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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
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“Financial Inclusion for Women: The Impact of Islamic
Microfinance on Women’s Empowerment in Indonesia”
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Umi Yaumidin, Economic Research Centre-Indonesian Institute of Sciences
Conference paper (excluding author names and affliations)
10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
THE FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR WOMEN:
The Impact of the Evaluation on the Islamic Microfinance to the Women’s
Empowerment in Indonesia
Abstract
The new concept of Islamic finance in Indonesia is focused on the engagement of the poor to the
economic productive activities, in other words, motivating them to new enterprises so that they can
get out of the poverty trap. The zakah, infaq and sadaqat are known as the collective funds for
philanthropic events (social safety nets) among the Moslems. Most of the zakah beneficiaries are
the poor and the vulnerable people in terms of the economics. Today, the zakah management has
transformed into a microfinance enterprise in order to drive the poor's engagement in the economic
activities as well as reduce the inequality. Empirically, Moslem women are more in favor to utilize the
program. Therefore, this study attempts to evaluate the impact of the Islamic microfinance institution
operating in the urban of Bandung City of Indonesia as the indicator of the women empowerment.
For that matter, we surveyed approximately two hundred and forty women who had been involved in
the microfinance of the Misykat program in the DPU of Daarut Tauhid and BAZNAS in Bandung to
have stratified random sampling. The Primary data collection was held in two sessions, starting
from June to December 2014. In the meantime, the causal effect of the credit on empowerment was
identified using quasi experimental setting with proxy controls for latent heterogeneity between the
control and the treatment groups. We have come to the assumption that the women involvement in
the microfinance will improve their position within the household through i) access to independent
income; ii) control over savings and credit use; iii) ability to bring productive asset to household
economy. In addition, using the matching propensity score and the instrumental variable methods
help us address the bias selection in a cross sectional setting.
Keywords: Islamic microfinance, women empowerment, zakah management, poverty
alleviation
Introduction
Indonesia’s poverty rate has returned to a level similar to what it was before the financial
crisis of 1997–98 (In 1996 the poverty rate was 17.47 per cent, and it rose to 24.23 per
cent in 1999). It has not fallen further partly because economic growth has been slow. The
higher rates of poverty continued for a period after the financial crisis (from 2000 to 2007).
By 2005, the poverty rate had reduced to 15.97 per cent, but it would be worse when the
poverty rate jumped to 17.75 percent in 2006 (Yaumidin, 2010). Various ways and financial
resources deployed to accelerate the elimination of poverty in Indonesia, as a result the
number of poor starts to decline significantly, but inequality has increases slowly in the
region, which have abundant natural resources (Yaumidin, 2013). Thus, Indonesia’s
government continues its efforts to reduce the gap by increasing inter-regional connectivity,
infrastructure development, and human resource development through various programs.
The figure of poverty or a person who are categorized as mustahik, at national level,
women poverty (51%) is little bit higher than men poverty (49%) (Purwakananta and
Abilawa, 2010). Therefore, it was argue that most of operational unit of zakah from
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
government institution (BAZNAS) and private institution (LAZNAS) are more concentrated
to utilize zakah in Java area than other province. It is more likely to utilize zakah fund to
empowering women through microcredit in order to improve their position more equal to
man in the household. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine empirical
evidence of the impact of Islamic microfinance on Muslim women’s empowerment in West
Java.
Methodology
1.
Questionnaire Design
The research design is set up to carry out a quasi-experimental framework. Prospective or
new client are used as a comparison or control group. A stratified random sample of 200
households was drawn from the population of 2000 female clients, with approximately 1000
DPU DT and 1000 BAZNAS clients. The sample of 200 clients with 120 clients of DPU DT
and 80 BAZNAS clients represented the proportion of DPU DT and BAZNAS clients in the
population. The mature client (the old participants whether active or inactive) will compared
with the control group to ascertain impact of credit. Questionnaire design based on the
conceptualization of women’s empowerment outlined in the conceptual framework.
The questionnaire is designed to answer underlying research objective: how the impact of
Islamic microfinance on indicators of women empowerment. It is designed to follow by
Asim (2008) with modification on the indicators of women empowerment, within the
particular context of Indonesia.
The questionnaire captured through a series of questions relating to variables in which
indicate empower for women based on the theoretical views i.e: concerning children, social
mobility and economic empowerment. Therefore the questionnaire will consist of sections
as follows;
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Household Information (Adult)
Household Information (Children)
Household Information (Labor)
Credit profile of household
Income/Expenditure/Saving/Debt/Asset Profile of HH
Female Enterprise
Attitude towards female enterprise /empowerment
The questionnaire also completed by such qualitative questions to reinforce the validity of
research findings.
Before we conduct experimental survey, we drawback the terms of “women empowerment”
through the exploratory evidence obtained from focus group discussion sessions and
subsequent deep interviews to have the sense of “women’s empowerment” in the view of
Indonesia’s Muslim women (see annexes for list of questions). We conduct FGD for two
group that we classified them based on level of education and economic strata. We divide
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
women group who MFI recipients into lower-medium education (from no graduate from
elementary school to junior high school) and medium-higher education (graduate from
senior high school or higher level). Based on the level of economic condition we divide a
group as the recipients, who used MFI credit for consumption and have no business, and
the other group is MFI clients who use their loan for working capital and they have a
business.
2.
Hypothesis
H0: Islamic Microfinance has impact on Preference based indicators of empowerment
H1: Islamic Microfinance has no impact on Preference based indicators of empowerment
There are five different dimensions of empowerment: children related decisions; health
decisions; economic decisions; social mobility decisions; and major household purchases.
This hypothesis empirically test the immediate changes in gender relation brought about by
participation in a microcredit program. If the position of the women within the household
has improved after taking the loan then power distribution should change across some
domains of decision making within the household.
3.
Method of Data Analysis
To estimates and test hypothesis, we use the class of probit and bi-variate probit models.
