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Researching Refugee Dynamics, Southern Populations
and Migration Dynamics in Post-revolution Libya
Activity 1: A Social and Economic Assessment of
Urban Refugees in Three Libyan Cities
Final Report
May 2013
Submitted to:
This publication was produced by Altai Consulting for review by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. Opinions expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the UNHCR.
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared by Eric Davin (Altai partner), Arezo Malakooti and Laurence Hargreaves and written
by Jules Maroto with the support of Arezo Malakooti.
Field research teams were managed by Usama Al Senosy (Al-Istishari Consulting) and included Sabri El-Abdawi,
Abdelrahman El-Basir and Hicham El-Karghaly.
We gratefully thank the UNHCR staff in Tripoli and Benghazi, the working staff of the Community Development
Centre (CDC) in Tripoli, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) staff in Tripoli and Sabha for their valuable input
and assistance, as well as all the refugees who graciously offered their opinions and stories for the purposes of
this study.
Table of contents
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... 5
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... 6
List of Images ............................................................................................................................... 7
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 7
List of Maps ................................................................................................................................. 7
I.
Introduction............................................................................................................... 8
II.
Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
III.
Nature of refugee communities screened in Libya. ............................................................. 9
Socio-economics................................................................................................................ 9
Coping Mechanisms ........................................................................................................ 10
Long timers ..................................................................................................................... 10
Perspectives: Specific vulnerabilities of Specific Communities .......................................... 10
Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 11
Methodology ........................................................................................................ 12
Objectives ....................................................................................................................... 12
Approach ........................................................................................................................ 12
Secondary Research ........................................................................................................ 13
Screening and Mapping of Refugee Groups ...................................................................... 14
In-depth Interviews ......................................................................................................... 16
Survey............................................................................................................................. 16
6.1
Sample ............................................................................................................................... 16
6.2
Locations............................................................................................................................ 17
6.3
Selection of Respondents .................................................................................................. 17
6.4
Separating Refugees From Other Types of Migrants ........................................................ 17
6.5
Data Collection .................................................................................................................. 18
6.6
Tools .................................................................................................................................. 18
6.7
Quality Control and Data Analysis and Handling............................................................... 19
7. Limitations and Challenges .............................................................................................. 19
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
IV.
Key Findings ......................................................................................................... 21
Descriptive Statistics: Survey Respondents....................................................................... 21
Nature of Refugee Communities Screened in Libya........................................................... 24
2.1
Main Reasons for Traveling to Libya ................................................................................. 24
2.2
Period of Arrival................................................................................................................. 26
2.3
Locations of Choice Within Libya ...................................................................................... 27
2.4
The Journey to Libya.......................................................................................................... 29
2.5
Libya as a Transit Location................................................................................................. 32
2.6
Return ................................................................................................................................ 35
3. Socio-economics.............................................................................................................. 38
3.1
Living Arrangements .......................................................................................................... 38
3.2
Household Composition .................................................................................................... 40
3.3
Standards of Living ............................................................................................................ 44
1.
2.
3.4
Levels of Integration .......................................................................................................... 49
3.5
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 52
4. Coping Mechanisms ........................................................................................................ 59
4.1
Support Networks.............................................................................................................. 59
4.2
Access to Information........................................................................................................ 62
4.3
Access to Healthcare ......................................................................................................... 64
4.4
Levels of Assistance and Expectations for Assistance ....................................................... 68
5. Long Time Refugees in Libya ............................................................................................ 73
5.1
Profiles ............................................................................................................................... 73
5.2
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 73
5.3
Support Networks.............................................................................................................. 74
5.4
Levels of Integration .......................................................................................................... 75
5.5
Living Conditions ............................................................................................................... 75
5.6
Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 76
V. Perspectives: Specific Vulnerabilities of Specific communities .................................. 77
1.
2.
3.
VI.
Arab Refugees ................................................................................................................. 77
Less Vulnerable African Refugees..................................................................................... 79
More vulnerable African Refugees ................................................................................... 80
Recommendations ................................................................................................ 82
1.
2.
Specific ........................................................................................................................... 82
General ........................................................................................................................... 84
VII.
Annexes ............................................................................................................... 85
Urban Refugees in Four Libyan Cities
Final Report
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CDC
DRC
IDI
KII
UN
UNHCR
USA
Community Development Centre
Danish Refugee Council
In-Depth Interviews
Key Informant Interviews
United Nations
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United States of America
Please note: Given the lack of an official determination of refugee status in Libya, and hence, the lack
of a clear demarcation between refugees and asylum seekers, no distinction is made between the two
types of migrants in this report and the word ‘refugee’ is used throughout.
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for survey sample ................................................................................................. 21
Figure 2: Representation of nationalities across the sample ................................................................................ 21
Figure 3: Representation of nationalities in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata, across the entire sample ................. 22
Figure 4: Main reasons for travelling to Libya ....................................................................................................... 24
Figure 5: Time of arrival in Libya ........................................................................................................................... 26
Figure 6: Main reason for settling in current location within Libya ...................................................................... 28
Figure 7: Main form of transportation used to travel to Libya ............................................................................. 30
Figure 8: Duration of journey to Libya .................................................................................................................. 32
Figure 9: Percentage of refugees who plan to stay in Libya ................................................................................. 33
Figure 10: Main reasons for which refugees would return to their country of origin .......................................... 35
Figure 11: Living arrangements of refugees .......................................................................................................... 38
Figure 12: Living arrangements of Sudanese refugees according to time of arrival ............................................. 39
Figure 13: Percentage of refugees living with family members ............................................................................ 41
Figure 14: Proportion of Sudanese refugees living with family members ............................................................ 42
Figure 15: Proportion of Sudanese refugees who feel integrated into................................................................. 42
Figure 16: Total monthly household cost of living, per community, in Libyan Dinars (LYD) ................................. 44
Figure 17: Total monthly household income, per community, in Libyan Dinars (LYD) ......................................... 44
Figure 18: Main reasons for which refugees borrow money ................................................................................ 45
Figure 19: Expected living condition in Libya, compared to their country of origin, before their arrival ............. 46
Figure 20: Current living conditions that refugees experience in Libya, compared to their country of origin ..... 46
Figure 21: Living conditions for Syrian refugees compared to country of origin, according to time of arrival..... 47
Figure 22: Living conditions compared to country of origin, across nationalities, in Tripoli and Benghazi .......... 47
Figure 23: Living conditions of Palestinian refugees in main cities compared to country of origin...................... 48
Figure 24: Living conditions of Iraqi refugees across Tripoli and Misrata, compared to country of origin........... 49
Figure 25: Feelings of integration into Libyan society amongst refugees ............................................................. 50
Figure 26: Frequency of contact with Libyans outside of work environment for refugees .................................. 51
Figure 27: Different ways in which refugees source work opportunities ............................................................. 53
Figure 28: Levels of employment for refugee communities according to location. ............................................. 54
Figure 29: Whether refugees believe that it is easier to find work after the revolution ...................................... 55
Figure 30: Gender breakdown across the sample ................................................................................................ 56
Figure 31: Levels of employment among female respondents ............................................................................. 56
Figure 32: Most important networks in the lives of refugees in Libya.................................................................. 59
Figure 33: Main support networks for the 2 different waves of Palestinian refugees ......................................... 60
Figure 34: Main ways in which refugees rely on support networks ..................................................................... 61
Figure 35: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they need advice about the education system ....... 62
Figure 36: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they need advice about the legal system ............... 63
Figure 37: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they have a problem in general .............................. 64
Figure 38: Main sources of healthcare for refugees ............................................................................................. 65
Figure 39: Comparison between healthcare received and level of integration into Libyan society ..................... 66
Figure 40: Comparison between healthcare received and financial status .......................................................... 67
Figure 41: Comparison between access to healthcare and level of assistance received ...................................... 67
Figure 42: Main type of assistance received by refugees from international agencies in Libya ........................... 68
Figure 43: Main type of assistance refugees expected from the Libyan government .......................................... 69
Figure 44: Main type of assistance refugees expected from international organisations .................................... 69
Figure 45: Percentage of refugees who have already heard of the UNHCR ......................................................... 71
Figure 46: Percentage of refugees who have received or are currently receiving assistance from the UNHCR .. 71
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Figure 47: Percentage of refugees who arrived in Libya 5 years ago or more ...................................................... 73
Figure 48: Living conditions for long timers compared to country of origin......................................................... 75
Figure 49: Spectrum of the three main categories of refugees in the sample...................................................... 77
LIST OF IMAGES
Image 1: Waiting for work at a roundabout in Fashloum, Tripoli ........................................................................ 25
Image 2: Abu Salim neighborhood in Tripoli ......................................................................................................... 29
Image 3: A Somali refugee in Abu Salim, Tripoli ................................................................................................... 34
Image 4: Somali refugees in a temporary shelter in Abu Salim ............................................................................ 36
Image 5: Living quarters of Somali refugees in Abu Salim .................................................................................... 40
Image 6: Somali refugees in Tripoli ....................................................................................................................... 43
Image 7: Waiting for work in Fashloum, Tripoli .................................................................................................... 52
Image 10: Living quarters of Somali refugees in Abu Salim .................................................................................. 70
Image 11: A sick Somali in a temporary shelter in Abu Salim ............................................................................... 72
Image 12: African refugees work as garbage collectors, Tripoli ........................................................................... 74
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: List of literature reviewed ....................................................................................................................... 13
Table 2: List of key informants interviewed .......................................................................................................... 14
Table 3: Key informants consulted in each location for screening purposes........................................................ 15
Table 4: Final number of IDIs carried out according to location ........................................................................... 16
Table 5: Final number of surveys carried out, according to location .................................................................... 17
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1: Locations screened for research ............................................................................................................... 15
Map 2: Main routes of travel into and across Libya.............................................................................................. 31
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the previous regime, Libya had not established any formal framework for the admission,
protection and welfare of asylum-seekers or refugees. There was neither legal definition nor any law
to protect their status, rights and obligations. However, this characteristic did not apply to Arab
refugees, who enjoyed rights equitable to Libyans. Indeed, Gaddafi, in his search for pan-Arabism,
welcomed refugees from other Arab countries with well-established refugee status, while sub1
Saharan refugees faced a complete legal vacuum . Further, in the late 1990s, as Gaddafi re-oriented
towards pan-Africanism, immigration policies from sub-Saharan Africa were often very relaxed,
making Libya an attractive destination for refugees and migrants.
In 1969, while Libya ratified the 1967 Amended Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa of the Organization of African Unity and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which recognised the right to asylum; it had no national asylum system in place. For
instance, the regime had authorized the UNHCR to maintain a presence in Libya from 1991 onwards,
but its status was never formalised. Hence during this period the UNHCR registered requests for
asylum, determined refugee status and provided humanitarian assistance, which represented a form
of protection but without any guarantees for refugees, as it was not matched by the national
government.
In the first weeks of the revolution in March 2011, the Transitional National Council (NTC) issued an
eight-point roadmap entitled A Vision of a Democratic Libya. Point eight stated: “Immigration,
residency and citizenship will be managed by government institutions, respecting the principles and
2
rights of political asylum and public liberties” . However, the general lack of legitimacy of transitional
authorities and administrative bodies has left those measures largely unimplemented in the country.
The Constitutional Declaration, introduced by the National Transitional Council in August 2011, is the
supreme law of Libya, and remains in effect until a permanent constitution is ratified in a referendum
expected in spring 2013. Yet, the Constitutional Declaration appears to be hesitant on the direction
to take on migration policy in terms of whether the authorities will break with or continue past
3
policies .
In light of the legal confusion that exists in relation to refugees residing in Libya, the UNHCR has
commissioned Altai Consulting to undertake a study on the condition of urban refugees in the
country across three different locations in order to better understand the dynamics of refugees in
Libya after the revolution, with the overall aim of improving their conditions.
1
UNHCR – Libya 2006 Annual Protection Report: Chapter I- Refugee Protection, and asylum policy and practice (2007)
A Vision of Democratic Libya quoted in The International Federation for Human Rights; Libya: The Hounding of Migrants
Must Stop (2012)
3
A Vision of Democratic Libya quoted in The International Federation for Human Rights; Libya: The Hounding of Migrants
Must Stop (2012)
2
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Final Report
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to identify the demographic, social and economic profiles of urban
refugees in three Libyan cities, as well as their coping mechanisms, needs and risks, and to assess
changes in these dynamics since the revolution, in order to identify ways for the UNHCR and Libyan
government to better support the refugee population in Libya.
Data was collected through secondary research and primary quantitative and qualitative research in
the form of in-depth interviews (IDIs) and quantitative questionnaires. A total of 401 quantitative
questionnaires and 81 IDIs were conducted in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. These interviews were
organized around six areas of interest: background, household information, socio-economic status,
expectations, coping mechanisms and needs and risks. The research centred on refugees from the
following seven countries of origin: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan and Syria.
1.
Nature of refugee communities screened in Libya.
Since the fall of the former Libyan regime in 2011:
−
−
−
−
2.
Refugees generally move to Libya because they are escaping security concerns in their country of origin.
However the specific risk that they are escaping depends on the nature of the conflict in their country of
origin. Libya is often selected as a destination because of the perception of strong employment and
economic opportunities.
The time of arrival of refugees, and subsequently, amount of time spent in country, depends again on
the nature of the conflict that refugees are fleeing. In general, Iraqis (88%) and one group of Palestinians
(16%) arrived over 5 years ago. There is a group of Sudanese (67%) and Eritreans and Ethiopians (17%
respectively) that also fall in this group. However, 73% of the sample arrived within the last year.
African refugees tend to travel with smugglers or in big groups and often spend time in Transit countries
along the way, either to raise money for the next stage of the journey, to find smugglers, or in an
attempt to settle. Their journeys are hazardous and encompass great risks. Arabs tend to face less
perilous conditions in their travel and often travel on main roads, in their own cars, with their families.
When refugees arrive in Libya, Arabs are more likely to settle in locations where there is a strong
network of other refugees from their country of origin, whereas Africans are more likely to follow
favourable employment and economic conditions and security.
Socio-economics
The socio-economic situation of refugees is often influenced by their time of arrival in the country,
the presence of family, the nature of their support networks, and their levels of education and
linguistic skills. In general:
−
−
Most refugees live in rented homes with access to water and electricity. While Arab refugees often live
in average homes, African refugees tend to live with a large number of other refugees and share water
and electricity amongst a number of people.
At the exception of Iraqis, all refugees self-evaluate their financial status to be poor and tend to borrow
money in order to meet their expenses. Most are surprised by the high cost of living and challenges in
finding employment that they encounter in Libya and had expected better conditions prior to arrival,
even though most declare their living conditions have improved somewhat compared to life in their
country of origin.
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−
−
3.
Final Report
Levels of integration are higher among Arabs than Africans generally because of shared language and
religion, higher education levels, and a certain sympathy for newly arrived Syrians. There are, however,
some exceptions, such as long time Sudanese refugees in Tripoli who are better integrated than other
African refugees, and Palestinians in Misrata who experience strong challenges integrating. The
presence of family members tends to assist integration, however, it is very rare for African refugees to
arrive with their families.
There is widespread unemployment amongst all communities and profiles at the exception of Iraqi
refugees who tend to be highly qualified. In general, African refugees tend to be low skilled and posses
low education rates, which hampers their employability but also makes them vulnerable to exploitation
and ill treatment by employers. Women suffer from particularly high unemployment rates.
Coping Mechanisms
Coping mechanisms for refugees are highly dependent on two main factors: the nature of their
support networks and the length of time spent in country, with such factors strongly influencing their
access to information, assistance, and healthcare.
−
−
−
4.
The main support networks for refugees across the sample are relatives and other refugees. Iraqis are
the only ones who declared relying on Libyan friends in a significant way (48%).
When sourcing information on a number of topics (e.g. Education, health, legal) Arabs tend to seek
official avenues of information while Africans tend to avoid approaching authorities out of their dear of
detention and deportation and consequently rely on each other for information.
There is currently very little assistance received across the entire sample and it did not change with the
revolution. Few refugees are registered with the UNHCR despite reasonable levels of knowledge of the
organisation.
Long timers
There is a group of refugees within the sample who arrived over 5 years ago (19% across the entire
sample) and has consequently spent many years in the country. Their profiles and living conditions
tend to be different to the sample in its entirety.
−
−
−
5.
This group of refugees tends to be Iraqis, Palestinians, Sudanese, Ethiopians, and Eritreans.
Long timers are more likely to migrate from one city to another to follow work opportunities and often
have greater job security when compared to other refugees thanks to stronger local support networks
and language skills.
Most feel well integrated into Libyan society but perceive deterioration in living conditions post
revolution and thus, would like to leave now after many years in the country.
Perspectives: Specific vulnerabilities of Specific Communities
From the key findings a categorisation of three main types of refugee groups emerges: Arab
refugees, less vulnerable African refugees and more vulnerable African refugees.
−
−
Arab refugees are better integrated and generally less vulnerable than their African counterparts. Their
specific vulnerabilities relate to access to work opportunities and dealing with insecurity. Newly arrived
Syrians and Palestinians who came from Syria are less integrated than the other Arabs but better
integrated than the Africans.
Less vulnerable African refugees include Eritrean and Ethiopian long timers from Benghazi and Sudanese
long timers in Tripoli. While their situation is better than their African counterparts, their lack of an
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−
Final Report
official status means that they lack job security, and despite reasonable levels of integration and local
support networks, they also struggle with insecurity (notably in Benghazi).
