Financial relationship with UE and use of

CORTE DEI CONTI
SEZIONE DI CONTROLLO
PER GLI AFFARI COMUNITARI
E INTERNAZIONALI
ANNUAL REPORT
1999
Financial relationship with U.E. and use of community founds
*********
CHAPTER I
FINANCIAL POLICY
1 – GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF FINANCIAL FLOWS BETWEEN ITALY AND THE EU
1.1 – Relations with the EU
Membership in the European Union is not only limited to political or juridical relationships. It also requires member States to guarantee the EU all the financial resources,
through special redistribution mechanisms, that – as realisation of the so-called cohesion policies – allow economic, social and territorial rebalance of the Community.
An analysis of financial relations between the European Union and the member States requires a review of the principles regulating reciprocal jurisdiction. This review
must take into account that the financial statement of that report is a necessary reflection of the economic policy agreed on by the European Union and entrusted to continually
evolving juridical instruments.1
Membership in the EU brings advantages and burdens that cannot all be measured purely from and accounting point of view. This does not exempt us from an
examination of the data found in the Community financial statements in order to investigate the extent of relations throughout the year from a strictly financial perspective.
This leads to the need to verify the budgetary balances as a means of comparing the outflow (income for the EU) and entry flow (shares of Community funding attributed to
the individual member States).
The European Union’s present system of financing must, from the EU’s point of view, respond to criteria of “adequacy and equity”. It must also take into account the
Union’s needs of financial autonomy. Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the financial situations of the member States, which, according to Union regulations, are required to
respect budgetary balances.
The effects of the joint policies of income and expenditures adopted by the Community can be seen for each member States in the overall financial framework where the
resulting situation of financial balance or imbalance is underlined.
Of course, algebraic data is not the sole, exclusive element of analysis of the phenomenon and indeed the European Commission was given a special mandate to assess
the documentation and study it in depth. The result was the special Report submitted on 7 October 1998. The conclusions in the aforementioned report will be amply discussed
with the data given and analysed below.
1.2 – 1998 Financial data discussed in the general report of the Italian State
An explanation of the accounts of the financial flows each year between Italy and the EU is contained in the report that the Ministry of the Treasury, in accordance to
article 5.2 of the Legislative Degree of 23 September 1994, n. 547, converted into the law of 22 November 1994, n. 644, presented to Parliament as an attachment to the
general of the State.
That official document was the source for the data given below, used as the basis for the account processing required by specific analyses.
Payments
Table I, column B shows the “payments” (cash flow) made by Italy to the EU. Column A, on the other hand, shows the budget allocations at the movement of definitive
budget estimates.2 The third column contains primarily the largest sums of payments vis-à-vis the definitive budget (generally calculated in November of each year). It is also
clear that, as regards the resources of VAT and the GNP, the comparison with forecasts must necessarily take into account the fact that the figures shown in Table I include
adjustments for the period 1988-1997 to the extent given in the note.
The larger amount of payments as opposed to allocations is partly due to the system of adjustments accredited to other countries as balance-sheet adjustments. This is
particular clear in the case of the United Kingdom.3 We should also point out a slight percentage reduction (-1,64%) of the GNP payment with respect to the definitive budget.4
1
2
3
4
Single European Act in effect as of 1987, Maastricht Treaty in effect as of 1991 and the very recent Treaty of Amsterdam.
A more specific explanation of the data in the budget appropriation of the Italian budget is given in section 2.2.
Please see the discussion in paragraph 2.
The initial budget was for 10,000 billion, definitively adjusted to 10,007 billion and later reduced to 9,843 billion during cost-price calculation.
Payments for the 1998 final statement came to 21,486 billion lira with an increase of 4.81% with respect to the definitive budget and a growth of 22% with respect to the
previous, as can be seen in Table 3.
Prospetto 1
Italy – EU Own resources in 1998
Comparison between forecasts and payments of Italy
(Mld/lire)
Final forecast
Payments
Augmentation
(A)
(B)
percentage
Own resources(*)
(B) / (A)
Sugar contribution (**)
149
194
30,20
Agricultural drawing (**)
81
128
58,02
Custom duty (**)
1.568
2.151
37,18
IVA
8.694
(***)9.170
5,48
PNL
10.007
(****)9.843
-1,64
Totale Generale
20.499
21.486
4,81
(*)
Fonte: bilancio generale della Comunità europea 1998 (compreso il suppletivo e rettificativo); per la conversione in lire è stato utilizzato il tasso ECU
(Lire 1.936,27).
(**)
I dati riportati sono espressi al netto del 10% trattenuto quale rimborso delle spese di riscossione
(***)
L’importo comprende 449 Mld versati per conguaglio IVA 1988-1997
(****)
L’importo comprende conguaglio PNL per il periodo 1988-1997
Credits
The payments that Commission offices accredit to the member States are cash movements for each financial period and for each “fund” the EU used to finance
intervention in the participating countries.
Table 2 shows, according to source of financing, the payments accredited in 1998, also providing an indication of the percentage values for each fund of the overall
figure received by Italy. On the whole, the general amount of funds accredited in 1998 came to 15,128.6 billion with a reduction of 20.92% in comparison to 1997 when the
total amount came to 19,132.3 billion lira.
For a better understanding of the data, it should also be pointed out that there was a singular discontinuity with respect to cyclic trends. This can also be seen in the
report on the 1997 balance sheet made last year by the Ministry of the Treasury. According to this report, the credits to Italy for that year were 69.99% higher than 1996. The
following section shows a comparison between 1997 and 1998, specifically prepared to highlight the phenomenon (Table 3).
Table 2 below only shows data for 1998 resulting from the Treasury balance sheet for that year.
Prospetto 2
Somme accreditate dall’Unione Europea all’Italia
Anno 1998
Distribuzione degli accrediti per fonte di finanziamento
FONDI
Importi in lire
Percentuale sul
totale
FEAOG - Garanzia
8.008.175.023.348
52,93
FESR
4.523.561.709.543
29,90
FSE
1.750.799.632.354
11,58
FEAOG - Orientamento
728.317.713.871
4,82
SFOP
52.149.949.392
0,35
Rimborsi FEAOG ante-riforma e
65.639.290.097
0,43
altri proventi
TOTALE GENERALE
15.128.643.318.605
100,00
Fonte: rendiconto dello Stato 1998 - Allegato 3 Tesoro
For greater understanding of the incoming and outgoing cash flow due to Italy’s membership in the EU, Table 3 provides an overview of the data presented in Tables 1
(column B) and 2. The aim is to supply an overall vision of the phenomenon in comparison to the previous year.
The last piece of information given represented the net balance of the various situations at the end of the fiscal period for the difference between payments and credits.
Table 3 shows a prevalence of payments made during 1998 on behalf of the EU with respect to the credits obtained and, therefore a negative final balance.
Wherever a comparison is made with similar data from the previous year, we see an increase of payments equal to 3,872.99 billion (+22%) and a reduction of credits of
4,003.73 billion (-20.9%).
Prospetto 3
Versamenti alla UE5
Risorse proprie
tradizionali
Risorsa IVA
Risorsa PNL
Totale
Accrediti dalla UE
FEAOG Garanzia
a)FEAOG-O. e Pesca
b)FESR
c)FSE
Altri proventi
Totale fondi strutt.li
a+b+c
Totale
1997
2.171,87
7.446,39
7.995,04
17.613,30
1997
9.900,81
1.110,93
5.208,53
1.904,91
1.007,21
8.224,37
19.132,39
(Mld/lire)
1998
differenza
%
2.473,42
301,55
13,9
9.169,48
9.843,39
21.486,29
1.723,09
1.848,35
3.872,99
1998
differenza
8.008,18
-1.892,63
795,09
-315,84
4.523,56
-684,97
1.750,80
-154,11
51,02
-956,19
7.069,45
-1.154,92
15.128,65
-4.003,73
23,1
23,1
22,0
%
-19,1
-28,4
-13,1
-8,1
-95,00
-14,00
-20,9
Saldo netto
1.519,09
-6.357,64
Fonte:rendiconto generale dello Stato - Allegato 3 Tesoro
The accounting data given above shows a situation that is certainly less favourable than that of the previous year, due to the combined effect of growth in all the items
making up the payments to the EU and a reduction of all credits from each European fund. Obviously the fund credits are linked to Italy’s greater or lesser ability to make
prompt use of Community funds, also through the use of co-financing. The good condition of the Funds expense procedures is an important element in quantifying credits.
The 23.1% growth of VAT and GNP resources must be assessed in the light of the Community regulation currently in force. Particular reference should be made to the
last Reg. 1355/96, aimed at modifying the Community’s own system of resources. The data for Italy should also be evaluated by comparing it to similar data of other member
States. This will help us correctly verify whether the phenomenon is an exclusively Italian characteristic or similar to other EU States. This will shed light on the comparative
table prepared by the European Audit Court (table 7). A study of this table shows that in the two previous years (’96 and ’97), the amount of the resources as calculated by
the GNP tends to increase to a greater proportion than in the United Kingdom which with it has different characteristics in common (e.g. the total percentage of contributions).
5
Per quanto riguarda i “versamenti alla UE” è necessario dare particolare significato al confronto dei versamenti relativi alle risorse IVA e PNL, in quanto per
quelli delle RPT, soprattutto con riferimento alla voce più significativa (dazi doganali, cfr. prospetto 1) lo Stato italiano effettua una mera operazione di
riscossione per conto della UE, e non costituiscono quindi una detrazione dalla ricchezza nazionale.
In this regard, we should consider that the Commission is well aware of the phenomenon of budgetary imbalances in member States. In its 7 October 1998 report on
the operation of its own resources, the Commission gives an in-depth, well-motivated analysis of the matter, reaching the conclusion that the existence of genuine budgetary
imbalances can only show up on the basis of particularly significant differences recorded between credits received and payments made.
In this report, however, the Commission insists that, in order to ascertain these imbalances, a series of parameters must be adequately evaluated. These parameters
are not only financial but also concern structural intervention and the secondary effects they create.
1.2 – Long-term analysis
Study of serial data for the period 1993-1994 (see table 4) shows that the negative balance of net cash flows is not a new phenomenon. There was a similar situation in
1996 with a figure that was, in absolute, grater than the present negative balance (-6,564.09 billion). While this situation tends to influence a more of the 1998 situation, it
certainly does not exonerate us from the obligation to carefully assess the cause that determined the negative balance particularly during the financial period under
consideration.
The trend of financial data of the 1998 financial period should be taken into consideration, both from the viewpoint of liabilities (payments made to the EU) and assets
(credits from the EU). The former rose in 1998 and the latter fell, creating a negative gap for Italy. While credits fell by 4,003.73 billion, in absolute terms they were still
greater in volume than in previous years (1993-1996, with the exclusion of 1997 when the EAGGF – Guarantee Section and the Structural Fund credited particular large sums
to Italy.
It should also be pointed out that the negative balance of the 1998 financial period was heavily influenced by the item “other income”, went from 1,007.21 billion in 1997
to 51.2 in 1998 (-95%). Moreover, the payments made on the basis of Commission requirements from the account “own resources” directly in the revenues of the State
balance sheet as a reimbursement for surplus payments, was included in that item, which also includes various programmes (CIP, IMP and others). There is no indication that
any payment of this nature was made in 1998, while in 1997 (as well as during previous years), sizeable reimbursements took place regularly. The result, only apparent
therefore, was of a decrease in revenues.
Prospetto 4
Movimenti finanziari Unione europea – Italia
(Mld/lire)
Imputazioni
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Versamenti alla U.E
18.636,87 16.902,51 15.875,34 17.819,36 17.613,30
Zucchero
199,27
258,68
254,53
187,25
169,16
Prelievi agricoli
277,27
235,82
174,87
79,49
85,04
Dazi
1.610,33
1,718,58
2.114,52
1.804,84
1.917,67
IVA
11.485,07
9.514,68
8.863,54
9.254,63
7.446,39
PNL
5.064,93
5.174,75
4.467,88
6.493,15
7.995,04
Accrediti all’Italia
14.387,38 12.359,78 14.164,87 11.255,27 19.132,39
FEAOG –G..
8.518,29
6.635,83
6.885,71
8.541,77
9.900,81
Fondi strutturali:
5.557,80
3.538,61
5.016,81
2.166,33
8.224,37
FEAOG-O e Pesca
547,78
603,35
910,87
644,31
1.110,93
FESR
3.459,14
2.456,91
2.807,32
987,34
5.208,53
FSE
1.550,88
478,35
1.298,62
534,68
1.904,91
Altri proventi
311,29
2.185,34
2.262,35
547,17
1.007,21
Movimenti netti
-4.249,49 -4.542,73 -1.710,47 -6.564,09
1.519,09
(*) Di cui 0,457 Mld riguardano dazi doganali in contenzioso
1998
21.487,29
194,35
129,09
2.150,98*
9.169,48
9.843,39
15.128,65
8.008,18
7.069,45
795,09
4.523,56
1.750,80
51,02
-6.358,64
After an examination of table 4, we should again recall the suggestions made by the Commission to correct any budgetary imbalances. The suggestion made was to
assign resources in a more equal manner as far as possible. It is also unfortunately true that, given its proportion, the financial phenomenon that occurred in Italy during the
1998 financial period is a singular one. This is true not only because the funds accredited were lower than forecast but also because the rates applied to VAT and GNP provide
a value for those resource that is not in proportion to Italy’s capacity to contribute. These percentages are provided in section 2.2.
2 - COMMUNITY BUDGET AND COMMUNITIES’ OWN RESOURCES
2.1 – EU Income
Use of the EU general budget (see table 5) for a comparison in percentage with the figures found in the financial report of Italy, implies a synthetic analysis of the main
components of the European balance sheet. This is particularly true in the section on income, the specific target of this report, compared later with the corresponding figures of
other members State (Tables 6 and 7).
In this regard, a synthetic overview of the so-called “own resources”. Established by Council Decision 70/243/EEC, they include:
taxes on agricultural products imported from non-EU countries, the amount of which is equal to the difference between the Community and world prices;
the contribution for sugar, including isoglucose, consisting of taxes from companies in the sugar sector, levies or duties called for in the organisation of the markets of
the sugar sector;
customs duties, also imposed on goods imported from third countries;
VAT income (established with decision 70/243/EEC) consisting of the revenues of an equal rate to be applied on each member State’s taxable VAT base, determined in
a uniform manner according to Community regulations;
the income from the so-called “fourth resource” (established by European Council Decision 88/376/EEC), consisting of the application of a uniform rate according to
Community regulations to each member State’s GNP.
Ultimately, agricultural revenues (contributions to sugar production) and customs duties (defined as “traditional resources”) have no fiscal goals. Rather than being an
instrument to finance the community, they are a measure to product Community production. On the other hand, since VAT and GNP income are considered residual resources.
Given the need to compare them to total expenditure and remaining revenues, they are regulated not only by legislation but also by the budget documents. This is because the
level of expenditures in the Community budget necessarily conditions and determines the volume of income. This characteristics leads to the principle of income authorisation,
generally incidental to the accounting systems of the member States.
Prospetto 5
Entrate degli esercizi 1997 e 1998
(Mecu)
Tipo di entrata e linea di Entrate effettive Entrate effettive
Variazioni
bilancio corrispondente
nel 1997
nel 1998
percentuali b/a
(a)
(b)
%
1.Risorse proprie tradizionali
14.172,27
14.110,67
-0,44
- Diritti agricoli (capitolo 10)
1.025,19
1.102,22
7,51
- Contributo zucchero e
1.114,04
1.070,08
-3,95
isoglucosio (capitolo 11)
- Dazi doganali (capitolo 12)
13.607,74
13.506,23
-0,75
- Spese di riscossione (capitolo
- 1.574,70
-1.567,85
-0,44
19)
2. Risorse proprie IVA e PNL
62.355,59
66.841,56
7,63
- Risorsa IVA (capitolo 13)
34.918,97
32.684,93
-6,4
- Risorsa PNL (capitolo 14)
27.436,62
34.428,35
25,50
(di cui riserva)
(286,89)
(271,72)
-5,29
3. Squilibri di bilancio correzioni a
-114,90
60,92
favore del RU
TOTALE
76.412,96
81.284,87
Eccedenza disponibile dell’
4.384,05
1.924,25
esercizio precedente (capitolo 30)
TOTALE GENERALE
80.797,01
83.209,12
I dati utilizzati per elaborare il prospetto 5 sono ricavati per il 1997 dalla relazione presentata lo scorso anno dalla Corte dei conti europea. I dati 1998 sono
ricavati dagli elaborati forniti dalla stessa Corte.
The data in Table 6 is particularly interesting. It shows the extent of each member State’s contribution to the 1998 EU budget.
Of the EU member States, Italy is the fourth largest in contributions to the European budget (10,581.4 Mecu), preceded by Germany (20,632.9 Mecu), France (13,584.2
Mecu) and the United Kingdom (12,249.1 Mecu). Italy also makes substantial contributions to the corrections of the United Kingdom’s budgetary imbalances. This is discussed
below using the analysis made by the European Commission and the European Audit Court.
Prospetto 6 Esercizio 1998 Versamenti effettuati dagli Stati membri (Ecu)
Stati Membri
Diritti Agricoli
1
Contributo
Zucchero e
isoglucosio
2
Diritti
dogana
di
Spese di
riscossione
(10% delle
risorse proprie
tradizionali)
4
Risorse
Proprie
Tradizionali
(nette 90%)
Totale Risorse
Proprie IVA
Totale Risorse
Proprie PNL
Correzione in
favore del
Regno Unito
6
7
8
TOTALE
10
9
Belgio
Danimarca
Germania
Grecia
Spagna
39.389.502
8.701.851
163.008.864
8.769.860
34.126.413
65.163.030
37.044.166
304.441.717
12.227.194
42.941.184
3
1.163.654.607
282.091.447
3.155.048.834
161.120.717
741.240.815
-126.820.714
-32.783.746
-362.249.941
-18211.777
-81.830.841
5
1.141.386.426
295.053.718
3.260.249.473
163.905.993
736.477.572
842.254.687
565.628.799
7.925.768.379
556.035.069
2.391.029.714
1.011.983.881
745.350.826
8.783.291.150
524.956.519
2.360.138.635
135.307.546
88.688.625
663.682.886
65.441.390
294.634.137
Francia
Irlanda
Italia
Lussemburgo
Paesi Bassi
Austria
Portogallo
Finlandia
Svezia
Regno Unito
62.502.156
670.105
72.881.962
693.536
175.458.980
14.442.554
43.507.021
8.936.098
25.845.804
443.277.109
298.600.514
11.064.550
110.961.242
0
72.403.800
30.532.706
3.843.905
8.314.842
19.305.085
53.233.409
1.307.649.055
207.184.821
1.224.804.548
23.829.122
1.630.448.131
223.461.821
150.301.922
138.127.413
380.752.633
2.716.519.142
-166.875.172
-21.891.948
-140.864.803
-2.452.266
-187.831.091
-26.843.708
-19.765.285
-15.537.835
-42.590.352
-321.302.966
1.501.876.553
197.027.529
1.267.782.949
22.070.392
1.690.479.820
241.593.373
177.887.563
139.840.518
383.313.170
2.891.726.695
5.534.251.273
410.045.530
3.887.684.654
97.256.191
1.622.201.995
863.576.957
441.008.371
436.902.137
949.257.881
6.563.553.879
5.785.336.489
342.860.726
4.801.551.695
87.948.631
1.588.961.905
867.688.616
430.337.709
504.840.992
933.781.622
6.251.472.020
1.102.211.816
1.070.077.345
13.506.235.030
-1.567.852.447
14.110.671.744
33.086.455.516
35.020.501.418
762.788.835
34.798.741
624.417.247
9.454.022
202.865.555
112.942.916
54.847.488
64.250.418
116.329.573
3.169.526.641
60.922.738
(*)
(**)
EUR 15
Restituzioni
a Grecia,
Spagna e al
Portogallo
29.865.735
483.303
29.382.432
3.130.932.540
1.694.721.968
20.632.991.888
1.310.338.972
5.752.414.323
13.584.253.150
984.732.526
10.581.436.545
216.729.235
5.104.509.275
2.085.801.863
1.104.564.433
1.145.834.066
2.382.682.246
12.537.225.952
82.249.168.984
(***)
Fonte: Corte dei conti europea
(*)La differenza in più che si riscontra alla colonna 6 rispetto alle cifre esposte nel prospetto 5 pari a 401,52 Mecu è dovuta alla circostanza che nel prospetto 6 sono incluse le
quote dovute da ciascuno Stato a saldo di annualità precedenti.
(**)La differenza tra il totale della colonna 7 del prospetto 6 e la cifra esposta nella colonna b del prospetto 5,pari a 592,15 Mecu, ha la stessa motivazione riportata sopra.
(***)La differenza tra l’importo globale riportato alla colonna 10 e l’importo totale riportato alla colonna B del prospetto 5 (Mecu 83.209,12) è pari alla somma delle due cifre
riportate nelle note precedenti detratti 33,71 Mecu (correttivi UE).
Prospetto 6A Versamenti per l’esercizio 1998 dei saldi 1982-97 relativi alle Risorse Proprie IVA (Ecu)
Stati Membri
Belgio
Danimarca
Germania
Grecia
Spagna
Francia
Irlanda
Saldi
Saldi Risorse proprie
Risorse
IVA
1997
proprie IVA
1996
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1995
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1994
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1993
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1992
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1991
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1990
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1989
Saldi
risorse
proprie
IVA
1988
-10.686.544
-5.264.535
876.652.47
1
34.130.714
76.546.286
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.786.674
15.294.785
.
997.771
0
488.740
0
1.869.53
8
990.478
385
-37.154
0
0
0
0
1.068.982
0
15.207.41
7
1.032.461
967.204
850.654
0
0
43.331.68
8
0
16.477.123
10.077.87
3
-32.001
387.048
8.507.75
1
6.374.74
6
0
4.788.92
7
2.381.82
2
498.401
6.675.757
138.316.06
4
60.615.197
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
7
0
0
0
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
6
0
0
0
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
5
0
0
0
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
4
0
0
0
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
3
0
0
0
Saldi
ris.
prop
IVA
198
2
0
0
0
0
10.878.26
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5.977.846
7.342.894
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.760.026
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
49.016
-2.999.613
0
0
0
0
0
0
21.327.720
0
0
-281.158
0
0
-563.769
0
0
-492.891
0
0
-106.372
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
70.129.345
-32.735.784
8.924.047
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15.033.597
0
28.116.74
4
23.764.78
2
0
29.063.33
1
19.602.30
8
0
35.451.50
2
17.638.53
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
99.127.448
676.485.54
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
401.519.28
0
Italia
244.726.10
1
0
13.705.87
8
0
Lussemburg
o
Paesi Bassi
Austria
Portogallo
4.574.607
6.917.648
5.294.190
57
70.129.345
-32.735.784
1.079.886
0
0
4.768.430
0
0
3.555.193
0
0
-421.696
1.991.68
5
4.293.61
4
0
0
0
Finlandia
3.935.212
0
0
0
Svezia
Regno Unito
93.042.539
769.117.11
9
0
0
11.098.38
5
6.084.909
0
0
0
1.388.42
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
EUR 15
294.241.60
8
48.242.430
41.296.27
8
25.864.11
0
5.548.99
2
4.451.86
4
3.475.00
2
TOTALE
saldi risorse
proprie
IVA
-10.686.544
-5.264.535
876.652.47
1
37.917.773
163.579.54
2
132.408.51
5
134.556.29
4
232.185.82
0
Prospetto 6B
Stato
membro
Belgio
Danimarca
Germania
Grecia
Spagna
Francia
Irlanda
Italia
Lussemburg
o
Paesi Bassi
Austria
Portogallo
Finlandia
Svezia
Regno Unito
EUR 15
Versamenti della risorsa complementare fondata
(Ecu)
Risorse
Risorse
Risorse
Risorse
proprie PNL proprie PNL
proprie PNL a
proprie
restituzione restituzion
tasso uniforme
PNL
prestiti e
e aiuti
1998
restituzion
garanzie
d’urgenza
i
1998
1998
FEAOG
1998
1.040.231.331
0
8.294.882
0
681.449.057
0
5.429.062
0
8.782.044.919
0
70.009.928
0
504.838.554
0
4.006.006
0
2.266.719.044
0
18.056.222
0
5.864.950.427
0
46.727.573
0
268.821.150
4.807.068.949
72.678.707
0
0
0
2.137.381
38.288.683
579.573
0
0
0
1.559.584.492
868.307.511
421.820.264
494.128.796
914.478.163
5.609.514.865
0
0
0
0
0
0
12.429.576
6.921.408
3.364.786
3.934.770
7.284.359
44.263.420
0
0
0
0
0
0
34.156.636.22
8
0
271.717.62
9
0
sul PNL per l’esercizio 1998
Saldi risorse
proprie PNL
degli
esercizi
1988-97
-47.198.986
60.892.324
-84.071.821
17.069.362
72.419.619
132.667.72
3
73.588.834
23.990.936
14.643.740
10.819.059
-16.359.336
4.571.034
4.499.517
13.787.216
581.715.74
9
597.699.62
5
Calcolo
definitivo del
finanziament
o
corr.Regno
Unito
TOTALE
Risorse proprie
PNL
10.656.654
-2.419.616
15.308.124
-957.403
2.943.751
6.326.212
1.011.983.881
745.350.826
8.783.291.150
524.956.519
2.360.138.635
5.785.336.489
-1.686.739
-67.796.872
46.611
342.860.726
4.801.551.695
87.948.631
6.128.778
8.819.034
581.626
2.277.909
-1.768.116
15.987.985
1.588.961.905
867.688.616
430.337.709
504.840.992
933.781.622
6.251.472.020
-5.552.065
35.020.501.41
8
2.2 – Own Resources
The EU budgetary revenues include figures in Ecu for all payments made by all the members States for the same
items included in the previous section as “expenditures for payments”, made by the Italian State budget. Table 6, entitled
“payments made by the member States”,6 the data expressed includes some accounting operations which influence the
budget even though they have to do with operations for previous years.
In particular, as regards “traditional resources” (see column 1, Table 6), the data in the budget do not include
collection costs withheld by the member States, amounting to 10% of the gross overall figure.
It is useful here to stress that that the EU’s accounting system, originally conceived as a single budget, also evolved
later in terms of jurisdiction. It should also be underlined that, in correspondence to the items of expenditure involved and
in order to represent and authorise obligations assumed for initiatives to be implemented throughout several financial
periods, the so-called “differentiated allocations” were introduced. Here, commitment or payment allocations are clearly
indciated. This means that is that the amount of “non differentiated” appropriations is importance both from the point of
view of commitment and of cash.
As a result, recapitulation of expenditures included in each section is expressed both in terms of jurisdiction and
cash. On the other hand, the summary table, showing budget balances, shows expenditures exclusively in terms of cash,
although the overall amount of the commitments assumed during the financial period are indicated in the final statement.
6 Source: European Audit Court
Prospetto 7
Risorse proprie effettive per Stato membro (1993-1997)
Esercizio/tipo di risorse
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
1993
-Prelievi agricoli (C.10)
-Contributi
zucchero
e
isogluc.(C.11)
-Dazi doganali (C.12)
-Spese
di
riscossione
(C.19)
- Risorsa IVA (C.13 e 31)
- Risorsa PNL (C.14,32 e
35)
TOTALE
NL
A
P
FI
N
S
UK
EU-15
16,3
36,7
180,0
339,2
11,3
18,7
117,3
43,3
76,9
321,7
3,9
12,5
167,0
121,1
0,2
-
107,1
81,8
-
75,3
0,1
-
-
212,9
68,9
1029,1
1115,3
838,8
-97,1
236,5
-28,9
3807,4
-432,7
166,1
-19,6
503,5
-66,4
1485,0
-188,4
190,2
-20,7
972,4
-126,0
16,7
-1,7
1445,2
-163,4
-
133,7
-20,9
-
-
2488,4
-277,0
12284,0
-1442,8
1029,3
491,9
626,4
319,6
10565,2
4617,2
616,7
217,9
3304,7
1270,2
6812,9
3037,4
282,4
99,0
6247,2
2883,4
114,3
37,5
1813,5
746,3
-
527,7
193,6
-
-
2549,4 34,489,9
2584,0 16498,0
2349,
9
3,7%
1206,
5
1,9%
19076,
4
29,8%
1011,
2
1,6%
5172,
6
8,1%
10265,
167,
0
0
16% 0,3%
4030,
6
6,3%
-
909,
6
1,4%
-
-
7626,
63973,
6
4
11,9% 100,0%
FI
N
S
UK
B
1994
-Prelievi agricoli (C.10)
-Contributi
zucchero
e
isogluc.(C.11)
-Dazi doganali (C.12)
-Spese di riscossione (C.19)
- Risorsa IVA (C.13 e 31)
- Risorsa PNL (C.14,32 e
35)
TOTALE
B
L
60,9
71,1
Esercizio/tipo di risorse
Esercizio/tip
o di risorse
1995
-Prelievi
agricoli (C.10)
-Contributi
zucchero
e
isogluc.(C.11)
-Dazi doganali
(C.12)
-Spese
di
riscossione
(C.19)
- Risorsa IVA
(C.13 e 31)
- Risorsa PNL
(C.14,32 e 35)
I
DK
11545,
567,
5
4
18,0% 0,9%
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
EU-15
46,2
90,3
15,4
51,0
161,9
411,6
10,9
24,5
73,2
68,6
67,4
393,7
2,1
11,9
136,1
150,4
0,2
-
98,0
99,3
-
102,6
0,4
-
-
208,4
80,3
922,5
1382,1
928,5
-106,5
1226,8
636,8
239,9
-30,6
645,8
645,8
3729,5
-430,3
11956,3
11956,3
131,7
-16,7
575,0
575,0
516,7
-65,9
2732,8
2732,8
1408,9
-187,0
7267,1
7267,1
229,3
-24,3
296,5
99,0
997,0
-128,3
4234,3
2883,4
19,9
-2,0
102,4
37,5
1521,5
-171,9
1801,1
746,3
-
122,3
-22,5
733,6
193,6
-
-
2574,9
-286,4
1708,1
2584,0
12420,0
-1472,4
33279,7
17657,0
2822,
1
4,4%
1296,
2
2,0%
21366,
992,
3
3
33,3% 1,5%
4718,
1
7,4%
12550,
638,
7759,
165,
9
9
6
4
19,6% 1,0% 12,1% 0,3%
4245,
9
6,6%
-
1251,
6
1,9%
-
-
6417,
64188,
4
8
10,0% 100,0%
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
0,1
95,9
7,0
100,6
-
94,1
10,3
FIN
S
UK
EU-15
12,6
11,3
187,7
844,3
0,6
3,6
8,1
86,4
1316,4
28,4
7,2
104,6
9,7
137,9
49,4
0,8
91,0
85,6
47,7
384,7
14,4
61,0
375,3
14,3
130,3
1001,0
263,3
3821,7
144,9
609,0
1476,9
238,3
1096,5
21,9
1658,5
229,4
127,5
136,2
371,0
2702,3
13898,4
-111,5
-31,8
-431,1
-16,9
-80,8
-190,2
-25,3
-131,8
-2,2
-184,9
-24,7
-22,9
-15,2
-39,0
-297,6
-1605,9
1209,2
733,1
13200,2
611,5
2194,3
7595,5
334,2
3641,1
113,5
1981,8
1162,2
513,6
558,0
945,1
4393,5
39186,8
467,4
275,9
4243,9
221,4
723,9
2569,9
102,5
1586,6
34,2
704,1
378,8
145,5
192,4
361,9
2179,3
14187,7
TOTALE
2680,
1
4,0%
1295,
4
1,9%
21324,
985,
1
2
31,4% 1,5%
3645,
2
5,4%
11876,
664,
8
8
17,5% 1,0%
6413,
167,
7
6
9,5% 0,2%
4349,
6
6,4%
1762,
9
2,6%
864,
887,
9
4
1,3% 1,3%
1658,
9251,
67827,
3
6
6
2,4 13,6% 100,0%
segue Prospetto 7
Esercizio/tip
o di risorse
1996
-Prelievi
agricoli (C.10)
-Contributi
zucchero
e
isogluc.(C.11)
-Dazi doganali
(C.12)
-Spese
di
riscossione
(C.19)
- Risorsa IVA
(C.13 e 31)
- Risorsa PNL
(C.14,32 e 35)
TOTALE
Esercizio/tip
o di risorse
1997
-Prelievi
agricoli (C.10)
-Contributi
zucchero
e
isogluc.(C.11)
-Dazi doganali
(C.12)
-Spese
di
riscossione
(C.19)
- Risorsa IVA
(C.13 e 31)
- Risorsa PNL
(C.14,32 e 35)
TOTALE
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
EU-15
0,2
133,6
12,3
36,3
9,5
6,5
241,4
810,1
80,0
33,7
0,4
10,3
22,4
101,5
1213,7
35,2
7,4
179,6
7,9
35,8
59,1
0,5
44,6
73,3
40,7
332,4
12,6
57,4
328,9
14,0
105,9
986,8
247,0
3377,1
145,9
598,6
1326,0
215,2
1013,4
20,1
1574,5
247,1
114,0
148,9
397,1
2657,3
13069,1
-109,5
-29,5
-388,9
-16,6
-69,2
-171,4
-23,0
-116,4
-2,0
-178,8
-29,3
-15,1
-16,9
-42,6
-300,0
-1509,3
1071,9
694,7
11497,1
610,3
2573,9
7138,8
341,7
4997,3
97,8
1836,1
1050,7
513,8
499,7
1003,1
2521,1
36448,0
685,3
399,6
5769,6
347,0
1342,4
3729,4
161,8
2890,4
47,1
990,3
558,1
256,7
309,8
570,9
3005,7
21064,0
2743,
0
3,9%
1359,
9
1,9%
20766,
9
29,2%
1107,
1
1,6%
4538,
9
6,4%
12410,
710,
8935,
163,
9
2
2
2
17,5% 1,0% 12,6% 0,2%
4435,
7
6,2%
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
-
1872,
906,
961,
6
1
3
2,6% 1,3% 1,4%
I
L
NL
A
P
182,2
13,6
40,5
73,8
28,6
1957,
8227,
71095,
4
1
7
2,8 11,6% 100,0%
FIN
S
UK
EU-15
7,7
14,9
410,7
1025,2
0,4
6,5
21,6
95,6
1114,0
240,3
131,5
146,1
366,7
2875,8
13607,7
-28,3
-17,2
-16,0
-40,3
-338,2
-1574,7
28,5
7,1
167,4
10,7
29,1
63,0
0,3
48,8
0,6
66,8
37,5
310,7
9,9
46,9
306,9
11,8
97,1
-
1070,2
276,1
3355,8
161,3
625,8
1353,1
237,5
1099,1
23,8
-116,5
-32,1
-381,4
-18,2
-70,2
-172,3
-25,0
-124,5
-2,4
1664,6
5
-192,1
1004,6
679,0
10503,5
598,3
2796,0
6842,0
272,0
3880,5
89,2
1826,1
1118,0
569,7
514,8
1170,1
2366,5
34230,1
917,9
538,2
7281,3
416,4
1940,0
4793,1
190,3
3666,2
59,5
1283,1
738,0
353,0
405,0
793,0
3515,6
26890,6
2971,
4
3,9%
1505,
8
2,0%
21217,
3
28,2%
1178,
4
1,6%
5367,
6
7,1%
13185,
687,
8667,
170,
9
0
1
7
17,5% 0,9% 11,5% 0,2%
4837,6
6,4%
2110,
4
2,8%
1077,
8
1,4%
1064,
1
1,4%
2326,
8925,
75293.
0
9
0
3,1% 11,9% 100,0%
Fonte: relazione Corte dei conti europea per l’anno 1997.
N.B.:
-
Risorse proprie effettive = risorse proprie riscosse nel corso dell’esercizio.
Bisogna rilevare che per i dazi doganali, i prelievi agricoli e i contributi zucchero e isoglucosio, gli Stati membri provvedono alla riscossione degli importi
dovuti per conto della Comunità.
Gli Stati membri trattengono, a titolo di spese di riscossione, il 10% degli importi corrispondenti da versare.
Il totale esposto in 75.293,0 Mecu è raffrontabile alla col.(a) del prospetto 5 (76.412,96 Mecu) aggiungendo i saldi per IVA (Mecu 688,87) e PNL (Mecu
546,02) e l’importo di compensazione (Mecu 14,83); bisogna considerare che il presente prospetto, elaborato dalla Corte dei conti europea, prende in
considerazione più capitoli di bilancio (per IVA, cap 13 e 31, per PNL, cap.14, 32 e 35), mentre nel prospetto 5 vengono utilizzate le sole cifre tratte dai
capitoli di bilancio 13 e 14.
European Audit Court data (1997 financial period report) quantified the traditional resources as coming to 17.6% in actual revenues, while VAT and GNP
came respectively to 42.6% and 33.4%.
For Italy, the same items in 1997 came, respectively to 12.4%, 42.2% and 45.4% of the funds made available by the Community.
Table 7 shows the serial data gathered between 1993 and 1997. This shows an average contribution from Italy to the EU of approximately 12% of the total
Community revenues (the peak was reached in 1993 with 16%, while the percentage in 1997 was 11.5%).
Examination of Table 7 prepared by the European Audit Court for the 1997 report shows that the positions of Italy and the United Kingdom are very similar,
also due to the effect of the system of corrections after the budgetary imbalances accredited to the United Kingdom.
Another interesting percentage found in the 1997 Report of the European Audit court regards the trend of Community resources. With respect to 1996, they
fell by 1.3%. In the same period, analogous data for Italy rose by 0.9%.
The comparison between the data emerging from the EU budget and that found in the Italian budget can therefore be summarised as follows:
1998 EU Budget: Traditional Resources 15.3%; VAT 40.8%; GNP 43.9%;
1998 Italian Budget: Traditional Resources 11.5%; VAT 40.7%; GNP 47.9%.
In the forecasts for 1999, data for Italy seemed to be following this tendency:
Traditional Resources 11.8%; VAT 38.7%; GNP 49.5%.
2.3 – Synthesis of data on provisional alocations, compared with data on the final statement
In the estimated national budget, the allocations required for payments to the EU are given in the section “revenues” and in the provisional appropriations of
the Ministry of the Treasury.
