The Naval Review

Transcription

The Naval Review

•
THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had formed
a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)
It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind
that the fullest capacity can, as a rule, be obtained. There
are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural
gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are
indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise
that the best specialist can be produced only after a long
training in general learning. The grasp of principle which
makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has
been evoked and moulded by high training.
Lord Haldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance with the
Regulation printed herein, which should be carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of 1911
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording
or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the
Editor in writing.
Vol. 86
No.2
APRIL 1998
Contents
Page
EDITORIAL
99
ARTICLES:
OXFORD STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP: AN ADDRESS
THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NATO LED FOLLOW ON FORCE IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
A NAVAL REVOLUTION?
101
106
110
'AN EMPTY BOX' - HOW ACCURATE IS JACQUES DELORS' ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT OF
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION?
BOMBING BAGHDAD - A 'JUST WAR'?
114
118
MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - A POSTWAR HISTORY OF THE BRITISH
CHURCHILL AND THE NAVAL ASSAULT ON THE DARDANELLES - II
121
128
134
SWIMMING TO VICTORIOUS
140
AN INCIDENT IN THE FIRST COD WAR ...
142
143
145
146
147
150
153
154
EXPERIENCE - II
LEADERS AND MANAGERS: CHALK AND CHEESE ...
RADIO ASTRONOMY AND NAVAL GUNNERY: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE...
THE VICTORIA AND CAMPERDOWNCOLLISION, 1893
FROM THE NAVAL REVIEW THIRTY YEARS AGO
END OF AN ERA?
MIDSHIPMEN JOIN THEIR FIRST SHIPS IN THE MED IN 1940
FORBIDDEN AREAS
KIPLING AT SEA
FOR THE ROYAL NAVY, ON THE PROSPECT OF LEAVING THE PAINTED HALL AND THE
CHALK GALLERY AT GREENWICH PALACE, 1998
CORRESPONDENCE
156
157
SUEZ 40 YEARS ON - THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF BRITISH PRESTIGE IN THE EAST HMS CENTURION - THE MANAGEMENT OF FEAR - THE SINKING OF SS KHEDIVE ISMAIL SHIPS IN CONVOY - A LITTLE HISTORY - AFO 1/56 REVISITED - SUBJECTIVE ISSUES - A
CONFUSING ISSUE - HELM OR WHEEL ORDERS - THE SHOVEWOOD - EARTHQUAKE RELIEF
IN 1939 - POLARIS HISTORY
REVIEWS-I
167
REVIEWS -II
179
NEW MEMBERS, OBITUARY AND ACCOUNTS
188
I
Editorial
vast extent. The contact number is 0181 312
6704, Fax 01813126533.
Secondly, the Queen's House is mounting an
exhibition
commemorating
the
300th
Anniversary of the visit of Tsar Peter the Great
to Britain, from 2 April to 27 September. He
learned much about shipbuilding and
navigation, and the British learnt a bit about
Russian ways too. In addition to the Exhibition,
there is a Conference from 9 to 11 July.
Finally, the Open Museum at the NMM is
running a course on the Victorian Navy on
Tuesdays from 28 April to 16 June. An
impressive list of speakers has been planned.
Further information from Caroline Tilbrook on
0181372 6747.
Thisissue
April is the cruellest month ... members who
know their Eliot, and their Editor, may think it
surprising that it has taken 15 years to prise out
that quotation. Well, it has happened now. This
issue does seem always to generate an
immensely varied crop of contributions,
exceptionally difficult to summarise in an
Editorial.
If anyone is looking for a theme, therefore,
they will look in vain I fear. We can instead, I
am delighted to say, find a rich spread in both
historical time and topic: from an authoritative
statement of joint and maritime policy (both
words carefully chosen) from the Deputy
Commander of the Fleet through a
reassessment of the Revolution in Military
Affairs, interesting appraisals of Bosnian and
Iraqi issues, the WEU factor, to Maritime Rules
of Engagement ... certainly members may look
for a read-across from each of those to the next.
Finally, of the contemporary articles - and
this is not to discount the value of the historical
material that is also well represented - I hope
members will not be daunted by the dense
structure of 'Leaders and Managers'. I don't
think Alston meant it to be easy reading, but he
did mean it to be read.
Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association Essay
Prize
To encourage a well informed debate upon the
important contribution Naval Aviation has to
make to the Defence of UK interests worldwide, including the promotion of the Nation's
economic well-being through regional stability,
the Fleet Air Arm Officers' Association has
established an annual Essay Prize of £500 to the
most significant entry.
The topic for 1998 is to be focused on the
important issue of the Carrier Replacement
Programme and should be encompassed within
the broad title Carrier 2000: A Consideration
ofNaval Aviation in the Millennium. Entries of
five to ten thousand words are invited from
Serving Officers of the Royal Navy or Royal
Marines, or Officers of any other Service who
have served with the Fleet Air Arm. Essays
should be submitted to Director Naval
Historical Branch at 3-5, Great Scotland Yard,
London SW1 2HW, marked 'FAAOA Essay
Competition', to be received by 31 May 1998.
A decision on the winner, assuming it is of
sufficient merit, will be made by a panel of
judges whose decision is final. Copyright of the
winning entry will belong to the FAAOA who
would expect to print it in professional journals
as well as their own journal 'Fly Navy'.
The Guinness Prize 1997
There was, almost inevitably, no embarras de
richesse in candidates for the 1997 Guinness
Prize (awarded for the best article by a member
of the rank of Lieutenant or below) as there was
in 1996. There was however a clear winner
with an article of exceptionally high quality:
Lieutenant George Franklin in 'Learning to
Learn' displayed clarity of thought and
~xpression as well as ample research skills.
Many congratulations then, and £150, to
Lieutenant Franklin.
'lational Maritime Museum
The Museum rates three paragraphs, albeit
Jrief, this time. The first is the longest-term: the
\1useum reminds users of its Picture Research
~oom, still in operation in spite of the extensive
mgoing works. The collection, both of
Jhotocopies of pictures in the NMM's
Jossession and of original photographs, is of
Binding service
In the January issue the Secretary-Treasurer
offered his services in arranging a binding
99
100
EDITORIAL
service for members. Take-up on this has been
slow so the notice is being repeated just this
once. Anyone interested in getting their back
copies bound, at a cost per volume of about
£30, please contact the Secretary-Treasurer on
01243 782553 (preferably after 18(0), or Fax
01243 775285, or of course by post.
General Meeting of The Naval Review will be
held in the Gunroom at The Naval Club, 38 Hill
Street, London WI at 1730 on Wednesday 27
May 1998. Members will be most welcome and
need merely to identify themselves to the
Club's receptionist on arrival.
RICHARD HILL
Annual General Meeting
By courtesy of the Committee, the Annual
Oxford Strategic Studies Group: An Address
Introduction
y
subject tonight is Maritime
Manoeuvre - or perhaps for reasons
which should become clear, the maritime
contribution to the manoeuvrist approach. Let
me begin, if so well-informed an audience will
forgive me, with some brief remarks on the
changes that affect the international security
context for this is, or certainly should be, the
starting point. And my starting point is the
changed strategic situation. When I was staff
college commandant in 1988, I used to tell my
students that the Soviet Union was about to
collapse and we had better think about it; well
now it has and we can all agree that life has
changed and that change has removed the cold
war lid from the international cauldron,
disturbed the strategic symmetry of that era
and ushered in a much greater use of the threat
of force to coerce and a corresponding need to
revert to force to back up diplomatic and peace
support activity.
It has, of course, been absolutely the norm
to see the collapse of the Berlin Wall as ending
a 40 year rift across Europe. But it has also
marked the end of a rather longer period of
strategic inertia. And in the case of Britain it
was the first time in over 200 years that we
were in a position to think about politicostrategic issues, freed from the immediate
need to defend our own territory.
Since 1793 our hands had been tied in this
way first by the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, then by the gaining and
garrisoning of an empire, and finally by two
world wars and the alliance system ofthe cold
war. In fact for almost 200 years the
persistence of a major immediate threat on the
continent of Europe has been, on and off, a
recurrent and constant worry to defence
planners. The recent shift has offered a
strategic choice, and we have at last the
opportunity to return to that enduring refrain
which has always been an essential element of
British military strategy, maritime power. But
let me make it absolutely clear that when I say
maritime power, I do not mean just naval
power, but rather diplomatic, air, sea and land
power deployed on and from the sea - the Full
Joint Monty!
M
101
Then there is the technological revolution.
An exciting feature certainly, but it is a double
edged sword too. For example: C4I advances
by the wealthiest nations add huge capability
but, through their cost, seriously threaten
interoperability; cruise missile precision gives
the west a dramatic coercion capability but
technology has also given our adversaries the
potential for· weapons of mass destruction, a
capability against which it is expensive, for
some nations too expensive, to defend.
A third trend, New Ways of War, is largely
the result of the first two. New ways of war
have developed. Indeed, if I was totally
politically correct I might not talk of war at all.
The Gulf War was a good example ofjust how
much things have changed:
There was time to build up forces,
develop political and military pressure,
and choose the moment of attack.
There were guaranteed and relatively
secure points of entry. There was almost
unlimited host nation support.
And the sea lines of communications,
on which so much depended particularly
during the mounting phase, were
unchallenged.
But in the uncertainty of life, it would be
very dangerous to use the Gulf War as our
only template. For it could all be very
different:
Disputes can flare up and spread, often
quicker than we can respond.
Overflying rights cannot be guaranteed
- and we have seen examples. For
instance in March '97 when the RN's
Ocean Wave deployment took on the
flying role for Op Jural over Iraq, or
during the current Iraqi crisis, when it is
by no means clear that host nations will
allow their bases to be used for all the
purposes we might intend.
Indeed the plain fact is that we cannot
be certain in all circumstances of
airfields, ports, and neighbouring states
willing to give support. This is hardly
surprising nor is it unreasonable.
Different countries inevitably have
different perspectives and interests.
There is a considerable proliferation of
102
advanced weapons notably, from a
mantlme
perspective,
the
wide
proliferation of conventional submarines.
How different the Gulf War supply lines
might have been if Gaddafi or some other
difficult leader had had a couple of
operational boats. Iran already has the
missile and submarine capability to close
off the Straits of Hormuz - what price sea
lines of communications then? And how
would we cope with a significant land
based anti-ship missile capability if we
could not attack it from the air because
we could not get near enough?
So, while the Gulf War was certainly a
milestone in terms of international diplomatic
and military co-operation there are dangers in
seeing it as a paradigm of all future military
activity.
Nonetheless, looking as far ahead as we can
see for, as Churchill remarked, it is unwise
and difficult to look further, there are at least
some constants. As a given, operations seem
certain to be at some distance from the UK and
probably to be coalition in character. They are
likely to be expeditionary and focus on the
littoral for this is overwhelmingly where
people live and issues are decided. This means
deployability and strategic lift and it means
access to entry points. These operations will
be to a large extent discretionary. Casualties
will be politically difficult to accept.
Operations may well be difficult to terminate
and withdrawal may become as much, and as
difficult, a part of our operational vocabulary
as entry. It will be necessary to identify the
points of maximum leverage, the fulcra of
political influence which may be as much
psychological as material.
I could go on but I hope I have shown that,
for military planners, we are a long way from
the certainties and clearly drawn scenarios of
the cold war and are dealing with a variety of
pieces of string of quite indeterminate lengths,
and, indeed, of unknown and untested
elasticity.
I think at this stage a definition of terms
might be useful with regard to Manoeuvre and
Manoeuvre Warfare. Manoeuvre is defined as
force which comprises movement plus fire, or
fire potential, to achieve advantage.
Manoeuvre Warfare is defined as a style of
warfare which seeks to collapse an enemy's
cohesion and effectiveness through a series of
rapid violent and unexpected actions that
create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating
situation with which he cannot cope.
I would claim that this changed military and
political world is a world for which maritime
power was designed. I have already said, and I
want to repeat and underline that maritime
power does not mean naval power in the
narrow sense. It means the use of the sea - that
wonderfully free route to almost anywhere to deliver sea, land and air power to the point
of decision; to provide transport, mounting
bases, airfields for all comers, store depots,
barracks, fire support, refugee havens and
even entertainment whenever it is needed, and
to shelter and protect it, given the right
equipment. It is a thoroughly joint
contribution to a joint endeavour although I
shall necessarily lean tonight on naval
examples because that is what I know about.
There will, I know, be those who will talk
about its relatively low speed - and I hope that
they will challenge me in the debate that
follows this because there are issues worth
exploring here.
Of course not all operations will directly
involve maritime forces. However a
significant proportion are likely to be
conducted around the periphery of land
masses, where centres of population,
resources, industrial production, political
control and trade are concentrated, and where
crises involving British interests may occur.
Effective operations in these 'littoral' areas,
which straddle the boundary between land and
sea, are potentially of crucial importance
either as the scene of an operation itself or as
the focus for deploying and sustaining forces
deeper inland.
Maritime, land and air forces have different
but complementary attributes. For example:
the sustained reach, forward presence,
mobility and leverage of maritime forces; land
force capacity for shock action, protection and
the ability to take and hold ground; and air
power's ubiquity, speed, responsiveness and
reach. As an element of joint operations, use
of the sea offers unique access, in terms of
movement, concentration of fire-power,
surprise or overt presence, to gain an
advantageous position. Maritime forces can be
used to deter an aggressor by deploying into a
region at an early stage, at virtually no risk and
if necessary, in considerable strength; they can
then apply packages of mixed land air or sea
force against key targets, if appropriate, to
prevent or impede a potential aggressor from
using force, with limited danger of major
escalation. In other words as well as
supporting operations on shore, maritime
power can stop crises ever happening or nip
them in the bud.
In sum, I believe the sea is for us a preeminent medium because, above all, it
provides that fundamental element - the ace in
the pack - Access. By history, tradition and
skill we are better placed, certainly than any
other European nation to exploit this medium
and to develop a theory of Manoeuvre
Warfare based on the joint use of the sea - a
theory which is rooted in traditional virtues
yet highly relevant to and congruent with
modern needs, well-established in doctrine
and providing as much strategic choice and
operational flexibility as is likely to be
achievable. Let me refer to it as a composite
joint projection capability and set out to
describe its components and explain its
application.
What we are talking about is a balanced,
versatile force to confront a range of
scenarios. It needs lift, combat power,
sustainability, flexibility and the minimum
possible dependence on outside help. It must
integrate and exploit joint assets, 'co-operate'
with other, perhaps unfamiliar, partners. It
must be deployable not simply transportable.
How about these things as a basis:
Real Time Forward Intelligence.
Deployable air power tailored to the
operation.
Surgical Strike of the type afforded by
Cruise Missiles.
Land forces able to secure entry
without necessarily having access to
ports or airfields.
Attack Helicopters.
Fire Support.
Protection and sustainability, including
103
care of casualties.
Special Forces.
Strategic C4ISR suitable for a
commander of any cloth, as appropriate
for the operation.
All of these things are already available to
us in UK and able to deploy across the
maritime space to wherever we need them. If I
had listed instead:
Aircraft Carriers with tailored Air
Groups (including of course RAF and
Army aircraft).
Submarines and TLAMs for both
intelligence and stealth.
An amphibious capability followed up
by armoured land forces.
Fleet fuel and heavy store auxiliaries
and ROCONS.
Air defences, ASW & MCM assets.
Organic helicopters.
Gunfire and Offensive Air Support.
The huge C4I power of the JFHQ
(Afloat),
you would properly have accused me of
promoting the RN. But I am not. I am listing
those elements of naval capability which can
contribute to the joint manoeuvre and
projection force to bring about the resolution
of a problem on land where it must necessarily
be resolved. The point is, you see, carriers,
command platforms, amphibious and logistic
capabilities are a service I, as an Admiral,
offer to whichever commander and force
elements need to use them.
And how will they be used? The modern
operating space is most likely to be a joint
operating area (lOA), and on many occasions
as we have already seen will be a three
dimensional area spanning sea and land - the
Littoral.
The actual conduct of the likely sort of
operation within this space will generally
require four phases - Defining the JOA,
Shaping the JOA, exploiting the JOA and
subsequent operations (which ~ay range from
developing large scale force, through peace
enforcement or peace keeping to termination
whether successfully or under unfavourable
conditions). I mention this last because there
tends to be an assumption these days that our
military operations will necessarily be
104
successful. This is a very risky assumption and
the problem of force extraction under attack is
a very demanding one in which you may have
to rely solely on your own assets that you have
brought with you, and can control.
The key feature of all these phases is to
bring and apply the right tool to the right task
in the right place at the right time. Experience
has shown us that tools are often most usefully
applied if applied early, which is why we have
always aimed to deploy our ships widely
rather than keep them at home - it is not an
accident but usually planned that ships are so
often in an area of interest, ready to make their
impact at a time and precise point of political
choice. Indeed, the freedom of the seas,
freedom for use, freedom from boundaries and
frontiers is why the sea is so valuable an arena
for joint force manoeuvre. And here perhaps I
should remind you of a fourth dimension to
the joint picture - the political dimension. For
once manoeuvre begins and we have to
consider graduated application of force, the
political process absolutely must go hand in
glove with the military process.
I hope that I have created a picture of a
theory of manoeuvre, based on the use of the
sea as a free and open medium of deployment,
designed to bring a carefully co-ordinated
joint force package under the command of the
most appropriate commander into a position to
apply a precisely targeted military lever in the
manner best designed to achieve the desired
political aim. Let me now be a little more
concrete about some of the detailed military
features of this package. I want to outline now
just four things - Adaptive Force Packages,
Platform to Objective Manoeuvre, Precision
Attack and Sea Basing.
In many respects, Adaptive Force
Packages, that is force packages tailored to the
task in hand, are an obvious idea. What is
perhaps less obvious up to now is the full joint
flavour of these. There has, for example been
a tendency to regard aircraft carriers as naval
units, purveying Naval aircraft almost in
competition with the Air Force. This is
nonsense. Of course, aircraft are best operated
from properly equipped land bases but these
are not always available. So we must learn to
see aircraft carriers as joint airfields operated
by the Navy for all three services and,
hopefully, other nations. This may allow us to
produce force packages which are not only
militarily tailored and integrated but
politically tailored and integrated too. The
UKlNL Amphibious Force is another example
of the latter. One could go on on this theme but
I hope the point is clear.
Now let me tum to Platform to Objective
Manoeuvre. This is where the shaping and
exploiting phases of a campaign really start.
The important feature here is to understand
that this phase really must be three
dimensional if it is to have the pace and power
to overwhelm the opposition's command,
control and will - shades of Liddell-Hart
perhaps. Anyone who tells you that
amphibious assault or parachute vertical
desant are the only way to conduct entry
operations is living in the past. We have to
develop a joint three dimensional approach to
this subject though from a maritime
perspective you will at once see the key role of
both tailored Carrier Air Groups and
Amphibious Forces and perhaps I should
mention the revival of raiding as a manoeuvre
option.
The same general thought colours my view
on Precision Attack which is also a truly three
dimensional business. Indeed we particularly
need to remember the fourth (political)
dimension here because it is an area in which
the key political needs of minimum casualties
to our own side, minimum collateral damage
to the other side and maximum use of the
appropriate fulcrum are vitally important.
Thus, whilst raiding parties, special forces or
more thoroughly constituted land forces may
be appropriate, so too very often will be the
precision of long range sea based (and
therefore relatively invulnerable) cruise
missiles, smart artillery and, of course,
aircraft. In this latter context it is worth
remarking on the great amount of work we,
the RN, and the RAF have put in to
developing the operation of RAF ground
attack GR7s from our aircraft carriers recently
demonstrated in Bosnia and, as we speak,
deployed in the Gulf. This really is the way
ahead.
Finally, before attempting a brief summary,
I want to mention the four dimensional virtues
of Sea Basing. I think I have said enough to
convey my firm belief that sea platforms are
flexible joint assets, which provide ideal
vehicles for area services, weapons and
resources of all sorts, most importantly in the
area of logistics and sustainability, all of it
.well adapted for its prime purpose of
facilitating and supporting land operations in
pursuit of political ends. But Sea Basing has
other advantages too. Crucially, from a
political (and of course practical) point of
view, it allows the projection of force to be
carried out with a very small land footprint,
reducing financial and diplomatic cost and
concentrating and easing the protection
problem; any of you who witnessed the
problems of the deployment of 24 Air Mobile
Brigade to Bosnia as a theatre reserve in the
summer of 1995 will recognise the value of
this. It allows, too, the exercise of Joint Force
Command from offshore unless and until it is
more sensible to move ashore; the digitisation
of the battle space may make this even more
valuable. It allows the maintenance in theatre
and convenient re-supply of all the
impedimenta that
make
up
logistic
sustainability.
And
lastly
it
allows
considerable in-theatre tactical mobility
(manoeuvrability in terms of this talk) - up to
400 km a day along a coast providing
opportunities for tactical surprise and
exploitation. A powerful hand indeed.
Let me now attempt a summary, although I
fear that in some areas I have skimmed the
surface. I have tried to proceed from an,
admittedly, somewhat swift description of the
way the politico-military world currently is,
via a smuggled assumption that we in Britain
can and should playa significant military role
in the management of the world, to some
thoughts about what that means for the
planning and use of military force where that
is an appropriate instrument. I am suggesting
105
that, in these new circumstances, a theory of
the use of military force based principally
upon the principles of Joint Adaptive Force
Packages and the philosophy of Manoeuvre
Warfare is appropriate. I have argued, and
believe as strongly as I can say, that this use of
force must be four dimensional, integrating
air, land, sea and political aims and tools. And
I have suggested that all of this enhances the
traditional worth of maritime assets flexibility, low political risk, access, reach,
mobility and sustainability
allowing
maritime power to be employed across the
range of crisis and political activity, and
conferring the ability to give an almost infinite
range of signals.
I have proposed a view of maritime force as
being, above all, joint and one in which the
naval assets are to a large degree the servants
of purposes which frequently, not always, but
frequently will be finally executed on shore
and by land forces. But I hope also to have
persuaded you that Maritime Manoeuvre, the
maritime contribution to this venture, offers a
more sensitive application of force or
influence, enabling intervention at a time and
place of political choice, and an opportunity to
exploit joint assets in a more manageable risk
environment.
Importantly the assets available to us today
by and large allow this approach to be adopted
- and incremental improvement, which is both
technically easily feasible and, given clear
thinking, financially affordable will enhance
the effect. Perhaps I might close by
remembering Lord Grey's 1912 remark that
'the British army should be a projectile to be
fired by the British navy' and suggesting that
today he might say something more like 'air
and land power are precision munitions to be
launched from the sea.'
J. J.
BLACKHAM
VICE ADMIRAL
The Requirement for a NATO led follow on
force in Bosnia Herzegovina
Introduction
HEN the Stabilisation Force (SFOR)
took over the responsibility for military
operations in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) on 20
December 1996 United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1088 mandated
that all NATO-led forces would be withdrawn
from BiH by 20 June 1998. These forces
would then subsequently be withdrawn from
Croatia and redeployed and reassigned. At the
time that SFOR was sanctioned, there was
optimism that an 18 month mandate would
suffice in achieving the end state of selfsustaining peace in the country. This was
premised on the successes of its predecessor,
the Implementation Force (IFOR), in halting
the fighting between the Former Warring
Factions (FWF). It was determined that a force
approximately half the size of IFOR could
continue to provide the safe and secure
environment required for the International
Organisations (10) to conduct their work in
establishing democracy to the country and
facilitating the return of the hundreds of
thousands of displaced persons, refugees and
evacuees (DPRE), who had been displaced as
a result of the conflict. Although significant
progress has been made in BiH, sadly the
conditions for a complete withdrawal of
NATO-led forces are not prevalent and
therefore the requirement for a Follow on
Force (FOF) to take over post 20 June 1998, is
considered mandatory. This paper aims to
highlight the significant events of SFOR's
tenure to date and determine unequivocally
the necessity for a FOF.
W
SFOR evolution
SFOR comprises approximately 32,000 troops
based in BiH and an additional 3,000 in
Croatia made up of troops from the various
services of over 35 nations. Up to 24 nonNATO nations provide approximately 18% of
the troop strength which is indicative of the
world's commitment to the problem in BiH. A
total of 27 ground manoeuvre battalions are
based in BiH and are distributed throughout
the territory of the three Multi-National
Divisions (MND). These divisions oversee a
third of the tOountry each and are commanded
by the framework nations, UK, US, France
and Germany. These combat battalions are
supported by effective air power and strong,
mobile reserves which are based both inside
BiH and outside the theatre, predominantly in
Italy. The reserves comprise the Operational
Reserve which is an air mobile reserve based
in BiH and exercised regularly, capable of
providing reinforcement to any of the three
MND sectors quickly and the Strategic
Reserve (six battalion equivalents) based
around a US Marine Expeditionary Unit
which is available at 4-17 days notice. This
element of the reserve is exercised regularly
and the next major exercise, Dynamic
Response 98, will take place in theatre from
25 March -7 April 1998 and involve 1,500
troops from six troop contributing nations.
Thus, SFOR provides a credible force of
sufficient strength to enforce the military
aspects of the General Framework Agreement
for Peace (GFAP). This document was the
product of the Bosnia Proximity Peace Talks
held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
from 1-20 November 1995, under the auspices
of the Contact Group. It was subsequently
signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 and
defines those measures that the Parties, the
Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, the Republic
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, agreed to in order to reach a
peaceful settlement of the conflict. Annex lA
of the GFAP deals with the military aspects of
the settlement and is the authority for SFOR to
conduct its business in the country in carrying
out the specific tasks listed.
Military achievements
SFOR's primary task of enforcing the
cessation of hostilities has been accomplished
superbly and BiH remains at peace with the
risk of any military confrontation between
SFOR and Entity Armed Forces (EAF) very
unlikely. The EAF have been substantially
compliant with the requirements of Annex lA
of GFAP and this has resulted in the
106
REQUIREMENT FOR NATO LED FOLLOW ON FORCE IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
establishment of a safe and secure
environment. All EAF heavy weapons remain
strictly controlled in cantonment sites which
are regularly inspected by the MNDs. The
MNDs approve, monitor, and report on all
movements and training conducted by the
EAF and on average, SFOR monitors over 750
distinct activities each month. SFOR also
maintains a visible presence throughout BiB
and especially along the 1,400 km Zone of
Separation which separates the Republika
Srpska (RS) from the Federation through
patrols (150 per day on average) and the
establishment of temporary checkpoints. In
essence, no military activity can be conducted
without SFOR's approval and any attempt to
bypass this authorisation process or deviate
from the agreed activity is met with severe
penalty.
SFOR has also provided significant and
often crucial support to civilian tasks while
maintaining a secure environment and
achieving its military tasks. In particular,
SFOR has been instrumental in supporting a
significant nationwide police restructuring
programme and, since August 1997, has
extended its authority over the specialist
police forces (paramilitary police) in BiH by
treating them as forces subject to the
provisions ofGFAP Annex lA. This has led to
the disbanding of all specialist police and the
confiscation of their weapons.
SFOR has contributed to promoting
freedom of movement by repairing war
damaged transport networks which is
fundamental to the re-integration of the
population. Throughout 1996 and 1997, IFOR
and SFOR have been instrumental in assisting
in the re-opening of the railway network in
BiH. Additionally, 2,566 km of theatre roads
have been maintained by SFOR engineers
with NATO funds totalling $22.7 million.
Additionally, IFOR and SFOR have installed
or repaired 64 bridges. Civilian control of the
airspace and airports in BiB has been
progressing and the Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) has completed initial
inspections of Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo,
and Tuzla airports and all but Tuzla are now
open to civilian traffic.
The military de-mining campaign has
107
developed a significant, operationally
effective and productive capability during
1997. Even during the winter the SFOR
Commander directed that training and reequipping the EAFs should be conducted
when the weather precluded actual de-mining,
so that the campaign could resume at full
strength in the spring of this year. This policy
also strengthened the relation between
demining and training/movement and obliged
the entities to produce detailed plans for
counter-mining operations for 1997 against
priorities laid down by SFOR. Statistics
illustrate the success of this policy. More than
20,000 mines were removed and destroyed
from marked mined areas and an additional
1,100 unexploded objects have been removed.
However, when these successes are put into
perspective, the sheer enormity of the problem
becomes clear. These 20,000 mines represent
approximately 5% of known mines and it is
estimated by the United Nations Mine Action
Centre (UNMAC) that only 50% of the total
number of minefields are documented.
Civil implementation
The long-term success of the NATO-led
military effort depends significantly on the
achievement of the complex civilian tasks
carried out, under the co-ordination of the
High Representative (HR), by the many
international agencies and non-governmental
organisations working in BiH. The mandate of
the HR is to oversee the implementation of the
civil aspects of the GFAP which include the
establishment of political and constitutional
institutions, economic reconstruction, the
promotion of human rights and the
encouragement of the return of DPREs. SFOR
has established close links with the five
principal lOs (Office of the High
Representative (OHR), Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE),
United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), International Police
Task Force (IPTF) and United Nations
Mission in BiH (UNMBiH» and of particular
note has been SFOR's well-coordinated and
executed support to the OSCE during the BiH
Municipal Elections, 13-14 September 1997.
This accomplished one of the most significant
108
steps for promoting democracy in BiH. The
RS Parliamentary Elections held on 22-23
November 1997 were conducted in a free and
fair manner, and the seven types of elections
scheduled for next September will mark
another step in propelling democratisation
forward. Arms Control has been another
notable success with over 6,500 heavy
weapons being neutralised. Co-operation
between the OSCE and SFOR has ensured that
the Entities' arms reductions as stipulated in
the Florence Agreement, met the ceilings
stipulated. A major cause of the war in BiH
was irresponsible nationalist media and the
persistence of this approach led to OHR
requesting the assistance of SFOR in taking
control of the RS radio transmitters in October
1997 and preventing the broadcast of
inflammatory and biased reporting. The
transmitters will be returned once the RS
agrees to restructure its radio and TV
organisation and create a democratic and nonprejudicial media.
The main responsibility for carrying out the
civil tasks lies with the BiH authorities;
however, continuing concerted pressure by the
International Community (IC) is necessary to
sustain momentum in the peace process. The
Sintra and the Bonn Peace Implementation
Council Meetings have given new impetus to
civil implementation of the GFAP and applied
additional pressure on the Parties to move
towards compliance. However, peace and the
institutions of civil society to uphold it, remain
fragile. The war has left a legacy of bitterness
and distrust and this has manifested itself in
extremely slow progress. Areas of particular
concern and which need impetus are the lack
of
functioning
governmental
and
administrative structures, the protection of
human rights, police reform and the rule of
law, a proper economic strategy to include the
fight against corruption and revenue evasion,
and to complete successfully the return of
DPREs. Approximately 150,000 refugees and
160,000 internally displaced persons have
returned, representing about 15% of the
overall total. Almost all have resettled in areas
of ethnic majority. The return of refugees and
DPREs to minority areas, together with the
freedom of movement to do so, have not been
achieved to an appreciable degree and remain
a major stumbling block to progress.
Within BiH, citizenship is not legally
defined and there is still no common flag,
passport or currency despite continual
encouragement, from the HR. Most recently,
the HR has used his powers to enforce a
solution where stalemate persists, but this
approach only highlights the continued
intransigence between the Parties. There are
no public corporations and the full
normalisation of BiH's relations with its
immediate neighbours has not taken place.
The police are still sometimes used to obstruct
the implementation.f.)f election results, do not
deal effectively with politically or ethnically
motivated crimes, are responsible for
documented cases of abuse of persons in
custody and more generally, are not
sufficiently obliged by the political leadership
to advance the goals of the Peace Agreement.
The requirement to bring persons indicted for
war crimes (PIFWC) to face trial at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former
Yugoslavia
(ICTY)
remains
paramount. Although the Croats, under
considerable pressure, have recently handed
over most of the Bosnian Croat PIFWCs, this
issue will continue to cause problems, with the
parties reluctant or refusing to co-operate
willingly with the IC in the investigation and
arrest of suspected criminals within their own
communities. The complete failure of the RS
and the FRY to carry out this obligation is
indicative of their reluctance to comply.
Economic growth
While there is some progress in the
reconstruction of infrastructure throughout
BiH, most projects are still directed at the
Federation because of its willingness to
comply with the Peace Agreement. Except for
some limited areas such as telecommunications, the status of reconstruction
in the RS is substantially behind due to its
intransigence and flagrant unwillingness to
pursue the goals of Dayton. Economic
disparity between the Federation and the RS is
a serious issue. The estimated 1997 Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) for the Federation is
over 2~ times that of the RS. The average
monthly wage for a Federation worker is DM
270 versus DM 85 for a worker in the RS.
Throughout BiH, substantial work remains,
with housing and education system
reconstruction being of particular importance
to long-term stability.
The way ahead
IFOR and SFOR have been the greatest single
contributor to subregional security since the
signing of the Peace Agreement. NATO's
plans to consider options for a multinational
FOF to SFOR post June 1998 have been
welcomed by the IC, for without this force, it
is assessed that the fragile peace would be
broken and the civil war would resume shortly
thereafter. Such a force must be capable of
providing deterrence as well as supporting
civil implementation efforts. In addition, this
FOF must be stationed inside BiH in order to
demonstrate resolve, support the lOs, and
provide for a quick response to any crisis. The
mere presence of a disciplined, capable, and
professional force, backed by clear political
guidance, will deter EAF aggression. It is also
imperative that the force be mission, vice time
dependent, for it iG.-evident that many stalling
tactics have been employed in the past by the
nationalist politicians in the knowledge that
the SFOR mandate expires in June and that the
international resolve will wane.
To realise military efficiency and to
demonstrate international resolve, a FOF must
be built on a core of NATO troops allowing
for non-NATO contingents to be incorporated.
A continued Russian contribution would
greatly assist in military and political crisis
management, and is therefore considered
essential. While SFOR is smaller than IFOR,
it actually assumed more diverse tasks and
became more closely integrated with civil
implementation. The primary military task of
preventing the Entities from resuming
hostilities remains; however, with most GFAP
military tasks accomplished, SFOR has been
able to devote more resources to supporting
tasks. This is clearly the way ahead as SFOR
109
is now able to offer more support to civil
implementation due to the reduced risk of
direct military confrontation and a closer
relationship with civil organisations. SFOR's
continuing support will allow the lOs and
NGOs to maintain the momentum of
economic recovery to spur investment, wider
employment opportunities and inspire DPRE
returns. In order to sustain this momentum,
SFOR must continue with what has been its
key to success: an overwhelmingly deterrent
force with clarity of mission and purpose,
robust rules of engagement, and strong,
unambiguous political support.
Conclusion
The long-term success of the NATO-led
military efforts depends also on the
achievement of the complex civilian tasks
carried out, under the co-ordination of the HR,
by the many international agencies and nongovernmental organisations working in BiH.
The SFOR contributing nations need to
consider, on an urgent basis, how best to build
on the progress achieved so far and how to
accelerate both the pace and scope of
implementation.
In most tasks,
the
commitment and responsibility of BiH leaders
must be emphasised, and they must be held
accountable for their actions. There are also
areas in which international efforts can be
improved and this has been highlighted by the
preparedness of the HR to use his powers to
resolve issues which cannot be resolved by the
Parties themselves within the specified time
periods
laid
down
in
the
Peace
Implementation Council meetings. The IC has
made major investments of time, money and
people to end the conflict and to begin the
rebuilding. Shifting emphasis and resources
from military to civilian tasks will be very
cost-effective for the longer term, and will
provide a solid basis for successful conclusion
of the military mission inside the country.
S. M.
BRAND
COMMANDER, RN
..
A Naval Revolution?
ANY readers will be aware that much
post-Cold War military literature
concerns the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'
(RMA), especially in the United States. New
information-based technologies are alleged to
be ready to transform the character of war,
bestowing unchallenged military superiority
on the only state able fully to exploit the new
information-based systems - the USA, and to a
lesser extent its principal allies. Near-perfect
situational
awareness
and
ever-more
surgically-precise weaponry will allow the
West to intervene wherever it chooses,
virtually cost-free, as during the Gulf War.
Other views are less sanguine, mindful of the
limitations
of complete
technological
superiority in Vietnam and Somalia, to name
just two.
Most definitions of an RMA begin with the
application of new technologies to produce
new operational concepts, with accompanying
organisational change. The result is a
fundamentally altered nature of warfare.'
