Securitization in Papua – The Implication of Security Approach

Transcription

SECURITIZATION
IN PAPUA
The Implication of Security Approach
towards Human Rights Condition in Papua
Sanksi Pelanggaran Pasal 72:
Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2002 Tentang Hak Cipta
1. Barangsiapa dengan sengaja dan tanpa hak melakukan perbuatan sebagaimana dimaksud
dalam Pasal 2 ayat (1) atau Pasal 49 ayat (1) dan ayat (2) dipidana dengan pidana
penjara masing-masing paling singkat 1 (satu) bulan dan/atau denda paling sedikit Rp
1.000.000,00 (satu juta rupiah), atau pidana penjara paling lama 7 (tujuh) tahun dan/atau
denda paling banyak Rp 5.000.000.000,00 (lima miliar rupiah).
2. Barangsiapa dengan sengaja menyiarkan, memamerkan, mengedarkan, atau menjual
kepada umum suatu Ciptaan atau barang hasil pelanggaran Hak Cipta atau Hak Terkait
sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling lama 5
(lima) tahun dan/atau denda paling banyak Rp 500.000.000,00 (lima ratus juta rupiah).
SECURITIZATION
IN PAPUA
The Implication of Security Approach
towards Human Rights Condition in Papua
Authors:
Al Araf, Anton Aliabbas, Ardi Manto, Bhatara Ibnu Reza, Cahyadi
Satriya, Ghufron Mabruri, Jaky Nurhasya, Junaidi Simun,
Muchamad Ali Safa’at, Poengky Indarti
SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
The Implication of Security Approach towards Human Rights
Condition in Papua
Authors
: (Imparsial Team)
Al Araf, Anton Aliabbas,
Ardi Manto, Bhatara Ibnu Reza,
Cahyadi Satriya, Ghufron Mabruri,
Jaky Nurhasya, Junaidi Simun,
Muchamad Ali Safa’at, Poengky Indarti
Cover Design : ISBG CommuniActions
Layout
: Sarifudin
First Edition, Imparsial, June 2011
Copyright © Imparsial; 2011
Published by:
IMPARSIAL, the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor
Jl. Slamet Riyadi Raya No. 19, Matraman, Jakarta, 13150
Telp
: (021) 8591 8650
Fax
: (021) 8591 8656
E-mail : [email protected], [email protected]
Website : www.imparsial.org
Cover : Courtesy Photo of the Democracy Alliance for Papua (ALDP)
Perpustakaan Nasional RI:
Katalog Dalam Terbitan (KDT)
Al Araf, et al.
Foreword Neles Tebay
Introduction Tubagus Hasanuddin
Securitization in Papua
Its Implication of Security Approach towards Human
Rights Condition in Papua
Jakarta: Imparsial, 2011
(xxx + 350 hlm; 14 x 21 cm)
ISBN 979-97695-22-x
TABLE OF CONTENT
List of Table and Figure
ix
Acronyms
xi
Foreword from Dr. Neles Tebay xix
Foreword from Major General (Retired) Tubagus Hasanuddin, S.E., MM xxv
Foreword from Imparsial
xxix
CHAPTER I
Introduction
A. Background
Book Content
CHAPTER II
The Conflict in Papua and Military Policy Prior
to the Reformation
A. The Roots of Conflict in Papua
B. Military Policy in the Past 1. ABRI Military Politics during the Pre-Reform
2. Miltary Policy during the Old Regime
3. Miltary Policy during the New Order era
CHAPTER III
Military Policy in the Post-Reformation Era A. Political Context
B. Military, Politics and Military Reforms
1. The Dynamics of Military Reform 2. Remaining Major Agenda in Military Reform C. Types of Military Operations D. Military Deployments 1. The Army 2. Navy 1
1
6
9
10
20
22
28
48
65
65
74
75
84
96
101
101
108
vi
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
3. The Air Force Troop Size Type of Troops (Organic and Non-organic) 1. Non-organic Units
2. Troops Rotation Operational Policies 1. Border Operations
2. At-Rist-Area and Vital Objects
Security Operations 3. Intelligence Operations 4. Territorial Operations
Operational Budget Military Development Plan The Relation between the Military and Economic
Activities in Papua
Military Policy Trends in Papua
(from the Old Order to Reform Era)
CHAPTER IV
Implication of the Roles of the Military
on Human Rights Conditions in Papua Society
A. Human Rights and Human Rights Violations 1. Extrajudicial Execution/Killing or Summary
Execution/Killing
2. Sexual Harrasment
3. Rape
4. Torture
5. Arbitary Arrest/Detention
6. Involuntary Disappearance
B. Human Rights Violations and Violence in Papua
in New Order Era
1. The Murder of Arnold Ap (1984) 2. Human Rights Violations against
Amungme Tribe in PT Freeport Indonesia
by the Indonesian Military (1973-1995)
C. Human Rights Violation and Violence in Papua
in Reform Era 109
110
112
113
113
115
116
117
117
118
119
120
124
128
133
134
138
138
138
139
139
139
140
140
142
146
TABLE OF CONTENT
D.
E.
F.
G.
1. Before Special Autonomy
(1998-Oktober 2001) 2. Post Special Autonomy Status
(November 2001-2010) Violence Against Women Violence against Human Rights Defenders The Case of Gunshot in Freeport Area:
From the Case of Shooting in the Area of Freeport:
from Two Spoons on One Plate to Security Business Other Cases Involving Military Personnel 1. Illegal Logging 2. Land Conflict 3. The Distribution of Illegal Liquor 4. The Confiscation of Traditional Ritual Instruments
147
151
164
167
175
184
184
185
186
187
CHAPTER V
Security (Military) Policy Politics and
Challenges in Enforcing Human Rights 189
A. Unchanged Central Paradigm 194
1. Lack of Trust between Jakarta-Papua 200
2. Personnel Prejudice on Separatism and
the Potentials for Violence 202
B. The Politics of Papua Security Policy
206
1. Military Domination and Repression 206
2. Legitimacy and Justification of the Roles
of the Military
236
C. Recurring Violence and Human Rights Violations 243
1. The Context of Violence and
Human Rights Violations
246
2. Violence and Human Rights Violations
as Intimidation on Daily Basis
247
3. Persoalization, Proceduralization and
the “Justification” of Violence
249
4. Expansion of Target (Victim) of Violence
by the Personnel
252
D. Causal Factors of Rampant Human Rights Violations 253
1. Stagnant Military Reform 256
vii
viii
2. Inconsistent Special Autonomy 258
3. Lack of Transparency and Monitoring
on Security Personnel 261
4. Impunity 262
5. The Culture of Violence and Weak
Human Rights Understanding
268
6. Separatist Stigma toward the People in Papua 269
7. Low Level of Welfare 272
8. Security Business
275
E. Challenges for Enforcing Human Rights in Papua
in the Future 276
1. Acceleration of Security Sector Performance
Particulary Military Perception
277
2. Adoption of Peaceful Conflict Resolution
281
3. Reducing Military Personnel in Papua 283
4. Impunity to Past Human Rights Violations
284
5. Supporting Public Scrutiny and Civil Authority 286
CHAPTER VI
Closing
A. Conclusion B. Recommendation Bibliography
Attachment Table 1. Military Operation in Papua
Table 2. List of Troops Deployed to Papua
Table 3. Show of Force of Military Area Command XVII/
Cenderawasih Table 4. Show of Force of Battalions Under Military
Area Command XVII/Cenderawasih
Table 5. Estimated Number of Military Troops in Papua Figure 1. Military Area Command XVII/Cenderawasih
Restructurization Figure 2. Military Forces in Papua 289
289
291
295
323
324
327
333
337
341
344
345
ix
LIST OF TABLE AND FIGURE
Table 2.1. Table 2.2. Table 3.1. Table 3.2.
Table 3.3. Table 3.4. Table 3.5. Table 3.6.
Table 4.1. Table 4.2. Table 4.3. Table 4.5. Table 4.6. The Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict 13
The Implementation of the Act of Free Choice
in West Papua 54
Progress of Military Reform Quantitatively 78
Comparison Between the Military’s New
and Old Doctrine 93
The Military Area Command XVII/
Cenderawasih Territorial Structure
106
Military Area Command XVII/
Cenderawasih Battle Units 107
Estimated Number of Military Personnel Currently Assigned to the Land
of Papua (2011) 111
Predicted Number of Troops
of the Military in the Land of Papua (2024) 124
Human Rights Violations in Freeport and
Its Neighbouring Area (1994-1997) 144
Prosecutions and Verdicts against
the Defendant/Convicts of the Murder
of Theys Eluay 154
Verdicts on the Defendants of a Video
of Torture Committed by Military Personnel
of Battalion Infantry/753 AVT Nabire 162
Violence Against Women Committed
by the Military in Papua (1999-2010) 166
Violence against Human Rights Defenders
by Military Personnel in Papua (1998-2010) 167
Table 4.7. Table 4.8. Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2. Human Rights Violations Victimized
by Violence Committed by Military
Personnel in Papua (1998-2010) Shooting in PT. Freeport Area (2002-2011) Structure of Military Area Command XVII/
Cenderawasih Diagram of Historical Background
of Assignment of Military Officias in Papua
(2005-2006) 168
180
102
115
xi
ACRONYMS
ABRI
Agimugah AHRC AKBP ALKI ALRI Alutsista AMD APBN Aspri ASP AVT BAIS BAKIN Baleg BAP BIN BKO BKS-Khusus BMN BPK BPUPKI Brimob Brigif Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia
Aroa, Wa, Stijinggah, Oa dan Noema
Asia Human Rights Commission
Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi
Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia
Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia
Alat Utama Sistem Pertahanan
ABRI Masuk Desa
Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja
Negara
Asisten Pribadi
Assembly of State Parties
Arga Vira Tama
Badan Intelijen Strategis
Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara
Badan Legislasi
Berita Acara Pemeriksaan
Badan Intelijen Negara
Bawah Kendali Operasi
Badan Kerja Sama Khusus Militer
Barang Milik Negara
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan
Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-Usaha
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia
Brigade Mobil
Brigade Infanteri
xii
Brigjen
BUMN Cadek Caduad COW CPI CZI Dandim Danlanal Danlanud Danpos Danramil Dansatgas DAP Deninteldam Dephan DIP Dipiad DK PBB
DM
DMP
DOM DPMP DPR DPRP Ekosob EW FBI Foreri FGD FNPIB Brigadir Jenderal
Badan Usaha Milik Negara
Catur Dharma Eka Karma
Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat
Contract Of Work
Conflict Prevention Institute
Corps Zeni
Komandan Distrik Militer
Komandan Pangkalan Laut
Komandan Landasan Udara
Komandan Pos
Komandan Rayon Militer
Komandan Satuan Tugas
Dewan Adat Papua
Detasemen Intelijen Kodam
Departemen Pertahanan
Daftar Isian Proyek
Detasemen Dinas Pelaksana
Intelijen Angkatan Darat
Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan
Bangsa-Bangsa
Darurat Militer
Dewan Musyawarah PEPERA
Daerah Operasi Militer
Desk Penyelesaian Masalah Papua
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua
Ekonomi, Sosial dan Budaya
Early Warning
Federal Bureau Investigation
Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian
Jaya
Focus Group Discussion
Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian
Barat
ACRONYMS
GAM GCI GPK GKS GPS HAM HIV/AIDS HRD HRW HUT
ICC ICCPR ICESCR ICG ICTJ ICTR ICTY IMTFE Inf. Inpres IRE JIM JPIC Kamtibmas Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Ground Control Interception
Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan
Gabungan Kepala Staf
Global Positioning System
Hak Asasi Manusia
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
/ Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome
Human Rights Defender
Human Rights Watch
Hari Ulang Tahun
International Criminal Court
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
International Crisis Group
International Center for
Transitional Justice
International Criminal Tribubnal of
Rwanda
International Criminal Tribubnal of
Yugoslafia
International Military Tribunal for
the Far East
Infanteri
Instruksi Presiden
Institute for Research and
Empowerment
Jakarta Informal Meeting
justice, Peace and Integrated of
Creation
Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat
xiii
xiv
Kav. KCPN KDRT Kemenko Polhukam Keppres
KKO AL
KKR KMB Koarmatim Kodam Kodim Kohanudnas Kolakopsrem Kolinlamil Komnas HAM Kopasgat
Kopassus Kopkamtib Koramil Korem Kosekhanudnas Kostrad KOTI Permibar Kotindo
KPS KSAD KSAB Kavaleri
Komponen Cadangan Pertahanan
Negara
Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga
Kementerian Koordinator Politik,
Hukum dan Keamanan
Keputusan Presiden
Korps Komando Angkatan Laut
(Marinir) Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi
Konferensi Meja Bundar
Komando Armada Timur
Komando Daerah Militer
Komando Distrik Militer
Komando Pertahanan Udara
Nasional
Komando Pelaksana Operasi Korem
Komando Lintas Laut Militer
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia
Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat
Komando Pasukan Khusus
Komando Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Ketertiban
Komando Rayon Militer
Komando Resor Militer
Komando Sektor Pertahanan Udara
Nasional
Komando Cadangan Strategis
Angkatan Darat
Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan
Irian Barat
Komando Kontingen Indonesia
Kepala Pemerintahan Setempat
Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat
Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata
ACRONYMS
KSB KSP KUHPM Lantamal LIPI LSM LSPP Mabes Mahmil Mahmilti Makorem Makodim Mayjen MBAD MEF Menhankam Menko Polkam Miras MK MRP Muspida
NAD NKRI
Nikgarlat Nikpursus OFM Obvitnas
OMP OMSP Kelompok Separatis Bersenjata
Kelompok Separatis Politik
Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum
Pidana Militer
Landasan Utama Angkatan Laut
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan
Indonesia
Lembaga Swadaya Masyaakat
Lembaga Studi Pers dan
Pembangunan
Markas Besar
Mahkamah Militer
Mahkamah Militer Tinggi
Markas Komando Resor Militer
Markas Komando Distrik Militer
Mayor Jenderal
Markas Besar Angkatan Darat
Minimum Essential Force
Menteri Pertahanan dan Keamanan
dan Panglima
Menteri Koordinator Politik dan
Keamanan
Minuman keras
Mahkamah Konstitusi
Majelis Rakyat Papua
Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia
Teknik Penyelenggaraan Latihan
Teknik Pertempuran Khusus
Ordo Fratrum Minorum
Obyek Vital Nasional
Operasi Militer untuk Perang
Operasi Militer Selain Perang
xv
xvi
OPM Opster Opsus OPSUS PP
ORNOP
Otsus Pangab Pangad Pamrahwan Pamtas PASMAR PBHI PDI-P PDMD PDP PEPERA Perbakin Perpres Perum PKI
PKK LIPI PMA PNBP PNG
Polri PO
POV
PPW LIPI Organisasi Papua Merdeka
Operasi Teritorial
Operasi Khusus
Operasi Khusus Pemenangan
PEPERA
Organisasi Non Pemerintah
Otonomi Khusus
Panglima ABRI
Panglima Angkatan Darat
Pengaman Daerah Rawan
Pengamanan Perbatasan
Pasukan Marinir
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan
Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perjuangan
Penguasa Darurat Militer Daerah
Presidium Dewan Papua
Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat
Persatuan Menembak Sasaran dan
Berburu Indonesia
Peraturan Presiden
Perusahan Umum
Partai Komunis Indonesia
Puslitbang Kemasyarakatan
dan Kebudayaan Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Indonesia
Penanaman Modal Asing
Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak
Papua New Guinea
Kepolisian Republik Indonesia
Perintah Operasi
Pengamanan Obyek Vital
Pusat Penelitian Wilayah Lembaga
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
ACRONYMS
PPRC Primkop Primkopad Protap Prolegnas PT PTFI PVB PVT
PWY Renstra Rindam RPKAD
Satgas Satgasintel Satgas Ops Pamtas SBJ Sesko SDM SKP SSP STFT SUAD TAP MPR Tontaipur TF
Timnas PAB TMMD
TNI AD
Komando Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi
Cepat
Primer Koperasi
Primer Koperasi Angkatan Darat
Prosedur Tetap
Program Legislasi Nasional
Perusahaan Terbatas
PT Freeport Indonesia
Praja Wira Braja
Praja Wira Tama
Praja Wira Yakhti
Rencana Strategis
Resimen Induk Daerah Militer
Resimen Para Komando Angkatan
Darat
Satuan Tugas
Satuan Gabungan Intel
Satuan Tugas Operasi Pengamanan
Perbatasan
Surya Bhaskara Jaya
Sekolah Staf dan Komando
Sumber Daya Manusia
Sekretariat Keadilan dan
Perdamaian
Satuan Setingkat Peleton
Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat dan Teologi
Staf Umum Angkatan Darat
Ketetapan Majelis Permusyaratan
Rakyat
Peleton Intai Tempur
Task Force
Tim Nasional Pengambilalihan
Aktifitas Bisnis TNI
TNI Manunggal Masuk Desa
Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan
Darat
xvii
xviii SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
TNI AL TNI AU Tridek Trikora TSTB TNI
TT UNTEA Uncen
UNHRC UP4B UU UUD VVIP
WNA Yonif Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Angkatan Laut
Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Angkatan Udara
Tri Dharma Eka Karma
Tri Komando Rakyat
Tim Supervisi Transformasi Bisnis
TNI
Tentara dan Teritorium
United Nations Temporary
Executive Authority
Universitas Cenderawasih
United Nations Human Rights
Committee
Unit Percepatan Pembangunan
Papua – Papua Barat
Undang-Undang
Undang-Undang Dasar
Very Very Important Person
Warga Negara Asing
Batalyon Infanteri
xix
FOREWORD
Dr. Neles Tebay
Director of STFT Fajar Timur, Jayapura, Papua
Papua is located in the eastern tip of the Republic of
Indonesia. Because it is so remote from Jakarta as the centre
of power, human rights situation in this New Guinea island
remains hidden from many people, especially those from
different provinces of Indonesia. When they do know about
this situation, their comprehension on the human rights
condition in the Land of Papua is fragmented and partial.
This was worsen by minimum publication on human rights
in Papua.
A number of human rights violations in Papua, including
torture military personnel against e people in Papua as fellow
citizens of Indonesia in Puncak Jaya district widely broadcasted
through You Tube in the past 2010 was appalling to many
and criticized by the media in Indonesia. Many people was
astonished by such cruelty committed by security personnel
toward fellow Indonesian citizens who should received
protection from the personnel. Yet we have to admit that even
with such widespread publication, we still could not obtain
comprehensive portrait on human rights situation in the Land
of papua. When the human rights situations in Papua was
finally noticed, the level of understanding remains superficial
as it was published case by case.
Therefore, a comprehensive research is required to
have complete description on human rights situation in
Papua. Imparsial research result on the Implementaiton of
(Military) Security Policies and their implications on human
rights in Papua is published timely as this addressed the
xx
abovementioned need. While acknowledging its limitations, it
stands as the first piece of writing in Indonesia that succeed in
providing a general overview on military policies – particularly
the Army – in the Land of Papua, the presence of military
personel and the implication on the protection and respect of
human rights in the Land of Papua since Papua was integrated
into the Republic of Indonesia in 1963 until 2010. By reading
this report, readers would be able to have an overview on how
the military views and treats the people in Papua in almost fifty
years of integration with the Republic of Indonesia.
This research clearly shows disharmonious relationship
between the military and the people in Papua. Violence taints
the relationship before and after the Reform era in Indonesia.
The military surely defends themselves by clarifying such
violence was not based on hatred toward the people in Papua
but to maintain the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. Violence
was deliberately used in dealing with any individuals involved
in separatist movement in Papua. The military has labeled with
this separatist movement in so many names. In the beginning,
it was called Uncivilized Disturbance Movement (Gerakan
Pengacau Liar/GPL). Then it became Security Disturbance
Movement (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan/GPK). Nowadays, it
is Armed Separatist Movement (Gerakan Separatis Bersenjata/
GSB). This research shows that the military defends and
protected the unity of the Republic of Indonesia by applying
security and military approach that leads into a myriad of
human rights violation such as intimidation, murder, terror,
torture, violence and so forth. Implementation of Special
Autonomy policy since 2001 fails to significantly alter military
approach that has been rooted deeply in Papua.
I understand that this report may be misinterpreted.
Therefore it needs to be affirmed that it is erroneous to see this
report as an expression of hatred toward security personnel. It
is also erroneous to interpret this report as a support toward
separatist movement in the Land of Papua. The motivation of
FOREWORD
this research is clearly stated in recommendations proposed
by the authors. By going through all recommendations in the
book, readers would understand that the underlying reason
for this research is appreciaitoin to human dignity through
the protection and respect to human rights. It is clear that this
motivation serves also as main criteria in testing all military
and security approach implemented in Papua. The question this
research tries to address is: how far the implication of military
and security policies implemented so far provide protection
and respect to human rights in the Land of Papua?
This research report highlights three issues. First, this
report shows that there are military and security policies
that result in human rights violations in Papua. This has
been happening since 1963 until 2010. If this policy remains,
violence will also stay in the Land of Papua. Casualties would
add up, from civil as well as military sides. Besides, the good
reputation of the military would be smeared by human rights
violations. The face of Indonesia as democratic State will
also be ruined in the eyes of the international communities.
Threfore this research report should serve as a push for the
people of Papua and the central government, including the
military, to act together in thinking about concrete steps to be
taken to end this series of human rights violations. Concrete
key steps, in my opinion, is that the people of Papua and the
central government join hands in identifying causal factors of
separatists movement in Papua and jotting down solutions to
deal with such factors.
Second, this report shows that past human rights remain as
open wounds. It should be noted that human rights violations
would never fade away from the memory of the people of
Papua, instead it would become collective memory passed
through generation. When the government shows neither good
will nor attempts to deal with human rights violations, this can
be understood as an act of ommission done consciously and
deliberately. As a result, the relationship between the people
xxi
xxii SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
in Papua and the government, here as the military, will always
be marked with suspicion and lack of trust to one another.
Both parties will continue to see and treat one another as
enemies. In the end, this would halt the speed of development
in the Land of Papua. Therefore this report reminds on the
importance of addressing human rights violations that remain
unresolved. The people in Papua and the central government,
including the military, needs to create a synergy in setting up
mechanisms to deal with past human rights violations to join
forces in building Papua as the Land of Peace.
Third, this research report highlights the steps for
prevention to ensure that past human rights do not repeat
in the future. When the existing military and security policiy
results in human rights violations, therefore such policy needs
to be evaluated and changed with a new one. The people in
Papua and the central government, including the military,
needs to discuss and decide concrete and measurable steps to
prevent human rights violations in the future, not only in the
Land of Papua but also on other provinces in Indonesia.
Therefore, this report needs to be read by the people and
Papua and by the central government, including the military.
The objectives is not to point fingers at one another to blame,
accused and judge one another but to join hands and search
and agree on concrete steps to stop, handle and prevent human
rights violations in the Land of Papua. This report should also
be read by policy makers in the House of Representatives in
the national and local level and anyone who is committed to
advance the respect to human dignity through the protection
and respect of human rights in the democratic nation of
Indonesia.
Budapest, Hongaria, 18 June 2011
Neles Tebay
xxiii
FOREWORD
Major General (Retired) Tubagus Hasanuddin, S.E, M.M
Vice Chairperson of Commission I of the House of Representatives
The problem in Papua is the problem of all Indonesians
to be resolved through fair conflict resolution mechanism. So
far, the government is inclined to security approach as main
solution to respond the dynamics in Papua. The implication
of this approach is a myriad of past and ongoing military
operations in Papua to create conducive security situation
in Papua.
In simple conception, security approach is effective
in dealing with volatile conflict-prone zones. Security
approach is seen as quick method to muzzle any types
of conflict that are ridden with violence and costing
casualties and material damages. Nevertheless, such
violent vicious cycle is never ending and fails to address
the real root of conflict. Moreover the paradigm shift of
national security in post cold war also transformed the
issue of security. At this moment national security is not
only reduced to state security but also constructively
transformed into human security as a mechanism to
prevent and manage conflict comprehensively. Transition
of national security paradigm demands synchronicity
between the use of authority of the legitimate State forces
and the obligation of the State to guarantee political,
social, economic and cultural rights of the citizens in
order to minimize threat to security as a whole.
In its development, security transition leads to
global security sector reform agenda that also breeds in
Indonesia during the reform era. Security sector reform
xxiv SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
agenda emphasizes on increasing professionalism of
State security personnel and on creating a democratic
mechanism of control on State institution and security
personnel. Military reform as part of security sector
reform agenda is one of the most important part of
democratization in Indonesia. The revocation of social
political roles of the military and its revitalization
as professional military forces has entered national
discourses discussed and debated in public domain. Yet
a lot of homework remains to be done in this military
reform, such as the question of territorial command
effectiveness, military business and military courts that
need to be resolved by the government and the public.
Military operation in Papua from post reform until
now can also be used as one of the indicators and also
constructive critics to the overall military reform.
Looking back on what happens in Papua, the
government tries to accommodate prosperity approach
to mitigate conflict through the implementation of
special autonomy status in Papua. Unfortunately in the
local level, prosperity approach leads to social disruption
in the public due to the practices of corruption done by
government elites in the local level. Substantial fund
injection from national budget through special autonomy
to guarantee the rights of the people in Papua is a mere
lip service as this rhetoric is not followed by significant
contribution to the overall population of Papua. As a
result, special autonomy only leads to new problems
– another justification to reinstall security approach in
Papua.
Lastly, this book based on the research from Imparsial
is a reflection on the dynamics of military operation in
Papua that should be appreciated as efforts made by
fellow citizens to ensure professional State security and
defence personnel who respect human rights and the
FOREWORD
values of democracy. Hopefully this book would become
a constructive learning opportunity for us with concerns
on Papua to take better steps toward peaceful Papua.
Jakarta, June 2011
Major General (Retired). Tubagus Hasanuddin, S.E., M.M
Vice Chairperson of Commission I DPR RI
xxv
xxvii
FOREWORD FROM IMPARSIAL
Security sector reform in Indonesia is one of the demands
of the public in the post Soeharto downfall on 21 May 1998.
This demand is related to the fact that during Soeharto time,
security institutions – particularly military institutions – were
abused as his vehicle to power for 32 years. The government
in the transition to democracy responded to public demand
for security sector reform by issuing a number of policies
such as People’s Consultative Assembly Decision No. VI/
MPR/2000 on the Separation of Military and Police dan
People’s Consultative Assembly Decision No. VII on the role
of the Military and Police; to change the name of Indonesian
Armed Forces (ABRI) and to return it into Indonesian Military
(TNI); to enact new laws of Defence Law No. 3 of 2002, Police
Law No. 2 of 2002 and Military Law No. 34 of 2004. One of
the content stipulated in these regulations is prohibition for
the military to be involved in politics and to prohibit military
business.
Imparsial was born during this transition to democracy,
therefore we are compelled to focus ourselves to monitor
security actors and situation of State security policy transition
from authoritarian to democratic nation. Imparsial is actively
monitoring human rights protection specifically in Aceh and
Papua because fair transition in Indonesia only succeeded if
peace resides in these two conflict zones. Imparsial focuses
on cross-cutting issues of security sector reform and human
rights protection – the implementation of security reform
and its impact on human rights protection in Papua. Papua is
xxviii SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
selected because in post 2005 Helsinki peace accord betwen
the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement, human
rights violations in Aceh are predicted to shift to Papua. Papua
is also chosen to assess any changes of security regulations
from 1963 when Papua was first integrated to Indonesia
and from 1998 from the downfall of Soeharto. This book is
expected to fill literature gap on the implementation of security
reform in Papua and its impacts on human rights in Papua. It
is expected that this research can be used as reference by the
Government and the Parliament in monitoring and evaluating
security reform in Papua in relation to the military.
Imparsial expresses its deepest gratitude to those who
gives their time in their busy schedul in Papua, including
the commander and all staff of military are command XVII/
Cendrawasih, the Chief & Staff of Indonesian National Police
of Papua Province, Head of Papua People Assembly the late
Agus Alue Alua, former member of Papua People Assembly
Erna Mahuze, Vice Head I of Papua House of Representatives
Yunus Wonda, Vice Head of National Commission of Human
Rights Papua Representative Matius Murib, religious figure
Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Head of Papua Traditional
Council Forkorus Yaboisembut, Dr Agus Sumule Advisory
Staff of Papua Governor, Head of Papua Moslem Council Aroby
Achmad Aitarauw, Papua youth figure leader Markus Haluk
and Papua observer Theo van den Broek.
In Jakarta, we would like to express our gratitude to
Liutenant General (Retired) Agus Widjojo, Head of Papua
Desk from Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and
Security Mr. Karseno, member of Commission I of House of
Representatives Paskalis Kosay, Muridan S. Widjojo from LIPI,
Executive Director of RIDEP Institute Amirudin al-Rahab,
Jaleswari Pramodhawardani from LIPI, Head of National
Commission of Human Rights Ifdal Kasim, member of National
Commission of Violence Against Women Sylvana Apituley
Ranti, member of Commission III House of Representatives
FOREWORD xxix
Eva Kusuma Sundari and Lecturer of Police Studies University
of Indonesia DR. Bambang Widodo Umar.
We also express our gratitude to Vice Chairperson of
Commission I House of Representatives Major General
(Retired) Tubagus Hasanuddin, S.E., M.M, Director of STFT
Fajar Timur Father DR. Neles Tebay, Secretary General of
Papua Council Presidium Thaha Alhamid, and Ikrar Nusa
Bhakti of LIPI as resource to be interviewed as as critical
readers of this book and write forewords for this.
We also would like to express our gratitude to to the
Hwead of the Deacon of Keerom District Father Yohanes
(John) Djonga PR, Executive Director of ALDP Latifah Anum
Siregar and all ALDP staff who provided assistance in the field.
We also would like to express our gratitude to Vice Director
ALDP Yusman Conoras, Musa Abubar from Tabloid JUBI and
Yuliana Flores Languwuyo from SKP KPKC Jayapura that lend
their hands to our field research in Papua.
Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude to research
team and all parties who assist in the research and publication.
We hope that this research contributes to military reform in
Papua and to peaceful dialogues in Papua.
Jakarta, 21 June 2011
Poengky Indarti, S.H., LL.M.
Executive Director
xxx SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
CHAPTER I
Introduction
A. Background
Located on the eastern tip of Indonesia, Papua remains
central in the public eyes and international community for
its unsafe and non-conducive situation. Papua continuously
struggles ever since the first time it was integrated to the
administration of Government of Indonesia through a
handover from United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
(UNTEA) on May 1 1963. Afterwards Papua became part of
Indonesia based on Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat
Rakyat/Pepera) on July 14 to August 2 1969, affirmed by UN
General Assembly through Resolution No 2504 on November
19 1969 assembly. Yet this failed to resolve the conflicts.
Before Act of Free Choice and after Papua became part of
Indonesia, the Government of Indonesia chose and adopted
security or military approach for the sake of State sovereignty,
to completely eradicate any movements seen as separatists
long cultivated by the Netherlands before leaving Papua. In
fact, this approach continues to be used and implemented
by the central government in dealing with a number of civil
society movements critical to the government or with peaceful
resistance from a number of groups in Papua which are
against the integration of Papua to Indonesia from the very
beginning. Security approach in the beginning of the intergration of Papua for example is
apparent in the context of the implementation of the 1969 Act of Free Choice,
in which terrors, intimidations, murders and a number of political manipulations
conducted by the people in Papua to maintain their independence or remained
distant to Indonesia. The victory of Indonesia in this Act of Free Choice could not
be separated from the results of the operations, especially specail military operation
lead by Ali Moertopo. There were a number of military operations launched such
This approach remains the same even though the regime
itself has undergone a number of changes. This can be seen
from the lack of any significant changes of central government
policies after more than 50 years of Papua integration to
Indonesia, in which security and military approach are used
and implemented based on the perception of threat against
State security and sovereignty.
When politics changed in the national level, following the
fall of New Order authoritarian regime in 1998, marked by the
snowballing process of democracy, Papua conflict resolution
remains stuck in such patterns of approach. In 2001, central
government led by President Megawati Soekarnoputri granted
Special Autonomy (Otsus/Otonomi Khusus) as a political
insentive to Papua through Law no 21 of 2001, yet this was not
the starting point of any change of pattern used in dealing with
problems in Papua, because the fact in the field showed that
security-based old approach was still very much in use. The
continuation of old approach in dealing with Papua reflects
the lack of any political will from the central government in
resolving the conflict in Papua politically. Therefore, it is no
surprise that there are rampant tragedies of humanity and
human rights in this region, as apparent in a number of cases
of violence, murder, torture and so forth. On the other hand,
the commitment behind the handover of special autonomy
status remains dubious as it has been frequently violated by
regional expansion policies in the province of Papua issued
without any consultation with the aspiration of the people
in Papua.
as Operasi Sadar, Bhratayudha, Wibawa, and Pemungkas Operations, leading to
a number of human rights violations. Agus A. Alua, Papua Barat dari Pangkuan
ke Pangkuan. Suatu Ikhtisar Kronologis. Cet Kedua. (Jayapura: Biro Penelitian
STFT Fajar Timur, 2006), pp. 53-54.
In his observation Tebay (2009) conclude that amongst Special Autonomy
problems and policy implementation is the failure to improve the welfare of the
people in Papua, putting the government as an inconsistent party in implementing
such policy. See: Neles Tebay, Dialog Jakarta-Papua. Sebuah Perspektif Papua.
(Jayapura: SKP Jayapura, 2009).
Introduction
The government seemed to be oblivious to past conflicts
in other regions, which have accumulated valuable lessons
learned for the central government to be utilized in dealing
with Papua. Those past experience includes conflicts in East
Timor, which obtained its full independence since 1999 after
the referendum. This government also fails to generate lessons
learned from Aceh conflict - resolved through dialogues
and now enters its peaceful phases after years of conflicts.
Regarding the experience cultivated from these two regions,
it is obvious that there are no attempts for any transfer of
experience of the government to change its approach in dealing
with the conflicts in Papua. Security or military approach
pattern clearly does not result in any conflict resolution. On
the contrary, this approach maintains conflicts and escalate
substantial humanitarian costs, particularly in the violations
of human rights in Papua.
Security approach is a pattern based on the framework
that sees the problems in Papua as merely security
problems. Therefore, these problems have to and can only
be solved through security approach by involving the military
(securitization). Yet in principle, not all problems in Papua
are rooted in security problems. Problems that emerge to
the surface may root from economic or political injustice
that trigger dissatisfaction from the local level against the
central government. When these are responded with security
approach, this pattern in general places security actors front
and centered as the main actors of any problem solving
attempts.
The presence of security personnel are highly apparent in
the daily life of the people in Papua. On the practical level, this
is due to a number of reasons: First, continuous deployment
of personnel both from the Military and the Police forces from
outside Papua (knowns as non organic troops) in such obvious
increasing rate, both in terms of numbers of personnel or the
frequency of tour of duty of these security personnel.
Up until know, it is difficult to find out the actual number
of non organic troops deployed and currently assigned to
Papua, because there is zero policy transparency. The public
only know that there are deployment, without any information
regarding the number of personnel, the objective of their
assignments and how they perform their duties. Meanwhile,
numerous military posts were set up, territorial commands
were increased, vital objects secured are added up – and all
of these troop deployements were based on the perception
of threat to security.
Second, there is an increase of military or security
activities in the area of Papua, from military or security
operations aimed at eradicating groups deemed as separatist
groups to social-oriented activities. Security operation are the
most common activities done under the context of security
approach patterns. They take various forms, from intelligence
operations to raids. Meanwhile, for social-oriented activities,
this can be seen from the efforts taken by the military to
intensively endorse programs such as civic missions (TNI
Manunggal Masuk Desa/TMMD) in a number of villages.
Through these programs, military personnel actively come to
villages and build social facilities such as roads, bridges and
other intrastructure.
As seen in New Order Era, even though they arere sociallyoriented, yet civic mission programs or TMMD (or ABRI Masuk
Desa/AMD as it was called in the past) have became an integral
part of this security approach. Endorsement of this program
can established dependence of the local people to the military,
and more important and more seriously, exert control into all
aspects of life of the people in Papuan villages. Based on the
consequences and impacts caused, civic missions in Papua can
be seen as just another version of security approach wrapped
under socially-appealing package. For further examinatin on the problems of the roles of the military see Budi Susanto S.J and Made Tony Supriatna. ABRI siasat kebudayaan 1945-199”(Jogjakarta:
Kanisius dan Lembaga Studi Realino, 1995).
Introduction
A number of military operations remains central in the
implementation of security approach. Ever since Papua was
integrated as part of Indonesia, the central government had
launched a number of military or security operations in Papua.
This included Sadar Operation (1956-1967), Barathayudha
Operation (1967-1969), Wibawa Operation (1969), Military
Operation in Jayawijaya District (1977), Sapu Bersih Operation
I and II (1981), Galang Operation I and II (1982), Tumpas
Operation (1983-1984) and Sapu Bersih Operation (1985),
Military Operation in Mapunduma (1996). In the reform era,
a number of military operations was launched as well. This
included an operation leading to Wasior case (2001), Military
Operation in Wamena (2003) and in Puncak Jaya District
(2007).
Security issues are the entry points for security actors to
enter Papua. Compared to more solid and organized Free Aceh
Movement, threat of separatism (Free Papua Movement) was
not significant. Free Papua Movement did not have substantial
armed forces threatening State sovereignty, did not have
neither organizational structure nor single command line as
they were fractured into small groups. Therefore, substantial
deployment of non organic personnel into the area was a
big question mark, if it was solely meant to deal with such
insignificant forces, without any intention to secure the
borders as those personnel were not assigned there. Such
movement was not only cost ineffective, it also led to the
potentials of human rights violations.
Conflict resolution experience from other areas of the
country and in Papua itself conclude that security approach
patterns or military means used to resolve the conflict was
far from succesful. This was also apparent in the conflicts of
Timor Leste and Aceh. Such approach failed to resolve the
problems and instead, it poured gasoline into the conflicts
See Amirudin Al-Rahab, Heboh Papua, Perang Rahasia, Trauma dan Separatisme,
(Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010)
to become more acute, chronic and difficult to settle. In such
situations where the military addressed problems with
security operations, problems increased instead of decreased.
As a result, fear instead of security, was rampant.
The case of Aceh, now in its path toward peace through
the process of dialogs, used as an example of the effectiveness
of dialog approach compared to security approach. Peace
is not the result of violence. Similar conclusion should be
generated in dealing with conflicts in Papua, which typology
of conflicts are similar to Aceh – a vertical conflict between
the State and the society rooted in politics and in misguided
policies and perpetual injustice. The use of security approach
is not only wrong in the attempts to address the typology of
conflict in Papua, but it also pushes for the never ending cycle
of violence and humanitarian tragedy.
Facts show that the use of security approach in Papua
so far has led to a series of human rights violations. In this
context, the people become targets of intimidation and violence
of security actors, especially those seen as critical against the
policies from Jakarta (read: the central government). Among
those cases are the murder of one of the most influential
figures in Papua of Theys Hiyo Eluay as the Head of Papua
Council Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua/PDP) committed
by personnel of Special Force Command (Kopassus) from
Tribuana Task Force. Of course, besides these particular
cases, they were many others. These included cases such
as intimidation, murder, terror, torture and violance and so
forth.
Book Content
This book discusses the implementation of security
policies, especially those related to military policies and their
implications to human rights in Papua.
This book begines with an introduction to lead the readers
to see problems and the dynamics of military policies in
Introduction
Papua. Chapter II describes the conflict in Papua and military
policies before the reform era. In this chapter, the root of the
conflict in Papua and past military policies from the Old Order
Era briefly after the integration of Papua to Indonesia until
the New Order Era. The pattern of security approach with
military dimension serving as the origin of the use of armed
forces in dealing with the problems in Papua is also explained
in this chapter.
Meanwhile Chapter III discusses the military policies in
the reform area that begins from the downfall of Soeharto in
May 1998 which includes a number of military operations and
their types, their forces and number of troops and the plan
to develop and to build military power in Papua in the near
future. Besides, this chapter also conveys the process of reform
in the military to provide brief description in understanding
the dynamics of the military in post New Order Era and how
it relates to the military approach used in Papua.
Moreover in Chapter IV, the readers will also be presented
with the relation implied from the roles of the military
to human rights conditions of the people in Papua. This
chapter will present a number of human rights violations and
violence in Papua in New Order era until the era of Reform.
In the context of time, the chronological order of the human
rights in Papua, particularly in the reform era, is divided into
two groups – before the enactment of Law no 21 of 2001
that authorized Special Autonomy for Papua and after the
enactment of this law.
The readers will also found analysis on security policies
and their implication on human rights in Chapter V. This
Chapter deals with the analysis of the politics of security and
human rights violations in Papua, analysis on the number of
troops, security perspective built by the central administration
(Jakarta) and justificiation on the security policies in Papua.
And finally Chapter VI that is the end of this book conveys
conclusion and a number of recommendation extracted from a
series of research conducted. Recommendations are described
in details in this chapter as it is expected that they will serve
as constructive recommendations to the peaceful resolution
of the conflict in Papua.
CHAPTER II
THE CONFLICT IN PAPUA AND MILITARY
POLICY PRIOR TO THE REFORMATION
Among Indonesia’s many provinces Papua may be one of
the few, which continue to experience conflicts. Even in the
earliest period of Indonesia’s independence the Papua region
had already provoked all sorts of polemics among the nation’s
elite of that time. Unfortunately, the advent of social reform
in the country has failed to bring with it any improvements
to the region to say the least.
This chapter attempts at a retrospective examination of
the condition in Papua from the days of its integration into the
Republic of Indonesia until the present time. The chapter will
be structured in two parts. The first specifically explore the
roots of the conflict in Papua. It will summarise a spectrum
of diverging experts’ views and researches. The purpose of
this chapter is to provide a variety of perspectives, which
will allow us to achieve a general overview of the various
problems in Papua.
The second part of the chapter details the military policy
of the Indonesian government. We will look at two specific
periods: the so-called Old Order and New Order regimes. The
attempt at distinction between these two periods was taken
into consideration because they reflected the major political
shift that was happening in the country at that time. The
Prior to its independence, key figures under Indonesian Independence Effort Exploratory Committee (Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan
Indonesia/BPUPKI) had to decide on voting on the issue whether Papua was part
of Indonesia or not. For further information, refer to Agus A Alua, 2006, Papua
Barat dari Pangkuan ke Pangkuan: Suatu Ikhtisar Kronologis, Biro Penelitian
STFT Fajar Timur: Jayapura, pp. 16-21.
10
dynamics of Indonesian military politics will be discussed at
length prior to our examination of military operations since
these more or less influenced the kinds of policies being
produced during those periods. The data presented in this
chapter will provide a chronological overview of policies
established by the Indonesian government in regards to its
security approach to resolve the conflicts in Papua.
A. The Roots of Conflict in Papua
Historically, Papua has been mired in conflict since the
earliest days of the Indonesian independence. Evidence of
social strive was there for everyone to see when the island was
officialy integrated into the Republic of Indonesiafollowing
the signing of the political treaty between Indonesia and the
Netherland that was facilitated by the UN in 1962.
When it first joined the Republic the province
was originally called Irian Barat (1962-1973) before it
became Irian Jaya (1973-2001). The island lies between
130 degrees-141 degrees latitude/longitude and 2.25
degrees North and 9 degrees South. The name “Iryan”
was introduced by Marcus Kaisiepo in September 1945.
In Biak/Numfor parlance the word means “sunshine” or
“hot land”. President Abdurahman Wahid legalised the
use of its present name, Papua, on 1 January 2000 through
Law number 21/2001 on Papua Special Autonomy, an
unthinkable act during the New Order regime. According
to the Constitutional Court ruling number 018/PUU Amich Alhumami, The Politics of Identity in Papua Secession Movement, The
Indonesian Quarterly Vol 34 No 2 Second Quarter 2006, pp. 101-102.
J.Budi Hernawan OFM and Poengky Indarti. 2008. The Practice of Torture in
Aceh and Papua 1998-2007. (Jayapura: Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian
Keuskupan Jayapura, 2008). p. 137.
Results from LIPI Team Research as quoted by Moch Nurhasim. 2007. Pengelolaan Keamanan dan Pertahanan di Papua. dalam Sarah Nuraini Siregar (ed). Studi
Kebijakan Pertahanan: Problematika Pengelolaan Keamanan dan Pertahanan
di Wilayah Konflik (Aceh dan Papua)., (Jakarta: LIPI, 2001). p. 100
THE CONFLICT IN PAPUA
I/2003 on 10 November 2003, Papua consisted out of two
provinces: West Papua and Papua, which consisted of 29
local governments and 2 Municipalities (Kota Praja). Public health is a serious concern in this region. Diseases
such as malaria, repertory infection, and dysentery are
the main causes of infant death. The mortality rate among
children is 70-200 per 1,000 while over 50 percent of under
five year old children suffers from poor nutrition and lacks
basic immunisation. The spread of HIV infection is about 40
times higher than the national average, made even worse by
increased unprotected sex, high illiteracy rate, and lack of
prevention and curative effort. Papua’s integration to Indonesia has not abetted social strive.
This stems from a difference in perspectives about the historical
foundations for its unification with Indonesia. Armed separatist
movements over the last three decades since the islands integration
into Indonesia also indicate human rights abuses.
Simply put, the terminology of conflict can be defined as a
relation that reflects the lack of shared objective between two
or more parties. Violence can be defined as any activities that
include actions, statements, attitudes, structures or systems
that resulted in physical, mental, social or environmental
destruction and/or barriers that kept individuals from
attaining their full potentials. Conflict or civil war can
be categorised two ways.10 First, war or conflict between a
J.Budi Hernawan OFM and Poengky Indarti, Op.Cit, p. 138
Rees, S., & Silove, D. 2007. Speaking Out about Human Rights and Health in
West Papua. The Lancet, 370(9588), 637. http://search.proquest.com/docview/
199064945?accountid=132811 (Accessed 12 February 2011)
Yulia Sugandi. 2009. Conflict Analysis and Policy Recommendation on Papua.
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Jakarta. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indonesien/06394.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
Rodd Mcgibbon. Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the
Papua Conflict. East-West Center Washington. www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS013.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
Chris Mittchel as quoted by Simon Fisher, et.al, Mengelola Konflik: Ketrampilan &
Strategi untuk Bertindak. (Jakarta: The British Council,Indonesia., 1981), p. 4.
10
Nurani Chandrawati. “Menelaah Hubungan Timbal Balik Konflik Internal dengan
Masalah Kemiskinan”, Jurnal Global FISIP UI, (Vol. 8 No. 2 Mei 2005). pp. 37-50.
11
12
government and separatist movements in the latter attempt
to achieve independence (vertical conflict). Second, conflict
between groups within a country, popularly known as civil
war (horizontal conflict). 11
Conflict, explains Muscat, occurs where several triggers
exists in an existing situation that is vulnerable to discord. 12
According to him, conflict is caused by extreme political and
economic inequality between two groups of people. 13 He saw
the failure to establish economic development that eradicate
poverty ass the principle cause of political, ethnic, and cultural
conflict and violence. 14
Meanwhile Willian J. Dixon categorise conflict through
two major aspects. Firstly, conflict resulted from shared
acknowledgement of contradictory fundamental values and
agenda. Secondly, conflict is a clear reflection of all social
relations. 15 Continuous discord within a state may be the
result of a governance crisis, which includes the absence of
a peaceful objective while resolving disagreements, policy
paralysis, and extreme humanitarian crisis.16
Particularly in regards to internal disputes, Michael E.
Brown expounds two driving factors that generate discords:
internally driven and externally driven. 17 While the trigger
factor for conflict could be explored at the elite and mass level
--with interconnectivity between both the culprit and trigger
factors (see Table 2.1).
Ibid.
Robert J Muscat, Investing in Peace, How Development Aid Can Prevent or
Promote Conflict. (New York: ME Sharpe Inc. New York, 2002), p. 139.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., p. 122.
15
William J. Dixon,“Third Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and
Promoting Peaceful Settlement”. International Organization, (Vol 50 , Autumn).
p. 655.
16
Morten B. Pedersen,. “The Crisis in Burma/Myanmar: Foreign Aid as a Tool for
Democratization”, NBR Analysis, (Vol. 15 No. Maret 2004). p. 94.
17
Michael E Brown, The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict.
dalam Michael E Brown (ed). The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict.
(London: The MIT Press. Cambridge & London, 1995), pp. 579-580
11
12
Brown argued that almost all internal conflicts are
triggered by internal problems and some may be organised
by figures within the elite strata.18 Poor leaders often became
the catalyst that transformed a perilous into an open war.
At the same time mass-level problems such as unrestrained
economic growth, modernisation, as well as political and
economic discrimination become the underlying condition
for a conflict to take place.
Table 2.1.
The Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict
Elite-level
Mass-level
Internally-driven
Bad leaders
Bad domestic problems
Source: Michael E Brown (1996: 579)
Externally-driven
Bad neighbours
Bad neighbourhoods
A quick survey reveals numerous researches that
examine conflicts in Papua. Ested Heidbuchel (2007), for
example, categorised the conflict in Papua at four levels.
19
First is the subjective level, which is the stereotypical
perception of Papuans by the rest of Indonesia, racial
differences, fear of disintegration versus fear of genocide,
the government’s lack of trust towards Papuans as well as
the Papuans’ own lack of conviction towards its government.
Second is the issue level, which stems from inconsistent
policy, Human Rights abuse, and corruption. Next is the
demand level, which relates to national integration and
unity versus the demand for independence or revision of
historical facts. Last is the compromise level, which relates
to special autonomy.
Amich Alhumami saw the conflict in Papua simply in
Ibid. pp. 571.
Esther Heidbuchel as quoted Muridan S Widjojo (Ed.), Papua Road; Negotiating
the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future, (Jakarta: LIPI, Yayasan
TIFA and Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), footnote p. 6.
18
19
13
14
terms of its economic and political dimensions. 20 The principle
issue related to economic dimension is the exploitation of
Papua’s natural resources, which locals are unable to profit.
Papua is recognised as one of Indonesia’s of richest provinces.
However, facts reveal that standard of living among its
indigenous populations is far below the rest of country. The
central government’s policies resulted in severe disparity of
economic well being among its inhabitants. The implication
is the majority of Papuans are dissatisfied with the central
government’s national development strategy that clearly has
created inequality in welfare. 21
The problems in Papua entered the political arena because
of a lack of proper response to their discontent. Disappointed by
the central government’s practice of marginalising its citizens
forced a number of Papua’s elite groups to demand freedom.
Several elements in Papua continue to insist separation from
Indonesia despite the fact that the government has enacted
special autonomy for the region since 2001. Their campaign
consolidate grass-root as well as international support through
various global forums. 22
LIPI’s Papua Team in the meantime saw four main issues
as the cause of the conflict in the region. 23 First is the history
of its integration and its status and political identity. At this
level, the conflict is the result of the diverging views between
Indonesian nationalists24 and Papuan nationalists about the
transfer of power in Papua from the Dutch to the Indonesians.
Indonesian nationalists no longer see any polemics related to
Papua’s transfer of power and political status following the
PEPERA 1969 and its ratification by the UN General Council.
Conversely, Papuan nationalists believed that the Indonesian
Amich Alhumami, Op. Cit p.102
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
For further explanation on the result of LIPI research, refer to Muridan S Widjojo
(Ed.), Op. Cit., pp. 7-41.
24
LIPI used the term ‘nationalists’ in dividing the groups based on their perspective
on the relationship between Indonesia-Papua.
20
21
government of that time had been deceitful during the process
of PEPERA. This included their appointment of 1,025 citizen
representatives. Moreover, Papuan nationalists pointed to the
incident of 1 December 1961.25
Second is the problem of political violence and human
rights abuse. LIPI noted that this problem came about from
the excessive views of the Republic to secure its national unity
at all cost and the perception that any attempts at separation
is against the law, which provoked militaristic solutions to
resolve differences. Military actions to combat the Papua
Freedom Organisation caused political violence and human
rights abuses26 to Papuans. Instead of protecting its citizens,
the state is now seen as the fearsome ‘bogeyman’. 27
Third is the problem related to the failure of economic
development. Economic disparity is seen as the root
of the conflict in Papua. Economic and developmental
inequality, especially in comparison with other regions,
policy discrimination by central government towards local
authorities, and excessive exploitations of Papua’s natural
resources are seen as examples of government’s failure to
economically develop Papua. Ironically, an examination of
data revealed that there were more development initiatives
1 December 1961 was the first time the Netherlands allowed the flag of Papua
to be raised and the anthem “Hey Papua My Land (“Hai Tanahku Papua”) to be
performed. Meanwhile the issue of independence emerged due to the promises
from the government of the Netherlands to Papua nationalists when West Papua
political status was discussed on the negotiation table. Elaboration on the promises
of the Netherlands can be read in PJ Drooglever, Tindakan Pilihan Bebas! Orang
Papua dan Penentuan Nasib Sendiri, (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2010);
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Pemusnahan Etnis Melanisia: Memecah Kebisuan
Sejarah Kekerasan di Papua Barat., (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Galangpress, 2007).
26
In LIPI documentations, violence and human rights violations in Papua took form
as violence toward individuals, toward communities in certain areas, psychological
violence, structural violence and business activities potentially violationg human
rights. Muridan S Widjojo (Ed.), Op. Cit., p. 13.
27
Because the country is highly focused on the activity of eradicating Free Papua
Movement, on certain level, the people in Papua interpreted actions taken by the
military and the police as the relationshpi between the colonized and the colonial
forces. Ibid, p. 12.
25
15
16
in Papua prior, but nor after, special autonomy. This condition
is made worst by acute social resentment felt by indigenous
Papuans towards settlers who controlled much of the
economic sector.
Finally is the marginalisation of Papuans and the
government’s inconsistent policies in regards to special
autonomy. As noted by Amich Alhumami, the practice
marginalising can be clearly observed in Papua. The LIPI team
explained that this marginalisation included demographic,
social-politic, social-economic, and social-cultural aspects.
Everything that the Papuans do, and including in its cultural
activities, are often identified as a movement toward
separatism. 28 While in the political sphere, particularly
during the New Order regime, a number of Papuans had been
appointed governors. 29
Examples of inconsistency around autonomy policies
can be gleaned from a number of case studies such as the
expansion of the Province of Papua into three parts: Papua,
West Irian Jaya, and Central Irian Jaya following the Presidential
Instruction Number 1/2003 as part of the implementation of
Law number 45/1999. Legally this expansion disregarded
Law Number 21/2001, which clearly stipulates that expansion
of the province would need the agreement of the Papua
People Council and Papuan Parliament and in consideration
of social-cultural unity. The government of Megawati was
undermining the attempt by the previous government led by
President BJ Habibie to introduce a peaceful solution to end
the conflict in Papua.
Since its inception the policy for autonomy, and including
the renaming of Irian Jaya to Papua and the promise of
economic well being, was presented as an attempt to win the
hearts and minds of Papuans. On the other hand, the central
Ibid.p. 18
After the signing of New York Accord, only 3 non Papuans sat on the governor
seat in Papua. They were Acub Zaenal (1973-1975), Busiri Suryowinoto (19811982) and Sodjuangan Situmorang (2005-2006).
28
29
government maintained its influence towards the provincial
governments and discouraged any design to acknowledge
Papuans’ land rights. Otto Ondawame reported that the
central government continued to exercise its right to closely
control local regulation, provincial regulation, and Governor’s
decisions. Ultimately, special autonomy did not reflect the
needs of all Papuans. 30
In general, special autonomy did accommodate a
number of citizens’ demands, including self-rule relating to
geographical area, fiscal, and the establishment of the Papuans
People Consultative Council. There were several implications
related to the establishment of special autonomy, as explained
by Rod Mc Gibbon31: First, the acceptance of the Draft Law on
special autonomy points to a well-planned advocacy campaign
by Papuan stakeholders, which resulted in a transformation
at the local parliamentary level. The team drafting the Draft
Law on special autonomy in Papua used advocacy and capacity
building efforts to overcome the lack of analysis and research
in the Parliament in Jakarta that had threatened to undermine
the legal products.
Second, the ratification of special autonomy showed that
Jakarta was adopting a different strategy in dealing with the
problems in Papua. The enactment of special autonomy is an
explicit sign of recognition of Papua’s political identity in the
form of a piece of legislation. Furthermore, that recognition
took the form of establishment of the Papua People’s Council,
Based on Special Autonomy policies, Papua received its revenue from the sectors
of forestry, fisheries and mining industries totaling up to 80 percent and 70 percent
other from the gas and oil sectors. Then after 25 years, allocation of revenue from
oil and gass will decrease to 50 per cent. This concession was seen as small win
to the people of Papua aiming to seek opportunities for capacity building and
administrative capacity buidling. Further information refer to Otto Ondawame.
Managing conflict over West Papua: Community engagement in peaceful dialogue http://devnet.anu.edu.au/online%20versions%20pdfs/60/0760Ondawame.pdf
(Accessed 12 February 2011)
31
This was extracted from Rodd McGibbon. 2004. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh
and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?. East-West Center Washington. www.
eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS010.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
30
17
18
an ethnic-based institution. Third, the government’s effort
revealed its goodwill in accommodating the needs of
Papuans.
Nonetheless, Toronto University’s political scientist, Jacques
Bertrand, notes that there’s no guarantee that the implementation
of special autonomy will be free from intervention.32 The Law
contained several weaknesses: (1) loopholes stemming from
the ambiguities of Law Number 21/2001, for example the lack
of clear roles Papua Parliament and the Papua People Council;
(2) dual role of the Papua Governor –who functions both as
representative of central government as well as leader of Papua—
which at some level make things difficult for the governor to
stand for the interest of Papuans.
The team from the Justice and Peace Secretariat of
the Jayapura Bishopic Mission (2006) 33 provided a slightly
different view about the root of conflict in Papua. They found at
least four sources of conflict: First, social change. The Jayapura
Mission observed that Papuans were unable to rely on the
traditional values, which have been their bedrock, to cope
with the rapid transformation brought upon by the changing
times. It’s this lack of guiding force that has led to a situation
of wider conflicts. 34 Second, condition relating to population
(social diversity). Huge number of transmigration to Papua
–initially encouraged by central government—became a
growing concern among the indigenous population. Papuans
came to see the settlers’ cultural, lifestyle, and religious
differences as well as their social status and positions not
as a pluralistic condition to be accepted but as a source of
Jacques Bertrand. Papuan and Indonesian nationalisms: Can they be reconciled?
dalam Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed). Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in
Papua, Indonesia. RSC Working Paper No. 42 September 2007. University of
Oxford. England http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/RSCworkingpaper42.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
33
Detailed explanation on the cause of conflict in Papua is elaborated by Tim SKP
Jayapura in Tim SKP Jayapura. 2006. Membangun Budaya Damai dan Rekonsiliasi, Dasar Menangani Konflik di Papua. SKP Keuskupan Jayapura: Jayapura.
pp. 7-16.
34
Ibid. pp. 8-9
32
conflict. The local population often felt discriminated upon
and treated as primitives; instead of creating common grounds
the emerging multicultural phenomenon actually highlight all
the differences between native and settlers. 35
The third source of conflict is socio-economic welfare.
The social disharmony between Papuans and settlers
includes resentments in regards to economic success.
Settlers often have better economic positions in comparison
to the indigenous population. This disparity is happening
not only between settlers and Papuans but also between
the various existing tribes, communities, and families in
Papua. This is then made worse by corrupt and collusive
practices, the jockeying for power, and the destruction of
natural resources in Papua. 36
Communal conflict between settlers and indigenous
population are not particularly novel in this land of the
Cendrawasih bird. 37 With over 250 tribes living on the
island, conflict among its indigenous population is also a
commonplace occurrence. These types of conflict are often
the result of differences in tradition and are often resolved
through tribal war. Nonetheless, the mechanism for conflict
resolution through traditional means is already a recognised
institution within Papuan society.
In regards to conflict between settlers and indigenous
population, research from IRE Yogyakarta stated that the
discord should be categorised as the conflict between two
fundamentally differing economic cultures. On the one hand,
the indigenous population are still implementing a simple
subsistence-based economy, relying and adapting to nature.
On the other hand are settlers who came to dominate the
economy through their agriculture and trading activities. 38
Ibid. pp. 9-10
Ibid. pp. 10-14
37
Detailed elaboration in this paragraph was extracted from Arie Sujito et al. 2009.
Meretas Jalan Perdamaian di Tanah Papua. IRE: Yogyakarta. pp. 52-55. 38
Ibid.p. 52
35
36
19
20
IRE Yogyakarta expounded three aspects as the source
of the above conflict: (1) central and local governments’
disregard of abuses of land rights in the name of business
growth rather than the welfare of Papuans; (2) Conflict
between local government offices and corporations as a result
from the later failure to employ the indigenous population;
and (3) the tendency for businesses and corporations to create
an enclave of wealth within the native tribal communities of
Papua.39
The fourth source of conflict according to the Jayapura
SKP team is basic socio-political rights. It must be accepted
that the socio-political situation in Papua has often been
described as dangerous. Intimidation and physical and nonphysical violence are daily occurrences in Papua. Alongside the
remaining ambiguity in regards to their history, particularly
those that relates to acknowledgment of their existence and
basic right for self-determination, have encouraged many of
its people to dream of independence. These are the elements
that trigger tension and conflicts. 40 B. Military Policy in the Past
Undeniably, there has already been a Military presence in
Papua before the land of the Cendrawasih bird was officially
acknowledged as part of the united state of the Republic of
Indonesia in 1969. On December 1961, President Soekarno
proclaimed the Three People’s Command (Tri Komando Rakyat)
to “kick” the Dutch out of Papua. That was soon followed by a
military operation in 1962, known as Operation Mandala under
the command of Major General Soeharto. That began the central
government‘s attempt at protecting the integrity of Papua as part
of Indonesia through military policy. 41
Ibid.pp. 53-54
Tim SKP Jayapura. 2006, Op. Cit., pp. 14-16.
41
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman. Papua: The Last Frontier for Democratization, Demilitar39
40
However, the presence of a-too-massive military
apparatus resulted in excesses. Violence againts local populace
and resistance by the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) became
unavoidable although initially this military presence was
not supposed to generate new conflict with and within the
populace. 42
Timo Kivimäki (2006) is of the opinion that the violence
occurring in Papua is related to what has been described as a
legitimised law enforcement action. 43 The kinds of hostility
perpetrated by the Indonesian National Defense Forces (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia/TNI) in Papua included criminal actions,
human rights abuses in the line of duty, the use of excessive force
including against civilians, and the deployment of settlers’ militia
forces that benefited from military training, armaments, and
support. In most cases the aggression perpetrated by the military
are related to the political agenda of the military institution as
well as state security forces. 44
There are at least three factors that instigate TNI
personnel into committing violence in Papua. First is the
difficulty in monitoring military activities in Papua, which
led to a situation where many violations that were committed
by the military go unpunished. Second, Indonesia’s feeble
judiciary system, particularly when trying on cases of abuse of
authority and crimes by the military. Third, the failure of TNI
to grasp that the acknowledging mistakes have less negative
impact on its image than loudly bragging of “defending”
personnel who had been involved in violence. 45
42
43
44
45
ization and Decentralization in Indonesia. in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed). Dynamics
of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia. RSC Working Paper No. 42
September 2007. University of Oxford. England http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/
RSCworkingpaper42.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
Faith-Based Network on West Papua. 2006. Geneva Appeal on West Papua: Papua,
Land of Peace. Justitia et Pax Netherlands: The Hague. Pp. 14-15
Timo Kivimäki. 2006. Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process,
and the Role of the International Community. East-West Center Washington. www.
eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS025.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011)
Ibid
ICG (2001) in Timo Kivimäki, Ibid.
21
22
Furthermore, the explanation about military policy
prior to the reform era will be divided into two distinct
timelines. This distinction, based on significant local
political changes that occur during the time of Old Order
and New Order regimes, is to ease the comparison between
the military policies implemented in Papua. Before we
examine these military policies, however, we will first
provide a quick overview of the military politic of that time,
which dominated the policies of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia (ABRI).
1. ABRI Military Politic during the Pre-Reform era
It would be difficult to attempt an overview of the
Indonesian military policies and operations if we to ignore
the context related to the military’s political struggle --both
internally within the Armed Forces and externally in its
relationship with those outside its institution-- of that time.
And why this is so relates to the fact that those two factors
were proven to be influential in steering its existing policies.46
Internally, for example, the friction within its own organisation
caused by individual and factional rivalries proved to have
affected its military policies. Similarly, the Indonesian Armed
Forces love-hate relationship with those outside its institution,
and in particular with civilian political leaders, also helped
shape military policies although to a different degree to those
cause by internal factors. 47
Internal rivalry was obvious in the period of 1950-1959. For example was the
incident of 17 October 1952 which was the epithomy of dispute between the groups
supporting AH Nasution and Bambang Supeno resulting at the end of Nasution’s
career. Refer to Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967; Menuju
Dwifungsi ABRI, Judul Asli: Road to Power: Indonesia Military Politics 19451967, Translator: Hasan Basari, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988); Refer also to Harold
Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia, Original Title: Army and Politics in
Indonesia, Translator: Th. Sumarthana, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999).
47
Example of the relationship between ABRI and its external parties is the dispute
between President Soekarno and General AH Nasution. To weaken the influence
of Nasution in the military, Soekarno as the Highest Commander in Chief of the
46
As the institution responsible in defending Indonesia,
ABRI’s function was not simply to be the first line of defence
against the country’s sovereignty but also to assume a
socio-political role. This dual role was later known as the
ABRI’s Dual-Functions, which gave ABRI a stabilising as
well as change-making role in nation building. 48
A quick look at history reveals that the military growing
role was based on the “middle-ground”, first proposed by
Nasution and later known as Double-Function, that aimed
at giving the army a supervisory role over the country’s
development. 49
In his speech at the National Military Academy’s Dies
Natalis in 1958, General AH Nasution stated: 50
TNI’s position is not simply as tools for civilians as in
western countries or As military regime controlling the power
in a country. We are a social power, a people’s power that
struggles alongside other civilian power
Earlier, President Soekarno inaugurated the National
Council, which included representatives from the military
and police on 12 July 1957. At the National Council’s
conference on 21-23 November 1958, TNI was conceded
as a functional group. This was the first time that TNI was
recognised as a political entity alongside other traditional
political parties. 51
48
49
50
51
military in 1962 created a new position titled the Armed Forces Chief of Staff
(Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata/KSAB) which was manned by General AH
Nasution who previously served as the Army Chief of Staff. Indria Samego. 1997. Demokrasi Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan Pendahuluan. In Indria Samego & M Hamdan Basyar (ed). Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah
dan Prospeknya. PPW-LIPI. Jakarta. p. 5
Indria Samego, “Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian”, in Indria Samego &
M Hamdan Basyar (ed), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya, (Jakarta:
PPW-LIPI, 1997), p. 214
Soebijono et al. 1992. Dwifungsi ABRI: Perkembangan dan Peranannya dalam
Kehidupan Politik di Indonesia. Gadjah Mada University Press. Yogyakarta. pp.
85-87
M Rusli Karim. 1989. Peranan ABRI Dalam Politik dan Pengaruhnya terhadap
23
24
The 1950s was a difficult period for President Soekarno. It
was no surprise that the announcement of emergency military
situation in March 1958, following separatist movements in
the country that involved a number of high-ranking ABRI
as well as the increased hostility against the Dutch and the
expanding military action to recapture Papua became a golden
opportunity for Soekarno to strengthen his political influence.
Soekarno fortified his position by responding to the failure
of the politicians by providing ABRI with the opportunity
to neutralise the situation and to become a balancing force
against the political parties. 52
Soekarno and ABRI have a lively relationship. The two have
a particularly warm relationship during the announcement
of the Decree of 5 July 1959, clearly because this piece of
important instruction would not have been issued with out
the full backing of ABRI. After this, however, there followed
a period of disenchantment when Soekarno appears to turn
his attention to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In
his attempt to balance out the power between ABRI and
PKI, Soekarno even had to resort to reducing ABRI’s political
clout. 53
Harold Crouch explained that what we were able to
glean from President Soekarno’s relationship with the
leadership of the Indonesian Army was their mutual
attitude not to underestimate one another. On one side,
Soekarno perceived ABRI and in particular it’s Army as a
potent force that didn’t shy from using their power. One the
Pendidikan Politik di Indonesia (1965-1979). CV Haji Masagung. Jakarta. p. 15
Maswadi Rauf, “Latar Belakang Peran Sospol ABRI”, in Indria Samego & M
Hamdan Basyar (ed), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya, (Jakarta:
PPW-LIPI, 1997), pp. 43-44.
53
The effort to weaken the power can be seen from the revocation of the emergency
status from Indonesia on 1 May 1963 after the eradication of DI/TII, PRRI-Permesta and the success of the free West Irian campaign. The emergency statues previously declared by the military to halt the progress of the Indonesian Communist
Party on March 14 1957. Soebijono dkk. 1992. Dwifungsi ABRI: Perkembangan
dan Peranannya dalam Kehidupan Politik di Indonesia. Gadjah Mada University
Press. Yogyakarta. pp. 28-29
52
other side the Army were considerate of Soekarno’s large
support base, which include almost all political parties
as well as those in the military. It was for this reason that
the two preferred an accommodative approach instead of
trying to dominate one another. 54
In addition there were at least two reasons that formed the
ABRI’s socio-political roles.55 The first is the military’s historic
socio-political role since the earliest days of Indonesia’s
independence; and the second is legalistic. Meanwhile, Dr.
Alfian (1986; 147) argued that there are two characteristics
that typify the military’s Dual-Function: quantitatively in
the numbers of military personnel that play a socio-political
role; and qualitatively in the way it influences the country’s
developments. 56
According William Liddle (1986: 17), when President
Soeharto took over power in Indonesia the implementation
of ABRI’s Dual-Function was simply an attempt at the
institutionalisation of New Order power pyramid. This
structure included the dominating power of the President,