Moreover, the deviation between the provisional data and the actual payments made, carried over in Table 8, conforms to the similar deviation between the
budget and final statement also present in the handling of the European budget.
Prospetto 8
1997
Preventivo entrate
Risorse
proprie
trad.
Risorsa IVA
Risorsa PNL
TOTALE
Competenza
Cassa
2.800
8.200
0
11.000
Preventivo spese
2.800
8.200
0
11.000
Competenza
Cassa
2.800
8.200
9.700
20.700
Versamenti
effettivi
2.800
Cassa
2.171,87
8.200
9.700
20.700
7.446,39
7.995,04
17.613,30
1998
Preventivo entrate
Risorse proprie
Risorsa IVA
Risorsa PNL
TOTALE
Preventivo spese
Competenza
Cassa
Competenza
Cassa
2.140,5
2.140,5
2.400,1
2.400,1
8.500,0
8.500.0
8.500,0
8,500,0
0,0
0,0
10.000,0
10.000,0
10.640,5
10.640,5
20.900,1
20.900,1
Versamenti
effettivi
Cassa
2,473,42
9.169,48
9.843,39
21.486,29
For 1999, the estimated expenditures of the Ministry of the Treasury (Table 4) that Italy’s own resources to pay to the European Union will come to
21,200.1 billion, 2,500 of which for TR, 8,200 for VAT, 10,500 for GNP and 100 million for compensation. It is clearly to be hoped that the prevision is correct in
order to avoid any further worsening of the net balance.
2.4 – Operations of the own resources system according to European Commission analysis
Brief mention was made above of the conclusions reached by the Commission regarding the question of own resources. Below is a more in-depth comment
of the most important reasoning used in that occasion.
Article 10 of Council Decision 728/94 required the Commission to present a report by the end of 1999 on the operation of the system of own resources. The
report was also to consider any review of the correction of budgetary imbalance granted to the United Kingdom.
In the report submitted on 7.10.98, the Commission analysed the system of "Communities’ own resources" currently in effect. It underlined that in the period
1988-94 (the date of the aforementioned Decision 728), the reforms introduced in the above legislation had provoked a gradual reduction of the share of VAT
contributions in the Community budget.
The Commission observed that the compensation mechanism in favour of the United Kingdom, along with other adjustments in the contribution system,
“removed transparency from relations between the member States and the EU general budget”.7 The report continued, “Despite the conceptual and technical
difficulties connected with measuring budget balances, the question of imbalances has again come out. Indeed, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden
affirm that they have budgetary imbalances that the Fontainebleau Agreement would define as excessive.”
Certainly, the problem of budgetary imbalances is particularly complex. It therefore cannot be discussed and resolved only through the instrument of
political concertation of the member States.
The conclusions reached by the European Council of Berlin in March 1999 (mentioned below) are thus of particular significance. For the sector of own
resources, these conclusions tend to promote mechanisms of greater equity than the present ones.
2.5 – Payments to the EU: Italy’s contribution
The Commission analysis, discussed above, and the results that emerged from the percentages given, also seen in the report of the European Audit Court
(cf. Table 7), show that Italy should be considered an optimal contributor to the EU. Reviewing the data given in section 2.2 as well, it is clear that the customs
duties do not show significant decreases. In addition payments for VAT and GNP resources show strong growth for Italy to the extent of 23.1% (comparison of
1997 and 1998 data, cf. Table 3), while these items show a negative trend vis-à-vis VAT resources in the EU budget.
As regards own resources, along with the introduction of the new decision to be applied (presumably in 2002), the new EAS 95 system of accounting8 must
also be applied. This was introduced to harmonise methods of calculation of the GNP and the equalisation in distribution of contributions.
2.6 – Prospects for reform: The European Council of Berlin
On 24 and 25 March 1999, the Berlin European Council, based on the aforementioned Commission proposal, reiterated that the system of own resources
must be equitable, transparent, economically efficient and simple. In addition, it must be based on criteria reflecting the contribution capacity of each member
State in the best possible manner.
The European Council acknowledged that various factor effect budgetary imbalances of member States to a greater or lesser extent. These include in
particular the global level of expenditure as well as the composition of expenditures and the structures of the States’ own resources.9
The decision on own resources was modified in order to complete the ratification process, thus allowing it to take effect at the beginning of 2002.
In consideration of the fiscal capacity of each member State, the European Council also deemed it opportune to correct the top rate applicable. This was
reduced to 0.75% in 2002 and 0.50% in 2004. Instead, traditional resources will be maintained with an increase of 25% (at present the level is 10%) of the
withholding due to each member State as compensation for collection operations.
The top limit of the Union’s own resources will be kept at the present level, equal to 1.27% of the GNP of the European Union.
Within this perspective, in order to avoid negative financial balances, Italy’s efforts must not only be addressed to influencing the expenditure policy of the
EU, bringing it in line with its own requirements, compatibly with the interests of the other States. Above all, it must also insist on maximum efficiency in
intervention implementation in order to obtain the maximum “credits” as a result of the hoped for improvement in expenditure procedures.
7 The Tables examined earlier show the difficulty of demonstrating those figures at the end of the financial period due to the amounts for balances and
compensation due.
8 EAS – European Accounting System
9 Berlin Council of Europe, held on 24 and 25 March 1999, sections 68, 70 and 71.
3 – APPLICATION OF EU REGULATIONS ON OWN RESOURCES
3.1 – Traditional resources: suspended accounting
Council Decision 376/88 and later modifications and integrations established that “the Community budget is to be entirely financed by it own resources”.
Earlier sections have shown the figures for the amount Italy has paid to the EU. This section will describe the collection procedures of the EU bodies and the
problems that may arise due to a law that is not always immediately adaptable to the Italian legal system.
As stated above, “traditional resources” come from:
agricultural taxes from duties on trade with non-member States within the framework of the CAP;
taxes or duties coming from the common market organisation of the sugar sector;
customs duties on trade with non-member States.
Regulation 1552/89, enacting Decision 376/88 was aimed at precisely defining how the above was to be ascertained. Article 2 states: “For the purposes of
application of the present regulation, a Community right on the Communities’ own resources, in accordance with article 2, sub-section 1, letters a) and b) of EEC
Decision 376/88, is to be verified as soon as the competent service of the member State informs the party of the amount due.” Moreover, article 6.1 set forth that
“accounts of own resources, divided according to the nature of the resources, are to be kept by the Treasury of every member State or the body designated by the
former.” Based on the aforementioned principle, sub-section 2 provided that:
a) the ascertained charges were to be carried forth in the ordinary accounts
b)
the ascertained charges and not carried forward in the accounts ex letter a), since they were not yet recovered and no guarantee was supplied, was to be
listed in separate accounts.
Management of the separate accounting is difficult to apply, as has been pointed out by the Commission and the European Audit Court. For Italian accounting
regulations, which make use of a pro-tempore balance sheet, the non-collected assessment becomes a residue until it is paid. For the EU on the other hand, sums
assessed and not collected are a latent debt to the Union which suffers from the excessive amount of funds due and often declares that it is dissatisfied by the
delays of the member States.
Actually, as far as Italy is concerned, the aforementioned problem could be solved by introducing some modifications in the internal instructions of the
Ministry of Finance. These changes would be aimed at having sums assessed and those recovered conform more closely.
3.2 – VAT Resource: the taxable base
By 31 July of every year, in accordance with article 10, sub-section 1 of Reg. 2892/1977, the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance, Office for
Comparative Legislative Studies and International Relations, provides the European Commission with the calculation base of VAT resources. It is also responsible
for gathering the necessary data to define the calculation base itself.
The Commission is then sent the basic documentation of the aforementioned accounting procedure. On this basis, the Commission directly defines the sums
that Italy is required to pay monthly.
3.3 – GNP Resources: the nation’s fiscal capacity
The calculation used to quantify monthly payments to the Commission is currently made on a “presumed” basis, making use of an accounting base that has
lent itself to various interpretations. The European Audit Court is undertaking a study on methods for making such calculations and audit systems for the Italian
administrations that make them.
In regard to the aggregated GNP, the “preliminary” procedure of calculation is entrusted to the Ministry of the Budget (today known as the Ministry of the
Treasury, the Budget and Economic Planning). Instead, elaboration of the GNP and related data is under the jurisdiction of ISTAT.
Elaboration of the Community GNP is under the jurisdiction of the Statistics Institute of the European Community (EUROSTAT) which gathers the data by
aggregates at the European level. The figures are determined using information from the national statistics institutes (ISTAT for Italy) at market prices, following
the Council Directive 130/89 regarding harmonisation of the GNP. For the division of taxes in proportion to the GNP, the statistics used correspond to those of the
previous year. A complex system of calculation the amount due by each member State and the Commission communicates the monthly instalments required.
The duties of the General State Accounting Office, in charge of transferring the sums to the EU, are not only operational, making the payments to the EU.
During the phase of assessment of revenues that generate traditional resources (customs duties, etc.), it also carries out functions of audit through the provincial
general accounting offices.
4 – REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES IN THE EU
4.1 – Analysis of overall credits for 1997 and 1998
The distribution of credits according to source of financing and goals is illustrated in Table 9, based on Table 7 of attachment 3 of the final statement of the
Ministry of the Treasury for the 1998 financial period.
In this regard, it should be underlined that between 1993 and 1998 (cf. Table 4), the flow of funding from the EU showed non-significant variations with the
exception of the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, marked by a slowdown phase probably linked to contingent situations such as the reduction of olive oil prices or the
decline in the demand in the cereal acreage sector.
The data in Table 9 is analysed in the section of this report dealing with implementation of the Structural Funds.
Here we want to make some comments on general finances and on the significance on credits to Italy inferred from the overall figures.
Two general observations can be made:
a)
The phenomenon of credit reduction flows took place in a terminal period or one very near the end of the final phase of programmes to be implemented. It
therefore seems reasonable to imagine that payments in Italy for individual projects and programmes should have been larger with related credits from the EU
that were at least the same as the previous year and certainly not less.
b) The new organisation of the central offices such as the Department for Cohesion and Development Policies of the Ministry of the Treasury (DPS – Direction for
Programming and Development), the Cabina di regia, the restructuring of IGFOR (now IGRUE), should have guaranteed programme implementation levels, at
least to the same extent as 1997. However, from the figures contained in the previous tables, Table 9 in particular, we can presume that there was been no
uniform support to implementation of the programmes. Nevertheless, these reached the minimum goals set.
Prospetto 9
Accrediti
Politica Agricola
Comune
Programmazion
e 89-93
Obiettivo 1
Obiettivo 2
Obiettivo 3 e 4
Obiettivo 5a
Obiettivo 5b
Iniziative
comunitarie
Altro
Programmazion
e 94-99
Obiettivo 1
Obiettivo 2
Obiettivi 3 e 4
Obiettivo 5a
Obiettivo 5b
Iniziative
comunitarie
Altro
Altri interventi
Assegnazioni
FESR
FESR
319.855.423.006
137.831.487.274
Somme accreditate dall’Unione Europea all’Italia
Anno 1998
Distribuzione degli accrediti per fonte di finanziamento ed obiettivo
(lire)
FSE
FEAOG-O
SFOP
FEAOG-G
8.008.175.023.34
8
66.628.690.520 32.911.750.615
2.398.076.410
39.734.618.343
Altre linee (*)
Totale
8.008.175.023.34
8
398.328.233.050
%
52,8
3
2,62
9.346.319.777
186.912.425.394
1,23
1.127.390.787
1.370.408.960
23.941.918.484
1.127.390.787
1.622.852.363
181.193.417.603
0,15
0,01
0,01
1,19
3.530.228.419
6.657.781.868.67
7
5.313.275.137.174
108.708.099.386
408.071.270.198
198.262.483.095
431.806.909.278
195.710.059.546
0,02
43,9
2
35,05
0,71
2,69
1,30
2,84
1,29
1.947.910.000
89.367.940.788
0,01
0,58
4.353.586.092
0,02
23.941.918.484
178.493.707.313
3.530.228.419
4.184.467.380.06
2
3.869.557.171.175
63.969.375.680
146.560.230.950
102.432.692.257
1.947.910.000
14.885.320.383
252.443.403
2.699.710.290
1.684.170.941.83
4
1.139.554.442.679
44.738.723.706
408.071.270.198
30.216.079.989
61.590.425.262
710.028.340.44
9
261.900.170.915
49.751.842.98
2
42.263.352.405
193.097.571.195
255.030.598.339
5.164.911.900
2.323.608.677
6.445.253.898
2.398.076.410
65.639.290.09
7
4.353.586.092
4.523.561.709.54 1.750.799.632.35 728.317.713.87
52.149.949.39 8.008.175.023.34
Totale
3
4
1
2
8
Generale
(*) Il dato è comprensivo dell’importo di lire 14.622.377.193 per rimborsi FEAOG-G
Elaborazioni Corte dei conti su dati tratti dal rendiconto generale dello Stato 1998 – Allegato 3 Ministero del tesoro.
65.639.290.09
7
15.158.006.651.95
5
100,
0
5 – SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
5.1 – Accounting system and computer system
In accordance with article 10 of Reg. 2064/97, the General State Accounting Office co-operates with the
Commission to ensure the best possible implementation of the programmes and auditing of payments. RGS – IGRUE is
responsible for payments of “own resources” to the EU.
A systems analysis includes an examination of the accounting system and computer system adopted in Italy. The
final study shows that the accounting systems used for traditional resources and for VAT and GNP resources are
substantially different and cannot communicate automatically with the IGRUE system. For “traditional resources” (customs
duties, agricultural taxes, taxes on sugar and isoglucose), the accounting system is conditioned by a complex adaptation
of the national system to the Community system.
This situation adds further difficulties to those already existing in tax mechanisms. In fact, following the abolition of
internal frontiers, the types of taxes (customs or excise duties) function at the European frontier for products coming from
non-EU countries. For this reason we should keep in mind the diversity of accounting regulations applied. The Italian
system is centred on a “jurisdiction” budget coupled with a “cash” budget, while the Europeaaln system operates primarily
as a cash budget, with remedial measures that qualify it as “mixed”.
The accounting system applied for these two sector is primarily European. Moreover, there is some conflict due to
the quantification of the total amount of taxes due to the EU determined by presumptive calculation where the data on
which calculations are based is derived according to juridical criteria inherent and internal to the national system of the
State in question.
The European system calls for internal audits for every procedure, even the calculations illustrated above. In Italy,
these are either insufficient or lacking altogether. This has led to a negative assessment from the Commission during
evaluation audits, ex articles 17 and 18 of Reg. 1552/89.
The lack of internal and external audits, in Italy as well, was revealed in a study made by the Commission in
accordance to article 8 of Council Decision 728/94, as well as the study carried out by the European Audit Court, ex article
248 of the EC Treaty.
Information systems
There are a host of information systems that converge in various ways in the RGS centralised system. In
accordance with article 1 of Presidential Decree 16 April 1971, n. 321, the national bodies in charge of assessment and the
collection of “traditional resource” (the Ministry of Finance for “customs” resources, the State Agency for Intervention on
the Agricultural Market (AIMA) for “sugar” resources) inform the State provincial treasury offices having jurisdiction for
each area of the calculated amounts. The AIMA directly informs the IGRUE which also receives information regarding
customs duties from the provincial general accounting offices.
As regards the assessments made by the Autonomous Board of the State Monopolies, the competent peripheral
offices send the information to the competent provincial treasuries which in turn send the information to the central
system by terminal.
Within such a complex system, the State Treasury has the primary role of active administration along with task of
monitoring and internal financing audits.
IRGUE is responsible for making traditional resources available to the Commission. Based on the data from the
information system, confirmed by the provincial treasuries, and the information sent directly by AIMA, IRGUE, acting on
behalf of the RGS, instructs IGEPA, in charge of relations with the General State Treasury (run by the Banca d'Italia) to
accredit the monthly sums in the Commission's treasury account.
Monthly payments by the RGS also take place for VAT and the GNP. As mentioned above, these calculations are
made by the Ministry of Finance and ISTAT, respectively.
After processing by the competent bodies, the calculation bases for VAT and the GNP are sent to the Commission
through Italy’s permanent representative. The EU determines the applicable rates and the General State Accounting Office
accredits the sums to the account of the EU treasury on a monthly basis.
5.2 – Auditing systems
Community regulations regarding “own resources” (Reg. 1552/89), Council Decision 728/94) and Reg. 1355/96),
call for a complex system of internal audits. The Community gives the individual States the organisational authority to
verify the system of internal audits and to conduct external audits through the higher auditing institutions (the Corte dei
conti in Italy).
The aforementioned Reg. 1552/89 known as Title VII “Provisions regarding audits” states in article 17.1 that “the
member States are required to take all necessary measures to that the amounts corresponding to the ascertained rights in
accordance with article 210 are made available to the Commission at the conditions set forth in this regulations.”
Article 18 states that “The member States shall carry out all necessary verification and inquiries in the area of
assessment and making own resources available, etc.”11
It should be noted that, while own resources deriving from VAT and the DP are the most substantial portion of “own
revenues” (over 80% in 1998), little or nothing is said regarding the audits in this sector to be carried out by the member
States.
The provision of article 8, sub-section 2 of Council Decision 728/94 makes up for this deficiency. It states that
“Without prejudice to the verification of accounts and audits in accordance to the procedures provided for in article 248 of
the EC Treaty, regarding essentially the reliability and efficacy of the national system and procedures to determine the
10 Dealing with tradition resources.
11 This too refers to traditional resources.
base for resources from VAT and the GNP and without prejudice to the audits organised in accordance with article 209,
letter C of this Treaty, the Council shall adopt all measures necessary for the implementation of this provision as well as
those needed for audit of collection… .”
As can be seen from the above, while the European Union’s legal system includes a complex, complete audit
system, it does not seem that, for Italy, the audit system, both internal and external, is adequately organised to fully
respond to the sector’s needs.
The need to define an efficient system of internal audits seems particularly urgent. This should be organised in a
manner similar to those used by the EU. This would allow the higher audit authority to carry out more meaningful activity.
5.3 - Community audits ex article 248 of the EC Treaty. Co-operation between the European Audit Court and
the Italian Corte dei Conti.
On the basis of article 248 EC, the Italian Corte dei Conti may co-operate with the European Audit Court every time
the latter decides to visit Italy for the purposes of auditing any of the sectors involved. This had occurred for the VAT and
GNP sectors.
The audit performed by the European Audit Court concerned the following sectors:
national provision procedures for the VAT taxation base, in application of article 8 of Reg. 1553/89;
national calculation of the tax base of own resources derived from VAT, in particular regarding calculation of the
weighted average rate (WAR), in accordance with Reg. 1553/89. The Court also examined aspects of data
presentation, operations and the results of these calculations along with the possibility of finding a way of measuring
the quality of the WAR;
files on the basic points of calculation of VAT resources for which, in accordance with the provisions of Reg.
1553/89, reservations were made both by the Commission and Italy;
some conceptual and practical aspects of the GNP as an indicator of the fiscal capacity of the member States.
Following the audit, the competent authorities received a “sector letter” containing observations on the
aforementioned points, summarised below.
As regards the taxable VAT resources, the European Audit Court felt that:
it is necessary to compare the methods applied in the various member States and maintain information sharing
system which can be implemented during meetings of the GNP committee and the Commission’s control visits. On the
basis of this information, the member State may evaluate its situation vis-à-vis harmonisation of statistics and the
national accounting system;
the thoroughness of the national accounting system is also considered a preliminary condition of comparison to the
extent to which it is effective in all the members States. Thoroughness must be assessed at a European level, by
EUROSTAT.
As regards the problem of “reservations” raised in accordance to article 9 of Reg. 1553/89, it should also be
pointed out that, at the time of the audit, the Commission had sent Italy six notifications. Only two reservations
(reimbursements of government securities, corrections for the flat rate for agriculture) had any real effect of own
resources even if, according to the Italian authorities, this effect was relatively minor.
In order to accelerate and simplify procedures to resolve the reservations, the Italian authorities proposed making a
preliminary list of the questions that were of the greatest financial importance.
As regards the theoretical earnings from VAT in the “sector letter” sent after the audit, the Italian authorities
underlined the need for detailed clarification regarding the notable differences between the theoretical VAT data and the
net revenues collected, calculated as a third of its total. It was certainly possible that the high number of categories of
products subject to VAT (148) could create problems of identification that can in turn influence the incidence of the
average rate. The excessive meticulousness of the accounting system might also have a negative effect on the precision of
the statistics. For example, while many small business in Italy are registered with the VAT office, the flat rate system is
widely applied in other member States.
As regards the problem of “reservations” raised in accordance to article 9 of Reg. 1553/89, it should also be
pointed out that, at the time of the audit, the Commission had sent Italy six notifications. Only two reservations
(reimbursements government securities, corrections for the flat rate for agriculture) can have a real effect on own
resources even if, according to the Italian authorities, this effect is relatively minor.
As regards the GNP calculation, the European Audit Court noted the following after its visit:
that the G nP is a representative indicator of national income and therefore also of fiscal capacity;
that the GDP; directly derived from the national accounting system; expresses a State’s productiom capacity and is
therefore less suitable as a tax base;
that the use of aggregates expressed in the “Standard of Purchasing Power” (SPP) has not received approval of the
national authorities since it does not appear a valid indicator of fiscal capacity;
that the other macro-economic aggregates introduced by SEC 95, i.e. the gross national income (GNI) and the gross
available national income (GANI); could instead be useful for this type of activity: According to ISTAT experts, these
aggregates do however create problems, particularly for sectors other than family consumption:
The EU makes use of non-homogeneous macro-economic aggregates. This happens when, for example, the VAT tax
base is used to determine the GNP base. VAT is linked to the extent of internal consumption and is not sufficiently
representative of the quantity of wealth produced:
5.4 - Analysis of risk
Special attention must be paid to the Community instruments used to verify the procedures for creating the VAT
and GNP tax base, as provided for in Reg. 2892/77 article 12 and ff. These provision provided the most suitable juridical
instruments to assess the procedures applied by the national bodies managing Community intervention:
Along with the Community legislation, Italian law is also creating innovative models for monitoring and internal
auditing that will allow a more efficient operations of audit systems of intervention manoeuvres (calculation of additionality
and evaluation of co-financing).
Wherever that assessment of risk is adopted as indicated in the 1997 report of the European Audit Court (subsections 1.14-1.15), there is acknowledgement of the need to centre attention on those sectors that have been audited
less. In the cases examined, the VAT and GNP sectors were those whose tax growth rate rose during 1998, certainly
determining a considerable net deficit in a system lacking internal and external audits that are useful to the national
interest.
The verification and analysis carried out both by the Commission and the European Audit Court were aimed at
protection of their particular interests in collecting “own resources”. Equally meaningful verification and analysis should be
performed in the interest of national finances to audit the base components of VAT and GNP calculation and to understand
whether the increases shown that already seem to weigh on the 1999 budget are regularly and proportionately in keeping
with the real growth rate of national wealth.
The Commission12 observed that “audit techniques lack harmonisation from one member State to another” and
expressed the conviction that the development of methods of risk analysis can resolve this situation.
As regards in particular the resources based on VAT and the GNP, the European Audit Court13 observes that the
Community system has problems of consistency, transparency and operations. Despite the importance of statistical data in
setting taxable bases, no instrument has as yet been created to measure quality. The lack of an instrument of this type
“falsifies the measure of the fiscal capacity of the member States.”
12 1997 Report of the European Audit Court, point 1.15
13 Report à) from points 1.25 to 1.29.
6 - FRAUD IN THE INTRACOMMUNITY VAT SYSTEM
6.1 – Incidence of fraud in VAT calculations
VAT Community resources represent a large share of the budget of Community revenues: 45% in 1997 and
approximately 43% in 1998. Even the percentage that would seem to be ceded to the GNP actually has strong ties to VAT.
The flat rate calculation of VAT is a component for calculation of the GNP. The maximum rate due the EU in 1998 comes to
1.08% of the VAT collected.
The tax base is determined in a uniform manner for all member States to the degree equal to the total of taxable
operations of each member State, with the addition of VAT not detectable by the recipient.
The percentage of 1.08% of VAT due to the EU is based on the funds collected and therefore excludes all the VAT
that can be detracted by the recipient. Fraud operating in the VAT sector in all the States creates a notable financial loss
for the EU. It is therefore necessary to study the mechanism for VAT collection in depth in order to better determine
possible methods of evasion and fraud (the peak of a system that passes through tax evasion, error and irregularity). This
will allow any audit procedures that are lacking or insufficient to be improved or activated with greater care.
Intra-community VAT has structural characteristics that are uniform in the various member States. Therefore, due
to those characteristics, it is aimed at developing a harmonious internal market. We should also underline the existence of
a series of particular situations – described briefly below – that can lead to evasion and so-called VAT fraud.
When the common market was founded, taxation of trade between the member States ended. When the single
market began in 1993, a new VAT system for intra-Community trade was introduced. While of a transitory nature, it is still
in effect today. This is because, while a definitive reform of the sector is needed, there are delicate questions of principle
related to the effective uniform homogenisation of the mechanism of the member States related to setting of VAT rates,
collection and audits.
Finally, we should mention some peculiarities that mark the present transitory VAT system of intra-Community
trade.:
a)
First, former exports are today known as “Community transfers for goods”; these transfers are VAT exempt in the
original member States, on the condition that the purchaser has a VAT code in another member State and that the
goods in question leave the national territory. The former imports are “intra-Community purchases of goods” and are
subject to the tax of the consuming member State, with the obligation to declare the purchaser in one’s own VAT
declaration.
b)
In substitution of all previously existing customs controls, an automatic exchange of information has been set up
among all the members States, known as the “VIES System”.14
c)
Consumers circulating within Europe, are required to pay VAT, without any other formalities, in the State where they
make the purchase. On 30 June of this year, the last exemptions for the EU were eliminated (ports, airports, etc.).
d)
Finally, there are particular systems (distance sales, new methods of transportation, subjects enjoying flat rate
systems) for whom VAT is not applied in the country of consumption.
6.2 - Study Group set up by the Contact Committee15
Several years ago, a study group was set up to analyse the problems described above. The Italian Corte dei Conti
was asked to participate, as were the audit institutions of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland
and the United Kingdom. The Group recently presented its fourth report (the others date back to 1994, 1995 and 1997).
In its first report in December 1994, the working group concentrated on the setting up of the “System of
Information Sharing on Assets” VIES. The system was meant to substitute the customs formalities and controls that
had been eliminated at the frontiers and to avoid evasion of tax revenues (VAT specifically). The working group
observed that the level of utilisation of this system varied considerably from one member State to another and that
the quality of the information was far from optimal. In this respect, it suggested developing an analysis of the risks in
this specific form of audit and encouraging greater co-operation among member States:
The second report in 1995 noted that there was a general reduction of tax revenues in the sector in comparison to
1993. The working group placed greater attention on the evolution found in the system of fraud, pointing out that the
VIES system is not yet functioning properly and that this is also due to the fact that it is incompatible with the parallel
system INTRASTAT.
In the third report in 1997, the working group made a preliminary observation that the instruments of co-operation
among member States in the fax sector is still not put to full use. According to the working group, the member States
needed to reach a uniform definition of punishable cases, the procedures to uncover the instances of fraud and the
applicable sanctions. Therefore, in order t avoid that different measures of effective struggle against fraud might
encourage those committing fraud, the various competent administrations needed to agree on audit methods and
strategies. They also needed to reinforce the mechanism to evaluation anti-fraud procedures and increase availability
of data on the application of sanctions.
The fourth 1999 report has yet to be published since it was only recently approved by the Contact Committee of
the Presidents of the Higher Audit Institutions – ISC – of European Union countries. In this report, the working group
noted progress in the administrative organisation of the anti-fraud methods applied. In particular, as regards Italy,
the report notes that an extensive programme is underway for an effective struggle against the underground
economy.
14 The application of this system has created notable difficulties.
15 The Contact Committee is a body for audit co-ordination, established by the Presidents or heads of the Higher Audit
Institutions.
The increase of tax revenues seen in the third quarter of 1999 seems to confirm the positive outcome of the
operation.
In reference to the increasing effective anti-fraud initiatives, it should be pointed out that the member States
signed a convention on 26 July 1995 to protect the Community’s financial interests. The aim of the convention was to
establish minimum penal standards until a single definition of fraud is adopted both for Community expenditures and
revenues.
According to the report explaining the convention approved by the Council, VAT was excluded from the field of
application of the convention to avoid designating VAT “an own resources collected directly on behalf the Community.
Thus, the current uncertainty vis-à-vis the VAT sector will continue, both in regard to the Commission’s not definitive
jurisdiction over the matter and in regard to the lack of homogeneity of the laws in force in the member States. All this
will lead to significant losses for the EU and for the individual States.
7 – “DAS” STATEMENT OF ASSURENCE
7.1 – Content and aims
Pursuant to the Treaties,16 The European Audit Court must present the Europe Parliament and Council an annual
statement (DAS) attesting to the reliability of audits and the legitimacy and regularity of the related operations.
In order to present the statement of assurance to the European Parliament and Council, the European Court must
ensure whether:
the Community accounts are, or are not, reliable
the operations pertinent to the accounts are, or are not, legitimate.
Should the Court not be able to reach this goal on the basis of the work done, it must be able to explain the
reasons (insufficient means, institutional or juridical obstacles, partial or total impossibility to audit the sectors under its
jurisdiction).
The statement of assurance consists of a global declaration expressing a general judgement on the reliability of the
accounts and the legitimacy and regularity of the pertinent operations.
Examination of the reliability of account is aimed at certifying that the Union’s accounts correct reflect the revenues
and expenditures of the year’s financial statement upon closure.
Account audits17 is conducted according to the MUS (monetary unit sampling) method, i.e. according to a statistical
sample based on the probability of extractions proportional to the financial dimension of the operation. It consists
essentially in:
1. a study of the financial results of the body audited in order to establish whether:
revenues have been correctly ascertained, recorded and collected;
expenditures have been ordered, appropriated, liquidated, paid and recorded in accordance with the laws in force;
the budgetary operations were regularly authorised;
the financial results adequately show all the information required to understand the operations in the period under
consideration and the financial situation at the end of the aforementioned period.
2. a study of the legitimacy and regularity18 of the operation at the base of the accounts in order to establish whether:
the nature of expenditures and revenues recorded in the aforementioned financial statements is in accordance with
the general and sector regulations in force;
expenditures were made respecting the timetable and financial limits allowed;
expenditures were ascertained and collected, where necessary, within the respecting the timetable and financial
limits established;
all debts and burdens were assessed and handled in accordance with the applicable regulations.
The European Court has distinguished two main types of irregularities, depending upon whether or not these were
intentional.
Intentional irregularity is an intrinsically irregular operation, so that the habitual audit procedures applied in
accordance with general accepted audit regulations must be used to discover it. The Court was therefore not able to issue
a declaration on the non-existence of cases of this kind.
Non-intentional irregularity includes errors on operations with accounting errors or that were not carried out in
accordance with the provisions provided for by law and regularly applied. The errors were classified by the European Audit
Court according to whether they affected the legitimacy/regularity of the operations, the reliability of the accounts or both.
The specifically qualifiable errors that directly affect the amount of operation regulated by the funds involved are
known as “essential errors”. Instead, “formal” errors are those without a direct quantifiable effect on the amounts of the
operations of supply of Community resources.
The results of audits carried out so far by the European Court to prepare a Declaration of Reliability19 have shown
certain types of generally recurrent errors.
Even though the Court distinguished its examination between the accounts regarding the supply of financial resources
for, respectively, the EAGGF-Guarantee Section and the Structural Funds, due to the diversity of the accounting
procedures that discipline the two large sectors of financial commitments of the Community budget, the most common
irregularities were:
mistaken declaration of beneficiaries of EAGGF-Guarantee Section payments with the result of undue
disbursement.
Financing of expenditures that were not “admissible”, that is they did not have the object prerequisites to take
advantage of Community funding;
16 Article 248 of the EC Treaty, article 160C of the Treaty establishing the European Community of Atomic Energy
(EURATOM) and article 45 of the Treaty establishing the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS).
The first DAS declaration was presented on the consolidated accounts of the European Community regarding the 1994
financial year.
17 These are consolidated Community accounts and include the management accounts and the financial budget, along
with an analysis of financial management. These are prepared by the Commission and presented to the European
Parliament, the Council and the Audit Court by and not later than 1 May of the following financial year.
18 The part of the declaration of reliability regarding legitimacy and regularity of the relative operations have the aim of
certifying for the recipients of the DAS that the operations on which the Union’s accounts are based respect Community
provisions concerning the acquisition and use of Community funds. Given that it is difficult to trace a precise confine
between legitimacy and regularity in the Community sector, the European Court has decided not to distinguish between
these two concepts and to ascertain that operations are both legitimate and regular (cf. DAS for the 1994 budget).
19 Those related to the 1994-95-96-96 financial years.
-
Applications for acknowledgement of sums by beneficiaries who had already gone beyond the amount actually
spent of authorised.
According to the Community Court, the causes of these irregularities can be found primarily in the inadequacy
and/or insufficiency of audits by the member States and the erroneous interpretation of Community regulations.
The first cause directly involves the audit systems of the countries belonging to the EU and, above all, the internal
bodies responsible for said audits. The second cause could easily be eliminated through more careful interpretation of
regulations by European institutions.
7.2 – The observations of the European Audit Court
Statement of assurance procedures are essentially seen as a guarantee of the formal and substantial regularity of
the Community budget. Nonetheless, since it is structured on inquiries based on a representative statistical sample of the
entire sector under examination, based on EU statistics, it does allow us to make an indirect assessment of the regularity
of the management and audit procedures in the national sphere.
It is therefore considered a good idea to describe the results reached by the European Audit Court during the DAS
in Italy.
The observations the European Court formulated on payment of Community funds to Italy over recent years reflect
the general trend of the types of irregularities also found in other countries:
a)
errors in distribution of sums to beneficiaries of EAGGF-Guarantee Section aid due to erroneous declarations they
made and which were not authenticated by prompt audit of the supervisory authority;20
b)
requests of payment of expenditures not admissible in the Structural Funds inasmuch as they do not respond to the
criteria to be included in an operative programme or relative to administrative costs excluded from co-financing.
7.3 – Analysis of irregularities found
An analysis of the 1997 statement of assurance investigation shows that the most common errors are those related
to:
a)
inadequacy of audit: the European Audit Court ascertained the sporadic or total lack of audits by the competent
bodies (Regions, AIMA, ASL). This has led, as a result, to a series of errors such as, for example, those regarding the
calculation of the amount due to beneficiaries or the difference between the amount declared by the beneficiary and
that observed during the inquiries by officials of the Community Court (e.g.: in the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, the
difference between the number of plants declared and those that actually exist or, in the EAGGF-Guidance Section,
for “veterinary measures”, differences between the certificate of control of animals existing in the farm and the
certificate of those slaughtered).
b)
errors of calculation of the sums due: these errors are due either to the aforementioned problems or to inaccurate
application of the amounts provided for by Community legislation;
delay in payment of contributions due the beneficiaries: this is the responsibility of the competent administration
c)
which have not respect the terms of payment, either due to internal problems caused by the large number of
applications to process or the lack of immediately available funds.
The table below summarises the types of errors found. They are marked with an X when the error is recurrent and
with a Y when the error occurs sporadically.
Tipologie di errori rilevati a seguito delle visite di controllo effettuate dalla Corte dei conti UE
Versamenti
Errore di
Ritardi di
Erronea
Mancanz
FONDI
Errore di
Errore
calcolo –
di
non
rendicontazion
erogazion interpretazion
a di
Indennità
calcolo
effettuati
e
e importi
e normativa
controlli
dai
dovuti
efficaci
al
del
beneficiari tasso di
produttori
(latte)
o
cambio
FEAOG-G
X
X
X
Y
X
FSE *
FEAOG-O
X
Y
X
X
SFOP
X
Y
X
FESR *
* Per il FSE e il FESR sono stati mossi solo rilievi formali.
7.4 – Conclusions
The overall value of the irregularities uncovered by the European Audit Court during the DAS verification came to
153,018,842 Ecu, about 300 billion lira.
If we consider that the control was carried out on a sample of no more than 5% of the annual expenditure of
Community financial resources, the value of the irregularities for which the Italian administration is responsible is certainly
substantial. It should be noted that almost all of the sum (152,543,807 Ecu) of the aforementioned irregularities are due
to the non-payment to the EU of the supplementary taxes on “milk quotas”, an old problem that the Italian Government
intends to resolve as quickly as possible, both at a national and Community level. Renegotiations of the Italian quota
during reprogramming of the agricultural policy for the upcoming 2000-2006 cycle should satisfactorily redefine this issue.
20 As regards the major body distributing and supervising EAGGF-GUARANTEE SECTION funds, AIMA, the Italian Corte
dei Conti presented a specific report (19/99) in which the issue of control in this delicate sector was analysed in depth.
The other irregularities almost exclusively concern the use of EAGGF-Guarantee Section contributions. This type of
irregularity is primarily marked by errors made in the distribution of contributions to beneficiaries with no title to receive
them.
Even though the percentage of these last irregularities found is low (0.3%), Italy absolutely must intensify the
improve its audits procedures to avoid reduction of Commission acknowledge of expenditures including in the accounted
present every year. In the case of difficulty in recovering aid distributed erroneously, this could be transformed into a
damage to revenues.
The phenomenon is certainly a substantial one if we examine the last EAGGF-Guarantee Section account21 approved
by the Commission (1994 financial period). While the Italian government lodged a protest with the EU Court of Justice,
acknowledgement of expenditures of over 191 billion lire was refused.22
While this results can be considered fairly “normal” considering the number of beneficiaries of aid from EAGGFGuarantee Section and the resulting difficulty of preparing efficient audit mechanisms through the national territory for
recipients of Common Agricultural Policy aid, the extent and frequency of these irregularities have reached a sizeable
amount in Italy. Nonetheless, the phenomenon is present, to differing degrees in all EU countries as the table below
shows.
