Countering Violent Extremism: Leveraging

Qatar International Academy for
Security Studies (QIASS)
Countering Violent
Extremism: Leveraging
Terrorist Dropouts to
Counter Violent
Extremism in Southeast
Asia
January 2013
Phase II: Volume II
Additional information is available on the QIASS
website at www.qiass.org
This Report is the property of
The Qatar International Academy for Security Studies
Leveraging Terrorist Dropouts to
Counter Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia
By Susan Sim !
Visiting Scholar, Qatar International Academy for Security Studies
Introduction
What I explain in this book is not with the intention of dropping my friends into a
mire of sorts, but has as its purpose the purpose of informing and giving insight to
the community. I do not have the heart to see the Islamic community grasping at
information that is sullied and malicious, let alone information that is deviated. … It
is sufficient that we confront the enemies of Islam who endeavor to lead the Islamic
community astray, and that we as Muslims do not depart from the Islamic community.
My other purpose in writing this book is to mutually remind Muslims, with the hope
that those friends who are involved in bombing actions away from the field of battle
or who have the desire and planning for such, to desist and cease from actions, which
to the best of my knowledge are actions that are encompassed within the bounds of
the classification known as earthly destruction. There are no physical actions I can
undertake to bring about a stop to their bombing operations except by means of my
tongue, which it is hoped will be able to open the inner hearts of those Muslim
friends. Remembering the statement of the Messenger of Allah who commanded his
companions to assist people who behaved cruelly by means of putting a halt to their
cruel acts. (Emphases added.)
Nasir Abas
Inside Jamaah Islamiyah: A Former Member’s True Story
Jakarta, October 2011
With this introduction to his memoir, former Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) leader Nasir
Abas suggests that he is carrying out both counter-radicalization within the Islamic
community at large and deradicalization of violent extremists.
The former Amir of JI’s Mantiqi III, a region encompassing Borneo island, Sulawesi,
and the Southern Philippines, his memoir was a best-seller in Indonesia when the
original Indonesian-language version first appeared in 2005. He was not the first JI
leader to write an account of life inside what is generally considered Southeast Asia’s
most deadly terrorist group. But he was the first defector to publicly denounce its use
of violence.

Susan Sim is Vice-President for Asia of The Soufan Group. She is also a Consultant and Adjunct
Lecturer at the Home Team Academy of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, and Associate
Fellow of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

There are various spellings, the most popular of which are Jemaah Islamiyah (used in the Singapore
White Paper) and Jemaah Islamiya (used by the US National Counterterrorism Center). For
convenience, this paper uses Jamaah Islamiyah, as spelled by the terrorist dropouts discussed here. The
group’s full name, Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah, means “Islamic congregation” in Arabic.
1
Figure 1. Covers of memoirs by Ali Imron and Nasir Abas.
Since then, Ali Imron, another Afghan mujahidin veteran, now in prison for building
a bomb used in the 2002 Bali bombing, has also written a memoir denouncing the
attack. Calling himself a country boy who became a militant, he minces no words
about his role, calling the book Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, or Ali Imron the Bomber
(Jakarta, 2007).
Nasir Abas and Ali Imron are the poster boys of the Indonesian police’s terrorist
disengagement program, which began with the arrest of Ali Imron in January 2003.
Nasir Abas was arrested three months later.
Despite the rising recidivism rate and criticisms of the program as insufficiently
rigorous, Detachment 88, the elite police counterterrorism unit, has since also
convinced another ideologue, Medan-based Khairul Ghazali, to write two
monographs that undercut the religious justifications used by terrorists to sanction
their use of violence. Ghazali is serving a five-year prison term for involvement in a
Medan bank robbery in 2010 to finance jihadi actions. The robbers were his students.
Umar Patek, another terrorist leader convicted of involvement in the Bali bombings in
2002, shed tears as he begged a Jakarta court for forgiveness in June 2012. How did
the Indonesian police convince a militant who trained and fought in Afghanistan and
the southern Philippines, who escaped arrest for nine years despite a bounty of $1
million offered by the United States, to express remorse in public for the killing of
innocents? The Umar Patek flip offers practitioners interesting insights into how to
persuade hardcore radicals to abandon their cause.
But perhaps the more salient question for policymakers is, to what avail? What use
are such books or tears in stopping terrorism?
2
From GWOT to CVE
In recent years, as attention has focused on understanding the processes of terrorist
recruitment and radicalization, policymakers have also begun to focus on the
processes of disengagement and deradicalization. What will it take to encourage
extremists to walk away from their groups and give up violence as a modus operandi?
The two processes are not always the same; nor does one follow the other. Where
terrorists have been captured and will eventually have to be released after a period of
imprisonment, more than a dozen governments have been experimenting with
disengagement programs that they call terrorist deradicalization or rehabilitation. As
Horgan and Altier (2012) note, they each have “their own distinctive titles, and that
proved to be a clue as to their context-specific expectations for what constituted
success.”1
Some of these programs have led to wider efforts to counter ideological extremism at
the community level. More than winning hearts and minds, policymakers are
increasingly concerned about disrupting, or providing an alternative narrative for,
those setting out on the path toward violence. Are there effective interventions that
communities or governments can undertake in order to dissuade a young person from
considering violence or from joining a terrorist group?
This shift in strategic analysis is reflected in the change of nomenclature. From the
controversial Global War on Terror (GWOT), we now worry about Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE).
CVE does not replace “catch or kill,” but it calls for intervention processes that
encompass the various phases of the radicalization trajectory, starting with inoculation
of the target recruitment pool, rebuttal or deterrence to discourage radicals from
engaging in violent action, and rehabilitation of captured violent actors.
In other words, CVE is about preventing and reversing radicalization.
A key component of CVE is identifying the types of extremist narratives that attract
recruits and contribute to their radicalization. It is not always clear why an individual
accepts the narratives, but terrorist recruiters like Ali Imron can articulate them in
everyday terms. In the passage below on practicing jihad, Imron explains his decision
to participate in the Bali bombings.
1
John Horgan and Mary Beth Altier, “The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs,” Conflict
& Security, Summer/Fall 2012.
3
From Ali Imron Sang Pengebom: “Why I Bombed”
The majority of people look at the bombings as acts of cruelty and brutality, barbaric, inhumane,
and so on. Then why should I be one of the actors involved in such actions? Below I will put
forward some of the reasons that led me to be involved with the [Bali] action. My reasons are:
1.
Lack of satisfaction with the current government
The main reasons for not being satisfied with the government are:
a.
The absence of Imamah
Imamah is the control center of the Islamic State that govern all aspects of life related to the
state of religion and the world. Because Muslims do not have Imamah, various problems will
arise ….
b.
The Syariat of Allah is not enforced thoroughly …
The absence of Imamah and Sharia has become a main cause for a country not to be blessed.
That makes Indonesia incapable of resolving multi-dimensional issues. One of them is the issue
of security. The citizens do not feel safe anywhere in the motherland. They are not safe from
crimes.
With the bombings that we did, the hope was that there would be a big revolution in Indonesia that
would send a message to build Imamah and to enforce Sharia thoroughly. At the least it would be
a lesson to the government to manage this country better than before.
2.
Rampant destruction
Destruction of morals, the economy, and the social and cultural fabric has affected the world,
including Indonesia, where Islam is the majority religion. The destruction occurred in two ways:
a. Destruction of faith and thought …
b. Destruction of morals …
[His list includes the government wasting its mandate, the majority of the people
following non-Islamic culture, promiscuity, prostitution, adultery, haram food and
beverages (including illicit drugs), murders and persecution, rape, robbery and fraud,
thuggery, gambling, entertainment and music, dressing in Western style).
3.
A hope of jihad fi sabilillah (in the way of Allah) being opened
Jihad is a war purely to enforce Allah’s word, to diminish the polytheistic, to protect Islam and
Muslims, enforce and protect the Islamic nation, widen Islamic power, protect and defend the all
Muslims territories, and spread kindness and the truth.
The multidimensional crisis in Indonesia has become worse, even though Islamic organizations,
religious schools, and mosques are numerous and the number of preachers and Islamic teachers is
large. All of them have the same mission and ambition, but cruelty has become rampant, and thus
the morals of this country are very poor.
It seemed that there was no effective way to effect change and to stop all the destruction except to
wage jihad—a war between good and evil. When there is a war between good and evil, sinners will
be afraid of the swords of the mujahidin. Thus, cruelty will be demolished gradually.
My involvement with bombing has a personal purpose and hope. We bomb those whom we think of
as the enemy and also in order to fulfill the obligation of jihad for Allah. Allah will show the way
to open the battlefield between Muslims and Kafirs [non-believers]. On the battlefield, it will be
seen who is good and who is evil. This will make it easier to demolish cruelty and other crimes.
With jihad it will be easier to resolve multidimensional issues in this country.
4.
To carry out the duty of jihad
5. Jihad fi sabilillah is a pure war which is ordered by Allah. I always pray to be given the ability
and opportunities to carry out my obligation to do jihad. While waiting for these opportunities,
4
Hambali came with the idea and program to bomb churches in 2000, while Ali Ghufron came with
the idea of the Bali Bombing in 2002. In my opinion there were still doubts as to whether these acts
were permissible. However at that time I agreed because I believed in those who brought the ideas. I
thought those bombings were jihad planned by Jamaah through which the truth is guaranteed. By
involving myself in those bombings, I was carrying out my obligation to do jihad in Allah’s path.
6.
5. To seek revenge against Kafirs
The ruthlessness of Zionist Israel towards Palestine, of the Somalia war, the Czech war, the Kashmir
war, the Moro war, the Ambon [Maluku island] riots, the Poso [Central Sulawesi] riots, and other
acts which are carried out by non-Muslims towards Muslims, have become the basis for our seeking
revenge. The church bombing [in Bali] is revenge against Christians because of the riots in Ambon
and Poso. The Bali bombing was revenge against America and its allies for attacking Muslims in
Afghanistan and Somalia. We believe that America is allied to Israel to fight the Palestinians. That
is why I followed when Hambali and Ali Ghufron came with ideas of bombing the churches and Bali.
Ali Imron’s rationale for participating in attacks on churches and pubs in Indonesia is
drawn from the Salafi Jihadi ideology that JI embraced and perpetuated: that jihad (by
which adherents mean physical battle, or qital) against Islam’s enemies is the most
important means of establishing Islamic law and restoring Islam to its former glory,
reached during the time of the Prophet’s companions. Creating an Islamic state in
Indonesia through the sword is but the first step toward a global caliphate.
Broken down into its key elements, Ali Imron’s list hits all the buttons that we now
know terrorist ideologues press, to varying degrees and in different combinations, to
recruit and radicalize:
•
•
•
•
The political narrative, in which the West (along with Israel and other allies)
is seen as controlling the world and threatening the existence of Islam.
The moral narrative that emphasizes the decay of Western societies.
The religious arguments that sanction the use of violence against enemies of
Islam and obliges good Muslims to wage jihad to restore the glory of Islam.
The social, heroic narrative that plays on the need of disaffected individuals to
make a difference by acting in solidarity with oppressed Muslims and
avenging wrongs to the community.2
If these are the extremist messages that recruiters learn to deliver, might a former
messenger be well-placed to help us craft effective counternarratives? And could he
also be a credible advocate against violent extremism?
Delivering Alternative Narratives
That credibility appears to be what Detachment 88 hoped to leverage when it decided
to provide former terrorist leaders Nasir Abas and Ali Imron with a platform to repent
for their past actions. The Indonesian police reasoned that JI members are more likely
See Eelco J.A.M. Kessels, Introduction to Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (The Hague:
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, July 2010).
2
5
to listen to their seniors, whom they respect, than to a government they considered
apostate. And Nasir Abas and Ali Imron have delivered, speaking out against the
violence wrought by the Bali bombing.
The problem is that, while both former terrorists reject violence directed at civilians,
they do not reject violence per se. They are candid in admitting that their regrets are
for tactical errors committed by JI, not for having been members of JI. They still
believe that they have a duty to kill American, Israeli, and Russian soldiers involved
in fighting Muslims. The difference is that now, having learned from their mistakes,
they will be better prepared and attack only from a position of strength.
In an interview with the QIASS CVE I team in August 2010, the affable Nasir Abas
boasted that he “could have planned operations any time”: “I had more weapons and
better-trained men than [JI leader] Hambali, and I know all the routes from the
Philippines to Malaysia to Indonesia.”3 He still regrets not having better prepared his
JI subordinates to fight Filipino soldiers in Mindanao. Asked what his greatest regret
was in a follow-up interview with the QIASS CVE II team in November 2011, he
said:
If I had to do it again, I would make a plan, prepare special forces and train
them in fighting against the troops. I would recruit many more people. This is
my greatest regret as, at that time, I saw myself as a warrior, a Muslim
warrior.
True to his new role, Abas hastened to add: “Only after capture did I see the light. But
I never used operations against civilians.”4
The JI doctrine of jihad qital, or jihad as battle, is still intrinsic to the group’s belief
systems, but they now place constraints on, say, suicide bombing. Or, as Ali Imron
says in “A Message to My Friends” at the beginning of his memoir:
Do not easily allow suicide and influence others to commit suicide because if
the action is wrong then you will bear the sin of suicide. And don’t let the
young guys be influenced by others [who are] willing to commit suicide by
bombing in a state of no war and in any place. Suicide bombing is [only]
permissible in war and when there is no other option available.
