this PDF file - Perspectives on Terrorism

Transcription

ISSN 2334-3745
Volume IX, Issue 6
December 2015
PERSPECTI VES O N TERRORISM
Volume 9, Issue 6
Table of Contents
Welcome from the Editor
1
I. Articles
The Evolution of Al Qaeda’s Global Network and Al Qaeda Core’s Position Within it: A
Network Analysis
2
by Victoria Barber
Radical Groups’ Social Pressure Towards Defectors: The Case of Right-Wing Extremist
36
Groups
by Daniel Koehler
Religion, Democracy and Terrorism
51
by Nilay Saiya
20 Years Later: A Look Back at the Unabomber Manifesto
60
by Brett A. Barnett
II. Research Notes
Re-Examining the Involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism: A Comparison of the
U.S. and U.K.
72
by Sam Mullins
Terrorist Practices: Sketching a New Research Agenda 85
by Joel Day
Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why They Joined, What
They Saw, Why They Quit
95
by Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla
III. Resources
Bibliography: Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation
119
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes
IV. Book Reviews
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 40 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related
Subjects
154
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
ISSN 2334-3745
i
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
V. Notes from the Editor
A Word of Appreciation for Our External Peer Reviewers 167
from the Editorial Team
TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2015: Call for Submissions
169
TRI National/Regional TRI Networks (Partial) Inventory of Ph.D. Theses in the Making
170
by Alex P. Schmid (Network Coordinator)
Job Announcement: Open Rank Faculty Search at CTSS, UMass Lowell
175
About Perspectives on Terrorism
177
ISSN 2334-3745
ii
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Welcome from the Editor
Dear Reader,
We are pleased to announce the release of Volume IX, Issue 6 (December 2015) of Perspectives on Terrorism
at www.terrorismanalysts.com. Our free online journal is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research
Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna (Austria), and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS),
headquartered at the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts (United States).
Now completing its ninth year, Perspectives on Terrorism has over 5,800 regular subscribers and many more
occasional readers and visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer-reviewed by
external referees while its Research Notes, Policy Notes and other content are subject to internal editorial
review.
This issue begins with analysis by Victoria Barber on the relationship between al Qaeda core and other
identifiable groups within the so-called “global jihadist movement.” She finds that many groups’ ideological
affinity seems to give way to more worldly concerns, and globalization to regional concerns, indicating
limited evidence of a truly cohesive global network. Then Dan Koehler looks at how right-wing extremist
groups react – emotionally and strategically – when individuals defect from the group. In the next article,
Nilay Saiya describes how states that provide religious security for their citizens undercut the ideological
narratives disseminated by religious militants (that their faith is under attack), and thus dampening the
resonance of their appeal for violent action. Finally, Brett Barnett examines how and why the manifesto of
“Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski has resonated with some radical environmentalists.
Our Research Notes section begins with a piece by Sam Mullins examining how religious converts compare
with non-converts in the U.S. and U.K. with regard to involvement in terrorist activities 1980-2013. Next, Joel
Day proposes an innovative mixed methods approach to the study of terrorist cultural, ritual and community
practices. And in the final piece of this section, Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla provide some preliminary
results of their Islamic State Interviews Project, based here on a sample of thirteen Syrian IS defectors who
spoke about life inside the “Islamic State” and now warn others not to join what they gradually came to see as
a totally disappointing, ruthless and un-Islamic organization.
The Resources section features an extensive bibliography by Judith Tinnes on homegrown terrorism and
radicalization, and 40 short book reviews by Joshua Sinai. And the issue concludes with a sincere word
of thanks to our external peer reviewers; an announcement for the annual TRI Award for Best Thesis; an
inventory of Ph.D. theses underway by members of the TRI National/Regional Networks; and a faculty job
announcement from the CTSS at UMass Lowell.
This issue of the journal was prepared by the co-editor of Perspectives on Terrorism, Prof. James Forest at the
University of Massachusetts Lowell, who offers a special thank you to our new Editorial Assistant Jared Mello
and to CTSS Co-Op Scholar Danielle Thibodeau for their considerable assistance. The next issue (February
2016) will be prepared in the European offices of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) by Prof. em. Alex P.
Schmid.
ISSN 2334-3745
1
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
I. Articles
The Evolution of Al Qaeda’s Global Network and Al Qaeda
Core’s Position Within it: A Network Analysis
by Victoria Barber
Abstract
There has been much discussion in recent decades regarding the nature of the threat posed by terrorism. In
doing so, many have cited the existence of a vast and amorphous global terrorist network, with Al Qaeda at
the helm. But is that model a truly accurate one? By using social network analysis to map and track Al Qaeda’s
global network from 1996 to 2013, this article seeks to determine whether the global movement is as cohesive
and ideologically-driven as it has been made out to be. Ultimately, it finds that not only is that model no longer
reflective of Al Qaeda’s global network, it likely never was. In the end, ideological affinity seems to give way to
more worldly concerns, and globalization to regional concerns, leaving the idea of a global movement lacking.
Keywords: Al-Qaeda; networks; influence
Introduction
T
here has been much debate in recent years over the nature of the threat posed by terrorism in the 21st
century. A prominent question within this debate concerns how the terrorist threat is structured: Is it
within traditional groups and their affiliates or individuals taking their own initiative, rendering the
traditional group structure irrelevant?[1] The impact of this answer will dictate strategies for intervention.
For example, should the threat lie in individual self-motivated actors, the often-used strategy of decapitation
is of limited use. While there are certainly arguments to be made for the threat posed by the rise of lone
wolves[2] and their origins in more familiar movements within the counter-terrorism field,[3] this article will
focus on established groups, as its primary concern is in relationships between them.
Such relationships have changed in recent decades, as advances in technology and more affordable travel
have made communication and coordination much easier.[4] This has given rise to transnational terrorist
movements and allowed these established groups to move beyond the national and regional struggles they
had engaged in before.[5] As part of this transition, many groups moved from the traditional hierarchical
organization observed in non-state armed groups in the past and toward a more horizontal structure,[6]
leading researchers to study terrorist organizations as networks.[7] There is much debate over the relative
merits of these organizational structures. On the one hand, size can be a limiting factor for a networked
structure, as large networks can be difficult to control and coordinate.[8] However, becoming networked
can make a group more resilient to intervention and can therefore be an attractive choice for clandestine
organizations.[9]
The rise of Al Qaeda provides an excellent example of this transition and the globalization of the terrorist
threat.[10] Arguably the group with the greatest reach and influence in the last several decades, Al Qaeda
Core began as a small and highly selective group that arose out of the Soviet-Afghan War.[11] They
maintained this status throughout the 1990s, quietly influencing uprisings throughout the Middle East and
biding their time until they entered the world stage with the September 11th attacks.[12] By September 12th,
2001, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were household names, and Al Qaeda Core was in the position to
ISSN 2334-3745
2
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
foster other militant groups on a much broader scale. It was seen as the hallmark of a new kind of terrorist
threat, one that was no longer confined to a specific conflict or geographic area and could pose a legitimate
threat to even the most powerful states.[13]
The most common contemporary image of Al Qaeda is that of a global movement with Al Qaeda Core as the
vanguard for a network of affiliated groups that could be utilized within the movement, but did not require
the same maintenance and control as a hierarchical organization.[14] This affiliation could be anything from
sending members to Al Qaeda affiliated training camps or publishing statements in support of Al Qaeda
to formally pledging one’s group to Al Qaeda Core. What emerged was a structure that could loosely be
described as a set of concentric circles, with Al Qaeda Core at the center, immediately surrounded by the
lucky few groups that were allowed to call themselves its regional branches, followed by affiliate groups who
benefitted from Al Qaeda in some way, and finally the independent cells or individuals, who were inspired by
Al Qaeda, but lacked any tangible connection to the Core.[15]
There is much debate over the nature and genesis of this structure.[16] Some scholars argue that the
networked approach was adopted consciously, with key members of the organization advocating for the early
versions of the structure even before 9/11.[17] Others argue that much effort was placed on maintaining a
strict hierarchy within the group, which made it less able to combat more networked organizations, such as
ISIS.[18] On this side of the debate, the structure emerged in response to counter-terrorism efforts, rather
than as a conscious choice by the leadership.[19]
Regardless of where one falls in these discussions, Al Qaeda as an organization evolved into being part of a
larger network that spanned the globe, though whether it maintains a position as a member or leader of that
network remains to be seen. But is the idea of a sustained global terrorist network an accurate one or is that
image overblown or out-of-date? The remainder of this article will attempt to address this concern by looking
at what makes groups cooperate and where Al Qaeda Core lies within the network.
There are many schools of thought surrounding the best way to measure the strength of a network, be it
density of connections, leadership roles, or number and independence of sub-groups.[20] However, while
these could certainly be useful when evaluating an organization as a whole, this research approaches the idea
of the network in a slightly different way. Rather than looking at Al Qaeda Core’s network in terms of strength
and weakness, the purpose of this research is to determine whether this image of a sustained, cohesive global
movement with Al Qaeda Core at the center was an accurate one.[21] To answer this question, Al Qaeda
Core’s leadership role within the network and whether those actors with which it cooperates are in line with
its ideology serve as key variables. As an ideologically based organization, it follows that working with groups
that have similar objectives would denote the maintenance of its image and that of a global movement. As
with any coalition, agreement on objectives is central to the maintenance of a multi-actor campaign. As such,
within the context of this research, Al Qaeda Core’s global network is considered “strong” when it maintains a
clear leadership role and engages largely with actors that are in line with its objectives.
The discussion that follows will track trends in cooperation and competition in Al Qaeda’s global network
as it grows and Al Qaeda Core’s place within it to determine the validity of this global network model.
Ultimately, the argument is made that we can use these variables to determine whether the image of a
cohesive global network is an accurate one.
ISSN 2334-3745
3
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Methodology
The primary analytical approach used within this article is network analysis. A networked dataset was
created largely from the data supplied by the Mapping Militants Project (MMP),[22] run by Professor Martha
Crenshaw of Stanford University, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[23] To create the dataset, this
project began with the list of groups and the links between them that were included within the Al Qaeda
Global Network portion of the MMP. From there, all of the incidents that involved two or more groups were
pulled from the GTD, provided that at least one group was in the original list from the MMP. The research
was restricted to these two sources in an effort to contain the scope of this project. This restriction does
give rise to some limitations in the research, which are elaborated upon in more detail later in this article.
However, future research could expand the source material in order to further test the conclusions found
here.
This methodology was chosen to highlight the connections between these groups and the character of those
connections. In the interest of showing the development of relations over time, the analysis was broken
into four time periods, each of which spans roughly five years. In the diagrams and analyses that follow, a
tie between two groups represents one or more incidents that involved those two groups during that time
period. In the instances where there were multiple incidents involving two groups that occurred in the same
time period, those incidents were aggregated according to an averaging method that will be elaborated upon
in the sections that follow.
Ultimately, this methodology allows the researcher to track the evolution and devolution of relationships
between groups within the larger Al Qaeda network, as ties are not cumulative between time periods. As
ties appear between groups, it indicates that there were incidents involving those two groups within the
time block in question. As they disappear between time periods, the lack of tie indicates that there was not
an additional incident within the more recent time block present in either the MMP or GTD datasets. In
doing so, this analysis reveals changes in cooperative behavior between groups within the network, as well as
patterns within the network as a whole.
Groups
In this analysis, all groups that were included within MMP or the subset of the GTD previously mentioned
were considered, regardless of their status as terrorist organizations, level of affiliation with Al Qaeda Core,
etc. An assortment of demographic information was collected on each one in an effort to determine whether
there was a pattern or change in the nature of groups admitted into the Al Qaeda network over time. These
included: country of origin/primary activity, level of Al Qaeda affiliation, primary target(s), organizational
objective(s), umbrella organization(s), and a series of yes/no features that are described in more detail below.
Ultimately, a total of 56 organizations were considered, all of which are listed below in alphabetical order.[24]
•
313 Brigade
•
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
•
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
•
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia)
•
Ahrar al-Sham
•
Al Jama’a Al-Islamiya
ISSN 2334-3745
4
December 2015
•
Al Qaeda Core (AQ)
•
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
•
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
•
Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY)
•
Al Shabab
•
Al Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood)
•
Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions
•
Al Tawhid Islamic Front (TIF)
•
Ansar al-Islam (AI)
•
Asif Raza Commandos
•
Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)
•
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)
•
Black Banner Brigade
•
Boko Haram
•
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
•
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
•
Free Syrian Army
•
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
•
Haqqani Network
•
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI)
•
Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen
•
Hizb-I-Islami
•
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)
•
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
•
Indian Mujahideen
•
Islamic Army in Iraq
•
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
•
Islamic State (IS)
•
Jabhat al-Nusra
•
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
ISSN 2334-3745
5
Volume 9, Issue 6
December 2015
•
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)
•
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)
•
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
•
Jundallah
•
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
•
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
•
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
•
Lashkar-e-Zil
•
Liwa al-Islam
•
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
•
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
•
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
•
Mujahideen Army (MA)
•
Mutassim Bellah Brigade
•
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
•
Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement
•
Second Soran Unit (SSU)
•
Sipah-I-Mohammed
•
Taliban
•
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Volume 9, Issue 6
The following analysis focuses mainly on whether or not a group’s organizational objectives are in line with
the stated objectives of the Core, its country of origin/primary activity, and the level of affiliation each group
has with Al Qaeda Core. Further discussion of the data collection methods for those three features can be
found below, though it is worth noting that the variables collected on the groups were treated as static. In
other words, attribute data were not collected separately for each time period. A full explanation of the data
that were collected but not addressed in this paper can be found in Appendix I.
Organizational Objective(s)
For coding purposes, each of the publicized organizational objectives, as specified in the MMP dataset and
supplemental source material, were recorded without any limitation on the number of objectives ascribed to
each group. The list of organizational objectives used in coding are as follows; few of the groups had only one
of them, while many have expressed a combination of any number of these as primary objectives:
ISSN 2334-3745
6
December 2015
•
Government Overthrow[25]
•
Establish Islamic Government
•
Wahhabi
•
Anti-Shia
•
Anti-Western
•
Incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan
•
Nationalist
Volume 9, Issue 6
In the analysis, the primary focus was on whether or not groups aligned with the publicized organizational
objectives of Al Qaeda Core—namely a combination of Anti-Shia, Anti-Western, and Establishing an Islamic
Government objectives.[26] As such, any organization with at least two of Al Qaeda Core’s organizational
objectives was treated as being ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda Core’s goals. For the purposes of this
analysis, a new binary variable was created to denote whether a group matched the above description or not.
Region
In an effort to determine whether geography was a factor in the admission of groups into the network, the
countries in which organizations originated—or, in the cases in which the leadership was forced to relocate,
primarily operate—were recorded. For the sake of more efficient analysis, the countries were divided into
regions, which were then used as the primary geographical identifiers for groups. The list of such countries,
divided by region, is as follows.
•
•
•
South Asia
•
Afghanistan
•
India
•
Pakistan
Pacific
•
Indonesia
•
Malaysia
•
Philippines
•
Singapore
Middle East
•
Iran
•
Iraq
•
Iraq (Kurdistan)
•
Israel
ISSN 2334-3745
7
December 2015
•
•
•
•
Palestine
•
Saudi Arabia
•
Syria
•
Turkey
•
Yemen
Volume 9, Issue 6
Northern Africa
•
Algeria
•
Egypt
•
Morocco
East Africa
•
Ethiopia
•
Somalia
West Africa
•
Mali
•
Nigeria
Level of Al Qaeda Affiliation
The first four levels of Al Qaeda affiliation were drawn from Hoffman and Reinares’s definitions of the four
types of affiliation with Al Qaeda Core.[27] There was, however, a need for two more categories within
the dataset, in addition to a category for groups with no apparent relationship with Al Qaeda Core. The
first, Anti-AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), though limited to groups in Iraq, did not easily fit into any of the four
categories. These groups generally work against AQI, now the Islamic State (IS), though have occasionally
worked with it. In both instances, their interactions with the group earned them places within the network
and, by extension, an additional category. The second addition, “Many members were veterans of the SovietAfghan War”, describes groups that have no obvious Al Qaeda affiliation, other than the fact that their
members served in the Soviet Afghan war with the original Al Qaeda Core members. They could potentially
be categorized within the fourth category, Independent Cell (Inspired by AQ), but the fact that the fourth
category specifies that Al Qaeda provided inspiration to the groups or individuals within it make that
argument problematic, as many of them were founded before or contemporaneously with Al Qaeda Core. As
such, they were given their own category of affiliation. Those groups with no apparent relationship with Al
Qaeda Core were coded as “no affiliation”. The full list of levels of affiliation is outlined below.
•
AQ Central / Core
•
AQ-Directed Branch / Territorial Extension
•
Autonomous Affiliate
•
Independent Cell (Inspired by AQ)
ISSN 2334-3745
8
December 2015
•
Anti-AQI (though occasional ally)
•
Many members were veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War
•
No affiliation
Volume 9, Issue 6
Links
To achieve a more nuanced view of the network, the links between the groups were also coded. The
two features of particular concern, other than which groups were involved in each incident and when it
happened, were the type of link and where that type fell on a scale of what level of commitment that action
represented on the part of the groups involved. More detail on both of those features is provided in the
sections below.
Type of Link
The type of link denotes the nature of the relationship between the two groups for that data point. Each link
describes an incident in which two groups were involved. As such, the links between the groups describe a
wide variety of actions that one group can take with or against another. All links described within the MMP
dataset were included in this analysis, regardless of the relationship’s nature, relative importance, or ultimate
outcome. Likewise, the only requirements for GTD incidents to be included in this analysis were that at least
one of the groups from the MMP was involved, and collaborative action was at least suspected. In other
words, if the incident was recorded within the GTD as having two groups involved because it was listed as
potentially being committed by either one organization or the other, rather than it being the product of joint
effort, it was excluded from this study. The 20 types of links between groups identified within the dataset are
listed below:
•
Documented Alliance
•
Joint Operation
•
Training
•
Host Leader
•
Material Aid
•
Shared Leader (i.e. the leader of one organization belonged to the other at some point)
•
Establishes Contact
•
Parent-Child Organizations
•
Public Statement of Support
•
Oath of Allegiance
•
Merger
•
Humanitarian Aid
•
Split
ISSN 2334-3745
9
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
•
Personal Friendship Between Leaders
•
Documented Rivalry
•
Sanctuary (i.e. one group provided sanctuary to a number of members of the other during a time of
persecution)
•
Public Statement of Condemnation
•
Armed Conflict
•
Rejected Merger
•
Training/Financial Aid
Link Level
To aid in analysis, the types of link were further categorized into six groups, based on two main criteria:
positive or negative (which describes whether the link between the two organizations was cooperative or
competitive, respectively), and high, medium, or low (which denoted the strength of the connection). The
distinction between positive and negative links is fairly straightforward, but the demarcation between high,
medium, and low level links is more subjective and, therefore, warrants further description.
The category “Low” was limited to those links that were either primarily based on public statements or
individual relationships. These are considered low-level links because they involve relatively less effort on the
part of the group (or even individual) or involve taking one group “out of the game” (e.g. hiding members of
another group during a time of persecution).
Medium-level links describe either relationships documented from an outside source (e.g. a government
report describing two groups as allies) or the provision of some sort of aid without one group taking the extra
step of performing a joint operation with the other. Again, this is a higher level of commitment than the lowlevel category in that there are additional steps taken (e.g. providing funds to support another group, rather
than simply praising them in public), but this relationship falls short of physically acting together.
Finally, high-level links are reserved for events that either change or establish organizational structures
(e.g. merging organizations, pledging allegiance, or splitting) or involve the groups actively working
with or against each other. These links denote the highest level of commitment, as they involve either the
fundamental structures of the groups or placing “boots on the ground” for an operation or conflict. As such,
they were awarded the highest weight.
A detailed breakdown of where each type of link was placed within this framework can be found in Table 1:
ISSN 2334-3745
10
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Table 1: Types of Links Between Organizations
Positive
Low
Public Statement
Medium
Documented Alliance
High
Oath of Allegiance
Hosting Leader
Training/Financial Aid
Merger
Shared Leader
Humanitarian Aid
Parent-Child Organizations
Establishing Contact
Material Aid
Joint Operation
Documented Rivalry
Armed Conflict
Personal Friendships
Negative
Sanctuary
Public Statement
Split
Rejected Merger
Analysis
In an effort to examine the changes within the network before and after the 9/11 attacks, the analysis here is
limited to the period between 1996 and 2013, when the MMP dataset ends. Moreover, the data is separated
into four intervals of time in order to both show the progression in the network over time and have enough
data in each interval of time to be meaningful.
Within the discussion of each interval, there is a network map to illustrate the structure of the network and
the types of links found between the groups that were active within that time period. Also included is a series
of network measures to assess Al Qaeda’s role within the network and trends in the groups with which it
chooses to interact.