STATI
BELGIO
DANIMARCA
FRANCIA
GERMANIA
GRECIA
IRLANDA
ITALIA
LUSSEMBURGO
PAESI BASSI
PORTOGALLO
REGNO UNITO
SPAGNA
TOTALE
SPESE DICHIARATE
(A)
2.249.241.565.612
2.525.562.924.096
15.639.048.188.720
9.829.516.210.979
4,609.536.993.944
2.903.658.970.306
7.269.367.990.162
21.465.819.887
3.689.356.359.926
1.362.736.736.893
6.641.693.842.987
8.849.568.550.920
62.347.404.324.132
SPESE NON RICONOSCIUTE
(B)
19.948.970.011
9.012.980.045
153.119.271.268
42.645.097.446
27.189.743.465
8.454.592.757
191.864.370.710
574.062.091
17.528.223.131
10.048.110.278
99.652.144.552
18.804.643.460
598.842.209.214
% B/A
0,89
0,36
0,98
0,44
0,59
0,30
2,64
2,68
0,48
0,74
1,51
0,23
0,96
The Italian Corte dei Conti has frequently informed Parliament – most recently with relation 19/99 on AIMA – of the
reasons for the large groups of evasion of the Community regulations. There are two main factors involved: the
inadequacy of the structure of the AIMA and the difficulties in auditing.
AIMA is the largest body distributing EAGGF-Guarantee Section contributions. Since its own personnel is insufficient
to carry out its ordinary institutional duties, it makes use of a very special organisational model. Along with the public
structure, private actors23 are also used. These have signed conventions with AIMA and carried out powers general
reserved for public authorities.
While on one hand, this model, which has EU approval, has made it possible to utilise financial resources to the
fullest, despite the high number of farms spread throughout the country. On the other hand, however, the level of
impartiality of the administration is not reliable enough, given that the private subjects operating in the agricultural
sectors, with the duty of verifying the farms’ legal rights to Community assistance, are primarily trade organisations. Their
action is aimed more at supporting the interests of their members rather than contrasting these interests.
Since no other alternatives to the “mixed” public-private model described above, Italy has reinforced its control
instruments through AIMA. It is in fact the only country in the EU that has created the SIGC, a geographic information
technology system throughout the entire country. This system produces digital photos of the crop situation by use of
satellite photography. With this system, audits in CAP’s sector of intervention (in particular cereal acreage, oil cultivation
and vineyards) are certainly more reliable. Most important, they are a great deterrent to attempts at fraud, although it will
still be some years until the positive effects on the regularity of EAGGF-Guarantee Section accounts are known since the
system was only completed in 1998.
Moreover, technological audits cannot substitute traditional on site audits carried out by the proper authorities. The
results that emerged from the assessments made in 1998 showed once more the lack of audit efficiency. This is
particularly true of those entrusted to the regions and the smaller local administrations. They need to make a greater
organisational effort to avoid the loss of Community resources, penalising a sector, such as Italian agricultural, that is
already at a distinct economic disadvantage.
21 The last as at 30.6.99.
22 The Italian Court will present a specific report on this aspect during the first months of 2000.
23 For example, the Agecontrol S.p.A. for the oil sector, SITRIS s.r.l. for the sugar sector, Agriconsulting S.p.A: for seeds,
Coldiretti, Confagricoltura, Unalat, etc.
CHAPTER II
THE POLICY OF SOCIAL-ECONOMIC COHESION
1 – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.1
– The Policy of cohesion from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Amsterdam
The authors of the 1957 Treaty of Rome were well aware of the need for economic and social cohesion. In one of the preambles, it charged the Community with the
ask of ensuring "harmonious development, reducing the gap between the different regions and the delay of those less privileged." This declaration did include any forecast, if
not of policy, at least of programmes or specific intervention. This was due to the conviction that economic integration would be an automatic effect of the policy of
competitiveness. In other words, the elimination of the obstacles to free circulation of persons, goods, services and capital would have reabsorbed the regional inequalities.
Later experience showed that not only did the process of economic integration not resolve the problems of regional differences, but it actually risked aggravating them since a
market marked by competitiveness, requiring substantial investments, ultimately penalises backward areas.
Towards the end of the sixties, a serious study was made of regional policy instrument. In 1975, this led to the establishment of the Regional Fund for Regiaonl
Development. The truly radical change in direction came ten years later with the Single European Act. This introduced a chapter in the EC Treaty dedicated to "Economic and
Social Cohesion". It opened with EC article 158 (ex article 130A), which established that "in order to promote harmonious development within the entire Community, it must
develop and continue its action to reinforce social and economic cohesion." More explicitly, the second sub-section, again using the formula of the preamble of the Treaty of
Rome, added that "the Community is aimed at reducing the gap between the various regions and the delay of island or less privileged regions", including rural zones. The
Structural Funds are important instruments to obtain the reduction of this gap.
The measures contained in the 1986 Single European Act underwent marginal changes by the Treaty of the European Union signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992.
This treaty substantially strengthened the role of regional policy through the protocol of economic and social cohesion, the creation of the Cohesion Fund (EC article 161) and
the institution of the Regional Committee (EC article 263).
The "constitutional" provisions of economic and social cohesion was further modified by the Treaty of Amsterdam which took effect on 1 June 1999. This contained two
main points: one dealt with the substitution of procedures for co-operation, provided for in EC article 162 with the procedure of co-decision. The other was the extension of
regional policy goals to include island regions (the aforementioned EC article 158).
The policy of cohesion is closely linked to other community policies. The connection with agricultural policy and social policy are clear, inasmuch as they make use of
structural instruments. On the other hand, community regulations on competitiveness are in contrast with the policy of cohesion. In any event as an exemption to the basic rule
prohibiting any agreement, decision or public intervention which may impede or undermine competitiveness, Community regulations provide for the possibility that the States
grant aid to encourage economic development in the regions where the standard of living is usually low or with serious problems of unemployment (EC article 87.31).
Relations between structural actions and the Economic monetary union are more complex. From one point of view, the policy of cohesion seems adapted to the
monetary policy. The passage to a single currency may have negative consequences if an area is marked by economic gaps large enough to suffer the shock of demand in an
asymmetric manner. Since it is impossible to react to these shocks through use of the exchange rate, the diversity can determine an occupational crisis with resulting social
tensions. This leads to the need to reduce differentials in development.
From another point of view, monetary policy has explicit effects on the policy of cohesion. These effects can either support or conflict. Eventually, the introduction of a
single currency, implying an irrevocable exchange rate as well as the definition and diffusion of single monetary and exchange policies (EC article 4.2) should, as it has until
now, mean the reduction of inflation and interest rates. This will probably have benefits for the less well developed areas.
For the moment, the rules of "sound public financing", including in particular, the Treaty of Maastricht prohibition against excessive deficits in defence of monetary
stability, later reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact, decided by the December 1995 European Council of Madrid, are forcing the States to carry out restrictive budgetary
policies. This is resulting in a reduction of investments which can accentuate the present gap between the States. This is what occurred in Italy in the 1994-1997 three year
period. According to the Ministry of the Budget, "while the implementation of deficit recovery policies and the elimination of mechanisms of public debt … has led to an
improvement in public accounts, it has also determined a consistent reduction of the national public expenditure and, simultaneously, a reduction of investments as well."
Svimez has also revealed that the weaker areas can also suffer further damage from the growing penetration of the markets that the monetary union, eliminating the
risk of exchange and reducing transaction risks, would offer products from stronger areas. Also to be considered is the fact that the opening up to the east and south will
accentuate the present gaps. This is because the countries aspiring to enter the European Union have more serious structural handicaps that the regions presently making use
of Community financial support.
The need for cohesion and a new territorial balance is particularly true for southern Italy. According to Svimez, between 1992 and 1998, accumulated growth of the
gross domestic product (GDP), was only 2.95 as opposed to 10.2% in the Centre-North, despite the improvement registered in 1998. This led to an increase in the gap of the
GDP per inhabitant (from 58.6% to 54.65% for the centre-north). According to the same source, from 1992 to 1998, employment in the south diminished at an average of
1.3% per year, almost three times the rate for the centre-north.
At any event, the real problem for the Structural Funds regards the importance of social-economic development. The Commission observed in this regard that the
incidence of the regional employment policy depends on the intensity and the combination of intervention, which vary according to the initial situation, the basic goals and the
member States. In order to reinforce impact, the Commission suggested making full use of immaterial investments and technological innovations. It also suggested paying
special attention to the goal of employment when financing intervention, promoting active employment policies (associating payment of unemployment benefits with training
programmes). Other suggestions included activating close collaboration among various institutions, social and economic partners, professional organisations and trade
associations in order to optimise results.
Again on the basis of the Commission’s assessment, the poorer region’s pro capita GDP is approaching the European Union average. In the decade 1986-1996, in the
ten regions with the lowest pro capita GDP, it rose from 41 to 50 percent. The same indicator rose from 52% to 59% in the twenty-five poorest regions (including Calabria).
The Union’s most serious problem, that of unemployment, has yet to be resolved. In the twenty-five hardest hit regions, unemployment hovers at a level of between
20% and 35%, considerably higher than twenty-five years ago. The phenomenon is particularly serious for women and young people. Unemployment rates for the former are
lower than 50% in the twenty-five regions with the highest overall unemployment rate. In the same regions, for the latter, the unemployment rate is 47%, twice as much as
the rate for people over the age of twenty-five.
Given the gravity of the phenomenon, unemployment will certainly be a priority in the division of resources for 2000-2006.
1.2. Legislative sources
In application of the new policy of cohesion including in the Single European Act, four sets of regulations were issued in 1988 that brought profound changes to the
subject matter. The legislation is organised as follows: a framework regulation (Reg. 2052/88), a horizontal regulation of co-ordination among the various initiatives in favour of
regional policy (Reg. 4253/88) and three specific vertical regulations concerning the European Regional Development Fund (Reg. 4254/88), the European Social Fund (Reg.
4255/88 and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund – Guidance Sector (Reg. 4256(88).
As mentioned above, Treaty of Maastricht contains a special protocol in this area expressing the need to make a more thorough assessment of the Structural Funds’
operations and efficiency. After this treaty went into effect, the legislation was re-examined, albeit not very incisively, in 1993 (Reg. 2082/93, 2082/93, 2083/93, 2084/93 and
2085/93, modifying the 1988 regulations mentioned above). A sixth regulation was issued for the occasion regarding the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (Reg.
2080/93).
Proposals for reform of the Structural Funds were drawn up in 1998. The Berlin Council of Europe urged the European Parliament and Council to adopt the new
measures rapidly given the need to ensure a smooth transition to the new period of programming that began on January 1, 2000.
In keeping with the request, the following acts were passed:
• Reg. 1260/99 of the Council of 21 June 1999 containing general provisions for the Structural Funds;
• Reg. 1783/99 of the European Parliament and Council of 12 July 1999, regarding the European Regional Development Fund;
• Reg. 1784/99 European Parliament and Council of 12 July 1999, regarding the European Social Fund;
• Reg. 1257/99 of the Council of 17 May 19999 on support to rural development by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and that abrogate
those regulations;
• Reg. 1258/99 of the Council of 17 May 1999 regarding financing of common agricultural policy;
• Reg. 1750/99 of the Commission of 23 July 1999 containing measures of application of the regulation 1257/99 of the Council on the support to rural support by the
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).
Bellow, reference will be made to the past legislation, containing provision for managing of the funds discussed in the present report, without prejudice to the delays on
the aspects of greater importance of the new legislation. This will in any event be analysed in the paragraph.
1.3 - Structural Funds
Below is a brief analysis of the aims of the Structural Funds, listed according to order of appearance.
The European Social (ESF), provided for in the Treaty of Rome, was established in 1960 and became operational in 1962. Its aim is to promote the possibility of
employ and the geographic and professional mobility of workers, as well as facilitating the industrial transformation through training and professional reconversion (art. 123
EC). It finances the following initiatives:
• professional placement of the long-term unemployed and young people in search of their first job;
•
•
•
•
•
•
placement of those threatened by exclusion from the labour market;
promotion of equal opportunity in the labour market;
helping workers adjust to industrial changes;
stability and growth of employment;
reinforcement of human potential in research;
training initiatives.
As of 2000, the ESF’s field of application will be regulated by article 2 of Reg. 1748/99.
The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), established in 1962, has the task of promoting development and diversification of rural areas and
co-financing of national systems of aid to agriculture. The guidance sections of the Fund support:
• measures to support agricultural income and productive agricultural communities in mountain areas;
• incentives for settlement of young farmers;
• improvement of farm structure efficiency;
• incentives for the creation of producers’ associations;
• improvement of the quality of agricultural production;
• the development of rural infrastructures;
• incentives for investments in the tourism sector;
• measures against natural disasters as well as the development of small local areas, protection of rural assets, exploitation of forests, environmental protection and
financial engineering.
In the next programming period, the EAGGF will operate within the spheres provided for in article 1 of Reg. 1258/99 which refers to the rural development measures
set forth in Reg. 1257/99.
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975. It contributes financing to:
• productive investments for the creation of jobs;
• infrastructures;
• investments in the sectors of education and health;
• initiatives for local development and the support of SMBs.;
• research;
• investments for the environment.
In the future, the ERDF will finance the initiatives provided for in article 2 of Reg. 1784/99.
The last fund established as part of the second 1993 reform, was the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) which intervenes to:
• reinforce the fishing sector;
• modernise the fleet;
• development aquaculture;
• protect some marine areas;
• equip fishing ports;
• transform and market fish products;
• promote fish products:
In the future, the initiatives financed by the FIFG will be those provided for in article 1 of Reg. 1263/99.
1.4 – Priority Goals
According to the framework regulations (2052/88), the Structural Funds were to contribute, each in an adequate manner, to achieving the following priority goals:
• Ob.1: structural adjustment of the regions with delayed development. Uses the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF-Guidance Section;
• Ob.2: economic reconversion for declining industrial areas, using the ERDF and the ESF;
• Ob.3: uses the ESF to fight long-term unemployment and professional placement of young people and people excluded from the labour market;
•
•
Ob. 4: back-up of industrial changes through preventive measures against unemployment, financed by the ESF;
Ob. 5: promotion of rural development through adjustment of agricultural and fishery structures (EAGGF, Guidance section and FIFG) and structural adjustment of
rural areas (EAGGF, Guidance section, ESF, ERDF) making up sub ob. 5a and 5b.
With the membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Ob.6 was set up. This concerned the development of scarcely populated regions (<8 inhabitants/km2).
Article 3 of the co-ordination regulations established that, in implementing regional policy objectives, the Commission was to ensure co-ordination and consistency
among the contribution of funds and intervention of the Ceca (with reference to readjustment aid, loans, interest rate subsidies and guarantees) of the European Investment
Bank (EIB), the new Community instrument and Euratom (loans and guarantees): In particular, the Commission was required to have the EIB take part in the use of funds and
other financial instruments for investment co-financing wherever the proper conditions occurred.
The Cohesion Fund, established by article 130D EC in the text modified by the Treaty of Maastricht is of particular importance in structural policy. All member States
with a gross national production 90% lower than the Community average may have access to these funds. As of the end of 1999, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland all
benefited from the fund. These countries had particularly advantageous treatment, both with regard to the amount of financial resources destined to the Cohesion Fund and for
the co-financing rates of Ob.1 intervention.
Reg. 1260/99 called for reduction of the number of objectives from seven to three. Ob.1 will include the outlying regions and areas currently part of Ob.6 as well as
regions with a pro capita GDP lower than 75% of the Community average. Ob.2 will deal with economic and social reconversion of areas with structural problems (in addition to
the areas undergoing social-economic changes, rural areas in decline, depressed urban areas that depend on fishing). Ob. 3 will support the modernisation of educational
policies and systems, vocational training and employment and will be applied to areas outside of Ob. 1 and 2.
1.5 – Eligible Areas
The initiatives co-financed by the Structural Funds for Ob. 3, 4 and 5a were implemented in any region or zone of the Community. Instead, Ob. 1, 2, 5b and 6 were
"regional", operating only in some regions or part of them. The Council decided which regions were covered by Ob. 1 and 6. Those coming under the aegis of Ob. 2 and 5b were
chosen by the Commission, based on suggestions made by the member States. In the new legislative framework, Ob. 1 and 2 will be regional and Ob. 3, national. The choice of
areas eligible for Community financing is particularly important since it is a premise for application of the benefits provided for by Italian legislation for depressed areas.
Ob. 1 was applicable in regions with a pro capita GDP is below 75% of the Community average and concerned 26.6% of the Community population (21.7% on the
basis of the 1988 legislation). Spain had an advantageous position given the number of inhabitants that benefit from the funds (23 million people as opposed to 21 million in
Italy). Italy’s southern regions, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardinia and Abruzzo (until 1996) were part of Ob. 1.
Ob.2 operated in declining industrial zones, identified on the basis of the following main eligibility criteria: unemployment rate higher than the Community average,
percentage of jobs in industry higher than the Community average, decline of jobs in industry. The 1988 legislation also called for secondary criteria (extension to areas
adjacent to those with the prerequisites). The sector regulation of 1993 also added restructuring of fisheries. In December 1993, following concertation with the member
States, the Commission identified a list of eligible zones. The population included in Ob. 2 came to 16.8% of the total (15% according to the regulations).
The State with the greatest number of inhabitants benefiting from Ob. 2 was the United Kingdom, but with a drop for the period 1994-1999 (with respect to 19891993). Instead, Italy doubled the population benefiting from Ob. 1, with an increase from 3.4 to 6.3 million inhabitants. The Italian regions eligible for Ob.2 financial for the
period 1994-1996 were Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Lazio. With its decision of 26
July 1996, the Commission confirmed the list of eligible regions for the previous three years with some modifications. Some locations in the provinces of Pisa, Milan, Varese,
Reggio Emilia and Modena were eliminated for Italy while areas in the municipalities of Rome, Venice, Milan, Trieste, Modena/Ferrara and Florence were added.
The regions benefiting from Ob.5b must meet the general criterion of low economic development and certain specific criteria (two of which are needed to meet
conditions of eligibility). These are: a high percentage of employment in agriculture, low level of income from agriculture, low population density and/or considerable tendency
towards depopulation and impact on fishery reconstruction.
France had the most favourable position in both periods of programming. The Italian regions eligible for Ob.5b benefits were Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria,
Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbra, Marche and Lazio.
1.6 – Principles of Structural Policy
According to Community regulations, the general principles of the cohesion policy are: concentration, partnership, programming and additionality. In order to complete
our analysis, we will also consider the principles of co-financing and evaluation.
1.6.1 – Principle of Concentration
Article 12.2 of the framework regulations establishes that a significant effort will be made to concentrate budget resources in favour of the regions with delayed
development. 70& of the financial allocations (a percentage substantially maintained by the reform) will be set aside for this purpose. The principle operates not only from a
financial point of view but also with regard to the primary objectives illustrated above. This is also true for local areas since, as seen earlier, regulations give maximum
percentages of population which can benefit from financing. Like the objectives, the new legislation undergoing approval limits Community initiatives.
With regard to the financial aspects, the new framework law on funding contains a very detailed regulations (Reg. 1260/99, art.7).
1.6.2 – Principle of Partnership
Concertation or partnership is an innovative principle introduced by the 1988 reform which was reinforced by the 1993 legislation. It implies a close concertation
between the Commission and the competent authorities of the member States, not only national but also regional or local. A partnership with the economic and social forces
and in the future, following the reform, even with the "other competent bodies".
The policy of the new strategy of attention towards the world of the autonomous governments is based on the principle of subsidiarity, according to which decision
must be made as close as possible to the citizen base (article 1 of the Treaty of Maastricht). The focal point of this strategy is EC art. 263 which establishes the Committee of
Regions, made up of representatives of the regional and local populations. The Committee expresses opinions in the sectors of social policy, culture, health and trans-European
networks, as well as in the areas of economic and social cohesion. Italy is present in the Committee of with 24 of the 222 members (similarly to Germany, France and the
United Kingdom).
The principle is valid for the preparation and financing phase, as well as in the phases of ex ante, in itinere and ex post evaluation (but not for consultation as set forth
in article 27 of co-ordination regulations 4235/88), without prejudice to the institutional, juridical and financial competence of each partner. Today, the principle is regulated by
art. 8 of Reg. 1260/99.
1.6.3.
– Principle of programming
With the introduction in 1988 of the principle of programming (as well as partnership and additionality), the policy of cohesion was no longer merely an instrument for
distribution of financial resources to less advantaged areas. It took on a more important role, becoming an allocation mechanism for national and regional authorities of
concertation of the lines of economic development of the regions receiving financial intervention.
The Community’s decision-making process regarding the Structural Funds was normally divided into the following phases:
• the member States presented plans for development and/or regional reconversion to the Commission. The plans, prepared by national or regional authorities,
contained an analysis of the situation vis-à-vis goals of reference, an indication of specific goals, quantified if possible and intervention priorities, evaluation of
environmental impact and an indicative global financial estimate. The plans were national for Ob. 3, 4, and 5a and regional for the other objectives;
• the Commission approved the Community Support Framework CSF), the instrument through which Community took a decisive role in the member States’
programming process. The CSF contains the priority lines of intervention, specific goals, the methods of ex ante evaluation, in itinere monitoring and ex post
evaluation as well as forms of intervention and the financial plan. For Objective 1 to 4 and 5b, the Commission had a six-month deadline to adopt the CSF. For Ob. 5b,
the methods of application had to be adopted by 31 December 1993. The CSF could be modified by the Commission through the initiative of the member State and the
Commission itself. Duration of the CSF was six years for Ob. 1, 3 and 5b and three years for Ob. 2 and 4;
• the member States applied to the Commission for contributions (for the forms of intervention which we will illustrate below); the Commission then decided on said
requests within six months.
Operational difficulties emerged in the first experience in applying the 1988 reform of funds due to the complex procedures involved. For this reason, the 1993
regulations provided for a more simplified system to present programme documentation. Co-ordination regulations allow the member States to present a single programming
document (SPD) which substitutes previous documentation for both development plans and contribution requests. As part of this system, the Commission makes a single
decision, both to adopt the CSF and to approve contributions.
On the basis of these new procedures (Reg. 120/99, art. 10.3), before presentation of the programming documents by the member States, the Commission must
define some of its positions regarding Community priorities for each of the Objectives.
1.6.4. – Principle of Additionality
According to article 9 of the co-ordination regulations (and article 11 of the new framework rules), aimed at guaranteeing effective economic impact, Structural Funds
and FIFG resources allocated by the Community for each of the priority objectives can substitute public expenditures for structural purposes and must be invested by the
member State. In particular, the latter must keeps its own public and other expenses at least at the same level reached during the precious programming period. During
preparation of the CSF, the Commission and the member State come to an agreement regarding ways of verifying additionality.
This matter is the subject of specific negotiations (see section 2.9) to be discussed below.
1.6.5. – Principle of co-financing
Although this is not generally considered a principle, co-financing is an important aspect of the cohesion policy. Community actions are conceived to supplement the
corresponding national actions or as contributions to the same (article 4 of the previous framework regulations and article 8 of Reg. 1260/99). Community regulations set
minimum and maximum limits to the rates of intervention of the Structural Funds.
In the regions of Ob.1, Community co-financing cannot exceed 75% of the total cost of investments and must come to at least 50% of the relative public expenditure.
There is however an important exception regarding the benefiting countries of the Cohesion Fund. For these countries, the Community’s financial contribution can go as high as
80% and, in the case of outlying areas, even 85% of the total investment.
For the other objectives, the co-financing rate may reach 50% of the total investment and may not be lower than 25% of the public funds envisaged for that type of
intervention. For technical assistance measures, Community financing may go as high as 100% in exceptional cases.
It should be noted that co-financing is a microeconomic, sectorial rule with no relationship to additionality which is, instead, a macroeconomic rule. The combination of
the two principles does however place heavy limitations on the budget. This means not only maintaining the same level as previous expenditures but also requires that every
centre of expenditure guarantee availability of financial resources for structural goals.
1.7. – Forms of Intervention
Generally speaking, Structural Fund intervention takes place according to diversified forms of financing based on the type of operation (article 5, framework
regulation).
The forms of intervention to carry out regional plans within the sphere of Ob. 1, 2 and 5b are:
• operative programmes (OP):
• individual requests for high amounts to be financed by the ERDF (at least 15 million Ecu for production investments and 25 million Ecu for infrastructures);
• global subsidies, managed by an intermediate organism appointed by the member State with the Commission’s approval and which has the task of dividing Community
financing in single subsidies to distribute to the final beneficiaries;
• co-financing of systems of national aid to companies at the condition that they respect rules of competitiveness;
• subsidies for technical assistance, including preparatory measures, evaluation activities and pilot projects.
The regional plans coming under Ob. 3 and 4 were carried out through operative programmes, global subsidies, innovative initiatives and subsidies for technical
assistance.
1.8 – Financial Resources
The financial prospects for 1988 called for a total financial outlay for the Structural Funds of 60 billion Ecu for the period 1989-1993. This was a considerable sun that
double the allocations made between 1987 and 1993. The Commission undertook the division of the sum among objectives, funds and member States. The Commission
adopted both the criterion of the regional and the national GDP to the detriment of the Mezzogiorno, Italy’s southern area.
As can be seen from the following table, Spain received the greatest amount of financing, more than Italy. A study of the Diplomatic Institute (from which the data for
the following table was taken) showed that, if we take into account the population covered by Ob.1, Ireland, Portugal and Greece rank highest.
Ripartizione delle risorse finanziarie per il periodo 1989-1993 (Mecu-prezzi 1993)
Ob.1
Ob.2
Ob.3 e 4
Ob.5a
Ob.5b
ATI(*)
TOTALE
BELGIO
400
400
200
40
50
1.090
DANIMARCA
50
200
100
30
40
420
800
1.200
1.000
500
200
7.000
20
8.220
GERMANIA
3.200
GRECIA
8.200
SPAGNA
12.000
1.700
1.200
200
400
300
15.000
FRANCIA
1.100
1.500
1.800
1.400
1.200
400
7.400
IRLANDA
4.500
10
4.510
500
1.200
500
500
300
12.100
LUSSEMBURGO
30
15
30
3
1
79
PAESI BASSI
200
500
100
50
50
900
15
8.515
ITALIA
9.100
PORTOGALLO
8.500
REGNO UNITO
1.000
3.200
2.100
400
400
25
7.125
TOTALE
47.600
8.380
8.615
3.930
3.223
1.411
73.000
(*) Azioni transitorie e innovative
The Council of Edinburgh held in December 1992, assigned a total sum of 176 billion Ecu to implementation of structural policies for the period 1993-1999. The yearly
average amounted to 25 billion Ecu, in contrast to the 13 billion Ecu allocated for the previous period. The Council also decided to concentrate the expense among the four least
prosperous countries belonging to the Cohesion Fund, the Community’s outlying city suburbs and rural areas. The sum of 85 billion Ecu was allocated to the four countries of
the Cohesion Fund. This mean a doubling of the financial subsidies for Ob. 1 from 1992 to 1999.
In 1993, the Commission divided Ob. 1 resources for the period 1994-1999 (note that the period considered by the Council of Edinburgh was 1993-1999). The relative
data is given in the table below.
Ripartizione delle risorse finanziarie per il periodo 1994-1999 (Mecu-prezzi 1993)
Ob.1
BELGIO
Ob.2 (*)
730
DANIMARCA
Ob.3 e 4
Ob.5a (**)
Ob.5b
160
465
170+ 21,6
77
56
301
127+135,0
54
733
1.942
1.068+ 65,8
1.227
GERMANIA
13.640
GRECIA
13.980
SPAGNA
26.300
1.130
1.843
326+105,6
664
FRANCIA
2.190
1.765
3.203
1.742+170,7
2.238
IRLANDA
5.620
684
1.715
680+118,6
901
7
23
39
6
300
1.079
118+ 41,2
150
2.142
3.307
361+ 78,3
817
ITALIA
14.860
LUSSEMBURGO
PAESI BASSI
PORTOGALLO
REGNO UNITO
150
13.980
2.360
TOTALE
47.600
6.977
13.948
4.631+737,3
6.134
(*) Periodo 1994-1996
(**) Rispettivamente, agricoltura e pesca
The total sum authorised for structural policies in the period 1994-1999 came to 141,471 billion Ecu, 96,346 of which (79%) went to Ob.1. AS mentioned earlier, two
groups of countries came under this Objective:
• the member States and regions benefiting from the Cohesion Fund (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal);
• the other countries.
The first four countries had a double advantage: a more favourable division of resources, guaranteeing a doubling, in real terms, of the allocation for the period 19921999, and a greater rate of co-financing for Ob. 1 funding.
For this Objective, Spain was the favoured beneficiary for the new period of programming. The same was true for Ireland. Portugal and Greece which also kept their
top rankings in allocation for resources destined to Objective 1 populations.
Italy was in second place for Ob. 1(15,85%), after Spain. It was in fifth place for Ob. 2, 3 and 4 and in third place for Ob. 5a and 5b.
The 1988 regulations called for direct intervention by the Commission. These so-called "Community initiatives" were aimed at action of particular interest. In the period
1989-1993, up to 10% of all allocations were assigned to these initiatives. The 1993 reform destined 9% of financial subsidies to Community initiatives for the period 19941999. The Community initiatives adopted in the framework of the new period of programming were: Interreg II, Leader II, Regs II, Employment and Valorisation of Human
Resources, Adapt, Rechar II, Resider II, Konver, Retes, Textile and Clothing in Portugal, SME, City initiatives and Fisheries.
The Berlin Council of Europe allocated a total sum of 195 billion Euro for the period 2000-2006. Assignment of resources for Ob. 1 and 2 to the member States will be
based on the following criteria: admissible population, regional prosperity and seriousness of structural problems with particular emphasis on unemployment. (Reg. 1260/99,
art.7).
1.9 – Monitoring, Evaluation and Control
Recently, awareness has grown that the existence of a system of monitoring, evaluation and control is needed to achieve the goals of the public administration.
As regards the Structural Funds, article 6 of the framework regulations establishes that Community action is the object of supervision aimed at ensuring the certain
realisation of commitments made within the framework of the goals defined by EC articles 130A and 130C (now EC articles 158 and 160).
This supervision should make it possible to redirect programmes as needed, starting from the requirements that emerge during implementation.
Section 2 of the same article adds that, in order to evaluate effectiveness of structural intervention, Community action shall be subject to ex ante evaluation,
supervision during intervention and ex post evaluation.
The legislation in this area is completed by Reg. 2082/93 which establishes that, within the area of partnerships, the Commission and the member States must ensure
effective supervision of intervention carried out at the level of the Community Support Framework and of specific initiatives. Monitoring is carried out by special bodies
(Supervision Committees) which, using a battery of indicators, periodically provide date on intervention progress. This is aimed at identifying any problems that might prevent
reaching the goals and in order to suggest possible corrective measures.
Monitoring might examine financial, procedural or fiscal economic tendencies. Financial monitoring revealed the data (commitments and payments) for financial flows.
Procedural monitoring examined the phases of intervention implementation. Fiscal monitoring supplies information on the actual state of implementation. This type of
evaluation is particularly important since, aside from providing cognitive information on the actual results reached through public action, it also helps to study methodology.
And this allows for improvement through the technique of retroactive, ex ante evaluation.
As far as audits of the management of Structural Funds are concerned, these must be carried out first of all by the administrations of the member States inasmuch as
they are the actual fund users. And since these funds are destined to achieve Community goals, it is clear that the national administrations must conform to European
dispositions aimed at ensuring regularity and good financial management. This was made a constitutional principle by the Treaty of Maastricht (EC art. 274).
In general, this obligation comes from EC article 5 containing the principle of States’ loyalty. According to this principle, the States must abstain from any measure
which might compromise realisation of the Treaty’s aims. The obligation derives in particular from article 2 of the financial regulations which commits the national
administrations to collaborating with the Commission to ensure the adequacy of the decentralised management system of Community funds. From this point of view, as part of
the struggle against fraud in the European Union budget, EC article 280 introduces the principles that national finance is similar to Community finance and that of co-operation
of national administration with the Commission. Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam requires that the member States respect the principle of sound financial management (the
aforementioned EC article 274).
There is also general and specific legislation that exists regarding individual sectors. Council Reg. 2988/95 established that the member States should adopt, according
to their various legislative systems and national regulations and administrations, the measures needed to ensure the regularity and effectiveness of the operations involving the
Community’s financial interests. The auditing measures, which must be in proportion to the goals pursued, must take the specific characteristics of each sector into account.
They must also consider each member State’s administrative practices and structures without requiring excessive economic restraints or administrative charges (article 8).
As mentioned earlier, specific obligations are also required by sector legislation. As regards Structural Funds, the Community regulations (Reg. 2082/93), article 23)
requires that all member States: periodically verify the correct implementation of actions, find and bring sanctions against irregularities, recover funds lost through abuse or
negligence, repay the Community any funds distributed unduly disbursed through negligence or fraud, perform supplementary audits upon request from the Commission
(restricted to the regularity of payment requests), inform the Commission of the system of management and audits applied in order to guarantee effective intervention.
In performance of the aforementioned article 23 of Council Reg. 2052/93, the Commission passed Reg. 2064/97, establishing rigorous measures for audits by member
States. Article 8 deserves special mention. According to this article, requests for payment of balances due and the declaration of the expenses presented by the national
administrations must include a certificate issued by an independent (even private) body. Said certificate must contain an evaluation of the validity of the request for payment of
the balance due as well as the legitimacy and regularity of the operations to which the declaration of expenses refers.
As regards national audits, the common legislation applies since the funds are now managed by the normal central and regional administrations. In particular, the
decisions made by CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning) in the financial sector are subject to preliminary audits by the Corte dei Conti (article 3.1 1. 20/94).
In the same way, the programming measures decided on by the regional administrations are audited a priori, by the state auditing commission (article 1, legislative decree, 13
February 1993, n. 40 and later modifications).
The new aspect of audits on Community funds is established by article 4 of Law 20/94 (the Section for Community and International Affairs was specifically set up to
enact this). The provisions of this article extend the model of performance audit to the management to funds coming from the European Union.
Verification of Structural Funds management is naturally carried out by the Community as well as member States. The Union institutions responsible for auditing the
Structural Funds are the Commission, Directorate General XX Financial Control, the Inspectorate General and the Corte dei Conti.
Here we will only discuss the Commission audits because, in contrast to other, more general controls of all Community financing, these audits are regulated by specific
provisions regarding Structural Funds.
Article 23 of Reg. 2083/93 establishes that – barring audits carried out by member States in accordance with national legislation and without prejudice to the
jurisdiction of the European Audit Court and any inspection aimed at ascertaining responsibility of authorising and accounting officers – Commission officials may perform on
site audits, in particular through surveys, of financial activity carried out with Community funds and of the systems of management and audit.
Monitoring, evaluation and audit of Structural Funds management were reinforced by the reform legislation (Reg. 1260/99, article 34 and ff.).
2 – PROGRESS MADE IN STRUCTURAL INTERVENTION
2.1. – OBJECTIVE 1
Ob. 1 is aimed at promoting the development and structural adjustment of the regions with a pro capita GDP lower than 75% of the Community average. Given the
principle of solidarity that so strongly characterises this objective, this is a primary goal of the EU’s social-economic cohesion policy. This can be seen by the overall sum of
financial resources for the period 1994-1999. This amounts 56.3% of the total amount allocated for structural intervention (see table 1). This objective uses the ERDF, the ESF
and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance Section according to the proportion indicated in graph 1.
Prospetto 1 – Piano finanziario 94/99 – Interventi strutturali
Ripartizione per OBIETTIVO Mecu
CONTRIBUTI
INTERVENTI
Costo totale
Peso % Comunitari Nazionali Privati
Obiettivo 1
31.083,9
65,1
15.214,1
10.700,6
5.169,2
Obiettivo 2
4.332,7
9,1
1.463,6
2.344,4
524,7
Obiettivo 3
2.999,5
6,3
1.348,4
1.636,3
14,8
Obiettivo 4
917,0
1,9
412,6
350,2
154,2
Ob. 5a - FEAOG/SFOP
2.695,8
5,7
793
1.239,3
663,5
Obiettivo 5b
5.676,2
11,9
1.358,6
1.773,9
2.543,7
Totale Obiettivi
(*) 47.705,1
(*) Dal costo totale è escluso l’ammontare relativo ai programmi comunitari.
100,0
20.590,3 18.044,7 9.070,1
Dati RGS- SIRGS
The regions affected by this objective were those of the centre-south (Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia). Abruzzo and the islands (Sardinia and Sicily)
were added only for the period 1994-1996.
The resources available through the CSF came to a total of 31,083.9 million Ecu. These were assigned to the regions according to the data shown in table 2. As can be
seen in table 3, these resources were divided into eight priority axes (communications, industry, handicrafts, tourism, enhancement of agricultural resources and rural
development, enhancement of human resources, technical assistance-promotion-monitoring). These were the basic strategic lines of intervention in the regions themselves.
Each axis is further divided into sub-axes and available resources are divided among them as see in table 4.
GRAPH 1
Prospetto 2 - PIANO FINANZIARIO INTERVENTI STRUTTURALI - ANNI 1994/1999
Ripartizione per aggregati geografici - obiettivi prioritari di sviluppo (Mecu)
AREE
INTERVENTO
DI Ob.1
Ob.2
UE
NAZ
Ob.3
UE
NAZ
UE
Ob.4
NAZ
Ob.5a
UE
NAZ
UE
Ob.5b
NAZ
TOT.
