BRINGING IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER United Nations

Review Articles
IN THE
BRINGING
NEW WORLD
Liberalism,
ORDER
Legitimacy,
and the
United Nations
ByMICHAEL N. BARNETT*
Boutros
Boutros-Ghali.
Agenda for Peace, 2d ed. New
York: United
Nations,
1995,159 pp.
on Global
Our Global Neighborhood.
New York:
1995,410
pp.
University
Gareth Evans. Cooperating for Peace. St. Leonards, Australia: Unwin
and
1993,224
pp.
Hyman,
on the Future of the United Na
Report of the Independent Working
Group
Commission
Oxford
Governance.
Press,
in Its SecondHalf-Century.
tions. The United Nations
dation,
1995,53
New York: Ford Foun
pp.
end of the cold war
un
vacuum
security
numerous
com
THE
activity,
flurry
including
and the
that reflected on the world
that was being left behind
missions,
that should be created
in its place. The
world
reports under review in
this article are among the best and most
influential
of the lot, and they
on the
to
is
have two defining
The
first
the
attempt
capitalize
qualities.
leashed
a
of
war moment
post-cold
sion an international
reports
share
and
the attendant
intellectual
to escape the
of realism and to envi
pessimism
secured without
the threat of force. These
order
the belief
that multilateralism
must
the security
supplant
assurance
must
that the language of
that defined
the cold war,
the
of
and that states should build institu
deterrence,
language
replace
these reports advocate
tions rather than militaries.
Second,
strengthen
practices
*
The
author would
Stephan Haggard,
like to thank Emanuel
Bruce Russett,
Adler, John Boli, Marty Finnemore, Aaron
for their helpful suggestions.
and Nina Tannenwald
WorldPolitics 49 (July 1997), 526-51
Friedberg,
NEW WORLD ORDER
527
ing the role of theUnited Nations in security politics. The UN was al
ready flexing its long-atrophying muscles at the close of the cold war as
it helped many protracted regional and domestic conflicts to wind
served as a central player
and undertook
the Gulf War,
down,
during
numerous
of tremendous
scope,
operations
complexity,
peacekeeping
once
to the back seat in se
and size. The
international
body,
relegated
had become
the darling
of the hour, a development
curity matters,
see
to
want
become permanent
rather than transitory. The
these reports
reports
discussed
here wax
eloquent
about
the transformational
possi
bilities for global politics and about the role of the UN as the prospective
global deliverer.
The
reports
have
been
overtaken
by events,
however.
They
began
their inquiries during the optimistic period of the early 1990s but
a
began publishing their findings just as the UNwas suffering series of
in Somalia,
the
and Bosnia. While
Rwanda,
setbacks, most
notably
a
were
in
and
ad
shift
commissions
painting
global politics
progressive
a central role for the UN in
security affairs, many parts of the
vocating
if not
into chaos
the UN was present were
world where
descending
states
of the UN. Furthermore,
the assistance
hell?and
arguably with
an
to see a
their
demonstrated
unwillingness
through
pocketbook
UN.
the news conferences
announcing
pub
Consequently,
strengthened
were
with
commissions
lication of the findings
of the various
greeted
the
and much
little enthusiasm
symbolized
cynicism. Their
reception
UN's hard times.
this
scholars were
relations
few international
surprised by
Arguably
be
turn of events. The UN has
under theoretical
obscurity
long labored
cause of the
it is a bit player, first, on the global scene
view
that
general
of the disci
research questions
in terms of the central
and, second,
on
the false promise
and institutionalists
largely agree
pline.1 Realists
to
as
and
subservient
view institutions
of the UN. Neorealists
permissive
power politics and therefore dismiss a role for the UN in global security
because
interests. Waltz
speaks
of state
that are independent
s
the bible of neorealism,
Politics,
Theory of International
its near silence on the UN;2 and the UN s post-cold
with
it lacks enforcement
volumes
mechanisms
1
before the end of the cold war,
For the rise and decline of the study of international organizations
as a Field of Study," Inter
see J.Martin
"The Rise and Fall of International Organization
Rochester,
and John Ruggie, "International
national Organization
40 (Autumn 1986); and Friedrich Kratochw?
40 (Autumn
A State of the Art on the Art of the State," International
Organization
Organization:
1986).
2
International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
Kenneth Waltz,
1979), 42,164.
Theory of
lone comment was to reject from consideration
Waltz's
any possible role for the UN as a system regu
lator or in a collective security system because it simply reflects state interests.
528
war
WORLD POLITICS
activities
neorealists,
strong reaction from prominent
not to
have
and
them.3
bury
praise
Policymakers
a
weave
to
of a
demonstrated
repeatedly
willingness
grand dreams
but these dreams have invari
institutions,
global order secured through
ably been
have
to
but usually
shattered
Although
elicited
them
by the timeless
of state
realities
interests.
these reports draw on many institutionalist insights, few
the UN s potential
contribu
reason. The
for
conditions
security. Perhaps
good
actors have
under which
"matter"?when
they posit that institutions
norms to overcome
interests and desire to establish
collec
convergent
comes
not present when
tive action and coordination
it
problems?are
war the great pow
to the UN and the area of
the
cold
security. During
neoliberal
tion
institutionalists
have
examined
to international
to the UN as a forum for
settlement
rarely turned
(except for
dispute
se
some
and
when
did
have
convergent
peacekeeping
they
episodes),
UN in favor of institutional
interests
the
avoided
arrange
curity
they
ers
more
the major
powers
they could
readily control. That
turned to the UN after the cold war reflects that, albeit temporarily,
they
either
interests.4 But the UN s recent decline
had converging
suggests
ments
that
that
interests have
converging
have found other institutional
those
powers
now
diverged
or that
to further
the major
their se
arrangements
While
their empirical
have
neoliberals
broadened
scope to in
curity.
or their
clude security, they know better than to stake their credentials
then are
theories on the UN. Neorealism
and neoliberal
institutionalism
in league
in their dismissal
of the UN, sharing
as
they do the general
lief that international order is founded on force coupled with
tional
But
a convergence
that are supported
by
an
additional
the reports under review offer
restraints
order
aids but
interests.
message?that
coupled with
not
is produced
only by force
in this way,
also by legitimacy. Read
war order
a
the
for
how
blueprint
post-cold
ternational
tional
of state
these
be
institu
in
institu
commissions
should be built. To
provide
be sure, these reports pay lip service to handing
the UN a standing army
and a central role in a collective
security system, and they insist that the
new
UN be invested with
to
its role in
instruments
strengthen
policy
one
if
these commissions
conflict
resolution.
Certainly,
judges
by
3
International
"The False Promise of International
Institutions,"
John Mearsheimer,
Security 19
(Winter 1994-95).
4
at
"The United Nations
See Isabelle Desmartis,
Julie Fournier, and Charles Thumerelle,
Fifty:
and Collective
James Schear,
Security," International Journal 50 (Winter 1994-95);
Regime Theory
in a Cooperative
Fit In?" in Janne Nolan,
Order: Does
the United Nations
"Global Institutions
ed.,
D.C.: Brookings
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the Twenty-first Century (Washington,
"Between aNew World Order and Norms: Explaining
1994); and Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Institution,
inWorld
in Keith Krause and Michael Williams,
the Re-Emergence
of the United Nations
Politics,"
of Minnesota
Press, 1996).
eds., Critical Approaches to International Security (Minneapolis: University
529
NEW WORLD ORDER
whether their proposals have been implemented, then they have failed.
But
offer
their languishing
recommendations,
beyond
a series of discursive moves
and rhetorical
legitimate
these reports were
succeed the cold war,
would
commissions
about what
arguments
order.
international
and a legitimate
to the international
that
order
looking
state action
constitutes
Because
these
they focus
on the constitutive
foundations
of global politics, how the new international order would be legiti
mated,
might
sions
its specific content
should be, and how the recalcitrant
come to
these
On
such issues, these commis
accept
principles.
are
UN should occupy a central
the
suggesting,
position.
what
Three
issues
out. First,
the
is a liberal order. These
stand
international
order
in
valorized
are informed
a dis
reports
reports
by
a
UN that can
liberal
worldview
and
recommend
tinctly
strengthened
in
facilitate
such an outcome.
