MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A TERRITORIAL CHALLENGE TO
NIGERIA’S SECURITY AND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
By
Dr. Nwanolue, B.O.G.
Department of Political Science
Anambra State University, Igbariam Campus
&
Victor Chidubem Iwuoha
Department of Political Science
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Abstract
Water is life. Beyond mere reconciliatory services: as food, for digestion, and appeasement of
both human and animal anatomies; water contours the foci of a nation’s economic life.
Meaningful economic activities are either originated or facilitated through the ocean: crude oil
exploitation, fishing, transportation of goods and passengers etc. However, the amplifying cases
of maritime criminality and terrorism in seawaters pose serious concerns for legal owners and
users; both at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels. Therefore, this paper
evaluates the low level of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and problematizes the
fundamental impact of same on Nigeria’s security and strategic development. To do this, the
qualitative method of data collection and analysis is adopted. Accordingly, we argue that the
protracted and intractable cases of violent maritime criminality grossly impinge on Nigeria’s
national security: safe oil exploration and conveyance, democracy, human security, food
security, human rights, economic development, favourable foreign trade and image, optimistic
foreign policy, employment and job creation, poverty alleviation, and so on. Hence, we
recommend the institution of a strategic security paradigm and enforcement of same by the
Guinean Gulf states. More directly, Nigeria should feed up relevant security apparatuses, provide
employment opportunities for youths, fight corruption, and utilize oil windfalls for the benefit of
rivarine communities, as these measures would enhance national security.
Keywords: Maritime, Security, Gulf of Guinea, Strategic Development, Piracy, Nigerian Navy,
Water, Oil, Ship, Political Economy.
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Introduction
Seawater is very relevant for commercial activities. If not seawater, a nation’s economic life is but a
compounded chimera. Remarkably, “the profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength
of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were
detected” (Mahan 1957:1). Most economic activities are either originated or promoted through the ocean:
crude oil exploitation, fishing, transportation of goods and passengers etc. Hence, well over 90 percent of
the world’s trade is transported via the maritime environment. As a result, anything that inhibits or
endangers the free transit of vessels and economic activities in the maritime domain can have serious
economic and security implications. However, one of the most dreaded maritime threats in the world today
is sea piracy. Relevant data abound on the summary account of pirate activity across world’s important seas.
For instance, over 445 cases of piracy attacks was reported in 2010 alone, compared to 406 in 2009, 293 in
2008 and 263 in 2007 (ASI Global, 2011).
Notably, the most contended threat has been the resurgence of sea piracy in African waters.
Regrettably therefore, Africa’s waterways have in recent times emerged as some of the world’s most
dangerous routes for vessels and their crew members in terms of pirate attacks (Baldauf, 2012). It is on
record that African waters, ever since 2007, overtook waters off Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Philippines, to become the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy. For instance,
startling evidence from the International Maritime Bureau indicates that there were a total of 1434 incidents
of piracy in Africa between 2003 and 2011. Beginning from 2007, the number of attacks has been on the
increase, frog-leaping from 61 in 2006 to 293 in 2011 (International Maritime Bureau, 2012).
In this light, the Gulf of Guinea continues to be the second most affected region of Africa aside from
the waters off Somalia (the region generally referred to as the Gulf of Aden). It is estimated that the costs of
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, both from stolen cargos and higher insurance premiums and security costs,
translate to $2 billion each year, compared with $7 billion from Somali piracy (Baldauf, 2012). More
importantly, Nigeria’s maritime environment is a prominent factor in the analysis of maritime criminality in
the Gulf of Guinea. Particularly, the rising cases of land border and maritime criminality in West Africa are
fuelled by Nigeria’s large deposits of oil and other marine originated natural resources (Fall, 2005; Adejo,
2005). However, the pervading maritime criminality in the Nigerian marine could be located within the
neighbourhood of gross inefficiency and incompetency of most Nigerian security operators (as a result of
poor funding, poor training, poor facilities etc.); the inherent contradictions of highly porous land borders,
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sea jetties and coasts; and the general low enforcement capacity of relevant national security legal regimes
in the country (Ilesamni, 2002; Ibeanu, 2007).
In the light of the above security concerns, therefore, genuine effort is made in this paper to critically
examine and interrogate the rising challenges of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and its impact on
Nigeria’s security and strategic development.
The Geostrategic and Maritime Perspectives of the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea geographic region is defined as the part of the Atlantic Ocean southwest of Africa.
The region encompasses over a dozen countries from West and Central Africa, namely; Angola, Benin,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (Onuoha, 2012). It is located more strictly by the intersection of
Latitude 00 (Equator) and Longitude 00 (Greenwich Meridian) (Anene, 2006). It should be noted that the
Gulf of Guinea covers over 6,000 kilometre coastal arc which stretches from Senegal in West Africa,
through Cameroun in Central Africa to Angola in Southern Africa.
The region’s geostrategic and maritime potentials are quite attractive. The GG is endowed with
enormous mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold, and fishes, among others. In particular,
it is home to huge hydrocarbon deposits. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in the
West African coast of GG. Experts forecast in 1999 that Western oil companies will invest between $40
billion and $60 billion in the Gulf of Guinea alone over the next 20 years. It is estimated that deepwater
drilling will account for 25 percent of offshore oil production by 2015, compared to just nine percent in
2007 (Onuoha, 2010). By 2020, oil production in Gulf of Guinea is expected to surpass the total production
of the Persian Gulf nations: 25 percent of the global production as compared to 22 percent from the Persian
Gulf (Paterson, 2007). Among the major oil-producing countries in the region are Nigeria, Angola,
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Since Chad’s oil is connected to Cameroon,
analysts are wont to add Chad as a player to the region.
