. No. 02-14-00034-CV, Sheryl Buchanan v. Compass Bank, from the 352nd District Court
of Tarrant County, by Michael A. Logan, Jeffrey S. Seeburger, Victoria Nsikak, Kane Russell Coleman
& Logan PC, 3700 Thanksgiving Tower, 1601 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellee. 8/5/14.
Appellant contends that: Issue No. 1: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
Appellant’s Claim for Breach of Contract. Issue No. 2: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on Appellant’s claim for violations of the TDCA. Issue No. 3: The trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on Appellant’s claim for negligent misrepresentation. 3 Issue No. 4: The trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on Appellant’s claim for Invasion of Privacy. Issue No. 5: The trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant’s claim for Wrongful Foreclosure. Issue No. 6: The trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant’s claim for Negligence/Gross Negligence. Issue
No. 7: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant’s claim for Trespass to Try Title
and Suit to Quiet Title. No. 02-14-00034-CV, Sheryl Buchanan v. Compass Bank, from the 352nd District
Court of Tarrant County, by J. B. Peacock, Jr., David M. Vereeke, Laura L. Pickens, Gagnon, Peacock
& Vereeke, P.C., 4245 N. Central Expressway, Suite 250, Lock Box 104, Dallas, Texas 75205, for
Appellant. 6/25/14.
Foreign Cost Assessments:
Foreign Judgment
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the properly
domesticated Missouri Judgment as Genesis Truckyard failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the Missouri Judgment was improper. No. 02-13-00404-CV, Xtra Lease LLC v. Genesis Truckyard
LLC, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County by Scott E. Hayes, Vincent Lopez Serafino &
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Jenevein, P.C., 1601 Elm Street, Suite 4100, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 1/30/14.
Forfeiture:
Forum Selection Clause:
Franchise Agreements:
Fraud:
Appellants contend the following questions bear addressing: 1. Whether Sec. 41.008, Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the party wishing to invoke it, and
whether the trial court in this case erred in finding that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 41.008 applied
to this case even though Appellees had not pleaded or otherwise attempted to invoke that statute prior to
trial on the merits. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting leave to Appellees to amend
their answer post-trial and post-verdict to add a new affirmative defense, Section 41.008, Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code. 3. Whether Section 41.008, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code does not apply to this suit as a
matter of law, based on the record and jury verdict. No. 02-13-00191-CV, Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis,
P.C., v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture, from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County, by W.
Bradley Parke, Ryan H. Anderson, 2317 Plaza Pkwy., Suite 100, Bedford, Texas 76021, for Appellants.
11/5/13.
Appellant contends the following questions bear addressing: 1. If the finding of fraud, in answer
to Question 6, is set aside, must the award of punitive damages also be set aside? 2. The jurors found fraud,
in answer to Question 6, and this requires evidence of reliance and causation. Was there "clear and
convincing evidence" of reliance and causation? 3. Can the finding of fraud, in answer to Question 6, be
upheld without evidence that White engaged in something more than "bad faith" conduct? No. 02-1300191-CV, Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C., v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture, from the 96th
District Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Gilstrap, Gregory A. Eyster, Hill Gilstrap, PC, 1400 West
Abram, Arlington, Texas 76013, for Cross-Appellants. 11/12/13.
Appellee addresses whether: (1) Davis has waived any error by failing to address every ground
on which this reduction could have been based; (2) the jury’s finding of $2.8 million in punitive damages
(almost ten-times actual damages) was constitutionally excessive; (3) White waived the punitive damages
cap by not pleading it; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in letting White amend his pleadings.
No. 02-13-00191-CV, Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C. v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture,
from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Gilstrap, Gregor A. Eyster, Hill Gillstrap, PC,
1400 West Abram, Arlington, Texas 76013, for Appellees. 1/24/14.
Cross-Appellees contend that: (1) The jury’s award of exemplary damages is fully supported by
sufficient evidence in the record; (2) Davis presented clear and convincing evidence of Davis’s reliance
on White’s misrepresentations, and how those misrepresentations cheated Davis out of more than
$300,000; (3) Davis presented sufficiently clear and convincing evidence of White’s intent to deceive him
and cause him financial harm; and (4) By failing to make specific charge objections or file post-trial
motions, White has waived his legal sufficiency points. No. 02-13-00191-CV, Kent Davis and D. Kent
Davis, P.C. v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture, from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County,
by Peter M. Kelly, Kelly, Durham & Pittard, L.L.P., 1005 Heights Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77008,
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and W. Bradley Parker, Ryan H. Anderson, Parker Law Firm, 2317 Plaza Pkwy., Suite 100, Bedford,
Texas 76021, for Cross-Appellees. 1/22/14.
Appellants reply that: (1) On appeal, White need not attack all grounds for reducing the exemplary
damages--only the ones presented to the trial court; (2) By failing to timely plead it, White waived
application of the § 41.008 cap on exemplary damages; (3) The jury’s award of exemplary damages will
survive White’s substantive due process attack, which he made for the first time on appeal. No. 02-1300191-CV, Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C. v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture, from the 96th
District Court of Tarrant County, by Peter M. Kelly, Kelly, Durham & Pittard, L.L.P., 1005 Heights
Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77008, and W. Bradley Parker, Ryan H. Anderson, Parker Law Firm, 2317
Plaza Pkwy., Suite 100, Bedford, Texas 76021, for Appellants. 3/11/14.
Cross-Appellants reply that: (1) There was no “clear and convincing” evidence of reliance or
causation; (2) Evidence of mere “bad faith” will not support a punitive damages award; (3) White
preserved error by making “no evidence” objections to each of the jury questions. No. 02-13-00191-CV,
Kent Davis and D. Kent Davis, P.C. v. Ledford White and M & M Joint Venture, from the 96th District
Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Gilstrap, Gregor A. Eyster, Hill Gillstrap, PC, 1400 West Abram,
Arlington, Texas 76013, for Cross-Appellants. 3/10/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court's adverse findings on each and every element of Clifford's conversion claim; (2) Because the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's adverse findings on each and every
element of Clifford's conversion claim, the trial court erred in denying Clifford's election for the return of
his personal property. Alternatively, the trial court erred in denying Clifford's request for conversion
damages; (3) The trial court's conclusion of law that Clifford's oral lease claim is barred by the statute of
frauds is erroneous because the evidence demonstrates that the oral lease agreement did not fall within the
statute of frauds; (4) Gruesen cannot argue for affirmance based on grounds not stated in her motion for
judgment. Alternatively, the trial court's judgment cannot be supported on any other theory. Specifically,
there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support an implied finding of waiver or laches.
Additionally, Gruesen did not plead or obtain a finding on an abandonment theory, and the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to support same; (5) Alternatively, if Clifford did not meet his burden of
proof (which Clifford contends he did), it was because (1) the trial court denied Clifford's motion to
compel certain discovery that went to the heart of his case and/or (2) because the manner in which the trial
court conducted the trial deprived Clifford of a fair trial. Clifford was harmed by the trial court's error(s).
No. 02-13-00105-CV, Richard Clifford v. Shari McCall-Gruesen, as Trustee of the Gruesen Family Trust,
from the County Court at Law of Cooke County, by M. Keith Ogle, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff, & Miller,
L.L.P., 777 Main Street, Suite 3800, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 6/3/13.
Appellee addresses whether: (1) the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court's ruling that Clifford failed to meet the essential elements of his conversion claim; (2) the trial court
erred in denying Clifford's alleged election for the return of his personal property; (3) the trial court erred
in denying Clifford's request for conversion damages; (4) the trial court's conclusion that the Clifford's
alleged oral lease claim is barred by the statute of frauds is erroneous; (5) the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Clifford's motion to compel discovery; and (6) the trial Court conducted the trial in
a manner that deprived Clifford of a fair trial. No. 02-13-00105-CV, Richard Clifford v. Shari McCallGuesen, as Trustee of the Gruesen Family Trust, from the County Court at Law of Cooke County, by
Joshua R. Brinkley, 104 West Main Street, Gainesville, Texas 76240, for Appellee. 7/5/13.
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Appellant addresses the following questions: 1. Whether Appellees, creations of the City and
performing functions described as municipal in the statute under which Layton received disability pension
benefits, are municipal entities for purposes of applying the doctrine of governmental immunity? 2.
Whether Appellees, as municipal entities, may claim governmental immunity against claims relating to
their voluntary provision of disability benefits, a proprietary, not governmental, function? 3. Whether
Appellees, whether or not regarded as municipal entities performing a proprietary function, may invoke
the doctrine of governmental immunity to preclude equitable claims or claims seeking the equitable relief
of reinstatement of benefits to Layton? 4. Whether Appellees can claim governmental immunity as to
Layton's claim of violation of the Texas Constitution seeking the equitable relief of reinstatement? 4 5.
Whether the statute under which Layton received pension disability benefits, in making final only
determinations of whether a claimant has been employed by the City and as such eligible for such benefits,
can be interpreted to preclude a judicial remedy for wrongful discontinuation of such benefits? No. 02-1400084-CV, William D. Layton v. City of Fort Worth, City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement Fund and
Board of City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement Fund, from the 141st District Court of Tarrant County,
by Robert E. Goodman, Jr., Kilgore & Kilgore, PLLC, 3109 Carlisle Street, Dallas, Texas 75204, for
Appellant. 4/17/14.
Appellee addresses: ISSUE No. 1 Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the
decisions of the .Board are final and not reviewable (Responding to Appellant's Issue No. 5) ISSUE No.2
Whether Appellant asserted a viable claim for relief under the Texas Constitution (Responding to
Appellant's Issue No.4) ISSUE No.3 Whether Appellees are entitled to governmental immunity from
Appellant's claims. No. 02-14-00084-CV, William D. Layton v. City of Fort Worth, City of Fort Worth
Employees’ Retirement Fund and Board of City of Fort Worth Employees’ Retirement Fund, from the
141st District Court of Tarrant County, by
Frivolousness:
Garnishment:
Governmental Immunity:
Appellant contends that Arlington Independent School District is immune from suit because: (1)
Appellee Wilson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (2) Appellee Wilson cannot meet her
burden under Vance v. Ball State University. No. 02-13-00180-CV, Arlington Independent School District
v. Sandra Wilson, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County, by Dennis J. Eichelbaum, Carol
A. Simpson, Andrea L. Mooney, Eichelbaum Wardell Hansen Powell & Mehl, P.C., 5300 Democracy
Drive, Ste 200, Plano, Texas 75024, for Appellant. 7/31/12.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdition over Appellee’s
claim: (1) concerning his evaluation and transfer, in light of FWISD's governmental immunity, because
Palazzolo did not properly initiate FWISD's grievance process; and (2) concerning the lifting of the
trespass warning, in light of FWISD's governmental immunity, because the lifting of the trespass warning
was not an adverse employment action and because the trial court relied on inappropriate evidence that
caused it to improperly deny summary judgment. No. 02-13-00006-CV, Fort Worth Independent School
District v. Joseph Palazzolo, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Thomas P. Brandt,
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Francisco J. Valenzuela, Jennifer Kelley, Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin, Two Energy
Square, 4849 Greenville, Avenue, Suite 1300, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellant. 2/27/2013.
Appellee contends that he timely initiated the grievance and may recover damages not redressed
in the process, and that liftig the trespass warning constitutes adverse action under the Whistleblower Act.
No. 02-13-00006-CV, Fort Worth Independent School District v. Joseph Palazzolo, from the 271st District
Court of Wise County, by Jason C.N. Smith, Art Brender, Law Offices of Art Brender, 600 Eighth
Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellee. Approx. 4/1/2013.
Guaranty:
Appellant contends: Point of Error No. 1. The trial court erred in granting Southwest’s MSJ over
Appellant’s objections because Southwest’s MSJ was not supported by sufficient evidence; Point of Error
No. 2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 51.003 Right, denying his statutory right to have any
deficiency reduced by the fair market value of the Property, because that issue was not before the trial
court when it granted Southwest’s MSJ; Point of Error No. 3. Subject to, without waiving and in the
alternative to Point of Error No. 2, the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 51.003 Right, denying his
statutory right to have any deficiency reduced by the fair market value of the Property, because Appellant
did not waive his 51.003 Right; and Point of Error No. 4. The trial court erred in granting Appellee its
attorney’s fees, including, but not limited to, for Appellee’s failure to provide timesheets or other sufficient
evidence documenting its attorney’s fees and there are controverting affidavits regarding the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees. No. 02-14-00122-CV, Richard A. Myers v. Southwest Bank, from the
236th District Court of Tarrant County, by William L. Wolf, Christopher K. Chapaneri, Wolf & Henderson,
P.C., 4309 Irving Avenue, Suite 200, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellant. 7/16/14.
Appellee contends: Issue No. 1 The Trial Court did not err in granting Southwest’s MSJ over
Appellant’s objections that the MSJ was not supported by sufficient evidence, because Southwest
conclusively established each element for suit on the Guaranty. Issue No. 2 The Trial Court did not err in
considering Appellant’s waiver of his statutory right to offset under Texas Property Code § 51.003,
because offset is an affirmative defense, Appellant had the burden to create a fact issue on each element
of the affirmative defense, and Southwest could properly address the affirmative defense for the first time
in its Reply. Issue No. 3 The Trial Court did not err in denying Appellant’s affirmative defense of offset
under Texas Property Code § 51.003, because Appellant waived the defense. Issue No. 4 The Trial Court
did not err in granting Southwest’s attorneys’ fees over the objections of Appellant, and Appellant did not
object or controvert Southwest’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees No. 02-14-00122-CV, Richard A.
Myers v. Southwest Bank, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Matthew T. Taplett, State
Bar No. 24028026, POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE,, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, L.L.P., 500 W. 7th
Street, Suite 600, Fort Worth, TX 76102, for Appellee. 8/15/14.
Guardianship:
Habeas Corpus:
Halfway Houses:
Hauling:
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Healthcare Liability:
Appellants address whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by dismissing the Family’s case
against Raja Sawhney, M.D. and awarding Dr. Sawhney his attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351, when the expert report of Douglas K. Holmes, M.D. represented an
objective good faith effort to address the standard of care applicable to Dr. Sawhney, how Dr. Sawhney
breached the standard of care, and how such breach proximately caused the death of and the damages
suffered as a result – a conclusion which was reached by this Court of Appeals in a companion case where
a nearly identical expert report was presented against Dr. Sawhney. No. 02-14-00060-CV, D.W., as Next
Friend of M.M.W. and T.F.W., Minor Children, and the Independent Administrator of the Estate of K. H.,
Deceased, and Deborah Harris and Clarence Haynes, v. Raja Sawhney, M.D., from the 17th District Court
of Tarrant County, by Rosalyn R. Tippett, Tippett Law Office, 106 N. Denton Tap Road, Suite 210-242,
Coppell, Texas 75019, for Appellants. 3/25/14.
Appellee addresses the following question: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Raja
Sawhney, M.D.’s Objections to Plaintiffs’ New Chapter 74 Expert Report of Douglas Holmes, M.D. and
Motion to Dismiss? No. 02-14-00060-CV, D.W., as Next Friend of M.M.W. and T.F.W., Minor Children,
and the Independent Administrator of the Estate of K. H., Deceased, and Deborah Harris and Clarence
Haynes, v. Raja Sawhney, M.D., from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Russell G. Thornton,
Thiebaud Remington Thornton Bailey LLP, 4800 Fountain Place, 1445 Ross Avenue, Dallas, Texas
75202, for Appellee. 4/21/14.
Appellee contends that: Issue No. 1: The Trial Court did not err in granting Kasden’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment: Issue No. 2: The Trial Court’s
Granting of Kasden’s Motion for Summary Judgment and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
of Kritzer’s Breach of Contract Claim does not violate the Open Courts provision of the Texas
Constitution or Equal Protection Under the Law; Issue No. 3: Kritzer was not harmed by the Trial Court
Granting Kasden’s Motion for Summary Judgment and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment 0213-00414-CV, Wendy Kritzer v. Scott E. Kasden, M.D., and Scott E. Kasden, M.D., P.A., from the 153rd
District Court of Tarrant County, by Edward P. Quillin, David D. Raff, Quillin Law Firm, P.C., 4101
McEwen Rd., Suite 540, Dallas, Texas 75244, for Appellees. 4/30/14
Appellees contend that Appellants contend that the Court abused its discretion by not following
the cases of Ross in the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals and Sherman in the Fifth District Court of
Appeals and instead deciding within the framework of the Mejia in Thirteenth Court of Appeals. In
denying Appellants Motion to Dismiss, the trial court determined that Plaintiff was not required to have
filed an expert report within 120 days as required by Sec. 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are not healthcare liability claims according to these facts and the
guiding cases on point regarding these issues. The issue presented is whether or not Plaintiff’s claim is a
health care liability claim. No. 02-13-00399-CV, Columbia Medical Center of Denton Subsidiary, L.P.
d/b/a Denton Regional Medical Center and Columbia North Texas Subsidiary G.P., L.L.C., v. Wanda
Braudrick, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Eric Cedillo, Dustin Brown, Law Offices
of Eric Cedillo, P.C., 1725 Greenville Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellee. 12/27/13.
Appellant addresses the following questions in its brief: (1) Whether the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling Appellant’s objections that Dr. Van Wyk’s Report failed to establish his
qualifications for offering expert opinions as to the cause of Mr. Bowen’s injuries. (2) Whether the trial
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court abused its discretion by overruling Appellant’s objections to the sufficiency of Dr. Van Wyk’s report.
Specifically, that the report failed to set forth the applicable standard of care or identify how Appellant
breached said standard of care. (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant’s
objections that Dr. Van Wyk’s report failed to establish a causal connection between Southwest Surgical
Hospital’s alleged misconduct and Mr. Bowen’s injuries. (4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to dismiss Appellees’ health care liability claim with prejudice. No. 02-13-00281-CV,
Southwest Surgical Hospital v. Larry G. Bowen, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by David
Luningham, Helena Venturini, Watson, Caraway, Midkiff & Luningham, LLP, 309 West 7th Street, 1600
Oil & Gas Building, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 12/18/13.
Appellant addresses the following questions in its brief: (1) Whether the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling Appellant’s objections that Dr. Van Wyk’s Report failed to establish his
qualifications for offering expert opinions as to the cause of Mr. Bowen’s injuries. (2) Whether the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling Appellant’s objections to the sufficiency of Dr. Van Wyk’s report.
Specifically, that the report failed to set forth the applicable standard of care or identify how Appellant
breached said standard of care. (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant’s
objections that Dr. Van Wyk’s report failed to establish a causal connection between Southwest Surgical
Hospital’s alleged misconduct and Mr. Bowen’s injuries. (4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to dismiss Appellees’ health care liability claim with prejudice. No. 02-13-00281-CV,
Southwest Surgical Hospital v. Larry G. Bowen, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by David
Luningham, Helena Venturini, Watson, Caraway, Midkiff & Luningham, LLP, 309 West 7th Street, 1600
Oil & Gas Building, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 12/18/13.
Appellant’s Reply that there is no basis in law for Appellee’s argument that Appellant’s appeal
is untimely, that the expert’s report assumes facts not in evidence, that key portions of Appellee’s brief
make reference to North Hills Hospital, which is not a party to this appeal, and by not obtaining an order
from the trial court and not filing a notice of cross-appeal, appellee is barred from seeking any affirmative
relief from this Court. No. 02-13-00281-CV, Southwest Surgical Hospital v. Larry G. Bowen, from the
17th District Court of Tarrant County, by David Luningham, Helena Venturini, Watson, Caraway, Midkiff
& Luningham, LLP, 309 West 7 th Street, 1600 Oil & Gas Building, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for
Appellant.
Appellant contends that: 1. Foster is a “claimant” as defined by Texas Civil Practice &Remedies
Code §74.001(a)(2) and, therefore, Foster was required to comply with the expert report requirements of
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(a) when filing her health care liability claims. 2. Foster’s
claims are health care liability claims as defined by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.001(a)(13)
and the controlling legal precedent and, therefore, are governed by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
Chapter 74. 3. The trial court erred when it refused to dismiss Foster’s lawsuit as it was undisputed Foster
failed to timely file an expert report as required by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §74.351(a).
No. 02-13-00315-CV, Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P. d/b/a Cityview Care Center v. Francesca D.
Foster, from the County Court at Law Number 1 of Tarrant County, Texas, by Gregory R. Ave, Walters,
Balido & Crain, L.L.P., 900 Jackson Street, Suite 600, Dallas, Texas 75202, for Appellant. 11/12/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Cityview’s,
Cityview, Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §74.351(a)
and (b) Because Cityview did not Present Sufficient Evidence to Show that Foster’s Claims Fall Under
the TMLA, Thus Eliminating the Expert Report Requirement; (2) Cityview Waived their Right or Benefit
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to have Foster’s Claims Dismissed with Prejudice and Receive Attorney’s Fees by Calling Foster’s Claim
a Healthcare Liability Claim, When Cityview Intentionally Conducted Discovery Within the 120 Day
Period Before an Expert Report was Filed. No. 02-13-00315-CV, Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P. d/b/a
Cityview Care Center v. Francesca D. Foster, from the County Court at Law Number 1 of Tarrant County,
Texas, by Christina M Fox, Law Office of Christian Fox, PLLC, 1205 Hall Johnson Road, Colleyville,
Appellant addresses whether it was error for the trial court to grant the Appellee’s motion to
dismiss, since Appellant presented the Trial Court and both Defendants with an expert report, from a
qualified expert, that contained a fair summary of the expert’s opinion regarding the applicable standard
of care, the manner which Defendant Michelle Hacker’s care rendered to Appellant failed to meet the
standard of care and the causal relationship between that failure to meet the standard of care and
Appellant’s injury. No. 02-13-00218-CV, Laura Hatchel, as Next Friend of Chance Hatchel, a Minor,
v. Michelle Hacker, FNP-C, from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by John L. (Lin) McCraw,
III, Bryan Gantt, 1415 Harroun Street, McKinney, Texas 75069, and Michael A. Yanof, Cassie J. Dallas,
Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., 700 N. Pearl Street, 25th Floor, Dallas, Texas 75201, for
Appellant. 9/25/13.