One might conclude that the Indonesian police, in using Abas and Imron, is buying
street cred to tell local extremists this – just not at home.
Even then, it is a message that is being drowned out by an increasingly radical fringe
that is shopping not so much for fatwas as for leaders prepared to tell them the next
target to bomb. In 2012 alone, there have been fourteen terrorist incidents in
Indonesia, and dozens arrested. None of the incidents was on the scale of the Bali
bombings, but a third of them targeted police officers. Compared to JI, these new
terrorists have virtually no training; inexperienced students of former JI bombmakers, supplemented by Internet recipes, hurriedly teach them bomb-making skills.
3
4
Interview with QIASS CVE I team, Jakarta, August 28, 2010.
Interview with QIASS CVE II team, Jakarta, November 3, 2011.
6
They also do not have the respect for seniority that the hierarchically conscious JI
cultivated in operatives, who had to swear oaths of allegiance to their Amir, a
supreme leader with absolute authority over them. To this new breed of Indonesian
terrorist, Nasir Abas and Ali Imron are “traitors,” not to be heeded.5
Yet for remaining JI members, their defection and public denunciations of the Bali
bombings are significant. One senior JI Mantiqi II member, arrested by the Malaysian
Special Task Force in 2002 and detained for six years, is still stung by their betrayal.
“I don’t know what made him change,” he says of Ali Imron. “We are good friends.
What he and Nasir Abas say may be good for them. But it is definitely not good for
us. It will ruin our solidarity.”6 What he means by “solidarity” is that Nasir Abas and
Ali Imron are now showing JI members an alternative interpretation of jihad that does
not glorify violence against civilians.
In assessing the effectiveness of former terrorists in crafting and delivering
counternarratives, we have to ask if leveraging terrorist dropouts is an idea of limited
use or one that has yet to be effectively utilized.
Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, with their nuanced renunciation of violence as a means of
achieving socio-political goals, might be acceptable messengers in Indonesia because
they were former mujahidin fighters trained in Afghanistan. Abas held a leadership
position in JI while Imron was a key participant in several terrorist acts, giving them a
legitimacy and capacity to influence those inside and on the periphery of the extremist
movement. Paradoxically, these same qualities would be undermined if they were to
completely deny jihad fi sabillilah. Adherents believe it to be a mortal sin to renounce
this doctrine.7
By emphasizing their jihadi credentials, Ali Imron and Nasir Abas provide an
alternative reading of salafi-jihadism that threatens the JI ideology. But is it one that
most societies can accept? Ali Imron, for example, in interviews with the QIAS CVE
team, saw the irony of his being asked about the content of his counternarrative
message.
I worry because my message might not be acceptable to the international
community. I’ll tell my friends we’re establishing an Islamic state by following
the way of the Prophet Mohammad and by saying Islam is a religion of peace.
But once we achieve [an] Islamic state, we can do war in the name of jihad.
Can my opinion be accepted internationally?8
Use of Terrorist Dropouts
In September 2007, the late Abu Yahya al Libi, a senior member of the al-Qaeda
Sharia Committee, offered the United States a six-step plan to defeat AQ. At the top
Author interview with Noor Huda Ismail, Singapore, January 12, 2013.
Author interview, Semarang, May 13, 2012. A Malaysian who frequently travels to Indonesia, he
asked that his real name not be used, preferring to be known only as Pak Cik.
7 I thank Robert McFadden, Senior Vice-President of The Soufan Group and former Special Agent in
Charge of the NCIS Global Support Field Office, for this insight.
8 Interview with the QIASS CVE II team, November 4, 2011.
5
6
7
of his list of unsolicited but rather brilliant advice was to amplify the cases of “backtrackers”—ex-jihadists who had renounced armed action. Al Libi, otherwise known
as AQ’s Theological Enforcer (Scheuer, 2007) and High Command attack dog
(Brachman, 2007), was drunk on hubris, having escaped from Bagram Prison two
years earlier, when he made the video “Dots of the Letters,” which contained this list:
1. Focus on amplifying cases of ex-jihadists who have renounced armed action.
2. Fabricate stories about jihadist mistakes and exaggerate mistakes when
possible.
3. Prompt mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas that incriminate the jihadist
movement and its actions.
4. Strengthen and back Islamic movements far removed from jihad, particularly
those with a democratic approach.
5. Aggressively neutralize or discredit the guiding thinkers of the jihadist
movement.
6. Spin minor disagreements among leaders of jihadist organizations as being
major doctrinal or methodological disputes.9
Ciovacco (2009) suggests that telling the stories of ex-jihadists is “one of the most
powerful tools to defeat al Qaeda” because it refutes AQ’s preferred message that it is
winning the long war. He adds:
Jihadist recruitment and radicalization are analogous to wildfire in the most
dry and combustible areas. When the number of recruits to jihadist groups
rises, its impact is exponential on the jihadist cause. Every additional recruit
serves as an ambassador for the greater movement, inspiring family members,
friends, and acquaintances by both the good news in their religious solidarity
and victories, but also with their bad news of injury and death. Often the latter
inspires a sense of revenge with willing observers accepting the gauntlet.
Consequently, the most influential way to counter this spread of jihadist
recruitment and radicalization is to inspire change from within. Internal
change is even stronger than destroying jihadist fighters because it avoids
their becoming martyrs and living on in memory to fight another day. This
internal change can be manifested in ex-jihadists. Ex-jihadists have
abandoned the cause for many reasons. … Regardless of why ex-jihadists
have defected, the critical step is the publication of their story. These
individual stories, although anecdotal, will help to illuminate the cracks in the
jihadist movement for all would-be recruits to see.10
The use of the media is important because, as Abu Yahya says, the role of the media
in publicizing the ideological retractions helps redirect public attention away from the
role of the host government in prompting the retractions; distance increases
perceptions of legitimacy.11 The media, he suggests, can conduct interviews with
reformed scholars, publish their articles, and print their books.
Carl J. Ciovacco, “Could Al Qaeda’s Own Strategy to Defeat Itself Actually Work?,” Strategic
Insights 8, no. 3 (August 2009); citing Jarret Brachman, “Abu Yahya’s Six Easy Steps for Defeating Al
Qaeda,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume I, Issue 5 (December 2007).
10 Ciovacco, “Could Al Qaeda’s Own Strategy to Defeat Itself Actually Work?”
11 Brachman, “Abu Yahya’s Six Easy Steps for Defeating Al Qaeda.”
9
8
Abu Yahya, it would seem, was taking a page from Detachment 88’s playbook. In
Indonesia, journalists have been given access to cooperative terrorist leaders for jail
cell interviews.12 Convicted terrorists are encouraged to write their memoirs and
ideological tracts. To facilitate the writing, they are given their own cells, portable
computers, and books, and when their works are ready, senior police officers provide
personal funds to publish them, usually under a minor but respectable imprint. The
hand of Detachment 88 is supposed to be hidden, but someone forgot to tell Nasir
Abas; in his introduction to the English edition of his memoir, he thanks Police
General Bekto Suprapto for supporting its publication. (Suprapto was the Head of
Detachment 88 when Nasir Abas was captured in April 2003; Abas credits Suprapto
for his conversion.)
Former Detachment 88 head MG Tito Karnavian explains Indonesia’s strategy of
leveraging terrorist dropouts for CVE as one of “neutralizing the JI recruiters like
Nasir Abas and Khairul Ghazali and neutralizing the narratives of the radical
ideologues.”
The police can’t debate religion. But we know the extremists are not interested
in listening to moderates. We therefore need to co-opt the radical ideologues
to re-orient some or all of their concepts—for example, the concept of thagut
[evil oppressors] is central to how they perceive the enemy. If Ghazali shows
that the government and police are not thagut, it’s a big problem for the
extremist movement as it’ll have to reformulate who the enemy is.
Ali Imron is good counter-propaganda. He amplifies the wrongdoings of JI—
the killing of innocents. We allow his recruits to visit him so he can tell them.
He’s the real deal.13
JI, he notes, employs tactics based on salafi-jihadist doctrines, including violence, and
the ability of spiritual leaders and operations recruiters to spread this ideology is
crucial to its survival. The main communication channels used by these JI recruiters
are invitation-only study sessions called taklim (education in the sense of
enlightenment) and tarbiyya (training and socialization of military information,
strategy, rationalization of violence, and construction and glorification of jihad and
jihad history).
Inspired by Sebeok’s simple communication model,14 Karnavian believes effective
radicalization will only take place if all the key elements are healthy. These include:
source (recruiters to formulate and encode the message), destination (recruits to
decode and interpret the message), a message (ideology communicated verbally and
Sadly, lax prison management also means journalists have also had no problems getting to
intransigent terrorists such as the Bali bombers, who fielded numerous interviews in the months
leading up to their execution in 2008. One of them, Imam Samudra, not only wrote his memoir, Aku
Melawan Teroris (I Am Against Terrorists), but also used a smuggled laptop to conduct lessons in
electronic hacking for his acolytes.
13 Author interview, Jakarta, May 10, 2012.
14 Thomas A Sebeok, “Communication,” in Paul Cobley (ed.), Communication Theories: Critical
Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies, Volume 1 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
12
9
nonverbally), a channel (face-to-face or mass communication) and a context (internal
and external). Any weakness in one element can disrupt the process.
In 2012, Karnavian wrote that this approach suggests several strategies for countering
the process of radicalization.
Focusing on the destination (potential recruits) and blocking the radical
pathway to them is not the only way to disrupt the process of radicalization.
Strategies and tactics could be formulated to target other parts of the
communication system: the source or sender (spiritual leaders or recruiters,
by co-opting or enabling), the channels (by paralyzing the enabling groups
and its activities or mass communication methods employed such as internet
or printed publications), the messages (countering the ideology or the
teachings by a more intense spread of more moderate ideology), and the
context, particularly the external context (the environment by which
disaffected persons or destination or receiver share common grievances.
Understanding the internal context or the individual is important for the
rehabilitation of militant detainees, but may be too complicated as a counterradicalization strategy, as the internal (or personal) context of each potential
recruit varies widely.15
In terms of weakening the message or ideological narrative, the goal is to make the
“content and packaging of the narrative less interesting and popular” through public
education involving influential ulama (theologians), as well as by constructing a new
narrative to counter and neutralize the concepts central to the radical ideology.
This of course requires the involvement of well-known religious institutions as
well as leaders who will be listened to by the public and whose depth of
religious knowledge cannot be questioned. In addition, it is most important
that the personal qualities of these ulama be exemplary so that the new
narrative can be understood and accepted both by the general public as well
as by the radical groups themselves. From the experience of Egypt and
Indonesia itself—as shown by the case of Nasir Abas—leading figures of the
radical network itself can revise the ideological narrative to become more
moderate and can have a more powerful impact on changing the thinking of
members of the network than moderate ulama. This effort requires state
pressure on these leaders through law enforcement and intelligence initiatives
so that they become cooperative.16 (Emphasis added.)
Karnavian’s explanation for Indonesia’s use of terrorist dropouts to undermine the
legitimacy of the extremist narrative is persuasive, raising the question of why
Malaysia uses its JI dropouts sparingly in its deradicalization efforts and Singapore
not at all. Part of the answer is that whereas Malaysia and Singapore have a fairly
good track record of rehabilitating captured extremists and containing the spread of
extremist narratives, Indonesia’s efforts have been far less successful. Leveraging
terrorist dropouts for CVE is seen as a low-cost, high-profile program with less
obvious outcomes.
M. Tito Karnavian, “Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah and the
Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007,” unpublished dissertation given to the author.
16 Ibid.
15
10
A comparison of how these three Southeast Asian governments have handled the
violent extremism exemplified by JI is instructive.
Until Singapore uncovered a local network in 2001, JI was flourishing in the radical
underground, successfully sending members to Afghanistan for mujahidin training
and recruiting Western-educated graduates in Malaysia, madrassah students in
Indonesia, and employed Singaporean men seeking religious knowledge. JI even
brought together operatives from around the region to carry out several terrorist
attacks incognito and ran training camps in conflict zones in Indonesia and the
southern Philippines, sometimes with the assistance of Arab fighters sent by al-Qaeda
central. Until the Bali bombings of October 2002, the Indonesian government denied
the existence of such a terrorist movement, playing to public opinion of a Western
conspiracy to undermine Muslims.
The Bali attacks were a wake-up call that forced Jakarta to allow the Indonesian
National Police to join the Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) and the
Malaysian Special Branch (later Special Task Force, Counterterrorism Operations) in
hunting down and decapitating JI. As Karnavian said in an interview, “The Bali
bombing was the turning point of Indonesia recognizing Jamaah Islamiyah as a
terrorist group.”17
The approaches used by the three countries differ. By October 2002, Singapore and
Malaysia had already swept up most of the JI members in their countries, using
preventive detention legislation bequeathed by the former British colonial government
to deal with a pan-Malayan communist insurgency. Of the 60-odd JI members
detained in Singapore under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since 2001, two-thirds
have been released following a comprehensive rehabilitation program consisting of
religious counseling by volunteer Islamic scholars, psychological counseling to cope
with stress and adjusting to civilian life, and after-care support for families. Malaysia
detained 100 under its ISA; almost all have been through a deradicalization program,
passed a polygraph test, and have now been released.
