PAPER MACHE3, ORIGAMI &amp

Transcription

PAPER MACHE 3, ORIGAMI & DRAFTING DISCOVERY:
CREATIVITY WITH PAPER
PAUL N. GOLD
Morgan & Weisbrod
6800 West Loop South, #450
Bellaire, Texas 77401
(713) 838-0003
(713) 838-9911 (fax)
ADVANCED EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY COURSE 1998
Houston * November 12-13, 1998
D
WRITER’S NOTE: This article was originally published in 1990 for the
State Bar Litigation Seminar and is re-printed here without any updating
or revisions. While the references may be dated, the substance of the paper
is still probably useful and instructive with regard to effective discovery
drafting techniques. The author strongly recommends that practitioners
update any case law cited herein before relying on it.
Paper Mache33, Origami & Drafting Discovery
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Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. DISCOVERY STRATEGY AND SCHEDULING ORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Discovery Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Scheduling Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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III. DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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IV. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Drafting Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Relevancy and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Responding and Objecting to Requests for Admission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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V. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Requesting Documents and Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Responding to Requests for Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. Sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
VI. INTERROGATORIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Number of Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Composite Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Option to Produce Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. Tactical Considerations: Specific Interrogatories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
H. Rule 215: Sanctions/Interrogatories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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VII. SUPPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. In Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Formality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
APPENDIX C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
APPENDIX D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
APPENDIX E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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PAPER MACHE33, ORIGAMI AND DRAFTING DISCOVERY:
CREATIVITY WITH PAPER
I. INTRODUCTION
Good drafting techniques can be as important as
discovery itself. The information that is obtained
through discovery will often be no more clear or
specific than the request in response to which it is
produced. Specificity and clarity are mandatory, if the
information and responses are to be useful at trial. It
is important for the litigants to understand what is
being asked and answered so that the litigation
progresses expeditiously and meaningfully. More
importantly, however, since written discovery requests
and responses may be read at trial, the jury must
understand what has been requested and produced.
How well the discovery has been drafted could very
well be outcome-determinative.
Much of the growing concern about discovery
abuse has focused upon the problems and the
gamesmanship encountered in written discovery and
what can be done about it. The Texas Supreme Court
has recently taken aim at requests for production,
emphasizing that overbroad and nonspecific requests
may fail to meet muster. Loftin v. Martin, 776
S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1985). Its next step should be to
target evasive, nonspecific responses. On a different
front, interest is growing in the concept of pattern
discovery requests as a way of eliminating the
tremendous amount of time and judicial resources
wasted on resolving sophisticated disputes over
semantics.1
Throughout this paper I will try to emphasize that
artful and conscientious drafting of discovery requests
and responses is an invaluable aspect of a successful
litigation and trial strategy. Whenever appropriate, I
will try to illustrate the concepts being discussed with
examples. These examples often will be taken directly
from my own practice and have not been certified or
approved by the bench, the bar or any other legal -- or
for that matter, illegal -- group. They may, in fact, be
subject to valid objections. I offer them here not as
forms to be blindly adopted and fed into a word
processor, but merely as starting points for creative
thought and drafting.
II.
DISCOVERY
STRATEGY
SCHEDULING ORDERS
AND
A. Overview
Scheduling orders, while not technically
discovery devices, can be a very critical aspect of the
discovery process. An order that is carefully planned
and drafted will enhance and enforce the discovery
strategy and timing that a trial attorney desires to
implement. In this regard the importance of a
discovery strategy cannot be over-emphasized.
Before undertaking discovery in a case the trial
attorney should give considerable thought to what are
going to be the key issues, terminology and evidence
in the case. It is important to form this understanding
as early and as clearly as practicable so that in drafting
discovery requests or responses these central themes
and terms can be consistently emphasized and
repeated.
B. Discovery Strategy
A well-thought-out discovery strategy is
fundamental to obtaining meaningful discovery in an
efficient and effective manner. Often the timing of a
discovery request can be as significant as the request
itself. The various discovery devices are designed to
augment each other, and a successful discovery
strategy will attempt to exploit this concept.
The guiding principal in seeking discovery should
always be to obtain information that will lead to
admissible evidence at trial. The ultimate goal that
every discovery strategy should seek to achieve is the
resolution of the dispute by what the facts reveal, not
by what facts are concealed. See, Jampole v.
Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984). Arbitrarily
engaging discovery merely as an end in itself is
wasteful and ineffective. Even worse is the tactic of
trying to bludgeon an opponent into submission with
onerous discovery requests merely to harass or
intimidate, or of attempting to entrap an opponent into
making a technical mistake which might cause him to
forfeit some vital proof. While craft, thoroughness
and tenacity are laudable, gamesmanship is not.
C. Scheduling Orders
1
The State Bar of Texas Administration of Justice
Committee has created a subcommittee to look into the
desirability and feasibility of such an approach.
1. Even though most trial attorneys recognize and
often advocate the importance of a planned and
disciplined approach to pre-trial preparation, few of us
are successful in sticking with such a game plan. The
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Advanced Evidence and Discovery Course, 1998
successful trial attorney understands, however, that no
matter how well crafted a strategy is, it has to be
flexible and, when necessary, must adjust to
unanticipated circumstances. A scheduling order is a
very useful tool in helping to shape and effectuate
such a strategy.
The scheduling order forces the trial attorney to
make decisions about what he needs, the order in
which things need to be obtained and most
importantly, when information should be obtained and
when it must be divulged. A common thread running
through the reported discovery cases is that attorneys
often times get into predicaments because they are
unprepared and end up reacting to discovery requests
rather than responding to them in a deliberate manner
in conformance with a theme or strategy.2 A
scheduling order can help remedy this problem.
c.
***
h. The exchange of a list of direct
witnesses, other than rebuttal or impeaching
witnesses the necessity of whose testimony
cannot reasonably be called to testify at
trial, stating their address and telephone
number, and the subject of the testimony of
each such witness;
i. The exchange of a list of expert
witnesses who will be called to testify at
trial,3 stating their address and telephone
number, and the subject of the testimony
and opinions that will be proffered by each
expert witness;
2. A sample proposed scheduling order is attached
as APPENDIX A.
3. Rule 166c, which is often overlooked by
attorneys, allows parties to modify the rules of
procedure to the needs of their particular case. By
conferring early in the litigation about the parties'
respective short-term and long-term goals, agreements
can be reached regarding, for instance, timing of
contention interrogatories, numbers of interrogatories,
order and scheduling of depositions, manner of
producing documents, designating and obtaining
reports and/or depositions of expert witnesses.
4. Trial courts have the discretion to enter
scheduling orders to control the manner and timing of
discovery, particularly with regard to designation and
production of expert witnesses for deposition.
Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, (Tex. 1979);
Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989);
Green v. Lerner, 786 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
5. Rule 166 Tex.R.Civ.Proc. has recently undergone
significant revision, effective September 1, 1990,
granting the trial judge considerably broad discretion
to require parties to appear at pre-trial conference to
consider, amongst other things:
A discovery schedule;
***
1. The marking and exchanging of all
exhibits that any party may use at trial and
stipulation to the authenticity and
admissibility of exhibits to be used at trial;
The rule goes on to authorize and require the trial
judge to "make an order that recites the action taken at
the pre-trial conference . . ."
6. The Texas Supreme Court, in Mackie v.
Koslow, 34 Tex.Sup.Ct.J.27 (October 10, 1990), has
held that striking pleadings and rendering a default
judgment are sanctions available to a trial court for the
failure of litigants to engage in an attorney or party
conference or failure to submit a joint pre-trial status
report, as ordered by the court.4 Mackie, supra at 30.
7. Keep in mind that some counties have specific
local rules that require that all discovery be completed
within a certain time before trial.5 ("All parties shall
complete discovery not less than seven (7) days prior
to the date said case is set for trial unless otherwise
ordered on motion previously filed." Dallas County
3
***
Compare the phrase "will be called" with the
phraseology in Rules 166b2(e)(l) and 166b(6)(b), which
only talk about experts who might be called or which a
party expects to call.
2
See, Babineaux v. Babineaux, 761 S.W.2d 102, 103
(Tex.App.--Beaumont 1988, no writ). ("The failure of a
litigant to utilize diligently the rules of civil procedure for
discovery purposes will not authorize the granting of a
motion for continuance.")
4
Decided under the pre-1990 amendments.
5
Rule 3a Tex.R.Civ.P. was specifically amended in 1990
to provide in subsection 2 that "no time period provided by
these rules may be altered by local rules."
Local Rules 1.15.) Therefore, it is a good practice at
the outset of a case to inquire whether the court has
any standing scheduling orders or guidelines.
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regard to the number of responses requested or that
certain requests that may be deferred because they are
premature, or to obtain extensions of time for filing
responses and objections.
III. DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
C. Definitions
A. Introduction
1. Believe it or not, but there was actually a time
when trial attorneys did not precede every set of
discovery requests with a five page set of arcane
instructions and definitions. The advent of these now
ubiquitous instructions and definitions coincided with
attempts by the courts to limit the number of discovery
requests that could be served. While definitions and
instructions can serve a useful purpose, they are often
misused as ammunition of abuse.
2. A sample set of definitions and instructions is
contained in APPENDIX D.
B. Instructions
1. It is senseless to give instructions in a set of
discovery going to a party. The party and his attorney
are presumed to know the law.6 Setting out the rules
in the preface to the questions merely takes up space.
Further, if the instructions impose requirements
different than the rules, they are probably of no effect.
This author is aware of no rule or case that states that
a party can unilaterally alter the rules of procedures to
suit his own purposes, or that the responding party can
waive an objection to such a tactic by not timely
objecting. Indeed, it can be inferred from other rules
that unilateral, unauthorized attempts to modify the
rules need not be considered.7 Instructions that make
an ordinary set of interrogatories burdensome might
even justify the imposition of sanctions. See,
Diversified Products Corp. v. Sport Center Co., 42
F.R.D. 3, 4 (D. Md. 1967).
2. Notwithstanding the above-stated limitations, it
can be helpful at the beginning of the set of discovery
requests to set out proposals for identifying and
attempting to voluntarily resolve potential
disagreements and disputes concerning the requests.
This approach can be used to obtain agreements with
6
The Texas Supreme Court has recently held that a party
is under no obligation to remind his opponent of his duties
under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Sharp v.