UE
NAZ
Abruzzo (94/96)
198,0
257,0
-
-
28,3
9,4
5,0
1,7
28,1
28,0
-
-
555,5
Basilicata
433,0
445,2
-
-
133,6
44,5
7,3
2,4
89,3
68,9
-
-
1.224,2
Calabria
681,7
944,2
-
-
121,4
40,5
8,9
3,1
58,3
58,3
-
-
1.916,4
1.124,8
1.507,3
-
-
161,7
53,9
43,6
14,5
81,3
87,0
-
-
3.074,1
Molise
223,3
209,0
-
-
24,9
8,3
6,8
2,3
37,0
25,6
-
-
537,2
Puglia
897,3
1.230,2
-
-
174,6
58,2
34,1
11,4
117,4
159,9
-
-
2.683,1
Sardegna
710,5
732,6
-
-
137,0
45,7
21,1
7,0
98,5
59,3
-
-
1.811,7
Sicilia
1.048,0
1.314,0
-
-
315,1
106,2
16,5
9,9
145,5
146,6
-
-
3.101,8
Multiregionali
7.113,6
7.719,6
-
-
542,0
180,6
103,6
34,5
242,9
243,1
-
-
16.179,9
12.430,2 14.359,1
-
- 1.638,6
547,3
246,9
86,8
898,3
876,7
-
-
31.083,9
Campania
Tot. Mezzogiorno
Abruzzo (97/99)
-
-
-
-
21,2
25,9
4,1
5,0
2,9
11,7
-
-
70,8
P.A. Bolzano
-
-
-
-
24,5
29,9
9,3
11,4
10,0
39,1
43,6
115,6
283,4
Emilia Romagna
-
-
21,9
42,8
184,4
225,4
67,1
81,9
26,9
107,7
55,7
233,8
1.047,6
Friuli Venezia Giulia
-
-
53,3
115,7
53,4
65,2
16,0
19,6
3,9
13,1
36,5
176,9
553,6
Lazio
-
-
124,0
179,0
122,3
149,5
35,9
43,9
8,7
26,1
144,1
329,5
1.163,0
Liguria
-
-
178,3
275,1
42,3
51,7
13,3
16,2
2,5
6,1
29,4
75,2
690,1
Lombardia
-
-
2,0
87,9
175,1
214,0
72,2
88,2
27,8
109,2
32,2
126,4
981,1
Marche
-
-
37,2
58,0
36,8
44,9
13,0
15,9
20,6
58,7
227,2
415,9
928,2
Piemonte
-
-
396,8
817,9
122,2
149,6
44,5
54,4
16,4
71,1
79,2
238,1
1.990,2
Toscana
-
-
232,6
535,4
65,6
80,2
24,1
29,5
11,1
46,1
127,0
441,5
1.593,1
P.A. Trento
-
-
-
-
28,2
34,5
8,9
10,9
11,5
42,6
19,9
45,9
202,4
Umbria
-
-
62,0
75,7
30,5
37,2
9,3
11,4
4,5
17,5
384,5
586,5
1.219,1
Valle D'Aosta
-
-
14,1
17,9
12,4
18,0
3,4
4,2
0,2
0,5
4,3
9,8
84,8
Veneto
-
-
126,0
216,8
108,3
132,4
41,6
50,8
15,3
60,4
129,8
469,5
1.350,9
M. dell'industria
-
-
169,3
446,9
-
-
-
-
-
-
45,2
1.053,0
1.714,4
Multiregionali
-
-
-
-
321,2
392,7
49,9
61,1
630,7
1.292,9
-
-
2.748,5
Tot. Centro-Nord
-
-
1.417,5 2.869,1 1.348,4
1.651,1
412,6 504,4
793,0
1.902,8
1.358,6 4.317,6
16.621,2
12.430,2 14.359,1
1.417,5 2.869,1 2.987,0
2.198,4
659,5 591,2 1.691,3
2.779,5
1.358,6 4.317,6
47.705,1
TOTALE
Prospetto 3 – Piano finanziario 1994/99 – Interventi strutturali
Ripartizione per ASSI PRIORITARI
(Mecu)
ASSE PRIORITARIO
COSTO TOTALE
1. Comunicazioni
PESO (%)
17,62
5.489,177
2. Industria, artigianato e
servizi alle imprese
8.241,315
3. Turismo
26,46
7,37
2.294,256
4. Diversificazione, valorizzazione
delle risorse agricole
4.540,767
5. Pesca
14,58
1,63
507,266
6. Infrastrutture di supporto
attività economiche
6.814,959
21,88
7. Valorizzazione risorse umane
(Ob.1, Ob.3 e Ob.4)
3.135,184
10,06
124,901
0,40
8. Assistenza tecnica, pubblicità e
monitoraggio
TOTALE GENERALE
31.147,826
100
Dati RGS – SIRGS
Prospetto 4 –Piano finanziario 1994/99 – Interventi strutturali
Ripartizione per ASSI PRIORITARI E SOTTOPROGRAMMI (Mecu)
ASSE PRIORITARIO –SOTTOPROGRAMMA
COSTO TOTALE
PESO (%)
1. Comunicazioni
1.1 Strade ed autostrade
1.423,073
25,92
1.2 Ferrovie
2.439,993
44,45
431,825
7,87
1.194,286
21,76
5.489,177
100,00
5.210,886
63,24
2.2 Aiuti all’artigianato
903,633
10,96
2.3 Aiuti ai servizi e alle imprese
534,115
6,48
1.337,623
16,23
255,058
3,09
8.241,315
100,00
3.1 Incentivi agli invest. Turistici
1.065,344
46,44
3.2 Valorizz.risorse interesse pubblico
1.228,912
53,56
2.294,256
100,00
1.724,473
37,98
4.2 Sviluppo rurale
884,129
19,47
4.3 Serv. Svil. in agric. e divulgazione
500,253
11,02
1.3 Altri mezzi di trasporto
1.4 Telecomunicazioni
Totale
2. Industria, artigianato e e servizi alle imprese
2.1 Incentivi all’industria
2.4 Sviluppo locale ed aree in crisi
2.5 Zone industriali ed artigianali
Totale
3. Turismo
Totale
4. Diversificazione, valorizz. risorse agricole
4.1 Ris.agric. e infrastrutture supporto
4.4 Obiettivo 5a
1.155,416
25,44
276,496
6,09
4.540,767
100,00
507,266
100,00
2.510,156
36,83
773,051
11,34
6.3 Ambiente
1.700,668
24,95
6.4 Ricerca, svil. e innovazione
1.690,881
24,82
140,202
2,06
6.814,959
100,00
7.1A Formaz.iniziale per Istituti Professionali di Stato
299,674
9,56
7.1B Formazione iniziale per lauree brevi
148,428
4,73
7.2A Formazione disoccupati di lunga durata
586,195
18,70
41,717
1,33
999,414
31,88
51,664
1,65
7.2E Formazione fasce deboli
139,217
4,44
7.2F Formazione donne
101,494
3,24
7.3A Formazione continua per lavoratori delle PMI
196,149
6,25
7.3B Formazione continua per lavoratori delle GI
111,998
3,57
50,667
1,62
130,667
4,17
74,666
2,38
4.5 Misure in corso
Totale
5. Pesca
Totale
6. Infrastrutture di supporto attività economiche
6.1 Acqua
6.2 Energia
6.5 Infrastrutture sanitarie
Totale
7. Valorizzazione risorse umane (Ob.1, Ob.3 e Ob.4)
7.2B Aiuti all’occup. per disoccupati lunga durata
7.2C Formazione giovani – 25 anni
7.2D Aiuti all’occupazione giovani – 25 anni
7.4A Creazione sistema formazione continua
7.4B Formazione funzionari delle P.A.
7.4C Formazione formatori e personale dei Centri
7.5 Strutture di formazione
203,229
6,48
3.135,184
100,00
8.1 Ass.tecnica, pubblicità, monitoraggio – FESR Ob.1
86,128
68,96
8.2 Ass.tecnica, pubblicità, monitoraggio – FSE Ob.3
38,773
31,04
Totale
124,901
100,00
T O T A L E (*)
31.147,826
Totale
8. Assistenza tecnica, pubblicità e monitoraggio
(*) Vedi nota 46 Dati RGS- SIRGS
2.1.1 – Analysis of Implementation
The operative programmatic framework, described in Table 5, included the multi-regional programmes (OMP). Implementation for these programmes was entrusted to
the central administration of the competent State by sector. There were also regional programmes (OP). Considering the close connection of the respective contents with socialeconomic profiles of the single regional territories, implementation of these programmes were undertaken by the regions involved.
An analysis of implementation of the individual forms of intervention as seen in Table 6, shows, both at a quantitative and qualitative level, significant delays in the
realisation of the projects financed.
Regarding regional programmes, the administrations involved, (with the exception of Puglia and Sicily, which showed less favourable levels both in commitment and
payment) generally used the mechanism of overbooking. This way, even the value of the previous projects financed by ordinary national legislation in the sector (the so-called
progetti sponda - internal projects which have been recycled with Community funds) is enhanced as an instrument to "attract" Community funds.
Overbooking is a method of "reserving" financial resources and is aimed at guaranteeing the absorption of the sums made available by the EU. The so-called progetti
sponda however, which can also be included in overbooking, ensure a reserve of projects suitable to transform in operative initiatives, therefore transforming the "reservation"
of financial resources into the object of specific destination of community contributions and national co-financing.
The instrument of overbooking is a legitimate, useful financial programming procedures. It tends to encourage complete utilisation of Community resources available
for specific operational programmes. For this reason it is to be hoped that the implementing actors continue to make use of this instrument in the next programming cycle for
2000-1006.
The use of progetti sponda – and we should underline here that the Commission has no doubts as to their legitimacy – shows inadequate programming which affects
prompt realisation of the individual OP initiatives. The fact that these projects are diverted from their original destination makes it more difficult to reach the goals set by sector
legislation. This creates both programming unbalances (due to the need to substitute them in the specific sector where they were destined with others of appropriate content)
and financial unbalances (due to the possible reduction of the funding provided for in sector legislation):
Of course, all this creates a lack of continuity with respect to the principle of sound, correct management of available financial resources. In addition, it does not seem
to be in keeping with the system of Community financing, since funding is distributed by adhering closely to the prescribed deadlines for implementation.
While this instrument was certainly useful in accelerating implementation of the OP for the period 1994-1999, it should be considered an exception. In contrast to
overbooking, it is to be hoped that it will not be used in the 2000-2006 programming cycle, at least in the measure previously implemented.
Prospetto 5 QCS 1994/99 Ob.1 – Programmi Operativi
AMMINISTRAZIONE TITOLARE
INTERVENTI
Regionali
Regione Abruzzo
POP
POM
Regione Basilicata
POP
Regione Calabria
POP
POM
SG AREA DI CRISI DI CROTONE
SG AREA DI CRISI DI GIOIA TAURO
Regione Campania
POP
PO PIANURA
SG ZOOTECNIA
SG BANCA PROVINCIA DI NAPOLI
Regione Molise
POP
Regione Puglia
POP
SG AREA DI CRISI DI MANFREDONIA
SG BRINDISI
SG AREA DI CRISI DI TARANTO
Regione Sardegna
POP
Regione Sicilia
POP
SG AREA DI CRISI DI SIRACUSA
SG BIC SICILIA
Multiregionali
Ministero dell’Industria
PO INDUSTRIA E SERVIZI
PO ENERGIA
SG PROGETTO SEPRI
SG PROGETTO B.I.C.I.
SG CONFCOMMERCIO-CARTESIO
SG FICEI
SG OASIS
Ministero della Pubblica
Istruzione
PO MPI
Ministero della Ricerca
PO RICERCA E SVIL. TECNOLOGICO
Ministero
Pubblici
PO RISORSE IDRICHE
dei
Lavori
PO INFRASTRUTTURE STRADALI
Ministero
Comunicazioni
delle
Ministero dei Trasporti
PO TELECOMUNICAZIONI
PO TRASPORTI E FERROVIE
PO INFRASTRUTTURE AEROPORTUALI
Dipartimento del Turismo
PO SVIL E VALORIZZAZIONE TURISMO
SG PARCHI LETTERARI
Ministero dell’Ambiente
PO AMBIENTE
Dipartimento
Protezione Civile
PO PROTEZIONE CIVILE
della
Ministero dell’Interno
PO SICUREZZA SVILUPPO DEL MEZZOGIORNO
Ministero
del
Bilancio e P.E.
GP PORTO GIOIA TAURO R. CALABRIA
Tesoro,
ASSISTENZA TECNICA QCS
PO PATTI TERRITORIALI
Ministero
P.S.
del
Lavoro
e
PO M.L. FORMAZIONE LAVORATORI
PO M.L. ASSIST.TECNICA E AZIONI INNOVATIVE
PO M.L. EMERGENZA OCCUPAZIONE SUD
PO PARCO PROGETTI
Ministero
Esteri
degli
Affari
PO M.L.FORMAZIONE ITALIANI ALL’ESTERO
Ministero per le Politiche
Agricole
PO ATT.SOSTEGNO SERVIZI AGRICOLTURA
PO VALORIZZAZIONE PRODUZIONI AGRICOLE
PO SOSTEGNO PROD.ORTOFRUTTICOLI
SFOP PESCA E ACQUACOLTURA
Examination of interregional programmes shows significant delays in implementation of projects whose aims were of strategic priority in the regions involved.
As far as infrastructures are concern, while the MOP for Transport and Railroads showed an acceptable results in terms of resources committed and spent, there were
long delays in implementing projects to reinforce the main railway hubs such as Bari and Naples. The level of investments in the airport sector, requiring deep-rooted structural
improvements was equally modest (only 13.6% of the overall cost of the works planned was used).
Also insufficient were the levels of realisation of project in sectors fundamental for the social-economic promotion of the communities involved, such as the
environment, enhancement of human resources and fishing.
The distribution percentages for funds available in the aforementioned sectors range from 38.8% in the MOP Environment (investment of just 200 billion lire) to 19.!5
of the MOP Civil Protection.
During 1999, however, the CSF Supervision Committee for Ob.1 effectively accelerated the use of available resources. During programming revision, these funds were
increased to meet the needs of the initiatives planned on the municipality of Sanrio for reconstruction projects following damage from the well-known flooding that took place.
Prospetto 6 - QCS 1994-1999 - Regioni Ob.1:
Stato di attuazione delle singole forme di intervento al 31/12/98 (Mecu)
Costo
totale
Impegni
1
2
Pagamenti
3
Imp./
c.tot.
4=2/1
Pag./
c.tot.
5=3/1
Programmi Regionali:
ABRUZZO
555,5
573,6
312,7
103,3%
56,3%
BASILICATA
1.224,2
1.284,8
713,1
105,0%
58,3%
CALABRIA
1.916,4
2.322,3
1.066,5
121,2%
55,7%
CAMPANIA
3.074,0
2.872,7
1.567,4
93,4%
51,0%
MOLISE
537,2
645,0
344,9
120,1%
64,2%
PUGLIA
2.683,2
1.843,0
1.091,9
68,7%
40,7%
SARDEGNA
1.811,7
1.599,5
992,3
88,3%
54,8%
SICILIA
3.101,6
2.327,3
1.365,9
75,0%
44,0%
14.903,8
13.468,2
7.454,7
90,4%
50,0%
245,3
157,9
37,1
64,4%
15,1%
Sub - totale (regionali)
Programmi Multiregionali:
PO M.L.
funz.P.A.
Formazione
Formatori
e
PO M.L. Assistenza tecnica e azioni
innovative
PO M.L. Emergenza occupazione sud
PO Industria, artigianato, servizi alle
imprese
PO M.L. Formazione italiani all'estero
101,3
99,8
31,7
98,5%
31,3%
474,3
455,5
143,0
96,0%
30,1%
5.591,1
5.098,2
4.784,8
91,2%
85,6%
32,0
30,5
24,1
95,3%
75,3%
471,0
512,6
273,5
108,8%
58,1%
PO Ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico
1.307,8
1.339,1
713,4
102,4%
54,5%
PO Risorse idriche
1.652,1
2.284,9
385,1
138,3%
23,3%
PO Telecomunicazioni
1.154,6
1.141,9
876,9
98,9%
75,9%
PO Trasporti - Ferrovie
1.981,6
2.014,1
1.127,5
101,6%
56,9%
PO Sviluppo, valorizzazione turismo
reg. ob.1
238,7
207,3
50,2
86,8%
21,0%
SFOP Pesca e acquacoltura
477,8
308,4
149,0
64,5%
31,2%
231,4
160,9
115,3
69,5%
49,8%
PO Valorizzazione produzioni agricole
120,0
94,6
6,5
78,8%
5,4%
GP Porto
Calabria
Regione
120,0
124,5
124,5
103,8%
103,8%
PO Infrastrutture di trasporto stradale
498,0
693,8
61,5
139,3%
12,3%
PO Energia
485,2
375,0
271,9
77,3%
56,0%
PO Infrastrutture aeroportuali
110,0
15,0
7,5
13,6%
6,8%
69,9
65,7
0,6
94,0%
0,9%
PO Ambiente
107,1
85,8
41,5
80,2%
38,8%
PO Protezione civile
120,3
95,5
23,0
79,4%
19,1%
8,2
8,6
5,0
104,9%
61,0%
SG Parchi letterari
29,3
2,3
1,0
7,8%
3,4%
PO Assistenza tecnica QCS
30,7
2,1
0,0
6,8%
0,1%
190,5
122,8
8,3
64,4%
4,4%
SG Confcommercio Cartesio
25,4
0,3
0,3
SG Confindustria S.E.P.R.I.
25,0
0,4
0,2
1,6%
0,8%
4,9
-
-
0,0%
0,0%
0,0%
0,0%
PO Ministero Pubblica Istruzione
PO
Att.
Sostegno
Agricoltura
di Gioia
servizi
Tauro
svil.
PO Parco progetti
PO Sostegno produttori ortofrutticoli
PO Sicurezza
Mezzogiorno
per
lo
SG FICEI
SG Unioncamere B.I.C.I.
sviluppo
del
18,8
SG OASIS Fondazione Europea
PO Patti territoriali
Assistenza tecnica QE
Sub - totale (multiregionali)
Sub
(regionali+multiregionali)
totale
22,3
-
-
0,0%
0,0%
234,3
-
-
0,0%
0,0%
1,1
1,1
0,7
100,0%
60,6%
16.180,1
15.498,6
9.264,046
95,8%
57,3%
31.083,9
28.966,8
16.718,746
93,2%
53,8%
In the sector of enhancement of human resources, the levels of implementation of the MOP Employment Emergency for the South and the Training of Public
Administration officials was equally unsatisfactory. These levels were far from the target of 55% of payments established by the Supervision Committee. Moreover, the MOP
Security for the Development of the Italian Mezzogiorno, only reached a level of distribution of funds of 4.4%, although it soul be underlined that the plan itself was only
approved by the Commission in March 1998 and that the funds committed reached 64.4% of the total cost that same year.
Similar considerations regarding the unsatisfactory trend of implementation can also be made for the MOP on Fishing and Water Culture. This sector is of great
importance in Italy’s productive sphere, for which resources amounting to 477.76 Mecu (approximately 900 billion lire) were allocated by the FIFG.
2.1.2 – Final Considerations
The above data on the programmes’ financial progress included in Ob.1 and referring to 31 December 1998 show that, at that date, almost all available resources were
committed, while the level of payment substantially respected the planned limit of 55%. This was undoubtedly due to the initiatives urged by the Supervision Committee as well
as the Cabinet of Control, accepted and supported by the central administrations in charge of these sectors. Naturally, the fairly positive judgement of the results reached
during 1998 ahs no absolute value. This conclusion can however be appreciated in the light of the largely unsatisfactory data for the previous years and as the expression of a
significant, albeit laborious, growth in the efficiency of the administrative apparatus.
As clearly emerges from the above observations, the causes of delays in programme implementation, found as always in programming defects, bureaucratic excess of
the decision-making procedures, fragmentation of responsibilities and the lack of valid planning ability, remain. Not only, but they seem to have taken on a structural
importance, as can be seen in the aforementioned persisting use of the progetti sponda mechanism, to attract Community funds.
It would appear essential that the 2000-2006 programming cycle be dealt with using new, more efficient planning procedures. While these procedures should
safeguard responsibilities and decision-making prerogatives of the agencies involved, they should be carried out through the method of concertation (necessary above all to
manage large, national projects). This would all for the realisation of projects that could be implemented in the short term.
2.2 – OBJECTIVE 2
The Community’s action through use of structural funds in Ob.2 is aimed at reconverting regions or parts of regions (including employment basins and urban
communities) seriously affected by industrial decline.
The industrial areas that can benefit from Community resources must respond to the following characteristics (Reg. 2081/93, article 9):
• the average employment rate must be higher than the Community average over the last three years,
• the employment rate in the industrial sector in comparison with overall employment, must be the same or higher than the Community average for any year of
reference starting from 1975;
• the employment level in the industrial sector must have dropped with respect to 1975:
Based on the information supplied by the member State, the Commission, in close concertation with the State concerned, compiled a list of the areas to include in Ob.
2. This list was periodically reviewed and, in any event, the contributions made by the Community in favour of the various zones were planned and distributed on a tri-yearly
basis. The subdivision of the 1994-1999 programming cycle in two three-year periods (1994-1996 and 1997-1999) is related to this. There was also a corresponding series of
programming documents known as SPDs (Single Programming Documents) containing intervention strategy and the description of specific operative programmes.
As regards Italy, the Commission approved SPD for areas included in all the regions outside Ob.1 (with the exception of the autonomous provinces of Trento and
Bolzano). For the two periods of programming, as seen in Tables 1 and 2, a total of Mecu 1,491.7 was allocated (little over three thousand billion lire). This, along with the
national and private co-financing, made over eight thousand billion lire available for the Objective’s structural interventions.
Prospetto 1 – Piano finanziario interventi strutturali
Anni 1994-1996 - Obiettivo 2 (Mecu)
Programmi Costo totale ___________Contributi_______
Comunitari Nazionali Privati
Emilia Romagna
31,7
10,1
17,5
4,1
Friuli V.G.
59,0
14,1
42,3
2,6
Lazio
142,5
55.0
69,0
18,5
Liguria
186,2
73,4
86,0
26,8
Lombardia
59,8
17,7
30,9
11,2
Marche
21,2
9,6
10,9
0,7
Piemonte
368,3
123,2
153,0
92,1
Toscana
323,5
93,7
174,5
55,3
32,3
15,6
16,7
_
1,6
0,6
0,7
0,3
Veneto
125,1
42,1
68,4
14,6
M. Industria
275,8
68,9
206,9
_
1627,0
524,0
876,8
226,2
Umbria
Valle D’Aosta
Totale
Prospetto 2 – Piano finanziario interventi strutturali
Anni 1997-1999 - Obiettivo 2 (Mecu)
Programmi Costo totale ____________Contributi__________
Comunitari Nazionali Privati
Emilia Romagna
33,0
11,8
18,6
2,6
Friuli V.G.
110,0
39,2
67,8
3,0
Lazio
171,1
72,2
86,6
12,3
Liguria
275,6
110,3
139,1
26,2
Lombardia
76,2
30,4
44,5
1,3
Marche
74,3
27,6
38,6
8,1
Piemonte
899,5
286,4
440,0
173,1
Toscana
444,5
138,9
206,5
99,1
Umbria
110,6
48,6
57,5
4,5
30,4
13,5
16,3
0,6
Veneto
233,4
88,3
126,0
19,1
M. Industria
340,8
100,5
240,3
0,0
2799,4
967,7
1481,8
349,9
Valle D’Aosta
Totale
As can be seen in Graph 1, aside from the financial resources assigned to the Ministry for Industry for implementation of the programmes in its province, the regions
that made greatest use of structural funds were Piedmont and Tuscany (particularly in the second period 1997-199). These regions were obviously capable of promptly
presenting plans of intervention with greater operational potential.
GRAPH 1
All the regions concentrated their programming in the priority sectors of intervention to the extend show in Graph 2.
2.2.1 – Analysis of implementation
According to the data gathered by SIRGAS, the Information System of the State General Accounting Office (see Table 3) always promptly communicated by the
regions, financial implementation as at 31 December 1998 of the 1994-1996 programming cycle showed some comforting results. This is also considering that almost 86% of
the financial allocations were distributed and that the final expenditure was known only during 1999, when some payments made in 1998 were debited to the accounts.
We must, however, underline the poor operational result of the Region of Lazio, which supplied payment data as of 31 December 1998 equal to just 42.91% of the
total cost of projects of intervention. This was due to an excessive delay in starting up projects.
Prospetto 3 – Periodo 1994/96 – Attuazione finanziaria per DOCUP – Situazione al 31/12/98
(Mgl/Ecu)
DOCUP
COSTO
TOTALE
94/96 (A)
IMPEGNI
(B)
PAGAMENTI
(C)
AVANZAMENTO %
B/A
C/A
Emilia R.
31.704,000
31.142,312
27.273,447
98,23
86,03
Friuli V.G.
58.950,000
59.178,832
56.735,663
100,39
96,24
Lazio
142.426,334
143.617,840
61.116,578
100,84
42,91
Liguria
186.159,900
189.735,001
166.337,800
101,92
89,35
Lombardia
59.776,000
56.922,198
47.604,052
95,23
79,64
Marche
21.196,000
17.470,538
14.952,258
82,42
70,54
Piemonte
368.282,412
379.186,455
309.694,276
102,96
84,09
Toscana
323.485,000
345.072,941
339.411,988
106,67
104,92
32.376,973
32.001,560
29.434,924
98,84
90,91
Umbria
Valle D’A.
1.601,000
1.692,113
1.579,453
105,69
98,65
Veneto
125.073,033
116.387,691
90.777,880
93,06
72,58
M.Industria
275.819,599
248.798,613
248.798,613
90,20
90,20
1.626.850,251
1.621.206,094
1.393.716,933
99,65
85,67
Totale
Dati RGS- IGRUE
In order to avoid risking a loss of funds made available for Italy, given the restriction for expiry of commitments and payment of contribution shares debited against
the European Union budget, a programming review was undertaken. This meant a movement of the financial resources planned for the period 1994-1996 to successive years.
The reprogramming decisions adopted by the Commission concerned all the regional SPDs. This meant an overall redistribution of investments envisioned at the time.
Reprogramming had a different effect on the various programmes, particularly vis-à-vis the issues raised by each SPD, which required specific corrective measures. It
also affected size of approved investments, meaning greater reductions in the larger programmes in absolute value.
In relative terms, reprogramming had a momentous effect on the Valle d’Aosta SPD which, while of limited amounts, underwent a reduction of approximately 90% of
the initial investment. There were also substantial reductions in the programmes of the Regions of Fruili–Venezia-Giulia, Marche and Umbria, with changes of close to 50% in
investments.
The financial resources coming from these adjustments were added to the available budget for the second phase of implementation of Ob.2 for the 1997-99 three-year
period.
As regards the second 1997-99 programming cycle, financing as seen in Table 4, was, on the whole, decidedly unsatisfactory. Not even 15% of the forecast payments
were made, an amount that the Italian government had agreed on with the Commission and established with CIPE resolution 64/98. Once again, there were alarming valleys
for Lazio and for the Region Fruili–Venezia-Giulia which spent respectively only 0.44% and 0.57% of allocated resources, and for Lombardy which only reached 5.59%. Umbria
only committed 18.38% of available resources but this data was affected by reprogramming after the disastrous earthquake.
The delay in implementing the 1994-1999 SPDs as of 31 December 1998 should also be considered taking into account that the programming documents were not
approved by the Commission any earlier than the first half of 1997. It should also be recalled that it took another two months for these documents to be received by the
regional Councils and that publication of the CIPE resolution assigning national co-financing only took place on 20 October 1997. Substantially, the time it took to complete
approval and allocation of financial resources covered almost the entire first year of the programming cycle.
A further delay in starting up SPD application was due to the time needed during the preliminary phase prior to OP implementation. This consisted of preparation and
approval of the bids for tender for access to financing and the deadlines set for submitting applications. Under the best of circumstances, this took part of the first semester of
1998.
While on one hand, time restrictions for OP activation partly justified the low percentage of Community fund use, on the other hand, they show the absolute lack of
preparation by the regions responsible for programme implementation. Given the experience they accrued in the first three-year programming cycle 0f 1994-1996, the regions
should have perfected procedural models by the second period. In particular, they should have had a set of projects immediately utilisable after approval of the operational
programmes.
Prospetto 4 – Periodo 1997/99– Attuazione finanziaria per DOCUP – Situazione al 31/12/98
(Mgl/ Ecu)
DOCUP
COSTO TOTALE
94/96 (A)
IMPEGNI
(B)
PAGAMENTI
(C)
AVANZAMENTO %
B/A
Emilia R.
C/A
32.946,000
20.679,272
3.361,505
62,77
10,20
Friuli V.G.
110.067,000
9.849,090
630,979
8,95
0,57
Lazio
160.483,266
22.131,658
707.024
13,79
0,44
Liguria
267.155,269
144.024,361
29.575,762
53,91
11,07
Lombardia
76.206,000
40.140,249
4.261,046
52,67
5,59
Marche
73.927,000
29.389,423
4.531,507
39,75
6,13
Piemonte
846.411,055
431.153,113
140.162,157
50,94
16,56
Toscana
444.544,000
263.455,018
90.997,518
59,26
20,47
Umbria
105.465,000
41.797,146
12.946,101
39,63
12,28
30.484,000
24.330,853
2.196,610
79,82
7,21
Veneto
217.665,444
157.189,788
17.370,416
72,22
7,98
M.Industria
340.337,560
109.067,139
43.571,206
32,05
12,80
2.705.691,594
1.293.207,109
350.311,831
47,80
12,95
Valle D’A.
Totale
2.3. – OBJECTIVE 3
Ob.3, financed by the ESF, is aimed at the struggle against long-term unemployment, facilitating professional placement of young people and the integration of people
who risk being excluded from the labour market.
The 1994-99 CSF takes into consideration the result of the previous 1989-93 programming cycle. In that cycle, the initiatives concerned 81% of final users of training
programmes with a decided majority of young people who had only finished compulsory schooling. The CSF introduced innovative strategies for the development of human
resources with respect to the Italian professional training system.
The principle of "social equity" was reinforced in the new CSF and extended to other weaker categories of the population, both vis-à-vis the labour market (women and
the long-term unemployed) and problems of social placement (various categories of the socially excluded). This goal was reached through by increasing medium and high level
professional qualifications and added opportunities for entry into the labour market, also including second and superior level training programmes for young people.
The objective covers twelve Centre-North regions and two autonomous provinces (Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont, Lombardy, the autonomous provinces of Trento and
Bolzano, Fuili-Venezia-Giulia, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio) with the OP and the Ministry of Labour with four MOP: 1) training-employment
initiatives; 2) innovative actions; 3) systems reinforcement; 4) set of projects.
The resources available for the CSF come to approximately 5,808 billion lire divided into five axes:
AXIS 1 – "Integration or reintegration of the long-term unemployed or those exposed to long-term unemployment" for a total of 1,568 billion lire and an
incidence of 27%. The measures cover people with insufficient or inadequate instruction: a) the unemployment without educational certification; b) the unemployed without
adequate educational certification; c) unemployed persons who were formerly self-employed; d) workers receiving special unemployment benefits or enrolled in the
unemployment lists.
AXIS 2 – "Reinforcement of initial training and integration of young people in the labour market" for a total of 2,88 billion lire and an incidence of 48%. The
axis targeted for young people was divided as follows: a) young people who completed compulsory schooling and drop-outs; b) young people with qualifications, diplomas,
university degrees; c) students in State professional and technical schools and university diploma programmes; d) young people employed with "apprentice" or "work training"
contracts.
AXIS 3 – "Integration or reintegration of people who risk socially exclusion" for a total of 580 billion lire and an incidence of 10%. Assistance is given directly
to subjects in conditions of particular difficulty or weakness; a) migrants, immigrants and nomads; b) physically or mentally challenged persons; c) prisoners, former prisoners
and substance abusers; d) unemployed adults and the poor.
AXIS 4 – "Promotion of equal opportunities between men and women on the labour market" for a total of 464 billion lire and an incidence of 8%. The
measures were targeted for: a) unemployed women without professional qualifications; b) women who want to join or be reintegrated in the labour market after a long
absence; c) women with difficult diplomas to use; d) women intending to enter sectors where they are under-represented or acquire professional training for what are culturally
seen as male jobs.
AXIS 5 – "Reinforce information and employment systems" for a total of 301 billion lire and an incidence of 5.2%. For the first time, this type of axis aimed at
reinforcing the training system through technical assistance and training targeted at programming structures and OP management as well as implementing actors was included
in the ESF.
In addition, allocations of 105 billion lire for "local initiatives" with an incidence of 1.8% were included.
ASSE
Costo totale
1994/99 in Ecu
N
Costo totale
1994/99 in lire
Peso %
degli
assi
1
Inserimento
o
reinserimento
disoccupati di l.d. o esposti
disoccupazione di l.d.
di
alla
809.840.110
1.568.068.897
27.0
2
Rafforzamento della formazione iniziale
ed inserimento dei giovani nel mercato
del lavoro
1.440.165.183
2.788.548.285
48.0
3
Integrazione o reintegrazione delle
persone esposte al rischio di esclusione
sociale
299.784.848
580.464.702
10.0
4
Promozione delle pari opportunità tra
uomini e donne sul mercato del lavoro
239.824.550
464.365.953
8.0
5
Rafforzamento
dei
formazione e di impiego
155.560.018
301.206.161
5.2
6
Iniziative locali
54.284.400
105.108.481
1.8
2.999.459.109
5.807.762.478
100
Totale generale
sistemi
di
The CSF objectives and priorities were determined in a moment and context of policy in transformation. This was because the scenario policies of human resources and
labour development have changed drastically. Recent legislation to promote employment (law 196/97), along with application of the decentralisation of some of the State’s key
functions to the regions (law 59/97) have not only allowed implementation of some of the CSF priorities but also creation of new channels of intervention.
In analysing ESF impact in the Centre-North, it was noted that there was no lack of difficulties in programme implementation in highly different local situations with
solid economic-production context. This can be translated into a series of positive and negative elements:
• the positive elements lie with the presence of production and vocational training systems that can secure and construct opportunities:
a. a) in much of the Centre-North, the vocational training system exists, is visible and of high quality;
b. b) the economic fabric is such that the capacity exists to create jobs even when widespread economic crisis might affect certain sectors or local areas;
c. c) there is a significant network of special-interest groups (industrial, artisan and trade associations, as well as workers’ associations) to stimulate and produce an
"organised" demand for training and quality.
• instead, the negative elements are:
a. a) "competition" between jobs and training: i.e., young people, particularly those just out of school, prefer having direct access to the labour market rather than
continuing their studies;
b. b) difficulties of exposure marking the vocational training system in areas of high employment levels.
2.3.1. – Analysis of Implementation
The financial resources employed from 1994 to 31 December 1998 came to approximately 5,168 billion lire, equal to 88.9% of the total allocations set aside for the
entire programming cycle – 85.4% for the OP and 100.4% for the MOP (see Table 1). In the same period, implementation efficiency (expenses/programmed cost) of all forms
of intervention came to 49.2%. This last figure represents a large internal gap between the implementation efficiency of the OP at a regional level (58.7%) and a multi-regional
level (18.9%). The lack of implementation efficiency is due primarily to the delay with which the OP were approved back in 1994. That year was a sort of bridge between old
and new management of the ESF. Commitments and payments for multi-year programmes belonging to the previous programming cycle (1989-93), contracting with the
European Union and new programming. The actual year for the programming was 1995, when there was an overload of managerial requirements for all those in charge of
intervention. At that time, a remedy was found by also making use of the 1994 resources through the mechanism of reprogramming.
Peaks of commitment capacity were found in the autonomous province of Trento with 126%, in Fruili-Venezia-Giulia with 93.2% and in the sub-programme "Innovative
Actions" of the Ministry of Labour with 105.6%. On the other hand, the greatest difficulties in enacting commitments were found in Lombardy with 78.8% and in Tuscany with
79.8%, given an average value of 88.9% (see table 1).
As regards payments, the largest allocations (implementation efficiency) were made by the autonomous province of Trento with 87.6% and by the regions of Emilia
Romagna with 77.6% and Piedmont with 71.6%. Vice versa, the greatest difficulties were found in all the MOP, particularly in the region of Lazio (44.4%) with an average value
of 49.2% (see table 1).
Difficult areas included the OP of the region of Abruzzo and the sub-programme denominated "project group", only approved in 1997, and the region of Umbria due to
the 1997 earthquake.
Evaluation according to "axes" shows that Axis 2 had greater commitment capacity with 92.5% vis-à-vis the average rate for the entire objective (88,9%) as well as
greater efficiency in implementation found in the second axis with 57.3% of the average rate of 49.2% (see table 3).
The objective of 95% of commitments to be spent by 31 December 1998 was only reached by the autonomous province of Trento with 126% with the sub-programmes
"Innovative Actions" (105.6%) and "Employment Training" (100.4%) (see table 1).
With respect to the goal of covering 55% of expenditures as at 31 December 1998, all the MOPs were very far from the average (see table 1).
Prospetto 1
F.S.E. OBIETTIVO 3 - PERIODO 1994/99
ATTUAZIONE FINANZIARIA PER FONDO/INTERVENTO AL 31/12/98
INTERVENTO
Costo totale
1994/99
Mgl/Ecu
Costo totale
1994/99
(A)
Mgl/lire
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
PERCENTUALI
capacità di
impegno
B/A
efficienza
realizzativa
C/A
capacità di
attivazione
C/B
Mgl/lire
VALLE D'AOSTA
30.407
58.876.162
50.735.425
33.909.222
86,2%
57,6%
66,8%
PIEMONTE
271.816
526.309.166
480.915.186
376.590.925
91,4%
71,6%
78,3%
LOMBARDIA
389.147
753.493.662
593.489.718
372.267.845
78,8%
49,4%
62,7%
P.A.TRENTO
62.711
121.425.428
152.986.388
106.388.333
126,0%
87,6%
69,5%
P.A. BOLZANO
54.433
105.396.985
91.803.717
68.767.287
87,1%
65,2%
74,9%
118.593
229.628.068
213.983.091
120.176.616
93,2%
52,3%
56,2%
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
VENETO
240.697
466.054.380
375.178.878
268.503.471
80,5%
57,6%
71,6%
93.960
181.931.929
148.134.373
114.923.567
81,4%
63,2%
77,6%
EMILIA ROMAGNA
409.797
793.477.637
731.463.563
615.380.625
92,2%
77,6%
84,1%
TOSCANA
145.796
282.300.421
225.392.029
138.028.198
79,8%
48,9%
61,2%
UMBRIA
67.736
131.155.185
101.003.373
57.739.615
77,0%
44,0%
57,2%
MARCHE
81.667
158.129.362
141.238.271
73.477.106
89,3%
46,5%
52,0%
271.749
526.179.436
425.160.026
233.578.516
80,8%
44,4%
54,9%
47.111
91.219.616
46.846.612
17.484.787
51,4%
19,2%
37,3%
2.285.620
4.425.577.437
3.778.330.650
2.597.216.113
85,4%
58,7%
68,7%
FORMAZIONE OCCUPAZIONE
482.444
934.141.844
937.849.056
183.393.141
100,4%
19,6%
19,6%
AZIONI INNOVATIVE
118.889
230.201.204
243.033.607
59.667.945
105,6%
25,9%
24,6%
RAFFORZAMENTO SISTEMI
52.190
101.053.931
93.149.235
13.777.726
92,2%
13,6%
14,8%
PARCO PROGETTI
60.316
116.788.061
113.416.549
4.871.000
97,1%
4,2%
4,3%
713.839
1.382.185.041
1.387.448.447
261.709.812
100,4%
18,9%
18,9%
2.999.459
5.807.762.478
5.165.779.097
2.858.925.925
88,9%
49,2%
55,3%
LIGURIA
LAZIO
ABRUZZO
TOTALE REGIONALE
TOTALE MULTIREGIONALE
TOTALE
valore ECU = 1936,27 Dati RGS - IGRUE
Prospetto 2
F.S.E. OBIETTIVO 3 - PERIODO 1994/99
ATTUAZIONE FINANZIARIA PER FONDO/INTERVENTO AL 31/12/98
INTERVENTO
Costo totale
1994/99
Mgl/Ecu
Costo totale
1994/99
Mgl/lire
Impegni
Pagamenti
PESO %
Costo
totale
Impegni
Pagam.