The availability of preventive detention legislation allowed Singapore and Malaysia
to hold extremists, even those who had not participated in acts of violence, for as long
as required to neutralize the threat they posed. Some were released within months. Up
to twenty, including the Singapore cell leaders of JI, who refused to undergo the
voluntary rehabilitation program, remain in custody.
Indonesia had few laws to deal with terrorism when the Bali bombers struck. Reeling
from the public outrage, it adopted a catch or kill, prosecute and release strategy. The
courts dealt with those the police could prove were involved in terrorist activity; of
the 800-plus suspects prosecuted in the last 10 years, three have been executed, but
most were released after short periods of imprisonment. About 80 suspects, including
the self-styled leader of al-Qaeda in Indonesia, Noordin M. Top, as well as bombmaker Azahari Husin, were killed in police raids.
The handling of former extremists is also markedly different in the three countries.
17
Author interview, Jakarta, December 13, 2010.
11
While Singapore used the intelligence it obtained from the JI detainees to write a
White Paper on “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism”
(Singapore Parliament, January 7, 2003), detailing the network and its operatives, its
links to al-Qaeda, and its terrorist plots, ISD did not then and still does not use the
militants themselves to counter the extremist narratives, either in counseling sessions
with detainees or in public counter-radicalization seminars. Those released from
custody are also discouraged from giving media interviews; there have been at most
three carefully screened media interviews given by former detainees on condition of
anonymity.
The Malaysian STF invites former militants to speak to those under detention for
terrorist activity. The few who do agree to help in the deradicalization seminars do not
speak publicly about their work. However, the cloak of secrecy has more to do with
the Malaysian STF’s general reticence to discuss what are known locally as ISA
cases; the public perceives preventive detention to be susceptible to abuse for political
purposes, leading to the law’s repeal last year.
In contrast, former terrorists like Nasir Abas are treated like celebrities in Indonesia,
invited to paid speaking engagements, recognized by hotel staff, and treated
respectfully by police officers. Abas has in fact turned himself into a mini-industry,
always ready to do interviews with foreign media and offer researchers ideas for
rehabilitating former extremists. His memoir was translated into English by a fan
living in Australia, who “volunteered to help translate this book even though we have
never met.”18 By his own account, he has trained many to be terrorists but has not
been personally involved in a terrorist attack.
Along the way, Detachment 88 has also had spectacular failures in its experiment
with former terrorists. At least two terrorist leaders released early because they were
cooperative immediately returned to militancy. Between 2009 and 2010, former JI
Mantiqi III leader Abu Tholut (Nasir Abas’s predecessor) and former KOMPAK
leader Abdullah Sunata set up a military training camp that brought together several
extremist groups across the jihadist spectrum. Detachment 88 uncovered this camp by
accident when a local resident reported the presence of outsiders in a remote area of
Aceh.
Abu Tholut and Sunata fooled their police handlers by continuing to stay in telephone
contact, pretending to be cooperative after their release. Failures such as these raise
questions about the effectiveness of deradicalization programs and whether
disengagement is ever permanent.
The Willing Dropouts
In making the case that terrorist dropouts can contribute to promoting a
counternarrative, Michael Jacobson defines dropouts as those who have “voluntarily
Nasir Abas, Author’s Introduction for English Edition, Inside Jamaah Islamiyah: A Former
Member’s True Story (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2011), 11.
18
12
walked away from” terrorist organizations.19 He was intrigued, while working on the
9/11 Commission, to learn that some of those selected by al-Qaeda to participate in
the suicide attacks had backed out, despite pressure from al-Qaeda. The long list of
defectors he compiled include former Egyptian Islamic Jihad head Sayyid Imam alSharif, also known as Dr. Fadly, whose work is often cited by al-Qaeda as ideological
justifications for its actions; Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Awdah, an extremist cleric
whose incarceration by the Saudis in the 1990s inspired Osama bin Laden to action;
Hassan Hattab, a founder of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, now
known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; six leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group; al-Qaeda members Jamal al-Fadl, Essam al-Ridi, and L’Houssaine Kherchtou,
who turned against the group and became US government witnesses in the embassy
bombing trials in early 2001; and Nasir Abas.20
Jacobson does not include Ali Imron on his list of terrorist dropouts, perhaps because
Imron is still in prison.
Indeed, Imron himself knows that his current status as a prisoner casts doubt on his
sincerity. “Please support me to be free from jail,” he pleads with a QIASS CVE
study team at the end of an interview. “My intention is to do maximum
deradicalization. Some say of me, ‘He’s saying what he does now because he’s a
prisoner.’ But I will do so even when I’m free.’”
Self-serving? No doubt. But as Karnavian says, he is “the real deal.” Some of Ali
Imron’s former students still visit him in prison. A group of ten former students
reportedly asked him to teach them to make bombs. Imron told another visitor that he
rejected the students’ request, but it is not clear if he reported their attempt to acquire
bomb-making skills to Detachment 88.21
The key difference between dropouts like Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, and the latest to join
their ranks, Khairul Ghazali, and “failures” like Abu Tholut and Abdullah Sunata, is
that Abas, Imron, and Ghazali have staked out public positions repudiating the
violence perpetuated by JI. There is no walking back for them. They may still be in
police custody, or were in police custody when they decided to make the break, but
they have now actually turned against JI in their public utterances, even if they still
believe in the goal of turning Indonesia into an Islamic state.
Jacobson and other analysts who have studied terrorist dropouts note that there are
many reasons why they turned against their groups, ranging from strategic and tactical
disagreements to petty rivalries and personal slights that turned into festering
disillusionment with their group leadership and dynamics. Specific acts of violence
can also be triggers for cognitive dissonance.
The QIASS CVE team heard many of these justifications during interviews with eight
former terrorists in Jakarta in August 2010 and November 2011. The former JI
members who were more senior cited particularly the tensions that arose within the
Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative,” Perspectives
on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009).
20 Michael Jacobson, Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left, Policy Focus #101
(Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010).
21 Confidential source, January 14, 2013.
19
13
group when it began to shift its targeting from the near enemy to the far enemy
following Osama bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa and its adoption by Hambali.
HS, a former JI leader who claims to have recruited more than two hundred people for
its Central Java operations, said he left the group in 1998 over takfiri issues.22 He had
joined JI because “as a Muslim, I want to see Indonesia under Islamic law.” His role
was to select recruits for training in Afghanistan in anticipation of the armed clash
with the Indonesian authorities.
But he grew uncomfortable when the Afghan veterans began “telling us the real
enemy is not the Indonesian government but America.”
As leader, I could understand why America [was] the enemy because it did
many bad things to Islam. But I felt ambivalence in the JI direction. There
were tensions among members about the shift in focus to the US. There was
even a discussion to remove Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as leader because some
senior members had direct access to al-Qaeda but not Ba’asyir.
We considered Bai’ah to be loyalty to God and Ba’asyir as leader of our
group. We pledged our loyalty to Ba’asyir as leader of the group. So some felt
uncomfortable because we took money from al-Qaeda. The JI doctrine is to
listen and obey. If the leader says A, we say A. Moving our bai’ah from one
person to another is okay if the leader does it. But Ba’asyir did not give his
bai’ah to Osama bin Laden. As far as I know, only two JI members did—
Hambali and Zulkarnean.
In repeated interviews,23 Nasir Abas and Ali Imron say that at the time of their arrest,
they were already disenchanted by al-Qaeda’s increased influence over the JI agenda,
and that the indiscriminate killings caused by the 2002 Bali bombing were the last
straw. They made deliberate decisions to cooperate with the Indonesian authorities
almost immediately upon capture. The courtesy their police interrogators showed
them made the decision easier. (Also see Annexes A and B for excerpts from their
memoirs.)
One could say that they used their capture by Detachment 88 to disengage and to
participate in their own rehabilitation. Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, whose brothers also
became involved in JI, are among the rare few who have gone further by helping the
Indonesian police persuade other JI operatives to cooperate. In fact, they are
considered “key CT assets,” helping to debrief prisoners as well as offering advice to
Detachment 88 on undercover operations.
Similarly, Khairul Ghazali says he “changed after being remanded” and now helps the
Indonesian government.
In fact, I write books, collaborate with the government to deradicalize, to
change the wrong paradigm of Muslims and their leaders [a paradigm that
22
23
Interview with QIASS CVE I team, Jakarta, August 28, 2010.
They were interviewed by the QIASS CVE team in Jakarta in 2010 and 2011.
14
views non-Muslims as the enemy], to convey the message that terrorism is unIslamic.24
Ghazali, who says Abu Bakar Ba’asyir considered him the movement’s “leader of
Sumatra and Aceh,” has written two books at the request of Detachment 88: Robbery
Is Not Fa’i, refuting the religious arguments used by extremists to justify the robbing
of banks and jewelry shops as fa’i (spoils of war) to finance their jihadist operations;
and They Are Not Thagut, defending the Indonesian police and government against
the extremist charge that they are evil oppressors deserving of death.
In separate interviews, each of the three ideologues spontaneously declared that he
had a “personal responsibility” to correct the misinterpretations of Islam held by
extremists. Each said that following his arrest by the Indonesian police, he had time to
reflect on the real meaning of jihad and learn that his faith did not justify the violence.
Having changed his mind, he felt a need to lead others to the correct path.
As Ghazali, who considers himself a religious scholar, put it:
As such, I am responsible to guide those in the wrong, who had spread the
wrong message to the community, to be led to the correct path. …The number
of terrorists or those with [a] terrorist mind-set is not large and there are only
a few. But these few are the ones who destroy the image of Islam. … I am
made the enemy by the other radicalized terrorists after I’ve chosen to return
to the correct Islamic path. They consider me as a usurper who leaked their
secrets. In actual fact, I want to return them to the correct path.
Ali Imron, who proudly noted that telling his life story to other detained terrorist
suspects had helped them change their minds and agree to cooperate with the police,
explained his obligation: “We all have [the] responsibility to do deradicalization,
personally or as a group, to help the police develop a program to deradicalize
people.”25
Nasir Abas went further by calling on the Indonesian government to do more to
involve the community in countering extremism:
The [party with the] most responsibility to do deradicalization is not the
government but the community. … The government makes the strategy, but
each of us has a personal responsibility. No budget? We do it voluntarily. The
priority must be to prevent the young from becoming radicalized and to work
on the ex-combatants.26
This community involvement is particularly important, Nasir Abas feels. He sees the
nature of the extremist threat as shifting from violence carried out by a well-organized
group like that of Noordin Top (a master planner killed by Indonesian police in 2009),
to self-radicalized individuals planting bombs they learned to make from recipes
found on the Internet. These individuals were getting their “ideological education
from the Internet and listening to Aman Abdurrahman, who preaches that the
24
25
26
Interview with the QIASS CVE II team, Medan, November 5, 2011.
Interview, November 4, 2011.
Interview, November 3, 2011.
15
government is the enemy and Muslims who are not with them are takfir.”
(Abdurrahman, who set up the Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad in Indonesia after the Iraqi
terrorist group of the same name, is currently serving ten years in prison for his
involvement in the Aceh training camp. He previously served four years in jail for
organizing a bomb-making class. He became famous in prison for his jailhouse
sermons and translations of jihadi texts from Arabic to Indonesian.)
The most effective counternarrative, the three terrorist dropouts said, were their life
stories—how they became involved in terrorist activity, killed for a flawed belief
system based on wrong interpretations of their faith, and now regret the deaths they
caused.
Although Singapore does not use terrorist dropouts to counsel its JI detainees, one of
the products of its comprehensive terrorist rehabilitation program, Faiz Abu Bakar
Bafana, now helps out with the Malaysian program, lecturing at the STF’s
deradicalization seminars for detained JI members. Faiz, a Malaysian who was
detained along with his brother, a Singapore citizen, by the ISD for four and a half
years and subsequently repatriated to Malaysia, had a radicalization trajectory similar
to many other JI members. In an interview with the QIASS CVE II team, he said he
did not set out to join a terrorist group. He was led into JI because he took religious
classes run by JI and found its interpretations of how Muslims should practice Islam
according to the Prophet’s way attractive. He was not well-schooled in Islamic
teachings and accepted uncritically JI’s use of religious verses to justify its violence,
recruiting his own brother into JI, along with thirty others.
I didn’t really think about the laws in Islam, but the people who were
attacking Muslims and so it was right to attack them. We didn’t bother to
check if it was allowed by Islamic law, the Sharia. It was about anger and
revenge.27
It was only in detention in Singapore that he began to ponder his religious beliefs.
“They asked me why do all this [violence]? I said they’re killing Muslims. We must
retaliate. They said, You’re not killing the perpetrators but people in the street. This
triggered my thinking.”
He began to read Islamic books and learned that jihad was permissible only under
certain conditions and that it had a wider meaning. JI had selectively used religious
verses to teach him that jihad was compulsory, that they were always at war (qital).
“JI comes up with these verses and fail[s] to show us the other parts that contain
injunctions.”
