american samoa tsunami study research topic #07 warning

Transcription

AMERICAN SAMOA TSUNAMI STUDY
RESEARCH TOPIC #07
WARNING & EVACUATION
October 2011
American Samoa Tsunami Study
October 2011
Page i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Research Topic #07: Warning & Evacuation ..................................................................................1
1.1
Executive Summary................................................................................................ 1
1.2
Study Overview ...................................................................................................... 1
1.3
Introduction............................................................................................................. 3
1.4
Methodology........................................................................................................... 4
1.4.1 Assessment Criteria .................................................................................... 4
1.4.2 Resources and Current Research ................................................................ 5
1.4.3 Consultation ................................................................................................ 6
1.4.4 Relationship to Other Papers ...................................................................... 9
1.4.5 Data Gap Analysis .................................................................................... 10
1.5
Synthesis and Analysis ......................................................................................... 32
1.5.1 Successes................................................................................................... 32
1.5.2 Target Areas for Improvement.................................................................. 32
1.5.3 Implementation Plan Implications ............................................................ 36
Resources .......................................................................................................................................37
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: American Samoa Location .............................................................................................. 1
Figure 2: American Samoa Villages on Tutuila and the Manua Islands ........................................ 2
Figure 3: PTWC and WC/ATWC Area of Responsibility............................................................ 10
Figure 4: Locations of Seismic Monitoring Stations in the Global Seismographic Network ...... 11
Figure 5: Illustration of DART Data Collection and Transmission.............................................. 13
Figure 6: Distribution of DART Buoys ........................................................................................ 14
Figure 7: Components of the Tsunami Warning System.............................................................. 15
Figure 8: Steps Involved in the Tsunami Warning System .......................................................... 15
Figure 9: Diagram of the Tsunami Monitoring and Warning Process.......................................... 16
Figure 10: American Samoa Warning System Process for Local Tsunami.................................. 17
Figure 11: Village Bells and Bullhorns for Early Warning .......................................................... 19
Figure 12: Evacuation Map for Maoputasi County ...................................................................... 23
Figure 13: Evacuation Map for Pago Pago Village ...................................................................... 24
Figure 14: Example Evacuation and Shelter Plan for Leone Midkiff .......................................... 29
Figure 15: Vertical Evacuation Planning...................................................................................... 30
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Radio Stations in American Samoa (FCC, 2011)........................................................... 18
Table 2: Summary PTRTF Report Findings................................................................................. 21
Warning & Evacuation
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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Table 3: Shelters Located in Potentially Vulnerable Areas .......................................................... 27
Table 4: Summary of Challenges and Recommendations ............................................................ 34
Table 5: Implementation Plan Scopes, Priority, ROM, Timeline................................................. 36
APPENDICES
Appendix 7A: Gap Analysis Table for: Warning & Evacuation
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA
AAR
AOR
ASDHS
ASDRO
ASG
ASPA
ATEP
CCR
DART
DHS
DOC
DOE
DOGAMI
DOH
DPA
DPS
DPW
EAS
EOB
EOC
EOP
FCC
FEMA
GIS
GSN
HMGP
IOC
IOTWS
Assembly Area
After Action Review
Area of Responsibility
American Samoa Department of
Homeland Security
American Samoa Disaster
Recovery Office
American Samoa Government
American Samoa Power
Authority
Alaska Tsunami Education
Program
Coastal Community Resilience
Deep-ocean Assessment and
Reporting of Tsunami
Department of Homeland
Security
Department of Commerce
Department of Education
Oregon Department of Geology
and Mineral Industries
Department of Health
Department of Port
Administration
Department of Public Safety
Department of Public Works
Emergency Alert System
Executive Office Building
Emergency Operations Center
Emergency Operations Plan
Federal Communications
Commission
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
Geographic Information System
Global Seismographic Network
Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program
Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission
Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning
System
Draft Working Paper
IRIS
ITIC
LBJ
NCS
NDPTC
NOAA
NPS
NTHMP
NWR
NWS
OIA
OSA
PCS
PTRTF
PTWC
SPT
TAC
TEB
TEMCO
TEOP
UNESCO
USACE
USGS
WC/ATWC
WSO
Incorporated Research
Institutions for Seismology
International Tsunami
Information Center
Lyndon B. Johnson Tropical
Medical Center
National Communication
System
Natural Disaster Preparedness
Training Center
National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
National Park Service
National Tsunami Hazard
Preparedness Program
NOAA Weather Radio
National Weather Service
Office of Insular Affairs
Office of Samoan Affairs
Pacific Services Center
Post-Tsunami Review Task
Force
Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center
South Pacific Tsunami
(9/29/2009 event)
Tsunami Advisory Committee
Tsunami Evacuation Buildings
Territorial Emergency
Management Coordinating
Office
Territorial Emergency
Operational Plan
United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural
Organization
United States Army Corps of
Engineers
United States Geological Survey
West Coast and Alaska Tsunami
Warning Center
Weather Service Office (Pago
Pago, American Samoa)
October 2011
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RESEARCH TOPIC #07: WARNING & EVACUATION
1.1
Executive Summary
The ability to effectively warn residents of a tsunami hazard and coordinate a safe and timely
evacuation are critical components to withstanding such events. Resilient communities have
comprehensive and redundant communication systems for transmitting warnings, practiced and
well-coordinated emergency operations plans (EOPs), clear and known evacuation plans, easily
identified evacuation routes, and adequate evacuation sites or shelters.
The Warning & Evacuation paper provides an overview and preliminary assessment of existing
warning systems involved in transmitting tsunami warnings and activating EOPs and issues
related to evacuation planning. Prior to the September 29, 2009 South Pacific Tsunami (2009
SPT) the warning system in American Samoa was developed fairly well, but training and
education were likely more effective in saving lives. Warning sirens have now been installed to
provide an additional level of redundancy for emergency communications and to reach a wider
portion of the general public. Improvements are needed in the documentation, awareness, and
practicing of EOPs as well as outreach to special needs populations with higher vulnerability,
including the elderly, disabled, caretakers, visitors, and migrants. Evacuation in 2009 was largely
effective, but evacuation planning is being improved including the development of evacuation
routes and installation of signage. Identification of and transportation plans for special needs
populations are still needed. Evaluation of sheltering capacity and locations, and adequacy of
public facilities at designated evacuation sites is needed. A major component of disaster
management planning is the coordination of plan development and revision and practicing the
protocol defined in EOPs. A new EOP coordinator position is needed to ensure EOP
development, review, training, and revision are undertaken and sustained.
1.2
Study Overview
American Samoa is located approximately 120
miles away from the Tonga Trench, one of the
fastest moving subduction zones in the world.
The 2009 SPT was generated by a series of
earthquakes that took place at possibly the
closest point of this trench to AS causing
fatalities and regional devastation.
This
subduction zone, and more distant geological
action throughout the Pacific basin, will
continue to produce earthquakes and
potentially damaging tsunamis, therefore there
is a goal to improve knowledge, protocol, and
Figure 1: American Samoa Location
Source: Marks, K. (2009); with credit to USGS
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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infrastructure in order to maximize community resiliency following future tsunami events.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (USACE) Honolulu District in cooperation with the
American Samoa Government (ASG) is conducting the American Samoa Tsunami Study under
USACE’s Planning Assistance to States program. The study’s goals are to identify areas that
could be improved to strengthen American Samoa’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from tsunami hazards. The study will also provide a resource base for organizations
undertaking hazard mitigation efforts in American Samoa. The study is structured around twelve
working papers to provide comprehensive coverage for assessing current tsunami resiliency. The
content of eight of these papers (Risk Knowledge, Emergency Response, Land Use & Structural
Design, Warning & Evacuation, Governance, Disaster Recovery, Coastal Resource Management,
and Society & Economy) are based on the guidance provided in the Indian Ocean Tsunami
Warning System (IOTWS) Coastal Community Resilience (CCR) guide (IOWTS, 2007). The
additional four topics (Geomorphology, Chronology of Events, Critical Infrastructure, and Case
Studies) were added to provide reference information, a more detailed focus for key issues, and
to develop additional key recommendations. Planning team research was based on questions
from the CCR guide, additional inquires, and concerns that were raised in interviews and
meetings or through research findings. These questions are being tracked throughout the study
and will be compiled in an appendix to the final report. The research questions guide and
categorize the issues addressed in each paper to ensure full coverage and avoid repetition. In
some cases, issues logically related to more than one paper may only be addressed in one
relevant paper, as determined by the planning team.
Figure 2: American Samoa Villages on Tutuila and the Manua Islands
Tau
Source: EA/HHF Joint Venture
In addition to the research papers, this project includes formalized meetings with critical AS
stakeholders such as agency leaders and department heads as well as input received from the AS
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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Governor’s Tsunami Advisory Committee (TAC). A major effort of this study is to gather and
document input on the issues that ASG officials and village leaders believe are important. TAC
members provided information and direction to the study topics and recommendations. Based on
the data gathered through research and in conjunction with the American Samoa-based TAC, the
study will result in a set of lessons learned and recommendations for building community
resilience for future tsunami events. Recommendations were generated in each of the applicable
papers and include a preliminary scope of work, prioritization, and budgetary cost estimate. All
recommendations and findings will be aggregated into a final summary report to provide further
comprehensive guidance. The papers, resources, and other materials developed throughout the
study are posted on the study website http://astsunamiresilience.org. This website will become
part of the American Samoan Government website and used in the future to update and widely
disseminate information to its users.
1.3
Introduction
Basis of Thought: Warning & Evacuation was investigated to identify:
1. What are the extents and effectiveness of the existing tsunami warning system?
2. What is being done for evacuation planning?
Scope of Work Definition: This paper reviews federal roles in tsunami monitoring and warning
and current practices and new initiatives regarding warning and evacuation at the local level.
Options for additional non-traditional warning mechanisms and opportunities for further
planning and outreach will be explored. For the purposes of this paper, warning and evacuation
include monitoring activities taken place before a tsunamigenic event occurs, the monitoring of
the effects of that event, the communication that takes place including the warning when
warranted, the transmission of that warning throughout American Samoa, evacuation plans and
practices, and sheltering plans for the families who lose their homes. Topics addressed in this
paper correlate with some topics addressed in the Governance and Emergency Response papers.
When areas of overlap are encountered references to the paper that addresses the correlating
topic are made.
Work Plan Focus: Gather documentation of the current structure of local and federal warning
systems and efforts regarding evacuation planning and highlight opportunities for additional
outreach, training, planning, or projects.
CCR Definition: The desired outcome of this element of resilience is a community that is capable
of receiving notifications and alerts of coastal hazards, warning at-risk populations, and acting on
an alert (IOTWS, 2007, p. 6-45).
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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1.4
Methodology
This topic area was assessed through the identification and review of literature resources and
websites, the development of region specific questions by the study team, and interviews with
key officials and community leaders. Areas investigated include federal monitoring for tsunami
and seismic events, communications practices between federal and local monitoring agencies,
warning dissemination in American Samoa, and evacuation and sheltering practices.
1.4.1
Assessment Criteria
Questions investigated are grouped as follows.
Warning:
1. What agencies are participating in monitoring tsunami threats?
2. What systems are used for identifying regional tsunami threats?
3. What systems are used for local warning and evacuation notification?
a. Do alert protocols define roles and responsibilities for authorities and media
participating in disseminating warning information?
b. Do the warning systems include human and technological backup components to
ensure warning delivery?
c. Are warnings multi lingual?
4. Are all aspects of the warning systems and evacuation notification procedures
periodically tested and evaluated to identify system shortfalls?
Evacuation:
5. Do established and publically available evacuation plans exist?
a. Is there a need for village level planning for warning and evacuation?
b. Are evacuation plans well publicized and practiced at schools and in business
districts?
c. Is the public well informed about tsunami risk and evacuation procedures?
6. Are there existing procedures for first responders to evacuate special needs populations
(e.g. elderly, disabled, visitors, and migrants)?
