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IS T R IB U TE 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance TE O R D “Financial Inclusion for Women: The Impact of Islamic Microfinance on Women’s Empowerment in Indonesia” PR EP R IN T: PL EA SE D O N O T Q U O Umi Yaumidin, Economic Research Centre-Indonesian Institute of Sciences Conference paper (excluding author names and affliations) 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance THE FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR WOMEN: The Impact of the Evaluation on the Islamic Microfinance to the Women’s Empowerment in Indonesia Abstract The new concept of Islamic finance in Indonesia is focused on the engagement of the poor to the economic productive activities, in other words, motivating them to new enterprises so that they can get out of the poverty trap. The zakah, infaq and sadaqat are known as the collective funds for philanthropic events (social safety nets) among the Moslems. Most of the zakah beneficiaries are the poor and the vulnerable people in terms of the economics. Today, the zakah management has transformed into a microfinance enterprise in order to drive the poor's engagement in the economic activities as well as reduce the inequality. Empirically, Moslem women are more in favor to utilize the program. Therefore, this study attempts to evaluate the impact of the Islamic microfinance institution operating in the urban of Bandung City of Indonesia as the indicator of the women empowerment. For that matter, we surveyed approximately two hundred and forty women who had been involved in the microfinance of the Misykat program in the DPU of Daarut Tauhid and BAZNAS in Bandung to have stratified random sampling. The Primary data collection was held in two sessions, starting from June to December 2014. In the meantime, the causal effect of the credit on empowerment was identified using quasi experimental setting with proxy controls for latent heterogeneity between the control and the treatment groups. We have come to the assumption that the women involvement in the microfinance will improve their position within the household through i) access to independent income; ii) control over savings and credit use; iii) ability to bring productive asset to household economy. In addition, using the matching propensity score and the instrumental variable methods help us address the bias selection in a cross sectional setting. Keywords: Islamic microfinance, women empowerment, zakah management, poverty alleviation Introduction Indonesia’s poverty rate has returned to a level similar to what it was before the financial crisis of 1997–98 (In 1996 the poverty rate was 17.47 per cent, and it rose to 24.23 per cent in 1999). It has not fallen further partly because economic growth has been slow. The higher rates of poverty continued for a period after the financial crisis (from 2000 to 2007). By 2005, the poverty rate had reduced to 15.97 per cent, but it would be worse when the poverty rate jumped to 17.75 percent in 2006 (Yaumidin, 2010). Various ways and financial resources deployed to accelerate the elimination of poverty in Indonesia, as a result the number of poor starts to decline significantly, but inequality has increases slowly in the region, which have abundant natural resources (Yaumidin, 2013). Thus, Indonesia’s government continues its efforts to reduce the gap by increasing inter-regional connectivity, infrastructure development, and human resource development through various programs. The figure of poverty or a person who are categorized as mustahik, at national level, women poverty (51%) is little bit higher than men poverty (49%) (Purwakananta and Abilawa, 2010). Therefore, it was argue that most of operational unit of zakah from 1 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance government institution (BAZNAS) and private institution (LAZNAS) are more concentrated to utilize zakah in Java area than other province. It is more likely to utilize zakah fund to empowering women through microcredit in order to improve their position more equal to man in the household. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine empirical evidence of the impact of Islamic microfinance on Muslim women’s empowerment in West Java. Methodology 1. Questionnaire Design The research design is set up to carry out a quasi-experimental framework. Prospective or new client are used as a comparison or control group. A stratified random sample of 200 households was drawn from the population of 2000 female clients, with approximately 1000 DPU DT and 1000 BAZNAS clients. The sample of 200 clients with 120 clients of DPU DT and 80 BAZNAS clients represented the proportion of DPU DT and BAZNAS clients in the population. The mature client (the old participants whether active or inactive) will compared with the control group to ascertain impact of credit. Questionnaire design based on the conceptualization of women’s empowerment outlined in the conceptual framework. The questionnaire is designed to answer underlying research objective: how the impact of Islamic microfinance on indicators of women empowerment. It is designed to follow by Asim (2008) with modification on the indicators of women empowerment, within the particular context of Indonesia. The questionnaire captured through a series of questions relating to variables in which indicate empower for women based on the theoretical views i.e: concerning children, social mobility and economic empowerment. Therefore the questionnaire will consist of sections as follows; A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Household Information (Adult) Household Information (Children) Household Information (Labor) Credit profile of household Income/Expenditure/Saving/Debt/Asset Profile of HH Female Enterprise Attitude towards female enterprise /empowerment The questionnaire also completed by such qualitative questions to reinforce the validity of research findings. Before we conduct experimental survey, we drawback the terms of “women empowerment” through the exploratory evidence obtained from focus group discussion sessions and subsequent deep interviews to have the sense of “women’s empowerment” in the view of Indonesia’s Muslim women (see annexes for list of questions). We conduct FGD for two group that we classified them based on level of education and economic strata. We divide 2 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance women group who MFI recipients into lower-medium education (from no graduate from elementary school to junior high school) and medium-higher education (graduate from senior high school or higher level). Based on the level of economic condition we divide a group as the recipients, who used MFI credit for consumption and have no business, and the other group is MFI clients who use their loan for working capital and they have a business. 