In December 2010, Ghana joined the league of oil producers in the region, when it commenced the
production of oil from its “Jubilee” field, located some 60 km offshore. At the shore of Sierra Leone also, an
oil field “Venus”, stocking around 200 million barrels was discovered in 2009. There is also a recent report
of new discoveries off Liberia; further raising optimism for other countries of the region yet to discover oil
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in their territory. Thus the region holds the prospects of supplying significant quantity of oil to the global
economy as we progress in the 21st century.
Typically, the Gulf of Guinea contains 50.4 billion barrels of proven reserves and it produces 5.4
million barrels of oil per day. Its low-sulphur oil and proximity to Europe and the US further raise its
strategic importance in global energy supply. The US currently obtains 15 percent of its oil imports from the
GG and this could increase to 25 percent over the next five years. The region has the fastest rate of
discovery of new reserves in the world. The ‘discovery ratio for oil wells in the US, for instance, is normally
about 10 percent, in West Africa the same ratio has been almost 60 percent (Dietrich, 2004). The huge oil
reserve of the region (Nigeria alone accounting for over 38. 61 billion barrels' oil reserve) is thus the magnet
drawing oil majors from America, Europe and Asia. The Gulf of Guinea is strikingly a key hub of
commercial maritime activities – exports of hydrocarbons and imports of manufactured goods and food
items. The growing investments in the region, especially in offshore oil infrastructure, has prompted a
quantum leap in coastal trading, such resulting to excessive maritime traffic in the region.
Despite the overwhelming economic and geo-maritime relevance of this region, however, there are no
definite naval control points that holistically navigate, manage sea traffic or contain rising vulnerability to
accidents and attacks in seaways. Hence, maritime criminalities of all kinds abound in the region, which can
be broadly categorized as economic, political, and environmental. Amongst many of the economic threats
are drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism, piracy, poaching, and sea robbery. The
environmental threats include coastal erosion and maritime pollution - dumping of toxic wastes and
accidents from oil industry. On the other hand, resource-insurgency remains a major political threat in the
region. There is also real threat of proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and growing
threat of maritime terrorism (Onuoha, 2012).
Of major concern is sea piracy. Thus, for a region of such geostrategic and maritime significance,
ensuring that good order at sea prevails is a matter of absolute necessity for the GG states and extra-regional
powers with growing economic interests in the region. This explains why the rapid increase in incidents of
piracy in the region has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC
has adopted two resolutions - 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February 2012) – calling for more regional
coordination and logistical support to regional security initiatives to counter the growing menace of piracy
in the region. We shall briefly highlight on the phenomenon of sea piracy.
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The Phenomenon and Dynamics of Maritime Piracy
Piracy has become a contentious issue in the discourse of maritime security (Obi, 2001). The
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), expands the
definition of piracy spelt in the United Nations Law of the Sea (Art.101) (UNCLOS), which contains the
following: “Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) Any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)” (United
Nations, 1982).
However, as Neethling (2010) rightly contends, it is obvious that the IMO definition of piracy restricts
it to illegal acts of violence or detention committed on the high seas, or outside the jurisdiction of a coastal
state, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship, directed against another ship.
At the same time, the IMO definition views and specifies acts of violence or detention committed against
ships that occur within the jurisdiction of a state as armed robbery against ships. Thus any unlawful act of
violence or detention or any act of deprivation at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal
state’s territorial waters is not specified and viewed as piracy (Maritime Terrorism Research Center, 2009).
More importantly, the definition of piracy according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a
specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce, concerned with collecting and exchanging
maritime information, is much broader and inclusive than that of the IMO (Johnson and & Pladdet, 2003). It
defines piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the attempt to or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (International
Maritime Bureau, 2009).
The Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), an informal mechanism for
scholars, officials and others to discuss political and security issues, configured a new definition for what is
termed “maritime terrorism”. Accordingly, maritime terrorism is defined as “… the undertaking of terrorist
acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in
port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including
tourist resorts, port areas and port town or cities (Maritime Terrorism Research Center, 2009). Maritime
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terrorism is, however, motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target.
Strictly speaking, piracy is not necessarily underpinned or driven by political goals, but this may be of
importance when studying piracy in the African context, specifically piracy off the Nigerian coast
(Neethling, 2010).
Empirically, the phenomenon of maritime piracy is defined as “An act of boarding or attempting to
board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime with the apparent intent or
capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (IMB, 2009). This is because most attacks on vessels
occur within a state’s territorial waters. The IMB definition is preferable to that of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which limits pirate attacks to incidents that take place
outside the jurisdiction of any state. Under the IMB definition, pirate attacks include all actual or attempted
attacks on vessels while in port, anchored, berthed or underway. Although the IMB acknowledges that its
data is incomplete due to underreporting, it remains the most comprehensive database for maritime piracy
information currently available (ASI Global, 2011).
Much more, maritime piracy is closely associated and (or) mingled with the term “maritime security”.