Appellees contend that, because Appellants' failed to serve an adequate expert report on any
defendant pursuant to Section 74.351(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code on Appellee, the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining Appellee's objections to Dr. Gerstein's expert report,
and because of the multiple inadequacies, Dr. Gerstein's expert report does not represent a "good faith
effort," the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by granting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss and Motion
for Statutory Sanctions. No. 02-13-00218-CV, Laura Hatchel, as next friend of Chance Hatchel, a Minor
Plaintiff, v. Michelle Hacker, FNP-C, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Stephen L. Tatum,
Jordan M. Parker, David K. Speed, Cantey Hanger LLP, Cantey Hanger Plaza, 600 W. 6th Street, Suite
300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees. 12/23/13.
Appellant replies that Dr. Ippolito’s Expert Reports Properly Describe the Causal Link Between
Chance Hatchel’s Injuries and Defendant Michelle Hacker’s Negligent Conduct, and the Standard of Care
for Defendant Michelle Hacker. No. 02-13-00218-CV, Laura Hatchel, as next friend of Chance Hatchel,
a Minor Plaintiff, v. Michelle Hacker, FNP-C, from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by John
L. (Lin) McCraw, III, Bryan Gantt, 1415 Harroun Street, McKinney, Texas 75069, and Michael A. Yanof,
Cassie J. Dallas, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., 700 N. Pearl Street, 25th Floor, Dallas, Texas
75201, for Appellant. 12/19/13.
Appellant addresses whether, when a visitor sues a hospital, alleging a departure from accepted
standards of safety about her slip and fall as she was exiting the hospital, does the trial court err in failing
to dismiss the lawsuit if the visitor does not provide a Chapter 74 expert report. No. 02-13-00063-CV,
Weatherford Texas Hosptial Company, L.L.C. d/b/a Weatherford Regional Medical Center, from the
County Court at Law No. 1 of Parker County, by Ty Bailey, Stinnett Thiebaud & Remington, L.L.P., 1445
Ross Ave., Suite 4800, Dallas, Texas 75202, for Appellant. 5/29/13.
Appellee contends that the trial court correctly denied WRMC's motion to dismiss (for failure to
serve expert report) because Smart's claims are not a "HCLC" as defined by Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code §74.001(a)(13) in the TMLA. No. 02-13-00063-CV, Weatherford Texas Hospital
Company, L.L.C. d/b/a Weatherford Regional Medical Center v. Katherine Smart, from the county Court
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at Law No. 1 of Parker County, by Bart Behr, Behr Law Firm, 1920 Corporate Drive, Suite 108a, San
Marcos, Texas 78666, for Appellee.
Appellee contends that the Trial Judge did not abuse her discretion when, after properly analyzing
the facts under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21 a, the appropriate rule, she correctly ruled that Appellee's
service of his expert's report and CV by Certified Mail was made on November 22, 2011 and therefore
timely and then, based on this ruling, denied Appellant's motion to dismiss for alleged untimely service.
No. 02-12-00099-CV, Michael J. McQuade, D.D.S., M.S., v. Richard Brooks Berry, from the 16th District
Court of Denton County, by Raul H. Loya, Loya & Associates, 10830 N. Central Expy., Suite 200, Dallas,
Appellant addresses whether: (1) Plaintiffs’ expert report is sufficient to support their claims that
Legend’s failure to prevent or respond to Macri’s alleged aspiration episode proximately caused her death
(i.e., does it establish the expert’s qualifications to testify regarding the cause of Macri’s death, is it
conclusory and based on speculation, and does it sufficiently rule out other plausible or suspected causes
of Macri’s death); and (2) the report is sufficient to support the claim that Legend’s negligence proximately
caused her fall-related injuries. No. 02-12-00042-CV, Legend Healthcare Gainesville, LP d/b/a Pecan
Tree Manor v. Josephine Barnes, Terri Baize, and Marie Hauser, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate
of Theresa Sue Macri, from the 235th District Court of Cooke County, by Nissa M. Dunn, Law Offices
of Nissa Dunn, P.C, 600 Navarro Street, Suite 500, San Antonio, Texas 78205, and Harold .I, Lotz, Jr.,
Loe & Associates, L.L.P., Ruben Olvera, 1210 Nacogdoches Road, San Antonio, Texas 78209, for
Appellant. 4/11/12.
Home Equity Loans:
Homeowners’ Association:
Indemnity:
Independent Contractor
Injunction:
Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion by enjoining Becker and Perdue
from operating water wells in violation of Article 9.26 of the Conditions and Covenants, and whether BFE
Development also required to prove the extra element that it had no adequate remedy at law in order to
establish its right to obtain an injunction. No. 02-13-00424-CV, Robert G. Becker and Harold Scott
Perdue v. DFE Development Corp. D/b/a FBE Water Company, Richard Bourland, and BFE
Homeowners Assoc., Inc., from the 415th District Court of Parker County, by J. Heath Coffman, Andrew
Norman, Brackett & Ellis, 100 Main Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees. 2/6/14.
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Inmate Litigation:
Appellant contends the trial court erred and abused its discretion in several respects: (1) in finding
Appellant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial judge should have been recused,
and by denying Appellant’s motion to recuse; and (2) at the hearing on Appellee’s Motion to Declare
Appellant a vexatious litigant, it (a) precluded Appellant from being present at the hearing, refused to
allow Appellant to argue and refused to consider his written opposition to said motion; (b) granted
Appellee’s motion; (c) denying Appellant’s motion for voluntary dismissal and thereafter allowing
Appellee to argue for dismissal with prejudice, precluding Appellant from being present and disallowing
Appellant to argue against dismissal with prejudice at said hearing, and then dismissing Appellant’s
Petition for Removal with prejudice. 02-09-00443-CV, Michael Lou Garrett v. Barry L. Macha, from the
30th District Court of Wichita County, by Michael Lou Garrett, Allred Unit, 2101 FM 369 North, Iowa
Park, Texas 76367-6568, Pro Se, for Appellant. 2/10/10.
Appellee contends the trial court properly: (1) declined to recuse in a matter given that the judge
of the court had heard other matters involving the defendant; (2) invoked the authority of Art. 11.051 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to declare Appellant a vexatious litigant without oral
argument by Appellant; and (3) dismissed Appellant’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with prejudice
without allowing Appellant opportunity for oral argument. 02-09-00443-CV, Michael Lou Garrett v.
Barry L. Macha, from the 30th District Court of Wichita County, by Todd Greenwood, Wichita County
Civil Division, Wichita County Courthouse, 900 7th Street, Room 351, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for
Appellee. 4/12/10.
Instructed Verdict:
Insurance:
Appellants contend that: (1) By entering into an Agreed Final judgment, Kurosky failed to comply
with the policy provisions requiring an actual trial; (2) By entering into an Agreed Final judgment,
Kurosky failed to comply with the policy provisions requiring cooperation; (3) By entering into an Agreed
Final judgment, Kurosky voluntarily assumed an obligation at his own cost; (4) Rust's bodily injury claim
was excluded under the 4333 Fossil policy, because Rust was an insured and a resident of the household;
(5) Rust's bodily injury claim was excluded by the "rental property" exclusion and the "other locations"
exclusion of the 4325 Fossil policy; (6) Rust's bodily injury claim was excluded by the "unscheduled real
property" exclusion of the umbrella policy; (7) TFIe's and FIE's alleged failure to provide a reservation of
rights letter did not constitute waiver or estoppel of any policy conditions, and could not create coverage
where coverage did not exist; (8) Neither the filing of this declaratory judgment action nor the supposed
rejection of a supposed settlement demand could excuse Kurosky's failure to comply with policy
conditions; (9) The trial court erred in granting Rust's motion for summary judgment; (10)The trial court
erred in denying TFIe's and FIE's motion for summary judgment; (11) The trial court erred in summarily
denying TFIe's and FIE's claims for declaratory relief against Kurosky in the absence of a motion for
summary judgment; (12) The trial court erred in denying TFIe's and FIE's postjudgment motions. No. 0213-00169-CV, Texas Farmers Insurance Company and Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Frank Kurosky
and Pamela Rust, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Kenneth R. Chambers, Kent
Chambers, 33014 Tamina Road, Magnolia, Texas 77354, for Appellants. 7/8/13.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting Fred Loya's Second Motion for Summary
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Judgment and by denying the City of Carrollton's Motion for Summary Judgment because: (1) the
smmary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that the insured substantially complied with any
and all of Fred Loya's alleged requirements for adding Donna Butts back to the Policy before the accident;
(2) the summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that the Policy is ambiguous as to how
additional insured arc to be added back to the Policy and when such addition is effective, and the
reasonable interpretation of the Policy proffered by the City of Carrollton must therefore be adopted; (3)
the summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that Fred Loya suffered no prejudice when
it received the full premium payment for the additional insured, even if allegedly received a few hours after
the accident; (4) the summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that Fred Loya waived its
right and/or was estopped to deny coverage for the accident because (I) Fred Loya failed to complete the
portion of the Auto Policy Change Request Form indicating the time at which the change would become
effective and (II) the Policy does not state that receipt of payment is required before the requested
additional insured change became effective; (5) the summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter
of law that Fred Loya ratified the Auto Policy Change Request Form adding Donna Butts back to the
Policy. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by granting Fred Loya's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment because even if the City of Carrollton were not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that: (1) Fred Loya failed to conclusively establish the
absence of genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment for Fred Loya, including: (a)
Whether the insured substantially complied with the Policy's requirements for adding Donna Butts back
to the Policy before the accident; (b) Whether the City of Carrollton's interpretation of the Policy as to how
additional insureds may be added to the Policy and when such addition is effective is reasonable; (c)
Whether Fred Loya suffered actual prejudice by the receipt of premium after the accident when the Auto
Policy Change Request Form was completed, received, accepted, and acted upon by Fred Loya before the
accident; (d) Whether the Auto Policy Change Request Form was signed and completed on the day before
the accident; (e) When the Auto Policy Change Request Form became effective; (f) Whether Fred Loya
waived any alleged right to require receipt of payment of the premium charged to re-add Donna Butts back
to the Policy before such change became effective when the Policy does not state any such alleged
requirement; when the Auto Policy Change Request Form does not state any alleged requirement; when
the blank on the Form for the time it was effective was left blank by Fred Loya; and when Fred Loya
stated on its Auto Policy Change Request Form that Donna Butts has been "added" before the accident;
(g) whether Fred Loya is estopped to deny coverage for the accident; (h) Whether Fred Loya ratified the
Auto Policy Change Request Form adding Donna Butts back to the Policy; (i) Whether the City of
Carrollton asserted a valid claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (j) Whether the City
of Carrollton asserted a valid claim for breach of the DTPA; (k) Whether the City of Carrollton asserted
a valid claim for breach of the Texas Insurance Code; and (I) Whether the City of Carrollton asserted a
valid Stowers claim; and (2) the affidavit of Lana Ruiz was not based on personal knowledge, did not
show a factual basis for her statements and conclusions therein, and therefore was without foundation or
predicate. No. 02-12-00470-CV, City of Carrollton v. Fred Loya Insurance Company, from the 431
District Court of Denton County, by D. Bradley Kizzia, Samantha R. Cooper, Brown Fox Kizzia &
Johnson PLLC, 750 N. St. Paul Street, Suite 1320, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellant. 2/19/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) the trial court did not err by trying Judy's direct claims against FIE, and
FIE's responsibility for ServiceMaster's negligent failure to properly mitigate water loss because these
theories involved common questions of law and fact; (2) Abundant evidence shows FIE failed to comply
with its policy; (2) Ample evidence supports the jury's finding that $42,000 will reasonably compensate
Judy for covered losses, and this evidence is easily sufficient to comply with the doctrine of Concurrent
Causation; (3) FIE's global issue that the trial court erred by failing to grant its motion for summary
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judgment and directed verdict presents nothing for review; (4) Ample evidence supports the jury's award
of trial attorneys' fees, and appellate attorneys' fees have not been challenged. No. 02-12-00437-CV, Fire
Insurance Exhcange v. Judy Kenedy, from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Craig S. Smith,
14493 S.P.I.D., Ste. A; P.M.B. 240, Corpus Christi, TX 78418, for Appellee. Approx. 9/16/12.
Insurance Coverage:
Intellectual Property:
Invasion of Privacy:
Inverse Condemnation:
Joint Use Agreement:
Appellant contends that: 1. The trial court erred in granting a take nothing summary judgment in
favor of Verizon, and in denying Tri-County’s motion for partial summary judgment. A. Tri-County
terminated the Joint Use Agreements (JUAs), requiring Verizon to remove all its attachments from TriCounty’s poles. B. There is at least a fact issue that Verizon is a tenant at sufferance and therefore a
trespasser. C. As to Tri-County’s breach of contract claims: 1. Verizon has refused to pay adjusted rentals
appropriately calculated under the pertinent contractual formula. 2. Verizon has not paid all rentals due
at the 1993 rates which it argued were correct. 3. New rental rates under the JUA are not conditioned on
Verizon agreeing to the same. 4. At least a fact issue exists as to Verizon breaching its contractual
obligation to report, and get permission for, attachments it made on Tri-County’s poles. 5. Verizon
breached the JUAs by failing to provide cost and charge information in good faith required by the JUAs.
D. There is some evidence to support an award of exemplary damages; 2. The trial court erred in granting
judgment to Verizon for its fees and costs. A. The trial court abused its discretion in granting Verizon a
post-rendition leave to amend its answer and supplement its motion for summary judgment to seek its
attorneys’ fees. B. The trial court abused its discretion in overruling Tri- County’s objection to Verizon’s
summary judgment evidence as to fees, since Verizon did not timely identify its expert witnesses on fees,
did not produce the documents on which they based their opinions. 1. There was no admissible evidence
to support a judgment for Verizon’s fees. 3. Once this Court reverses the judgment of the trial court as to
Tri- County’s claims, it is required to reverse the trial court’s judgment as to Verizon’s attorney’s fees.
No. 02-14-00199-CV, Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc., v. GTE Southwest Incorporate, d/b/a Verizon
Southwest, from the 43rd District Court of Parker County, by Steven K. Hayes, Law Office of Steven K.
Hayes, 201 Main Street, Suite 600 Fort Worth, Texas 76102, John Westhoff, Borden & Westhoff, LLP,
1250 Santa Fe Drive, Weatherford, Texas 76086, and Thomas Magee, Keller and Heckman LLP, 1001
G Street, N. W., Suite 500 West, Washington, D.C., 2001, for Appellant. 9/15/14.
Judgment:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment without giving Appellant credit
for the amount paid in settlement to Appellee by a previously settling defendant. 02-09-00031-CV, Paul
Thailing v. Sonny Matthews a/n/f/ of Charles Matthews, from the 17th Judicial District Court of Tarrant
County, by Steven P. Amis, Amis & Farish, 2301 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 250, Arlington, Texas 76006,
for Appellant. 4/14/09.
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Appellee contends the trial court did not err in its judgment. 02-09-00031-CV, Paul Thailing v.
Sonny Matthews a/n/f/ of Charles Matthews, from the 17th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, by
Thomas W. McKenzie, Turner & McKenzie, 1800 Norwood Drive, Suite 100, Hurst, Texas 76054, for
Appellee. 5/26/09.
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc:
Judicial Immunity:
Jurisdiction:
Appellant contends that: 1. As to Giovanni’s breach of contract claim-which directly relates to
Oncor’s provision of Delivery Services which are covered by Oncor’s Tariff-PURA places exclusive
original jurisdiction over the issues covered by Oncor’s Tariff in the pertinent regulatory authorities, i.e.,
the City of Fort Worth and the PUC; (2) Oncor’s Tariff, and the filed-rate doctrine as it applies to Oncor’s
Tariff, continue to have the same role after the 1999 deregulation amendments to the Public Utility
Regulatory Act as they had before deregulation. PURA specifically excepted Oncor from deregulation,
and Oncor remains subject to regulation. No. 02-11-00237-CV, Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Giovanni
Homes Corp., from the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Steven K. Hayes, Law Office of Steven
K. Hayes, 201 Main Street, Suite 600 Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and Micheal V. Winchester, Jack
Conner, Micheal V. Winchester & Associates, P.C., 5601 Granite Parkway, Suite 410, Piano, Texas
75024, for Appellant. 10/31/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) The PUC Does Not Have Exclusive Jurisdiction Over this Dispute;
(2) The Filed-Rate Doctrine Does Not Apply Here; and (3) Alternatively, if the Court Concludes it Lacks
Jurisdiction, Giovanni’s Claims Should be Remanded and Abated to Cure the Defect, Not Dismissed. No.
02-11-00237-CV, Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Giovanni Homes Corp., from the 48th District Court of
Tarrant County, by R. Brent Cooper, Michelle E. Robberson, William Allred, Cooper & Scully, P.C., 900
Jackson Street, Suite 100, Dallas, Texas 75202, and Charla G. Aldous, Aldous Law Firm, 2311 Cedar
Springs, Suite 200, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellee. 10/13/13.
Appellant responds that: 1. In governing the relocation of lines, and obligating the customer to
pay all costs therefore, Oncor’s Tariff makes no exception for lines lying outside of a platted easement..
2. Giovanni was a Retail Customer to which Oncor’s Tariff applied, both because of its concession that
its request for relocation would serve its properties, and its historic use of Oncor. 3. The breach of contract
cases show the regulatory authorities have exclusive original jurisdiction over Giovanni’s contract claim.
4. Giovanni agrees deregulation did not affect Oncor’s Tariff. The Fifth Circuit has recently confirmed that
the filed-rate doctrine bars a claim regarding repair times, as that claim “involves the subject matter of the
tariff.” . No. 02-11-00237-CV, Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Giovanni Homes Corp., from the 48th
District Court of Tarrant County, by Steven K. Hayes, Law Office of Steven K. Hayes, 201 Main Street,
Suite 600 Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and Micheal V. Winchester, Jack Conner, Micheal V. Winchester
& Associates, P.C., 5601 Granite Parkway, Suite 410, Piano, Texas 75024, for Appellant. 11/12/13.
Appellant contends that the courts of Texas cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction over ACT
Trading, in conformity with the requirements of due process, and the exercise of jurisdiction over ACT
Trading by the courts of Texas would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. No.
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02-14-00035-CV, ACT Trading F.Z.E. v. Triple Canopy, Inc., from the District Court of Hood County,
by Matthew L. Benson, Benson Comstock, LLP, One Riverway, Suite 1850, Houston, Texas 77056, for
Appellant. 4/21/14.
Appellee addresses the following questions: 1. Did the district court reversibly err when it
concluded that ACT Trading FZE was “fused” with its sole owner and employee Dennis Mark and the
other Defendants for purposes of jurisdictional analysis? 2. Did the district court reversibly err when it
concluded that Texas Courts have general jurisdiction over ACT Trading FZE? No. 02-14-00035-CV,
ACT Trading F.Z.E. v. Triple Canopy, Inc., from the 355th District Court of Hood County, by Gregory
Dimmick, Katie P. Harrison, J. Matthew Wright, Mullin Hoard & Brown, L.L.P., 2911 Turtle Creek Blvd.,
Suite 880, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellee. 5/13/14.
Appellant addresses whether: (1) the Trial Court erred in that it not have personal jurisdiction over
Appellees in light of the substantial factual record set forth before the Trial Court showing that Appellees
numerous contacts with the State of Texas; (2) Appellees met their burden to negate all twenty-eight (28)
bases for personal jurisdiction as set forth by Appellant in its Third Amended Petition and Amended
Response to Appellees' Special Appearance and Objection to Personal Jurisdiction in light of the evidence
submitted to the Trial Court in which Appellees failed to address the majority of the bases for personal
jurisdiction and broadly responded to remaining bases for jurisdiction; (3) the Trial Court erred in finding
that it not have personal jurisdiction over Appellees in light of the undisputed evidence showing that
Appellees had minimum contacts with Texas and, thus, conferring specific jurisdiction; (4) Appellees
purposefully availed themselves of conducting activities in Texas and exercise of jurisdiction comports
with the notions of fair substantial justice; and (5) the Trial Court erred in finding that it did not have
personal jurisdiction over Appellees in light of the undisputed evidence showing that Appellees had
continuous and systematic contacts with Texas and, thus, conferring general jurisdiction. No. 02-1200426-CV, Professional Association of Golf Officials v. Phillips Campbell & Phillips, L.L.P. and Patrick
C. Campbell, Jr., from the 96th District Court of Tarrant County, by Christian S. Dennie, W. Judd
Pritchard, Barlow Garsek & Simon, LLP, 3815 Lisbon Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Appellees.
5/7/13.
Appellees addresses whether: (1) Appellant waived challenging the trial court's Findings of Fact,
entered in conjunction with granting Appellees' Special Appearance, by failing to challenge them for legal
or factual insufficiency in its Brief; (2) Notwithstanding Issue No.1 above, Appellees' evidence, submitted
by their Special Appearance, was legally sufficient to support the trial court's corresponding Findings of
Fact; (3) Notwithstanding Issue No.1 above, Appellees' evidence, submitted by their Special Appearance,
was factually sufficient to support the trial court's corresponding Findings of Fact; and (4) the trial court
properly granted Appellees' Special Appearance, for lack of personal jurisdiction, when the evidence, as
found by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and unchallenged by Appellant for legal or factual
insufficiency, establishes that: a. Appellees are a law firm and lawyer in Pennsylvania who do not conduct
"business" in Texas as defined by Section 17.042 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; b.
Appellant is an association which, for the entirety of the attorney client relationship, was also located in
Pennsylvania, and did not move to Texas until it terminated the attorney-client relationship right before
it filed suit in response to Appellees filing a writ of summons against it in Pennsylvania to collect fees; c.
the gist of Appellant's legal malpractice allegations against Appellees involve negotiation of a CBA in
states other than Texas; d. with the sole exception of a single board meeting, Appellees represented,
advised and interacted with Appellant from Pennsylvania, either in person, by phone or email; and e. the
sole in-person meeting between Appellant and Appellees in Dallas, Texas is a single board meeting
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attended by Appellee lawyer, set up at a place of Appellant's choosing per its Bylaws, to take place at a
central meeting place for members. No. 02-12-00426-CV, Professional Association of Golf Officials v.
Phillips Campbell & Phillips, L.L.P. and Patrick C. Campbell, Jr., from the 96th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Michael A. Yanof, Thomas A. Culpepper, Robert James Pathroff, Thompson, Coe, Cousins
& Irons, L.L.P., 700 North Pearl Street, 25th Floor, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellees. 7/9/13.
