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Chapter 3
Mood and Stereotyping: Affective
States and the Use of General
Knowledge Structures
Herbert Bless
Universitiit Heidelberg
Norbert Schwarz
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Markus Kemmelmeier
Universitiit Heidelberg
ABSTRACT
We review how affective states moderate the impact of stereotypes in social
judgment. The reported evidence suggests that stereotypes have more impact on
judgments formed by individuals in a happy mood rather than sad mood,
whereas the reverse holds for individuating information. We trace these effects
to mood-dependent differences in processing style. Extending previous theorizing, we suggest that individuals are more likely to process new information in a
bottom-up fashion when the situation is perceived as problematic, which is
partially a function of being in a sad mood. In contrast, individuals are more
likely to rely on pre-existing general knowledge structures when the situation is
perceived as safe, which is partially a function of being in a happy mood. The
available evidence indicates that the differential impact of general knowledge
structures is not mediated by mood effects on processing capacity or motivation,
in contrast to what previous theorizing suggested.
European Review of Social Psychology, Volume 7. Edited by Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone.
© 1996 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
64
HERBERT BLESS, NORBERT SCHWARZ AND MARKUS KEMMELMEIER
INTRODUCTION
Social scientists have long assumed a close link between affective states on the
one hand and stereotyping and prejudice on the other hand. This link may
take two different forms. On the one hand, the stereotyped group itself (or
some contextual information associated with the group) may elicit im affective reaction. Bodenhausen (1993) has referred to such affective reactions as
"integral" affect. On the other hand, individuals may be in some affective
state, e.g., a happy or sad mood, when they are exposed to a stereotyped
target. In this case, the perceiver's affective state is not a reaction to the
stereotyped group and has hence been termed "incidental" (Bodenhausen,
1993). While the potential impact of incidental affect has only recently received theoretical and empirical attention (see Bodenhausen, 1993), integral
affect has played a central role in numerous approaches that understood
prejudice as resulting from negative affective states. At the beginning of this
century, the influence of Freud's (1933) psychoanalysis prompted researchers
to focus predominantly on intrapsychic causes of stereotyping and prejudice.
Thus, research into the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) portrayed prejudice as a product of the individual's defense mechanisms which serve to shield him- or herself from aversive
emotional impulses. Sharing this focus on negative affective states, the
frustration-aggression hypothesis conceptualized negative affect towards outgroups as a channeled projection of aggressive impulses resulting from deprivation experiences (Dollard et ai., 1939; Miller & Bugelski, 1948). This
notion is also captured in the "scapegoat theory" that views prejudice as an
outlet of displaced hostility (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1949). Allport (1954)
discussed a variety of negative affective states, including pr9jected guilt and
anxiety, as antecedents of stereotyping and prejudice. Lippmann (1922), who
introduced the concept of a "stereotype", saw stereotypes as devices to avoid
the aversive states of high cognitive complexity and subjective uncertainty.
Combining cognitive and motivational aspects in social identity theory, Tajfel
and Turner have conceptualized individuals' affect towards themselves and
their group as driving forces for ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). In line with social
identity theory, inducing negative affect by threatening individuals' selfesteem has been found to increase ingroup favoritism (Meindl & Lerner,
1984), and vice versa, the expression of ingroup favoritism increased reported
self-esteem (Oakes & Turner, 1980; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; see also Messick
& Mackie, 1989).
The above approaches share the assumption that negative affect becomes
associated with the stereotyped group, rendering it an integral part of the
process of stereotyping. While these approaches conceptualize stereotyping
and prejudice as part of the individual's intrapsychic self-regulation, other
MOOD AND STEREOTYPING
approaches have conceptualized stereotyping as emanating from real
tergroup conflict over power and resources (e.g. Allport, 1954; Blau
Both lines of reasoning, however, converge in suggesting that stereot
most likely to occur when individuals experience negative emotiona
The focal role of affect in different theories of prejudice suggests that 1
of intergroup relations may be ideal for investigating the impact of a
states on social judgment. As Hamilton (1981, p. 347) noted, "If ther
domain of human interaction that history tells us is laden with stror
passionate feelings, it is the area of intergroup relations".
Nevertheless, affective states have received little attention as resea
stereotyping progressed. With the rise of the information processir
digm, most researchers seemed to lose interest in the affective comp(
prejudice and the focus shifted towards the cognitive bases of stere
(Hamilton, 1981; see also Stroebe & Insko, 1989). This shift went alon
decreased interest in emotion in general, reflecting that affective stat
difficult to capture in the computer metaphor that dominated infor
processing theories (see Hilgard 1980; Zajonc, 1980). However, as pI
by some researchers (e.g., Tomkins, 1981), affective states have 1::
discovered as a research topic in the 1980s and the interplay of afl
cognition became a central area of research in social cognition. This I
resulted in the integration of affective processes in models of info
processing (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1992; Sch
Clore, in press, for reviews) and focused on the impact of moods on t1
of information stored in memory ·(e.g., Bower, 1991~ , the use of mOl
basis of judgment (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and the impact of m
the style of information-processing (e.g., Isen, 1987; Fiedler, 1991; S
1990).
More recently, researchers have drawn on these lines of theoriz
have expanded the analysis of the role of affective states in stereoty
focusing attention on the role of incidental rather than integral aff(
present article reviews this research, focusing on how incidental (
states may facilitate or inhibit reliance on stereotypic knowledge stru(
social judgment. Reflecting the nature of current research, our revi
phasizes the role of global happy and sad moods, rather than the
specific, and more intense, emotions. Moreover, we concentrate
moods influence cognitive processes involved in stereotyping and do
dress how stereotyping, in turn, may influence affective states. In eSSf
ask if being in a happy or sad mood makes individuals differentially I
rely on stereo typic knowledge structures, and if so, what are the p:
that may mediate such an effect?
The focus of the present chapter is on the interplay of moods, steI
and individuating information in social judgment. Following a short n
dual-processing models that conceptualize the role of categori,
66
individuating information in the judgment process, we address different assumptions bearing on how moods may influence information-processing and
derive competing predictions for the impact of categorical and individuating
information in social judgment. Subsequently, we review the available evidence in light of these hypotheses. This review will indicate that being in a
happy mood increases reliance on stereo typic knowledge structures, whereas
being in a sad mood increases reliance on individuating information at the
expense of stereotypic knowledge structures. Unless the individuating information is blatantly inconsistent with the implications of the stereotype, these
processes result in increased stereotyping under incidental happy moods and
decreased stereotyping under incidental sad moods, in contrast to what previous theorizing on the role of integral affect would suggest. Following this
review, we offer some general conclusions and outline issues for future
research.