an armed forces that was actively involved in politics, a
decision making process in the hands of bureaucrats, and
a relationship pattern between society and the state that
combined attempts at being responsive with cooptation
and repression.57
Ulf Sundhaussen (1982) has said that in general
military intervention in civic affairs is caused by internal
Harold Crouch. 1999. Op. Cit. pp. 46-47
The legal basis starts from the 1945 Constitution to Decisions of the MPRS
XXIV/1966, TAP MPR no IV/1978 and Law No 1 of 1988. Yet in the post reofmr,
they were no longer used as references. Indria Samego. 1997. Demokrasi Peran
Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan Pendahuluan. Dalam Indria Samego & M Hamdan
Basyar (ed). Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya. PPW-LIPI. Jakarta.
pp 5-7
56
As quoted from Dr. Alfian in Riza Sihbudi, “Dampak Perubahan Lingkungan
Domestik terhadap Peran Sosial Politik ABRI”, in Indria Samego & M Hamdan
Basyar (ed), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya, (Jakarta: PPW-LIPI,
1997), p. 108.
57
Ibid.
54
55
25
26
and external factors. Internal factors include class interest,
individual interest, professionalism and modernisation, and
corporate interest. External factor, meanwhile, includes the
systemic failure of existing political structure and institutions.
Particularly in Indonesia there are other considerations that
needs to be taken into account. This includes ideological
considerations, personal inclinations, and traditional cultural
values.58
Nonetheless, Soeharto may appear to simply reinforcing
the policies of his predecessor. Following Nasution’s speech,
Lieutenant-General Achmad Yani gave another speech during
the graduation ceremony of military officers on 26 December
1962, reiterating the military’s role as a defence force and
functional group. President Soeharto reinforced ABRI’s social
political role in his speech at the ABRI 25th anniversary
celebration on 5 October 1970: 59
Groups within the society should see this Dual Functions
from our own political system that we ourselves use, from the
history of the development of our own nation and not by other
perspectives from outside that may not be objective.
Another military figure, Lieutenant General TB
Simatupang once said that ABRI’s domination was the result
of the political parties failure to function properly. Most of
the existing political parties of that time were preoccupied
with ideological debates and hence failed to bring about
social development. 60 This echoed LIPI’s analysis, which
explained that the military’s expanding role was not due to its
opposition to political parties but as a result of the weakness
of political parties and other political organisations. At the
same time ABRI was more than willing to fulfil the function
of bureaucratic power.
Nugroho Notosusanto dkk (ed), Pejuang dan Prajurit; Konsepsi dan Implementasi
Dwifungsi ABRI, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), p. 214.
59
Soebijono dkk, Op. Cit., pp. 85-87.
60
M Rusli Karim, Op. Cit., p. 77.
58
At the beginning of the New Order regime, ABRI’s
socio-political role was implemented by placing military
officers in civilian positions such as government ministers,
ambassadors, governors, and other important offices. Of
the 27 government ministers in 1966, 12 were from ABRI
of which 6 were from the Army. While quantitatively
civilians dominated the cabinet all strategic positions
were held by the military. Interestingly, however, the
position of governors in conflict areas such as Aceh, East
Timor, and Papua were all held by civilians. 61
Cha l id M awa rdi, a m em b er of t h e H o u s e o f
Representative’s Commission I, saw ABRI’s domination of
civil positions with growing concern (1979). The presence
of military officers in virtually all government agencies had
resulted in a lack of civilian control since civilian leaders
were reluctant to criticise the military. Any improvement
was solely dependent on ABRI’s own political will. 62
Chalid was proven to be right after the reform
movement . The Indonesian military proposed to
withdraw their political function and state decisionmaking during the Military Leadership Meeting in 2000.
While there were still lots of question marks left to be
answered, the political observer Salim Said revealed that
the reduction in military political power following the
fall of Soeharto must be viewed as the strengthening of
civilian political role and international pressure as well
as the weakening of the military resources as the result
of past mistakes. 63
M Hamdan Basyar and Sri Yanuarti, “Peran Sosial Politik ABRI pada Masa Orde
Baru”, in Indria Samego & M Hamdan Basyar (ed), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah
dan Prospeknya, (Jakarta: PPW-LIPI, 1997), pp. 71-74.
62
M Rusli Karim, Op. Cit., p. 80.
63
Salim Said, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan Pemikiran Politik
Militer Indonesia (1958-2000), (Jakarta: Aksara Kurnia, 2002), pp. 206-207.
61
27
28
2. Military Policy during the Old Regime
Looking back, Soekarno’s government had been
attempting to conquer Papua since 1950.64 However, he did
not endeavour to do this through military operation but
through a clandestine operation. Some notable examples
include the infiltration to Gag Island led by Ali Kahar (1953),
the infiltration that landed at Fak-Fak led by Sergeant Kalalo
ML (1953) and the infiltration that snuggled through Etna Bay
under the command of JA Dimana (1954). 65 Specifically in
the case of the 42 soldiers led by JA Damara, it was said that
they’d been fully armed and worn their uniform but without
badges that distinguished their company. Dimana’s operation
was noted for successfully smuggling and distributing a huge
amount of Republic of Indonesia currency. The Dutch was
able to ascertain the pattern of the troop’s movement and
was able to engage them in a shoot-out. As a result, Dimana
lost 11 of his team members while the rest were captured by
the Dutch. However, this type of operation was not sustained
for a long time.
According to Socratez (2007:395), during the infiltration
phase, about 10 ABRI companies were deployed to Papua. The
intention was to form the basis for a guerrilla war and front
line camps for assaults.66 The infiltration was followed with
attacks at several incursion points such as Kaimana, Merauke,
Biak, Fak-Fak, and Sorong. The consolidation of troops in
Papua followed only at the end of this stage.
In the period of 1950-1957, the attempt to liberate Papua from the Netherlands
can be categorized as a peace phase. The term peace refered to a strategy used
by the government to prioritized diplomacy. Refer to Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi
ABRI, Tri Komando Rakyat Pembebasan Irian Barat: Trikora, (Jakarta: Markas
Besar ABRI, 1995), hlm. 59.
65
Ibid
66
One of the officials serving as infiltrants was Benny Moerdany who was a Captain
at that time. He was with his troops of 206 personnel from the Special Forces (RPKAD, now Kopassus) and Company II Battalyon 530/Paratrooper from Brawijaya
Military Area Command. This operation was known as Djayawijaya Operation.
See Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 395.
64
At the same time, the RI government established
the Military Teritorium VII (TT-VII) in May 1950 based in
Makassar that oversaw military operations throughout eastern
Indonesia (Celebes, Lesser Sunda Islands, and including the
Mollucas islands, and Irian Barat). 67 In September 1950, ABRI
reorganised the Military Command of South Mollucas and
transformed it into Kopad D, responsible for the Mollucas
island and Irian Barat. On 5 July 1952, Kopad S was liquidated
and transformed into Infantry Regiment 25 (RI25) with the
same territorial responsibility. The infiltration operations to
Irian Barat was commenced under the command of RI 25 as
initial military action to conquer and bring back Irian Barat
into the fold of the Republic of Indonesia. 68
Factually, military operations in Papua commenced since
1961 with the deployments of voluntary-soldiers.69 Their
tasks were to gain access to some of section of the island
and hence disrupt the Dutch governance in Papua. Some
time before this, the National Front for the Liberation of
West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian barat/FNPIB)
led by the Army Chief of Staff Major General AH Nasution
was formed in support of the invasion of West Irian.70 The
organisation, established by the Army Chief of Staff Resolution
in his capacity as the Central War Commander through Kpts/
Peperpu/012/1958 on 17 January 1958, was set up to recruit
and assemble all national potential to form the basis and
support for the struggle in Irian Barat in particular and to
complete the revolution in general.71
The change in ABRI’s operational approach since 1960
was not a surprise. Since the Dutch often renegaded on their
promises, the government of the Republic of Indonesia altered
their defensive diplomatic strategy into an offensive one
Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p. 110.
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 395.
69
Ibid, p. 394.
70
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., p. 39.
71
National Front for the Liberation of Irian Barat was sworn in directly by
President Soekarno in the State Palace on 10 February 1958. Ibid.
67
68
29
30
although Irian Barat’s status was still under consideration at
the UN.72 Presidents Soekarno was also upfront of the use of
“alternative approach” in the resolving the claim over Irian
Barat. This was clearly revealed in his State Address on 17
August 1958 entitled “The Year of Challenge.”73 Since then,
the government of Indonesia commenced its confrontational
politics against the Dutch.
During this phase of confrontational politics, the
Indonesian military was delegated with at least two tasks,
which were to deliver the infiltration operation and preparing
the invasion. To achieve that the military prepared a cadre of
young Irians to represent the Indonesian government in the
case of an all out war. This particular task was assigned to
the Special Military Cooperation Body (BKS-Khusus) of the
National Front for the Liberation of Irian Barat (FNPIB). 74
To ensure the success of the operation, Nasution
instructed the Army General Staff (SUAD) I to organise an
intelligent operation. This operation was given the code name
Operation A, B and C with Colonel Magenda who was First
Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff as the officer in charge
and supported by the Army Intelligence Unit. Operation A
was led by Major Roedjito infiltrated Irian Barat. His troops
included Papuans who had been specially trained at Cikotok
in West Java. The objective of that operation was to collect
information about Dutch military movement, to motivate the
Papuans, and to establish a guerrilla base. 75
Penetration were organised all along the island’s south
coast, from the Bird’s Head area to Manokwari. To launch the
operation the military divided the area under three command
posts. First, North Area (IP-101 Gebe) led by Major Roedjito,
which included the Ternate island, Gak and its environment.
Second, Central Area (IP-102 Geser) led by Major Amir
74
75
72
73
Ibid. p. 38
Ibid
Ibid. pp. 60-61
Ibid. pp. 61-62
Yudowinarno, which included Geser island and East Ceram.
Third, South Area (IP-103 Dobo) led by Major Ali Murtopo.
The central command post of these three concentration posts
was located in the Inteligence Post Compound 001 (IP 001)
at Ujir island that was equiped with direct communication to
the Army Head Quarter (MBAD) in Jakarta. 76
The first infiltration operation troops set foot in Papua
on 9 November 1960. The 29 soldiers under the command
of Lieutenant Antabirawa embarked from Buru island
heading towards Etna Bay and were given the code name
Guerrilla Troop (PG-100). The team was tasked with gathering
intelligence on Dutch military in the area as well as to provoke
the local populace to join the war. No record existed about the
fate of these 29 men since then.77 On 14 September 1961 a
second group with the code name PG-200 of 33 men led by
Lieutenant Djamaluddin Nasution infiltrated Irian via the
Raja Empat islands. Again, no record existed about the fate
of this team.
Simultaneously, the BKS-Khusus FNPIB launched
Operation B with the objective of preparing a military unit
recruited from a cadre of soldiers from Irian and the Mollucas
islands. Meanwhile, Operation C was tasked with weakening the
Dutch international position through diplomatic means. This
was led by Uyeng Suargana, Frans Seda and a representative
appointed by the Army Chief of Staff
An attempt to strengthen armaments was done through
cooperation with the Eastern Bloc countries. The Cabinet of
Ali Sastroamidjojo initiated the purchase of defensive system.
On 6 April 1958, the contract to purchase US$ 60 million worth
of warships and fighter jets from Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia was dully signed. 78
In the interim, in 1960 Nasution also took the initiative
to explore and physically prepare an official solution towards
Ibid p. 63
Ibid. pp. 63-64
78
Ibid. p. 41.
76
77
31
32
the Irian Barat problem. Among others, the Army Chief of
Staff established a specific battle-hardy Military Corps to
function as Army General Reserve troops that was ready to
be deployed 24-7.79 They were established through the Army
Chief of Staff Resolution number Kpts-1067/12/1960 on 27
December 1960. In the same month, Nasution led a delegation
representing Soekarno to Moscow to purchase weapons from
the Soviet Union.
With the commencement of the confrontation phase,
preparation for Operation B was starting to produce some
results, particularly when President Soekarno requested
the Joint Chiefs of Staffs to begin deliberating a Plan for a
Joint Operation on Irian Barat. The request was conveyed
through the Army Chief of Staff, General AH Nasution, at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 12 April 1961. The meeting
agreed that representatives of the Chiefs of Staffs, Permanent
Operation Heads, Intelligence, and the Chiefs of Staffs logistics
would prepare the plan. The Army was represented by 1st
Deputy of the Army Chief of Staff, Major General Achmad Yani
(1st Deputy of the Army Chief of Staff for Eastern Indonesia),
and 2nd Deputy of the Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General
Soeharto (Commander of Army Corps 1/General Reserve
troops). The Air Force was represented by 1st Assistant to the
Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Colonel RIS Wirjosapoetro
and Director Operations A-B, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel
Srimulyono Herlambang, while the Navy was represented
by Director Operations Lieutenant Colonel (P) Soedomo. 80
Nonetheless, the agreed action to pursue open warfare as
deliberated in the meeting was never pursued further due to
new developments in diplomatic operations. 81
Ibid pp. 41-49
Ibid. p. 57
81
This meeting proposed 3 types of operation options: B-1 Operation or open military
operation with the target fully to take over and take power over the whole West
Irian, B-2 Operation of military operation with limited target and B-3 operation
or an operation with infiltration scope. From those three options, it was decided
that B-1 Operation was the best yet it was adviced that it should be launched in
79
80
The Mandala Command
Military-influenced policy could be clearly observed when
President Soeharto established the Mandala Commando for
the liberation of Irian Barat with its headquarter in Makassar.
That decision was supported by the Presidential Resolution
number 1, 1962, about the Establishment of the Mandala
Commando for the Liberation of Irian Barat on 2 January
1962. 82 Its task was to 1) plan, prepare, and organise military
operations for the liberation of Irian Barat; 2) Bring into line
the military situation in Irian Barat with diplomatic efforts
such that it would be able to develop a de facto free zone led
by local government representatives as quickly as possible.
The Command of the operation was led by Major General
Soeharto (Mandala Commander-in-chief) with Navy Colonel
Subono (Deputy Commander I), Air Force Colonel Leo
Wattimena (Deputy Commander II) and Colonel Achmad
Tahir (Chief of Staff). The Presidential Resolution divided the
operation into three phases. First, infiltration phase: to deploy
limited sortie to establish guerrilla bases and front line posts
in preparation for a larger attacking force. Until the end of
1962 the aim was to infiltrate at least 10 companies to Irian
Barat. Second, exploitation phase whereby to launch open
warfare against the enemy in Biak no later than 1963. The
main target points were between Fak-Fak, Sorong, Kaimana,
Kota Baru (Jayapura) and Merauke. Third, consolidation
phase of the Indonesian government in Irian Barat following
the successful military operations. 83
Infiltration Phase. At the infiltration phase the operation
was split into their approaches: sea incursions, Mandala Navy
operations, and airborne drops.84 Sea infiltration was further
the end of 1963 to obtain optimum results. Ibid
Amrin Imran et al. 1971. Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan Darat. Pusat Sejarah
ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan. Jakarta. pp. 115-116.
83
Ibid. p. 116
84
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., pp. 225-260.
82
33
34
split into two stages: a Pre-Mandala operations and Mandala
operations phase. The Pre-Mandala operations used the
military code PG (Guerrila Troops). There were at least five
sea deployments. First was PG-300, which consisted out of 1
company of trained-soldiers from West Irian and Aru islands
bolstered by 4 Army Special Force soldiers. They were split
into two teams: Team-1 led by Private First Class Isnana that
landed at Gag island on 18 March 1962 and Team-2 led by
Marine Sergeant Thomas that headed for Wigeo island on 20
March 1962. Most of the PG-300 soldiers were captured by
the Dutch. 85
The Second was PG-400, which mostly consisted of Army
soldiers. Led by Charles Papilaya, the 39 soldiers were able to
set up a defensive base at Lamlam on March 1962.86 The third
was PG-500, which consisted of ex-Permesta soldiers led by
First Lieutenant J. Kumontoy. They embarked on March 1962
to successfully destroy a Dutch radio installation and engage
the enemy in firefight.87
The fourth was PG-600 led by Maksum (Batallion 700/
R). It consisted out of a total of 31 soldiers, of which 24
people were able to land, as the rest had been captured by
the Dutch. 88 Lastly, the Reconnoitre Infiltration Unit that
embarked from Military Post-102 based in Seram and tasked
with gathering intelligence. Until March 1962, sea-based
infiltrations were thought to be unsuccessful and unable to
reach its objectives. Not only did the Dutch Navy control the
sea route and able to observe the infiltrations, the huge sea
waves also proved to be a contributing factor to the failure of
many of the infiltrations.89
Nonetheless, sea-based infiltrations continued to be in
operation during the period of Mandala Command. These were
87
88
89
85
86
Ibid. pp. 225-229.
Ibid. p. 230.
Ibid
Ibid. p. 231.
Ibid. pp. 232-233.
led by Lieutenant Colonel Djoko Basuki based in Amahai. To
improve the commando line, the area of operations was split
into three: (1) South zone (P-101/Hanggada) led by Major Ali
Murtopo, with command post at Aru islands that reported to
the Mandala Army; (2) Central zone (P-102/Kapi Jembawan)
led by Lieutenant Colonel Amir Judowinarno, with command
post at Geser island controlled by the Mandala Command;
(3) North zone (P-103/Hanilo) led by Major Roedjito, with
command post at Gebe island controlled by the Mandala
Command. 90
Since Dutch military assault often thwarted infiltrations,
the military operations were further bolstered by Infantry
Brigade 2/Mandala Army led by Lieutenant Colonel Sumeru.
The soldiers prepared for the infiltrations consisted of two
companies from Infantry Battalion 515/Brawijaya, two
companies from 516, one company from 521, plus one Scout
Detachment led by AKP Anton Soedjarwo. This was further
strengthened by the arrival of Infantry Brigade-1 led by
Lieutenant Colonel Tjiptono Setiabudi, which consisted of
two Battalions of raider-class troops, the Banteng Raiders and
Sumatera Raiders, plus one Infantry Battalion. 91
As for the Mandala Navy operations, according to the
available literature there were at least four operations
involved in the liberation of Irian Barat. 92 First, Operation
Show of Force that was organised on 1 March – June 1962.
This consisted of Operations Alugara and Antareja. Operation
Antareja was an underwater operation that occurred from 28
February to 2 May 1962, involving the submarine Nanggala. Its
task was to reconnoitre port towns all along the coast of Irian
and to patrol and attack Dutch ships. Meanwhile, Operation
Ibid. p. 233
Ibid.pp. 233-234
92
There is no detailed literature on how many operations launched by Mandala
Navy. This information was collected from Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op.
Cit., hlm. 241- 245; dan buku karangan Sudono Jusuf, Sedjarah Perkembangan
Angkatan Laut, (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan,
1971), pp. 170-190.
90
91
35
36
Alugara was held from 28 July to 26 August 1962, involving
the submarines Wijayadanu, Hendrajaya, and Alugara. Their
tasks was to sink merchant and warship all along the north
coast of Irian Barat. The operation ended on 15 August 1962
following the New York Treaty. 93
Second, Operation Torpedo Ship. 94 This operation’s main
task was to attain sea supremacy, support clandestine sea
sorties, and back-up the infiltration sea armada. It was directly
led by Deputy Commander of Mandala Navy, Navy Colonel
M. Subarkah. Most notable among its many activities was
Operation Badar Lumut and Operation Badar Besi. Operation
Badar Lumut was assigned to conduct silent landing at
Kaimana on 28 June 1962. Operation Badar Besi was assigned
silent landing at Missol on 11 August 1962.
Third, Operation Cakra.95 This was a submarine operation
to attain supremacy at sea in preparation for Operation
Jayawijaya. Components engaged included 530 RI Nagabanda
led by Navy Major Wignyo Prayitno between Kotabaru and
Biak, 504 RI Trisula led by Navy Major Mardiono between
Noemfoor and Manokwari and 506 RI Nagarasang led by
Navy Major Agus Subroto with area of operations in the
environment of Sorong. The operations were held on 20-29
July 1962.
Fourth, Operation Lumba-Lumba. 96 Its task was to land
the Army Special Forces at Tanah Merah Bay near Kotabaru
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., pp. 241-242; New York Accord consists
of 29 articles regulating 13 issues. Indonesia was represented by Soebandrio who
was Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, and the Netherlands was represented
by J Herman van Roijen and CAW Schurman. There were 4 issues highlighted
by this accord: administrative transfer from the government of the Netherland to
the UN (10 articles), the administrative handover from the UN to Indonesia (2
articles), act of free choice (8 articles) and the rights of citizens (2 articles). On
New York Accord, refer to Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., hlm. 49-50; read also Subandrio,
Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat, (Jakarta: Yayasan Kepada Bangsaku,
2001), pp. 89-109.
94
Sudono Jusuf, Op. Cit., pp. 178-180.
95
96
Ibid, pp. 244-245. Refer also to Sudono Jusuf, Op. Cit., pp. 180-182.
93
beach. Ships involved were the RI Candrasa led by Navy Major
Mardiono, RI Nagarangsang led by Navy Major Agus Soebroto
and RI Trisula led by Navy Major Teddy Asikin Nataatmaja.
The operation was organised on 15 August 1962. However,
only RI Candrasa was able to land the Army Special Forces
on 21 August 1962 . The rest failed because of the Dutch
military close watch. There were there attempts to land and
during this infiltration phase the Mandala Navy was able to
help land 213 soldiers.
Airborne infiltration was led by Air Force Commander,
Commodor Leo Wattimena supervised by the Mandala
Commander-in-Chief, Major General Soeharto. 97 There were
at least 8 operations in support of this infiltration. The first
was Operation Banteng Ketaton bade on Operation Instruction
(PO) Mandala Commander number 1/PO/SR/4/1962 dated
11 April 1962. 98
The operation on 26 April 1962 landed the Army Special
Forces and the Air Force Special Forces. 99 The morning
operation utilised 6 Dakota and 15 Air Force airplanes that was
tasked with deception flight. 100 The operation consisted of two
phases: (1) Operation Banteng I (Banteng Putih) using three
Dakota planes led by Air Force Major Nayoan targeting FakFak and tasked with transporting one Army Special Forces/Air
Force Special Forces team (42 soldiers) under the command
of Second Lieutenant Agus Hernoto; (2) Operation Banteng II
(Banteng Merah) led by Air Force Captain Santoso, targeting
Kaimana and transporting one Army Special Forces/Air Force
Special Forces team of 40 soldiers under the command of
Second Lieutenant Heru Sisnodo.101
Ibid, pp. 246-249.
99
Dalam literatur lain, 1 tim Kopasgat (15 orang) dan pasukan RPKAD ini diterjunkan pada 23 April 1962. Baca Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, Sejarah
Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat (Kopasgat) TNI Angkatan Udara, (Jakarta: Dinas
Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, 1977), p 103.
100
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., p. 246.
101
Ibid, pp. 246-247.
97
98
37
38
The second operation, Operation Garuda, was based on
Operation Instruction Mandala Command number 02/PO/
SR/5/62 dated 13 May 1962.102 This involved two sorties: (a)
Garuda Merah, which used Dakota planes on 15 May 1962
transporting 28 personnel from Battalion 454/Parachuters
led by Captain Kartawi targeting Fak-Fak and a Hercules
plabe on 19 May 1962, which landed 79 soldiers; (b) Garuda
Putih using Dakota plane on 15 and 17 May 1962, landing 54
personnels from Battalion 454/Parachuters and Air Force
Special Forces under the command of First Lieutenant Idrus
as well as a Hercules plane on 25 May 1962 which transported
68 soldiers.
Following that was Operation Serigala based on Operation
Instruction Manadala Command number 03/PO/SR/5/62
dated 13 May 1962. 103 This operation was split into two
stages: (1) Parachute landing of 39 Special Air Force soldiers
under the command of Air Force Lieutenant II Manuhua
at Taminabuan on 17 May 1962 using a Dakota plane; (2)
Parachite landing of 81 Special Air Force soldiers104 led by
Air Force Lieutenant Suhadi at Sanposor on 19 May 1962
using a Hercules. A fierce shoot-out often ensued during the
operation because the Special Air Force soldiers had landed
on Dutch military barracks. 105
The fourth operation was Operation Kancil that was
specifically tasked with reconnaisance and photography.106
The operation was split into 3 stages, which occutred for 3
days on 15-17 may 1962, which are: (a) Kancil I targeting FakFak and transporting 1 company of soldiers on 3 C-47 planes
and escorted by 2 P-51 Mustang warplanes flown by Air Force
Captain Iskandar and Air Force Major Loelu Wardiman; (b)
Kancil II targeting Kaimana transporting one company of
Ibid, pp. 249-250.
Ibid, pp. 251.
104
In other source, it was referred that the number of troops deployed was 84 personnel. Refer Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, Op. Cit., p. 103.
105
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., pp. 251.
106
Ibid, pp. 251-252.
102
103
soldiers using 3 C-47 planes and escorted by a B-25 plane
piloted by Air Force Captain M. Abdulkadir; (c) Kancil III
targeting Sorong using B-25 plane piloted by Air Firce Major
Soedarman and Captain Soedjito.
The fifth operation was Operasi Naga under the
command of Captain Benny Moerdani based on Operation
Instruction Mandala Command number 04/PO/SR/6/62
dated 2 June 1962. 107 The target was the Merauke region.
The operation that was held on 4 June 1962 involved
215 soldiers that consisted of 55 Army Special Forces
soldiers led by Second Lieutenant Soedarto and 160
soldiers of Company 2 Battalion 530/Brawijaya led by
Captain Bambang Soepeno. The parachute drop involved
3 Hercules planes piloted by Air Force Major Mhd Slamet,
Major Najoan, and Captain Pribadi.
New developments in the diplomatic efforts with the UN
proposing peace had changed the main operational duties that
had been organised since July 1962. 108 Since 31 July 1962
the emphasis of the new main operational duties would be
to bring in additional troops and logistics in the drop zone of
of Merauke and Kaimana.
The sixth operation was Operation Rajawali based on
Operation Instruction Mandala Command number 14/PO/
SR/7/62 dated 26 July 1962. 109 Held on 31 July 1962, the
operation parachute-dropped 71 personnels of Company
Batallion 328/Siliwangi led by Lieutenant Atma at the Kaimana
region.
Ibid, pp. 252-257. The story about this Dragon Operation can be read in the
biography of Benny Moerdani. Refer to Julius Pour, Benny: Tragedi Seorang
Loyalis, (Jakarta: Kata Hasta Pustaka, 2007), pp. 81-96.
108
Proposal for peace was intiated by Ellsworth Bunker and announced by the UN
Secretary General U Thant. To follow up the development, President Soekarno
issued Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1962 requesting for military operation to
be implemented according to activities in the area of diplomacy. Pusat Sejarah
dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., p. 257.
109
Ibid
107
39
40
In addition was Operation Lumbung. 110 As its
name implies, this was an operation focused on securing
suplementary logistics to the troops in Irian Barat. The
operation was based on Operation Instruction Mandala
Command number 08/PO/SR/6/62 dated 26 June 1962.
The operation was held on 30 June 1962 in Merauke111 using
a Hercules plane piloted by Air Firce Major Mhd. Slamet and
in Kaimana using similar type of airplane flown by Major
Nayoan.
The military presense was further strengthened when the
Army Chief, Genera Ahmad Yani established the Military Area
Command XVII/Irian Barat using the Army Chief Resolution
number KPTS/052/8/1962 dated 8 August 1962.112 However,
since Indonesia did not as yet have full jurisdiction in Papua,
the Military Area Command’s task was limited to supervising
the UNTEA and the pro-independence Papuan populace. The
first commander of the Military Area Command was Brigadier
General U. Rukman. 113
The last operation to end the airborne infiltration was
Operation Jatayu. 114 This operation was held on 14 August
1962 based on Operation Instruction Manadala Command
number 15/PO/SR/7/62 dated 9 August 1962. Its task was
to organise parachute drop of troops and supplies in the
region of Sorong, Merauke, and Kaimana. In its execution the
operation was split into three sections: (1) Elang targeting
Sorong was led by Captain Psk Radix Soedarsono who led 134
personnels from Batallion-2/Special Air Force troops and one
company led by Air Force First Lieutenant Sujatto using the
Ibid. p. 258
Logistics were dropped in this area as assistance to Benny Moerdani troops.
112
Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p. 110. In another literature, Military Area Command
VII was said to be set up based on Ministrial Decree/Army Commander in Chief
No.Kpts-1058/8/1962 on 17 August 1962 or 2 days after New York Accord was
signed. See Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 398.
113
Socratez Sofyan Yoman (Ibid).
114
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, Op. Cit., hlm. 258-260.
110
111
Hercules plane that was flown by Air Force Major Mhd Slamet
and Captain Sukardi; (2) Gagak targeting Kaimana using the
Hercules plane piloted by Major Mhd Slamet transporting
131 personnels of Batallion 454/Para under the command
of Major Untung; (3) Alap-Alap transporting 132 soldiers of
Batallion-2 Special Air Force troops to Merauke under the
command of Air Force Second Lieutenant B. Matitaputty.
Explotation Phase. According to initial plan, an open
warfare was set for execution at the end of 1962. However, that
plan was modified following political and military changes,
which demanded quick results. 115 The Mandala Command,
then, prepared a large-scale operation code-named Operation
Jayawijaya that was carried out in August 1962. 116 This policy
was based on the Resolutio of the Commander-in-Chief for the
Liberation of Irian Barat (KOTI Permibar) on 28 May 1962,
which confirmed the large-scale operation (B-1) for Biak and
Hollandia. 117
The total number of troops that was to be involved in
Operation Jayawijaya was 70,000 soldiers. The Army was to
deploy Commando Division-II, which would have included
Task Force/TF Lesmono, Paratrooper Brigade (TF-1) under
the command of Lieutenant Mung Parhadimuljo, Paratrooper
Brigade (TF-2 Gatotkaca) under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Widjojo Sujono, Infantry Brigade-1 (TF Hanoman) led
by Major Noertjahjo, and Infantry Brigade-2 led by Lieutenant
Ibid. pp. 260-261
This operation faced quite a challenge as there was no certainty on the D-Day.
After a meeting with the Chief of Staff of Highest Command of the Liberation of
West Irian (Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat/KOTI Permibar) Major
General Achmad Yani with Commander in Chief of Mandala Navy, Commander
in Chief of Mandala Air Force and Landing Troop (Pasukan Pendarat/Pasrat-45)
diputuskan hari H tentatif pada 12 August 1962.
117
At first, the option decided was operation B-2 (Military operation with limited
target) in the area of Sorong and Fak-fak. This option was decided in the meeting
on 7 April 1962. The selection of Sorong and Fak-fak was because they were seen
as realistic targets for Airborne and Amphibi Operations. Yet this operation was
canceled due to considerations on the military and political technicality aspects
on May 28 1962
115
116
41
42
Colonel Soemeru. The Navy was to deploy 3 Marine Batallions
(TF Wibisono) under Marine Lieutenant Colonel Soewadji,
126 assorted warships, anti-submarines, submarines, fregat,
torpedo ships, mine sweepers, LST, AKA/APA, salvage, tankers,
medical ship, and 33 transport ships. The Air Force, meanwhile
was to deploy 38 bombers, 18 MIG-17s, 6 P-51 Mustangs, 1
Gannet Squadron, and Albatros. 118
However as the troops were assembled on 5 August 1962,
the Mandala Commander-in-Chief Major General Soeharto
postponed the invasion to H+14. The delay was caused by
the fact that the Dutch agreed to the UN peace proposal.
The sudden decicion caused problems related to the large
concentration of troops resolved through deception, securing
supplies, and maintaining troop morals. Following the signing
of Treaty of New York on 15 August 1962, Operation Jayawijaya
was officialy cancelled on the instruction of the Persident/
Commander-in-Chief KOTI Permibar on 18 August 1962. 119
Consolidation Phase. Following the New York Treaty,
the infiltrating troops in Kaimana, Fak-Fak, Sorong and
Merauke was shifted to Holandia (now Jayapura). Captain
Benny Moerdani was appointed provisional commander the
infiltration troops. 120 President Soekarno also instructed the
cease of hostility between the Netherland and Indonesia to
all guerrilla troops in Papua on 16 August 1962.121 The order
instructed the cease of all exchange of fires and hostility as
of 18 August 1962 at 09:31 although soldiers were told to
continue to consolidate their forces and keep vigilance. 122
All the infiltrators were consolidated into the Indonesian
Contingent (Kotindo) as part of the United Nation Security
Forces that was part of the United Nation Temporary Executive
Ibid. p. 264
Ibid. p. 269
120
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 395; refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Heboh
Papua; Perang Rahasia, Trauma dan Separatisme, (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu,
2010), p. 42.
121
Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., p. 50.
122
Ibid
118
119
Authority (UNTEA). 123 The Indonesian troops were split into
4 detachments: Detachment A in Merauke, Detachment B
in Kaimana, Detachment in Fak-Fak, and Detachment D in
Sorong.
Despite being part of UNTEA, ABRI continued to be
responsible for organising and administering the infiltrating
soldiers. The Mandala Commander-in-chief continued to
control the troops. Thus, while the soldiers formally “wore”
the UNTEA uniforms, they continued to exercise the Trikora
Command by ensuring that the UN troops did not undermine
Indonesia’s interests. 124
To support this, the Mandala Commander-in-chief issued
Operational Guidelines number Pops-07/SK/6/62 dated 3
September 1962, which mentioned the Operation Bradjamusti.
125
The operation’s objectives was to prepare the Task Force that
would anticipate the possibilities of the Dutch disregarding the
Treaty and recapturing specific target (Sorong) as a front line
base. This policy was issued since there had been reports of
the Dutch still conducting patrols. However, this operation was
abandoned when the Dutch announced the plan to withdraw its
troops on November 1962. 126
The Mandala Commander-in-Chief, then, deployed
Operation Sadar that was based on Operation Guidelines
number POPS-08/SR/62. 127 It was aimed to anticipate
potential chaos in the areas left by the Dutch on 15 November
1962. The main focus of Operation Sadar was preparing the
hand-over of Irian Barat from the UN on 1 May 1963. Since
the mission of this operation was about securing the military
and diplomatic gains of the Indonesian government, it follows
that there were attempts to to openly and clandestinely embed
military, territorial and civil elements within the UN tasks.
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 395; refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op.
Cit., pp. 42-43.
124
Ibid, p. 396; refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 43.
125
Sudono Jusuf, Op. Cit., pp. 188-189.
126
Ibid
127
123
43
44
For example, the Army involved troops from Division II
that included Division Command, Infantry Brigade-I, Infantry
Brigade-II and Paratrooper Brigade; Military Command Area
and replacement troops for the Paratroopers in Irian Barat
and a battalion from Infantry Brigade-II. These troops were
embedded as UN staff, UNTEA staff, Advance Group, Papua
Battalion, and Group Support Team for each objective.
The Navy assigned the Amphiby-19 (ATA-19) Task Force
led by Navy Lieutenant Colonel Toto PS. ATA-19 commanded
fighting unit, transport unit, special task unit, air force unit,
and Marine Battalion led by Marine Major Umar Said. They
were prepared as staffs at UN, UNTEA, Advance Group, and
Kodamar. Besides their UN duties, the Mandala Navy had the
task of supporting and preparing the expansion of the military
troops on board of RI Multatuli, the territorial unit that
included Battalion 1 KKP, elements of the Navy 100 squadron,
and a number of war ships. This included transportation
duties by preparing 6 LSTs and merchant ships.
The Air Force, meanwhile, established the AC Task Force
Commando that consisted of bomber elements, air defence
elements, ground attack elements, and transport elements.
They were also tasked with joining the staff at the UN, UNTEA,
and Advance Group. Civilian elements were directly prepared
by KOTI.
Troops already present in Papua were gathered
in Kaimana and Sorong with follow-up duties split into
4 detachments spread in various areas. Detachment A
was assigned to Merauke. This detachment included the
detachment of Army Special Forces led by Major LB Moerdani,
Company-2 Battalion 530/Brawijaya under the command
of Captain Bambang Soepeno and Company-3 Batallion-2
Special Air Force troops led by Air Force Second Lieutenant B
Matitaputty. Major Untung was assigned to lead Detachment B
in the Kaimana area. This troop consisted of Company Garuda
Putih Battalion 454/Diponegoro led by First Lieutenant Idrus,
Company Gagak Battalion 454/Diponegoro led by Major
Untung, Company Rajawali Battalion 328/Siliwangi led by
First Lieutenant Atma and Banteng Tim II/Army Special
Forces plus 10 personnel from Special Air Force troop under
the command of Second Lieutenant Heru Sisnodo.
Detachment C was assigned Fak-Fak, led by IP TK II
Hudaya Sumarya. This detachment only consisted of Company
A Mobile Brigade Detachment. Lastly, Detachment D that was
assigned in Sorong under the command of Captain Psk Radix
Soedarsono. The troops consisted of one Company of Special
Air Force soldiers led by Captain Radix Soedarsono, one
Company Nussy Batallion 700/R and 1 Company Kumontoy.
All four detachments were under the direct command of
the Indonesian Contingent Commando (Kotindo), Colonel MW
Soedarto. 128 However, there were communication problems
between Kotindo and the detachments. Some of the obstacles
included damaged and lost communication equipments as
the result of being sent out with parachuting troops, limited
spare-parts, and missing monitoring and communication
equipments that the UN had been in charge of.
While structurally and operationally it’s under the
supervision of UNTEA, Kotindo maintained its territorial
administration in order to prevail its PEPERA objectives. A
clear example was the incident at Kotabaru where a group of
people flew the Papua flag. The Kotindo commandant, Colonel
NW Soedarto immediately deployed a Hercules plane to pick
up the Army Special Forces troop under Major LB. Moerdani in
Merauke. The soldiers was instructed to take down all Papua
flags in Kotabaru. 129
Indonesian Contingent Commando was set up as a respons to faciliate coordination amongst units in West Irian in the post New York Accord signing. Indonesian
Contingent Commando was set up based on Order Instruction of the Commander
in Chief No SP-417/E/9/1962 and Order Instruction of the Commander in Chief
of Mandala Army Corps No SP-126/DIV/9/1962 dated 25 September 1962. Based
on the approval from United Nation Security Forces, Indonesian Contingent Commando was equipped by 100 personnel. Ibid. pp. 288-291
129
After finding out about the information, Moerdani and his men moved to Ko128
45
46
Furthermore, in preparation of the hand over of Irian
Barat to the Republic of Indonesia on 1 May 1963, the Mandala
Command execute a last operation code-named Operation
Wisnumurti. 130 Based on Operation Instruction POP-17 dated
5 January 1963, the objective of this operation was to develop
the populace’s mental health through outreach programmes.
The structure of the Kotindo staff also experienced a makeover.
According to SP number 64/PLM/BS/1/1963 dated 21 January
1963, the Kotindo was to be commanded by Brigadier General
U Rukman.
On 1 May 1963 West Papua was officially handed over
to Indonesia by the UN through UNTEA. At that time the
population of Papua was approximately 7,000 souls. 131 With
the withdrawal of UNTEA in May 1963 and the hand over of
Irian Barat, The Military Command Area XVII/Irian Barat
commenced its official function on 17 May 1963. 132 Prior
to that, the Military Command established the territorial
command in Papua, which consisted of one Military Resort
Command, 8 Military Area Command, 7 Puterpa, and 20
Koorterpa. The number of troops was strengthened with and
additional two Infantry Batallion. Alongside its military duties,
it also perform soci0-politic function (Socratez 2007; 398)
On 13 April 1964, the Miitary Area Command, Kodam
XVII/Irian Barat, was renamed Kodam XVII/Tjendrawasih
and later yet again renamed Kodam XVII/Trikora. 133 The
number if military personnels in Papua when the Kodam
was first established was thought to be 2,000 soldiers
tabaru. Based on their success in carrying out orders without no armed contact,
Moerdani was promoted as Asistant II of Indonesian Contingent Commando.
Ibid. p.301.
130
Ibid. pp. 303-306
131
Robin Osborne, Kibaran Sampari: Gerakan Pembebasan OPM, dan Perang
Rahasia di Papua Barat, (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat,
2001), p. 3.
132
Ibid, p. 75.
133
Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p. 110. Other sources mentioned the change of name
of Military Area Command on 30 June 1964. See also Socratez Sofyan Yoman,
Op. Cit., p. 398; refer also Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 45.
with the redeployment of new troops at Infantry Batallion
641/Tjendrawasih I from Kodam VII/Diponegoro and at
Infantry Batallion 642/Tjendrawasih II that came from
Kodam VI/Siliwangi. There were at least three new infantry
batallions in Papua: Infantry Batalltion 751/Tjendrawasih
whose personnels came from Kodam VII/Diponegoro and
stationed in Manokwari, Infantry Battalion 752/Tjendrawasih
thta came from Kodam VI/Siliwangi that was stationed in
Sorong and Infantry Battalion 753/Tjendrawasih assigned
to Jayapura. 134 The Kodam main duties were to uphold the
government’s authority, maintaining security and order and
to support the civilian government to rebuild Irian Barat. The
infiltrating troops formed the core of this force when Kodam
was established in Papua. 135
Resistance by pro-independence Papuans first occured
on 28 July 1965 in Manokwari. About 20,000 people from
Fak-Fak and Rasinki that was led by Johan Ariks (75), and
later, Lodewijk Mandatjan, Barens Madatjan, Ferry Awon and
Permenas Awon,136 attacked the Indonesian Armed Forces
barracks. They came from the hills to execute a hit-and-run
tactics.137
On 28 July 1965, the organisation known as Laskar Papua
assaulted the Kasuri Battalion at the Military Headquarter in
Arfak, Manokwari.138 The attack was led by Ferry Awom and
400 people who came from the Biak, Ajamaru, Serui, and
Numfor tribes.139 At least three military personnels from
Infantry Battalion 641/Tjendrawasih was killed.140 Later this
action inspired the song Yamewero.141
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., pp. 398-399; refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab,
Op. Cit., p. 44.
135
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 397; refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab
(Ibid).
136
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., pp. 76-77. Refer also to Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., p. 55.
137
Robin Osborne, (Ibid).
138
139
140
Ibid
141
134
47
48
While it provoked all sorts of political debates in Jakarta,
this did not appear to be affecting the military activities in
Papua. As proof, when Brigadier General K. Kartijo became
Military Commander of XVII/Tjendrawasih (from 1965 to 23
March 1966), he deployed a military action to respond to the
pro-independence organised by Papuans. The operation was
codenamed Operation Sadar142 and included intelligence, the
gathering of tribal heads to ensure their loyalty, capturing
the leaders of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) and
investigating citizens who rejected integration.143
Starting in 10 August 1965, the operation was focused
around Manokwari and had the objective of capturing Ferry
Awom and Julianus Wanma dead or alive before 17 August
1965. 144 The operation’s geographical reach was later
expanded since 25 August 1965. The Papua region was then
split into 4 sectors. The Manokwari region and its environs
became the front line operational post and was completed by
intelligence and territorial operations in support of its battle
operations. Other areas only had intelligence and territorial
operations to prevent the expansion of resistance. 145 In
addition in February 1966, about 100 families were shipped
from Java as part of the transmigration programme. 146
3. Military Policy during the New Order era
Military operations in Papua continued during the
transition period of the government of President Soekarno
following the 30 September movement. Nonetheless military
operations in the New Order period differed from those during
the Old Order era. During the Old Order period most military
operations were directed towards kicking-out the Dutch
Nurima KI Hendrowinoto (1998) as quoted by Agus A Alua (Ibid).
Ibid.
144
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., pp. 404-405.
145
Ibid.
146
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. 81.
142
143
from Irian Barat following the failure of diplomatic efforts.
During the New Order era military operations, which were
first executed on 28 July 1965 in Manokwari, were primarly
intended owards eliminate the Free Papua Organisation.
Between 23 March 1965 and 25 June 1968, the Commander
of the Military Area XVII/Tjendrawasih, Brigadier General
RR Bintaro, launched the military operation codenamed
Operation Bharatayudha. Its objective is to quash OPM’s
activities led by Ferry Awon in Manokwari and to establish
supremacy over the whole region in Papua. 147
During this operation, the military suplemented its
Infantry Batallion 314/Siliwangi with personnel from two
companies from Battalion 700/RIT, two companies from
Batallion 935/Mobile Brigade, two Marine platoons, one
Special Air Force platoons, and one Army Special Forces
team. 148 In addition, they also deployed at least two B-26
bombers, 1 Dakota plane, and 1 war ship. The military
intentionally deployed a huge force not only to crush the
OPM but also in preparation of winning the referrendum
(PEPERA). 149
Excessive casualties as a result of this massive operation
was unavoidable. Throughout 1967, record showed that
operation had resulted in 73 people shot dead, 60 people
arrested, forced 3,539 people to surrender themselves, and
confiscated 60 pieces of firearms. The huge force deployed by
this operation intimidated the Papuans who were surprised
that the central government was about to execute open
warfare to squash the OPM. 150
Military operation continued after this. The Military
Command Area XVII/Tjendrawasih under the command
of Brigadier General Sarwo Edhi Wibowo (25 June 1968 22 August 1969) organised another operation codenamed
Nurima KI Hendrowinoto (1998) as quoted by Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., p. 56.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
147
148
49
50
Operation Wibawa I. The operation was intended to rout the
remaining OPMs under Ferry Awon, secure the givernment
attempt to win the referrendum, and consolidate the
Indonesian government’s authority in Papua.151 To achieve
that, the Military Command Area integrated battle, intelligence,
and territorial operations. Sarwo Edhi also instructed every
Military District Command (Kodim) set up ready-to-bedeployed troops.152
Sarwo Edhi combined combat and non-combat
operations in this operation. 153 To prevent violence, Sarwo
Edhi printed out pamphlets that were distributed by Dakota
and B-25 planes, calling for the rebels to cease the actions
and support the Indonesian government. Furthermore, Sarwo
Edho assigned Army Specia Forces Major Heru Sisnodo and
Sepcial Air Force Sergeant Major John Saleky to convene a
meeting with the OPM leader, Lodewijk Mandatjan, in the
jungle. Their task was to persuade Mandatjan to terminate his
resistance and leave the forest. They proved to be successful
in their duties. 154
To secure the PEPERA referrendum, Kodam XVII/
Tjendrawasih was also reinforced by the Intelligence Operation
Agency Detachment and the Army Special Forces Karsa Yudha
team. The military also established Special Operation (Opsus)
led by Major Ali Moertopo. Opsus was tasked with intelligence
and social-economy activities in support of mass mobilitasion
within the territorial operation. 155 On the whiole, Operation
Wibawa involved 6,220 soldiers.
Nurima KI Hendrowinoto (1998) as quoted by Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., p. 56.
153
Hendro Subroto, Sintong Panjaitan, Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando,
(Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009), pp. 157-158.
154
Heru and John have personal connection with Mandatjan. Keduanya adalah
anak angkat dari Mandatjan. Dengan kedekatan tersebut, Mandatjan beserta anak
buahnya bersedia menyetop perlawanan dan keluar dari hutan. Mandatjan sempat
dibawa ke Biak untuk bertemu Sarwo Edhie. Mandatjan kemudian dibawa ke
Jakarta untuk diberi gelar Mayor titular Angkatan Darat. Ibid, pp 158-161.
155
151
152
Although structurally the command of the operation
was led by the Military Area Commander, in reality central
command of security in Papua was dominated by Opsus under
the control of General Ali Moertopo. This model continues
today with the intelligence operation in Papua. 156
Operation Wibawa was split into four stages: (1) to
defeat armed resistances, expand the military’s territorial
control and prepare one infantry troop under every People’s
Resistance Affair Officer to execute the territorial operations;
(2) to secure the Indonesian government‘s victory over
the referrendum in the “Bird’s Head” region; (3) to ensure
victory over the referrendum; (4) to secure the result of the
referrendum. 157
Some of the stages didn’t go as planned. In several areas
such as Erambo (Merauke), Dubu/Ubrub, Enarotali, and
Wahgete there had been resistance from the populace. In
Enarotai, for example, the opposition was led by Papuan police
officers who supported the rebelion under the leadership
of AR Wamafma, Senen Mote, Maphia Mote, and Thomas
Douw. There were open exchange of fire. To subdue this
resistance, Sarwo Edhi deployed troops from the Area Defense
Command, the third Company of Batallion 725/Hasanuddin,
Army Central Intelligence Service, and the Air Force Task
Force that was complemented by B-26, Dakota, and Hercules
planes to bolster the Military District Command 1705/Nabire.
To defeat the resistance in Wahgete, Sarwo Edhi assigned
troops from the Batallion 724/Hasanuddin. This operation
was led by Major Mochtar Jahja and Major Sitompul. 158
In addition, in 1967, the military organised Operation
Tumpas. This operation was executed in the Ayaamaru,
Teminabuan and Inanwatan region. It was said that this operation
resulted in huge number of casualties but thus far no report
existed to ascertain the specific number of victims.
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., pp. 407-408.
158
Ibid
156
157
51
52
Alongside his duty as the Chief of Military Command
Area, Sarwo Edhi was also appointed Head of the Regional
Executive Project through the Interior Minister’s document
number 30/1969. Based on this document, he was
responsible for managing, directing, and coordinating the
activities of all local government’s civilian, military, and
private sector personnel in Papua. 159 Interestingly, although
Sarwo Edhi had a reputation for being non-comprimising
he appeared to establish a good impression by taking a
more accommodating approach when dealing with the
OPM. 160
Sarwo Edhi’s effort paid off. The result of referrendum
showed that between 14 July and 2 August 1969 the option to
join Indonesia received the most votes. 161 Since then Papua
officially joined the Republic of Indonesia. 162
Regarding the referrendum, the military organised
a special operation codenamed Special Operation To
Secure Victory over the Referrendum. This operation was
led by Major Ali Martopo (1961-1969). The focus of their
activities was intelligence and social-economy in support
of the territorial operations. In securing victory over the
referrendum, the Special Operation’s execution was split
into 4 stages: (1) destruction of resistace and expansion of
the military troops’s control of the region; (2) ensure the
victory of the referrendum in the “Bird’s Head” region; (3)
ensure victory of the referrendum on D-Day; (4) secure the
result of the referrendum. Alongside its military operations,
Special Operation also executed socio-politic operations. Local
government officers disloyal to the Republic of Indonesia were
to be ousted from their posts. The Military Area Command
was to monitor this. In addition, the military also scrutinise
civilians’ activities.
Ibid
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. 80.
161
On PEPERA, refer to Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., pp. 58-76.
162
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. xxvii.
159
160
The PEPERA referrendum or Act of Free Choice in 1969 was
not implemented simultaneously but commenced in Merauke on
14 July 1969163 and ended in Jayapura on 2 August 1969. There
was the conference that was organised in 8 cities in Irian Barat
and overseen by the UN Delegate, Dr. Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, the
Bolivian Ambassador to the UN, who was assigned by the UN
Secretary General, U Thant, to implement tasks related to Act of
Free Choice in Irian Barat in 1969. 164
To manage the implementation of Act of Free Choice in
Irian Barat, Ortiz-Sanz arrived in Jayapura on 22 August 1969
accompanied by three staffs and Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro,
special aide for Papua to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. 165 After
visiting the region and gathering information about the procedure
of implementing the referrendum, on 1 October 1968 OrtizSanz as the UN envoy was to accept the result of the people’s
conference to be organised later in 1969. 166 The referrendum
conference held in 8 cities in Irian Barat was to be represented
by various groups. 167
163
John RG Djopari, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, (Jakarta: November, 1995), p. 74.
Ibid. p. 74.
Ibid. p. 75.
166
Ibid
167
Ibid
164
165
53
54
Table 2.2.
Implementation of Act of Free Choice in Irian Barat168
Dates
Districts
Members of the
referendum People’s
Discussion
Population
14 July 1969
Merauke
175
144.171
19 July 1969
Paniai
175
156.000
16 July 1969
23 July1969
26 July 1969
29 July 1969
31 July 1969
2 August 1969
Jayawijaya
Fak-fak
Sorong
Manokwari
Teluk
Cenderawasih
Jayapura
JUMLAH
175
175
110
75
130
110
1.025
165.000
43.187
75.474
49.875
91.870
83.760
809.307
Long before the implementation of the referendum, the
Indonesian military had organized the Operation Wibawa that
was operationally led by the Military Area Command XVII/
Tjendrawasih.169 The objective of the operation was to secure
the referendum, crush the Free Papua Organisation (OPM)’s
rebellion led by Ferry Awon, and uphold the authority of the
Indonesian government. 170 The operation to secure victory in
the referendum was executed by the Sandi Yudha Commando,
today known as the Army Special Forces, in cooperation with
territorial military personnel and other troops deployed in
the area. 171
To implement the referendum, the Act of Free Choice
People Council (DMP) was established in every district, in
which every population of 750 souls was represented by one
Ibid
Hendro Subroto, Op. Cit., p. 169.
170
Ibid
171
Ibid pp. 169-170.
168
169
DMP. Since each district differed in population size it was
decided that the minimum number of DMP members was 75
persons and the maximum number was 175 persons. 172 The
Council consisted of local elements such as Local Authority/
District chiefs, representatives of political parties, social and
religious mass organisations, and traditional elements such
as tribal and traditional chiefs. 173
However, the condition post-referendum did not improve.
Most of those who disapprove of the result left Papua. 174 Postreferendum there were two quarelling groups: those who
were pro-integration and those who were against it. The
later group was often categorised as OPM. As a result of the
security situation post-referendum was the exile of a large
number of people from Papua to Papua New Guinea. This
was the beginning of the open conflict between those who
support and those who rejected the referendum. 175 To note,
over the course of the implementation of the Act of Free Choice
in 1969, over 4,000 people crossed the border to Papua New
Guinea. 176
After Sarwo Edhi, Brigadier General Acub Zaenal took
over the command of the Military Area Command XVII/
Tjendrawasih. 177
Acub organised a military operation codenamed
Operation Pamungkas. The objective was to squash the
remaining OPM in Biak and Manokwari. In this operation
the military had two policy approaches. First was a soft line
policy, a persuasive method that called for OPM followers
to surrender. Second, a hard line policy that was to be
Ibid.p.. 168.
Ibid.p.. 168.
174
Moch Nurhasim in Pengelolaan Keamanan dan Pertahanan di Papua. p. 102
175
Ibid
176
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “Papua: The Last Frontier for Democratization, Demilitarization and Decentralization in Indonesia”, dalam Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed),
Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia, RSC Working
Paper No. 42 September 2007, University of Oxford, England www.rsc.ox.ac.
uk/PDFs/RSCworkingpaper42.pdf, (Accessed 12 February 2011).
177
Agus A Alua, Op. Cit., pp. 56.
172
173
55
56
implemented if the OPM failed to go along with the first
approach. This method was implemented when the army
pursued Ferry Awom.178
Under Acub’s leadership, the Military Area Command
was expanded to include three Military Resort Commands, 9
Military District Commands, and three Infantry Batallions. 179
The Infantry Batallion 751/Tjendrawasih stationed i Arfai,
Manokwari, was deployed for long-term duty from the Military
Area Command VII/Diponegoro. Infantry Batallion 752/
Tjendrawasih in Sorong came from Military Area Command
VI/Siliwangi and Infantry Battalion 753/Tjendrawasih based
on the Ifar mountain, Jayapura, was assigned from Military
Area Command VIII/Brawijaya in addition to soldiers recruited
in Papua. The three Infantry Batallions was developed into
an organic troop based in Papua while soldiers from other
units were stationed in Papua on assignment-base missions.
This reorganisation was implemented in anticipation of the
upcoming general election of 1971. 180
The OPM waged resistance when the Military Area Command
prepared the implementation of the general election. Operation
Pamungkas was executed at the Military District Command in
Biak led by the Military District Commander Major RA Hendrik
and Batallion 753 Commander Major Puspito. Other troops
involved in the operation were Infantry Batallion 753 and 752.
181
A similar operation was deployed in Manokwari led by the
Combined Battalion Unit Task Force 3/Merdeka Commander,
Major Ahmad, later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel S. Mardjan.
This operation involved Task Force 3/Merdeka, one Batallion
751 platoon and one Batallion 752 platoon.
As a result of the continuing resistance againts the
Indonesian government, the military closed off media access
to Papua. Military operation continued to build massively. The
Ibid
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., pp. 410-411
180
Ibid; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 51.
181
Ibid
178
179
operation was noted for the use of OV-10 Bronco and armed
helicopters. 182
As in the general election of 1971, there had been armed
confrontation during the “democracy party” of 1977 in
Kobagma, Bokondini, Mulia, Ilaga, Piramid, Enarotali, Biak,
Mikika, along the border of Papua New Guinea and Jayawijaya
district. At that time, the post of Military Commander was
held by Brigadier General Imam Munandar. The resistance
was a response againts the placements of military personnel
throughout Papua. 183
In Jayawijaya, for example, the operation was held in April
and June 1977 to bring to an end the resistance of the Ndani
tribe that opposed government policy forcing their people
to wear cloths. The operation was codenamed Operation
Koteka (Penis Sheath). Around 15,000 people had gathered
to protest. At Tiom, Jayawijaya, apprpximately 4,000 people
attacked a government office. In response the military sent
out helicopters to drop Army Special Forces troops.184
The OPM also assaulted PT. Freeports, Timika, on July
1977. They attacked pipes and company’s facilities. The
military retiliated with air strikes using Bronco planes
and dropping paratroopers from Infantry Batallion 753. 185
Because of this conflict the general election was postponed
in several areas.
The military organised huge operations throughout
1977- 1978. In south Jayapura close to the border and known
as the OPM’s base, the military undertook big operations in
the Jayawijaya hinterland, in Piramit, Kelila, Bokondini, and
almost all areas in Jayawijaya. It was said that the military
10,000 personnel who were preceded by air strikes using
Bronco planes. It was thought that during the operation about
1,602 OPM supporters and civilians were killed. Furthermore,
Ibid, p. 412-413; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 52.
Ibid
184
Ibid, p. 414; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p 53.
185
Ibid
182
183
57
58
the Indonesian Ambassador to Papua New Guinea estimated
that 1,800 soldiers were in pursuit in the jungle while another
3,000 stood guard. 186
In November 1978, the Minister of Defense/Military
Chief General M. Jusuf announced the “Operation Senyum” for
all Papua region. With this policy the Indonesian government
wanted to stop attempts at “disrupting” local Papuan culture
and allow its people to slowly adapt to norms already in
acceptance in the rest of Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia
would not undertake huge military operation in its handling
OPM. Instead it will simply implement border patrols and
regular security duties. 187
Nonetheless, rebellion against central government was
renewed especially since the beginning of its integration
into the Republic government policy in Papua continued
to be implemented with stringet political control. 188 Since
1982, Papua was given the status of Military Operation
Region (DOM, which ended in 1998). The result of the DOM
status was that the region became swamped by military,
intelligence, and police personnel, whose number equaled
the population’s density. It was noted that between 1982
and 1983 thousands of people evacuated to Papua New
Guinea from West Papua. 189
On 9 February 1984, the OPM flew the Bintang Kejora
flag. That incident was the beginning of series of events which
caused 10,000 people from West Papua to seek refuge in
Papua New Guinea. 190 As a result in the period of March and
June 1984, the military sent out Army Special Forces troops
to infiltrate the border. 191 The operation went on to capture
people who had been suspect.
Ibid
Ibid
188
J. Budi Hernawan OFM and Poengky Indarti, Op. Cit., p. 139.
189
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. xxvii.
190
Ibid, p. 24
191
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 416; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op.
Cit., pp. 54-55.
186
187
The flow of refugees entering Papua New Guinea
accelerated when the Muyu tribe in Mindiptana, Woropko
and Merauke went into exodus. The Muyu tribe, for
example, left their lands when the Army Special Forces
intelligence unit came in to seek out OPM members
following their attack of the military post in Kanggewo
and Kakuna on 11-12 April 1984. 192 The intensity of
this operation caused about 11,000 people to cross the
Papua New Guine border throughout February 1984 and
October 1985. 193
During this time, the military organise massive
intelligence operations. 194 Alongside its active soldiers,
the military also deployed retired personnel through the
transmigration programme in Papua. It was unsurprising to
see military patrols in areas that were base of operations of
the OPM such as Arso, Koya and Merauke. 195
Military operation intensified in 1984 or two years
after the implementation of the DOM status. It was noted
that the Military Area Command had at least six infantry
battalions, of which three were based in Papua and the
rest in the Mollucas islands as a combined Military Area
Command troops. Specifically, the infantry battalion
based in the Mollucas was given a different operation
tasks to those based in Papua, which undertook year-long
operations under the Military Resort Command. They
undertook operations on rotation. One of the infantry
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p. 416; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op.
Cit., pp. 54-55.
193
The decision taken by Muyu tribe to move out was followed by other tribes in Jayapura,
Fak-Fak, Manokwari, Mimika (Amugme), Sorong and Wamena. Refer to Eva-Lotta
E. Hedman, “Papua: The Last Frontier for Democratization, Demilitarization and
Decentralization in Indonesia”, in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed), Dynamics of Conflict
and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia, RSC Working Paper No. 42 September 2007,
University of Oxford, Inggris, http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/RSCworkingpaper42.
pdf (Accessed 12 Februari 2011); Refer also to Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Op. Cit., p.
418; dan Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 55.
194
Ibid
195
Ibid.
192
59
60
battalion in Ambon, the Airborne Infantry Battalion 733
was also classified as paratroopers. 196
Up until the military reorganisation of 1985
–undertaken by General Beny Moerdani—structurally
Irian Jaya was the responsibility of the Commander of the
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih and Special
Operations was the responsibility og Major General Ali
Moertopo. Special Operations was controlled by the
infamous institution known as New Order’s “invisible
hand”, led by the President’s personal assistant, Major
General Ali Moertopo. 197
Throughout 1995-1990, the military implemented at
least five operations.198 The first operation was Operation
Gagak I (1985-1986) led by the Commander of the Military
Area Command, Major General H. Simanjuntak. This operation
was undertaken in three sector areas: First, Sector A (border
region) which included: Military District Command 1701/
Jayapura augmented by supplementary troops from Infantry
Battalion 733/BS, one company of Infantry Battalion 751,
9 intelligence, two Civil Defence Units; Military District
Command 1702/Wamena supported by one Infantry Battalion
751, two platoons Kilipur-4/Diponegoro, two platoons of
Combat Engineers 10 and two Civil Defence Units; Military
District Command 1707/Merauke with one company of
Infantry Battalion 751, one platoon of Combat Engineers
4/Diponegoro, one platoon of Combat Engineers 10 and two
Civil Defence Units.
Second, Sector B (Central area) that included the
Military Resort Command 173/PVB with its main focus in
Nabire. Troops involved in the the operations alongside the
territorial personnel were one platoon Infantry Battalion
Ibid, hlm. 419-420; Refer also to Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 56.
Tatang Sumarsono (ed), AH Nasution di Masa Orde Baru, (Bandung:Mizan, 1997),
pp. 244-248, as quoted from Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p. 109.
198
Explanation on military operation in Papua from 1985 to 1990 is extracted from
Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., pp. 56-60.
196
197
753, one platoon Combat Engineers 4/Diponegoro and two
Civil Defence Units. Third, Sector C (“Bird’s Head” area) that
included the Fak-Fak region involving two companies from
Infantry Battalion 752 and two Civil Defence Units. It was
thought that there had been at least 14 OPM killed, 8 captured,
and two firearms confiscated.
The second operation was Operation Gagak II (19861987) led by Commander of the Military Area Command,
Major General Setiana. This operation was aimed at isolating
OPM from the rest of the population as well as detecting
people’s loyalty through patrol and intelligence and territorial
operations. The operation was implemented in three sectors
involving the whole organic troops and the Military Area
Command territorial soldiers as well as the Under Operational
Task Force of Infantry Batallion 321/Army Strategic Reserves,
six Army Strategic Reserves intelligence batallions, one
company of Infantry Batallion/Diponegoro, one company of
Combat Engineers/Brawijaya, Navy and Air Force personnels,
as well as Army pilots. In this operation it was said that 21
suspected OPM had been killed, 5 captured, 12 surrendered,
and 12 firearms confiscated.
The third operation was Operation Kasuari I
(June 1987-May 1988) led by Major General Wismoyo
Arismunandar. The focus of the operation was to crush
the OPM in border area, Jayapura, Paniai, Fak-Fak, and
Biak. The operation was undertaken in three sub-sectors:
(1) Sector A1 that included the border of Jayapura and
involving Infantry Battalion 321/Army Strategic Reserves
Task Force, Patimura II Task Force, two platoons of Infantry
Battalion 751, one Infantry Battalion 752 team, one team of
Army Special Forces analysts, one Army Strategic Reserves
combat intelligence, Special Intelligence Task Force of the
Command of the Restoration of Security and Order, one
platoon Combat Engineers-4 /Diponegoro, one company
of Combat Engineers-5/Brawijaya, and four Civil Defence
61
62
Units; (2) Sector A2 covering Wamena and involving troops
that consisted of one platoon of Infantry Battalion 751,
one platoon Combat Engineers-5/Brawijaya, one team
of Combat Intelligence of the Army Strategic Reserves,
one platoon plus Task Force 624/Tanjungpura and one
Civil Defence Unit; (3) Sector A3 covering Merauke
and involving troops that consisted of one platoon of
Infantry Batallion 751, one platoon Combat Engineers5/Brawijaya, Special Intelligence Task Force of the
Command of the Restoration of Security and Order,
one team of Combat Intelligence of the Army Strategic
Reserves, and two Civil Defence Units.
Meanwhile, sector B1 operational area included Nabire.
It involved troops from Infantry Battalion 753, Special
Intelligence Task Force of the Command of the Restoration
of Security and Order, one platoon Combat Engineers-4 /
Diponegoro, one platoon of Army Intelligence Section 173,
Marine unit, one platoon of Special Air Force unit, one team
from Military District Command Nabire, and two Civil Defence
Units. Sector C was only assigned in PT. Freeport’s area
and Jila village under the command of the Military District
Commander 1706/Fak-Fak. Troops involved in the operation
included one company of Infantry Battalion 752, 1 team of
Infantry Battalion 753, one platoon of Army Intelligence
Section 171, Special Intelligence Task Force of the Command
of the Restoration of Security and Order, and one Civil Defence
Unit. During this period, Thomas Wanggai was sentenced to
25 years imprisonment for flying the Morning Star lag at the
Jayapura sport stadium. 199
The fourth operation, Operation Kasuari II (1988-1989)
continued to be led by Major General Wismoyo Arismunandar.
The operation along the border of Papua New Guinea had
199
Thomas Wanggai died in prision in 1996. Read Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p.
xxix.
many similarities with Operation Kasuari I in its operations
and the type of troops involved. The operation’s activities
included territorial, intelligence and combat as well as order
and security through the Civil Defense Force. The territorial
activities were particularly geared towards the establishment
of pro-military villages.
The final operations were Operation Rajawali (19891990) led by Major General Abinowo. Their focus continued
to be the OPM along the border. This time, Abinowo’s
strategy tried to combine intelligence, territorial, and combat
operations at the same time. The establishment of militaryprotected villages and isolating OPM from the rest of the
population were the objectives of the territorial operations.
The Intelligence operations, meanwhile, was aimed to identify
and subdue the movement and influence of the OPM. At the
same time, patrols, which were part of combat operations,
pursued and destroyed OPM. Troops involved were from
the Military Area Command VIII/Trikora, Infantry Batallion
621/Tanjungpura, Infantry Batallion 431/Brawijaya (replaced
by Infantry Batallion 310/Siliwangi), one team of Combat
Intelligence of the Army Strategic Reserves, Army Special
Forces Dampak XX Task Force, Air Force Task Force, 3 Pula
helicopters, one Navy Cassa plane, 32 Sector Police, and six
Civil Defense Units.
At the beginning of 1990, military operations involved
organic Military Area Command troops supported by 32
Military Resort Command, which included the Task Force
of Infantry Batallion 732, Task Force Company of Combat
Engineers-10, Company of Infantry Batallion 751, Infantry
Batallion 752, Intelligence Task Force. In addition, nonorganic troops involved included Task Force Infantry Batallion
621, Infantry Batallion 431, Infantry Batallion 310, Combat
Intelligence team of the Army Strategic Reserves, Army
Strategic Reserves Detachments, and Air Force Task Force.
This period also saw the increase of the Army Special Forces’
63
64
intelligence operations.
Military operations undertaken throughout 1990-1998
were Operation Rajawali 03 (1991-1992), Operation Rajawali
04, Operation Rajawali 05 (1 April-30 September 1993),
Operation Rajawali 06 (1994), Operation Rajawali 07 (19951996), Operation Rajawali 08 (1 April-30 September 1996),
Operation Rajawali Command 10 A (1998-1999). Those
operations were implemented through three means, which
are Territorial Operation ( as part of main operation/show of
force) supported by Intelligence operation, Combar Operation
and Civil Defense Operation. Within this old model, the role
of police was to provide integrated support to all territorial
operations. 200
In short, throughout the New Order period, President
Soeharto used a security approach in subduing local armed
resistance. There had been a number of massive military
operations such as Jayapura (1977-1978) and in 1996-1998
in Bela, Alama, Jila and Mapenduma that, according to many
resources, resulted in human rights abuses. 201 The New Order
regime had made Papua its fiefdom because its military
leaders used armed might to dominate local politics and
government. 202
The Book on Dharma Bhakti of Military Area Command XVII/Trikora 1990-2001 period, as quoted from Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p 111.
201
Angel Rabasa dan John Haseman, “The Military and Democracy in Indonesia:
Challenges, Politics, and Power”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002,
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1599/MR1599.
ch10.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011); refer also to Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p.
xxxii.
202
Sendius Wonda, Jeritan Bangsa, Rakyat Papua Barat Mencari Keadilan, (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Galangpress, 2009), p. 108.
200
65
CHAPTER III
MILITARY POLICY IN THE POSTREFORMATION ERA
Political Context
The fall of the Soeharto government more or less brought
changes to the situation in Papua. While President, BJ Habibie
admitted that the problems in Papua was one the issues that
need to be resolved to in order to prevent political-economic
disturbance and an obstacle to the reformation. The President
was of the opinion that the situation in Irian could be resolved
through democratic process and by allowing autonomy as part
of the reform movement but would still need to refer to the
constitution and existing laws. Consequently, the government
felt that the situation in Papua was a domestic problem,
which would be handled internally and would not need UN
intervention. Nonetheless, Papua continued to suffer from
casualties from armed conflicts. Twenty-six people died
following military assault during a march where the Morning
Star flag was unfurled. Finally, the military took formal action that could
be considered distinctive. On August 1998, the Military
President BJ Habibie saw that there were 3 national issues potentially disturbing
the political, economic stability and hamper the process of reform which were the
status of East Timor as a province that was questioned by the UN Security General,
the fight from Free Aceh Movement who wished to free Aceh from Indonesia which
had no support from the UN and the fight from Irian Jaya separatist groups who
wish to free the province of Irian Jaya but also had no support from the UN. See
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. 2006. Detik-detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang
Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi. THC Mandiri. Jakarta. p134
Ibid. p. 135
Ibid p. 214
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. xxxii.
66
Commander-in-Chief expressed a public apology and
revocation of the Military Operation Zone (DOM) status in
Papua. Despite this official revocation, the characteristics of
military operations remained unchanged.
President Habibie initiated a dialogue for peaceful
resolution. The Papua elite, which included intellectuals,
church leaders, non-governmental organisation activists,
and tribal chiefs who banded together in the Irian Jaya
People Reconciliation Forum (Foreri) took the opportunity
by engaging the State Secretariat to organise the Jakarta
Informal Meeting (JIM). That meeting established a team of
100 Papuan leaders, representing the island’s social, religious,
and geographical groups, who will meet President BJ Habibie
on February 1999. In that meeting the Papuan elites continued
to demand independence with a transition period supervised
by the UN. However, the President did not respond to their
demand.
At the end of 1999 President Gus Dur visited Irian
Jaya and renamed it Papua (but not West Papua) and its
capital Port Numbay. Gus Dur also allowed the populace to
fly the Morning Star flag. He apologised for human rights
abuses and dismissed military and police officers that had
consented to the use of violence. Furthermore, on August
2000, President Abdurahman Wahid planned to grant Papua
a special autonomy status.
Sendius Wonda, Op. Cit., p 111.
The meeting was hosted in the office of the Vice President in the beginning of
November 1998 and attended by the eliets of Papua, the government and the
scholars. Refer to Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. 2005. Hak Menentukan Diri Sendiri Jenis
Baru di Papua: Pilihan antara Kemerdekaan dan Otonomi. In Dewi Fortuna
Anwar dkk (ed). Konflik Kekerasan Internal: Tinjauan Sejarah, Ekonomi-Politik,
dan Kebijakan di Asia Pasifik. (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia) pp. 241-269
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p xxxiv.
Gus Dur allowed the rising of Morning Star flag as long as its height did not compete with the red and white flag. Refer to Angel Rabasa dan John Haseman. The
Military ... www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1599/
MR1599.ch10.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011).
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. xxxiv.
MILITARY POLICY
Gus Dur’s action could be perceived as an attempt to
respond to at least two major events in Papua. The first was the
second Papua People Assembly at the beginning of May 2000,
which validated the region’s demand for separation from the