The two measures this research focuses on are centrality and cohesion. Centrality denotes the role of an
individual actor within the network. There are several measures to determine centrality, each with its own
implications. For these purposes, three have been selected: betweenness, eigenvector, and closeness. For
comparison, each interval discussion includes the top three groups for each measure. Before discussing
these measures in the context of this research, it is worth defining each in order to ensure clarity in their
implications.
Betweenness denotes the number of paths between groups. Actors with high betweenness scores are couriers
of information. They connect groups to each other and can act as both bottlenecks and facilitators.[28]
Within the context of this research, one would expect Al Qaeda Core to have a high betweenness score for
each time interval, if it is truly the “mastermind” of the network.
Eigenvector centrality measures the level of connection to other well-connected nodes. Those with high
eigenvector scores are informal leaders, who have influence over more overt power players.[29] As with
betweenness, one would expect Al Qaeda Core to have a very high score for eigenvector centrality, meaning
that it is pulling the strings behind the regional clusters of groups.
Closeness determines how many steps are required for each group to reach every other group within the
network. Groups with low closeness scores have fewer steps to get to the others in the network. Within the
context of this research, this is the number of other groups one actor would have to work through to reach
ISSN 2334-3745
11
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
every other actor. Again, one would expect Al Qaeda Core to have a low closeness score in each time block.
This implies that AQC has relatively few steps to go through to get to each of its affiliates, as compared to the
rest of the network, which would have to go through AQC to reach another affiliate.
To assess the cohesion of the network, or how often groups tend to work with other groups that are similar
to them in some respect, this analysis uses an E-I Index. This measure reports on a scale of -1.00 to 1.00 how
often a group (or all groups within the network as a whole) interacts with another group with whom it shares
a given characteristic. A score of -1.00 denotes that a group only works with groups that are like it and 1.00
describes an actor that only works with groups that are unlike it. A characteristic used within this analysis
is region of primary activity. If the E-I Index is taken for a group based in the region of primary activity for
actors within the network, then the score a group receives describes how likely that group is to work with
other groups from its region. If an actor scores a -1.00, that means that it interacts entirely with other actors
from the same region.
For the purposes of this analysis, an E-I Index for both Al Qaeda Core and the network as a whole are
included, with the “in-group” defined in four different ways:
1.
Those who are considered in line with Al Qaeda Core’s objectives, as defined in the Methodology
section of this article
2.
Those that originate from or primarily operate in a given region
3.
Those who fall into the category of being Al Qaeda Core, a Regional Branch, or an Autonomous
Affiliate (i.e. have an established and tangible relationship with Al Qaeda Core)
4.
Those who are either Al Qaeda Core or a Regional Branch.
These categories were chosen to examine whether Al Qaeda Core is more likely to interact with groups that
are ideologically or organizationally similar to it, as demonstrated by similar objectives or an established
relationship, respectively.
Combined, these measures speak to the strength of Al Qaeda Core’s position within the network. With
high centrality measures, AQC is in a position of power within the network, with that power defined by
both controlling the flow of information and affiliation (with Betweenness and Closeness) and maintaining
connections to other well-connected actors (with Eigenvector centrality). Cohesion speaks to the idea that
Al Qaeda Core is maintaining control over its message and goals within the network by maintaining ties to
groups that are ideologically similar to itself.
One important note in the centrality and cohesion measures is that, unlike network maps, only positive links
were included. In other words, the cohesion score represents how likely Al Qaeda Core is to work together
with another group, not how likely the two groups are to simply interact. This was done to prevent the
negative ties from skewing the measures toward actors that often clash with others, as this research is chiefly
concerned with Al Qaeda’s positive control over its network.
The following sections include an analysis of Al Qaeda Core’s network at four time intervals, including
a network map, centrality measures to determine Al Qaeda’s position within that network, and cohesion
measures to quantify the features of groups that make Al Qaeda Core more or less likely to work with them.
ISSN 2334-3745
12
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
1996-2000
This block represents the period leading up to the September 11th attacks. This was when the network was in
its infancy, as Al Qaeda Core was planning the attack under the watchful eye of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. It
was also during this period that the networked structure and “homegrown” jihad movement were developed.
[30] At this point, Al Qaeda Core certainly had ties to other groups, as evidenced below. However, the
familiar concentric circle model has yet to take shape. In Figure 1 below, the colors represent the average
commitment level between those groups during this time period, a method that will carry forward for
every subsequent diagram within this paper. To obtain this average, each link level was given a weight (i.e.
Negative, High = 1, Negative, Medium = 2, up to Positive, High = 6) and an average level was taken based on
the number of links between the groups.
Figure 1: Al Qaeda Network 1996–2000
In the map above, the network has a hub-and-spoke structure, with Al Qaeda Core at the center, not unlike
the star network proposed by Arquilla, which requires information and planning to flow through the hub.
[31] This is especially interesting to observe, given the previously mentioned debates surrounding when and
why Al Qaeda adopted a networked approach to its activities. Regardless of whether it was done intentionally
before counter-terrorism measures put pressure on the organization after 2001, it does appear that Al Qaeda
Core had been developing a network among its associates before that time. Al Qaeda Core tends to enjoy
strong positive links (i.e. Positive High and Medium), while the rest of the network is defined by weaker
positive and even negative links. In short, Al Qaeda is securely positioned at the center of a network that is
defined by its relationships.
It is worth noting that much care was taken to code each tie independently of external factors to maintain
both the integrity of the dataset and the ability to observe the network as it evolved. For example, a reader
who is familiar with the case may view the positive-low link weight between Al Qaeda Core and the Haqqani
Network as reductive of the relationship between the two groups. However, in the interest of consistency,
ISSN 2334-3745
13
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
every instance of one group hosting the leadership of another, or providing safe-haven for that group,
is coded as a low-positive tie, regardless of the long-term implications of that tie. Additional relations
that, admittedly, likely grew out of the affiliation cemented during this period will be coded and analyzed
separately in subsequent sections as they arise.
Centrality
Unsurprisingly, Al Qaeda is a strong frontrunner in all three measures of centrality, as shown in Table 2,
below. To reiterate, a high betweenness measure indicates that Al Qaeda Core is the path through which
information and planning flows. Having the highest eigenvector measure indicates that Al Qaeda Core is the
most strongly connected to other well-connected groups. Finally, having the lowest closeness score means
that Al Qaeda Core can connect with other groups within the network by going through the lowest number
of other groups, (i.e. has the least degree of separation from other actors). In combination, leading each of
these categories denotes that Al Qaeda Core has a firm grasp on the network.
Table 2: Analysis of Data on Centrality, 1996–2000
Betweenness
First
Al Qaeda Core
(62.000)
Second
Third
Laskar-e-Jhangvi (40.000)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (36.000)
Eigenvector
Al Qaeda Core
(0.453)
Haqqani Network (0.362)
Closeness
Al Qaeda Core
(26.000)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (32.000)
Not only does it control the flow of information between the groups with its high betweenness measure,
but it also enjoys a position that is both well connected to other well-connected groups, such as they are in
a network like this, and requires very few steps to reach any other group. This implies that there is little that
gets done involving multiple actors within network without Al Qaeda Core’s involvement.
Cohesion
Once again, cohesion measures indicate a group’s likelihood to work with another that shares some
characteristic with it. This analysis also included cohesion measures along each parameter for a variety of
datasets, including two different ways to consolidate multiple ties within a time interval and subsequently
eliminate negative ties.
Thus far, this analysis has focused on the average commitment level between groups for a given time interval.
However, to thoroughly test the aggregation methods, cohesion measures were also taken using the highest
level of commitment between two groups, rather than the average. For example, if two groups had two
ties, one with a strength of 1 and the other with a strength of 4, they would average to 2.5, which would be
excluded from the average-based analysis, as it would round to a level 3 tie, which corresponds to a Negative
Low score. However, in running the measures for the highest tie between groups, this relationship would be
included, as the highest commitment level between them is 4, a Positive Low score.
ISSN 2334-3745
14
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
In addition, not only were cohesion measures run for all positive ties, but they were also run for only the
highest levels of commitment. In other words, cohesion measures were determined both for a network of all
positive ties between groups (i.e. low, medium, and high), and for only the Positive High ties.
As a result, the EI index was taken for each interval in four different ways:
1.
Taking the average commitment level between two groups and eliminating all negative ties (i.e.
Weights of 1-3 are eliminated, leaving only positive commitment levels)
2.
Taking the highest commitment level between two groups and eliminating all negative ties (i.e.
Weights of 1-3 are eliminated, leaving only positive commitment levels)
3.
Taking the average commitment level between two groups and eliminating all but the Positive High (6)
commitment (i.e. Weights of 1-5 are eliminated, leaving only Positive High commitment levels)
4.
Taking the highest commitment level between two groups and eliminating all but the Positive High (6)
commitment (i.e. Weights of 1-5 are eliminated, leaving only Positive High commitment levels)
This was done in order to determine whether the choice of analyzing only positive average commitment
levels obscured other results, which may have come to light in using another method of consolidating the
data. However, the results for all methodologies were comparable, and therefore all cohesion measures within
the body of this article will be average positive ties going forward. A table of all cohesion results can be found
in Appendix II.
The cohesion measures for our four key characteristics for the average positive commitment level between
1996 and 2000 are displayed in Table 3 below. Once again, the EI Index used for this analysis is on a -1.00
to 1.00 scale, with groups scoring a -1.00 interacting exclusively with those who are the same as they are. In
other words, if a group should score a -1.00 for the “Same Region” category, it means that said group interacts
exclusively with other groups from its region.
Table 3: Analysis of Data on Cohesion, 1996–2000
Similar
Same
Core/Regional Branch/
Core/Regional Branch
Objectives Region
Independent Affiliate
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.231
0.231
-0.692
0.692
Whole Network
-0.405
-0.568
-0.189
-0.405
Interestingly enough, even in these early stages, Al Qaeda Core is slightly more likely to interact with groups
that are not in line with their objectives. There is a stronger tendency within the network for groups that are
in-line with AQC’s objectives to work with each other and those who are not to work together. However, the
tendency is not very strong, implying that links are not necessarily ideologically motivated. One possible
explanation is that ideologically dissimilar groups are brought into the network in an effort to indoctrinate
them. However, it is impossible to prove that thesis definitively within the context of this project.
There is also a slight tendency for Al Qaeda Core to work with groups that are not focused within its region,
which is expected given its global agenda. There is also a moderate tendency for groups to work with others
within their region, which is, again, expected as the global network is still developing.
ISSN 2334-3745
15
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
There is a fairly strong tendency for AQC to work primarily with those with whom it has an established
relationship, at least when affiliates are included. However, that tendency reverses when affiliates are not
included in the “in-group”, which is to be expected given the timing, as many of the regional branches had yet
to take shape within the network.
2001–2005
The period including and following the September 11th attacks was one of expansion in the network.
Suddenly, groups were clamoring to be affiliated with the Al Qaeda brand,[32] which is reflected in Figure 2
below.
Figure 2: Al Qaeda Network 2001–2005
Once again, one can see a hub-and-spoke structure with Al Qaeda Core at the center and roughly the
same breakdown of the level of direct ties between AQC and others.[33] However, there is a significant
development that was not present in the previous time period. In the 2001-2005 period, we begin to see not
only affiliate groups connecting with each other on a large scale, but strong positive links between those
groups. In particular, the network begins to display small groups of two or three that are typically connected
to Al Qaeda Core through one member of the cohort, for example the cohort of Second Soran Unit (SSU)
Al Tawhid Islamic Front (TIF) and Ansar al Islam (AI), who are connected to the Core through AI. This
development is significant in that it denotes the decentralization of power within the network. Al Qaeda Core
still enjoys its place as the hub, connecting a vast array of spokes, but other hubs are beginning to emerge
among the groups in its network.
ISSN 2334-3745
16
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Centrality
Once again, there is little surprise in the centrality measures, as displayed in Table 3 below. Al Qaeda Core
maintains its place at the top of every centrality measure, with Ansar al-Islam often staking out second place.
Despite the expansion of the network and the increasing connections between affiliates, AQC is still the main
source of direction and information within the network.
Table 4: Analysis of Data on Centrality, 2001-2005
Betweenness
Eigenvector
Closeness
First
Al Qaeda Core
(349.000)
Al Qaeda Core
(0.616)
Al Qaeda Core
(49.000)
Second
Third
Ansar al-Islam (107.000)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (103.000)
Abu Sayyaf Group and
Jemaah Islamiyah (0.254)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the
Islamic State (69.000)
Cohesion
The EI Index for the four characteristics of interest during the 2001-2005 time interval are displayed in
Table 5. The results are very similar to those of the previous interval, with most of the patterns established
remaining largely unchanged.
Table 5: Analysis of Data on Cohesion, 2001-2005
Al Qaeda Core
Similar
Same
Core/Regional Branch/ Core/Regional
Objectives Region
Branch Only
0.231
0.231
-0.692
0.692
Whole Network
-0.368
-0.579
-0.158
-0.368
The paradoxically inclusive nature of Al Qaeda Core continues into this period, as there is a slight tendency
for AQC to interact with groups that are not in line with their objectives, as compared to the slight tendency
of the rest of the network to stay within their “in-group”, with regards to AQC’s ideology, though that effect
appears to be weakening compared to the previous time period. Moreover, while AQC’s tendency to seek out
groups outside of its region has continued, the regional focus of the network has only increased.
Likewise, there is still a strong tendency for Al Qaeda Core to interact with those groups, with which they
have an established connection. However, the tendency reverses when independent affiliates are removed
from the “in-group”, implying that Al Qaeda Core is largely limiting its activities to its independent affiliates,
as many of the regional branches are still forming.
In short, Al Qaeda Core remains the main hub of activity in a growing network. It is the key connection
between smaller networks of groups that share similar ideology and regional focus, without pigeon-holing
itself by excluding connections based on ideology or region. While this inclusion may or may not have been
a strategic decision, it reveals that even in the early stages, the Global Al Qaeda network does not meet the
characterization of strength in a global movement as provided within this research.
ISSN 2334-3745
17
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
2006-2010
The 2006-2010 time block shows a flurry of activity within the network. Not only have several new actors
emerged, but the structure of the network has changed dramatically, as displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Al Qaeda Network, 2006-2010
Once again, the number and breakdown of ties directly to Al Qaeda Core remained relatively constant.
However, the ties between affiliates with little interaction with AQC has increased exponentially, with both a
high proportion of strong positive ties and the highest number of negative ties that have appeared thus far.
Most significantly, while there is still a hub and spoke structure surrounding Al Qaeda Core, it no longer
has the monopoly on that structure. Figure 3 reveals the development of Al Shabab and Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan as hubs in their own rights. This is where one may begin to believe that the network may have
overextended itself. For more empirical data to that effect, this analysis will turn to centrality and cohesion
measures.
Centrality
While Al Qaeda Core managed to hold onto the top centrality scores, maintaining its position as a broker of
information, TTP is hot on its heels, as shown in Table 6.
ISSN 2334-3745
18
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
First
Al Qaeda Core
Betweenness
(80.500)
Al Qaeda Core
Eigenvector
(0.535)
Al Qaeda Core
Closeness
(214.000)
Second
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(45.000)
(0.509)
(218.000)
Third
Al Shabab (27.000)
Taliban (0.355)
Taliban (222.000)
In previous time intervals, there was rarely such consistency in the second and third positions in each
measure. A group may have one or two of the second-place spots. However, having a “clean sweep” of
second place and such little variety in third implies the solidification of other centers of power that are wellpositioned to challenge that of Al Qaeda Core.
Cohesion
In Al Qaeda Core we can observe near perfect external cohesion, perfect internal cohesion, and perfect
indifference, as evidenced in Table 7. Within the 2006-2010 time period, Al Qaeda almost exclusively
interacted with groups that were not in line with its organizational objectives, but with whom it had an
established relationship. However, it appeared that autonomous affiliates were still the preferred groups. It
also appeared to lose its preference for groups that were not part of its region, as it displays no preference
either way.
Al Qaeda
Core
Whole
Network
Similar
Objectives
Core/Regional
Branch/ Independent Core/Regional Branch
Affiliate
Only
Same
Region
0.75
0
-1
0.25
-0.403
-0.583
-0.667
-0.417
This implies that the ideology of the groups with which it interacted did not matter, so long as they were a
known ally. Moreover, it demonstrates the disconnect between the objectives of the affiliates and branches
AQC chose to foster in this period of expansion and the ideology of Al Qaeda Core itself. Although AQC
has displayed a pattern of being slightly biased toward bringing in groups that have different ideologies, there
has previously been a stronger base of those groups that are in line with its objectives to balance it out. In this
latest time period, it would seem that as the network has expanded, Al Qaeda Core has lost some measure of
control of its message via its affiliates.
Interestingly enough, groups in the rest of the network have displayed a moderate to strong preference for
those of with the same features that they do. In other words, groups with objectives in line with Al Qaeda
tend to work with each other, as do groups that operate within the same region, or have the same or similar
ISSN 2334-3745
19
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
levels of affiliation with Al Qaeda. This implies that even as Al Qaeda’s control over the network begins to
wane, its influence on the groups within it has remained. Still, while it has maintained one aspect of strength,
as defined within this context,[34] it seems to have abandoned the pursuit of the other.[35]
2011-2013
The shift in the network from the 2006-2010 time period to this one is clear in Figure 4. The number of links
has been dramatically reduced, as has the number of groups within the network.[36] Part of that reduction
may have been a function of the limitation of the MMP and GTD datasets, which only included links up to
2013, two years short of the full five-year interval that the other time periods were allotted. Another possible
explanation is the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. One of Al Qaeda Core’s greatest strengths was the
cult of personality around its leadership[37] and the loss of Osama bin Laden was a significant blow to the
organization, which may have translated into a period of inactivity within the network as the power void was
filled.
Figure 4: Al Qaeda Network, 2011-2013
The period is significant, however, as it includes the first negative tie between Al Qaeda Core and one of its
affiliates, the Islamic State. Up until now, direct connections between Al Qaeda Core and its affiliates have
been fairly predictable – a roughly equal mix of positive high, medium, and low ties. Now, however, it only
has two Positive High ties and one Negative Low. It would appear that Al Qaeda Core is becoming more selective with its links, only allowing for open affiliation in occasions of high commitment or public censure for
its affiliates stepping out of bounds (i.e. the Islamic State).
Centrality
This interval brings a change in centrality as well, as Al Qaeda Core is no longer the top score in each
centrality measure, displayed in Table 8. Indeed, it is not even in the top three for any of the measures.
ISSN 2334-3745
20
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
First
Second
Third
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Lashkar-e-Taiba (28.000)
Jabhat al-Nusra (16.000)
Betweenness
Pakistan (34.000)
Islamic Movement of
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Uzbekistan and Lashkar-e- Lashkar-e-Taiba (0.335)
Eigenvector
Pakistan (0.642)
Jhangvi (0.366)
Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, LashkarTehreek-eCloseness
Taliban Pakistan Lashkar-e-Taiba (449.000) e-Jhangvi, Indian
Mujahideen, and Haqqani
(448.000)
Network (456.000)
As was foreshadowed in the 2006-2010 interval, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has taken over as the bestconnected group in the network.[38] This is likely at least in part because of the larger size of the sub-network
in which it is central. Indeed, the network structure of the 2011-2013 interval implies the breakdown of the
global network into smaller, more easily managed groups that share some characteristic that binds them
together. Just what that characteristic is will be the subject of the subsequent section of this discussion.
Cohesion
The pattern for Al Qaeda Core in the 2011-2013 interval is one of extremes, as displayed in Table 9. It
exclusively works with groups that are not in line with its organizational objective, are from a different region,
and with which it has some type of established relationship. However, it does not have a preference between
regional branches and non-regional branches.
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Core/Regional
Branch/ Independent Core/Regional Branch
Similar
Same
Affiliate
Only
Objectives
Region
1
1
-1
0
-0.12
-0.68
-0.44
-0.6
Even more compelling are the results from the rest of the network. The pattern established in the previous
interval has held, in that groups still tend to work with those that are similar. The preference for groups
to work with those who match their alignment (or lack thereof) with Al Qaeda’s objectives has almost
disappeared, but the regional preference has increased to be the strongest factor in interaction between
groups, followed by whether the group is a regional branch of Al Qaeda. However, the strong preference
for working with groups that match one’s own status as a regional branch of Al Qaeda is likely skewed by
the small number of regional branches included within the 2011-2013 interval. The regional affinity of the
network is especially apparent in Figure 5, which displays the same network map as Figure 4, but with the
groups coded by region. There is clearly a division along regional lines within the larger network.
ISSN 2334-3745
21
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Figure 5: Al Qaeda Network 2011-2013, Coded by Region
Clearly, the network has lost any semblance of strength as a global AQC-led movement, as it does not meet
either criteria required for strength within the context of this project. Rather, the network appears to have
taken on a life of its own and returned to the regional focus that was the norm before Al Qaeda’s rise.
Conclusion
While Al Qaeda Core’s network of affiliates has certainly grown over time, the data do not support the
doomsday image of a vast and amorphous enemy that its reach implies. Rather, the network ultimately
appears to have overextended itself for Al Qaeda Core’s purposes, and the group has gradually lost control.
