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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
CIENTIFIC
UARTERLY
QUARTERLY
no 4(89)
WARSAW
WARSAW 2012
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
Associate Professor Andrzej Glen, Ph.D. – chairman, Professor Stanisław Zajas, Ph.D. –
deputy-chairman, Associate Professor Waldemar Kaczmarek, Ph.D. – Management and
Command Faculty, Associate Professor Waldemar Kitler, Ph.D. – National Security Faculty,
Dr James Corum – Baltic defence College, Col. Miroslaw Dimitrov, Associate Professor –
National Defence Academy in Sofia, Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D.
– National Defence University in Bucharest, Doc. Ing. Mariana Kuffova, Associate
Professor – Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Professor Pavel Necas – Armed Forces
Academy in Slovakia, Col. Dimitar Tashkov, Associate Professor, Ph.D. – National
Defence Academy in Sofia, M.A. Adam Szynal
Thematic editor: Assoc. Prof. Piotr Gawliczek, PhD
The list of reviewers:
Colonel Instructor Stan ANTON, Ph.D.;
Commander Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel
BUČKA, Ph.D.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D. ;
Colonel Miroslav Stefan DIMITROV, Assoc. Prof.; Colonel Instructor Pascu FURNICĂ,
Ph.D.; Doc. Ing. Peter LIPTAK, Cs.C.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.;
Colonel Professor Dimitar NEDYLKOV; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Constantin POPESCU,
Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, Ph.D.; Researcher Alexandra SARCINSCHI,
Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Peter SPILÝ, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej Glen, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KACZMAREK, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI, Ph.D.;
Prof. Stanisław KOZIEJ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Marian KOZUB, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof.Zdzisław KURASIŃSKI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Józef MARCZAK, Ph.D.;
Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.;
Maj.Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Jacek PAWŁOWSKI, Ph.D.;
Prof. Piotr SIENKIEWICZ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Stanisław SIRKO, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof. Zenon STACHOWIAK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Jeremiasz ŚLIPIEC, Ph.D.;
Col. Prof. Jarosław WOŁEJSZO, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek WRZOSEK, Ph.D.;
Prof. Stanisław ZAJAS, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Janusz ZUZIAK, Ph.D.
Editorial committee:
Anna Doraczyńska, M.A. – chief editor (tel. 6/813-516),
Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters, M.A. – editing of papers in English
Address: 00-910 Warszawa 72
al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela 103, bl. 4
tel./fax: (6)813-516
e-mail: [email protected]
The papers published in the „NDU Scientific Quarterly” are reviewed by experts.
They express individual opinions of the authors;
they are also verified by an anti-plagiarism system.
National Defence University
Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University, order no 1089/2012,
edition of 100 copies
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
Assoc. Prof. Robert KUPIECKI, Ph.D.
What is the future of NATO? Lecture given at the inauguration of the academic year at the
National Defence University, Warsaw, 28th September 2012 ..............................................................5
NATIONAL SECURITY
Maj. Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.
New missions of the European Union ................................................................................................12
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej GLEN, Ph.D.
The Cognitive basis of air defence ......................................................................................................25
Col. Leszek ELAK, Ph.D.
Reasons for contemporary conflicts – an outline of the problem ........................................................46
Lt. Col. Krzysztof DABIK, Ph.D.
Security in social contract theories .....................................................................................................55
Lt. Col. Jarosław JABŁOŃSKI
The building of knowledge capacity in the national security system ..................................................63
Andrzej ZAPAŁOWSKI, Ph.D.
Challenges to the security of Poland related with the regionalization of Ukraine ...............................74
ART OF WAR
Col. Tomasz RUBAJ, D.Sc.
Fire support – an integral part of contemporary operations ................................................................90
Col. Waldemar SCHEFFS, D.Sc.
The Automation of Electronic Equipment in Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare ...........................104
Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D.
CBRN reconnaissance in the Polish Armed Forces ..........................................................................126
Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D.
Maj (ret.) Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI MSc
From swarm intelligence to multiagent systems for mobile robot navigation ..................................137
ECONOMY OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICS
Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK , Ph.D.
Optimization of logistic system in the polish armed forces ..............................................................151
3
Lt. Col. Sylwester T. KUREK, D.Sc.
Prof. Janusz PŁACZEK, Ph.D.
The essence of security economics as a scientific discipline ............................................................161
Lt. Col. Sławomir BYŁEŃ, Ph.D.
The Optimization of Logistics Costs in Computer Assisted Command Post Exercises ....................175
Aleksandra KACZMAREK, PhD student
Corporate Social Responsibility From The Perspective of The First
Decade of 21st Century in Poland ....................................................................................................193
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION
Prof. Józef JANCZAK, Ph.D.
Maj. Grzegorz PILARSKI, M.A.
The Platform of Heterogenic Simulation Environment ....................................................................199
Justyna LIPIŃSKA, Ph.D.
Public information of the polish armed forces ..................................................................................206
Elżbieta OLZACKA, M.A.
A "Cultural turn" in the study and conduct of warfare - a new analytical perspective ......................217
Elżbieta POSŁUSZNA, Ph.D.
Typological Aspects of Single Issue Terrorism ................................................................................232
Assoc. Prof. Ilona POLITOWICZ, Ph.D.
Assoc. Prof. Piotr MAKOWSKI, Ph.D.
Agata NIEDZIÓŁKA, M.A.
Space marketing – innovative ideas produce creative technologies ..................................................242
Marcin KRUPA, M.A.
A behavioral model determining the impact of USA military activity on the
global number of wars ......................................................................................................................260
EXPERIENCE
Anna MILER, Ph.D.
Function and responsibilities of CIMIC in operations on Balkans ...................................................277
COMMENTS, REVIEWS AND REPORTS
Aneta NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN, Ph.D.
Bartosz Bolechów, Terrorism, actors, extras, viewers, PWN, Warszawa 2010, ss. 399 ..................295
4
WHAS IS THE FUTURE OF NATO?
NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(89) 2012
WHAT FUTURE IS THERE FOR NATO?
Lecture given at the inauguration of the academic
year at the National Defense Academy, Warsaw,
28th September 2012
Assoc. Prof. Robert KUPIECKI, Ph.D.
Undersecretary of Defense
Honorable Minister,
Honorable Rector-Commandant,
Honorable Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a great honor and pleasure for me to participate in the inauguration of the
academic year here at the National Defense Academy. It is the largest and by far
the most important Polish academic institution educating officers and civilian
experts in various specializations associated with the military, defense and national
security. Good education and practice are of great importance in building effective
solutions in these fields.
Speaking to the academic personnel and the administrative staff under the new
leadership of the Rector-Commandant Maj. Gen. Boguslaw Pacek, as well as the
course participants and Academy supporters, I would like to wish you all
a successful academic year and that you continue with distinction your dedicated
service to Poland, the Ministry of Defense and the Polish Armed Forces.
In the Ministry we expect from the Academy “fresh” military and strategic
thinking and I am speaking here also on behalf of my boss, the Minister of National
Defense Mr. Tomasz Siemoniak. The NDA should lead in raising the competence
of state institutions and promoting the knowledge pertaining to defense among our
citizens.
I wish the new recipients of academic degrees good luck in their scientific
research.
I think that the question regarding the future of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has not been chosen by accident as the topic of the inaugural lecture.
By referring to the future "in general" I mean an inquiry into the reasons for its
existence in the contemporary world while the future "in particular" means in other
words the importance of NATO to the Member States.
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ROBERT KUPIECKI
In the latter case we refer to the widely perceived mission of NATO composed
of the classical function of collective defense and the new expeditionary tasks
taken up by the Alliance following the end of the Cold War.
A regular and sound reflection on the condition of NATO is needed.
Testing the value and quality of the Atlantic Alliance is fundamental for the
security of the Member States and the stability of their surroundings. This also
concerns Poland which develops its defense plans and capabilities in harmony with
NATO planning and operational requirements.
Hence, the defence and security advantages offered by the Atlantic Alliance
must be of interest to Poland in a natural and obvious way. Difficult questions
asked in our country and by other Allies should be perceived as guidance in the
process leading to a correct strategic diagnosis.
Questions about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance have remained valid
since its very inception in 1949. Many have shared the view that NATO did not
have a chance to become a reality. In fact, on both sides of the Atlantic it embraced
countries which differed in terms of the pressure felt from the Communist bloc, the
military potential they had at their disppsal, political will, aspirations and public
sensitivity to military matters.
Frequent internal disputes and crises in the history of NATO for many have
been vivid evidence that it cannot work. Former Secretary General of NATO PaulHenri Spaak was once asked if those disputes posed an existential threat to NATO.
He then accurately remarked that for an alliance of free and democratic states
disputes are a proof of its vitality and a confirmation of the fact that NATO is just
doing its job.
It is worth to continue with this line of reasoning also today. Not to
underestimate or diminish the contemporary challenges facing the Atlantic
Alliance but to remind us of its essence. It is a voluntary commitment of the
Member States who jointly decide on what they have in common.
This quick lesson of the Alliance’s real politik does not mean praise for
relativization of mutual obligations but is a reminder that they function in the real
world. It is defined by both the needs and opportunities, but also limitations. In
order to overcome them the Atlantic Alliance has developed unprecedented
instruments of consultation and military cooperation.
The sum of all weaknesses in the real world never creates any strength.
Still, the strength comes from overcoming weaknesses through smart cooperation,
solidarity, pooling of military capabilities, forging political consensus and bold
action, where necessary and when there is political will. In the case of NATO, by
bringing the potential of Europe and America together this strength has neither a
precedent in history nor a good alternative for the future.
We want it to be credible but no matter how it is perceived, the very existence
of NATO is a strategic asset for the Member States. It forces possible adversaries,
who would contemplate a "provocation", to reconsider their options.
6
They must take into account in their plans the fact that any possible conflict
with a NATO country is not worthwhile, its price will be high and its scale cannot
be maintained in the low-intensity rigors.
Even if one asks whether the mechanism of mutual guarantees will actually
work, we know that a prudent planner and a strategist must assume that this will
happen and consequently abandon evil intensions. This mechanism has been
working effectively for 63 years and therefore it is worth to work persistently to
ensure that its credibility is preserved in the future.
One researcher, immediately after the Cold War compared NATO to
a prestigious theatre which had never given a performance. However, with the
quality of art acquired through many rehearsals and mastering skills, nobody
wanted to challenge its reputation.
Using this “theatre” parallel, today we are enriched with the experience of
a few allied "shows”. They have solved the Post-Cold War dilemmas included in
the following questions:
– will the Atlantic Alliance have a raison d'être without a clearly defined
enemy?
– will the Atlantic Alliance be able to adapt to an uncertain world of
multidimensional threats emerging outside the North Atlantic area?
– finally, will the ambitiously integrating Europe need guarantees and the
military presence of the United States?
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Macedonia, in the airspace of Serbia,
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, in the Gulf of Aden and on the Mediterranean Sea
NATO has proven not only its usefulness but also indispensability. NATO was the
only international actor able to support its value – based declarations on the
credible factor of military power.
It has also opened new areas of cooperation, ranging out from combating
terrorism, alleviating the effects of natural disasters to energy security. It has also
started broad partnership cooperation with many countries in the world.
NATO is not looking for the enemy and is not hostile to anyone. This also
applies to Russia, with whom the Atlantic Alliance has been trying to develop
strategic cooperation framework for almost two decades. So far, these efforts have
been without a major breakthrough or understanding from the other side, but also
not without a slow progress.
If all this were to prove the weakness of NATO, one may wonder how else to
define NATO’s power?
Part of the problem of perception comes from the fact that in today's world of
quick tabloid and television analysis, every argument and example can well support
the reasoning of either disputing party.
Let’s consider one of numerous examples – NATO operation in Libya. The
operation has achieved its goals. It has actually shown the allied interdependence,
the importance of US military potential and the directions in which the European
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ROBERT KUPIECKI
allies should develop their military capabilities. NATO operation in Libya has also
accelerated decisions and demonstrated the need for a rational approach to the
build – up of defense capabilities. The Alliance refers to this as "smart defense"
and the European Union calls it "pooling and sharing". In every case it means
"more cooperation" and "more solidarity".
For the critics of NATO, the operation in Libya has become an ultimate proof
of the fall of the Atlantic Alliance, the military collapse of its European part and
the prominence of the US military role. One publicist has compared this situation
to Snow White, whose skirt 27 dwarfs were tightly holding on to. We have heard
such ominous visions before, for example, when some analysts put the NATO
mission in Afghanistan in Hamletian categories of ‘to be or not to be’.
To those who are unfamiliar with the subject I will highlight the role of the
Polish member of the Madeline Albright Group in the course of work on the report
preceding the Lisbon strategic concept. He restored the right proportions for this
matter and adequate provisions on Afghanistan as a task and mission of the
Atlantic Alliance, rather than its raison d'être.
Many extreme voices are heard on the future of NATO. However, it is worth
finding in them premises for constructive action as a collective effort and on the
national level.
If anyone should have doubts why in Poland we are carrying out our own
ambitious plans of military modernization, supported both by the President and
Prime Minister, he or she should remember that the essence of the alliance
contained in article 5 of the Washington Treaty takes its roots in national actions as
described in article 3 of this document.
In short, these provisions mean that while expecting assistance from others,
first you have to do everything you can to provide for your own defense. Therefore,
in doing our job it is worth analyzing what our allies are doing in this matter.
While thinking of the future of NATO, however, one should get rid of the
demobilizing perspective of NATO decline and collapse, not for the sake of
“official optimism” but the well perceived national and allied interest.
Before this year's NATO summit in Chicago in May, the Foreign Policy
magazine asked 57 prominent politicians from Atlantic Alliance countries, how
they predicted its future. Their responses are very interesting.
All respondents answered positively the questions whether NATO should
continue to exist and whether the U.S. engagement in Europe should be
maintained.
But the question of what its main objectives should be, divided those
politicians: 14 of them pointed at the collective defense, 2 at out-of-area missions,
no one pointed at global military missions and guarding against Russia, 31 named
the combination of many functions whereas the remaining pointed at other issues.
On a lighter note, Sweden was recognized as the most desired new NATO
member; greatest preference for the removal was expressed with regard of a
8
southern country. There were also 9 other candidates for the expulsion from NATO
- nobody indicated Poland which I perceive as a sign of our reliability.
The results of this poll (and I only quote its small portion), in comparison with
the results of the NATO Summit in Chicago strengthen the optimistic approach
towards the future of NATO.
In my opinion the challenges facing NATO point at two types of issues which
the allies will have to deal with:
– first, what type and scale of tasks will NATO be used for in the future? After
all it isn't a universal remedy for all the problems of world;
– second, what type of military capabilities should the Alliance have to remain
credible in the anticipated missions and how to develop such desired capabilities?
The Atlantic Alliance was created in order to defend its members. Its other
functions, set by NATO Strategic Concept of 2010, such as crisis management and
cooperation with partner states, are supposed to serve the implementation of NATO
key mission.
Allies vary in terms of the importance they attach to these functions. Some
NATO countries situated far from the areas where traditional threats may originate
from are mainly interested in stabilization operations, often far from their own
borders. Others want to be reassured that NATO, while tackling the challenges
within its borders, will be able to defend them.
Therefore, the problem with finding the right balance for these tasks seems to
be the most important today.
It concerns not only the military efforts and political attention but also
decisions on the use of limited resources. Even more, decisions regarding one type
of mission sometimes affect the availability of resources for other types. Although
this dilemma does not always appear in such a sharp contrast, it should not be
neglected.
The Allies have only one set of forces, one budget and different needs. Thus,
they have to be addressed in such a way that the ensuing balance becomes
a guarantee and a source of allied trust. This, in turn, should create political will to
support current NATO missions.
Poland effectively works to ensure that the Alliance has updated its operational
plans which would enable it to strengthen our defense in case of a threat.
NATO also needs capabilities enabling the conduct of high intensity and large
scale operations. One should remember that this potential can also be used in
stabilization missions well outside its area.
We are also seeking funds for co-financing NATO’s military infrastructure
essential for collective defense. The idea is that the states have the ability to receive
assistance from other NATO members on their own territory. It can also be used to
support expeditionary missions.
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ROBERT KUPIECKI
Finally, we want the requirements for collective defense to be included in allied
training and the exercises policy.
From this perspective the Summit in Chicago has met our expectations. It has
confirmed collective defense as the main function of NATO. While making
recommendations for further development of the defense capabilities the Summit
also highlighted the initiatives and tasks which are most important for us, for
example, the development of interoperability between the allied forces or regular
exercises which also allow testing collective defense scenarios.
As I have already pointed out, Poland makes every effort to develop its own
capabilities in synergy with NATO solutions. Good examples here are our plans to
strengthen air and missile defense as the Polish contribution to the NATO BMD
program.
It does not mean, of course, that we are reluctant to crisis management or the
cooperation with partner countries. We have been actively involved in those
activities since 1994 and we view them as related with the security of our country.
Another issue is NATO military effectiveness. The economic crisis in Europe
has caused reductions in defense budgets and a subsequent decrease in the allied
military capabilities. It concerns the tasks related to both collective defense and
expeditionary missions. Poland with its growing defense spending, including the
modernization of the armed forces, is a positive exception in Europe.
The key issue in preventing the effects of the reduction in defense spending
will be multinational cooperation initiatives like Smart Defense.
However, they cannot serve as a pretext for further cuts nor dilute
commitments through complicated procedures which prevent or slow down the
action. They will also have to facilitate the use of jointly acquired capabilities or
lending them to other allies.
The rational approach to multinational defense building is an art not a science.
Solutions in this regard must meet the priority needs of Member States; whereas
NATO and the EU should cooperate closely.
Preservation of the transatlantic ties is no less important both politically and
militarily. The increasing involvement of the United States outside Europe creates
the temptation to weaken these ties. Therefore fewer U.S. troops in Europe must
mean more effective efforts to achieve the interoperability of forces, including
exercises and training as well as greater regional impact stemming from their
presence.
The development of the military capabilities of the European states is the other
side of this process. Although it is difficult in current budgetary realities it is
necessary for raising the profile of the European Union on the international arena
and maintaining the political and military ties with the US.
The outgoing US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates made reference to this in
his farewell address. The truth of his words has been confirmed by NATO
operational activities.
10
In the world of contemporary challenges I am confident about the future of
NATO. And it depends on the Member States, their ability to combine and wisely
manage their resources, to find partners supporting the Allied missions, prudence
in strategy making and perhaps also a reduction of global ambitions.
In 2014, NATO will change its tasks in Afghanistan and significantly reduce
the number of its troops in this country.
So perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that we will be able to do more with less,
not only in Afghanistan. To be realistic is an important call for allied strategy.
However, reduced global ambitions do not necessarily mean less global
importance for NATO, especially in its usefulness for the Member States.
Today's NATO is not "an alliance from the days of our fathers" as the
Americans like to say meaning that it used to be better. However, it is able to make
its members safe, protect their development, save the lives of innocent people
threatened by the bloody tyrants, and encourage more partners.
There is no alternative to NATO now or in the foreseeable future; an
alternative which will be able to provide military capabilities for difficult
operations.
Let us not forget that it is still attractive for countries striving to join the
Atlantic Alliance. The enlargement process has not been completed yet.
When thinking about the future of NATO one should keep all these issues in
mind.
Thank you for your attention.
11
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
NATIONAL SECURITY
NEW MISSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Maj. Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.
Rector-Commandant, NDU Warsaw
Abstract
The article deals with the new military missions under the European Union flag, as
part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This paper covers three missions. The
first one being in South Sudan which aims to strengthen the security of the Juba
International Airport. The second one is in the Horn of Africa, focusing on the regional
maritime capabilities building. The third one is in the geographic region of Sahel, focusing
on the training of the security forces of the Republic of Niger. The planning and financial
aspects of these missions are described and the mission is stated as having strategic goals
in line with the assumptions of the European Security Strategy, namely – the protection of
the European continent against destabilising factors.
Key words – European Union, security, civilian missions, crisis management
Introduction
Between the years 2009 and 2011 the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) was passing through a difficult period. There were no new missions
deployed, defence budget was reduced, there were advanced considerations to
terminate some of the functioning missions and operations. There was a lack of
concrete visions for further CSDP development. Reasons for this impasse were
undoubtedly enhanced by the budget crisis of the Euro zone, which brought about
a bigger interest of the European Union (EU) member states’ politicians in
financial issues rather than defence.
On the 1 January 2012, the first anniversary of the EU diplomatic service,
formally known as the European External Action Service (EEAS), was celebrated.
It assembles all planning and executive tools of the Union’s civilian missions and
12
military operations1. However, the Secretary General of the EEAS stated that the
creation of a fully operational diplomatic body is an effort involving a minimum of
10 years intensive work for all departments and their personnel.
Despite the presented difficulties, the EU managed to commence three new
missions in the framework of the CSDP. All three were deployed to the African
continent, in the areas of the Horn of Africa, Sahel and South Sudan. All of them
are still in their initial phases, nevertheless apart from constraints stemming from
politico-strategic conditions, their planning was considerably influenced by
budgetary aspects.
These three new engagements were purposely considered as civilian missions
and not military operations even though after some modifications the encountered
conditions would enable them the use of military tools. The reason for this is that
civilian missions are normally financed from the Union’s budget, while military
operations are financed through the Athena2 mechanism, a common pot into which
member states are obliged to make financial contributions proportionate to their
Gross National Product. During a period of financial crisis this proposal is seen as
unpopular and cannot be accepted by some of the member states.
During extensive consultations conducted while preparing the missions, EU
member states' ambassadors and other representatives clearly pointed out that the
austerity measures are to be respected. Negative comments for the above indicated
that this type of planning does not have a lot in common with crisis management,
which should be first of all characterised by a fast decision-making process and not
the arranging of challenges in a way that would bring the biggest possible financial
savings.
The afore mentioned aspects, dealing with the creation of the optimised
diplomatic tool, are the reasons to present in this article the key findings related to
the main factors as far as the new missions of the European Union are concerned.
The assumption has been to find the answer to the general problem of how and
why the European Union should develop its capabilities to execute civilian
missions. The problem formulated in this way could be solved by defining the
demanded planning and executive tools, which are at at the disposal of the
European Union.
The research activities have been undertaken, describing the following working
hypothesis: the development of the totally functioning diplomatic tool, mainly
through the integration of the various expert capabilities (diplomatic, political,
military, technological and others) permits the setting up of effective
1
EEAS Implementation Report. European External Action Service. Brussels 2012. p. 3.
Athena – European Union mechanism of administering finances which are used for covering
common costs of EU military crisis management operations. Costs covered through the Athena can be
in the areas of transportation, infrastructure, medical support and the so-called national expenses
(NBC – National Borne Costs) for accommodation, fuel, etc. (European Union Military Staff
Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2007. p. 36)
2
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BOGUSŁAW PACEK
coordination mechanisms and rules for the decision making process among
the EU member states.
In the described crisis realities of the EU, civilian missions are the most desired
solutions in the area of crisis management. The EU conducts civilian missions in
the scope of policing, border policing, customs, rule of law, administration, civil
protection, monitoring missions, security sector reform (SSR) and the supporting of
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)3.
A comprehensive approach to any crisis situation is another requirement sought
in the EU. In this aspect it is less important to plan jointly the civilian and military
dimensions of a given engagement in one theatre of operations. The most essential
problem appears in the field of integrating other EU instruments into a crisis
response. These instruments belong mainly to the European Commission (EC),
namely the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO),
whose representatives participate in the planning of each crisis management
mission and operation. The Treaty of Lisbon4 in Article 28 A extorts that all
available tools are to be used for dealing with crises. In the case of the CSDP these
tools are mainly used for (i) complementing missions’ efforts during their duration
and (ii) as part of their exit strategies aiming at ensuring the continuation of
a missions’ achievements once they are terminated. However, because of lengthy EC
financial planning process, benefiting from these tools is often heavily constrained.
Mission No 1.
South Sudan – strengthening security of the Juba
International Airport (JIA) – mission EUAVSEC South Sudan
(EU Aviation Security South Sudan)
On the 1 January 1956 Sudan announced independence from the United
Kingdom and Egypt. The Sudanese territory consisted of the islamic North, of
Arabic origin, and the catholic South, inhabited by black African people who
immediately started their effort to gain independence through the creation of
a separate state.
Without the Southern Sudanese having possibilities to gain independence by
peaceful means, a war broke out in 1983 along a temporarily agreed borderline of
both regions, which was regarded as one of the bloodiest conflicts in the world.
As a result approximately 2 million people were killed and another 4 million
were declared refugees. Fighting ended in 2005 with the signature of a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between the North and the South. This agreement granted
autonomy to the southern provinces of Sudan. In January 2011 a referendum in the
3
Ibidem p. 46.
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community. European Union. Brussels 2007. p. 45.
4
14
South took place. Almost 99 percent of the voters voted for separation from the
North, with the aim of creating a separate country. On the 9 July 2011 the South
claimed independence. A new state was created: South Sudan. Its independence
was recognised by the main international organisations and the majority of the
world's countries. Unfortunately, in spite of having vast oilfields and other
minerals, the country of South Sudan is one of the poorest and least developed
states in the world.
The EU is deeply engaged in delivering support to South Sudan. Together with
EU member states active individually in South Sudan, in particular Germany, the
United Kingdom and Norway, the EU is the biggest financial aid donor. In May
2011 the European Development Fund (EDF) released an additional 200 million
Euros allocated proportionally to the needs to different areas. In accordance with
the EU Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan,5 EU efforts are
focusing on 1) Health, 2) Education, 3) Food security and Rural development,
4) Rule of Law; this is in line with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS)
priorities for assistance. In addition, the EU and its Member States are providing
technical and financial support for peaceful co-existence through the Early
Warning System of the African Peace Facility and the Instrument for Stability,
which funds conflict prevention and peace-building efforts with a focus on the
border areas and basic social services. In the frame of point 4), the Council of the
European Union invited the European Union External Action Service to develop
CSDP options for potential support to the state of South Sudan which would be
complementary to other efforts.
An inter-institutional European Union specialist team, during its visit to South
Sudan at the beginning of 2011, identified the following areas6, in which the Union
could be involved in the frame of Common Security and Defence Policy:
(i) capacity building of the South Sudanese Police Service SSPS in the field of
investigations, (ii) creation and training of South Sudanese border police and
(iii) enhancing the security of the Juba International Airport (Juba – the capital of
the Republic of South Sudan).
After long and extensive discussions among the European Union member states
which were held in working groups and Committee, it was decided that the option
(iii) with regard to the security at the Juba airport will be further developed.
As a newly independent country, the GOSS was facing a series of significant
challenges to the establishment of a fully functional and compliant transport hub
for commercial and passenger purposes. The Juba airport was not designed to be
a major departure and arrival point, rather it was set up as a regional, small-scale
airport capable of dealing with domestic air traffic. The terminal was very small
and struggled to cope with an ever-increasing passenger load.
5
EU Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. Council of the European Union.
Brussels 2011. p. 4.
6
CSDP options paper for South Sudan. Council of the European Union. Brussels 2011. p. 2.
15
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
Nearly all international air traffic is received at this airport. The poor condition
of the infrastructure, limited existing security arrangements and a lack of basic
equipment drastically impaired the flow of passengers and goods. Moreover the
airport stood as an open door to terrorism that could target the South Sudanese and
the numerous internationals present in country, while on the other hand connecting
with airports in major international African traffic hubs.
The security arrangements in place fell short of international standards. The
work of security and police services showed not only a lack of coordination but
also an obvious lack of individual skills. Taking the above into consideration the
airport is likely to act as a magnet to unscrupulous persons seeking easy access to
international flights, including criminals and terrorists trying to identify the
weakest link in any regional airport network.
The European Union engagement in enhancing the security of the Juba
International Airport is taking place upon the request and agreement of the
government of South Sudan. The Union’s commitment is to train and raise the quality
of security service activities to a level fulfilling requirements of the International
Civi Aviation Organization (ICAO)7.
The civilian mission, EUAVSEC South Sudan, is a good example of an
integrated approach to a crisis. Except for the CSDP mission’s effort, the financial
instruments of the European Commission are used for budgeting of the airport's
equipment. Moreover, cooperation with other partners during the planning phase of
the mission brought about complementarities with the United Nations International
Organization for Migration (IOM) which is training the airport personnel in
immigration procedures and with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), which is conducting training of customs procedures.
In the mission there are approximately 50 personnel with a mixture of expertise
including police, border police and installations security. Personnel are unarmed,
do not have executive powers and cannot substitute the autonomous airport
security. They are performing tasks of training, monitoring, mentoring, advising as
well as the coordination of security services and activities of the airport. The
mission’s initial mandate has been set up for 12 months since the date of the
achievement of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
In the future it is possible that the European Union’s Common Security and
Defence Policy engagement in South Sudan will be farther enhanced. The Political
and Security Committee obliged the European External Action Service to consider
other strategic options within the framework of a strategic review for the
EUAVSEC South Sudan.
7
Crisis Management Concept – CSDP mission in South Sudan). European External Action
Service. Brussels 2011. p. 5.
16
Mission No 2.
Horn of Africa – Regional Maritime Capabilities Building (RMCB) –
mission EUCAP Nestor
The sea route through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
possesses the biggest strategic importance of all sea routes in the world. Within the
space of a year thousands of transport vessels go through it. Costs of cargo
transported through it each year surpass billions of dollars. This route is also used
for the transportation of various types of dangerous cargo such as military
equipment, weapons and ammunition, which in the case of them falling into the
wrong hands could be threatening to the whole region.
Starting from 2005, piracy began to flourish on these waters. As a result of
huge ransoms paid by sea companies for the release of the hijacked vessels and
their crews, the assets of pirates got considerably higher with some part of the
funds being devoted to buying better ships and weapons, something that made the
efficiency of piracy grow even further. The piracy was practiced by, among others,
local fishermen who developed a standard action plan, starting from the
observation of a potential victim vessel, for which usually a slowly moving target
was chosen, without security ships or helicopters. The attacks used to take place in
the narrow Gulf of Aden, where transport vessels had to slow down and pirates
could potentially attack from all directions.
Victims of Somalian pirates were often vessels of the World Food Programme
(WFP), which paradoxically transported food for Somalia. The piracy itself was
caused by crisis and extreme poverty in this country. International organisations
clearly indicated that without proper actions in-land, inside the country, prevention
against piracy on the sea would not bring the required effects.
In the efforts of fighting piracy are engaged, among others, the Combined
Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Union’s EUNAVFOR Atalanta
operation. With the aim of protecting their own vessels, many states possess in the
Horn of Africa war ships, including global leaders such as China, India, Japan and
Russia.
The „maritime capabilities” should be understood as capabilities for an effective
management of the overall marine domain. They are an indispensable condition for
performing basic state functions in the area of marine planning and conduct, search
and rescue operations and customs duties. Critical aspects of maritime capabilities
are the law enforcement and the rule of law.
Structurally, the maritime capabilities consist of four pillars: law, training,
equipment and information. Their effective co-functioning will ensure that the
states of the Horn of Africa will be in possession of an efficient tool for fighting
piracy.
17
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
Law:
– Suitable national laws of respective states,
– Agreements for detainees’ hand-over,
– Criminal intelligence and investigation capacities,
– Courts,
– Prisons.
– Navy,
– Police,
– Border guard,
(RMCB)
Regional Maritime Capacity Building
Training:
– Support personnel.
Equipment:
– Patrol boats,
– Communication,
– Maintenance,
– Supply system.
Information:
– Gathering of information,
– Transformation of information,
– Exchange of information,
– Creation of a common operational picture.
Source: drawn by the author.
Picture 1. Pillars of the maritime capabilities)
The naval operation of the European Union: EUNAVFOR Atalanta started
in 2008. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution
No. 1846, Atalanta performs tasks of, among others, ensuring security to WFP
vessels, merchant vessels, and fishing companies; it fulfils tasks of deterrence,
prevention and intervention, aiming at ending piracy acts in the operation’s area of
responsibility and also detaining and transferring to other respective services and
authorities individuals suspected of participation in piracy activities.
18
The strategic End State of this operation is a continued reduction, and
potentially a thorough elimination, of piracy on the waters of the Horn of Africa. It
is obvious that this objective will not be received only as a result of activities on
sea. This is why the European Union, being one of the leading international
organisations in the region, deployed a new mission of maritime capabilities
building EUCAP Nestor, whose main objective would be to contribute to the
continued reduction of piracy, something that creates conditions for the achieving
of EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s End State.
EUCAP Nestor is a European Union civilian mission conducted in the frame of
the Common Security and Defence Policy, with the participation of military
experts, including naval ones. It creates synergy effects not only with Atalanta, but
also with the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), whose main objective is to
contribute to the development of the Somalian security sector through broadened
officer and soldier training and formation.
EU NAVFOR
Atalanta
EUTM
Somalia
EU Strategic Framework
for the Horn of Africa
EU NAVFOR
Atalanta
EUTM
Somalia
EUCAP
Nestor
Source: drawn by the author.
Picture 2. Integrated EU Approach against piracy in the Horn of Africa
Planning for the EUCAP Nestor mission started in 2010, however
discrepancies among the European Union’s Member States regarding its possible
character, blocked the decision-making processes. Initially it was considered as
another military operation, nevertheless because of the previously presented
financial aspects, the EU decided to deploy a civilian mission.
The EUCAP Nestor is a part of a broader EU Strategic Framework for the Horn
of Africa (Picture 2). An initial mandate for this mission was predicted to last 24
months. During the mid-mandate a strategic review was foreseen. Basing on this
review, decisions will be made for the termination or an extension of the mission.
It is predicted that the piracy in the Horn of Africa will be eliminated when
three factors will be coexisting8:
• Stabilization of the situation in Somalia.
• Acts of piracy will be properly punished.
• Regional maritime capabilities will be enhanced.
The European Union is making efforts to implement all these factors.
The EUCAP Nestor mission is complex and ambitious. To approach the
problem of building the regional maritime capabilities in an integrated manner, it
8
Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of Africa.
European External Action Service. Brussels 2011. p. 8.
19
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
was planned that the mission will be operational in eight states of the region:
Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia and
Tanzania.
To properly coordinate actions with other organisations, the European Union
signed strategic partnerships with, among others, the African Union (AU), the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) and with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
The European Union’s political objective is to considerably contribute to
international efforts aiming at the elimination of piracy in the Horn of Africa and
such reinforcement of the maritime capabilities of the region’s states which would
allow them to control their own territorial waters and economic areas and in
a farther perspective to take over full responsibility for security issues.
Political efforts of the European Union will not only be limited to the
organisation of Common Security and Defence Policy missions but will be more
complex. The Union’s financial instruments also participate in this project; among
others the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Instrument for Stability
(IfS). All proposed actions are carefully coordinated to prevent a duplication of
efforts.
It was decided that the EUCAP Nestor would have the following tasks9:
1. Training of functionaries of border guard, police, and support services and
selected navy officers in suitable expertise areas; indispensable for an efficient
fight against piracy.
2. Expert mentoring in the fields of law, criminal intelligence, investigations,
court and prison functions and maritime operational issues.
3. Coordination of the delivery and distribution of specialist equipment.
There are two ways of providing training:
− Using the Regional Training Centre in Djibouti (DRTC), established basing
on the Djibouti Code of Conduct, promoting the fight against piracy in the Horn of
Africa. The DRTC is financed by the European Union and Japan.
− Using the Maritime Training and Support Teams (MTSTs), possessing
mobility capabilities to redeploy and conduct trainings in all states of the region.
Each of the states of the Horn of Africa in which the EUCAP Nestor is
operational, is in a different strategic situation. Therefore to each of them
a different individual approach has been used. These states differ as to law systems
in force, security forces’ structures or the level of training and equipping of
respective formations.
9
Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of Africa.
European External Action Service. Brussels 2011. p. 11.
20
Mission No 3.
Sahel – training of security forces of the Republic of Niger –
mission EUCAP Sahel Niger
The Sahel is a geographical region in Africa, bordering with the Sahara
southern regions, extending from Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan
and Eritrea to Ethiopia. Its western part, except for the Niger Delta, and some
mountainous areas, are a sterile desert. On these fields there are several ethnically
diversified desert tribes with the most numerous being Tuaregs, aiming at
establishing their own independent country – Azawad.
The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the
challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises,
rapid population growth, fragile governance, unresolved internal tensions, the risk
of Islamist radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats. The
situation has also deteriorated due to the outcomes of the Libyan crisis. As a result,
numerous groups of fighters and bandits, but also considerable amounts of military
equipment, weapons and ammunition have migrated from Libya to the Sahelian
states10. The states of the region have to face these challenges directly. The three
core Sahelian states are Mauritania, Mali and Niger. Some of the challenges posed
impact on neighbouring countries, including Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria. Their
engagement is necessary to help resolve them; and the problems facing the Sahel
not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the
interests of European citizens.
Northern regions of the Republic of Mali, in which lawlessness reigns without
the presence of any governmental security forces, became a safe haven to the
Al-Qaida Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) (Picture 3). Current AQMI’s activities are
not only common criminal activities but also murders of white European and
American citizens, something that is efficiently blocking all Western investment in
the region.
Forces, resources and operational capabilities of the Al-Qaida in the Republic
of Mali are growing much faster than those of governmental security services.
Additionally, deteriorating security conditions make it difficult for humanitarian
aid to be delivered.
The situation has also been worsened by the coup d’état on 21 March 2012 in
Mali’s capital city – Bamako. It was conducted by representatives of the Malian
army as a protest against the government which used to send soldiers to fight the
better trained and equipped Tuaregs in the north of Mali. As s result, plenty of
Malian soldiers were killed during these fights.
10
Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission in the Sahel. European External Action
Service. Brussels 2011. p. 3.
21
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
Zone under control
Zone of direct activities
Region of Sahel
Source: European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. European External Action Service.
Brussels 2011.
Picture 3. Activities of Al-Qaida in the states of Sahel
In the presented situation, the Republic of Niger is one of the last strongholds
of stability in the region. Niger’s politicians show clear willingness to resolve
existing problems, in particular to prevent their spilling over into other states of the
region. The government of the Republic of Niger, as the only one of the three
mentioned Sahelian states (Mali, Mauritania, Niger) into which the European
Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission could be deployed,
expressed a strong will to welcome this mission on their territory.
The European Union (EU) has a longstanding interest in reducing insecurity
and improving development in the Sahel region. The EU’s political objective is to
enhance stability, security, good governance and social cohesion in the Sahel, and
especially Niger, and help establish the conditions for local and national
sustainable development.
22
The EU strategic objective has been defined so as to contribute to improving
the capacity of Nigerien Security Forces to fight terrorism and organised crime in
an effective, coherent and coordinated manner and to support and advise on the
implementation of their own strategies for security and development.
To achieve these objectives, the EU has deployed a civilian CSDP Advisory,
Assistance and Training mission to Niger – EUCAP Sahel Niger – to contribute to
strengthening the capacities of Niger to fight terrorism and respond to urgent needs
in organised crime, in order to improve the control of their territory, allowing for
the execution of development-related projects and facilitating development.
In the Republic of Niger there are three types of security forces: Gendarmerie,
National Police and National Guard. Their operational skills are not satisfactory. It
is on these three service that the EUCAP is focusing.
The mission consists of approximately 40 personnel with a mixture of expertise,
with the majority of police officers specialising in law enforcement, public order,
criminal intelligence, investigations, forensic techniques, combating terrorism and
organised crime. The personnel are unarmed, do not have executive powers and
cannot substitute the autonomous security forces. The EU force is performing tasks
of training, monitoring, mentoring, advising and coordination of the three Nigerien
security forces. The mission’s initial mandate has been set up for 24 months.
During the mid-mandate a strategic review will be conducted basing on which
recommendations will be made to the Political and Security Committee regarding
the future of the mission. It is probable that the mission will be extended
territorially to Mali and Mauritania, to make combating of organised crime and
terrorism more effective.
Similarly to EUCAP Nestor and the EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUCAP Sahel
Niger is an integrated part of a complex international effort, to aid the states of the
Sahel to regain stability and security. Among the international organisations
present in Niger, the United Nations, the African Union and the ECOWAS11 should
be listed, while among states – Canada, France and the USA are actively
supporting the training and equipping of military and civilian forces of the Sahelian
countries.
Conclusion
The presented progress in deploying new crisis management Common Security
and Defence Policy missions eludes to an optimistic trait regarding CSDP’s future,
which was until recently unclear. The political and strategic objectives of the three
11
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States. Regional group of 15 Western
Africa states; established in 1975. Its goal is to promote economic integration in the fields of industry,
transport, telecommunication, natural resources, finance and socio-cultural issues. (Source:
www.ecowas.int)
23
BOGUSŁAW PACEK
new missions remain in line with the European Security Strategy, whose main goal
is to define activities helping to defend Europe from destabilising factors, but first
of all from acts of terrorism, organised crime and regional conflicts.
It is possible to assess, as a result of the research efforts, that the goal has been
achieved, and the working hypothesis has been verified positively.
The building of security in the closest vicinity of Europe is of special
importance for Europe, that is why the European Union has a longstanding interest
in political stability in Africa. Apart from the three described missions, there is also
the issue of Libya remaining unresolved as to the scope of potential EU
engagement, with the works currently ongoing.
Bibliography
Crisis Management Concept for Regional Maritime Capabilities Building in the Horn of
Africa. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.
Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission in the Sahel. European External Action
Service. Brussels 2011.
Crisis Management Concept – CSDP mission in South Sudan. European External Action
Service. Brussels 2011.
European Union Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. Council of the
European Union. Brussels 2011.
European Union Military Staff Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions. Council of the
European Union. Brussels 2007.
Rapport de démarrage de l’Instrument de stabilité pour contre-terrorisme Sahel. CIVIPOL.
Brussels 2012.
EEAS Implementation Report. European External Action Service. Brussels 2012.
European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. European External
Action Service. Brussels 2011.
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community. European Union. Brussels 2007.
CSDP options paper for South Sudan. European External Action Service. Brussels 2011.
24
THE COGNITIVE BASIS O FAIR DEFENCE
THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF AIR DEFENCE
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej GLEN, Ph.D.
Abstract
The article includes a description of the axiological, ontological and epistemological
basis of the phenomena of air defence (AD). It characterises the value system of AD, and
explains how AD exists in the physical and conceptual reality. AD is defined in a broad
sense as part of the air security of the state and in a narrow sense as part of the armed
struggle. It specifies the mode of understanding of the whole complex system of AD, as well
as the mission, domain and goal of AD. The essence of AD is explained with regard to its
subject, object, the type of actions and the nature of an air attack.
Key words – air defence, value, existence, mission, domain
Introduction
In the last century, airspace became one of the spheres of the Earth's environment
most intensively used by humans. Thanks to the scientific and technological
revolution of the twentieth century possibilities became a reality. The product of
this revolution was the airplane at the beginning of that century. The dynamics
of aviation development resulted in the fact that after over one hundred years from
the flight in 1903 of the first Flyer 1 airplane of the Wright brothers, aircraft driven
by piston and jet engines are omnipresent in human life. The aforementioned
omnipresence includes unfortunately also creating numerous threats both of a nonmilitary and military nature. It is hard nowadays to imagine any armed conflict in
the world without the involvement of aircrafts, helicopters, and unmanned aerial
vehicles. However, it is easy to notice the significant dynamics of the growth and
robotization of airspace exploitation for the purposes of battle. Also, the peaceful
exploitation of airspace is characterised by the high dynamics of growth combined
with a tendency to extend the scope of use to aerospace.
While exploiting the airspace so intensely, mankind wants to do it both in the
military and non-military sphere, with the assurance of one of his existential needs,
25
ANDRZEJ GLEN
i.e. security needs. Currently, security is being understood in a narrow scope, in the
sense of an absence of threats, and in the broad sense as a certainty of existence,
survival, maintenance of identity and development in terms of threats. However,
the state’s existence, survival, maintenance of identity and development in terms of
air threats is regarded as its security. In a systemic presentation, the air security
of the state can be considered as being isolated from the state’s security system in
terms of a collective accumulation of airspace purposely in terms of the secure and
effective, as well as economical and ecological, use of airspace, prepared staff,
constructed devices and developed principles, methods, modes, and procedures
along with relations of matter, energy and information exchanges that connect
those resources, arranged to ensure the existence, survival, identity and
development of the country in an air threat environment1. Within the concepts of
a state’s air security it is easy to notice a set of values, such as: efficacy, sense
of threat absence, ecology, economy, and the direct operation of state security
systems in the military and non-military aspects. Air defence (AD), both in time of
war and peace, as well as crisis, is today an inherent part of the security system
of each country.
Currently, the perception of the function of air defence in the world is changing.
More and more often it is treated not as a part of the battle, but much more broadly
as part of the security system of the state, region, or alliance. The system of
integrated and extended AD NATINEADS (NATO Integrated Extended Air
Defence System) already functions during peacetime, protecting the integrity of the
alliance’s airspace.
At present, AD is rather oriented to perform new tasks, which to this point have
been unusual for it. Nowadays, already during peacetime, fighters are in full
readiness to combat threats of a RENEGADE type. Whereas, the ground-based
systems of AD are used to combat missiles and mortar bombs attacking NATO
military contingent bases, which perform their tasks far beyond the borders of the
alliance, and also to combat various types of manned and unmanned aircraft used
for terrorist and criminal purposes.
Meanwhile, the theory of air defence remained in the phase of interpreting of
this phenomenon, especially as part of the battle. In the research literature on the
subject (both domestic and foreign) one comes across only a few, contributive
entries indicating the need for an extension and redefinition of AD. Therefore, the
classic situation (as regards the formulation of scientific problems) of ignorance
arose from a discrepancy between the state of theory and practice. AD theory was
delineated probably during the development period of AD, where the existing
principles and methods of AD can be further used to solve problems of fighting
with traditional, classic air threats, and at the same time it is necessary to take an
attempt to develop AD theory in order to make it more adequate to the new,
asymmetrical, military and non-military air challenges and threats.
1
26
A. Glen, System bezpieczeństwa powietrznego państwa, NDU Scientific Quarterly, AON, 4/2008.
The specified prerequisites of AD theory extension resulted in that the
following article includes the most important content of the research description on
the cognitive basis of AD, in which it was assumed to obtain an answer to the
general problem question: What cognitive basis should direct the development
of AD theory(and how it is to be formulated)? The problem formulated this way
can be solved by specifying the ontological, axiological and epistemological
basis of AD theory, which was taken as the purpose of the research. The
accomplishment of the purpose of research and solving a general problem, in turn,
required their structuralisation. It was recognised that such structuring is possible
by dividing the problem into the following three detailed problems: how does AD
exist in the real and conceptual spheres?, what system of values underlies the
organisation of AD?, how to understand both AD alone and its basic
categories?
The study was operationalised by formulating the following working hypothesis:
most probably AD exists both in the real and conceptual sphere, as the collective ontic
object consisting of items and interactions which join them together. The value system
is likely to be arranged in AD for the balanced accomplishment of two autotelic values
– efficacy and security. Finally, with a high probability, contemporary AD ought to be
understood in a broader sense than has been done so far, and its extension should result
from changes in the environment that currently surround AD .
Such structured research methodology required axiological, ontological and
epistemological settlement of AD theory. The axiology relations with ontology
and the epistemology underlining it have been explained by L.J. Krzyżanowski2.
The author reminds us that conducting analysis, and drawing conclusions in the
fields of ontology and epistemology would not be possible without continuing
valuation; that is accepting and rejecting hypotheses, classification, hierarchy of
concepts and categories. Following the advice of L.J. Krzyżanowski, the extension
and arrangement of AD theory was preceded by the identification of the value
system3. The arrangement and selection of cognitive actions during the
implementation of the aforementioned research activities, was based on specific
methodological guidelines, which include the following definition: The values, to
the materialisation of which an entity aspires, influence the behaviour, including
human actions, directly and through the attitudes and motives, and constitute
criteria for the selection of both individual goals and internalized collective
common goals4.
2
See L.J. Krzyżanowski, Podstawy nauki zarządzania, PWN, Warszawa 1985; tenże
O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej, PWN, Warszawa 1999.
3
According to L. Krzyżanowski, a value is accepted as [...] the product of feelings, convictions
or beliefs of some entity: individual, social group, local community, national and other cultural
community or global society of what, in the natural and psycho-social and cultural reality is
positively evaluated and deemed to be worthy of craving and aspirations. L. Krzyżanowski
O podstawach kierowania....wyd. cyt., p. 205.
4
Ibidem, p. 206.
27
ANDRZEJ GLEN
Axiological basis
Identifying the values of AD, giving them a significance hierarchy and
specifying interrelations between different types of values5, should allow for the
consideration of the axiological impact on the developed system of AD knowledge.
The first declared conceptualised measure in AD is the arrangement and extension
of the value system acknowledged by the AD system staff. To the question of what
is a positively assessed subject of ultimate goals in AD, we often intuitively
answer, that it is effectiveness. Meanwhile, the analysis of AD history allows us to
collect enough facts to be able to formulate on their basis the opinion that
frequently in history efficacy and security played interchangeably the role of a final
(autotelic) value in AD. Security as an AD value is understood as: a condition in
which the individual, social group, organisation, or state, has no sense of threat to
their existence or fundamental interests; a situation in which there are formal,
institutional, or practical guarantees of protection6, while efficacy is perceived as
one, next to cost-effectiveness, profitability, energy, precaution in the form of
efficacy of action assessed in terms of approaching the goal that has been
intentional and constitutes the basis of this assessment7.
In the history of AD, the staff was usually guided in their activity by efficacy
and security. While observing the actions within AD it is possible to notice
a permanent relativisation of these values to the intensity level of the combat. The
aforementioned relations allow one to notice the regularity, which consists in that
in AD, in the actions of higher combat intensity, the efficacy is a significantly
higher value, while in the actions conducted in conditions closer to peace (e.g.
humanitarian operations) – this would be security.
The aforementioned arguments allow one to make a conclusion that the
autotelic values in AD are both the efficacy and security, and that the hierarchical
position of the efficacy and security in AD is not constant in nature, and the
significance hierarchy of the two values aforementioned changes within the combat
intensity function (The regularity of the relativisation of efficacy and security
values in AD to the intensity of combat is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 in
a simplified manner).
5
To the basic types of value in the axiological system being created, I include the objective
(autotelic) and indirect (instrumental) values.
6
R. Smolski, M. Smolski, E.H. Stadtmüller, Słownik encyklopedyczny edukacja obywatelska,
Wydawnictwa Europa, Warszawa 1999.
7
Encyklopedia organizacji i zarządzania, PWE, Warszawa 1981, p. 471, 485.
28
Security value
1
0,5
0 peace
crisis
0,5
conflict
war
1
Combat intensity
Source: Own work.
Figure 1. The value of the AD efficacy in the intensity of military operations function
Efficacy
value
1
0,5
0
peace
crisis 0,5 conflict
war
1
Combat
intensity
Source: Own work.
Figure 2. The security value in AD in the intensity of military operations function
In the research conducted, a number of historically shaped indirect
(instrumental) values were revealed, which are sought in AD. These values
include: efficiency, detection, simplicity, harmony, flexibility, and synergy. To
flexibility, however, regulation and once more identification are relativized. The
activity of AD affects directly the detection and efficiency (see Figure 3).
29
ANDRZEJ GLEN
SECURITY
EFFICACY
SIMPLICITY
EFFICIENCY
HARMONY
DETECTION
COORDINATION
ACTIVITY
Identification
FLEXIBILITY
Regulation
Identification
SYNERGY
Integration
Source: Own work.
Figure 3. The value system model of AD
Efficiency and detection, in turn, remain in relation to autotelic efficacy. Yet,
the systems’ flexibility8 has its limits and then the value, which is the simplicity of
action, reveals its significance in achieving both final values - efficacy and
security. Moreover, synergy largely contributes to the final effect of efficient action
in AD. Achieving this value seems to be impossible without the integration of
actions of various entities implementing the tasks of AD. EFFICACY
The specifying of the value system of AD was considered as a research activity
allowing, in an orderly manner, to logically move to determining the position of
theory of being with reference to AD.
8
An engineer would call the democratic pluralism a flexibility built into the system that,
however, must have limits. [...]However, where on the operational efficiency decide micro millimeters
and nanoseconds, there appears fortune, as the new God of war, which decides on the success or
destruction, a fortune in a pure state, somewhat exaggerated and taken out from the microscopic
dimensions of atomic physics, since it is just that the fastest and most perfect systems finally reach the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation, which nothing will defeat, since it constitutes a fundamental
property of matter in the whole Universe. S. Lem, Biblioteka XXI wieku, Wydawnictwa Literackie,
Kraków 1986, p. 51, 52.
30
Ontological basis
The features discovered so far and the probable value system that characterises
AD indicate the praxeology-organizational nature of this phenomenon. Therefore,
as the most appropriate, the ontological regard for air defence was recognised, the
one which is representative of the praxeological and organisational mainstreams. It
was therefore accepted that it is convenient to explain the ontological nature of AD
phenomenon for the sake of ontological realism.
When searching for the essence of AD being, it should be emphasised that all
that exists is a being and creates some universe of being, and whatever exists, is a
partial being, a constituent material of this universe. If AD exists objectively,
independently of the awareness of the knowing subject, it should be a partial being,
a part of the objectively existing reality. Most of the doubts as to the existence of
AD can be explained by answering the question - whether and how does AD exist?
First of all, in the reality that surrounds us it is possible to notice, in nonmilitary crisis situations, armed conflict, or at war, the external in respect, to the
knowing subject, existence of AD phenomena. The reality compels the subject to
solve problems, overcome difficulties associated with AD. Therefore, AD opposes
it regardless of its consciousness, thus it exists objectively.
However, AD exists also inherently in respect to the knowing subject. The
evidence for such AD existence, found in this place of article, is even the
description of observations, impressions and ideas established by the author in the
course of the ontological nature analysis of the research subject. Thus, AD remains
in the awareness and consciousness of the researcher in the form of his own
impressions, experiences, and ideas. This manner of existence does not fulfil the
conditions of the objective existence, therefore, AD exists also subjectively.
A researcher associating with AD phenomenon, finally meets with a number of
established products of the intellect in the form of doctrines, manuals, and
instructions, collected in compact studies, describing and explaining the
procedures9 specific to AD. These products, as a result of their preservation by
record, do not fulfil all the criteria of the subjective existence, also equally difficult
is to recognise their existence as an objective one. They are in some sense placed
transcendently in respect to the researcher, yet they are too dependent on his
process of reasoning to be considered as part of the objective reality. It is therefore
necessary to find indirect, between the objective and subjective, intersubjective
means of AD existence.
Summing up this part of the analysis of the ontological nature of AD
phenomenon, it is possible to state the objective, subjective and intersubjective
existence of the research subject. Going back to the question: whether and how AD
exists?, the first part of it should be an affirmative answer. However, the answer to
the second part of question requires reducing the possible means of AD existence.
9
Such is the nature of the present article.
31
ANDRZEJ GLEN
The reduction was made with the use of Ingarden’s modes of existence (modus
existentiae)10. Ingarden distinguishes two modes of existence – the real being and
the intentionally conceptual, thus unreal, illusory. Comparing these modes of
existence with the analysis conducted thus far, it can be concluded that if each
component of being exists really or conceptually, then it is also these two modes of
existence: the real and conceptual that AD adopts. Confirming the position of AD
in the realistic part of the surrounding reality us, it is necessary to verify the
concreteness and abstraction aspect of the living objects.
The actions in AD are performed by people. These people, called in this work
the AD staff, belong to a particular social group. They bring in the field of AD
attitudes and behaviour typical for this environment, finally they hold the relevant
knowledge and skills in the area of AD. In AD, the devices used are constructed
purposely for it, moreover, the physical features which characterise AD differ from
those describing other phenomena observed in a battle. Thus, AD is physically
determined. AD can be observed only in a specifically defined sector of the
environment – airspace, in a specifically set time – it is, therefore, defined by time
and space. AD, therefore, can be considered as a specific object, existentially
completed, thus, existing objectively.
At this point of the ontological analysis it is possible to answer the question,
how AD exists in the real sphere of the reality surrounding us. However, the
question remains of the existence of AD in the other mode of existence proposed
by Ingarden – conceptual. But, if to look at AD as a conceptual object, it is possible
to notice its abstracting from reality. The conceptual objects – models of real
objects, detach themselves from reality, are made schematic in their matter content
and indeterminate.
The conducted ontological analysis allowed to assign AD to the real and
conceptual sphere of reality. The Ingarden modus existentiae proved to be helpful
in this research activity. The same distinguished author of the realistic perception
of the world (Ingarden) invented existential moments (moment existentiae),11 a tool
allowing one to specify the examined part of reality as an existential object and to
verify whether it has the features of a real being. The existential moments are the
reliable criterion of the affiliation evaluation of the object examined with regards to
the real or conceptual sphere of the existential universe.
In assessing the AD phenomenon in terms of Ingarden’s existential moments
and acting according to the indications of ontological realism12, the independence
10
See R. Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa 1960, p. 93-102.
Ibidem.
12
The real objects, always existentially derived of some other real objects, are self existential,
because on their own, that is in their quality content, have the existential foundation; at the same time
they are self-reliant, if they do not necessarily have to coexist within one and the same unity with
some other object, but being existentially self-reliant they are always dependent on some other real
objects, with which they enter into causal connection, otherwise they would not be components of the
real being. L. J. Krzyżanowski, O podstawach kierowania…,op.cit. p. 161.
11
32
and existential primordiality of AD should be rejected. AD, as the real object
functioning in the armed forces, in the crisis and conflict reality, (Figure 4.), is
a derivative of the people – military commanders – who are its creators.
primordiality
self existence
derivation
AD
nonexistance of self
self-reliance
not self-reliance
independence
dependence
Source: Own work.
Figure. 4. The evaluation model of air defence as the real object, according to the Ingarden’s
moment existentiae criterion
Moreover, AD is in causal connection with many other real objects on which it
is dependent. Above all, these are the connections with coverable objects. AD
enters in casual connection with them by exchanging energy (for example, in the
course of the use of electronic identification systems to distinguish their own from
the foreign aircrafts) and information (for example, on mutual movements of AD
forces and objects of cover). The lack of objects of cover obviously causes the
AD's existence only as a conceptual object (Figure 5.).
primordiality
self existence
derivation
AD
nonexistence of self
self-reliance
not self-reliance
independence
dependency
Source: Own work.
Figure 5. The evaluation model of air defence as the conceptual object, according to the
Ingarden’s moment existentiae criterion
However, it can be observed in situations of crisis and conflict that AD has in its
quality content the existential foundation. The qualitative content consists of other real
objects of AD, which include the specialised staff and devices deliberately created for
AD. From the point of view of the pair of existential moments i.e. self existence –
nonexistence of self, AD is a self existent object, thus real.
33
ANDRZEJ GLEN
The analysis of the next pair of existential moments: the existential selfreliance – non self-reliance, shows, however, that AD is not existentially selfreliant and must co-exist within the same unity with the state’s air security system,
alliance, or, at least, with the armed forces’ battle system. The existence of AD
outside these systems does not make much sense, because AD alone cannot solve
all the problems facing the country and its armed forces in non-military or military
crisis situations.
Generalising the completed phase of ontological analysis, it can be stated that
AD as a real object is existentially derivative of other real objects – the state
security system, or its armed forces, it is self existent, but not self-reliant, as it must
coexist within one and the same unity with these systems, finally, it is existentially
dependent on other real objects with which it enters into causal connections i.e. the
objects of cover, the absence of which prevents the existence of AD as a real
object.
However, AD being perceived as a conceptual object, can be described as an
existentially derivative of socio-psycho-bio-physical real objects – people,
nonexistent of self since its existential foundation derives not from its qualitative
content, but from the quasi-objective creations of the human intellect, preserved by
their release. AD must coexist with them as their carriers, so it is not existentially
self-reliant and dependent on them, and consequently in this case it is not
a component of the existential real universe sphere.
It can be stated, that AD, in both the examined approaches to ontology, is part
of both the real and conceptual sphere of the existential universe. Furthermore, it is
also possible to note that causal connections take place only in the real layer of the
existential universe between the real objects. Connections of this type in the
conceptual sphere, must, however, be intentionally determined, they cannot take
place without the participation of the human intellect.
Summarising the outcomes of the conducted ontological analysis of AD as
a part of the real and conceptual sphere of existential universe, it can be concluded
that:
1) AD, as a part of the real sphere, exists self existentially, but not selfreliantly, co-existing, at least, with the system of the armed forces, and mostly also
with the security system of state; moreover, it is existentially derivative of the
armed forces and dependent on the objects of cover by entering with them in causal
connections and is fully completed existentially and concretised.
2) AD as a component of the conceptual sphere, that is as a product of real
entities (systems of the armed forces) is nonexistent of self, not self-reliant, and its
content is characterised by indefinability. In addition, when proceeding with the
study of AD, we must remember that as part of the real reality also the part of
conceptual sphere built on it should be taken into account, because reality – in the
broad sense – make up both of these layers, as shown in Figure 6.
34
Intergrated AD
AD of AF, LF, N
Theory, doctrines, methods,
forms, modes, procedures
conceptual sphere
people, devices,
airspace
real sphere
Source: Own work.
Figure 6. Air Defence as a part of existential universe, according to Ingarden’s modus
existentiae
The established ontological regularities of AD existence constituted only the
specific phase in explaining the ontological nature of the research subject.
However, already at this stage the complexity of the AD phenomenon could be
noticed, while so far only the ontological nature of AD as a real object – a thing –
has been determined. Meanwhile, the needs to determine the appropriate
epistemological approach to new challenges facing AD, require the conclusions
resulting from the ontic complexity of the studied phenomenon to be taken into
account.
If we assume that AD is characterised by complexity and inconstancy, and that
the only philosophical category complying with Ingarden's conditions of moment
existentiae and modus existentiae is a thing, then the ontological description of AD
needs the use of an additional philosophical category. Such a category is a relation,
which includes the features of an ontic being. Relations are divided into ratios and
actions. The ratio of one object to another is a stated category, but not a real one,
because as a result of it the features of the real object do not change, but what
changes are only the relative qualities. Thus, this change is unstable in nature,
because nothing changes in the real object after the cessation of the ratio relation.
The actions, however […] are real, based on specific, it is a physically, temporally
and spatially determined transferring of matter, energy and information. […] the
changes in the interaction of objects-things are their result13.
The impacts in AD as a real object, may for example change the quality level
of staff training, cause the undertaking of or resigning from any action, direct
(control) the aircrafts’ flight. It is therefore reasonable to use actions as an
13
Ibidem, p. 166.
35
ANDRZEJ GLEN
additional category when describing the ontological nature of the phenomenon.
Demonstrating the ontological complexity and inconstancy of AD requires,
however, adding also the collective set category to reflect the co-occurences and
interaction of things and actions.
The explanation of AD as an ontic collective object, which is a fragment of the
real being of a unique structure, should explain the existential nature of the
research sufficiently to draw conclusions for its proper and full understanding.
A structure should be understood here as the totality of relations of comprising and
acting; as specified as the set of parts that make up the whole collective set of AD.
The complexity of the description required to increase the readability is presented
in Figure 7. showing the AD model as an ontic collective object. In the conducted
analysis of AD structure there has also been used the already specified ontological
regularities of the studied phenomenon.
Intergrated AD
The reference level – zero
AD of the
Air Force
AD of AF
unit
AD of AF
unit
Elements of
command
Elements of
reconnaissance
Elements of
destruction
AD of other
components
Immanent structure of KPP
Deep structure of AD
the relation of comprising
the relation of interaction
Source: Own work.
Figure 7. The model of air defence as an ontic collective object
It was established that AD exists independently in each type of the armed
forces (TAF). In that case, the reference level (zero) in the construction of the
ontological structure will be the very AD of air force as well as navy and ground
forces. The derivation of the studied phenomenon was also established. Thus, AD
36
through the comprising relations will be included in the object of a higher order,
and that will be an integrated air defence. At the same time, AD will connect with
the interaction relations with similar ontic objects of other types of armed forces
(TAF) in the objective unity, that is, unity within the AD object.
In turn, AD of other TAF consist of objects of a directly lower rank – AD of
other TAF units, and the interaction that connects them determines the immanent
structure of the object of study, i.e. AD. The elements of command, reconnaissance
and destruction, constituting AD, create on the other hand a deep structure, and the
interaction that connects them determines the deep structure within the AD object.
Epistemological basis
From a cognitive point of view, AD is the area of knowledge and skills, in
which the unity of understanding which characterise the phenomenon of states,
events, and processes, is one of the conditions for the success of most of the
hostilities conducted today, non-war operations, as well as peaceful non-military
actions in emergency situations. The internalisation of the basic terms used in the
process of AD cognition should, as a result, lead to the full dissemination of their
uniform understanding. It is therefore necessary to take a theory cognitive position
in respect to the epistemological categories as "totality", "complex", "system". It is
necessary to uniform the understanding of the aforementioned concepts, without
which it would be impossible to use the term: the epistemological position of AD.
The totality of AD is a set of AD elements of Air Force, Ground Forces, Navy,
combined with AD by the comprising relation.
OF GROUND
FORCES
AD
OF NAVY
OF AIR FORCE
Source: Own work.
Figure 8. The model of the air defence whole
The AD complex is a collection of its elements of command, destruction,
informing, assistance, and supply, among which there are complementary relations
(Fig. 9.).
37
ANDRZEJ GLEN
AD
DISTRUCTION
INFORMING
COMMAND
SUPPORT
SUPPLY
Source: Own work.
Figure 9. The model of air defence complex
Finally, the AD system should be understood as being separate from the state’s
air security system and the armed forces system; the collective14 and ordered
collection of human resources (the staff), specialised technical equipment, airspace,
methods, modes and procedures of action and interactions of matter, energy and
information that connect and order them for the efficient and secure combat by
means of air attack (MoAA) in the air.
The AD system is expressed in Figure 10. by a dark oval, within which the key
system resources have been included in the form of three slightly brighter ovals.
These resources are: creative – the staff, natural – the airspace, and artificial – the
technical equipment along with the principles, methods, procedures for their use.
All the three types of aforementioned resources overlap, thereby expressing the
ties that connect them, and constitute the structure of AD. The dashed lines in the
figure indicate the relations of the system with the surroundings. Inside the model,
the structure of the system was illustrated with two darker ovals. The top oval
illustrates the authority performing in the system the role of executive member
establishing the domain, mission and objectives of AD. The lower, on the other
hand, expresses a basic, executive level of AD together with the subsystems of:
destruction, information, support and supply. These subsystems transform the
resources that flow into the system in the services (products) provided for the
state’s air security systems of the state and the armed forces as well as the
coverable objects placed in the first of the lighter ovals surrounding AD system –
in its immediate surroundings. The second and the brightest oval represents the
14
The collection in the collective sense […] called the mereological collection, by which a
complex totality (set, pack, aggregate) is meant, (juxtaposed) from the objects that are its parts
(components). See ibidem, p. 124.
38
resources from which the AD system must derive the supply. The small white ovals
illustrate other systems with which the AD system enters into an interaction
relation.
Source: Own work.
Figure 10. The model of air defence system
As it was found earlier, all relations (ratios and interactions) that connect the
elements of the system are oriented as AD’s objectives. Before explaining the
concept of AD’s “objective” category, it is necessary to refer, in the course of
explaining the structure of AD system, to the two newly introduced concepts
related to the activities of the governing bodies of the system – the "mission" and
"domain". The mission will be regarded as the object of aspirations, i.e. the
permanent aspirations of AD as regards the security of the state and the armed
forces whereas the domain of AD will represent the area and type of the undertaken
within operations.
After expressing my attitude to the category of "mission" and "domain", let us
now turn to a full explanation of the concept of "object" that directs the AD system.