Appellant replies that: (1) PAGO was formed and operated as a membership organization run by
its members; (2) Appellees’ torts, bad acts, and manipulation occurred in Texas and can be broken down
into three categories: (A) historic bad acts; (B) post-termination bad acts; and (C) loss of automobile,
automobile insurance, travel privileges, and failure to grieve; (3) Appellees are in accord with Appellant
that it had the burden to negate all twenty-eight (28) allegations of jurisdiction. Appellees simply failed
to do so, thus, as a matter of law, Appellees’ special appearance should not be upheld; (4) Appellees
focused on what are perceived technicalities and did not focus on the merits of the case. Appellant
adequately and clearly presented the issues on appeal for this Honorable Court’s consideration; (5) Texas
law does not require a lawyer to sit in an office in Texas to be found to have purposefully availed himself
of personal jurisdiction in Texas. Based on the conclusions of law reached by the Trial Court, this
Honorable Court should review the record de novo. No. 02-12-00426-CV, Professional Association of
Golf Officials v. Phillips Campbell & Phillips, L.L.P. and Patrick C. Campbell, Jr., from the 96th District
Court of Tarrant County, by Christian S. Dennie, W. Judd Pritchard, Barlow Garsek & Simon, LLP, 3815
Lisbon Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Appellees. 7/29/13.
Jury:
Jury Trial:
Jury Charge:
Appellant contends that the Court erred by submitting an unnecessary and impermissible
instruction to the jury in the Court’s Charge. No. 02-14-00218-CV, Teri Anglim v. Chesapeake Operating,
Inc., from the 43rd District Court of Parker County, by Kirk Claunch, Kyle Claunch, The Claunch Law
Firm, 301 W. Central Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76164, and James D. Piel, James D. Piel, P.C., 1101 bear
Creek Parkway, Suite 3105, Keller, Texas 76248, for Appellant. 10/7/14.
Justice of the Peace Appeals:
Juvenile:
Appellant addresses: 1. Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
jury's decision for a 15 year sentence. 2. The 15 year sentence given to M.E. is cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the 8th Amendment. 3. The trial court erred in only allowing each side 6
peremptory strikes. 4. The trial court abused its discretion by closing the hearing without good cause.
No. 02-14-00051-CV, In the Matter of M. E., from the Cooke County Court at Law, by Joshua R.
Brinkley, 209 South Dixon Street, P.O. Box 1517, Gainesville, Texas 76240, for Appellant. 8/29/14.
Appellant addresses: 1. Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
jury's decision for a 15 year sentence. 2. The 15 year sentence given to M.E. is cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the 8th Amendment. 3. The trial court erred in only allowing each side 6
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peremptory strikes. 4. The trial court abused its discretion by closing the hearing without good cause.
No. 02-14-00051-CV, In the Matter of M. E., from the Cooke County Court at Law, by Joshua R.
Brinkley, 209 South Dixon Street, P.O. Box 1517, Gainesville, Texas 76240, for Appellant. 8/29/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) The destruction of jury questionnaires used in voir dire amounts to
a destruction of a part of the record necessary to the appeal's resolution, violated Respondent's Due Process
rights to participate meaningfully in his appeal, amounts to a closure of judicial proceedings in violation
of the public's First Amendment right to access the proceedings; (2) the Trial Court erred in overruling
Respondent's Batson Challenge; (3) material evidence involving a third party confession was not turned
over to trial counsel in violation of Brady v. Maryland; (4) the jury was not permitted to hear testimony
concerning a third party confession, thus depriving the Respondent of the right to present a complete
defense; and (5) The jury charge provided the jury with a definition of self defense, but failed to mention
self defense in the application section of the charge. No. 02-11-00335-CV, In the Matter of C. H., a
Juvenile, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Blake R. Burns, 115 North Henderson Street,
Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 7/5/12.
Landlord/Tenant:
Lawyer Discipline:
Lease:
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred: (1) in finding that John and Laura Lemley were
liable as personal guarantors on a 2011 lease agreement between two corporate entities, where John and
Laura Lemley personally guaranteed a 2008 lease agreement between the same parties for a set term, and
the corporate entities subsequently entered into separate agreements extending some terms of the 2008
lease without John and Laura Lemley's signatures as personal guarantors. 24. (2) Whether the District
Court erred in awarding title to the Vessels to Tejas, where the Vessels were built and paid for by JFFG,
the Vessels were at all times titled in JFFG's name, and no evidence was presented that any party ever gave
JFFG consideration for the Vessels. No. 02-13-00316-CV, Just for Fun Grapevine, Inc., John Lemley,
and Laura Lemley v. Tejas Fun, L.P. and Peter J. Clark, from the County Court at Law Number 2 sitting
for the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Joshua H. Northam, K. Elizabeth Swan, Moore &
Northam, 111 W. Spring Valley Rd., Ste. 250, Richardson, Texas 75081, for Appellants. 12/16/13.
Appellant replies that the Lemley’s personal guaranty did not automatically renew, and Appellee
has presented no evidence that it has the right to title to the vessels. No. 02-13-00316-CV, Just for Fun
Grapevine, Inc., John Lemley, and Laura Lemley v. Tejas Fun, L.P. and Peter J. Clark, from the County
Court at Law Number 2 sitting for the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Joshua H. Northam, K.
Elizabeth Swan, Moore & Northam, 111 W. Spring Valley Rd., Ste. 250, Richardson, Texas 75081, for
Appellants. 2/3/14.
Legal Malpractice:
Libel:
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Licensed Professionals:
Liens:
Appellant contends that: (1) The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Aflatouni's Application for
Temporary Injunction Because the Montoyas' Lien is Unenforceable Due to Res Judicata; A. Res Judicata
Res Judicata is Applied in Texas Using a Transactional Approach, not Based Upon the Similarity of the
Claims as Argued by Appellees; B. Res Judicata Applies to Any Claim Arising Out of the Occurrence or
Transaction, Not Solely Compulsory Counterclaims as Argued by Appellees; C. Appellees Seek to Expand
the Holding in Stephens; and (2) Because the Ryan Debt to the Montoyas Automatically Accelerated
When: (1) Ryan Defaulted on Ryan's Debt to WMC or (2) Lots Were Sold by WMC and Ryan,
Limitations Bars the Montoyas' Claims (a) Ryan's Default on the WMC Debt Matured Ryan's Debt to the
Montoyas. No. 02-13-00064-CV, Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John Aflatouni v. Mark Anthony Montoya and
Enid Montoya, from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by Jeffrey R. Sandberg, Palmer & Manuel,
L.L.P., 8350 N. Central Expressway, Suite 1111, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellant. 6/11/13.
Appellees reply that: (1) The Doctrine of Res Judicata does not apply to non-judicial foreclosures
because a non~judicial foreclosure by power of sale is a right exercisable without the need to resort to the
judicial process; (2) Texas Law requires notice of the exercise of an option to accelerate and requires that
a Holder of an Installment Note make demand to the Maker for payment of an overdue installment prior
to exercising an optional Acceleration Clause . No. 02-13-0064-CV, Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John
Aflatouni, v. Mark Anthony Montoya and Enid Montoya, by Roger M. Yale, 1417 E. McKinney, St., Ste.
220, Denton, Texas 76209, for Appellees. 5/28/13.
Limitations:
Limited Liability Companies:
Lost Profits:
Local Option Elections:
Local Rules:
Mediation:
Mental Health:
Appellant addresses the following: Was the evidence legally and factually insufficient to support
the authorization of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to administer to C.P.
psychoactive medications, regardless of C.P.’s refusal? No. 02-14-00246-CV, In the Matter of C.P., from
the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Brett W. Hale, P.O. Box 98, Iowa Park, Texas
Appellee addresses: Whether the Evidence was Legally and Factually Sufficient to Support the
Trial Court’s Decision that C.P. Receive Court-Ordered Psychoactive Medications? ? No. 02-14-00246________________________________________
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CV, In the Matter of C.P., from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Lori Johnston,
Wichita County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 900 7th Street, Room 351, Wichita Falls, Texas
76301, for Appellee. 10/2/14.
Appellant addresses whether the evidence legally and factually insufficient to support the order
authorizing psychoactive medication. No. 02-14-00210-CV and 02-14-00209, In the Matter of S.C.P.,
from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Wichita County, by Jeff McKnight, Kristen Leigh Hornyk, 900
8th Street, Suite 815, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for Appellant. 7/18/14.
Appellee addresses Whether the Evidence was Legally and Factually Sufficient to Support the
Trial Court’s Order Authorizing the Administration of Psychoactive Medication and that Appellant receive
court-ordered temporary inpatient mental health services. No. 02-14-00210-CV and 02-14-00209, In the
Matter of S.C.P., from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Wichita County, by Lori Johnston, Wichita
County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 900 7th Street, Room 351, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for
Appellee. 8/7/14.
Appellant addresses whether the Evidence was Legally and Factually Sufficient to Support the
Trial Court's Order Authorizing Administration of Psychoactive Medication. No. 02-13-00129-CV, In
the Matter of A.S.K., from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Laura C. Ingram, Wichita
County Courthouse, District Attorney's Office, 900 7th Street, Room 351, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301.
Appellant addresses whether the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the
authorization of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to administer to A.S.K.
psychoactive medications, regardless of A.S.K.' s refusal. No. 02-13-00129-CV, In the Matter of A.S.K.,
from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Brett W. Hale, P.O. Box 98, Iowa Park, Texas
Appellant addresses whether the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the
temporary mental health commitment. 02-10-00149-CV, In the Matter of T.J.H., from the County Court
at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Brett W. Hale, P.O. Box 98, Iowa Park, Texas 76367, for Appellant.
6/8/10.
Appellee contends the trial court did not err in its judgment that the Appellant be committed for
court-ordered temporary mental health services because the evidence was factually and legally sufficient
to show a continuing pattern of behavior to support the commitment. 02-10-00149-CV, In the Matter of
T.J.H., from the County Court at Law #1 of Wichita County, by Barry L. Macha, Todd Greenwood,
Shelly Wilbanks, Criminal District Attorney’s Office of Wichita County, Wichita County Courthouse, 900
7th Street, Wichita, Texas 76301, for Appellee. 6/15/10.
Mortgages:
Motion in Limine:
Municipal Employment:
Municipal Utility Districts:
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Negligence:
Necessary Parties:
New Trial:
Appellants address whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellants’ Motion
for New Trial. No. 02-13-00278-CV, Hest Technologies, Inc., Trip Wire Entertainment, LLC, and Chris
Canard, v. PC Connection Sales Corp., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Thomas M.
Michel, James V. Jay, Griffith, Jay & Michel, LLP, 2200 Forest Park Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76110,
for Appellants. 10/11/13.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion for new trial because the
damage award was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and the motion for new
trial complained about the lack of a court reporter for trial without an agreed waiver of the same. 02-0800332-CV, Kohler v. M & M Truck Conversions, from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Tarrant County,
by Mr. Leigh W. Davis, Fort Worth, Texas, for Appellant. 1/21/09.
Appellee contends the trial court did not err by denying the motion for new trial nor was the
amount awarded against the great weight and preponderance of both the evidence at trial and the evidence
at the motion for new trial. Appellee also denies that there was no agreement to waive the reporter. 02-0800332-CV, Kohler v. M & M Truck Conversions, from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Tarrant County,
by Jeffery D. Gooch, 2315 North Main Street, Suite 320, Fort Worth, Texas 76164, for Appellee.
4/09/09.
Noncompetition Agreement:
Appellants address: 1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling, before trial, that noncompete
agreements signed by four of the five individual defendants as consideration for jobs they had not held for
many years were valid and enforceable, even though: a. All of the individual defendants had been
promoted to different positions with different job titles, rights, and responsibilities, and did not sign new
noncompete agreements in connection with their new positions. b. None of the old noncompete
agreements contained a geographical restriction, which is required by Texas law. 2. Whether the jury’s
finding that the individual defendants breached their noncompete agreements should have been
disregarded as immaterial, because the noncompete agreements were old, invalid, and unenforceable. 3.
Whether the jury’s award of more than $4 million in future lost profit damages should be set aside
because: a. Future lost profits are not recoverable in this case because Horizon cannot prove the fact of
damages. b. Horizon admitted at trial that it had not lost any customers or contracts to PRP that would
support the future lost profit award.. c. Horizon’s only evidence was speculative expert testimony. d.
Horizon has no entitlement to future lost profits generated by Piechocki, an at-will employee. 4. Whether
Horizon’s numerous and duplicative tort liability theories were supported by the evidence or by Texas law.
5. Whether Horizon was entitled to exemplary damages, where: a. It submitted defective jury questions
that prevent this Court from understanding the basis for the jury’s findings on exemplary damages. b.
There is no evidence that the defendants specifically intended to cause a substantial injury that would
support exemplary damages. c. There was no evidence of the harm required to support an exemplary
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damage award. d. The awards against Acadia and PRP cannot be sustained on Romero grounds. 6.
Whether the attorneys’ awards are improper, where: a. Texas law does not authorize the recovery of
attorneys’ fees in a suit to enforce covenants not to compete. b. Horizon failed to adequately segregate its
fees. c. The trial court erred in awarding appellate attorneys’ fees as a matter of law where the evidence
of those fees was not conclusive. 7. Whether the trial court’s sanctions award against Mike Saul should
be set aside because it was based on a mistaken view of Saul’s legal duties. No. 02-13-00339-CV, Acadia
Healthcare Company, Inc., Michael A. Saul, Timothy J. Palus, Peter D. Ulasewicz, Barbara H. Bayma,
and John M Piechocki v. Horizon Health Corporation, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by
Grace Weatherly, R. William Wood, Jesse L. Cromwell, Wood, Thacker & Weatherly, P.C., 400 West
Oak Street, Suite 310, Denton, Texas 76201, for Acadia and PRP; Stephen J. Roppolo, Alia S. Wynne,
Fisher & Phillips, LLP, 333 Clay Street, Suite 4000, Houston, Texas 77002, for Saul, Paulus, Ulasewicz,
Bayma, and Piechocki; Jeffery T. Nobles, Kelly H. Leonard, Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, LLP, Post Oak
Boulevard, Suite 2500, Houston, Texas 77056, for Appellants. 5/23/14.
Cross-Appellant addresses these questions: I. Did waiver of their argument concerning
segregation of attorney’s fees preclude Defendants from raising this issue as a basis for reducing the jury’s
attorney’s fee award after trial? II. Was remittitur of the jury’s award of attorney’s fees for trial to Horizon
on the basis of failure to segregate improper, where Horizon segregated its fees and the trial court’s
remittitur was not conditioned on a new trial or Horizon’s acceptance of remittitur? III. Was the reduction
of Horizon’s appellate attorney’s fees improper where the uncontested evidence supported the full amount
requested by Horizon? No. 02-13-00339-CV, Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., Michael A. Saul,
Timothy J. Palus, Peter D. Ulasewicz, Barbara H. Bayma, and John M Piechocki v. Horizon Health
Corporation, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Kendyl T. Hanks, Greenberg Traurig,
LLP, 300 West 6th Street, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701, for Cross-Appellant. 5/23/14.
Cross-Appellee addresses the following: 1. Did the trial court properly enter judgment
notwithstanding the jury’s answers to Question 28 regarding an award of attorneys’ fees where Horizon
offered no evidence supporting a fee award of $900,000 and any award of attorneys’ fees in this case
would be improper under settled Texas law? 2. Did Horizon preserve its complaint regarding an improper
remittitur of the fee award when it did not move for new trial or remittitur, or draw the trial court’s
attention to any error in sua sponte ordering a remittitur without the condition of a new trial? No.
02-13-00339-CV, Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., Michael A. Saul, Timothy J. Palus, Peter D.
Ulasewicz, Barbara H. Bayma, and John M Piechocki v. Horizon Health Corporation, from the 16th
District Court of Denton County, by Grace Weatherly, R. William Wood, Jesse L. Cromwell, Wood,
Thacker & Weatherly, P.C., 400 West Oak Street, Suite 310, Denton, Texas 76201, for Acadia and PRP;
Stephen J. Roppolo, Alia S. Wynne, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, 333 Clay Street, Suite 4000, Houston, Texas
77002, for Saul, Paulus, Ulasewicz, Bayma, and Piechocki; Jeffery T. Nobles, Kelly H. Leonard, Beirne,
Maynard & Parsons, LLP, Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 2500, Houston, Texas 77056, for Appellants.
8/22/14.
Cross-Appellant replies by contending that: The Trial Court Could Not Account for an
Unpreserved Segregation Discount; The Trial Court Cannot Substitute Its Finding For That of the Jury;
Horizon Provided Sufficient Evidence of Attorney’s Fees. No. 02-13-00339-CV, Acadia Healthcare
Company, Inc., Michael A. Saul, Timothy J. Palus, Peter D. Ulasewicz, Barbara H. Bayma, and John M
Piechocki v. Horizon Health Corporation, from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Kendyl T.
Hanks, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 300 West 6th Street, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701, for CrossAppellant. 9/22/14.
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Appellants contend that: (1) The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to disregard the
Agreement's non-compete provision in its entirety given that it contains overly broad geographic and
subject matter restrictions in violation of the Texas Covenants Not to Compete Act ("Act"), Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code Ann. § 15.50 et seq; and (2) The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it
could not reform the Agreement at the temporary injunction stage. No. 02-12-00403-CV, Michael J.
Boyzuick and Garda Security Inc. v. Brink’s Incorporated, from the 393rd District Court of Denton County,
by Jacqueline C. Johnson, Aundrea L Gamble Holt, Littler Mendelson, P.C., 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite
1500, Dallas, Texas 75201-2931, Paul J. Kennedy, Littler Mendelson, P.C., 1150 17th Street NW, Suite
900, Washington, D.C. 20036, and Donald R. White, Jr., Richard D. Hayes, Hayes, Berry, White &
Vanzant, LLP, P. O. Box 50149, 512 W. Hickory, Suite 100, Denton, TX 76206, for Appellants.
10/31/12.
Nonsuit:
Nuisance:
Appellants address: Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
possible ground that Appellants’ private nuisance claims are preempted by federal aviation law when the
claims pertain to a non-commercial training flight pattern adopted by a private company emanating from
a privately-owned heliport. Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
possible ground that Appellee conclusively established its limitations defense and there is not a fact issue
as to whether the Appellee’s training routines only became a nuisance within two years of the lawsuit
being filed as claimed by Appellants. No. 02-14-00065-CV, Jimmy and Karen Lewis v. Bell Helicopter
Textrox, Inc., from the 431st Judicial District Court of Denton County, by C.D. Peebles, The Peebles Law
Firm, 1604 Devon Court, Southlake, Texas 76092, for Appellants. 6/20/14.
Appellee addresses: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting Bell’s no-evidence summary
judgment asserting that there was no evidence of such a regulatory violation when Appellants proffered
no evidence in response; and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting Bell’s summary-judgment
motion, which asserted that Appellants’ claims were for permanent nuisance and that the limitations period
had expired before suit was filed? No. 02-14-00065-CV, Jimmy and Karen Lewis v. Bell Helicopter
Textrox, Inc., from the 431st Judicial District Court of Denton County, by Charles H. Smith, Bryan S.
David, Cantey Hanger, LP, 1999 Bryan St., Ste. 3300, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellees. 7/18/14.
Offset:
Cross-Appellant addresses whether the Trial Court err in ordering that Wise was entitled to an
offset of $2,578,067.00 against the judgment in favor of AHC when Wise neither pleaded that it was
entitled to an offset nor offered any evidence proving an offset. No. 02-13-00439-CV, American Hat
Company v. Wise Electric Cooperative, Inc., from the 97th District Court of Montague County, by David
F. Farris, John R. Lively, John R. Lively, Jr., Daniel R. Aguilar, Lively & Associates, L.L.P., 201 Main
Street, Suite 1260, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Cross-Appellant. 3/21/14.
Cross-Appellee addresses the following issues: 1. Was the trial court correct in concluding that
Wise is entitled to an offset of $2,578,067 against American Hat’s recovery, based on the evidence that
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American Hat’s insurer, Travelers, paid that amount to American Hat for its losses and Travelers assigned
its entire priority claim interest in any recovery by American Hat to Wise? 2. In the alternative, is Wise
entitled to a settlement credit of $1,900,000 under chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code?
No. 02-13-00439-CV, American Hat Company v. Wise Electric Cooperative, Inc., from the 97th District
Court of Montague County, by David Keltner, KELLY HART & HALLMAN, LLP. 201 Main Street,
Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, T. B. Nicholas, Jr., DOWNS & STANFORD, P.C., 2001 Bryan
Street, Suite 4000, Dallas, Texas 75201, Michael Choyke, Thomas C. Wright, Andrea G. Tindall,
WRIGHT&CLOSE, LLP, One Riverway, Suite 2200, Houston, TX 77056, for Cross-Appellee. 6/26/14.
Oil and Gas:
Appellant addresses the following: Issue No. 1 : Did the trial court err in granting EOG Resources,
Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in holding, as a matter of law, that Danny and Rhonda Griswold
owned only a one-half (1/2) interest in the mineral rights in question and not a one-hundred percent (1/1)
interest in the mineral rights in question? Issue No. 2 Did the trial court err in denying Danny and Rhonda
Griswold’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in holding, as a matter of law, that Danny and Rhonda
Griswold owned only a one-half (1/2) interest in the mineral rights in question and not a one- hundred
percent (1/1) interest in the mineral rights in question? No. 02-14-00200-CV, Danny and Rhonda
Griswold v. EOG Resources, Inc., from the 97th Judicial District Court of Montague County, by Harvey
G. Joseph, Law Offices of Harvey G. Joseph, P.O. Box 810485, Dallas, Texas 75381, and William
Knowlton, Law Offices of William Knowlton, 607 Lindsey, Suite B, Bowie, Texas 76230, for
Appellants address the following issues: 1. Gibb rejected the offer for a mineral interest made in
lieu of a guaranteed commission and made repeated counter offers insisting on a guaranteed minimum
commission. Can Gibb accept an offer by performance after he rejected the offer and made counter offers?