Where significant technological innovation
simply leads to existing tasks being performed
more efficiently, or in different ways, the term
'Military-Technical Revolution' is coined,
implying less profound change in the overall
character of war. Whichever may be at hand, it
has considerable implications for the future
nature of the naval profession.
In some important respects, the current
RMA has its origins at sea. It was a American
sailor, Admiral Owens, who coined the phrase
'System of Systems" to describe a new era of
warfare,
in
which new
information
technologies transform the nature of conflict.
Precision, Stealth and Information, the widelyaccepted hallmarks of the RMA, have long
been staple elements of operations at sea. Yet
if such concepts actually are not new, just how
'revolutionary' is the application of new
technology to the maritime environment? As in
the other warfare environments, we need to
assess the RMA at sea on two levels: Firstly,
how radically different are the new
information-based and other systems entering
service now and in the future? Secondly, what
does this mean for the future nature of warfare
at sea? Conversely, we should also ask, if naval
M
operations are to be very different in the
future, to what extent is this attributable to new
technologies?
All innovations, technological or not, can be
two-edged swords. It may be trite to say that
change is as much a challenge as an
opportunity, or indeed vice versa, but it is
nonetheless true. This is especially so as
potential opponents may adapt just as much as
we do. Getting the right perspective on the
RMA at sea is important, not as a subject of
endless academic fascination, but because if
the nature of war at sea is changing
fundamentally, we need to understand how
much, in what ways and for what reasons. In
this way we can ensure that whether
technological or doctrinal imperatives are
forcing the pace, the other is adapted to keep
pace.
RMAs are not new to mariner:~. About 150
years ago, warfare at sea had not changed
dramatically for over three centuries. Since
then, weapons technology has advanced more
than in all of Man's previous experience at sea.
Despite a continuous process of change, we
can identify four particularly intensive phases
of development, two largely technologypushed (the mid-nineteenth century industrial
revolution, and the innovations of the 1960s),
and two mainly operationally-driven (both
world wars). By the 1880s iron (later steel)
hulls, steam propulsion and breech-loading
guns truly had transformed the nature of war at
sea, though Mahan in particular was still able
to identity unchanging fundamentals. The First
World War saw mines, torpedoes, submarines,
wireless, and, tentatively, aircraft, making
naval warfare multi-dimensional for the first
time. World War Two brought the maturing of
sensor technology radar and sonar, and of
carrier aviation, and saw the demise, after five
centuries, of the big gun-armed warship.
The period of the 1960s is instructive, not
least because it is largely overlooked in studies
of the relationship between war and
technology, perhaps because there were
relatively few comparable breakthroughs in
land warfare. Nuclear weapons, nuclear
propulsion, jet aircraft, guided missiles,
'smart' torpedoes and mines, 3D radar, and
110
A NAVAL REVOLUTION?
perhaps most significant in view of the current
information-based RMA debate, electronic
warfare, computerised combat systems and
related data links, all appeared or matured in
roughly the period 1955-1967. Equally
important was the assumption by navies of a
strategic bombing role (by means of
submarine-launched
ballistic
missiles),
previously the prerogative of air forces.
If a fifth 'spurt' of technological and
therefore tactical development at sea is now
upon us, what form does it take? Is it simply a
'military-technical revolution' (as arguably the
1960s were), or is it more profound? A recent
series of wargames conducted by the USN, to
investigate the implications ofthe RMA for the
Navy, came to mixed conclusions. 3 Escalating
costs, reducing budgets, equipment lead-times,
so-called 'sunk decisions' (ie alreadydetermined givens), and existing force
structures (over three-quarters of naval units in
service in 2010 are already in commission or
under construction)', all mean that much is
predictable for' the next 30 years or more.
Equally, the types and significance of new
technologies have been so widely studied and
discussed, that the principal features of a
putative military-technical revolution are
known (though we should always be wary of
nasty surprises).
Most, though by no means all, of the new
systems are information-based. The extent to
which they stem from commercially-derived
technologies has been often commented upon.
Most previous innovations this century have
originated from military requirements, but this
has not always been so - steel and steam were
not developed with naval applications
primarily in mind. The greatest changes
foreseen in naval warfare today are focused on
computing power and new communications
networks, leading to 'Third Wave Warfare', or
Information Warfare (IW). Much of IW is not
unique to the maritime environment, but the
US Navy in particular does have its own
implementation
programmes.
One
is
Copernicus, a plan to collate and fuse allsource
information
ashore,
providing
specially-tailored information packages to
units afloat. It is an architecture rather than a
discrete system - it cannot be seen or touched,
111
but exemplifies what Admiral Owens has in
mind with his 'system of systems'. This and
other concepts provide for wide-area
surveillance and real-time data transmission
and fusion, leading to 'dominant battlespace
knowledge', which in tum permits, amongst
other things, 'precision massed fires'. The fog
of war will be, if not eliminated, at least
dissipated.' We should not over-state the
changed role of information at sea, however, as
elsewhere. Fundamentally, the role of
information has not changed. It has always, if
translated into real knowledge, been a prime
need for the warfighter. New technologies and,
importantly, related concepts, simply allow
existing jobs to be done more efficiently and
effectively.
Notwithstanding
the
still
somewhat futuristic claims of I-War
proponents, we have not yet done away with
the need to deliver ordnance on target, and
suggestions that one day we will be able to do
so should, for some time at least, be treated
with considerable scepticism. There is also
doubt as to the real significance of the greatly
increased availability of information at all
levels of command. Does more information
increase 'battlespace awareness', or simply
swamp the decision-maker? Does it allow
greater delegation of authority in 'flatter'
command structures, or concentrate decisionmaking in ever-fewer, ever-more senior hands?
There are other technological developments
to note, in the fields of weapons and sensors.
Supersonic, stealthy, manoeuvring cruise
missiles with multi-mode seekers, hypersonic
(Mach 8 plus) missiles, directed energy
weapons (lasers), and rail guns are the naval
weapons of the future. Advanced hull forms
such as Surface-Effect Ships and Trimarans,
submarines with non-nuclear Air Independent
Propulsion (AlP), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), and 'Stealth' designs incorporating
substantial signature reduction measures, are
all developments coming to fruition. Other
growth areas include non-acoustic submarine
detection, increasing use of satellite
surveillance, positioning and communications,
computer-based decision aids, infra-red
surveillance and tracking and more advanced
radars.
Of particular note is the American
112
A NAVAL REVOLUTION?
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).
CEC is driven by the twin requirements to
defend against current and future advanced
anti-ship missiles, and provide sea-based
theatre ballistic missile defence. It provides
'sensor-netting' such that all participating units
have, in theory, identical tactical pictures,
indeed the same tactical picture, with all source
information of a quality as if it were the unit's
own, and exchanged by horizon-range microwave links. This complete 'sensor-to-shooter'
connectivity is achieved through the sharing of
unfiltered sensor measurement data, rather
than the processed track information
characteristic of existing data links. The longstanding problem of 'dual-tracking' is to be
replaced by the positive advantages of
'composite tracking'. Such an ability certainly
represents a significant advance over existing
coordinated but not integrated individual
electronic combat and weapon systems, but
nonetheless is part of a constant process of
evolution, that began with the first non-real
time data links, video links and Over-theHorizon targeting methods. It is claimed that
concepts like CEC will produce a shift away
from 'platform-centric' warfare towards
'network-centric' warfare. 6 The idea that
individual ships are merely part of a larger,
composite whole, however, would be familiar
to eighteenth century admirals, as well as to the
principal commanders at Jutland, and
notwithstanding the Nelsonian interlude in
between.' Elements of CEC will also provide
new levels of integration with airborne and
land-based systems like AWACS and
PATRIOT, though to some extent this
integration is more novel to the USN than
some others, the RN in particular.
In passing we should note a real concern on
the part of America's allies. The ability to
participate effectively in alliance or coalition
operations increasingly depends on having
connectivity with the dominant partner - the
United States. This is especially so at sea,
where genuinely multi-national forces do
operate together at much lower levels than
elsewhere. No other nation can afford to 'buyinto' the RMA on anything like the same scale.
The ability to operate alongside American
forces is not a new priority, however. And
several factors combine to keep the problem
manageable. Connectivity with US systems is
essential, but not necessarily having all the
same sensor and weapon capabilities.
Connectivity is aided by the increasing use of
'open architecture' systems adhering to
common
protocols,
many
of them
commercially-derived.
The
Americans
themselves are, for political and economic
reasons, giving a much higher priority to
ensuring
technical
and
operational
compatibility with allies, than they ever did
during the Cold War. So while connectivity
with technologically advanced Americans
cannot be taken for granted, it is neither a new
problem nor an insurmountable one.
Not all innovations at sea are technological.
A dramatically-changed strategic environment, as well as the development of new
technological systems, has already brought
about
'revolutionary'
new operational
doctrines. Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that the true RMA is a doctrinal
one.' This is so because, for the first time this
century, the United states Navy and its
maritime allies have no 'peer competitor' to
dispute control of the oceans. Even during the
era of 'Pax Britannica' last century, the Royal
Navy was faced from the l860s on by a
succession of naval rivals, principally France,
Russia and Germany. The demise of the Soviet
Union has removed any conceivable challenge
to Western naval supremacy. The Mahanian
ideal of Command of the Sea has been
achieved by the West, almost by default,
though we should not overlook the role of Cold
War naval competition in Communism's
decline. Suddenly, navies have to address the
exploitation, rather than the winning, of
Command of the Sea. Or at least that is so on
the open oceans. Western Command, or its
lesser brother Control, of the seas is a good
deal less secure in the littoral regions, and it is
precisely in the littorals that they are to operate.
This is so because, with no-one around to
dispute the high seas, navies can concentrate
on exercising significant, even decisive
influence over events ashore, which as Sir
Julian Corbett reminded us, is where great
issues between nations are decided.' The move
into the littorals (other peoples' coastal areas)
ANAVAL REVOLUTION?
is exemplified by Forward Naval Presence,
seeking to have an early, decisive and direct
effect on events ashore, through various forms
of Power Projection. However, in these coastal
regions an increasing number of states are able
to dispute intervening powers control of the
littoral, and western navies face the conflicting
requirements of close-in Presence and standoff precision engagement (enabled by many of
the new systems). Going in 'harm's way' in
other states' local environments challenges the
ability of US forces to achieve 'Information
Superiority',
'Dominant
Manoeuvre',
'Precision
Engagement'
and
'Full
Dimensional Force Protection', all buzz-words
from Joint Vision 2010, the United States'
latest conceptual template. 1O
•
Despite concerns about the extent to which
Western control of the oceans can be exploited
in the littorals, the profoundly altered nature of
naval operations should not be under-rated.
We must also recognise the inter-relationship
of technological and strategic change in the
new maritime environment. Technology
enables navies to perform many of the new
missions required by the new political
landscape, and conversely, doctrinal changes
and innovative operational concepts are also
'pushed' by the availability of new systems.
Though the doctrinal adaptation required to
translate technological innovation into real
change is stressed by almost every writer on
the subject, rather fewer recognise that an
RMA need not have a technological origin at
all. This may, however, be precisely the
situation today. New systems are certainly
enabling navies to do new things, principally
by extending their reach, and also to do old
things more effectively, mainly through better
use of information. But many of the current
and future technological changes are more
evolutionary than revolutionary, and so too,
therefore, is their effect on naval operations.
As ever, the effect of technological change can
also be a two-way street, and where not, is
often offset by asymmetrical styles of
warfighting (in other words, doctrines) that can
do much to negate the advantages of new
systems. Moreover, asymmetries of warfighting may be more than just those of style
and method. In post-Cold War interventions by
113
western powers, their own interests may be at
stake, but hardly the survival of their country
or regime, as it was during the Cold War. For
local states, the objects of such interventions,
the stakes may be a good deal higher. With
more at stake, our adversaries are likely to
show less restraint, and therefore more fully to
exploit more limited means.
True change in the nature of war at sea may
therefore be more 'demand-pulled' than
'supply (or technology)-pushed'. That is, the
altered strategic environment may have far
more to do with the new style of maritime
operations, than availability of new hardware.
The dressing-up of long-established principles
of warfighting in new conceptual jargon
should not obscure the fact that real change has
occurred. Information and manoeuvre are
nothing new, and nor is their importance. True
change at sea lies in unchallenged supremacy
and its exploitation, however partial its
practical application.
J. R. STOCKER
LIEUT. CDR RNR
References
'See Colin S. Gray 'The Changing Nature of Warfare?'
in Naval War College Review Newport, RI: Spring
1996 p.9
'Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens 'America's
Information Edge' in Foreign Affairs Vol.75 No.2
MarchiApril 1996.
'See Captain E. A. Smith USN The Navy RMA War
Games Series: April 1995-November 1996' in Naval
War College Review Vol. L No.4 Autumn 1997.
'ibid p.20.
'See Captain James Stavridis The Second Revolution'
in Joint Force Quarterly No.8 Spring 1997.
'See Stacey Evers 'US Navy seeks fast track to
revolution' in Jane's Defence Weekly 26 November
1997.
'See Andrew Gordon The Rules of the Game: Jutland
and British Naval Command (London: John Murray,
1996).
"See for example Jan Breemer 'The End of Naval
Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of
American Naval Power' in Peter T. Haydon and Ann L.
Griffiths (eds) Maritime Security and Conflict
Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era (Halifax
NS: Dalhousie University, 1994).
9Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy: Originally published 1911, edited by Eric
Grove (Brassey's: London, 1988) p.16.
"See Admiral Jay L. Johnson 'The Navy in 2010: A
Joint Vision' in Joint Force Quarterly No. 14
(Washington DC: Winter 1996-7).
'An Empty Box' - How Accurate is Jacques
Delors' Original Assessment of the Western
European Union?
T
HE Western European Union (WEU) has
been the focus of much attention since its
rise from obscurity in 1984 as part of an
attempt to strengthen the European pillar of
the transatlantic alliance.' This article will
analyse the events, both political and military,
that have led the WEU to where it is now, and
will aim to pinpoint the position it holds
within the critical triumvirate of NATO, EU
and US viewpoints. It will then argue that, far
from being an 'empty box', the WEU, by
embracing and then fully utilising the
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept,
may well hold the key to the conundrum of
disparate defence and security aims within
Europe and across the transatlantic divide and
thereby become the acceptable, independent
continuation lock between the EU, NATO and
the US.
In 1988 the WEU invoked Art. VIII(3) of
the Modified Brussels Treaty for the first time
following the Iran-Iraq war. However it was
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that had the
effect of driving the WEU to become, in an
informal way, the security arm of the then
EC'. The link between the WEU and the EC
intensified during the period of Desert Shield
and Storm when, in an attempt to demonstrate
European solidarity as a significant player in
the Gulf, the Foreign Ministers adopted a form
of shuttle diplomacy between the WEU and
EU forums.' These events provided the
catalyst for the formalisation of the expanding
links between the WEU and the EC with the
Foreign and Defence ministers agreeing in
February 1991 that the WEU, in principle,
should become a bridge between NATO and
the EC<. At the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London a month later
Jacques Delors, in his first ever speech on
security policy, called on the EC to 'shoulder
its share of the political and military
responsibilities of our old nations". He went
on to say that he wanted the WEU to have its
own multilateral forces and to come under the
EC's wing. This statement sparked much
debate and was a view with far from universal
agreement during the series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) held during
the remainder of 1991 which culminated in the
NATO Summit in November and Maastricht
in December.
The NATO summit delivered a crucial
endorsement of the move towards an
integrated European defence policy when it
formally supported the initiation and
development of a European 'Security
Identity'. In the debate the following month at
Maastricht the WEU was awarded a 'stronger
operational role'·, although this has to be
caveated by the fact that there was still
disagreement on the crucial issue of whether
the CFSP should be established with common
defence as an integral part of the union, or
whether the WEU should remain an
independent organisation. This rhetoric at the
end of 1991 was perhaps best opined by the
Economist when it summarised that 'the
Maastricht wording [on collective security
and defence 1 will offend no one; it will
convince no one either".
Having looked at the background to the
second stage of WEU revitalisation post the
Gulf War it is necessary to analyse how far the
June '97 Amsterdam IGC took forward the
development of the WEU. The Summit
resulted in a crucial re-wording of the Treaty
of the Union with regard to the relationship of
the EU to the WEU. Maastricht stated 'the
Union requests the WEU, which is an integral
part of the development of the union, to
elaborate and implement decisions and actions
of the Union which have defence
implications." At Amsterdam the wording
was changed to 'the Union will avail itself of
the WEU to elaborate and ... '9. To examine
the significance of both the change of words
from 'request' to 'avail itself' when
describing the relationship between the WEU
and the EU, and to attempt to rationalise the
reasoning behind the deletion of the
prescriptive definition of the role the WEU
114
'AN EMPTY BOX'
was to have had within the EU, it is necessary
to go to 1995 and examine the member states'
views and, pivotally, the views then held by
the US.
In February 1995 the Prime Minister, John
Major, spoke out strongly in an address before
a special session of the WEU in London
against 'encumbering the Union with military
responsibilities' and argued that it would do
nothing to enhance the EU's political and
economic influence in regional security
issues 10. The British view, shared by others,
was that the WEU should act either as a
'bridge' between the EU and NATO or as a
'wholly owned subsidiary of both'. However
during this debate the Achilles heel of the
WEU, its lack of political machinery and
military equipment to be able to mount
operations and deploy forces quickly, was
uppermost in all politicians' and military
planners' minds. The answer was delivered in
a report by the WEU Council to its Assembly
in March 1995 when it said 'the strengthening
of the WEU's operational role depends ... on
NATO's elaboration of the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF) concept'll.
The degree to which the CJTF concept of a
deployable,
multinational,
multiservice
formation generated and tailored for specific
military operations would be embraced would
be dictated in general by NATO and in
particular by the US. Also, since it would
depend on potentially huge commitments of
US resources to Europe or European derived
interests, public opinion in the US would be
critical. Barbara Conry, foreign policy analyst
at the Cato Institute in Washington, argued
that the WEU, as the 'security arm of the
European Union', should replace NATO as
the prime guarantor of European Security. Her
argument was based on the perception that
whilst Europe has at its heart many common
security interests, in contrast the views of the
US and Europe were steadily diverging 12 •
Happily for Europe and the WEU, Conry's
views were not shared by the Clinton
Administration as, far from wanting to pull
back from their commitments to NATO, they
wanted to embrace Europe and allow it, with
US support, to continue to strive for a united,
peaceful Europe. Having held up the relative
115
success of the IFOR forces in Bosnia as an
example of what NATO could achieve, the US
believed that the lessons learnt could be
applied to make the alliance more effective
and flexible in the conduct of post-Cold War
operations. They envisaged that these changes
would be centred around the CJTF concept
which would allow for greater flexibility in
the deployment of NATO forces and assets
involving different mixes of contributing
nations. A formal declaration of intent,
political and military, was made by the US
Secretary of Defence, William J. Perry, in a
speech to the WEU Transatlantic Forum in
June 1996 when he said '... [the] CJTF will
permit such things as operations led by the
WEU using NATO assets, and it will allow the
European members to strengthen their new
security and defence identity' 13.
So could the WEU be effective with the
crutch of the CJTF and could it mount an
effective operation? The Economist noted that
any CJTF-Ied operation, with elements of the
alliance's HQ structure matched to those
troops involved, could be run by the WEU
'should the Americans choose not to join' the
relevant task force l4 . The distinction is
important. It has to be accepted that US
support forces would be involved in any large
scale or out-of-area operation due to the
inevitable requirement for strategic lift,
intelligence and communications facilities
that only they could provide. As soon as any
substantial front line forces were involved it is
highly unlikely that anything other than a
NATO command structure, with direct US
involvement, would be acceptable to the
Americans. The realistic, although somewhat
cynical, view was that in private the US would
continue to play down the theme of
Europeanisation and argue that there was
unlikely to be a security crisis in Europe that
they would not want to be involved in, and
therefore there would be little need for a
WEU-led force. The French view that since it
had taken some time to involve the US in
Bosnia, then perhaps there may well be an
occasion when Europe would be left alone,
may also have had some validity at the time l5 .
So back to 1997 which would be a repeat of
1991 with dual summits of the EU and NATO
.~~~~~~~~~-------------------------------
116
'AN EMPTY BOX'
in June and July respectively. The Amsterdam
Summit resulted in a political agreement on
the future role of the WEU within Europe. The
carefully crafted statement allowed for
differing conclusions to be drawn by the
member states, with the Telegraph headlining
'Tony Blair last night claimed victory in his
battle to prevent the EU being turned into a
military alliance' .16 It commented that as Blair
had also claimed to have ruled out any
commitment for a merger between the WEU
and EU the foundations for a European Army,
pressed for by France and Germany, would
not be laid. So was Blair's view signalling the
end of the WEU dream? Tim Butcher, the
Defence Correspondent in the Telegraph,
thought not. Also commenting on the day after
the Amsterdam Summit 17 he agreed that
Blair's opposition to the WEU was clear, but
only in terms of it (the WEU) being put
forward as a predominant force to NATO.
However the overall message from the
detractors, principally the UK but supported
by Denmark and the four EU neutral states,
and commentators post Amsterdam was clear;
the WEU was not, and could not be, a
substitute for NATO, but it could and should
be complementary.
The following month the NATO summit
met in Madrid and whilst fully aware of the
revised EU position on the WEU, they were
also clear about the manner in which the US
had laid out its stall with regard to loaning
NATO forces to a WEU-sponsored, CJTF-Ied,
operation. It was therefore not surprising that
the Madrid Declaration reflected what had
been signalled earlier in the year by the US
Secretary of Defence when it declared
'We reaffirm . .. our full support for the
development of the ESDI by making available
NATO assets and capabilities for WEU
operations. With this in mind, the Alliance is
building ESDI grounded on solid military
principles and supported by appropriate
military planning and permitting the creation
of militarily coherent and effective forces
capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of the WEU.
We endorse the decisions . .. in this regard
which serve the interests of the alliance as
well as of the WEU'''.
This unequivocal endorsement of the use of
WEU-Ied NATO forces was coupled to a
directive to continue with further development
of the CJTF concept which went so far as to
note that WEU-Ied CJTF's could allow for the
possible participation of non-NATO forces as
part of the development of ESDP'.
So what of the future of the WEU? It is
clear that NATO is forging ahead with both
the CJTF and a willingness to encourage and
embrace the ESDI which includes the
provision for the WEU. The position of the
Europeans is perhaps harder to define. Britain,
as the strongest proponent against the
formation or adoption of a European Defence
force, argues for maintaining the status quo
with the WEU remaining as an autonomous
organisation but cannot argue against the
concept of its operating as an alternative to
NATO, albeit with full NATO support both
politically and militarily, in an agreed fashion
at an agreed time. This appears, post
Amsterdam, to be the agreed EU line. In so far
as the WEU is concerned, the hook on which a
workable and acceptable NATO-WEU link
can be hung and maintained is of course the
CJTF. With such a ringing endorsement by
NATO in Madrid and, crucially, the support
that the US has given, it would take a volteface of monumental proportions to prevent the
further development of a CJTF structure that
would enable a WEU-led, NATO-supported,
operation being mounted in the future.
Finally, the long-term position of the US
has to be considered. There is no doubt that
the Americans are fully supportive in the open
arena of the development of ESDI, and are
keen to see the CJTF con~pt put into effect
with the WEU leading forces including NATO
units. However, it is also clear that there is not
unilateral support for NATO and NATO
operations beyond the shores of the
continental US. It is not unrealistic to surmise
that the development of the WEU as an
organisation that could lead NATO forces
with limited US forces, and perhaps no frontline US assets at all, could satisfy the US
electorate that their 'boys' were not going to
be drawn into a future European security
crisis.
The WEU has come a long way since 1984
'AN EMPTY BOX'
and, whilst it may not have developed exactly
as Jacques Delors envisaged, it now holds a
key position at the heart of tpe NATO, EU and
US triumvirate. The reasons are not just
military, and certainly not just driven by the
imperatives of European Defence and
Security but does it matter? It has the support
of the EU in its current form as they can avail
themselves of it when required; it satisfies
individual national considerations and it is
backed by NATO and the US. Despite the
somewhat machiavellian manner in which it
has evolved the WEU has an assured future
and, far from being an empty box, it has the
potential to be both effective in its own right
and to ensure a continuing hard link between
Europe, NATO and the US.
R. C. R. WELLESLEY
COMMANDER, RN
References
'Gates, D. (1995): 'The UN and Europe's Security
Institutions: Dashed Expectations?', The Strategic and
Combat Studies Institute Occasional No. 14.
'Duke, S. (1996): The Second Death (or the Second
Coming?) of the WEU', Journal of Common Market
Studies Vol. 34, No.2, June 1996.
'Salmon, T. (1992): Testing Times for European
Political Co-operation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia,
117
1990-2', International Affairs, Vol 68, No.2.
'Duke, S. (1996), n.2.
'Grant, C. (1994): 'Delors, Inside the House that
Jacques Built' (Nicholas Brealey Publishing).
'Gates, D. (1995), n.!.
'Economist (1991) 'Europe's Dutch Treat', 14
December.
"Maastricht Treaty Art J 4.2 (My italics).
'Amsterdam Treaty Art J 7.3 (My italics).
"'Smith, Sir Dudley, President of the WEU Assembly in
'UK Argues for WEU to Remain Autonomous'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (AWS) Vol 144
Iss 11, 11 March 1996.
"WEU Doc 1458 (1995) The Future of European
Security and Preparations for Maastricht II.
"Conry, B., 'The Western European Union as NATO's
Successor', Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 239, 18
September 1995. www.cato.orglpubs/pas/pa-239.htm.
"Perry; William J., US Sec of Defence: Speech 'Second
Chance to Build a Whole Europe' delivered to WEU
Transatlantic Forum, Washington, 25 June 1996.
www.defenselink.mil: 80.
"Economist (1996), 'NATO acquires a European
identity' 8 June 1996.
"Economist 8 June 1996.
"Helm, T & Lockwood, C. 'Blair heads off European
Army' The Daily Telegraph, 17 June1997.
"Butcher, T. 'EU forces lack the clout to take on
NATO's role' The Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1997.
'"Art. 18, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security
and Co-operation - issued by Heads of State and
Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Madrid, 8 July 1997.
"'Art. 17, Madrid Declaration, 8 July 1997.
Bombing Baghdad - a 'Just War'?
HE Gulf crisis over United Nations' time without causing disproportionate harm.'
inspectors carrying out inspections in
In much of the debate I would suggest that
Saddam Hussein's palaces appears to be over some at least have been guilty of muddled
and a bombing campaign averted - at least for thinking. In particular I believe that there has
the present. As a member of the Church of been muddle concerning the legal and moral
England I was interested by the arguments issues as to whether Iraq might be attacked.
offered by church leaders as to whether the The legal and moral issues are separate but
country would have been right to have carried have been identified with one another in some
out an attack on Iraq. A statement by the quarters.
Much Christian thinking about the
Bishop of Oxford, an expert in the ethics of
warfare, suggested that subjecting the legitimacy of war uses the Just War criteria.
potential conflict to the Just War criteria These, indeed, were used by the Bishop of
resulted in no clear conclusion being reached. Oxford and the Archbishop of York. These
He concluded, 'I have spoken to military criteria are a historical set of criteria by which
experts, strategic experts and others. No one any potential conflict can be judged. The
feels at all certain about which is the right, that criteria began with Saint Augustine and have
is, the least destructive course of action.' In subsequently been refined by Aquinas and
his speech in the House of Lords he was bold other figures up to the present day. They state
enough to admit that governments 'may be in that a war is just where (i) it is undertaken by
possession of facts unknown to the rest of us a legitimate authority; (ii) it is undertaken for
and indeed there may be an actual policy that a just cause; (iii) it is undertaken as a last
is different from the declared one. For these resort; (iv) there is a formal declaration of war;
reasons a certain reticence from church (v) those engaging in the war must have a
leaders is appropriate at this stage.' In his reasonable hope of success; (vi) the evil and
speech in the House of Lords, however, he damage which the war entails must be judged
shifted his position a little by agreeing that in to be proportionate to the injury it is designed
the end of the day military strikes could not be to avert; (vii) non-combatants must be
ruled out as an ethical option.
immune from attack; and (viii) the methods of
Then the Archbishop of York set out very war must not result in disproportionate harm
clearly in the Yorkshire Evening Press the for any of the populations involved, or for
problems that would have been involved third parties.
whatever the decision taken. Surveying many
Cardinal Hume's letter suggested that there
of the issues and dilemmas in a similar fashion might be disproportionate harm caused to the
to the Bishop of Oxford, he concluded that Iraqi population. There was also the
'there are no easy options or answers in this suggestion that the military objective itself
present crisis.' He did imply, however, that in was unclear. If the objective was to destroy
the end of the day a bombardment could be Saddam Hussein's arsenal of chemical and
seen as a moral option. Oxford and York biological weapons then this is an objective
seemed very close.
which was unlikely to have been achieved.
From the opposite side of the globe the Chemical and biological stockpiles are simply
Archbishop of Melbourne urged his too mobile. If, however, recognising this fact,
government to reconsider its decision to send the aim were to have been to destroy as much
troops to support the American intervention. of that arsenal as possible but also to inflict
He clearly saw any attack on Iraq as wrong. such damage on the Iraqi military machine
On the Roman Catholic side Cardinal Basil that the delivery of such weapons would have
Hume wrote to the Prime Minister saying, 'I been seriously weakened then such an
must confess to having strong doubts about objective might have been achievable. The
whether it is possible to identify a specific military planners and politicians would have
military objective which stands a good chance had to have made a pragmatic judgment based
of being secured by the use of force at this upon available intelligence. Whether the
T
118
achievement of such an objective would have
involved 'disproportionate harm' would again
be a matter for the politicians and military
planners. Most of us, including Cardinal
Hume, do not have the necessary facts. For
our discussion on the morality of a bombing
campaign it could be argued that the relevant
criteria could have been met.
The more difficult question is to decide
whether, in the words of the Just War criteria,
the bombardment would have been for a 'just
cause.' Certainly Saddam' s arsenal sounds
horrific. According to the United Nations Iraq
may have as much as 200 tons of the VX
chemical, enough to kill everyone on earth
according to the US Defence Secretary,
William Cohen. 1 It is also suggested that
Saddam Hussein may have stocks of
botulinum toxin and bacterium clostridium.
Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary,
said in the House of Commons debate that 'the
volume on which Saddam hopes to produce
such weapons is on such an irrational scale
that it leaves frightening questions over his
intentions. '
I believe that with regard to the possession
of chemical and biological weapons that the
United Kingdom and the United States had the
law on their side. The 1991 cease fire
resolution required Saddam Hussein to make a
disclosure within 15 days of all Iraq's nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their
capacity to deliver them. The maintenance of
the cease fire depended on that condition
being met. Intelligence provided by
Lieutenant General Hussein Kamil, Saddam
Hussein's son in law, indicated that that
condition had not been met. It was he who
provided the information which pointed to
concealment of biological and chemical
weapons in Saddam's presidential palaces.
Legally, therefore, the cease fire became
ineffective. As such one could rightly argue
that the bombing campaign was legal.
However, I would argue that the cease fire
resolution itself, when it was originally
formulated, did not envisage a situation some
seven years down the line when the war might
be restarted. I would suggest that a war ought
only to be restarted following the agreement
of the United Nations Security Council. In the
119
debates in both the British House of Commons
and the House of Lords it was said that we
should not allow the authority of the United
Nations to be flouted. That is correct but I
would suggest again that at this stage of the
proceedings an attack on Iraq should only
have been begun where the United Nations
Security Council had itself officially called for
such action. The statement put out by the
Bishop of Oxford did say that the legitimate
authority for prosecuting a war in this instance
was that of the United Nations. That being the
case I believe that he denied his own premise
when he declared that military strikes could be
seen as a moral option according to the Just
War criteria.
It is all right saying that the authority of the
United Nations should not be flouted; but how
would it have looked if the United Nations
themselves
had
not
sanctioned
a
bombardment? It would have meant that one
half of the Security Council would have been
doing something with which the other half
disagreed. I would therefore agree with Lord
Owen when he said that 'it would be far, far
preferable if we can get unanimity among the
United Nations Security Council and a
resolution authorising the use of force'. The
Foreign Secretary himself seemed at one point
to agree with Lord Owen when he said that
'there should be a further Security Council
resolution to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein
and the rest of the world that any action that is
taken by the US and the UK is action that has
the support of international consensus.' Mr
Cook could have been in the unenviable
position of ordering an attack on Iraq having
failed to have obtained the Security Council's
agreement. Mr Cook wanted the moral
authority as well as the legal authority but
might have been forced to act with the
backing of legal authority only. Gerald
Kaufman, in his speech in the House of
Commons debate, suggested that clearance
from the UN would have been 'laudable', but
not necessary. I suggest that such clearance
would have been necessary for any
bombardment to have been just.
In the Gulf War of 1991-2 a coalition of
thirty nations joined forces against Saddam
Hussein. In the latest stand off only the United
120
States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand were willing to
attack Iraq. And on purely pragmatic grounds
would a war that set much of the west against
nearly all of the Arab nations have been a
good course of action? And what if Middle
Eastern terrorist organisations and the state of
Israel had come into the frame?
Saddam Hussein has backed down on this
occasion. I believe it may not be too long
before he puts the United Nations to the test
again. This time it will be Britain's job to
ensure that wide ranging support is
forthcoming from within the United Nations
before any military action is initiated. Going it
alone, or nearly alone, might be legally
justifiable but it would not be morally correct.
And the purely practical consequences of
failing to gain such support could be
disastrous.
One final observation: what emerges from
this short paper, and very clearly from the
Archbishop of York's article and the
statements by the Bishop of Oxford, is that the
Just War criteria alone offer only limited
guidance in helping us to decide whether a
war is just. There are many pragmatic
consequences to be weighed and decisions to
be taken, often based on political judgment
and military intelligence. The Just War criteria
alone are unable to determine the morality of a
conflict in such a complex situation.'
DAVID
G.
KIBBLE
LIEUT. CDR, RNR
References
'Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, 128, 1998,
p.109. The journal also reports that the key workers in
Iraq's biological weapons effort were educated in the
UK and that UN weapons inspectors suspect that Iraq
may have conducted tests of biological weapons on
prisoners captured in the Iraq-Iran war.
2 Cf also David G. Kibble, 'A Theology for the Nuclear
Debate,' Churchman, 99,1985.
Maritime Rules of Engagement - a Postwar
History of the British Experience - II
Further developments - from the Falklands to the Gulf
The Falklands Conjlict
y the end of the 1960s rules of
engagement were laid down in national
publicati;ns on tactical and fighting
instructions, based on the experience to date
which was updated during the 1970s, not least
as a consequence of the so called fish wars off
the coast of Iceland, though these were based
more on stopping and riding off Icelandic
gunboats than on warfighting. By the time of
the invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982
the UK had reached the stage of combining all
the rules for land, sea and air operations into a
single national joint warfare publication
available for all three services which had been
extant for three years. At this stage the first
ever edition of NATO maritime rules had been
in force a mere two and a half years and there
was no question that any other than UK
national rules would be used for the operation,
even though they were tailored to a
confrontation with the Warsaw Pact and
certainly not to a sea train stretching 12,000
miles. It also became evident that different
rules were needed for a. the Total Exclusion
Zone, b. the approaches to the Total Exclusion
Zone and c. the area around Ascension Island,
particularly as it was considered most
important not to precipitate hostilities in any
way. It was therefore decided to take the
national joint warfare publication rules but
amend them by special prefixes and suffixes,
looking at specific rules for specific
operations. 12 special rules, with one other
subsequently added on, were drawn up for
submarine
operations
which
were
significantly different from those that had
been envisaged against the Soviet Union.
Of course it is easy to write national rules
for a single operation and the experience of the
Falklands indicated that it was probably better
to re-write or adjust the rules so that they are
tailored to the particular operation, although
this does not obviate the need for flexibility.
The definition of a hostile act, for example, is
reasonably easy to specify and understand, but
B
the interpretation of hostile intent is fraught
with difficulty. On the other hand international
operations are more likely to need a library of
rules contained in a more specific standard
reference book, given the differences in the
various national approaches. It is worth
mentioning in passing that the perceived need
by NATO to write special ROE for the'
Adriatic operation SHARP GUARD, which
was in fact carried out by a Royal Navy
captain using all the residual British
experience on the subject, reflects much of the
authoritative thought on this aspect of the
matter which considers that it is better to rewrite rules for particular operations.