In this sense, maritime security can be defined as the freedom from or absence of those acts which could
negatively impact on the natural integrity and resilience of any navigable waterway, or which undermine the
safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels and other conveyances legitimately existing in, conducting
lawful transactions on, or transiting through territorial and international waterways. It therefore implies
unhindered oceanic trade and safe navigation of people, cargo, vessels and other conveyances (Onuoha,
2009). Maritime security thus cuts across the whole gamut of profound stability and protection of the ocean
environment. A stable ocean domain is apposite for unhampered economic utilization of the sea, as it dilutes
and limits maritime threats of divergent dimensions such as illegal fishing, pollution, piracy, asymmetrical
threats and other criminal activities.
Challenges of Maritime Security in Nigeria
Nigeria is located in the West Africa with 351649 square miles land area, total area 356,667 square
miles, population as at 2009 estimated 149,229,090 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Largest cities are
Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Kaduna Major Oil and gas producer and exporter, population. Ports and harbours:
Calabar, Lagos (Tin Island and Apapa ports), Onne Port Harcourt, Sapele and Warri and waterways 8,600
kilometres (Niger and Benue Rivers and smaller rivers and creeks. Its territorial sea is 12 nautical miles
from the baselines, EEZ is 200 nautical miles from the baselines, and continental shelf is 200 miles depth or
to the depth of exploitation. Favourably, Nigeria is a proud and boisterous maritime nation with a coast line
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of about 420 nautical miles (nm) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200nm, which translates to an
area of about 84000nm available to be explored and exploited. In this area lie abundant living resources like
fish, which accounts for about 40 per cent of total animal protein in the diet of the average Nigerian; and
non-living resources such as oil, that accounts for about 95 per cent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings.
Apart from these resources, there are several seaports and oil terminals which serve as gateway to the nation
with the rest of the world. In addition is the large volume of shipping activities due to the nation's importoriented economy and commercial fishing fleet (Giginya, 2010).
Outstandingly, Nigeria accounts for 70 percent of seaborne trade in West Africa and Central Africa,
which is now variously and constantly blanketed by sea vulnerabilities. However, the task of surveillance,
securitization and preemptive navigation of the maritime environment are expressly within the domain of
the Nigerian naval force. In line, the Nigerian naval strategists have critically conceptualized the navy's
maritime mission as defense in-depth within three overlapping perimeters. Level one, the highest priority,
was coastal defense and inshore operations involving surveillance, early warning, anti-smuggling and piracy
operations; protecting offshore oil installations; search and rescue; and policing out to 100 nautical miles.
Level Two encompassed the maintenance of a naval presence in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for
monitoring, policing, and sea control; and for coordinating regional efforts, such as prevention of poaching,
dumping of hazardous materials or toxic waste, and marine research. Level Three, the outer ring, involved
surveillance, intelligence-gathering, training and flag-showing cruises; independent and joint exercises; and
allied operations.
The navy's maritime defense roles, officially known as the Trident Strategy, comprised three elements
contributing toward national military strategy. The first element was sub-regional sea control to defend
Nigeria's national and maritime interests and to execute the national shipping policy by protecting sea-lanes.
The second element, coastal defense, included protection of the coastal zone's approaches, territorial waters,
and the EEZ. In the third element, the navy was to provide adequate sealift and gunfire support to the army
in amphibious operations. This ambitious strategy may require increased resources in the future.
However, some important factors impinge on the effectiveness of the Nigerian Navy. Mainly, the
Navy’s efforts in nation building are limited by lack of platforms, training deficiencies, poor funding,
pecuniary interest and lack of established jurisdiction. For instance, Giginya (2010) noted with great dismay
that most of the ships currently in the Nigerian Navy inventory were commissioned into the Service in the
early 80s. With no regular refit or upgrades, they are in various states of disrepair, thus reducing their
7
availability for deployment. Coupled with this is the insufficient number of vessels, as well as the ever
increasing requirement and challenges of securing the nation's maritime environment and assets. The result
is that maritime security forces are ill-equipped and underfunded to perform interdiction operations. Off
West and Central Africa, for example, there are fewer than 25 maritime craft longer than 25 meters
available for interdiction efforts (Vogel 2011:2). The developments of oil fields in deep waters like Bonga,
Agbami and the joint venture fields in the Joint Development Zone (JDZ), between Nigeria and Sao Tome
and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea, have further increased the demand for a navy platform. With the JDZ,
the navy is saddled with more area to police as the other member of the venture obviously does not have the
capability to police the area.
Related problem is the issue of poor training. Ordinarily the training given to navy personnel on entry
into the Service is reasonably adequate for basic deployment. However, with the multi- roles of enforcement
and assistance to other agencies in the maritime environment, there abound some copious deficiencies in the
current training curricular. Hence, the unprofessional conduct of navy personnel due to lack of knowledge
of operational and technical skills mostly result to duty negligence, overall ineffectiveness or outright nonperformance.
Apparently, it is equally contended that land security is given advantage attention over maritime
security. Such magnification of land patrol thus gives ample vent and justification to the overwhelming
backup and support given to land-based forces, particularly the army, to the neglect of maritime security
forces such as navy, airforce and coast guards. The data presented in Table 1 not only shows how this
discrepancy plays out in terms of personnel strength of the armies and navies of five selected countries in
the Gulf of Guinea, but also implies that such disproportionality which manifests in personnel strength
correspondingly affects the size of budgetary allocations to maritime forces.
Table 1: Comparison of Personnel Strength of the Army and Navy of Five GG States
Country
Army
Navy
Nigeria
62,000
8,000
6,500
900
110,000 – 120,000
6,703
1,100
120
800
70
Cote d’Ivoire
Congo DR
Equatorial Guinea
Gambia
Source: Mugridge (2010).