MOODS, STEREOTYPES AND EVALUATIVE
JUDGMENTS
The Impact of Categorical and Individuating Information in Person
Perception
Stereotypes are often referred to as the cognitive component of prejudice and
discrimination and are assumed to consist of a structured set of beliefs about
the attributes shared by members of a particular group (e.g., Hamilton, 1979;
Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Lippmann, 1922). Thus, a stereotype may be considered a group schema, i.e., a general knowledge structure about a group.
Independent of whether these knowledge structures are accurate or not, they
often have a strong impact on how individuals form judgments (e.g.
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985), on how they seek (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Snyder &
Swann, 1978) and interpret (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983; Sagar & Schofield,
1980) information, on attribution processes (e.g., Macrae & Shepherd, 1989),
and on how they react towards a member of the group (e.g., Gaertner &
Dovido, 1977; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; for an overview see
Hamilton & Sherman, 1994).
Of course, the degree to which evaluative judgments are influenced by
stereotypes may vary across situations. To capture these differences, recent
models of person perception distinguish between two different processing
strategies involved in impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg,
1990). On the one hand, judgments may be primarily based on the implications of a target person's category membership. In this case, judgments reflect
the perceiver's general knowledge about the category to which the target is
assigned, i.e. the implications of the stereotype. On the other hand, judgments
may be primarily based on the available individuating information abc
specific target. In this case, the impact of category information is dimini:
One of the key assumptions holds that judgments based on category men
ship information require less processing capacity and/or motivation than
ments' based on individuating information (see Fiske & Neuberg, .
Kruglanski, 1989).
For the present purpose, it is important to note that the impact of a st.
type may be mediated by different processes. On the one hand, indivi.
may primarily rely on general knowledge structures pertaining to the tal
category membership at the expense of individuating information, essen
using the category membership information as a peripheral cue that simj:
the judgmental task. If so, specific individuating information about the t
should have little impact. Moreover, any inconsistencies between the
viduating information and the implications of the target's category men
ship are likely to go unnoticed.
On the other hand, individuals may rely on general knowledge structm
encoding the specific individuating information, thus relating both soure
information to one another, similar to event-schemas supporting the enc(
of social situations (e.g. Abelson, 1981; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 197
so, individuating information that is consistent with the implications 0
target's category membership can be processed rather parsimoniously.
mechanism, however, does not necessarily imply less processing in all !
. tions. In particular, inconsistent information will require additional proce
attention (for overviews see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989). C
that this additional processing attention is provided, inconsistent inform
is likely to receive particular weight in forming an impression (Ma
Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991; for meta-analyses 0
role of inconsistent information, see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stang
McMillan, 1992). The specific role of inconsistent information will be.
particularly important in the following sections and will be addressed:
extensively below.
Mood and Different Styles of Information Processing
Research into the interplay of affect and cognition documents that n
differences in affective states may have a pronounced impact on cogr
processes (for overviews, see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Fiedler,
Forgas, 1992; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwa
Clore, in press). The empirical evidence suggests that the processing of
viduals in elated moods can be characterized as more heuristic, and a!
systematic and detail-oriented than the processing of individuals in ne
moods. In contrast, individuals in mildly depressed moods seem particl
likely to engage in detail-oriented, analytic processing of new informatic
68
These conclusions have been most consistently supported in research on
mood and persuasion (e.g., Bless et at., 1990; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992;
Bohner et at., 1993; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987; see
Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991, for a review). Specifically, individuals in an
elated mood have been found to be more influenced by the presence of
peripheral cues associated with the message and less influenced by the quality
of the presented arguments than individuals in a mildly depressed mood, with
individuals in a neutral mood falling in between. Similarly, in the domain of
person perception, individuals in an elated mood have been found to be less
influenced by detailed person descriptions, and to be more likely to show halo
effects, than individuals in a depressed mood (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992, for a
review). While there is consensus about the general conclusion that individuals' affective states influence their style of information-processing, different
assumptions have been offered regarding the mediating processes, as reviewed below.
Mood and Processing Capacity
One assumption holds that being in a good mood limits processing capacity.
This assumption rests on the notion that more positive than negative material
is stored in memory and that positive material is more interconnected. Indirect evidence for this "Pollyanna Principle" results from the observation that
positive material is more easily recalled than negative material (Boucher &
Osgood, 1969; Matlin & Stang, 1979). If being in a positive mood increases the
accessibility of pos~tively valenced material, while being in a negative mood
increases the accessibility of negatively valenced material (Bower, 1981; Isen,
1984), more material will be potentially activated when individuals are in a
positive affective state. Accordingly, the activation of a large amount of interconnected material may decrease processing capacity for the task at hand
(e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989).
Mackie and Worth (1989) report empirical evidence for the assumption of
reduced capacity under happy mood in the persuasion domain. In general,
attitudes of subjects in a happy mood failed to reflect the quality of a persuasive message, while attitudes of subjects in a neutral mood showed differential
effects after exposure to strong or to weak arguments. Happy subjects did,
however, differentiate between strong and weak arguments when they were
encouraged to take as much time as they wanted for reading the message.
Mackie and Worth concluded that the extra processing time provided to
subjects eliminated the capacity deficits of happy subjects, resulting in the
observed differential impact of strong and weak arguments (for an alternative
explanation of these results see Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
If being in a happy mood decreases processing capacity, we may expect that
happy individuals are more likely to rely on stereotypes, which generally serve
as energy saving devices in social judgment (Bodenhausen, 1990; Gilb
Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Moreover, the pr,
ing con~traints presumably experienced by happy individuals should r
the likelihood that happy individuals elaborate on detailed individuati
formation about a specific target.
It has also been argued that negative affective states reduce proc.
capacity because they activate (negative) material that is irrelevant fe
task at hand (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Supporting empirical evie
however, has primarily been obtained in studies that assessed memo:
relatively content-free materials. Studies that used more meaningful
materials, on the other hand, did not obtain supportive evidence (f
overview see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994).
Mood and Processing Motivation
An alternative approach suggests that the impact of moods on proc(
style reflects the informative function of affective states (Schwarz,
Schwarz & Bless, 1991). According to this approach, being in a sad I
signals that the environment poses a problem, whereas being in a happy I
signals that the environment is benign. As a result, individuals in a sad :
are more motivated to engage in detail-oriented systematic proc(
strategies, which are typically adaptive in handling problematic situatio.
contrast, individuals in a good mood may see little reason to spontane
engage in effortful processing strategies, unless this is called for by other
(see Schwarz, 1990, for a more detailed discussion).