The special isolated position ofthe Falkland
Islands and South Georgia did indeed
facilitate the rule of engagement problem in
that there were unlikely to be any other
nationalities in the area, but this did not apply
to the route of the transit to the area through
the South Atlantic and the force had
considerable problems with reconnaissance
aircraft. At one time the Task Force
Commander even expressed a wish to shoot
down the shadower in 'flagrant defiance of my
own Rules of Engagement, perhaps to save
ships and lives in my own force'. He then
asked for a change in rules and to his surprise
received approval subject to the aircraft being
within a specific range and positive
identification. After several passes outside the
range an aircraft came heading straight for the
force next day. With missile systems locked
on and about to fire, a final check revealed that
the aircraft was on a direct line running from
Rio de Janeiro to Durban and positive
identification by a Sea Harrier revealed a
Brazilian civil airliner, the consequences of
the shooting down of which, could have had
such a reaction that it might have caused the
operation to be abandoned in the face of world
hostility and horror,' Such are the problems of
ROE in the period before hostilities and they
take one back to the classic argument between
hostile intent and act.
121
•
122
MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - A POSTWAR HISTORY - II
Admiral Woodward goes into great detail in
discussing the considerable problems of the
commander of a major force in interpreting
ROE in this interim period before hostilities
are joined and, what is more, ensuring that all
his commanders had a similar outlook to his on
interpreting them. The difficulty of reconciling
the politicians' aim for the British to be seen as
not being the instigator of hostilities and the
commander's very real fear that he could not
afford to lose a carrier is covered in graphic
detail. However once he reached the vicinity of
the total exclusion zone with the freedom to
engage any Argentine targets in it, many of his
problems disappeared and he had a much more
straightforward approach.
As Admiral Woodward put it on his passage
down south, in considering a response to one
commanding officer who was champing at the
bit and eager to push ahead of the force and
take early action, 'I shall have to amplify the
ROE so that all the Commanding Officers can
know what I am thinking rather than apply
their own interpretations.' 10 One of his
commanding officers, Commander Chris
Craig, later himself to be the commander of a
Royal Navy wartime task force, this time in
the Gulf Conflict, testifies to the efficacy of
this principle in that, as a consequence of
regular contact with the commanding officers
over secure speech, none had any doubt as to
his intentions and also all were put on their
mettle by snap unexpected questions which
tested out the potential response within the
ROE. By the time Commander Craig came
into action in mid-May he felt that he had
unambiguous and very robust ROE which
allowed him to conduct a highly successful
night engagement under the principle that he
only required belief that the contact he
engaged was involved in clandestine
operations. Thus he opened fire at six miles,
sank the target at four miles and it was never
seen. The lesson he drew from his experience
was the importance of initial homework by
constructing and anticipating scenarios."
While there was a balanced sense of restraint,
there was also the strong feeling that one must
not be a catalyst for disaster and must not take
the first hit. The self defence clause overriding
all other rules was seen as a most helpful
escape avenue should one prove necessary.
The one really difficult problem was to change
the rules of engagement to allow an attack to
be carried out on the cruiser Belgrano outside
the total exclusion zone before contact with
her was lost and this was complicated by the
fact that the submarines were being controlled
from the UK and not by the Task Force
Commander. 12
Lessons learnt
In the subsequent analysis of the operation,
in spite of the single nation scenario, it was
considered that the ROE in use were too
elaborate and there was a feeling that political
control was getting in the way of warfighting.
By the end of the 1980s it was decided that the
rules should be rewritten and geared around
three key elements. In the first place they had
to be revised to avoid their containing a
mixture of prohibitions and permissions,
which one expert described as a deadly
combination because eventually they will
come into conflict. Permissions should go into
the operation order because they are missions,
whereas limitations should be contained in the
ROE and in some ways this bears a
resemblance to the French approach to the
subject which will be briefly explained in the
summary. The second key element was that
one had to determine the political aim out of
three choices, de-escalation, preserving the
status quo or escalation (these are known as
political objectives) and, finally, once this was
established it is most important to have
sufficient forces to be able to enforce the given
ROE. This last point is not well understood by
politicians, and experts in the military see the
period from the Falklands War to the Gulf
Conflict as a ten year education process for the
politicians in the United Kingdom. Closely
aligned with the determination of the political
aim is the principle used by UK forces of
adopting what is called a profile of operations
which in practice means that the force is
allocated a group of rules to conform with the
desired profile and aim of the force concerned.
This does not mean that changes cannot be
made as circumstances change, but it provides
an initial suite of complementary rules
designed to meet the aims of the operation.
North Atlantic exercises
There was another field which contributed
to the British development of thought in this
area and this was in the Atlantic Strike Fleet,
of which a Royal Navy force formed a
significant part in the form of the Second
Carrier Strike Group, later to become the
ASW Strike Force. During the mid-1980s
when
Admiral
Mustin
was
COMSTRIKFLTLANT and Admiral Oswald
was COMASWSTRIKFOR the dialogue
between the two national afloat commanders
was particularly good. It was to this force that
ROE would most likely be pertinent and the
relatively recent publication of NATO ROE in
1979 gave the subject an impetus that was
eagerly taken up by the two nations whose
own national policies were well ahead of the
rest of the world, but who, until the NATO
rules were published, lacked a common forum
for exercising the philosophy. Therefore great
premium was placed on the subject, which
was given added emphasis by the potential
problems, which were even more relevant to
the forces in the Mediterranean, posed when a
Soviet 'Charlie' class submarine was marking
a carrier. The debate centred around deciding
what actions in such circumstances might
constitute hostile intent. The Naval Warfare
Committee was a forum in which the Atlantic
Strike Fleet commanders met to discuss such
issues and Admiral Mustin's admonition that
'no Commanding Officer is required to wait
for incoming mail' is fondly recalled. There
was also an arrangement for what was called
battle fleet input training in which ROE games
were frequently played. However, the
consequence of this was that it highlighted the
differences and disparities between NATO
and national doctrines on the subject and from
a British perspective this was most evident at
the level of the UK Commander in Chief
Fleet, who also held the NATO posts of
CINCHAN and CINCLEASTLANT.13 It was
incidentally to this appointment that Sir Julian
Oswald, with his heightened sense of
perspective on the subject, went next in 1987.
The Gulf War
Here was a situation unique in post war
history in an operation that reflected,
123
particularly in the build-up period, known in
the USA as DESERT SHIELD, the fact that
nations in general find it easier to dispose
maritime forces as a symbol of concern, than
land or air forces which represent real
commitment, not least because ships can be
confined to international waters thus not
infringing any territorial rights and are
politically less contentious to the electorate.
Thus in 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait by
Saddam Hussein relatively few nations
disposed land or air forces to the support of the
allied operations, but large numbers sent
maritime forces to the area, such that there
was an embarrassment of resources. This
complicated
the
embargo
operations,
particularly as the national ships or groups
operated under differing ROE. Worse, the
reluctance of nations to compare ROE suites
definitely precluded, with very few
exceptions, combined boarding operations. If
nations found it easier to allocate ships to the
allied effort, the ROE attitude of each nation
soon revealed the real commitment to
effective action. Although the precise rules
were not known, it was evident that
differences in ROE stemmed from the degree
of robustness of nations in putting themselves
forward with real intent. If the starting point of
commitment is clear then so are the ROE. In
those countries with a similar system of
political control to that of the United Kingdom
there was probably a lack of clarity within the
civil service and in presenting the issues to
ministers. Even in the UK MOD there was
perhaps a reluctance to push the civil service
secretariat to think all the issues right through.
However, the preparation was there and all
ships being deployed to the Gulf sent their
command teams to the Maritime Tactical
School to play in all aspects games focused
around ROE.
In assessing the main players among other
nations the US, Australia and France did not
share rules with the UK. The Dutch, if perhaps
under some political constraint, were known
to be in unison, but there is a history of
common effort between these two nations
engendered by a great similarity in approach
and mutual respect to which can be added the
experience and confidence gained over many
124
years of operating together in the
UKINetheriands Amphibious Force.
There were some combined boarding
operations, generally between American,
Australian and British forces, not least in the
action against the Ain Zalah in December
1990. This was a time of considerable political
concern because at that period there was a so
called 'peace ship' (Ibn Khaldoon) with
considerable numbers of women on board also
proceeding to the Gulf and it was felt that this
would need to be handled fairly sensitively.
There was no doubt that the US had the most
robust set of rules of all the nations and as far
as the boarding operations were concerned
there was concern among other nations that
they were too forceful, an attitude that resulted
in a very heavy handed approach to the crews
of the ships boarded. The Royal Marine
boarding parties, who themselves had the
potential to be extremely tough if ever
required to do so, felt that there was too much
emphasis on physical restraint and not enough
premium placed on the deterrent aspect of the
operation. This had the consequent
presentational risk of something going
seriously wrong, leading to condemnation in
the world forum at a time when the allied
forces should have been seen to have been
operating well within the tenets of
international acceptability, not least with a
'peace ship' with women onboard in the
offing. In a microcosm these attitudes reflect
the differences between the European and
American approach to the whole subject. At
the time it was an edgy process and
emphasised the need for a combined plan of
action.
Forward Commitment
From the UK perspective there was
immense frustration and inconvenience
created by nations not being honest in saying
what forces they would commit and what they
would do and the UK Commander,
Commodore Craig, could not overemphasise
that point. There was a monthly meeting of
WEU Maritime Interdiction Force which
paralleled the meetings being held in Paris,
France then having the Chair of the Union, but
one senior source nevertheless described the
dedicated WEU area as 'positively cloying' to
the tactical deployment of forces. Even with
British liaison officers aboard the US
command ships and a good dialogue with
Admiral Arthur in USS Blue Ridge and
Admiral March in USS Midway, the UK force
commander found the Americans ultra
sensitive and unforthcoming about the plan for
war. This affected the degree of forward
commitment which was
considerably
constrained by this state of affairs.
Commodore Craig is convinced that this led to
the substantial mining threat because the area
was not covered. Forces were not permitted
north of a line from the Dhorra Oilfield and
therefore the allies were not allowed to deploy
maritime patrol aircraft in the threatened area
to track and counter the mining effort or
allocate forces to establish a hold in the
fighting area. Even the Canadians and
Australians were not in a position to say how
far forward they would be committed. The
Belgians, whose potential contribution to the
mine countermeasure (MCM) effort was
considered essential, remained outside the
Persian Gulf and were thus a constant source
of frustration."
This somewhat unsatisfactory state of
affairs eventually resolved itself to a certain
extent by the formation of a BritishlUS
forward force with the WEU group acting in a
support role further south in the Gulf. The
Canadian, Australian and Dutch line hardened
to allow them to support the battle group.
There was considerable debate about the
comparability and proportionality of risk and
indeed the subject of proportionality was
examined exhaustively. It was considered
that, for example, because of its significance a
disproportionate amount of risk in defending
the mine countermeasure force was
acceptable. However, there were additional
complications for even at the very late stage
after the tum of the year the UK MCM force
under its command ship RFA Sir Galahad was
available to the US under UK operational
control, but there was still uncertainty over
tactical control. Worse, the Royal Navy Type
42 destroyers were under US tactical control
but until the ROE were rationalised in early
January, only days before the ultimatum to
Saddam Hussein expired, it was not possible
for them to be fully and positively integrated
into the US battle group, to the disadvantage
of all concerned.
As usual in this rationalisation process
everything hung on the definition of hostile
intent and it was evident that the US had
infinitely more robust rules for their units than
had the UK. The British had a sensible blend
of self defence measures, but it was
appreciated that HMS Cardiff was the most
vulnerable as the most forward ship.
Nevertheless the rules at that time only
permitted engagement within a five mile
radius unless there was positive identification
further out, which was considered highly
unsatisfactory. The UK combined forces
theatre commander gave approval for a
relaxation of the engagement rules, but was
clamped down on by the MOD and his licence
for approval removed. This was the precursor
for some fairly hectic diplomatic activity and
about a week before the expiry of the
ultimatum the two sets of rules, UK and US,
were rationalised and the forces were totally
integrated. There is a feeling in the UK,
emphasised as one of the lessons learnt from
the campaign, that had the British naval
commander been a two star instead of a one
star officer, it is possible that it might have
made a difference and the problem been
resolved in a much more timely manner to the
benefit of all forces concerned. This is one of
the lessons to be learned for future coalition
operations. It also reflects the need for
pragmatic judgments when examining ROE
for maritime forces, for which the stakes are
much greater than, for example, for air forces
in a very complex environment.
Operating Problems
Once hostilities had commenced there
were, with one exception which will be
discussed in a moment, no problems over
ROE if forces were subject to attack, but there
were questions over contacts in the northern
part of the Gulf, largely created by the US
national procedures that allowed no foreign
disclosure. Thus the war plan for dealing with
incursion from seaward was foggy, even
where it concerned the protection of mine
125
countermeasure vessels, vital to the clearance
of the assault and bombardment areas. In the
anti surface warfare operations British Lynx
helicopters combined with the US Seahawk
helicopters in the Northern Persian Gulf, but a
great number of possible targets went
unengaged because of differences in attack
criteria. This was because, despite British
briefings, the Americans did not appreciate, or
accept, the fact that the capability of the Lynx
helicopter was superior to that of the Seahawk.
Thus, although the Anti Surface Warfare
Commander clearly agreed the attack criteria,
the fact that the Lynx had the ability to use its
passive equipment and identify targets and
was cleared by UK procedures to close targets
closer than the Seahawk was ignored. All
helicopters were limited to the attack criteria
for the Seahawk, with the consequence that
many targets that could have been engaged by
the Lynx helicopters were in fact left
unmolested. This was one of the few areas in
which the Royal Navy had a definite edge
over its ally, but this was not conceded, to the
advantage of the enemy. Both ROE and attack
criteria should be constructed to take
advantage of the capabilities of all the forces
available.
The potential for blue on blue engagement
was not a problem initially, but in due course
other Arab nations were more willing to
participate and when nations like Qatar began
operating Mirage Fl aircraft it was almost a
minor miracle that none of these was engaged.
Operations in the minefields off the Kuwaiti
coast created special problems. The UK was
firmly in favour of a total exclusion zone and
was supported in this aim by the US MCM
commander in USS Tripoli. All were
conscious that a 'leaker' could get through the
air defence network in spite of its
comprehensiveness: at risk were mission
essential forces and more than $1.5 bn if one
were forced to express the commitment in
hard cash terms. However, the US forces
would not even consider this because of the
substantial numbers of aircraft returning from
raids, but it does reveal how the less
glamorous forces can be given less than due
consideration of the risks to an operation.
Without doubt the possibility of attack on the
126
MCM force was a constant matter of concern
among those with a direct interest.
Key ROE Lessons from the Campaign
Several lessons come out of the Royal Navy
experience during this campaign.
a. It is no use designing a constructive
set of rules, if the political dimension is
omitted. This aspect has to be considered
by the military.
b. When conducting multinational
operations with a high risk of escalation
and pre-emption the initial war planning
must include ROE rationalisation among
all the nations participating.
c. The earliest possible statement of
commitment must be achieved before this
rationalisation of ROE.
d. If they are to be effective and not
risk potential escalation, medium tension
operations must be rationalised at the
outset and not as affairs develop.
e. Paradoxically, low tension ROE are
more complex and have more potential
for embarrassment and the 'peace ship'
provides a good example. If someone is
killed during one of these episodes then
there is an international incident.
f. The correct interpretation of hostile
act/intent remains the only thing that
matters. If you get that wrong you are in
serious trouble.
g. Intelligence is a boon, but the
importance of correct filtering of the
product in a lean, timely manner is
fundamental to the manner in which one
deals with the ROE problem. For
example, if you do suddenly find a
'Ieaker' heading your way from the
coastline, what is your collateral? In this
day of a plethora of intelligence there is a
desperate need for informed filtering of
the information.
Central control of the decision making
process
In considering this subject it is important to
bear in mind that the power within the MOD
lies in the Central Staff formed of officers of
all three services with substantial civilian
participation in the form of MOD civil
servants, the upper echelons of whom wield
considerable power. These last are not
political appointees, but are professional civil
servants who spend much longer in the
Ministry than their military counterparts.
They act as advisers to the politicians and are
not unknown to put themselves into the
position of advising others what ministers are
thinking and how they are likely to respond. In
this environment civil servants and politicians
had great difficulty in accepting that Rules of
Engagement reflected a choice when it was
proposed to improve the book, which hitherto
was little more than a signal code with limited
flexibility, to one which had a comprehensive
set of rules, escalating to a high level of
engagement, but which gave the politicians
many options in responding to a given
situation. The possibility of substantial
advances and improvement in the system were
according to one significantly influential
figure bedevilled by this approach of the civil
servants and he felt that there was a delay of
some ten years in the development of theories
in this field. Because they did not understand
the subject they had an almost malign
intention to hold back the military and feared
giving them too much power, particularly at
the higher levels of the rules. This assessment
parallels the kinder and perhaps less accurate
viewpoint mentioned above that there was a
ten year education process for ministers, but
there is no doubt that the consequences were
highly disadvantageous for the introduction of
an effective set of rules and this was to come
to light in due course. Even today after the
Gulf Conflict there is a feeling that with really
good intelligence and superb communications
we have the infrastructure for the
implementation of rapid and effective ROE,
yet expeditious responses could still be
constrained by the political process. There is a
perception among the military in some
quarters of the Ministry of Defence that other
European nations have a less constrained
system and are able to clear changes more
quickly. This is not entirely true, though the
British system is probably the most thorough
of all, but in being so is also probably the most
constrained. The French system is worth
mentioning here because it has an admirable
logic about it. It is divided into two sections,
rules of engagement and rules of behaviour.
Control of the former, which involves
anything which leads to the actual firing of a
weapon, is very firmly in the hands of the
French Government. However, the latter,
which involves every other aspect of
interaction between forces, such as proximity
of approach to potentially hostile units or the
conduct of boarding operations, remains
under the control of the military. Thus the
rules of behaviour can be invoked without
involving politicians, but there is a guiding
principle felt by all concerned that the
government must never be put in an
embarrassing position.
Politicians and particularly civil servants in
the UK have greater control, but this does
have the end product that the political aim is
fully reflected in any operation and at the end
of the day, in a democracy, the military are the
servants of the politicians.
It is interesting to note that when Iran began
to acquire Kilo class submarines, the Royal
Navy wished to change the anti-submarine
warfare rules for ships on the Armilla patrol in
the northern Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and
Persian Gulf. Without the imperative of
conflict, by the time the issue had been
debated with civil servants, law officers and
politicians, it took six months to implement
the changes, a period which left the Royal
Navy feeling distinctly uneasy. However,
there is no doubt that all the potential
ramifications had been thoroughly addressed
and argued and that the rules subsequently
adopted met every political requirement. In
peacetime of course there is the luxury of time
and issues can be over analysed, as they
almost certainly were in this case, whereas
once conflict is likely speedy action is
essential and any delay in the latter
circumstances can be critical so that rapid
decisions have to be made.
In general highly placed commanders have
a concern that they must avoid taking a hit,
particularly on a high value unit, whereas
there is a determination on the political front
that military forces should not be seen to be
too aggressive unless the enemy performance
warrants it and this tension between the two
127
schools still exists today. Nevertheless there is
a feeling among the military that they do have
the ability to judge when to respond and
interpret hostile intent and act. Whereas they
feel they might not be able to do anything
about the launch vehicle, they do feel
confident in the ability to destroy the missile
subsequently fired and thereby avoid taking
action that might initiate hostilities or raise the
level of conflict prematurely. There is a
maturity and stability in this attitude born of
sound training and professionalism, balanced
by an acute awareness of the political
dimension.
General principles
Rules today must give adequate authority
without the need to refer back to the operating
authority.
When
examining
political
directives it is most unlikely that one will ever
be asked to escalate the situation, but if this
did occur it is essential that the force
commander has robust ROE with which to
defend his own units. As far as the freedom to
change rules of engagement is concerned,
bearing in mind the very high quality special
communications and intelligence picture
available, it is desirable that the MOD should
increase the extent to which responsibility is
delegated to an authority with accountability,
preferably the theatre commander, but if not
that, at least to the controlling four star
headquarters. This, however, is something the
civil servants and politicians might well have
difficulty in accepting, but would lead to a
much more effective mechanism for
implementing rules to suit the tactical
situation.
G. A. S. C. WILSON
References
'Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992) pp. 101-103.
lOibid, p.100.
"Author's conversation with Commodore C. J. S.
Craig, CB, DSC, Royal Navy, 28 July 1993.
"Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days
(Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992) p.153-8.
"Author's conversation with Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Julian Oswald, GCB, 26 July 1993.
"Author's conversation with Commodore C. J. S.
Craig, CB, DSC, Royal Navy, 28 July 1993.
,
Leaders and Managers: Chalk and Cheese
BEGAN this piece originally as an
Idescription
examination of Professor Norman Dixon's
of Authoritarian and Autocratic
Officers, sometimes, also referred to as
Regulators and Ratcatchers, see below.
Professor Norman Dixon: 'On the
Psychology of Military Incompetence' ... (A)
The Authoritarian Officer: The
Authoritarian Officer joins the Armed
Forces to make a virtue out of various
personality disorders which make him
particularly adaptable to military life.
These problems can, allegedly, range
from childhood scatology, through
parental neglect, sexual repression and
virility self doubts, to a need for peer
group approval and promotion with
which the peacetime armed services
award conformity. He draws self esteem
from the status imparted by his rank and
uniform. He defers naturally to seniority
and obeys orders to the letter, loves order
and ceremony, is meticulous in attention
to detail and is often paranoid about
cleanliness. He is strong in sequential
reasoning processes, suppresses his
imagination, rejects information which
conflicts with his (and his seniors')
preconceptions, and is fearful of using his
initiative. He is often prudish, idolises
women (a state of mind assisted by
unfamiliarity), shuns publicity and seeks
safety in secrecy. He keeps an unblotted
copybook and thus gains unhindered
advancement in peacetime. But he is
easily disorientated by the crisis and
dilemmas of war, and responds
inappropriately or not at all.
The Autocratic Officer: The Autocratic
Officer is approximately the reverse of
the above. He tends to think laterally,
rather than serially, and his convictions
often follow instincts. He uses his
initiative as a matter of habit. He is
receptive to the possibility that his juniors
might be right or his seniors wrong, and
takes his career in his own hands when he
believes the latter to be the case. His
attitude to hierarchy and military bull is
casual or even overtly ironical; he tends to
be individualistic, or negligent, about
dress. His peacetime career ascent is often
difficult because he lacks the docility
convenient to his immediate seniors and
he is typically considered disruptive. In
wartime it falls to him to clear up the mess
pioneered by the Authoritarian Officer
who gained preferment over him in the
years of peace.
Whilst this examination has its place I
rapidly came to the conclusion that it was also
unhelpful in that it did not explore or identify
the requirement, selection and training of
Leaders and Managers nor suggest that there
are good and bad officers who might portray
Authoritarian or Autocratic traits. In this,
Dixon's statement might be accused of being
both divisive and simplistic in that it fails to
address the different shades of leadership and
management styles necessary in both a
wartime and peacetime Navy, whilst
appearing to agree with the old adage that both
Authoritarian and Autocratic Officers are born
and not made; that education has no place to
play. In this I disagree. On the other hand, a
Senior Officer, in his opening remarks to a
recent Maritime Warfare Course, asked the
question 'would anyone wish to employ the
Autocratic Officer, no matter how admirable
his qualities'? The question that appeared to
fall from both these observations was 'do we,
as a Navy, require a balance of different types
of officers, or not?' It is my conjecture, if we
are to succeed through both war and peace,
that one of our most critical requirements is to
identify the different types and ensure that
they are promoted and retained for when they
are needed most, in other words 'keeping our
powder dry'. This piece sets out to look at how
to differentiate and cater for the differing
requirements of Leaders and Managers. The
second question that I attempt to answer in this
paper is 'how we go about achieving a healthy
balance between the Managers and Leaders',
accepting that officers who exhibit the full
range of Authoritarian traits will always be
bad officers, leaders or managers.
Managers Versus Leaders - A Few Thoughts
'Managers do Things Right: Leaders
128
LEADERS AND MANAGERS: CHALK AND CHEESE
do the Right Thing' Anon
(B)
'Steady State is Managed: Change is
Led'
(C)
'Leaders identify Solutions: Managers
understand Problems'
(D)
'Leaders need Champions: Managers
seek Sponsors'
(E)
'Leaders are Loved and, or, Hated:
Managers are Liked/Disliked'
(F)
'Managers Staff Work: Leaders Staff
Issues and People'
(G)
'Leaders Teach their People: Managers
Train them'
(H)
'Leaders are Guided by Laws:
Managers Apply the Rules'
(J)
'Leaders are Remembered: Managers
are Forgotten'
(K)
Managers - A Thought
'Wineglass
"Stem"
Theory:
Recognition and Management of the
environment - superiors, peers and
juniors'
(L)
Leaders - Possible Identifiers
'Leaders are defined by Risk; they are
Not Risk Averse'
(M)
'Wars make Leaders: Leaders Win, or
Lose, Wars'
(N)
'Leaders Know and can Articulate the
Truth'
(P)
Good and Bad Management and
Leadership Attributes
'The promotion of one's people: not as
a means to promotion' '"
(Q)
'The Control of Delegation'
(R)
'The Constructive use of
Limitations'
(S)
'The Division of Them and Us'
(T)
'The Constructive use of No: to
Positively do Nothing'
(U)
'The Inspiration of Excellence: not
Fear of Fault'
(V)
'The Tyranny of Blame: Find the
Scapegoat'
(W)
A Few Other Thoughts / Observations
'The Majority is always Wrong'
George Bernard Shaw
(X)
'Truth is in the Middle'
(Y)
129
'To Achieve the Big Idea Sell the
Small' '"
(2)
Discussion
One of the questions that I have sought to
answer above is what defines a Managerial
style from a Leadership one. An Autocratic
Officer is probably a Leader: he is
inspirational, intuitive (A) and he is at his best
in a state of change (C) often looking for
answers, outwith his own or the collective
experience (S). By contrast, Managers may be
either Authoritarian or Autocratic: they are
more likely to be risk aware, preferring
compromise and the collective support of the
majority (X) to back-up their decisions. What
Professor Norman Dixon fails to acknowledge
is that different types of officers are necessary
within an Armed Force that is likely to spend
95% of its time at peace. This, then, raises the
question as to how we retain our good
Managers and Leaders in peace. Here, the
reward factor comes into play. The
Authoritarian Officer is likely to feel rewarded
by the personal esteem of promotion, honours
and patronage within the system (A) (Q). The
Autocratic Officer, Manager or Leader, will,
by contrast, judge himself against the job he is
presently in, those colleagues he is working for
and the esteem that individual and team
success should bring with them (V). In other
words, the good Officer will, by instinct, seek
out personal challenge, whereas the
Authoritarian Officer is, typically, risk averse
(M).
The Leader needs Managers to manage the
status quo (C) thus releasing him to lead those
start up, get well or change driven projects
where leadership is fundamental to success
(A). As soon as that challenge is over, the risks
defined (M) and change has become the status
quo (C) the Autocratic Leader will, by
inclination, wish to move on. The timing of
this can be significant. The Manager type,
being naturally risk aware (not averse) (M),
will seek out those jobs with a proven track
record or where the hard decisions have
already been made. In an appointing cycle,
where success lags failure, one will often see
an officer being awarded for the efforts of his
predecessor, for which he has contributed
130
nothing. If one thinks of the good Leader or
Manager who has dragged his failing
Department together, re-engineered the
systems and defined the Refit it will often be
his successor who gains the credit for the
improved reliability whilst he is left
unrewarded. It is, therefore, quite possible,
that without careful management the
Appointing Cycle will frequently penalise the
good, unless Captains and Squadron Staff give
credit where credit is due (E) (G) (Q).
Similarly, an Autocratic Leader or Manager
who takes over a project from an Authoritarian
Officer may be equally disadvantaged. In this
case, it is likely that his predecessor, being risk
averse (M), has not taken the difficult
decisions, has watched his six, ensured that he
is never seen to be a problem and that he is,
apparently, meeting his milestones (A) (B) (C)
(D) (G) (J). His successor, of a different
mould, then discovers that the project is
behind time and that the Prime Contractor has
bitten off more than he can chew. The good
Leader or Manager will not instinctively try to
apportion blame (B) (G) (W), instead he will
seek to scope the problem or identify solutions
and keep the Project sponsors informed (D)
(P). So, let us say, he reports that his hi-profile
project will be behind time to a Senior
Executive Officer (SEO), for whom delay is
unacceptable. The SEO, in true Executive
fashion, tells him that delay will not be
tolerated and that he is held personally
responsible (W). The Equipment Project
Manager (EPM) then reports to his
Procurement Line Manager who tells him that
the funding necessary to advance the project to
meet the timelines will not be available and,
that by the way, 'he could far more readily
wreck his career than could the SEO' (V) (W).
In this case, one would suggest that the EPM is
trapped between a rock and a hard place: the
honesty which defines him (D) (P) will be
penalised by the culture in which he finds
himself (T) (V) (W).
This brings us onto the tricky question of
promotion or, more bluntly, why Managers are
preferred to Leaders. One reason is that
Autocratic Leaders will, by nature, offer
solutions to problems (D) that have not yet
been confronted. This also extends into the
'Yes' approach typical of many officers who
cannot or will not say 'No'. By contrast, the
successful Leader will, invariably, use 'No' as
an answer (D) (U). In other words, he is
capable of confronting the issue and making a
positive and defendable decision to do
nothing, rather than saying 'Yes' and hoping
the problem (D) will go away. In a peace time
environment, where one is not expected to
'rock the boat', it will always be the more risk
aware Manager, who agrees and rarely says
'No', that will be preferred. This is not simply
a question of 'Who will rid me of this turbulent
Priest', but a recognition that Managers are
generally more aware of their situation than
Leaders and are prepared to cultivate their
seniors (E) (L). Moreover, it is also true to
reflect that 'like' will usually promote and
prefer 'like' (F) (Q) (X). Thus, in peace time,
Managers will climb the slippery pole faster
than Autocratic Leaders, irrespective of
ability. By contrast, the Autocrat will only be
promoted if he is championed and that will
invariably be by one of his few in-number like
minded Autocratic Officers promoted despite
the prevailing system (E).
Note I: In order to better identify
individual strengths a number of
companies now ask for subordinates to
report on their people, along with their
superiors. This is an interesting move
away from simple open reporting and
towards a more global picture of the
person. The results of this type of
comparative open reporting would be
interesting. It would be my conviction
that the Autocratic Leader is more likely
to win the praise of his peers and juniors
than from his seniors (E) (F) (K).
Similarly, the Manager is more likely to
be praised by his seniors than his juniors
(E) (F) (L).
The question as to how the individual
inspires and directs his people is also a good
indication of style. In this respect one can see
that the Autocratic Leader or Manager will,
more naturally, seek to promote his people
than will the Officer who feels threatened by
any success other than his own. This is a
maxim close to my heart, in that I believe all
good Leaders and Managers owe it to their
people to promote their people. This is not the
same as getting them promoted, but that the
good Officer identifies within his people their
own strengths and weaknesses (S) and
promotes their abilities to cope (Q). Given a
particularly hi-profile project, involving a
major visit, I identified that I had little time for
the simpering Staff Officer and that my phone
techniques left much to be desired. I had in my
team an excellent POWRNS Writer of the old
school who not only knew a friend in the right
place but had super phone techniques and who
would get the required result. In this case, I
was happy to delegate the task (Q) (R), whilst
maintaining the protective cloak of
responsibility for failure, (V) not (W).
Whilst working in NATO for a senior
Officer I fell into conversation on the art of
staff-work. The General made a particularly
interesting observation by asking me 'whether
or not I meant staff work or staffing, and had
the difference between the two ever been
pointed out to meT This came as a revelation
to me. With respect to this article the
difference between the two attributes is
suggested at (G). Taking the same line of
reasoning further one can also conclude that
poor Officers are more likely to find fault in
other people's 'staff work' (W) than they are
to acknowledge the excellence of the solution
provided therein (V).
This leads on to how Managers and Leaders
work within a defined environment and how
they bring on their people. It is my contention
that Managers are more likely to understand
and work within the rules than are Leaders,
who will more likely be guided by them (1).
The fact that Managers are likely to apply rules
to their working environments means that they
will, typically, be more prescriptive than a
Leader. With respect to bringing on their
people, therefore, the Manager is more likely
to instill a regime of quantifiable training to
achieve the required Performance Standard
than the good Leader who will, more readily,
achieve the same by Teaching from experience
and first principles (1) (H).
One of our greatest Generals of the Second
World War was General Slim who, not by
accident perhaps, had also been a teacher. In
the setting of this piece he is also a good
131
example of the Autocratic Officer who got to
the very top because of war. Nelson and C. C.
Walker provide similar Naval examples of
good teachers, autocrats and leaders of men
who came to the top at a time of crisis but
would not otherwise have done so. This leads
on to a more stark conclusion that Leaders are
found if not created by crisis, specific
situations or war, (N) whereas Managers
thrive within the status quo (C). The corollary
to this is that, whilst Managers can win and
lose the peace, Leaders have the capacity to
win and lose the war (N).
Finally, I come to the two maxims which
have received little attention through this
piece, that dealing with truth being in the
middle (Y) and that to sell the big idea one
sells the small (Z). Truth has to be found and
looked for: it is not necessarily at the centre or
the Centre of Gravity, on the side of the big
battalions nor the lone voice (X), but
somewhere in the middle. It is the courageous
man that looks for the truth when so easily he
can manage the facts readily available to him.
The good Leader or Manager is also capable of
achieving his aim by giving his people a series
of tasks within their mien (Z). Again I am
reminded of working for an excellent leader
who enabled me to triumph whenever I
thought I had caught up with his thinking, only
to realise that he was already two steps ahead.
In this way the Leader is not over ambitious,
he has defined the big idea (or Truth) but
knows that to achieve this he must approach it
incrementally, at the speed of advance of his
people, and, sometimes, by subterfuge (D).
Returning to the concept of Truth, I am
reminded of one of the,great lines spoken by
the formidable actor Jack Nicholson in the
film 'A Few Good Men'. In the final,
remarkable court room drama, he states to the
effete Prosecutor (in his faggoty white
uniform) 'You cannot handle the truth'. In the
final analysis I would contend that it is only
the brave who can handle the truth for it is only
they that know it (P). Whatever is thought of
Mountbatten he was a Leader of Men and
nowhere more so than when he addressed the
Commonwealth Armies of India and Burma to
tell them that 'they were the forgotten Army,
but that he intended to make them otherwise'
132
(K). This was the truth, his people knew it was
and loved him the more for making it so
plainly obvious to them all and into a rallying
call from which their great triumphs emerged.
Churchill also knew the truth and, even in our
darkest moment, had the courage to use it to
inspire the people of the Empire. Our greatest
leaders not only knew the truth, they embodied
it and the people they led found trust and
confidence within the truth they espoused, no
matter how dark (P).
Spotting the difference - selecting the few
One of the results of this examination of the
differences between Leaders and Managers
appears to be that at times other than crisis, it
will be difficult to identify which officers will
come to the fore in an emergency. We
probably all like to think of ourselves as
Leaders, which clearly cannot be the case. The
defining difference appears to be that of timing
and situation, however this might also be
unclear. Good Managers are risk aware, which
does not mean that they cannot manage or take
risk when the situation so requires. Similarly,
bad officers will not necessarily make good
Leaders just because they are obnoxious and
difficult to get on with in peace time (A). The
good Manager, who does things right, staffs
the work required, trains and promotes the
skills of his people, understands the problems
and risks at hand, manages his working
environment, knows his limitations, delegates,
and applies the rules deserves sponsorship and
might, easily, be confused as a good Leader.