Broadway National Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1990).
7
See, Rules 3a and 166c.
1. Definitions of technical terms and terms of art
can be particularly helpful in making more
understandable a discovery request containing the
word or phrase and should be utilized.
2. When requests for production are being served on
a non-party, definitions of terms -- such as "the
parties," "the occurrence in question," "the product in
question," and "the date in question" -- can go a long
way toward putting the inquiry into a meaningful
context, which will probably result in more direct
responses with less delay.
3. There is the occasional problem that arises when
the parties disagree about the definition of a term. In
such circumstances, the responding party should
probably specially except to the definition and
preferably offer an alternative definition for
consideration. If the dispute cannot be resolved
informally, court resolution should probably be sought
because, if there is uncertainty about the question
during discovery, there is predictably going to be
confusion and disagreement about the answer at trial.
4. An interesting question is how broadly a party
can define a generic term before it becomes vulnerable
itself to the objection of being overbroad.
a. For instance, in Loftin v. Martin, 776
S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989), the Texas Supreme Court
held that a request for all documents relevant to a
particular issue in the lawsuit was vulnerable to the
objection of being overbroad. The court pointed out
that the request did not focus on a particular type or
category of documents. Could the attorney have
overcome this deficiency by merely defining the term
"document" to include every conceivable type item?
The answer is probably "no" because, while specific
documents might in fact be mentioned in the
definition, the request is in no way narrowed by the
definition. Cf., Mole v. Millard, 762 S.W.2d 251
(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988) (orig. proc.).
b. In County of Dallas v. Harrison, 759
S.W.2d 530 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, no writ), it was
held that a request for production of photographs did
not include videotapes. Consider whether the use of
definitions might have saved the request, if the request
had been for all "photographic films and prints" and
defined this term to include photographs, slides,
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videotapes, movie film and electronically or digitally
stored photographic materials.
D. Agreements
1. Rule 166c provides that, unless the court orders
otherwise, the parties may by written agreement
modify the procedures for how discovery is conducted.
2. It is important that, if in response to instructions
or proposals set out in a set of discovery the rules are
modified (e.g., an extension of the response deadline),
the agreement be expressly set out in writing, signed
by all parties and filed with the court.8
2. The following requests were held to be
permissible in a Jones Act case, under the 1984
amendments allowing inquiry into opinions and
contentions:
@
The plaintiff was not injured on board the
F/V Jason Wade.
@
On or about September 4, 1984, the F/V
Jason Wade was seaworthy.
@
The F/V Jason Wade's owners, operators,
captain and crew were not negligent on or
about September 4, 1984.
3. Precision is important in drafting such
agreements. For instance, if an extension of time is
agreed to for discovery responses, it should be made
clear that such agreement does or does not pertain to
objections.
See, Laycox v. Jaroma, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 2, 3-4
(Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see,
also, Shaw v. National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 723 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
IV. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
3. A party is not required to admit or deny a pure
proposition of law or facts of which he has no
reasonable means of knowing. Gaynier v. Ginsberg,
715 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). A party cannot be forced to admit the
authenticity of a physician's records or that such
records pertained to the patient. Some of the more
specific holdings in the case are as follows:
a. Where a request asks a party to admit to
having made a statement, an answer that the
respondent cannot recall is complete and sufficient.
b. A party cannot be forced to admit a
proposition of law; i.e., that a statement concerned the
party's state of mind, at the time it was made.
A. Drafting Considerations
There is no other type of request more difficult to
draft than a good request for admission. Overbroad
requests, constructed with disjunctive or conjunctive
phrases, will accomplish nothing. A similar outcome,
unfortunately, is also predictable if the request is too
specific. To compound the drafting conundrum, the
request must be drafted in such a way that, if admitted,
the admission has some understandable meaning to a
jury.9
B. Relevancy and Scope
1. Under amended Rule 169(1), requests for
admissions may relate to any matter discoverable
under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b. Further, Rule 166b
provides that it is not ground for objection that a
request propounded pursuant to Rule 169 relates to
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of
law to fact or mixed questions of law and fact or that
the documents referred to in a request may not be
admissible at trial. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(2)(a).
8
Rule 11 Tex.R.Civ.P. See, Valley Industries, Inc. v.
Cook, 767 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, err.
denied).
9
While requests for admission do not have to be read to
a jury to be admissible, nothing prevents them from being
read, and it can oftentimes be effective to do so.
4. More often than not the problem the trial judge
will have with a request for admission is not whether
it is relevant, but whether the device is being properly
used. This is pretty much a discretion call, since there
is very little, if any, guidance in this regard from the
case authorities and the rule. Some trial attorneys and
judges adopt a pragmatic approach in attempting to
limit the applicability of requests for admission,
expressing the attitude that requests for admission
should really be limited merely to proving the
genuineness of documents and that other discovery
devices should be used for ferreting out factual
disputes, opinions and contentions. This approach,
however, is needlessly restrictive and finds no support
in the rule or the case authorities. The scope of
discovery under Rule 169 is as broad as that under any
other discovery device; and there is nothing in the
rules that limits its application, save for the examples
cited above.
C. Tactical Considerations
1. Despite the broad scope of inquiry under Rule
169, it is permissible (although strongly discouraged),
subject to the provisions of Rule 215(4), to deny a
request merely to put the matter in issue at trial.10 It is
not, therefore, uncommon for a responding party to
deny matters that even seemingly appear undeniable.
To combat this tactic, interrogatories and requests for
production may be used in conjunction with the
requests for admission to obtain more complete
information.
a. If the respondent denies a request, a
corresponding interrogatory should request that he
state all facts he knows or believes to exist relevant to
such denial.
b. Another interrogatory should request all
individuals with knowledge of facts relevant to such
denial.
c. An interrogatory should be propounded for
the identification of all types and categories of
documents and things relevant to such denial, followed
by a request for production for all such items.
2. Rule 169, effective September 1, 1990, now
permits service of requests for admission at any time
"after the commencement of the action." Presumably,
this means that a plaintiff may now serve requests for
admission with his original petition.
a. It is probably doubtful that as a matter of
routine the plaintiff will elicit many substantive
concessions by serving requests with the petition;
however, there could be instances, such a claim
involving unliquidated damages, when requests with
the petition are served and a defendant defaults, where
the plaintiff might be in a position to request that the
requests be deemed admitted and avoid having to put
on evidence of damages at the default hearing. See,
Laycox v. Jaroma, 709 S.W.2d 2, (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
b. A more practical benefit of serving requests
for admission with the petition would be the effective
elimination of general denial practice. By serving
requests for admission, asking the defendant to admit
each of the plaintiff's allegations, the defendant would
be forced to admit or deny each specific allegation.
This might be useful in narrowing issues, particularly
regarding whether the right defendant has been served
and whether venue is proper.
10
For instance, under Rule 215(4)(c) a party may move
for expenses incurred in making proof when an opponent
fails to admit a request.
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3. Combining the broad scope of discovery with the
goal of narrowing issues, a trial attorney can draft
requests for admission to eliminate the potential for
being surprised at trial.
a.
Assuming a litigant sends an interrogatory
asking for all individuals with knowledge of facts
relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit and the
responding party responds with few or no individuals,
requests may be sent the responding party to admit
that it has listed all individuals with knowledge of
relevant facts and that the individuals it has listed are
the only ones that it is aware of with such knowledge.
b. The responding party always has the ability
to request leave to amend a response; but, where no
showing has to be made to supplement the abovementioned interrogatory answer, the responding party
would have to prove good cause and no prejudice to
the opposing party before it should be allowed to
amend the response to the request for admission. See,
Rule 169(2).
c. The above example works equally well with
documents that are identified or produced in response
to interrogatories or requests for production.
4. Requests for admission may also be used to
require greater completeness or responsiveness in
responding to other forms of discovery. For example,
recently I was engaged in a products liability case with
a large manufacturer that had been involved in other
similar cases for over a decade. Over the course of
that time, it had generated in excess of 500,000
documents, all of which it alleged had been placed in
its "reading room" for inspection by plaintiff's
attorneys. The defendant proceeded to answer all
interrogatories and requests for production by saying
that the answers or documents could be found in the
"reading room." Rule 168(2)(b) allows a party to refer
a litigant to business records in answer to an
interrogatory, provided "the burden of deriving or
ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for
the party serving the interrogatory as for the party
served." I reasoned that, if I could demonstrate that
the burden was not "substantially the same," I could
then force the defendant to have to narratively respond
to my requests. Accordingly, I sent the defendant a
detailed set of requests, asking whether the defendant
had computerized retrieval capability with which it
could identify and retrieve documents in the reading
room.11 The defendant after three successful motion
to compel hearings finally unequivocally admitted the
requests. From that point forward it was no longer
permitted to respond to a request or interrogatory by
11
See, APPENDIX B.
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stating the answer or document could be found in the
"reading room." See, also, American Bankers Ins.
Co. of Florida v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427
(Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
o
5. Requests may be used to expose weaknesses in
an opponent's case or defense. For instance, consider
a case in which the plaintiff has alleged $50,000 in
medical expenses as a result of the occurrence. The
following requests may be used to expose how the
defendant intends to defend against the allegation,
while at the same time potentially forcing the
defendant to admit the point:
o
Admit that the defendant is aware of
facts relevant to the plaintiff's
allegation12 that he has incurred $50,000
in reasonable medical expenses for
medical services that were necessary to
provide the plaintiff for the injuries he
has alleged to have sustained as a result
of the occurrence in question.13
o
Admit that the defendant is aware of no
individuals with knowledge of facts
relevant to the plaintiff's allegation that
he has incurred $50,000 in reasonable
medical bills for medical services that
were necessary to provide proper care to
the plaintiff for the injuries he has
alleged to have sustained as a result of
the occurrence in question.
o
Admit that the defendant is aware of no
documents relevant to or containing
information relevant to the plaintiff's
allegation that he has incurred $50,000
in reasonable medical bills that were
necessary to provide proper care to the
plaintiff for the injuries he has alleged to
have sustained as a result of the
occurrence in question.14
12
I generally try to use the term "alleged" in my requests
to avoid the evasive response that the defendant denies the
plaintiff sustained an injury because of the defendant's
negligence.