This
raises the second
issue: legitimacy
a
In
series of intriguing
observations
and hypotheses
global politics.
these
concerning
moment,
in global
relations
the legitimation
process
international
they remind
of the concept
of legitimacy,
importance
central place in the works
of the classical
of favor in recent decades.5 The
concept
these
reports
in terms
of (1) how
politics
scholars
a
concept
realists but
at this historical
of the potential
that once found a
that has fallen
in various
appears
all international
orders must
out
guises
be legit
in
imated if they are to have any staying power; (2) how the legitimation
of a particular
order can shape
principles
the UN can be the site for the legitimation
states accountable
to its norms.
holding
state
and (3) how
practices;
of a particular
order and for
can
The UN, they suggest,
state
and transmitting
practices
shape
by establishing,
articulating,
norms
state behavior. Third,
that define acceptable
these
and proper
commissions
understand
that not all actors will find this vision attrac
tive or attainable.
tive
integration
Hence,
that can
the UN as an agent of norma
they envision
increase
of actors who
the number
identify
with and uphold the values of a liberal international order.This essay is
organized
according
to these
Overview
Some
three central
of Four Commissions
information
background
reports is in order. Boutros-Ghalis
5
themes.
about
the central
Agenda for
orientations
Peace was
of these
the first
to ap
See Thomas
Press,
Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations
(New York: Oxford University
... is its
as a labora
1990). As Franck writes, "The international
systems weakness
peculiar strength
on
legitimacy in in
tory for those seeking to isolate the legitimacy factor" (p. 20). For past statements
ternational politics, see Henry Kissinger, A World Restored(Boston:
Mifflin,
1964); and E.
Houghton
H. Carr, The Twenty Years'Crisis (New York Harper Torchbooks,
treatments,
1964). For contemporary
530
WORLD POLITICS
is the cornerstone
pear and
of the other
documents
review. Un
under
dertaken at the request of a Security Council thatwas reeling from the
growing demands placed on its agenda, Agenda for Peace was drafted by
various
UN hands
longtime
at Yale University)
war
post-cold
of controversy
Boutros-Ghali
was
controlled
sovereignty.
James
(including
now
Sutterlin,
in residence
to fashion the role of the United Nations
order.
Peace
immediately
Third World
Agenda for
and vigorous
debate.
s vision handed more
in the
became
the subject
states worried
that
that
power to a Security Council
in
the
threaten
their
turn, might
great powers, which,
by
In turn, the great
members
is, the permanent
powers?that
that a strengthened UN might reduce
of the Security Council?feared
their autonomy
and power. Notwithstanding
these reservations,
the ab
sence of any other
on the
that
security
blueprint
agenda guaranteed
on the
war order.
Peace would
shape the debate
post-cold
Agenda for
And
indeed at the UN and in capitals
the
world, member
throughout
states debated
a revitalized
UN.
its various
its
and
call
for
proposals
of its specific proposals were not warmly
received, notably for
a
no
UN army; and others that had been discussed
standing
initially,
a
now
in
for
role
have
discarded
been
greater
peace enforcement,
tably
because of recent setbacks. Nevertheless,
its broad conceptualization
of
Many
and
security
the future
international
order
to inform
continues
the
thinking of many policymakers. Specifically, Agenda for Peace suggests
that (1) the threat of domestic insecurity is a legitimate concern of the
UN because
it has
the potential
to undermine
security
regional
and any
semblance of a cosmopolitan sensibility; and that (2) conflict has a life
from
cycle,
measures
preventive
to
peacekeeping
and peace
enforce
ment to postconflict nation building. This highly provocative and far
reaching
is testimony
but
secretary-general
document
departed
politics.
were
That
Boutros-Ghali's
not
also
vision
only
to a
to its times
and the UNs
moment
particular
exceeded
what
member
now
in world
states
was
to accept
to the
in his Addendum
conceded
generally
are the more
as a
Peace: gone
ambitious
such
Agenda for
proposals
ever
under
the
of
direction
the
and
army
standing
secretary-general
is the notion
that the UN will have to delegate
tasks and re
present
ready
to other state and nonstate
actors and learn to work with
sponsibilities
to fulfill its
them as it attempts
security agenda.
increasingly modest
see Miada
to theWar of
"American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence
Bukavowsky,
51 (Spring 1997); J. S. Barkins and B. Cronin,
"The State and the
1812," International Organization
48 (Winter 1994); Kratochwil
and Ruggie
Nation," International Organization
(fn.l); and Helen Mil
in International Relations," Review of International Studies 17 (Jan
of Anarchy
ner, "The Assumption
uary 1991), 74. The "English School" has also been attentive to the legitimacy of international orders.
See Adam Watson,
The Evolution
of International
Society (New York: Routledge,
1992).
NEWWORLD ORDER
Gareth
statement
the face
Australia's
531
Evans's
Peace represents
another
synthetic
Cooperating for
on the role of the UN and
in
regional organizations
shaping
of security
and countering
the new security
threats. Evans,
desired
minister,
foreign
to
weigh
in on the post-cold
war
security debates and timed the publication of the book to coincide with
the opening of the 1993 General Assembly. Written with considerable
at Australian
input from scholars
well received and quickly viewed
Peace.6 Evans
is most
anate from domestic
he offers
concerned
rather
the blue book was
University,
as a necessary
to
companion
Agenda for
new
with
the
that em
threats
security
National
than from
traditional
interstate
a set of measured
conflicts, and
peace mainte
categories?peace
building,
meet
and peace enforcement?to
the severity
nance, peace restoration,
of the conflict. His proposed
solution,
security, reflects the
cooperative
a middle
to
find
between
the
of common
and
attempt
concepts
ground
in his view, are too focused on military
solu
security, which,
too
of comprehensive
which
is,
well,
tions, and the concept
security,
to be of much value to
to these
Attached
comprehensive
policymakers.7
a
use of sanctions,
are a series of
concepts
greater
proposals?including
collective
of new peacekeeping
training centers, and expanded
to
roles for civilian
will better enable the United
Nations
police?that
reconstruc
in
establish
and
international
engage
in-country
regimes
recon
to Evans,
tion.
and domestic
international
regimes
According
the establishment
struction
are the twin
paths
to a stable
international
order.
Our GlobalNeighborhood, the product of the Commission
on Global
a
Governance,
repre
distinguished
panel of experts and policymakers,
a
sents
to
future
order
consider
the
self-conscious
attempt
by
global
of prior
of the central
and extending
many
arguments
synthesizing
on the future of the world
commissions
economy,
security, and envi
that the background
mission were written
liberal-minded
scholars,
by
in the bibliography
and Peter Haas,
and nowhere
ronment.8
It should
be noted
papers
for the com
including Ernst Haas
or citations
is there a
submission that is identifiable as realist.9The report is striking for its
6
Gareth Evans, "Cooperative
Security and Instrastate Conflict," Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994). See
and Robin Ward, Building International Community: Cooper
also the related volume, Kevin Clements
Peace Case Studies (St. Leonards
and Canberra: Allen and Unwin
and Peace Research Centre,
ating for
National University,
Australian
1994); and the interesting collection of responses to Cooperating for
Peace in Stephanie Lawson,
ed., The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond
1996).
(Canberra: Allen and Unwin,
7
in Lawson
the Agenda,"
(fn. 6), 7-8.
Lawson, "Introduction: Activating
8 Stephanie
on Environment
Our Common Future (New York: Oxford
and Development,
World Commission
The Challenge to the South (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987); South Commission,
University
Press, 1990).
9
Issues in Global Governance:
Kluwer
Law
International,
1995).
Papers
Written for
the Commission
on Global Governance
(Boston:
532
WORLD POLITICS
willingness
states conduct
While
numerous
to entertain
to alter how
designed
proposals
and organize
their security.
are familiar
of the proposals
and draw
their relations
many
on
the
ideas
found m Agendafor Peace and Cooperatingfor Peace yit goes beyond them
on the UN's role in economic,
social, and
an
and integrated
increasingly
complex
international
global polity requires similarly comprehensive
organiza
tions. Second,
it argues that traditional
notions
of security, defined by
the states defense
of its territorial borders, do not exhaust the meaning
in five respects. First, it focuses
matters
environmental
because
of security
economic,
be shifted
in the current
is, since
era; that
security has environmental,
the concept of security must
state and toward
individuals.
and humanitarian
components,
its locus on the
from
away
Third, Our GlobalNeighborhood h less constrained by or committed to
the idea of state sovereignty
who
tist, or Boutros-Ghali,
than
is Evans,
is unapologetically
who
as
sta
of an interstate
orga
secretary-general
the
vision
of
Indeed,
sovereignty.
global
in Our Global
inter
situates states alongside
governance
Neighborhood
national
and regional
and
organizations,
intergov
nongovernmental
nization
is also committed
to
actors. Fourth,
it is
and other transnational
organizations,
UN as
in its interest in issues of governance
and
the
explicit
seeing
to
the most
the ongoing
likely candidate
guide
global transformation.
to address the
it imperative
the commission
found
of
Fifth,
question
an
the values of global society and devotes
entire chapter to the subject.
ernmental
most
Finally, the Report of the Independent Working Group on the Fu
ture of the United Nations, The United Nations in Its SecondHalf-Cen
tury (Independent Working Group), also examines the relationship
between the future course of global politics and the potential functions
of the UN. The project (funded by the Ford Foundation, supported by
the Secretariat,
Yale University)
and overseen
by Paul
and Bruce
Kennedy
Russet*
of
resembles Our GlobalNeighborhood in three important
a
context that ismarked
the UN within
respects. First,
global
a
it offers an inte
and
Second,
by
growing
deepening
interdependence.
effort in develop
grated view of global politics and invests tremendous
it situated
for the UN's security
ing proposals
in ways
economic
and social functions
instruments
that will
inensifying effects of interdependence. Third,
discussion
to the need
states."10This
10
See also Gerald
1992-93);
of the
international
and
enable
increasing
it to manage
its
the
it devotes considerable
community
to "save failed
on principled, political, and
agenda item is justified
Helman
Steven Ratner,
and Steven Ratner,
UN
Peacekeeping
The New
"Saving Failed States," Foreign
St. Martins
Press,
(NewYork
Policy 89 (Winter
1996).