The good Leader, who does the right thing,
responds to change, staffs issues, identifies
solutions, teaches and promotes his people's
abilities to cope, imaginatively applies the law,
inspires his team, knows his limitations and
delegates constructively should also deserve
similar sponsorship to the good Manager. The
reason that he does not is probably that the
Leader will also take things that extra mile
beyond that of a Manager: he will state the
truth as he sees it, he will take risks that
managers would not, and he will be loved and
respected by his people who recognise him as
their leader. In this, Leaders and Managers
might be like Venus and Mars, Chalk and
Cheese, so different from each other that many
Managers cannot comprehend the strengths of
Leaders for their apparent fool hardiness, lack
of docility, disruptiveness (A) and, sometimes,
jealousy. Ironically, one concludes that the
very strengths that define our good Leaders
will act against them in the risk averse, safe,
mono-culture of a peace time Navy.
The question thus raised is how to identify
and then to promote the Leaders? This might
at first appear difficult but, given the self
selecting process for Manager types, it
actually comes down to educating our good
Managers to identify and realise the potential
of our prospective Leaders. This might indeed
be a big step for the Navy: it would challenge
many of the precepts taken for granted within
a peace time Navy whilst acknowledging that
Managerial principles might not always be
right (X). Such a process would require
something of a leap of faith, which might be
enhanced by an open reporting system that
looked down as well as up. Leaders will
always be in the minority: in any hierarchical
system there will always need to be more
Indians than Chiefs. In this respect the
Manager, who identifies and promotes the
Leader, will actually be securing his own
position within the peace and, ironically
enough, the war. The problem is that the
promotion of Leaders will entail a certain
amount of risk. There are good Leaders and
bad Leaders, some who lead their people to
failure and others to success and where the
difference between the two (often intuition or
luck) can rarely be calculated objectively. The
answer might be to use a template to identify
prospective Leaders at an early stage and to
ensure fair representation within a typical
career profile. In this way one is actually
managing the risks and providing guidelines
(1) for our Managers to apply. The
identification of Leader or Manager type
profiles would also greatly enhance our ability
to provide constructive career advice and to
retain those we might otherwise lose.
Conclusion
One of the questions I ask in this article is if
Leaders need Managers and vice versa. The
fact is that both groups need each other if they
are to thrive and make it to their respective
tops. There are good Managers and good
Leaders and most of us probably occupy a
position that is somewhere between the best of
them both. The key point is that Leaders and
Managers are very different people and that
we need them both. It is also true to reflect that
business also needs Leaders and Managers and
that it is the Leaders who will, more generally,
make it to the top, supported by their more
management orientated staff. The bigger the
reward, the bigger the risk, and so businesses
can also be described by whether they are led
(Industry, Commerce or Trade) or managed
(Banks). Most businesses are pyramidical in
structure, therefore it follows that there will
always need to be more Managers than
Leaders and that there will always be highly
competent Leaders who will suffer the
personal sadness of never realising their
potential. The trick would appear to be to
identify those people who are our Leaders and
those who are our Managers and to attempt to
ensure that they are not discriminated against.
This is not easy and will certainly require
organisations requiring us to look more closely
at how our officers are developed, identified
and nurtured. In his article on 'Critical Chaos',
Admiral Lees (NR, Jan '98) misunderstands
the key point I was making. The fundamental
truth in my piece was that our people are not
simply units of work (or supporting elements)
but that they are disutilities that react
differently to the levels of investment we make
133
in them. In this I was trying to illustrate the
fact that the ratio of equipment to manpower
expenditure had probably swung too far
against our people and that some readjustment
was necessary. In his article, Admiral Lees
goes on to state that a service only requires
uniformed personnel ... 'to kill or be killed'.
Not only do I abhor this statement, which
appears to fly in the face of our people as our
first and best deterrence to war, but it also
raises the fundamental question of whether or
not we can have war without people, leaders
without war? A peacetime navy gets the
leadership it deserves. Whether by design or
by size our officers appear to be growing for
ever greyer and less well defined (K). Perhaps
we should begin to ask ourselves more clearly
what we wish to be remembered for and how
we might better define our purpose and people.
Who will remember our Senior Officers of
today, tomorrow? As things stand we are more
likely to remember the names of those who
have been recently court martialled by the
navy than those officers whose decisions
brought them there in the first place.
Leadership is not exclusive to the Armed
Forces but we are more usually defined by our
Leaders than our Managers. Perhaps it is time
to look again at how we can best employ,
promote and equally develop our people
without prejudice and favour?
ALSTON
Churchill and the Naval Assault on the
Dardanelles - II
T would be invidious to blame Churchill
alone for this tragedy of missed opportunity
for in working through his strategy for a naval
assault he was able to take advantage of a
singular absence of cross examination from
the War Council and a failure by senior
officers in the Admiralty to express their
concerns. In the initial stages of the planning
of the naval attack, there was little sign of the
dissent from the naval staff that was to mark
the subsequent months. During Churchill's
exchanges with Carden in early January,
several senior Admirals were in some way or
other consulted and none presented any
outspoken opposition to it.
However, it is fair to say that Churchill's
advisers in the Admiralty were, from the start,
very much less enthusiastic about the plan
than the First Lord. While the latter was
forging ahead with his proposals, more
sanguine characters had been at work studying
the practicalities of a naval attack. On 5
January, for example, Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson sent Churchill a memorandum that
wholeheartedly condemned any plan to 'rush'
the Straits. He estimated that such an
operation would result in numerous
battleships being sunk by mines - six out of
eight in an initial squadron with further losses
as subsequent squadrons fought through - a
'fatal error', he stated, which would leave the
ships vulnerable to the Turkish fleet and
totally annul their use. 23
One explanation for the failure of the
Admirals to present any real early opposition
to the First Lord's plan is found in Churchill's
self-centred management style. With an
incredibly active brain, a vivid imagination
and a huge capacity for work, Churchill was
too much even for Fisher and always outreasoned and out-manoeuvred him. It is a
testimony to his powers that he was able so
reasonably to browbeat such an adversary and
not surprising, perhaps, that the other
Admirals were unable or unwilling to stop him
in full flight. In any event, Churchill was
moving fast in the early days of 1915, totally
confident that his naval plan was right, and his
I
staff were left in his wake. By the time they
caught up, he had already secured War
Council approval.
If goings on in the Admiralty gave cause for
concern, even more worrying was the manner
in which Government Ministers, and in
particular the War Council, handled the
Dardanelles issue. From the moment when its
members
unquestioningly
endorsed
Churchill's plan as announced at the meeting
of 13 January, the War Council failed to press
Churchill on the details. They, like the
Admirals, seem to have been swept along by
the force of Churchill's persuasive reasoning
and stand guilty of allowing themselves to be
dazzled by the prospect of claiming the
glorious prizes that would certainly have
accrued from success and failing to consider
the basic question of whether this was a
practical operation of war. As the Dardanelles
Commission concluded:
'Looking at the position which existed on
13 January, we do not think the War Council
were justified in coming to a decision (on the
naval plan) without much fuller investigation
... We hold that the possibility of making a
surprise amphibious attack on the Galipoli
Peninsula offered such great military and
political advantages that it was mistaken and
ill-advised to sacrifice this possibility by
hastily deciding to undertake a purely naval
attack."4
To compound the initial error, Asquith and
his Ministers then failed effectively to
confront the implications of the increasing
groundswell of concern within naval circles
for fear of rocking the boat. As early as 20
January, Hankey had informed Asquith of
Fisher's increasingly open unease but he
wrote to Venetia Stanley that he did not want
Churchill to know 'of course'''; a man of
compromise and consensus, he was not able to
deal effectively with the growing dissension.
It was Fisher's concerns that were to
present the first and most vocal challenge to
the naval assault. Despite his initial
enthusiasm for the venture, he had, by mid
January, so convinced himself that the
134
at
CHURCHILL AND THE NAVAL ASSAULT ON THE DARDANELLES-II
Galipoli campaign would bleed the resources
of the Grand Fleet dry, that he was on the point
of resignation. By 28 January, Asquith was
well aware of this and called a meeting with
him and Churchill, which appeared to resolve
some of his concerns. However, at the War
Council meeting in the afternoon, as Churchill
was outlining the preparations for the naval
assault, Fisher made to resign from the
meeting and was only dissuaded by the
personal intervention of Kitchener.
Nonetheless, the groundswell of concern
continued to spiral to the extent that on 10
February, Hankey felt obliged to write to
Balfour that, while he supported the principle
of an assault on the Dardanelles,
'from Lord Fisher downwards every
naval officer in the Admiralty who is in
the secret believes that the Navy cannot
take the Dardanelles position without
troops. '26
On 13 February Admiral Jackson sent a
memorandum to Carden with information and
suggestions on the reduction of the
Dardanelles defences and included some
strong views about the need to have landing
parties to ensure the destruction of the forts,
stating that full advantage would only be
obtained by the occupation of the Peninsula by
military force as the enemy field army would
make passage of the Straits impossible by all
except the most powerfully armed vessels. He
concluded by stating that a naval
bombardment was not considered to be a
sound operation unless there was a strong
military force to assist or at least to back it
up.n Carden must have been completely
confused. On the one hand ordered to conduct
a naval assault on the Dardanelles without
military assistance, he was on the other being
advised that such an operation was untenable
without the very assistance that he was to be
denied!
At last the Prime Minister called an
emergency War Council meeting for 16
February at which Kitchener, having himself
already been separately advised that a naval
assault was considered unsound, agreed to
send the 29th Division in support. He also
agreed that, if necessary, Australian and New
Zealand (ANZAC) troops and the Royal
135
Naval Division would be sent from Egypt.
This meeting, although late in the day,
seemed to have set the Galipoli campaign
back on track with the promise of troops to
assist the Navy. Totalling some 50,000 men, it
was a significant force. However, while the
Navy thought that these troops were to be used
from the outset, Kitchener decreed that they
were only to be committed to secure the
passage of the Straits once the Navy had
forced its way through. The Dardanelles
Commission summarised the situation
succinctly:
'The scope of the intended military
operation was left in doubt.'28
Ironically, Churchill fully appreciated how
dangerous this situation was and tried to work
on the unimaginative, but immensely
powerful, Kitchener. But as he put the
dilemma himself:
'I had no right at this stage to complain
if Lord Kitchener had said, "I am not
going to land on the Peninsula." I could
not have said, "Oh! you have broken faith
with the Admiralty." On the contrary, we
had said we would try it without
committing him to that, and he would
have had a right to complain if we had
turned round and immediately demanded
that he should undertake this very serious
military operation.'''
So, despite the now well understood
requirement for active military assistance to
force the Straits, the venture still remained a
naval one. Even worse, three days after the 16
February War Council, Kitchener was allowed
to withdraw the 29th Division.
Churchill still harboured hopes that the
Royal Navy might yet succeed and pressed
Carden to continue with the bombardment that
had commenced on 19 February 1915. The
challenge facing his fleet was immense. A
study of the Turkish defences of the Straits
would have revealed a comprehensive range
of defences which the Navy was ill-equipped
to overcome. These consisted of a range of
medieval fortresses with huge fixed gun
emplacements, from those at Sedd el Bahr and
Kum Kale at the entrance to the Straits up to
those at Derma and Nagara at the entrance to
the Sea of Marmara. They also included no
136
fewer than six forts clustered around the
Narrows which dominated, at 1,600 yards, this
the shortest point of the Dardanelles Straits
from the plateau of Kilid Boor and the hills
behind Chanak. Although cumbersome and
inaccurate, the huge batteries of guns within
these forts were capable of inflicting severe
damage on warships in the Straits as was to be
proved during the campaign; in particular, any
fleet passing through the Narrows themselves
would be subjected to a murderous weight of
fire. Positioned between these forts were
mobile batteries of howitzers which were dug
in along the entire length of both sides of the
Straits and presented a far more accurate, if
less deadly, threat to the fleet; the British
minesweepers operating in the Straits were
particularly easy targets for these guns. The
final layer of defence was formed by the
minefields that had been sown from a position
eight miles up the Straits for six miles through
to the far end of the Narrows. Early ideas to
run the Fleet straight through these fields had
sensibly been rejected and Commodore Roger
Keyes was put in charge of preparing a
sweeping force to remove them. However, the
insoluble problem that beset the fleet's
commanders as they tried to force the Straits
was that they could not allow the battleships to
get close enough to reduce the forts at the
Narrows until the mines had been cleared.
Conversely, the minesweepers could not get
near the minefields until the guns were
silenced.
On 19 February, Carden opened his
bombardment of the outer forts of Sedd el
Boor and Kum Kale and again on 25 February
with greater effect; many of the guns were
silenced or abandoned. At the same time
parties of Royal Marines were landed at the tip
of the Peninsula to finish off the work that the
Navy had started by spiking the surviving
guns of the forts, a tacit acknowledgment even
at this stage of the importance of combined
operations.
With the outer defences breached, 26
February saw the Intermediate Defences
attacked for the first time from within the
Straits where mobile howitzers, although not
causing serious damage, were disconcerting
enough to prevent the warships from
establishing an effective fire. There was little
that the ships could do to silence their
harassers as these batteries were well
concealed in the hills and could be moved to
different locations from one day to the next.
On 7 and 8 March, the Fleet turned its
attention to the Narrows defences but to little
effect; the mobile howitzers continued to
prove impossible to hit while the forts and
other fixed batteries were difficult to reduce at
such long range. And all the time the morale
of the Turkish gunners spurred on by their
German tutors was rising.
Equally worrying for Carden was the
complete inability of Keyes' minesweeper
fleet to make any progress in dismantling the
fields in the Narrows. These vessels were
small civilian manned fishing trawlers that
were barely capable of making way against
the strong currents in the Straits and which
proved to be singularly vulnerable to the
harrowing fire of the mobile howitzer
batteries. Their crude sweeping wires ill
equipped for the task, these improvised
vessels were themselves vulnerable to the
mines they were supposed to clear and rarely
managed to reach the Kephez mineflelds. On
10 March they succeeded but were forced to
withdraw after one of them was blown up by a
mine and on 13 March a concerted effort
resulted in four of the six sweepers involved
being severely damaged by howitzer fire.
At this stage, with morale in the Fleet
sinking fast and under pressure from his
masters at home to make rapid progress,
Carden decided that it was time to launch a
full-scale attack on the Narrows. Before he
could see his plan realised, however, his
health failed and he was replaced by his
second in command Rear Admiral John de
Robeck. De Robeck rapidly concurred with
his predecessor's plan, and preparations for an
assault involving 18 battleships and countless
cruisers and destroyers were commenced in
earnest.
On 18 March, this mighty force steamed
into the Straits in three waves to launch itself
at ever reducing ranges at the Narrows forts
with the aim of overpowering them by weight
of sustained shelling. However, the ships were
themselves subjected to a heavy fire. The
French battleship Gaulois had to be beached
after suffering shell damage under the
waterline and HMS Inflexible also had to
retire temporarily with substantial damage to
her superstructure. Nonetheless, after 2 'j,
hours of bombardment, the minesweepers
were sent forward.
From this point the assault floundered in the
face of the Straits' defences; as the French
battleship Bouvet was pulling back from her
bombardment to make way for the
minesweepers, she was rent by a huge
explosion, probably caused by a mine, and
capsized with the loss of most of her ship's
company. Then, in a spate of incidents, several
more battleships were lost or critically
damaged; HMS Inflexible hit a mine and had
to struggle out of the Straits, HMS Irresistible
was torpedoed and later sank, and the French
battleships Suffren and Ocean were
respectively seriously damaged and sunk by
plunging shells from the Narrows forts. As a
final signal of the futility of the Fleet's efforts
the minesweepers fled in the face of the
relentless howitzer fire with barely a mine
swept. In the face of such losses, de Robeck
decided to disengage and regroup.
But what of the Turkish defenders?
Commodore Keyes felt that they were a
'beaten foe' .'" But Colonel Kannengiesser,
now in charge of a detachment of Turkish
troops, testifies differently in his memoirs.
Reflecting on the state of the forts at the end of
the 18th, he writes of the minimal nature of the
damage that the huge medieval forts had
suffered." At Kale Sultanie, for example,
there was extensive damage to the
surrounding buildings and houses but little
structural damage to the fort itself while at
Hamidie only two guns had been destroyed. In
all, of 176 guns, the Fleet had destroyed only
four with no more than ISO defenders killed.
In return the Fleet had lost almost 700 men
with three battleships crippled and three sunk
out of a total of 18. Even more significantly,
only one line of mines had been swept from
the Straits and there seemed little chance of
the minesweepers making any more progress
with the mobile howitzers still as persistent as
ever. The single ray of hope was the Turkish
shortage of ammunition with some of the forts
137
down to only a few dozen more long-range
high explosive shells. There was also no
reserve of mines. The medium howitzers and
minefield batteries, however, still had 50% of
their stocks left.
It has been argued that fate dealt the Navy a
cruel hand on 18 March and that a series of
unfortunate events, such as the sinking of the
Bouvet by a minefield that had only been laid
a few nights before, conspired to sabotage a
promising plan.
However,
a closer
examination of the day's battle will show that
the natural defensive qualities of the Straits,
complemented by an effective combination of
military defences, were the factors that won
the day; the heavy guns of the forts sank the
battleships, the howitzers repelled the minesweepers, and the mines that therefore could
not be swept in turn sank more battleships.
The only hope the Navy had of breaking
through the Narrows was that the Turks did
indeed run out of ammunition. A renewed
attack on the scale of the 18th would not have
been possible but it is true to say that the Fleet,
significantly but not irretrievably damaged,
could have re-engaged the next day. Some of
the forts might well have run out of heavy
shells but further ships would have floundered
in the assault. The key to the matter though
was the mobile howitzer and minefield
batteries, which could not be silenced at any
cost, and which would have continued to make
it impossible to sweep the mines regardless of
whether the forts had been silenced or not.
In any event, even if a battered Fleet
managed to force its way past the Narrows in
spite of the attention of the unswept
minefields and the mobile batteries, there was
no clear idea of what it was then meant to do.
Assuming a weakened and reduced Fleet
managed to see off the Turkish fleet and the
powerful Goeben and Breslau, it would then
probably commence a bombardment of
Constantinople aimed at causing panic and
toppling the government. But, regardless of
any short term political impact, in effect the
Squadron would have been bottled in; with the
defences at the Straits still very much intact
and able to operate again once fully resupplied, there would be no way out and no
means of re-supply or re-fuelling. Once the
138
,
,
\"')
,
~,
Pc'f\C.'~ fo,,",
o
l't\\l\t~dcl ~
C't\o'\)'\ ~ \\ouo'h. Qcal1.n""
Turks had realised the futility of the Fleet's
position, de Robeck would have had two
options; fester in a Russian Black Sea port for
the duration of the war or make a dash back
out of the Straits, tail between legs.
In the event, de Robeck called off the attack
until military forces could be called in to
assist. Professor Reguer is not the only
historian to have censured him for his
decision. However, just as there was no
fundamental failing with his conduct of the
attack on the 18th, there was no fault in his
logic now in cutting his losses rather than
continuing with an assault which promised
further major losses but little chance of
success. Of course, by doing so, his actions
indirectly led to the hugely greater catastrophe
of the land campaign but it was hardly within
his remit to make predictions about the
possibilities of success in a military operation.
What he, and Carden before him, had come to
realise after two months of battering their
ships on the Strait's defences, was that there
had never been a genuine fighting chance of
success.
And so, with the Navy's failure, began a
notorious and heroic struggle in the stinking,
fly infested trenches on the narrow shores of
the Galipoli Peninsula. Many have argued
since that Churchill's brave plan was
sabotaged, on the brink of success, by weaker
men and thereby absolve him of much of the
responsibility for the horrors that followed. In
fact the naval assault was never a realistic
proposition. In any event it is clear that the
weakness of Turkish dispositions at Galipoli
in early 1915 support the proposition that a
determined joint military and naval operation
at that time would have overrun the entire
Dardanelles. In early 1915, the wartime
government was on the verge of ordering just
such an attack until Churchill intervened.
139
Those that argue that Churchill was not the
only motive force behind the naval attack
point to the fact that he was by no means the
most powerful man in the War Council; that
accolade undoubtedly fell to Kitchener. But
whereas Kitchener could prevent policy by his
veto, it was Churchill, with his incredibly
active mind and a brimful of plans and ideas,
who was the most influential. This was
Churchill's plan in its entirety and he who,
lacking the direct power of Kitchener, relied
on his highly persuasive arguing and
infectious enthusiasm, as well as a generous
helping of duplicity, to ensure that it was his
plans and ideas that were implemented. In
doing so over Galipoli, he became personally
responsible for sabotaging a plan that could
have shortened the war by many months and
even years. It is a paradox that one can admire
the brilliance of Churchill's political skills, his
energy and imagination and the sheer force of
his personality, all of which made him a
source of inspiration in the War Council but,
equally, be appalled by the manner in which
his complacency and flawed judgement led
him to make one of the most costly errors of
the First World War.
(concluded)
H. K.
ACKLAND
LIEUTENANT, RN
References
"Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, Memorandum, 5 Jan
1915 (Gilbert).
"Dardanelles Commission First Report.
"Asquith - Venetia Stanley, 20 Jan 1915 (Gilbert).
"Hankey - Balfour, 10 Feb 1915 (Gilbert).
"Rhodes James.
3OKannengeiser.
3'From Rhodes James and Kannengeiser.
Swimming to Victorious
7'YfE following account is contributed by
1 Captain R. Pelly, to whom the story was
told.
The visit to Malta had nothing to do with
tourism. Valletta, or rather the company's
agent there, Giovanni Muscat and Co., was at
the end of a tour I had begun three months
earlier in March 1967 with Athens and
Istanbul, going as far east as Saigon and Hong
Kong then back over the same track.
Muscat's knew their job, so the brief report
I wrote to Head Office in my room at the Astra
Hotel in Sliema after lunch left four hours free
to enjoy a sunny Maltese afternoon before
dinner.
Across Sliema's promenade the sea lay
blue, sparkling and still so I put on my bathing
trunks, walked across the sizzling pavements
and along the stone jetty by the side of the old
fort. Before taking the steps down to the water
I glanced out to sea and took in a large vessel
apparently stationary on the horizon, then in I
went.
In that flat, calm sea I decided to put some
distance between myself and the island to see
the place from a different perspective. Using
backstroke I pulled away from land until first
the walkers, then the cars and buses, and
finally the palm trees along the promenade
became hazy then lost to view. Now I could
see the island of Malta from end to end
shimmering white in the June heat.
As the land got too far away to be
interesting I took a look at the sea around me:
plenty of fishing boats, handy to resort to if a
wind got up, and on the seaward horizon, now
a lot closer, the large vessel seen from the jetty
had materialised into an aircraft carrier. So I
changed backstroke for breaststroke and
slowly the great bulk came nearer.
Eventually, I found myself 150 yards or so
from the bows rising like a great cliff of steel
in front of me and I could see the name
Victorious. Men gathered on the flight deck to
look at the lone swimmer treading water and
soon a commanding voice floated down with
the question
'Hey you, what are you doing down there?'
The call seemed to come from one of three
officers grouped at a large aperture on the
hangar deck, so I shouted back,
'I'm waiting.'
'What are you waiting for?'
'I'm waiting for someone to invite me
aboard for a drink.'
After this there was a brief pause from on
high, punctuated by laughter from the flight
deck, then
'Do you want a drink?'
'Wouldn't you if you had swum from
Malta?' was my reply.
'All right then, come aboard.'
'How?'
'Swim round to the starboard side and
climb eight companion ladders, then you have
got to the hangar deck'.
So this I did, and padded across the steel
plates past the parked aircraft to where a
Lieutenant Commander and two Lieutenants
stood silhouetted against the light waiting to
receive their self-invited guest.
The Lieutenant Commander said 'Welcome
aboard - you haven't swum from Malta have
you?'
'Well, I certainly haven't walked', I
answered.
'So how long did it take you?' asked one of
the Lieutenants.
'I don't know', I replied, 'I don't normally
swim with a watch on. What time is it now?'
'Quarter past five', was the answer.
'That makes just over two hours, then. I
went in just after three.'
Soon a large pink gin arrived and I toasted
my reluctant hosts, at which the younger
Lieutenant asked me if I had served in the
Royal Navy.
'No', I said, 'Royal Air Force, and in the
RAF you have to know how to swim in case
the Navy is a bit late!'
Laughter all round at this one, though I
noticed the senior officer was starting to get a
worried look about him. Then it came out.
'Tell me,' he said, 'Are you going to swim
back?'
'To tell you the truth', 1 replied, 'I hadn't
really thought about it. I'm enjoying this pink
gin too much'.
This wasn't the answer the senior officer
wanted and a few minutes later he brought up
140
SWIMMING TO VICTORIOUS
the subject again.
'No', I said, 'I'm not going to swim back.
The light is going already and I might miss
Malta altogether.'
'Well,' he asked again, 'how are you
getting back?'
So I said, 'I'll hitch a ride on one of your
liberty boats. That will be all right, won't it?'
'There are no liberty boats,' came the
ominous reply. 'We are on emergency standby
because of the crisis between the Arabs and
the Israelis.'
This crisis I knew something about, having
visited Amman, Cairo and Tripoli on my way
to Malta during the past ten days. Cairo had
been especially tense (though it hadn't
stopped me negotiating our firm's biggest
export order ever) and now things were
coming to the boil with the so called 'Six Day
War' about to break out. Which left me at the
end of a delightful swim, and nearing the end
of my pink gin, being presented with the
problem of how to leave Her Majesty's
aircraft carrier Victorious in gathering
darkness without benefit of boat.
So I stalled and tried to play for time,
141
dredging up (imaginary) rights of British
subjects on board a British warship.
'It's a good job I'm a taxpayer, then,' I
suggested. 'I'm sure you will be able to offer
me a comer somewhere for the night with all
this space lying around.'
But the Lieutenant Commander strangled
that idea at birth with 'No no, that's quite
impossible - as I told you, we're on
emergency standby and we can receive orders
to sail at any moment!'
Just as I could see myself descending again
to the now darkening waters and trying to feel
my way back to Sliema - or anywhere - relief
came to hand in the form of a Maltese
bumboat which had come to do a bit of trading
with the crew. The return journey took twenty
minutes and I arrived back at the Astra in good
time for a substantial Maltese dinner of roast
beef and Yorkshire pudding.
Perhaps, even after 30 years it isn't too late
for former Pilot Officer Philip Astington,
Royal Air Force 1950-52, to say a thank you
to those officers of Victorious who treated
with such consideration that unexpected (and
unwanted) guest.
An Incident in the First Cod War
W
HILE writing a short account of a less
benign incident than that related below
about the run-up to the dispute about fishing
rights with Iceland, I dredged the following
memory from the depths of my subconscious.
I was the Sub in the 'Daring' class Diana,
and we were patrolling to the south of
Grindevik in an attempt to protect our fishing
boats from the unwelcome attentions of the
Icelandic gunboats, when we received a report
that a trawler had been boarded and taken over
by a party from the Thor. We were either
ordered or volunteered to regain her.
Our Captain, Bill Graham, sent for me and
handed me a loaded revolver with a stem
admonition not under any circumstances to
use it. A few moments later it was 'Slip' and
the starboard whaler was on its way across the
mercifully and unusually calm sea. The
boarding party consisted of the Captain of the
Forecastle, Petty Officer Bertie, and, I think,
seven sturdy seamen.
As we approached the trawler I could see a
gang of desperadoes lining her bulwarks,
142
armed with axes, cutlasses and ... was that the
dull gleam of the blued steel of old .303s?
We were still six feet from the trawler's side
when Bertie grabbed me by the seat of my
trousers, or so it seemed, and doubtless with
Lieutenant Turner's leap from the Cossack to
the Altmark in mind, propelled me bodily on
board. As Kipling nearly wrote: ' ... the vartue
av the ould (sailor) that knows his orf' cers
work and does ut for him at the salute'. No
salute for me though but ... 'twixt the stirrup
and the ground I mercy asked and mercy
found' ... by the time I had brandished my
pistol in an effort to inspire fear into the hearts
of the desperadoes - they had gone! Out of the
corner of my eye I saw a boat heading back to
the Thor, but I was more occupied with
accepting a generous tot of rum and
subsequently a basket of fresh cod.
I was greeted as a hero on my return to the
Diana but Petty Officer Bertie and I knew
better!
A. B. H.
NELSON
Radio Astronomy and Naval Gunnery: The
Unlikely Alliance
EMBERS of The Naval Review may
well scratch their heads in puzzlement
over the improbability of the above title.
Radio astronomy is a very precise science,
pinpointing stars billions of light years away
from Earth. Naval gunnery on the other hand,
at least when I was serving during our conflict
with Herr Hitler, was imprecise, especially in
the anti-aircraft department. The tale of how
the one aided the other was told to me last
autumn. My wife and I had been invited to
stay with Sir Bernard Lovell, the creator and
first Director of Jodrell Bank.
I wanted very much to see over the
telescope, and my host promised that he would
give me a personally conducted tour the next
morning. Bernard Lovell then became
somewhat enigmatic when he said 'and I think
that as a former naval officer, you will find
something of especial interest at Jodrell'.
The next day's weather was quite glorious,
the sun shining out of a cloudless blue sky,
making my visit to the radio telescope all the
more pleasant. Since a great part of it consists
of a vast complex of steel girders open to the
elements I was glad that my tour would be in
the dry and not in pelting rain.
The sheer size of the radio telescope fills
one with awe mixed with admiration for those
whose foresight and ingenuity created it. The
dish measures two hundred and fifty feet in
diameter, and on that beautiful morning it was
a wonderful and futuristic sight.
I was introduced to the Senior Engineer and
we entered the Control Room. Here the first
link with the Service appeared in the form of
the Duty Controller who had been a Petty
Officer Radar Mechanic. The Control Room
had a huge window which looked out on to the
telescope. Bernard Lovell told me of one
awful night when, during a storm of hurricane
force, he was summoned from home as the
telescope was in danger from the high winds.
He gave orders to turn it so that it presented
the least resistance, but he said it was touch
and go.
A clock on the wall showing sidereal time
was a reminder, if one was needed, that this
M
was a place which dealt with the stars. We
stood beneath the telescope only a foot or two
away from its circular tracking. Bogies were
supported on the railway tracking and
suddenly they moved a few inches. It was
brought home to me that our planet was
turning and the telescope with it. ..
The three of us arrived at a door which was
situated at the bottom of one of the tall pillars
supporting the dish. I was extremely pleased
to see that this led to a lift, and this took us up
some two hundred feet. Just when I was
feeling relieved that my fear of heights was
not to be put to the test, Bernard Lovell led us
to the bottom of a twenty foot vertical steel
ladder up which he began to climb with the
agility of a teenager. My fears were now to be
realised and as I followed him, I tried not to
look down. Lovell seemed quite unmoved by
the climb and said 'I promised my engineers
that when I reached eighty I would not climb
this more than twice a year. 1 think I have now
climbed it fifty times since then.'
We walked a little way along a narrow
passage and then Bernard Lovell opened a
door saying 'here you are'. I looked down at
rows of huge steel teeth and realised that I was
looking at the mechanism on which the dish
was tilted. 'This' said Lovell, 'is the
connection between astronomy and naval
gunnery'. He went on to explain how the rings
of teeth came to be there. As so often happens
in designs large and small, cash projections
are not always in line with reality. When the
telescope was being built, the dish turning
mechanism was a major factor, and money
was beginning to be tight. It was here that the
naval service of Professor P. M. S. Blackett
was of infinite value. Blackett had served as
an RN two-striper in Barham when she was
Flagship of the 5th Battle Squadron at Jutland.
He knew what he was talking about. (When I
proposed writing this article and showed
Bernard Lovell the draft, he was astounded to
learn that I had been present when Barham
was sunk in the Mediterranean in November
1941 .* He had no idea we kept battleships for
so long!)
143
144
RADIO ASTRONOMY AND NAVAL GUNNERY: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE
On 5 July 1950, at one of the innumerable
conferences discussing building progress,
Blackett made his proposal. He said that the
problem of how the telescope was to be driven
was similar to that of aiming and controlling
the guns of a battleship. He told Lovell to visit
the Admiralty Gunnery Establishment at
Teddington and thither Lovell repaired with
colleagues on 20 July.
To quote from Bernard Lovell's book
Astronomer by Chance: 'J. M. Ford of
Teddington and his naval colleagues thought
our problem was simple in comparison with
that of controlling the gun turret of a battleship
and advised us to talk to Metropolitan Vickers
about the use of their "metadyne" control
system. This was an electrical drive system
that would give the telescope an acceleration
proportional to the displacement from the
required position. By this time our Consulting
Engineer H. C. Husband had become
concerned about the size of the gear racks that
would be needed to drive the elevation. Ford
also solved that problem. He advised Husband
to obtain some of the 25-foot diameter racks
used to drive the 15-inch gun turrets in a
battleship.
Husband soon secured a major bargain over
the question of these large racks. On 3 August
he journeyed to the ship-breaker's yard in
Inverkeithing where the battleships Royal
Sovereign and Revenge were being broken up.
There he discovered that one of Royal
Sovereign's turrets had not yet been broken
down and that two complete 15-inch gun
turret racks of Revenge were in perfect
condition. Husband warned me that "to
produce two new racks and pinions of this
quality would cost several thousand pounds".
By mid-September the ship-breakers told
Husband that the rack and pinion from Royal
Sovereign was freed and lying aboard the ship
and that we could have it for £250 and also the
two from Revenge when they had been freed.
By any standards this was a bargain offer' . It
was in this way that the Royal Navy assisted
indirectly in the construction of the radio
telescope at Jodrell Bank.
My tour of the telescope over, Bernard
Lovell and I realised that we had omitted to
arrange a rendezvous with my wife and his
guest. We separated and searched but returned
without success to the Control Room car park.
'Bernard', I said, 'this is ridiculous. Here you
have a wonderful instrument capable of
pinpointing with unerring accuracy the
positions of stars billions of light years away
and we can't find the people we are looking
for!' We found them among the stars ... in the
Planetarium!
ADRIAN HOLLOWAY
'see my book From Dartmouth to War published by
Buckland Publications, reviewed in NR April '94.
The Victoria and Camperdown collision, 1893
N the afternoon of 22 June 1893 thirteen
battleships and cruisers were exercising
O
off Tripoli in what is now Lebanon when the
after he had ordered all the officers off the
bridge. We had a very big funeral this
morning & we shall have them for the
next week. There is no chance of getting
the Victoria up as she went down in 75
fathoms of water. The Camperdown is in
a very bad way, her bows are very nearly
under water & divers & people have been
working all night & all day; there are two
holes in the bows big enough for a man to
walk through & the great fear at present is
that the watertight bulkhead will give
way with pressure when she will go
straight down. It was horrible when we
first got there in the boats, there were
dozens of men nearly all more or less
mangled & as we got nearer we could see
them being sucked down by the wash
right in front of our eyes & within half a
dozen yards of you. Two of the fellows
who past out of the Brittania with me
were drowned.
I remain yours sincerely,
H. Tweedie
Victoria (the C-in-C's flagship) and the
Camperdown (flagship of the second-incommand, Rear-Admiral Markham) collided.
The Victoria was sunk with the loss of 359
lives including the Commander-in-Chief,
Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon. On the next
day the 16-year-old Naval Cadet Hugh
Tweedie of the battleship Dreadnought wrote
the following letter to his mother. It had been
a make-and-mend at the time of the collision
(which was at 1534) and all the midshipmen
and cadets not on watch were asleep in the
gunroom.
HMS Dreadnought
23rd June, Tripoli
My dear Mother,
Before you get this letter you will have
heard of the frightful disaster. It
happened about half past three when we
were all in the gun-room & we suddenly
heard the pipe 'Away all boats'; it struck
us as very funny that all boats should be
called away just as we were going into
harbour but we ran up just in time to see
the Camperdown crash in the Victoria.
She filled rapidly in the bows & in little
over five minutes she gave a sudden lurch
& went down with all hands on board.
Our boats were there almost as soon as
she disappeared & between us we saved
10 I officers & men [110 according to his
Captain's memoirs). The Nile's boats
saved 82 & the Camperdown's 52, the
remainder saved 10, three of our men
died since & one of the Nile's making a
total of 249 out of a ship's company of
over 600. 5 Mids were saved & 8
drowned, out of 50 officers 25 were
drowned & 8 were out of the ship.
The Captain, Hon Maurice A. Bourke,
was saved. I don't know whether he is
any relation to the Bourkes at Pulborough
[his uncle was rector of Pulborough,
Sussex). The Commander-in-Chief was
last seen on the top of the chart house
The fleet had been in two divisions in line
ahead, led respectively by the two flagships,
with the Nile immediately astern of the
Victoria, and the Dreadnought astern of the
Nile. Tryon, who was regarded as the greatest
tactician of the age, ordered the ships in the
two columns to alter course in succession
sixteen points, turning inwards, although the
distance between the columns (six cables) was
known to be too narrow for this evolution.