Mgl/lire
VALLE D'AOSTA
PIEMONTE
30.407
58.876.162
50.735.425
33.909.222
1,3%
1,3%
1,3%
271.816
526.309.166
480.915.186
376.590.925
11,9%
12,7%
14,5%
LOMBARDIA
389.147
753.493.662
593.489.718
372.267.845
17,0%
15,7%
14,3%
P.A.TRENTO
62.711
121.425.428
152.986.388
106.388.333
2,7%
4,0%
4,1%
P.A. BOLZANO
54.433
105.396.985
91.803.717
68.767.287
2,4%
2,4%
2,6%
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
118.593
229.628.068
213.983.091
120.176.616
5,2%
5,7%
4,6%
VENETO
240.697
466.054.380
375.178.878
268.503.471
10,5%
9,9%
10,3%
93.960
181.931.929
148.134.373
114.923.567
4,1%
3,9%
4,4%
EMILIA ROMAGNA
409.797
793.477.637
731.463.563
615.380.625
17,9%
19,4%
23,7%
TOSCANA
145.796
282.300.421
225.392.029
138.028.198
6,4%
6,0%
5,3%
UMBRIA
67.736
131.155.185
101.003.373
57.739.615
3,0%
2,7%
2,2%
MARCHE
81.667
158.129.362
141.238.271
73.477.106
3,6%
3,7%
2,8%
271.749
526.179.436
425.160.026
233.578.516
11,9%
11,3%
9,1%
47.111
91.219.616
46.846.612
17.484.787
2,1%
1,3%
0,8%
2.285.620
4.425.577.437
3.778.330.650
2.597.216.113
100,0%
100,0%
100,0%
FORMAZIONE OCCUPAZIONE
482.444
934.141.844
937.849.056
183.393.141
67,6%
67,6%
70,0%
AZIONI INNOVATIVE
118.889
230.201.204
243.033.607
59.667.945
16,7%
17,5%
22,8%
RAFFORZAMENTO SISTEMI
52.190
101.053.931
93.149.235
13.777.726
7,3%
6,7%
5,3%
PARCO PROGETTI
60.316
116.788.061
113.416.549
4.871.000
8,4%
8,2%
1,9%
713.839
1.382.185.041
1.387.448.447
261.709.812
100,0%
100,0%
100,0%
LIGURIA
LAZIO
ABRUZZO
TOTALE REGIONALE
TOTALE MULTIREGIONALE
Valore Ecu = 1936,27 Dati RGS – IGRUE
Prospetto 3
Q.C.S. OBIETTIVO 3 FSE – Periodo 1994/99 – ATTUAZIONE PER ASSE al 31/12/98
ASSE
N°
Costo
totale
1994/99
Costo totale
1994/99
(A)
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
PERCENTUALI
capacità
efficienza
PESO %
capacità di Costo
impegni pagam.
Mgl/Ecu
1
2
3
4
5
6
Inserimento o reinserimento di
disoccupati di l.d. o esposti alla
disoccupazione di l.d.
Mgl/lire
1.568.068.897
Rafforzamento della formazione
iniziale ed inserimento dei giovani
nel mercato del lavoro
1.440.165
2.788.548.285
Integrazione o reintegrazione delle
persone esposte al rischio di
esclusione sociale
299.785
Promozione delle pari opportunità
tra uomini e donne sul mercato del
lavoro
239.825
Rafforzamento
dei
sistemi
formazione e di impiego
155.560
Iniziative locali
TOTALE GENERALE
di
Mgl/lire
1.345.163.451
809.840
realizzativa attivazione totale
di
impegno C/A
C/B
B/A
646.608.995
85,8%
41,2%
48,1% 27,0%
26,0%
22,6%
92,5%
57,3%
61,9% 48,0%
50,0%
55,9%
84,0%
51,2%
60,9% 10,0%
9,4%
10,4%
88,8%
50,7%
57,1%
8,0%
8,0%
8,2%
77,3%
26,0%
33,6%
5,2%
4,5%
2,7%
4.871.000
102,7%
4,6%
4,5%
1,8%
2,1%
0,2%
2.999.459 5.807.762.478 5.165.779.097 2.858.925.925
88,9%
49,2%
55,3% 100%
100%
100%
54.284
580.464.702
464.365.953
301.206.161
105.108.481
2.579.529.252
487.843.292
412.336.050
232.949.503
107.957.549
1.596.833.045
297.043.268
235.258.127
78.311.490
ValoreECU=1936,27 Dati RGS – IGRUE
2.4. OBJECTIVE 4
Ob. 4 of the ESF, targeted both to workers and companies, was created to support adaptation to the rapid, continuous and complex changes brought about by market
globalisation and technological development. It was to be achieved through training projects aimed at continuing training and upgrading of worker knowledge.
As part of this objective, the basic element of the SPDs prepared by Italy between 1993 and 1994 was to develop a genuine continuing training system based on the
indications in law 1,236/93 (on urgent intervention to support employment). Particular attention was paid to concertation in the areas of potential exuberant workers, i.e. lower
level employees with low basic training levels (workers who need to be requalified or retrained).
With the aim of reaching a higher employment level, according to the lines of economic and social development defined by the European Union and with the
contribution of Community and national policies and various structural funds, the SPDs’ prime strategic aim was the "progressive institution of a continuous education system to
safeguard and develop worker positions for better interaction with the system of production of goods and services."
In order to reach that goal, a six-year (1994-1999) programme was set up, divided into two periods of three years each.
The first period (1994-1996) had the two-folded goal of starting up initiatives to benefit critical employment situations (workers with low basic training levels needing
requalifying or retraining) and lay the basis for a continuing education system. The goal of the second period (1997-1999) was to institutionalise the continuing education
system by concentrating initiatives on maintaining and increasing workers’ skills. In order to reach the SPDs’ strategic goal and objectives, available resources were divided into
three axes:
AXIS 1 – "Advancement, support to programming and management of training systems", aimed at the "creation and development of stables, permanent
structures and instruments particularly aimed at identifying training needs supported by the social partners."
AXIS 2 – "Back-up/adjustment intervention of human resources vis-à-vis structural changes in the economic-productive sub-system and impact of the
domestic market", divided into three sub-axes:
1. initiatives for workers affected by important changes in the organisation of the production system;
2. development of worker skills, in particular in the SMEs;
3. development of company and inter-company training plans and evaluation of skills.
AXIS 3 – "Technical assistance", aimed at the establishment of a horizontal connection so as to co-ordinate and reinforce the actions implemented in axes 1 and 1 through
two lines of intervention:
1. creation of a co-ordination structure;
2. establishment of company information and service structures for experts of the social partners, regions, provinces and the Ministry of Labour.
The financial distribution among the axes prepared by the Ob.4 SPD was divided into two periods, 1994-1996 and 197-1999 according to the following percentages:
table
FSE – Quadro Finanziario del DOCUP Ob. 4 - peso percentuale
1994/1996
1997/1999
Asse 1: Anticipazione
25%
5%
Asse 2: Accompagnamento
70%
90%
Asse 3: Assistenza Tecnica
5%
5%
The forms of intervention called for in the SPD included 14 regional programmes, divided into the three axes described (Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy,
the autonomous provinces of Bolzano and Trento, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio and Abruzzo) and three multi-regional
programmes run by the Ministry of Labour (Innovative Actions, Retraining and Requalification of Employees, System Reinforcement).
2.4.1. – Analysis of implementation
The financial data of the Ob.4 SPD are given in the table below:
FSE – Ob.4 Programmazione ed attuazione finanziaria al 31/12/98
(Mgl/lire)
N. ASSE
Programmato
Impegnato
Pagato
159.161.743
84.270.494
1.213.321.720
609.247.473
1994/99
1
Anticipazione, supporto alla programmazione
209.597.354
e gestione di un sistema di formazione
2
Interventi di accompagnamento/adeguamento delle risorse umane in relazione ai cambiamenti
strutturali del sistema economico-produttivo
ed all'impatto del mercato interno
1.474.291.469
3
Assistenza tecnica
Totale complessivo
91.581.699
67.552.680
27.475.470
1.775.470.522 1.440.036.143 720.993.437
valore ECU=1936,27 Dati RGS - IGRUE
In relation to the individual axes comprising the SPD (data as of 31 December 1998), implementation capacity for Axes 1 and 2 was greater from the financial point of
view in comparison to that of Axis 3. This can be seen from the higher levels of commitment (75.9% for Axis 1 and 82.2% for Axis 2) in contrast to the Axis 3 (73.7%). It can
also be seen from the optimal implementation progress as of 1996. Performance was certainly determined by the target, concentrated more on training and the presence in the
the northern regions of a closer relationship between the institutions and the economic production system to create the continuing education system which was the SPD’s
ultimate goal.
FSE – Ob.4 Programmazione ed attuazione finanziaria al 31/12/98
Peso percentuale degli assi per obiettivo
N. ASSE
Programmato Impegnato Pagato
1994/99
1
Anticipazione, supporto alla programmazione
12%
11%
12%
Interventi di accompagnamento/adeguamento delle risorse umane in relazione ai cambiamenti
strutturali del sistema economico-produttivo
ed all'impatto del mercato interno
83%
84%
84%
Assistenza tecnica
5%
5%
4%
100
100
100
e gestione di un sistema di formazione
2
3
Totale complessivo
In analysing the percentages of the individual axes, we should remember that at the 83% of the financial resources were set aside during the planning phase for Axis
2, at the level of commitment and payment. Thus, we can see a slight increase to the benefit of axis 2, with a percentage of 84%. This led to implementation difficulties for Axis
3 where there was an imbalance during the programming and operational phases with problems regarding both programming documentation and the instruments used to reach
Ob.4 goals, particularly regarding establishment of a continuing education system.
When we examine the financial data divided according to programmes seen in table 2, we note a divergence between the commitments and payments of the regional
programmes set during the planning phase and those during implementation of the programme with areas that are not homogeneous.
As regards the MOP run by the Ministry of Labour, there are divergences for the programme "Retraining and Requalification" with an absorption of 86.1% of the
resources in terms of commitment and 92.2% in terms of amounts paid for all the multi-regional programmes.
Table 1 shows data underlining an uneven situation with respect to the parameters of optimal progress for Ob.4. Financial indicators based on commitment (capacity to
activate) were only slight higher than 52.6% for the regional programmes, with variegated situations at a national level. On the other hand, the percentage actually dropped to
43% for the MOP run by the Ministry of Labour. As regards payments (implementation efficiency), the percentage of 4.19% for regional programmes is lower than the
expenditure goal of 55% as at 31 December 1998. Disaggregated data according to region shows that only the autonomous province of Bolzano went higher, actually reaching
76.8%. As regards all the other programmes, the deviations are minimal for Piedmont (52.5%), Valle d’Aosta (49.3%), the autonomous province of Trento (54%) and EmiliaRomagna (53%). They are, on the other hand, much higher for Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Giulia, Tuscany, Umbria Marches, Lazio and Abruzzo, with
percentages ranging from 46.7% to 4.8%, showing extremely critical situations. We should add, however, that the programme run by the region of Abruzzo (4.8%) was only
first implemented in 1997. The MOP run by the Ministry of Labour show a global percentage of 31.3%, highlighting the many difficulties in activating the three programmes.
This led to a extremely differentiated situation from a financial point of view and with regard to each region with some areas showing good performance and others
where there were long delays. This was also true for the MOPs where the data was lower than the percentages reached at a regional level.
Prospetto 1 F.S.E. OBIETTIVO 4 - PERIODO 1994/99
ATTUAZIONE FINANZIARIA PER FONDO/INTERVENTO AL 31/12/98
PROGRAMMI
Costo totale
1994/99
Mgl/Ecu
Costo totale
1994/99
(A)
Mgl/lire
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
PERCENTUALI
capacità di
impegno
B/A
efficienza
realizzativa
C/A
capacità di
attivazione
C/B
Mgl/lire
PIEMONTE
98.836
191.373.182
188.007.317
100.553.205
98,2%
52,5%
53,5%
7.610
14.735.015
13.760.366
7.266.526
93,4%
49,3%
52,8%
29.535
57.187.734
41.665.537
24.951.867
72,9%
43,6%
59,9%
160.338
310.457.659
252.775.134
145.034.637
81,4%
46,7%
57,4%
BOLZANO
20.685
40.051.745
43.598.293
30.776.145
108,9%
76,8%
70,6%
TRENTO
19.821
38.378.808
53.168.268
20.710.846
138,5%
54,0%
39,0%
VENETO
92.401
178.913.284
119.933.232
68.088.808
67,0%
38,1%
56,8%
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
35.634
68.997.045
52.805.790
28.863.628
76,5%
41,8%
54,7%
149.031
288.564.254
224.582.708
152.915.104
77,8%
53,0%
68,1%
TOSCANA
53.584
103.753.092
78.834.806
29.994.397
76,0%
28,9%
38,0%
UMBRIA
20.702
40.084.662
33.618.445
14.141.917
83,9%
35,3%
42,1%
MARCHE
28.897
55.952.394
44.793.644
12.428.582
80,1%
22,2%
27,7%
LAZIO
79.812
154.537.581
89.987.357
17.243.795
58,2%
11,2%
19,2%
9.111
17.641.356
5.053.200
842.363
28,6%
4,8%
16,7%
VALLE D'AOSTA
LIGURIA
LOMBARDIA
EMILIA ROMAGNA
ABRUZZO
TOTALE REGIONALE
805.997
1.560.627.811
1.242.584.097
653.811.820
79,6%
41,9%
52,6%
AZIONI INNOVATIVE
11.096
21.484.852
16.710.449
4.347.633
77,8%
20,2%
26,0%
RICONV./RIQUALIF.
94.313
182.615.433
169.985.116
61.916.403
93,1%
33,9%
36,4%
RAFFORZAMENTO SISTEMI
5.548
10.742.426
10.756.481
917.582
100,1%
8,5%
8,5%
TOTALE MULTIREGIONALE
110.957
214.842.710
197.452.046
67.181.618
91,9%
31,3%
34,0%
TOTALE
916.954
1.775.470.522
1.440.036.143
720.993.438
81,1%
40,6%
50,1%
Valore Ecu =1936,27
Dati RGS – IGRUE
Prospetto 2 F.S.E. OBIETTIVO 4 - PERIODO 1994/99
ATTUAZIONE FINANZIARIA PER FONDO/INTERVENTO AL 31/12/98
INTERVENTO
Costo totale Costo totale
1994/99
1994/99
Mgl/Ecu
LIRE
Impegni
Pagamenti
PESO %
Costo
totale
Impegni Pagam.
LIRE
PIEMONTE
98.836
191.373.182
188.007.317
100.553.205
12,3%
15,1%
15,4%
7.610
14.735.015
13.760.366
7.266.526
0,9%
1,1%
1,1%
29.535
57.187.734
41.665.537
24.951.867
3,7%
3,4%
3,8%
160.338
310.457.659
252.775.134
145.034.637
19,9%
20,3%
22,2%
BOLZANO
20.685
40.051.745
43.598.293
30.776.145
2,6%
3,5%
4,7%
TRENTO
19.821
38.378.808
53.168.268
20.710.846
2,5%
4,3%
3,2%
VENETO
92.401
178.913.284
119.933.232
68.088.808
11,5%
9,7%
10,4%
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
35.634
68.997.045
52.805.790
28.863.628
4,4%
4,2%
4,4%
149.031
288.564.254
224.582.708
152.915.104
18,5%
18,1%
23,4%
TOSCANA
53.584
103.753.092
78.834.806
29.994.397
6,6%
6,3%
4,6%
UMBRIA
20.702
40.084.662
33.618.445
14.141.917
2,6%
2,7%
2,2%
VALLE D'AOSTA
LIGURIA
LOMBARDIA
EMILIA ROMAGNA
MARCHE
28.897
55.952.394
44.793.644
12.428.582
3,6%
3,6%
1,9%
LAZIO
79.812
154.537.581
89.987.357
17.243.795
9,9%
7,2%
2,6%
9.111
17.641.356
5.053.200
842.363
1,1%
0,4%
0,1%
ABRUZZO
TOTALE REGIONALE
805.997 1.560.627.811 1.242.584.097 653.811.820 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
AZIONI INNOVATIVE
11.096
21.484.852
16.710.449
4.347.633
10,0%
8,5%
6,5%
RICONV./RIQUALIF.
94.313
182.615.433
169.985.116
61.916.403
85,0%
86,1%
92,2%
RAFFORZAMENTO SISTEMI
5.548
10.742.426
10.756.481
917.582
5,0%
5,4%
1,4%
TOTALE MULTIREGIONALE
110.957
214.842.710
197.452.046
67.181.618 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
valore Ecu = 1936,27 Dati RGS - IGRUE
Prospetto 3 F.S.E OBIETTIVO 4 - PERIODO 1994/99 - ATTUAZIONE PER ASSE AL 31/12/98
N. ASSE
1
Costo Totale Costo Totale
1994/99
1994/99
(A)
Impegni
(B)
Mgl/Ecu
Mgl/lire
Mgl/lire
Pagamenti
(C)
PERCENTUALI
PESO
%
capacità di efficienza
capacità di Costo
impegno
realizzativa attivazione totale
B/A
C/A
C/B
Impeg.
Pagam.
Anticipazione
108.248
209.597.355
159.161.742
84.270.493
75,9
40,2
52,9
11,8%
11,0%
11,7%
2 Accompagnamento
761.408
1.474.291.468
1.213.321.721
609.247.474
82,2
41,3
50,2
83,0%
84,3%
84,5%
47.298
91.581.698
67.522.680
27.475.471
73,7
30
40,6
5,2%
4,7%
3,8%
916.954 1.775.470.522 1.440.006.143 720.993.438
81,1
40,6
3
Assistenza tecnica
TOTALE GENERALE
50 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Valore ECU = 1936,27 Dati RGS- IGRUE
2.4.2 – Problems common to Ob. 3 and 4
The results of the accounting records examined above show a considerable delay implementing programmes financed by the ESF. Aside from the complexity and
number of projects used to reach Community objectives, these delays are due to two main factors, one contingent and the other structural.
The first factor is linked to the Commission’s late appropriation for the OP (only passed in December 1994) and the problems related to changes in the management of
the Central Office for Guidance in Professional Training for Workers – COGPRW of the Ministry of Labour – in charge of managing Community funds allocated by the ESF.
Practically speaking, this delayed activation of 1994-1999 programming for two years, also due to the absence of proper procedures for project selection.
The above notwithstanding, as of 1996 the COGPRW managed to reduce the delays, primarily in terms of commitments. Expenditures procedures however are still
undergoing longs delays due to a series of "bureaucratic" reasons regarding:
• the time needed to obtain the anti-Mafia declaration issued by the Prefecture (about four months from approval),
• the bodies’ delay in declaring project start up with respect to project approval (about two months);
• omission of the request for advance payment by half the promoters, who prefer to have the final balance to avoid added costs of surety
• the difficulties of many bodies in obtaining surety;
• non-compliance with time table agreed upon for conclusion of the activities by about 80% of the bodies which requested extensions (about two months of difference);
• the length of time it takes inspectors to carry out controls, often caused by the lack of personnel (about six months from the end of the activity);
• the time taken by the Ministry of the Treasury to accredit funds to the implementing bodies, about 60 days from when the notice of liquidation is sent by COGPRW;
• the mechanisms of ESF allocations by Community services.
The COGPRW has calculated the time needed to distribute contributions (given in the table below). It has also proposed corrective measures, not yet completely
applied. On one hand, these measures tend to give incentives to "final beneficiaries" to accelerate programme implementation and present expenditure documentation by
cancelling financing and refusing extensions. On the other hand they are aimed at eliminating the aspects that have a strong effect on the commitment of financial resources,
reducing Community and Ministry of the Treasury payment times and creating a surety fund, a practice that, while aimed at protecting the State from damage deriving from the
insolvency of private beneficiaries, continues to slow down realisation of the OPs.
TEMPO MEDIO PER EROGARE IL PRIMO ANTICIPO
DALL’ APPROVAZIONE DEL PROGETTO (decreto direttoriale)
Tempo
medio Tempo
necessario
cumulato
Richiesta documentazione ai fini dell’antimafia
30 gg.
30 gg.
Arrivo documentazione e invio alla Prefettura
40 gg.
70 gg.
Arrivo dichiarazione da parte della Prefettura
45 gg.
115 gg.
Stipula convenzione
10 gg.
125 gg.
60/70 gg.
195 gg.
Richiesta documentazione per erogazione anticipi (fideiussione e fattura)
30 gg.
225 gg
Predisposizione delle note di liquidazione e invio al Ministero del tesoro
10 gg.
235 gg
Pagamento del Ministero del tesoro
60 gg.
295 gg.
Dich.ne inizio attività Ente e richiesta anticipi
TEMPO MEDIO PER EROGARE IL SECONDO ANTICIPO
Tempo
necessario
Richiesta ente + richiesta documentazione + invio al Ministero
medio Tempo
Cumulato
90 gg.
90 gg.
del tesoro
TEMPO MEDIO PAGAMENTI SALDI DALLA FINE DELLE INIZIATIVE
Tempo
necessario
Rendiconto
medio
Tempo
cumulato
60 gg.
60 gg.
Verifiche amministrativo contabili
180 gg.
240 gg.
Controdeduzioni (presentazione ed esame)
180 gg.
420 gg.
Predisposizione note di liquidazione
10 gg.
430 gg.
Pagamento Ministero del tesoro
60 gg.
490 gg.
2.5. OBJECTIVE 5a
Among the development objectives, the goal of 5a is to accelerate adjustment of agricultural structures (Ob.5a Agriculture) and fishing (Ob.5a Fishing) so that they
can meet Community structural policy aims.
All the regions in Italy are considered eligible for financing from Ob.5a Agriculture and Ob.5a Fishing.
2.5.1. – Objective 5a (Agriculture)
The initiatives of Ob.5a (Agriculture) – financed exclusively by the EAGGF, Guidance section – consist of:
• direct intervention to support agricultural incomes and help young agricultural workers find employment;
• investments to improve living and labour conditions and promote economic diversification;
• direct intervention in production transformation and marketing.
In the regions admitted to Ob.1, the Ob.5a measures were planned as part of the CSF. These regions aside, the provisions concerning the structure of product
transformation and marketing were planned as part of the CSF for Centre-North regions (those not part of Ob. 1). This is not true for the provision regarding production
structures. Member States simply presented the Commission with an estimated budget since no actual programming took place.
For the areas outside of Ob.1, the total resources allocated for the period 19994.1999 came to 2,333 Mecu, 68% of which was a public share (EAGGF and national cofinancing). Many of the resources available for this objective were provided for by Reg. 950/97 and 951/97.
The initiatives activated by Reg. 950/97 were aimed at improving farm structure. Their concrete goals were 1) compensation indemnity for mountain agriculture and
disadvantaged areas, 2) aid to farm investments; 3) aid in helping young people find agricultural employment; 4) aid to agricultural professional training.
Instead, Reg. 951/97 calls for improvement of the transformation and marketing of agricultural products. Specifically, the goals set include: 1) rationalisation of
present transformation structures and technologies; 2) improvement of technical and economic efficiency of marketing circuits; 3) creation and modernisation for
transformation and marketing centres in areas with structural inadequacies; 4) environmental protection by construction of purification plants; 5) promotion of transformation
and marketing structures for high quality and biological products.
Further initiatives are provided for by Reg. 876/90, 952/97, 1035/72 and by directive 159/72.
Regarding initiatives included the above-mentioned regulations, the average percentage, as at 31 December 1998, came to 66.2% for the level of commitment and
39.1% of payments made, as can be seen in table 1.
Prospetto 1 – Attuazione finanziaria al 31/12/98 (Regioni fuori Ob.1)
(Mgl/Ecu )
Regolamenti
Costo totale
(A)
Reg. 950/97
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
%
B/A
%
C/A
1.330.163,548
980.605,890
679.040,522
73,72
51,05
Dir. 159/72
85.253,259
77.024,652
77.024,652
90,35
90,35
Reg. 952/97
12.722,997
3.720,423
3.444,080
29,24
27,07
Reg. 1035/72
17.573,508
10.438,055
10.321,556
59,40
58,73
Reg. 951/97
856.785,879
454.277,315
134.235,941
53,02
15,67
Reg. 867/90
30.861,983
18.840,659
8.413,158
61,05
27,26
2.333.361,174
1.544.906,995
912.479,909
66,21
39,11
TOTALE
Valore ECU = 1936,27 Dati RGS - IGRUE
The resources distributed as part of Reg. 950/97 reached a fairly high level of implementation since the measures called for contained instruments of utilisation which
were consolidated by the regional governments. The implementation mechanisms of these measures are fairly simple and – in the case of compensation indemnity, allow for a
fairly rapid use of the funds available. As regards Reg. 951/97 however, the relatively low level of initiative implementation can be explained primarily by the long delay in
preparing and approving the OPs. Commission approval for almost all the OPs took place during the second half of 1996 (with the exception of the OP for the autonomous
province of Bolzano which was approved at the end of 1995). The MOP run by the Ministry for Agricultural Policies was only approved in 1997.
Consistent resources were mobilised for directive 159/72. As at 31 December 1998, over 77 Mecu (an implementation level of 90.35%) had been consumed. In the
face of such reassuring data, we should point out that it refers to residual appropriations assigned to projects being completed.
2.5.2 – Objective 5a (Fishing)
As far as Objective 5a (Fishing) is concerned, the actions co-financed by the FIFG were planned within the sphere of the Ob. 1 CSF for regions of the Mezzogiorno and
then incorporated into the "fishing" MOP. The others were included in a SPD for the northern regions of Italy.
The initiatives provided for, the same both for the Ob.1 regions and the others, counted in projects for strengthening the fishing industry (e.g. definitive approval and
established of mixed companies), modernisation of the fishing fleet, implementation of aquaculture plants, the creation of protected marine areas, renewal of port equipment,
promotion of fishing and aquaculture products and relative transformation and marketing.
The above initiatives were marked by a slow start – no commitment was made until 1995, due to delays in approval of the OPs (at the end of December 1994). In
addition, further time was needed to issue the national laws in the sector supporting Community action and the implementation procedures of agencies involved. As of 1998,
data on project progress, particularly regarding payments in both the Ob.1 regions and those of the Centre-North were discouraging as can be see in table 2.
Prospetto2 - Attuazione finanziaria al 31/12/1998 – Periodo 1994-99
(Mgl/Ecu )
Regioni
Costo totale
(A)
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
%
B/A
%
C/A
Ob. 1 *
479.260,000
308.369,523
149.013,223
64,3
31,2
Fuori Ob.1
380.840,000
158.741,631
51.160,367
41,7
13,4
860.100,000
467.111,154
200.173,590
54,3
23,3
Totale
Valore ECU = 1936,27
Dati RGS- IGRUE
(*) Al costo totale (479.260,000 Mgl/Ecu) concorrono il POM Pesca e Acquacoltura per 477.760,000 Mgl/Ecu e il POM Patti territoriali per l’occupazione per
1.500,000 Mgl/Ecu.
2.6 – OBJECTIVE 5b
The aim of Ob. 5b was to promote rural development, facilitating structural adjustment in the areas involved.
In contrast to Ob.5a, the allocated resources for Ob.5b were destined for certain territorial areas, specifically those that, aside from the regions of Ob.1, were marked
by a low level of social-economic development, assessed on the basis of the pro capita gross domestic product. These areas also had to meet two of the three prerequisites
below (Reg. 2081/93, article 11):
a. high rate of employment in the agricultural sector in relation to overall employment;
b. low level of agricultural income from agriculture, expressed in particular in agricultural added value per work unit (AWU);
c. low population density and/or consistent for depopulation.
Following the procedures set by Reg. 2081/93, the Commission accepted the recommendations made the Italian government for the rural zones admissible to Ob.5b.
These comprised areas in all the regions in Italy not included in Ob.1 and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano. Each region involved presented a SPD containing
OPs divided into prime axes, sub-programmes and measures. On this basis, the Commission approved the allocation of Community resources for the period 1994-99 coming to
1,358,663.831 thousand/Ecu as well as national co-financing of 1,773,970.086 thousand/Ecu and a private contribution of 2,543,557.315 thousand/Ecu.
These resources were distributed among the regions involved when the SPDs were approved according to the percentages shown in graph 1. They then underwent a
series of readjustments, particularly following the natural disasters that hit some regions in Italy (Umbra and Marche). For this reason, assignment of community resources as
at 31 December 1998 was as described in table 1.
Prospetto 1 DOCUP OB. 5b - Periodo 1994/1999
Programmazione Finanziaria per DOCUP - Situazione al 31/12/98 (mgl/Ecu)
Misura
Costo totale
1994/99 (**)
Costo
pubblico
1994/99
Settore
Privato
Contributi comunitari
FESR
FSE
Contributi nazionale pubblico
FEAOG
Totale
FESR
FSE
FEAOG
Totale
P.A.
Bolzano
159.247,731
106.796,405
52.451,326
18.198,850
5.238,474
20.209,536
43.646,860
25.708,322
6.407,962
31.033,261
63.149,545
Emilia
Romagna
311.197,029
129.747,429
181.449,600
21.451,000
7.074,000
28.535,000
57.060,000
28.879,429
8.616,000
35.192,000
72.687,429
Friuli
Venezia
Giulia (*)
213.415,638
146.096,630
67.319,008
13.645,492
3.881,168
18.997,497
36.524,157
40.936,477
11.643,504
56.992,492
109.572,473
Lazio
515.068,113
357.421,113
157.647,000
51.518,000
24.127,000
70.037,000
145.682,000
95.202,001
29.490,111
87.047,001
211.739,113
Liguria
(*)
141.353,165
67.623,819
73.729,346
14.834,654
3.758,883
12.178,915
30.772,452
17.641,907
4.104,455
15.105,005
36.851,367
Lombardia
(*)
221.759,382
88.219,141
133.540,241
13.803,000
3.606,000
16.376,000
33.785,000
31.490,552
4.385,839
18.557,750
54.434,141
Marche
(*)
815.150,544
491.182,549
323.967,995
105.260,024
14.591,238
117.463,252
237.314,514
116.982,078
17.833,736
119.052,221
253.868,035
Piemonte
424.982,304
189.383,226
235.599,078
39.542,290
9.874,289
34.084,405
83.500,984
61.795,684
8.930,758
35.155,800
105.882,242
Toscana
728.409,397
336.419,407
391.989,990
56.050,000
18.450,000
58.460,000
132.960,000
117.122,407
20.474,000
65.863,000
203.459,407
P.A.
Trento
65.774,617
47.588,943
18.185,674
7.849,994
2.826,320
9.223,686
19.900,000
13.983,322
3.447,726
10.257,895
27.688,943
Umbria
(*)
1.045.270,205
786.839,087
258.431,118
147.169,714
19.623,900
220.823,528
387.617,142
158.774,517
19.623,900
220.823,528
399.221,945
Valle
D'Aosta
14.119,317
12.109,807
2.009,510
1.996,500
90,723
2.203,500
4.290,723
3.919,200
110,884
3.789,000
7.819,084
1.020.443,790
373.206,361
647.237,429
56.801,588
23.268,119
65.540,292
145.609,999
117.502,282
26.082,117
84.011,963
227.596,362
Veneto
TOTALE
5.676.191,232 3.132.633,917 2.543.557,315 548.121,106 136.410,114 674.132,611 1.358.663,831 829.938,178 161.150,992 782.880,916 1.773.970,086
(*) Il piano finanziario tiene conto delle Decisioni comunitarie approvate entro il 31/12/98.
(**) Il costo totale dei DOCUP delle singole regioni comprende anche gli importi delle misure a titolarità del MICA.
Dati RGS – IGRUE
2.6.1 – Analysis of Implementation
Analysis of the data in Table 1 shows that the regions that benefited the most were those struck by the earthquake (Umbria and Marche), while Veneto had a high
percentage of resources attributed to it during original programming.
It is interesting to note that the private contribution, globally 50% higher than the total cost of the initiatives planned, did not reach these values in the regions struck
by the earthquake (probably justified by reliance on state intervention), the special statute regions (Valle d’Aosta and Fruili-Venezia-Giulia) or in the autonomous provinces of
Trento and Bolzano. Here obviously, private investments were directed towards other sectors of production, also due to the geographic characteristics of the respective territory
or the different social-economic makeup of the area.
In reaching the goals of Ob.5b, i.e. the "development and structural adjustment of rural areas", all the regions planned to use the resources concentrating their
intervention in important sectors such as safeguarding and upgrading agricultural and zootechny production (Agriculture), protection of forests and the environment
(Environment), incentives to SMEs and crafts (Industry), promotion of demand and improvement of tourist accommodations (Tourism), vocational training (Human Resources),
safeguarding to the artistic patrimony (Cultural Assets). However the attempt to cover all the sectors needing some sort of financial intervention generated an excessive
fragmentation of the distribution of resources. Given that Community and national contributions were not exceedingly high, this weakened the possible benefits to each sector
concerned that would have come with a greater concentration of the commitment of resources on behalf of more urgent territorial needs.
As regards financial implementation, as seen in table 3, on the whole it can be regarded as unsatisfactory, considering that use of available resources came to a mere
58.80% (of the commitment) as at 31 December 1998, in other words, a year before closure of the programming cycle. It is an appreciable proportion if we consider the
difficulties in starting up all the OPs in Italy, particularly those whose implementation was entrusted to regional authorities.
Despite this, the different behaviour of some regions in the use of funds should be underlined. In contrast to Liguria, for example, which made complete use of
available resources, there was a low increase in commitment in Marche (31%) and Umbria (29.3%), the very two regions that had the greatest need to make prompt use of the
aid made available. The difficulties following the earthquake in the two region cannot justify the trend of planned intervention once the state of emergency ended.
Prospetto 2 – DOCUP Ob.5b – Periodo 1994-1999 – Situazione al 31/12/1998
Attuazione finanziaria per DOCUP con il dettaglio del M. Industria (Mecu)
DOCUP
COSTO
94/99
(A)
TOT.
IMPEGNI
(B)
PAGAMENTI
(C)
Avanzamento
%
B/A
C/A
P.A. Bolzano
159,2
123,1
70,5
77,3
44,3
Emilia R.
289,5
192,6
129,6
66,5
44,8
Friuli V.G.
213,4
212,2
95,3
99,4
44,6
Lazio
473,6
316,2
136,6
66,8
28,8
Liguria
104,6
111,5
57,8
106,6
55,3
Lombardia
158,6
158,4
79,2
99,9
49,9
Marche
643,1
203,3
94,5
31,6
14,7
Piemonte
317,3
267,3
139,6
84,2
44,0
Toscana
568,5
451,3
272,3
79,4
47,9
P.A. Trento
65,8
50,6
26,9
76,9
40,9
Umbria (*)
971,0
284,7
163,5
29,3
16,8
14,1
10,9
5,1
77,3
35,9
599,3
419,0
227,9
69,9
38,0
1.098,2
859,6
270,7
78,3
24,6
5.676,2
3.660,7
1.769,6
64,5
31,2
Valle D’A.
Veneto
M.Industria
TOTALE
(*) Dati al 30/9/98
Valore ECU=1936,27
Dati RGS – IGRUE
2.7 – COMMUNITY INITIATIVE PROGRAMMES – CIP
Within the sphere of social-structural policies, the Commission can, on its own initiative and upon notification sent to the European Parliament, decide to urge the
member States to submit requests for contribution for actions of particular interest for the Community. (Reg. 2082/93, article 11).
The priority sectors of particular interest are as follows:
• transfrontier, transnational and/or interregional co-operation and networks;
• improvement of development conditions in the agricultural sector;
• promotion of development and adjustment in the Community’s outermost regions;
• upgrading of human resources and promotion of employment;
• management of industrial transformation.
Thirteen Community initiatives were approved for the 1994-1999 programming cycle with provisional overall allocations of 14,471.1 Mecu.
The CIPs which involved Italy had the following aims:
RECHAR II: This initiative was directed at economic reconversion of coal-mining areas in crisis, primarily at environmental remediation wherever mining activity created severe
damage in the zone. The final objective was thus renewal and modernisation of the social-economic infrastructures in mining villages as well as the construction of advanced
mines and the promotion of alternative economic activity.
RETEX II: The goal of the initiative was to accelerate diversification of economic activity in zones heavily dependent on the textile and clothing sector through technological
adjustment and reconversion of economic sound companies in all industrial sectors.
RESIDER II: The programme pursued the goal of reconversion of areas specialising in metallurgy affected by the crisis in the sector which led to a high unemployment rate.
KONVER: The seriousness of the crisis in the armament sector following normalisation of relations between East and West and the subsequent reduction of military
expenditures encouraged the Commission to start this initiative for reconversion of factories hit by the reduction of orders.
SME: The programme provided for actions aimed at improving production and management systems for industrial and tertiary companies and create incentives for the use of
technological innovation with the introduction of modern communications and information systems. By aiming not only at adaptation of internal markets but also at
competitiveness at an international level and promotion of efficacious co-operation between SMEs and research centres, the programme was meant to facilitate access to new
market outlets, including those in non-EU countries and promote the adaptation of small and medium enterprises to the single market.