13
If the defendant admits that it is aware of facts, then an
interrogatory can be sent or a deposition question posed
asking of which specific facts the defendant is aware.
14
By using negative and positive requests, different goals
are achieved. If the opponent admits that he is aware of
individuals with knowledge of facts and has not timely
Admit with regard to the $50,000 in
medical expenses which the plaintiffs
alleges to have incurred as a result of the
occurrence in question that: (answer
each subpart separately)
o
The expenses were incurred by the
plaintiff.
o
The expenses were reasonable at
the time they were incurred.
o
The expenses were for medical
services which were necessary to
provide the plaintiff proper care for
the injuries he has alleged to have
sustained as a result of the
occurrence in question.15
6. Requests may be drafted to eliminate a claim or
defense even though the opposing party refuses to
stipulate the point. For instance, if the defendant is
alleging unavoidable accident, this means that neither
party to the lawsuit was responsible for the
occurrence. A defendant will generally plead this as
an alternative defense, which is proper and
noncommittal. However, if the defendant is served
with requests asking it to admit that the plaintiff was
negligent and that the plaintiff's negligence was a
proximate cause of the occurrence, the defendant is
faced with a difficult dilemma. It can either admit the
requests, in which case its defense of unavoidable
accident is eliminated, or it can deny the requests
which will eliminate a defense of comparative
negligence.
7. Admissions may be used to prove a Motion for
Summary Judgment. See, Laycox v. Jaroma, supra.
In the crash of Delta 1141 litigation, Delta Air Lines
offered to stipulate liability in return for the plaintiffs
agreeing to drop their claims for punitive damages.
Many of the plaintiffs did not consider this acceptable,
supplemented answers to interrogatories naming them, such
individuals may be potentially stricken. If he admits he
knows of no individuals, he would then have to prove good
cause and no prejudice to be able to later amend.
15
Question whether these requests could arguably be said
to be outside the opponent's knowledge. Gaynier v.
Ginsberg, 715 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). If so, the opponent may be hard pressed to
show a basis for producing rebuttal evidence on this issue
at trial.
since the stipulation did not go far enough. Instead,
the plaintiffs sent Delta requests for admissions asking
it to admit responsibility and the violation of various
standards. These requests resulted in obtaining
admissions from Delta which then served as the basis
of successful motions for summary judgment. See,
APPENDIX C attached.
8. Requests for admission may and should be used
to confirm the authenticity of certain documents or to
verify that all the documents a party has produced in
response to a previous request for production
constitute a complete response. When using this
device, however, be sure to attach the documents in
question, unless they have been previously produced
and marked as exhibits, in which case the exhibit
numbers may be used instead for reference. See, Rule
169(1) Tex.R.Civ.P.
D. Responding and Objecting to Requests for
Admission.
1. It is not ground for objection that a request for
admission propounded pursuant to Rule 169 related to
statements or opinions of fact or the application of law
to fact or mixed questions of law and fact of that the
documents referred to in a request may not be
admissible at trial. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(2)(a).16
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5. Evasive, self-serving statements, inappropriately
used to qualify a response, may be stricken and result
in the admission being deemed admitted. Lowe v.
Employers Cas. Co., 479 S.W.2d 383
(Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1972, no writ).
6. A "preliminary statement" preceding a response,
even if not stricken, will be held to be inadmissible as
hearsay at trial. Morehead v. Morehead, 741
S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1988).
V. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
A. Introduction
Documents and other visual or physical items
will usually be some of the most compelling and
persuasive evidence at trial. This is because juries
tend to believe what they see. Documents and things
generally are most persuasive when they are offered
against the party who generated them. In this respect,
they can be the most damning of all admissions.
Recognizing the trial significance of physical
evidence, underscores the significance of requests for
production. What the jury sees will in large part be
dependent upon what the trial attorney has obtained
through discovery. And what the trial attorney obtains
will be a function of how well his requests are drafted.
B. Requesting Documents and Things
2. If an objection to a request for admission is
lodged, the reason must be stated and the objection
must be served within the time provided for responses.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 169(i).
3. Admissions qualified with the phrase, "to the best
knowledge and belief," are subject to being deemed
admitted. McIntyre v. Sawicki, 353 S.W.2d 953
(Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. A request may be deemed admitted when a denial
is found not to have been made in good faith or fails to
fairly meet the substance of the request. U.S. Fire
Insurance Co. v. Maness, 775 S.W.2d (Tex.App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ ref'd).
1.
Scope
a.
Rule 167(1)(a) allows any party to request
another party:
[T]o produce and permit the party making the
request, or someone acting on his behalf, to
inspect, sample, test, photograph and/or copy,
any designated documents or tangible things
which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of Rule 166b which are in the possession,
custody or control of the party upon whom the
request is served. (Emphasis added.)
b. Scope Defined by Rule 166b.
A party may request to have produced any of the
documents and things designated in Rule 166b. This
includes:
16
Although Rule 166b(2)(a) provides that a party
receiving an interrogatory requesting an opinion or
contention may move for a protective order deferring an
answer until a later time, there is no such provision for a
request for admission directed to an opinion or contention.
If faced with such a request at the outset of a case, this
should not stop a party from at least trying to get such relief.
. . . all documents (including papers, books,
accounts, graphs, charts, photographs, electronic
or videotape recordings, and any other data
compilations from which information can be
obtained)...and any other tangible things which
constitute or contain matters relevant to the
subject matter in the action.
D-8
2.
Breadth.
a. The Texas Supreme Court, in Loftin v.
Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989), has
emphasized that, while the scope of discovery under
Rule 167 remains quite broad, requests for production
must be drafted specifically. The request for
production that was the center of attention in Loftin
was as follows:
. . . all notes, records, memoranda, documents
and communications made that the carrier
contends support its allegations [that the award
of the Industrial Accident Board was contrary to
the undisputed evidence.]
The carrier objected to the request on the ground that
it was vague, broad and unclear. The court agreed
with the carrier that the request was vague, and found
that, while the plaintiff was entitled to see the evidence
against him, he was required to formulate his request
for production with a certain degree of specificity.
Supra at 403. It can be inferred from the decision that
the degree of specificity the Court alludes to requires
identifying a particular class or type of document.
Supra at 403.
b. No Fishing.
Justice Spears, writing for the majority of the
court, pointed out that the 1966 General Commentary
to Rule 167 Tex.R.Civ.P. quoted with approval the
following from Steely and Gayle, "Operation of the
Discovery Rules," 2 Houston
L. Rev. 222, 223, (1964):
Unlike interrogatories and depositions, Rule 167
is not a fishing rule. It cannot be used simply to
explore. You are permitted to fish under
deposition procedures, but not under Rule 167.
The Motion for Discovery must be specific, must
establish materiality, and must recite precisely
what is wanted. The Rule does not permit
general inspection of the adversary's records.
Loftin, supra at 148.17
17
While every trial attorney who has ever received a
request such as the one involved in Loftin will doubtless
applaud the result the court has reached, the court's analysis
is somewhat troubling. Justice Spears apparently based the
holding on the reasoning in an article written twenty-five
years ago when parties had to demonstrate "good cause" and
materiality for a request for production. The court fails to
reconcile the present rule with the prior rule requiring
showings of materiality and good cause. Further, the court
fails to explain why requests for production should be
treated differently than any other discovery device.
3.
The Implications of Loftin v. Martin.
It is one thing to recognize that requests must be
drafted with specificity; it is quite another to actually
do it. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court provided no
examples in Loftin of what it considered to be a
proper, specific request. All we know is that the
request that was at issue was found deficient because
it did not request a particular class or type of
document. What does that mean? What, for instance,
comprises a class of documents?
a. Class of Documents.
(1) One recent case has held that, if the
request for production is for a "category" of
documents and the responding party objects to
producing certain documents because of a claimed
privilege or exemption, it is not necessary for the
responding party to specify the "particular items" for
which protection is being sought. Green v. Lerner,
786 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
1990, no writ).
(2) Comment: Although the Green holding
might be a logical interpretation of the rules, it is
difficult from a practical standpoint to see what is
achieved by preventing the requesting party from
knowing what items are the subject of the request for
protection. Of course, if the Green holding is
approved, it is just one more reason for drafting
requests as specifically as possible.
b. Types of Documents.
(1) It would seem that, if the Green
holding is indeed correct, the safest thing to do would
be to request specific types of documents, whenever
feasible. Requesting specific documents, however, is
not without its risks.
(a) The perils of specificity are
brought home by the decision in County of Dallas v.
Harrison, 759 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988,
no writ). In that case the Dallas Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of whether photographs and
videotapes are in the same category or in different
categories under Rule 167(1)(c) in trying to decide
whether a request for photographs includes a request
for videotapes. The court held that they are two
separate items and consequently a request for one is
not going to be considered a request for the other.
(b) In Ramirez v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.App.--Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied), the plaintiff served
Volkswagen with the following request:
All written or other documentation, photographs
and reports including, but not limited to,
documentation of testing, factual observations,
test, supporting data and calculations of the area,
persons and or vehicle and objects involved,
either made before, at the time of or after
the time of the events in question in your
possession and/or in the possession of your
experts.
During trial, Volkswagen offered into evidence some
tests of a "Volkswagen Type 2 vehicle," and the
plaintiff objected because such items had not been
previously produced in response to the above request.
The court admitted the evidence, observing that, while
the request for production was limited to "tests . . . of
the vehicle . . . involved," (Emphasis added by court.)
the offered evidence related to a vehicle other than the
actual one involved. Ramirez, supra at 706.
(2) Recall that, earlier in the paper, under
the discussion about definitions, the issue was raised
whether the Loftin requirement of specificity could be
avoided merely by defining the term "documents" to
include everything that Rule 167 has defined it to
mean. It is uncertain whether the Texas Supreme
Court is going to allow attorneys to meet the
specificity requirement it has promulgated by merely
defining terms broadly. It is doubtful, since it would
be difficult to reconcile such an approach with the
philosophy that requests for production are not a
device for fishing. The more likely interpretation that
will be given Loftin is that a request must be confined
to a particular type or class of document.