After a few minutes the Camperdown rammed
the Victoria. Admiral Markham in the
Camperdown assumed that Tryon would order
some further manoeuvre to avoid a collision,
but with his death it is not known wh~ was in
Tryon's mind. Of the Victoria's ship's
company of 600 there were only 241
survivors.
The
Camperdown,
though
damaged, was able to steam to Malta with an
escort for repairs. At the court-martial held on
the loss of the Victoria, it was found that the
'collision was due to an order given by ViceAdmiral Tryon'.
Hugh Tweedie ended his career as a full
145
146
THE VICTORIA AND CAMPERDOWNCOLLISION. 1893
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief at the
Nore, retiring in 1935. In his autobiography
The Story ofa Naval Life (1939) he recalls that
after picking up survivors from the Victoria
the boats were employed in salvaging
wreckage. He found himself alongside a chest
of drawers which was too large to get into his
boat, so they broke into it and extracted all the
clothes. They were found to belong to the
future Admiral Jellicoe, the commander of the
Victoria, who at the time of the collision was
in bed in his cabin with a temperature of 103°.
Cadet Tweedie's letter is published for the
first time with the kind permission of his
daughter, Mrs John Carver, and at the
suggestion of Captain R. G. Tosswill, to both
of whom I express my warm thanks.
HUGH OWEN
CAPTAIN, RN
From The Naval Review Thirty Years Ago
ROM the point of view of the country and
the Royal Navy the most important event
in 1968 was the commissioning of HMS
Resolution, the first of the four 'R' class
Polaris submarines. This was a great
achievement as it was within the time scale
set. The three submarines Repulse, Renown
and Revenge were to commission at
approximately six-month intervals following.
In the previous year 'Moryak' was to
propose that the manning of Polaris
submarines should be done by a separate force
which he called the Polaris Submarine Force
and it should be reconstituted as a National
Deterrent Force. This set off the big guns of
the Chief Polaris Executive and our former
Editor Admiral McGeoch, to refute this
argument. The chief Polaris Executive,
Admiral Mackenzie, dismissed the suggestion
because 'this is no job for "nice old cups of
tea" or for civilianisation'. Admiral McGeoch
in a carefully considered commentary on the
submarine scene at the time admitted that
'Moryak' was persuasive and powerfully
played on emotions. It was therefore possible
F
'that the absurdity of his proposition might
pass un-noticed by many, were it not pointed
out . . .' which he then sought to do in the
January 1968 issue.
Technological change began to run like a
forest fire and 'A Bit' in the July 1968 issue
wrote 'If the Navy is to be fully effective in
the future, it must have a corps of officers who
have been trained in the techniques of
handling information as part of their basic
education. '
Thirty years ago the Soviet military threat
was a dark shadow which cast a baleful
influence on world peace. But there was a
glint of sunshine as depicted by 'J.E.' in the
October 1968 issue. He wrote 'the expansion
of Soviet maritime power is a coherent policy
capable of supporting equally effectively
either the legitimate aims, or any illegal
expansionist ambitions, of Russia. At present
it represents for NATO a political challenge
rather than a direct military threat.'
Discuss? ..
PARAVANE
End of an Era?
A CHRISTMAS card on offer this year (/997)
by King George's Fund for Sailors depicts a
stern view of HM Yacht Britannia as she
passes the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.
Both are about to be decommissioned. The
title of this far from festive picture is 'End of
an Era '. Twenty years ago the distinguished
historian
Richard
Gllard
MA FRSL
contributed to Vol. I, No.1 of the Nautical
Review an account of 'Pepys and the sea
officers', here reproduced by permission.
Members of The Naval Review, after reading
it, may ask themselves If it is the era initiated
by Pepys, with the help of King Charles II,
which is alleged to have ended: the Royal
connection, the combination of civil with
professional administration, the association
with Greenwich as centre of maritime art and
science, and above all the spirit of 'all of one
company' infusing the officer corps.
Ian McGeoch
AY 29 would be dedicated, if his life
had afforded a title to sanctity, to King
Charles II. Up the river in Chelsea the
pensioners of his splendid hospital observe the
feast of their founder with appropriate
conviviality. It was his birthday. It was the day
on which, amid scenes of delirious rejoicing,
he re-entered London in 1660, the day, more
than any other, to be celebrated as the
anniversary of his Restoration. Pepys, as one
of the most vivid reporters who have ever
described London, whose Diary gives us, and
for the Restoration period especially, the very
form and pressure of the time, might at first
sight offer rich material for an account of this
historic day.
In fact, however, he was not among those
taking part. He had stayed behind aboard the
Royal Charles with his cousin and patron, Sir
Edward Montagu, soon to be ennobled as Earl
of Sandwich. He spent the morning writing
letters, including one to find out how much his
employer would have to pay for his institution
as a Knight of the Most Honourable and Noble
Order of the Garter, and after dinner on board
went ashore with his master for a most
agreeable and refreshing ride. From the top of
Kingsdown cliffs they watched the Fleet fire
M
salutes in honour of the King's birthday and in
the evening there was supper and music in the
Great Cabin.
Pepys was coming to the end of the first of
two long periods in his life spent in a warship
at close quarters with the sea-officers - the
second was his voyage to Tangier at the very
end of the reign now opening. It is his relation
to this body of men that I propose to discuss. It
was a subject that, in the whole course of his
life, probably claimed as much of his time and
attention as any other It was certainly one to
which his contribution was of the first
importance.
Sea-officers, Pepys and his contemporaries
said. Naval officers, we say. Why the
difference? Pepys was distinguishing between
people like himself who were officers of the
navy - as we would put it, officials of the navy
board - and people like Sir John Narbrough or
Captain Wyborne - to name two of his
particular friends - who occupied their
business in great waters. Some of Pepys'
colleagues, Penn and Batten most notably, had
great experience in both spheres. Even Pepys
himself could technically claim to have been a
sea-officer. On 13 March, 1669, we read in the
diary:
But that which put me in good humour
both at noon and night, is the fancy that I
am this day made a Captain of one of the
King's ships, Mr Wren having this day
sent me the Duke of York's commission to
be Captain of 'The lerzy' in order to my
being of a Court-Marshall for examining
the loss of 'The Defyance' and other
things; which do give me occasion of
much mirth, and may be of some use to
me, at least I shall get a little money by it
for the time I have it; it being designed
that I must really be a Captain to be able
to sit in this Court.
A few days later he was not so much
amused. Packing a Court-Martial with bogus
Captains was a dangerous precedent. It was
exactly the way to promote the favouritism
and inefficiency that Pepys spent his whole
life in fighting. So he privately compromised
and determined that though playing his full
part in the inquiry - 'I did lay the law open to
147
148
END OF AN ERA?
them and rattle the Master-Attendants out of
their wits almost' - he would withdraw when
the Court was reaching its conclusions.
The sea-officer proper, the naval officer of
our day, cannot historically be considered
merely in his professional capacity. He
occupies a prominent position in English
society, in our literature, in our manners and
our morals. For the mid-twentieth century
Noel Coward's In Which We Serve
exemplifies the pattern: courteous, reliable,
unself-seeking,
balanced,
competent,
unemotional. We remember that King George
V and King George VI were both brought up
as naval officers and we observe that the
present heir apparent is so serving. A century
and a half ago, at the high noon of the Royal
Navy, Jane Austen portrays a large cast of
naval officers to whose domestic virtues she
pays memorable homage in the last sentence
of her last novel.
Social and professional divisions
The sea-officers of Pepys' day were, so to
speak, the rude forefathers of these paragons.
Unlike their successors in the twentieth
century, or even in Nelson's day, they were
contract labour, not permanent members of a
profession with a recognised system of
promotion and seniority. They were divided,
socially and professionally, into two classes,
the gentlemen and the tarpaulins. The
tarpaulins, as their name suggests, were the
real professional seamen who would earn their
living in merchant ships when there was no
billet for them in the King's. The gentlemen
were scions of noble or landed families who
recognised military leadership as one of the
obligations of their position. One personified
competence, the other the mental and social
qualities of a class that had been bred to
command and was likely to have had the
advantage of a liberal education. It was Pepys'
aim to fuse the two, an aim which by the time
of Nelson and Jane Austen had to a great
extent been achieved.
The means he employed were as various
and resourceful as himself. Perhaps nowhere
in his official life can we find a fuller
expression of his personality. He based
himself on the traditional wisdom of the
apprenticeship system. The young gentleman
must first and foremost serve at sea and obtain
certificates from his commanding officers as
to his 'sobriety, diligence, obedience to order
and application to the study and practice of the
art of navigation'. But literacy and cultivation
of mind - those quintessentially Pepysian
qualities
were given their proper
importance. The young officer was required to
keep ajournal- not, one hastens to add, on the
model of that unique and secret document on
which his own fame rests. And finally, in
December, 1677, the Board of Admiralty
agreed to the establishment of an examination,
based on these requirements, for the rank of
Lieutenant. The hallmark of the modern
profession was originated, designed and
carried through entirely by Pepys. It is worth
remembering that examinations for admission
to the Civil Service were not established for
another 200 years.
But institutional reform is only part of the
story. One does not have to read far in Pepys
to recognise his passionate interest in people
and his skill in handling them. The stream of
letters to individual officers that poured out of
the Admiralty office during his two tenures of
the Secretaryship taught the sea-officers what
was required of them and set standards that
have never since been entirely forgotten.
To take but one example. In the spring of
1675 the Captain of the Phoenix died while
she was on the West Indies station, and the
Governor of the Barbados, Sir Jonathan
Atkins, a personal friend of Pepys, appears to
have secured the command for his son, instead
of allowing the Lieutenant to succeed to the
Captain's place ... 'Justice' ... wrote Pepys
in a letter to the soi-disant Captain Atkins ...
'must be preserved in all matters of that kind
or the whole discipline of the navy must be
abandoned, in which nothing is less to be
controverted than the right of a lieutenant to
succeed to the command of the ship upon the
death of his captain, at least until he shall
come within the reach of His Majesty or the
Lord High Admiral.'
'As to my own particular, besides the
impartiality which I pretend to govern myself
by in all other cases, there will be little ground
to suspect me of any other dealings in this, the
END OF AN ERA?
lieutenant being one I never saw, much less
have any personal concernment for ... while
on the other hand I have that especial regard to
my noble friend, your father, Sir Jonathan
Atkins, as would easily incline me to the
giving preference to a son of his on any fair
occasion. But right is right and shall never on
any consideration receive interruption where I
can prevent it, and least of all where the
prejudice attending his Majesty from it may be
of importance a thousandfold more than the
benefit of the private person that is to be
gratified by it.'
This is the note that the sea-officers came to
recognise in their tireless correspondent.
Clarity, firmness, discipline, order: the whole
backed up by the timeless certainties of
morality
'Right is Right'
so
characteristically reinforced by an explanation
of the practical disadvantages one incurs by
flouting them. And underlying it all is the idea
of the service as a continuous entity, to whose
future as well as whose present one's actions
must refer. How incalculable have been the
benefits of instilling that spirit.
Pepys, like his friend and mentor in these
matters, Sir William Coventry, was generally
accused of favouring the tarpaulins at the
expense of the gentlemen. This was politically
both dangerous and unpopular, since in the
early years of the reign the tarpaulins were
bound to be officers who had held
commissions under the Commonwealth and
Protectorate, whereas the gentlemen were
almost certain to belong to Royalist families.
It is true that almost all Pepys' closest friends
among the sea officers were tarpaulins. Sir
John Narbrough, the great admiral who was
also a great navigator, and Sir John Berry,
who had entered the service as a boatswain,
both came into the Royal Navy from the
merchant service, without so far as is known
149
having served under the Commonwealth. But
it was their professionalism and their
conspicuous attention to duty that won them
Pepys' high regard, not their political or social
origins. And he had no prejudice against
aristocrats, provided they were ready to learn
their job. On the contrary he wanted more
aristocrats in the navy, not less, because he
rightly saw that parliament was an essentially
aristocratic and landed club - witness the
amount of time it spent adding to the already
excessive number of game laws - and naval
affairs would never get a proper hearing there
until aristocrats could be brought to
contemplate a naval career. But it must be a
career, and they must accept discipline. As
Drake had put it 'I would have the gentleman
to haul and draw with the mariner, and the
mariner with the gentleman.' Young sparks
who came on board for a battle as though they
were going for a fortnight's grouse shooting
were worse than useless.
In all this Pepys was running counter to the
spirit of the society in which he lived. To obey
orders was still felt to be the part or a servant,
a mechanic, an artisan or a tradesman. The
pride and honour of a gentleman were, by our
standards, morbidly egocentric. In the Civil
War the Royalist commanders were forever
taking the huff with each other and sometimes
with difficulty, restrained from fighting duels
when they should have been concentrating on
the enemy. Professionalism in the army and
the navy had grown fast under Cromwell, but
Charles II was a very different man to work
for. Yet the sea-officers with whom Pepys,
down at Deal, passed such an agreeable day
while the King was riding into London close
enough for us to have heard the huzzas were
products of the Cromwellian system. Perhaps
their professionalism contributed to his own.
-Midshipmen join their First Ships in the Med
in 1940
'T ET's put on our pyjamas,' said Michael.
.L
What an enormously good idea it
seemed and so it was. There was much
rummaging in over-night bags and in quite a
short time we were all in pyjamas, which were
or something approaching the native costume
of the land through which we were passing in
the not too clean Egyptian train.
We were thirty-six midshipmen, all
apparently calm and self-possessed young
men, mostly seventeen years old, although a
few of eighteen or nineteen, crossing the
Egyptian isthmus from Suez to Alexandria to
join our first ships in His Majesty's Eastern
Mediterranean fleet, otherwise known as the
Med Fleet. Inside ourselves, each according to
his temperament, it was different; the apparent
nonchalance was superficial. We had left the
troop transports at Port Tewfik early that
morning wonderfully clean in our long white
duck trousers and high necked tunics which
were already becoming grubby with the
ubiquitous yellow dust of the desert.
The war was entering its second year and no
one was under any illusion that 'it would be
over by Christmas' and we were keen to play
our part. We had chosen the Royal Navy: we
were professionals. The question of defeat did
not enter our heads; the British Empire always
won in the end, although we knew that it also
started wars badly. We had left Liverpool in
September, the Battle of Britain was on, and
the blitz had hardly started. Our airmen were
wonderful, but even in the unlikely event of
their being overcome, we could not seriously
envisage Hitler's armies crossing the Channel
in the face of the Royal Navy.
After leaving Britain and its blackout and
with no responsibilities on the voyage in the
quite comfortable accommodation of the
luxury liners that made up our troop convoy it
had seemed more like peacetime every day.
Troopships were not even 'dry' in those days.
The soldiers on board - an anti-aircraft
regiment - were not so lucky; two thousand in
hammocks crammed together below decks.
We did not worry about them, they were
soldiers and not our responsibility anyway.
There was the gorgeous expanse of Table Bay
that we entered one morning, the fascinating
girls who drove us for brief visits to colourful
racecourses and entrancing nightclubs were
intoxicating.
A few bombs dropped very wide off Italian
Somaliland before lunch time drinks one day
were a diversion, but the burnt out hull of the
liner Georgie swinging at anchor in Suez Bay
was a grim reminder that after all we were on
the serious business of war.
It was already dark when our train pulled
into Alexandria station, so the almost white
duck suits into which we had changed once
more, in the poor Egyptian blackout went
unnoticed. Bundled into battered local taxis,
already dusty and weary, we were hardly
ready to appreciate that moment of moments,
not to be forgotten by any young man, when
he joins his first ship!
Through darkened, yet thronging, streets
we were taken to what we came to know as
'No.6 gate'. Here the boats of the fleet were
awaiting the new arrivals. We were divided
according to ships. Warspite, Valiant, Malaya,
Orion, Ajax, the famous names that we had
only heard on the BBC rang out, called by the
coxswains and midshipmen who were driving
the boats and they entered into our lives for the
first time. The boats, motor cutters and picket
boats, jostled each other along the wharf.
Starlight reflected in the wavelets. Then
'whoosh!' And phosphorescence as boat after
boat pulled away into the blackout. The water
was close at hand for in the tide-less
Mediterranean, there was no need for high
jetties.
We trotted up the port after ladder onto the
quarterdeck of the Valiant and saluted in the
dark. The blackout here was complete. A tired
and somewhat bedraggled lot, we were guided
to a space between decks, a flat as we learnt
later it was called, were given seamen's
hammocks and bedding which we laid out on
the deck, put on our pyjamas and were soon in
an exhausted sleep.
Sometime later we heard over the ship's
broadcasting system a sound that was to be the
150
--MIDSHIPMEN JOIN THEIR FIRST SHIPS IN THE MED IN 1940
background of much of our time in the Med,
but having nowhere to go or duties to perform,
we let noise of rushing feet and slamming
doors pass us by and huddled down on our
makeshift bedding; some of us were anxious
lest our last moments had come before we had
even started on our lives of adventure. 'Tumpa
tumpa tum, tumpa tumpa tum,' went the
bugle, 'Repel aircraft! Repel aircraft!' went
the voice, over and over again for what
seemed an age. The impression was that the
enemy aircraft were actually landing on the
ship, but it was probably no more than a
reconnaissance over Alexandria. Then the
'thump! thump!' of a 4.5-inch battery, four of
Valiant's heavy anti-aircraft guns, firing a
barrage into the sky.
It was not until later that Michael confided
that he had missed the directions to the heads.
Caught desperately short he had found himself
wandering around in the pitch dark of the
blacked-out quarterdeck. He relieved himself
on what can only have been the barbette of Y
15-inch turret. Horrors! This should have been
a matter for the Guinness Book of Records at
another time.
The
Gunroom,
where
twenty-two
midshipmen and three lieutenants ate, played
and where several also slept on the settees and
armchairs, was a long space amidships on the
starboard ship's side under the catapault deck.
Most of the space was taken up by a long
wooden table up against the settee on the
ship's side with chairs on the inboard side. At
this table the entire mess could, on the rare
occasions that called for it, almost all sit down
together. There was just room on the inboard
side for an electric fire and a club fender
against the bulkhead and four or five black
leather covered armchairs. The pantry was at
the forward end, a tiny space which gave onto
the mess by a small square serving hatch. This
square was big enough for Farmer Helps, as
one of our term was known, to aim a full plate
of victuals at Petty Officer Steward Hancock
with accompanying expletives, if they failed
to take his fancy. Petty Officer Hancock
would dodge smartly, grinning broadly and
clearly enjoying the horseplay more than
anyone, and the plate would smash against the
not far off pantry bulkhead.
151
The food was plain but ample, for which we
were stopped 10/3d a week out of our
midshipmen's 5/- a day. The most enjoyable
meal was probably breakfast, with plenty of
toast, butter and marmalade and the small
Egyptian eggs fried and served on fried bread,
of which, despite a slight flavour of garlic,
snotties would often consume four or even six
portions.
Midshipmen were supposed to be 'under
instruction' and an officer known as the
Snotties' Nurse had the duty of supervising
this. But the pressures of warfare and other
ship's duties, both on the students and on the
ship's officers who were supposed to be the
instructors, and in particular on the Valiant's
Snotties' Nurse who was the ship's navigating
officer and one of the most heavily burdened
officers, was so great that I do not remember
more than a dozen lectures during my time
onboard. An exception was the Journal or
Log, which all midshipmen were required to
keep. These were a test in observation and
should show that the snotties were absorbing
more than just their daily round. They were
read at monthly intervals by the Snotties'
Nurse and also initialled by the Captain
himself.
Breakfast with the Captain was an ordeal.
During a quieter time in harbour two snotties the name was an unfair survival from the
youngsters' runny noses - were detailed for
breakfast with the Captain. Reporting to the
steward at 8 am in the large after cabin was the
start. Where to put your hands while waiting
in the highly polished ante-room was in itself
a problem. In a moment the Captain was there
and doing his best to put his visitors at ease,
which 1am sure did not come naturally to him.
Our Commanding Officer was probably
wronged by his nickname 'Black Morgan'
thanks to his generally taciturn manner. It
seemed difficult on the bridge or quarterdeck
to extract more than a gruff 'Wouf! Wouf!' or
something that sounded like it. At breakfast
the effort at conversation on both sides
banished the pleasure of an excellent English
breakfast, served by his steward on the
miraculous shining white fluted china as
supplied by the Admiralty for post Captains'
messes. What should have been a highlight
..
152
MIDSHIPMEN JOIN THEIR FIRST SHIPS IN THE MED IN 1940
was quickly forgotten by the guests.
Their duties onboard and in particular their
action stations, for the fleet was at four hours'
notice for steam in one of the most active war
zones at that time, was a preoccupation for the
newly arrived midshipmen. From positions of
really high responsibility to more mundane
tasks were the lot of the snotties. The ship's
officers, and in particular the ship's Gunnery
Officer, a Lieutenant Commander of fearsome
aspect, but actually the kindest and most
considerate of all the officers, a graduate from
that mythical place, the naval gunnery school
at Whale Island in Portsmouth, were carefully
weighing them up.
The most important jobs were concerned
with the ship's anti-aircraft defence. For this
the Valiant had been recently modernised and
carried twin turrets of 4.5-inch high angle
guns set in batteries of four guns, each group
covering one quarter of the ship. Then came
the much-vaunted 'Chicago Pianos'. These
were enormous mountings, each with eight
30mm barrels and vast trays of belted
ammunition. The shells self-destructed at
3,OOOft and when firing made a satisfactory
thumping sound of great intensity.
Within 24 hours of joining Valiant the fleet
put to sea for a sweep along the North African
coast. This large fleet, all leaving the restricted
harbour of Alexandria after dark, as was their
wont, with radio silence and no more than
dimmed navigation lights, seemed a miracle.
My action station was in B IS-inch turret
under Lieutenant Henry Barnes, a large
delightful pre-war officer who enjoyed his
comforts. We settled in the small office at the
rear of the huge turret, its austere metal walls
hung with a few telephones, but softened by
ample rugs and cushions supplied by Henry
himself, together with Thermoses of tea and
tins of plum cake. The more sinister aspect
was the two mountings of point five-inch
guns, four to each mounting, on the roof of the
turret. The IS-inch gun crews manned these
against close air attack. The turret officer,
Henry, and his midshipman naturally, went up
with the gun's crews. Happily this did not
arise for several weeks (when the aircraft
carrier Illustrious was put out of action by
Stukas) and I had moved to a less exposed
action station.
When 'repel aircraft' was sounded, in
harbour as at sea, to get inside B turret I had to
run along an exposed deck within just a few
feet of the muzzles of a 4.5 inch battery; my
fear was that the guns might start firing before
I had dipped through the hole under the
overhang of the large 15 inch turret. Happily
this never happened to me.
J. KANE
LIEUT. CDR, RN
Forbidden Areas
One
N 1935 we paid a visit in the small aircraft
carrier Hermes to three ports in Japan,
ending in a visit to Nagasaki.
We were to sail for exercises with the rest of
the China Fleet at 1800 on a Sunday.
The Petty Officers' Mess had been given
permission to go on a picnic in a cutter to one
of the small islands in the harbour.
I was on duty in the afternoon and was
horrified to see our cutter and the Petty
Officers being towed by a Japanese steamboat
past the ship and up to the top of the harbour.
We got in touch with our Consul who learnt
that the Petty Officers had landed on a most
secret island and were being interrogated to
see if they were spies.
Our Captain, the Hon. George Fraser, was
very reluctant to make a signal to the
Commander-in-Chief to say we were unable
to sail. Just about the time we were due to sail
the Consul said that if the Captain landed in
full dress and bowed and apologised to the
Governor of the Port it was possible that the
Petty Officers and cutter would be allowed to
return.
This is what happened and we sailed about
two hours late.
The men had just lit a fire on the island and
were starting to cook a meal, when they were
aware of Japanese Marines, armed and in full
combat gear, crawling towards them through
the bushes.
I
153
Two
Two or three days before, three of us went for
a walk in the hills overlooking the city. We
had been walking for some time and
commented that there was no one about, when
we came to a large notice in several languages
including English, which said we were in a
prohibited zone.
Luckily we were able to retrace our steps
without being spotted.
Three
In the Spring of 1938 we arrived at Gibraltar
in the Cornwall, which was at the time a Boys'
Training Ship. We had landed Lord Chatfield
at Marseilles, after he had attended the
combined exercises of the Home and
Mediterranean Fleets.
We learnt that the previous week the pocket
battleship Deutschland had been at Gibraltar.
She had given leave and shortly afterwards the
top of the Rock was seen to be covered with
German officers and men in uniform.
The authorities were naturally very
concerned and questioned the Army sentries
by the entrance to the Forbidden Zone.
Their orders were that only officers and
men from the armed forces in uniform were to
be allowed through.
Nothing was said about nationality.
RICHARD PHILLIMORE
COMMANDER, RN
p
Kipling at Sea
F Rudyard Kipling is thought of at all these
days it is probably as the writer of stories of
IIndia,
its people and its Army. Having been
educated in England at a school which
prepared boys for Sandhurst and Woolwich
(his eyesight debarred him from the Army) he
returned to India and saw a lot of both the
'Indian Army' and the 'Army in India' and of
the native people, and a lot of his writing
reflects that. But he wrote about much more
than those. In prose and verse he depicted
vignettes of English history from Roman
times, the men and manners of modem
England, war in the trenches and, rather
surprisingly, about the sea and ships.
Kipling's affection for the Navy began in
1891 when after a serious illness in England
he was returning to India via the Cape and on
board the 'gigantic three thousand ton liner,
the Moor', he met a Naval Captain who was
en route to take up a new command at Simons
Town. A 'life-long friendship' began, and he
introduced Kipling to the Naval society of
Cape Town 'where the Admiral of the Cape
Station lived in splendour, with at least a brace
of live turtles harnessed to the end of the little
wooden jetty, swimming about until due to be
taken up for turtle soup'. He goes on to
describe a 'rag' at the Naval Club there after 'a
polite suggestion to a newly appointed
Lieutenant-Commander that the fore-topmast
of his tiny gunboat wanted staying forward'.
That was undoubtedly the germ of Kipling's
story 'Judson and the Empire' in the book
Many Inventions. In that tale he brings to life
the relationships among the ship's company of
a small ship a century ago and the extent to
which comparatively junior officers, out of
touch when detached, were expected to have
some knowledge of international politics and
to use initiative. Another that must have come
from stories heard was 'A Flight of Fact',
from Land and Sea Tales, which deals with a
naval aircraft's crew who found themselves
with problems while flying about a Pacific
archipelago. Once again his detail is accurate
and surprising.
'We'll meet again,' said my Captain, 'and if
ever you want a cruise, let me know.' From
this must have sprung the invitation to embark
in the Flagship for the Channel Fleet
manoeuvres, as recounted in 'Their Lawful
Occasions' in the book Traffics and
Discoveries. He 'missed his ship on sailing'
and took part instead aboard a small torpedo
boat. ('''Join us - buy a 'am an' see life," said
Petty Officer Second Class Pyecroft.')
In my youth I knew a retired naval officer
who had then been in that same boat. He told
me that Kipling, made free of the ship by her
captain, talked with every one aboard her
(there were not many). 'He knew just how to
phrase a question to produce the greatest
information,' he told me, 'and after a couple of
days he knew more about that ship than any
one man in her.' 'Lawful Occasions' shows it.
He must, however, have been at sea in a big
ship at some time, for the tenseness in a ship of
the Fleet at sea in fog is well described in his
poem 'The Wet Litany' preceding 'Their
Lawful Occasions'.
'The Ballad of the Clamperdown' in
Barrack Room Ballads, written in the 1880s,
describes a fictional battle fought by an early
turret-gun ship which was ended by boarding
the enemy when her two turrets had been put
out of action.
During the First World War he wrote much
about the Navy and its tasks in both prose and
verse. The stresses of Channel patrol were
well depicted in 'Sea Constables' in Debits
and Credits, while in The Five Nations are the
poems, 'Cruisers', and 'Destroyers'. The
Submarine Service is recognised, though in
pre-war exercises, in Traffics and Discoveries
by the verses introducing 'Their Lawful
Occasions' beginning,
The wind went down with the sunset,
The fog came up with the tide,
When the Witch of the North took an
eggshell
With a little blue devil inside.
In his little book, The Fringes of the Fleet
Kipling describes the wartime doings of the
sweepers, submarines, and patrols in the
Channel, sometimes in prose, sometimes in
verse, always accurately.
The Royal Marines were not overlooked,
and in The Seven Seas is a poem, 'Soldier and
Sailor Too', while in Traffics and Discoveries
154
KIPLING AT SEA
is an entertammg tale, 'The Bonds of
Discipline', of how a cruiser's ship's company
staged a display of sloth and indiscipline
culminating in an 'execution' of a Royal
Marine for mutiny, for the misinformation
(though the term had not arrived then) of a
French spy masquerading as a Portuguese
refugee.
Kipling's writings kept the Navy well in the
public eye, but his seafaring was not with the
Navy alone. Some of his tales of marine
engineering were set in merchant ships, and
others, such as 'An Unqualified Pilot' in Land
and Sea Tales or 'A Disturber of Traffic' in
Many Inventions dealt with the difficulties of
river pilotage or with lighthouse service.
While living for some years in the United
States he had met a Doctor Conland, who had
been with the cod fishing fleet on the Grand
Banks of Newfoundland in his youth. From
his experiences came another full book,
Captains Courageous. Kipling wrote, 'My
part was the writing, his the details.' In the
course of writing the story, Kipling said, he
and ConIand moved among the fishermen of
Boston harbour, 'assisted hospitable tugmasters to shift schooners round the harbour,
and boarded every craft that looked as if she
might be useful' - an example of Kipling's
quest for detail.
In his autobiography, Something of Myself,
he describes how his inherited ability with
words was enhanced by the wide reading of
which he was made free in his Headmaster's
library. Study of the varying styles of the
writers there gave him the flexibility of style
with which he later wrote.
He was born in India, and went straight
from his English school to being a reporter on
a big Indian newspaper, which gave him a
grounding in expressing much in the fewest
words and experience in eliciting facts with
the fewest questions, and a close acquaintance
with the Army and the native people.
It was his training as a reporter that refined
in him the ability to create a picture with the
minimum of words, and that trained him to get
his colour from the men - and women - he
met by the use of keen observation and by
listening to them. It is his skill in depicting
155
detail, and particularly technical detail, that
makes his writing so fascinating, though he
did not do it unhelped, and says in his
autobiography, 'I have had miraculous
escapes in technical matters. Luckily men of
the sea and the engine room do not write to the
papers.' Elected to the Athaneum at the age of
thirty-three, he 'realised that if one wanted to
know anything from forging an anchor to
forging antiquities one would find the world's
ultimate expert there at lunch. [There was] an
old General who had begun life as a Middy in
the Crimea before he entered the Guards. He
was a fearless yachtsman and dealt with me
faithfully if I made technical errors in any tale
of mine that interested him.'
One of the surprising aspects of Kipling's
writings is his apparent familiarity with ship
construction, and steam engines both on rails
and at sea. The former is illustrated in 'The
Ship that Found Herself in the book The
Day's Work. The story begins with the
launching of a freighter, and the woman who
launched her saying, 'Isn't she a beauty!', to
which the captain designate replies, 'Now,
she's just irons and rivets and plates put into
the form of a ship. She's got to find herself
yet.' The rest is a detailed description of the
inter-relationship of every part of her and how
they come to settle in to 'pull together' in an
Atlantic storm on her maiden voyage.
Kipling includes in that story the part
played by the engines, and it is a good
technical account, too, but more detailed and
technical are his 'Devil amid the Deep Sea'
and 'Bread upon the Waters', both also in The
Day's Work, while 'M' Andrew's Hymn' from
The Seven Seas used to be found framed in
many a Chief Engineer's cabin.
He was indeed not just a teller of stories of
India, and the Navy of his day owed much to
him for what would now be termed his 'P.R.'
writings on its behalf. Today, we can learn
from his writings some amusing stories and
some idea of the Navy as it went about its
business then. He's still worth reading.
1. LENNOX-KING
COMMANDER, RNZN
-For the Royal Navy, on the prospect of leaving
the Painted Hall and the Chalk Gallery at
Greenwich Palace, 1998
'Nautis sublevandis destinata'
H
ERE, you'd have dined on hard-tack like a king,
Your King, meanwhile, promoted to a god
Over your head; instead, the old men trod -
Between the bases where the columns spring
And Dome fronts Dome - that vault from Wing to Wing,
Trampling their pipe-stubs down to dust, dry-shod
Through a white, meridian sea. Their steady plod
Stacked memory here: it meant the mirroring
Of Hospital in College, West in East,
And like raked embers, warmed the rising yeast
Which worked on, Course by Course, towards this Hall;
Until we sensed, above its silvered feast
Time's crest, toppling towards us like a wall
As each prospective Tenant pitched his stall.
2312/98
ROBERT COCKCROFf
156
Correspondence
SUEZ 40 YEARS ON
Sir,-I originally decided to keep my trap shut
after reading John Winton's article in the
October 1996 issue, but, after chattering
recently with some of my senior staff at the
time, I now think that a full response is called
for in answer to his criticisms of a ship we
were all very proud of. I am in a position to do
this as I left her in July 1956 - sadly for me not
long before ~uez - after an initially difficult,
but finally rewarding, two and a half years as
her 'Chief. I think that lowe it to the splendid
team that I led in the second commission to
correct the rather sour impression he leaves on
record.
I would like to start by clearing away one
side issue that may have had a bearing. I am
absolutely astonished that there was no
official recognition of the bravery and
efficiency shown by those, of whom he was
one, concerned with extinguishing the
extremely serious hangar fire. John has told
me about this and I can only assure him that,
had I still been there, the outcome would have
been very different. No names, no pack drill,
and some of those concerned are no longer
with us, but I think that the whole affair
reflects adversely on the senior officers
concerned.
I am equally astonished, however, at his
rather emotionally critical comments on his
ship. It is simply not true that she was
'chronically accident prone on an almost
operatic scale'; and nor were her sailors
'convinced that the ship builders had locked a
black leprechaun up inside her', at least not
the sailors I spoke to! And his comments
about 'everything being designed to work in
the most awkward time consuming and
labour-intensive way' are just plain silly as
applied to one ship. Eagle was designed the
same as any other Fleet Carrier to meet war
requirements. A little over the top, then, John?
You have to accept that life in an
operational Carrier is life at full stretch.
Challenging; exhilarating; fascinating - and,
in the nature of it, filled with potential hazard.
Lesser mortals should keep out. My father and
I, between us, spent some seven or eight years
in Carriers as 'Chief' and 'Senior' and as I
write this I am looking at photographs of a
mangled 'Flycatcher' being hoisted back on
board out of the drink; and the wreckages of a
'Blackburn Bison' and a 'Fairey IIIF' being
hauled out of the side netting. And a lot more.
I pass on to a 'Firebrand' crashing on
Implacable's flight deck and bursting into
flames; then to 'Attackers' and 'Sea Hawks'
crash-landing on Eagle.
These are just a few vignettes of life up-top
in a carrier. Along with these go full-power or
near it, on the engines six to eight times a day;
around a hundred launches and recoveries; for
days on end, and sometimes in marginal
weather. All systems go, and it ill becomes
anyone to cry havoc when just occasionally
something goes wrong. I fear that leprechauns
are in the eye of the beholder.
Eagle did not have a good start in life. I
have no intention of pointing the finger of
criticism at anyone here, but when I took over
she was neither an efficient ship nor an
entirely happy one. It was not necessarily the
fault of the people concerned - with one or
two exceptions - but rather, in my view, of the
system.
The Engine Room Department provides all
the power for flying operations; the speed for
launching and recovery; and the operation of
the catapults, barriers, and arrestor wires.
Fuelling the aircraft too. Total teamwork and
integration with Commander (Air) and his
men is an absolute must. If the machinery is
not kept in tip-top condition then flying
efficiency will suffer. Proper upkeep is
essential.
