TG1 - Festival dell`Economia

Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer
Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi's Italy
Ruben Durante
Brian Knight
June 2010
Introduction
•There is significant concern over partisan control of the media sector.
•In particular, impressionable voters may be influenced by an
ideological media, resulting in an electoral advantage for one party.
•This argument rests upon two key assumptions:
1. Partisan control of the media will lead to biased media content.
2. Consumers do not respond to bias by shifting to other outlets.
•We examine these issues in the context of Italian television, where
the main public channel (TG1) is controlled by the ruling coalition.
•Also, the main private network is owned by Berlusconi, who leads the
center-right coalition.
Research questions
• Using content and viewership data from before and after the 2001
change in government, we ask three related questions:
1. Where do news channels lie on the ideological spectrum? Does the
change in government lead to changes in the relative ideological
position of TG1?
2. Do consumers respond to any change in the ideological position of
TG1 by switching between channels?
3. To what extent does any such switching between channels offset the
change in the ideological content of TG1?
Why Italy?
• The Berlusconi anomaly: the leader of the center-right coalition owns
the private network Mediaset (TG4, TG5, SA).
•Majority's influence over the main public channel (TG1)
•Heterogeneity across the public network RAI in political leaning: the
right always controls TG2, and the left always controls TG3.
•High viewership of TV news (>90 percent)
Content Analysis
• We begin by estimating the ideological location of each channel.
• This measure is based upon a test for equal treatment.
• A channel is unbiased if:
1. coverage of the right when the right is in power equals
2. coverage of the left when the left is in power
• A channel is biased to the right if:
1. coverage of the right when the right is in power exceeds
2. coverage of the left when the left is in power
• A channel is biased to the left if:
1. coverage of the right when the right is in power is less than
2. coverage of the left when the left is in power
RAI Channels
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
TG1
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
TG2
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
TG3
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
Mediaset Channels
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
TG4
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
TG5
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
Studio Aperto
Elections 2001
Berlusconi's Government
Majority's % of ST
Elections 2006
Opposition's % of ST
Estimated
ideologicalPositions
PositionsofofNews
NewsStations
Stations
Estimated Ideological
Left
Center
Right
Coverage within the majority
• We next examine how time devoted to the majority is
distributed between the relevant players:
1. Prime Minister
2. Others in Government
3. MPs
4. Speakers
TG1- Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
20%
Others
Government
10%
Speakers
0%
Prime Minister
-10%
-20%
Majority MPs
TG2 - Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
20%
Others
Government
10%
Speakers
0%
Prime Minister
-10%
Majority MPs
-20%
TG3 - Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
20%
10%
Others
Government
Speakers
0%
Prime Minister
-10%
-20%
Majority MPs
TG4 - Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
50%
Prime Minister
25%
Others
Government
0%
Speakers
-25%
-50%
Majority MPs
TG5 - Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
20%
Prime Minister
10%
0%
Speakers
Others
Government
-10%
-20%
Majority MPs
SA - Change in the Majority Speaking Time
when Berlusconi in power vs. Left in power
20%
Prime Minister
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
Others
Government
Majority MPs Speakers
Coverage within the Majority
• We next examine how time devoted to the majority is
distributed between the relevant players:
1. Prime Minister
2. Others in Government
3. MPs
4. Speakers
• The increased coverage of the majority on
Berlusconi’s Mediaset when the right is in power is
driven by a steady increase in the coverage of the
Prime Minister himself.
Using changes in control of TG1
• These measures of station ideology do not account for the
changes in the majority control of TG1.
• To examine the role of these changes, we next develop a
measure of station ideology that is time-varying (but relative).
• This measure gauges changes in coverage of the right on TG1
following the change in ideological control, relative to changes in
coverage on the other channels.
TG1
TG2
TG3
TG4
TG5
SA
Copertura della destra quando
Sinistra al potere Destra al potere
33%
71%
40%
72%
29%
55%
69%
86%
40%
74%
51%
73%
Differenza
38%
32%
26%
17%
34%
22%
Using changes in control of TG1
• These measures of station ideology do not account for the changes in
the majority control of TG1.
•To examine the role of these changes, we next develop a measure of
station ideology that is time-varying (but relative).
•This measure gauges changes in coverage of the right on TG1 following
the change in ideological control, relative to changes in coverage on the
other channels.