The period leading up to the 9/11 attacks saw a small, but stable network. Al Qaeda Core was well-positioned
as a power-player within a hub-and-spoke network. It did have a mix of groups that were in line with its
organizational objectives and those that were not, so it did not meet that aspect of strength. However, the
presence of both implies the maintenance of its ideological base, while logistical or doctrinal motivations may
account for the presence of dissimilar groups. All in all, it is the organized, tight-knit network that one fears
in the image of a Global Al Qaeda.
The five years following 9/11 did not see major changes in the nature of the network, as outlined above. Al
Qaeda Core still enjoyed its status as a hub and maintained a mix of ideologically similar and dissimilar
affiliates. However, this period saw an expansion in the network as groups flocked to AQC’s banner. More
importantly, those groups began to form connections with each other. So while groups maintained their
connections with Al Qaeda Core, they no longer relied on it as their sole source of information or direction –
they began to rely on each other.
ISSN 2334-3745
22
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
The true breakdown in Al Qaeda Core’s control came during the 2006-2010 interval, where it was not yet
ousted as the sole source of information and direction within the network, but its affiliates were clearly poised
to take active leadership roles. Even more damaging, it abandoned efforts to maintain ties with ideologically
similar groups altogether. There could be any number of logistical or tactical motivations for this, but the
ultimate implication is that the ideology of the group is not as important. For an ideologically motivated
organization like Al Qaeda, this represents a dangerous departure from its rhetoric and the loss of control
over its overall message.
The final interval, although incomplete, is important in that it represents both the increasing regionalization
of the network, and the introduction of competition between Al Qaeda Core and its regional branch. Al
Qaeda Core had previously been insulated from such negative ties, implying that this new period marks the
end of Al Qaeda’s unquestioned leadership. It also seems to point to the end of a global network, as groups
increasingly focus on regional conflicts and objectives. The ultimate function of Al Qaeda Core was to
inspire the rise of militant organizations and then connect them to each other. As the network grew and Al
Qaeda Core’s power waned, rather than prop up its creator, the movement fractured into regional networks.
Given the ongoing regionally focused conflicts in which many of these groups operate today, the trend
towards regionalism is unlikely to change. However, without additional data, it would be unwise to draw firm
conclusions from this interval.
The use of only two datasets, particularly ones that only include data up to 2013 has certainly limited the
number and types of links available for this research. In the interests of maintaining data integrity, only data
points included within the MMP and GTD datasets were considered. Moreover, links between groups were
only included when and how they were presented in the dataset. For example, Al Qaeda Core and Lashkare-Jhangvi had a close relationship beginning in the 1990s and continuing through the early 2000s. However,
there were only two specific links listed between them in the MMP dataset and none in the GTD – one in
1998 and another in 2001. To preserve consistency in coding, additional ties were not extrapolated from this
implied ongoing relationship and therefore these were the only ties between the two groups included within
this dataset. However, this methodology does have a trade-off in leaving the dataset open to some gaps. Some
of the more prominent omissions have been denoted in the footnotes of this paper for reference, though they
are not exhaustive.
In addition, the methods of aggregation—i.e. condensing multiple incidents involving groups into a single
tie within a given time period—did not take into account the relative importance of those events. In other
words, if there was a public statement of support that went largely unmarked and a joint operation with far
reaching consequences for the relationship between two groups, they were weighted the same within the
average (i.e. the tie would be weighted 5, as the joint operation is weighted 6 and the public statement 4).
Relative importance of ties was partially addressed in the weights themselves, however they do not address
specific instances in which a given event that may have a low score within this framework because of its type,
but has far reaching consequences on the relationship. This could lead to students of this network noting ties
that are weighted higher or lower than they would expect within the network maps. Some notable examples
have been highlighted in the text and footnotes, but these are also not exhaustive.
The inclusion of additional links or the expansion of the timeline could certainly alter or strengthen these
conclusions. In particular, recent developments with the Islamic State would have likely given the network
map in the 2011-2013 time block a very different shape, had it extended to present day. Moreover, as the GTD
is almost exclusively a database of terrorist attacks, all incidents taken from it were coded as the highest level
of either positive or negative commitment. This has the potential for biasing any results toward a higher level
ISSN 2334-3745
23
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
of commitment than might otherwise be observed with access to a greater number of medium and low level
incidents.
Finally, the use of a single coder, who is also the researcher, opens the dataset to questions of subjectivity. As
such, those interested in continuing research on the topic should do so using more rigorous coding methods,
as well as a more expansive dataset.
Ultimately, the image of a vast and tightly controlled network of organizations with Al Qaeda Core pulling
all the strings does not seem to be realistic. While that may have been the case on a smaller scale, during the
group’s time “under the radar”, its leap to infamy with the September 11th attacks appears to have marked the
end of that structure. Indeed, it never fully met the requirements of a strong network, as defined within this
project. Rather, we have a large, increasingly regionalized network that, while at least inspired and sometimes
aided by Al Qaeda, does not maintain the idea of a unified, globalized movement. In the end, with great
networks comes a great lack of control.
About the Author: Victoria Barber is a second-year Master’s student at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, concentrating on International Security Studies. In her research, she utilizes social network analysis
to study inter- and intra-group networks of non-state armed groups.
Bibliography
Abdoulaye, Ibbo Daddy, Jason Hanna, and Pierre Meilhan. “Report: Islamist Militants Claim 2 Deadly
Attacks in Niger.” CNN: Africa. CNN, 23 May 2013. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA).” Terrorist Organization Profile – Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA).
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
“al-Badr.” Terrorist Organization Profile – al-Badr. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
“al-Mansoorain.” Terrorist Organization Profile – al-Mansoorain. National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
Atwan, Abdel Bari . The Secret History of Al-Qa’ida, London: Saqi Books, 2006, p.265–66.
“Asif Raza Commandos.” Asif Raza Commandos. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Web. 9 June
2015.
“Asif Reza Commando Force.” Asif Reza Commando Force. South Asia Terrorism Portal. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).” Terrorist Organization Profile – Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
Berger, J.M.. “ISIS/The Islamic State.” Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA,
February 17, 2015.
Brams, J. Steven, Mutlu Hande, and S. Ling Ramirez, “Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to
Directed Graphs,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, 2006, p.703–718.
Carley, M. Kathleen, Diesner Jana, Reminga Jeffrey and Tsvetovat Maksim, “Toward an Interoperable
Dynamic Network Analysis Toolkit,” Decision Support System, 43, 2006, p.1324-1347
ISSN 2334-3745
24
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Carley, M. Kathleen, Ju-Sung, Lee and Krackhardt, David, “Destabilizing Network,” Connections 24 (3), 2002,
p.79–92.
Chalk, Peter. “The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern
Philippines?” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 26 Nov. 2013. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.
Cozzens, Jeffery B. and Magnus Ranstorp, “The Enduring Al Qaeda Threat: A Network Perspective,” in
Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, ed. Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair, London: Routledge,
2012, 90–97.
Cozzens, Jeffrey B.. “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function, Culture and Grand Strategy,” in Mapping
Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, London: Routledge,
2007, p.127–64, 132
Crenshaw, Martha. “Abu Sayyaf.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 20 July 2015. Web. 4
March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford
University, 12 May 2015. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University,
20 Jan. 2013. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Qaeda in Yemen.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 18 July 2015.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 9
Aug 2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Qaeda.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 28 Nov 2012. Web. 4
March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al Shabab.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 30 Sep 2013. Web. 4
March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Al-Tawhid Islamic Front.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 23 July
2015. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Ansar al-Islam.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 14 Aug 2014. Web.
4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Boko Haram.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 20 Feb 2015. Web. 4
March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Egyptian Islamic Jihad.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 9 Aug
2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Global Al-Qaeda.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, n.d. Web. 4
March 2015.
ISSN 2334-3745
25
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Crenshaw, Martha. “Haqqani Network.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 15 May 2015.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Harkat-ul-Jihadi al-Islami.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 28
Nov 2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 28 Nov
2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Hizbul Islam.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 10 July 2013. Web.
9 June 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Islamic Army in Iraq.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 23 July
2014. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Jabhat al-Nusra.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 12 Nov 2014.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Jaish-e-Mohammad.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 25 June
2015. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Jemaah Islamiyah.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 8 July 2015.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 7 July 2015.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Lashkar-e-Taiba.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 3 Aug 2012.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Lashkar-e-Zil.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 25 Aug 2012. Web.
4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Jaish al-Islam” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 5 Nov 2014. Web. 9
June 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 18
July 2013. Web. 9 June 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford
University, 6 Aug 2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Mujahideen Army.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 11 Aug 2014.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Second Soran Unit.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 11 Aug 2014.
Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 7
Aug 2012. Web. 4 March 2015.
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Islamic State.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 15 May 2015.
Web. 4 March 2015.
ISSN 2334-3745
26
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Taliban” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, 2 July 2013. Web. 4
March 2015.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Cyber Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse,” Parameters 36(2), 2006 p.77–87.
“Free Aceh Movement (GAM).” Terrorist Organization Profile – Free Aceh Movement (GAM). National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
“Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian Army.” Syria Comment RSS. Syria
Comment, 29 July 2011. Web. 9 June 2015.
Gunaratna, Rohan, “Al Qaeda’s Trajectory During and After Bin Laden,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,
Howard and Hoffman (eds.) Terrorism, p. 206-237.
“Hamas.” Terrorist Organization Profile – Hamas. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
Hamzawy, Amr, and Sarah Gebowski. “From Violence to Moderation: Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya and AlJihad.” Carnegie Papers 20 (2010). Print.
Helfstein, Scott and Wright, Dominic. “Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution, October 2011, pp. 785-813
“Hizb-I-Islami.” Terrorist Organization Profile – Hizb-I-Islami. National Consortium for the Study of
“Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).” Terrorist Organization Profile–Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9 June 2015.
Hoffman, Bruce, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 26, 2003, p.429-442.
Hoffman, Bruce. “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87(3), 2008, p.133–138.
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 63-71
Hoffman, Bruce and Fernando Reinares, “Conclusion,” in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, p. 618639
Holzer, Georg-Sebastian. “Somalia’s New Religious War.” Digital Library. International Relations and Security
Network, 31 July 2009. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C).” Terrorist Organization Profile: Islamic Great Eastern
Raiders Front (IBDA-C). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START). Web. 9 June 2015.
“Jamaat-e-Islami.” Military. Global Security.org. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM).” Terrorist Organization Profile – Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM).
Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Statement on Terrorism: Current and Long-Term Threats”, Senate Armed Services
Committee on Emerging Threats, November 15,2001. RAND Testimony Series. 2001.
ISSN 2334-3745
27
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Krebs, E. Valdis, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24 (3), 2002, p.43–52.
Koschade, Stuart, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism
and Intelligence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (6), 2006, p.559–575.
Laszlo-Barabasi, Albert, and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks.” Scientific American 288(5), 2003, p.60-69.
“Mahdi Army.” Terrorist Organization Profile – Mahdi Army. National Consortium for the Study of
Mayntz, R, “Hierarchy or network? On the Organizational Forms of Terrorism,” Berliner Journal für
Soziologie 14 (2), 2004, p.251.
“Mutassim Bellah Brigade.” Mutassim Bellah Brigade. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Web. 9
June 2015.
“Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).” Terrorist Organization Profile – Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web.
9 June 2015.
Pedahzur, Ami and Perliger, Arie, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective.”
Social Forces 94 (4), 2006.
Pedahzur, Ami and Perliger, Arie, Jewish Terrorism in Israel, New York: Columbia University Press (2009).
Perliger, Arie and Pedahzur, Ami, “Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence,”
Political Science and Politics, 44(1), 2011, p.45-50.
Perlinger, Arie. “Terrorist Networks’ Productivity and Durability: A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis.”
Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(4), 2014. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/
view/359/712.
Picarelli, John T. “The Future of Terrorism.” NIJ Journal, no. 264 (n.d.). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/228387.pdf.
“Rajah Solaiman Movement.” Rajah Solaiman Movement. United National Multilingual Terminology
Database. Web. 9 June 2015.
“Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement.” Terrorist Organization Profile – Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary
Movement. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Web. 9
June 2015.
Raufer, Xavier, “Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (2003): 391-398.
Rana, Amir. “Vengeance, Frictions Reviving LJ and Sipah-e-Muhammad.” Daily Times Archives. Daily
Times, 7 Apr. 2004. Web. 9 June 2015.
Reynolds, Paul. “Iraq Strategy Tough to Enforce.” BBC News. BBC, 4 Oct. 2004. Web. 9 June 2015.
Ryan, Michael W. S. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy ; the Deep Battle against America. Columbia Studies in
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 227-229.
Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2004.
ISSN 2334-3745
28
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Sahimi, Muhammad. “Who Supports Jundallah?” PBS. PBS, 20 Oct. 2009. Web. 9 June 2015.
Sakhuja, Vijay. “Terrorism or Freedom Struggle: The Free Aceh Movement by Vijay Sakhuja.” Terrorism–
Articles. Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 1 Dec. 2002. Web. 9 June 2015.
Sciolino, Elaine and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very Private Feud over Terrorism,” New York Times, June 8, 2008.
“Signers in Blood Battalion.” Signers in Blood Battalion. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Web.
9 June 2015.
“Sirri Powz.” Sirri Powz. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Web. 9 June 2015.
“The Daily Star Web Edition Vol. 4 Num 338.” The Daily Star Web Edition Vol. 4 Num 338.
The Daily Star, 13 May 2004. Web. 9 June 2015.
“The Holders of the Black Banner.” Terrorist Organization Profile – The Holders of the Black Banner.
Thomas, Timothy L.. “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning,” Parameters 23(1) 2003,
p.112–123.
Tunnard, Christopher, “Consulting Firm–Analyzing.” Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 30 September 2014.
Vennesson, Pascal. “Globalization and al Qaeda’s Challenge to American Unipolarity,” in Recalling September
11th: Is Everything Different Now?, ed. James Burk, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p232–61,
242.
Vidino, Lorenzo, “The Evolution of the Post-9/11 Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” in The Evolution of the Global
Terrorist Threat, p. 3-28
Zurutuza, Karlos. “’We Are Suffering Genocide at the Hands of Pakistan’: An Interview with BLF
Commander Allah Nazar | VICE News.” VICE News RSS. Vice News, 15 Apr. 2015. Web. 9 June 2015.
ISSN 2334-3745
29
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Appendix I: Other Coded Data for Groups
Analysis of these features of the dataset was eliminated for the sake of time and space within the article.
However, future research could certainly delve more deeply into how these features of the groups relate to
patterns of interactions within the network, as well as the longevity of the groups themselves.
Primary Target(s)
In an effort to determine where groups focused their operations, the dataset included the primary targets
of each group. The number of primary targets each group could have was not restricted, but rather all of
those identified within the Stanford project and other sources were recorded. This allowed for analysis on
the combination of targets, (e.g. groups that target primarily western institutions and foreign combatants
would likely be more sympathetic to the domestic population than those who target civilians and domestic
combatants). The primary target groups identified were as follows:
•
Civilians
•
Foreign Combatants
•
Domestic Combatants
•
Political Figures
•
Western Institutions
Umbrella Organization
In recent years, there have been several “umbrella organizations” that have emerged within the larger global
Al Qaeda network, primarily in Iraq.[39] These three organizations are listed below, however, the vast
majority of groups within the dataset do not belong to any of them.
•
None
•
Jihad and Reform Front
•
The Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance
•
United Jihad Council
Yes-No Attributes
Finally, a series of yes/no demographics for each group were recorded, which can be found in the list below.
These features were identified as potential factors that could either strengthen or weaken an organization’s
position within the global context and were recorded to determine if the there was any sort of pattern in
whether Al Qaeda Core interacted with groups that met such criteria. In coding them, a simple 1=true,
0=false system was used.
•
Is State Sponsored
•
Uses Criminal Fundraising
•
Is Funded by Other Terrorist Organizations
ISSN 2334-3745
30
December 2015
•
Is Officially Designated Terrorist Organization
•
Targets Combatants
ISSN 2334-3745
31
Volume 9, Issue 6
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Appendix 2: Full Cohesion Measures
1996-2000
Positive Only Cohesion (Average)
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.231
0.231
-0.692
0.692
Whole Network
-0.405
-0.568
-0.189
-0.405
Positive Only Cohesion (Highest)
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
0
0.333
-0.667
0.333
-0.167
-0.333
-0.333
-0.333
Positive High Only Cohesion (Average)
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
-0.333
1
-1
-0.333
-0.6
-0.2
-0.6
-0.6
Positive High Only Cohesion (Highest)
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
0
1
-1
0
-0.429
0.143
-0.429
-0.429
2001-2005
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Al Qaeda Core
0.231
Whole Network
-0.368
Only
0.231
-0.692
0.692
-0.579
-0.158
-0.368
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.333
0.333
-0.667
0.667
Whole Network
-0.389
-0.556
-0.167
-0.444
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.429
0.143
-0.429
0.714
Whole Network
-0.448
-0.724
-0.034
-0.586
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.429
0.143
-0.429
0.714
Whole Network
-0.484
-0.724
-0.032
-0.613
ISSN 2334-3745
32
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
2006-2010
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Same Region
0.75
Whole Network
-0.403
Only
0
-1
0.25
-0.583
-0.667
-0.417
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
0.75
0
-1
0.25
-0.403
-0.583
-0.667
-0.417
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
0.5
0.5
-1
0
-0.25
-0.625
-0.5
-0.625
Similar Objectives
Same Region
Only
Al Qaeda Core
0.667
0
-1
0.333
Whole Network
-0.158
-0.684
-0.579
-0.474
2011-2013
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
1
1
-1
0
-0.12
-0.68
-0.44
-0.6
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
1
1
-1
0
-0.12
-0.68
-0.44
-0.6
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
Same Region
Only
1
1
-1
0
-0.217
-0.739
-0.391
-0.652
Similar Objectives
Al Qaeda Core
Whole Network
ISSN 2334-3745
Same Region
Only
1
1
-1
0
-0.167
-0.75
-0.417
-0.667
33
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Notes
[1] Picarelli, John T. “The Future of Terrorism.” NIJ Journal, no. 264 (n.d.). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/228387.pdf.
[2] Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
[3] Ryan, Michael W. S. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle against America. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2013, p. 227-229.
[4] Cozzens, Jeffery B. and Magnus Ranstorp, “The Enduring Al Qaeda Threat: A Network Perspective,” in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, ed. Richard Jackson
and Samuel Justin Sinclair, London: Routledge, 2012, 90–97; Thomas, Timothy L. “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning,” Parameters 23(1)
2003, p. 112–123; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Cyber Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse,” Parameters 36(2), 2006 p. 77–87.
[5] Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Rev. and expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 63-71
[6] Hoffman, Bruce, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26, (2003): 429-442; Mayntz, R.,
“Hierarchy or Network? On the Organizational Forms of Terrorism,” Berliner Journal für Soziologie 14 (2), 2004, p. 251; Raufer, Xavier, “Al Qaeda: A Different
Diagnosis,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (2003): 391-398; Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
(2004); Pedahzur, Ami and Perliger, Arie, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective.” Social Forces 94 (4), 2006.
[7] Brams, J. Steven, Mutlu Hande, and S. Ling Ramirez, “Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
29, 2006, p. 703–718; Carley, M. Kathleen, Ju-Sung, Lee and Krackhardt, David, “Destabilizing Network,” Connections 24 (3), 2002, p. 79–92; Carley, M. Kathleen,
Diesner Jana, Reminga Jeffrey and Tsvetovat Maksim, “Toward an Interoperable Dynamic Network Analysis Toolkit,” Decision Support System, 43, 2006, p.
1324-1347; Krebs, E. Valdis, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24 (3), 2002, p. 43–52; Koschade, Stuart, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah
Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (6), 2006, p. 559–75; Perliger, Arie and Pedahzur, Ami, “Social
Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence,” Political Science and Politics, 44(1), 2011, p. 45-50.
[8] Carley et al. 2002; Pedahzur and Perliger, 2006
[9] Laszlo-Barabasi, Albert, and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks.” Scientific American 288(5), 2003, p.60-69.; Pedahzur, Ami and Perliger, Arie, Jewish
Terrorism in Israel, New York: Columbia University Press (2009); Cozzens, Jeffrey B.. “Approaching Al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function, Culture and Grand Strategy,” in
Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, London: Routledge, 2007, p.127–64, 132; Atwan, Abdel Bari . The
Secret History of Al-Qa’ida, London: Saqi Books, 2006, p.265–66.
[10] Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Statement on Terrorism: Current and Long-Term Threats”, Senate Armed Services Committee on Emerging Threats, November 15,
2001. RAND Testimony Series.
[11] Berger, J.M. “ISIS/The Islamic State.” Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, February 17, 2015.
[12] Gunaratna, Rohan, “Al Qaeda’s Trajectory During and After Bin Laden,” in Howard and Hoffman (eds.) Terrorism and Counterterrorism, p. 206-237.