4. Potential Problems and Complying with Loftin
v. Martin.
a. The practical problem posed by the Loftin
decision, particularly with regard to plaintiffs, is that
early in discovery it difficult to know what specific
types of documents exist. This problem can become
even more frustrating when the responding party has
developed unique identifying names and titles for
items, apart from how they may be generically referred
to in the industry. A related problem is the "Rambo"
tactic of a witness refusing (often on advice of
counsel) to answer a question until every term is
specifically and precisely defined. By requiring
specificity without providing examples for guidance,
the Texas Supreme Court may have unintentionally
lent support to these practices. In an attempt to
lighten the burden of discovery and bring clarity to the
process, the Supreme Court may be opening Pandora's
box just enough to release the demons of sophistry and
hypertechnicality, two creatures which must be
shackled and exiled if the primary objective of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is to be achieved. See,
Rule 1 Tex.R.Civ.P.
b. One approach to complying with Loftin is
to use interrogatories to identify what should be
sought. See, Limas v. DeDelgado, 770 S.W.2d 953
D-9
(Tex.App.--El Paso 1989) (orig. proc.). I have begun
experimenting with the technique of using
interrogatories to identify the specific classes and
types of documents I might want to initially obtain.
An example of a set of interrogatories utilizing such
approach is set out as APPENDIX D.
(1) The above technique is particularly
useful in a complex case, such as a product liability
claim, and may not be necessary in a simpler action,
such as a motor vehicle collision, in which there will
be little mystery about what pertinent documents to
seek.
(2) In the event this technique is to be
utilized, prior to sending out the interrogatories, an
agreement with the responding party or an order of the
court should be obtained, allowing for the enlargement
of the permissible number of responses that may be
elicited. It would stand to reason that if, rather than
sending out a burdensome "fishing net" set of requests
for production, a party were to utilize interrogatories
so that the responding party could merely identify
what, if any, items in its possession were specifically
responsive, the court should be inclined to give wide
latitude to the number of "identification interrogatory"
responses that may be allowed.
5.
Purpose.
One of the purposes of the request/response
procedure is to substantially reduce court involvement
in the discovery process.
6.
Procedure.
a. Instead of filing a motion for production, the
procedure for the party seeking production is to file a
request on another party, which specifies a reasonable
time, place and manner for making the production or
inspection, or performing the related acts. Effective
September 1, 1990, the request must be filed with the
court and served upon every party to the action.
b. The party upon whom the request is served
has thirty (30) days in which to file a written response
and any objections to the request. The time for
making the response may be lengthened or shortened
by the court on a showing of good cause. Effective
September 1, 1990, the response, but not necessarily
the responsive documents, must be filed with the court
and served upon every party to the action.
c. In Limas v. DeDelgado, 770 S.W.2d 953
(Tex.App.--El Paso 1989) (orig. proc.), interrogatories
were served requesting that the responding party:
. . . attach all reports and opinions of your
attorney or subject to your control, from such
expert witness or potential expert witness you
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expect to call at the trial of the above entitled and
numbered cause.
The testimony of the responding expert witness was
allowed at trial although no documents were attached
to the answers to interrogatories. The court found no
abuse of discretion, reasoning that the wrong
procedure was utilized in the attempt to procure the
documents and that a request for production under
Rule 167 should have been employed instead.
d. Rule 167 allows a plaintiff to serve requests
for production with the citation and original petition.
In such instances, the party served with the request
will have fifty (50) days after service within which to
serve written responses and objections.
C. Responding to Requests for Production
1.
Specificity.
a. The Texas Supreme Court, in Loftin v.
Martin, only addressed the specificity required of a
request; nothing was written regarding the specificity
required of a response. There is no question that an
overbroad request can be frustrating and burdensome;
however, equally frustrating and dilatory is the
unresponsive, nonspecific response.
b. Comment: One of the major frustrations
with requests for production is that the requirements
for the written response are so minimal as to make the
written response of virtually no value at all. Rule
167(1)(d) provides as follows:
The party upon whom the REQUEST is served
shall serve a written RESPONSE which shall
state, with respect to each item or category of
items, that inspection or other requested action
will be permitted as requested . . .
The problem which all too frequently arises is that the
responding party merely responds by saying "we will
make available whatever documents and things are in
our possession," or "we will make the documents in
our possession available for inspection," or "we have
documents responsive to the request, which we will
make available for inspection." These type answers,
while arguably in compliance with the rule, provide no
meaningful information that advances the ball. The
requesting party has to make arrangements to inspect
the documents, and only then will he find out what is
and is not being produced.
The Texas Supreme Court should consider
amending Rule 167(1)(d) to require that the written
response "fairly meet the substance of the request"
(See, Rule 169.), meaning that, if the request asks for
"all maintenance logs regarding preventative
maintenance performed on the machine in question for
the months of June, July, and August 1988," the
response should state "the defendant has been unable
to this point to locate any logs in response to this
request" or "no such logs were kept," or "such logs
were kept at one time but were destroyed in the
ordinary course of business, in 1989, as part of a
longstanding document retention policy," or "we have
been able to locate a requested log only for the month
of August, 1988." Such an amendment would mean
that written responses would then provide meaningful
information regarding what is in the possession of the
respondent and what is not, what will be made
available and what will not.
The requirement imposed by Loftin, that
requests be specific, solves only part of the problem.
Until litigants are required to respond to specific
requests with like specificity, delay and abuse will
continue to pervade the discovery process.
2.
Possession.
a. A party is required upon receipt of a proper
request to produce for inspection and copying
discoverable documents and things in its possession.
The documents or things to be produced or inspected
must be within the possession, control or custody of
the party served with the request. Texhoma Stores,
Inc. v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 466
(Tex.App.--Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); In Re W.
R. M., 534 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1976, no
writ). The right of custody and control, rather than
physical possession or geographical location,
constitutes the most important consideration in
determining the right of production. See, e.g., Sales,
Pre-Trial Discovery in Texas, 31 S.W.L.J. 1034
(1979); Bifferator v. States Marine Corp., 11
F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.C. N.Y. 1951) (F.R.C.P. 34). The
documents or other matters to be produced need not be
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court. See,
generally, Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271 (D.C.
N.Y. 1970) (F.R.C.P. 34); Cf., Hastings Oil Co. v.
Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); and Robb
v. Gilmore, 302 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth
1957, no writ). By "control" of the party, it is meant
not only that he directly controls or personally
possesses the document or thing sought, but also
includes those items over which he exercises indirect
control and thus has access to such items. Documents
relating to a foreign corporation that are in the actual
possession of an American subsidiary have been held
to be discoverable. Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motor
Corp., USA, 362 F.Supp. 54 (D. Or. 1973); Reeves
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 80 F.Supp. 107 (D. Del.
1948). The opposing party's tax records are
discoverable although not in the care or custody of the
party, since he does "control" them in the sense that he
has the right to obtain them. Mareska v. Marks, 362
S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962). Further, it has been held
that material evidence, not otherwise privileged, which
the party has turned over to his attorney is subject to
discovery. See, Ex Parte Knollenburg, 123 Tex.
126, 62 S.W.2d 37 (1934); see, also, United States v.
I.B.M. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 650 (D.C. N.Y. 1973).
Actual ownership of the item is not required; simple
possession is sufficient. United States v. National
Broadcasting Corp., 65 F.R.D. 415 (C.D. Cal.
1974), appeal dismissed, 95 S.Ct. 1668 (1976).
b. The 1988 amendments expanded the
concept of possession to include "superior right to
compel." A party that has a superior right to that of
the requesting party to compel the production of an
item from a third party (including an agency, authority
or representative) is considered to have possession of
the item.
3.
Options.
a. The party who produces documents is given
the option to produce them as they are kept in the
usual course of business or to organize and label them
to correspond with the categories in the request.
b. The responding party should avoid engaging
in the abusive tactic of producing massive piles of
papers (the "boxcar production") and the tactic of
scrambling or burying key documents ("shuffling the
deck"), rather than producing documents in their
original form or in an otherwise orderly state. Both
practices have been denounced and could be grounds
for sanctions. See, American Bankers Ins. Co. of
Florida v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.): and see, also, Kaminsky,
"Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil
Litigation," 48 Fordham L. Rev. 907, 974 (1980).
4.
Destructive Testing.
A new protective provision has been added to
Texas Rule 167 which provides for notice, a hearing,
and prior approval by the court if the testing sought or
the examination of the matters produced is likely to
cause destruction or material alteration of an article.
See, Tex.R.Civ.P. 167(1)(g). In keeping with the
Federal Rules, broad discretionary powers rest in the
trial court in the implementation of this and other
provisions of the new rule.
5.
Authorizations.
a. Medical Authorizations.
Rule 166b(2)(h) provides that any party alleging
physical or mental injury and damages "shall be
required, upon request, to produce or furnish an
authorization permitting full disclosure of medical
D-11
records not theretofore furnished to the requesting
party, which are reasonably related to the injury or
damages asserted." Recently, in Mutter v. Wood,
744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1988), the Texas Supreme
Court held that the trial judge abused her discretion by
requiring the plaintiffs to sign a medical authorization
requiring absolute and total waiver of the
patient/physician privilege. The court observed that
the plaintiffs had properly requested that the physician
not be questioned out of their presence. (This had
been accomplished by setting out this restriction in the
medical authorization provided by the plaintiff.) This
opinion evidences strong disapproval of the practice of
conducting ex parte communications with an
opponent's treating physician. It should be noted that
the party is permitted under this rule to produce the
records in lieu of furnishing a medical authorization to
the opposing side. In Batson v. Ramsey, 762 S.W.2d
717 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proc.),
the relator complained that the medical authorization
he was being requested to sign was defective for the
same reasons as the one in Mutter. The appellate
court disagreed, holding that the authorization was
restricted to 1) records; 2) from a specific doctor's
office, and 3) relating to a specific condition (alcohol
or drug use by the relator). Batson, supra at 721.
b. Comment: While Rule 166b(2)(h) allows
for the production of a medical authorization from any
party alleging physical or mental injury, there is no
provision in our Rules of Procedure for requiring an
authorization to produce any other types of records
such as income tax returns, social security wage
earning verifications, employment or school records.
But see, Martinez v. Rutledge, 492 S.W.2d 398
(Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1979, err. ref'd 1980).
6.
Objections.
a. Burdensome Requests.