African newcomers are the most vulnerable group in our sample. Access to employment is very
challenging due to low skills, low education, and low levels of integration and acceptance. These factors
combined mean that they often face exploitation and ill treatment in the workplace and have no
avenues for redress. They are also confronted with arbitrary arrest and detention and fear authorities
and militia groups as a result. This causes them to live deeply underground and inhibits their integration.
6.
Recommendations
6.1
Specific recommendations
a)
Push registration of refugees with the UNHCR, through greater information campaigns that inform
refugees about the benefits of registration. This not only allow greater control of flows but will also allow
greater access for refugees to basic needs and services. It can potentially also provide more vulnerable
African refugees in Benghazi greater access to means for legal redress and some kind of status to refer to
when confronted by authorities.
b) Increase status of African refugees through skills training as the most vulnerable of the African refugees
usually have quite low levels of education and skills and find themselves in very low skilled jobs, which
prevents them from establishing job security and keeps them in a vulnerable position.
c) Increase access to healthcare outside of Tripoli. Some refugees in Tripoli have managed to increase their
access to healthcare through the community development centre (CDC) but access remains limited to
Tripoli. Increasing such initiatives in other major cities will ameliorate the healthcare problem for many
other refugees in our sample.
d) Further develop the CDC model through satellite clinics across the city, in order to facilitate better access
for refugees, especially those that live deeply underground.
e) Launch information campaigns within communities of highly vulnerable African refugees, as most of
them are unlikely to venture out of their neighbourhoods out of their fear of the authorities. Creating
inroads into these communities is imperative for their protection.
f) Provide specific aid for the community of Palestinian newcomers in Al-Zaroog area, Misrata, as they lack
links with other Arab communities and experience low levels of acceptance by Libyans, placing them at
significant risk.
g) Make a distinction between the needs of women and men in terms of access to employment, as regular
employment is key to the integration process of refugees and women are experiencing particular
challenges in this area.
6.2
General recommendations
a)
Developing collaboration with Libyan associations, national and international NGOs to implement all the
previous recommendations through a common roadmap at the domestic level.
b) Continue working with government for official recognition of refugee status, and a refugee status
determination process, while implementing the other specific recommendations in the meantime, as
official status is key to most refugee issues.
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III. METHODOLOGY
Objectives
1.
Altai Consulting was commissioned by UNHCR’s Libya office In November 2012 to conduct three
interlinked research projects in Libya and the surrounding countries. The first project examines the
social and economic situations of urban refugees in several Libyan cities, and the second project
examines populations in six districts in the south of Libya to assess their identity documents and
access to state services. The third and final project examines post-revolution drivers and routes of
mixed migration into Libya. The first and second projects are empirical by nature, and used largely
quantitative approaches for gathering data and drawing conclusions. Over one thousand urban
refugees and people in southern Libya were interviewed for the first two research projects, believed
to be the first time research of such scale has been conducted in Libya. The third project involves
fieldwork in Niger, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Sudan, Malta and Italy, and it is believed to be a rare
example of regional fieldwork conducted in this manner. This report is the first in a series of three
reports outlining findings from the three research projects.
The overall objectives of this study are for UNHCR and its international and Libyan government
partners to better understand the dynamics of urban refugees in the country with the aim of
improving their conditions.
More specifically:
2.
•
To better understand demographic profiles of urban refugees in three cities in Libya: Tripoli;
Misrata; Benghazi;
•
To better understand the social and economic profiles, coping mechanisms, needs and risks
of these populations;
•
To assess changes in these dynamics as a result of the 2011 revolution;
•
To make recommendations to UNHCR and the Libyan government for better supporting the
refugee population.
Approach
The study involves a number of complementary research modules to produce an approach that
combines a screening of the main communities of refugees in the country with a more detailed
investigation of the experiences of the main ones.
Data was collected in a number of ways, including both in-depth qualitative interviews as well as a
quantitative survey across three different locations.
The evaluation was conducted in the main cities of the country including Tripoli, Misrata, and
Benghazi. Other key locations such as Sabha, Gharyan, Al-Zawiyah and Ajdabiya were also screened
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for the purposes of the study but large communities of urban refugees were not found outside of
detention so no interviews were conducted4.
Initially, a desk review was conducted of literature that existed on the topic, with the purpose of
exploring the context of urban refugees. Then, in each location, two layers of investigation occurred:
•
•
A screening phase to identify the main refugee communities in each location and the main
areas of the city in which they could be located;
Targeted research into each community through in-depth interviews with key informants
from within the community (who acted as entry points into their respective communities)
followed by a survey with a number of community members from each community.
3.
Secondary Research
3.1
Literature Review
Secondary research was undertaken in order to explore the context within which urban refugees are
currently living in Libya. Table 1 sets out the main reports consulted:
Title
Libya: The Hounding of Migrants Must Stop
The Plight of Refugees, Asylum-seekers and
Migrants in Libya
UNHCR Country Operation Profile- Libya
Libya: The Demographic-Economic Framework of
Migration / The Legal Framework of Migration /
The Socio-Political Framework of Migration
A Comprehensive Survey of Migration Flows and
Institutional Capabilities in Libya
Author(s)
The International Federation for Human
Rights - FIDH
Year
Amnesty International
2012
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees - UNHCR
Anna Di Bartolomeo, Thibault Jaulin and
Delphine Perrin - Consortium for Applied
Research on International migration
(CARIM)International Centre for Migration Policy
Development - ICMPD
2012
2012
2011
2010
Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in
Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the
Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh - Journal of
Muslim Mental Health
Kristy Crabtree
2010
UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions
in Urban Areas
Refugees - UNHCR
2009
UNHCR 2006 Annual Protection Report - Libya
Refugees - UNHCR
2007
Forced Migration Online Research Guide: Urban
Refugees
Loren B. Landau
2003
UNHCR 2003 Country Report
Refugees - UNHCR
2003
Convention governing the specific aspects of
refugee problems in Africa
Organisation of African Unity - OAU
1967
Table 1: List of literature reviewed
4
Except in Sabha where two IDIs were conducted and included in the sample.
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3.2
Final Report
Key Informant Interviews
As part of the background research for this study, a number of key informant interviews were also
carried out, in all locations, with individuals who were able to give a picture of the urban refugee
dynamics in their respective areas.
Table 2 table sets out the main interviews conducted:
Organisation
Al-Wafa
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
Name/title of interviewee
Ahmed Farjani, Former Director
Natia Mosashvili, Protection Manager
Islamic Relief
Ghamera Al-Karghaly, Manager
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Mohamed Akelah, Associate Protection Officer
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Ghada Abdulrazak, Protection Officer
Table 2: List of key informants interviewed
4.
Screening and Mapping of Refugee Groups
The initial week of fieldwork in each location was dedicated to a screening exercise that resulted in
an initial mapping of groups of refugees in each location. This was achieved via a layered approach
involving three separate investigations:
1. Research teams spoke to a number of experts in the field, that is, individuals who were involved in
refugee issues, to create an initial refugee map per city. This included UNHCR staff, staff of local or
international NGOs and representatives of local authorities.
2. Then research teams conducted a number of very informal, semi-structured interviews on location
with individuals who were likely to have had contact with refugees (shopkeepers, landlords,
restaurant staff, taxi drivers, employers, etc.). This was then coupled with observations and
crosschecked with initial maps to source locations where refugees assemble and live across each city.
3. Finally, a screening was done of the entire city by dividing the city up into a number of smaller units
and screening each section one by one through observations and informal discussions with community
members.
The screening phase took between 5 and 8 days in each location depending on the size of the area to
map and the numbers of key actors to consult. Based on this initial mapping, a short list of 20 subgroups was made within the refugee population in each city. The groups were purposively selected in
order to ensure the broadest variety of groups in terms of backgrounds and profiles. The key
informants consulted in each location appear below in Table 3.
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Location
Tripoli
Misrata
Benghazi
Sabha
Final Report
Name
Organisation/Title
Ahmed Farjani
Former Director, Al-Wafa NGO
Natia Mosashvili
Protection Manager, DRC
Ghamera Al-Karghaly
Manager, Islamic Relief
Mohamed Akelah
Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR
Ghada Abdulrazak
Protection Officer, UNHCR
Hassan Tareq
Professor, Zoology Department, University of Misrata
Abu Ahmed
Director, “Altanseqqyea Alsoria” (Syrian political association in Libya)
Saleh Najem
Program Officer, UNHCR
Ahmed Kashboor
Associate Manager, Qasvi, NGO
Elsa Moreno
Head of Desk, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), NGO
Father Chielso
Priest, Catholic church
Mohamed Akelah
Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR
Table 3: Key informants consulted in each location for screening purposes.
Map 1 identifies the locations that were screened for research and where interviews were
conducted.
Map 1: Locations screened for research
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In-depth Interviews
5.
In each of the refugee groups identified, an entry point was sourced through discussions with key
informants during the screening phase. This entry point was purposively selected based on his/her
reputation, knowledge of the history of the sub-group and ability to represent the sub-group, and
was interviewed specifically on these points through an in-depth interview (IDI).
An initial total of 20 IDIs were supposed to be carried out in the four locations of Tripoli, Benghazi,
Misrata and Sabha. However in the light of difficulties encountered in Sabha in making contact with
urban refugees, further IDIs were conducted in other locations to maintain the entire sample at 80
IDIs. This demonstrated in Table 4 below.
In-depth-interviews (IDIs):
Initial Estimate
20
In-depth-interviews (IDIs):
Final Result
30
Benghazi
20
29
Misrata
20
20
Sabha
20
2
Total
80
81
City
Tripoli
Table 4: Final number of IDIs carried out according to location
6.
Survey
6.1
Sample
A total of 401 quantitative surveys were conducted across seven nationalities and three urban
locations.
The sample did not attempt to be representative of the actual proportions that each nationality
represents of the total refugee population, but rather was targeted at capturing a broad range of
refugee experiences in order to make the final analysis more comprehensive. Had it been
representative, the study would have encompassed a greater number of Syrian refugees, due the
great influx of such refugees into Libya in recent times. However, to avoid the sample being
dominated by a certain type of experience, certain nationalities were overrepresented and some
were underrepresented.
Refugees from the following countries of origin were included in the sample:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Iraq
Palestine
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Research teams managed to target a 63/37 gender split, in favor of men, across all types of
communities and locations. Also, 15% of refugees in our sample had received, or were currently
receiving assistance from the UNHCR. This percentage was ensured in order to have a point of
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comparison between UNHCR affiliated and non-affiliated refugees and was requested during the
inception phase of this project by UNHCR staff. A total sample size of 400 interviews was initially
planned for the survey, across the four locations of Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Sabha. As with IDIs,
Difficulties in Sabha led to a greater number of interviews in other locations to maintain the sample
size at 400 respondents. This is demonstrated in table 5 below.
Number of survey interviews
planned
100
Number of survey interviews
realised
157
Benghazi
100
145
Misrata
100
99
Sabha
100
0
Total
400
401
City
Tripoli
Table 5: Final number of surveys carried out, according to location
6.2
Locations
In order to ensure a representative sample of respondents, four cities were initially targeted to
complete the study (Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Sabha). However, in Sabha, research teams found
that clashes in the area had moved refugees out and that the border was no longer seen as an entry
point into the country. Of refugees that were sourced in the area, all were either in detention or in
the hands of smugglers waiting to be moved to another part of the country. For this reason, Sabha
was removed from the sample and the share of the sample was increased in other locations.
6.3
Selection of Respondents
In-depth interviews were conducted with refugees who acted as entry points into their respective
communities. Accordingly, they introduced research teams to survey respondents. That is, a
snowball approach was used where each key informant was asked to introduce research teams to
ten urban refugees from their group. Key informants were specifically asked to introduce researchers
to a range of profiles within their community, from the most vulnerable and uneducated, to the most
educated and prosperous.
The following profiles were sought in each location (where possible) to ensure that a number of
perspectives and experiences were captured:
1. Illiterate females who are the heads of vulnerable households;
2. Illiterate males who are the heads of households and have employment (including informal
employment);
3. Young illiterate males who are jobless and recently arrived;
4. Educated heads of households who are jobless;
5. Educated young men or women who are employed.
6.4
Separating Refugees From Other Types of Migrants
In order to ensure that respondents were in fact potential refugees and not other types of migrants,
two different levels of screening occurred.
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Firstly, research teams engaged in an informal discussion with potential respondents by asking them
several questions about their country of origin and their reasons for coming to Libya. If this
discussion led research teams to believe that the respondent had moved to Libya to escape
persecution or personal harm, the interview was commenced.
As a second layer, several questions were built into the questionnaire itself to allow a screening of
the migrant in question. The first question involved asking the migrants if they considered
themselves as refugees. A number of other questions were then included to allow research teams to
analyse the migrants’ self evaluated answer against some objective criteria. Namely:
−
−
−
−
−
6.5
What is the main reason for which you came to Libya? (Question 3)
What was the main reason for which you left your country of origin? (Question 12)
What is the main thing that would make you feel ready to return to your country of origin? (Question
21)
What did you expect your living conditions to be like in Libya, compared to your country of origin?
(Question 48)
How would you describe your current living conditions, compared to your living conditions in your
country of origin? (Question 49)
Data Collection
Data collection for the survey was conducted by teams of interviewers trained in Tripoli and
Benghazi. Two training sessions of two full-days were organized in those locations and then
completed by a full day of pilot testing in the field before teams were deployed. Research teams
trained in Tripoli were deployed in Misrata; Sabha and Tripoli and Benghazi teams were trained for
interviews in Benghazi.
All research teams were managed by an experienced national consultant who travelled from Tripoli
to the research locations in order to accompany the team of interviewers in the field. An
international consultant was also present in all locations to provide overall supervision and to check
the quality of interviews.
6.6
Tools
Two separate tools were created for the in-depth interviews and the quantitative survey.
The in-depth interview questionnaire contained 53 open-ended questions with the aim of
understanding the general story and experience of the respondent’s community as a whole.
For the quantitative interviews, the questionnaire contained 74 closed-ended questions that sought
specific data about the experience of the individual being interviewed.
All questionnaires were developed collaboratively with UNHCR staff in Libya. They were developed in
English, translated into Arabic, and then back translated in order to ensure the quality of the
translation. Both questionnaires are annexed to this report.
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6.7
Final Report
Quality Control and Data Analysis and Handling
To ensure quality, interviewers were monitored by a national consultant in the field who checked
their questionnaires at the end of each day. National consultants were monitored by international
consultants who also accompanied the team in the field and checked questionnaires in all locations.
To ensure quality, 5% of respondents from each location were randomly selected and called for
quality control purposes.
When questionnaires were judged satisfactory, data was entered into EpiData data entry software
and exported to SPSS, then checked for consistency and cleaned.
7.
Limitations and Challenges
Overall, research teams succeeded in gathering the different profiles expected in all locations visited.
However, certain profiles were more challenging to source. For example, female-headed households
were few and far between. Moreover, ensuring a diversity of educational backgrounds was
challenging, as in-depth interviewees often did not know education levels, thus they were not
necessarily able to direct research teams to interviewees with a range of educational profiles. This
required research teams to engage in greater investigation.
It was also particularly difficult to ensure that 20% of refugees interviewed were connected to the
UNHCR, especially in the city of Benghazi where the presence of local and international actors
involved in refugee aid is less visible than in Tripoli where the Community Development Centre (CDC)
plays a central role in assisting refuges. It also became apparent that a large number of Syrian
refugees do not want to be registered with the UNHCR, as they do not know what will be the
outcome of the civil war in their country and thus do not want to officialise their presence in Libya in
case the old regime stays in place. In the end, a total of 15% of refuges in our sample had received, or
were currently receiving assistance from the UNHCR.
A number of location-specific challenges were also encountered and are outlined below.
7.1
Sabha
Locating urban refugees in Sabha was problematic due to their low levels of visibility in the city,
which made it difficult for research teams to locate them and also difficult to gain information about
them through other key informants. This was mainly because clashes in the area had moved refugees
out and because the border was, consequently, no longer seen as an entry point into the country. Of
the refugees that remained, the majority was either in detention or in the hands of smugglers
waiting to be transported to other parts of the country.
Research teams visited a detention centre in the city to gain information about the location of
refugees in the city through their counterparts in detention. However, this proved unsuccessful, as
mot of the refugees encountered in detention had been in the hands of smugglers prior to their
detention so they did not have any information about refugee communities in the city.
Further research in “Shara al-Afriqiyah,” a neighbourhood of Sabha city, put research teams in
contact with several migrants from neighboring countries (Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad, Sudan or
Mauritania) but none of them could identify a community of Eastern African or Darfuri refugees
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living in the city. Research teams also attempted to conduct research in “Souq al-Namla”
neighbourhood but clashes in this area prevented advanced research.
7.2
Tripoli
Among African refugees in Tripoli language became a barrier, as most of them did not speak Arabic,
English, or French. To address this obstacle, often one member of the community who could speak
one of the listed languages was recruited to act as a translator for interviews with refugees from his
country origin.
Moreover, after having created initial contact with African refugees in the Abu Salim area of Tripoli at
the end of December, the research team lost all of them as they were arrested by authorities while
trying to travel to Europe by boat from the coast. The screening process had to be resumed to meet
new entry points into the communities.
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IV. KEY FINDINGS
1.