Evidence consistent with this assumption has been reported in a vari.
domains (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, in pre~
a review). In the persuasion domain, for example, sad subjects are
persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas happy subjeci
equally persuaded by both, as noted above. If this difference is due t.
ferences in processing motivation, it should be reduced by manipulation
increase the processing motivation of happy subjects. Supporting this ass
tion, Bless et at. (1990) observed that happy subjects differentiated bet
strong and weak arguments when they were instructed to pay attenti,
argument quality.
Further supporting the informational functions approach to mood ane
cessing style, Sinclair, Mark, and Clore (1994) observed that the imp,
happy and sad moods on the processing of persuasive communication:
eliminated when the informational implications of the mood were callee
question. Relying on good vs. bad weather as a mood induction, Sin
Mark, and Clore (1994) replicated that sad but not happy subjects wer.
ferentially affected by strong vs. weak arguments. However, when the j
mational value of subjects' mood was discredited by drawing sub
70
attention to the weather as a potential cause for their momentary feelings (see
also Schwarz & Clore, 1983), mood no longer played a role and a main effect
of message quality emerged.
In combination these findings cast doubt on a cognitive capacity account of
mood effects on ~rocessing style. If being in a happy mood cluttered subjects'
minds with irrelevant thoughts that reduce processing capacity, instructing
subjects to pay attention to argument quality or inducing them to attribute
their mood to the weather should not eliminate the impact of the presuma.bly
automatic process of mood-congruent recall. Hence, these findings point to
.'
the impact of moods on processing motivation.
Given that a decreased processing motivation usually results m an mcreased impact of stereotypes (for examples, see Kruglanski, 1989), one would
expect a stronger impact of stereotypes on the judgm~nts for~ed. by happy
rather than sad individuals. Moreover, reduced processmg motivatIOn should
also decrease the likelihood that happy individuals elaborate on the individuating information, unless this is required by other goals.
A Mood-and-general-knowledge Assumption
Finally, Bless (1994; see also Bless et al., in press) proposed an alternative r.n 0del
that accounts for the heuristic processing observed under happy moods without
assuming that different moods result in different amounts of processing. Extending the mood-as-information approach (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bl~ss,
1991), this model again assumes that positive affective state~ inform the subJe~t
about a benign situation, whereas negative affective states Signal a problematic
situation. When the current situation is perceived as unproblematic and safe, as
signalled by being in a positive affective state, indi~iduals may not, .or not o~ly,
feel less motivated to engage in effortful processmg. Rather, the Information
provided by happy moods may imply that it is possible to rely on o~e's gen~ral
knowledge structures, which usually serve one well. In contrast, the mformatlOn
provided by sad moods may imply that reliance on general knowledge .structures is risky, reflecting that problematic situations usually require a~te~tlOn to
their specific characteristics. If so, happy individuals may feel more mclmed to
rely on their general knowledge structures than sad individuals.
This mood-and-general-knowledge assumption is compatible with much of
the available evidence. If we consider heuristic processing strategies as involving the application of general knowledge structures to specific information
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980), we may view heuristics as a variant of a larger set of
general knowledge representations including schemata, scripts, or stereotypes. From such a perspective, the increased reliance on heuristics under
happy moods (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Isen, 1987) would fit
nicely with the assumption that happy individuals are more likely to rely on
general knowledge structures than sad individuals. Similarly, in the
persuasion domain, happy subjects are more likely than sad subjects to rely
a previously activated global representation of a persuasive message (Bh
Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992).
While the available evidence clearly indicates a more pronounced impaci
heuristics and other general knowledge structures under happy moods, .
specific mediating mechanism is open to debate. As noted above, the (
served effects are usually attributed to motivational or capacity deficits, wh
presumably limit the amount of processing. The actual amount of processi:
however, has rarely been directly assessed. Rather, it has typically been
ferred that given an increased impact of general knowledge structures, thl
must be some deficit in either processing capacity or processing motivation.
contrast, the general knowledge structure approach does not assume that 1
impact of happy moods is mediated by reduced processing capacity
motivation.
Directly addressing this assumption in a dual-task paradigm, Bless et at.
press) had subjects work on a secondary task while they were exposed
information to which a previously activated script was applicable. As I
pected, happy subjects' encoding of the presented information showed
stronger impact of the activated script than sad subjects' encoding. When
this finding, by itself, may reflect any of the processes discussed above, t
data bearing on the secondary task are diagnostic of the underlying process.
happy subjects are more likely to rely on general knowledge structures, ~
coding information to which an accessible script is applicable should requ:
fewer attentional resources, thus allowing happy subjects to perform better
the secondary task. If being in a happy mood generally decreases processi
motivation or processing capacity, however, happy subjects should perf01
poorly at the secondary task. Consistent with the former prediction, hap
subjects outperformed sad subjects on the secondary task, rendering it u
likely that they suffered from a general deficit in processing motivation
capacity. This interpretation is further supported by the finding that subjec
mood did not affect their performance on the "secondary" task if this task w
presented as the only task.
Bless and Fiedler (1995) reported converging evidence in another domai
Specific judgments about a target person were more strongly influenced .
preceding general trait judgments about the target when subjects were in
happy rather than a neutral or a sad mood. Analyses of response latenci
strongly indicated that the increased impact of global trait judgments I
specific judgments observed under happy mood was not mediated by a I
duced amount of processing but rather by happy subjects' reliance on genel
knowledge structures.
As stereotypes are another form of general knowledge structures, tl
mood-and-general-knowledge assumption again predicts a stronger impact
stereotypes when individuals are in a happy rather than a sad mood. This is,
72
course, the same general prediction that has been derived from the reduced
capacity or reduced motivation assumptions. These approaches differ,
however, in their predictions pertaining to the interplay of stereo typic and
individuating information. If happy individuals are less likely to engage in
extensive processing (either due to limited capacity or limited motivation),
individuating information should receive little attention and the judgment
should primarily be based on the implications of the stereotype. Hence, these
approaches trace the increased impact of stereotypes under happy moods to
the neglect of individuating information. In contrast, no processing constraints are postulated by the mood-and-general-knowledge hypothesis, which
assumes that happy individuals process individuating information to the same
extent as sad individuals. Reflecting their increased reliance on general
knowledge structures, however, happy individuals are expected to encode the
individuating information in terms of the stereotype. This should result in
more stereotypic judgments under good mood, provided that the individuating information is not inconsistent with the stereotype. If the individuating
information is inconsistent with the stereotype, no stereo typic judgment
should be obtained. In fact, the judgment may be contrasted to the stereotype
under this condition. Hence, the mood-and-general-knowledge assumption
traces the increased impact of stereotypes under happy moods to stereotypic
encodings of the individuating information rather than to a neglect of individuating information. These different mechanisms can be distinguished by
testing the impact of moods under conditions where the individuating information is either consistent or inconsistent with the implications of the stereotype, as we shall discuss in more detail below.