Republic of Indonesia. This reinforced the principle hypothesis
that the OPM movement was no longer a guerrilla movement
but has transformed into a political wing aiming for “freedom.”
10
The second event was the Papua National Assembly on June
2000 that was attended by 3,000 participants and demanded
the re-examination of the Act of Free Choice referendum.11
Subsequently, in the early days of democratic transitions
following the separation of the Military with the Police on 1
April 1999, military operations in Papua remained unchanged.
For example, there were no significant changes in the type of
operations and type of tasks assigned to Military/Police personnel
between Operation Rajawali 10 A, which was conducted for a
year, and the follow-up Operation Rajawalli 011 until the end of
2000.12 Both operations utilised the territorial operation concept
as its core approach supported by intelligence operation, battle
operation, and security and public order operation. Territorial
operation was deployed to strengthen civilian’s ability to defend
itself from separatist threats. Operation Rajawali 10A safeguarded
82 villages while Operation Rajawali 011 protected another 82
villages. In addition, the Police Mobile Brigade shot at least 55
people south of the Timika Mines where PT. Freeport’s gold and
coalmines is located on 2 December 1999. One person died of
the shooting. 13
Moreover, the fear of losing Papua was also reflected
in the deployment of the Conditioning and Communication
Network Expansion operation (Operation Conditioning and
Mobilisation) in 2000-2001. This operation was intended to
12
13
10
11
Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p 104.
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p xxx.
Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p. xxxvii (In this period, Police institution was under
the Armed Forces).
67
68
create a conducive situation and condition for the functioning
of local government while upholding the central government’s
credibility. This operation involved the Interior Ministry, the
Ministry of Defence and Security, the Foreign Office, Police,
Military, State Intelligence Coordinating Body, the Military
Strategic Intelligence Body, and the Regional Security Council
of the Province of Papua.
The method of the operation consisted of two aspects. First,
direct operation in the form of diplomatic mission, propaganda,
and a centralised publication and communication network
development such as mass gathering, pledge of allegiance,
and interactive dialogue. Secondly, indirect operation through
economic development by attracting investors, giving out
donations, granting of awards, constructing the history of
the integration of Irian into Indonesia, and recruiting locals
as government officers.
Central government’s inconsistent policy in Papua
continued during Megawati time as President.14 One the
one hand, Papua was given a special autonomy status. Other
hand, in 2003, President Megawati issued Presidential Decree
Number 1/2003 to accelerate the implementation of Law
Number 45/199 on the Establishment of West and Central
Irian Jaya Provinces and the Paniai, Mimika, Puncak Jaya,
and Sorong Regencies although the establishment of West
and Central Irian Jaya provinces were rejected the Local
People Representative Body. In other words, although special
autonomy was the principal policy the government continued
to persist with the expansion of the region.
Meanwhile, the Military Head Quarter implemented an
organisational structure at the Military Territorial Command
that consisted of two levels, which are the Command HQ and
Military Territorial Command Executive Unit XVII/Trikora.
In emergency security situation requiring rapid deployment
of personnel, the role of Military Territorial Command was to
14
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Op. Cit., p. 265.
MILITARY POLICY
support the Local Police. The Command HQ consisted of four
echelons (Head, Assistant Head, Service Staff, and the Military
Territorial Command Executive body). The Unit, meanwhile,
consisted of Military Resort Command 171/PVT; Military Resort
Command 172/PWY; Military Resort Command 173/PVB; and
two of the Main Regiment of the Military Territorial Command.
15
Alongside the Main Command, the military also deployed
external troops into the province of Papua, with the emphasis of
placing Army Special Forces to guard border areas and strategic
installations such as PT. Freeport Indonesia.16
The Police Mobile Brigade was also specially tasked with
guarding border areas alongside the Military. Specifically, a
combined Military and Police (particularly Mobile Brigades)
command post could be found in the border areas at Wutong. The
Military specialised in dealing with OPM threat while the Mobile
Brigade was positioned to support immigration officers and to
control the movement of people criss-crossing the border. 17
The most shocking event was the murder of the Papuan
leader, Theys H. Eluay, by the Army Special Force in 2001. Who
ordered the killing and the motive behind it, remains a mystery
until today, although the modus of throwing the body into a
ravine was typical of a crime scene in Papua. 18 The Military
pulled out 250 Special Forces personnel back to Jakarta in
2003, when the general public demanded the withdrawal of
the Army Special Forces following Theys’ murder. They were
redeployed to various assignments throughout Indonesia.
19
The withdrawal also marked the end of the Combined
Intelligence Task Force formerly known as the Maleo Task
Force. The Military used this fact to justify the expansion of
the Trikora Military Territorial Command Local Intelligence
Detachment of that time. 20
Ibid, p. 114.
17
Ibid pp. 116-117
18
Amiruddin al Rahab, Op. Cit., p. 61.
19
Kompas, “Kopassus Tidak Ditempatkan Lagi di Papua”, 25 February 2003.
20
Matthew N. Davies. 2006. TNI&POLRI Forces in West Papua: Restructuring
15
16
69
70
Megawati Soekarnoputri’s time in government could
be considered as a set back period. The government openly
declared military operations. The most revealing comments
occurred in April 2002. At that time, the Military Territorial
Commander Major General Mahidin Simbolon stated that the
2002 Project Budget Allocation of Rp. 8 billion provided by
the local government for the Military Territorial Command
XVII/Trikora was significantly short of the necessary fund the
military required in order to operate throughout Papua. 21
While providing guidance to the local government’s
Regional Security Council and Military/Police personnel at the
Sasana Krida Dok II Jayapura on July 2002, the Coordinating
Minister for Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
reiterated that nationally the Indonesian government was
dealing with four pressing agenda. These were: separatism,
conflict in Papua, terrorism, and the general election. In Papua,
the two pressing problems were separatism and conflicts.
According to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the government’s
response to curb separatism in Papua would be achieved through
two methods: eradicating it through military means and/or by
implementing economic, social, and cultural development while
allowing as much as possible the realisation of local authority and
considering separatism as a lower priority issue. In dealing with
the conflict in Papua, the government’s first attempt was to first
to bring to an end the separatist movement or to halt its spread
and to concede special authority status to the island.22 On August
2002, the Military Territory Commander Major General Nurdin
Zainal followed on this comment by stating that the military had
prepared two Platoons consisting of approximately 60 personnel
to support the Police in securing the city of Timika.23
Military personnel were even involved in administrative
&Reasserting Sovereignty. Nautilus Institute. RMIT.
Catholic Church, Frederika Korain, Theo P.A. Van Den Broek, Goglian Lumbangaol, Memoria Pasionis di Papua 2002-2003, (Jayapura dan Jakarta: SKP
Jayapura dan Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan, 2004), p 13.
22
Ibid.pp. 29-30
23
Ibid.p. 70
21
MILITARY POLICY
operations. On September 2002 the Regional Security Council
and Military/Police of the Mimika Regency executed a justice
operation all over Timika, conducting identity card control
in order to maintain security and prevent infiltration by
agent provocateurs. The Regent of Mimika, Klemen Tinial,
participated in the activity alongside the Mimika Local Police
Chief, Grand Commissioner Adjutant Drs. Paulus Warerpauw;
the Military District 1710 Commander, Infantry Lieutenant
Colonel F. Gultom; the Mimika Navy Base Commander, Navy
Major Lukman Hakim; and the Air Force Base Commander,
Major Admiral I Wayan Suhantika; and the Chief of the Mimika
District Court, Muhamad Yunus. 24
Military operations in Papua resumed in April-October
2003. This time it focused on Wamena. In this operation, the
Military Resort Command 171/Jayapura supported by Army
Special Forces and the Army Strategic Reserves was assigned
to annihilate OPM. The operation responded to the seizure
of the military’s weapons depot by armed attackers on 4
April 2003. The troops’ pursuit was not limited to villages
in Wamena but went as far as Kwiyawage. Civilians who had
been captured in Wamena were incarcerated at the Military
Resort Command HQ and were tortured.
This condition was further strengthened by the Military
Chief policy of October 2003, which ordered the deployment
of four new Battalions to Papua to supplement existing troops
numbering 10,000 soldiers. The extra four battalions were
tasked with guarding vital and strategic objects in Papua
(particularly in mining area), border region, and the city of
Jayapura and its environment. 25
The Presidential Instruction number 1 of 2003 on the
expansion of the province of Papua also caused continuing
Ibid.p. 73
Ikrar Nusa Bakti, “Operasi Militer dan Pemilu di Papua”, makalah singkat disampaikan sebagai bahan diskusi mengenai “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh,
Papua dan Poso pada Pemilu 2004” hosted by Propatria, Hotel Santika, Jakarta,
7 January 2004.
24
25
71
72
polemics among local inhabitants that resulted in loss of lives.
Some of the civilian groups thought that the expansion would
only lead to the increase of Military Territorial Commands in
Papua. On May 2003, for example, the Head of the Panel of
Papua Council of Mimika Regency, the Reverend Izak Onawame
was of the opinion that the Presidential Instruction number 1
of 2003 was a mistake by the central government and would
only lead to new conflicts. According to him, the concept for
expansion was not intended to develop Papua’s inhabitant but
to exterminate them. The sole Military Territory Command
present in Papua were already embroiled in human rights
abuses; with the division of the island into three regions there
would be two more Military Territory Commands in existence.
26
Meanwhile the Commander of the Main Navy Base, Admiral
Henk Wabiser agreed with the expansion of Papua province.
He even suggested that expansion would divide the island into
West, North and South. North Papua capital would be Jayapura
while Merauke would be the capital of South Papua. 27
Casualties resulting from the excess related to the
expansion idea were unavoidable. At least one person died
and eight others were wounded as the result of conflict during
the declaration of the expansion of Central Irian Jaya on
August 2003. Only after this happened, on 27 August 2003, did
the government as represented by the Coordinating Minister
for Politic and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, made the
statement that the government and parliament together will
review the various regulations related to Papua, including
Law number 21/2001 on Special Autonomy and Presidential
Instruction number 1/2003 on expansion. 28
The organisation of the region that fell under the control
of Military zone and Territorial VII (TT-VII) in the era of
Catholic Church, Frederika Korain, Theo P.A. Van Den Broek, Goglian Lumbangaol, Op. Cit., p. 50.
27
Ibid. p. 46
28
Ibid. p. 67-71
26
MILITARY POLICY
infiltrations to Irian Barat29 went through reorganisation
during the reform era, particularly if we were to compare
this with the emphasis of the political control and Military
Operation Zone30 status as implemented since 1982. During
those period even tribal wars such as those that occurred
between the Ndani tribes were handled using military
repression. 31
The change in Papua’s security management system
brought national and international attentions. The vast area
of the Papua province was of significant interest to security
policy makers in Jakarta, considering its land mass of 421,981
kilometres was over 3,5 times the size of the island of Java.
Bordering the Pacifi to the north, the Arafura Sea to the
south, and the Mollucas islands to the west made Papua one
of the Republic’s defensive front lines. 32 The international
community’s has a huge interest towards the management
of security and defence in Indonesia’s eastern most province,
particularly considering the intensity of reports around human
right abuses resulting from the Indonesian government’s
attempt to uphold security and defence in this region.
Military policy, military operations, placement of organic
and non-organic troops, operational budget, operational
policy, and the military’s plans for Papua will be explained
further in the subsequent section. However, it is important to
have an overview of the military position during the reform
The name was changed on 8 August 1962, when Commander in Chief of the Army
(Panglima Angkatan Darat/Pangad) set up a Military Area Command XVII/West
Irian with Commander in Chief of the Army Decision Letter No. KPTS/052/8/1962
under the name of Military Area Command XVII West Irian, Moch Nurhasim,
Op. Cit., p. 110.
30
The status of Military Operation Zone resulted the area to be swarmed with mlitary
personnel, intelligence personnel and police personnel that matched the overall
population density. The status ended in 1998. See J. Budi Hernawan OFM dan
Poengky Indarti, Op. Cit., p. 139.
31
In 1982, there was a tribal war amongst Ndani tribe, the military kidnapped the
head of the tribe and threw him from a helicopter. Robin Osborne, Op. Cit., p.
8.
32
J. Budi Hernawan OFM dan Poengky Indarti, Op. Cit., p. 137.
29
73
74
era to understand the context of military operations deployed
in Papua during the reform era and as a basis in analysing the
politics of security in succeeding chapters.
B. Military, Politics and Military Reforms33
“To me they are heroes because those they killed were rebels
or leaders of insurgents.” 34 “The Law says they are guilty. Fine,
but to me they are heroes,”35
That was how the former Army Chief of Staff General
Ryamizard Ryacudu responded to the judges who sentenced
the four Army Special Forces soldiers on trial for the
murder of Theys Hiyo Eluay, the head of the Papua Council
Presidium.36
The former Army Chief of Staff ’s attitude was ironic
and worrying. His attitude seemed to say that --even though
it happened during peace time and not in a period of direct
armed conflicts—the murder perpetrated by soldiers are
justified as the men they had been pursuing were rebels.
In a period of rapid democratisation, the army’s highestranking officer’s excessive attitude in regards to differences
in views held by some of its citizens was frightening. As a
law abiding nation, the government should have solved
Theys alleged insurgencies and his attempt of opposing
the constitution by trying him in a court of law, not by
killing him.
Reflecting on Theys’ case and the former Army Chief
of Staff ’s statements forces us to question the meaning
and direction of the ongoing military reformation. What
Most of the substance of this article was published in Al Araf, “Tentara Nasional
Indonesia (TNI)”, in Beni Sukadis, Almanak Reformasi Sektor Keamanan di
Indonesia 2007, (Jakarta: Lesperssi dan The Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces), 2007.
34
Pontianak post, “Ryamizard: pembunuh Theys Pahlawan”, 24 April 2003.
35
www.tempointeraktif.com,“Jenderal Ryamizard Theys Hiyo Eluay adalah Pahlawan’, 23 April 2003.
36
This case is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 33
MILITARY POLICY
was the meaning of the military new paradigm that was
announced at the beginning of the reformation era? Why
were the excessive views and disregard towards legal
mechanism continuing to occur? On the basis of these
questions, the process of military reform described in this
section will form the starting point for investigating the
relationship between the military reforms and the Papuan
problem in the next chapter.
1. The Dynamics of Military Reform
Indonesia’s transition as a democracy is a complex and
fragile process. Although political change since 1998 has
unlocked ample room for democracy, the institution, practice
and culture of democracy are yet to fully develop. Public
control towards state authority is not fully guaranteed. In
other words, although there has been more recognition for
civil rights, the state excessive power and hegemony remain
entrenched.
The process of political transition does not necessarily
allow the reformist group to easily seize and influence
power so that they can shape political change. Despite
Soeharto’s fall from power, established groups (the status
quo) continue to affect immense pressure against subsequent
political transitions. This process is characterised by political
negotiations between established and emerging groups. No
clear divide separates the two.
With this sort of process, any attempt at resolving the
military reform agenda is very much determined by the
reformist group’s political strength and energy to pressure
the status quo to sit down at the negotiation table. The
status quo is swayed not only by military politics but also by
other elements that are upset by the changes. This included
businessmen who are structurally dependent by military
politics as well as those who uphold certain political beliefs
75
76
and who perceive these changes as a threat against their
group identity 37
Since then, various assessments on the progress of
military reforms have emerged. A number of observers
concluded that the military has substantially reduced its
intervention in the political process, that they have improved
their professionalism and respect in regards to human
rights values, and that they have accepted civilian control.
John Bradford commented that the military, through their
commitments and policies, have distanced themselves from
the practice of politics and instead refocus on national defence
against external threats. However, others are of the opinion
that the reformation that started in 1998 had mostly been
ineffective and superficial in nature. The establishment of
an institution with sufficient power to control their agenda
did not accompany the military’s withdrawal from politics.
William Liddle believes that there has been no fundamental
change since the onset of the reform movement of 1998. 38
Regardless of these views, it must be admitted that on
the one hand the process of military reform has produced
positive developments while one the other hand retaining a
number of problems. Retrospectively speaking, a number of
commentators believed that the military’s commitment to
reform originated when Wiranto announced the military’s
new paradigm. This encompasses the following: First, the
Indonesian National Military (formerly the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia) will try to position itself in a more
supporting function rather than taking a leading role; second,
the military will take an influencing rather than an occupying
role; third, the military wants to have indirect rather than
direct influence; fourth, the military is ready for role-sharing
Rocky Gerung, Indonesia transisi politik dan perubahan dalam buku Indonesia di
tengah transisi, propatria, 2000, p. 178.
38
Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia:
Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, by the East-West Center
Washington, 2006
37
MILITARY POLICY
in state-level decision making related to governance with
other non-military constituents in the country.39 The new four
military paradigms were further expanded into the 14 steps
for internal military reform.
While Wiranto was the person who had first declared
the New Paradigm, others believed that this same paradigm
had been prepared since the time of President Soeharto. Agus
Wirahadikusumah40 claimed that the military Paradigm was
nothing new. Agus revealed that what Wiranto had proclaimed
had already been prepared when President Soeharto was
considering limited reform. As the movement gained steam,
this concept was again brought to the fore.
Further examination reveals that the new Paradigm
does not reflect the military’s aim and commitment to fully
disengage from political life. The new Paradigm simply changed
the military political model, from leading and dominating
Indonesian politics41 to taking a back seat although still
influencing the political dynamics.42 Furthermore, Ikrar Nusa
Bhakti asserts that the military new paradigm remains on the
surface and lacks substance.
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Teori dan Praktik Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Indonesia, in the
book on the dynamics of reform of security sector, Imparsial, 2005.
40
Agus Wirahadikusumah is considered by many as a radical and brave figure in
pushing for military reform. He served as Commander in Chief of Wirabhuana
Military Area Command and the Commander in Chief of Army Strategic Reserve
Command. One of the ideas of Agus Wirahadikusuham was the eradication of
territorial command structure. (see Salim Said, Legitimizing Military Rule, p 181,
Sinar Harapan, 2006.)
41
Military politics can be infered from the placement of active military personnel in
key State related positions (Ministers, Governor, Head of District and so forth).
42
The influence of politics to the military can be seen from the involvement of
Military Commander in Chief in the cabinet meetings to formulate political
policies. In the more extreme issues, politics shaped and pushed the military as
apparent in the final days of the Gus Dur administration downfall, when on 22 July
2001, Commander in Chief of the Army Strategic Reserve Command deployed a
number of tanks to the Palace in a periodic briefing in National Monument. This
symbolized military apathy to Gus Dur. Eight days later, Gus Dur was ousted and
Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri raised as President. See Ornop Wandelt,
“Security Sector Reform in Indonesia, Military vs Civil Supremacy” in Bob S
Hadiwinata and Christoph Schuck (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia, The Challenge
of Consolidation, (Jakarta: Nomos, 2007).
39
77
78
In this context, Anders Uhlin was correct in thinking
that the Indonesian military sees its involvement in politics
as permanent. 43 For the culturalist, as explained by Ben
Anderson, authoritarianism and the expansive role soldiers
play in all aspects of life originates from the position and
cultural image of soldiers in Indonesia, which continued the
tradition of the Javanese nobles of the Robe and the political
concept of the Mataram kingdom that emphasised obedience,
seniority, and harmony. 44 This Mataram political tradition
continues to be observed within the military.
The progress of military reform can be quantitatively
described as follows: 45
Year
1999
Table 3.1.
Progress of Military Reform Quantitatively
Government
Gus Dur
Achievement
Reorganisation of
the Department
of Defence and
Security into
Department of
Defence
Notes
Unfortunately the
transformation was not
followed by a reorganisation
of the Department of
Defence. Today, the
Department’s second level
is still dominated by active
military officers. This
condition made it difficult
for the establishment of a
more independent Defence
Department since the
military officers answered
both to the Minister of
Defence and the Military
Commander-in-Chief.
nders Uhlin, Oposisi Berserak, (Bandung: Mizan, 1998).
Robertus Robert, “Empat Konsep Kritik Reformasi Sektor Keamanan”, in Al Araf,
et al (eds.), Dinamika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005).
45
It is modified from the table of Marcus Mietzner in his paper The Politics of
Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and
Institutional Resistance, by the East-West Center Washington, 2006
43
44
MILITARY POLICY
1999
Gus Dur
1999
-
2000
Gus Dur
2000
Gus Dur
2000
Gus Dur
2000
Gus Dur
2000
Gus Dur
2002
Megawati
Appointing civilian
as Minister of
Defence
Declaration of
neutrality and
separation from
Golkar party
Structural
separation of the
Military and Police
Separation of
Military-Police
duties. Military
is responsible for
defence. The Police
is responsible for
security
Removal of
the Double
Function doctrine
(professional
doctrine)
Termination of
the Coordinating
Agency for National
Stability
Appointment of
senior Navy officer
(Admiral Widodo
AS) as Military
Commander-inChief
Establishment of the
National Defence
Law
Previously the Minister of
Defence was simultaneously
the Military Commanderin-Chief
The Military was previously
affiliated with Golkar
The People’s Assembly
Decree number VI. 2000
The People’s Assembly
Decree number VII. 2000
-
Throughout Soeharto’s 32
years in powers his Military
Commander-in-Chief were
mostly appointed from
among senior Army officers
Despite apparent loopholes,
this law provide the basis
to redesign the defence
sector. This included the
government’s obligation
to develop a general policy
on national defence and
the establishment of the
National Defence Council. In
reality the two requirements
had never been
implemented. Note also that
although the law was passed
during Megawati’s time in
government, it was already
under consideration when
Gus Dur was president.
79
80
2004
Megawati
2004
SBY
2005
SBY
Establishment of the Despite apparent
Indonesian Military weaknesses, normatively
Law
this law provide the
basis to redesign a more
professional military.
This includes the military
obligation to respect
democratic and human
rights principles, the
requisite to restructure its
territorial commands, the
prohibition to enter politics,
the hand over of its business
concerns, etc. In reality the
two requirements had never
been implemented.
Abolition of the
While the Military faction
Military/Police
has ceased to exist from
faction in the
the People’s Representative
Parliament
Council during the time
of SBY, this policy was
produced long before his
presidency.
Termination of the
Military Emergency
Status in Aceh.
The above table reveals that the most radical and
clear achievements of military reform occurred during the
leadership of Abdurahman Wahid. It is now wonder that
several political and military observers commended Gus Dur
as a committed and successful figure in pushing for military
reform. In his biography Greg Burton concluded that although
it ended too soon, President Gus Dur’s “control” of the military
was one of his “greatest achievements” 46
However, Gus Dur’s massive intervention in the
autonomy of the military caused resistance from the military
and may have contributed to his downfall. His appointment
of Agus Wirahadikusumah as the Army Strategic Reserves
Commanders, which bypasses the military internal procedures,
was seen as an excessive intervention by a civilian authority
(i.e., Gus Dur) in the military. Historically, this may reassemble
Ibid p. 22
46
MILITARY POLICY
Nasution’s mutiny against the government of Soekarno, which
also intervened deeply into military affairs of that period. In
this context, it’s relevant to remember Huntington’s model
of objectively controlling the military. He argued that civilian
authority need to respect the various aspects related to the
military’s own autonomy in devising its relationship with
civilians. 47
Apart from this, Gus Dur’s success in pushing for military
reform was very much influenced by an impetus to prove to
the public that his government was different from previous
ones.48 Furthermore, the direction of military reform had
become an imperative since civilisation demanded change.
Democratic movement has become a world political trend
in the last decade and global economic transaction has been
more or less independent from the polarisation of EastWest ideology. This last factor is a significant point since
the historical interpretation and practice of the military
Double Function had been developed within the context
of the cold war. As such the military’s aims and objectives
had been affected by cold war military doctrine. 49
In this context, the ups and downs of military reform
have essentially been influenced by two political dynamics:
global and national politics. The political commotion around
the national leadership of 2001 that ended with the fall of
Gus Dur, forced Megawati to compromise with the demands
of conservative elements within the military on the subject
of military reform when she took over the leadership. It
must be noted that Megawati’s concession to the military
was the result of her coalition and conspiracy with the
military and several political elites in toppling Gus Door.
This resulted in various aspirations by conservative groups
Samuel P Huntington, Prajurit dan Negara; Teori dan Politik Hubungan Militer-Sipil, Original Title: The soldier and The State : The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations, Penerjemah: Deasy Sinaga, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2003).
48
See Rocky Gerung, Op. Cit.
49
Ibid, p. 140.
47
81
82
within the military being accommodated. This included
the establishment of Battalion 714 Sinuous Morose in
Central Sulawesi, the Military Emergency status in Aceh,
the establishment of the Military Territorial Command
Iskandar Muda in Aceh, etc., in spite of Gus Dur’s50 initiative
to restructure the territorial commands as part of the
national reform agenda.
Furthermore, the Military Emergency status in Aceh
contradicted Megawati’s own commitment that not one
drop of blood will be shed in the region known as Mecca’s
veranda under her leadership. Even more tragic, Megawati
did not pursue legal resolution against human rights abuses
that occurred on 27 July 2006, in which she had been the
victim. Military reform became sluggish and diminished
during this period.
Nonetheless, at the end of her time in power the
Megawati government did enact the Indonesian Military
Law number 34/2004. Regardless of the normative
achievements of the military reforms as reflected in the
law, its enactment was not free from military politics and
Megawati’s accommodating government. This was the only
time that the Military faction was able to participate in
the drafting of the military law51 and thus safeguarding its
interests. The law was very quickly passed, less than 15
days, by the Parliament. 52
Meanwhile there has not been significant progress
in Military reform during SBY’s leadership. Some
commentators had earlier made prediction to that
The most important indication done by Gus Dur in reforming the military is that he
support the debate over territorial command in the future. Comman sytem has the
capacity and opportunity for political intervention that is the core of the military
interest, Ibid.
51
Post 2004 Election, there is no longer a Military Fraction in the House of Representatives
52
For further informaiton on the problems of the enactment of military law, refer to
Rusdi Marpaung, et al (eds.), Menuju TNI Profesional (Dinamika Advokasi UU
TNI), (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005).
50
MILITARY POLICY
effect. With a president who is a retired military officer
and supported by the military, military reforms has
become ambiguous. Various military reform agenda
had not been completed. This includes their neglecting
to restructure the territorial command as stipulated by
article 11 of the Indonesian Military Law no 34 of 2004,
the unfinished hand-over of military business concerns,
the incompletion of cases of human rights abuse, the
sluggish progress on military tribunal, etc. In other
words, SBY’s time in government has been marked not
only by the politics of doubt but in the context of military
reform he also implemented the politics of fearfulness.
In the global political context, the campaign against
terror also influenced the ebbs and flows of military
reforms during and prior to SBY’s reign. The war
against terror became a new justification for hard-line
institutions 53 (including the military) to push against
reform, as can be seen in their attempt to maintain
the territorial command structure under the guise
of war against terror. It was for the same reason that
the US government ended the weapons embargo that
was in force following the human rights abuses in East
Timor. SBY-JK’s government received positive marks
for terminating the Military Emergency status in Aceh
and achieving peaceful resolution in the province that
resulted in the Helsinki Accord. 54
Under the pretext of war against terrorism, National Intelligence Agency is requesting for more authority to the House of Representatives to arrests people suspected
for acts of terror. This is a clear contradiction to the initial function of the intelligence and a disturbance and a violation to criminal justice system mechanism. 54
Yet this accord cannot be separated from tsunami disaster in Aceh which leads to
international pressure on SBY-JK administration to resolve Aceh through peace
and negotiation.
53
83
84
2. Remaining Major Agenda in Military Reform
Restructuring Territorial Command
The military and political reformation specifically
mandated the necessity of restructuring territorial
commands. However, since the onset of the reform movement
the government has not taken any serious effort to implement
this directive. Instead, the government seems to be defending
and even strengthening the territorial command structure.
This can be seen in the utilisation of the territorial command
structure and function in the war against terror, which started
with Megawati and continued through Susilo Bambang
Yudhono’s government. Moreover, on 22 March 2005, the
Army Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant Djoko Santoso even declared
to the Parliament that the Army would establish 22 additional
Military Territorial Commands that consisted of 3 Military
Resort Commands and 19 Military District Commands. The
reason for this was based on the consideration that the
military is not yet equipped to implement a defensive model
for conventional warfare in the archipelago; its defensive
strategy would rely on war on land.
Organisationally, territorial commands are constructed
following the administrative configuration of local
bureaucracies rather than military defence zone. Its
organisation duplicates the bureaucratic structure of local
government from its highest level down to the administrative
village. Consequently, a Territorial Commander would
be directly involved in local governance to shape local
development through the Local Leaders Caucus, which
continues to exist until today.
Briefly, there are several reasons why territorial
commands need to be restructured. First, politically the
attempt to maintain and expand the territorial command
goes against the demands of the reform agenda. At the
MILITARY POLICY
outset of the reformation, almost all democratic elements
agreed that territorial command was part of the Military/
Police Double Function, which became a platform for the
military to be involved in politics. Consequently, there need
to be an alternative to territorial commands. In the past
territorial commands were also entangled with military
businesses, legal or otherwise, which led to human rights
abuses. Despite the military’s official withdrawal from direct
involvement in politics, its territorial commands’, which
duplicate the structure of civilian authority down to its
lowest level, continues to allow it to directly and indirectly
influence the political process and local governments. The
addition of 22 territorial commands could only mean the
government is not serious in reforming the military as a
professional army.
Second, in terms of security the territorial command
overlap the functions and structure of the Police. Third, from
a defence point of view, in reality the territorial command
structure is no longer relevant or significant to the current
type of threats and geographic context of Indonesia as
an archipelago. The territorial command structure as a
defensive stance and show of force need to replaced by
a more contextual model, which allows it to respond to
new and ever-changing threats and able to adapt to the
geographical condition of the archipelago.
Fourth, Article 11 of Law number 34/2004 on the
Indonesian Military implicitly mandates the restructuring
of territorial commands. The appendix also clearly states
that the military stance needs to consider and prioritise
security-prone areas, border zones, conflict-prone regions,
and outlaying islands in accord with geographical conditions
and defence strategy. It also ordered the military to avoid
using its power to establish organisations that will open up
opportunities for the practice of politics and duplicate the
administrative structure of civilian authority.
85
86
Furthermore, President SBY’s commitment to
restructuring is questionable. This can be inferred from
his statement before he became President in 2004 where he
denied any plans for terminating territorial commands and
Military Resort Commands if he was elected. To clarify this
issue he directly contacted the then Military Commanderin-Chief General Endriyartono Surtarto and the Army Chiefof-Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu. Another example is
when SBY requested the military to be actively involved in
cracking down on terrorist actions in Indonesia, which the
military immediately responded by activating its territorial
commands.
The attempt to reactivate territorial commands in
the war against terror provoked criticism from a number
of groups, such as former President Gus Dur who clearly
rejected the idea of reviving territorial command to combat
terrorism in Indonesia. He believed that this reactivation
would return the military into politics and therefore need
to be avoided. He believed the military has to stay true to
its function as defenders. The reactivation of territorial
commands will blur the lines and provide opportunities for
the military to return to politics.
Taking Over Military-owned Businesses
The transformation of the Indonesian military as a
professional defensive force stipulates its withdrawal from
owning active businesses. The Indonesian Military Law is
resolutely prohibiting the military to engage in commerce
while ordering the Indonesian government to takeover all
businesses owned by the military.
The law stipulate that the takeover of all businesses
owned by the military need to be completed by the end of
2009. As a first step, in early 2005 the government set up the
Military Business Transformation Supervision Team, which
MILITARY POLICY
involved the Defence Department, Finance Department,
Law and Human Rights Department, and the Ministry
for State-owned-Enterprises (MSOE). Led by the MSOE’s
Secretary, Said Didu, the team was tasked with verifyng
all military businesses, which were said to, consisted of
219 business units. In its initial plan, as declared by the
Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono, the process will
happen in 3 (three) months, in which the businesses owned
by the military will be taken over by the government to be
reclassified as a Public Company, a Limited Company or a
Holding Company (Joint Company).
However, from the outset the steps taken by the
government have come into a lot of criticism. Besides the
problems related to transparency, there was also the issue
of the government’s sluggishness. The result is that the
process remains incomplete until today. One of the problems
resulting from this condition is the concern that the military
could potentially shift its business assets to avoid the take
over. It’s important to raise this issue since in 2005 the
Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono revealed that the
government would only take over 10 out of the 219 business
units owned by the military, with a total assets of about Rp.
25 billion per unit. What happened to the other 209?
Moreover, the government’s slow progress also
provoked criticism and enquiries about its commitment
around this agenda. The criticism and questions centred on
the President who until the beginning of 2008, for example,
failed to produce a Presidential Decree that would serve as
a legal platform for the sorting out and take-over of military
businesses.
Meanwhile, the recommendation of the National Team
for the Take-Over of Military Business Activities led by Erry
Riyana Hardjapamekas, noted that the military controlled
23 foundations that oversaw 53 limited companies. They
also controlled 1,098 co-operatives that also manage two
87
88
limited companies, and made use of State-owned-Assets
that was managed by third parties. The team found also
found that the military controlled 1,618 parcels of land
totalling 16,544.54 hectares; 3,470 parcel of lands and
buildings totalling 8,435.81 hectares; and 6,699 buildings
totalling 37.57 hectares. At the end of 2007, foundations
owned by the military had Rp. 1,8 trillion in cash while its
co-operatives had Rp. 1,3 trillion in cash. In general the
military’s foundations, co-operatives, and companies’ total
assets amounted to Rp. 3,2 trillion. By subtracting Rp. 980
billion in administrative duties, their assets came to Rp. 2,3
trillion a year.
The team proposed several recommendations related
to the regulation and taking-over of the military business
and assets. Among its recommendations was the taking
over of the military business activities by regulating
and repositioning all of its foundations, including its cooperatives and State-owned-Assets, except its primary
co-operatives. Erry Riyana argued that their reason for
maintaining the primary co-operative was because its aim is
to improve soldiers’ welfare. Furthermore, the team would
return those State-owned-Assets used by the military but not
related to its functions and duties to the Ministry of Finance.
State-owned-Assets managed by third parties would be
regulated in reference to Non-Tax State Income regulations.
The other recommendation around the repositioning
of military businesses was to integrate military-owned
foundations and co-operatives with similar businesses
under the supervision of the Defence Department.
The next step was comprehensive legal and financial
audits of military-owned foundations and co-operatives. A
Task Force set up by the Department of Defence to ensure
continual service for soldiers, meanwhile, will replace
primary Co-operative. This unit will even be attached to
troops in battlefield.
MILITARY POLICY
Regardless of the various criticisms and debates
related to this issue, the government need to speed up and
complete the regulation and taking-over of all militaryowned businesses as mandated by the law. This is to ensure
that the whole military reform agenda will be implemented
effectively in the effort to establish professional soldiers.
The sluggish pace in the implementation of the agenda
could only impede the process of military reform. The
government’s commitment, particularly those of the
president and the military as the government’s implementer
in matters relating to national defence, are at stake.
Reforming Military Tribunal
Yet another incomplete reform agenda is the proposed
changes to Law number 31 for 1997 on Military Tribunal
as mandated by the People’s Assembly Decree number VII
of 2000 about the functions of the military and polices well
as Law 34 of 2004 on Indonesian Military. The process of
reviewing the draft law is stuck in Parliament despite the
fact that those Members of Parliament elected in 20042009 elections have now been replaced by those elected
in 2009-2014.
The sluggishness of the review raises questions
considering that the reformation of military tribunal is
important in pushing the military reform agenda in general,
which necessitates military’s obedience to legal supremacy
as well as a civilian authority that is democratically elected
through public votes. The need for change is also driven
by various facts in which military tribunal is often used to
conceal criminal acts perpetrated by military personnel
without impunity.
Member of Parliaments initiated the draft law on
changes on Law number 31 of 1997 on Military Tribunal
from the 2004-2009 periods. However, in reality there has
89
90
already been a demand for change since the parliamentary
period of 1999-2004. Nonetheless, the review process has
not been as simple as was thought earlier. The Parliament
was embroiled in a tough debate with its government partner,
which in this case was the Department of Defence.
The debate centred on two crucial points: First, relating to
the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, the draft law proposed
to have military personnel to be tried in general court for
committing civilian crimes and to be tried in military tribunal
for offenses related to military crimes; Second, relating to
the government’s demand that the Parliament prioritise the
revision of the regulation of law related to military penal codes
rather than reviewing military tribunals. The ongoing debates
caused participants in the review of the draft law to be at odds
with one another so that President SBY had to intervene and
declared his agreement on the changes on jurisdiction as
proposed in the draft law. In spite of this, until the end of the
Parliamentary period of 2004-2009, the review process of the
draft law remains unfinished.
Defence Budget
The issue of military spending has become a frequent
debate in Indonesia. There are at least three elements
involved in this debate. They includes the parliament and
the government which have the authority to set the budget,
the military as the institution benefiting of that budget, and
the general public. The central topic of this debate remains
the insufficiency of the military and defence spending. This
issue resurfaced during the 2009 presidential election
and as a result of numerous fighter and transport planes
accidents. The ensuing discourse was predictable with
the military demanding more funds and the parliament
responding by saying that they will increase spending in
next year’s National Budget.
MILITARY POLICY
Looking at the 2009 National Budget, the military
received a budget of Rp. 35 trillion. This amount was less
than the previous year when they received Rp. 36,37 trillion
following general cuts to all department spending. The
Parliamentary Commission I will increase the military
budget by Rp. 10 trillion in the 2010 National Budget in an
attempt to support the battle-readiness of the military’s
main weaponry and personnel. The ensuing discourse and
response beg another question.
It must be admitted that the current spending
does not yet attain the “ideal” budget. However, fixing
principle problems in the defence sector is a prerequisite
to determining increases in spending. This includes a
rethinking of the redesign of defence systems and strategy;
the introduction of gradual defence planning; and the setting
up of measurable scale of priority. The fact is that while
geographically Indonesia is a maritime nation, its defence
orientation still emphasised the deployment of land-based
Army supported by a structure of territorial commands.
The government is even considering the establishment of
national reserves with the consequence that it will become
yet an additional cost in the existing budget.
Moreover the demand for an increased defence budget
needs to be accompanied by transparency and accountability
of the defence sector. Transparency and accountability
remains an issue related to corruption. The misuse of funds
in the name of ensuring soldiers’ welfare has resulted
in internal conflicts within the military. In addition, the
parliamentary and the State Financial Audit Body are yet
to prove their effectiveness in monitoring spending in the
defence sector.
Under this context, the difficulty of allocating budget for
the defence sector is not only affected by limited spending
but also misallocation of funds, inefficiency, ineffectiveness,
and poor supervision of defence spending. As a result, the
91
92
allocation of defence budget is yet to show strong correlation
with improvements in defensive might.
Consequently, the political decision maker need to
position the discussion on defence spending as an integral
part of the wider discourse on defence in particular and
other issues in general, so that it can establish a defence
spending that is proven, measurable, and accountable.
The Military Doctrine
In 2007, after 9 years of reform, the military declared
its new Tri Dharma Eka Karma doctrine to replace the
previous Catur Dharma Eka Karma, based on the Military
Commander-in-Chief ’s Decreed number Kep/21/I2007.
What has substantially changed with this new military
doctrine and how is this different than the old one?
The new doctrine was part of the mandated military
reform. An investigation of the substance of the doctrine
reveals a number of changes, including institutional and
functional changes. Nonetheless this military doctrine still
failed to separate its values and virtues as reflected in the
inclusion of state values in the doctrine, which is stated to:
“uphold the authority of the state, defend the integrity of
the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, and protect the
nation and the homeland from threats and attacks against
national unity.”
Those values are the values that should be defended
by all elements in the country not just by the military. As
such, those values did not need to be included in the military
doctrine. The inclusion of such values would not only confuse
values with virtues but also will open to interpretation that
all the nation’s problems are the problems of the military
so that the military would solve it through military means,
which often use a forceful approach. It must be remembered
that the use of force should only taken as a last mean in
MILITARY POLICY
resolving the nation’s problems. The military doctrine
should have been more operational in nature and should
not contain national values that are already included in the
constitution as well as affirmed in the Law on Indonesian
Military.
Moreover, the military need to be extra careful in
interpreting its Tridek doctrine, particularly in facing
various “non-military” threats. The military cannot be
reckless in detaining civilians who are critical towards
their own country. In a democracy, critical discourse is
part of “the freedom of opinion and expression” and is not
considered a military threat.55 The military need to avoid
the use of force in this matter.
Table 3.2.
Comparison Between the Military’s New and Old Doctrine
Old Doctrine
“Catur Dharma Eka Karma”
The Military and Police as part of one
institution
The Armed Forces of the Republic
Indonesia function as defence and security
as well as a socio-politic force.
55
New Doctrine
“Tri Dharma Eka Karma”
The Military as a separate institution from the
Police
The Indonesian National Military functions as
a defence apparatus of the state, performing its
duties in accordance to the policy and decree of
the state.
M Alfan Alfian, “Doktrin Baru TNI”, http://alfanalfian.multiply.com/journal/
item/8/Doktrin_Baru_TNI, (Accessed on 1 June 2011).
93
94
A.
The Armed Forces of the Republic
of Indonesia’s defence and security
functions to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Take action and be the
first line of defence
against any threat from
enemy from outside and
inside the country
Secure, uphold public
order and rescue the
people and to enforce
state law
Train and guide the people
as part of the defence and
security of the state, by
establishing the people’s
capacity and strength for
resistance against threats
Act as a guide to develop
the state’s defence
and security capacity
and strength as part of
the state defence and
security management
by maintaining and
improving its defence and
security capability and
strength on land, at sea, in
the air, and in upholding
public order and safety.
The Indonesian National Military’s function as a
defence force is as:
A.
B.
C.
Protector, the military must have
the capability to defend against any
military and non-military threats
from outside and inside the country
that endanger the nation’s power,
territorial integrity, and safety.
Enforcer, the military must be able
to be deployed to destroy enemy’s
forces that threaten the nation’s
power, territorial integrity, and
safety.
Restorer, the military in cooperation
with other government institutions
support the government’s function
to restore the security condition
following war-caused chaos.
Act as a socio-political
force
The main duties of the Armed Forces of
The main duties of the Indonesian National
the Republic of Indonesia as a defence and Military is to uphold state authority, defend the
security forces are to:
integrity of the United Republic of Indonesia’s
territory, and to protect the Indonesian
A. Secure, save, defend, and preserve
people and the motherland from threats and
freedom, state authority, and the
disturbance against the unity of the state and
integrity of nation and state.
people.
B. Secure, save, defend and preserve
the Pancasila ideology and the
Constitution of 1945
C.
Secure, save, defend and preserve
the implementation and results of
national development
MILITARY POLICY
The Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia’s operational configuration are:
A.
Defence operations.
1.
Conditioning operations
3.
Territorial defence
operations
2.
4.
5.
B.
Retaliation operations
Public security and safety
restoration operations
1.
Intelligence operations
3.
Battle operations
4.
A.
Territorial operations
National Security and
Order operations
War military operations:
1.
Combined military operations
3.
Sea operations
2.
Conventional operations
National Defence operations.
2.
The Indonesian National Army’s main duties
are implemented through:
4.
5.
B.
6.
Land operations
Air operations
Military campaigns
Aid operations
Non-war military operations:
1.
Surmount armed separatist
movements
3.
Surmount terrorism
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Surmount armed insurgencies
Protect border areas
Protect national vital objects of
strategic values
Perform international
peacekeeping duties in
accordance to foreign affairs’
political policies.
Protect the President and VicePresident and their families
Empower defence territories
and their supporting forces
early on as part of the national
defence
Support the duties of local
governments
10. Support the Indonesian
National Police in their security
and public order duties
11. Protect visiting Head of States
and Foreign Representatives
12. Support humanitarian missions
for refugees and victims of
natural disasters
13. Perform Search and Rescue
mission in accidents and
disasters
14. Support the government in
securing ship faring and air
transport from piracy, hostage
taking and smuggling.
95
96
Resolving Human Rights Cases
Many human rights abuses such as the Trisakti case,
Semanggi shooting, Aceh, and Talangsari remain unresolved
despite the existence of a Human Rights Court as was the case
with the East Timor trial. In the later case the court was a
place for impunity since none of the military officers on trial
were convicted.
In sum a number of factors get in the way of military
reform: the government’s lack of political will to complete
reforms in the defence sector (military reform); lack of control
and oversight particularly by the Parliament; continuing
vested interest from players in the defence sector such as the
military and police, which obstruct the process of military
reform as can be attested from the continuing debate around
the revision of the Law on Military Tribunal; a reduced public
pressure on military reform agenda, which was unlike the
situation at the beginning of the reform movement in 19982000; under qualified human resources both in the parliament
and in government to understand the dynamics of various
defence problems and issues; an absence of grand design in
pushing military reform.
The unresolved military reform will have direct and indirect
implications to the military problems in Papua, particularly those
related to human rights abuses. This has led to various crimes
perpetrated by military personnel go unpunished.
C. Types of Military Operations
Principally, the Indonesian National Military execute
two types of operations: War military operations (OMP)
and Non-War military operations (OMSP). This was clearly
defined in article 7 point 2 of Law number 34 of 2004 on the
Indonesian National Military. The two types of operations are
distinguished on the kinds of threats the military is facing.
MILITARY POLICY
OMP is directed against usual threats such as military threats
from other countries, while OMSP is targeted at freestanding
and combined operations in conjunction with other agencies
to face non-state adversaries.
Despite its title, Non-War Operations are differentiated
into two kinds: battle operations and non-battle operations.
Battle operations are further classified as various types
of operations that included operations against armed
separatist; operations against armed insurgencies;
operations against terrorism, operations against security
threats on sea and on the air; border security; and showof-force operations.
On the other hand, Non-battle operations included
humanitarian missions; support operations for civilian
authorities; VVIP protections; protecting national vital objects;
operations to surmount communal (horizontal) conflicts;
international peace-keeping duties; and other operations as
decreed by the President.
Despite the Military-Police separation on 1 April
1999, at the beginning of the transition period the types of
operations between these two state institutions remained
more or less similar. This can be attested from operations
that were implemented in Papua at the end of that era as well
as the Operations Rajawali 10 A and 011 that occurred until
the year 2000, which continue to emphasis repercussive
approach to deal with defence and security problems in
Papua. 56
The special operations of those time consisted of there
approaches: Territorial Approach (as the main operation/core
of the show-of-force) supported by Intelligence operations,
Battle operations and Security and Public Order operations.
A number of operations carried out throughout 1990-2001 aimed at eraditating Security Disturbance Group of Free Papua Movement such as Rajawali
03 Operation (1991-1992), Rajawali 04 Operation, Rajawali Operation 05 (1 April-30 September 1993), Rajawali 06 Operation (1994), Rajawali 07 Operation
(1995-1996), Rajawali 08 Operation (1 April-30 September 1996), Rajawali 10
A Operation Instruction (1998-1999), and Rajawali 011 Operation (1999-2000).
Dharma Bhakti Military Area Command XVII/Trikora 1990-2001 period, from
pp. 34-49, as quoted from Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., p 111.
56
97
98
In all three operations, the role of the Police was to provide
operational support that was executed following the repressive
model of the military. 57
The transformation only happened following the
structural and functional separations of military and police
functions. Local Police is responsible for security and its
apparatus while defence becomes the responsibility of the
Indonesian National Military (Military Area Command) and
their non-organic troops stationed in Papua such as the
Army Special Forces, the Army Intelligence Agency, the Army
Strategic Forces, and others.
At the military unit level, the national defence is now
implemented using a territorial approach through the
territorial command. The Military Resort Commands unit
under the Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih have
important functions since its operations directly engage the
immediate populace. Each Military Resort Command routinely
visit and communicate with Papua Tribal Council, the general
public, and non-governmental organisations, and various
forums for indigenous Papuans, using a non-repressive
approach to support their core territorial approach. 58 This
was attempted by building collaboration between military
personnel and the population in developing Papua. 59
As a territorial unit in Papua, the Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih is responsible for giving emphasis on nonrepressive approach while supporting the security situation
in Papua. The Military Area Command’s role in anticipating
security problems is simply to provide back up to the local
Ibid.
For example, see www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
code=2011200920112655, “Danrem 172/Praja Wirayakti Sillaturahmi ke Pimpinan
Dewan Adat Papua”, (Accessed 1 February 2011); dan www.tni.mil.id/index2.
php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=113012006122373, “Pangdam XVII/Cenderawasih Mayjen TNI A.Y Nasution Bertatap Muka Dengan Para Ketua LSM
Se-Papua”, (Accesed 1 Februari 2011).
59
http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/16/1/239148/papua-rusuh-polri-tni-gelaroperasi-khusus, “Papua Rusuh, Polri & TNI Gelar Operasi Khusus”, (Accessed 1 February 2011).
57
58
MILITARY POLICY
police. In sudden security situation, their role is to support
the local police in back-up position.
In other words, the military’s general role related to
security in Papua is limited to special situations. However,
with the increase in firearm attacks against their personnel
in Papua, the military and police are deploying frequent
special operations.60 Nonetheless, these types of operations
are increasingly falling under the scrutiny of Papuans, the
Indonesian general public, and international observers.
One example is the incident that happens every 1 May.
The first of May is recognised by local people as the Papua
freedom day. Local media in Papua usually report increase in
clandestine military and police operations in the week leading
up to 1 May61 although the military always deny that they are
undertaking such operations on those dates.
The military policy makers argue that they continue
to emphasise non-repressive approach and engagement
in anticipating security threats in Papua. This persuasive
attempt is focused on territorial operations to encourage the
Free Papua Organisation to return to the United Republic of
Indonesia. 62 The military claims that these persuasive methods
have been effective in bringing the Free Papua Organisation
back into the fold. 63
An example of persuasive approach by the Military Area
Command XVII/Cendrawasih is to highlight the presence of
http://tabloidjubi.com/index.php/index-berita/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=660:jelang-hari-pembebasan-papua-di-nabire-tnipolri-gelaroperasi-terselubung&catid=42:seputar-tanah-papua&Itemid=65, “Jelang Hari
Pembebasan Papua di Nabire, TNI/Polri Gelar Operasi Terselubung”, (Accessed
1 February 2011).
61
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=113012006112748,
“TNI tetap Akan Fokuskan Operasi Kewilayahan di Papua”, (Accessed 1 February
2011).
62
“TNI tetap Akan Fokuskan Operasi Kewilayahan di Papua”, (Accessed 1 February
2011).
63
“TNI Tetap persuasif di Provinsi Papua”, (Accessed 1 February 2011).
60
99
100 SECURITIZATION IN PAPUA
Papuans soldiers in their troops as part of the wider Papuan
society. To achieve that the military apparatus in eastern
Indonesia had to increase the recruitment of local Papuans
as soldiers.64 This was considered an important step since
most indigenous Papuans are little interested in this type of
profession. 65
Another example occurred during the shooting that
killed a Police Mobile Brigade personnel in the Puncak Jaya
regency in June 2010. The Military Commander-in-Chief
instructed the Cendrawasih Military Area Commander to
take a more supporting role in assisting the Papua police
force. Despite his instruction that the military took on a
bigger role, he also reminded that the soldiers were only
authorised to support the police in their security duty
and that their involvement was not considered a military
operation in Papua. 66
Nonetheless, there had been proof that military
operations in Papua still continue with the broadcasting of
a video showing the torture of Papuans by military soldiers,
which resulted in a court martial against three personnel
of Battalion 753 at the Military Tribunal III-9 on January
2011. The Military Commander-in –Chief, Admiral Agus
Suharono admitted there had been military operations in
Papua but were limited to border areas as part of border
security.67
“Kodam XVII/Cen Bertekad Wujudkan Papua Tanah Damai”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
65
“Danrem 172/PWY: Minat Putra Asli Papua Jadi Anggota TNI, Minim”, (Accessed
2 February 2011).
66
www.papuabaratnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1773:panglima-tni-perintahkan-pangdam-cendrawasih-membantu-poldapapua&catid=83:hukum-dan-kriminal&Itemid=460, “Panglima TNI Perintahkan
Pangdam Cenderawasih Membantu Polda Papua”, (Accessed 1 February 2011).
67
http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/11/11/339/392476/panglima-akui-tni-gelaroperasi-militer-di-papua, “Panglima Akui TNI Gelar Operasi Militer di Papua”,
(Accessed 1 February 2011).
64
MILITARY POLICY 101
D. Military Deployments
In general, the objective of military deployments in Papua
is to maintain supreme defence position in Indonesia’s eastern
region. This is reflected in various deployments focusing on
the eastern region of Indonesia by the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and support operations by the Police Force. The following
article will outline the structure and operations of the three
military forces in Papua.
1. The Army
Officially, the Military Area Command XVII/Cendawasih
is tasked with four core duties. First, the deployment of the
military’s Army troops in securing defence. Second, protecting
the security in Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border areas and
the outer islands. Third, the establishment and strengthening
of the Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. Finally, to
empower defence area on land.
The organisation at the Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih consists of two structures: Command Head
Quarter and the Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih
Task Force unit. The Command HQ’s structure consists of four
echelons (Commanders, Assistant Commander, Support Staff,
and the Military Area Command Executive Team). The Task
Force consists of Military Resort Command 171/PVT; Military
Resort Command 172/PWY; Military Resort Command 173/
PVB; and Military Resort Command 174 Anim Ti Waninggap
that was installed in 2005. Two Military Core Regiments
further augmented the Military force in Papua. 68 In the same
year, the military also established three Infantry Battalion in
Papua: Infantry Battalion 745/Eme Neme Kangasi in Timika,,
Infantry Battalion 755/Yalet in Merauke and Infantry Battalion
756/Winame Sili in Wamena. 69
G.T. Situmorang, “Pertahanan Negara di Papua Semakin Baik?”, 2006, in www.tni.
68
69
Figure 3.1.
The Structure of Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih70
PANGDAM
IRDAM
KASDAM
AS
INTEL
AS
OPS
AS
PERS
ESELON PIMPINAN
ESELON PEMBANTU PIMPINAN
AS
LOG
ASREN
LIASION
SSUSDAM
AS
TER
ESELON PELAYANAN
KASETUMDAM
KASANDIDAM
KAPUSKODALOPS
DANDENMADAM
ESELON BADAN PELAKSANA
DAN
POM
DAM
KA
ZI
DAM
KA
HUB
DAM
KATOP
DAM
KA
PAL
DAM
KA
AJEN
DAM
KABEK
ANG
DAM
KAJAS
DAM
KABABIN
MINVET
CADDAM
KABINTAL
DAM
KA
KUM
DAM
KA
KES
DAM
KAPEN
DAM
KA
KU
DAM
KAINFOLATHA
DAM
ESELON PELAKSANA
DAN
DAN
DAN
REM
REM
REM
DAN
RINDAM
DAN
BRIGIF
DAN
DIM
BS
DAN
YONIF
RAIDER
DAN
YON
KAV
DAN
YON
ARM
DAN
YON
ARH
DAN
YON
ZI
DAN
DEN
INTEL
mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1837, (Accessed 1 February
2011).
70
http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/page/3324/organisasi.html, “Struktur Organisasi
Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat Komando Daerah Militer XVII/Cenderawasih”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
MILITARY POLICY 103
Illustration 3.1.
The Structure of Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih
Indonesian text
PANGDAM
Eselon Pimpinan
Eselon Pembantu Pimpinan
IRDAM
ASREN
LIASION
SUSDAM
KASDAM
AS INTEL
AS OPS
AS PERS
AS LOG
AS TER
Eselon pelayanan
English Translation
Commander In Chief Military Area Command
Leading Echelon
Leading Assistance Echelon
Inspectorate Of A Military Area Command.
Assistant On Planning
Liasion Office
Military Area Special Staff.
Military Area Command Head Of Staff.
Intelligence Staff Division.
Operations Staff.
Personnel Staff
Logistics Staff
Territorial Staff
Service Echelon
KASAMDIDAM
Military Area Command Head Of Cryptography
Service.
KASET UMDAM
KAPUSKODALOPS
DANDENMADAM
Eselon Badan Pelaksana
DANPOMDAM
KAZIDAM
KAHUBDAM
KAPALDAM
KAAJENDAM
KABEKANGDAM
KABABINMINVETCADDAM
Military Area Command Head Of General
Secretariat.
Operational Command Centre Chief.
Military Area Command Headquarters
Detachment Commander.
Executing Agency Echelon
Commander of Military Area Command
Military Police.
Military Area Command Chief of Engineers.
Military Area Command Chief of
Communications.
Military Area Command Chief of Equipment.
Chief of Military Area Command
Administration.
Military Area Command Chief of Supply and
Transport.
Head of the Administrative Section for
Indonesian Veterans and Reservists at a
Military Area Command.
KAKUMDAM
Military Area Command Legal Service Chief.
KAKUDAM
Military Area Command Head of Finance
Department.
KAKESDAM
KATOPDAM
KAJASDAM
KABINTALDAM
KAPENDAM
KAINFOLANTADAM
Eselon pelaksana
DANREM
DANRIMDAM
DANBRIGIF
DANDIM BS
DANYONIF RAIDER
DANYONKAV
DANYONARM
DANYONARH
DANYONZI
DANDENINTEL
Military Area Command Chief of Medical
Service.
Chief of Military Area Command Topography.
Military Area Command Head of Sports.
Military Area Command Chief of Mental
Guidance Service.
Head of Military Area Command Information
Department.
Chief of information and data processing
department.
Executing Echelon
Commander of Military Resort Command
Commander of Military Area Command
Regiment
Commander of Infantry Brigade
Commander of Independent Military District
Command
Commander of Raider Infantry Battalion
Commander of Cavalry Battalion
Commander of Field Artillery Battalion
Commander of Defence Artillery Battalion
Commander of Engineering Battalion
Commander of Intelligence Detachment
In accordance to the characteristic of its core function, the
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih is the military’s
army instrument, which implements the military’s land
operation in Papua through its War Military Operations and
Non-War Military Operations. The Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih’s core duties include maintaining security
in lands bordering other countries; implementing the
military’s duties in developing and expanding its military
force on land; and building the capacity of ground defence
by planning, developing, directing, and controlling area of
defence through territorial management.71
http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/page/3323/tugas.html, “Tugas TNI AD”, (Ac-
71
MILITARY POLICY 105
Functionally, the Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih’s72 basic structure can be distinguished into
four types: Territorial Units, Training Institution, Battle Units,
and Support Units. Its Territorial Units include Military Resort
Command 171/PVT Praja Wira Tama in the Sorong region,
which controls the Infantry Battalion 752/Para Wira Utama
Sorong, Military District Command 1703/Manokwari and
Military District Command 1704/Sorong; Military Resort
Command 172/PW Praja Wira Yakti Jayapura North Papua
which oversees Infantry Battalion 751/Vira Jaya Sakti
Jayapura, Military District Command 1701/Jayapura, Military
District Command 1702/JW, and Military District Command
1712/Sarmi; Military Resort Command 173/PVB Praja Wira
Braja Biak North Papua, managing Infantry Battalion 753/
Arga Vira Tama, Military District Command 1705/Nabire,
Military District Command 1708/Biak Numfor, and Military
District Command 1709/Yapen Waropen; and Military Resort
Command 174/AW Anim Ti Waninggap Merauke West Papua
that oversees Infantry Battalion 755/Yalet Merauke, Military
District Command 1706/Fak Fak, and Military District
Command 1707/Merauke. As a territorial unit, the Military
Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih also manage a training
base in the form of a Military Area Main Regiment with its
Command HQ in the Ifar Mountain range. See the table bellow
for more detail.
cessed 2 February 2011).
The task of the military on territorial guidance is to prepare the aspects of
geography, demography and social conditions to create space, intruments and
condition of fighting that is resilient to be empowered to support the tasks of the
Army in implementing non-war and warm operations. Territorial guidance is carried out through Military Area Command, Military Resort Command, Military
District Command and Military Sub-District Command in each areas. This is
quoted from Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Judi Paragina M.Sc, “Re-Vitalisas
dan Re-Aktualisasi Pembinaan Teritorial Komando Kewilayahan TNI AD Guna
Mendukung Kepentingan Pertahanan Matra Darat Pada Masa Mendatang”, in
www.kodam-jaya.mil.id/arsip-artikel-kontribusi/960-re-vitalisasi-dan-re-aktualisasi-pembinaan-teritorial-komando-kewilayahan-tni-aa-guna-mendukungkepentingan-pertahanan-matra-darat-pada-masa-mendatang?start=3, (Accessed
2 February 2011).
72
Table 3.3.
The Military Area Command/Cendrawasih Territorial
Structure73
Military Resort
Command 171/
PWT Sorong
Infantry Battalion
752/PWT Sorong
Military District
Command 1703/
Manokwari
Military District
Command 1704/
Sorong
Military District
Command 1706/
Fakfak
Military District
Command 1710/
Mimika
Military District
Command 1713/
Kaimana
Military Resort
Command 172/
PWY Jayapura
Infantry Battalion
751/Vira Jaya Saktu
Jayapura
Military District
Command 1701/
Jayapura
Military District
Command 1702/
Jayawijaya
Military District
Command 1712/
Sarmi
Military Resort
Command 173/
PVB Biak
Infantry Batallion
753/Arga Vira
Tama
Military District
Command 1705/
Nabire
Military District
Command 1708/
Biak Numfor
Military District
Command 1709/
Yapen Waropen
Military Resort
Command 174/
ATW Anim Ti
Waninggap
Merauke
Infantry
Battalion 755/
Yalet Merauke
Military District
Command 1706
Fak-Fak
Military District
Command 1707/
Merauke
The Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih’s battle
units consist of Infantry Brigade 74 20/Ima Jayakeramo
headquartered in the city of Timika in Mimika Regency. The
Infantry Brigade oversees three Infantry Battalions, Infantry
Battalion 753/Arga Vira Tama Paniai; Infantry Battalion
754/Eme Neme Kangasi Timika; Infantry Battalion 756/
Winame Sili Wamena; Infantry Battalion 751-BS which is
Data is a compilation from official websites of units under Military Area Command
XVII/Cenderawasih accessed on http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/, http://korem171.com/, http://korem172.wordpress.com/, and http://korem172.wordpress.
com/, (Accessed 22 April 2011).
74
Military Brigade Organic unit of the Army supervises at least three infantery
battalions. In Indonesia there are 13 Infantry Brigade of the Army comprising of
two characteristics: regular Infantry Brigade and Airborn Infantery Brigade.
73
MILITARY POLICY 107
a separate infantry battalion from Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih. Based in Sentani, Jayapura, Papua with
Company D based in Doyo, Jayapura Residence, and Company
E in Skamto, city of Jayapural; and Cavalry Detachment 3/
Serbu, which was a branch of the organic Cavalry of Military
Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. In addition, the Military
Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih also includes support
troops from Combat Engineer Detachments 10, 11, 12, and
13. 75 See the table bellow for more detail.
Table 3.4.
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih Battle Units76
Prior to Special Autonomy
(pre-2001)
Infantry Battalion 751/Vira Jaya
Saktu, Jayapura (1964)
Infantry Battalion 752/Praja Wira
Tama, Sorong (1964)
Infantry Battalion 753/Arga Vira
Tama, Jayapura (1964)
Post Special Autonomy
(2001-2010)
Infantry Brigade 20/Ima Jayakeramo,
Timika (2007)
Infantry Battalion 756/Winame Sili,
Wamena (2006)
Infantry Battalion 755/Yalet, Merauke
(2006)
Infantry Battalion 756/Winame Sili,
Wamena (2006)
In addition to the above units, there will be one division
of Strategic Reserves Commando in Papua. The military senior
officers on the assumption that it will maximize its operations
to secure the border areas and against separatist actions
Website of Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
76
The data is a compilation of the official websites under Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih accessed from http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/, http://korem171.com/, http://korem172.wordpress.com/, and http://korem172.wordpress.
com/, (Accessed 22 April 2011).
75
decided this extra division of Strategic Reserves Commando in
Papua. The Strategic Reserves as a battle troop is considered
a correct and rational choice for this type of duties. 77
Unlike training in other Military Area Commands, the
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih continue to
organise Jungle Warfare Training, which consists of Training
Management Technique, Special Combat Technique, jungle
night shooting, defence, and assault and operating GPS
equipment. Training runs for 2 weeks and is partaken by 50
participants representing all the infantry battalions under the
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih and Military Area
Main Regiment XVII/Cendrawasih. 78
2 The Navy
Two Navy Main Bases protect Indonesia’s eastern region
as part of the Eastern Armanda Command led by the Eastern
Armada Admiralty, which is the Jayapura Navy Main Base X
Jayapura79 and the Navy Main Base XI Merauke, the latest
Navy Main Base that was launched on 15 January 2009. 80 The
latest data stated that the Navy Main Base X personnel has 981
personnel. The Navy’s Eastern Sea Maritime Security Group
in Papua deploys the sea patrol operations.81
The Navy’s decision-makers are of the view that the eastern
region, including Papua is vulnerable to infiltration by foreign
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1644, “Angkatan
Darat Tetap Tambah Satu Divisi di Papua”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
78
http://beritamiliter.com/pangdam-xviicendrawasih-buka-penataran-perang-hutan,
“Pangdam XVII/Cenderawasih Buka Penataran Perang Hutan”, (Accessed 2
February 2011).
79
Lantamal X sendiri berasal dari Lantamal V Jayapura yang berganti nama pada
Agustus 2006.
80
www.tnial.mil.id/Majalah/Cakrawala/ArtikelCakrawala/tabid/125/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1496/Default.aspx, “Lantamal XI Merauke: Menjaga Sumber
Daya Alam Papua”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
81
“TNI AL Ringkus Kapal Berbendera Hongkong di Perairan Papua Barat”, (Accessed 3 February 2011).
77
MILITARY POLICY 109
forces, piracies, agitations, and smugglings. The contour of Papua’s
deep seas and outlying islands is of special consideration for the
Navy. Consequently, it organises several naval trainings such as
Armada Jaya XXVI in 2006 at the Kaimana Bay in Papua. 82 The
exercise was participated by 5,000 personnel and 56 war ships
including submarines, destroyers, frigates, and others was aimed
to intensify the main base defence operations, naval operations,
amphibious operations, artillery support coordination, maritime
reconnaissance operations, and communication and logistics
supports. 83
3. The Air Force
Air Defence is supported by mainly Air Force Base in
Jayapura and the National Air Defence Command Sector IV
based in Biak. In the implementation of its duties two Air Force
Radar Units and one civilian Radar in the Biak region support
the National Air Defence Sector Command. Air Defence Radar
is utilised as Ground Control Interception and Early Warning
system and interception targeting guide. 84
Radar units in Merauke and Jayapura are used to monitor
the border regions with Papua New Guinea, Saumlaki, and
Timika. The placement of the radars in this area is to support
the radars in Merauke in monitoring the south Papua region,
the ones in Sorong to protect national vital objects, and the
ones in Morotai and Ambon to anticipate possible enemy
attacks from the south and the three North-South sea routes
passing trough the archipelago. 85
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/papua/2006/12/19/brk,20061219-89737,id.
html, “Papua Dinilai Rawan, TNI AL Gelar Latihan Perang”, (Accessed 3 February
2011).
83
“Armada Jaya XXVI TNI AL Gelar Latihan Perang di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
84
www.dpr.go.id/complorgans/commission/commission1/visit/K1_kunjungan_
Propinsi_Irian_Jaya_Barat.doc+kunjungan+kerja+komisi+1+ke+papua, “K1 Kunjungan Propinsi Irian Jaya Barat, Komisi 1 DPR RI”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
85
Ibid.
82
E. Forces Size
Post-2002 saw a significant increase in forces size among the
three armed forces, particularly in Indonesia’s outer territories
that border other countries.86 The Army, Navy and Air Force
as this period announced and implemented various initiatives
to expand its institutional capabilities, strengthening military
hardware superiority, and improve its counter-insurgency and
conventional battle operations. 87
The Army in general experienced a rapid expansion of
troops. For example, since 2003 there was at least an additional
supplement of four infantry battalions, which completed the
projected total of 17 infantry battalions. 88 With this planned
increase, the Army will have at least an extra 16,000 soldiers.
In Papua, in general four battalions are reserved for protecting
strategic vital objects, border areas, securing the city of Jayapura
and its environments. 89
Yet at the moment, it is difficult to obtain accurate data on
military personnel deployed to Papua. Based on all resources
interviewed by Imparsial from member of the House of
Representatives, Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and
