b767 engineering continuation training

FOR REFERENCE ONLY
B767
ENGINEERING
CONTINUATION TRAINING
Q1 & Q2 2013
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FOR REFERENCE ONLY
Contents
1
DHL Air Procedures Review
2
Star Air Procedures Review
3
767 Maintenance Tips
4
767 Technical Notes & AENs (DHL Air)
5
767 Airworthiness Directives
6
767 UK Maintenance Related MOR
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1 DHL Air Procedures Review
For clear and precise instructions on how DHL Air require their Technical Logs to be
completed, refer to the following!
See DHL Air DAEP CD for DAEP No 67.
Tech log completion
See DHL Air DAEP CD for DAEP No 8 (General Section)
Deferred Defect
See DHL Air DAEP CD for DAEP No.70 and 67 and the DHL Air
ETOPS manual for information relating to ETOPS Operations
See DHL Air DAEP CD for DAEP No. 84 for AWOPS operations
See DHL Air DAEP CD for DAEP No. 85 for RVSM operations.
AEN 58E has been issued to give some useful flow charts providing guidance to all
engineering staff on the ETOPS downgrading and upgrading process following a
defect or maintenance action. There are relevant TRs to the DHL Air ETOPS manual.
DAEP’s:
ETOPS Manual:
B767 Maint Tips:
Available on CD
Hard copy
See TechCom
2 Star Air Procedures Review
For clear and precise instructions on how Star Air require their Technical Logs to be
completed, refer to the following!
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FOR REFERENCE ONLY
See Star Air CAME CD Part 1, Chapter 1.1.1 Aircraft Technical Log,
Chapter 1.1.1.2 Instruction for Use
See Star Air CAME CD Part 1, Chapter 1.1.4 Deferred Items, General.
Defect reports (Deferred Defect Policy) Part 1, Chapter 1.8.3
ETOPS Operations – not applicable
All Weather Operations – If there is ice or snow, do the cold weather
maintenance service. Please refer to Boeing AMM ref. AMM 12-3301/301.
RVSM – Refer to Boeing AMM TASK 51-10-00-206-001 (Examine the
Airplane Skin) for instructions on Inspection/Check
ALL OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE ALT LINE
STATION OFFICE or ALT Technical Library:
3 B767 Maintenance Tips
Please see ALT TechCom for full details using the following link or the full MTIP can
be found in the “useful files” attachment to this module.
https://intranet.altitudeglobal.aero/techlib/techserv/Maintenance%20Tips/Forms/AllIte
ms.aspx
Please note that non-relevant maintenance tips and those subject to correction of
typographical errors or subject to minor non-relevant amendments have not been
included in this listing. All complete MTIPS are in the useful file.
There were no relevant Maintenance Tips for this period.
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4 B767 Technical Notes & AENs (DHL Air)
Below is a summary of all Technical Notes & AENs recently issued by DHL Air for the
B767.
TN / AENs Number:
48E
Subject
CF6-80C2 Information
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TN Number:
68E
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Subject
Pegasus FMC 2009 Issues
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TN Number:
69E
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Subject
Forward Equipment Cooling Fan Part Numbers
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TN Number:
67E
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Subject
B767-300F Fleet Differences
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FOR REFERENCE ONLY
5 B767 Airworthiness Directives
Below is a listing of Airworthiness Directives issued over the last period:
AD Reference:
2013-05-07
Subject
Stiff Operation – Elevator Pitch Control
AD Reference:
2013-07-09
Subject
O2 Mask Stowage Box Units
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AD Reference:
2013-08-20
6
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Subject
Fuel Tube Replacement
B767 Maintenance Related MOR
The following are maintenance related extracts from the UK CAA MOR data base
related to the B767 family.
The information is protected by the UK CAA and the monthly digest are now strictly
controlled by them. It is respectfully requested that with this in mind, the content of
the following is not copied or distributed in any way.
British Airways
Bolt found in LH engine tail pipe during walk around.
Bolt found laying on the green section of the acoustic lining. Engineer determined the bolt came from
the inboard side of the pylon between the core and outer engine lining. Bolt replaced with proper
torque setting. Checks revealed none of the bolts were at the correct torque setting, this was rectified.
CAA Closure: Investigations confirmed that a bolt had been found in the LH engine tail pipe lying on
the green section of the acoustic lining. The engineer determined that it came from the inboard side of
the pylon, between the core and outer engine lining. He replaced the bolt with the proper torque
setting. On checking other bolts in the area he found none were at the proper torque setting so
retightened them all. The panel was the hoop plate fairing on the left engine and the a/c had recently
had a 4C Check where the hoop plate fairing bolts are required to be torque checked in accordance
with maintenance instructions. The engineering staff who had worked the engine overnight stated that
the hoop plate inspection and check of bolts was carried out, with none found missing and the plate in
good condition. The bolts in question are small and prone to vibrating loose. The instructions call for
tightening of bolts which is considered as a satisfactory requirement.
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British Airways
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Unreported damage: Sheared and drilled bolt found inside engine thrust ring.
The jacking bolt (used to remove the thrust ring) was found sheared off and still in place in the ring.