2. The Statute of Frauds and the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act (TRELA) require an adequate property
description as a condition precedent for judicial enforcement. Can Gibb cobble together a contract from
four discrete documents—one of which was not between the parties and all of which were sent at different
times—containing contradictory terms that were rejected? 3. The only evidence of damages came from
Gibb’s expert who calculated the damages long after the date of the alleged breach and based on a 100%
interest in the mineral leasehold rather than the 30% Conglomerate owned. Did the expert’s testimony
constitute legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the submission of, and the jury’s answer
to, Question No. 5? 4. The testimony of Gibb’s expert was based on assumptions that contradicted
undisputed facts. Yet, it was the only testimony on Gibb’s alleged damages. Was the testimony improperly
admitted and the error harmful? 5. Gibb brought a breach of contract claim and six tort claims. His
lawyer’s testimony, however, largely ignored the obligation to segregate fees between causes of action for
which attorneys’ fees are recoverable and those for which they are not. Is the evidence legally and factually
insufficient to support the submission of, and the jury’s answer to, Question No. 6? No. 02-14-00119-CV,
Conglomerate Gas II, L.P. and Vancouver Sky Management, L.L.C., v. Gregg Gibb, from the 236th District
Court of Tarrant County, by by David E. Keltner, Bill Warren, Sharon Fast Fulgham, Kelly Hart &
Hallman, LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellants. 7/18/14.
Appellant contends the issues on appeal are: 1. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding that the parties agreed to the May 23 email because the evidence showed that Gibb
accepted the agreement both verbally and by performance, and Meeker admitted that the parties reached
an agreement. 2. The trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion for directed verdict as to the Texas
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Real Estate Licensing Act and the Statute of Frauds because TRELA does not apply, and the May 23 email
complied with the Statute of Frauds and/or TRELA in any event. 3. Legally and factually sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s damage award because the jury heard evidence from experts on both sides
and awarded damages within the range of testimony. 4. Gibb presented sufficient evidence of the
segregation of attorney’s fees because his counsel testified that he reduced the fees incurred for tasks
relating to tort claims, and the jury made a determination as to the amount of reasonable and necessary fees
as fact finder. 5. Conditional Cross-Point: The trial court erred in granting directed verdict as to Gibb’s
fraud and statutory fraud causes of action because evidence was presented as to each element of fraud. 6.
Conditional Cross-Point: The trial court erred in granting directed verdict as to Gibb’s intentional
interference cause of action because evidence was presented as to each element of interference. 7.
Conditional Cross-Point: The trial court erred in granting directed verdict as to Gibb’s commingling theory
because evidence was presented to support the submission. 8. Conditional Cross-Point: The trial court
erred in submitting Question 4, the date Appellants breached the contract, to the jury and in tying Question
5, the amount of damages, to the date found in Question 4. No. 02-14-00119-CV, Conglomerate Gas II,
L.P. and Vancouver Sky Management, L.L.C., from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by George
C. Haratsis, Brittani Wilmore Rollen, John W. Wright, McDonald Sanders, P.C., 777 Main Street, Suite
1300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, and Jeffrey H. Kobs, Law Offices of Jeff Kobs, P.C., 5044 Byers
Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Cross-Appellant Gibb. 9/17/14.
Appellant addresses: (1) Whether, as a matter of law: A. The 1944 Judgment is valid and
enforceable against all parties in this case, B. The 1929 Mineral Deed is void ab initio, and C. The Trustee
can rely on the 1929 Mineral Deed to establish that it is a bona fide purchaser for value; and (2) The trial
court erred when it ruled on these issues adversely to the position and interests of the Trustee. No.
02-14-00057-CV, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Trustee of the Red Crest Trust v. Louis Dorfman, et al,
Frank Moravits et al, and Petrohawk Properties, LP, from the 342nd District Court of Tarrant County, by
Patrick K Sheehan, David Jed Williams, Eduardo L. Morales, Hornberger Sheehan Fuller and Garza, 7373
Broadway, Suite 300, San Antonio, Texas 78209-3266, and Kevin M. Beiter, McGinnis Lochridge &
Kilgore, LLP, 600 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200, Austin, Texas 78701, for Appellant. 5/12/14.
Appellees address whether the trial court properly found, as a matter of law, that: I. The 1944
Judgment is valid and enforceable against all parties in this case; II. The 1929 Deed is void ab initio; and
III. Appellant cannot rely on the 1929 Deed to establish it is a bona fide purchaser for value. No.
G. Michael Gruber, Michael J. Lang, Gruber Hurst Johansen Hail Shank LLP, 1445 Ross Ave., Suite
2500, Dallas, Texas 75202, for certain Appellees. 6/23/14.
Appellees contend that: In this interlocutory permissive appeal, Appellant challenges the trial
court’s “Rule 166 Order on Legal Matters Decided by the Court” entered on February 5, 2014 in
consideration of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment in the consolidated cases in the court
below. In that Order, the trial court made the following conclusions of law that are pertinent to this appeal,
each of which Appellee challenges: 1. The judgment dated April 6, 1944, of the 81st District Court of
Karnes County, Texas, in Cause No. 4602, Mary Moravitz et. al. v. McMullen Oil Royalty Company, Inc.,
et.al., and recorded in Volume 623 at Page 361 of the Official Records of Karnes County (the “1944
Judgment”), is valid and enforceable against all parties in this cause; 2. The mineral deed dated September
11, 1929, from J.W. Moravits and Mary Moravits, as grantors, to H.J. McMullen, as grantee, and recorded
in Volume 86 at Page 415 of the deed records of Karnes County (the “1929 Deed”), is void ab initio; and
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3. Neither the Defendants, Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., individually and as
Trustee of the Red Crest Trust, and Phillip Mettham, nor their predecessors and successors in title to the
200.1 acres of property described in the 1944 Judgment (the “Property”) can rely upon the 1929 Deed to
establish the defense of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a conflicting claim of ownership
to the Property. No. 02-14-00057-CV, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Trustee of the Red Crest Trust v.
Louis Dorfman, et al, Frank Moravits et al, and Petrohawk Properties, LP, from the 342nd District Court
of Tarrant County, by John F. Carroll, Attorney at Law, 111 West Olmos Drive, San Antonio, Texas
78212, Jon Christian Amberson, Larissa Janee Hood, Jon Christian Amberson, P.C., 2138 Hildebrand
Avenue, San Antonio, Texas 78209, for Moravits/Kortz Appellees. 6/23/14.
Appellant replies that: A. The 1944 Judgment Is Void Because The Trustee Of The Langille Trust
Was A Necessary Party To The 1943 Lawsuit; B. The 1944 Judgment Has No Res Judicata Effect On The
Langille Trust; C. The Trial Court Cannot Render A 166 Order Adjudicating Disputed Fact Issues. No.
Patrick K Sheehan, David Jed Williams, Eduardo L. Morales, Hornberger Sheehan Fuller and Garza, 7373
Broadway, Suite 300, San Antonio, Texas 78209-3266, and Kevin M. Beiter, McGinnis Lochridge &
Kilgore, LLP, 600 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200, Austin, Texas 78701, for Appellant. 8/15/14.
Appellants contend that the trial court was asked to interpret certain conveyance language. But the
court delegated interpretation to a jury, forcing the parties to try a legal question as though it were factual.
The court also allowed a lawyer and a landman to give “expert” testimony about how to interpret the
conveyances. Appellants then address whether the trial court erred: 1. In asking a jury to interpret the
conveyances; and 2. in admitting the expert testimony. No. 02-13-00057-CV, Lakota Energy Limited
Partnership v. Merit Management Partners I, L.P.; Merit Energy Partners III, L.P.; and Merit Energy
Company, LLC, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Bryan D. Bruner, Gina M. Bruner, 3700
West 7th Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, and David M. Gunn, Erin H. Huber, Beck Redden LLP, 1221
McKinney, Suite 4500, Houston, Texas 77010, for Appellant. 2/19/14.
Cross-Appellant addresses whether the trial court: (1) erred in refusing to award attorneys’ fees
to Merit under the Declaratory Judgments Act because the construction of the Conveyances implicates title
to mineral interests; and (2) abused its discretion in refusing to award reasonable and necessary attorneys’
fees as are equitable and just to Merit on its claim for declaratory relief concerning the proper construction
of the Conveyances. No. 02-13-00057-CV, Lakota Energy Limited Partnership v. Merit Management
Partners I, L.P.; Merit Energy Partners III, L.P.; and Merit Energy Company, LLC, from the 271st District
Court of Wise County, by Thomas F. Loose, J. Robert Beatty, Brent A. Kirby, Locke Lord LLP, 2200
Ross Avenue, Suite 2200, Dallas, Texas 75201-6776, for Cross-Appellants. 2/19/14.
Cross-Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining the request of
the Merit entities to award them a total of over $1.3 million in fees for the trial and appeal. No. 02-1300057-CV, Lakota Energy Limited Partnership v. Merit Management Partners I, L.P.; Merit Energy
Partners III, L.P.; and Merit Energy Company, LLC, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by
Bryan D. Bruner, Gina M. Bruner, 3700 West 7th Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, and David M. Gunn,
Erin H. Huber, Beck Redden LLP, 1221 McKinney, Suite 4500, Houston, Texas 77010, for CrossAppellee. 4/4/14.
Appellee addresses the following issues: 1. Lakota: (i) asked the trial court to submit the contract
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interpretation issue to the jury; (ii) did not object to submission of that issue to the jury; and (iii) did not
ask the trial court to construe the Conveyances as a matter of law until after the jury returned a verdict
adverse to it. As a consequence, the jury was unable to perform its fact-finding role with regard to other
issues that were conditioned on the contract interpretation question. Has Lakota waived its claim that the
trial court should have construed the Conveyances as a matter of law? 2. Did the trial court correctly
conclude that the Conveyances were ambiguous? 3. If this Court concludes that the Conveyances are not
ambiguous, then are the terms of the agreements properly construed to convey only overriding royalty
interests in the Exhibit B wells in light of the surrounding circumstances, the parties’ business objectives,
and the parties’ conduct for the decade that followed the transaction? 4. If this Court concludes that the
Conveyances are ambiguous, should it affirm the trial court’s judgment because the jury’s finding on the
meaning of the Conveyances is supported by sufficient evidence? 5. If this Court concludes that Lakota’s
interpretation of the Conveyances is reasonable, may it render judgment as Lakota has requested where
xvi (i) the property interests claimed by Lakota remain undefined, (ii) as interpreted by Lakota the
Conveyances are not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and (iii) a new trial would be necessary to
adjudicate Merit’s remaining claims and defenses? 6. If the Conveyances, as interpreted by Lakota, are
not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, may the Court uphold the trial court’s judgment on this
independent basis? 7. Young’s and Cummings’ expert testimony: (i) concerned the interpretation of an
ambiguous contract (as Lakota frames the issue), and therefore concerned issues of fact, not law; (ii)
concerned industry custom and usage regarding a mineral conveyance beyond the realm of lay knowledge
or experience; and (iii) was relevant to claims and defenses other than contract interpretation. Did the trial
court abuse its discretion in admitting their testimony? 8. Lakota failed to make specific objections to any
of Craig Young’s testimony, and made only three specific objections to Allan Cummings’ testimony.
Further, Lakota did not object to the admission of, and itself elicited, voluminous evidence of a similar
character concerning the parties’ intent and interpretation of the Conveyances. Has Lakota preserved error
regarding its claim that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony by
Young and Cummings? xvii 9. Voluminous other evidence of a similar character concerning the parties’
intent and the proper interpretation of the Conveyances was admitted without objection (much of which
elicited by Lakota). Even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Young’s and Cummings’
testimony, was Lakota harmed? No. 02-13-00057-CV, Lakota Energy Limited Partnership v. Merit
Management Partners I, L.P.; Merit Energy Partners III, L.P.; and Merit Energy Company, LLC, from
the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Thomas F. Loose, J. Robert Beatty, Brent A. Kirby, Locke
Lord LLP, 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200, Dallas, Texas 75201-6776, for Appellee. 4/4/14.
Appellant addresses whether the Deed reserved a fixed fractional royalty or a fraction of a royalty,
and whether the trial court erred when it awarded attorney’s fees to Appellees but not to Appellant under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. 02-10-00403-CV, Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Wanda Jo Moore,
et al, from the 355th District Court of Hood County, by Kelly W. Decker, Raymond B. Kelly III, Decker,
Jones, McMackin, McClane, Hall & Bates, P.C., Burnett Plaza, Suite 2000, 801 Cherry Street, Unit No.
In an original and an amended brief, Appellees address Fraction of Royalty vs. Fractional Royalty
and Attorney' s Fees. 02-10-00403-CV, Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Wanda Jo Moore, et al, from
the 355th District Court of Hood County, by William P. Weir, Law Office of William P. Weir, P.O.
Box 100818, 1701 River Run, Suite 711, Fort Worth, Texas 76185, for Appellees. 3/14/11 and
3/28/11.
Appellant contends: (1) that venue should be transferred to Hemphill County, where the
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mineral properties are located, because no probative evidence overcomes the mandatory venue
provision; (2) the assignment through which Appellee claims title to the mineral properties is invalid
because it was forged when recorded in Lubbock County and forged again four years later when
recorded in Hemphill County; (3) if the assignment is upheld, the trial court’s judgment should be
modified for a commencement date of September 11, 2009 for payment of Appellant’s “40% net
profit interest” as the assignment provides instead of the 20% ordered in the judgment; and (4) the
trial court improperly awarded Appellee relief not requested in her pleadings, and a portion of the
judgment is vague and unenforceable and should be stricken. 02-09-00442-CV, Frances Jane Fuller
Jackson Morris v. Margaret Ann Fuller, from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by George
Whittenburg, David Gamez, Jr., Whittenburg Whittenburg Stein & Strange, P.C., 1010 S. Harrison
Street, Amarillo, Texas 79101, for Appellant. 4/14/10.
Appellee contends: (1) the trial court properly denied the motion to transfer venue because
the case concerns ownership of the Joint Venture rather than the title to property located in Hemphill
County; (2) sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Assignment was not forged;
(3) the trial court properly found that Appellee was entitled to twenty percent of the total net profit
of the Joint Venture; and (4) the trial court properly entered a judgment that addressed all issues
raised by the pleadings or tried by consent of the parties, including an order for an accounting as
pled by Appellee. 02-09-00442-CV, Frances Jane Fuller Jackson Morris v. Margaret Ann Fuller,
from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Daniel G. Altman, Roswald E. Shrull, Shrull &
Associates, 1701 River Run, Suite 1116, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Appellee. 7/6/10.
In reply, Appellants reassert the issues raised in their opening brief: (1) that venue should
be transferred to Hemphill County, where the mineral properties are located, because no probative
evidence overcomes the mandatory venue provision; (2) the assignment through which Appellee
claims title to the mineral properties is invalid because it was forged when recorded in Lubbock
County and forged again four years later when recorded in Hemphill County; (3) if the assignment
is upheld, the trial court’s judgment should be modified for a commencement date of September 11,
2009 for payment of Appellant’s “40% net profit interest” as the assignment provides instead of the
20% ordered in the judgment; and (4) the trial court improperly awarded Appellee relief not
requested in her pleadings, and a portion of the judgment is vague and unenforceable and should be
stricken 02-09-00442-CV, Frances Jane Fuller Jackson Morris v. Margaret Ann Fuller, from the
67th District Court of Tarrant County, by George Whittenburg, David Gamez, Jr., Whittenburg
Whittenburg Stein & Strange, P.C., 1010 S. Harrison Street, Amarillo, Texas 79101, for Appellant.
8/16/10.
Appellee COG addresses whether: (1) Appellants can claim, despite the warranty in a prior
deed, that they actually intended to convey less than half of the mineral rights and that they still
retain some legal claim to the minerals; (2) the trial court was correct in deciding, as a matter of law,
that the Walkers had no legal rights to the minerals on the property; (3) the trial court properly
declined to consider testimonial evidence containing legal opinions about the meaning of the
language in the deed; and (4) the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Appellee on the conversion, trespass, and unjust enrichment claims based on its ruling that the
Appellants retained no legal rights in the property at issue. 02-10-00061-CV, Bill Walker &
Bobbye Walker v. Campuzano Enterprises, Ltd, Campuzano Investments, Inc., Fernando
Campuzano, Francisco Campuzano, Carmen L. Campuzano and Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., from the
352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Charles W. Sartain, Brent E. Dyer, Looper Reed &
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McGraw, P.C., 1601 Elm Street, Suite 4600, Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellee COG. 9/17/10.
In reply, Appellants address whether the trial court erred by granting final summary
judgment “disposing of all parties and claims”, whether the trial court committed error by failing
to find ambiguity in the reservation of mineral rights in the deed, whether the trial court erred in
granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, whether the C defendants established
ownership of the property, mineral rights or otherwise, and whether the trial court erred by
sustaining objections to plaintiffs’ evidence in support of denial of the summary judgment motions
because ambiguity permits introduction of parol evidence. 02-10-00061-CV, Bill Walker & Bobbye
Walker v. Campuzano Enterprises, Ltd, Campuzano Investments, Inc., Fernando Campuzano,
Francisco Campuzano, Carmen L. Campuzano and Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., from the 352nd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Eric D. Fein, Vickie S. Brandt, Eric D. Fein, P.C. & Associates, 3500
Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 510, Dallas, Texas 75219, for Appellants. 9/7/10.
Ordinances:
Appellant ACE addresses the following questions: (1) Did the Trial Court commit reversible
error by granting the City’s Plea where the City has effectively barred ACE from getting into court
to test the validity of the Ordinance? (2) Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by granting the
City’s Plea on the grounds that “ACE failed to demonstrate injury to vested property rights under
State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d at 945”? (3) Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by granting
the City’s Plea in the face of ACE’s declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the
penal Ordinance? No. 02-14-00146-CV, ACE Cash Express, Inc., v. The City of Denton, Texas,
from the 16th Judicial District Court of Denton County by Clayton E. Bailey, Benjamin L. Stewart,
Bailey Brauer PLLC, 8350 N. Central Expy., Ste. 935, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellant.
10/9/14.
Appellant contends: ISSUE I. A general law town has no constitutional or statutory
authority to apply its building codes in its ETJ. The Town's attempt to impose its expensive building
permit ordinance upon homebuilders in its ETJ is unsupported under Texas law. The trial court erred
in entering judgment that the Town could extend its building code to its ETJ pursuant to Chapter 212
of the Texas Local Government Code and other Texas statutes. ISSUE II Even if the Town had
general authority to extend its building codes to its ETJ under Chapter 212 of the Texas Local
Government Code, that authority does not apply here because the Town is prohibited from applying
its subdivision regulations to Appellant's property pursuant to section 212.007 of the Texas Local
Government Code. The trial court erred in holding that the Town's building code could be extended
to the Lot pursuant to its platting authority under these facts. ISSUE III Chapter 245 of the Texas
Local Government Code provides that municipalities cannot apply new ordinances or regulations
to pending development projects with a few exceptions. The Town has attempted to apply its new
building permit policy to Bizios' already permitted project where none of Chapter 245's exceptions
apply. The Town did not introduce any evidence supporting any of Chapter 245's exemptions to this
project. The trial court erred in holding that the Town may impose its new building permit
requirements on an already permitted subdivision project. No. 02-14-00143-CV, Harry Bizios v.
Town of Lakewood Village, Texas, from the 431st Judicial District Court of Denton County, by
Arthur J. Anderson, Winstead PC, 500 Winstead Building, 2728 N. Harwood Street, Dallas, Texas
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Appellee addresses the following: Whether the trial court properly granted the Town’s
request for temporary injunction when the evidence showed the Town had a probable right to relief.
1. The Town has, and all Texas municipalities have, the statutory authority to apply their subdivision
rules for development to the ETJ. No statute prohibits this authority. 2. The Owner does not have
vested rights to a 1995 plat filed only with Denton County. No. 02-14-00143-CV, Harry Bizios v.
Town of Lakewood Village, Texas, from the 431st Judicial District Court of Denton County, by WM.
Andrew Messer, Jennifer W. Decurtis, Brenda N.mcdonald, Messer, Rockefeller & Fort, PLLC
6351 Preston Rd., Suite 350 Frisco, Texas 75034, for Appellee. 8/8/14.
Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Builders contends that: 1) The Town's True Motivation
is to Generate Revenue; and 2) The Town lacks statutory authority. No. 02-14-00143-CV, Harry
Bizios v. Town of Lakewood Village, Texas, from the 431st Judicial District Court of Denton County,
by Manuel Muñoz, Jr., Texas Association of Builders, 313 E. 12th Street, Suite 210, Austin, Texas
78701, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Builders. 9/26/14.
Parent Child Relationship:
Appellant contends that: (1) The court erred in permitting the Respondent father to proceed
to trial without an attorney; (2) There was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court's
finding that Appellant father knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions which might endanger the children; (3) There was no evidence or insufficient evidence
to support the court's finding that Appellant father engaged in conduct that had in any way
endangered the children; (4) There was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court's
finding the Appellant father failed to comply with any court-ordered services. No. 02-14-00245-CV,
In the Interest of S.G., I.G., III, and B.G., Children, from the 323rd Judicial District Court of TArrant
County, by Richard A. Gladstone, 1515 8th Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellant.
10/17/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) the Court should reverse the trial court's decision to terminate
the parent-child relationship between J.W. and the children K.W. and K.W. because the Department
presented no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that by clear and
convincing evidence J.W. constructively abandoned her children; (2) the Court should reverse the
trial court's decision to terminate the parent-child relationship between J.W. and the children K.W.
and K.W. because the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support the court’s finding
that by clear and convincing evidence termination was in the best interest of the children; and (3)
The evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as Permanent sole managing conservator of the children K.W. and K.W. No.
02-14-00211-CV, In the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Minor Children, from the 323rd District Court
of Tarrant County, by Melissa K. Swan, Schneider Law Firm, P.C., 400 E. Weatherford St., Ste. 106,
Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant J.W., 9/8/14.
Appellant addresses the following: I. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that DFPS established grounds for the
termination of E.R.’s parental rights and that the termination was in A.R.’s best interest? II. Whether
the trial court abused its discretion by denying a 180-day extension of the dismissal date in
accordance with section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code? III. Whether the trial court clearly
abused its discretion by denying E.R.’s verified motion for continuance? No. 02-14-00237-CV, In
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the Interest of A. R., a Minor Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Brian J.
Newman, 209 W. 2nd Street, Suite 347, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant E.R., 9/5/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) the Court should reverse the trial court's decision to terminate
the parent-child relationship between J.W. and the children K.W. and K.W. because the Department
presented no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that by clear and
convincing evidence J.W. constructively abandoned her children; (2) the Court should reverse the
trial court's decision to terminate the parent-child relationship between J.W. and the children K.W.
and K.W. because the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support the court’s finding
that by clear and convincing evidence termination was in the best interest of the children; and (3)
The evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as Permanent sole managing conservator of the children K.W. and K.W. No.