The endogeinity of treatment in our specification necessitates making the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 : ignorability treatment
Conditional on observed individual characteristic Xi, outcomes (Y0, Y1) are independent of
the treatment T. This assumption implies conditional mean independence of outcomes:
Assumption 2: stable unit treatment of value assumption
Estimation strategy by imposing a linear relationship for conditional mean independence
Where:
X is the vector of covariates. It covariate has the average value of X at the treated
population.
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
In this generic heterogeneous treatment effects model we allow both the parameters of
slope
and intercept term
to vary across the outcome regimes. This switching
regression model can be reduced to a single equation giving the expected empowerment
outcome Y conditional on X, T:
Where Y = (1-T) Y0 + TY1 is the observed outcome (equal to Y1 for participants in the
treatment group and Y0 for participants in the control group).
The Development of the microfinance in Indonesia
Indonesia is one of the first countries to develop the commercial microfinance in Asia with
regulated financial institutions that provides the bulk of microfinance services throughout
the archipelago. In addition to the success of the commercial microfinance providers,
Indonesia has also been a favorable ground for the development of numerous subsidized
government programs, whether it is local, community-based financial institutions,
cooperatives or NGOs (City Foundation, 2009).
Indonesian microfinance is supported by a diverse set of institutions, originated from the
government, the voluntary sector agencies (both the national and international), the private
sector to the bi- and multi-lateral agencies. These institutions may be named as the
initiators for the setting up of the microfinance enterprises in Indonesia such as the Pro-FI
(the promotion of Small Financial Institutions) project which is supported by the Bank of
Indonesia and the German technical assistance agency, GTZ. It aims to improve the
operations of two categories of the microfinance providers: the “People’s Credit Banks”
(BPR) and some non-bank microfinance institutions, especially the “village Credit Boards”
(LPDs) in Bali. PERBARINDO, Permodalan Nasional Madani (PNM), GEMA PKM
(Gerakan Bersama Pengembangan Keuangan Mikro Indonesia), GIC (Global Innovation
Consulting) and many others have also given high contribution to the development of the
microfinance activities which operated by the rural banks as well as the non-bank financial
institutions.
Table 1 the Formation of the Microfinance in Indonesia
Number of
Number of
Total Financing
Bank
Worker
(Credit)
BPR Syariah
160
4,826
4,354,183
BPR Conventional
1,634
74,531,494
Cooperative
203,701
438,541
8,118,959
Conventional
Cooperative Syariah
3,038
157,000
Sources: Bank of Indonesia, 2013 and Ministry of Cooperative and SMEs, 2007
Note
Oct. 2013
Oct. 2013
Oct.2013
2007
In terms of number, the BPR Syariah and Cooperative Syariah which operation is based on
the Islamic teachings own less capital than that of the conventional institutions. While PNM
as the state-owned enterprise has a mandate from government to engage in serving more
of the SMEs than the micro-enterprises. PNM supports the linkage program between the
commercial banks and the BPRs and also between the commercial banks and the nonbank microfinance providers. PNM provides loans to non-bank microfinance providers
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
through the regional development banks (BPD) with the saving that is mobilized by the
retail microfinance institutions as a unique form of collateral. It has a special brief on the
support of Syariah (Islamic) microfinance. Islamic banking is a significant force in the
microfinance and financial sectors in Indonesia in terms of the volume of the financial
services provided and the number of outlets that provide them.
Despite this proliferation of the microfinance service providers, several studies have shown
that there is still an unmet demand for the microfinance services as a majority of rural
households still do not have access to a source of funds from either a semi-formal or formal
institution. Some of them were caused by the regulations and the limited funds as the
revolving loans, but some may also be due to the lack of good management inside the
institutions.
In the case of empowering the poor, a number of studies concluded that microfinance also
had a close relation to women’s empowerment (Asim, 2008). However, defining the
women’s empowerment is debatable since the term of ‘empowerment’ also relates to the
gender system in the country (Wee and Shaheed, 2008). The gender system is a system of
constructing and regulating specific standards for males and females as well as the
relations between them in terms of the relative hierarchy or the relative equality. If
intersecting with other forms of power relations, however, diverse gender systems produce
a variety of spaces for women’s initiatives and empowerment which is accompanied by
distinctive constraints, diverse sources of support, and dissimilar access to a range of
resources.
The Women empowerment in the view of Moslem women
In this study, we conducted an exploratory approach to obtain the women's perception on
the terminology of women empowerment. We conducted Focus Group Discussion three
times: first, we discussed with groups of facilitators who have relatively higher levels of
education and economics; secondly, we discussed with the members of micro-credit who
possesses lower levels of education and economics; thirdly, we discussed with the policy
makers on the top of the management level of the zakah management organization.
In the first discussion, we had the impression that women in the view of Moslem should
follow the Islamic Laws. The taskforce and the position between men and women were
different so that they might not carry the same level of responsibility. However, they agreed
that women should have the same right in terms of having the ability to convey their opinion
as well as being the decision maker in the family.
Mrs Aisyah from Amanah group mentioned that “women as mothers hold a more important
role than just working in “the kitchen, toilet and bedroom”, and therefore women should be
included in the democratic process of the household, particularly in the educational aspect
of the children. In my case, although, my husband pays all of the tuition fee of our children
schooling, but as a mother my responsibility is to keep everything else on the right track”.1
Similar to Mrs. Aisyah's opinion , Mr. Dasep who is the leader and senior mentor of the
group believed that women were better in seeing the future progression of their children as
well as in helping their husbands in the decision making process.
1
FGD with mentor of Myskat program in Bandung, 24 April 2014. It was attended by 13 mentors, 7 women
and 6 men mentors.