39
ANDRZEJ GLEN
From the point of view of the research process requirements and taking into
account the availability of the desired results of an AD operation as well as the
time factor, the studies used in the initial phase the four categories of objective:
ideal, intention, purpose and task. The first of these – the ideal – was based on the
established value system15 in AD. The ideal determines a perfect state in the AD
object, which is unattainable, but also one for which it should be aimed for. The
intention determines the category of objective defined objectively, describing the
state of AD, which can be achieved in an unspecified perspective. The categories,
which are most often used in a later phase of determining the AD state – is
a purpose and task. They objectively and subjectively define the future and desired
result of AD’s actions, those possible and predicted to be achieved within
a specified lapse of time and time limit, were assumed as a purpose in the
aforementioned presentation. The task was termed as being separate objectively
and subjectively, in time and space; and in general procedurally, a part of the
purpose provided for the implementation in the agreed period or time limit, set in
a lapse of time predicted to achieve the purpose16.
In the description of AD, there were also used two epistemological categories,
the explanation of which was considered as necessary to obtain an internalized
perception of this phenomenon. These categories are "procedure" and "function".
Procedure, from French procédure as proceder 'proceed', from Latin procedere, is
that which is established by normative rules and procedure17 in AD matters.
Function is the same as the set of potential, usually repetitive, conventional and
procedurally formal actions, separated due to their content and relativisation to the
objective of AD.
Before attempting to define and partly redefine the objective of AD, it was
considered necessary to specify the two concepts not applied yet in the theory of
AD: missions and domain. An ability in times of peace, crisis and war on the
territory of country, of armies and other objects to prevent the incurring of
losses of military and non-military means of air attack was regarded as the
mission of AD. As for AD domain, we can regard the actions undertaken in AD
as part of the two basic functions of AD: the destruction caused by MoAA and
informing about them.
The AD objective has been defined so far18 in the broad sense from the point of
view of the national defence system, as the state's achievement of a condition of
15
Commencing the arrangement of instruments from the category of objectives, I am formulating
a draft thesis that the objectives of the "organization", as any other objectives, derive from the values,
in this case, from the valuesdeclared by the participants of 'organization', and by its social and
institutional surrounding, with which it conduct, as an open system, an exchange of material, nominal
and immaterial goods. See L. Krzyżanowski, O podstawach kierowania... wyd. cyt., p. 250.
16
Ibidem., p. 252–253.
17
W praktyce tryb ten będą określały stałe procedury operacyjne OP, wytworzone przez
określone organy dowodzenia (najczęściej dowódcę operacyjnego).
18
See B. Zdrodowski, Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 2002.
40
national security in its air area, while in terms of air defence – a part of an armed
struggle, as the prevention of an opponent’s MoAA to attain their objectives,
thereby creating favourable conditions to conduct an armed struggle in the broader
sense in the air threat conditions.
A careful axiological and theoretical analysis of a state’s air security category
reveals that among the values directing the objective of the state’s security
system19, at present, next to efficacy and security, also ecology and economy are
included. While the first two listed values are common to the state’s air security
and AD, the other two: the economy and ecology of using airspace with AD
domain, have little in common.
Thus, it is suggested, that the AD objective, in its broad sense, and from the
point of view of the state’s air security, is to consider to be preventing military and
non-military means of air attack from causing losses to the covered objects and
army in times of peace, crisis and war both within the country and outside it, not
allowing these objects to function normally. In such an adopted definition of the
objective of AD, for the "normal" functioning it is considered that such a state of
the covered system exists in which its structure and functions performed were not
affected to such an extent as to not allow for the implementation of the mission,
domain, purpose and tasks of the system.
In case of a narrow understanding of AD objective, in terms of an armed
struggle, it was recognised that it requires only a small adjustment related to the
current scheme of air threats20, in which on the first division level the military and
non-military air threats were distinguished. The military threats include those in
which the source of danger are the armed forces of the state, alliance, and or
coalition of states, while the non-military ones include those threats the source of
which should be traced in the terrorist and criminal activity, which does not involve
the armed forces of any country.
After the aforementioned adjustment was made, it is suggested that as a pat of
the objective of AD, treated as part of the armed struggle in its narrow sense,
should be the prevention of the military MoAA of the enemy to cause losses to
the covered objects, compromising the operational power of these covered
objects, that is, losses that do not allow the covered objects to accomplish their
tasks21. The essence of such a defined AD objective explains the interpretation of
AD objectives introduced to the theory of AD by B. Zdrodowski which is included
in Figure 14.
In accordance with that interpretation, the covered troops (objects) can perform
combat tasks if they have at their disposal the size of the battle potential (PBpotrz)
at least sufficient for it. The opponent having at his disposal a means, including
19
See A. Glen, Bezpieczeństwo powietrzne elementem systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa, w
Zarządzanie kryzysowe w Polsce, WSH, Pułtusk, 2007.
20
See A, Glen, J. Nowak, Sytuacje kryzysowe w polskiej przestrzeni powietrznej ich źródła,
AON, Warszawa 2008.
21
Lt. B. Zdrodowski, Teoria …, wyd. cyt.
41
ANDRZEJ GLEN
MoAA (PBŚNP), aims to reduce the battle potential (PBdysp) of the covered
troops (objects), to a level that prevents the execution of their tasks, they have
specific capabilities at their disposal (MŚNP)
Source :B. Zdrodowski, Teoria…, wyd. cyt.
Figure 11. A graphic interpretation of air defence objective
Each of the symbols in Figure 11. stand for:
– PBdysp – a baseline battle potential of the covered objects;
– PBpotrz- a battle potential of the covered objects necessary to accomplish
the task;
– PBkryt- a critical battle potential, determining the threshold of maximum
losses which the covered objects may suffer as a result of MoAA impact;
– MŚNP – the capabilities of MoAA;
– PBŚNP – a battle potential of MoAA;
– MBOP – the battle capabilities of AD;
– PBOP – a battle potential of AD.
The difference between the baseline battle potential (PBdysp), and the battle
potential necessary of the covered troops (objects) (Pbpotrz) is termed as a critical
battle potential (PBKryt), that is, such loss which we accept without the threat of
not being able to accomplish a task.
PBdysp - PBpotrz = PBKryt
where:
– PBdysp - the baseline battle potential of the covered troops (objects);
– PBpotrz - the battle potential necessary for the covered troops (objects) to
accomplish the tasks;
– PBKryt – the critical battle potential, acceptable for loss, without the threat
of not being able to accomplish the task.
42
If the capabilities of MoAA (MŚNP) are greater than the critical battle potential
(PB-Crit), then it should be considered that the MoAA will accomplish their tasks:
– when MŚNP > PBKryt then MoAA are able to accomplish the task.
– when MŚNP < PBKryt then AD is able to accomplish the task.
From the interpretation of AD objective results it can be seen that to achieve
this objective it is necessary to affect MoAA in such a way which enables the
reduction of their battle potential (PBŚNP) to a level where the battle capabilities
of MoAA (MŚNP) will be smaller than the critical potential of the covered troops
(objects) (PBKryt), thus ensuring the accomplishment of the mission by the troops
(objects).
Another important category of AD are the functions. The objective of AD,
understood both in a broad and a narrow sense, is achieved by implementing two
key functions22:
– of the destruction of MoAA in the air;
– of informing on air threat.
AD FUNCTIONS
COMMAND
EXECUTING
BASIC:
- destruction
- information
about MoAA
ASSISTING
SUPPORTING:
- increase basic functions
capability
- decrease MoAA capability
SUPPLYING:
- logistically
- staff
- information
Source:B. Zdrodowski, Teoria …, wyd. cyt.
Figure 12. The air defence functions
In addition to the basic functions in AD – as a complex category – there should
be a managerial (command) function exercised. Moreover, for the efficient
performance of the destruction and informing functions it is also necessary to fulfil
security functions, i.e. of support and supply. (see Fig. 12.). The informing on
MoAA, from a formal point of view, should be placed within the security
functions, supplying informationally the basic AD processes. However, for the
sake of the crucial, for the Ad system, importance of informing, this function was
raised in AD to the basic level.
22
Ibidem.
43
ANDRZEJ GLEN
AIR DEFENCE
THE OBJECT OF AD
THE TERRITORY OF
THE COUNTRY
AIR FORCE
OBJECTS
AIR DEFENCE
A TYPE OF ŚNP
AIR DEFENCE
SPACE DEFENCE
MISSILE DEFENCE
AIR DEFENCE
A TYPE OF AD SUBJECT
NON-SPECIALIST
SPECIALIST
AIR DEFENCE
TYPES OF AD ACTIONS
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
Source :Own work on the basis of B. Zdrodowski, Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 1996.
Figure 13. The division of air force
The final specification of the contemporary concept of AD requires the
classification of the objective phenomenon using clear criteria of division. These
criteria include: the subject and object of AD and the type of actions of the AD and
the opponent with which the battle is to be undertaken (see Fig. 13). As a result,
there were determined the air defence of: the territory of the country, the armed
forces, other objects; along with: space defence, air defence, missile defence,
specialist and non-specialist defence, active and passive defence.
The scope of AD depends on the same criteria by which the classification was
made. Thus, AD may include combating the opponent’s aviation in the air by the
use of ground forces or to undertake the battle with all MoAA (aircrafts, missiles
and battlespace powers) on land and in aerospace, by all specialist and nonspecialist forces, engaging in both active as well as passive actions.
Conclusions
Summarising the results of the research obtained in the course of the cognitive
identification of the theoretical basis of OP (AD), the broad and narrow sense of
AD may be regarded as justified.
44
In the broad sense, AD should be comprehended as part of a state’s air security
aimed at preventing military and non-military means of air attack from causing
losses in times of peace, crisis and war, to the covered objects and troops both on
the territory of country and outside, not allowing these covered objects to function
normally.
However, in the narrow sense, AD should be interpreted as part of the armed
struggle aimed at preventing the military MoAA of the opponent from causing
losses to the covered objects, excessing the critical battle potential of those covered
objects, that is, the losses that do not allow the covered objects accomplish their
tasks.
Moreover, when describing and explaining the phenomenon of AD, especially
determining its referent, there should be considered the AD divisions according to
the criteria of: object, type of entity, type of MoAA, type of AD actions, and the
divisions denotations and connotations of AD resulting from these.
Bibliography
Encyklopedia organizacji i zarządzania, PWE, Warszawa 1981.
Glen A., Bezpieczeństwo powietrzne elementem systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa,
w: Zarządzanie kryzysowe w Polsce, WSH, Pułtusk, 2007.
Glen A., Nowak J., Sytuacje kryzysowe w polskiej przestrzeni powietrznej ich źródła, AON,
Warszawa 2008.
Glen A., System bezpieczeństwa powietrznego państwa, NDU Scientific Quarterly, AON,
4/2008.
Ingarden R., Spór o istnienie świata, PWN, Warszawa 1960.
Krzyżanowski L.J., O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej, PWN, Warszawa
1999.
Krzyżanowski L.J., Podstawy nauki zarządzania, PWN, Warszawa 1985.
Lem S., Biblioteka XXI wieku, Wydawnictwa Literackie, Kraków 1986.
Smolski R., Smolski M., Stadtmüller E.H., Słownik encyklopedyczny edukacja obywatelska,
Wydawnictwa Europa, Warszawa 1999.
Zdrodowski B., Teoria OP, AON, Warszawa 2002.
45
LESZEK ELAK
REASONS FOR CONTEMPORARY
CONFLICTS – AN OUTLINE
OF THE PROBLEM
Col. Leszek ELAK, Ph.D.
Abstract
The article presents the modern approach to the problem of armed conflicts in the world.
Armed conflicts lead societies to demoralization and weaken growth opportunities of states.
Furthermore, they often destroy all social structures and serve as a backing of numerous social
pathologies. The number of parties involved in the conflict, and the aspirations of the leaders,
and external interventions (intrusions) often prolong the conflict, even making impossible
finding any peaceful solutions. The author, in this article characterized reasons of nowadays
military conflicts and presented the consequences resulting therefrom.
Key words – conflict, state, war
Currently, there is a general feeling that the outbreak of a global war is
unlikely. However, attention is drawn increasingly to the probability of an
increased number of local crises, consisting of country-to-country or regional
conflicts which, in the case of their escalation may lead to war on a wider scale.
Nevertheless, according to C. Clausewitz – each era has its war. The turn of 21st
century coincided with a transition to a new era – a so-called information era, in
turn coinciding with a general civilisation change. So the current era will probably
also have their war1. Recently, in national security and defence strategies, the main
focus is taken by defensive strategy (war strategy). Currently at the forefront, can
be seen the crisis strategies or the strategies of crisis response.
Conflicts or wars break out in different situations - both against relations
between individuals, as well as between individual social groups or between
countries. The essence of conflicts and wars constitute defined contradictions,
occurring between two or more parties, which usually result from a difference of
interests2. A conflict of interest is to be found both within individual countries, and
between them. In other words, in the first case we are dealing with an intra-state or
1
See Balcerowicz, B. 2002. Peace and un-peace. Bellona, Warsaw 2002, pp. 167.
See Cziomer, E. 2000. Outline of contemporary international relations. PWN, Cracow 2000,
pp. 203.
2
46
REASONS FOR CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS – AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM
local conflict, and in the second case with international conflict. This conflict of
interest refers to relations between the state regarding national and political values
as: sovereignty, independence, self-determination and territorial integrity.
Therefore we can speak about an international conflict only when the participating
warring parties, not only have contradictory interests, but realise it; which is in turn
reflected in their behaviour, proceedings and action. It is also important to
distinguish such conflict from normal relations occurring as part of inter-state
rivalry3. Both international and local conflicts affect indirectly the security of its
neighbouring countries and their citizens.
Until recently, the defence systems of states were adjusted to the implementation
of the tasks in the framework of peace and war. As a result of many changes at the
end of the 20th century, and in the beginning of the 21st century the likelihood of
armed conflicts on a large scale has decreased significantly, but new categories
of security risks have appeared. This situation has meant that attention began to be
attached to the issues relating to crisis situations caused by the various threats, both
military and non-military. A common system of state defence (the alliance) should
be able to resist any risks causing crisis situations in the area of the country and
beyond its borders4.
A serious threat is the escalation of local conflicts in to international conflicts.
This may occur in cases where: there are uncontrolled supplies of weapons,
diplomatic pressures are being exerted by external members, common actions are
agreed in issues like combating international terrorism outside the state as well as
the armed intervention of neighbouring countries or external powers.
Often two interchangeable concepts are being used – war and armed conflict.
Therefore, both these concepts require clarification. The concept of war is to be
distinguished from other forms of combat such as gang actions, political and armed
revolutions. War is a social, historical and class phenomenon, consisting of the
regulating of disputes or execution of political objectives by the application of
violence through the use of the armed forces5. War is also a continuation of politics
conducted by the means of violence, in order to compel the opponent to meet our
will. It [the war] bears also the nature of the bloody armed struggle, conducted by
the organised armed forces6. The war is not just a political deed, but the real tool of
politics, a furthering series of political relations, carrying them out with other
means7. And the armed conflict should be considered to be the actions of the armed
forces of the opposing parties (states, nations, classes, and social groups) carried
out on a limited (in relation to the used measures, area, duration) scale8. The armed
3
Ibidem.
Sobolewski, G. 2009. Emergency response in an urban environment. National Defense
Academy, Warsaw 2009, pp. 78.
5
Universal Encyklopedia, PWN, Warsaw 1976, vol. IV, pp. 697.
6
Skibiński, F. 1978. Reflections on the art of war. Warsaw 1978, pp. 29.
7
von Clausewitz, C. 1958. About war. Warsaw 1958, pp. 15.
8
Mucha, L. 1991. Armed violence. Warsaw 1991, pp. 33.
4
47
LESZEK ELAK
conflict can be treated as a kind of armed violence consisted of striving to achieve
the purposes of the state (the coalition, social group) by reciprocal action using the
armed forces or organised and armed groups. The application of this criteria
regarding ways to use armed conflicts allows one to distinguish between war and
border armed conflicts9. According to another source10 the armed conflict is an
ambiguous term, as to which there is no compatible acceptance in science. Among
the various types of war, there is listed a conflict of reduced intensity, which is
being described as: armed action in the field between peace and an open war using
strictly limited forces and methods. Traditionally war is characterised by the
following characteristics11:
– two or more organised armed forces, of which, at least on one side, are
involved are regular troops, paramilitary troops take part in the fight;
– both fighting parties must be organised according to a certain pattern, and in
addition to that, there is a planned and organised structure of armed actions, even if
it only confines to defence;
– there is a chronological – fixed continuation of an armed conflict or
correlation of strategic and tactical purpose of command level.
And the features distinguishing the armed conflict shall be primarily taken as:
– existence of at least two entities fighting on a limited scale;
– use of organised armed forces by the fighting parties against the armed
forces of an adversary;
– usage of methods and measures of armed struggle.
In the 1990s a qualitative change occurred in conflicts and wars. The most
important elements are12:
– a clear dominance of conflicts and wars of an internal nature, which gradually
become international and constitute a serious threat to neighbouring countries: the
conflict in the former Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and numerous
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia;
– a serious increase of conflicts in connection with the disintegration of
multinational states (USSR, Yugoslavia, Sudan);
– an exacerbation of conflicts over tensions of an ethnic-national-religious
character;
– an increase of war damage and losses among the civilian population, which
in many cases are greater than among the parties directly involved;
– difficulties in the peaceful resolution of international disputes;
– international terrorism and organised crime;
– participation of international organisations in resolving conflicts and local crises.
9
Glossary of basic terms of safety. Warsaw 1994, pp. 12.
Dupuy, T. N. 1993. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. Vol. 6, Washington
1993, pp. 2886.
11
Cziomer, E. 2000. Outline..., pp. 204.
12
Ibidem, pp. 217.
10
48
At this point it would be worth narrowing down and analysing the theories of
wars and causes of conflicts and also responding to the question of why war
happens in these and not other times, between only those countries and not others
and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outbreak of war or
conflict. The theories of the causes of wars can be divided, according to the level of
analysis13:
1. the system – the main reasons for the wars derive from the structure of the
international system;
2. the state – its nature and character of the society are crucial;
3. the decision-making process, organisational and bureaucratic mechanisms,
particularly in crisis situations
There are many theories of the reasons for wars. The first noteworthy is the
realist theory of the balance of forces, which relies on the fact that the members
shall endeavour to avoid hegemonies and maintain their independence. The balance
of powers is such a system of international relations, in which any one power may
not influence on the other or impose on them their rights14. In accordance with this
theory, one should create alliances, in order to protect against the undue advantage
of others – external balancing, unlike internal balancing, which follows through
armaments. Military potential should be stable and possible to measure, so that
member states could properly define it: what is necessary for a proper balancing.
Technological changes in the sphere of military may influence disturbing because:
– they create uncertainty about the actual strength of individual states;
– they create an opportunity to use technology to the advantage of one state,
before the technology spreads;
– they stimulate arms races15.
Another theory is the theory of overwhelming force, which says that equal
distribution of forces creates the danger of believing in victory by one of the
parties. The advantage of one state is the guarantor of greater stability; the war is
unnecessary for the stronger one and too risky for the weaker one. The next theory
– the theory of force transition proclaims that the main sources of war are changes
of the forces relationship arising as a result of the different pace of economic
growth. The dominant state shall bear the costs associated with maintenance of the
system, while its rivals benefit from this without incurring costs16. Another theory
proclaims that the country whose strength is growing, may initiate the war in order
to obtain impact and political importance in accordance with its economic and
military status. The likelihood of war breaking out is the greatest when the
development of the rising country is quick, and its strength close to the strength of
the dominant country, especially in the absence of a tradition of cooperation
13
Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. PWN, Warsaw 1998, pp. 18.
Stefanowicz, J. 1996. International Order : Experience and Future. Warsaw 1996, pp. 140.
15
Czaputowicz, J. 1 System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 19.
16
Houweling, H. 1998. Power transition as a cause of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1998,
vol. 32, no 1.
14
49
LESZEK ELAK
between them and when the revisionist state is attempting to alter and replace the
existing international order with its own order17.
Some theories show that the reasons for the wars lie rather in the nature of the
state and its society. They override the statement that the international system
affects the outbreak of wars and conflicts. According to them, relative prosperity
and social consensus minimise the likelihood of a war. On the other hand the
religious differences and nationalism disturbs and heighten the aggression which as
a consequence, can lead to war. The uncontrolled internal situation in the country
leads the authorities to initiate a war, in order to increase the national unity and to
strengthen its[the country’s] position. Often the authorities and politicians behave
irrationally and their heads-up lead to a disregard of the future wars costs. They
often derive personal benefits from the war without incurring the direct costs18. In
the mainstream of those theories there is also the democratic theory, in the light of
which the democratic states do not start wars. Other theories of wars causes
concern wars at the level of the decision-making process – military doctrine (the
offensive -increases the likelihood, the defensive – reduces it), as well as
investigating the causes of wars in conflicts between the parties involved in the
dispute, the lack of information, underestimating or overestimating the forces or
the intentions of the opponent.
In the subject of literature we can find the long cycle theory. According to it,
the international system returns after a period of time to the point of take-off. An
excessive extension of the dominant state leads to its collapse. The change of
leadership in the world follows in cycles more or less every 100 years: the world
superpower in the 16th century was Portugal, in the 17th - the Netherlands, in the
18th and 19th - England19. Currently from the 20th century the United States has
served this role.
Academics examining the causes of the wars came to interesting conclusions20
in the sixties. The results obtained were valid for the times and have proven that:
– conflicts and internal disorders are frequent cause of wars;
– the equability of forces degradation between the main countries reduces the
risk of war;
– the rapid development of one state increases the risk of war;
– a very small or very large degree of force polarisation increases the risk of war;
– arms races leads to the escalations ending in war.
Other studies of the wars 21 in the years 1816-1980 have led to the conclusion
that a weaker state cannot reasonably attack a stronger one – unless, in an alliance;
17
Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World politics. New York 1968, pp. 376.
Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 20.
19
Modelski, G. 1998. The long cycle of global politics and the nation-state. Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 1998, no 20, pp. 214-235; Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 20.
20
See Desler, D. 1991. Beyoned correlates. Toward a casual theory of war. International Studies
Quartely 1991, pp. 339-341; Singer, J. D. 1978 -1980. The correlates of war, New York 1979-1980.
21
Comp. Czaputowicz, J. 1998. System or chaos. Op.cit, pp. 21.
18
50
the powers more often participate in wars of lesser importance than other states and
expectations as to preserving the third countries may be crucial for the start of the
war. Moreover in a situation where the expected losses of one state exceed the
potential gains of another state, there is a strong likelihood of negotiations, the
allied state may affect the stronger state only in certain situations and the wars
between allies are more frequent than between enemies.
By analysing the theories of the causes of wars and conflicts one cannot
overlook assumptions of the peace and conflicts studies, which detect causes in
three categories:
1. structural – dependent on their intellectual, economical, technical,
infrastructural, industrial, agricultural development, the geopolitical situation and
historical circumstances;
2. cyclical – alliances, coalitions, social behaviour under the influence of
propaganda, indoctrination and ideology;
3. other – unforeseen incidents, provocations, etc.
Summarising the above considerations, it is clear that there is a belief that the
heterogeneity of the modern world, the diversity, intensity and multidimensional
nature of international relations generate in a natural way disputes and
contradictions. Therefore, the most important causes of wars are the following
factors22:
– economical:
• poverty;
• access to natural resources;
• tensions of an internal nature;
• external dependence;
• place in the international division of labor;
– political:
• internal, social tensions;
• ethnic classifications;
• territorial claims;
• refugees and displaced people;
• a sense of external threat;
• activities of the opposition;
– ideological:
• the political system;
• past history;
• racial prejudice;
– religious;
– ecological:
• natural and environmental disasters;
22
Borkowski, R. 2001. The conflicts of the modern world. Scientific – Didactic Academic
Publisher, Cracow 2001, pp. 42.
51
LESZEK ELAK
• environmental degradation;
• water shortages;
• globalization;
• instability of energy markets;
• migration of the population;
• diseases of civilization;
• shrinking of natural resources;
• ecological terrorism;
– organized crime;
– international terrorism.
Given the previously presented theories of the causes of wars and conflicts, it
should be noted that it happens rarely, that at the root of the conflict lays only one
reason. There are a whole combination of reasons leading to conflicts. The country
leaders controlled by their own political ambitions, internal agreements and
emotions, trying to strengthen or maintain their position as a state in the
international arena, referring to the reasons of state, have made their own
interpretation of the conflict situation. Disregarding the interests of their partner or
the international law, they have made decisions about the use of force. These
factors determine the nature of the conflict, which is seldom clear. A conflict is
often accompanied by ethnic and religious tensions, often by the interference of
third countries. It creates a conglomerate of the causative mechanisms that are
difficult to explain. Sometimes, the given region of the world is dominated by
a specific cause of conflict which reveals itself in other areas, for example,
territorial disputes sometimes have a very long pedigree. Particularly disturbing are
those whose origin is closely connected with the collapse of colonialism.
Boundaries erected individually by European countries remained unchanged. Not
following the natural ethnic or cultural distribution, they enclosed in the structure
of the state lots of conflicting interests and attitudes. In another case, the dominant
causes are raw materials, where it is not only about access to resources, but also
differences of opinions concerning their distribution23.
The most important consequence of the majority of contemporary armed
conflicts is a kind of de-institutionalisation, which means there is no central control
and rules of action for the parties to the conflict. De-institutionalisation, compared
to traditionally comprehended wars, manifests itself primarily in two interrelated
elements24:
– diversity of warring parties;
– brutalisation of the conflict.
Contemporary armed conflicts are characterised by a diversity of warring
parties and thus subject to some kind of privatisation. The participants of the
conflict in addition to the regular army (and sometimes instead of them) are various
23
24
52
Ibidem, pp. 42-23.
Ibidem, pp. 118.
non-state subjects, ranging from a loosely organised band of armed and
paramilitary groups, ethnic groups, tribes, clans, drug cartels, companies engaged
in supplying mercenaries, as well as further warlords or partisans similar to the
state army25. It encourages the incorporation of external state, and especially nonstate, actors in the conflict. The vast majority of participants of this kind of wars
confined its activity to the territory (countries) covered by the fights. However,
some of them, at the same time, engage in activities in the form of asymmetric
threats to other countries. An example of this might be terrorist activities of some
Islamist terrorist organisations, and especially such as Al Qaeda26.
The second aspect of the de-institutionalisation of modern armed conflict is the
widely understood brutalisation of conflicts. It is characterised primarily by the use
of combat methods different from typical interstate wars, often treated as inhumane
and unacceptable under international law. Its expression is also a frequent focus of
activities connected with, and including attacks on, civilians belonging to different
ethnic or religious community.
Outlined above, two characteristics of contemporary conflicts affect very
significantly the developmental abilities of the asymmetric threats constituting
subjects. Some Islamic terrorist groups have been formed during or as a result of
armed conflict. Moreover, most of the course of armed conflict enables the
operation of organisations and criminal groups asymmetrically – it enables the
recruiting of new members, as well as opens a very broad perspective for their
existing participants to gain relevant militant experience. Possibilities of
recruitment of new members are being increased by the fact that the asymmetric
threat is constituted by both cultural or religious factors. Another convenience for
organisations and groups is the increased availability of certain types of weapons
(small arms)27.
The important consequence of modern warfare, and above all their costs and
negative consequences for the international system, is also a substantial modification of
roles and responsibilities of regular armed forces and especially the troops in
countries belonging to NATO or the EU. Currently their traditional function,
defence against external aggression from other states, has lost its importance; so
the main task and actions actually performed by modern armed forces are several
missions related to the need to intervene in internal conflicts (including
peacekeeping or humanitarian operations) as well as the need for post-conflict
stabilisation and reconstruction. This raises important implications for NATO and
EU countries: in addition to the reorganisation of their respective armed forces,
there is the issue of intervening in conflicts where they themselves are not directly
concerned (for among other reasons due to geographical distance). This leads to
25
Cienciara, A. 2010. International conflict - a theoretical approach. International Relations,
University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2010, p. 106.
26
Borkowski, R. 2001. The conflicts…. pp. 118.
27
Ibidem, pp. 119.
53
LESZEK ELAK
a significant asymmetry in the determination or the will to participate in the
conflict between the forces of intervention (stabilisation) and the local combatants.
The consequence of this is the susceptibility of intervention (stabilising) forces due
to the asymmetrical nature of the methodology employed and consequently the
negative effects of entities, which in turn constitute asymmetric threats. The fact
that the state of the transatlantic area engage militarily in conflicts in remote and
culturally different regions of the world, can be interpreted by some of the local
community as objectionable unauthorised interference in their internal affairs and
a manifestation of imperialism28.
Armed conflicts lead to a demoralisation of societies and weaken the
development prospects of countries. They often destroy all social structures and are
the underlying causes of numerous social pathologies. Often the number of
participating parties to the conflict, the aspirations of leaders and interference from
the outside prolong conflicts preventing the establishment of peace. Then the fights
lasts until all the forces and motivations of the combatants become exhausted.
Therefore, the reduction of armed conflicts and settlement of disputes, ie. opposing
views of interested parties, using peaceful means for the international community is
one of the most important problems to be solved at the present time.
28
54
Ibidem, pp. 120.
SECURITY IN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES
Lt. Col. Krzysztof DRABIK, Ph.D.
Abstract
Security is a basic need and practical aim of safe existence, survival and development.
This fundamental attribute is important for every rational being and it is anchored in the
social contract theory. An agreement between individuals at the ethical and social level
reveals a method to achieve security. Here, ethical principles and the political system of the
state are the basis for safe human existence.
Key words – security, contract theories, politics
The dichotomy of the natural state and political state
The elementary components of the discourse on human security are the
functional principles of the social structure built upon social contract. They are key
determinants when analysing the creation of security, and even indispensable when
thinking of it.
The social contract theory indicates a possible origin of the initial rules that
form the basis to discuss the prospects of the shaping of security. The hypothetical
character of this theory does not disqualify its practical effects in a social reality.
Just as the a priori assumption of the need for an axiom in logic allows for the
adoption of a particular method of defining concepts and proving judgements. The
social contract theory allows for the formulation of convincing assumptions
describing a model of the social structure in a country. Thus, it is used for
diagnosing and formulating conclusions about methods of shaping security. An
important indicator of the role played by the contract between individuals is the
difference between the natural state and the political state, or the application of the
principles of justice.
Thomas Hobbes highlighted the significant dichotomy between these states.
And so, in the state of nature there is no law that would allow for meeting the needs
of an individual, which would not interfere with the same rights of another
individual. Everyone has the right to freedom (or rather liberty) without any
restrictions. In this case there is a conflict of individual interests that are derived
55
KRZYSZTOF DRABIK
from the right of everyone to everything. On the other hand, having no restrictions
to the natural law would initiate a war of all against all.
Hobbes' dichotomy between the natural state and political state emphasises the
importance of a legally authorised agreement between individuals. The agreement
is primarily intended to eliminate the imperfections of the natural state, i.e. to
restrict the rights of everybody to everything1. The category of freedom is defined
in another, let's call it a social (community), dimension. The point of freedom lies
in its limitations, which are the areas of freedom of other individuals.
The social contract organises the structure of a community of individuals. They
formulate a set of rules for interconnected functioning on individual and
institutional levels. The scope of the contract includes the process of creating
security for individuals and the entire political community. Only in a legal system
that is based on the initial contract, does the principle of justice comes into force,
and it covers the whole of social functioning.
The theory of justice as the basis for the creation of a well-organised
social system
The American philosopher John Rawls used the social contract theory to
construct a theory of justice. It seems that social contract theories are adequate for
the construction of social, ethical, political and other theories that consider a social
community to be the basis for scientific reflection. The social contract allows us to
determine the so-called primary principles that become points of reference for
further regulations of functioning social communities. Rawls used the social
contract theory on purpose. For him it represented a good starting point for the
formulation of the primary principles of justice in the so-called initial situation.
The contract allows one to develop a consensus whether it concerns the principles
of justice, or the functioning of the legislative, executive, judicial branches of the
state or the functioning of other state institutions. And so, legal principles in the
social contract theory are devoid of an origin a priori.
In his attempt to design a theory of justice, Rawls chose the social contract
path, which has become the primary method of determining the principles of
justice. In this approach, the importance of justice has a significant impact on the
direction of the shaping of security, which lasts as long as the individuals follow
the rules adopted in the initial situation. Thus, security is closely related to the
structure of the primary rules set by the social contract. Failure to comply with
these principles shall initiate risks and have a negative impact on the continuity of
the existence, survival and development prospects of security subjects.
1
Locke's dichotomy has a less expressive form. The rule bellum omnium contra omnes is not in
force, but the imperfections of natural state result from the need to overcome the principle nemo iudex
in causa sua.
56
One should take into account the fundamental reservation about the substance
of the principles established in the social contract. These rules are the result of
a collective consensus, i.e. of such an agreement that may be accepted to an
optimal degree by all individuals. It is not an easy task because of the differences
that identify the specific and individual personality, life experiences, and existential
circumstances of each person. Rawls shows the importance of such diversity and
proposes, adequately to the strictly philosophical nature of the social contract
theory, a solution that seems to be far from a practical implementation. It involves
the application of the so-called veil of ignorance when determining the primary
principles of justice. The veil of ignorance allows individuals to take a break from
the sociological situation in which they are at the moment. It means a primary
nullification of their social and professional status, their positions and roles they
play in the social structure. This creates the initial situation, where people are
a relatively isolated set of elements, independent of circumstances and relationships of
a sociological origin. Such "sociological insulation" allows us to create an initial
situation where the possibilities of using private class interests, professional
interests etc. in determining the primary principles of justice are limited.
No one is guided by the so-called class interests when formulating a principle
of justice that is characterised by impartiality. Thus, the concept of justice as
impartiality is a public concept: covering society as a whole, regardless of the
natural differences between individuals. As emphasised by Rawls, "a society is
well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but
when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice"2.
The consequence of the author's philosophical reflection is to derive practical
principles of justice from the abstract idea of human intuition, as the power to
express judgements that are arbitrary but significant in its effects. Here, the
abstraction realm expressed in judgements a priori pervades the practice of social
life in the form of general principles of justice. It is the transition from theory to
practice. The initial situation and the veil of ignorance are the theoretical
foundation of the theory of justice as impartiality. Thus, Rawls's theory, as well as
the long tradition of social contract theory, reflects the power required for the
formation of social practice. The need to move from theory to practice, especially
in concepts of social structures was expressively articulated by Jürgen Habermas:
"No theory and no enlightenment can take off our shoulders the burden of the risk
of involvement in one of the sides and the unintended consequences of this
involvement. Attempts at emancipation, which are also attempts to implement the
utopian content of cultural traditions, can be interpreted as a practical necessity,
pointing to the conflicts generated by the system (which must be explained by
theory) and the avoidable suffering and repressions"3. Habermas's observation sits
2
J. Rawls, A theory of Justice, translated by M. Panufnik, PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 31.
J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, translated by M. Łukasiewicz, Z. Krasnodębski, Państwowy
Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1983, p. 62.
3
57
KRZYSZTOF DRABIK
well with Rawls's writings on social theory. In an initial situation, it is better to
adopt the principles of justice by an agreement and to implement them in practice,
than to suffer because of the undetermined fundamental principles that should be
the basis for a well-organised society. It is not enough to adopt by agreement
a certain state model (social and political institutions). First, basic principles for
their operation must be formulated. Then the social and institutional structure of
the state will be well organised.
The social contract theory provides a description of the origins of the state. It is
a legitimate institution as long as it is based on an organized social structure; the
state is the people who constitute it. The situation is no different from the socialtheory-based theory of justice as impartiality by Rawls. Principles of justice are not
the product of an external entity, they are the result of an agreement between
people in the initial situation.
The social contract theory is thoroughly imbued with humanism and it is far
from non-human justifications. Therefore, it is people who constitute the state and
the rules for its functioning, they also are responsible for the continuity of the state
and its development. This significant attribute of the social contract theory was
highlighted by Thomas Hobbes in the following words: "Though nothing can be
immortal which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to,
their Commonwealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internal
diseases. For by the nature of their institution, they are designed to live as long as
mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life.
Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine
disorder, the fault is not in men as they are the matter, but as they are the makers
and orderers of them"4.
The security principle in the tradition of the social contract
The initial situation derived by Rawls from the tradition of the social contract
in order to formulate a theory of justice as impartiality is an important
interpretation of the reflection on the security problem. The deductive method and
the high level of abstraction of the social contract discussion provides a basis for
the formulation of assumptions and theses that will also determine human
existence, survival and development. It should be emphasised that the adoption of
the primary rules in the hypothetical initial situation can adequately reflect the
method of reasoning in search of safe forms of existence. This is about transferring
the social contract method onto the broader platform of security considerations.
In the social contract tradition, state-building concepts prevail, in which the
hypothetical state of nature gives way to a rational agreement that includes basic
functioning principles of a social (political) community. Legal norms, institutions,
4
58
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, translated by Cz. Znamierowski, PWN, Warszawa 1954, p. 285.
power - all these are the product of an agreement between individuals who are
aware of the fact that greater benefits can be achieved in a political society than in
the atomised state of nature.
In the history of the social contract concept there are two mainstreams, which,
on the one hand, present a strict state-building character (the theory of Hobbes,
Rousseau, Locke), while on the other hand, illustrate the ethical dimension, which
appears in Rawls's theory of justice. I call the first one - the social-contract-trend,
and the other one - the pre-social-contract trend. From the philosophical point of
view, we can see here a hierarchy, a process of deductive analysis, of transiting
from the ethical matter (general) to the political matter (specific).
Formulation of the theory of justice in the initial situation is the first step to
create other agreements of political provenance. And so, the method of creating
a socio-institutional state depends on the adopted initial criterion, which is the
theory of justice as impartiality. This ethical initial basis introduces the parties to
the next stage of social contract tools.
As previously mentioned, the primary theory of justice and the secondary
theory of the social contract are differentiated by the degree of abstraction. While
traditional political agreements could be considered to be abstract, the theory of
justice presents a higher level of abstraction. Importantly, the criterion of
abstraction concerns the method of reaching a consensus, which results in a certain
social contract. The content of this agreement is by all means of a practical nature.
This distinction highlights the common ground for theory and practice. It's about
finding a theoretical method to determine the initial principles that should be in
force in a well-organised society.
Morality as a regulator of the functioning of social groups is the foundation for
other regulations – legal, economic, political, cultural etc. So the ethical pre-socialcontract trend lays down rules for the classical social-contract-trend. This
observation is important when defining security based on the theory of the social
contract. So how do we combine the reflection on the ethical and political
mainstream with the general theory of human security?
Security in philosophical terms is a dignified form of existence, which allows
survival and the continuation of this existence. It is necessary to specify the
elements contributing to the creation of a dignified existence form. With regard to
the social contract theory, a dignified existence form is shaped by the
implementation of ethical principles of justice and social contract related sociopolitical agreements. The desired level of security is achieved by a man on the
ethical and socio-political basis. Security is genetically related to ethical and social
principles. Development of security is not possible without the adoption of an
ethical and socio-political context. In this perspective it seems reasonable to
distinguish a third trend in the tradition of the social contract - the post-socialcontract trend where security is a general result of the consensus reached by
parties.
59
KRZYSZTOF DRABIK
Development of human security is a rational act of changing the environment
and one's dispositions in such a way that it covers the needs for existence, survival
and development to the utmost. So, it is not a process independent from individual
intentions5. In reflecting on security, the subject, his choices and rational volitional
acts are the important factors. Rawls brings the realm of morality, as an evolving
social and natural phenomena, to a rational ethical contract, which is a specified
and primary point of reference for secondary social and political contracts. The
primary and undefinable morality in view of the theory of justice is gaining
a particular ethical dimension. From multi-faceted moral judgements, the parties
negotiate precise primary rules for further, more detailed, contracts. Thus, ethics is
the foundation for regulations of the social structure, for both righteous institutions
and righteous human deeds. The pre-social-contract ethical principle shapes the
social-contract political principle, which in turn creates an area of human security
within a post-social-contract principle of security. A secure (dignified) existence
form and development of an individual is possible on an ethical and political
foundation. The abstract hierarchy of these principles is presented below:
The pre-social-contract principle
(the theory of justice as impartiality)
the need for security
morality
The social-contract principle
(the theory of the social contract)
The post-social-contract principle
(the principle of security)
In this approach, security as a rational and practical act of creating safe
existence, survival and development is a secondary element to the ethical and
political contract. There can be no security without ethical, social and legal
foundation. Similarly, you can not refer to principles of justice, if no laws are in
force (natural and positive). This ontological hierarchy is presented in social
contract theories, among which the most expressive one is the theory of Hobbes.
The natural state is a war of all against all, no one can feel safe. Only the
5
I leave out here the factors of randomness and random natural forces, which are the
determinants of security beyond the control of human activity.
60
establishment of legal norms on the basis of a contract between an individual and
his sovereign and other individuals creates a safe form of existence. Hobbes
confirms the thesis that the social-contract principle is primary to the security
principle.
Security in a psychological and praxeological sense
The concept of security as a human need should be distinguished from the
concept of security as a practical effect of human activities. The natural need for
existence and development is primary to other higher-order needs. The need for
security is an integral part of existence and regardless of external circumstances, it
directs the way an individual acts. Also in the state of nature, individuals seek to
maximize security, but due to the lack of a normative system, or the non-genuine
implementation thereof, the need for security is not satisfied adequately to the
actual expectations.
Security perceived as a need defines the motivational realm and provides the
basis to take adequate steps to satisfy this need. From the point of view of our
discussion, the practical dimension of security is important in the form of actual
regulations regulating the dignified form of existence and the development of an
individual. The practical trend in defining the concept of security leads to the
satisfying of the security needs by the pre-social-contract ethical principle (the
principle of justice) and the social-contract socio-political principle.
The need for survival and development would be possible to implement in
a hypothetical world of atomised individuals, whose areas of freedom have no
points of contact. In this case, ethical, social, and political principles, and finally
principles of security in the described sense would not play any role in the life of
autonomous individuals. However, the aim is to establish such a normative system
(security system), which takes into account the natural social dispositions of
individuals and the interpenetration of areas of individual freedom. Locke
interestingly presented the issue of autonomy and the inevitability of the
conclusion of the social contract. When individuals can make use of free natural
resources for example by adopting new areas of land for cultivation, it is not
necessary to comply with contractual standards. However, when natural resources
run out, then it is necessary to establish rules for the distribution of these resources.
The core of social contract theories is the assumption a priori about the need to
create organised social structures which, by their nature, but also because of the
objective situation, strive to create a safe system of interdependence. These
interdependencies are typical for every social community. The aim is for the social
system to be safe, and it can be achieved by consensual agreement on ethical and
socio-political grounds.
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KRZYSZTOF DRABIK
Conclusion
An important ascertainment in the reflection on security, in view of social
contract theories, is the thesis that the primary need for human existence, survival
and development is determined by the post-social-contract security principle. And
so, the need for safe existence and growth takes an actual real form in
arrangements of the ethical and socio-political dimension. The will to survive
reaches its apogee in the social contract that creates an area of collective security.
The signatories of the ethical and socio-political contract satisfy their primary need
for security in real conditions of collective existence. Here, the primary need is
satisfied in the practice of the social creation of security. The desire to exist,
survive and develop finds its form in security contracts.
The ascertainment that defines security as a post-social-contract element makes
the concept of security more psychological and sociological in nature. Security in
the perspective of social contract theory has two meanings: personal and structural.
This includes both an individual and institutional dimension of safe existence and
development. In a social structure, personal individual rights to be safe are
important, as well as a system of just institutions, creating structural environment
of security.
The post-social-contract principle indicates the unidirectional nature of the
shape of security. It concerns the initial conditions in the process of creating
security. As already pointed out by Aristotle, a person can become fully operational
only in a self-sufficient institution such as state. A state satisfies all human needs
and to go beyond the jurisdiction of the state means to fall beyond the security area,
not only the structural, but also the personal security area. An individual outside
the social structure is not safe, not only because of the lack of self-sufficient and
protective institutions, but primarily because of shortage of psychological stimuli.
The phenomenon of social isolation is not just about a hypothetical situation of
existence outside a state, but it concerns the actual situation of many people, living
in a society, but suffering from their inability to satisfy their need for affiliation.
Thus, being a member of a social group has a strict psychological grounding and it
creates a naturalistic justification for the legitimacy of social contract concepts.
Primary social dispositions, even in the form of affiliation needs, create the initial
dispositions of individuals to be a party to the social contract. These dispositions
are conducive for the formation of security that reaches its optimum in the social
structure created on the basis of an ethical and socio-political contract.
62
THE BUILDING OF KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Lt. Col. Jarosław JABŁOŃSKI
THE BUILDING OF KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY
IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Abstract
Despite indications in the National Security Strategy of the inter-exchange of
experiences as part of the integration of security systems, the Lessons Learned System has
only the Ministry of Home Affairs (The Bank of Best Practices in the Police) and the
Ministry of Defence (The Polish Armed Forces Lessons Learned System). However, there is
not a national system (structure, process, tools) that could integrate all national security
entities through a process of knowledge sharing. Structure dedicated professionals in the
structures of national security entities using a unified knowledge management process and
modern communication technology can play an integration role of national security entities
by building capacity in the area of national security.
Key words – national security, knowledge management systems, lessons learned
system
Introduction
The ability to process large amounts of information (knowledge), obtained as
a result of activities in the field of national security has increased significantly
since it was decided to start using in the process of information systems. Recently,
it has been more evident that the belief that in addition to an exclusive collection of
dry data and information, and the subsequent analysis of the entities responsible for
maintaining security, it becomes necessary to achieve progressively higher and
higher levels in this area, by the merger and subsequent use in practice of two key
factors. Theoretical knowledge and experience nurtured by the work (service) in
units of national security. Both of these ingredients, when they are integrally linked
in an inseparable whole and continuously updated will have an increasing impact
on the security of each state. Unfortunately, experience shows that very often
a large part of the theoretical knowledge and previous experience is irretrievably
lost because of the routine treatment with standard methods and tools for
knowledge management.
Practically since the mid-1990s, the degree of participation of military
structures responsible for the security of the Polish crisis, conflict and military
operations has been increasing. One of the desirable effects of this is the generation
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JAROSŁAW JABŁOŃSKI
of an unprecedented amount of observation and experience acquired by the staff of
these structures. At the same time it becomes a major challenge due to the fact that
knowledge and experience acquired as a result of daily practice are located almost
exclusively in the minds of the staff of the national security structures. Hence, it
becomes very difficult or even impossible to collect, manage, and transfer the need
for security policies and provide for the next generation. The vast majority of
information collected is too often irretrievably lost, causing the frequent repetition
of the same mistakes in the practical realisation of the next national security policy
objectives. The large fluctuations of personnel in the security structures are
a natural process. For instance, one of the most common reasons for the resignation
of the most experienced security staff is significant physical exhaustion, as a result
of the service (work) in very serious and complex conditions. When we add, the
general reluctance of young people to the wider bureaucracy (and as such they
consider including the creation of procedures, training programs, reports,
proposals, studies, etc.), resulting in activation of the mentioned factors, we will
receive a significant cause of the loss of the wider potential in national security
structures.
In addition to the material potential (in military terms it is called a combat
potential), a significant component of the value of each structure responsible for
national security and one of the major elements of its characteristics is the
intellectual potential. Hence, the members of structures implementing national
security policy objectives at the tactical level, very often acting in a hostile and
isolated environment in terms of safety and time constraints, must temporarily and
independently make decisions of varying difficulty and complexity, based only on
their own knowledge and their intellectual potential.
This process can take place through appropriate techniques and methods of
knowledge management and can be distinguished by the Lessons Learned System
(LLS). The LLS has a relatively short history, dating back to the early 1990s. The
need for the development of knowledge management was first seen by consulting
firms, treating knowledge as a product. They quickly began to create a repository
containing the experience and expertise of their consultants, in such companies as:
Knowledge Curve (Pricewaterhouse Coopers) Kworld (KPMG), Knowledge
Xchange (Andersen). Over the next few years, the knowledge management process
found a permanent place in the structure of the U.S. military and NATO. In the
meantime, because of the enormous development of information technology, the
creation of knowledge management systems was a natural result. National security
elements, using knowledge management systems supported by new technology,
helped to avoid some mistakes.
This type of problem while taking care of knowledge from national security
activities was also faced in the Polish defence system by Armed Forces. The Polish
Armed Forces must be able to manage large volumes of knowledge and
information inside their structure and outside to the NATO LLS. There was the
64
urgent need for the development of a process of using experience, to be able to
enhance the efficiency of national security. This meant forcing the Polish political
and military decision-makers to focus on the creation mechanism of drawing
conclusions from the experience gained so far, mainly in order to achieve a higher
level of management reporting to national security structures.
Development of appropriate processes and creating effective mechanisms for
implementing lessons requires a comprehensive engagement in the entire country
with all national security actors. Interdepartmental cooperation, based on the
relevant exchange system will allow the increase of the level of their performance
in the framework of the Polish security system. One of the significant positive
effects of this system is the building of the LLS, which should support the saving
of time and money for all those involved in the future of the national security
system.
None of the national security entities (Police, the Polish Armed Forces) has
LLS with leading characteristics and cannot be considered as a standard tool.
However, the process of LLS creation has started. Although it still requires the
development of many more organisational projects, in order to obtain the required
quality. So, there is a kind of indisputable need for the experience of countries that
already have such systems, in the final phase of construction of the Polish National
LLS (POL N LLS) to use the experience to achieve the expected results.
One of characteristic feature of the present time is the rapid development of the
IT sector, with particular emphasis on the use of networked interactive cooperation.
It provides some kind of universal access to the means and methods of data
collection, processing, and exchange of experience. It means that they are
distributed with rapid access to the information. A properly designed and build
LLS may allow wide access by the security structures and security Subject Matter
Experts, in order to achieve some level of synergy in improving national security
policy. On the other hand, digitisation does not solve the problem. However, it can
allow the efficiently and timely exchange of experience between national security
organisations. This kind of approach will be legitimate to draw attention to the use
of LLS as a knowledge management tool, in order to obtain the improved
efficiency of security policy.
During the world economic crisis, when many countries started to look for an
increase in the efficiency of their own security systems, knowledge management
tools and the integration of security structures were common practices. An
appropriately added LLS could help to achieve the next level of integration of
distributed safety systems, which is required both by politicians and security
agents, realising their specific goals. The modern LLS relies on electronic systems,
allowing a quick exchange of knowledge between policy makers establishing the
scope of security policy goals and the providers of these goals. It is essential to
obtain information superiority and to create the right conditions for conducting
high-quality, network-centric national security policy. It is therefore important that
65
the actions of each player in the national security system, characterised by farreaching synergies arising from the cooperation, are based on the joint use of the
knowledge acquired within the National LLS.
Current status
The current "National Polish Security Strategy" from 2007 (SBN 2007) draws
attention to the state decision-making bodies and the use by them of all available
opportunities aimed at improving the safety and integrated approach to the national
security system. Hence, the integration of national security has to be based on:
competencies, skills and expertise of people working in the various sub-systems,
interdepartmental cooperation in scale, tightening the bonds of alliance and
implementation of solutions for workforce management and the use of interinstitutional exchange.
Although SBN 2007 has a very high level of generality, the creation of the
Integrated National Security System (INSS) indicates some factors determining the
efficiency of an integrated security system. The exchange of knowledge between
security organisations efficiently is one of the five determinants of an efficient
integrated national security system. Additionally, the sharing of knowledge in the
field of security allows the harmonisation of military cooperation and civil entities
of an integrated national security system. What is more important, we have three
areas of national security, nine sectors and more than 30 entities dedicated to work
in an integrated national security system. It is advisable at this point to draw
attention to SBN 2007: “(...) a fully integrated national security system requires (…
the state to ...) continue to improve communication between all elements of the
system, and thus the existence of the requirement to integrate all those national
security by means of modern communication.”
Returning to the efficiency factors of an integrated national security system, the
process of exchange of expertise and experience between the elements of the
national security system must be made not only in one particular area but also
between the same parties of the security sector, as well as the end of the entire
security system. It is vital for the security management subsystem, which should be
based on mutual trust between the people working (serving) in its structure, who
have to have both access to the knowledge databases and rights to share their
knowledge.
Stanislaw Koziej pinpointed what “(...) should be especially strongly
emphasised is the need for an integrated civil-military approach to the construction
of national security management system (...) the era of an exclusively specialised
departmental approach has long since ended. Thinking in terms of government
departments is perhaps appropriate in other spheres of activity of the state, but not
in regard to security. (…).”
66
For such purposes at the national level it is time to build an inter-agency
structure working closely to the state’ decision-maker and holding together the
whole strategic effort of national security instruments. When considering only one
of the factors in the smooth functioning of an integrated national security system
(inter-institutional exchange of experience), it turns out that there is a requirement
of the exercise of administrative, organisational and proper approach in the field of
interpersonal relationships (i.e., willingness to share such negative experiences).
The proper functioning of an integrated national security system is first necessary
for harmonious co-operation based on knowledge management within a single
subsystem (i.e the utilisation of the Armed Forces experiences) and after that to
achieve the same quality level in interagency cooperation and finally at the
strategic and political level. As was mentioned above, the feature belongs to the
multi-stakeholder approach to national security, the process of building and
integrating security subsystems, including the system to use the experiences.
Integration of national security entails a need for a broader type of action to
transform existing structures, policies and rules that should be focused primarily on
improving its efficiency. At the end of SBN 2007 the authors point to the need for
the transformation of the security system and subsystem targeting both national
security and the military executive subsystems to the level of multi-department.
This process required the development of the Polish security system and entailed
the introduction of various integration activities involving all safety system entities.
As a minimum is should include: integration management system (at all levels),
professionalization of specialised subsystems and widespread regulations for the
safety of the preparation (activation of the local authorities).
Particularly, the integration of management systems in the national security
system in accordance with the views of Stanislaw Koziej should be accelerated and
include: (...) a higher level of consolidation, namely integration in the sphere of
national security – a unified opposition to any threat (military and non-military,
internal and external – and capture opportunities, take on challenges and reduce
risks in all of these dimensions), with the system using all (military and civilian)
resources of the state.
Integration of multi-stakeholder security system becomes one of the new
challenges of the security system. However, maintaining a uniform direction in
ensuring the safety of the security held by a multi-stakeholder system requires the
organiser to carry out periodic reviews. Therefore, many countries have decided to
organise a strategic review of national security, as a tool for verifying the security
of its policies and to identify future directions of its development.
Another common point with the Polish National Security Planning (according
to SBN 2007) is the requirement of transformation processes in all national security
instruments. In accordance with “The Polish National Strategic Review” (2011) the
transformation process is indicated as a strategic objective of the authorities and
public administration. The main determinant of the transformation is the permanent
67
changing of the security environment. The transformation required the activity of
all national security subsystems with the main focus on the transformation of the
military subsystem. Just as was the case in SBN 2007 in the exchange of
experience, the SOP 2011 emphasises the importance of Transformation is a longterm process, using advances in technology and modern methods of management
and control of the armed forces. The following tools are used in transformation: the
development of new concepts and their verification through experimentation,
defence planning based on the development of skills and experience to use the
system.
Both, SBN 2007 and “The Polish Defence Strategy of 2009” (SO 2009)
pointed out on the exchange of experiences as a significant part of the national
security transformation process which have to take place in military instruments.
There is an unquestionable need to carry out the future development of the armed
forces (transformation) and it has to support knowledge- based activities. Such an
approach requires military and civilian decisions taken by the government, which
will include searching appropriate mechanisms and procedures for harmonising the
activities of all entities involved in security operation on strategic, operational and
tactical levels.
The Polish Armed Forces LLS
The Polish Armed Forces Lessons Learned System (AF LLS) has been initiated
with the development of “The First Strategic Defence Review” in 2007. Despite
the existence for many years in the AF LLS of reporting mechanisms using After
Action Procedures it was found that there was not proper promotion of, and
sometimes even negligible, experience sharing and observation from the
participation of Polish Armed Forces in military operations.
The process of collecting applications and the experience of the work carried
out, both analytical and planning, working on the introduction of the Armed Forces
resulted in some residual system solutions. The lack of a systematic approach
caused in certain Ministry of Defence structures a decrease of efficiency of
functioning.
The major reason for such a situation was a lack of dedicated structure for
knowledge management in the Ministry of Defence and what is more important the
limited use of modern knowledge management tools. The Armed Forces LLS
construction started in parallel, leading the legislative, regulatory documents,
including creating and conducting an analysis of already existing systems in the
world. Legislative work was based on the Organisational Regulations and Defence
Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces in 2007-2012.
The basis of the system construction was issued by the Chief of the General
Staff, Polish Army, in an order dated February 2007, which was the first formal
68
step in the construction of the so-called The System of Collection and
Dissemination of Experience (SCDE). The order stated the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Polish Army was the primary supervisor of the implementation
and operation of the SCDE, with particular emphasis on the participation of the
Armed Forces in military operations outside the country. It is assumed that there is
a need for an annual assessment of the effects of the system, with the main
emphasis on the identification of military operational areas requiring further
improvement.
An important part of that order was to include into the SCDE process several
departments of Defence: Transition, Budget, Foreign Affairs and Military
Armament Policy. Hence, for the construction of the theoretical assumptions of the
system the National Defence Academy was actively enrolled. The first phase
covered 2007 and consisted of the collection and dissemination of conclusions and
experiences of the Polish Military Contingents (PMC) abroad. At the tactical level
abroad, military units identified problems and experience and deployed
applications in three areas of interest: operations outside the country, training and
exercises. From 2007 the SCDE system did not have a dedicated organisational
structure to perform the tasks, the participants in the system were all organisational
units of the Armed Forces, supervised by the Training Branch (P-7) of the General
Staff. In the second phase, implemented in 2008, there was an expansion in the
number of system’s areas of interest and the range of data collection from national
and international training and ongoing military operations.
The next step was to establish, by order of the Chief of General Staff (August
2008), a Working Group with the main responsibility to prepare, organise and
implement the modern AF LLS. The Working Group developed the "Concept of
AF LLS," which contained a main development direction of the system based on
both a full-time and training structure and unified LL process. The Concept was
released on 17 June 2009 by the Chief of General Staff, with the previous changes
in the SCDE to the LLS, and what is more important additions in order to
determine the national usability. Hence, the Concept made a strong impetus in the
AF LLS for the interdepartmental cooperation in the national security system and
the NATO LLS.
In order to maintain interoperability with NATO LLS, the development of the
AF LLS was based on the guidelines contained in the policy documents of the
Alliance (Bi-SC Directive Lessons Learned (LL) Directive 80-6 and NATO
Lessons Learned Policy). Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendations
contained in the "Vision of the Polish Armed Forces - 2030", for responding to
urgent requirements for improving the operational capacity of the AF and how to
carry out the process of the unification of analytical research in the Armed Forces,
the AF LLS is a system corresponding to the above recommendations.
According to the normative documents, improving the functioning of the AF in
times of peace, crisis and war in the light of experience is the main goal of AF
69
LLS. The result of the application of LLS in the Armed Forces should be a formal
change in the areas of operational capabilities. The utilisation of the result of the
LL Process (LLP) is implementing changes in the following functional components:
D – doctrine, O – organisation (structure), T – training, M – armament and military
equipment, L – Leadership, P – staff, F-infrastructure, I – interoperability.
The national structure for AF LLS was supervised by the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, and since 1 January 2012, when it reached full operational
capability, the Doctrine and Training Centre of The Armed Forces (DTC AF) in
Bydgoszcz. Additionally, the Centre performs the function of the organiser and
coordinator of the system and is responsible for conducting the Armed Forces LL
Central Database (CBD).
According to the doctrinal documents the process of building on experience
was based on the assumptions used in the NATO LLP. Identification of the
observation begins the process of building on the experience. The LL cells report
observations of a need to make changes in the areas of interest. The observations
are consolidated and approved in the form of research problems and are included in
the Priority Requirements Analytical List; classified with a fixed priority (called
the Prioritised List of Analysis Requirements). Observations of changes needed to
be made in areas of the strategic-level military structures are reported to Chief of
General Staff by the DTC AF by organisational units of the Ministry of Defence
cells inside the General Staff, Armed Forces Operational Command, Command of
the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, Inspectorate of Military
Health Service and the Military Police Headquarters.
The analysis process consists of five phases designed to translate an observation
into lessons learned. On the national level each phase is implemented by the
Department of Dissemination Applications and Lessons the DTC AF.
After the initial phase, the Chief of General Staff (or the Operational Command
Commander or respectively by the Commander of the Armed Forces Service
Branch, the Support Inspectorate of AF, the Commander of the Military Police, the
Inspectorate of Military Health Service, the Inspectorate of Military Health
Service) accepts a final report submitted by the Chief Executive Board of the DTC
AF. Additionally, this phase determines, or makes it, the responsibility of the
parent institution of the Contractor to assign appropriate corrective actions.
The second phase is carried out to determine the effectiveness of corrective
actions and determine whether the observation need of the LLP has been
eliminated in accordance with the successive stages of the process, including
corrective actions. The Verification may require additional examination in order to
correct and achieve the effectiveness of planned corrective actions. Implementation
of the second phase of the cell also indicates the use of experience. The process
also participates in another part of the structure of the DTC AF: the Experiment
and Implementation Branch, or in appropriate cases at the request of the head of
the cell. It uses the experiences of different organisational unit (internal) of the AF.
70
The completion process is to implement changes, which improve operational
capabilities (solving the problem). The LLS is supported by computer software at
all phases of process management, database management and dissemination of
experiences. The LLS personnel acuities and the DTC AF cell perform their tasks
based on the work plan for the year, which is draw from the Priority Research
Letters (created once a year and verified every six months).
The Priority List is approved by the Head of Research of the DTC AF. The
General Staff is reported to the DTC AF about proposals of research problems and
informed about all national and operational levels of MoD institutions. At the
operational level the Priority Analysis List is approved by the appropriate
operational level commander. The list is drawn up on the basis of observations and
proposals for research problems raised by internal units Command (Inspectorate
Headquarters) organisational units subordinate to the tactical level (including
sections' and specialists' experience) and senior managers. The way to implement
the identification of problems and experiences, and the implementation of remedial
programs specifies all structural elements, such as functional Operational
Commander of the AF and is supervised by the DTC AF.
The cooperation at the MoD level consists of four areas: a transformation
cooperation with the department for a proposals preparation in order to reach the
requirements of the Priority Analysis List (developed by the DTC AF); the DTC
AF cooperation with the stockholder of the project; as requested, a share of
information contained in the CBD AF LL Armed Forces; and as required, and use
of expert knowledge and the exchange of information on ongoing projects.
The Polish AF dedicated structure consists of three levels. At the strategic level
is the Dissemination Division of Applications and Experiences in the DTC AF. At
the operational level (Land Forces Command, Headquarters Air Force, Naval
Command, Special Forces Command, Operations Command, Inspectorate Support
of AF, Military Health Service Inspectorate, Military Police Headquarters) there
has been organised since 2008, a Branches and Departments Use of Experience. At
the tactical level in the initial period (2008-2010), is an almost not existent
dedicated structure of the AF LLS. Tasks resulting from the implementation of the
tasks in the AF LLS at the tactical level are carried out in departments responsible
for training.
71
Conclusion
At present The Polish Armed Forces are a leading player in the security system
for the construction site and the development of their intellectual potential.
Becomes justify continuation of this process to the next phase to create such
a platform for mutual cooperation of security entities, which will enable the fast
exchange of experiences and the implementation of all stakeholders, including the
military and non-military.
With respect to our country it is very important, that despite the many projects
involving the Polish system, still the use of experience differs from the standards
experienced by more experienced countries, although the analysis shows that the
use of the implemented Polish system already shows dividends. Also, the economic
crisis that gripped our country, means that the resources devoted to security are
unfortunately limited. Hence, building the National LLS, which in itself does not
require large amounts of money, and, under the requirements of today's global
political realities must find support among the decision-makers in whose favour it
will operate. It is also necessary to further modernise, and as the present needs of
the development of new procedures, mechanisms and tools that will enable a more
efficient use of knowledge in strengthening the security of Poland and its citizens.
Each system, including even the best acting in the national security community
has a certain amount of chaos. Hence, the need for an overarching structure for the
coordination of interaction processes, which therefore can be more effectively used
by the leading security policy.
And the meaning of Experience Exploitation System (SWD) is best illustrated
by comparing it to one of the many links in the chain called "the Polish security"
while observing the rule paraphrased William James, "a chain is only as strong as
its weakest link ...". Therefore, in the interest of every citizen of our country it
should be that SWD, as one of the many links of the national security system, gets
stronger.
However, even the greatest knowledge management systems, which have the
largest current information processing capabilities and the best performance
indicators are virtually useless if they are not sufficiently reliable. Even the best
system, if it has cyclical failures, is worse than the one that works reliably,
although it is inferior in terms of performance. Specific requirements for a system
involving the use of experience, working for national security, should be based
primarily on well-designed knowledge management processes.
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73
ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY OF
POLAND RELATED WITH THE
REGIONALIZATION OF UKRAINE
Andrzej ZAPAŁOWSKI, Ph.D.
Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
Abstract
The article discusses the relevant safety of the Polish political and social conditions in
Ukraine, which may significantly increase the instability in Central Europe in the near
future.
At the moment, Poland, as in the past, being kind of the geopolitical lock limiting
Russia’s influence to Central and Eastern Europe, is particularly vulnerable to various
measures.
Russia, in deliberately and consciously way, is rebuilding its empire to establish the
privileged position in Eastern Europe. The current Kremlin’s actions are slightly alarming,
since they are taking place in the time when the NATO and the European Union, on which
the Polish fundamentally security is based, are becoming weaker.
Taking into consideration the rapidly changing situation by the Eastern Polish Border,
there are necessary actions to take, which will redefine the policy of the Polish National
Security as well as by influencing the European Union and the NATO, will allow us to
maintain our position in Central Europe
In the face of varying international situation, it is required to change the essential
establishment of the National Security Strategy in favor to Poland.
Key words – security, Poland, Ukraine
One of the paradigms of security is predictability and surprise, as well as the
constant variability of the geopolitical conditions, especially in the regions with
highly variable borders. There are no stable states, no stable alliances, no durable
strategies, especially in terms of the geopolitical conditions of Poland. In this case,
the issue of adapting the Polish security strategy to those changing conditions is of
crucial importance.
Apart from the Balkans, it is mainly Central-Eastern Europe that has been the
area in Europe with many changes in borders over the last two hundred years. The
purpose of this article is to present the main challenges related with the possible
74
CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY OF POLAND RELATED WITH THE REGIONALIZATION OF UKRAINE
changes of the internal situation in Ukraine, and their influence on the state of
Polish security in terms of the strategic shield1.
The text below constitutes a general analysis of the geopolitical situation in
Ukraine, and indicates the possible scenarios for the development of the situation
in that country. Naturally, the most favourable situation for Polish security would
be the maintenance of the current state and territorial structure of Ukraine.
However, Polish state interests require that the suitable steps related with state
security are taken on the basis of the possible, and in some cases – probable,
scenarios of events in Ukraine.
A shift in the geopolitics of security in Eastern Europe
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and later – after Poland joined, in
institutional terms, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the geography of
international security in Eastern Europe changed. The decisive moment for the loss
of the superpower position of Russia was when Belarus, and especially Ukraine,
became liberated from under its direct supremacy. For Poland, the appearance of
new states on one hand created an area in the east that would provide the longexpected strategic shield, and on the other – forced the responsible support of the
new state on its way to independent existence. Thus, the geopolitical situation of
Warsaw changed over a very short period of time. Poland was forced to actively
participate in the construction of the new mass security system in Europe,
especially through the process of reorienting the main political and military
alliances, and on the other hand – to participate in strengthening the process of
stabilization in independent Ukraine, which at that time was a nuclear power.