02-14-00211-CV, In the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Minor Children, from the 323rd District Court
of Tarrant County, by Melissa K. Swan, Schneider Law Firm, P.C., 400 E. Weatherford St., Ste. 106,
Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant J.W., 9/8/14.
Appellant addresses the following: I. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that DFPS established grounds for the
termination of E.R.’s parental rights and that the termination was in A.R.’s best interest? II. Whether
the trial court abused its discretion by denying a 180-day extension of the dismissal date in
accordance with section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code? III. Whether the trial court clearly
abused its discretion by denying E.R.’s verified motion for continuance? No. 02-14-00237-CV, In
the Interest of A. R., a Minor Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Brian J.
Newman, 209 W. 2nd Street, Suite 347, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant E.R., 9/5/14.
Appellant contends that: ISSUE NO. 1. The Trial Court Erred by Proceeding to Trial
Without Notice to Appellant. ISSUE NO. 2 The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to
Grant Appellant’s Motion for New Trial Because She Satisfied the Craddock Standards. ISSUE NO.
3 The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Give a Specific Possession Order that Could
be Enforced by Contempt. No. 02-14-00203-CV, In the Interest of D.Z. and E.Z., Children, from
the 322rd District Court of Denton County, by Lacie Friday, Lenora M. Reece, Friday & Reece,
PLLC, 1170 Corporate Dr. W., Suite 101, Arlington, Texas 76006, for Appellant. 8/26/14.
Appellant contends that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. No. 02-14-00175-CV, In the Interest
of Z.B., A Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Brandon W. Weaver, Katherine
Allen, 800 N. Industrial Blvd., Ste 106, Euless, Texas 76039, for Appellant. 7/28/14.
Appellant addresses whether she is a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual
care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than ninety days
preceding the date of the filing of her petition? No. 02-14-00102-CV, In the Interest of S.D., A
Child, from the 325th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, by Bob Leonard, Law Offices of Bob
Leonard, Jr., 101 Summit Avenue, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 7/17/14.
Appellant addresses: (1) Whether the trial court erred when it denied Father’s Motion for
JNOV because Texas Family Code Section 105.002(c) does not prevent a trial court from
contravening a jury verdict that does not appoint a conservator. Even if Texas Family Code Section
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105.002(c) prevented the trial court from contravening the jury’s verdict, whether the statute
prevents this Court from contravening the jury’s verdict when there was no evidence to support the
jury’s verdict that Father should not be appointed as the Child’s managing possessory conservator;
(2) Whether there was no evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding that Father should not be
appointed as the Child’s joint managing or possessory conservator; (3) Even if Texas Family Code
Section 105.002(c) prevented the trial court from contravening a jury verdict and regardless of
whether the jury appointed Father as a possessory conservator—whether Section 105.002 prevented
the trial court from granting Father access to or possession of the Child; and (4) Alternatively, if
Family Code Section 105.002(c) permitted the jury to deny Father conservatorship and access and
possession, whether Family Code Sections 153.191 and 105.002(c), operated in concert
unconstitutionally as applied to Father because the statutes permitted the jury effectuate a de facto
termination of Father’s parental rights under a preponderance of the evidence standard and
prohibited the trial court from contravening the jury verdict. No. 02-14-00135-CV, Chad Lee S. v.
Melinda A.S., from the 158th Judicial District Court of Denton County, by Georganna L. Simpson,
Georganna L. Simpson, P.C., 1349 Empire Central Drive, Woodview Tower, Ste. 600, Dallas, Texas
75247, and Mark Scroggins, Craig M. Fowler, Hammerle Finley & Scroggins, 2871 Lake Vista
Drive, Suite 150 (Town not given), for Appellant. 7/16/14.
Appellee contends that: 1) The trial court did not err when it denied Father’s Motion for
JNOV because Texas Family Code Section 105.002(c) does prevent a trial court from contravening
a jury verdict that does not appoint a conservator. Additionally, the trial court found there was
evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Father should not be appointed as the child’s managing
or possessory conservator; 2) The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that
Father should not be appointed as the child’s joint managing conservator or possessory conservator;
3) Trial court is prevented from granting Father access or possession of the child because the jury
did not name him as a possessory conservator; and 4) There was not a termination in this case, “de
facto” or otherwise. No. 02-14-00135-CV, Chad Lee S. v. Melinda A.S., from the 158th Judicial
District Court of Denton County, by Robert N. Eames, Tiffany L. Haertling, Holmes, Diggs &
Eames, 1517 Centre Place Drive, Suite 300, Denton, Texas 76205, for Appellee Melinda. 9/15/14.
Appellant replies that Mother’s reliance on Walters and Hopkins is misplaced. A trial court
is not prohibited from granting a non-conservator possession of or access to a child. No.
02-14-00135-CV, Chad Lee S. v. Melinda A.S., from the 158th Judicial District Court of Denton
County, by Georganna L. Simpson, Georganna L. Simpson, P.C., 1349 Empire Central Drive,
Woodview Tower, Ste. 600, Dallas, Texas 75247, and Mark Scroggins, Craig M. Fowler,
Hammerle Finley & Scroggins, 2871 Lake Vista Drive, Suite 150 (Town not given), for Appellant.
9/22/14.
Appellants contend there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. No. 02-14-00126-CV, In the Interest
of B.M., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Brandon W. Weaver, Katherine
Allen, Attorneys at Law, 800 N. Industrial Blvd., Ste 106, Euless, Texas 76039, for Appellants.
6/18/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s suit for lack of standing
because appellant had standing under section 102.003(a)(9); under section 102.003(a)(9), there is
(1) no requirement the biological parent (appellee) be unfit, (2) no requirement the biological parent
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(appellee) abdicate parental responsibilities, and (3) no requirement the non-biological parent
(appellant) have exclusive actual care, control, and possession of the child. No. 02-14-00102-CV,
In the Interest of S.D., from the 325th District Court of Tarrant County, by Dean M. Swanda, Law
Office of Dean M. Swanda, 219 E. Lynn Creek Drive, Arlington, Texas 76002, and Mary
Thomsen, Thomsen Law Firm, 675 N. Henderson St., Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for
Appellant. 6/3/14.
Appellant contends that: A. Evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and as a matter fact
for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that JSR knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
ASMR to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional
well-being under Section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code. B. Evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law and as a matter fact for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that JSR
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct
endangering the physical or emotional well-being of ASMR under Section 161.001(1)(E) of the
Texas Family Code. C. Evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and as a matter fact for a jury
to find by clear and convincing evidence that JSR failed to comply with the provisions of a court
order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of ASMR under
Section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code. D. The trial court failed to provide due process
to JSR by failing to grant a directed verdict denying termination of the parent-child relationship
between JSR and ASMR, and appointing JSR as temporary possessory conservator until JSR's
mental health issues could be resolved to a level of reasonable probability. No. 02-14-00027-CV,
In the Interest of A.S.M.R., from the 393rd District Court of Denton County, by Evan R. Clift, Clift
& Associates, 1512 E. McKinney Street, Suite 205, Denton, Texas 76209, for Appellant Father.
5/5/14.
Appellant contends that: First Issue: The trial court erred by not providing findings of facts
and conclusions of law. Second Issue The evidence was factually insufficient to find grounds under
section 161.001(1)(D). Third Issue The evidence was factually insufficient to find grounds under
section 161.001(1)(E). Fourth Issue The evidence was factually insufficient to support the finding
of grounds under section 161.001(1)(O). Fifth Issue The evidence was factually insufficient to
support the finding that termination was in M.N.P.'s best interest. No. 02-14-00032-CV, In the
Interest of M.N.P., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Dean M Swanda,
Law Office of Dean M. Swanda, 219 E. Lynn Creek Drive, Arlington, Texas 76002, for Appellant.
5/2/14.
Appellant addresses: 1. Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(D) of the family code that J.A. knowingly
placed or knowingly allowed D.A. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the
emotional or physical well-being of D.A.? 2. Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(E) of the family code that J.A.
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of J.A.? 3. Whether the evidence is factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to Section 161.001(2) of the family code that
termination of the parent-child relationship between J.A. and D.A. is in D.A.’s best interests? No.
02-14-00076-CV, In the Interest of D.A., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County,
by Clifford D. Mackenzie, The Law Office of Clifford D. Mackenzie, 1515 8th Ave., Fort Worth,
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Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion for a bench
warrant, thereby precluding Appellant’s appearance at the trial on the merits in this case. No.
02-14-00101-CV, In the Interest of S.N.C., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County,
by Katherine Allen, Brandon Weaver, 800 N. Industrial Blvd., Ste 106, Euless, Texas 76039, for
Appellant. 5/20/14.
Appellant contends that The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Bill of Review
because: A. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Void or Voidable Because It Was Not Supported
by a Pleading; B. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Void or Voidable Because No Notice Was
Given to the Biological Father; C. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Voidable Because It Failed
to Appoint a Representative for the Child; and D. The Absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Prevents Appellant from Demonstrating There Was Legally and Factually Sufficient
Evidence to Prove the Wrongful Conduct of Appellee Unmixed With Negligence of Appellant. No.
02-13-00337-CV, In the Interest of E.M. and F.M. (F/KA.F.G.), from the 231st District Court of
Tarrant County, by Jerome A. Styrsky, 111 North Houston Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for
Appellant. 4/17/14.
Appellee contends that: (1) As a Judgment Based Upon a Mediated Settlement Agreement,
It Was Not Required to Be Supported By Any Specific Pleadings; (2) Any Lack of Due Process Was
Fatal Only as to the Party That Was Not Served Notice, Not to Appellant; (3) The Trial Court Did
Not Abuse Its Discretion By Failing to Appoint a Representative for the Child; and D. The Absence
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Does Not Significantly Harm Appellant and Is
Therefore Not Sufficient Grounds for Reversal. No. 02-13-00337-CV, In the Interest of E.M. and
F.M. (F/KA.F.G.), from the 231st District Court of Tarrant County, by Patrick J. Clabby, 6208 W.
Poly Webb Rd., Arlington, Texas 76016, for Appellee. 4/10/14.
Appellant addresses the following questions: 1. When a nonparent challenges a parent for
managing conservatorship in an original custody suit, the trial court may enter a judgment denying
a parent managing conservatorship and appointing a nonparent primary joint managing conservator
based on only three grounds. The Texas Family Code outlines the nonparent's grounds for recovery
in the provisions regarding the parental presumption. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by
appointing the Appellees primary joint managing conservators when it failed to enter specific
findings of fact or conclusions of law on each element of the Appellees grounds of recovery? 2.
Even if the trial court did not err by failing to enter findings on each ground of recovery, did it abuse
its discretion by finding that the Appellees presented legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support a judgment that they successfully rebutted the parental presumption? No. 02-13-00464CV, In the Interest of R.M.R., from the Hood County Court at Law, by The Law Office of Donnica
Marie Blackful, PLLC, 9898 Bissonnet Street, Suite 598D Houston, Texas 77036, for Appellant.
4/11/14.
Appellees address: 1. Whether Appellant has waived the error of the absence of express
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and if not, whether a remand for the entry of such is the
appropriate remedy. Issue 2: Whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding of
the statutory criteria for appointing non-parents as joint managing conservators. No. 02-13-00464CV, In the Interest of R.M.R., from the Hood County Court at Law, by Robert Kersey, Attorney at
Law, 827 W. Pearl Street, #4, Granbury, Texas 76049, for Appellees. 6/19/14.
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Appellee contends that contends that there was ample evidence to sustain the trial court’s
“best interest” determination, and that the Holley factors weigh in favor of termination. No.
02-13-00388-CV, In the Interest of B.D.M. and S.P.M., Children, from the 323rd District Court of
Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M. Mallin, Anne Swenson, David M. Curl, Perry R.
Pack, Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, 401 W. Belknap Street, Fort
Appellant contends that the judgment below should be vacated because Appellees [maternal
grandmother and step-grandfather] had no standing to file this suit. No. 02-13-00413-CV, In the
Interest of E.L.C., a Child, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Robert Walker,
2363 Highway 287 N, Suite 202, Mansfield, Texas 76063, for Appellant. 2/20/14.
Appellant contends that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. 02-13-00388-CV, In the Interest of
B.D.M. and S.P.M., Children, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Katherine Allen,
Brandon Weaver, 800 N. Industrial Blvd., Ste 106, Euless, Texas 76039, by Appellant Father.
1/24/14.
Appellant contends that The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant’s Bill of Review
because: A. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Void or Voidable Because It Was Not Supported
by a Pleading; B. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Void or Voidable Because No Notice Was
Given to the Biological Father; C. The Order Adjudicating Parentage is Voidable Because It Failed
to Appoint a Representative for the Child; and D. The Absence of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law Prevents Appellant from Demonstrating There Was Legally and Factually Sufficient
Evidence to Prove the Wrongful Conduct of Appellee Unmixed With Negligence of Appellant. No.
02-13-00337-CV, In the Interest of E.M. and F.M. (F/KA.F.G.), from the 231st District Court of
Tarrant County, by Jerome A. Styrsky, 111 North Houston Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for
Appellant. 2/5/14.
Appellant addresses whether: (1) the trial court erred in allowing appellee's Expert to testify
on the law in Dubai regarding the enforceability of an American family order because his opinion
was not disclosed during discovery in compliance with rule 194.2(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing appellee' expert witness to testify
when appellee's expert lacked the specialized knowledge by education, knowledge, skill and
training, to testify as an expert on the issue of children abduction in Dubai; (3) the trial court's error
in the admission of the expert testimony has probably caused an improper Judgment; (4) the findings
of the court of changed circumstances allowing for the travel overseas of the children to Non-Hague
countries are against the great weight and preponderance of evidence; (5) the court abused discretion
when it made findings of intentional unemployment underemployment against Appellant acting
arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles and failing to analyze
or apply the law correctly ; (6) the court abused discretion in calculating the net resources of the
respondent acting arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles
denying appellants the credit for the return of capital and ignoring operating expenses and attributing
income to the wrong year. No. 02-13-00293-CV, In the interest of D.W. and K.W., Children, from
the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Azzam Hussami, 702 Dalworth, Grand Prairie, Texas
75205, for Appellant. 12/20/13.
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Appellant contends that: (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
Jury’s findings that: (a) C.D.M knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings, which endangered the physical or emotional well being of the child; (b)
that C.D.M. failed to comply with the provisions of the Court order that specifically established the
actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of N.F.A., the child the subject of this suit, who
had been in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under
Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.; (c) C.D.M. constructively abandoned the child
who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family
and Protective Services or an authorized agency for not less than six months, and the department has
made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent and that parent has not regularly visited or
maintained significant contact with the child and the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide
the child with a safe environment; or (d) termination of the parent-child relationship between N.F.A.,
the child the subject of this suit, and C.D.M. is in the child’s best interest; and (2) the Jury’s finding
that C.D.M. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child to remain with persons who engaged
in conduct, which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child is against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence presented at trial and is legally and factually insufficient.
No. 02-13-00345-CV, In the interest of N.F.A., a Minor Child, from the 211th District Court of
Denton County, by Tiffany L. Haertling, Holmes, Diggs & Eames, 1517 Centre Place Drive, Suite
300, Denton, Texas 76205, for Appellant. 12/13/13.
Appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the
jury’s findings that: (1( N. A. engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engage in conduct, which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child, or that N.A.
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surrounding which
endangered her physical or emotional well-being; or that N.A. failed to comply with the provisions
of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return
of the child who have been in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department of family
and Protective services for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the
parent for abuse or neglect; and (2) that Father’s constitutionally protected due process rights were
violated by the State of Texas, resulting in the father’s rights to his child being terminated. No. 0213-00345-CV, In the interest of N.F.A., a Minor Child, from the 211th District Court of Denton
County, by Joseph F. Zellmer, 620 West Hickory Street, Denton, Texas 76201, for Appellant.
12/8/13.
Appellee contends that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support that: (1)
N.A. and C.D.M. knowingly placed or allowed N.F.A. to remain in endangering conditions or
surroundings; (2) that N.A. and C.D.M. failed to comply with the provisions of the CourtOrder that
established the actions necessary for the return of N.F.A.; (3) the termination fo N.A.’s and C.D.M.’s
parental rights was in N.F.A.’s best interest; and (4) that C.D.M. constructively abandoned N.F.A.
No. 02-13-00345-CV, In the interest of N.F.A., a Minor Child, from the 211th District Court of
Denton County, by by Paul Johnson, Charles E. Orbison, Andrea R. Simmons, Allison Sartin, Sherry
Wolf, and Karin Qualls, Denton County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, 1450 East McKinney,
Denton, Texas 76209, for Appellee. 1/29/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and may have acted without
jurisdiction by failing to apply the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and
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solicit a determination by the Cherokee Nation as to whether or not each child was an "Indian child"
for the purposes of ICWA. In the event that Indian child status was acknowledged by the Tribe, the
court erred by failing to apply the specific legal standards required by ICWA for the termination of
a parent-child relationship. No. 02-13-00346-CV, In the interest of M.L.A. and A.S.A., the Children,
from the 211th District Court of Denton County, by Evan R. Clift, Clift & Associates, 1512 E.
McKinney Street, Suite 205, Denton, Texas 76209, for Appellant. 12/10/13.
Appellant contends the following questions are raised: 1. Whether the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(D) of the
family code that J.T. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed D.T. to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger the emotional or physical well-being of D.T.. 2. Whether the evidence
is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding pursuant to Section 161.001(1
)(E) of the family code that J.T. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of D.T.. 3. Whether the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding pursuant to Section
161.001(1)(N) of the family code that J.T. constructively abandoned the child who has been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services or an authorized agency for not less than six months, and: (i) the department or authorized
agency has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (ii) the parent has not regularly
visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (iii) the parent has demonstrated an
inability to provide the child with a safe environment. 4. Whether the evidence is factually sufficient
to support the trial court's finding pursuant to Section 161.001(2) of the family code that termination
of the parent-child relationship between J.T. and D.T. is in D.T.'s best interests. No.
02-13-00331-CV, In the interest of D.T., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County,
by Clifford D. MacKenzie, 1515 8th Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76014, for Appellant. 11/5/13.
Appellee contends that there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s conduct,
environment, constructive abandonment, and best interest findings and determinations, and that the
Holley factors weigh in favor of termination. No. 02-13-00331-CV, In the interest of D.T., a Child,
from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M. Mallin, Anne
Swenson, David M. Curl, Marvina N. Robinson, Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant
County, 401 W. Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellee. 12/16/13.
Appellee contends that there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s conduct,
environment, constructive abandonment, and best interest findings and determinations, and that the
Holley factors weigh in favor of termination. No. 02-13-00331-CV, In the interest of D.T., a Child,
from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M. Mallin, Anne
Swenson, David M. Curl, Marvina N. Robinson, Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant
County, 401 W. Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellee. 12/16/13.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting permanent injunctive relief which
was neither pled for nor supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence, and which prohibited
Mother from having any contact with the children and prohibited the parties from having unrelated
members of the opposite sex spend the night. No. 02-13-00151-CV, In the Interest of A.A.N., I.G.N.,
and N.L.N., II, Children, from the 323rd District Court of Hood County, by Melissa K. Swan,
Schneider Law Firm, 400 E. Weatherford St., Ste. 106, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant.
10/7/13.
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Appellee contends that fhe evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the best
interest findings. No. 02-13-00139-CV, In the Interest of K.K.J. and D.K.S., from the 323rd District
Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M. Mallin, James Gibson, Marvina Robinson,
Tarrant County District Attorney, 401 W. Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201, for Appellee.
7/19/13.
Appellant contends that Chris Weast directly and collaterally attacked the 2004 Petition to
Establish the Parent-Child Relationship, contending that the court entered the default judgment
although it clearly lacked both in personam jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellant then addresses whether: a. Should the direct attack have been sustained because the
record showed that the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction to issue the default judgment; b.
Should the direct attack have been sustained because the record showed that Chris had satisfied the
element(s) of a Bill of Review with no service of process; c. Should the direct attack have been
sustained since the Office of the Attorney General knew and/or reasonably should have known
Chris' address was _____________, Fort Worth Texas at the time of this hearing since the Attorney
General had been sending Chris billing statements regarding his deceased son's child support; d. No
injury will result to the opposing parties; e. Chris was prevented from filing a timely motion for new
trial by the clerk's failure to send the required notice of default judgment ("official mistake") TRCP
Rule 239a, Rule 306a. No. 02-12-00488-CV,Christopher Robert Weast v. Office of the Attorney
General, from the 325th District Court of Tarrant County, by Christopher Robert Weast, 833 Hallvale
Drive, Fort Worth, Texas 76108. Pro Se Appellant. 8/12/13.
Appellee addresses whether: (1) the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s decision
to deny the bill of review; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Mr. Weast’s
motion to strike the Attorney General’s answer. No. 02-12-00488-CV, Christopher Robert Weast
v. Office of the Attorney General, from the 325th District Court of Tarrant County, by Greg Abbott,
Daniel T. Hodge, Rande K. Herrell, John B. Worley, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box
12017 (MC 038-1), Austin, Texas 78711-2017, for Appellee. 10/2/13.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court had jurisdiction to terminate Mother's parental
rights at a final hearing relying on temporary emergency jurisdiction. No. 02-12-00498-CV, In re
F.M.-T. & E.M., from the 323rd District Court of Hood County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M.
Mallin, Andy Porter, and Marvina Robinson, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney, 401 W.
Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201, for Appellee. 9/3/13.
Appellant addresses whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
trial court's finding pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 154.001(b) that ST should be ordered
to pay child support for the children. No. 02-13-00159-CV, In the Interest of C.N.T. and R.J.T.,
Children, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Frank Adler, P.O. Box 2511, Keller,
Texas 76244, for Appellant K.M.. 7/18/13.
Appellees address: 1. Whether the trial abused it's discretion in ordering the Respondent, S.T.
to pay child support for the children. 2.) Whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court's finding pursuant to Texas Family Code section 151.001 (a) and 154.001 (a)
(3) and (8) that S.T. should be ordered to pay child support for the children. No. 02-13-00159-CV,
In the Interest of C.N.T. and R.J.T., Children, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by
Patricia L. Summers, 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112, for Appellee.