NEW WORLD ORDER
533
strategic grounds:
community
by saving failed states, the international
will better that community
and foster a more
order.
stable international
Each
of the four
reports offers
to a stable international
challenges
for
stabilizing
that order.
Even
a
vision of the current
far-reaching
as
as
numerous
well
order,
proposals
in better
which
these are not,
times,
most of these proposals would not likely see the light of day.Nonethe
some reforms
the inhospitable
continue.
For
climate,
despite
to
have
been
taken
establish
effective
instance,
arrange
steps
stand-by
ments
for
there
have
been
forces;
develop
peacekeeping
important
ments
for effecting
the bureaucratic
transition
from peacekeeping
and
less,
peace building; and in February 1997 the first informal consultations
took place
between
the Security Council
of international
and several
nongovernmental
and security (the Great
reforms receive consid
on a matter
peace
organizations
Lakes region of Africa). These
and other policy
an exclusive
in these
erable attention
reports.11 But
focus
on how
few
of the proposals have been implemented risks prematurely dismissing a
set of reports that
provides
to, the legitimation
process
a window
in global
A Liberal
into, and conceivably
contributed
politics.
International
Order?
a lib
not
portrait painted by these reports is,
surprisingly,
largely of
eral international
order; after all, many of those involved in the framing,
are self-described
and
of these documents
liberals?
writing
drafting,
The
s term) and
communities
(to use Gramsci
organic intellectuals
epistemic
use
are intellectuals who
the term favored by constructivists).12
These
(to
to learn from the past;
in progress;
believe
the capacity of individuals
to increase freedom
the construction
institutions
and
of new political
reduce the likelihood of physical violence;
improve
the "moral
character
and material
and thus the ability to
welfare
of humankind."13
11
It is impossible to determine whether
these proposals led direcdy to these and other reforms; after
all, the proposals built on both already existing "lessons learned" in recent peacekeeping
operations and
the recommendations
lent
of other documents
and commissions.
At the least these commissions
greater credibility to these and other proposals.
12
UN system
Those
scholars whose work is informed by a Gramscian
approach also situate the
a
on its role as an agent of liberal
context
within
and
focus
economic,
global, though largely
change.
International Organizations
and Industrial Change (New York: Oxford University
See Craig Murphy,
Press, 1995); and Robert Cox, "The Crisis ofWorld Order and the Problem of International Organi
zations," International Journal 35, no. 2 (1980).
13
Mark Zacher and Richard Matthews,
"Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Diver
in International Relations Theory: Realism and theNeo
gent Strands," in C. Kegley, ed., Controversies
Liberal Challenge (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1995), 110.
534
But
WORLD POLITICS
are four
there
quintessentially
other
that
elements
these
define
as
documents
liberal.14
rela
that "international
reports start from the premise
a process
The
of modernization."15
transformed
by
being
of
the
how
detail
economic,
pages
reports
opening
thickening
political,
are revolutioniz
networks
environmental,
cultural, and communicative
First,
tions are
these
ing the texture of global politics. The terms of reference for the Global
Governance
Commission
stress
(p. 366)
those
transformational
quali
ties of global society that exhibit the "forces of integration and division"
and
thus present
it with
tremendous
"uncertainty,
and op
challenge,
portunity." The Independent Working Group (p. 4) similarly pro
claims: "In the context of global forces unleashed in the past 50 years,
only
a collective
effort
can
give
states
the framework
and the strength
to shape their own destiny in the promising but turbulent times that lie
derives from this conviction." The communications
Report
is col
continues
the Independent
revolution,
Working
Group
(p. 7),
us into
greater contact, for good and for ill.
lapsing space and bringing
ahead. Our
new
and
and modernization
present
opportunities
Interdependence
a fear that
are
and
these
driven
reports
by
interdependence,
challenges,
and
for both national
if unchecked,
will have disastrous
consequences
international
Second,
politics.
these reports
support
the notion
that
international
organi
zations in general and the UN in particular are needed to deal with the
in these
effects of modernization
dizzying
conflicts
that arise from
ameliorate
transitional
times
There
to
help
is histor
interdependence.16
to manage
the ear
of the UN: it helped
ical precedent
for this function
to
era
of empires
and colonialism
lier global
transformation
from the
the rapid decol
the era of sovereignty. As a critical forum for handling
onization that followed World War
tion on grounds
of principle
and
II,17 the UN justified its interven
security
and
it established
numerous
in John Dunn,
141 derive these tenets from Robert Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered,"
Press, 1990); Andrew
ed., The Economic Limits toModern Politics (New York: Cambridge
University
"Liberalism and International Relations Theory," Center for International Affairs, Working
Moravcsik,
no. 92-6 (Cambridge: Harvard University,
and G.John
Series,
1993); Daniel Deudney
Ikenberry,
Paper
and Sources ofWestern
Political Order"
"Structural Liberalism: The Nature
1995);
(Manuscript,
Zacher andMatthews
Politics," in Kegley (fn. 13).
(fn. 13); andMichael Doyle, "Liberalism andWorld
15
Zacher and Matthews
(fn. 13), 110.
16
in a Turbulent World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
See also James Rosenau, The United Nations
1992).
17
in International
Normative
of Ideas inDecolonization:
See Robert Jackson, "TheWeight
Change
in Judith Goldstein
and Robert O. Keohane,
eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Relations,"
Political Development,
and the UN,"
Cornell University
"Colonialism,
Press, 1993); Rupert Emerson,
and Colo
19 (Summer 1965); and Harold Jacobsen, "The United Nations
International Organization
1 (Winter 1962).
nialism: A Tentative Appraisal," International Organization
NEW WORLD ORDER
institutional
mechanisms
transition.18
Boutros-Ghali
535
a
to encourage
and
relatively peacefiil
speedy
observes
that the present
era, too, defined
or
and disintegration,
demands
international
as it is
by globalization
like the United
ganizations
Nations.19
In general,
these
commissions
hold to the liberal tradition that looks to international organizations to
help
states
cope with
interdependence.
Specifically, it is the United Nations in their view that is in a posi
tion to help the global polity through the difficult times ahead.With
respect
merous
foster
and advance nu
security affairs, they endorse multilateralism
on the lessons of institutionalism
to
institutional
designs based
a more
stable and secure international
order.20 To this end, the UN
to
can be a neutral
forum
communicate
inwhich
states and nonstate
their
actors
and coordinate
can voice
their
their policies.
and foster trans
grievances,
preferences,
Further, it can establish confidence-building
agreements
so as to encourage
a more
states to
defensive
and less
parency
adopt
militarized
it can create oversight
and
security posture.21 And
finally,
to assure states that others will not defect from
mechanisms
monitoring
their
hancing
enforce)
most
famously
expressed
by the UN's peacekeeping
to the issue of en
of these documents
speak direcdy
not
the UN's ability to oversee and monitor
(though
necessarily
agreements,
activities.22 Most
international
and domestic
agreements.
18
This raises a potentially
interesting, though generally unexplored, question: what
the end of the cold war? As international relations theorists
play in helping to manage
"new thinking" and the emerging
they tend to focus on the Soviet Unions
explanations,
U.S. would not take advantage of its international
retreat and domestic
reforms. Was
the Soviet Union facilitated by the existence of the UN? The U.S. and the Soviet Union
to end various regional conflicts, and they did so under the auspices
and multilaterally
role did the UN
isolate various
belief that the
the easy fall of
worked jointly
of the UN. It is
that there was a forum
stature
their declining
that by working
through the UN, the Soviets (1) could rest assured
status and
that guaranteed
them superpower
power despite
decision-making
(and perhaps caused the U.S. to give itmore due than otherwise might have been the case, for example,
in the negotiations
the Persian Gulf War
in January 1991); and (2) learned through doing
preceding
that the U.S. would not try to setde these and other conflicts in a manner
immediately disadvantageous
to the Soviets. As Roberts and
note, Soviet premier Gorbachev
Kingsbury
increasingly and simultane
and the importance of the UN.
ously stressed the necessity of a framework of international cooperation
conceivable
See Roberts
"The UN's Roles in International
and Kingsbury,
Society," in A. Roberts and B. Kings
Press, 1993), 46-47.
bury, eds., United Nations, Divided World (New York: Oxford University
19
Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
"Global Leadership
after the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 75 (March
1996).