The bolt appeared to have been drilled flush, indicating that it was known to be in place on re-fitting. It
is likely that this would have been the cause of the reported high vibration, which was the reason for
this engineering investigation.
CAA Closure: The organisation has concluded its investigation. The subject a/c was last at contracted
maintenance organisation for a 4 C check from the 27 Apr 2011 until 2 Jun 2011. During this check the
right hand engine fan blades were removed, cleaned, lubricated and installed. This is the last recorded
work performed on the subject engine relating to the damaged thrust ring. The investigation
concentrated on two task cards from the pack. Detailed investigation could not establish that the
rework occurred at this input, noting vibration was not reported post input and the witness marks
appeared more recent. Further investigation failed to identify where the faulty work took place. It has
therefore not been possible to identify the root cause in this instance and the evidence to date
indicates that there may have been some unrecorded work activities but this cannot be confirmed.
ThomsonFly
A/c returned following multiple electrical and display failures.
During taxi 'L GEN OFF' EICAS message appeared, checklists followed and generator reset. The
same problem occurred on rotation along with the failure of captain's flight director, command airspeed
bug and LH FMC CDU. Control was handed to FO whose display was functioning normally.
Subsequently multiple failures occurred including failure of auto throttle, speed window frozen and
MCP displays all frozen. Fuel jettisoned and a/c was flown back using RH autopilot and manual thrust.
Engineers could find no faults once a/c was back on the ground. CAA Closure: BPCU BITE carried out
which provided a ‘MPU/wiring’ 'LH generator' message. Fault diagnosis carried out and LH and RH
generator GCU and IDG replaced due to failure. Operator's Reliability Department confirms that IDGs
are now subject to a 16000hr soft life campaign. Furthermore, the minimum company requirement of
received IDGs is set at OEM overhaul status. These actions are designed to increase in-service
reliability. Data on GCUs shows no component reliability trends and no further relevant defects
recorded to date with no autoflight system reoccurrences.
ThomsonFly
Flight crew oxygen found partially closed and wire locked.
First Officer checked his oxygen and noticed a significant drop in pressure when tested. Pressure
resumed after testing. Engineer checked oxygen tap and found it partially closed and wire locked. Wire
lock broken and tap opened fully to allow normal oxygen supply.
CAA Closure: The a/c had undergone a C Check at a third party maintenance organisation. A task was
carried out which resulted in crew oxygen bottle being removed and refilled. After witnessing the
installation of the bottle by the mechanic, the engineer ensured that the valve was fully open and
performed a leak test before going to the flight deck to check EICAS. Meanwhile the mechanic
installed the locking wire. The AMM procedure requires the installer to turn the valve to fully open then
close the valve ‘one quarter of a turn’ before applying locking wire. The engineer inspected the safety
wire and certified installation. During the event when the flight crew reported the drop in pressure, the
oxygen bottle was inspected and was found to be partially closed and wire locked. Engineering staff
involved were interviewed and it was found that both the engineer and mechanic had worked in excess
of 50 hours in the 5 days prior to the error and the engineer had been responsible for certifying the
majority of over 200 cabin interior defects. The operator has recorded seven similar events of the crew
O2 cylinder being either closed or partially closed. The only common theme appears to be human
error. Of the seven, only two are linked to a hangar location and these happened in 2008/9. The other
six, including this event, were traced either to 3rd party maintenance organisations or line stations.
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During this period, there have been a five company Technical Notices issued to reinforce the need to
follow AMM procedures and cautioning against partially closing the valve to the point of preventing
oxygen flow. These have been available to third party MROs. The MRO has confirmed that the
investigation report will be distributed to all engineers to ensure that all task requirements are strictly
followed. They will actively demonstrate both the availability of qualified staff per project and the manhour-limitation for those staff. As a process improvement, review whether associated tasks should be
linked together in a single process stream to ensure that tasks on the same system are completed at
the same time.
British Airways
On removing nose wheel it was discovered that there was no axle washer or spacer fitted.
Further reports reveal that missing items had been returned to the workshop attached to a wheel.
ThomsonFly
At 700ft on approach EICAS message 'trailing edge disagree'. Flap gauge checked both indicating flap
25.
A/c manually flown and handled normally with uneventful landing completed. Flaps retracted normally.
CAA Closure: EICAS message 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' appeared after selection of F25 on approach.
During go-around, F20 selected and message disappeared. A/c then reconfigured early and after F25
was selected no EICAS message appeared. The landing checks were completed and at this point the
'TE FLAP DISAGREE' message flashed on and off for the rest of the second approach. It was
concluded that it must be a spurious message and normal landing was completed. Similar messages
have intermittently appeared on the B767 fleet, both in flight and during rollout and can go more than a
year with no reports. Flap/Slat Electronic Unit (FSEU) BITE checks show no faults on the ground. All
operators use an FSEU P/N 285T0049-53 or 285T0049-63 configuration. Boeing developed the -63
with an improved BITE and troubleshooting capability. Many operators with older 767 fleets maintain a
few -63 units expressly for this purpose. The -63 also has greater tolerance when exposed to nuisance
or intermittent fault indications. Boeing Fleet Team Digest 767-FTD-27-11003 refers. Experience has
shown that while there could be multiple causes for the 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' message, operators
benefit by focusing on certain higher probability components which is aided by using a -63 FSEU. The
FSEU was replaced with a -63 part number to aid fault finding and reduce nuisance messages. No
further occurrences to date.