He had hitherto never challenged the JI teachings. “They [Singaporean authorities]
brought in ustadz (religious scholars) for me to check my beliefs. They asked me
questions. Is it Islamic to put bombs in a supermarket, to kill old ladies? What if one
of them is your mother? I realized that in Islam, we are not allowed to kill women and
children except in war zones. We are not in a war zone. I pondered and came to the
conclusion that these actions were against religion. They must stop.”
27
Interview with the QIASS CVE II team, Kuala Lumpur, November 2, 2011.
16
For former JI Secretary General Zulkifli Marzuki, a Malaysian, the reality of life on
the run sank in after he found himself in Dacca after fleeing Malaysia with Hambali
when the Singapore and Malaysian crackdown on JI began in late 2001. After five
years on the run, hiding out in Thailand, Cambodia, and finally Bangladesh, he began
to have regrets. “I started thinking I had a good family, business. I killed people but
we were not military. I had made a big mistake.”28
Marzuki also feared that if he “surrendered to the wrong government,” or if he were
captured, he might end up in Guantanamo Bay. In 2005 he contacted his family to
arrange his surrender to the Malaysian police. His former business partner gave him
the name of a Malaysian STF officer to contact. He accepted the STF’s terms of
surrender, returned to Malaysia a year later, was detained several months, and went
through a deradicalization seminar conducted by the STF with help from several
religious clerics. He now speaks at such seminars, among a small group of carefully
vetted former detainees whom the STF considers “radical but … out of the circle of
militancy” and able to exert a positive influence on those still in custody.29
Unlike Bafana, Marzuki did know JI was an armed group—“a mujahidin organization
that had been involved in the Afghan war and was linked to other organizations in
South Thailand and the Philippines”—when he decided to become a member. His
former business partner was close to Hambali, whom he admired. He was thus
flattered when Hambali told him that his business skills were needed to help JI set up
front companies for the network. “They said that as an accountant and businessman, I
have good financial ability and can help them manage JI as it grows,” he recalled in
an interview with the QIASS CVE II team.
Now a successful entrepreneur in Kuala Lumpur, his message for those on the verge
of joining JI is to think carefully. “There are many channels to express your
unhappiness to the government or the UN. You still have a chance to change the
world without violence.”
The specter of Gitmo looms large for JI operatives arrested overseas. Umar Patek
decided to be cooperative with the Indonesian police following his arrest in
Abbotabad in 2010 because he feared that they might allow Pakistan to turn him over
to the United States, where he would face indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay.30
All six men had different entry paths to violence. The similarities in their individual
trajectories to disengagement suggests that the decision to leave the terrorist
organization might be emotional, but de-radicalization is a cognitive choice (or series
of choices) that a terrorist must make. He has to want to change his beliefs before he
will accept that his religion does not justify resorting to terrorist violence.
Interview with the QIASS CVE II team, Kuala Lumpur, November 2, 2011.
STF briefing for QIASS CVE II team, Kuala Lumpur, November 2, 2011.
30 Author interview with MG Tito Karnavian, May 12, 2012.
28
29
17
The Ex-Jihadi Food Network
From left: Anchor of Neo-Democrazy program, Metro TV; Noor Huda Ismail, terrorism
expert and social entrepreneur; Yusuf Adirima, former JI fighter in Mindanao and
manager of Dapoer Bistik in Semarang.
TV Anchor: You are known as a writer as well as an analyst on terrorism
issues. Why do you want to open a café with former convicted terrorists as
your employees?
Noor Huda Ismail: Well, I do believe that no one is born a terrorist. There are
processes where normal individuals become involved in terrorism, namely
introduction to violence, being involved, but also leaving [disengaging from]
violence. I have been using [the] food industry as a way to help former
convicted terrorists to integrate into society because running a café like
Dapoer Bistik, we can’t choose our customers. We have to serve everyone who
comes to our café regardless of their background. So in many cases, Yusuf,
who used to fight against Catholic people in Mindanao in 2000, is now
serving Catholic people who come to our café after their church sermon. Food
becomes a medium for Yusuf and his perceived enemy to constantly interact in
a normal setting. The fear of this initiative is the possibility of Yusuf going
back to violence again after he gets enough money from working in the café.
TV Anchor: Is that true, Pak Yusuf? If you are strong you will go back to
terrorism?
Yusuf Adirima (smiling): That allegation is baseless. Indeed, I was fighting for
two years in the conflict area in Mindanao. I carried an AK-47 every day; it
was like my second wife. When I came back to Indonesia in 2002, I was asked
18
by my senior Abu Tholut to find a house, where he stored explosive materials
in a sealed box. I was in jail because of this. I met Pak Huda in 2003 when he
interviewed me as a journalist for the Washington Post. After my release, I
contacted him and we started this café together. My priority is now around
family and this café business. This is my new jihad. I don’t want to go back to
violence anymore.
TV Anchor: Why don’t you want to go back to violence?
Yusuf (after a pause): My intense interaction with many difference people has
taught me that the use of violence isn’t the best way to achieve what we want. I
never regret my jihad in Mindanao because Muslims were oppressed and it
was in the medan jihad [jihad front], but I don’t think Indonesia is now medan
jihad. There is no conflict here.
Neo-Democrazy program, Metro TV, Jakarta, April 14, 201231
That moment of epiphany for Yusuf Adirima, occurring as it did on live television,
earned him the approval and admiration of peers that he never obtained fighting with
a combined JI-Moro Islamic Liberation Front unit in the Mindanao jungles in 2000 to
2002, even though “it was the best time of my life, as I was able to live fully as a
Muslim.”32
Within days of his appearance on Metro TV, Yusuf had received more than ten calls
from people he knew in East and Central Java. These men had been egged on by
families and friends who wanted their sons and loved ones to learn from him how to
succeed as an entrepreneur. Some asked him to open new restaurants in their locations
so they could work for him, he said in an interview a month after his television
debut.33
A jailed JI member from his Mindanao cohort texted Yusuf, asking him to bring him
and his fellow prisoners food from the restaurant so that they could sample his steak
and bakery products.
Yusuf, whose real name is Machmudi Haryono, became convinced that Islam was
being oppressed when a religious teacher in his hometown of Jombang, East Java,
showed him a video of Bosnian Muslims being attacked by Christians. When
communal fighting broke out in Ambon and Poso in the late 1990s and mosques in
Jombang issued leaflets calling on Muslims to go to the conflict areas, he was swayed
by their message that defending Muslims in oppressed places was the greatest level of
jihad. After joining JI, however, he was sent to Mindanao for military training, where
he fought alongside the MILF in a number of direct military confrontations with the
Philippines Army.
Yusuf was able to evade capture on his return to Indonesia, but he was arrested and
sentenced to seven years in prison when JI Mantiqi III leader Abu Tholut told the
Transcript and photo provided by Noor Huda Ismail.
Interview with QIASS CVE I team, Jakarta, August 29, 2010.
33 Author interview, Semarang, May 12, 2012.
31
32
19
Indonesian police that he had left a suitcase of explosives in a house rented by Yusuf
in Semarang. (Yusuf has always claimed he did not know the suitcase contained
explosives and is convinced that Abu Tholut received a lighter sentence of only five
years for selling him out.) Disappointed by his own leader’s betrayal, Yusuf decided
to leave JI, but there was no help available until he reached out to Noor Huda Ismail,
then a Washington Post reporter who had interviewed him in prison.
“I was a fine prisoner,” Yusuf said. “And I learnt that there was almost no program to
reform us. So when I came out, I realized I needed to inform people in the network
how to get out.” His spontaneous rejection of violence on TV was “to inspire friends
in the network to leave violence.”
There are some people in the network who want to get out. But there is no
guidance on how to do so. Who to talk to. I now know how to lead a normal
life. I want to help others. Many have already been out of jail longer than me,
but I am more accepted. They can learn from me. …
Friends who really want to get out were pleased to see me on TV. They called
me to ask what I have achieved. Some of course were suspicious why I have
been able to achieve so much so quickly. I told them I work as a team. …
Now if I have a chance to go back to Mindanao, I will, but to do dakwah
[missionary work]. I will tell them to do what I can do—run restaurants.
I have a new identity—I am an entrepreneur.
Yusuf’s employer, Noor Huda Ismail, is a terrorism researcher. He had his moment of
epiphany ten years ago, when he realized that one of the Bali bombers was a former
roommate from the Ngruki boarding school, the incubator of most of Indonesia’s
terrorists. Ismail considers Yusuf’s public renunciation of terrorism a validation of his
rehabilitation efforts.
“The fact that Yusuf expressed his remorse publicly without my pressure suggests the
viability of disengagement initiatives by civil society, because the study of terrorist
engagement, disengagement and reengagement holds important lessons for
academicians and policymakers,” he said in a separate interview.34
Ismail, who decided to start his own Food for Peace program to provide employment
to jihadis released from prison after Yusuf’s appeal for help, realized that they needed
a sense of empowerment to cope with feelings of ostracization from society and their
old network. Working with Yusuf, he started Dapoer Bistik, which serves traditional
Indonesian food.
Food can provide an excellent platform for nearly everyone to start engaging
with each other. In Indonesia, food has been widely used to promote peace.
One of the examples is the celebration of Padungku in Poso, where Muslims
and Christians eat together to thank God during harvest time.
34
Author interview, Semarang, May 12, 2012.
20
Since the opening of Dapoer Bistik in Semarang, Yusuf has recruited other former
radicals to work with him. Says Ismail: “It is like a multilevel marketing system
where a member gets other members to participate in this disengagement initiative.”
One of Noordin Top’s former lieutenants runs another Dapoer Bistik in Solo. He is
empowered to train and bring in former radicals but is supervised by a manager hired
by Ismail.
Ismail now dreams of setting up a food network around Indonesia. He wants to open
more Dapoer Bistiks to teach ex-jihadis to cook so they will have jobs and be able to
support their families and not be forced by circumstance to return to their radical
networks. He says that the Food for Peace program does no overt ideological
deradicalization; despite his early education at Ngruki, he does not feel equipped to
engage his patrons and clients in theological discussions.
But the café as a social enterprise is potent counter-radicalization. By serving all
faiths and religions, it helps radicals break out of the us-versus-them mentality that is
intrinsic to their continued radicalization.
Since Yusuf’s celebrity moment on television, he has also begun to attract those on
the periphery of the extremist movement who are looking for alternatives to the
violent influences they are surrounded by.
Is Yusuf more credible and more effective than police-sponsored dropouts like Ali
Imron and Nasir Abas? He is confident that he is. Nasir Abas, he says, has been
widely rejected since he began saying the Bali bombing was wrong. “It is irritating
that he’s so open in discussing the Bali bombing. It’s vulgar.”
Ali Imron, on the other hand, is more acceptable because he is serving time in prison
and his denunciations of violence are more subtle. “Nasir Abas says this is wrong. Ali
says I don’t agree with this action but this is my opinion,” Yusuf explains, raising an
interesting conundrum about conditional disengagement. Extremists are usually
indoctrinated to see the world in Manichean terms—good versus evil, us versus
them—and yet Imron’s more nuanced rejection of the Bali bombing is more
acceptable than Abas’s categorical denunciation, even for someone like Yusuf, who
has publicly declared that violence does not work.
Six Practical Lessons for Policymakers
As their memoirs and utterances make clear, Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Khairul Ghazali,
and Yusuf Adirima are terrorist dropouts on their own terms; their disengagement is
conditional on their being accepted as jihadists, with the caveat that they will fight
only in defense of Muslims in conflict zones and only against soldiers. That is, they
consider that fighting in Palestinian territories, Russia, Afghanistan, and the southern
Philippines is justifiable.
Leveraging them for CVE raises three strategic issues for policymakers:
21
1. By providing such terrorist dropouts with what amounts to a pulpit to preach
against violence directed at civilians, will governments be mainstreaming their
idea of armed jihad as an obligation for Muslims in defense of other Muslims
and the establishment of an Islamic state? In other words, can we accept that
the strategy to undermine the popular narrative of JI is to accept the legitimacy
of its goal to create an Islamic caliphate throughout Southeast Asia—by force,
if necessary?
2. Who decides what constitutes a conflict zone? Should governments turn a
blind eye to citizens who take up arms to fight foreign soldiers in other lands?
What is to stop them from deciding that local communal conflicts fit the
definition of medan jihad? For instance, clashes that started over petty
disputes between Christians and Muslims in Ambon in the late 1990s and
Poso in the mid-2000s became more violent and protracted when JI and
various radical organizations in Jakarta declared jihad and sent volunteers to
the islands to defend Muslims.
3. How do we even calculate the cost-benefit analysis of such conditional
disengagement?
Obviously, these are problematic issues for any society. For majority Muslim
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, a certain amount of ambivalence is to be
expected. Anger against Israel and the West is sufficiently prevalent that the instinct
is to say to detained extremists, as a Malaysian STF officer acknowledged he does:
“Malaysia is not under attack. Palestine is. So go die in Palestine.”35
Accepting any definition of armed jihad amounts to a government’s agreeing to give
up its monopoly on violence to a group claiming religious grounds. Even if a
government is prepared to turn a blind eye to its citizens engaging in violence
overseas for geostrategic or political reasons, it is rare for a state to officially sanction
it.
As a law-and-order solution, leveraging terrorist dropouts can offer immediate gains.