[13] Vennesson, Pascal. “Globalization and al Qaeda’s Challenge to American Unipolarity,” in Recalling September 11th: Is Everything Different Now? ed. James Burk,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 232–261, 242.
[14] Hoffman, Bruce and Fernando Reinares, “Conclusion,” in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, p. 618-639
[15] Ibid.
[16] Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008; Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth
of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87(3), 2008, p.133–138; Sciolino, Elaine and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very Private Feud over Terrorism,” New York Times,
June 8, 2008.
[17] Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda. Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 95-101.
[18] Berger, J.M. “ISIS/The Islamic State,” 2015; Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” 2008, p. 133–138.
[19] Porter, Patrick. The Global Village Myth: Distance, War and the Limits of Power. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015, p. 136.
ISSN 2334-3745
34
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[20] Laszlo-Barabasi, Albert, and Eric Bonabeau, “Scale-Free Networks.” Scientific American 288(5), 2003, p.60-69; Pedahzur, Ami and Perliger, Arie, Jewish
Terrorism in Israel, New York: Columbia University Press (2009); Brams et al, “Influence in Terrorist Networks,” 2006; Carley et al, 2002, 2006; Helfstein, Scott
and Wright, Dominic. “Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2011, pp. 785-813; Krebs, “Mapping
Networks of Terrorist Cells,” 2002, p. 43-52; Koschade, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 2006, p. 559-575; Perliger, Arie. “Terrorist Networks’
Productivity and Durability: A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis.” Perspectives on Terrorism 8(4), 2014. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/359/712; Perliger and Pedahzur, 2006, 2009, 2011.
[21] Arguments can certainly be made for the role of ISIS in fracturing the movement, but this piece will focus on the period before IS broke from Al Qaeda.
[22] Crenshaw, Martha. “Global Al-Qaeda.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University, n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.
[23] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2014). Global Terrorism Database [GTD 1970-2013]. Retrieved from
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
[24] Sources used for coding the groups can be found in the Bibliography section of this paper.
[25] This designation was reserved for groups that were concerned with the overthrow of a specific government (e.g. the TTP in Pakistan), rather than groups that
were interested in the overthrow of apostate governments writ large.
[26] Al Qaeda Core’s organizational objectives, along with most other attribute data within the dataset, were taken from the Mapping Militants Project. In the
interest of maintaining as much consistency in the dataset as possible, it was only on the occasions that sufficient data were not available in the MMP, typically
because the group was not included within it, that outside sources were consulted.
[27] Hoffman, Bruce and Fernando Reinares, “Conclusion,” p. 618-639
[28] Tunnard, Christopher, “Consulting Firm–Analyzing.” Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 30 September 2014.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Vidino, Lorenzo, “The Evolution of the Post-9/11 Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, p. 3-28.
[31] Arquilla, John, David F. Ronfeldt, and United States, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.
[32] Berger, J.M. “ISIS/The Islamic State.” 2015.
[33] Again, one who is familiar with the case may note the positive high tie between AQC and Hamas as strange, given the public disputes that occurred between
the two during this period. However, the public disputes did not appear within the MMP dataset, and yet the GTD did list a joint operation between the two in
2007. As joint operations are coded as a high positive weight, the relationship between the two is shown as a high positive tie.
[34] Leadership i.e. the top place in centrality measures.
[35] Cooperation with those with whom it shares organizational objectives
[36] A reader who is familiar with the case may note the lack of ties between Al Qaeda Core and many other groups with which it had relations through this time
period, such as TTP, the Haqqani Network, and AQIM. However, there were no specific incidents linking Al Qaeda Core to any of these groups in either dataset
from 2011 to 2013. As mentioned previously, this project was limited to the MMP and GTD data for reasons of feasibility.
[37] Hoffman and Reinares, “Conclusion,” p. 618-639.
[38] Once again, a follower of TTP and LeT may find it odd that the two groups have a positive high link, given their history of shared hostilities. However, as with
the positive high tie between AQC and Hamas in the 2006-2010 interval, the MMP dataset did not include data points for the hostilities within this time period,
although there were some previously. Rather, the GTD listed a joint operation in 2012, which gave it the positive high weight.
[39] Crenshaw, Martha. “Global Al-Qaeda.” 2014.
ISSN 2334-3745
35
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Radical Groups’ Social Pressure Towards Defectors: The Case
of Right-Wing Extremist Groups
by Daniel Koehler
Abstract
Research on deradicalization and disengagement from terrorist groups has produced insights into factors
motivating to turn to violent milieus as well as reasons for turning away from them. Less exploration has focused
on the group dynamics involved when individuals leave the group. In particular, the social pressure component,
including the use of retaliatory violence, has not been adequately addressed. Testing Levine and Moreland’s
theoretic model of group reaction to disloyalty, this article illustrates how extremist groups determine the type
of social pressure, using five problem-centred interviews with former German neo-Nazis, as well as 12 cases
of violent social pressure on defectors in Germany and the United States. The main argument of this article is
that a group’s internal negotiation process regarding the pressure is typically segmented into two phases: one
emotionally-based, immediately after the defection and a second, more rational and strategic response phase
later on. Important factors determining the group’s reaction are: the in-group status of the defector, group specific
ideology, in-group future prospects and strategies, group structure, prevention of further defection, in-group
behavioural learning processes, the defection process itself, and pressure on the group from the government.
Keywords: Germany; right-wing extremism; deradicalization; defection; disloyalty; social pressure
Introduction
I
n November 2011, German police discovered that a right-wing extremist terrorist cell which called
itself the “National Socialist Underground (NSU),” had killed at least 10 people, was responsible for two
bombings, and had committed more than a dozen bank robberies over a period of more than 14 years.[1]
The trial against the only surviving member of the cell, Beate Zschäpe, and several alleged supporters started
in May 2013 and included witness statements of former right-wing activists. In one statement, a defendant
told the court that during his time in the movement “deviant” behaviour, such as eating non-German food,
was heavily punished. In his case he had to do push ups while being whipped[2]. This severe form of social
pressure only scratches the surface of what might happen to group members who consider leaving the group
and its ideology behind. In fact, numerous cases of murdering defectors are publicly known.
Although violent reactions and social pressure by right-wing groups towards potential and successful
defectors are well-known within deradicalization research, no systematic study about the mechanisms
and factors determining the types of social pressure inflicted by these groups exists at present. Most of the
literature on this issue focuses on the micro-social level and has established a number of important individual
motivations for joining and leaving such groups. A significant gap, however, can be found at the meso-social
level, as it is almost unknown which mechanisms and determining factors lead to specific forms of social
pressure which aim to either prevent individual defection or retaliate against those former group members
who have left the group. The present study therefore addresses the question: what are the mechanisms and
determining factors for social pressure to be directed at potential and successful defectors within extreme
right-wing groups? In addition, this article looks at the types of pressure typically used and the benefit
envisioned by the group.
ISSN 2334-3745
36
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Methods and Sources
This article is based on five problem-centred interviews[3] with former members from the German rightwing extremist scene. These interviews focused on two biographical phases–active time and post-defection–
asking about the respondents’ experiences with social pressure when the group was confronted with
defections during their active involvement, and how the group they belonged to reacted after the departure
of those interviewed. The interviews applied a semi-structured questionnaire. All interviews were recorded,
transcribed and qualitatively analysed, using MAXQDA software in several parallel coding and re-coding
phases. The interviews were conducted with the full consent of the respondents, within a safe environment
(e.g. the researcher’s office or a place of choice selected by the interviewee), and in full accordance with
the APA ethical standards. Quotes have been translated into English by the author. The sample consisted
of four male and one female interviewees. The respondents age ranged from 23 to 37 years (average being
32.6), reflecting the fact that all of the former extremists had relatively long careers in the German neo-Nazi
movement and left after occupying high ranking positions. In order to protect the interviewees’ identities all
have been given alias names when quoted.
In addition, twelve cases of publicly known violent retaliations executed by extreme right-wing groups in
Germany and the United States were analyzed, using information that was in the public domain (press
reports, court documents, and published interviews with perpetrators or victims). A list of these cases is
provided in the Annex. These two countries (USA and GFR)) were chosen because they provide a high
number of well-documented incidents.
Literature Review
Deradicalization Research
Research about deradicalization and disengagement processes from radical social movements and terrorist
groups has produced very important insights into individual motivations to join and leave these milieus. So
called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors have been identified, which together determine individual decisions to leave
extremist groups. ‘Push’ factors include, but are not limited to, sanctions by the government, loss of faith
in the group’s cause, disillusionment, lack of faith, burnout, decline in personal status, as well as conflicts
within the group or discontent with the group’s strategy[4]. ‘Pull’ factors typically consist of individual
efforts to return to a “normal” life, changes in family situations, new goals for future developments, getting
older, and finding new friends or develop intimate relationships[5]. Leaving a radical or terrorist group is
not a irreversible but a highly complex process. It involves many risks for the potential defector, including
inhibiting factors such as positive aspects of life within the group, lack of future perspectives outside the
group, losing protection against enemies as well as potential judicial sanctions[6]. Group sanctions are among
the strongest reasons for some defectors to abstain from leaving, although some groups appear not to react
with violence against defectors. Tore Bjørgo[7] has noted that, should former members leave middle- or
upper cadre levels in the group’s hierarchy and should they provide information to extreme left-wing groups,
police or media, group reactions my include disappointment, observation, death threats, physical attacks,
harassment, verbal threats and expression of contempt, but only rarely killings.This has also been reported by
Horgan[8] and Aho regarding contact with the media [9].
In other cases, reports about special arrangements between defectors and the group have surfaced, e.g. the
practice of ‘separation contracts’ by al-Qaeda, as described by John Horgan[10], vacation breaks for IRA
members[11] or severe death threats for potential defectors in case of the Ulster Defence Forces (UDA)
ISSN 2334-3745
37
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[12]. Other groups have relied on blackmailing potential and successful defectors, either by making public
information about crimes committed by the defector in the past or by threatening to disclose signed vows of
loyalty to the ideology from the defectors[13].
Although the literature on deradicalization and disengagement does not provide much in terms of evidence
to substantiate such observations, scholars have identified at least two categories of group reactions which are
strongly dependent on the defector’s former status, time spent within the group and his/her post-defection
behaviour regarding groups hostile to the former one [14]: (i) a ‘quiet’ exit without any sanction or pressure
and, (ii) some form of verbal and/or physical aggression. If radical groups resort to violence, it is usually very
severe. Cases of defectors being crucified by their former group, arson attacks against their homes, home
invasions, and targeted robberies have been described in interview studies with former extremists [15]. As a
very common first reaction, the complete social and physical banishment of the defector was described[16].
In addition, studies of deradicalization programs in a prison context have shown that sometimes a
competition between radical groups over the membership of potential defectors can lead to more positive
forms of social pressure (i.e. incentives) to prevent members from leaving, for example in Israeli prisons[17].
Terrorism Studies
In other related academic fields, such as terrorism studies or social psychology, potential violent reactions of
groups confronted with defections are generally known, but rarely qualified or analysed as such. Researching
the community context of terrorism for example, Bates[18] briefly touches on the issue by stating that
terrorists groups, which are “normative coercive,”[19] rely on “sustaining loyalty” as a “significant priority”
and develop “elaborate strategies to preserve morale and membership” including “more formal controls”[20].
When confronted with individual defection, these groups might even use deadly violence as the highest level
of social pressure:
Terror or enforcing squads are used to retaliate against defectors. (...) While a great loss of status
seldom results from a single act, serious or persistent deviations may lead to loss of status, one’s
reputation as a trusted member, or even one’s life within the terrorist movement.[21].
Social Psychology
Examining other areas of social psychology that discuss social processes on the meso-social level, typically
either internal group dynamics[22] or group formation related topics[23] are extensively discussed and
analysed. However, the specific mechanisms behind the application of social pressure on the defector,
including processes of decision making and factors determining the potential options and behaviour when
confronted with individual defection and disloyalty, have not received any attention from social psychologists
or related academic fields. The only known exception is the model by Levine and Moreland[24], which lays
out a theoretical framework of potential group reactions when confronted with individual disloyalty (in nonradical contexts). This present article attempts to empirically test Levine and Moreland’s theoretical concept
in the area of radical social movements (i.e. the extreme right) using the interviews and case studies to
validate and further develop their model.
On the one hand, Levine and Moreland collect known possible group reactions in cases of disloyalty:
“the punishments associated with disloyalty are often quite negative, including public condemnation,
imprisonment, and death“[25]. According to Levine and Moreland the reasons for these negative sanctions
are rooted within the competition between groups and the subsequent loss or gain of advantage through
ISSN 2334-3745
38
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
defectors[26]. In general, the authors distinguish four types of defectors: “reliable defector (current and
future orientation toward the group positive), unreliable defector (current positive, future likely negative),
unreliable spies (current negative, future positive), reliable spies (current negative, future negative)“[27]. This
typology reflects the previously explained role of defectors’ behaviour against the former group (e.g. giving
information to police, to left-wing groups, or to the media) in the field of right-wing extremism. Levine and
Moreland name the defector’s status within the group, his/her motivation to leave, time spent in the group,
knowledge about the group, personal relationships within the group, and the group’s general character
(groups under high “pressure” are likely to react more harshly when confronted with disloyalty) as the most
important factors determining the specific course of action undertaken by the group[28].
Accordingly, Levine and Moreland’s model predicts that groups facing strong competition will react
harshly and negatively towards those defectors whom they perceive to create a disadvantage for the group
as well as positively attempting to win back those who have not totally broken with the group’s collective
identity or narrative. This is supported by literature on organizational turnover, which might have serious
negative impacts on organizations in terms of operational costs and demoralization of organizational
membership[29]. Thus, sanctions against defection or positive rewards to avoid it can be expected.
Summary
In summation, the literature on deradicalization and disengagement processes has not addressed the question
of how radical groups form defection-inhibiting social pressure. Nevertheless, this literature suggests several
types of social pressure (i.e. violence, threats, blackmailing, condemnation and slander) They are typically
determined (most importantly) by the length of time spent in the group and the behaviour towards it after
the defection (i.e. information given to the police, media, anti-racists). However, these claims have yet to be
validated by empirical studies focusing on this aspect.
Findings
Types of Defectors
One of the first observations in the literature refers to the fact that groups appear to differentiate between
various types of defectors, based on their expected future behaviour regarding the group. Levine and
Moreland’s model predicts negative group sanctions for at least two types: current negative/future positive
and current positive/future negative. Translated to the radical social movements, this classification would
relate to the question of individual motivation to defect, i.e. the degree to which the group’s ideology is
questioned or whether more personal reasons affected the decision. In addition the future behaviour
towards the group was stated by Levine and Moreland as critical. This was strongly supported by most of the
interviewees. Interviewee ‘John’ instantly could identify three types of defectors requiring different reactions
from the group. He differentiated between defectors who merely ‘retire’ without questioning the group’s
ideology (type A, called “dropouts”), persons who leave the group and ideology behind but do not speak out
against the former group (type B “renegades”), and those who leave behind both the group and its ideology
and become publically active against the former group (type C “traitors”). Two points were central for this
group-internal classification: the remaining degree of adherence to the ideology and the level of counteractivism against the former group.
ISSN 2334-3745
39
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Future Behaviour towards Group
The element of ‘betrayal’ in the form of passing on information towards police, anti-fascists or the press
was seen as one the most important criteria to assign the above mentioned categories, which also directly
supports Levine and Moreland’s model. The main logic behind this process was the fear of incriminating
knowledge ending up with enemies of the group. In one case a very brutal reaction followed after a short
period of shock within the group:
“This was indeed a very extreme group reaction, because he did conspire with the political enemy.
How it would have been, if he wouldn’t have been seen there I can’t say of course. But back then I
found this very hard. Because he was a very close friend and one never expected that he would defect
to the political enemy. It was like being paralysed with shock in the first moment; no one from the
group did expect that he would do something like that.” (Transcript “Ted”)
‘Ted’ continued to describe how he and the group felt deeply betrayed by this defector, a feeling mostly
fuelled by panic and fear of concrete information possibly revealed by the defector. ‘Ted’ himself left the
movement quietly, which resulted in an almost complete absence of any reaction by the group, except for a
few half-hearted attempts to contact him. ‘Ted’ explained this lack of backlash with the fact that the group did
not know that he gave information to outsiders. It is especially noteworthy that ‘Ted’ describes that his former
group regularly accepted also other defections, without much disturbance or reaction at all. This however was
only the case with ‘type A’ defectors. Others were declared open targets.
Several of the case studies support this dynamic of right-wing groups resorting to violence after the defector
had committed an ‘act of treason’. In 1984, for example, eight German right-wing extremists held ‘court’ and
sentenced a former leading member of their ‘combat group’ to severe punishment due to treason. The group
raided the victim’s home at night, read an indictment to him, and severely assaulted him. The victim was
also water boarded and threatened with an weapon pointing at his head which turned out to be unloaded.
After another round of beatings, the person was left in a forest to die, but luckily survived.[30] Another case
happened on February 3rd, 1987. It led to the murder of the 17 year old German Gerd-Roger Bornemann
by his former comrades after he had made witness statements to the police.[31] In yet another case, in
March 1996 the 26 year old former German neo-Nazi Martin Kemming was shot and killed by a former
comrade[32].
Sometimes even the attempt to leave the group is seen as sufficient to use violence. James A. Aho [33]
reported that in 1988 two persons in his sample were physically attacked and massively threatened once their
decision to leave the right-wing milieu became known. In several other cases, the act of defection itself was
the only reason for the violent reaction, indicating that, as postulated by Levine and Moreland, the group’s
general character by itself plays a very important role. One female defector who left a skinhead group did
not recall any differentiation regarding type of defectors, as her former group routinely employing violence
in reaction to defection. When asked how she saw defectors during her active time ‘Maria’ replied: “They
were traitors, they were subhuman people, and they were free to be shot.” In this case the act of defection was
automatically equated with treason. From this it would appear that some groups simply could not muster
the necessary reflective and intellectual skills to distinguish between different types of defectors and different
forms of social pressure.
ISSN 2334-3745
40
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Forms of Social Pressure
Previous studies as well as Levine and Moreland’s model suggest that groups use a variety of forms of social
pressure ranging from public condemnation, monetary fines, verbal abuse, ostracism all the way to torture
to death.[34] In regard to right-wing groups, it was suggested that if the groups react at all, it would typical
result in threats, verbal abuse, blackmailing, slander but rarely lead to lethal violence.[35] However, the
interview sample and the case studies (see Annex) suggest that (severe) forms of violence are much more
common than suggested by the Levine and Moreland’s model as well as other authors. One risk is that groups
might not take the time or have the skills to differentiate between various types of defectors. It could also be
that the group was simply not willing to take the risk, and as a consequence almost all interviewees reported
immediate resort to violence. ‘Maria’s’ group deployed a very specific method to deal with defections. In this
case, the group generally came together and formed something the interviewee called “Skinhead Control
Commandos”, a small group of selected executors for the punishment, which consisted of arson attacks and
heavy beatings. Like a task force, this ‘commando’ met prior to the attack and planned the form of retaliation:
“Well we sat together and then it started: We drive there. What do we do, what do we take with us? A baseball
bat, Molotov cocktails, brass knuckles, self-made things and so forth.” (Transcript “Maria”)
This form of direct retaliatory violence was, however, an exception rather than the rule. Typically the groups
tried to find an appropriate strategy to deal with the situation; rarely did it resorted to long-lasting strategic
violence. One example of this would be the case of the former high ranking German neo-Nazi leader Ingo
Hasselbach. He received a fully functional mail-bomb in 1993, only good luck prevented it from exploding
[36].
Group Reaction Differentiation According to Defector Type
Interviewee “John” described how his group deployed different form of reactions depending on the defector
type, thereby confirming Levine and Moreland’s claim of group reaction differentiation according to defector
types. ‘Type A’ defections usually caused great disappointment and feelings of betrayal because friendship,
according to John, could never be understood alone without the political cause. However, other than
distancing and the expression of disappointment, the group did not attempt to do anything else. ‘Type B’
defectors were usually seen as blinded through other social forces (e.g. family) or interests. Sometimes the
group first responded positively by trying to win the former member back.
‘Type C’ defectors received the harshest group treatment. Verbal intimidation, physical violence and arson
attacks on the defector’s home were variations of response. In this case, it was important for the group to add
specific information about the punishment’s origin:
“The other option would have been, and that was planned (…) to visit him at his residence and afflict
physical violence upon him. This was to be done in specific combined with a clear message, so not
only physical violence, which indeed has a symbolic value, but we wanted to give a name to the whole
thing. He had to know where this is coming from. Also for the outside, for others who might decide to
leave, we wanted to set an example.” (Transcript “John”)
In all cases, the group was very careful to make in advance a detailed ‘cost-benefit’ analysis, so as to
balance the potential negative reactions and expected beneficial effects. Another interviewee reported
that his former group systematically kept defectors under surveillance and interrogated them as soon as a
specific ‘hostile’ behaviour was noted. In several cases, group members attempted to break in the defectors’
homes, drag the persons out and punish them, because they had “spoken with the political enemy”.