ThomsonFly
LH engine ran down and stopped approx 1min after start.
Run down associated with 'L eng spar valve' message. A/c returned to stand.
CAA Closure: Circuit breaker P6- 1 E1 cycled and valve actuator exercised several times iaw FIM.
Valve operation verified as satisfactory and engine started normally. The next day the symptoms
occurred again and engineers transposed the LH engine spar valve V25 with LH wing defuel valve.
The defuel valve was locked out in a closed position and the a/c despatched iaw MEL. On landing,
spares were positioned, the defuel valve was replaced and a/c restored to flight conditions. The spar
valve had failed due to normal wear and operator's reliability data indicates no trends with the item.
FOR REFERENCE ONLY
British Airways
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'Brake Temp' indication received at 110kts on take-off roll.
After seeing brake unit 6 with a temperature of 9 units in white, indication was considered spurious and
gear retracted. After 45secs there was no change to temperature indication and decided to stop at flap
1 and gear dropped. After 20secs indication dropped to 8 units. Gear left down for approx 4mins until
temperature indication reached 4 units. Temperature slowly dropped to 1 unit after 40mins with gear
retracted. Tyre pressure at 245psi initially dropping to 233psi. After consultation with Maintrol it was
deemed the best option was to continue to destination. Brake temperature rose to 4 units on arrival at
destination. Upon wheel removal, entire inner bearing assembly was missing and inner bearing
housing was melted and fused.
DHL Air Limited
Oxygen cylinders in closed position and safety wired.
During pre-flight check the contents of oxygen fell from 1700 to 950psi. On investigation both oxygen
cylinders had been left in the closed position and safety wired. Both cylinders were safety wired in the
open position and oxygen pressure tested to be within limits.
British Airways
First Officer rudder pedal locking mechanism failed during landing. No rudder input from P2 position.
A/c on final approach in slight crosswind when application of rudder was applied to align a/c with
runway centreline. P2 rudder pedals were not locked and therefore travelled as if they were being
adjusted. A/c landed firmly but not in line with runway centreline. Control handed over to other pilot
who aligned a/c with runway and controlled deceleration. Taxi to stand uneventful but P2 rudder pedals
did not operate. Pre-flight checks had not highlighted this fault. Investigation showed that the spring
loaded pin was not engaging with the lock plate. The pin had either worn away or had sheared and
worn.
British Airways
Nr1 slat intermediate sensor and attachments found to be missing.
On pushback, EICAS "LE SLAT ASYMM" warning occurred. On investigation the sensor target along
with the auxiliary slat track roller bearing, bolt, washers and castellated nut were all missing. No
evidence of the missing parts or of any damage sustained to the area.
CAA Closure: Sensor 282 is located on the nr1 slat outboard auxiliary track and the intermediate target
was found to be missing. The sensor provides position information and is also used to detect an
asymmetry condition with the slats on the opposite wing. Each slat has two sensors for this purpose.
The target installation also incorporates a roller for the auxiliary track an all these parts were found
missing. As no asymmetry condition had been noted on the previous flight, the parts must have
departed the a/c when the slats were deployed to the extended position. As the parts were unavailable
for inspection, no determination of failure mode can be made. The bolt is secured by a nut and split
pin, so it is reasonable to assume that the bolt sheared rather than the nut unwinding. There is no
record of recent maintenance to the track.
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ThomsonFly
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During scheduled maintenance it was discovered that an electrical loom was resting on flight control
cables.
Whilst accessing crown skin station 544 it was observed that the electrical loom terminating at M749
(lighting ballast) was resting on the two sets of control cables for the rudder and elevator in the upper
cabin area. Work order raised to inspect for damage, rectify and prevent continued loss of clearance.
CAA Closure: No damage to the flight control cables was found and a fleet check was carried out
without any other findings. Details of the occurrence was sent to the external maintenance
organisation's Quality department for investigation of work carried out prior to the event. The response
indicated that the previous tasks in 2009 were carried out correctly, evidenced by other non-related
findings in that area and no evidence of loom movement. The root cause was an unpredicted gradual
loom droop, potentially caused by disturbance away from the immediate area over the last three years.
Cable fastenings in this area were considered to be of a satisfactory standard. The loom was repaired
and cleaned and additional cable clamping was applied to the wire bundle to ensure clearance. A
Quality Information Bulletin was published to internal and external maintenance personnel and for
inclusion in technical training to alert staff to the safety issues.
British Airways
A/c flown not iaw MEL for RH thrust reverser fault.
The MEL procedure had not been followed insofar as the circuit breakers, for locking out the
inoperative thrust reverser, had not been tripped and collared as required. The a/c had flown for two
days in this condition.
CAA Closure: The investigation could not determine when the circuit breakers had been reset. A
Quality Alert Bulletin is to be raised to reinforce the importance of recording all work carried out on a/c
systems.
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