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All of the FGD participants agreed that the women's opinion may be heard by their
husbands should the opinion was found to be brilliant enough to help solve the family
problem. However, it took only one wrong suggestion for the women to have their opinion
disregarded. To be able to come up with brilliant suggestion there were some aspects to be
considered, such as education which could be achieved not only from the formal but also
from the religious education. When it comes to religious education, the women were
expected to possess good moral and be apt to Islamic law that their husband believed in.
In other word, women should have extensive knowledge in any matters of live. This means,
not only educating them in formal education but also encouraging them to be more active in
social events such as following religious or social organizations in their communities. While
all of the participants in the focus group discussion tended to view the empowerment to be
similar to the equality between men and women, they understand that the process of
empowerment and the equality between wife and husband in the family was actually a
result of this process.
Empowerment is an integrated process among motivators, facilitators and a group of
society that requires empowerment through the improvement of knowledge, skills and the
provision of amenities as well as the opportunity to reach access to the system of
resources in the augmentation of social welfare (Rahima, et.al.; 2013). One of the purposes
of microfinance is reducing the number of poor by giving them more access to financial
institutions so that they can empower themselves. Self-empowerment is the interaction
that enables a person to assume an attitude of empowering his/herself by making good use
of “personal potential” in dealing with problems that they faced (Charon, 1979).
According to Sumardjo (1999) the characteristic of an empowered individual are:
1. Being able to comprehend herself and her potentials, being able to make planning
(to anticipate the change of condition in the future);
2. Being able to direct herself
3. Having the power to negotiate
4. Having the bargaining power to do mutual cooperation and
5. Being responsible of her own action.
This indicates that an empowered individual is one who knows, understands, has good
motivation and opportunities, makes good use of the opportunities, has the energy, can
cooperate, knows a variety of alternatives, can make decisions, dares to take risk, can
search for information, and has the ability to act in accordance with the situation. Therefore,
the process of empowerment should be done constantly and continuously so that it can
lead them to prosperity.
In the case of mentors, most of the participants agreed that regardless of any rupiahs given
by their husbands, the money should be able to meet all their household's needs. They did
not ask their husbands to satisfy their desires for precious goods. However, they
emphasized that they could get full empowerment if they could manage their husband's
income as well as their own. In other words, the husbands' money should be seen as the
wife’s money, however, if the wife can earn some money of their own, this money should
be counted as theirs only and their husbands could not control it.
Some of them also argued that this argument may not be accepted by all men. Ms. Alifah
stated that “there is a time when my husband needs some money from me to pay for
something but it is then counted as a loan, and I always remain him to pay his loans”.
Debating who had more control of money in the household could be a sensitive subject as
mentioned by Ms. Ai who ran her business together with her husband, “If I have more
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
money from my own business, I always spend it for the household's needs, and I never
think that my husband has a loan from me’.
Mr. Dasep, one of the mentors of the Misykat program, had a different view on the subject,
“as a husband I have two sources of income, my main income that comes from teaching I
give to my wife, but my secondary income from performing as a band member I use for my
own necessities. However, I support my wife if she wants to have her own saving from her
own income”.
We received a different view from another Moslem women's group who did not join the
Islamic microfinance. This group had a characteristic of both low levels of education and
income. They felt afraid to speak out and share their opinions on women empowerment.
They tended to need their husbands' permission to make their own decisions. Some of
them mentioned that their husbands' family members, particularly their mother in laws,
always interfered with their internal household matters. It seemed that defining women
empowerment for them was hard as they held the Islamic law only partially. In the holy
Quran, it was mentioned that Men are the women's leaders so that women should be
behind the men and therefore should always seek approval of their husbands in every
decision making process. This situation, based on their story, conditioned them to be
cheaters and have problems with money lenders or loan sharks who charge high interest
rate for debts. In Bandung City, there are many money lenders who plunge the poor into
even deeper poverty.
It can be concluded from the group discussion that the mentoring and the training from
Misykat program had affected their view on self empowerment. The model of selfempowerment through strong social capital was maintained well in togetherness which
would enable growth in personal spirit leading to more productive individuals which in turns
improve competence. Self-empowerment brings implication on positive value for individuals
who do the self-empowerment, namely: (a) promoting self-confidence; (b) opening and
developing individual’s entrepreneurship; (c) opening job vacancies; (d) facilitating the
provision of raw materials; (e) facilitating in obtaining loans; (f) facilitating in marketing
because of the wide network; (g) improving work ethics; (h) improving skills/competence;
and (i) having creative and innovative traits to reform.
The Review on the Islamic Microfinance
1. The Misykat Program of the DPU DT (Dompet Peduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhid)
Misykat (Microfinance Masyarakat – Microfinance Based on Community) is one of the
programs from Dompet Peduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhid Foundation.2 This program was
2
Wallet Caring Ummah (DPU DT) is a community-owned non-profit organization that is engaged in
raising (fundraising) and utilization of zakat (Zakat, Infaq, and Charity) and other funds from the
lawful and legal individuals, groups, companies or institutions. It was founded on June 16, 1999 by
KH. Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) as part of the Foundation of Daarut-Tauhid with LAZ
determination to be trustful, professional and accountable. DPU DT has effectively carried out its
activities from June 16, 2000, on the basis of database, where each donor has the number and
membership card so their commitment can be measured. From the formal legal aspects, DPU DT is
registered as a Zakat Institution by the Government of West Java, dated August 19, 2002. By
Decree No.: 451.12/Kep. 846 - YANSOS/2002. DPU DT foundation has also got the attention of the
central government, in a short amount of time since the days of its standing and becoming of
LAZDA, it has managed to become the National Institute of Amil Zakat, LAZNAS, in accordance with
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originally set up in 2004 but only established four years later. This foundation develops the
concept of channeling zakat fund as revolving loan fund rather than simply a charity
program. However, some Islamic scholars do not agree with this fund being used for loan
as the function of zakah is a social protection and therefore should be directly given to the
beneficiaries’ as stated in the Qur’an.