For Poland, similarly to the majority of states in the world, the independence
referendum of 1991 was a big surprise2. The fact that the majority of the society,
consisting of many nations and largely using the Russian language, was in favour
of independence for Ukraine, demonstrated the internal separatist tendencies of that
region inhabited by about twelve million ethnic Russians, inside the Soviet Union.
1
The strategic shield refers to military and non-military undertakings and includes the operation
performed constantly during both periods of peace and crisis as security against surprise attacks and
other forms of violence [quoted from:] R. Jakubczak, J. Marczak, K. Gąsiorek, Założenia polityki i
strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego [Assumptions of the national security policy and strategy.] [in:]
Podstawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski w erze globalizacji [The fundaments of the Polish
national security in the era of globalization] , Warsaw 2008, p. 130.
2
84.18% of the citizens of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic took part in the referendum of
1 December 1991. 90.32% of the votes were for independence. The Crimea was the only place where
the percentage of the “for” votes was different from the Ukrainian average – it was 54.19%.
75
ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
This also demonstrated the first tendencies of division inside the new state
organism in the form of the independence of the Crimea3.
The significant error, of the then world leaders, was the assumption that those
tendencies constituted the intention of isolating a new social organism, a kind of
society for which the Ukrainian identity was the chance to establish an independent
state structure that would identify itself more through the Ukrainian state than
through its Ukrainian ethnicity. The perspective of the Ukrainian state in the minds
of its respective parts, was underestimated. What is more, for the Ukrainian
politicians the state self-identification was confronted with the national selfidentification (with its main headquarters in western Ukraine). With the passing of
time, that inconsistency came to fruition causing a situation when several million
Ukrainians from the western regions took up an impossible task, i.e. on one hand,
to nationalize the Ukrainians from central Ukraine by implementing the tradition of
the Cossacks into its catalogue of Ukrainian identity, and on the other – “to
convert” about twelve million Russians in the east and south to ethnic Ukrainian
identity. The demographic, economic, and especially cultural potential of the
Ukrainians from the west did not allow that concept to win, because it was not
possible to implement it over several decades. Also the historical and identityrelated experiences, especially related with the legacy of the first half of 20th
century, played a significant role.
Another mistake that caused a situation of instability in Ukraine was when the
United States and the Western European countries entered the struggle for political
and economic influence which, especially after the expansion of NATO in 1999,
was interpreted by Russia as the attempt to restore a military block in Ukraine
which would downgrade the position of Moscow as a significant participant in
global political relationships. We did not have to wait long until Russia undertook
countermeasures. The use of the energy-political threat became an inherent part of
the expectations of the Russian minority and of the Russian-speaking society which
was downgraded to the level of a russified social group by the new personnel
mainly from western Ukraine. Moreover, Russia gave the chance to cooperate in its
new economy to the new group of oligarchs from the eastern regions of that
country, giving them a certain guarantee of establishing their own capital groups
through the privatized main sectors of Ukrainian economy. For Russia it was a
guarantee of maintaining significant influences in most areas of Ukraine. What is
more, Kiev’s policy to maintain proportional relationships with NATO and Russia,
prolonged for two decades, resulted in larger divisions in the society of the former
Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Instead of integrating the society on the basis of the
historical and cultural values important for both groups, the state allowed, and
often participated in, the designation of new areas of division.
3
The autonomy of that region was proclaimed in 1991. In view of the risk of secession, the
Ukrainian authorities consented to the autonomy proclaimed on 5 May 1992 and granted the republic
the status of an autonomous region.
76
Another factor that had a negative influence on the deregulation of the social
situation in Ukraine, was the influence of the diaspora, usually Canadian Diaspora
which tried to introduce in Ukraine, through various circles in that country, the
various ideas which had lost currency while confronted with the reality of a few
decades years earlier. That state and formative anachronism resulted in deepened
divisions in reference to the World War II tradition which is crucial for Ukrainian
society, which actually resulted in the establishment of a political and territorial
organism that had not been known in the history of the Ukrainian statehood. It is
mainly the attitude of the western regions of Ukraine to the tradition of the
“Patriotic War” which was identified as the beginning of the occupation of Ukraine
by the Soviet military. That state resulted in a situation when, in popular opinion, at
least twelve million Ukrainian citizens actually became the society identified with
the hated Soviet invader. This division gave birth to new divisions, especially
political ones. For millions of Russian-speaking Ukrainians outside the cultural
magnet, Russia became not only a natural ally, but mainly an important political
centre in the world, which centre stood up for the cultural values of that
community, while at the same time their own country became increasingly foreign.
A change of the geostrategic order in Eastern Europe at the beginning
of 21st century
At present Poland, just like in the past, is especially exposed to various
activities resulting from the fact that it constitutes a geopolitical threshold for
Russia, which reduces the influences of that state in Central and Eastern Europe. At
present Russia continues to dismiss the principles and values of Latin civilization,
as the main quality of its international politics, especially in the situation when the
fight for status and spheres of influence has become again the main issue of
international politics. Russia reconstructs the Russian empire consciously and with
premeditation, and wants to hold a privileged position in Eastern Europe. It
continues to strive to recover the position that was once exceptional in that part of
Europe over the last few centuries. Moscow’s main aim in Eastern Europe is at
least to convert that area into a neutral strategic zone.
The present activities of the Kremlin are very alarming, because they occur in a
period when the NATO and the European Union, on which Polish security is
based, are becoming weaker. The main EU states, among others Germany and
Great Britain, cut expenditure on their military. Last year Germany changed its
military strategy and the priorities of its armed forces4. What is more NATO,
4
J. Gotkowska, Bundeswehra 3.0 polityczny, wojskowy i społeczny wymiar reformy sił
zbrojnych RFN [Bundeswehra 3.0, the political, military and social dimension of the reform of the
military forces of the FRG], Centre for Eastern Studies, Punkt Widzenia No. 28, Warsaw, May 2012.
77
ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
without the crucial logistics and military engagement of the United States, is not
able to perform a large military operation.
After 1990 the main expression of Polish efforts in the international arena was
the issue of entering NATO and the European Union. That main basic direction of
the Polish activities, related with security, has been visible until today in the State
Security Strategy5, in which the guarantee of state security is mainly contingent
upon the defence capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while the
domestic defensive potential plays only a secondary role. That assumption is
completely wrong from the point of view of Polish national interests and
demonstrates that the potential threats to state security are not realistically
addressed by the authors of that document. What follows from it has far-reaching
consequences in the form of the operating plans of the Polish Armed Forces that
are disproportionate (limited) in comparison with the threats6.
Currently, the activities aimed at gaining certain influence over the specific
areas or regions in the world are performed through various methods. They include,
for example: a quasi-war (e.g. Afghanistan), economic activities (e.g. Greece),
influencing and creating the attitudes of the border communities (e.g. eastern
Ukraine), psychological activities (e.g. the repeated referendum on the Lisbon
Treaty in Ireland), activities in cyberspace (e.g. an attack on the Estonian
government servers in 20077). A very interesting tendency in that regard was noted
by General Rupert Smith who stated that: “… at present we are living in
a completely new era of conflicts – maybe even a new paradigm – which I describe
as “the war among civilians”, that is a war which addresses both political and
military issues”8.
In the current geostrategic conditions of European security, Poland continues to
play the role of an important threshold in Central and Eastern Europe. The
threshold which, through its membership in NATO and the EU, successfully blocks
the dissemination of Russian influences in Central Europe. The effectiveness of
those activities in the future will condition the maintenance of the EU’s economic
position at the current level and the cohesion of NATO in terms of its defensive
5
Domestic Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2007.
R. Jakubczak, K. Gąsiorek, H. M. Królikowski, J. Marczak, Działania nieregularne. Element
strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski [Irregular activities. The element of the Polish national
security strategy], Warsaw 2011, pp. 285-291; R. Jakubczak, J. Marczak, Obrona Terytorialna
Polski na progu XXI w. [The Territorial Defense of Poland at the beginning of the 21st century],
Warsaw 1998, pp. 221-224; J. Marczak, Strategiczna ocena działań zmierzających do zniesienia
powszechnej obowiązkowej służby wojskowej w Polsce w 2008 r.[The strategic assessment of the
activities aimed at abolishing the obligatory military service in Poland] [in:] Podstawy
bezpieczeństwa narodowego… [The basics of national security…], appendix 13.
7
K. Popławski, Kiedy science fiction staje się życiem [When science fiction becomes real] [in:]
Nowa Europa Wschodnia No. 3-4/2012, pp. 46-51.
8
R. Smith, Przydatność siły militarnej. Sztuka wojenna we współczesnym świecie [The
usefullness of the military force. The art of war in the modern world.], Warsaw 2010, p.16.
6
78
potential, and through that – the maintenance of a high level of displacement of
other parties in the region.
The current situation of Poland and its function for European security seems to
be more and more complicated. It is influenced on one hand by our engagement in
the Eastern Partnership, and on the other – by the Russian efforts to recover its
crucial position in Ukraine. Although Vladimir Putin devoted the first two terms of
his presidency to recovering economic power, he is currently striving to recover
political influences on the area of the former Soviet Union9.
One of the aims of the reintegration of the mentioned area is the construction of
a Eurasian Union, which is highly probable for Russia in political and economic
terms. For Russia, the country that constituted a civilization on its own and which
wanted to maintain an actual influence on its gigantic territory (the territory being
a peculiar demographic desert), the acquisition of stable influences in the area of
Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, has been a strategic purpose10.
The problem of many politicians and people dealing with international security
is that they perceive Russia and the Asian countries through the European system
of values and culture, which used to be the dominant element of international
relations over the previous centuries when the old continent was the centre of the
world in terms of economy and culture. At present, with the declining position of
Europe, the economic influences of the world have shifted towards Asia. However,
from the previous century, when it used to be a power, Europe retained its rhetoric
and a peculiar manner of “instructing” the world.
What has been an increasingly visible aim of Moscow politics in Europe is,
apart from the political reintegration of the former Soviet republics, the recovery of
Russian influence in Central Europe, whether those countries are members of
NATO or not. Naturally, the effectiveness of that policy requires a limited consent
from the USA.
Poland plays a special role in Russia’s plans by attempting to neutralize
Russian influence in Eastern Europe. Moscow realizes what the position of Poland
in Europe is, despite its small military potential. The main aim is to establish strong
economic relations with European countries so as to not let Russia penetrate the
Polish market in an extensive manner.
The threat of a conflict inside Europe in the foreseeable future is slim, with the
exception of the Balkan states. Russia may not count on such a scenario. Francis
Fukujama11 is party correct by saying that there will be no wars between the states
with stabilized, liberal political systems. He formulated an opinion that the
democratic processes which take place in states with market economies, preclude
9
The leading representatives of that trend in the Russian geopolitics are professors Alexandr
Dugin (originator of the concept of the current Eurasian movement) and Sergey Karaganov
(originator of the Union of Europe and Russia).
10
L. Sawin, Renesans eurazjatyzmu [The renaissance of Eurasianism], Geopolityka No. 6 (9)
2011, pp. 2-8.
11
F. Fukujama, Koniec historii [End of History], Poznań 2000.
79
ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
war. According to the author, that opinion is correct only in reference to the states
of the so-called old Europe. It does not refer to the European countries with fresh
democracy and changing borders, at least in terms of the last two hundred years.
The fight for spheres of influence and for shifting them has reappeared precisely on
the areas where the borders kept changing in the 19th and 20th century. Naturally,
for now this conflict has demonstrated itself as slight economic and social changes.
By restoring its position in the world, Moscow will aim to have its influences
secured at its western borders. The scope of its policy of confrontation outside the
area of former Soviet republics, will be limited.
The whole picture is complicated by the changing American strategies and
priorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the meeting in Lisbon
in November 2010, the NATO member states adopted a new strategy that stated
that Russia’s position is significant in terms of consultations related with the
construction of new weapon systems, especially the anti-missile defence system of
the NATO12. As Bolesław Balcerowicz stated, that document is the result of from
many compromises, and compromise is its trademark13.
The significance of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the above strategy
has a realistic meaning only if the societies of the NATO states are willing to
implement it. As early as during the Russian-Georgian war, the then prime minister
of the Netherlands stated publically that if Georgia belonged to NATO, that state
would not have met the treaty obligations. A similar statement was made then by
the leader of the liberal fraction in the European Parliament – Cohn-Bendit. Taking
the above precedential statements into account, it must be emphasized that the best
guarantee of security for Poland, the guarantee that article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty
will be fulfilled, has been provided by the United States, if we assume that our
country would be significant for the American interests in this part of the world at
the precise moment.
The current decrease of the security guarantees from the USA for the European
members of NATO, including Poland, has been influenced by the American
Domestic Defense Strategy14 amended in January 2012. A significant element of
that strategy is the clear change of the priorities related with the USA’s security as
regards the decrease of the military presence in Europe in favour of its increase in
Asia. These activities are related with the significant increase in the military
potential of China and India. That change has a very particular significance for
Europe. About 10,000 American soldiers will leave Europe, and the units that will
stay on the old continent will mainly perform logistic tasks for the American troops
12
Koncepcja strategiczna obrony i bezpieczeństwa członków organizacji Traktatu
Północnoatlantyckiego, przyjęta przez szefów państw i rządów w Lizbonie [The Strategic Concept for
the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads
of State and Government In Lisbon] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, Warsaw 2011, pp. 23-33.
13
B. Balcerowicz, Koncepcja strategiczna NATO 2010. Wymiar wojskowy [The 2010 NATO Strategic
Concept. The Military Dimension] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, Warsaw 2011, p. 46.
14
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
80
stationed in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan. And so, Europe will be devoid
of significant operational American troops, which confirms the argument that the
continent has ceased to be a priority for the USA.
The second guarantee of security for Poland, i.e. the European Union, has not
been able, despite its efforts, to establish the announced 100 thousand-strong army.
It is not even able to perform large operations outside Europe independently. And
so, the military component of that organization does not play a crucial role in the
military security of Poland. The only significant role is played by the political
dimension of the participation in the EU, due to the fact that our country entered
the area of influence of the old Europe. For France, Spain or Italy influence in the
Mediterranean Sea is more important than in Eastern Europe. What is more, the
majority of the countries of the old EU continue to decrease their spendings on
defence, which makes them review the main areas of their previous national
interests in favour of Africa, and the alliance solutions are becoming for them less
and less important. Besides, for several years France and Germany have been
communicating individually with Russia with regard to security issues15.
At present, the EU countries, with their half a billion citizens, would not be
able to achieve even 30% of what the American military could. That demonstrates
the actual picture of the military position of the old continent in the world. Russia,
an area four times smaller, with an economy which is backward in comparison with
that of the EU, is more important in terms of security in the world, than the EU.
An important premise that has changed the position of Warsaw on the map of
the global security system, has been a shift in the American approach to partnership
with Russia. Currently Moscow seems to be a significant and desirable partner for
the USA in Asia (the issue of China or North Korea). It seems that the weakened
activeness of the USA in Eastern Europe has resulted from the American political
elites acknowledging the defeat of the Washington policy in that part of the world
and allowing for Russia to have more influence in the post-Soviet area. In a way,
this is the price that satisfies Moscow in exchange for cooperation between the
USA and Russia in Asia.
Challenges to the security of Poland in the east
In the light of changes in the current system of European security, there arises
a question of what is the most sensitive direction for Polish military security. The
issue of Kaliningrad has had a crucial role. Although from the operational point of
view the area of Kaliningrad is too small to pose a threat for the whole Polish state,
together with Belarus it continues to remain a real, not to say deadly, threat for
Poland. If we take into account the potential of the new initiative in the form of
15
Polityka zagraniczna Polski w trudnym roku 2010 [Poland's foreign policy in the difficult year
2010] [in:] Rocznik Strategiczny 2010/2011, p. 310.
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ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
a Eurasian Union, headed by Russia and Kazakhstan, and in the future – maybe
also by Ukraine, the situation will occur to be of vital importance for Poland.
Another element significant to the security of Poland has been the issue of
Ukraine. In the short term, a significant threat to state security may appear from
that direction, although not a threat to its existence. Why? Kaliningrad is a region
of Russia, and so long as the current system of security in the world is not broken,
there exists no direct military threat from it. Currently Belarus does not pose
a military threat, not only due to the military potential of that state, but mainly due
to the fact that the foreign policy and military forces of that country are controlled
by Moscow.
The question arises of what might happen in Ukraine in the foreseeable future
that would influence the security of our country. While analyzing the situation in
that region, we should pay attention to the processes which have been occurring in
that state for several years.
Firstly, there is a distinct outline of division lines and an emphasized lack of
historical identity in the state as a whole within today’s borders. In the area of
today’s Ukraine, there has never existed a political organism with a capital city in
Kiev. Currently, that state is inhabited by a number of ethnic Russians, mainly
living in eastern and southern Ukraine, comparable with the number of the Galician
Ukrainians living in three or four regions in the west, with a distinct national
identity.
Therefore, there exists a clear influence from Russia in political, spiritual and
social issues in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is an area of several hundred
thousand square kilometres, and the number of citizens comparable to an average
European state.
A significant mistake from the European and American politicians and strategists,
has been to treat the entire Ukrainian state as an area in which the mentality and
civilization conditionings of the population may be changed. Currently Europe has
problems with much bigger communities striving for the autonomy of their regions,
and ignoring such processes in Ukraine constitutes a fundamental strategic mistake.
At present, any talks about Ukraine without Russia and the authorities of the
pro-Russian Party of Regions (whether it is in power or not) are doomed to fail,
because it is an area which, according to most Russians, is a part of Russia located
outside its administrative borderlines. For Russia, with its tragic demographic
situation, the possibility to constantly use the dozen of millions of Russians in
Ukraine, has been an issue of utmost importance for Russian security.
In Poland, politicians continue to be unaware of the capacity for Poland to
influence the situation in Ukraine. Warsaw undertook (with support from the USA
and some European countries) to shape the political situation in an area comparable
to that of Poland (meaning eastern and southern Ukraine), inhabited by over 20
million people, mainly Russians. These politicians, driven by the old geolitical
82
concepts of Intermarium16 or Giedroyc17 tried to use the Russian weakness and play
for Ukraine, but in fact led to an influence of the Russians in that country.
Another mistake made by the Polish and Western politicians has been to
perceive the western and eastern areas of Ukraine as similar communities.
Although many geopoliticians underlined the civilization differences between the
regions of this country and the lack of their internal cohesion, it seems that their
output was not analyzed frequently enough. One of the authors who explicitly
addressed the issue of the civilizational division of Ukraine was Samuel
Huntington18 who emphasized the possibility of secession of Western Ukraine.
According to him, it would only happen upon a definite deterioration of the
relations between Western Europe and Russia, and as a result of tensions provoked
by rivalizing parties. However, Huntington did not take into account the social
tension which might appear from inside Western Ukraine, caused by a far-reaching
integration of Ukraine and Russia. Earlier it was Feliks Konieczny19 who paid
attention to the inability of two civilizations to coexist permanently in the area of
one state (due to the lack of synthesis between civilizations). According to him,
such coexistence will shortly lead to one party displacing the other, or to a dynamic
conflict between them.
In the western provinces of Ukraine, such a process of “clash of civilizations”
has been ongoing for some time now. What should be noted is that in that region,
constituting about twelve percent of the area and inhabitants of Ukraine, the power
is exercised by the politicians invoking a vision for Ukraine that’s completely
different from the remaining areas of that country.
That situation signifies only that the Western political centres play a game for
Ukraine through the communities with distinct anti-Russian attitudes, while the
ideology on which those operations are based, is irrelevant. The question remains
how will those communities behave in the case of a shift in European policy,
mainly as regards the policy of NATO with regard to Russia. Will they continue to
support the national communities in Ukraine and indirectly lead to a division of
that state, thus creating a political and economic problem for themselves (such
16
Intermarium – the political idea promoted by the circles associated with Józef Piłsudski prior
to the I World War, which consisted in the establishment of a federation of the states of Central and
Eastern Europe. Ultimately, Intermarium was to include the area between the Adriatic, Baltic and
Black Seas, i.e.: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Czechslovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Jugoslavia, and possibly Finland. The proposed federation was to refer to the Jagiellonioan
traditions of the multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Piłsudski believed that that
federation would help the Central European states to avoid the domination of Germany or Russia.
17
The koncept of Jerzy Giedroyc formulated in 1974 in the Parisian “Kultura” monthly
magazine, where he presented the contept that the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus is
a factor favourable to the independence of Poland, while the domination of those countries by Russia
would pave the way to enslave also of Poland. After 1990 that concept became the guideline of the
Polish policy towards Russia and the Eastern European states.
18
S.P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji [Clash of Civilizations], Warsaw 2006, p. 276.
19
F. Koneczny, Prawa dziejowe [Historical laws], Komorów 1997, pp. 237-260, 439.
83
ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
a state would have to be supported financially, just like Kosovo right now), or will
they attempt to calm down the social moods in that part of Europe?
A problem appears in the form of the strong determination of the society of that
region on its way towards secession. In western Ukraine it is not only some
Galician Ukrainians that strive for a distinct character or autonomy for their region.
There is also the issue of the Carpatho-Rusyns who have strived for autonomy for
their region and who have considered themselves largely as a nation distinct from
the Ukrainians20. There is a problem of the autonomy of Romanians and
Hungarians. In the Chernivtsi Oblast, as many as 50 thousand citizens have
Romanian citizenship, while in the Berehove region 76% of citizens are
Hungarians, and the regional council adopted the national anthem of Hungary as
the anthem of the self-government authority21.
Another area of confrontation has been the issue of the Supreme Council of
Ukraine outvoting the right to use a regional language in the areas inhabited by at
least 10% of national minorities. Under the new statute, Russian language would
become the regional language of 13 out of 27 regions of Ukraine, including in Kiev
and Sevastopol. The Crimean Tatar (Crimean) language would become the
regional language in the Crimea, the Hungarian language – in the Zakarpattia
Oblast, and Romanian – in Chernivtsi Oblast. The current language confrontation
is one of the main social catalysts in Ukraine. Professor Roman Szporluk from
Harvard was correct to state that: “millions of people who consider Russian to be
their language, voted for independence on 1 December 1991. Taking that into
account, the citizens whose mother tongue is Ukrainian, have a special political and
moral obligation towards them. If we take that into consideration, if we treat the
population as two parts – the “leading” part and the “national minorities”, we will
face quickly the perspective of the territorial and ethnic disintegration of Ukraine.
(…) Thus, the fact that the Ukrainian nation is bilingual needs to be taken into
account while establishing a state. (…) The easiest way to destroy Ukraine is to
start the ukrainization of the non-Ukrainian citizens. The biggest threat to an
independent Ukraine is posed by language fanatics”22. That voice of reason not
only in reference to the language act, but also in reference to the attempt to
ukrainize the national minorities, has been a fundamental problem on which the
future of Ukraine will depend. Either the actual state in the form of various
traditions and cultures of the respective regions will be sanctioned, or the process
of disintegration of Ukraine will start.
20
Rusini nie chcą Ukrainy [The Rusyns do not want Ukraine], www.konserwatyzm.pl [21
December 2011]
21
Mały krok do Wielkich Węgier [A small step towards the Great Hungary],
http://www.kresy.pl/publicystyka,wydarzenia-tygodnia?zobacz%2Fmaly-krok-do-wielkichwegier&fb_source=message [2012-04-13]
22
"Wojna słów" na Ukrainie [„A war of the words In Ukraine”],
http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/wojna-slow-na-ukrainie,1,5182570,wiadomosc.html [7 VII 2012]
84
In the presented situation, that part of Ukraine has the potential for an ethnicbased conflict destabilizing the situation in that part of Europe, and the dynamic
course of that process may result in a lack of stability in south-eastern Poland
(refugees). Moreover, the mentioned area may be negatively affected by the
Russian army stationed in Transnistria.
Having analyzed the above situation, all the facts indicate that it is Russia, and
not Europe, who has the key to the decisions concerning the future of Ukraine. For
Moscow there exist two fundamental solutions. The first one is striving to take
control over the whole of Ukraine and to pacify the western regions of Ukraine
through economic and administrative methods. The second one – making the
decision to regionalize them, on the basis of the Crimean casus, with a separate
parliament, and transforming Ukraine into a federal state at first, and then, over the
next few years, pushing that region out of the federation and towards its
independence. Naturally, there exists a third scenario which is highly unlikely. The
eastern and southern lands of the current Ukraine are annexed to Russia, while
western and Central Ukraine form a joint state23. That scenario is highly unlikely
for two reasons. First, such operations would provide a precedent in Europe in the
form of annexation by a superpower of part of the territory of a weaker neighbour,
which certainly would invoke resistance from the international community, and
second – Russia would not allow the nationalist trends, with clear anti-Russian
attitudes, to move east, as that might pose a threat of loss of influences in that area.
The first two scenarios are very dangerous for Poland and its national security.
In the case of the first scenario, practically the entire eastern border of Poland
would constitute a border with the Russian area of influence (the Belarussian and
Ukrainian states certainly would remain on the map of the world). Therefore,
Poland would be susceptible to tensions stimulated by Moscow, and would lose its
economic activity areas because of negative relationships with Russia. In the
23
Such a vision was presented by Volodymyr Horbulin and Alexander Lytwynenko (the former
experts of the Ukrainian Council of National Security and Defense) who published their conjectures
in an opinion-forming weekly magazine "Dzerkało Tyżnia". According to them, the vision of a
protectorate, and then of division of the country into three, is realistic. They emphasize that the
concept of Russia’s foreign policy and its National Security Strategy include clear expressions
associated with Russian interests in Ukraine. They refer to prevention of Ukraine becoming a member
of NATO and to “defending the interests of the Russian-speaking community”, i.e. making Ukraine
stay in the Russian sphere of influences and privileged interests. According to those experts, the
preservation of the territorial unity of Ukraine is dependent on whether it will adopt “special
relations” with the Russian Federation, i.e. if it will assume Russian patronage. The analysts also
stated that the establishment of a protectorate is not necessarily the ultimate aim for Moscow. Maybe
it would only be a transition stage before the further division of Ukraine, probably into three parts, in
accordance with the model published (probably by the Russian intelligence services) in the Italian
geopolitical magazine “Limes”. That partitioning would look as follows: the southern and eastern regions of
Ukraine would be annexed to Russia, central Ukraine would be governed by a puppet government, while
the western part of the country, as the “main violator of the peace” would be completely isolated [quoted
after:] http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/boja-sie-ze-rosja-podzieli-ukraine-na-trzy-czesci,
109489.html [2009-09-19]
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ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
second scenario, Poland would border the West-Ukrainian state with a pauperized
society, with a claim-based and nationalist attitude to its surroundings and
susceptible to provocations threatening the stability of the borderline areas.
We should ask a question of whether in Ukraine, including the western regions,
there is a sufficient potential and social determination to perform the aforementioned
scenarios. Observing the publications of intellectuals from Lviv, it seems that yes
(Jarosław Hrycak24, Mykoła Rabczuk25 Wasyl Rasewycz26, Wołodymir Pawliw27 or
even Marian Mudryj28). These authors draw attention to the fact that the culture of
Galician Ukraininans mixes with Cossack and Russian socities. The only
possibility of maintaining the identity of western Ukraine is autonomy.
The problem of reaching the “Galician autonomy” relies on the issue of how to
achieve it - as in Czechoslovakia in 1993 or Yugoslavia. Parliamentary voting in
autumn 2012 might be helpful to answer this question. It depends which way
Ukraine will choose and which way Russia will lead it.
The changes which were brought about on 08 June 2012 i.e. establishing the
new Strategy of National Security of Ukraine entitled “Ukraine in the world which
changes” and Military Doctrine, significantly influenced and defined Ukrainian
policy as the policy of beyond blocking.29 The president of Ukraine, signing the
aforementioned document fulfilled the expectations of Moscow in the form of
Ukraine’s resignation from becoming a member of NATO. He has shown that
national security policy is of secondary importance. This state is reflected in the
current condition of the Ukrainian army which in size is comparable to the Polish
army and has approximately 130 thousand soldiers. However, with reference to
military equipment and its usefulness, the Ukrainian army is in deep crisis. Within
the last three years, Ukraine spent more than two times less money on defence than
Poland i.e. 0.8 % of GDP.30 In the current budgetary year, there is visible a slight
increase of expenditures, mainly for repairs of military equipment.
24
ederation –chance for Ukraine, www.zaxid.net [22 I 2011]
Ukraine as a second Ulster, http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/interview/ukrainesecond-ulster [20 IX 2011]
26
Federalisation: challanges and threats,
http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?federalizatsiya_vikliki_i_riziki&objectId=1256477 [1 VI
2012]
27
Ukraine -Galicia at the crossroads: between the impossible and undesired,
http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?galitske_perehrestya_mizh_nemozhlivim_i_nebazhanim&
objectId=1256057 [27 V 2012]
28
Ukraininan Piedmont has always been Kiev, http://geopolityka.net/ukrainskim-piemontemzawsze-byl-kijow/, http://www.chasipodii.net/article/9937/ [3 V 2012]
29
President Janukovic defines the vision of the security of Ukraine,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2012-06-13/prezydent-janukowyczokresla-wizje-bezpieczenstwa-ukrainy [22 VI 2012]
30
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120125/170941238.html [2 VII 2012]; Anna Dudek states
that expenditures on military purposes as the percentage of GDP for Ukraine in 2009 as 2.9% [in:]
Strategic Annual 2011/2012, Warsaw 2012, p. 414. However, according to the Centre of Eastern
Studies in the years 2005-2008, the real ratio of expenditures on defence in Ukrainian GDP decreased
26
86
For Janukovic, the guarantor of military security is Russia, he only cares for
internal security. In February 2012, the opposition blamed the president for putting
a son in law of a former vice prime-minister of Russia into the position of Minister
of Defence; the person had gained citizenship in 2005, he was Russian formerly.31
With reference to the problems with security, Kiev underlines short-term real
threats i.e. existence of quasi states on independent territories and precedences of
acknowledging their sovereignty (in relation to separatist tendencies), an increase
in rivalry for access to natural resources and control of the routes of their delivery.
In a regional dimension, the main threats rely on activation of processes for
creating so called impact zones, threats of the preventive use of military forces and
an increase in the militarisation of the region. The factors that directly threaten the
defence of Ukraine were an unregulated conflict in Transnistria, the issue of
dividing the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, as well as the lack
of the demarcation of the national border with Russia, Belarussia and Moldavia and
unregulated issues connected with the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet.32
At present, the guarantors of the independence of Ukraine are mainly oligarchs,
as they have a significant influence on the parliament and the government. These
oligarchs care for not being in the common national body i.e. Russia as they would
lose their position of influencing politics and would be subject to the Kremlin.
Assessing the Polish politics in the East, the state of failure is noticeable.
Poland was to be connected with Ukraine by strategic partnership. However, after
two decades, we have slight economic influence and limited political cooperation.
We are almost absent, both culturally and scientifically. This has been a failure of
all subsequent governments.
Conclusions for Polish policy and security strategy
Keeping in mind the dynamically changing situation on the eastern borders of
Poland, it is vital for Poland to redefine its national security policy as well as
actively influence the EU and NATO in the scope of maintaining a presence in
Central Europe. Russia in its relations with NATO still differentiates the rights to
security of “old” and “new” members of the pact.33. Command of NATO belongs
to “old” members of the Treaty.
from 1.3% to 0.99% (in accordance with assumptions of the programme of reforming military forces
in 2005, Ukraine was to spend 2% GDP) [in:] N. Orłowska-Chyż, PGradual degradation of
Ukrainian army, Week in the East of 14.10.2009
31
S. Matuszak, Ukraine [in:] New Eastern Europe no. 3-4 /2012, p. 16.
32
President Janukovic defines the vision of the security of Ukraine,
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2012-06-13/prezydent-janukowyczokresla-wizje-bezpieczenstwa-ukrainy [22 VI 2012]
33
A.D. Rotfeld, NATO summit in Lizbon: what next? [in:] Strategic Annual 2010/2011, Warsaw
2011, p. 36.
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ANDRZEJ ZAPAŁOWSKI
For Poland, due to the changing situation, it is required to change significant
assumptions of the National Security Strategy, connected with the long lasting
process of the decomposition of the security institutions which are significant for
collective security. It is mainly about the gradual withdrawal of the USA from
Europe and the weakening, at the same time, of the structure of collective
deterrence and the European Union suffering from a deep crisis. This situation
requires cooperation with the USA beyond NATO in the field of security with the
possibility of placing several US garrisons in Poland.
Another indispensible step is the implementation of Poland’s own, national
structure of deterrence by means of common Territorial Defence and maintaining
operating troops at the same level. The common self-defence of citizens utilising
both government and non-governmental forms of security organisations constitutes
the essence of modern, common, national security of a democratic and independent
Poland which would be an answer to the challenges from the East.
It is indispensible to prepare structures of the state for the possible changes of
the internal situation in Ukraine with reference to new scenarios in the
development of the internal situation. Assuming the scenario of the decomposition
of Ukraine in the form of its regionalisation or secession of some of the regions,
much emigration or even “escapes” may by anticipated, which may undoubtedly
influence the internal situation in Poland. It must be remembered that in western
Ukraine, there are descendants of the people which were forced to emigrate after
the Second World War. Mass emigration of these people into the territory of
Podkarpacie or Lubelskie may have an unfavourable influence in the form of
vulnerability to the national destabilisation of the border area.
In case of the political and social conflict in Ukraine, Poland should be neutral
and not support any party. For Warsaw, the partner shall be the centre of legal and
real power in Kiev. Experiences of Poland’s engagement in the Orange Revolution
are a significant experience of political and economic losses and profits where
Poland suffered significant economic losses.
An important action in the scope of regional security is to assume proper
actions aimed at finding possibilities of creating local economic and political
partnership in the form of the Kaliningrad Triangle i.e. the cooperation axis:
Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow, which would stabilise the situation in Eastern Europe and
constitute an element of a strategic shield for Poland. Tightening international
cooperation in this capacity, especially in connection with a growing number of
border threats (nuclear power stations, floods, illegal migration, organised crime),
forces a necessity of broad cooperation, including aid, in the scope of security,
creating durable institutions and procedures of neighbourhood cooperation.
Poland should increase economic cooperation with Far Eastern and Central
African countries as an element of the diversification of the economic security of
Poland, as well as undertake further actions for the benefit of the diversification of
directions and sources of gaining energetic resources.
88
In summary, we are dealing with a situation in which the United States is
profoundly limiting its presence in Europe; the European Union, due to its deep
economic crisis is not a significant guarantor in the field of security, Russia is reestablishing influences in the territory of post-soviet republics; and Poland, in its
basic assumptions, is still attached to geopolitical concepts from over 20 years ago,
not to say over 100 years ago.
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
ART OF WAR
FIRE SUPPORT – AN INTEGRAL PART OF
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS
Col. Tomasz RUBAJ, D.Sc.
Abstract
The paper presents the essence, the general conditions and components (subsystems) of
the joint fire support. It was noted that the need of conducting of joint fire support, due to
the complexity of the contemporary operating environment and decentralization of
operations, are also more and more present at the tactical level, the lowest level
of command. The general structure of joint fire support and within it a brief description of
fire support participants was presented. The needs for coordination and synchronization,
resulting in the integration of three main areas of the joint fire support: reconnaissance,
command and control and effectors/delivering platforms from different components
(operating in different operating environments) has been indicated.
The importance and responsibility for planning and integration of joint fire support
with warfighting and joint functions was also discussed. In this scope, article is limited only
to illustrate the need of integration of fire and fire support with maneuver – as integration
of two complementary functions. In conclusion author pointed out the expanding and
evolving nature of the engagement and influence (encompassing fires and effects), which
increasingly affects not only the physical plane, but also takes place in the sphere of nonphysical activities (cognitive plane/domain), and is caused by the needs of the present and
expected in the nearest future operating environment.
Key words – Fires, Support, Fire Support, Joint Fire Support
“The beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right
names”.
Confucius
As was stated in the ancient quotation above, the first basic problem to define
and explain is terminology. Analyses of foreign sources leads to the a` priori con90
FIRE SUPPORT – AN INTEGRAL PART OF CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS
clusion that the starting point for consideration should be fire. Fire as one of the
elements of combat power (warfighting functions at the tactical and the joint functions at the operational level) was and still remains an omnipresent factor in commanders' hands and allows them to have an influence on the outcome of battles,
operations and campaigns.
It ought to underlined, that there is an analogy with our national war art because in the theory of fire support, fire is the basic term and includes other classifications including direct fire, indirect fire, operational fire etc.
Fire is defined as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or
nonlethal effect on a target. All fire is normally synchronised and integrated to
achieve synergistic results. Fire can be delivered by air, land, maritime, or special
operations forces (SOF)1. In the definition presented above the environmental
criteria has been introduced and fire is produced by various assets operating in an
air, land and maritime environment – as part of a Joint Operations Area (JOA).
According to other sources fire is produced during the employment of forces
from two or more components (component/service criteria) in a coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective – in this case fires
is called Joint Fires (JF)2. When fires/joint fires assist air, land, maritime, and SOF
to move, manoeuvre, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters
are called Fire Support/Joint Fire Support (JFS).
The most common definition presented in various sources treat Fire support/Joint Fire Support as the collective and coordinated use of the fire of land and
sea based indirect fire systems, armed aircraft, aviation, electronic warfare and
non-lethal munitions against ground targets to support combat operations at both
the operational and tactical levels3. FS/JFS is the integration of fire and effects to
delay, disrupt or destroy enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities in pursuit
of operational or tactical objectives. It shatters the enemy’s cohesion and undermines his will to fight. The inherent flexibility of fire support allows it to bring fire
to bear in deep, close and rear operations – in a geographical dimension or in shaping, decisive and sustaining operations – in order to provide and effect dimension,
if necessary simultaneously. It is therefore essential that it is integrated fully into
the operational plan. It must be synchronised with other battlespace activities in
terms of time, space and purpose to achieve the optimum concentration of force.
Target priorities and engagement criteria must be established and fire support used
aggressively, in concert with ISTAR systems capable of acquiring targets and carrying out battle damage assessment.
1
Joint Fire Support, JP-3.09, Joint Chief of Staff, 2010.
Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components, in coordinated
action toward a common objective, AAP-6, NATO glossary of terms and definitions, NSA, Brussels
2011, p. 2-J-1. There is an analogy to the term of Joint Operations/ Allied Joint Operations.
3
eg. ATP-3.2, Land Operations, Brussels 2003, p. 2-5.
2
91
TOMASZ RUBAJ
From a general perspective, FS/JFS encompasses three basic subsystems, also
referred to as – three vital components: surveillance and target acquisition (STA);
command and control information system (C2IS); weapon (delivering) systems
(See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Subsystems of a Fire Support System
In the latest standardization agreements JFS is called Indirect Fire System (IFS)
and has been divided into five crucial elements. JFS/IFS is a system of systems, the
main characteristics of which are its 24/7 ability to function (24 hours a day and
7 days a week without interruption), all-weather capability to acquire ground targets and achieve effects over a wide area and in depth. It should be able to deliver
guided or unguided munitions in order to strike point or area targets. The JFS/IFS
is a system which includes the following elements4:
• A family of Surveillance, Target Acquisition (STA) systems which are
linked to the wider ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) system;
• A command, control and information system (C²IS) which provides a command and control network over the battlefield and enables artillery commanders to
act as fire and effect integrators also responsible for operational environment management in all dimensions;
• Delivery platforms like guns, rockets and missiles launchers, mortars, combat or weaponised/armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);
• A variety of precision-guided, conventional and non-lethal munitions;
• An ammunition resupply system.
4
92
NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2010, p. 2-1.
IFS/JFS units are characterised by a very flexible organisation in order to be
able to deploy and operate in a highly centralised or decentralised manner. Resulting from this flexible structure, IFS/JFS units are able to perform efficiently in
a complex operational environment.
The first subsystem – STA, closely connected with the ISTAR system, consists
of assets organic to the JFS/IFS units STA (See Figure 2). STA sources provide the
means to successfully detect, locate, identify, track and classify targets. These systems include many individuals, units, and resources on the battlefield that help with
the effective employment of the weapon. They yield basic data and information for
fire support as well as contribute to the development of situational awareness (SA).
JFS/IFS STA assets can be used for non-JFS/IFS intelligence collection tasks, but
such use must be weighed against the need to acquire JFS/IFS targets. Sensors not
belonging to JFS/IFS systems (e.g. sensors of reccee unit5) could also contribute to
the target acquisition process.
Figure 2. Subsystems of an IFS/JFS system
5
eg. Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Aviation Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare (EW)
Sensors, Long Range Patrols (LPR).
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
Command Control and Information System (C²IS) provides a command and
control network over the battlespace. There are many developed Fire Control Systems linked to the manoeuvre Command and Control Systems. In my opinion we
should discus Joint Fires Command and Control Systems rather than about Fire
Control Systems because modern systems play not only Fire Control/Direction
roles, but also: Tactical Fire Control – planning and coordination, Technical Fire
Control – during mission execution, Movement Control, Combat Service Support
and fulfil Airspace Management functions.
A few years ago a new NATO initiative concerning Fire Command and Control
Systems was established. Their purpose still remains to achieve interoperability
between different system from leading countries. Artillery Support Cooperation
Activity - ASCA (the name of the initiative – focused on cooperation data and experience exchanging between: American AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System); German ADLER (germ. Artillerie Daten Lage Einsatz Rechnerverbund – System); British BATES (Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement
System), French ATLAS System and Italian SIR System.
For example AFATDS is a Joint Fire Support Battle Command system. It provides complete flexibility to manage attacks on preplanned and time-sensitive targets. AFATDS provides fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fire and effects. It supports weapon systems such as
mortars, field artillery cannons, rockets, close air support, attack helicopters, and
Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) systems. AFATDS also acts as a fire support
"server" to LAN-based and Tactical Internet-based clients, including the AFATDS
Effects Management Tool (EMT), and the USMC Command and Control Personal
Computer (C2PC) EMT. The system is used in all U.S. Army echelons from weapons platoon to corps and in the Marine Corps from a firing battery to Marine Expeditionary Forces. AFATDS is installed aboard the U.S. Navy LHA/LHD Class big
deck amphibious ships to support Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) during amphibious operations6.
In Command and Control Information System (C2IS) there are also located JFS
planning and coordination elements. It must be underlined that there are different
solutions implemented in different countries. In most cases fire elements are represented at all levels (from Corps to Battalion) as Joint Fire and Effect Elements –
Centres/Cells/Groups/Teams.
Through their Joint Fire Support Centres/Cells//Teams, the TF staff (Brigade
sized or higher) plan fire and effects, in that they match the manoeuvre commander’s intent and scheme of manoeuvre to those fire assets available. They book,
arrange and liaise to ensure that the assets are available at the correct time and are
able to operate in the specified area with all logistic, ROE and other requirements.
Through their Brigade Joint Fire Support Cell, the Brigade staff further integrate
the fire assets available by conducting Battlespace management (BM), timings,
6
94
Source: www.raytheon.com (Access October 2012).
routes, weapon loads and communications infrastructures. The Fires Support Team
(FST) make the most appropriate use of allocated fire assets in order to achieve the
effect required by the Manoeuvre Commander. The chosen asset will minimise the
risk of fratricide or further encroachment upon the operation of other assets7. Solutions discussed above, as an example JFS planning and coordination elements organisation, are presented in the Figure 3.
Source: Fire Support Integration Paper, CDoD, 2008, page 8.
Figure 3. JFS planning and coordination elements
Attack resources encompasses land, air and sea based delivering platforms
which are able to engage targets at the proper time, place and with the appropriate
volume of fire. There are sources which divide attack resources in two categories lethal and non-lethal (eg. Electronic Attack, Computer Network Attack, PSYOPS,
Information Warfare, Obscurant Fires & Illumination. In considerations provided
below only lethal means will be discussed8.
a. Land-based JFS/IFS uses a variety of weapon systems and ammunitions
(guided and unguided) in order to cover the entire battlefield with indirect fire de7
Fire Support Integration Paper, Canadian DoD, 2008, p. 8.
NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2012, pages 3-1
and 3-2.
8
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
livering a variety of effects, as determined by the manoeuvre commander. There
are three principal types of ground-based indirect fire weapon systems. These are:
• Mortar uses self-propelled, towed and man-portable equipment. In general
it is integrated in the JFS/IFS and uses precision as well as unguided ammunitions;
• Tube artillery uses self-propelled and towed gun equipment and is characterised by a high responsiveness, accuracy, and the capability to deliver sustained
fire. An extensive selection of ammunition, coupled with sophisticated target acquisition assets permit the engagement of both point and area targets and a target
effect adjusted to the tactical requirements.
• Rocket/Missile artillery uses guided or unguided ammunition and its long
range enables it to strike high pay off targets throughout the depth of the battlefield. It has the capability to deliver a very heavy weight of fire for a short period.
b. Air-based JFS/IFS – called also in many sources Anti Surface Force Air
Operations (ASFAO)
• Fixed Wing. ASFAO will be used in two aspects: Anti-surface warfare operations (maritime) and air-land operations. Air-land operations consist of Air Interdiction (AI) which is mainly used for operational level objectives and Close
Air Support (CAS) which is mainly used for tactical level objectives. CAS is an air
action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and
which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement
of those forces. The mission must always be supported by a qualified Tactical Air
Control Parties Forward Air Controller or TACP (FAC) and is flown in direct support of ground forces, in offensive and defensive operations, to destroy, disrupt,
suppress, fix or delay enemy forces where they are in close proximity to friendly
forces. This team should be included in the Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) in
order to ease integration of all fire support assets.
• Rotary Wing. The primary missions of rotary wing assets are divided in two
basic types of attack: Interdiction Attack (IA) and Close Combat Attack (CCA). IA
is a hasty or deliberate attack either to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy the
adversary before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. IA is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with ground
forces is not required. CCA is a hasty or deliberate attack providing air-to-ground
fire for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of
friendly forces, detailed integration is desirable but not always possible.
• Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (C UAV) / Weaponised/Armed UAV.
C UAV (or Weaponised/Armed UAV) is an armed UAV that can be used in a reconnaissance role and/or combat actions.
c. Sea-based JFS/IFS called also Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS).
• Some land operations may be supported by sea based indirect fire systems
such as amphibious operations and defence of coastal areas (contribution of the
Maritime Component to Joint Operations). The coordination of naval fire happens
at every level. Specialist naval fire support coordinators may be used for liaison
96
through the Supporting Arms Coordination Centre (SACC). If there is no allocated
maritime fire support observer for ground troops, the JFSE has the additional responsibility of observing and controlling NSFS in support of the land component.
A maritime fire support group consists of naval combatants assigned to support
Land Forces operations ashore using naval gunfire support (NGS) and guided missile support. Due to the multi-role character of many naval combatants, units of an
escort/screening group may conduct fire support missions without being formed
into a separate fire support group and vice versa. NGS can provide large volumes
of immediately available, responsive fire support to Land Combat Forces operating
near coastal waters.
• The general mission of NSFS ship units in an amphibious operation is to
support the assault by destroying or neutralising (1) shore installations that oppose
the approach of ships and aircraft, (2) defences that may oppose the landing force
(LF), and (3) defences that may oppose the post-landing advance of the LF. When
the number of ships permits, each assault battalion will be assigned a ship in direct
support (DS). The DS mission establishes a one-to-one relationship between
a NSFS ship and the supported unit. The ship delivers fire on planned targets and
targets of opportunity in her zone of fire, which normally corresponds to the zone
of action of the supported unit. When possible, ships capable of performing simultaneous missions will be given a DS mission to allow for maximum firepower to
the forward units of the LF. The general support (GS) mission requires a NSFS
ship to support the force as a whole or that portion of the force to which the ship is
assigned. A ship in a GS role attacks targets in the zone of fire which corresponds
to the zone of action of the supported unit. Prearranged fire is delivered in accordance with a schedule of fire published in the ATF OPORD and the NSFS plan in
the LF OPORD. Fire may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a specific mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to the GS role. Ships in
a GS role support regimental-sized units or larger.
Conventional and precision-guided munitions. The JFS/IFS munitions are
divided into two different categories9:
1. Unguided Munitions. It follows the ballistic trajectory. Their accuracy is directly related to the delivery platform (e.g. Topographical, Meteorological and
ballistic data). The ability to guarantee first round effective fire is dependent on the
accuracy. The accuracy of the system can be improved through registration fires,
calibration or/and adjustment.
2. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM). PGM are munitions for which the effect
and its point of delivery, in time and space, may be controlled, either internally or
externally, after departure from the launch platform. PGM can be divided in the
following types:
– Laser-Guided Projectiles (LGP);
– Terminally Homing Projectiles (THP);
9
Ibidem, p. 3-3 and 3-4.
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
– Trajectory Correctable Munitions as e.g. Course Correcting Fuzes (CCF) or
GPS guided munitions,
– Sensor Fuzed (Sub) Munitions,
– Loitering munitions (LM)10,
– Video link lock-on munitions.
An ammunition resupply system. The overall capability of the JFS/IFS is to
a great extent dependent on an effective logistic support system. The timely and
guaranteed resupply of ammunition is a critical factor. Therefore, the logistic support system of the JFS/IFS has to be capable of resupplying the various components of the assets in all weather and terrain conditions. This is complicated by the
dispersed deployment of the components. The system possess a significant transport capability. This has to include the capacity to carry a basic load of ammunition. Ammunition resupply system should be controlled by an effective logistic
management system, capable of monitoring stock levels throughout the supply
chain and facilitating the timely movement of stocks.
The role of JFS/IFS is to support the ground manoeuvre forces with fire and
effect. The artillery commander at all levels is the JFS/IFS adviser of the manoeuvre commander and an expert supporting manoeuvre forces with all types of fires.
They are responsible for the integration, synchronisation and coordination of fire
support delivered by air, maritime and land effectors, in time, space and purpose, in
support of the common land operational objective. It only emphasises the fact that
synchronisation of JFS with the supported forces is essential. JFS may thus provide
lethal or non-lethal effects in such a way as to have synergistic effects on land operations. Nevertheless, IFS provides close and deep fire support, counter battery
fire and contributes to the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD).
The tasks of JFS/IFS are based on the concept of operations and the intent of
the manoeuvre commander. These are the basis for combat organisation. In detail:
– Allocation of IFS assets (effectors and sensors).
– Taking part in the intelligence cycle and STA.
– Fire support and effects integration.
– Command and Control (C²) of all IFS.
– Coordinating the Joint Fire Support effects.
– Liaison and cooperation with other services, branches and combined forces.
– Execution of combat service support.
– Force protection.
10
Loitering munitions: Munitions able to remain in position over a target area and to be reassigned a target in flight. During the attack phase target can be aborted with the munition returning to
the loitering mode. These munitions are delivered by a wide range of platforms e.g. rocket launcher,
plane or ship. Details concerning this specific topic are given in Artillery Procedures AArtyP-1(B),
NSA, Brussels 2009.
98
Effectiveness of the JFS/IFS effort is measured by creating desired effects on
the enemy, setting conditions for decisive operations, and supporting force/joint
force operations. Effective JFS/IFS support depends on planning for the successful performance of the following four basic fire support tasks:
(1) Support Forces in Contact. The commander must provide responsive
JFS/IFS that protects and ensures freedom of manoeuvre to forces in contact with
the enemy throughout the operational area.
(2) Support the Concept of Operation. Commanders set the conditions for
decisive operations by successfully attacking prioritised targets.
(3) Synchronise JFS/IFS. JFS/IFS is synchronised through fire support
coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate and CONOPS. Joint fire
support must be planned both continuously and concurrently with the development
of the scheme of manoeuvre. Further, operations providing joint fire support must
be synchronised with other joint force operations (e.g., air operations, intelligence
functions, special operations, and IO) in order to optimise the application of limited
resources, achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide.
(4) Sustain JFS/IFS. Joint fire support planners must formulate joint fire support plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic capabilities. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all
critical in sustaining joint fire support operations.
As can be seen from the appraisal provided so far, Joint Fire Support doesn’t
exist in a separate manner in the battlespace/Joint Operational Environment, however in specified periods of battle/operation, commanders can dominate the above
areas covering them with reconnaissance and fire, without sending troops there.
Moreover, fire has a unique ability to engage targets in depth (especially in shaping
operations) in order to reduce enemy combat power before close combat (decisive
operations) occurs.
At the tactical level fire exists between elements of combat power. Combat
power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities
that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. As far as Army forces
are concerned, their combat power is generated by converting potential into effective action.
There are eight elements of combat power (See figure 4): the six warfighting
functions (mission command, movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) which are multiplied by leadership and complemented by
information. In other words, commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
Source: Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, February 2011, page 4-1.
Figure 4. The elements of combat power
A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organisations,
information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to
accomplish missions and training objectives. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations combine all the warfighting functions to generate combat power. Additionally, all warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and
nonlethal effects. No warfighting function is exclusively decisive, shaping, or sustaining. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint
functions.
At the operational level there are joint functions. Joint functions are related
capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronise, and
direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels
of war fall into six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fire, movement and manoeuvre, protection, and sustainment. Fire is closely connected with all joint functions
(elements of combat power), and especially with manoeuvre.
The foundations of joint fire support are based on the elements of combat
power, the principles of joint operations and joint functions. The elements of
combat power are combined to provide the basis for the generation of overwhelming firepower. The fire support system has its roots in the firepower element of
combat power.
The fire function encompasses a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and
processes). Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate response to them, while considering operational requirements
100
and capabilities. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fire
to actions and tasks at the component level.
The art and science of Joint Fire Support is how to synchronise joint fire and
manoeuvre in support of JFC objectives. Coordination between components in
order to maximise the target detection, planning and execution of targets to create
the effects desired with attack resources is the critical function of the Joint Fire
Support System.
As was mentioned, Joint Fire Support may include, but is not limited to, the lethal effects of air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects of some
EA actions and space control operations, as well as other nonlethal capabilities.
Integration and synchronisation of joint fire and joint fire support with the fire
and manoeuvre of the supported force is essential. The JFC helps to ensure this
unity of effort by doing the following:
– Coordinating Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Target Acquisition;
– Developing plans & orders;
– Running a Joint Targeting & Coordination Board;
– Supporting a Joint Fires Element or augmenting the fires staff as required.
To express the Joint Fire Integration idea I would like to quote the Fire Integration principle: “The integration of deconflicted fire with movement to achieve
manoeuvre”.
Synchronised Joint Fire Support requires the coordinated interaction of all of
the elements of the fire support system, thorough and continuous planning, aggressive coordination, and vigorous execution.
To synchronise joint fire support operations, “commanders and staffs must
have a thorough knowledge of each Service’s doctrine, major systems, significant
capabilities and limitations and often their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”.
Combining Joint Fire Support and manoeuvre relies on the fundamental and
beneficial effects of teamwork, unity of effort, and synchronisation of capabilities
in time, space, and purpose. Manoeuvre and Joint Fire Support are complementary functions that are essential to achieving the Joint Force Commander's
(JFC) objectives. Joint Fire Support neutralises, destroys, or suppresses enemy
forces and disrupts enemy manoeuvre, both on the surface and in the air, which
assists the manoeuvre of friendly forces.
The JFC is responsible for ensuring the synchronisation and integration of
joint fire. The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and synchronise the wide range
of capabilities at his disposal. The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3)
serves as the JFC’s principal staff advisor for the coordination, integration, and
synchronisation of Joint Fire Support with other major elements of operations. The
J-3 recommends, coordinates, reviews, designates, and disseminates fire support
coordination measures, manoeuvre control measures, and airspace coordinating
measures as part of the overall concept of the operations for joint fire and joint fire
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TOMASZ RUBAJ
support. The JFC may approve the formation of a Joint Fire Element (JFE)
within J-3. The JFE advises the JFC and assists J-3 in joint fire planning, coordination, and execution. The JFE would be composed of a variety of experts from the
joint force headquarters, the components, the combatant command, and other supporting organisations as required. Typically, JFCs organise joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating centre for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. The joint targeting
coordination board normally reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and prepares and refines joint target lists. The JFE would also
take the lead on providing the Joint Fire information for any Operations Plans,
Orders or Fragos. JFE has numerous functions throughout the Joint meetings,
working groups and boards in order to enable the targeting process.
To summarise, I would like to underline, that the latest standardisation agreements have extended the range of capabilities from the influence on enemy forces
to the sphere of influence in order to achieve desired effect, not only physical but
also psychological. Therefore, Joint Fire Support (JFS) and Effects is the coordinated and integrated employment of all weapon platforms delivering fire (it includes land, air, naval delivered indirect fires) to achieve the required effects on
ground targets to support land operations in the full spectrum of conflict. It encompasses the integration of indirect fire and effect in order to influence the adversary forces, installations or functions. Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) could
either encompass influencing elements such as PSYOPS, CIMIC, and EW or be
incorporated in a wider cell dealing with the overall influence on activities. Lethal
and non-lethal – these more and more common functions, seek not only physical
effect, but more importantly, effects on the understanding, perception and will of
the adversary.
The necessity of conducting JFS more often occurs and reflects the tactical
level as well, because of the complexity of the contemporary operational environment (non- linear and non-continuous battlespace, dispersion of forces, high operations tempo, and the short time of reaction required in most cases). For this reason
JFS should be coordinated, synchronised and integrated in the frame of three vital
components: surveillance and target acquisition (STA); command and control (C2);
and weapon (delivering) systems. Among these assets Field Artillery Forces posses
a relevant part of each mentioned subsystems and their capabilities have an influence on battle during shaping and decisive operations. The chosen solutions from
different countries presented here have been experimented with and put into practice, and experiences from latest and current peace support and stability operations,
indicate planes and directions of further researches and development of Joint Fire
Support and Effect System, and have proved its` crucial role in contemporary operational environment.
102
Instead of a final conclusion I would like to quote General George S. Patton in
what he said to his soldiers prior to US involvement in World War II - he reflected
on combined arms/ joint warfare and comparing it to an orchestra:
“There is still a tendency in each separate unit...to be a one-handed puncher. By
that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire...That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first
with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with
the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get the
harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in
battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of
Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you...You must each of your
own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at
the proper time...”
General George S. Patton, Jr., 8 July 1941,
address to the men of the 2nd Armored Division,
The Patton Papers, Vol. II, 1974
Bibliography
AAP-6, NATO glossary of terms and definitions, NSA, Brussels 2011.
Artillery Procedures AArtyP-1(B), NSA, Brussels 2009.,
Bailey J. B. A. Maj. Gen., Field Artillery and Firepower, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis
2004.
Fire Support Integration Paper, Canadian Department of Defense, 2008.
Joint Fire Support, JP-3.09, Joint Chief of Staff, 2010.
Joint fire support in 2020, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey-California, 2006.
NATO Field Artillery Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5 , NSA, Brussels 2001.
NATO Indirect Fire Systems Tactical Doctrine AArtyP-5(A), NSA, Brussels 2010.
Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, February 2011.
Rubaj T., Połączone wsparcie ogniowe – zdolności i atrybuty operacyjne sił oraz wybrane
aspekty organizowania, Zeszyty CSAiU, Toruń 2008.
Rubaj T., Artyleria w połączonym wsparciu ogniowym, referat wygłoszony podczas Seminarium Naukowego w WSOWLąd. nt. Artyleria we współczesnych operacjach, ZN
WSO WLąd. Nr 2/2012, Wrocław 2012.
Połączone wsparcie ogniowe - integralna część współczesnych operacji, materiały z Seminarium Naukowego zorganizowanego przez Zakład Wsparcia Działań IWLąd. WZiD
AON w dniu 03.04.2012 r. (w opracowaniu).
103
WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
THE AUTOMATION OF ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT IN CYBERSPACE AND
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Col. Waldemar SCHEFFS, D.Sc.
Abstract
Gaining the upper hand and, in the long run, achieving victory is an aim that each of
the battling parties strives at. Supremacy can be achieved through a variety of measures
ranging from political pressures to military action. The rapid technological advancement of
IT engineering has given rise to clandestine and intense war in the electromagnetic and IT
environment. A signal transmitted simultaneously to a large number of receivers has
become a tool to wage this kind of war. The signal itself is devoid of power and mass.
However, when combined with the signal that transmits it, it becomes a decisive factor and
stage of military action.
New technologies have given rise to new potential areas of warfare. Cyberspace is the
most telling example of an artificially created environment in which bits transmitted
through an appropriate signal play the dominant role. This new warfare environment has
been claiming an ever larger proportion of the ways of sending and receiving information:
command, reconnaissance and electronic war, among many others. An in-depth grasp of
the functioning of electrical apparatuses in a new environment constitutes the gist of the
paper at hand.
The article mentions topics closely connected with the automation of electrical devices
operating under two different conditions: cybernetic and electromagnetic. One dovetails
with the other and both could use the same type of equipment, yet their functions differ. The
common area of operation of equipment in both environments and the possibility of their
undergoing the process of automation allow whole new reconnaissance systems to be
developed. Furthermore, the paper attempts to define the foregoing environments through
the prism of operating in network-centred environment. At the same time some effort will be
made to point to a new meaning of the concept “work in an electronic environment” taking
its source in information hostilities.
Key words – electronic warfare, cyberspace
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THE AUTOMATION OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN CYBERSPACE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Introduction
Since the middle of the 20th century we have been observing a revolution in
science and a rapid development of the industrial world which is characterised by
the vast production and consumption of a variety of goods manufactured by man
along with those used as crude resources. Not only have electronic devices
dominated the life of man, but also industry in general, the lion share of which has
been taken up by the military. Currently many scientists are of the opinion that
Electronics and Informatics have become part and parcel of everyone`s daily life.
Military engineering in WW II was developing fast, as seen from that time.
Electronic equipment was very modern (electron lamps, triodes, pentodes), yet not
without limitations: mainly power consumption and size. The first major breakthrough
came with the scientific design and development of the magatron lamp used in
radio detectors. The revolution proper transpired with the close of WW II. The
transistor and integrated circuits triggered a boom in electronic circuits of various
use. The military sees in it a great potential and have put electronic devices to
a wider use in such areas as communications, reconnaissance, air defence, and
artillery. Electronic equipment is used in military vehicles on a more regular basis
(tanks, armored vehicles, wheeled vehicles, and modern stealth aircraft steered by
man). Perhaps in the not so distant future similar aircraft following on from UAVs
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) will be carrying out military action.
Airspace is not the only area where electrical devices reign supreme. The navy
with its warships and submarines is yet another example of metal leviathans packed
full with missile steering equipment, command, recon, communication, electronic
battle, unit control etc. Any one vessel is a self-contained stronghold. Be it alone or
in a group of vessels, it is capable of locating, recognising, and destroying a target
at a large distance. Warships are equipped with stale-of-the-art technology, being
a live example of how to forge cutting edge ideas into practicability.
Without electronic equipment and computerisation space flight would remain
unattainable. The recent mission of the last space shuttle, Atlantis, does not put pay
to space exploration. It merely marks an end of a stage, in which Electronics and
Informatics have dwarfed the obsolete technology. Needless to say, one must not
disregard military engineering on land. Steel stallions are movable robots, in which
electrical apparatus serves as a basis for a well-aimed fire. The crew operates
a vehicle enabling the defeat of the opponent from a safe distance. Finally and most
importantly, there is the human soldier. The soldier of today may not be a cybersoldier yet; however, taking into account the sheer amount of electrical military
gadgets at his disposal, one can go as far as to talk about a revolution with respect
to soldiers` add-ons. While personal firearms are still considered the basis of any
soldier’s equipment, every so often one hears about PDA computer terminals
enabling more efficient command, sending information concerning hostile
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
reconnaissance and enabling more efficient fire, at the same time staying clear, out
of sight.
All of the afore-mentioned electronic devices remain operative in electronic,
electromagnetic or IT environments. Separately or together with others, the devices
can all be identified and jammed with electromagnetic energy or with a signal
carrying a program that infects an operative system.
The problems seem to lie with the identification of devices working for
electronic warfare systems on the one hand, and those that could be used in an
information environment, on the other. As inanimate matter, electronic equipment
in general, and its operativeness in particular, can undergo automation.
Caution should be kept as to which devices and in which order, as well as to
whose benefit can undergo this process. This paper is devoted to these particular
issues. The first two chapters are concerned with the use of electronic equipment in
an electromagnetic (environment) and cybernetic exploited in electronic warfare
systems. The contents of those chapters exemplify the possibilities of identification
of devices with a practical potential in both environments being the same apparatus
but serving different functions.
Hostilities in an Electronic Warfare Environment
Electromagnetic Waves as a Combat Environment
Until relatively recently the range of light visible to the naked eye was sole
range of the spectrum used inadvertently by man. In battle the visible light
spectrum was initially used to collect data through observation and to transmit
a priori established light, smoke and similar signals. However, those ranges of the
spectrum, as well as the subsequent means capable of transmission, were
considerably limited by the distance to which signals were relayed. Inevitably,
transmission was dependent on the broadcasting position (Data Terminal Position)
as well as particular transmission sectors. Not until the invention/discovery of radio
waves was the electromagnetic space used to its full potential. Following this, the
possibility of confrontation in this very environment materialised.
The last decade of the 19th century saw the first confrontation in the
electromagnetic space. This was marked by the invention of the first wire
telegraphs and the transmission of militarily useful signals via radio waves. War, as
seen from this perspective, began to take shape at the turn of the 20th century. It
was at that time that a certain level of technology was reached allowing the radio to
pay service to the military. Almost simultaneously, with this new use for the radio,
there was a sudden outbreak of war within the electromagnetic space. At the very
beginning, military operations aimed at intercepting and deciphering information
sent via radio. Moreover, as a standard procedure they sent out signals in order to
disrupt the ones sent by the enemy. With radio technology ever quickening its pace
106
of development, new methods of waging clandestine war began to emerge. Novel
solutions, based on divergent scientific thought began to emerge, these included:
reconnaissance, pre-emptive strikes, radio-location, and radio propaganda.
In the years separating the two World Wars the seeming gigantic radioelectronic advancement did not translate itself into new modes of combat nor into
an improvement in combat methodology. The main area of confrontation was
reconnaissance and warmongering done via radio programs. This was mainly in the
KF band. By contrast during the 2nd World War, following 1940, the opposing
armies saw a rapid development in the forms and means of waging electromagnetic
warfare.
The allied forces` scientists and engineers brought to a successful end
a multitude of programs that provided the military with a substantial quantity of
modern reconnaissance and jamming equipment capable of efficient work across
a variety of frequencies. Furthermore, this new technology could emit signals
disrupting electromagnetic energy of a considerable intensity.
The Third Reich and other Axis Powers were unceasingly carrying out
developmental research. They were focusing acutely on defence reconnaissance
and radio-wave interferences. Through such steps they strived at maintaining the
survivability of their radio-electronic systems. The aftermath of World War Two
was characterised by an intensive speeding up in the improvement of technology
and forms of waging electronic war. The whole process was further galvanised by
experiences gained from different local wars and pockets of military conflict.
Especially relevant ones to the issue discussed here are the following: The Korean
War of 1950s, The Vietnam War (1964 – 1973), The Middle East Conflicts (fought
in the years 1967, 1973, 1981), The Falklands War (1982), The Persian Gulf War
(1990 - 1991), The War in Yugoslavia (1999).