The intelligence and insights the former terrorists offer on their groups and former
colleagues can prevent attacks and save lives. In the medium term, by exposing the
hypocrisy and reality of terrorist organizations, terrorist dropouts will perhaps
dissuade the young from going down the path to violence. Some of these gains are
measurable, others not.
For policymakers trying to navigate potential minefields, the Southeast Asia
experiences offer six practical lessons:
35
Interview with QIASS CVE II team, Kuala Lumpur, November 2, 2011.
22
1.
The Counternarrative
It is clear that no self-respecting former terrorist will deliver a counternarrative that is
unambiguously against the use of violence as a religious duty. They are dropouts with
serious doctrinal, tactical, and emotional differences with their former colleagues;
they are not pacifists. As some of the cases described here show—in particular, as
Nasir Abas and Ali Imron’s cases show—many did not set out to join a terrorist group
but saw themselves in a heroic light, as “Muslim warriors” (in Abas’s words) fighting
Soviet oppression in Afghanistan.36 Indeed, both Abas and Imron begin their memoirs
with accounts of studying at the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy in Sadaa,
Pakistan, and the thrill of fighting alongside the Afghan mujahidin during “study
holidays.”37
Imron was motivated to follow in the footsteps of the brother he was closest to, Ali
Ghufron (one of the executed Bali bombers), who he knew had joined an
“organization which had a program of military practices.”38
Ten years after leaving southern Mindanao, Yusuf Adirima still lights up when he
talks about the two years he spent with the MILF fighting Filipino soldiers whose
government, he said, had “declared war against Islam.” He was “compelled to go
there” by the circumstances and has no regrets about having done so.39
The way they tell their life stories, their path into terrorist violence was a sad
deviation from holy warrior to baby killer engineered by unscrupulous leaders,
namely Hambali and Abu Tholut. The details that the former terrorists provide are the
stuff of soap opera. Nasir Abas, for example, sounds like a jealous spouse when he
complains that Hambali, citing the difficulty of raising funds, would not give him
money to buy PCs for his camp in the southern Philippines. “But if I had a plan for
bombing churches in Kota Kinabalu, he’ll find the money. He has no money for
training. But for operations, he’ll find money in one night.”40
They also humanize their stories by describing the pain they feel not only in being
betrayed by their superiors but in seeing friends and relatives in custody. Imron
describes watching his brothers Ali Ghufron and Amrozi “curled up in a cell,
handcuffed and flanked by guards”—a humiliation he could not bear to witness, he
says.41
Interview, November 3, 2011.
Nasir Abas, Inside Jamaah Islamiyah: A Former Member’s True Story. Abas, who was in the fifth
batch at the Mujahidin Academy, said that the Indonesians were not permitted to “join the battle on the
frontmost line,” where the infantry troops are, but that each year, a small group of students was
selected to join the Afghan mujahidin for a month at the front. After he became a small arms instructor
at the academy, he went to the battlefront a few more times. Imron, who went to Afghanistan in 1991
along with Imam Samudra in the eight batch, never had the opportunity, as the communist government
in Kabul had by then been defeated. He was instead sent to the practice camp of the practical war unit
in Towrkham to learn bomb-making. (Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom.)
38 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom. He also made this point in his interview with the QIASS CVE
I team in 2010.
39 Interview, May 12, 2012.
40 Interview, November 3, 2011.
41 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom.
36
37
23
The authenticity that these men bring to the propaganda war is indisputable. They are
real bad guys with blood on their hands who have seen the light. At the same time,
policymakers should be aware of their limitations and use their stories appropriately.
Such counternarratives can be misconstrued and can have the effect of exciting
participation rather than serving as cautionary tales. A graphic novel featuring Nasir
Abas was produced by the nonprofit organization Lazuardi Biru in cooperation with
the police. Entitled Kutemukan Makna Jihad (I Found the Meaning of Jihad), its
opening pages are filled with images of men, armed only with assault rifles, fighting
modern tanks. The comic book also features the victims of suicide bombings as well
as a suicide bomber. Perhaps the most powerful panels are those in which the
bomber’s tearful parents apologize for their son’s actions and denounce as cowards
those who sent their son on a suicide mission. But these panels appear on page 130 of
a 138-page book that is designed to educate schoolchildren. As yet, it is not part of
any school curriculum.
Clearly, given the terrorist dropouts’ underlying radical interpretation of jihad, such
materials need to be part of a larger public education campaign involving community
leaders who can provide context and demonstrate normal values versus extremist
beliefs. (See also Lesson #6.)
Highlighting these stories in a larger hearts and minds campaign is a double-edged
sword. As Noor Huda Ismail says of Nasir Abas and Ali Imron:
Both persons are useful to counter violence ideology for people who are not in
the network, the commoners. They have … legitimacy … because of their past
experience. Continuing to support them to disseminate their story to the general
public is crucial. However, they are not effective enough for those who are still in
the network because both of them are seen as [an] extension of the government’s
interest and the puppets of the police.42
2.
The Messenger
As those studying terrorist disengagement well know, there is no consensus on the
question of whether we need to deradicalize terrorists in order to reduce the risk of
their reengaging in violence. Horgan and Altier (2012) argue that the assumption that
changing detainees’ beliefs about violence will result in a change in their behavior
might in fact be unrealistic.
Aside from the fact that attitudes and behavior rarely correlate in a reliable
fashion, a phenomenon that is well-documented in the field of psychology,
there is a broader looming issue of far greater importance. We cannot reliably
predict if people will re-engage in terrorism without knowing how or why they
dis-engage and re-engage.43
Nasir Abas and Ali Imron are examples of terrorist dropouts who have been very
cooperative without being completely deradicalized. Their moment of cognitive
42
43
Email to author, April 18, 2012.
Horgan and Altier, “The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs.”
24
dissonance in jail allowed them to see the tragedy of their past, but not the error of
their belief system.
Jacobson (2010) makes a telling comment about Nasir Abas that rings true for anyone
who has interviewed him:
… by dropping out, Abas effectively traded one leadership role for another,
going from terrorist commander to outspoken JI critic. This new role likely
fulfilled his need to feel important in the same way that being a key member of
JI had.44
Just as Yusuf Adirima has reinvented himself as a restaurant entrepreneur, Abas too
has reinvented himself as a counter-radicalization entrepreneur, using his knowledge
of JI to peddle ideas to government agencies and philanthropic groups desperate to try
something. But it is not just self-importance that motivates Abas; most of his ideas are
about helping his erstwhile colleagues, particularly the former mujahidin fighters he
trained with or instructed, reintegrate into society—with him as their leader, of
course.
A Malaysian citizen, Nasir Abas has also reaped real rewards from his cooperation
with the Indonesian police. He is now a free man, removed in 2008 from the United
Nations Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated
List, which had subjected him to an assets freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo.45
Still wanted for arrest by the Malaysian police, he does not have a valid passport to
travel beyond Indonesia but is said to have applied for Indonesian citizenship. The
implicit assumption is that an Indonesian passport is contingent on his continued good
behavior and cooperation.
It is also about second chances. As Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, now a successful
businessman with a family, pleads: “We have been detained and punished. Give us a
second chance to come back to the people. Allow us to be loved and guided. We’ll
appreciate the kindness.” He believes other extremists deserve a second chance, and
he is helping the Malaysian STF rehabilitate other detainees.
A Malaysian cleric who works with the STF told the QIASS CVE II team in 2011 that
second chances are what rehabilitation is about. “Even the bad ones still have a sense
of humanity. Look at them as humans with potential to repent and turn back,” he said.
“Talk to them as Muslim brothers gone astray. Tell them they have a second chance
to go back.”46
Is there a serious risk that terrorist dropouts could reengage if conditions, in their
mind, change such as to allow them to circumvent their current definition of armed
jihad and advocate terrorist violence? Several countries engaged in terrorist
rehabilitation, like Singapore, do not consider the risk of giving products of their
programs a public platform to promulgate their new views worth taking. But the
Jacobson, “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative.”.
“Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Approves Deletion of One Entry
From Consolidated List,” SC/9458, September 26, 2008,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9458.doc.htm.
46 Interview with QIASS CVE II team, Kuala Lumpur, November 2, 2011.
44
45
25
public platform is perhaps more constraint than opportunity. Terrorist dropouts who
change their minds could be rearrested for inciting violence or (for those still under
detention) could lose certain liberties. Ali Imron, asked to explain Abu Tholut’s
reengagement with the extremist movement after his early release from jail, scoffs
that the police should have kept better tabs on him. “He should have been controlled
by all levels of society,” he declared.47
Unless dropouts who have gone public (Abu Tholut had not) can offer a compelling
reason for their flip-flop that benefits the extremist movement—for example, by
alleging police coercion or torture—they also risk becoming objects of ridicule.
Policymakers can minimize the risk of flip-flops by banning the use of coercive
measures to compel cooperation from those suspected of terrorist activity. Indeed, the
practice of torture provides the extremist movement with a useful tool to dismiss
defections as government lies. On the other hand, decent treatment from the point of
arrest helps convince detainees that the costs of a voluntary exit from terrorism might
not be prohibitive but rewarding. Nasir Abas is a case in point.
3.
The Audience
On the tenth anniversary of the public disclosure of JI’s existence in Singapore, The
Straits Times (Singapore) ran this headline: “What Jemaah Islamiyah Did Was
Wrong, Convicted Terrorist Says” (January 7, 2012). In the piece, former detainee M
talks about discussing his treatment in jail with his wife and children during weekly
family visits:
“During these visits, I told them that I was allowed to perform my religious
obligations, and my rights as a Muslim were well respected.”
It was not what he had expected. While in the JI, he explains, it was drummed
into him that the authorities would treat him harshly and prevent him from
performing his religious obligations should he be detained.
What M encountered was quite different: He was given a prayer mat, and the
sign showing the direction of Mecca, to which Muslims face during prayers,
was already drawn on the floor of his cell. “A Gurkha guard would knock on
my cell door and inform me of prayer times,” he adds.
During the fasting month of Ramadan, arrangements were made for him to
have his meals at the specified times – after dusk and before dawn. Dates were
also provided for him to break his fast.
“As I was permitted to keep a copy of the Holy Qur’an in the cell, I read it
daily, and often complete reading the entire Qur’an on a weekly basis,” he
recounts.
47
Interview, November 4, 2011.
26
The Singapore ISD does not generally encourage former detainees to talk publicly
about either JI or their experiences in detention. Yet media requests for interviews
with former detainees have selectively been acceded to—for example, to
commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Religious Rehabilitation Group, a network
of volunteer clerics and Islamic scholars who counsel detainees on Islam. Judging
from the article contents and headlines, the objectives are twofold—to emphasize the
continuing threat of terrorism and religious extremism, and to demonstrate that the
religious rights of detainees are respected in custody.
For a secular state like Singapore with a minority Muslim population, showing that
Muslims are not oppressed is seen as crucial, especially since JI’s political ideology
demonizes non-Muslims.
Even in Malaysia and Indonesia, where Muslims are the majority, Muslim police
officers in the security services also go out of their way to showcase their religious
credentials, using their shared religion as a bonding tool with detainees, praying and
breaking fast with them during Ramadan. Detachment 88 has been known to bring
extremists in its custody to orphanages and shantytowns. Help them instead of
fighting the so-called infidel, they tell the extremists; this is how good Muslims
should help other Muslims.
Empathy not only helps reduce resistance, offering terrorist dropouts a reason to find
an alternative pathway from violence, but also demonstrates that the police champion
the cause of Muslims and are not thagut.
Policymakers should remember, in crafting counternarratives, that their audience is
not only those inside extremist movements or on the periphery, about to take the
plunge, but also society at large. Communities at risk, in particular, need to be
reassured that they are not supporting abusive or repressive policies. In Malaysia,
public pressure forced the government to repeal the Internal Security Act, which had
been used to detain terrorist suspects for investigation and to neutralize security
threats, but which the public believed to have been abused by the federal government
for political purposes. These perceptions have also deprived the STF of larger
community support for its counter-radicalization programs.
4.
The Terrorist Landscape
Do terrorist dropouts have a shelf life? Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, even Yusuf
Adirima, are from a generation of terrorists nurtured by a hierarchical organization
that indoctrinated recruits through a structured process of religious study and military
training and organized itself in geographic and functional units. By 2007, this JI no
longer existed, as documents seized from JI leader Abu Dujana by Detachment 88
showed.48
Karnavian, “Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah and the
Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007.”
48
27
Today’s terrorists are either self-radicalized through exposure to extremist websites
on the Internet or are radical activists who graduated from smashing bars and vice
dens in Central Java to suicide bombing.
A survey conducted by the Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy in October 2011
in Central Java and Yogyakarta showed that the majority of Indonesians do not
support radical organizations. Another survey, conducted in mid-January 2012
following a suicide bomb attack against a police station in Cirebon in April 2011 and
a bomb attack on a church in Solo in September of the same year, both committed by
young men known to have been active in Muslim youth groups, found that “a number
of radical Muslim activists in Central Java cities have become jihadists,” suggesting
that “radical youth groups are acting as ‘incubators’ for new jihadists who later
become terrorists.”49
The Setara Institute attributed the shift from activism to terrorism to a profound hatred
of those who are not Muslims (for example, Christians) and of Indonesian security
forces. Many young radicals were also involved in raids against nightclubs and vice.