In the hope of reducing the poverty rate, this foundation points out that the important thing
of zakah utilizations is not only to give the fund to the beneficiaries’, but also to empower
them so they can be out of poverty. Utilizing zakah needs high skills, patient, as well as
seriousness. The basic concepts that this foundation implemented to its microfinance in
regards to reduce poverty rate are:
1. Capital is not everything. Islamic law teach that for the Moslems there is no zakah
fund for people who are capable to work, thus anticipate the vulnerable people who
fall under the poverty line group, they need assessment to improve their business.
Thus, according to this foundation, zakah funds can be used for this purpose.
2. No charity, charity only helps the poor in short time, and in the long run, they will still
be poor if there is no effort to empower them to be more economically active.
3. Awareness of their potentials, the first thing to do to help the poor is to see their
potentials and optimally developed them.
4. Access to wider market and networking
5. Household management in terms of the economic flow
6. Mentoring, empowerment needs a long process in terms of the planning, monitoring
and evaluation, therefore the role of mentors/facilitators is important to determine
the success of the program.
7. Urgent need for professional mentors,
8. Takes time and process, not instant
9. Motivation to work
While the source of zakah fund is limited, the number of poor people is large. Accordingly,
appropriate strategies are needed to cope with the problem. Some implications for this
condition are:
1. Charity system do not work properly to alleviate poverty.
2. ZMO (Zakah Management Organization) institutions need to have their own
systematical strategy to alleviate poverty. They do not have to fall into populist
program.
3. All the empowerment programs will not be able to capture every poor directly in the
short time. Therefore, there should be programs that are sustainable conducted
with the pilot project in some priority regions.
4. Empowering program should only be seen as a trigger and not as a charity. Then, it
should be counseled in the management system from the planning, organizing,
staffing to the controlling.
5. Empowering program should stimulate greater access to formal financial institution
for the poor.
the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 410 of 2004 on October 13, 2004. After becoming
LAZNAS, the DPU DT developed a network covering eight cities, namely Jakarta, Bogor,
Tasikmalaya, Garut, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Lampung and Palembang. It has hundreds of network
utilization programs from Sabang to Papua.
.
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This shifting paradigm is not easy to be accepted by other Moslems. Therefore, this
foundation requires some restriction in the requirement step to select new members. They
need high commitment from the members to follow the rule, which they set up based on the
Islamic teachings.
DPU Daarut Tauhid holds Misykat (community-based microfinance) which provides microcredit to merchants who do not enjoy the economics and spiritual prosperity. The terms and
conditions to be a Misykat’s member are:
1. Women with age between 17 and 55 years old, one group consist of at least five
people.
2. Each member must live in an area that can be reached on foot and has lived in the
area for at least six months.
3. Mandatory responsibility of each member that has to follow the guidance from
Daarut Tauhid that holds a meeting once a week. The meeting agenda consists of
attending lectures, installment loans, money saving and paying dues to the group.
4. In a group, the business can be heterogeneous or not the same.
5. Prefer members that have already had a business (not starting from zero).
Misykat’s type of financing is imposed with the 2-2-1 pattern with the calculation of five
people in one group. Two people are given the first capital. If the first installment runs
smoothly, then the next two new will be given. So, it will continue on until the last person,
who usually is the chairman of the group. This fee is unsecured (non-physical) in the form
of the social cohesion or social tolerance. Therefore, when the first two people are given
the loaned capital, three others learn to "let go" and oversee the order not the default
installment so they can later also be directly given the loaned capital.
Since its establishment in 2006, DT Misykat in the capital of Jakarta has given nearly 300
people from a variety of sources of funding of the DPU DT Jakarta, ranging from the charity
to the shodaqoh/infaq. In the meantime, friends who want to join as "investors" can transfer
fund to the productive account:
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Misykat Scheme
RECRUITMENT
• STAGE I
• Survey
• Sosialization and
• STAGE II
• Introducing program
to new member
• Filling out formulir
•
•
•
•
•
STAGE III
Interview candidate
Commitee meeting
Annoucement
group formation
MENTORING
• New member:
saving, muamala,
robanniah
haouseholds
• Mature member:
entrepreneurship,
financial
manajerial
• Leader member:
management
organization,
leadershif, and fiqh
of zakat utilization
FUNDING
• First step
• Patern 2-2-1 break
2 weeks 2 payment
loans
• Second step
• Patern 2-2-1 break
2 weeks 2 payment
loans
• Third step
• Patern 2-2-1 break
2 weeks 2 payment
loans
LIPI
Figure 1 Misykat Scheme
Sources: Dompet Peduli Ummat – DaarutTauhid, 2014
Mrs Alifah, one of the mentors told her story when she joined the microfinance. “The first
time I joined this microfinance as a member of a lending group from 2007 to 2010, the
group chose me to manage our financial report, and when our leader had a problem that
caused her to be fired, I replaced her as the leader as well as the mentor. Before I joined
this MFI, I did not have a job, but after I got some entrepreneurship trainings from this MFI
for more than four times I tried to open a stall. After four years, I have my own PAUD
(Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini – pre-school building) for all the children whose parents are
clients of the MFI”.
Another story was told by Ms. Ai who mentioned that before joining Miyskat, she was one
of the boards of “Warna Sari” a group which funded by the Indonesian government under
BKKBN (The National Board for Family Planning). The government gave them fund for
approximately 30 members. This program, however, only lends money and they have
regular meetings once in two or three months. In reality, the members were quite
indiscipline in terms of paying the loan and following the group's rules. If there was a
margin or profit from their businesses, they used it to develop their own organization. This
model is different from the Misykat program. According to her, each member has
responsibilities to attend weekly meeting and recitation. They also should have a saving
which is mandatory as well as voluntarily. This program also offers a saving plan which is
useful to cover any unexpected or large expenses such as house leasing, school tuition
fee, or other big plans for their own investments. The mentor should encourage the
members to save their money before spending it for their daily lives.