Defence or Commander in Chief of Military Area Command
XVII/Cenderawasih, no one is able to give exact number of
military personnel involved in securing Papua. Yet based on
an estimated calculation on the number of military personnel
in Papua, Army comprises of 12,000-13,000 personnel,90 Navy
1,272 personnel, and Air Force 570 personnel.91 Therefore the
estimated prediction on the total number of military personnel
deployed to Papua at the moment is around 14.842 personnel.
88
89
Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., p. 5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ikrar Nusa Bakti, “Operasi Militer dan Pemilu di Papua”, brief paper presented
as a discussion material on “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh, Papua dan Poso
pada Pemilu 2004” hosted by Propatria, Hotel Santika, Jakarta, 7 January 2004.
90
An estimated number of troops in papua is revealed in an interview with Lieutenant
Colonel (Infantry) Victor Tobing, Intelligence Assistance Military Area Command
XVII/Cenderawasih, 18 January 2011.
91
See Attachment
86
87
MILITARY POLICY 111
Table 3.5.
Estimated Number of Military Personnel Currently
Assigned to the Land of Papua (2011)
No
1
2
3
Force
Army
Navy
Air Force
Total
Number of Personnel
13,000 personnel
1.272 personnel
570 personnel
14.842 personnel
On the air, the Air Force was also expanding its forces.
156 personnel and 2 helicopters in its operations support the
Jayapura Air Base. The Air Force monitoring capability in the
region was improved by adding more radar in the Timika and
Merauke regions to supplement those units already installed
in the Biak region in 2010. 92 The additional radars were
intended to support the establishment of Air Force Defence
Command Area IV, which included defence areas in Jayapura,
Timika, and Merauke. 93 The establishment of this Command
Area IV was thought to be necessary to strengthen the defence
capability of the western territory of Papua from air space
violation and natural resources thefts and smuggling. 94
Naval power also experienced improvements with the
addition of Naval Bases planned for the Padang, Merauke, and
Tarakan regions. Further expansion is planned in cooperation
with other countries such as Russia, South Korea, Japan, and
the Netherlands. 95
“Penyiapan Radar TNI Au di Papua Tidak Ada Masalah”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
93
www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110644, “KOHANUDNAS Terus
Kembangkan Sistem Deteksi Dini”, 10 February 2006, as quoted by Matthew N.
Davies, Op. Cit., p. 6.
94
“TNI-AU Akan Tempatkan Radar di Timika, Papua”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
95
Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., p 7.
92
F. Type of Forces (Organic and Non-organic)
In west Papua military expansion is specifically focused
on increasing the size of its organic troops. This was taken
in consideration of the negative effects of continuous tour
of duties and its consequence on operational success.
Nonetheless the military maintains a rotation of nonorganic troops generally among infantry soldiers and
troops specially deployed for border guard operations in
Papua. 96
Three additional infantry battalions (751, 752, and
753) strengthened the three existing infantries in the
two western Papua provinces since 2004. The increase in
infantry troops were mostly assigned from soldiers outside
the Military Area Command, as much as 260 soldiers at
the outset plus the Military Area Command Jayapura’s
Main Regiment. Each battalion was allocated to have 1,000
strong personnel. 97
One of the most conspicuous is the increase of the
Army Strategic Reserves and Marine troops. Along with
a 30% increase in Marine troops in 2002, there was a
tendency of expansion among infantry troops. The
presence of Marine Corps Division 3 in Sorong, West Papua,
in the time of Abdurahman Wahid’s presidency was an
example of a prominent military expansion in Papua. The
addition of the Army Strategic Reserves Division in the
same period also strengthened the defensive power in the
region encompassing Sulawesi, Sorong, and Jayapura. This
was part of the medium-term (5-year) development that
ended in 2009. 98
Ibid
Cenderawasih Pos, “3 Batalion Baru Terbentuk”, 5 Maret 2004, seperti dikutip
Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., hlm. 8.
98
Bob Lowry (1993) as quoted by Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., p. 9.
96
97
MILITARY POLICY 113
1. Non-organic Units
Alongside the core units, the military also deployed nonorganic forces in Papua, particularly the Army Special Forces
and support troops from infantry battalions from Military Area
Commands throughout Indonesia to patrol the border regions.
99
In general, the troops consist of 650 soldiers who worked
under a Combined Task Force for Border Security; their tourof-duty last between 6 and 12 months. Each group usually
has about 100 officers, 200 Non-commissioned officers, and
400 privates. 100
2. Troops Rotation
For border patrol, the military routinely rotate about 400
soldiers from each Military Area Command and other units
throughout Indonesia for assignment in Papua. Rotations
between military posts in border regions occur every three
months so that in a one-year period each military post
will have 3 to 4 rotations. This policy was taken to prevent
demoralisation among soldiers, which may adversely affect
border security. The lack of air transport in Papua means that
rotations are dependent on availability of sea transport.
Before their assignment to Papua, each soldier is trained
in military strategy and tactics, particularly in combat
techniques for mountain and swamp area. Each soldiers is
given training on the field situation, traditions, and survival
methods in Papua. 101
For example, one of the groups deployed are on www.kendaripos.co.id, “Batalyon
Infanteri 725/Woroagi Siap Mengamankan Perbatasan NKRI-Papua Nugini”, (accessed 4 February 2011); lihat juga www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.
html&nw_code=375, “Pangdam VII/WRB Melepas 900 Personil ke Papua”,
101
“Yonif 521 Akan Gantikan Batalyon 509/Kostrad di Papua”, (Accessed
4 February 2011); www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
99
100
The military particularly emphasises territorial control,
the law, and human rights in training soldiers who are assigned
to Papua.102 The rotation usually occurs every year, with each
rotating group consisting of 400 soldiers functioning as nonorganic troops in the region for one year.
It’s difficult to obtain the regulation on tour-of-duty. Prior
to 1990, Army soldiers are usually assigned for one full year
as stipulated in each personnel’s assignment documents.103
In practice, the military often extended their assignments
without prior notice.
There was more clarity about rotation starting in the
mid-1990s. Soldiers who had completed their assignments
were pulled back to their original command and received
one-month leave. Afterwards they may be redeployed for
another 12 months period. Soldiers may experience up to
three assignments in the same location; only then would they
be released from the operations. 104
Matthew N. Davies observed specific pattern in the
appointments of senior territorial officers in Papua. Historically
the appointed officers would have served in Aceh, East Timor,
Ambon, and Papua with a strong background of having served
in the Army Strategic Reserves and Army Special Forces. 105
A clear example can be seen from the career of Major
General Hotman Marbun, the previous Military Area
code=2011200920117113, “141/AYJP Berangkat ke Papua”, (Accessed 4
February 2011); dan www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
code=113012006123398, “Pangdam VII/Wirabuana Kunjungi Satgas 725/Woroagi
di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
102
w w w. t n i . m i l . i d / i n d e x 2 . p h p ? p a g e = d e t a i l i n d e x . h t m l & n w _
code=2011200920115516, “Upacara Pembukaan Latihan Pratugas Satgas Ops
Pamtas Papua Yonif 141/AYJP TA. 2010”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
103
For other forces, the period of operation varies. For Airforce pilit for example,
the maximum period is 2 weeks and afterward he has to be assigned to his initial
post. This is done to avoid stress on pilots. Informal interview with high rank
Airforce official, 9 March 2011, in Jakarta
104
This is obtained from mid-ranked Army officer assigned to a militar operation in
Papua.
105
This is obtained from mid-ranked Army officer assigned to a militar operation in
Papua.
MILITARY POLICY 115
Commander XVII/Cendrawasih. He had formerly been the
Task Force Commander Maleo in Irian Jaya in 1994. 106 Davies
also argued that being assigned a strategic post in Papua is
considered a strong career move as can be testified from a
number of current senior officers in the military such as the
Army Chief-of-Staff George Toissutta who’d previously serve
as Military Area Commander Trikora in 2005.
Figure 2.
Diagram of Historical Background of Assignment of
Military Officials in Papua, 2005-2006
Source: Matthew N. Davies (2006: 19)
G. Operational Policies
As mentioned earlier, operational policies as implemented
by the three armed forces in Papua experienced significant
changes. This can be seen from the three armed forces attempt
to emphasis their defensive roles in comparison to their main
function in Papua during New Order, which was aimed at
internal security.
106
www.antara-sumbar.com/id/index.php?sumbar=berita&d=0&id=76279, “Mantan
Dan Satgas Maleo jadi Pangdam Cenderawasih”, 18 January 2010.
1. Border Operations
The border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea
stretches 780 kilometre. 52 signposts as agreed by the two
countries mark the borders. The Indonesian government is
responsible for monitoring 24 signposts while the Papua New
Guinea 28 signposts. The Indonesian show-of-force in the border
area is supported by 114 border posts consisting of 20 organic
military posts controlled by Infantry Battalion 751, 755, and
756 as well as 94 military posts by non-organic troops from
Infantry Battalion 408, 303, 320, and 516. Each post has between
10 and 25 soldiers. Special border battle units consist of 6
infantry battalions in Sorong, Nabire, Sentani, Merauke, Timika
and Wamena. This battle units are supported by 1 Regiment of
Combat Engineers107 that function as a battle support unit, and
one Company of Cavalry in Timika. The total personnel involved
in border operation are at least 4,044 soldiers. 108
Border operations in Indonesia’s outer islands also fall
under the responsibility of Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih. As much as four most outlying islands are
designated as control area for Indonesia’s eastern most
regions. This are have been the responsibility of the Navy
Marines in Papua. However starting in 2011 there are plans
to augment the protection details in the outermost islands
with troops from Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih,
of which 80% will be from the Marines and 20% from the
Military District Command. 109
The Headquarted of Combat Engineering Detachment 10 is in the area of Waena,
in the valley of Mountain Yoka. According to Army Chief of Staff Decision Letter no 65/XIII/2005 dated 12 December, this unit’s main tasks are to implement
construction, destruction and nubika pasif to expand the movement ability of its
unit, to milit the enemy’s movement and to support the survival ability of military
area command unit. (Suara Trikora)
108
Propinsi_Irian_Jaya_Barat.doc+kunjungan+kerja+komisi+1+ke+papua, “K1 Kunjungan Propinsi IRian Jaya Barat. Komisi 1 DPR RI”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
109
http://bataviase.co.id/node/520305, “Pangdam Cenderawasih: Fasilitas Pen107
MILITARY POLICY 117
To support the military in the border area, the Police and
Police Mobile Brigade have also been deployed in vulnerable
spots along the border. There also exist combined MilitaryPolice post in the Wutong district with the military focusing
on facing the Free Papua Organisation and the Mobile Brigade
assisting immigration officers and cross-border traffic. 110
2. At-Risk-Area and Vital Objects Security Operations
As much as 1,735 soldiers are deployed for securing
dangerous areas in Papua. Logistics in Wamena and Merauke
are particularly difficult due to dependence on available air
transports. Another problem is that there is yet to be a legal
product to regulate this kind of operations. 111
Operations to protect vital objects such PT Freeport
Indonesia, the Timika Airport, as well as the Portside and
Cargo Dock in Papua is performed by Operational Command
171/PVT consisting of 700 personnel. The protection of PT
Freeport Indonesia since July 2006 has been operationally
assigned to the Papua Regional Police supported by a military
Assigned Sub-Unit Command of 350 strong. 112
3. Intelligence Operations
At the command level, there is a lack of co-ordination
between organic and non-organic troops. An example is the
overlap between intelligence agencies such as the National
gamanan Masih Kurang”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
Interview between Moch Nurhasim with Mobile Brigade Command in Kelapa
Dua, October 2007. As quoted in Moch Nurhasim, Op. Cit., pp. 116-117.
111
Propinsi_Irian_Jaya_Barat.doc+kunjungan+kerja+komisi+1+ke+papua, “K1 Kunjungan Propinsi IRian Jaya Barat. Komisi 1 DPR RI”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
112
Propinsi_Irian_Jaya_Barat.doc+kunjungan+kerja+komisi+1+ke+papua, “K1 Kunjungan Propinsi Irian Jaya Barat. Komisi 1 DPR RI”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
110
Intelligence Agency with the Military Area Command
Intelligence and Police Intelligence, and others at the local
level. This includes intelligence relating to Free Papua
Organisation base area, protection of strategic assets such
as large corporations (PT Freeport, etc) and border areas.
Another example is how the Police lack information regarding
the assignments and target area of the Army Special Forces
in Papua as the result of confusion cause by the grey area
between defence and security. 113
Following the murder of Theys Eluay and the shooting
against Indonesian and US citizens in Tembagapura, the
Military Area Command officer of that time, Major General
Mahidin Simbolon announced the withdrawal of Army Special
Forces personnel who were part of the Joint Intelligence Task
Force, known as the Maleo Task Force.
Major General Mahidin Simbolon said that the withdrawal
of 250 Army Special Forces soldiers from the Cendrawasih
Task Force was not the result of the kidnapping and murder of
the Head of Papua Council Presidium but as part of the usual
rotation policy to maximise the military’s performance. 114
To fill the gap left by the Special Forces, the Military
Area Command Trikora added more intelligence capacity
by recruiting 65 personnel from its own organic troops.
The Army Strategic Reserves and Army Special Forces also
provided more personnel with the Strategic Reserves move to
increase its Battle Reconnaissance elements since 2000. 115
4. Territorial Operations
Military operations in Papua were not limited to security
activities. Territorial operations resembling the “Armed Forces
United with the People in Building-up Villages” are often
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=347, “Kopassus
Tidak Ditempatkan Lagi di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
115
Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., pp. 11-12.
113
114
MILITARY POLICY 119
implemented as part of the military civic action programme. 116
The civic programme involved about 125 military
personnel from various units in Papua. Areas that have been
target of operations included defence area in Jita District and
villages in West Mimika District, Kokonao; Amar; and Ipaya.
Activities included creating wind mills, renovations of people’s
houses and houses of worships, building bridges, docking
piers for motor boats, farm cultivation, and the construction
of village halls. The Military are also engaged in non-physical
activities such as teaching reading and writing, providing
health services, and training in the construction of fishnets
and paddocks for livestock.117
Civic operations were also performed at unit level,
including the Navy Civic Operation, Surya Bhaskara Jaya
(SBJ) that included medical services, training, construction,
and delivery of communication equipments in the region
of Depapre and Muara Tami, which encompasses Kampung
Waiya, Tabla Supa, Tabla Nusu, Skow Sae, Skow Mabo, Skow
Yambe and the Sarmi region.118
A variety of military social mission are organised every
Military Day. According to a mid-ranking military officer in
Papua, the objectives of these operations are to build close
relations between soldiers and the Papuans. 119
H. Operational Budget
The military’s effort to improve its capability in the
middle of this transition period of its basic function since
the reform era brought its own dilemma, considering that
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1614, “Gubernur
Papua Lepas Satgas Manunggal Desa Binaan”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
117
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8060, “November Prajurit TNI di Mimika, Papua Gelar Opster”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
118
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1579, “Koarmatim
Operasi Bhakti ke Papua”, (Diakses 4 Februari 2011).
119
www.antaranews.com/berita/1285892634/aparat-tni-di-timika-gelar-bakti-sosial,
“Aparat TNI di Timika Gelar Bhakti Sosial”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
116
its budget is dependent on the government’s domestic
spending calculation as well as foreign donors. 120 This was
revealed by the Military Area Commander Mahidin Simbolon
in 2002 who said that the Allocated Budget provided by
local government to the Military Area Command was well
bellow what was required to implement military operations
throughout Papua.121 In 2010, Papua received a budget of Rp.
21,89 trillion, and increase of Rp. 2,8 trillion from the 2009
budget. The Department of Defence received one of the largest
allocation, amounting to Rp. 0,61 trillion. 122
I. Future Military Development Plan
The defence system transformation in Papua is far
from completed. The three armed forces each has their own
agenda for a region that is considered of central importance
to decision makers in Jakarta. There are many plans for
development in terms of structural, functional and capacity
aspects in Indonesia’s eastern most defense regions.
For example, there has been talks about the possibility
of establishing a new Military Area Command in Papua,
which will add to the current 12 Military Area Command
existing in Indonesia today. 123 The Army Chief-of-Staff
General George Toisutta conveyed this information following
the handover ceremony from outgoing Army Chief-of-Staff
Catholic Church, Frederika Korain, Theo P.A. Van Den Broek, Goglian Lumbangaol, Op. Cit.,, p. 13.
122
http://papualife.blogspot.com/2010/01/2010-papua-digelontor-rp-2189-triliun.
html, “2010 Papua Digelontor Rp 21,89 Triliun”, 10 March 2011.
123
Until now the military has 12 military area command. Iskandar Muda Military
Area Command in Banda Aceh; Military Area Command I/Bukit Barisan in
Medan; Military Area Command II/Sriwijaya in Palembang; Military Area Command III/Siliwangi di Bandung; Military Area Command Jakarta Raya in Jakarta;
Military Area Command IV/Diponegoro in Semarang; Military Area Command
V/Brawijaya in Surabaya; Military Area Command VI/Tanjungpura in Balikpapan;
Kodam VII/Wirabuana in Makassar; Military Area Command IX/Udayana in
Denpasar; Military Area Command XVI/Pattimura in Ambon; and Military Area
Command XVII/Cenderawasih in Jayapura.
120
121
MILITARY POLICY 121
General Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo in 2009. 124 However,
at the same time the incoming Army Chief-of-Staff, also
questioned the relevance of establishing a new Military
Area Command since several groups have remarked that
the most pressing problem in Papua is security, not threats
from neighbouring countries. 125
The Member of Commission I of the House of
Representatives from the PDI-P Faction, Sidharto
Danusubroto, remarked that there has to be further studies
to determine the need for a new Military Area Command in
Papua. While Law number 34/2004 stipulates that border
areas necessitate placement of troops, the government need
to avoid having more institutions that may provoke further
conflicts. 126
Moreover, many groups questioned the urgency of a new
Military Area Command in Papua. The Papua People Council
even raised the same concern through Deputy Head Hana
Hikoyabo, who declared that a new Military Area Command
is not a pressing matter for the defence in Papua.
Similarly, in early 2011, the Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih Major General Efri Triassunu said that
what the Military Area Command needed was not additional
soldiers but 60% increase in equipments. His comment
again raised our question about the urgency of expanding
the number of military personnel through a new Military
Area Command even though at the same time the Military
Area Commander was saying that the security facilities in
the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border was only 40% of
the required capacity. 127
Besides, there area also information stating that in the
Kompas, “KSAD: Akan Ada Kodam Baru di Pulau Papua”, 12 November 2009.
code=2011200920111772, “Kasad: Dikaji Pembentukan Kodam Baru di Papua”,
126
Kompas, “Mabes TNI Belum Putuskan Kodam Papua”, 13 November 2009.
127
http://bataviase.co.id/node/520305, “Pangdam Cenderawasih: Fasilitas Pengamanan Masih Kurang”.
124
125
future in the period of 2015-2024, the Land of Papua would
be equipped with 10 new Military Sub-District Command
and 1 Air Defence Artillery Battalion and Mechanic Infantry
Battalion.
Yet compared to State Defence Posture published
by Department of Defence in 2007, there is a plan to set
up 1 new Military Area Command in West Papua. 128 The
establishment of New Military Area Command would cover
at least 1 Military Area Command Headquarter, 1 Infantry
Brigade, 1 Air Mobile Infantry Battalion, 1 Mechanical
Infantry Battalion and 1 Swap Sea River and Coast Mountain
Forest Infantry Battalion, 1 Airborne Infantry Battalion, 1
Raider Infantry Battalion, 1 Cavalry Battalion, Field Artillery,
Air Defence Artillery, Combat Engineering, 1 Intelligence
Detachment, Water Transportation Battalion, 1 Military Area
Command Engineer, 1 Military Area Command Equipment, 1
Military Area Command Transportation Logistics, 1 Military
Area Command Military Post, 1 Military Area Command
Health Unit, 1 Military Area Command Administration,
1 Military Area Command Topography,r1 Military Area
Command Mental Guidance Service, 1 Military Area Command
Information Department, 1 Military Area Command Head
of Sport, 1 Military Area Command Information and
Data Processing Department, 3 Companies of explosives
defusing and on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
1 Regiment of Military Area Command, and 1 Composite
Helicopter Squadron.129 This will also be supported with 1
Military Resort Command, 15 Military District Commands,
64 Military Sub-District Commands, 1 Infantry Brigade
Headquarter, 6 Buffering Infantry Battalions, 5 Infantry
Battalions, 5 Cavalry Battalions, 5 Field Artillery Battalion,
2 Combat Engineering Battalions, 3 Air Defence Artillery
Battalion, 2 Water Transportation Battalions, 1 Explosive
Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Postur Pertahanan Negara, (Jakarta:
Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2007), First Edition, p. 80.
129
Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Op. Cit., p. 102.
128
MILITARY POLICY 123
Defusing and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
Company, 2 Military Resort Command Intelligence Team, 5
Military Area Command Intelligence Units, 2 Treasurers, 4
Equipment Detachments, 2 Regional Ammunition Arsenals,
2 Regional Medical Detachment, 4 Hospitals, 1 Military
Region Command Administration, 2 supply and transport
detachments, 1 Military Police Detachment and 2 Composite
Helicopter Squadrons.130
The Army had also place the establishment of a new
Infantry Brigade on its agenda, alongside the new Military
Area Command, since 2009. Infantry Brigade 22/Ota Manasa
was planed to be established under the command of Infantry
Division 3/Army Strategic Reserves Command and based in
Gorontalo. The formation of this Brigade was set to complete
in 2014. This organic brigade will be a new unit consisting
of Infantry Battalion 221/Motuli’ato, Infantry Battalion
222/Mo’tohangi in Tolongio, Infantry Battalion 223/Mo’e’a
in Sumalata and Field Altillery Batallion 19/105 MM/Tarik at
Lolak, Bolaang Mandow. It is expected that in 2010-2024, a
new Army Strategic Reserve Command be set up in Papua.
The Navy also supplemented their troops through the
Marine Troop 3, which was planned to be completed by
2024. When combined with the Army Strategic Reserves
Command, this extra manpower will provide 15,000
additional soldiers in West Papua. The Navy also sees the
area of Papua in need for 10 pots of the Navy specialized
in operations to prevent fish theft and smuggling from
other countries that share border with Indonesia. Areas in
Papua without Navy posts are Nabire, Bintuni, Wondama
Bay and Paniai districts. 131
Furthermore, there are information stating that Air
Force would also build their forces in 2010-2024 in Papua
130
131
Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Op. Cit., p. 101.
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1782, “Papua
Butuh Tambahan 10 Pos TNI”, (Accessed 7 February 2011).
by setting up 5 squadron, 2 land-air missile forces, the
establishment of new technical squadron and 1 special
force.
Therefore it is expected that until 2024, the number
of new personnel in the overall of Papua in both Papua
and West Papua is around 17.980 personnel. It means that
if the total number of personnel in Papua remains, it is
expected that in 2024, the number of old and new personnel
assigned to Papua would be around 14.842 + 17.980 =
32.732 personnel.
Table 3.6.
Predicted Number of Troops of the Military in the Land of
Papua (2024)
No
1
Army
2
Air Force
3
Navy
Unit
1 Military Area Command,
West Papua
1 Army Strategic Reserve
Command Division
5 Squadron
1 Land-Air missile
1 Technical Squadron
1 Special Corps
Total
Number of Troop
5.000 personnel
10.000 personnel
400 opersonnel
140 personnel
50 personnel
500 personnel
1.800 personnel
17.980 personnel
J. The Relation between the Military and Economic
Activities in Papua
It is hard to deny public perception of the close link
between security institutions with businesses in Indonesia,
including in conflict areas. If we look back at its history, the
military has been controlling many aspects of life including
expanding their influence in the business sector. Since
Indonesia’s’ independence, the military has been involved
MILITARY POLICY 125
in all kinds of businesses.132 This was institutionalised since
1957 through the establishment of Pertamina (the National
Mining Company).
The phenomenon of close relationship between the
military and businesspersons was not limited to the case of PT
Freeport, which to this day remains controversial. Rathgeber
(2005:130-131) explained that national and international
investors engage in illegal businesses with military apparatus.
These investors operate without official license to conduct
illegal logging. As a result thousands of hectares of rain forests
have been cut down and forced local populations out of their
lands. In other words, the military has close relationship with
both legal and illegal businesses.133
This close relationship between the military and
businesses are strengthened by security reasons. The
terminology of security, particularly in conflict areas, has
been used to as primary justification by multinationals such
as Freeport, which, as a foreign company, require security
guarantee from the country in which it is investing in mining
projects. The government of Indonesia is responsible for
providing this security measures. The two things became the
initial connection between the two sides since the signing of
Contract of Work (CoW) between the government of Indonesia
and PT Freeport in 1967. 134 Since then, the world’s largest
gold and copper mine became of the largest assets owned by
the government of Indonesia.
The exploration zone that was split into two areas, CoW A
(port, road and airport area) and CoW B (Mining Exploration
area) stood on the lands of the Amungme, Kamoro, Moni and
Theodor Rathgeber. 2005. Remarks on the Economic Activities of Military Forces
in Indonesia. Dalam Theodor Rathgeber (ed). Economic, Sosial, and Cultural
Rights in West-Papua: a Study on Sosial Reality and Political Perspectives. The
Evangelical Church in the Rhineland. Germany. pp. 129-132
133
Ibid, pp. 130-131.
134
Oil and Mining Projects Threaten Communities in Aceh and Papua. http://www.
amnestyusa.org/justearth/indonesia.pdf
132
Nduga tribes. 135 History record that between 1975 and 1997
over 160 people were killed in the area around PT Freeport.
136
The area around PT. Freeport continues to be under threats
although the country has gone through reform. The road
connecting Timika and Tembagapura, known as the “Deadly
Road”, has taken many lives from among the military, police,
local workers, and expatriates. 137
The threats necessitated special protection in the area. The
Indonesian Government has reported PT Freeport of allocating
special funds for protection services during the New Order era.
Conflict Prevention Institute (CPI) noted that during the time of
New Order, Freeport paid at least US$ 18,5 million for military
protection. Other institutions have even said that the real amount
was closer to US$ 35 million in addition to an annual fee of US$
11 million.138 However, this special allocation for protection had
stopped following the reform movement. In 2002, following
new internal regulation in the US, payments by Freeport to the
Indonesian military was terminated. 139
Moreover, the reformation wind of change also transformed
the role of ensuring the security of the area controlled by the
multinational. The Police now perform general security. 635
personnel from the Papua Regional Police, Mobile Brigade Corps,
and military who are parts of the Joint Task Force Amole Timika
are now deployed in protecting the Freeport area. The Task Force
who are on four months assignments is directly controlled by
the Papua Regional Police and led by an Adjunct Senior Police,
Kamoro tribe lives in the low-land and the Amungme is a high-land tribe. Both
tribes rely on their neighbouring areas including tropical forests, mountains and
riverbanks http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/LNG/Refs/002AbrashFreeport.pdf
136
Editorial Jatam, 21 Juli 2009 http://www.jatam.org/dmdocuments/papua.pdf,
“Papua Membara lagi. Tanya Freeport”, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
137
One of the cases resulting in the death of foreign national in the area nearby
Freeport is a shooting on 11 July 2009 that killed Drew Nicholas Grant, an Australian www.smh.com.au/world/new-dad-dies-in-gunman-attack-20090711-dgmx.
html?skin=text-only, “New Dad Dies in Gunman Attack”.
138
P.A. Rifai-Hasan. Development, Power, and the Mining Industry in Papua: A Study
of Freeport Indonesia. Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 89:129-143
139
Ibid.
135
MILITARY POLICY 127
a middle-raking officer. 140 Although the military is providing a
supporting role141 in reality its presence in the Task Force remain
significant considering the regular escalation of threats around
the PT Freeport mining area. 142
Despite the change in interaction between PT Freeport
and the government’s security forces, allegations of the
military and police receiving “protection pay” continues. One
indication came from PT. Freeport 2008 report that stated
that the company had paid US$ 9 million of “Support Cost”
directly to the military and police for security operations in
the company’s area. 143 This “Support Cost” included logistical
support, infrastructure as well as additional military and
police operations’ costs. 144
The then Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, made
clear that payments made by any multinationals to the military
would have gone through civilian authority first. The Member
of Parliament, Marzuki Darusman, in response to various
suspicions such as conveyed this on the possibility of direct
payments to military and police personnel. 145 On this issue,
PT Freeport denied the charge by saying that there had been
no direct contracts with military or police personnel. 146
One proposed a solution to reducing security by
military or police personnel is for PT Freeport to provide its
internal security. Presidential Decree number 63/2004 on
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php, “635 Personel POLRI/TNI Amankan Areal
Freeport”, 10 March 2011.
141
There are 112 personnel from the Army, the Navy and Air Force in each Amole
Task Force assignment http://kosmo.vivanews.com/news/read/82521-_tni_di_balik_konflik_freeport__itu_fitnah_, “TNI Di Balik Konflik Freeport, Itu Fitnah”.
142
Similar view is expressed by Karseno, Head of Papua Problem Handling Desk
(Desk Penyelesaian Masalah/DPMP) of the Coordinating Ministry of Politics,
Law and Security in his interview with team Imparsial.
143
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/30/govt-slammed-tni-security-payments.
html, “Govt Slammed for TNI Security Payments”, 30 August 2008.
144
www.ptfi.com/reports/files/wtsd2006.pdf
145
http://antikorupsi.org/indo/index2, “TNI Bukan Tentara Bayaran”, 2 January 2006,
146
www.tni.mil.id/images/gallery/tni%20commits%20to%20reform%20by%20koh
irin.pdf
140
Vital Objects of National Interest was very clear about the
provision of internal security. Since then PT Freeport has been
in the process of transforming its security through internal
protection. Retired Brigadier General MR. Saragih who work
as PT Freeport Indonesia’s Security Manager said that PT
Freeport security system consist of 650 personnel, including
direct and indirect security personnel who are responsible for
human protection, technology security, construction security,
and animal protection. 147 PT Freeport Indonesian reported
that they have spent US$ 15,3 million to invest in its internal
security department. PT Freeport Indonesia also claimed that
they have organised training in human rights and emphasised the
adherence of human rights of its internal security forces. 148
The establishment of PT Freeport Indonesia’s internal
civilian security department was welcomed by many groups,
including the Head of the People’s Thoughts Faction in the
Papuan Council, Yan P. Mandenas SOS who said that the
routine convoy of joint police and military unit in the Freeport
area had provoked the shootings. 149 It was this concern on
the attempt at placing more security forces that has led many
people to call for the reduction for security intervention from
the military and the police.
K. Military Policy Trends in Papua (from the Old Order
to Reform Era)
Generally there has not been a change in central
government’s policy on Papua from the time of the Old
Order regime to the Reform Era. When dealing with the
www.esdm.go.id/berita/37-umum/447-pt-freeport-indonesia-menuju-sistempengamanan-internal.pdf, “PT Freeport Indonesia Menuju Sistem Pengamanan
Internal”.
148
www.ptfi.com/reports/files/wtsd2006.pdf, Nilai Mendasar. PT Freeport Indonesia.
Laporan Berkarya Menuju Pembangunan berkelanjutan 2006”.
149
www.wartapapuabarat.org/index.php/eco-terrorismtop/153-eco-terrorism/145dprp-minta-tni-dan-polri-ditarik-dari-areal-freeport, “DPRP Minta TNI dan POLRI
Ditarik Dari Area Freeport”, 28 March 2010, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
147
MILITARY POLICY 129
problems in Papua, the government consistently emphasised
a security approach and the use of the military. If there had
been some changes over the long run, these have not been of
significance.
Each regime has its own characteristics in regards of
military operations and in its use of violence. Firstly, during
the Old Order regime it was clear that military operations
were taken as an option in order to defeat the Dutch who
colonised Papua. All military policies were centrally led.
Since the enemy was a state, operational-control was led
directly from the centre under the President as the Armed
Forces Commander-in-Chief. It was a big-scale operation that
deployed a huge number of soldiers from the various armed
forces. This join operational command was not dominated
by one particular armed force. All operational planning and
execution was also coordinated centrally and supervised by
a Field Commander-in-Chief.
The operations of this period were limited-scale
intelligence and battle operations. However, the military
operations were influenced by the dynamics of Indonesia’s
international politics since these were employed in conjunction
with diplomatic efforts. Every new development resulting
from diplomatic negotiations were taken into consideration
in deciding military operation policies.
Furthermore, the use of military policies in Papua was
not simply a mean to defend the integrity of the region but was
also influenced by the pressure against President Soekarno’s
political position. He used his decision to recapture Irian Barat
from the Netherlands to revive his waning popularity.
Secondly, during the New Order regime there was a
marked difference from its predecessor in regards to military
operations in Papua. The military operations deployed during
this time were no longer targeted against a state but a nonstate entity, the Free Papua Organisation. There were no
large-scale deployments of troops although these continue
involved all armed forces. Operational control was no longer
led centrally but under the Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih supervised by Military HQ. This was made
possible due to the Military Operation Zone status in Papua.
The kinds of operations implemented were territorial
operations as its core supported by battle operations,
intelligence operations and security and public order
operations. Another difference those operations during the
Old Order was that these new operations were no longer
influenced by diplomatic efforts as there were no more
negotiation with the Dutch. The only exception was during
the Act of Free Choice referendum, which involved the UN,
although this did not significantly affect the ongoing military
operations at that time.
During this period, military operations was principally
used to protect territorial integrity as can be read from the
New Order’s military doctrine, which defined danger as:
“…Physical and mental infiltrations, subversions, and
insurgencies from within Indonesia, which betrays Pancasila
and the Constitution of 1945 and rejects the reforms from the
Old Order and New Order.“150
Thirdly, is the military operation following the reform
era, which despite being declared not as a military operation,
continues to be deployed by the military in Papua
Nonetheless there are clear similarities between these
military operations in Papua. First, all military operations in
Papua deal with separatist problems although upon further
examination the Old Order and New Order had different
concept of Papua’s disintegration. The Old Order fought
disintegration because the regime perceived Papua as a region
that should have been automatically part of Indonesia since
1945 but in reality was still in Dutch hands. The New Order
150
Sesko AD. 1966. Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI AD Tri Ubaya Sakti. Buu Induk
Seminar AD ke II on 21-25 August 1966. Sesko AD. Bandung
MILITARY POLICY 131
and Reform era governments perceived it as protecting the
territorial integrity of Papua from internal insurgencies.
Another similarity between these regimes is the poor
monitoring of military operations by civilians authorities. The
minimal supervision during the Old Order period was due to
the fact that everyone’s attention was absorbed in reclaiming
Papua from the Dutch. During the New Order period this was
caused by the military’s dominance, which controls many
civilian political posts. Consequently, the critical objections
voiced by civilian groups were never optimally accommodated
and discussed by political parties and civilian politicians.
Meanwhile, poor monitoring following the reform era was the
result of a lack of political would among civilian politicians
as well as a lack of capability among civilian authority in
understanding security issues.
The final similarity between military operations in
Papua is continuous human rights abuses. The security
approach continues to cause negative excesses to the
population. Human Rights Monitoring Agencies, including
the National Commission for Human Rights, note many cases
of intimidations, harassments, rapes, and other human rights
abuses perpetrated by soldiers during their operations.
133
CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATION OF THE ROLES
OF THE MILITARY ON
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS
IN PAPUA SOCIETY
The presence of the military, as part of security attempt
after Papua is intergrated into Indonesia, does not guarantee
security to the people in Papua. Instead, practices of violence
are done by security personnel particularly the military
The stigma of “separatists”, labelled onto the people
in Papua for having political differences or any kind of
differences against the government, often lead to acts of
violence. Constitution clearly guarantees freedom of
expression covering freedom of opinion on what is best for
the people in Papua, expressed in non violence manner. Yet
stigmatisation practiced onto the people who resist the will
of the government and security personnel throughout the
military operation.
In the writing of the chapter, human rights become the
analytical criteria in interpreting events of violence in Papua.
Therefore it is important to begin this chapter with a number
of explanation for human rights. This is followed by acts of
violence and human rights violations central to the concern
in the national and international levels. These cases explore
violations of human rights in the reform area without neglecting
past violence and human rights violations. Furthermore, the
cases of violence and human rights violations elaborated in
this chapter are those central in the public scrutiny. It means
there are many other cases of violence and human rights
violations in Papua not yet reveal in this chapter.
A. Human Rights and Human Rights Violations
Law No 39/ 1999 defines human rights as a set of rights
integrative to the substance and essence of human as the
creature made by God Almighty and the blessing from God
to be respected, adhered and protected by the State, law and
the government, and everyone for the respect and protection
of the dignity and self-worth of human beings. In 2000, through the Second Amandment of 1945
Constitution, in Chapter XA in Human Rights, a number of
rights are adopted from international human rights laws,
from Universal Declaration of Human Rights and from
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) adopted in 1966 to 1976.
In human rights, categorisation civil political rights and
economic social cultural movements should be interrelated
and indivisible, leading to equality of importance for both right
groups. For both right groups, the importance is on the role
of the State in human rights. State is not an entity providing
human rights to the citizens but protector and guarantor of
human rights. State also guarantees the fulfillment of human
rights encapsulated in three State obligations – to promote,
to protect and to fulfill.
To fulfill civil and political rights, State presence should
be minimized or in other words on the negative pole. The
bigger State intervention on this right group, the bigger the
potentials of restrictions and limitations. In other words, the
fulfilment of civil and political rights are based on individual
Article 1 point (1) Law No 39 of 1999 on Human Rights
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, (XXI), December 16, 1966, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , adopted 16 Dec.
1966, entered into force January 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
IMPLICATION OF THE ROLES OF THE MILITARY 135
rights immediately exercised by limiting the role of the State
from personal domain.
ICCPR regulats a number of non-derogable rights:
1. Right to life (Article 6)
2. Right to be free from torture, cruel or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7)
3. Right to be free from slavery or involuntary servitude
(Article 8)
4. Right not to be imprisoned for contractual debt (Article
11)
5. Right not to be convicted or sentenced to a heavier
penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal conditions
(Article 15)
6. Right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law (Article 16)
7. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(Article 18)
Meanwhile Indonesia only adopted a number of rights
under non-derogable rights under Article 28I Article (1) 1945
Constitution:
1. Right to life
2. Right to be free torture, cruel or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment
3. Right to be free from slavery
Meanwhile, economic, social and cultural rights from
ICESR are:
1. Right to work
2. Right to form trade unions
3. Right to social security
4. Right to protection and assistance to the family
5. Right to an adequate standard of living (adequate food,
clothing and housing)
6. Right to be free from hunger
7. Right to education
8. Right to health
According 1945 Constitution, economic, social and
cultural rights not regulated
under one specific article but distributed in a number
of articles in or out of Chapter XA on Human Rights. These
human rights are:
1. Right to health (Article 28H point (1))
2. Right to social security (Article 34 point (3))
3. Right to housing (Article 28H point (1) and Article
28E)
4. Right to education (Article 28C, Article 28E point (1) and
Article 31 point (1))
5. Right of the indigenous people (Article 28I poin (3) and
Article 32 point (1))
Gross Human Rights Violations
Article 7 Law no. 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Court
stipulates that gross human rights violations include genocide
and crime against humanity. Genocide is defined in Article 8
of Human Rights Court Law as: “deliberate and systematic
destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, race, ethnic or
religious group, through:
Most of the writing on the termilogy of gross human rights violations referred to
Bhatara Ibnu Reza, International Criminal Court: Suatu Analisis Order dalam
Hubungan Internasional, Thesis, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, Jakarta: 2002. pp 74-80
a. murder of member of the group;
b. physical or mental durress on member of the group;
c. creation of conditions resulting, in whole or in part, on
physical annihilation of the livelihood of the group;
d. forced prevention of birth within the group; or
e. forced transfer of children and groups from one group
to another.”
Meanwhile crime against humanity is defined in Article 9
Human Rights Court Law as: “an offence constituting expansive
or systematic attack directly targetting civilians, such as:
a.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
murder;
annihilation;
slavery;
forced eviction or transfer;
arbitrary deprivation of freedom or any physical
liberty violating principles of internatonal law;
torture
rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, forced sterilization and any other equal
sexual violences;
persecution to particular group or association based
on political belief, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture,
religion , sexual identify or other reasons according
to universally recognized international law;
involuntary disappearance; or
crime of apartheid.
In understanding crime in Papua so far, this should be
viewed from the patterns of human rights violations under
the jurisdiction of Human Rights Court Law. Therefore,
it is required to provide a normative description of the
patterns of crime against humanity.
1. Extrajudicial Execution/Killing or Summary Execution/
Killing
Extrajudicial execution is an unlawful murder done
deliberately based on the instruction of the government
or superior personnel and/or through silent agreement or
accord. The action is called summary killing or a murder
done quickly and erratically. It means that the actors have
justified that anyone they come accross are enemies.
2. Sexual Harrasment
Sexual harrasment is a crime against humanitarian law
according to Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention and
Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Convention (1977) on NonInternational Armed Conflict. This action is degrading to
human dignity and self-worth, that are basic human rights
and the obligation of the State to protect it, under Article 33
point (1) cq. 71 Human Rights Law no 39/1999.
3. Rape
Rape is a violation of humanitarian law and human
rights. The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention on Civil Protection
in Wartime Article 27 and Article 4 and Additional Protocol II
of the 1949 Geneva Convention (1977) on Non International
Armed Conflict clearly prohibits the use of rape as part of the
war strategies.
Rape is categorized as a violation of Article 9 Human
Rights Court no 26/2000 cq. Article 29 Human Rights Law
no 39/1999 cq. Article 285 of Indonesian Penal Code and so
forth.
Amnesti Internasional, 14-Poin Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial
Executions. http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/apro/APROweb.nsf/pages/philippines_pk_kit/$File/recommendation1.pdf, (accessed 11 February 2011).
4. Torture
Based on the 1984 Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, torture
is any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him, or a third person, information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions.
Indonesia has ratified Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
through Ratification of Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Law no
5/1998. This is strictly regulated in Article 4, 33 and 34 of Human
Rights Law no 39/1999 cq. Article 9 Law no 26/2000.
5. Arbitary Arrest/Detention
Arbitrary arrest is unlawful, without any warrant for
arrest and/or detainment (in the case of planned arrest, not
caught in the act), categorized as violations against Article 9
point (1) International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
declaring that no one can be arbitrary arrested or detained.
6. Involuntary Disappearance
According International Convention on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance adopted December
20 2006, involuntary disappearance is defined as: UN General Assembly, Resolution 61/177 Adopted by the General Assembly:
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 12 January 2007, A/RES/61/177.
“For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents
of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of
the law.”
B. Human Rights Violations and Violence in Papua
in New Order Era
1. The Murder of Arnold Ap (1984)
Arnold Ap was an anthropolog, ethnology museum
curator in Cendrawasih University (Uncen) and a leader of
a traditional Papuan performance called Mambesak. His
activities in the development of Papuan culture and his
political view were seen by the Government of Indonesia as
a danger. Mambesak was a popular event in the community
and their music was used by Indonesian military to persuade
members of Free Papua Movement from the forests.
On November 30 1983, Arnold Ap was arrested by a
military personnel dressed as a civilian from Sandi Yudha
Troop Command (Kopassandha) in a car without any plate
number. 10 His family did not know his whereabout yet they
were informed that he was in a detainment center in Jayapura
called Panorama.11 Sinar Harapan national daily received strict
notification from the government for publishing this incident
and the editor was assigned to fly to Jayapura to express his
apology and to learn “the whole truth.”12
Robin Osborne, Op.Cit. p. 203
Ibid.p. 316.
Ibid.p. 316.
10
Ibid.p. 319.
11
Ibid.p. 320.
12
Ibid.p. 320.
On February 21 1984, Arnold Ap and four Sandi Yudha
Troop Commmand detainees were transferred to the police.
The accusation was that Ap was allegedly involved in the
Free Papua Movement. In police detainment, Arnold Ap was
allowed to visit a number of places outside prison, including
Cendrawasih University, with police escort. 13
On April 26 1984, the body of Arnold Ap was found in
the morgue of Aryoko Hospital, Jayapura.14 Bruises and ropes
were apparent on his arms along with injury in the stomach.
Government official statement was released a week later,
announcing that the death of Ap was caused by his attempt
to escape together with the other four detainees.15
This case was brought to trial in January 1985 in Jayapura
State Court with four detainees with subversive accusation
of assisting the escape of Ap and four other detainees.16 They
were a student Jonas Rejauw, two bureacrats Bob Souwela and
Izaak Arobaya and prison guard Pius Wanem.17 Throughout
the trial, an evidence of made in Israel UZI-type handgun
and a magazine with 16 9-mm bullets.18 It was informed that
Ap was shot dead “in an operation launched by Sandi Yudha
Troop Command.”19 There was no explanation on how the red
berret troop found out and reached the location.20
All defendants were sentenced as guilty for treachery
against Indonesia by providing safe haven to enemy of the
State.21 Pius Wanem was sentenced with seven years in prison,
with five and a half year of reduction. Other defendants
received various sentences of two and a half years, and five
and a half years.22
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
13
14
Ibid.p. 321.
Ibid. p. 324.
Ibid. p. 323.
Ibid. p. 329.
Ibid. p. 329.
Ibid. p. 330.
Ibid. p. 330.
Ibid. p. 330.
Ibid. p.. 330.
Ibid. p. 331.
2. Human Rights Violations against Amungme Tribe in
PT Freeport Indonesia by the Indonesian Military
(1973-1995)
PT Freeport Indonesia is a mining operation operated
in Timika, Papua, since 1967.23 Freeport Indonesia entered
Indonesia through McMorand Copper and Gold Inc under
Foreign Investment Law no 1/1967, and in a week after its
enactment on April 7 1967, the contract of work between
the Government of Indonesia with Freeport Indonesia was
signed.24
After five years of operation, on March 3 1973, President
Soeharto visited the mining location to officially launch this
project and named the city where Freeport labour stay
as “Tembagapura.”25 Freeport Indonesia’s copper mining
led to problems on forced eviction of the land owned by
the indigenous group of Amumgme Tribe living nearby
the mining location. This was worsen by the involvement
of military in the security operation on Freeport mining
location.26
Amumgme Tribe left their ancestors’ land in the
mountain controlled later on by Freeport and they moved
to Agimugah (Aroa, Wa, Stijinggah, Oa and Noema). 27
Afterwards, in 1980s, all areas belonging to Amungme
Tribe was included as part of Lorenzt National Park.28 This
triggered anger of the Amungme Tribe as they no longer
lived on their ancestors’ land.29
Amiruddin Al Rahab dan Aderito Jesus de Soares, Perjuangan Amungme: Antara
Freeport dan Militer, (Jakarta: ELSAM, 2003), p. 39.
24
Ibid. p. 39.
25
Ibid. p. 39.
26
Ibid. p. 60.
27
Ibid. p. 58.
28
Ibid. p.58.
29
Ibid. p.58.
23
In 1977, based on January Agreement, Amungme Tribe
living around Timika and Tembagapura was prohibited from
entering the area of Gunung Bijih Timur (GBT).30 January
Agreement was signed on January 8 1974 in which the
agreement between Amungme Tribe and Freeport stipulated
that the Amungmes should let go of their land to Freeport
for the sake of a number of social facilities.31 The Amungmes
protested this agreement and in June 1977, the Army
bombarded Akimuga Village, leading to the murder of around
30 Amungmes.32
The increase of security in the mining area by the Military
of Indonesia became apparent in March 1983 when General
L.B. Moerdani as Commander in Chief of Indonesian Armed
Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia/ABRI)
and Operational Command for the Restoration of Security
and Order (Kopkamtib) deployed 100 Special Forces Forces
Command personnel and added 200 personnel from the
same unit.33 Since 1999, Special Forces Command and Army’s
Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) troops reaches 1,600
personnel – targetting the people of Papua labelled as antiFreeport and members of Armed Security Disturbance
group (Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan/GPK)-Free Papua
Movement.34
Human rights violations caused by Freeport Indonesia in
collaboration with the military are apparent in a number of
cases of violence against the Amungmes. This happens from
1994 to 1997. These cases of violence were committed by
military units assigned to Freeport mining area and in most
events, the military personnel labelled civilians as Free Papua
Movement members.
32
33
34
30
31
Ibid. p.61.
Ibid. p.221.
Ibid. p.61.
Ibid. p.62.
Ibid. p.62.
Table 4.1.
Human Rights Violations in Freeport and Its Neighbouring
Areas (1994-1997)35
No
1
Year
1994
2
1994
3
1994
4
1994
5
1994
36
Event
Exchange of fire on Chrismast day between
Free Papua Momvement and the military
happened in Timika. The military personnel
forced the people to gather, chase and
attack Free Aceh Movement. In this incident,
military personnel raided the hiding post of
Free Aceh Movement and murdered Yulius
Yanempa. Yulius’ hand was cut off and
shown to the Commander of the Company as
emblem of triumph. On December 27 1994,
the military along with the local people
arrested two civilians, Dominikus Narkime
and Petrus Omabak.
A civilian Wendi Tabuni was shot on
December 25 1994 inside Freeport-owned
bus no 44 between Timika and Tembaga
Pura. His body was dumped on Mile 66.
Torture against Yoel Kogoya, Peregamus
Wake and Elias Jikwa in Freeport workshop
in Koperapoka.
Nawaral Deik-In family was surrounded
by the military on October 6 1994 for
their alleged relationship with Free Papua
Movement. The military captured Sebastianis
Kwalik with his brothers Romulus Kwalik,
Marius Kwalik and Hosea Kwalik and
detained them inside a container, used as
military detainment facility in Koperapoka
post, Timika.
Yosepha Alomang, Yakobus Alomang,
Yuliana Magal, Mathias Kelanangame and
Nicholas Magal was arrested and brought to
Koperapoka military post in Timika. They
were arrested for allegedly assisting Free
Papua Movement figure Kelly Kwalik.36
Actor
This operation
involving
civilians was
kept away from
the media.
Batallion 733
Pattimura
TNI
TNI
TNI
Summarized from Bab V tentang Deretan Pelanggaran HAM terhadap warga
Amungme dalam Buku Perjuangan Amungme: Antara Freeport dan Militer. Ibid.
pp. 91-115.
36
See Benny Giay dan Yafet Kambai, Yosepha Alomang: Pengalaman Seorang
Perempaun Papua Melawan Penindasan, (Jakarta: Elsham, 2003), pp. 77-81.
35
6
1995
7
1995
8
1995
9
December
1996October
1997
On April 16 1995, exchange of fire launched
by Batallion 733 Pattimura in Kwamki Lama,
Timika, resulted in two casualties
On May 31 1995, Batallion 752 Paniai raided
Kingmi Protestant mass in Hoea Village (+
90 km east of Tembagapura) in the middle
of their prayers, resulting on 11 civilian
casualties including Reverend Martinus
Kibak
On December 25 and 26 1995, 15 civilians
were arrested and detained in a contained
belonging to Freeport security. After a couple
of days, they were released after suffering
from inhuman treatment.
Civilians in Bella, Jila and Alama (150 km
east Tembagapura suffered from inhuman
treatment from security personnel during
the military operation to rescue WWF
researchers in Mapenduma under the
custody of Kelly Kwalik and Daniel Yudas
Kogoya. Throughout the operation that
spanned from December 1996 to October
1997, 16 civilians were killed, 13 of them
were residents of Bella and Alama village, 2
from Jilla and one from Mapenduma. Details
showed that 11 people were shot dead,
two were declared missing and three were
seriously injured. Moreover, 13 religious
facilities were damaged, along with a
number of houses, gardens and cattles.
Batallion 733
Pattimura
Yon 752/Paniai
TNI
Special Forces
Command,
Infantry
Battalion 753/
Paniai, Infantry
Battalion
752/Sorong
and Infantry
Battalion 751/
Jayapura
These cases were included in the report compiled by
Diocese of Jayapura, Mgr. Herman Muninghoff titled “Reports
on Human Rights Violations against Local Community in South
Timika, Fak-fak district, Irian Jaya in 1994-1995.”37 Based on
this report on human rights violations in the operation to free
hostages in Mapenduma based on the reports submitted to
National Commission of Human Rights in 1998 by leaders of
three churches – Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) Mimika
Area Head, Reverend Isak Onawatme; Father P. Nato Gobay
from Catholic Church Tiga Raja Timika Parochial; and Head
of Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) Mimia Clasis, Reverend
ABM Hutapea.38
Amiruddin Al Rahab dan Aderito Jesus de Soares, Op.Cit. p 94.
Ibid. p. 98.
37
38
National Commision of Human Rights announced their
findings confirming the cases documented by Mgr. Herman
Muninghoff on September 22 1995 on summary execution,
torture, involuntary disappearance and arbitrary arrest and
detention.39 Based on this report, National Commision of
Human Rights clearly stated that human rights violations were
committed in Freeport facilities such as repair shop, security
posts, buses, containers and workshop, implying Freeport
involvement in these strings of violations.40
In responding to the report, Freeport Indonesia that the
their facilities were used since the military involved were
responsible for Freeport security, yet Freeport public relation
denied that these human right violations were committed
under Freeport supervisor.41
Lack of clear stance from National Commission
of Human Rights resulted on major disappointment
from Amungme Tribe and concerned non government
organizations. 42 This was because National Commission
of Human Rights have promised to the community to
investigate the involvement of Freeport in the cases of
human rights violation in Timika.43
C. Human Rights Violations and Violence in Papua in
Reform Era
There are a number of human rights violations committed
by the military in Papua, from the Old Order, New Order to
the current reform era. The government of Indonesia with
its military face tends to handle the problems in Papua with
violence. As a result, Indonesia is seen as a collonial power in
the perspective of the people in Papua toward the government
of Indonesia.
41
42
43
39
40
Ibid. p. 98.
Ibid. p. 103.
Ibid. p. 103.
Ibid. p. 104.
Ibid. p. 104.
Human rights violations cases range from torture,
gunshot, arrest and arbitrary confiscation and a number
of acts of violence. Violence and human rights violations
committed by the military in the reform era happen
before and after Special Autonomy status was granted
to Papua.
1. Before Special Autonomy Sebel (1998-October 2001)
The Case of Torture in Paniai District (1998)
Paniai district is one of the regions in Papua declared as a
Military Operation Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer/DOM). This
status means that security personnel are deployed intensively
to this specific region to enforce the law related to military
emergency situation. On January 24 to 29 1998, Infantry
Batallion 712 Rajawali (Wira-9) gathered and interogated
the people in Paniai, including Head of Epouto Village, Head
of Wotai Village and community leaders alledgedly assisted
Thadeus Johny Yogy who was labelled as head of Free Papua
Movement in Paniai.44 This interrogation included acts of
violence such as submerging people into the gutter or threw
buckets of cold waters onto them.
The series of violence continued up to February 11 to
13 1998. When they were out searching for Yogi, the military
came accross three civilians Rufus Giyai, Mikael Pekey and
Fidels Bukega. The military accused them as Yogi’s men. They
were detained and tortured in Waghete Military Sub-District
Command (Koramil).45
In 1985 Tadeus Johny Yogi gave himself up to the military by reporting to Enarotali
Military Sub-District Command under Captain Hanafi. Yet he was not punished
and was set free instead. This led to a series of disturbance caused by Free Papua
Movement leaders, including kidnapping of a number of women to be made his
wives. The military used this as justification to relaunch an operation to arrest
Tadeus Yogi.
45
J. Budi Hernawan OFM and Poengky Indarti; The Practice of Torture in Aceh and
Papua 1998-2007., p. 151
44
After interrogating around one hundred and fifty people,
they were instructed to bring woods, vegetables, chickens
and others to the Military Sub-District Command. They were
forced to bring along their working tools and instructed to
level the field, create sewer systems and clear the grass on
the yard of the Military Sub-District Command.
This interrogation continued until June 3 to 4 1998, seven
military personnel from Rajawali Unit gathered people from
Kopaidagi and Pugo villages. They interrogated the people to
collect information on Yogi’s whereabout, they also blamed the
people for not maintaining their local security posts. Based on
these accusations, they tortured all young people with woods.
To avoid the threat of being submerged in the water, the people
gave them 2 chickens and money up to Rp 150.000,Three military personnel visited Waidide Village. They
instructed the people to gathered and afterwards accused and
blamed them for not assisting the military to arrest Yogi, for
not maintaining their local security posts and for not clearing
the streets. This resulted in the torture of 25 young people.46
To escape being submerged into Pugo river, the villagers gave
them 6 chickens and money up to Rp 500.000,The Case of Violence against Albert Kalakmabin in Oksibil
(1998)
On the morning of August 7 1998, Albert Kalakmabin
delivered his statement as he was summoned by the military
personnel to their security post. There he was interrogated
and assaulted to admit that the letter he brought along was
not written by Karel Uropkulin (Free Papua Movement) but by
Tribuana Special Forces Command in Oksibil. Oksibil Church
reverend witnesed the incident that caused bruises to the face
of Albert Kalakmabin.47
Papua 1998-2007., pp. 155-156
47
This case is reported to three church heads in Jayapura, Reverend Leo L. Ladjar
46
In this security operation in Oksibil, the government
deployed Batallion 725 and Special Forces Corps. These units
were deployed to Bintang Mountains and arrested Karel
Uropkulin. Differences between these units led to friction
amongst them, resulting in abuse of power to the local
community. The military attempted to control the livelihood
of the people of Oksibil, Bintang Mountain sub-district by
launching a military operation to deal with Free Papua
Movement under the leadership of Karel Uropkulin.
The Case of Arbitrary Shot in Kemtuk-Sentani (1999)
In 1999, a young man named Robby Yaung was shot.48
Robby Yaung was found dead in the street side of KemtukSentani or 70 km west Jayapura on June 6 1999. Robby was
shot from behind when the pick up he rode passed by a group
of military personnel attempted to hitchhiked. Because he did
not stop his car, a military personnel took a shot and ended
his life. This bloody incident lead to Head of the Tribe Niko
Yaung to demand Rp 500 million as a compensation money to
Commander in Chief of Trikora Military Area Command.
This incident received special attentio from the then
Head of Papua House of Representatives NT Kaywai and
then Jayapura Head of District JP Karafir. Robby ceremony
at the cemetary was attended by then Commander in Chief
of Trikora Military Area Command VIII Major General Amir
Sembiring.49
OFM (Jayapura Archbishop), Reverend Benny Giay (JPIC CAMA office) and
Reverend Herman Saud (Head of Gereja Sinode from Papua Evangelist Church)
to Army Commander in Chief Major General Amir Sembiring, 1 July 1999, titled
Laporan Laporan Dampak Kehadiran Aparat Keamanan bagi Situasi Kemasyarakatan dan HAM di Wilayah Pegunungan Bintang, Jayapura, Juli 1999 (The Report
on the Impact of the Presence of the Security Forces to the Social and Human
Rights Situation in the Area of Star Mountains). This report can be accessed on
www.hampapua.org/skp/index2.html
48
Kompas Clipping, “Aceh Masih Membara, Dua Tentara Tewas - Di Irja Warga
Sipil Ditembak”; 11 June 1999.
49
Ibid.
The Case of Arbitrary Shot in Madi Village
On May 21 2000, the military launched a military
operation to Madivillage, Paniai sub district. Military personnel
took their shots along the way to Etenedimi in Uwibutu post in
Madi.50 There was no casualty in this incident yet the people
in Madi village were tramatized bythe sounds of the gunshots.
The people remained inside their houses for a couple of time
because of this incident.
Ironically, after this incident, the Police summoned two
civilians, one of them is Madi village official and member
of civilian defence corp. With police instruction, they were
submerged into a fish pond from seven o clock in the evening
until the next morning.51
The Case of Sweeping and Gunshot at Bonggo, Jayapura
(2001)
This is alledgedly an unfortunate case of a wrong shot
done bye the military in Jayapura. On the early morning of
Sunday September 23 2001, the military announced that the
task force 511 of Bonggo Army’s Strategic Reserve Command.52
Perpetrators were about more than 100 people using arrows,
machetes, axes and other traditional weapons. Perpetrators
attacked in a surprise. Until the morning, members of the
military remained allert to anticipate further attack.
On 3 o’clock in the morning, after hundreds of Free
Papua Movement armed with traditional weapons attempted
to attack the post, the military fought back by conducting
sweeping operations to the villages nearby. As a result, two
person accused as members of the Free Papua Movement were
Papua 1998-2007, p. 160
51
Papua 1998-2007, p. 161
52
http://www.hampapua.org/skp/skp04/app-07i.pdf
50
killed by the bullets shot by the military. These two bodies
were not returned to the family because of the concerns that
their final ceremonies might erupt into incidents threatening
the stability of the security.
2. Post Special Autonomy Status (November 20012010)53
The Case of Murder of the Head of Papua Council Presidium
Theys Hiyo Eluay (2001)
The murder of Theys Eluay was included in the post
Special Autonomy period in 2001 considering that the case
was dealth after Special Autonomy Law no 21/2001 was
signed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri. Afterwards,
the murder of Theys Eluay became a momentum for changes
of political climate in Papua after the enactment of Special
Autonomy Law no. 21/2001. Up until now, the case remained
unsolved and left deep scars in the people of Papua.
Dortheys Hiyo Eluay, known as ys Eluay, was the Head
of Papua Council Presidium (Presidium Dewan Papua/PDP)
campaining for the independence of Papua.54 Theys had been a
member of the House of Representatives First Level in Irian Jaya
from Karya Pembangunan Fraction for three periods.55 Theys
had also been the Head of Indigenous People Agency (Lembaga
Masyarakat Adat/LMA) Irian Jaya after the appointment by the
Governor of Irian Jaya Barnabas Suebu in 1992.56
His activities in setting up Papua Council Presidium
with Tom Beanal in post Soeharto era was initiated in the
Law No. 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua effective 1 January 2002.
54
Sam Karoba, Hans Gebze, et al, Papua Menggugat 11 November 2001 Hari Kematian Demokrasi, HAM dan Perjuangan di Tanah Papua?, (Yogyakarta: Galang
Press, 2002), p. 21.
55
Ibid. p.21.
56
Ibid. p. 21.
53
Grand Assembly (Musyawarah Besar) with traditional leaders,
intelectual figures, women’s representatives and youth figures
from all over Papua on February 23-26 2000.57 Beforehands,
Theys pioneered the official raising of Morning Star flag on
December 1 2000 as a symbol of their demands toward the
government, even though the flag raising movement had
been done sporadically since 1998.58 Theys also initiated the
second Papuan People Congress (Kongres Rakyat Papua)
in 2000, resulting in the refusal of 1969 Act of Free Choice
(PEPERA).59
Theys’ activities became the serious concerns of the
security personnel, who arrested him for act of treason in
November 2000.60 Even though he was put to trial, Theys
maintained his activities after he underwent medical treatment
in Jakarta for his cardiac problem.61
The attempt to murder Theys started when he was invited
to the Commander in Chief of Tribuana Special Forces Corps
Task Force, Liutenant Colonel Infantry Hartomo to attend
the reception of National Heroes Commemoration Day on
November 10 2001.62 Theys took the invitation and in the
evening, the murder took place in the car owned by Thyes and
the driver Aristoteles Masoka was missing after the incident.63
The body of Theys was found in Koya Village, on the border
of Papua – Papua New Guinea.64
The death of They triggered a huge commotion in Papua,
in the national and international levels. The government of
Indonesia took measures to put the murderers of Thyes to
trials, all came from Special Forces Commands.
The Military High Court (Mahkamah Militer Tinggi/
59
60
61
62
63
64
57
58
Ibid. p. 23.
Ibid. p. 23.
Ibid. p. 23.
Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 26.
Mahmilti) III in Surabaya put a number of officers and soldiers
of Special Forces Command from Tribuana Task Force to trial.
They were Commander in Chief Tribuana Task Force Liutenant
Colonel Infantry Hartomo; Vice Commander Major Doni
Hutabara and five of their members Captain Rionardo, First
Liutenant Agus Supriyanto, First Sergeant Lourensius, First
Sergeant Asrial and Chief Private Zulfahmi.65 The defendants
were divided into two groups with head judge Colonel (CHK)
Yamini and Colonel (CHK) Amirudin Rahim and Colonel (CHK)
Suryono as members with military prosecutor Colonel (CHK)
Haryanto from Military High Court Prosecutor (Oditur Militer
Tinggi/Odmilti) III of Surabaya.
On this trial, Chief Private Zulfahmi admitted that he was
the one who covered Theys’ mouth due to a misunderstanding
on the way between Theys escorts from the Special Forces
Command with his driver Aristoteles, leading to a cacophony.66
He covered Theys’ mouth for five minutes leading to his death.
Yet this military high court did not chase for the testimonies
of other defendants.67 Hartomo as Commander in Chief of
Tribuana Task Force changed his testimony regarding his
instruction allowing the use of force as long as it did not result
in death.68 This military high court did not chase any further
on the order of the commander for an execution.
On April 21 2003, the verdicts delivered highlighted that
seven defendants faced their time in prison and two of them
were released from their military duty. What was interesting
from this trial was the statement of the Chief of Staff of the
Army General Ryamizard Ryacudu that these seven defendants
were heroes and they should face minimum sanctions.69
Tempo, “Membekap Kematian Sang Paitua, (Tempo 10-16 February 2003), p.
94
66
Ibid. p. 94.
67
Ibid. p. 95.
68
Ibid. p. 95.
69
Tempo Interaktif, “Jenderal Ryamizard: Pembunuh Theys Hiyo Eluay adalah
Pahlawan”, (23 April 2003). p. http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2003/04/23/brk,20030423-43,id.html. Accessed on 16 March 2011.
65
Table 4.2.
Prosecutions and Verdicts against the Defendants/Convicts
of the Murder of Theys Eluay
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Names of the
Defendants
Charges from
the Military
Prosecutor
Liutenant Colonel
Infantry Hartomo
2 years 6 months
3 years 6 months and
was stripped off from his
military duty
2 years
3 years
Major Infantry
Doni Hutabarat
Captain Infantry
Rionardo
First Liutenant
Infantry Agus
Supriyanto
First Sergeant
Lourensius
First Sergeant Asrial
Chief Private
Ahmad Zulfahmi
From various sources
2 years 6 months
3 years
2 years
3 years
3 years
Verdicts
3 years 6 months
3 years
2 years
3 years 6 months
3 years 6 months and
was stripped off from his
military duty
Representative of legal advisors to the defendants Hotma
Sitompul filed for appeal and stated that this verdict was highly
influenced by public opinions and international pressures.
In the higher courts, the defendants were released. Based
on the investigation, a number of officers were promoted to
higher positions and ranks. One of them were Liuetenant
Colonel Infantry Hartomo who was promoted to Commander
of Group 1 Special Forces Corps located in Serang, Banten with
the rank of Colonel, at the time when he was supposed to be
mutated out from the Special Forces Command. 70
Berita HanKam,”Kopassus Mutasi Sejumalah Perwira menengah”. http://beritahankam.blogspot.com/2010/03/kopassus-mutasi-sejumlah-perwira.html, accessed
5 April 2011.
70
The Case of Wamena
The case started from a breaking and entering of an
arsenal belonging to District Military Command 1702 Wamena
Jayawijaya headquarter on April 4 2003 by an unknown group.
This led to two casualties of Captain Infantry Napitupulu and
Second Sergeant Infantry Ruben Wana and 19 weapons missing.
District Military Command suspects that this was done by Free
Papua Movement under the leadership of Yustinus Murib
from Kwiyawage area, Tiom District, Jayawijaya District.71
Military personnel launched a counter attack to the villages
and residential areas in Jayawijaya District and confiscated
valuable documents, money, coffee grounding machines,
arrows, typewriters, screw jacks and car keys.72 Besides
there were arrests, tortures, assaults, shots and murders of
the civilians including the burning down of honai (traditional
house), church, healthcare clinic and school.73
The military arrested Jigi Jigabalom and Tenius Murib
in an operation in Bolame on June 5 2003.74 On June 7 2003,
investigation reports on both of them were submitted to
Wamena District Attorney for committing acts of treason.75
The court decided 20 years to life of prison time for Jigi
Jigabalom, Tenius Murib and five others. 76 After they
were detained in Wamena Penitentiary, they continued
to be terrorize by the personnel. One of them, Yapenas
Murib, died under torture in the detainment facility in
District Military Command 1702 Wamena on April 14
2003. 77 Yet according to Commander in Chief of Resort
Laporan Awal Kasus Wamena 4 April 2003 oleh Koalisi LSM untuk Perlindungan
dan Penegakan HAM di Papua, Jayapura 6 May 2003, p 12.
72
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (PBHI), Papua
on Trial, (Ganesha Syndicated: PBHI, Jakarta 2005), p. 102.
73
Ibid. p. 103.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid. p. 104.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
71
Military Command (Korem) Jayapura, Colonel Calvalery
Agus Mulyadi, he died due to asphyxiation and twice
of difficulties in swallowing his food, received medical
treatment in the hospital yet he did not survive.78
To respond this case, National Commission of Human
Rights investigated this case together with Wasior case.
After completing his mission, National Commission of
Human Rights via its Head, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara,
delivered the findings on September 2 2004. Results of the
fact finding done by National Comission of Human Rights
revealed the involvement of four military personnel of
Military Area Command (Kodam) XVII/Trikora responsible
in delivering the command. 79 Meanwhile the criminal
actors comprised of unidentified individuals including
164 members of the military from Military Area Command
XVII/Trikora and Assisting Task Force outside the Military
Area Command.80
The follow up from the investigation process of National
Commission of Human Rights on its letter dated No. 290/
TUA/IX/2004 dated September 3 2004, was the handover
of documents of Wamena-Wasior incident investigations to
the Attorney General Office as presecutor of gross human
rights violations according to Human Rights Court Law no
26/2000. Yet the documents were returned along with the
leter dated R-015/A/F.6/03/2008 dated March 28 2008
requesting for completion of the document according to
article 20(3) Law no. 26/2000, that “in the event that the
investigator considers the inquiry findings referred to in
clause (2) insufficient, the inquirer shall immediately resubmit the inquiry findings to the investigator accompanied
by guidelines for their completion, and within 30 (days) of
receiving the inquiry findings, the investigator is required
Koalisi LSM untuk Perlindungan dan Penegakan HAM di Papua, Op. Cit., p.
46.
79
PBHI. Op.Cit., p. 105.
80
Ibid. p.106.
78
to consummate these insufficiencies.” National Commission
on Human Rights resubmitted the completed document
with a letter No. 422/TUA/IX/2008 dated September 15
2008.
The Case of Violence against Rafael Kapura in Merauke
On April 25 2005 around 3.30 in the afternoon, Rafael
Kapura was arrested in the residence of Daniel Mekiuw in
Bupul XII Village by four members of Army Strategic Reserve
Command 643/WNS Kalimantan assigned to Merauke, to be
brought to military security post in the village. The military
personnel conducted a search into his bag and found a
number of leaflets including a bulletin from West Papua
Indigenous Association81, a handout from West Papua National
Authority and a sheet of statement from American Samoan
US Congressman on West Papua.
The military interrogated him and forced him to strip
naked and tied his hands with plastic ropes. The military
bombarded him with a series of questions such as: “Why
do you want to attack a military post? Are you a member of
a Free Papua Movement? Who are your accomplices?” and
Rafael answered, “No.” Yet he explained to the military that a
member of Free Papua Movement from WPIA in Papua New
Guinea was going to visit Papua on Julay 27 2005 to collect
data on Papuan indigenous people. To prepare for the visit, a
team would come around May 2005. Based on the perception
of the military personnel, it was the time to attack their post,
leading them to accused Rafael as a leader of Free Papua
Movement. 82
Rafael then transferred to Muting post. The military
interrogated him on weapon and because he could not give