April
20
See John Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism
Matters
(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993); and
Thomas Pickering, "Power and Purpose: Making Multilateralism Work," Foreign Service Journal Q\Ay 1992).
21
sWar
D.C.: USIP Press, 1994); The United Na
Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique
(Washington,
tions and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
United Nations
Book Series, vol. 3 (New York: Department
of
Public Information,
1995).
22
literature has exploded over the past few years. For overviews and analysis, see
The peacekeeping
in International Politics (New York: St. Martins
Alan James, Peacekeeping
Press, 1990); A. B. Feather
s Press, 1994); Paul Diehl,
ston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin
International Peacekeeping
Press, 1993); Paul Durch,
ed., The
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University
UN
et al., eds.,
Evolution
Press, 1993); Michael
(New York: St. Martins
Doyle
of
Keeping
Peacekeeping
UN Operations
in Cambodia and El Salvador (New York: Cambridge Uni
the Peace: Multidimensional
WORLD POLITICS
536
these
Third,
the
democracy;
days
mestic
realm because
should
are
reports
are
in
the spread of
quite unabashed
promoting
the UN dared not tread in the do
past when
it feared
be
by democratic
populated
on
and because of peace
principle
serts
state
The world
violating
sovereignty.
these
states,
claim,
reports uniformly
as
and security issues. Boutros-Ghali
states possess
that modern
certain
constitutive
foundations
that
revolve around democratic principles.23 Our GlobalNeighborhood (\>.66)
links democracy
and legitimacy
and asserts that the "democratic princi
must be ascendant. The need for greater
arises out of the
ple
democracy
close linkage between
and
effectiveness."24
legitimacy
on peace and
The demand
for democracy
is also justified
security
grounds. Whereas
the prevailing belief during the cold war had been
on balances
of
premised
to an
that
akin
regulative
produced
something
the reports under consideration
here argue that
ety,"25
matters
notion
and that empirical
sovereignty?the
that
order was
international
norms
power and
"anarchical
some
soci
domestic
that
politics
states have
some
and control over their society and within
degree of legitimacy
so
states
to
their borders?enables
the norms of international
uphold
of the
is the foundation
stated, the rule of law at home
ciety.26 Simply
to Boutros-Ghali,
is
ul
the
rule of law abroad.27 Democracy,
according
timate
The
would
litical
such
of peace.
guarantor
In the
Agenda for
authority of the United Nations
rest on
peace.
as the
achievement
the consensus
is an obvious
There
rule
of
that
of
law
true peace
and
and
social
system to act in this field [human rights]
peace
connection
or
as
po
strategic
important
between
democratic
practices?
in decision
the
making?and
is as
transparency
in any new
security
he writes:
Peace
and
stable
political
order.
seconds the sentiment.
Evans
Indeed, all
(p. 53) enthusiastically
domestic
and inter
between
four reports take this assumed
connection
in domestic
affairs.
intervention
national
order to justify greater
Gareth
Multinational
and Jarat Chopra,
"Second Generation
Opera
versity Press, 1997); John MacKinley
and Civil
ed., The United Nations
tions," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1992); and Thomas Weiss,
Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995). For the factual side, see United Nations Peacekeeping In
Blue Helmets, 3d ed. (New York United
formation Notes (New York: United Nations Press, 1995); and
Nations
Press, 1996).
23
"An Agenda
for Peace: One Year Later," Orbis 37 (Summer
See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
1993), 329; idem, "Democracy: A Newly Recognized
Imperative," Global Governance 1 (Winter 1995),
1996).
3-12; and the recently published Agenda for Democratization
(New York: UN Publications,
24
See also Boutros-Ghali
(fn. 23,1995).
25
1983).
Hedley Bu?, Anarchical Society.A Study of Order inWorld Politics (New York MacMillan,
26
Robert Jackson, Quasi-States
Press, 1990).
(New York: Cambridge University
27
These reports draw on the growing literature on the "democratic peace." See Michael Doyle, "Lib
eralism andWorld
Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (1986);
theDemocratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993).
and Bruce Russett,
Grasping
537
NEW WORLD ORDER
Not only will an international system populated by democratic states
decrease
the likelihood
the
reduce
likelihood
of interstate
that domestic
states also will
war, but democratic
tensions will become militarized
inter
traditional
acknowledge
assume
state
of violence
and conflict,
that the root
they nearly
causes of most
conflicts
reside in the domestic
sphere. Thus, Our Global
interstate war is not extinct, "in
that even though
Neighborhood
predicts
and internationalized.
While
the reports
sources
the years ahead theworld is likely to be troubled primarily by eruptions
of violence within countries" (p. 81), and the Independent Working
on intrastate
focuses
conflict. These
reports hold that the pat
Group
to minimize
terns of war are
vi
domestic
shifting and that the best way
is to widen
the
olence
of international
violence)
(and thus the prospect
states.
of democratic
community
All four reports, particularly Our GlobalNeighborhoodand The United
in Its
of
the importance
emphasize
and
international
governance.
rights
in the area of
the mid-1980s
the UN has become
Since
quite active
war
era of decol
a
human
rights,
change from the cold
period and the
was
states
when
the United
Nations
onization,
by member
prohibited
issues of human
and considering
from investigating
rights.28 Today,
Nations
human
most
Second
Half-Century,
as an issue of domestic
peacekeeping
operations
have
a human
rights
component,
and the
UN held aWorld Congress inVienna in 1993 and established the posi
tion of high commissioner for human rights the following year.29
on the international
agenda for several
rights has emerged
one
states
should respect
reasons, but
catalyst is the belief that "civilized"
based on
human rights and have some degree of domestic
accountability
a
means
to an
of
both
democratic
because
rule,
they represent
principles
an
in
interna
itself.
The
and
end
for
international
end,
order,
example,
Human
tional
community
as a matter
of principle
rights
cause of the
presumed
order, then, these reports
features
of the modern
28
Jacobsen
treats
for human
and ethnic
respect
and an issue of peace and security.30 Be
domestic
and international
between
relationship
increasingly
look
to the UN to articulate
the constitutive
state.
and Human Rights," International
"The United Nations
(fn. 17), 47; and Louis Henkin,
19 (Summer 1965), 512.
Organization
29
and Human Rights (New York: Cam
ed., The United Nations
See, for instance, Philip Alston,
"The United Nations
and Human Rights at Fifty:
Press, 1995); David Forsythe,
bridge University
Global Governance 1 (September-December
An Incremental but Incomplete Revolution,"
1995); and
"The United Nations
and the Protection of Individual and Group Rights," Inter
W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe,
national Social Science Journal \AA, no. 3 (1995).
30
has argued that domestic politics mat
This is not the first time that an international organization
ters for international order and is a legitimate concern of the international community. The League of
on minority rights and
too, through its mandate policies and various commissions
Nations,
plebiscites
538
WORLD POLITICS
The fourth, liberal, dimension of these reports is the shift away from
the sovereign state as the principal actor in global politics and toward,
such as nations,
groups
indigenous
peoples,
identity-based
as a central actor.
and ethnicities,
the individual
women,
and, second,
has always been tension between
the UN's role as representative
There
first,
its role as
of peoples
representative
and deserve
the protection
rights
For most
of its history
the UN has
states and
of sovereign
uals who have universal
and
individ
of the inter
that
resolved
community.
in favor of state sovereignty,
but these reports advocate a change
in the direction
of greater balance. The Global Governance
Commis
states
which
sion has a chapter on the values of the global community,
as
are exhorted
to respect; while
these values are forwarded
principled
national
tension
rather than liberal, few liberalswould object to them. The Independent
Working
Group
advocates
the protection
of the "social fabric" of soci
eties inwhich the "rights of every individual are guaranteed by the rule
in their own governance,
and disagreements
of law, people can participate
over
are
These
settled peaceably"
reports, moreover,
policy issues
(p. 34).
a set of
and
of
the
rule
law,
propose
democracy,
institutions?including
and
freedom.
economic
and
markets?to
promote
opportunity
political
are
to protect
individual
These
reports, then,
rights by in
attempting
states.
sovereign
already constituted
stilling liberal values within
as
and
the
modernization
documents
narrate,
Furthermore,
processes
are
new networks of association
include
do
that
creating
interdependence
movements
a
to
the state,
of transnational
mestic
challenges
proliferation
and a nascent
civil society. The Global Gover
that individu
the
changing ways
length
Increased
vis-?-vis
other communities.
als identify and locate themselves
whose mem
has created a "common
neighborhood,"
interdependence
common
cul
interests and also share an increasingly
bers have mutual
actor in
even if the state remains the
ture. Thus,
primary
global politics,
are to create
and negative,
both positive
the results of interdependence,
are
to
new networks
and associations,
many of which
attempting
guide
in the domestic
and international
the state's activities
sphere.
and organizations,
nance Commission
Although
creasingly
included
reviews
global
at
an in
are
playing
organizations
international
role in various
issues, they tend to be
important
on an ad
as the UN
such
in international
only
organizations
NGOs
and
transnational
in Europe, made the case that there was an important relationship between domestic and international
of Chicago Press, 1991). As reflected by
order. See Dorothy
Jones, Code of Peace (Chicago: University
state could main
or not the
the League of Nations mandate
system, at issue was whether
recognized
domestic order and the capacity to govern should be used as cri
tain some semblance of order?that
teria for independence
and recognition.