•We find that:
1. content on TG1 shifted to the right relative to each of the five
other channels.
2. TG1 was a less extreme version of TG3 when the left was in
power.
3. TG1 was a less extreme version of TG5 when the right was in
power.
Estimated ideological Shift in TG1 when Right in Powwer
Left
Right
Choice of Media Outlet
• We next examine how viewers in Italy responded to this change in the
ideological position of TG1.
• Our hypotheses are based upon an economic model in which viewers
prefer to watch stations with ideology that is closest to their own.
Ideological Distribution of Viewers
Sinistra
Destra
Ideological Distribution of Viewers and Stations when Left Controls TG1
TG3
TG1
TG5
Hypothesized Choice of Stations when Left Controls TG1
TG3
TG1
TG5
Choice of Media Outlet
• We next examine how viewers in Italy responded to this change in the
ideological position of TG1.
• Our hypotheses are based upon an economic model in which viewers
prefer to watch stations with ideology that is closest to their own.
• This model suggests that viewers may switch to like-minded outlets
following a change in control of the government from center-left to
center-right.
Choice of Stations when Right Controls TG1 without Switching
TG3
TG1
TG1
TG5
Choice of Stations when Right Controls TG1
TG3
TG1
TG1
TG5
Choice of Media Outlet
•
Given the findings of the content analysis, we hypothesize that:
1.
2.
•
•
•
left-leaning voters may switch from TG1 to TG3.
right-leaning voters may switch from TG5 to TG1.
To test these hypotheses, we use data from the Italian National
Election Survey (ITANES).
This survey interviews the same set of individuals in both 2001 and
2004.
Survey questions include information on voter ideology and
favorite news channel.
Left-Wing Voters Favorite News Channel 2001 vs. 2004
2001
2004
46.1
41.8
21.9
20.3
14.8 15.3
20.1
13.2
1.6
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
1.8
SA
1.1
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
1.8
SA
Center Voters Favorite News Channel - 2001 vs. 2004
2001
2004
42.4
42.4
37.2
35.5
8.4
9.4
7.9
6.4
3.0
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
3.9
1.2
SA
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
2.5
SA
Right-Wing Voters Favorite News Channel 2001 vs. 2004
2001
2004
59.2
47.3
34.2
24.7
6.9
6.4
3.5
3.1
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
3.1
4.2
SA
TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 TG5
3.8
3.5
SA
Offset Measures
• We found above that TG1 content shifts to the right but remains to
the left of TG5.
• We also found that many right-leaning voters shifted from TG5 to TG1
and that many left-leaning voters shifted from TG1 to TG3.
• Taken together, this implies that ideological consumption for these
voters shifted to the left, even though media content shifted to the
right.
• We next investigate the degree to which these behavioral responses
offset the changes in content.
• If there are no behavioral responses, then our measure of offset is 0.
• If behavioral responses are complete, so that ideological consumption
does not change when TG1 moves to the right, then our measure of
offset is 1.
Percentage Offset by Political Ideology
Left
Center-Left
Center
Center-Right
Right
Additional Evidence
• We find similar patterns in responses to survey questions regarding
how often viewers watch each of the six channels for both news and
non-news programming.
• In an analysis of second choices in news channels, we find that rightleaning viewers tended to watch Mediaset channels as a second choice
even after switching to TG1 as a first choice.
• We investigate survey questions regarding trust in the media.
Consistent with our switching analysis, we find that trust in RAI is higher
among right-leaning viewers when the right is in power.
Trust in Public Channels
Left
Center-Left
Center
2001
Center-Right
2004
Right
Trust in Berlusconi’s Channels
Left
Center-Left
Center
2001
Center-Right
2004
Right
Additional Evidence
• Fourth, we analyze AUDITEL viewership ratings over the period 20012007. Consistent with our findings in the switching analysis, we find
that viewership of TG3 rises when the right is in power. We find no
evidence, however, that viewership of TG5 falls.
•We investigate readership of newspapers, a media sector over which
the ruling party has no direct control. We find that readership patterns
are stable between 2001 and 2004.
Conclusion
• Using speaking time measures of media content, we find significant
ideological segmentation of the Italian news market.
•We also find a shift in content on TG1 to the right following the change
in government.
•Viewers responded to this shift in content by adjusting their viewing
habits.
•This behavioral response significantly, though only partially, offset the
change in content.