Academic-Athletic Scandals at NCAA Division I

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Academic-Athletic Scandals at NCAA Division I Institutions in the U.S.
Mohit Chandi and Rishab Revankar
ENGL 105i Health and Medicine
Dr. Bradley Hammer
28 Oct 2014
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Academic-Athletic Scandals at NCAA Division I Institutions in the U.S.
“My job is to protect The Entertainment Product ... You can hate that; you
can hate the system. But at the end of the day, it's who they are. They're the
raw material in a multibillion-dollar sports and entertainment business.
And it's my job to protect them.”
-Phil Hughes, Associate Director for Student Services, Kansas State University
As stated by Phil Hughes, due to the role of intercollegiate athletics at U.S. universities,
Division I Institutions have grown to assume their current state: “a multibillion-dollar sports and
entertainment business.” In response to the argument proposing the prominence of intercollegiate
athletics as justification for “protecting” student-athletes, contemporary American society has
questioned the lawfulness and ethics of this form of protection (Branch). Simply put, the
protection is geared towards ensuring that student-athletes meet minimum NCAA GPA
requirements in order to maintain athletic eligibility. The resulting emphasis on meeting
minimum GPA requirements has lead to the evolution of a sports culture that deprioritizes an
institution’s core educational values in favor of meeting athletic eligibility as defined by the
NCAA. According to a law student at Seattle University School of Law, “As collegiate athletics
increased in popularity, the competition to recruit the best student-athletes has become
rampant—in many instances without regard to a student’s academic ability. As a result,
institutions sacrifice educational values, as evidenced by academic underperformance or cheating
amongst student-athletes” (Gatmen 510-511). Simply, academic institutions undermine their core
educational values in order to recruit the best student-athletes. Conclusive NCAA investigations
can be found to support Gatmen’s claim that institutions, through their emphasis on cultivating
athletic success, have contributed to an increase in the academic misconduct of their student
bodies. For example, Francis Cullen, Distinguished Research Professor at The University of
Cincinnati’s School of Criminal Justice, found that, “Increasing concern has been raised over the
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status of ‘big time’ collegiate athletics. NCAA investigations have turned up widespread and
repeated instances of serious rule infractions. Indeed, as of 1989, 25 institutions were under
NCAA scrutiny for ‘improper recruiting,’ ‘improper benefits to athletes,’ or similar forms of
misconduct” (Cullen et. al 56). Yet, heightened NCAA scrutiny was unsuccessful in reversing
the trend of increased academic misconduct; according to a 2011 report by USA Today, an
analysis conducted by the news agency Inside Higher Ed revealed that the number of Division I
institutions not merely under scrutiny but furthermore punished by the NCAA had more than
doubled a decade later: 53, from 2001 to 2010 alone (Lederman). And, with this understanding
as the foundation, our paper will investigate the causal links, not merely the corollary factors,
that demonstrate not only “how” but “if” the American sports culture diminishes the integrity of
the honor codes of Division I institutions.
Examined collectively, these university scandals cannot be attributed to a single factor;
rather, the problem is systemic of the American sports culture. “Coaches cautioned that much
cheating and corruption could be traced to the intense pressures to win under which they labor
(Cullen et al., 61-62).” Simply, corruption in college sports is not due to individual failings, but
to the system that leads coaches to leave their moral mandates. Yet, as demonstrated by Cullen
and his research team, the system cannot force athletic personnel to leave their moral mandates
unless there is a lucrative reward:
The pressure to win, moreover, is fueled by the large economic stakes inherent in
major collegiate athletics. From an occupational standpoint, coaches occupy a
high risk, but potentially lucrative, position. Although typically granted little job
security, coaches draw not only substantial salaries but also a myriad of fringe
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benefits (for example, radio-television contracts, endorsements, paid speaking
engagements, summer sports camp)—a total financial package. (Cullen et al., 62)
Simply, coaches become absorbed in a system that rewards them generously with money and
fame for winning at all costs. Consequently, through the authoritative emphasis on earning
money, there is a considerable incentive for circumventing NCAA rules. Yet, wouldn’t the
blatant circumvention of NCAA rules cause administrators and staff in the athletic department
and university to report infractions to the appropriate governing body? On the contrary,
according to the NCAA’s University of Miami Public Infractions Report, academic scandals in
Division I schools such as Miami were permitted to evolve despite the knowledge of head
football coaches and staff. Regarding the 1994 scandal wherein academic advisor Tony Russell
was found guilty of helping 80 athletes falsify applications for Pell Grants, “the head football
coach and the associate director of athletics for compliance and internal operations were aware of
(scandalous activity)” (NCAA). Simply, coaches, due to their prioritization of the athletic
eligibility of student-athletes on the football team, did not attempt to expose or make amends for
academic misconduct. As demonstrated by the failure of athletic authorities to report incidences
of academic misconduct, there exists a direct correlation between generously rewarding coaching
staff for athletic success and the abandonment of moral mandates and NCAA regulations by the
coaching staff.