Their motivations:
A strong hostility towards those who in their views were responsible for
wrongdoing against Islam motivates attacks against the police and members
of other religious confessions [groups]. Strong anti-Americanism is another
feature.
Without quick and radical change in the country, the study said, these radical
youth organizations will not hesitate [to use] force in violent actions to reach
their political goals, including imposing the Sharia.50
The narratives have not changed, but there is an increased focus on the near enemy—
the thagut government and police. Decapitated and stripped of bomb-making and
planning skills by a decade of police action, the extremist movement no longer has the
wherewithal to carry out big operations. Yet the hatred has not diminished.
Neither has the importance of leadership. Until 2009, those intent on violent actions in
Indonesia gravitated toward Noordin M. Top, who planned the post-2002 suicide
bombings in Indonesia. Now their hero is Aman Abdurrahman, a young ideologue
who first made his name translating the works of contemporary jihad thinkers such as
al Maqdisi and Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz while in prison for several years for
organizing a bomb-making class in 2004. Some 70 translated works, as well as his 30
prison essays on tawhid and jihad, have been uploaded onto a website that attracts
100–200 readers a day. Some of Abdurrahman’s papers have been published, in book
form, by the Jazeera publishing house in Solo.
Back in prison a second time, Abdurrahman is now focused not only on encouraging
attacks on the police but also on countering the Indonesian government’s counterradicalization initiatives. He issued, from prison, a swift and robust rebuttal of Khairul
“Study Shows How Young Radical Indonesian Muslims Become Terrorists,” Asia News, February
1, 2012; http://www.setara-institute.org/en/content/study-shows-how-young-radical-indonesianmuslims-become-terrorists.
50 Ibid.
49
28
Ghazali’s second book on the concept of thagut, cheekily titling his Ya, Mereka
Memang Thagut (Yes, They are Indeed Evil Oppressors). Abdurrahman’s book has
attracted thousands at road shows organized by a JI publishing house. A book
discussion in Bima, Lombok, alone attracted 400 fans in March 2012.51
The best policy response to Aman Abdurrahman is perhaps not to enlist a dropout to
engage him in a verbal fistfight but rather to muzzle him. He has been convicted of
terrorist offenses and is in prison. There is no reason to accord him the same liberties
to write and publish as the more cooperative terrorist dropouts.
5.
The NGOs
In a speech at a counterterrorism conference in Jakarta in October 2012, Noor Huda
Ismail issued this powerful appeal for help to develop his Food for Peace program:
I hope my work can be useful as a possible model that can be leveraged and
modified to tailor to the needs of each local space, cultural differences and
context. Further, considering the significant amount of time and financial
investment needed, particularly with newly released convicted terrorists, I [am
not] capable of engaging with them effectively all at once. Therefore, the state
must commit to support social enterprises that help to integrate those released
from prison. Alone I can help perhaps 10 at a time. But what if we have a
network of 10 volunteers and NGOs? Or 50? Together we will be able to reach
out to 50 Yusufs, and through them, help 500 former militants re-enter
Indonesian society, so that they will not return to lives of violence.
The prospect of government sponsorship for a network of social enterprises
employing former terrorists raises the same objections Ismail himself had to
leveraging Nasir Abas and Ali Imron for CVE: the audience they need to reach—
potential terrorist recruits—will not listen to those they consider government puppets.
Is it possible to support NGOs without showing the hand of government? Yes. But
can policymakers live with the lack of prudential controls this implies?
6.
The Mainstream Moderates
In countries that have felt the pain of terrorist attacks, the urge to punish those
responsible, to demand retributive justice, is strong. Rehabilitation can be perceived
as a weakness, the response of soft-hearted liberals who want to treat terrorists as
victims instead of criminals.
Putting terrorist dropouts on a pedestal, even if this response is carefully calibrated,
can be controversial and offensive to families of victims. Policymakers should not
only restrain from lionizing dropouts, but they should also balance the scales by
focusing public attention on the volunteers who work with them.
51
Confidential source, April 2012.
29
The Singapore terrorist rehabilitation program, for example, has attracted attention
since it was unveiled in 2004 because it focuses not on terrorists or the zero
recidivism rate but on the volunteers, particularly the Religious Rehabilitation Group
(RRG), who assist in their rehabilitation.
As former ISD Director Benny Lim recalls, it was “ordinary people in the community,
from the Malay-Muslim religious community, who stepped forward to work with us
to craft the rehabilitation approach.
“Although it’s lauded today, at that time it was untested, uncharted territory and went
against the grain of conventional views. It’s a measure of their conviction and courage
that they stepped out and I really admire them.”52
Moderate community leaders who exemplify mainstream thinking are the enduring
partners in any CVE work and should not be overlooked in the search for ever
creative approaches to fighting terrorism.
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the following, who made this paper possible: Police Major
General Tito Karnavian, Chief of the West Papua Police and former Head of Detachment 88,
who shared invaluable insights and allowed access to terrorist leaders in police custody; Noor
Huda Ismail, who introduced me to his Food for Peace program and its clientele and
continues to educate me on the Indonesian jihadist scene; Dato' Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay,
Deputy Director of the Malaysian Special Task Force (Ops/Counter Terrorism), and DSP
Mohd Zaini Mohd Akhir, also of the STF, who provided very comprehensive briefings on
their work; Ali Soufan, CEO of The Soufan Group, who demonstrates daily how private
sector national security research can be of value to national counterterrorism efforts, and who
introduced me to a great CVE team: John Horgan, Steve Kleinman, Thomas Neer, Stephen
White, Barry McManus, Dan Freedman, and Don Borelli—and especially Robert McFadden,
who gently kept this paper on track and offered very constructive comments. And of course,
friends in Singapore who do not wish to be named but whose work in pioneering CT
initiatives inspire me always. All errors are mine alone.
Wong Sher Main, “Life Is More Complicated than Black and White,” Challenge, March 13, 2012,
http://www.challenge.gov.sg/2012/03/life-is-more-complicated-than-black-and-white/.
52
30
Annex A
In his own words … Ali Imron
Excerpts from:
Ali Imron Sang Pengebom (Ali Imron the Bomber), by Ali Imron (Jakarta: Republika,
2007)
Ketika Nurani Bicara (When the Conscience Speaks), graphic novel featuring Ali
Imron (Jakarta: Lazuardi Birru, 2010)
Translations from the Indonesian by Jasminder Singh
Why I Joined Jamaah Islamiyah
At the end of 1990 and in the middle of my madrassah education, my
friends who were staying at Pondok Pesantren Karang Asem held a
meeting and I attended. At the meeting, there were some stories from a
few Ustadz who told us about the conditions of the Muslim community
worldwide, particularly in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Videos of
Muslim struggles in some of these places were also shown, and videos
of jihad in Palestine were shown. I felt a calling to change all my bad
habits to good deeds. I wanted to be serious about my religion and
education. I also wished to be part of the struggle for the rights of
Muslims in Palestine and Afghanistan.
From that moment on, I tried to study hard, think positively, and do
good deeds. I even wanted to leave my hometown to enter into jihad.
The first step was to send a letter to my brother Ali Ghufron, who was
in Malaysia. I told him that I wanted to be with him. I had heard that he
had gone to Afghanistan. He replied positively to my letter and
welcomed me to Malaysia to be with him. …
It was a pleasure to see Ali Ghufron after six years. He has been the
brother closest to me since childhood.
I told him of my interest in going to Afghanistan just as he had done.
One week later he told me that, God willing, my wishes would be
fulfilled. I was told to be prepared physically and mentally and to leave
behind my family and all worldly pleasures. I had to listen attentively to
what was said and to follow the rules. …
Before I went to Malaysia I had never joined any organization that
followed military practice. I had heard of such organizations. I had also
heard that Ali Ghufron was a member of such an organization. When he
finished his studies at Pondok Pesantren Al Mukhmin Ngruki, Solo, he
went to war in Afghanistan. That is why I had decided to join an
organization that had a program of military practice; Ali Ghufron was
on my mind. Because I had minimum knowledge of the organization, I
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 1$
needed Ali Ghufron' s help to be able to be part of it. It was because of
Ali Ghufron that I was able to go to Pakistan and become a member of
the Mujahidin Military Academy.
When I was in Negri Sembilan at Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar’s house,
waiting to leave for Pakistan, he gave me a few lessons. I came to
understand the obligations of Jamaah, hIjrah, idad, and jihad, which
have to be turned into a reality. From those lessons I concluded that
Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar had a group, and that some of his followers
were sent to Afghanistan in order to carry out jihad. Before leaving for
Pakistan, I was sworn by Abdullah Sungkar. The swearing was a
promise to carry on with my duties. Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar organized
my departure for Pakistan. When I reached the Afghanistan Mujahidin
Military Academy, my friends told me that the agreement with Abdullah
Sungkar was a Bai’at to be part of Jamaah Darul Islam. I took it as
normal and as an important part of being in the academy.
At the beginning of 1993, one of our instructors said that the
Indonesians under Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar had seceded from Darul
Islam and founded Jamaah Islamiyah. Those who wanted to join JI
should sign on the paper provided. Signing the agreement meant that
one was a member of Jamaah Islamiyah. I signed the papers without
having to redo the Bai’at. Even though I had joined JI, I did not know in
detail about them and their methods, because in the academy there was
no lesson taught about JI and there was no handbook given. After I had
finished my time at the academy, I used to read the handbook of the JI
of Egypt. At that point, I knew that the JI I had been following was the
same as the Egyptian JI.
After I returned to Malaysia I still did not understand much about JI.
For me it was not important, because I trusted my seniors, including my
brother Ali Ghufron, and what was most important was to follow the
program created and run by the alumni of Afghanistan.
My Journey to Engaging in Terrorist Violence
In 1998, Ustadz Zulkarnaen asked me to be part of JI’s Team
Khos, whose duty was to find ammunition and other war
equipment. From then on I did not follow the activities of JI in
East Java. In 1999, I was sent to Ambon to help the Muslims
who were fighting against the Christians.
Imam Samudra:
We all have to be
spirited on the
journey to jihad!
Our target in Bali
is to fight with
I was with Ustadz Zulkarnaen in 1999 in Ambon and Kafirs.
received news that Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar had passed away in
Bogor. After his passing, I did not know, and never received The Bali bombing
information about, who took over his position as Amir of JI. I is
to
assumed that Ustadz Abu Bakar Bashir had taken over, because commemorate the
from the time I was in the Al Mukmin Boarding School in Solo WTC attack.
until the time I was in Malaysia, the two men were always
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 2$
together. I never joined any activities organized by JI. Thus I
never knew many details, or the structure of organization.
In the middle of 2000 some of our friends bombed the
Filipino Embassy in Jakarta. I was involved in preparing some of
the explosives and the transportation. At the end of 2000,
Hambali came to me with the idea to bomb churches on
Christmas Eve of that year. Some members of our group were
involved in the 2001 bombing of the Atrium Senen mall—I
learned this after I met with Usman Abas, who told me he was
involved in the bombing.
Those bombings made me ask myself if the actions were part
of JI or not. If they were, then why was it that most of our
friends whom I believed to be part of JI did not approve of them
and were not happy to see them carried out? If those actions
were JI’s programs, then why was Ustadz Zulkarnaen not
involved in them, even though he was the one responsible for
Team Khos? At that time, there were problems in JI regarding
Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which had been founded in
August 2000. Most of the members of JI did not wish to join
MMI. There was also a problem among us in organizing jihad in
Ambon. These problems and others caused conflicts among us in
private and among JI members in general.
Those issues could not be solved, and my brother Ali
Ghufron came in and brought the idea to bomb Bali. I asked him
whether my other friends knew about this program. I asked him
that question because I was afraid that this program would make
the issue worse. Ali Ghufron answered that if everyone knew the
program, they might not agree to it. He only told Zulkarnaen that
he would use Zulkarnaen’s men to carry out the program. My
involvement with such actions was based on my belief in the
seniors in JI. I believed such bombings were among JI’s agreedupon programs. I did not know about JI in detail, but as a
member I had to follow the program. If the seniors whom I had
trusted did not agree to the JI program, but they agreed to their
own program, let it be their own responsibility. …
$
… when Hambali came to see us with of the idea for a church
bombing that was based on carrying out jihad, back then I just
believed and followed it. Trust me, it is because Hambali was
from the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy Alumni and
was in the congregation with my brother Ali Ghufron. I
considered the bombing of churches to be a program that had
been agreed upon, and thought that it must be consistent with the
process of true jihad. ….
At that time, I also told Ali Ghufron, “If you want to fight
jihad against America and its allies, then let us commandeer the
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 3$
ships that sometimes stop at Indonesian ports. We could bomb a
warship using suicide missions by pulling alongside in a
speedboat, which would be filled with explosives.” My
recommendation was that there be no bombings in public places
where there were innocent people. Moreover, the majority of our
friends in Indonesia do not agree with the bombings we’ve done.$
My Capture
The arrests of Amrozi and Imam Samudra,
followed by those of Ali Ghufron and some
friends, were a heavy burden for me. As I
was also caught, the burden was even
heavier—I knew many friends had been
arrested for helping me escape. … I hoped
that our friends and family left behind could
be patient, forgive me, and understand the
incident.$
$
Once I was officially imprisoned, the
burden increased. This was due to the
growing number of captured friends. They
were simply there because they had helped a
fugitive or had hidden information about the
bombers. For me, if the bombers are arrested,
it does not really matter because, as the
bombers, of course, they are ready to risk
anything that will happen, knowing the
consequences.$
$
The burden was even heavier, and the
feeling became more painful, when I had to
watch my two brothers, Ali Ghufron and
Amrozi, huddled in the Bali police holding
cells. Whenever they were removed from the
cell, they would be handcuffed and flanked
by guards. This was something I had never
imagined I would see. To be curled up in a
cell, handcuffed and flanked by guards, is a
form of humiliation, in my opinion. It was
really painful for me to see them in that state,
so even if there was an opportunity to meet or
see them, I chose not to look at them because
I could not take it.