Descriptive Statistics: Survey Respondents
The field survey was conducted with a sample of 401 refugees and asylum seekers across Tripoli,
Misrata and Benghazi5 between December 2012 and February 2013. This resulted in a diversified
sample of respondents across gender (37% women), age (58% of the sample is below 30), status
(37% are the head of their household)6 languages, literacy levels and unemployment rates (78%). The
spread of the sample is delineated in Figure 1.
* Tertiary courses and religious studies
**Eben Tamin, English, Saho, Soninke, Swahili, Zengawie
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics for survey sample
The spread of nationalities, or the country of origin of refugees and asylum seekers interviewed, is
represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Representation of nationalities across the sample
The influx of Syrian refugees in recent months due to the ongoing turmoil in that country explains
their larger share of the sample. Syrian communities were especially large in Misrata and Benghazi,
two of the three research locations in our sample. Their share of the sample is however not reflective
of the true size of their community in Libya. It was deemed important to capture the unique
experience of Syrian refugees while not creating a bias in the sample by giving them too large a
5
6
Two interviews in Sabha were also included in the sample
Not all respondents lived in households and so in some cases the concept was irrelevant.
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proportion of it, due to the temporary nature of their migration. It was therefore agreed with UNHCR
staff to keep the proportion of Syrian refugees to below 40% of the total sample. This was done to
ensure that the study would encompass the spectrum of vulnerabilities across ethnic groups and
countries of origin without focusing too much on one specific group. In that sense the sample was
purposively designed to reach the broadest variety of profiles.
In general, African communities7 were harder to locate in research locations due to their lower levels
of visibility when compared to their Arab counterparts, especially in locations outside of Tripoli.
The split of nationalities amongst survey respondents for each research location is represented
below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Representation of nationalities in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata, across the entire sample
As Figure 3 demonstrates, the sample in Tripoli contains a higher proportion of African refugees,
particularly Somalis who seem to be more visbile there. Interviews with this profile of refugees
revealed that they felt relatively safer in Tripoli due to the perceived threat of militia in locations
such as Benghazi and Misrata which raised the risk of detention. This, coupled with greater
opportunities for employment, encouraged settlement in Tripoli. Moreover, Tripoli and its surrounds
(notably the town of Az-Zawiyah) act as the main point of departure for refugees who wish to travel
on to Europe by sea and as African communities are often more likely to see Europe as their final
destination they are more likely to settle in Tripoli.
7
The classification of “African communities or non-Arab refugees” refers to Ethiopians, Eritreans, Somalis and Sudanese,
and the classification of “Arab refugees” refers to Iraqis, Palestinians, and Syrians. This is a classification made for the ease
of the reader and is not necessarily based on rigorous racial classifications.
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The large proportion of Syrians settling in Benghazi is mainly due to the proximity of this location to
the Egyptian border, which is the principal point of entry into Libya for this community. Plus almost
half of the Syrians interviewed in Benghazi (49%) link their decision to settle in Benghazi with the
presence of friends or family members there. Thus, the intitial settlement of Syrians in this area has
induced others to move there also.
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2.
Nature of Refugee Communities Screened in Libya
2.1
Main Reasons for Traveling to Libya
Final Report
Security emerged as the most common reason for making the journey from one’s home country to
Libya, and the most often cited, across nationalities and for African and Arab refugees alike.
In the sample of refugees screened in Libya for the purposes of this study, a wide variety of reasons
were cited for making the journey from one’s home country to Libya. However, security emerged as
the most common reason and the most often cited, across nationalities and for African and Arab
refugees alike, as demonstrated in Figure 4. Specifically, 91% of Somalis and 85% of Eritreans
presented it as their main reason, as did 80% of Palestinians and 88% of Syrians. Poverty and hunger
issues were also important factors for 32% of Iraqis, perhaps a flowing consequence of embargos
placed on that country following the first Gulf War in the 90’s. This was gleaned from in-depth
interviews where Iraqi refugees that arrived in the 90’s often cited economic difficulties as a result of
“blockades” as their reason for moving to Libya.
Figure 4: Main reasons for travelling to Libya
In depth interviews revealed that Syrians in our sample were escaping the civil war in their country,
particularly random bombings in the northern cities of Homs and Alep, and the general growing
suspicion towards them by authorities.
Somalis referred largely to the lack of a functioning government and the general lack of hope for the
future that was encouraged by the resulting state of anarchy.
Eritreans also refer to governmental issues and discontent with the current regime. For Eritreans
compulsory military conscription was often cited as the specific cause of discontent that eventually
led to departure, as one Eritrean man in Tripoli explained “Life is difficult with the current regime;
people are escaping from military obligations and looking for jobs in Libya.”
Sudanese refugees from Darfur largely fled because of political pressure from the central
government of Khartoum who has been fighting against a separatist movement in the region since
the 1990s. Ethiopians also fled governmental oppression and the resulting lack of freedom.
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Palestinian refugees were either escaping the Syrian conflict as they were already living there under
refugee status, or they fled from the Palestinian territories due to the presence of Hamas in the Gaza
strip or, more generally, the conflict with Israel.
Iraqi refugees were either fleeing war (Iran-Iraq war of the 80’s; inter-confessional war following the
US invasion) or hardship resulting from
economic embargos.
While security is commonly cited by all
profiles of refugees in the sample, the
nature of the threat varies from one
community to another.
Most African refugees explained that when
fleeing their countries, Libya was seen as the
most ideal destination due to the perception of
greater employment opportunities and the
Image 1: Waiting for work at a roundabout in Fashloum, Tripoli
ability to improve one’s economic situation,
suggesting a somewhat blurred line when classifying the motivations for migration. Sudanese
communities, for instance, generally point out the fact that Libya is the nearest country to escape to
which can provide employment.
Libya is seen as an attractive country of destination due to the perception of greater employment
and economic opportunities.
In depth interviews with African refugees also revealed that some of them had planned to settle in
countries such as Sudan or Kenya but the lack of employment opportunities there and the racism and
poor treatment that they encountered in those countries led them to travel on to Libya. For example,
an Eritrean man from Tripoli explained “All in all I spent 4 full months in Sudan as I thought I could
find a job there and earn a living. However the lack of freedom there and racism against foreigners
pushed me to try my luck in Libya. So I raised some money to get some help to cross the border into
Al-Kufra.” Unfortunately, this poor treatment was not rectified in Libya for the most part, as will be
demonstrated in proceeding sections.
Similarly, some Syrians in the sample spent months in Egypt before travelling to Libya but again, lack
of employment opportunities and the cost of life pushed them to Libya. Eritreans and Ethiopians also
pointed out that their poor treatment, and resulting fear of deportation, in neighboring Sudan
encouraged them to continue on to Libya.
Some refugees planned to settle in ‘transit’ countries but eventually moved on to Libya due to the
lack of economic opportunities there and poor treatment.
Thus, while the large majority of refugees in the sample left their countries to “escape security
issues,” the specific security issues they were escaping varied across refugee communities. Libya is
also an attractive destination for refugees in the sample because of the perception of strong
employment opportunities. Some communities initially settled in countries between theirs and Libya
(For example, Sudan, Kenya, and Egypt) but eventually left and travelled on to Libya because of the
lack of employment opportunities in those places.
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2.2
Final Report
Period of Arrival
A demarcation appears between refugee communities in our sample who began arriving some years
ago and those that have begun arriving in larger numbers more recently. Naturally, the time of arrival
reflects the nature of the conflict that forces them to flee their countries. The time of arrival of the
refugee communities in our sample is represented in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Time of arrival in Libya
There are a variety of arrival times, which reflects the nature of the conflict that refugees are
fleeing.
For example, Syrians began arriving within the last 12 months due to recent unrest (88% of the
sample of Syrians), and 84% of Palestinians in our sample also arrived within the last 12 months,
reflecting the fact that this group of Palestinians were settled in Syria and moved to Libya as their
second place of migration when that country became unstable. The smaller proportion of
Palestinians in the sample that arrived 5 years ago or more (17%) represent another wave of
Palestinian migrants who fled security issues linked either to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the
Hamas presence in the Gaza strip and moved to Libya throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The two
different communities of Palestinians often have different experiences in Libya due to the amount of
time spent in country.
Syrians arrived recently and Palestinians arrived in two groups: those who came years ago from
Palestinian territories and those who arrived recently from Syria.
On the contrary, the large majority of Iraqi and Sudanese refugees migrated some years ago when
the conflict in their countries began to escalate. For example, 88% of Iraqis and 67% of Sudanese
refugees interviewed had arrived more than 5 years ago. Among Sudanese, many of them have been
living in Libya for up to 15 or 20 years due to the conflict in Darfur. This often means that their
experiences in Libya are quite different to other African refugees who arrived more recently. For
example, a Sudanese man from Tripoli, who left Darfur in 1996, explained “I was wanted by
authorities so I decided to run away to the nearest country. Now I have refugee status and if I ever
faced any problems I would go to the police headquarters to settle it,” demonstrating the often
different position of Sudanese refugees in the country.
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The majority of Iraqi and Sudanese refugees are long time migrants who arrived some years ago.
For the Iraqis different waves of migration can be traced, the first one being a consequence of the
1980s Iran-Iraq war, a second one occurring as a response to the embargos placed upon Saddam
Hussein’s regime in the 1990s, and a final wave occurred in the mid-2000s following the interconfessional war in the country after the US intervention. For example, an Iraqi refugee who arrived
in 2007 explained that “sectarianism and exposure to risks from Iraqi security forces forced me to
leave” while another, who arrived in 1997, explained that: “My salary was not enough because of the
blockade in Iraq and we therefore had to leave” However, as shown in Figure 5 the migration of Iraqis
seeking refuge in Libya has diminished in recent years.
African refugees demonstrate different migration patterns. In the case of Ethiopians and Eritreans,
periods of arrival are more diverse and spaced. While 65% of Eritreans and 50% of Ethiopians arrived
within the last year, there seems to be a generally even spread over the last few years, particularly
for Ethiopians. However, only 17% arrived more than 5 years ago. Somalis refugees represent a new
wave of migration with 88% of the sample having arrived within the last year.
Ethiopians and Eritreans have been coming to Libya over the last few years, with half arriving within
the last year.
Thus, the waves of migration for particular nationalities in our sample mirror the timing of the
conflict and insecurity that they were escaping, with some communities, such as the Iraqis and
Palestinians, experiencing different waves of migration due to the various problems faced in those
countries and by those communities over the years.
2.3
Locations of Choice Within Libya
As explained earlier, the panel of refugees screened in this study resided in Tripoli, Misrata and
Benghazi and 89% of all refugees across the sample have always lived in the same city in Libya,
suggesting a trend to settle in the city that one first arrives in.
Most refugees across the sample have always lived in the same city in Libya
When refugees were asked to cite the main reasons for which they had settled in the particular city
that they were living in, two main reasons emerged as common across the sample; the presence of
family and friends in the area and the availability of employment opportunities. This further
demonstrates the point that the ability to find employment influences decisions to move to Libya.
The main reasons that influence the location of choice within Libya for refugees is demonstrated in
Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6: Main reason for settling in current location within Libya
Most Arab refugees acknowledge that the presence of family or friends in a location was the main
reason that led them to settle there as they were able to assist in housing them on arrival and then
put them in contact with local employers. The presence of family and friends is also naturally
attractive for the support network it can provide for refugees, as discussed more fully in section
IV.4.1 “Support Networks.”
Most African refugees tend to choose their city based on a mixture of different factors such as
employment opportunities, the security context and the general cost of living. In-depth interviews
revealed that this group of refugees has less faith in the ability of friends, and other refugees from
the same country of origin, to put them in touch with employment opportunities and to be able to
assist in any significant way with logistics due to the fact that integration is generally difficult for the
community as a whole. Thus, locations are instead selected on the above-mentioned criteria.
However, most African interviewees intimated that once they arrive in a location they are likely to try
and find a community of other refugees to settle with. For example an Eritrean man from Tripoli
stated that: “When I arrived in Tripoli I was told to go to the Abu Salim area because there were a lot
of other migrants there and now I live and work there with my compatriots.”
Moreover, most African refugees tend to settle in Tripoli and its surrounds, as other locations, such
as Misrata or Benghazi remain largely hostile to them due to the higher presence of militia groups
and a less welcoming local community of Libyans. For example, a Sudanese man living in Benghazi
mentioned that: “Libyans in Benghazi treated me as a mercenary when I went to the hospital with a
broken leg.” African refugees in the sample were also more likely to want to move on to Europe, the
journey to which is often undertaken from Tripoli and surrounding areas (such as Sabratha and
Zuwara) encouraging them to settle in Tripoli over other areas.
Most Arab refugees select the city they settle in according to the presence of family and friends
there. African refugees tend to follow favourable economic conditions and good security but still
settle with other refugees once they arrive in their city of choice.
Thus, most refugees in our sample settled in the first Libyan city they arrived in. The choice of
location is usually based on one of two factors; the presence of family and friends, which is usually
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common for Arab refugees, and the availability of employment opportunities, which is usually more
relevant for non-Arab refugees as the Arab communities in the sample were often introduced to
employment opportunities through their network of friends and family. Tripoli also emerged as a
more attractive location for African
refugees given the greater employment
opportunities, a less pronounced presence
of militia and insecurity, and the proximity
to ports where boats depart for Europe.
2.4
The Journey to Libya
Travelling to Libya appears to be a long,
expensive and dangerous journey for
almost all refugees in our sample,
regardless of their nationalities and points
Image 2: Abu Salim neighborhood in Tripoli
of departure. However one must outline
particular difficulties encountered by African
communities and to a lesser extent Syrians, as they try to reach Libya, compared with Iraqis and
Palestinians.
Most African refugees in our sample travelled to Libya by road (100% of interviewees in the case of
Eritreans and Ethiopians), as demonstrated by Figure 7. As a result, a large proportion of them spent
several months, and sometimes years, in other countries, such as Sudan or Kenya, on their way to
Libya. For some of the refugees we spoke to, the lack of sufficient amounts of money for the entire
journey necessitated stopping in “transit” countries along the way to work and make enough money
to complete the journey. In other cases, time was required in countries along the way to find
smugglers and/or groups of other migrants to travel on with, as the journey was undertaken in
stages for some refugees. As discussed previously, some refugees also attempted to settle in
countries along the way but eventually moved on, mainly due to the lack of employment
opportunities, as demonstrated by one Somali man in Tripoli who stated that, “I spent 6 months in
Sudan but as the work was not well paid, I managed to find and pay smugglers to escape the country
and reach the Libyan border.”
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Figure 7: Main form of transportation used to travel to Libya
African refugees tend to travel by road and sometimes spend long periods of time in transit
countries in order to find smugglers, to raise money for the rest of the journey, or in an attempt to
settle.
Some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees mentioned that Sudan had been an attractive option due to
the presence of refugee camps in that country. Some members of these communities mentioned
that while they had spent some time in these refugee camps, they eventually decided to leave the
camp and travel on to Libya due to a perceived presence of Eritrean and Ethiopian spies within the
camps threatening deportation back to countries of origin. An Eritrean refugee from Tripoli also
mentioned “I spent 4 months in Sudan but racism from the locals and the constant fear of being
deported back to Eritrea convinced me to move to another location.”
Some African refugees mentioned spending time in refugee camps along the way to Libya.
2.4.1 Use of a Smuggler
Not surprisingly, refugees who used road transportation almost systematically travelled in groups
and were assisted by smugglers either throughout the entire journey, or in key locations in the least.
In general, the African refugees in the sample were prone to traveling in large groups composed of
young men, with up to 100 men in the same group at times, while Syrians were more prone to
travelling with their entire family and in groups composed of a few families.
Syrians often cited using smugglers to either enter Libya from Egypt or to exit their country or
hometown (especially those that are native to cities such as Homs or Alep where clashes are rife).
Where African refugees in the sample did not travel the entire way with smugglers, they were likely
to at least use smugglers to reach Gharyan and Benghazi through Sabha, Al-Kufra and Ajdabiya and
sometimes to simply exit Sudan. The main entry points for these refugees is usually either in the
Southeast near the Sudanese/Chadian border or the Southwest near the Chadian/Nigerian border
and then they travel with smugglers between Al Kufra and Sabha and then on from Sabha to Ajdabiya
or Gharyan in the north. For newly arrived refugees, Al Kufra tends to be avoided due to the heavy
clashes there since the revolution. The mapping of migration routes and entry points into Libya will
be dealt with in more detail in Activity 3 of this project, but a preliminary mapping is delineated
below in Map 2.
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Map 2: Main routes of travel into and across Libya
Africans tend to travel in big groups and Syrians in groups composed of a few families. Refugees that
travel by road tend to use smugglers either for the entire journey or in key locations.
2.4.2 Duration of Journey
Figure 8 below highlights a clear demarcation between Arab and African communities of refugees in
terms of their duration of journey to Libya as the large majority of the former take less than two
weeks to travel to Libya (80% of Iraqis, 93% of Palestinians and 90% of Syrians) while results from the
latter are more diversified with 50% of Ethiopians taking between two weeks and one month to
reach Libya and 38% of Somalis taking between one and two months.
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Figure 8: Duration of journey to Libya
One will not be surprised to discover that the longer the journey the higher the risks faced by
refugees. Indeed African refugees in our sample were confronted with life threatening obstacles
throughout their travel to Libya in the form of armed smugglers, unsympathetic national border
authorities, but also thirst and hunger as they traversed the Sahara. A Somali man explained “As we
were in the desert, we didn’t have much food and very little water in the end. Such difficult living
conditions lasted for several days and we lost 4 men and 3 women on our way who died as a result of
those extreme living conditions.” Some Sudanese also specifically mentioned the Sudan, Chad, Libya
triangle as an area of particularly high risks for them for the same reasons mentioned above.