ISSN 2334-3745
41
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
“Peter”, another interviewee who left a well-structured neo-Nazi organization, described how his former
group planned “campaigns” against defectors, and how he actively participated in two of those campaigns
against former members while he was an active neo-Nazi. He threatened them via phone calls and helped
to create something he called “scenarios of intimidation”. He also took part in several group meetings
that discussed revenge operations against defectors. One operation against a defector, who allegedly had
provided information to the police, even targeted the defector’s mother – suggesting that she be murdered.
Peter described how leading group members spurred others against the defectors, prodding lower ranking
members of the group to execute the punishment more or less on their own.
Stirring up other members of the right-wing movement beyond those in one’s own group to act against the
defector was reported in all cases and included tactics ranging from ostracism to slander campaigns. In such
cases, names, addresses and slanderous allegations were typically published online. All former extremists
interviewed reported online campaigns against them. Typically these campaigns aimed to “prove” that the
former member was corrupt, a paedophile, mentally unstable, a drug addict, police informant, weak and
worthless.
Another tactic is to turn up at any public place the defector might be found and make a ‘show of force’.
Frequent phone calls, letters, and specifically targeted propaganda (i.e. stickers and flyers left only in
the mailbox of the defector) aimed to create ‘scenarios of intimidation’, which, at times could have fatal
consequences. In 1980, for example, a former US-American neo-Nazi died of a heart attack after a series of
death threats and bomb and arson attacks on his home[37]. In ‘Maria’s’ case, such intimidation campaigns
came in waves–the result of a revived interest triggered by certain events that brought her back into the
group’s memory.
How Groups Arrive at a Strategy
In all cases of the sample, the former groups had some sort of mechanism to determine the course of action
and selected the form of social pressure to be applied – something going beyond the options contained
in the Levine and Moreland’s model. This ranged from very formal meetings, called ‘courts’, where highly
strategic discussions took place in an attempt to assess the cost-benefit ratio of any damage control tactic.
Many groups feared that violent retaliation could create “blowback” for the group and tried to develop longterm forms of social pressure, e.g. in the form of online defamation campaigns. As stated by one interviewee,
the actual situation of the group and its level of information regarding the case under consideration were
most important factors influencing the selected course of action. Seeking revenge for treason and for the
disclosure of group secrets, were described by all respondents as main drivers behind exercising pressure on
defectors. Many interviewees described a first phase of emotional shock caused by the defection, followed
by a subsequent phase of more rational planning. ‘John’ described how every defection from the movement
caused a general éclat. News about recent defections travels fast and often result in pressure from other
extremist groups to offer an explanation how this could be allowed to happen in the first place. Defections
appear to be highly embarrassing for each group, and influences their standing negatively within the larger
movement, promoting the notion that they are suffering from internal divisions and lack of resolution.
This supports Levine and Moreland’s theory the inter-group competition is the main reason for social
pressure in the event of disloyalty. It is seen as a potential threat within the right-wing movement when
defections could lead to the collapse of smaller groups. Rarely, however, are defections seen as a form of
purification. All interviewees reported that defections had the long-term effect of treating newcomers with
ISSN 2334-3745
42
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
a higher degree of suspicion which led to more aggressive demands that they quick integrate into the group
and obey its collective norms.
Discussion of Findings and Future Directions for Research
Looking at these findings, previous research as well as Levine and Moreland’s model, many of the suggested
forms of social pressure have been confirmed by the interviews and by case studies. Verbal threats, ostracism
campaigns and (albeit to a higher degree than postulated in the literature) violence were the most common
forms of social pressure. As suspected by Levine and Moreland, (internal) group competition is one major
driving force behind some of these actions. In addition, there is the fear of incriminating information
being passed on to the group’s enemies. Although right-wing groups appear to distinguish between various
types of defections, the differentiation is not as detailed and complex as Levine and Moreland assumed. In
general, such groups distinguish mainly on the basis of an assessment whether or not the defector abandons
the group’s ideology or not, and whether his or her future behaviour might involve cooperating with the
group’s enemies. Several groups did not want to take any risk and resorted directly to the use of violence as
punishment, seeing the defection as equal to betraying the group’s ideology, which, in this author’s view, is
a noteworthy and important finding since the role of commitment to the ideology as a factor determining
the group reaction has not been mentioned at all in previous research. So far only doubts about the group’s
ideology have been identified as cause for individual disengagement.[38] Several major factors determining
violent forms of social pressure suggested in the existing literature and by Levine and Moreland have, on the
other hand, been strongly confirmed – in particular the importance of the length of time spent in the group,
the status of the defector, his or her possession of incriminating information, and the role of motivation
behind the decision to leave the group. In addition, positive attempts to win back defectors—one of our
findings— have only rarely been reported in the existing literature..
Group Decision Making Processes
As for the processes and mechanisms behind the group’s decision to employ certain forms of social pressure,
this study has produced some unique and novel insights. First, group reaction to defection influenced
as much by group-related factors as by defector-related factors–something not foreseen by Levine and
Moreland. Relevant factors are the group-specific ideology (especially in regard to the status of treason etc.),
group affinity to violence, in-group future prospects, group structure and hierarchy (especially in regard to
decision-making and strategic reflection about possible consequences), the danger of further defections,
pressure on the group by the government, relative status of the group within the larger movement as well as
the overall movement’s political position, and, finally the role of in-group behavioural learning processes.
Furthermore, when confronted with defections, right-wing groups typically were found to go through two
distinct phases of decision-making–something not mentioned by Levine and Moreland. At first, emotions
(Phase I) dominate the group’s decision-making process. (Mis-)Guided by feelings of personal betrayal,
shock, anger, and fear about secrets to be disclosed to the authorities or the public, violence in all its forms is
considered as a gut reaction. If the defector amplifies these emotions through behaviour perceived as threat
by the group, the group is most likely to respond with direct physical violence or at least with strong physical
intimidation. After a certain period of ‘cooling down’ and getting accustomed to the fact that a defection has
taken place, generally more mature strategic reflection and planning comes into play (Phase II). In this phase,
the group calculates the costs and benefits of any retaliatory action, taking into account possible blowback
against the group. Typically the methods chosen in this phase are large-scale defamation and ostracism
campaigns, public outings, ‘scenes of intimidation’, and direct anonymous threats (by mail or phone)
ISSN 2334-3745
43
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
targeting the defector or his family. Carefully planned and complex violent operations such as assassinations
and bombings do occur. However these are relatively rare, and are usually applied only when the group is not
prepared to take the risk of information leakage or when the defector, by his former status, becomes a liability
to the group (e.g. when s/he speaks out against it publically). Phase I can be ‘resumed’ even after a long
period of time, Typically this is the case when group members meet the defector by accident or when certain
events (e.g. media articles, court verdicts, group banning) are directly connected to the defector and revive
the group’s initial emotional reaction.
All groups had more or less sophisticated decision-making processes, based on the group’s hierarchy and
intellectual level. This is also a finding that goes beyond Levine and Moreland’s model. It turned out that
even the more violent and non-intellectual skinhead type groups displayed surprising organizational skills to
exercise social pressure (e.g. the ‘skinhead control commandos’). This took the form of online blogs, fanzines,
and chat rooms containing pictures, addresses and family information of defectors. Followed by targeted
propaganda distribution (e.g. leaflets with the defector’s name written on it), this all serves to create ‘scenes of
intimidation’ based on the psychological fear of becoming a target of retaliation.
While these findings are limited due to the small sample of cases analysed, nevertheless new light is shed on
some meso-social dynamics of social pressure against defectors from extremist right-wing groups. While
many of the factors and mechanisms suggested by Levine and Moreland’s original model have been strongly
supported, it has also been shown that group-related mechanisms regarding applying social pressure on
defectors are much more complex which points to the need for more research. As an important future
direction for research, the reaction of other extremist movements vis-à-vis defectors (e.g. defectors from
jihadist groups) should be explored in order to better determine the role of specific ideologies in the selection
of forms of punishment meted out against who have lost faith in extremist groups.
About the Author: Daniel Koehler is the Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS) in Berlin, Germany since November 2015. He is also a Fellow at the George
Washington University’s Center for Homeland and Cyber Security Program on Extremism. He has worked for
over six years in the practical field of de-radicalization as case manager and has trained mentors as well as
designed different tools and programs. He has done extensive research on various aspects related to terrorist
rehabilitation and de-radicalization.
Annex: Brief Case Descriptions
1.
1980: a former US-American neo-Nazi died of a heart attack after repeated bomb and arson attacks
on his home and death threats.[39]
2.
1984 eight German right-wing extremists “held court” and sentenced a former leading member of
their “combat group” to severe punishment due to treason. The group broke into the victim’s home at
night, read the indictment to him, and severely beat him. The victim was water boarded and “shot”
with an unloaded weapon put to his head. After another round of beating up the person was brought
to a forest to die but he luckily survived.[40]
3.
1987: the 17 year old German Gerd-Roger Bornemann was killed by his former comrades after he had
given witness statements to the police.[41]
4.
1987: a former Ku Klux Klan leader was crucified by other Klansmen in Sacramento.[42]
ISSN 2334-3745
44
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
5.
1988: in California “a disenchanted female member of the Chicago Area Skinheads (CASH), had her
home broken into, her face maced, her body beaten limp, and a swastika painted on the wall with her
own blood”.[43]
6.
1988: Aho [44] reports of two persons in his sample who were physically attacked and massively
threatened once their decision to leave the right-wing environment became known.
7.
1993: the former high ranking German neo-Nazi leader Ingo Hasselbach received a fully functional
mail-bomb which did not explode due to unforeseen circumstances.[45]
8.
1995: the former German neo-Nazi skinhead Sven Silbermann and his brother Michael were found
dead in Dresden. Sven Silbermann was outed as ‘traitor’ shortly before, and his brother had possible
links to a right-wing terrorist group.[46]
9.
1996: the 26 year old former German neo-Nazi Martin Kemming was shot and killed by a former
comrade.[47] Kemming had left the right-wing movement and acted as a court witness against the
person who would later kill him.
10. 2011: a youth court sentenced five German neo-Nazis to serve several years in prison due to their
massive violent assault on a defector, whom they lured into a trap and severely beat him.[48]
11. 2011: a former German neo-Nazi (together with his girlfriend) met a former comrade by accident at a
train station in Berlin. After he was recognized another 10 neo-Nazis were called into the train station
and tried to attack the defector with his girlfriend, who sought protection with the train station
personnel. The 11 right-wing activists split up and controlled the entry and exit doors of the train
station until police arrived.[49]
12. 2014: five German neo-Nazis attacked a person and his girlfriend in Berlin and severely injured them.
Although the person might not be seen as a full defector (as he still expressed sympathy for national
socialist ideology online) he was the target of a long-lasting online defamation campaign, in which he
was accused as ‘traitor’ who gave witness statements in court against former comrades.[50]
Bibliography
Aho, James A. “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism.” Current Research on Peace and
Violence 11, no. 4 (1988): 159-68.
Altier, Mary Beth, Christian N Thoroughgood, and John G Horgan. “Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons
from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology.” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 5 (September 1, 2014 2014):
647-61.
Barrelle, Kate. “Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and Life after Extremism.” Behavioral Sciences of
Terrorism and Political Aggression 7, no. 2 (2014/12/21 2015): 129-42.
Bates, Rodger A. “Terrorism within the Community Context.” The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology
3, no. 1 (2010): 1-14.
Bjørgo, Tore. “Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right.” In Leaving Terrorism
Behind. Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, 30-48. New York:
Routledge, 2009.
ISSN 2334-3745
45
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
———. Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses. Oslo:
Aschehoug, 1997.
Bjørgo, Tore, and John Horgan. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement. London/
New York: Routledge, 2009.
Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, and Peter J. Richerson. “The Evolution of Altruistic
Punishment.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, no. 6 (March 18, 2003 2003): 3531-35.
Campbell, Donald Thomas. “Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives.” In Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation, edited by David Levine, 283-311. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. “Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 2 (2013/10/27 2013): 99-115.
Demant, F., Marieke Slootman, F. J. Buijs, and Jean Tillie. “Decline and Disengagement–an Analysis of
Processes of Deradicalisation.” In IMES Report Series. Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
(IMES), 2008.
Disley, Emma, Kristin Weed, Anais Reding, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Richard Warnes. “Individual
Disengagement from Al Qa’ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy
and Practice in Preventing Terrorism.” Cambridge: RAND Europe, 2011.
Fink, Chowdhury Naureen, and Ellie B. Haerne. “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement
from Violent Extremism.” International Peace Insitute, 2008.
Ganor, Boaz, and Ophir Falk. “De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
36, no. 2 (2014/11/18 2013): 116-31.
Garfinkel, Renee. “Personal Transformations. Moving from Violence to Peace.” In Special Report: United
States Institute of Peace, 2007.
Gegenrede. “Berlin-Lichtenberg: Rechte Jagen Szene-Aussteiger.” In gegenrede. Informationsportal gegen
Rechtsextremismus für Demokratie., 2011.
Hart, Claire M., and Mark Van Vugt. “From Fault Line to Group Fission: Understanding Membership
Changes in Small Groups.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32, no. 3 (March 1, 2006 2006): 392-404.
Hasselbach, Ingo, and Tom Reiss. Führer-Ex : Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi. 1st ed. New York: Random
House, 1996.
Horgan, John. Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist
Movements. London/New York: Routledge, 2009.
Klußmann. “Explosives Klima.” http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8848666.html.
Kruglanski, Arie W., and Donna M. Webster. “Group Members’ Reactions to Opinion Deviates and
Conformists at Varying Degrees of Proximity to Decision Deadline and of Environmental Noise.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 2 (1991): 212-25.
Levine, John M., and Richard L. Moreland. “Group Reactions to Loyalty and Disloyalty.”. In Group Cohesion,
Trust and Solidarity. Advances in Group Processes, edited by Shane R. Thye, 203-28: Elsevier Science/JAI Press,
2002.
ISSN 2334-3745
46
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Maegerle, A. “Rechtsextremistische Gewalt Und Terror.” In Handbuch Rechtsradikalismus. Personen–
Organisationen–Netzwerke Vom Neonazismus Bis in Die Mitte Der Gesellschaft, edited by Bernd Wagner and
Thomas Grumke, 159-72. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2002.
Mauer, R. “Violence Plagued Ex-Aryan Ally.” Idaho Statesman, September 17 1980.
Noricks, Darcy M.E. “Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs.” In Social Science
for Counterterrorism. Putting the Pieces Together., edited by Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, 299-320. Santa
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009.
Peel, Quentin. “The Faces of Neo-Nazism.” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dfda3010-3438-11e2-9ae700144feabdc0.html#axzz2K6JSUB7i.
Pidd, Helen. “How Could German Neo-Nazi Killers Have Evaded Police for 13 Years?” The Guardian,
November 18 2011.
———. “Neo-Nazi Terror Scandal Grows in Germany.” The Guardian, November 16 2011.
Rhein-Zeitung. “Neonazi-Prozess: Fünf Rechte Schläger Müssen Ins Gefängnis.” Rhein-Zeitung, October 30
2011.
Riehl-Heyse, Herbert. “Bilder Einer Schaurigen Traumwelt. Beobachtungen in Einem Prozess Gegen Junge
Neonazis.”. In Rechtsextremismus in Der Bundesrepublik. Vorrausstetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen.,
edited by Wolfgang Benz, 295-98. Frankfurt am Main, 1984.
Rochford, E. Burke, Jr. “Factionalism, Group Defection, and Schism in the Hare Krishna Movement.” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 28, no. 2 (1989): 162-79.
Sani, Fabio. “When Subgroups Secede: Extending and Refining the Social Psychological Model of Schism in
Groups.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 8 (August 1, 2005 2005): 1074-86.
Sani, Fabio, and John Todman. “Should We Stay or Should We Go? A Social Psychological Model of Schisms
in Groups.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28, no. 12 (December 1, 2002 2002): 1647-55.
Schneider, Theo. “Blutiger Szenestreit in Berlin.” In Stoerungsmelder. Berlin: ZeitOnline, 2014.
Spiegel. “The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror.” SpiegelOnline, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-rightterror-a-797569-4.html.
———. “Ei Im Nest.” Der Spiegel, 1983, 67-68.
———. “Neo-Nazi Killings: Terror Trio’s Network May Have Been Bigger.” Der Spiegel, March 25 2013.
———. “Sachsen: Mögliche Nsu-Verbindung Zu Ungeklärtem Doppelmord.” Der Spiegel, June 6 2014.
———. “Verräter Verfallen Der Feme.” Der Spiegel, May 13 1996.
Staw, Barry M. “The Consequences of Turnover.” Journal of occupational Behaviour (1980): 253-73.
Sundermann, Tom. “Wer Döner Aß, Wurde Ausgepeitscht.” Die Zeit, June 18 2013.
UPI. “Ex-Kkk and Neo-Nazi Leader Found Nailed to Board.” Los Angeles Times, August 11 1987.
ISSN 2334-3745
47
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
van der Valk, Ineke, and Willem Wagenaar. “The Extreme Right: Entry and Exit.” In Racism & Extremism
Monitor. Leiden: Anne Frank House/Leiden University, 2010.
Witzel, Andreas, and Herwig Reiter. The Problem-Centered Interview. 2000. Vol. 1, New York: Sage, 2012.
Notes
[1] Helen Pidd, “Neo-Nazi Terror Scandal Grows in Germany,” The Guardian, November 16 2011; Spiegel, “The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New
Dimension of Far-Right Terror,” SpiegelOnline, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-rightterror-a-797569-4.html; Quentin Peel, “The Faces of Neo-Nazism,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dfda3010-3438-11e2-9ae7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2K6JSUB7i.
[2] Tom Sundermann, „Wer Döner Aß, Wurde Ausgepeitscht,“ Die Zeit, June 18 2013.
[3] Andreas Witzel and Herwig Reiter, The Problem-Centered Interview, vol. 1, 2000 (New York: Sage, 2012).vol. 1, 2000 (New York: Sage, 2012
[4] Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (London/New York: Routledge, 2009); Ineke van der Valk and
Willem Wagenaar, “The Extreme Right: Entry and Exit,” in Racism & Extremism Monitor (Leiden: Anne Frank House/Leiden University, 2010); Mary Beth Altier,
Christian N Thoroughgood, and John G Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology,” Journal of Peace Research
51, no. 5 (2014).
[5] Tore Bjørgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement; Darcy M.E. Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization:
Processes and Programs,” in Social Science for Counterterrorism. Putting the Pieces Together., ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation,
2009); Chowdhury Naureen Fink and Ellie B. Haerne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism,” (International Peace
Insitute, 2008); Renee Garfinkel, “Personal Transformations. Moving from Violence to Peace.,” in Special Report (United States Institute of Peace, 2007); van der
Valk and Wagenaar, “The Extreme Right: Entry and Exit.”; Emma Disley et al., “Individual Disengagement from Al Qa’ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups: A Rapid
Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism,” (Cambridge: RAND Europe, 2011).
[6] Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses. (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1997); Bjørgo and Horgan, Leaving
Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement.
[7] Idem.
[8] John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), 47.2009
[9] James A. Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism,” Current Research on Peace and Violence 11, no. 4 (1988): 165.no. 4 (1988
[10] John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements, 37.
[11] Idem., p. 93.
[12] Idem., p. 114.
[13] Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses., 224.
[14] Tore Bjørgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement.
[15] James A. Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism.”Current Research on Peace and Violence 11, no. 4 (1988), p. 165.
[16] Idem., p.163.
[17] Boaz Ganor and Ophir Falk, “De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 2 (2013): 125-26.
[18] Rodger A. Bates, “Terrorism within the Community Context,” The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology 3, no. 1 (2010).no. 1 (2010
[19] Idem., pp. 4–5.
[20] Idem, p. 11.
[21] Idem., p.12.
ISSN 2334-3745
48
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[22] For examples onE.g., ‘altruistic punishment’, see Robert Boyd et al., “The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
100, no. 6 (2003); Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M. Webster, “Group Members’ Reactions to Opinion Deviates and Conformists at Varying Degrees of Proximity to
Decision Deadline and of Environmental Noise,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 2 (1991); Donald Thomas Campbell, “Ethnocentric and Other
Altruistic Motives,” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. David Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965).
[23] Fabio Sani and John Todman, “Should We Stay or Should We Go? A Social Psychological Model of Schisms in Groups,” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 28, no. 12 (2002); E.g., group factionalism, fissions, shisms, see Fabio Sani, “When Subgroups Secede: Extending and Refining the Social Psychological
Model of Schism in Groups,” ibid.31, no. 8 (2005); E. Burke Rochford, Jr., “Factionalism, Group Defection, and Schism in the Hare Krishna Movement,” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 28, no. 2 (1989); Claire M. Hart and Mark Van Vugt, “From Fault Line to Group Fission: Understanding Membership Changes in
Small Groups,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32, no. 3 (2006).