7. What critical facilities need to evacuate and what impact does this have on operations?
8. Are tsunami hazard zones, evacuation routes, shelters, and safe areas clearly marked
throughout the community with signs and/or maps?
9. Can shelters accommodate special needs of elderly, disabled, children, or pets?
For a complete list of questions, answers identified, and resources see Appendix 7A – Gap
Analysis Table for: Warning & Evacuation. The numbers to the above questions correlate with
the numbered questions in Appendix 7A.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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1.4.2
Resources and Current Research
The following documents were particularly informative to the Warning & Evacuation working
paper.
The Tsunami Warning and Education Act of December 2006, PL 109-424, fortifies federal
support for tsunami warning efforts and authorizes the agency roles in the Tsunami Forecasting
and Warning Program including development and transfer of technology, reporting, and
appropriations to support these efforts. The tsunami warning system used in the Pacific basin has
been developed and is monitored and maintained by collaborative domestic and international
efforts. Domestic systems are primarily developed and maintained by branches of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and International Tsunami Information
Centre (ITIC), with support from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
United States Geological Survey (USGS). The U.S. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program (NTHMP) document, National Media Tsunami Guidebook (NTHMP, 2011), offers a
clear description of tsunami monitoring systems and warning process. The NOAA document,
The Tsunami Warning System – How Does It Work? (NOAA, N.D.), also provides insight into
local and distant source tsunami risks and the actions are appropriate for each situation. The
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) Frequently Asked Questions web page offers
responses to tsunami related concerns including how the Tsunami Warning System works,
PTWC responsibilities, how the PTWC evaluates earthquakes for tsunami potential, how the
PTWC disseminates messages, and the difference between a tsunami warning, watch, advisory,
and informational bulletin. ITIC websites provide extensive information on how the Deep-ocean
Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) program assists in tsunami monitoring and
warning. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)/ITIC information brochure,
Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (IOC, 2004), also provides concise descriptions on
topical issues of the tsunami warning system used in the Pacific.
American Samoa Department of Homeland Security’s (ASDHS) Territorial Emergency
Operations Plan (TEOP), (ASDHS, 2010), outlines response protocol and responsibilities for all
hazards. The TEOP Hazard Specific Annex C: Tsunami identifies the roles of organizations with
primary responsibility for tsunami warning and evacuation actions and clarifies warning roles
and sequencing of activities. Critical actions include dissemination of the tsunami warning to key
agencies and the general public to ensure timely and effective evacuation. ASDHS, as the State
Administrative Agency, is the primary ASG agency responsible for coordination of emergency
response during a tsunami.
The Domestic Travel Trip Report American Samoa, April 26-30, May 24-27 and June 14-15,
2010 (Kong, Yanagi, 2010) provides insight into the status and improvements to Emergency
Alert System (EAS) practices. The ITIC initiated and facilitated a Chilean Tsunami After Action
Review (AAR), attended by representatives of the local National Weather Service Weather
Service Office Pago Pago (WSO) and ASDHS on May 24, 2010. This AAR helped identify
warning and mitigation needs in American Samoa including stakeholder coordination, operations
and communications, warning forecasting, education and outreach (and development of such
materials), and other mitigation countermeasures. (Kong, Yanagi, 2010). The developments
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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noted in this record assisted in the planning team’s understanding of key roles and
responsibilities in the tsunami warning system and provided a record of recommendations and
needs related to executing timely and effective warning and evacuation.
The Post-Tsunami Review Task Force (PTRTF) Report (PTRTF, 2009) provided the planning
team with firsthand accounts of the warning and evacuation efforts made in response to the 2009
SPT. Summaries of findings provided in the report give attention to areas where such efforts
were successful and to areas that could be improved. These findings come from interviews held
by the PTRTF with Pulenuus, Department of Education (DOE) and Schools, Department of
Administrative services/ Executive Office Building (EOB), American Samoa Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Public Works, Office of Samoan Affairs, and the WSO. The
findings of the PTRTF Report are summarized and discussed in Section 1.4.5 of this report.
The planning team reviewed information from many sources to identify examples for evacuation
planning. The Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI)—working
with NOAA, Oregon Emergency Management, and Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and
Technology—is the primary agency responsible for the development of detailed tsunami
inundation maps and evacuation route maps for most of the populated communities of the
Oregon coast and aims to have new generation of tsunami inundation maps for Oregon by 2013.
DOGAMI is also working with OEM, Oregon Department of Transportation, and the Oregon
Parks and Recreation Department on signage along coastal roads and state parks. Oregon’s
coastal communities are involved in the installation of warning systems and tsunami evacuation
route signs. (Oregon Coastal Atlas, N.D.) In Earthquake and Tsunami Pre-Disaster Mitigation:
Preliminary Recommendations (Heathman, C, and Y. Wang, 2005), Chris Heathman and Yumei
Wang, of DOGAMI, offer considerations on site evacuation planning, signage and route
selection that are applicable to American Samoa and were used as a basis for recommendations.
1.4.3
Consultation
Interviews and inquiries were undertaken with American Samoa Government (ASG) agency
heads, village mayors (Pulenu'u), and federal agency representatives in Hawaii and the mainland
U.S. Individuals interviewed are listed alphabetically by last name.
Interviews with ASG Agency Heads (March 29 – April 4, July 5 – 11, September 23 – 29):
x American Samoa Government
o Togiola Tulafono, Governor of American Samoa
o Evelyn Langford, Governor’s Authorized Representative
o Gaoteote Tofau, Senate President, American Samoa Senate
o Savali Talavou Ale, House Speaker, American Samoa House
x American Samoa Chamber of Commerce (COC)
o Hobbs Lowson
o David Whitby
x American Samoa Department of Commerce (DOC),
o Coral Reef Advisory Group: Hideyo Hatori
o Coastal Zone Management/Land Use/Permits:
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Nate Ilaoa
Mohan Seetharam
Charles Seitz
Marvis Vaiagae
Lauren Wetzel
o Deputy Director: Lelei Peau
o Economic Development:
Lasiandra Hall
Ma’u Leha
o Geographic Information System (GIS) Office:
Mataio King
Cristin Reynolds
Junior Sauni
Mike (Kang) Sevao
o Law: Sean Morrison
o Statistical Office: Mine Timoteo,
American Samoa Department of Homeland Security (ASDHS)/ Territory Emergency
Management Coordinating Office (TEMCO)
o Alefa Afalava,
o Vinnie Atofau
o Jacinta Brown
American Samoa Department of Health (DOH): Siitia Soliai-Lemusu
American Samoa Department of Port Administration,
o Harbors:
Tavita Fuimano
Chris Soti
o Airport: Peter Lefiti,
o Water Transportation: Ioakopo F. Toilolo
American Samoa Department of Public Works (DPW): Sina Voigt
American Samoa Disaster Recovery Office (ASDRO):
o Salu Tuigamala
o Lima Fiatoa
American Samoa Economic Stimulus & Recovery Office: Pat Galeai
American Samoa Power Authority (ASPA):
o Karen Kitiona
o Kesi Kuki
o Andra Samoa
o Edward Setu
o Ryan TuaTua
o Aperila Tuufuli
o Reno Vivao
American Samoa Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster(ASVOAD): Phil Falema’o
Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources (DMWR): Doug Fenner,
Department of Interior Department of Interior, Office of Insular Affairs (OIA): Lydia
Faleafine-Nomura
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Economic Advisory Council: David Robinson
National Park Service (NPS):
o Sara Bone
o Mike Reynolds
NOAA Pacific Islands Regional Office (Fisheries): Fatima Sauafea-Le’au
Office of Samoan Affairs (OSA):
o Paramount Chief Tufele Li’amatua
o Muliagatele Sanele Tuiteleleapaga
UH Sea Grant Extension: Ephraim Temple
Unified Health Command/ Lyndon B. Johnson Tropical Medical Center (LBJ): Michael
Gerstenberger
WSO – Local office of the National Weather Service (NWS): Hans Malala
Interviews with Pulenuu (Trip 2 and phone 8/2&8/4):
x Aasu Village Mayor: Tafaifa Roberts
x Aoloau Village Mayor: Vela Lefotu
Interviews with Organizations in US (Hawaii and Mainland):
x Federal Communications Commission: Dale Bickel
x FEMA
o Marilyn Shigetani
o Colby Stanton
x FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) during the 2009 SPT: Kenneth Tingman
x ITIC
o Laura Kong
o Brian Yanagi
x Natural Disaster Preparedness Training Center (NDPTC)
o James Burke
o Grant Chartrand
o Karl Kim
o Justine Nihipali
o Dean Sakamoto
x NOAA, Fisheries: Chris Hawkins
x NOAA, Pacific Services Center (PSC)
o Steve Frano
o Doug Harper
o Jessie Huart,
o Kristina Kekuewa
o Penny Larin
o Adam Stein
o Bill Thomas
x National Park Service (NPS):
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
1.4.4
o Vicki Ozaki
PTWC
o Gerard Fryer
o Charles ‘Chip’ McCreery,
o Stuart Weinstein, PTWC
Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), Kihei, Hawaii:
o Stanley Goosby
o Lara Payne
UH Manoa, Department of Urban and Regional planning:
o Karla Filibeck
o Dolores Foley
o Luciano Minerbi
o H. Ginger Porter
o Pragya Pradhan
UH Manoa, Pacific Business Center: Dr. Papalii Tusi
UH Manoa, Social Science Research Institute: Cheryl Anderson
UH Sea Grant, Coastal Storms Program: Dolan Eversole
USGS: Michael Shulters
Relationship to Other Papers
The Warning & Evacuation working paper addresses the activities that take place immediately
after a tsunami is potentially generated by a seismic event or once a tsunami is confirmed
depending on the distance between the source of the tsunami and the population at risk. This
includes the roles of federal and local agencies, the systems used by both to communicate
information, the ability of the community to receive the information, and the ability of the
community to understand the information and take the right action. The issues addressed in this
paper relate to some of the issues discussed in the Governance, Emergency Response, Critical
Infrastructure, and Geomorphology topics.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 10
1.4.5
Data Gap Analysis
Federal Agencies Involved in Tsunami Monitoring and Warning
Official tsunami warning capability in the U.S. began in 1949,
when the Tsunami Warning Center was est “NWS is responsible for the
Beach, Oahu. After devastating tsunami impacts in 1960, the overall execution of the
nations of the Pacific decided to coordinate efforts to prevent Tsunami Program. This
tsunami losses in the Pacific Basin (PTWC, 2009). The ITIC includes operation of the
Tsunami
Warning
was established in November 1965 by the IOC of the United U.S.
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Centers as well as leadership
(UNESCO) to mitigate the hazards associated with tsunamis of the NTHMP. NWS also
by improving tsunami preparedness for all Pacific Ocean supports observations and
nations (ITIC, 2011). Under the IOC, an International data management through the
Coordination Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the National Data Buoy Center
Pacific (ICG/ITSU) was established in 1968 (IOC/ITIC, (NDBC)” (NOAA, 2011,
2004) became the operational July 27).
headquarters for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System and the facility was renamed the Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC, 2009). The ITIC works closely with the PTWC and both are
hosted by the NWS, and operate under the NOAA. PTWC works with regional centers to
evaluate potentially tsunamigenic earthquakes (IOC/ITIC, 2004). NOAA's two Tsunami
Warning Centers, PTWC and West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC),
have separate areas of responsibility (AORs), shown in Figure 3. Responsibilities of each center
within these geographical areas include the dissemination of messages and the provision of
interpretive information to emergency managers and other officials, news media, and the public.
PTWC provides warnings for distant tsunamis to countries around the Pacific Rim, Indian
Ocean, and most Pacific island states.
PTWC AOR:
Figure 3: PTWC and WC/ATWC Area of Responsibility
Samoa, Guam, Wake
Island, Johnston Island,
the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas, the
Federated
States
of
Micronesia, the Republic
of the Marshall Islands,
and other U.S. interests in
the Pacific located outside
WC/ATWC's area of
responsibility
(PTWC
AOR, 2009).