Arab refugees did not face such risks on their way to Libya and managed to bribe local authorities on
the road to Libya when needed in order to avoid major issues, especially the Syrian refugees. Syrians
often used smugglers to exit their own country due to the fear of being confronted by domestic
authorities, as explained by one Syrian refugee in Benghazi who explained “If authorities knew I was
from a liberated area in Syria I could have been arrested and jailed.” However, once outside Syria
they tend to cross Jordan and Egypt using main roads with their own cars and families and so they
are not exposed to the same risks as African refugees who cross the desert with smugglers.
Africans face more hazardous journeys because they cross the desert with smugglers in large groups,
whereas Arabs tend to take main roads, using their own cars and traveling with their families.
Due to the type of transportation used, the general length of the journey and the strong dependency
on smugglers, African refugees tend to go through a particularly dangerous and complex journey to
reach Libya. This is particularly evident when compared to the journeys undertaken by Arab
refugees, even though many Syrians admitted to having faced uneasy situations specifically when
exiting their country.
2.5
Libya as a Transit Location
When asked whether they were planning to stay in Libya or move to another country, a significant
percentage of refugees replied that they planned to stay in the country, as shown in Figure 9. Once
again, there was a perceivable difference between the Arab and African refugees; 93% of Somalis,
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83% of Ethiopians and 71% of Eritreans did not cite Libya as their final destination, whereas 56% of
Iraqis and 48% of Palestinians did.
Figure 9: Percentage of refugees who plan to stay in Libya
In depth interviews with non-Arab refugees revealed that they felt quite poorly treated and
experienced high levels of race-based prejudice in Libya, encouraging them to want to move onto
Europe. A Sudanese refugee from Benghazi mentioned that he did not plan to stay in Libya because
“There is strong racism towards Africans, I myself was attacked and jailed by authorities without any
valid reason.”
It is not implausible to imagine that Arab refugees in the sample, such as the Syrians, Palestinians and
Iraqis, felt particularly better integrated and accepted and were able to establish themselves more
comfortably in Libya, encouraging them to stay. In depth interviews revealed a particular empathy
for Syrian refugees amongst the Libyan population for the fact that they were perceived as going
through something similar to what Libyans had just been through. As a matter of fact a Syrian man
who recently arrived in Benghazi stated that: “My Libyan neighbors are good people as they
protected me when I arrived and found me a job in a restaurant.” This tends to then affect the way
Syrians engage with their new environment, with another Syrian man stating “Other Syrians and I
tend to blend as much as possible into Libyan society to understand their history but also their
traditions in order to create more links with Libyans.”
Arabs are more likely to see Libya as their final destination because they are better integrated and
Africans tend to experience more racism and hardship making them want to move on to Europe.
However, it is important to note that for many of the refugees in our sample, the decision to leave
was made hurriedly and urgently without a great deal of planning or information on what lay ahead
and so often the choice of a final destination was not definitively made and changed at different
points along the journey. As explained previously, some refugees had planned to stay in countries
along the way, such as Sudan and Kenya, and the inability to find jobs there and thus be able to
support themselves, or the fear of being discovered by spies, forced them to move on to Libya. For
many of the non-Arab refugees in the sample, the lack of improvement in their situation in Libya also
encouraged them to think about moving on to Europe even if that had not been the original
intention. When asked why she now wanted to move on to Europe one Ethiopian woman from
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Benghazi pointed out that her life in Libya had not met her expectations, she said “I don’t see any
freedom, only big mess and weapons around me.” A
Often the choice of final destination was not definitively made and changed at different points along
the journey according to conditions experienced.
For other refugee communities in the sample, Libya was seen as a temporary destination as they
hoped to return home when conditions improved in their country of origin. For example, 73% of
Syrians answered affirmatively when asked if they planned to stay in Libya. However, when pressed
further in in-depth interviews, it became apparent that most of them were hoping to return to Syria
if and when the current regime fell. As a result, some Syrians in Benghazi highlighted the importance
of different political associations of Syrians in Libya linked to the national opposition movement back
home in bringing Syrian refugees together and allowing them to remain engaged with the political
changes in Syria.
Syrians see Libya as a temporary destination because they hope to return home when the situation
improves.
Within the sample of respondents that wish to move on
from Libya, there is also a surprising incidence of
refugees that have been in Libya for more than 5 years
(and often for 20-30 years) and are now interested in
leaving. This was particularly the case for Iraqi refugees
and for Palestinian refugees who had arrived some
years ago from Palestinian territories (as opposed to
the Palestinians who arrived recently from Syria). Indepth interviews revealed that for the most part, these
Image 3: A Somali refugee in Abu Salim, Tripoli
communities of refugees felt that security had
deteriorated since the revolution, and the economic situation had worsened, and so they were no
longer happy to stay in Libya. For example, a Palestinian woman in Misrata explained that “security
has worsened after the revolution and there are no more jobs so I don’t know how I can live here
anymore. It has become a different place from when I first arrived” This community of Palestinians, as
well as the Iraqis in our sample, were also most likely to mention ‘dealing with insecurity’ as their
current main challenge in Libya (25% and 16% respectively).
A large majority of these respondents, however, indicated that they wished to move through official
means and cited the UN as the organization that they hoped would help them. For example, an Iraqi
man in Misrata, who arrived in Libya in 1999, said, “I plan to move to another country, to Canada
because there are many jobs there, and I’m trying to go through the UN”.
Some long time migrants feel that security and economic conditions have deteriorated since the
revolution and now wish to move on to another country. For the most part, they are trying to do so
through official means.
It becomes apparent that often refugees leave their countries hurriedly and don’t have a definitive
target for country of final destination. Some refugees in our sample initially settled in countries along
the way but eventually moved on to Libya when their quality of life did not improve in those
locations. Now, the lack of improvement in Libya for some African communities who continue to
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battle with prejudice and lack of employment encourages them to want to move on to Europe. Had
they managed to build a better life in Libya they would have been likely to stay. For some long time
refugees, such as the Iraqis and Palestinians that arrived in the country between 5-20 years ago,
there is a desire to now leave because of a perceived deterioration in security levels post-revolution.
There are also some communities who hope that the conflict in their home country will end soon and
allow them to return home, such as the Syrians.
2.6
Return
When asked what would encourage refugees to want to return to their home country, most
responses fell within “I will never return to my country of origin” and “when the situation changes in
my country of origin,” as demonstrated by Figure 10. A rather high proportion of Palestinians (77%)8
and Syrians (92%) reported that they would return home once the situation improved in their home
countries, indicating a temporary perspective on their lives in Libya. Iraqi refugees were less likely to
imagine returning home (48%) which is probably explained by the fact that they are long time
migrants who have established lives in Libya. As explained in the previous section, Iraqi refugees are
also more likely to want to move onto a third country than to return home.
Figure 10: Main reasons for which refugees would return to their country of origin
Amongst Arab refugees, Palestinians and Syrians hope to return home when the situation there
improves. Iraqis are more likely to want to go to Europe than return home.
8
The Palestinians interviewed were mainly Palestinians who had been living in Syria as refugees for long periods of time
before their arrival in Libya, and were fleeing unrest in Syria.
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Non-Arab refugees were less likely to want
to return home, particularly Eritreans (32%)
and Ethiopians (22%). For many of these
refugees the journey to Libya has been
arduous, lengthy, and required a huge
investment in money and necessitated the
assumption of more serious risks than their
Arab counterparts, thereby discouraging
them from considering a return home.
Moreover, in addition to persecution and
instability, many of these refugees have also Image 4: Somali refugees in a temporary shelter in Abu Salim
fled poverty and economic devastation so an
improvement in the political or governmental situation may not necessarily conduce to a big
improvement in their standards of living. In our sample, none of the Eritrean, Ethiopian, Somali or
even Sudanese refugees had ever attempted to return home.
In the case of the Sudanese, their reluctance to go back to their country of origin appears to be a mix
of security reasons, lack of money, but also lack bonds left there. A Sudanese man who arrived in
Tripoli in 2009, mentioned that: “my house has been burnt and all my camels stolen by authorities
therefore I have nothing left there and no reason to return.”
Travelling on to Europe was far more attractive for non-Arab refugees than returning home and
often encouraged by the need for greater economic stability, something that they found hard to
achieve even in Libya. As one Eritrean man in Tripoli explained; “I am planning to move on to a third
country, maybe Norway because most people who go there seem to succeed and have a better life
which allows them to provide education to their children. I tried to move to this country with the
UNHCR but there they couldn’t help me so I am saving some money to go there by boat.
African refugees are less likely to want to return home because huge investments were made, and
big risks were assumed, in order to travel to Libya. Europe is a more attractive option because it is
perceived as being able to provide economic stability.
It is also interesting to note that while a very insignificant proportion of the sample declared that
they would return home whenever their family did, it was only mentioned by Iraqis, Palestinians, and
Syrians, which reflects the fact that it is usually only these communities that actually arrive in
families. Non-Arab refugees very rarely make the journey with their families. In some cases, they left
their families in refugee camps along the way, or close to home, and made the journey to Libya
alone. An Eritrean living in Tripoli described the journey of his fellow country men in the following
way “They leave their families in Sudan and come to Libya alone as they can be jailed on their way for
an indefinite amount of time and they do not want to expose their families to such risks.”
Only Arab refugees mentioned that they would return home when their families did. African
refugees rarely arrived with families.
Thus, non-Arab refugees are less likely to want to return home, given the greater sacrifice they made
to get to Libya and the greater risks entailed in the journeys they undertake. These communities are
more likely to move on to a third country than to want to return to their country of origin. Long time
Iraqi and Palestinian migrants in Libya are often of the same school of thought. Syrian refugees, and
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Palestinian refugees that have arrived from decades of living in Syria, hope to return once the regime
collapses. Arab refugees also include their families in their considerations on return or further travel
to another country as they are more likely to be living with their families in Libya, whereas their
African counterparts usually leave their families at home or in camps/locations along the way due to
the risky nature of the journeys they undertake.
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3.
Socio-economics
3.1
Living Arrangements
Final Report
Figure outlines the living arrangements of the refugee communities included in our sample. As can
be seen, most refugees manage to settle in rented homes instead of living with friends or relatives
(87% of Somalis, 83% of Syrians, 73% of Sudanese). However, the concept of a “rented place” varies
greatly from community to community.
Figure 11: Living arrangements of refugees
Most refugees live in rented homes, however, the type of rented home varies across communities
For example, most Syrians who recently arrived in Libya live with their families in an apartment with
a room, a kitchen, a bathroom and a living room, demonstrating that this community manages to
create the semblance of a ‘normal’ life quite quickly upon arrival. This is due to both a better
economic situation in general and to the fact that they tend to have stronger, and generally wealthier
support networks in Libya (through other Syrian refugees in the country). On the contrary, non-Arab
refugees usually share rooms with other refugees from their country of origin, thereby decreasing
the share of rent of each individual refugee. As one Eritrean man from Tripoli explained, ”I live with
150 other people in the same place without water and electricity, there is no kitchen and three
bathrooms only”.
Syrians live with family in well-equipped homes, thanks to their better general economics and the
availability of strong support networks of other Syrian refugees.
The data suggests, however, that the amount of time spent in the country affects living
arrangements positively. Indeed Sudanese refugees who have been living in Libya for more than 5
years have better living conditions, often similar to that of the Syrian community, while the newly
arrived Sudanese refugees have living conditions similar to the non-Arab refugees, with some of
them living in abandoned areas, particularly those that have settled in Benghazi. For example, a
Sudanese man who arrived in August 2012 in Benghazi said he was squatting in a “car wash area”
while another Sudanese man from Tripoli, who arrived in 2003, said he shares a “house with 4 rooms,
one bathroom and a kitchen” with his two children and his wife. Living conditions for Sudanese
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refugees according to their date of arrival in Libya are represented in Figure 12, which demonstrates
a clear improvement in living conditions with the passing of time.
Figure 12: Living arrangements of Sudanese refugees according to time of arrival
Living arrangement for refugees in our sample improve with time, even for African communities.
When the data is analysed across locations, the results are slightly different. For example, in Tripoli
more than 90% of all African communities reported living in rented homes, and amongst the
Eritreans and Ethiopians in Tripoli it hits 100%. In terms of the Arab communities, Palestinians
followed a similar trend but 50% of Iraqis declared living with relatives or friends. This was also the
case for 16% of Syrians. However, for most Iraqi interviewees ‘living with relatives’ was understood
to mean living with their families, so in fact the majority of this community are living in rented homes
too.
Results on refugee living arrangements in Benghazi, however, are much less uniform. The majority
still live in rented places, however 17% of Ethiopians and 38% of Eritreans live with relatives or
friends in their homes. Moreover 14% of the Eritrean and 31% of the Sudanese refugees in our
sample in Benghazi claim to be living in an abandoned place without paying anything. In-depth
interviews revealed that there is less of a visible network of refugees in Benghazi that can be of
assistance to newly arrived refugees. Thus, while Eritrean refugees in Tripoli would mention the
“Eritrean network in Abu Salim” as a source of information about shelter, there was nothing similar
for refugees arriving in Benghazi.
This also extends to other refugee communities; for example, while no less than 13% of Sudanese
refugees from Tripoli present their friends made in Libya as their major support network, this rate
plummets to 4% in Benghazi. In addition, not a single African refugee from Benghazi in this sample
mentioned the ability of their support network to offer general advice and information about life in
Libya. On the contrary, 8% of Eritreans, 18% of Somalis and 26% of Sudanese from Tripoli mentioned
it as the main way their support networks helped them. The flowing implication being that the
greater presence of support networks in certain locations positively affects the ability of refugees to
source liveable housing.
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Support networks are significant for refugees in sourcing liveable housing and the greater presence
of support networks in certain areas (for example, Tripoli when compared to Benghazi) means that
refugees live in better conditions in those locations.
In Misrata, the data is slightly more uniform as only
Arab refugees were located and interviewed there
and they all tend to live in rented places, except some
Syrians (9%) who live with relatives in their home.
However, it is interesting to note that while
Palestinians living in Misrata are largely newcomers
(90% arrived less than 12 months ago) who were
living in Syria prior to arrival in Libya, and the
Palestinians that are settled in Tripoli came some
Image 5: Living quarters of Somali refugees in Abu Salim
years ago from the Palestinian territories, (70%
arrived more than 5 years ago) there is no clear
difference in their living arrangements, levels of income or the nature of their support networks. The
only major difference between the two communities is their feelings on their level of integration into
Libyan society, which is particularly unfavourable among the more recent wave of Palestinian
migration. This will be addressed more in-depth in section IV.3.4 “Levels of Integration.”
The immense majority of refugees interviewed reported having access to both water and electricity,
with at least 80% of all communities sampled reporting as such, even though sometimes this takes
the form of a single tap shared amongst 30 people as in the case of African refugees. Similarly, for
these communities, access to electricity is often very basic and consists sometimes of only a single
light bulb in a room where numerous people sleep. The small percentage of Sudanese and Eritreans
in the sample that reported not having access to those two basic necessities (17% and 6%
respectively) were located in Benghazi where they live in abandoned places, as mentioned
previously.
Most refugees have access to water and electricity although this is more problematic for African
refugees. The small percentage that don’t have access to these things are living in abandoned places
and mainly in Benghazi.
Thus, while the majority of refugees in our sample claim to be living in rented accommodation, the
nature of the accommodation varies across communities. Arab refugees are often living in rented
homes that contain all basic necessities, with their families, while African refugees are more likely to
share rented spaces with large numbers of other refugees in poorer conditions. However, living
arrangements often improve with the amount of time sent in country, as was exemplified by the
Sudanese community. Living arrangements are also varied across locations, with Benghazi being
significantly less favorable. The data suggests that the differences in locations are linked to the
availability and nature of support networks in each location. Access to water and electricity tends to
follow the same trend.
3.2
Household Composition
As has been touched upon previously in this report, Arab refugees are more likely to travel to, and
arrive in, Libya with their families. African refugees in the sample, however, are far less likely to
travel with their families as the voyage to Libya is far less predictable, seems to encompass far
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greater risks, and requires a more arduous journey in general due to the need to traverse the Sahara.
Accordingly, most African refuges left their families at home, or in locations or camps along the way
to Libya. There is also a very small proportion that did travel with family but have since been
separated. For example, 7% of Ethiopians declared that they arrived with their families but are no
longer living with them because their relatives have travelled onto a third country; while 4% of
Somalis and 3% of Sudanese declared that family members who had arrived with them have now
either been detained or disappeared.
As demonstrated in Figure 13, more than 90% of Iraqis, Syrians and Palestinians interviewed
currently live with their families in Libya, as compared to only 22% of Somalis and 25% of Sudanese.
Figure 13: Percentage of refugees living with family members
The voyage to Libya is more hazardous and less predictable for African refugees so they rarely arrive
with their families, whereas the majority of Arab refugees arrive and live in households.
Naturally, the presence of family in Libya alters the Libyan experience for refugees interviewed. No
less than 33% of refugees across the entire sample cited their family as their main support network in
Libya, a significant finding given that only 64% live with their families in Libya. Moreover, this rate
reaches 48% amongst Syrians and 52% amongst Palestinian newcomers who claim that this network
largely provides them with empathy and understanding.