The concept of Planned Upkeep was not
new to me. I had learnt much from my father
who had led the way here for many years in
the Royal Navy, and practised it in total
understanding and co-operation with those
illustrious sailors Admirals Fisher, Noble and
Horton. At the end his running of the
Maintenance
Command
in
Western
Approaches was a vital factor in the winning
of that battle. I treasure a crumpled piece of
paper in my possession which says at the end
'(Wildish) has contributed in great measure to
the successful outcome of the U-Boat War. I
know of no other officer, not actually in the
157
158
CORRESPONDENCE
battle line, who is more worthy of special
recognition for his services during this war'.
Max Horton was not one to cast bunches of
roses around indiscriminately, and this was for
planned upkeep on a vast scale.
What did I find in the Eagle? Totally
unreliable flight machinery above all else. To
this day I can hear the voice of 'Buster' Hallett
(Cdr Air) over the 'bullhorn'; 'Chief! see you
at flight-deck level. The arrestor gear is VIS.
The jets have three, repetition three, minutes
left before they must divert. How long before
the gear is ready?' And I remember Walter
Couchman, highly intelligent FOHS, and my
other boss as his SEO, writing behind my back
to complain to the Engineer-in-Chief about the
unreliability of the catapults. We sorted this
out and talked of what to do. Before he hauled
down his Flag he sent a directive to my
Captain, Holland-Martin, which, in effect,
said 'Eagle has never in this commission
achieved the operational capability for which
she was designed. You are to investigate why,
and make proposals'. Northey (Executive
Officer) was detailed off as Chairman, and the
small Committee included me and a
Lieutenant Commander on the Flying staff.
If I tend to blow my own trumpet here it is
only because it was my department that had
failed - for whatever reason - and it was up to
us to find a better way forward. I sought, and
got, agreement to two major proposals:(a) an operating cycle basically
comprising two weeks' intensive flying
(Monday to Friday week), followed by a
week's self-maintenance in harbour.
(b) the operational period to be spent
continually at sea, replenishing under
way, thus avoiding the daily light-up and
shut-down that engines don't like and nor
do their minders.
We set a target of a hundred sorties a day,
dawn to dusk, to meet the flying requirement,
a target considerably higher than performance
to date.
These concepts were accepted and the
Carrier Cycle became a fact of life. While all
this was going on two determined, and
talented, Captains in the Engineer-in-Chiefs
Department were beavering away at an
important related project - the preparation of
fully documented maintenance schedules for
ship's machinery. Captains D. J. Hoare (later
Rear Admiral and DAMR) and A. F. Turner
(later Admiral and 4SL) both had AlE
backgrounds and were intent on introducing
aircraft style upkeep to ships. We got together
and Eagle got the first fully programmed
ship's machinery maintenance system ever in
the Royal Navy, to go along with the Carrier
Cycle. I was delighted.
All this took place during Eagle's refit and
installation of the interim angled deck, and our
new Skipper joined, a press on aviator, the
highly decorated Captain E. D. G. Lewin. I
was lucky here. Appalled at what he had heard
of Eagle's past record he was determined on a
clean sweep of all remains of the first
commission. My head was on the block; but
my Appointers stood firm and I stayed on to a
wholly fulfilling relationship with 'Drunky'. I
remember our first meeting on board when he
listened to my run-down on affairs, and then
quietly said 'Chief I have spent much of my
life flying behind a single reciprocating
engine. You don't have to lecture me on the
need for proper maintenance. Rather you and
I, together, have got to persuade our Admiral'.
So a future opened up full of hope. It wasn't
an easy start. It never is with a new
commission. I commanded an outfit of some
twenty-five officers and around five hundred
men. Fortunately many of the Chief ERAs and
Chief Stokers were volunteers to stay on from
the last commission, and they were a grand
lot. However of the three hundred, or so,
junior rates some two hundred were straight
out of training. So there was a lot to get on
with, and - yes, incidents did occur. There
were some floods, and I think, a minor fire,
and there was the major flood in the boiler
room that Philip Seymour referred to in the
January issue ( and I am particularly grateful
to him for his kind words). But it all soon
started to click. Our near full-power six times
a day, and firing the main armament a hundred
times a day, became routine. Team work with
the Air Department was superb, and one day
we hit a record two hundred and one sorties.
Showed up the Americans, too, when
operating with them and cross decking. We
were all very proud. All?
..
CORRESPONDENCE
Anyone who has read Neil McCart's book
will discover the full story of the success that
followed for Eagle for another four
commissions. His tale is one of continued
splendid operational achievement interspersed
with routine planned self-maintenance.
In his words 'so ended the career of one of
the most powerful warships the Royal Navy
had ever possessed. She had also been one of
the happiest and most efficient, serving the
country well'.
I am proud to have served in her, and to
have played a small, but formative, part in her
long and successful career. I hope that my
words will help to set the record straight.
D. B. N. WILDISH
VICE ADMIRAL
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF
BRITISH PRESTIGE IN THE EAST
Sir,-In 'The beginning of the end of British
prestige in the East' (NR, Oct. '97)
Commander Humphrys comments that the
Prince of Wales 'had carried out a bitty
programme without gaining much useful
fighting experience,' ... Really? It was her
gunnery officer who spotted that the Prinz
Eugen was leading the Bismarck, which in
consequence was not being engaged by the
Hood; and it was a hit by the Prince of Wales
which led to the Bismarck being sunk, despite
the calamity of l4-inch turrets jumping off
their roller paths. As to morale, having served
with her captain, John Leach, I can only
suggest that, had she been a private ship when
sent out east, she might well have been
happier. It was her fate to be victim of the
errors of two admirals; the first failed to
deploy correctly, and the second scorned the
air threat. The Prince of Wales was a
magnificent ship, finely commanded.
IAN MCGEOCH
Sir,-I read Comdr Humphrys' interesting
article while in Singapore staying with my
son, who has an influential situation there and
is in a position to make judgments of the
present climate of opinion, which I discussed
extensively with him. I was also able to go to
the Singapore Archives, now housed in a new
building and beautifully kept.
159
Humphrys' article largely coincides with
my recollections, but there are a few points 1
can add and perhaps stress a few others. The
vital operational factor was of course the lack
of air cover. With adequate cover there is little
doubt that the two capital ships· could have
destroyed the Japanese transports and totally
frustrated the invasion. The unavailability of
Indomitable was most unfortunate, but to send
the two ships without air cover, in the full
knowledge that the RAP's capability was far
from adequate, demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the characteristics of ships'
armament which was, to put it mildly,
reprehensible. We had other carriers. This
failure has often been attributed to Tom
Phillips, which is most unjust. He was not
gullible enough to think that in his position he
could succeed, and strongly resisted the
expedition without air power. The fault lies
much higher up, partly at the Admiralty but
certainly at Cabinet level. With a man like
Churchill, with his mastery of rhetoric, one
must exonerate the Board and operational
staff. If you have never argued with Churchill
you can have little idea how dictatorial and
opinionated he was. He always thought he
knew better than senior officers and had a
vastly exaggerated belief in the power of naval
guns, whose difference from the military
weapons he never understood.
In January 1941 a conference of
commanders in the Far East recommended
582 aircraft should be supplied, which the
Chiefs of Staff reduced to the figure of 336.
But Churchill wrote:
I do not remember to have given my
approval for these very large diversions
of forces ... The political situation in the
Far East does not seem to require, and the
strength of our Air Force by no means
warrants, the maintenance of such large
forces in the Far East at this time.
Instead of 582 aircraft the RAF had only
158 obsolescent Swordfish, Wildebeeste and
Brewster Buffaloes, many unairworthy. Only
Hurricanes could match the Zeros, and 200
were sent to Russia in 1941. Even so the local
RAF optimistically estimated they could
destroy 70% of the enemy aircraft - without
knowing how many would be opposed.
160
CORRESPONDENCE
Phillips vigorously resisted the expedition
without air cover. His previous appointment
had been VCNS and he knew Australia was
uneasy. Sir Earle Page had been sent to
London to represent to the War Cabinet the
need for reinforcements and Smuts was of the
same view. On the way out, at Capetown,
Phillips flew to see him and Smuts
telegraphed London of the danger of a 'first
class disaster' .
When he sailed from Singapore Phillips left
Admiral Palliser behind to ensure the RAF
provided what little assistance it could, but on
9 December Palliser signalled Phillips that no
air cover would be available. The decision was
on the orders of the Air Vice Marshal Pulford,
Air Officer Commanding. There was little
point in Phillips breaking wireless silence and
ample arguments against it. But carriers and
RAF reinforcements were available; the
aircraft fruitlessly sent to Russia would have
saved Malaya, and four months later we had
three carriers in the Eastern Fleet.
But the decision of the civilian Governor,
Sir Shenton Thomas, to forbid the sounding of
sirens, in case it should frighten the civilian
population, until 15 minutes before the bombs
began to fall, when it was too late, (the RAF
station had to be awakened at 0400) is
inexplicable.
The Military commander, General Percival,
surrendered 'unconditionally'. There is debate
about the 'unconditional' nature of the
surrender. The word did not appear in the
surrender document, of which Percival was
given no copy, but I have seen a transcript of
the negotiations in which the question was put
to Percival:
Yamashito: Unconditionally?
Percival: Yes.
Phillips should never have been placed by
the politicians in the absurd position he was.
'The surrender of Singapore is the blackest
page in our military history for all time.'
The attack was not an isolated one. It was
the Japanese intention to attack Ceylon and
Calcutta similarly, with the object of taking
India. Of 32 RAF planes, 25 were lost.
Nagumo, out at sea, sank Cornwall,
Dorsetshire and Hermes. But at Ceylon his
losses meant he had only two out of five
carriers at the Battle of the Coral Sea a month
later.
From memory, Tenedos was the only one of
Force Z to escape and when Colombo was
bombed, she was sunk in the harbour. She, and
the AMC Hector lay upright on the bottom,
their upper decks awash, in the next billet to
my ship, until the end of the war.
But my visit to Singapore has convinced me
that a magnificent little country has arisen.
The mixture of races and religions working in
friendship together - Muslim and Hindu,
Chinese and Japanese, Malay and European,
Christian and Buddhist, Jew and Gentile, is an
example to Northern Ireland and the Balkans.
All are proud of the order and prosperity of
their efficient country. All work hard for that
prosperity and my son confirms the
impression I gained so strongly - that it is far
from the end of British Prestige in the East.
The admiration and - yes - affection the
people of all racial origins have for Great
Britain is stronger than ever. They have not
forgotten that the Englishman, Raffles, started
the planting of rubber in Malaya and founded
Singapore (without authority!)
GEOFFREY PENN
Sir,-Having read the correspondence on Cdr
Humphrys' article with great interest,
especially the 'red herring' of Indomitable's
crucial non-availability, may I add a postscript
which is not generally known.
Whilst serving as NA in Tokyo in 19681969, the office was constantly assailed by
unusual requests. A relevant one was from the
former Commander (E) of the Repulse (then in
his 70s) who was on a World Tour. He wished
to call in at Tokyo to have the opportunity to
host a dinner for as many of the original
Japanese aircrew we could muster who took
part in the successful sortie against our big
ships. We found about a dozen rather
surprised volunteers who were pleased to be
entertained royally at the Okura Hotel and no
doubt surprised to be given recognition and
praise of their behaviour by their 'ex' enemy.
This was to thank them for making sure that
the Cdr (E) plus a dozen other survivors on a
lone Carley raft from Repulse were picked up
by one of the destroyer escorts which were
CORRESPONDENCE
'conned' to their position by one of their
aircraft. Throughout, the destroyers were
allowed to pick up all survivors unmolested
and the Commander was determined that he
would show his appreciation and thanks for
conduct which the official 'histories' (he said)
had signally failed to do.
P.P.S. At about this time, many Japanese
were keen to go to Europe and the UK for the
first time. Our office had to spend
considerable time locating people in the UK
they wanted to see again, having 'met' them in
the war, in one way or another. With the cooperation of the Admiralty and War Office we
were mostly successful, but it was time
consuming for both ends of the system. As a
minor personal 'retaliation' on my part, I
asked my Japanese Naval Liaison Officer
(later a large rumbustious NA in London with
an outsize sense of humour) to see if he could
locate the ex-Gunnery Officer of the Haguro
with which we, in the 26th DF had come to
blows on 16 May 1945. I thought a lunch
would be interesting and illuminating to
discuss that memorable encounter. The
invitation went out, and he reported that the
ex-Gunnery Officer was overcome with all
manner ofjoy, delight and honour to be asked,
but apologised as only a Japanese can, to be
excused 'this time'. Having become a very
public figure, and one of Japan's wealthiest
TV tycoons, I don't doubt he had no wish to be
reminded of the part he played in the
Haguro's sinking that night. My informant
and I with gin in our hands and tears in our
eyes agreed it was 'Game, Set and Match'
once again! I never did know his name!
JOHN ROBATHAN
CAPTAIN, RN
HMS CENTURION
Sir,-In the October issue I asked whether any
member knew about the service of the World
War I battleship HMS Centurion in World
War II. I have received information from
Mr 1. A. Allan of New Zealand who kindly
sent me some information which was
published in Blackwood's Magazine in
January 1946. She was designed to
masquerade as HMS Anson but soon after
commissioning in April 1941 she was
161
earmarked to be sunk at the entrance to Tripoli
harbour, thus blocking the port. Admiral
Cunningham had previously refused to detail
Barham for such a task.
However this operation was cancelled and
Centurion was told to proceed to Alexandria
via the Cape. But this destination was also
altered and Centurion sailed for Bombay
where she was to remain for nine months.
Then an event occurred which put Centurion
back again in the limelight. She was now to
masquerade as Duke of York and make
amends for the damage to Queen Elizabeth
and Valiant by Italian underwater charioteers.
She was filled to overflowing with food and
other necessities and proceeded in convoy for
Malta. Within three days Centurion was hit by
a 1,000lb bomb and returned to Alexandria
with a heavy bow down angle. After repairs
she was intended to block the Suez Canal if
need arose. But other tasks were ahead of her
and early in 1944 she was detailed as a
blockship for the Normandy landings. Her last
resting place was the beach off Varreville in
Normandy.
As to her speed, she once touched 18 knots
and she was converted to oil burning.
PATRICK TAILYOUR
Sir,-Early in 1938, during my first term as a
Cadet (E) in HMS Erebus, we were taken to
see HMS Centurion, as a technological
development in which we should take an
interest. It certainly interested me. All this
took place almost 60 years ago, but my
memory of its machinery installation is still
reasonably clear.
The machinery layout was the standard for
'Dreadnought' type battleships. There were
four shafts, direct driven by the main turbines;
high pressure turbines (200 psi) were sited in
small wing engine rooms and discharged their
exhaust steam through the longitudinal
bulkhead that separated the wing engine
rooms from the centre one, into two large LP
turbines, which due to the line of the shafting,
had to be mounted low down, so that there was
no space to fit the condensers underneath
them. The exhaust steam from the LP turbines
was led, by huge rectangular ducts, beautifully
encased in mahogany strip over the lagging, to
p
162
CORRESPONDENCE
two condensers sited towards the crown of the
compartment. To go astern, there was a
separate astern turbine on the forward end of
eachLP.
The auxiliary machinery was spread around
the main engines and there were, as far as I can
remember, one or two dynamos in the centre
engine room. The remote control was fitted
only to the main throttles; I cannot remember
whether it was fitted to the astern as well as
the ahead throttles, but I think not. The
auxiliary machinery in the engine room was
left to look after itself and did not, in general,
need altering, once set.
Forward of the engine rooms was a number
of boiler rooms, each containing either four or
six small Babcock (I think) boilers, but they
may have been three-drum, then called
Yarrow. Saturated steam, of course. I am
certain that the boiler rooms used for remote
control had been converted to oil firing - it
would have been quite impracticable to try to
use coal. I think that two boiler rooms were
converted, but it may have been only one.
There was some arrangement for putting on
and taking off sprayers by remote control and
also for varying the fuel pump pressure, to
control boiler pressure over a limited range,
but I remember being told that it was a bit
inflexible, which limited the power to
manoeuvre the ship and, I think, that we were
told that they could not stop by remote control,
other than by using what later generations
came to call the 'Scram button'. I am pretty
certain that there was no form of automatic
boiler control, where the boiler followed the
demand for steam, but I may be wrong about
this. I think that we were told that the
maximum speed in remote control was 12
knots and the ship could, of course, be steered
remotely from the destroyer.
In its target role, the ship was fired on to hit
by shells up to six inch. Above that, the bigger
guns used 'Throw-off' firing, so that they did
not hit the ship intentionally. We were shown
how much damage even a six inch practice
shell could do and we were told that, due to
Sodd's Law, the aerials for the remote control
were quite frequently shot away.
It was clear that the whole business was
great fun and that the people involved were
wildly enthusiastic about their jobs. Allowing
for the relatively primitive electronics of the
day,
it
was
remarkably
successful.
Regrettably, we did not go to sea in the ship.
DAVID GARSTIN
CAPTAIN, RN
THE MANAGEMENT OF FEAR
Sir,-Admiral Le Bailly's article on the
management of fear was thought provoking.
Readers looking for a different style of
management may care to read Fabulous
Admirals by Geoffrey Lowis wherein will be
found the following.
Admiral Lord Howe was awoken one night
by the Officer of the Day. 'My Lord,' he
panted, 'the ship is in grave danger. A gale
blows and we drag anchors on to a lee shore.
But have no fear, my Lord. We are exerting
ourselves to the utmost to make sail and avert
disaster. '
The Admiral looked calmly at his
lieutenant. 'Tell me sir,' he replied, 'how fear
feels. I can see how it looks.'
D. T. FROST
COMMANDER, RN
THE SINKING OF SS KHEDIVE ISMAIL
Sir,-Spencer Drummond's interesting review
of The Sinking of the SS Khedive Ismail (NR
Book Review II, Jan 1998) reminds me of our
own experiences in CS4 under Rear-Admiral
A. D. Read flying his flag in my ship, the
Newcastle, with I think Kenya and Norfolk, or
another of that great County-class. We left
Calcutta in a hurry early in 1944, refuelled at
Colombo, and steamed at best speed, about 22
knots, to Port Louis, Mauritius, where we
again refuelled and changed evaporator coils
(a story in itself of two excellent
Mechanicians) before sweeping south the
same day, eventually I believe beyond 35"S, in
search of one of the two submarine supply
ships known to be in the Indian Ocean. We
returned to Grand Port Mauritius, where we
awaited news from the RAP's very long-range
Catalinas and elsewhere, which led us to send
the Rocket and Relentless to seek out what
must have been the Charlotte Schliemann
somewhere NW of Mauritius. They found her
one tropical dawn, were mistaken for cruisers,
CORRESPONDENCE
and the supply ship fired her scuttling charges;
that was lucky because, when the destroyers
fired their torpedoes, recently loaded in
Mombasa, not one of them went off, and it
transpired that the enemy had a 9.2in gun and
might well have blown them out of the water.
Perhaps Paladin and Petard had obtained their
torpedoes from the same dud batch.
Later our squadron, with the woolworth
carrier Boxer (?) left Colombo or Trincomalee
for a sweep near the equator, in search of the
other supply ship; I remember being amazed
that the Swordfish could operate at all in such
atrocious sea conditions. I believe that enemy
was also sunk; she may well have been the one
on which the Japanese Ro.110 (sunk the day
before) and the 1.27 (which sank the Khedive
Ismail on 12 February - and nearly the
Paladin too when her hydroplane sliced into
her engine room) were depending to continue
their attacks along the several regular shipping
lanes passing not far from Addu Atoll.
Losses in that convoy included a number of
Admiral Somerville's staff being transferred
from Mombasa to Trinco or Colombo;
amongst them were several Wrens, some of
whom had I believe taken passage with me
from the Tail of the Bank in the troopship
Llangibby Castle to Suez, and then in the
Henderson-line's coal burner Salween, in
which we coaled ship at Aden and then
crossed the Line with due ceremony before
landing in Mombasa. I remember one of the
few survivors became my boats' ERA in the
Newcastle, and took time to recover from his
ordeal.
MICHAEL RANKEN
SHIPS IN CONVOY
Sir,-I was intrigued by the correspondence in
the recent issues ,regarding 'Ships in Convoy'
to see the name Commander Alex Cherry
mentioned in the text. I have often wondered
what became of him as his book Yankee RN
had a profound influence on my appreciation
of the war at sea and of the RN as a service.
Writing from a unique perspective he was able
to bring to life the way the Service operated,
especially the interactions of personalities
within the traditions which at that time gave so
much support to the many thousands of HOs
163
which swelled the ranks of the Regular
Service. I was intrigued by his story,
especially his decision not to transfer to the
USN where he was promised a Brass Hat and
destroyer
command
and
the
later
disappointment when he was passed over for
command in the RN. Reading between the
lines it seems he came into conflict with his
Commanding Officer and the death of Captain
Walker RN was a greater blow to him that one
would have thought.
Some years ago I ended up being the First
Lieutenant of one of our Frigates and found
sympathy in the experiences Commander
Cherry underwent. I did try then to contact the
publishers of the book to find out if I could
contact him, but alas they were no longer in
existence. So what did happen to him? Did he
revert to being a Wall Street Stockbroker? It is
an intriguing question to which somebody
must know the answer.
R. J. MARTIN
COMMANDER, RNZN
A LITTLE HISTORY
Sir,-I read OTH' s letter bemoaning the lack of
a naval history chair at Oxbridge with
considerable interest, having been called upon
by no less a personage than the Pro-ViceChancellor of the University of Hull, with
begging bowl!
I feel sure you are aware of it, but it may be
of interest to the membership at large, that the
U of H has set up a Maritime Historical
Studies Centre. There is already a Lectureship
which focuses on the economic aspects of
maritime history, and they are working
towards the establishment of a Lectureship on
the technical and scientific aspects, plus a
range of scholarships etc. etc. In today's
climate I think it would be too much to ask
that a specifically Naval History chair be set
up, not least because it is impossible to
disentangle the political, economic, social,
technical etc. strands which make up the
whole of maritime history - and not forgetting
geography, climatology, archaeology. . .
Therefore Hull's initiative must be the next
best thing, and I would think that it merits the
wholehearted support of the members of the
Review. The address is the Maritime
164
CORRESPONDENCE
Historical Studies Centre, U of H, Hull HU6
7RX, tel. 01482 465608, Fax 466126, and I
feel sure that Professor Lloyd (the PVC)
would be delighted to hear of NR interest, and
probably only too happy to write you an
article about it.
R. F. CHANNON
CAPTAIN, RN
AFO 1/56 REVISITED
Sir,-MEO's 'AFO 1/56 Revisited' (NR, Jan.
'98, p.32) stirred some memories. I was
promoted Midshipman (from Cadet) on 1
January 1956 and was looking forward to
shipping my white stripe which, to an
outsider, made one look more important than
one's seaman equivalent. Having gone to
great expense to put it on my No. 5s I was
bawled out by the DSO of HMS Glasgow
when I joined her on 6 January for being
improperly dressed. All Officers in HMS
Glasgow had been required to remove
coloured stripes on I January 1956 but were
encouraged to sport the appropriately
coloured handkerchief in the top pocket. Not
too difficult for Pussers.
MEO mentions
that
the
Seaman
Specialisation kept its hands firmly on the
levers of power, but later on in my career I
experienced what I call reverse prejudice from
the hierarchy of my Branch. I was the Supply
Officer of HMS Dainty and it was my third
ship as a Bridge Watchkeeper. As well as my
normal watchkeeping duties I was the action
officer of the watch and special sea duty
officer of the watch and I was allowed the odd
RAS and alongside. My CO, then Commander
Peter Maslen, suggested that I should apply to
take the various command examinations and
so I applied for Gunnery and TAS and,
reasonably, asked for an exemption in Supply
and Administration. The response was a
handwritten note from the Chief Naval Supply
and Secretariat Officer telling me to wind my
neck in, stop rocking the boat and concentrate
on matters Supply and Secretariat. Whether
this response was prompted from the Master
Race I shall never know but, like MEO, I have
never quite understood the mystique of ship
command and why that should be a
prerequisite for the ultimate post in the RN.
But then, I was not allowed to find out.
C. M. 1. CARSON
COMMODORE, RN
SUBJECTIVE ISSUES
Sir,-I write with reference to the very
interesting article 'Subjective Issues' by Lt
Cdr Martin Dawson (NR, Jan. '98), but would
like to take issue with him on two points.
Firstly he says that apart from Aircraft
Carriers, Corvettes and LSTS were probably
the two most important classes of vessel in our
winning the 1939-45 War. Although I may be
considered biased, I feel the Submarine
Service should join his elite. If not a war
winner, it was certainly a war saver,
particularly in the Mediterranean viz the 10th
Flotilla in Malta.
He then goes on to say that Corvettes and
LSTs (not quite - there were some in Malta
1948- circa early 50s) were scrapped from
1945, this through the unfeasibility of
appointing RN officers other than in
Command or as First Lieutenants, or in certain
staff appointments. I believe this to be wrong
in fact, as Reserve Qualified Officers held
equal status in seniority with their RN
counterparts. In my own case in 1944/46 the
submarine Scotsman was commanded by
Lieutenant A. H. B. Anderson DSC RNR and
the 'Jimmy' was Lieutenant H. C. Robjohns
RNZNVR. Both the other RN Lieutenant and
I were very happy to serve under these two
very fine officers, as indeed was the whole
ship's company: some half of whom were
Active Service.
There were quite a few successful RNR and
RNVR operational submarine COs with RN
First Lieutenants. In fact I believe I am correct
that Lieut. Cdr E. P. Young DSC of the Storm
then went on to become the only non-RN
Commander SM in HMS Cyclops (Captain
SM7) - where he was much respected.
CFTP
A CONFUSING ISSUE
Sir,-I write to confess to becoming confused
whilst reading the correspondence column in
the Jan '98 issue. Many of the articles and
letters in recent years have been from retired
RN and serving or retired RNR officers
CORRESPONDENCE
exhorting serving RN officers to become more
commercial, cost conscious and like the real
world of business. I am sure that they have a
number of good points which we should,
indeed, follow.
Lt Cdr H. W. F. Baynham RNR (Alumni,
NR Jan '98) should, therefore, have been
surprised if staff were employed to find old
boys from his old public school, not surprised
that his request was denied. And, please, do
remember there can be bad PR for spending
public money: 'Navy spends thousands
searching for old school ties'.
And imagine the fun the press could have if
we followed the advice of Lt Cdr John
Howard RN (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) who appears, in his last
paragraph, to be encouraging expenditure on
what he calls 'old boys and girls clubs' as a
higher priority than that given by the current
line management. Lord Irvine's £650k could
soon seem a minor indiscretion?
On a different, but also confusing, note Lt
Cdr J. R. Stocker RNR (Horizon Names)
believes that the Type 42 Destroyers
(Edinburgh, York. Glasgow, Nottingham,
Newcastle etc) are named after towns. As a
resident of Scotland's capital city and former
MEa of HMS Edinburgh it was at this point
that I regretted not having a dram before
reading the Naval Review.
DAVID GRIFFITHS
LIEUT. CDR RN
HELM OR WHEEL ORDERS
Sir,-HM Bark Endeavour, in which the
Shipwright's Clerk served (J anuary 1998, page
46), also employed my son on the two earlier
legs of the ship's UK cruise, and I was able to
visit her in Plymouth later. She is steered using
a wheel mounted just forward of the mizzen
mast, which in turn is just forward of the fore
end of the tiller, which sweeps the quarter deck
at ankle height. A rope wound round the drum
on the wheel shaft is led via blocks to either
side of the ship and then back to the tiller. If the
helmsman is in any doubt as to which way he is
moving the rudder he has only to turn round
and see the tiller. Turning the top of the wheel
to port moves the tiller to starboard and the
rudder to port: 'arrnonious with the motions, as
165
they used to say at (B)RNC.
My son noticed that the rope may be led in
several ways. The present lead of the rope
embraces the drum less than if it were to be
rove so that putting the wheel to port would
put the rudder to starboard and involves a
tighter turn around the blocks on the deck
either side of the drum. The alternative lead
would be fair with a greater wrap on the drum,
possibly less effort required of the helmsman,
and you have the convention 'wheel to port,
tiller to port' which I presume applied in the
late l700s. He felt that he was turning the
wheel the 'wrong way' but then he is used to a
tiller. A small piece of evidence, if such it is.
Captain Bromley-Martin's recollection
(July 1997, p.278) is that in the 1920s the
wheel went the same way as the rudder
whatever the person conning the ship ordered,
and that this applied also in HMS Victory and
power
boats
around
1928.
Recent
correspondence in The Times initiated by
FOSM confirms that at some time in the nottoo-distant past - before the 1930s - while the
orders followed the 'tiller' convention,
rudders moved the same way as the wheel.
Can one conclude that merchant ships of the
mid to late 18th Century followed an older
fashion - Endeavour having been built as a
Whitby collier - but that the Royal Navy was
leading the way towards harmony in its ownbuild ships? The Times letters were on 7, 12,
16 and 19 February 1998.
In the other naval dimension, in the early
1950s submariners changed their depth orders
from the amount the submarine should
descend from its afloat condition to 'keel
depth', so that some 30 feet or so had to be
added to the previously accustomed 'depth'.
HMSIM Talent suffered a bent fin on going
from periscope depth to avoid a surface vessel
because, if I remember right, 60 feet was
called for instead of the necessary 90. Was this
incident sufficient to impress on the
submariners the need to follow the new
practice: and did the surface fleets really
escape unscathed when the wheel orders
changed, as stated by Captain MacKenzie
RNR in The Times of 12 February?
G. C. CHAPMAN,
COMMANDER, RN
166
CORRESPONDENCE
THE SHOVEWOOD
Sir,-I am pleased that my version of 'The
Shovewood' and its subsequent variations
were published in the Review, because now
the venerable tale has been given a new lease
of life among at least the current generation of
young officers.
J. LENNOX-KING
COMMANDER, RNZN
EARTHQUAKE RELIEF IN 1939
Sir,-A Mr J. Fielding has written to the Anglo
Chilean Society asking for help in locating
photographs of the earthquake disaster which
struck Chile in January 1939, in the
Concepcion/Ta1cahuano area. Some 30,000
people are believed to have perished.
At the time Mr Fielding was serving in
HMS Ajax. Both HMS Ajax and HMS Exeter
made all speed to the area and landed
members of the ships' companies to render
assistance to the Chilean authorities
(alongside the Chilean Navy) in rescuing the
trapped, giving medical help, restoring water
and power supplies and in opening up
communications.
The photographs he took were subsequently
lost as a result of war damage.
If any Naval Review members are able to
help, they should write to:
J. E. Fielding
46 Slaidburn Drive
Accrington
Lanes BB5 OJJ
ROGER VENABLES
CAPTAIN, RN
POLARIS HISTORY
Sir,-August 1996 saw the end of Polaris
patrols with the decommissioning of HMS
Repulse, marked by an impressive ceremony
at Faslane in the presence of John Major. I
believe it would be fitting for an account now
to be written of that most successful 30 year
Polaris deployment. Advantage could be taken
of numerous fresh memories available, and
any relaxation in security restrictions which
may now be acceptable.
May I use The Naval Review as a means of
floating the idea, which could also have
occurred to others, like myself, who were
associated with the programme from start to
finish.
I would, of course, be delighted to assist
any reader who has the journalistic urge to
take the lead.
COMMANDERP.
W. HONEY, RN
37 Field Lane
The Hamptons
Appleton
Cheshire WA4 5JR
Book Reviews-I
BROADSHEET 1997/8
This issue of Broadsheet is the thickest yet
and also the most upbeat. It has without doubt
been thought right that the Navy's official
annual, the organ of leadership and
management, should emit a confident note: if
the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall
prepare himself for battle?
That this is editorial policy is made clear by
the editor himself on page I. Commander Lee
Hulme in a brief Editorial writes that the
publication 'seeks to emphasise our successes
and the value, capability and utility of the
modem Royal Navy ... shining out from these
pages you should sense the energy in our
people... A Service which is justifiably proud
of itself and its achievements.'
On the facing page the First Sea Lord's
Foreword is no less confident but
acknowledges the 'uncertainties engendered
by a Defence Review', the 'manpower
shortages that still bedevil us' and the
phenomenon of 'change fatigue' - others call
it change-upon-change. Nonetheless, after an
exceptionally busy year, he sees the Navy as
having a first class story to tell.
In one sense, 1997 was a relatively easy
year to report. The Ocean Wave deployment
was the largest out-of-area (dreadful phrase as if we should be confined to any 'area'
except the sea itself) excursion for very many
years, and included all major elements of
Britain's maritime forces: carrier with
embarked air group, amphibious forces (40
Commando reinforced by 45 Commando for
an exercise in Brunei), nuclear powered
submarines and no less than seven RFAs in
support. It lasted in all for seven and a half
months. No wonder it keeps popping up
throughout the Broadsheet: a running gag, as
farceurs used to say.
Not that there was much farce, as reported
in Broadsheet, though clearly a lot of
enjoyment for the 4,500 men and women who
took part and had opportunities to see parts of
the world that were almost routine to, and
therefore less appreciated by, previous
generations. 33 different countries were
visited in all. Even old stagers, counting
carefully, might be hard put to match that. Of
course not every unit visited every country;
nevertheless it was a most impressive
deployment and did wonders for British
reputation in many fields.
One aspect is particularly well noted in
Broadsheet and that was the deployment for a
month of No. I (Fighter) Squadron RAF, four
of whose Harrier GR7s embarked in
Illustrious off Muscat and continued operating
from her, via Abu Dhabi and India, finally
disembarking in Malaysia for a long ferry
home. Wing Commander Leakey RAF writes
'the already lengthy arm of carrier projected
air power has been shown to be significantly
enhanced by inclusion of the GR7 into tailored
Carrier Air Groups - so making best use of all
UK military capabilities'. Amen to that.
Joint operations are indeed another running
theme of the 1997 Broadsheet. Members will
be aware of the emphasis being placed by all
higher levels of the Navy's leadership on this
aspect of Britain's defence posture in the postcold war era, and it is not just the Strategic
Defence Review that is driving the Service in
this direction, but conviction that it is the right
way to organise our forces for the diverse,
often unexpected, challenges likely over the
next many years. Thus the key 'From the
Ministry' pieces in Broadsheet set out simple
truths about the influence of technology, the
nature of modem conflict and the increasing
importance of littoral areas, and blend them
into a case whose terms may be well known to
many of us but bear repetition.
News from sea, scattered around the
publication though focussed in a section
headed 'The Front Line Building on Success',
looks generally good. It is indeed astonishing
how much is being done by our lean and leanmanned ships and submarines, air squadrons
and amphibious forces, supported let's never
forget by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Part of
this efficiency - management-speak might
give it a more ponderous title - is due, though
no official would dream of saying so, to the
diminution of cold-war pressures and the
prerogatives of NATO, both formally in the
way
of exercise
commitments
and
earmarking, and informally in providing
enough coppers on the block north of the
167
.....
168
BOOK REVIEWS-I
Tropic of Cancer to reassure our European
allies. There are still some such commitments
and they are willingly shouldered in
contributions to Standing Naval Forces,
Partnership for Peace operations and staff and
liaison work, but the old compulsions are less.
Most of the high workrate though is due to
sheer, well, efficiency: but one must recall that
an engine running at maximum efficiency has
not much margin.
That brings the reader on to what is clearly
the most worrying problem of all to today's
management: gapping. A two-page article
called 'Stretching over the Gaps' is frank
about its extent and how it came about, and
hopeful about the way in which it is being
handled.
There is 'global gapping', that is to say
unfilled complement billets, of 11 % in the
Royal Navy and 16% in the Royal Marines,
mostly in 'other ranks', and at present it is
rising. Historians might not think that
amounted to crisis level - there have been
many instances of much worse figures in
wartime let alone peace - but it is more than
uncomfortable, particularly in acute shortage
categories where sea-shore ratios are being
remorselessly squeezed and family life is the
first sufferer.
It is the theme of the article that this acute
situation arose principally because the
Defence Costs Studies of the late '80s and
early '90s prescribed a one-third cut in naval
(RN and RM) numbers from 1990 to 1998 and
in the outturn, for the RN, this fell almost
entirely in the period 1992-96. A decision then
had to be made on how to strike the balance
between imposing massive redundancies or
turning off the recruiting tap completely. It is
clear that the decision tended quite
significantly towards the latter course.