The aforementioned conflicts have all paved the way for modern
electromagnetic warfare. Operations carried out across FM waves have come to be
dominant in the aerial, marine, and ultimately cosmic environment. This viewpoint
is very clearly reflected in West European countries` policies and in their use of
electromagnetic warfare systems.
The Iron Curtain countries of the Cold War period firmly believed that an
electronic appliances` primary function should rest with ground forces. It played a
secondary role when it came to the Navy, and Airforce. The overall proportions of
this technology being installed and their tactical usage are visible to this day. Such
a glaring disparity of approaches to the same issue takes its source in World War
Two experiences. It is also justifiable by the scientific and technological boom in
the Western Block. More importantly, one must not disregard here the ongoing
arms race. Its two main sides: The USA and The USSR were bent on worldwide
domination and were in an urgent need of advanced reconnaissance systems that
would remain operative over vast distances.
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At that time it was only long range aircraft that could meet the high technical
standards set for reconnaissance. Back then space reconnaissance was at its
“drawing board” stage. US strategic reconnaissance gave rise to new directions on
the development of electronic equipment, including recon and jamming devices.
Long range reconnaissance with an accompanying spurious signal stands at the
center of innovativeness. It constitutes the essence of technological thought and
prevails in the construction and later use of electronic devices. The electromagnetic
wave setting has become an undeniable domain in the arms race and covert
operations.
The Work of Electronic Warfare Systems under Electromagnetic Conditions
In accordance with the established doctrinal provisions, operations taking place
within an electromagnetic setting are carried out in all manner of military activities
and should be taken for granted. Such operations are mainly the domain of special
units equipped with reconnaissance, jamming, and electronic defence systems. The
electromagnetic setting allows for electronic warfare. Thus, the operational area of
electronic warfare is electromagnetic space as well as radio-electronic sources
emitting and receiving electromagnetic energy. The EW (electromagnetic warfare)
setting is characterised by the following traits: the range of electromagnetic spectrum
used, the density of frequencies used, the surrounding density of electromagnetic
energy, the total number of operating electromagnetic devices per square kilometer,
the deployment of individual radio-magnetic devices and their proximity in relation
to the contact line of troops, the specification and distribution of key military
facilities e.g., main communication junctions, radar stations, reconnaissance
centers, communication satellites. Electronic war spans over the same range of
frequencies used by hostile radio-electronic systems which include communications,
radio location, tele-detection, and radio navigation. The relevant band range from
30 KHz to 40 GHz to infrared and finally to light visible to human eye. The
deployment of particular radio-electronic devices determines which areas and
which frontiers are manned with the required amount of equipment. Being familiar
with charts down to the minutest detail is key in estimating the effectiveness of RM
(radio magnetic) interference from specific sources. Moreover, it is essential that
there be a detailed specification of vital RE (radio electronic) facilities as well as
their viable positions. This is done in order to set a proper course of action for
reconnaissance and allow an appropriate amount of time for jamming with the use
of electromagnetic impulse or munitions.
Electronic Warfare with diversified operational and tactical activities of troops
strives at gaining information about the systems and measures of electronic ground
forces; the aircraft forces and their defence potential; the navy; and weapons
operating in outer space. Disruption and deliberate disorganisation of the
reconnaissance systems of hostile armies and their commanding officers is central
to its definition. Of all the mentioned ways of waging this kind of war, the EM
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waves setting is slowly but surely taking the lead. One can provide a number of
examples of armament systems where electronic devices play a subsidiary role in
achieving the expected results is of top priority:
1. command and communications systems (C2W)
2. radio-technical systems
3. munitions control systems (missiles, UAV)
4. reconnaissance systems (e.g. optoelectronics)
5. aircraft defence breaking systems (SEAD)
6. electronic warfare systems (including EM impulses)
7. IT systems (including cybernetic systems)
8. navigation systems (GPS, Glonass)
9. various back-up systems used by the navy and ground forces
The electronic equipment in question is being used continuously irrespective of
war, crisis or peace. The only factor susceptible to change is the extent of military
operations in each of the respective states.
The approach toward the work of electronic devices in the EW environment
within the Polish Armed Forces and in relation to the whole theory refers to
specific tasks and is strictly task-oriented. During peace, military headquarters
make all the necessary preparations over a certain timespan. Those preparations are
subsequently tasted on the range. The planning officers of particular electronic
combat units analyse hostile activity, assess potential risks, plan the chain of
operation stages, see them through, and finally check whether the entire enterprise
has yielded the expected results. They verify this by receiving the enemy`s signals
from particular bandwidths. Should the operation turn out a success they proceed
with the next stage. If the results do not come up to the expectations, the whole
procedure is repeated or the final decision verified and the operation continues. The
rule of thumb in operations and planning is: plan-realise-check-verify. It has
a strong footing and immense historical background and has been widely used by
virtually any armed forces involved in electronic warfare.
For almost eight years now a new concept concerning EW has been on
NATO`s agenda. Its centrepiece is to ascertain specified end results even prior to
planners beginning their work. The concept came to view in a publication issued in
2008 under the title, NATO Electronic Warfare Policy (MC 0064/10). It rests with
the planner to define the results of electronic combat operations conducted under
electromagnetic conditions. Moreover, it is their duty to assess how this will affect
the success of the operation. This leads to an entirely new outlook on the planning
phase, the preparation, and the actual carrying out of electronic combat.
The previous approach had it that with a certain amount and specific type of
EW equipment, the enemy`s EW potential was expected to be diminished. What
was taken into consideration was the degree of damage to hostile electronic
potential with a rough estimate of the outcome of the battle. The operation was to
be repeated until the desired effect was reached. The latest approach, by contrast, is
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
achieving the objective by any means. Depending on the challenge ahead a varying
amount of equipment and munitions is used in order to accomplish the end result.
If the EW arsenal of a given country happens to be insufficient, it is enhanced by
a surplus from other NATO states. Thus the new framing of electronic warfare
assumes joint operations. In a leap-frog over the next few subsections, it could be
claimed that such operations will most certainly play a fundamental role in future
electromagnetic warfare.
The Automation of the Work of Electrical Equipment in Electronic warfare
Systems
The concept of automation is applicable to both the analytical and planning
process. Moreover, it also refers to the procedure of realising combat operations via
the electronic route. Finally, one can talk about the automation of information
transfer to the decision-maker and back. A consequential question follows: can all
processes be automated? Furthermore also, can all reconnaissance and jamming
devices be coupled into separate automated systems? The latest generation of these
technology items leaves the assembly-line semi- or fully automated and serve as
multi-task appliances. We run up against problems trying to piece together the old
with the cutting edge. Keeping to standards in this situation boarders on the
impossible. Some items fail to be automated due to their technological
incompatibility. Others can be automated, however only to some extent. Financial
and technical analyses state in no uncertain terms that building EW systems on
older generation devices will generate financial losses. A more advisable solution
would be the development of a whole new system based on our own engineering
thought and with the aid of domestic industry. To better understand the problems
connected with automation, it is essential to possess a good knowledge of the
characteristics of conducting operations in an electromagnetic environment. The
Polish Armed Forces fight this war mainly from the ground and the sea. In other
words, operations are run in a limited two-dimensional environment. Here we can
talk about the width and depth of the battlefield zone. The potential role of the
airspace has been underscored, but thus far severely underused. The possibility of
realising tasks has been diminished by tactical units' demarcation lines as well as
the limited range of communication between them. The pervasiveness of EW
combat can be impeded by the inability to receive electromagnetic emission i.e. the
radio horizon for VHF, UHF, SHF, and EFH bands. Also, of much relevance here
is the distribution of hostile electrical equipment. The total number of EW systems
at the Polish Armed Forces` disposal leaves much to be desired. Currently, we are
far from possessing a fully fledged automated EW system. Not even the automated
system Wołczenica can render the military fully automated. It is still the case that
many subunits fight with no automation whatsoever when it comes to tactics and
operation. The whole of reconnaissance and jamming is done manually through
sound waves from command post subunits. This leaves the commanding officer of
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the subunit with insufficient time for reaction to the rapidly changing conditions on
the battlefield. Combat dynamics is characterised by a quick pace of change.
Consequently, without an instantaneous reaction to the detected sources, the
tactical unit will be exposed to electronic hostilities from the enemy. In practice,
there is no need to jam every single source. In some situations it is left to the
soldier`s discretion to decide which source should take priority. That is why
automated command and control apparatus should be equipped with manually
operable equivalent.
Control relations at the level of EW subunit
The exchange of information
The relation of command from the command post of the tactical unit
WE
WE
WE
WE
20
25
WE
20
WE
15
25km
10
10
5
FEBA
Picture 1. EW Company formation at the tactical level
The tactical operating of a EW company via radio is by direct orders issued by
G2 SD tactical unit (pic. 1). The entire system is controlled by the EW chief
commander and individual posts are run by the EW company commander. The
update on the progress of the operation is sent to the analysis and assessment team
in the G2 unit. The presented command mode of the EW company devoid of a fast
radio connection severely undermines the effectiveness of electromagnetic combat.
This is also the case at the operational level. Without automated systems, the HF
band cannot be used to its full potential. A particular subunit equipped with
outdated technology does not match the high standards of the modern battlefield.
The lack of automated systems controlling reconnaissance and jamming has its
consequences in the located radio signal being terminated even before the jamming
initiates. The HF jamming subunit works in phonic-manual mode most of the time,
although it also has an in-built semi-automated control unit. Its wear and tear
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
causes its fallibility. The EW system code-named Przebiśnieg was to have been an
answer to these shortcomings. The system is used by an EW company at the
tactical level. It constitutes an internally automated system at the subunit level. It
has significantly improved the system`s detection, tracking, and jamming
capabilities. Up to now, it has not reached the required reconnaissance penetration
across the entire reconnaissance zone of the tactical unit, approximately 50 km.,
even though the antenna was operating at 50 meters above sea level. Each subunit
in the system is controlled via radio using a TDMA time loop emitted from the
commanding vehicle. This is synonymous with automation. What is more, each
system is perfectly capable of individual work, being independent from others, and
aggregating information intercepted by the commanding vehicle.
However, one downside of the system is the yet unresolved problem of
a simultaneous display of the results obtained from reconnaissance and tracking in
the EW company command vehicle. The commanding officer has only radio or
radio location devices to rely on. He or she does not have insight into data
verification essential in assessing the tactical and/or operational character of each
source. Yet, the very basic design flaw of the Przebiśnieg system is the lack of
direct connection of automatic data transmission and control in the commanding
tactical unit. The commanding unit should be able to send and receive data to and
from the system respectively. It is a top priority that this missing element be
designed, developed, and put to use in the ground forces. It is vital that a vehicle
receiving and sending data automatically should be able to make use of the existing
means of transmission. Otherwise the system will co-operate with the EW subunit
only. If this is the case neither the commanding officer nor the headquarters will
receive data in real time but with a considerable time lag. There is a real danger
that vital decisions will be taken based on partial data. This being said, it is obvious
that automation of EW subunits is an absolute necessity.
In the future development of EW systems the main emphasis will be placed on
data transmission. The speed with which reconnaissance and prevention function
have a major say in the efficiency of the systems. A fast track to achieving this goal
is possessing a perfect medium of data transmission. Still in the pipeline, the
system Kaktus is to meet this requirement. It will be able to transmit data in almost
real time. The system, apart from having an internal automated module, will be
equipped with external modules as well. With a variety of communication systems
data aberration will hardly be noticed. Such a technical solution ensures the
unhindered flow of information in the form of written text, graphics or images. The
messages will be able to carry substantial byte-load and will not lose out on
quality. For the operation to be carried out in sync with the commanding unit an
appropriate reception model is a prerequisite. A separate transmitting vehicle with
a direct access to the internal system of data circulation should also meet this
condition; without one, even the best system remains a manually operated device
of very limited use. In these types of units, data have to be collected first, then
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processed, and finally presented to the commander, who is the ultimate decisionmaker. Needless to say, it takes a considerable amount of time for the data to
complete the full cycle.
Currently, EW units in the Polish Army have a large portion of this technology
produced abroad. The technology is being used at different frequency bands. The
vast majority serves to identify and track radio sources. The search and interception
of signals relevant for EW units is central to reconnaissance proceedings. The
technology used today is capable of detecting most signals, the medium being
electromagnetic waves at virtually all frequency bands. The intercepted signals are
not always broadcast by radio transmitters. Often the source of transmission cannot
be established with certainty. The spectral analysis of such signals helps conclude
that their origin may as well be radio waves, computer emission or microwaves.
Signals of this type will also be detected and intercepted. Going back to the
Przebiśnieg system again, it must be pointed out that there is a possibility to detect
and track electronic devices that are beyond the interest of military decisionmakers. Radio receivers are designed to receive a signal up to 3GHz and radio
location receivers up to 18 GHz. The problem lies in their ability to identify
signals. With an appropriate database built up of signals carrying no information at
all such identification is possible. Therefore, reconnaissance appliances can serve a
double function. Some will satisfy the needs of EW, others can be used as
multifunctional recon apparatus, depending on the need and applicability. Apart
from EW purposes, multifunctional receivers will be searching for atypical signals
at different bandwidths. With available database patterns serving a touchstone
function, it will be possible to identify and jam the source of emission. Here the
jamming procedure is a whole different issue in itself. Jamming devices emit
energy that makes hostile devices dysfunctional. The information thus transmitted
changes its character, and in other situations it is destroyed. The role of those
devices is twofold as well. They may be used in EW systems. They may also be
used as signals distorting the signal proper in computer networks. If it is assumed
that spurious signals carry an additional program such as a virus, then this kind of
hostility lies in the domain of the cybernetic environment and can be dubbed
cybernetic warfare.
The Cybernetic Environment – Terminology
Operations across and within computer networks should be understood through
the prism of the changes that have been taking place during military conflicts as
well as operations other than war. With the end of the Cold War period and the
global, bipolar, military status quo, an entirely new political situation has emerged.
The situation has changed dramatically when it comes to global security. Over the
last few decades we have been witnessing emergency situations we never faced
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before. An immediate result of those changes is a non-standard use of armed forces
and a new approach toward planning, commanding, controlling, and collaborating
with domestic troops as well as allied forces abroad. We are also observing a major
change in the attitudes toward non-military organisations, for instance,
humanitarian organisations under military supervision. The massive influence
those changes have, has given rise to a number of asymmetric effects on domestic
and hostile forces. This exemplifies new hazards in the area of military operations.
The traditional methods of waging war are being superseded by surprise attacks
using small groups of troops in many places simultaneously. A physical attack,
aside from gunfire, has come to be associated with other mediums and cyberattack
certainly counts as one of them.
Cyberspace is the “primordial soup” that spawned all manner of means of
information transfer, be it the spoken word, printed messages or images at present,
and holographic images in the future. As far as easy availability of information is
concerned, global data transfer constitutes a bona-fide revolution. The military are
trying to make the most of this state of affairs. Any commanding officer`s decision
can be tracked online. Commanders and their troops have become mass media
hostages. Their decisions are assessed by domestic and foreign audience. The
cybernetic setting, which has become their working ambience, is transparent to
public opinion always hankering after the latest developments.
The fast tempo of development in the IT area made such easy access to
information possible. Countries all over the globe started coming up with different
definitions of information networks. The concept as we know it began to take on
new meaning when approached from a global perspective. It has been extended to
encapsulate gathering data, detecting and jamming the information setting. For
some time there has been a noticeable increase in the bulk of material published on
the topic of cyberspace. Many authors have been taking the term for granted,
without giving much thought to its true meaning. Some of them seem to blur and
skew its meaning in attempting to present their views. One consequence of the
nascent change was a new doctrine proposed by the US Armed Forces in
December 2008. It was made public as The National Military Strategy for
Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO). It defines the cybernetic domain, enumerates
potential threats, and nephralgic areas. It constitutes a basis for further military
action in this area. The doctrine itself is an expression of a multidimensional
strategic approach by the US Army to the use of cybernetic operations ensuring the
nation`s supremacy in this field. According to the doctrine, this objective is to be
achieved through an integrated cybernetic offence with defensive operations aided
by highly-qualified personnel. The doctrine is an attempt at defining cyberspace.
Cyberspace is a domain characterised by the use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum for gathering, modifying, and exchanging data via
network systems and the accompanying physical infrastructure. The document
contains an older definition from a previous publication (JP 1-02). It reads as
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follows: cyberspace – a virtual environment in which digitalized information is
made available via computer networks.
These two framings of cyberspace differ glaringly when juxtaposed. While in
the older version access to data is exclusively through computer networks, the
latest version includes a selection of electronic devices and accompanying physical
infrastructure. Both definitions refer to already existing information networks.
However, cyberspace`s social dimension should also be taken into account.
Traditional social relations stand in great contrast to the ones maintained over and
with the help of the Internet. Time and space lose their core meaning in cyberspace.
Interpersonal relations are of the essence. In this respect borders between countries
have ceased to exist and people using the Web have become uncontrollable.
Everyone is connected to everyone else while remaining an anonymous netizen.
It should be reiterated that cyberspace can be approached from different angles.
It could be treated as a human activity aided by information technology, where all
activity is synonymous with technology, and where geographical notions are
irrelevant. As was pointed out by P. Villo “… its elements are devoid of an
expansiveness dimension, they function within and can be subsumed under
a specific timeframe across which information flows. […] Integrated computers
and computer displays render the division into the here and there non-existent.
It is almost a cliché to say that cyberspace is a new medium transferring data at
light speed by means of bits. Even without a sharpened definition we seem to know
instantly that what authors have in mind are computer networks in general and the
Internet in particular. Cyberspace is treated as something created artificially.
A value stripped of geographic parameters, immeasurable and limitless. As
Z. Bauman pointedly observed: ”its frames and boundaries are measured by the
current level of IT advancement and the extent to which the world has been
Interneticized”. Indeed, what we call distance in cyberspace is far from being an
objective impersonal datum physical in character. All remaining factors, by means
of which group identities arise, gain and preserve their uniqueness.
The character of contact between networking users has changed since the first
stages of cyberspace. Interpersonal relations have turned into a form of partnership,
while freedom of speech is gaining wider and wider ground. Territorialism has
become a thing of the past. It is no longer possible to control who communicates
what to whom. The most pressing issue then is not so much an unimpeded flow of
information but the control of virtual space. Democratic countries wanting to
control cyberspace are obliged to adhere to fundamental human rights, the freedom
of expression being one of them. It has been decided that since cyberspace cannot
be controlled, the effects of its functioning ought to be minimised.
The results of those measures can be observed in a limiting of access to some
Internet content for underage users. Access to sites promoting pornography and
violence are automatically censored. Similar steps are taken by companies toward
their employees. The same is the case with authorities banning access to
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aggressive, subversive or otherwise unwanted Internet content. In some Asian and
Arabic countries such practice has become standard. Many authoritarian regimes
go to great lengths to keep their society ignorant. They purposefully block Internet
sites, some of which are fertile ground for insurgency. Such countermeasures may
prove effective, as a broadband connection in these countries is still a rarity.
Cyberspace is thoroughly discussed in an official document published in
Poland in 2008 entitled Governmental Program for Cyberspace Protection for the
years 2009-2011 – Provisions. It is a reaction to different measures taken by the
EU. The document provides specific guidelines for the Polish presence in
cyberspace. It also provides a simple definition of the term, which reads:
Cyberspace is communication space consisting of a system of internet links. It
provides some names of governmental organisations working in the cyberspace
environment, which include: MSWiA, ABW, MON, SKW. Moreover, it mentions
non-governmental organisations, and owners of resources, etc. It informs that the
Polish Ministry of Defence (MON) has been granted its own share of responsibility
for cyberspace. The legal basis for the Armed Forces jurisdiction is the document
Decision of MON nr. 375/MON dated 29/07/2008 concerning the response to
computer incidents in the National Defence Department. This can be taken as red
that the military had already been involved in cyberspace activities.
Following government decisions The Minister of National Defence formed The
Polish Armed Forces Centre for Cybernetic Security, which is to be in charge of
cybernetic hostilities at the operational level. Professionals working at the office
define operations in cyberspace as an easy access to and wide use of
electromagnetic waves. Following their idea of cybernetic activity; It is a global
expanse within an IT setting comprising the Internet, telecommunications
networks, and IT systems. Cyberspace can be understood as accomplishing
different objectives via cyberspace route. Those measures include activities whose
aim is to gain and protect relevant data. This take on the matter corresponds with
the American definition. Cybernetic operations are a true evolutionary milestone.
Obviously, the trend setting country in this respect is The United States of
America. It can boast the most advanced IT in the world. With the document DD 3
– The US tries to define cyberspace, extending its core meaning to include
cybernetic operations and cybernetic defence.
The concept has been extended to include by an IT domain. Here, cyber-ops
are explained away as cybernetic solutions where self-interest plays a key role.
Such operations include activities in IT networks and activities defending the
Global Information Grid. The set of aforementioned definitions help to sharpen the
concept of the cybernetic advantage to operating in cyberspace as a method of
carrying out hostilities in a given time and domain without unwanted interference.
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The Correlation of Electrical Apparatus
After WW2 both civil and military theoreticians were of the view that future
wars will be strictly tied with outer-space and the electromagnetic spectrum. The
views expresses placed the EW waves as the most palpable background for military
conflict. This claim is substantiated by numerous examples of the use of electronic
weapons throughout history. The evidence for the shift toward the EM dimension
is further confirmed by many innovations introduced to the field over the years.
The view expressed by the historian Michael Howard in his book War in the
History of Europe tellingly frames the issues related to the development and use of
electronic means of communication, cryptography, reconnaissance, and radio
location. (…) The side that prevailed eventually was more capable of keeping track
of the enemy`s movements, deciphering its messages, and at the same time it could
keep its own secrets secret. During World War Two this would not have been
possible without the know-how of intercepting radio signals.
It can be assumed that already in those years a new war environment was being
exploited. One can bring forward countless examples of attempts at categorizing
military activities and defining all war dimensions.
Up until recently military confrontation was taking place in a three-dimensional
environment. This matches very closely human cognition and understanding. Strife
at a modern battlefield transcends these barriers. Some theorist talk about as many
as six modern warfare dimensions altogether. One of them is Colonel R. Grabau of
the German Armed Forces who discusses the multidimensionality of war by
pointing to six aspects in waging it. The first three are rather standard and include
the following: X-width, Z-depth, and H-height. Additionally, he introduces time,
information, and electromagnetic spectrum. He envisages the last three factors to
be decisive in future conflicts.
The same conclusion was reached independently by a colonel from the United
States Airforce in the first years of the 1990s. Colonel John Warder put forward his
claim of strategic paralysis, where he presented his Warden`s Model. According to
his theory, any enemy can be seen as a collective system of subsystems. Thus, any
organisation can be regarded as a structure composed of five inner rings that form a
unit and serve different functions. He includes in his model a number of
organisations: companies, the military, terrorist organisations, organised crime,
among others. Here is an approximation of how his model is supposed to work:
1. Political elites i.e. the controlling factor.
2. Basic institutions – earlier referred to as organic needs transferring energy
from one ring to another.
3. Infrastructure.
4. Society – the human factor.
5. Defence Systems – composed of demographic groups.
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
The model is organised along the following lines; each of Warden`s rings
functions in a specific settling: the sea, ground, air, outer-space, cyberspace.
Taking into account current conditions, the model calls for a slight modernisation.
Nowadays the preferred setting for various activities is electronic rather than
electromagnetic. Thus the fifth ring is divided into two parts, the cybernetic setting
and the electromagnetic setting.
Air
Defense Systems
Society
Cosmos
Infrastrucure
Basic Institutions
Political Elites
Sea
Ground
EM Environment
Cybernetic
Environment
Electronic Setting
Source: Own work.
Picture 2. A modified version of Warden’s Model
The problems with automation of electronic devices concern the EW waves
environment. Neither automation nor electronic systems are issues keenly pursued
by Polish military decision-makers. The past as well as ongoing military conflicts
especially in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide irrefutable evidence that the IT
setting is becoming more and more important in battle. Hence the questions: can
electronic equipment be used to detect IT networks? If that is the case, then which
devices are these specifically? Can these devices also work in other environments?
Perhaps they are operating within a yet undefined one.
Traditionally a battlefield used to be described as a closed geographical area,
within which hostilities are carried out. The very definition of the battlefield
imposed ways of waging war. Nowadays modern combat uses other environments
as well. By their nature, they are far removed from the battlefield in a geographical
sense, which is responsible for the radical change in the ways war is waged. This is
noticeable even at a very fundamental level. As a case in point we can observe
network-centric hostilities connected with maintaining a continuous, unimpeded
flow of information from the decision-maker to appropriate sensors. Multifunctional
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devices of a global range help individual troops accomplish strategic goals. They
keep soldiers up-dated by a continuous flow of data so that they can take optimal
decisions. Another telling example is antiterrorist hostilities, especially the ones in
a network-centric environment. In the case of opposing an unidentified enemy it is
difficult to talk about a battlefield as such. In this context military operations rarely
bring the expected result. Asymmetrical conflicts are characterised by an atypical
battlespace area. The enemy and its pursuer are constantly on the move. The side
whose position is compromised loses out. Conversely, the side fighting by stealth
controls the situation.
A reaction to this state of affairs was a new concept proposed by the US
military. What used to be called a battlefield is now superseded by the battlespace.
It includes strategic, operational and tactical conditions irrespective of their
geographical location. From this angle, operations even at the tactical level are
conditioned by a vast number of factors, most of which lie beyond the commonly
understood battlefield. Here, one can talk about other settings for activities.
Generally speaking, traditionally organised operations limit the manoeuvrability of
the commanding officer with respect to the monitoring and assessment of the
situation. His recon capacity is not fully used. This situation is instantly resolved
with the application of a network centric approach toward military operations. In
other words, the IT and electromagnetic environments prevail.
Geospace
IT Warfare
Environment
Network-Centric Environment
Working environment of
electronic devices in
cybernetic operations
Electronic
Devices.
Electronic
Devices.
Electronic
Devices.
Electronic
Devices.
Electronic
Devices.
Working environment of
electronic devices in
Electronic Warfare
Electronic
Environmnet
Source: Own work.
Picture 3. The working environment of electrical devices in an Electronic Warfare and
Network-Centric Setting
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
The use of electromagnetic energy in air, outer-space, and water, as well as the
use of computer systems in cyberspace directed military action toward a totally
new environment where Electronics plays the most important role. Obviously, arms
in the traditional understanding will long remain a vital part of any army`s arsenal.
However, they will probably be used to scare off potential enemies. The common
denominator for this environment are electronic systems and devices. We have thus
entered a new era of the electronic environment. One cannot overvalue its role as it
is used to operate and control virtually every piece of equipment. Man is an
essential component of this mechanism. Autonomous military operations are now
possible, which is another great achievement in the field of cybernetic science.
Independent operations carried out at sea, in the air or on land with the use of
electronic equipment further bear out the claim that we are witnessing the
emergence of a novel battlefield environment. With this in mind, the electronic
environment can be described as follows:
• The set of all objects including their attributes and dependencies between
them, which due to certain criteria of assignment to the system, have been excluded
from it.
• The totality of inanimate elements both natural and created by man existing
within a particular area including the links and dependencies between them.
The concept of the setting in which electronic devices function has been
narrowed down to the total number of inanimate elements resulting from human
activities in a particular time and space.
This paper has viewed the electromagnetic setting from many different angles.
A considerable amount of space has also been devoted to a number of problems
connected with an automation of electrical devices in their working environment.
A different issue is automation in other environments. The resultant question is,
can equipment functioning in other settings also be automated. The characteristics
of the setting have been provided. The conclusion is that electrical devices
functioning in this setting are mainly computers. However, apart from them, there
is a wide range of auxiliary appliances.
Carrying out operations in cyberspace means facing the same challenges pertaining
to Electronic Warfare. The hostilities in both environments are comparable if one
assumes that the means of combat in cyberspace are reconnaissance, jamming, and
defence. The fundamental question is whether they are the same in nature.
Cybernetic reconnaissance aims at gaining information about the movement of
objects in computer networks. In other words, it is concerned with gathering data
that is of interest to the recipient, intercepting information from identified objects,
detecting relevant sources and tracking them. Therefore, it can be concluded that
these are very similar tasks that lie at the core of Electronic Warfare. What has
partially changed are the tools used to accomplish these goals. The radio receiver
has given way to the computer equipped with appropriate software. This software
constitutes the key and is the fundamental difference between cybernetic and
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electromagnetic warfare. With a closer look at the issue one encounters a further
problem. Computers are equipped with receiver-transmitter devices such as Wi-Fi
or Bluetooth. Consequently, an electronic appliance together with a computer form
a transmitter-receiver system. Through their protocols, Wi-Fi devices allow for
data to be transmitted over a long distance by means of 2.4 GHz electromagnetic
waves. Taking this into consideration we can say that receiving devices are starting
to function like similar devices used in EW. In a nutshell, information
reconnaissance is electronic reconnaissance realised by searching emission sources,
intercepting and tracking signals transmitted via electromagnetic waves. What
changes is the character of the detected devices. By contrast, information
reconnaissance within cybernetic warfare focuses on the search for objects,
programs, and their interception, detection and tracking in computer networks with
the use of impulses and, to some extent, electromagnetic waves. The way to access
computer networks is via the electromagnetic spectrum or direct connection to the
network.
G2
Source: Own work.
Picture 4. The idea of radio-electronic reconnaissance
Granting the fact that that under certain conditions radio-electronic and
information reconnaissance is feasible by means of electromagnetic waves, one
may wonder whether it would be possible to construct a universal tracking device.
Such a hypothesised item would be able to monitor computer networks and other
electronic equipment working at similar frequencies for both cybernetic and
electromagnetic warfare. If we assume that EW breaks out in a civic setting then
construction of the device is viable. With just one such remotely splayed item
capable of receiving a wide frequency spectrum, it would be possible to gain access
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WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
to electronic devices of interest to EW and to receive impulses at the working
frequency of practically any network. Remote connection to such equipment would
make it possible to connect to any particular network undetected.
Intercepting radiotransmission in
computer networks
G2
Interception radiotrasmission
from own unit
Direct connection to
network
Source: Own work
Picture 5. The idea of cybernetic reconnaissance
EW subunits
universal
electronic device
Intercepting radiotransmission in computer
networks via common electronic device
CW subunits
Source: Own work.
Picture 6. A model of a common locating device in electronic and cybernetic warfare
122
Apart from electronic devices typical for electronic warfare, cybernetic warfare
will also be using jamming devices and technology for cybernetic defense.
Interference and jamming in this sense is tantamount to introducing spying
software into computer networks. This means gaining specific data in specific
networks and computers using all manner of methods. Moreover, what is also
understood by jamming is introducing software in order to cause physical damage
to software e.g., destruction of database content, virus infection, overload causing
hardware to go haywire, deliberate overloading of the CPU, RAM, and graphics
board. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of accessing computer networks.
Breaking into computers from any place on the globe. The other being direct
connection to network. Many receivers take necessary safety precautions, which
prevents access to their databases. Information seekers are expected to possess
a formidable body of knowledge, which with the level of IT education available, is
not a problem at all. Additionally, a much more severe problem is posed by
networks located outside the reach of cyber-warriors. Providing special units with
universal devices might be a solution to this problem. Such devices could be used
for electronic reconnaissance in the traditional sense, but at the same time they
could monitor a given area for networks of interest. As soon as one has been
located, then with the use of appropriate software, cybernetic warfare ensues.
Automation and the universality of reconnaissance have been mainly due to
cost cuts and tightening of the budgets. Another consequence is the miniaturisation
of devices and gear. The smaller a device is, the less it costs to produce. The best
examples are sensory devices, whose functions range from detecting to jamming to
booby traps.
Another issue is computer network security. From the point of view of
cybernetic warfare, defence comes down to the technical protection of computers
with the help of programs, monitoring devices, the surveillance systems.
Furthermore, it includes barring access of unwanted individuals and/or programs to
the network itself, the server, identification cards, and finally to the premises.
The automation of electrical devices for the needs of both EW and CW is
possible to a certain extent and in relation to highly specialised reconnaissance
devices. Experience gained from past military conflicts teaches us that the future
combat environment will force us to change much in our ideas and attitudes. The
proposals made in this paper may contribute to finding novel technical solutions.
Conclusion
The ongoing evolution in the organisation of military operations in
environments other than electromagnetic, as well as the permanent reorganisation
of reconnaissance does not concern only structural and doctrinal changes. Focus on
other environments means a deep transformation, which is predicted to last
123
WALDEMAR SCHEFFS
relatively long, perhaps even more than twenty years. The heart of the matter is the
a change in the mentality and concepts concerned with activities in IT networks
and approaching electronic devices from a broader perspective. The electronic and
cybernetic dimension is becoming a reality. Personal, tactical, structural and
technological changes impress upon us different attitude toward functional and
constructional considerations of electronic devices operating within different
environments. Homogenous devices operating within a single setting are costly,
inordinate in size, and easily detectable on the battlefield. By contrast, miniaturised
multifunctional devices will be able to achieve levels of efficiency unattainable for
older technology. They will excel at accomplishing complex tasks. Thus,
automation of such devices is a prerequisite and a necessity.
These changes are being made and probably will be taking place during
missions organised by the military. This is taken to mean that altogether three
processes are taking place in parallel: (1) the participation of reconnaissance in
missions with the use of state-of –the-art recon gear, (2) automation systems, (3)
the search for new technological solutions. That is why reconnaissance operations
will be carried out under very hard conditions. Taking this into consideration, it can
be assumed that in the coming years the dominant environment for The Polish
Armed Forces will be the electromagnetic environment. The automation of systems
will be developed systematically. When it comes to the cybernetic environment,
the automation of devices is limited in range. Yet, considering the difficulties
accessing certain networks, especially LAN networks, common electrical devices
(sensors) could undergo this process.
New concepts referring to electronic equipment are discussed by different
panels of experts. It is for academics to decide whether some will enter the
technical language. After verification from scientific circles they will be included
in doctrines and books. Those considerations are still to come.
Automation and miniaturisation are changing scientists` views on problems of
reconnaissance in different environments. Not only do the EW units work in the
EM spectrum, but they are also looking for ways to expand and work efficiently in
other environments. With hindsight, the rapid development of technology and the
speed of changes will cause a revolutionary shift from the electromagnetic
spectrum to a wholly new environment. It barely needs pointing out that we must
do all there is within our power not to miss it and keep abreast with the times.
Bibliography
Bauman Z., Globalizacja, czyli komu globalizacja, a komu lokalizacja, “Studia
socjologiczne”, nr 3, 1997.
Bauman Z, Globalizacja, Warszawa 2000.
Bógdał-Brzeinska A., Gawrycki M. F., Cyberterroryzm i problemy bezpieczeństwa
informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2003.
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Czeszejko S. Działania elektroniczne w NATO i Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
– próba kategoryzacji, AON, Warszawa 2011
Cyberspace Operations (DD 3-12), Centrum Rozwoju Doktryn i Edukacji Sił Powietrznych
USA, 2010.
Grabau, Sześć wymiarów wojny, WPZ nr 1,2,3, Warszawa, 1987
Howard M, Wojna w dziejach Europy, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1990.
Konopka L., Walka sieciocentryczne sposobem działania sił zbrojnych w przyszłości, Myśl
Wojskowa, nr 2/2006.
Mały słownik Cybernetyczny, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1973.
Materiały robocze Centrum Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego, Białobrzegi, 2011.
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations – NMS-CO, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Waszyngton, 2006,
Price A., Narzędzia mroku, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 2006
Rządowy program ochrony cyberprzestrzeni RP na lata 2009-2011 – założenia, Warszawa,
2009.
Scheffs W., Walka elektroniczna w operacji i walce, AON, Warszawa 2005.
Scheffs W, Środowisko działania sensorów walki elektronicznej, ZN AON nr 4/2010
Sienkiewicz P., Wizje i modele wojny informacyjnej. w: Społeczeństwo informacyjne –
wizja czy rzeczywistość ?, Biblioteka Główna Akademii Górniczo-Hutniczej, Kraków
2003.
Vego M., Systemowe kontra klasyczne podejście do działań bojowych, Kwartalnik Bellona
nr 2, Warszawa, 2009.
http://en.wikipedia.org/cybrprzestrzeń
125
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
CBRN RECONNAISSANCE IN THE POLISH
ARMED FORCES
Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D.
Abstract
Modern combat operations are carried out in a constantly changing reality. The
speed and diversity of these changes means that parties to the conflict work with
limited access to information. For many years, it has been known that one of the
most difficult types of combat operations are conducted in terms of the use of
weapons of mass destruction. The immense power of destruction combined with the
massive contamination typical for that weapon means that the problem of quickly
gathering reliable information about WMD strikes and contaminations is still
extremely important. For this purpose, CBRN reconnaissance has been developed,
however because of the importance of the project and the considerable diversity
there are several interpretations as to what it involves.
This article is an attempt to assess the relevance and credibility of the various
theories of CBRN reconnaissance. It discusses the history of that type of
reconnaissance, its nature and numerous application examples. The analysis
examined the rules in force in Poland's CBRN reconnaissance which result from the
current understanding of doctrine. In addition to considerations relating to the
reconnaissance, the U.S. solution were presented as a comparison.
Particular attention was paid to the analysis of tasks, methods and techniques of
CBRN reconnaissance, which in most cases still remain unclear. At the same time effort
has been taken to present proper, according to the author, an interpretation of all these
elements of CBRN reconnaissance, allowing for the verification of the suitability of
existing tasks, methods and techniques and to propose a more useful solution.
Key words – CBRN, WMD
Modern threats, manifested in the form of various types of contamination can
be diverse in nature. In general, however, there are no major problems in dividing
them into two separate, quite different types. The first one is derived from strictly
military threats, specifically threats generated by nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. The second type of threats, occurring also in peacetime, usually are the
result of the potential impact of large numbers of toxic industrial chemicals which
occur in the national economy.
126
CBRN RECONNAISSANCE IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
For many years in the Polish Armed Forces, to overcome these threats,
a number of different projects have been prepared, which now operate under the
concept of CBRN Defence1.
Currently, CBRN Defence is seen as a set of undertakings carried out in order
to deter the enemy from using WMD and ensuring the security of forces during
operations in terms of contaminations caused by the use of nuclear, biological,
chemical and radiological weapons as well as by the release of dangerous
substances in situations other than a WMD strike2.
The achievement of such a formulated goal of CBRN Defence will never be an
easy task. This is due to the enormous potential for destruction, which targeted
accurately can cause death and destruction on a scale rarely seen. An additional
complication is the unusual variation of mass destruction, which makes the defence
effort very different. But in all cases, to achieve the objective of CBRN Defence it
should be pursued by the full and proper use of all available forces and means.
The implementation of these tasks are carried out within the wide spectrum of
CBRN Defence System, in which the tasks conducted first are those whose purpose
is to avoid contamination. Among them, certainly, CBRN reconnaissance should
be found; however, is that the case?
The purpose of this article is to identify the place and role of CBRN
reconnaissance in the Polish Armed Forces within the overall task of determining
the functioning of a modern CBRN Defence System. During the investigation
answers will be sought to the questions: What is the CBRN Defence System and
what made it? What is CBRN reconnaissance? What are the methods, tasks and
techniques of modern CBRN reconnaissance?
A Brief History
As mentioned, in the past there operated a number of terms relating to the
general sense of defence against weapons of mass destruction. In certain periods
there simultaneously operate two or even three types of combat service support.
Originally, this was due to the separation of the various "defences" into antichemical, anti-biological (antibacterial)3 or anti-nuclear, but later, after
simultaneously been used for a long time there developed an anti-chemical defence
1
Previously, there were anti-chemical defence, chemical support, anti-gas defense, anti-nuclear
defence and anti-biological defence - see. I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań obrony
przeciwchemicznej w Wojsku Polskim, ZN AON, No. 3/1998 Warsaw.
2
Obrona przed bronią masowego rażenia w operacjach połączonych, DD/3.8, MON, Warsaw
2004, p. 5.
3
In this respect, the detection of biological attacks was more wishful thinking than a real
possibility, so this aspect of the story appeared in OPBMR rather rarely. This was due to very poor
technical preparation of troops in this area. Even today only a few armies in the world are supplied
with equipment to identify biological contamination.
127
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
(chemical support) together with Defence Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
(OPBMR).
Just as many, if not more numerous, were the changes in the specific activities
that occurred within OPBMR, chemical support or anti-chemical defence. Despite
these changes each time the tasks were among those more or less related to CBRN
reconnaissance or CBRN detection. Among them were found quite "exotic" tasks,
such as for example the observation of preparations for an assault by toxic agents
or the detection of enemy preparations for the use of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons. The list of tasks associated with CBRN reconnaissance, which
occurred over the years in anti-chemical defence, CBRN defence and other early
varieties of "defence" is shown in Figure 1.
1918-1924
1924-1934
Observation of preparations
for the chemical assault
1934-1939
Observation of preparations for Contamination reconnaissance
the assault toxic agents
1941 – 1945 (West)
1943 – 1955 (East)
Reconnaissance and marking of contaminated
areas
Chemical reconnaissance
Nuclear reconnaissance
Infection reconnaissance
1955 - 1964
1964 - 1976
Chemical and nuclear reconnaissance
(detection)
1976 - 1985
CHEMICAL SUPPORT
CBRN DEFENSE
Detection of nuclear detonations and
chemical attacks and incendiary agents
Reconnaissance of contamination
and infection
CBRN DEFENSE
CHEMICAL SUPPORT
1985 – 1994
1985 - 1990
ANTICHEMICAL DEFENSE
Detection of enemy preparations to use
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
1990 - 1994
Detection of nuclear detonations and chemical
attacks and incendiary agents
Chemical, nuclear and biological reconnaissance
1994 – 2004
Detection of nuclear and chemical attacks;
CBRN monitoring (reconnaissance)
Source: Retrieved own study on the basis of I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań ..., ed. cited
Figure 1. Evolution of CBRN reconnaissance tasks
128
From the information contained in figure 1 it can be concluded that despite the
many changes in terminology and how to interpret the various projects they are all
related to a specific task area. Basically, it can be assumed that the tasks were of
two types, either related to contamination reconnaissance or complex detection
of enemy strikes using nuclear, chemical or biological methods.
The realisation of CBRN reconnaissance tasks has always been a challenge,
mainly because it required careful coordination and a lot of effort and resources.
All these efforts, however, were strongly associated with other projects CBRN
Defence, because only together could they constitute a whole, aimed at achieving
the CBRN Defence objectives.
CBRN Defence System
To achieve these objectives the CBRN Defence System was established, which,
according to the definition is an orderly arrangement functioning in times of peace
and war, focusing on the coordination of planning and organisation – with
executive regulations realised by the elements in such a way as to provide the
strength and resources to achieve the goals CBRN Defence4.
To ensure an integrated whole, aimed at achieving the objectives CBRN
Defence, the system should take into account all possible aspects of the defence.
Thus it must include specific, specially prepared subsystems, which will make
possible the achievement of the individual objectives involved. In fact the CBRN
Defence system consists of five stand-alone subsystems, interconnected and
correlated in such a way as to obtain the best possible result. These sub-systems
are: CBRN detection, CBRN protection, CBRN decontamination, rescue and
management. Graphic characteristics of the system are presented in Figure 2.
The structure and nature of the respective subsystems leads to the conclusion
that the survival of the dangers of a WMD attack or onset of a ROTA event will be
based on three basic pillars, namely the detection of threats, CBRN protection and
their elimination. Proper coordination of these tasks will be possible only after
combining the total with the management subsystem.
From this observation it follows that one of the essential elements of the system
is a subsystem of detection of CBRN strikes and contamination. It is in fact,
a system whose primary goal is to quickly assemble the fullest information about
the risks generated by weapons of mass destruction or ROTA events. To
accomplish the tasks of this subsystem the following were stablished: CBRN
Warning and Reporting System (SWS), which includes: a sources of information
(detection units); analytical laboratories; and CBRN warning and reporting centres.
4
See. J. Solarz, E. Malicki, M. Młynarczyk, Wojska chemiczne w systemie obrony przed bronią
masowego rażenia, AON, Warsaw 2009, p. 9.
129
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
CBRN PROTECTION
SUB-SYSTEM
CBRN
DECONTAMINATION
CBRN DETECTION
SUB-SYSTEM
SUB-SYSTEM
RESCUE
SUB-SYSTEM
Figure 2. CBRN Defence System components
It is easy to note that to date none of the names for any of the elements of the
system gives reference to the principle of CBRN reconnaissance. This does not
mean, however, that this type of reconnaissance has already completely
disappeared. Quite the contrary, by penetrating deeper into the structure of the
Warning and Reporting System the traces of CBRN reconnaissance will become
highly visible5.
CBRN Defence tasks
Another clue leading to CBRN reconnaissance are OPBMR tasks. The definition
of defence against weapons of mass destruction implies that it is a set of
undertakings ... which in a simple and effective way should ensure the realisation
of its objectives. Currently6, in line with the doctrinal requirements, we distinguish
five tasks, which include:
– Detection, identification and monitoring (DIM);
– CBRN Warning and Reporting;
– CBRN Protection;
– Hazard Management;
– Medical Countermeasures and Support.
Even a preliminary analysis of these tasks indicates that, in principle, they are
not single projects, but all of them are groups, incorporating a number of different,
often very complex tasks.
In the first case we are dealing with the project, defined as DIM, which stands
for detection, identification, and monitoring. The Polish equivalent is the same, on
5
For example, in the form of sub-units, reconnaissance patrols and checkpoints.
Previously, the number and nature of individual CBRN tasks varied widely. See. I. Nowak,
J. Solarz, Ewolucja zadań obrony.., Ed. cited.
6
130
the condition that the first element will be seen as “detekcja”, not as sometimes
happens “wykrywanie”. But still no word about CBRN reconnaissance, with the
exception of the DD/3.8 document, which places it among CBRN detection. This
interpretation is not correct, and the only acceptable alternative appears to be the
detection of contamination (strokes).
The problem of understanding the detection of contamination is another aspect
that needs to be developed. There is a peculiar duality of the concept, which is to
detect contamination while being assimilated in the detection of the same
contaminants (i.e. finding the fact of contamination) and the detection of WMD
strikes and other events leading to the formation of contamination. Both
interpretations are appropriate and should be considered together.
The second element located in the name of the task is identification of the
contamination, which is based on the sampling of contaminated materials and their
study aiming to identify the type, nature and character of the contaminant. The last
element of DIM is the monitoring, the action, the purpose of which is to observe
the level of the hazard. It is based on a continuous or periodic occurrence of
pollution control (or lack thereof), which allows for a quick and flexible response
to changing threat levels and to plan further action on the affected area.
In general, it can be concluded that the primary goal of respective DIM
elements is the adequate military response to the threat of contamination due to the
presence of chemical, biological and nuclear substances. Typical ways of reacting
may be as follows:
1. DETECTION – alerting troops and launching procedures and protective
measures;
2. IDENTIFICATION – determining the nature and level of risk, optimising
safety procedures and risk management;
3. MONITORING – control over the level of threat and response to changes.
Separation of respective DIM elements indicates the apparent specificity of the
tasks that are carried out in the framework, and that no major obstacles can be
performed separately. Despite this, individual perceptions of individual DIM
elements are not a good idea, as detection, identification and monitoring of
contamination are a consistent, comprehensive and interconnected conglomeration
of projects and tasks that need to be considered together. In practice, all of these
tasks are carried out in this manner.
The basic task of detection is the early detection of the presence of chemical or
biological agents or radioactive material, which adversely affects the health, before
they have a negative impact on the realisation of tasks (resulting in alarming)7. As
7
You have to remember that in nature we find a number of naturally occurring chemicals,
biological materials, and radioactive substances. Their common presence is harmless until the
moment when they exceed certain levels of contamination defined (for each substance). This may
occur for example, after WMD attack or releasing of toxic industrial chemicals.
131
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
a result, early information can be sent which will enable the troops to adopt an
appropriate level of personal protective equipment (warning).
Due to the required speed of detection of contamination their full identification
is excluded. Typically, the information obtained is limited to the detection of
whether a hazard exists or not. In general, detectors may be only a function of
warning, which in turn would allow for a significant reduction in the time required
for training, as well as the size and weight of the detectors.
A more detailed diagnosis of the danger arises only at a later stage in the
process of identifying contamination. Its main task is to define (determine the
characteristics, the analysis of) the nature of the substance or species in terms of
their quantity and quality. In this way, we get an opportunity to confirm the type
and nature of the risk and to optimise the level of protection as well as to select
appropriate risk management measures. Generally speaking, the information
obtained details the identifying information provided by the detectors.
The last step in DIM is monitoring, during which scouts conduct a continuous
or periodic monitoring of the presence (or absence) of contamination. It can be
carried out in relation to contaminants of all types: chemical, biological and
nuclear.
The three parts of DIM gives the impression that these three elements are its
tasks. However, even a cursory analysis of the source document allows you to
identify the actual tasks performed in the DIM. According to ATP-3.8.18 there are:
– CBRN Reconnaissance;
– CBRN Sampling in accordance with SIBCRA Standards (AEP-10/AEP-49)
and STANAG 2112)9;
– CBRN Field Analysis;
– CBRN Forensic Analysis.
It is easy to notice that it is only here for the first time, that the term CBRN
Reconnaissance is presented. To clearly understand and properly qualified this it is
worth comparing the different elements in the DIM-tasks that are carried out within
its framework. In this way we obtain a statement shown in Figure 3.
From the data presented in the figure it follows that the three tasks carried out
in the framework of DIM are directly related to the identification of contaminants.
Thus, CBRN reconnaissance should include both the detection and monitoring of
contamination. This interpretation, however, is not the end of the process because
as it turns out, some tasks of identification will be carried within CBRN
reconnaissance. This is a sampling of contaminated material, although, unlike the
SIBCRA teams, mainly for operational purposes and on a much smaller scale.
8
ATP-3.8.1 CBRN Defence on operations, volume I, Brussels 2010, s. 7-8.
AEP-49 NATO handbook for sampling and identification of radiological agents. (SIRA),
Brussels 2006; AEP-10 NATO handbook for sampling and identification of biological and chemical
agents, Brussels 2000; STANAG 2112 Nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance, Brussels
2005.
9
132
DETECTION
CBRN RECONNAISSANCE
MONITORING
CBRN SAMPLING
CBRN FIELD ANALYSIS
IDENTYFICATION
CBRN FORENSIC ANALYSIS
Figure 3. Diagnosis of contamination vs DIM
So if we accept that some of the tasks associated with the identification of
contaminants also fall under the term CBRN reconnaissance then we get the full
picture of this project. In summary, we can conclude that the place of CBRN
reconnaissance is on the whole an area specified for the detection, identification
and monitoring of contamination with the exception of the part that relates to the
identification carried out by specialised SIBCRA teams.
The graphic interpretation of the space occupied by CBRN reconnaissance in
the DIM is shown in Figure 4.
CBRN
CB CBRN DETECTION
IDENTYFIKATION
RN
RE
CO
NN
AIS
SA
NC
CBRN MONITORING
E
Figure 4. The space occupied by CBRN reconnaissance in the DIM
For a better understanding of the nature, place and role CBRN reconnaissance
its methods and tasks should be presented. It turns out, however, that even this is
not entirely clear. The problem stems from the different approaches to the tasks of
133
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
CBRN reconnaissance. According to the previously quoted ATP-3.8.1 in CBRN
reconnaissance tasks we include:
1. CBRN Surveillance;
2. CBRN Field Reconnaissance, including reconnaissance of the road (route),
zone, and the area;
3. CBRN Sensitive Site Reconnaissance;
4. CBRN Survey;
5. CBRN Monitoring.
The analysis of the cited "tasks" leads to the conclusion that they are rather
types, forms and methods of CBRN reconnaissance, maintained in specific
circumstances, in terms of need and opportunity. In this way, it is hard to talk about
tasks, which are known to be typical for the activities10 conducted under CBRN
reconnaissance, and not as a form or method of the same reconnaissance.
There seems to be a much better interpretation of reconnaissance tasks found in
the FM 3-11.19 study11. According to the American point of view, CBRN
reconnaissance considered as the main way to avoid contamination includes tasks
in which the further implementation will lead to achieving the final objective.
These tasks include:
1. Contamination detection (detection);
2. Identification of contamination (identification);
3. Determination of contaminated land (marking);
4. Reporting about contamination (reporting);
5. Contaminated material sampling (sampling).
The presented set of tasks explicitly specify the form, scope and sequence of
the respective steps (tasks) of CBRN reconnaissance, and ensure the achievement
of the objective in a complete and comprehensive manner.
According to the above, first we should make a note of the fact of
contamination detection, then determine (identify) the contamination, after that we
need to mark the contaminated area, and finally give a report of contaminations. In
addition, in some situations, you may need to load samples of contaminated
material. It should be noted that all of these tasks (except perhaps the last) will be
conducted in the same way, regardless of the method of reconnaissance.
At this point, it might be considered that the problem of tasks and methods for
CBRN reconnaissance has been resolved. Unfortunately, references of CBRN
reconnaissance methods are difficult to find in the literature, both academic and
instructional. Instead, we can meet tasks which, as previously noted, do not fulfil
the standard criteria for the tasks, and are more suited to the form or method. What
10
Task is an activity to be performed – see. Słownik języka polskiego, PWN, Tom 3, Warsaw
1989, p. 898.
11
Multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for NBC reconnaissance, Washington 2004,
s. I-1.
134
is more, in the previously mentioned U.S. proposals, we can find projects treated
not only as tasks, but also as missions12.
These are:
1. Search (searches)
2. Specific identification of contamination (surveys)
3. Observation (surveillance)
4. Contaminated material sampling (sampling)
5. Reconnaissance of roads, areas and zones (router, area, zone reconnaissance)
A careful analysis of the set of tasks leads to the conclusion that the second
interpretation of tasks (by FM 3-11.19) is a specific combination of the two
previously discussed solutions. Thus, interpretation introduces a mess that not only
does not help the understanding of CBRN reconnaissance but actually it makes it
complicated. It seems that the authors of this document, by introducing two
different interpretations of CBRN reconnaissance tasks, lost their way a little bit
and as a result instead of the bright, clear image of reconnaissance, created an
interpretive chaos.
Conclusions
Summing up the discussion, you can confidently say that CBRN reconnaissance is
realised within the detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) which is one of
the five projects that CBRN Defence consist of. The only problem that arises is the
need for understanding the project as a unified whole, without a separate
examination of its individual components. Only in this way will you be able to look
inside and see the reconnaissance, which, as it turns out, is only apparently hidden
somewhere. On the other hand, CBRN reconnaissance is an essential pillar of the
CBRN Defence System, in which it is an integral part of the warning and reporting
subsystem.
The currently existing division of CBRN reconnaissance tasks (ATP - 3.8.1)
is unclear, and the confrontation with the existing rules of reconnaissance is
confusing. Moreover, other existing approaches and interpretations are also
inconsistent and vary greatly, even within a single publication. For this reason,
there is a need for a separation of the tasks and methods of CBRN reconnaissance
and an unambiguous interpretation. The proposed solutions are shown in Figure 5.
12
There.
135
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
CBRN MONITORING
CBRN SENSITIVE SITE
RECONNAISSANCE
CBRN SURVEY
CBRN SURVEILLANCE
CBRN FIELD RECONNAISSANCE
METHODS (TECHNICS, FORMS?):
TASKS
1. CBRN DETECTION
2. CBRN IDENTYFICATION
3. MARKING
4. SAMPLING
5. REPORTING
Figure 5. Proposed tasks and methods of CBRN reconnaissance
136
OD INTELIGENCJI ROJU DO WIELOAGENTOWYCH SYSTEMÓW DO NAWIGACJI…
FROM SWARM INTELLIGENCE
TO MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS FOR
MOBILE ROBOT NAVIGATION
Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D.
Maj (ret.) Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI MSc
Abstract
Swarm intelligence is perceived as complex social behaviour emerging from simple
interactions of unsophisticated agents. It is derived from the collective behaviour of natural
systems, e.g. ant colonies, but may be adapted to artificial systems. This situation gives
various chances for military use of swarm intelligence technology to navigate mobile
robots. This article aims at investigating the extent to which the available opportunities in
this area are being exploited.
Key words – robotics, artificial intelligence, swarm intelligence, military applications,
battlefield robots
Introduction
We are deeply convinced that many commanders observing the harmonious,
rapid manoeuvres of shoals of fish or flocks, think how is it possible and dreamt of
similar harmony of subordinated military units. But this is not science fiction –
scientists are aware of advantages derived from nature imitation. Information
technology solutions based on natural (biological) patterns play an important role
in the genesis of artificial neural networks (ANN), genetic algorithms (GA),
simulated annealing, swarm intelligence1, and many others. There are a lot of
useful solutions based on biological patterns, what more their number increases
with each day (e.g. chemical computers (biomolecule-based computing2)). The
cause of this situation is the perceived difficulties in effectively solving some
important scientific problems using only classical hardware and software. Despite
1
Kennedy J., Eberhart R. C. Swarm Intelligence. Morgan Kaufman Publishers, San Francisco
2001; Hantak C. Comparison of parallel hardware based and graphics hardware based platforms for
swarm intelligence simulations. Integrative Paper, UNC-Chapel Hill 2003; Bonabeau E., Dorigo M.,
Theraulaz G. Swarm intelligence: from natural to artificial systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford
1999.
2
See also research of I. Willner (Hebrew University, Jerusalem).
137
EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI
quick development, current possibilities of „classical” information technology are
limited by:
− computationally complicated problems (even despite well known algorithm),
e.g. chess games,
− adaptive systems fading dynamical change of situation/environment, e.g.
business management, stock exchange simulations, etc.,
− fully-autonomous systems,
− fuzzy-logic systems, e.g. intelligent human-machine interaction, multimodal
interaction with speech recognition.
Despite the aforementioned advantages, we should be aware of the limitations
of the methods which nature uses to solve its problems:
− nature makes compromises, e.g. choosing first useful, but not optimal
solution,
− nature's strategies are not always successful (i.e. may be deceptive),
− some natural mechanisms may be to difficult to capture and formulate the
algorithm,
− some problems, despite being efficiently solved by nature, may be solved
better (more efficiently, quicker, cheaper, etc.) another way – due to this, people
use a much larger number of means than nature.
Swarm intelligence is perceived similar to some kind of computational
problems by:
1. goal: optimalisation of task fulfilling,
2. basic application range:
− search (e.g. for food),
− route selection (e.g. shoals of fish, flocks),
− transport (ants),
− complex group behaviour emerging from simple activities of individuals
(ants, termites, bees, etc.).
Thus similar solutions may be used to solve similar problems:
− multiple interactions among autonomous agents scattered on an area
(important because of their task),
− self-organising control and co-operation (without central management),
− labour division and task allocation.
Swarm intelligence as a basement for multi-agent systems
Swarm intelligence is a perceived feature of the system, which is characterised
by coherent global patterns emerging from collective behaviour of simple agents
interacting locally with the other similar agents and the environment. Thus swarm
intelligence provides a framework useful the in research of collective (distracted)
problem solving approaches which operate without central control or any global
138
model. The same way is possible for complex behaviour of the group (swarm,
colony) consisting of autonomous individuals (agents) fulfilling simple activities
within a determined close environment. Complex behaviour of the whole group,
necessary to fulfil task and achieve success, emerges as a result of the group ability
to self-organise the agents' activities. Functions of agents themselves are usually
simple and limited, influencing the simplicity of the agents’ construction. Single
agent have not got any global (comprehensive) knowledge, apart from “local”
knowledge about its close environment (“neighbourhood”). The agent gets to know
about this neighbourhood thanks to:
− interactions with it (using artificial „senses”),
− interactions with the closest similar agents (at least one agent) – this is
a process of exchange of „local” knowledge among agents,
− environment modification – as optional indirect way of communication
among agents.
The activity of agents is usually strictly limited. They can move or modify their
environment. An agent (if it can choice) takes a decision concerning the next step
(activity) on the strength of the current status of the closest neighbourhood. More
than one option makes this choice rather random, but generally selected activities
are more probable than the other. Single agents are relatively independent – they
have not got superiors or even any global plan. Thus their behaviour depends on
two main issues:
− preliminary programming, called „local plan”, consisting of the rules of
operation: e.g.: move randomly and search for food, if you find food: pick it up,
remember location of the food, and then return to the group,
− interactions with the closest agents and environment, consisting of the rules
of operation: e.g. inform closest agents, where the food is.
Swarm intelligence uses two key mechanisms:
− self-organisation – global structures emerge from repetitive local
interactions, resulting in a process similar to collective decision making,
− stigmergy – stimulation through work, consisting of indirect communication
and/or coordination based on environment modification, useful e.g. for cooperative
transport purposes.
Self-Organisation within the group of agents thanks to both direct and indirect
interactions is perceived as very effective. Solutions found due to aforementioned
collective decision making are much more complex than possible for a single
agent. What is more this result, similar to the effect of distributed processing, is
achieved without any defined complex computational processing. Agents may
learn how to assess the stimulation and its meaning (positive or negative) – this
process provides an exchange of knowledge between individual learning and group
learning. In spite of the fact that not all mechanisms of swarm intelligence are
clear. We can define basic features of the swarm intelligence:
139
− simple and cheap, but autonomous individuals (agents),
− distributed control,
− purposeful use of interactions: agent-agent, agent-environment, and agentenvironment-agent,
− use of direct or indirect communication (including stigmergy),
− scalability: from several agents to many thousands of agents,
− increased operational reliability thanks to redundancy and simple
construction of agents (homogenous or heterogenous).
Thus an artificial swarm intelligence system should be:
− simple,
− adaptive,
− stable (i.e. behaviour of the agents should be coherent and aiming at the
same goal),
− sufficient in the area of quality of operation, i.e. result of operation may be
perceived as satisfying, but not necessarily optimal (the best possible),
− in selected cases: should provide various reactions in the same conditions.
Current areas of swarm intelligence application are as follows:
– optimisation, e.g. in telecommunication networks,
– robotics,
– movement patterns within transport and production systems,
– simulation of group (social) behaviour.
Examples of swarm intelligence application are as follows:
− searching (e.g. food) by social insects as pattern of optimisation e.g. in
telecommunication networks and travelling salesman problem (TSP),
− cooperative transport in insects – important for specialists in robotics,
− adaptive labour division and task allocation in ants – undisturbed despite
lack of central control, global situation assessment, and systems to pass directions
on – as patterns of control algorithms (e.g. in robots) resistant to interferences,
− nest building by social insects – as patterns for self-reconfigured robots and
systems,
− group sorting and classification – useful in automatic data analysis systems,
− movement of shoals of fish or flocks – useful in crowd movement analysis,
traffic analysis (including rush hours, traffic jams, etc.),
− alife (artificial life) simulations – from simple forms of artificial life to
advanced simulations of social and/or evolutionary processes,
− tests of distributed systems, wide area systems, and software.
The best optimisation techniques based on swarm intelligence are perceived as
(depends on the task):
− Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO),
− Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO).
140
There is need to admit, that due to the quick development and diversity of
solutions there is a lack of common criteria for the purposes of assessment and
compartmentalisation of swarm intelligence systems. Practice shows useful tools in
the aforementioned area: simulations, and compartment of flexibility and resistance
to errors (similar to robots competitions).
Ant Colony Optimisation
Colonies of social insects (ants, termites, bees) are able to fulfil tasks requiring
flexibility and intelligence based on single insects (simple, unified individuals,
without knowledge, without intelligence). Single insects use their senses and play
their role based on very simple rules. The spectrum of their possible behaviour is
significantly limited. What's more, single insects do not know about the general
status of the whole colony, directions of its development, and tasks division.
Global structure (e.g. ant hill) emerges from activities of a lot of single insects.
What's more – it is stable, self-controlled, adaptive (e.g. to changes within
environment) unit3.
One of the most important pieces of research on social insects is on methods of
cooperative terrain search (e.g. for food). Despite the fact that a single ant is able to
search only a small part of terrain, ants divide work and co-operate e.g. exploiting
food resource found by one of them. Thus group behaviour of an ant colony is
perceived as a compound of interactions among single ants belonging to the
colony. Because of it there is a possible resultant complex in ant colony behaviour.
First attempts of the ACO4 application to optimise artificial systems took place
in the 1980s. Ants become the general concept of a pheromone trail in
communication derived from biological patterns. Bonabeau et al. showed the first
ACO system in 1989. This system provided simple rules concerning the behaviour
of single ants (agents) within a moving column of ants. Indirect communication
uses pheromone trails: a route with pheromone (laid down by an ant which found
food) seems be more attractive for other ants. Thus a stronger pheromone trial
indicates not only information, but even a call for help (e.g. in food transport).
Pheromone evaporates, so if no ant refreshed it (e.g. after food resource
exploitation), this route becomes unattractive. A second important ant feature is the
ability to find the shortest path from the food resource to the ant hill. Pheromone
trails play a key role in it. Ants create (and maintain) pheromone trails, but the
shortest path is the most attended, the transfer takes the shortest time period, thus
3
Dorigo M., Stützle T. Ant Colony Optimization. MIT Press, Massachusets 2004; Dorigo M., Di
Caro G. Ant Algorithms for Discrete Optimization. Artificial Life, 1999, 5(3): 137–172.
4
Navarro Varela G., Sinclair M. C. Ant Colony Optimisation for virtual-wavelength-path routing
and wavelength allocation. Materiały Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC’99), 1999; White
T., Bieszczad A., Pagurek B. Distributed fault location in networks using mobile agents. Materiały
3rd International Workshop on Agents in Telecommunication Applications IATA’98, 1998.
141
this way is the most common refreshed with pheromone, and the most attractive.
Thus we can observe the global solution for a whole group of ants derived from the
behaviour of every single ant. What is more: if any obstacle will appear on the
aforementioned shortest path – the same mechanism will provide the shortest
avoidance or (if avoidance is not possible) even the new (shortest in the new
conditions) path. Scientists perceive the aforementioned mechanisms as being very
effective, because they are useful since millions of years.
Substituting ants with simple (artificial) agents we can observe simple
framework for various tasks. Basic task seems be simulation of travelling salesman
problem. More complex task is simulation of the telecommunication network
overload, freight transportation, or traffic monitoring. Some aspects of ACO are
useful for logistical support (including e.g. drugs for hospitals), task allocation, and
even (in selected cases) strategies of operation for whole companies5.
Proper use of ACO requires:
− proper analogy choice,
− proper environment simulation, including its dynamical changes,
− proper simulation of agents' behaviour (especially heterogenous agents
fulfilling different tasks),
− proper choice of the simplest rules concerning agents’ activity, based on
experience, and providing required group behaviour – thus rules do not limit
behaviour of single agents, and let them find unknown, better solutions, especially
if the current solution is not useful,
− that the result may be satisfying (e.g. meeting the criteria), but not always
optimal (the best possible).
Features of insects significantly influencing success (both natural and artificial
systems) are as follows:
− flexibility – ability to adapt to various environment conditions,
− operational reliability – group fulfil its tasks despite errors (or even damage)
of several single agents,
− self-control – lack of central control and management system.
5
Mohamad M. M. Articulated robots motion planning using foraging ant strategy. Journal of
Information Technology - Special Issues in Artificial Intelligence, 2008, 20(4): 163–181; Mohamad M. M.,
Taylor N. K., Dunnigan M. W. Articulated robot motion planning using Ant Colony Optimisation.
Materiały 3rd International IEEE Conference on Intelligent Systems, 2006, ss. 690–695; Mohamad
M. M., Dunnigan M. W., Taylor N. K. Foraging Ant Motion Planning for Articulated Robots.
Materiały International Joint Conference SICE-ICASE, 2006, ss. 4285–4290; Mohamad M. M.,
Dunnigan M. W., Taylor N. K. Ant Colony Robot Motion Planning. Materiały IEEE International
Conference on Computer as a Tool: EUROCON 2005, ss. 213-216.