Empirical Evidence
The different conceptualizations of the impact of moods on processing strategies converge on the prediction that stereotypes should have a stronger
impact on judgments formed by individuals in a happy rather than sad mood,
at least under conditions where the individuating information is not clearly
inconsistent with the stereotype. Several studies support this general prediction. For example, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and SUsser (1994) presented subjects in different mood states with descriptions of an alleged student
misconduct and asked subjects to determine the target's guilt. Subjects in a
happy mood rated the offender as more guilty when he was identified as a
member of a group that is stereo typically associated with the described offense than when this was not the case. This impact of the stereotype, however,
was not observed for subjects in a neutral mood. Similarly, Bodenhausen,
Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) observed that sad subjects were less affected by
an applicable stereotype than neutral mood subjects. Moreover, Edwards and
Weary (1993) reported converging evidence based on naturally depressed
m?o~s. Non-~epressed subjects were more likely to rely on category mem!;
ship mformatton than depressed subjeCts, who seemed to engage in a ffio
eff~rtful an~lysis of the individuating information provided to them. Thus,
available eVidence suggests that stereotypes have more impact on individuah
a happ~ rather than a sad or neutral mood. This conclusion is compatible \\
the notIOns that happy mood reduces processing capacity (Mackie & WOl
1989), that h~ppy mood reduces processing motivation (Schwarz, 1990), or t
happ~ mo~d mcreases r~liance on general knowledge structures (Bless, 199,
U~~g different mampulations, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and SUsser (19'
expl.lcltly c~ntr~sted the re~uced capacity hypothesis and the reduced p
cessmg mottvatlOn hypothesIs. To reduce the likelihood that the mood man
ulation taxes subjects' cognitive capacity, they selected mood manipulati<
that were unlikely to drain cognitive resources (smells facial feedback man
ulations) . ~ince thes 7 non-taxing mood inductions r~plicated the previou
observed mcreased Impact of stereotypes for happy subjects, the auth,
concluded that the cognitive capacity approach cannot account for their fi!
ings. Moreover, increasing subjects' processing motivation with an accou
ability manipulation (TetJock, 1983) eliminated the differential impact
stereotyp.es on hap~y vs. neutral mood subjects. Again this finding sugge
that the mcreased Impact of stereotypes under happy moods is not due
~educed proce.ssin.g capacity. At least, any processing constraints that may
md~ced by ?emg m a happy mood cannot be very severe, given that they;
eaSily overndden by accountability manipulations (Bodenhausen, Kramer.
SUsser, 1994) or processing instructions (as observed in the persuasion;
main, Bless et al., 1990).
Wher7as t.hi~ evidenc7 does not support the reduced processing capac
assumption, It IS compatible with the reduced motivation as well as with 1
mood-and-general-knowledge assumption. As mentioned above however 1
latter t-:v0 mechanisms differ with respect to their predictions 'regardin~ 1
processmg of stereotype consistent and inconsistent individuating informati<
The Impact of Inconsistent Information
If th~ increa~ed imp~ct o~ stereotypes on judgments formed by happy indiv
ual~ IS mediated p~lm~nly by ~appy individuals using the stereotype a~
penpheral cue, speCific mformatton about the target is less likely to be elat
rated. As a consequence, judgments should be independent of whetl
stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent information is provided. In 1
case ~f inc~nsistent inf~rmation, happy individuals may either not detect
may SlIll~ly Ignore ~he discrepancy due to their reduced processing motivati<
If th~ mcreased Impact of stereotypes on happy individuals is mediated
happ.y mdivi~uals' reliance on general knowledge structures in processi
new mformatton, however, specific individuating information is unlikely to
74
unnoticed. In this case, their encoding of new individuating information
should be guided by the activated stereotype. As long as the individuating
information is consistent with the implications of the stereotype, the two
sources of information have the same implications for evaluative judgments.
As a consequence, the "peripheral cue" and the "guided encoding" mechanisms cannot be distinguished on the basis of individuals' judgments if the
individuating information is consistent with the stereotype, as was the case in
all previously reported studies. In contrast, individuating information that is
inconsistent with the implications of the stereotype should strongly affect the
obtained judgments. This requires, however, that the inconsistency is noticed
in the first place. According to the mood-and-general-knowledge assumption,
this should be more likely when individuals are in a happy mood, and hence
more likely to rely on stereotypes, than when they are in a sad mood, and
hence unlikely to draw on the stereotype to begin with. Accordingly, the
mood-and-general-knowledge assumption predicts that stereotypeinconsistent information receives more weight in judgment formation under
happy than under sad moods. Note, however, that dealing with stereotypeinconsistent information requires considerable cognitive resources (e.g. Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 1991; see also Fiske &
Taylor, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Thus, observing a more pronounced impact
of stereotype-inconsistent information under happy rather than sad mood
conditions would argue against the assumption that being in a happy mood
reduces processing capacity or processing motivation.
To summarize, the assumption of reduced processing under happy mood
(either due to a lack of capacity or a lack of motivation) predicts a more
pronounced impact of stereotypes when individuals are in a happy rather than
in a sad mood. Happy individuals are assumed to rely on the target's category
membership as a peripheral cue and to neglect individuating information, thus
rendering it irrelevant if the individuating information is consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype. As a result, reduced processing approaches predict
a main effect of mood on stereotyping. In contrast, the mood-and-generalknowledge assumption predicts increased stereotyping under happy mood
only for conditions under which the individuating information is consistent
with the stereotype. According to this assumption, happy individuals are more
likely to rely on general knowledge structures and will therefore encode the
individuating information in terms of stereo typic concepts. This results in
stereotypic judgments when the individuating information is consistent with
the stereotype, but not when it is inconsistent. Sad individuals, on the other
hand, are expected to process individuating information without drawing on
stereotypic knowledge structures, rendering the consistency of the individuating information and the stereotype irrelevant. Accordingly, this approach
predicts an interaction effect of mood and the stereotype consistency of the
individuating information.
Investigating the Relative Impact of Categorical and Individuating
Information
!n ~ s.eries o.f st~dies, Bless, Wieland, and Schwarz (in press) investigated ·
~ndlVlduals III different mood states are influenced by category member
I~for~ation, by individuating information, and, most importantly, by the)
tlOnshlp of the two. In these studies, subjects were provided with categOi
and individuating information of different valence about a target person. ,
result of this orthogonal manipulation, the implications of the stereotype v
either consistent or obviously inconsistent with the implications of the tar{
specific behaviors.