Source: PTWC Responsibilities (PTWC, 2009)
Seismic monitoring is the foundation of tsunami detection and warning. Sea level monitoring is
also used to help track tsunami events across the ocean and improve the precision of warnings
for potentially impacted regions. The PTWC explains that, “Because seismic waves travel about
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
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100 times faster than tsunami waves, scientist can detect and study the earthquake much more
quickly than the tsunami itself” (PTWC, 2009). The combination of monitoring seismic data and
sea level data allows PTWC to give very accurate warnings for distant tsunamis.
Systems Used for Identifying Tsunami Threats
Tsunamis are most commonly caused by seismic events, which are monitored by a vast array of
networks under several agencies around the globe comprising the Global Seismographic
Network (GSN). Through the Earthquake Hazards Program, the USGS uses the GSN to monitor
seismic activity. GSN “is a permanent digital network of state-of-the-art seismological and
geophysical sensors connected by a telecommunications network, serving as a multi-use
scientific facility and societal resource for monitoring, research, and education. Formed in
partnership among the USGS, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Incorporated
Research Institutions for Seismology (IRIS), the GSN provides near-uniform, worldwide
monitoring of the Earth, with over 150 modern seismic stations distributed globally” (USGS,
GSN, 2011). Data collected from this network are archived at the IRIS Data Management
Center. The GSN serves as a tool for research on global earthquake mechanisms and the geologic
processes and provides alerts of areas threatened by earthquake hazards and possible tsunami
threats. Locations of seismic stations used in the GSN are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Locations of Seismic Monitoring Stations in the Global Seismographic Network
Source: IRIS GSN Maps, (IRIS, 2011)
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 12
The NWS explains that if an earthquake’s “hypocenter is
under or near the ocean and not too deep within the earth,
and if the magnitude is sufficiently large, then tsunami
generation is possible. On the basis of this seismic evidence,
the Center issues a regional tsunami warning to areas located
near the epicenter. Because tsunamis move through the water
in accordance with known physical laws, estimated arrival
times are computed and given for key Pacific locations.
Additional bulletins are issued at least hourly and the
warning and watch areas expanded as needed” (NWS, 2004).
Relaying information from a DART buoy warning takes too
long to be useful for a local tsunami. Through consultation,
the PTWC explained that DART buoys are intended to
improve the quality of tsunami warnings from distant sources
and that they are not exactly real-time devices in the sense
that information arrives to the PTWC immediately after it is
recorded at sea.
It first takes the wave time to reach the DART, then another
several minutes for the information to reach the PTWC, and
then PTWC personnel have to watch the record for a few
minutes to interpret the tsunami potential.
When a large earthquake
occurs in the Pacific Ocean
area,
PTWC
personnel
determine the earthquake's
hypocenter, the initial rupture
point of the earthquake, and
its magnitude. On the basis of
this seismic evidence, the
Center issues a regional
tsunami warning to areas
located near the epicenter
(NWS, Tsunami Warning
System in the Pacific, 2004).
Because seismic waves travel
about 100 times faster than
tsunami waves, scientist can
detect
and
study
the
earthquake
much
more
quickly than the tsunami itself
(PTWC, Frequently Asked
Questions, 2009).
PTWC personnel state that “Even if you had a DART right on top of the earthquake, it would take
at least five minutes to get a warning out—that is no better than what we can already do as a
consequence of the new seismometers deployed in the SW Pacific.” This is the same situation
experienced in the Pacific Northwest where local warnings are also based solely on interpretations
from the earthquake data collected from seismometers.
The IOC/ITIC notes that the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific “makes use of hundreds of
seismic stations throughout the world to locate potentially tsunamigenic earthquakes, and
accesses nearly 100 water level stations throughout the Pacific to verify the generation and
evaluate the severity of a tsunami. The system disseminates tsunami information and warning
messages to well over 100 points scattered across the Pacific” (IOC/ITIC, 2004). As a part of this
system NOAA placed DART stations at sites in regions with a history of generating destructive
tsunamis to add precision to distant tsunami warnings. The NWS is responsible for the overall
execution of the U.S. Tsunami Program. This includes operation of the U.S. Tsunami Warning
Centers and leadership of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NOAA, 2011, July
27).
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 13
Figure 5: Illustration of DART Data Collection and Transmission
DART systems consist of an
anchored seafloor bottom
pressure recorder (BPR) and a
surface buoy for real-time
communications.
An acoustic link transmits
data from the BPR on the
seafloor to the surface buoy
(NOAA, 2011, July 27).
The system has two data
reporting modes, standard and
event. In standard mode, the
system collects data every 15
seconds and transmits data at
scheduled transmission times.
In event mode, 15-second
values are transmitted during
the initial few minutes,
followed
by
1-minute
averages (NOAA, 2011, July
27).
Source: NOAA, DART Description, 2011
Second generation DART®
systems
(DART
II),
operational since 2005, have
two-way
communications
between the BPR and the
TWCs/NDBC, allowing the
TWCs to set stations in event
mode in anticipation of
possible tsunamis or retrieve
the high-resolution data for
detailed analysis (NOAA,
2011, July 27).
When potentially destructive tsunamis are confirmed by
DART buoys, the PTWC issues a Pacific-wide tsunami
warning, alerting all local EAS participants to the threat and
estimated tsunami arrival times. The warning from the
PTWC continues as long as the threat exists with at least
hourly updates. “Messages are disseminated throughout the
Pacific to the Member States in accordance with procedures
outlined in the Communications Plan for the Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific. Dissemination agencies in the participating Member States have
the ongoing responsibility for educating the public concerning the dangers of tsunamis and for
developing safety measures to be taken to avoid the loss of life and reduce property damage”
(NWS, 2004). It is important to note that there is not enough time between a local earthquake
(within 200 miles) and the arrival of the first tsunami wave for a DART buoy to provide
advanced warning.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 14
Figure 6: Distribution of DART Buoys
DART Station 51425
American Samoa
DART Station 51426
Source: NOAA, Real-Time DART Data (NDBC), 2011
Currently, 41 DART buoys are located in the Pacific Ocean, 33 of which are maintained by
NOAA. The two DART buoys closest to American Samoa are Stations 51425 and 51426.
x Station 51425 is 370 nautical miles northwest of Apia, Independent Samoa, or
approximately 750 miles northwest of American Samoa.
x Station 51426 is 400 nautical miles southeast of Tonga, or approximately 625 miles south
of American Samoa.
The epicenter of the earthquake that
generated the 2009 SPT was
approximately 120 miles southwest
of
American
Samoa.
ITIC
acknowledged that such an event is
unlikely to occur any less than 100
miles southwest of American Samoa.
The existing DART buoys in this
area will not contribute early warning
in the case of a locally generated
tsunami.
Maintenance of DART buoys is a major challenge:
x Station 51425 began malfunctioning in
March of 2011 and eventually went adrift.
This station was re-established on 18
August, 2011—offline for approximately 5
months.
x Station 51426 failed on 27 December, 2010
and was re-established 23 August, 2011—
offline approximately 8 months.
Due to constant weather and ocean exposure, and logistical difficulties for maintenance and
replacement, the risk of failure for extended periods of time exists.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 15
Figure 7 shows how all the Figure 7: Components of the Tsunami Warning System
components of the warning
system work in concert. The
Tsunami Warning System in
the Pacific communicates realtime information through the
use of seismometers, tide
gauges, DART buoys, and
satellites to the Tsunami
Warning Center. The Tsunami
Warning Center then transmits
information to regional NWS
gateways (WSO for American
Samoa), the State Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) and Source: National Media Tsunami Guidebook (NTHMP, 2011.)
Figure 8: Steps Involved in the Tsunami Warning System
the U.S. Coast Guard.
Figure 8 shows the typical
warning transmission sequence
of through this system.
NTHMP notes that individuals
should pay heed to natural
warnings and official warnings.
Natural Warning:
Strong ground shaking, a loud
roar from the ocean, water
receding from the shore and
exposing the sea floor, or the
water level rising rapidly
(NTHMP, 2010).
Official Warning: TV and
radio broadcasts, NWR, or
announcements (emergency
officials, aircraft, outdoor
sirens, Emergency Managers
Weather
Information
Network
(EMWIN),
or
mobile devices) (NTHMP,
2010).
Source: National Media Tsunami Guidebook (NTHMP, 2011.)
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 16
Figure 9 illustrates the Figure 9: Diagram of the Tsunami Monitoring and Warning Process
tsunami warning system
for Washington State. This
diagram shows the steps
taken from identification of
the seismic event that
causes the tsunami to the
warning transmitted to the
general public.
Washington State also has
a limited amount of time to
evacuate if there is a major
tsunamigenic earthquake
on
the
Cascadian
Subduction Zone, (an
estimated 20-30 minutes).
PTWC
personnel
acknowledge that the
current monitoring and
warning system is great
for distant tsunami, but
less effective for nearby
events.
NOAA’s document The
Tsunami
Warning
System – How does It
Work? states “if you
feel violent shaking…
head for higher ground.
The Earthquake is your
warning” (NOAA, N.D.).
Source: The Tsunami Warning System – How Does it Work? (NOAA, N.D.)
Local Roles in Tsunami Warning
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Local Area Plan, as presented in the
Governor’s Post-Tsunami Review Task Force Report (PTRTF, 2009), defines the EAS as “a
warning system to provide the public with immediate messages that affect life and property”
(FCC, 2006). As indicated in Figure 9, the EAS in American Samoa is comprised of the regional
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 17
NWS [WSO], emergency management officials [TEMCO, Department of Public Safety (DPS)],
communication networks (telephone and two-way hand-held UHF radios) between key EAS
agencies, individuals with NOAA Weather Radios (NWR) responsible for leading evacuations,
agency heads with UHF radios, and TV, Radio, and Cable TV broadcasts, and the use of bells
and bullhorns in villages. In addition to the EAS, American Samoa is now equipped with 44
warning sirens (two yet to be installed on Aunu’u and Ofu), a critical component of the current
local warning system. Based on testimony provided to the U.S. Congress House Committee on
Homeland Security by the ASDHS Director Tuala Mike Sala, key EAS agencies and personnel
that are active and monitor the 2-way radios at all times for significant events include: NOAA
regional NWS [WSO], EOC [TEMCO], Governor's Security, DPS (Police Dispatch), KKHJ
(primary), KULA (secondary), KSBS, and Showers of Blessing Radio Stations, KVZK TV
Station, and Blue Sky. (ReliefWeb, 2009)
Figure 10, shows the initial points of the tsunami warning process used in American Samoa with
an approximate timeline to show the time needed between steps. It is important to note that the
fastest warning is the earthquake. If a strong earthquake is felt, the public should prepare to
evacuate and seek guidance from the radio, TV, or public officials.
Figure 10: American Samoa Warning System Process for Local Tsunami
Source: Developed by EA/HHF JV through consultation with PTWC
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 18
The WSO is the Primary Entry Point (PEP) for earthquake and tsunami warnings. (PTRTF,
2009) When an earthquake occurs the PTWC makes a rapid earthquake assessment to determine
potential tsunami generation. The level of information given to regional weather service stations
is contingent on the amount of time that a locale has to evacuate. For near source warnings,
immediate action is taken. When the threat of a local tsunami is possible, based on the magnitude
and depth of an earthquake, the PTWC sends a tsunami warning to the WSO. When several
hours are available, as is typically the case for a distant tsunami, the PTWC is able to give more
precise information.