539
NEW WORLD ORDER
because
hoc basis
such
international
ticipation to states. Consequently,
and the Global
mechanisms
state
propose
to establish
at the UN and
actors more
fully
restrict
the Independent Working
Commission
Governance
usually
organizations
to include
its sister organizations
in all aspects of the decision-making
par
Group
various
these non
process.
They envision new councils that direcdy link peoples and the organs of
the international
in ways
community
that challenge
the state's monop
oly on decision-making authority at the global level.The hope is to give
over states that violate
the norms
groups normative
leverage
on issues of domestic
of the international
governance.
community
to be liberal to the
To summarize: we can consider
these documents
domestic
extent
that
their
modernization
are informed
narratives
and
interdependence
are
by
a belief
transforming
in progress:
that
the character of
global politics; that institutions can be established to help manage these
that democracy
is a principled
issue and can enhance
peace
changes;
to protect
and security; and that the UN has an obligation
individuals,
create institutions
that can encourage
po
promote universal values, and
are more
litical and economic
assertions
than simply a
freedom. These
set of
for a
for peace and security, they are also a blueprint
proposals
durable,
stable,
theme of these
how
and
legitimate
is what
reports
international
constitutes
a
order. Thus,
recurring
state action and
legitimate
to fulfill
and the authority
the UN can gather both the resources
Such matters
speak direcdy
this new mandate.
to the
larger
issue of le
gitimacy in global politics.
Legitimacy
In offering positions on what should be the rules of the game andwhat
is considered
these reports address the concept of
behavior,
acceptable
both
substantive
and
First, ends that are consid
legitimacy,
procedural.
to pursue
these ends should be
ered desirable
and the means
selected
viewed
as proper
decision-making
proper by the members
dominates
importance
the discussion
of
31
For substantive
and second, the
community;
to
that is deemed
practice
correspond
of the community.31
Substantive
legitimacy
by the relevant
should
process
institutional
political
in the reports, although
the
they also consider
for furthering
reforms
legiti
procedural
Kellner, The Homeless
legitimacy, see Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried
in
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973); W. Richard Scott, "Unpacking Institutional Arguments,"
Institutionalism
in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Uni
TheNew
Walter Powell and Paul Dimaggio,
versity of Chicago Press, 1991), 169-71; and Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(Glencoe, 111.:Free Press, 1964), 124. For procedural legitimacy as applied to the UN, see Franck (fn. 5),
24,25;
idem, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York Oxford University Press, 1996);
and Bruce Russett, ed., The Once and Future Security Council (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
Mind
540
WORLD POLITICS
the need to reform the Security Council
and de
instance,
other organs of the United
Nations
system.
are social constructs
Because
orders
and a product of mate
political
on
rial and normative
the
focus
how these orders are
forces,
reports
to establish
and the struggles
that are waged
their legitima
produced
a
tion principles.
is not merely
"Politics
for
struggle
power," observed
for
macy,
mocratize
a
in which
Inis Claude,
"but also a contest over legitimacy,
competition
or
or
the conferment
the confirmation
of legitimacy
revocation,
denial,
is an important
his classic^? World Restored by
stake."32 Kissinger
began
that
stating
construction
the central
issue
of a set of socially
that determines
what
principles
In many
respects,
war
the
post-cold
these
reports
for the post-Napoleonic
the
order was
and collectively
recognized
legitimated
is
and what
permissible
apply Kissinger's
historical
is
prohibited.33
concerns
to
era.
then are international political orders legitimated? As Claude
How
cen
of the twentieth
article, a notable phenomenon
to
is
that
the
of
international
tend
be
tury
agents
legitimization
politi
cal organizations,
and since World War
II that function has been nearly
observation,
reports reinforce Claude's
by the UN.34 These
monopolized
as the debate over the
the
and the ac
of
international
goals
community
means
to achieve
in and around
those goals arguably centered
ceptable
noted
in his classic
the UN, because
obtain
any emerging
arrangements
only there would
some moral
and
After
international
all, any
politi
standing
legitimacy.
to be
cal order?or
order for that matter?needs
any political
legiti
if it is to have any staying power or be based on anything
mated
other
a forum for collective
than coercion. And
the UN provides
legitimation,
a
where
the
is coronated.
international
order
place
It is impressive how many proposals
and discussions
about the future
international
order occurred
the
vehicle
Nations.
of
the
United
through
would major and minor
powers alike turn to the United Nations?
Why
to
of course, but it
Various
material
considerations,
point
explanations
com
is worth
the UN's symbolic
role in the international
considering
munity.
apply
One
of the first
for admission
acts of an
independent
to the United
Nations,
is to
state, for example,
as
former
for,
Secretary
General Perez de Cueller observed, joining the UN is the "final confir
mation
of
32
Claude,
independence,
nationhood,
and sovereignty."35
These
reports
as a Political Function
International
"Collective Legitimization
of the United Nations,"
20 (Summer 1966), 368.
Organization
33
(fn. 5).
Kissinger
34
Claude
(fn. 32).
35
and the United
States" (Address at the fiftieth an
Javier Perez de Cuellar, "The United Nations
10,1988). Cited from Franck (fn. 5), 9.
niversary celebration, Dartmouth
College, May
NEW WORLD ORDER
541
articulate both implicitly and sometimes explicitly the necessity of lo
a "center" not
to
the international
with
cating
only
provide
community
a concrete
a
to
mechanism
it
but
also
steering
give
symbolic
footing
and some meaning.
As Gareth
Evans
"The world
needs a
observes,
center,
and some
confidence
that the center
is holding:
the United
Na
tions is the only credible candidate."36And as Our GlobalNeighborhood
affirms, it is the only international forum that has the legitimacy and
stature
to operate
in these matters.
this period
During
of rapid change
and fluidity it can best provide the stabilizing influence needed by the
international
Following
the collective
system.37
Emile Durkheim,
beliefs of states
one can ask whether
the UN represents
in a way that is almost quasi
in
religious
can be no
not
Durkheim
does
"which
wrote,
society,"
at
feel the need of upholding
and reaffirming
regular intervals, the col
lective sentiments
and collective
its unity and its per
ideas which make
character.
"There
turn to the UN after the cold war becomes more
sonality."38 The
plausible
in light of its symbolic
role vis-?-vis
the international
In
community.
turn
even
to
UN
the
the
be
necessitated
deed,
may
by "dynamic density,"
new
that is, intensifying
of interaction
that are generating
patterns
forms
of social
organizations
and collective
representations.39
In gen
eral, even if the principles of the international community embodied in
the UN Charter
and
in its thousands
of documents
not have
the standing of social facts, the UN
the organizational
international
community,
collective
beliefs.40
nity's
What
nization
is the source
and resolutions
is still the cathedral
repository
do
of the
of the commu
of the UN's legitimacy? The UN is the only orga
and is invested by states as hav
universality
that approximates
ing some degree of moral authority.Most
simply, it has this legitimacy
states invest
and authority
by virtue of the fact that member
legitimacy
in it.41To be sure, the UN's
has varied over time and across
legitimacy
ever
but no other regional or international
constituencies,
organization
36
Canadian House of Commons,
External Affairs Committee;
quoted from Lawson (fn. 7), 3.
37
22
Oran Young, "The United Nations
and the International
System," International Organization
(Autumn 1968), 906.
38
Cited fromW. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations
(Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Press,
1995), 10.
39
The Division
Emile Durkheim,
of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964); John Ruggie,
in theWorld
ed., Neorealism and Its Crit
"Continuity and Transformation
Polity," in Robert Keohane,
ics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986).