Ms. Lia also added some information on how Misykat program can empower the members
through micro credit. “There are some differences of lending process between other
microfinance and the Misykat program by DPU DT. If we lend from cooperative (other
microfinance), we just pay the installment and the interest rate. In Misykat program, there is
weekly gathering as well as the mentoring program for the lenders to manage their income
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so that they can save their money and use it more appropriately. Members also learn more
about understanding a contract.
2. The Zakah Utilizations Program of Baznas
Simply relying on the government's budget without having private partners to alleviate
poverty hardly works to reach the MDG’s goal. Poverty eradication should not only be the
government's responsibility, but also all element and entities in the country. BAZNAS is one
of the alternatives to get funding for the poverty alleviation from the private as well as the
community.
Zakah management has undergone some significant changes since the enactment of the
Act No. 23 of 2011. This new Act mandated a stronger integration of zakah management in
the country. In accordance to this Act, Badan Amil Zakah Nasional (Baznas) comprises
three elements; Islamic scholars, professional, and Islamic community leaders. Eight of
them should be from the community while the 3 of them come from the government. In
addition, the Presidential decree no 14/2014 has completed the implementation of this law.
However, the enactment of this law has caused a controversy since it has stipulated that
the zakat management and the public is only allowed to participate with the government
authorization. According to Saidurahman (2013), it also stipulated that the alms
management be carried out by BAZNAS's operating hierarchy from the central to the
regional levels. This stipulation seemed to limit the number of zakat management
organizations. It can be said that through this law, the government needs to strengthen the
zakat management in order to mobilize its full potential, on the other hand, the government
intends to also control the zakat management.
In 2013 Zakah fund has been collected by BAZNAS in West Java Province for
approximately 88% and the rest (12%) is from non zakah fund (Alms) such as infaq and
sadaqah. This fund increased dramatically from the previous year. According to the board,
they just collect “Zakah Profession” rather than “Zakat Maal” from the civil servants. Every
month more than US$ 40.000 is collected.
Zakat Collection
NON ZAKAT
12%
ZAKAT
88%
Figure 2 The Zakah Collection By BAZNAS West Java Province 2013
Sources: Baznas West Java, 2013
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In its operation, Zakah disbursement is allocated for activities which supports economic
programs such as small enterprise empowerment. The disbursement can be done directly
by the Unit Pengumpulan Zakah (UPZ-Zakah Distribution Unit) which is available in every
counter of Baznas or UPZ partner. This economic program has been planned
systematically in order to ensure that the benefits of this empowerment are not only
individuals but also for their community. It can hopefully encourage the community
development initiated by Baznas, its partners and the community.
120,000,000,000
100,000,000,000
80,000,000,000
60,000,000,000
40,000,000,000
20,000,000,000
education
health
economic
social
dakwah
Figure 3 Zakat disbursement and Utilization from BAZNAS West Java Province 2013
Sources: Baznas West Java Province, 2013
In regards to the disbursement of the Zakah system, Baznas has been using three models
to achieve its economic goals. The zero-level-channel, aims for direct empowerment
through mustahik; The two-level-channel, uses coordinators to oversee the turnover of the
mustahik; The three-level-channel, welcomes the involvement of the third parties and other
coordinators.
Even when the recipient of Zakah is an individual, the usage of the money should not only
be for consumption. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) taught us to distribute Zakah for
productive activities that in turn would be advantageous not only for the mustahik but also
for the community. This is in accordance with the main purpose of Zakah allocation which
is to eradicate poverty. There have been some success stories in generating fund to
alleviate poverty using Zakah fund for the empowerment of the small-scale enterprises
based on local initiative3 Which for the Indonesian case, the disbursement of zakah is more
likely to follow the same patterns.
3
Again, Zakah revenue can be spent for raising the productivity of the poor. Such as financing
various development projects in education, health care, safe-water and other social welfare
activities, designed exclusively for the benefit of the poor. It is expected that this program can create
a multiplier effect for the poor welfare. However, it is intuitively plausible that an increase in income
from Zakah investment is expected to have a multiplier that is larger in size than an increase in
income from non-Zakah funds investment. It is due to the fact that in addition to the leakage of the
saving, some portion of income at the successive rounds of income and spending would be
12
10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
The Statistical Analysis
1.
The Descriptive Analysis
The survey was carried out by a team of four female surveyors and was headed by the
author for the supervision during the implementation phase. This research was conducted
in the west and the south city of Bandung. The Surveyors were assigned to certain local
areas and given a one day training to familiarize themselves with the questionnaire. These
surveyors had had prior experience of field work and their experience of the location helped
us in hunting down the sampled clients including the drop out ones. Any problems that
occurred and identified would result to the questionnaire being dropped with feedback
given by the surveyor to ensure quality control. Once the data collection was completed,
the data was processed into the computer by a team of four individuals including the author
herself. The data consistency was checked at all three stages including the collection, the
processing and the analysis.
Table 2 presents the characteristic of the respondents, most of them are married women
with age between 41 and more than 50 years old. In terms of the highest education level,
the proportion of all respondents is less educated with more than 70% of the respondents
graduated from elementary and junior high schools. Their monthly earning was only less
than US$ 300.
Table 2 The Characteristic of the Respondents
Characteristic
Marital Status
a.
b.
Education
a.
b.
c.
Age
a.
b.
c.
d.
Income
a.
b.
c.
d.