142
Particle Swarm Optimisation
The concept of PSO was developed by social psychologist James Kennedy and
engineer (electrician) Russell Eberhart in 1995. It derives from earlier research on
the behaviour of flocks (of birds). The behaviour of a flock emerges from simple
rules describing activity of single birds during flight:
− set direction and speed aiming at remaining inside the flock,
− set direction and speed aiming at not collide with other birds (in the closest
neighbourhood).
If any bird flies towards discovered food, the closest birds follow it. As a
consequence whole flock files in the same direction, unless another bird discovers
a more attractive source of food. Implicit rules allow for synchronous and
collision-free movement, due to efforts of individual birds to remain at the optimal
distance to neighbours. Making the analogy: aforementioned food searching is
similar to searching within an area of potential solutions for the best of them. The
distinction of the best solution from the others needs to allow for comparison (by
particular single particle) of an individual's own results with the results of its
„neighbours”. If the results of one of the “neighbours” are better then its own, the
particle follows it – this way the best tactics are copied by others6. Thus generally
PSO constitutes a simulation of a simplified social system7. But we should be
aware, that human behaviour is much more complex, e.g. may be based on feelings
and opinions.
Due to the aforemetioned analogy the two basic mechanisms controlling the
searching algorithms of PSO are as follows:
− exploration of the space in the searching process aims at the area of the best
previous solutions – it influences a quick convergence of the algorithm, but may
terminate only on the first found solution, e.g. local minima instead of the global
minima,
− use of information concerning previous achievements in searching process –
PSO's one-way information sharing method: only the best (local or global)
individual (particle) may share its knowledge with the others; what's more each of
the individuals bases action on its own experience (including its own best position
to compare with the proposed one).
Advantages of PSO are as follows:
− few parameters controlling optimisation process,
− handy representation of solutions,
− simple rule of transformation from one solution to another.
6
Basement of PSO’s genesis is perceived assumption that social information sparing among
individuals form the same team/community constitutes significant evolutionary advantage.
7
Fealko D. R. Evaluationg Particle Swarm Intelligence Techniques for solving university
examination timetabling problems. Doctoral thesis. Nova Southeastern University 2005.
143
Applications of PSO have to establish undisturbed equilibrium between
individual behaviour and group behaviour due to:
− focus on individual behaviour which causes separate searching for the
solution and a lack of knowledge sharing with „neighbours” (result: endless
searching procedures or termination on the first found solution, e.g. local minima),
− focus on group behaviour which causes common reaping benefits from
knowledge of the other individuals (result: lack of individual search, group focus
on the first found solution, e.g. local minima).
Evidence from experiments proved that not numerous „neighbourhood”
provides increased model efficacy. In the case of PSO “neighbour” means: next in
the row/column, but not exactly “close”, because distances between particles may
be bigger.
PSO algorithms are perceived as efficient in solving a wide spectrum of
problems, independent in the number of dimensions or size of problems. The
biggest advantage may be their simplicity and scalability, and moreover:
− rapid solving of non-typical problems,
− ability of the optimisation of difficult mathematical problems, both analog
and discrete.
Multiagent systems
One of the most interesting forms of co-activity (cooperation or competition) of
huge groups of simple agents are perceived multi-agent systems (MAS). MAS are
similar to ACO or PSO. The general result (as realisation of the system goal)
emerges from a compound of activities of a lot of simple agents, interacting with
each-other, based on basic rules implemented in each of the agents. Thus MAS
constitutes intelligent distributed software.
The description of the agent (in a MAS context) changes depending on task and
application. In the most general case agent consists of two main parts: software
(logical, as information), and hardware (physical, as robot, other machine or e.g.
part of production line). Thus a dedicated technology of software is necessary. The
aforementioned technology should provide simulation and implementation of
individual and social behaviour in distributed systems.
Multi-agent system consists of such elements as: environment, objects in the
environment, agents in the environment, and relationships among agents. Thus
features of a multi-agent system are as follows:
− it consists of autonomous agents: each of them fulfils its own task, and this task
may be (but not necessarily) coherent with tasks/goals of the whole group of agents,
− way/kind of communication describes environment,
− decision making is distributed (i.e. every agent has its own level of
autonomy).
144
Agents may exchange messages with each other. Basic types of aforementioned
messages are as follows: proposal of (particular) activity, rejection/approval of this
offer, and counter-proposal. Agent, as a form of artificial intelligence, may attempt
to communicate to the other agent(s) – e.g. in the case of a task fulfilment demand,
or reject it (e.g. if it may decrease probability of task fulfilment). Aforementioned
issues are a part of agent’s autonomy within control system8.
Paradigms of multi-agent systems are as follows:
− reactivity – environment observation and timely reaction to its changes,
− proactivity – reaction to changes in environment and activity towards
(purposefully) making changes in it,
− autonomy of agents – agent may act individually (without other agents or
people), having control of its status and activities,
− ability for social behaviour – possibility of co-operation with other agents,
people, including self-organisation and grouping/clustering,
− rationality – agents activity is determined by success (goals) achievement (so
called control by goals),
− ability to communicate – ability to share knowledge with other agents,
control system, and environment (e.g. for threat identification purposes),
− ability to learn and flexibility/adaptation – agents improve their operation
with time,
− mobility – ability to change location within environment9.
Basic tasks of multi-agent systems are as follows: environment sweeping/search,
movement control, movement within formation. Aforementioned tasks may be
fulfilled by four basic kinds of agents:
− logical agent – its decision is a result of deduction,
− reactive agent – its decision is a result of environment analysis (situation to
action mapping),
− bdi agent (beliefs-desires-intentions) – its decision depends on bdi
combination,
− layered architectures – its decision is a result of the co-operation of software
layers (horizontal or vertical) – each of them is responsible for the other layer of
environment abstraction10.
Basic classification of multi-agent technologies is as follows:
− based on agent paradigms: Prometheus, Styx, HLIM, Cassiopeia, Tropos,
GAIA, MASE, SODA, etc..,
8
Hakansson A. Agent and multi agent systems technologies and applications. Springer Verlag,
New York - Heidelberg 2010.
9
Wooldridge M., Jennings N. R. Intelligent agents: theory and practice. The Knowledge
Engineering Review, 1995, 10(2): 115-152.
10
Gnatowski M. Wykorzytsanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów
mobilnych. Rozprawa doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii
Nauk, Warszawa 2005.
145
− based on object orientation: MASSIVE, AOMEM, ODAC, AOAD,
DESIRE, MASB, AAI, etc.,
− based on knowledge engineering (KE): CommonKADS, MASCommonKADS,
CoMoMAS itp.,
− based on requirements engineering (RE)11.
Thus multi-agent systems constitute a practical programmatic implementation
of distributed artificial intelligence - DAI12.
The most important military applications of multi-agent systems are as follows:
− multi-level adaptive simulations of warfare13,
− route planning with the passing by of danger zones,
− fulfilling various tasks providing situation awareness,
− Interoperable Command & Control based on MultiAgent Systems –
IC2MAS),
− multi-agent robots.
It seems that the aforementioned applications will be a significant part of the
autonomous military technology, based on both programmable agents, land robots
(including mechanical mole robots), flying robots, and buoyant robots. They may
constitute an important part of the Net Enabled Capability and Common
Operational Picture paradigms.
Multi-agent robots
Useful examples of the effective application of multi-agents systems are
constituted by multi-agent robots. Single autonomous robots are currently
technologically accessible. The next step is the use of teams of robots, co-operating
with each-other, and aiming at the same goal. But we should be aware that there is
no assumption that one robot is one agent. Relationships of robot-agents are much
more complicated. Basic are as follows:
− extended agent – agent is built both in robot and control system,
− agent built in robot, and its image is built in control system, mainly for
simulation purposes,
− agent built in control system, and robot is only its tool,
11
Alonso F., Frutos S., Martinez L. i wsp. Towards a natural agent paradigm development
methodology. MATES 2004, LNAI 3187, s. 155-168.
12
Cetnarowicz K. Pojęcie M-agenta i koncepcja systemów wieloagentowych. [In:] Stanek S. (ed.)
Rozwój informatycznych systemów wieloagentowych w srodowiskach społeczno-gospodarczych.
Wydawnictwo Placet, Warszawa 2008; Cetnarowicz K., Dreżewski R., Byrski A. i wsp. Agentowe metody
inteligencji obliczeniowej. [In:] Stanek S (ed.) Rozwój informatycznych systemów wieloagentowych w
środowiskach społeczno-gospodarczych. Wydawnictwo Placet, Warszawa 2008.
13
See also research of B. Kamiński from Division of Decision Analysis and Suport, Institute of
Economics, Warsaw School of Economics.
146
− group of agents built in control system, controlling simultaneously one robot
or even group of robots14.
Important issue seems be the architecture of the robot(s):
– deliberative – robot has its own model of environment, and changes in it are
made by contact,
– behavioural – robot has not got its own model of environment, but gets to
know about the environment during observation, action, and reaction,
– hybrid – tasks are divided into the two aforementioned types15.
Examples of the aforementioned architecture constitute: AuRA, CEBOT,
ATLANTIS, SSS, TCA, SAPHIRA, ARA, DAMN, 3T, ALLIANCE, BERRA,
SWARM-BOTS, YAVUZ, BUSQUETS, VOMAS or Tripodal Schematic Control
Architecture.
There is a need to admit that agents do not always have concordant (or even
consistent) goals – see e.g. problem of common access to the same resource. Thus
full cooperation of all agents may be not possible (e.g. ACO may not be
applicable). This situation requires the modification of the single agent software:
the adding of a bit of competition among agents may provide quicker and more
effective task completion.
Tasks for groups of robots can be divided into:
– tasks, which can be fulfilled by a single robot, but group of robot will fulfil it
quicker, and/or more effectively, etc. (e.g. through task sharing),
– task which cannot be fulfilled by a single robot, and only a group of cooperating robots can achieve the success (e.g. cooperative transport).
Teams of homogenous robots are redundant: one robot can play the role of
another (e.g. in the case of serious damage). From the other point of view
heterogenous robots, fulfilling different tasks within the team, provide a wider
spectrum of possible applications for the whole team. Their specialty differ, but
this feature may be necessary in more complex tasks.
Applications of multi-agent robots are wide: from industry16, through health
care (micro-robots and nano-robots17), to the role of advanced tools in search and
14
15
16
Krasiński A. Wieloagentowy system robotów mobilnych. Opis projektu. Prace Naukowe
Instytutu Cybernetyki Technicznej Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1998, 98: 241-247; Gnatowski M.
Wykorzystanie systemów wieloagentowych we współdziałaniu robotów mobilnych. Rozprawa
doktorska. Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2005; Bartyna W.,
Ambroszkiewicz S. Architektura systemu wielorobotowego, język komunikacji i protokoły. Materiały
X Krajowej Konferencja Robotyki, Miechowice 2008; Ambroszkiewicz S., Cetnarowicz K. On
situating agents in multi-robot systems. Materiały CS&P'2005 Workshop; Skrzypczyński P. A Team
of Mobile Robots and Monitoring Sensors – from Concept to Experiment. Advanced Robotics, 2004,
18(6): 583–610.
147
rescue operations, etc. Multi-agent robots may be useful in military applications
too. Battlefields based on Net Enabled Capability (NEC) needs these solutions as
a useful supplementation of weapon systems, reconnaissance and identification
systems, fulfilling stealthily important tasks behind enemy lines independent of
weather conditions for example. Teams of homogenous multi-agent robots (even:
flying or buoyant) due to their numerical force and redundancy are extremely
resistant to damage. What more every agent is able to replicate another one (e.g.
one damaged). Use of multi-agent robots in search and rescue operations, both in
urban complexes, and terrain hard to reach due to other causes will significantly
increase current possibilities18.
According to current knowledge multi-agents robots for military purposes
should provide:
− flexibility, including supplementation and modernisation during operation,
− ability to fulfil tasks even in very hard conditions (loss of many agents/robots,
severe damages) – result may be only satisfying (e.g. fulfilling criteria), but not
optimal (the best possible),
− ability to work in various conditions (as a part of land forces, navy, air
forces, and even in space),
− ability to use heterogenous agents (for task division purposes),
− ability to work using incomplete information (e.g. unknown area) or in
quickly changing environment (e.g. location of people within the closest
neighbourhood),
− ability to collaborate with single soldier or military unit – collaborative
robotics,
− stability,
− effectiveness.
Military possibilities of multi-agent robots was noticed earl19. Research is being
conducted almost all around the world, including NATO countries. Leading
research centres are as follows:
− DARPA – UltraLog and Cougar projects20,
− NASA Ames Research Centre and NASA Glenn Research Centre21,
In the beginning almost the whole effort was focused on robots able to work in
space, including exploration of neighbouring planets. Military applications of the
aforementioned robots resulted from their ability to fulfil tasks in variable
17
Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Neurorehabilitacja XXI wieku. Techniki
teleinformatyczne. Impuls, Kraków 2011; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Roboty rehabilitacyjne.
Rehabilitacja w Praktyce, 2010, 4: 49-53.
18
Looije R., Neerincx M., Kruijff G.-J. M. Affective collaborative robots for safety & crisis
management in the field. Materiały ISCRAM 2007 - Intelligent Human Computer Systems for Crisis
Response and Management 2007.
19
Multi-Robot Systems in Military Domains. RTO TECHNICAL REPORT TR-IST-032/RTG-014.
20
Por. Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES).
21
Wong E., Litt J. S. Autonomous multi-agent robotics for inspection and repair of propulsion
systems. Materiały AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference 2004.
148
(including unpredictable) conditions and environments, despite loss of a significant
part of agents. This makes multi-agent robots an almost ideal tool on the
battlefield.
UNASSISTED
WITHIN TEAMS:
ROBOTS + PEOPLE
Route
reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
(incl. NBC) and
target
intelligence
Search
and rescue
operations
Combat and
indirect suport, air
suport, naval
support, increased
mobility
Applications of
cooperative
robots
Weapon
carriers, medical
systems carriers
Patrols (incl.
patrolboats),
warning systems
Diversion
Transport
& Logistics
Fig. 1. Selected military applications of multiagent systems of mobile robots
The most important Polish research centres in the area of multi-agent systems
and multi-agent robots are perceived as the Institute of Computer Science at the
Polish Academy of Sciences, AGH University of Science and Technology in
Cracow, and Poznań University of Technology. Moreover, research on selected
issues of multi-agent systems and multi-agent robots are conducted in the majority
of Polish universities, as part of artificial intelligence and/or robotics.
149
Conclusions
Multi-agent robots are still at the beginning of their development. Further
development needs more research in the area of perception, navigation, planning,
distributed control, etc. This situation allows for other chances for the military use
of swarm intelligence technology to navigate mobile robots, as an alternative for
humanoid robots, and the supplementing of other dynamically developed solutions:
exoskeleton with the living operator22. A key issue may be human-machine
interaction and the ability of intuitive cooperation between humans and the
independent robotic environment, increasing their effectiveness on net-centric
battlefield.
22
E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski: Egzoszkielet jako szczególna forma robota – zastosowania
cywilne i wojskowe. „Kwartalnik Bellona” 2011, nr 1, s. 160-169; E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski:
Zastosowania automatyki i robotyki w wózkach dla niepełnosprawnych i egzoszkieletach medycznych.
„Pomiary Automatyka Robotyka”, 2011, nr 5, s. 58-64; E. Mikołajewska, D. Mikołajewski: Exoskeletons
in neurological diseases - current and potential future applications. “Advances in Clinical and
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Zaopatrzenie ortopedyczne. Wydawnictwo Lekarskie PZWL, Warszawa 2009, s. 74-76.
150
OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTIC SYSTEM IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
ECONOMY OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICS
OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTIC SYSTEM
IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.
Abstract
The optimisation of the logistic system results from the urgency of complex problems
and regulations appearing due to the logistic transformations in the Polish Armed Forces
and also from adjusting its structures for tasks and commitments as well as for the planned
and performed organisational-functional changes. The goal of elaboration is to introduce
these changes in the process of the logistic support of military troops during peacetime,
mainly at the angle of tasks performed by military logistics according to the needs at all
army organisational levels. Undoubtedly, an essential factor for implementing changes
adjusted to the logistic system of the Polish Armed Forces is the membership of Poland in
the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). It requires the necessity
of taking permanent actions aiming at, among other things, the complex integration of the
logistic system in the Polish Armed Forces with the structures of Alliance, mainly with its
procedures to achieve the essential level of standardisation and unification. The general
purpose of this process is an increase in the effectiveness of military forces and the
enlargement of the access to defence resources of the member states. Removal of
inaccuracies in logistics of the Polish Armed Forces is accomplished at stages. The basis
for the undertaken ventures are the decisions of the Minister of National Defence, records
in the programs of Armed Forces development and the plans of development for the
logistics imposing the new task-structural competences or verifying the existing ones.
Key words – logistic system, subsystem, codification, logistic equipment, stationary
logistic potential
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WOJCIECH NYSZK
Introduction
Membership of the Polish Republic in NATO intensified the adaptation process
in the Armed Forces. This process is aiming at reaching a required level of
standardisation in all military activities and its functioning systems, including
logistics.
The transformations of the Polish Armed Forces and their involvement in
NATO structures also forced the need for transforming the logistic system at an
angle of adjusting it to the standards obligatory both in the armies of the EU and
NATO.
The result of these changes was the acceptance by Poland of the long-term
requirements of defense initiatives resulting in a wide spectrum of allied
commitments in the consecutive editions of NATO Armed Forces Objectives as –
Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). A
very important role was also played by the conclusions resulting from crisis
reactions and operations in the on the Balkans, 11th September in U.S. and military
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Outline of the functioning of the logistic system of the polish armed
forces
The act of The Polish Armed Forces being involved in task accomplishment as
part of the NATO Alliance generated new requirements for military logistics
demanding a systemic and far-reaching approach.
The tasks of the logistic system were divided into the six basic areas that were
not covered by the assumptions of logistic doctrine. In such a logistic system as the
Polish Armed Forces all subsystems at the particular levels of organisation in the
army did not have any parallels. At the central level, the logistic system of the
Polish Armed Forces was formed only by the three subsystems; managerial,
material and technical. The Chief of the General Board of Logistics was
responsible for the logistic system of the Polish Army. The Board of Logistic
Planning and the Material-Technical Board in the General Staff were subordinated
to the Chief. The Material-Technical Board functioning in the structure of General
Staff was an organisational cell appropriate for creating the directions of
development and elaborating the structures of functional-organisational logistics in
the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime, crisis and war. The Chief of the
General Board of Logistics supervised the operational readiness of the logistic
system. He established and determined the main directions and ways of task
accomplishment for the logistics in the national and international area. The other
elements of the subsystem were beyond the responsibility area of the Chief.
152
To appreciate the importance of problems in the General Board of Logistics
2000 – 2004 the basic trends of optimisation were specified to adjust the logistic
system for the standards obligatory in the NATO Armies and the EU. The urgency
of optimisation came also from:
− a necessity of setting in order the task priorities specified in legal regulations
and decisions of the Ministry of National Defence;
− a necessity of adapting areas of competence in logistics, which were
dispersed till now, to the tasks resulting from “The Logistic Doctrine of Polish
Armed Forces”. The purpose of doctrine is to draft procedures essential for
managing logistics in the Polish Armed Forces including cooperation with logistics
of commands in the NATO and international organisations supporting the logistics
of the Polish Armed forces during peacetime and war;
− the providing of a 30-day self-sufficiency fixed length of time for Polish
military troops during operations abroad;
− the need to provide a considerable flexibility in possibilities of logistic
adaptation to various climatic conditions;
− lack of commonly functioning software systems to support the management
of logistics;
− insufficient progress in indexation and codification;
− low level of staff professionalisation.
An important factor determining the state of the logistic system and
possibilities of its essential changes was a lack of impact of the Chief of General
Board of Logistics (coordinator) on the allocation of financial assets for task
accomplishment. A systemic lack of grounds for direct impact on achieving the
logistic purposes financed by branches of the Polish Armed Forces was acutely
experienced. It caused either obstacles or made at impossible to execute the task
accomplishment in the required ranges and to the planned deadlines. The applied
system of persuasion was not always so effective, especially in a situation of the
permanent shortage of financial assets.
The limitation of military expenses implied the necessity of actions tending to
improve the management efficiency that was quite possible due to a unification and
integration of the entire logistic system. It forced the centralisation of the logistics
management processes.
Taking advantage of the conclusions from the currently functioning logistic
system in the General Board of Logistics of the Chief, the Concept of
reorganisation of the Logistic System in the Ministry of National Defence was
elaborated with the following assumptions:
1. Optimisation and adaptation of the executive potential of logistics in the
three branches of the Polish Armed Forces to the real needs resulting from previous
commitments together with the accomplishment of the regional logistic system.
2. Removal of the basic obstacles that curtail and disturb the functioning and
efficacy of logistics in the Polish Armed Forces.
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WOJCIECH NYSZK
3. Restructuring of logistic systems in an essential range according to new
conditionings in the Polish Armed Forces and NATO.
When fulfilling the assumptions of “Concept ….” from the part of the logistic
potential at the level of General Staff and the branches of Armed Forces by the end
of 2006 the legal body for guiding the executive logistics was established as the
Inspectorate of Logistic Support for the Armed Forces. Now it is the Central
Logistic Organ in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is the only one to provide
complex logistic support inside the state and for military troops in missions abroad.
Simultaneously the Inspectorate of Logistic Support has the authorisation of the
competent entity to keep at its disposal the financial assets of the second degree.
The Inspectorate of Logistic Support for the Armed Forces is the decisive
centre capable of the complicated solving of tasks in the range of:
1. The competence function for logistic equipment.
2. The Central Logistic Organ standardising the entire management of logistic
resources from their implementation to withdrawal.
3. Moreover the Inspectorate performs tasks in:
a) adjusting the logistic system of Polish Armed Forces to requirements of
NATO and the EU,
b) elaborating the rules to protect needs of mobilisation and war concerning the
combat and material assets, including assessment of size, dislocation and rules of
gathering, deployment,
c) supplementing the needs of logistics in a framework of:
- maintaining the budgetary and mobilisation reserves of the state,
- preparing the GN for the tasks resulting from PMG,
- support of domestic and allied forces by the civil sector,
d) responsibility for achieving the logistic purposes on the scale of the Armed
Forces,
e) coordination of the entire complexity of a mission resulting from the duties
of host nation and the state sending its military troops abroad.
Simultaneously, the Inspectorate of Logistic Support took over part of the tasks
from the General Board of Logistics, most of the tasks from branches of the Polish
Armed Forces (with exception to tasks connected with logistic planning) and tasks
from the Head of Transportation and Troop Movement, as well as part of the tasks
from the Infrastructure Department of the Ministry of National Defence.
The creation of the Inspectorate made it possible to bring order into problems
connected with the issues of command and the performance of tasks in the rear
zone, especially in a framework of logistic support (including HNS) and its
functional connections with the system beyond the military.
After the creation of the Inspectorate of Logistic Support the logistic system at
particular levels of organisation in the Polish armed Forces is composed of:
1. The Board of Logistic Planning – as part of the structures of General Staff –
as the logistic planning section that preforms the function of the organiser of the
154
logistic system and it is responsible for contributing to the elaboration of the
development program of the Polish Armed Forces. It is also responsible for the
proposals for the medium and long-term development programme of the PAF in a
framework of improving the logistic system.
2. Sections of logistic planning G/A/ N-4 at the level of military branches of
PAF.
3. Logistic planning in the military staffs (G/A/ N-4 and the Chief) and their
executive structures at the tactical level covering the mobile units and logistic
devices designated for direct logistic support during peacetime and war.
The organisational structures of logistics at this level provide management of
logistic support in the military units and cooperation with the logistic structures of
NATO according to the Objectives of The Polish Republic Armed Forces.
Moreover, at this level the intention tend to remove the financial-economic tasks
from the commanders responsibility on account of operational-educational tasks.
For this purpose there is a specialised military unit: the Military Economic Section
that is subordinated to the Inspectorate of Logistic Support.
The final model of the logistic system in the polish armed forces
In the final model a logistic system should be characterised by mobility,
flexibility, simplicity and an ability for rapid reaction. It ought to be organised in
such a way to provide for self-sufficiency and to make possible task
accomplishment and maintenance of combat capacity in the supported troops.
A method for improving its efficiency is to reorganise the logistic structures and to
combine them with a decrease in the cost of the functioning of military units in the
particular branches of the Armed Forces and the continuation of ventures
connected with the integration of logistic subunits at the tactical level. The results
of this program show an improvement of the system dealing with the management
logistic resources.
The implemented concept will rationally relieve the commanders’ burden of
financial-economic tasks and will not deprive them of deciding about priorities in
a framework of logistic and financial support of military units.
As a consequence of the planned changes in the logistic system of the Ministry
of National Defence the Military Economic Sections, as the support unit
subordinated to the military bases, gather the needs and deliver supplies as well as
render services for the supported units according to the priorities settled by the
commanders of branches in the PAF.
Taking into account the experiences resulting from long-term participation of
Polish military units in peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to notice the need
of implementing the logistic solutions according to NATO standards, that is
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WOJCIECH NYSZK
a condition enabling them to function without conflict in a multinational
environment.
In the case of supporting troops in allied operations, it is extremely important to
gain a transparent uniformity of documents and procedures used by logistic organs
in staffs and military units. That in turns, may constitute the basis for success in the
domain of logistic interoperability. It is a factor stimulating the proper functioning
of multinational logistics.
Obtaining a prospective model for the functioning of a logistic system should
be considered with optimising the structures of the stationary logistic potential of
the Armed Forces submitted to the Chief of Inspectorate of Logistic Support. The
restructuring and optimisation of the stationary logistic potential is possible on
account of the forming of Regional Logistic Bases on the grounds of dispersed
stationary elements of technical and material support.
In the final model (after 2012), 4 Regional Logistic Bases will render logistical
services in the region of responsibility for the military units of all military branches
in the Armed Forces regardless of their subordination.
The next very important element at the disposal of modern logistics is
a possibility of searching for new solutions for the performance of logistic support
using outsourcing.
A modern battlefield develops due to technical and civilisation progress. It
generates new demands also in the framework of military support.
One of the methods of improving army logistic support is the use of an external
supply of sources and services rendered by non-military entities.
The concept of outsourcing has been widely applied in the activity of economic
entities; that is the new strategy of management connected with delegating outside
the tasks not connected directly with the basic activity of an organisation. That is
why the organisation can focus its resources and assets on the areas constituting the
basis of its activity.
Experiences of many states within the framework of NATO point at the great
possibility of effectively using this form of service rendering.
The departmental Team (Group) for implementing the contract system of
services beyond the military was established by the Minister of National Defence.
This Team specified the area where an array of proposals concerning rendering
services in the following domains is included:
• Repairs and services for military equipment, telecommunication nets and
computer equipment,
• Leasing vehicles, load equipment, machines, aggregates and specialised
devices,
• Utilisation of combat assets, rockets, fuels, rubber goods, chemical agents,
disinfectants, medical waste, expired supplies as well as toxic waste,
• Transport,
• Gathering and storing reserve supplies,
156
• Social cover of the military,
• Maintenance of military estates,
• Training sessions,
• Legal and administration assistance,
• Security of facilities,
• Security of the Polish Logistical Components (nutrition, services of laundry
and repairs, supplies of fuels and grease products, supplies of common use assets,
organisation of camps, accommodation and social services, repairs of modern
equipment.
However, the priority in seeking new solutions should be the combat readiness
of military troops and their capability to perform tasks and missions during
peacetime, crisis and war. The Armed Forces ought to preserve skills for
performing training and support with security during the situation of crisis and
direct threat. Disturbances in rendering services provided by civil contractors
cannot influence the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. It seems that the
solution employed within a framework of outsourcing should be supplementary to
a support system and functional security in the range of Armed Forces having a
positive correlation.
A lack of systemic solutions in this range also results, among other things from
a limitation of the legal system of the Polish Republic and legal gaps regulating
these problems at various levels of departments.
It concerns among others the things regulations in a legal act on public
finances, public orders, taxes from goods and services, VAT, the signing of
agreements by the units of the public finances sector and the departmental
regulations in the range of military commanders responsibility as well as the
branch regulations concerning the economy in the budgetary unit of the military.
The considerable possibilities in this field may bring about the planned legal act on
public-private partnership.
Nowadays, accomplishment of new tasks of the Polish Armed Forces,
including logistics, imposes organisational and functional changes as well as also
generating the necessity of improving the processes of logistic support. When
improving these processes the priority is to gain predominance in access to
information that must be gathered, stored and shared in a proper time at an
appropriate level of decision while guaranteeing the required security level. It can
be done when building and implementing the integrated, multilevel information
system.
Despite the fact that what is to be done is known, the existing organisationalfunctional conditionings, habits, restructuring of tasks and competences and lack of
long-term prognoses obstruct the creation of a finally integrated, multilevel
information solution. The creation of such solutions requires a holistic strategy
covering description of particular processes of management at all organisational
levels of logistics.
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WOJCIECH NYSZK
The application of modern technologies from tele-informatics in the
department of national defence requires the analysis of state investigating density
of information networks. In particular, it concerns the coordination of basic
information ventures: the sector of main accountant and logistics. Right here The
coherence between sectors must be maintained right here; financial, material,
technical, medical, transport, movement of military troops and the infrastructure.
In the logistics, finances or personnel departments of national defence, there is
not any information system functioning to support all organisational levels, in
particular the branches (sectors] from the economic sector in the budgetary unit of
the military thorough regional bases for materials, military districts, kinds of
military forces to the central level.
The current lack of stability and transparency of logistical components at all
organisational levels of national defence badly influenced the projecting and
implementing of information systems. A lack of information structures or their
inefficient remainders in logistics, financial assets dispersed in departments, a lack
of prospective programs and plans for financing the information science
development obstructs the implementation of modern information solutions.
The currently functioning logistic systems of information should be adjusted to
the new requirements or remade. Depending on the level or sector, the particular
information systems are not mutually correlated and integrated so their utility does
not fit the present needs.
It is suggested that the ventures in the range of logistics of the national defence
branch would cover all organisational levels of military branches and include the
logistic systems: material, technical, medical, transport and troop movements as
well as infrastructure to integrate them also with the finance and employment
sectors.
The basic trends in development of the military logistics with the information
nets should cover the latest technologies (software, applications, equipment,
computer networks) and tele-information security. Moreover, it is necessary to
accelerate the development of a system of identifying the defence devices as the
basis for the creation of databases enabling the computerisation of the entire
property of the military. In the final effect the Integrated Multilevel Information
System Supporting the Logistic Activity should be established. The system would
work during peacetime, crisis and war to enable the exchanging of information
with similar systems functioning in the national economies of NATO and EU
states.
Conducting a uniform registry in terms of quantity, quality and value and
material-financial planning, based on an integrated informational system, requires
a credible system of identification and classification of resources remaining in the
department of national defence and the new ones implemented to be used. The
implementation of such a system will enable the functioning of all planning,
registering reporting systems in the national defence department. The biggest
158
obstacle in effectively introducing the modern solutions in tele-information has
been the lack of a uniform basis to identify all defence products.
In taking into account the need of interoperability[IO] in the range of the
Alliance in the area of logistic processes, it is necessary to perceive also the
necessity of the common implementation of the NCS NATO Codification System
in the department of national defence. Due to the complexity of identification and
codification processes, as well as the magnitude of engaged forces and assets, in
the initial stage the Uniform Index of Material (UIM) will function in the
department of national defence. The UIM is created, maintained and distributed by
the competent entities and administrated by the logistics department. It will be the
solution that improves the management of the military resources in the national
system by the identification and classification of all products (resources) as
a matter of material-financial turnover in the department of national defence.
Identification and classification by UIM will enable a stocktaking of defence
products and point at the products that due to their qualities of “NATO importance
of supply” will be the first things proposed by competent experts to be codified
according to the NCS.
Both identification of defence products and their integration require a rapid
building and rebuilding of the coherent tele-information structure. An appropriate
development of tele-information systems ought to make possible the connection of
all Regional Logistic Bases with their material stocks and economic sections to the
NIL-WAN and INTER-MON nets. A creation of these nets in the units of local
nets should also be possible.
Development of computer nets is an expensive venture so it should be
performed in the logistic units when the dislocation and magnitude of logistic,
financial and the personal potential is determined.
Cooperation with the NATO systems, EU and national economy should also be
provided. In particular it concerns the Multilevel System of ADAMS, Multi-aspect
Software Model ACROSS (Allied Europe ACE Optimisation Software System)
and the System of Logistic Modelling (LOGREP).
The new challenges in the XXI century are connected with the implementation
of modern tele-information solutions: they require new concepts, well prepared
people and the implementation of accurate motivational systems. Logistics,
finances and the employment sector in the armed forces are most susceptible to
computerisation but simultaneously the results of the information science are not
easy to be popularised by the media compared to, for instance, a purchase of
multitask aircraft, combat vehicle etc. The implementation of tele-information nets
into logistics, finances and employment procedures at particular levels of
organisation ought to ensure a quicker achievement of purposes and an optimal
accomplishment of tasks.
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WOJCIECH NYSZK
Conclusions
It is reasonable to expect that the accomplishment of task areas specified in the
elaboration, according to the stages and deadlines of task performance, will make it
possible to achieve the assumed organisational-functional and qualitativequantitative changes in the logistics of national defence department including the
operational-logistic, technical and technological capacities. They are determined by
the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of General Staff and they also
result from the Objectives of NATO Armed Forces, long-term requirements for
Poland and its Commitments for the Defence Capacity.
The result of implemented changes will be an improvement of support from the
host state for the Polish Armed Forces and its functional connection with the
national system of support in the civil departments.
It is possible to state with satisfaction that during recent years it has been
possible to implement a series of changes in the logistic system. They considerably
improved its functioning and capacity of task performance in the national and
allied system. The extremely advantageous effects are:
− an increase in effectiveness and efficacy of logistic tasks accomplishment for
the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime, crisis and war,
− the rationalisation of logistic structures at particular levels of organisation in
the PAF as well as competence of planning and executive organs,
− an improvement of abilities for cooperation in the multinational system and
providence of support for the allied forces of reinforcement,
− the improvement of efficiency in managing the logistic resources of the
military and a better use of resources of the national economy,
− the beginning of works on systemic solutions in a framework of PMG with
the identification of the PMG task area, and the schedule of task performance was
elaborated,
− the creation of a section in the Operational Command for performance of
tasks connected with the organisation and coordination of logistic support for
contingents abroad,
− the continuity of works on the creation of the Uniform Material Index and
implementation of logistic systems; in the Military Economic Sections,
− the joining of the allied planning of stocks and displacement of military
troops with the use of tele-information supportive systems of NATO,
− the determination of areas susceptible for the application of outsourcing in
the Polish Armed forces as one of numerous forms of military support.
Bibliography
Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-4.2, Finale draft October 2002.
Logistic Doctrine of the Polish Armed Forces DD/4. SG/2004.
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, NATO military agency for standardisation
AAP-6 (T).
160
THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY ECONOMICS AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE
THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY
ECONOMICS AS A SCIENTIFIC
DISCIPLINE
Lt. Col. Sylwester T. KUREK, D.Sc.
Prof. Janusz PŁACZEK, Ph.D.
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji
w Warszawie
Abstract
The objective of this article is to present the essence of security economics as part of a
modern scientific discipline in the methodological context of reflection. We present the
evolutionary nature of security economics, its specific field of inquiry and attributes such
as: language, research methods and science streams. This article also included information
about connections with other disciplines, functions and usability (pragmatics) of security
economics. We briefly highlight research and academic centres which are engaged with
economics and defence inquiries. All presented information can be treated as an outline of
these problems, which have methodical characteristics and knowledge ordering.
Key words – security economics, usability
The evolutionary nature of security economics
Security economics has its evolutionary origin in historical knowledge. It
appeared as a result of economics science of wars and the fundamental economics
of national security. Political consciousness of economy during battles and wars
grew in line with war measures and their development. Years ago tribal wars were
not prepared, together with the preparation of food, clothes and armaments. As the
nation grows along with production power, it lead to wars. This lead to supply
needs for certain products. Governments and commanders noticed the connection
between military power and economy. Experienced leaders understood that the
greatness of an army in the field depends not only on the size of the nation but also
on the economic potential. Financial support was always a very important key. For
ages this was a problem for rulers. During mercantile times, trade exchange was
identified with the power of a nation. During classical times the production role
was emphasised, which is the main source of a nation's wealth along with with
military power. During physiocratism times the most important thing was selfsufficiency in food production – an important factor during an economic blockade.
It is known that the level of military techniques determined the method of fighting,
and always enforced new requirements for back-ups, which are the dynamics and
161
SYLWESTER T. KUREK, JANUSZ PŁACZEK
structures of societal reproduction processes. The war economy system was
established during the First World War and became a new science discipline – war
economics.
War economics between the First and Second World Wars put a great
contribution in economic preparations for the new World War. Especially the role
of industry and technical progress of battle equipment. At those times the
obligatory rule was “economy works for the front line needs, for the army”. Then
the new effect of the arms race between the two opposed economy-political
systems appeared which was projected on economy growth. Even if there was
a peace between the two blocks, the level of budgets of the nation did not allow for
them to resign from typical war economy actions. Economic-Defence studies are
important now, especially during times of peace. That is why war economics is
called now defence economics.
They focused on connections between space planning and defence system, on
creating economy mobilisation plans, energy and food system, as well as economy
calculation of the role of the economy-defence system. Both names (war
economics & defence economics) have traditionally a historical meaning tied
between national defence and national economy.
There are an essential number of premises indicating the way of defence
economics' evolution towards the new science discipline – security economics. The
most important premise is political changes in Europe during the 1980’s and
1990’s. At that time the Warsaw Pact and Berlin Wall was demolished. The nations
of central Europe moved on towards a democratic system and its economy towards
a free market model. These nations limited their defence budgets and size of armed
forces. In the literature of those times it was noticed that there were changes in
analysing the national economy in order to strengthen security in a crisis, not
military but terrorist crisis, natural disaster or lack of food, energy and water
supplies. Another very important issue is that Poland is a member of NATO (since
1999) and European Union (since 2004). The complete opening of Poland meant
also that information penetrated from the Western countries.
The real military threat cannot be excluded, which causes the necessity of
a permanent capability of military standard levels. There is always a possibility of
local outbreaks or the necessity to participate in alliance operations. It is important
to define the strategic challenges and potential sources of menace for the country
(alliance) as well as operation prevention actions.
Prevention strategy in the modern world has greater and greater meaning and is
more efficient. That is why it should be developing, its methods should be
modernising, people should be informed better. The extra military menace and its
meaning grow more and more. The number of threats is growing nowadays:
organised crime, terrorism, atomic weapons, economic wars, information’s
blockade, financial dependence or technology espionage. We are constantly
bombarded by media with the effects of natural disasters or damages to the
162
ecology. To resist against all these threats we need to employ the organised, well
trained forces with mobile equipment. On one side there is the army (national and
alliances) on the other side there is the whole governmental machinery (extra
military). However, this system (crisis and security reaction system) is not ideal
and requires much effort to improve. The war economy in the army is far away
from the analysis as well as the economy in the army.
The action field moved for the peaceful forming of economy security basis
which means the economy resistant to modern, extra military threats. The clear
stream has been aroused connected with the crisis reaction during peace times. We
should consider the macro and micro scale of the researched effect. This issue
concerns local needs of certain economy or industry brunches as well as groups of
countries, alliances, continents or even the whole globe. Summarising it means the
need of extending present defence economics research of the new elements. The
new matters of extra military field should be included into new discipline - security
economics.
The range of this discipline has been evolving constantly, that is why the
identity accents in its name as well as the relations between and the merits
connections (figure 1).
Security Economics
“SE”
Defense Economics
“DE”
EW
<
EO
<
EB
EW
⊂
EO
⊂
EB
Military Economics
“ME”
Figure 1. The range of present economic-defence disciplines
The field of inquiry
To correctly define security economics we should define two basic concepts.
Security, according to general principles, is understood as a lack of threats or
protection against threats. To understand it on a political basis (nation) we can say
it is a result of organised protection and defence against all military and extra
military, foreign and domestic threats, employing all governmental forces. In fact
163
there is a symbiosis of the security threats elements, in the first place – extra
military characters. Economics has been defined as a part of economy which
researches economic activity in a certain field of national economy. Its objective is
to define by scientific methods the effective instruments of economic policy and
the economic rules in this field. Both definitions corresponds with each other very
well. They indicate how to manage, in what form, and by what instruments. All of
this is to efficiently manage economics against all threats. That is why economics
connects two groups of science – security/defence and economy; as well as being
connected with political science. In general it can be stated that security economics
is a particular scientific discipline, which researches essentials, forms and
methods of national economy functions, which are ready to fulfil the national
security task and it analyses and evaluate the economic security level of the
country. It concerns the effectiveness of economic resources during peace, crisis
and war.
The objective of economics is to help create a rational security policy. So, the
main task is to look for a way for the efficient management of the national reserves
to create national security. The subject of security economics is the correctness of
the building economy process system, which is focused on the three different states
of the nation: peace, crisis and war. Nowadays the research program of security
economics is more complex than a few years ago, and include such issues as:
dividing of the burden of defence within a framework of alliances, managing
security and defence systems in crisis, civil-military cooperation, economictechnical possibility for support in times of natural disasters, social-economic costs
of armament conversion, reconversion of army personnel and economical
terrorist’s premises.
The research object of this discipline (specialty) are the economic basis of
security and defence of the nation (EBoSaD – figure 2, table 1), particularly
defence economy in different types. The research includes the connections of
economic process to create a rational security policy. Defence economy which is
the EBoSaD core is a fundamental part of any nation, and every nation must utilise
part of the nation’s economy for its own defence policies. This part has been
always variable and grows during a military crisis. There were situations in history
during world power wars where the role of defence economy was very slight. In
the Middle East there is a paradoxical situation where in peace time, the nations
finance the security needs as in war.
There are four types of defence economy (table 2):
– peaceful defence economy – when the burden of gross domestic product is
less then 7-8%,
– war readiness economy (sometimes crisis) – when it/s over 8%,
– war economy – it’s over 14-16%,
– demobilisation economy – when the burden of gross domestic product is
diminishing in a short time.
164
CONSUMPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL ECONOMY
A
B
C
Space not useful for
security and defense
matters
“Double usage” space
Space used only
for security and defense
matters
SECURITY ECONOMICS
ECONOMY BASIS OF SECURITY AND
DEFENSE
(EBoSaD = B + C)
Economy Basis of
Security and Defense
Management System
Defense
Economy
System
Defense
economy
managing
Defense
(military)
industry
Economicdefense
infrastructure
Adjustment
of defense
needs
capabilities
of economy
Economicdefense
reserves
Scientific
and technical
progress
Economic
mobilization
REGULATION SPHERE
International
economic-defense
cooperation
Defense
Logistic
System
Defense
needs
fulfilling
Services
for defense
system
Host nation
support
(HNS)
REAL SPHERE
Figure 2. Economy basis of security and defence
165
Table 1
Interpretation of the content of economy fields with the view point of different needs
fulfillments
Space
Economy
Meet the basic needs
A
Meet the consumption;
Needs of higher type and development;
Rational transformation space
Optional cost of security
comparing to other needs
Economy basis
of consumption and development
B
C
A+B
B+C
Security economics
Space not useful for security and defence
matters
“Double usage” space
Space used only
for security and defence matters
Economy basis of security and defence
Commentary:
The certain spaces are created by:
A
-
B
-
C
-
Indispensable reserves for civilians surviving, governmental functioning (taking care of
children, sick people, minimum of administration).
During peaceful times the reserves are used for consumption and development, but
during times of threat may be used to counteract (communication and transportation,
after conversion production). It is also the space of rational transformation of the
reserves.
Reserves used for security needs only (military industry, reserves and stocks in case of
war, supporting the alternative supply sources).
Table 2
The characteristics of defence economy types
Peaceful defence
economy
War readiness
economy
War economy
Defence expenditures
< 7-8% GDP
> 8% GDP
> 14-16%
Demobilisation
economy
Burden of GDP is
diminishing in a short
time
The above factors are relatively general and have to be compared over a period
of several years. For some countries as increase means “hot war” while for others it
means nothing more than just doubling the defence expenses. Besides that these
factors must be observed, because they indicate the based relativeness of
connections between economy and defence.
The ability of defence a state economy (majority in EBoSaD) to achieve the
next stages of readiness (or decreasing) means that a defence state economy is very
flexible. The more flexible it is, the faster and more able able it is to fulfil its
defence functions. For sure it is a fundamental characteristic of modern defence
economy. This flexibility is defined as the ability to change, even for a huge
organisation, with a negligible loss of time or resources. It depends mostly on
management skills, moral readiness of the nation to meet new challenges and on
the economy function. It is said the economy is more flexible if it has more
reserves at its disposal (production, transportation). Also the mobility of labour
166
force, and technological ability means that the key role is taken by managers,
engineers and scientists.
Defence economy is a real core EBoSaD of the country and it has its own role
to play. The basic goal is to create premises to build the financial basis of security
and defence and to ensure the survival of civilians during crisis or war. Its aim is to
effectively exploit the existing economical potential for the sake of the security.
The typical examples of the peaceful defence economy tasks are:
– to prepare and constantly update the economy mobilisation plan in case of
threat or war;
– to maintain, support, train, and equip the army, as well as its building and
military facilities;
– to adjust technological infrastructure to defence and security state
requirements;
– to create conditions for the survival of civilians in extreme situations, e.g.
preparing civil defence;
– to gather state reserves;
– to prepare production and technical (repair) bases in the industrial branch
during times of threat and during war;
– to run the science and research studies in defence and security fields;
– to participate in the task and operations for the alliance’s armies and in
realising defence investments.
The basic economy elements of security and defence which speaks of its
readiness for the action are among others (figure 2.): defence industry, strategic
reserves of the state, economy-defence infrastructure, science-research centres,
international economy-defence cooperation and defence logistic.
The key role is state economy organisations who manage the security and
defence of the state.
The important premise that defines EBoSaD is considering the conditions of
economy functions. The main conditions of this type are: geographical position
of the state; economic and military alliances; level of economic growth; level of
reserves (manpower, materials and assets (cash, gold reserves etc); location
of defence-economic potential; volume of defence expenditures.
To characterise security economics among nationwide knowledge we may
separate three attitudes:
– considering security economics in security and defence sciences taking into
account that it appeared together with war science, we can learn from military
conflicts;
– including security economics in political science as an inquiry of the internal
and international political relations, because war is a political act;
– including security economics as a part of general economy science as one of
detailed economics. The object of its interest is the state economy but in a defence
function.
167
At the same time we reject the thesis that security economics can be a separate
science discipline. We are sure that security economics lies in the middle of these
sciences. It also depends on the place of lectures and science centres. In Poland for
years defence economics was a specialty of economy sciences. Currently security
economics is included in security or defence sciences as a result of stereotypical
premise, that if it is security, it must be connected with military uniforms. It should
not be connected this way. We understand that the government is responsible for
national security, but individually businessmen and consumers create economic
systems and have bigger roles to play, about which A. Smith in XVII century had
written.
Language, sciences streams and research methods
Each science discipline has its own specific language. There are different
categories which describe the current state. These categories are historically based,
they are changing all the time as well as conditions of functioning and
surroundings. In security economics there are specific descriptions connected with
the functioning of security and defence of the economy of a certain nation. Some of
the categories are brought from other science disciplines, but there are some new
ones that describe certain processes better. Most often categories are: potential,
reserves, expenditure, cost, analysis, evaluation, value, parameters, factors,
mobilisation, methods, model, allocation. These categories are narrowed to specify
the field e.g.:
– reserves – to manpower, objects, financial and information;
– potential – to economy, defence or military;
– mobilisation – to economy, technical infrastructure, economy subject;
– expenses – to defence, military, armaments, or extra military.
To explain the specifics of this language we should also explain and highlight
the isolation from the other sciences, which are sometimes even close to these
sciences. We need to specify the following categories:
– economic-defence potential, which roots are in general economy category
and has its roots also in exact and military sciences (security and defence science in
present);
– economic mobilisation, which moved some mobilisation rules of the armies
to economy ground;
– strategic raw materials – their roots are in the word “raw materials” but it
shows exact group necessary for security and defence needs;
– war economy – expresses clearly the impact on a different country with the
economic tools to force the beneficial behaviour;
– intensity of economy – which means the ability of the economy to resist
against bad conditions due to military actions of the enemy;
168
In the extra military category we can specify the following:
– compensation of defence purchasing;
– crisis management (reaction);
– trans-frontier migrations;
– action supporting the host state;
– double-use equipment (goods);
– economic espionage;
– civil-military cooperation.
In consequences there are three parallel main streams of the science of modern
security economics:
– first is a continuation of a present stream of war economics with the matters
of: manpower in war economy, war distribution etc.;
– the second has roots in defence economics, widening of disarmament
economics, crisis management etc.;
– the third one regards extra military threats as an organisation and functioning
of the state organs, assortments, state reserves. All of the above science streams
should serve the national security policy in the alliances as well as between
continents.
Considering science’s methods there are analysis and synthesis used in many
different science disciplines. Also there are certain statistics methods used such as
induction and deduction. Sometimes the interviews enrich the analysis. The science
method depends on the task character and source of information. History’s wars
and economies give comprehensive materials for research and study. Also it is
important to make comparisons to today’s conflicts. It is very important to study
this kind of historic material to observe the proper connections which demonstrate
the basic war-economy processes. At the same time the anticipation of discovered
trends and rules can help with the future planning and predicting of conflicts.
Connections with other disciplines, functions and usability of security
economics
Security economics, as with each science discipline, has connections to a
number of sciences and disciplines. It takes full advantage of their achievements.
The strongest connections are with different economy branches like industrial,
agricultural, transport and trade economics. Is has also connections with
international affairs economics, geographical economy and the finances of the
state. Defence and security sciences also play a significant role, as well as political
and military alliances. This analysis considers periods of both war and peace. The
military equipment, manpower etc – all of these are keys to the technological
progress. The administration, law, exact sciences give the type of research methods
and knowledge. Summarising there are clear connections between economy,
169
security and political sciences. And we cannot forget about these discipline's
surroundings, especially about the technological, social and political sciences
(figure 3).
1
2
8
3
7
6
4
5
Legend:
1. Defence-Economic thought
2. Military-economic history
3. War economics
4. Military economics
5. Economic-Defence planning and programming
6. Economic-Defence simulation
7. Economic-Defence policy
8. Economic security
Figure 3. The closer and further surroundings of security economics
We can say that the functions of security economics are different from other
science disciplines. There are three main functions: cognitive, creative and
practical application. The first means information acquiring and their selection. In
this area there is a huge amount of information which should be found, ordered and
grouped. Nowadays the inflow of the economic, security/defence and political
information is so great that we have to use special filters to choose the information
needed for future research. The next function is a result of analyses, evaluation and
formulating a hypothesis which need further verification. We can easily say it is a
“specific laboratory” where all the products are put to test. The third function is
realised in the process of postulations and conclusions. Based on this generalisation
170
we can form the statements, which enrich the theoretic thought of the researched
discipline.
We need to consider also the usability of this science discipline. We can
strongly recommend the thesis that economics is extremely useful for state
security. It is expected to give the answers and solutions, methods and instruments.
Also it has to warn and stimulate, offering different questions. There is a need for
this kind of research world-wide to create an efficient security system for people
and nations.
Security economics research programs and the researches centres
It is difficult to describe the most important science problems of security
economics. It depends on two premises: the first is the institution needs for this
kind of research; the second one is a result of research scientists. There are eight
following standard topics (figure 3):
1. The field of defence-economic thought:
– origin;
– connections and dependences;
– forming the opinions;
– theories.
2. Military-economic history:
– role of war loot in the ancient countries power;
– economic basis of Middle-Ages wars;
– growth of the navy during Mercantilism times;
– industrial revolution in England and war technology development;
– economy bases influence on massive conflicts increase.
3. War economics:
– war resources mobilisation;
– war catering;
– war economic effect;
– war finances;
– war resources allocation;
– war production;
– war costs.
4. Military economics:
– finance army planning;
– resources efficiency;
– standing army economics’ dilemma;
– civil-military cooperation (CIMIC);
– alliances’ role in economic supporting;
– military costs.
171
5. Economic-Defence planning and programming:
– tools;
– economy mobilising planning;
– technological infrastructure utilisation for the SBiOP need;
– economic conditions of the stabilising missions;
– economic-social effect of disarmament;
– management of defence-economic resource system;
– economic-defence analyses related to cost-effect;
– modern economic mobilisation.
6. Economic-Defence simulation:
– economic-defence potential measurement;
– economic-defence condition vaulting;
– diagnoses methods and techniques;
– modelling of the connections.
7. Economic-Defence policy:
– army role in the economic-defence potential;
– defence direction;
– methods of economic-defence policy creating;
– alliances;
– decision-making;
– arms traffic;
– analyses and evaluation of the resources;
– role of resources and strategic reserves;
– role of the domestic industry;
– international cooperation;
– security and defence costs;
– terrorists premises and cost of the terrorists control.
8. Economic security:
– modern economy intelligence;
– economic security of sectors (energy, raw, finance, food, ecological etc);
– economic security threats of the country;
– methods and resources of the economic security.
The above subjects may be of different shades. In the effect we wanted to show
the connections between theory and practice. We hope, presented problems may be
a present program of security economics research.
It is important to point out the research sciences centres and the scientist. There
are seven main centres:
– British centre at the Defence Study University Centre in York (K. Hartley,
D. Greenwood, M. Kalder, G. Kenedy, J. Lovering) and scientists in other centres
(N. Cox, J. Thompson or R.P. Smith).
– American centre at The University of Texas in Dallas (T. Sandler, D. Arce),
Harvard University (E.B. Kapstein, L.D. Olvey, J.R. Gulden, R.C. Kelley),
172
California University (J. Hirshleifer, M. Interiligator, M. McGuire) and also people
working at other centres (A.L. Ross, G. Kennedy, N. Hooper, D. Braddon,
P. Dowdall, M. Kaldor).
– Swedish centre at the International Stockholm Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) and Peace and Conflict Research Division at Uppsali University
(M. Sollenberg, P. Wallensteen, I. Anthony, E.M. Loose-Weintraub, E. Skons,
S. Deger, W. Omitoogun, C. Perdomo, D. Fruchard, S.T. Wezeman, P. Satalenheim,
M. Ward).
– Russian centre at the Russian Science Academy, Russian Natural Reserves
Academy, National Economy Academy (W.K. Senczagow, W. Chaczaturow).
– German centre at the Budesrepublic Academy in Hamburg and Koblence
University (J. Gerber, G. Kirchhoff, G. Werner, O. Hahn, H. Einhorn and
G. Kozianka) and also the representatives of Military Economy Dachau
Association (J. Blackert, E. Kuhn, M. Ebig, J. Saalbaum, P. Neuhaus).
– Czech centre at the Defence University in Bern (M. Krc, J. Nedbal,
J. Selesovsky, V. Sefcik, L. Odehnal, L. Stancl).
– Polish center connected at the National Defence University (Z. Stachowiak,
M. Sułek, J. Płaczek, L. Kościelecki, S. Kurinia, J. Wróbel, J. Olszewski,
K. Stańczyk, S.T. Kurek).
In other European countries (France – J. Aben, J. Fontanel and Italy – Jean
Caro) these problems are also mentioned, but in very limited research. In every
country all these problems are being analysed even if there is no specialists in this
field of research. There is also a periodical magazine edited “Defence and Peace
Economics”. This bi-monthly magazine was first edited in 1990 as “Defence
Economics”. It is concerned with subjects like: economical aspects of defence,
disarmament, conversions and peace. The readership of this magazine consists of
international scientists and authors. The analyses and researches in the articles
speaks of mathematical aspects of the research.
Summary
Summarising we can say that there is an authentic need for this kind of security
economics analysis in Poland and in the wider world. Security economics is written
for a positive impact in the scientific process and to help the economy and political
sciences. There is research and scientific works as well as monographies and
manuals and articles being published. This subject is lectured on at many academic
centres. There are a number of great research teams of specialists and experts. The
scientific thought is creating and research methodology is creating and verifying.
All of these mean that we, as this article's authors, being at the same time the
representative of this thought, are assured of the great prognosis of this thought for
the future. It will find an important place among modern science.
173
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Górski P., Płaczek J., Skarżyński M., Sułek M., Wojna a gospodarka. Problemy, myśl,
proces przemian, AON, Warszawa 2008.
Hartley K., Sandler T., Handbook of Defense Economies, Elsevier, New York 1995 i 2007.
Kurek S.T., Koniunktura gospodarki obronnej. Syntetyczne ujęcie modelowe, AON,
Warszawa 20011.
Kurek S.T., Logistyczny wymiar systemu obronnego państwa, Zeszyty Naukowe AON, Nr
3(83), Warszawa 2011.
Płaczek J., Ewolucja polskiej myśli obronno-ekonomicznej w latach 1976-2000, AON,
Warszawa 2001.
Stachowiak Z., Kurek St., Kurek S.T., Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne RP, AON, Warszawa
2004.
Sułek M., Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, Bellona, Warszawa 2008.
Wybrane problemy ekonomiki bezpieczeństwa, red. Z. Stachowiak i J. Płaczek, AON,
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174
THE OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTICS COSTS IN COMPUTER ASSISTED COMMAND POST EXERCISES
THE OPTIMIZATION OF LOGISTICS COSTS
IN COMPUTER ASSISTED COMMAND POST
EXERCISES
Lt. Col. Sławomir BYŁEŃ, Ph.D.
Abstract
The War Game and Simulation Centre (WG&SC) is able to support different kind of
Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX’s), also it has the ability to conduct geographically distributed exercises. This article is an attempt to present the problems of logistics costs in CAX’s. The
objects of research were the real logistics support of CAX’s, conducted at various locations. In
comparison with other types of exercises, the use of computer simulation significantly reduces
logistics costs. However, differences in the costs of logistics are also found in the Command
Post CAX exercises. It depends on where they are carried out. Information contained in this
paper shows the way to optimise and rationalise logistics costs.
Key words – logistics, cost, the optimization
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, commands and staffs of leading
armies of the World have developed the use of computer simulation for training in
order to replace the practical deployment of troops. Nowadays, in this area an
increased share of distributed computer simulation is assumed. Similar trends can
be observed also in the training of the Polish Armed Forces. Awareness of the
direction of the focus of leading the armed forces of NATO countries, led to
the establishment in the Polish Armed Forces of a dedicated organisation of cells
controlling computer-aided exercises1 CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise).
Based on the decision of the Minister of National Defence2 in 2002 work began
on creating a War Games and Simulation Centre (WG&SC), which operates in
1
Instructions for preparing and conducting exercises with headquarters and staffs in the Polish
Armed Forces. DD/7.1.1 (A). MoD, Warsaw 2010, p. 8.
2
The basic documents that define the tasks, subordination and structure WG&SC were “Regulation
No. 54/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 21/08/2001 in the matter of the creation of
WG&SC at National Defence University” and “Regulation No. 51/MoD of the Minister of National
Defence, dated 08/26/2002 ordinance amending the years on the creation of the War Games and Simulation
Centre in the National Defence University”, (Journal of Laws No. 16, MoD, September 17, 2002).
175
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
conjunction with the American simulation systems, designed for the modelling and
simulation of join operation ¬ JTLS (Joint Theatre Level Simulation).
The WG&SC, in order to meet the global trends in the organisation of CAX
exercises, and most of all to try to meet the demands Ministry of Defence, General
Staff and Type of Armed Forces leaders in the rationalisation of expenditure on
training, has set it self the objective of optimising the cost of computer-aided
training, with particular emphasis on logistics costs.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the economic benefits of the
organisation of CAX exercises, carried out in a dispersed form.
Keywords: the command post exercise, computer assisted exercises, distributed
exercises, optimisation of costs, logistics costs.
Systematic approach to the costs of military logistics
Between 2008 and 2012, due to the economic situation actions were taken by
the state at all levels of the Polish Armed Forces aimed at reducing the cost of
military operations, especially the promotion of solutions according to the
rationalisation of the use of funds allocated for defence.
The basis for the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces is the defence budget
for the calendar year, which consists of property and personal expenses and
expenses related to the operation of armaments and military equipment, as well as
expenses associated with the training of commands, staffs and troops3. It is in the
rationalisation of expenditure on training, including CAX exercises in WG&SC,
that measures have been taken to ensure its optimisation.
Issues of logistics costs4 are among the most difficult and complex problems of
modern logistics. The problem involves even the definition, separation and
isolation. In the literature, there is the concept of logistics costs in different sections
according to different classification criteria, and experts point to the different
sources and types of costs and how to identify their structure5. Information on
costs, their height, where the formation, deviations, etc., are the basis for
conducting economic analysis, and thus economic decisions boil down to
3
Generally, the defence budget is divided into: defence expenditure (expenditure incurred for the
functioning of the defence system of the country), military expenditure (costs money spent on the
functioning of the armed forces and military expenditures (purchase of armaments and military
equipment, and military construction.). See.: J. Płaczek, Economics of defence, NDU, Warsaw 1994,
p. 80.
4
In terms of logistics, instead of the commonly used term "logistics costs" the correct name
should be the term "logistics costs", a concept that does not affect the formal principles of cost
accounting. See.: K. Ficon, Economic Logistics, BEL Studio, Warsaw, 2008, p. 254 and P. Blaik, The
concept of an integrated logistics management, PWE, Warsaw 2010, p 373.
5
See eg: K. Ficon, op. cit, pp. 261-296 and P. Blaik, op. cit, pp. 370-410.
176
optimising costs. On the other hand, a well-functioning system of information on
costs of logistics processes is necessary to determine the size of the actual costs6.
Logistics costs are one of the main criteria for assessing the effectiveness of
any system of logistics7, and the minimisation should be a basic requirement
of logistics processes. Logistics costs, through the impact on the overall economic
results are the primary quantitative measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of
these processes8. Civilian logistics divides the most commonly used criteria for the
allocation of the costs of logistics into the following groups9:
− logistics costs in cross-generic (generic division);
− logistics costs by phase of movement and places of formation (split phase);
− logistics costs logistics segment / component logistics processes (the residue
division process);
− cost by volatility distribution.
The military is increasingly placing the emphasis on economic factors, where
an important determinant of the training plan is to rationalise the cost of training10.
Therefore, training in planning projects includes the principle of economic
calculation in terms of 'cost – effect. In this regard, action is taken:
− to reduce activities with the use of military equipment by introducing a wider
range of process training school and training devices and simulators;
− to equip military units with equipment to assist the training process;
− to ensure the widespread use by the leadership and staffs of the centres of
computer simulation and war games;
− to combine various levels of command exercise in all types of armed forces;
− to organise and conduct combat training in an integrated way, the after-ligo
¬ nach and training sites.
In the army costs of logistics include many elements (components), mainly
investment: financial, property, and personal time11, and the realization of logistics
processes causing the cost of logistics. The most common cost-sharing is a generic
cross-section, based on the criterion of economic content. The generic includes
costs such as:
6
T. Kaminski, Logistics economic branch, NDU, Warsaw 1996, p 120.
Efficiency (Latin Effectus - effect) is evaluated on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness. At
the same time efficiency means "doing things the right way", and the effectiveness of "doing things
right". See.: P. Drucker, [in:] J. Stoner and Ch. Wankel, Directing, PWE, Warsaw 1992, p. 29.
8
Performance by Pszczołowski, the effectiveness is defined as: 1) "positively evaluated
compliance effort to", 2) "is effective in terms of efficiency and versatile in the sense of the primary
component synthetic ...". T. Pszczołowski, Small encyclopedia of praxeology and organization
theory, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1978, p. 219. The effectiveness according to P. Sienkiewicz is seen as
an essential criterion in the evaluation of the operational effectiveness of the system expressed as "...
the ability of the system to the act, leading to the desired effect as the goal of this action".
P. Sienkiewicz, Theory of systems efficiency, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1987, p. 57. In terms of military
efficiency, effectiveness and efficiency are used interchangeably because of the lack of clear
measures (indicators) classification.
9
See.: M. Nowicka-Skowron, Effectiveness of logistic systems, PWE, Warsaw 2000, p. 93.
10
Training Doctrine of the Polish Armed Forces, DD / 7 (A), MoD, Warsaw 2010, p. 24.
11
K. Ficon, op. cit, p. 255.
7
177
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
a) material costs:
− depreciation;
− use of materials, fuel and energy;
− material services;
b) intangible costs:
− salaries of soldiers and army personnel;
− other personal debts soldiers and military employees fail to pay;
− intangible services;
− cash outflow of premiums, taxes, fees and insurance;
c) other costs.
Undoubtedly, the cost of the military operations budget unit (MBU) occupies a
significant place in logistics costs, including:
– the costs of supply and field services:
– organisation of food provision;
– organisation of uniform provision;
– organisation of supplies, fuels, and lubricants;
– organisation of munition supply;
– the costs of maintenance support:
– maintenance of armaments in technical performance status;
– repairs of weapons and combat equipment;
– the costs of transport support;
– the costs of accommodation;
– the costs of health service support.
In general, the allocation of logistics costs corresponds to the division of the
military logistics system (CSSS)12, contained in the doctrine of logistics. Types of
logistics costs are show Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Types of costs of logistics in the budget of the military unit activity Study
The most important positions in the logistics costs of the CAX exercises are the
costs of feeding, accommodating and transporting participants.
12
The „Military logistics system „… is an ordered set of elements of the organizational
structure and the functional areas which purpose, interconnection and relationships ensure the smooth
functioning of the Polish Armed Forces in peace, crisis and war”. See: Logistic Doctrine of The
Polish Armed Forces, DD/4, MoD, Warsaw 2004, p. 21.
178
Variants of Computer Assisted Exercises
According to the latest classification of military operations there are three types
of simulation: Real, Virtual and Constructive13. This classification is related to the
division of the two variables, namely the factor of personal and work environment.
Schematic division of the criteria adopted by the simulation show in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Types of simulation in computer assisted exercises Study
From the point of view of the most useful CAX exercises it is a constructive
simulation, carried out in a dispersed form. In countries with long-standing
traditions of using simulation systems, and above all, in the U.S. and Germany,
among exercises in the classic sense, are distributed CAX exercises, which use at
least two simulation systems. Constructive simulation is primarily useful in
training commands and staffs where as the virtual and real simulations are for
training crews and improving the individual skills of soldiers.
In practice, the concept of distributed organisations for CAX exercises results
in different jobs being done by different components14:
13
Simulation of the real (Live Simulation) – of real soldiers using actual combat equipment that
is connected to the simulated environment. Simulation of the virtual (Virtual Simulation) – a real
person operating the device simulation (simulators) modeling individual equipment, vehicles,
aircrafts, etc. Simulation of the constructive (Constructive Simulation) is the computer models that
represent the processes carried out by the actions of people and equipment. This category includes
simulation systems to conduct „war games” that model the military in real time. See: E. Cayirci,
Computer Assisted Exercise Process, 5th NATO Joint CAX Forum, Ottobrunn, 30/08/2010. Available
on line: iabg.de/verteidigung/.../CAXProcess.pdf.
14
See: P. Boryn, “Distributed exercises CAX as a modern form of training commands and
staffs”. [Accessed: 02/07/2012]. Available on the Internet: www.csikgw.aon.edu.pl/.