2. Hypothesis H0: Islamic Microfinance has impact on Preference based indicators of empowerment H1: Islamic Microfinance has no impact on Preference based indicators of empowerment There are five different dimensions of empowerment: children related decisions; health decisions; economic decisions; social mobility decisions; and major household purchases. This hypothesis empirically test the immediate changes in gender relation brought about by participation in a microcredit program. If the position of the women within the household has improved after taking the loan then power distribution should change across some domains of decision making within the household. 3. Method of Data Analysis To estimates and test hypothesis, we use the class of probit and bi-variate probit models. The endogeinity of treatment in our specification necessitates making the following assumption: Assumption 1 : ignorability treatment Conditional on observed individual characteristic Xi, outcomes (Y0, Y1) are independent of the treatment T. This assumption implies conditional mean independence of outcomes: Assumption 2: stable unit treatment of value assumption Estimation strategy by imposing a linear relationship for conditional mean independence Where: X is the vector of covariates. It covariate has the average value of X at the treated population. 3 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance In this generic heterogeneous treatment effects model we allow both the parameters of slope and intercept term to vary across the outcome regimes. This switching regression model can be reduced to a single equation giving the expected empowerment outcome Y conditional on X, T: Where Y = (1-T) Y0 + TY1 is the observed outcome (equal to Y1 for participants in the treatment group and Y0 for participants in the control group). The Development of the microfinance in Indonesia Indonesia is one of the first countries to develop the commercial microfinance in Asia with regulated financial institutions that provides the bulk of microfinance services throughout the archipelago. In addition to the success of the commercial microfinance providers, Indonesia has also been a favorable ground for the development of numerous subsidized government programs, whether it is local, community-based financial institutions, cooperatives or NGOs (City Foundation, 2009). Indonesian microfinance is supported by a diverse set of institutions, originated from the government, the voluntary sector agencies (both the national and international), the private sector to the bi- and multi-lateral agencies. These institutions may be named as the initiators for the setting up of the microfinance enterprises in Indonesia such as the Pro-FI (the promotion of Small Financial Institutions) project which is supported by the Bank of Indonesia and the German technical assistance agency, GTZ. It aims to improve the operations of two categories of the microfinance providers: the “People’s Credit Banks” (BPR) and some non-bank microfinance institutions, especially the “village Credit Boards” (LPDs) in Bali. PERBARINDO, Permodalan Nasional Madani (PNM), GEMA PKM (Gerakan Bersama Pengembangan Keuangan Mikro Indonesia), GIC (Global Innovation Consulting) and many others have also given high contribution to the development of the microfinance activities which operated by the rural banks as well as the non-bank financial institutions. Table 1 the Formation of the Microfinance in Indonesia Number of Number of Total Financing Bank Worker (Credit) BPR Syariah 160 4,826 4,354,183 BPR Conventional 1,634 74,531,494 Cooperative 203,701 438,541 8,118,959 Conventional Cooperative Syariah 3,038 157,000 Sources: Bank of Indonesia, 2013 and Ministry of Cooperative and SMEs, 2007 Note Oct. 2013 Oct. 2013 Oct.2013 2007 In terms of number, the BPR Syariah and Cooperative Syariah which operation is based on the Islamic teachings own less capital than that of the conventional institutions. While PNM as the state-owned enterprise has a mandate from government to engage in serving more of the SMEs than the micro-enterprises. PNM supports the linkage program between the commercial banks and the BPRs and also between the commercial banks and the nonbank microfinance providers. PNM provides loans to non-bank microfinance providers 4 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance through the regional development banks (BPD) with the saving that is mobilized by the retail microfinance institutions as a unique form of collateral. It has a special brief on the support of Syariah (Islamic) microfinance. Islamic banking is a significant force in the microfinance and financial sectors in Indonesia in terms of the volume of the financial services provided and the number of outlets that provide them. Despite this proliferation of the microfinance service providers, several studies have shown that there is still an unmet demand for the microfinance services as a majority of rural households still do not have access to a source of funds from either a semi-formal or formal institution. Some of them were caused by the regulations and the limited funds as the revolving loans, but some may also be due to the lack of good management inside the institutions. In the case of empowering the poor, a number of studies concluded that microfinance also had a close relation to women’s empowerment (Asim, 2008). However, defining the women’s empowerment is debatable since the term of ‘empowerment’ also relates to the gender system in the country (Wee and Shaheed, 2008). The gender system is a system of constructing and regulating specific standards for males and females as well as the relations between them in terms of the relative hierarchy or the relative equality. If intersecting with other forms of power relations, however, diverse gender systems produce a variety of spaces for women’s initiatives and empowerment which is accompanied by distinctive constraints, diverse sources of support, and dissimilar access to a range of resources. The Women empowerment in the view of Moslem women In this study, we conducted an exploratory approach to obtain the women's perception on the terminology of women empowerment. We conducted Focus Group Discussion three times: first, we discussed with groups of facilitators who have relatively higher levels of education and economics; secondly, we discussed with the members of micro-credit who possesses lower levels of education and economics; thirdly, we discussed with the policy makers on the top of the management level of the zakah management organization. In the first discussion, we had the impression that women in the view of Moslem should follow the Islamic Laws. The taskforce and the position between men and women were different so that they might not carry the same level of responsibility. However, they agreed that women should have the same right in terms of having the ability to convey their opinion as well as being the decision maker in the family. Mrs Aisyah from Amanah group mentioned that “women as mothers hold a more important role than just working in “the kitchen, toilet and bedroom”, and therefore women should be included in the democratic process of the household, particularly in the educational aspect of the children. In my case, although, my husband pays all of the tuition fee of our children schooling, but as a mother my responsibility is to keep everything else on the right track”.1 Similar to Mrs. Aisyah's opinion , Mr. Dasep who is the leader and senior mentor of the group believed that women were better in seeing the future progression of their children as well as in helping their husbands in the decision making process. 