As the stimuli materials were basically identical in all studies repo
below, we first describe these materials. Subjects were told that they woul.
listening to a tape-recorded description of a target person and would I
answer some questions about it. The tape-recorded description provided
categorical as well as the individuating information, which both resulted f
extensive pretesting, and which both pertained to the same traits descri
below. In the positive category condition the target was presented as worl
full-time as a Greenpeace representative, while in the negative category co
tion the target was described as a manager of BASF, a large chemical c
pany. In all descriptions the category label was mentioned five times, twic
the beginning, once in the middle, and twice at the end. In addition, subj
were presented with specific behaviors about the target that were combine
form a person description. In the positive individuating information condi
subjects were presented with six positive and two negative behaviors, whil
the negative individuating information condition subjects were presented,
six negativ~ and two positive behaviors. Information that had been prete:
as unambIguously neutral was added in order to provide cohe:
descriptions.
After listening to the tape-recording, which took about 3 minutes, subj
were asked to evaluate the target along the four dimensions that had emer
fr?m the pretest results. Subjects were asked to evaluate the target 's car,
~md~?ness, his consumer orientation, his ecological responsibility, and
likabIlIty on four nine-point rating scales. According to pretest data, ecol
ca.l responsibility and likability constituted positive attributes, whereas car,
mmdedness and consumer orientation constituted negative attributes for
subjects. Treating the four judgments as a within-subjects factor did not re
in any significant interactions of this factor with the experimental ma:
ulations, and a summary score was computed by substracting the rating!
the two negative dimensions from the ratings on the two positive dimensi
and divid!ng the difference by four. This summary score (Cronbach's alph.
0.74 or hIgher) could range from -4, indicating negative evaluations to
indicating positive evaluations.
'
76
HERBERT BLESS, N ORBERT SCHWA RZ A ND MA RKUS KEMMELMEIER
Experiment 1: The Relation of Categorical and Individuating Information
In Experiment 1, subjects in different affective states were exposed to the four
different target descriptions outlined above. To induce a happy or sad mood,
subjects were asked to report either a positive or negative li~e-event, p~rpor
tedly to construct a Life-Event Inventory. Neutral mood subjects descnbed a
normal day in their life. An assessment of subjects' mood revealed a reliable
effect of these manipulations. Subjects then listened to the tape-recorded descriptions of the target person and evaluated the target al~ng. the fo~ dime~sions.
The pattern of results shown in Figure 3.1 reflects a signIficant mteractlOn of
mood, valence of category, and valence of individuating information, sugges~
ing that subjects in different mood states made differential use of the ~ateg.on
cal and the individuating information. First, it can be seen that subjects m a
sad mood were unaffected by the valence of the category, replicating the
findings reported by Bodenhausen, Sheppar?, a~d ~amer (199~). ~~reov.er,
sad subjects' judgments only reflected the ImplicatIOns of the mdlVlduatmg
information, consistent with previous findings reported by Edwards and
Weary (1993): the target was evaluated significantly more positively when the
majority of the behaviors was positive rather than negative.
Like sad subjects, neutral mood subjects were significantly influenced by the
individuating information. In addition, however, they were also influenced by
the category label and evaluated a member of a positively evaluated category
more positively than a member of a negatively evaluated category. The absence of an interaction between the two sources of information suggests that
neutral mood subjects used them additively in forming a judgment.
For happy mood subjects, no main effect of the categorical information was
obtained, although a significant interaction of individuating and categorical
information clearly indicates an impact of the category label. However, the
specific influence of the category label depended on the nature of the individuating information. If provided with positive individuating information, happy
subjects rated the target more favorably when it was a member of the positively
rather than the negatively evaluated category. This positive impact of being a
member of a positively rather than a negatively evaluated category replicates the
findings obtained by Bodenhausen and colleagues (Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
SUsser, 1994). This effect reversed, however, when negative individuating information was provided. In this case, the target was rated less favorably when
described as a member of a positive category performing negative behaviors
rather than as a member of a negative category performing these behaviors.
In summary, the results obtained under conditions where the implications
of the individuating information were consistent with the implications of the
category membership information replicated previous findings by indicating a
stronger impact of stereotypes on judgments formed by individuals in a happy
than in a sad mood (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & SUsser, 1994; Bodenhausen,
2
Sad
mood
\
1
c:
0
ii::l
Happy
mood
Neutral
mood
0
'jij
Indlvldu
Informa'
!'
>
OJ
a;
+poall
···nega
e'·1
{!
'
..
•
·2
ri
------'
·3
po.lliv. negallv.
pOIIII'll nagatlve
poaltlv. nagatlv.
Category Information
Figure 3.1 Target evaluation as a function of mood, valence of category informa
and valence of individuating information (from Bless, Wieland, & Schwarz, in p
Experiment 1)
Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Edwards & Weary, 1993). Findings of this 1
have typically been attributed to a neglect of individuating information UI
happy mood conditions, in line with reduced processing assumptions. Howe
the results obtained under conditions where the implications of the individ
ing information were inconsistent with the implications of the stereotype
this conclusion into question. Under these conditions, happy individuals ev
ated the target most negatively when the target was described as a member
positive group engaging in negative behaviors. If happy subjects had sin
relied on the stereotype as a peripheral cue, as predicted by reduced proces
assumptions, a member of a positively evaluated group should have been ev
ated more favorably than a member of a negatively evaluated group, indel
dent of the individuating information. In contrast, the obtained interac
effect indicates that happy subjects processed the individuating information
elaborated on the relationship between both sources of information. 1
however, implies that happy subjects had sufficient cognitive resources
were motivated to bring them to bear on the task, as implied by the mood-,
78
general-knowledge assumption. Thus, the pattern of findings obtained under
happy mood conditions renders it very unlikely that being in a happy mood
reduced subjects' processing capacity or motivation.
In general, the observed interaction pattern is compatible with the assumption that the category information guided the encoding of the individuating
information. However, the interaction was asymmetrical, as shown in Figure
3.1. Whereas negative behaviors shown by a member of a positive category
resulted in a particularly negative evaluation, positive behaviors shown by a
member of a negative category did not result in a particularly positive evaluation. Hence, the increase in the impact of inconsistent information predicted
by the " guided encoding" assumption was only observed under positive category membership conditions. Why, however, was this pattern not observed
when the implications of a negative behavior contradicted the implications of
positively evaluated category? This issue was addressed in a subsequent study.