179
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
− JTLS operation system is based on a central computer (server), located in
WG&SC;
− JTLS system management is performed centrally by the administrator of the
operating system WG&SC;
− computer network management, which carries out CAX exercises is done
using network administrators, such as the classified Defence network (MIL-WAN);
− administering workstations is done by IT security teams, separated from the
units participating in the exercises.
Due to the criterion (geographic location) of the following options, exercises
are of the following types of CAX exercises15:
− Variant A – deployment all elements of the exercise in WG&SC;
− Variant B – deployment the authority of the exercise in WG&SC and
commands post in places of permanent dislocation (PPD) or in the field;
− Variant C – deployment all elements of the exercise in places of permanent
dislocation.
Variants of CAX exercises in the various configurations are shown in Figure 3.
Source: own study based on archival materials WG&SC [Accessed: 07/07/2012]. Available on the Internet:
http://csikgw.aon.edu.pl/.
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of the variants of command-post computer assisted exercises
according to their place of conduct
Variant A. Deployment of all elements of the exercise in WG&SC
Variant A is a classic way of organising the CAX exercise. It results from
WG&SC past experiences which show that this organisational structure and form
15
In the Polish Armed Forces because of the place conducting exercises, there are two types of
exercises: a) in the field and b) stationary facilities, including: the place of permanent dislocation, the
backup job, and simulation centers. See: Instructions for the preparation of …, op. cit., p. 37.
180
of preparing and conducting the exercise presents the least problems. In this variant
both the course in JTLS system operators, and the exercise itself is conducted in
WG&SC rooms. The deployment of functional DISTAFF cells of the exercise and
the exercising of command facilities and equipment occur in WG&SC. The
advantage of this variant is a developed (stationary) logistic infrastructure and
Information Technology (IT) stores which ensures that the WG&SC facility is
treated as the basic place for organising computer assisted exercises. Over the last
six years of active use, the WG&SC was the most often applied variant for
organising CAX exercises. The first test of this form of exercise was CAX with 2.
Mechanised Corps, covername "Beskidy 06".
Variant B. Deployment of the exercise authorities in WG&SC and commands
post in PPD
The second option of the organisation of the CAX exercise assumes arranging
particular elements of the exercise in different locations (garrisons). We are talking
then about conducting distributed CAX exercises. This variant is based on the
distribution of the DISTAFF part, including leadership, exercise directors and
OPFOR in the WG&SC, while exercising command in their command stations or
in the field. In the activity of our Centre the first exercise conducted in a distributed
form was training connected with different systems of command, organised in 2007
by the General Staff of the Polish Army, covername "Stokrotka 07".
Variant C. Deployment of all elements of the exercise in PPD
Another example of the organisation is an exercise in the form of a distributed
CAX. This variant deploys elements of the exercise outside of the complex
distribution of WG&SC. In this case, both the training of JTLS system operators as
well as CAX exercise takes place in the permanent deployment units participating
in the exercise. Such a solution was used for the first time in the full range of uses
in January 2012 in a CAX exercise with 10. Armoured Bde, covername “Bóbr 12”.
The methodology for calculating the costs of logistics in CAX exercises
A. INPUT
Analysis and assessment of the real logistical systems in command-staff
computer assisted exercises (CAX), organised in 2012, comparable due to the
organisational level, including:
a. 11th Armoured Div. Exercise with 10th Armoured Cavalry Bde, covername
“BÓBR-12”, conducted in military facilities of Żagań and Świętoszów
(distributed system).
b. 12th Mechanised Div. Exercise with 7th Costal Defence Bde, covername
“WILK-12”, conducted in a facilities of WG&SC (stationary system).
The size of the forces and resources involved in preparing and carrying out the
exercise are shown in Table 1.
181
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
Table 1
FORCES AND RESOURCES DEDICATED TO SUPPORT CAX EXERCISES
Name
exercises
BÓBR-12
WILK-12
Participant
Number of
exercises
soldiers
Period of exercise preparation
11th Arm Cav Div
42
WG&SC
16
Period of exercise duration
11th Arm Cav Div
150
WG&SC
6
Period of exercise preparation
12th Mech Div
42
WG&SC
16
Period of exercise duration
12th Mech Div
240
WG&SC
32
Quantity of transportation
Bus
Minibus
Car
1
-
2
1
-
3
-
1
1
2
-
1
-
1
-
8
-
2
-
3
-
Source: own study on the basis of the documentation of exercises covername: “Bóbr-12” and “Wilk-12”.
B. THE LEGAL BASIS
The basis for the organisation of real logistic support for CAX exercises are:
a) in the organisation of feeding:
− Regulation of the Minister of National Defence on boarding soldiers16;
− The decision of the Minister of National Defence in determining the
monetary value of Standards Board17.
b) as regards the organisation of accommodation:
− General Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, MoD,
Warsaw 2009.
− Legal act on accommodation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Poland18.
− The order of the Rector-Commander National Defence Academy No 18 of
22 April 2009 on the principles of drawing up cost paid for teaching and other
educational services and a price list for the rental of premises.
c) for the organisation of the transport support:
− Orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of
29 May 2008 on the indicators of the operating costs of the selected equipment
tanks-automotive.
16
See: Regulation of the Minister of National Defence, No 327 of 04 March 2011 on board
troops active duty military, (Official Journal of the MoD, 2011 No. 63, item. 327).
17
See: Decision of the Minister of National Defence, No. 55/MoD with 23 February 2011 in
determining the monetary value of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD No. 5, item. 61 of
24 March 2011).
18
Legal act of 22. June 1995 on the accommodation of the Armed Forces, (Official Journal 2005,
No. 41 item. 398).
182
− Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the
Armed Forces of 29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs indicators for selected
equipment service tanks-automotive.
− Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support for the Armed Forces from
21 March 2011 on upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011.
Organisation of the feeding of the participants of a CAX exercise
The feeding of participants of a CAX exercise is done by the food standards
basic school 020 and additional standards: total 110 and 160 beverages. These
standards according to the provisions of the food service industry are for the
soldiers both participating in exercises outside the garrison, and participating in
training or exercises in garrison19. Current cash values on the Board on the
activities of the individual Regional Logistics Bases is shown in Table 2.
Table 2
THE CASH VALUE OF THE STANDARDS BOARD
Regional
Logistics
Base
Lp.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1 RLB
Wałcz
2 RLB
Warsaw
3 RLB
Kraków
4 RLB
Wrocław
Essential standards Board [PLN]
a soldier's a schol's
010
020
specjal
030
operation
al 040
Additional standards Board
[PLN]
general
drinks
bread 111
110
160
13.60
14.59
19.65
21.49
6.21
1.40
1.10
14.67
15.69
21.11
22.79
5.88
1.40
1.10
13.95
14.92
19.61
21.56
5.79
1.40
1.10
13.17
14.12
18.63
20.38
5.38
1.40
1.10
Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD of 23 February 2011 in determining the monetary value
of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD, No. 5, item. 61 of 24 March 2011).
It should be noted that, in comparison with the provisions in force until 2011,
when the whole Armed Forces applied a standardised rate, currently, these values
vary depending on the area of responsibility of the individual Regional Logistics
Base.
Variant A. Stationary exercise conducted in WG&SC facilities.
In accordance with the summary presented in Table 1, participants in the period
of preparation of CAX exercises (conferences, courses, reconnaissances, workshops),
and at the time of exercise is entitled to basic standards board by school board 020
and by additional food standards: 40% of the total 110 and drinks 16020. Moreover,
19
20
Ibidem, § 8. 1.
See: Decision of the National Defence Minister No. 55/MoD, op. cit.
183
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
in relation to the feeding of participants on exercise using the National Defence
University (NDU) canteen, according to the commissioned system, one should
increase costs of the food by costs posed by raw materials (mark-up of 150%). The
daily rate of overall costs of maintaining soldiers in the National Defence
University per capita is shown in Table 3.
Table 3
DAILY RATE OF COSTS OF MAINTAINING SOLDIERS IN THE NDU
+ 150% of
bedspread/s prime
costs [PLN]
39.22
5.88
1.10
46.20
Monetary value
[PLN]
Norm foods
Fundamental school 020
Additional general 40% 110
Additional of drinks 160
Total
15.69
2.35
1.10
−
Remarks
15.69 x 2.5
2.35 x 2.5
Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD, op. cit.
Variant B. Distributed exercise conducting in WG&SC and PPD
Feeding participants of a mixed exercise involves both the provision of food in
NDU canteens and the feeding of participants of the exercise in the parent unit
canteens. The cash value of food standards is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
DAILY RATE OF FEEDING COSTS OF A MIXED SYSTEM
Standard board
The basic school
020
An additional 40%
of the total 110
An additional
beverages 160
Total
Monetary value [PLN]
3rd RLB
4th RLB
Kraków
Wrocław
1st RLB
Wałcz
2nd RLB
Warsaw
NDU
Warsaw
14.59
15.69
14.92
14.12
39.225
2.484
2.352
2.316
2.152
5.88
1.10
1.10
1.10
1.10
1.10
18.17
19.14
18.34
17.37
46.20
Source: own study on the basis of Decision No. 55/MoD, op. cit.
Note: Adopted to calculate the monetary value of RLB Wałcz, as appropriate for the 12th Armored Div and NDU.
Variant C. Distributed exercise conducting in PPD
Depending on the area of responsibility of various alimentation members RLB
exercises carried out using the school principal food standards 020 and by additional
food standards: 40% of the total standard drinks 110 and 16021. The cash value of
Board presents in table 4. Note: for the calculation of the monetary values, RLB
Wroclaw figures were adopted, as appropriate for 11st Armoured Cavalry Division.
21
184
Ibidem, (Official Journal of the MoD No. 5, item. 61 of 24 March 2011).
Organisation of accommodation for participants of CAX exercises
Variant A. Stationary exercise carried out at the premises of the WG&SC
This option implies free accommodation in the unit in Zegrze, Białobrzegi and
Wesoła. Accommodation in civilian hotels is approximately 150 zł per person /
day. Accommodation in NDU hotels is from 50 to 100 zł per person / day (using
the calculation of 50 zł).
Variant B. Distributed exercise conducted in WG&SC and PPD
This option implies accommodation of participants in mixed exercises. For
participants in WG&SC, accommodation in units in Zegrze, Białobrzegi and
Wesoła is free. For other participants in G&SC civil hotel accommodation about
150 zł per person / day. For exercises participants at PPD units, accommodation is
free.
Variant C. Distributed exercise conducting in PPD
Accommodation of participants is free in facilities based on home barracks.
Organisation of transport CAX exercise participants
According to the Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No.
444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of 29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs
indicators of selected equipment service tanks-automotive22 for the transport of
each unit corresponds to its own. The number of people and means of transport
involved in the exercise is contained in Table 1.
Adapted to calculate the distance between two locations and the number of
journeys:
a) The distance between Świętoszów – Rembertów – Świętoszów = about 1100
km.
b) The distance between Szczecin – Rembertów – Szczecin = about 1200 km.
c) The distance between Rembertów – Zegrze – Rembertów (x 2 trips – 120
km) = 3 x bus x 120 km x 8 days = about 2900 km.
d) Odległość Rembertów – Zegrze – Rembertów (x 2 trips – 120 km) = 8 x bus
x 120 km x 8 days = about 8900 km.
Indicator unit operating costs of equipment adapted to the values indicated in
Table 523.
Examples:
− 1 x bus averaged: 7.25 zł + 8% TAX = 7.83 zł;
− 1 x minibus averaged: 3.35 zł + 8% TAX = 3.62 zł;
− 1 x personal car averaged: 2.12 zł + 8% TAX = 2.29 zł.
22
Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support the Armed Forces from 21 March 2011 on
upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011.
23
As an indicator of operating costs counted 8% TAX.
185
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
Table 5
UNIT OPERATING COSTS OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE TRANSPORTATION
ASSETS
Source: The Annex to the order of Chief of General Staff No 444/Log/IWsp SZ of 29 May 2008, op. cit.
The results of the cost of logistics in the computer assisted exercises
Table 6
Our study.
186
Table 7
Our study.
Table 8
Our study.
187
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
Conclusions from the results of the logistics costs of computer assisted
exercises
Our study.
Fig. 4. The costs of feeding in computer assisted exercises
Our study.
Fig. 5. The costs of accommodation in the computer assisted exercises
188
Our study.
Fig. 6. The costs of transport in the computer assisted exercises
Our study.
Fig. 7. The total costs of logistics in the computer assisted exercises
1. The study shows that the highest total logistics costs arise in the computer
assisted exercises conducted using a stationary system in WG&SC (variant A).
2. The lowest total cost of logistics are in exercises carried out in the places of
the permanent dislocation headquarters (variant C).
189
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
3. The difference in the amount of logistics costs is approximately 180
thousand, which is 3.5 times less. Assuming that during the year there are two or
three classes at this level, it's a serious saving.
4. From the point of view of WG&SC, the situation is the opposite. The highest
costs occur in the exercises conducted a distributed system, due to the costs of
accommodation and transport of representatives of WG&SC, aiming to secure the
operational needs and ICT CAX in PPD practicing commands, both in the
preparation (training of simulation system operators) and running exercises (part of
the composition of the management exercises).
5. A shortcoming of option C is the need of human potential distraction
WG&SC. This is sufficient to protect the exercise of DIV in one location for the
local inputs, while in the case of exercises at the operational or strategic level such
a solution cannot be considered.
Advantages and disadvantages of options to organise computer assisted
exercises
1. Variant A. The main disadvantages of this option includes the high cost of
logistics, especially in view of the costs of accommodation, feeding and transport.
2. Variant B. In organisational terms the most optimal solution, in terms of
logistics costs less favourable than option C.
3. Variant C. The advantage of this option are reduced logistics costs in all
areas of domain (accommodation, feeding and transport), as exercising leadership,
using their own logistic infrastructure does not generate additional costs of
logistics. The disadvantages include the need for the potential distribution of
WG&SC exercises necessary to protect distributed in different locations.
Conclusion
The increasing role of CAX exercises in the training of commands and staffs in
the Armed Forces resulted in the creation of WG&SC. The trend towards the use of
simulation systems in computer assisted exercise illustrates the obvious economic
benefits of conducting this type of exercise. It is expected that in the future they
will provide an important link in the process of training commands and staffs.
On the other hand, conducting distributed CAX seems to be the perfect solution
at a time when financial considerations have forced terminology to abandon the
traditional practice of CAX. In addition to cost savings related to the fact that both
the exercising staffs and teams, most notably playing the opponent and
subordinates, carry out their tasks in places of permanent dislocation, including the
operator training simulation system, the preparation of the script in a database can
190
be done through the use of Internet technology and technology education can be
carried out at distance (e-learning).
The adoption of such solutions implies lower training costs, which in the global
settlement should bring tangible economic benefits. At the same time you have to
have in mind that the actions taken to optimise the cost of training cannot reduce its
effectiveness. In any case, it must be ensured that the objectives of training are
achieved.
The analysis of CAX exercises conducted in 2006-2012 shows that the cost of
logistics, without a doubt, the key items are personnel costs which, in order of size
include: the cost of accommodation and food for participants of the exercises,
followed by operating costs of equipment dedicated to transport participants during
the exercise. Based on experience with CAX exercises conducted in the WG&SC
we are able to conclude that logistical tasks carried out in the framework of a real
security exercise (Real Support Exercise) are the most financially consuming
aspects of the cost of the exercise.
The action taken in terms of rationalisation of training may not reduce its
efficiency. In any case, they must ensure the achievement of the objectives of the
training. Commonly, however, it is also known that not every reduction of costs is
rational and reasonable. When implemented processes are irrational, there are
training losses, which in the terminology of the economic costs are lost benefits24.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between rational expenditure incurring
unreasonable costs and incurring losses.
Bibliography
Decision No. 55/MoD of the Minister of National Defence of 23 February 2011 in
determining the monetary value of Standards Board (Official Journal of the MoD,
No. 55, item. 61).
Documentation of Command Post CAX exercise 11th Armored Cavalry Division with 10th
Armored Cavalry Brigade covername “BÓBR-12”.
Documentation of Command Post CAX exercise 12th Mechanized Division with 7th
Coastal Defence Brigade covername “WILK-12”.
Instructions for preparing and conducting exercises with headquarters and staffs in the
Polish Armed Forces. DD/7.1.1 (A). MoD, Warsaw 2010.
Płaczek J., Economics of defence, NDU, Warsaw 1994.
Orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of 29 May 2008
on the indicators of the operating costs of the selected equipment tanks-automotive.
Regulation No. 327/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 04/03/2011 on board
troops active duty military, (Official Journal of the MoD, 2011, No. 63, item. 327).
Annex to the orders of the Chief of General Staff No. 444/Log/IWsp the Armed Forces of
29 May 2008 on the unit operation costs indicators selected equipment service tanks24
K. Grzybowska, Podstawy logistyki, Difin, Warsaw 2009, p. 351.
191
SŁAWOMIR BYŁEŃ
automotive. Letter from the Head of the Inspectorate Support the Armed Forces from 21
March 2011 on upgrade unit indicators operating costs of equipment for 2011.
Regulation No. 54/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 21/08/2001 in the
matter of the creation of the War Games and Simulation Centre at National Defence
University.
Regulation No. 51/MoD of the Minister of National Defence, dated 26/08/2002 in the
matter of change on the creation of the War Games and Simulation Centre at National
Defence University.
The order of the Rector-Commander National Defence Academy No 18 of 22 April 2009
on the principles of drawing up cost paid for teaching and other educational services
and price list for the rental of premises.
192
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE…
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIRST
DECADE OF 21ST CENTURY IN POLAND
Aleksandra KARCZMAREK, PhD student
Abstract
It has been over twenty years since the events which set in motion radical social and
systemic changes in Poland took place. As a result, the conditions of business operation
have changed completely. The changes influenced also ideas, methods and ways of
management. Many new problems and challenges have appeared. One of them is corporate
social responsibility. The author describes the changes in the perception of corporate
social responsibility by Polish society based on research conducted by specialised research
facilities. She also presents the trends of improving corporate social responsibility resulting
from implementation of the ISO 26000 standard.
Key words – business organizations, management, Corporate Social Responsibility,
ISO 26000 standard
After World War II Poland was taken into the sphere of influence of the former
Soviet Union (as a result of the settlement made by the great world powers). This
fact has affected many aspects of Polish society, including the generallyunderstood economy. During that period the "socialist" centrally managed
economy had a dominant role in Poland. The political authorities decided what is to
be manufactured, for whom and how. Even the prices of particular items were set
at the top level. The goal of this economy was a fair and just distribution of goods,
as opposed to profits made by capital owners in capitalist countries.
There were two significant characteristics of the centrally managed economy: the
domination of the state-owned means of production and the allocation of economic
resources with a disregard for the market. The state-owned means of production
included mostly capital facilities, to a lesser degree land and least of all the labor. Key
decisions concerning allocation of economic resources were made by the central party
and state bureaucracy, which included central planners. The economy was regulated
not by the market, but by the central plan. This economic system affected also the
management processes which focused mostly on completion of plans. During that
period companies operated in a specific way, as they had to fulfill a number of social
functions as decreed by political authorities. Therefore the issue of what we call today
corporate social responsibility did not even emerged.
193
ALEKSANDRA KACZMAREK
The social and political transformation which took place in Poland after 1989
brought about a change of the economic system: to that of a market economy.
Companies began to operate in a new way as their roles and functions changed.
Also the methods of corporate management evolved, based on the principles,
methods and cases tested in other countries. However, a host of new issues
appeared, related not only to the companies and their management, but also to the
society for whom the companies are working. One of those issues which went
unnoticed before was corporate social responsibility (pertaining to an organisation
or a company). Therefore the goal of my paper is to show the changes which have
occurred in the first decade of the twenty first century in respect to that area.
In order to present the problems of corporate social responsibility more clearly
it is necessary to define some notions which are essential to this analysis. What is
social responsibility of an organisation? The simplest answer is that it is a number
of obligations for organisation in order to protect and empower the society it
operates in. In other words it is a concept in which the company at the strategy
building stage voluntarily considers social interests and environmental protection,
as well as proper relations with various groups of stakeholders.
The relevant literature contains many definitions of that concept. One of them
points out that it is management's duty to select such decisions and actions which
contribute both to the organisation's own interest (increasing its profits) and to the
protection and enhancement of well wellbeing of the society.1 This definition
highlights two aspects of social responsibility. As far as protection is concerned,
the focus is on refraining from actions which are socially harmful, even if they are
profitable to the company. On the other hand, companies should take actions which
will be directed toward prevention and elimination of various negative social
phenomena. As far as welfare is concerned, the focus is on the creative role of
business in attaining social wellbeing.
Corporate social responsibility is one of the most dynamic, complex and
challenging issues which face business leaders today. Nowadays private companies
feel the increasing pressure to play a more active role in creating conditions for a
better life. CSR means the involvement of business in ethical conduct and the
promotion of economic development while demonstrating respect for people, local
communities, nations and the environment. CSR integrates the concept of global
citizenship with concern for the environment and sustained development.
The practice of Polish companies shows that corporate social responsibility
may appear as one of four attitudes: resistance, social obligation, social reaction
and social contribution.
If a company does not get involved in solving social problems or even, in some
cases, refuses to accept that responsibility or decides to cover it up, this means the
company's attitude is that of resistance. In the strategy of social obligation the
1
Rybak M., Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu – idea i rzeczywistość (Corporate social
responsibility – concept and reality), Warsaw 2001, page 28.
194
company tries to legitimise its operation by the application of economic and legal
criteria. In such cases the company assumes it is responsible only to its
shareholders, which practically means that it accepts only obligations designated
by law. Social reaction implies that a company accepts its legal and ethical duties
and, in some cases, gets involved in charity work. The strategy of social
contribution is the top level of social responsibility. The fundamental principle of
this strategy is to be a good citizen who proactively seeks opportunities to provide
individual contribution to the welfare of the whole society.2 Social responsibility
should affect any decision, whether it pertains to employees, products, quality or
operations. It is a way of thinking and acting and not a separate program or
campaign.
As far as management theory and practice are concerned, social responsibility
of an organisation is based on five domains:
The domain of economic responsibility, which pertains to executive
supervision, consistency of actions related to economic development of the
organisation and of the society, tax contributions, cooperation with local suppliers
and local work force etc.
The domain of social responsibility, which pertains to work safety, health,
amenities, fair remuneration, avoidance of child labor and discrimination, cooperation
with community organisations, professional organisations and local authorities; in
other words, it relates to human rights, labor rights and development of local
communities.
The domain of environmental responsibility, which pertains to preventing or
minimising harmful influences on the environment, the reduction of the
consumption of natural resources, support of initiatives which promote
responsibility toward the environment, and the development and implementation of
systems, processes, technologies and innovations which are friendly to the
environment.
The domain of knowledge responsibility, which pertains to learning, knowledge
creation, management and sharing of knowledge, creating community access to
knowledge (e.g. scholarships for outstanding students), helping to promote the
education of local communities.
The domain of ethics responsibility, which pertains to abiding by laws and
ethical standards in all aspects of the organisation's operation, promoting ethical
standards, preventing corruption and other social abuses.
The concept of corporate social responsibility is very broad and complex,
therefore it is difficult to establish a standard or a system which would cover all
aspects of CSR. But there are some emerging tools to compare actions related to
CSR:
2
Rybak M., Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu – idea i rzeczywistość (Corporate social
responsibility – concept and reality), Warsaw 2001, page 37.
195
– The Keidanren Charter for Good Corporate Behaviour – ten principles
established by the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations, defining
business activities;
– Principles for Business – seven principles drafted by the international
network of business leaders – Caux Round Table. The purpose of establishing
those principles is to define a world standard of social responsibility which could
be used to measure the performance of organisations;
– Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility – a universal tool for
comparative assessment prepared by the Interfaith Centre on Corporate
Responsibility, which helps to ensure the responsibility of companies in line with
the best standards specified by international conventions on human rights and
labor;
– Social Accountability 8000 – a standard developed to enable organisations to
develop voluntary standards of social responsibility and their authorisation;
– Sustainability Reporting Guidelines – a platform for the creation of reports
on related aspects of sustainable development from the economic, environmental
and social perspective;
– Sustainability Through the Market – seven chief principles developed by the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development that allow companies to
implement practices of sustainable development and to benefit from them.3
Today the sphere of social responsibility of organisations is governed by ISO
26000, adopted on 1 November 2010. It contains the answers to key questions:
– How do you define social responsibility and what are its basic principles?
– What are the key areas of social responsibility?
– What issues and actions are important to each area?
– How to implement the principles of social responsibility in accordance with
ISO 26 000?
– What are the benefits of implementing the principles of social responsibility?
The provisions contained in ISO 26000 show that social responsibility of an
organisation means that the impact of its decisions and actions on society and the
environment: (through transparent and ethical behaviour):
– contributes to sustainable development, including health and welfare of the
society,
– takes into account the expectations of stakeholders (individuals or groups
who are interested in decisions or actions of the organisation),
– is compliant with applicable laws and consistent with international standards
of conduct,
– is implemented throughout the organisation and enforced in its activities
within its sphere of influence.
3
Gustafson J., Czym jest społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu? (What is social responsibility of
business?) [in:] Biznes vol. 1. Zarządzanie firmą, Warsaw 2007, p.192.
196
Analysis of the standard indicates that it contains guidelines for social
responsibility, which may be applied voluntarily by all organisations; at the same
time, it does not contain requirements and is not meant to be used for certification.
A key problem related to the issues discussed is the answer to the question:
how does society understand and interpret corporate social responsibility. Research
conducted in Poland indicates that as the economic situation improved and market
economy principles took hold, attitude toward corporate social responsibility began
visibly to change.
In the beginning of the 21st century Poles assessed companies primarily on the
basis of the quality of their products and ways in which they treated their
employees and subcontractors. Quality of service was also an important factor in
the evaluation. Involvement into communal and charity activities and the issues of
environmental protection were perceived as much less important. It might be said
that companies were seen from the perspective of a customer who wants to buy
a good product and be well served and from the perspective of an employee who
needs proper treatment and a fair wage.
Research conducted at that time indicated that in the opinion of the respondents
the role of large companies in society is to generate profit, pay taxes and provide
workplaces; in other words, to observe the law. Hence it can be concluded that the
issue of corporate social responsibility was almost nonexistent in the respondents'
perception and needs. It was identified mostly with the issue of the proper
treatment of workers, obeying workplace health and safety rules and timely
payment of wages.4
Today those attitudes are clearly changing. Increasingly corporate social
responsibility is assessed by the Polish public in terms of new values. These
include the attitude toward the natural environment, support for charity
organisations and local communities, as well as ethical conduct. However, the
promotion of principles and goals of corporate social responsibility in society is
still a challenge. It may be seen that the media is more interested in showing the
negative impact of companies' actions than their commitment toward initiatives
benefiting society and the environment.
Summary. In recent years there has been a drive to develop a common model
of promotion of corporate social responsibility. Various groups of stakeholders
were invited to the discussion, so that the policy will be developed from a wide
perspective. The list of possible actions is long. The authorities face an important
task of encouraging companies to include the policy of corporate social
responsibility in their practice, especially the small and medium enterprises, which
have taken modest attempts to commit to social actions on a larger scale. The
following years will show how deeply the idea of social responsibility has become
4
The presented findings are based on research conducted by IPSOS Polska in 2003, as published
in „Postawy wobec społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu” (Attitudes towards corporate social
responsibility), www.ipsos.pl/3_2_009a.pdf.
197
rooted in the awareness of Polish entrepreneurs and what will be actually
accomplished due to the strategic thinking of benefits for all stakeholders.5 It shall
also be seen how the issue will be understood and assessed by the society as
a whole.
5
Rudnicka A, Wpływ strategii społecznej odpowiedzialności na rozwój regionu (Influence of the
corporate social responsibility strategy on the regional development), [in] Społeczna
odpowiedzialność biznesu a struktury lokalne, Poznań 2009.
198
THE PLATFORM OF HETEROGENIC SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION
THE PLATFORM OF
HETEROGENIC SIMULATION
ENVIRONMENT
Prof. Józef JANCZAK, Ph.D.
Maj. Grzegorz PILARSKI, M.A.
Abstract
A simulator platform of a heterogenic simulation environment is a solution which
enables the conduction of a decision making process on the contemporary battlefield as
part of the achievement of a network centric capability. Decisions made in this process,
owing to the application of modern simulation solutions are burdened with a relatively low
level of risk for the operations’ success, which is directly expressed by the reduction of
losses in people and equipment. The armed forces are now involved in a wide scope of
activities (military and peaceful) which results in a serious demand for the support of the
activities with the use of simulation platforms. Thanks to the application of the heterogenic
simulator, the army planning process can use different, complicated and expensive
simulation systems, installed in a safe place, without the necessity of their installation in the
region of operations where they could be destroyed as a result of operations.
Key words – NCW, simulator, DMP, ACS.
Introduction
The simulation of the operations performed by the elements of the Armed
Forces in a heterogenic environment is becoming a prerequisite in the preparation
process of the command and staff units as well as a complementary element of
‘forecast’ situation awareness.
Simulation, as an element of the command process, conditions the effectiveness of
the undertaken operations. The aim hidden behind the creation of the simulator of
heterogenic simulation environment is to assure the functioning of the simulator
platform resulting in a simulation based on a model which describes various combat
operations of different types of armed forces with the use of the simulation platforms
which already exist, as well as the systems supporting decision making processes.
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JÓZEF JANCZAK, GRZEGORZ PILARSKI
The application of the simulator
While creating the simulator platforms it is advised to take into consideration
the following environmental factors:
• the character of staff trainings using computer simulators,
• the necessity to take into consideration the simulation scattering,
• assuring the variability of picture definition presenting the combat units of
different levels,
• taking into consideration the character of the information exchange route in
the structure entailing different levels of command – the structure of information
domains,
• the depiction of terrain conditions with certain details.
The simulator of heterogenic simulation environment should provide the
following possibilities:
• to support the trainings of command posts from the level of battalion and
above in accordance with the training requirements of particular armed forces,
• to implement procedures of trainings’ conduct being in force in NATO,
• to support the planning process on particular levels of command
(identification of decision making situation, generating the decision options
alongside with their assessment as well as the choice of the best decision),
• to conduct trainings in the scope of crisis and peace time operations,
• to ‘feed’ the simulator with information from the data bases of the existing
decision making support systems of different armed forces,
• to hold trainings in the regions of training units dislocation,
• to be used in combat operations during the missions performed abroad,
• to be used in the operation planning process as well as in the process of
command in international operations,
• to assess the results of the trainings or certain operations.
Basic functions of the simulator
The armed forces are presently involved in a wide scope of operations (military
and peaceful). Such a broad competence scope requires certain preparation of the
personnel. The simulation platform can be the element supporting the preparation
and conduct of operations in a given scope. The simulator should be used,
depending on the needs, in the following areas:
• conducting trainings, most of all, with the use of dispersed simulation,
• supporting units in the process of decision making especially those which
use the automated command system of particular types of armed forces,
• supporting the combat units (elements) during external (out of country)
operations,
200
• preparing missions, including:
– determination of task structure adequate for the planned combined
operations in the international environment,
– simulation of the possible operations’ scenarios,
– preparation of standard operation procedures depending on the possible
existing operation plans,
• running crisis and peace time operations.
During a mission (crisis and peaceful) the simulation platform, through using
the dispersed simulation, can perform the supporting function in the decision
making process in situations which were not anticipated in the mission preparation
process (lack of adequate standard operation procedures). A vital characteristic of
the simulation platform to be applied can be the creation of ‘a virtual scenario’ of
the operation course. The scenario would present the description of situations
possible to take place alongside the indication of their logical and coherent
outcome based on environmental conditions and the decision to run the operation.
The virtual scenario determines cause-effect relations between the occurrences
(the ensuing decisions of the parties and their outcomes), the counteraction
between objects (the trainees – simulated units) and the surrounding (the opponent,
the area of operations, meteorological conditions, the time of the year or of the day,
etc.); moreover, it allows for the depiction of the given situation from different
points of view. The above leads to a conclusion that the operation scenario
generated by the simulation platform should include information of a dual type:
• determination of possible situations presented step by step,
• indication of possible options for each occurrence, at each step which can
prevent, diversify or enable the situations to take place.
Architecture of the simulator
While setting the architecture of the simulation platform it is advised to, first of all,
follow the function of the simulator of a heterogenic simulation environment, namely
the integration of different simulation platforms with the use of dispersed simulation.
Such attitude to the system architecture will result in the following traits:
• flexibility of solution,
• trainings’ cost-effectiveness,
• the training elements will be dispersed,
• adaptive qualities of the analyst group depending on a certain option of
activity to be taken,
• making the operations realistic during trainings,
• integration of tools: simulation platform and decision support systems,
• streamlining the automation of activities connected with the situation’s
options in the process of command – application of simulation platform,
201
• the flow of information based on the ICT infrastructure which is allocated or
generally accessible with the guarantee of a proper level of transmission security,
• safe simulation layer of the critical simulation infrastructure.
The main assumption of simulation functioning in a heterogenic environment is
the usage of a proper information transfer platform – ICT networks. In case of
national applications it is possible to use the allocated ICT networks which already
function in the armed forces. While, in a case when it is impossible to use such
networks e.g. abroad, the global Internet network can be used as a transport layer.
Such a solution is possible under the condition that certain security mechanisms are
implemented, which allows for the transmission of secret information in
accordance with the required security level.
The examples below present the options of system configuration depending on
the purpose and the way of data transmission to the simulator.
1. System architecture based on the simulation centre with the use of a
dispersed simulation of the elements taking part in a training – implementation of
data or its acquisition from the decision support systems.
This option can be realised in a country and abroad. The whole group
responsible for the simulator operation is gathered in one place in the so called
Simulation Centre, while the participants of a training are present in the regions of
the training or the permanent dislocation spots (Figure 1).
Fig. 1. Architecture of simulation system – area of operation: abroad – data implementation
202
The elements taking part in a training can use different simulation platforms,
which can exchange data through the integrator, which is the key element of the
simulator. The implementation of data to the simulation platforms is realised by the
operators of certain simulation systems, which are the integral part of the structure
of the elements taking part in a training. The operators, equipped with proper web
access and interfacing with the system, can implement data about the situation of
the elements of a training. The simulation product is received in the simulation
centre from where it is transferred by the training management or directly to the
training elements. The dispersed elements make the operations more realistic
without the need of financial outlays in case of trainings conducted in one location.
Moreover, the simulator's critical infrastructure is placed in one certain location
(the safe one) operated by a group of specialists.
The key assumption of the system architecture presented in Figure 2 is the fact
that the data for the simulation platform is gained directly from the databases of
decision support systems without the necessity to involve operators.
Fig. 2. Architecture of simulation system – area of operations: abroad – data implementation
Usage of the dispersed simulation allows for supporting the elements realising
tasks outside the country by implementing data to the simulation system by
operators or transmitting the data automatically from the decision support systems.
When the tasks are realised abroad it is possible to assure the safety of the
simulation platform, since the whole critical infrastructure and the group of
operators is located in a safe place far away from the region of combat operations.
203
2. System of architecture with the use of dispersed simulation of the elements
taking part in a training – data implementation.
In this solution the structure of the simulation centre is dispersed into regions
of training elements. The simulator infrastructure (Integrator) is located in a
separate place and is maintained by the necessary team of experts. While, the data
for the simulator platform can be delivered as in the previous examples through
operators or is taken directly from the decision support systems.
Fig. 3. System architecture with the use of dispersed simulation – administrative division into
the region of operations and the region of the simulation platform infrastructure deployment –
data implementation
In the above solutions used abroad particular command posts use certain
simulation platforms connected with one another through the platform of
a heterogenic simulator, being located in a safe place far away from the region of
operations.
204
Fig. 4. System architecture with the use of dispersed simulation – administrative division into
the region of operations and the region of the simulation platform infrastructure deployment –
data taken from the automated command system
Summary
The platform of a heterogenic simulation environment is a modern solution
facilitating the decision making process during combat operations both in a
national and international dimension. Activities aiming at the achievement of a
network centric capability by NATO member states exert the need to create tools
and systems supporting the decision making process. Decisions made in the
process should be burdened with the lowest level of risk for the operations’
success, which directly leads to the limitation of losses in people and equipment.
The platform of a heterogenic simulator allows the army to use different
complicated and expensive simulation systems, installed in a safe place, without
the need to install them in the operations region where they are exposed to the
danger of being destroyed.
Bibliography
Coleman J., Network Centric Warfare w: Directions Magazine, (2004).
Kręcikij J., Wołejszo J., Podstawy dowodzenia, AON, Warszawa (2007).
Wołejszo J., Metodyka przygotowania i prowadzenia ćwiczeń z dowództwami, AON,
Warszawa (2005).
Posobiec J., Krakowski K., Wymagania operacyjne dla symulatorów heterogenicznego
środowiska symulacyjnego, AON Warszawa (2009).
205
JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
PUBLIC INFORMATION OF THE POLISH
ARMED FORCES
Justyna LIPIŃSKA, Ph.D.
Abstract
Polish MoD information policy is to build up the public understanding of military
affairs, national defense and support all the activities of the Armed Forces and prevention
and mitigation of information discrediting achievements. The implementation of
information policy adopted is based on the provisions of the laws, regulations and
decisions of the Minister of Defence. The article presents the assumptions described in
these documents.
Key words – Polish MoD information policy, press service, press officer
Introduction
It is an obligation for each charitable organisation to provide the public with
information, except such information which content violates the protection of
rights and freedoms of other persons or entities. In addition, information cannot be
provided in an open way if it significantly disturbs public order, security or
important economic interests of the state. The right to public information may be
also limited due to other regulations relating to the principles of the protection of
classified information. In the other cases, the organisation is required to publish
any information related to its mission.
Action taken by the Ministry of Defence is intended to build up the public
understanding of military affairs, national defence and support all the activities of
the Armed Forces, as well as promote acceptance of their mission, operating
principles, objectives and capabilities. On the other hand, it aims at the prevention
and mitigation of information discrediting the achievements and position of the
North Atlantic Alliance and the Polish Armed Forces. Also the commanders and
department heads of the Polish Ministry of Defence are obliged to stick to the
official NATO policy in this matter which regulates media access to knowledge
about the tasks carried out by the Armed Forces, including those which are
conducted during combined operations.
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PUBLIC INFORMATION OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
Normative acts obliging the armed force institution for information
policy
The implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to information is one
of the most important principles in the overall information policy of the National
Defence Department. It means that each person has the right to demand
information concerning the ministry of defence's issues, both positive and negative,
and it is the defence department obligation to make it available, directly or through
the media. Awareness of these duties makes the defence ministry realise the need
to have an active information policy.
The mass media play a decisive role in shaping social attitudes and public
opinion in regard to the military and defence issues.
Information policy in the Polish Armed Forces is governed by the following
normative acts:
1. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland;
The Republic of Poland shall offer its citizens the right to obtain information
on the activities of public authorities and persons exercising public functions1.
Article 14 of the constitution provides freedom of the press and other mass
media2, and art. 54 stipulates that everyone shall have the freedom to express
opinions, to acquire and disseminate information3.
2. The Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information
According to the Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information
(Journal of Laws No. 112 Pos. 1198), every citizen of the Republic of Poland has
the right to get any information about the activities, competencies, legal status, and
rules of the decisions taken by public authorities. These bodies are required to
make available non-confidential information about their business to be published in
the Public Information Bulletin and without any delay (within 14 days) to provide
such information at the request of the individual.
3. The Act of 26 January 1984 "Press Law"
Moreover, the Act of 26 January 1984 "Press Law" (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24)
Article. 2 and 4 states that the state authorities, in accordance with the Constitution
of the Republic of Poland, must provide the press with conditions suitable for the
carrying out of its functions and responsibilities, including enabling commercial
newspapers and magazines editors, diversified in terms of the program, with a full
presentation of the subjects and attitudes4.
1
Act 61 Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with
amendments).
2
amendments).
3
amendments).
4
Article 2 and 4 Press Law of 26 January 1984 (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24)
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JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
4. Act with NATO alliance (MC457)
In the NATO document (MC457) regulating the issue of communication with
the public on military matters, the parent category is Public Information. In the
Polish reality it was called "Press and Public Information Activities." It consists of
activities involving the use of various forms and methods of public relations with
regards to communication on military and defence issues.
5. Acts of States in the EU
By becoming a member of NATO and the EU, we have adopted not only the
obligations associated with the modernisation of command, communication and
military technology, but also standards for public information distribution
appropriate for the institutions of a democratic state. The NATO standardisation
documents also define the rules for informing the public body and define how to
work with the media in combined allied operations (NATO AJP 01 / B). The Polish
national
equivalent
of
this
document
is
“Joint
Operations”
(Szt.Gen.Wewn.3/20/2001) which provides the information about how to give fair,
accurate and fast information to the public through the media. It was defined as one
of the most important tasks during the joint operation run by the operational
command.
6. Act of 5 January 2010 on the protection of classified information.
When the safety of the mission and the soldiers involved in the operation is
threatened, there is a natural refusal to create the conditions for the implementation
of journalistic activity. Access to the classified information may be limited. This
process is regulated according to applicable legislation in line with the Republic of
Poland Constitution, paragraph 61. 3. That issue was detailed in the Act concerning
the protection of classified information dated on 5 January, 2010 (Journal of Laws
No. 182, item 2010. 1228).
These documents are compatible with:
7. National Security Strategy of the Polish Republic.
and
8. Development program of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 20082018.
In addition, civilian staff and employees of the military press are obliged to
abide by international law, ratified by the Republic of Poland, such as:
– The 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration;
– The 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms;
– The 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights;
– The 1982 Declaration on freedom of expression and information, also known
as the European Charter for Media.
The basic document regulating the information policy of the Ministry of Polish
National Defence and the Armed Forces are:
208
1. Information management strategy of the Ministry of National Defense and
the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic for 2009-2018;
2. The Polish Armed Forces development program for 2009-2018;
3. The concept of promotion of the Polish Armed Forces for 2012-2015.
Objectives of Informational policy
The strategic goal of the information policy department of the Polish National
Defence is to get the support and understanding of the public for the purpose, tasks
and activities undertaken by this department.
According to the NATO normative documents, the responsibility for the
implementation of the public information policy lies with commanders and heads
of organisational units and their subordinate officers, including press officers, who
play the role of the experts and advisors. The main pillar in the construction of an
efficient system is to inform national and international public opinion. The officer
mentioned above must be aware of theirs mission in this field.
Information policy objectives should be implemented by all military personnel
and military employees in their daily business activities. It must also be accepted
that the main principle is that every soldier involved in the potential operations or
serving in the military unit may be a part of the notification process. In this case the
soldier who is recommend as a statement provider to the media should receive
prior methodological support from professional press tutors.
The Polish Armed Forces information policy directs its activities to the:
– internal environment: professional military staff, students of the military
academies, soldiers, military employees, military personnel, MoD civil servants
and soldiers with the allocation of mobilisation. The internal environment in this
matter consists of the management of the of MoD, commanders at all levels of
command and control, as well as military experts;
– proximal external environment: military families, former professional
soldiers, veterans, combatants, candidates for professional military service and
members of non-governmental organisations which have signed an agreement with
the Minister of National Defence;
– further external environment: the members of the general public of the
local community, school and academic potential recruits and foreign customers;
– influential environment: national and international media, the government,
Parliament (both lower and upper houses), local authorities, universities and
schools, political parties, groups, social initiatives, NGOs, churches and religious
and moral authorities.
The Ministry of Defence, in the light of the information management strategy
of the MoD and the Polish Armed Forces in the period 2009-2018 carries out the
tasks of information propagation by use of:
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JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
– Information Centre of Defence (MoD CI), which manages, implements
and coordinates the information in the National Defence Department;
– The MoD Department of Education and the Promotion, which manages,
carries out and coordinates the image of the defence resort.
Information policy assumptions assume that the information policy of the
Ministry of National Defence is an integral part of the government's information
policy and only Ministry of National Defence rules the implementation of national
defence information policy of the national defence specifies.
For analysis of such an organisation, which is a military service, the public
information may relate to the functioning military unit, its equipment, the impact
on the environment and methods of dealing with crisis situations such as natural
disasters. The military in order to communicate with the environment has a specific
communication strategy that is defined by a decision of the Minister of National
Defence dated. 04.07.2009 on the principles of information policy in the Ministry
of Defence.
The information policy department of national defence, the whole of the
activities and decisions of the Ministry how to inform the public about matters of
the Polish Armed Forces and defence and the formation of a positive image of the
Armed Forces using available communication means, including through the mass
media (the media)5.
Press service tasks
The main objective of an information policy department of National Defence is
to meet the information needs of the public and gain public understanding and
acceptance. The Director of the Public Information Department of the MoD is
responsible for information policy in Polish Armed Forces. He performs tasks in
the area of the information policy department by providing accurate and objective
information to the public, soldiers and employees of the department at all levels of
command and management of the Armed Forces. Its tasks include planning and
running close cooperation with the media. Particular emphasis is placed here on the
dissemination of information via e-mail or of placing it in the Public Information
Office (PIO) website. One of the Director’s responsibilities is to serve as the
Administrator of the National Defence Ministry PIO while supervising ministry
websites with the ability to intervene in their substantive content. In addition, his
office coordinates the work relating to the conduct of information campaigns and is
responsible for organising training in communication for soldiers, experts and staff
of the department. He is also responsible for the collection and sharing of
information which is issued in various formants like promotional brochures and
5
The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 7 April 2009 on the principles of
information policy in the Ministry of National Defence (OJ. MON No.7, pos. 82).
210
videos relating to the operations of the Armed Forces carried out by Poland. The
diagram below shows the structure of the Department of the Press - Information of
the Ministry of National Defence.
Figure 1. Organizational Chart of the Department of the Press - Information of the Ministry of
the National Defence
The Ministry of Defence is the only institution standing at the top of various
types of forces and entities associated with military service. Each organisation
subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, or any military unit, has its own
spokesman who is responsible for contacts with the media. Specific regulations on
information policy in the Ministry and its subordinate units is regulated by the
document entitled “The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 31
May 2011 on the press service of the Ministry of National Defence”.
The main duty of the Press Service of the Armed Forces includes primarily
implementation of the ministry's information policy in peacetime, crisis and war.
The purpose of the Press Service of the Armed Forces is to organise contacts with
the media and to inform the public about matters of national defence and actions
taken by the MoD. Currently, the main purpose of the information is to broaden
public knowledge in terms of:
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JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
1. Operations abroad.
Armed Forces engagement in operations outside the country is associated with
a high interest from the public and the media. This is primarily due to the high risk
and possibility of a loss of personnel. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake
integrated measures of Public Relations to boost public understanding of both the
mission and the purpose for which these activities are carried out.
2. Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces.
This process requires the preparation of relevant information and promotion
campaigns to encourage people to join the army. These activities support the
recruitment process and must be addressed to different audiences. The activities
related to the professionalization of the army consists of all activities intended to
promote elitism and the prestige of the military profession.
3. Technical modernisation of the Armed Forces.
This is an area having significant potential for image development. It provides
information on the process of obtaining new weapons and military equipment and
can have a very positive impact on the perception of the military service in society.
Therefore, it requires a long-term strategy for the preparation of information and
promotion activities, including projects both on the national and local level.
4. Organisational and structural reforms.
Carrying out these particular changes and with their deep adherence to public
opinion and preferences ensures that the National Defence Ministry and all military
institutions are seen as fit managers of public money.
5. The construction of a professional press service in the Defence Ministry.
6. The introduction of modern, efficient information systems, with the
particular emphasis on electronic media.
Having in mind the fact that the Internet is becoming more and more common
for people searching for information, the PIO panel or MoD websites are also
becoming more popular. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate solutions
to the resort and military units for the use of military telecommunication networks.
7. Providing military contingents press service equipment and technical
capabilities necessary to provide the public with information about the tasks
of the soldiers involved on operations.
8 The creation of the coherent and flexible emergency response system in
the Ministry of National Defence.
An emergency situation requires the making of properly planned and
coordinated activities of the Armed Forces. This applies not only in response to
emergency situations but also to the proper management of information and
communication with the media and local communities affected by the problem. It
is both an opportunity to demonstrate professionalism and responsibility, and, at
the same time, the possibility of serious damage to the military's reputation through
chaotic and uncoordinated project running. Therefore the creation of the
212
appropriate system is extremely important to build up a positive image of the
military organisation.
It is worth noting that the goals of information policy should be implemented
by all military personnel and military employees in their daily business activities. It
should be noted that each soldier of the Polish Army may be in some way a
participant in the process of providing information. In the event that there is a need
to provide statements to the media, each individual should have received
substantive and methodological support from the press professionals beforehand.
Military communication tools for contacting the external environment do not
differ so much from the tools used in other charitable institutions and commercial
enterprises. In addition to being a subject of military law and having access to
public information the service has the constitutional obligation to publish them by
PIO, the ways and means which the military service uses in communication with
the environment are the same as in most ordinary companies. Therefore, The
Promotion of the Polish Army Concept for 2012-2015 prepared by the Ministry of
Defence lists four main instruments of policy information:
– public information – the informing of the public, including the issuance of
the Public Information Bulletin in the electronic form;
– media relations – actions aimed at the media, building relationships with the
media, allowing for effective interaction through them to the public;
– Public Affairs – actions aimed at building mutually beneficial relationships
with institutions of public life;
– e-public relations – activities in the field of communication, implemented
via the Internet (web portal, email, multimedia presentations) and intranet. The
most important tool of e-public relations is the web portal of the Ministry of
National Defence: www.mon.gov.pl, consisting of two parts – firstly, the CI
administered by the Defence Information section and secondly, the part
administered by the Education and Promotion Department of Defence
www.wojsko-polskie.pl.
The role of press officer in the armed forces
According to the statement of the Council of Ministers, dated on 8 January
2002, on the organisation and tasks of the spokespersons in the offices of
government (issued under that Act, OJ 2002 no. 4 poz. 36) press officers perform
tasks related to government information policy in conjunction with the heads of
organisational units of the office.
The person who is responsible for coordinating the work of the Press Service of
the OU is the press officer. This particular person must have a predisposition to
work in the field of interpersonal communication and the ability to communicate
freely and directly both orally and in a written way. It is also important to have
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JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
specialist knowledge of public relations, journalism and social sciences. Press and
media officers are mostly professional soldiers, graduates of upper officers schools
or have civilian higher education and postgraduate studies. They report directly to
the commander of their military unit. Cpt. Szczepan Głuszczak who is a Press
Section Chief of 11Lubuska Armoured Division in the article "Press-Military
Officer of PR-sheep" so characterised his work:
The most difficult step is to get the attention of all people who may be
interested in this business. This is the biggest challenge for anyone who begins his
journey as spokesperson. [...] We need to be very creative in our actions6.
He points out that at this stage, his work does not differ too much from the
work of fellow PR person from a private company. Just as he has to look for
current topics of interest to a wider audience, prepare and shoot footage for what
happened in his unit.
Workplace is the same as in a company or a large corporation7.
However, not everything is the same. The most sensitive part of the job is to
keep calm in a crisis, and while staying outside the country such as on an
operation. Such situations require a very high concentration and the ability to work
with leaders and provide reliable and consistent information.
The main tasks of the press and the press officer overlap in most of the tasks of
the Press Service of the Armed Forces in the organisations described above. A
detailed list of tasks given the decision in the structures of the Press Service of the
Armed Forces.
Analyzing the work of the Press Officer of the unit, it should be noted that the
scope of its responsibilities is not only to inform journalists and the wider
community about current affairs. It is also conducting ongoing and periodic
analysis of the media for commanders and the formation of conclusions and
proposals for the perception of the military in the media. As the spokesman of each
organisation, the military press officer must keep track of what the media say about
this organisation. In the case of meetings with representatives of the media, press
officer takes care of the preparation of these conferences, looking after the leaders
of meetings and the overall setting of the event. As a military unit is a specific
organisation to which no unauthorised person has access the officer must ensure
that the organisation of journalists getting into the units has the proper clearance
and that he provides them assistance. If a journalist has any questions the press
officer is obliged to respond to them, of course, in so far as they are authorised to
do so. The Press Officer in a specific unit is also responsible for preparing material
for training, and military exercises, and creating a database of photographic or film
material of the unit.
Spokespersons and press officers and officers in general are obliged to prepare
monthly plans of undertakings, along with reports on working with the media and
6
7
214
http://www.proto.pl/PR/Pdf/Oficer_prasowy_wojskowy_PR-owiec.pdf.
Ibidem.
public interest areas. These plans contain information about projects for the coming
month and the issues which the media are interested in. Reports are a source of
information about the effects of actions taken by the press service regarding the
quantity and nature of media coverage. They are described by the controversy way
about the published reports, the number of conducted press conferences and other
meetings with citizens having information and promotional nature.
Conclusion
Polish MoD and Armed Forces information policy will create a need to prepare
more and more new concepts and promotional campaigns to support the
recruitment process, addressed to different groups (also in terms of territorial),
which provide candidates for service. A key area of action is to pass on information
about military transformation which image has a significant positive potential.
Therefore, the construction of the professional press service of the MoD requires
building up a coherent information system, especially at the level of military units
and commands, based on staff full-time release. In addition to external information
focusing on the media, it should be focused on improving internal information
system on matters influencing the conditions of service and discipline of the
military service. This allows to fulfil the existing gap between the ability to
respond to the central government institutions and capabilities and equipment of
staff performing the tasks in this area at the level of military units and garrisons or
commands. Currently, outside of the Information Centre of Ministry of Defence
and some of the organisational units of the Polish Armed Forces (General Staff,
Headquarters RSZ), there is no full time press service position.
The introduction of modern, efficient information systems, with particular
emphasis on electronic media creates a growing necessity to provide Internet
accessibility for citizens and additionally the need to improve the situation of
internal information accessibility. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate
solutions for the use of military telecommunication networks. In addition, the
construction of the optimal functioning of the military press should lead to
rationalise the cost of publishing in the military and "open up" the military press to
the external market.
Another important direction of improvement for military defence information
policy is to provide military contingents with press service equipment and technical
capabilities which are necessary to provide the public with information about the tasks
of the soldiers involved in operations. It is all about increasing the opportunities to
develop and record press releases, using television and broadcasting systems, by
providing these services in the frame of a "combat camera", prepared for the
implementation of film and photographic materials outside the country, while allied
and coalition operations are going on.
All of this requires a long-term strategy for the preparation of information and
promotion activities, including projects on a national and local scale.
215
JUSTYNA LIPIŃSKA
Bibliography
The decision of the Minister of National Defence dated. 7 April 2009 on the principles of
information policy in the Ministry of National Defence (OJ. MON No.7, pos. 82).
http://www.proto.pl/PR/Pdf/Oficer_prasowy_wojskowy_PR-owiec.pdf.
Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws No. 78, item. 483 with amendments).
Information and promotion strategy MON, www.wp.mil.pl / files / File /
strategia_informowania_i_promocji.doc.
Press Law of 26 January 1984 (Dz.U.84. No. 5 pos. 24).
216
A „CULTURAL TURN” IN THE STUDY AND CONDUCT OF WARFARE…
A „CULTURAL TURN” IN THE STUDY AND
CONDUCT OF WARFARE – A NEW
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE
Elżbieta OLZACKA, M.A.
Jagiellonian Uniwersity in Krakow
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to acquaint the reader with “cultural turn” which in recent years has been becoming visible not only on the level of thought about war and its
analysis, but also on the level of practical change in the tactics and methods of implementation of the military action. The failure of coalition forces in asymmetric conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan led after 2006 to a change in strategy to the one granting a greater role to
the cultural knowledge and skills. At the same time, on the level of theoretical reflection,
the analysis through the lens of technological development of the means of war conduct, as
well as the popularity of the RMA category (revolution in military affairs) gradually gives
way to a culturally oriented studies. It is caused mainly due to the fact that the 21st century
wars depend increasingly on immaterial factors - knowledge, information, culture and
values; rather than exclusively on the fire power. The article describes the most important
concepts of Western analysts (R.M. Cassidy, J.W. Jandora, D. Adamsky), but also the Russian anthropology of war (W. Bażukow, W. Grebienkow), as well as the practical implications of the cultural approach to war (e.g. Human Terrain System).
Key words – anthropology of war, cultural turn, military culture, Human Terrain System, counterinsurgency
Introduction
In recent decades, the view on war held by military historians and analysts has
been dominated by analysis from the perspective of the technological development
of the means of war. Until 2006, the Western strategy and tactics were mainly
based on the use of more and more technologically advanced and precise weapons
with the greatest firepower. Hence the popularity of RMA (revolution in military
affairs) in the military discourse1. The Western (primarily American) specialists
1
Most known works include: T. Benbow, The Magic Bullet? Understanding the Revolution in
Military Affairs, Brassey’s . London 2004; M. Knox, W. Murray (ed.), The dynamics of military
revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001; A.F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to computer;
the pattern of military revolutions, “The National Interest” 37, Fall 1994, pp. 30-34; W.S. Lind, Un-
217
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
expected technological supremacy to ensure a definite dominance over the less
developed armies of enemies. The asymmetric wars in Iraq and Afghanistan contradicted these expectations. Neither technological superiority nor greater firepower ensured success in these wars conducted under new rules. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Americans, assuming that the opponent agrees with their
concept of war, expected that the war would end with the defeat of the ground
forces of the enemy. They were not prepared for a so-called "low-intensity" conflict that is difficult to win by means of technological superiority only.
Therefore, in recent years, among researchers dealing with military issues, we
can observe a significant increase in interest in the cultural side of conflicts and in
the development of strategies and tactics that would take into account the cultural
differences between the warring parties. Studies on the different war cultures, seeking to understand and explain non-Western ways of warfare and the different views
on war and the role of violence in social life are very important these days. Their
conclusions should therefore be presented to the Polish reader. In this paper we
examine the most important concepts of Western analysts, but also the concepts of
anthropology of war developed to the east of Poland, as well as the practical implications of the "cultural" approach to war.
War as a cultural phenomenon
War can be seen as a cultural phenomenon, immersed in the culture of a society
that understands and conducts it in its own special way. War is shaped by the cultural system, e.g. through the prevailing views on it, concepts on the use of violence, values, ideals, "ethical horizon" and the concept of power dominant in socalled "official culture". The methods of warfare are determined not only by practical considerations, technology and efficiency, but often also by cultural considerations. History provides numerous examples of this2. We can repeat after Philippe
Contamine that “war is a cultural phenomenon. The concepts of war prevailing in a
given era or society influence, in a more or less visible way, its outbreak, course
and conduct"3. The perception of war as not only a military, political and social,
but also cultural phenomenon finds more and more supporters. An influential British historian, John Keegan is one of the pioneers of this approach. In his A History
of Warfare he proves that war is a cultural phenomenon, and it is this culture that
has the greatest impact on its course, and the methods of conducting it. He writes:
derstanding Fourth Generation War, “Military Review”, September-October 2004, No. 5, 12-16;
B. D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs, CSBA, Washington 2011. As far as Polish
literature is concerned, a book by Łukasz Kamiński, Technologia i wojna przyszłości. Wokół nuklearnej i informacyjnej rewolucji w sprawach wojskowych, WUJ, Kraków 2009 is worth a mention.
2
I write about this in more detail in my article Kulturowy wymiar zjawiska wojny – zakres badań
i doniosłość, „Kultura i Historia” nr 22/2001.
3
P. Contamine, Wojna w średniowieczu, Marabut, Warszawa 1999, p. 269.
218
“War is more than just an extension of policy. War is an expression of the culture
of a given society; (...) it is often a determinant of culture, and sometimes of the
society itself”4. The impact of culture on warfare has long been recognised and
analysed by anthropologists, a prime example of which is Ruth Benedict. In the
second chapter of her famous The chrysanthemum and the Sword she connects the
methods of warfare, as well as the ways of thinking about the phenomenon of war
in a given society with a specific cultural pattern5.
In the past few years, the "cultural perspective" in the analysis of the methods
of warfare has also penetrated military circles. The relationship between war and
culture is more often noticed and examined in the course of strategic and military
studies6. As Patrick Porter notes, we deal with a "cultural turn" in studying war;
and strategists increasingly refer to the knowledge of anthropologists and sociologists. The failure of American strategy based primarily on technological supremacy
meant that a growing number of military analysts began to see a need to understand
"the relationship between how people fight and their traditions, identity, religion,
collective memory, preconceptions and sheer force of habit"7. This resulted in new
theoretical concepts, emphasizing the anthropological approach to the problem of
war and the need to understand the cultural differences between the various methods of warfare8. The relationship between war and culture has also been perceived
as more important in the practical dimension. Cultural competence is a central
value in the new American counterinsurgency field manual9. As Patrick Porter
calculated, it mentions “culture” 88 times and “cultural” 90 times in 282 pages.
The need to equip military personnel with language skills and in-depth cultural and
social knowledge of the region is today noticed both by politicians, as evidenced by
the speech of the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in 200410, as well as by
the military personnel themselves, as evidenced by the article of the retired U.S.
4
J. Keegan, Historia wojen, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1998, p. 25.
R. Benedict, Chryzantema i miecz. Wzory kultury japońskiej, PIW, Warszawa 2003.
6
J. W. Jandora, War and Culture: A Neglected Relation, “Armed Forces & Society”, Vol. 25,
No. 4, Summer 1999, pp. 541-556.
7
P. Porter, Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War, “Parameters”, Vol. 32 (2/2007), p. 47.
8
The researchers who see a need for a new theoretical approach include: T. Corn, Clausewitz in
Wonderland, “Policy Review” September 2006,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/4268401.html; M. McFate, Anthropology and
Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of Their Curious Relationship, “Military Review”, 85 MarchApril 2005, pp. 24-38.; G. Packer, Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on
Terror?’, “New Yorker”, 18 December 2006, pp. 60-69.
9
The term counterinsurgency used in Western literature is translated in this paper as „wojna
partyzancka”. It should however be noted that it is associated with such concepts as "small wars",
"low intensity conflict", "fourth generation warfare" or the "war on terror" and relates generally to an
asymmetric conflict, irregular warfare, with no clearly defined front line, scope or even the sides of
the conflict. See H. Münkler, Wojny naszych czasów, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2004; M. van
Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, Ballantine, New York 2008.
10
P. Porter, op.cit., p. 48.
5
219
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
Army General Robert H. Scales, who argues that the Iraq crisis "requires an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture and motivation", and proposes a
new model of culture-centric warfare11. Let us now examine the most distinctive
theoretical concepts that approach the issue of war from a cultural perspective.
A "Cultural turn" in the analysis of war - a theoretical approach
To analyse the relationship between war and culture, researchers are looking
for relevant terms that can facilitate this task. Western science on strategy has,
since 1977, used the term "strategic culture"12, which is based on the quite natural
assumption that "there is a connection between the wider culture of a nation / society and its strategy, in other words, culture affects the behaviour and strategic decisions”13. Alistair I. Johnston in Thinking about Strategic Culture proposed a definition of this concept consisting of two parts. “The first part, broader, covers basic
assumptions related to the structure of strategic environment, the role of war in the
life of society, including on the international stage (necessity or aberration?), the
nature of threats and their sources, the adequacy of military force in face of these
threats and conditions under which it can be used. These issues are discussed and
resolved in a broader institutional framework, represented by the state. The second,
narrower part of the concept of strategic culture relates to the operational level, i.e.
explains how the military force can be used in an actual armed conflict”14. According to Roman Kuźniar, strategic culture not only provides ideas and norms for
strategists and politicians, giving strategists specific goals and objectives, but is a
kind of "lens" through which the overview and assessment of the international
situation is performed15. This is important as such issues as collective beliefs regarding the image of the state, its mission and place in the international order, the
role and vision of foreign policy are important for understanding the causes and
nature of wars waged by the state and vary depending on the historical, geopolitical, political, social, and, last but not least, cultural context.
In recent years, however, the term "military culture", has been gaining much
more popularity, as evidenced by such works as: A Military Culture. A Paradigm
Shift? by Karen O. Dunivin16, Military culture and transformation by Michael B.
11
R.H. Scales Jr., Culture-CentricWarfare, “Proceedings” 130, October 2004, pp. 32-36.
It was introduced by an American theorist of international relations Jack Snyder in his work
about Soviet nuclear strategy. See: J. Snyder, The Soviet Stategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear
Options, RAND, Santa Monica 1977.
13
R. Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki, Wydawnictwo Scholar,
Warszawa 2005, p. 186.
14
Quoted in: R. Kuźniar, op.cit., p. 187.
15
R. Kuźniar, op.cit., p. 189.
16
K. O. Dunivin, A Military Culture. A Paradigm Shift?, Air War College, Maxwell Paper № 10,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1997.
12
220
Siegl17, The Military Culture and The Strategic Art by Eugen Bădălan18 or a more
detailed Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the
Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict by Robert M. Cassidy19. Despite the absence of
a clear definition, these researchers refer the term "military culture" to a military
institution. Michael B. Siegl writes about relations, values, goals and beliefs characteristic of an army, rooted in traditions, customs and practices, and influencing
the models of leadership. The army, like other organizations, has a culture that
determines the patterns of responding to various challenges20. Similarly, Eugen
Bădălan understands "military culture" as a military system of values, without
which "a soldier would simply be a robot”21. Soldiers, regardless of the position
they occupy inside the hierarchy, are firmly rooted “in the national, European,
Euro-Atlantic and universal system of values”22. These values affect their views,
opinions and behaviour.
Robert M. Cassidy, in turn, emphasises the strategic aspect of the military culture and defines it as a set of beliefs, relationships, and values that affect the decision on how and when to use military force to achieve strategic objectives. Culture,
understood in this way, is conditioned by, and develops as a result of, historical
experience, geography and political culture. Relationships between the "military
culture" and the strategic culture are also noticed by other researchers. Fritz W.
Ermarth in his Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present and... In Transition23?
argues that the strategic culture (in Russia) can not be considered as a simple result
of the "military culture", i.e. of "deep convictions about how military power should
be developed and used". The influence of political, economic and foreign policy
culture is as equally important as the influence of military culture. Furthermore,
influences between these areas are bi-directional and not always easy to grasp.
In addition to the function of theoretical generalisations, most Western works
that deal with military culture are very practical. The patterns of changes within the
American military culture are of interest, and especially the shift in the nature of
conflicts from conventional war to low-intensity conflict. According to James Carafano, the modern armed forces of the United States are inadequately prepared for
the new type of operations, so-called "peacekeeping" or stabilisation missions,
which represent a growing percentage of all military missions in the twenty-first
century. In his article Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America's Military for
21st Century Missions he notes that in order to better prepare the armed forces for
17
M. B. Siegl, Military culture and transformation, w: “Joint Force Quarterly”, No. 49, April, 2008,
pp. 103-106.
18
E. Bădălan, The Military Culture and The Strategic Art, “Strategic Impact” No. 3/2005, pp. 5-9.
19
R.M. Cassidy, Russia In Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict, U.S. Army War College, 2003.
20
M. B. Siegl, op.cit., p. 103.
21
E. Bădălan, op.cit., p. 6.
22
Above.
23
F. W. Ermarth, Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and… in transition?, SAIC Reports
2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf.
221
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
such tasks (post-conflict operations) a change within the military culture is necessary. Knowledge, skills and values that foster understanding of other peoples and
cultures, as well as enable cooperation in a multinational environment should play
a bigger role within this culture24. Similar arguments are also put forward by other
researchers who deal with "new wars" - Robert M. Cassidy in Counterinsurgency
and the Global War On Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War25 and Hugh
Gusterson in his article The Cultural Turn in the War on Terror26.