In response to the slew of expository NCAA investigative reports that implicitly point a
finger at the administrations of Division I institutions, respective authorities have given various
arguments to justify the occurrence of academic-athletic scandals. In the wake of the publishing
of a report detailing the academic-athletic scandal at The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill spanning 1993-2011, Chancellor Carol Folt addressed the Chapel Hill community:
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It is important to separate the past from the present—and the
future. (The investigation) found that the irregularities were
confined to one department, peaked almost a decade ago and ended
in 2011. Since first learning of these irregularities four years ago,
Carolina took action to stop the wrongdoing and implemented
numerous additional reforms … We already are stronger as a result
... of our willingness to accept responsibility. (Folt)
In simplified terms, the Chancellor attempts to qualify the negativity associated with the scandal
by claiming the scandal to be a past occurrence as opposed to a current issue, limited in terms of
the scope of academia concerned, and not without its positive outcomes, namely an experience
that demonstrated the university’s ability to accept and handle significant responsibility. Much
the same, student body president Andrew Powell wrote to students: “The media (has) been quick
to use the 3,000+ number as an indictment of us as a student body. But I believe the context is
also important: over the same period there were more than three million class enrollments at
UNC. 9,000 illegitimate credit hours out of over 9,000,000 total hours do not define our student
body or University” (Powell). In other words, by creating a comparison between the number of
students who were receiving illegitimate credit hours and a considerably greater number of
students who were concurrently receiving legitimate credit hours, Powell defends his institution
by downplaying the severity of the scandal. Yet, UNC is not the only institution to publicly
defend internal academic conflicts in the recent past. According to The University of Wisconsin
Chancellor Rebecca Blank, “You can run a clean program. You can have student-athletes. And
you can win big games—even in the big money sports ... I’m willing to defend our students as
student-athletes—absolutely” (Wisconsin State Journal). Despite Blank’s stated confidence in
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the ability of the university to maintain a Division I athletic program without giving rise to
student-athlete controversy, sports network SB Nation draws attention to seven major NCAA
infractions committed by Wisconsin as of 1982 (KingOState). The nature of these scandals
ranges from instances of academic violations by student-athletes to “falsified certifications of
compliance,” “extra financial aid for basketball players,” and “illegal sponsorships” associated
with the athletic department (KingOState). Thusly, Blank’s defense of student-athletes is
contradicted by the institution’s history of scandals and blatant violations of NCAA regulations.
Revelations of athletic scandals are damaging to the perception of a university and to
athletes involved in intercollegiate competition. When an athletic scandal is uncovered by mass
media, a university invariably responds in a manner that protects its public perception. John
Fortunato analyzes Duke’s response to its 2006 lacrosse rape case. He writes:
Duke’s public relations function was to attempt to frame the story. Administrative
authorities at Duke wanted certain facts to be emphasized in the media coverage
and communicated to its critical stakeholders, particularly its accepting
responsibility for the incident, its corrective actions of forming committees to
address the cultural environment and creating higher behavior standards for the
lacrosse team, its positioning the university as a leader in addressing the issue of
alcohol on campus, and the communication of the positive aspects of the
university. (Fortunato)
Simply, Duke attempted to minimize the negative implications associated with its athletic
scandal by engaging in public relations. Consequently, the focus of the university was shifted
from the actual misconduct to its public perception. Thusly, intervention provided by Division I
universities like Duke does not target the central role-players in academic-athletic scandals:
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student-athletes. In conclusion, “To date, little or nothing has been done to address the
fundamental cause of the recent scandals—the competitive pressures created by
commercialization … (preventing incidences of academic misconduct) will depend on
implementing reforms that diminish the persistent, intense pressures on coaches to win and
accrue profits for their universities” (Cullen et al., 63).
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