INTERREG II: The actions of this programme were aimed at intervention in frontier areas within and without the Community and exchange with non-EU countries, with the
possibility of completion of measures already underway with the Regional Programme (energy networks). The entire programme was finalised at encouraging the solution of
problems inherent to development, determined by the relative isolation of the areas concerned.
LEADER II: Within the framework of Community intervention in rural development, the programme was an important methodological and training instrument promoting the
integrated development of rural areas as well as the trade of products and services among two or more member States through greater transfrontier co-operation.
FISHING: This initiative continued efforts to strengthen and economic diversification of those areas heavily dependent on the fishing sector and with serious problems of
unemployment.
EMPLOYMENT: The initiative was divided into three programmes: "Now", "Horizon" and "Youthstart", with the aim of improving the structural conditions of that part of the
labour force with the greatest difficulties in placement in the labour market, i.e. women, the disabled and young people.
ADAPT: This initiative was aimed at promoting adaptation of the labour force to the changing labour demand conditioned by the changing needs of the market. This aim, closely
related to the actions programmed in the vocational training sector, was aimed at preventing unemployment, facilitating the creation of new jobs and encouraging the
development of entrepreneurial competitiveness with measures for adaptation of organisational structures, support systems and company co-operation and exchange, and
promoting consulting and guidance for employees.
URBAN: This was an integrated initiative associating promotion of economic activity and improvement of infrastructures and the environment in urban areas with low income
levels and precarious living conditions. These situations were aggravated by the financial difficulties of the city governments with a consequential breakdown of the urban fabric.
Graph I shows the distribution of the resources among the eleven initiatives and the contribution quota assigned Italy. The initial Commission allocation to Italy during
general programming came to 1,659.1 Mecu. As at 31 December 1998, this came to 1,854.270 Mecu following reprogramming.
Graph 1
The leading administrations in implementing the CIP were selected according to the criterion of each individual Community initiative and by grouping the CIP according
to similarity of final goals. Table 1 gives an overview of the amount of funds assigned to the four leading ministries and the overall state of utilisation of these funds.
Financial implementation as at 31 December 1998 showed a discouraging rate of commitment (4.28%), favourably affected by the data from the Ministry of Labour
(96.64%), and a low rate of payment (11.27%). This is a demonstration of an unjustifiable slowness in starting up the programmes that reoccurs in this type of Community
initiative.
Prospetto 2 – PIC – Programmazione 1994-1999 - Attuazione finanziaria per
Amministrazione titolare: situazione al 31/12/1998 (Mgl/Ecu)
AMMINISTRAZIONI
CAPOFILA
COSTO TOTALE
(A)
IMPEGNI
(B)
PAGAMENTI
(C)
Avanzamento %
B/A
M. POLITICHE AGRICOLE
C/A
945.110,224
265.716,021
38.982,295
28,11
4,12
M. DEL LAVORO
1.063.409,742
1.027.682,443
259.067,435
96,64
24,36
M. DELL’INDUSTRIA
1.823.183,000
603.290,070
101.298,516
33,09
5,56
M. DEI LAVORI PUBBLICI
1.033.992,029
452.351,174
149.071,771
43,75
14,42
4.865.694,995
2.349.039,708
548.420,017
48,28
11,27
TOTALE
Valore ECU = 1936,27 Dati RGS – IGRUE.
The accumulated delays in implementation of the CIP are linked to both the programming and implementation phases.
In contrast to the programming phases of the structural objectives OP, that of the CIP was subsequent to the Commission’s notification to the member States of the
resolution setting guidelines and the type of actions that could be implemented within the sphere of each CIP. It meant concertation at the regional and local level requiring
fairly decision-making long times, particularly due to the difficulty of agreeing on homogeneous types of intervention in the areas affected.
The implementation phase suffered from the slowness of the approval procedures for regional programmes and the selection of individual projects. This meant, in
some cases, delays of up to two years in the starting up of execution of various initiatives. Indeed, as at 31 December 1997, Italy was the country with the lowest percentage
of implementation of the CIPs (with commitments of 6.86% and payments of 1.59%).
In order to make up for the time lost and avoid reduction of the allocations to Italy, the Supervisory Committees decided on reprogramming and creation of new rules
of intervention for the CIP based on movement of resources within the sphere of the same programme, primarily within the same region, before compensating among the
various regions.
Analysing financial implementation for each CIP, as shown in table 3, it is clear that, given the almost total commitment of the sums destined to encourage
employment (over 96% of the projects Adapt and Employment), other programmes showed a decidedly low level of commitment. Indeed, the Commission, given the lack of
use of Community funds as at 31 December 1997, decided, on 16 December 1998, to reduce the total allocation for Italy’s CIPs to 44.7 Mecu.
Prospetto 3 – PIC – Programmazione 1994-1999
Attuazione finanziaria per PIC: situazione al 31/12/1998 (mgl/Ecu)
PIC
Costo totale
(A)
Impegni
(B)
Pagamenti
(C)
Avanzamento %
B/A
LEADER II
862.669
239.400
32.042
27,8
3,7
PESCA
82.400
25.636
7.000
31,1
8,5
ADAPT
411.834
397.898
74.100
96,6
18,0
OCCUPAZIONE
651.276
629.479
102.028
96,7
15,7
300
290
200
96,6
66,7
URBAN
338.497
154.373
50.745
45,6
15
INTERREG II
834.925
428.900
103.200
51,4
12,4
15.009
13.217
8.100
88,1
54
PMI
648.478
195.827
30.230
30,2
4,7
RETEX II
275.673
121.994
45.474
44,3
16,5
RESIDER II
427.131
114.473
8.209
26,8
1,9
KONVER
317.462
26.909
4.427
8,5
1,4
4.865.654
2.348.394
465.755
48,3
9,6
ASS.TECNICA M.L.
RECHAR II
TOTALE
Valore ECU = 1936,27
C/A
Dati RGS – IGRUE
In any event, in 1998 the thrust of the Supervisory Committee encouraged a resumption of implementation of Community initiatives. While limited to the industrial CIP
(SME, RETEX, RESIDER, RECHAR II and KONVER), these were estimated to reach 100% of their commitment by the end of 1999.
The overall lack of success in implementation of the Community Initiative Programmes within the EU – and therefore not only in Italy – was primarily due to the
excessive number. The high number was decided on to meet a plurality of concerns of Community level importance. Ultimately however, this was unsuitable, due to the
resulting excessive fragmentation of available resources. In order to restore effective impact to the CIP within the framework of structural actions, the Commission proposed
that the initiatives in the new general regulations of the Structural Funds be reduced to three dealing with the following sectors:
• transfrontier, transnational and interregional co-operation to create incentives for development and a harmonious, well-balanced organisation of European territory;
• rural development;
• transnational co-operation for new ways of fighting discrimination and inequality in all types of access to the labour market.
In the next programming cycle for 2000-2006, financing for CIP will drop from 9% to 5.35% of allocations for the Structural Funds.
2.8 – FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance)
The FIFG was established in 1993, the year of reform of the Structural Funds. It was created as a specific financial instrument for fisheries guidance.
The FIFG has the following goals:
• to create a long-lasting balance between fishery resources and their use;
• to maintain the competitiveness of the structures operating in the sector;
• to promote the development of economically valid companies;
• to improve supply and enhancement of fishing and aquaculture products.
As part of Ob.5a (Fishing), the FIFG co-finances actions throughout Italy. In particular, it contributes to the initiatives implemented in the regions of Ob.1 and in the
regions so-called "outside Ob.1". It also finances the Community Initiative "Fishing".
Concretely, the actions consist in:
• Adaptation of the strength of the fishing sector (there are two definitive approval of measures for ships and the creation of mixed companies and temporary
associations of companies with one or more non-EU countries);
• Renewal and modernisation of the fishing fleet;
• Construction, equipment and modernisation of aquaculture plants;
• Organisation of protected marine areas to safeguard and develop fish resources;
• Equipment for fishing ports;
• Transformation and marketing of fishing products;
• Promotion of fishing and aquaculture products;
• Rationalisation of reconversion of the spadara (this measure was included in May 1997)
As with the other Structural Funds, in the Ob.1 regions, the FIFG co-financed initiatives up to a maximum of 75% of the overall cost and at least 50% of the expenses
borne by public agencies. Instead, in the regions outside the Ob.1, the maximum rate reached 50% of the total cost and 25% of the expenses borne by public agencies. For the
programming period 1994-1999, FIFG allocations for Ob.5a (Fishing) came to 380.8 Mecu, 264.4 of which for Ob.1 areas and 134.4 for the other regions.
In the regions that are part of Ob.1, the measures of Ob.5a (fishing) were incorporated into an MOP. Instead, as regards initiatives provided for in regions outside
Ob.1, a SPD for the regions of the Centre-North was adopted.
For both the intervention provided for by the MOP "Fishing" (Ob.1) and that provided for by the SPD (for regions outside Ob.1), responsibility for implementation is
primarily entrusted to the Direction General for Fishing and Aquaculture at the Ministry for Agricultural Policy.
As part of its control activity, the Direction General for Fishing and Aquaculture makes use of the outlying maritime offices (Port Authorities). Wherever the plants to
control re not centred in maritime areas, the Direction General makes use of the regional authorities as well as the competent technical offices (Civil Engineering, municipal
technical offices and the Italian Naval Registry, according to the type of initiative). These public offices collaborate with the central administration in carrying out certification. In
particular, for every project submitted for financing, they ascertain the correctness and conformity to the laws in force. In addition they verify technical-economic comformity of
the project implemented to the project’s predictions, the formal regularity of the accounting documents and receipts presented, the correction attribution of expenses sustained
and documented. The administrations in charge prepare payment orders, sending them to the Ministry of the Treasury only after receiving this documentation. The latter
Ministry then sends the treasury (the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) the payment order to be accredited to the beneficiary.
As regards identification and selection of projects to be financed, procedures were fairly complex, also given that verification of documentation enclosed with the
application for financing took place in two phases. First the government body in charge carried out administrative controls to ensure there were no formal errors (checking that
the documentation submitted for the request for financing was complete and consistent). The second phase took place with the assistance of independent evaluation groups
made up of experts in the sectors for which financing was requested. These groups of experts controlled the project’s conformity with the goals set and made a technical
assessment based on the aims of the individual measures.
As regards financial implementation, the project selection system was not activated until mid-1996 since the government body in charge had not prepared the
definitive regulations until then. However, we should keep in mind that, before procedures for selection and approval of the individual initiatives actually started, there had been
a accumulation of other delays. The first was in the Commission’s approval of the Community programmes (6 December 19994 for Ob.1 regions and 22 December 1994 for
regions outside Ob.1). There was another delay with the adoption of CIPE’s first resolution (the end of 1995) and yet another with the reprogramming (October 1995) of the
resources granted by the EU for 1994 which were moved to 1995 since they were not used the previous year. There was, therefore, no financial implementation throughout
1995, either for the intervention planned for the Ob.1 regions or for the others. During subsequent years, implementation of the measures was decidedly slow, not so much for
the level of commitment as for the level of payment. The latter is still not satisfactory (cf. graphs on progress for the year 1996-98).
Graphs
It is clear that, despite a constant increase for both levels of commitment and payment for the entire national territory, considering that the commitments had to be
closed by 1999, the percentage growth was much too slow. As at 30 September 1998, the average percentage for all the measures in all the regions involved, came to 54.3%
for commitments and 23.3% for payments.
3 - ADDITIONALITY
3.1 – Concept and aims
One of the most important principles governing the Structural Funds is that of "additionality". The aim of this principle is to avoid having Community resources
distributed to each member State used simply to substitute national aid, thus losing their characteristic as an addition to "ordinary" expenditures set aside in national budgets
for social-economic development policies.
Article 9 of Reg. 4253/88 (modified by Reg. 2082/93) states that, for every objective, each member State must ensure a level of public expenditures for structural
aims at least equal to those reached in the previous programming period is maintained in the areas concerned.
The European Commission periodically verifies that the member States respect this obligation by evaluating the additionality during the entire period of implementation
of the CSF and SPDs.
In order to facilitate this control, the member States undertake to supply the Commission with all financial information during the entire period of OP implementation.
3.2 – The difficulties of accounting control in Italy
There are various difficulties in carrying out this type of control in Italy. In order to check whether a member State has respected the principle of additionality, the
magnitude of the financial commitment that the public administration (the State, local government, public agencies of economic interest and non, i.e. all public bodies of
reference), autonomously allocate funds in their budgets for structural aims. In other words, these allocations should be the same as the funds included in the Community
budget for the realisation of programmes of economic-social development and cohesion in which every member State must participate with their own co-financing.
Therefore, in calculating additionality, the amount of Community funds contributed to the Ob. must be subtracted. This subtraction, apparently elementary since the
total amount of Community financing is set for each operative programme, is actually made quite complex since it is difficult to know the actual figures for ordinary public
financing for the same goals set by the EU’s structural funds. This difficulty derives from the absence of local public accounts that distinguish and underline the local division of
financial flows by structuring sub-aggregates of accounting records that refer to the regional areas involved and by the fact that the Commission adapted a different
classification system, linked to the CSF priority axes.
3.3 – The methodology adapted for Ob.1
In order to determine the ordinary national expenditures for calculation of the additionality in Ob.1, a procedures made up of various phases was adopted.
The first phase, that of identifying expenditures for structural purposes, has the difficulties mentioned above linked to the lack of public regional accounts, i.e.
accounting records that show the financial flows destined to the local areas affected by the Community objective. In order to reach a homogeneous aggregate of expenditure, it
is therefore necessary to extract from the budgets of the various bodies forming the aggregate "Public administration" the total expenditures for structural purposes in the
regions included in a certain objective. This is no easy task if we consider that, in the budgets of the regions belonging to a certain objective there are no records of distinct
structural funds for each individual Community objective. The same difficulty of disaggregation is also found in the national budget and in those of public agencies.
Once the all expenditures by a sector of public agencies to development policies have been grouped together, following a series of "accounting screenings", the data
may be aggregated according to the classification established by the Commission. This is because, while the national and local budgets are structured according to objectivefunctions, the Commission established a type of aggregate that corresponds to the priority axes of the CSF.
Since control of respect of the principle of additionality is the result of the comparison of the total annual and cyclic financial expenditures between two periods of
programming, the monetary values in which the estimated expenses are expressed must be expressed in a constant value, homogeneous to that to which it is being compared
(in this case, 1994). In order to carry current expense values over to constant prices, a deflator is needed. This was identified in the percentage value of the GDP,
Finally, in order to convert the constant values in lire obtained into Ecu, the exchange rate was set at 1.9, equal to the average of the monthly lira/Ecu exchange rate
for 1994.
This procedure allowed calculation of the additionality for Ob.1 according to the results of tables 2 and 3 given below. It is clear that, as far as 1998 and 1999 are
concerned, the sums given are the result of estimates of expense capacity and not expenses actually sustained.
Prospetto 2
Spesa Nazionale
Media annua
1994/1999
1995
1996
1997
1998
Addizionalità
(3)=(1)-(2)
Extra Bilancio
Fondi
Strutturali
(2)
Totale
(1)
Bilancio
22.434,63
15.852,60
6.582,04
2.476,67
19.957,96
18.874,72
18.554,30
13.821,71
14.205,19
15.027,76
14.392,85
10.993,26
11.467,24
3.846,96
4.161,45
2.828,44
2.737,95
1.640,20
1.855,31
3.211,70
2.366,80
17.234,52
16.698,99
10.610,01
11.838,39
On the basis of the accounting data given above, the payments or likely payments made for expenditures connected to the development in the years 1995, 1996, 1997
and 1998 were lower than the average expenditures envisioned in the programming period of 1994-1999.
The general calculation of additionality (public national expenditure minus the expenses relative to the Structural Funds as evaluated in constant Mecu at 1994 prices)
shows a difference between the average of the expenditures envisioned in the 1994-1999 programming period (19,957.97 Mecu) and that related to the years monitored. The
difference runs from 2,723.44 constant Mecu in 1995 (17,234.52 Mecu) to 9,347.95 constant Mecu in 1997 (10,610.01 Mecu).
In 1995 and 1996, the deviation with respect to the estimated average expenditure in the 1994-1999 programming period, with strict reference to public sector, was
reduced considerably (-5.20% and –9.21% respectively), while evolution of development related public expenditure began to be a problem in 1997, an economic tendency that
had a strong impact in 1998.
This negative economic tendency must clearly be interpreted in light of the changing macroeconomic context and some specific economic tendencies. While
implementation of policies to reduce the national debt and stifle the dynamics of the public debt has led to an improvement of public accounts, it has also determined a
consistent reduction of the national public expenditures and, consequently, also of expenses for investments in the public sector in general.
This aspect is made even clear by a close examination of Table 3 where, as the Commission requires, expenses are grouped together according to "priority axes".
3.4 – The criteria adopted in the other Objectives
The methodology described above, adopted for control of additionality within the scope of Ob.1, has not yet been applied to the other Community objectives. For this
reason, Italy – and this was the point made by the European Audit Court – has not managed to univocal criteria to control additionality.
For Ob. 2 and 5b, calculation of additionality does not take place for the sums allocated for development policies in the areas concerned (those outside Ob.1, i.e. the
Centre-North) and then actually spent, but only for those transferred from the State to the region.
Going to a lower level, consisting of the "zones" eligible for financing, national expenditures are parameterised to the total population eligible for each of the two
objectives. According to the Ministry of the Treasury, this decision was deemed opportune on the basis of the following considerations:
• the calculation region by region would only have increased the complexity of processing, already difficult, without affecting the final results in any significant manner
since it was a proportional calculation;
• in any event, the procedure is identical for the periods 1989-1993 and 1994-1999. For this reason, any negative or positive deviation would be seen for both periods of
programming with an overall "neutral" effect for the purposes of calculation of additionality.
The Commission acknowledged that the methodology used to check additionality for Ob.2 and 5b was valid for "completeness and disaggregation".
Simplifying the various passages in the method used for Ob. 2 and 5b as much as possible and wanting to compare, for example, the expenditure in 1994 for Ob.5b
with respect to the yearly average of the 1989-93 programming cycle, calculation of additionality followed the phases below:
a. The starting point was the expenditure planned for 1994 given in Table 4 (where the other five regions admitted to the subsequent programming cycle for 1994-1999,
i.e. Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Liguria, Fruili-Venezia-Giulia and Emilia-Romagna). To this the expenditures Regional Development Programmes Fund (RDPF) and for
vocational training (which have a separated economic and functional classification in the national budget) were added. This gave the amount of overall 1994
expenditures, equal to 3,428.144 million/lire;
b. The figure thus obtained was the average expenditures for all the Ob.5b regions. In order to determine the quota of this expenditure relative only to the "zones" that
are part of Ob.5b, the pro capita average expenditure of the resident population was calculated and later multiplied by the population affected by Ob.5b. This gave the
average costs for 1994 as indicated in Table 5. However, in order to know the total public expenditure, the amount of national co-financing for Community intervention
must be added, so that the final figure rises from 652,607 to 696,590 million/lire;
c. When this last calculation (for the year 1994 at 1994 prices) is compared with the yearly average for the previous programming period 1989-1993, we obtain the
result described in Table 6. There we can see that the principle of additionality was respected with a positive increase (696,590 million/lire with respect to the previous
615,080).
d.
Prospetto 4
Anno 1994 – Pagamenti del bilancio dello Stato per le spese elegibili ex Ob.5b
I dati riportati si riferiscono alle otto regioni comprese nell’Ob.5b nel periodo di programmazione
1989-1993 . (nel seguito della dimostrazione del principio dell’addizionalità, verranno coinvolte solo
queste ultime per omogeneità di calcolo nel confronto con il precedente periodo di programmazione
che vedeva coinvolte solo tali regioni).
Regioni
Lazio
Marche
Piemonte
Toscana
Umbria
Veneto
P.A.Trento
P.A.Bolzano
Totale
Sezione XIII
Agricoltura
Sezione XIV
Industria
Artig.
e
Sezione XVI
Altri
interventi
Totale
156.365
25.850
79.847
182.761
18.270
99.434
7.182
21.537
104.459
45.380
323.280
156.230
113.955
108.076
29.207
16.245
158.664
29.337
59.980
72.058
19.822
204.644
10.285
2.263
419.488
100.567
463.107
411.049
152.047
412.154
46.674
10.045
591.246
896.832
557.053
2.045.131
Dati RGS- IGRUE
•
•
Il prospetto non tiene conto delle seguenti risorse:
Fondo per i programmi regionali di sviluppo.
Fondo di rotazione ex lege 183/1987.
Prospetto 5
Regioni
Ob.5b:
spesa
elegibile
media annua
Regioni Ob.5b:
Popolazione
residente
Regioni
Ob.5b Popolazione
Spesa
eligibile interessata
pro-capite
Ob.5b
Zone Ob.5b:
Spesa eligibile
media annua
(Ml/lire)
(A)
(unità)
(B)
3.428.144
(Mgl/lire)
(C=A/B 1000)
20.629.513
(unità)
(D)
166,177
(Ml/lire)
(E=C D/1000)
3.927.181
652.607
Prospetto 6 – Quadro complessivo dimostrativo dell’addizionalità per le regioni dell’Ob. 5b
Anno 1994 – prezzi costanti. (La ripartizione settoriale del prospetto ha valore
indicativo essendo il risultato di operazioni di tipo statistico)
(Ml/lire)
Media annua 1989-1993 (prezzi 1994)
Settore
spesa
Agricoltura
Industria
Formazione
Ambiente
Altri
TOTALE
1994 (prezzi 1994)
di
Spese
pubbliche
nazionali
ammissibili
(4)=(1)(2)
Spese
pubbliche
ammissibili
totali
(5)
1.359
2.045
1.569
363
50
141.699
157.245
142.828
40.786
132.522
5.386
615.080
Spese
pubbliche
ammissibili
totali
(1)
Azioni cofinanziate
Fondi
strutturali
(2)
Nazionale
(3)
148.049
163.199
144.742
41.859
132.772
6.350
5.954
1.914
1.073
250
630.621
15.541
Contributo DOCUP
Fondi
strutturali
(6)
Nazionale
(7)
Spese
pubbliche
nazionali
ammissibili
(8)=(5)(6)
245.552
323.800
172.110
44.364
115.572
83.687
78.466
25.228
14.134
3.293
15.661
23.565
10.061
4.181
576
161.865
245.334
146.882
30.230
112.279
901.398
204.808
54.044
696.590
Dati RGS- IGRUE
As regards Ob.3 and 4, the Ministries of Labour and of the Treasury, along with ISFOL, attempted to prepare a methodology suitable to measuring intermediate
additionality referring to the period 1994-1999. To this end, they took into consideration the report of expenditures prepared by the State and the regions for the 1994, 1995,
and 1996 financial years.
According to the UCOFPL-Ministry of Labour report, the items of expenditure related to initiatives financed as part of national and regional policies for Vocational
Training and Employment within the sphere of Ob.3 and 4 of the ESF were selected for each year of reference. There was a great deal of difficulty in the survey. This was due to
the mixture, particularly in the regional accounts, of the aggregated allocation of the resources available without distinction of their origin (Community or national) and, at the
same time, of their destination to the various objectives. Indeed, at times it was not possible to proceed on the basis of identification of specific items. In that case, estimates
were made that took into account the "weight" of each objective in overall regional planning.
A similar problem arose for the disaggregation between Ob.3 and 4. For this reason, the resources attributed in the relative CSF and SPDs were taken into account in
the division. A table was prepared in which, for each region, a percentage separation of the weight that the available resources for all the objectives had within the entire
programme.
The limits of a methodology based more on projections of estimated investments than on irrefutable measures of funds actually distributed for each objective should be
taken into consideration. However, it should be acknowledged that the methodology adopted by the Ministry of Labour had an acceptable "macro-tendency" reliability. Given
the results shown in tables 7 and 8, this methodology shows that, for the years of reference, the respect of the principle of additionality was respected with a constant increase
of national public expenditures not co-financed.
Prospetto 7 – Addizionalità in itinere Obiettivo 3 – Fondo Sociale Europeo Mecu
Spesa totale
pubblica
eligibile
(1)=(2)+(5)
Spesa pubblica cofinanziata
Totale
Cofinanziamento
(2)=(3)+(4) Fondo
Sociale
nazionale
Europeo
(4)
(3)
Stato
Regioni
Spesa
pubblica
nazionale
non
cofinanziata
(5)
Spesa
nazionale
pubblica
strutturale
(6)=(5)+(4)
1994
932,976
284,996
229,810
48,945
6,241
647,979
703,165
1995
1.658,834
938,690
304,381
607,733
26,576
720,144
1.354,453
1996
1.739,650
961,505
230,997
682,837
47,671
778,145
1.508,653
(Dati IGRUE)
Prospetto 8 – Addizionalità in itinere Obiettivo 4 – Fondo Sociale Europeo Mecu
Spesa totale
pubblica
eligibile
(1)=(2)+(5)
Spesa pubblica cofinanziata
Totale
(2)=(3)+(4)
Fondo
Sociale
Europeo
(3)
Cofinanziamento
nazionale
(4)
Stato
Regioni
Spesa
pubblica
nazionale
non
cofinanziata
(5)
Spesa
nazionale
pubblica
strutturale
(6)=(5)+(4)
1994
153,666
30,487
23,538
5,053
1,897
123,179
130,128
1995
282,120
143,976
61,497
76,654
5,825
138,143
220,623
1996
315,568
176,560
60,151
103,200
13,210
139,008
225,418
(Dati IGRUE)
Looking at the data in the two tables, we note that national public structural expenses (column 6) rose gradually starting from 1994. This, however, was primarily due
to the notable increase of national co-financing, i.e. to the share of participation in financing of Community initiatives rather than a sizeable increase in ordinary national
investments for employment aside from the Community objectives.
This result is even more important in Ob.3, where the national co-financing (column 4), initially lower than that of the ESF (1994), was more than twice as much as the
Community sum for the year 1995 and 1996.
We should also point out that the figures given in the summaries do not give a clear demonstration of additionality (even though still underway). This is because they
show values of financial allocations and not expenditures actually sustained and, especially, because there is no comparison with the previous cycle of programming. These
figures only prove a positive economic outlook for financing in the three-year period considered but this is not enough to guarantee the calculation of additionality.
Finally, as regards Ob.5a (not part of Ob.1), the methodology adopted by the Ministry for Agricultural Policies to control additionality required no special measures. All
it required was the disaggregation of the data referring to Community financing used at a regional level for Ob.5a from the total expenditures on behalf of agriculture in the
individual regions.
The data concerning expenditures for agriculture in the individual regions can be deduced from the various items in the regional budgets. However, in order to compare
this data with the costs of Ob.5a, the Ministry for Agricultural Policies decided to use the reclassification of the regional expenses destined to the agricultural sector as drawn up
as part of the research project entitled SPEAR (Survey of Public Expenditures for Regional Agriculture), being carried out by INEA with financing from the Ministry for
Agricultural Policies and still underway. In particular, use was made of "economic-function" reclassification which identifies the main types of expenses activated by agricultural
policy intervention in the various regions. Specifically, the following items were identified:
Technical assistance, training and diffusion: expenses for production services;
Aid to farm management financing: expenses for short-term aid for farm management;
Farm investments: expenses for companies directly involved in agricultural production for the acquisition of fixed factors;
Investments for infrastructures: expenses for investments outside individual farms which receive a beneficial impact from the external economies located in the areas where
they are located;
Construction and/or restructuring of transformation plants: expenses to finance companies specialising in the transformation and marketing of agricultural products;
Promotion and marketing: expenses to encourage trade expansion of agricultural products, including costs of trademarks and quality enhancement.
The results of disaggregation between total agricultural expenditures and those for Ob.5a given in Table 9, limited to 1995, show for the two years (1994-1995)
subsequent to the first programming cycle (1989-1993) an almost constant percentage in the average of the period 1989-1993 (8.8%) of Community financing (8.5%). What is
even more important, the percentage was also in keeping with the national expenditure for agriculture (2,136,173 million/lire with respect to the 1989-93 average, equal to
2,186,611). Thus, the principle of additionality can be considered respected, at least until 1995.
Prospetto 9 Spesa agricola destinata a interventi strutturali e spesa effettuata a titolo dell’Ob.5a
(Regioni fuori Ob.1)
(Ml/lire)
Spesa agricola totale di provenienza regionale e comunitaria
Spesa totale per l’Ob.5a
Spesa agricola totale – Spesa Ob.5a
% di spesa Ob.5a / (spesa agricola totale – spesa Ob.5a)
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
2.096.741
2.138.611
2.069.172
2.214.495
2.404.249
2.227.437
2.044.910
94.143
169.693
200.673
220.685
199.138
165.205
168.952
2.002.598
1.968.918
1.868.499
1.993.811
2.205.111
2.062.232
1.875.958
4,7
8,6
10,7
11,1
9,0
8,0
9,0
3.5 – The search for single methodology
In verifying respect for the principle of additionality in Italy’s budget, the European Audit Court made some formal considerations to which the Italian Administration
will not find it difficult adhere. The EU Audit Court also criticised Italy’s decision to adopt different methodologies.
While this observation is theoretically correct, it does not take into account the lack of homogeneity in the structure of Italian public accounts that recent legal
innovations (the aforementioned laws 94 and 279 of 1997) and, for local governments (legislative degree 77/95 and subsequent modifications and additions) attempted to
create some homogeneity. Structural homogenisation of the national and local budgets is a fundamental step towards ensuring transparent public accounts, particularly
accounts that are "legible" from a functional-economic point of view. In other words, public accounts should demonstrate not only the financial resources committed but, in
particular, how the funds were spent. They should not be a mere audit instrument but also provide the basis for analysis on how public expenditures can be optimised.
The difficulty in calculating additionality in the national budget derives from the lack of homogeneity in the structure of public budgets and the records of Community
allocations for development policy programmes, often confused with allocations for sector regulations compatible with common structural aims. This makes identification of
"ordinary expenditures" for development and cohesion that every member States is required to keep at the level of the previous programming cycle particularly complex.
Homogenisation of public accounts means disaggregation of accounting records and therefore the creation of items of expenditure set aside for allocation aimed at the
realisation of objectives that inspire the EU’s social-economic action. This task, apparently not insurmountable, is made more complex by the fact that Community regulations
require respect of the principles of additionality for every objective and not for the total national expenditure. For this reason, records in different items of expenses must meet
both the need to distinguish between Community and national resources but also those of pointing out the different origin of contributions for the individual objectives.
Not only must public accounts be clear however. Methods of calculation for all the member States must be univocal. Given the different structures of the national
budgets, this is not yet possible and the Commission and the EU countries need to find a satisfactory, concerted solution to the problem.
Methodology to verify the principle of additionality, as correctly underlined by the DPS of the Ministry of the Treasury, based on an incremental logic (of Community aid
with respect to ordinary national investments), should not only concentrate on a statistical comparison of the expenditure considered in each yearly budget or in the short term.
It should also take into account the dynamic evolution of expenses in the long term and the economic tendencies of policies in the national budgets.
If, as was underlined above, Italian accounts show a slight drop in the level of expenditures for development policies (at least for Ob.1), there is no doubt that this
result was influenced by extraordinary, unavoidable economic tendencies.
Respect for the parameters of Maastricht and therefore the need for a rapid reduction of the public deficit, and later of the public debt, forced the Italian government to
adopt a restrictive budget. Inevitably, even structural allocations were affected.
But there is another aspect that plays a non-negligible role in calculation of additionality, i.e. the privatisation of agencies once belonging to the public sector, defined
as "outside-budget" aggregates (ENEL, the State Railway, the Post, IRI, ENI, ANAS). These economic bodies or autonomous companies, now transformed into share capital
companies, are still considered for calculation of additionality. This solution however, no longer appears to be consistent in comparison of levels of expenditures in Italy during
the various programming periods (as provided for in article 9 of the aforementioned Reg. 2082/93). It is to be expected that these bodies will no longer be included in the
administration belonging to the so-called extended public sector.
Aside from the extraordinary economic tendencies which influenced public financial policy in Italy and therefore the investments to sustain structural development in
the neediest regions, it is absolutely necessary for the Italian government to safeguard the level of destination of financial resources for structural policies. This is not only in
order to accelerate national development goals but also to avoid that, given the provisions of the new general regulation for Structural Funds (article 44.2), the EU Commission
decided not to attribute the reserve allocations of the European budget. This share (equal to 4%) can only be distributed after the level of efficacy and efficiency of each of the
OP or SPD and the respect of the obligations of additionality are ascertained.
However, it is only right to underline that Italy is the EU member that has done the most to rectify the problems connected with verification of the principle of
additionality. Particularly for Ob.1, it has created a methodology, the result of notable efforts of accounting homogeneity, capable of guaranteeing control of the data extracted
from public accounts with clarity and transparency. Indeed, Italy was requested to illustrate this methodology as a model for other nations as well at the Forum on Cohesion in
Brussels in April 1997, also receiving commendation from the Commission.
4 – THE NEW STRUCTURAL FUNDS REGULATIONS
4.1 –Problematic aspects of the old regulations
The experience coming out of an examination of Structural Funds management during the 1994-1999 programming cycle showed the EU Commission some
unquestionably weak operational aspects. These had an effect on the promptness and efficacy of intervention.
In particular, the negative aspects concerned:
a. the excessive number of operational programmes (OP);
b. the inopportune fragmentation of financial resources distributed by the various funds;
c. the complexity of the procedures for expenditures and, following that, those for liquidation of Community funds;
d. the uncertainty vis-à-vis the principle of additionality;
e. the weakness of the responsibility for programming and implementation of the individual member States.
The negative aspects had an impact on the cardinal principles on which the cohesion policy was based: programming, partnership, concertation and additionality.
Reinforcement of the principle, in order to obtain a more effective use of financial resources is the main reason for the changes introduced in the new general regulations for the
Structural Funds.
4.2 – Reduction of objectives
The principle of concentration has an immediate impact on finalisation of Community resources since it implies a choice in programming that converges on specific
objectives. The variety of objectives of the 1994-1999 programming and the resulting enormous number of OPs led to an immense dispersion of funds, which nebulized them
and had a negative effect on the large projects of social-economic development of the regions concerned.
The new regulations (article 1) reduced the objectives to three. This requires that more specific choices be made, limits approval to OP that meet more specific, welldefined goals, compels choices that, within the sphere of primary needs of the regions admitted to European contributions, favour initiatives that have a greater effect on
acceleration of development, i.e. that have an unequivocal social-economic impact.
The reduction of the number of objectives, however, has not changed the priorities of Structural Funds action. Ob. 1 and 2 include in aid recipients all the zones
previously contained in Ob. 1, 2 and 5, i.e. those with delays in development (the former Ob.1 which had already eliminated Abruzzo in 1996, while Molise will benefit from
temporary support until 31 December 2006), those with structural problems of industrial reconversion (the former Ob.2) and depressed rural areas (the former Ob.5a):
The decision to concentrate development of human resources in a single objective (Ob. 3) is proof that employment is a central point in Europe’s strategy, in line with
the commitments made at the European Council of Amsterdam.
It is clear that the decision to reduce the number of objectives to three better responds to the principle of concentration in utilisation of resources. The latter will thus
be used to support three main fields of intervention: infrastructures, production and labour.
In order to operate with greater efficiency and efficacy within the three objectives, the member States must assume greater responsibility in the choice and
implementation of initiatives. The new regulations made substantial modifications to this end, introducing more pressing measures and more binding conditions for assignment
of Community aid. These modifications concentrate on the following aspects: a) programming; b) additionality; c) supervision and evaluations.
4.3 – The new model of concertation
At a programming level, the new regulations made a decisive effort to create a more qualified model of concertation. According to article 8, Community action is based
on close concertation between the Commission, the member State, the regional and local authorities and other competent authorities as well as economic and social partners.
"In identifying the most representative partners at a national, regional, local or other level, the member State shall create a wide-ranging, effective association of all
the relevant bodies, in accordance with national legislation and practice, taking into account the need to promote equal opportunity between men and women and sustainable
development through integration of prerequisites for protection and improvement of the environment."
Programming must be based on the objective needs of the local areas and on social-economic situations rather than on the "curator State", which makes programming
decisions based on autonomous evaluations. Social partners and local authorities are better informed as to the extent and type of intervention needed to meet these needs.
Furthermore, environmental protection and the promotion of equal opportunity between men and women cannot be ignored in the choice of programmes.
Concertation among partners also concerns the preparation, financing, supervision and evaluation of intervention. Concertation and responsibility are closely connected
by virtue of the principle of "subsidiarity", which imposes respect of division of the competence between the Commission and member Sates and, as part of the latter, among
the local authorities concerned. However it backs up the competence of the resulting responsibilities in realisation of the goals.
4.4 – Content of the operational programmes
The new regulations have increased the number and contents of the obligations of the authorities of the member State during the programming phase. The
Commission wants use of the Structural Funds to come out of detailed operational proposals. It is no longer willing to approve programmes that respect development aims and
economic-social cohesion while remaining fairly generic regarding implementation plans.
Programming will take place at two different levels. The first, leading to approval of the CSF and the SPD is the result of concertation between the Commission and the
member States. Its aim is to set general strategic lines of social-economic development in keeping with the objectives set down in the general regulations of the Structural
Funds. This will take place through identification of priority axes of intervention, multi-annual measures and the integrated operational programmes. Financing, in other words,
will be ensured by several funds (cf. article 9).
The second level of programming is the result of concertation within the member State itself, among local government and the economic and social partners
concerned. It is implemented through preparation of "supplementary programming", sent to the Commission for its information (article 9, sub-section m). This document will
contain detailed measures for implementation of strategy and the priority axes. The supplementary programming may be "adapted", i.e. modified and new rules of
implementation created even in the division of financial resources (without however affecting the total cost of intervention and the extent of participation in the fund). This will
be done by the authority responsible for implementing the OP ("Managing authority") on its own initiative or upon request of the Supervisory Committee without need for
authorisation by the Commission (article 34.1, sub-section b).
The system of programming introduced by the new regulations carries out the double intent of creating a much more agile procedure for drawing up, approving and
modifying OP. It will also reduce implementation times and increase the partnership role among the various authorities of the member States since supplementary
programming, which is purely executive planning, comes out of more detailed, decentralised concertation.
The member State’s responsibility will increase not only during the programming phase but also during implementation of the OP. The increase will no longer affect
only reimbursement of expenses sustained but also the distribution of the 4% reserve (articles 7.5 and 44.2) that the Commission sets aside from the allocations made
available for the entire programming cycle. This 4% is paid out only in the case of the member State’s ascertained "success" in achieving the goals set for the OP.