Karen O. Dunivin is also interested in changes in the American military culture. In her articles Military Culture: Change and Continuity27 and A Military Culture. A Paradigm Shift? she examines the evolution of the traditional paradigm on
which the American military culture is based (FMA Paradigm: Masculine Warrior
Combat and Paradigm). The old and, according to the author, outgoing paradigm is
characterised by "exclusion" of women and men who do not fit into traditional
gender roles, closure, homogeneity and relations based on hierarchy and mutual
hostility. The military culture is dominated by the "cult of masculinity" (dominance
of male values, norms and lifestyles) and the need to fight and win wars as the
primary objective of the armed forces. According to the author, the requirements of
the new, rapidly changing world force changes within this model of military culture. The new paradigm is characterised by heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and relationships based on tolerance. The military no longer rely on outdated gender categories and open to new social categories: women and homosexuals. This makes it
better suited to the new roles required by the logic of new conflicts.
Sheila Miyoshi Jager from the American Strategic Studies Institute has carried
out a comprehensive and extremely interesting analysis. In her work On the Uses of
Cultural Knowledge she examined the role of cultural knowledge in the course of
new wars, distinguishing several levels on which this knowledge had been used.
Starting from the tactical level, i.e. the knowledge of cultural customs, traditions,
learned behaviours and norms (e.g., "do not spit in public places", "do not stare at
women"), through the operational level, to the development of strategies and policies. The author argues that it is precisely at these highest levels that cultural
knowledge is not sufficiently used, which reflects negatively in the conduct of military operations in low-intensity conflicts28.
Dima Adamsky in his The Culture of Military Innovation chose a very interesting topic29, by examining the issue of the impact of cultural factors on the rate and
24
J. J. Carafano, Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America’s Military for 21st Century Missions; Heritage Lectures, no. 810, 2003, http://www.heritage.org.
25
R. M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford 2008.
26
H. Gusterson, The Cultural Turn in the War on Terror, in: John Kelly (ed.), Anthropology and
Global Counterinsurgency, Universitety of Chicago Press, pp. 279-298.
27
K. O. Dunivin, Military Culture: Change and Continuity, “Armed Forces and Society” 20,
no. 4, Summer 1994, pp. 531-547.
28
S. M. Jager, On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge, Strategic Studies Institute, Washington 2007.
29
D. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, Stanford Security Studies, Stanford 2010.
222
quality of changes during revolutions in the military. With the examples of Russia,
United States and Israel he demonstrated that different strategic and military cultures adapt and use new technologies in different ways, which translates into different ways of conducting war.
Anthropology of War - Russian researchers' theoretical proposal
Equally interesting theoretical proposals concerning the cultural aspects of war
are formulated to the east of Poland. The concept of “anthropology of war”, developed by Vladimir I. Bazhukov, is certainly worth noticing30. The new subdiscipline, by being "a comprehensive study of man in the military sphere"31, is
supposed to combine elements of such sciences as cultural studies, sociology, psychology, history, ethnology and, of course, anthropology. The subject of anthropology of war has been defined as "human beings, culture and society in the conditions of war and military conflict, as well as in the process of preparing for them
and overcoming their consequences"32.
The most important prerequisite for the formation of this new discipline was
the adoption of an anthropological approach to the study of war culture. What does
this approach propose? The researcher lists five main directions of interest for the
anthropology of war. The first one, natural and historical, examines the impact of
environmental conditions on war, the armed forces and all military activities, as
well as the manifestations of human nature in war culture (the impact of human
instincts on behaviour in war conditions; study of the aggressive instinct). The
purpose of the sociological direction is to study the culture and social structure of
different social groups, military organisation and culture in times of peace and war.
The third direction, psychological, deals with issues of war-time socialisation and
the enculturation of the young generation, military and patriotic consciousness of
society, the society's attitude to the armed forces, military aspects of the national
character and mentality, the examination of human thinking in combat circumstances, determination of war-time values, customs and traditions, and examination
of war-time mythology and rituals. The symbolic direction primarily consists of an
analysis of semiotic and symbolic aspects of war culture, such as military flags,
uniforms, ranks, medals and awards; with weapons and technology having specific
signs and symbols. Military posters, paintings of battle scenes, military marches
30
Vladimir Bazhukov has developed his concept in the following works: Методологические
проблемы военной антропологии, „Вопросы культурологии” № 5/2007, pp. 24-27; Военная
антропология: объект, предмет, направления, методология, „Вестник Военного
университета”, № 3/2008, pp. 37-45; Эвристические возможности антропологического
подхода к исследованию военной культуры, Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой
степени доктора культурологии, Москва 2009.
31
В.И. Бажуков, Эвристические возможности… op.cit., p. 3.
32
Above.
223
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
and songs, military rituals and rites are of a semiotic and symbolic nature. The last
direction, historical, examines man during wars of various historical eras, starting
from the pre-class and ending with the modern, post-industrial society.
The central concept allowing for an analysis of cultural foundations of warfare
is the concept of "war culture" (военная культура). Bazhukov understands it as a
"complex, multi-level phenomenon that includes axiological, normative, spiritual,
ideological, symbolic and material elements”33. War culture can be viewed in a
broad or a narrow sense - both these approaches are complementary. In the broad
sense the war culture covers everything created by man during military operations,
and thus includes political, economic and social, but also spiritual spheres. It therefore includes war-time: ideology, politics, economics, technology, science, art,
doctrines, policies, traditions, and armed forces and weapons, as well as artistic
culture dedicated to the issues of war. In a narrow sense, the war culture is a complex of constant, historically formed, states of consciousness and models of human
behaviour in the military sphere. The war culture, understood in this way, can be
expressed in military customs and traditions, military ceremonies and rituals, as
well as various signs and symbols.
Although Vladimir Bazhukov's concept stands out with its detailed research
and vigour, the researcher is neither the first nor the only one to be interested in
this phenomenon. Russian researchers have been trying to define precisely this
concept and turn it into a set of concepts for the social and historical sciences. The
interest and research effort of Russian specialists dealing with this issue can be
divided into two directions. The first one focuses on the theoretical analysis of the
war culture viewed as a whole system, which is a subsystem of the overall culture
of the society. Researchers are interested in such issues as: mutual relations between war culture and the natural environment, and on the other hand - human
personality; manifestations of war culture in times of war and peace, the typology
of war culture, analysis of the structure and functions of war culture, the study of
specific aspects of war culture: normative, axiological, symbolic, semiotic, linguistic etc.34. Finally, they study the war culture of particular countries and societies
(especially the domestic one) and their mutual interactions35. In the analysis of war
culture the researchers also take into account the processes of its formation and
how they are affected by material, socio-economic, and political conditions. The
second direction is of a practical nature. Specific issues that may interest an an33
Above, p. 3,4.
See: В.Д. Грачев, В. Н. Гребеньков, Особенности языка военной культуры, „Волгоград:
Известия ВГПУ”, №2 (15), 2006, pp. 24-29; В. Н. Гребеньков, Феноменологический подход
квоенной культуре общества и ее нравственные основания, „Вестник ВГУ” № 3, 2008, pp. 268273; В. Н. Гребеньков, Рациональность в контексте формирования диалога военной культуры
и религии, “Вестник Башкирского университета” Т. 14. №2, 2009, pp. 564-568.
35
С.Н. Ермоченко, Патриотизм как базовая ценность российской воинской культуры,
“Вестник Toмского ГУ”, № 314, pp. 65-67; А. Е. Мусин, Milites Christi Древней Руси. Воинская
культура русского Средневековья в контексте религиозного менталитета, СПб.: Петербургское востоковедение, 2005.
34
224
thropologist of war include: the military socialisation of youth and how it is affected by various social institutions such as family, school, university or media;
how ideas about war, army and military service of various social groups, including
military and political elite are shaped, how the organisational culture of the armed
forces is shaped; peculiarities of thinking and behaviour of soldiers in military conflicts of the beginning of the twenty-first century36.
As evidenced above, the works of Western researchers, dealing with the issue
of "military culture", are primarily focused on the institution of the armed forces
and are usually of a practical nature. They analyse modern military cultures, and
provide guidance on how to change them and adapt them to new kinds of conflicts.
These concepts deal with the important issue of the role of knowledge of the culture of the enemy, and in general - "cultural competence" - in wars conducted in a
foreign cultural environment, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Russian researchers, in turn, emphasize that the most effective approach to
studying cultural aspects of military activity is an anthropological approach, which
treats war culture as part of the overall culture of the society. War culture understood in this way is related to not only the institution of the armed forces, but in
general - to a human being - and determines his/her image of war and the military,
which in turn affects his/her behaviour under conditions of war and in times of
peace. Russian works contain a rich theoretical aspect, which can be a great starting point for historical and comparative studies.
Practical application - A "cultural turn" in strategy and tactics
Including culture in military thought has far-reaching consequences in the practice of warfare. In 2006, Tony Corn, the author of a prestigious and very popular
blog devoted to the problems of "small wars", and conflicts of a new type - Small
Wars Journal, called for the "anthropologisation" of the strategy and tactics of the
U.S. military, as only anthropology can explain the logic of new tribal conflicts,
and may enable the adaptation of American military culture to the task of fighting a
new enemy37. Discussions on the subject were held not only in the journalistic and
academic discourses but also in military circles, as evidenced by the article of the
commander of coalition forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus (from 2010 a commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan), who drew attention to the need for an
analysis of the cultural norms of the conquered societies, and for understanding the
36
В.И. Бажуков, Военная культура и национальная безопасность, „Вестник Военного
университета”, № 2/2007, pp. 94-99; E.Н. Романова, Военная культура и ее основные характ
ристики, “ВестникСамГУ” № 1 (60), 2008, pp. 213-218; В. Н. Гребеньков, Региональные
спекты военной культуры и некоторые характеристики образа военной службы в сознании
молодых россиян, „Вестник Башкирского университета” Т. 14. №3, 2009, pp. 933-937.
37
T. Corn, op.cit.
225
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
network of informal relationships between tribal institutions38. Under his guidance,
a new Iraq strategy was developed, taking into account the postulates of "cultural
awareness" of commanders and soldiers.
One of the courses of action is to equip soldiers and commanders with the appropriate cultural competence. John W. Jandora, an analyst working for the U.S.
Army, notes the importance of "cultural awareness" of the area in which military
operations are conducted. Knowledge of the language, but also culture - legal and
moral norms, customs and traditions - seems to be a necessary skill for any soldier
working in a foreign cultural environment39. Manuals and training are supposed to
serve the same purpose40. However, since equipping all soldiers with such specialised knowledge seems to be impossible, the Human Terrain System project has
been developed, engaging social scientists - anthropologists, sociologists, political
scientists, linguists and cultural theorists - in warfare. And thus Human Terrain
Teams were born, i.e. small units which included academic experts with knowledge
of the local communities and who were able to engage with them. The project, in
operation since 2007, gives such results that the Ministry of Defence has decided to
assign anthropologists to each brigade operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite
the negative opinion of the American Anthropological Association, which in 2007
condemned the idea of enlisting anthropologists, there are still scientists eager to
do such work41. Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist who helped in the creation
of the Human Terrain System has the following to say on the situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan: "We can not build democracy, education and the banking system
without the knowledge of the society in which we want to work"42.
38
D.H. Petraeus, Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations From Soldiering in Iraq, “Military Review”, January-February 2006.
39
J. W. Jandora, Military Cultural Awareness: From Anthropology to Application, “Landpower
Essay” No. 06-3 November 2006.
40
Such training in the U.S. armed forces is to be carried out, among others, in the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Another project envisages carrying out specialised courses (Regional
Studies), whose main purpose is to inform future soldiers of the significance of cultural awareness and
understanding of how other regions, nations and societies see themselves. See. S.M. Jager, op.cit.,
p. 6, 10.
41
More can be learned about the project from the article of Vanessa M. Gezari, who is writing a
book on the functioning of Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan: idem, Rough Terrain: The Human
Terrain Program Embeds Anthropologists With the U.S. Military in Afghanistan, „The Washington
Post”, August 30, 2009.
Other interesting publications on this topic, reflecting how much the idea of hiring anthropologists in the U.S. Army has proved to be controversial and widely discussed in the American press,
include: D. Rohde, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, “The New York Times”, October 5,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html; Ch. Shay, Should Anthropologists Go to War?, “Time U.S.”, December 13, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1947095,00.html#ixzz23EZOqYSU; D. Price, Human Terrain Systems, Anthropologists and the War in Afghanistan, “CounterPunch” 2009,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/12/01/human-terrain-systems-anthropologists-and-the-war-inafghanistan/.
42
V. M. Gezari, op.cit.
226
The new U.S. Army manual, FM 3-24, on counterinsurgency is an important
document aimed at facilitating the use of cultural knowledge in military operations.
It reads: “Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is «normal» or «rational» are not universal. To the
contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality,
appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender.
Thus, what may appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as
self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents—
especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid
imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem”43
The strategy based on the use of cultural knowledge gives good results. It
turned out that problems could be solved not only by combat action, but also
through negotiations, or, for example, by providing vocational training to Afghan
villages, which resulted in the reduction of the incentive for young men to join the
Taliban44. Another project envisages the creation of Afghan tribal militias that
would bear the brunt of fighting the Taliban45.
Also in Europe - mainly in the Balkans - NATO has developed cooperation between the armed forces and the civilian population in the areas of military operations, i.e. the CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation), in operation since 200646. Efforts aimed at improving cooperation between universities and the armed forces in
the field of scientific research and education are also significant47.
Conclusions
As evidenced by concepts described in this article, a "cultural turn" occurred
not only at the level of thinking about war and its analysis, but also at the level of
practical changes in the tactics and methods of implementation of military operations. Contact with the enemy, but also with new allies, motivated by different
values, whose understanding of the concept of war and warfare is completely different than ours, made it necessary to deepen our cultural knowledge in this field.
In addition to new practical solutions implemented with increasing success in the
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the Human Terrain System described
in this article, it has become necessary to introduce new theoretical categories, in
43
Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007,
p. 1-15.
44
V. M. Gezari, op.cit.
45
R. L. Holt, Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-village-militia-a-people-centric-strategy-to-win.
46
AJP-9 Nato Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003,
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf.
47
Uniwersystet podpisał umowę naukowo-militarną z wojskiem, 11 kwietnia 2012,
http://www.uj.edu.pl/uniwersytet/aktualnosci/video-foto//journal_content/56_INSTANCE_7Cwe/10172/5669027.
227
ELŻBIETA OLZACKA
order to develop a "grand strategy" and to implement effective policy in these campaigns.
Culture, influencing the way people think and behave, should be taken into account as an important dimension of strategy and policies. Not only language, ideas,
beliefs, customs, symbols, values, perceptions, and awareness, should be analysed,
but also the role of history and historical memory in their creation. Culture is not a
collection of constant, unchanging elements that allow us to predict behaviours, but
a process that we must learn to understand. The use of the term "war culture" and
the ‘anthropology of war’ approach proposed by Vladimir Bazhukov and Vasily
Grebenkov allow extensive comparative and historical research that can help capture the characteristics of the war culture of different societies, which is important
in understanding how these societies conduct wars. This, in turn, seems necessary
for the development of efficient strategies.
These days changes in culture, and thus in war, occur faster than ever before.
New problems arise, not only social, but also ethical, related to new methods of
conducting wars. Third wave wars described by Heidi and Alvin Toffler increasingly depend on intangible factors - knowledge, information, culture, and values48.
The conduct of military operations is increasingly determined by profound social
and cultural change, such as media coverage of all areas of modern life. This new
element of culture is successfully used by terrorist organisations that, with the use
of modern media, spread panic among Western democratic societies and indirectly
influence the decisions of the political elites. Modern technology, such as the use
of unmanned aircraft, changed the traditional perception of ethical issues, and thus
affected the so-called ethics of war49. For these reasons, it seems to me that the
study of the cultural aspects of the phenomenon of war in the theoretical and historical dimension should be a research challenge for both military analysts, as well
as for cultural theorists and sociologists.
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231
ELŻBIETA POSŁUSZNA
TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SINGLE ISSUE
TERRORISM
Elżbieta POSŁUSZNA, Ph.D.
Warsaw Uniwersity of Life Sciences – SGGW
Abstract
th
In the second half of the 20 century in the United States of America and Western
Europe there appeared a new kind of worldview-driven violence defined as “single issue
terrorism.” This type of terrorism has progressively gained importance. Hence, a closer
look at the phenomenon becomes a necessary condition for its understanding and, in
consequence, fighting it down. The author sets in the paper several goals – to look at single
issue terrorism through the prism of specific typologies; to evaluate to what extent the
accepted definitions of single issue terrorism are justified; to find and explain the
distinctive criteria between single issue terrorism and “many issues terrorism”; to show
the difficulties of any kind of classification endeavours regarding the groups, which
according to common opinion engage in single issue terrorism. The paper is closed with
a postulate to give up, while creating typologies, so called essential thinking in favour of
Wittgensteinian thinking in the categories of family resemblances.
Key words – terrorism, security
The phenomenon of single issue terrorism has not been, as yet, highly popular
among the researchers working on terrorism and security. So far, not one complex
theoretical work addressing that issue has been written. Yet, single issue terrorism
is not a marginal or atrophic phenomenon. The constant increase of this kind of
offence, its growing radicalisation, multiplicity of its forms and its manifestations,
as well as a permanent evolution of methods and tactics of individuals and groups
who commit it is a reason to perceive this type of terrorism as a phenomenon of
high danger potential; dynamic, liable to change in time and space, and thus needed
to be included in the broad security perspective.
There have been a few attempts to define single issue terrorism1 during the last
three decades. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf were among the first ones who
1
In the subject literature the term “special interest terrorism” is used interchangeably with the
term “single issue terrorism” (terrorisme à cause unique czy terrorisme lié à une cause particulière,
Terrorismus für Einzelstreitfragen, terrorismo de causa única). Apart from these two the most
common denominations there are various variations of the two, e.g. single-issue group terrorism,
232
TYPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SINGLE ISSUE TERRORISM
put it forward a definition. At the beginning of the 1980s they defined single issue
terrorism as “terrorism by an individual or small group pressuring authorities to
grant some privilege to a larger group with which the terrorists sympathise”2.
Somewhat different is the approach of G. Davidson Smith (from the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service): “The term ‘Single Issue Terrorism’ is broadly
accepted as extremist militancy on the part of groups or individuals protesting
a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or
inaction”3. Later authors did not use in their definitions these too general and thus
imprecise characterisations and considered “single issue terrorism” as different
from other forms of terrorism due to its focus on resolving one particular issue4. In
such a manner this kind of terrorism is defined by for example David Veness (from
the Metropolitan Police Service) in his article “Single Issue Terrorism”: “Single
issue terrorism may be defined as the adoption of the full arsenal of political
violence towards the promotion of one political subject. This issue need not be
strictly aligned to any political or religious ideology. Hence, supporters are narrow
in their focus on the single issue but broad as regards the delivery of their
message”5. Quite similarly it is defined by the analytics from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation – probably the most experienced institution in counteracting the
development of this type of terrorism (mainly due to the fact that the majority of
ideological violence acts classified as single issue terrorism takes place on the U.S.
territory). In various FBI publications one can find the following elucidation of that
phenomenon: “Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-wing and
left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to influence
specific issues, rather than effect widespread political change. Special interest
extremists conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of
society, including the general public, to change attitudes about issues considered
focused-issue based terrorism, special-issue terrorism; respectably: International Encyclopedia of
Terrorism, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1997, p. 209, Maxwell Taylor, John Horgan (eds.),
The Future of Terrorism, London/Portland: Routledge 2000, p. 84, Aref M. Al-Khattar, Religion and
Terrorism: An Interfaith Perspective, Westport, London: Praeger 2003, pp. 21-22. There are also
attempts of going beyond this terminological paradigm – for example “reducted conflict range
terrorism” (terroryzm zredukowanego pola konfliktu), see: patrz: Bartosz Bolechow, Terroryzm
w świecie podwubiegunowym, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2002, pp. 25, 55.
2
Alex P. Schmid, Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the
Western News Media, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1982, p. 56.
3
G. Davidson Smith, „Single Issue Terrorism“, Commentary (A Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Publication), 1998, No 74, p. 1; and G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism, London, New
York: Routlege 1990, p. 7.
4
Of course, terrorist or extremist groups focused on one single issue are in many instances a part
of broader movements (fighting for example for a moral restoration or new socio-political order).
However, as often emphasised, the aim of their activities is not to evoke a larger political change but
rather to ‘resolve’ one particular issue.
5
David Veness, „Single Issue Terrorism”, in: Barbara Szamota-Saeki, Dobrochna Wójcik (eds.),
Impact of Political, Economic and Social Change on Crime and its Image in Society, Warszawa:
Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN 1996, p. 190.
233
important to their causes”6. At the end, it is worth quoting William Dyson’s
definition, who in respect to the discussed phenomenon uses two terms – specialinterest terrorism and single issue terrorism: “Special-interest/single issue terrorism
involves the use of extreme force and violence for the purpose of coercing
a government and/or population to modify its behaviour with respect to a specific
area of concern. These extremists do not have an overall political agenda. More
often than not, special-interest/single issue extremists do not seek the overthrow of
a government or even a major alteration in the manner in which it operates or in the
manner in which the people live. Instead, their intention is to force the government
and population to change its direction in line with the philosophy of the extremist
with respect to a specific subject. In many instances, the overall philosophical
cause of the special-interest/single issue terrorist is fairly popular with the citizens.
Therefore, rather than attempting to “educate” the public about the topic, the
clandestine terrorist’s emphasis is more towards coercing and forcing the people to
take a desired action. The terrorist seeks immediate change, and refuses to wait for
a legislative process to bring about the desired end”7.
Two of the above quoted definitions – the FBI’s and Dyson’s itemise the
following distinctive features of the discussed phenomenon: (1) the focus on
“solving a single issue” and (2) non-revolutionariness (no will for wide-ranged
changes) in regard to the existing system (the state, society) in its entirety. In the
subject literature, what should be mentioned, is that the two features are usually
being accepted as the basis for classification, i.e., the criterion to differentiate
between single issue terrorism and other types of terrorism. Naturally it is always
an author’s terminological decision that determines the definition (the decision is
usually limited by the scientific utility of the term that is being defined). The author
decides on how he or she understands and characterises the analysed phenomenon.
Such a definition should not be disputed with. One may (or even should) argue
against an erroneous classification (ordering) of particular phenomena under such a
constructed definition. Let us move then to the classification.
Right at the beginning it should be noted that just a few authors tried to come
up with such a classification. Kai Hirschmann was one of them. He used the
number of taken up issues as the criterion and on that account divided the entirety
of the phenomena labelled as terrorism into two categories: multiple-issue-terrorism
(Streiffragenbuendel Terrorismus) and single-issue-terrorism (Terrorismus fuer
Einzelstreitfragen). In the first category Hirschmann lists the following kinds of
terrorism: ideological, political, nation-orientated, supported by the state, based on
faith (religious and world-view-orientated), of the ‘chosen ones’; whereas in the
second one he places terrorism “fighting” for animal rights, the environment and
6
Terrorism in the United States: 1999, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington 1999, p. 20.
7
William Dyson, „The Emergence of Special-Interest/Single-Issue Terrorism”, presented by IIR
Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Tallahassee, Florida, 2001, p. 1.
234
against abortion. According to Hirschmann the anti-globalists and gene technology
opponents are also on the path towards single issue terrorism8.
Another terrorism researcher, Guenter Loeckinger, considers single issue
terrorism in the framework of a slightly different typology. By employing the
motivation criterion he divides terrorism into: religious, drugs-related and political.
The latter he then breaks down into left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism and
single issue terrorism (streitfragen-spezifischer Terrorismus). Following
Hirschmann, Loeckinger counts animal rights terrorism, environmental-protection
terrorism, and “pro-life” terrorism in the single issue terrorism category (after
Hirschmann he also believes that anti-globalists and gene technology opponents
gravitate towards single issue terrorism)9.
Whereas Alex Schmid having divided political terrorism into regime/state
terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, vigilante terrorism, and insurgent terrorism
distinguished single issue terrorism in the frames of the latter; next to such
phenomena like social revolutionary terrorism, right-wing terrorism, religious
terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism. As above mentioned researchers
Schmid places animal rights terrorism, environmental protection terrorism, and
anti-abortion terrorism under the single issue terrorism category10.
In their single issue terrorism classification considerations all authors quoted above
have (practically exclusively) taken into account the extremist activities of animal
rights defenders (animal rights terrorism), environment defenders (environmental
protection terrorism), and “pro-life” activists (identified in the subject literature as
“anti-abortion terrorism”). However, it is worth mentioning that there are authors who
set the range of the term “single issue terrorism” rather differently. Raymond Corrado,
for instance, divides anti-state terrorism into three categories: ideological terrorism
(religious or secular), ethnic-national terrorism and so called issue terrorism; the latter
is further divided into environmental terrorism, animal rights terrorism, anti-abortion
terrorism and anti-tax terrorism11. Another broadening of the range of the term is made
by the already mentioned William E. Dyson who distinguishes the following primary
causes of single issue terrorism: animal rights, environmental or “eco” issues, antiabortion, and anti-genetic engineering12.
One should remember, of course, that classification endeavours comprise of
far-reaching generalisations. In particular cases these generalisations may obscure
the issue, not clarify it. Contrasting that remark with the typologies given above it
8
See: Kai Hirschman, “Terrorismus in neuen Dimensionen. Hintergruende und Schlussfolgerungen”,
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, v. 51, 2001, p. 8.
9
Georg Loeckinger, Terrorismus, Terrorismusabwehr Terrorismusbekaempfung, Vienna:
Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 29.
10
Alex P. Schmid (ed), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, New York: Routledge,
2011, pp. 688, 171.
11
Raymond Corrado, Irwin Cohen, Terrorism, Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 2000, Quoted
in Jesse L. Cale, Issue Terrorism: An Analysis of Trends in North America, Simon Fraser University,
November 2003, summit.sfu.ca/system/files/.../b34734508.pdf, s. 19, (12 April 2012).
12
William E. Dyson, Terrorism: The Investigator’s Handbook, Elsevier: Anderson Publishing,
2012, p. 28.
235
would be difficult not to agree with the claim that in the case of anti-abortion
terrorism or animal rights terrorism we deal with a classical example of a terrorism
(or extremism) aiming at resolving one particular goal (single issue). In the case of
anti-abortion terrorism the goal is obviously to place a full ban on abortion; in the
case of animal rights terrorism the goal is to appoint animals with the right to life
and development, which would be comparable with the ones humans possess. The
instance of environmental protection terrorism is somewhat different. In my
opinion, not all organisations employing this kind of terrorism focus, in their
activities, on one particular issue. After a closer analysis of the tasks of some
radical pro-environmental organisations, one may get the impression that although
their fundamental goal is protection of the natural environment (in this very general
sense they focus on a “single issue”), for many of them this goal can be achieved
only if certain socio-political (often quite radical) changes are carried out; in other
words, when many various “particular issues” are realised. A good example of such
an organisation is, I believe, Earth First! – one of the largest, oldest and at the same
time the most recognised extremist environmental group. In spite the fact that from
the worldview perspective this group is of a pro-environmental character, it does
not limit itself to carrying out a single, narrow-ranged task. On the contrary, in the
area of its goals there are multifarious issues, i.e.: a ban on natural environment
devastation, reconstruction of social awareness, decrease of population growth,
thorough reconstruction of society, or the eradication of technological
infrastructure. Due to the multiplicity of the goals and the fact that they are
pertinent to the whole socio-political reality, not only its selected fragments, Earth
First! (as well as many other extremist pro-environmental groups) may be
classified as rather one of the extremist organisations of the revolutionary
(transformational) type, which aim at a total change of the world, than as an
organisation of the single issue type, which accordingly to the accepted definition,
focus on resolving one particular issue.
Another remark refers to too the narrow definition of single issue terrorism. It
is not entirely clear why authors of the quoted single issue terrorism typologies do
not take into account phenomena, which by virtue of explicit or implicit definitions
accepted by them should almost for certainly have been placed there. As it seems,
among such phenomena there are: racist terrorism (aiming at social exclusion of
people ethnically different), wise use terrorism (aiming at repeal of proenvironmental restrictions), or, already belonging to previous categories, feminist
terrorism (aiming at overthrowing patriarchy and “women's liberation”). All the
mentioned types of terrorism do not aim at reconstruction of the existing social
order but at carrying out one particular issue. Nationalist-liberation terrorism may
raise a few classification doubts. On the one hand, it seems to be focused on
carrying out a single issue – the liberation of the nation from foreign occupation,
and on the other, that carrying out a single issue is related with (it is however not
its goal, at least not as the basis for action) complex, wide-ranging transformations
in the functioning of the state and society.
236
The above cases should, as it seems, induce an attempt of an interpretative
specification of the definition of single issue terrorism (which would imply
a decision concerning whether pro-environmental terrorism and nationalistliberation terrorism may be recognised as not aiming at “evoking broad political
changes”) or setting the range of the defined term somewhat differently (by
assigning to it a different set of designations).
Such a definition specification, which would allow to include proenvironmental groups and nationalist-liberation groups in the single issue terrorism
category is, in my opinion, an extremely difficult task, if ever possible. The
majority of those groups strives for a fundamental, broadly understood social
reconstruction that consists in the abolition of the state, eradication of technological
infrastructure, changing the lifestyle of people (pro-environmental groups) and the
eradication of oppressive, foreign forms of domination (nationalist-liberation
groups). It can be argued however that for those groups the changes are not the
goal in itself (it is not the ultimate goal of their activities). In this case, sociopolitical changes are merely a means enabling them to reach another goal, i.e.
natural environment protection or liberation of their own nation. This goal can be
reached, at least theoretically, without introducing larger structural changes in the
functioning of the state and society. Let us notice however that in the case of those
groups environmental and liberation goals are closely interlinked with the political
objectives (and they cannot be separated from one another), and secondly, relying
on the same principles as other kinds of terrorism (almost all of them) they can be
included in the single issue terrorism category, e.g. ultra-left-wing terrorism, which
revolutionary (transformational) goals may be interpreted as tools enabling the
introduction of social justice or religious terrorism, which attack at a certain way of
governing or lifestyle can be explained as a means for reconstructing the bond
between humans and God. In this notionally difficult situation, the only solution, as
it seems, is to get to terms with “interpretative failure” and acknowledge that
probably just a part of environmental protection terrorist groups (the one that does
not aim at social and political changes) can be qualified, on the account of the
analysis of their activities, to the single issue terrorism category, and the other part
should be excluded from it. However, nationalist-liberation terrorism on the whole
should be rather qualified as non-single issue. For, it seems not likely, that there
would be a case of nationalist-liberation terrorism, which aims at the realisation of
its liberation aspirations (carrying out a single issue) without simultaneous attempts
to introduce socio-political changes. The above mentioned classification
difficulties compel the discerning researcher to reject a simple “notional
framework” and to decide “in the moment” whether a given group (at a certain of
stage of its development) focuses on single issue, or whether it aims at wideranging (revolutionary) social changes.
The goals of single issue terrorism (narrow-ranged) and revolutionary terrorism
(wide-ranged) are different. This difference among the goals gives hope for more
efficient counteraction and prevention of this kind of phenomena. The distinction
among the goals of the two types of terrorism suggests their different motivations, and
237
hence possibly various determinations. This is the reason for looking at the violence
acts and trying to find there the difference of the sources. There are many
psychological theories regarding the sources of terrorism. The majority of these
theories search for them in internal conflict as the effects of a maladjustment to reality
and stemming from it a rampageous rebellion against it, based on violence. My
interpretation goes in line with that conception. I regard that behind the willingness for
radical actions there is usually a complex system of defence mechanisms, which are
most commonly a reaction to experiencing the feeling of resentment13.
Resentment theory has been employed many times, both, in psychological and
social analyses. From the very beginning of examining this phenomenon, it has
been believed that the resentment conception is characterised by a high explanatory
potential, both in the psychological and social research areas. It was also used for
elucidation of the key issues for this study, namely extremism and terrorism14.
Resentment is a complex of hateful emotions. It arises on the basis of the feeling of
inferiority stemming from the inability to reach the desired values15. Resentment,
as noted by Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler and Max Weber is an experience
shared by the oppressed, rejected and depreciated; those, who feel they lose in the
existing value order. How can one deal with a painful, overwhelming inferiority
feeling? A human being with resentment will not achieve the desired values with
an activity directed outwards (he or she is too weak for such an action). They will
not satisfy their second paramount want as well – the need to destroy those who are
the bearers and at the same time the object of their unfading hatred. However, the
conflict between the desire and helplessness is staved off. Durability of situations
generating negative emotions and their constant suppression lead finally to the
point where the consciousness begins to pursue towards overcoming the tension
between the aspiration and inability, which results in a re-evaluation of values. The
essence of the “re-evaluation” is the depreciation of the unreachable (but still
13
Ressentiment is not, obviously, the only one predicate of radicalism. It seems, cultural and
political processes, like globalisation and informationisatio play here equally essential role. As rightly
stated by Castells, these processes endanger the areas which have been, till now, common identity
generators. Due to their characteristics (aiming at unlimited cooperation with unlimited number of
individuals accompanied by the lack of value-creating preferences) they cannot be identity providers.
It results in the necessity of building one’s own identity on the basis of new, individualised sense
sources (such that escape value annihilation processes). Of course, not all these newly formed
identities must inevitably gravitate towards extremism. However, the necessity of rivalry in the scope
of mutually competing justifications makes this path highly probable. Both, Nietzschean ressentiment
theory and Castells’ conception of “common identity expression” shed new light on the issue of the
future of single issue terrorism suggesting the conclusion that it may be practically impossible to
eliminate this kind of terrorism because it is impossible to eliminate the internal impulses behind it.
14
See for example: Lauren Langman, Douglas Morris, „Islamic Terrorism: From Retrenchment to
Ressentiment and Beyond”, in: Harvey Kushner (ed.), Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses
of Problems and Prospects for the 21 Century, New York: Richard Altschuler&Associates, 2002.
15
Such a feeling of inferiority is not experienced by all the people but only those who due to their
various psychological or physical defects suffer long lasting depreciation or incapability to create or
confirm by themselves their own value, and who have limited possibilities to deal with challenges brought
by reality – the reality that is “made to measure” the people who are free of such defects.
238
desired by the subject), the re-ordering of values and establishing in their place
a new order; such an order, where his or her values (perceived before as the reason
for their life failures; generating suffering and inferiority complex) are being
identified with that what is positive, good, and valuable. The re-evaluation gives
energy and the will to act – it gives the power to tear down the old resentment
generating orders of values (breaking the old game rules). It induces acts of
a terrorist character.
Resentment seems to be a psychic power that forces individuals and groups to
overcome, in the name of maintaining identity and a positive self-image,
a conformist anxiety and become what they want to become – the sole and true
creators of values and communal sense. In their case, reaching for violence
becomes a way of dealing with both arising doubts and the resistance of the
reluctant towards these world values. Due to the fact that the essence of resentment
is a pursuit towards re-evaluating the vales (depreciation of the existing values and
establishing the new, resentment inspired ones), it has to lay at the foundation of
the acts, which aim at total social transformations. Resentment as such does not
aim at a change of some part of reality but at a transformation of the world in its
entirety. It is impossible to control terrorism based on resentment by concession
and negotiations because it is not interested in them. Resentment terrorism aims at
total (uncompromising) changes. It aims also at the destruction of all old order
residua (symbols of unattained values) which, on the account of resentment, it feels
connected to. Where there is a black and white reality, there is no place for
attempts to come to an agreement or any kind of actions based on the idea of
compromise. Therefore, it probably occurs more often in terrorism of the
revolutionary type, than in single issue terrorism.
The latter, contrary to the former one, makes no total, transformational claims
because it is focused on carrying out a single issue – on dealing with merely one
particular fragment of reality (unless it is allied with a “transformational”
ideology). Hence, it must be non-fundamentalist in its essence (i.e. resentment
plays, if any, a marginal role in its forming). If the above conception is right, then,
there is a high probability that after carrying out that issue (or at least after
introducing a number of compromise solutions) the terrorism would be
extinguished or at least largely reduced. Such a perspective seems impossible in the
case of revolutionary terrorism (wide-ranged, resentment based) that aims at total
social transformation. For revolutionary terrorism these issues are only a pretext for the
articulation of internal transformational claims stimulated by inferiority instinct. The
need behind it (the need to devaluate the world that depreciates the “I”) is indeed
unchangeable and always stays current – that is why fulfilling the articulated claims is
not able to satisfy it. In the fight against resentment terrorism there are only possible,
as it seems, preventive actions, but they should be undertaken much earlier – before
resentment enters the phase of re-evaluation of values.
At first sight, this state of affairs may lead to a claim that single issue terrorism
is easy to resolve by complying with these few demands, which are the cause of the
conflict. The reality however seems to contradict that claim, at least in the case of
239
environmental protection terrorism and animal rights terrorism. In spite of the
progress that has occurred in the area of animals and nature protection (in spite of
successive satisfying of the ecological demands, i.e. the single issues the ecological
radicals fight for), the violence of the single issue type groups has, thus far,
escalated and the number of their followers in on a constant increase.
It can bring about many doubts, one of which (the most interesting in this
context) must be pertinent to the fact, of whether we deal here with a single issue
extremism. It is not so in all of the cases. For instance, not all radical ecological
organisations are focused on resolving a single, particular issue. Some of them (e.g.
the previously mentioned Earth First!) want revolutionary changes, which aim is to
transform the whole society, and not only a part of reality. It is also worth
mentioning that many ecological organisations adopt revolutionary slogans and
ideologies from other movements (the fight against globalisation or social
injustice). More and more often the groups that used to be ideologically
homogeneous ally with other, often revolutionary or transformational, groups and
form a kind of ideological front based on the common definition of the foe and
similar methods of acting (mainly sabotage). Particularly, examples can be seen
with ecological (animal rights and pro-environmental) organisations, which do not
limit themselves any more to attacking the deforestation companies, ski resorts,
high voltage lines or laboratories, where experiments on animals are conducted.
More and more often big corporations, private houses, SUVs, and also (that is
a relatively new trend) various symbols of capitalism are becoming the target of
their attacks. Anti-capitalist ideas occurred in ecological ideology and in the natural
environment protection movement already at the countercultural beginning of its
strongest wave. However, explicit pronouncing against capitalism and globalisation
by the groups that have come into being on account of the latter, had a place not
until the late 1990s, when the people professing the ideas of collectivistic
anarchism and connected to the alter globalist movement started to gain influence
in those groups. Earth liberation, for them, has become closely linked with the
abolition of capitalism and social liberation. The path leading to that goal was not
slow reforms but a revolutionary spurt proceeded by concentrated attacks on
elements of the capitalist system. It does not mean that there should be an equals
sign between the old and new ideas. Ecological ideas (pro-environmental or on
animal rights) are still treated by those organisations as the priority. However, it is
not any more justified to categorise them as “pure single issue extremism.”
It should be also noted that from the mid-1980s the majority of secret groups
(including terrorist ones) due to safety reasons started to resign from hierarchic and
centrally governed structures in favour of looser structures, possibly the least
centralised, quite often truly horizontal ones, without clear governance or control
centres. Many single issue organisations followed that way as well, giving up
stable organisational structures and exchanging them for a network structure –
a loose configuration of small, autonomous cells (individuals or small groups) that
are not managed by any governing or activity-inspiring decision centre.
Sometimes, they have totally resigned from any form of governance and have
240
introduced so called leaderless resistance. Nowadays, we do not really deal with
organisations in the traditional sense of the word but rather with egalitarianorientated groups of activists (which often meet extemporaneously in order to carry
out a particular action) or independent individuals, acting alone, and not
communicating with other proponents of the cause. It does hinder any classification
attempts and the examination of the phenomenon of single issue terrorism.
There is no doubt that the transformations of the last twenty years resulting in
a significant “organisational blur” and “intermingling of ideas” are the cause for
less frequent occurrences of the “pure” type of single issue organisations. We deal,
more and more, with a mosaic (or network) of loosely interconnected individuals
and groups devoid of clear structure, which operate on the basis of a few ideologies
(mutually influencing one another) and often extemporaneously defined goals. It is
impossible to precisely establish what the organisational frames of a given terrorist
group are, and what its current goals and motivations are. In consequence, it should
not be expected that “carrying out the issues” would lead to the “appeasement of
the movement” and, in effect, to a decrease of illegal acts. Such a state of affairs
makes the examining of those groups an extremely difficult task. Even thinking
about them in “essential” categories seems anachronic, at most. It is time to get rid
of them in favour of more elastic thinking, which might be somewhat more fluid
but in spite of that it reflects the character (not the essence) of the given
phenomenon in a better way. A postulate of that kind refers to Wittgensteinian
thinking in the sense of “family resemblance” categories – to think in these
categories, is to be convinced that the notions do not always refer to the universals.
It happens that the scope of the notion is established by a set of designations that do
not have any common feature but still are similar. (That type of notions, according
to Wittgenstein, resembles a rope woven of many strands, with none of them
stretching the whole length of the rope.) In the context of our considerations one
should remember that all typologies are, first of all, tools in service of ordering and
explaining the examined reality. They mould and simplify at the same time – they
are ideal models, which at the same time explain and falsify the reality image by
often arbitrary assimilation of various, although in some respects related,
phenomena. The researcher’s task is to avoid, if possible, simplifying analyses and
to be attentive in regard to the multi-aspect character of the described phenomena,
as well as, to “mixed phenomena,” which do not entirely fit into the idealising
model. Excessive schematisation (not taking nuances into consideration) of reality
leads directly to improper evaluations, on the basis of which we are prone to take
actions. Relating the above remarks to the study of single issue terrorism, it should
be noted that special attention is needed while employing any kind of abstractions,
especially in going “from general to specific” – carrying out intellectual operations
on general terms, and then transposing the conclusions drawn from them to
a particular phenomena (e.g. the activity of the particular groups). For, it may turn
out that the abstractions diverge too much from the empirical reality, and thus they
do not only describe it inadequately but represent them falsely.
241
ILONA
POLITOWICZ,
PIOTR MAKOWSKI, AGATA NIEDZIÓŁKA
NDU Scientific Quarterly
no 4(89)
2012
Assoc. Prof. Ilona POLITOWICZ, Ph.D.
Assoc. Prof. Piotr MAKOWSKI, Ph.D.
Uniwersity of Zielona Góra
SPACE MARKETING – INNOVATIVE IDEAS
PRODUCE CREATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Agata NIEDZIÓŁKA, M.A.
Uniwersity of Zielona Góra
Abstract
Due to our accession to the European Space Agency, Poland gains the position of a full
member state of ESA, instead of the previous cooperating role. Our membership in ESA should
be considered in a much wider context. It should include European space policy (prepared and
implemented together by the EU and ESA), as well as our country's methods of extensive
communication in the area of product information, and space technology including its
applications and benefits. The main aim of this article is to introduce particular problems
connected with the improvement of form and methods of communication in the areas of needs
and possibilities among space technology’s transfer. Space technologies are here the common
good of ESA organisation. Moreover, the article will focus on the general potential directions of
solving problems, which concentrate on the development of a communication model’s needs in
the context of the communication of new possibilities, technology transfer and space services.
Space technology products are worldwide innovations, which stimulate new technology’s
development and are conducive to the transfer of them to other fields of economy. They also
require new forms of marketing, human resources management and quality control. We can
notice the emergence of a new market for space services, which is the driving force of innovative
solutions in many economic areas (communication, transport, environment, agriculture, safety)
and administration. Poland cannot be only the client of solutions delivered from abroad. Poland
has to actively participate in the creation of new technologies, and to establish its own
promotion system for that matter.
Key words – space, marketing, digital technologies
242
SPACE MARKETING – INNOVATIVE IDEAS PRODUCE CREATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Introduction
By being a full member of ESA, our country is taking the challenge of creating
better conditions for the development of science and economy. Membership will
also help to upgrade the level of safety and access to modern technologies. The
accessibility of the newest solutions created for the space industry will certainly
improve the innovation of many areas in our lives.
This generates plenty of problems, which solutions demand a country’s
interference using special institutions, as well as the creation of supporting methods
for research and implementation projects.
This article has the aim of introducing particular problems connected with the
improvement of form and methods of communication in the areas of needs and
possibilities among space technology’s transfer. Space technologies are here the
common good of ESA organisation. Moreover, the article will focus on the general
potential directions of solving problems. This is the equivalent accessibility rule to the
described products, generating a new quality of mutual communication. There appears
new questions: how to improve the communication methods of new possibilities in the
area of technology transfer of space services and how to define target groups, improve
signalising needs, as well as how to educate society about new forms and methods of
communication. Is there a requirement for putting that form of cooperation with ESA
in an institutional pattern of safety or only of defence.
It can be assumed that in the process of preparing new, and improving existing,
methods and forms of communication, the theory of marketing and innovation
implementation will be useful. It should be then modified with the suggestions
from the dynamics and innovation researches of space and digital technologies
development. The main success in that field can be introduced in the concept of
electronic – mobile – marketing. During research examples of very important
criteria can be: society level of living or the effectiveness of industry and
administration activities on the particular areas, which use innovative and space
solutions. Apart from the implementation methods of marketing products, typical
for informative society, it can be assumed that the knowledge given to the potential
customers and producers can be more effective through youth education in the field
of space marketing specialisation. Those effects can be already observed.
There are no doubts, that the problems mentioned above, should be solved
jointly by theoreticians and practitioners of management and marketing fields.
Satellite technology sector. Regional context
Created in the last decades of the twentieth century satellite infrastructure
fulfils the needs of communication, navigation and Earth observation. It made
possible, beside the development of the space technology hardware, development
243
ILONA POLITOWICZ, PIOTR MAKOWSKI, AGATA NIEDZIÓŁKA
of a brand new sector of this industry – services. The diagram below illustrates the
structure of the space sector. This rising new industry – modern satellite services
industry – is becoming a driving force of innovative solutions in many branches of
the global economy (i.e. communication, transport, environment, agriculture,
security) and administration. Simultaneously, these sectors create market for highly
specialised services. Innovative satellite applications become a strong transforming
force for new methods of marketing communication and create new marketing
systems by increasing the productivity of the new and strong relations with
customers in the open space of time. In last 30 years, Poland has been developing
its own space section. It already gained huge experience and can prove real
achievements among firms from the sectors of technology, information,
telecommunication and informatics. These companies are ready to become any
stage in the chain of production and satellite services, starting with the production
of components, satellite platforms, through downstream segments (data stations,
satellite signal receivers etc.), to the services using satellite technologies.
The scientific and technology potential of the Polish space sector is proven by
the effects of cooperation with ESA as part of the PECS Cooperation Agreement,
signed in 2007 for 5 years. Over 135 motions had been put forward in three
competitions that had already been offered by PECS. Nowadays, lasting projects
are related to observation, navigation and satellite communication, and transfer of
technologies. They are contracted by Centrum Badań Kosmicznych PAN,
Geosystems Sp. z o.o., Instytut Geodezji i Kartografii, Politechnika Wrocławska,
Akademia Marynarki Wojennej, Instytut Lotnictwa, Astri Sp. z o.o., Politechnika
Warszawska, Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, WASAT Sp. z o.o.
Technologies used in creating newer or highly improved goods are based on
the practical use of a combination of knowledge and experience. Usually, even the
process as such, is unique and new, so it requires creative promotion. Human
beings create new solutions and tools when they want to accomplish a task or solve
nurturing problem.
From that point of view, the main driving force of invention is human curiosity
or problems encountered during new tasks and projects. On one side, inventions
bring freshness, curiosity and open new possibilities for discovering and creating
new services, pushing forward progress and stimulating innovations. On the other
side, there are situations in which projects or new activities are forcing the creation
of the new tools, techniques or technologies, in some way pulling behind them
development and innovations. Both are illustrated on the picture no. 1 below:
244
Source: own work.
Picture no 1. Innovation development
Technological needs and potential that is hidden in new technologies, both
affect one another, stimulate the development of newer and newer technologies and
spur innovative solutions for marketing communicators. Looking into consumer
needs, we cannot close one's eyes to factors like the growing requirements of the
education sector, life style changes (that are more often than before), or consumer
preference changes. Marketing specialist should acquire knowledge that not only
applies the functioning of modern technologies but also should be prepared to train
the sender and recipient, which are potential customers of satellite services or
direct users of these services.
The process of marketing technics requires the receiver to go into marketing
techniques and products' specifications, which consider:
– the space services market,
– the principles of the products' choice in space services market,
– effectiveness of products manufacturing,
– spin-off techniques,
– prices in the market of space technologies,
245
– principles of determining prices in non-profit sectors,
– cost estimation,
– cost designing for a particular manufacturing cycle,
– supervision and risk management,
– costs of insurance,
– distribution and promotion.
In the space technology industry, receivers are the most important source of
information. Interviews with technology users show the need for development that
are very often implied by manufacturing limits and technology imperfections.
Projects executed within ecosystems of innovations, widely supported by social
campaigns, could be the example of the development of modern technologies.
Those arguments confirm the main thesis for the need for specialist trainings. The
efforts made by the whole authoring teem on the space marketing specialisation at
the Economy Management Faculty of Zielona Góra University, will be shortly born
out in practice. The specific character of the national security knowledge,
especially defence, allows us to formulate a thesis about the need for education on
space marketing at the main polish universities.
From invention to innovation in modern technologies
These two notions, often used alternatively, play a huge role in technological
development. Invention is a new, promising concept, an idea. It may expand and
take the features of an innovative solution, that is standing out due to its mature and
highly advanced progress, or even implementing of the solution. The world's
research indicates that innovations are now the only source of permanent economic
growth, and therefore are posing as a strategy foundation for the competitiveness
strategies of companies on the international market.
The OECD indicates that 2/3 of the total economic growth in Developed
Countries should be connected with implementing innovations in their markets.
Price domination, so efficiently conducted by the Asian markets, makes the rest of
the countries compete on the international markets with innovation only, that
means new solutions and technologies. The Innovation Union Scoreboard1 ranks
Poland as a moderately innovative country. The goal of the Innovation and the
effectiveness strategy of the polish economy is to introduce Poland to the group of
the leading countries by 20202. Innovations are crucial to the industry and
management policy. As Shumpeter says, innovations cannot be treated as a universal
good, but as a complex, destructive force, that is creating new possibilities and
challenges for a particular economical system.
1
Innovation index, Global Competitiveness Report.
Rising from the 22nd to 15th place , Innovation and effectiveness strategy of polish economy,
Ministry of Economy.
2
246
In short perspective, this means a division for winners and losers. In the longer
period, innovations become the driving force of economic growth, better quality of
life of particular social groups and technological progress.3 This quality of life
should be researched with the aim of the creation of effective communication
methods, on the bases of the needs and possibilities of space technology transfer.
To increase the innovation of economy it is important to back it up with
modern services and industry branches with the highest growth potential, as with
the hi-tech industry. The base of the success in this case are technological
innovations, which at the beginning require expenditure, but at the end they bring
calculable profits through the high efficiency of resources involved and the
advanced research backup.
One of the most innovative sectors is the space sector. It belongs to the group
of sectors with the highest level of added value. Statistics shows, that for every €1
invested, ca. € 10 of pay off. The average growth of this sector is constantly
increasing. In 2010 it was estimated as 7,7%. The Polish industry structure is
dominated by the production of low-manufactured, material-consuming products,
which requires a lot of energy and expanded labor structure in the production
process. Changing of this situation is possible with the use of the hi-tech industry
and communication-related modern solutions and services. Chances for development is
given to us by, among others, digital space technologies. Research made for the
European Space Agency concerning the Polish economy in relation to the
development of the space sector 4, shows that many Polish companies have a great
potential of knowledge, experience and organisation culture, allowing the
development of informative, telecommunication and electronic technologies.
Defining target groups and the scope of information dedicated to them, we can
speak about the new technology implementation, firm differentiation etc. Those
conditions are created on their situation and market maturity, as well as on the
character of its innovations. Innovations can be divided into supportive and
destructive. Supportive innovations mean planned evolution or revolution of the
existing and developed market, which in most cases applies to big and developed
enterprises. Destructive innovations create new markets, often destroying or
marginalising older technologies, they are unpredictable, and mostly occur in
immature companies, that are in the early stages of growth, and while entering
markets are more willing to take a risk and compete.
Differences between the basic characteristics of developed companies and
start-ups (see picture 2) show that big and mature organisations, with sufficient
resources, a variety of experts and a professional management style, are leaders of
technologies that are planned and developed on regular basis.
3
„Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012.
“Industry Assessment of Poland for Space Activities”, Bertin Technologies, polish space sector
analysis before signing the PECS agreement (Plan for European Cooperating States), 2004 r.
4
247
Source: “Model of Innovation: Start-Ups and Mature Corporations.” Jerome S Engel., Presentation. Inside
Innovation, Conference. University of California, Berkeley. November 2007.
Picture no. 2. Model of features of young and mature organisation
Small enterprises are willing to take a risk of sudden, interesting and significant
inventions, that can be the source of innovations, which in the end can be the way
to the top, but with the risk of losing everything. Innovations are essential to the
concept stage of every project life cycle.
The closer to the end of the project schedule, the more difficult it is to accept
any revolutionary changes or solutions. That is mostly because of the high
accomplishment cost or high level of risk, that could lead to the project failure. The
exception in such a situation can be technological gaps, that have to be filled to run
the project, otherwise the project itself would not stand a chance. Taking a risk and
bearing the costs related to this new solution is then necessary.
Specific target groups of communication can be created form many different
criteria. As an example, those are subjects participating in the external and internal
248
national safety assurance (administration, institutions, research and development
centres, industry etc.). Such a target group, closed to the general information
transfer, and important due to national interests and missions, require separate,
institutional forms and methods of communication with ESA. The additional
argument for such a solution is the creation of European military forces. The
implementation of the concept of European combat groups, allows us to think that
they will be the first users of space technology. Needs of unifications require
organised international work.
The process of modern technologies development
In the process of the working out and improving of the new technologies,
companies are creating their own methods of management, using schemes and
patterns. The model of Technology Readiness Levels, created by NASA, is an
example of such a pattern. It looks as like this:
Picture no. 3. Technology Readiness Levels – TRL in space sector, NASA
249
If we interpret this model for the other segments of the market, in many
companies it could look as follows:
Picture no. 4. Technology maturity model, Source: own work on the bases of Technology
Readiness Levels NASA
The presented model is also based on the methodology of project management,
which creates unique solutions and products. We can observe the clear outlining of
the stages of planning, analyses, projecting of the solution, testing and
implementations.
250
Source: own work.
Picture no. 5. The process of need management and project starting
The need, that is the main driving force to creating these new solutions, has an
influence on decisions about investment in research, new ideas, converting the
scheme into the real, working devices or technology. In this way, companies are
able to accomplish their strategic goals and effectively compete on the market.
Unfortunately, it's extremely rare for scientific findings and discoveries to be
directly implemented or used in the economy. Satellite techniques are not the
exception here. In this case however, the results of scientific research and
experiments are most often the effect of planned development, strategies and goals,
and they go through a long process from the idea, through testing and experiments,
to the final implementation and testing during the space mission. The information
flow between the parties creating and using innovative solutions is very important.
It should be optimised according to arising needs. EISC distinguished 4 different
models of cooperation for innovative projects:
1. Closed inside – closed outside.
This term means focused, geographically separated work of a multitask team of
young professionals in a hermetic environment. Results of scientific research are
protected and kept in secret.
2. Closed inside – open outside.
That means work in a specialised team, most often in government institutions,
institutes, universities, that gather scholars and other scientific workers. The results
are introduced to the public.
3. Open inside – closed outside.
This type can be described as one that is using knowledge, experience and ideas
rising in the macro – environment of the company, to achieve solutions to problems
and issues in the project. Mostly it is crowd-sourcing. Using crowd-sourcing
251
platforms can cut costs, diversify the list of possible solutions, and multiply the
intellectual property of the company.
4. Open inside – open outside.
This model is based on open cooperation and taking the role of the macroenvironment of the company in creating brand new solutions, also allowing for the
free and unlimited use of the results of the research in the future.
This last scheme of partnership creates innovative solutions in a large part based on
solutions that are open for general use, or simply called “open source” solutions.
The market of space technologies, in general, prefers a partnership with
companies5. Cooperating, these institutions use their resources in the most efficient
way, and more often are successful in the process of technology creation.
According to the Ministry of Economy, only half of Polish companies benefit
from research and development agencies in the process of creating solutions,
technologies and management theory. The Internet, including communication
platforms and information exchange markets etc., is the main source of information
about possible cooperation with external experts for around 30% of enterprises.
The other 20% of companies draw information about partnerships with scientist
from the press and media.
Yet an economy based on knowledge needs cooperation skills and information
transfer between companies, scientific centres and customers. Such actions support
a better distribution of resources, responsible leadership, and help create
knowledge and information. Innovations arise and spread as a result of partnership
and cooperation between organisations. This model determines the innovation of
the whole economy and affects it's development.
Implementation of innovative solutions
Innovative solutions can contribute to the global challenges concerning climate
changes, security, the ageing of societies or curing new diseases. Innovations can
be implemented in many areas of social and economic life, even those seen as
traditional and not innovative, such as agriculture.
Space and digital technologies are nowadays strategic services, with high
economic and social value.
There are a lot of innovations that developed as a result of preparations for
space missions. Some examples of these inventions in various areas are:
• Medicine: blood dialyzer, CT scanner, telemedicine, new methods of
manufacturing drugs.
• Sport and recreation: better sports shoes, breathable materials such as Goretex, Velcro.
5
252
„Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012.
Picture no. 7. Space technologies in our daily (socio – economic) life
Source: Program for space technology development and using satellite systems in Poland., Ministry of Economy, 2012.
253
• Food manufacturing: products suitable for long term food storage, instant
soups, nutritious products for infants.
• Safety: new isolating materials e.g. polymer used in fire suits, innovative
products that enable water treatment (including blood dialyzer), toxic gas sensors
(including smoke, chemicals and pollution), communication in case of natural
disasters, meteorology.
• Agriculture: monitoring of ground quality, precise valuation of the crop,
precise determination of the need for fertilising.
• Technique and industry: battery powered tools (cordless drills, vacuum
cleaners, screwdrivers), winter tires, composite materials in brake pads, carbonhardened blades, metalized foil, oil free bearings, telecommunication, satellite
communication, digital television, internet television, GPS, Galileo, new tools for
digital photography processing, digital photography.
Most of the technologies mentioned above, are already rooted in our everyday
lives and we can be unaware that the genesis for all these inventions were space
missions. As a consequence of the growing role of the space sector in the world
economy, in the late 1990s the process of shaping space marketing policy began in
the European Union. This policy is supposed to encourage the growth of
innovations and economic progress, and to function as a simplifying tool for EU
sector policy execution in many areas like:
• the development and use for space solutions that serve EU policies and the
needs of European enterprises and citizens, including the natural environment,
balanced development and global climate changes,
• the fulfilment of European needs in security and defence areas regarding
cosmic space,
• building a strong and competitive space industry, that supports innovations,
economic growth, and expansion, as well as gives balanced, reasonably priced
services at a high level,
• supporting a society based on knowledge, by pulling significant investments
in researches connected with cosmic space, and also ensuring Europe plays a
significant role in the international ventures of exploration,
• Providing unlimited access to new and innovative technologies, systems and
potential for ensuring the independence of European space applications.
The main pillar of this policy is the construction and exploration of the GMES
and Galileo systems. It also means development in four areas of priorities:
1. research in climate changes,
2. innovations and accomplishment of Europe 2020 Strategy,
3. security,
4. and exploration of cosmic space.
To successfully compete on the market, the majority of business lines are
creating brand new solutions, technologies and innovating ideas and secure them
until they are published. They are developing new projects in privacy, dominating
254
over competing parties during the implementation of research results and
introducing products to the market. The space technologies sector is based on quite
different rules. One can say: “Space shares technologies”. Governments are greatly
involved in the development of this sphere and the wide globalization of its
products and services. The majority of these technologies, except those related to
security and defence, are transferred in a very short time to the open market in
order to be developed and adapted for the use of customers on the whole Earth.
E-m-marketing / space marketing / info-editing in e-media
The modern information technologies market is driving at the ready-made
product. Not only partial services and products are crucial and most desirable now,
but complex approaches that combine the knowledge and solutions of the different
fields and technologies. Due to the development of new technologies, marketing is
changing. Today the marketing of digital and satellite technologies is a result of
many cultural, social and technological changes. It uses social media, mobile
solutions, complex digital multimedia devices and natural user's interface. This
process has changed and still is creating new ways and places for content
distribution to particular users, customers or business partners. Digital marketing
became one of the most important ways of communicating with clients. Despite the
need of fast and continuous reaction and adaptation, it is now more and more
popular. The most important is to invest in innovative solutions, and to be in real
contact with customers and partners, to personalise news up to the style and needs
of clients and integrate all communication forms with the specific target.
This new model generates challenges and costs as well. Investments in new
technologies and innovative solutions require suitable expenditure. The methods of
deepening partnership and an integrated approach to the information directed to
customers are also challenging. Perfect solutions of digital communication should
meet the fundamental needs of:
– providing uninterrupted contact with the customer, also on demand,
– including every target group,
– defining target groups in a proper way, and directing our information more
precisely,
– directing our information through many channels,
– being available in every convenient form (computer, mobile phone, iPad,
interactive television etc.),
– increasing demand on our services and product,
– increasing efficiency of our marketing strategies,
– allowing for the full valuation of our strategies efficiency and achieved goals,
– a long-term lifecycle with the opportunity for development and further
adaptation.
255
Nowadays, in the time of economic crisis, recipients are looking for free-ofcharge content and information on the Internet. Development of content
accessibility by the use of mobile sources and the lower cost of obtaining it, is the
factor that inspires customers to gain knowledge this way and choosing this type of
communication. We are approaching the phenomenon of the commercialisation of
the internet content. Recipients are willing to pay for digital information more
often. This channel is becoming profitable and widens our knowledge about the
efficiency of marketing actions.
Digital technologies allow for marketing management integration. They
improve contact with the customer due to personalisation and higher interactivity,
allowing for the interesting graphic exposition of the brand, and give more
possibilities of marketing analyses. New technologies exert on companies a need
for innovations requiring flexibility and adaptation. This integrated marketing
management, is a combination of all accessible and usable methods, tools and
resources used in marketing communication, in order to gain a more powerful
impact on customers and deepen the customer's awareness about our brand.
Nowadays, not only the commercial content, but also information is an element of
the imagery and communication with the customer.
Space marketing tools use effectively the Internet, digital advertisements or
social media. The adaptability and interactive character of these tools make
communication with the client easier compared to using traditional methods.
Besides, mechanisms of website analysis, system of managing the relationship
with the customer (CMR) and planning the resources of the company (ERP), allow
the gaining of valuable information about a client's behaviour and the efficiency of
running marketing campaigns.
The biggest advantages of digital marketing are:
• the possibility of communication with the customer by the use of various
media, brands and places,
• the suitable and efficient directing of the marketing transmission;
• widening the circle of the recipients of our information;
• a significant growth of sale, including indirect services - more expensive and
luxurious;
• an efficient method for the initiation of new technologies and tools;
• cost cutting;
• the shortening of the time needed for new products and services to be put on
the market;
• the growing customer activity;
• better flexibility;
• the enrichment of graphic content of our transmission.
Development of the new technologies and innovative solutions increasing the
mobility of the communication between producers and customers. That is why the
256
concept of e-m-marketing6, that is: electronic-mobile-marketing, is considered
more often.
Space technologies, world digitization, development of broadband and highspeed Internet, direct us to the use of artificial intelligence, semantic intelligence
and 3D graphics. Usage of space technology affects the changes of directions and
possibilities of marketing communication. Most of the tools and services that
require integration of the facts and deduction, are based on human intelligence and
activity using a particular product in a particular moment. We are, however, closer
to the moment, when our computer, phone or other device armed with a suitable
application, will be able to answer complex questions, choosing for us interesting
elements in the jungle of data. Just imagine, that going for holidays we command
our car autopilot to pick the road with the most interesting, historical places with
beautiful viewpoints. And this way, we can have a pleasurable journey to our
destination.
Or when we are looking for a new TV set, we can type into the searcher “find
the cheaper model of the TV with such and such parameters”. Nowadays we need
to use our knowledge to make such a search successful and satisfying. In a short
time our computer will analyse information gathered on the internet databases for
us and will show the best options for buying our desired TV.
Successful and efficient marketing in the circumstances of the progress of
virtualization and mobility, involves using new technologies, including satellite
ones. As Kotler says: “The Internet will create new winners and bury the laggards”.
The catalog of communication tools is getting wider, and what is most important,
the majority of them are being built with the possibility of the efficient
measurement of their use, which was not common till now. Enterprises are
investing into information systems, that play key roles in cost cutting and gaining
advantage over companies. They are organising their activities around the
customer7 and to strengthen the impact on the recipient, they are integrating
marketing communication. Contents, forms and media, gathered from various
sources, are integrated in one place.8 So that is how a complete database, that
enables the even more efficient planning of marketing activities and allowing the
designing of new products, perfectly fitted to the users' needs, is being created. The
Internet, along with electronic and mobile marketing, is the foundation of
competition and innovation of organisation. This marketing manages a client's
attention, engages him in using the particular product, makes our customer
communicate to us strategic and important information about the process of sale.
6
„E-marketing” Liliana Nowak, from the monograph „Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne”,
under scientific redaction of prof. dr. hab. Henryka Mruka, Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008.
7
„Marketing”, Philip Kotler, 11th edition, Rebis, 2005.
8
„Komunikacja marketingowa – kierunki zmian” (Marketing communication – changes ‘
directions) Henryk Mruk, from the monograph „Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne” (Marketing –
modern definition), under scientific redaction of prof. dr. hab. Henryka Mruka, Forum Naukowe,
Poznań 2008.
257
Nowadays, it is efficiency that counts the most, not only a new, different,
broadcast. In the EU, the meaning of communication policy, that is the basic tool in
the development of an innovative and competitive economy, is growing all the
time.9
The use of the satellite techniques, and services based upon them, is oriented
towards fulfilling the needs for fast and correct information for European citizens,
and also as a tool that is enabling the better realisation of many policy sectors in the
EU. This is why in the 2014-2020 period, the EU is planning to spend a total of
€15,475 billion for space activities (3 times more than in the current financial
perspective), Poland's contribution is valued at around €495 billion.
Summarising, the most important goal of all processes and actions is the
change of invention and ideas into innovations. It really does not matter if they will
be done by planned and systematic actions, or if they will be done by taking risk
and staking on a brand new solution, not proven on any grounds. Communication
of the new solutions to the selected markets and potential recipients is crucial. It
can highly increase the possibility of success.
Nowadays, innovations should now be seen as a tool that is soothing the results
of the current economic breakdown, and as solutions to the problems we are facing.
Standard resources of growth are not that profitable anymore, so we should focus
on problem solving and social challenges. The main goal of Polish strategy is a
highly competitive economy (innovative and efficient) based on knowledge and
cooperation.10. The most important element of companies' innovative activities and
modern trades, is the necessity of creating an efficient system promoting
relationship support, cooperation and communication between scientificresearching sectors, and companies and customers. To rise up, it needs deepened
research on the effectiveness of communication methods and forms. It confirms the
need for highly specialised education for human resources, to cope with the
challenge of new forms and methods of space marketing. In the case of national
safety, there is a need to work on the institutional forms of cooperation with ESA.
Bibliography
An economic analysis of the sector and the role of Policy, The Space Economy in the UK:
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, February 2010.
Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report. 2011-2012, World Economic Forum,
Geneva 2011.
Henryk Mruk, Komunikacja marketingowa – kierunki zmian, red. Nauk Henryk Mruk
Marketing – zagadnienia współczesne, , Wyd. Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008 r.