the “right” answer, they hit his head and punched the side of
This organisation used to handle Papua refugees in Papua New Guinea.
Papua 1998-2007, p. 174
81
82
his head. The military then tied his neck with plastic rope and
everytime he gave the wrong answer, they pulled the rope
around his neck. When they let go of the rope, Rafael was
numb and could not answer the questions. As a result, they
went further by hitting and punching him until he passed
out. When he regained consciousness, the military continued
the interrogation and forced him to confess on who held
the weapons. To avoid inhuman treatment, Rafael lied and
mentioned a number of names including Willem Yawa, Bartol
Yolmen, Yustus Wali, Yusak Bokowi and Siprianus. He also
lied by mentioning that Edi Waromi was the intellectual actor
behind July 27 2005 attack.
On April 26 20005 around 6 in the afternoon, Rafael was
transferred to the police post in Bupul village and on the next
day he was transferred back to Kali Wanggo military security
post before the military brought him to the Army Strategic
Reserve Command security post in the city of Merauke for
further interrogation. The next day on April 28 2005 Rafael was
brought back to Kali Wanggo post where he was interrogated
regarding the weapon. The military threatened him by saying
that when the weapons were discovered, he would received
lessons learned by members of Free Aceh Movement from
the military, that the military would give him a shovel to dig
his own grave, to cover his eyes with black piece of cloth, to
instruct him to pray and then to push him into his own grave
and to shot him dead. 83
The Case of Violence against Yulius Meage in Yahukimo
Yulius Meage worked for a Kumira Sub-District Military
Command (Koramil) personnel named First Sergeant Panji
Suwito Putro. Out of the blue on May 13 2007 around 19:30
local time, Yulius was arrested by a group of two military
Papua 1998-2007, p. 175
83
personnel from Kurima Sub-District Military Command. He
was accused of stealing money from First Sergeant Panji.
He was brought to the headquarter of Sub-District Military
Command where Eduardus Kimbirop, a military personnel
from Kumira Sub-District Military Command, dragged him
into a fish pond and submerged his head into the pond. Yulius
was tied to a flag pole in front of the headquarter for an hour
while a number of personnel of Batallion 756/Wamena and
Kurima Sub-District Military Command repeatedly threw
punches on him. 84
Yulius was forced to admit that he stole money amounting
Rp. 2.370.000, yet he said it was Rp 320.000. Even though
he had admitted it for three times, he was hit, kicked and
showered on the head by the military. He was then released
and brought to home by Sergeant Panji and Eduardus. At the
home of First Sergeant Panji, Yulius was tied to the chair with
plastic ropes while he was re-interrogated and forced to admit
his crime once more. When he refused to do so, the military
personnel lighted a candle. First Sergeant Panji stripped
Yulius by force and commanded him to stick his tongue out.
First Sergeant Panji then burned Yulius’ penis and tongue.
When Yulius tried to insert his tongue back, First Sergeant
Panji continued to intimidate him. First Sergeant Panji used
a tweezer to squeeze Yulius’ scrotum and toes.
The Case of Gunshots in the border of Indonesia-Papua New Guinea
Borderland is an area where human rights violations
are commonly found, with the military as the main actor.
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border located in Papua is
the permanent operational site of the military on anyone
travelling in and out of these two countries.
This case was reported by Jaringan Advokasi Penegakan Hukum dan HAM Balim
Wamena Pegunungan Tengah Papua (The Advocacy Network of Law and Human Rights Enforcement of Balim, Wamena, Central Highlands), to the head of
military district command of Wamena, May 2007.
84
The people in Papua and in Papua New Guinea are
connected with family and traditional ties. Regular visit is a
deeply rooted habit. They periodically cross Indonesia-Papua
New Guinea border for rituals.
On September 16 2009, three children from Air Asin village,
Arso Timur, returned home after a family visit to Skoscahu-Papua
New Guinea. On the way home, the dog belonging to patrol troop
in Bewain border post barked. They avoided the dog, yet Isak
Pesakot (13 years old) was shot in the chest. 85
Isak received medical treatment in one of the hospitals in
Jakarta with financial assistance from local government. At the
moment, he is continuing his study in a school located in Arso IX.
This shot was a violation of agreemenet between local people
and the military securing their post in the border. Jack Mekawa,
a local community figure explained that there was an agreement
regarding the act of crossing border of the local community, which
includes that whenever someone crossed the border, the military
should request for his or her ID card or contact the local or village
leaders to confirm this person’s identity. 86
The Case of Arbitrary Search
On November 26 2010, around 2 in the morning. Airborne
Infantry Batallion Task Force (Satgas Yonif Linud) 330/TD of the
Army Strategic Reserve Command raied and searched the house
of any individuals suspected to be related to Lambert Pekikir, a
member of Free Papua Movement. Based on the testimony of
Workwana-Arso people in Keerom district, this Task Force came
in 2 (two) military trucks and dressed in combat uniforms.
The house was surrounded by members of Task Force
330 who pointed their guns to the houses. When the door was
opened by the owner of the house, Lukas Menigir, Task Force
http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/2009/06/23/brk,20090623-183280,id.
html
86
Jakarta Globe, Shot Papuan Child Still Alive, but in Critical Condition, 24 June
2009.
85
personnel asked about Lambert’s whereabout. 87 When he
said that he has no knowledge on that matter, these personnel
searched the whole house. After the search, they returned to
the trucks and left the house.
This house was occupied by Lukas Menigir, Lambert
Pekikir’s son in law. Lambert was a member of Free Papua
Movement, now missing. Family and friends believed he was
already in Papua New Guinea.
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih through its
Chief of Information Liutenant Collonel Czi. Harry Priyatna
admitted the search and affirmed that it was done by the book
according to the operation procedure. 88 Yet this search left
tremendous fear to the family living inside the house, causing
them to live elsewhere for a couple of days.
This is not the first arbitrary house search. Before, other
troops had done similar operation. In September 2010, an
alleged Special Forces Corps troop and local Tactical Command
(Kotis) Task Force searched the house and garden of the
people suspected to be related to Lambert family as it was
suspected to serve as Free Papua Movement arsenal.
The Case of Video of Torture in Tingginambut, Puncak Jaya
A video of torture in Tinginambut, Puncak Jaya, surfaced
in the website of Hong Kong-based Asia Human Rights
Commission (AHRC) on October 17 2010.89 This 11-minute
video showed the practice of torture done by Indonesian
military against the local community. There were two separate
incidents in the video. First was a video of violence in March
16 2010 operation where a number of local people in Gurage
http://gresnews.com/ch/Regional/cl/Kodam+XVII+Cenderawasih/id/1688319/
Kodam+XVII+Cenderawasih+Bantah+Menganiaya+Saat+Menggerebek+Rum
ah+Tokoh+OPM, 4 March 2011
88
Koran Tempo, Kodam Bantah Geledah Rumah, 27 November 2010.
89
Vivanews, “Video Penyiksaan di Papua Beredar di Youtube” p. http://nasional.
vivanews.com/news/read/183850-video-kekerasan-tentara-indonesia-. Accessed
on 22 March 2010.
87
Village were hit with helmets and kicked. 90
Second was a video of torture on a penis of someone
under the interrogation burned. This incident happened
on May 30 2010 and done by a military personnel in an
interrogation for the whereabout of Free Papua Movement
leaders, Goliat Tabuni and Marongen Wenda. 91
Later it was known that it was a military personnel from
Batallion Infantry/753 Arvita Pam Rawan (AVT) Nabire and the
victim was Anggenpugu Kiwo. 92 The military then processed
seven soldiers from this batallion. Their investigation report
was submitted to Military Court III-19 Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasi. The five defendants were charged with Article
103(1) Military Penal Code on deliberate avoidance of service
or inexcussable neglect with two years of prison time. Military
Court III-19 Jayapura decided that these five defendants faced
different jail times in November 2010 and January 2011. This
court-martial was criticised for the use of Article 103 of Military
Penal Code and for failure of the military prosecutor to include
the article of torture. Moreover, the victims never attened the
court proceeding to deliver their statements.
Table 4.3.
Verdicts on the Defendants of a Video of Torture Committed
by Military Personnel of Batallion Infantry/753 AVT Nabire
No
Names of the Defendants
1
Second Liutenant Infantry Cosmos Z
2
Chief Private Syaminan Lubis
3
Second Private Joko Sulistiyono
4
Second Private Dwi Purwanto
5
Second Sergeant Irwan Rizkiyanto
6
First Private Yakson Agu
7
First Private Tamrin Mahangiri
From various sources
Verdict
7 months of prison time
Report of Monitoring and Investigation Team on Violence in Puncak Jaya, National
Commission on Human Rights , 22 December 2010. pp. 47-49.
Ibid. pp. 49-50.
92
Ibid. p. 40.
90
91
Moreover, Chief of Commander Admiral Agus Suhartono
added that actions taken by these defendants should not be
classified under gross human rights violations as they were
merely a violation of authority. 93
National Commission of Human Rights responded by
setting up a Monitoring and Investigation Team on the Violence
in Puncak Jaya in the period of November 15 2010 to December
31 2010. 94 Report from National Commission of Human Rights
monitoring and investigation on violence committed by military
personnel from Batallion 753/AVT cocludes that there were
human rights violations in Puncak Jaya.
The cases included first, the murder of Reverend
Kinderman Gire; second, the video of violence in a security
operation, and three the video of violence in the interrogation.
In this report, National Commision of Human Rights jotted
down a number of recommendations to a number of parties
from the President to local Papuan officials, including a strong
recommendation to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to
conduct an overall evaluation on State security approach by
prioritizing human security approach in the Land of Papua
and another strong recommendation to Commander in Chief
of Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih to carry out
an indepth investigation on a number of violence in Papua
particularly in Puncak Jaya. 95
Yet there was no thorough legal process implemented
onto the abovementioned cases, placing the military as a
“productive” actors in human rights violations in Papua.
Between National Commission of Human Rights and Attorney
General Office, there was a constant tug of war on the reasons
of formality and norms, leaving the suffering of the victims
untended as they watched the parody of trial in Indonesia in
their deteriorating condition and endless hope for justice.
Detikcom, “Panglima TNI: Itu Bukan Pelanggaran HAM Berat”, (31 December
2010), p. http://www.detiknews.com/read/2010/12/31/154918/1536954/10/panglima-tni-itu-bukan-pelanggaran-ham-berat. Accessed on 22 March 2011.
94
Report, Op.Cit. p 5.
95
Ibid. pp. 70-74.
93
The fact showed that human rights violations committed
by the military in Papua were not seriously addressed. This
resulted in victims unable to access remedies legitimate for
their sufferings from inhuman treatments.
The impacts of torture were not only felt by the victims
but also their community. This practice of torture has torn the
social fabrics in their community as fear remained in their
collective emory and seriously hampered the advancement
of the community in the future.
In most of the cases, the people of Papua were labelled
as part of the separatist groups, a reason used to justify
torture. Label of separatists is politically-ridden, an indication
of a strong relationship between the practice of torture and
political policy of the Government on Papua.
The tradition of impunity had pampered the defendants
with the luxury of having their life untouched and some were
even honoured as heroes, with promotion of ranks and positions.
In most of human rights violations, security personnel (militarypolice) are the main actors. The principles of human rights and
democracy are seen as threat to State sovereignty.
D. Violence Against Women
As an area continuously engulfed in conflicts, protection
for women in Papua needs special attention. It is because
women living in conflict areas faces the possibilities that
they become victims directly or indirectily. Violence against
women in Papua escalates to a concerning level as the central
government continued to use security approach in dealing
with conflicts in Papua.
Violence against women are any act of gender-based
violence that results in physical, sexual, mental harms or
suffering to women including threats of such acts, coersion
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty whether occuring in public
or in private life.96
Article 1 UN Declaration against Violence on Women, 1983
96
Worse, in this condition, women in Papua face unfair
treatment by alleged military personnel. Hundreds of women
are victims of rape, left with deep trauma and difficulties to
turn new pages of their life. Rape is done for various motives
including to weaken Free Papua Movement, to release tension
in the middle of Papuan jungle, and to arrest members of Free
Papua Movement. One of the most difficult trauma was on
the patient named Yuliana Serwa in Sarmi, the remote part
of Jayapura.
Serwa with her husband were accused as supporters of
Free Papua Movement and arrested by military members in
their house in Sarmi in the high noon. They underwent such
grave treatment difficult to be told openly to the readers,
leaving the husband and wife traumatized, stressed and
deeply humiliated. Their three adult children understood
the condition of their parents. They could not come forward
to deliver their testimonies in spite of numerous requests to
do so in Jakarta. They could only tell the story after days of
being outside of their house, through constant persuation and
continuous support in narrating their cases. 97
Based on the table of cases issued by National Commission
on Violence Against Women, there were 36 cases of violence
against women from 1999 to 2009.98 The most prominent
violence in the reform era is rape, which amounts to 19
(nineteen) cases, committed by alleged military personnel.
The most frequent violations done by military personel is
eviction, resulting in starvation in 7 cases. Meanwhile, there
is also common sexual harrasment against women in Papua
committed by the military, totalling to 6 cases. Meanshile,
violence committed by military personnel against women
in Papua includes torture and minor assault of 4 cases. This
indicates that women in Papua are vulnerable victims of
human rights violations.
Joint Report of Komnas Perempuan, ICTJ, and Pokja Perempuan Majelis Rakyat
Papua on 2009
98
ibid
97
One of the rape incidents occured on September 11 2010 in
Yuruf. 99Perpetrators identified by the local community were 5
members of a non organic troops of border security from Infantry
Batallion 527/BY Yuruf post. Commander of Infantry Batallion
527/BY at that moment was Chief Sergeant Nurcahyo.
Victims and people knowing such incidents did not have the
courage to step forward and report for justice. This was because
they were afraid of the consequences that might happen to them.
Approaching the rotation of security guards, in the beginning
of September 2010, a memo from the security post surfaced,
requiring signatures from local village and religious leaders.
The content of the memo was that (1) the personnel
on duty (Infantry Batallion 527/BY) delivered service to the
community and (2) should any problem emerges in the future,
the community would not press charges against the personnel.
This resulted in a cover up by the community on problems
during the period of this unit’s operation. This memo was used
to shield those on duty to prevent any advocacy process done
by the community in the future.
The indirect impacts of the victims include loss of income
from their husbands if they were murdered or killed, leaving
women to raise the children on their own. In other words,
women constantly become victims of the conflict.
Table 4.5.
Violence Against Women Committed
by the Military in Papua (1999-2010)100
No
Type of Violence
1
Rape
2
Sexual Harrasment (attempt of rape)
3
Forced eviction
4
Common torture / assault
Total number of violations
ibid
Ibid.
99
100
Number of Violence
19
6
7
4
36
E. Violation against Human Rights Defenders
Humanitarian works done by human rights defenders
in Papua faced with obstacles, intimidation and violence
psychologically, physically or through restrictions such as
limitation of freedom of expression and assembly. Human
rights defenders in Papua were cornered by military personnel
in Papua, accused as non patriotic, accomplices to criminals
or related to subversive and separatist groups.
Throughout reform era from 1998 to 2010, there are at
least 15 cases of violations and violence committed by military
personnel in Papua against human rights defenders. These
cases include intimidation, arrest, assault, torture and even
murder. These cases happen not only in the city of Jayapura
but also to other areas in Papua such as Merauke, Wamena,
Puncak Jaya up to Sorong, Manokwari, West Papua.
Cases of violence and violations against human rights
violation done by military personnel in Papua can be seen in
the table below.
Table 4.6.
Violence against Human Rights Defenders by Military
Personnel in Papua (1998-2010)
No
1
2
3
4
Total
Type of Violence
Torture and assault
Intimidation and threat
Death threat
Unlawful killing
Number of Cases
6 cases
5 cases
1 case
3 cases
15 cases
Victims of violence against human rights defenders
come from various professions and organizations such as
NGO activists, students, journalists, religious leaders and
community leaders. Characteristics of victims of violations
against human rights defenders in the reform era can be seen
in the table below.
Table 4.7.
Human Rights Violations Victimized by Violence Committed
by Military Personnel in Papua (1998-2010)
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
Victims
NGO (activist and organisation)
Religious leader (reverend)
Journalists
Individuals and community leaders
Students
Indigenous Activist
Numbers of case
3 cases
5 cases
4 cases
1 case
1 case
1 case
15 cases
Based on cases of violence against human rights defenders
in Papua committed by military personnel described in Table
1 and 2 above, obstacles, violence and threat of violence faced
by human rights defenders in carrying out their jobs take a
number of forms including restriction in procedure, minor
threat up to actions that end in deaths.
Meanwhile the modus operandi of violence against
human rights defenders in Papua includes the following:
1. Becoming targets of terror via short message services or
phone
2. Becoming targets of interceptions on communication
devices (cellular, phone)
3. Becoming objects of surveillance on activities inside and
outside the office (house and so forth); and
4. Direct violence such as being hit by a vehicle and shot
with a firearm.
Restrictions include action or absence of action against
the rights of human rights defenders in their works directly
related to human rights. Violence and threat of violence
in terms of arbitrary arrest and detainment, assault with
torture during the arrest, interference to meetings, limitation
of freedom of expression and assembly, attack to property
owned by human rights defenders up to death threat and
murder.
Type of violation ad violence committed by military
personnel against human rights defenders in Papua in the
reform era from 1998 to 2010 includes:
1. Intimidation: Perpetrators intimidate and terrorize
through phone and remain from direct action against
human rights defenders. The act of surveillance,
espionage, interception and so forth are classified under
this category; and
2. Direct physical and psychological assault, damage to
property belonging to human rights defenders
Motive of violence due to the activities carried out by
human rights defenders can be classified under the following
points:
1. Crime
2. Agent provocateur and act of treason against the State;
and
3. Separatism
Furthermore, the motive of labelling human rights
defenders in Papua as “separatists” or “accomplices to the
separatists” to any political difference or any difference
whatsoever in the relationship with the government is used
to justify violence against human rights defenders committed
by the military in Papua.
In a number of cases, since 2000, the label “separatist”
was no longer used by the military personnel in Papua in
their relationship with human rights defenders in Papua.
The label changed to “they/groups who are not/not yet on
the same page with ‘us’.” 101 This idiom is another version of
a justification used in violence and violations committed by
military personnel in Papua in their interaction with human
101
Interview with Staff of Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih, 19 January 2011.
rights defenders. There has been a change of paradigm, yet
the substance of the problem remains – threat and violence
remained as the key approach.
One of the cases of violence happened to Rafael Kapura,
student activist of University of Sam Ratulangi, Manado, South
East Sulawesi, not long after his graduation day on April
25 2005, by four members of the Army Strategic Reserve
Command in their post in Bupul XII in Merauke district. 102 At
that time, Rafael was on his way from Bupul Village to Bupul
I, II, V on a motorcycle to Bupul XII. When he arrived in Bupul
XII around 15:30, Rafael was arrested by four members of the
Army Strategic Reserve Command in the residence of Daniel
Mekiuw. The arrest was made based on the information
obtained by those members from the wife of Daniel Mekiuw.
Rafael was then brought to the Army Strategic Reserve
Command Post in Bupul XII.
In the Army Strategic Reserve Command Post in Bupul
XII, Rafael’s belonging such as backpack was searched.
Inside his back, a nuber of documents were found, including
certificate, cellphone and a number of namecards. He was
interrogated and stripped naked, his hands were tied with
clothing rope and then wipped by a piece of string. A number
of questions were bombarded to Rafael, including “Why do
you want to attack Bupul XII Post? Who are your friends?
Are you a member of Free Papua Movement or not?” Rafael
answered, “NO” to all of those questions. Yet members of the
Army Strategic Reserve Command continue to hit him while
bombarding him with questions.
Another case was summary killing resulting on the
death of Papua Traditional Council (Dewan Adat Papua/DAP)
Opinus Tabuni when he attended the commemoration of
102
Wempi Fatubun, “Hilangnya Rasa Aman (Situasi Militer dan Ekosob Perbatasan
RI-PNG di Kabupaten Merauke)”, Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian Keuskupan Agung Merauke, 2007; and J. Budi Hernawan and Poengky Indarti, Laporan
Praktek Penyiksaan di Aceh dan Papua selama 1998-2007, (Jakarta: Imparsial,
2009), First Edition, pp. 174-176.
International Day of Indigenous Peoples in Wamena, Papua, on
August 9 2008.103 He was shot dead by an unknown individual
allegedly a military personnel. On the commemoration of this
international day, Opinus Tabuni, with a number of Papua
Traditional Council members allegedly involved in the raising
of Morning Star flag.
Meanwhile, police and military personnel also terrorized
the people and NGOs in Papua with the label of “Supporters of
Free Papua Movement” “Human Rights On Sale” and “Foreign
Funded” to human rights defenders attempting to criticize
the actions taken by the military personnel in violation of
human rights.104
Chief of Strategic Intelligence Agency (Badan Inteligence
Strategis/BAIS) Major General Syafnil Armen attacked
human rights defenders through stigmatic label to direct
public discourse on unfavorable stance toward human rights
defenders. One of the examples are “None of the Above
Radicals” labelled by Chief of Strategic Intelligence Agency
to Elsham Papua as a radical organization non supportive to
Pancasila, continuously critical against government policy
and funded by foreign aid.105
A year after, in 2007, violence against human rights
defenders in Papua commited by military personnel increases.
Ironically, the increase of violence happens when Special
Rapporteur of UN Secretary General on the Protection of
Human Rights Defender Hina Jilani visited Papua on June 8
2007.
This case happened to NGO activist (Frederika Korain)
and Reverend Perinus Kogoya after attending a meeting
with UN Special Rapporteur. On their way home, their car
Tim Imparsial, “Catatan Akhir Tahun 2008: ‘Kembalinya Konservatisme dalam
Penanganan Kasus HAM di Indonesia’”, January 2009.
104
Tim Imparsial, “Catatan Kondisi HAM Indonesia 2006: ‘The Absence of the Sense
of Rights’”, January 2007.
105
Ibid. See also paper from Major General Syafnil Armen, “Persepsi Ancaman
Internal dan Transnasional, presented to Department of Defense, 29 August 2006, p. 15.
103
was hit by someone claiming to be Commander Intelligence
of the Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. When
confirmed a day after, this commander said that his driver
was disoriented.
It is highly likely to have Hina Jilani concluded after her
visit to Indonesia that Papua is an area where human rights
defenders continue to face violence while carrying out their
activities to promote human rights. Perpetrators are security
personnel (military, police and intelligence). Even though
their leaders deny the involvement of their superiors, yet
the fact shows that violence against human rights defenders
is committed by the personnel and there is no legal sanction
to the prepetrators.
Below is the conclusion made from the report from the
visit of Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders Hina
Jilani to Indonesia last 2007:
“Despite visible progress in the country’s democratic
development, human rights defenders continue to experience
serious constraints in conducting their activities for the
protection of human rights. Such constraints are imputable to the
continuing activities of the police, the military and other security
and intelligence agencies as well as religious fundamentalist
groups that are aimed at harassing and intimidating defenders
or restricting their access to victims and to sites of human rights
violations”.106
Meanwhile there are other cases of violations and
violence committed by military personnel in Papua against
human rights defenders.
First, the case of Father John Djonga Pr., from St
Willibrordus Parochial, Dekenat Keerom, Papua. 107 In the
beginning of July 2007 Chief of Military Sub-District Command
threatened to shot Father John who was seen as obstructing
106
107
See A/HRC/7/28/Add.2, 28 January 2008.
Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Papua Wilayah Keerom, Arso, “Laporan Situasi
HAM di Kabupaten Keerom, Provinsi Papua”, October 2007.
the development process in Waris. The position taken by Chief
of Military Sub-District Command was obvious when Father
Jhon expressed his disagreement when he was requested to
give his authograph as witness of the release of customary
land for the development of Banda Task Force Post in Waris.
In this transaction, the odd point was that the letter to release
this customary land was drafted by Chief of Waris Military
Sub-District Command, not by the owner of the land.
Moreover, Father John was also labelled as “traitor
to the State, agent provocateur and should be buried 700
meter underground.” This statement was expressed by First
Liutenant Usman when he received a team of journalists from
Papuan Women’s Voice (Suara Perempuan Papua) Tabloid
who visited Waris on August 22 2007. At that time, First
Liutenant Usman received questions from the journalists
about security situation and public education and health in
the border area. 108
Second, the case of torture of Anang Budiono along
with three other fellow journalists in Sentani, Jayapura,
April 20 2009. 109 This case happened when hundreds of
military personnel of Batallion 751 Sentani ran amok and
damaged their headquarter. This resulted in the torture to
four journalists assigned to cover this incident when they
took their break to have their meals in the food stall in front
of Batallion 751 headquarter. They were approached to be
tortured.
Third, the case of intimidation, torture and shot by
military personnel from Batallion Infantry/756 against
Reverend Kindeman Gire and Reverend Pitinius Kogoya on
March 17 2001 in Tingginambut District, Puncak Jaya.110 The
case of Reverend Kindeman Gire began when he waited for 15
Ibid. See also TSPP 22-29 August 2007, p. 7.
Imparsial team, “Human Rights Report 2009: ‘The Parsiality of Human Rights Enforcement 2009’
110
Komnas HAM Papua Representative Yearly Report on 2010; and National Commission on Human Rights, “Report on Violence Monitoring Inquiry in Puncak
Jaya”, 2011.
108
109
liter of gasoline he and his congregation ordered bought by
Air Gire in Wamena. This gasoline was use to work on woods
used to build church in Toragi, Tingginambut.
At that moment, Pitinius Kogoya, a reverend, on the same
day, also waited for his belonging delivered by someone in
Wamena brought by a driver from Toraja. On the same day,
military personnel from Batallion Infantry/756 passed by and
asked Kindeman Gire and Pitinius Kogoya about a carriage,
weapons (including magazine and bullet) and the hiding
post of Free Papua Movement. In the afternoon (around
17.00), two victims were instructed to the higher part of
the street by this military personnel and tortured until their
faces were bruises and blackened. Under durress, Pitinius
Kogoya managed to escape by rolling himself down into the
bushes. At the moment, he heard two gunshots and he had
no idea that Kindeman Gire was dead. According to the local
community, there was a chance that Reverend Kindeman Gire
was mutilated and his body was dumped in Tinggin/Yamo/
Gurage river or burried underground. 111
Based on the cases of a number of human rights defenders
in Papua as listed above, it can be concluded that these type of
violence and threat of violence experienced by human rights
defenders were basically aimed to restrict and weaken their
struggle and activities. Based on human rights perspectives in
reference to Human Rights Law no. 39/1999, these violations
cover derogable and non-derogable rights. Below are human
rights violations committed by military personnel against
human rights defenders in Papua:
a. Violation to the right to life;112
b. Violaition to the right to be free from torture;113
c. Violation to the to personal freedom, 114 freedom of
Ibid.
Article 9 point (1) Law No. 39 Tahun 2009: “Everyone has the right to life, to
sustain life, and to improve his or her standard of living”.
113
Article 33 point (1) Law No. 39 of 2009: “Everyone has the right to freedom from
torture, or cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment”.
114
Article 15 Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the right to develop himself by
111
112
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
thought and freedom of consciencion;115
Violation to the freedom of assembly;116
Violation to the freeedom to express opinion;
Violation to freedom of movement and residence;117
Violation to the right for safety;118 and
Violatio to the right to participate in the advancement
and enforcement of human rights;119
F. The Case of Gunshot in Freeport Area: From the Cas
of Shooting in the Area of Freeport: from Two Spoons
on One Plate to Security Business
The case of gunshots fired around PT Freeport
Indonesia area lead to big question mark. This is because
the perpetrators of these gunshots remain in the dark while
these cases results on the deaths of a number of employees
and civilians. Perpetrators or actors made as black sheeps of
this string of incidents were Free Papua Movement. Yet there
were questions considering that these gunshots were done in
highly professional manner with clear targets.
individually and collectively protecting his rights, in the interests of developing
his society, nation, and state.”
115
Article 23 ayat (2) Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the freedom to hold,
impart and widely disseminate his beliefs, orally or in writing through printed
or electronic media, taking into consideration religious values, morals, law and
order, the public interest and national unity”.
116
Article 24 Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the right to peaceful assembly and
association”.
117
Article 40 Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the right to a place to live and the
right to an adequate standard of living”.
118
Article 30 Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the right to security and protection
against the threat of fear from any act or omission”.
Article 35 Law No. 39 of 1999: “Everyone has the right to live in a peaceful, safe
and secure society and nation which fully respects, protects and executes human
rights and obligations as set forth in the provisions in this Act”.
119
Article 101 Law No. 39 of 1999: “All people, groups, political organizations,
community organizations, and self-reliant organizations and other non-government organizations, have the right to submit reports of human rights violations
to the National Commission on Human Rights or other competent agency, in the
interests of protecting, upholding and promoting human rights”.
Questions surfaced on the case of gunshots in August 2002
in Mile 62-63 in Tembagapura-Timika route. The case was now
brought to cessation level, in which the Supreme Court on May
25 2007 confirmed the verdict of Jakarta High Court delivered
on January 22 2007. 120 Supreme Court cessation verdicts
were delivered to defendant Antonius Wamang who faced
a lifetime of prison; while Yulianus Deikme and Agustinus
Anggaibak faced eight years in prison. Other defendants
whose cessations were rejected by the Supreme Court was
Reverend Ishal Onawame, Esau Onawame, Hardi Tsugumol
and Yarius Kiwak, each faced five years in prison.
This case caused two casualties of US citizens and was
central to the attentio of the public because Federal Bureau
Investigation was involved in this investigation. The case
remains as mystery considering Antonius Wamang named
this incident as “Two Spoons on One Plate.”121 In his testimony
documented in Kuala Kencana Police Precinct, he admitted
that he took the shot.122
In his shot, he used an M-16 gun and shot randomly
with his members, using 30 bullets or one magazine.123After
the shot, his group retreated as another group continued
taking the shots wearing face cover and military look-alike
uniform, leading Wamang to concluded that they were military
personnel. Interestingly, the process of interrogation on him
was stopped post Police convetion.124
Wamang legal advocate, Hanum Siregar, confirmed
Wamang statement on “One Plate Two Spoons” and declared
that the perpertrators of this incident came from Special
See VHR Media, “ MA Tolak Kasasi Terpidana Kasu Mile 62-63http://www.vhrmedia.com/vhr-news/berita,MA-Tolak-Kasasi-Terpidana-Kasus-Mile-62-63-539.
html (accessed 3 May 2011)
121
See Tempo, “Mengungkap Operasi Piring Sendok”, (22 January 2006), pp. 2627
122
Ibid. p. 27.
123
Ibid. p. 27
124
Ibid. p. 27.
120
Forces Command.125 According to Wamang testimony, he knew
the perpetrators well because he had assisted this military
personnel while looking for Gaharu woods as this personnel
was a broker. 126
The gunshot in Mile 62-63 did not end with the actors
come forward. The shot in Tembagapura-Timika route that
crosses PT Freeport Indonesia happened each year. This was
an odd recurrence considering that PT Freeport Indonesia
had a tight security provided by military personnel as its
security. Freeport also admitted for providing “additional
assistance” to security personnel to cover their needs including
infrastructure, meals and dining out, houseing, transportation,
car repair, petty cash and so forth. 127
In the report titled Freeport Form 10-K issued by Human
Rights Watch (HRW), since 2002 to 2005, Freeport had
disbursed a total of US$ 66 milllion.128 HRW in its report titled
Too High a Price reported, as published by New York Times,
that there were confirmed data that Freeport from 1998 to
2004 had paid US$ 20 million per year.129
In 2004, the government through Presidential Decree no.
63/2004 on the Security of National Vital Object, classified
Freeport as the biggest mining corporation in Papua, as
a national vital object in Indonesia. The issuance of this
Presidential Decree caused an impact to the management
of vital object security long dominated by the military. This
presidential decree confirmed the transfer of vital security
object from the military to the police as security actor. This
was stipulated by Article 4 of Presidential Decree of:
1) National Vital Object Management responsible on the
security of National Vital Object each based on the
principle of internal security
Phone interview with Anum Siregar, 25 April 2011.
Tempo, Op. Cit, p. 27.
127
Human Rights Watch, Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian
Military’s Activities, (New York: Vol. 18No 5 (c). June 2006). p. 49.
128
Ibid. p. 49.
129
Ibid. p. 50.
125
126
2) Police is responsible in delivering security assistance for
National Vital Object
Regarding the period of the handover, Presidential Decree
no. 63/2004 confirmed that:
“Security regarding National Vital Object currently managed
by the military would be transferred to the party in charge for
managing National Vital Object within the period of 6 (six)
months from the issuance of this Presidential Decree.”
Since the Presidential Decree was issued, the gunshots
along the route toward Freeport increased. This time, victims
were not only civilians but also security personnel particularly
from the Police. This case strongly indicated that this was a
dispute of security business that has long been on the hands
of the military. 130 No surprise that the shootings increase
within the period of 2009. At that time, Indonesia was facing
its General Election and direct presidential elelection, leading
to the concentration of security to guard this celebration of
democracy.
The position of Freeport as the biggest tax payer
under Papua’s Special Autonomy resulted to tough
competition amongs a number of interests. As explained
beforehand, substantial amount of fund from Freeport to
pay for security service provided by military personnel.
Furthermore, this time the shootings aimed at clear
targets, leading to assumption that this was done by
trained and professional people and therefore it was
difficult to point a finger to Free Papua Movement as
perpetrators in this Freeport case. 131
See Okezone.com,”Insiden Freeport terkait Rebutan Bisnis Militer Polisi http://
news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/14/1/238647/insiden-freeport-terkait-rebutanbisnis-militer-polisi, (accessed 10 May 2011).
131
See Primaironline,” Imparsial Minta aparat tak langsung Tudh TPN-OPM, http://
www.primaironline.com/berita/detail.php?catid=Politik&artid=imparsial-mintaaparat-keamanan-tak-langsung-tuduh-tpn-opm, (accessed 11 May 2011).
130
Yet the military had denied that this shooting was related
to dispute related to security business involving the military.
Chief of Information of the military, Air Vice Marshall Sagom
Tamboen stated that the assumption on military involvement
was based on the quality of shot.132 In his opinion, civilians
with resources and access to ammunition could have taken
their shot with such high standard, by referring to members
of Indonesian Association of Target Shooting and Hunting
(Persatuan Menembak Sasaran dan Berburu Indonesia/
Perbakin).133
It is difficult to be certain when the shootings in
Freeport would stop. The case of Antonius Wamang could
repeat especially since the indications of dispute of security
business remain. It should be taken into consideration
that this is a violation against Military Law no 34/2004
that prohibit military business. This would end if Jakarta
could take a strict measure against the practices of illegal
dealings to provide security service in Papua and addressed
the problems in Papua using dialog as an approach instead
of security.
See Media Indonesia Online, “ TNI Minta Imparsial Berikan Bukti”, http://www.
mediaindonesia.com/read/2009/07/07/85387/17/1/TNI-Minta-Imparsial-BerikanBukti, (accessed10 May 2011)
133
Ibid. http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2009/07/07/85387/17/1/TNI-MintaImparsial-Berikan-Bukti
132
No
Table 4.8.
Shooting in PT. Freeport Area (2002-2011)
Time
1
13 August
2002
2
11 July
2009
Victim
US citizens, Ted
Burcon and
Rickey Spear,
were shot dead,
along with an
indonesian
FX Bambang
Riwanto. Nine
out of 12 injured
victims were
foreigners, one
of them is a
minor; Nancy
Burcon, Patsy
Spears, Sandra
Hopkins, Teia
Hopkins, Stephen
Ema, Lynn
Roston, Francine
Goodfreen, Jim
Burke, and Ken
Back. Three
others were
Indonesian
citizens were
Yohannes
Bawan, Lodwik
Worotikan, and
Mastur.
An Australian
citizen, Drew
Nicholas Grant
(38), was shot
dead.
Lia Madandan,
Maju Panjaitan
and Lukan Jon
Biggs were
injured by the
shots.
Actor
Notes
A separatist
group led
by Antonius
Wamang
was seen as
responsible.
Antonius
Wamang
faced a
lifetime in
prison.
Three employees
of PT Freeport
Indonesia (FI)
were dead and 12
others were injured
after their vehicles
were bombarded
in Kilometer 62-63
from Tembagapura
on their way to
Timika, Papua.
Evidences include
28 M-16 bullets,
1 large size
projectile from an
unknown weapon,
1 projectile used.
Unknown
An employee of PT
Freeport Indonesia
from Australia,
Drew Nicholas
Grant (38) was
shot dead by an
unknown individual
on Saturday, 11
July 2009 on mile
51 on his way from
Tanjungpura to
Timika.
3
12 July
2009
Markus Rante
Allo (security
officer of PT
Freeport) was
shot dead
Unknown
A security officer
named Markus
Rante Allo was the
second victim in the
series of violence
actions in the area
of Tembagapura,
Timika, Papua, in
the last two days.
4
13 July
2009
Second Brigadire
Merson
Pettipeloh was
slashed on the
throat
Unknown
Second Brigadire
Merson Pettipelohi,
Papua Regional
Police personnel
investigating terror
in PT Freeport
Indonesia mining
area, Tembagapura,
was found dead
with his throat
slashed, allegedly
by sharp weapon.
This was a series
of three incidents
in a row, with the
death of Australian
worker Drew
Nicholas Grant
who was shot dead
by an unknown
individual, on
Saturday. The body
of Merson was
found in Mile 38 in
PT Freeport route
in Mimika District,
Papua, with major
injury in the neck.
5
15 July
2009
Chief Brigadire
Jimmy Reinhard,
Second Brigadire
Sumaji, Second
Brigadire
Supriadi, First
Brigadire Sardis
Rumaropen and
First Brigadire
Abraham
Ngamelubun
suffered from
gunshots
Unknown
6
12
September
2009
Two people were
injured
Unknown
7
20 October
2009
Kristian and Rudi
Parendeng
Unknown
Exchange of
fire occurred
on Wednesway
(15/7) around
14:30 between
the police and
unknowned armed
groups in Mimika
District, Papua.
Five police officers
were injured in
this incident.
Based on obtained
information,
gunshots happened
on Mile 54, on a
connecting road
between Timika,
the capital city of
Mimika District
and Tembagapura,
where PT Freeport
Indonesia office
and employee
residential area
were located
An internal
security compnay
bus was shot by a
group of unknown
individuals. Two
persons injured.
Tuesday
(20/10/09), a
convoy of Freeport
employee shuttle
bus was shot
by an unknow
individual on Mile
42 between TimikaTembagapura.
Four out of seven
buses guarded by
Mobile Brigade
were bombarded
from both sides,
two people were
injured.
8
24 January
2010
Eight people were
injured, one of
them a Canada
citizen
Unknown
9
6 April
2011
Abdul
Simanjuntak
was injured by a
broken projectile
on the back
Unknown
10
7 April
2011
Two security
guards died
(Daniel
Mansawan
(security
manager) and
Aris Siregar
(Jensub Security)
on Mile 37.
Unknown
These gunshots
happened in Mile
60-62, leaving a
Mobile Brigade
troop and a
number of PT
Freeport Indonesia
employees injured,
including a Canada
citizen, James
Howard Lochard
These gunshot
happened when a
Freeport car type
of Toyota LWB
with plate number
01-4063 driven by
Abdul Simanjun did
not return to TRMP
office mile 39 on
its way to Kali Kopi
mile 37.
Freeport car
bringing two
corporate
employees was
shot until it turned
upside down and
burned. As a result,
two passengers
were killed by
the engulfing
fire. Both were
Daniel Mansawan
(security manager)
and Aris Siregar
(Jensub Security).
G. Other Cases Involving Military Personnel
1. Illegal Logging
In 2003, Forest Watch published by Justice and Peace
Secretariate (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian/SKP) and
Institute for Press and Development (Lembaga Studi Pers dan
Pembangunan/LSPP) documented that each month Papua
lost 600.000 square metre of wood (7.2 million square metre
in a year) due to illegal logging. Considering that a square
metre of wood worths Rp 850.000, Papua suffers loss up to
Rp. 510.000.000.000 per year.134
After fre quent investigation on illegal logging and
its trading in Indonesia, particularly in Papua, the modus
operandi became more subtle. Military and police personnel
involvement as brokers in illlegal logging cases were not
confirmed institutionally. 135 Colonel (Infrantry) Daniel
Ambat, Commander of Military Resort Command 127/PWY,
declared that no military personnel are involved in illegal
logging.136
Based on Imparsial observation, along the street of
Sentani to Demta area, many trucks with containers were
moving in convoys. In the afternoon, they were moving toward
Demta. In the evening or early in the morning, they were out to
Sentani. There were assumptions that these containers were
loaded with logs taken from the forests along the area. Similar
view was seen on the way to Taja village. Many trucks with
open containers were seen transporting logs at night.
Broek, Theo van den, “Membangun Budaya Damai dan Rekonsiliasi: dasar
menangani konflik di Papua,” (Jakarta: LSPP, 2004), p. 9.
135
Based on the catory of illegal logging actor, brokers pay the cost for the logging
and obtain substantial profit from it. These include State officials, government
officials (including the retired), businessment, alleged member of the military
and police. See: Adinugroho, Wahyu Catur. “Penebangan Liar (Illegal Logging), Sebuah Bencana Bagi Dunia Kehutanan Indonesia Yang Tak Kunjung
Terselesaikan,”Institut Pertanian Bogor: 2009. p: 6.
136
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih. 19 January 2011.
134
All through the trip, on the abovementioned example,
there were military sub-district command and police posts
with police vehicle monitoring the road. In the middle of the
highway, some put a large drum so big sized vehicles could
not pass directly. It was assumed that those guarding the
road were expecting money or, in other words, coordination
fee between businessmen and security personnel. The drum
was one of many indicators as the passing vehicles had to
slow down and requested permission or coordinated with
security personnel on duty.
In 2005, it was calculated that this coordination fee
between illegal logging businessmen with alleged military
personnel in a year reached Rp 11.7 billion. The coordination
fee with alleged police personnel reached Rp 10.32 billion.
Then with civil service officers, the fee amounted to Rp 3.6
billion. The total number of coordinaton fee received by these
three elements was Rp 63.75 billion per year, and the number
distributed routinely was Rp 25.62 billion per year. The rest
Rp 38.13 billion per year was distributed to personnels upon
request.137
2. Land Conflict
Land conflict in Papua in general was caused by the
handover of the land owned by indigenous people done
without any consultation with them. The case, according
Father John Jonga, 138 was the remains from policies in New
Order era to clear up new land for transmigration. Military
personnel was involved in arresting local people who were
tending the land in the forest to be made into transmigration
location.
See “Anggota TNI Diduga Terlibat Illegal Loging di Papua,” http://www.kompas.
com/utama/news/0503/30/011908.htm, 29 March 2005.
138
Imparsial, “Politik Militer dalam Penguasaan Tanah: belajar dari tragedi Pasuruan,
2007,” (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2009), p. 30.
137
Forced and massive handover of indigenous owned land
ignited conflict with local community. This conflict spilled
over to the third party who hired land claimed as military
owned. Many land dispute cases in Papua were related to
the release of indigenous owned land for licensed land use
(HPH), land transaction to corporations, and to individuals
were unpresedented in the customary law.
New phenomenon in land ownership dispute in Papua
emerges. 139 A string of new owners were the army, the navy,
the airforce and the police. Owners were recognizable through
signposts planted on the area, such as: “The Land is Owned by
the Army.” Some were on leased to third parties, for example
as shop houses.
Another modus was forced land handover to be
transformed as security posts in villages to secure the unity
of the State. Most of the landowners did not receive sufficient
compensation.
Labelling anyone expressing critical voices as Free Papua
Movement led to lack of attempt from landowners to fight for
justice for their land disputes.
3. The Distribution of Illegal Liquor
It has become public knowledge that illegal liquor was
distributed in Arso region, involving security personnel in the
distribution. The largest illegal liquor distribution in the area
of Arso was operated by a merchant with an intial G, known to
the local community as liquor shop. He remained in business
despite frequent confiscation of liquor he owned by police
personnel. Confiscated liquor could easily be taken out and
put back to the market after a certain amount of money was
paied to local police personnel.140
Many players were involved in the distribution of illegal
139
140
Ibid
Interviews with the people of Workwana 30 January 2011.
liquor, leading to decreasing quality of the liquor to a level
that was detrimental to public health, and some was even
deadly.
On January 1 2011, 3 (three) people from WorkwanaKeerom died after consuming liquor for New Year’s Eve.
The liquor was from a number of bottles held by Second
Sergeant Nawir to Marinus, a resident from Workwana.
Marius tasted the drink and as a result, he suffered problems
on his vision. 141
Second Sergeant Nawir was on duty in Company E
Batalion 751 in Keerom district. Marinus took care of the
liquor to be put on sale. Yet because the price was not fixed
yet, the liquor was still on hold. In New Year’s Eve, he handed
the bottles to a number of young people about to celebrate
the New Year’s Eve. They requested the bottles from Marius
because they could not get the liquor on sale in G’s shop. 142
After the death of these three young people, the bottles
were confiscated by the police and some were returned to
Second Sergeant Nawir. Up until now, investigation on illegal
distribution of liquor leading to three casualties still led to
no result.
4. The Confiscation of Traditional Ritual Instruments
It was customary for non organic troops on duty in the
border to made themselves “foster children” (“anak piara”)
to the local community. On one hand, this established some
kind of family relatioship between the local people and the
military personnel on duty. On the other hand, these “foster
children” often confiscated traditional ritual instruments
from the local people when their assignmend ended. This
happened every year everytime non-organic troops ended
their shifts in remote islands.
141
142
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
An example was the case in Yuruf, when Batallion Infantry
Task Force 527/BY was about to end their assignments, a
number of traditional instruments used by the local people
for their ceremonies (such as tifa musical instruments, arrows,
decorative ornaments) were requested as souvenirs. The
inability for the people to refuse such request was because
of psychological fear on the possible consequences. It was
impossible for the local community to shake off the fear. It
was because of the habit of the military personnel to bring
their weapons around the village, on their village patrol and
when they visited the residential areas. 143
143
Interview with the people in Yuruf 26 September 2010
189
CHAPTER V
SECURITY (MILITARY) POLICY POLITICS
AND CHALLENGES TO ENFORCE
HUMAN RIGHTS
As the wheel of political transition started to roll in
1998 along with the downfall of President Soeharto, there
was hope in the society that the process of democratization
that followed would lead to major changes to the country.
This hope vibrated in the central and local governments. The
peole expected that the ongoing political transition would
translate into positive changes, especially in the management
and implementation of State authority from the central to
local level. During New Order era, State authority took form
“iron fist” policies in line with the authoritarian nature and
political model of the administration, therefore it is expected
that in the reform area, democratization and human rights
occupy a central place in the agenda to deconstruct the legacy
of New Order authoritarian regime, with the hope that post
New Order State authority would be better and no longer bear
an authoritarian and repressive face. One aspect expected to
change at the moment was on the way the State dealt with
conflicts in a number of areas.
In post reform era, Indonesia faced a number of conflicts
in a number of regions, horizontally or vertically. It should be
noted that some of the conflicts were caused by old repressed
flame in the society. Many of the conflicts were deeply rooted
in the previous order. Such conflicts were vertical in nature,
bearing the issue for independence or separation from the
State. Explosion of vertical conflicts occurred in the areas in
Papua, Timor Leste and Aceh. Furthermore, conflicts on the
last two regions, Timor Leste and Aceh, led to peace built
through various routes, leading Papua as the remaining region
on fire up until now.
The fact shows in spite of a decade of reform process,
the conflict in Papua remains. A number of positive efforts
were initiated and implemented by the regime throughout
the reform era by President Habibie, Gusdur, Megawati up to
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, yet these led to no avail. The facts
gathered from the field show that perennial problems trigger
endless conflict and cycle of violence. In such condition, the
people are always the victims.
As explained in Chapter II on the dynamic of the conflict
in Papua and its stages, military policies were implemented
as the main approach. Referring to the explanation, it can be
concluded that military policies used as the model to deal
with the conflict in Papua has long history and are deeply
rooted. The fact shows that the central has long adopted this
policy model, before and after Papua was integrated officially
into the country. Based on the presence and the role of the
military in Papua before the integration, it can be stated that
the military had strong and prominent presence in the early
formation of Papua into the framework of Indonesia. This
initial phase becomes the launching pad for the involvement
and domination of the military on each historical phase,
development and journey of Papua integration up until
now.
In the reform era, even though there were a number of
policy changes in Papua, yet no major changes happens and
the violence remains. In 1998, the then Chief of Commander
of the military, General Wiranto, issued a formal statement
Vertical conflicts in Timor-Timor and Aceh ended differently. Timor-Timor
gained their independence from Indonesia after a referendum under the control
of UNAMET in 1999 refusing the option of extended autonomy option offered by
the Government of Indonesia. Aceh took a different path of peace post Helsinky
accord between the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement. This
Helsinki MoU is a result from a series of dialogs and negotiations facilitated by
the third party of former President of Finland Martii Ahtisaari.
SECURITY POLICY POLITICS 191
of apology and the revocation of military operation zone
status from Papua, yet the fact shows that patterns and
characteristics of their approach remain. The statement should
be followed by deployments of non-organic military troops
out of Papua. On the contrary, military policies implemented
since the integration of Papua continued under the rational of
eradicating pro-independence groups. This lead to negative
impacts to Papua because the implementation of this policy
model results in a number of violence and human rights
violations.
Therefore, long history of violence and human rights
violations remains in the identity of the people of Papua.
At this point, military policies do not end the conflicts; in
fact it maintains the conflict in Papua with regenerating
actors. This experience ignites the perception of the people
in Papua to associate Indonesia with violence. This stance is
related to the experience of Papua in the past. The people in
Papua knew Indonesia for the first time from the presence
of its military personnel since 1961 from its infiltrates.
Since then, Indonesian military (Indonesian Armed Forces/
Indonesian National Defense Force) was integrative to
the image of Indonesia for decades in Papua. The reaction
displayed by the people of Papua was counter-reacted by
the central government by the intensification of violence
through military operation. Decades of violence have
become an endless cycle of violence. This series of violence
could not be separated from the making of Indonesian face
in the eyes of the people in Papua. Therefore in the mind of
the people in Papua, “The military is Indonesia, Indonesia
is the military.” Sendius Wonda, Op. Cit. 2009. p 111.
The identification of “enemy” for the sake of security policy at the moment can be
concluded from the statement of staff of Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih. 22 January
2011
Amiruddin al Rahab. 2010. Operasi-Operasi Militer di Papua: Pagar Makan
Tanaman?. in Heboh Papua. Perang Rahasia, Trauma dan Separatisme. Jakarta:
Komunitas Bambu, p. 43.
This series of bitter experience accumulated for years
of suffering from violence and violations of human rights
from the integration of Papua to the country remain alive
and vivid. The memory of sufferance (memory passionis)
is vibrant and passed on from generations to generations.
Considering the daily fact of their life, it is understandable that
the people of Papua protested they way they have been treated
and demanded for independence. It is also understandable
that these differences of opinion led to tension and conflict.
In this case, Broek and Kambayong stated that without
advocacy, protests in Papua would dim down and be labelled
as a separatist expression. Peaceful protests were responded
with violence. The use of violence only worsens the existing
conflicts. Based on the writing, the civil society groups inside or
outside Papua demanded that the conflict of Papua would
and must be resolved with political approach through
dialogs as the main measure, to realize the image of “Papua
the Land of Peace.” In reality, this is an empty promise.
Military approach remains the main approach used in
dealing with conflicts in the area. In spite of cutting the
vicious cycle of violence in Papua, the continuation of
this pattern transformed the conflict as a permanent and
perennial pattern. Based on past experience of a series of
conflict in Aceh and Timor Leste before its independence,
military approach can never end any conflict. Conflict
remains and the actors regenerate.
Theo van den Broek and Rudolf Kambayong. Op. Cit., pp. 11-12.
In the concession revealed by Keadilan dan Perdamaian (SKP) Jayapura, the creation of “Papua Land of Peace” is the ultimate prerequisite and the means toward
liberty and non violent conflict resolution. The term “Papua Land of Peace” is
understood as a ‘condition of the society’ and not as a ‘violence-free geographical area’ in the middle of warzones. Therefore the term “Papua Land of Peace” is
used instead of “Papua Zone of Peace.” Peace here refers to the Land of Papua as
a whole. The term “Zone of Peace” is easily linked with a geographical division
of “Zone of Peace” and “Zone of War”
Regarding this context, the question is that why a more
democratic political and regime changes may not correlate
with the pattern of conflict resolution in Papua? On one
hand, Indonesia has a handful of experience in conflict
resolution in Timor Leste and Aceh, yet these experiences
particularly in dealing with Aceh did not result in valuable
lessons learned to be transferred to Papua? This question
addressed this contradiction. Therefore, it makes sense
that the violence in Papua remains and the interpretation
of this phenomenon is integrative to the continual use of
military approach framework. Various facts gathered prove
this point.
Civil society groups and a number of key figures inside
and outside Papua highlight the importance of dialogs.
Many arguments endorsing dialogs emphasize the failure
of military approach. Therefore, dialogs are the venue
preferred by democracy because in principles, democracy
rejects the use of violence in dealing with differences.
Dialogs remain open when freedom and participation are
accommodated. Constructive and honest communication
position relevant figures in equal footing allowing each to
negotiate his or her interest. This is different from security
approach. This last option opens no room for dialog, when
the logics work on the other way around with the operation
of repression actors. When repression suppresses political
domain and civil liberties, dialogs would stop. Within this
framework, dialogs should be followed by demilitarization
of Papua; by freeing the area in Papua from the presence,
the colonisation and the control of military personnel.
Neles Tebay elaborates a number of reasons why Jakarta-Papua dialog is important: path of violence has never put an end to conflict in Papua; implementation
of Law of Special Autonomy failed to brought welfare to the people in Papua;
the government implements Law of Papua Special Autonomy inconsistently;
people in Papua do not believe the government and internatoinal support toward
the government declines. See Neles Tebay. Op.Cit. pp 1-11.
A. Unchanged Central Paradigm
The construction of central government regarding
Papua was heavily dominated by paradigm and perspective
that saw the root of conflict in Papua was mainly caused
by separatist problems, leading to the adoption of security
approach with military involvement through military
operation (securitization). Securitization of the problem in
Papua has become a deeply rooted paradigm in the mind
of the elites of government and security actors from the
past until the present time. Buzan, Weaver and Williams
state that securitization is an extreme version of politicizing
in which securitization movement pattern leads to the
politics of democracy to go beyond its established regulatory
restriction. Securitization, in this perspective, is positioned
on the crossroads of the implementation of democracy by a
government or an authoritarian actions taken to solve the
problems at hand. The process of securitization have changed the routine
political conduct carried out in normal condition, and limited
discussions and debates done by policy makers which are
perceived as obstacles to acts necessary to be taken in order
to solve the problems.10 Securitization redefined options of
solution to be implemented in resolving a problem into quick
and coercive options, oftentimes in the forms of deployment
of military instruments and delegitimation of long-term and
negotiation solutions.11
The process of securitization leads to negative
impacts to social community where such process takes
place. Emphasize on reactive and situational solutions
Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), “Security: A New Framework
for Analysis”, in Paul D Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An Introduction, (New
York: Routledge, 2008), p. 126.
Didier Bigo, “International Political Sociology”, in Paul D Williams (ed.), Security
Studies: An Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 2008).
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
results in minimum consideration on the best ideas to
solve the problems with options highlighting the casualties
potentially caused throughout the process. Many have
scrutinized the process of securitization, and they are
worried that this process would be used by the State to
solve an ongoing problem. Therefore, one of the solutions
offered to stop the process of securitization is through a
desecuritization process by returning the condition into
normal state and preventing the extension of “emergency”
situation. Buzan, Weaver and Williams, affirm that the
process of desecuritization would return the issue back to
the hands of the normal politics.12
Securitization of Papua can be seen from a number
of indicators, including first, the continuation and the
prioritization of security approach and policy by involving
the military in conflict resolution in Papua by the central
government,13 second, the remaining military operation in
Papua leads to human rights violations as seen in the case of
Puncak Jaya, third, the deployment of non-organic troops to
Papua continues, fourth, the continuation of expansion and
addition of new territorial command structure in Papua, fifth,
the establishment of military posts nearby civil residence and
other civil areas, sixth, accumulation and deviation of budget
for the military in relation to operations by the military from
national budget, regional budget and private companies such
as PT Freeport Indonesia; and seventh, the plan to develop
the military show of force in Papua such as the plan to set up
new show of force of the military in Papua comprising the
Army, the Navy and the Air force.14
Buzan et, al., Op. Cit.
Security approach and policy involving the military can be seen from a number of
official stance taken by central administration officials who admit of implementing security approach in conflict resolution in Papua and can also be seen from a
number of military operations continued to be implemented in a number of cases
including the case of Puncak Jaya.
14
See Table 3.6. Prediction of the Number of Troops of the Military in the Land of
Papua (2024).
12
13
The problem with paradigm and perspective of
securitization becomes the fundamental issue highlighted by
various parties and figures in Papua. When security approach
is implemented, it is the derivative of how the State sees
the people in Papua. The changes in perspective should be
addressed radically, because policies are generated from this
perspective. The problem is that if this perspective remains
in the back of the minds of policy actors from the central
(State), the approach adopted to deal with the conflict in
Papua would also remain, by prioritizing security approach
pattern. Regarding this paradigm problem, Thaha Alhamid
from Papua Council Presidium (PDP) explains that “When
you see me as a human being, the approach used is a human
approach, but when you see me as a pig or an animal, the
approach is clearly different. When it comes to slaughter, the
reason is simple. He is a member of Free Papua Movement,
separatist groups, and so forth. “15
In principle, the military as a whole should be freed from
such perspective.16 All this time, the people in Papua are seen
as separatist groups and therefore enemies of the State. The
paradigm used does not explore or ignore the complexity of
conflict in Papua. For example, the discourse of “separatist
versus the unity of the State” is a simplification and even
a manipulation of view used to cover the abuse of power
committed by conflicting parties.17 There are assumptions
those certain parties from the government to serve a number
of interests; such as career improvement, promoting the
interest of certain groups, promotion and so forth, use the
issue of separatism.18
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Papua Public Figure, 21 January 2011.
Interview with Neles Tebay , Director of STFT Fajar Timur, Papua, 25 March
2011.
17
Amiruddin al Rahab. Op.cit.
18
Interview with Agus Alue Alua Head of Papua People Assembly, 20 January
2011
15
16
Reference to a number of studies, such as the one
produced by team of Indonesian Science Institution (Lembaga
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia/LIPI), concludes four (4)
sources of conflict in Papua: first, the history of integration,
political status and identity; second, the problem of political
violence and human rights violations; third, problems due
to the failure of the development; and lastly, the problem of
marginalization of the people in Papua and inconsistency
of Special Authority policies. Peace and Justice Secretariat
Team (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian/SKP) from
Jayapura Archbishop also lists down four sources of conflict
in Papua: first, the climate of (cultural) transition, second,
the climate of population, especially anxiety of the local
indigenous people due to high influx of transmigration into
Papua, third, the climate of social economic and welfare,
19
fourth, social and political climate caused by unfulfilled
basic rights. Moreover, based on the perspective of National
Commission of Human Rights, the fundamental problems in
Papua are “dissatisfaction of the people in Papua regarding the
settlement of human rights violations problems committed by
security personnel and the prominent issue of injustice and
political, economic and social discriminations experienced
by the people in Papua.” 20
Based on the elaboration above, it shows the complex
root of the conflict in Papua. Yet in practice, such complexity
was simplified and reduced to “separatist versus the State”
issue. Conclusion emerged from such paradigm or perspective
in reality dominates the narration behind the making of
central policy in Papua. Security policies in Papua were built
upon this narration. Another alternative narrative explanation
remains unseen.
Complete explanation on the sources of conflict in Papua from Tim SKP Jayapura
can also be seen in Tim SKP Jayapura. 2006. Membangun Budaya Damai dan
Rekonsiliasi, Dasar Menangani Konflik di Papua. SKP Keuskupan Jayapura:
Jayapura. pp 7-16.
20
Statement from National Comission of Human Rights regarding human rights
violations in Irian Jaya on 25 August 1999.
19
It is difficult to muzzle the voices from certain groups
demanding the independence of Papua. Since the beginning
of integration, such groups existed. Yet the emergence of
this demand could not be separated and could not exist by
them. Reference to the studies abroad show that complicity
is a key factor of the conflict in Papua. From the problems of
history, injustice, long exposure to violence, experiences as
a victim of arbitrary violence, poverty, intimidation and so
forth. When these problems were accumulated, protest and
demands for independence became central. The problem
is that Jakarta has been seeing Papua from a singular
point of view and this view was forced through violence.
When protests were expressed, they were countered with
intensified violence.
In principle, then the demand for independence from the
central government is seen as a disintegrative factor which
existence can only be understood from how this integrative
factors realized. These disintegrative factors never stand
by themselves, but they were always related to integrative
factors. The problem occurs when the central government
always enforcing their will and uniforming all local political
movement. This results in local reaction because the central
government is seen as too interfering. The growing forces of
groups demanding independence of Papua, and the growing
support on such groups could not be separated from the
action taken by the central government that are intimidating,
violent, forced handover and underestimating the people in
Papua. So far, the people in Papua are treated unfairly by the
State since the integration. 21
The fact shows that sustainable security approach
involving the military reflects the force exerted by the
central to Papua. It reflects the shallow perspective and
ignorance of fundamental and complex problems mentioned
in the above. The involvement of the military based on past
Amiruddin al Rahab. Op. cit. pp 22.
21
experience does not solve any problem, yet the problem
remains. The potentials for such voice to amplify toward
actual demands for separation or independence of Papua
continue to increase.
The problem underlying the policy in Jakarta is related to
the use of unchanged “security paradigm” not relevant from
the dynamics of democracy and security reform implemented.
The continuation of security approach in Papua within this
context is related to how the central government defines
“security” in the context of Papua. When military personnel
are deployed to Papua and executing a number of military
operations under the pretext of “threat against the sovereignty
of the State”, it shows that the security paradigm adopted
by central government remains with emphasis on “State
security” paradigm.
This security concept emphasizing the dimension of
security focuses only on the attempt to maintain the sovereignty
and territorial boundaries of the State and as a result, adopts
military dimension. As a result, the basis of this concept is
the idea that military supremacy is a means to protect State
sovereignty. 22 The emphasis shows that the involvement of the
military is inevitable. The tendency to use the military concept
as the foundation is apparent from the statements of military
elites in reading social, political and security uprisings in
Papua, used in the relationship of “threat of separatism.”
According to military interpretation, separatism is a “threat to
sovereignty and unity of the State” and therefore, the military
is deployed to maintain the territory of the State.
On the other hands, the concept of “human security” as
alternative tends to be marginalized. This concept of security
highlights the aspect of individual security as a human being.
In this point, the effort to protect and fulfil his or her human
rights is the indicator to be considered.
See: Rizal Sukma, Konsep Keamanan Nasional. Paper presented in an FGD hosted
by Propatria 28 November 2002.
22
Furthermore, the problem emerging from the paramount of
coercion of security paradigm with emphasis on the dimensions
of territory and military lead to the emergence of repressive
security policies in Papua. For the sake of “State security,” the
community security of the people in Papua is marginalized.
The facts gathered from the field show how the presence of
military personnel remains; a number of military operations
are implemented silently for the sake of “Separatist threat.” In
this situation, human rights violations become inevitable and
rampant in Papua. This is obvious from a number of cases.
Based on facts and testimonies from various resources,
security policy emphasizing on security dimension in the State
remains in Papua, with lower intensity from the New Order.
This is confirmed by Theo Van de Broek. On his opinion, in
terms of approach, nothing has changed in Papua. Security
approach remains above other approaches. Besides, the idea
of security is interpreted by the (central) government in
relation to State interest, instead of community security such
as peace, recognition, acknowledgement and acceptance.23
The issue of separatism is not just a security problem but
it is more of a political issue. Because it is political, it could
not be solved through security approach. It requires political
solution. Therefore, the government should be pushed to
solve the problems of separatism in Papua through political
approach. This can be done through dialogs. The government
should open itself for dialogs with the people of Papua who
were long seen as the enemies of the State. 24
1. Lack of Trust between Jakarta-Papua
The relationship between Jakarta and Papua is now
engulfed in suspicion and lack of trust. The central government
suspects every single move made by Papuan separatist groups.
Interview with Theo Van den Broek, Papua People Figure, 28 January 2011.
Written interview with Neles Tebay, Director of STFT Fajar Timur, Jayapura, 25
March 2011.
23
24
On the other hand, Papua sees Jakarta as full of manipulation.
The problems between suspicion and lack of trust do not
exist in a vacuum. This breeds from security problems of the
people in Papua.
The problems of suspicion and lack of trust become
a major problem on the relationship between Jakarta and
Papua. As a result, this could not be solved ever since Papua
is integrated to the country. From the perspective of the
people in Papua, the government is seen as deceptive; whose
words and actions do not match. On the other hand, the
government does not trust the Papuans. This can be seen
from excessive suspicion. The people in Papua are seen as
separatists, therefore military operations are launched. The
impact from this lack of trust inhibits the development in
Papua based on the concept submitted. According to Tebay,
the dialog between Jakarta-Papua is important as an initial
step to deal with lack of trust and suspicion. 25
Yet the attempt to push for dialogs between Jakarta and
Papua is not an easy one. It is because of the problems rooting
in the lack of trust. Based on the perspective of the people in
Papua, the problem underlying the absence of dialog between
Papua and Jakarta is that the government of Indonesia
maintains its suspicion against the people in Papua. It is
clear that the central government sees that any opportunity
for dialog would be used by the people in Papua to demand
and to push for the independence of Papua. Therefore, the
government is not interested in initiating dialogs with the
people in Papua. 26
The tendency of the central government to see the
problems with an eye of suspicion and lack of trust against
the people in Papua can be concluded from a number of
statements delivered by the elite figures in Jakarta. This is
Neles Tebay, Ke-(tidak)-percayaan antara Jakarta dan Papua, Kompas 9 April
2011. [Online] Available at: http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/04/09/04480
398/ [Accessed 02 Mei 2011).
26
Neles Tebay, Op.Cit.
25
particularly obvious in the military. Indeed that when the
reform begins, a number of groups in Papua use the political
domain to voice their concern and to resolve the problem
of conflict in Papua. Yet these efforts cannot be separated
from the suspicion from Jakarta. This can be seen in the
statement of Marshall (Retired) Djoko Suyanto when he
was Commander in Chief of the military, who stated that
in demanding for independence, the separatist groups in
Papua pursued political venue and therefore the government
and the House of Representatives should be alert because
political venue was outside the jurisdiction of the military. 27
This statement shows strong “separatist stereotype” against
the people in Papua. In the level of military personnel, this is
realized in much worse actions.
2. Personnel Prejudice on Separatism and the Potentials
for Violence
Once the problem of prejudice of separatism from
the central elites, it realizes itself into ideas prevalent in
constructing the mind of the military personnel on their
assignment in the field. Many facts on the field show that
such prejudice is not only infiltrate deeply in the military
elite, but also enter the level of consciousness of the military
personnel shown in their inclinations. This tendency realized
on a number of actions and stances.
Based on this phenomenon, it is clear that the stance
and action taken by the military show how idea infected the
perspective adopted by the elites to the lower level of personnel
on the field. This can be done through numerous channels. For
example the briefing process from the commander to the
military personnel who are about to be assigned or are in
the middle of their assignments in Papua. The impact of this
www.indosiar.com/fokus/50367/panglima-tni-minta-dpr-dan-pemerintah-waspadai-separatis -papua, “Panglima TNI Minta DPR dan Pemerintah Waspadai
Separatis Papua”, [Accessed 21 April 2011].
27
can be seen in more concrete patterns of stance and actions
exhibited by the personnel in treating the people in Papua.
Moreover, this can be made worse through the emergence of
“operation principles” to be implemented by the personnel
in the field.
Most of the military personnel assigned to Papua adopt
the perspective that they are facing a group of separatists who
are the enemies of the State. They have to always be alert so
the enemies will not kill them. On the other hand, they have to
kill first. In this kill, not to be killed mode, the people in Papua
is not seen as citizens, because they are seen as separatists
and enemies of the State. It seems that the military personnel
in Papua adheres some kind of operation principle that “each
and everyone in Papua are separatists until proven otherwise.”
Based on such idea, all people in Papua have to be suspected.
Furthermore, every single move of the people of Papua should
be followed and tagged along. The military personnel can
even kill whenever and wherever based on the justification
of eradicating separatists. 28
Such inclination is seen from the experience of the local
people and the key figures of Papua. These are experienced
directly in their daily life. For example, whenever they want
to go to their own garden, the people in Papua have to be
cautious to avoid being treated and suspected as separatists
by the military personnel.29 The people in Papua are seen as
