Senior Vice President Julianne Smith Discusses Why Russia`s Anti

 BGS Senior Vice President Julianne
Smith Discusses Why Russia’s AntiAccess And Area Denial (A2AD)
Capabilities Are Just As Worrisome
As China’s.
Anti-Access/Area Denial Isn’t Just for Asia Anymore
Defense One
|
April 2, 2015
By Julianne Smith and Richard Fontaine
If there’s one set of foreign military capabilities that has garnered
U.S. attention in recent years, it’s those related to anti-access and
area denial. Even the most acronym-constrained policymakers regularly
cite A2/AD and its challenge to American power projection in the western
Pacific. And with good reason: China’s investments in ballistic and
cruise missiles, submarines, air defenses and counter-maritime forces
have focused military minds on the East Asian littoral’s increasingly
contested nature, and on ways in which the United States and its allies
might overcome the growing challenges.
Anti-access is, however, not merely an Asian affair. While Washington
continues its rebalance to the Pacific, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
has dragged the U.S. back to Europe and to a renewed focus on the
continent’s attendant security threats. As NATO and Pentagon planners
begin to envision the previously unimaginable – conflict with Russia in
Europe’s east – they must focus on Moscow’s growing A2/AD capabilities
and strategies and move quickly to apply the lessons from Asia. Russia’s
ability to contest the landmass in Europe’s east may actually exceed
China’s capacity to keep American forces away from thousands of miles of
coastline.
Russia is currently probing all over the north Atlantic region, testing
defenses at sea, in the air, and on land. NATO has reported more than
100
Russian
sometimes
by
intrusions
planes
into
that
European
turn
off
airspace
their
over
the
transponders
past
as
year,
they
fly
dangerously close to commercial aircraft. Near-misses have occurred at
sea
as
well.
Earlier
this
month,
Russian
fighter-bombers
practiced
attack scenarios against NATO warships in the Black Sea; last fall, a
suspected Russian submarine violated Sweden’s territorial sovereignty.
On land, Russia is conducting snap exercises on its Baltic frontier and
has announced that it will send Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, which
borders Poland and Lithuania.
Reason dictates that such probing will remain just that; it would be
folly
for
Russia
to
pursue
aggression
against
a
NATO
member.
Yet
Moscow’s embrace of hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine has shown how a
brazen,
revanchist
nationalism
rules
Russian
foreign
policy.
As
a
result, it’s worth thinking hard about what a contingency in Europe
might comprise.
Specifically, the West needs to prepare for a scenario in which it is
denied access to the countries on NATO’s eastern flank long enough to
establish
facts
on
the
ground
that
would
be
hard,
and
perhaps
impossible, to reverse. If the fighting in Ukraine is any example, we
could expect Russia to move quickly to seize railheads, as it has done
in Debaltseve, and to contest airspace, as separatists have done in
downing Ukrainian aircraft. It would take control of key transportation
routes and airports, like it did in Donetsk, and attack ports, as it has
done in Mariupol. Russia would also move aggressively to dominate the
cyber
domain
and
prevent
communications
among
opposing
forces
while
conducting information operations and covert activities to harden local
populations against a western force and incite Russian minorities.
With the relative paucity of American forces and materiel prepositioned
in the east, in a contingency the United States would need to surge
quickly into the region. American and allied forces would depend on
ports, roads, railways and airspace in which Russia would deploy its
large and growing A2/AD capabilities. To cite just one example, the
general commanding U.S. air forces in Europe recently said that onethird of Poland is covered by Russia’s integrated air defense system.
Other NATO members, such as the Baltic nations, likely sit within range
of Russian anti-aircraft missiles.
U.S. policymakers have largely focused on deterring further aggression,
reassuring NATO allies, and imposing costs, especially diplomatic and
economic penalties, on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. Some of these
efforts
are
helpful
in
confronting
the
A2/AD
challenge,
including
increasing NATO air-policing patrols over the Baltics, rotating ground
troops in the east, prepositioning military equipment, and planning to
counter Russia’s sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities. But much
more is needed. One answer to the anti-access challenge in Asia has been
the
vaunted
Air-Sea
Battle
concept
(now
awkwardly
rechristened
the
“Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons”), which
would harness cutting-edge technologies to overwhelm and overcome enemy
efforts to contest domains. In Europe, if anything, the problem may be
more profound, with any NATO effort to project power likely to confront
challenges in the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains.
Washington and its allies should start with a complete review of U.S.
force posture in Europe. That doesn’t necessarily mean the United States
should return two heavy brigades to Europe, but it should determine
whether its forward presence on the continent is sufficient to prevent
Russia
from
denying
the
U.S.
access
in
a
crisis.
In
addition,
the
transatlantic allies should begin exercises that focus specifically on
the A2/AD challenge. The recent “Dragoon Ride,” which had U.S. Strykers
traveling 1,100 miles across Europe, was a good start. NATO should also
mine American efforts in Asia for lessons that apply in Europe; increase
prepositioning;
aircraft,
and
unmanned
exploit
aerial
technologies
vehicles,
and
including
stealthy
longer-range
platforms.
And
Washington should lock in the rotational forces that are currently in
the
region,
ensure
continued
funding
to
support
U.S.
training
and
exercises in Europe and avoid any near-term withdrawals of U.S. forces
from the European continent.
During the Cold War, the United States spent an enormous amount of time
and resources preparing for what it hoped would never materialize: a
military confrontation with the Soviets on European soil. Since the fall
of the Berlin Wall, many of those efforts have languished as the United
States
and
its
allies
have
turned
to
an
array
of
expeditionary
challenges in faraway places. In the face of Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine and its near-constant probing in, above and around European
borders, it is high time for the United States and Europe to renew
critical muscle movements after years of atrophy. Russia will no doubt
call such efforts escalatory. Yet the United States and its allies
cannot afford to assume that we have the seen the end of Russia’s
ambitions for the region. They should hope for the best, but plan for
otherwise.