A good proportion of refugees who live with their families in Libya cite their family as their main
support network.
Furthermore, the data suggests that there may be somewhat of a link between the presence of
family members in Libya and the extent to which refugees feel integrated into Libyan society; 81% of
all refugees living with family members claim to feel “a little bit,” if not “completely,” accepted by
Libyan society. While it should be noted that the majority of refugees living with their families in
Libya are from Arab communities (see Figure 13 for rates) and these communities do generally
integrate better given the shared language and religion, differences in levels of integration can be
perceived within these communities too. For example, 40% of Sudanese refugees interviewed in
Tripoli live with family members, for only 11% in Benghazi, and 70% of the Sudanese in Tripoli felt
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accepted by Libyan society for only 50% in Benghazi, further supporting the case for a connection
between presence of family and integration. This is displayed visually in Figure 14 and 15 below.
The presence of family in Libya aids integration, with refugees who live with their family feeling
more integrated than those who do not.
Figure 14: Proportion of Sudanese refugees living with family members
Figure 15: Proportion of Sudanese refugees who feel integrated into
The time of arrival in Libya also tends to influence household composition for some refugee
communities in the sample. In the case of Sudanese refugees, of those interviewed in Tripoli, 40%
live with family members and 78% arrived more than 5 years ago. Of those interviewed in Benghazi,
only 11% live with families and only 56% arrived more than five years ago. For Eritreans the contrast
is even more striking as 88% of those in Benghazi arrived more than 5 years ago and live with family
members, whereas Eritreans in Tripoli are mainly newcomers who arrived within the last year and
only 30% live with family members.
Refugees who arrived some years ago are more likely to be living with family than those that arrived
recently.
Moreover, all Sudanese refugees interviewed in Benghazi were men among whom 73% were single,
as opposed to Tripoli where 60% of the Sudanese refugees interviewed were either married or
engaged. These findings coupled together tend to give an image of changing patterns of migration
for this community, with a previous trend to arrive in families being replaced by a trend for young,
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unmarried men to arrive alone. One Sudanese key informant explained that, “Because of the war
many men were conscripted into the army against their will in Darfur and so there are more men
arriving alone,” providing a possible explanation for the change in migration dynamics for this
community.
Newly arrived Sudanese refugees tend to be single young men whereas the Sudanese refugees who
arrived some years ago were more likely to arrive with their families. This seems to be linked to
conscription in home country.
The presence of family members can also have challenging economic consequences for communities.
In the case of Syrians for instance, their need to house and feed big families often places them in a
difficult economic position and is key in their massive need for borrowing money, especially since
among Syrian households interviewed, 23% of respondents acknowledged that they were the only
person working in the household. A Syrian woman living in Benghazi
claimed that: “We are really struggling to pay the rent and other
expenses as I live with my husband, my children, my nephew and his
wife. My husband is working but it is not enough to meet all expenses.”
Living in families also has negative economic consequences for
some communities because there are more mouths to feed. This is
especially evident amongst Syrians.
In conclusion, African refugees are far less likely to arrive in Libya with
their families due to the more perilous nature of the journeys they
have to undertake and this changes their experience of life in Libya.
This is mainly because the data demonstrates that the presence of
Image 6: Somali refugees in Tripoli
family creates a very strong support network for refugees and even
aids in integration levels, as was the case for Arab communities. Household composition is affected
by the time of arrival into Libya for some communities, demonstrating changing migration patterns,
and the presence of family can also have negative economic consequences.
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3.3
Final Report
Standards of Living
a. Financial Status
Total monthly household income and expenditure is demonstrated for refugees across the sample in
Figure 16 and Figure 17. Once again, there is a perceivable difference amongst Arab and African
refugees in the sample.
Figure 16: Total monthly household cost of living, per community, in Libyan Dinars (LYD)
Figure 17: Total monthly household income, per community, in Libyan Dinars (LYD)
With the exception of Iraqis who are long time migrants and often have qualified employment at
universities for instance (which will be developed further in section 3.5 “Employment”), standards of
living are generally low across the sample mainly because most refugees imagined that they would
find employment opportunities in abundance in Libya and did not expect the general cost of life to be
so high. As a result while 52% of Iraqis claim that their income exceeds their costs, this rate only
reaches 6% amongst Palestinians, 15% amongst Syrians, 18% amongst Somalis, 28% amongst
Ethiopians and 20% for Eritreans and Sudanese.
The direct impact of this is that African refugees tend to make more sacrifices in their everyday lives,
usually related to housing and food, in order to absorb the gap. Unfortunately, access to assistance is
also low and not contributing to an improvement in living standards; More than 90% of all African
refugees in this sample claim not having received any assistance from international agencies or
governmental authorities since their arrival in Libya, with the figure increasing to 97% for Somalis.
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Most refugees experience a poor financial status because they imagined that they would find
employment opportunities in abundance in Libya and did not expect the general cost of life to be so
high. Assistance levels are also apparently very low, particularly for African refugees.
Arab refugees arrive with greater amounts of money and were generally in a better economic
situation in their countries of origin, facilitating better living conditions. While only 6% of Palestinians
(mainly coming from Syria) and 15% of Syrians claimed that their income exceeds their costs, these
communities tend to arrive with a pool of savings that allows them to absorb the gap and make ends
meet for the time being. Some also mentioned the fact that friends and family in other countries
would send them money from time to time. However, many of these refugees in our sample
indicated their concern for the fact that this would only take them so far. For example, one Syrian
man explained “We are worried that we cannot find jobs so we live with four families in the same
house and share the same food and all the expenses together as a way to cope with our financial
situation.”
Arab refugees arrive with greater amounts of money and were generally in a better economic
situation in their countries of origin, facilitating better living conditions in Libya, but many are
eating into their savings, which is not sustainable.
Many refugees claimed that they had to borrow money in order to meet their expenses, with the
exception of Somali refugees who were instead receiving help from their friends in the form of nonmonetary assistance such as shared meals. For example, a Syrian refugee in Benghazi explained “I am
currently able to financially support myself because my Libyan neighbours lend me money and my
brother invited my family and I to move in with him, lessening our burden for rent” When asked what
they were borrowing money for, securing a home was the main reason presented by Syrians,
Palestinians and Somalis, whereas other African communities pointed to unemployment and low
levels of income. Amongst the Iraqi community, unemployment was never mentioned as a reason
but 44% did indicate that their incomes were too low. This is delineated in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Main reasons for which refugees borrow money
Most refugees claim borrowing money in order to make ends meet. Arab refugees tend to borrow
money to secure housing, whereas African refuges borrow money because of unemployment or low
levels of income.
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3.3.1 Expectations and Perceptions of Living Standards
Figure 19 and Figure 20 demonstrate that most refugees in our sample had higher expectations for
their new life in Libya than what they are currently experiencing. Notably, Iraqi refugees are the only
group in our sample that declared that their current living conditions in Libya are better than what
they had expected; 68% had expected their living conditions in Libya to be better than in their
country of origin and 80% declared that their living conditions were now, in fact, better than what
they had experienced at home. However, despite life in Libya not meeting the expectations of most
groups in our sample, the majority do, nonetheless, feel that their lives have somewhat improved
when compared to what they experienced at home. It should be noted, however, that a proportion
of the sample, while not the majority, do feel that their living conditions have worsened; 29% of
Palestinian and Sudanese refugees in our sample, as well as 23% of Syrians, declared so.
Figure 19: Living conditions refugees expected to have in Libya,
compared to their country of origin, before their arrival
Figure 20: Current living conditions that refugees experience in
Libya, compared to their country of origin
The data does suggest, however, that the length of time spent in Libya affects perceptions of living
conditions amongst Arab refugees. There seems to be high levels of optimism in the initial periods of
arrival, which drops in the medium term and then picks up again in the long term. For example, 69%
of Syrian refugees who had arrived within the last month said their life in Libya was better or much
better than it had been in their country of origin. This dropped to 44% and 52% for Syrian refugees
who arrived within the last year, before climbing to 75% for refugees that have been in the country
for more than a year. It demonstrates that initial optimism on arrival is tempered in the medium
term when the reality of life in Libya sets in and as refugees struggle to establish themselves,
ameliorating in the long term as they manage to become more established. This is demonstrated for
Syrians across Libya in Figure 21 below.
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Figure 21: Living conditions for Syrian refugees compared to country of origin, according to time of arrival
Length of time spent in Libya affects perceptions of living conditions among Arab refugees with high
levels of optimism in the initial periods of arrival, which drops in the medium term and then picks up
again in the long term.
There is also evidence to suggest that standards of living vary across locations. Figure 22
demonstrates how the same refugees across different locations view their living conditions. While
83% of Sudanese refugees living in Tripoli felt that their living conditions had improved when
compared to their country of origin, only 42% of Sudanese refugees living in Benghazi shared the
same sentiment. There would naturally be a clear link between ones living arrangements and
perceptions of their standards of living, thus it is not surprising that this difference exists between
Tripoli and Benghazi, given the fact that section 3.1 demonstrated that living arrangements were
quite different across these two locations with a good proportion of the sample in Benghazi squatting
in abandoned places. Insecurity has also been mentioned oftentimes by refugees living in Benghazi as
a significant problem, with some of them making statements such as “We cannot go out at night
after 6pm as it becomes too dangerous.”
Figure 22: Living conditions compared to country of origin, across nationalities, in Tripoli and Benghazi
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African refugees in Tripoli feel more positively about their standards of living than their counterparts
in Benghazi.
The same trend can be observed for Eritreans with 20% of those interviewed in Tripoli considering
their living conditions to be the same or worse than in their country of origin while this increases to
38% in Benghazi. Again, difficult living conditions (17% live in abandoned places and 38% with
relatives or friends in their home) and security concerns (often explained by statements such as
“there are a lot of weapons and chaos in the neighbourhood” as mentioned by an Eritrean woman
from Benghazi) contribute to the less favourable living conditions in Benghazi.
In the case of Ethiopian refugees, however, the trend is different. 62% of those living in Benghazi
consider that their living conditions have improved in comparison to their country of origin, while
only 40% of those residing in Tripoli shared the same sentiment. However, it should be noted that
Ethiopians represent the smallest sample in this study (18 refugees, only 5 in Tripoli), meaning that
findings are only suggestive and it is difficult to draw definite conclusions. The in-depth interviews
with Ethiopians in Benghazi did suggest that perhaps the greater incidence of aid received by this
community in Benghazi was contributing to more favourable impressions of living conditions. An
Ethiopian woman in Benghazi who arrived in 1998 pointed out that: “I received financial support
from the UNHCR in the form of 150 LYD as I was unemployed but it only happened once. I was happy
as I could buy food with it.” Another Ethiopian woman living in Benghazi stated: “I received financial
support from the Italian NGO Qasvi who gave me 250 LYD for three months as well as the Red
Crescent who gave me 200 LYD. I was happy as it finally meant that someone was taking care of me.”
Ethiopians are an exception as the community in Benghazi is happier with its standard of living than
those in Tripoli.
Palestinian communities in Benghazi were also experiencing much better living conditions than their
counterparts in Tripoli and Misrata, as shown in Figure 23. A valid explanation may be that, in this
sample, all Palestinians in Benghazi arrived between one and six months ago, whereas in Misrata and
Tripoli they arrived some time ago (only 37% in Misrata and 30% in Tripoli arrived between one and
six months ago), which further supports the argument that there is generally a higher level of
optimism in the initial period of arrival.
Figure 23: Living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi, compared to country of origin
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While Iraqi refugees are generally quite happy with their living conditions across both locations that
they were interviewed in, Figure 24 shows that the conditions in Tripoli are still perceived as being
better. This can possibly be explained by the presence of the UNHCR and, more precisely the work of
the CDC and Al-Wafa association, which provide free healthcare to refugees in Tripoli. Iraqis in
Misrata very often mentioned the scarcity and expensive price of healthcare in Misrata's private
hospital, which may influence perceptions of standards of living. It should also be noted that the
sample of Iraqis from Tripoli represents only 16% of the total sample of Iraqis, which may slightly
skew the data.
Figure 24: Living conditions of Iraqi refugees across Tripoli and Misrata, compared to country of origin
Palestinians in Benghazi are experiencing better living conditions than their counterparts in Misrata
and Tripoli and Iraqis are quite happy everywhere but slightly better off in Tripoli.
In conclusion, standards of living are generally low across the sample mainly because most refugees
imagined that they would find employment opportunities in abundance in Libya and did not expect
the general cost of life to be so high. The length of time spent in Libya does affect perceptions of
living conditions; there seems to be high levels of optimism in the initial periods of arrival, which
drops in the medium term and then picks up again in the long term once refugees become more
established in the country. There is also evidence to suggest that standards of living vary across
locations with Tripoli generally presenting better standards of living through a combination of better
access to employment, assistance and better security conditions. For a number of communities,
Benghazi was a more challenging environment given the high presence of militia groups and relative
lack of assistance.
3.4
Levels of Integration
As can be seen in Figure 25, most Arab communities feel strong levels of integration (92% of Iraqis
and 92% of Syrians feel at least somewhat integrated), while African respondents tend to be more
nuanced on this point with only 54% of Eritreans, 67% of Ethiopians and 53% of Somalis sharing the
same sentiment.
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Figure 25: Feelings of integration into Libyan society amongst refugees
There are higher levels, and feelings, of integration amongst Arab refugees in general.
While only 65% of Palestinians felt somewhat integrated, when the ‘older’ Palestinian refugees
(those who arrived more than 5 years ago) were separated from the newly arrived Palestinians who
came from Syria, the situation changed with 88% of them declaring that they felt integrated into
Libyan society. The data thus demonstrates that these two different groups of Palestinian refugees
do have fundamentally different experiences in the country, and suggests that the situation of
Palestinian refugees improves with time. In-depth interviews also suggested that there may be a
certain level of resentment from Libyans towards Palestinians because of the benefits they enjoyed
under the Gadhafi regime, particularly in relation to land grants and easements on access to
property, which may now be more targeted at the newcomers. Fieldwork observations in Misrata
also revealed that Palestinian newcomers did not enjoy the same level of aid as their Syrian
counterparts as Syrians tend to organize themselves into political associations linked to the situation
at home, which has conduced to links with local NGOs and a consequential giving of aid (blankets,
food, clothes for instance), which Palestinian refugees are not necessarily a part of.
Palestinians that arrived some years ago are much more integrated than the newly arrived ones,
suggesting that integration improves with time, even for Arabs.
Integration was also explored further by asking refugees how often they had contact with Libyans
outside of their work environment. Not surprisingly African refugees declared having very little
contact with Libyans compared to the Arab refugees and compared to Sudanese refugees who have
been here a long time and who speak Arabic. The large majority of African refugees declared having
less than monthly contact with Libyans outside of their work environment, if ever, as shown in Figure
26. On the other hand 20% of Sudanese refugees interviewed declared daily contact with Libyans, as
did 17% of Syrians and 40% of Iraqis. This is often because African refugees tend to live on the
outskirts of society, such as the Abu Salim area in Tripoli, and are more cautious about interacting
with Libyans given their lack of status. An Ethiopian woman from Benghazi explained “We tend to live
together as it Is hard to deal with Libyans and even though those who have been here for some years
are more familiar with the way of life and habits of Libyans; not having ID papers make refugees
afraid of getting involved with others in general.”
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Figure 26: Frequency of contact with Libyans outside of work environment for refugees
African refugees have very little and close to no interaction with Libyans outside of their work
environment, as they tend to live on the outskirts of society and are afraid of being reprimanded by
authorities.
Surprisingly enough, there are no strong differences between refugees from different locations and
their general feeling of acceptance into Libyan society, with the exception of Sudanese refugees. 70%
of Sudanese refugees in Tripoli declared that they felt quite integrated while only 50% shared the
same sentiment in Benghazi. This is reflected by greater contact between Sudanese refugees and
Libyans in Tripoli, with 30% claiming daily contact (compared to only 11% in Benghazi). It seems that
for this community the trend is also explained by greater time spent in country with no less than 78%
of Sudanese living in Tripoli having arrived 5 years ago or more for only 56% in Benghazi.
No strong differences between refugees from different locations and their general feeling of
acceptance into Libyan society
More time spent in country does seem to influence feelings of integration for other communities in
the sample too. For example, 75% of Eritreans who arrived 5 years ago or more feel completely or a
little bit integrated for only 51% of those who arrived less than 5 years ago. The lack of a sample of
Somalis and Syrians that arrived more than 5 years ago, and the small sample of long time Ethiopians
does not allow comparisons to be made for these communities. Similarly, the lack of a sizable sample
of Iraqi newcomers also prevents a comparison according to time spent in country for this
community. However in the case of Palestinians, 88% of those who arrived more than 5 years ago
feel well-integrated for only 60% of their counterparts who escaped troubles in Syria and arrived
recently, adding evidence to the observation that integration improves with time spent in country.
Integration improves with time spent in country for most communities in the sample.
Section 3.2 also demonstrated a potential link between the presence of family and levels of
integration for refugees in our sample as 81% of all refugees living with family members claim to feel
“a little bit,” if not “completely,” accepted by Libyan society. Moreover, when this concept is
explored within communities, the same trends arise. For example, 40% of Sudanese refugees
interviewed in Tripoli live with family members, for only 11% in Benghazi, and 70% of the Sudanese
in Tripoli felt accepted by Libyan society for only 50% in Benghazi.
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There is a possible link between the presence of family and levels of integration for refugees in the
sample.