[24] John M. Levine and Richard L. Moreland, “Group Reactions to Loyalty and Disloyalty.,” in Group Cohesion, Trust and Solidarity. Advances in Group Processes,
ed. Shane R. Thye (Elsevier Science/JAI Press, 2002).
[25] Idem., p.211.
[26] Idem., p. 207.
[27] Idem., p. 219.
[28] Idem., p. 212–215.
[29] Barry M Staw, “The Consequences of Turnover,” Journal of occupational Behaviour (1980): 257.
[30] Herbert Riehl-Heyse, „Bilder Einer Schaurigen Traumwelt. Beobachtungen in Einem Prozess Gegen Junge Neonazis.,“ in Rechtsextremismus in Der
Bundesrepublik. Vorrausstetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkungen., ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt am Main: 1984).
[31] Klußmann, „Explosives Klima,“ http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8848666.html.
[32] Spiegel, „Verräter Verfallen Der Feme,“ ibid., May 13 1996.
[33] James A. Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism,” 163, 65.
[34] John M. Levine and Moreland, “Group Reactions to Loyalty and Disloyalty.,” 211.
[35] Tore Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators, and Responses; Bjørgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and
Collective Disengagement.
[36] Ingo Hasselbach and Tom Reiss, Führer-Ex : Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1996).
[37] R. Mauer, „Violence Plagued Ex-Aryan Ally,“ Idaho Statesman, September 17 1980; Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism,” 160.
[38] See, for instance.g., Kate Barrelle, “Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and Life after Extremism,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
7, no. 2 (2015); Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Promoting Exit from Violent Extremism: Themes and Approaches,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 2 (2013); F.
Demant et al., “Decline and Disengagement–an Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation,” in IMES Report Series (Amsterdam: Institute for Migration and Ethnic
Studies (IMES), 2008); van der Valk and Wagenaar, “The Extreme Right: Entry and Exit.”
[39] James A. Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism,” 160; Mauer, “Violence Plagued Ex-Aryan Ally.”, Idaho Statesman, September 17,
1980.
[40] Herbert Riehl-Heyse, “Bilder Einer Schaurigen Traumwelt. Beobachtungen in Einem Prozess Gegen Junge Neonazis..”
[41] Klußmann, „Explosives Klima“.
[42] UPI, “Ex-Kkk and Neo-Nazi Leader Found Nailed to Board,” Los Angeles Times, August 11 1987.
[43] James A. Aho, “Out of Hate: A Sociology of Defection from Neo-Nazism,” 160.
[44] Idem, p. 163 & p. 165.
[45]Hasselbach and Reiss, Führer-Ex : Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi.
[46] Spiegel, “Sachsen: Mögliche Nsu-Verbindung Zu Ungeklärtem Doppelmord,” Der Spiegel, June 6 2014.
ISSN 2334-3745
49
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[47] „Verräter Verfallen Der Feme.“, Der Spiegel, May 13, 1996
[48]Rhein-Zeitung, “Neonazi-Prozess: Fünf Rechte Schläger Müssen Ins Gefängnis,” Rhein-Zeitung, October 30 2011.
[49] Gegenrede to gegenrede. Informationsportal gegen Rechtsextremismus für Demokratie., 2011, http://www.gegenrede.info/news/2011/lesen.
php?datei=110328_01.
[50] Theo Schneider to Stoerungsmelder, December 28, 2014, http://blog.zeit.de/stoerungsmelder/2014/07/16/blutiger-szenestreit-in-berlin_16704.
ISSN 2334-3745
50
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Religion, Democracy and Terrorism
by Nilay Saiya
Abstract
One of the most important policy-relevant questions terrorism researchers have attempted to address is
the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Some extol the virtues of democracy in combating or
discouraging terrorism. Others claim that the vulnerabilities inherent in democracy make terrorist activity
easier to carry out. This essay suggests that both schools of thought may be correct: democracies suffer
disproportionately from certain manifestations of terrorism but not others. Specifically, I show that religious
terrorists - those who prescribe for themselves religious aims and identities-are more likely to target authoritarian
states, while non-religious terrorists tend to attack liberal democracies. The reason for this is two-fold: (i)
religious terrorists are not as deterred by systemic repression as their secular counterparts and (ii) authoritarian
countries breed religious extremism by radicalizing religious actors, weakening moderates and increasing support
for extremism by making religion a point of cohesion against the state. States that provide religious security
for their citizens, on the other hand - the common understanding that religious identity (including beliefs and
practices) of groups and individuals in society is inviolable–undercut the narrative propounded by religious
militants that their faith is under attack, thus dampening the impetus towards violence. Religiously secure
countries also allow for the development of cross-cutting cleavages other than those rooted in religion. For this
reason, secular terrorism is more likely to occur in liberal countries than in repressive ones.
Keywords: Terrorism; religion; democracy
The Democracy-Terrorism Debate
S
cholars of terrorism have been studying the connections between democracy and terrorism for decades.
Yet the literature on democracy and terrorism has not reached a conclusive verdict. On one side are
those who argue that democracy mitigates terrorism. These studies reveal an inverse relationship
between political freedom and the likelihood of terrorism. The logic here is straightforward: the availability
of political representation found in democracies and not present in repressive states affords groups and
individuals the ability to select their leaders, pursue their political ambitions, and air their grievances through
political channels rather than resorting to terrorism. In this same vein, some scholars have found that the
democratic commitment to civil liberties also lessens the risk of terrorism and other forms of political
violence.[1] Thus democracies are believed to be “accessible systems” that naturally undercut the motivations
for terrorist activity by providing legitimate, non-violent avenues for political dissent.[2] Contrariwise,
authoritarian regimes that choke nonviolent avenues of dissent, ban participation in political decisionmaking and curb freedom of expression incentivize terrorist activity in that they leave violence as the only
way by which aggrieved persons can try to change the system.[3] Such systems also serve to delegitimize
the state, alienate citizens, and increase popular grievances, thus providing terrorists with a steady supply of
support from among ordinary citizens.[4] Furthermore, when these kinds of regimes harshly crack down
on more peaceful forms of dissent such as protests, they invite retaliatory violence against governmental
brutality.[5]
Democracies also make superior counter-terrorists, according to this school of thought. Max Abrahms,
James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, for example, have all argued that a commitment to civil liberties restrains
democracies from overreacting to terrorism–the precise thing that terrorists want them to do. For countries
ISSN 2334-3745
51
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
to violate their liberal values in combating terror risks losing the support of the very constituencies–
moderates, the international community, and their own publics–required for success. On the other hand,
by goading states into using excessive force, terrorists can actually engender support from those would
otherwise be sympathetic towards the state.[6]
On the debate’s other side are those who claim that instead of diffusing terrorism, democracy actually enables
it.[7] This school of thought holds that the qualities inherent in democracies serve to facilitate attacks by
militants. For instance, the democratic commitment to the rule of law, limits on the executive, and respect
for individual rights (especially freedoms of movement, speech, and association) enable terrorist activity
by providing militants with an open space to attract sympathizers, recruit members and plot attacks.[8]
Furthermore the presence of a free media makes it easier for terrorists to spew propaganda, communicate
which each other and claim responsibility for terrorist strikes, thus making violence easier for terrorists in
democracies.[9]
Democracies are also believed to be inferior in terms of responding to terrorism by making the detention
and prosecution of suspected terrorists more cumbersome due to restrictions on policing, a commitment
to due process, and the presence of an independent judiciary.[10] By contrast, authoritarian states are less
susceptible to terrorism precisely because they have greater capacities to monitor society, more restraints on
movement, more media restrictions, and fewer constraints on surveillance and interrogation practices, thus
raising the costs of participating in terrorist activity.[11] In short, according to this school, non-democracies
experience less terrorism than democracies because they increase the costs of engaging in violence by making
terrorism difficult and dangerous, whereas the openness of society in democratic states decreases those costs.
[12]
Looking at both terrorism and communal conflict more generally, a final set of studies finds an inverted
U-shaped relationship between democracy and domestic violence. According to this logic, both highly
repressive states and highly democratic ones experience low levels of civil conflict. In the former case, the
costs of engaging in violence are prohibitive; in the latter, other means exist whereby groups in society
can affect political change. So-called “anocracies”—countries transitioning either toward democracy or
authoritarianism—experience the worst of both worlds. They do not yet have the institutions and political
channels for citizens to peacefully express their dissatisfaction with the political status quo; at the same time,
they do not have or choose not to use the tools of repression to undercut terrorist group formation and
violence a priori. Anocratic countries in the transition period between democracy and autocracy, countries
exhibiting enduring semi-democracy and new democracies tend to suffer higher levels of civil conflict
including terrorism.[13]
Religion and Variations in Terrorist Targeting
The connection, then, between democracy and terrorism is inconclusive. Why is the literature so mixed? A
large reason is that the historical record itself points in both directions. Some long-standing democracies like
those in Scandinavia and Canada have been relatively free of terrorism; others like India, Greece and Israel
have suffered hundreds of attacks. In examining the relationship between democracy and terrorism, scholars
have attempted to disaggregate different dimensions of democratic governance and their effect on terrorism,
thus accounting for the variation. Such studies have looked at the importance of multi-party competition,
[14] rule of law, [15] democratic participation, [16] different representation systems, [17] and regime
strength.[18] Thus, both regime type and specific regime characteristics need to be taken into account when
considering the structural determinants of terrorism.
ISSN 2334-3745
52
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
While many studies on democracy and terrorism examine different components of democracy, most do
not attempt to disaggregate terrorism with respect to ideology, motivations, or tactics in the same way. The
majority of these studies tend to lump terrorist groups together without taking into account the guiding
ideologies of different terrorist organizations. “Terrorism,” however, runs the risk of being an overlyaggregate dependent variable. Perhaps democracies/autocracies give rise to some manifestations of terrorism
but not to others. Thus a disaggregated approach is more promising for understanding the structural
conditions that encourage particular forms of terrorist violence, thus explaining some of the observed
variation in the studies discussed above. It might, therefore, be more useful to classify terrorist incidents
based on who the perpetrators are and their long-term objectives.
One possible way of distinguishing terrorist groups is on the basis of religion. Religious terrorists–those
who prescribe for themselves religious identities and aims–are fundamentally different from their secular
counterparts in important ways.[19] Religious terrorists look to their faith as a source of inspiration,
legitimation and worldview, resulting in a totally different incentive structure than exists for their secular
counterparts.[20] Accordingly, religious terrorist groups are also more lethal and long-lived than nonreligious organizations.[21] Such groups have been implicated in a rising number of suicide missions
in recent years, while suicide attacks by secular groups have declined.[22] To be sure, religious terrorist
organizations can pursue vastly different goals, ranging from apocalyptic notions to the establishment of a
religious state in the here and now. Yet because religious militants often understand their endeavors as part of
a larger-than-life spiritual struggle, the constraints that normally limit secular terrorist groups seem to have
little bearing on groups and individuals who commit violence in God’s name.
It stands to reason, then, that the structural conditions that enable religious terrorists might not have the
same effect on non-religious terrorists and vice versa. Religious terrorist groups, for example, may be willing
to carry out attacks in the same conditions of pervasive authoritarianism that might otherwise discourage
non-religious terrorists who are not motivated by transcendent concerns. Indeed, analyzing terrorist attacks
by group ideology and regime type reveals a striking dissimilarity between religious and non-religious
terrorist groups. Non-democracies are far more likely to birth religious terrorists, while democracies are
more likely to experience attacks by groups motivated by non-religious concerns.
The charts below examine the average annual number of both religious and non-religious domestic terrorist
attacks according to countries’ level of freedom. The freedom scores are taken from Freedom House, a
widely used index to assess the democratic status of countries worldwide.[23] Coding of religious and nonreligious terrorist incidents was done by analyzing terrorist attacks that were included in the University of
Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database from 1991-2012. Only attacks by groups that are driven by an explicit
and professed religious ideology rooted in supernatural assumptions are considered “religious” attacks.
[24] Focusing on beliefs and practices rooted in supernatural assumptions has the benefit of allowing for
the differentiation of religious from secular ideologies and avoiding debates as to whether ideologies like
Marxism or nationalism constitute religion. Another benefit is that it allows for the separation of groups
driven by a professed religious ideology from groups that may coalesce around a common religious identity
but do not have overtly religious goals or motivations as in the cases of the Tamil Tigers, the Irish Republican
Army, and the Greek Orthodox EOKA.[25]
ISSN 2334-3745
53
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Figure 1. Religious Terrorist Attacks by Democracy Level, 1991-2012
The charts reveal a marked difference in the countries most susceptible to religious or non-religious terrorist
attacks. The first chart shows that 74 percent of religious attacks transpired in countries that were “not free”
by Freedom House’s standards. 23 percent of attacks occurred in “partly free” countries.
Figure 2. Non-Religious Terrorist Attacks by Democracy Level, 1991-2012
Only 3 percent of attacks took place in liberal democracies. By contrast, only 10 percent of non-religious
attacks took place in authoritarian, unfree countries. Two-thirds of these attacks occurred in partly-free
countries. Yet nearly a quarter of attacks, 23 percent, transpired in liberal democracies. Simply put, religious
terrorists appear not to be deterred by the same structural conditions that apparently deter their secular
counterparts. Conversely, non-religious terrorists are far more likely to attack partly-free or free countries; 90
percent of these attacks occurred in moderately free or fully free countries.
These percentages show important differences in the logics of both kinds of terrorism. Even if repression
generally raises the costs for engaging in terrorism, this rule does not seem to apply to terrorists motivated
by religion. Put differently, the same structural context that makes terrorism a suboptimal tactic for political
dissidents trying to secure concessions from their adversaries actually enables terrorism by those motivated
by an ideology that downplays the strategic calculus of purely political rebel groups. Religious terrorists see
value in engaging in violence in authoritarian settings, despite the risks of doing so. This does not mean that
religious terrorists are irrational, but rather that they operate according to a different type of cost-benefit
analysis than non-religious terrorists.
Religious Security and Terrorism
How can we account for these differences in the targeting preferences of religious and non-religious
groups? One possibility is that religious terrorist attacks are concentrated in countries that have high levels
of religiosity to begin with. While this might be true in certain cases, this rationale does not account for
the fact that in a fair number of authoritarian countries plagued by religious terrorism, levels of religiosity
ISSN 2334-3745
54
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
are actually quite low as in China and Burma. Conversely, some highly religious countries like Ghana and
Romania witness very few terrorist incidents. Another possibility is that religious terrorism occurs with
higher frequency in authoritarian states because the majority of Islamic countries are authoritarian and most
religious terrorist groups claim an Islamic mantle. This rationale falls short for three reasons. First, certain
Islamic countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan are equally or more likely to experience non-religious forms
of terrorism as they are to suffer from Islamist terrorism. Second, slightly more than one-third of Islamic
countries actually experienced no terrorism during the timeframe being analyzed, and more than two-thirds
witnessed fewer than 10 attacks. The evidence indicates that Islamic countries are not more likely to suffer
from religious terrorism when compared to non-Muslim countries. Third, about the same number of Islamic
countries are “free” as those that are “not free.” Like the rest of the world, most fall in the “partially free”
category.
Insights derived from the sociological theory of post-materialism first developed in the 1970s can be useful in
developing a theory for understanding why religious terrorism tends to occur in authoritarian settings, while
non-religious terrorism occurs in largely democratic countries. University of Michigan Political Scientist
Ronald Inglehart has long argued that rising levels of wealth free people from a fixation on materialistic
values like economic or physical security, and allow them to emphasize a different set of values—“postmaterial” ones—that stress autonomy and self-expression.[26] Thus rising prosperity creates a perceived
widespread sense of existential security, which gradually liberates those living in rich countries from
occupation with basic materialistic needs, allowing them to pursue other goals such as belonging, esteem
and intellectual satisfaction.[27] In contrast, in countries marked by abject poverty and the uncertainty
of survival, individuals vulnerable to physical, societal and personal risks tend to be preoccupied with
materialistic values (i.e., basic healthcare, access to clean water, etc.) because survival cannot be taken for
granted as it can in prosperous countries.
The theory of post-materialism can be adapted to help understand variations in religious and secular
terrorism across time and space. Just as Inglehart argued that survival values predominate when material
sustenance and physical security are scarce, the tendency for religion to turn violent exists when religious
security is in short supply. While the most obvious way in which religious security can become compromised
involves government restrictions on religious practice in the forms of unfavorable laws, violent state
suppression, or cooptation of religious institutions, religious insecurity can result from several other factors
including domestic or international conflict, religiously-based social hostilities and persecution, bellicose
religious doctrines, and so forth. For this reason, religious security is a much more expansive concept
than conventional notions about religious freedom. When religion becomes embattled for any of these
reasons, it serves to radicalize political theologies and give more credence to the narrative espoused by
religious extremists that their faith is under attack, either by the state or society at large. Because legitimate
institutional vehicles are not available to voice grievances, certain religious groups feel compelled to take
matters into their own hands.
The key problem with respect to religiously insecure states is that they isolate and radicalize religious identity
in society and increase the possibility that religious groups and individuals feel aggrieved enough to take
up arms against a state or group that is perceived to be attacking that religious identity. For example, when
governmental institutions act in a discriminatory manner and block channels for political and cultural
engagement, they create conditions ripe for the development of bellicose political theologies where people
of faith perceive their religious beliefs are being attacked and are in need of defense. [28] This dynamic can
be seen in places like Algeria, Egypt, and China. Religious security can also become compromised at the
society level. Inter-group hostilities rooted in religion often result in tit-for-tat retaliations by targeted groups,
ISSN 2334-3745
55
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
leading to violent conflict spirals. [29] In the western Rakhine state of Burma, communal violence, including
widespread rioting and clashes, between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists has resulted in thousands of
deaths and hundreds of thousands of people being internally displaced. Finally, as seen most vividly in
Iraq and Syria, civil wars and the collapse of the state often creates a power vacuum which is exploited by
extremist groups which threaten the religious security of all who do not unswervingly abide by their radical
ideology. These are just three examples of the myriad ways in which religious insecurity and violence are
connected, and these conditions are far less likely to be present in liberal democracies.
Unlike in Inglehart’s argument, religious security does not come about through the generation of wealth,
but rather by through respect for the rights of religious groups and individuals—a quality inherent in liberal
democracies. When people of faith are free to believe whatever they want and practice their religion however
they see fit, a transformation of individual values ensues. As countries transition toward greater religious
tolerance and inclusivity, the subsequent strengthening of religious security reduces the necessity of violence
on the part of religious adherents. No longer do individuals have to fight to earn basic religious rights; instead
these rights are guaranteed and indeed taken for granted in highly secure countries. The full recognition of
religious rights allows individuals to gradually shift their attention to non-religious goals.
In states that are religiously secure, religion does not cease to be an important value–just as Inglehart’s
concept of existential security never stops being fundamental–but rather, concerns over religion are
not overwhelmingly predominant, often leading to attention being given to other or new issues and the
formation of cross-cutting cleavages in which religious and other forms of identity are given more equal
weight. Prolonged periods of religious security encourage the spread of these non-religious concerns, while
the declination of religious security has the opposite effect. People raised in times of religious security will
turn their attention to “post-religious” concerns. These concerns permit an entirely different set of grievances
to emerge that has little to do with religion–secular nationalism, environmentalism, animal rights activism,
racial supremacism, etc.–for which terrorists may take up the gun.
Terrorism of this variety often occurs when groups believe they are too small or marginalized to work
through the system or the state refuses to negotiate on issues of importance. Religious terrorism may well
occur in religiously secure countries, but it tends to be intermittent and carried out by “lone wolf ” militants.
This logic might help us understand how a country like the United States can remain highly religious
and multicultural, yet at the same time face few problems when it comes to religious violence.[30] This
also means, though, that secular violence becomes more common in religiously secure states. In short, in
religiously-secure countries, the religious and political rights of religious groups and individuals are basic,
allowing for other kinds of cleavages to rise to importance. Because people of faith in these states can practice
their faith as they see fit and work through democratic channels in order to achieve their political goals, the
likelihood for religious violence is diminished because the right to religion is essentially unquestioned.
As the literature shows, religious terrorism has been on the rise over the past 30 years and especially after
the attacks of September 11, 2001.[31] This can be attributed to two key factors. The first involves the global
resurgence of religion in response to the perceived destruction of religious values by corrupt and self-serving
secular political orders.[32] The religious resurgence has been exacerbated by forces like modernization and
globalization. Yet this increase in religion’s prominence comes at the precise time that religion has come
under unprecedented assault from governmental religious restrictions, communal hostilities involving
religion, and religiously-based civil wars–the withering of religious security.[33] The confluence of these
trends helps to both explain the rise of religiously-motivated terrorism and predict its continuation and
intensification well into the future.
ISSN 2334-3745
56
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Conclusion
This article has made the case that religious terrorism tends to occur in authoritarian settings because faithbased terrorists are not as likely to be deterred by repression and such settings make religion a point of
cohesion and contention. By contrast, in religiously secure places, people are less likely to take the claims of
militants that their faith is under attack seriously and will be less willing to support or join religious terrorist
organizations. People in these countries may, however, subscribe to a different militant narrative–a secular
one–that supports the use of violence.