The arrest and imprisonment of us is part
of God's destiny. We should be pleased
because it was ordained by God. However,
because the destiny is something we did not
Narrator: Ali Imron and his friends
were not only hiding but they were
also working. Ali Imron felt sick and
could not do any work. When the sun
set, no one could work. They only
stayed in the hut and listened to Bali
bombing news developments on the
radio. The police had traced one of
the Bali bombers since October. The
bomber ran away to Kuala
Pembuang, East Kalimantan.
Ali Imron: I’m sure the police will
capture me soon. …
Narrator: Ali Imron’s feelings were
accurate. Two days after he listened
to the news on the radio, on January
13, 2003, the police were able to
trace his whereabouts. He was found
at Muhajir’s embankment.
Friend: Isn’t it the sound of
speedboats? The sound is heading
toward us. Yes, it’s true, there are
two speedboats coming toward us. I
think it’s the police. What now?
Ali Imron: Okay, so what can we do
now? Just let it be and let them catch
us, as we don’t have anywhere else to
go. …
Police: We are the police. Hands up
and stay in your place. Put the parang
away. Ali Imron! Where is Ali
Imron?
Ali Imron: Yes, sir. I am Ali Imron.
Police: Why are you skinny? Where
have you been, Ali Imron?
Narrator: Finally, Ali Imron and his
friends were captured. Ali Imron’s
journey of escape is over. His new
journey, wherein he will have to take
responsibility for what he has done as
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 4$
expect, I have to look inward to find its a Bali bomber, is about to begin.
cause. Because in addition to creating
destiny, God also created cause and effect.
Fate that befell our cause is our own fault.
Therefore, as our network was uncovered, we
were pursued by the police. We were caught
and jailed. The trigger was the Bali bombing.$
Why I Changed My Mind
The Bali bombing was carried out to attack foreigners who were
possibly from the United States and its allies, and it was carried out
for jihad. The attack was in retaliation for attacks on the Muslims of
Afghanistan. The attack was also aimed at combating the infidels, and
it was a fulfillment of the obligations of jihad in Allah's path.
In addition to serving as retaliation against the United States and
its allies, the attack was also directed at the perpetrators of
disobedience and the kafirs, so that they would quit bad habits and
stop damaging human morals. With the bombing in Bali, we hoped to
reduce immorality there, and we hoped this could serve as a lesson for
other places.
On October 12, 2002, we made and exploded a bomb as planned.
Less than a month after the bomb exploded, Amrozi was arrested. I
ran away. At that time, I thought that the arrest of Amrozi was a
destiny that was not good. Therefore I began to correct the flaws and
faults of the Bali bombing. Because in the course of jihad in Allah's
way, it would produce and victory is not a bad result of the bombing.
This correction, I started from the word of Allah Ta'ala.
What comes to you of good is from Allah, but what comes to you
of evil, [O man], is from yourself. And We have sent you, [O
Muhammad], to the people as a messenger, and sufficient is
Allah as Witness. (An-Nisa:79)
$
We were being hunted, arrested, and imprisoned as the Bali
bombers, and I thought that it was a disgrace and a destiny that was
not good for us. It is true that in every struggle there are risks and that
they require sacrifice. But if the fight is in the form of a disastrous
risk, it stands to reason that the main cause of the error is as Allah
himself said above.$
In the history of the struggle of the Muslims, the defeat by the
enemy has been because of their own mistakes. For example, the
defeat of the Muslims at Uhud was due to errors of archers who
disobeyed the orders of the Prophet Muhammad. Likewise with
almost the defeat of the Muslims in the battle of Hunain was due to
their own fault that the majority of Muslims were proud of the large
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 5$
number of them. …
I began to look for shortcomings and mistakes that could serve as a
lesson to everyone, especially to our brothers, so that they would no
longer make mistakes like we did.$
Among the errors in the Bali bombing are:
1. Violating the norms of jihad$
Among the norms of jihad that we violated in the bombings in
Bali are:
a. Not conveying propaganda and warning.
Propaganda is delivered as a way of offering to the parties
who will soon come under attack the opportunity to convert
or submit to Islam. We should have warned the parties who
were about to be attacked and told them why they must be
fought.
b. Beyond the killing.
The purpose of the Bali bombing was to attack and kill
foreigners.
c. Killing women who were not involved in the fight against
Muslims.
The Bali bombing targets were strangers, and women were
also subjected to assault and murder.
d. Killing the innocent.
The purpose of the bombing in Bali was to attack the United
States and its allies. But in reality people who are not guilty
in this matter were exposed to the bombardment. This was
because the bombing was not preceded by conveying
propaganda and warning.
2. There is no clarity on the status of people who were attacked
We were targeting people who were most likely from the United
States and its allies. But we did not know for sure whether the
actual people we bombed were from the United States and its allies
or not. We also did not know for sure whether they were infidels or
not, or whether they included people who were hostile to Islam and
Muslims or not.
Since our targets were foreigners, I just looked for places where
the majority of visitors and residents were Caucasian people.
Finally we found the Sari Club and Paddy’s Pub, located on Jalan
Legian Kuta.
It cannot be denied that the Sari Club and Paddy's Pub is a place
that is full of immorality. However, it does not mean that a place
like that should immediately be destroyed and the people in it
attacked without warning.
$
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 6$
3. Driven by emotion$
The triggers were:
a. Hatred and anger against the United States and its allies.
b. The fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden, which requires us to
fight the United States and its allies, whether military or
civilian.
c. In some states, they have begun to undergo a jihad of attacks
against infidels and their interests, and so we also have our
fight.
d. The existence of funds provided for jihad against infidels
and attacking people; these funds may not be used for other
purposes.
e. Guilt over not doing jihad.
f. If we do not launch jihad now, then when?
g. There is a sense of shame at being mujahidin jihad
elsewhere if we do not start our actions that we regard as
jihad in Allah's path.
h. Whatever the risks, we have to begin by conducting
bombing jihad against those parties we think are the enemy.
i. We want to have jihad between the Muslims and the kafirs.$
4. Have no power:
What is meant by not having power is:
a. The bombing we did was not to implement the program for
the Muslim Jamaat or Islamic state or Caliphate.
b. We are not bombers under the Imam of Muslims.
c. We as bombers do not have any territory or a safe base.
Territory is an area that is one hundred percent owned by
Jamaat of Muslims led by the Imam of the Muslims.
5. The creation of hostilities$
The bomb that devastated the area of Jalan Legian Kuta Bali,
which killed and injured many people, was the cause of hatred and
hostility toward our group and several parties. Even some Muslims
have come to hate us. The Bali bombing led to the search for our
bombers, so we had to deal with the government of Indonesia,
particularly the police; we were searched, arrested, and
imprisoned. Even our friends who were not bombers were also
sought, arrested, and imprisoned because they were involved in
helping to give information about us…
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 7$
6. Cannot meet the purpose of jihad$
… the bombing in Bali cannot eliminate polytheism and cannot
mediate the establishment of monotheism. … In fact, the bombing
gave rise to more polytheism. And on the former site of the Bali
bombings, a monument has been built that is inscribed with the
names of the victims. Do not rule out the possibility that the
monument would be part of idol worship one day.
As for reducing disobedience, the Bali bombing cannot make a
difference. After the bomb exploded, the majority of foreign
tourists whom we consider to be the destroyers of diminished
morals were afraid to come to Indonesia. However, the effect was
not long-lived, because jihad by means of a bomb in Bali is merely
a target to kill and injure people and will not reduce disobedience.
This is because the Bali bombers themselves do not have the
power that can be used as a tool to subjugate people to the Sharia
of Allah.$
$
7. There is no support from Muslims
… before we did the bombing, we did not first seek to understand
the other Muslims involved in the struggle. We also did not try to
make other Muslims support our cause or be sympathetic to us.
And we also did not seek to minimize the enemy or those who did
not like us, though the success of the fight using guerrilla warfare
like we did depends on the local population. …
8. To proceed with suicide bombings
Suicide is an act that is forbidden by Allah and included in kabair
(major sins). Although forbidden, it is in certain circumstances
allowed to attack enemies by suicide in urgent situations.
There were other ways to do a bombing other than suicide
bombing. The suicide bombing was carried out with the aim of
adding a sense of fear in the hearts of unbelievers, and in the hearts
of those who are considered enemies. Suicide bombing is also
intended to encourage Muslims to fight for Islam—to be bold and
courageous people. …
9. Haste (Isti'jal)
The desire to carry out the duty of jihad in the way of Allah is our
main justification for and the underlying cause of the bombing.
Actually, we had long wanted to do the bombing, but there was no
reason to do it.
So with the United States and its allies attacking Afghanistan,
we had a reason to conduct bombings against those Caucasians
who most likely were the ones from the United States and its allies.
We believed that the reply to the infidels should be to attack their
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 8$
interests. Therefore the bombing was allowed.
Justification is also provided by the fatwa from Osama bin
Laden that maintains that one must fight or kill the United States
and its allies, whether civilian or military. So we wanted to go
ahead with the bombing without considering the pros and cons in
depth.
We wanted to bomb but left out the tactics and strategy. We
wanted to bomb, but were not prepared to anticipate the
consequences and did not do subsequent planning. We wanted a
way to quickly perform jihad but did not have a program for
planning the next jihad.
Haste was triggered by the desire to detonate bombs on
September 11, 2002, so as to commemorate the collapse of the
WTC buildings a year before in the United States—though
planning did begin until around mid-August 2002.
Haste caused some things to be omitted from the planning.
Haste also caused some problems that led to internal dispute.
10. Disagreement
The absence of community and a lack of priests (in accordance
with the demands of the Sunnah) was to cause some problems
when we were preparing for the bombings in Bali. Among these
issues are:$
a. Less than the maximum leadership in organizing and
leading.
b. Lack of trust between each other.
c. Each defended his ego.
d. Blaming each other.
e. Offense to one another.
f. Less patience among some of us
11. Excessive use of funds$
When preparing the bombs in Bali, I could feel that in using the
funds available, we used them excessively. Items that should not
have been bought were purchased. Some things were done that
should not have been done. We also rented property beyond what
we needed, thereby reducing the funds available. Using property
that exceeds the purpose of the action is forbidden, especially if the
property belongs to people.
12. Excessive incognito (camouflage)
Basically camouflage in war is allowed, as part of the deception.
However, we donned many disguises when preparing for the
bombings in Bali, and I think it was excessive. Among the
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 9$
disguises were:
a. My friends and I took frequent walks, sitting among people,
both men and women, who were half-naked. We also
frequently hung out in front of cafés and discos and around
other dirty places.
b. When we sat in the streets and did surveys, some friends and
I smoked cigarettes. My own hair was colored blond.$
c. At the time of the survey, we used to play music and
Western songs on tape from our car; we also did so when we
were in a rented house.
d. On the days we were assembling the bomb, there was a clash
between us about playing music and listening to Western
songs. $
i. One of us said that he did not agree with playing music,
on the grounds that while preparing a bomb we should
increase devotions and prayer.
ii. We concluded that it was okay to play music, the aim
being disguise, so no one would suspect us, and also so
we would not to be heard.
All the disguises were used with the aim of deceiving—in order to
cover up our real identity and to be able to freely do preparations
for the bombing, conduct the survey, bring equipment and supplies
to assemble the bomb in the midst of the general public, make
ourselves secure in bringing a bomb to the target, and succeed in
the mission.
Why I No Longer Believe Violence to Be Justified
Narrator: In the cell he spoke to himself.
Ali Imron: Jihad in Allah’s way is a good deed. But then it is either
accepted or not; we have to surrender all to God. Was the Bali
bombing a jihad in Allah’s way? I saw many victims.
I have to rethink and correct what I have done. Our fault was we
went the wrong way in jihad. There was no warning and passing of
messages. We killed many innocent people, including women. …
Narrator: He spoke aloud in his heart that what he did was a crime.
Ali Imron: I admit and regret what I have done. …
I have realized that the explosion in the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar
wasn’t jihad. Jihad in Islam means very pure and holy. The
explosion was a crime.
Why I Wrote My Memoirs / Took Part in the Comic Book Project
When we were formally arrested at Bali police The purpose of this comic
headquarters, then slowly I began to write about the is to show the younger
experience and my journey, especially about my generation that terrorism
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 10$
involvement in the bombing. With this writing, I intend
to inform the world about the purpose of the Bali
bombing and lay out our responsibility as bombers. The
important thing is that this writing can serve as a lesson
for other friends and all of us not to do jihad in the
manner of the Bali bombing.