The WSO is responsible for activating the EAS and TEMCO is responsible for sounding the
warning sires. Warnings from the PTWC are reported to the TEMCO by the WSO. When
immediate action is needed, TEMCO contacts the Governor’s Office, sounds the sirens, and
activates primary response agencies. The EOC is activated and Response Agencies report to
coordinate activities (ASDHS, 2010; Kong, Yanagi, 2010; PTRTF, 2009). The Territorial
Emergency Operations Plan (TEOP), Hazard Specific Annex C: Tsunami, identifies the primary
response agencies activated during a tsunami warning as the DPS police and fire and DPW
(ASDHS, 2010). If WSO cannot contact TEMCO, WSO is responsible for sounding the sirens.
Siren activation can be controlled from four sites: the EOC (primary), WSO, police/911 dispatch
(back up), and remote wireless (Kong, Yanagi, 2010). If a tsunami causes damage and shelters
are needed DOE, DHSS, Red Cross, OSA, DOA and the Office of Procurement are activated. In
parallel, WSO activates the EAS, which transmits an automated emergency message through
local FCC licensed broadcast stations and cable systems (ReliefWeb, 2009). The TEOP has
identified two radio stations as part of the EAS—KKHJ FM is the primary and KULA is the
secondary—and one television station, KVZK. As of October, 2011, the radio stations in
American Samoa and listed on the FCC’s website are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Radio Stations in American Samoa (FCC, 2011)
Call
NEW
NEW
KMOA
KPPO
KIOE
KSBS-FM
KKHJ-FM*
KULA**
WVUV-FM
KNWJ
KJAL
Service
City
Licensee/Permittee
FM 88.1
TAFUNA
LEONE CHURCH OF CHRIST
FM 88.9
PAGO PAGO MARIANAS EDUCATIONAL MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
FM 89.7
NU'UULI
HORIZON CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP
FM 90.5
MAPUSAGA SECOND SAMOAN CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF LONG BEACH
FM 91.3
UTULEI
LEONE CHURCH OF CHRIST
FM 92.1
PAGO PAGO SAMOA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
FM 93.1
PAGO PAGO SOUTH SEAS BROADCASTING, INC.
FM 95.1
ILI’ILI
PACIFIC ISLANDS BIBLE SCHOOL
FM 103.1
FAGAITUA
SOUTH SEAS BROADCASTING, INC.
FM 104.7
LEONE
SHOWERS OF BLESSINGS RADIO
AM 585
TAFUNA
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF GOD IN AS
AM 630
HCNR3
AM 1420
LA VOZ DE HU
* LP1 – Primary EAS Station
**LP2 – Secondary EAS Station (not listed on FCC’s website)
The PTRTF report notes that radio is the most effective way to reach the general public;
however, NWR coverage is inadequate in Tula, Afono, and Fagasa. Radio reception on the
Manua Islands was limited to radio stations in Independent Samoa (PTRTF, 2009). ASG is
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 19
considering the development of a new high powered AM station to improve coverage. Based on
consultation with FCC official Dale Bickel, the development of a new high powered AM station
is not the most effective course of action. The FCC official consulted noted that even the most
powerful 50 kW AM station will not cover an adequate radius during the daytime (to Manua
Islands) due to restrictive signal propagation conditions and might cause local interference
(airport and other radio communications), as well as a significant drain on the local power grid.
The FCC adds that construction of an AM station is more expensive and difficult to construct
than an FM station and AM stations require a large dedication of land for the buried ground
system. AM stations require international coordination. In response to an inquiry if a local FM
station might be willing to develop an AM station to serve this need, the FCC official explained
that existing FM station license holders are not likely going to cover the expense of building an
AM station that would duplicate the coverage of their FM station or to solely relay emergency
transmissions. The FCC official recommended utilizing more of the existing FM and AM
stations (particularly KJAL) for relaying EAS emergency signals to ensure complete coverage.
An in depth analysis of existing radio coverage and coverage improvement possibilities is
needed to determine the most effective way to address warning communication deficiencies in
the Eastern District.
The press release for the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security hearing (2009) states that
“the Emergency Alert System (EAS) … specifically describes an automated emergency message
relaying system that all FCC licensed broadcast stations and cable systems must participate in. It
is a federally mandated system that facilitates automatically using radio, TV, and cable TV to
quickly and simultaneously disseminate emergency messages to the public” (ReliefWeb, 2009).
Based on this statement and statements made by the FCC, an assessment into which stations
could be utilized to improve coverage and the infrastructure enhancements needed, in
comparison to the commitment of resources required to develop a new AM station is warranted.
Figure 11: Village Bells and Bullhorns for Early Warning
Source: EERI, 2009
Draft Working Paper
In addition to electronic
systems, American Samoa
uses village-based warning
practices including the
traditional use of village or
church bells to signal
tsunami evacuation. In
some cases, Pulenuu used
bullhorns
during
the
evacuation for the 2009
SPT, also highly effective.
The examples shown in
Figure 11 are from Samoa,
but are also applicable for
American Samoa, these are
good practices and should
be
continued
and
promoted.
October 2011
Page 20
Evacuation Notes from the 2009 SPT
Many sources note the invaluable contribution of tsunami awareness training undertaken—by
agencies including TEMCO, NOAA (ITIC), and the DOE—in the months preceding the 2009
SPT in keeping the number of lives lost relatively low. Education and awareness initiatives were
undertaken by various entities in both American Samoa and Independent Samoa. It is widely
acknowledged that the timing of the tsunami—in the
“The people of American Samoa
morning as people were getting ready for work and
and Samoa did the right thing after
school—also contributed to the effectiveness of
they felt the early morning
evacuation during this event.
earthquake—they self-evacuated
from the coast to higher ground in
However, differences in the number of fatalities and the
the 10 to 15 minutes before the
educational messages in Samoa and American Samoa are
tsunami arrived. … This instance
noteworthy. In American Samoa the outreach was clear
of self-evacuation underscores that
that evacuating by foot was the appropriate procedure
education saves lives.” (Jaffe,
(even though many did evacuate by car), but in
2009)
Independent Samoa “only a month [before the 2009
SPT] they had been told that cars help with
“Community-based education and
evacuations…” (ScienceDaily, 2009) Particularly in
awareness programs minimized the
Independent Samoa, people were trapped on congested
death toll from the recent Samoan
small roads because of traffic or debris on the roads and,
tsunami, though there are still
because most roads run parallel to the beach, were
ways to improve the warning and
vulnerable to the tsunami. In response to this tragic
evacuation process.”
situation, one post-disaster researcher, Costas Synolakis,
(ScienceDaily, 2009)
stated that “misinformation kills.” (ScienceDaily, 2009)
Another researcher discovered through approximately
“The technical solution doesn't
170 interviews that “most people were educated about
always work for coastlines near the
tsunamis and knew how to react because of communityepicenter with less than 30 minutes
based educational programs, not ancestral stories.”
between earthquake and onslaught
(ScienceDaily, 2009)
of the tsunami. Earthquakes with
durations of more than 30 seconds
Synolakis acknowledged that education helped keep the
number of lives lost low, but also pointed out that there is serve as a natural warning,
still progress that can be made. On 7 October, 2009, resulting in a spontaneous selfSynolakis and the research team experienced a tsunami evacuation.” (Herman Fritz, cited
in ScienceDaily, 2009)
warning while presumably in American Samoa and
“witnessed first-hand the tremendous confusion and disorganization that followed.” Synolakis
notes that “although there are warnings signs along the beaches in American Samoa, there is no
information about where the evacuation routes are,” and adds that “it’s also just as important to
let people know when it's safe to come back as it is to warn them.” (ScienceDaily, 2009)
The PTRTF report provided firsthand accounts of the warning and evacuation efforts made in
response to the 2009 SPT and summaries of the findings of this information call attention to
areas where such efforts were highly successful as well as to identify areas that could be
improved. These findings come from interviews held by the PTRTF with Pulenuu, DOE,
Department of Administrative Services/ Executive Office Building (EOB), ASDHS, DPW, OSA,
and WSO. A review of these findings, divided by organization, is offered in Table 2.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 21
Table 2: Summary PTRTF Report Findings
ASDHS (TEMCO)
Pros
1. Training helped many
Pulenuu perform their
responsibilities.
2. Community is aware of
tsunami dangers and
how to respond.
3. Utilizing village bells is
an effective and
understood way to
signal evacuation for
American Samoans.
1.
DPW
Pulenuu
Source
1.
2.
Department of
Administrative
Services/EOB
1.
2.
WSO
1.
OSA
2.
1.
2.
TEMCO has a Territorial
Emergency Operations
Plan (TEOP) (2001)
Training was given to
Pulenuu and some
schools prior to the
tsunami
Cleared roads and
worked on Leone bridge
Private construction
crews responded quickly
(Leone bridge).
All ASG agencies are
mandated by the
governor to have an
evacuation plan
Cons
1. Contingency plans did not exist if the Pulenuu is not present or
does not have time/physical capacity to respond (no one is
designated to take action).
2. Distance of the Pulenuu’s house from village bells was a problem in
some cases. In some villages, this problem was overcome by using
church bells, yelling, and using bullhorns. In some villages, aumaga
3. Nearly half of the Pulenuu did not receive adequate training on
response and evacuation practices because they were new to the
position.
4. Access to evacuation sites is problematic in some cases
5. Radio signals are limited in some areas (could only get a station
from Western Samoa). In some cases NOAA Weather Radios were
not where they needed to be during the event
6. Phone lines jammed after the earthquake and phone lines went
down during the tsunami cutting off many villages from
communication with public officials.
1. TEOP under revision since 2004, but not yet approved or signed by
the Governor.
2. Funding freeze limited ASDHS actions—training record not kept
3. ASDHS in floodplain near sea level
4. EAS activation was confused and responsibility in wrong hands
(recommended to be put at DPS)
5. Jammed phone lines, officials couldn’t make needed calls
6. NWRs not in Pulenuu’s possession in some cases
7. Little ASDHS prep training since 2007 due to lack of funding and
human resources
8. Training not reaching village level
9. Training materials are inadequate
10. TEMCO – No set training schedule
11. Training and workshops only for ASG officials
1. Experienced trouble with communication lines
2. Noted traffic congestion from high number of people fleeing for
high ground by car.
1.
2.
3.
All villages have Pulenuu
Pulenuu receive regular
emergency response
training
1.
All Pulenuu and schools
were assigned NWRs
Meteorologist in charge
1.
Draft Working Paper
2.
2.
Most agencies outside the EOB don’t have evacuation plans.
Many EOB employees did not exit as instructed in the evacuation
plan, and many drove to the tramway.
The tramway is an evacuation site, and this created congestion and
conflicts between pedestrians (students) and motorists.
A disconnect exists between ASDHS and OSA regarding Pulenuu
training
Not all Pulenuu have or know how to use NOAA Weather Radios or
know what type of response equipment and supplies they should
have at the ready.
Response from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center comes too late
(warning sent 7:04, tsunami estimated to arrive 6:59)
WSO experienced difficulty activating the EAS due to congestion of
October 2011
Page 22
Source
Pros
EAS
gave a verbal warning to
ASDHS to activate the
EAS
1.
EAS can be an effective
way to transmit national
and territorial messages
Cons
telephone lines; UHF radio was the only way to communicate
between WSO and ASDHS
3. Tula, Afono, and Fagasa did not have good NWR reception
1.
2.
DOE
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
DOE requires schools to
establish and practice
evacuation plans at least
quarterly.
Students were generally
aware and educated
about evacuation plans.
Faculty and staff
generally understand
roles/responsibilities.
Individuals involved in
response generally were
concerned with protocol
and following a clear
chain of command, with
the ability to make
decisions independently.
Individuals showed
resourcefulness in
helping to evacuate
special needs students
and others.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
EOC/ASDHS did not have access to the EAS and had to rely on UHF
and NWR
A delay was experienced in determining which agency should take
the lead in telephone line installation to link all concerned parties
to the EAS.
Official warning from the PTWC came after the first wave
Several elementary schools were located in tsunami hazard areas.
Most elementary schools interviewed are located at sea level and
over 50% of schools interviewed are less than 100 yards from the
shoreline.