1 FGD with mentor of Myskat program in Bandung, 24 April 2014. It was attended by 13 mentors, 7 women and 6 men mentors. 5 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance All of the FGD participants agreed that the women's opinion may be heard by their husbands should the opinion was found to be brilliant enough to help solve the family problem. However, it took only one wrong suggestion for the women to have their opinion disregarded. To be able to come up with brilliant suggestion there were some aspects to be considered, such as education which could be achieved not only from the formal but also from the religious education. When it comes to religious education, the women were expected to possess good moral and be apt to Islamic law that their husband believed in. In other word, women should have extensive knowledge in any matters of live. This means, not only educating them in formal education but also encouraging them to be more active in social events such as following religious or social organizations in their communities. While all of the participants in the focus group discussion tended to view the empowerment to be similar to the equality between men and women, they understand that the process of empowerment and the equality between wife and husband in the family was actually a result of this process. Empowerment is an integrated process among motivators, facilitators and a group of society that requires empowerment through the improvement of knowledge, skills and the provision of amenities as well as the opportunity to reach access to the system of resources in the augmentation of social welfare (Rahima, et.al.; 2013). One of the purposes of microfinance is reducing the number of poor by giving them more access to financial institutions so that they can empower themselves. Self-empowerment is the interaction that enables a person to assume an attitude of empowering his/herself by making good use of “personal potential” in dealing with problems that they faced (Charon, 1979). According to Sumardjo (1999) the characteristic of an empowered individual are: 1. Being able to comprehend herself and her potentials, being able to make planning (to anticipate the change of condition in the future); 2. Being able to direct herself 3. Having the power to negotiate 4. Having the bargaining power to do mutual cooperation and 5. Being responsible of her own action. This indicates that an empowered individual is one who knows, understands, has good motivation and opportunities, makes good use of the opportunities, has the energy, can cooperate, knows a variety of alternatives, can make decisions, dares to take risk, can search for information, and has the ability to act in accordance with the situation. Therefore, the process of empowerment should be done constantly and continuously so that it can lead them to prosperity. In the case of mentors, most of the participants agreed that regardless of any rupiahs given by their husbands, the money should be able to meet all their household's needs. They did not ask their husbands to satisfy their desires for precious goods. However, they emphasized that they could get full empowerment if they could manage their husband's income as well as their own. In other words, the husbands' money should be seen as the wife’s money, however, if the wife can earn some money of their own, this money should be counted as theirs only and their husbands could not control it. Some of them also argued that this argument may not be accepted by all men. Ms. Alifah stated that “there is a time when my husband needs some money from me to pay for something but it is then counted as a loan, and I always remain him to pay his loans”. Debating who had more control of money in the household could be a sensitive subject as mentioned by Ms. Ai who ran her business together with her husband, “If I have more 6 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance money from my own business, I always spend it for the household's needs, and I never think that my husband has a loan from me’. Mr. Dasep, one of the mentors of the Misykat program, had a different view on the subject, “as a husband I have two sources of income, my main income that comes from teaching I give to my wife, but my secondary income from performing as a band member I use for my own necessities. However, I support my wife if she wants to have her own saving from her own income”. We received a different view from another Moslem women's group who did not join the Islamic microfinance. This group had a characteristic of both low levels of education and income. They felt afraid to speak out and share their opinions on women empowerment. They tended to need their husbands' permission to make their own decisions. Some of them mentioned that their husbands' family members, particularly their mother in laws, always interfered with their internal household matters. It seemed that defining women empowerment for them was hard as they held the Islamic law only partially. In the holy Quran, it was mentioned that Men are the women's leaders so that women should be behind the men and therefore should always seek approval of their husbands in every decision making process. This situation, based on their story, conditioned them to be cheaters and have problems with money lenders or loan sharks who charge high interest rate for debts. In Bandung City, there are many money lenders who plunge the poor into even deeper poverty. It can be concluded from the group discussion that the mentoring and the training from Misykat program had affected their view on self empowerment. The model of selfempowerment through strong social capital was maintained well in togetherness which would enable growth in personal spirit leading to more productive individuals which in turns improve competence. Self-empowerment brings implication on positive value for individuals who do the self-empowerment, namely: (a) promoting self-confidence; (b) opening and developing individual’s entrepreneurship; (c) opening job vacancies; (d) facilitating the provision of raw materials; (e) facilitating in obtaining loans; (f) facilitating in marketing because of the wide network; (g) improving work ethics; (h) improving skills/competence; and (i) having creative and innovative traits to reform. The Review on the Islamic Microfinance 1. The Misykat Program of the DPU DT (Dompet Peduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhid) Misykat (Microfinance Masyarakat – Microfinance Based on Community) is one of the programs from Dompet Peduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhid Foundation.2 This program was 2 Wallet Caring Ummah (DPU DT) is a community-owned non-profit organization that is engaged in raising (fundraising) and utilization of zakat (Zakat, Infaq, and Charity) and other funds from the lawful and legal individuals, groups, companies or institutions. It was founded on June 16, 1999 by KH. Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) as part of the Foundation of Daarut-Tauhid with LAZ determination to be trustful, professional and accountable. DPU DT has effectively carried out its activities from June 16, 2000, on the basis of database, where each donor has the number and membership card so their commitment can be measured. From the formal legal aspects, DPU DT is registered as a Zakat Institution by the Government of West Java, dated August 19, 2002. By Decree No.: 451.12/Kep. 846 - YANSOS/2002. DPU DT foundation has also got the attention of the central government, in a short amount of time since the days of its standing and becoming of LAZDA, it has managed to become the National Institute of Amil Zakat, LAZNAS, in accordance with 7 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance originally set up in 2004 but only established four years later. This foundation develops the concept of channeling zakat fund as revolving loan fund rather than simply a charity program. However, some Islamic scholars do not agree with this fund being used for loan as the function of zakah is a social protection and therefore should be directly given to the beneficiaries’ as stated in the Qur’an. In the hope of reducing the poverty rate, this foundation points out that the important thing of zakah utilizations is not only to give the fund to the beneficiaries’, but also to empower them so they can be out of poverty. Utilizing zakah needs high skills, patient, as well as seriousness. The basic concepts that this foundation implemented to its microfinance in regards to reduce poverty rate are: 1. Capital is not everything. Islamic law teach that for the Moslems there is no zakah fund for people who are capable to work, thus anticipate the vulnerable people who fall under the poverty line group, they need assessment to improve their business. Thus, according to this foundation, zakah funds can be used for this purpose. 2. No charity, charity only helps the poor in short time, and in the long run, they will still be poor if there is no effort to empower them to be more economically active. 3. Awareness of their potentials, the first thing to do to help the poor is to see their potentials and optimally developed them. 4. Access to wider market and networking 5. Household management in terms of the economic flow 6. Mentoring, empowerment needs a long process in terms of the planning, monitoring and evaluation, therefore the role of mentors/facilitators is important to determine the success of the program. 7. Urgent need for professional mentors, 8. Takes time and process, not instant 9. Motivation to work While the source of zakah fund is limited, the number of poor people is large. Accordingly, appropriate strategies are needed to cope with the problem. Some implications for this condition are: 1. Charity system do not work properly to alleviate poverty. 2. ZMO (Zakah Management Organization) institutions need to have their own systematical strategy to alleviate poverty. They do not have to fall into populist program. 3. All the empowerment programs will not be able to capture every poor directly in the short time. Therefore, there should be programs that are sustainable conducted with the pilot project in some priority regions. 4. Empowering program should only be seen as a trigger and not as a charity. Then, it should be counseled in the management system from the planning, organizing, staffing to the controlling. 5. Empowering program should stimulate greater access to formal financial institution for the poor. the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 410 of 2004 on October 13, 2004. After becoming LAZNAS, the DPU DT developed a network covering eight cities, namely Jakarta, Bogor, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Lampung and Palembang. It has hundreds of network utilization programs from Sabang to Papua. . 8 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance This shifting paradigm is not easy to be accepted by other Moslems. Therefore, this foundation requires some restriction in the requirement step to select new members. They need high commitment from the members to follow the rule, which they set up based on the Islamic teachings. DPU Daarut Tauhid holds Misykat (community-based microfinance) which provides microcredit to merchants who do not enjoy the economics and spiritual prosperity. The terms and conditions to be a Misykat’s member are: 1. Women with age between 17 and 55 years old, one group consist of at least five people. 2. Each member must live in an area that can be reached on foot and has lived in the area for at least six months. 3. Mandatory responsibility of each member that has to follow the guidance from Daarut Tauhid that holds a meeting once a week. The meeting agenda consists of attending lectures, installment loans, money saving and paying dues to the group. 4. In a group, the business can be heterogeneous or not the same. 5. Prefer members that have already had a business (not starting from zero). Misykat’s type of financing is imposed with the 2-2-1 pattern with the calculation of five people in one group. Two people are given the first capital. If the first installment runs smoothly, then the next two new will be given. So, it will continue on until the last person, who usually is the chairman of the group. This fee is unsecured (non-physical) in the form of the social cohesion or social tolerance. Therefore, when the first two people are given the loaned capital, three others learn to "let go" and oversee the order not the default installment so they can later also be directly given the loaned capital. Since its establishment in 2006, DT Misykat in the capital of Jakarta has given nearly 300 people from a variety of sources of funding of the DPU DT Jakarta, ranging from the charity to the shodaqoh/infaq. In the meantime, friends who want to join as "investors" can transfer fund to the productive account: 9 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Misykat Scheme RECRUITMENT • STAGE I • Survey • Sosialization and • STAGE II • Introducing program to new member • Filling out formulir • • • • • STAGE III Interview candidate Commitee meeting Annoucement group formation MENTORING • New member: saving, muamala, robanniah haouseholds • Mature member: entrepreneurship, financial manajerial • Leader member: management organization, leadershif, and fiqh of zakat utilization FUNDING • First step • Patern 2-2-1 break 2 weeks 2 payment loans • Second step • Patern 2-2-1 break 2 weeks 2 payment loans • Third step • Patern 2-2-1 break 2 weeks 2 payment loans LIPI Figure 1 Misykat Scheme Sources: Dompet Peduli Ummat – DaarutTauhid, 2014 Mrs Alifah, one of the mentors told her