40
The importance and potential behavioral impact of the UN's symbolic role is also raised by Roberts
and Kingsbury
(fn. 18), 19-22.
41
Claude
Press,
Franck, Nation
(fn. 32); Thomas
(New York: Oxford University
against Nation
1985).
542
WORLD POLITICS
to rival
emerged
whereas
a
neoliberal
potential
liability
it, even when
institutionalism
it was
at its lowest
might
collective
for overcoming
ebb.42 Indeed,
as
the UN's universality
re
action
these
problems,
view
ports hold that it is its very universality that generates its legitimacy and
thus
its ability
The
action,
to encourage
states to
international
comply with
UN
to
the
the
broad
expect
legitimate
principles
reports
not a new
role for
UN embodies
it. The
many
norms.
of state
of the most
im
norms of the international
norms that,
portant constitutive
community,
are
states
to be
in effect,
how
modern,
sovereign
prescribe
expected
are
have. Dorothy
observes
that
there
"nine
fundamental
Jones
princi
ples that constitute
the international
tions Charter
but
a summary
sphere....
the authors
of state reflection
All
and these norms
did not create
them."43
of as constitutive
as members
from both
emerge
for what
upon proper action in
can be found in the United
Na
of the document
can be
These
principles
thought
states how to enact their
identity
munity;
concern
nine
if these basic
norms, for they tell
com
of the international
a climate
of fear, that is, a
not heeded,
to
ought
operate.44
the UN
these norms,
norms were
might
happen
and a hope for how the international
community
And while
of the UN did not invent
the architects
home and legitimacy. The
gave them an institutional
reports reiterate
stress
these principles
and
the importance
of renouncing war (except in
a multi
and unilateral
intervention
and of embracing
self-defense)
lateral sensibility.
States
lations
of course
do not
do violate
tell us whether
these
norms
the norms
of state action, but
state behavior
shape
such vio
on other
that is, do states ever alter their actions in order to be viewed
occasions;
on it.While
rec
as
are
reports
legitimate
by other states? These
betting
no
at
times
for
hand
of
that
there may be
substitute
the heavy
ognizing
to this end
state
sanctions
and multilateral
they discuss
power?and
42
Ernst Haas
is the degree to
argues that a rough measure of the legitimacy of the United Nations
... to
"member states invoke its purposes and principles
justify national policy." See Haas, Be
Press, 1964), 133. For a good discussion of
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
yond theNation-State
see Arthur Stinch
a
some measure of
how to verify empirically whether
order
has
legitimacy,
political
of Chicago Press, 1968), 162-64.
combe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago: University
43
These principles of state action are "sovereign equality of states; territorial integrity and political
in internal af
of states; equal rights and self-determination
of peoples; nonintervention
independence
in
fairs of states; peaceful settlement of disputes between
states; no threat or use of force; fulfillment
good faith of international obligations;
cooperation with other states; and respect for human rights and
inModem
Tradition
International Law," in T.
freedoms." See Jones "The Declaratory
fundamental
which
and D. Marpel,
Press,
eds., Traditions of International Ethics (New York Cambridge University
1992), 44-45.
44
norms and state action, see Ron
Jones (fn. 43), 48-49. On constitutive
Jepperson, Alexander
and Security," in Peter Katzenstein,
and Peter Katzenstein,
ed., The Culture
Norms,
Wendt,
"Identity,
Norms and Identity inWorld Politics (New York Columbia University
Press, 1996).
Security:
ofNational
Nardin
NEW WORLD ORDER
military
their
543
states also care about
posit that
are
an international
part of
community
documents
operations?these
because
legitimacy
they
from which they derive their rights, obligations, and authority to act in
are
ways.45 Power, these documents
suggesting,
on those who adhere to the
values and norms,
community's
sanctioned
legitimately
is conferred
and leadership is not only about having military power but also about
moral
projecting
imization
put, state
ments. The
thus
Inis Claude
contends
that collective
legit
purpose.46
of the UN shapes states' behavior
because,
simply
state
officials have made
it important
by their actions and
function
very demand
its causal force.47
These
reports
and moral
offer
for this
various
to
is its source
function
designed
proposals
state action. Several
to use
of power
and
the UN status
in
proposals
care
Our Global Neighborhood
about their rep
operate only if states
to stop
to the
utation. One
threats
security of people" is
"grave
proposal
authority
guide
can
of the
to develop a Council of Petitions to include a panel of distinguished,
independent individuals whose taskwould be dedicated to safeguard
to the secre
recommendations
ing the security of peoples
by making
a Council without
"It
the
and
Council.
would
be
tary-general
Security
and the
But the eminence
of its members
any power of enforcement.
quality of its proceedings
its conclusions
considerable
also
asserts
that
a measure
moral
of respect that will give
(p. 262). The commission
authority"
and most
efficient
the easiest
is through
compliance
can foster
direct
contact,
publicity,
method
for ensuring
and the
deterrence,
"mobilization of shame" (p. 328).48This highlights one of the UN'smost
important functions (and one on which it holds amonopoly): to dis
tribute
seals of
claiming
approval
and
principles
Kingsbury,
society."49
But does
"remain
and disapproval.
central
the search
for
in pro
Roberts
and
"The UN's functions
write
conferring
legitimacy,"
to the effective maintenance
of international
legitimacy
shape
the behavior
of the most
powerful?
45
to
"Nations, or those who govern them," writes Thomas
Franck, "recognize that the obligation
as the
to
states
them
of
is
owed
the
ofthat
validation
of
community
community's
comply
by
reciprocal
their nations statehood." See Franck (fn. 5), 196.
46
See also Paul Schroeder, "New World Order: A Historical
Perspective," Washington Quarterly 17,
no. 2 (1994), 33; John
and Change: Embedded
Liber
Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions,
alism in the Postwar Economic
Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University
Press, 1983).
47
Claude
(fn. 32), 374-75.
48
International Orga
See also Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance,"
nization (Spring 1993).
49
Roberts and Kingsbury
(fn. 18), 57.
WORLD POLITICS
544
If legitimate power is ... power that is valid according to rules, and where the
rules themselves are justifiable by and in conformity with the underlying beliefs,
then the main way inwhich the powerful will maintain their legitimacy is by re
specting the intrinsic limits set to their power by the rules and the underlying
principles on which they are grounded. Legitimate power, that is to say, is lim
ited
power.50
Power
and
legitimacy,
are
in short,
ones.51 The
are not
but rather
concepts
conflicting
want
to be
actions
their
too,
powerful,
to maintain
their power and further their
complementary
as
viewed
if only
legitimate,
interests. Even
in this view, cannot act in an expedient
the powerful,
so
manner
international
and narrowly
self-interested
and must observe
rules and norms.
ciety's underlying
a
war
even the
it is striking feature of the post-cold
Thus
period that
most
states seek the UN's stamp of
there are
approval. While
powerful
materially based reasons for this development,
The Global Governance
cosmopolitanism.52
that
suggests
increasing
interdependence
one factor in how state officials
identity is
these reports highlight
for instance,
Commission,
civic
and a growing
global
con
think about themselves,
to
have
and
desire
activities,
their interests,
their
organize
ceptualize
their actions collectively
The UN's stamp of approval, how
legitimated.
as con
must be viewed
cost: the
ever, does not come without
operation
sistent with
the goals
is subject to
its very design
result is that the
process. The
of the member
states,
amendment
the authorization
during
state
forfeits
considerable
authorization
autonomy.
seeking
The
celebrate
this
reports uniformly
development.
in the area of hu
Such a development
may be particularly
important
member
manitarian
support
chronic
intervention.
for
the
While
these
documents
of humanitarian
concept
that states will
express
intervention,
that their interventions
tremendous
there
is the
are, by de
danger
are
to
further their
in fact, they
finition,
humanitarian,
when,
designed
to le
own interests. For this reason, the reports insist that the
authority
not
a humanitarian
must
it
need
reside
with
the
UN;
gitimate
operation
at
be the executing
the very least it should be the authorizing
agent, but
forum
that legitimates
the goals
sistent with
using
the means
claim
such actions
accepted
that they really are con
and implemented
community
and ensures
of the international
by that community.53
50
Power (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities
David Beetham, The Legitimation
Press, 1991), 35.
of
51
Claude (fn. 32), 368.
52
For a discussion of these points, see Michael
Barnett, "Spheres of Influence?" in Joseph Lepgold
and Changing World Politics (Albany: State
and Thomas Weiss,
eds., Collective Conflict Management
of New York Press, 1997).
University
53
character of humanitar
tie legitimacy to the multilateral
Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno
in Lyons and Mastanduno,
See Lyons and Mastanduno,
ian operations.