In many instances the issue raised in a discovery
request for documents is not that the documents do not
exist or are irrelevant, but that it would be burdensome
for the responding party to have to gather and produce
the documents. The question has been addressed in
several recent cases dealing with the issue of whether
prior similar claims are discoverable. There is an
apparent consensus in the decisions that information
regarding other similar claims may be relevant and
discoverable when there are allegations of a continuing
pattern or practice or unfair course of dealing;18
however, there is less clarity regarding when a
18
Also, see, John Deere & Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d
369 (Tex.App.--Waco 1989), regarding admissibility of
prior judgments on the issue of notice.
D-12
responding party has to actually produce documents in
response to the request. Scrivner v. Casseb, 754
S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, no
writ); Aztec Life Insurance Co. of Texas v. Dellana,
667 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984, no writ);
and Lunsman v. Spector, 761 S.W.2d 112, 114
(Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, no writ).
(1) In Aztec, supra, an insurance
company's own claim files were held discoverable.
(2) However, in Scrivner, supra, the
respondent City produced an affidavit that other
similar complaints were not indexed by the City and
that it would be burdensome to produce the
documents. The court held that the actual pleadings
from other lawsuits were not required to be produced
because they could be obtained from public records.
(3) In Lunsman, supra, an affidavit was
also filed by the respondent stating that the files of the
lawsuits that were being sought were located in
various offices throughout the country. The court held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to know of other
similar claims to establish an unfair course of dealing
but the request for the actual pleadings was overly
burdensome.
b. Relevancy.
The request should be narrowed to a relevant
time period. General Motors v. Lawrence, 651
S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983);19 however, the request does
not have to be confined to the specific product or
items involved in the litigation. Jampole v. Touchy,
673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984); and Independent
Insulating Glass/Southwest, Inc. v. Street, 722
S.W.2d 798 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1987, writ
dism'd). The scope of discovery does not have to be
confined to the pleadings. See, Stevenson v. Melady,
1 F.R.D. 329 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); and United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F.Supp. 1314 (D.
D.C. 1978); but cf., Lindsey v. O'Neill, 689 S.W.2d
400, 402 (Tex. 1985) (holding that it is not an abuse
to limit discovery to the issues pleaded). The scope
may even be broadened if gross negligence is alleged.
General Motors v. Lawrence, supra, (concurring
opinion, Justice Ray).
c. Requests Are Confined to Existing Things.
A Rule 167 request for production cannot be
used to require a party to generate something that does
not exist; for example, a list of potential witnesses.
Loftin v. Martin, supra, at 146; McKinney v.
National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, Pa., 772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1989).
d. Expert Reports.
If a party wants an opponent's expert witness to
reduce to tangible form his opinions and conclusions,
it is not enough to merely send a request for
production. If the party does not respond or objects,
the requesting party must file a motion and obtain a
court order. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.
1989).
e. Timeliness of Objections.
After the date on which answers are to be served,
objections are waived unless an extension of time has
been obtained by agreement or order of the court or
good cause is shown for the failure to object within
such period. Rule 166b(4) [effective September 1,
1990].
f. Improper Requests/Special Exceptions.
It has been indicated by members of the Texas
Supreme Court that the required procedural steps
necessary for preserving an objection to a request for
production under Rule 166b(4) are activated only by
a proper discovery request. McKinney v. National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh Pa.,
772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1989) (McKinney II).
Although Gutierrez v. Dallas I.S.D., 729 S.W.2d 691
(Tex. 1987), concerned improper interrogatories, it is
reasonable to infer that, if a party sends an improper
request for production, the responding party must
specially except to it within the time period for
responding to the requests, at the risk of waiving the
objection.20
6.
Supplementation Requirement.
Failure to timely supplement a request for
production can result in the automatic exclusion of the
unproduced documents and things at trial. Lopez v.
Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, appl. for writ filed); and Wilson v.
Snead Site Preparation, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 840
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989). Along these
same lines, a testifying expert's testimony could be
limited or excluded for failing to produce an ordered
report. Ramirez v. Volkswagen of America, 788
S.W.2d 700 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied).
7.
19
In this regard, it is recommended that the definitions of
the request always contain the term "designated time
period." The term should be defined to include a particular
time period unless otherwise stated. See, APPENDIX D.
Non-Parties.
Rule 167(5) grants the court authority to order
production from a person, organizational entity,
20
See, APPENDIX E.
D-13
government agency, or corporation who is not a party
to the suit. However, in order to achieve such
discovery, the movant must give notice to all parties
plus the non-party and then file a motion setting forth
with specific particularity the request and the necessity
for such discovery. The court then has a hearing on
the motion in which all parties and the non-party from
whom discovery is sought shall be given the
opportunity to assert objections to the motion for
discovery. Tex. Education Agency v. Anthony, 700
S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1985). There is no comparable
federal rule that permits production from a non-party.
Rule 34(c) Fed.R.Civ.P. provides, however, that "this
rule does not preclude an independent action against a
person not a party for production of documents and
things and permission to enter upon land."
"report" as used herein includes all
documents
(memoranda,
notes,
correspondence, charts and graphics)
containing
the
expert's
factual
observations, as well as all opinions and
all supporting data or material which the
expert has reviewed and/or relied upon
in formulating his opinions and mental
impressions relevant to the subject
matter of this lawsuit. In this regard, the
term "reports" also encompasses all
"learned treatises" (works of scientific
value in the field of the expert's area of
expertise) the expert has reviewed
and/or relied upon in forming his
opinions relevant to the subject matter of
this lawsuit.
8.
Tactical Considerations: Specific Requests.
In drafting requests for specific documents and
things, the best advice is to track the rules and case
authority as closely as possible. Also -- although I
personally have a very hard time following this advice
-- try not to make the requests long and complicated.
Some attorneys adhere to the belief that a request
cannot be comprised of more than one sentence. This
is wrong; requests should be comprised of as many
sentences as it takes to make the request clear.
Sometimes it is helpful to add an explanation to a
request, explaining the parameters and purpose for
them. The following examples are offered to illustrate
these concepts:
a.
o
All tests, photographs, movie and/or
videotape film, and/or image-recording
films of any nature; diagrams; sketches;
graphs; computer-assisted calculations
and recreations; and/or models and
mock-ups generated by or provided to
the expert relevant to his involvement in
the instance case and/or relevant to the
testimony he may give at trial.
o
For any consulting expert whose work
produce has been reviewed by an expert
who may testify on your behalf at trial,
please similarly produce all the aboverequested items.
Expert Reports.
o
o
o
For each and every expert witness that
the defendant has employed -- specially
or in the ordinary course of business
(including its agents, representatives,
employees and vice-principals) -- and
who may testify at trial in this cause,
please produce the following things in the
defendant's "possession":
The expert's current and complete
biography or curriculum vitae, including
all bibliographies of completed works
which he has authored or co-authored,
or to which he has contributed, whether
or not such works have been generally
published.
All "reports," including, but not limited
to, all drafts and revisions of such
reports (whether on hard copy or
electronically stored).
The term
b.
Investigation.
o
All investigative and/or incident
"reports" generated by or on behalf of
the defendant prior to its being aware of
an outward manifestation from the
plaintiffs of an intent to bring the instant
lawsuit relevant to the following:
o
The subject matter of the instant lawsuit;
o
The "incident in question";
o
The defendant's personnel (agents,
representatives, officers and employees)
that were on the premises in question at
the time of the incident;
o
The policies, procedures, guidelines
and/or regulations that were applicable
to the activities taking place on the
D-14
premises in question at the time of
the incident in question, which were
material to the incident in question;
o
o
c.
Potential witnesses regarding the
incident and/or the circumstances that
existed on the premises immediately
prior to, during and/or after the incident.
In addition to the above "reports," the
following things generated (during the
same prescribed time period) in
conjunction with the above-referenced
investigations and/or investigation
reports are requested:
all notes,
memoranda, written communications,
electronically
stored
data
and
communications, photographs, movies,
videotapes, models, reenactments,
audiotapes, written statements and tests.
Insurance Policies.
o
All insurance agreements and/or policies
-- including, but not limited to, primary,
umbrella and excess policies (and
including all endorsements, schedules
and amendments) applicable to the date,
incident or claims in question (regardless
of whether on a claim made or
occurrence basis) potentially obligating
the insurance carrier(s) to pay a
potential judgment in this case for the
claims asserted against the defendant.
[It is requested that the defendant make
the above documents available for
inspection
in
their
original,
unexpurgated form.]
o
In the event the claim is being handled
by the insurance carrier(s) on
reservation(s) of rights, please produce
all communications from the carrier(s)
relevant to such reservation(s).
o
In the event the pertinent policies are
aggregate policies and the annual
aggregates have been reduced, please
produce all settlement documents and/or
agreements relevant to the payment of
such claims, reducing such aggregates.
o
In the event the carrier(s) of any
pertinent policies have given the
defendant notice of financial impairment
or potential financial impairment, please
produce all written communications
from the carrier(s) relevant to such
notice.
D. Sanctions.
1. Production of meaningless documents that are
non-responsive to a request may result in sanctions.
American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Caruth,
786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, n.w.h.)
2. Failure to timely respond or supplement a
response will result in the withheld evidence being
stricken. Wilson v. Snead Site Preparation, Inc.,
770 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
1989).
VI. INTERROGATORIES
A. Introduction
Interrogatories are by far the most flexible and
forgiving written discovery device for obtaining
information. An interrogatory may be drafted in such
a way as to obtain virtually any type of information a
trial attorney might want to obtain in preparing for
trial. This is not to say, however, that interrogatories
do not have limitations or that they should be
exclusively used to develop a case. The question,
oftentimes, is not whether the interrogatory can be
drafted to elicit particular information, or how it
should be drafted, but whether an interrogatory should
be the device used to seek the information.21 The
drawback to interrogatories is that, just as attorneys
are the ones that usually draft them, it is attorneys who
usually prepare the answers. Unfortunately, this
means that, more often than not, a well-crafted
interrogatory will merely inspire a well-crafted (read
that, evasive or non-responsive) response. Despite
this limitation, interrogatories are a useful discovery
device that can play an important role in advancing a
discovery and trial strategy. Effective drafting
techniques will take these advantages into
consideration.
21
The main problem with interrogatories is that, no
matter how well crafted, they tend to reveal the attorney's
strategy and thought process. This may sometimes be
tactfully disadvantageous. Depositions are usually a better
device for obtaining explanations. Interrogatories are
excellent for obtaining factual data.