Schools stated need to revise evacuation/emergency plans. Seven
schools interviewed stated their evacuation routes were unsafe or
indirect.
a. Coleman Elementary and Matafao Elementary
experienced particular difficulty with their evacuation
route due to roadway crossings and unyielding motorists.
b. Mt. Alava (Vatia) and Le’atele’s students are evacuated
towards the ocean for some distance before continuing to
higher ground.
In some cases, students, staff, and faculty were forced to evacuate
by someone other than a school official because administrators did
not receive an alert through the EAS.
Contingency measures for evacuation protocol did not exist for
situations where guidance from the EAS was not received.
Plans did not exist for evacuating individuals with special needs.
Student drop off time was unregulated resulting in no supervision,
or someone to lead an evacuation, before school hours.
Some teachers lack hazard training and education due to short
time in position.
Phone and radio communications are limited: Eastern District has
little or no radio or cell phone coverage; Le’atele (Fagasa)
Elementary has no emergency phone line.
Many issues raised in the PTRTF report can be addressed through EOP development and
training. Formally documented evacuation plans were not made available to the planning team.
Through consultation, secondary sources, and because of the evacuation training undertaken by
TEMCO at schools, government agencies, and for Pulenuu, it is clear that at least conceptual
plans do exist and were largely successful during the 2009 SPT. Recommendations for EOP
development and training will be discussed in the Governance working paper. More specific
evacuation and sheltering issues are addressed herein.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 23
Evacuation Planning in American Samoa
Evacuation maps for all communities threatened by tsunami hazard zones in American Samoa
are not yet available. Evacuation procedures and routes are being addressed through evacuation
planning currently in progress by TEMCO with support from the Department of Commerce
(DOC) and National Park Service (NPS). Reportedly, evacuation mapping is complete for
Maoputasi County with village level maps available for Pago Pago, Fagatogo, and Utulei.
Examples of these maps are shown in Figures 12 and 13.
Figure 12: Evacuation Map for Maoputasi County
Source: DOC, 2011
Large scale overview maps provide a quick look at hazardous areas over a greater distance and
can help people easily see if they are located in an evacuation zone. This first level of awareness
is critical to risk knowledge and being able to identify several safety zones throughout the area so
evacuation can be undertaken effectively throughout the day. Large scale maps identify locations
to evacuate to or Assembly Areas (AAs), but they don’t stand out on the map and cannot be
easily identified. Capacity analysis of AAs should be undertaken to consider the populations that
can be expected to utilize evacuation sites in the event of an evacuation during the night
(residential) and during the day (labor force).
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 24
Figure 13: Evacuation Map for Pago Pago Village
Source: DOC, 2011
Smaller scale maps are needed to show evacuation routes and site specific safety zones, as shown
in Figure 13. This example village level evacuation map shows the determined safe evacuation
area (to the 50 foot/15 meter elevation line), the inundation extents of the 2009 SPT (not
available for all tsunami hazard zones), location specific routes that should be followed, and
critical facilities/infrastructure. Village scale evacuation maps identify AAs, but they don’t stand
out on the map and cannot be easily identified. The need for vertical evacuation structures should
be investigated where there are great distances between population segments and safety zones.
The NTHMP notes that tsunami evacuation maps need to be widely distributed to raise
awareness and instill effective response behavior so individuals know how to react when a
tsunami strikes. “The evacuation maps include the area at risk, the evacuation routes and the
safety zones, as well as the evacuation sites. Consideration can also be given to using tall
buildings for vertical evacuation.” (NTHMP, 2010) NTHMP is developing guidelines for
evacuation map development and criteria for defining the evacuation routes, evacuation sites,
vertical evacuation exercises, guidelines for inundation maps that help develop the evacuation
maps, and guidelines for the approval and distribution of evacuation maps.
The Warning & Evacuation working paper was composed after TAC #2 (28 September, 2011) in
which TAC members identified evacuation routes as one of the highest priorities along with
tsunami inundation modeling. Problems encountered with evacuation routes during the 2009 SPT
include primary road way crossing by students, individuals evacuating to areas also heavily
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 25
utilized by automobiles, blockages to evacuation such as mangroves, rivers, or fenced in areas,
impassible evacuation routes (footpaths), inadequate signage for and awareness of evacuation
routes, and traffic congestion. Conflicts between pedestrians and automobiles should be reduced
as much as possible.
As evacuation routes are developed for each community the following should be investigated:
1. Do all individuals have ready access to evacuation maps?
2. Does adequate signage exist for evacuation routes and is the directional information
clear?
3. Do blockages to evacuation exist in the most direct route from each house to the nearest
evacuation route (e.g. mangrove, river, livestock pen, other)?
4. Are the path or roadway conditions adequate for pedestrian or vehicle passage?
5. Do chains, fences or other blockages prevent access at any time?
6. Do evacuation routes exist that can be accessed by vehicles assisting children or disabled
individuals where needed?
7. Is roadway capacity adequate between areas with high residential or labor force
populations and safe zones?
Village level planning for evacuation procedures should clearly identify and provide signage for
routes, destinations, and communication lines between shelters (with lateral transportation
connections for responders [possibly to reconnect families]). Evacuation planning should
consider transportation for the disabled to include individuals with mobility, visual, hearing,
speech, and cognitive impairments.
FEMA Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide (FEMA CPG 101, 2010) offers detailed lists of considerations that should be addressed
during evacuation planning. The following list highlights some considerations for Evacuation
Support:
1. Does the plan identify the agency that has the lead role in coordinating an evacuation and
ensuring children (and those with limited mobility) are incorporated into all evacuation
considerations and planning?
2. Does the plan identify accessible transportation resources (including paratransit service
vehicles, school buses, municipal surface transit vehicles, drivers, and/or trained
attendants) that can provide needed services during an evacuation?
3. Does the plan include mechanisms or processes for providing safe evacuation/
transportation assistance to unaccompanied minors and limited mobility individuals?
4. Does the plan include affirmative recognition of the need to keep [children and adults]
with disabilities with their support systems, mobility devices, other durable medical
equipment, and/or service animals during an evacuation?
5. Does the plan identify means and methods by which evacuation transportation requests
from individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs are
collected, consolidated, tracked, and monitored as they are fulfilled?
6. Does the plan include mechanisms or processes for tracking children, especially
unaccompanied minors, during an evacuation?
7. Does the plan address re-entry? (FEMA CPG 101, 2010)
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 26
The Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) has made great strides
in preparing Oregon’s coastal communities for a local tsunami that could be generated by a large
earthquake at the Cascadia Fault (similar to tsunami threats in American Samoa from the Tonga
Tranch) and offer guidance on the development of evacuation routes, installation of signage, and
the development of evacuation shelters. DOGAMI officials Chris Heathman and Yumei Wang
offered guidance to the Oregon State University: Hatfield Marine Science Center for preparing
an earthquake and tsunami pre-disaster mitigation plan in Earthquake and Tsunami Pre-Disaster
Mitigation: Preliminary Recommendations (Heathman & Wang, 2005). This report offers
important considerations in locating evacuation sites and shelters and preparing good evacuation
routes and signage and is the basis for the following points on Assembly Area development
(Adapted from Heathman & Wang, 2005):
x It should be determined during evacuation planning that the gathering location has
sufficient space to be comfortable for an extended period of time (>24 hours).
x If the gathering place is located on someone else’s property, the owners should be
notified ahead of time if the location will be used (e.g. for evacuation drills or distant
tsunamis).
x If a tsunami structure (e.g. tower) is constructed for additional safety, it should be able to
accommodate the projected number of evacuees. Evacuation drills may help determine
potential occupancy and other problems ahead of time.
x Should consider roadways or pedestrian routes that may be blocked or unusable during an
earthquake, (e.g. electrical lines that may be down).
x Should consider proximity to gas storage tanks and lines that may be ruptured and
burning and other hazardous materials.
x Should consider the feasibility to deliver emergency supplies to the area and the
availability of potable water sources.
x Local community evacuation strategies should be developed through coordination with
local agencies and businesses.
x If the development of a long-term evacuation shelter is needed, then the ability of cost
sharing amongst stakeholders should be pursued.
x The evacuation route should be properly identified with standard signage. Guidance
should be sought through the local Department of Transportation, local government
agencies, and neighbors.
x If possible, any roadways or paths identified as unusable during the hazard identification
process should not be considered as part of the evacuation route.
x Walking traffic should be able to easily utilize the route without causing significant
traffic delays. Evacuation drills will be beneficial to determine potential problems with
the chosen route(s).
x Site-specific studies can help determine if roads, or access to the roads, are likely to be
damaged during a large magnitude earthquake.
Known and easily accessible safety zones (shelters, AAs) are a critical component in tsunami
evacuations. The 2009 SPT caused total destruction or major damage to 538 homes. Having
adequate shelters in safe locations are also critical to provide a place where people can feel safe,
get rest, and take meals until other arrangements can be made. Through consultation, the
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 27
planning team learned that evacuation during the 2009 SPT resulted in large groups amassing in
highland villages for up to three days, exhausting local resources and overwhelming facilities.
This underscores the need for more comprehensive and coordinated evacuation planning and
public awareness initiatives.
Review of current DOC GIS data shows that there are 28 church shelters and 12 school shelters
on Tutuila. The Land Use & Structural Design working paper identified seven of these located in
areas that were heavily impacted by the 2009 SPT. Complete damage records and inundation
lines were not available for all villages, but evidence suggests that damage was experienced in
VE as well as AE flood zones (see Land Use & Structural Design working paper). Table 3 shows
the number of shelters that are located in potentially vulnerable locations.
Table 3: Shelters Located in Potentially Vulnerable Areas
School Shelters in Church Shelters in
areas impacted by areas impacted by
the 2009 SPT
the 2009 SPT
1. Masefau
1. Afono
2. Nua
2. Alao
3. Amanave
4. Fagasa
5. Tula
School Shelters in
potentially
vulnerable areas
1. Aua
2. Fagaitua
Church Shelters in
potentially
vulnerable areas
1. Amouli
2. Aoa
3. Auasi
4. Auto
5. Fagaalu
6. Fagamalo
7. Masausi
8. Nuuuli
9. Onenoa
10. Sailele
11. Utumea East
12. Vatia
Over 50% of
shelters may
be located in
vulnerable
areas.
The shelters in Table 3 are mainly located in the AE flood zone. Only four villages are known by
the planning team to have suffered heavy damage in the AE zones, but these areas are potentially
vulnerable to tsunami impacts. The findings in Table 3 indicate that more than 50% of church
and school shelters are located in potentially vulnerable areas.
An assessment of the capacity and accessibility of shelters outside of evacuation areas or
possible inundations zones and the number of people in nearby villages that are to utilize these
shelters is needed to identify areas that require safer or more accessible evacuation possibilities.
Where sheltering facilities are inadequate, areas suitable for shelter development should be
identified. These shelters could also be used for emergency sheltering during hurricanes and
could be used as community centers or other public uses when not needed for emergencies.
FEMA document 361, Design and Construction Guidance for Community Safe Rooms (FEMA
361, 2008), identifies criteria for developing shelters. The primary focus of FEMA 361 is to
protect individuals and communities from tornado and hurricane risks. The feasibility for
pursuing shelter development should be investigated further. FEMA provides examples of
projects accepted or completed on the Public Safe Room Initiatives webpage. (FEMA, 2010)
These shelters can be funded on a cost-share basis through FEMA programs and examples of this
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 28
are given on FEMA’s Safe Room Funding webpage. (FEMA, 2010) One possible source of
funding is the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). “HMGP funds may be used to fund
projects that will reduce or eliminate the losses from future disasters. Projects must provide a
long-term solution to a problem, for example, elevation of a home to reduce the risk of flood
damages as opposed to buying sandbags and pumps to fight the flood. In addition, a project's
potential savings must be more than the cost of implementing the project. Funds may be used to
protect either public or private property or to purchase property that has been subjected to, or is
in danger of, repetitive damage. Examples of HMGP funded projects include, but are not limited
to:
x Acquisition of real property from willing sellers and demolition or relocation of buildings
to convert the property to open space use
x Retrofitting structures and facilities to minimize damages from high winds, earthquake,
flood, wildfire, or other natural hazards
x Elevation of flood prone structures
x Development and initial implementation of vegetative management programs
x Minor flood control projects that do not duplicate the flood prevention activities of other
Federal agencies
x Localized flood control projects, such as certain ring levees and floodwall systems, that
are designed specifically to protect critical facilities
x Post-disaster building code related activities that support building code officials during
the reconstruction process” (FEMA, 2010)
FEMA document, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (FEMA CPG 101), offers detailed lists of consideration that should be
addressed during emergency shelter planning. The following list highlights a few of these
considerations for shelter operations (FEMA CPG 101, 2010):
1. Does the plan include mechanisms or processes for handling of and providing for
unaccompanied minors in shelters?