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Beyond that, confident efforts have been variously invested in a bid to securitize Nigeria’s maritime
environment. Some of these fervent strides include:
1.
(i)
Relevant laws of maritime security such as:
Section 215(h) of its Merchant Shipping Act of 2007, conforming with the IMO Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its related Protocols on Fixed Platforms; have
also been enacted by the National Assembly.
(ii) A Bill for an Act to establish the Maritime Security Agency to promote Maritime Security and for Other Related
Purposes.
(iii) Enactment of a Bill on Armed Robbery and Piracy at Sea to fully implement SUA in line with the
recommendation of the maritime stakeholders at the International Conference on Piracy and Armed Robbery at
Sea held at Sheraton Hotel and Towers, Abuja, 28th to 30th April, 2008 and to overcome the criticisms,
adequacies and objections with respect to (i) and (iv) above and put in place a legal framework for cooperation
by West African States against armed robbery and piracy in West Africa. This is a work in progress being carried
out by yours sincerely.
(iv) Domestication of the ISPS Code and the Work in Progress by PICOMSS and NIMASA which had been
designated as per the report of the IMO Needs Assessment Mission on Maritime Security IN November, 2007 as
authorities for the implementation of ISPS Code in Nigeria with respect to ports facilities and ships in Nigeria
respectively.
(v) Decree Number 10 of April 1987 promulgated a national shipping policy, and the Navy Board's approval of a
maritime defence strategy, announced in April 1988, shifted Nigeria's strategic focus toward the South Atlantic
because of external threats to its economic lifeline to the southeast.
2. Creation of a special Ministry of Niger Delta to specifically handle the issues of Niger Delta sustainable
development and contain the restiveness of youths in the oil producing region.
3. Various amnesty proclamations in Nigeria – 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2009, in pursuant to section 175 of the
Constitution, whereby amnesty and unconditional pardon was granted to all persons who had directly or
indirectly participated in the commission of offence associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta upon
their surrender and handing over of all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition and execution of the
Renunciation of Militancy forms specified in the schedule to the Proclamation.
4. Graduated improvement and funding of the Nigerian Navy, Marine Police, Nigerian Customs Service,
Immigration etc, in checking maritime insecurity.
5. Long range tracking system to enable NIMASA in conjunction with the Nigerian navy to track and monitor the
activities of all ships operating up to 30 nautical miles from the baselines of Nigerian waters to ensure they are
not engaged in maritime violence or piratic activities.
6. Post-Amnesty Programme of infrastructural development of the Niger Delta States and creating relevant jobs
opportunities for the Youths of the Niger-Delta especially those that had been pardoned so that they do not have
reasons to go back to militant activities, breaking of pipelines, and maritime violence and kidnapping in order to
survive.
7. The Nigerian government has, in January 2012, transformed its Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope,
previously installed to combat militancy in the Niger Delta, into an expanded maritime security framework,
known as Operation Pulo Shield. The Operation Pulo Shield was established to eliminate, among others,
pipeline vandalism, crude oil theft, illegal oil refining, piracy and all forms of sea robbery within its area of
responsibility.
8. In terms of bilateral response, the Governments of Nigeria and Benin Republic in October 2011 set up a
combined maritime patrol of their waters. This security outfit was Code-named Operation Prosperity, the
bilateral cooperation was the first of its kind in the region and is in tandem with the Maritime Organization of
West and Central Africa (MOWCA) Coastguard Function Network Initiative. It is expected that the joint patrol
9
9.
would be expanded to include the navies of Ghana and Togo, in a bid to increase the span of surveillance and
eliminate maritime threats.
In February 2012, the Nigeria Navy hosted Exercise Obangame Express: an annual naval exercise of Africa, US
and Europe. The maritime interdiction exercise attended by 12 nations – Nigeria, United States, France, Italy,
Spain, Cameroun, Ghana, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo, Benin Republic and Republic
of Congo – was aimed at enhancing the response capabilities of the Navies in the GG. The idea was to encourage
countries in the region to improve on interoperability of communications and sharing MDA information to
collectively combat piracy and other maritime crimes. This was followed up with a high-profile meeting of
representatives from the Economic Community of West African States and Economic Community of Central
African States as well as the United Nations in Benin in March 2012, to further fine-tune collaborative regional
efforts at improving maritime safety and security in the GG.
10. Nigeria has benefitted from the US AFRICOM’s African Partnership Station (APS) military initiative,
(see Iwuoha 2010), which has been involved in joint training exercises with navies in the region to
develop proficiencies in areas such as maritime interdiction operations, search and rescue operations,
and counter-terrorism, among others. To this end, the US has expended about $35 million in the
training of naval personnel in Nigeria and other countries within the Gulf of Guinea on how to combat
piracy, oil bunkering and other maritime crimes that have plagued the region in recent times.
However, these and other efforts which are targeted and negotiated around enhancing maritime safety
have not tangibly yielded into desired results. Hence, there has been a rising and intractable syndrome of sea
criminality in the region with renewed vivacity and momentum of high caliber importance (Nwanolue and
Iwuoha, 2012a).
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Why are Attacks Cataclysmically Persistent?
Instructively, the rising cases of maritime piracy are fuelled by a number of factors. Generally, one can
locate the rising trend of maritime insecurity at the threshold of bad governance and non-performance, such
leading to low feasibility of state welfare in most Gulf of Guinean states. It is highly damning and appalling
that despite their oil wealth and prominence, Gulf of Guinean states still account for worst indices of human
development. There are striking cases of unemployment, hunger and malnutrition (Obi and Iwuoha, 2009).