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11/18/13.
Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
findings that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. No. 02-1300155-CV, In the Interest of K.J.L., from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Felipe
Calzada, 2724 Kibo Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76111, for Appellant. 7/17/13.
Appellant addresses whether: (1) in seeking a very limited geographical restriction-as
opposed to no geographical restriction upon the Mother’s right to designate the children's residence
per the Georgia order-the Appellee sought to modify the designation of the person having the
exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children; (2) the trial court erred in
proceeding to a hearing on Appellee's Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship when the
requisite affidavit attached by petitioner fell drastically short of the burden of proof set forth in
section 156.102; and (3) Few-if any-of the trial court's conclusions of law are supported by sufficient
evidence. No. 02-12-00498-CV, In re C.R.A. and S.A.A., from the 355th District Court of Hood
County, by Rebecca Davis, Law Office of Rebecca Davis, P.L.L.C., 111 West Akard Street,
Weatherford, Texas 76086, for Appellant. 7/8/13.
Appellee addresses whether: (1) §156.102, Tex. Fam. Code, applies to a Georgia order that
does not designate the person having the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the
child; (2) §156.102, Tex. Fam. Code, applies when a final decision is rendered through an arbitration
award more than one year before a motion to modify is filed; (3) the trial court abused its discretion
in finding a substantial and material change of circumstances since the rendition or entry of the
Georgia order; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that a domicile restriction to
Hood County was in the best interest of the children. No. 02-12-00498-CV, In re C.R.A. and S.A.A.,
from the 355th District Court of Hood County, by Janice A. Schattman, 2630 West Freeway, Suite
218, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellee. 8/30/13.
Appellant replies that: (1) Appellee's analysis of the impact of the date of the arbitration
award entered by the state of Georgia is flawed; (2) Because Appellee has incorrectly analyzed the
final date of the last order entered by the Georgia court, Appellee's motion to modify is, indeed,
governed by section 156.102 of the Texas Family Code; (3) Texas law holds that, if one parent seeks
a significant geographical restriction of the children's primary residence, then that parent is seeking
a modification of the parent with the right to determine residency of the children. Thus, section
156.102 of the Texas Family Code governs; (4) Appellee has chosen to ignore the evidence
presented to the trial court indicating that his children are definitely having a difficult time with both
their father's snatching them from their mother's care and with adjusting to life in Hood County. No.
02-12-00498-CV, In re C.R.A. and S.A.A., from the 355th District Court of Hood County, by Rebecca
Davis, Law Office of Rebecca Davis, P.L.L.C., 111 West Akard Street, Weatherford, Texas 76086,
for Appellant. 9/18/13.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred: (1) because the evidence offered by the
Petitioner was not legally sufficient to show that it would be in the best interest of the child J.P. to
have the parental rights of his father J.P. terminated; and (2) because the evidence offered by the
Petitioner was not factually sufficient to show that it would be in the best interest of the child J.P.
to have the parental rights of his father V.P. terminated. No. 02-13-00095-CV, In the Interest of
J.P., A Child, from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by James Bruce Harris, 1401
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Holliday, Suite 206, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for Appellant. 6/17/13.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion: (1) for appointing Appellee
as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child within Denton
and contiguous counties, for ordering Appellant to have no overnight possession with the child for
December 22, 24, 28, and 30 when there was no legally and factually sufficient evidence to support
a jUdgment for this custom visitation schedule, for appointing Appellant as Joint Managing
Conservator and awarding her standard possession, per the Texas Family Code Section 153
Subchapter F, for ordering Appellant to pay child support to Appellee starting April 1, 2013 when
there is no legally and factually sufficient evidence to support an order for child support, for
ordering drug testing for Appellant when there was no legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support an order for future drug testing, for not allowing Appellant to have a trial continuance in
order to obtain drug testing results for both parties to be introduced at final trial, and for not
considering the best interest of the child when not granting a continuance. No. 12-02-00469-CV,
In the Interest of A.K.M.., a Child, from the 393rd District Court of Denton County, by Marjan
Shansab, Shansab Law Firm, 6440 North Central Expressway, Suite 615, Dallas, Texas 75206, for
Appellant. 6/5/13.
Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion In appointing
appellant and appellee as joint Managing conservatories of the minor child; (2) the trial court did
not err in or abuse its Discretion in ordering drug testing for the Appellant; (3) the trial court did not
err in or abuse its discretion in denying appellant a continuance; (4) the court of appeals should deny
the appeal of the Appellant based on no findings of facts or conclusions of law being requested or
filed by the Appellant. No. 12-02-00469-CV, In the Interest of A.K.M.., a Child, from the 393rd
District Court of Denton County, by Neil L. Durrance, 1108 North Locust Street, Denton, Texas
76201, for Appellee R.G.M. 7/5/13.
Appellee addresses whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
finding that termination of V.P.'s parental rights is in the J.P.'s best interest in light of V.P.'S history
of drug use, domestic violence, problems comply with his court-ordered services, and emotional
abuse of J.P., V.P. has failed to have any contact with J.P. for approximately two years as of
February 26,2013, has failed to contact the Department, and did not appear for trial. J.P. has been
in an adoptive home with A.T. for one year with his sister and A.T.'s other adoptive children. J.P.
has made incredible progress under A.T.'s care, loves her, wants to be adopted by her, and A.T.
wants to adopt J.P. No. 02-13-00095-CV, In the Interest of J.P., A Child, from the County Court at
Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by Cynthia M. O’Keefe, Johnnie Beth Page, Michael Shulman, Office
of General Counsel, 2401 Ridgepoint, Bldg. H-2, MC: Y-956, Austin, Texas 78754, for Appellee.
7/8/13.
Appellant addresses whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
trial court's finding that pursuant to: (1) Texas Family Code Section 161.001(1)(D), Mother
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) Texas Family Code Section
161.001(1)(E), Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (3)
Texas Family Code Section 161.00 l(l)(N), Mother constructively abandoned the children who were
in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and
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Protective Services or an authorized agency for not less than six months and: (I) the Department or
authorized agency made reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother; (2) Mother did not
regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children; and (3) Mother has demonstrated
an inability to provide the children with a safe environment; (4) Texas Family Code Section 161.001
(1)(0), Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the
actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children who have been in the permanent or
temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not
less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the
abuse or neglect of the children; and (5) Texas Family Code 161.001 (2) that termination of Mother's
parental rights is in the children's best interest. No. 02-13-00061-CV, In the Interest of M.C.D. and
J.N.D., Children, form the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Caleb I. Moore, Law Firm of
Caleb Moore, PLLC, 2205 Martin Drive, Ste. 200, Bedford, Texas 76021, for Appellant Mother.
4/15/13.
Appellant contends that: (1) as MD was incarcerated at the time, he could not have
"knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child" under §161.001(1) (D); (2) the evidence
was factually and legally insufficient to find that M.D. "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child"; (3) The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 161.001 (1)(0), M.D. failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the
return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of
the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the
children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children; (4)
the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to find that termination was in the best interest
of the children. No. 02-13-00061-CV, In the Interest of M.C.D. and J.N.D., Children, form the 323rd
District Court of Tarrant County, by James D. Saint, 5751 Kroger Drive, Ste. 239, Keller, Texas
76244, for Appellant M.D. 4/11/13.
Appellant replies: (1) The evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's
nonpaternity findings because the paternity registry never came up at trial, because Father admitted
being the child's parent in his "Request for Counsel," and, further, because Father identified himself
as the father at trial; and (2) Paternity was tried by consent, and, therefore, the trial court's
nonpaternity findings were immaterial. 02-13-00061-CV, In the Interest of M.C.D. II and J.N.D.,
Children, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by James D. Saint, 5751 Kroger Drive,
Ste. 239, Keller, Texas 76244, for Appellant. 5/30/13, for Appellant.
Appellee, in surreply, contends that the new complaints contained in Appellant’s reply brief
cannot be considered, and Appellant’s immaterialness issue is inadequately briefed and should not
be considered. No. 02-13-00061-CV, In the Interest of M.C.D. and J.N.D., Children, form the 323rd
District Court of Tarrant County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Charles M. Mallin, Anne Swenson, David M.
Curl, Marvina N. Robinson, Office of the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, 401 W.
Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellee. 6/5/13.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion: (1) by finding a material
and substantial change in circumstances when the only alleged change in circumstance was the
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child's denial of admission into a private school, which circumstance was contemplated in the
Decree; and (2) infringed upon Appellant's due process rights when it: A. entered findings of fact
without any evidentiary support; B. severely limited time for cross-examination of a recalcitrant
witness; C. allowed testimony from documents not previously produced, though responsive to
specific requests for production; and, D. allowed personal bias to affects its decision. No. 02-1200510-CV, In the Intersest of A.E.A., a Child, from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by
Mark D. Winnubst, Latrice E. Andrews, Sheils Winnubst, P.C., 1100 Atrium II, 1701 N. Collins
Boulevard, Richardson, Texas 75080, for Appellant. 2/13/13.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying Appellant
Mother's Motion for Continuance, and there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the
court's finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. No. 02-12-00484-CV, In the
Interest of C.L.C. and B.D.S., Children, from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, by
Katherine Allen, Brandon Weaver, Attorneys at Law, 800 N. Industrial Blvd., Ste. 106, Euless,
Texas 76039, for Appellant Mother. 2/8/13.
Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of
Appellant without finding by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant P.H. committed an act
stated in Sections 161.001(1) or161.002 of the Texas Family Code; and that (2) alternatively and
without waiving the above issue, the evidence of legally and factually insufficient to find by clear
and convincing evidence the following: a. That after being served with citation Appellant did not
respond by timely filing an admission of paternity or by filing a counterclaim for paternity or for
voluntary paternity to be adjudicated under Chapter 160 of the Texas Family Code before the final
hearing; b. That Appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions
or surroundings which endanger the emotional or physical well-being of the child; c. That Appellant
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and d. That Appellant constructively
abandoned the child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the
Brief of Appellant Department or an authorized agency for not less than six months and: 1. The
Department or authorized agency had made reasonable efforts to return the child to the father; ii. The
father had not regularly visited or maintained the significant contact with the child; and iii. The
father had demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. No. 02-12-00444CV, In the Interest of A. H., a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Hunter
Bland, The Law Office of Hunter Bland, 5900 S. Lake Forest Drive Suite 300, [city not included on
face of brief], for Appellant. 1/31/2013.
Appellant addresses whether the District Court acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner
or without reference to any guiding rules or principles in determining the best interests of tile child.
No. 02-12-00340-CV, Christopher S. Crago v. Cheri Aziza Crago, from the 322nd District Court of
Tarrant County, by Mark C. Lane, Pamela L. Wilder, Law Office of Mark C. Lane, 6115 Camp
Bowie Blvd., Suite 140, Fort Worth, Texas 76116, for Appellant. 1/24/2013.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion in a conservatorship decision.
No. 02-12-00340-CV, Christopher S. Crago v. Cheri Aziza Crago, from the 322nd District Court of
Tarrant County, by Candace M. Taylor, 902 S. Jennings, Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellee.
4/30/13.
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Appellant contends that: (1) The order erroneously recites that if was an agreed order and
should be reformed to reflect the truth; (2) The trial court abused its discretion by changing the
child's name because it failed to find the name change was in the child's best interest as required by
section 45.004(a)(l) of the Texas Family Code, the evidence is legally insufficient to support
changing the , and the evidence is factually insufficient to support changing the child's name . No.
02-12-00397-CV, In the Interest of T.G.-S.L., a Child from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant
County, by Dean M. Swanda, Swanda & Swanda, P.C., Attorneys at Law, 109 E. Park Row Drive,
Arlington, Texas 76010, for Appellant. 10/23/12.
Appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient: (1) to show grounds under (D)
because D.S. did not know about the dangerous conditions or surroundings; (2) to show grounds
under (E) because D.S. 's conduct was harmless as long as M.A. W. provided a safe and stable home,
and D.S. did not know M.A. W. was failing to provide a safe and stable home; (3) to show grounds
under (Q) because the evidence showed D.S. might get paroled less than two years from the filing
of the petition and because the evidence was not clear and convincing that he would serve more than
two years before getting paroled; (4) to support the trial court's nonpaternity findings because D.S.
admitted being the child's parent in his pro se "Original Answer" and, further, because DNA
evidence admitted at trial proved D.S. was the father. Appellant also contends that (5) Paternity was
tried by consent, and, therefore, the trial court's finding that D.S. had not registered was immaterial;
and (6) to the extent the Court rules paternity was not tried by consent, D.S. asserts counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not filing a counterclaim to establish paternity or by not complaining about
the nonpaternity findings in a motion for new trial. No. 02-12-00291-CV, In the Interest of K.G.B,
a Child, from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County, by Dean M. Swanda, Swanda & Swanda,
P.C., Attorneys at Law, 109 E. Park Row Drive, Arlington, Texas 76010, for Appellant D.B..
9/4/12.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion: (1) in its denial of the adoption;
(2) in its application of the "best interest of the child" standard; and (3) the trial court erred in
overruling Appellants' Appeal of Visiting Judge Order and Motion to Reconsider because the Trial
Court's denial of the adoption was not in the best interest of the children. No. 02-12-00085-CV, In
the Interest of J.G., D.G., and C.G., Children, from the 235th District Court of Cooke County, by
Wayne Northcutt, 225 N. Locust, Denton, Texas, 76201, for Appellant. 8/30/12.
Partnership:
Appellant addresses whether: (1) Appellant failed to preserve its challenge to the partnership
status of Professional Pharmacy for appellate review; (3) the Trial Court properly found that
Professional Pharmacy II has standing to bring its claim for negligence against Appellant; Whether
the trial court properly found that Appellant owed a legal duty to Professional Pharmacy II; (3) the
jury's response to the Negligence Question is void of legal significance; (4) the Economic Loss Rule
is applicable to the facts of this case; (4) the Jury properly found that Appellant failed to exercise
ordinary care, that Appellant's negligence proximately caused injury to Professional Pharmacy II;
(6) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of damages; (7) the evidence was sufficient to
support the damages awarded to Professional Pharmacy II; (8) Professional Pharmacy II's negligence
claim is barred by limitations, the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel; (9) the Jury
correctly found that the evidence did not conclusively establish the negligence of third parties
Bisong, Ashu or Jama; and (10) the Trial court correctly awarded pre-judgment interest. No. 02-11________________________________________
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00373-CV JPMorgan Chase Bank. NA. v. Professional Pharmacy II and Cambridge Gorbutt. L.P.,
from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by John M. Hafen, Collin D. Kennedy, Hanshaw
Kennedy Marquis, PLLC, 1125 Legacy Drive, Suite 250, Frisco, Texas 75034. 7/11/12.
Personal Injury:
Pets:
Plea to Jurisdiction:
Pleadings:
Politics:
Possession of Premises:
Pre-Judgment Interest:
Appellee addresses whether the trial court erred in not granting judgment for prejudgment
interest at the rate of 18% per annum under Chapter 28 of the Texas Property Code. 02-10-00167-C,
Ralph P. Larrison, Jr., v. Catalina Design V, from the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Paul
H. Cross, 9601 White Rock Trail, Suite 205, Dallas, Texas 75238, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
7/28/10.
Premises Liability:
Appellant addresses the following questions: 1. By placing floor-mats and warning signs in
the entry-area of its store on a rainy day, did Wal-Mart adequately warn Sparkman of a potentially
wet floor and, thereby, satisfy its duty to her as a matter of law? 2. Did the alleged wet condition of
the floor near the entrance of Wal-Mart’s store on a rainy day constitute an unreasonably dangerous
condition so as to create a duty on the part of Wal-Mart? 3. Did Wal-Mart have actual or
constructive knowledge of the purported unreasonably dangerous condition at issue? No.
02-13-00355-CV, Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, v. Kimberly G. Sparkman, from the 431st District
Court of Denton County, by Gregory R. Ave, Walters, Balido & Crain, L.L.P., Medow Park Tower,
15th Floor, 10440 North Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas 75231,f or Appellant. 4/18/14.
Appellant replies that: 1. Sparkman’s Subjective Appreciation of Wal-Mart’s Warning Does
Not Affect Its Adequacy as a Matter of Law; 2. Wal-Mart Adequately Warned Sparkman of an
Open and Obvious Danger; 3. Out-of-State Authority Is Relevant and Useful; and 4. Wal-Mart’s
Safety Procedures Do Not Establish a Legal Standard of Care. No. 02-13-00355-CV, Wal-Mart
Stores Texas, LLC, v. Kimberly G. Sparkman, from the 431st District Court of Denton County, by
Gregory R. Ave, Walters, Balido & Crain, L.L.P., Medow Park Tower, 15th Floor, 10440 North
Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas 75231,f or Appellant. 6/24/14.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury based on
Appellant’s status as an invitee in Appellee’s house, and in its supplemental charge that Appellee’s
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actual knowledge be established at the time of the occurrence in question. Appellant also addresses
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to join Cortes as an
additional party defendant and in striking Appellant’s amended petition which had joined Cortes as
a responsible third party defendant. 02-10-00304-CV, Tammie Jones v. Natalia Fernandez Cortes,
from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Constance M. Maher, The Maher Law Firm,
P.C., 4304 S.W. Green Oaks Blvd., Suite 150, Arlington, Texas 76017, for Appellant. 2/8/11 and
2/17/11.
Appellee addresses whether the trial court abused its discrection: (1) in charging the jury
based on Appellant's status as a licensee rather than an invitee, and by issuing a supplemental charge
consistent with the standard applicable to licensees; and (2) in denying Appellant's motion to join
C.C. as an additional defendant and in striking Appellant's Fifth Amended Petition which had
attempted to join C.C. as an additional defendant. No. 2-10-00304-CV, Tammie Jones v. Natalia
Fernandez, from the 352nd Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, by Alexander N. Beard,
Michael A. Hummert, Ignacio Barbero, Bishop & Hummert, P.C., 5910 North Central Expressway,
Suite 1600, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellee. 4/20/11.
Prescriptive Easements:
Appellants address whether the trial court erred: (1) by granting Appellee’s summary
judgment when the evidence clearly showed that a fact issue existed as to one or more elements of
Appellee’s claims that a prescriptive easement existed and/or an implied public roadway existed;
and (2) by denying Appellant’s summary judgment, when evidence showed that no fact issues
existed as to one or more elements of Appellant’s claims that no implied or prescriptive easement
existed on her land and that Appellee abused process by filing suit against her. 02-10-00383-CV,
Patsy Whitehead v. Gavin MacKenzie and Patricia MacKenzie, by David W. Wynne, 5128
Birchman Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Appellant. 8/2/10.
Appellees address whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment, and in denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. 02-10-00383-CV, Patsy
Whitehead v. Gavin MacKenzie and Patricia MacKenzie, by Ned Webster, Hill Gilstrap, PC, 1400
West Abram, Arlington, Texas 76013, for Appellees. 11/1/10.
Principal and Agent
Prisoner Litigation::
Appellant contends that: I. The trial court erred by participating in prohibited ex parte
communications with defendants. II. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to issue
default judgment. III. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to suppress Plaintiff's
deposition. IV. The trial court abused its discretion in not finding conflicting material of evidence
on fact issues in Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. No. 02-13-00036-CV, Mark
Walters v. Management & Training Corporation (MTC), Ricky Denny, Charlotte Walker, & Brenda
Wilkinson, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Mark Walters, Hughes Unit, 3201 FM
929, Gatesville, Texas 76597, for Appellant, Pro Se. 11/12/13.
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Appellees contend that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant default
judgment or by failing to suppress Appellant’s deposition, that the trial court did not err in finding
there were no fact issues that precluded granting summary judgment for Appellees, and that it did
not engage in improper communications with Appellees. No. 02-13-00036-CV, Mark Walters v.
Management & Training Corporation (MTC), Ricky Denny, Charlotte Walker, & Brenda Wilkinson,
from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by Joanna Lippman Salinas, Fletcher, Farley,
Shipman & Salinas, L.L.P., 1717 W. 6th Street, Suite 300, Austin, Texas 78793, for Appellees.
12/12/13.
Probate:
Appellee contends that Appellant Failed to Preserve No Evidence and Insufficient Evidence
Points of Error, and Failed to Object to the Court’s Charge, and That the Trial Court Correctly
Found That the Will Put Appellant to an Election. No. 02-13-00417-CV, In re the Estate of Robert
R. Cole, Deceased, from the Probate Court of Denton County, by B. Prater Monning III, Wynne &
Wynne, 137 West James Street, Wills Point, Texas 75169. 7/16/14.
Appellant contends that: 1. A beneficiary has the inherent right to sue her executors and
trustees for their breaches of their fiduciary duties without triggering an in terrorem clause. 2.
Because in terrorem clauses are strictly construed, a beneficiary does not forfeit her inheritance
when the in terrorem clause does not expressly prohibit her actions. 3. A beneficiary does not forfeit
her inheritance when her actions seek to enforce rather than vary the terms of the will. 4. A
beneficiary does not violate an in terrorem clause when she sues executors and trustees in good faith
and with probable cause. 5. A beneficiary satisfies the conditions precedent to obtain her inheritance
when she expressly accepts the provisions of a will. 6. The probate court erred in granting
Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. ? No. 02-13-00198-CV, Mary T. Ard v. Edward
R. Hudson, Jr., and William A. Hudson, II, Individually, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Josephine
T. Hudson, Deceased, and as Co-Trustees of the Edward R. Hudson Trust No. One, Frost National
Bank, and Josephine Terrell Ard, from the Tarrant County Probate Court No. 1, by Laurie Ratliff,
Frank N. Ikard, Jr., 400 West 15th Street, Suite 975 Austin, Texas 78701, Steven K. Hayes, 500
Main Street, Suite 340 Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 6/9/14.
Appellees address the following: 1. Did the probate court properly grant summary
judgment? 2. Did Mary T.’s repeated attempts to prevent the Co-Executors from drilling wells on
the estate’s oil and gas properties violate the No-Interference Clause in Josephine Hudson’s Will?
3. Should Josephine’s unambiguous No-Interference Clause be enforced in light of Mary T.’s
attempts to interfere with explicit Co-Executor powers granted in the Will, or do Mary T.’s vague
fiduciary-breach allegations give her immunity? 4. Absent any conflicting precedent or statute, must
a testator’s declaration that an excuse of “good faith and probable cause” not pardon attempts at
interference be honored, in conformity with the cardinal rule that the testator’s intent governs? 5.