B. Timing
1.
Request.
a. The First-Strike Capability.
Rule 168 permits a plaintiff to serve
interrogatories with the original petition. In such an
instance the responding party has fifty (50) days from
the date of service within which to file responses and
objections. There are perhaps a number of reasons
why plaintiffs would want to send out interrogatories
with their petition, a very good one being to simply to
get it done. On a tactical level, however, serious
thought should be given to what the goal is in seeking
early information. If the goal is merely to put the
defendant on the discovery defensive, then the strategy
is at best a short-sighted one because the defendant
can send out discovery -- which will have to be
answered by the plaintiff before the defendant's
answers are due -- before its answer date. In short, the
tactic of being first, just to be first, is a petty weak
strategy.
b. Limitations on Early Requests.
Poor timing of a request can sometimes impair its
usefulness. If, for instance, a plaintiff serves only a
bare-bones petition accompanied by a set of
interrogatories requesting the defendant's contentions,
it is predictable that all that is going to be netted is a
return set of objections and requests for protection.
Contention interrogatories at the inception of a case
are probably vulnerable to an objection that they are
premature, and requests for production that the
answers be deferred until additional factual discovery
has been completed.22
(1) Rule 166b(2)(a) allows a party
receiving a contention or opinion interrogatory to seek
an order from the court that such an interrogatory
"need not be answered until after designated discovery
has been completed or until a pretrial conference or
other later time."
(2) It is also worth pointing out in this
discussion that asking a defendant in the first set of
interrogatories to admit that it manufactured the
"product in question," without specifically identifying
the product in a set of definitions, is probably a
hopeless endeavor. If such an interrogatory is going to
be propounded, the term "product" should be as
precisely defined as feasible, with as much
information as the plaintiff has (serial number,
incident reports, manuals, photographs, etc.) being
22
See, Rule 166b(2) and In Re Convergent
Technologies Securities Litigation, 108 F.R.D. 328 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (interpreting Rule 33(b) Fed.R.Civ.P., which is
virtually identical in wording to Rule 166b regarding scope
of discovery extending to opinions and contentions.)
D-15
attached to the definition as appendices and
incorporated into the definition by reference. The
same specificity considerations would similarly apply
to other terms such as the "incident" or "transaction"
in question.
c. Information to Be Sought in Early Requests.
(1) Plaintiff.
An early set of interrogatories, served with
the petition or shortly after the defendant has filed an
answer, can be useful in answering important
questions so that the plaintiff knows he is on the right
track and can establish some early discovery targets.
Useful interrogatories in this regard would be ones
that elicit whether the defendant has been properly
named and sued, the financial ability of the defendant
(assets and/or insurance) to pay a potential judgment,
individuals who are believed to have knowledge of
facts regarding the lawsuit in general or about specific
issues, individuals employed by the defendant in the
ordinary course of its operations who might have
expertise in specific areas relevant to the issues in the
case, and types and categories of documents that
might be relevant to or contain information relevant to
particular issues in the case.
(2) Defendant.
An early set of interrogatories sent out by
the defendant should in a number of respects mirror
the types of requests served by the plaintiff. Useful
interrogatories in this regard should attempt to identify
all the potential plaintiffs and what special or
quantifiable damages they are claiming, the total
amount of damages the plaintiffs are seeking,
individuals who may potentially have knowledge of
facts relevant to the plaintiffs' allegations, other
entities with whom the plaintiffs have entered into
agreements with regard to the occurrence giving rise to
the lawsuit or the lawsuit itself, and types and
categories of documents in the plaintiffs' possession
that contain information relevant to the plaintiffs'
allegations.
(3) Types and Categories of Documents.
After the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in
Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1990), I
have attempted to refrain from sending out requests
for production until after I have sent out
interrogatories asking the respondent to identify
pertinent types and categories of documents.23
Basically, this approach results from a recognition that
oftentimes the plaintiff does not know what types or
23
An example of such a set of interrogatories is attached
as APPENDIX D. The rationale behind this approach is
discussed in detail under the section on Requests for
Production.
D-16
categories of documents in the defendant's possession
are relevant to the issues in the case. Moreover, even
when he does, the defendant may have unique names
or descriptions for such documents. In both cases, the
plaintiff, if he sends out a generic set of requests, is
probably going to be met with the objection that the
requests are overbroad and nonspecific. See, Loftin,
supra. Once I get back the answering party's
responses identifying the pertinent documents, I
merely send out a request for production, attaching the
interrogatory responses and asking the opposing party
to produce all such documents in its possession. See,
Limas v. DeDelgado, 770 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.App.--El
Paso 1989) (orig. proc.).
Responses:
a. Interrogatories Served With the Petition.
A defendant has fifty (50) days from the date it
is served within which to serve responses, absent a
stipulated agreed extension (read, written agreement)
from the party serving the interrogatories or an order
extending the time for responding, entered in response
to a request for protection served by the responding
party within the original time period. See, Rule
166b(4) (effective September 4, 1990).
b. Normal Response Time.
A party being served with interrogatories
normally has thirty (30) days from the date the
interrogatories are served within which to file
responses, objections, requests for protection or
motions seeking an extension of time. Failure to serve
objections or requests within this time period are
waived unless an extension has been obtained by
agreement or order of the court. Rule 166b(4)
(effective September 4, 1990).
c. Request for Protection:
Insufficient
Discovery.
In some instances, when a defendant is served
with interrogatories at the same time it is served with
the original petition, it may have insufficient
knowledge to understand what is being alleged or
insufficient knowledge with which to adequately
formulate a response, particularly if the interrogatory
is asking for an opinion or contention.
(1) Rule 166b(2)(a) provides that in such
a circumstance:
demonstrate that they have attempted to informally
resolve the matter, it is suggested that as soon as the
contention interrogatories are identified the respondent
consider serving a response such as follows:
Response: Defendant requests that the
plaintiff agree to enter into a protective order
agreement with regard to this interrogatory,
permitting the defendant to defer answering
the interrogatory until such time as factual
discovery in the case has been completed
and/or until such time as defendant's expert
witnesses are designated and their opinions
disclosed. Subject to receiving a response to
this request, defendant objects to the above
interrogatory on the basis that it is premature
and the defendant has not as yet completed
sufficient discovery to be able to meaningfully
respond to it.
2.
. . . the court may order that such an interrogatory
need not be answered until after designated
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial
conference or other later time.
(2) Given the admonition by the Texas
Supreme Court that, prior to being able to seek court
intervention on a discovery dispute, the parties must
Notwithstanding the above approach, unless an
agreement is obtained (in writing), a protective order
granting such relief must be obtained within the time
period for responding to the interrogatory.
C. Number of Answers
1. The rule provides that, absent leave of court, no
more than thirty (30) answers may be sought in one
set of interrogatories. There is also the limitation that
no more than two sets of interrogatories may be served
by a party to any other party, except by agreement or
as the court may permit after hearing upon the
showing of good cause. Discretion is placed in the
court for reducing or enlarging the number of
interrogatories or sets of interrogatories. Many federal
districts' local rules provide a limitation of twenty (20)
interrogatories.24
2. In Lone Star Life Insurance Company v.
Street, 703 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1986,
opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d
638), Lone Star filed a motion to quash and for
protective order relative to a set of interrogatories
containing seventeen (17) interrogatories and a
number of subparts. The appellate court observed that
Lone Star's motion, under the particular facts, was not
24
This rule has helped to eliminate the use of the longform set of interrogatories with multiple subsections.
Significantly, the Supreme Court, in anticipation of the
dispute as to what constitutes one interrogatory, did not
limit the number of questions as such, but rather limited the
questions so as to not require more than thirty (30) answers.
frivolous and held that Rule 168(6) requires that the
trial judge hold a hearing on a motion to quash or a
motion for protective order whenever a party seeking
discovery asks questions which the recipient objects to
as calling for more than thirty (30) answers.
D-17
and agents (including attorneys)27 having knowledge
of facts relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit, or
even a particular issue in the lawsuit. However, an
additional or alternative approach might be to ask a
concluding interrogatory such as follows:
D. Composite Information
Example:
1. One of the most important advantages of
interroga-tories is that they call for the party to
answer. In the case of a corporation, association or
partnership, there may be more than one individual
who has knowledge of pertinent information and no
one person is capable of answering all questions. In
responding to interrogatories, the organization must
gather all the pertinent information and provide a
composite answer.
State the name, address and telephone
number of each individual with knowledge of
facts relevant to the answers to the foregoing
interrogatories you have given (setting out the
respective interrogatory answers as to which
each such individual has knowledge of
relevant facts).
2. Although there have been no holdings of the
Texas Supreme Court on the issue of composite
knowledge, Rule 168 has been patterned after Rule 33
Fed.R.Civ.P.; therefore, it can be assumed that Texas
courts would enforce the federal courts' interpretation
of Rule 33 Fed.R.Civ.P. that a corporate party is
required to answer interrogatories based upon its
"composite" knowledge.
See, e.g., General
Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co., 481
F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1162 (1974); 4A Moore, Federal Practice, Sec. 33.26;
and Boyd, "Paper Discovery: Use of Interrogatories
and Requests for Admission," Advanced Civil
Discovery for the 1980's (University of Houston Law
Center, 1982).25
3. Oftentimes a party will want to learn more than
merely the composite knowledge of an organization;
they will want to identify who in the organization is
most knowledgeable on certain issues. The answer to
this question might be finessed by asking about
individuals, including employees, consulting experts26
25
Caveat: Some writers in this field have noted that there
remains some doubt as to whether a corporation must
disclose the identities of everyone assisting in the
preparation of answers (United States v. National Steel
Corp., 26 F.R.D. 599, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1960)), or whether
it must reveal the source of particular information. See,
B&S Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 4-5 (S.D. Tex. 1959); see, also, Haycock
and Herr, "Interrogatories: Questions and Answers" 1 Rev.
of Lit. No. 3, 263 at 291-292 (Fall 1981).
26
Axelson v. McIlhany, 34 Tex.S.Ct.J. 56 (October
24, 1990).