With declining opportunities for legitimate sources of livelihood amidst perceived affluence, some youths in
the region are vulnerably recruited and rejoined to the creeks for violent criminality (piracy) for survival.
The cases of resource-conflicts in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region and Angola’s Cabinda region,
arising from bad governance are typical examples. By implication, the outbreak of violent conflicts
compounds the problem of SALWs proliferation in the region. Not surprisingly, the Head, Department of
Collective Defense and Security, Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, Mrs. Salman Mann,
confirms that out of 100 million illicit weapons in circulation in sub-Saharan Africa, about eight to ten
million are concentrated in the West African sub-region, killing no fewer than 1000 people daily in the subregion (Bah, 2004; MacCullum, 2007). In turn, the availability of SALWs contributes to the frequency and
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intensity of conflicts and criminality (such as piracy) that bedevil these states. Thus, with bad governance,
violent criminality, SALWs proliferation, ill-equipped and underfunded navies, and the absence of a
maritime strategy coexisting with affluence, it is not surprising that piracy is brewing in the region. The
interrelated manifestation of these factors has contributed greatly to the prevalence of maritime disorder in
the region.
In specifics, the immediate causes of sea piracy are clearly articulated as follows:
1. Weak or ineffective measures against pirates. Some national governments lack the capabilities to combat
piracy, and their efforts may also be hampered by corruption at various levels. Geographical features of
a country or region may also give a natural advantage to pirates over those who seek to pursue them.
Furthermore, when piracy occurs in international waters, complications can arise as to who has the right
to pursue, detain and prosecute perpetrators.
2. The presence of a large number of vessels and their concentration in several relatively confined areas.
The level of maritime shipping has increased in recent years, while improved technology and the desire
to cut costs has led operators to reduce crew sizes.
3. The availability of weapons. Pirates can obtain weaponry from a variety of sources, which improves
their capabilities and prompts them to attempt more daring and sophisticated attacks.
4. Large ransom payments. In their desire to secure the release of hijacked vessels and kidnapped crew
members, a few vessel owners have been willing to pay incredibly large sums of money. The hope of
obtaining such payments makes the risks they incur worthwhile for the pirates. Furthermore, the pirates
tend to use the money they obtain to purchase weapons and equipment, further improving their
capabilities (ASI Global, 2011).
Most remarkably, these factors are prominent in the waters off Somalia’s coast and in Nigerian waters,
serving to make these areas the world’s major piracy hotspots, as addressed above. Hence, it has been
forecasted that Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea will likely remain the highest threat areas for piracy; and
that political and economic factors that have fueled piracy in Nigeria appear unlikely to be addressed soon
(ASI Global, 2011).
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Examining Cases of Maritime Attacks
Piracy worldwide has continued to increase for the fourth straight year in 2010. More precisely, the
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 445 attacks in 2010,
compared to 406 in 2009, 293 in 2008 and 263 in 2007. Since 2008, the trend of attacks has involved a
higher impact on the vessels’ owners, operators and crews, and this trend was sustained in 2010, as
illustrated by at least three indicators: (1) the number of hijackings was 53 in 2010, compared to 49 in 2009,
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which in turn was the highest number ever recorded, although only a 12 percent increase from 2008; (2) a
total of 1,181 crew members were taken hostage, another record, compared to 1,050 in 2009 and 889 in
2008; (3) pirates continued an elevated use of firearms, as guns were used in 243 attacks in 2010 for the
second year in a row, compared to 139 attacks in 2008 and 72 attacks in 2007. It is becoming increasingly
common for pirates to use guns as opposed to less sophisticated weapons, such as knives. It should be
pointed out, however, that violence against crew members who are in captivity is uncommon, with only six
assaults against crew members reported in 2010 (ASI Global, 2011).
Importantly, since 2007, African waters overtook waters off Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Philippines – as the traditionally dangerous hotspots of global piracy (Obi, 2007). More
directly, however, for much of the past half a decade or so, maritime piracy has been intensified around
Africa and such has been more in the Guinean Gulf, owing to the magnitude location of oil resources in the
region. Indeed, it worth mentioning that the Gulf of Guinea continues to be the second most affected region
of Africa aside from the waters off Somalia. The costs of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, both from stolen
cargos and higher insurance premiums and security costs, translates to $2 billion each year, compared with
$7 billion from Somali piracy (Baldauf, 2012). The Nigerian situation is however prominent and of utmost
concern. In May 2008, for instance, the BBC reported that, according to statistics provided by the IMB,
Nigeria accounted for 10 of the 49 attacks registered worldwide in the first quarter of 2008, which translate
into a figure of more than 20 per cent (cited in Neethling, 2010).
As calculated, pirate attacks in this part of the world dangerously involve violent armed robberies with
the highest percentage of injuries to crew members; Nigerian pirates also kidnap crew members with higher
frequency than anywhere else in the world except Somalia (ASI Global, 2011). Most piracy incidents in the
Gulf of Guinea occur in Nigerian waters, but other countries are also affected. Pirates usually aim to steal
cargo and valuables, but kidnappings and hijackings for ransom also occur. Again, pirates are often armed
and pose a significant threat to crew. This has, awkwardly and most regrettably, been the case in spite of
growing national, regional and international efforts at improving maritime security in these sea routes. For
instance, startling evidence from the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships Annual Report indicates that there were a total of 1434 incidents of piracy in Africa between
2003 and 2011. Beginning from 2007, the number of attacks has been on the increase. It jumped from 61 in
2006 to 293 in 2011. The reason for this astronomical rise was the outbreak of piracy off the coast of
Somalia and Gulf of Aden. The table below corroborates this assertion.