This study reinforces the notion that there is heterogeneity in terrorism, arguing that different structural
contexts have the potential to breed different kinds of terrorist groups. The disaggregated approach used here
cautions against making blanket judgments about the causes of “terrorism” in general, as much of the existing
literature does. Contemporary terrorism has diverse roots, and this reality becomes even clearer when
comparing the contexts that give rise to religious and non-religious forms of terrorism. This further means
that making universal policy recommendations is difficult as the findings suggest that there is no single
“silver bullet” for defeating terrorism. Approaches designed to combat secular terrorism need not necessarily
apply to religious terrorism and vice versa.
Instead of adopting blanket approaches to terrorism, states would be best advised to take into account
the specific nature of the threats they face. For example, this article suggests that if states struggling with
religious terrorism take steps towards introducing a modicum of religious security, then this will have a
mitigating effect on that particular form of terrorism, even though the threat of religious terrorism can
never be completely eradicated. But the case has also been made that liberal democracies are far more likely
to experience nonreligious forms of terrorism. Fortunately, though, it has been shown that dealing with
non-religious terrorism is a more manageable task and can be handled through methods like policing and
intelligence. These counterterrorism tactics, which tend to be ineffective against religious terrorism, often
succeed when used against non-religious terrorist groups.
While this article has revealed marked divergences in terrorist targeting against certain kinds of regimes
based on group ideology and while it offered a possible explanation for this finding, it has not attempted to
robustly test this relationship or rule out alternative explanations. Future research, therefore, can expand
upon the arguments put forward in this article in two ways. First, statistical analysis should be used to
examine the robustness of the relationship between religious insecurity and violence, while accounting for
other variables that may have an effect on variations on terrorist targeting. Second, case studies at both the
country and group level would provide increased leverage in determining how and why violence arises.
About the Author: Dr. Nilay Saiya is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies
at the State University of New York, Brockport. His research interests include the study of religion and global
politics, American foreign policy, and terrorism. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame in 2013.
Notes
[1] Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s.” American Journal
of Political Science, (1997), pp. 1079-1103; Patrick Regan and Daniel Norton, “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, no.
49 (2005): pp. 319-36.
[2] Joe Eyerman. “Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems,” International Interactions, no. 24 (1998), pp. 151-70.
[3] Martha Crewshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, no. 13 (1981), pp. 379-99.
ISSN 2334-3745
57
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[4] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
[5] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[6] Max Abrahms, “Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists,” Security Studies, no. 16 (2007), pp. 223-53; James I. Walsh, and James A. Piazza, “Why
Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” Comparative Political Studies, no. 43 (2010), pp. 551-77.
[7] Erica Chenoweth, “Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity,” Journal of Politics, (2008), pp. 16-30.
[8] Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 4 (1992), pp. 14-25; William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Does
Democracy Encourage Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 6 (1994), pp. 417-43; William Lee Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg. “Terrorism and
Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims.” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 13 (2001), pp. 155-64.; Quan Li. “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational
Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 49 (2005), pp. 278-97; Ana Bela Santos Bravo and Carlos Manuel Mendes Dias, “An Empirical Analysis Of
Terrorism: Deprivation, Islamism And Geopolitical Factors.” Defence and Peace Economics, 2006, pp. 329-41.
[9] Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sara Jackson Wade and Dan Reiter, “Does Democracy Matter?: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 51 (2007), pp. 329-48.
[12] Erica Chenoweth, Why Democracy Encourages Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).
[13] Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.34,
no.4 (1990), pp. 624-651; Eyerman. “Terrorism and Democratic States”; Eubank and Weinberg, “Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims”; Alberto
Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004); Konstantinos Drakos and Andreas
Gofas, “In Search Of The Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue,” Defence and Peace Economics, no. 17 (2006), pp. 73-93; Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens
K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, “The Political Economy Of Freedom, Democracy And Transnational Terrorism,” Public Choice, no. 128 (2006), pp.289-315;
James A. Piazza, “Regime Age and Terrorism: Are New Democracies Prone to Terrorism?” International Interactions, 2013, pp. 246-63.
[14] James A. Piazza, “Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India,” Security Studies, no. 19 (2010), pp. 99-123.
[15] Alex P. Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a Multi-pronged Approach,” in Tore Bjorjo (Ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, 2003), pp. 209-231.
[16] Quan Li,, op. cit. “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”
[17] Deniz Aksoy and David Carter, “Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups,” British Journal of Political Science, no. 44, (2012), pp. 181-204.
[18] Tore Bjorjo, “Conclusions,” in Tore Bjorjo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (2003), p. 258.
[19] Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror”: The Implications Of Terrorism Motivated By A Religious Imperative,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. 18 (1995), pp. 271-84;
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Magnus Ranstorp, Terrorism
in the Name of Religion, Journal of International Affairs, no.50 (1996), pp. 41-62; Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York:
Harper Perennial.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008); Victor Asal and R. Karl
Rethemeyer, “The Nature Of The Beast: Organizational Structures And The Lethality Of Terrorist Attacks,” Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 2 (2008), pp. 437-49; Bruce
Hoffman, “The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 9, no. 2 (1997), pp. 1-15; Jessica Stern, The
Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Walter Enders and Todd Sanders, “Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?: A
Time Series Investigation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 44, no. 3 (2000), pp. 307-332.
[22] Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2008). Peter S. Henne, “The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, no. 24 (2012), pp. 38-60.
[23] Freedom House assesses a country’s level of freedom along two different dimensions–political rights and civil liberties–on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least
free). Countries whose averaged scores fall between 1-3 are considered “free”; those scoring 3-5 are considered “partly free;” those scoring above 5 are considered
“not free.”
ISSN 2334-3745
58
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[24] A list of organizations used in the analysis is available from the author.
[25] Each attack was coded as either “religious,” “non-religious,” or “unknown.” An attack was coded as “religious” if the following conditions were met: (a) it was
carried out by a group or individual that conceives of itself as a predominantly religious actor; (b) that group frames its mission in religious terms, although it may
have other goals as well; and (c) the attacker, although perhaps involved in a communitarian conflict that politicizes religious symbols, holds a discernible religious
ideology or motivation that serves to animate its strategies and goals apart from or in addition to the mere utilization of religious objects or rhetoric.–See Bruce
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 81-131.
[26] Ronald F. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977);
Ronald F. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ronald F. Inglehart, Modernization and
Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart,
Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ronald F. Inglehart, and Christian Welzel, Modernization,
Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[27] Ronald Inglehart, “Changing Values Among Western Publics From 1970 To 2006,” West European Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1-2 (2008), pp. 130-146.
[28] Nilay Saiya, “Explaining Religious Violence Across Countries: An Institutional Perspective,” in Kevin R. den Dulk and Elizabeth Oldmixon (eds.), Mediating
Religion and Government: Political Institutions and the Policy Process (New York: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 209-240; Nilay Saiya and Anthony Scime, “Explaining Religious
Terrorism: A Data-Mined Analysis,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 35, No. 5 (2015), pp. 487-512; Nilay Saiya, “The Religious Freedom Peace,”
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2015), pp. 369-382.
[29] Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2011).
[30] Risa Brooks, “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious is the Threat?,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2012), pp. 7-47.
[31] Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (London: University of California Press, 1993); Walter Laqueur,
The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern
Terrorism,” in Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 46-73.
[32] Monica Duffy Toft, and Timothy Shah, “Why God is Winning”, Foreign Policy, (2006), pp. 39-43; Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, God’s
Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism
in the Modern World (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).
[33] Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied; ,Timothy Samuel Shah, Religious Freedom: Why Now?: Defending an Embattled Human Right
(Princeton, NJ: The Witherspoon Institute, 2012); Alan Hertzke, (Ed.), The Future of Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Pew Research
Center, ‘Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High’, Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-yearhigh/(accessed 1 June 2014).
ISSN 2334-3745
59
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
20 Years Later: A Look Back at the Unabomber Manifesto
by Brett A. Barnett
Abstract
On September 19, 1995, The New York Times and The Washington Post submitted to “Unabomber” Theodore
Kaczynski’s demand to publish his manifesto, a treatise that would come to be known as the “Unabomber
Manifesto.” While Kaczynski has been serving a life sentence for the letter-bombing campaign that he perpetrated
between 1979 and 1995, the radical environmentalist rhetoric contained within his manifesto has become
available to an even wider audience of current and would-be environmental extremists than when it was first
published. Given its availability online, the Unabomber Manifesto has become one of the most well-known
rhetorical artifacts endorsing environmental extremism. Using Herbert Simons’ “rhetorical requirements”
approach, this study demonstrates that the Unabomber Manifesto represents Kaczynski’s rhetorical efforts
to animate like-minded environmental extremists. The article concludes by discussing how the Unabomber
Manifesto resonated with some radical environmentalists and may have even served as a catalyst for later acts
committed by U.S.-based environmental extremists. By utilizing a framework for examining the rhetoric of
violent revolutionary social movements, this study provides further insight into what motivates environmental
extremists of today.
Keywords: Unabomber Manifesto; eco-terrorism; environmental extremists; radical environmentalists;
rhetorical analysis
Introduction
B
etween 1979 and 1995, Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski perpetrated a letter-bombing campaign that took
the lives of three individuals and seriously injured 23 others.[1] Nicknamed the “Unabomber” by the
FBI because his early bombing victims were connected to universities or airlines[2], Kaczynski eluded
authorities for almost 18 years.[3] During his crime spree, Kaczynski sent letter bombs to various computer
scientists, industry leaders, and other individuals whom he believed promoted technology to the detriment
of the natural environment in the United States. Feeling that his murderous rampage had failed to sufficiently
heighten the public’s awareness of the negative consequences of technology, in June of 1995, Kaczynski
demanded that The New York Times and The Washington Post publish “Industrial Society and Its Future.”[4]
Indeed, Kaczynski threatened to continue his killing spree if the Times and the Post refused to publish his
34,390-word, 56-page typewritten manifesto, a treatise in which he articulated his anti-technology, proenvironment worldview.[5]
On September 19, 1995, both papers submitted to Kaczynski’s demands and ran 3,000-word excerpts
from the treatise[6], now better known as the “Unabomber Manifesto.” While publication of the manifesto
garnered the Unabomber national headlines, it was also Kaczynski’s undoing. After reading the manifesto,
a social worker from Schenectady, New York, noticed remarkable similarities in the language use and
writing style of the Unabomber to those of his brother, Theodore Kaczynski, and notified authorities.[7] On
April 3, 1996, FBI officials arrested Kaczynski at his cabin in Montana, effectively ending the Unabomber’s
campaign of eco-terrorism.[8] As part of a plea bargain, Kaczynski was sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.[9] However, Kaczynski’s imprisonment did not serve to silence his anti-technology,
pro-environment message. Given its availability online, Kaczynski’s radical environmentalist rhetoric has
become available to an even wider audience than when it was first published. Moreover, certain elements
ISSN 2334-3745
60
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
of the Unabomber Manifesto, a rhetorical artifact endorsing the destruction of the man-made world and
the promotion of the natural environment, are reflected in the ideology and actions of many of today’s
environmental extremists.
Given the covert and autonomous manner in which he perpetrated his eco-terrorism campaign, Kaczynski
was the ultimate embodiment of a lone wolf environmental extremist. In discussing individuals who operate
independently of a larger organizational structure, “lone wolf ” describes an individual perpetrator, “lone
wolves” describes a group of two or more perpetrators, and “lone wolfing” describes the acts committed
by these perpetrators. Other terms commonly used by researchers and law enforcement for “lone wolf,”
“lone wolves,” and “lone wolfing,” are “leaderless resistor,” “leaderless resistors,” and “leaderless resistance,”
respectively. A concept developed and popularized by White supremacist Louis Beam in the hope of
stimulating numerous acts of violence from far right extremists, leaderless resistance is an oppositional
strategy allowing for, and encouraging, individuals, or small “cells” of lone actors, to perpetrate acts of
violence independently of any leadership hierarchy or support network.[10] However, since its conception,
leaderless resistance has also been embraced by individuals adhering to various ideologies (e.g. antigovernment, anti-abortion, animal liberation), including radical environmentalism. Similar to Louis Beam’s
attempts to stimulate acts of violence from White supremacists, the Unabomber Manifesto represents
Kaczynski’s attempt to animate like-minded environmental extremists.
Utilizing a framework for examining the rhetoric of violent revolutionary social movements, this study
examines the rhetoric contained in the Unabomber Manifesto and demonstrates that the manifesto
represents Kaczynski’s rhetorical efforts to animate like-minded environmental extremists. The essay
demonstrates how Kaczynski rhetorically navigated the wide range of competing worldviews that exist
within the larger radical environmentalist movement. The essay concludes by discussing how Kaczynski’s
manifesto resonated with some radical environmentalists and may have even served as a catalyst for later acts
committed by U.S.-based environmental extremists.
Rhetorical Analysis
The full text of the Unabomber Manifesto with the original section titles (see Appendix) and numbering
scheme was retrieved from The Washington Post website.[11] The author’s examination of the manifesto
is instructed by Herbert Simons’ “rhetorical requirements” approach which appears in his oft-cited essay,
“Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements.”[12] Simons’
“rhetorical requirements” approach provides a useful framework for examining the rhetoric of violent
revolutionary social movements, the sort of movement Kaczynski advocated in his manifesto and the sort
embraced by like-minded environmental extremists. Simons argues that social movements, just like more
formal entities such as political parties and governments, must fulfill functional requirements.
Simons further explains that the functional needs of a movement create “rhetorical requirements” for the
movement’s leaders. Simons identifies three rhetorical requirements that leaders of social movements must
fulfill: (1) attracting, maintaining, and molding followers into an efficiently organized unit; (2) securing
adoption of their ideology by the larger structure (i.e. the established order); and (3) reacting to resistance
generated by the larger structure. Simons also points out that inherent conflicts among these requirements
result in “rhetorical problems” that must be resolved strategically. He describes these rhetorical strategies as
ranging along a continuum from moderate to intermediate to militant, each with its own suitable styles and
tactics.
ISSN 2334-3745
61
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Given Kaczynski’s anti-collectivist sentiment and his history of lone wolfing, it is doubtful that Kaczynski
was intentionally seeking to lead a large social movement when he drafted his treatise; it is more plausible
that Kaczynski was hoping to animate like-minded environmental extremists. But, regardless of Kaczynski’s
intentions, he nevertheless fulfilled the rhetorical requirements of a movement leader when his antitechnology, pro-environment treatise was published. In using Simons’ framework to examine the Unabomber
Manifesto, the author demonstrates how Kaczynski attempted to animate like-minded environmental
extremists and, consequently, why it is conceivable that like-minded environmental extremists might have
been, or could still be, energized by his rhetoric. The author’s analysis shows how Kaczynski fulfilled the
rhetorical requirements that were created by the functional needs of a radical environmentalist movement,
the problems he faced, and the strategies he adopted to solve these dilemmas.
Attracting, Maintaining, and Molding Followers
Kaczynski was of the opinion that technology and nature were dichotomous, with technological development
representing a social ill and environmental preservation representing the cure. This point is exemplified by
the following statement Kaczynski made in the manifesto:
“Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several reasons. Nature (that which is outside
the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to expand indefinitely the power
of the system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has tremendous popular
appeal. The radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and opposes
technology. . . . To relieve the pressure on nature it is not necessary to create a special kind of social
system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. . . . It will relieve the worst of the pressure
on nature so that the scars can begin to heal.”[13]
Thus, for Kaczynski, open opposition to technology was as beneficial to the preservation of the environment
as environmentalism itself. What is more, these statements reveal that Kaczynski’s goal in drafting the
manifesto was not to create an anti-technology, pro-environment movement, but rather to energize likeminded individuals from within the larger radical environmentalist movement.
Like Simons, Kaczynski realized that the survival and effectiveness of any movement is dependent on
followers. Throughout his manifesto, Kaczynski made extensive use of both emotional and rational appeals.
In an obvious attempt to garner support for his radical environmentalist agenda, Kaczynski made issueoriented appeals that he knew would likely strike an emotional chord with readers, such as fears about the
loss of basic freedoms and the well-being of future generations, particularly their own children. On the issue
of freedom, Kaczynski discussed how technological development was increasingly forcing people to function
“as parts of an immense social machine” [14] that resulted in a loss of individual autonomy and basic
freedoms, including privacy and speech rights. The importance that Kaczynski placed on “autonomy” and
being “autonomous” was apparent; at several points within his treatise, he capitalized the words.[15]
To support claims regarding the loss of personal autonomy and freedoms, Kaczynski offered a variety of
evidence that had become all too familiar to Americans by 1995: (1) the prevalence of hidden cameras
and other surveillance techniques in society, (2) the ease of access to personal information contained in
computer data banks, (3) the conglomeration of media resulting in fewer speech opportunities, and (4) the
concentration of corporations into fewer and fewer hands resulting in less choice for consumers. Clearly,
Kaczynski’s strategy was to begin with a series of emotional appeals, playing to fears and concerns that he
believed readers held, then try to substantiate those emotions with a series of rational appeals, offering
verifiable evidence of the seemingly negative effects that technology had imposed on society.
ISSN 2334-3745
62
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Kaczynski used a similar approach when discussing the well-being of future generations. Commenting on the
effects that technology would have on humans, he wrote, “The Industrial Revolution and its consequences
have been a disaster for the human race”[16] and “threats to the modern individual tend to be MANMADE.”[17] To support such assertions, Kaczynski once again offered a variety of verifiable evidence, such as
“ozone depletion,” “greenhouse effect,” and “nuclear proliferation.”[18]
In an apparent attempt to create a sense of shared identity between himself and other like-minded
environmental extremists, Kaczynski made frequent use of the terms “we,” “us,” and “our” when referring
to individuals who opposed technology and the environmental devastation it caused.[19] Alternatively,
Kaczynski frequently used the term “they” when referring to persons with an opposite worldview in which
technology is embraced. When referring to adherents to his radical environmentalist agenda, Kaczynski also
frequently used “FC,” letters which authorities would later learn were an acronym for “Freedom Club.”[20]
At one point, Kaczynski even suggested that adherents to his radical environmentalist ideology were more
intelligent than non-adherents, a further attempt to create a sense of shared identity in “us-versus-them”
terms.
In an effort to organize FC into an efficient unit, Kaczynski first established what form of action he believed
the movement needed to embrace. Early in the manifesto Kaczynski wrote, “We . . . advocate a revolution
against the industrial system.”[21] Kaczynski did not view technological reform as a possibility; he viewed
revolution as the only alternative. What is more, Kaczynski contended that the longer this revolution was
delayed “the more disastrous the results.”[22] Thus, Kaczynski attempted to instill a sense of urgency in those
readers who may have lent credence to his revolutionary rhetoric.
In a further effort to define FC’s agenda, Kaczynski wrote, “we do outline in a very general way the measures
that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution against
that form of society.”[23] Kaczynski also established that FC’s goal was “not to be a POLITICAL revolution,”
that its objective was “to overthrow not governments but the economic and technological basis of the present
society.”[24] However, Kaczynski was not opposed to insurrection against governments, per se; Kaczynski
did endorse a decision to target governments to the extent that those governments supported the “industrialtechnological system.”[25]
Securing Adoption of the Ideology by the Larger Structure
Simons points out that the “product of any movement is its ideology, particularly its program for change,” and
the revolutionary rhetorician will insist that a significant renewal of values by the larger structure is necessary
to provide harmony and stability.[26] In his manifesto, Kaczynski provided like-minded environmental
extremists with a strategy for securing adoption of FC’s radical environmentalist ideology by the larger
structure. Perhaps the most important strategy Kaczynski developed for FC is revealed in the following
statement:
“[T]wo tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the industrial system is reducing the
human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within the system so as to increase the
likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a revolution against it becomes
possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the
industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened.”[27]
Kaczynski believed continual attacks on the industrial-technological system were vital for an environmental
revolution. Assuming a radical environmentalist movement was successful in the initial task of sufficiently
ISSN 2334-3745
63
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
weakening the industrial-technological system, the success of the revolution would then only hinge on the
movement’s ability to propagate an anti-technology, pro-environment ideology that might be adopted by the
larger structure.
In discussing how FC should go about getting others to accept its worldview, Kaczynski wrote, “an ideology,
in order to gain enthusiastic support . . . must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The
positive ideal we propose is Nature.”[28] Kaczynski later stated, “the ideology should be propagated in
a simplified form that will enable the unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in
unambiguous terms.”[29] Thus, Kaczynski indicated that FC’s ability to articulate its ideology with complete
clarity was essential for securing adoption of its radical environmentalist ideology by the larger structure.