2. Does the plan include mechanisms or processes for ensuring that general population
shelters are accessible and have planned to fully address the physical, programmatic, and
communications accessibility requirements of individuals with disabilities and others
with access and functional needs?
3. Does the plan include mechanisms or processes for ensuring Americans with Disabilities
Act Accessibility Guidelines govern the shelter site selection and operation?
4. Does the plan address necessary staff, medicines, durable medical equipment, and
supplies that would be needed during an emergency for individuals with disabilities and
others with access and functional needs?
5. Does the plan identify the agency responsible for coordinating shelter operations?
6. Does the plan provide for the care and maintenance of each facility while in use as a
shelter?
Sheltering should not only account for the adequate provision of shelter, but should also consider
potable water, a sufficient number of restrooms for the anticipated number of users, security, and
accommodating pets. Once determined, the locations of public emergency shelters should be
published in resources everyone has access to such as phonebooks, informational brochures,
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 29
website information, or other locally relevant sources. One common oversight in an emergency
situation is that officials neglect to open the emergency shelter during an evacuation. Planning
for evacuation procedures should include protocol for an official to check shelters to ensure
evacuees can make use of the facilities. As a contingency measure, it is advisable to have a
number posted that people can call if they cannot access a shelter.
Schools
It is very important to note that, in the case of a local tsunami, schools outside of the evacuation
zone should not allow students to leave the school premises. School officials should have all staff
and students shelter in place. All students should be accounted for so families can confirm the
safety of their children. Since 2009, evacuation planning and awareness on procedures has
improved at schools through outreach efforts. One example evacuation and sheltering plan for
tsunami developed by Leone Midkiff Elementary is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Example Evacuation and Shelter Plan for Leone Midkiff
Source: Leone Midkiff, 2010
Evacuation plan development has reportedly been undertaken by every school in American
Samoa. The Leone Midkiff tsunami evacuation plan (Figure 14) is the only one available on the
American Samoa Department of Education website and the only one identified by the planning
team. The Leone Midkiff tsunami evacuation plan identifies routes for vertical evacuation. Even
though this school is outside of the tsunami evacuation zone they presumably elected to plan for
vertical evacuation as an additional precautionary measure. This is an important concept to
consider in areas with limited possibilities for evacuation but with building tall and strong
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 30
enough to withstand tsunami forces. Buildings developed with intended purpose to be used as a
tsunami evacuation site are referred to as Tsunami Evacuation Buildings (TEBs).
Vertical Evacuation Planning
TEBs have been investigated in the Pacific North West’s Cascadia region in anticipation of a
major earthquake and tsunami from the Cascadia Fault. DOGAMI has undertaken research into
how to design and locate TEBs. In A preliminary white paper on Tsunami Evacuation Buildings:
A New Risk Management Approach to Cascadia Earthquakes and Tsunamis (Raskin et al.,
2009), DOGAMI personnel and other authors discuss the need for TEB as new approach to risk
management. The concept is based on the strategies discussed in FEMA P646, Guidelines for
Design of Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis (FEMA-646A, 2009), and looks at
how this conceptual approach would work for rebuilding the Cannon Beach City Hall as a TEB.
“Preliminary design, technical and social issues are considered, including tsunami dissipater to
deflect wave energy away from the TEB and geotechnical and structural design to survive a
magnitude 9 earthquake and near field tsunami.” This document does not determine tsunami
evacuation scenarios, foundation conditions, or funding challenges (Raskin et al., 2009).
The FEMA document, Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis (FEMA P646A, 2008), notes that for
complete coverage of the population, the following questions must be considered (FEMA-646A,
2008):
Figure 15: Vertical Evacuation Planning
x How many people need vertical
evacuation?
x What is the capacity of the vertical
evacuation structures?
x What is the topography of the
community?
x How far apart will the vertical
evacuation structures be?
x How much space is needed for each
occupant within the refuge?
FEMA P646 provides guidance on spacing and
sizing of vertical evacuation structures. The
circles indicate reasonable walking distance.
Answers to the population coverage questions
can help determine the appropriate number and
location of vertical evacuation structures
needed.
Source: FEMA P646, 2008
Examples of vertical evacuation structures are offered in the Land Use & Structural Design
paper. Figure 15 an example analysis for locating vertical evacuation structures in a coastal
community. In considering evacuation possibilities in densely populated coastal areas it is
important to note the need for evacuation plans at hotels and other tourist focused facilities.
Appendix C of the Pacific Island Tsunami Resilience Planning Guide, offers guidance on such
planning in the Tsunami Preparedness Guide for Oregon Lodging Facilities (DOGAMI, 2003).
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 31
Communications
Regional communications systems are often problematic during emergencies regardless of
location. Communications refers to the ability of responding agencies to exchange information in
order to take appropriate action, the ability of those with leadership roles during emergencies to
make the general public (especially visitors or migrants) aware of what is happening and what
they should do, and the ability of family members to make sure other members are safe or learn
more about what is happening. The ability of responding agencies to exchange information and
respond is covered in the discussion on the EAS. Providing leadership to the general public
during evacuation and wider scale communication are separate issues.
Hawaii was noted in Planning magazine as providing good leadership during a tsunami
evacuation in March 2011, by effectively providing information to visitors on a large scale
(Stromberg, 2011). This comment was made in reference to the mobile group of information
providers established by the Waikiki Business Improvement District Association known as the
Aloha Ambassadors. The development and sustainment of such a group is only feasible in an
area densely populated with tourists that provided adequate revenue to support this service.
Regardless, the concept and function could be recreated during emergencies by volunteer
responders.
Due to the limited capacity of telecommunications utilities in American Samoa, it is common
that phone lines become overwhelmed during emergency situations. This is problematic for
emergency responders and concerned families. Local radio stations play a major role in keeping
the public informed during emergencies and can also help responders communicate. During
response efforts for the 2009 SPT, responders used the National Communication System’s
(NCS) “SHAred RESources High Frequency Radio Program to contact an amateur radio
operator on [Tutuila], who passed information on to other emergency responders” (NCS, 2009).
NCS also “successfully used the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)
to contact local carriers and the local broadcast station responsible for Emergency Alert System
capabilities to help coordinate the deployment of generators and fuel until commercial power
was restored” (NCS, 2009). In Telecommunications Infrastructure in Disasters: Preparing
Cities for Crisis Communications, Townsend & Moss note that the U.S. DHS has recognized
amateur radio operators as the first of first responders “yet there are no programs or funding
sources dedicated to modernizing the services provided by hams in disaster response efforts.”
(Townsend & Moss, 2005). Townsend & Moss extend the question, “How can the amateur radio
emergency service link to the growing hobbyist and community network movement around
unlicensed wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi, which offer much great data transmission
capabilities?” Even though this question was raised over six years ago, the notion is still relevant.
There are several internet based media possibilities that could be used to deliver information. In
the case of voice and electronic communication, capacity enhancements are needed. The
possibility for funding telecommunication enhancements through public and private sources
should be pursued.
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 32
1.5
1.5.1
Synthesis and Analysis
Successes
Despite problems encountered with the warning system during the 2009 SPT, warning
dissemination and evacuation was successful largely due to the training key people received on
tsunami risk and emergency protocol and the initiative they took to act appropriately. The vast
majority of residents recognized the natural warnings and evacuated safely due to the training
and education efforts provided to Pulenuu, schools, and responding officials by TEMCO and
ITIC. The recognition of natural warning signs and decisions to evacuate were bolstered by the
use of village bells and bullhorns by Pulenuu to signal evacuation. This practice is a tried and
proven low-tech fail-safe method that saves lives and should continue to be considered a primary
emergency alert system. Studies have shown that, in general, people need to receive a warning or
notice to evacuate from two sources of information to confirm their decision to evacuate. The
village bells offer a primary, or at least secondary, source and can instill a greater level of
confidence because the person delivering the message is known and trusted. School officials and
responding agencies took the appropriate actions needed to get people to safety and provide basic
needs.
Since the 2009 SPT, warning sirens have been installed and tested—completion pending the
installation of two sirens on Ofu and Aunu’u. Many agencies and organizations have taken steps
to improve EOPs. DOE and other agencies have streamlined policies on who declares an
emergency and has delegated this responsibility to individual school administrators. (PTRTF,
2009)
Public outreach was highly effective, and is widely recognized as the single most important
action that can be undertaken to reduce disaster related losses. These activities require education
on risks, warning signs, and the appropriate actions that should be taken. The foundation for the
instruction is emergency operations and evacuation planning. Practicing the procedures that are
detailed in the plans is the best way to identify and fix shortfalls in the plans and to ensure that
the procedures are known by relevant persons. A tsunami warning was issued in March of 2009,
and EOPs were largely ineffective because they had not been adequately vetted, taught, or
practiced. It was fortunate that this situation occurred because it gave response personnel a
chance to improve practices before the arrival of the tsunami in September. This situation
underscores the need to practice and revise EOPs regularly. Incorporating hazard risk and
emergency procedure education throughout grade school will help sustain natural hazard risk
reduction efforts over time.
1.5.2
Target Areas for Improvement
Based on the review of issues related to Warning & Evacuation, the most important action that
should be undertaken is the documentation, coordination and training of EOPs for all agencies
and organizations involved in tsunami warning and response. Such efforts should also
incorporate the tracking of EOP development, review, coordinating tabletop exercises to practice
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 33
and test procedures, and coordination of EOP revisions. This effort would require a full time
position and is likely best to be taken on by TEMCO. Presently TEMCO does not have available
staff that can take on these responsibilities. A new position is needed to oversee EOP and
evacuation plan development and training. EOP training should be delivered immediately to all
new personnel assigned to positions that may require them to lead emergency evacuation
procedures. This should include OSA, Pulenuu, school officials and teachers, and relevant
agency officials. This should also occur with any major change in ASG administration such as
after an election. All Pulenuu and teachers should have NWRs. Pulenuu should also be equipped
with emergency equipment (e.g. bullhorns). Equipment standards should be determined by the
TEMCO in cooperation with OSA, Pulenuu, and DPS officials.
Education at schools has been highly effective and it is recommended that tsunami risk
awareness education be incorporated in the regular public school curriculum to assist in the
sustainment of tsunami risk awareness and risk reduction efforts. The Alaska Tsunami Education
Program (ATEP) provides an example of how to incorporate traditional knowledge and science
instruction with “hands-on, standard-aligned classroom lessons, interactive multimedia, and
mapping projects for grades K through 12.” (ATEP, 2011) The development of this program was
funded by the U.S. Department of Education. A similar program could be considered for
American Samoa.