12
Table 2: Pirate Attacks in Africa’s Waters, 2003–2008
Location
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Gulf of Aden
18
8
10
10
13
92
Somalia
3
2
35
10
31
19
Nigeria
39
28
16
12
42
40
Rest of Africa
33
35
19
29
44
37
* The waters of 22 African states.
Source: Adapted from International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1
January – 31 December 2008, London: IMB, 2009.
As indicated in the table above, it is obvious that the incidence of piracy attacks has been disastrously
and comparatively felt more in the Nigerian coast than the rest of African waters. More especially, by
recording well over 39 cases of sea piracy in 2003, Nigeria’s situation is worse off than the whole of Gulf of
Aden -18; Somalia -3, and the rest of Africa -33. By the expiration of 2008, the figures became so terrible,
with about 40 prominent cases of sea attacks. However, further scholarly interrogations, conducted and
coordinated by the ASI Global, reveal that the bulk of attacks continue to occur in Nigerian waters: 19
incidents were reported off Nigeria in 2010 alone. Significantly, smaller numbers (anywhere from one to six
per location) occurred off Conakry, Guinea; Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Cameroon has emerged as an increasing area of concern, especially the waters of the Bakassi
Peninsula, located on the border with Nigeria. Of the reported 19 incidents in Nigerian waters, 13 vessels
were boarded and four were fired upon, although no vessels were hijacked. Pirates attack tankers, fishing
vessels and cargo carriers of various types. Although the number of reported attacks in Nigeria decreased
for the second consecutive year, the actual number may be more than twice as high, as many incidents -especially those involving fishing and oil vessels -- go unreported.
Furthermore, according to the IMB director, Nigerian pirates are more violent than their Somali
counterparts; one indicator of this is the fact that 15 crew members were injured during piracy attacks by
Nigerian pirates in 2010, the highest number anywhere in the world (the second highest number was six, in
Somalia). The reason for this is likely that Nigerian pirates typically do not intend to extract ransom for the
vessel but for crew members instead, with a total of 17 maritime kidnappings reported in 2010.
A general lack of political will and pervasive corruption continue to hinder efforts to deter maritime
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Although Nigeria’s navy is considered among the best-equipped in Africa, a
lack of funding, vessels, training and discipline continue to restrict its law enforcement capabilities. Local
13
governments that have little legitimacy and endemic corruption also inhibit the mustering of the necessary
political will to contribute resources and enact legislation to effectively deter attacks. Furthermore, the Gulf
of Guinea’s relatively unexplored oil and gas reserves are currently attracting increased amounts of foreign
investment and are consequently presenting additional lucrative targets for maritime pirates in the region.
Table 3 below provides detailed statistics on the actual and attempted attacks against ships in the Gulf of
Guinea; while Figures 1 & 2 illustrate more on the percentages of same.
Table 3: Actual and Attempted Attacks Against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea, 2003-2011
Gulf of Guinea States
2003
Angola
3
Benin
1
Cameroon
2
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
4
1
2
2009
2010
1
4
2
Congo Dr.
1
3
4
Eq. Guinea
2
3
5
1
2
3
2011
Total
1
11
20
22
19
4
1
Ghana
3
5
3
3
1
Guinea
4
5
1
4
2
7
1
3
5
Guinea Bissau
6
2
27
5
32
1
Ivory Coast
2
4
Liberia
1
2
Nigeria
39
28
Senegal
8
5
Sierra Leone
3
16
1
12
3
1
1
42
40
2
2
64
1
56
1
1
29
19
20
6
10
1
1
Total
4
2
The Congo
1
1
235
13
3
Togo
17
25
31
53
3
1
2
59
48
31
8
4
6
11
53
427
Source: Adapted from IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports, 2003-2011
14
16
Source: ASI Global, 2011.
From the ongoing, hence, attacks off the coast of Gulf of Guinea constitute a fair share of the high
incidents of piracy recorded in Africa. As recorded, the Gulf of Guinea accounted for 427 of the 1434
attacks in African waters between 2003 and 2011. It should be noted that the Gulf of Guinean pirates are
known to be violent, as they usually deploy sophisticated arms and weapons like AK-47s. The traditional
modus operandi of pirates operating in the region had largely involved the use of speedboats to attack and
dispossess shipping crew of cash, cargo and valuable, when the vessel is at anchor or in harbour, but mostly
close to shore.