As a Flag Officer Admiralty Interview
Board who saw his entry target reduce from
800 at his appointment in 1981 to 350 when he
left in 1983 (both figures approximate), and
saw some of the crazy situations that resulted
from that roller-coaster, your reviewer is not
likely to give an impartial view on the merits
of these difficult choices The article in
Broadsheet admits that so far there has been
an 'inability to re-establish our recruiting
market position'. Enough said, perhaps. Some
sympathy must lie with the manpower
planners as they go about their grisly task, but
with only a trace of bitterness it must be said
that there has grown up a mystique about
manpower planning, and that officers and civil
servants steeped in it may not be the best
people to recommend policies to meet radical
new demands. The new Naval Manning
Agency may find answers that were
previously not apparent or not adopted. All
will wish it well.
There are references in several parts of
Broadsheet to the new three-tier commission
for officers, due to come into effect on 1 April
1999. Beyond the bare bones of a l2-year
Initial Commission, a second-tier Career
Commission to age 37 for pension and a Full
Term Commission to 55 - each subject to
selection at the appropriate stage - your
reviewer ended with a pretty fuzzy impression
of the flesh. All kinds of questions crowded in:
some about entry, some about training, some
about ex-ratings, some about promotion
prospects. May we perhaps expect a more
comprehensive treatment in the next
Broadsheet: or would some NR member in the
field write a factual article for these pages,
within the bounds of confidentiality? It is
important that those now outside the Service about half the Review's current membershipshould know as much as can properly be told,
for it is often they whom parents or potential
candidates will approach for advice in the first
instance.
Both the Controller and the Chief of Fleet
Support have limited Broadsheet space this
time. The Controller has the easier task of
exposition; after all, conceptual studies turn
into plans, and plans into craft and equipment,
and you can have descriptions and yes
pictures of both. Support is a more abstract
subject viewed in the round, and needs highly
charged treatment to make the right impact on
the reader. It lends itself to some sort of
storytelling - A Month in the Life of a
Paperclip, if one may be flippant - by way of
explanation, to satisfy those who want to
know, and some do, why all the changes in
organisation and management have come
about and in what way things are now better.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
It is good to see twelve pages of feature
articles covering the International Festival of
the Sea (Portsmouth, 28-31 August 1998), the
great changes in progress at Faslane, the Royal
Naval Museum Portsmouth's Development
Plan, King George's Fund for Sailors, The
Nautical Institute and a memoir of Captain
Walker of Western Approaches fame. These
form a suitable pendant to another highly
distinguished edition of Broadsheet. Some, to
whom a bottle tends to look half empty, may
think it over-optimistic, its tone more
confident than the facts justify. Maybe it errs
on that side: so it should. If the Navy doesn't
blow its own trumpet, no one will.
RICHARD HILL
THE MARINE ENGINEERS' REVIEW
Most members of the NR will have received
Broadsheet 97/98. The article by the
Controller, 'Naval Procurement Programme',
covers the same ground as the RN Ships
section of this review which will therefore be
limited to qualifying remarks only, drawn
from the Marine Engineers' Review among
other sources. The Broadsheet also included a
long article on HMS Ocean. Many of the
intentions for new-design ships and
equipment are now released at Conferences.
These are reported under the heading now
retitled 'Ship and Equipment Design
Conferences' .
Ships
RN
Despite the Controller's article, there are
press reports that the CNGF (Type 42
replacement) project is suspect from the
standpoints of in-service date (the first three
ships by 2004) and scope (UK requirement
reducing from 12 to eight ships, Italy from six
to two and France from four to two - a total
reduction from 22 to 12 ships). There are
suggestions that the project is at least two
years late, that the specifications are too rigid
for three separate national requirements and
that MOD is looking at alternative proposals
for ships with more global capabilities.
An interesting comparison of HMS Albion
and Bulwark with LPDs under construction or
in service with the navies of the Netherlands,
169
Spain, France and the USA (2 classes) shows
remarkable similarities between the ships. The
complement for the RN version seems to have
reduced from 325 (NR Oct '97, p.388) to 265,
and considerable attention has been paid in it
to the configuration of the superstructure and
airflow over the helideck to improve airborne
operations. The new USN LPD 17 class (now
the 'San Antonio' class) is somewhat larger
than the others.
The Trimaran Demonstrator (NR, Oct '97
p.392 and April '96, p.l77) is expected to be
ordered in 1998. It will be about 325ft long,
66ft beam (over the three hulls) and displace
1,000 tons. It will have diesel electric
machinery of 6,700 shp, giving a top speed of
23 knots and 18 knots in sea state 6.
HMS Tracker, the first of two new 66ft high
speed coastal training craft, has been delivered
by BMT Marine Procurement to the 1st Patrol
Boat Squadron for attachment to the Oxford
University RN unit. The design is derived
from the P2000 'Archer' -class vessels.
The DERA owned and operated research
vessel, Colonel Templer (NR, April '95
p.165), has been re-engined with diesel
electric machinery driving a single azimuthing
thruster with contra-rotating propellers. This
will reduce high levels of radiated and
environmental noise. Her primary role is to
provide a deep-sea platform for data
gathering, research trials of sonobuoys, active
dipping sonars and other airborne sensors, on
a world-wide basis. This role requires
extremely accurate positioning.
RAN
The first of the class of six minehunters
(NR, Oct. '97 p.436), HMAS Huon, was
launched at Newcastle, NSW, on 25 July
1997. She will commence trials in April 1998
and be handed over at the end of the year. The
design is based on the Italian 'Gaeta' class
MCMV, with a monocoque grp hull. Details
and equipment were given in the above
reference. These may be updated at
acceptance.
USN
The USS Bataan (NR, Oct '96 p.399), the
fifth of seven 'Wasp' class amphibious assault
--
I
170
BOOK REVIEWS-I
carriers, has joined Amphibious Group 2 of
the Atlantic Fleet and the last ship will be
named USS Iwojima. Full details were given
in the above reference.
The first ofthe three 'Seawolf' class SSN is
now well into her sea trials. They are larger
than the 'Los Angeles' class (the last being
USS Cheyenne and not USS Greeneville as
previously reported) with surface/submerged
displacement 7,460/9,150 tons compared with
6,330/7,177 tons, shorter, 326ft compared
with 360ft, and greater beam of 40ft compared
with 33ft, and thus with greater volume. They
are fitted with eight torpedo tubes and carry a
mix of up to 50 Tomahawk and Sub-Harpoon
missiles, and Mk 48 Adcap torpedoes or
mines. Speed is stated to be 'over 35 knots'
and extremely quiet. The complement is 130,
living in cramped conditions, including in the
torpedo space. Construction of the third boat
has not yet started and cost is reported to have
escalated very considerably.
It was this cost escalation that led to the
New Attack Submarine (NSSN) (NR, Oct. '97
p.389) of similar capabilities but cheaper
design. Agreement on sharing the programme
between EBDiv and Newport News (NNS)
has been achieved for the first four boats, with
EBDiv being the lead design yard, and
building of compartments, assembly, testing
and delivery shared between the two
yards.
The new Sealift Command 'Bob Hope'
class prepositioning support ships (NR, April
'97 p.158 and NR, Oct '97 p.389) will shortly
enter service. These are very large ships, 950ft
long, 106ft beam and draught 34.5ft,
displacement 62,000 tons full load, speed 24
knots and endurance 13,000 miles. Up to
seven, diesel driven, are being built at
Avondale, New Orleans and there is a similar
order at San Diego, but gas turbine driven.
The military payload is 13,260 tons including
wheeled and tracked vehicles (including main
battle tanks), and 300 troops. They are RoRo
vessels with stem and side ramps and 55 ton
cranes serving hatches.
Bollinger Shipyards, Lockport, NY, has a
$23.2m contract to build 14 'Cyclone' class
diesel propelled patrol boats. Displacing 328
tons, they are based on a Vosper Thomeycroft
hull design, with Paxman engines. USS
Thunderbolt of this class was at Imdex (see
below).
Germany
The FGN has two classes of MEKO
frigates building or on order (MEKOMEhrzwec KOmbination or multipurpose
combination). Four Type 123 'Brandenburg'
class are currently completing, displacing
4,600 tons while the Type 124 'Sachsen' class
are larger, displacing 5,600 tons. The latter
are intended to meet a NATO requirement for
a multi-purpose frigate with an AAW bias
and task force command facilities.
Considerable attention has been given to
stealth and the weapon design combines
European sensors and software with US
missiles, including the Sea Sparrow, and
other weapons. There are Memoranda of
Understanding with a range of countries for
different design aspects. Propulsion is by
CODAG (Diesel and Gas) rather than
CODQG (QI) plant. Contracts for three ships
with an option for a fourth have been placed
with a consortium of builders, the first ship to
be delivered in 2002 and the rest at two year
intervals (see also the review of the MECON
conference below).
The FGN is also ordering the K-130
corvette. This is a 272ft vessel designed for
Baltic operations, with better sea-keeping
qualities and endurance than an FPB. 15 are
planned, with the first 5 to be delivered in
2002-7.
A large contract has been placed for a Type
702 'one stop' replenishment ship, capable of
extending a Task Force endurance from 21 to
49 days. Delivery will be in 1999, with an
option for a second ship. She will be to
commercial standards, length 566ft, beam 79ft
and draught 24ft, displacement 19,670 tons
and a speed of 19.5 knots. She will have a
hangar for two MH 90 helicopters, a helideck
able to take Sea Lynx and Sea King, and three
RAS points. Complement will be 139 with
accommodation for 233.
The German Customs Authority has
acquired an 80ft CustomslPolice launch, the
Granitz. She is capable of all-weather
operation in the North Sea and in ice.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
Norway
The 14 'Hauk' class FPBs are to be
modernised with new combat management,
communications and navigation systems,
sensors and structural updates. The first will
return to service in late 2000 and the rest will
follow at 3-4 month intervals. An optional
contract for providing 6-8 weapon systems for
the 'Skjold' class surface effect FPBs is under
consideration.
A shiphandling simulator is being
purchased for the Bergen Royal Naval
Academy for delivery in December 1998. It
will simulate seagoing characteristics for the
principal RNorN vessels. A similar simulator
is planned for the Italian Naval Academy at
Leghorn.
Morocco
The Logistic Support Vessel Dakhla has
been built in France. She has wide
capabilities, including supply of dry and liquid
stores, particularly to support the new OPVs,
troop carrying with vehicles, and acting as a
disaster relief vessel. The machinery and
bridge are aft with cargo access by side door
and cranes. Length is 226ft, beam 38ft and
draught 13.75ft, displacement 2,160 tons,
speed 12 knots on diesel machinery and
endurance 4,300 miles.
Israel
The first of three 'Dolphin' class SSK, built
in Germany, is on trial following a long
history of changed contracts. She has three
diesel generator units mounted abreast, giving
a very short submarine. The bulk of the spaces
are on a two-deck layout.
Turkey
Five
wooden-hulled
'Circe'
class
minehunters, built in 1972-3 have been
acquired from France, where they are being
refitted and updated. It was decided not to
build new ships.
UAE
An early decision is expected on a contract
for eight 213ft ocean-going patrol boats.
Possible builders include VT, NNS, France,
Germany and the Netherlands.
171
Qatar
The first two 184ft strike craft, Huwar and
Barzan, built at Vosper Thornycroft (VT)
Portchester and Southampton, have arrived in
Qatar. Details were given in NR April '96
p.174.
Saudi Arabia
The government has taken up the option for
the third stretched 'La Fayette' class frigate
(NR, April '96 p.174). The defence system
will be a 32 cell vertical launch Aster SAMS.
Displacement is now stated to be over 4,000
tons.
Cambodia
A Malaysian shipyard has shipped two 44
ton fast patrol boats of German design. They
are 69ft long, beam 19ft and draught 4.3ft.
Speed is 34 knots.
Malaysia
After four years of negotiation, the first six
of 20 New Generation Patrol Vessels will
shortly be ordered from the Malaysian Naval
Dockyard at Lumut. These are a variant of the
MEKO A-IOO corvette design, 297ft long,
44ft beam, 1,900 tons displacement and speed
in excess of 30 knots. They carry a 16 cell
VLS, 8 SSMs, a CIWS, 1 medium and 2 small
guns, 4 fixed torpedo tubes and a medium
helicopter. They are of stealth design. See also
the report of the MECON Conference below.
The former light frigate Hang Tuah, now a
coastguard/training ship, has recently been
completely re-engined. She was built by
Yarrows in 1965 as the despatch vessel for
President Nkrumah of Ghana and later became
HMS Mermaid before transfer to Malaysia.
The original machinery was identical to the
RN type 41/61 diesel frigates.
Philippines
The three remaining 'Peacock' class patrol
vessels from the Hong Kong squadron were
delivered direct from Hong Kong by their RN
crews, after the handover.
Chile
Chile has acquired from Germany six of
their 'Tiger' class missile armed strike craft,
172
BOOK REVlEWS-I
two in 1997 and four in 1998. These originally
entered FGN service in 1972-4 and only 10,
embodying the latest updates, remain in FGN
service. Although of German design the
majority were built and all were outfitted in
France.
and other propulsion equipment for the AlP
driven German Type 212 submarine.
The UDT is at least an annual event with
two gatherings planned for 1998 - UDT
Pacific in Sydney in February and in London
in June.
Bahamas
The Royal Bahamas Defence Force has
ordered its largest vessels, two Europatrol 375
US built but VT designed patrol vessels. They
are 200ft long, beam 29ft and draught 8.5ft,
displacement 375 tons, speed 24 knots on
three shafts and a range of 3,000 miles at 15
knots. They are designed to US specifications
for damage stability, damage control,
firefighting and life saving. They can remain
fully operational in sea state 6 and can cope
with 70 knot beam winds.
The contract also includes options for four
141ft 'Nassau' class patrol boats.
MECON '97
Ship and Equipment Design: Conferences
There have been a number of important
conferences including Underwater Defence
Technology (UDT) in June 1997 and Mecon
'97, both in Hamburg, the British only Royal
Navy and British Army Equipment Exhibition
(RNBAEE) and the International Maritime
Defence Exhibition (lmdex '97) at Greenwich
in October 1997. Many plans for future
warships and their equipment were revealed at
them.
UDT '97
This three-day conference and exhibition
included 99 papers. It was followed by a
NATO confidential sitting covering another
30. The emphasis was on mine warfare, ship
design and signature management, at some
expense to sonar matters. The emphasis in
mine warfare lay in aspects of saving lives and
rapid clearance of safe channels. The
development of unmanned drones - floating
magnetic and acoustic generators - driven
ahead of a control vessel or from a mobile
shore station, and both cheaper than an
MCMV, is a prime interest. Much attention
was paid to simulators and surface systems for
the Italian and Norwegian navies and to the
C2 system and the development of fuel cells
This was the first in a planned series to
explore developments in the MEKO
programme. It lasted two days, was attended
by 81 representatives of 24 navies and a large
number of MEKO programme ship and
equipment manufacturers, and included 32
papers - all in English.
The MEKO system evolved in the late
1960s, comprising a series of ship platforms
able to carry a wide range of alternative
weapon and propulsion systems, prepackaged with standard services connections,
and tested in standard forms, for easy
installation and subsequent updating. The
hulls and major components are supplied by a
range of countries including Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
UK and the USA or are built under licence by
the customers. The use of this system can
enable the interval between keel-laying
and commissioning to be as little as two
years.
MEKO ships are found world-wide
including Nigeria (1981 - one ship),
Argentina (1983-90 - seven ships) and then
Turkey (8), Portugal (3), Greece (4), Australia
(8), New Zealand (2) and Germany itself.
Early designs displaced about 3,600 tons but
the later 200 series reduced to 3,000 tons with
the same weapon fit. The FGN has a number
of different designs including the larger FI23
and 124 frigates and the K-130 corvette (see
above).
The newest designs shown at MECON
include the A-200 series frigate and the A-lOO
corvette. The former is a 3,800 ton ship with
CODAG propulsion driving propellors on
diesels on the outer shafts and a gas turbine
driven centre line water jet of 31,000
equivalent shp for sprint operation. As the
exhaust discharges through the transom it is
water cooled with a much reduced IR
signature and a considerable reduction in
BOOK REVIEWS-I
space required for uptakes and funnels. Speed
exceeds 29 knots. Complement is much
reduced, to 130. The A-100 corvette is being
built for the Malaysian navy - see above for
details.
RNBAEE
Press reports state that this went almost
unnoticed between MECON and IMDEX, as
far as the RN was concerned. The items of
interest were the models of the VT Sea Wraith
II stealth frigate and the BAeSEMA Cougar
light frigate. These are both enlarged versions
of those shown at Euronaval '96 (NR April '97
p.160) now respectively 443 and 387ft long
compared with 380 and 312ft. A 16.5 ft long
self-propelled model of Sea Wraith II is being
built to demonstrate the sea-keeping
capabilities of the wave-piercing hull form.
Both were also shown at IMDEX.
Another BAeSEMA proposal was Project
Barracuda, envisaging an SSBN operating as a
mother ship with two SSK.
IMDEX '97
The conference included addresses by lSL,
Chief of Defence Procurement, the Chief
Executive of DERA, the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (US) and senior representatives
from the US (including the Director of the
Joint Strike Fighter Program) and Italy. It
included a very wide range of ship and
weapon design topics. The exhibits included
Sea Wraith II, Project Cougar and the Swedish
YS 2000 'Visby' class corvette. This vessel,
also now building, is of stealth design, 236ft
long, displacement 600 tons. There are
different configurations, MCM, ASW,
minelaying and air defence. Canada has a
contract for an integrated towed array,
variable depth and hull mounted sonar suite
for the first four ships, of which 16 are
planned.
There was also a large floating exhibition of
ships. These included the RSwN Gotland A19
class SSK, the first operational SSK with AlP,
and the 425 ton missile-armed 'Goteborg'
class. Denmark showed two Stanflex 300
series grp
hulled
vessels
in
two
configurations, for ASW and missile firing.
The latter carries 2 quad Harpoon SSM, a 6
173
cell Sea Sparrow VLS and launch tubes for
Bofors wire-guided torpedoes - all in a 177ft
hull. They also showed a multi-support vessel
for 'peace keeping' operations to replace
existing fisheries patrol vessels.
In addition there was a number of existing
vessels including the French frigate Tourville,
an FGN Type 332 minehunter, an Irish
corvette, the RNethN frigate Karel Doorman
and a 'Walrus' class SSK, HMS Lancaster
and a new USN patrol boat USS Thunderbolt,
(see above).
There were large exhibits of guns and
missiles and a smaller section dealing with
propulsion machinery including the WR 21
gas turbine.
INEC '98
This will be the next event of interest, to be
held at HMS Sultan in April 1998. The subject
is 'Surviving the War' and themes will include
peacetime preparation for wartime survival
including equipment and system design for
survivability, damage control and firefighting,
platform management and human aspects.
Other items
On the environmental front, MOD(N) is
conducting an audit on the sources of oilywater waste from ships. The mixture of oil,
water and fuel from bilges is a major problem
when designing shore plant for handling such
mixtures. The IMO requirements for reduction
of NOx and SOx in diesel exhaust emissions
have now been relaxed somewhat to avoid the
need to fit reduction equipment to existing
ships. This is clearly helpful to warships
already in service but could have a big effect
on machinery to be installed after 1 January
2000.
A Netherlands shipping company became,
in 1997, the first to operate legally with
electronic charts as the main navigation
system and a number of British companies are
similarly involved. The Dutch government
laid down the following requirements:
The charts must be supplied by an
official Hydrographic Office - in this
case the UKRO.
Two completely separate Electronic
Chart Display Information Systems
..
174
BOOK REVIEWS-I
(ECDlS) had to be fitted, capable of
accepting Raster (RCDS) and later
ECDIS charts.
With no paper charts on board, track
charts have to be kept as a record.
Permission to sail without a lookout
during darkness was only granted on an
experimental basis - to be approved by
the Master.
The
Shipping
Company
was
responsible
for
training
bridge
watchkeepers who had to have 12
months' prior experience.
Electronic chart file correcting requires
about 20 minutes' work per week for a file of
about 400 charts.
The RNethN is using virtual reality
techniques for validating bridge and
operational area layouts for their Air Defence
and Command Frigate, thus saving on mockups.
A fibre optic gyro compass has been
developed, also in the Netherlands, initially
for integrated bridges and high speed craft. It
has no moving parts or fluids but uses three
fibre optic coils as sensitive rate sensors to
measure the earth's speed of rotation. In
conjunction with two electronic level sensors,
true north can then be detected. It has a short
settling time of only 30 minutes.
A method of handling helicopters on frigate
and destroyer decks eliminates the need for
handlers on deck. It uses control beams,
operated from a console moving along
transverse and longitudinal rails set in the
flight deck.
Shipbuilding ship repair and naval bases
The Fleet Maintenance and Repair
Organisation (FMRO) ceased to be the last
Government owned and operated ship repair
facility on 2 November 1997 when it was
taken over by Fleet Support Ltd, comprising
VT, VSEL and GEC Marine. The FMRO had
'risen from the ashes' of the old Portsmouth
Dockyard on 1 October 1984, initially with
2,800 employees, and led a charmed life amid
the closure of the other familiar Dockyards
and Naval Bases. In its early days, under the
direct control of CinC Fleet, it continued to
refit Type 42 Destroyers, to give extensive
DEDs to a wide range of ships and SSKs and
to carry out major repairs including the fire
damage to HMS Illustrious. Its commercial
status will enable it to widen its scope to
handle commercial ship repairs.
The former Naval Base at Rosyth has been
handed over to a commercial consortium for
development as a business, retail, leisure and
industrial site. The Dockyard, now employing
about 3,000 people, remains. The Dockyard
site had been bought in 1903 and construction
completed in 1925 although it was put into
care and maintenance until WW2, apart from
being used commercially as a shipbreaking
facility for German warships scuttled at Scapa
Flow.
Commercial shipbuilding in the USA is of
great interest as the warship building
programme runs down (in relative terms!).
The President has signed the Maritime
Security Act stating that 'The American Flag
must always sail in the sea lanes of the world
... critical role played by the US Merchant
Marine in protecting our interests and allies'.
The NNS is already building a line of tankers,
some for foreign owners, and the former
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard has been bought
by a commercial shipbuilding company.
As a contrast in UK, the Chairman of the
Wear Dockyard Group has commented that 'if
we don't start building ships soon we will end
up as an island nation which can't build a
canoe through lack of skills ... a hell of a state
of affairs . . . every country should have a
smaller, leaner, more efficient shipbuilding
industry'. His own contribution is to take on
75 apprentices since his present labour force
are in their 50s and 60s. Two commentators,
one at Imdex, have remarked on the adverse
effect of the privatisation of the dockyards on
the availability of skills to the RN and its
ability to react in times of stress.
There are some signs of improvement,
mostly related to the offshore industry, with
work in hand at Harland and Wolff, Kvaemer
Govan, VSEL Barrow (three small tankers
outside the naval programme) and Cammell
Laird where investment in facilities has been
put in hand. However this compares very
unfavourably
with
large
commercial
shipbuilding programmes in Germany,
BOOK REVIEWS-I
France, Italy, Finland, Russia and Spain, let
alone in the Far Fast.
Other maritime matters: Personalities
A new marine agency will be created on
I April 1998 by combining the Coastguard
and
Marine
Safety
Agencies
with
headquarters in Southampton.
Vice Admiral Sir Christopher Morgan is to
be the next Director General of the Chamber
of Shipping, succeeding Admiral Sir Nicholas
Hunt.
R.B.B.
US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
July-December 1997
The United States Naval Institute is also the
Institute of the US Marine Corps. The point
needs to be made at the beginning of this
review, because the six months covered here
have been so dominated by the Corps that one
might be forgiven for thinking it had
conducted a coup d'etat over the whole
organisation.
So concerned was your reviewer after
writing that first paragraph that he looked for
confirmation through the contents list of all
six issues of the Proceedings under review. In
statistical terms, confirmation wasn't there. Of
the 80 major articles listed, 14 were written by
USMC people, and observing that the Corps is
one of five constituencies covered by the
Proceedings - the others being the surface
fleet, naval aviation, submarines and the Coast
Guard
this appears in no way
disproportionate. Yet, in terms of impact, the
sense of dominance remains.
Partly this is due to the articles' choice of
subject matter and partly to the forthrightness,
often indeed passion, with which views are
expressed. In both areas the Marines have, it
seems to me, taken the high ground.
It begins with, oh how the hollow tones
resound, the topic of Women in Combat
Roles. Many and many are the strands, more
even in the USA than here, but those making
up this particular line go back to 1979 when
James Webb (naval academy graduate,
Vietnam veteran, subsequently a Secretary of
State for the Navy) wrote an article for the
Washingtonian magazine entitled 'Women
Can't Fight'.
175
That was a long time ago, and scarcely
likely on its own to trigger a response now.
According to Colonel Paul E. Roush, USMC
(Retired), now a Professor in the US Naval
Academy's Leadership Ethics and Law
Department, there have recently been several
similar articles or statements by Webb which
impelled Roush to mount a heavy counterattack ('A Tangled Webb', August 1997).
Roush seeks to demolish what he regards as
Webb's unjustified criticism of double
standards under training - particularly in
physical attainment - and weakening of
warrior ethos. Roush also strongly supports
current Congressional policies and laws which
not only admit women to most forms of
training for war (an exception is Marine Corps
combat units, which Roush does not mention,
but of which more later) against what he
implies are unconstitutional attacks by Webb.
His line is encapsulated in the words 'Urging
that Midshipmen be permitted publicly to
speak out in opposition to the law of the land
while they remain on active duty is
inexcusable' .
There is much even stronger stuff in
Roush's article and it is unsurprising that the
correspondence columns of the Proceedings
for the next four months were full of comment
and advocacy. Of the 16 contributions, nine
were in favour of Webb, four for Roush, and
three put arguments on both sides although all
of those were critical of Roush's style, and
allegations against him of selective quotation
and misinterpretation were numerous.
Your reviewer will not, as if you ever
expected it, attempt his own assessment of the
relative merits. To do so would be to claim a
knowledge not only of all the writing that has
gone before, but of atmosphere and practice in
US training and operations, and such a claim
would be unfounded. That views are
passionately held and expressed is only too
apparent, and it is not only Tailhook that bites
deep. One is tempted to ask if it all need be
taken so seriously. Would it be unbearably
flippant to put in the terms of Sellar and
Yeatman's 1066 and All That - like the
Cavaliers, Webb is Wrong but Wromantic,
while like the Roundheads, Roush is Right but
Repulsive? And, more to the point, is there a
F
176
BOOK REVIEWS-I
middle ground in the American military that
says this is how it is, so we had better get on
with it and make it work?
One senior retired officer, again from the
US Marine Corps, clearly does not think so.
Major General J. D. Lynch ('All Volunteer
Force is in Crisis', September 1997) begins his
article 'The social fabric of the US military is
showing signs of wear. This should come as
no real surprise, since the society from which
it springs also is showing signs of serious
decay'. This profoundly pessimistic tone
pervades the article but it quickly adjusts its
focus towards, yes, women in combat roles.
General Lynch contrasts the 'major
problems' faced by the US Army (ratio of
women to men 'inching toward one in four',
though it is still resisting assigning women to
'narrowly defined combat fields') and the US
Navy (paying a potential 'wartime price of
degraded combat readiness' and a 'peacetime
price ... of shipboard pregnancies') with the
Marine Corps, 'the only service to have
avoided integrated male/female recruit
training'. He believes the Corps must continue
to defend this position - 'Anything less means
the end of the Marine Corps as we know it' but is not certain it can do so, given the
pressures of legislators and publicists. Those
pressures, he argues, are not exerted by the
public at large; quite the reverse: 'if the public
does not like what it sees ... there will be no
joining'. This, he suggests, is already
happening and much of it is due to a visibly
weakened defence establishment.
What emerges, however, from General
Lynch's article is not simply a polemic against
fashionably correct attitudes which are at
variance, as he sees it, with the desires of the
American public. For that polemic is based on
a view of the military's mission that is in fact
quite extreme. It comes out at an early point in
the article: ' ... it's time to wake up. It's time
to sound reveille. It's time to return to the
basic truth that a nation's military exists to
destroy the nation's enemies and nothing
more. In short, the military exists to kill'.
This bald statement stands unqualified by
any other in the article. There is nothing about
deterrence, breaking the enemy's will to fight,
or establishing dominance, let alone coercion
through manoeuvre, graduated response or the
whole range of intervention, constabulary or
benign operations. Indeed there is specific
reference to 'confusion stemming from an
added emphasis on humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations such as the Somalian
and Haitian failures and the increasingly likely
failure in Bosnia. However debilitating all that
may be. . .' One may be forgiven for
concluding that in General Lynch's view, any
work other than killing is, for the military, an
aberration.
I must confess that I found this aspect of
General Lynch's article disturbing, as I did the
fact that my point above was picked up by
only one Proceedings correspondent, and he a
civilian
from
Columbia
University
(November 1997, p.19). He correctly
observes, quoting Clausewitz, that 'as the
military is the instrument of war, so too by its
very nature, it must be an instrument of
policy'.
Implicitly, the extreme view of the
military's role is considerably modified by
other Marine Corps contributions. In
particular, the three published entries to the
Marine Corps Essay Contest (November
1997) get down to the business of how best
amphibious operations, with a wide range of
missions and applications of force, may be
run.
The winning essay is in fact by a US Navy
Commander, Terry Pierce, who addresses the
important but (in an atmosphere full of
explosive vapours) relatively safe question of
expeditionary force command. He concludes,
drawing upon American World War II and
subsequent experience, that 'a Navy
commander should be ... in charge of naval
manoeuvres on the sea and from the sea - a
time-honoured naval tradition'. It was slightly
surprising that he did not mention the
Falklands, where surely some lessons were to
be learned, but he may have wished to stay in
more familiar waters. The subject will not go
away though, particularly now that modem
networked command, information and
communication systems allow calls for
precise fire from units far out at sea in support
of forces ashore that may be widely scattered
both as to location and to level of command.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
This preoccupation is apparent in both the
other published entries. Captain Harold R. van
Opdorp, Jr, USMC, accepts that the goal is
dominant battlefield awareness and that
technology is one of the primary movers
towards that goal, but warns that 'Technology
Alone Cannot Win'. He sees drawbacks in too
great a reliance on the system-of-systems
approach that is increasingly dominating
American military thinking: a multitude of allseeing eyes leading to comprehensive
knowledge, certain appraisal and precise
application of violence.
Captain van Opdorp is none too happy
about the ability of communication systems to
handle this amount of information and
sceptical of the ability of the system to
manage and filter data so that the relevant
material reaches the right people without
swamping them. He goes on to discuss
uncertainty, quoting Tom Paine and van
Creveld, and continues with 'Shared Picture
does not mean Shared Understanding'. Here
he shows the well-known picture that on one
view represents a stylish young woman with a
feather in her hair, and on the other a shawled
crone. Even with some foreknowledge of this
picture, your reviewer had great difficulty
focusing on the crone and constantly reverted
to the stylish young woman, so presumably
Captain van Opdorp's point is made.
Finally, Captain van Opdorp makes the
point that a subtle, thoughtful enemy may be
able to 'work around' Dominant Battlefield
Awareness and quotes examples from the
Vietnam War where the Viet Cong, by
'surprising the Americans and separating
them from their firepower', were able to
achieve many successes. I fancy this parallel
will be contested by the Sea Dragon
establishment on the ground that the detection
of hostile forces, even if they are in penny
packets, is now so certain that none can move
without American commanders knowing
where they are and what they are doing.
The debate will continue, but one can hear
the Great Duke ('guessing what was at the
other side of the hill') applauding Captain
Opdorp from down below, and Copenhagen's
hooves drumming approval from Stratfield
Saye.
177
The third winning article is in many ways
the most interesting of the three. It is written
by Sergeant Dallas E. Shaw, USMC, and is
entitled 'It takes More than Technology'. This
is a title very similar to Captain van Opdorp's
and maybe the general theme is the same, but
the approach is different. It is well
summarised in the lead-in: 'Can technology
make a typical grunt squad capable of carrying
out deep reconnaissance missions 150 miles
behind enemy lines? Can it substitute for the
rigorous training and intense indoctrination
required of a Recon Marine?'
The shoulder headings in the article are also
indicative. There are only two: Master the
Basicsffhen Add the Technology. It could not
be simpler or more orthodox, nor, if some of
the Sergeant's anecdotal evidence is borne out
by general experience, could it be more
necessary. 'I asked him [a squad member]
which way was east. He informed me "I ain't
got the compass" ... this was at 0800, so I told
him that on planet Earth, the sun rises in the
east. . .'
Preparation only for 'best-case scenarios,
where high-speed gear never fails its operator'
is, argues Sergeant Shaw, training for failure.
He lobbies nevertheless for certain add-ons to
currently-held equipment, moving into sets of
initials unfamiliar to those not initiated in such
things. But by that time, did not one believe
every word he said? There is so much
common sense in this essay that it deserves
consideration at every level.
Which brings us back, by a rather tortuous
route, to the scope and range of the Corps'
operations and training. Certainly all the
essays are predicated on the need for an
effective warfighting posture: but surely, as it
seems to your reviewer, they recognise a need
for sophisticated responses, at many levels of
command, to a variety of situations. They will
need to, in years to come. If you don't know
who the enemy is, but think you 'exist to kill',
well...
The point is made, though not explicitly
(Commentary, November 1997), by Colonel
Hays Parks, USMC (Retired), a distinguished
trial lawyer with many Proceedings articles to
his name. He describes an incident in the
Vietnam War which, while nothing like so
r
178
BOOK REVIEWS-I
dreadful as the My Lai massacre, was
sufficiently serious to be classed as multiple
murder. In brief, 16 unresisting women and
children were shot dead in the village of Son
Thang on 19 February 1970, by a patrol from
the US Marine Corps.
The incident was fully investigated at the
time, but according to Hays Parks there was
some resistance within the Corps to
publication of details in their Gazette, and it
was not until the publication in 1997, by the
Naval Institute Press, of a book confined to
this one incident that the full story was made
available.
It has chilling aspects quite apart from the
murders. The returning patrol lied about the
circumstances of the incident, reported less
than half the true number of dead, represented
those as killed in action and produced a
previously-captured
weapon
as
false
corroboration. There was also evidence of
competition in body-counts as shown on a
battalion 'kill board'. In spite of obstacles the
matter was fully investigated and brought to
trial, and two Marines were convicted of
multiple murder; one other, this having been
his first patrol at the age of 18, was convicted
on 15 counts of unpremeditated murder and
later committed suicide.
Colonel Hays Parks argues persuasively
that it is necessary to bring all this to light now
so that the lessons may be relearnt. The
military must maintain the quality of its
people; it must be sensitive to the special
challenges of counter-insurgency operations;
it must eschew simplistic 'body-count
mentality'; it must train its junior officers to
face such dilemmas; it must have enough
people learned in the law of war to have the
necessary influence.
At two points Hays Parks quotes the words
'Marines don't do that'. It is clearly a
generally expressed view. He shows that they
did, on occasion; they might argue that,
supplied as they now are with higher quality
human material and more discriminating
systems, they no longer do. That's as hereafter
may be, and all that has gone before in this
review is relevant. But it does lead to one
much broader point.
There is an underlying assumption in most
American military thinking - preoccupied
with firepower as it is, emphasising
warfighting as it does, racked by competing
specialisms as it appears to be - that the USA
is a benevolent nation. Essentially it desires
the good, not only for itself but for human
kind. I believe this to be true. Given
America's military and economic power, if it
were not true the rest of the world would be
groaning under tyranny. Sometimes, when the
USA is pushed to the limits of its tolerance,
the possibility of worse outcomes peeps out.
But the world is, on the whole, lucky.
There is much more in these six issues of
Proceedings that cannot be covered in the
necessary detail in this review. Pleas for
gunfire support to remain an option; for deepwater ASW to stay on the agenda; for the
Coast Guard to keep up technologically; for
shipborne aircraft to keep pace with other
developments: all will be found here and
there. Some may be rather crude lobbying for
particular constituencies, but all are of
interest. Least noticeable in the last six months
have been the submariners; they are used to
running silent and deep, have come to terms
with the curtailment of Seawolf and are no
doubt regrouping round NSSN.
As always, the Proceedings are lively and
highly professional. They are not so immersed
in technospeak and initialese as they used to
be, and are the better for it. Good reading.