8
Individuating Information
• positive
III negative
6
2
Experiment 2: The Diagnosticity of Negative and Positive Information
If the increased impact of inconsistent information under happy mood results
from its discrepancy to the categorical information, then the asymmetry could
be due to a differential degree of inconsistency in the stimuli materials. In
fact, previous research demonstrated that negative behaviors are generally
considered more diagnostic for morality related judgments than positive behaviors (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; see also
Rothbart & Park, 1986). Although bad persons may occasionally do good
things, doing one bad thing implies one isn't really a good person. Thus,
environmentally irresponsible behaviors may be perceived as being more
discrepant with the category label "Greenpeace activist" than are environmentally responsible behaviors with the category label "manager of a chemical company". This differential degree of inconsistency may underlie the
asymmetric nature of the interaction of category membership and individuating information observed under the happy mood conditions of Experiment 1.
The plausibility of this explanation was explored by presenting subjects in a
neutral mood with the same target descriptions as in Experiment 1. Instead of
forming evaluating judgments, however, subjects rated the discrepancy between the implications of the category label and the described behaviors.
The results presented in Figure 3.2 clearly supported the assumption that the
combination of a positive category with negative behaviors reflected a higher
degree discrepancy than the reversed combination. Presumably, this pattern is
not specific to the present materials, but reflects that negative behaviors are
generally judged as more diagnostic for morality-related judgments than positive behaviors (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
These findings have direct implications for the interpretation of Experiment 1. Specifically, we suggested that as a result of happy subjects processing
o
. negative
positive
Figure 3.2 Perceived discrepancy as a function of valence of category informa
and valence of individuating information (from Bless, Wieland, & Schwarz, in pI
Experiment 2)
the behavioral information in terms of their general knowledge about
target's category, the obviously inconsistent information received additic
attention and strongly affected subjects' judgments. If, however, only
negative behaviors are perceived as inconsistent with the positive categ(
the impact of inconsistent behavioral information should be restricted to .
condition-as was the case in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3: The Functional Equivalence of Explicit Instructions and
Different Mood States
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that happy subjects' encoding of
individuating information was guided by their knowledge about the targ
category membership. As this impact was not observed in the form of a rr
effect of the category information, the findings render it unlikely that hal
subjects merely used the category information as a peripheral cue. Rather,
results that happy subjects related the specific behavioral information to
implications of the target's category membership. If so, explicitly instruct
neutral mood subjects to process the behavioral information in relation to
80
target's category membership should result in a similar pattern as inducing
happy mood. Similarly, the reported evidence suggests that sad subjects did not
rely on the category information but focused solely on the behavioral information. If so, explicitly instructing neutral mood subjects to focus on the behavioral information should result in a similar pattern as inducing a sad mood.
To test these considerations, subjects in a third experiment were provided
with the four target descriptions above and were either instructed to focus
" especially on the relation between the target's profession and the individual
behaviors" (an instruction supposed to elicit the strategy presumably observed under happy mood conditions) or "to focus especially on the individual behaviors" (an instruction supposed to elicit the strategy presumably
observed under sad mood conditions).
These manipulations resulted in a significant interaction of instruction, valence of category, and vaJence of individuating information, as shown in Figure
3.3. A comparison of Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3 illustrates the similarity of the
patterns obtained in both experiments. Specifically, subjects who were instructed to focus on the individuating information reported a pattern of judgments similar to the one obtained for sad subjects in Experiment 1. These
subjects rated the target more favorably if positive rather than negative behaviors were presented. In contrast, subjects who were instructed to focus on
the relation between the individuating and the categorical information reported a pattern of judgments similar to the one obtained for happy subjects
in Experiment 1, as indicated by the same significant simple interaction of
category and individuating information. When provided with positive individuating information, these subjects rated the target more favorably when it
was a member of a positively rather than a negatively evaluated category. As
in Experiment 1, the impact of positive category membership information was
again eliminated, however, when negative individuating information was provided and the target was rated more unfavourably when described as a member of a positively rather than a negatively evaluated category.
In combination, these results and the findings of Experiment 2 suggest that
happy individuals are more likely to relate individuating information to relevant category information than are sad individuals. Of course a similar effect
pattern does not necessarily imply the same underlying mechanism. However,
the similarity of the results suggests a functional equivalence of (a) explicitly
instructing subjects to relate individuating behaviors to the category label and
being in a happy mood, and (b) explicitly instructing subjects to focus on the
individuating information and being in a sad mood.
Experiment 4: The Timing of the Category Information
The findings reviewed so far suggest that happy individuals are more strongly
influenced by category membership information than sad individuals. On a
2 -
Focus on
relation
Focus on
individuating
information
1
~"
0;-------------------------------------
..
"
>
.
ftj
..
Individuating Ir
+ positive
-• . negative
.' .
-2
-3~-----------------------------positive
negatlvB
positive
negative
Figure 3.3 Target evaluation as a function of instructional set, valence of cate
information, and valence of individuating information (from Bless, Wielanc
Schwarz, in press; Experiment 3)
general level this conclusion converges with previous research
Bodenhausen and colleagues (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer & Susser, 1994)
emphasized above, however, the present findings do not reflect a main el
of mood but an interaction effect of mood and the stereotype consistenc
the individuating information. This interaction could not be detected in vious research because the stimulus materials did only include stereoi
consistent or stereotype irrelevant information. While the obtained inte
tion is incompatible with a reduced processing assumption, it follows dire
from the mood-and-general-knowledge hypothesis.
In addition to their differential ability to account for the observed inte
tion, the competing theoretical assumptions differ in their predictions reg;
ing the processing stage at which category membership information may e:
its influence. The mood-and-general-knowledge hypothesis holds that ha
subjects relate the individuating information to the category member:
information. This obviously requires that the target's category membershi
82
known when subjects are exposed to the behavioral description. Acquiring
the category membership information after the behavioral information is encoded should therefore greatly reduce the impact of category information.
Thus, the pattern obtained for happy subjects in Experiment 1 should be
restricted to conditions under which subjects know the target's category membership when they are exposed to the behavioral description. In contrast, the
reduced processing assumption holds that subjects use the category membership information as a peripheral cue to simplify th.e j~dgment task. I~ s~,
category membership information may also exert Its mftuence when It IS
presented after the individuating information.
To test these competing predictions, the person descriptions were modified
so that the category membership information either preceded or followed the
individuating information. Specifically, the target's category membership was
mentioned three times, either at the beginning or at the end of the descriptions (in the materials used in the preceding experiments the category membership information was presented five times, twice in the beginning, once in
the middle and twice at the end). Prior to the presentation of the descriptions,
happy or sad mood was again successfully induced by having subjects report
either a positive or negative life-event.