9
Due to the British statistics, the average productivity for one employee of the space sector
stands for 142 thousand pounds per year, what means 4 times more than average in the country of
U.K. (“The Space Economy in the UK: An economic analysis of the sector and the role of policy”,
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, February 2010).
10
Innovation and effectiveness strategy of polish economy, Ministry of Economy.
258
Industry Assessment of Poland for Space Activities, Bertin Technologies, 2004 r.
Jerome S Engel., Model of Innovation: Start-Ups and Mature Corporations.” Presentation.
Inside Innovation, Conference. University of California, Berkeley. November 2007.
Liliana Nowak, E-marketing, red nauk. Henryk Mruk, Marketing – zagadnienia
współczesne, Wyd. Forum Naukowe, Poznań 2008 r
Philip Kotler, Marketing, wydanie 11, Wyd. Rebis, 2005 r.
Program działań na rzecz rozwoju technologii kosmicznych i wykorzystywania systemów
satelitarnych w Polsce, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2012 r.
Space and the Processes of Innovation”, ESPI Report, July 2012.
.Strategia Innowacyjności i Efektywności Gospodarki Polsk na lata 2011-2020,
Dynamiczna Polska, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2012.
259
MARCIN KRUPA
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL DETERMINING THE
IMPACT OF USA MILITARY ACTIVITY ON
THE GLOBAL NUMBER OF WARS
Marcin KRUPA, M.A.
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship occurring between U.S.
foreign policy, understood in terms of the military, with global processes, which is defined
in terms of polemology (the phenomenon of war). The distinguishing feature of the research
process is its methodology, which by its structure refers to the number of ideas positivist
philosophy of science. This appeal reflected an attempt to clarify the research process,
which is implemented using mathematical tools, which are used at the level of abstraction.
The same methodology is an important factor distinguishing this research process, giving it
the status of originality. The results of the research process as carried out the results,
which show the correlation that exists between the processes marked.
Key words – War, USA, Foreign Policy, Globalization, Methodology.
Introduction
The following scientific article has the nature of the original research process,
which through its methodological structure refers to the behavioral tradition; its
aim is, as the title suggests, to find a precise answer to the following question: how
U.S. foreign policy affects the global number of wars?
The article consists of three sections: the first defines behavioral research, and
the tradition of this type of research process against the background of the historical
development of the scientific discipline of international relations as a whole; the
second determines the object of the study; the last, third, chapter describes the
course of the research process realized and presents its results.
Behaviourism in the history of international relations theory
The organised research process of international relations emerged only after
World War I, earlier this issue was dealt with in a loose way by thinkers of all
types, especially philosophers, lawyers and practitioners of the public life. The
260
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF USA MILITARY…
need for an organised research process was triggered by wars getting out of control,
becoming more and more destructive in nature.
The scientific development of the independent scientific discipline called
International Relations takes place on the basis of the so-called "great debates", the
final result of which are paradigms, the construction of which are determined by
the victorious theories. The first debate took place during the 1930s and 1940s; the
second began in the fifties and lasted until the early seventies; the third began in
the eighties; when it comes to the last, fourth, there is a significant dispute in this
respect as to whether it is an extension of the third debate.
The first school of international relations was established before World War I
and based its theoretical structure on the scientific dimension of liberal thought. In
a nutshell: international liberalism assumes that people are good by nature, so the
source of war is not to be found in human nature, but in bad organisation of the
system or in educational shortcomings. Thus, the phenomenon of war can be
eliminated through efficient international organisations, the aim of which are to
improve cooperation, not only between countries, but also between other state
entities; therefore the entire system of international relations was to be based on the
eurocentric culture, liberal-democratic principles and Christian morals.1
In practice, the liberal assumptions were not effective. In 1939, a famous work
of the British historian Edward Carr: The Twenty Years Crisis was published, in
which the author stressed the assumptions of the liberal school and questions them,
and the validity of his argument was borne out by history with great precision.2
Since that time, the liberal school of that time has been referred to as idealist or
utopian. The conservative thinking called classical realism began to be heard
again. In 1948, a famous work was published entitled Politics Among Nations by
Hans Joachim Morgenthau, in which all the principles of realism were codified and
modified giving rise to neoclassical realism, which became the most important
theory in the history of international relations (some scientists proclaim that only
the work of Morgenthau brought International Relations into existence as an
independent scientific discipline). Realism refers to human nature in a pessimistic
way, focusing mainly on forcible and state centric elements, stating that the best
and natural tool to ensure peace is the balance of powers.3
Morgenthau’s theory was exceptional in many respects; one of the distinctive
elements of the neoclassical realism theory was the following statement: "Political
1
A. Gałganek, Geneza stosunków międzynarodowych i ich teoria, [w:] W. Malendowski,
Cz. Mojsiewicz (red.), Stosunki międzynarodowe, Wydawnictwo Alta2, Wrocław 2000, p. 16-17.
R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, Wprowadzenie do teorii stosunków międzynarodowych: Teorie i kierunki
badawcze, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2006, p. 36-42. S. Burchill,
R. Devetak, A. Linklater, M. Paterson, Ch. Reus-Smit, J. True, Teorie Stosunków Międzynarodowych,
Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 2006, p. 50-79.
2
E. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, Perennial, New York 2001, passim.
3
R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 42-46.
261
MARCIN KRUPA
realism believes that politics, like society, is governed by objective laws (…)”.4
This statement is related to the earlier war philosophy studies realised by Quincy
Wight, Pitrim Sorokin, Lewis Fre Richardson which state that social phenomena
are causal, and thus repeatable, so that it is possible to recognise the objective laws
and on the basis of them to ensure greater control over the course of social
processes and in an identical manner to make their predictions. Thus, the work of
Morgenthau, consolidating the position of realism, heralded the beginning of a new
debate in which traditionalists versus behaviourists competed with each other.
Researchers connected with the traditional approach in international relations
draw attention to the differences separating the humanities and social sciences from
exact sciences, stating that these differences require a different research methodology
based on normative elements. However, the representatives of behaviourism not
recognising these differences, proclaim the need to eliminate the normative
element from social science, which they believe is the source of the lack of
scientific progress. Thereby, traditionalism propagates the need to implement
studies of a perceptual and intuitive deduction type based on the inference
characteristic for philosophy combined with a free interpretation of historical
processes.5 Whereas, behaviourism, which is associated with positivism and
scientism, states that knowledge, even on the human and social basis, should be
gained through rigorous and quantitative and inductive analysis methods based on
mathematical mechanisms of empirical data processes; data should be acquired
through taskonomization and quantification of history, on this basis bold
hypotheses should be made and subject them to constant verification in order to
develop precise definitions, of which the ultimate goal is to find universal laws
governing the behaviour of states.6 Ultimately, the debate finished as suddenly as it
began and ended without a conclusion, but in a sense, relatively and not
unanimously behaviourism can be regarded as the winner of the debate; why?
Because, since the seventies, most of the research carried out on the basis of
international relations includes behavioural elements, or possibly refers to the
results of this type of research. It is worth mentioning here that International
Relations is an Anglo-Saxon science, and Polish research relating to international
issues is scarce, and those of a behavioural methodology structure type are almost
none, thereby, one of the purposes of this article is to fill this gap.
The most important researchers conducting international issue research using
behavioural methodology elements include: Marton Kaplan, David Easton, Stanley
4
H. J. Morgenthau, Polityka między narodami: Walka o potęgę i pokój, Difin, Warszawa 2010, s. 20.
R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., ss. 46, 54-58, 248-252, 269-282. H. Bull, International
Theory: the Case for a Clasical Approach [w:] K. Knorr, J. Rosenau (red.), Contending Approaches
to international Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1969, p. 20-38. A. Gałganek, Geneza
stosunków międzynarodowych i ich teoria, [w:] op. cit., p. 21. R. Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 56-59.
6
R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 47-49, 61-63, 243-248, 250, 253-260, 264-269, 279-282.
J. E. Dougherty, R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, Lippincott, New
York 1971, p. 36-37. R. Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 56-59.
5
262
H. Hoffman, Karl Deutsch, David J. Singer, Dawid E. Spiro, George Modelsky,
Richard Rosencrance, John W. Burton, Kenneth Waltz, Rudolf Rummel, Melvin
Small, Jack Levy, Roger Burrows, Brian Spector, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and John
Galtung. The third debate, which should be mentioned in a few words at the end of
this section, finished without any conclusion; however, the research parties
involved in it gave a synchronised answer on the whole structure of international
issue. Nowadays, in order to better understand international relations in terms of
safety, competition and war a theory of neorealism and structural realism is being
used; to better understand the relationships emerging in communities, especially in
the European Union, or, alternatively, the process of globalisation and peace,
a number of liberal theories with neoliberalism at the forefront are used; whereas,
to better understand disproportions in world development the theories of
dependency are used, of which Marxism is the main foundation; moreover, for
better understanding of processes ideological and cultural in character, the
constructivist theories are used.
The subject of the research
The research process, which will be carried out below, is based on several
stages. In the first stage the variables will be distinguished, the analysis of which is
able to give an answer to the research question put in the introduction of the article.
The variables will be distinguished basing on the realisation processes of
quantification and taskonomization of data. The obtained data in the second stage,
transformed to chart form showing the course of the cycle, will be juxtaposed.
Already at the beginning it should be noted that the obtained data can be analyzed
In several dozen ways using a number of methods of mathematical induction, but at
this point these methods will not be used; the knowledge taken from the charts will
be acquired freely with the help of methods closer to a traditional school. In the
third stage, the acquired knowledge will be abstractly interpreted and expressed in
the graphical and mathematical form. What variables are we dealing with? The first
two variables are the variables of the global number of wars, and the third variable
is a variable that specifies the level of the U.S. military activity. Two variables are
the variables of the Correlates of War project, which have been modified from the
point of view of the research question. The first variable is: "the number of new
wars." The course of this variable is shown by a graph in Figure 1:
263
MARCIN KRUPA
The source: Own work, made on the basis of statistical data taken from The New COW War Data 1816 – 2007,
Correlates of War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011). Extra - State War, Correlates of
War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011).
Fig. 1. The number of “new wars” in the years 1962 – 2007.
The graph is a measurement that shows precisely the number of newly created
wars. The second variable is: „the number of wars being waged”. The shape of this
variable shows a graph in Figure 2:
The source: Own work, made on the basis of statistical data taken from: The New COW War Data 1816 – 2007,
<Correlates of War, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011). Extra - State War, Correlates of
War, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (29.09.2011).
Fig. 2. The number of „Wars being waged” in the years 1962 – 2007
264
The graph shows the general number of wars in progress. The graphs’
differences can be presented using the following example. The VietnameseCambodian War lasted three years, i.e. 1977-1979. In case of variation: "the
number of new wars" the Vietnamese-Cambodian war is recorded in the statistics
only once, it takes place in 1977. However, in case of variation: "the number of
wars being waged" the Vietnamese-Cambodian war is recorded in the statistics
three times each year from 1977 to 1979.
The last variable is:
The source: Own work made on the basis of quantification of the U.S. history.
Fig. 3. The military activity of the USA in the years 1962 – 2007
The chart above (Fig. 3) was developed as follows: The U.S. military activity
(WUS) was divided into several types, and for each of them, basing on relative, yet
logical thinking, a specific value was assigned. The individualisation takes place in
a definitively distinct way as opposed to in the case of Correlates of War project
and is presented as follows:
CW – cold war = 1
LW – limited war = 1
FCW – full-scale war = 2
CC – „Cuban crisis” = 1
D – detente (times of positive trends in the U.S.A. - Soviet Union relations) = - 0,5
A – accumulation of the arms race under President Ronald Reagan = 0,5
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MARCIN KRUPA
The general formula in the arithmetic form is as follows:
Formula 1:
However, the general stochastic formula in the functional form can be
presented as follows:
Formula 2:
Commenting on the above formulas some facts are noteworthy: The cold war
(CW) was characterised by tension variation, which has been presented as
a constant numerical base (1), as well as a number of variables distinguishing
specific time periods, such as: the cuban crisis (CC = 1), detente times (D = - 0.5)
and the accumulation of the arms race (A = 0.5), which determine the evolution or
the fluctuation of the phenomenon. As for the first variable: the cuban crisis was
the event which constituted the essential accumulation of the cold war tension,
therefore it became essential to assign values (1) to the event, so that in
combination with the cold war value, the sum of the cold war in the period of the
year 1962 is (2). Another variable: detente, determines the times of reduction of the
cold war tension. Some historians state that this process began in 1963, right after
the cuban crisis had finished, however it is possible also to divide this period into
specific time sequences (certainly the years 1972- 1973 are the most stable times in
the discussed period). For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the time of
detente was not until 1969, when the U.S.A. under the leadership of Richard Nixon
joined the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms: Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), the treaty was signed in 1972. The detente
period certainly ends in the last month of 1979 when the Soviet Union intervened
in Afghanistan. In case of the last variable, namely in the accumulation of arms
issue, since 1962 the process took place only at a time when US foreign policy was
managed by the administration of Ronald Reagan. This value can also be assigned
to the events of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine (1947), until the death
of Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War (1953), however, this period is not
the subject of this scientific research (the variable CC is equivalent to the variable
A, yet, it takes a higher value due to the historical status of the event). A few words
in terms of the remaining variables: Limited war (LW), is a war in which the
U.S.A. in a direct way used their armed forces at a relatively low level, which is
not included in a definition of war in the Correlates of War project (the wars not
included in this definition are classified as conflicts). These wars are the
interventions of small range. This category includes interventions in the following
countries: Dominican Republic 1965, Grenada 1983, Lebanon 1985,7 Panama
7
Taking Lebanon into account is mainly due to heavy casualties (241) incurred by the U.S. in
this mission, which was the result of a terrorist attack.
266
1989, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia i Herzegovina 1995, Iraq 1998, Sudan
1998, Yugoslavia 1999. All the cases mentioned above have an assigned value (1).8
The last group of variables is a full-scale war (FSW). In the years 1962-2007, there
have been three such wars, one of them currently continues in Afghanistan
(estimated time of completion of the mission is 2014), and the second was
concluded less than two years ago (2010 is the official date of completion of
military operation in Iraq). Apart from them, the United States since 1962 on such
a large military and political scale were only involved in the Vietnam war (19651973). Wars of this type, with regard to the involvement scale, has been assigned
the number 2. The last issue that should be raised is the one of American
involvement in Vietnam in the years 1962-1964. In this period of time, in Vietnam,
the U.S.A. were engaged with two kinds of battle groups, the military advisers
were the first and the units of special forces so-called "green berets" were the
second battle group. Moreover, with the help of citizens of other Asian countries,
with the CIA’s money, the U.S.A. conducted subversive warfare on limited scale in
the North Vietnam, which is why this period of time is considered as a period of
limited war (LW).
The analysis
Fig. 4. Comparison of variables relating to the U.S. military activities (WUS), new wars (WR)
and ongoing wars (WT). The yellow line on the graph determines the level of five wars; the
black lines that are undersigned, identify major historical events on the timeline
8
For greater precision and clarification it should be noted that the U.S. intervention in Somalia began
in the late 1992 and finished in early 1994. In this case, the widening and statistical formulation of
intervention in Somalia in the years 1992-1994, when the essence of the operation was completed in 1993.
267
MARCIN KRUPA
The above chart compares all of the variables in order to analyse them. What
strikes the eye in the first place, is the fact that during the war in Vietnam the
number of new wars (NW) was no more than five and begins to increase only after
the U.S. withdrawal from the country. At this point, the number of ongoing wars
(WT) is also stable, the two variables begin to increase rapidly only when the U.S.
Army withdraws Vietnam completely; so that in 1968, when the U.S. was most
militarily involved, the number of new wars was 2, and those ongoing 13; however,
in 1975, when the U.S.A. suffered a clear defeat in its Vietnam policy, the number
of new wars was 8, and ongoing 19!
Another fact worth mentioning is the so-called period of "little cold war", i.e.
the ultimate end of detente between the blocs in the Cold War relations and the
strengthening of mutual competition which started with the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan. The period of accumulation of new Cold War struggles fell between
the years 1980-1985, after which it began to diminish, and finally, what is not
evident in length of the black line, but is demonstrated by the first black vertical
line, led to the defeat of the USSR. Before the start of a new race of arms, in 1978,
the number of new wars was 9, and those ongoing 21; in 1985, in the moment of
accumulation, the number of new wars was 1, and ongoing18!
Another fact worth mentioning is the existence of two vertical black lines
determining the changes in the international system, which automatically
transformed from a bipolar to unipolar world. The transformations taking place in
the structure of the international system manifest themselves in the form of a
significant increase in the number of wars: in 1989 the number of new wars is 9,
and those ongoing as many as 24! In 1991, the situation is even worse, the number
of wars which began in this year is 11, and those ongoing is close to the magic
number of 27! At this point, a positive effect of the U.S. involvement in Iraq is very
apparent - or, alternatively, it is possible to construct a hypothesis stating that the
unipolar system is more stable – after which the number of wars falls at a very fast
pace. In 1995, the number of new wars was 2, and the ongoing a year later only 15.
The final element worth attention is the increased, and unnoticed so far, very
high level of U.S. military activity, which was initiated by terrorist attacks on the
main buildings of world finance taking place on 11 September, 2001. In the same
time, the Americans intervened in Afghanistan, and less than two years later in
Iraq. In the last year of the research period (2007) the number of wars fell to its
lowest level in history, with only one outbreak of a new war, and only two taking
place. There is still one last noteworthy fact: in 1973, when the U.S.A. withdrew
from Vietnam, systematically the number of ongoing wars was growing, which
could be interpreted In the form of two hypotheses: the first one - the wars
underwent extension due to an increase of participation in them of powers
(balancing of military capabilities, unwillingness to compromise) - this hypothesis
can be confirmed on the basis of detailed studies of political science; the second
one - an increase in the number of wars was the result of the decrease of U.S.
military involvement, which will be confirmed by two facts: the first one, that the
268
war in the Persian Gulf, after the end of which after five years the number of wars
decreased by nearly 50%; the second one is the fact that Americans in the research
period of 1962-2007 were involved at a very high level only twice, during the
Vietnam War and during the currently still ongoing global war on terrorism, and in
those periods the level of the number of ongoing wars is very low.
Thus, one can put the following research hypothesis: At a time when the
United States conduct an offensive foreign policy (they are more active militarily),
the number of wars in the global sense decreases; however, if the United States
conduct a defensive foreign policy (military activity level decreases), the number of
wars in the global sense increases.9
Thereby, the induction phase of the research was completed, the aim of which
was to gather relevant knowledge. The second phase will consist in the deductive
attempt to arrange the acquired knowledge.
It is possible to present the principle of the remarked processes in the following
mathematical-graphical way:
Formula 3:
Fig. 5. The above graphic-mathematical model is a reflection of the hypothesis course summarising
the course of the inductive research process. The n1 value corresponds to the equilibrium. The U.S.
military activity (WUS) is a dominant variable, which determines the course of the process, when this
variable increases, the global number of wars (GW) decreases (n2), and vice versa (n3)
9
The above hypothesis is even more apparent when from the global number of wars one will
subtract the war with the participation of the U.S.A. (GW – WUS).
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MARCIN KRUPA
The above process is far more complex, because the level of U.S. military
activity is not determined by the usual "will", but as Morgenthau would state, it is
determined by the objective laws. Thus, the above model should include another
variable, which is the self-shaping stability of the international system structure,
which affects the global number of wars and the level of U.S. military involvement,
which is accurately presented by the models below.
Formula 4:
Fig. 6. The above graphic-mathematical model constitutes an a-priori element, which enforces
the need to incorporate elements that go beyond the scope of bilateral relations occurring
between the level of U.S. military activity (WUS), and the level of the global number of wars
(GW). An additional element is necessary to take into account the spontaneously emerging
international system instability level (PNSM). In the model, it is assumed that the level of U.S.
military activity is rigid and thus the level of the international instability has a tendency to rise
spontaneously, which is proportionally related to the increase in the global number of wars
270
Formula 5:
Fig. 7. This model is a continuation of the above (Fig. 6), except that it assumes a-priori that the
U.S. military activity (WUS) is flexible and reacts in direct proportion to changes in the level of
international stability (PNSM). Therefore, an increase in the international instability (R2)
automatically forces an increase of American interventionism, and vice versa. This means that
WUS is no longer a variable determining the course of systemic processes, however still plays an
important role, which is clearly shown in details of drawings below
271
MARCIN KRUPA
Formula 6:
Fig. 8. The chart above is a continuation of the model contained in Figure 6, assuming an
additional change in the level of rigidity of the U.S. commitment to restore equilibrium
272
Formula 7:
Fig. 9. The chart above is a continuation of the model contained in Figure 6, taking into account
the additional increase in U.S. military involvement in order to restore the equilibrium level
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MARCIN KRUPA
Formula 8:
Fig. 10. The drawing along with the above formula summarises the structure of the whole
model, showing in general terms what level of U.S. military involvement (WUS) is necessary in
order to maintain the number of wars (GW) on the level of equilibrium, with the changing
circumstances of the international system stability (PNSM)
Conclusion
The empirical analysis presented in the introduction of the third section of this
scientific paper highlighted three facts:
1) An increase in U.S. military activity precedes a reduction in the number of
global wars.
2) A decline in U.S. military activity precedes an increase in the global number
of wars.
3) The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union happens steadily along with the
increase in the proportion of the global number of wars.
On the basis of the observed regularity a formalisation of the acquired
knowledge was made. Figure 5 presents the first two points of the research
274
conclusions, and the other figures take into account the elements of the naturally
emerging international system stability (Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). The same general
model, which has been formed on the basis of the basic tendencies observed,
gradually takes the form of a model presenting the multifactoriality of mutually
overlapping processes interacting with each other in a constant process of dynamic
interaction.
The inductive research sphere can be expanded in a meaningful way using
a number of methods of arithmetic mathematics (statistics, econometrics, calculus
of probability [probabilistic analysis], etc.); the deductive research sphere can also
be expanded using a number of methods of formal mathematics (algebra, logic,
geometry, differential calculus, etc.). Many elements of the research process
outlined above require the use of detailed political sciences analysis. To
synchronise and expand, the whole research process is able to bring into existence
a new quality of international relations theories (there are many behavioural
theories of international relations, such as "the field theory" or "the systems
theory").
Referring the results of this research process to individual conclusions coming
from a number of currently existing theories, at this stage of the study one should
be somewhat careful; although it is possible to argue that the presented statistics
challenge the neo-realism thesis that the bipolar system was far more stable,10 it is
simply on the contrary, since 1991 there has been a continuous decline in the
global number of wars (the arithmetic mean: 1962 – 1991 WT = 16,5 / 1992 – 2007
WT = 15,1; 1962 – 1991 WR = 4,2 / 1992 – 2007 WR = 3,9).
The theoretical construction of conclusions coming from the conducted
research process is as follows: If the United States increase their level of military
activity and thus begin to conduct a more active foreign policy, it causes the
reduction of the global number of wars; whereas, if the U.S.A. reduce their level of
military activity and thus their foreign policy becomes more regressive, the global
number of war begins to rise (model fig. 5). Referring to the theory of neo-classical
realism, which says that the United States conduct a particular foreign policy, the
above statistics can not distinguish whether the increase in the level of international
instability causes an increased U.S. military activity, this element would have to
undergo some detailed political science analysis; in terms of modelling, it is evenly
assumed that an increase of international instability contributes to the autonomic
growth of U.S. military activity (Fig. 7,9), and apathy is also assumed in this
respect (Fig. 6,8). The overall conclusion of the model is such that U.S. military
activity reduces the level of instability in the structure of the international system,
but there are circumstances in which there may occur an increase of U.S. military
activity and global instability of the system (an assumption that with the increase of
instability of the international system there has been an increase of the level of
10
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Mass 1979,
p. 161-193, 195, 204.
275
MARCIN KRUPA
threats to the U.S. priority interests at the point of which the country responds with
military means), for to restore the previous state of equilibrium in such a situation
(ie, the pre-growth state) the U.S.A. must increase the level of its military activity
above the level already state during the period of equilibrium. In a Real dimension
the course of these processes may be present as follows: if the attack of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi troops on Kuwait in 1990 resulted from the collapse of the
weakening position of the USSR (Iraq was an ally of the Soviet Union, and the
Soviet Union had instruments of influence on the behaviour of its allies), then the
level of system stability was restored by the decisive U.S. military response. The
analysis of political science have no direct connections that would link those events
with the weakening position of the Soviet Union, so this example has only a
theoretical dimension, however, this example shows great possibilities of
behavioural analysis that can help in noticing numerous regularities, schemes and
tendencies in international relations, which a humanistic historical analysis is not
able to make. Therefore, in order to increase the scientific progress on the ground
of international relations, it is worth combining the traditional and behavioural
research methods.
276
FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIMIC IN OPERATIONS ON BALKANS
EXPERIENCE
FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF CIMIC IN OPERATIONS ON BALKANS
Anna MILER, Ph.D.
Akademia Marynarki Wojennej
Abstract
Civil-Military Cooperation was a new experience for NATO militaries. It functioned as
a part of a peace mission for allied military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. CIMIC is
operated as part of the international military powers under the command of NATO, as well
as among civil international and non-governmental organisations and miscellaneous
military powers who are part of the conflict.
The main goal and responsibility of CIMIC was placing statements for common
cooperation in order to expand and sustain full cooperation between civil population and
institutions. It was also responsible for creating suitable cooperation conditions between
civil and army institutions on each level. It was achieved through assistance of civil
representatives of humanitarian organisation in the area of a mission. A wide range of
tasks was realised by around 350 highly skilled, civil and military staff members. Thanks to
their work CIMIC was established.
In order to form a positive image of soldiers CIMIC created Civil-Military
Cooperation units, that were responsible for law advisory and support within humanitarian
and economic projects.
The efficiency of CIMIC in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to be very good, this was
confirmed by the army which reported a stable situation. Good results of CIMIC are shown
also by a successfully cooperation with international organisations, that were represented
by a well qualified personnel, as well as good relations with local governments and the
wider population.
Key words – Civil-Military Cooperation – CIMIC, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Implementation Force – IFOR, Stabilisation Force – SFOR, CIMIC House
When military force face problems concerning the political, social, moral or
legal, economic and humanitarian aspects of operations the army must count on
civil help. Circumstances force military forces and the civilian sides to start
277
ANNA MILER
cooperation. Such a situation took place in the peace operation in BosniaHerzegovina led under the supervision of NATO.
It was possible to notice negative effects of the civil war in former Yugoslavia
directly after the truce; above all by the infringement of the structure of civilian
authorities, the fall of the economy, ethnic riot, many homeless and refugees, as
well as a common breaking of human rights. It has involved many civilian
international and non-governmental organisations bringing humanitarian aid and
help in the political and social reconstruction of the economic infrastructure. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina the experience of three ethnic groups complicated the
structure of the cooperation (Muslims, Serbs, Croats). However, Civil-Military
Cooperation is a tool, which appropriately used, might in certain situations help
with achieving military success without using military forces.
CIMIC is based on two groups of principles, seen from the side:
1. Military action including: precedence of military purposes of the mission,
direct commanding (the commander is answering for directing and carrying out
CIMIC action) and responsibility of the commander for the civil effects of military
action, economics of using own human resources and material.
2. Civil-military relations among which we point out: civil benefits, common
objectives, consenting to working on the part of civilian organisations,
humanisation of taken action, their transparency and understanding cooperating
with civilian organisations1.
In order to understand well the usage of the Civil-Military Cooperation
involved in the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina we should present the definition
which evolved and changed over several decades.
The project of NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-9), which came into effect in 2003,
defines CIMIC in the following manner: the coordination and the cooperation of
the commander of NATO with the civilian population, international and local
authorities and organisations and international, domestic and non-governmental
agencies, led as support for the completion of the allotted task2.
On the other hand in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the Civil-Military
Cooperation is defined as a set of means and arrangements supporting cooperation
between commanders of military forces and local military and civil authorities
(regional and local) and local people in areas where NATO forces can be found or
are planned to be deployed3.
The CIMIC abbreviation which means Civil-Military Cooperation is not only
recognisable in the military environment, but also amongst civilians, and defines
1
S. Olszewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, w Bośni i Hercegowinie, Wojsko i Wychowanie,
nr 5, Warszawa 2002, s. 109-110.
2
Doktryna Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej (CIMIC) NATO AJP-9 [w: Zbiór Dokumentów
Normatywnych NATO w Zakresie CIMIC], Dowództwo Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej,
Warszawa 2003, s. 45.
3
M. Wojciszko, Uwarunkowania organizacyjno-prawne związane z kierowaniem obronnością
państwa w ramach Współpracy cywilno-wojskowej, Wiedza Obronna, nr 3, Warszawa 2007, s. 38.
278
the new speciality in the army. Understanding CIMIC as a function, rather than as a
specific type of military is very important. The widely understood cooperation with
international and non-governmental organisations, as well as civilian authorities
means that it has a long tradition. It has been in its current form from the 1990s.
The schemata of CIMIC is illustrated in figure 1.1.
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
CIVIL
STREFA
COOPERATION
WSPÓŁPRACY
ZONE
MILITARY
COMPETENCE
Źródło: J. Gołębiewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, Myśl Wojskowa, nr 5, Warszawa 2005
Fig. 1.1. Schematic illustrate of Civil-Military Cooperation
The concept of Civil-Military Cooperation which was approved by NATO, was
built on the basis of experience of the assembled company in the result of actions of
American individuals to civil cases, in addition the functioning of French, British
and Dutch units considerably elaborated this concept and improved it.4.
Establishing and keeping the full cooperation of the civilian population and
acting institutions in the area where operations are conducted is a crucial
objective of Civil-Military Cooperation. The cooperation is aimed at ensuring
conditions for taking back the greatest moral, financial and tactical benefits
possible, both for civilians as well as servicemen5.
In the stated time it is possible to divide CIMIC action into two kinds of
purposes: short and long-term. Freeing the local infrastructure from military-civil
conflicts and sustaining cooperation among armies of NATO can be a short-term
purpose, with the civilian population, as well as organisations and institutions.
Checking needs as part of basic services and the humanitarian aid for civilians.
Creating and keeping conditions which are a base, is a long-term objective of
durable solutions and agreements of cooperation in contingencies.
4
S. Olszewski, Współpraca …, s. 109.
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacji pokojowej w Bośni, MON,
Warszawa 1998, s. 16-17.
5
279
ANNA MILER
Civil-Military Cooperation in institutionalised way was used for the first time
in Bosnia-Herzegovina by armies of NATO. In this area CIMIC mattered greatly in
operations conducted through IFOR – Implementation Force of NATO and SFOR
– Stabilisation Force of NATO, being an integral element of activity on all rungs of
commanding, as well as with subject of planning and training.
Civil-Military Cooperation conducted during the IFOR operation required
cooperation between political and military activity. Help and assistance given to
commanders of NATO is a base for CIMIC operation. The effectiveness of those
kinds of undertakings was ensured by arranging the factor dealing with CIMIC on
individual rungs in the command structure. On the central level J-9 and
appropriately into the G-5 hole and S-5. CIMIC supports the activity of remaining
organisational units through:
– coordinating official announcements having a primary importance for public
affairs;
– supporting the information campaign;
– providing consultation for the legal chapter in matters of legal aspects of
agreements, memoranda or investigating complaints;
– coordinating preparations of expert analyses and studies for the purposes of
commands in political issues and the Civil-Military Cooperation;
– transmitting data for making plans for the next stages of the operation;
– ensuring contacts between the local government;
– providing important information from a point of view of security and protection6.
The Civil-Military Cooperation during the peace enforcement/keeping
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in 14th of December 1995 in the
Paris Agreements on military aspects of establishing the peace on areas of BosniaHerzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement). This agreement contains the plan of
international intervention by others in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
divides operations in this country into two sections:
– military, carried out by a coalition of states under the direction of USA,
exploiting the NATO structure (IFOR/SFOR);
– civil carried out by OBWE7.
In the mandate of the mission they determined: a legal bases of activity, the
objective of the mission, the duration, tasks and contractors8. The document from
Dayton became a main aspect of undertaking activity in this area in view of
military forces as well as civilian international organisations. The civil part of the
6
W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC na przykładzie Bośni i Hercegowiny [w:
Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa, materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w Departamencie
Społeczno – Wychowawczym MON w dniu 23 marca 1999], MON, Warszawa 1999, s. 15.
7
L. Bagiński, C. Marcinkowski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacjach pokojowych,
AON, Warszawa 2000, s. 45.
8
Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa Polska – NATO, cz. 1 – studium analityczne, red. M. Drost,
AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 76
280
agreement governed the cooperation among military forces, the civilian community
of parties to the conflict and the relation with the international community.
The Implementation Force – IFOR acted by virtue of the UN Security Council
Resolution No. 1031, 15th of December 1995 based, on the provisions included in
decisions of chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations. On the 16th of
December NATO started, along with multinational forces (IFOR), the operation
under the code name "Joint Endeavour".
Further to this, the Stabilisation Force – SFOR was a multinational force
mandated by UN Security Council Resolution No. 1088 on the 12th of December
1996. Both IFOR and SFOR forces were authorised to apply the military aspects of
the Dayton peace agreement. SFOR Forces, as well as IFOR, acted according to
chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
IFOR forces were organised on the basic of NATO’s command structure. It
was a practical test of the organisation concept and made use of the Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF) structure. These forces consisted of separate naval and
air forces components as well as a land forces component. The Land forces
component included three multinational divisions and the Rapid Reaction Force
brigade along with fighting support and force protection units. Individual Member
States were assigned to make-up these forces, partner states participating in the
program also included states from the NATO Partnership for Peace, as well as
other states from outside this program. The whole of IFOR amounted to about 60
thousand soldiers9.
On the other hand, SFOR forces, allotted to the purpose of the execution of
tasks, made up about 30 thousand soldiers, which constituted about half of IFOR
forces. On this basis the Dayton agreement was guaranteed by parties to the
conflict, but enforced by the action of IFOR forces. The numerical strength of
SFOR was lower and it concentrated on implementing decisions put in force in the
annexe to the Dayton peace agreement through:
– stabilisation of the agreement between parties to the conflict and the
creation of an environment for safety, in which national and the local government
and international organisations were able to perform their tasks without obstacles;
– providing support for other organisations (as part of the Civil-Military
Cooperation, considering the criterion of the reduction in forces in the area of the
operation)10.
In the IFOR combined joint task force, according to principles of conducting
the operation of supporting the peace, a unified chain of command was introduced,
as well as planning and organising action according to procedures NATO. The
General military forces were in the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander in
9
F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w Doktrynie Obronnej RP,
MON, Warszawa 1998, s. 163.
10
Zgrupowania taktyczne wojsk lądowych w operacjach wsparcia pokoju, red. A. Bujak, AON,
Warszawa 2004, s. 60-61.
281
ANNA MILER
Europe (SACEUR): General George Joulvan. Admiral Leighton Smith was appointed
to the position of the first IFOR commander (COMIFOR). The commander-in-chief of
allied powers in South Europe (CINCSOUTH), and MSC AFSOUTH became a parent
command for the command of multiethnic connected powers. In July 1996 to the
COMIFOR position admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed, however, in November,
when the command of IFOR forces was subordinated to the Allied ground forces of
Centre LANDCENT Europe Gen William Crouch became a commander, who was
replaced in July 1997 by Gen Eric K. Shinseki11.
For Forces of the Alliance a realisation of the civilian side of the plan,
consisting of implementing the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a new
experience. IFOR forces enabled the strong support of civil tasks in the area of
restrictions, which was an effect of the mandate and the available resources. During
the execution of tasks IFOR forces closely cooperated with:
– Office of the High Representative (OHR);
– International Police Task Force (IPTF);
– International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
– World Health Organisation (WHO);
– World Food Programme (WFP);
– United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
– European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM);
– Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
– International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
– and many other organisations, including over 400 non-governmental
organisations12.
Tasks of IFOR forces consisted of protecting these organisation by providing:
– temporary accommodation;
– medical evacuation;
– repair and evacuation of equipment;
– transport services;
– information about the safety state;
– consultation and many other logistic services13.
As part of the Civil-Military Cooperation a wide range of tasks were carried
out by 350 persons of the civilian and military staff. Amongst all the things carried
out by IFOR forces in the command on the tactical and operating level there ranked
among them:
– the command of multinational connected powers;
– the command of individual components;
– the command of individuals included in their composition.
11
Tamże, s. 57-58.
J. Knetki, B. Panek, J. Trembecki, Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii i praktyce sztuki
operacyjnej „Pokój”, AON, Warszawa 2002, s. 129.
13
Tamże, s. 130.
12
282
The Group consisted of qualified staff in different fields, among others
teachers, lawyers, specialists from public transport, economists, farming
specialists, and engineers. They were a CIMIC part of a team which provided the
consultation, as well as the technical support and the coordination of tasks
undertaken by a lot of working parties and the committee, as well as nongovernmental organisations and civil and local authorities with the IFOR build-up.
Multilateral education of the civilian CIMIC staff and them experience, as well as
the acquaintance of organisational structures of armies affects work in the area of
reconstruction, repatriation and the extension of democracy in the area of action.
The commander of NATO and IFOR has set duties for CIMIC, but one of the
main tasks in the beginning of the operation was keeping a wide spectrum of forces
concerned with clarifying assumptions of the organisation.
Preventive work associated with de-mining the area was also an important task.
Being afraid of mines, parties to the conflict communicated to CIMIC units
descriptions of locations where there were unfired rounds, explosives, mine traps,
minefields, wire-wound entanglements which can expose to danger the civilian
population staying in this area as well as NATO forces.
IFOR forces were established in order to provide assistance to parties of the
conflict while implementing a peace agreement. According to this document, in the
IFOR military task were:
– guaranteeing the continued following of the cease-fire agreement;
– guaranteeing the withdrawal of fighting armies from the agreed area of
separation to their appropriate territories and making a division of fighting
armies;
– creating conditions for the safe, efficient and fast withdrawal of armies of
the UN which weren't subordinated to the NATO operation14.
as well as:
– ensuring the defence and the freedom of movement for IFOR branches in the
mandated area;
– supervising the borders and separation zones between parties of the conflict;
– creating airspace control above Bosnia-Herzegovina and of migration of
branches of servicemen in principal areas of communications trails;
– appointing a joint military committee to work as the main IFOR
representatives in contacts with the sides of the peace treaty15.
According to the peace treaty they entrusted the Implementation Forces also
with setting up the protective conditions for the functioning of humanitarian
organisations and of the realisation of non-military aspects of the peace treaty:
14
Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny, red. J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński, AON, Warszawa
2001, s. 69.
15
P. Piątkowski, Operacja IFOR „Wspólny wysiłek” w Bośni i Hercegowinie, MON, Warszawa
1996, s. 9.
283
ANNA MILER
– to provide assistance to ensure safety in order to accomplish non – military
aspects of a peace treaty, including conducting free and democratic elections in
Bosnia-Herzegovina;
– support the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other
international institutions, also in performing their humanitarian missions by
providing them with freedom of movement;
– to give help with supervision and the law enforcement, for free movement of
the civilian population, refugees and migrants;
– to supervise clearing the area of mines in Bosnia-Herzegovina16.
In view of various projects and after just enough progress in the peace process
they created, Coordination Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation, which tasks were
based on:
– monitoring civilians’ humanitarian needs;
– establishing and keeping in touch with the civilian, military local
government and local and international police (IPTF);
– checking the compliance of political-military and social events with regards
to the spirit of the “Dayton Agreement”;
– of coordinating, government and non-governmental meetings of international
organisations17.
The effectiveness of CIMIC undertakings was guaranteed thanks to the
inclusion of all of the operational commands dealing with the coordination of
activities connected with the military specificity, into a structure of everyone
concerned with actions of a civil meaning. The performed tasks of with
organisational units included:
– ensuring permanent contact among the local government and civilian
organisations in the realisation of concluded agreements;
– passing an information for security and protection to the interested parties;
– coordination of public announcements in issues having a primary
importance for public affairs;
– supporting the information campaign and creating a positive image of the
armed forces being involved in a mission;
– ensuring the technical help in investigating legal aspects of agreements,
memoranda, and complaints;
– coordination of preparations of expert opinions, analyses and studies for
needs of the command in the Civil-Military Cooperation and political areas;
– participation in the data preparation for making plans for next stages of the
peace support operation18.
16
Tamże, s. 9.
A. Jóźwiak, C. Marcinkowski, Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych, AON,
Warszawa 2002, s. 91.
18
Tamże, s. 93-94.
17
284
In order to provide the ability to execute tasks which were a consequence of
Civil-Military Cooperation, SFOR developed operational procedures which in
detail showed the duties and obligations of all participants of the peace process.
They were:
– keeping impartiality in every situation and every place;
– a prohibition of having weapons and ammunition;
– a prohibition of having hidden filming and tracking;
– right to use emblems of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent;
– right to use the protection of SFOR;
– possibility of getting arrested by SFOR for everyone who is committing an
offence, crime or is preventing forces from performing their tasks19.
The knowledge of procedures is a condition of the effective action of civil
employees. What is very important, form safety point of view and the possibility of
completing tasks as part of CIMIC is having and carrying a weapon. Depriving the
civilian staff of humanitarian and non-governmental organisations of the right to
carry weapon in the area of Bosnia was very advantageous. In such situation it isn't
possible to treat them with hostility, because they are perceived as unarmed people.
The usage of military forces in a peace support operation needed the wide
cooperation of military authorities and civilian communities, that were building the
quota of peacekeeping forces including representatives of the local authority. It was
also important that SFOR had the right to stop everyone who was preventing
peacekeeping forces from accomplishing their mission20.
The Stabilisation Forces of NATO was based on the same principles of using
force (ROE)21 as IFOR. Its essential responsibility was strengthening peace and
safety. Its detailed tasks were:
– stopping and preventing a renewing of hostilities shares by parties to the
conflict;
– continuing the achieved results of IFOR forces, and creating the climate in
which the continuation of the peace process would be possible;
– providing support for civilian organisations, in the framework of CivilMilitary Cooperation22.
Civil-Military Cooperation is carried out by the military and civilian staff
performing their tasks in established full-time structures which are found at the
operational and tactical level23. In this aspect coordinated arrangement of the staff
is important, above all volunteers: representatives of various organisations that can
19
C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, CIMIC w wybranych misjach humanitarnych i pokojowych,
Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych, nr 1, Warszawa 2001, s. 91.
20
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa na przykładzie operacji pokojowej w Bośni [w:
Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa – konferencja], AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 14.
21
Rules of Engagement,
22
Operacje wsparcia pokoju w teorii współczesnej sztuki operacyjnej „Wsparcie pokoju”, red.
W. Kaczmarek, AON, Warszawa 2002, s.
23
W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC …, s. 12.
285
ANNA MILER
be useful in excluding many incompatibilities of arrangements which may occur in
the initial period of a mission, as well as, prevent the doubling of manpower tasks.
Forming conditions for effective action for completely unarmed people can be a
significant element affecting their successes.
It has a great impact on the effectiveness of the staff involved in a cooperation.
They also have cultural differences in civil-military relations, from which most
noticeable are:
– fundamental values are a base of motivation for bringing help to (…);
– the organisational structure of military forces and non-governmental
organisations is naturally different, in addition the structure of the second one is
always unique (…);
– as a consequence of structural differences the decision making and the
execution of tasks are also burdened (…)24.
At the beginning, especially on the central rank, Americans were CIMIC
employees, representatives of other states constituted 45%. As a result of trainings
conducted by SHAPE NATO was able to send more staff into the specific area of
action. With the purpose of accomplishing the trainings, they have set up a group
of international instructors who started training candidates (officers) to positions
in the CIMIC structure in Bosnia. Trainings that were carried out were based in
facilities at a Training Centre belonging to the 7 the Army of USA in Germany. 25
Obtaining the approval of local authorities to arrange the group of people to
become representatives was the next important factor for the organisation. It was
about helping the local community. The approval to start operations in the area of
operations is essential regardless of the mandate of international forces. One should
obtain permission for each individual or, in case of its lack, to show the readiness
for action as a member of an official operating organisation.
In the middle of 1997 a need to specify areas of common functioning of the
civilian and military division arose. CIMIC worked accurately to fulfil the needs of
the army, performing mainly objectives of military powers which fulfilled
important tasks of the support and the peacekeeping mission. Orders given by the
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe – SACEUR – for the purposes of
the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina presented areas of functioning of the armed
forces. Tasks were performed with respect to the coordination of efforts of civilian
and military forces, functioning in the common space of a peacekeeping mission.
In this way they achieved the function of widely protecting CIMIC in conflict,
which is described in the 1.2 picture.
24
25
286
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 9-10.
W. Sąsiadek, Doświadczenia w zakresie CIMIC …, s. 16.
Civilian
Population
Join
Force
CIMIC
Non-Governmental
Organisation
Politicians
Military
Subbranch
Civil
Defence
International
Organisation
State
Administration
Territorial
Defence
Źródło: Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe, red. D. Kozerawski, AON, Warszawa 2003
Fig. 1.2. Areas of Civil-Military Cooperation within the framework of a peacekeeping mission
This is why the fundamental meaning for peacekeeping in the area of conflict is:
– establishing and sustaining good relations with civilians, institutions and
organisations in order to demonstrate legal aspects of mission, supporting the
freedom of movement, minimising threats to the staff of the mission;
– coordinating, helping and supporting, and also providing technical
assistance in restoring democratic government institutions, in the reconstruction of
the necessary infrastructure, the judicial system and activity of police. Also
providing populations with agencies, organisations and international institutions
of employment and the essential economic activity;
– assisting the high representative and other international institutions,
agencies and organisations in creating essential conditions to enable civilian
authorities to continue the implementation of the agreement after the reassignment
of SFOR from the mission26.
26
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa na przykładzie operacji pokojowej w Bośni [w:
Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa – konferencja], AON, Warszawa 1999, s. 29-30.
287
ANNA MILER
There was a possibility of specifying three phases in the preparation process in
such a system of cooperation:
– preparatory – where as part of preparing the contingent of forces, potential
undertakings of the cooperation are being planned. They effect the preliminary
training, they acquaint the staff with the premises of the mission, also they are seek
specialists from determined fields;
– implementation of the mission – establishing contact, the starting point and
the development of cooperation, coordination of undertakings, keeping in touch,
the transmission of information;
– transitional – ensuring conditions for the gradual withdrawal of stabilisation
forces and handing over to the local community the full liability for completing the
peace process27.
The military power presented by SFOR forced parties of the conflict to find
peaceful solutions. At the same time it showed the need for mutual cooperation,
also the local Civil-Military Cooperation. Moreover, it created conditions for the
gradual withdrawal of international military forces from the area of conflict and
the handing over to the local authorities the responsibility for peacekeeping28.
An advantage of being bart of an international funded operation was that the
Civil-Military Cooperation units in Bosnia-Herzegovina were able to use so-called
CIMIC House (houses of the Civil-Military Cooperation) and information-press
service. The duty of both structural and organisational factors was highlighted
while creating the positive image of the mission, soldiers of SFOR and the meaning
of the political-military transformations which were occurring.
The idea of creating the CIMIC House appeared in the second half of 1997 as
an element of changes to the mission. SFOR was changed from a military to a more
civil focus, also there was a wider opening for the cooperation with the local
government and the population. The first CIMIC House was opened on 1st of April
1998 in Doboju in Nordic-Polish zone of the brigade.
Their main duties were:
– creating positive image of SFOR soldiers;
– being seen as an information centre working in two directions;
– supporting the economic assistance in drawing up the proposal for plans of
humanitarian projects;
– running the bank of ‘to do’ matters;
– support and legal consulting for the local government29.
At the end of year 1998, 12 organisations were operating in BosniaHerzegovina, 14 international organisations, 14 governmental organisations, 136
international non-governmental organisations and 284 national non-governmental
27
Tamże, s. 30.
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 8.
29
C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, CIMIC w…, s. 92.
28
288
organisations. General efforts of the mentioned organisations and groups were
focused on the following parts of action:
– supporting the legal law and order;
– synchronisation of civil-military effort;
– infrastructure and economics;
– the matter of the return of refugees;
– introducing democracy in the life;
– public safety30.
The role of international organisations within CIMIC duties in BosniaHerzegovina rested on 1B Annexe of the peace agreement, Agreement from
Vienna and Agreement from Florence, are files placed in the document of SFOR
Standard Operational Procedures. SOP SFOR established cooperation with key
institutions responsible for the safety in Europe and with many humanitarian
organisations.
International organisations in possession of forces and means, funds for
appointed action, are a principal ally of military forces in peace support operations.
They establish one of the most important components of the CIMIC cooperation.
One of the most important institutions involved in Bosnia is OSCE31. Its main
role is to supervise elections. Also an important matter was the establishing of the
OHR bureau – Office of the High Representative. The high representative was
appointed by the UN Security Council at the request of signatories to the
agreement, in order to supervise the applying of the civil dimensions of the
agreement, as well as coordinating the functioning of all organisations and agencies
participating in this process. Also in the process of CIMIC cooperation are civilian
international governmental organisations. According to ROE rules, members of
international organisations are regarded by SFOR as persons with a special status.
It means that soldiers of SFOR can use force, in critical situation they can use
power. Examples of these organisations are: OHR, OSCE, ECMM, ICRC, WHO,
WFP, ICTY, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, the UNESCO.
As far as non-governmental organisations operating in Bosnia are concerned,
there are mainly organisations of volunteers which directly are not being financed
by the government. Their functioning is based mainly on carrying out the
humanitarian actions. Common task of NGO's and SFOR is to help suffering
people, to improve people’s standard of living, as well as supporting efforts
towards the reconstruction and development of the country. Members of nongovernmental organisations cannot carry any weapon. All private and nongovernmental voluntary organisations have their bank account, steering cell and in
some situations their own department.
The development of conflict in Bosnia showed the possibility of using NGOs,
in a position of total independence in the initial period, before NATO and other
30
31
S. Olszewski, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 110.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
289
ANNA MILER
European countries sent IFOR forces in December 1995. Deployed to military
forces and civil representatives of participating countries, non-governmental
organisations were able to achieve higher levels of functioning than in previous
conflicts.
NGOs have limited logistics possibilities and therefore are willing to help, but only
in one assignment. In other situations they must join international organisations as just
one of many members. Some of them are financed by independent international
institutions functioning in the country, other organisations are functioning directly, or
by the use of different organisations. The majority of NGOs carrying out their
projects, as a result of the invitation of local partners, are dependent in their actions
on foreign help. Agencies and organisations responsible for bringing civil aspects
of the agreement into effect claim that NGO's are the only option until now, and
only with them they can sustain working. Preparing local organisations and their
employees for autonomous functioning is an important aim for foreign institutions.
Civil international organisations and international organisation can form a
proper basis and ensure favourable terms for achieving peace. Despite that, without
the help of people living there SFOR, CIMIC and NGO wouldn't have been able to
ensure peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A commitment of political leaders is
necessary, leaders, who were responsible for actions taken to stabilise the peace.
Agreements of different types were very often broken by people who earlier signed
them.
The IFOR mission, and later the SFOR mission the fulfilled assigned tasks.
They formed appropriate conditions deciding on the success of administration,
political and economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR forces
(operation “Joint Endeavour”) have created and strengthened the peace. However,
SFOR forces (operation “Joint Guard”) were supposed to ensure the stability of the
peace processes.
The NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the code name Joint
Endeavour was the first land operation implemented by multinational forces
connected with the function of supporting the peace. From this moment, the
Alliance collected great experience in operations of this type. As evidence we can
observe NATO leading the next operations in former Yugoslavia.
On the 20th of December 1996 IFOR completed its assignments and achieved
its objective. Military forces were divided and transferred to the designated place,
hostility was stopped. At the beginning of the operation it was already known that
the civil unit would have more tasks to do. However, military forces could only
create appropriate conditions for the performance – of building the peace, by
creating conditions of the peaceful existence of parties. A particular situation and
formed aim of operations led the mission to the intentional effect, of reducing the
presence of the army. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and members of NATO
stated that military forces should be reduced in the area in order to lead to
290
stabilization. For that purpose they reorganised the Implementation Force – IFOR
into the Stabilisation Force – SFOR.
Conducted examinations are showing that creating CIMIC in the future cannot
be based only on experience. Every conflict has a different dimension. Agreements
do not apply on the same principles, although they have shared objectives, which
are to lead to implementation of peace agreements. We need flexible structures and
arrangements within CIMIC which can be changed depending on the needs of
peace operation.
Focusing on the effective cooperation of CIMIC can influence the economical
and social improvement of the standard of living among local communities. It can
stimulate the return of refugees and migrants in order to a rebuild better Bosnia.
CIMIC can, and is making many Bosnians more happy and better prosperous32.
Experience gathered on several dozen missions shows regularities determining
CIMIC activity. They include:
– a distinct specifying of essential objectives of the mission, as well as a clear
division of tasks for the military and civilian organisations which are facilitating
cooperation;
– the real military force presented by the military component imposes peaceful
solutions upon parties to the conflict and at the same time points out explicitly the
need for mutual cooperation;
– the military component supports institutions, organisations and international
agencies and the local government in the civil realisation of the agreement;
– the military component creates conditions for the gradual withdrawal of
international military forces from the area of conflict and the handing over to local
authorities of the responsibility for peacekeeping;
– the civilian staff puts the peace arrangements into practice – authority,
volunteers, representatives of various civilian organisations – they are arranged in
a coordinated way, that prevents duplicating some undertakings, especially
humanitarian;
– the structure of civilian humanitarian organisations is unique and it gives
them the elasticity of action, but the lack of specifically assigned organisational
dependence creates determined problems in the coordination of the cooperation;
– necessary approval of local authorities to arrange groups of people
representing civilian organisations, ready to bring help to the local population;
– successfully performing tasks, along with civilian organisations supporting
the military forces that are involved in a specific mission, creating a positive image
of the military component along with helping others in their action33.
Effects of CIMIC activity are the most visible in the middle management level
of command, that is at the level of the brigade. In this way we are watching
practical actions with which the Civil-Military Cooperation must usually struggle.
32
33
W. Wójtowicz, Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa …, s. 34.
C. Marcinkowski, L. Bagiński, Wybrane elementy …, s. 208-209.
291
ANNA MILER
However, we should observe the difference in functioning of elements of CIMIC
organisation in individual divisions. They are very big and are give the possibility
of general conclusions. E.g. in the Multinational Division 'North' apart from battle
groups, brigades and other individuals, also an American CIMIC battalion
operated. Its functioning, especially in the area of carrying out humanitarian help,
was based on detailed guidelines of the Department of Defence in USA.
Picturing all tasks run by the Civil-Military Cooperation would need an
extensive review, therefore describing the most important stages of action is
significant.
An important aspect aspiring to the success is the issue of the return of refugees
to their homes from times before the armed conflict. It is a relevant problem for
stabilising the situation, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the entire area
of the Balkans. Next to the refugees, that are outside the country, internal refugees
also appear. They are people, who being in their own country, aren't able to go
back to their houses for various reasons. The importance of this problem meant,
that the entire activity of the Civil-Military Cooperation was subordinated to
matters connected with the return of refugees.
The next element is a unit responsible for introducing democracy. It was
focused on supporting permanent contacts with the organisations responsible for
the monitoring of law. Contacts concerned the cooperation with OSCE and UNBIH
mainly (with Mission of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to which the International
Police Force belongs.
The next element was a team coordinating projects which were responsible for
the process of the selection and supervision of projects in the area of reconstruction
of the infrastructure. It is carried out with funds from the American Agency of
International Development and the European Union, but also with countries which
were involved in the mission. Its main aims were: repair of schools, doctor's
surgeries, repair of bridges and roads and power lines.
A team dealing with exploring the area is the last element of the mission. The
aim of this team consisted of the accumulation of information about all kinds of
political problems, socioeconomic issues and infrastructure and political parties
and politicians. Information about this unit is very important for a proper CIMIC
operation.
CIMIC also carried out the plan for the evacuation of persons having so-called
special status. It was reasonable for ensuring the safety of all representatives of
international organisations and UN departments UN in danger.
CIMIC success is based on the unity of the cooperation of staff units:
operating, reconnaissance and logistic, but also its based on cooperation with legal
units and psychological operations. Cooperation with the press unit can also give
positive effects on the part of promoting CIMIC achievements, as well as obtaining
necessary information.
292
Experience shows, that commanders of the alliance need CIMIC. The CivilMilitary Cooperation became a main part of planning, training and actions of
NATO. For the proper functioning of multinational teams, there are special
trainings and courses prepared.
It is necessary that CIMIC is an important part of future NATO peace
operations of NATO. Above all, it is important to carry out all kinds of different
analyses and plans that are significant in this sector.
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Jóźwiak A., Marcinkowski C., Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych,
AON, Warszawa 2002.
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„Wsparcie pokoju”, AON, Warszawa 2002.
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294
Review of the book: Bartosz Bolechów, Terroryzm, aktorzy,
statyści, widzowie, PWN, Warsaw 2010, pp. 399
Aneta NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN, Ph.D.
When analyzing bookshops’ offers, it is difficult to find publications dealing
with the problem of terrorism. Those which are on offer include translations of
foreign authors. (A good example is W. Dietl, K. Hirschmann, R. Tophoven,
Terroryzm, PWN.) Polish publications in this field, generally speaking, do not play
a significant role. In the search for materials concerning research into terrorism one
can encounter different attitudes to the topic. Some of them look at the problem
from the perspective of the psychology of terrorism. A good example of such
a book is „Terroryzm aktorzy, statyści, widzowie” (Terrorism actors, extras,
audience*) by Bartosz Bolechów published by PWN publishing house. Such
attitude required from the author to make the assumption that terrorism is a fear
evoking method of repeated acts of violence, which is politically motivated, used
against non-fighting targets where, unlike in the case of other forms of political
violence, the direct target of the attack is not the key target. (translation of
quotation p. 9) The author wants to say that the victims are intermediaries between
the terrorists and audience, on the stipulation that the audience can also be the
target of an attack.
Because of such an attitude to the topic Bolechów divides the book into two
parts. Thus, the structure of the book is as follows: part one: Terroryści
i terroryzm (Terrorists and terrorism*) includes 11 chapters, where on over 180
pages the author deliberates on the psychological genesis of terrorists and
terrorism; part two: Audytoria, ofiary, decydenci (Audience, victims, ruling
bodies*), consists of 8 chapters where on over 150 pages the author presents
psychological aspects connected with the beneficiaries of terrorism. The first part is
preceded by an extensive Wprowadzenie (Introduction*), where the author
describes among other things: research problems, goals , methods and the structure
of the book. It finishes with Zakończenie (The ending). Moreover, it includes the
295
ANETA NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN
following: index of abbreviations (Wykaz skrótów), index of names (Indeks
nazwisk), subject index (Indeks rzeczowy) and bibliography (Bibliografia).
Let us now move to a short presentation of the subject matter of the first
chapter. Chapter 1 Psychopatologia, racjonalność i problem „osobowości
terrorystycznej” (Psychopathology, rational thinking and the issue of the
terrorist personality*) provides explanation for terrorist behaviour. It shows
biological theories which were first introduced in the initial wave of terrorism (pp.
25 – 31). The recapitulation of the achievements in this field is expressed in the
following words: among terrorists there is no trace of an overrepresentation of
people with psychopathic features – it refers both to psychiatric illnesses as well as
personality disorders (translation of quotation p. 31). Moreover, Bolechów
presents terrorists as rational players (pp 32 – 38). The theory finds its best place in
the description of a personality typology called – political strategist (p. 43). Since
they govern organisations, it seems that the latter ones should be analyzed from this
point of view. The argument, which is against this theory, saying that not everyone
chooses terrorist activities as rational ones, seems to be groundless. For not
everyone opts for work in a big corporation, or starts their own business activity.
Thus, in accordance with the author’s suggestion, rationalism of the choice of way
of life is an individual case. The two remaining types of personality mentioned by
B.B. are: radical theorist and aggressive activist. In chapter 2 Teorie
psychodynamiczne (Psychodynamic theories*) the author explains psychodynamic
reasons for terrorism, including e.g. malicious personality mutation* „złośliwe
mutacje osobowości” (p. 48), narcissism (p. 51), paranoia (p. 55), identity crisis (p.
56), aggression and frustration (p. 61). According to BB the usefulness of the
provided theories seems to be limited unless one applies stricter criteria and
research methods, such as: clearly structured interviews, quantitative methods,
sample methods (p. 64). Chapter 3 Czynniki społeczne i kulturowe (Social and
cultural factors*), as the title indicates, focuses on the influence of factors on
terrorism with reference to an individual as well as to a group. Moreover, it seems
that group, organisational and social psychology, with particular emphasis on the
issue of group identity provides a more constructive basis to understand terrorist
psychology and behaviour (translation of quotation p. 97). It is worth paying
particular attention to the subchapter concerning the memetics of terrorism, where
particular waves of terrorism are described through the perspective of memes.
Chapter 4 Geneza, radykalizacja i eskalacja (Genesis, radicalisation and
escalation*) shows that the reasons for terrorism are differentiated and
comprehensively connected with one another…starting with the social conditions,
through the process of group formation, up to the achievement and maintenance of
the group’s operational ability (translation of quotation pp. 103-104). It seems that
the reasons for terrorism quoted from different experts in the subject field should
be grouped, e.g. with the use of methods of strategic analysis. Then the chapter
would become more interdisciplinary. Chapter 5 Neutralizacja psychospołecznych
296
inhibitorów agresji (Neutralisation of psychosocial aggression inhibitors*)
describes psychological processes which can be used to deactivate moral standards.
This chapter does not finish with a conclusion, as in the case of most chapters in
the first part. (It also includes chapters 10 and 11). Chapter 6 Dynamika grupy
terrorystycznej (Dynamics of a terrorist group*) focuses on terrorism as a group
activity and therefore the product of an internal group’s dynamics (translation of
quotation p. 126) and it is not only about an attempt to convince an individual to
certify an untruth but to change the perception of truth (translation of quotation p.
129). Chapter 7 Psychospołeczny model procesualny (Psychosocial processual
model*) is dedicated to the explanation of J. Horgan’s theory which integrates
psychological and social perspectives in a dynamic way by overlapping the aspects
of terrorism and the following stages: entering a group, being in the group and
leaving the group. The subsequent statement deserves particular attention:
terrorism is rather a thing that the members of an extremist group do along with
many different things (translation of quotation p. 142). Chapter 8 Psychologia
terroryzmu religijnego (Psychology of religious terrorism*) describes the theories
of e.g. K. Armstrong, A.A. Dol, J.S. Piven, D.J. Feeney which explain the
phenomenon of religious terrorism making their critical review at the same time.
Chapter 9 Psychologiczne aspekty terroryzmu samobójczego (Psychological
aspects of suicide terrorism*) provides explanation of different aspects of terrorist
attacks where the death of the terrorist is a must and not the side effect of a given
attack (translation of quotation p. 171). One of the explanations why this type of
weapon is so widespread is its effectiveness and efficiency. Chapter 10
Psychologia superterroryzmu (Psychology of super-terrorism*) refers to the
possibility of using weapons of mass destruction in terrorist attacks. The author, by
reference to different theories, calms down the readers by explaining that in spite of
strong strategic, political and tactical reasons for using weapon of mass
destruction, along with the technological possibilities, it is common to have
psychological aversion to deploying them (translation of quotation p. 196), thus
there is hope that this kind of weapon will not be used. In chapter 11 Rola kobiet –
terroryzm w kontekście płci społecznej (The role of women – terrorism in the
context of social gender*) the author conducts an analysis of the participation of
women in acts of terrorism through the perspective of terrorism waves. Moreover,
he talks about the necessity to provide different explanations of the engagement of
women in terrorism than is done in case of men.
Part two starts with chapter 1 Terroryzm jako proces komunikacji i wpływu
społecznego (Terrorism as a process of communication and social influence*)
which presents a kind of symbiosis of present terrorism and mass media. For
terrorism is a theatre … terrorist attacks are often well calculated and planned in
order to draw the attention of electronic media and press (p. 212) and terrorist
campaigns can be examined by using the analogy of advertising campaigns (p. 218
translation of quotations). Chapter 2 Psychologiczne aspekty sytuacji
297
ANETA NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN
zakładniczych (Psychological aspects of hostage situations*) presents three types
of terrorist activities where hostages are taken i.e. kidnapping: taking over means
of transport together with passengers and crew, barricade situation. The latter one
is broadly described here. This chapter as well as the next one does not include a
part entitled Conclusions. In chapter 3 Ofiary terroryzmu (Victims of terrorism*)
the author tackles such topics as e.g. 1) victimization which stems from: the wish to
draw attention, symbolic aspects and instrumental character; 2) category of victims
e.g. direct victims, family and relatives of the direct victims, negotiators. Chapter 4
Strach, lęk i percepcja ryzyka (Dread, fear and risk perception*) presents critical
elements of terrorist strategy where rational dread and irrational fear exert
influence on the perception of risk (p.252). Chapter 5 Trauma i zaburzenia
posttraumatyczne jako skutek działań terrorystycznych (Psychological trauma
and post-traumatic disorders as the result of terrorist activities*) presents
numerically: the traits of traumatic situations, possible reaction to the situations,
and categorisations of post-traumatic disorders. The author compares terrorism to
other occurrences and proves that in many aspects there is an analogy with natural
disasters and catastrophes caused by man (p. 277). However, we should be a little
bit critical as far as their implementation in research on the results of terrorist
incidences is concerned. Chapter 6 Psychologiczne konsekwencje działań
terrorystycznych w wybranych grupach szczególnych (Psychological consequences
of terrorist activities in the chosen special groups*) touches on the reaction of the
following groups to incidents and terrorist campaigns: 1) children, 2) the elderly,
3) members of intervention groups, in order to build an effective, comprehensive
system of minimisation of psychological effects of terrorist activities, which was
broadly described (p. 29) in chapter 7 Minimalizowanie psychologicznych skutków
działań terrorystycznych (Minimisation of psychological effects of terrorist
activities*). The author puts here emphasis on education, information,
communication, and discussion in the neutralisation of the negative psychological
influence exerted by terrorists. Chapter 8 Elementy psychologii antyterroryzmu
(The elements of antiterrorism psychology*) draws particular attention to the fact
that terrorism is first of all a psychological weapon (translation of quotation
p. 336). The author in the ending writes that psychosocial analysis of terrorism
mechanisms leads to the noticing of numerous paradoxes and research problems
(p.355) and it should be said that BB managed to illustrate it clearly in his book.
An unquestionable plus of this publication is the fact that the presented theories
and models are exposed to critical assessment.
It is difficult to indicate the recipients of the book. It can be anyone who wants
to understand why there are terrorist attacks in the world. Thus, it can become the
basis of society’s education, as we all should realise the complicated psychosocial
aspects connected with the problem of terrorism. This book can also be
recommended as an introduction to the comprehension of the problem for those
who are beginning their research into terrorism (p. 18). The author writes that this
298
is an interdisciplinary attitude to the problem, and I partly agree with him. As an
economist, theorist and practitioner of management I lack here the continuation of
the presented attitudes’ implementation in the problem of terrorism. Such curiosity
was awoken in me by chapter 1 of part I. Moreover, the structure of the book is not
well balanced, i.e. we can find here chapters with 5 as well as 32 pages. Some of
them lack conclusions (chapter 7 and 19). In spite of the structural shortcomings, as
well as the fact that my scientific hunger has not been satisfied, the book can be
(and even has to be) recommended to everyone, and in particular students of not
only psychology but also security and defence.
* free interpretation of the translator
299
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