If the answer to Issue 4 is “no,” did Mary T.’s efforts to interfere with the Co-Executors lack good
faith and probable cause as a matter of law? 6. Did Mary T.’s pronounced refusal to accept
Josephine’s Will’s express grant to the Co-Executors of unfettered authority to participate in oil and
gas ventures on behalf of the Estate violate the Will’s condition precedent that beneficiaries must
“accept and agree to all provisions” of the Will? No. 02-13-00198-CV, Mary T. Ard v. Edward R.
Hudson, Jr., and William A. Hudson, II, Individually, as Co-Executors of the Estate of Josephine
T. Hudson, Deceased, and as Co-Trustees of the Edward R. Hudson Trust No. One, Frost National
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Bank, and Josephine Terrell Ard, from the Tarrant County Probate Court No. 1, by George Parker
Young, Law Offices of George Parker Young, PLLC, P.O. Box. 33092, Fort Worth, Texas 76162,
and Karen Precella, Vincent P. Circelli, Haynes and Boone, LLP, 201 Main Street, Suite 2200, Fort
Worth, Texas 76102, for Hudson Appellees. 8/25/14.
Appellant addresses the following issues: Issue No. 1:1s an executor's unexcused and
intentional failure to deliver a bequest to a beneficiary a breach of his fiduciary duty? Issue No. 2:
When an executor profits from his wrongdoing, does the trial court have any discretion to refuse to
hold him individually liable to the beneficiary that he harms, especially when he is sued in his
individual capacity, but fails to deny, under oath, that he is not individually liable? Issue No. 3;When
a beneficiary is wrongfully denied his inheritance, what is the proper measure of interest upon his
withheld bequest? No. 02-14-00170-CV, Lonnie Boylan v. Cooper Boylan, from the County Court
at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by J. Brian Thomas, Edward L. Rice, Mark R. Caldwell, 4851 LBJ
Freeway, Suite 601, Dallas, Texas 75244, for Appellant. 8/5/14.
Cross-Appellant contends: 1) The trial court erred in its Final Judgment in finding “That
Article XII (hereinafter the “no-contest clause) of the Last Will and Testament of Maurice L. Boylan
shall not operate against Lonnie Boylan so as to eliminate any share of the Estate of Maurice L.
Boylan to which Lonnie Boylan is entitled” for the reason that such finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of evidence so as to be manifestly unjust; 2) The trial court erred in
making its Finding number 4 and the Conclusions of Law numbers 5,6,7,8,9,10,11 for the reason
such finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law are so against the great weight and preponderance of
evidence so to manifestly unjust. No. 02-14-00170-CV, Lonnie Boylan v. Cooper Boylan, from the
County Court at Law No. 1 of Wichita County, by S. Price Smith, Jr., 705 Eighth Street, Suite 100,
Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for Cross-Appellant. 8/19/14.
Cross-Appellee contends that: Issue No. l. Thc Fact Question: Is the evidence in this case
sufficient to support the Trial Court's conclusion that Lonnie's will contest was brought and
maintained w i t h h o n e s t i n t e n t i o n s ? Issue No. 2: The Legal Question: Did Lonnie avoid
the harsh result of forfeiture under an in terrorem clause when he filed, but later nonsuited, a
contest? No. 02-14-00170-CV, Lonnie Boylan v. Cooper Boylan, from the County Court at Law
No. 1 of Wichita County, by J. Brian Thomas, Edward L. Rice, Mark R. Caldwell, 4851 LBJ
Freeway, Suite 601, Dallas, Texas 75244, for Cross-Appellee. 9/11/14.
Appellant addresses the following issues: A. Was the surviving wife put to an election under
her husband’s Will? B. Was there any evidence (or sufficient evidence) to support the jury’s answer
to question number one finding that appellant made a knowing election to take under the Will? See
jury charge, TAB B. C. Was the jury’s answer to question number two against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence because the listed subparts were “capital improvements” as a matter
of law? D. Did the failure of the jury to answer conditionally submitted jury questions number three,
four, five, and six deny appellant’s right to a determination of the amount of reimbursement damages
owed to her for community property improvements to the husband’s separate property real estate?
E. Did the conflicting instructions defining “good faith” and “just cause” under two different
standards cause error harmful to appellant? F. Were the answers to jury questions number eight and
nine finding lack of good faith and just cause against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence where the appellant prevailed in conclusively proving a community property interest in the
securities account and a reimbursement claim? G. Is the correct disposition of this case a remand
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for a re-trial on all issues in this appeal? [Presuming a remand is this Court’s judgment.] No.
02-13-00417-CV, In re the Estate of Robert R. Cole, Deceased, from the Probate Court of Denton
County, by Richard H. Kelsey, Kelsey, Kelsey & Hickey, P.O. Box 918, Denton, Texas 76202, for
Appellee addresses: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in assessing a death
penalty sanction against Appellant P and whether Appellant properly preserved that argument; (2)
whether Texas law recognizes a cause of action by an administrator of an estate against beneficiaries
of a multi-party account for return of the funds under Tex. Probate Code §442; (3) whether
Appellants’ have waived their rights to complain of: (a) the damages award in the interlocutory
judgment and/or final judgment with respect to Appellee administrator’s payment of attorneys fees
made pursuant to court order to the ad litem of DP; and (b) the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law or to complain that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to
support the final judgment and interlocutory judgment incorporated therein. 02-09-00233-CV,
Michael B. Preston and Scherry J. Levi v. Stephen E. Dubner as Successor Administrator of the
Estate of Doris Rose Preston and Western Surety Company, from the Probate Court of Denton
County, by Nancy H. Hamren, Coasts, Rose, Yale, Ryman & Lee, P.C., 3 E. Greenway Plaza, Suite
2000, Houston, Texas 77046, for Appellee Western Surety. 5/7/10.
In a probate case which Appellant’s Brief says involved an allegation of an informal
marriage, the Appellant questions whether the decision of the trial court was against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence. 02-08-00371-CV Walker v. Walker, from the County Court at
Law No.1 of Wichita County, Texas, by James Robertson, Wichita Falls. Week of 1/2/09.
Probation Revocation:
Products Liability:
Professional Services:
Promissory Note:
Property:
Property Taxes:
Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the
property may qualify for both open-space land and a residence homestead; (2) there is no evidence,
or insufficient evidence, to support the trial court’s determination that the property qualifies as a
residence homestead; (3) the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to strictly construe
appellee’s right to the homestead exemption; (4) the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding
that appellee proved the property’s appraised value was excessive pursuant to tax code §42.25. No.
02-13-00182-CV, Parker County Appraisal District v. James D. Francis, from the 415th District
Court of Parker County, by Judith A. Hargrove, Hargrove & Evans, LLP, 4425 Mopac South,
Building 3, Suite 400, Austin, Texas 78735, for Appellant.
Appellee addresses: (1) whether the trial court properly concluded that the Texas Tax Code
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permits a property used as a principal residence and also principally for agricultural use to qualify
for both open space valuation and the residence homestead exemption; and (2) whether the trial
court properly concluded that, based on the undisputed evidence, Appellee Francis' property met the
qualifications to qualify for both open space valuation and the residence homestead exemption. No.
02-13-00182-CV, Parker County Appraisal District v. James D. Francis, from the 415th District
Court of Parker County, by Joshua W. Carden, 545 E. John Carpenter Freeway, Suite 300, Irving,
Appellant contends that the trial court erred: (1) in denying Appellant's no evidence motion
for summary judgment because Appellee admitted that it had not performed a lawful appraisal of
Appellant's inventory for the years in dispute, but had relied solely upon Plaintiff's tax renditions
for its values and had not complied with appraisal techniques required by law. § .22.01(g), Tex. Tax.
C. and § 23.01(b), id; and (2) by basing its decision, in part, on § 1.04(18)(B), when the Appellant's
claims are all based on §1.04(18)(A), id. No. 02-13-00170-CV, Stacy Family Enterprises, Inc., v.
Tarrant Appraisal District, from the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by L. Terry George, 1117
Castle Top Drive, Fort Worth, Texas 76052, for Appellant. 7/10/13.
Appellee contends that the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor
of appellee, and that appellant failed to preserve error as to any objections made regarding appellee’s
summary judgment evidence. No. 02-13-00170-CV, Stacy Family Enterprises, Inc., v. Tarrant
Appraisal District, from the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Peter G. Smith, Braden W.
Metcalf, Nichols, Jackson, Dillard, Hager & Smith, L.L.P., 1800 Lincoln Plaza, 500 North Akard,
Dallas, Texas 75201, for Appellee. 9/6/13.
Public Official:
Appellant addresses the following issues: 1. Can a public official be removed from office
for conviction of a class B misdemeanor that does not require an intention to violate the law? 2. Did
Appellant raise genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether he was convicted of a
misdemeanor involving “official misconduct,” thus precluding the granting of summary judgment
and the removal of Appellant from office? 3. Did Appellant waive his right to a jury trial in the
removal case by pleading guilty to a class B misdemeanor in the criminal case without a jury? No.
02-14-00128-CV, Terry Ross v. N. Lane Akin, from the 271st District Court of Wise County, by
David Fielding, Fielding, Parker & Hallmon, L.L.P., 6001 Bridge St., Suite 102, Fort Worth, Texas
Public Road:
Appellant Orchards contends that: ISSUE 1 The trial court erred in denying The Orchards’
motion to disregard the jury’s finding on the width of the publicly dedicated road and entering
judgment based upon that finding because that finding is unsupported and contradicted by the
evidence, the jury’s determination of public dedication, and statutory laws enacted to promote public
safety and welfare. ISSUE 2 The jury’s finding that the roadway is only 12.2 feet wide is supported
by legally insufficient evidence; rather, the evidence proves as a matter of law that the roadway is
20 feet in width. The trial court should have disregarded this finding and entered judgment for
Appellant. . No. 02-14-00172-CV, The Orchards on the Brazos, LLC v. Buron Stinson, from the
355th District Court of Hood County, by Arthur J. Anderson, Winstead PC, 500 Winstead Building,
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2728 N. Harwood Street, Dallas, Texas 75201, Adam Plumbley, Winstead PC, 777 Main Street,
Suite 1100, Fort Worth, Texas 76102. 8/25/14.
Pro Se:
Appellant contends that: (1) Appellant Was Illegally Denied Access To the Courts While
Being Unrepresented in this Matter; (2) the Trial Court Denied Appellant Due Process of Law by
Denying Appellant's Motions to Abate the Proceedings until the Unrelated Criminal Proceedings
Could Be Concluded; (3) the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Various Defense
Motions While Granting Plaintiff's Motions. No. 02-13-00059-CV, Paul Lair, Jr., v. R.M., et al,
from the 17th District Court of Tarrant County, by Paul Lair, Jr., Huntsville, Texas 77342, for
Appellant, Pro Se. 7/15/13.
Quantum Meruit:
Real Property:
Appellant contends that: (1) The trial court should not have granted judgment awarding title,
because the claim to fee simple title was waived by virtue of Lucas' Motion for Summary Judgment;
(2) The trial court should not have granted any relief which would in any way affect title to the
property, because a declaratory judgment action is an improper vehicle for pursuing removing
clouds on title; (3) The trial court should not have granted any relief which would in any way affect
title to the property, because a Trespass to Try Title action is the sole remedy for adjudicating
disputed claims of title to real property and no party filed any pleading suggesting a Trespass to Try
Title action; (4) The trial court failed to rule on Miller's claim that Lucas had no standing to assert
any claim that the Miller violated his fiduciary duty. Lucas cited no case or statute to establish that
she has standing; (5) The trial court did not allow Miller to present in a full trial the facts stated
iniMiller's Affidavits that would establish his equitable title under the doctrine of resulting trusts;
(6) The judgment of the trial court does not resolve all issues of title, including equitable title to the
property, but the judgment could be used as a shield to prevent pursuit of litigation that would in fact
resolve title to the property by a properly brought Trespass to Try Title action, as well as other relief
that could be sought by virtue of pursuing enforcement of equitable liensand equitable rights; (7)
The only way to resolve the unresolved issues with respect to equitable title and other claims against
the property held by Appellant is to reverse and remand the case for a trial. No. 02-13-00298-CV,
Jerald Miller v. Sheree Lucas, from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Tarrant County, by A. Bruce
Wilson, Ray & Wilson, 6300 Ridglea Place, Suite 1008, Fort Worth, Texas 76116, for Appellant.
12/20/13.
Appellee contends that: 1. The trial court had the requisite evidence before it to find that
Appellant had breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in self dealing. 2. Appellant failed to plea,
argue, and provide evidence to the trial court to rebut the presumption of unfairness that arises in
cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty through self dealing, thereby providing grounds for summary
judgment against Appellant. 3. The trial court’s order was proper as “The Property” was not the
subject matter of the law suit but was the measure of damages under the principle of disgorgement.
4. The trial court was within it’s authority to require Appellant to disgorge the misappropriated
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property in favor of the rightful owner (Appellee in the case at bar). 5. The trial court properly
determined that a. a Trespass to Try Title action was not necessary, and that b. such defense was not
properly pled by Appellant. 6. The trial court’s order was proper as the suit was not one for title to
property but an action for breach of fiduciary duty. 7. The trial court did rule that Appellee had
standing to bring the suit. No. 02-13-00298-CV, Jerald Miller v. Sheree Lucas, from the County
Court at Law No. 3 of Tarrant County, by Scott E. Moseley, Scott E. Moseley, 2266 8th Avenue, Fort
Receivership:
Appellants address whether: (1) the trial court erred in failing to vacate the defective order;
(2) the trial court erred in separately ordering an applicant's bond and failing to vacate the
receivership order; (3) the trial court erred in failing to fix a bond that related only and specifically
to the individual defendants subject to the receivership; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in
fixing a bond amount without notice of hearing or considering any evidence of potential damages;
and (5) the trial court erred in failing to vacate the receivership and in appointing the receiver if it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. No. 02-12-00388-CV, Green Diesel, LLC and Fuel Streamers,
Inc. V. VicNRG, LLC, from the 153rd District Court of Tarrant County, by W. Joel Bryant, P.O. Box
53587, Houston, Texas 77052, for Appellants. 12/4/12.
Appellant replies that TUFTA does not allow a receiver to operate an alleged transferee's
business, that Perry and Trans Global have not waived their rights to address Chem Source's
spurious TUFTA argument, that TUFTA does not authorize a receiver to run a transferee's business,
that Chem Source's argument that TUFTA supports the receiver order belies Chem Source's motions
before the trial court, and that Chem Source cannot obtain by equity what is prohibited by law. No.
NO. 2-11-00156-CV, Trans Global Resources, LLC and Charles W. Perry v. Chem Source, LLC,
n/k/a Frac Tech Chemical Company, LLC, from the 236 Judicial District Court of Tarrant County,
Robert A. Bragalone, B. Ryan Fellman, Gordon & Rees, LLP, 2100 Ross Avenue Suite 2800 Dallas,
Texas, for Appellant. 7/11/11.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied Appellants’ motion to set
aside execution sale, because the levy and sale was prohibited by law and fatally flawed; (2) granted
plaintiff’s application for turnover order and appointment of receiver because Texas law prohibits
the turnover of managerial and voting rights of judgment debtors who own partnership/membership
interests in partnerships and/or limited liability companies; and (3) appointed a receiver to receive
and administer assets of non-debtor third parties, because the Texas Turnover Statute is an
inappropriate vehicle through which to adjudicate the substantive rights of non-debtor third parties.
02-09-00291-CV, David Huetten and Peggy Huetten v. San Diego National Bank, from the 153rd
District Court of Tarrant County, by Darrell W. Cook, Kelly E. Bryan, Darrell W. Cook &
Associates, P.C., One Meadows Building, 5005 Greenville Ave., Ste. 200, Dallas, Texas 75206,
for Appellants. 11/12/09.
Rescission:
Recusal:
Remittitur:
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Reparations:
Replevy:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in that this matter was set for formal re-hearing
before the court, and in that it awarded Appellant’s reply bond to Appellee to satisfy the damages
of appellee. 02-10-00422-CV, De Lage Financial Services, Inc., v. A.J. Morris, M.D., P.A., Rio
Grande Valley, Imaging, Inc., and A.J. Morris, M.D., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County,
by A.J. Morris, M.D., 5313 Hidden Oaks Drive, Arlington, Texas 76016, Pro Se Appellant.
7/13/10.
Record:
Responsible Third Party:
Res Judicata:
Restrictive Covenants:
Roads and Bridges:
Rule 11:
Sanctions:
Appellant Stinson addresses whether the Trial Court erred in awarding sanctions for
disclosure of settlement negotiations occurring outside of an alternative dispute resolution
procedure. No. 02-14-00172-CV, Buron Stinson v. The Orchards on the Brazos, LLC, from the 355th
District Court of Hood County, by S. Gary Werley, Law Offices of S. Gary, 1840 Acton Highway,
Suite 102, Granbury, Texas 76049, for Appellee. 8/25/14.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting sanctions against Allison: (1) under
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 13 because the counter-claim and third party claim were not
groundless and had a nonfrivolous legal basis; (2) absent evidence that the counter-claim and third
party claim were brought to harass or delay; (3) under Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 10.00110.006 because the counterclaim and third-party claim were not presented for an improper purpose;
each claim is warranted by existing law and each allegation had evidentiary support; (4) absent
evidence Allison knew of defects in the affidavit and failed to take remedial action to avoid or
mitigate any consequences that resulted. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in
awarding attorney’s fees as a sanction against Allison absent evidence of segregation of attorney
fees incurred and a nexus between the fees and the sanctioned conduct. No. 02-13-00205-CV, Kip
H. Allison v. Conglomerate Gas II L.P., et al, and Clifford W. Ginn, from the 342nd District Court
of Tarrant County, by Kip H. Allison, Allison | Associates, 5600 Tennyson Pkwy, St. 330, Plano,
Texas 75024, Pro Se, 1/23/14.
Settlement Credit:
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Sex Offender:
Seizure of Property:
Sequestration:
Service Fees:
Appellant addresses whether the Denton County Commissioners’ Court authorized a fee of
sixty eight dollars for service of process by certified mail, and whether a fee of sixty eight dollars
for service of process by certified mail is: (1) “reasonable” within the meaning of Section 118.131(a)
of the Texas Local Government Code; and (2) not “higher than necessary to pay the expense of
providing the service” within the meaning of Section 118.131(b) of the Texas Local Government
Code. 02-09-00279-CV, Victor J. Burgess, d/b/a Eydie’s Bail Bonds, and Local Agent for Seneca
Insurance Co., Inc., v. The State of Texas, from the 362nd District Court of Denton County, by
Richard Gladden, Jackson & Hagen, 100 West Oak Street, Suite 302, Denton, Texas 76201, for
Appellant. 11/5/09.
In reply, Appellant contends that the State’s assertion that a trial court is without authority
to adjudicate an award of costs is without merit, that ministerial acts by the clerk are not the same
as adjudicative acts by the trial court, and that a separate suit by the Defendant Surety is not
required. 02-09-00279-CV, Victor J. Burgess, d/b/a Eydie’s Bail Bonds, and Local Agent for Seneca
Insurance Co., Inc., v. The State of Texas, from the 362nd District Court of Denton County, by
Richard Gladden, Jackson & Hagen, 100 West Oak Street, Suite 302, Denton, Texas 76201, for
Appellant. 1/14/10.
Service of Citation:
Settlement:
Appellant addresses the following questions: 1. Did the trial court err in granting Deegear
and Deemaxx’s motion for summary judgment on their affirmative defense of prior settlement and
release? This issue includes, but is not limited to, the following sub-issues:
A. The 2009 Settlement Agreement between Kodiak and Charles Deegear specifically states
that the parties were only releasing claims which may have arisen “prior to, or at the time
of, the effective date” of the 2009 Settlement Agreement. The claims asserted by Kodiak in
the lawsuit that forms the basis of this appeal arose after the effective date of the 2009
Settlement Agreement. As such, did the trial court err in granting Deegear and Deemaxx’s
motion for summary judgment on their affirmative defense of prior settlement and release?
B. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Deemaxx’s affirmative defense
of prior settlement and release when the undisputed evidence established that Deemaxx
Components, Inc. was not a party to the 2009 Settlement Agreement, and, in fact, was not
even in existence when the 2009 Settlement Agreement was executed?
2. Did the trial court err in granting Deegear and Deemaxx’s supplemental no-evidence motion for
summary judgment on Kodiak’s cause of action for unfair competition? 3. Did the trial court err in
granting Deegear and Deemaxx’s motion for summary judgment on their counter-claim for
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declaratory relief? 4. Did the trial court err in awarding Deegear and Deemaxx trial and appellate
attorney’s fees? No. 02-13-00422-CV, Kodak Products Co., Inc. v. Charles H. Deegear, Jr. And
Deemaxx Components, Inc., from the 236st District Court of Denton County, by Joseph W. Spence,
M. Keith Ogle, Christopher G. Lyster, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P., 420 Commerce
Street, Suite 500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellant. 4/21/14.
Sovereign Immunity:
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in denying the State’s Plea to the
Jurisdiction: (1) where Saxion failed to allege a viable Free Exercise claim; and (2) as to Saxion’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) claim. No. 02-13-00227-CV, The State of Texas and
Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion,
Inc., and Valirie Saxion, Individually, from the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, by Greg
Abbot, Daniel T. Hodge, David C. Mattax, James “Beau” Ecles, Susan M. Watson, Office of the
Attorney General, General Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas
Appellee contends that: (1) she sufficiently plead and supported the allegation with proof of
an unconstitutional, ultra vires state action against her Freedom of Exercise Rights and other
constitutional rights; and (2) the trial court did not err in denying the State’s plea to the jurisdiction
on RFRA. No. 02-13-00227-CV, The State of Texas and Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., and Valirie Saxion, Individually, from
the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, Martin Merritt, Friedman & Feiger, 5301 Spring Valley
Road, Suite 200, Dallas, Texas 75254, for Appellee. 9/20/13
Cross-Appellant addresses: (1) whether or not the trial court's denial of Cross Appellants'
summary judgment motion because courts lack the power to hear this case under Tilton v. Marshall
immunity for religious free speech constitutes reversible error; and (2) whether or not the trial court's
refusal to grant Cross Appellants' "No Evidence" and traditional summary judgment motions on the
basis of the affirmative defenses and counterclaims of Free Speech and Free Exercise grounds
constitute reversible error. No. 02-13-00227-CV, The State of Texas and Greg Abbott, in his
Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., and Valirie
Saxion, Individually, from the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, Martin Merritt, Friedman &
Feiger, 5301 Spring Valley Road, Suite 200, Dallas, Texas 75254, for Cross Appellants. 8/19/13.