story when she joined the microfinance. “The first time I joined this microfinance as a member of a lending group from 2007 to 2010, the group chose me to manage our financial report, and when our leader had a problem that caused her to be fired, I replaced her as the leader as well as the mentor. Before I joined this MFI, I did not have a job, but after I got some entrepreneurship trainings from this MFI for more than four times I tried to open a stall. After four years, I have my own PAUD (Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini – pre-school building) for all the children whose parents are clients of the MFI”. Another story was told by Ms. Ai who mentioned that before joining Miyskat, she was one of the boards of “Warna Sari” a group which funded by the Indonesian government under BKKBN (The National Board for Family Planning). The government gave them fund for approximately 30 members. This program, however, only lends money and they have regular meetings once in two or three months. In reality, the members were quite indiscipline in terms of paying the loan and following the group's rules. If there was a margin or profit from their businesses, they used it to develop their own organization. This model is different from the Misykat program. According to her, each member has responsibilities to attend weekly meeting and recitation. They also should have a saving which is mandatory as well as voluntarily. This program also offers a saving plan which is useful to cover any unexpected or large expenses such as house leasing, school tuition fee, or other big plans for their own investments. The mentor should encourage the members to save their money before spending it for their daily lives. Ms. Lia also added some information on how Misykat program can empower the members through micro credit. “There are some differences of lending process between other microfinance and the Misykat program by DPU DT. If we lend from cooperative (other microfinance), we just pay the installment and the interest rate. In Misykat program, there is weekly gathering as well as the mentoring program for the lenders to manage their income 10 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance so that they can save their money and use it more appropriately. Members also learn more about understanding a contract. 2. The Zakah Utilizations Program of Baznas Simply relying on the government's budget without having private partners to alleviate poverty hardly works to reach the MDG’s goal. Poverty eradication should not only be the government's responsibility, but also all element and entities in the country. BAZNAS is one of the alternatives to get funding for the poverty alleviation from the private as well as the community. Zakah management has undergone some significant changes since the enactment of the Act No. 23 of 2011. This new Act mandated a stronger integration of zakah management in the country. In accordance to this Act, Badan Amil Zakah Nasional (Baznas) comprises three elements; Islamic scholars, professional, and Islamic community leaders. Eight of them should be from the community while the 3 of them come from the government. In addition, the Presidential decree no 14/2014 has completed the implementation of this law. However, the enactment of this law has caused a controversy since it has stipulated that the zakat management and the public is only allowed to participate with the government authorization. According to Saidurahman (2013), it also stipulated that the alms management be carried out by BAZNAS's operating hierarchy from the central to the regional levels. This stipulation seemed to limit the number of zakat management organizations. It can be said that through this law, the government needs to strengthen the zakat management in order to mobilize its full potential, on the other hand, the government intends to also control the zakat management. In 2013 Zakah fund has been collected by BAZNAS in West Java Province for approximately 88% and the rest (12%) is from non zakah fund (Alms) such as infaq and sadaqah. This fund increased dramatically from the previous year. According to the board, they just collect “Zakah Profession” rather than “Zakat Maal” from the civil servants. Every month more than US$ 40.000 is collected. Zakat Collection NON ZAKAT 12% ZAKAT 88% Figure 2 The Zakah Collection By BAZNAS West Java Province 2013 Sources: Baznas West Java, 2013 11 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance In its operation, Zakah disbursement is allocated for activities which supports economic programs such as small enterprise empowerment. The disbursement can be done directly by the Unit Pengumpulan Zakah (UPZ-Zakah Distribution Unit) which is available in every counter of Baznas or UPZ partner. This economic program has been planned systematically in order to ensure that the benefits of this empowerment are not only individuals but also for their community. It can hopefully encourage the community development initiated by Baznas, its partners and the community. 120,000,000,000 100,000,000,000 80,000,000,000 60,000,000,000 40,000,000,000 20,000,000,000 education health economic social dakwah Figure 3 Zakat disbursement and Utilization from BAZNAS West Java Province 2013 Sources: Baznas West Java Province, 2013 In regards to the disbursement of the Zakah system, Baznas has been using three models to achieve its economic goals. The zero-level-channel, aims for direct empowerment through mustahik; The two-level-channel, uses coordinators to oversee the turnover of the mustahik; The three-level-channel, welcomes the involvement of the third parties and other coordinators. Even when the recipient of Zakah is an individual, the usage of the money should not only be for consumption. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) taught us to distribute Zakah for productive activities that in turn would be advantageous not only for the mustahik but also for the community. This is in accordance with the main purpose of Zakah allocation which is to eradicate poverty. There have been some success stories in generating fund to alleviate poverty using Zakah fund for the empowerment of the small-scale enterprises based on local initiative3 Which for the Indonesian case, the disbursement of zakah is more likely to follow the same patterns. 