4.5 – Effect of the principle of additionality
The problems vis-à-vis the principle of additionality – according to which Community funds contribute additional, not substitutive, capital at the level of investment that
every State must maintain and guarantee in reach the goals of development and social-economic cohesion – were discussed in a special chapter of this report.
Here we can only underline the great importance that the Commission attributes to respect of that principle. It will be assessed (as per article 11.3) at the moment of
preliminary evaluation before the CSF or the SPD are issued. It will also be examined during intermediate or in itinere verification within 31 December 1003 and during final
auditing by 31 December 2005.
This three-fold verification will oblige the Italian government to prepare an accounting methodology that will satisfy the Commission’s requirements promptly and
clearly. Most of all, it will have to approve a budget policy that ensures investments in those areas where development is delayed and that would consequently lose part of
Community aid, while taking into account the financial balance linked to the stability pact between countries belonging to the EMU.
4.6 – Financial management
The new Structural Fund regulations introduce important changes in financial management methods, particularly in terms of payment.
For initiatives lasting two years or more, the sequence of distribution of funds, which on the basis of the previous regulations, called for an initial payment as an
advance, of 50% of the first year of costs of the financial programme at the moment with each OP was approved and intermediate payments up to a maximum of 80% of the
yearly commitment. The sums were payable after documentation certifying use of at least half of the first advance was presented. The new regulations (article 32.2.1.) provide
for an advance of 7% of the Funds’ contribution to the initiative and subsequent intermediate payments. Both these and the final balance are subject to conditions. All these
conditions were set to encourage real, prompt realisation of the operational projects approved within the sphere of each action.
Since the advance payment of 7% of the cost of the entire planned initiative will reduce the financing available from Community sources, the States will be forced to
make national co-financing available in a short amount of time. This will avoid delays in programme implementation and possible financial cuts by the Commission. Said cuts
may be provided for in the commitment resolution (article 31.2.1) for the area for which no request of payment is presented to the Commission upon expiry of the second year
following that of the annual commitment or the time-limit (six months) for presentation of the final report (either on ongoing progress during the year or termination of the
project, article 37.1).
It is clear that the new provisions are meant to meet the two goals of avoiding massive commitments in the Community budget for initiatives where implementation
might be problematic or, in any event, delayed, and to compel the member States to ensure implementation of the various projects with the national co-financing funds agreed
on. With the new regulations, the member State will have a more decisive role as the body advancing financial resources instead of its former role of subsidiary co-financer. The
national budget policy will certainly be influenced by this face.
As regards financial audits, the new regulations make important changes with the aim of compelling the member States to perfect and reinforce audit systems (article
38).
The responsibility of every State in ascertaining irregularities has increased and two levels of "sanctions" have been introduced. The first consists in financial
rectification that the member State itself may made, suppressing wholly or in part the Community contribution. The funds thus freed may be reassigned by the State, according
to methods to be defined with the Commission as provided for in article 53.2 (article 39.1).
The second level is where the Commission intervenes if no agreement on the observations of financial irregularity is previously made or if the member State has not
carried out the rectification requests. By virtue of the provision of article 39.3, the Commission may: -a) reduce the initial advance of payment for the initiative’s estimated
cost; -b) make the necessary financial rectification, suppressing either wholly or partially the Funds’ participation in the initiative in question.
Greater attention should be paid to the second type of sanction, because the extent of rectification is entrusted to the Commission’s discretion. The latter must take
into account "in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the nature of the irregularity or modification as well as the range and financial implications of the insufficiencies
found in the management or auditing system of the member State. "The result of implementation of this principle could mean the application – as with some sectors financed
by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section – of a lump sum sanction based out the outcome of the sample audit. Should the irregularity be presumed consistent, this could be extended
to the entire initiative with a resulting loss of substantial resources. This empirical sanction criterion, based on the assumption of diffuse irregularity cannot be approved since
any hypothesis of financial rectification should be adopted according to certain, objective criteria: an addition to the regulation to clarify this point seems absolutely necessary.
4.7 – Supervision and evaluation
In the new Structural Funds regulations, supervision and evaluation reinforce the role of essential moments in verification of the use of the Community contribution at
the level of the CSF and specific actions through much more detailed previsions than those previously applied.
The main innovation (article 34) is certainly the introduction of the "management authority", i.e. of the authority or body designated by the member State to manage
the individual OPs, taking the responsibility for regular, prompt execution. This body was also present in the previous programming cycle but both functions and resulting
"responsibilities" were extremely generic.
In accordance with article 34.1, the management authority is responsible for:
a. creating a mechanism to gather financial data and reliable statistics on implementation for supervision indicators in accordance with article 34 and for the evaluation
provided for in article 42 and 43 as well as transmission of this data according to the methods agreed on between the member State and the Commission;
b. adaptation and implementation of the programming supplement;
c. preparation and presentation to the Commission, after approval of the Supervisory Committee, of the annual implementation report;
d. organisation of intermediate evaluation in co-operation with the Commission and member State;
e. utilisation by the bodies managing and running the initiative, of a separate accounting system or an appropriate accounting code for all activities included in the
initiative;
f.
the regularity of financial operations for the initiative, specifically of implementation of internal auditing measures compatible with the principles of sound financial
management;
g. respect of Community policy;
h. respect for obligations of information to the public.
Along with the management authority, the Supervisory Committees retain their functions of efficiency and quality control of the initiative’s implementation with respect
to the programme’s objectives. The Committees also take on a greater role of partner in national programming since they intervene in adoption of "supplementary
programming" (article 15.6) for which they may also propose changes during implementation (article 34.3).
Reg. 2082/93 entrusts supervision of operational programme implementation to indicators showing:
• the operation’s progress as well as the objectives to be reached within a prescribed time-limit;
•
management trends and any related problems.
The new regulation (article 36), on the other hand, has eliminated generic definitions and specifies the supervision indicators must be structural and quantified so as to
precisely state, for the various initiatives:
• specific goals, quantified if possible, of the measures and priority axes and their consistency;
• progress within the priority axes and measures in terms of tangible implementation, result and, as soon as possible, impact at the appropriate level (priority axis or
measure);
• the progress of the financial plan:
The indicators will be defined (article 44) on the basis of the Commission’s methodological proposals. They will be quantified in the reports on annual implementation
and intermediate evaluation.
The choice of indicators and their appropriateness to measure tangible results and impact of intervention is a topic of the utmost importance. It is also one that will be
difficult to apply. It will therefore be interesting to see how the working methods adopted by the Commission to identify them can go beyond simple analysis of implementation
in financial and tangible terms in favour of a judgement on the real effects on development and economic-social cohesion.
5 – PROGRAMMING FOR 2000-2006
Programming is certainly the crucial moment of a serious, effective policy for utilisation of Community funds. Not only because this phase is required by European
Union regulations but also because it is the basic premise for each State or region to reach the goals set in accordance with Community aims. For this reason, correct, timely
programming does not only influence the commitment schedule for EU aid but also, and this is the most important aspect, it influences the effective realisation of tangible
results in terms of social-economic development.
At least until 1996, Italian programming for the 1994-1999 cycle was unable to ensure respect of either time-limits for utilisation of Community resources (as at 31
December 1996 only 19% of the programmed expenses had been committed). Nor was it able to meet the real needs of the regions involved, due to the delays in
implementation of initiatives and because the initiatives themselves were inadequate.
The main reasons for the lack of effectiveness of Italian programming can be expressed in a single concept: the lack of a programming "mentality". Up until now,
programming was seen simply as an instrument aimed at obtaining Community funds. It was not considered a means of identifying the most appropriate actions to encourage
real economic and social development in the country.
Italian programming has been fragmentary, dispersed in a thousand different directions. This was because in the choice of the OP, Italian programming favoured their
correspondence to the major intervention guidelines (Sub-programmes, Axes, etc.) over the real needs of the regions concerned. Instead, programming must be seen as an
expression of the real needs of the territory, the result of concerted analysis of the social-economic needs of the local population.
There was a notable acceleration in utilisation of Community resources over the last three years (1997-1999) (the commitment was to be completed at the end of
1999 and the sums distributed were to reach 75%). This was due to stimulus from the central administrations of reference (the Ministries of Industry, of Labour, for Agricultural
Policies) and particularly the DPS of the Ministry of the Treasury. This however does not mean that programming was adequately evaluated with respect to the real needs of the
benefiting areas. While it was still suitable for attracting European resource, there was a race for presentation of projects (the so-called progetti sponda). Here, preliminary
evaluation of consistency and effectiveness with the aims of real economic-social development were was certainly insufficient.
Changing programming mentality means planning projects that do not simply stimulate financial flows but that generate real economic-social growth. It is no longer
enough to see project implementation as an added value that is exhausted in the short-term. It must also be seen as an effect of permanent development in the local socialeconomic fabric.
In order to reach these results, an ultra-regional strategy must be created. Planning limited to a restricted regional area must be abandoned, encouraging, through
infra-state partnership, the choice of operations based on the primary needs for the synergies connected to national interests and that go beyond the concept of local regional
needs, fostering interregional needs instead. This concept should be conceived as the programming of large projects for works that can provide long-lasting social-economic
effects for the populations of large areas in the country and not only for a single region.
Therefore, improvement is needed not only in programming methodology through more intense infra-national partnership activity. Regional and local authorities must
also be convinced to abandon a strategic vision limited to their respective borders and make a unified effort.
Aware of the need to change programming mentality, the DPS has quite rightly concentrated its efforts on reaching a programming level that takes advantage of
Agenda 2000, i.e. the Community resources tied to the new structural policy cycle for the period 2000-2006.
The guidelines were followed to allow for effective programming: a) identification of needs; b) evaluation of priorities; c) choice of the most suitable initiatives to meet
these needs.
The three strategic guidelines are closely related and start from the same valid assumption: a real, working knowledge of the needs in a certain area. But it is not
simple to acquire such knowledge because it is essential to make use of updated information on local economic characteristics based on local microeconomic surveys.
The first thing that is needed is a reliable vision of the economic tendencies for these local areas not based on traditional macroeconomic variables but on indicators of
economic and structural tendencies in the region for the evaluation of development prospects.
A fundamental role in preparation of effective microeconomic indicators comes from statistics. This information, useful at a national level, must be perfected at the
level of regional disaggregation. Microeconomic information is essential for programming since it highlight the needs and encourage the selection of the most suitable forms of
intervention.
Having high quality statistics on the structural need of individual areas is an excellent starting point for effective programming. However, in order to reach the
operational phase and, above all, the prescribed programming objectives, particularly given the limited financial resources available, careful consideration must be given to
priorities and the corresponding type of intervention needed as well as the most appropriate instruments to implement this intervention promptly and effectively.
The choice of primary operational initiatives must be based on local microeconomic information and the methods of concertation among all the partners interested in
policies of regional cohesion.
Aware of the need for prompt programming that can absorb the financial resources to be made available during the upcoming 2000-2006 programming cycle, the
Italian government is preparing a very well thought out phase of concertation.
The Ministry of the Treasury, through the DPS, has starting contacting the central administration in the sector and the regions. It is in the process of identifying ways
of changing evaluation and monitoring methods, administrative procedures, information systems and possible areas of domestic intervention. The initial findings of project ideas
that could be proposed were included in the document "A Hundred Ideas for Development – Programming Documents for 2000-2006".
The work of the DPS, whose conclusions were approved by all the administrations concerned, was adopted by CIPE. With resolution of 22 December 1998, n. 140, CIPE
set objectives, timetables and methods for Italian programming for the Agenda 2000. CIPE resolution attributed a fundamental role to the method of concertation, respecting
the provision of the aforementioned new general regulations for the Structural Funds.
According to the CIPE resolution, the first phase of institutional and economic-social partnership was the constitution of two systems of programming tables, one at a
national and one at an international level. The system of regional tables was aimed at establishing a mutual exchange of ideas with the local governments, the trade
associations and trade unions and the other social partners representing important interests (the environment, for example) and to prepare "interim relations". The main goal
of the system of sectorial (national) tables, on the other hand, was to explore programming possibilities that, taking into account the results of the regional working tables and
the leading national administrations in the sector, would indicate the needs to be met, the goals to be reached, the priority of intervention to reach these goals, the questions of
institutional and procedural organisation to resolved and the information to be gathered to evaluate whether these goals can actually be met.
The result of this concertation was the preparation of a synthetic report containing "orientations" for the 2000-2006 development programme in the Mezzogiorno
(DPM). This report was prepared on the basis of consultation with the three levels of government, national, regional and local, uniting the conclusions of 20 sectorial reports
(prepared by the national government) and 8 regional reports.
The orientations that originated in this first phase of concertation dealt with:
• the general goal of the DPM, taking into account economic tendencies already existing in the area and the tie with other policies for the Mezzogiorno;
• the program’s specific goals and the way of measuring their impact;
• the main strategies and programme details aimed at reaching the goals set;
• the financial plan and division of resources (by sector and by region);
• the division of jurisdiction among the various subjects involved in operational programming and implementation;
• some general principles on the method of programming, also useful for community of structural funds in the Centre-North areas:
The second phase of the programming process consisted of the formulation and adoption of the DPM and preparation of the OP. This allowed their approval within a
time-limit compatible for transmission to the European Commission together with the DPM, allowing the programme to be operational as of January 2000. This timetable was
respected.
The DPM was prepared by 30 July 1999. Together with the Regional Operational Programmes (Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sardinia, Sicily and Molise) and
the National Operational Programmes (Scientific Research and Higher Education, Schools, Safety, Fishing, Transport, Local Development and Technical Assistance to the CSF),
the DPM was sent to the European Commission.
On the basis of the DPM, CIPE, with a resolution of 6 August 1999, divided up the overall programmable Community resources for the period 2000-2006 among the
regions of Ob.1 (and Molise). This was done taking into account the results of concertation with all the national and regional administrations concerned and the economic and
social partners, as well as the observations made during the State-Regions Conference and the unified conference of the State-regions, ity and local governments. The amount
came to a total of 21,471.943 Meuro. CIPE also established the amount of national, public co-financing for the programme initiatives (estimated at 23,963.356 Meuro). Finally,
it set the financial coverage which, as regards the National Operational Programmes (NOP), will be completely covered by the rotation fund provided for in article 5 of law
183/87 or laws on specific sectors and, as regards the Regional Operational Programmes (ROP) will be covered by the aforementioned fund to an amount of 70% of the
estimated cost while the remaining 30% will be covered by the regions and/or local bodies concerned.
In the same resolution, CIPE established that the administrations in charge of running the MOP and ROP were to present, by 31 December 1999, the "programming
supplements" provided for in articles 9 and 18 of the new Reg. 1260/99 for the Structural Funds, specifying the individual initiatives included.
It should be acknowledged, therefore, that the Italian institutions have concluded the programming phase of Agenda 2000, eliminating those defects that so strongly
conditioned the start and prompt implementation of the MOP and OP for the period 1994-1999.
CHAPTER III
COMMON AGRICULTURE POLICY
1 - COMMON AGRICULTURE POLICY AND ITS REFORMS
1.1 – Description and the MacSharry reform
Article 33 of the EC Treaty recognises and affirms the peculiarities of the social structure of agriculture as well
as the structural and natural differences of the various agricultural regions. It therefore set the following goals for a
common agricultural policy:
a. increase agricultural productivity, developing technical progress, ensuring the rational development of
agricultural products and an improved commitment of the production factors, manpower in particular;
b. ensure in this way an equitable lifestyle to the agricultural population, in particular by raising the individual
incomes of agricultural workers;
c. stabilise the markets;
d. guarantee the safety of supplies;
e. ensure reasonable prices in delivery to consumers.
In order to reach the above goals, article 34 provided for the creation of common agricultural markets. In
relation to the products list in Appendix II of the Treaty, this organisation can take the forms indicated below,
according to an order of gradual greater completeness of legislative restrictions:
a. common rules in the area of competitiveness;
b. obligatory co-ordination of the various national market organisations;
c. European organisation of the market.
The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was set up to finance the CAP. The Fund
consisted of two sections. The guarantee section financing export refunds to third countries and intervention to
regularise the agricultural markets. The guidance section financed common actions of a structural nature (Reg.
729/70).
Actually, the organisation of a common market consists of a set of regulations, governing the sale of products
(letters c), d) and e) of article 33), presumed adoption of initiatives aimed at pursuing other, structural aims set forth
in these regulations (letters a) and b)).
This organisation was to include all the measures necessary to pursue the goals set, particularly price
regulation, subsidies for both production and distribution of various products, systems for the creation and storage of
reserves and common mechanisms to stabilise imports and exports.
Synthetically, market organisation consists of a set of regulations and Community mechanisms destined to
guarantee market regulation of a determined product or group of products.
In examining the main measures listed above, we should stress that they might consist of:
• price intervention practised by the bodies designated by the member States to purchase products; such
practise is done to prevent the fall of market prices under certain minimum prices guaranteed by Community
intervention;
• customs duties, consisting of samples taken from imports to avoid that an excess fall of the world market
prompts the entry into the Community of products from third countries at prices that are too low;
• export refunds, distributed to adjust the cost of Community products to the level of world prices, thus
allowing exports;
• aid for production or distribution, with market support, also to compensate for the reduction of minimum
guaranteed prices, in other words withdrawal from production of part of a farm’s production.
In addition, setting fairly high minimum prices was the cause of substantial increased in production –
surpluses that were not exportable to non-community countries beyond a certain limit – and the resulting increase of
public Community reserves as well as expenditures for the purchase and preservation of products.
Community institutions, therefore, were forced to take steps to affect the size of production in order to reduce
market supply of surplus products.
When the Single European Act went into effect in 1987, article 174 was included in the EC Treaty. Sub-section 2 of this
article expressly provides that "the need to safeguard the environment must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of other Community policies." Above all, this provision includes environmental safety among the
objectives of the CAP.
The CAP reform decided in 1992 is aimed particularly at substantial modification of the previous direction. In spite of
the type of intervention described above and the stabilisation of markets, it had lead to a rise in production surpluses
and the resulting increase in parts of the budget aimed at price support.
This reform, inspired by the contents of a 1985 document by the Commission entitled "Prospects for a Common
Agricultural Policy", known as the Green Paper, was proposed by Commissioner MacSharry. It is based on the following
points:
• defence of the European model of family farms;
• partial abandoning of the previous policy of quotas and stabilisation;
• more equitable distribution of support to farms;
• drastic reduction of minimum guaranteed prices and institution of a scheme of aid to income of farmers;
• accompanying measures for environmental protection, quality and forestation.
In order to allow good results of the reform, on 30 June 1992, the aforementioned "accompanying measures"
were also introduced. These set up a scheme of aid in the area of agricultural production compatible with
environmental protection needs and the safeguarding of natural areas (Reg. 2078/92), early retirement in agriculture
(Reg. 2079/92) and forest measures in the agricultural sector (Reg. 2080/92).
These measures were introduced by the member States and had the benefit of a 75% Community
contribution, financed by the EAGGF-Guarantee, in the regions part of Ob.1 mentioned in article 1 of Reg. 2052/88 and
a 50% contribution in the other regions.
Of particular importance from the point of view of Community agricultural and environmental policy are the
aims of the aid scheme created by Reg. 2052/88. These aims:
a. promote the use of agricultural production methods that reduce the polluting effects of agriculture, at the
same time contributing to a better market balance through a reduction of production;
b. promote environmental-friendly, extensive grazing of plant production and beef and sheep breeding, including
the reconversion of cereal acreage in extensive grazing land;
c. promote forms of agricultural cultivation compatible with the safeguarding and improvement of the
environment, nature, the landscape, natural resources, the soil and genetic diversity;
d. incentive care of set aside agricultural lands and forests in the areas where this is necessary for ecological
reasons or the existence of natural risks or fire and to prevent the dangers related to depopulation of
agricultural regions;
e. encourage long-term set-aside of cereal acreage for environmental reasons;
f.
encourage management of lands for public access and recreational activities;
g. promote awareness and the training of farmers in agricultural production methods compatible with the needs
of environmental protection and care for natural spaces:
The reform under examination also deals more energetically with the phenomenon of the so-called "Community
frauds", increasing as a result of the insufficient control systems previously implemented.
In this regard, an integrated management and audit system of Community aid schemes was set up. They
were imposed on the member States with Reg. 3508/92 regarding the compensation mentioned in Reg. 1765/92 and
premiums to beef and sheep's meat producers.
1.2 – From Agenda 2000 to the decisions of the Berlin summit
In July 1997 the document "Agenda 2000. For a Stronger, Wider Europe" was presented by the European
Commission. It contained, among other things, analysis and reflections on the CAP, meant to be a further evolution of
the inspiring principles of the May 1992 MacSharry reform.
The goals set by this document for future Community policies can be summarised as follows:
1. greater competitiveness of EU agricultural products to be realised through a substantial adjustment of internal
prices to world prices;
2. greater guarantees of product safety and quality for consumer protection;
3. improvement of economic conditions and income stability of agricultural and rural populations;
4. creation of sources of employment and income outside agriculture as well;
5. further insistence on the principle of environmental compatibility of agricultural production;
6. simplification of CAP management.
The pursuit of the above goals was also conditioned by elements of internal and international order. As far as
the former are concerned, the financial limitations were fundamental. These were the need of cost containment and
rebalancing of the net deficit in some member States towards the Community budget. There was also the need of
including stronger criteria of decentralisation and subsidiarity in the CAP.
As regards the latter elements, the international factors linked to the process underway to extend the Union
of the Central-Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and respect of agreements in force or negotiation with the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) were deemed of the utmost importance.
During negotiations for Agenda 2000, particularly to limit the greater financial burdens brought about by the
reform, proposals were made to introduce:
a. national co-financing of aid distributed by CAP amounting to 25% of the sum total;
b. progressive reduction of this aid over time;
c. creation of maximum limits of aid for each benefiting farm.
However, no consensus was reached among the member States on these last automatic mechanisms to
contain expenditures. For this reason, the Berlin summit of 24 and 25 March 1999, respecting the need to economise
on the budget, was forced to reduce the innovative impact of the reform, essentially regarding the sectors of cereal
acreage, beef, milk and wine.
Making a synthetic evaluation of the innovations introduced in the various sectors, we should stress that the
direction indicated in the previous 1992 (MacSharry) reform for cereal acreage was continued. Actually, even though
the intervention price corresponded to an increase of payment per hectare, these payments should not be considered
solely as compensation. They are also direct aid per surface unit. On the other hand, the increase in payment was only
set at 50% of the reduction of intervention price.
A further element to confirm this direction consisted of setting aid at a single level for all cereal acreage crops
(grains, oilseed and non-textile flax seed) and for set-aside land, i.e. the temporary suspension of cultivation of
agricultural terrain. This leads to the conclusion that the production initiatives in the sector will necessarily be
influenced in the future by market conditions instead of the amount of Community aid according to the various crops.
The most important point to note regarding the reform of the beef sector is its obviously contradictory nature.
On one hand, it includes the most innovative elements of Agenda 2000 such as the gradual elimination of Community
price intervention and the transfer of policy management to the individual member States. On the other, it notably
reduces the importance of the national envelop and introduces a generalised premium for slaughtering, based
primarily on compensation criteria for the gradual elimination of price intervention.
As far as the milk sector is concerned, the proposals made in Agenda 2000 call for three gradual modifications
of the current system in the period 2000-2006:
• reduction of institutional prices;
• a system of direct payments, part paid out to all producers according to their quotas and another part
managed by the individual member States (the national envelope);
•
an increase of national quotas to be assigned to young producers and those operating in mountain zones,
with an approximately 2% increase of the national amount guaranteed by the Community and a 2.9%
guaranteed by Italy.
Actually, the reasons for a substantial postponement of the reform in the sector are essentially economic,
given that the partial proposal of a transfer of the burden of market support from the consumers to the EAGGFGuarantee Section would have determine a sizeable increase in the Community budget.
On the other hand, reform of the wine sector shows a substantial reduction of the effect market support in
favour of greater flexibility on control of production potential and the new system of aid for vineyard reconversion. In
addition, again in line with the renewal process proposed by Agenda 2000, the reform seems to encourage a growth of
quality in the sector.
Aside from the innovations examined herein, the reform also intends to correct some aspects of unequal
distribution of agricultural income as well as combat the negative effects of the CAP in the environment though the
horizontal measures listed below (reg. 1259/99):
- cross compliance in virtue of which the member States will adopt measures aimed at: a) distribution of aid related to
specific agro-environmental obligations accepted by the farmer; b) setting obligatory environmental prerequisites,
either general or specific, in order to benefit from support system aid;
- modulation of payments through which the member States may reduce direct payments on the basis of parameters
linked to employment or income, coming to not more than 20% of the total sum due an individual farmer in one solar
year;
- use by the member States of costs saved in the last two measures as supplementary resources for agroenvironmental measures, early retirement, disadvantaged areas, areas with particular environmental limitations and
forestation;
- the limitation of payments to those who are actually involved in agricultural activity.
To complete this explanation we should recall that, as part of Agenda 1000’s package of reforms of the
Structural Funds, Community legislation for rural development was also approved (Reg. 1257/99). With the aim of
simplifying intervention, the package introduces the new principle according to which all structural actions and all
those related to rural development in the areas outside Ob.1 shall be financed by EAGGF-Guarantees in a single
programme.
This legislative includes three groups of measures: modernisation, farm and economic diversification and
accompanying measures and income support. As regard the latter group, EAGGF-Guarantees has financial jurisdiction
independently of the Objective areas called for in structural policies.
In particular, while partially extending the sphere of application, the accompanying measures recall the
previous similar regulations that characterised the 1992 reform (Reg. 2078, 2079 and 2080/92) regarding agroenvironmental measures, early retirement and forestation.
In forming an overall evaluation of the reform from the viewpoint of its effect on the budget, Tables 1, 2 and
3 show that agricultural costs, particularly with respect to market policies, will lead to a further, constant rise in prices
in the period 2000-2006, reaching a yearly average value of over 38 billion Euro. To this must be added approximately
2.5 billion/Euro per the previous accompanying measures. The rest will come from rural development policies which,
with the reform, will no longer be financed by the guidance section but by the guarantee section of EAGGF.
Prospetto 1 - Previsioni di bilancio 2000-2006 conseguenti alle decisioni finali (marzo
1999) su Agenda 2000 (Meuro; prezzi 1999)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
1-Agricoltura
40.920
42.800
43.900
43.770
42.760
41.930
41.660
297.740
PAC mercati
36.620
38.480
39.570
39.430
38.410
37.570
37.290
267.370
4.300
4.320
4.330
4.340
4.350
4.360
4.370
30.370
2-Azioni strutt.
32.045
31.455
30.865
30.285
29.595
29.595
29.170
213.010
Fondi strutturali
29.430
28.840
28.250
27.670
27.080
27.080
26.660
195.010
Fondo di coesione
2.615
2.615
2.615
2.615
2.515
2.515
2.510
18.000
3-Politiche interne
5.900
5.950
6.000
6.050
6.100
6.150
6.200
42.350
4-Azioni esterne
4.550
4.560
4.570
4.580
4.590
4.600
4.610
32.060
5-Amministrazione
4.560
4.600
4.700
4.800
4.900
5.000
5.100
33.660
900
900
650
400
400
400
400
4.050
3.120
3.120
3.120
3.120
3.120
3.120
3.120
21.840
6.450
9.030
11.610
14.200
16.780
58.070
100.255
102.035
103.075
104.995
107.040
702.780
Sviluppo rurale(*)
6-Riserve
7-Aiuto di preadesione
8-Allargamento
Totale (**)
91.995 93.385
(*) Comprensivo delle misure di accompagnamento
(**) Stanziamenti per impegni
Fonte: Presidenza del Consiglio
2000-06
Prospetto 2 - Previsioni di bilancio 2000-2006 conseguenti alle decisioni finali
(marzo 1999) su Agenda 2000 (composizione percentuale)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
200006
1-Agricoltura
44,5
45,8
43,8
42,9
41,5
39,9
38,9
42,4
PAC mercati
39,8
41,2
39,5
38,6
37,3
35,8
34,8
38,0
4,7
4,6
4,3
4,3
4,2
4,2
4,1
4,3
2-Azioni strutt.
34,8
33,7
30,8
29,7
28,7
28,2
27,3
30,3
Fondi strutturali
32,0
30,9
28,2
27,1
26,3
25,8
24,9
27,7
Fondo di coesione
2,8
2,8
2,6
2,6
2,4
2,4
2,3
2,6
3-Politiche interne
6,4
6,4
6,0
5,9
5,9
5,9
5,8
6,0
4-Azioni esterne
4,9
4,9
4,6
4,5
4,5
4,4
4,3
4,6
5-Amministrazione
5,0
4,9
4,7
4,7
4,8
4,8
4,8
4,8
6 Riserve
1,0
1,0
0,6
0,4
0,4
0,4
0,4
0,6
7-Aiuto di preadesione
3,4
3,3
3,1
3,1
3,0
3,0
2,9
3,1
6,4
8,8
11,3
13,5
15,7
8,3
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
Sviluppo rurale(*)
8-Allargamento
Totale (**)
100,0
100,0
(*) Comprensivo delle misure di accompagnamento
(**) Stanziamenti per impegni
Fonte: Presidenza del Consiglio
Prospetto 3 - Previsioni di bilancio 2000-2006 conseguenti alle decisioni finali
(marzo 1999) su Agenda 2000
(composizione percentuale)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2000-06
1-Agricoltura
46,0
47,4
48,4
48,7
48,4
47,8
47,8
47,8
PAC mercati
41,2
42,6
43,6
43,9
43,5
42,9
42,8
42,9
4,8
4,8
4,8
4,8
4,9
5,0
5,0
4,9
2-Azioni
strutturali
36,1
34,8
34,0
33,7
33,5
33,8
33,5
34,2
Fondi strutturali
33,1
32,0
31,2
30,8
30,7
30,9
30,6
31,3
2,9
2,9
2,9
2,9
2,8
2,9
2,9
2,9
17,9
17,7
17,6
17,6
18,1
18,4
18,7
18,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0
Sviluppo rurale
(*)
Fondo di
coesione
3-Altre spese
Totale (**)
(*) Comprensivo delle misure di accompagnamento
(**) Stanziamenti per impegni al netto delle spese per preadesione e allargamento
Fonte: Presidenza del Consiglio
This phenomenon is in sharp contrast with the decreasing financial incidence for structural intervention in
same period. Since the data shown in the previous tables refer to allocations for commitments and not to payments
actually made, it seems to penalise agricultural expenditures.
In contrast to expenditures for Structural Funds, agricultural funds are primarily distributed for direct aid in
well-defined measures and, in any event, concern chapters where allocations are not likely to lead to expense reserves
due to over commitment.
Finally, some brief considerations are in order regarding Italy’s position vis-à-vis the most important
innovations introduced by the reform in question.
As regards the cereal acreage sector, Italy has obtained an increase of the national yield to be used for the
revision of the regionalisation plan, with a possible increase of payments per hectare to producers and less risk of
penalisation as a result of possible application of the Community financial stabiliser mechanism. Indeed, the new
methods of calculating aid to protein crops seems particularly advantageous. Furthermore, the abolition of the
reference price to calculate oilseed payments could mean a reduction of the amount of Community aid for our
producers.
Regarding the beef sector, Italy will certainly benefit greatly from the new slaughtering premium extended to
all types of livestock. In that way, there will be a rebalancing of Community funds allocation for this sector, otherwise
strongly penalised by payment of funds only for bulls, beef and milk cows.
As far as the milk sector is concerned, the increase of 60,000 tonnes obtained for the national quota should
be enough to absorb the surplus production that occurred during the last two campaigns with respect to the ceiling set
by the Community. In terms of a "super levy", this corresponds to a yearly savings of 350 billion Euro for Italian
producers. Nonetheless, national legislation must be passed to assign an increase of the quota, thus resolving the
complex questions that arose in the past and encouraging reasonable, well thought out policy choices in the sector.
This means prompt action in order to avoid the risk of further indiscriminate increase of national production.
As regards the wine sector, which has also suffered from market liberalisation, the measures aimed at
regularising management of production potential are a fairly positive result for our producers. This will be true in Italy
on the condition that a) the wine inventory introduced by the reform is rapidly adopted; b) regulations are passed to
assign rights to the new crops; c) intervention programming consdiers eligibility for reconversion aid as well as the
subsequent financial redistribution in favour of member States with greater expenditure capacity.
Finally, Table 4 underlines the reform’s financial impact on Italy for the sector most greatly affected by the
decisions of the Berlin summit, examined and evaluated above.
ACCORDO POLITICO DEI MINISTRI DELL’AGRICOLTURA
DEL MARZO 1999
Impatto finanziario (a regime) per l’Italia nei settori interessati dalla riforma
Meuro/anno
Mld/lire/anno
+206
+398
Riduzione aiuto semi oleosi
- 93
- 180
Aumento rese Italia da 3,78 a 3,9
+ 46
SEMINATIVI
Aumento aiuti da 54,34 a 63 Euro/tonn.
TOTALE
+ 89
+159
+307
65,6
127
134.7 compreso premio
estensivazione
261
Vacche nutrici da 144,9 a 200
174 compreso premio
estensivazione e supplemento
nazionale (50 euro/capo)
337
premio macellazione:
- vitelloni/vacche/giovenche:
80E/capo
- vitelli 50E/capo
174 vitelloni
54.28 vacche
44.6 giovenche
66 vitelli
648
CARNI BOVINE
"envelope" nazionale
Bovini maschi da 135 a 210 ton
TOTALE
713
1.380
LATTE
Aiuti diretti
248 +171 aiuti diretti
+ 77 "envelope"
480
206
circa 400
454
879
100 ripartiti in proporzione alla
superficie (25%)
193
regolarizzazione (10.346 ha)
77
150
Nuovi impianti (12.933 ha)
67
130
Aumento quota (non pagamento multa)
TOTALE
VINO
Ristrutturazione e conversione
smaltimento alcool
TOTALE
TOTALE GENERALE
4
circa 8
248
480
1.574
3.047
1.3 – The reform of management of EAGGF-Guarantee Section funds in Italy
The recent legislative decree n. 165 7 May 1999, issued in accordance with law 15 March 1997, n. 59,
abolished AIMA (Agency for Intervention in Agricultural Markets). At the same time, the Agency for Distribution of
Funds in Agriculture (AGEA) was established as well as various regional bodies to distribute funds.
The aforementioned measure expressly set forth that AGEA was a public law body (article 21). This overcame
the controversial problem of the legal personality of AIMA as per the provision of law 610/82. To be more precise,
AGEA is a non-economic public body. This can be seen indirectly by the retirement indemnity plans applied to its staff
and the termination indemnity system for the personnel of non-economic public bodies article 6.7).
It is important to underline that the agency is the body of co-ordination mentioned in article 4, sub-section 1,
letter a) of Reg. 7219/70, as modified by article 1 of Reg. 1287/97. These provisions legitimise it to act as the State’s
sole representative before the Commission for all questions related to EAGGF-Guarantee Section in accordance with
Reg. 1663/95 (article 3.1).
Actually, according to the aforementioned Community regulations, the need for a co-ordination body is seen
in the existence of a number of paying bodies in a member State since this guarantees consistent management of
funds as well as connections between the Commission and various recognised paying bodies.
By virtue of this specific qualification, the Agency is responsible to the EU for all CAP aid management
functions as well as market intervention and structural intervention of the agricultural sector financed by EAGGF. The
agency’s representative office with the EU is in function of this.
In correspondance to AGEA’s assignment as co-ordinating body, the legislative decree provides for the
institution of paying bodies in the regions and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano. This is based on a
order by the Ministry for Agricultural Policies to limit the number of such and set the methodology and procedures for
recognition (article 3.2).
It should be recalled that, for the purposes of recognition as a paying body – granted to the bodies perceived
as jurisdiction in the individual regions or autonomous provinces – Community regulations require separation of the
main functions assigned to the body among the various offices, as well as the existence of technical and internal audit
services.
Moreover, until the institution and recognition of paying bodies in the individual regions and autonomous
provinces, the Agency is the paying body of the Italian State for the distribution of Community aid, contributions and
premiums provided for by EU regulations and financed by EAGGF wherever this is not attributed to other national
paying bodies. They include the National Rice Board which will continue to carry out the function of paying body in the
rice sector until the institution and recognition of regional paying bodies. According to Community regulations currently
in effect, the AGEA will also need to obtain recognition from the competent Ministry as a paying body. This is because
it functions at a national and not at a regional level (articles 3, 4 and 6).
There are some provision that appear of particularly importance here. They regard:
a. the Agency’s accounting regulations which provide for the separation of EAGGF and national funds in
accordance with Community regulations;
b. the Agency’s management structure and methods which must be in accordance with the needs dictated by its
functions as paying body, functions which are distinct from those of co-ordination in accordance with the
regulations (article 10.2 and 4).
We should also point out that, in application of Community regulations, the measures also created a special
committee at the Ministry of the Treasury – made up of Ministry personnel and personnel with appropriate professional
qualifications. The committee has the task of certifying annual accounts of the paying bodies vis-à-vis the expenses
borne by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section (article 12.1 and 2).
The legislative decree was intended to adapt Italy’s organisation regarding the distribution of expenditures for
common agricultural markets to Community regulations in this area. These regulations assign every member State the
task of reducing to the minimum the number of recognised paying bodies, "taking into account its own constitutional
statutes and institutional structure" (Reg. 1287/95, article 1).
Actually, at a constitutional level, Italy’s institutional structure is divided on a regional base. This will define
the sphere of local jurisdiction of the various recognised payment bodies.
The reform is definitely based on the need to decentralise the numerous functions heretofore carried out
through a complex organisation. This was essentially comprised of an essentially public central structure – AIMA –
assisted by other bodies, primarily private. Relations with these bodies (trade unions and associations and companies
belonging to consortia) were regulated by conventions. This situation became consolidated with time due to the urgent
need to carry out Community CAP regulations and the objective organisational defects of AIMA. And in effect, it led to
malfunctions in the juridical instruments used. Substantially, what was involved was a transfer to private bodies of the
exercise of institutional powers belonging to the public administration.
For this reason, the creation of the Agency for distribution of agricultural funds appears to be in line with the
most recent legislative lines. These are meant to entrust technical-operational activity carried out by central state
administrations and public bodies to agile structures (cf. legislative decree 10 July 1999, n. 300, article 8).