As can be seen in table 2, piracy in the GG has not been evenly distributed. Hence, the incidents of
piracy in the region decreased from 64 attacks in 2003 to 56 in 2004 and 25 in 2005. It increased from 31 in
2006 to 53 in 2007 and 59 in 2008. Although it declined from 48 in 2009 to 39 in 2010, it has picked up
again with 53 cases recorded in 2011. The majority of the attacks recorded between 2003 and 2011 occurred
17
in Nigerian waters (55 percent), even as most attacks in Nigerian waters go unreported. Between 2003 and
2005, there was a decline in the number of attacks in Nigerian waters, and overall in the GG. However,
there was an increase in the number of attacks between 2007 and 2008. The said increase is mostly related
to the upsurge in the activities of ethnic militants in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, who were
protesting perceived marginalization of the region by successive governments in Nigeria. Characteristic of
the militant protests was the emergence and activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND), among other groups (Onuoha, 2012). The operational tactics of the militant groups cut
across hostage-taking of oil workers, sabotage of oil facilities, attacks on oil vessels, illegal oil bunkering,
kidnapping and ransom receipts, and many more. Pirates are however, increasingly modifying their tactics
by hijacking fishing vessels, particularly within Nigerian waters, and using same to attack other vessels
operating off the coasts of neighbouring countries like Benin and Cameroun. Recent attacks have extended
further out at sea and have focused largely on oil-laden vessels, to steal the petroleum product. As noted by
Malaquais (2012), “the GG piracy is the organized, sometimes highly sophisticated, illicit taking of oil.
They steal the oil, make a couple of black market circles of the stuff, and then deposit it back into the global
supply”. Most attacks on oil vessels are likely spurred by the hike in oil prices, especially in Nigeria. To be
sure, the subsidization of the ‘oil corruption’ or oil lifting concessions to numerous indigenous business
moguls - the ‘cabal’, who smartly navigate Nigeria’s crude oil for refining in neighbouring West African
states is at the heart of the pirates’ bargain (Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2012b).
Not minding that the amnesty initiative saw over 15 000 militants surrender large cache of arms and
weapons: about 2,760 assorted guns, 287,445 ammunition of different caliber, 18 gun-boats, 763 dynamites,
1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and several other military accessories, such as, dynamite cables,
bullet-proof jackets and jack-knives; the opting out from the amnesty by a faction of MEND partly explains
the resurgence of pirate attacks beginning from 2011. According to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), there have been 10 reported piracy incidents in the first two months of 2012 alone, an indication that
piracy threat remains extremely high. In early March 2012, MEND claimed responsibility for shooting four
police officers on a boat patrolling the Nembe River in Bayelsa state, while indicating ties with pirates
groups in the region (Alessi, 2012). Moreover, it is speculated that a powerful transnational mafia group (
people with vast knowledge of the operation of the oil industry) is financing and facilitating the operations
of pirates that target oil tankers, by giving them vital information such as names of ships, the course they
18
will take, value of cargo and extent of insurance cover (Rasheed, 2012). In the Gulf of Guinea, as has been
the case, hostage takings may last as long as ten days as compared to six months for Somali hijackings.
Maritime Security and the Political Economy of Nigeria’s Strategic Development
Apparently, the prevalence of maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea has some devastating and
destructive effects upon the present and future of Nigeria’s security. The main concern here is the issue of
adequate protection of the country’s strategic core values and natural endowments (Ikejiani-Clark, 2007). In
this sense, it is palpable that the rising maritime contradictions in the ‘new Gulf’ variously undermine the
development and security of the Nigerian oil deposits, Nigerian navy development, economic development,
national security, human security, human rights, international image, foreign trade, foreign policy, food
security, democracy, and so on. More cohesively, Giginya (2010) has highlighted the variations of maritime
crime: piracy, poaching, marine pollution, maritime terrorism, illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism. To
begin with, one of the immediate receptors of the threats of Guinean Gulf maritime insecurity is the
Nigerian shipping industry. Mainly, the oil and gas exploitation has titivated shipping activities in the
nation's water in terms of coastal tankers, crew boats, house boats and supply boats. Hence, ship traffic in
major ports in Nigeria excluding tankers is estimated at an average of 3500 vessels per annum. Take for
instance, "about 2 billion US dollars was realized from shipping activity within the companies operating in
the oil industry in 2002" (Giginya, 2010). However, piracy and sea robbery tend to concentrate in areas of
heavy commercial maritime activity, like the Nigerian waterways. This has posed serious economic threats
to the shipping/fishing economy. In the main, the problem of inadequate security: inefficiency of navy
patrol teams, poor surveillance facilities and low law enforcement capacity; has provided more optic visual
and freer space to pirates in the area. According to Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association (NITOA) there
were more than 100 pirate’s attacks on trawlers in 2007.
Primarily, attacks on fishing vessels include theft of fish cargoes, engines and other material on board.
In some instances, fishermen are also killed. Attacks on fishing trawlers have reached the point where the
captains of many fishing boats refuse to put to sea. Hence, many trawlers have been idle since 2008, and this
resulted in job losses of approximately 50 000 at one stage (Neethling, 2010). Piracy also leads to disruption
of livelihood systems as well as shortages in food supply. In February 2008, for example, the Nigerian
Trawler Owners Association recalled about 200 vessels from shore due to spiraling piracy. Consequently,
piracy attacks were so cataclysmic on the fishing industries, as over 50 percent of about 250 trawlers
registered in Nigeria in 2003/2004, with over 40 fishing companies, have suddenly fizzled out of business.
19
This resulted in a temporary work stoppage for an estimated 20,000 workers, and consequently over 100
percent increase in the prices of seafood in the local market (Onuoha, 2009). To this effect, most shippers
have, in fact, begun to factor higher insurance premiums into their pricing, and increased shipping costs are
typically passed on to consumers (Nincic, 2009). Thus, the act of sea piracy has adversely impacted on the
job opportunities and such, negatively affecting the economic growth and development of the nation.