RICHARD HILL
Book Reviews-II
THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
WHITEHALL PAPER No 41
by SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN
(RUSI, 1997 - £6.50)
If I were asked to choose whose thoughts
about Nuclear Weapons one would most like
to read, Michael Quinlan's name would come
top of my list - by a mile. In this short offering
- at 84 pages somewhere between a book and
a booklet - we are gently (but firmly) led
through the core issues surrounding nuclear
weapons, their possession and deployment, by
a uniquely qualified, highly intelligent and
totally morally responsible writer who enjoys
the added benefits of a razor sharp mind and
charming facility with the pen.
Michael Quinlan covers in tum the three
D's;
Deployment,
Deterrence
and
Disarmament. In successive posts in the MOD
he held escalating responsibility for advising
on nuclear policy and he certainly does not
dodge the politically and ethically difficult
issues raised by the deployment of nuclear
weapons.
His irresistible logic is perhaps at its most
telling in the section on deterrence, where he
disposes neatly of a number of false,
misleading or unprofitable concepts and leads
us back inexorably to his starting point, the
simple thesis that deterrence is about
persuading the potential attacker that the game
is not worth the candle - and that this has
worked, does work, and will continue to work.
The section on disarmament bears very
careful reading because it treats fairly, but
dismisses, several of the ideas which have
been even more fashionable since the end of
the Cold War - Alternative Defence, No First
Use, Minimal Armouries, and even the
Strategic Defence Initiative.
It was not until he reached Appendix I that
your reviewer encountered a thought which
much troubled him. In addressing the
hypothetical question of a situation in which
the UK defence budget was so reduced, at the
height of the Cold War, that the British
Government would have had to make a choice
between making cuts in British Forces for the
North German plain of a severity unacceptable
to our allies, or foregoing the modernisation of
UK nuclear capability, he would probably
have advised in favour of the latter. I find this
hypothetical,
probable
recommendation
troublesome, and for me it does not lie easily
with the whole rationale, spelt out so well in
earlier chapters, for the UK possession of an
independent nuclear capability. Surely a more
attractive option (and one infinitely preferable
for the US) would have been to maintain and
when necessary, modernise our nuclear
capability and invite our continental European
Allies to fill the gaps on the ground. That
shows no lack of commitment to their defence.
I thoroughly recommend this book and
believe it will become a widely used and
respected plane of reference.
JJRO
INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE AND WAR
by MICHAEL HERMAN
(Royal Institute of International Affairs/
Cambridge University Press, 1996 - £16.95)
The last twenty-five years have seen a vast
number of books about Intelligence. Many of
them have dealt with single aspects, others
have portrayed the history of particular
intelligence happenings; only a very few have
looked at Intelligence in its own right as a
powerful instrument of national policy. And
none, to your reviewer's knowledge, has
produced such a unique overview ofthe whole
intelligence scene as Michael Herman has
managed to write.
Written in plain and easily readable English
with the notes and references on the related
page, the extremely complex subject is
divided into six sections comprising twenty
chapters and a final Summary showing the
power of modern intelligence. For anyone
with the time and opportunity and access to a
large library there are no less than ten pages of
recommended reading.
The whole book derives from wide and
obviously
scrupulous
research,
very
considerable personal experience and, quite
clearly, deep reflection. The 400 pages, thanks
to the elegant and helpful layout provide an
easily assimilated set of intelligence
experience and principles with a bearing on
179
r
180
BOOK REVIEWS-II
most Western intelligence systems. I concur
with the verdict of a former HC Chairman that
it will probably become a standard text. It is
pleasing too that, despite the continued
sensitivity about intelligence publications, it
received official security clearance.
The Intelligence services are an important
but always controversial part of modern
governance. Their failures are often the
subject of many column inches, their triumphs
hardly ever see the light of day. Military,
economic, political, security intelligence,
decisions on how to 'cut' the always hard won
and in these days usually reducing financial
'cake', and the need for efficiency in public
administration call for a particular brand of
management if the national interest is to be
adequately served. Herman explores and
throws much light on these complex problems
and on what sort of intelligence strategy in the
broad and in detail we need in the post Cold
war, post modern world.
In a recent Paper published by our Minister
in Bonn, he asserts 'The kind ofworld we have
depends on the kind of states that compose it,
for the pre-modern world success is empire
and failure is disorder; in the modern systems
success is balance and failure means falling
back into war or into empire. For the postmodern state success means openness and
transnational co-operation. The open state
system is the ultimate consequence ofthe open
society. But there is nothing inevitable about
the survival of the post modern state in what
remains a basically hostile environment. '
This century has seen the advance (if that is
not a contradiction in terms) from the premodern (empire type) world through attempts
in two world wars to maintain some sort of
international political balance to the postmodem (ED type) open and transnational
world where an admiral (not this one) can
communicate instantaneously with a friend
driving a stern wheeler on the Irrawaddy
whose Burmese Chief Engineer was a
Manadon product. The changes in the nature
of the intelligence product needed by
governments, arising from such fundamental
changes in world conditions, technological
advance, political, military and social near
chaos, are almost impossible to grasp.
Herman's book covers the role in the future,
as he sees it, for intelligence in peace and war
and the anarchic conditions now beginning to
prevail in so many Nations. The October 1997
NR reviewed Herman's shorter essay on the
role of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). In
this book this is set in the wider context of the
merits and difficulties of both centralised and
more
split up
national
intelligence
organisations. He avers, with considerable
supporting evidence, that we need some sort
of central agency for a detailed holistic study
of countries in all their political, military and
economic detail. The HC, he suggests, is good
at pulling things together but does not direct
research. He argues his belief that it is time to
reformulate the DIS Charter and give it
explicitly dual roles - serving the MoD and
the military for defence intelligence on one
hand, but acting as a national analysis agency
on the other - and staff it for the job. In this, as
he mentions, he is returning to the original
concept when the three Service organisations
and the scientific and technical and economic
expertise of the Joint Intelligence Bureau were
brought together in and after 1964.
Your reviewer is not up to date with 'the
pecking order' of the Chief Scientific Adviser
to the MoD and the Chief of Defence
Intelligence. But in your reviewer's
experience it is essential that they should have
the same level of access. In today's
technological world the multiplicity of data
bases in the scientific establishment
sometimes lead to quite different conclusions
from those arising from secret intelligence
sources. Some politicians, as today we are
only too well aware, are hypnotised by
scientific predictions. In your reviewer's day
as DGI he served two governments. One had a
Prime Minister and Defence Secretary who
tended to believe they knew everything but
who bowed obsequiously to 'science', and a
Foreign Secretary deeply interested in
intelligence who also possessed profound
wisdom. The other government had a Prime
Minister almost obsessed by intelligence and a
Defence Secretary and Chancellor, who if not
obsessed, wished to be kept up to date and
who were prepared to argue and discuss
different viewpoints in an always refreshing
BOOK REVIEWS-II
and earthy way; while the Foreign Secretary
seemed far less interested in the scientific or
intelligence views other than those from M16.
Herman does not deal with this problem
directly, but the type of organisation he seems
to favour would certainly provide politicians
with more firmly based advice.
With all the changes now in train in the
corridors of Whitehall it is almost too much to
expect that such a fundamental re-hash of our
Intelligence Community might be embarked
upon. But Herman's book shows what well
may be the best path for the future. It is to be
hoped that there are amongst those in
Government and the highest ranks of the Civil
Service, men and women of understanding,
who will institute action.
LOUIS LE BAILLY
VICE ADMIRAL
THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM BOOK
OF WAR BEHIND ENEMY LINES
by JULIAN THOMPSON
(Sidgwick & Jackson - £25)
This latest book by Maj Gen Julian Thompson
aims to give the general reader some idea of
what it was like for a British Serviceman to
operate behind enemy lines in the Second
World War. Almost exclusively, he restricts
his consideration to those 'who penetrated the
enemy's rear, but fought in uniform expecting
to be treated by the enemy in accordance with
the laws and usages of war'. This definition
thus excludes most SOE and OSS operations
but sweeps up the majority of those conducted
by units that we would now consider as
'Special Forces'.
The fall of France and the Italian threat in
Africa saw Britain alone and at bay. The need
to hit back at the enemy, at a time when
conventional units were inappropriate for the
conditions, generated the Commandos and the
Long Range Desert Group. These were the
first of a proliferation of 'private armies'
which subsequently operated in almost every
theatre of the War. They scored some notable
and dramatic successes, the St Nazaire Raid
being one, but overall, their tangible output
was perhaps not all that was expected of them.
This has caused some to question their value.
Gen Thompson suggests the fairest means of
181
judging their effectiveness as being in
considering the balance of 'return' set against
'investment'. With this question hanging, he
presents comprehensive accounts of the many
different units and their most significant
campaigns behind the lines. For his part,
comment is generally limited, in the main
leaving the reader to consider the balance and
judge for himself. As the author clearly
intends, the story's colour and subjectivity
flow from his generous use of personal
accounts from the players and their critics,
some recorded at the time and some relatively
recently. Whilst, of course, the author has had
the opportunity to introduce bias in his
selection of 'witness statements', weighting is
not apparent. The book presents a convincing
and even case.
Unsurprisingly, the story is littered with
accounts of military and human achievements
of the highest order, generally in the face of
the overwhelming odds that one associates
with special forces. Soberingly, for each of
these there are a greater number of tales of
failure caused by the most frustrating
combinations of the frictions of war and some
disasters
born
of quite
astonishing
incompetence and amateurism. The conduct
of a commando attack aimed at killing
Rommel in a house on the north African coast
would be funny but for the tragic
consequences of its failure. In contrast, there
are many incidents of consummate
professionalism. The SAS's Paddy Mayne
finished the war as one of the two most highly
decorated British Army officers, having
achieved a personal score of enemy aircraft
destroyed more than double that of any allied
air 'ace'.
Whilst one associates 'behind the lines'
activity with the efforts of small teams of
determined men there were most notable
exceptions. Many will be surprised to read of
the Chindit Expeditions which saw brigade
and divisional level deep penetration into
Burma. These incursions were supported,
logistically, almost exclusively by air,
including the glider borne delivery of artillery,
vehicles and mules. Fire support too was air
delivered.
Casualty
evacuation
was
undertaken by light aircraft from hastily cut
F
182
BOOK REVIEWS-II
jungle strips in deep strongholds that, on
occasion, endured a distinctly 'Khe San'
experience. The enigmatic Wingate was
behind these schemes. Although it was not of
his conception, he was the first allied leader to
prove the capability of air supply to operations
of this type.
General Thompson uses very simple and
direct English which complements the
vernacular and often highly idiosyncratic
styles of his veterans. The combination makes
highly digestible reading and draws one on
easily through some 400 pages of narrative.
There are useful maps and good photographs
of many of the key characters.
As the story progresses, the reader is likely
to become increasingly uneasy about the
balance of investment against return. A
considerable number of lives were lost and, at
face value, it seems that a disproportionate
amount of effort was dissipated in projecting
special forces behind the lines. Certainly the
author quotes some contemporary critics who
dismiss almost totally the contribution of
special forces to the Allied victory. What, of
course, cannot be accurately quantified, is
how much of the enemy's potential was drawn
from their main effort in hunting down these
irritants. Although a few teams, notably the
LRDG, were an outstanding success, there
were clearly too many of these special units,
resulting in duplication of effort, redundancy
and direct conflict of interests. Too many units
were led astray on the personal hobby horses
of their commanders. In the tailpiece, General
Thompson identifies an absence of strategic
level direction and coordination as the
underlying cause of the overall inefficiency of
the special forces' efforts. But he concludes by
reminding the reader that this was a book
about people and, in the main, they were
obviously a special bunch.
Most of the action and the majority of
characters are, at best, only vaguely familiar to
today's reader. To better understand the
British special forces today, you probably
need to know where they came from. This
book is an education and is strongly
recommended.
M. J. D. NOBLE
MAJOR, RM
BATTLECRUISERS
by JOHN ROBERTS
(Chatham Publishing - £30)
I'm not quite sure what it is about battleships
and battlecruisers - they seem to exert the
same fascination as steam trains - certainly to
judge by the continuing literary output on the
subject. After my unflattering review of an
earlier volume from Chatham Publishing
(A. S. Pavlov's on Soviet Warships Oct '97), I
am delighted to be able to say that this book is
beautifully produced - indeed the photographs
and line drawings are one of its main selling
points. The author has written widely on
warships in the Dreadnought era and many of
the photographs are from his own collection.
Roberts is also his own draughtsman and the
line drawings are of a uniform high quality
(again oddly in contrast to the Pavlov
volume). The inside back cover contains a
1:250th plan of HMS Queen Mary in 1913 side elevation, deck plans and several sections
through, but my favourites are the two
perspective drawings of a 12" turret and the
Queen Mary's bridge superstructure. One
could (ie I have!) pore over them both, if not
for hours, then certainly for several minutes.
But what of the written content? Roberts
starts with an Introduction, in which he
outlines the historical background to the
development of the battlecruiser and follows
this by an 'Origins' chapter in which, drawing
heavily on Admiralty minutes, he tells of the
arguments that surrounded their evolution not really helped by the fact that Fisher never
seemed to be 100% clear what they were for.
Then follow two chapters on the design and
construction of the first (pre-WWI) and the
second (post-1914) groups. Looking at the
drawings, one is struck by how simple these
ships - especially the pre-WWI ones - were.
They were nothing but platforms on which to
put turrets. Line drawings often simplify a
design by leaving out much of the extraneous
equipment, but, in this case, the photographs
emphasise how focussed on their one task
these ships were. The second half of the book
contains three, very comprehensive, chapters
on Machinery, Armament and Armour. There
are certainly enough detailed facts and figures
here for the most ardent battlecruiser fan - such
BOOK REVIEWS-II
as that the communication tubes in Renown
were 3" and 4", but they were al13" in Repulse.
In his final chapter, Roberts tries to sum up
Fisher's battlecruisers. They started in 1905 as
simple armoured cruisers, faster and armed
with bigger (12") guns. The first ships were
quickly outclassed by the German response in effect fast (unfortunately faster) second
class battleships. The arms race continued,
with the German ships being, generally, better
armoured and so more capable of taking
punishment. Their smaller tube boilers and
lighter calibre but higher velocity guns, plus
much
lower
habitability
standards,
contributed significantly to this superiority.
The Battle of the Falklands was the
battlecruisers' one and only undisputed
success. The loss of Indefatigable, Queen
Mary and Invincible at Jutland was, at the
time, blamed mainly on the weakness of their
horizontal armour and, although the German
deck armour was no thicker, this criticism was
never really shaken off. The primary cause of
the catastrophic losses at Jutland was the
instability of our ammunition and associated
weaknesses in magazine design. However, by
Jutland advances in battleship design (the
Queen Elizabeth's) had made it no longer
necessary to choose between armour, speed
and armament and the end of the short era of
the battlecruiser was in sight. Roberts
concludes that, with the benefit of hindsight,
the battlecruiser should not have been built,
but that the widely-held perception that the
battlecruiser was a failure is wrong - the
ammunition was at fault, not the platform.
I enjoyed this book - it is clearly a labour of
love, especially in the illustrations - and, if you
want a reasonably compact, but full, account of
the battlecruiser as a ship type (there are many
more and better books on Fisher's influence on
the design), I would recommend this one.
ANDREW WELCH
COMMANDER, RN
SILENT HUNTERS: GERMAN U-BOAT
COMMANDERS OF WORLD WAR II
ed. THEODORE P. SAVOS
(Savos Publishing Company/Greenhill
Books, 1997)
There is a view that too much attention has
183
been given already to the Battle of the Atlantic
and that the time has come to draw a line
under this historical episode as everything of
value has already been extracted. But still new
works continue to emerge, some repackagings
of work done earlier, some actually attempting
new perspectives on the longest maritime
struggle of the Second World War. One such
school which has grown up over the last few
years, notably in America, has looked at the
series of campaigns that form the Battle from
the German perspective; Silent Hunters
clearly falls into this category but its approach
is somewhat different from many in selecting
six submarine captains and considering their
lives and careers, each examined by a different
writer. Although a point is made of suggesting
that these were typical rather than outstanding
officers, there is a clear bias towards the 'ace',
reflected in the title of two of the chapters. In
only one case, Heinz Wilhelm Eck, to whom
we shall return, was this really true and then
only in terms of his attainments.
Engelbert Endrass is described in an almost
elegiac fashion by Erich Topp. This approach,
which would tend towards the mawkish in any
other hands, is acceptable, perhaps moving, as
Topp himself was not only a very successful
captain and indisputably an ace, but because
of his especial affinity and sense of
kameradschaft - comradeship.- with Endrass,
who was lost at sea in December 1941, sunk
by Walker's group. The next four chapters,
being written by uninvolved historians, lack
this sense and are more factually based.
Timothy Mulligan writes crisply on KarlFriedrich Merten, whose South Atlantic
adventures included carrying over 100
survivors from sunken German surface
raiders. Mulligan stresses Merten's humanity
and humour.
Gaylord Kelshall, who served in the
Trinidad and Tobago Coastguard, tells of
Ralph Kapitsky whose U-615 succumbed in
the Caribbean only after an epic struggle with
a number of aircraft and in which the dying
Kapitsky exercised great leadership. Fritz
Guggenberger, a Bavarian, has a very
considerable claim to fame, at least in British
eyes, as the man who sank the Ark Royal. Eric
Rust, who wrote an excellent description of a
r
184
BOOK REVIEWS-II
single year's intake of German officers in
Crew 34, contributes this chapter which is a
thoroughly workmanlike production. Jordan
Vause, who previously wrote a biography of
Wolfang Liith, tells of the career of Victor
Oehrn, who although a more than competent
captain, made his name first as one of the most
competent of Donitz's staff. Subsequently,
whilst serving in the Mediterranean area, he
managed the curious feat of being wounded
and captured in the African desert before
being repatriated to Germany, partly as a
result of his injuries and to some extent
because of his pioneering self-research into
anorexia. Latterly, he again served Donitz
directly. This chapter, too, is competent.
The last contribution is an unusual one
compared to the rest of the book. It is by far
the longest one, the officer at its centre Heinz-Wilhelm Eck - is probably the least
accomplished officer described and most of
what is described takes place after the war. In
this account Dwight Messimer only briefly
recounts Eck's career and period in command
of U-852 which sank the Greek freighter
Peleus in the South Atlantic in March 1944
before herself being lost to aircraft in May off
the Hom of Africa. Unfortunately for Eck, his
war diary survived. The sinking of Peleus was
fairly routine; what followed was not. U-852
cruised amongst the wreckage and survivors
attempting to obliterate both by machine-gun
fire. The most distasteful aspect was probably
the willing and enthusiastic participation of
the submarine's doctor. Eck and several of his
crew were tried for this in October 1945 and
executed. Messimer gives over most of his
long account to the trial and his perception of
its unfairness. His final judgment that what
occurred was Siegerjustiz - victor's justice is tenable but unbalances the book as a whole.
In a sense, however, this provides a key to
understanding much of this school of literature
better. In most, but not all, instances of the
genre there is a clear perception of the German
submariner as hero. Another way of looking at
this is to consider whether such a work would
be likely to be produced today about
American or British submarine captains in
quite the same style: this would seem unlikely.
Perhaps this is just the wheel of historical
fashion turning rather slowly. On the other
hand heroes beget myths which are unhealthy.
For this reason the book, good as it is in
several ways, should be read with both caution
and a dash of scepticism.
W. J. R. GARDNER
LIEUT. CDR
DON'T STEP ON A STONEFISHl
by COL DAN RASCHEN, Royal Engineers
(Retired)
(Buckland Publications Ltd, London,
1993 -£14.95)
Following my review of Diplomatic Dan (NR,
Jan. '98), Colonel Raschen gave me this book.
Our editor thought it worthwhile to alert NR
members to the existence of it.
It covers reconnaissance undertaken in
1960 by two sappers (Major Raschen plus
one) into the possibility of using explosives to
clear boat channels to various coral islands in
the Gilbert and Ellice groups (now Kiribati
and Tuvalu respectively, as all NR readers will
surely know). I was lucky enough to have
visited the area just one year before, and the
problem of boat access was sorely evident;
many channels were a 'channel' in name only.
Christmas Island, where Major Raschen was
based - commanding the RE detachment there
-lies nearly 2,000 miles east of Tarawa (main
island in the Gilberts) and there's not much in
between!
He was only a mediocre swimmer, wore
spectacles, and suffered from seasickness in
small vessels; furthermore, he started with no
knowledge of Pacific atolls, and found it
difficult to get much useful information in
advance. But acting on first principles, and
with enthusiastic co-operation from others, he
built up an enviable stock of practical
knowledge, so much so that the four-week
reconnaissance was entirely successful. The
subsequent operation (by Royal Engineers,
but not including him) was of great and lasting
benefit to the islanders. His Annex 'Thoughts
on Atolls' contains his ideas about the
formation of coral atolls and is thoughtprovoking, while inevitably leaving some
matters unresolved; we simply don't know
enough, methinks.
I found this a delightful, fascinating book.
BOOK REVIEWS-II
Never afraid to admit to ignorance, or
mistakes that he made, he enlivens the tale
with many droll observations; he very much
engages our sympathy. But do follow his
advice - don't step on stonefish, they are very
nasty.
HILARY FOXWORTHY
COMMANDER RN
MY ROAD LEADS ME SEAWARDS
by MICHAEL BADHAM
(New Millennium Publishers - £9.95)
This is a long book, over 500 pages, because it
is two books in one. The first 200 pages
concern the author's service in the Navy,
culminating with the attainment of submarine
command. Under the 'golden bowler' scheme
he chose to leave in 1959 because, as he says
'I had a life of my own to lead'. He then chose
to embark on a 'lunatic voyage' to Australia in
a sailing boat with his family of wife, two
children and a dog and three friends the sailing boat being a 57 year old RNLI
lifeboat. When he got to the Caribbean he was
seduced by the opportunity of chartering in
order to make some money. His friends who
had signed on for Australia then left.
He spent 17 years in the chartering business
in the Caribbean and on the New England
coast and Bermuda, first in Westering the
converted lifeboat and then in one of the first
Trimarans, Spearhead, which he had built and
sailed himself across the Atlantic. His final
spell as a charter skipper, after being an
owner, was as a paid employee as skipper!
However it was not all plain sailing. One of
the most impressive and suspense ridden
experiences is his anticipation of Hurricane
Esther. His detailed precautions should be
incorporated in any future seamanship
manual. He rode it out entirely alone and it is
an example of consummate seamanship
combined with cool courage.
Eventually chartering as well as the sea also
showed its hidden dangers and the sequel was
tragic. I will not reveal the circumstances, you
must read the book to discover it.
A minor criticism is that the editorial could
have done with some excision, being
occasionally prolix. An index too would have
been helpful - the assignment of names to
185
inanimate objects such as George, Edward,
Siegfried and Smith and the parade of people
mentioned, was not always easy to identify. A
glossary too would have assisted those not so
seaman-like as the author.
However there is no doubt that Mike
Badham is a courageous and highly competent
seaman and navigator. It is surprising their
Lordships didn't promote him and put him
back on the Active List; but then of course he
would not have wanted that. Highly
recommended.
PATRICK TAILYOUR
WITH ZEAL AND ABILITY
A personal record 1896-1945
by CAPTAIN A. D. DUCKWORTH, RN
(Obtainable from Brig. G. Duckworth, Weir
Cottage, Bickton, Fordingbridge,
Hants SP6 2HA - £9 (inc p&p»
Older members, not only Supply Officers,
may remember A. D. Duckworth's invaluable
book An Introduction to Naval Court-Martial
Procedure which ran to four editions in the
1930s and' 40s. Those who served under oldfashioned captains may recall the first words
of their flimsies, 'with zeal and ability', which
Captain Duckworth has taken for the title of
his most interesting and entertaining
autobiography.
Joining his first ship, Inflexible, the
Mediterranean fleet flagship, as an Assistant
Clerk (alias Paymaster Cadet) in 1913, he
moved to the Invincible in time for the Battle
of the Falklands Islands and was in the
Birmingham at Jutland.
His unique
photographs of the Falklands action were
published in the press, and on his return home
he was summoned to Buckingham Palace to
show them to the King.
For his first twenty years he was employed
entirely on the secretarial side, mostly abroad
and mostly in Commander-in-Chiefs' offices,
with exotic peace-time cruises. His first
pussering job came on promotion to
Paymaster Commander in 1934 in the
Carlisle, flagship on the South Africa Station.
In June 1938 came a most unusual mission,
a job with the Non-Intervention Committee
working with representatives from France,
Germany and Italy on a manifestly impractical
•
186
BOOK REVIEWS-II
scheme to end the Spanish Civil War.
Duckworth spent June to December 1938 in
Germany with a German staff not the least
interested in non-intervention and well aware
that Germany and Italy were determined to
continue their vigorous assistance to General
Franco at the same time as they were secretly
preparing for all-out war. His account of this
'highly ridiculous situation' is almost beyond
belief.
The outbreak of war found Duckworth
converting the RAF Station at Donibristle into
an RN Air Station and subsequently
'mothering' the newly opened stations at
Crail, Arbroath and Macrihanish. In
December 1942 he joined the Warspite and
saw service in the East Indies, the final days of
the capture of Sicily, the surrender of the
Italian Fleet, and Salerno where she was
damaged by two glider bombs.
In May 1944 he was appointed to the Naval
Control Commission for Germany in Norfolk
House, London, planning the control of ports
and harbours as soon as they were captured.
He was based in Germany from June to
December 1945 when he took voluntary
retirement to become Secretary of the Royal
Institution of Naval Architects.
Autobiographies of Supply Officers are
rare. This one is exceptionally interesting,
perceptive and enjoyable, and should prove a
profitable source for historians of the
administrative and social sides of the Royal
Navy.
HUGH OWEN
CAPTAIN, RN
I
I
MORRISON OF THE BOUNTY
by JAMES SHAW GRANT
(AcairLtd., Stornoway, 1997 -£11.95)
I am not a 'Bounty buff'; before I read this
book, I knew only the main outlines, that
Captain Bligh had been cast off in an open
boat, Fletcher Christian eventually made it to
Pitcairn, Bligh made it (near-miraculously)
back to England, many of the mutineers were
apprehended, several were hanged. With a
confused recollection of Charles Laughton
playing Bligh in the first film, my knowledge
ended there.
This book came as a revelation; for
instance, the film, made in 1937, relied
heavily on Morrison's journal- which I didn't
know existed. Morrison was boatswain's mate
in the Bounty, was asleep when the mutiny
happened, and had nothing to do with it. He
remained in the ship, and eventually got to the
island of Toobouai, then to Tahiti. The frigate
Pandora came there to apprehend mutineers:
he gave himself up voluntarily; he was tried
and condemned to be hanged, but reprieved
because of his excellent (self-conducted)
defence. He stayed in the Navy, became a
gunnery instructor, and Admiral Troubridge
deliberately acquired him as the gunner for his
flagship; he was drowned when Blenheim
foundered in 1807. (As well as his journal,
Morrison wrote a fascinating account of Tahiti
which runs to 40,000 words.) It all makes a
wonderful story.
And James Shaw Grant tells it well. The
mutiny itself, adventures on Toobouai and
Tahiti, appalling hardships in the Pandora,
and the drama of his trial and reprieve are all
covered fully and perceptively. But the point
of the book is not just to recount Morrison's
heroic exploits; it is to stress that he came
from the Isle of Lewis, and to draw many
comparisons between 18th and 20th century
Lewis matters. It packs about 100,000 words
into 200 pages; I found it very rewarding and
illuminating, and recommend it highly.
H. L. FOXWORTHY
COMMANDER, RN
BOOKS RECEIVED
The following books have been received and
are gratefully acknowledged. Space and
subject do not allow a full review; it is hoped
that the following brief notices, which are
made without any value judgment or
recommendation, will be helpful in bringing
the books to the attention of members with
specialised interests.
Ocean Bridge: the History of RAF Ferry
Command, by Carl A. Christie (University of
Toronto Press, 1997,458 pp. Paperback, £15):
comprehensive study of the subject including
organisation, operations, routes, losses.
Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military
Applications, by Major Glenn E. James USAF
(Newport Papers No. 10, US Naval War
BOOK REVIEWS-II
College, 1996, 125 pp. Paperback, no price
quoted): covers theory and mathematics in
simple terms, followed by chapters on
occurrence in military systems and situations,
with opportunities for exploitation.
What Color Helmet?, by Myron H.
Nordquist (Newport Papers No.12, US Naval
War College, 75 pp. Paperback, no price
quoted): Addresses history of peacekeeping
under the United Nations and examines the
need to reform peacekeeping mandates in the
'mixed "war-peace settings" , now likely to be
encountered.
Three Tiffies and a Sweeper, by Alfred E.
Deeble (Pentland Press, 1997, 145 pp., £15):
187
with a Foreword by Vice Admiral Sir Louis
LeBailly. Story of three friends (usually) in a
ship of the 'Algerine' class during the Second
World War. Plenty of hard-lying stories,
engineering tribulations and runs ashore.
Femhurst Books, who specialise in work on
small craft, have announced publication of
their latest brochure of some 100 titles. They
offer a 20% discount off any of their books to
anyone applying for a free copy of the
brochure before 31 May 1998. The address is
Femhurst Books, Duke's Path, High Street,
Arundel, West Sussex BNI8 9Al, Tel. 01903
882277. Entitlement to the discount should be
claimed at the time of ordering the brochure.
»
L
New Members
The following have enrolled as members since
ACKLAND, H. K.
ANDERSON, M. E. J.
BARROW, M.
1 September 1997:
LIEUTENANT
SUB-LIEUTENANT
HON. MIDSHIPMAN
BENBOW, T. J
.
BENNETT, P. M.
BISSETT, P. K. ...
DANNREUTHER, R. P.
DOUGLAS, D. C.
FITZGERALD. G. D.
FORTESCUE, R. C.
GAMLEN, T. R.
GARRATT, J. K.
HUDSON, G. M.
HUMPHRYS, J. A.
KEANE, M. L. ...
LIEUT. CDR
LIEUTENANT
CAPTAIN
LIEUT. CDR
SUB-LIEUTENANT
LiEUT. CDR
DOCTOR
LIEUTENANT
COMMANDER
LAURANCE, M. A.
LOWER, I. S.
MCPHAIL, A. J.
MERCER, A. P.
MICALLEF, R. ...
MOO~HOUSE, P. J. N.
NAIL,'Y. A.
NIMMO-SCOTT, S.
O'REILLY, S. A.
COMMANDER
COMMANDER
HON. MIDSHIPMAN
COMMANDER
PALMER, A.
PHILLIPS, A. E. W.
LIEUT. CDR
HON. MIDSHIPMAN, RNR
PRESTON, A. M.
PROWSE, M. A.
REED, A. W.
REID, W. A.
REILLY, P. J.
REYNOLDS, P. A.
SHARMAN, J. M.
SHAW, K. N. G.
SHIRLEY, W. P.
SHUTTS, D.
STEEDS, S. M. . ..
TAYLOR, K. A. .
WHEAL, A. J
.
HON. MIDSHIPMAN
LIEUT CDR (re-joined)
LIEUTENANT
SUB-LIEUTENANT
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, RM
LIEUT. CDR
LIEUT. CDR
LIEUT. CDR
LIEUTENANT
LIEUT. CDR
COMMANDER
LIEUTENANT
SQUADRON LEADER, RAF
LIEUTENANT
LIEUT. CDR, RNR
HEO, MOD CIVIL SERVICE
Prize membership for a period of two years has been awarded to:
CASTLE, C. D. ...
FITZGERALD, G. D.
GAYFER, M. J.
MORLEY, D. S.
NICKISSON, D. J.
SUB-LIEUTENANT
SUB-LIEUTENANT
LIEUTENANT
SUB-LIEUTENANT
LIEUTENANT, RM
188
Obituary
We regret to report the deaths of the following members in the period 1 September 1997 to
1 March 1998:
Date joined
1922
1963
1952
1989
1995
1950
1954
1948
1953
1983
1956
1938
1949
Member
CAPTAIN G.
C. BLUNDELL, CBE
R. J. BROOKE
COMMANDER
F. J. G. COOK, ESQ
LIEUTENANT T. A. GREEN
V. HOLT, CVO,
L. JORDAN, OBE
COMMANDER T. D. KITSON, OBE
LIEUT. CDR. C. R.
VRD, RNVR
COMMANDER C.
MRS JOHN LITTLER
LIEUT. CDR P. NEALE
LIEUT. CDR G. M. W. ROWBOTHAM
LIEUT. CDR A. W. SPENCE, MBE
CAPTAIN G. H. STANNING, DSO
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR WILLIAM STAVELEY, GCB, DL
189
F
THE NAVAL REVIEW
Registered Charity No. 214610
TRUSTEES:
Admiral Sir James EBERLE, GCB, LLD
Captain A. B. SAINSBURY, VRD, MA, RNR
Captain P. G. HaRE, RN
H. U. A. LAMBERT ESQ., MA
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1997
1997
1996
£
£
.
37,558
37,644
.
.
.
.
.
.
6,121
7,423
1,287
1,327
5,716
1,354
INCOME
Subscription Income
Income Tax Recovered from
Deeds of Covenant
Interest on Investments
Interest on Nat West Deposits
Advertising Income
Donations Received
Sundry Income
,
EXPENDITURE
Editorial Honoraria
Secretaryrrreasurer Honoraria
Employers National Insurance
Printing and Production
Literary Services
Guinness Prize
Stationery and Duplicating
Accountancy Fee
Bank Charges
Direct Debit Charges
Meeting Expenses
Postage and Telephone
Sundry Expenses
Depreciation of Computer Equipment
Legal Expenses
,
EXCESS OF INCOME OVER EXPENDITURE
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
190
6,190
468
1,207
1,000
160
£54,184
£53,272
8,246
6,749
711
20,038
833
150
3,140
176
373
922
7,269
6,563
o
692
21,072
1,190
150
1,610
141
608
o
735
73
5,414
263
939
264
48,190
5,994
46,984
6,288
£54,184
£53,272
o
5,635
278
938
THE NAVAL REVIEW BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1997
1997
£
£
FIXED ASSETS
Investments at cost
Tangible Assets
.
..
..
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Accounts Payable and Subscriptions
in Advance (Note 3)
NET CURRENT ASSETS
..
ACCUMULATED FUNDS
Accumulated Fund
Surplus for the year
96,194
939
1
150
21,382
18
150
14,823
7
21,550
£14,980
3,042
3,405
£3,042
£3,405
£18,508
£11,575
£114,703
£108,708
108,709
5,994
102,421
6,288
£114,703
108,709
.
..
J. H. F. EBERLE, Chairman
1996
£
£
96,194
Note 1
Note 2
CURRENT ASSETS
Accounts Receivable and Accrued
Balances at Bank
Cash in Hand
191
A. J. W. WILSON, Secretary-Treasurer
THE NAVAL REVIEW ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT TO THE TRUSTEES
We have prepared the attached Financial Statements, without carrying out an audit, from the
records and information submitted to us. We confirm that the accounts are in agreement with the
books and records.
A. C. WILDER & Co
Chartered Accountants
3, Station Approach
Worcester Park
Surrey
KT47NB
March 1998
¥
THE NAVAL REVIEW
192
NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1997
1.
1997
£
1996
£
10,572
33,000
12,000
10,622
30,000
10,572
33,000
12,000
10,622
30,000
£96,194
£96,194
£115,540
£106,113
INVESTMENTS
2,421 units - M & G Charifund Income Units
£34,593 6%% Treasury Stock 2004
£12,019 IOX% Conversion Stock 1999
£10,000 Allied Domecq PIc 9%% Debenture Stock 2019
48,356.05 units - Charities Aid Foundation Income Fund
MARKET VALUE as at 31 December 1997
No adjustment has been made for the increase in the value of the Investments.
£
2.
FIXED ASSETS
Cost of Computer and Printer
Less: Depreciation
Net Book Value
2,817
2,816
£1
The cost of the Computer Equipment has being written off over three years on a straight
line basis
3.
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE AND SUBSCRIPTIONS
Subscriptions in advance
PAYEandNIC
Accruals
£1,200
£1,426
£416
£1,599
£1,404
£402
£3,042
£3,405

The Naval Review

Transcription

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