"Introduction,"
Beyond
NEW WORLD
In general,
these documents
over
war
debate
the post-cold
545
ORDER
are an
to the
contribution
important
international
order. For them, the UN ful
fills a legitimation function in global politics: not only does it poten
tially legitimate the principles upon which the future international
order
of those
rests, but the legitimation
principles
states will honor
that
its norms.
States
expectation
norms
carries with
it the
will
these
violate
to be
that states do have
sure, but the reports are suggesting
to
available
them various mechanisms
for stabilizing
their social rela
their ability to confer or deny approval and legitimacy.
tions, including
The un as an Agent
As
of Normative
Integration?
of a liberal
international
order, these reports will be read
on how
their
various
audiences,
differendy
by
receptive
they
depending
are to the
on
an
and
role
of
how
view
such
order
the
prospect
they
they
advocates
are supposed to play in bringing it about. The West is the first audi
ence. Sometimes it is subtly chastised for being hypocritical and not
this is one reading of the em
by the rules that it established;
on
law and the Interna
the role of international
phasis
strengthening
in adjudicating
More
tional Court
of Justice
often, however,
disputes.
abiding
the most
powerful Western
states
(liberal) leadership role for which
are criticized
for not providing
they arewell
suited materially and
the
is the primary, though unnamed,
culprit. While
ideologically.
it celebrates
of de
the community
liberalism
and speaks of enlarging
wont
to
mocratic
and financially
states, it has been
support politically
The
U.S.
to this end. The
in
the very institution
that might
operate effectively
ac
to
collective
ternational
needs
community
leadership
accomplish
states. These
tion, and the likely leaders are liberal, Western
reports,
then, are in part attempts
terests reside.
The Third World
for a liberal
tance.
ance
their
in
international
by these commissions
order but rather
not as a source of support
site of resis
potential
as a
the compli
with
all the reports are concerned
securing
Nearly
most
to and
resistant
distant
from
the liberal
of those most
order; these are actors
societies.
This
highlights
international
Western
states of where
sits in a different place. Arguably, much of the
is viewed
Third World
to convince Western
located
an
almost
important
exclusively
of
feature
in non
the UN:
and International Intervention
Press,
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Westphalia? State Sovereignty
in Peter
Norms
of Humanitarian
Intervention,"
Finnemore,
1996), 12; and Martha
"Constructing
World Politics (New York: Co
Katzenstein,
ed., The Culture ofNational
Security: Norms and Identity in
lumbia University
Press, 1996).
546
WORLD POLITICS
though ostensibly a global organization,
dressing Third World and North-South
the UN, far from maintaining
observes,
a
it is in fact dedicated to ad
issues. As Anthony Parsons
global
jurisdiction,
is generally
"preoccupied with the problems of the newly independent majority,
namely the dangerous disputes in the so-called Third World."54 This
focus
is as true today
Ghali's
proclamation
cum-disintegration
and democracy
as itwas
during the UN's first forty years. Boutros
in this era of
that the UN's mandate
globalization
is to develop markets
and impart the rule of law
leaves
about
little uncertainty
posed solution.55
raises a central
This
the problem
and
its pro
con
come to
give their
that
the
order, especially
legitimation
principles
political
an international
interests
of
the
the
order usually
represent
undergird
to their relative
the weak
and operate
advantage.56 Whether
powerful
issue: how
sent to a
do the weak
since
on
they might not fully benefit depends
accept an order from which
a
duce
particular
its norms
come
to be universalized
and in
are
to
be the
such that the values of the individual
ternalized,
projected
this occurs affects the degree
values of humanity.57 The extent to which
to repro
to which
incentives will be necessary
coercion
and selective
and how
whether
order
and values
and enhance
the prospects
for social
integra
tion.58
to
a number
that purport
of theories
reports identify
explain
to a
The weak are more
order.
and why the weak consent
particular
These
how
likely to accept the principles forwarded by the strong, in the first in
rather
framed as universal
UN
the
these
of
very legitimation
by
principles
an
is
resistance
is
likely if
step in this direction.
By contrast,
important
or as
the
are seen asWestern
in orientation
these values
fostering
in
continued
West's
power
global politics.
a source of state
the UN conceivably
Second,
represents
identity and
interac
interests by providing
the organizational
space for interstate
if such principles
stance,
than particularistic.
The
are
convincingly
tion. Our Global Neighborhood also observes that the UN's deliberative
54
Interests of States," in Roberts and Kingsbury
(fn. 18), 111-12.
Parsons, "The UN and National
55
Boutros-Ghali
(fn. 19).
56
have examined various features of how a liberal
and Tom Biersteker
Robert Cox, John Ruggie,
was established
it operates. See Cox, Production, Power and
and to whose
advantage
political order
York: Columbia
World Order: Social Forces in theMaking
Press, 1987);
(New
University
ofHistory
in the Developing World,"
Economics
of Neoclassical
"The Triumph
Ruggie (fn. 46); and Biersteker,
in J. Rosenau
and Ernst-Otto
eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in
Cziempel,
World Politics (New York Cambridge University
(fn. 50), chap. 4.
Press, 1992). See also Beetham
57
Verso Press, 1991), 56.
Terry Eagleton,
Ideology (New York
58
and theEvo
in theModem
Problems
State," in Communication
"Legitimation
J?rgen Habermas,
lution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
NEW WORLD ORDER
functions?generally
sent
a source
disparaged for being all talk all the time?repre
of new
once
Chadwick
interests,
observed
Alger
at the UN led to a socialization
terests.59 Other
represent
These
547
scholars
and
practices,
that interaction
process,
too have noted
identities.
conceivably
states
member
among
new identities
and in
fostering
that international
organizations
a site of new
reports
of action.60
interests, and categories
identities,
the establishment
of various mechanisms
also propose
and institutions that might help convey norms from the North
South.61
new
at this, the United
to create
Nations
help
and new
of actors, new interests for actors to pursue,
and interests. The
reflect new identities
Independent
a social council
to establish
that is "empow
proposes
If it is successful
categories
that
strategies
Working
ered to
to the
can
Group
to
and integrate
the work of all UN activities
relating
supervise
actors access to its
issues of social development"
and grants nonstate
new councils,
deliberations.
other reports, though not proposing
The
are equally insistent on the need to establish mechanisms bywhich the
that are in "distress."
regulate those societies
can be seen as an attempt
war
activities
the
UN's
Indeed,
post-cold
are
to and can be
actors
to
of
the number
who
committed
expand
UN can
counted
as
part
of a liberal
generation
political
order. Consider
the UN's second
fa
they have largely concerned
to civil
state"
"failed
society, from
operations:62
peacekeeping
from civil war
the transition
cilitating
to a state able to govern
it with
itself, by investing
legitimacy
popular
include new constitutions,
and democratic
forms of rule that nominally
and so on.63 Several of these peace
human
elections,
rights provisions,
established
and trained new civilian police forces
operations
keeping
modeled alongWestern
lines and designed to foster democratic identi
59
no. 3
as a Learning Process," Public
Participation
Opinion Quarterly 27,
Alger, "United Nations
Interna
Nation-State:
the
(1963), 425. See also Claude
(fn. 32), 373; Connie McNeely,
Constructing
and Prescriptive Action (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
tional Organization
Press, 1995); and Martha
N.Y.:
Cornell University
Interests in International Society (Ithaca,
Press, 1996).
Finnemore, National
60
in theWorld
"World Culture
John Boli and George M. Thomas,
Polity: A Century of Interna
American Sociological Review 62 (April 1997); and McNeely
tional Non-Governmental
Organization,"
(fn.59).
61
and the transmis
For broader theoretical statements on the relationship between organizations
and Powell (fn. 31);W. Richard Scott and Soren
sion of norms and acceptable practices, see Dimaggio
Stud
International and Longitudinal
Christensen,
eds., The Institutional Construction of Organizations:
ies (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications,
1995); John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," Inter
as
"International Organizations
national Organization
47 (Winter
Finnemore,
1993); and Martha
47 (Autumn 1993).
Teachers of'Norms," International Organization
62
see Michael
of this argument,
For an expanded discussion
Barnett, "The New U.N. Politics of
to
Global Governance 1 (Winter 1995).
Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty
Sovereignty,"
Empirical
63
International, Peacekeeping and Human Rights (Mimeo, January 1994); Sally Morphet,
Amnesty
and Ratner
in Roberts and Kingsbury
and Election-Monitoring,"
"UN Peacekeeping
(fn. 18); Helman
"International Election Observing:
(fn. 10); and David Padilla and Elizabeth Houppert,
Enhancing
the Principle of Free and Fair Elections," Emory International Law Review 7 (1993).