This reasoning can help us better understand the measure which also give the regions the power to entrust
the functions of paying bodies to bureaux set up as consortia or companies with mixed public and private capital
(article 3.3).
On the other hand, Community regulations do not set down specific rules or limitations in this regard. They
only insist that the prerequisites (cf. notes below) ensuring that the funds allocated to finance CAP initiatives are
applied in conditions satisfactory from an administrative and accounting point of view.
We should not, however, underestimate the fact that, on the basis of advanced technological innovations, the
current organisation has introduced a highly perfected system of surveying Italian agricultural production. Just to
mention a few, there are the olive and wine inventories, the GIS – the national information system – and the SIAN –
the national agricultural information system.
The provisions of legislative decree 165/99 are significant in this regard. According to this measure, all the
paying bodies will make use of the SIAN on the basis of special conventions to carry out the functions and duties
provided for in the decree (article 5.4).
By requiring the new peripheral services for the distribution of common agricultural market funds to link up
with an single information system, these regulations allow for uniformity of management, particularly from the
viewpoint of the controls required. These are indispensable for reducing the risk of irregularities which could be
damaging for Community and national finances.
2 – FINANCING OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
2.1 – Procedural aspects of Community financing
Introduction
The financial burdens deriving from implementation of the common agricultural policy are borne by the
Community budget, in particular by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee Section
(EAGGF-Guarantee Section). The EAGGF-Guarantee Section acts as the budget’s "register" where almost 50% of all
allocations are concentrated.
From the point of view of implementation, liquidation of expenditures within the framework of the common
agricultural markets organisation (refunds for export to third countries, intervention to regularised the agricultural
markets) was in conformity with the procedures designated by Community regulations, based on monthly advances
and yearly liquidation of accounts referring to the 16 October-15 October of the following year.
Monthly advances
The member State were to make available to the paying bodies the funds needed to make payments to
beneficiaries for CAP initiatives. These expenses were reported to the Commission on a monthly basis (within the
twentieth day of the month following their payment). The Commission then reimbursed the member State within the
third working day of the second month following payment.
Yearly liquidation of accounts
By the 10th of February of the year following the financial period of reference, the member States transmit the
yearly accounts debited to the Fund, plus relative certification to the Commission. By the 30th of April, the Commission
liquidated these accounts.
During the liquidation process, the completeness, accuracy and truthfulness of the accounts were verified and
the amount of expenditures made by each member State during the financial period that can be debited to the Fund
was calculated.
Following that control, the final balances to be reimbursed (or repaid) by the member State were calculated.
This was done by deducting the total of the monthly reimbursements paid out during the financial year from the total
amount of recognised expenditures.
The balance item was then defined by debiting or accrediting the monthly reimbursements payable to the
member State during the second month following the month in which liquidation of accounts was carried out
(therefore, as an example, by the month of June in the year following the financial period under consideration).
Commission audits
The Commission could also perform audits after liquidation of accounts. For this reason, the member States
were required to keep the relevant documentation until the end of the third year following that in which the
Commission liquidated expenditures. Here too, in the case of appeal, attempts were made to come to an agreement
before the Commission made a final decision. Any reduction of Community financing calculated in the decision was
debited to the reimbursements for expenses of the second month following the decision.
Recovery of sums
The sums recovered following irregularities or negligence were collected by the paying bodes and then
detracted from the allocations paid by the Fund, while interest for the sums are paid into the Fund.
In the case that the sums were not recovered, the financial consequences of irregularity or negligence were
borne by the Commission, save in the case that said irregularities or negligence was ascribed to the bodies of the
member States.
2-2 – Profiles of intervention management and control for the common agricultural policy
Introduction
For the profile under examination, the cardinal points of Community law are the following:
• the Commission is responsible for implementation of the Community budget;
• administration of the EAGGF-Guarantee Section is entrusted to the Commission;
• the Commission is responsible for financing;
• the Commission has the right to implement performance audits;
• the member State is responsible for management and audit of expenditures Funds in the national sphere.
These are the cardinal points of the Community regulations which identify the following juridical subjects
given responsibility for management and control in the national sphere:
• "competent authority - the subject which issues and revokes recognition of paying body (Ministry for
Agricultural Policies, Ministry of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance, respectively for the AIMA, the Rice Board,
IGFOR and DCCC);
• "co-ordinating body" - the subject acting as the member State’s sole representative before the Commission
for all matters related to the EAGGF – Guarantee Section (Ministry for Agricultural Policies, General Direction
of Community and International Policies),
•
•
"paying bodies" - the services or bodies authorised by the recognition of the competent authorities to pay the
expenditures debited to EAGGF-Guarantee Section (Italian Agency for Intervention in the Agricultural Market
– AIMA; Ministry of Finance; Department of Customs Duties and Indirect Taxes, Sector Direction of Central
Accounting – DCCC; National Rice Board; Ministry of the Treasury, General State Accounting Office,
Inspectorate General for the Rotation Fund);
"certifying body" - the service or body in charge or certifying yearly accounts; it is independent of both the
paying and co-ordinating bodies.
Certification of annual accounts
Certification was entrusted to the body or service with the "necessary technical competence". It carried out
certification adhering to "internationally recognised regulations on auditing of accounts". Its activity consisted of a
series of complex preliminary studies, auditing and evaluation whose prime guidelines were set by Community
regulations whose primary aim was to protect the Community’s financial interests.
Certification was carried out for the annual accounts of the paying bodies, starting from the financial period of
16 October 1995 – 15 October 1996. AIMA and the Rice Board entrusted certification to some private audit companies
while DCCC entrusted certification to the Provincial State Accounting Office.
The institution of certification of annual accounts is an obvious example of the power of the Commission,
responsible for the EU budget and finances. The Commission has the power to prepare all the instruments needed to
carry out all auditing of expenses when it deems this necessary. It therefore can obtain that completeness, accuracy
and truthfulness, in other words, certainty, needed for prompt liquidation of accounts for the year in question, without
compromising the Commission’s decision as to whether expenditures were admissible for financing as a result of
verification following inquiries by the Commission to ensure that expenses conform to Community regulations.
Within the framework of "certainties" mentioned above, the function of certification involved the responsibility
of the designated certifying bodies. These bodies had to submit reports on the audit process they carried out, making
particular reference to the following goals:
• respect for the conditions required by Community regulations for recognition of the paying body;
• high level of guarantee to ensure that procedures implemented by the paying body conform to the
Community regulations regarding expenditures debited to EAGGF-Guarantee Section;
• correspondence of annual accounts with the accounting books and records of the paying body;
• truthfulness, accuracy and completeness in recording declarations of expenditures debited to the Fund;
• protection of Community financial interests regarding advance payments, guarantees obtained, intervention
reserves and the sums still to be paid out;
• conformity of payments to Community regulations within the limits that the administrative structures of the
paying body have for ascertaining conformity before payments are made.
With reference to the 16 October 1995 – 15 October 1996 financial period, the qualified bodies certified that
they obtained guarantees that the accounts the paying bodies presented to the Commission were relevant from every
point of view and, on the whole, true, complete and accurate.
This synthetic evaluation is obviously controlled by a series of specific observations, ranked according to
greater, average and lesser importance. An integral part of the certification report, these observations were the result
of the analysis made by the certifying body. In any event, they did not impede a decision of the aforementioned
conformity, indeed, they provided useful recommendations to the distributing body for improvement of management
and control procedures.
We believe it useful to include some of the most important observations regarding the three paying bodies for
Community intervention for the 1997-1998 financial period.
a. AIMA
- There are significant lacks in credit management procedures as seen by: the "debtors register" which only
shows the credits as of the 1995 financial period; the credit ledger which is not filled in; information on
revenues and compensation in the credit account, sent late to the "credit recovery" section; the lack of
indication in the register of the interest accrued (to be paid to the Community) on the credits listed; the
impossibility to verify the credit balance (two cases); non-inclusion in the credit register (three cases found
during ad hoc inquiries).
- Lack of prompt information to the AIMA by the parties assigned to control the results of the surveys
especially on a peripheral level, even when there were proper, physical controls that led to rejection of the
contribution requested submitted.
- Lack of a filing system making it impossible to verifying a "limited" number of files.
- Lack of constant monitoring of the entries in the "revenue recovery" account, needed to facilitate closing of
annual accounts.
- Insufficient number of controls by the "internal audit" section to ensure perfect functioning of the delegated
bodies.
b. DCCC
- The main observation concerns the delays with the balance files were treated. Number suggestions were
made to rationalise relations between the Direction and the Provincial Treasury (Banca d’Italia) vis-à-vis
payment orders and their prompt discharge and payments in the recovery account from the exporting
companies. Some recommendations dealt with internal audits for more efficient audit programming.
c. National Rice Board
- The certifying body classified its observations of secondary importance since limited exception they concerned minor
amounts found during audits of transactions during the financial period.
Audit of finance management
The substantial complexity of Community regulations regarding intervention in various sectors of agriculture
is reflected both on the management and the audit of EAGGF-Guarantee Section expenditures. It has given rise to a
large number of irregularities, often with financial consequences raning from simple error to fraud to non-effectiveness
of the intitiative itself.
The exclusive responsibility of the Commission at the Community level regarding budget and financing is of
course without question. Community regulations however involve the member States in the management and, with
growing incisiveness in recent years, audit of Community expenses. They also define the distinct but interdependent
roles of the Commission and the States.
This co-participation in management and, our concern at the moment, in audit, is of particular importance in
the case of the EAGGF-Guarantee Section. Here the member States are called on to play an active role in safeguarding
the Community’s financial interest against fraud and, more generally, in protection of the use of Community
allocations in accordance with the principles of sound management. For this reason, the States are obliged to watch
over the reality and regularity of financing, implementing those audit procedures and structures provided for by
Community regulations in this sector. In the event of inadequate organisation of audits, the States must bear the
financial consequences for the irregularity or negligence for which they are responsible.
Aside from the certification mentioned above, the audit system in the agricultural sector is quite detailed.
In particular, in Italy, the integrated system of management and audit (SIGC), introduced by Community
regulations during the changeover from support for agricultural prices to compensation for farmer incomes, involves
numerous bodies. All this takes place with different timetables and audit functions and methods according to the body
and the agricultural sector concerned.
The integrated system is based on structural intervention planning in order to create a common audit system
for all the agricultural sectors. This will soften the differences between the various aid systems. It consists of creation
and updating of a farmers' register, payment management, administrative procedures, audits, appeals and relations
with the credit institutions making the payments. Briefly, the SIGC is based on the applications for aid presented by
farmers for the agricultural lots set aside for production and stored in a data bank containing essential information on
farmers and farms. The data contains an alpha-numerical identification system of agricultural lots created by aerialsatellite surveys. For animal production, the SIGC is based on an alpha-numerical system for animal identification
registration.
In order to create and run SIGC, AIMA stipulated contracts with two consortia: The Consortium for Integrated
Control of Agriculture (CCIA) for photographic surveys of the national territory with aerial and satellite technology; and
the Consortium for the AIMA Information System (CSIA) for the realisation, running and updating of AIMS’s software
needed for initial investigation and cross checking of the requests submitted by agricultural producers. Just to give an
idea of the extent of the phenomenon, these come to a total of approximately two 2,300,000 units per year.
Again, for the purpose of rationalising and obtaining the most from audits, the "vineyard registry" and the
"olive registry" were already introduced in the sector. They too were run by a private company (FINSIEL, in the period
1994-1998). These two registeries recorded the size of individual farms producing olive oil and wine. As of 1996 they
were updated to create a digital photographic map of reference. Based primarily on aerial and satellite photos, the
registries are very similar to that used by SIGC, so much so that, during the operational phase, a person was
appointed to co-ordinate the activities of the Consortium CIA and FINSIEL.
With reference to all the information software used by the two consortia (CSIA and CCIA) and FINSIEL, the
Agency Audit Section underlined the monopoly that these bodies had attained in a sector of special public interest. The
Section also acknowledged that, by making use of technological innovations, particularly the aerial and satellite
photography purchased from the consortia, AIMA set up a survey system for production throughout Italy that was
unique in Europe. The operational validity of the system was recognised (and developed, for example) in other
Community venues.
The instrumentation discussed above is the technical support to the bodies in charge of carrying out
administrative audits (particularly during the initial inquiry phase) and on-site audits (during the inspection phase) run
by AIMA in the agricultural sector. As regards actual validity of the audits, a full discussion can be found in the Corte
dei Conti’s report on the AIMA, mentioned above.
Here we will only provide an extremely synthetic overview of the bodies (and their sectorial jurisdiction)
authorised to perform controls by various legislation (national law, Community regulations, ministerial circulars,
special contracts, letters of appointment, internal organisation, etc.).
AIMA internal controls
• Inspection office (on site inspections)
• Technical service (verification of elements justifying payments and technical controls)
• Audit service (procedural audit)
• General accounting office.
Controls outside AIMA
• regions and autonomous provinces (set-aside, accompanying measures, grubbing up of vineyards, wine, fruit
and vegetables, milk, beef and sheep and goat meat)
• State Forestry Corps (Ministry for Agricultural Policies) (set-aside, accompanying measures)
• UTF (Technical Office of the Revenue Guard Corps) (alcohol distillation)
• Inspectorate General for the Repression of Fraud (Ministry for Agricultural Policies) (wine enrichment and
distillation of alcohol)
• Guardia di Finanza - Revenue Guard Corps (Ministry of Finance) (fruit and vegetables)
• AGECONTRIL S.p.A. (olive and wine cultivation)
• INCA (National Institute of Food Preserves) (fruit and vegetables)
• Protection consortia (cheese, seeds)
• Trade unions and associations (oil, fruit and vegetable transformation)
• SITRIS (Italian Society for International Level Control and Supervision) (sugar)
• SGS – Servizi Agrilogistici s.r.l. (tobacco)
This is the complex structure of controls existing in the sector of agricultural aid distributed by AIMA. In the
near future, given abolition of the AIMA and the transfer of its functions as paying body to the regions and
autonomous provinces, the structure will require revision and the bodies carrying out audit functions (and connected
responsibilities) will be clearly identified. We should also recall the establishment of the national agricultural
information system (SIAN). This is a structure of the Ministry for Agricultural Policies with the job of guaranteeing
conformity of obligatory audits in agriculture and ensure the services needed for the paying bodies to meet CAP
requirements, including services to manage and update oil or wine inventories. SIAN will take over management of the
information resources based on aerial and satellite photography mentioned above. This system is not only an
experimental control system but it is also an ideal method of dissuasion of attempts at fraud and litigation from
producers.
2.3 – Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy
2.3.1 – Allocations in the European Union Budget
The economic, political and social importance that CAP has had since when the European Economic
Community was created can be seen from the purely financial viewpoint of the resources allocated to meet policy aims
(resources to cover "obligatory expenses", as CAP expenditures are described in the Community budget).
The expenses required by CAP are covered by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section with two distinct types of
financing (refunds, intervention). From a quantitative point of view, this takes into account the existing regulations for
the different agricultural markets.
Limiting our examination to the resources assigned to the sector in the period 1994-1997 when there was, we
should recall, a strong accentuation of structural policies with the resulting increase of resources, we can see an
average of more than 47% of the allocations for EU commitments is absorbed by support to the agricultural sector.
This rises to 50% is we look at allocations for payments.
From the viewpoint of payments actually made debited to the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, we should stress
that almost all (approximately 95%) of the allocations were utilised (see table 5).
Prospetto 5 Il Finanziamento della Politica Agricola nel bilancio UE
Bilancio Unione Europea (Mecu)
A
Stanziamenti per impegni *
Stanziamenti per pagamenti **
(definitivi)
Totale(a)
(disponibili)
FEAOG-G
Totale(a)
Importo
(b)
%
(b/a)
Inc.
72.875
36.297
49,81
100
1995
80.854
37.220
46,12
1996
86.935
41.313
1997
89.812
41.614
Esercizio
1994
FEAOG-G
Importo (b)
%
(b/a)
Inc.
70.714
36.651
51,83
100
103
76.897
36.940
48,04
101
47,52
114
82.855
41.365
49,92
113
46,33
115
83.817
41.680
49,73
114
B
Stanziamenti per impegni *
Stanziamenti per pagamenti **
(definitivi)
(disponibili)
Impegni
Esercizio
B/Ax100
Pagamenti
B/Ax100
Totale
Feaog-g
Totale
Feaogg
Totale
Feaog-g
Totale
Feaog-g
1994
67.587
33.412
92,7
92,1
60.305
33.605
85,3
91,7
1995
75.056
34.503
92,8
92,7
66.915
34.498
87,0
93,4
1996
83.737
39.108
96,3
94,7
76.756
39.081
92,6
94,5
1997
86.627
40.675
96,5
97,7
80.236
40.623
95,7
97,5
Approximately 11% of the payments made over the four-year period went to support Italian agriculture (for a
total of 16,194 Mecu), benefiting in particular the grain and olive oil markets, traditionally the basis of Italian
agriculture, along with the wine and fruit and vegetable sectors. (see table 6).
Prospetto 6
FEAOG-G : PAGAMENTI ALL'ITALIA
1994
Settori
Seminativi
Importo
%
(Mecu)
1995
base Importo
%
1996
Incr. Importo
%
1997
Incr. Importo
%
Incr.
1.046
30,1
100
1.475
43,4
141
2.033
48,0
194
2.208
43,4
211
Zucchero
126
3,6
100
92
2,7
73
109
2,6
86
84
1,6
66
Grassi e piante
proteiche
708
20,4
100
516
15,2
73
685
16,2
97
1.025
20,1
145
Ortofrutta
342
9,8
100
446
13,2
130
405
9,6
118
415
8,2
121
Vino
477
13,7
100
357
10,5
75
339
8,0
71
399
7,8
83
Tabacco
394
11,3
100
332
9,8
84
396
9,3
100
396
7,8
100
Latte-caseari
191
5,5
100
178
5,2
93
178
4,2
93
-110
-2,1
-58
Carni
346
9,9
100
324
9,6
94
447
10,6
129
443
8,7
128
31
0,9
100
73
2,2
235
47
1,1
152
72
1,4
232
-180
-5,2
-
-402
-11,8
-
-408
-9,6
-
159
3,1
-
3.481 100,0
100
3.391 100,0
97
4.231 100,0
122
5.091 100,0
146
Vari
Altre azioni
Tot. Italia (A)
Tot. UE (B)
A/B ´ 100
33.605
10,36
100
34.498
102 39.081
9,83
10,83
116
40.623
121
12,53
We should also point out the accentuated tendency for payments in favour of Italy to rise, with increases of
22% in 1996 and 46% in 1997 with respect to the 1994 data base. This is in comparison with a lesser increase of the
total expenditures for the UE’s agricultural policy (respectively 16% and 21% in the two years mentioned). In absolute
terms, the increase for 1994 (Mecu 1,160) was primarily absorbed by the grain (+1,163 Mecu) and olive oil (+317
Mecu) sectors. It is also worth observing that in the following year, 1998 (for which there is not yet any official EU
data), there was a substantial drop in payments to Italy, as can be seen from an examination of the national accounts
discussed below (sub-section 2.3.3).
2.3.2 – Financial relations between Italy and the European Union
Introduction
Starting with 1998, the financial allocations needed to meet expenses for CAP implementation have been
mobilised (advanced) by the member States on the basis of the need of their respective paying services (bodies). The
European Community then reimburses these sums with payments made, at the latest, on the third working day after
the second month following that when the paying body liquidated the sums.
The paying bodies
In the period under consideration, management in Italy of the various guarantees of the agriculture market
on which the agricultural policy was based, was entrusted to four bodies with differing duties, operational methods,
jurisdiction and continuity.
State Agency for Intervention in the Agricultural Market – AIMA
AIMA is a body for Community and national intervention in the agricultural sector. In particular, regarding
Community intervention, AIMA distributes over 90% of the aid, premiums and subsidies provided for by Community
regulations and financed by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section (the remaining 10% is distributed by the paying bodes
discussed below).
The Corte dei Conti – Section on Audits of State Subsidised Agencies, recently informed Parliament of the
results of the audit made of AIMA’s financial management for the financial periods 1993-1997. This report should be
referred to regarding AIMA’s regulations, purposes and organisation as well as an analysis of the methods of
management and control of the institutional activities linked to the CAP.
Sectorial Direction for Centralised Accounting (DCCC)
This body of the Ministry of Finance was set up in 1991 with jurisdiction covering the entire country. It is
centred on the granting of Community aid connected to import-export operations for regulated agricultural products:
essentially export and production refunds.
The advance payments made, recorded in the accounts, reported monthly and reimbursed by the EAGGFGuarantee Section, are recovered with transfers ordered by the Ministry of the Treasury against the treasury account
n. 415/23305 and accredited to the DCCC’s special account. The Direction pays benefiting exporters and producers
from this account.
National Rice Board (ENR)
The institutional purpose of the National Rice Board is to protect the national production and related activities,
as well as the promotion of the production and consumption of rice.
As a paying body, the Board acts as intervening body for public reserves, distributes aid for the production of
certified rice seed and has, since the 1997-1998 campaign, been paying out income compensation in the grain/rice
sector.
Ministry of the Treasury: General State Accounting Office, Inspectorate General for the Rotation Fund (IGFOR)
In the period under examination and until the beginning of 1997, IGFOR acted as paying body, a function
later transferred to AIMA, limited to the particular sector of Reg. 1442/88 regarding premiums for setting aside
vineyards.
2.3.3 – Requests to the European Community for reimbursement in the national accounting systems
Payments and reimbursements
In the period 1994-1998, the Ministry for Agricultural Policies submitted a regular request to the European
Community for the amounts advanced by Italy for CAP implementation. The Commission ordered the relative
reimbursements in the terms provided for by Community regulations.
Over the five financial periods, the total sums requests was 433,690 billion lire.
Prospetto 7 - FEAOG-G: rimborsi richiesti alla CE
(Mld/lire)
Anno
Importo richiesto
Importo rimborsato
Differenza
1994
7.603
7.615
12
1995
8.881
8.328
- 553
1996
8.699
8.626
- 73
1997
9.530
9.090
- 440
1998
8.977
8.955
- 22
43.690
42.614
- 1.076
TOTALE
It should immediately be noted that the amount requested does not correspond to the expenses actually
sustained by the paying bodies. The amount is actually the balance between:
• the sums advanced by these bodies for CAP implementation (47,459 billion lire)
• the various types of compensation (3,769 billion lire) paid directly by the Ministry for Agricultural Policies:
collections for agricultural levies and the sugar contribution; monetary compensation; levies for the milk
quotas; penalties for the milk quotas (see infra); liquidation of accounts.
The table below shows the global amounts actually requested as reimbursement, the part of the quota
financed with compensations and the part of the quota financed with further payments from the Commission.
Prospetto 8
FEAOG-G: pagamenti e rimborsi
(Mld/lire)
Anno
Pagamenti
Rimborsi
Compensazioni
Versamenti CE
Differenze
Totale
1994
8.123
520
7.615
8.135
12
1995
9.700
819
8.328
9.147
- 553
1996
9.876
1.177
8.626
9.803
- 73
1997
10.287
757
9.090
9.847
- 440
1998
9.473
496
8.955
9.451
- 22
47.459
3.769
42.614
46.383
- 1.076
Totale
With reference to the previous table, we should underline that most of the compensation is for activity
connected to the ECOFIN agreement of 21 October 1994, which set 3,573 billion lire as the penalty for surplus
production with respect to the milk quotas assigned Italy for the 1988-89/1992-93 campaigns. The compensation,
minus the Community reimbursements, was paid either by the Ministry for Agricultural Policies or the Direction of
EAGGF-Guarantee Section of the Commission. It was spread over the period 1995-1998 as follows:
1995
1,226 billion lire
1996
671 billion lire
1997
544 billion lire
1998
208 billion lire
total
2,649 billion lire
As regards the difference (1,076 billion lire) between the payments requested minus compensation and the
reimbursement paid by the Commission, it is worthwhile noting that this too is the sum of compensation paid directly
by the Direction of EAGGF-Guarantee Section of the Commission due to the lack of compliance with Community
regulations for payments made (delays, inadequate audit procedures, non admissibility of expenditures, etc.), for
liquidation of annual accounts and for milk quota penalties following the period 1992-1993.
In particular, for the milk quota penalties, the Direction of EAGGF-Guarantee Section paid compensation as
per the aforementioned agreement with ECOFIN (in 1995) as well as for the milk quota levy account for the campaigns
1995-1996 and 1996-1997.
For these last two campaigns, the levy for surplus production was calculated respectively to the amount of
368 billion lire (73 billion of which already paid by the producers) and, temporarily, 155 billion lire. Compensation for
these sums was paid by the Commission in 1997.
Annual payments by the paying bodies
The payments data analysed according to paying body are a confirmation that AIMA has managed almost all
the Community aid in the agricultural sector. This is seen by the fact that a) the intervention of the Rice Board was
almost completely marginal; b) the intervention of IGFOR was limited to management of regulations for grubbing up of
vineyards; c) the intervention of the DCCC primarily concerned export refunds (see table 9).
Prospetto 9
Pagamenti per FEAOG-G: analisi per organismi pagatori
(Mld/lire)
DCCC
Incr.
Pagamenti
%
ENTE RISI
Incr.
Pagamenti
%
IGFOR
Incr.
Pagamenti %
TOTALE
Incr.
Pagamenti
%
Incr.
6
100
736
9,1
100
18
0,2
100
250
3,1
100
8.123
100,0
100
2
120
801
8,3
109
14
0,1
78
328
3,4
131
9.700
100,0
119
3
127
626
6,4
85
17
0,1
94
219
2,2
88
9.876
100,0
122
2
133
750
7,3
102
48
0,5
267
4
_
_
10.287
100,0
127
3
120
731
7,7
99
188
2,0
1.044
_
_
_
9.473
100,0
116
3.644
7,7
285
0,6
47.459
100,0
0
801
1,7
AIMA financed intervention in favour of the agricultural sector
The financial intervention of the agricultural sector is regulated by "campaigns". The accounts for this
intervention are calculated on the basis of the cash balance principle, in harmony with Community regulations and with
reference to the financial period 16 October – 15 October of the following year. The table below shows the payments
made by AIMA during the 1993-94/1997-98 campaigns. This is the data the Commission considers for the purposes of
annual liquidation of accounts.
Prospetto 10
FEAOG-G -AIMA:
importi erogati per campagna
(lire)
Campagna
Importo
Incr.
93-94
6.260.600.395.860
100
94-95
7.181.916.568.533
115
95-96
8.711.115.787.809
139
96-97
10.180.441.034.031
163
97-98
7.674.550.635.273
123
40.008.624.421.506
As we can, in the first four campaigns, there is a marked tendency towards an increase of financial
intervention. This regarded not only the main components of the agricultural sectors, particularly those regulation by
the new CAP (grains, oilseed, protein crops, zootechny and set-aside), but also allocations for complementary
measures (forestry improvement, environmental rebalance and protection, extensification, forestation).
The considerable drop that marked the period 1997-98 affected all the most important sectors and was
caused both by seasonal circumstances and the reduction of the intervention prices (for example, contributions to the
olive oil sector fell by approximately 855 billion lire both because the payments covered the 1996-97 campaign,
marketed by low production, the so-called "unloading year", and as a result of price reduction).
Of the other sectors, there was also a significant drop in the grain sectors (342 billion, due to a reduction in
the number of requests and a reduction in aid to income in the oilseed sectors and for the "suspension" of requests
subject to inquiry following a more rigorous application of the cross checking methodology). In addition, there was a
reduction in payments for obligatory set-aside (100 billion lire, due to a reduction in the percentage of land to be set
aside, which fell from 10% to 5% of cultivated land). Contributions to supplementary measures fell to 928 billion lire
as a result of the fact that the sizeable incentives in 1997 for biological production premium requests did not reoccur
1998, the year when, in addition, concession of premiums was partially suspended while Italy was seeking national
funds for co-participation.
Refunds financed by the Sectorial Direction for Centralised Accounting- DCCC
There were no significant variations in the refunds paid by the DCCC in the period 1994-1998. These funds
were standardised at amounts that ranged between 600 and 800 billion lire. The table below analyses the amounts
paid according to type of intervention.
Prospetto 12 - FEAOG-G - DCCC: restituzioni all'esportazione
(Mld/lire)
Anno
Tipologia di
intervento
Totale
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Esportazioni verso
Paesi terzi
690,9
769,2
598,3
720,5
699,5
3.478,4
0,1
-
-
-
-
0,1
62,8
44,2
34,2
37,0
35,4
213,6
753,8
813,4
632,5
757,5
734,9
3.692,1
0,1
0,1
-
-
-
0,2
generale
753,9
813,5
632,5
757,5
734,9
3.692,3
Recuperi
18,1
13,1
6,3
7,1
3,7
48,3
735,8
800,4
626,2
750,4
731,2
3.644,0
Esportazioni verso
Paesi aderenti
Restituzioni alla
produzione
Totale
esportazioni
Importazioni
Paesi membri
Totale
Totale chiesto
a rimborso
The types of products most greatly affected by exports to third countries were rice, beef and sugar.
Intervention financed by the National Rice Board
The payments advanced by the Rice Board in the financial periods under examination mainly concerned aid to
certified rice seed (12.5 billion lire in 1993-94 and, respectively, 13.7, 17.2, 15.6 and 14.0 billion lire in the following
financial periods) as well as management of reserves in 1997-98 (69 billion lire) and payments for income
compensation (44 billion lire).
3 – PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS IN MANAGEMENT OF THE NEW COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
3.1 – General considerations
In Italy, some sectors affected by the new CAP have shown anomalies and irregularities which will be briefly
described below.
In the zootechny sector, the obligation to register and mark all cattle, required by Community directives to
reduce the recurrent phenomenon of multiple payments of premiums for the same animal, was only partially applied
due to delays of the competent veterinary service in creating the registry.
A similar situation occurred regarding premiums to sheep and goat breeders. There is no obligation to mark
each animal give the difficulty of carrying out adequate controls before prompt payment of the support under
consideration.
In regard to the wine sector, the types of Community aid for wine distillation have led to increases in alcohol.
This in turn created notable financial burdens for storage and the constant control of the stored product.
The EU mechanism for support to olive oil producers showed understandable obstacles in carrying out the
necessary controls of actual production size. This was due to the extremely high number of beneficiaries (about one
million).
Special notice should be given to the servizio di assuntoria for public Community reserves of products
purchased at the intervention prices are entrusted to private parties enrolled in a special register. Following the more
restrictive provisions for enrolment in this register, a dispute arose between AIMA and those assuntori who no longer
had the prerequisites required, compromising the periodic certification of the products in storage, needed for
reimbursement of expenses from the EU and the possibility of having the non-deteriorated products returned at the
end of the period of service.
The problem of milk quotas was also quite complex. It led to substantial financial burdens for Italy in
penalties paid to the EU for the surplus production that occurred in some campaigns, without payment of the
corresponding penalties by the individual producers of the surplus with respect to their own quotas. On the other
hand, the collection of supplementary levies from the producers, entrusted to those purchasing the milk, uncovered
numerous cases of management irregularities, also considering the lack of adequate guarantees in the exercise of this
function of tax collector, as well as an obligation to report the sums collected.
As far as the accompanying measures are concerned, it should be recalled that, in general, they are cofinanced by the EU. However, the inadequacy of the funds allocated by Italy, as well as the complex procedures of
expenditures meant delays in use of part of the financial resources available.
In particular, the premium for temporary or definitive setting aside of land for grain cultivation is the result of
the lack of impetus in pursuing the Community goal of reducing overall production since this form of support primarily
affected lots not particularly suited to crops or of marginal value.
3.2 – Particular information on frauds
The Treaty of Amsterdam substituted article 209A EC which underlined the particular responsibility of the
members States at the level of the national administrations, to protect Community finances. The present article 280
requires sharing of that responsibility between the Community and the member States.
The importance of the struggle against fraud is underlined by this regulation which now expressly requires the
Commission to submit annual reports to the European Parliament and Council on this matter. The last report
underlined that, in the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, there was a 13% reduction of fraud and irregularities in the
amounts paid with respect to 1996 (318 Mecu in 1997 in comparison to 365 Mecu in 1996).
Actually, when Reg. 2988/95, regarding the protection of the Community’s financial interests, used the
concept of irregularities which are damaging to the Community budget it refered both to simple omission, through
error or negligence, and to intentional behaviour corresponding to the more restrictive concept of fraud in the accepted
meaning given the convention established with the Council Act of 26 July 1995.
This unquestionably positive fact is the result of the combination of a number of factors, such as more
efficient juridical protection of the suns contributed, improved co-operation between Community institutions and the
member States and the consolidation of the UCLAF (Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Unit).
In analysing the various types of EAGGF-Guarantee Section expenditures affected by the phenomenon, the
most important financial data regarding the Community budget concerns market support measures (quotas and
various types of intervention) which represent 50% of the global impact (71% in 1996).
32% of the sums involved (with respect to 21% in 1996) concern export refunds. This piece of data is more
understandable if we consider that, in spite of the notable reduction of export refund expenses, the Commission’s
inquiries in this area in co-operation with the member States constitutes over 50% of the global impact of the inquiries
held in 1997.
There has also been an increase of the impact on the Community budget of cases of direct aid (production
premiums and setting aside of production), which rose from 5% in 1996 to 17% in 1997.
The inquiries in the agricultural sector regard fraud committed primarily by organised crime relative to
products with high prices in world quotations, such as beef, olive oil (particularly in the sphere of aid for consumption)
and fruit and vegetables.
Finally, obligatory mention must be made of the situation of credit recovery from the implementation of
expenditures covered by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section, connected with cases of fraud or irregularities in general. As
can be seen in Table 13, of the 165 Mecu reported in 1997, three quarters, i.e. 122 Mecu, must still be recovered.
Prospetto 13
FEAOG-G:
Irregolarità comunicate dagli Stati membri nel 1997 sulla base del Reg. 595/91
Numero di casi
Importi in Mgl/Ecu
(tasso di conversione del dicembre 1997)
Stati
membri
Casi
comunicati
Di cui
scoperti
prima del
pagamento
Importi
in gioco
a
b
c
Di cui senza
Di cui con necessità di recupero
necessità di
recupero
Totale da
Già
Saldo da
(scoperti
recuperare recuperati recuperare
prima del
pagamento)
d
e
f
G=e-f
B
27
8
1.672
379
1.294
267
1.026
DK
24
3
419
42
377
343
33
D
601
95
26.895
2.204
24.662
5.801
18.861
EL
160
66
36.931
3.793
33.138
164
32.975
E
261
2
43.449
16.402
27.047
1.568
25.479
F
91
12
3.801
1.046
2.755
828
1.927
IRL
79
63
693
472
221
69
152
I
249
2
31.352
20
31.331
606
30.726
NL
130
58
7.666
4.542
3.124
582
2.542
A
36
14
628
115
513
247
266
P
81
2
4.378
41
4.337
287
4.051
7
6
75
43
32
32
0
66
59
735
585
150
104
46
246
32
6.221
1.003
5.218
1.166
4.052
2.058
422
164.884
30.686
134.199
12.064
122.135
FIN
S
UK
Totale
N.B.:il Lussemburgo ha segnalato che non è stata accertata nessuna irregolarità superiore a 4.000 Ecu.
The greatest difficulty in this regard is due to the length of time of the recovery procedures. They normally
last much longer than the time-limit of four years established by the Commission for liquidation of accounts of the
member States regarding expenses financed by the EAGGF-Guarantee Section. This can be seen in the two tables
below.
Prospetto 14
FEAOG-G:
Situazione del recupero concernente irregolarità comunicate prima del 1994
Reg. 595/91
Numero di casi
Stati
membri
Totale
comunicati
Totale
recuperati
A carico
FEAOG-G
A carico
dello
Stato
membro
Da
recuperare
Di cui con
procedura
giudiziaria
Richiesta
dello Stato
membro
"irrecuperabile"
Saldo
1
2
3
4
5=(1-2-3-4)
6
7
8=(56-7)
B
176
130
7
DK
482
371
89
1.928
1.564
94
EL
303
249
E
439
309
F
1.002
851
40
167
129
1
1.180
292
NL
723
681
P
218
105
1.525
1.319
8.144
6.000
D
IRL
I
UK
Totale
74%
39
10
10
19
1
21
8
13
0
5
265
112
50
103
9
45
7
1
37
130
16
1
37
2
109
17
18
74
4
33
3
14
16
888
239
1
648
1
39
2
10
27
4
109
8
72
17
117
10
93
14
305
43
1.795
432
211
1.152
2
22%
19%
Prospetto 15
Stati
Importi in Mgl/Ecu
(tasso di conversione del dicembre 1997)
101
Totale
comunicati
Totale
recuperati
A
carico
FEAOGG(*)
A carico
dello
Stato
membro
Da
recuperare
Di cui con
procedura
giudiziaria
Richiesta
dello
Stato
membro
"irrecuperabile"
1
2
3
4
5=(1-2-34)
6
7
8=(5-67)
B
23.385
9.587
6.169
0
7.629
1.593
3.211
2.826
DK
28.586
13.872
1.331
2
13.382
10.815
2.567
0
D
170.923
51.708
52.233
27.645
39.337
22.800
11.566
4.971
EL
78.154
3.582
0
53.981
20.592
15.279
0
5.312
E
9.355
3.274
0
0
6.081
584
0
5.497
F
72.174
31.651
1.102
12
39.408
14.067
2.483
22.858
IRL
18.188
12.464
17
23
5.684
2.609
0
3.075
I
577.638
48.360
0
0
529.278
207.970
0
321.308
NL
36.481
25.915
36
218
10.312
1.433
158
8.720
P
9.189
2.009
0
496
6.684
3.596
0
3.088
UK
45.777
22.601
3.357
1.641
18.178
1.756
7.008
9.414
Totale
1.069.850
225.023
64.245
84.018
696.563
282.501
26.993
387.070
membri
Saldo
21% 65% 36%
(*) Non recuperabile: Decisione formale nel quadro della liquidazione dei conti [Reg.729/70].
As far as Italy is concerned, the tables above are emblematic of the modest sums recovered with respect to
the enormous amounts still outstanding and the scarce effectiveness of recovery action, even many years after
notification of the irregularity was made.