The PTRTF stated that evacuation drilling was not strictly enforced. Evacuation drilling should
be planned for and executed regularly so staff and students are well aware of procedures. The
PTRTF also noted that some schools experienced problems with evacuation routes during the
2009 SPT including: Matafao Elementary, Coleman Elementary, Tafuna High School, Mt.
Alava, Le’atele, and Leone High School. School evacuation plans and safety zones should be
reevaluated and revised as needed to address some of the problems encountered during the 2009
SPT including the safety of the evacuation sites and routes, acceptability of the evacuation site
location, highway crossings or other conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles, or other
potential problems. If highway crossings are necessary, they should have crossing signs and be
publicized as evacuation routes so drivers are aware that pedestrians (students) may be crossing
the roadway. Police officers should be deployed to these locations to ensure safety. Evacuation
drills should be required regularly at all private institutions and encouraged at commercial
enterprises, especially hotels.
The PTRTF notes that student drop-off time was unregulated. In tsunami evacuation zones, at
least, there should be an established time that students can be dropped off with the provision that
a school official, with EOP training, be present. Programmatic transportation possibilities should
exist at all schools with special needs students during any hours the students may be present.
NPS is working with villages, TEMCO, and DOC on the development of evacuation routes. In
some cases evacuation routes are inaccessible, impassible, or nonexistent. The overall strategy
for determining the sufficient number and location of evacuation routes, where footpaths are
needed in addition to existing roadways, is unknown to the planning team, although both NPS
and TEMCO staff indicated that they are working on the coordination of this effort. NPS is
providing their trail crews to work with the villages to map out these evacuation routes. An
analysis of day and nighttime populations should be undertaken to determine the numbers and
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 34
locations or large populations that will need to evacuate to ensure that evacuation routes are
adequate. When footpath development is needed, new and existing routes should be inventoried
and responsibility for maintaining and overseeing the maintenance of these trails should be
clearly assigned. While NPS trail crews are able to assist in the development of these foot paths,
their maintenance should rest with the village. A traffic study is also needed, accounting for day
and night populations separately, to identify critical points where roadway improvements might
be warranted. The recommendation for a traffic study does not discredit the guidance that people
should evacuate by foot, not by automobile, but evacuation planning must consider the
possibility that many cars will be on the road when evacuation is necessary. Reducing the
interference and potential conflicts between cars and pedestrians is an important consideration.
The PTRTF report also notes that phone and radio communications are limited in the Eastern
District and Le‘atele Elementary had no emergency phone line at the time of the 2009 SPT.
Increasing telecommunications capacity is strongly recommended. Regarding the tsunami
warning process, PTWC is aiming for a two to three minute turnaround time for earthquake
assessment and warning dissemination when local tsunamis may occur. The feasibility of
increasing telecommunications capacity, increasing radio coverage, and using text messaging or
internet based applications to help disseminate early warnings should be pursued.
The availability and adequacy of evacuation sites and shelters should be investigated. A mapping
exercise between OSA and the Pulenuu and TEMCO staff could help uncover where large
populations are and where they are likely to go at different times of the day when evacuation is
needed. Sites for new shelters should be identified in areas where the location or capacity of
shelters is inadequate. Where existing shelters are suitable, the availability and development of
adequate restroom facilities should be considered. Federal funding sources may be available for
shelter development and should be pursued in this investigation.
Table 4: Summary of Challenges and Recommendations
Challenge
Recommendation
Inadequate EOP development, training,
Create an EOP coordinator position to ensure EOP development,
and awareness between agencies.
review, training, and revision.
Confusion about evacuation procedures
Regulate EOP development and enforce evacuation drills at public
and responsibilities.
institutions and encourage evacuation drills at vulnerable commercial
enterprises (e.g. hotels).
Tsunami risk awareness throughout the
Develop a DOE tsunami risk awareness program and incorporate into
general population.
the K-12 public school curriculum.
Safety of schools evacuation routes.
School evacuation plans and safety zones should be reevaluated and
revised as needed.
Improve unsafe evacuation routes at:
1. Matafao Elementary
2. Coleman Elementary
3. Tafuna High
4. Mt. Alava Elementary
5. Le’atele Elementary
6. Leone High
Transporting special needs students.
Program transportation possibilities for special needs students.
Unsupervised students at schools.
Regulate earliest drop of time and assign an EOP trained staff member
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 35
Challenge
Unavailable or inadequate evacuation
routes.
Roadway congestion during evacuation.
Evacuating special needs populations.
Adequacy of existing shelters or assembly
areas (AAs).
Restrooms at major designated AAs
Telecommunication systems
overwhelmed during emergencies.
Inadequate radio coverage in eastern
villages
Rapid warning transmission to a large
audience.
Draft Working Paper
Recommendation
to be present.
Undertake adequacy analysis of evacuation routes. Inventory routes and
assign responsibility for trail maintenance.
A traffic study should be done to identify areas where roadway
improvements might be warranted to improve evacuations.
Office of Protection Advocacy for Disabled could develop registries to
help responders assist or evacuate individuals with special needs faster
An assessment of the capacity and accessibility of shelters/AAs outside
of evacuation areas or possible inundations zones should be undertaken
to identify where new shelters should be developed. Informational
material should be published and outreach undertaken so all populations
know where to go during evacuation. Lateral pathways could be
developed to connect evacuation sites and shelters. The use of federal
funds for pursuing shelter development based on risks in American
Samoa should be investigated further.
Identify major evacuation areas and the likely number of evacuees, and
build public restroom facilities at major AAs.
Telecommunications capacity should be increased. Identification of
public and private funding sources is needed.
An in depth analysis of existing radio coverage and coverage
improvement possibilities is needed to determine effective solutions for
addressing warning communication deficiencies.
The feasibility of using text messaging or internet based applications to
help disseminate early warnings should be pursued.
October 2011
Page 36
1.5.3
Implementation Plan Implications
The following table provides scopes and preliminary priority rankings for follow-on projects.
The final report may refine or reprioritize the project list.
Table 5: Implementation Plan Scopes, Priority, ROM, Timeline
Scope
EOP coordinator position:
regulate EOP development,
exercises, and revision
Develop DOE tsunami
education program
Regulate school evacuation
planning and drills
Improve unsafe evacuation
routes at:
1. Matafao Elementary
2. Coleman Elementary
3. Tafuna High
4. Mt. Alava Elementary
5. Le’atele Elementary
6. Leone High
Inventory evacuation routes,
and assign maintenance
responsibility.
Traffic study for roadway
evacuation improvements.
Emergency shelter location
and capacity assessment.
Build restroom facilities at
major designated AAs
Radio coverage analysis for
warning communication
improvements
Identify funding sources for
telecommunications
capacity improvements.
Draft Working Paper
Priority
(High/Med/Low)
ROM
Timeline
High
TBD
TBD
Med
TBD
TBD
High
TBD
TBD
High
TBD
TBD
Med
TBD
TBD
Med
TBD
TBD
High
TBD
TBD
High
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
High
High
October 2011
Page 37
RESOURCES
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Draft Working Paper
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2011, from International Tsunami Information Centre: http://itic.iocunesco.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1180&Itemid=2297&lang=en
Jaffe, B. (2009, December). Surprises from the Deadly September 29, 2009, Samoa Tsunami.
Retrieved October 13, 2011, from United States Geological Survey, Soundwaves Monthly
Newsletter: http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2009/12/
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 39
Jaffe, B.E., G. Gelfenbaum, M.L. Buckley, S. Watt, A. Apotsos, A.W. Stevens, and B.M.
Richmond. (2010, February 18). The Limit of Inundation of the September 29, 2009, Tsunami on
Tutuila, American Samoa. Retrieved October 19, 2011, from U.S. Geological Survey Open-File
Report 2010-1018: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1018/
Kong, L., B. Yanagi. (2010, August 3). Domestic Travel Trip Report. American Samoa, April
26-30, May 24-27 and June 14-15, 2010. Honolulu, Hawaii: International Tsunami Information
Centre (ITIC).
Kong, L., C. McCreery. (2009, July 27). Foreign and Domestic Travel Report. American Samoa,
June28 - July 2, 2009. Honolulu, Hawaii: International Tsunami Information Centre (ITIC) and
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).
Leone Midkiff. (2010). Evacuation plan for Tsunami Leone Midkiff SY 2010-11. Retrieved
October 15, 2011, from American Samoa Department of Education :
http://www.doe.as/ourpages/auto/2010/12/2/54537199/evacuation%20plan%20mapTsunami%20
_2_.pdf
Meinig, C., S.E. Stalin, A.I. Nakamura, F. González, H.B. Millburn. (N.D.). Technology
Developments in Real-Time Tsunami Measuring, Monitoring and Forecasting. Retrieved
October 7, 2011, from NOAA Center for Tsunami Research:
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/Dart/Pdf/mein2836_final.pdf
National Communications System (NCS). (2009). Fiscal Year 2009 Report. Retrieved September
29, 2011, from National Communications System:
http://www.ncs.gov/library/reports/ncs_fy2009.pdf
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17, 2011, from National Communications System:
http://www.ncs.gov/library/reports/ncs_fy2009.pdf
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2011, July 27). Deep-ocean
Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) Description. Retrieved October 4, 2011, from
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/dart/dart.shtml
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2011, April 20). Real-Time DART
Data (NDBC). Retrieved October 3, 2011, from NOAA National Data Buoy Center:
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/dart.shtml
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2011, September 30). Real-Time
DART Data; Staiton 51426. Retrieved October 5, 2011, from NOAA National Data Buoy
Center: http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=51426
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2011, September 30). Real-Time
DART Data; Station 51425. Retrieved October 5, 2011, from NOAA National Data Buoy
Center: http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=51425
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 40
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (N.D.). The Tsunami Warning
System – How Does It Work? Retrieved October 6, 2011, from National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Tsunami:
http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/sew/TheTsunamiWarningSystem.pdf
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP). (2010, June 21). National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program 2009-2013 Stategic plan. Retrieved October 12, 2011, from National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program: nthmp.tsunami.gov/documents/NTHMPStrategicPlanvf062110.doc
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, NTHMP. (2011, March 23). Exercise PACIFEX
11 Participant Handbook. Retrieved September 30, 2011, from National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program, Warning Coordination Subcommittee:
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/documents/PACIFEX11Final.pdf
National Weather Service (NWS). (2004, November). Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific.
Retrieved October 4, 2011, from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Weather Service: http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/twsp_brochure_jan05.pdf
Oregon Coastal Atlas. (N.D.). Tsunami hazards. Retrieved October 12, 2011, from Oregon
Coastal Atlas:
http://www.coastalatlas.net/index.php?Itemid=9&id=13&option=com_content&task=view
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) . (2011, October 14). Message
pacific.TIBPAC.2011.10.14.0342. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from Pacific Tsunami Warning
Cente: http://ptwc.weather.gov/ptwc/?region=1&id=pacific.TIBPAC.2011.10.14.0342&msg
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC). (2009, November 25). Frequently Asked Questions.
Retrieved July 28, 2011, from Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:
http://ptwc.weather.gov/ptwc/faq.php
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC). (2009, November 25). PTWC History. Retrieved
October 4, 2011, from Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:
http://ptwc.weather.gov/ptwc/history.php
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC). (2009, November 25). PTWC Responsibilities.
Retrieved October 4, 2011, from Pacific Tsunami Warning Center:
http://ptwc.weather.gov/ptwc/responsibilities.php
Raskin, J., Y. Wang, M.M. Boyer, T. Fiez, J. Moncada, K. Yu, and H. Yeh. (2009, March 20).
Preliminary White Paper on Tsunami Evacuation Buildings (TEBs): A New Risk Management
Approach to Cascadia Earthquakes and Tsunamis. Retrieved October 10, 2011, from The
Geological Society of America : http://www.geosociety.org/news/pr/0910_CBTEB.pdf
ReliefWeb. (2009, December 9). American Samoa: Gov. Togiola said Homeland Security
making positive progress in disaster education. Retrieved October 7, 2011, from ReliefWeb:
http://reliefweb.int/node/337050
Draft Working Paper
October 2011
Page 41
Samoa News. (2011, October 15). Wave of panic sweeps over the territory following tsunami
warning. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from Samoa News:
http://www.samoanewsonline.com/publicviewstory.php?storyid=4755&newspaperid=189
ScienceDaily. (2009, November 11). Community Education And Evacuation Planning Saved
Lives In Sept. Retrieved October 13, 2011, from ScienceDaily:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/11/091105092611.htm
Stromberg, M. (2011, May/June). News: "We Have a lot to Learn," Experts Say. Planning
Magazine, p. 5.