Based on the facts mentioned, I decided to publish
my writing in order to record the errors we had
committed in the manner we did jihad. I hope this
writing can be used as a lesson for others in order to
carry out jihad and that they do not make mistakes like
we did. I also wrote this for my friends, the bombers
and others who agree with the bombings, whether
through jihad or not.$
I hope that this writing can help people understand
what occurred; that it adds to the knowledge of those
who already understood; and that it helps to clarify
matters for those who have made mistakes, helps those
still in doubt, and helps anyone who is constantly trying
to do good deeds. If there is truth, it comes from God
alone. … And if it hurts, it's from my shortcomings;
may Allah forgive me.
has caused a lot of trouble
in this country. We want
the younger generation to
be aware and alert and to
protect themselves from
acts of terrorism. Ali Imron
offers many messages
about peace. He speaks of
his conscience and his
regret at being one of the
Bali bombers. He regrets
his family’s involvement in
the bombings.
We hope that this comic
will stir your heart and
encourage
you
to
participate in the fight
against terrorism.
My Message to Other Terrorists/Jihadists
Since I have been arrested, I would
like to invite my friends who were
involved as perpetrators of the Bali
bombing to jointly prevent other
friends from doing jihad by carrying
out similar acts. Events have proved
that jihad as we conducted it is
wrong. The impact of the Bali
bombing is proof that we have not
been able to carry out the duty of
jihad as undertaken by the Salaf
Saalih (first three centuries of
Islam). …
Ali Imron: To prevent radicalism and
terrorism, Ali Imron would like to say some
words.
Dear friends, please don’t force yourself to do
jihad without looking at the bigger picture.
The negative effect will come after.
Do not get yourself into prison; once you are
in, it will be difficult to free yourself. You will
lose your family. You could be sentenced to
death.
If you are doing jihad your family is also
affected. …
I am sharing this message with all of you so
that you will not get trapped in the net of
radicalism and terrorism.
Recruitment of jihadis is usually done by
families, as happened in my case. It also
happens through marriage and friendship.
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 11$
After recruitment, preaching is done by a
teacher and brainwashing occurs. After
brainwashing, the recruits are asked to join an
organization that has the same mission as
jihad.
Annex A - Ali$Imron Page 12$
Annex B
In his own words … Nasir Abas
Excerpts from:
Inside Jamaah Islamiyah: A Former Member’s True Story, by Nasir Abas (Jakarta:
Grafindo, 2011). (The original Bahasa Indonesian edition was published in July
2005.)
Kutemukan Makna Jihad (I Found the Meaning of Jihad), graphic novel featuring
Nasir Abas (Jakarta: Lazuardi Birru, 2011).
Translation by Jasminder Singh
Why I Joined Jamaah Islamiyah
At the time, I was not particularly interested in the
struggles undertaken by the Indonesians, since I
was Malaysian—especially since what I desired
had already taken place: jihad in Afghanistan and
helping the Islamic community (Ummah). I had
never had the intention to travel to Indonesia but
desired to stay longer in Afghanistan in order to
serve and help the Islamic community … and to
be fit to die in a state of Shahid (martyr), which
only Allah can determine. And if the opportunity
arose, at that time, for marriage, then I would seek
a partner from amongst the Afghan women. …
Around January of 1993, I was called for by
Zulkarnaen to Peshawar, who went on to inform
me that Ustadz Abdul Halim and Ustadz Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir had separated themselves from the
NII group. Consequently, I was given the
opportunity to choose … the “leader to be
followed,” that is, Ustadz Abdul Halim or a
legitimate leader (other than Ustadz Abdul
Halim). It was further explained to me that, if I
chose Ustadz Abdul Halim, I would still have the
opportunity to stay in Afghanistan. If I chose
another legitimate leader, I would be reassigned
back to Malaysia as soon as possible. …
Because I still desired to remain in Afghanistan
and I was not disposed to inquire further into the
essence of this matter of conflict that had come
about within the higher ranks, I chose as my
leader Ustadz Abdul Halim, whom I had known
for quite some time. Furthermore, I was asked to
Ustadz Hashim: Do you want to
go to Afghanistan or Perlis?
Nasir Abas (thinking): Finally…
I will be leaving the country.
Nasir (thinking of tanks and
ammunition): Afghanistan. …
Instructor: We have to always
defend Negara Islam Indonesia
(NII), we have to continue the
struggle of Kartosuwiryo in
Indonesia.
Nasir (thinking): Oh, so this is
the purpose of their struggle.
Nasir (thinking): It means that
even before I left for Afghanistan
I had already become part of the
NII. Why didn’t they tell me
earlier? That means all the
Indonesians in Afghanistan are
members of the NII. …
Narrator: In 1993 there was a
split in the NNI organization
between Ustadz Abdul Halim
and Ustadz Ajengan Masduki.
Nasir: I chose to be with Ustadz
Abdul Halim because I was
familiar with him and I am happy
to do jihad in Afghanistan.
Narrator:
Hence,
all
the
mujahidin from Indonesia who
were in Afghanistan were under
the leadership of Ustadz Abdul
Halim and they were named Al
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 1&
perform bai’at (oath) to my new leader, namely to Jamaah Al Islamiyah.
Ustadz Abdul Halim, via Zulkarnaen as his
representative. I was then no longer a member of
the NII group. In other words, I had already
become a member of a new Jamaah under the
leadership of Ustadz Abdul Halim. The bai’at I
undertook was with the intention and purpose of
remaining in Afghanistan, but I never revealed
this. …
Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, well known as
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), was formed in January of
1993, at which time I was assigned as a military
instructor at the training camp run by the NII
group under the guidance of Ustadz Abdul at
Towrkham, in Afghanistan. After the NII was
disbanded I continued my occupation under the
management of a new Jamaah, namely Al Jamaah
Al Islamiyah, and was assigned as a trainer at the
same camp in Towrkham which had transferred
control to the training camp of Al Jamaah al
Islamiyah.
My Journey to Engaging in Violence
Ustadh Hashim A. Ghani revealed the message in the form of a
question. He said, “Do you want to go to Afghanistan or Perlis?”
Very quickly I thought about the narratives of the jihad of the
mujahidin in Afghanistan and also of the stories of my friends who
had been sent to Perlis.
Most of my heart’s feelings urged me to leave for Afghanistan,
since I wanted to know and experience for myself the atmosphere of
jihad that until now I had only read about in books and daily
newspapers. I had already imagined the ambience of fighting
together with the mujahidin of Afghanistan and wished to experience
it myself, and I also imagined holding a weapon as well. …
All the graduates from the Military Academy for the year 1990
and thereafter were tasked to be instructors at the Afghanistan
Mujahidin Military Academy, and I took the opportunity on a
number of occasions to go to the battlefront.
My Capture
I was finally arrested on the 18th of April, 2003, during a search
operation for the Bali bombers by the Indonesian Police (INP).
On the basis of information possessed by the police, [it was
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 2&
determined that ] I was not involved with the bombing events in
Bali on the 12th of October, 2002. However, because I was a
member of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah, I was interviewed in
connection with what I knew about the bombings in Bali. …
Because I was a Malaysian citizen who was using a false identity
and had entered Indonesia without a passport, it meant that I had
to be detained until I was tried in the State Court at Palu. I
received a ten-month sentence. That sentence ended on the 18th of
February, 2004.
Why I Changed My Mind
I realized that I had to participate in the prevention of violent
actions that contradicted Islam. In addition, I had to explain to the
police that not all graduates from Afghanistan and the Philippines
thought in the same manner as the Bali bombers.
The primary and most important issue that I desire to reveal here
is that it is not my agreement from amongst the members of Al
Jamaah Al Islamiyah, who have already deviated from the
guidance of Islam by carrying out attacks and bombings on
common people. Amongst them are those composed from within
the leadership of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah and also those from
within the regular [membership].
The understanding and conviction to wage war in Islam that is
wrongful in meaning becomes a form of war towards people who
are not the enemies of Islam. The bombings that occurred on
Christmas Eve 2000, the Bali bombings, the bombing of the J. W.
Marriott hotel, and the bombing in front of the Australian embassy
were the result of people who have the same understanding as
Imam Samudra, that is, to attack people who are non-Muslim
without limits ….
This understanding has already had its influence upon the
activities of Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah by effecting [sic] the Islamic
da’wah mission, which was carried out with the aim of having the
Islamic community hating non-Muslims and attacking them.
Whereas, Islamic law is not like that which is illustrated by Imam
Samudra and those people who have the same understanding as
him.
My exit from Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah was for the purpose of
[salvaging] the Islamic community, to the best of my capabilities,
in order that they are not lost to some erroneous understanding;
and in order that the Islamic community specifically, and
“mankind” in general, do not become the victims of bombings and
attacks that are carried out for illegitimate and inhumane reasons.
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 3&
Why My Treatment by the Police Helped Me Change My Mind
Police: Let’s join hands to stop all the bombings.
Nasir (thinking): The police are able to differentiate between
members of JI who support bombings and those who do not.
Nasir (thinking about cooperating with police): I think there is no
other way. I have to stop these bombings which were done by my
brothers. As long as the intentions are good I will do it.
Nasir: I want to speak to Pak Bekto in private.
Bekto: Open his handcuffs.
Nasir (thinking): Why is this policeman so brave as to ask his
colleagues to open the handcuffs? Is he not afraid that I will attack
him? But his attitude has won my respect.
Nasir: I am upset with the actions that my brothers have done. I think
those actions have spoiled the meaning of jihad.
Nasir: I will help you [the police], whatever risks I may face, but I
need my family in Palu to be brought to Jakarta. I don’t have any
other family members in Indonesia.
Why I No Longer Believe Violence to Be Justified
Journalist: Have you heard about the Cirebon bombing? What are
your views about it?
Nasir: Yes, I have heard about it. I curse the actions of the bomber. It
is not jihad but an act of cowardice. To confront the Muslims who
were praying and were unarmed is an act of cowardice. They do not
understand the meaning of jihad.
The recruiters of young suicide bombers alter the verses of the Quran
based on their needs. They do not see the verses as a whole. Seeing
them as a whole would define jihad differently.
I can’t bear to see or hear my religion being labeled as a religion of
terrorists. I don’t have the heart to see innocent members of the public
become victims. It is not only the responsibility of the police and the
media to fight against terrorism but also the responsibility of the
public.
But Violent Jihad Is Justified Under Some Conditions
What I understand is that attacks undertaken by the Messenger of
Allah together with the Muslim troops were [carried out] for reasons
of violations of peace treaties accompanied by enmity.
The utilization of strength within the readiness to uphold this
Daulah is carried out at places of conflict for the care of the Islamic
community who are under attack, wherever that place may be in this
world, and the utilization of strength is also put into effect after there
is a command [statement] from the Amir of the Jamaah to perform
jihad with arms in a specified area or region.
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 4&
Jihad Musallah means to perform jihad with the use of weaponry;
that is warfare. When the Amir of Al Jamaah al Islamiyah has
already pronounced or declared war or authorized involvement in
war to assist the Islamic community, then Jihad Musallah must be
undertaken, and its implementation is ordered to the point where it is
carried out in accordance with Islamic law and with the strategy of
war.
If attacked, then resistance can be carried out without the need to
wait for the command, but if it will be the carrying out of attacks
against the enemy, then one must wait for the decision from the
command of the state’s leader or highest-ranking leader of the troops.
The implementation of attacks undertaken by the Messenger of
Allah was the right of the Muslims in order to execute as such, in the
event of betrayal or attack. The implementation of resistance is also
the right of the Muslims and in fact must be the status upheld for
reasons of warding off, self-defense, and saving oneself from the
threats and opposition of the enemy.
Fighting in order to wage a struggle for the “homeland” is the
most noble jihad because such a concern is the maintenance of the
maruah (honour) of religion, people, and state.
Why I Wrote My Memoirs
This book tries to confer answers to all the accusations or suspicions that
abound and are amongst us. On the basis of the experience of the author,
who at one time was with the Bali bombers—in the same organization,
both in the role of leader as well as having been part of its field
personnel—a portrayal will be furnished, for the readers, about the
background and capabilities in the use of military equipment and
chemicals.
On that basis, this books means to answer the various questions that
circulate within the community. Amongst such questions are, what is Al
Jamaah al Islamiyyah? How long has JI been around and carried out its
activities? What are they struggling for? What is the relevance of the Bali
bombings?
For those reasons I, as a former member of JI’s leadership, will furnish
those answers to the community for what until now is still a bone of
contention for people, both in Indonesia and around the world.
My Message to Other Terrorists/Jihadists
I appeal and call to all friends and all people Narrator: Now Nasir Abas is fighting
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 5&
who still have the intention to carry out
bombings upon whatever and whomever as
targets … that they stop and immediately
ask forgiveness from Allah.
against violence in the name of
religion. He is using the meaning of
jihad to truly fight for peace and is also
helping to put to rest the idea that jihad
is about violence.
My appeal is an appeal that hopes for the Nasir: Now the most important thing is
salvation and unity of Muslims, in order that to prevent the recruitment of future
they truly practice in accordance with the suicide bombers.
guidance of the Messenger of Allah. And
also, in order that the status of Islam returns
to its respectful and noble position, for the
unity of fellow Islamic communities, as well
as a united understanding towards Islam.
Annex B - Nasir&Abas Page 6&