Sources: Survey, 2014
Proportion (%)
Married = 91.67%
Widowed = 8.33%
Elementary school =49.30%
Junior high school = 25.35%
Senior high school = 25.35%
21 – 30 years old = 2.78%
31- 40 years old =27.78%
41 – 50 years old = 34.72%
> 50 years old = 34.72%
<US$ 100/month = 21.13%
>US$ 100 – US$ 200 = 36.62%
>US$ 200 – US$ 300 = 29.57%
>US$ 300 – US$ 1000 = 12.68%
Table 3 summarizes the entire exogenous and endogenous variables used in the oprobit,
and biprobit regressions. Table 4 Provides the summary statistic for the preference related
indicator of the empowerment. Table 5 summarizes the autonomy based indicator of the
empowerment.
siphoned off by other leakages such as taxes, and imports, mostly in the case of the income of the
rich (Mannan, 2000)
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
Table 3 The Summary statistic: The Explanatory Variable from the Household Data
Set
Variable Name
Endogenous
Variable
Treatment Dummy
Exogenous
Variables
Age of Respondent
Schooling of
Respondent
Children
Age difference
Joint Family
First Utilization by
respondent
Working female
before loan
Interaction Term
Institution*Treatment
Definition
0 – 1 Dummy Variable:
=1 if the client registered with MFI
before December 2013;
=0 for clients registering in/after
January 2014.
Reported age of respondent
confirmed by observation
Number of years of schooling
completed by the respondent
Number of total children of the
respondent
Difference between the reported
ages of husband and wife
0-1 Dummy Variable,
=1 if the respondent lives with the
parents of her husband;
= 0 otherwise
0-1 Dummy Variable,
=1 if the first loan taken from MFI
was utilized by respondent
herself;
= 0 otherwise
0-1 Dummy Variable,
=1 if the respondent was a
working women prior to taking
loan;
= 0 otherwise
0-1 Dummy Variable,
=1 if the respondent is a member
of DPU-DT;
= 0 if the respondent is a member
of BAZ
Number of
Observation
*Standard Deviation in parenthesis
Treatment
Group Mean and
SD
.5548387
(.4985946)
Control Group
Mean and SD
46.39535
(10.91602)
8.05814
(2.536114)
2.081395
(1.356597)
3.965116
(3.637865)
.3372093
(.4755298)
43.55072
(9.535593)
7.594203
(2.528187)
2.086957
(1.094628)
4.449275
(4.009314)
.3043478
(.4635016)
.5813953
(.4962238)
.3768116
(.4881372)
.627907
(.486198)
.3333333
(.4748581)
.8604651
(.3485361)
.6811594
(.4694413)
144
96
Sources: Survey, 2014
Most of the variables are self-explanatory; only a few need further explanation. In table 3
the two exogenous variables: ‘working female before loan’ and ‘first utilization by
respondents’ need some clarification. Working female before loan is a dummy variable
constructed by assigning ‘1’ to all the women who had a working status before taking the
loan, this will not be influenced by intervention. This variable serves as an exogenous
proxy for the initial endowment of empowerment. The choice of this proxy is motivated
from an economic theory, where one of the routes identified for early empowerment is
through access to independent income. As a natural extension, we argue that by
controlling the women who were working prior to taking a loan we can capture most of the
unobserved heterogeneity between the incoming borrowers and those who took the loan at
an earlier date. Likewise, the dummy for the ‘first loan utilized by the respondents’
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
captures whether they were already empowered at the time of taking the loan and acted as
another exogenous proxy by controlling the levels of the initial empowerment.
It can be seen in table 4 that there is a significant drop in the number of observations
available for each indicator both in the treatment and the control group. The observations
on widowed women were dropped from the analysis. Also, some of the questions were
inapplicable to those women who had not yet been required to make decisions. For
instance, women having young children did not know whether their preferences would be
reflected in their children's marriages. In such cases the observation was dropped.
Nevertheless, for most of the variables there were enough observations in the control and
the treatment groups which allowed for a meaningful estimation, except for the decision
regarding the children's marriages. Hence, the question regarding the children's marriages
was dropped from the final analysis.
Table 4 Summary Statistic: The Outcome Indicators – ‘Say’ in HH Decision Making:
The Ordinal Development Variable (1-5)
Treatment
N
Control Group
N
t-stat for
Dependent Variable
Group Mean
Mean and SD
difference in
and SD
means
4.670588
108
3.898551
78
-3.5289**
Boy’s schooling decision
(1.039554)
(1.655161)
4.639535
132
4.347826
88
-1.5499
Girl’s schooling decision
(1.105205)
(1.234624)
3.895349
98
3.869565
40
-0.0954
Children Marriage
(1.735641)
(1.589608)
decision
4.918605
120
4.594203
78
-3.0317**
Children Medical Care
(.3824108)
(.896379)
4.837209
108
4.608696
78
-1.7137*
Family Planning Decision
(.7492815)
(.9110012)
4.94186
132
4.565217
88
-3.4051**
Respondent Medical Care
(.3549532)
(.9467943)
4.872093
132
4.521739
88
-2.9116**
Social visits to women’s
(.454947)
(.9942289)
families
4.744186
96
4.521739
69
-1.5974
Social visit in husband’s
(.7225127)
(1.008912)
families
4.313953
98
4.072464
69
-1.0250
Social visit in
(1.408058)
(1.517727)
neighborhood
4.697674
120
4.362319
80
-2.0677**
Work for earned income
(.8686672)
(1.150077)
4.953488
120
4.434783
80
-4.3635**
Borrow money from MFI
(.2118255)
(1.077555)
4.825581
120
4.565217
80
-2.2371*
Purchase of HH assets
(.4650581)
(.9467943)
4.790698
120
4.463768
80
-2.3093*
Decision about House
(.6706674)
(1.078939)
Repair
4.72093
120
4.376812
80
-1.9994*
Sale/purchase house
(.8765059)
(1.261435)
*All the dependent ordinal variables measure the extent to which women’s preferences are reflected
in decision making process; 5 indicating that her preferences are never reflected in these decisions
while 1 indicates that her preferences are always taken into account s.
**Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis.
Sources: Survey, 2014
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
Moreover, it is important to note that the difference in the unconditional mean across the
control and the treatment groups comes out to be negative for all the variables such as
child related, health and social mobility decisions as reported in the table 4 and 5. The
pattern in the data gives some credence to our earlier conjecture that power distribution is
not different across various domains of the household decisions. In other words, the basic
statistics suggests that microcredit might be important to reduce the level of the power
coefficient in the household decision making.