Thus, Arab refugees in the sample tend to feel
much more integrated into Libyan society when
compared to their African counterparts and
declare much higher levels of contact with Libyans
outside of their work environment. African
refugees have very little, and sometimes no
contact with Libyans mainly due to the fact that
they tend to live on the outskirts of society and are
generally afraid of being exposed and thus,
Image 7: Waiting for work in Fashloum, Tripoli
detained. The data suggests that integration levels
increase with time and that the presence of family in a location also aids in integration. There were
no major differences observed across locations.
3.5
Employment
a. Levels of Employment
The strong unemployment rate experienced by African refugees can be seen as both a result and a
consequence of their low levels of integration and infrequent contact with Libyans. No less than 93%
of Somalis, 72% of Ethiopians, 78% of Eritreans and 76% of Sudanese are currently unemployed. This
rate is also very high among Syrians (78%) and Palestinians (79%) while less for Iraqis (52%).
All communities in the sample experience high rates of unemployment. Iraqis experience the best
employment rates and Arabs tend to have better employment rates than the Africans.
As demonstrated by Figure 27, the main network used by refugees to source employment
opportunities is other refugees from the same country of origin, as declared by 82% of Eritreans, 86%
of Sudanese, 80% of Ethiopians and 75% of Somalis. Iraqis, and to a lesser extent Palestinians from
the Palestinian territories, are the only ones who rely on other ways of sourcing employment in our
sample; 30% of Iraqis and 40% of Palestinians claim having their own business and 20% of Iraqis
source employment through job advertisements. This is largely facilitated by their language skills and
the better economic position they enjoyed from the outset, in their countries of origin, which
provides some capital for business ventures.
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Figure 27: Different ways in which refugees source work opportunities
Africans source employment through networks with other refugees. Arabs also use job
announcements and some open their own businesses.
Unsurprisingly, access to employment is somewhat linked with time of arrival in the country as an
overall employment rate of 11% among those who arrived less than one month ago jumps to 30% for
those who have been here for 5 years or more.
Employment rates improve with time.
In addition, as shown in Figure 28, levels of unemployment across the three main cities of this study
are varied. Removing Palestinians in Benghazi and Tripoli due to the fact that their proportion of the
sample was quite small (respectively 12% and 20% of all Palestinians interviewed) and because there
was an overwhelming percentage of female Palestinian refugees in these areas, it is interesting to
note that Iraqis always enjoy a rather high level of employment across all locations while the
experience of Syrians largely differs between Tripoli (46% are employed) and Benghazi and Misrata
(17% are employed). The sample of Syrians in Misrata and Benghazi also contained a higher
proportion of female respondents (34% in Misrata and 59% in Benghazi, compared to only 21% in
Tripoli) giving the overall impression that female refugees are rarely employed.
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Figure 28: Levels of employment for refugee communities according to location.
Employment rates in Tripoli are higher than other locations for Arabs and female employment rates
are generally low.
3.5.1 Nature of employment
Most refugees in our sample who reported that they were currently in employment were engaged in
low-skilled jobs such as working as shopkeepers (6% of Syrians), fruit and vegetables vendors,
watchmen (20% of Somalis each) or cleaners (20% of Eritreans). Moreover, 47% of all refugees,
across the entire sample, who are working, are working as labourers (80% of Ethiopians and 50% of
Sudanese). Arab refugees were the only ones who reported working in more skilled positions; Iraqi
and Palestinian refugees reported working as teachers (42% of Iraqis and 10% of Palestinians),
pharmacists or doctors (17% of Iraqis each), and technicians such as plumbers or electricians (50% of
Palestinians and 24% of Syrians). Syrians were spread over the various options, including skilled jobs
in some instances, but were more likely to be in low skilled jobs like their African counterparts (45%
of them claim working as laborers).
African refugees tend to be in low-skill jobs; Iraqis and Palestinians hold some skilled positions and
Syrians are spread out across the options.
However, with the exception of skilled workers such as the Iraqis, refugees in our sample do not
manage to stay in the same job for long periods of time. When asked how long they had been in their
current position, 80% of Ethiopians said less than three months, as did 70% of Eritreans and 79% of
Somalis. As the majority of Syrians and Palestinians in our sample were recent arrivals, they were
excluded from this analysis.
In-depth interviews revealed that most African refugees in the sample were ill treated by their
employers, and this, coupled with their lack of official status (which translates into a lack of avenues
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for redress), means that most of them are changing jobs frequently. A Somali man in Tripoli pointed
out “sometimes we are exposed to kidnapping in the workplace as some Libyans don’t respect human
rights. The police don’t support us or protect our rights as we do not have official status here.”
Sudanese and Iraqi refugees constituted the exception with 67% of both communities having been in
the same job for 12 months or more. The case of Sudanese can be explained by their time spent incountry as well as their professional skills as 40% of those who have employment claim to be
technicians such as plumbers or electricians. One Sudanese man in Tripoli explained, “I have been
working for 20 years as an electrical technician in Tripoli. I now have my own business and it is good
as people need my skills most of the time.”
Refugees don’t stay in the same job for long periods of time because of ill treatment by employers.
Sudanese and Iraqis are the exception mainly because they hold skilled positions or have their own
businesses.
For refugees who arrived in Libya before the revolution, there is a perceivable difference between
their experience with employment before and after this event. As shown by Figure 29, 75% of
Ethiopians, 72% of Somalis and 71% of Syrians consider that it is easier to find employment under the
new Libyan government. When prompted further, respondents referred to a better atmosphere in
the country in general and the presence of fewer migrants. For example, a Syrian refugee stated, “It
has now become easier to find employment after the revolution as there is more love and warmth
between citizens from both countries.” Additionally a Sudanese from Benghazi pointed out that,
“There are less workers in the streets and more manual jobs available for people like us.” However,
Sudanese refugees are also the only ones who highlighted that it has become harder to find
employment after the revolution (50% in Benghazi and 39% in Tripoli). Yet, it should be noted that, as
highlighted in the previous paragraph, 67% of them have been employed for at least 12 months and
may therefore, have a skewed vision of the current employment market in Libya.
Figure 29: Whether refugees believe that it is easier to find work after the revolution
Most refugees believe that job opportunities have increased since the revolution.
In conclusion, there are high levels of unemployment among African refugees, which is generally
explained by low levels of integration causing them to mainly rely on other refugees from their
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country of origin to source jobs. Arab communities in the sample are more prone to rely on general
job advertisements, or to have their own businesses, which is facilitated by their language skills and
the better economic position they arrived with. There are low levels of employment among female
respondents, but in general, Tripoli provides better opportunities for all refugees and employment
rates improve with time. African refugees in the sample who are employed are mainly in low-skill
jobs and tend to change jobs frequently, due to workplace abuse and their lack of avenues for
redress. However, there is a perception of improved employment opportunities post-revolution
amongst these communities.
3.5.2 Women and Unemployment
Women represent 37% of the entire sample of refugees in this study. Within this group, 89% are
unemployed. Due to the specific nature of this community of refugees and their specific needs and
risks, their relationship with employment was analysed separately in order to determine trends and
possible areas of opportunity. Figure 30 sets out the gender breakdown per community and Figure
31 shows employment rates for women per community.
Figure 30: Gender breakdown across the sample
Figure 31: Levels of employment among female respondents
Amongst Iraqi refugees, while 33% of women are employed, this actually only represents 3 out of 9
women, which does not allow any solid conclusions to be drawn. Nonetheless, for the sake of
determining trends across nationalities, it is interesting to note that all of them are teachers and
have strong education rates with 63% of them being university educated for only 12% out of the
entire sample of women. In addition the time spent in Libya seems to facilitate their access to
employment, thanks notably to their local connections and support networks. An Iraqi woman
currently unemployed mentioned in her in-depth interview that: “My previous job was easy to find
because I have learnt over time how to deal with the government.”
Education levels and time spent in country improves access to employment for Iraqi women.
Out of the 7 long time Palestinian women who were interviewed for the survey, none are currently
employed, even though 3 of them are university educated.
Despite good education levels, none of the Palestinian women from the long time Palestinians are
employed.
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Syrian women represent the biggest proportion of women in this study with 75 of them interviewed,
however only one woman across this sample was employed. This extremely low level of employment
can be linked to their low level of education (30% went to primary school and 48% to middle school,
at best) as well as the fact that they have big families to care for in Libya. Palestinian women who
arrived at the same time as Syrians (that is, the newly arrived Palestinians) have better access to
employment with 2 out 8 being currently employed.
There are no major differences in terms of education
levels between the two communities, indicating that the
strain of having big families to care for is more significant.
However, a Palestinian female who arrived in 2011
mentioned that “finding a job is currently the biggest
challenge facing the community of refugees from
Palestine,” indicating that this is still a major challenge for
Palestinians too.
Syrians have very low employment rates and low
levels of education. They also live in big families
meaning that they may be more occupied at home.
Palestinian women that arrived with Syrians have
better employment rates but still see access to
employment as a major challenge.
In the case of the Sudanese, none of the 8 Sudanese women interviewed are employed despite the
fact that they have all been here for more than 5 years. Key informants interviewed in in-depth
interviews mentioned work opportunities as the main challenge for Sudanese women in Libya.
All Sudanese women in the sample are unemployed despite having been in the country for a long
time.
Eritrean females in this sample mainly live in Benghazi. Only 4 out of 15 are employed and they
mainly work as cleaners. In-depth interviews with women from this community also revealed that ill
treatment and lack of payment by employers was a significant challenge for these women. One
woman explained that when that happened there was little possibility for redress. She said, “I cannot
do anything in that case as I am a foreigner without power. I just keep quiet and try to forget about
it.”
Similarly Ethiopian women are mainly located in Benghazi and 4 out of 11 are employed. However indepth interviews shed light on the recurrent issue of not being paid by their Libyan employers. One
of them, who arrived in 1998, stated that, “I sometimes do not get paid for my work and it happens
more often than before the revolution.”
Ethiopian and Eritrean women have slightly better employment rates than other women but are in
low skilled jobs, mainly working as cleaners. They have significant challenges with ill treatment by
employers, usually in the form of not being paid for services rendered.
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Finally only 1 out of 6 Somali women is employed in this sample. Their very low level of education
(50% are illiterate) can be presented as an explanation
as well as their recent arrival (5 arrived less than 12
months ago).
Somali women have very low education rates and
the majority arrived recently. Consequently, they
have very low employment rates.
In conclusion, access to employment is a challenge for
all women across the sample. The data suggests that
education levels can aid the situation and for some
communities time in country has improved the situation, while for some it has not made a
difference. While these findings provide possible trends and shed some light on the experience of
female refugees in terms of employment, in order to draw conclusive trends more research would
need to be done in this area.
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4.
Coping Mechanisms
4.1
Support Networks
Final Report
In exploring the issue of coping mechanisms for refugees, a number of support networks emerged.
The nature of these networks, and the type of support they provide, varies from community to
community.
As presented in Figure 32, the two most important networks for refugees in Libya are composed of
other refugees from the same country of origin and relatives. Iraqis were the only refugees in the
sample that relied on friends made in Libya in a significant way (48% declared it to be their most
important support network), which supports the findings on Iraqis being better integrated than other
communities and having higher employment rates. It is also notable that a very negligible part of the
sample declared relying on local NGOs and organisations or the UNHCR (3% of Somalis mentioned
the UNHCR while 2% of Eritreans and 4% of Iraqis mentioned local NGOs).
The two most important support networks for refugees are relatives and other refugees from the
same country of origin. Iraqis are the only ones that rely on friends made in Libya in a significant
way.
Figure 32: Most important networks in the lives of refugees in Libya
Once again, a demarcation appears between newly arrived Palestinians and older Palestinian
migrants. Palestinians who arrived more than 5 years ago experience levels of integration more akin
to that of their Iraqi counterparts with 25% of them declaring their Libyan friends as their main
support network in the country. Newly arrived Palestinians and Syrians were much less likely to rely
on Libyan friends with only 5% and 9% referring to such a network, respectively. The natural
conclusion is that time spent in country aids integration, especially for Arab refugees who already
share language and religion with Libyans. However, it is interesting to note that Palestinian and Iraqi
refugees also have much higher levels of education than the Syrians in the sample. 56% of Iraqis and
50% of Palestinians in the sample are university educated, as opposed to only 11% of Syrians,
suggesting that education levels can also be influential. Figure 33 compares the main support
networks for the two different waves of Palestinian migrants.
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Figure 33: Main support networks for the 2 different waves of Palestinian refugees
Greater time in-country and higher education levels help refugees network with Libyans, especially
Arab refugees who already share language and religion with Libyans.
African refugees tend to rely mostly on other refugees from their country of origin or other refugees
in general. The majority of the African refugees in the sample arrived without their families, often in
large groups with other refugees who had completed the journey with them, and tend to settle
amongst themselves on the outskirts of general Libyan society (for example, in Abu Salim area, in
Tripoli) causing them to rely on one another. Some also explained that they met other refugees while
in detention. An Eritrean man interviewed in Abu Salim explained that he lived in a home with
Sudanese, Ethiopian, Chadian, Nigerian, and Somali refugees that he met while detained.
African refugees tend to rely mostly on other refugees from their country of origin or other refugees
in general and some met while in detention.
When asked what kind of support refugees received from their support networks, African refugees
were more likely to mention empathy and understanding and access to food and basic goods. Somali
and Sudanese refugees tend to rely more strongly on their support networks for food and basic
goods whereas Ethiopians and, to a lesser extent Eritreans, mainly refer to the importance of their
networks in understanding their situation and empathizing with them. Iraqi refugees were the most
likely to mention ‘general information and advice’ when asked what type of support they received
from their networks which links naturally with the previous finding about Iraqi refugees relying
heavily on Libyan friends as their main support network. The results are demonstrated in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Main ways in which refugees rely on support networks
Most refugees rely on support networks for empathy and for access to food and basic good. Iraqis
rely on support networks for general advice.
Previous sections of the report also demonstrated that the greater presence of support networks in
certain locations assists refugees in sourcing housing and sometimes influences their choice of city to
live in. Arab refugees are generally more likely to follow family and friends to particular parts of the
country as family and friends tend to be well integrated and thus, better able to support them in
locating housing and job opportunities. African refugees are less likely to select locations based on
the presence of a community, but do have the tendency to settle in the part of the city where other
refugees are located. For these communities, employment opportunities, cost of living, and security
are more influential in their choice of location but other refugees are sought out for the empathy and
sense of community that they can potentially provide.
The greater presence of support networks in certain locations assists refugees in sourcing housing
and sometimes influences their choice of city to live in, but this is more common amongst Arab
refugees.
Section IV.3.2 also demonstrated that family could constitute a major support network for those
refugee communities that arrived with their families. Out of the 64% of refugees in our sample who
arrived with their family, 46% cite family as their main support network. In the case of Syrians, 91%
arrived with family members and 49% claim relying on them as their main support network while
38% mentioned other refugees.
Family is also a major support network for those who arrived in families.
In conclusion, well-educated Arab refugees, namely Iraqis and Palestinians who arrived a long time
ago, tend to rely on Libyan friends; Syrian newcomers who arrived with large families tend to rely on
their families and do not engage as much with Libyan society as they look forward to returning to
Syria and African refugees ten to rely on each other as their main support network.
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4.2
Final Report
Access to Information
Access to information for refugees over several subjects such as education, employment, legal issues
and general problems are very much linked to the nature of their support networks. Large
proportions of refugees rely on other refugees or friends from their country of origin when seeking
information.
Figure 35: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they need advice about the education system
Figure 35 highlights the main ways in which each refugee community in our sample accesses
information about the education system. As can be seen, ‘friends’ and ‘other refugees’ are the most
commonly mentioned responses across the entire sample. For African refugees in the sample, these
constitute the main avenues for information with very few other options, whereas for Arab
communities the Ministry of Education and ‘schools’ are more commonly cited. For Iraqi and
Palestinian refugees the Ministry of Education constituted the main source of information.
Unfortunately, 18% of Eritreans and 17% of Ethiopians said they have no avenues for information
about the education system, which is significant, especially given that only 4% of the entire sample
was in the same situation. However, 9% and 11% respectively did cite the UNHCR as an information
source, which is the highest out of any of the communities interviewed. The percentage of refugees
across the entire sample that quoted the UNHCR as an information source for education information
was only 4%.
The media was very rarely mentioned and did not emerge as a significant avenue for information for
any of the communities. However, it is to be noted that the only communities that did mention it
were the Arab refugees in our sample (4% of Iraqis, 2% of Palestinians, 2% of Sudanese, and 1% of
Syrians) perhaps indicating their better economic situation and that language potentially opens up
greater opportunities for information.
Similarly, when confronted with legal issues, Arab refugees were more likely to seek official avenues
for information and to have greater options at their disposal. Figure 36 demonstrates that Arab
refugees are likely to consult lawyers or visit a Libyan court to obtain advice about legal issues.
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Figure 36: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they need advice about the legal system
The trends for information about the legal system follow closely the trends cited above for
information about the education system. One again, it is concerning that 14% of Eritreans and 18% of
Ethiopians have no venues for information and this time 11% of Palestinians join them. Another
surprising trend is that 42% of Sudanese refugees and 11% of Palestinian refugees claim that they
would go to the police for information about the legal system, perhaps indicating that Arabic
speaking refugees do not share the same apprehensions about making themselves known to the
authorities as their African counterparts. This is the case even though the majority of Syrians
intentionally do not register with the UNHCR (in case they decide to go back to Syrian under the
current regime in which case evidence of their claims for asylum could create problems for them). On
the contrary, Somali refugees are more likely to turn to the UNHCR rather than local authorities.