Townsend, A.M. & M.L. Moss. (2005, April). Telecommunications Infrastructure in Disasters:
Preparing Cities for Crisis Communications. Retrieved October 17, 2011, from New York
University Publication Archive: http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/NYU-DisasterCommunications1Final.pdf
United States 109th Congress. (2006). H.R. 1674: Tsunami Warning and Education Act.
Retrieved October 10, 2011, from govtrack.us:
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-1674
United States Geological Survey (USGS). (2011, March 14). Global Seismographic Network.
Retrieved October 4, 2011, from United States Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards Program:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/monitoring/gsn/
Weather Service Office, Pago Pago (WSO). (2011). Tsunami Warning System Workshop.
Tafuna: The National Weather Service, Weather Service Office, Pago Pago.
Weather Service Office, Pago Pago (WSO). (2011). WSO Pago Pago Home Page. Retrieved
October 4, 2011, from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather
Service, Weather Service Office, Pago Pago, American Samoa: http://www.prh.noaa.gov/samoa/
Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC). (2011). Tsunami Hazard Mitigation and
Preparedness, A Perspective from State and Territory Tsunami Programs in the High Tsunami
Risk Pacific Region. Retrieved October 19, 2011, from Western States Seismic Policy Council:
http://www.wsspc.org/Reports/WSSPC_Report_2011-01.pdf
Draft Working Paper
Appendix 7A
Gap Analysis Table for: Warning & Evacuation
7A-1
The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) monitors seismic
activity and sea level stations across the Pacific region and is the
highest authority in issuing tsunami warnings. PTWC is part of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
National Weather Service (NWS). The NWS Weather Service
Office (WSO) in American Samoa is the primary entry point for
tsunami warnings in American Samoa and is responsible for
activating the Emergency Alert System (EAS). The WSO has the
authority to issue tsunami warnings if the PTWC in Hawaii
cannot be reached. The WSO communicates with the American
Samoa Department of Homeland Security (ASDHS)/Territorial
Emergency Management Coordinating Office (TEMCO), who
oversee Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operations, on
warning issuance. ASDHS is responsible for sounding the sirens,
but the WSO can sound the sirens if the ASDHS cannot be
reached.
Tsunamis are most commonly caused by seismic events, which
are monitored around the globe. Through the Earthquake
Hazards Program, the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
uses the Global Seismographic Network (GSN) to monitor and
record seismic activity (USGS, 2011). The PTWC issues regional
tsunami warning to areas located near the epicenter on the
basis of seismic evidence (NWS, 2004). The Tsunami Warning
System in the Pacific also accesses nearly 100 water level
stations throughout the Pacific to verify the generation and
evaluate the severity of a tsunami. DART Buoys help confirm
tsunamis and estimate arrival time of distant tsunamis across
the Pacific. (IOC/ITIC, 2004)
1. What agencies are
participating in the
monitoring of tsunami
threats?
2. What systems are used for
identifying regional
tsunami threats?
Findings
Consultation:
ITIC, Kong, Laura
ITIC, Yanagi, Brian
PTWC, Fryer, Gerard
PTWC, McCreery, Charlels
PTWC, Weinstein, Stewart
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), International
Tsunami Information Centre (ITIC). (2004, November). Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific. Retrieved October 4, 2011, from
National Weather Service:
National Weather Service (NWS). (2004, November). Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific. Retrieved October 4, 2011, from
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather
Service:
United States Geological Survey (USGS). (2011, March 14). Global
Seismographic Network. Retrieved October 4, 2011, from United
States Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards
Program: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/monitoring/gsn/
Consultation:
ASDHS/TEMCO (EOC), Brown, Jacinta
ITIC, Kong, Laura
ITIC, Yanagi, Brian
PTWC, Fryer, Gerard
WSO, Malala, Hans
Weather Service Office, Pago Pago (WSO). (2011). WSO Pago Pago
Home Page. Retrieved from: http://www.prh.noaa.gov/samoa/
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2011,
April 20). National Data Buoy Center. Retrieved from:
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/dart/dart.shtml
References
Appendix 8A - Gap Analysis Table for:
Evaluative Criteria
October 2011
What systems are used for
local warning and
evacuation notification?
a. Do alert protocols define
roles and responsibilities
for authorities and media
participating in
disseminating warning
information?
b. Do the warning systems
include human and
technological backup
components to ensure
warning delivery?
c. c. Are warnings multi
lingual?
Are all aspects of the
warning systems and
evacuation procedures
periodically tested and
evaluated to identify
system shortfalls?
3.
4.
Evaluative Criteria
7A-2
EOP documentation, coordination, training, practicing,
evaluation, and revision are not adequately undertaken
presumably due to the lack of staff available to coordinate this
effort. The planning team was not able to review any EOPs,
other than the Terrotorial Emergency Operations Plan, and was
also not able to determine which agencies had current EOPs or
the existing protocol for development, training, and revision. It
is recommended that a new position be developed at the
TEMCO to oversee the documentation, review, training, and
revisions of EOPs for all components of American Samoa’s
tsunami warning system.
Consultation:
ASDHS, Brown, Jacinta
ASG, Langford, Evelyn
ITIC, Kong, Laura
ITIC, Yanagi, Brian
OIS, Faleafine-Nomura, Lydia
TEMCO, Vinnie Atofau
Consultation:
ITIC, Kong, Laura
ITIC, Yanagi, Brian
PTWC, Fryer, Gerard
WSO, Malala, Hans
AS Village Chiefs
Weather Service Office, Pago Pago (WSO). (2011). Tsunami Warning
System Workshop. Tafuna: The National Weather Service, Weather
Service Office, Pago Pago.
Kong, L., B. Yanagi. (2010, August 3). Domestic Travel Trip Report.
American Samoa, April 26-30, May 24-27 and June 14-15, 2010.
Honolulu, Hawaii: International Tsunami Information Centre (ITIC).
PTWC: http://ptwc.weather.gov/
WSO, Malala, Hans
References
The PTWC transmits local tsunami warnings to the WSO through
six modes of communication: EMWIN, PTWC website, WCATWC
website, fax, email, CISN, and the direct phone hotline. After the
PTWC sends a local tsunami warning to the WSO, the WSO is
then responsible for contacting the EOC to sound the warning
sirens. The EOC contacts the Governor’s Office, the Department
of Public Safety, Police, and the Department of Public Works to
coordinate response. After contacting the EOC, the WSO
initiates the EAS by contacting local radio and TV stations
responsible for transmitting the warning. The warning is
broadcast in English and Samoan. Telephones are primarily
used, but UHF radios are used when phone lines are inoperable.
Authority roles are fairly well defined, but documentation and
training need to be improved. Human and technological backups
do exist. The most helpful component of the tsunami warning
system was the use of village and church bells to alert villages of
the danger and signal evacuation. This is a model practices and
should be continued and promoted.
Findings
October 2011
Signage for some tsunami hazard zones is in place, but this is not
complete. Signage for evacuation routes, shelters, and safe
areas is non-existent or inadequate.
8. Are hazard zones,
evacuation routes, shelters,
and safe areas clearly
marked throughout the
community with signs
and/or maps?
9. Do existing tsunami
evacuation routes provide
adequate and traversable
paths, and are there
adequate and maintained
assembly areas at the
upper limits of the routes?
7A-3
NOAA and the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of
Urban and Regional Planning (DURP), are undertaking a
community resilience study that will focus first on Leone and
Pago Pago. A team of DURP students and professors visited
Leone and tried to identify evacuation routes. They reported
that these routes were not easily recognizable and in some
cases nearly impassible. Through consultation the planning team
Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC). (2011). Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation and Preparedness, A Perspective from State and
Territory Tsunami Programs in the High Tsunami Risk Pacific Region.
Retrieved October 19, 2011, from Western States Seismic Policy
Council: http://www.wsspc.org/Reports/WSSPC_Report_2011-01.pdf
The TEMCO is developing large scale evacuation maps for the
Island of Tutuila. Based on consultation and references made in
informal documents it is assumed that at least conceptual plans
exist for institutions or village level evacuation, but these are
not well known. Businesses do not have evacuation plans and
locally relevant evacuation plans are not yet publically available.
The level to which evacuation planning and drilling at school is
taking place is not known, but is reportedly taking place. Public
outreach and training, largely undertaken by the TEMCO, has
been effective in informing the public about tsunami risk. Public
Service Announcements (PSA), focusing on earthquake/tsunami
awareness, are broadcasted through local radio stations in
seven languages: English, Samoan, Fijian, Philippine, Chinese,
Korean and Tongan (WSSPC, 2011).
No such plans or procedures were made available to the
planning team. It is assumed that individual responsibility is
taken to care for family/village members. It could be possible
that the Office of Protection Advocacy for Disabled develop
registries to help responders assist or evacuate elderly or
disabled people faster. Outreach to migrants and tourism based
businesses should be undertaken.
The LBJ Hospital, EOC, and WSO have to evacuate during
tsunami warnings. These facilities have reported that EOPs are
in place to accommodate evacuation with manageable
disturbances to operations.
5. Do established and
publically available
evacuation plans exist?
a. Is there a need for village
level planning for
warning and evacuation?
b. Are evacuation plans
well publicized and
practiced at schools and
in business districts?
c. Is the public well
informed about tsunami
risk and emergency
procedures?
6. Are there existing
procedures for first
responders to evacuate
special needs populations
(e.g. elderly or disabled
persons, transients:
tourists, migrants)?
7. What critical facilities need
to evacuate and what
impact does this have on
operations?
Consultation:
ASDHS, Atofao, Vinne
ITIC, Kong, Laura
ITIC, Yanagi, Brian
NPS, Bone, Sarah
NPS, Richards, Mike
Consultation:
DURP, Filibeck, Karla
DURP, Foley, Dolores
DURP, Minerbi, Luciano
DURP, Porter, Ginger
DURP, Pradhan, Pragya
NPS, Bone, Sarah
Consultation:
LBJ Hospital, Gerstenberger, Mike
WSO, Malala, Hans
NA
Consultation:
ASDHS/TEMCO, Brown, Jacinta
DOC GIS, King, Mataio
DOC GIS, Reynolds, Cristin
DOC GIS, Sauni, Junior
DOC GIS, Sevao, Mike (Kang)
References
Findings
Evaluative Criteria
October 2011
10. Can shelters accommodate
special needs of elderly,
disabled, children, or pets?
7A-4
NPS, Richards, Mike
learned that this case is similar in many tsunami hazard areas.
NPS is developing and improving evacuation routes, but the
planning team is not aware of any assessment of the adequacy
(capacity and condition) of assembly areas. As evacuation
planning moves forward, an assessment of assembly areas
should be undertaken.
Emergency sheltering possibilities for tsunami evacuation and
temporary sheltering are inadequate based on availability of
facilities reported through consultation and locations of existing
shelters based on GIS analysis of critical facilities with regard to
reported 2009 SPT inundation and evacuation maps currently
under development. When sheltering needs and locations are
identified, the ability to accommodate the needs of elderly,
disabled, children, and pets should be considered during
planning, design, and development.
Jaffe, B. (2009, December). Surprises from the Deadly September 29,
2009, Samoa Tsunami. Retrieved October 13, 2011, from United
States Geological Survey, Soundwaves Monthly Newsletter:
http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2009/12/
Department of Commerce (DOC). (2011). GIS Users Group, GIS
Layers: Critical Facilities, Elevation, and Flood Zones. Retrieved
October 19, 2011, from Department of Commerce: http://gis.doc.as/
References
Findings
Evaluative Criteria
October 2011

american samoa tsunami study research topic #07 warning

Transcription

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