3 Again, Zakah revenue can be spent for raising the productivity of the poor. Such as financing various development projects in education, health care, safe-water and other social welfare activities, designed exclusively for the benefit of the poor. It is expected that this program can create a multiplier effect for the poor welfare. However, it is intuitively plausible that an increase in income from Zakah investment is expected to have a multiplier that is larger in size than an increase in income from non-Zakah funds investment. It is due to the fact that in addition to the leakage of the saving, some portion of income at the successive rounds of income and spending would be 12 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance The Statistical Analysis 1. The Descriptive Analysis The survey was carried out by a team of four female surveyors and was headed by the author for the supervision during the implementation phase. This research was conducted in the west and the south city of Bandung. The Surveyors were assigned to certain local areas and given a one day training to familiarize themselves with the questionnaire. These surveyors had had prior experience of field work and their experience of the location helped us in hunting down the sampled clients including the drop out ones. Any problems that occurred and identified would result to the questionnaire being dropped with feedback given by the surveyor to ensure quality control. Once the data collection was completed, the data was processed into the computer by a team of four individuals including the author herself. The data consistency was checked at all three stages including the collection, the processing and the analysis. Table 2 presents the characteristic of the respondents, most of them are married women with age between 41 and more than 50 years old. In terms of the highest education level, the proportion of all respondents is less educated with more than 70% of the respondents graduated from elementary and junior high schools. Their monthly earning was only less than US$ 300. Table 2 The Characteristic of the Respondents Characteristic Marital Status a. b. Education a. b. c. Age a. b. c. d. Income a. b. c. d. Sources: Survey, 2014 Proportion (%) Married = 91.67% Widowed = 8.33% Elementary school =49.30% Junior high school = 25.35% Senior high school = 25.35% 21 – 30 years old = 2.78% 31- 40 years old =27.78% 41 – 50 years old = 34.72% > 50 years old = 34.72% <US$ 100/month = 21.13% >US$ 100 – US$ 200 = 36.62% >US$ 200 – US$ 300 = 29.57% >US$ 300 – US$ 1000 = 12.68% Table 3 summarizes the entire exogenous and endogenous variables used in the oprobit, and biprobit regressions. Table 4 Provides the summary statistic for the preference related indicator of the empowerment. Table 5 summarizes the autonomy based indicator of the empowerment. siphoned off by other leakages such as taxes, and imports, mostly in the case of the income of the rich (Mannan, 2000) 13 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Table 3 The Summary statistic: The Explanatory Variable from the Household Data Set Variable Name Endogenous Variable Treatment Dummy Exogenous Variables Age of Respondent Schooling of Respondent Children Age difference Joint Family First Utilization by respondent Working female before loan Interaction Term Institution*Treatment Definition 0 – 1 Dummy Variable: =1 if the client registered with MFI before December 2013; =0 for clients registering in/after January 2014. Reported age of respondent confirmed by observation Number of years of schooling completed by the respondent Number of total children of the respondent Difference between the reported ages of husband and wife 0-1 Dummy Variable, =1 if the respondent lives with the parents of her husband; = 0 otherwise 0-1 Dummy Variable, =1 if the first loan taken from MFI was utilized by respondent herself; = 0 otherwise 0-1 Dummy Variable, =1 if the respondent was a working women prior to taking loan; = 0 otherwise 0-1 Dummy Variable, =1 if the respondent is a member of DPU-DT; = 0 if the respondent is a member of BAZ Number of Observation *Standard Deviation in parenthesis Treatment Group Mean and SD .5548387 (.4985946) Control Group Mean and SD 46.39535 (10.91602) 8.05814 (2.536114) 2.081395 (1.356597) 3.965116 (3.637865) .3372093 (.4755298) 43.55072 (9.535593) 7.594203 (2.528187) 2.086957 (1.094628) 4.449275 (4.009314) .3043478 (.4635016) .5813953 (.4962238) .3768116 (.4881372) .627907 (.486198) .3333333 (.4748581) .8604651 (.3485361) .6811594 (.4694413) 144 96 Sources: Survey, 2014 Most of the variables are self-explanatory; only a few need further explanation. In table 3 the two exogenous variables: ‘working female before loan’ and ‘first utilization by respondents’ need some clarification. Working female before loan is a dummy variable constructed by assigning ‘1’ to all the women who had a working status before taking the loan, this will not be influenced by intervention. This variable serves as an exogenous proxy for the initial endowment of empowerment. The choice of this proxy is motivated from an economic theory, where one of the routes identified for early empowerment is through access to independent income. As a natural extension, we argue that by controlling the women who were working prior to taking a loan we can capture most of the unobserved heterogeneity between the incoming borrowers and those who took the loan at an earlier date. Likewise, the dummy for the ‘first loan utilized by the respondents’ 14 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance captures whether they were already empowered at the time of taking the loan and acted as another exogenous proxy by controlling the levels of the initial empowerment. It can be seen in table 4 that there is a significant drop in the number of observations available for each indicator both in the treatment and the control group. The observations on widowed women were dropped from the analysis. Also, some of the questions were inapplicable to those women who had not yet been required to make decisions. For instance, women having young children did not know whether their preferences would be reflected in their children's marriages. In such cases the observation was dropped. Nevertheless, for most of the variables there were enough observations in the control and the treatment groups which allowed for a meaningful estimation, except for the decision regarding the children's marriages. Hence, the question regarding the children's marriages was dropped from the final analysis. Table 4 Summary Statistic: The Outcome Indicators – ‘Say’ in HH Decision Making: The Ordinal Development Variable (1-5) Treatment N Control Group N t-stat for Dependent Variable Group Mean Mean and SD difference in and SD means 4.670588 108 3.898551 78 -3.5289** Boy’s schooling decision (1.039554) (1.655161) 4.639535 132 4.347826 88 -1.5499 Girl’s schooling decision (1.105205) (1.234624) 3.895349 98 3.869565 40 -0.0954 Children Marriage (1.735641) (1.589608) decision 4.918605 120 4.594203 78 -3.0317** Children Medical Care (.3824108) (.896379) 4.837209 108 4.608696 78 -1.7137* Family Planning Decision (.7492815) (.9110012) 4.94186 132 4.565217 88 -3.4051** Respondent Medical Care (.3549532) (.9467943) 4.872093 132 4.521739 88 -2.9116** Social visits to women’s (.454947) (.9942289) families 4.744186 96 4.521739 69 -1.5974 Social visit in husband’s (.7225127) (1.008912) families 4.313953 98 4.072464 69 -1.0250 Social visit in (1.408058) (1.517727) neighborhood 4.697674 120 4.362319 80 -2.0677** Work for earned income (.8686672) (1.150077) 4.953488 120 4.434783 80 -4.3635** Borrow money from MFI (.2118255) (1.077555) 4.825581 120 4.565217 80 -2.2371* Purchase of HH assets (.4650581) (.9467943) 4.790698 120 4.463768 80 -2.3093* Decision about House (.6706674) (1.078939) Repair 4.72093 120 4.376812 80 -1.9994* Sale/purchase house (.8765059) (1.261435) *All the dependent ordinal variables measure the extent to which women’s preferences are reflected in decision making process; 5 indicating that her preferences are never reflected in these decisions while 1 indicates that her preferences are always taken into account s. **Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Sources: Survey, 2014 15 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Moreover, it is important to note that the difference in the unconditional mean across the control and the treatment groups comes out to be negative for all the variables such as child related, health and social mobility decisions as reported in the table 4 and 5. The pattern in the data gives some credence to our earlier conjecture that power distribution is not different across various domains of the household decisions. In other words, the basic statistics suggests that microcredit might be important to reduce the level of the power coefficient in the household decision making. Table 5 Summary Statistic: The Outcome Indicators –‘Autonomy’ in HH Decision Making: The Dichotomous Dependent Variable (0/1) The Estimation Results Dependent Variable Purchasing Ice-cream for Children Purchasing Grocery/fruits Treatment Group Mean and SD N Control Group Mean and SD N t-stat for difference in means -1.1107 .9767442 86 .942029 69 (.1515989) (.2354007) .9534884 86 .8985507 69 -1.3228 (.2118255) (.3041346) Purchasing Medicine for .9767442 86 .8550725 69 -2.8732** herself (.1515989) (.3546068) Purchasing clothes/cosmetics .9186047 86 .826087 69 -1.7515* for herself (.2750451) (.3818115) Purchasing books/uniform for .872093 86 .6666667 69 -3.1491** children (.3359451) (.4748581) Purchasing furniture .627907 86 .5652174 69 -0.7882 (.486198) (.4993602) Purchasing refrigerator/TV .3023256 86 .1884058 69 -1.6277* (.4619592) (.3939006) Sale/purchase of personal .3372093 86 .1449275 69 -2.7925** assets (jewellery) (.4755298) (.3546068) Taking a child to a doctor .2093023 86 .1323529 69 -1.2452 (.4091966) (.3413936) *all the dependent binary variables measure whether the women requires someone’s permission in making the decision. ‘1’ indicates that she does require someone’s permission in the HH while ‘0’ indicates complete autonomy in decision making. ** standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis Sources: Survey, 2014 This section uses nine ordinal dependent variables as summarized in the table 4 to test whether the participation in the microcredit program had increased the extent to which the women’s preference were taken into consideration in various domains of household decisions. the ordinal dependent variables take a value on an increasing scale of 1 to 5 where the lower end of scale indicates virtually no ’say’ in decision making while higher end values indicate full recognition of her ‘voice’ in the household decisions. The dependent variables span five broad categories of household decisions regarding children, economics, health, social mobility and resources allocation that were sufficient to indicate the extent of women’s centrality within the household. 16 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance 2. Testing Hypotheses The results from ordered probit regression are reported in the table 6-9. The result are grouped in five different dimensions of empowerment: children related decision; health decision; economic decision4 ; social mobility decision; and major household purchases. The prefered regression is regression (1) in the table 6-9. It uses proxies including a dummy for ‘working women before taking a loan’ and a dummy for self utilization of first loan by respondents. Both these proxies seek to control potential endogeneity stemming from the initial differences between the control and the treatment groups. The regression (2) adds an interaction term of institution dummy interacted with the treatment dummy to control any unobserved institutional differences between the treated units of the participating institution.5 Table 6 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment ‘Say’ in child Related Decision Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on: Independent Variables Treatment Dummy Age difference with husband Age of respondent Education Number of Children Joint family First Utilization by respondent Working female before loan Interaction Term Number of Observation Pseudo R-Squared 2 Chi Statistic Log likelihood 1 -4.82558 2 -4.81483 1 -4.01316 2 -4.13561 Child’s Medical Care Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.133813 -.094100 -.038100 -.047343 .052351 .0626757 .033566 .0303593 .005564 .0340026 .2529663** 4.58502 .001752 .0346214 .2465285** 4.624978 -.002490 -.084092 .097062 4.49178 .0021591 -.078312 .1074353 4.57228 -.021426 -.057577 -.016942 -.227390 -.023881 -.059423 -.022789 -.237595 .8216936** .795852** .3179571 .3829298 1.00797 .9991379 .8216936 .1122615 .0661656 .0746215 -.128941 -.151093 155 0.1215 0.3324 -32.95852 .2971111 85 0.1382 0.3215 -32.8160 155 0.0737 0.7076 -34.2916 -.386793 86 0.0789 0.7553 -34.0981 155 0.1389 0.6478 -18.5807 .1151546 86 0.1395 0.7377 -18.570 Boy’s Schooling Oprobit Coefficients Girl’s Schooling Oprobit Coefficients Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Sources: Survey, 2014 4 Household and economic decisions are both reported in the table 8 for spatial convenience Note that the experiment design constraintned by the dynamics on the ground as outlined in the sampling framework precludes the use of simple institutional dummy to capture fixed effect. 5 17 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Table 7 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment ‘Say’ in Health and Economic Decision Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on: Medical Check Up Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 4.844224 Treatment Dummy 6.591975 -.040884 Age difference with husband -.0272978 -.015405 Age of respondent -.0719173 -.1022231 Education .0649423 .1263963 Number of Children -.1438596 -.7379897 Joint family -.0719495 .0389189 First Utilization by respondent -.0139065 .6674733 Working female before loan .2313231 Interaction Term 2.688104* 155 Number of Observation 86 0.1655 Pseudo R-Squared 0.2483 2 0.4914 Chi Statistic 0.5943 -18.728171 -11.217673 Log likelihood Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis Independent Variables Family Planning Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.4887809 5.019463 -.0271348 -.0385695 .003076 -.0239426 -.0415296 -.0916436 .3748481 -.1012836 -.2429177 -.495065 .143611 -.3547715 .055649 .6911719 .9053429 155 86 0.0553 0.1768 0.7789 0.5405 -47.867172 -18.472607 Working for Earned Income Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.7847578 -.4531279 -.0042969 -.0146573 .0234619 -.008274 -.0971106 -.0358653 .0759002 .0686888 -.2509616 -.1083243 -.2286697 .1852644 .1594682 .5799223 .2145065 .0408157 155 86 0.0705 0.0350 0.4497 0.9354 -58.438835 -49.763737 Borrowing Money from MFI Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.4490239 -4.321536 -.0178478 .0430218 .0087026 .0172373 -.0507903 -.042819 .1472656 -.1004129 -.1831991 -.0984602 -.358488 .2587404 -.1006922 4.644496 .4208851 .0960044 155 86 0.0507 0.1789 0.7333 0.7609 -56.791199 -13.283674 *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Sources: Survey, 2014 18 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Table 8 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment; ‘Say’ in HER Social Mobility Decision Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on: Independent Variables Treatment Dummy Age difference with husband Age of respondent Education Number of Children Joint family First Utilization by respondent Working female before loan Interaction Term Number of Observation Pseudo RSquared 2 Chi Statistic Log likelihood Social Visits to Women’s Family Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.9592319 1.364555 Social Visits to Man’s Family Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -1.20225* .2355147 Social Visits in Neighbourhood Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 .0094279 -.145479 .0350032 -.1307885** .0234244 -.0322655 -.001521 .0401171 .0301659 .0202196 -.0457297* .024017 .0178261 .0307801 -.0127902 -.0433653 .0196767 .0832972 .0002321 -.025389 .1226517 .3412289* .3416545* -.2049735* .0345707 .1594491 .2068361 -1.030494 .1608763 .2394649 -.2942929 -.7194185 -.2361006 .3307036 -.2456633 -.3812406 .0257825 -.5268271 .1886047 -.0625136 .3173985 .2414786 .0340297 .4231851 .7225997 .1997865 .0178061 155 86 155 86 155 86 0.0693 0.1546 0.0820 0.0460 0.0381 0.0749 0.5680 -51.454678 0.3466 -27.47594 0.4162 -51.66077 0.8646 -48.142996 0.8084 -66.80892 0.3675 -60.498157 Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Table 9 Ordered Probit Estimates of Women’s Empowerment: ‘Say’ in Sale/Purchase of HH Assets Decision Women’s opinion taken into consideration in household decisions on: Independent Variables Treatment Dummy Age difference with husband Age of respondent Education Number of Children Joint family First Utilization by respondent Working female before loan Interaction Term Number of Observation Purchase HH Assets Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.730150 -.336199 -.010226 .0196507 .0282308 -.052331* -.116767 .0631836 2525069 .1120729 -.55551 .6224147 House Repair Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.9482864 .0763931 -.0037228 -.0135122 .0123852 -.042357* Sale/Purchase House Oprobit Coefficients 1 2 -.2572196 -.623578 .0314706 .0241185 .0234785 -.021130 -.14466* -.1009398 -.1175352 .0048526 .4414575* .2295004 .4352295* .259426 -.4056291 -.8610494 -.4269948 -.037896 .1043397 .4277972 -.4560298 .448004 -.3934748 .2704221 -.121362 .5310206 .1667079 86 .2117244 .4693008 .8346708* 86 .0910417 .6571657 -.290977 86 155 155 155 19 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance Pseudo R-Squared 2 Chi Statistic Log likelihood 0.1009 0.2691 -49.4414 0.1745 0.1230 -33.0607 0.1168 0.1123 -54.0324 0.1612 0.1498 -34.5944 0.1101 0.1541 -53.3093 0.0782 0.6755 -39.0767 Standard deviation are reported in the parenthesis *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Sources: Survey, 2014 The estimated effect of the treatment on the indicators of empowerment varies across these five dimensions. For the decision relating to children particularly the treatment effect which is statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level for both spesifications. Most decision of boy’s scholing is affected by the number of children and the first utilization of loan by respondents. But, the cooeficient doesn't have much of a difference between the first and the second models of regression. Therefore, it can be concluded that the preference of empowerment related to the decision on children between the mature and the new clients is not affected by their participation in such microfinance. Turning to the health and economic decisions, we strongly find the positive and the significant effect of the treatment only for the variable ‘respondents' medical checkup’ at the 90% of the confidence interval. But for other variable dependents, the effect of the participation in the microfinance is insignificant. Similarly, for the major household decisions such as purchasing household asset, households repairs and sale or purchase of house, the treatment effect only significant for the households repair variable, but not for other variables. Concluding Remark Islamic microfinance has grown rapidly as one of tool to alleviate poverty particularly in urban area of Indonesia. Zakah, Infaq and shadaqoh utilization has been utilized as one of microfinance resources fund, although it is debatable between Islamic scholar and Uelama. In our analysis, private institution management (DPU-Daarut Tauhid) tend to use combination of zakah, infaq and shadaqah as financing of microfinance institutions. However, the use those resources are different purpose and proportion. However, government institution (BAZNAS) has strictly do not use zakah fund for microcredit funding, but they tend to use infaq and shadaqah fund as microcredit fund. Statistical evidence found that microfinance has no great impact to improve the preference of Muslim women empowerment in urban area of Bandung city. The estimated effect of the treatment on the indicators of empowerment varies across these five dimensions. For the decision relating to children particularly the treatment effect which is statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level for both spesifications. Most decision of boy’s scholing is affected by the number of children and the first utilization of loan by respondents. But, the cooeficient doesn't have much of a difference between the first and the second models of regression. Therefore, it can be concluded that the preference of empowerment related to the decision on children between the mature and the new clients is not affected by their participation in such microfinance. Turning to the health and economic decisions, we strongly find the positive and the significant effect of the treatment only for the variable ‘respondents' medical checkup’ at the 90% of the confidence interval. But for other variable dependents, the effect of the participation in the microfinance is insignificant. Similarly, for the major household decisions such as purchasing 20 10th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance household asset, households repairs and sale or purchase of house, the treatment effect only significant for the households repair variable, but not for other variables. REFERENCE Ahmad, Z. (2000). ‘Comment’.in IA Imtiazi, MA Mannan, MA Niaz and AH Deria (eds). Management of zakah in modern Muslim society.(2ndedn). Jeddah: Saudi Arabia. Ahmed, H. (2004). ‘The role of zakah and awqaf in poverty alleviation’.Islamic Research and Training Institute. Occasional paper no.8.Jeddah: Saudi Arabia. Ashe, J. and L. Parrott (2001). 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