When sourcing information across a range of tropics, African refugees tend to rely on other refugees
whereas Arabs seek more official avenues. Africans are less likely to turn to authorities out of fear of
detention.
Nonetheless, as highlighted in Figure 37, when refugees were asked whom they would most likely
turn to if they had a problem in general, 15% of Sudanese, 10% of Somalis and 9% of Eritreans did say
that they would seek the help of the authorities. For most African communities, the biggest problem
they face is mistreatment by employers, and not being paid for work rendered, specifically. This small
proportion did say that they would seek the help of authorities if such a problem arose, despite fears
of detainment. An Ethiopian woman living in Benghazi explained, “When my boss didn’t pay me I
asked for my money and decided to go to the police even though I didn’t have any official papers, but
they did not help me.” However, the majority of the sample of African refugees do not approach
authorities and feel as though they have few avenues for redress for wrongs suffered. As put by one
Somali man in Tripoli “We usually do not do anything, we just try to forget what happened and pray
to God.”
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9
Figure 37: Whom refugees are most likely to turn to when they have a problem in general
Not surprisingly, there is a link between time spent in country and propensity to turn to authorities.
For example, 41% of Sudanese refugees across the entire sample claimed that they would approach
the authorities if they experienced problems of a legal nature and this figure climbed to 57% for
Sudanese refugees in Tripoli who are longer-term migrants having arrived in the late 1990’s.
Similarly, 38% of Palestinians who arrived more than 5 years ago declared that they would contact
authorities if confronted with a problem, whereas only 13% of those who arrived within the last year
would do the same.
There is a link between time spent in country and propensity to turn to authorities, even for African
refugees.
Overall, across a number of issues, Arab refuges in the sample are more likely to approach officials or
authorities for information and African refugees are more likely to rely on one another. Arab
refugees mentioned approaching the Ministry of Education or schools for information about the
education system, and lawyers or courts, for information about the law. Of concern is the fact that a
good proportion of the sample of Eritreans and Ethiopians declared that they had no avenues for
information. The data also suggests that the longer refugees have been in the country, the more
likely they are to approach authorities.
4.3
Access to Healthcare
Overall, Arab communities have greater access to healthcare than their African counterparts. Most
refugees in the sample claim that they visit public hospitals when they need healthcare, although
62% of Iraqis (and a smaller proportion of Syrians, Sudanese and Eritreans) frequent private hospitals
as well (See Figure 38 ).
9
While “God/religion” was not included as one of the built-in responses to this question, it was commonly referred to in
the “other’ field.
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Figure 38: Main sources of healthcare for refugees
While the majority of refugees in our sample visit public hospitals when they require healthcare,
most of them claim to have paid for those services, which limits access for many. In addition, 96% of
refugees in Benghazi and 65% of refugees in Tripoli who declared having received healthcare at some
point, said that they encountered a number of obstacles in doing so; 56% in Benghazi presented cost
as the main obstacle and 20% their lack of official papers, and 43% presented cost and 12% the lack
of official papers in Tripoli. One Eritrean woman in Benghazi explained “I rarely see a doctor when I
am sick because I am too scared to be arrested as I do not have any ID papers with me”.
Arabs have better access to healthcare because of better economics. Africans go to public hospitals
but are still often required to pay.
The fear of detention/deportation is further demonstrated by exploring the link between levels of
integration and access to healthcare. This is demonstrated by Figure 39 below where it is seen that
the higher the feeling of integration, the better ones access to healthcare. This is presumably
influenced by the fact that the less one feels integrated, the less likely they are to want to expose
themselves by visiting a health facility.
The higher the feeling of integration, the better ones access to healthcare
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Figure 39: Comparison between healthcare received and level of integration into Libyan society
When access to healthcare is explored across locations, it is found that refugees from Tripoli seem
more satisfied with healthcare services received when compared to refugees in Benghazi where
issues related to cost and the low quality of care seem recurrent. For example, one Sudanese man in
Benghazi explained “I had a broken leg and needed help but everyone treated me like I was some kind
of anti-government mercenary, even though the fighting stopped a long time ago.” An Eritrean
woman interviewed in Benghazi also claimed to have lost her husband because a private hospital
would not treat him when she didn’t have enough money for the procedure. She explained “The
price they asked for the procedure that my husband needed was too high for me to afford it so they
didn’t treat him and he died.”
Refugees from Tripoli seem more satisfied with healthcare services received when compared to
refugees in Benghazi where issues related to cost and the low quality of care seem recurrent.
Flowing on from this, access to healthcare was much more apparent amongst refugees who were in
employment. Across the entire sample, 81% of refugees who testified to having a job claimed to have
received healthcare when they were sick, whereas only 58% of unemployed refugees had done so.
Figure 40 demonstrates access to healthcare according to (self-evaluated) level of wealth across the
entire sample and not surprisingly, the better ones economic situation, the more favourable their
access to healthcare.
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Figure 40: Comparison between healthcare received and financial status
Refugees in employment tend to receive healthcare when they’re sick whereas the unemployed
don’t.
A link also becomes apparent between assistance from international and/or governmental
organisations and healthcare. Figure 41 below demonstrates that refugees who received some
assistance from the government or international organisations were also more likely to have received
healthcare when it was required. While the increase in access to healthcare for those who have
received some assistance from the government is slight, it is more significant for refugees who
received assistance from international organisations. Some refugees in the sample mentioned
receiving healthcare through local organisations, such as Al Wafa, and sometimes regularly.
However, the data suggests that such assistance is probably more common in Tripoli and less
common in the other locations of the sample as only 33% of Eritreans (and 40% of Syrians) who had
received healthcare in Tripoli declared having paid for it, whereas the figure increases to 100% for
Eritreans in Benghazi (and 71% for Syrians).
Some refugees are receiving healthcare through aid agencies. However, this seems to be rare
outside of Tripoli.
Figure 41: Comparison between access to healthcare and level of assistance received from governmental and
international agencies
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Surprisingly, there seems to be no clear relationship between support networks and access to
healthcare. Not a single refugee in the sample mentioned access to healthcare as one of the main
things that their support network assists them with.
Not a single refugee in the sample mentioned access to healthcare as one of the main things that
their support network assists them with.
Generally, Arab refugees have better access to healthcare as they are in an economic situation to
visit private clinics. While most refugees in the sample said they would visit public hospitals if they
required healthcare, they declared having to pay for this, further demonstrating the importance of
economics in access to health. Hence, access to healthcare also increased with access to assistance.
The other main obstacle for refugees in accessing healthcare is the lack of official status and the fear
of detention, which is more common amongst the African refugees in the sample, which helps
explain why access to healthcare increases with feelings of integration.
4.4
Levels of Assistance and Expectations for Assistance
Figure 42 demonstrates actual levels of assistance received by refugee communities in our sample
and indeed demonstrates that for the vast majority, very little, and usually close to no assistance has
been received.
Figure 42: Main type of assistance received by refugees from international agencies in Libya
While most refugees in the sample did not have great expectations for assistance prior to arrival,
their expectations did exceed what they are currently receiving, as demonstrated by Figure 43 and
Figure 44 below. These figures set out the types of assistance that refugees had expected prior to
arrival.
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Figure 43: Main type of assistance refugees expected from the Libyan government
Figure 44: Main type of assistance refugees expected from international organisations
The above figures demonstrate that most African refugees had very little expectations for assistance,
whereas Palestinians (and Syrians to a lesser extent) expected basic assistance (such as food, water,
and shelter), presumably reflecting the more urgent nature of their situation. A surprising trend
emerges amongst Arab refugees in the sample, with greater proportions of them having expected
financial support from international organisations, compared to the African sample where it is much
less pronounced.
Africans had very little expectation for assistance prior to arrival. Arabs had higher expectations in
terms of basic assistance and financial assistance.
The data also suggests that refugees who arrived more recently have higher expectations from
international organisations than those who have been here sometime. Only 9% of refugees who
arrived one month ago or less did not expect any assistance from international or governmental
agencies while this increases to 25% for those who arrived more than 5 years ago. Despite these
expectations, however, levels of assistance have not changed since the revolution, from the
perspective of the longer-term migrants; 77% of those who had settled in Libya prior to the
revolution said that assistance levels had not changed post-revolution.
Refugees who arrived more recently have higher expectations for assistance but from the
perspective of migrants, assistance levels have not changed since the revolution.
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When exploring the nature of assistance
received by refugees and the effect that this
subsequently has on their standards of living,
interesting trends emerge. The data suggests
that refugees who have been given official
status (that is, they were determined to be
refugees by the UNHCR) are in a better
situation than those that have received
financial support or basic assistance (food,
shelter, etc.). When type of assistance received
was cross analysed with perceptions of ones
Image 10: Living quarters of Somali refugees in Abu Salim
financial situation, it became evident that 75%
of refugees who had been granted official status considered their current (self-evaluated) financial
status to be wealthy or average. Conversely, 93% of refugees who received financial support and 78%
of refugees who received basic assistance consider themselves as either poor or very poor. However,
it should be noted that the majority of refugees in the first group arrived more than 5 years ago and
are Iraqis while the majority of the refugees in the second group are Africans who arrived within the
last year and preceding sections of this report have demonstrated that Arab, and particularly Iraqi,
refugees seem to be in a better position in general in Libya. However this analysis does suggest that
the granting of refugee status does have the potential to greatly affect the lives of refugees.
There is a possible link between the acknowledgement of refugee status and standards of living for
refugees.
4.4.1 Official Refugee Status
The percentage of refugees who have received official refugee status is low and usually only evident
in a few specific communities (30% of Iraqis and 2% of Sudanese). Such status was only granted by
international organisations and not from governmental authorities, for refugees in this sample. Even
though the size of this sample is modest, some trends do emerge. All of them are refugees who
arrived 5 years ago or more and all are Iraqi men who live in Misrata. There is a spread of ages with
some falling in the 18-25 age bracket, but most of the individuals in this age group were born in Libya
to Iraqi refugee parents.
Official status is almost non-existent outside of the Iraqi community and was granted by
international organisations, not the government.
4.4.2 UNHCR Assistance
As show in Figure 45 a fair amount of refugees do seem to be aware of the existence of the UNHCR.
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Figure 45: Percentage of refugees who have already heard of the UNHCR
However among those who declared knowledge of the UNHCR, very few claimed having ever
received assistance from the organization as shown in Figure 46. In addition, only 38% of them are
African refugees when they are generally the most vulnerable. Observations in the field revealed that
while some refugees were registered with the UNHCR, they did not consider themselves as receiving
assistance from the UNHCR and so registration on its own did not constitute a real link with the
organization in the minds of refugees.
Figure 46: Percentage of refugees who have received or are currently receiving assistance from the UNHCR
Reasonable levels of knowledge of the UNHCR, but low registration and assistance levels.
The majority of Arab refugees who have received or are currently receiving assistance from the
UNHCR live in Misrata or Tripoli while the African refugees in the same situation live in Tripoli (with
the exception of 2 in Benghazi). This can be explained by the relatively easy access to assistance
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provided by the CDC in Tripoli compared to other locations. In the case of Misrata, assistance from
UNHCR is also currently available for Syrian refugees.
Image 11: A sick Somali in a temporary shelter in Abu
Salim
In Benghazi, very few refugees declared receiving
assistance from the UNHCR, which is not surprising
on the part of the African communities there given
the fact that most of them live in a very dispersed
manner and are intentionally quite invisible due to
their fear of being apprehended by militia. In the
case of Syrians, the scattered nature of the
community in the city, lack of a CDC center like
Tripoli as well as political divisions within different
associations of Syrian refugees does not facilitate
access to aid.
Higher levels of assistance in Tripoli and Misrata for Arab refugees and in Tripoli for Africans. Access
to aid is less common in Benghazi for all communities.
In exploring the profiles of UNHCR assisted refugees, it was found that most were living in families
and it was rare for young, single refugees to be registered with the organisation. While all UNHCR
assisted Arab refugees live with family members, this was also the case for 60% of UNHCR assisted
Eritreans and 100% of UNHCR assisted Sudanese refugees (compared to only 31% across the entire
sample of African refugees).
Most UNHCR assisted refugees are living in families, and assistance rates for young, single men are
lower.
Overall, very little assistance is received by refugees throughout the sample and despite rather high
expectations for assistance among newly arrived refugees, from the perspective of migrants
assistance levels have not changed post-revolution. In addition, while most refugees declared that
they had heard of the UNHCR, their registration levels remains low and access to UNHCR assistance is
less common in Benghazi than in Tripoli and Misrata. Official refugee status is almost non-existent,
except among Iraqis, but the data suggests that there could potentially be a positive link between
official refugee status and financial status.
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5.
Final Report
Long Time Refugees in Libya
As a demarcation has appeared at different points in this study between the experiences of those
refugees who have been living in Libya for some time and those that are newly arrived, a specific
section has been dedicated to better understanding the unique experiences of the group of long time
refugees in the sample in order to explore how living conditions and experiences in Libya for refugees
can change over time.
5.1
Profiles
Across the sample of refugees in this study, 19% have been living in Libya for 5 years of more, as
highlighted in Figure 47. The profiles evident within this group are sometimes at odds with the
general characteristics of migrants gleaned cross the entire sample. For example, 48% are above 41
years of age and 27% of them went to university compared to only 10% across the entire sample. In
addition, Arabic is the native language of 83%, which is due to the fact that the majority of this group
are Sudanese (43%), Iraqis (29%) and Palestinians (11%). The high incidence of Iraqis and Palestinians
also explains the relatively higher education levels.
Figure 47: Percentage of refugees who arrived in Libya 5 years ago or more
68% of refugees in this group them live with family members, as compared to 64% across the entire
sample. While the difference is negligible, it becomes more striking for particular communities within
this group. For example, for Eritrean long timers in Benghazi, the figure climbs to 88%.
The majority of long timers are native Arabic speakers and originate from Sudan, Iraq and Palestine.
As a consequence, their levels of education are higher when compared to the rest of the sample.
5.2
Employment
Amongst long timers, employment levels are slightly higher than the rest of the sample (although not
by very much) with 29% declaring that they are currently employed, compared to 21% across the
entire sample. However, 23% of those employed among long timers have been in the same position
for 12 months or more, which is only the case for 5% of refugees across the entire sample. This is
often contributed to by their Arabic language skills, with even the non-Arab refugees in this sample
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having learnt Arabic over the time that they have spent in Libya. Support networks also seem to
contribute to this situation; In the case of Sudanese and Eritreans for instance, 13% of each
community claim relying on friends made in Libya as major support network for respectively 8% and
4% across the entire sample.
Long timers seem to retain jobs longer than the rest of the sample, facilitated by their language
skills and better support networks.
There is a slight indication that this group is more
likely to relocate across various Libyan cities, when
compared to the entire sample, with 72% of long
timers having always lived in the same city in Libya,
compared to 88% across the entire sample. As this
group has been living in Libya for some time,
sometimes 15 years or more (particularly in the case
of Iraqis and Palestinians), they are more likely to
have had the opportunity to settle in a number of
locations. It seems plausible to imagine that
Image 12: African refugees work as garbage collectors, Tripoli
relocation has been affected with the intention of
following economic opportunities as when asked to cite their main reasons for relocating to the city
where they currently live, most said that it was for “economic opportunities” or “the cost of living.”
Across the rest of the sample, the most often cited reasons were “presence of family members” or
“security.”
There is a slight indication that long timers are more likely to relocate for work opportunities or
economic reasons, between various Libyan cities.
5.3
Support Networks
In terms of support networks, 25% of long timers highlight friends made in Libya as their main
support network (for 9% overall), indicating that time in country has assisted integration. Only 25%
cited relatives as their main support network, compared to 33% overall, which is not surprising; as
integration improves and refugees settle into life in Libya, their ability to rely on networks other than
family increases.
Time spent in country enhances contact with local support networks and reliance on family
decreases.
However 24% cited other refugees as their main support network, compared to 20% overall. While
this may be somewhat surprising, it is important to bear in mind that most of them are mixing with
other refugees that are in a similar situation to themselves (that is, have lived in country for a long
time and are well integrated) meaning that this network is probably able to provide more
sophisticated types of support (information on the legal system, contacts for employment, etc.)
when compared to African newcomers who do not know much about the country yet and rely on
other African newcomers to provide support.
Reliance on other refugees does not decrease with time, however, support networks of other
refugees for long timers are more helpful as they are usually other long timers who know the
country well.
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5.4
Final Report
76% of the respondents in this group declared that they feel well integrated into Libyan society,
compared to 42% overall. However, despite high levels of integration, only 56% of long timers said
that they would like to stay in Libya. In-depth interviews revealed that many from this group felt a
shift in security and economic conditions since the revolution, which makes them feel as though
Libya is no longer an ideal place for settlement even though they had lived in the country quite
successfully over the last few years. However, 72% of them are planning to make their journey to a
third country by air and 37% of them pointed out that they would only do so once they had obtained
a visa, indicating less of an urgency to “get out” and a more evaluated decision to do so, unlike the
newcomers in the sample who were aiming to get to Europe irregularly.
Long timers feel integrated into Libyan society but approximately half would like to leave Libya,
through official means, as a consequence of deteriorating conditions post-revolution.