Poaching is another significant issue to contend with. Poaching is the act of fishing in a nation's waters
without permission or license. Incidentally, to most littoral West African countries including Nigeria, fish
represents a substantial part of their protein need and source of foreign exchange. Consequently, the
incidences of poaching by foreign unlicenced fishing vessels have resulted not only in reduced catches by
local artisan and trawlers but loss of revenue to Nigeria from landed catches. Hence, the Nigerian economy
loses incalculable amount to poaching in her waterways.
Marine Pollution is equally rampant in Nigerian seaways. Marine pollution is the indiscriminate
discharge or dumping of toxic or hazardous waste in the maritime environment. Oil spill is almost a regular
occurrence in the Nigerian shores, as a result of criminal activities of both the downstream and upstream of
the oil sector. Oil is often spilled in the upstream sector during exploration and exploitation activities while
in the downstream it is during various transfers/discharges. The problem of low enforcement capacity in the
Nigerian oil and gas sector has impotently nullified the observance and operationality of relevant safety laws
and measures such as the use of booms to trap oil at discharge points or during bunkering operations. by
implication, pollution does not only results in loss of fishery resources, it degrades the ecosystem and
requires huge resources that would have been channeled towards nation building to remedy the effects.
Again, restive youths in the Niger Delta are deeply involved in acts of maritime terrorism (Ibeanu,
2002). Maritime terrorism pertains to the use of threat or violent action in the maritime circle against
persons, installations and shipping in other to achieve political or socio-economic aims or to force a
government to act in accordance with terrorists' demands (Watts, 2007). In substance, acts of maritime
terrorism pose operational challenge to the Armed forces of Nigeria and the Navy in particular. Obviously,
the sustained restive youth activities in Niger Delta impinge on national economic growth, as most
companies are no longer willing to continue their operation in the area. Remarkably, crude oil theft/Illegal
Bunkering which refers to the transfer of fuels and other petroleum products between vessels, from vessels
to storage facilities and vice versa without following the prescribed procedure or guidelines of the
government, has become a daily affair in Nigerian seaways (Adams, 2008; Alapiki and Allen, 2006). In the
20
case of crude oil theft, Giginya reports that perpetrators steal crude oil from crude oil pipelines and facilities
that transverse the various rivers and creeks. At the peak of the Niger Delta crisis, Nigeria lost an estimated
70,000 – 300000 barrels per day of oil to theft amounting to $4.69 - $20.10 million US dollars at $67 US per
barrel. Specifically, the report of the Technical Committee on Niger Delta has it that about US
1,978,191,600 was lost in 2006; US 18,805,262,000 in 2007; and - US 720,842,000 in 2008 (cited in
Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2011).
Also, the remote locations of most oil installations in the creeks and derivable compensation from
spills have exacerbated the spate of pipeline vandalism and sabotage. Cyclically, the earnings arising from
compensation from oil spillage and siphoning of oil from the pipeline have encouraged the destruction of
pipelines and flow stations. Smuggling and trafficking of illegal weapons are further encouraged.
Consequently, the Federal Government has lost over N174 billion as production and repair loss due to
pipeline vandalism in the last 10 years (Giginya, 2010). This money could have been channeled to other
important developmental needs of the country. By extension, therefore, the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons (SALW), as a result of the ongoing illegal bunkering in the Nigerian seaways endangers the
security of human lives and properties, such overwhelming giving obnoxious space to violation of human
rights to life and dignity of mutual existence.
More importantly, the upsurge and proliferation of illicit fire arms in the country, as a dangerous
outcome of maritime vulnerability fan daily losses of human lives and valuable property as well as infliction
of bodily injuries and trauma to innocent crews and their families. Worthy of note therefore, is that all these
cataclysmic but opprobrious incidences perfunctorily and peremptorily byzantine, or more accurately,
contends the very notion about the reality of Nigeria’s national security and stability.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have vigorously and effortfully attempted the examination of the Gulf of Guinea
maritime security imbroglio, and correspondingly problematized same with respect to specific impacts on
Nigeria’s security and strategic development. To be recalled is that the rising violent maritime criminality in
the Gulf of Guinea has posed debilitating security challenges to Nigeria as a nation. From the subsisting
interrogations, thus, it is overwhelmingly obvious that the rising maritime criminality and other inherent
contradictions in the ‘new Gulf’ comprehensively underplay the development and security of the Nigerian
oil deposits, Nigerian navy development, economic development, national security, human security, human
rights, international trade and image, foreign trade, foreign policy, food security, democracy, and so on.
21
Therefore, there is an urgent need for Gulf of Guinean states to collaborate and advance an integrated
and sustainable security strategy to safeguard and protect their geostrategic seaways against maritime piracy
and attacks. More particularly, however, it behooves on Nigeria, as a major oil state in the region, not only
to beef of relevant legal instruments that deal with insecurity in the maritime environment, but also to
strengthen and animate its enforcement capacity regime to curb corruption and lawlessness in the oil and gas
sector of the country. To do this, the navy and other incidental but apposite security outfits must be
profoundly and perspicuously reinvigorated.
Beyond that, however, there is also the need for attention to move beyond the sea to the land, where
the real threats at sea actually originate. Comprehensive strategy for internal policing and surveillance must
be set in motion. More critically, Nigeria should leverage on her oil affluence to address excruciating
problems of unemployment, poverty and deprivation especially in riverine communities, which incubate
maritime afflictions. The fight against corruption must be accentuated and made a top priority, as
bureaucratic corruption peremptorily preempts, and blankets preordained natural sequence of human
development: state welfare, provision social services, poverty alleviation, human security and more
importantly, the ideal capacity of security forces to counter piracy.
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