low and not worthy of respect as part of the State citizens. The
military personnel on the other hand consider themselves
as carrying out a holy mission. They can say and do anything
against the people in Papua. This can be seen in the statement
expressed by perpetrators of torture in Puncak Jaya surfaced
through You Tube video, in which the people in Papua were
called as “scumbags.” 30
Ibid.
Discussed in an FGD in Keerom District, 30 January 2011
30
Alleged officials yelled, “Hey you, scumbags, we are here to carry out the order
from the State” Waspada Online.com, Buktikan TNI Langgar HAM di Papua, 19
28
29
Thaha Alhamid retold his experience when he and Theys
were detained in the Regional Police post. Even though it was
dealt with police officers, yet the negative construction of the
personnel against the people in Papua could not be separated
from the role of the elites in the institutions. In other words,
the composite idea of perspective, prejudice and stance taken
by the elite were transmitted to their subordinates in their
institutions that affected the way the personnel see and
treat the people of Papua. Thaha Alhamid for example told
that, “... when we were detained in the detainment facility of
the Regional Police post, each night there were 10-15 police
officers taking turn in sleeping and monitoring in front of the
tennis court of the post. At one time, during the rain, they
took cover on the edges of the walls until Theys summoned
us. When we were inside, they remained outside; they were
asked why they stayed there. They explained that they were
instructed to guard a Xanana Gusmao-like people (dangerous
figures). These are police officers from Palu, which briefing
was to prevent any threat from such dangerous Xanana
Gusmao-like figures.”31
Negative construction on Papua and other related
perspective resulted in the emergence of negative
identification pattern (stigmatization) against the people
in Papua, including its key figures. The term “dangerous
figures” are used to identify a number of people in Papua
seen as pro independence. Moreover, the personnel have
a list of the key figures in Papua with red marks on it to
be constantly monitored or checked every time the new
troops come to Papua. 32 Therefore, such transference of idea
becomes inevitable within the military. This was made worse
by some kind of operational principles.
October 2010. [Online] Available at: www. waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=150655:buktikan-tni-langgar-ham-di-papua&catid=17:
nasional&Itemid=30, “Buktikan TNI Langgar HAM di Papua”, [Accessed 02 May
2011].
31
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Papua People Figure, 21 January 2011
32
Discussed in an FGD with sectoral groups in Jayapura on 4 February 2011.
Recently there were attempts to change the terms used
to identify the groups previously identified as separatists.
For example, the term separatists are changed with people
with “different perspective” or other euphemism.33 Karseno
from Political, Law and Security Division who substituted the
term Free Papua Movement with “armed criminals” expresses
this. This term is used due to the fact that this group bears
arms. On his opinion, armed criminals in this context is not
motivated by criminal intention only because there is an
element of politics and ideology – demands for independence.
34
Yet, when this term is defined along with the description of
patterns, action and practices of the military personnel in the
field, it is clear that there are no substantial changes in terms
of perspective and approach. 35 On the other hand, the claim
for changes is not subsisted.
Furthermore, claims for changes of terms to call this
group in Papua such as the change of separatists to “groups
with different perspective,” it is seen by many as mere political
rhetoric. This can be seen from the statement delivered by
For example the statement of Commander in Chief of Military Resort Command
172/PWY Colonel Czi I Made Sukadana in a commeoration of the 45th anniversary
of Military Resort Command 172/PWY Military Resort Command Headquarter
Courtyard Padang Bulan, Abepura, that there was no separatists in Papua. Regardless of the aspiration they express, they are our brothers and sisters who need to
be enlightened and guided so they would not be lost and then to join us as part of
Indonesian nation. http://tabloidjubi.com/tabloid-jubi/surat-pembaca/1780-stopstigma-separatis-di-papua.html [Accessed 02 May 2011]
34
Interview with Mr. Karseno, Head of Papua Desk, Coordinating Ministry of Political, Law and Security, 9 November 2010.
35
The term goups with “different perspective and ideology” used to call Free Papua
Movement is also used by Commander in Chief of Military Area Command Cendrawasih Major General Azmyn Yusri Nasution. For example, he stated: “… our
brothers with different perspective and ideology (Free Papua Movement), they
are not the enemy of the military. They are part of of us who temporary not on
the same page with us. Therefore, it is the duty of all component of this Nation
including the military to enlighten them so they would return to the Motherland
of the Republic of Indonesia to build this region for the people’s welfare and
wellbeings.” Tni.mil.id, Lebih Dekat Dengan Pangdam XVII/Cendrawasih yang
Baru Mayjen TNI Azmyn Nasution. [Online] Available at: http://server.tni.mil.
id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1130 12006119477 [Accessed
20 April 2011].
33
Thaha Alhamid. This rings true on the new terms used to
substitute the idea of separatists. For example, the armed
resistance groups in Papua continued to be named “Armed
Separatist Group (Kelompok Separatis Bersenjata/KSB)”
while the unarmed ones are called “Political Separatist Groups
(Kelompok Separatis Politik/KSP).” 36
B. The Politics of Papua Security Policy
1. Military Domination and Repression
Based on the facts gathered from the field and a number
of testimonies of the resource persons, it is clear that conflict
in Papua in the reform era is approached using the security
approach pattern. 37 In the level of practice, this is marked
by the presence and involvement of the military in Papua
based on the reason of dealing with “threat of separatists”
in Papua.
Nowadays it is difficult to obtain the accurate number of
military troops in Papua. Based on all resources interviewed
by Imparsial from Members of the Parliament, Coordinating
Ministry of Politics, Law and Security to Commander in
Chief of Military Area District XVII/Cendrawasih, no one can
offer a fixed number of the total number of military troops
deployed to secure Papua. However, based on the estimation
of Imparsial, the number of military personnel in Papua from
the Army is around 12,000-13,000 personnel 38 the Navy
is 1,272 personnel, the Air force 570 personnel. 39 So the
Regardeless no one on the top civil and military leadership confirmed that security
approach is applied in Papua, yet Karsono as the Head of the Handling of Papua
Problem (DPMP) in an interview stated that the government is (admitting of) using security approach in Papua. Interview with Karseno Papua Problem Handling
Desk, Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security, 9 November 2010.
38
Estimated number of troops in Papua is revealed in an interview with staff of
Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih, 18 January 2011.
39
See Attachment.
36
37
approximate number of the total military personnel in Papua
at the moment is 14,842 personnel.
Based on this calculation, it can be inferred that there are
a number of clear inclination interpreted from the number of
military personnel deployed to Papua:
(1)No clear explanation from civil authority and military
authority shows secrecy on the forces and the number
of troops deployed to Papua. This can be inferred that
the military forces in Papua is not regulated under one
authority, and this also highlights the existence of secret
operations involving the military in Papua;
(2)The existing data shows concentration of troops in Papua
is dominated by the Army;
(3)Compared to Aceh in 2003 martial situation, the total
number of military personnel deployed there was about
33.703 personnel.40 Meanwhile Papua that is not under
any emergency be it in the military or civilian nature, yet
it hosts half of the total number of personnel deployed
to Aceh in 2003. This means that the situation and
status in Papua was almost congruent with the forces
of the military at the brink of the announcement of
military emergency status in Aceh. Yet up until now the
government has never launched any clear and strict
policies regarding the security status in Papua. This
represents an error;
(4)In the conflict of Aceh, it is assumed that 1 armed
personnel (from Fee Aceh Movement) was handled by
10 military personnel. Therefore the number 33,703
personnel were under the assumption that the total
number of Free Aceh Movement personnel was about
3,300 people. Consequently, the show of force of the
military totalling up to 14,842 personnel in Papua is
handling around 1,400 armed separatist forces in Papua.
Tim Imparsial, Rekonstruksi Negara Melalui Kebijakan Darurat di Aceh: Sebuah
Analisis Kebijakan di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2004), p. 18.
40
The fact shows that the number of armed separatist
people in Papua is not that significant. Or if the forces
and number of troops deployed to Papua is based on the
assumption of border security, therefore the number of
military personnel deployed does not have to be that
high. In the interview with military officials in Papua,
Papua New Guinea that shares border with Indonesia
is not a threat to the country.41 It can be concluded that
there is an overconcentration of military personnel in
Papua, and this refers how the civil society in Papua
is potentially identified as part of armed separatist
movements. This serves as the basis for violence and
human rights violations to highly likely occur in Papua.
This erroneous judgment should be put under scrutiny
by the government and the Parliament;
(5)With such overconcentration of military personnel
explained on the above, it is clear that there is a
securitization in Papua where conflict resolution in
Papua is biased with military approached;
(6)Parliament and the government is weak in monitoring the
forces and rotation of military personnel in Papua. This can
be seen from the interview with members of the parliament
and the government who are in oblivion in terms of the
accurate number of military personnel in Papua.42
Moreover, it is predicted that in 2024, the total number
of newly deployed troops in the area of Papua from Papua
itself to West Papua would reach around 17,980 personnel. It
means that if there is no change in the total number of Papua
at the moment, in 2024 it can be expected that a total number
of military personnel deployed to Papua is around 14.842
+ 17.980 = 32.732 personnel. This can be infered from the
following points:
41
42
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih, 7 February 2011.
Interview with Tubagus Hasanuddin, Vice Chairperson of Commission I of the
House of Representatives, 10 January 2011.
i. Up to 2024, the government remains firm to implement
security approach by involving military in dealing with
the problems in Papua;
ii. If the number of military personnel in Papua is consistent
with the total number of 32.732 military personnel
in 2024 and no reduction and rotation of previous
personnel is carried out, therefore in the near future
(2024) the factual status of Papua is on the military
emergency level, even tough the government never issue
any policy regarding this issue. In Aceh, the number of
military personnel in military emergency period reaches
33,703 personnel;
iii. Concentration of military forces building in the future
(2024) in Papua is dominated by the Army.43
iv. This confirms how securities in Papua are biased with
military forces approach, which will remain until 2024.
Military engagement in the conflict of Papua is essentially
an old method.44 Indications from the field can be observed
from a number of military operations that are continued over
and over again. Even though formally the status of Papua as a
military zone is already revoked, yet in reality, it still is. Even
though in writing, there is no letter stating Papua as a military
zone, yet the implementation is strongly felt everywhere.45
Testimonies from the people on their experience regarding
military activities around them are evidence supporting
this notion, even though central military elites denied the
existence of military operations seemingly run covertly. 46
See Table 3.6. Predicted Number of Military Troop in Papua (2024).
This is regarded as old method as this pattern has been used since the initial integration of Papua. Military operation was first launched in 1961. See: Amiruddin
el Rahab, Op.cit. pp. 39-65.
45
Interview with Socratez Sofyan, Executive Director of Central Service Agency
of the Baptism Church of Papua 27 January 2011.
46
Such rebuttal is expressed by Coordinating Minister of Politics and Legal Affairs
Djoko Suyanto in responding to the statement of the Head of National Comission
of Human Rights Ifdal Kasim in relation to the trend of human rights violations
since the deployment of additional personnel. He stated: “t is not true that the
43
44
The involvement of the military in the conflicts in Papua
was not free from problems. For the people in Papua whose
lives were packed with acts of violence, the involvement of the
military in the conflict of Papua results in serious impacts to
their lives. In spite of security, they ended up with lack of one.47
The correlation of military involvement and lack of security
was affirmed by Socratez. In his words, “There is no security
for the people in Papua. The military and police personnel in
Papua have no use. On the other hand, they became the threat
to our livelihood.” 48
In principle, each policy requires legitimation. So does the
involvement of the military in the context of conflict resolution
in Papua. In practices, in dealing with facts and testimonies of the
resources, there are two routes to be taken – through domination
and hegemony. According to Daniel Sparingga, on his analysis
on how the New Order built their legimation, the first pattern
(domination) takes form in repression, in direct manner (such as
arbitrary arrest, intimidating and kidnapping) or a more subtle
way. The second form (hegemony) takes form in the attempt of
mind control and even manipulative monopoly of meaning. 49
These two patterns do not stand on themselves; they correlate
and are concurrent in the implementation of security policy in
Papua.
State continues to launch military operations”. Kompas, Djoko Bantah Operasi
Militer di Papua, 22 Oktober 2010. [Online] Available at: http://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2010/10/22/1248124/Djoko.Bantah.Operasi.Militer.di.Papua [Accessed
29 April 2011]
47
Lack of security due to the presence and the activities carried out by the military
is told by the people of Papua from various sectors. Not only that it is relevant to
the case of murder and violence, but it is also relevant with the close proximity
of the personnel in the residential area which transmitting fear to the community.
For example, the assignment of personnel to the middle of the viollage, to guard
the market with loaded weapons, to secure the sales of liquor in the security pots
and so on. The people were afraid to carry out their activities. This is discussed
in an FGD with the people in Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
48
Interview with Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Executive Director of Service Center of
The Union of Baptist Church in Papua, 27 January 2011.
49
See: Daniel Sparinga, TNI: Sebuah Refleksi Kritis atas Sejarah. In Anas S. Machfudz and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani (eds). 2001. Military Without Militerism.
Jakarta: PKK-LIPI, pp 94-95.
Furthermore, the maintenance of security pattern
permanently positions the military as one of the main actors
in Papua. The role of the military showed the spreading of this
tendency. Even though now the responsibility of the security
is on the hand of Papua Regional Police, yet in practices, the
military tends to dominate in the implementation of military
operation in Papua. Some of the military operations are
done under the table without involving the police personnel.
This was revealed by Matius Murib. An operation done
exclusively by military in Puncak Jaya was carried out without
any knowledge from the Head of the local Police Precinct.
Puncak Jaya district is a newly created area with neither Police
Precinct nor Police Sub-District Posts, yet the presence of
military personnel can be found over there.50
The Centralization and Dispersion of Military Personnel
Based on the presence, the military holds the upper
position in Papua. This is apparent in the Army. Based on
the testimony of the residence, they were easily found in
many places and areas. From the border into the village
residence, they were there. Even though all elements of the
military are sent to Papua, in practices, the army through its
territorial units dominates security approach pattern. The
army dominates in Papua through its elements. 51
During reform era, there were attempts to add more
military personnel to Papua. Such attempt is apparent in the
issuance of the policy of Commander in Chief of the military
in October 2003 to deploy four new battalions to Papua to
enforce the existing army totalling up to 10.000 troops. The
deployment of four new battalions assigned to secure strategic
and vital objects in Papua (particularly mining areas), border
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Head of Natonal Comission of Human Rights
Papua Representative, 19 January 2011.
51
This allegation is expressed by Pater Neles Tebay in a written interview, Director
of STFT Fajar Timur, Jayapura, 25 March 2011.
50
areas and the city of Jayapura and its neighbouring areas.52
In principles, the military personnel in Papua comprises of
organic and non-organic troops from three elements of the
Army, the Navy and the Air force.
Furthermore, according to its basic functional characteristics,
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih as part of the Army
carries out the roles of the army in the land of Papua through War
Military Operation (Operasi Militer untuk Perang/OMP) and Non
War Military Operation (Operasi Militer Selain Perang/OMSP).
The basic structure of Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih
was divided into four characteristics, which includes Territorial
Unit Education Institution, Combat Unit and Combat Assistance.
Territorial unit of Military Area Command XVII Cendrawasi
comprises of: 53
1. Military Resort Command 171/PVT Praja Wira Tama
in Sorong that supervises Batallion Infantry 752/Praja
Wira Tama Sorong, Military District Command 1703/
Manokwari and Military District Command 1704/
Sorong;
2. Military Resort Command 172/PW Praja Wira Yakti
Jayapura North Papua that supervises Batallion Infantry
751/Vira Jaya Sakti Jayapura, Military District Command
1701/Jayapura, Military District Command 1702/JW, and
Military District Command 1712/Sarmi;
Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Discussion “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh, Papua, dan
Poso pada Pemilu 2004. Propatria Hotel Santika Jakarta 7 January 2004
53
The duty of the military to secure the territory includes the preparation of geographical, demographical and social aspects of the condition to achieve resilient
area, tools and condition ready to support the duty of the Army to carry out war
military operation and non war military operation. Territorial monitoring in the
local level is carried out by Military Area Command, Military Resort Command,
Military District Command to Military Sub-District Command in each area. This
is quoted from Liutenant Colonel Infantry Judi Paragina. M.Sc. Re-Vitalisas dan
re-aktualisasi Pembinaan Teritorial Komando Kewilayahan TNI AD Guna Mendukung Kepentingan Pertahanan Matra Darat Pada Masa Mendatang. Situs Kodam
Jaya/Jakarta. http://www.kodam-jaya.mil.id/arsip-artikel-kontribusi/960-re-vitalisasi-dan-re-aktualisasi-pembinaan-teritorial-komando-kewilayahan-tni-aa-gunamendukung-kepentingan-pertahanan-matra-darat-pada-masa-mendatang?start=3
accessed 2 February 2011 at 23.21 WIB
52
3. Military Resort Command 173/PVB Praja Wira Braja
Biak North Papua, that supervises Battalion Infantry
753/Arga Vira Tama, Military District Command 1705/
Nabire, Military District Command 1708/Biak Numfor,
and Military District Command 1709/Yapen Waropen;
and
4. Military Resort Command 174/ATW Anim Ti Waninggap
Merauke West Papua that supervises Battalion Infantry
755/Yalet Merauke, Military District Command
1706/Fak Fak, and Military District Command 1707/
Merauke.
As a territorial unit, Military Area Command XVII
Cendrawasih also has its Education Institution that is the
Military Area Main Regiment (Resimen Induk Daerah Militer/
Rindam) in Sentani Jayapura. Besides there was also a combat
unit called Infantry Brigade54 20/Ima Jayakeramo which
includes Battalion Infantry 753/Arga Vira Tama Paniai,
Battalion Infantry 754/Eme Neme Kangasi Timika, Battalion
Infantry 756/Winame Sili Wamena, Batallion Infantry 751BS and Cavalry Detachment-3/Serbu, which is par of organic
Cavalry of Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. Military
Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih also comprises with
Combat Assistance unit of Combat Engineering Battalion 10,
11, 12 and 13.55
Post 2002, there has been a significant increase of
numbers in the three elements of the military in the national
level. This increase was apparent in the outer areas of
Indonesia in the borders on international regions. 56 The Army,
Navy and Air force at that time announced and implement the
ongoing and upcoming initiatives to expand its institutional
Organic troop of Army Brigade supervises at least three infantry battalion. In Indonesia, there are 13 Infantry Brigade of the Army comprising of regular Infantry
Brigade and Airborne Infantry Brigade.
55
Website of Militiary Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih, http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/ (accessed 2 February 2011)
56
54
capacity, to improve weapon quality and to increase combat
counterinsurgency capacity and conventional combat
operations. 57
The Army in general experienced escalated number of
personnel, for example, in 2003, there has been an increase at least
four infantry battalion. This increase adds to a total projection
of seventeen infantry battalion. With this plan of increase, the
Army will add to its power at least 16.000 personnel.58 Four
battalions were assigned to guard strategic vital objects, border
areas, Jayapura city security and so on. 59
In the Air force, there has been an increase of personnel
as well. Jayapura airport in its implementation of operational
task was supported with 156 personnel and 2 helicopters.
The detection capacity of the Air force in this are is also
improved by the plan to enhance the radar capacity in the
areas of Timika and Merauke to empower radar armada
established in the area of Biak in 2010. 60 The enhancement
of radar capacity is done to support the establishment of Air
force Command Area IV which covers the defence of Jayapura,
Timika and Merauke. 61
Three additional infantry battalion (751, 752, 753)
supported the previous infantry battalions assigned in two
provinces of West Papua, which is commenced in 2004. The
increase of infantry troops secured as the majority of troops
allocated from outside of the Military Command Area, ranging
from 260 personnel in the initial stage of the additional and
also an addition from local Military Area Main Regiment
Ibid.
Ibid.
59
Ikrar Nusa Bakti. Diskusi “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh, Papua, dan Poso
pada Pemilu 2004. Propatria Hotel Santika Jakarta 7 January 2004
60
Penyiapan Radar TNI AU di Papua Tidak Ada Masalah. http://www.tni.mil.
id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=113012006119146 accessed 4
February 2011. 61
www.tni.mil.id/news.php?q=dtl&id=113012006110644, “KOHANUDNAS Terus
Kembangkan Sistem Deteksi Dini”, 10 February 2006, as quoted from Matthew
N. Davies, Op. Cit., p. 6.
57
58
of Jayapura Military Area Command. Each battalion was
allocated to have around 1000 personnel. 62
One of the most prominent points in the attemp to
increase the force of the military is the increase on Army
Strategic Reserve Corps and the Marine troops. After up to
30 per cent of increase on the number of marine troops in
2002, the following increase of infantry troops showed the
increase of forces in the military. The increase of the Army
Strategic Reserve Corps Division adds strength to the defence
forces in the area covering Sulawesi, Sarong and Jayapura. The
increase happens on the medium term development plan (5
years) up to 2009. 63
Besides its main forces, the Province of Papua also
displays its non-organic forces, including Special Forces Corps
and additional troops from infantry battalions in the existing
Military Are Command all over Indonesia to safeguard the
borders. 64. In general, these troops comprises of groups
totalling up to 650 units under Border Security Task Force
assigned from 6 months to 1 year. In each groups, there is
less than 100 Privates, 200 Non-Commissioned Officers and
400 Enlisted Officers. 65
The increase of military personnel was implemented
through border security. The land border between the Republic
of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea stretched around 780 km
marked with 52 landmarks agreed by both countries. The
Government of Indonesia was responsible for the security of
24 landmarks and The Government of Papua New Guinea was
responsible for 28 landmarks. The military personnel in the
border was supported by border security forces of 114 posts,
Cenderawasih Pos, “3 Batalion Baru Terbentuk”, 5 March 2004, as quoted from
63
Bob Lowry (1993) as quoted from Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., p. 9.
64
65
Example of the deployed group Batalyon Infanteri 725/Woroagi Siap Mengamankan Perbatasan NKRI-Papua Nugini. www.kendaripos.co.id see also
Pangdam VII/WRB Melepas 900 Personil ke Papua http://www.tni.mil.id/index2.
php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=375 (accessed 4 February 2011)
62
including 20 posts of organic troops of Infantry Battalion
751, 755, 756 and 94 posts of non organic troops of Infantry
Battalion of 408, 303, 320 and 516. The number of personnel
of each post was around 10-25 personnel.
The then Chief of Military Area Command XVII/
Cenderawasih, Major General Erfi Triassunu supported the
plan to add more personnel. According to Major General
Triassunu, this additional was necessary considering that the
area of Papua was twice the area of Java Island. The security in
Papua at this moment was like assigning one security officer
to guard a factory, leading to numerous places unguarded and
a number of security breaches. 66
According to Papua People’s Assembly, the increase of
personnel should be based on the request from the Governor.
At the moment, there was no information whether this
mechanism was implemented or not. The fact showed that
the increase of troop in Timika includes three battalions.67
Moreover, Thaha Alhamid also added Special Forces Corps
who were assigned in the area of Angkasa. 68
Members of Papua House of Representatives Yunus
Wonda also stated that his institution had no knowledge on
the increase number of troops. During Wamena increase of
troops, his office had refused the attempts as it inflicted the
sense of insecurity. The number of security personnel was
almost a match to the whole population of Papua. 69
The presence of non-organic battalion was not necessary
because it was needed during the wartime.70Commander of
Military District Command 1072/Jayapura stated that the
presence of non-organic troops was necessary to guard the
Interview with Agus Alue Alua, Head of Papua People Assembly, 20 January
2011.
68
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Papua People Figure, 21 January 2011.
69
Interview with Yunus Wonda, Vice Head I of Papua House of Representatives, 31 January 2011.
70
Interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Papua Indigenous Council, 22 January
2011.
66
67
border of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The security in
the border was shared amongst the Police, Custom and Excise
and Immigration. Yet the Commander of Military District
Command stated that there was no troops from Special
Forces Command or Army Strategic Reserve Corps. 71 The
Head of Papua Problems Handling Desk (Desk Penyelesaian
Masalah Papua/DPMP), Karseno stated that the existence of
troops in Papua was to safeguard the border and performed
border security operation. When there was a criminal armed
disturbance in Timika and other areas, this fell under police
jurisdiction.72
On the presence of these posts, the claim that military
personnel were assigned on the border was not completely true
according to Matius Murib. He stated that in the city of Mulaia, the
numbers of offices, in terms of police or military posts, exceeded
the population. These offices are located in Puncak Jaya that is
not the border between Indonesia-Papua New Guinea and is
located in the middle of the juggle.73 Aroby also confirmed that
military posts were not in the border only but almost in every
single village whose presence was a disturbance to the local
community. It was because the people had to report every time
they went out to the forests and gardens. 74 If they were deployed
to monitor the border, Thaha Alhamid questioned the substantial
number of personnel. It seemed that Papua New Guinea was
about to attack Indonesia. 75
The presence of military personnel in the border also
triggered a number of problems. As stated by Erna Mahuse,
the population of a village around the borders of Papua
was about 30 families. In each posts, they were 25 to 30
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih, 22 January 2011.
Interview with Mr. Karseno, Head of Papua Desk Coordinating Minister of Politics
Law and Security, 9 November 2010.
73
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Head of National Commision of Human Rights
Papua Representative, 19 January 2011
74
Interview with Head of Papua Moslem Assembly, Aroby Achmad Airatauw, 26
January 2011
75
71
72
security personnel. They helped secure the village indeed,
yet their presence was a nuisance to the local people. They
occupied indigenous-owned lands in low rental price or
even no charge at all. The number of military posts was more
than enough. From Merauke to Bovendigoel, one could find
a military post every 10-15 kilometres, be it in the middle
of the forest or nearby the village. Nearby big sized rivers,
there was a military post there. Each post was guarded with
20 to 30 personnel.76 The presence was suffocating because
it restricted the freedom of the people in Papua. It is also
repressive because every single mistake can result in assault
or forced labour for the sake of the military. 77
The negative side of military posts were expressed in
the focus group discussion with the people in the city of Arso.
One person stated that they felt unsafe, because they were
afraid that when they left their houses, one of them would
be murdered. Not only the people in Papua but also by other
ethnicities felt such climate. 78 In an FGD in Workwana, the
participants also expressed violence. One stated that his house
was once ambushed, leading to deep trauma. 79
To avoid boredom, they were assigned in a rota basis.
A troop was assigned to the border for about one year. 80
This rotation was in line with the argument of Jaleswari
Pramurdawardhani. Rotation is needed to avoid boredom
that may reduce or decrease their motivation in carrying out
their duty. 81
Member of Commission I of the House of Representatives,
TB Hasanudin, expressed different opinion. In his view, one Interview with Erna Mahuze, Member of Task Force on Religion Papua People
Council, 26 January 2011
77
Interview with Theo Van den Broek, Papua People Figure, 21 January 2011
78
Result of an FGD with the people of Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January
2011
79
Result of an FGD with the people of Workwana, Keerom District, 30 January
2011
80
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih, 7 February 2011
81
Interview with Jaleswari Pramurdhawardani. LIPI Researcher, 9 November
2010
76
year of assignment led to low sense of responsibility as they
were there for a limited period of time. Therefore, problems
should be solved by local troops or units with more established
relationship. 82
The tendency to add more military forces was also
obvious from the proposal to set up a new Military Area
Command in Papua to complete the existing 12 Military
Area Commands all over Indonesia at the moment. 83 Army
Chief Liutenant General George Toisutta stated this after
the handover of the position of Army Chief from General
Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo to him in 2009. 84 Yet, the
Army Chief also questioned the relevance of setting up new
Military District Command because the prominent issue
in Papua was security issues, not defence issues involving
neighbouring countries. 85
Similar view was also expressed in the beginning of 2011,
in which Commander in Chief of Military Area Command XVII/
Cendrawasih Major General Efri Triassunu stated that Military
Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih needed no additional
personnel but additional equipment, especially the equipment
of the unit up to 60 per cent from the existing situation.
The comment made by Commander in Chief of the Military
Command Area highlighted the assumption that additional
personnel following the establishment of new Military Area
Interview with TB Hasanuddin, Vice Chairperson of Commission I of the House
of Representatives, 10 January 2011.
83
The military at the moment has 12 Military Area Command of Iskandar Muda in
Banda Aceh; Military Area Command I/Bukit Barisan in Medan; Military Area
Command II/Sriwijaya in Palembang; Military Area Command III/Siliwangi in
Bandung; Military Area Command Jakarta Raya in Jakarta; Military Area Command IV/Diponegoro in Semarang; Military Area Command V/Brawijaya di
Surabaya; Military Area Command VI/Tanjungpura in Balikpapan; Military Area
Command Vii/Wirabuana in Makassar; Military Area Command IX/Udayana
in Denpasar; Military Area Command XVI/Pattimura in Ambon; Military Area
Command XVII/Cendrawasih in Jayapura.
84
Kompas, “KSAD: Akan Ada Kodam Baru di Pulau Papua”, 12 November 2009.
85
code=2011200920111772, “Kasad: Dikaji Pembentukan Kodam Baru di Papua”,
82
Command was unnecessary, even though at the same time
Commander in Chief of the Military Command Area also
stated that security facilities in the border of the Republic
of Indonesia-Papua New Guinea was only equipped by 40
percent of its optimum need. 86
Security operation in the border of the outer islands of
Indonesia also fell under the responsibility of Military Area
Command XVII/Cendrawasih. There were four outer islands
secured in the eastern tip of Indonesia. These points were
secured by marine officers from the Navy assigned to Papua,
but in 2011, it was planned that the security personnel in
those points would be increased by deploying troops from
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih to come up with
the proportion of 80 percent marines and 20 percent Military
Area Command personnel.
Security monitoring operations of the border area in the
outer islands on Indonesia is also under the responsibility of
Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasih. There are around
four outer islands that served as monitoring points of the
eastern area of Indonesia. These points so far are monitored
by marine officers from the Navy assigned in Papua, yet in
2011 it is planned to add more security personnel on the
outer islands from the troops from Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasi with the ration of 80 per cent marines and
20 percent of Military Area Command personnel. 87
Meanwhile to secure vital object, this is done by deploying
Military Resort Command Operation Implementation Command
(Kolakopsrem) 171/PVT with 700 personnel for securing PT
Freeport Indonesia, Timika Airport and Portside and Cargo Doc.
For POV operation at PT FI, starting July 2006, it is implemented
by deploying assistance (under operational command) to Papua
Regional Police by launching Military Task Force Sub Command
(Kosubsatgas TNI) with 350 personnel.
http://bataviase.co.id/node/520305, “Pangdam Cenderawasih: Fasilitas Pengamanan Masih Kurang”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
87
Ibid.
86
It can be seen from the plan of personnel deployment
inferred from the setting up of Military Area Command,
Infantry Brigadier, Marine Troops and new border posts in the
area of Papua, that the government of Indonesia prioritized
the assignment of military personnel in a substantial number
to the eastern tip of Indonesian defence, which highlighted
the concerns of decision makers in Jakarta on the internal
security and defence condition in this area.
Military troops in Papua consist of organic as well as
non-organic troops. Command-wise, non-organic and organic
troops may suffer from lack of clarity. One example is the
overlapping of intelligence agency in the local level between
National Intelligence Agency and Military Area Command
Intelligence, Police intelligence and so forth. This also happens
in the dealing with the home of Free Papua Movement, and
the security of strategic assets such as big corporation (PT
Freeport and so forth) and the border areas. Another example
is how Regional Police did not know for certain how Special
Forces Command assigned to Papua worked and which areas
they were assigned to, due to lack of clarity in this grey area
of security and defence in Papua.88
Special Forces Command is a non-organic troop in Papua
under the spot light. It is so especially after the involvement
of a number of Special Forces Command personnel in the
murder of the Head of Papua Council Presidium, They Hilo
Eluay. Later it is known that the Special Forces Command is
allegedly involved in the 2007 operation based on its leaked
secret document. The Special Forces Command is allegedly
involved in a number of operations. The operations include
military operations, intelligence and field operations targeting
civil society and its key figures.89
Waspada online, Dokumen Operasi Kopassus di Papua bocor, 11 November 2010.
[Online] Available at: http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=155847:dokumen-operasi-kopassus-di-papua-bocor&catid=17:
nasional&Itemid=30 [Accessed 23 April 2011]
88
89
In the context of performance, it is obvious that there are
problems in the coordination amongst security personnel. Yet,
in relation to their function and roles carried out by non organic
troops in Papua, Commander in Chief of Military Area Command
XVII/Cendrawasih Brigadier General Erfi Triassunu stated that
their presence in Papua was under his control and coordination90
Therefore, it can be concluded that the overall military presence
both organic or non-organic in Papua, and their placement and
activities, are unknown to Cendrawasi Military District Command
as the responsible party in the implementation of security policy
and conflict handling in Papua.
Regarding its distribution, it is clear that the military
dominates the area of Papua. It is done not only from its
territorial command from the Military Area Command
(Kodam) to the lowest level of Military Sub-District Command
(Koramil) including a number of military posts set up in a
number of locations. Military assignment covers not only the
border areas but also right at the centre of the residential
area or at least nearby. This was revealed by Aroby Airatauw
(Head of Papua People Assembly). Military posts can be found
not only in the border areas but also in almost every village
and became nuances to the nearby community. These are
permanent posts. One of the nuances experience by the people
is that every time they want to go to the garden in the forts,
they have to report first to the military posts.91
The presence of military posts is elaborated by Pater
Neles. In his opinion, at this moment, there are a number of
military posts set up in Papua, such as military posts along
the State border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;
security posts around corporations; and security posts in
areas seen as vulnerable. Moreover, there are a number of
alleged covert posts. It is because military personnel assigned
to such posts do not wear any military uniforms. The last
Interview with Aroby Achmad Airatauw, Head of Papua Moslem Council, 26
January 2011.
90
91
one includes posts of Special Forces Command set up in each
districts and small yet strategic cities all over Papua.92
Moreover, the problem of expansion of the area of Papua
is often used as an excuse to deploy more military troops to
Papua. In the context of territorial command expansion, the
creation of newly developed region is used as means for such
expansion. It is because basically the structure of Territorial
Command is built by duplicating the structural model of civil
government bureaucracy from the central to local levels.
Therefore, as Papua is divided into a number of regions, hence
new territorial commands are built as well.93
As new districts are created in the land of Papua, the
military establishes new commands. The military set up
Military Resort Command to supervise Military District
Command. In each district, a new military district command
is set up because each district a Regional Consultative Council
(Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah/Muspida) is set up and in
every Regional Consultative Council, Commander in Chief of
Military District Command chairs as a member. No Regional
Consultative Council is complete without Commander in Chief
of Military District Command. Therefore, as new districts are
created, more Military District Commands are set up as well.94
Similar framework is used along the governance level to the
local level, such as a new Military Sub-District Command is
set up in every newly established sub-districts.
Expansion of Territorial Command and establishment
of military posts all over Papua are not in line with the wish
of the people in Papua who have long refused such posts
and territorial commands.95 They demanded the eradication
Written interview with Pater Neles, Director of STFT Fajar Timur, Jayapura, 25
March 2011
93
The establishment of Military Resort Command 174 in Merauke in 2005 94
Written interview with Pater Neles, Director of STFT Fajar Timur, Jayapura, 25
March 2011
95
For example is the statement of the Head of Nasem Village requesting for Task
Force Post in Nasem manned by military personnel to be moved elsewhere. The
people was traumatized and afraid in the post attack and shooting of two civil92
of territorial commands. There are a number of reasons
for this: First, territorial institutions – through a number
of operation and their personnel – have implemented a
number of human rights violations in the land of Papua.
Second, territorial institutions in the past have been used
as instruments to degrade the existence of indigenous
institutions and indigenous people. For example, traditional
ceremonies could not be carried out without the blessing
of security personnel. Third, security personnel frequently
are excessive in carrying out their duties. For example, they
often stop trucks to ask for security money before they can
pass through. Fourth, a number of territorial commands
are implemented by these territorial institutions leading
to the accumulation of wealth to a number of military elites
and officials rather than contributing to the welfare of the
local people or the low-ranked officers. Fifth, a number of
territorial operations are mere sporadic, or implemented
once a year. Sixth, a number of human rights violations and
inhuman treatments conducted by the military personnel
resulted in deep trauma to the heart and the minds of
the people in Papua. Seventh, the presence of territorial
institutions do not guarantee security and welfare of the
local people. In many districts, where Military District
Command is present, disturbance often happened.96
Within the context of the eradication of Territorial
Command, Riefqi Muna explains that there are at least three (3)
reasons to be considered as compulsory to liquidate territorial
command in Indonesia. These reasons are: First, Territorial
ians by the military personnel http://tabloidjubi.com/index.php/daily-news/seputar-tanah-papua/10988-masyarakat-tolak-keberadaan-pos-satgas-tni-di-nasem,
“Masyarakat Tolak Keberadaan Pos Satgas TNI di Nasem”, 13 February 2011,
(Accessed 2 May 2011).
96
See: Muhammad Asfar, Sikap Daerah terhadap Gagasan Pengembalian Fungsi
Teritorial dari TNI ke Pemerintah Daerah: Laporan dari Jatim, NTT, Maluku,
Papua dan Aceh. In: Muhammad Asfar, dkk. 2003. Wacana Penghapusan Koter:
Pengembalian Fungsi Teritorial dari TNI ke Pemerintah Daerah. Surabaya: PusdeHAM, pp. 195-199.
Command is politically ridden, Second, is economically ridden
and economically oriented. Third, is land-based.97
The presence and expansion of territorial command and
the establishment of numerous military posts in numerous
locations in Papua reflect the pattern of territorial control as
approach adopted by the military in the context of dealing
with “threat to separatism” in Papua. This pattern infers a type
of logic that believes the more security personnel distributed
in the area, the safer the situation would be. Based on their
distribution, the military obviously dominate every inch of
land in Papua. Through military personnel established and
territorial command set up in each territory, the military
control all domains. They even control the livelihood of the
people in Papua in each village.
Within such domination, the military play key roles. Some
of roles they play are related to their main duties, yet some
are beyond. Based on regulation, the military have two duties
of war military operation and non-war military operation. In
the context of military roles in Papua, it can be observed that
they take form in many means. This includes safeguarding
State border, implementing intelligence operations, carrying
out raids and exercising territorial operations. It can be
concluded that the military enters almost all sectors in Papua.
This includes the sectors in which civil society should reign
supreme. The last role is implemented through territorial
command. In fact, the military also wish to be involved in the
domain where the police should rule such as the handling of
social conflict in Papua. This implies such high ambition in the
military to be involved in many facets or sectors in Papua.98
Furthermore, the military wish to engage in the roles
taken by civil government officials. This is exercised under
the excuse of territorial monitoring. This can be seen from
Riefqi Muna (ed). 2002. Likuidasi Komando Teritorial dan Pertahanan Nasional.
Jakarta: Cadass dan the Ridep Institute. 98
www.kemhan.go.id, “KSAD: Pengaman di Papua Harus Melibatkan TNI”, accessed 6 May 2011
97
the military civic rural missions (TNI Manunggal Masuk
Desa/TMMD) in a number of villages in Papua. Through
these missions, the military come to a number of villages
and carried out a number of civic-oriented programs. 99 This
includes the building of water mill, house renovation, the
building of bridges, the building of motorboat docks, pilot
gardens, the building of village hall and the renovation of
religious facilities. This also includes non-physical operations
such as literacy program, capacity building such as education
initiative on how to make fish net, healthcare education,
building cattle facilities and so forth. 100
This program is a revamped version of similar program
carried out in New Order Era, ABRI Masuk Desa/AMD.
Despite its social nature, the series of activities is ridden
with ideologically based security approach. From the aspect
of security, this program enables the military to monitor and
control the livelihood and the movement of the people in the
village through non-military measure. From the aspect of
ideology, this builds dependency to the military as the roles
weaken the function and roles of civil government. All of these
ring true in the context of Papua as a conflict area in which
the military is legitimized to secure the “security interest” in
almost all domains in Papua.101
Military Budget Embezzlement in Papua
The domination and extensive role of the military
in Papua open the circle of influence within the political
context and local government. For example through
Regional Consultative Councils (Muspida) and Sub-District
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1614, “Gubernur
Papua Lepas Satgas Manunggal Desa Binaan”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
100
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8060, “November Prajurit TNI di Mimika, Papua Gelar Opster”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
101
Budi Susanto S.J dan Made Tony Supriatna, ABRI; Siasat Kebudayaan 1945-199..,
(Jogjakarta: Kanisius dan Lembaga Studi Realino, 1995).
99
Consultative Councils (Muspika) in which Commanders of
Military Resort Command and Military District Command
and even Military Sub-District Command can be involved
in dealing with various local affairs. Moreover, the level
of authority of the military enables it to enforce its will to
civil government personnel in Papua.
This domination opens up the possibilities for abused
done by the military in Papua. For example was the scope
of budget for the military. Based on Defence Law, budget for
defence sector has to be centralized. In other words, this is the
authority of the central government. Moreover, the military
could not and must not seek for other sources to address
its budget constraint in fulfilling its needs. Yet such thing is
rampant in Papua. One of the forms of budget deviation is
related to the allocation of military budget through Papua
regional budget, even though the post itself was not explicitly
named under the military.
Socratez Sofyan brings up the assumption of the
allocation of Papua regional budget. He stated that the
military personnel unhesitant requested for an allocation
of fund. Commander of Military District Command or Head
of Task Force in Papua for example, came and requested
money to the Head of the District. According to him,
in general the Head of District in Papua gave money to
Commander of Military District Command or Head of Task
Force. Even though they complained, yet they complied out
of fear. In the context of budget report, the budget allocated
for the military was documented under miscellaneous.
102
The most apparent cases is the allocation of regional
budget of Puncak Jaya District to finance the army’s military
operation in the area. 103
Interview with Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Head of Baptist Church Union, 27 January
2011.
103
National Commission on Human Rights “Laporan Tim Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Kekerasan di Puncak Jaya Tahun 2010”.
102
Besides regional budget of a number of districts in
Papua, deviation of budget occurs also on the allocation
of budget for the military through private corporations in
Papua. For example, the budget allocated by PT. Freeport
for the military. Indications on the allocation of budget from
Freeport can be seen from its 2008 Annual Report, in which
PT Freeport declared its payment totalling to US$ 9 million
under “Support Cost” directly to the military and the police
for security operations in the area of the corporation. 104
“Support Cost” includes logistic support, facilities and other
extra costs for the purpose of security operations launched
by the military and the police. 105
In principle, budget allocated by the private sectors such
as PT Freeport was a clear violation of defence budget policy.
Budget allocation has to come from the State and centralized.
Therefore, the fact that the military seeks for opportunities
or to receive budget from any other resources outside the
national budget cannot be justified. Other resources include
regional government from its regional budget and private
sectors. Furthermore, this embezzlement causes problems in
the monitoring mechanism of the military. Budget mechanism
established includes monitoring mechanism on the military.
So when the military seeks for other source of revenue from
outside the national budget, this leads to the opportunities to
put the military as an autonomous and free from the control
from civil political authority.
Furthermore, the fact from Papua regarding military
budget allocation in and outside of the national budget reflect
the dominant security approach in the region considering
military operations require budget availability. The multiple
sources of revenue for the military in Papua are a proof on
the continual dominance and the excessive nature of military
operation in Papua from the past up to the present time.
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/30/govt-slammed-tni-security-payments.
html, “Govt Slammed for TNI Security Payments”, 30 Agustus 2008.
105
http://www.ptfi.com/reports/files/wtsd2006.pdf
104
Continuous Repressive Approach
Even though high rank officials from the military declared
that they are adopting persuasive approach to the people
of Papua, the reality shows that repressive pattern is very
much applied and implemented in every operation done in
Papua. The emergence of the cases of violence and human
rights violation described in the previous chapter is a result
of the tendency of repressive pattern used so far. Repression
is a realization of military dominance at play to support the
existence of military policy. In this situation, violence and
human rights violation are inevitable. It is because they
both go hand in hand with military policy, taking form in the
pattern of repression in the field.
The tendency of this pattern can be inferred from the
type of unit sent to Papua, which was dominated by combatoriented units. For example, Special Forces Corps who quickly
counter-reacts to any movement done by the people of Papua,
apparent in various operations it implemented. In terms of
operation, the people in Papua face the continuity of pattern
of repression. It takes form in various measures. It ranges
from physical assault, arbitrary actions, murder, involuntary
disappearance and intimidation along with other forms of
intimidation. This increases even more in the remote areas.
Based on the cases, it can be seen that there is no
significant changes in the pattern of actions taken by the
military as it continues to put forward repressive approach.
This was affirmed by Forkorus Yaboisembut. According to
him, attitude and behaviour shown by the military are more
or less the same as years before. 106 Similar view is expressed
by Erna Mahuze, member of the Religious Working Group of
Papuan People Assembly, by highlighting that there has been
no changes between approaches used at the moment and
106
Interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Head of Papua Indigenous Council, 22
January 2011.
used 20 (twenty) or 30 (thirty) years ago. The people living
in the villages of Papua remains as objects all these time. 107
The indicators that this approach sustained are the cases
experienced by the people.
The people of Papua complained about the presence of
the military in the daily life. 108 As explained in the above, the
presence was close to the residence. This leads to further
problems. Based on the experience shared by the people,
such close presence generates problems. Many of the people
in Papua tell their fearful versions caused by the treatment of
the military, or their fear of the future consequences following
the excessive action taken by the personnel around them.
This was expressed in a number of focus group discussion
(FGD). One participant for example expressed their fear to
move about because they were afraid to be killed. 109 Many
were afraid and traumatized by house raid. 110 The people
can be assaulted and forced to work for the interest of the
military. 111
Victims of the repressions are poor people. Most of
them are living in a remote area with limited access to
information and communication, and also transportation.
It can be concluded that the military personnel are so
omnipotent and able to do anything to the people. Many
faced repression and their lives in the villages are under
the control of the personnel assigned on the area. One
mother tells how she was always terrorized by intelligence
personnel who come everyday to her house. House raids
were commonly done to search for people considered as
Interview with Erna Mahuze, Member of Religion Task Force of Papua People
Assembly, Wednesday 26 January 2011.
108
For example a participant questioned on why more military personnel are deployed
to Papua. In Papua, military personnel are on the whole are from top to bottom.
They add more troubles here in Papua. FGD result with the people of Arso Kota,
30 January 2011.
109
Ibid.
110
Discussed in an FGD in the people in Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January
2011.
111
107
separatists. They came at night and banged the doors. In
many cases, offices were also raided because they were
suspected of loading the weapons. 112
Outside of the cases mentioned on the above, there
were many cases told by the people, even though some of
them were not published or documented. According to the
residents, of all military elements, the Special Forces Corps
were the strictest. They labelled many as separatists. Based
on the testimonies of the residences, some were arrested by
the personnel even though they were released afterwards.
According to the residences, the personnel silently killed
many, for example they were taken from their houses then
shot dead. 113
In other cases, restriction on the daily life of the people
in the village is also done. They are restricted and forced to
comply with regulations made by the personnel. In Wembi
for example, the people told about a code regulated by the
military. The code takes form in the sound of a gunshot.
If the people do not return to their home after the sound
is heard, nobody is responsible for the wellbeing of the
people. This is the code of the Special Forces Corps. Another
rule is that all people who want to go to their gardens or
anywhere else has to ask for permits from the military post,
day or night. This is the rule of the thumb. Furthermore, the
people are also threatened by the military to stay put on the
rumours that there is a Free Papua Movement personnel
running around. 114
In principles, the close presence of the personnel to
the people and their pattern of behaviour make people
uncomfortable. The presence of the military make the
people of Papua feel that their freedoms are restricted with
continuous monitoring. According to Theo Van den Broek,
the military silences the people. The people of Papua no
Discussed in an FGD in Wokrwana Village, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
112
113
longer have any courage to speak because of the constant
surveillance by the military. Any minor wrongdoings may
lead to physical assaults. The people can be forced to work for
the interests of the military in the area. The head of the subdistrict is powerless. In the remote area, they (the military)
resemblance an autonomous governance. If any of the people
in Papua have opinions that are different from them (the
military), they are immediately regarded as separatists and
can be treated arbitrarily. They could be assaulted and even
murdered. 115
This is faced not only by the common people, but also
by key figures in Papua. The common pattern is that on troop
rotation, there is always a check on local community figures
considered as “red.” 116
Facts and testimonies above proof that claims of changes
to persuasive approach toward the people in Papua in the
context of security policies in the era fails to be realized.
Continuous experience of violence and human rights violations
support this conclusion. Repression is commonly used by the
military personnel to achieve its operation objectives and to
support security policies in Papua.
The Politics of Military Career in Conflict Areas
Assignment to conflict areas including Papua become
an important and crucial milestone for career advancement
in the military. Furthermore, a unit assigned in conflict areas
also reveals specific assignment patterns. This is apparent on
the appointment of a number of territorial senior personnel
positions. This is shown in Papua. This tendency was explained
by Matthew N Davies. In his elaboration, the pattern can be
inferred from the historical background of the assignments
that are similar to each others: assignment to Aceh, Timor
Discussed in an FGD with sectoral groups in Jayapura, 4 February 2011.
115
116
Leste, Ambon and Papua, in which the unit deployed are heavy
on the Army Strategic Reserve Command and Special Forces
Command. 117
Many of the examples show this pattern. Most of the
officers under Cendrawasih Military Area Command have
Special Forces Corps that is traceable from the background
of the Commander of the Military Area Command – Major
General Erfi Triassunu. Similar backgrounds can also be
identified from the previous Commander of the Military Area
Command such as Major General Hotman Marbun, who served
as Commander of Task Force of Maleo in Irian Jaya who is
known as Papua in the 1994.118 Moreover, similar background
can also be traced on the level of Military Resort Command
in Papua. Colonel Infantry Daniel Ambat for example, once
served as Chief of the Military Resort Command 172/PWY.
Furthermore, Davies also argued that assignment posts
in strategic positions in Papua has significant diplomatic
weight to the career of the military officers. In the past, Jhony
Lumintang served as the then Trikora Military Area Command
in Papua (20 August 1996-6 April 1998) and in the next couple
of years he held the position of Chief of Army Strategic Reserve
Command and other posts in the Military Headquarter. This
can also be traced from the historical background of a number
of current military key figures such as Chief of Staff of the
Army General George Toisutta who served as Trikora Chief
of Military Area Command in 2005.
A number of military officers in Papua also served
a number of posts in conflict areas. For example, George
Toissutta, once the Chief of Military Area Command in
Jayapura, previously held the position of Chief of Operation
Coordination (Pangkoops) in Aceh when it was still a military/
civil emergency zone. Moreover, Aznyn Yusri Nasution who
Matthew N. Davies, Op. Cit., p. 19
www.antara-sumbar.com/id/index.php?sumbar=berita&d=0&id=76279, “Mantan
Dan Satgas Maleo jadi Pangdam Cenderawasih”, 18 January 2010, (Accessed 10
March 2011).
117
118
once served the position of Chief of Cendrawasih Military
Area Command (2008-November 2009) also built his career
in Aceh as Chief of Military Resort Command 011 Liliwangsa
Lhokseumawe. The current Chief of Cendrawasih Military
Area Resort, Major General Erfi Triassunu (12 November
2010-now) was also assigned in Aceh in a number of positions
including Chief of Staff of Aceh Iskandar Muda Military Area
Command and so forth.
Human Rights and Their Relationship with Career Promotion
Besides career promotion, those now in strategic positions
in Papua previously hold structural posts in the Army in the
conflict area allegedly involved in human rights violations.
For example is Colonel (Infantry) Heronimus Guru who
currently serves as Commander in Chief of Military Resort
Command 171/PTV Sorong, West Papua. When in Aceh in 1999,
Heronimus Guru was still a Liutenant Colonel with the position
of Commander of Airborne Infantry Battalion 328/Dirgahayu
Army Strategic Reserve Command, Cilodong, West Java. At that
time, Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Heronimus Guru is Field
Commander (Operational Control Commander) appointed by
Colonel (Infantry) Syafnil Armen, Danrem 001/Liliwangsa,
through Telegram No. STR/232/VII/1999, to identify, seek,
approach and arrest figure of Aceh Security Disturbance
Group Teungku Bantaqiah and his supporters.119
On July 23 1999, military personnel with a total number
of 215 personnel led by Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry)
Heronimus Guru and Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Sudjono
as Operation Oversight Commander, shooting and killing
Teungku Bantaqiah with his 56 religious pupils in Dayah
Babul Mukarromah, Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh. In a matter of
one hour, Teungku Bantaqiah and his 56 students were killed
See Otto Syasuddin Ishak, Sang Martir: Teungku Bantaqiah, (Jakarta: Aliansi
Masyarakat Sipil untuk Demokrasi (Yappika), 2003), pp 118-123.
119
by the military gunshots.120 This summary killing against
Teungku Bantaqiah and his students were committed under
Sadar Rencong II operation.121
Ironically, in this connection court, cases were brought to
Banda Aceh State Court in the beginning of 2000 did not put
Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Heronimus Guru as a defendant.
He was merely a witness in this court.122 Even though he is
not a defendant, it was no denial that the involvement of
Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Heronimus Guru in a military
operation resulting violence and human rights violations
causing casualties.
At the moment his assignment as Commander in Chief
Military Resort Command 171/PVT Sorong, West Papua,
the rank as Colonel can be interfered that military officials
serving in conflict area and allegedly involved in human rights
violations tend to get career and rank promotion.
Reflecting on the careers of officers assigned to
conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua, Aceh sociologist Otto
Syamsuddin Ishak involved in the advocacy of the case of
Teungku Bantaqiah murder, SBY regime still appointed Army
officers allegedly involved in human rights violations in Aceh.
For example the murder of
Teungku Bantaqiah, Colonel (Infantry) Heronimus Guru
allegedly involved in the murder of Teungku Bantaqiah in 1999
was promoted to a strategic position in another conflict area
in Papua as Commander in Chief of Military Resort Command.
In this context, violence and human rights violations seemed
to serve as indicators of achievement of personnel in conflict
Ibid.
Ibid. See Kompas, “Sidang Kasus Bantaqiah Diwarnai Protes Mahasiswa”, 20
April 2000; www.tempo.co.id/harian/include/05/652000-205.htm, “Lanjutan
Sidang Koneksitas Aceh; Danrem Liliwangsa Jadi Saksi”, 6 May 2000, (Accessed
13 June 2011).
122
http://m.serambinews.com/news/view/1403/hakim-tolak-semua-eksepsi-pembela,
“Hakim Tolak Semua Eksepsi Pembela; Komandan Operasi Berikan Kesaksian”,
27 April 2000, (Accessed 14 June 2011). See also the verdict from connection
court on this case No. 11/PID.B/KONEKS/2000/PN-BNA.
120
121
areas. This opens the space for perpetual violence and human
rights violations in the conflict areas such as Papua.123
It is also expected that this is a serious obstacle in
Indonesia in the eyes of international community and the
people in Papua, particularly in resolving the problem of
Papua in peace, considering that the actors positioned in
military strategic posts in Papua are allegedly involved in
cases of violence and human rights violations.124
2. Legitimacy and Justification of the Roles of the
Military
From the beginning of integration, resistance or any
other movements voicing dissatisfaction against the central
government remains strong. One of them took the path of
armed resistance. Many terms are used to call such groups.
One of them is Free Papua Movement. The activity of this group
was obvious from the sporadic attacks to a number of targets
in Papua, and therefore it is seen as threat to security and
sovereignty and unity of the State. Yet, an analysis examines
that Free Papua Movement is essentially different than similar
groups in other areas such as Free Aceh Movement in Aceh.
Free Papua Movement is seen to be lacking in strong armed
forces to be able to threat the unity of the State from Papua. Free
Papua Movement does have neither organizational structure
nor single line of command. As a group, it is fragmented into
smaller ethnic- or area-based groups.125 Even though Free
Papua Movement is not a significant threat, why the security
construction in Papua shows that the sovereignty of the State
is under serious threat of separatist groups in Papua? This
is apparent from a number of statements expressed by the
Interview with Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Aceh Sociologist Aceh, 13 June 2011.
Ibid.
125
See: Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Operasi Militer dan Pemilu di Papua. A paper briefly presented as a discussion material on “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh, Papua dan
Poso pada Pemilu 2004” hosted by ProPatria, Hotel Santika, Jakarta, 7 January
2004.
123
124
military regarding the situation and condition in Papua.
In reality, the statements not only reflects certain
paradigm in reading Papua yet it is also a part of the process
to reconstruct public discourses, which regardless of whether
it is denied or confirmed, it plays a political role in legitimating
security policies in Papua and its military involvement.
In the beginning of this chapter, the pattern on how the
existence of security policy in Papua was legitimated. Besides
the path of domination taking form in repressive instruments
in Papua, there is another path of hegemony. The second
pattern takes form in the pool of knowledge and discourse
continuously produced and reproduced to control the mind
and the way public think in a manipulative way. In the context
of Papua, this pattern works by building the foundation for
the pattern of justification but also to accumulate public
support over security policy in Papua. This can be observed
and examined from the statements from the central elites.
Reproduction of the “Threat to Separatism”
The creation of a security institution is in principles to
deal with threat. The military for example has a main role in
dealing with military threat from the outside (external threat).
At this point, the aspect of threat shaped the foundation of
relevance on the presence, function and role taken by security
institution. Based on this logic, the absence of threat is equal
to the reduction of the ‘level of relevance’ on the presence
and role of security institution. Based on this argument, the
need to secure and manage the relevance is done through
reproduction of discourse of “threat to security.” This
framework also applies to the context of the military in its
role in Papua. For example, the military elites simultaneously
issue, affirm and add to the reading of “perception of threat”
in the national level. This is done continuously through the
statements delivered from the institution or its elites.
In the context of the institution, this can be seen from
the publication of “Defence White Paper” by the Department
of Defence, which includes the perception of current threat
potentially faced by Indonesia. The perception of threat is a
construction of various real threats that exist in the society.
One of them is related to the internal security issues that are
relevant to the issue of “threat of separatism” as one of the
aspects included.126 Many perception of threat continue to be
reproduced through various statements expressed by military
officials in the media.
The experience of Papua proofs this. According to
the perception of the central government, the conflict in
Papua is frequently associated with the issue of “threat of
separatism”, the existence of Free Papua Movement or the
threat of sovereignty and unity of the State. Furthermore,
based on the examination of the root of the problem, many of
the statements implied confirmation on the role of the military
in Papua. By working on the issue of security, the presence of
the military is legitimated. This is affirmed by Thaha Alhamid.
For example, he stated that by adjusting and re-adjusting the
tension of condition in Papua by staging chaos, the raising
of the Morning Star flag, Free Papua Movement and raid and
so forth, the State can conclude that security personnel is
highly needed in Papua.127 The facts show that more and more
personnel are deployed, territorial commands are expanded
and the military continues to be involved in the conflict in
Papua.
Furthermore, on the elaboration of perception of threat
in 2011, Commander in Chief Admiral Agus Suhartono jots
down a number of potential threats faced by Indonesia. One
of them is “armed separatist threat” in Papua. For this matter,
the main role of the military is to deal, prevent and take action
against any form of threat and disturbance endangering
See: Department of Defense White Paper titled “Mempertahankan Tanah Air
Memasuki Abad 21”, published by Department of Defense in 2003.
127
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Op.Cit.
126
the livelihood, the honour of the State, the sovereignty and
the unity of the country. Specifically he states the roles
of the military in dealing with separatist movement and
armed uprisings in Papua.128 The previous couple of months,
Admiral Agus Suhartono also listed down eight groups of
potential threats including separatism. In this statement, the
Commander in Chief of the military confirms three tasks of
the military. One of them is to uphold State sovereignty, to
maintain the unity of the country and to protect the nation
and motherland from any threat and disturbance against the
unity of the state and the nation.129
By examining the statements issued by elites in the
military circles, it seems that there is some kind of “preference”
to continue the reproduction of the existence of “threat of
separatism” Papua. In this context, each incidents comprising
of social political tension are oftentimes bear significant
correlation with facts and evidence gathered on the serious
threat of separatism. Such conclusion continues to resurface
in various media.
For example, the statement of former Commander in
Chief General Djoko Santoso i responding to the raising of
Morning Star flag. It is stated that the flag raising justifies and
proofs the existence of separatist activities in Papua.130 Similar
notion is apparent in the statement of former Commander in
Chief Marshal Joke Squanto. In the speech delivered in an
event in Military Sea Traffic Command Headquarter (Marko
Kolinlamil), in 2007. In this statement, the Commander in
www.harianpelita.com/read/14377/10/derap-tni_polri/panglima-tni--gerakanseparatis-bersenjata-masih-akan-terjadi/, “PanglimaTNI: Gerakan Separatis
Bersenjata Masih Akan Terjadi”, 20 January 2011, (Accessed 27 April 2011)
129
http://kominfonewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=708:panglima-tni-ada-delapan-kelompok-ancaman-keamanan&catid=36:nasional-khusus&Itemid=54, “Panglima TNI: Ada Delapan Kelompok Ancaman
Keamanan”, 5 October 2010, (Accessed 27 April 20011)
130
www.papuapos.com/index.php/index-berita/components/com_comment/joscomment/images/templates/ww/css/index.php?option=com _content&task=view&id
=1441&Itemid=0, “Kegiatan Separatisme Masih Ada di Papua”, 13 August 2008,
(Accessed 21 April 2011).
128
Chief highlighted “threat of separatism” in a number of areas
against national integrity. 131 On a separate occasion, on the
official handover of the position of Rapid Deployment Force
Troop Command (Komando Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat/
PRRC) in Abdul Saleh Malah Airstrip, he also took the issue of
threat of separatism by stating that “Recent armed separatist
elements in Papua has to be monitored, especially since it had
taken lives from the security personnel circle.” 132
Besides Commander in Chief, there are many other
military elites who are involved in sustaining the construction
of security of security actor perception. Unfortunately, civil
elites also show similar tendency, by adopting perception
and point of view similar with security actors in reading and
evaluating the situation of security and conflict in Papua. For
example, statements issued by Minister of Defence who also
reveals similar perspective (separatist conflict paradigm)
and furthermore, he even strengthened the security defence
discourse in Papua based on security actor perspective. Civil
elites in this context were trapped in the pattern of Papua
security condition shaped through such discourse which
ends and results in the legitimacy of security policies, the
presence and the roles of the military in Papua for the sake of
eradicating threat of security from Papua separatists. 133
The question is, how to draw an association between
those statements with security policies and military
involvement in the conflict of Papua? Every time “threat
“Panglima TNI: Separatisme Ancaman Persatuan dan Kesatuan Bangsa”, [Accessed 03 Mei 2001]
132
http://berita.kapanlagi.com/politik/nasional/panglima-tni-waspadai-elemenseparatis-bersenjata-di-papua-65trre7.html, “Panglima TNI: Waspadai Elemen
Separatis Bersenjata di Papua”, (Accessed 17 April 2011).
133
An example is the statement of former Minister of Defense (late) Matori Abdul
Djalil in front of the members of the House of Representatives on the increasing
intensity of separatist movements in Papua after Timor Leste from Indonesia. Key
figures of Free Papua Movement were inspired by the struggle of independence
of Timor Leste. This boosted the confidence of Free Papua Movement that their
struggle to be free from Indonesia was not just a dream.
131
of security and separatism” especially in Papua is brought
up, that very same time, tasks and roles of the military
are confirmed. This is obvious from a series of statements
expressed by Commander in Chief regarding the threat to
security especially on the threat of separatism in Papua.
For example, repeated statements on the function and role
of the military as “an instrument to maintain the unity or
integrity of the State.” When issues on threat of separatism
emerge, logically, such issues would relate to the issues
of “sovereignty” or integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.
When it is about sovereignty, the military feels that it has
to be involved in it in conflict resolution in Papua.
The Construction of the Military as “The Messiah”
Furthermore, besides external dynamic that translates
into the definition of threat, the effort to involve the military
in the context of conflict resolution in Papua is also pushed
by the internal dynamic of the military. This is related to the
issue on the influence of doctrine and identify of the military
that puts it as an entity to be involved in all State affairs.
This is a reminder of the politics of military roles
during the New Order. Even though officially, Dual Function
(Dwifungsi) no longer applies, yet the characteristics remain.
Up until now, for example, within the military, the tendency
to hold an ideology known as “white man’s burden” or the
holy mission of the Caucasians to colonize the whole world to
bring civilization and to provide examples of the real culture
by promoting a type of life believed to be more dignified.
Sparringga explained that this white man’s burden is similar
to the “sacred mission” of the military especially the Army to
save the nation, the country and the people of Indonesia from
cultural, spiritual and mental challenges in general. 134
134
Daniel Sparringa, Politik Militer Indonesia dan Kolonialisme Internal. in: Anas
S. Machfudz dan Jaleswari Pramodhawardani. 2001. Military Without Militerism.
Jakarta: PKK LIPI, p.140.
This tendency is apparent in each statements delivered
by military elites. This rings true especially in relation with
Papua. The military often defines itself as the salvation or
“the messiah” with holy and sacred mission of maintaining
the unity and sovereignty of the State on their shoulders.
A number of statements from the Commander in Chief on
the role and task of the military confirm this tencendy. The
military feels that it should be involved in the conflict in Papua
because in its perception, the threat on Papua is integrative to
the sovereignty of the country under treat by separatism.
Not only the statements from the military elites, the
construction of the military as the carrier of the roles and
tasks of a “messiah” is also obvious from the interpretation
of the new military doctrine, Tri Dharma Eka Karma which is
a substitute from Catur Dharma Eka Karma. Even though the
change of doctrine is due to public demand in the beginning
of the reform era, yet it keeps the “white man’s burden” within
the ideology. It continues to push the military to be constantly
involved in all State and national affairs.
Basic problems in this doctrine is that it does not separate
values and virtues. It is obvious from the inclusion of values
of the State, such as attempts to “uphold the sovereignty of
the State, maintain the unity of the country and to protect the
whole nation and motherland from any threat and disturbance
against the unity of the nation and the State” as part of the
military doctrine. According to both old and new doctrines,
this value should be upheld not only by the military but also
by all elements of the nation. Therefore, it should not be part
of the doctrine. If this is included in the doctrine, it may lead
to distortion between values and virtue, moreover it opens up
interpretation leading to erroneous belief that all problems
in this nation is military problems that should be solved with
the military way that prioritizes coercive approach. 135
135
Al Araf and Willy Aditya, Transformasi Nilai TNI. Bulletin Sadar 243 Tahun V2009.
This doctrine is used as the foundation for the military
to interpret all problems faced by this nation in accordance
to the doctrine regarding sovereignty and integrity of the
country, leading to the justification and legitimacy to get
involved. Based on this doctrine, the military sees the problem
on Papua as the threat of State sovereignty, then the security
policy and integrity of the State is justified.
The urge of the military to be involved is not restricted
to conflicts that are vertical in nature. Based on the statement