Assuming that the above example is held to be
unobjectionable, an additional inquiry might be made
regarding documents:
Example:
"Identify" each and every "document"
(stating the title, if any, and nature of the
document, who generated it, to whom it was
designated and the date of each such
occurrence) in your "possession" relevant to
and/or containing information relevant to
each answer you have given to each of the
foregoing interrogatories (setting out the
respective interrogatory to which each such
document relates).
a. Comment: I have found the above
interrogatories to be quite controversial with opposing
counsel, but generally approved by trial judges. They
are derived from my attempts to correlate important
specific information with particular potential
witnesses, while avoiding the objection that I am
seeking to invade attorney work product and
communications protected by the attorney/client
privilege in asking the opposing party to "identify
everyone who participated in answering these
interrogatories." The interrogatory does not ask
specifically what information was "communicated" by
anyone, merely which individual possesses knowledge
or relevant facts. Further, the interrogatory does not
ask what documents "support" contentions or what
will be used at trial (both of which probably bring
27
Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation v. Davis, 775 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.--Austin
1989) (orig. proc.).
D-18
objectionable invasions of the attorney work product
exemption), but merely what documents are or contain
information relevant to the answers. Such a request is
both "relevant" and specific to a particular issue.
b. Caveat: The above request might be
vulnerable to an objection that, with regard to
documents, it is overbroad, notwithstanding it is an
interrogatory and not a request for production. See,
Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989). In an
attempt to preempt and draft around this objection, I
have experimented with the following interrogatory:
compilations,
abstracts
(Emphasis added.)
Example:
"Identify" (by the stating the title of the
document, who generated it, to whom it was
sent and on what date) all types and
categories of documents and things in "your"
"possession" relevant to and/or containing
information relevant to each answer "you"
have given to each of the foregoing
interrogatories (identifying the respective
interrogatory to which each such type or
category of documents relates).
E. Option to Produce Records
1. Rule 168(2) provides an option to narratively
answering an interrogatory, where it can be shown that
the answer may be derived or ascertained from:
. . . public records; or
from the business records of the party upon
whom the interrogatories have been served, or
from an examination, audit or inspection of such
business records; or
from a compilation, abstract or summary based
on such business records;
and
"the burden of deriving or ascertaining the
answer is substantially the same for the party
serving the interrogatory as for the party served."
If the above requirements are satisfied: It is
sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify
the records from which the answer may be
derived or ascertained, and if applicable, to
afford the party serving the interrogatory
reasonable opportunity to examine, audit or
inspect such records and to make copies,
or
summaries.
2.
Threshold Considerations under Rule 168(2).
a. The answer must be capable of being
derived or ascertained from the records.
b. The burden of ascertaining the answer is the
same for both parties.
c. The records containing the information are
specified.
d. The specification of records provided shall
include sufficient detail to permit the interrogating
party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the
party served, the records from which the answers may
be ascertained.
3.
Federal Case Law.
a. As with most of the recent amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding scope of
discovery, there have been few decisions dealing with
the mechanical application of Rule 168(2). Since Rule
168(2) is similar in wording and intent to Fed.R.Civ.P.
33(c), one can turn to the federal cases for guidance.
See, generally, Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
534 F.2d 221 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 889,
97 S.Ct. 239 (1976).
b. Rule 33(c) was held not applicable where
the responding party did not specify where the answers
could be found in the records made available.
Rainbow Pioneer #44-18-04A v. Hawaii Nevada
Inv. Corp., 711 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1983).
c. It has been held that Rule 33(c) is not an
available alternative if an interrogatory can be
responded to more readily and conveniently by written
answer. See, Compaquie Franchise D'Assurance
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. N.Y.
1984).
4.
Texas Case Law.
a. In Firestone Photographs v. Lemaster,
567 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1978, no
writ), a case decided long before the 1988
amendments, it was held that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's request
that, in response to interrogatories, the plaintiff be
required to travel to the defendant's offices in Ohio
and inspect the pertinent documents, where there was
no evidence preserved for review demonstrating that
the burden of inspecting and locating the information
would be substantially the same on both parties.
Supra at 278. This would seem to suggest that the
burden is on the responding party to prove the
applicability of this alternative means of responding to
interrogatories.28
b. In two recent cases it has been held that,
where a party requests information regarding prior
lawsuits and the responding party demonstrates that
compliance with the request would be
overburdensome, it is an adequate response to give
only sufficient information to allow the requesting
party to be able to locate the public documents in the
District Clerk's office. See, Scrivner v. Casseb, 754
S.W.2d 354 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, no writ);
and Lunsman v. Spector, 761 S.W.2d 112
(Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, no writ).
c. In American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida
v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990,
n.w.h.), American Bankers originally responded to the
plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production
that information requested was contained in excess of
30,000 boxes containing numerous files in a
warehouse. Further, American Bankers alleged that
the only way to access the information was to
manually inspect each of the files in each of the more
than 30,000 boxes in their warehouse in Florida.
American Bankers' computer staff was then deposed,
which revealed that American Bankers had a
sophisticated data base and computer that contained
and could produce a great deal more information than
was requested by the plaintiffs. American Bankers
later conceded that all the requested discovery could
be generated by the computer in approximately forty
hours. The court sanctioned American Bankers
$4,500 for its intentional withholding of documents
and production of "worthless" documents which
amounted to no production at all. When American
Bankers still did not produce the documents, its
pleadings were stricken.
D-19
these uses can help facilitate early evaluation of the
case and potentially lead to early settlement.30 A final
important use of interrogatories is for defining the
universe, or establishing the parameters, for what
issues, witnesses and documentary evidence may be
offered at trial.
2. Always keep in mind that interrogatories and the
responses to them can be read to the jury and must be
read to be considered as evidence. However, they can
only be used against the party answering them, and the
responding party cannot read them to bolster his case.
See, Soobitsky v. Continental Trailways Tours,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
G.
Tactical
Interrogatories
Considerations:
Specific
1.
Contentions and Opinions.
a. Contention interrogatories can be effectively
used to obtain not only an adversary's position on
potential trial issues, but information regarding the
evidence which might be relevant or probative on such
points. Rule 166b(2) specifically states that "it is also
not ground for objection that an interrogatory
propounded pursuant to Rule 168 involves an opinion
or contention that relates to fact or the application of
law to fact . . ." Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(2)(a). The author
has been unable to locate any Texas cases that
particularly focus on this issue in the context of
interrogatories; however, the scope of discovery in
Rule 166b(2) applies to all the discovery devices and
contention inquiries that have been held to be
permissible in oral depositions31 and requests for
admission.32 There is no reason to believe a different
rule would apply to interrogatories.
F. Strategy
1) Example:
1. Interrogatories are most useful for identification
of issues, parties, potential fact and expert witnesses
and physical evidence.29 Another significant, though
more problematic, use is for ferreting out contentions
and the potential evidence that supports them. Both of
Interrogatory No. : With respect to the
contentions set out in paragraph X of the
Defendant's Answer, "identify" (set out the
title, date generated, by whom and to whom
sent) each type and category of documents
and things relevant to your contention that
28
However, compare Daiflon, supra, a federal court
decision, wherein it was held that the party seeking to
compel narrative answers must prove that the burden of
searching the responding party's records is heavier on him
than on the responding party.
30
See, Klenk, "Using and Abusing Interrogatories," 11
Litigation 25 (1985).
31
Williamson v. O'Neill, 696 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
29
This is also referred to by one noted author in the field
as "scanning." See, M. A. Dombroff, Discovery §4.06 at
112 (1987).
32
Laycox v. Jaroma, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 2 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
D-20
the plaintiff had previous knowledge,
warning or notice of the alleged defective
condition of the product in question.
2)
Example:
contentions set out in paragraph III of
Defendant's Counterclaim, set forth all facts
relevant to the Defendant's position or
contention that the Plaintiff's claims brought
under the provisions of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act are "groundless and
brought in bad faith," or were brought for
the
purposes
of
harassment
of
Counter-Defendants.
3)
Example:
contentions set out in paragraph III of
Defendant's
Counterclaim,
"identify"
(complete name, last known address and
telephone number) all individuals with
knowledge of facts relevant to the Defendant's
contention, position or opinion that Plaintiff's
claims brought under the provisions of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act are
"groundless and brought in bad faith," or
were brought for the purposes of harassment
of Counter-Defendants.33
b. As a counterbalance to broadening the scope
of discovery to include opinions and contentions, Rule
166b(2)(a) provides that:
. . . the court may order that such an interrogatory
need not be answered until after designated
discovery has been completed or until a pretrial
conference or other later time.
c. An additional precaution that the responding
party can take is to request an agreement in the
preliminary response:
Example:
Response:
Plaintiff requests that the
defendant agree to enter into a protective
33
order agreement with regard to this
interrogatory, permitting the plaintiff to defer
answering the interrogatory until such time as
factual discovery in the case has been
completed and/or until such time as plaintiff's
expert witnesses are designated and their
opinions disclosed. Subject to receiving a
response to this request, plaintiff objects to
the above interrogatory on the basis that it is
premature and the plaintiff has not as yet
completed sufficient discovery to be able to
meaningfully respond to it.
See, City of Houston v. Harrison, 778 S.W.2d 916
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989 (orig. proc.)
(regarding discoverability of investigation underlying
allegations.
d. Since the rule allowing inquiry into opinions
and contentions is relatively new in Texas, there is not
real precedent for determining how "contention
interrogatories" are actually to be handled. A constant
question arises regarding when such questions are
appropriate and answers should be required. For a
recent federal case discussing this problem with
respect to Federal Rule 33(b), which is virtually
identical in wording to Rule 166b regarding scope of
discovery extending to opinions and contentions, see,
In Re Convergent Technologies Securities
Litigation, 108 F.R.D. 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985), wherein
it was held that, while contention interrogatories were
proper, a party ordinarily should not be compelled to
answer them until after substantial completion of its
own discovery, absent the requesting party's
convincing justification (i.e., narrowing of issues) of
early answers. The analysis of this case should be
applicable and helpful when this issue surfaces under
our rules.
2.
Potential Witnesses.
A party may obtain the name, address and
telephone number of all individuals having knowledge
of facts relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.
Rule 166b(2)(d) Tex.R.Civ.P.
a. Requests.
(1) The identity of ALL individuals with
knowledge of relevant facts is discoverable regardless
of whether they are parties, employees or consultants.