As expected, the results obtained in Experiment 1 replicated when the
category label preceded the individuating information, but not when it followed the individuating information. When the category label was presented
at the beginning of the description, the pattern of results was very similar to
Experiment 1, resulting in the same significant three-way interaction, as
shown in Figure 3.4. Under these conditions, sad subjects were again unaffected by the category membership information and evaluated the target
more positively when positive rather than negative behaviors were presented.
For happy subjects a significant interaction of individuating and category
membership information in form of the already known pattern was obtained.
Again, judgments were congruent with the implications of the category when
the individuating information was positive. As in Experiment 1, negative
individuating information eliminated this pattern, due to its particularly
strong impact when it was inconsistent with the implications of category membership. Thus, the findings of Experiment 1 were replicated when the category
membership information preceded the individuating information.
However, a completely different pattern emerged when the category information was presented after the individuating information. In this case, subjects evaluated the target more positively when positive rather than negative
behaviors were presented, and when positive rather than negative category
information was provided. However, there were no indications that subjects
in different mood states made differential use of the category membership or
of the individuating information (all interactions involving mood were nonsignificant).
Sad mood
Happy mood
§ O·· t-----------------------__________~-;;;
Indlvlduatln!
Information
I positive
"
~
• negative
lii
e> .1 -
{!
·2
·3 -· ~--------
positive
___________________
negative
positive
negative
Figure 3:4 Target evaluatio~ as. ~ fun~tion of instructional set, valence of categ
informatIOn, and. va.lence of Indtvtduatlng when the category information was I
sented at the beginning (from Bless, Wieland, & Schwarz, in press; Experiment 4)
The reliability of the pattern obtained in Experiment 1 under conditi<
where the catego:y information preceded the individuating information, c
t~e ab~en~e of thIS pattern when the category information followed the in
~Iduatmg mformati?n, supports the assumption that happy subjects are m.
lIkely to rely on theIr general knowledge structures than sad subjects. Presu
abl~, happy subjects' encoding of the individuating information was guided
theIr .knowled~e about the category-which was only possible when the ca
gory mformatIOn preceded the behavioral information.
WHAT MEDIATES THE IMPACT OF CATEGORICAL
INFORMATION ON HAPPY INDIVIDUALS?
In combi~ation, th~ reported studies support previous findings suggesting tJ
category mformatIOn has a stronger impact on judgment formation wh
individuals are in a happy rather than a sad mood (e.g., Bodenhaus.
Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; EdwaJ
84
& Weary, 1993). By manipulating the valence of the individuating informa-
tion the present research provides a better understanding of (a) how the
impact of the category information affects judgments, and of (b) what causes
happy individuals to rely on category membership information.
Most obviously, the specific nature of the impact of the category information, in particular the increased impact of inconsi~tent negative in~ivi~~ating
information, is not consistent with the assumptIOn that happy mdlVlduals
resort to a target's category membership as a peripheral cue that allows them
to form a judgment without paying much attention to the individuating information. If happy subjects simply used the target's category membership as a
peripheral cue, a main effect of the category membership information should
have been obtained under happy mood conditions (Experiments 1 and 4);
moreover, such a main effect should also have been obtained when the category membership information was introduced after the individuating. infor~a
tion (Experiment 4)-neither of which was the case. In fact, subjects m a
happy mood were most likely to use category membership and in?ivid~ating
information in the present studies, and elaborated on the relatIOnshIp between the two. This elaboration, however, requires a considerable amount of
processing capacity and motivation (e.g. Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993;
Stangor & Duan, 1991; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991). This additional processing should not have been observed if being in a happy mood reduced
processing capacity (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989) or processing motivation
(e.g., Schwarz, 1990).1 Accordingly, the present results render it unlikely that
the happy subjects were either unable or unwilling to process the individuating information provided to them.
Rather, the pattern of results is most consistently accounted for by the
mood-and-general-knowledge assumption, which does not imply any capacity
constraints. This perspective holds that happy individuals are more likely to
rely on general knowledge structures and to process specific information in
light of them. As a consequence, inconsistent information is more likely to be
noticed and elaborated on and results in a stronger impact on judgments. This
conclusion is further supported by the finding that explicitly instructing neutral mood subjects to relate individuating and categorical information to one
another resulted in a similar pattern as inducing a happy mood. Moreover, the
crucial pattern of results was only observed when the categorical information
I Onc may try to reconcilc the obtaincd findings with the assumption that being in a happy
mood decreases the likelihood of systematic processing, as other goals or relevant fcatures of the
situation may elicit additional processing (Schwarz, 1990). Thus, one would assume that the
inconsistencies instigated more cffortful processing of the detailed information. Note, however,
that only judgments of happy subjects showed an !nteraction of individ~ ating and categorical
information, while judgments of neutral mood subjects showed an additive Impact of the two
sources of information. This suggests that the inconsistency by itself was not sufficient for the
interaction effect observed under happy mood conditions.
preceded the individuating information, thus allowing subjects to process
behaviors in light of category membership information, but not when
categorical information followed the individuating information.
Finally, the mood-and-general-knowledge assumption can account
previous findings which seemed to support the notion that being in a ha
mood reduces processing motivation. As reviewed above, Bodenhausen
his colleagues (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994) observed a I
nounced impact of category membership information under happy but
under sad mood. They attributed this finding to reduced processing moi
tion under happy mood, after having ruled out an account in terms 01
duced processing capacity. However, their conclusion was based on stu
in which the target's category membership was either consistent with
implications of the target's behavior or irrelevant to these behaviors. Ur
these specific conditions, the mood-and-general-knowledge assump
leads to the same predictions and the respective conditions of the pre:
experiments replicated Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser (1994) findi
The resulting main effect pattern, however, was not observed when inca
stent individuating information was provided. Under this condition, ar
teraction of category and individuating information emerged, sugges
that happy subjects used the category information as a processing guide
the encoding of the individuating information and did not rely on the c
gory information as a peripheral cue at the expense of individuating in
mation. Thus, the independent manipulation of the evaluative implicat:
of individuating and categorical information allowed us to investigate I
happy subjects use category membership information in arriving (
judgment-and the observed use is inconsistent with the redw
processing-motivation assumption we favored in our own previous rese,
(e.g., Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
In sum, the reported findings provide substantial evidence for the m(
and-general-knowledge model introduced by Bless (1994; Bless et al.
press). Building on earlier theorizing (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 19
this model assumes that affective states inform the individual about the na
of current situation, with happy moods signalling a benign situation and
moods signalling a problematic situation. The information provided by ha
moods presumably implies that it is possible to rely on one's general knl
edge structures, which usually serve us well. In contrast, the informa
provided by sad moods presumably implies that reliance on general knl
edge structures is risky, given the nature of the situation, which may req
attention to specifics. If so, happy individuals may feel more confident to
on their general knowledge than sad individuals. As discussed above, sUi
processing style should have resulted in a main effect of category member:
information, without much impact of the more detailed individuating in
mation, which should have received little attention. In contrast, the me
86
and-general-knowledge structures assumption accounts for the observed
interaction effect of both sources of information under happy mood conditions. As emphasized above, this interaction indicates that happy subjects not
only paid attention to the individuating information, but processed it in terms
of the implications of their general knowledge about the target's categ~ry
membership-resulting in an increased impact of stereotypes and an mcreased impact of stereotype inconsistent information.