5.5
Living Conditions
When respondents within this sample were asked to evaluate their living conditions in comparison to
their country of origin, most said it was “better,” “much better” or “same as before,” as shown in
Figure 48.
Figure 48: Living conditions for long timers compared to country of origin
It is interesting to note that while Palestinians and Syrians did have a small proportion of long timers
who felt that their lives were worse than they had been in their country of origin, they were also the
only long timers who felt that their living conditions, when compared to their lives under the former
regime, were “worse” or “much worse” (47% of Sudanese and 25% of Palestinians), indicating that
changing conditions as a consequence of the revolution could have affected their feelings about their
lives in Libya in general.
Moreover, when respondents were asked to identify their greatest challenge in Libya, 27% of the
long timers cited dealing with insecurity and militia groups as their main challenge. However, it was
only Sudanese and Palestinians who cited dealing with militia and insecurity (with a small sample of
Iraqi’s also citing “dealing with insecurity”), which they explained was a new phenomenon post-
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revolution. Amongst the rest of the sample finding employment (40%) and securing food access
(16%) were much bigger challenges.
Most long timers believe that their living conditions improved in Libya. The data suggest that
changes post-revolution could be the reason why small proportions of this group evaluate their
living conditions in Libya as worse than in their country of origin.
5.6
Assistance
Overall, 12% of long timers have received some form of assistance from international agencies while
in Libya, usually in the form of financial support, and 11% have received official refugee status, when
positive results among other refugees for both is almost inexistent. Also, 20% of long timers declared
that they have received assistance from the UNHCR for only 9% across the entire sample.
The majority of refugees who claim having received official acknowledgement of refugee status, or
assistance from international organisations or the UNHCR, fall within this group of long timers.
Overall, long timers experience better, or less critical, living conditions than other refugees. They are
mainly native Arabic speakers who enjoy rather high levels of employment with stable jobs. Their
time spent in country has given them the opportunity to enjoy high levels of support from local
support networks. Yet, while they experience the highest rates of assistance amongst the sample and
experience high levels of integration, almost half of them would like to leave the country due to
changing conditions post-revolution.
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V. PERSPECTIVES: SPECIFIC
SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES
Final Report
VULNERABILITIES
OF
The purpose of this section is to focus in on the specific vulnerabilities of specific communities, as can
be gleaned from the key findings, in order to provide a framework for recommendations.
From the key findings a categorisation of three main types of refugee groups emerges: Arab
refugees, less vulnerable African refugees and more vulnerable African refugees, as demonstrated in
Figure 49.
Figure 49: Spectrum of the three main categories of refugees in the sample
1.
Arab Refugees
This category includes long time Arab refugees who have been in Libya for more than 5, if not 10 or
15 years.
1.1
Profiles
This group is mainly composed of Iraqs and Palestine refugees who enjoy high levels of integration
and acceptance by Libyans and relatively good employment rates thanks to their linguistic skills and
shared religion. Some of them were even officially registered as refugees by the UNHCR (28% of all
Iraqis) during the former regime. They are also often well educated and therefore occupy high-skilled
jobs, such as university professors, for example.
While Syrian and Palestinian newcomers share some of these characteristics, they tend to be in low
skilled jobs and have fewer links to Libyan society. Despite this, levels of integration for Syrian
refugees remain quite solid, mainly due to a certain sympathy from Libyans for the fact that the
Syrians are going through something similar to what Libya has just experienced. Palestinian
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newcomers are less integrated and less accepted by Libyans, mainly due to a certain ill feeling
towards them from Libyans who do not appreciate the concessions that were given to Palestinians
under the former regime.
1.2
Employment
The main problem encountered by Syrian and Palestinian newcomers is that they often do not
possess high skills or qualifications for employment, which means that they are not particularly more
attractive to employers than other basic workers on the local employment market. They often end
up in irregular and low-paid jobs, which makes it difficult for them to provide for the large families
that they tend to arrive with. In addition, the unexpected high cost of life in Libya and expensive
rental market worsens the situation and has prompted many of them to rely on their savings to
absorb the gap, which is not sustainable in the long term.
On the contrary, most long time Iraqis and Palestinians are highly educated and find work relatively
easily. Most Iraqis work as teachers, pharmacists or doctors and live in urban areas where their level
of education helps them establish contacts with educated Libyans who become strong support
networks for them.
In the case of long time Palestinians, their access to employment is still quite limited as the majority
is female. However the fact that they all live with family members and have been here long enough
to have established strong networks amongst Libyans that can help them source information and
work opportunities when needed, does not necessarily put them at risk. Indeed 88% of them feel
well integrated into Libyan society, among whom 50% feel completely integrated.
1.3
Insecurity
Insecurity appears to be a primary issue for long time Iraqis and Palestinians mainly because they are
in well-paid employment and enjoy a good standard of living, which can make them targets for petty
theft and crime. Moreover, they have lived in Libya for a number of years so they have a point of
comparison for life under the new regime and perceive a relative state of lawlessness postrevolution. However, the fact that they do not live in the poorer neighbourhoods of Libya, unlike
other more vulnerable refugees, does provide a certain level of protection.
In the case of Syrian and Palestinian newcomers, insecurity is rarely mentioned as a key issue as they
arrived recently and so do not have a point of comparison whereby they can pinpoint a deterioration
in security. Moreover, there seems to be a certain level of sympathy from the Libyan population
towards refugees arriving from Syria (as mentioned previously), which means they are not heavily
targeted.
1.4
In general, Arab refugees experience higher levels of integration, as they tend to blend in more given
their shared language, culture, and religion. Long time Palestinians and Iraqis are particularly well
integrated given the addition of good standards of living and education levels. As demonstrated in
previous sections, 92% of Iraqis and 88% of long time Palestinians declare that they feel somewhat
integrated into Libyan society. Moreover, 48% of Iraqis cite their Libyan friends as their main support
network in the country.
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While Syrian newcomers tend to have stronger links with Libyans than other Africans refugees, their
levels of integration are not as strong as the long time Arabs. While 82% declared that they felt
somewhat integrated, and some mentioned that their Libyan neighbours had helped them financially
with loans, only 9% cited Libyan friends as their main support network (the rest cited relatives of
other refugees). This seems to be because they hope to return to Syria once the unrest stabilises and
see Libya as a purely temporary home. They are more likely to mingle with other Syrians within
Syrian political associations formed here in Libya than to create lasting bonds with other Libyans,
which does not always work in their favour as their Syrian counterparts are less able to connect them
with employment opportunities and provide advice on dealing with life in Libya.
Many of the Palestinian newcomers in Misrata, particularly Al-Zarooq area, also mentioned
significant challenges with integration, which seems to stem from ill feeling toward Palestinians who
had received concessions under the Gadhafi regime, which is unfortunately targeted at these newly
arrived Palestinians. Moreover, while they have arrived from Syria, the political associations that
have been established by Syrians in Libya often exclude Palestinians which keeps them quite isolated;
these associations not only create a sense of community amongst newcomers but also attract
assistance and aid as it becomes easy for organisations to distribute assistance when communities
are established into visible groups.
2.
Less Vulnerable African Refugees
Less vulnerable African refugees mainly refers to African communities who have been living in Libya
for some time.
2.1
Profiles
This group includes Sudanese refugees who arrived in Libya over 5 years ago and tend to be
concentrated in the Al-Krimiya area of Tripoli. While their time in Libya has enabled them to establish
reasonable standard of living (unlike their newly arrived African counterparts who live in precarious
conditions) their self-evaluated financial status is described as poor or average. Access to
employment remains complicated but their technical skills (electricians, plumbers) contributes to
their unemployment rates being lower than other Africans. They tend to experience reasonable
levels of integration.
Long time Eritreans and Ethiopians living in Benghazi can be included in this group as well. They tend
to possess lower skills and find themselves in low-paid jobs. They are mainly women, which makes
them more vulnerable to insecurity. In fact, insecurity is a main challenge for all three groups, much
like it is for Iraqis and long time Palestinians.
2.2
Employment
While long time Sudanese refugees tend to be in more technical positions and work as plumbers and
electricians and in other similar trades, which increases their employability and attractiveness to
potential employers, they do tend to still struggle with ill treatment by employers and clients. They
often mentioned not being paid for services rendered and feel inhibited by their lack of status from
seeking recourse.
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Long time Ethiopians and Eritreans living in Benghazi face similar problems, especially since some of
them are in less-skilled positions such as cleaners or domestic staff and a good proportion of them
are women. Their lack of status, which prevents them from turning to authorities in cases of ill
treatment, is coupled with the stronger presence of militia in Benghazi acting as a further
disincentive.
2.3
Insecurity
The Sudanese community in Tripoli cites insecurity as a major challenge as they are in generally
regular employment and live in neighbourhoods where they are relatively better off than their
neighbours, making them more targeted.
For long time Eritreans and Ethiopians from Benghazi, the issue is somewhat different as they are too
poor to be targeted by thieves, however, the frequency of clashes in the city, which was non-existent
before the revolution, causes them to cite insecurity as a main challenge. Moreover, the fact that the
majority of them are women also increases their vulnerability in the face of such clashes and general
lawlessness.
2.4
The relatively high level of contact that long time Sudanese refugees enjoy with Libyans can be
similarly explained by the areas that they live in, which are populated by less wealthy Libyans that
are more likely to be open to connecting with their Sudanese neighbours, and their generally higher
education levels. 20% of Sudanese respondents across the sample declared that they had daily
contact with Libyans when this was almost non-existent amongst other African refugees in the
sample.
For long time Eritreans and Ethiopians from Benghazi, their levels of interaction with Libyans are
similar to those of the long time Sudanese, as described above, as they tend to live in areas of
Benghazi where their standards of living are similar to those of their Libyan neighbours who are not
very wealthy. Such bonds ease their living conditions but do not make them less vulnerable to issues
related to their lack of official status.
3.
More vulnerable African Refugees
Finally, this last category of refugees is composed of two main groups of refugees namely African
newcomers originating from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur); as well as a long time
Sudanese community living exclusively in Al-Wahishi area, Benghazi.
3.1
Profiles
Most are less than 30 years of age, if not 25-year-old men who consider themselves to be very poor.
They live in basic rented places or abandoned shelters with large numbers of other refugees, very
often without family members.
Their levels of integration are very low as they live amongst themselves on the outskirts of urban
areas and Libyan society (for example, in the Abu Salim area of Tripoli or Al-Wahishi in Benghazi), in
quite poor areas comprised mainly of refugees or migrants.
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In addition, their lack of ID papers makes them particularly concerned about being apprehended by
authorities and causes them to remain invisible and to live amongst themselves. They rely exclusively
on other refugees and have low levels of assistance from aid organisations, which usually takes the
form of financial support or the provision of basic goods.
These factors create a concerning situation where these communities, due to the fact that they are
isolated, invisible, and inaccessible, are highly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Moeover, this
precarious situation causes many of them to decide to move on to Europe, by boat, even if that was
not the initial intention. This again, exposes them to incredible risk and vulnerability; the journey is
very dangerous, many of them do not survive it, and they place their fate in the hands of smugglers
who do not have their best interests at heart.
3.2
Employment
African newcomers are low-skilled workers, which decreases their employment possibilities and
opens them up to significant vulnerability in the workplace. Employment is hard to come by, as low
skilled positions are scarce and irregular. Moreover, they are in direct competition for a limited
number of jobs with economic migrants from countries such as Chad, Mali, Niger, or Tunisia, who are
numerous and speak Arabic, making them more appealing to employers.
They tend to work as daily labourers, on jobs sourced at roundabouts. They are often mistreated by
employers and many complained that employers had not paid them for work completed and
threatened them when they inquired about it.
3.3
Insecurity
African newcomers also mentioned insecurity as a primary issue but for different reasons. They are
less likely to be targeted by thieves, as they are extremely poor, but referred a lot to clashes, which
occur regularly in the poor areas that they live in. Most of them are afraid of being apprehended by
authorities or militia and consequently being detained or deported, or simply harassed. This is the
main reason why they continue to live underground and avoid accessing healthcare or going out of
their way to connect with aid organisations that are not conveniently located close to their living
quarters.
3.4
Levels of integration
Unsurprisingly, this community experiences very low levels of integration and infrequent contact
with Libyans. This stems both from the fact that they experience high levels of racism and ill
treatment from Libyans, and fear detention or deportation, but also because they live amongst
themselves on the outskirts of society, which provides few occasions for contact. This translates into
a lack of access to information on a number of topics and low levels of healthcare, and has
encouraged many of them to want to move on to Europe, even if that was not their initial intention.
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Final Report
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
Specific
RECOMMENDATION 1: Push registration of refugees with the UNHCR, through greater information
campaigns, across all locations, in order to provide status and support.
For various reasons, the majority of refugees are not registering with the UNHCR when they arrive in
Libya. For Syrians and Palestinians it tends to be because they hope to return to their home country
and do not want to create problems for themselves when they do so. Other refugees expressed that
they did not see great benefits in registration and so did not go to great efforts to do so.
Greater registration will not only allow greater control of flows but will also allow greater access for
refugees to basic needs and services. It can potentially also provide more vulnerable African refugees
in Benghazi greater access to means for legal redress and some kind of status to refer to when
confronted by authorities.
For this to be effected, greater information campaigns will be required to communicate the benefits of
registration and thereby encourage refugees to do so and information on ways to affect a registration
process.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Increase status of African refugees through skills training
The most vulnerable of the African refugees usually have quite low levels of education and skills and
find themselves in very low skilled jobs, which prevents them from establishing job security and keeps
them in a vulnerable position. Increasing their skills base will not only assist in decreasing their
vulnerability but will also help integrate them into the labour market, potentially making the local
population and authorities more welcoming. Moreover, moving this community into more stable and
skilled employment will also increase their levels of interaction with Libyans and assist with their
integration.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Increase access to healthcare outside of Tripoli
Lack of access to healthcare is a common problem across the sample, with only the
‘wealthier’ refugees managing to seek healthcare when required. Some refugees in Tripoli
have managed to solve this problem by accessing healthcare through the community
development centre (CDC) but access remains limited to Tripoli. Increasing such initiatives in
other major cities will ameliorate the healthcare problem for many other refugees in our
sample.
Moreover, greater information about the centre and its services will also increase access as
many refugees did not know about it or did not see how it would help them.
RECOMMENDATION 4: Further develop the CDC model
The CDC model could be developed to include satellite clinics across the city, in order to
facilitate better access for refugees. This is particularly pertinent for the more vulnerable
African refugees who live deeply underground out of their fear of detention or deportation
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Final Report
and are unlikely to travel large distances to other parts of the city for services out of their
fear of apprehension.
RECOMMENDATION 5: Launch information campaigns within communities of highly vulnerable
African refugees.
As the most vulnerable African refugees are unlikely to venture out of their neighbourhoods out of
their fear of the authorities, increasing information campaigns within their communities, in areas such
as Abu Salim in Tripoli and Al-Wehishi in Benghazi, to inform them on the types of assistance and the
potential avenues for redress available to them, could be highly beneficial.
Moreover, their negative experiences and lack of opportunity in Libya has encouraged many of them
to make the trip by boat to Europe. Increasing information campaigns in their areas, not only on
avenues available to them in Libya for better living conditions, but also on the risks of the journey to
Europe, and the reality of life for migrants there, would allow them to make more informed decisions.
Moreover, the high level of vulnerability of these communities and the fact that they live together,
isolated, and without links to general Libyan society or aid organisations creates a potentially
dangerous situation and increases their levels of vulnerability. Finding ways to create inroads into
these communities is imperative for their protection.
RECOMMENDATION 6: Provide specific aid for the community of Palestinian newcomers in Al-Zaroog
area, Misrata.
The Palestinian community in this area is experiencing very low levels of acceptance from the local
Libyan community, which seems to be a consequence of former concessions granted by the old regime
to Palestinians in the past. The exclusion of this group from political associations formed by Syrian
newcomers also affects their levels of assistance as these associations attract aid but exclude
Palestinian newcomers. This effectively means that their lack of support from Libyans is compounded
from their lack of links to other Arab refugees, placing them at significant risk.
RECOMMENDATION 7: Make a distinction between the needs of women and men in terms of access
to employment.
Accessing regular employment is key to the integration process of refugees, as has been demonstrated
in various sections of this report. It has also been demonstrated that the needs of women in this
respect are often quite different to the needs of men. The challenges that women face in accessing
employment often affect entire households, especially those that rely on a female head of household.
In particular, Eritrean and Ethiopian women living in Assabri and Assilmani areas in Benghazi
demonstrate particular vulnerability that could be addressed by initiatives to increase women’s access
to employment.
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2.
Final Report
General
RECOMMENDATION 1: Develop collaboration between Libyan associations and national and
international NGOs to implement all the previous recommendations through a common roadmap at
the domestic level.
The different profiles and needs of all communities of refugees are too widespread to be addressed
specifically by one single organization. Implementing a comprehensive plan encompassing all local,
national and international actors along with their expertise in healthcare services, training courses or
general information related to refugee rights would be central to ensuring the viability of such a
project.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Continue working with government for official recognition.
Official recognition of refugee status is key to most refugee issues. Continuing to advocate for official
status, and a national process for refugee status determination, while implementing the other specific
recommendations in the meantime, would be integral to an overall plan to address the vulnerability of
refugees in Libya.
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Final Report
VII. ANNEXES
Annex List
1. Key Informant Interview Guidelines
2. Survey Questionnaire
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Full report

Transcription

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