WORLD POLITICS
548
ties and practices. Most
of these reports
resources
into
postconflict
peace-building
conflicts before they escalate.
also advocate
measures
more
channeling
aimed at resolving
To
these reports suggest
that all international
summarize,
some
measure
orders need
of legitimacy
if they are to be
political
sustained
without the threat or deployment of force. At the heart of thematter is
to which
not ever or
the weak
and those who might
degree
evenly
more
states dis
benefit
from that order acce;de to its
The
principles.
as
states that view themselves
rules, particularly
agree on fundamental
the
victims
These
process
national
of this
system,
the more
precarious
the UN as a central
reports
identify
of narrowing
the number
the
international
order.64
this
agent for advancing
that object to a liberal inter
normative
In this re
integration.
of states
order
and thus for achieving
liberals," individuals
spect,
reports were written
by "sociological
who do not believe
that liberalism
is an analytic
that stands
category
to
rather
but
believe
that
liberal
and
societies
individuals
prior
society
UN can
from
social
and
historical
the
emerge
processes.65 Conceivably,
these
to international
contribute
function
gitimation
of state action
commissions
order by shaping state action
and the articulation
and transmission
in domestic
and
international
spheres. At
its le
through
of the norms
least so these
predict.
Conclusion
a debate over the
reports under consideration
represent
post-cold
war international
a liberal international
order, the struggle to legitimate
to extend the circle of believers.
the UN's
order, and an attempt
Despite
current financial
straits and the
its abil
that weakens
paralysis
political
The
to act as an agent of
and norm transmission,
the UN
ity
legitimation
a
nevertheless
has symbolic
and
function.
This
standing
legitimation
function may prove to be particularly
the rules of the
important when
there is a transition
from one order to
game are in flux, that is, when
or when
there are significant
to the established
order.
challenges
or
to
has
the
organization
body
capacity
legiti
norms of the international
mate the
so it
and
order,
underlying
principles
com
is to the UN that states turn for
and sanction. These
legitimation
missions
remind
international
relations
scholars
that international
another
No
other
international
64
R. J. Vincent,
"Order in International Politics," in J. D. B. Miller
and R. J. Vincent,
eds., Order and
Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations
(New York Oxford University
Press, 1991), 54.
65
Keohane
(fn. 14).
NEWWORLD ORDER
order
is founded
not
only
549
on a stable balance
of power but also on a set
few political
orders are ever sus
of legitimation
principles.
Certainly,
tained by shared norms alone, but fewer still have existed for any
length
of time without
them. What
classical
realist scholars understood
has
been
students of global politics.
forgotten
by contemporary
If these reports can be taken as indicative
of the debate over the sub
stance of the international
seem to
the
of liberalism
order,
champions
are
on
be having
their day and those who
feel otherwise
the defensive.
Liberal principles are accepted in theWest;
at issue iswhether theywill
states. These
be accepted
and internalized
commis
by non-Western
are
as
war
sions
the missionaries
for the post-cold
order, preach
acting
to the converted
can be an
UN
that
the
agent of a liberal
ing
important
to widen
order and hoping
the community
of believers.
in
Couched
this way, the discussion
tion and contestation
directs
and
our attention
toward
toward
the potential
sites of confronta
that en
mechanisms
courage the diffusion of this liberal sensibility at the global level.The
a critical
to these reports, can
UN, according
play
the general
liberal tenor of the post-cold
Indeed,
even more
if
the focus is widened
from
apparent
role
in both
war
order
regards.
is made
the UN Secretariat
to
include the other organs of the United Nations system. The World
Bank, the UNHigh Commissioner on Human Rights, the United Na
tions Development
Program,
scribe to liberal tenets. Taken
be read as
inextricably
of
international
isomorphism
and other
as a whole,
involved with
might
Yet
in any
Thus,
these
stance,
over the last half
politics
century.66
on the
contradictions
inherent
potential
in general
in
and in liberalism
particular.
are silent
these
reports
international
order
to
they fail
acknowledge
undermine
reports might
the
sub
generally
Nations
system
the impressive
institutional
organizations
the United
the pursuit of some of the goals of
others. The
reports gloss over, for in
that
between
economic
relationship
to
fail
consider
how market
similarly
disputed
democracy.
They
are
as the
which
proper way to organize
accepted
tensions
acerbate
between
groups
identity-based
to the
tribute
of local communities
disintegration
polities.
Such
peace-building
tensions
are
particularly
situations where World
manifest
and
growth
mechanisms,
an economy,
can ex
con
and perhaps
in already fragile
in many
postconflict
Bank officials call for fiscal re
and structural adjustment-type
sponsibility
policies while
the UN system clamor for ethnic peace based on
minimizing
66
see
et al., Institutional
On institutional
isomorphism,
George Thomas
State, Society, and the Individual(Beverly
Hills, Calif: Sage Press, 1987).
other
parts of
the costs of
Structure: Constituting
the
550
WORLD POLITICS
Nor
reconstruction.
postconflict
do these
consider
reports
the
possible
connection between liberalism and inequality.67Finally, they tout the
as the
for the
panacea
organizations
world's
without
that while
these organizations
duly noting
problems
are
be
above
still
with
Inter
may
power politics,
they
fraught
politics.
can become
new sites of
national
themselves
organizations
authority
to either member
states or the
that are unaccountable
populations
they
construction
of
are mandated
to assist, and thus
pursue policies
might
of either of these constituencies.68
with
this
liberalism
scholars
relationship
our
directs
between
the UN and these
different
to the
general
neglect
relations. Whether
international
attention
of international
strands
of
the UN by
relations
the
of
a role for the UN in the
of international
order
production
on how
international
order and security.
they conceptualize
consider
depends
Neorealism
does
that are at odds
the interests
But
orists
international
envisions
not
no
coercive
such role for the UN because
the organization
or a robust collective
mechanisms
security
possess
institutionalism
leans toward a neorealist
system. Neoliberal
generally
as
an effective
or
view in that it does not see conditions
being ripe for
to a strict rationalism
vibrant role for the UN. By adhering
and leaning
on materialism,
and neoliberal
both neorealism
institutionalism
heavily
a role for the UN in the
are
to
much
of
identify
hard-pressed
production
and maintenance
of international
order in the ways advocated
by these
reports.
In contrast
to neorealism,
neoliberal
which
which
emphasizes
focuses on
coercion
and force,
stabilized
and
rela
institutionalism,
exchange
norms
constructivism
entertains
the
and institutions,
through
a
that order is also achieved
normative
structure, an
through
possibility
re
of some basic rules of the game
that place normative
acceptance
tions
strictions
67
Andrew
Marie-Cloude
on behavior.69
Not
all constructivists
are advocates
of a liberal
and Ngaire Woods,
and Inequality," Millennium
"Globalisation
24, no. 3 (1995);
"International Organizations
and Inequality among States," International So
Feminism and International Relations: Towards
144, no. 3 (1995); Sandra Whitworth,
Hurrell
Smouts,
cial Science Journal
a Political
Economy
Institutions
(New York St. Martins
of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental
Press, 1994).
68
and Dehis
See, for instance, Liisa Mallki,
"Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism,
11 (Fall 1996); Michael
"The Pol
Barnett and Martha
Finnemore,
toricization," Cultural Anthropology
at the International
of International Organizations"
itics, Power, and Pathologies
(Paper presented
Studies Association
annual meetings, Toronto, March
69
International
Alexander Wendt,
"Constructing
20-24,1997).
Politics," International
Security 20 (Summer
and Katzenstein
1995); Jepperson, Wendt,
(fn. 44); and Emanuel Adler "Seizing the Middle Ground:
andWorld
Constructivism
See also
(forthcoming).
Politics,"European
JournalofInternationalRelations
Dennis Wrong,
The Problem of Order (New York: Free Press, 1994), chap. 3; Jeffrey Alexander, Twenty
Lectures (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1987), chap. 1; and John Rhoads, Critical Issues in So
cial Theory (College Station: Penn State Press, 1991), chap. 5.
NEWWORLD ORDER
worldview
would
tions
551
or agree that a liberalworld would be a
pacific world; nor
rela
and stabilized
argue that coercion
exchange
in
the
international
factors
of
important
reproduction
constructivism
because
shares with
these reports a consider
constructivists
are not
order. But
ation of how
international
is better
to consider,
able
duced
forces, it
through normative
order might
be pro
international
and transmission
of the codes
legitimation,
order
is secured
first, how
by the articulation,
of state conduct,
and second,
role of the UN in all the
the potential
or sustained
above. Few international
orders are ever founded
by force
drafted
who
well
understood
the
alone,
by
something
policymakers
relations theorists who
these reports and wisely heeded by international
to
orders that
international
understand
their
actions
and
the
attempt
they
construct
and sustain.