Table 5 Summary Statistic: The Outcome Indicators –‘Autonomy’ in HH Decision
Making: The Dichotomous Dependent Variable (0/1)
The Estimation Results
Dependent Variable
Purchasing Ice-cream for
Children
Purchasing Grocery/fruits
Treatment Group
Mean and SD
N
Control Group
Mean and SD
N
t-stat for
difference in
means
-1.1107
.9767442
86
.942029
69
(.1515989)
(.2354007)
.9534884
86
.8985507
69
-1.3228
(.2118255)
(.3041346)
Purchasing Medicine for
.9767442
86
.8550725
69
-2.8732**
herself
(.1515989)
(.3546068)
Purchasing clothes/cosmetics
.9186047
86
.826087
69
-1.7515*
for herself
(.2750451)
(.3818115)
Purchasing books/uniform for
.872093
86
.6666667
69
-3.1491**
children
(.3359451)
(.4748581)
Purchasing furniture
.627907
86
.5652174
69
-0.7882
(.486198)
(.4993602)
Purchasing refrigerator/TV
.3023256
86
.1884058
69
-1.6277*
(.4619592)
(.3939006)
Sale/purchase of personal
.3372093
86
.1449275
69
-2.7925**
assets (jewellery)
(.4755298)
(.3546068)
Taking a child to a doctor
.2093023
86
.1323529
69
-1.2452
(.4091966)
(.3413936)
*all the dependent binary variables measure whether the women requires someone’s permission in
making the decision. ‘1’ indicates that she does require someone’s permission in the HH while ‘0’
indicates complete autonomy in decision making.
** standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis
Sources: Survey, 2014
This section uses nine ordinal dependent variables as summarized in the table 4 to test
whether the participation in the microcredit program had increased the extent to which the
women’s preference were taken into consideration in various domains of household
decisions. the ordinal dependent variables take a value on an increasing scale of 1 to 5
where the lower end of scale indicates virtually no ’say’ in decision making while higher end
values indicate full recognition of her ‘voice’ in the household decisions. The dependent
variables span five broad categories of household decisions regarding children, economics,
health, social mobility and resources allocation that were sufficient to indicate the extent of
women’s centrality within the household.
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
2.
Testing Hypotheses
The results from ordered probit regression are reported in the table 6-9. The result are
grouped in five different dimensions of empowerment: children related decision; health
decision; economic decision4 ; social mobility decision; and major household purchases.
The prefered regression is regression (1) in the table 6-9. It uses proxies including a
dummy for ‘working women before taking a loan’ and a dummy for self utilization of first
loan by respondents. Both these proxies seek to control potential endogeneity stemming
from the initial differences between the control and the treatment groups. The regression
(2) adds an interaction term of institution dummy interacted with the treatment dummy to
control any unobserved institutional differences between the treated units of the
participating institution.5
Table 6 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment ‘Say’ in child Related
Decision
Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on:
Independent Variables
Treatment Dummy
Age difference with
husband
Age of respondent
Education
Number of Children
Joint family
First Utilization by
respondent
Working female before
loan
Interaction Term
Number of Observation
Pseudo R-Squared
2
Chi Statistic
Log likelihood
1
-4.82558
2
-4.81483
1
-4.01316
2
-4.13561
Child’s Medical
Care
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.133813 -.094100
-.038100
-.047343
.052351
.0626757
.033566
.0303593
.005564
.0340026
.2529663**
4.58502
.001752
.0346214
.2465285**
4.624978
-.002490
-.084092
.097062
4.49178
.0021591
-.078312
.1074353
4.57228
-.021426
-.057577
-.016942
-.227390
-.023881
-.059423
-.022789
-.237595
.8216936**
.795852**
.3179571
.3829298
1.00797
.9991379
.8216936
.1122615
.0661656
.0746215
-.128941
-.151093
155
0.1215
0.3324
-32.95852
.2971111
85
0.1382
0.3215
-32.8160
155
0.0737
0.7076
-34.2916
-.386793
86
0.0789
0.7553
-34.0981
155
0.1389
0.6478
-18.5807
.1151546
86
0.1395
0.7377
-18.570
Boy’s Schooling
Oprobit Coefficients
Girl’s Schooling
Oprobit Coefficients
Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Sources: Survey, 2014
4
Household and economic decisions are both reported in the table 8 for spatial convenience
Note that the experiment design constraintned by the dynamics on the ground as outlined in the
sampling framework precludes the use of simple institutional dummy to capture fixed effect.