Cross-Appellee addresses whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction over this cross appeal,
and whether the trial court properly denied Cross Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Cross Appellants’ Free Speech claim. No. 02-13-00227-CV, The State of Texas and Greg Abbott,
in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., and Valirie
Saxion, Individually, from the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, by Greg Abbot, Daniel T.
Hodge, David C. Mattax, James “Beau” Ecles, Susan M. Watson, Office of the Attorney General,
General Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711. 9/23/13.
Appellant replies that: (1) Saxion Misconstrues the Applicable Law and The Allegations In
the State’s Suit; (2) Saxion’s Reliance on Tilton v. Marshall Is Misguided; (3) Saxion Did Not Plead
a Texas RFRA Claim, And Should Not Be Allowed to Replead; and (4) Saxions’ Pleadings
Affirmatively Negate Jurisdiction As To the Free Exercise Claim And Saxion Is Not Entitled to
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Replead. No. 02-13-00227-CV, The State of Texas and Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., and Valirie Saxion, Individually, from
the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, by Greg Abbot, Daniel T. Hodge, David C. Mattax,
James “Beau” Ecles, Susan M. Watson, Office of the Attorney General, General Litigation Division,
P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711, for Appellant.
Special Appearance:
Spoliation:
Standing:
State Acquisition:
Statute of Frauds:
Subdivisions
Subornation:
Subrogation:
Summary Judgment:
Appellant addresses the following issues: I. Whether traditional summary judgment is
properly granted when the summary judgment movant fails to bring forth sufficient evidence to shift
the burden to the nonmovant to respond? II. Whether a trial court clearly abuses its discretion in
overruling an objection to the summary judgment hearing based on the need for additional discovery
when summary judgment is sought on a defense pleaded for the first time when the summary
judgment motion is filed, making discovery essentially impossible? No. 02-14-00161-CV, Michael
Reynolds v. SW McCart, L.L.C., from the 342nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Steven R.
Samples, Samples Law Group, 2605 Airport Freeway, Suite 100, Fort Worth, Texas 76111, for
Appellant. 7/28/14.
Appellee addresses the following issues: 1. Did the trial court err in (ii) not giving
Appellants notice and the opportunity to supplement its summary judgment proof after the Court set
aside its prior judgment declaring that two instruments filed by Davis and McMurray were void?
Answer: No, the Court did not err. 2. Did the trial court err in granting a no evidence summary
judgment in favor of McMurray? Answer: No, the Court did not err. 3. Did the trial court err in
granting traditional summary judgments in favor of McMurray? No, the Court did not err. 4. Did the
trial court err by failing to enter judgment declaring: (i) The Piper No 1 was capable of production
in paying quantities, was shut in, and the appropriate shut in royalties were paid prior to November
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20, 2011. Answer: No. (ii) Litigation extended the primary term of the F ABDA lease until 180 days
after a final and non-appealable judgment is rendered in this case. Answer: No. (iii) Appellee's
attempts to unilaterally "extend" expired leases are void. Answer: No. No. 02-13-00349-CV,
Allegiance Exploration, LLC, Enexco, Inc., Centennial Group, LLC, Kingswood Holdings, LLC v.
Charles Chander Davis, FABDA, Inc., Thomas M. McMurray, as Trustee of the TMM Family Trust,
and Nasa Energy Corp., from the 16th District Court of Denton County, by Thomas M. McMurray,
McMurray Law Firm, 209 S. Woodrow Lane, Suite 700, Denton, Texas 76205, for Appellee TMM
Family Trust. 6/26/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) Appellee US Bank N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment
created a fact question on the face of the summary judgment evidence presented by Appellee US
Bank; (2) McKissack Partner's "Deemed Admissions" were procedurally defective; requested
admissions of pure questions of law; and did not support the granting of Summary Judgment. No.
02-13-00444-CV, Wenatchee 1308 Land Trust, v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee,
Successor in Interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee as Successor by Merger
to Lasalle Bank, National Association, as Trustee for Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Securities I, L.l.c., Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2007- He3 , and Mckissack Residential
Partners I, Ltd., from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Travis Daxon Howard Richard,
Law Offices of Travis Daxon Howard Richard, 2926 Maple Avenue, Ste. 200, Dallas, Texas, for
Appellant. 3/13/14.
Appellant addresses whether the trial court erred in granting the Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment. No. 02-12-00421-CV, Jack Brewer, Individually and d/b/a/ Resolution Trust
Co., v. Green Lizard Holdings, LLC, Series SR, from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by
Jack Brewer, in propria persona, 6608 Shadow Rock Drive, Plano, Texas 75024. March 27, 2013.
Appellee contends that The trial court did not err: (1) in granting Green Lizard's Motion/or
Summary Judgment as the affidavits were made on personal knowledge that presented admissible
summary judgment evidence; and (2) in granting a final judgment. All claims and counterclaims
were addressed in the Motion/or Summary Judgment. No. 02-12-00421-CV, Jack Brewer,
Individually and d/b/a/ Resolution Trust Co., v. Green Lizard Holdings, LLC, Series SR, from the
158th District Court of Denton County, by Robert A. Miller, Prager & Miller, P.C., 14911 Quorum
Drive, Suite 320, Dallas, Texas 75254, for Appellee. Approx. 4/18/13.
Supersedeas:
Appellant contends that: (1) This case is moot as to the issue of immediate possession, but
is not moot as to the issues of the damage awards and the release of the supersedeas bond; (2) There
is no basis in law or fact to support the damage award of late fees in an eviction proceeding when
the contract is clear that the late fees are purely a liquidated damages penalty and not a measure of
rentals; (3) there is no basis in law or fact that supports the trial court's judgment of eviction as the
lease cannot be voided due to an enterprise for profit and the conditions precedent were not met; and
(4) the Trial Court Improperly Denied Appellant's Special Exceptions and Motion to Abate; and (5)
Appellant’s motion to abate and dismiss should have been granted as Ray failed to provide notice
as required under the lease agreement; and (6) Appellant moves this Court to Render an Order to
disperse the bond funds held by the Young County Court. No. 02-12-00443-CV, Ray Bell v. Rick
Ray, from the Constitutional County Court of Young County, by Kathleen Tiaden, Legal Aid of
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Northwest Texas, 703 Scott Avenue, Wichita Falls, Texas 76301, for Appellant. 1/31/2013.
Surety:
Sworn Account:
Appellants contend that: (1) The judgment rendered in this cause was procured by the
fraudulent conduct of CPS and in equity should be reversed; (2) the judgment rendered in this cause
is not enforceable as a Tex. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 agreement; (3) The judgment rendered in this cause
was not enforceable as a contract. No. 02-13-00356-CV, Putz Farms, A Joint Venture; Dr. Herbert
R. Putz; and Sign Putz v. Crop Production Services, Inc., from the 362nd District Court of Denton
County, by Jess L. Nickerson III, Nickerson Law Office, 39 North Main, Paris, Texas 75460, for
Appellee contends that: (1) Trial Court’s refusal to set aside the judgment and grant a new
trial was correct because: (1) Appellants’ issue that “judgment rendered in this cause was procured
by the fraudulent conduct of CPS” was not raised in the trial court; (2) There is no evidence in the
record to support the assertion of fraudulent conduct; and, (3) The Clerk’s Record affirmatively
shows that there was no fraud; (2) The Trial Court’s refusal to set aside the judgment and grant a
new trial was correct because: (1) Appellants’ assertion that the judgment is not enforceable as a
Rule 11 agreement was not raised in the trial court; and, (2) The final judgment is, in fact, an agreed
judgment which needs no reference to Rule 11 for its validity; and (3) The Trial Court’s refusal to
set aside judgment and grant a new trial was correct because: (1) Appellants’ assertion that the
judgment is not enforceable as a contract was not raised in the trial court; and (2) The final judgment
is, in fact, an agreed judgment which needs no reference to a contract for its validity.. No. 02-1300356-CV, Putz Farms, A Joint Venture; Dr. Herbert R. Putz; and Sign Putz v. Crop Production
Services, Inc., from the 362nd District Court of Denton County, by Robin M. Green, Dulan D. Elder,
Richards, Elder & Green, PLLC, 3223 South Loop 289, Suite 424, P.O. Box 64657, Lubbock, Texas
79464, for Appellee. 1/24/14.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because: (1) Appellee
did not meet his burden of proving the elements of his causes of action as a matter of law; (2)
Appellee’s sworn answer raises fact issues; (3) the documents used by Appellee in his motion for
summary judgment contained only conclusions as to balances allegedly owed at various times and
were not supported by adequate facts and were not adequate summary judgment evidence; (4) the
only claim of Appellee’s rights proceed from an assignment which is hearsay and which furthermore
raises fact issues regarding the balance of the account being assigned, and is therefore not admissible
as summary judgment evidence; and (5) Appellee’s evidence is not consistent and therefore there
are fact issues within Appellee’s own pleadings and evidence as to what amount is owed. 02-1000112-CV, Martin B. Smith and Toni E. Smith v. Dale A. Burrows, from the 158th District Court of
Denton County, by James L. Robertson, P.O. Box 200215, Arlington, Texas 76006, for Appellant.
6/17/10.
Taxation:
Appellant contends that: FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED. The trial court erred in granting
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summary judgment for the Jack County Hospital District and denying summary judgment for the
Jack County Appraisal District in holding that the leased equipment comprising the subject property
in the underlying lawsuit was owned by the Hospital District, whether legally or equitably, for the
purpose of property taxation; was exempt under Texas Tax Code section 11.11(h) or otherwise not
subject to property taxation; or should be removed from the appraisal roll. SECOND ISSUE
PRESENTED. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Jack County Hospital
District and denying summary judgment for the Jack County Appraisal District on any basis that the
Hospital District was denied due process because the 2012 notice of appraised value was delivered
to the owner of the leased equipment. No. 02-14-00188-CV, Jack County Appraisal District v. Jack
County Hospital District, from the 271st District Court of Jack County, by James R. Evans, Jr.,
Hargrove & Evans, LLP, 4425 Mopac South, Building 3, Suite 400, Austin, Texas 78735, for
Appellant. 9/3/14.
Appellant contends the trial court erred: (1) in finding the Legislature clearly and
unambiguously waived governmental immunity and granted permission for taxpayers to file suit for
refunds pursuant to Tex. Tax Code §31.11; and (2) in denying Lewisville ISD’s plea to the
jurisdiction and motion to dismiss based on CH Townhomes’ failure to pursue the exclusive
remedies provided by the Tax Code. 02-10-00338-CV, Lewisville Independent School District v.
CH Townhomes, Inc., by George C. Scherer, Daniel D. Bohmer, Law Offices of Robert E. Luna,
P.C., 4411 North Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas 75205, for Appellant. 11/1/10.
Appellee contends the trial court was correct in finding it maintained subject matter
jurisdiction over a request for refund of overpayment or erroneous payment of property taxes in that
the Texas Legislature provided a remedy in §31.11 of the Texas Tax Code, and in determining that
Appellee pursued its administrative remedies as required by the Texas Tax Code prior to filing suit.
02-10-00338-CV, Lewisville Independent School District v. CH Townhomes, Inc., by John Brusniak,
Jr., Melinda D. Blackwell, Rick L. Duncan, Amy Stowe Myers, Brusniak | Blackwell, PC, 17400
Dallas Parkway, Suite 112, Dallas, Texas 75287-7305 for Appellee. 12/23/10.
Temporary Injunction:
Appellant contends that: (1) The Trial Court Erred When it Denied Aflatouni's Application
for Temporary Injunction Because the Montoyas' Lien is Unenforceable Due to Res Judicata and
Limitations; and (2) Aflatouni Meets the Two Remaining Requirements for Obtaining a Temporary
Injunction - Aflatouni Pleaded a Cause of Action and Established The Harm Was Imminent and
Irreparable. No. 02-13-0064-CV, Jonathan Aflatouni, a/k/a John Aflatouni, v. Mark Anthony
Montoya and Enid Montoya, by Jeffrey R. Sandberg, Palmer & Manuel, L.L.P., 8350 N. Central
Expressway, Suite 1111, Dallas, Texas 75206, for Appellant. 4/1/13.
Appellants contend that the order for temporary injunction is void, ab initio, as Appellee did
not present a bond to the Court, nor any writ of injunction was ever issued. Appellants also contend
the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction because: (1) Appellee made no showing
of extreme hardship necessary to support a temporary mandatory injunction; (2) the temporary
mandatory injunction would destroy rather than preserve the status quo pending the trial on the
merits; and (3) Appellee showed no irreparable injury which would occur if the temporary injunction
were denied. 02-11-00222-CV, Steven M Johnson, P.C., dba The Johnson Law Firm and Steven M.
Johnson v. Mary McKinney, from the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County, by Robert D. Akers,
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Law Office of Robert D. Akers, 3116 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76107, for Appellants.
7/25/11.
Texas Citizens’ Participation Act:
Appellees address the following questions: 1. Did the “merits” of Rauhauser’s Chapter 27
motion to dismiss (i.e., the Step 1 and Step 2 issues under § 27.005(b) and (c)) survive the
Appellees’ nonsuit? 2. Were the “merits” of Rauhauser’s Chapter 27 motion to dismiss rendered
moot by Appellees’ nonsuit? 3. Was Rauhauser’s request for § 27.009(a) attorney’s fees and
sanctions precluded as a matter of law because the condition precedent to recovery of fees and
sanctions under § 27.009(a) was not fulfilled? 4. If the merits of Rauhauser’s Chapter 27 motion to
dismiss were not rendered moot, did the trial court err in denying the motion to dismiss? 5.
Assuming Rauhauser’s request for § 27.009(a) attorney’s fees and sanctions was denied by operation
of law, did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Rauhauser’s request? 6. If denial of
Rauhauser’s request for attorney’s fees and sanctions was erroneous, is remand to the trial court for
further proceedings the proper disposition? 7. Because Appellees nonsuited their claims, under any
circumstances can Appellees’ claims now be dismissed, much less be dismissed with prejudice? No.
02-14-00215-CV, Neal Rauhauser v. James McGibney and Viaview, Inc., from the 67th District
Court of Tarrant County, by Joseph W. Spence, Paul F. Gianni, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller,
L.L.P., 420 Commerce Street, Suite 500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, for Appellees.
Appellant replies: 1 Did Rauhauser's TCPA motion to dismiss "survive" plaintiffs' nonsuit?
2 Did the TCP A apply? 3 Was Rauhauser entitled to TCPA attorney's fees and sanctions? 4 Can
this Court reverse and render judgment awarding Rauhauser the attorney's fees and sanctions of
which the evidence was uncontested? 5 Can plaintiffs' claims be dismissed with prejudice even
though plaintiffs nonsuited? No. 02-14-00215-CV, Neal Rauhauser v. James McGibney and
Viaview, Inc., from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County, by Jeffre L. Dorrell, Philip A. Meyer,
Ciro J. Samperi, Hanszen LaPorte, 11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850, Houston, Texas 77079, for
Appellant. 10/6/14.
Appellant contends that: (1) The Trial Court erred in its extremely limited construction of
the Texas Citizens' Participation Act. (2): The Trial Court erred in finding that Williams presented
a prima facie case for any of his claims against Bilbrey. No. 02-13-00332-CV, Tim Bilbrey and
Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Michael Johnston,
Elizabeth Johnston Smid, Nathan Schattman, Johnston Legal Group PC, 4200 Airport Freeway, Fort
Worth, Texas 76117, for Appellant Tim Bilbrey. 10/30/13.
Appellant contends the following questions are raised: 1. Did Hall meet his initial burden
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams’ claims are based on or relate to the
Defendants’ exercise of their right to free speech? 2. Did Williams meet his burden of providing
clear and specific evidence which satisfied a prima facie case for each essential element of his
claims against Hall? No. 02-13-00332-CV, Tim Bilbrey and Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams from the
158th District Court of Denton County, by Alexader N. Beard, J. Brantley Saunders, Saunders,
Walsh & Beard, Craig Ranch Professional Plaza, 6850 TPC Drive, Sute 210, McKinney, Texas
75070, for Appellant Chuck Hall. 10/30/13.
Appellee contends that: (1) Anti-SLAPP Statute Not Applicable; (2) Williams Has
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Established Prima Facie Case for His Claims; and (3) In the Alternative, Williams’ Motion for
Continuance To Take Discovery Should Have Been Granted. No. 02-13-00332-CV, Tim Bilbrey
and Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams, from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by Scott E.
Hayes, Vincent Lopez Serafino Jenevein, P.C., 1601 Elm Street, Suite 4100, Dallas, Texas 75201,
for Appellee. 11/18/13.
Appellant Bilbrey replies that the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act applies to Williams’
claims against Bilbrey, and that Williams failed to present a prima facie case for any of his claims
against Bilbrey. No. 02-13-00332-CV, Tim Bilbrey and Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams from the
158th District Court of Denton County, by Michael Johnston, Elizabeth Johnston Smid, Nathan
Schattman, Johnston Legal Group PC, 4200 Airport Freeway, Fort Worth, Texas 76117, for
Appellant Tim Bilbrey. 12/10/13.
Appellant Hall replies that contrary to Williams’ brief, the TCPA applies to the present case
and that Williams failed to meet his burden of providing clear and specific evidence which satisfied
a prima facie case for each essential element of his claims against Hall. No. 02-13-00332-CV, Tim
Bilbrey and Chuck Hall v. Ryan Williams from the 158th District Court of Denton County, by
Alexader N. Beard, J. Brantley Saunders, Saunders, Walsh & Beard, Craig Ranch Professional
Plaza, 6850 TPC Drive, Sute 210, McKinney, Texas 75070, for Appellant Chuck Hall. 12/13/13.
Third-Party Beneficiary:
Tort:
Tort Claims Act:
Trademark:
Trade Secrets:
Trespass to Try Title:
Trial:
Trusts:
Turnover Order:
Appellee contends: Point 1. The Trial Court did not err in determining the April 11, 2003
turnover order was not a “writ of execution” pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
34.001, and therefore Appellant failed to comply with statutory timelines for revival of a dormant
judgment. Point 2. The Trial Court did not err in determining the April 11, 2003 turnover order was
not enforced by execution, thereby correctly concluding that the original judgment had expired due
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to lapse of time. Point 3. Appellant has wholly failed to comply with the briefing requirements of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, rendering this appeal frivolous. No. 02-14-00096-CV,
Keith M. Jensen, P.C., Roger M Briggs, Jr., from the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, by Lloyd
E. Ward, Adam C. Gallegos, Lloyd Ward & Associates, PC, 12655 N. Central Expy., Ste. 1000,
Dallas, Texas 75243, for Appellee. 6/20/14.
Unemployment Claims:
Appellee contends the trial court did not commit error in affirming the decision of the Texas
Workforce Commission and granting the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. Substantial evidence
exists that Lytle engaged in misconduct connect with his work, thereby disqualifying him for
unemployment compensation under TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §207.044 (Vernon 2006). 02-100000019-CV, Jason Lytle v. Texas Workforce Commission and Morrell Construction, Inc., from the
141st District Court of Tarrant County, by Greg Abbott, C. Andrew Weber, David S. Morales, Kevin
Van Ooort and Susan M. Wolfe, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Taxation Division, P.O.
Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711, for Appellee TWC. 7/28/10.
Unjust Enrichment:
Venue:
Voir Dire:
Voluntary Payment Rule:
Whistleblower Act:
Appellant contends that: 1. TheTrial Judge should have been recused due to being provided
salary, benefits and staff by the County; 2. There is a question of fact on the County's affirmative
defense; 3. Venue was proper in Dallas County. No. 02-13-00194-CV, Nina Lopez v. Tarrant
County, Texas, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant County, by Jason C. N. Smith, Zoe Courtney,
Art Brender, Law Offices of Art Brender, 600 Eighth Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant addresses and contends the following: Issue No. 1. Tarrant
County provides facilities, personnel and supplemental money to the district courts of Tarrant
County. Are these provisions sufficient to establish disqualification or create a need for the judge
to recuse in cases where Tarrant County is a party? Issue No. 2: Tarrant County fired Lopez for
gross insubordination and conduct unbecoming an employee. Did Lopez offer any evidence
rebutting these facts to create a fact issue on the affirmative defense found in §554.004 (b) of the
Texas Government Code? Issue No. 3: The Texas Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to
reverse the decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals in finding that venue was mandatory in Tarrant
County. Is that decision so clearly erroneous that it should be considered by this Court?
Alternatively, does the venue provision of the Whistleblower Act, found in § 554.007 (b) of the
Texas Government Code, control over the mandatory venue provision of § 15.015 of the Civil
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Practice & Remedies Code? ISSUE AS CROSS-APPELLANT Issue No. 1: To meet the elements
of a whistleblower claim, and waive immunity, a report of a violation of law must be made in good
faith. Based upon the evidence, Lopez’s claim of assault was not objectively reasonable. Lopez’s
failure to satisfy this element precludes the waiver of Tarrant County’s immunity. No.
02-13-00194-CV, Nina Lopez v. Tarrant County, Texas, from the 236th District Court of Tarrant
County, by Joe Shannon, Jr., Christopher W. Ponder, Robert D. Browder, Tim Curry Criminal
Justice Center, 401 West Belknap, 9th Floor, Fort Worth, Texas 76196, for Appellee/CrossAppellant. 2/12/14.
Appellant replies that: (1) the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the county’s
cross-appeal because the county did not file a notice of appeal; (2) question of fact exists regarding
whether Lopez’s reported violations of law were made in good faith; (3) question of fact exists
regarding the county’s affirmative defense; (4) review of venue ruling not precluded by previous
mandamus. by Jason C. N. Smith, Zoe Courtney, Art Brender, Law Offices of Art Brender, 600
Eighth Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas 76104, for Appellant. 3/11/14.
Witnesses:
Workers Compensation:
Wrongful Death:
Zoning:
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