Rule 166b(3)(d). See, Griffin v. Smith, 688 S.W.2d
112, 113 (Tex. 1985); Axelson v. McIlhany, 34
Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 56 (October 24, 1990). An attorney
should be careful about verifying interrogatories, as
this practice may get him deposed. See, City of
Houston v. Harrison, 778 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (orig. proc.); Borden, Inc.
v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.App.--Corpus
Christi 1989, no writ); and Gilbert McClure
Enterprises v. Burnett, 735 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
(2) It is a proper purpose of this type
inquiry to flush out the universe of individuals who
could potentially be called as witnesses. However, it
is improper to ask a party for a "witness list" ("all
individuals the party will call as witnesses at trial").
Gutierrez v. Dallas Independent School District,
729 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1987).
(3) Be careful to always ask the general
question (i.e., "relevant to the subject matter of the
lawsuit"). There have been instances where trial
attorneys have asked only a specific question, directed
to a particular issue (i.e., "all individuals who are
witnesses to the occurrence"), and thereby were held to
have failed to lay the proper predicate for learning of
everyone with knowledge of facts relevant to all issues
in the lawsuit. See, Phaup v. Boswell, 731 S.W.2d
625 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ);
and Robledo v. Grease Monkey, Inc., 758 S.W.2d
834 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi, 1988, writ denied)
(holding that such interrogatories should be construed
liberally).
(a) In Robledo v. Grease Monkey, Inc.,
758 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988,
writ denied), an interrogatory was served asking for
the identity of witnesses who had "seen, heard or
known about the alleged occurrence." The court
rejected the argument that this interrogatory inquired
about "witnesses with knowledge of relevant facts,"
and allowed an undesignated witness to testify on
matters outside those delineated in the interrogatory.
(b) In Farm Services, Inc. v. Gonzales,
756 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no
writ), a question involved whether the trial court
committed error in allowing the plaintiff's wife to
testify because she had not been designated in
response to an interrogatory propounded by the
defendant, seeking the identities:
. . . of all persons having knowledge of relevant
facts surrounding the incident of on or about
June 15, 1984, which allegedly resulted in the
alleged injuries suffered by you and which form
the basis for the [lawsuit].
The court held that the interrogatory should be
interpreted liberally to include all facts concerning the
exposure, not just those leading up to the incident.
Farm Services, Inc. v. Gonzales, supra at 751.
(c) While the analysis used to reach the
holding in Lunsman v. Spector, 761 S.W.2d 112
(Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, no writ), is not totally
clear, the result is in keeping with the mainstream of
recent decisions on the points. The interrogatory in
question asked:
D-21
Please identify by name, complete address and
telephone number, each and every person . . . to
have any knowledge of any fact or record relating
to this cause of action or any factual disputes
which may arise in connection with these
proceedings.
The court sustained an objection to the interrogatory
observing that it "did not inquire into a wrongful
course of action." The peculiar passage in this opinion
then follows:
It asked for any information associated with "this
cause of action." This is clearly too broad.
(Emphasis added.)34
(d) Finally, be sure you make this type
inquiry in interrogatories, and not solely in requests
for production. One case has held that a party would
only have to respond to a request for production to the
extent that there was already a list of names, which is
rarely going to be the case. McKinney v. National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.,
32 Tex.S.Ct.J. 306 (April 8, 1989). The better
practice is to use interrogatories to identify potential
witnesses.35
b. Responding to Interrogatories.
(1) Absent a demonstration and finding of
good cause, failure to timely provide the address of an
individual possessing knowledge of relevant facts
should result in the exclusion of that individual as a
witness. Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.
1989); and Clark v. Trailways, 32 S.Ct.J. 415 (May
31, 1989).
(2) Failure to list an individual who has
knowledge of facts adverse to your position may result
in you being precluded from proving that point. See,
34
Comment: Nowhere in the decision does the court
ever acknowledge that Rule 166b allows for the discovery
of all individuals with knowledge of facts relevant to the
subject matter of the lawsuit. The effect of the above
language is to narrow the scope of discovery prescribed by
the rules set out in the rule, since relevancy to "this cause of
action" surely is no broader than "the subject matter of the
lawsuit." This court, however, was correct in holding that
the rule restricts the discovery to individuals with
knowledge of relevant facts and that "knowledge of
potential future factual disputes" was clearly an overbroad
inquiry.
35
See, APPENDIX D. See, also, Limas v. DeDelgado,
770 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1985) (orig. Proc.).
D-22
City of San Antonio v. Fulcher, 749 S.W.2d 217
(Tex.App.--San Antonio, 1988, no writ).
(3) Be sure not to interpret an
interrogatory requesting all individuals with
knowledge of facts relevant to the subject mater of the
lawsuit to mean only the ones you intend to call at
trial. The question is not directed to trial strategy, but
to identification. Tinkle v. Henderson, 777 S.W.2d
537 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1989, writ denied).
(4) It is unsettled whether a party may rely
on the interrogatories and answers of other parties to
the same lawsuit. For instance, if a defendant who
subsequently settled had propounded interrogatories
to a co-defendant asking about individuals with
knowledge of facts relevant to the lawsuit, and the
nonsettling defendant never responded and the
plaintiff never separately propounded such an
interrogatory, would the nonsettling defendant be
prevented from putting on fact witnesses at trial in its
defense against the plaintiff? One case has held that
you may rely on the interrogatories served by the other
party, and the nonsettling defendant's witnesses should
be excluded. Smith v. Christley, 755 S.W.2d 525
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, error denied).
Another court, however, has held the contrary. Austin
Ranch Enterprises, Inc. v. Walls, 760 S.W.2d 703
(Tex.App. --Fort Worth 1988, no writ). See, also,
Lacy v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 794 S.W.2d 781
(Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, appl. for writ pending).
base his or her testimony presented at trial,
including the identity of each consulting
expert whose opinions or data has been
referred to, reviewed by and/or relied upon
by the expert witness; the complete title and
author of each learned treatise reviewed,
referred to and/or relied upon by the witness
in forming and/or corroborating his or her
opinions regarding the subject matter of this
lawsuit; and the complete work product of all
consultants whose work produce has been
reviewed and/or relied upon, in whole or in
part, relative to the expert's involvement in
this case and/or in formulating his/her
opinions relative to the subject matter of this
lawsuit.
3.
Expert Witnesses.
a. Interrogatories are an effective tool for
learning whom an adversary may call as expert
witness at trial, on what subject matter the expert is
expected to testify, what opinions the expert has
formulated and the factual basis for such opinions.
Example:
INTERROGATORY NO. : Identify the
name and address of all individual(s)
Defendant may call as expert witness(es) at
trial and for each such individual, please
state:
A. The subject matter on which the witness
is expected to testify;
B. All factual observations, test results,
supporting data, learned treatises (medical
books, journal articles, texts or other
publications) and opinions which the witness
intends to, has or may use to support his
opinions and conclusions relative to the case,
or upon which the witness has based or will
b. Even if the expert is merely a consultant, if
he has knowledge of relevant facts, the facts he has
knowledge of are discoverable. Griffin v. Smith, 688
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1985); and Axelson v. McIlhany,
34 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 56 (October 24, 1990).
c. Prior to September 1, 1990, if the expert
relied upon a consulting expert's work product, in
whole or in part, in forming his opinions, the identity
of the consultant and his work product had to be
revealed. This continues to be the rule; however, the
rule has been broadened.
d. Under Rule 166b(3)(e), Tex.R.Civ.P.,
effective September 1, 1990, if an expert witness
reviews the work product of a "consultant-only
expert," the identity and work product of the
consultant is discoverable to the same extent as that of
a testifying expert.
e. Finally, if there has been a proper
interrogatory regarding expert witnesses and the
adversary does not identify such experts "as soon as
practical" and no later than thirty (30) days before
trial, the expert shall be prevented from testifying.
Disclosure that meets the thirty (30) day requirement
may still not be sufficient. See, Builder's Equipment
Co. v. Onion, 713 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.App.--San
Antonio 1986, no writ); but, see, Mother Frances
Hospital v. Coats, 796 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.App.--Tyler
1990) (disapproving holding in Onion).
H. Rule 215: Sanctions/Interrogatories
Failure to answer interrogatories within the
prescribed time period and inadequate responses may
result in harsh sanctions. In City of Houston v.
Arney, 680 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, no writ), the appellate court affirmed the
order of the trial court which struck the defendant's
answer after failing to answer interrogatories
compelled by a previous court order. In Jarrett v.
Warhola, 695 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd), the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's cause of action in part for the plaintiff's
failure to completely and timely respond to
interrogatories and discovery orders. The Supreme
Court refused the writ of error application and adopted
the Court of Appeals' opinion concerning sanctions
upon discovery abuse. In Bosnich v. National
Cellulose Corporation, 676 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ), the appellate court
approved the trial court's sanctions of striking a party's
pleadings for failing to timely and completely answer
interrogatories. In a recent decision, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that the trial judge does not
have to first employ less harsh sanctions before
striking
pleadings
and
that
subsequent
supplementation of the interrogatory answers
precludes the imposition of sanctions. Skinner v.
Grimes Iron & Metal, 766 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
VII. SUPPLEMENTATION
There are several basic considerations that should
be kept in mind in preparing supplementation of
discovery, from a drafting perspective.
A. In Writing
The Texas Supreme Court has made it
emphatically clear that supplementation of discovery
must be in writing. Sharp v. Broadway National
Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1990).
B. Formality
Until the Texas Supreme Court clarifies the
format written supplementation should take, it is
probably prudent to adhere to formal discovery
formats. See, Stiles v. Royal Insurance Co. of
America, 1990 WL ______, ____ S.W.2d ____
(Tex.App.--Dallas 1990) (not yet reported).
C. Duty
A party is under no duty to remind an opponent
of a need to supplement. Sharp v. Broadway
National Bank, supra.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Having watched people make things by origami36
and from papier mache', I am convinced that trying to
construct a case from written discovery requires just as
much creativity and skill. The results can be just as
tangible and rewarding. Indeed, written discovery may
36
Japanese art of folding paper into decorative shapes
D-23
be more gratifying, since, if it is properly crafted and
effectively executed, the trial attorney should wind up
with more than just paper.

PAPER MACHE3, ORIGAMI &amp

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