5
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
Table 7 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment ‘Say’ in Health and Economic Decision
Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on:
Medical Check Up
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
4.844224
Treatment Dummy
6.591975
-.040884
Age difference with husband
-.0272978
-.015405
Age of respondent
-.0719173
-.1022231
Education
.0649423
.1263963
Number of Children
-.1438596
-.7379897
Joint family
-.0719495
.0389189
First Utilization by respondent
-.0139065
.6674733
Working female before loan
.2313231
Interaction Term
2.688104*
155
Number of Observation
86
0.1655
Pseudo R-Squared
0.2483
2
0.4914
Chi Statistic
0.5943
-18.728171 -11.217673
Log likelihood
Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis
Independent Variables
Family Planning
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.4887809
5.019463
-.0271348
-.0385695
.003076
-.0239426
-.0415296
-.0916436
.3748481
-.1012836
-.2429177
-.495065
.143611
-.3547715
.055649
.6911719
.9053429
155
86
0.0553
0.1768
0.7789
0.5405
-47.867172 -18.472607
Working for Earned Income
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.7847578
-.4531279
-.0042969
-.0146573
.0234619
-.008274
-.0971106
-.0358653
.0759002
.0686888
-.2509616
-.1083243
-.2286697
.1852644
.1594682
.5799223
.2145065
.0408157
155
86
0.0705
0.0350
0.4497
0.9354
-58.438835
-49.763737
Borrowing Money from MFI
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.4490239
-4.321536
-.0178478
.0430218
.0087026
.0172373
-.0507903
-.042819
.1472656
-.1004129
-.1831991
-.0984602
-.358488
.2587404
-.1006922
4.644496
.4208851
.0960044
155
86
0.0507
0.1789
0.7333
0.7609
-56.791199
-13.283674
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Sources: Survey, 2014
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
Table 8 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment; ‘Say’ in HER Social
Mobility Decision
Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on:
Independent
Variables
Treatment Dummy
Age difference
with husband
Age of respondent
Education
Number of
Children
Joint family
First Utilization by
respondent
Working female
before loan
Interaction Term
Number of
Observation
Pseudo RSquared
2
Chi Statistic
Log likelihood
Social Visits to Women’s
Family
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.9592319
1.364555
Social Visits to Man’s
Family
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-1.20225*
.2355147
Social Visits in
Neighbourhood
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
.0094279
-.145479
.0350032
-.1307885**
.0234244
-.0322655
-.001521
.0401171
.0301659
.0202196
-.0457297*
.024017
.0178261
.0307801
-.0127902
-.0433653
.0196767
.0832972
.0002321
-.025389
.1226517
.3412289*
.3416545*
-.2049735*
.0345707
.1594491
.2068361
-1.030494
.1608763
.2394649
-.2942929
-.7194185
-.2361006
.3307036
-.2456633
-.3812406
.0257825
-.5268271
.1886047
-.0625136
.3173985
.2414786
.0340297
.4231851
.7225997
.1997865
.0178061
155
86
155
86
155
86
0.0693
0.1546
0.0820
0.0460
0.0381
0.0749
0.5680
-51.454678
0.3466
-27.47594
0.4162
-51.66077
0.8646
-48.142996
0.8084
-66.80892
0.3675
-60.498157
Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 9 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment: ‘Say’ in Sale/Purchase of
HH Assets Decision
Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on:
Independent Variables
Treatment Dummy
Age difference with husband
Age of respondent
Education
Number of Children
Joint family
First Utilization by
respondent
Working female before loan
Interaction Term
Number of Observation
Purchase HH Assets
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.730150
-.336199
-.010226
.0196507
.0282308 -.052331*
-.116767
.0631836
2525069
.1120729
-.55551
.6224147
House Repair
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.9482864 .0763931
-.0037228 -.0135122
.0123852 -.042357*
Sale/Purchase House
Oprobit Coefficients
1
2
-.2572196 -.623578
.0314706 .0241185
.0234785
-.021130
-.14466*
-.1009398
-.1175352
.0048526
.4414575*
.2295004
.4352295*
.259426
-.4056291
-.8610494
-.4269948
-.037896
.1043397
.4277972
-.4560298
.448004
-.3934748
.2704221
-.121362
.5310206
.1667079
86
.2117244
.4693008
.8346708*
86
.0910417
.6571657
-.290977
86
155
155
155
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
Pseudo R-Squared
2
Chi Statistic
Log likelihood
0.1009
0.2691
-49.4414
0.1745
0.1230
-33.0607
0.1168
0.1123
-54.0324
0.1612
0.1498
-34.5944
0.1101
0.1541
-53.3093
0.0782
0.6755
-39.0767
Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Sources: Survey, 2014
The estimated effect of the treatment on the indicators of empowerment varies across these five
dimensions. For the decision relating to children particularly the treatment effect which is
statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level for both spesifications. Most decision of
boy’s scholing is affected by the number of children and the first utilization of loan by
respondents. But, the cooeficient doesn't have much of a difference between the first and the
second models of regression. Therefore, it can be concluded that the preference of
empowerment related to the decision on children between the mature and the new clients is not
affected by their participation in such microfinance.
Turning to the health and economic decisions, we strongly find the positive and the significant
effect of the treatment only for the variable ‘respondents' medical checkup’ at the 90% of the
confidence interval. But for other variable dependents, the effect of the participation in the
microfinance is insignificant. Similarly, for the major household decisions such as purchasing
household asset, households repairs and sale or purchase of house, the treatment effect only
significant for the households repair variable, but not for other variables.
Concluding Remark
Islamic microfinance has grown rapidly as one of tool to alleviate poverty particularly in urban
area of Indonesia. Zakah, Infaq and shadaqoh utilization has been utilized as one of
microfinance resources fund, although it is debatable between Islamic scholar and Uelama. In
our analysis, private institution management (DPU-Daarut Tauhid) tend to use combination of
zakah, infaq and shadaqah as financing of microfinance institutions. However, the use those
resources are different purpose and proportion. However, government institution (BAZNAS) has
strictly do not use zakah fund for microcredit funding, but they tend to use infaq and shadaqah
fund as microcredit fund.
Statistical evidence found that microfinance has no great impact to improve the preference of
Muslim women empowerment in urban area of Bandung city. The estimated effect of the
treatment on the indicators of empowerment varies across these five dimensions. For the
decision relating to children particularly the treatment effect which is statistically insignificant at
the 95% confidence level for both spesifications. Most decision of boy’s scholing is affected by
the number of children and the first utilization of loan by respondents. But, the cooeficient
doesn't have much of a difference between the first and the second models of regression.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the preference of empowerment related to the decision on
children between the mature and the new clients is not affected by their participation in such
microfinance.
Turning to the health and economic decisions, we strongly find the positive and the significant
effect of the treatment only for the variable ‘respondents' medical checkup’ at the 90% of the
confidence interval. But for other variable dependents, the effect of the participation in the
microfinance is insignificant. Similarly, for the major household decisions such as purchasing
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10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance
household asset, households repairs and sale or purchase of house, the treatment effect only
significant for the households repair variable, but not for other variables.
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