issued by General Ryamizard Ryacudu as stated above, it
also aims to be constantly involved in dealing with conflicts
in Papua due to limited capabilities and numbers of police
officers available in Papua.
C. Recurring Violence and Human Rights Violations
Based on the previous elaboration (Chapter IV) on human
rights situation during the security policy implemented in
Papua before and after the reform, it is shown that there
has been a long history of human rights violations in Papua.
In other words, there are many cases involving security
personnel particularly the military. Many cases of human
rights violations happen before the reform area, and many
others afterward. The fact shows that violence and human
rights violations continue to grow. Conflicts in Papua and
other areas are spreading in the fertile ground for violence
and human rights violations. Human rights violations and
violence in the reform era in Papua occur before and after
special autonomy status. It can be concluded that special
autonomy status does not have any positive contribution to
improve human rights situation in Papua.
In general, human rights in Papua remains in poor
condition, especially regarding a number of rights such as
freedom of expression and restriction and prohibition to
foreigners. Restrictions also vary greatly. As explained in
Chapter 4, violations comprise of restriction on freedom of
assembly and opinion, intimidation and violence toward civil
society, torture, arbitrary arrest, murder, sexual violence until
confiscation of belongings. Another problem is that law is not
enforced on human rights violations, leading to impunity to
perpetrators of human rights violations.
Rampant human rights violations are strongly confirmed
by Papua community figures. Head of Papua People Assembly
(Majelis Rakyat Papua/MRP) for example, states even though
they happen in lesser frequency and sporadically, human
rights are commonly happened in Papua. 136 Theo Van den
Broek affirmed this. From his point of view, in terms of human
rights violations, regardless of the statement expressed by
the government, there is no change compared to the previous
era. 137 Meanwhile, in terms of actors and violations, Papua
representative Matius Murib from National Commission of
Human Rights stated that most of the perpetrators are police
and the military. Violations committed varied. It ranged from
torture to murder. 138
Human rights situation in Papua reflects an irony. It is
because these series of violence and human rights violations
occur in the reform era, in the middle of orchestrated efforts
to improve human rights conditions. We can take note on a
number of positive achievements in improving human rights
particularly on its normative guarantees. It covers from the
Constitution and ratification of human rights instruments.
Yet according to the situation in Papua, it is clear that these
normative guarantees do not correlate positively with the
implementation on the field. Human rights in this area
remain in poor condition because violence and human rights
violations remain in this area. For the sake of guaranteeing
Interview with Agus Alue Alua Head of Papua People Assembly, 20 January
2011.
137
Interview with Theo Van den Broek. Papua People Figure, 28 January 2011.
138
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Head of National Commission of Human
Rights Papua Representatives, Wednesday, 19 January 2011.
136
“State security” and “State sovereignty”, the personnel
became trigger-happy. Worse, this was blatantly ignored
and confirmed.
Furthermore, violence and human rights violations in
Papua did not occur in a vacuum. In other words, it happened
in a situational context that correlates with a number of
motives as its factors. In the context of Papua, violence and
human rights violations were integrative to the context of
security policy implemented and enforced in dealing with
conflict in this area. This policy implemented in a militaristic
way would stand vis-a-vis with violence and human rights
violations. In other words, when security approach is adopted
in dealing with conflict and in any differences arose between
the government and the people, then the potentials for
violence and human rights violations remain.
On a number of cases related to violence and human
rights violations committed by military personnel, it can
be seen in the previous chapter. Yet, these cases were only
fractures of the reality as other were hidden from the eyes of
the public or from the publication of the media. It is because
when the life of the people in Papua since the integration
was investigated, more and more cases would surface. This
was especially true in the remote areas. Many of the people’s
testimonies gathered in this research reveal this trend.
In many of the prominent cases involving public’s
concerns inside and outside Papua, the murder of Papua
figure, Theys Eluay, the head of Papua Council Presidium in
2001. It is known that the murder of this Papua figure involved
a number of military personnel from Special Forces Corps
brought to the court and were sentenced as guilty. Another
case was torture in Puncak Jaya committed by the military.
This case is published in You Tube video and attracted the
attention of the public from inside and outside Papua. 140 Of
course in both cases, there were many other violence and
human rights violations. Moreover, many remains uncovered
or unpublicized. 141
139
1. The Context of Violence and Human Rights Violations
Violence and human rights violations do not happen in
a vacuum. It involves more than two parties of perpetrators
and victims. These cases have their space and context in which
these violations happen. In Papua, this is related to conflict
and security approach pattern used in conflict resolution.
Violence and human rights violations committed by security
personnel in Papua have to be read in this framework. In
other words, when a military personnel commits violence and
human rights violations, for example, he directly or indirectly
correlates with the sustainability and the practice of security
policy in Papua.
Through the implementation of security approach, in
reality Papua is under the control of this policy. This applies
in the deployment of military personnel. Their presence and
activities in Papua are integrated with conflict resolution
efforts in Papua under this approach. They set up security
posts in a number of locations, and launched a number of
Latifah Anum Siregar, Director Alliance for Democracy Papua, stated that torture
was experienced not only by the separatists but also by the villagers. This has been
going on for a long time. See http://fokus.vivanews.com/news/read/183918--videokekerasan-papua-tak-mengejutkan-, “Video Kekerasan Papua Tak Mengejutkan”,
20 October 2010, (Accessed 2 May 2011).
140
Details on both cases are available in Chapter IV.
141
Based on the statement from National Commission of Human Rights in Papua,
human rights violations in Papua in 2010 rised for about 70% compared to the
previous year. On the cases of violence, it typically occurs in the mountainous
area such as Puncak Jaya. Dominant actors are security personnel. Okezone.com,
Komnas HAM: Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Naik 70%, 7 Desember 2010. [Online]
Available at: http://news.okezone.com/read/ 2010/12/07/340/400834/komnasham-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-naik-70 [Accessed 29 April 2011)
139
operations as part of it. These operations are done even when
they were not under official assignments. It is because the
fact is they were deployed and their presence are under the
umbrella of security policy. Using this logic, what they were
doing and their influence and impact in Papua indirectly and
indirectly, is integrated to the security policy approach used
in conflict resolution in Papua.
A number of cases can speak volume about this. For
example, the murder of Thyes by the Special Forces Corps,
violence nearby security posts and villages and a number
of other locations such as torture in Puncak Jaya and so
on – all of these happen within the context of the central
administration dealing with “separatist conflicts.” This
should be considered even though some of the violent acts
were committed beyond the scope of official operation
control. Some of the cases indicated that similar patterns of
violence can be found in domestic sectors. This means that
domestic violence shown in those cases cannot be detached
from the impact or influence of the implementation of
security policy. For example, in domestic violence in which
women often suffer ‘multiple’ victimization. 142 In other
words, in a number of cases in which women in Papua
suffer as victims, there is a correlation between violence
in public and private domain. 143
2. Violence and Human Rights Violations as
Intimidation on Daily Basis
Based on testimonies from local communities gathered
The case of domestic violence is apparent in the cases of women who were victims
of sexual violence committed by military personnel, leading to the women victims
to be left alone by the husbands. Interview with Sylvana from Komnas Perempuan
(11 April 2011)
143
For further information regarding the cases of violence against women and how it
corelates in the violence in public domain, see research result Komnas Perempuan
berjudul, Stop Sudah! Kesaksian Perepmpuan Papua Korban Kekerasan dan
Pelanggaran HAM 1963-2009. 2009-2010 Documentation.
142
from the field, violence and human rights violations become
problems that potentially happen to all people in Papua on
daily basis. In other words, the potential of becoming victims
is wide open. This rings true particularly to the people in
Papua living in remote areas. The potential for this is also
wide open. This relates not only to civil and political rights
but also on economic, social and cultural rights. The type of
violations varies widely. Examples are domestic violence,
murder, torture, intimidation and confiscation of land and
goods belonging to the community. Yet because not all cases
are publicized, it can be assumed that the number of cases
increases. Some of the prominent cases can be observed from
the previous elaboration (See Chapter IV)
The fact above refers to testimony from the field.
This is gathered from the people and figures from the
community in the grass root. This correlates with the
presence of military personnel in the community where
the people live and stay. Recognized or not, their presence
is part of the security policy implementation in Papua. For
example, the establishment of security post in the middle
of the village or stretched throughout the main streets, and
so on. Their presence and activities created unsafe climate
leaving the people feeling intimidated. This fear is not
without reasons. Based on the narrative told by the people,
it was clear how military personnel acted repressively
around security posts or communities. It is because their
presence triggers the opposite of security. For the people
in Papua, when the security (military) personnel came to
their life, they interpreted it as lack of security.
Theo van den Broek explained how the military could
do anything. 144 They controlled the life of the people in the
villages. Military control over the life of the people in the
village is high. For example, the obligation for the people to
report to military posts every time they went to the garden.
144
Interview with Theo van den Broek, Papua People Figure, 28 January 2011.
Also, the regulation obliges the people in the village to be
home at certain hour. 146 Some of the cases in the border are
related to their control over indigenous owned land by the
military to set up headquarters or military posts. As a result,
conflicts between the military and the people often happen.
147
Moreover, the people also tell a story on how the military
personnel act arbitrarily. Examples include confiscation,
violence and so forth. For women in Papua for example, they
too become victims of sexual violence.
145
3. Personalization, Proseduralization, and the
“Justification” of Violence
By referfing to the abovementioned context, it can be said
that violence and human rights violation in Papua in various
forms could not be separated from the context of military
security to be implemented in Papua. Problems from security
policy now open up the space and push for more and more
violence and human rights violations.
Furthermore, there has been two perspectives in looking
at cases of violence by military personnel in Papua. The first
perspective tends to look at those cases not as human rights
violations. This is mainly represented by the State. The second
perspective represents civil society groups especially Non
Government Organizations, which see it more as human rights
violations. Muridan expressed these differences in responding
to cases of torture in Puncak Jaya. On his perspective, there
are two interpretations on State violence. On one side, Jakarta
sees this within the context of defending the unity of the State.
This represents the package of this problem. Therefore, the
military sees this as a justification because this is their duty.
Based on the evaluation of Muridan, Commander in Chief of
FGD with the people of Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
Ibid
147
Interview with Erna Mahuze, Member of Religion Task Force, 26 January
2011.
145
146
the military did not even comment on the case of the video
of torture committed by the military personnel, implying
that such action is justified as the normal part of operation
practise. Meanwhile, a different perspective is used to see
such behaviour as human rights violations. 148
Since security policy is applied in Papua, violence and
violations of human rights happen rampantly. Yet, State
perspective ignores such fact as human rights violation. This
can be concluded from the statements expressed by officials
from the central administration especially from military
institutions.
Based on those statements, it is clear that there have been
attempts of personalization of the cases of violence done by
military personnel in Papua. It means, violence committed is
often constructed as the consequences of individual mistakes
and bears no correlation with security policy. Various excuses
expressed to comment on internal investigation, such as the
perpetrator violated procedures, went beyond his authority,
committed a disciplinary violation and so forth. Hence the
term ‘alleged personnel’ is used. A closer look on this example
confirmed this, for example the case of torture in Puncak
Jaya. This can be viewed from the response of Commander
in Chief Marshall Agus Suhartono who declared that action
taken by those personnel could not be categorized as gross
human rights violations. From his point of view, this is a mere
violation of authority. 149 Such tendency can be infer from
the statement of Commander of Military Area Command
Cendrawasih Major General Erfi Triassunu. Although he saw
this as a violation of law, yet from his statement, it can be
inferred that it was seen as mere violation of procedure. 150
Similar stance was taken by another officials from the
Interview with Muridan S Widjojo, LIPI researcher, 12 January 2011
www.detiknews.com/read/2010/12/31/154918/1536954/10/panglima-tni-itubukan-pelanggaran-ham-berat, “Panglima TNI: Itu Bukan Pelanggaran HAM
Berat”, 31 December 2010, (Accessed 22 March 2011).
150
148
149
military headquarter, such as Inspector General Lieutenant
General M. Moer Muis, declaring that the case of violence
committed by military personnel to Papua civilians taped
and distributed through the Internet. This was a violation of
order that went beyond proper limitation. It was expressed as
“a violation of order upon activities of prisoner interrogation
that was committed beyond proper limitation.“ The violation
of order is used to refer to actions such as hitting, kicking
and inappropriate action. 151 Yet these statements expressed
by military officials were different compared to results
documented from Monitoring and Investigation Team set
up by National Commission of Human Rights concluding
that there has been a violation of human rights in the case
of torture in Puncak Jaya. Furthermore, besides Puncak Jaya
case, there are many other proofs of personalization on the
attempt to define it as human rights violations.
Response from the central elites of the military showed
that there has been tendency of justification, or at the very
least, permissive attitude. Situational contexts on the field
were used as excuses. 152 The most negative stance was
justification on violent action taken by the personnel. An
example is the statement of former Army Chief of Staff General
(Retired) Ryamizard Ryacudu, who considered the actor of
Theys murder as heroes carrying out the duty of safeguarding
the unity of the State, regardless of the casualties. This shows
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/hukum/2011/01/02/brk,20110102-303111,id.html,
“TNI Anggap Kekerasan di Papua Bukan Pelanggaran HAM”, 2 January 2011,
152
An example is the statement of Commander in Chief Admiral Agus Suhartono
responding to the case of torture by the military in Puncak Jaya. He states that
“It should be taken into account that, unlike Jakarta, the situation there is horrific. There is no instruction from any superior officers on torture. It can not be
categorized as gross human rights violation. It was a mere violation to authority mandated by their superior officers.” Rakyat Merdeka.com, Panglima TNI:
Penyiksaan Warga di Papua Bukan Pelanggaran HAM Berat, 01 January 2011.
[Online] Available at: http://www.rakyatmerdekaonline.com/news.php?id=13646
http://www.rakyatmerdekaonline.com/news.php?id=13646 [Accessed on 03 May
2011].
151
incoherence of values. Values that should be upheld and
prioritized by military personnel such are humanitarian
values, human rights and so forth are marginalized or ignored
for the sake of the “holy mission” of safeguarding the unity
and sovereignty of the country in Papua.
4. Expansion of Target (Victim) of Violence by the
Personnel
Furthermore, an in-depth examination on the aspect
of the victims in the cases of violence and human rights
violations committed by military personnel in Papua, it is
clear that they comprise of various background. Victims
include political figures, religious leaders, common people,
journalist to ordinary people. The fact showing diverse
background of the victims confirms that repressive action
taken by military personnel in Papua knows no boundary.
It means that this action can happen to anyone in Papua.
Human rights defenders guaranteed by international and
national laws to carry out their activities are also targeted by
the military. This also applies to religious figures who were
victimized and intimidated with violence and threat.
How to read the expansion of victims of violence and
human rights violations in Papua? The central authority
from the very beginning has been engulfed with “separatist
prejudice” and adopted suspicious mind in looking at the
people in Papua. Lately, the attention of the central authority
on threat of separatism is not directed to armed groups
only, but they also eye on unarmed groups. Based on the
analysis of the central authority, the separatist groups have
changed their approach. They no longer take the armed route
but also through political one. For example, this is done by
using national and local issues in Papua. Prejudice-ridden
perspective leads to numerous problems. It is because the
central authority since the beginning was full of prejudice,
applied to various issues on the condition of Papua to surface.
The issues of human rights were often suspected as the
extension of separatist interests. 153
These various interests can be inferred from the statements
of a number of elites in the central authority, including the
military. This suspicion is apparent. Lately, National Search
and Rescue Agency Major General (Marine) Nono Sampono
discussed the modus operandi of separatist movement in
Indonesia in one of the meetings in Cilangkap Headquarter.
He said that “control over a certain area nowadays no longer
relies on military invasion such as in Iraq, but through social
and political conditions of a country.” Free Papua Movement
in Papua, he states, now used national issues. This is done
by putting forward the issues of social and political gaps
in Papua.154 This suspicion was also elaborated by former
Commander in Chief Marshall (Retired) Djoko Suyanto. 155
The impact of the expansion of surveillance is apparent.
Focus and attention of the central administration are not
only directed toward armed resistance group but it was also
extended religious, social and political activists and groups.
Because of their prejudice and suspicion, surveillance was
applied onto them. They are monitored, threaten and so forth.
Examples include religious and community figures up to nongovernment activists. Head of Strategic Intelligence Agency
Syafniel Armen categorized Elsham Papua as extremists to
be taken into serious consideration for disturbing the unity
of the State. In the implementation, surveillance was carried
out by security personnel.
An example is what happen to an NGO Elsham Papua accused as part of PDP
network regarding its research report on alleged involvement of Special Forces
Command in the shooting in Timika in the end of August 2002. Koran Tempo,
TNI Tuding Elsham Jaringan PDP, 28 September 2002.
154
http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/200129-tni--modus-gerakan-separatisberubah, “TNI: Modus Gerakan Separatis Berubah”, 19 January 2011 (27 April
2011).
155
www.indosiar.com/fokus/50367/panglima-tni-minta-dpr-dan-pemerintah-waspadai-separatis-papua, “Panglima TNI Minta DPR dan Pemerintah Waspadai Separatis Papua”, [Accessed 30 April 2011].
153
D. Causal Factors of Rampant Human Rights Violations
The question is why violence and human rights violations
are rampant in Papua? There are many factors. As discussed
in the previous part, violence and human rights violations
happen in the context of sustained security policy adopting
repressive approach in dealing with problems in Papua. It is
because the logic at work behind all of these is that military
personnel operate as instruments of conflict handling in
Papua. Once repressive approach is used, it is inevitable that
this implied to the potentials of violence to the community.
Security policy provides the context and space for violence
and human rights violations.
Based on previous elaboration, the problem of
stagnation of the central authority in the paradigm of
separatist conflicts has designed the mindset of State
actors. Not only to its elites, this also spreads to the lower
level up to the personnel on the field. For the personnel,
this paradigm triggers “separatist prejudice” which at the
end influenced the attitude and conduct toward the people
of Papua. This leads to constant suspicious and lack of
trust. The people in Papua were suspected as separatists,
dangerous and enemy of the State. This leads to fertile
ground for violence and human rights violations.
Suspicion breeds from the condition of being
intimidated. In Papua, this leads to the place where violence,
intimidation and marginalization grow. The string of
human rights violations in Papua is a reflection of the State
who constantly feel under threat by its shadows from the
wicked past. To deal with the feeling of intimidation, State
personnel from the central to the local levels act beyond
reason and full of suspicion against the people in Papua.
The attempts to support and add more personnel were
done on the reasons of security the unity and sovereignty
of the State. This can be seen as attempts to grow fear on
the party suspected as enemy. Human rights violations in
Papua always intersect with the objectives of securing the
sovereignty borders. The State constantly in fear for its
sovereignty to be under threat is highly likely to succumb
to the cycle of fear and human rights violations. 156
Furthermore, by looking at the tendency of justification
and permissiveness toward violence and human rights
violations, it can be concluded that there is an incoherence of
values. Military officials states that at the moment, it produces
a human rights guide booklet to be used as reference to
military personnel on the field. 157 Yet, observation on their
attitude and conduct of the military personnel and the stance
taken by their elites on human rights, it is clear that there are
problems in the attempt to internalize those values.
Violence committed by security personnel is also related
to the unfinished transformation of State values into the
entity called the military. The values of the State based on
the law, civil supremacy and human rights stipulated in the
Constitution are not fully transformed into State values to be
as the first priority to be respected and implemented by the
military in carrying out its main tasks. The military personnel
are more afraid to the instructions from their superiors rather
than from the State values. This results in the obedience on the
superior’s orders even in assignments that clearly at conflict
with State values resulting in human rights violations. The
military personnel could not differentiate or do not even care
Amirudin al Rahab, Papua, HAM, dan Negara yang Merasa Terancam. Online]
Available at: http://cetak.kompas. com/read/xml/2009/12/17/03165267/papua.
ham.dan.negara.y [Accessed 29 April 2011].
157
An example is the statement by staff of Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih that the
personnel are equipped with a pocket booklet on humanitarian law and human
rights. This is seen as significant as there is no human rights violations committed
by any personnel. The booklet is a self-reading reference for the personnel and
endorsd by their commanding officers through official instruction letters. Moreover, personnel take part in pre-assignment orientation in their basis, in which
they receive introduction on social, cultural, religion, and community context of
Papua. Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih. Op.Cit
156
to differentiate between the values stipulated in Pancasila
and the Constitution or the virtue stipulated in the military
doctrine, military identity, seven pledges and soldier’s oath to
know which one should be respected and upheld. 158
This can be inferred from the statement of the Army Chief
of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu in responding to the guilty
verdict from the judges on four personnel from Special Forces
Corps as defendants of the case of murder of Thyes Hiyo Eluay
(Papua Council Presidium). He states that: “For me, they are
heroes because the murdered is a rebel, or a leader of the
rebels.” 159 “The law may see them as guilty. Fine, they were
sentenced, but for me they are heroes.” 160 This statement is
an irony. For the sake of safeguarding the sovereignty of the
State, values they should upheld such as humanity and human
rights are ignored. Permissiveness is shown by the current
Commander in Chief of the military Admiral Agus Suhartono
on the torture in Puncak Jaya. He stated that “What needs to
be understood is that the situation was different from Jakarta,
it was under constant threat. There is no instruction from the
superior officer to commit torture. This cannot be categorized
as gross human rights violations. This is a mere violation of
authority granted by their superiors.” 161
Furthermore, the repetition of violence and human rights
violations in Papua is caused by the following factors:
1. Stagnant Military Reform
Al Araf and Willy Aditya, ”Transformasi Nilai TNI, Buletin Sadar, (Ed. 243, Tahun
V, 2009).
159
Pontianak Post, “Ryamizard: Pembunuh Theys Pahlawan”, Thursday, 24 April
2003.
160
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2003/04/23/brk,20030423-43,id.html,
“Jenderal Ryamizard: Pembunuh Theys Hiyo Eluay adalah Pahlawan”, 23 April
2003 Accessed 19 April 2011.
161
www.rakyatmerdekaonline.com/news.php?id=13646, “Panglima TNI: Penyiksaan
Warga di Papua Bukan Pelanggaran HAM Berat”, 1 January 2011, (Accessed 3
May 2011).
158
Military reform is one of the agenda included in the
process toward democracy and respect for human rights.
Military reform aims to build professional organization and
personnel of the military in accordance to its functional
scope in the field of defence. Military reform is expected to
shape the political culture and tendency and violence from
the past attached into the identity of the organization and the
personnel of the military.
Even though military reform has resulted in positive
achievements, yet the major issues in the agenda of military
reform remain unfinished. Stagnant reform in the military directly
or indirectly leads to the repetition of violence committed by the
military in Indonesia, particularly in Papua.
Many issues remained unsolved is the restructuring of
territorial command stipulated in Article 11 of Law No. 34/2004
on TNI. Instead of committing to restructuring, the government
maintained and even strengthened the territorial command
structure especially in Papua. On March 22 2005, Army Chief
of Staff Lieutenant General Djoko Santoso stated in front of
the members of Commission 1 of the House of Representative
that the Army would add 22 territorial command headquarters
comprising of 3 Military Resort Command Headquarters and
19 Military District Command Headquarters. The plan for this
addition is based on the consideration that the military is not
equipped to implement island country defence pattern to be
prepared for conventional war, leading to the reliance of the
mainland as its defence strategy.
The discussion of military court amendment draft law
as an attempt to reform the military also remains stagnant.
A tough debate between the House of Representative
and the government happens, especially Department of
Defence. There are two crucial points on debate: First, in
relation to the jurisdiction of military court in which this
draft stated that military personnel committing general
crime is to be brought to general court and military crime
to be brought to military court. Second, the demand from
the government so the House of Representative should
prioritize the House of Representative the revision of
regulations on material law such military penal code rather
than discussing on military judicial institutions.
As the military reform remains stagnant, this implies to the
problems of the military in Papua, especially in relation to the
problem of human rights violations. As reform of military court
remains also unfinished, impunity also remains on military
personnel and the ongoing military violence in Papua.
Moreover, there has been no regulation on assisting
task, which remains as problems in the involvement of the
military in Papua. Often time, one sided interpretation on
non war military operation in dealing with conflict creates
an impression of urgency in spite of the fact that they
are not needed, leading to human rights violations. This
creates certain complexity on the process of operation
accountability
2. Inconsistent Special Autonomy
One way of democratic resolution promised by the
central administration in the beginning of reformation is
the granting of autonomy. This is implemented in Special
Autonomy status legalized with Law No 21/ 2001. It is
about time to put all policies on Papua within the Special
Autonomy status.
Yet in 2003, the government enforced the policy of
dividing the province of Papua into three new provinces
of Papua, West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya. The policy
itself was decided before Special Autonomy status, based
on Law No 45/1999 through Presidential Instruction No
21/2003. Law No 45/1999 was no longer relevant with Law
No 21/2001. Based on Law No 21/2001, the division of the
province of Papua should be agreed by Papua People Council
and Papua House of Representative by considering social cultural
unity.
In general, special autonomy accommodates a number of
demands from the people in Papua, including areal autonomy,
fiscal and the establishment of Papua People Assembly. Special
Autonomy, according to Rodd Mc Gibbon162 shows that Jakarta
adopted different strategies in dealing with the issue of Papua.
Special autonomy explicitly marked the recognition of Papuan
ethnic political identity in the form of law. Furthermore,
this also represents in the establishment of ethnic-based
institutions of Papua People Assembly. This indicates that
the government displayed good intention to accommodate
the need of the people in Papua.
In the normative level however, Special Autonomy has
a number of weaknesses. Jacques Bertrand noted the main
weakness – on no guarantee in the implementation of
Special Autonomy to be free from any inference. 163 Another
weakness is that Special Autonomy is packed with ambiguous
provisions stipulated on Law No 21 of 2001 with no specific
division of roles between Papua House of Representative
and Papua People Assembly, with dualism on governor
position – extension of the central administration and
leader of Papua – which on certain level puts the governor
in a difficult position, no ‘decentralization’ of authority in
security affairs and Special Autonomy still refer to the 1945
Constitution implying that its implementation should be
in accordance to other laws or it is a breach of the unity of
the State.
This explanation is summarized from Rodd McGibbon. 2004. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?. East-West Center
Washington. www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS010.pdf (accessed
12 Februari 2011)
163
Jacques Bertrand. Papuan and Indonesian nationalisms: Can they be reconciled?
In Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed). Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua,
Indonesia. RSC Working Paper No. 42 September 2007. University of Oxford.
UKhttp://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/RSCworkingpaper42.pdf (accessed 12 Februari
2011)
162
From the perspective of the key figures in Papua
or in government, Special Autonomy is positioned as to
compromise a number of conflicting positions, leading to
numerous weaknesses in conceptual and implementation
levels. Yaboisembut stated that Special Autonomy does
not fit with the background of struggle of the people
in Papua especially in protecting the population of the
people of Papua. 164 Theo Van Den Broek also sees Special
Autonomy as a compromised solution yet it is violated by
the government itself by dividing the province without
any consultation with the governor. 165 Regardless of
the conceptual weakness of Special Autonomy, many
see Special Autonomy as a solution. Aroby for example
views good implementation of Special Autonomy will rehumanize the people in Papua.
On the other hand, the government also sees Special
Autonomy as a compromise. Head of Papua Problems
Handling Desk (Desk Penyelesaian Masalah Papua/DPMP),
Karseno stated that Special Autonomy is a compromise
between the demand for independence resonated in the
beginning of reform era together with East Timor and
Aceh and the attempt to safeguard the unity of the State.
At that time, a national dialog between Jakarta and Papua
was implemented from 1999 to 2009 during Habibie
administration. This dialog results in Special Autonomy.
The compromise is seen to accommodate all aspirations
and interests. Yet in the implementation, some considered it
as failures, leading to the attempt to return to the previous
status. The implementation of Special Autonomy supported
with almost 21 Trillion of fund results in yet a very slow
development. Poverty is rampant. Therefore it is necessary
to enact Presidential Instruction No 5/2007, yet it cannot
be implemented. This Presidential Instruction focuses on
Interview with Forkorus Yoboisembut, Head of Papua Traditional Concil, 22
January 2011.
165
Interview with Theo Van Den Broek, Papua People Figure, 28 January 2011
164
Special Autonomy on 5 (five) issues of poverty, food, health,
education and infrastructure. 166
The failure due to inconsistent implementation of Special
Autonomy results in the problems of fulfilling the economic
and social rights of the people in Papua covering the right to
education, to health and other rights.
3. Lack of Transparency and Monitoring on Security
Personnel
Based on the framework of democratic State, the highest
authority to decide on policies and operation of the security is
civil supremacy, in this case the President. To maintain control
and to ensure objectives achieved, an institutional monitoring
required the authority of the House of Representatives. Yet, in
the framework of democratic State, the authority of the House
of Representatives do not erase the public’s right to find out
and to monitor security policies and their implementation.
This mechanism requires public’s right to open access
to information. The public has the right to find out security
policies, including particular areas such as Papua, and how
those policies are implemented. In the context of Papua,
the public has the right to find out that their policies are
implemented, operations launched, troops deployed and
sources of fund and use of budget. Through freedom of
information and monitoring, policy or its implementation
prone to violate human rights can be prevented.
The policy regarding Papua is very closed. The
Government through the military and Department of Defence
never formally announce any form or type of security policy
implemented in Papua. Furthermore, the number of troops
deployed to Papua and the in and out movement of troops
remains secrets as well.
166
As a result, the House of Representatives and the public
can not exert control over policy and its implementation.
This is marked with weak function of control of the House
of Representatives and the public vis-a-vis with security
institutions leading to human rights violation because there
is no monitoring on military activities in Papua.
Weak monitoring is apparent in lack of civil authority
control in Papua over the number of troops in Papua and
their movement or operation implemented, as elaborated in
the previous part. This occurs because the priority in Papua
is security due to perception of threat. 167
Weak control is apparent in weak authority of
National Commission of Human Rights in the monitoring of
human rights violations. This is expressed by representative
of National Commission of Human Rights in Papua, Matius
Murib. According to Murib, recommendation from National
Commission of Human Rights is lacking. National Commission
of Human Rights is often in doubt to declare human rights
violations regardless of the convincing facts gathered. 168
4. Impunity
One of the factors leading to remaining human rights
violations committed by security personnel is because of no
legal process on various cases of human rights violations.
Some cases were legally processed, yet the legal mechanism
and the verdict produced do not fit with the sense of justice
and fair trial. Impunity on human rights violations shapes
the perception of security personnel that violations are not
crimes. Even though they committed violations, their status
as security personnel provided them with immunity.
This condition leads to violence and human rights
violations as part of the culture of security personnel. There is
167
168
Interview with Theo Van Den Broek, Op Cit.
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Head of National Commission on Human
Rights Papua Representative, 19 January 2011.
no obligation to act according to the legal procedure to respect
human rights. Whenever human rights violations happen, it
is guaranteed that there is no fair punishment. The culture of
impunity is supported by the stance taken by the commanders
to protect and to wash the bloodstain in their hands, and even
to provide legitimacy that a personnel punished in Papua for
murder is a hero in fact, because the murdered victim is a
separatist or enemy of the State. 169
The cases of human rights violations tend to be seen
not as violation of human rights but instead as a common
crime committed from violating the order of the superior
officers. Trial used for such violation is military court, to
avoid general court or human rights court. Military Court
refers to Military Disciplinary Act or Military Penal Code
with light sentence.
The practice of impunity on human rights violations in
Papua can be concluded from various cases. Example was
the murder of Theys. On the trial in Military High Court
(Mahkamah Militer Tinggi/Mahmilti)-III Surabaya, a number
of personnel from Special Forces Corps from Tribuana Task
Force. They are Commander of Tribuana Task Force, Liutenant
Infantry Hartomo; Vice Commander Major Doni Hutabarat
and five personnel of Captain Rionardo, First Liuenant Agus
Supriyanto, First Sergeant Lourensius, First Sergeant Asrial
and Chief Private Zulfahmi.170 Military Court delivered the
verdicts to give only 2 to 3 years and 6 months in prison and
2 personnel were dismissed – Liutenant Colonel Infantry
Hartomo and Chief Private Ahmad Zulfahmi.
The next case is the murder of Tenius Murib that begins
with the breaking and entering of arsenal owned by Military
District Command Headquarter 1702 Wamena, Jayawijaya
2003 (Accessed 19 April 2003)
170
Majalah Tempo, “Membekap Kematian Sang Paitua”, 10-16 February 2003, p.
94
169
on April 4 2003 by an unknown group. 171 Military personnel
launched a counter attack to the villages in Jayawijaya
District in which goods were confiscated such as valuable
documents, money, coffee grounding machine, arrows,
typewriters, screwjack and car keys. 172 Besides, there
were arrests, torture, assault, shooting and murder against
civilians including the burning down of honai (traditional
house), church, healthcare service and school. 173
The military succeeded in arresting Jigi Jigibalom and
Tenius Murib in an operation in Bolame on June 5 2003. 174
The court granted them with 20 years in prison to life to
Jigi Jigibalom, Tenius Murib and five others. 175 In Wamena
Penitentiary, the guards terrorized them. One of them, Tenius
Murib, ended up dead because of the terror experienced in
Military District Command 1702 Wamena on April 14 2003. 176
Yet according to the Commander of Military Resort Command
Jayapura, Colonel Calvalery Agus Mulyadi, the victim died due
to suffocation and twice experiencing difficulties swallowing
food and was brought to the hospital but ended up dead. 177
Based on the case, the National Commission of Human
Rights commenced an investigation of revealing the
involvement of four members of the military from Military
Area Command XVII/Trikora seen as responsible actors in
command. 178 Yet no follow-up from the finding of National
Commission of Human Rights.
The next case is on the video of torture in Tinginambut,
Koalisi LSM untuk Perlindungan dan Penegakan HAM di Papua, “Laporan Awal
Kasus Wamena 4 April 2003”, Jayapura, Jayapura 6 May 2003, p. 12.
172
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (PBHI), Papua
on Trial, (Ganesha Syndicated: PBHI, Jakarta 2005), p. 102.
173
Ibid. p. 103.
174
Ibid. p. 103.
175
Ibid. p. 104.
176
Ibid. p. 104.
177
Koalisi LSM untuk Perlindungan dan Penegakan HAM di Papua Op.Cit., p.
46.
178
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (PBHI),. Op.Cit.,
p. 105.
171
Puncak Jaya, surfaced on the website of Hong Kong-based Asia
Human Rights Commission (AHRC) on October 17 2010. 179
This 11-minute video showed the practice of torture done by
Indonesian military against the local people. There were two
events shown in the video. The first was a video of violence
commited in the operation commenced in March 16 2010
when a number of people from Gurage Village were hitted
with helmets and kicked. 180 The second event is torture
by burning the genitalia of a person under interrogation
with cigarettes. This event happened on May 30 2010 and
the torture was committed by military officer in search
for information regarding the whereabout of Free Papua
Movement – Goliat Tabuni and Marongen Wenda. 181
Later it was discovered that the perpetrator is military
personnel from Infantry Battalion/753 Arvita Pam Rawan
(AVT) Nabire and one of the victims of torture was Anggepugu
Kiwo.182 The military processed seven personnel from this
battalion and submitted their investigation to Military High
Court III-19 of Military Area Command XVII/Cendrawasi. Five
defendants were charged with Article 103 (1) Military Penal
Code for deliberate avoidance of service or non-excussable
neglect with two years of prison time. Military Court III-19
Jayapura decided that these five defendants faced different jail
times in November 2010 and January 2011. This court-martial
was criticised for the use of Article 103 of Military Penal Code
and for failure of the military prosecutor to include the article
of torture. Moreover, the victims never attended the court
proceeding to deliver their statements.
Commander in Chief Marshall Agus Suhartono stated that
the acts committed by the defendants cannot be categorized
http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/183850-video-kekerasan-tentara-indonesia-, “Video Penyiksaan di Papua Beredar di Youtube”, Accessed 22 March
2010.
180
National Commission on Human Rights, “Laporan Tim Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Kekerasan di Puncak Jaya”, 22 December 2010. pp. 47-49.
181
Ibid. pp. 49-50.
182
Ibid, p 40.
179
as gross human rights violations because it was seen as a
violation of authority. 183 Meanwhile, National Commission
on Human Rights set up a Monitoring and Investigation Team
on Violence in Puncak Jaya from the period of 15 November
2010 to December 31 2010, 184 which concluded that human
rights violations happen in Puncak Jaya.
Many were concerned with impunity, especially the
people in Papua. Besides the factors of rampant human rights
violations, impunity is deeply rooted in the people of Papua
and escalates and deepens conflicts between the people of
Papua and the government, especially security personnel.
This can be concluded from the interviews.
The vice head of National Commission of Human Rights
Papua representative, Matius Murib, stated that there is
no human rights violations to be brought to human rights
court. The existing cases were always reported to Head of
Regional Police or Commander of Military Area Command
and recommended to the Attorney. Yet without international
pressure, such as the one in the video of torture, there would
be no follow up. Investigation on the personnel suspected
with violations would never be done. This can be seen in the
murder of Reverend Gilman Gire and 30 others. 185
Regarding the torture in Puncak Jaya, the case was brought
to military court, Matius saw this as irrelevant because this
was considered as gross human rights violations. Military
court is an internal process to improve professionalism in the
future. Yet from the perspective of human rights, it should be
brought to human rights courts, as it is seen as part of a series
of events from 2004 as a systematic violence commenced
through repeated instruction, operation and victims. 186
www.detiknews.com/read/2010/12/31/154918/1536954/10/panglima-tni-itubukan-pelanggaran-ham-berat, ““Panglima TNI: Itu Bukan Pelanggaran HAM
Berat”, Accessed 22 Maret 2011.
184
National Commission on Human Rights, Op.Cit. p. 5.
185
186
Ibid
183
On human rights violations in Papua, National Commission
on Human Rights Papua representative recommended
National Commission on Human Rights to set up Investigating
Commission of Human Rights Violations (Komisi Penyelidikan
Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia/KPP HAM) to carry out
investigation to be brought to human rights courts, because
according to Regional Commission of Human Rights in Papua,
there has been strong indications for gross human rights
violation in Puncak Jaya. Yet the recommendation issued by
National Commission of Human Rights in Jakarta showed
different result.187 National Commission of Human Rights in
Jakarta states that there are no gross human rights violations
in Puncak Jaya.
Regarding the torture in Puncak Jaya, Head of Papua
Problems Handling Desk (Desk Penyelesaian Masalah Papua/
DPMP), Karseno categorized this not as human rights violation.
Karseno viewed that this was committed by alleged personnel
and it was not part of the military policy. Therefore, this
should be handled as common crime, not as human rights
violations to be brought to human rights court. 188
On the other hand, Yunus Wonda see this as human
rights violation. Moroever, there is this unfinished case of the
murder of Head of Papua Presidium Council, even though the
people already know how the murder was commited as it was
relevant with the key figure in Papua. The actors allegedly
involved with the murder are suspected to remain in duty up
until now. 189
The absence of settlement through human rights court
is also highlighted by Jaleswari Pramudawardhani. She views
that the military court process can only reach to low rank
officers. This happens because of egocentrism and pride in
Ibid
Interview with Mr. Karseno, Head of Papua Desk Coordinating Ministry of Politics
189
Interview with Yunus Wonda, Vice Head of Commission I Papua People , 31 Januari 2011.
187
188
the military personnel to be put to non military court. 190
Based on the verdicts of military court, almost all of
them include only low ranked personnel. Besides, the verdicts
delivered to the actors violating the military discipline or
crime were lightly punished and rarely dismissed. These
facts lead to a conclusion that military court actually serves
as forum to protect and grant impunity to military personnel
committing human rights violations.
5. The Culture of Violence and Weak Human Rights
Understanding
The era of reform could not eradicate the culture of
violence in the military personnel. On the contrary, the
culture of violence remains due to weak understanding on
human rights from the personnel and the culture of impunity
that provides legitimacy to violence committed. On the
institutional level, there has been a policy to deliver materials
on human rights in trainings to military personnel. Yet with
no monitoring and evaluation, the achievements remained
on the internal scope.
For security personnel in Papua, before they were deployed
to Papua, each personnel was equipped with military technique
and strategy training, especially for mountain and swap combat.
Personnel were also equipped with guidance related to contextual
situation, tradition and how to survive on the Land of Papua.
191
Furthermore, for personnel to be sent to operations under
Borderland Security Operation Task Force (Satgas Ops Pamtas),
an introductory course on territorial maintenance, law and
Interview with Jaleswari Pramurdhawardani, LIPI Researcher, 9 November
2010
191
“Yonif 521 Akan Gantikan Batalyon 509/Kostrad di Papua”, (Accessed
4 February 2011); www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
code=2011200920117113, “141/AYJP Berangkat ke Papua”, (Accessed 4
February 2011); dan www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
code=113012006123398, “Pangdam VII/Wirabuana Kunjungi Satgas 725/Woroagi
di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
190
human rights were provided. 192 These personnel would be on
duty for a year and would be rotated.
Weak understanding on human rights and the culture of
violence as one of the causal factors of violations committed
by military personnel is also expressed by member of the
Commission I of the House of Representatives, TB Hasanudin.
In his opinion, human rights violation occurs because the
personnel on duty lacks the knowledge on human rights,
packed with arrogance and ridden with short-cuts seeking.
Therefore, interrogation is not done through systematic means
yet it is done by trampling on heads. 193
Yet Commander of Military District Command 1072/
Jayapura stated that the personnel were provided with booklet
on humanitarian law and human right. This is considered
as a significant achievement due to the absence of human
rights violations committed by the personnel. This booklet
was read by the personnel based on instructions given by
their commander officially through instruction letters. The
personnel also took part in pre-duty orientation in their bases,
in which introduction on social, cultural, religious and society
situation in Papua was provided. 194
The fact that booklets and pre-duty orientation were
provided to them did not have any impact to the reduction of
human rights violations. According to Yaboisembut, it is true
that military leaders endorse human rights enforcement to
the military personnel. Yet, some of the key figures encourage
the personnel not to be afraid of human rights. This creates
incoherence of message, leading to confusion on the level of
personnel. 195 Indications on such incoherence was expressed
: / / w w w. t n i . m i l . i d / i n d e x 2 . p h p ? p a g e = d e t a i l i n d e x . h t m l & n w _
code=2011200920115516 “Upacara Pembukaan Latihan Pratugas Satgas Ops
Pamtas Papua Yonif 141/AYJP TA. 2010.” (Accessed 4 February 2011)
193
Interview with Tubagus Hasanuddin Vice Chairperson of Commission I House
194
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 22 January 2011.
195
Interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Papua Indigenous Council, 22 January
2011.
192
by TB Hasanudin. From his perspective, the remaining factor
is that the instructors are people with old paradigm and
military culture. 196
6. Separatist Stigma toward the People in Papua
One of the root of conflicts in Papua is politics, the
difference of perspective on the result of Free Act Choice and
the demand for independence from Indonesia to stand as a
separate State of Papua. From the point of view of human
rights, this demand or perspective and belief is legitimate
and should be respected as long as it is done through peaceful
manners in the framework of democratic State.
Guarantee to freedom of opion, belief and expression
tend to be violated by the central government as they
were seen as threats to the unity of the State. This is the
dominant perspective used as the foundation of State
policies on Papua. Differences on political perspectives
seen as “threat” is to be solved with security measures. The
people in Papua with different political perspective should
be positioned as enemy of the State to be eliminated. They
are the “separatists” who has no chance of living in the
Republic of Indonesia.
This is clearly expressed on the opinion of Commander
of Military District Command 1072 stating that the threat in
Papua is from the group demanding for “independence.”197
This group was called by Head of Papua Problems Handling
Desk (Desk Penyelesaian Masalah Papua/DPMP) as armed
criminal groups with more than criminal intent but also with
political and ideological elements.198 This intimidation is an
internal threat, from people with different opinions who wish
Interview with Tubagus Hasanudin Vice Chairperson of Commission I House of
Representatives, 10 January 2011.
197
198
196
for independence. 199
Even though at the beginning, the label of “separatists”
is limited to groups with armed resistance struggling for
independence, yet in further development, this label is also
attached to anyone with different faith and political beliefs,
including those campaigned non violently. There is a tendency
amongst security personnel that the label has become a
stigma, believing that all people in Papua are “separatists”
based on any type of difference, beyond political belief. The
practice of stigmatization is also done onto the people who
resist the will of the government or security personnel during
the military operation.
Stigma as separatist has lead the security personnel
to treat the people in Papua as enemy of the State. As a
result, actions taken are actions against enemy of the State
in wartime. This contributes to the high number of human
rights violations against the people in Papua.
Stigma as separatists made the military to be constantly
suspicious against the people in Papua, in whatever they do.
200
The people in Papua, especially in the border, cannot look
for food. It is because whenever they bring out their machetes,
arches and arrows to go to the forest, they were questions on
where they are going, what they are up to and how long they
are going to stay there. No one can tell how long a hunt would
be. It is possible for them to stay inside the forest. The military
also suspected temporary housing set up in the middle of the
jungle. Those temporary housing was set up by the people to
look for food. 201
The narrative on the impact of separatism stigma
was also revealed in a focus group discussion in Workwana.
A participant told a story on a raid in the evening nearing
the dawn. Military personnel knocked the door, gave some
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 7 February 2011.
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Papua People Figure, 21 January 2011.
201
Interview with Erna Mahuze, Member of Religion Working Group Papua People
Assembly, 26 January 2011.
199
200
questions and asked to be permitted into the house. They
examined the whole house, rooms and warehouses. They also
tare the room apart and cut the lines of hammock. They came
in substantial numbers and set up a perimeter around the
village. They came into each house and interrogated whether
they were hiding people there. They also brought crowbars
and shovels to dig the ground looking for weapon. This causes
deep trauma to the people.202
7. Low Level of Welfare
A number of human rights violations are committed by
military personnel in general shows that the existing condition
of military personnel at the moment are not qualified as
professional military personnel. One factor influencing the
level of military professionalism, besides education and
expertise, are low level of welfare.
Low level of welfare causes the military personnel to
loose focus on the tasks and profession. Psychologically, their
welfare is not sufficient and this disturbs the level of maturity
in handling violence that oftentimes erupts in dealing with
the people. Also, low level of welfare pushes the military
personnel to moonlight to add their income, by using their
military status or facility. This activity spans from trading up
to illegal activities that taint their military professionalism
and image in front of the people.
In Papua, a number of activities done by military
personnel occur for example illegal liquor distribution, forced
trade in the border and indications for illegal logging. Military
economic activities in Papua elaborated by Rathgeber 203
(2005: 130-131). Illegal investors building illegal business
with security personnel on illegal logging. Thousand of
hectares of trees were cut and a substantial portion of the
202
203
Discussed in an FGD in Workwana Village, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
Theodor Rathgeber, Op. Cit, PP 130-131
local people had to moved.
On illegal logging, Commander of Military District
Command 1072 states that the military was not involved,
especially before it required substantial amount of
venture. 204 Yet, Theo stated different roles taken by the
military personnel. They always attend the meetings
between the financiers and the head of the community
groups. The military became brokers and intimidators to
the community. 205
In Workwana focus group discussion, it is revealed from
the statements gathered that the military would directly
transport logs belonging to the community. To run the business,
lack of capital would be compensated thorugh partnership
with financiers. Moreover, the military personnel also work as
staff in logging company. Usually, they have armed assistants
coming from military personnel. One of the corporations is
Rajawali or PTP. They have housings for their employees but
they were occupied by Special Forces Corps and the military.
Meanwhile the employees lived elsewhere. 206
Other economic activities in Papua include crude palm
business in Jayapura and gold mining in Sentani. Another
economic activity also occurs in East Arso. 207 Overthre, the
personnel especially those from Special Forces Corps, took
the logs belonging to the community or traded them with
tainted food. 208
Another economic activities committed by military
personnel is illegal liquor distribution. In a focus group
discussion with the people from the city of Arso, it is revealed
206
Discussed in an FGD in the people in Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January
2011.
207
This statement is delivered by Musa Abu Bakar and Yuliana Flores Languwuyo
in an interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Head of Papua Indigenous Council,
22 January 2011.
208
Discussed in an FGD in the people in Workwana, Keerom District, 30 January
2011.
204
205
that the military personnel brought liquor to Papua. The
liquor then sold to the merchants. When the merchants were
arrested, they were quickly released. 209
Even though the military allocation had not reached the
“ideal” number, any attempt to add the numbers should be
proceeded with reformulation of defence system and strategy;
staged defence planning; and priority setting. It is because the
fact states that regardless of Indonesian geographical reality as
a maritime country, the orientation of defence relies on landbased forces by maintaining territorial command structure.
The government set up a State defence reserve components
that consequently added to the defence budget.
More than that, the need to increase defence budget
should be followed up with transparency and accountability
in the sector of defence. Up until now, transparency and
accountability in the sector of defence remains a major
problem, leading to the practice of corruption. Practice of
corruption also implies to money embezzlement for the
welfare of the military personnel leading to internal conflict.
More than that, monitoring functions carried out by the House
of Representatives and State Audit Agency also shows lack of
optimum performance in monitoring defen e sector.
With low level of welfare, there are indicators that the
military personnel received budget from the regional levels
in Papua. This was denied by Chief of Military Area Command
XVII/Cenderawasih, for operational purpose or for salary
and benefit.210 Yet indirectly, the Chief of Military District
Command 1072/Jayapura stated that there were assistance
from Regional Government for special interests, such as office
renovation or other social oriented activities. 211
Besides, Matius Murib explained that since 2004, regional
government in Papua allocated fund on periodic basis to the
military. In Puncak Jaya district, since 2004, National Unity
Discussed in an FGD with the people of Arso Kota and in an FGD in Workwana,
Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
210
Interview with staff of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, 7 February 2011
211
209
Office (Dinas Kesbang) allocated fund for the military. In a
year, the budget for the military reached around 3 (three)
billion rupiahs. According to Murib, this was admitted by the
Head of Puncak Jaya District. In the beginning, in 2004, it was
a donation. Yet due to complexity in budget accountability, it
was transformed into routine annual budget. 212 Similar view
was expressed by Socratez Sofyan. He stated that many Head
of District complained the problems in budget reporting. 213
8. Security Business
The relationship between capital interest and security
often time creates complication of human rights violations,
considering that human rights violations are not merely
committed by State actors but also by the power of the
capital. Financiers need security guarantee to continue their
production. At that time, because the State could not provide
any security guarantee, the financiers directly contacted
security institutions, who were in need for extra income.
This mutually benefitting relationship transformed security
personnel as instrument of the State into instrument of the
financiers, whose roles are to protect the financiers from the
community victimized by human rights violations committed
by the financiers.
In Papua, this close relationship between the military
and business interest goes beyond oil and gas sector such as
PT Freeport, but based on Rathgeber national and foreign
investors also established illegal business with security
personnel. 214 Investors operate without any license in
exploiting the forest. Thousand hectares of trees in the forests
were cut down and local community were evicted with force.
In other word, close relationship with security institutions
213
Interview with Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Head of Service Center of Papua Baptist
Church Union, 27 January 2011.
214
Theodor Rathgeber, Op. Cit., pp. 130-131.
212
was developed by official economic actor and also by illegal
business players.
From 1975 to 1997, more than 160 casualties in the
area of PT Freeport. 215 Security disturbance in the area
of PT Freeport continued until the era of reform. 216 PT
Freeport had allocated funds specifically for security service
provided by New Order government and the government
in the reform era.217
According to the statement delivered by Head of Papua
Regional Police in the beginning the security of PT Freeport
was carried out by 1.600 police and military personnel. The
number dropped to 800 then 600. At the moment, there are
about 160 military personnel carrying out their security
duties.218 Yet Thaha Alhamid stated information he obtained
from a member of the Police force that police officials got
250 million rupiahs from the corporation. The leader got 600
million rupiahs.
Besides Freeport, security business is also done by other
corporations. In an FGD in Workwana, it is revealed that
military personnel especially Special Forces Corps were made
as staff in a logging company of Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia.
Even the houses for their employees were occupied by Special
Forces Corps and the military. 219
E. Challenges for Enforcing Human Rights in Papua in
www.jatam.org/dmdocuments/papua.pdf, “Editorial Jatam: Papua Membara lagi.
Tanya Freeport” , 21 July 2009.
216
One of the cases resulting the casualties of foreign nationals in Freeport area is
the shooting on 11 July 2009 yang menelan korban Drew Nicholas Grant, warga
Australia. www.smh.com.au/world/new-dad-dies-in-gunman-attack-20090711dgmx.html?skin=text-only, “New Dad Dies in Gunman Attack”, (Diakses 10
Maret 2011).
217
For further information, see P.A. Rifai-Hasan, “Development, Power, and the
Mining Industry in Papua: A Study of Freeport Indonesia”, Journal of Business
Ethics (2009) 89:129-143.
218
Interview with Chief of Papua Province Police. 26 January 2011.
219
Discussed in an FGD with the people in Arso Kota, Keerom District, 30 January
2011.
215
the Future
Referring to human rights conditions in Papua at the
moment, no significant changes happen compared to New
Order era in the beginning of their integration to Indonesia,
then in the future similar stagnation also envisioned in the
future, unless fundamental political and policy are radically
changed. Therefore, the biggest challenge of human rights
in Papua in the near future is to carry out major overhaul in
politics and in policies to peacefully resolve the conflict in
Papua to eliminate factors causing human rights violations.
According to these factors, there are five strategic agenda
of challenges to support human rights enforcement in Papua
in the future, such as (1) Acceleration of security sector
performance particularly military reform; (2) Adoption
of peaceful conflict resolution; (3) Reduction of military
personnel deployed to Papua; (4) Elimination of impunity on
human rights violations; and (5) Support to public scrutiny
and civil authority.
1. Acceleration of Security Sector Performance
Particularly Military Perception
Security sector reform accelerated agenda especially
military reform is needed since there are many weaknesses,
on the level of policy and implementation, on the institutional,
cultural and personnel level. On the institutional level, there
are three important points that are not implemented according
to security sector reform spirit. First, new military doctrine
declared as the military’s new paradigm still opens up room
for the military to take actions within “security” domain
who is the main function of the police based on the excuse
of “upholding the sovereignty of the State, maintaining the
unity of the State and protecting the State and the motherland
from threat and disturbance on the unity of the State and the
nation.” This doctrine is positioned in vague and abstract
value used to legitimize the military action and on the other
hand it is non operational and limitative. This doctrine is
also the basis for attitude and conduct of the military in
dealing with “non military” threat without first examining
the manifestation of such threat by taking the position as a
democratic and peaceful State. Everything is handled with
violence, resulting into a more and more complex conflict.
To deal with “non military” threat” the military can
launch non war military operation Yet the implementation
of the operation can be done thorough military operation
with specific target on dealing with armed separatists, armed
insurgencies, terrorist acts, security disturbance on sea and
on air, borderland security and show of force. In the case
of Papua, the military is also used to handle a number of
show of force. If the problem in Papua is seen as a separatist
problem, it should not be handled with military approach if
the separatist movement itself is not an armed movement.
Besides, in a number of cases, the military also carries out
security operations without involving the police, or at least
becomes the main forces instead of complementary one as
should be.
To accelerate reform on the institutional level, it requires
a more operational framework instead of a doctrine. The
operational framework should be made in details and
restrictive on the roles and approach of the military allowed
to be used to deal with threats defined restrictively, such as
non war combative operation can only be deployed to deal
with armed movements within the framework of human
rights protection and humanitarian law.
Another institutional reform remains unfinished is
restructuring territorial command, which is an important
mandate in the reform era. On the other hand, the policy
implemented sustained and strengthened territorial command
structure, as obvious in Papua. Consequently, the interaction
between military personnel and local community is packed
with frictions and done within such context perceived by the
people in Papua as separatism and unfinished cultural and
personal reform, leading to various human rights violations
since the military personnel engaged in relation pattern
between “the guard of State sovereignty and unity” with
“separatist threat.” Therefore, territorial command restructure
should be accelerated by halting the expansion of territorial
command structure in the middle of the civil society of
Papua, by shifting into defence force with the main task of
securing border area especially the border of the sea and air.
To improve defence force, what is needed is reinforcement
and improvement of defence system equipment such as high
tech facilities, instead of adding more military personnel and
extending the structure of territorial command.
Another aspect of unfinished military reform is the change
in court jurisdiction on military personnel committing crime
and in specification on military court jurisdiction to military
crime and disciplinary acts and wartime court. Nowadays
there is a strong tendency that the military wish to bring
military personnel committing general crime and human
rights violations to military court, regardless of the fact that
the military court is often questionable due to lack of fair and
impartial practice and verdict delivered and is often seen as
part of an impunity institution for any human rights violations
committed by military personnel.
According to the principle of equality before the law,
it has become a standard for modern democratic State that
military personnel have no privilege whatsoever in the court
of law. Therefore, when committing crime or human rights
violations, they have to be brought to the same court where
non military criminals are brought to – which is the general
court. Thorough the general court, fair trial principles can
be upheld since it provides systematic guarantee on the
independence of judge and legal proceeding. Military court
has its weaknesses as all components of the trials come from
military personnel leading to strong tendency to protect the
corps and lack of ability to free themselves from the chain of
commands. Therefore, the military court should specifically
put military crime to justice, and not general crime, violations
of military discipline and crimes or violations committed in
wartime.
From the cultural aspect, the fact that human rights
violations are comitted by military personnel in Papua shows
that there has been no significant change of the culture of
violence in the military. Military personnel are trained for
combat to deal with enemy of the State and therefore violence
is part of the unique characteristic of the military and should
remain specific only to them. Yet violence can only be used
against forces threatening to the State and that force should
be an armed one. Besides, in using their forces, consequences
of being a democratic State under the law, they can only be
used in ways that are measureable with respect to human
rights and humanitarian law.
As a result, the culture of violence should be balanced
with the culture of respect of the law and human rights.
This cannot be fully implemented and adopted as military
culture. This situation results in non significant changes in
the reform of personnel and pattern of military education.
Even though the military personnel has been equipped with
human rights and humanitarian law booklet, yet they are
not yet integrated into education system and substance and
organization culture maintained and sustained in each layer
of the chain of command. Respect to law and human rights
oftentimes lacks of substance and more of a mere formality to
be implemented and is seen by many as obstacles in successful
completion of mission. Therefore, cultural change can never
be achieved only by publishing and distributing booklets
and including it into education materials, but it needs to
be internalized through the overall education system and
development of military organizational culture.
Reform on other personnel influential to the improvement
of professionalism of the military is the advancement of
personnel welfare and military business handover. Lack of
welfare would allure the military personnel to be involved in
economic activities by abusing their positions and characters
as military personnel leading to human rights violations
shown in various cases in Papua elaborated on the previous
section. Furthermore, economic activity carried out in the
institutional level would shift the main task of the military as
defence instrument. Military personnel no longer secure the
interest of the State but protect their economic or financier
interest instead. On the other hand, military business does not
positively correlate with personnel welfare. On the contrary,
business opens the opportunity for practice of corruption that
will destroy the organization and the morale of the military.
Improvement of welfare of the military personnel should
be done by improving the discipline of the military personnel
to remain distant from economic activities. Therefore, the
military business should be ended and shifted to State asset
to be managed professionally. The improvement of welfare
can only be done by using State budget to avoid conflict of
interest in carrying out its tasks and functions.
2. Adoption of peaceful conflict resolution
The rampant violence and human rights violations in
Papua are the result of unresolved conflict and approach that
endorses violence. Therefore, conflict resolution and approach
used are significant in the enforcement and protection of
human rights in the future. It is described that the conflict in
Papua is an ongoing one. On the other hand, the way chosen
by the government fails to answer the problem and to address
the deeply rooted conflict. Conflict resolution in Papua with
violence and security approach show that conflict is not
understood proportionally as recognition on differences of
perspective. Conflict in Papua is positioned as disobedience
to be resolved through pressure and violence. 220
Based on various roots of conflict mentioned by the
experts and through research findings, there is no real policy
addressing the core of the conflict itself. One of the main
roots of the conflict remains untapped and even avoided,
that is political conflict. Based on various sources, political
roots determine the solutions of various aspects of conflicts.
The resolution of political conflicts can only be done through
mechanism of dialog between the people in Papua and between
Papua and Jakarta. 221
The process of dialog is the only alternative to solve the
conflict in Papua because security and violence approach
can only intensify the conflict and human rights violations.
Initiatives for dialogs have been discussed by various people
along with its framework. Yet Jakarta cannot accept and
military approach remains effective resulting to more and
more human rights violations. The government offers
constructive communication seen as a degradation of civil
society in Papua. 222
Radical conflict resolution through peaceful dialog
should be done to resolve the problem completely and to stop
violence and human rights violations in Papua. This dialog
can only occur when both the government of Indonesia and
figures of Papua show willingness and openness. Dialog is key
to politically-based conflict resolution as the basis of a more
comprehensive solution that is open and dignified.
Along with the efforts to build and exercise dialog, approach
to the problems in Papua should also be changed from security
approach to welfare approach. Counter productive security
Chris Mittchel (1981) as quoted in Simon Fisher et al. 2001. Mengelola Konflik:
Ketrampilan & Strategi untuk Bertindak. (translated edition). The British Council.
Indonesia. p 4.
221
Interview with Muridan S Widjojo, Researcher for LIPI, 12 January 2011.
222
Ibid.
220
approach would be an obstacle to dialog as it promotes violence
instead of peaceful means mainstreamed in the dialog. Security
approach visually apparent in the form of pressure, arrest and
shooting would never erase the political roots of the existing
conflict. Instead this approach would escalate conflict as the
public see with their own eyes that their brothers were murdered
and their family were shot. 223
With the process of dialog and humanistic and welfare
approach, special autonomy policies as a compromise can still
be implemented, as long as it is consistently applied by both
parties. Autonomy can be interpreted substantially through
the provision of rights to run the government according to
the uniqueness of Papua to the people of Papua, not only
by the regional government in Papua. Consequently, the
implementation of Special Autonomy has to be managed
democratically by placing the people in Papua as main actors
in the institutional level through Papua people representative
or substantially through the mechanism of public decision
making involving all elements of the public including Papua
People Assembly.
3. Reducing Military Personnel in Papua
As one of the consequences of the acceleration of
military reform in the form of restructuring of territorial
force and in the shift from security approach to humanistic
and welfare approach, the presence of military personnel in
Papua should be reduced. The presence of non-organic troops
should be eradicated completely. This is very important to be
implemented as it shows the good will of the government in
peaceful resolution to the conflict of Papua and to return the
trust and to erase the trauma of the people who long have
been victimized with violence and human rights violations.
223
Interview with Yunus Wonda, Vice Head of Commission I of Papua House of
Representatives, 31 January 2011.
In Papua, the State is presented and represented by actions
and conducts taken by the military personnel. Therefore all
violence and human rights violations are identical with the
existence of the State itself. The potentials of violence and
human rights violations to occur increase along with the
increase of military personnel deployed to Papua and the
more frequent they interact with the people in Papua.
Rejection against the overrated presence of military
presence is a rational aspiration of the people in Papua due
to the fact that they cause negative impacts. For the people in
Papua, the presence of military personnel in such abundance
triggered fear instead of security. It is especially when the
number of security personnel now match the population of
the indigenous people of Papua.224
According to the topography of Papua, the presence of
the personnel should be oriented to secure the border area on
land, at sea and on air. Therefore, security posts should not be
placed in the city centre or in the residential areas and should
be moved to border areas. The security of border posts done
by organic troops who are familiar with the characteristic
and culture of the people in Papua because in the border,
interaction with the people is inevitable. As a consequence,
the presence of non-organic troops is not needed as they are
required only on wartimes. 225
Troops assigned in the border should be equipped
with knowledge on law and human rights, local culture and
welfare and humanistic approach. It is to avoid negative
impact because security approach through the setting up of
the posts cause the people to feel restricted in term of their
liberty due to constant surveillance. 226 The public do not feel
safe in their movement because they are afraid of getting
Ibid.
Interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Head of Papua Indigenous Council, 22
January 2011.
226
224
225
killed. 227 To avoid boredom, rotation of troops is still needed.
Troops are assigned to the border for a one-year assignment.
228
Rotation is needed to avoid boredom that may affect or
reduce the motivation in carrying out their duties. 229
4. Impunity to Past Human Rights Violations