.
Importantly, in the domain of stereotyping, the assumed stereotype gUIded
encoding of individuating information can only be distinguished from the
sheer reliance on category membership as a peripheral cue when the implications of the individuating behavior contradict the implications of category
membership. In contrast, when the implications of the individuating information are consistent with, or unrelated to, the target's category membership,
stereotype-guided encoding and reliance on category membership as a
peripheral cue result in the same pattern of judgments.
Overriding Effects and the Impact of Specific Emotions
Whereas the mood-and-general-knowledge assumption generally implies that
positive affective states should increase, and negative affective states should
decrease, reliance on general knowledge structures, the effects elicited by the
valence of mood can be overriden by other factors. For example, increasing
individuals' processing motivation or increasing processing capacity will generally decrease reliance on general knowledge structures (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kruglanski, ·1989, for overviews). Depending on the relative
contributions of the affective state and the processing motivation and capacity, mood effects might not be observable. This has been demonstrated in
studies which, in addition to mood, manipulated subjects' processing motivation or processing capacity. As expected, happy subjects' reliance on heuristics and stereotypes decreased as processing motivation (Bless et ai., 1990;
Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Susser, 1994) or processing capacity (Mackie &
Worth, 1989) increased.
Similarly, an increased reliance on general knowledge structures can also
result from individuals' arousal levels being either very low (e.g.
Bodenhausen, 1990) or very high (Kim & Baron, 1988; Paulhus, Martin, &
Murphy, 1992; see also Broadbent, 1971). As affective states may differ with
respect to the associated level of arousal, the valence of the affective state
may not be the only determinant of the use of general knowledge structures.
If so, negative affective states associated with a high level of arousal may
increase the impact of general knowledge structures. Some evidence for this
assumption has been reported by Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer
(1994). Investigating the impact of different negative affective states, the
authors observed that sad subjects were less influenced by stereotypes than
neutral mood subjects. In contrast, however, inducing an angry m,
presumably associated with a higher level of arousal-elicited an incre
stereotyping. Similarly, the emotional state of anxiety has been fou
facilitate stereotypic judgments (Wilder, 1993).
CONCLUSIGNS
The available evidence on the relation between individuals' mood an
!mpact of stereotypes suggests that positive affective states may increa~
Impact of stereotypes, while negative affective states may decrease the il
of s~ereotyp~~ on evaluative judgments. Given that most people report be
a mildly pOSItIve mood most of the time (e.g., Diener et ai., 1985), this seE
spell trouble. Depending on the assumptions made about the underlyinl
cess, however, there may be a silver lining at the horizon. As the rev.
eviden.ce indicates, the pronounced impact of stereotypes under happy mmost likely due to happy individuals' tendency to process new informat
light of existing general knowledge structures. If so, happy individuals ShOi
more likely to apply a stereotype. As a result of drawing on the stere.
however, they should also be more likely to detect discrepancies between
~tereoty~e and new, stereotype-inconsistent information. As relating th,
mf~rmatIOn to the stereotype seems essential for changing the stereotyp
vanous models see Hewstone, 1989, 1994; Rothbart, 1981; Weber & en
1983), we may therefore speculate that being in a happy mood may fac
stereotype change. In contrast, sad individuals have been found to be less
to rely on stereotypes in forming a judgment. Rather, sad individuals
primarily on individuating information. Although this lack of stereotypir
der s~d mood may seem desirable in many ways, it has negative implica
Mos~ lffiportantly, it implies that sad individuals are unlikely to notice inc
tencies betwe~n individuating information and the stereotype they hold.
r.esult, they w.Ill n.ot experience a need to revise their stereotypes, rendeJ
hkel~ that ?emg m a sad mood inhibits stereotype change. These possit
proVIde an Important avenue for future research.
S~milarly, future ~esearch could also benefit from relating to the pI
findmgs to research mto the impact of moods on stereotype-related cog
pr.ocesses that are .not directly involved in forming evaluative judgmen
thIS respect, affectIve states have been found to influence the percepti
outgroup hom~geneity (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992), the phenomena
lusory. correlatIOns (Stroessner, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992), and, pe
most Importantly, the amount of ingroup favoritism (Forgas & Fiedl
press).
In .additio~, future r~search needs to extend current experiments b
dressmg the Impact of mtegral affect, that is, affect elicited by (or at
88
attributed to) the target (Bodenhausen, 1993). So far, research into mood and
stereotyping has focused on incidental affect, such as mood states induced in a
manner that is unrelated to the target. Whether this is an advantage or disadvantage depends on one's primary research goal. If one's primary goal is to
understand the role of affective states in social judgment, relying on incidental
affect inductions has the advantage that it allows researchers to isolate the
role of affective states. This is impossible to accomplish when affect is elicited
by the target itself, as this strategy would require comparisons between targets
that elicit different affect (in which case the targets are bound to differ on
many other dimensions) or comparisons between individuals who hold different stereotypes about the same target (in which case the individuals'
knowledge structures are bound to differ in many ways). On the other hand,
reliance on incidental affect inductions limits the implications of the obtained
results for situations in which affect is an integral part of the stereotype. We
trust, however, that future research into the role of integral affect will benefit
from an understanding of the impact of incidental affect, which will help in
disentangling some of the unavoidable confounds that this research will have
to tackle.
Bless,d H.
G .,'Schwarz, N.' Golisano , V .,
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?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The reported research was supported by grants from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bl 286/5 to H . Bless, N. Schwarz, & M. Wanke; Schw
278/5 to N. Schwarz, H. Bless, and G. Bohner; and a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) fellowship to M . Kemmelmeier). Thanks are due to
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Gerd Bohner, and Klaus Fiedler for stimulating discussions and comments on a previous draft.
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