As explained on the previous part, one of the factors
leading to no decrease of human rights violations by security
personnel is that there is no fair legal process that brings
justice in a number of cases of violence and human rights
violations. Permanent impunity has shaped the mentality
of security personnel that violence is the risk that comes
from carrying out their duty and not a violation of law and
human rights. Impunity is also supported by decisions
of military courts that are far from justice and tend to be
protective to their colleagues and the permissive attitude
shown by the military chiefs to wash their hands clean from
any responsibility - leading to the legitimacy of violence
committed by their personnel. 230
Impunity felt by the people in Papua is an accumulation
of injustice that trigger more conflicts in Papua. The people
in Papua see that no human rights violation has been
brought to human rights court so far. 231 Regarding military
court, the people see the decisions as far from the sense
of justice because military court is an internal process to
improve professionalism in the future. 232 Indications of
partialness of military court are evident in the decisions of
Result of FGD from the people of Arso Kota, Op Cit.
229
Interview with Jaleswari Pramodhawardani. LIPI Researcher, 9 November
2010.
230
2003, (Accessed 19 April 2011).
231
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Had National Commission of Human Rights
Papua Representative, 19 January 2011
232
Ibid
227
228
the overall as they only address low level military personnel
with light penalty for disciplinary violations or military
crime.
There are two alternatives to end impunity in Papua.
First is through human rights court believed up until now
to be able to put the cases to fair and impartial trials. All
cases of human rights violations should be brought to
justice to reveal the truth and to bring justice. The truth
and the fulfilment of the demand for justice are important
prerequisites for the success of dialog to resolve the conflict
to its roots. Without truth, nothing can be agreed and no
improvement can be made as no lessons learned can be
derived from the past. Without any sense of justice, dialog
is difficult to be implemented as revenge hampers the
willingness and openness for peace.
The second alternative suggested by human rights
defenders in Papua is through the mechanism of Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. In the national level, the
possibility to set up Truth and Reconciliation Commission is
revoked, yet the cancellation does not undo the urgency of
Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself. The decision of
the Constitutional Court to revoke Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Law is not based on the lack of urgency of
the existence of Truth and Reconciliation Commission
mechanism, but it is because the Constitutional Court sees
the reconciliation mechanism stipulated in the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Law as a violation of the basic
principle of reconciliation on the unresolved provision on
restitution and rehabilitation on the testimony of perpetrator
and forgiveness by the victims. Moreover in the context of
Papua, Truth and Reconciliation Commission is highly relevant
considering the high number of violence and human rights
violation in terms of number and period of time.
5. Supporting Public Scrutiny and Civil Authority
To guarantee the process of peaceful conflict resolution
and respect to human rights in Papua, support to civil authority
in controlling and monitoring the implementation of political
policies and support to public scrutiny in securing that no
deviation takes place and to support fair law enforcement on
all deviations and violations.
Support to civil authority includes control from the
President and parliamentary monitoring from the House of
Representatives. It should be emphasized that the politics of
security and security actions in Papua are implemented directly
by the military. The House of Representatives frequently
have no knowledge and no capacity in implementing their
oversight function due to lack of open access to information.
Therefore, support for public monitoring and civil authority
requires openness to public information in the security and
defence sector. Up until now, weak surveillance can be seen
from no control of civil authority over Papua on the number of
personnel deployed to Papua and on movements or operations
implemented, as elaborated on the previous section. This is
possible because the priority in Papua is security due to the
presence of threat. 233
Besides civil authority, the public has the right to find
out about security policy, including in particular area such
as Papua and how the policy is carried out. The public has
the right to know about the operation implemented, the
number of personnel deployed and the source and the use
of fund.
Besides security policy and politics, monitoring is
needed to secure guarantee and respect to human rights.
This is needed to prevent any violation of human rights and
to ensure punishment on any kind of violence and violation
of human rights. At the moment, the authority of human
rights monitoring is on the hands of National Commission of
233
Interview with Theo Van Den Broek, Papua People Figure, 28 January 2011.
Human Rights – weaken by the lack of information and by the
ignorance of the military over the recommendation proposed
by National Commission of Human Rights.234 Weak intention
and willingness of National Commission of Human Rights in
dealing with human rights violations in Papua are factors
hampering the monitoring of security actors, particularly
in investigation and legal proceeding following the cases of
human rights violations.
234
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Had National Commission of Human Rights
Papua Representative, 19 January 2011.
289
CHAPTER VI
CLOSING
A. Conclusion
Policy and pattern of approach adopted in dealing with
problems in Papua in the era of reform remain unchanged
since Papua is integrated to Indonesia. Approach used is
dominated by security approach with the policy to eradicate
what is known as separatist movement, implemented through
political venue in the era of reform.
Even though in the beginning of the reform it is stated
that the problem in Papua is an internal affairs of the people
in Indonesia that can and will be resolved through the process
of democracy and the granting of autonomy, yet this show no
avail in the level of implementation. This can be seen from
the reluctance of committing into dialog and by prioritizing
security approach in military engagement through military
operation (securitization) in resolving the conflict in Papua.
The security over the problem in Papua has become a deeply
rooted paradigm in the mindset of the government and
security actors from the past to the present time.
Securitization of Papua can be seen from a number
of indicators, such as: first, the use and the priority given
in the approach and policy of security through military
engagement in dealing with conflicts in Papua by the central
administration. Second, the continuous implementation of
Security policy and approach involving the military can be seen from a number of
official stance taken by officials from the central government who admit the use
of security approach in resolving conflict in Papua and from a number of ongoing
military operations such as the case of Puncak Jaya.
military operation in Papua which often results in violations
of human rights as apparent in the case of Puncak Jaya.
Third, continuous deployment of non-organic troops to
Papua. Fourth, expansion and addition of new territorial
command structure in Papua. Fifth, the development of
military posts in civil residence and other civil areas. Sixth,
overlapping and deviation of military budget in relation
to operations implemented by the military coming from
national and local budgets and private corporation such
as Freeport. Seventh, a plan to build and strengthen the
military show of force in Papua.
Security approach pattern and policy are related to the
unfinished process of military reform and security reform and
low professionalism of military personnel. As a result, human
rights conditions in Papua remain unchanged or increased
compared to the previous period. Limitation of freedom
of expression, limitation and prohibition of movement,
intimidation, arrest, torture, sexual violence, confiscation of
goods and belongings and arbitrary killing remain rampant.
These cases were never been brought to justice to fair and
impartial trial.
Such gloomy picture of human rights in Papua is caused
by interrelated and interwoven factors. The main factor is
endless conflict with no serious resolution. On the contrary,
conflicts develop to be more complex with security policy and
politics that add fuel to the conflict itself. On the overall, the
causal factors leading to human rights violations in Papua
are:
1) Unresolved conflict;
2) Domination of security (military) approach/
securitizations;
3) Stagnant military reform;
4) The large number of military personnel;
5) Inconsistent special autonomy;
6) Lack of access and capacity for monitoring;
CLOSING 291
7) The preservation of impunity;
8) The culture of violence and weak understanding on
human rights issues in the military;
9) The stigma of separatists on the people of Papua;
10)Low welfare of the military personnel;
11)Security business of military personnel; and
12)Unfair, discriminatory and partial law enforcement
B. Recommendation
To improve security and human rights enforcement in
Papua in the future, radical political and policy changes are
needed. The main policy and political orientation is to resolve
the conflict in Papua in peace and to eradicate factors leading
to the rampant human rights violations.
Thorough conflict resolution in Papua and improvement
of protection and respect to human rights in the future can be
achieved through five important policy agenda of:
(1) Accelerating security sector reform particularly military
reform
a. Military court reform through revision of Law no 31
of 1997
b. Restructurization of Territorial Command particularly
limitation of the extention of new territorial
structure
c. Completion of military business handover
d. Prohibition of the use of local budget and non national
budget (private) for the military
e. Enactment of Law on Taks of Assistance
f. Improvement of welfare of military personnel
g. Improvement of education and training of human
rights for military personnel
h. Reformulation of military doctrine
i. Distancing between military facilities and civil
facilities (humanitarian distance)
j. Adoption of human security paradigm.
(2) De-securitization and Reduction ofn military personnel
in Papua.
a. Ceasement of security policy and approach through
military operation
b. Deployment of non-organic personnel
c. Eradicaton of military posts in civil residential areas.
d. Evaluation on the plan to develop Army Strategic
Reserve Unit and Marine Troops in the area of
Papua.
e. Deployment of military personnel from security
posts of private corporations and the use of military
personnel for other security services
f. Deployment of all Special Forces Command from
Papua
g. Deployment of all non-organic military intelligence
unit from Papua
h. Evaluation on the number of personnel on the
border
(3) Adoption of peaceful conflict resolution;
a. Conducting Jakarta-Papua dialog
b. Formulating government regulations in favor for the
implementation of the process of dialog
c. Evaluation of the implementaiton of Special Autonomy
in Papua
(4) Eradication of impunity of past human rights
violations;
a. The setting up of human rights court to settle the
cases of human rights violations in Papua
b. The setting up of Truth and Reconsiliation
Commission
c. The increase of status of representative office of
National Commission of Human Rights into Regional
Comission of Human Rights in Papua
CLOSING 293
(5) Strengthening of civil autority and public scrutiny
a. Push for the House of Representatives and the
Government to carry out evaluation on the overall
security policy in Papua, including budget, military
operaiton, policy and so on.
b. Push for National Commission of Human Rights to
take active role in dealing with cases of human rights
violations in Papua
c. Push for members of Papua People Assembly and
Papua House of Representatives for more effective
monitoring on security policies and cases of human
rights violations in Papua
d. Involvement of participation of civil society in the
monitoring of security policy and human rights
violations in Papua
(6) Prioritizing law enforcement approach by assigning
police in the front line of security maintenance.
(7) Strict, fair and impartial law enforcement
295
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Adinugroho, Wahyu Catur, Penebangan Liar (Illegal Logging);
Sebuah Bencana Bagi Dunia Kehutanan Indonesia Yang
Tak Kunjung Terselesaikan, Bogor, Institut Pertanian
Bogor, 2009.
Al Araf, “Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)”, in Beni Sukadis,
Almanak Reformasi Sektor Keamanan di Indonesia
2007, Jakarta, Lesperssi and The Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007.
Al Rahab, Amiruddin and Aderito Jesus de Soares, Perjuangan
Amungme: Antara Freeport dan Militer, Jakarta, Elsam,
2003.
Al Rahab, Amiruddin, Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma
dan Separatisme, Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu and
Imparsial, 2010.
Alua, Agus A., Papua Barat dari Pangkuan ke Pangkuan; Suatu
Ikhtisar Kronologis, Jayapura, Biro Penelitian STFT Fajar
Timur, 2006.
Asshiddiqie, Jimly, Hukum Tata Negara Darurat, Jakarta, PT.
Rajagrafindo Persada , 2007.
Asfar, Muhammad, “Sikap Daerah terhadap Gagasan
Pengembalian Fungsi Teritorial dari TNI ke Pemerintah
Daerah: Laporan dari Jatim, NTT, Maluku, Papua dan
Aceh” in Muhammad Asfar, Wacana Penghapusan Koter:
Pengembalian Fungsi Teritorial dari TNI ke Pemerintah
Daerah, Surabaya, PusdeHAM, 2003.
Atmasasmita, Romli, Reformasi Hukum, Hak Asasi Manusia dan
Penegakan Hukum, Bandung, Mandar Maju, 2001.
Baehr, Peter R., Hak-hak Asasi Manusia dalam Politik Luar
Negeri, Judul Asli: The Role of Human Rights and Foreign
Policy, Penerjemah: Somardi, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor
Indonesia, 1998.
Bagus, Lorens, Kamus Filsafat, Jakarta Gramedia, 2005.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde. “Security: A New
Framework for Analysis” in Paul D Williams (ed.). Security
Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Basyar, M Hamdan and Sri Yanuarti, “Peran Sosial Politik
ABRI Pada Masa Orde Baru”, in Indria Samego & M
Hamdan Basyar (ed.), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan
Prospeknya, Jakarta, PPW-LIPI, 1997.
Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa, Operasi Militer dan Pemilu di Papua, Paper is
presented as discussion material on “Penerapan Darurat
Militer di Aceh, Papua dan Poso pada Pemilu 2004” hosted
by ProPatria, Hotel Santika, Jakarta, 7 January 2004.
____________________, “Hak Menentukan Diri Sendiri Jenis Baru
di Papua: Pilihan antara Kemerdekaan dan Otonomi”, in
Dewi Fortuna Anwar dkk (ed.), Konflik Kekerasan Internal:
Tinjauan Sejarah, Ekonomi-Politik, dan Kebijakan di Asia
Pasifik, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005.
____________________, “Teori dan Prakik Hubungan Sipil-Militer di
Indonesia”, in Al Araf, et al (eds.), Dinamika Reformasi
Sektor Keamanan, Jakarta, Imparsial, 2005.
Bigo, Didier. “International Political Sociology” in Paul D
Williams (ed.). Security Studies: An Introduction. New
York: Routledge, 2008.
Broek, Theo van den, “Membangun Budaya Damai dan
Rekonsiliasi: Dasar Menangani Konflik di Papua,” Jakarta,
Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangungan, 2004.
Broek, Theo van den dan Rudolf Kambayong, Membangun
Budaya Damai dan Rekonsiliasi. Dasar Menangani Konflik
di Papua, SKP Jayapura Jakarta, 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
Brown, Michael E, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions
of Internal Conflict”, in Michael E Brown (ed.). The
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge
& London, The MIT Press, 1996.
Catholic Church, Frederika Korain, Theo P.A. Van Den Broek,
Goglian Lumbangaol, Memoria Pasionis di Papua 20022003, Jayapura and Jakarta, SKP Jayapura and Lembaga
Studi Pers dan Pembangunan, 2004.
Crouch, Harold, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia, Original
Title: Army and Politics in Indonesia, Translator:
Th. Sumarthana, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan,
1999.
Davidson, Scott, Hak Asasi Manusia, Original Title: Human
Rights, Translator: A. Hadyana Pudjaatmaka, Jakarta,
Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1994.
Davies, Matthew N., TNI & POLRI Forces in West Papua:
Restructuring &Reasserting Sovereignty, RMIT, Nautilus
Institute, 2006.
Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia. Postur
Pertahanan Negara. Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan
Republik Indonesia, 2007
Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, Sejarah Komando Pasukan
Gerak Cepat (Kopasgat) TNI Angkatan Udara, Jakarta,
Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Udara, 1977.
Djopari, John RG, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka,
Jakarta, November, 1995.
Drooglever, PJ, Tindakan Pilihan Bebas! Orang Papua dan
Penentuan Nasib Sendiri, Yogyakarta, Penerbit Kanisius,
, 2010.
Faith-Based Network on West Papua, Geneva Appeal on West
Papua: Papua, Land of Peace, The Hague, Justitia et Pax
Netherlands, 2006.
Fisher, Simon, et al, Mengelola Konflik: Ketrampilan & Strategi
untuk Bertindak, (translated edition) Jakarta, The British
Council Indonesia, 2001.
Forsythe, David P., The Internationalization of Human Rights,
Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1991.
Gerung, Rocky, “Tentara, Politik dan Perubahan”, in Stanley
(ed.), Indonesia di Tengah Transisi, Jakarta, Propatria,
2000.
Giay, Benny dan Yafet Kambai, Yosepha Alomang: Pengalaman
Seorang Perempuan Papua Melawan Penindasan, Jakarta,
Elsham, 2003.
Gulo, W., Metodologi Penelitian, Jakarta, Grassindo, 2002.
Gutman, Roy and Davis Rieff, (eds.), Crimes of War: What the
Public Should Know, Singapore, W.W. Norton & Company,
1999.
Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf, Detik-detik yang Menentukan:
Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi, Jakarta, The
Habibie Center (THC) Mandiri, 2006.
Hamid, Zulkifli, Sistem Politik Pasifik Selatan, Jakarta, Pustaka
Jaya, 1996.
Harrison, Lisa, Metode Penelitian Politik, Jakarta, Prenada
Media, 2005.
Haryomataram G.P.H., Sekelumit Tentang Hukum Humaniter,
Solo, Sebelas Maret University Press, 1994.
Haryomataram, G.P.H.,”Masalah Kejahatan Perang, Penjahat
Perang dan Penanganan Penjahat Perang”, in
Kushartoyo B. et. al., Hukum Humaniter: Kumpulan
Tulisan, Jakarta, Pusat Studi Hukum Humaniter FHUSAKTI, 1999.
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E., “Papua: The Last Frontier for
Democratization, Demilitarization and Decentralization
in Indonesia”, in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.), Dynamics
of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia, RSC
Working Paper No. 42 September 2007, University of
Oxford Inggris.
Hernawan, J. Budi, and Poengky Indarti, Laporan Praktek
Penyiksaan di Aceh dan Papua selama 1998-2007, Jakarta,
Imparsial, 2009.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 299
______________________________________________.The Practice of Torture
in Aceh and Papua 1998-2007, Sekretariat Keadilan dan
Perdamaian Keuskupan Jayapura, Jayapura, 2008.
Huntington, Samuel P, Prajurit dan Negara; Teori dan Politik
Hubungan Militer-Sipil, Original Title: The soldier and
The State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations, Translator: Deasy Sinaga, Jakarta, Grasindo,
2003.
Imran, Amrin et al, Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan Darat,
Jakarta, Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen PertahananKeamanan, 1971.
Indarti, Poengky, et al, Perlindungan terhadap Pembela Hak
Asasi Manusia, Jakarta, Imparsial, 2005.
Jenkins, David, Soeharto & Barisan Orba: Rezim Militer Indonesia
1975-1983, Original Title: Suharto and His Generals:
Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983, Translator:
Harsutedjo, Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu, 2010.
Jusuf, Sudono, Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan Laut, Jakarta,
Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan,
1971.
Karim, M Rusli, Peranan ABRI dalam Politik dan Pengaruhnya
terhadap Pendidikan Politik di Indonesia (1965-1979),
Jakarta, CV Haji Masagung, 1989.
Karoba, Sam, Hans Gebze, et al, Papua Menggugat 11 November
2001 Hari Kematian Demokrasi, HAM dan Perjuangan di
Tanah Papua?, Yogyakarta, Galang Press, 2002.
Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt, “Military Politics and the
Mission of Nation Building”, dalam Kees Koonings &
Dirk Kruijt (ed), Political Armies: the Military and Nation
Building in the Age of Democracy, London & New York,
Zed Books Ltd., 2002.
Marpaung, Rusdi, et al (eds.), Menuju TNI Profesional (Perjalanan
Advokasi RUU TNI), Jakarta, Imparsial, 2005.
May, Larry, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Mietzner, Marcus, “The Politics of Military Reform in PostSuharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and
Institutional Resistance”, East-West Center Washington,
2006.
Miles, Matthew B. and A. Michael Huberman, Analisis Data
Kualitatif, Jakarta, UI Press, 1992.
Müllerson, Rein, Human Rights Diplomacy, New York, Routledge,
1997
Muna, Riefqi (Ed), Likuidasi Komando Teritorial dan Pertahanan
Nasional, Jakarta, Cadass dan the Ridep Institute,
2002.
Muscat, Robert J, Investing in Peace, How Development Aid
Can Prevent or Promote Conflict, New York, ME Sharpe
Inc., 2002.
Neuman, W. Lawrence, Social Research Methode: Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1997.
Notosusanto Nugroho, et al (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit:
Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI, Jakarta,
Jakarta, 1991.
Nurhasim, Moch, “Pengelolaan Keamanan dan Pertahanan di
Papua”, in Sarah Nuraini Siregar (ed). Studi Kebijakan
Pertahanan: Problematika Pengelolaan Keamanan dan
Pertahanan di Wilayah Konflik (Aceh dan Papua), LIPI,
Jakarta, 2007.
Osborne, Robin, Kibaran Sampari: Gerakan Pembebasan OPM dan
Perang Rahasia di Papua Barat, Original Title: Indonesia’s
Secret War: the Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, Translator:
Tim Penerjemah Elsam, Jakarta, Elsam, 2001.
Panjaitan, Sintong, Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando,
Jakarta, Gramedia, 2009.
Pour, Julius, Benny: Tragedi Seorang Loyalis, Jakarta, Kata Hasta
Pustaka, 2007.
Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia
Indonesia (PBHI), Papua on Trial, Jakarta, Ganesha
Syndicated dan PBHI, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 301
Pusat Sejarah and Tradisi ABRI, Tri Komando Rakyat
Pembebasan Irian Barat: Trikora, Jakarta, Markas Besar
ABRI, 1995.
Quiroga, C.M., The Battle of Human Rights, Dordrecht, Nijhoff,
1988.
Rathgeber, Theodor, “Remarks on the Economic Activities of
Military Forces in Indonesia”, dalam Theodor Rathgeber
(ed.), Economic, Sosial, and Cultural Rights in WestPapua: a Study on Sosial Reality and Political Perspectives,
Germany, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland,
2005.
Rauf, Maswadi, “Latar Belakang Peran Sospol ABRI”, in
Indria Samego & M Hamdan Basyar (ed.), Peran Sospol
ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya, Jakarta, PPW-LIPI,
1997.
Reza, Bhatara Ibnu, International Criminal Court: Suatu Analisis
Order dalam Hubungan Internasional, Thesis for Faculty
of Social and Political Sciences University of Indonesia,
Jakarta, 2002.
Robert, Robertus, “Empat Konsep Kritik Reformasi
Sektor Keamanan”, in Al Araf, et al (eds.), Dinamika
Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, Jakarta, Imparsial,
2005.
Rover, C. De, To Serve and To Protect: Acuan Universal Penegakan
HAM, Original Title: To Serve and to Protect: Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security
Forces, Translator: Supardan Mansyur, Jakarta, PT.
RajaGrafindo Persada, 2000.
Said, Salim, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi: Perkembangan
Pemikiran Politik Militer Indonesia (1958-2000), Jakarta,
Aksara Kurnia, 2002.
_____________. Legitimizing Military Rule, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan,
2006.
Salim, Agus, Teori dan Paradigma Penelitian Sosial, Yogyakarta,
PT. Tiara Wacana, 2001.
Samego, Indria, “Demokrasi Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan
Pendahuluan”, in Indria Samego & M Hamdan Basyar
(ed.), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya,
Jakarta, PPW-LIPI, 1997.
_________________. “Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian”,
in Indria Samego & M Hamdan Basyar (ed.), Peran
Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya, Jakarta, PPWLIPI,1997.
Suyanto, Bagong dan Sutinah, Metode Penelitian Sosial, Jakarta,
Prenada Media, 2005.
Sesko AD, Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI AD Tri Ubaya Sakti, Buku
Induk Seminar AD ke II August 21-25 1966, Bandung,
Sesko AD, 1966.
Sihbudi, Riza, “Dampak Perubahan Lingkungan Domestik
Terhadap Peran Sosial Politik ABRI”, in Indria Samego
& M Hamdan Basyar (ed.), Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah
dan Prospeknya, Jakarta, PPW-LIPI, 1997.
Sihombing, Herman, Hukum Tata Negara Darurat di Indonesia,
Jakarta, Djambatan, 1996.
Soebijono, dkk, Dwifungsi ABRI: Perkembangan dan Peranannya
dalam Kehidupan Politik di Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Gadjah
Mada University Press, 1992.
Subandrio, Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat, Jakarta,
Yayasan Kepada Bangsaku, 2001.
Subroto, Hendro, Sintong Panjaitan, Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit
Para Komando, Jakarta, Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009.
Sujito, Arie et al, Meretas Jalan Perdamaian di Tanah Papua,
Yogyakarta, Institute for Research and Empowerment
(IRE), 2009.
Sumarsono, Tatang (Ed.), A.H. Nasution di Masa Orde Baru,
Bandung, Mizan, 1997.
Sundhaussen, Ulf, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967: Menuju
Dwifungsi ABRI, Original Title: Road to Power: Indonesia
Military Politics 1945-1967, Translator: Hasan Basari,
Jakarta, Penerbit LP3ES, 1988.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 303
Strauss, Anselm & Juliet Corbin, Dasar-Dasar Penelitian
Kualitatif, Yogyakarta, Pusataka Pelajar, 2003.
Tim SKP Jayapura, Membangun Budaya Damai dan Rekonsiliasi,
Dasar Menangani Konflik di Papua, Jayapura, SKP
Keuskupan Jayapura, 2006.
Tim Imparsial, Perebutan Kuasa Intelijen: Dari Otoritarian
Menuju Penghormatan HAM, Jakarta, Juli, 2010.
Tebay, Neles, Dialog Jakarta-Papua; Sebuah Perspektif Papua,
Jayapura, SKP Jayapura, 2009.
The Supreme Court of Indonesia, Guidline Elements of
Crimes Gross Violations of Human Rights and Command
Responsibility”, Jakarta, The Supreme Court of Indonesia,
2006.
Uhlin, Anders, Oposisi Berserak, Bandung, Mizan, 1998.
Vincent, R.J., Human Rights and International Relations,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Vredenbregt, J., Metode dan Teknik Penelitian Masyarakat,
Jakarta, PT Gramedia, 1983.
Wandelt, IOrnop, “Security Sector Reform in Indonesia,
Military vs Civil Supremacy”, in Bob S Hadiwinata
and Christoph Schuck, Democracy in Indonesia,
The Challenge of Consolidation, Jakarta, Nomos,
2007.
Wonda, Sendius, Jeritan Bangsa, Rakyat Papua Barat
Mencari Keadilan, Yogyakarta, Penerbit Galangpress,
2009.
Widjojo, Muridan S (ed.), Papua Road Map: Negotiating the
Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future,
Jakarta, LIPI, Yayasan Tifa and Yayasan Obor Indonesia,
2007.
Yoman, Socratez Sofyan, Pemusnahan Etnis Melanisia;
Memecah Kebisuan Sejarah Kekerasan di Papua
Barat, Yogyakarta, Penerbit Galangpress, 2007.
B. Articles and Papers
Al Araf and Willy Aditya, “Transformasi Nilai TNI”, Bulletin
Sadar Edition 243 Year V-2009.
Alhumami, Amich, “The Politics of Identity in Papua Secession
Movement”, The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 34 No. 2
Second Quarter, 2006,.
Al Rahab, Amirudin, “Operasi-operasi Militer di Papua: Pagar
Makan Tanaman?”, Jurnal Penelitian Politik, Papua
Menggugat, (LIPI, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2006).
Al Rahab, Amirudin, “Papua, HAM, dan Negara yang
Merasa Terancam”, http://cetak.kompas. com/read/
xml/2009/12/17/03165267/papua.ham.dan.negara.
y (Accessed 29 April 2011).
Bakti, Ikrar Nusa, Diskusi “Penerapan Darurat Militer di Aceh,
Papua, dan Poso pada Pemilu 2004”, Propatria Institute,
Hotel Santika Jakarta, 7 January 2004
Chandrawati, Nurani, “Menelaah Hubungan Timbal Balik
Konflik Internal dengan Masalah Kemiskinan”, Jurnal
Global FISIP UI, Volume 8 No. 2 Mei 2005.
Fatubun, Wempi. “Hilangnya Rasa Aman (Situasi Militer dan
Ekosob Perbatasan RI-PNG di Kabupaten Merauke”.
Merauke: Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian
Keuskupan Agung Merauke, 2007.
Pedersen, Morten B., “The Crisis in Burma/Myanmar: Foreign
Aid as a Tool for Democratization”, NBR Analysis, (Vol.
15 No. Maret 2004), 2004.
Safa’at, Muchamad Ali, “RUU Perlindungan Pembela HAM”,
Paper presented in a Public Discussion “Pembuatan
Undang-Undang Perlindungan Pembela HAM sebagai
Jaminan bagi Pembela HAM di Indonesia”, Imparsial
and Kontras Aceh, Grand Nanggroe Hotel, Banda Aceh,
29 June 2010.
Reza, Bhatara Ibnu, “Kodam Legal Koops Ilegal: Carut Marut Struktur
Komando di Aceh”, Acehkita.com, 4 October, 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 305
Rifai-Hasan, P.A., “Development, Power, and the Mining Industry
in Papua: A Study of Freeport Indonesia”, Journal of
Business Ethics, 2009.
C. Report and Other Documents
Amnesti Internasional, 14-Poin Program for the Prevention of
Extrajudicial Executions. http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/
apro/APROweb.nsf/pages/philippines_pk_kit/$File/
recommendation1.pdf, (Accessed 11 February 2011).
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Document of the People of
Workwana, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Document of the People of Arso
Kota, Keerom District, 30 January 2011.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Document of the Sectoral
Groups in Jayapura, 4 February 2011.
Human Rights Watch. Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost
of the Indonesian Military’s Activities. (New York: Vol.
18No 5 (c), June 2006.
Imparsial Team “Human Rights Report 2006: The Absence of
the Sense of Rights”. January 2007.
Imparsial Team, “Human Rights Report 2008: Kembalinya
Konservatisme dalam Penanganan Kasus HAM di
Indonesia”. January 2009.
Imparsial ZTeam, “Human Rights Report 2009: ‘The Parsiality
of Human Rights Enforcement 2009’.
Koalisi LSM untuk Perlindungan dan Penegakan HAM di Papua.
“Laporan Awal Kasus Wamena 4 April 2003”. Jayapura,
6 May 2003.
Komnas HAM. “Laporan Tim Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan
Kekerasan di Puncak Jaya”. 22 December 2010.
Komnas HAM Papua Representative Yearly Report on 2010;
and National Commission on Human Rights, “Report
on Violence Monitoring Inquiry in Puncak Jaya”,
2011.
Laporan bersama Komnas Perempuan, Pokja Perempuan
Majelis Rakyat Papua dan International Center for
Transitional Justuce (ICTJ) Indonesia. “Stop Sudah!
Kesaksian Perempuan Papua Korban Kekerasan dan
Pelanggaran HAM 1963-2009”. hasil pendokumentasian
2009-2010. Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan dan Pokja
Perempuan Majelis Rakyat Papua, 2010.
Laporan Tahunan Komnas HAM Perwakilan Provinsi Papua
Tahun 2010.
Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Papua Wilayah Keerom, Arso.
“Laporan Situasi HAM di Kabupaten Keerom, Provinsi
Papua”. October 2007.
Pengadilan Koneksitas atas Kasus Teungku Bantaqiah, Putusan
No. 11/PID.B/KONEKS/2000/PN-BNA.
D. Interview Documents
Interview with Commander and Staff of Kodam XVII/
Cendrawasih, 18 and 19 January 2011.
Interview with Matius Murib, Vice Head of National Commission of
Human Rights Papua Representative , 19 January 2011.
Interview with Agus Alue Alua, Head of Papua People Assembly,
20 January 2011.
Interview with Thaha Alhamid, Papua Public Figure, 21
January 2011.
Interview with Forkorus Yaboisembut, Head of Papua
Traditional Council, 22 January 2011.
Interview with Erna Mahuze, Former Member of Papua People
Assembely, 26 January 2011.
Interview with Chief of Police of The Indonesian National
Police in Papua Province, 26 January 2011.
Interview with Aroby Achmad Aitarauw, Head of Papua
Moslem Concil 26 January 2011.
Interview with Socratez Sofyan Yoman, Executive Director of
Central Service Agency of the Baptism, 27 Januari 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 307
Interview with Theo Van den Broek, Papua People Figure,
28 January 2011.
Interview with the people of Workwana, 30 January
2011.
Interview with Pascalis Kossay: Member of Commission
I of the House of Representatives , 20 December
2010
Interview with Tubagus Hasanuddin, Vice Chairperson of
Commission I of the House of Representatives, 10
January 2011.
Interview with Eva Kusuma Sundari, Member of
Commission III of the House of Representatives, 4
February 2011
Interview with Amirudin Al Rahab: Excecutive Director
of RIDEP Institute Sabtu, 11 December 2010
Interview with Yunus Wonda, Vice Head I of Papua House
Phone interview with Latifah Anum Siregar, Executive
Director of ALDP, 25 April 2011.
Interview with Mr. Karseno, Head of Papua Desk From
Coordinating Minister of Politics, 9 November
2010.
Interview with Agus Wijojo, The Former Chief Territorial
Staff, Selasa 9 November 2010
Interview with Muridan S Widjojo, LIPI Researcher, Rabu,
12 Januari 2011
Interview with Jaleswari Pramurdhawardani, LIPI
Researcher, 9 November 2010.
Written interview with Neles Tebay, Director of STFT Fajar
Timur, Jayapura, Papua, 25 March 2011.
Interview with Sylvana Member of National Commission of
Violence Againts Womens, 11 April 2011.
Interview with Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Aceh Sociologist
Aceh, 13 June 2011.
E. Print Media
Cendrawasih Pos, “3 Batalion Baru Terbentuk”, 5 March 2004.
Majalah Tempo, “Membekap Kematian Sang Paitua”, 10-16
February 2003.
Majalah Tempo, “Mengungkap Operasi Piring Sendok”, 22
January 2006.
Jakarta Globe, “Shot Papuan Child Still Alive, but in Critical
Condition”, 24 June 2009.
Kompas, “Aceh Masih Membara, Dua Tentara Tewas; Di Irja
Warga Sipil Ditembak”, 11 June 1999.
Kompas, “Sidang Kasus Bantaqiah Diwarnai Protes Mahasiswa”,
20 April 2000
Kompas, “Kopassus Tidak Ditempatkan Lagi di Papua”, 25
Februari 2003.
Kompas, “Mabes TNI Belum Putuskan Kodam Papua”, 13
November 2009.
Kompas, “KSAD: Akan Ada Kodam Baru di Pulau Papua”, 12
November 2009..
Koran Tempo, “TNI Tuding Elsham Jaringan PDP”, 28 September
2002.
Koran Tempo, “Kodam Bantah Geledah Rumah”, 27 November
2010.
Pontianak Post, “Ryamizard: Pembunuh Theys Pahlawan”, 24
April 2003.
F. Internet
Alfian, M Alfan. “Doktrin Baru TNI”, http://alfanalfian.
multiply.com/journal/item/8/Doktrin_Baru_TNI
(Accessed 1 June 2011).
Al Rahab, Amiruddin. “Papua, HAM, dan Negara yang
Merasa Terancam”. http://cetak.kompas.com/
read/2009/12/17/03165267/papua.ham.dan.negara.
yang.merasa.terancam (Accessed 29 April 2011).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 309
Amnesty Internasional. “14-Poin Program for the Prevention
of Extrajudicial Executions”. http://asiapacific.amnesty.
org/apro/APROweb.nsf/pages/philippines_pk_kit/
$File/recommendation1.pdf, (Accessed 11 February
2011).
Bertrand, Jacques. “Papuan and Indonesian nationalisms:
Can They be reconciled?”. dalam Eva-Lotta E. Hedman
(eds.). Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua,
Indonesia. RSC Working Paper No. 42 September 2007,
University of Oxford, Inggris. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/
RSCworkingpaper42.pdf (Accessed 12 February
2011).
Chauvel, Richard dan Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. “The Papua
Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies”. EastWest Center Washington, 2004, www.eastwestcenter.
org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS005.pdf (Accessed 12
February 2011).
Kivimäki, Timo. Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors,
Issues, Process, and the Role of the International
Community. East-West Center Washington, 2006.
www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/
PS025.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011 pukul
20.00
Laporan-Laporan Dampak Kehadiran Aparat Keamanan
bagi Situasi Kemasyarakatan dan HAM di Wilayah
Pegunungan Bintang, Jayapura, Juli 1999 (The Report
on the Impact of the Presence of the Security Forces
to the Social and Human Rights Situation in the
Area of Star Mountains)” www.hampapua.org/skp/
index2.html
Masstricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 2226, 1997, www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
Maastrichtguidelines_.html, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
Mc Gibbon, Rodd. “Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic
Change, and the Papua Conflict”. East-West Center
Washington. www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/
stored/pdfs/PS013.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011).
Mc Gibbon, Rodd. “Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua:
Is Special Autonomy the Solution?”. East-West Center
Washington, www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/
stored/pdfs/PS010.pdf (Accessed 12 February
2011).
Ondawame, Otto. “Managing Conflict Over West Papua:
Community Engagement in Peaceful Dialogue”. http://
devnet.anu.edu.au/online%20versions%20pdfs/60/
0760Ondawame.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011).
Paragina, Judi. “Re-Vitalisasi dan Re-A k t u a l isa si
Pembinaan Teritorial Komando Kewilayahan TNI
AD Guna Mendukung Kepentingan Pertahanan
Matra Darat Pada Masa Mendatang”. www.kodamj aya . m i l . i d / a r s i p - a r t i ke l - ko n t r i b u s i / 9 6 0 - re vitalisasi-dan-re-aktualisasi-pembinaan-teritorialkomando-kewilayahan-tni-aa-guna-mendukungkepentingan-pertahanan-matra-darat-pada-masamendatang?start=3 (Accessed 2 February 2011).
Rabasa, Angel and John Haseman. “The Military and
Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and
Power”. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monograph_reports/MR1599/MR1599.ch10.pdf
Rees, S., & Silove, D. 2007. “Speaking Out about Human
Rights and Health in West Papua”, The Lancet,
370 (9588), 637. http://search.proquest.com/
docview/199064945?accountid=132811 (Accessed
12 February 2011).
Seruan Para Pemimpin Agama di Tanah Papua, www.
hampapua.org/skp/skp04/app-07i.pdf
BIBLIOGRAPHY 311
Situmorang, G.T. “Pertahanan Negara di Papua Semakin
B a i k ? ”. 2 0 0 6 , h t t p : / / w w w. t n i . m i l . i d / i n d ex 2 .
php?page=detailindex.html&nw_code=1837
Sugandi, Yulia. Conflict Analysis and Policy Recommendation
on Papua, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Jakarta. http://
library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indonesien/06394.
pdf (Accessed 12 February 2011).
Tebay, Neles. “Ke-(tidak)-percayaan antara Jakarta dan Papua”.
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/04/09/0448
0398/, 9 April 2011 (Accessed 2 May 2011).
http://antikorupsi.org/indo/index2.php, “TNI Bukan Tentara
Bayaran”, Senin, 2 Januari 2006, (Accessed 2 February
2011).
http://bataviase.co.id/node/520305, “Pangdam Cenderawasih:
Fasilitas Pengamanan Masih Kurang”, (Accessed 4
February 2011).
http://beritahankam.blogspot.com/2010/03/kopassusmutasi-sejumlah-perwira.html, ”Kopassus Mutasi
Sejumlah Perwira menengah”, (Accessed 5 April
2011).
http://berita.kapanlagi.com/politik/nasional/panglimatni-waspadai-elemen-separatis-bersenjata-di-papua65trre7.html, “Panglima TNI: Waspadai Elemen Separatis
Bersenjata di Papua” (Accessed 17 April 2011).
http://beritamiliter.com/pangdam-xviicendrawasih-bukapenataran-perang-hutan, “Pangdam XVII/Cenderawasih
Buka Penataran Perang Hutan” , (Accessed 2 February
2011).
http://fokus.vivanews.com/news/read/183918--videokekerasan-papua-tak-mengejutkan-, “Video Kekerasan
Papua Tak Mengejutkan”, 20 Oktober 2010 (Accessed 2
May 2011).
http://gresnews.com/ch/Regional/cl/
Kodam+XVII+Cenderawasih/id/1688319/Kodam+XV
II+Cenderawasih+Bantah+Menganiaya+Saat+Menggere
bek+Rumah+Tokoh+OPM, “Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih
Bantah Menganiaya Saat Menggrebek Rumah Tokoh
OPM”, (Accessed 4 March 2011)
http://idsps.org/idsps-news-indonesia/pers-release/
siaran-pers-bersama%3A-menyikapi-perluasankoter-dan-pergantian-panglima-tni-201007053814/,
Siaran Pers Bersama berjudul “Menyikapi Perluasan
Koter dan Pergantian Panglima TNI” [Accessed 22
April 2011].
http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/page/3323/tugas.html,
“Tugas TNI AD”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/page/3324/organisasi.
html, “Struktur Organisasi Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Angkatan Darat Komando Daerah Militer XVII/
Cenderawasih” (Accessed 2 February 2011).
http://kodam17cenderawasih.com/, (Accessed 2 February
2011).
http://kominfonewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id =708:panglima-tni-adadelapan-kelompok-ancaman-keamanan&catid=36:
nasional-khusus&Itemid=54, “Panglima TNI: Ada
Delapan Kelompok Ancaman Keamanan”, 5 Oktober
2010 (Accessed 27 April 20011).
http://kosmo.vivanews.com/news/read/82521-_tni_di_
balik_konflik_freeport__itu_fitnah_, “TNI Di Balik Konflik
Freeport, Itu Fitnah”, (Accessed 20 February 2011).
http://m.serambinews.com/news/view/1403/hakim-tolaksemua-eksepsi-pembela, “Hakim Tolak Semua Eksepsi
Pembela; Komandan Operasi Berikan Kesaksian”, 27
April 2000, (Accessed 14 June 2011).
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/10/22/1248124/
Djoko.Bantah.Operasi.Militer.di.Papua, “Djoko Bantah
Operasi Militer di Papua”, 22 Oktober 2010. (Accessed
29 April 2011).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 313
http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/183850-videokekerasan-tentara-indonesia-, “Video Penyiksaan di
Papua Beredar di Youtube”, (Diakses 22 Maret 2010).
http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/16/1/239148/
papua-rusuh-polri-tni-gelar-operasi-khusus, “Papua
Rusuh, Polri & TNI Gelar Operasi Khusus” (Accessed 1
February 2011).
http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/11/11/339/39247
6/panglima-akui-tni-gelar-operasi-militer-di-papua,
“Panglima Akui TNI Gelar Operasi Militer di Papua”
http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/12/07/340/40083
4/komnas-ham-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-naik-70,
“Komnas HAM: Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Naik 70%”, 7
Desember 2010 [Accessed 29 April 2011).
http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/14/1/238647/
insiden-freeport-terkait-rebutan-bisnis-militer-polisi,
“Insiden Freeport terkait Rebutan Bisnis Militer Polisi”
http://papualife.blogspot.com/2010/01/2010-papuadigelontor-rp-2189-triliun.html, “2010 Papua Digelontor
Rp 21,89 Triliun”, (Accessed 10 March 2011)
http://server.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.
html&nw_code =113012006119477, “Lebih Dekat
Dengan Pangdam XVII/Cenderawasih yang Baru
Mayjen TNI Azmyn Nasution” (Accessed 20 April
2011).
http://tabloidjubi.com/index.php/index-berita/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=660:
jelang-hari-pembebasan-papua-di-nabire-tnipolrigelar-operasi-terselubung&catid=42:seputar-tanahpapua&Itemid=65, “Jelang Hari Pembebasan Papua di
Nabire, TNI/Polri gelar Operasi Terselubung”, (Accessed
1 February 2011).
http://tabloidjubi.com/tabloid-jubi/surat-pembaca/1780stop-stigma-separatis-di-papua.html, “Stop Stigma
Separatis di Papua” [Accessed 2 May 2011).
http://tabloidjubi.com/index.php/daily-news/seputartanah-papua/10988-masyarakat-tolak-keberadaanp os- sa tga s-t n i-di- n a se m , “ M a sya ra ka t To l a k
Keberadaan Pos Satgas TNI di Nasem”, 13 February
2011 (Accessed 2 Mei 2011).
www.amnestyusa.org/justearth/indonesia.pdf, “Oil and
Mining Projects Threaten Communities in Aceh and
Papua”, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.antaranews.com/berita/1285892634/aparat-tni-ditimika-gelar-bakti-sosial, “Aparat TNI di Timika Gelar
Bhakti Sosial”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
www.antara-sumbar.com/id/index.php?sumbar=berita&d=0&id=7
6279, “Mantan Dan Satgas Maleo jadi Pangdam Cenderawasih”,
18 Januari 2010, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.detiknews.com/read/2010/12/31/154918/1536954
/10/panglima-tni-itu-bukan-pelanggaran-ham-berat,
“Panglima TNI: Itu Bukan Pelanggaran HAM Berat”, 31
Desember 2010, (Accessed 22 March 2011).
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php, ““635 Personel POLRI/
TNI Amankan Areal Freeport”, (Accessed 10 March
2011).
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&si
d=8060, “November Prajurit TNI di Mimika, Papua Gelar
Opster” (Accessed 4 February 2011).
www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&
sid=5682, “KSAD: Pengamanan di Papua Masih Harus
Melibatkan TNI” (Accessed 27 April 2011].
www.dpr.go.id/complorgans/commission/commission1/
visit/K1_kunjungan_Propinsi_Irian_Jaya_Barat.doc+k
unjungan+kerja+komisi+1+ke+papua, “K1 Kunjungan
Propinsi Irian Jaya Barat: Komisi 1 DPR RI”, (Accessed
4 February 2011).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 315
www.esdm.go.id/berita/37-umum/447-pt-freeportindonesia-menuju-sistem-pengamanan-internal.pdf,
“PT Freeport Indonesia Menuju Sistem Pengamanan
Internal”, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.harianpelita.com/read/14377/10/derap-tni_polri/
panglima-tni--gerakan-separatis-bersenjata-masihakan-terjadi/, “PanglimaTNI: Gerakan Separatis
Bersenjata Masih akan Terjadi”, 20 Januari 2011
www.indosiar.com/fokus/50367/panglima-tni-minta-dprdan-pemerintah-waspadai-separatis-papua, “Panglima
TNI Minta DPR dan Pemerintah Waspadai Separatis
Papua”, (Accessed 21 April 2011).
www.jatam.org/dmdocuments/papua.pdf, “Papua Membara
lagi. Tanya Freeport”, Editorial Jatam, 21 Juli 2009,
(Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.kendaripos.co.id, “Batalyon Infanteri 725/Woroagi
Siap Mengamankan Perbatasan NKRI-Papua Nugini”,
www.kompas.com/utama/news/0503/30/011908.htm,
“Anggota TNI Diduga Terlibat Illegal Loging di Papua,”
29 March 2005.
www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/LNG/Refs/002AbrashFreeport.pdf,
(Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2009/07/07/85387/17
/1/TNI-Minta-Imparsial-Berikan-Bukti, “TNI Minta
Imparsial Berikan Bukti” (Accessed 10 May 2011).
www.papuapos.com/index.php/index-berita/components/
com_comment/joscomment/images/templates /ww/
css/index.php?option=com _content&task=view&id=
1441&Itemid=0, “Kegiatan Separatisme Masih ada di
Papua”, 13 Agustus 2008 (Accessed 21 April 2011).
www.papuabaratnews.com/index.php?option=com_conten
t&view=article&id=1773:panglima-tni-perintahkanpangdam-cendrawasih-membantu-polda-
papua&catid=83:hukum-dan-kriminal&Itemid=460,
“Panglima TNI Perintahkan Pangdam Cenderawasih
Membantu Polda Papua” (Accessed 1 February
2011).
www.primaironline.com/berita/detail.php?catid=Politik&a
rtid=imparsial-minta-aparat-keamanan-tak-langsungtuduh-tpn-opm, “Imparsial Minta Aparat Tak Langsung
Tuduh TPN-OPM” (Accessed 11 May 2011).
www.ptfi.com/reports/files/wtsd2006.pdf, “Nilai Mendasar. PT
Freeport Indonesia. Laporan Berkarya Menuju Pembangunan
berkelanjutan 2006”, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.rakyatmerdekaonline.com/news.php?id=13646,
“Panglima TNI: Penyiksaan Warga di Papua Bukan
Pelanggaran HAM Berat”, 1 Januari 2011 [Accessed 3
May 2011).
www.smh.com.au/world/new-dad-dies-in-gunman-attack20090711-dgmx.html?skin=text-only, “New Dad Dies in
Gunman Attack”, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.tempo.co.id/harian/include/05/652000-205.htm,
“Lanjutan Sidang Koneksitas Aceh; Danrem Liliwangsa
Jadi Saksi”, 6 Mei 2000, (Accessed 13 June 2011).
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2003/04/23/
brk,20030423-43,id.html, “Jenderal Ryamizard:
Pembunuh Theys Hiyo Eluay adalah Pahlawan”, 23 April
2003, (Accessed 16 March and 19 April 2011).
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/papua/2006/12/19/
brk,20061219-89737,id.html, “Papua Dinilai Rawan, TNI
AL Gelar Latihan Perang”, (Accessed 3 February 2011).
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/2009/06/23/
brk,20090623-183280,id.html, “Warga Perbatasan
Papua Tewas Ditembak Prajurit TNI”, (Accessed 10
March 2011).
www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2006/02/28/
brk,20060228-74603,id.html, “TNI Belum Tarik Pasukan
dari Papua”, 28 Februari 2006 (Accessed 23 April 2011).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 317
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/30/govt-slammed-tnisecurity-payments.html, “Govt Slammed for TNI Security
Payments”, 08 30 2008, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.tni.mil.id/images/gallery/tni%20commits%20to%20ref
orm%20by%20kohirin.pdf, (Accessed 10 March 2011).
www.tni.mil.id/index2.php?page=detailindex.html&nw_
code=2011200920112655 “Danrem 172/Praja
Wirayakti Sillaturahmi ke Pimpinan Dewan Adat Papua”
code=113012006122373 “Pangdam XVII/Cenderawasih
Mayjen TNI A.Y Nasution Bertatap Muka Dengan Para
Ketua LSM Se-Papua” (Accessed 1 Februari 2011).
code=113012006112779 “TNI di Papua Diminta Tetap
Waspada”, (Accessed 1 February 2011).
code=113012006112748, “TNI Tetap Akan Fokuskan
Operasi Kewilayahan di Papua” (Accessed 1 February
2011).
code=113012006112754 “TNI Tetap persuasif di
Provinsi Papua”, (Accessed 1 February 2011).
code=113012006122917 “Kodam XVII/Cen Bertekad
Wujudkan Papua Tanah Damai”, (Accessed 2 February
2011).
code=113012006119806, “Danrem 172/PWY: Minat
Putra Asli Papua Jadi Anggota TNI, Minim”, (Accessed 2
February 2011).
www.tnial.mil.id/Majalah/Cakrawala/ArtikelCakrawala/
tabid/125/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1496/
Default.aspx, “Lantamal XI Merauke: Menjaga Sumber
Daya Alam Papua”, (Accessed 2 February 2011).
code=1644, “Angkatan Darat Tetap Tambah Satu Divisi
di Papua”, Accessed 2 February 2011).
code=113012006117841, “TNI AL Ringkus Kapal
Berbendera Hongkong di Perairan Papua Barat”,
code=113012006112882, “Armada Jaya XXVI TNI AL Gelar
Latihan Perang di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=113012006119146, “Penyiapan Radar TNI Au
di Papua Tidak Ada Masalah”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
code=113012006113598, “TNI-AU Akan Tempatkan
Radar di Timika, Papua”, (Diakses 4 February 2011).
code=375, “Pangdam VII/WRB Melepas 900 Personil
ke Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=113012006111933, “Yonif 521 Akan Gantikan
Batalyon 509/Kostrad di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
code=2011200920117113, “141/AYJP Berangkat ke
Papua” (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=113012006123398, “Pangdam VII/Wirabuana
Kunjungi Satgas 725/Woroagi di Papua”, (Accessed 4
February 2011).
code=2011200920115516, “Upacara Pembukaan
Latihan Pratugas Satgas Ops Pamtas Papua Yonif 141/
AYJP TA”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 319
code=113012006119146, “Penyiapan Radar TNI AU
di Papua Tidak Ada Masalah”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
code=375 , “Pangdam VII/WRB Melepas 900 Personil
ke Papua”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=2011200920117113, “141/AYJP Berangkat ke
Papua”, (Diakses 4 February 2011).
code=113012006111933, “Yonif 521 Akan Gantikan
Batalyon 509/Kostrad di Papua”, (Accessed 4 February
2011).
code=113012006123398, “Pangdam VII/Wirabuana
Kunjungi Satgas 725/Woroagi di Papua”, (Accessed 4
February 2011).
code=2011200920115516, “Upacara Pembukaan
Latihan Pratugas Satgas Ops Pamtas Papua Yonif 141/
AYJP TA. 2010”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=347, “Kopassus Tidak Ditempatkan Lagi di Papua”,
code=1614, “Gubernur Papua Lepas Satgas Manunggal
Desa Binaan”, (Accessed 4 February 2011).
code=1579, “Koarmatim Operasi Bhakti ke Papua”,
code=2011200920111772, “Kasad: Dikaji
Pembentukan Kodam Baru di Papua”, (Accessed 7
February 2011).
code=1782, “Papua Butuh Tambahan 10 Pos TNI”,
code=113012006114962, “Panglima TNI: Separatisme
Ancaman Persatuan dan Kesatuan Bangsa” (Accessed 3 May
2001).
www.vhrmedia.com/vhr-news/berita,MA-Tolak-KasasiTerpidana-Kasus-Mile-62-63-539.html, “MA Olak Kasasi
Terpidana Kasu Mile 62-63” (Accessed 3 May 2011).
www.wartapapuabarat.org/index.php/eco-terrorismtop/153eco-terrorism/145-dprp-minta-tni-dan-polri-ditarikdari-areal-freeport, “DPRP Minta TNI dan POLRI Ditarik
dari Area Freeport”, 28 Maret 2010. (Accessed 10 March
2011)
www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=155847:dokumen-operasi-kopassus-dipapua-bocor&catid=17:nasional&Itemid=30, “Dokumen
Operasi Kopassus di Papua bocor”, 11 November 2010
[Accessed 23 April 2011).
www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=150655:buktikan-tni-langgar-ham-dipapua&catid=17:nasional&Itemid=30, “Buktikan TNI
Langgar HAM di Papua”, 19 October 2010. (Accessed 2
May 2011).
G. Dokumen Internasional
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West
Irian), New York, 15 August 1962.
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 1983.
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN
doc. E/CN.4/1987/17.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res.
2200A, (XXI), December 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp
(No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force January
3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, 2006.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
UN General Assembly, Resolution 61/177 Adopted
by the General Assembly: International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, 12 January 2007, A/
RES/61/177.
H. Legal Regulation
1945 Constitution (Second Amendment)
TAP MPR Nomor IV of1978 of State Guidelines
TAP MPR Nomor XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights
TAP MPR Nomor VII of 2000 on the Roles of Military and
Police
Law Number 59 of 1958 on State Participation in Geneva
Convention Dated 12 August 1949.
Law Number 1 of 1988 on the Amendment of Law Number
20 of 1982 on State Security Guidelines State
Gazette of 1988 Nomor 3.
Law Number 31 of 1997 on Military Court State Gazette of
1997 Number 84.
Law Number 39 of 1999 on Human Rights State Gazette of
1999 Number 165.
Law Number 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Court State
Gazette of Number 208.
Law Number 34 of 2004 on National Military Indonesian
State Gazette of 2004 Number 127.
Law Number 45 of 1999 on the Establishment of Province of
Central Irian Jaya, Proinve of West Irian Jaya, District
of Paniai, District of Mimika, District of Puncak Jaya,
and the City of Sorong State Gazette of 1999 Number
173.
Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for the
Province of Papua Otonomi State Gazette of 2001
Number 135.
Presidential Instruction Number 21 of 2003 on the
Acceleration of Implementation of Law Number 45
of 1999 Tentang Pembentukan Province of Central
Irian Jaya, Proinve of West Irian Jaya, District of Paniai,
District of Mimika, District of Puncak Jaya, and the
City of Sorong.
323
ATTACHMENT
Operation B
Antrareja
Imam Sura
Aluguro
Badar Lumut
Badar Besi
Cakra
Lumba-Lumba
Sikat
Banteng I
Banteng II
Lintas
Garuda Merah
Garuda Putih
Serigala
Operation A
(Guerilla Troops)
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
4
Infiltration
Infiltration
Infiltration
Name of Operation
1
2
3
No
1960
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
n/a
1962
1962
1962
1960
1952
1953
1954
Year
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Colonel (L) M Subarkah
Colonel (L) M Subarkah
n/a
n/a
n/a
Major Airforce Nayoan
Captain (Pnb) Santoso
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Major Roedjito
Ali Kahar
Sergeant Kalalo ML
JA Dimara
Command
Table 1.
Military Operation in Papua
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Operational
Issues
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Enemy Faced
42
Wibawa
Barata Yudha
Sadar
41
40
Kancil I
Kancil II
Kancil III
Naga
Rajawali
Lumbung
Jatayu
Gurita
Sadar
Merpati
Damai
Nurti
Opsus
Janggi
Wisnumurti I
Wisnumurti II
Wisnumurti III
Wisnumurti IV
Giat
Tangkas
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
1967-1969
1966-1967
1965
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
n/a
n/a
n/a
1961-1969
n/a
1963
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
Brigadire General Sarwo Edhi
Wibowo
Brigadire General R Bintoro
Brigadire General R Kartidjo
n/a
n/a
n/a
Captain LB Moerdani
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Mayor Ali Moertopo
n/a
Brigadire General U Rukman
Brigadire General U Rukman
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Belanda dan OPM
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
ATTACHMENT 325
Wamena Sweeping
Flag Raising Monitoring
Vulnerable Area Monitoring
Rajawali III
Rajawali II
Rajawali I
Kasuari II
Kasuari I
Gagak II
Gagak I
2002-2004
1999-2002
1998-1999
1994-1995
1990-1991
1989-1990
1988-1989
1987-1988
1986-1987
1985-1986
1984
1978-1982
1977
1971
n/a = not available
Source: Compiled from various literature
56
55
54
53
52
51
50
49
48
47
46
Sate
Sapu Bersih
Koteka
45
44
Pamungkas
43
Major General Nurdin Zaenal
Major General Mahidin Simbolon
Major General Amir Sembiring
Major General I Ketut Wardhana
Major General Abinowo
Major General Abinowo
Major General Wismoyo
Arismunandar
Major General Wismoyo
Arismunandar
Major General Setiana
Brigadire General RK Sembiring
Meliala
Brigadire General H
Simanjuntak
Brigadire General CI Santosa
Brigadire General Imam
Munandar
Brigadire General Acub Zainal
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Disintegration
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
Free Papua
Movement
6
5
Infantry Battalion 752/
Cenderawasih
1964
1964
1962
1962
Diponegoro
Cenderawasih
Battalion 328/Siliwangi
4
3
Battalion 530/Brawijaya 1962
2
1962
Year of
Deployment
Mobile Brigade Pioneer
Detachment
Name of the Troops
1
No
n/a
n/a
141
71
160
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Organic
Number
of
Status
Troops
65
Non
Organic
Sorong
Manokwari
(now in
Jayapura)
Kaimana
Kaimana
Merauke
Fak-fak
Post
Tabel 2.
List of Troops Deployed to Papua
Led by Aiptu Hudaya Sumarya in
the infiltration done under Mandala
Command. Mobile Brigade at that
time was under the military until the
separation of the military and the police
in 1999.
Led by Captain Bambang Soepeno. This
troop was involved in Dragon Operation.
Led by Liuetentant Atma, involved in
Rajawali Operaiton
Led by Major Untung, involved in Gagak
Group Operasi Jatayu Operation.
From Military Area Command VII/
Diponegoro, a development from Infantry
Battalion 641/Cenderawasih I now is
Infantry Battalion 751/ Vira Jaya Sakti
and organic unit to Military Resort
Command 172/PW Praja Wira Yakti.
From Military Area Command VI/Siliwangi,
a development from Infantry Battalion
642/Tjenderawasih II. Now is called
Infantry Battalion 752/Praja Wira Tama
and an organic unit to merupakan satuan
organik Military Resort Command 171/PVT
Praja Wira Tama. Violence and Human
Rights Violations against Women in Papua
Documentation Working Group 2009-2010
noted that alleged members of this troop
raped 5 underaged women in 2006.
Notes
ATTACHMENT 327
Siliwangi
RIT
Mobile Brigade
Hasanuddin
Army Intelligence
Executing Unit (Dinas
Pelaksana Intelijen AD
/Dipiad)
Airborne Battalion 733/
Maluku
8
13
12
11
10
9
Cenderawasih
7
1984
1967-1969
1967-1969
1966-1967
1966-1967
1966-1967
1964
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Organic
Mamberamo,
Arso, Wares,
Kemtuk, Demta
Enarotali,
Paniai
Enarotali
n/a
n/a
n/a
Jayapura
Violence and Human Rights Violations
against Women in Papua Documentation
Working Group 2009-2010 noted that
alleged members of this troop impregnated
a Merauke residence in 2001-2002.
Involved in Wibawa Operation. In
this operation, personnel from Army
Intelligence Executing Unit was also
involved
Since 1984, battalion from this troop was
delopyed to Papua and rotated once a year.
Involved in Wibawa Operation
Involved in Baratayudha Operation
A development from Infantry Battalion
641/Tjenderawasih I and Infantry
Battalion 642/Tjenderawasih II. Now is
called Infantry Battalion 753/Arga Vira
Tama. A combat unit from Military Area
Command XVII/Cenderawasih under
Infantry Brigade 20/Ima Jayakeramo.
Violence and Human Rights Violations
against Women in Papua Documentation
Working Group 2009-2010 noted that
alleged members of this troop raped a
minor in 2005.
Kostrad
Combat Intelligence/
Kostrad
Combat Engineering
Battalion 5/Brawijaya
Tanjungpura
Tanjungpura
Brawijaya
Siliwangi
Maluku
Special Forces Command
(Kopassus, then RPKAD)
17
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
Combat Engineering 10
Kilipur-4/Diponegoro
15
16
Combat Engineering
4/Diponegoro
14
1960
1990
1988-1989
1988-1989
1988-1989
1987-1988
1986-1987
1986-1987
1986-1987
1985-1986
1985-1986
1985
Varied
in each
operation
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Wamena
Jayapura
Jayapura
Mendiptana
and Waropko
n/a
Wamena,
Jayapura,
Nabire
Mendiptana
dan Waropko
Wamena
This troop was deployed to Papua before
Mandala Command was established
Involved operations in 1990s
Involved in Rajawali I Operation, involved
operations in 1990s
Involved in Rajawali I Operation
Involved in Rajawali I Operation
Involved in Kasuari I Operation
Involved in Gagak II, Kasuari I, Rajawali I
Operations
Involved in Gagak II Operation
Involved in Gagak II Operation
Involved in Gagak I Operation
Involved in Gagak I Operation
Involved in Gagak I, Gagak II, Kasuari I
Operations
ATTACHMENT 329
Yalet
Winame Sili
Suhbrastha
Badak Putih
29
30
31
33
Caraka Yudha
Eme Neme Kangasi
28
32
Marine Command Corps
(Marinir (KKO)
27
n/a
n/a
n/a
2005
2005
2005
1962
Special Corps Command 1962
(Paskhas, then Kopasgat)
26
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Organic
Organic
Varied in each
operation
Varied
Organic
in each
operation
n/a
Organic
n/a
n/a
n/a
Wamena.
Merauke
Timika
Varied in each
operation
Varied
Organic
in each
operation
Mandala Command was established.
There is one organic battalion in Biak,
Battalion 468 Sarotama Special Forces
(Paskhas) with headquarter in Biak
Numfor District.
Mandala Command was established. Now
Marine Troop-3 resides in Sorong.
This battalion was established in 2005.
It is a combat unit of Military Area
Command XVII/Cendrawasih under
It is an organic unit of Military Resort
Command 174/ATW Anim Ti Waninggap
Merauke.
It is a combat unit of Military Area
Command XVII/Cenderawasih under
This came from Military Area Command
IV/Diponegoro yang bertugas menjaga
perbatasan.
V/ Brawijaya yang bertugas menjaga
perbatasan.
III/Siliwangi yang bertugas menjaga
perbatasan.
Awang Long
Tamalarea
37
38
41
40
39
Infantry Battalion
413/6/2 Kostrad
Infantry Battalion 413
Bremoro / Kostrad
Airborne Infantry
Battalion 431/Satria
Setia Perkasa
Kostrad
501/Bajra Yudha
36
35
Setia Sampai Mati
Airborne Infantry
Battalion
34
n/a
n/a
n/a
2003
2002
2005-2006
2005-2006
n/a
124
450
124
n/a
n/a
n/a
350
n/a
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
n/a
Timika
n/a
n/a
n/a
Timika
n/a
An Army Strategic Reserve Command
securing the borders.
Led by Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry)
Luthfie Beta. Involved in Security
Operation of PT Freeport Indonesia in
Timika, Papua.
Under the command of Infantry
Brigadire 9/2 Daraka Yudha, Army
Strategic Reserved Unit. Headquarter of
this Battalion was in Sukerejo, Jember.
Involved in securing the borders between
Indonesia and Papua New Guiena
operations.
Under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel (Infantry) Suharjono. Involved in
the Assignment to Critical Areas -Rajawali
1.
The headquarter in Palleko
Polobangkeng, Takalar. Involved in
Assignment to Critical Areas Operation
Under the command of Captain (Infantry)
Suratno
Lead by Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry)
Syafruddin. Involved in National
Vital Object of PT Freeport Indonesia
Operation, Timika, Papua.
Lead by Kapten (Inf) Suratno. Involved in
Assignment to Critical Areas Operation
ATTACHMENT 331
Woroagi
Airborne Infantry
Battalion 432/Waspada
Setia Jaya
Wing I Special Corps
Paracommand (Wing I
Paskhas Parakomando)
Airborne Infantry
Battalion 431 Satria
Setia Perkasa / Kostrad
2008
n/a
650
450
September
n/a
2004-December
2005
n/a
n/a
Souces: A compilation from various literature
45
44
43
42
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
Non
Organic
n/a
Timika
Timika
n/a
operations.
Involved in National Vital Object of PT
Freeport Indonesia Operation, Timika,
Papua.
Lead by Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry)
Syafruddin. Involved in National Vital
Object of PT Freeport Indonesia
Operation, Timika, Papua.
operations.
Number of
Troops
500 personnel
(estimated)
300 personnel (estimated)
200 personnel
(estimated)
Colonel ARH Hadi
Prasojo
Colonel (Infantry) I
Made Agra, former
Asops Kodam Jaya
300 personnel
(estimated)
174/Anim Ti
Waninggap
Merauke, Papua
173/Praja Vira
Braja
Biak, Papua
XVII/ Cenderawasih
Jl. Setiapura II, Jayapura, Papua
Major General Erfi Triassunu
(Once assigned as Commander in Chief of Military Resort Command 173/Praja Vira Braja in 20042007)
725 personnel (estimatimated)
Pelaksanaan tugas TNI Matra Darat di bidang pertahanan; pelaksanaan tugas menjagaan
keamanan kawasan perbatasan darat RI-PNG dan pulau-pulau terluar; pelaksanaan pembangunan
kekuatan Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih; dan juga pelaksanaan pemberdayaan wilayah pertahanan di
darat.
171/Praja Vira
172/Praja Wirayakti
Tama
Jl. Pramuka No. 1
Abepura, Papua
Remu, Sorong, Papua
Barat
Current
Colonel (Infantry)
Colonel (Infantry) Daniel Ambat
Commander and Heronimus Guru
Rank
Military Resort
Command
Headquarter
Tasks and Function
Number of Troops
Current Commander and Rank
Military Area Command
Headquarter
Tabel 3.
Show of Force Military Area Command XVII/Cenderawasih
ATTACHMENT 333
Tasks and
Function
Supervising 5
Military District
Command and 1
Infantry Battalion
2. Military Sub-District Command
Headquarter 1701/Jayapura in Jayapura
covering an area of 164.712 Km2,
supervising 16 Military Sub-District
Commands and 2 Military Sub-District
Command Posts with the area of 1 City
(Jayapura) and 2 Districts (Keerom and
Jayapura Districts) supervising 9 Districts
in the Eastern part sharing borders with
Papua New Guinea, Westen part sharing
borders with Military Resort Command
173/PVB, Northern part sharing border
with the Pacific Ocean and Pasific in
the Southern part sharing border with
Military District Command 1712/JWY;
1. Military Resort Command 172/Praja
Wirayakti covering an area of 259.180,91
Km2 comprising of 3 Military District
Command, 36 Military Sub-District
Commands and 4 Military Sub-District
Command Posts covering 1 City and 12
Districts with in the Eastern part sharing
borders with Papua New Guinea, in
the Eastern part sharing borders with
Military Resort Command 173/PVB, in the
Western part sharing borders with Pasific
Ocean in the South part sharing borders
with Military Resort Command 174/ATW;
Supervising Military District Command
1701/JPR, Military District Command
1702/JWY, Military District Command
1712/Sarmi:
Supervising Military
District Command
1705/Paniai, Military
District Command
1708/Biak Numfor/
Military District
Command 1709/
Yapen Waropen/
Infantry Battalion
753/AVT dan
Combat Engineering
Detachment 12
Supervising Military
District Command
1707/Merauke,
Military District
Command 1711/
Boven Digul, Battalion
755/Yalet, and
Combat Engineering
Detachment 11/MA
Number of Troops
Tasks and Function
Current Commander
and Rank
Lieutenant
Colonel
(Cavalry)
Edward Sitorus
-
KODIM 1703/
Military Resort
Command 171/Praja Manokwari
Vira Tama
Headquarter
-
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
(Cavalry)
Agus Erwan
-
-
Kaimana
District
Jl. Jenderal Ahmat Yani,
Kota Sorong, Papua
Barat
Lieutenant
Colonel (Infantry)
Abdurrahman
Jl. Agimuga Mile
32 Kualakencana,
Mimika, Papua
Lieutenant Colonel
(Infantry) Boni
Christian Pardede
1706/Fakfak 1710/Mimika
1704/Sorong
4. Military Sub-District Command
Headquarter 1712/Sarmi in Sarmi covering
an area of 41.553,91 Km2, supervising 7
Military Sub-District Commands.
3. Military Sub-District Command Headquarter
1702/Jayawijaya di Jayawijaya covering an
area of 52.915 Km2, supervising13 Military
Sub-District Command and 2 Military
Sub-District Command Posts 13 Military
Sub-District Command and 2 Military SubDistrict Command Post with the areas of 8
Districts of Jayawijaya, Yahukimo, Tolikara,
Peg Bintang, Mamberamo Tengah, Lany
Jaya, Yalimo and Nduga in the Eastern part
sharing borders with Papua New Guinea,
Westen part sharing Military Resort
Command 173/PVB, Northern part sharing
Military District Command 1701/Jayawijaya
in the Southern part Military Resort
Command 174/ATW;
-
Lieutenant Colonel Arm
Budi Darmawan (???)
JL. Pramuka No. 1 Sorong,
Papua Barat
1713/Kaimana
ATTACHMENT 335
-
-
-
Number of
Troops
Tasks and
Function
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
Cavalry
Edward
Sitorus
-
Current
Commander
and Rank
-
-
Headquarter
Military
District
Command
1703/
Manokwari
Military
District
Command
1702/
Jayawijaya
Military
District
Command
1705/
Paniai
-
-
-
Jl. Jenderal
A. Yani
Klademak,
Sorong, Papua
Barat
Lieutenant
Colonel
Infantry
Abdurrahman
Military
District
Command
1704/Sorong
-
-
-
-
Military
District
Command
1706/Fakfak
-
-
-
-
Military
District
Command
1708/Biak
Numfor
-
-
-
Military
District
Command
1709/
Yapen
Waropen
-
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
Infantry
Christian
Boni
Pardede
-
-
Military
District
Command
1710/
Mimika
-
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
Czi Setya
Gantiarto
Sarmi
District
Military
District
Command
1712/
Sarmi
Lieutenant Colonel Czi Setya
Gantiarto
-
Lieutenant Colonel (Field Artilery)
Ihutma Sihombing
-
Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry)
S.E. Ginting
-
Military District Command
1712/Sarmi
Military District Command 1701/ Military District Command
JPR
1702/JWY
Military Resort
Command 173/
Praja Vira Braja
Military Resort Command
172
Headquarter
Current Commander and
Rank
Number of Troops
Tasks and Function
-
-
Headquarter
Current
Commander
and Rank
Maybrat
District, West
Papua
Captain
Infantry Roby
1704-04/
Ayamaru
Captain
Infantry
Sugiarto
South Sorong
District
1704-05/
Teminabuan
1704-12/Aifat Military
Sub District
Command
1706-02
Bomberay
Maybrat
District, West
Papua
Second
Lieutenant
Infantry Basir
Ando
-
-
Military Sub
District Command
02/Sausapor Kab.
Tambraw
Combat
Engineering
Detachment
10
Battalion
Name
Waena, Yoka
valley
Headquarter
Current
Commander
and Rank
Major Czi
Winarno
Engineering
Type of
Battalion
255 Troops,
11 Officers,
50 Non
Commission
Officers, 194
Private
Number of
Troops
Carring out construction, destruction, and
passive nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons to expand the movement of own
unit, to restrict the movement of enemy
unit and to support the survival ability of
Military Area Command.
Roles and Functions
Notes
Captain Infantry
Catur
Military
Sub District
Command
1703-07/
Wasior
-
Table 4.
Show of Force of Battalions Under Military Area Command XVII/Cenderawasih
170104/Arso
Military
Sub District
Command
ATTACHMENT 337
Infantry
Battalion
753/AVT
Combat
Engineering
Detachment
11
Combat
Engineering
Detachment
12
Combat
Engineering
-13
Infantry
Battalion
752/VYS
Infantry
Lieutenant
Colonel
Infantry
Purmanto
Klasaman
Sorong, Papua
Barat
Yapen Waropen Lieutenant
District
Colonel
Infantry
Hidayat
Suryono.
Engineering
-
Klalin Kab.
Sorong, Papua
Barat
Jl. Basuki
Rahmat KM 12
Infantry
-
-
Sorong
Engineering
-
Waena,
Jayapura
-
-
-
-
-
f. 1984 -1989 Galang Operation in Paniai.
e. 1975 - 1976 Kikis Operation in the
borders of Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea.
d. 1974 - 1980 Tumpas 1, 2 dan 3
Operations in the borders of Indonesia
and Papua New Guinea, Wamena,
Timika, Fak-Fak, Tembaga Pura,
Jayapura and Nabire.
c. 1973 Koteka Operation in Wamena
and Sakti Operation in the borders of
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.
b. 1971 - 1972 Waspada Operation and
dan Sakti Operation in the borders of
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.
a. 1970 Pamungkas Operation in Biak.
Operations
Rawan Critical Area Security Operation
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Infantry
Battalion
754/Eme
Neme
Kangasi
Mimika District, West Papua
Infantry
-
-
q. 2005 - now Operasi Pam Rah Wan in
Puncak Jaya and Paniai.
p. 2004 Tugas Pam RI I and RI II in
Nabire.
o. 2004 - 2005 Rajawali II Operation in
Jayapura.
n. 2004 - 2005 Pam Rah Wan Operation in
Puncak Jaya.
m. 2003 - 2004 Rajawali I Operation in
Jayapura and Sarmi.
l. 2002 - 2003 Pam Obyek Vital Tembaga
Pura Operation and Pam Rah Wan
Operation in Paniai and Puncak Jaya.
k. 2001 - 2002 Nuri Operation in Paniai
and Puncak Jaya.
j. 1993 Tugas Pam RI I and II in Jayapura.
i. 1992 Tugas Pam Pemilu.
h. 1989 - 2000 Rajawali Operation in
Paniai and Timika.
g. 1981, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 2003 Pam
Obyek Vital Tembaga Pura Operation
Dislocation
of troops
are: Mayon,
Kima, Kipan
A and Kibant
in Kuala
Kencana,
Kipan B in SP
3, Kipan C in
Mapurujaya,
Kipan D in
Pomako, and
Kipan E in
Kaimana.
ATTACHMENT 339
Infantry
Battalion
756/Wi
mane Sili
Infantry
Battalion
755/Yalet
Infantry
Battalion
752/VYS
Wamena
Jl. Basuki
Rahmat KM.
10 Klasaman
Sorong, West
Papua
Papua
Merauke
Sentani,
Jayapura,
Jl. Lintas Barat
Sumatera,
Muaraenim
Infantry
Battalion
751/Berdiri
Sendiri
Infantry
Battalion
141/AYJP
Skouw Wutung,
Muara Tami
District,
Jayapura City
Infantry
Battalion
Linud 330/
TD
-
-
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
Infantry Ida
Idewa Agung
Hadisaputra
-
Lieutenant
Colonel
Infantry R.
Novi Rubadi
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
-
-
-
-
-
-
Pamrahwan Task Force
-
-
Pamrahwan Task Force
-
-
-
-
-
-
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Security Task Force
Combat Unit
80-225
300-1.300
3.000-5.000
10.000-15.000
8-13
26-55
Personnel
Captain/Major
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel/Brigadire General
Major General
Commander
Group Commander
Platoon Commander
Military
District
Command
Military
Sub District
Command
Border
Protection
Forces
-
-
40-50 personnel
-
Captain
-
Estimated Number
Commander
of Troops
Source
100 personnel
Liutenant Colonel
http://www.google.co.id/sear (Based on the List
ch?sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF- of Personnel and
8&q=laporan+kunjungan+kerj Equipment)
a+komisi+1+dpr+PAPUA
Notes
kekuatan pengamanan perbatasan
sebanyak 114 pos, meliputi 20 pos satuan
organik oleh Yonif 751, 755, dan 756,
dan 94 pos oleh satuan non organik oleh
Yonif 408, 303, 320, dan 516. Keseluruhan
jumlah personel yang terlibat 4.044 orang.
-
Territorial Unit
According to 1985 TOPROY TNI, the number of personnel in the battalion is 747 personnel, yet improvement made in the issuance of
2000 TOPROY TNI in 2000 documented more than 1,000 personnel, as it supervises more than 3 company (a, b, c, d, e) and additional
assistance company and headquarter company.
Company
Battalion
Regiment/Brigade
Division
Information :
Group
Platoon
Tabel 5.
Estimated Number of Military Troops in Papua
ATTACHMENT 341
500 personnel
(estimated)
Military Resort
Command 171/
PVT
Military Resort
Command 172/PW
1029 personnel
Infantry Battalion
751/BS
Infantry Battalion
752/Sorong
Infantry Battalion
753/Nabire
Combat
Engineering
Detachment 10
Total Organic
Troops
8.045 personnel
(estimated)
1000 personnel
(estimated)
1000 personnel
(estimated)
-
3.000 personnel
(estimated)
300 personnel
(estimated)
200 personnel
(estimated)
Military Resort
Command 173/PVB
Military Resort
Command 174/
ATW
Infantry Brigade
20/IJK
300 personnel
(estimated)
Number of Troops
725 personnel
Organic
Military Area
Command XVII/
Cenderawasih
Infantry Battalion under Military Area Command
Supervising 3 Infantry Battalions: Infantry Battalion
754/Eme Neme Kangasi Timika; Infantry Battalion
755 Yalet Merauke, Infantry Battalion 756 Winame
Sili Wamena These three Infantry Battalions are
merged from the best Infantry Battalions under the
supervision of Military Resort Command.
-
-
http://bayitentara041.blogspot.
com/
-
-
Supervising 3 Military District Command, 36
Military Sub-District Command and 4 Military SubDistrict Command Posts
Supervising 3 Military District Command, 1 Infantry Battalion and 1 Combat Engineering Detachment
Supervising 2 Military District Command, 1
Batalyon and 1 Combat Engineering Detachment
Notes
Sources
Military and Government Personnel in Military Area http://kodam17cenderawasih.
com/article/57465/ditengahCommand XVII/Cenderawasih
berbagai-keterbatasan-prajuritkodam-xviicenderawasih-tetapmampu-mengaktualisasikan-jatidiri.html
Supervising 5 Military District Command and 1
Infantry Battalion
Lanud Merauke Air Strip (Type C)
Lanud Manuhua Air Strip, Biak (Type C)
Timika Air Strip Jayawijaya
Radar Merauke
Radar Timika
Radar Biak
Total Air Force Troops
-
-
Note
Note
Resource: http://www.dpr.go.id/complorgans/
commission/commission1/visit/K1_kunjungan_Kunker_
Komisi_I_DPR_RI_ke_Papua_Barat.pdf
Number of Troops
80
80
80
70
70
70
570 (estimated)
120
Fasharkan Manokwari: 219 personnel
1.272 personnel (estimated)
Sorong Navy Base: 137
Biak Navy Base: 155 personnel
Number of Troops
Mako Lantamal X: 761 personnel
Air Force
Jayapura Air Strip (Type B)
Total
Navy
Navy Base X
ATTACHMENT 343
Source: Matthew N. Davies (2006:17)
Figure 1.
Military Area Command XVII/ Cendrawasih Restructurization
Source: Matthew N. Davies (2006:7)
Figure 2.
Military Forces in Papua
ATTACHMENT 345
347
IMPARSIAL PROFILE
IMPASIAL was established in June 2002 by 18 of
Indonesia s most prominent human rights advocates who
shared the same concern: the power of the state showed an
increasing tendency to assert itself to the detriment of civil
society. The founders of IMPARSIAL are: T. Mulya Lubis, Karlina
Leksono, M. Billah, Wardah Hafidz, Hendardi, Nursyahbani
Katjasungkana, [Alm] Ade Rostina Sitompul, Robertus Robert,
Binny Buchory, Kamala Chandrakirana, HS Dillon, [Alm]
Munir, Rachland Nashidik, Rusdi Marpaung, Otto Syamsuddin
Ishak, Nezar Patria, Amiruddin, and Poengky Indarti.
Ironically, although the new era after the fall of the New
Order regime of President Suharto in 1998 has opened the way
for greater public advocacy activities, the strength of human
rights and other civil society groups has tended to decrease in
recent years.
All the founders agreed that the time had come for the
establishment of a new human rights protection organization
to work for the following goals: (1) to formulate a standardized
approach to reporting and documenting human rights
protection matters; (2) to prepare and campaign for an
alternative human rights policy, and; (3) to work as a partner of
the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM).
Vision and Mission
IMPARSIAL was taken from the word Impartial to denote
the organization s commitment to upholding the fundamental
equality of the rights possessed by all human beings, with
special concern given to promoting the rights of the less
348
fortunate. The organization s impartiality also denotes
its commitment to helping victims of human rights abuse
regardless of their social origins, gender, ethnicity, political
or religious beliefs.
IMPARSIAL is a vehicle for promoting civil liberties,
struggling for fundamental freedom, fighting discrimination,
and supporting human rights abuse victims seeking justice
and accountability. IMPARSIAL monitors and investigates
human rights violations, releases its indings to the public, and
demands the powerful within the state fulill their obligation
to protect human rights and work towards the elimination of
violence from national life.
IMPARSIAL promotes solidarity between Indonesians
and works to garner international support for the faithful
implementation of international human rights law.
IMPARSIAL researches the social reality that forms the
context in which human rights must be protected, recommends
changes and alternative state policy, and keeps a close watch
on their implementation.
IMPARSIAL is independent of the state, non-partisan,
and obtains its funding from like-minded organizations and
individuals without any reciprocal obligation besides a firm
commitment to work for the protection of human rights.
Aim
To function as a vehicle for Indonesian civil society in its
attempts to apply internationally recognized human rights
standards in public policy and in practice.
Unique Characteristic
IMPARSIAL is unique in Indonesia in that it strives to
amalgamate a number of important endeavours: to formulate
alternative human rights policies, establish a standardized
349
documentation system of human rights protection matters
in order to advocate legal remedies, and to institute a
comprehensive system to protect human rights defenders.
Work Ethic
In its work, IMPARSIAL is committed to supporting the
important role played by human rights defenders at all levels
of society local, national and international in advocating
changes to national human rights policy and conducting
disciplined research and documentation of related matters.
Board
T. Mulya Lubis, Karlina Leksono, MM Billah, Wardah
Hafidz, Hendardi, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, [Alm] Ade
Rostina Sitompul, Robertus Robet, Binny Buchory, Kamala
Chandrakirana, HS Dillon, [Alm] Munir, Rachland Nashidik,
Rusdi Marpaung, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Nezar Patria,
Amiruddin, dan Poengky Indarti.
IMPARSIAL, the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor
Jl. Slamet Riyadi Raya No. 19 Matraman Jakarta 13150
Phone: (62-21) 859 18656, Fax: (62-21) 859 18650
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
website: www.imparsial.org
350

Securitization in Papua – The Implication of Security Approach

Transcription

Similar documents

Casino Anbieter - Headhunt Revisited

`the Jungle` and the Multiplicity of Spatio-Temporal

An Overview of Hymnody in Papua New Guinea

Trip Notes - World Expeditions

Papua New Guinea - World Vision Australia

to the report.

Papua New Guinea Vision 2050 - Sustainable Development

20160105 Profil Anggota AC ENG Periode 2015

The TELKOM Assessment Center - International Congress on

Succeeding in Mobile Advertising