Kaczynski also discussed what sort of adherents he believed FC should focus attention on while spreading its
radical ideology, when he wrote:
“The revolutionary ideology should therefore be developed on two levels. . . . the ideology should
address itself to people who are intelligent, thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a
core of people who will be opposed to the industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full
appreciation of the problems and ambiguities involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting
rid of the system.”[30]
Next, Kaczynski suggested that the effectiveness of FC’s efforts to secure adoption of its radical
environmentalist ideology by the larger structure should not be measured strictly in terms of how many
people were motivated to act out in support of its cause. While FC’s ability to advance its revolution
ultimately hinged on compelling at least some individuals to commit physical acts, Kaczynski conceded that
the majority of people only needed to be aware of its radial environmentalist ideology. Following from earlier
statements, Kaczynski wrote:
“Until the time comes for the final push toward revolution . . . the task of revolutionaries will be less
to win the shallow support of the majority than to build a small core of deeply committed people.
As for the majority, it will be enough to make them aware of the existence of the new ideology and
remind them of it frequently . . .”[31]
Thus, Kaczynski believed that FC would be more effective in securing adoption of its radical ideology
by the larger structure by simply spreading its message to a majority of people. Of course, Kaczynski’s
demands for the Times and the Post to publish his manifesto represented his own efforts to spread a radical
environmentalist message to the general public, a goal he achieved quite successfully when considering the
readership of the two papers and the widespread online availability of the treatise.[32]
Reacting to Resistance from the Larger Structure
Simons points out that the larger structure may respond to a movement in one of two ways. On one hand,
the larger structure may be “too kind” to a movement by appointing an entity to “investigate the issue,”
disarming the movement by accurately predicting its demands and acting on some of them, or some other
seemingly positive response that produces little, if any, progress for the movement.[33] On the other hand,
the larger structure may be too restrictive to a movement by, among other tactics, refusing to negotiate with
the movement or carry its message in the mass media.[34] Believing that the larger structure would be too
restrictive in its response to FC’s radical environmentalist efforts, Kaczynski drafted his treatise accordingly.
ISSN 2334-3745
64
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Kaczynski suggested, both implicitly and explicitly, that like-minded environmental extremists should
react violently to any potential resistance from the larger structure. Implicit in Kaczynski’s writings is that
FC should react to any potential resistance from the larger structure with enough violence to weaken the
industrial-technological system, a strategy repeatedly referenced in the manifesto. Within his treatise,
Kaczynski discussed “FC’s violent methods” and the history of violence in the United States and abroad.
In many instances, Kaczynski suggested that violence was a justifiable response to oppressive conditions
imposed by power-elites. For example, in discussing a fictional power struggle between a “weak” and a
“strong” member of society, Kaczynski wrote, “The only sensible alternative for the weaker man is to kill
the strong one while he has the chance. In the same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy
it.”[35] Although he speculated that FC “may or may not make use of violence,”[36] Kaczynski believed that
violent tactics were ultimately the most effective means to its success when opposed by the larger structure.
In other instances, Kaczynski explicitly stated this. For example, Kaczynski made explicit his belief that
violence was more effective than non-violence when he wrote, “If we had never done anything violent and
had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted.”[37] In fact,
Kaczynski went so far as to state that murder was an acceptable response to resistance by the larger structure
when he later stated, “In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting
impression, we’ve had to kill people.”[38] Of course, this is exactly what Kaczynski did during his bombing
campaign, and why the Times and the Post gave in to his demands to publish his manifesto. After all, both
papers, as well as other elements of the larger structure (e.g. law enforcement), were keenly aware that
resistance to the Unabomber’s demands to publish his radical environmentalist ideology were likely to be met
with more violence. What is more, the very publication of the Unabomber Manifesto in the Times and the
Post demonstrated how effective the use of violence would be in getting a radical environmentalist message
publicized to a mass audience.
“Rhetorical Problems” and “Rhetorical Strategies”
Simons points out that while the social movement leader needs to fulfill all three rhetorical requirements,
inherent conflicts frequently exist among those requirements, creating “rhetorical problems” that need to
be resolved by the leader.[39] Inherent conflicts among Kaczynski’s rhetorical requirements resulted in two
“rhetorical problems” that complicated his attempts to guide FC’s radical environmentalist efforts: (1) how
the movement was supposed to spread its message to a mass audience without using the very technologies
the movement opposes and (2) how the movement was to avoid alienating the mass of potential followers
who utilized the technologies the movement sought to eliminate.
Kaczynski made direct reference to the first inherent conflict when he wrote, “they [revolutionaries] will
be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching that other goal. If they give in to that temptation, they
will fall right back into the technological trap.”[40] At the same time, however, Kaczynski realized that
like-minded environmental extremists needed to use some technologies if they hoped to disseminate their
message to a wide audience. Kaczynski attempted to resolve this inherent conflict when he later wrote:
ISSN 2334-3745
65
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
“It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system without using SOME modern
technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to spread their message. But
they should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the technological system.”[41]
Kaczynski’s resolution of this conflict was relatively simple. He indicated that technology use was a necessary
evil that, if limited to the single purpose of harming the technological system, must be permitted if the
radical environmentalist movement hoped to spread its message to a mass audience.
With regard to how FC was to avoid alienating prospective adherents who utilized the technologies the
movement sought to eliminate, Kaczynski attempted to resolve it strategically by suggesting that the
movement should focus its efforts only on those in control of the technology:
“As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the public. . . . other conflicts tend to
distract attention from the important conflicts (between power-elite and ordinary people, between
technology and nature) . . . Generally speaking, one should encourage only those social conflicts that
can be fitted into the framework of the conflicts of power-elite vs. ordinary people, technology vs.
nature.”[42]
Kaczynski suggested that FC should not direct its aggression toward ordinary citizens who used technology
because that approach would have been counterproductive to the movement’s objectives. In Kaczynski’s view,
FC would be more effectively served by stopping technological development at its “power-elite” source and
allowing society to see the benefits created by a technology-free environment, rather than by attempting to
convince “ordinary” people to do away with their technologies.
Simons points out that individuals seeking to lead social movements often find themselves having to
navigate through an intricate web of conflicting rhetorical demands that must be resolved strategically.[43]
The movement leader may employ a moderate, intermediate, or militant type of strategy.[44] The strategy
of the moderate is one of peaceful persuasion, whereas the strategy of the militant is to use rhetoric as an
expression, a tool, and an act of force.[45] Although his general rhetorical style was more militant, Kaczynski
adopted an intermediate strategy that combined moderate and militant messages when faced with rhetorical
dilemmas involving technology.
Individuals unaware of the conflicting demands imposed on movement leaders may well perceive the
adoption of an intermediate rhetorical strategy by a person attempting to lead a radical environmentalist
movement as oxymoronic, especially when considering the violence that Kaczynski perpetrated during his
eco-terrorist bombing campaign. However, as Simons points out, contemporary social movements, when
viewed broadly, all seem to require combinations of moderate and militant rhetorical strategies.[46]
Conclusion
In adopting an intermediate rhetorical strategy, Kaczynski’s rhetoric resonates with a wider universe
of radical environmentalists. Bridging the myriad of ideological divides existing within the radical
environmentalist movement has been a principal rhetorical problem facing the movement’s leaders. Given
that Kaczynski managed to bridge this divide, if only partially, it certainly warrants examination. Using
Herbert Simons’ “rhetorical requirements” approach for examining the rhetoric of violently revolutionary
social movements, the author demonstrated how the Unabomber Manifesto represented a rhetorical effort
by Ted Kaczynski to animate like-minded environmental extremists he referred to as FC, an acronym for
Freedom Club. The examination demonstrated that Kaczynski fulfilled Simons’ three rhetorical requirements
ISSN 2334-3745
66
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
for social movement leaders by (1) attempting to attract/maintain/mold FC into an efficiently organized
unit (e.g. emotional and logical appeals, sense of urgency, sense of shared identity, the revolutionary form
of action needed); (2) instructing FC on how to secure adoption of their ideology by the larger structure
(e.g. continual attacks on the industrial-technological system, a “for-and-against” ideology propagated in
a simplified form); and (3) suggesting to FC that it should react violently to resistance generated by the
larger structure. The examination also revealed how Kaczynski attempted to strategically resolve “rhetorical
problems” that were created by these rhetorical requirements by adopting an intermediate strategy that
combined moderate and militant messages.
Kaczynski’s manifesto clearly represented his rhetorical efforts to animate like-minded environmental
extremists. Believing that he was in allegiance with other radical environmentalists, Kaczynski sought not
only to fortify their convictions but also to guide their actions through his manifesto. Kaczynski’s rhetorical
efforts were consistent with some of his earlier writings. Prior to his demands that the Times and the Post
publish his manifesto, Kaczynski drafted letters to Earth First! and other radical environmentalist groups
regarding his strategy for destroying the industrial-technological system.[47] During a search of Kaczynski’s
cabin following his arrest, FBI investigators discovered carbon copies of letters Kaczynski had written to
Earth First! in an overt attempt to enlist the group as an ally.[48] One of the letters discovered was entitled
“Suggestions for Earth Firsters! from FC.”[49] Also, investigation revealed that Kaczynski drew upon radical
environmentalist literature during his bombing campaign, even using it to select two of his victims.[50] This
discovery as well as Kaczynski’s efforts to communicate with Earth First! indicate that the group’s radical
environmentalist rhetoric struck a responsive chord with him.
Just as the rhetoric of Earth First! resonates with various radical environmentalists, including a lone wolf like
Kaczynski, the rhetoric in Kaczynski’s manifesto has also resonated with various radical environmentalists.
Because Kaczynski referenced ideals common to the larger radical environmentalist movement and
utilized an intermediate rhetorical strategy, his manifesto likely resonated with a wider universe of radical
environmentalists. Indeed, there is some evidence to support that Kaczynski’s revolutionary rhetoric
resonated with environmental extremists in the United States.
Despite his deadly tactics, Kaczynski had, and perhaps still has, a number of sympathizers within the radical
environmentalist movement.[51] In 1997, the year following Kaczynski’s apprehension, an anonymouslyproduced flyer reading “Free Ted Kaczynski” was distributed at the Earth First! Rendezvous by a long-term
radical environmentalist movement participant.[52] The back side of the flyer read, in part, “It may be that
the Unabomber will be looked upon … as a kind of warrior-prophet … Return to Wild Nature – Destroy the
Worldwide Industrial System.”[53]
Some individuals within the radical environmentalist movement have even employed tactics that resemble
those endorsed by Kaczynski in his manifesto. For example, after comparing Kaczynski’s revolutionary
rhetoric with subsequent eco-terrorist acts committed by individuals linked with the Earth Liberation Front
(ELF), several parallels exist. To begin, Kaczynski’s militant, pro-environment rhetoric is reflected in the
violent eco-terrorist attacks committed by ELF cells in the United States. The year following the manifesto’s
publication, ELF cells committed various large-scale acts of eco-terrorism, including multiple arsons and
a variety of other destructive attacks against property, facilities, and housing developments.[54] What is
more, the persistence of the eco-terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals linked with the ELF is reflective
of Kaczynski’s assertion that a radical environmentalist movement must wage continual attacks against the
industrial-technological system in order to achieve its environmental objectives.
ISSN 2334-3745
67
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
The views that Kaczynski espoused in his manifesto are also reflected in some targets of eco-terrorism
perpetrated by ELF cells in the United States. Mirroring Kaczynski’s call to violence, ELF cells have
committed attacks on construction sites, luxury retreats, developments in rural areas, facilities used
for genetically engineering trees and crops, as well as equipment and/or properties used by a variety of
corporations and government agencies that the group perceives to be environmentally-unfriendly. Moreover,
the tactic of attacking large, costly facilities, including the upscale residences of individuals deemed to be
assisting in environmental degradation, parallels Kaczynski’s strategy of perpetrating violence against powerelites, the entities he argued were most capable of supporting wide-scale environmentally-harmful activities.
Additionally, the guidelines Kaczynski established for propagating an ideology are reflected in how some
ELF cells and sympathizers propagate radical environmentalist ideology. In some instances, ELF cells have
attempted to propagate their ideology through the use of an unambiguous slogan (i.e. “If you build it, we
will burn it.”), an approach that echoes Kaczynski’s recommendation that environmental extremists should
propagate their ideology in a simplified form. ELF sympathizers have also attempted to spread a radical
environmentalist message to a wider audience through the media of mass communication, particularly the
Internet, an approach Kaczynski endorsed with the provision that it was done with the exclusive aim of
harming the technological system.
In examining the rhetorical nature of the Unabomber Manifesto, the present article provides further insight
into what motivates environmental extremists of today, and perhaps this study serves to assist society in
guarding against future acts of eco-terrorism. Given its availability online, the radical environmentalist
rhetoric contained within Kaczynski’s manifesto has become available to an even wider audience than
when it was first published. If the manifesto’s anti-technology, pro-environment rhetoric resonated with
environmental extremists in the past, like-minded individuals may view the essay as a guide for their
eco-terrorist activities in the future. Future studies should examine the role that other rhetorical artifacts,
especially those employing intermediate rhetorical strategies, may play in bringing radical environmentalists
from various ideological perspectives together for a common cause. With environmental extremists and a
host of other deeply committed issue-oriented extremists (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-globalization) actively
operating in the United States and abroad, examinations of the rhetorical nature of extremist rhetoric are
needed now more than ever.
About the Author: Brett A. Barnett is Associate Professor of Communication at Slippery Rock University of
Pennsylvania. He examines the rhetoric of hate groups and other extremists. He is the author of “Untangling The
Web Of Hate: Are Online ‘Hate Sites’ Deserving Of First Amendment Protection?”
Appendix: Sections of Theodore Kaczynski’s “Industrial Society and its Future”
1.
“Introduction”
2.
“The Psychology Of Modern Leftism”
3.
“Feelings Of Inferiority”
4.
“Oversocialization”
5.
“The Power Process”
6.
“Surrogate Activities”
ISSN 2334-3745
68
December 2015
7.
“Autonomy”
8.
“Sources Of Social Problems”
9.
“Disruption Of The Power Process In Modern Society”
Volume 9, Issue 6
10. “How Some People Adjust”
11. “The Motives Of Scientists”
12. “The Nature Of Freedom”
13. “Some Principles Of History”
14. “Industrial-Technological Society Cannot Be Reformed”
15. “Restriction of Freedom Is Unavoidable In Industrial Society”
16. “The ‘Bad’ Parts Of Technology Cannot Be Separated From The ‘Good’ Parts”
17. “Technology Is A More Powerful Social Force Than The Aspiration for Freedom”
18. “Simpler Social Problems Have Proved Intractable”
19. “Revolution Is Easier Than Reform”
20. “Control Of Human Behavior”
21. “Human Race At A Crossroads”
22. “Human Suffering”
23. “The Future”
24. “Strategy”
25. “Two Kinds Of Technology”
26. “The Danger Of Leftism”
27. “Final Note”
28. “Notes”
Notes
[1] Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, (2011), “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 5(5-6), pp.4350; Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko & Benjamin Van Son, (2013), “Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent Offenders: A Comparison of Assassins and School
Attackers,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(1), pp.4-24; Claire Wardle, (2003), “The ‘Unabomber’ vs. the ‘Nail Bomber’: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Newspaper
Coverage of Two Murder Trials,” Journalism Studies, 4(2), pp.239-251.
[2] Some researchers and law enforcement officials use the term “Unibomber” when referring to Kaczynski. However, “Unabomber,” the more commonly used term,
more accurately accounts for the fact that Kaczynski sent bombs to persons affiliated with universities (“Un”) and airlines (“a”).
[3] Alston Chase, (2003), “Harvard and the Unabomber: The Education of an American Terrorist,” New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
ISSN 2334-3745
69
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[4] Theodore Kaczynski, “Industrial Society and Its Future,” The Washington Post, September 19, 1995, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
national/longterm/unabomber/manifesto.text.htm, accessed December 10, 2015.
[5] Ron Arnold, (1997), “Ecoterror: The Violent Agenda to Save Nature, the World of the Unabomber,” Bellevue, WA: Free Enterprise Press.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Chase p.21 (See note 3); Robert Graysmith, (1997), “Unabomber: A Desire to Kill,” Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Chase p.22 (See note 3).
[10] Paul Joosse, (2007), “Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(3), pp.351368.
[11] Kaczynski (See note 4). Kaczynski’s manifesto is divided into 28 sections. While environmentalism is not referenced in any of the section titles, Kaczynski
discussed environmental issues at several points within the manifesto. Within the body (i.e. excluding footnotes) of the manifesto, individual paragraphs are
designated by numbers listed in ascending order from 1 to 232. When information from the manifesto is quoted, the paragraph or paragraphs from which the
quoted material was taken is cited in the endnotes.
[12] Herbert W. Simons, (1970), “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1), pp.1-11.
[13] Kaczynski, paragraph 184 (See note 4).
[15] Kaczynski wrote his manifesto on an old-fashioned typewriter that did not allow him to italicize or boldface words.
[18] Kaczynski, paragraph 169 (See note 4). Kaczynski also discussed how he believed increasingly liberal (“leftist’) attitudes regarding the personal acquisition
of consumer goods, coupled with higher population densities, were wreaking havoc on the environment. In essence, Kaczynski believed consumer demand for
products had grown beyond environmental sustainability levels.
[19] Kaczynski’s use of “we,” “us,” and “our” could have also been intended to convince authorities he represented an actual multi-person group.
[20] Bron Taylor, (1998), “Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber Manifesto to the Earth Liberation Front,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 10(4), pp:1-42. Kaczynski inscribed “FC” on some of his bombs.
[26] Simons, p.4 (See note 10).
[30] Kaczynski, paragraphs 186-187 (See note 4).
[32] If that were not enough, Kaczynski’s manifesto is available in book form through several libraries.
ISSN 2334-3745
70
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[39] Simons, pp.4-7 (See note 10).
[42] Kaczynski, paragraphs 190-191 (See note 4).
[47] Chase p.77 (See note 3).
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Taylor p.2 (See note 20).
[52] Taylor p.7-8, 35 (See note 20).
[54] Michael Loadenthal, (2014), “Eco-Terrorism? Countering Dominant Narratives of Securitisation: A Critical, Quantitative History of the Earth Liberation Front
(1996-2009),” Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(3), pp:16-50.
ISSN 2334-3745
71
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
II. Research Notes
Re-Examining the Involvement of Converts in Islamist
Terrorism: A Comparison of the U.S. and U.K.
by Sam Mullins
Abstract
This article explores the role of converts in the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’ based on a sample of 75 American and 47
British converts who became involved in Islamist terrorism between 1980 and September 11th, 2013. Converts
are compared to non-coverts on a variety of demographic, operational and investigative variables, and each
sample is further divided into those who mobilized before and after 9/11 in order to allow assessment of changes
over time. Contrary to previous research, results show that American converts in particular constitute a “jihadi
underclass” that is markedly disadvantaged compared to the rest of the U.S. sample. They also present a generally
less capable terrorism threat and are especially likely to be caught in sting operations. British converts, whilst also
clearly disadvantaged and less capable, are much less distinct compared to non-converts in the U.K. Practical
and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
Keywords: Islamist; terrorism; jihad; converts; United States; United Kingdom.
Introduction
F
rom Richard Reid to Omar Hammami, the involvement of converts in Islamist terrorism has been a
subject of much interest, yet there has been relatively little in the way of systematic research. A notable
exception to this is the work of Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer, who found that American converts
“were likely U.S.-born young men with a good education who had since found regular work” and were on a
similar socioeconomic footing to the rest of their sample.[1] Utilizing a somewhat broader sampling frame,
this paper re-examines the involvement of American converts in Islamist terrorism and compares them to
British converts whilst also taking into account changes over time. Although there are broad similarities
between the two bodies of research, the conclusion here is that American converts in particular constitute a
highly marginalized “jihadi underclass” which is markedly worse off than the rest of the sample. This suggests
a rather different reality than Simcox and Dyer depict, thus raising important questions about how and why
converts are drawn to Islamist terrorist activity in the U.S. and what this means for counter-terrorism (CT).
This is a critical issue in light of the recent increase in Islamist terrorist activity, combined with the fact that
that converts make up for a significant percentage of such cases in the U.S.
Methodology
The Simcox and Dyer study included a total of 171 people (among them 40 converts) who were convicted of
al-Qaeda related offences (AQROs) or were killed in suicide attacks within the U.S. between 1997 and 2011.
The analysis presented here is based upon a U.S. sample of 365 individuals (75 converts, i.e. 21%) and a U.K.
sample of 427 (including 47 converts, i.e. 11%) who mobilized in support of the al-Qaeda-led “Global Salafi
Jihad” (GSJ) between 1980 and September 11th 2013 (see Appendices 1 and 2).[2] This included anyone
from, living, or offending in the U.S. and U.K who:
ISSN 2334-3745
72
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
•
Was convicted of a relevant offence (whether under terrorism legislation or otherwise);
•
Was killed during the course of terrorist activities, either at home and abroad;
•
Was facing legal allegations at the time the analysis was conducted;
•
Was subject to administrative or other sanctions in the absence of a conviction (detention,
deportation, financial asset freezing and British control orders);
•
Openly admitted their involvement in the GSJ, for example by way of appearing in a jihadi
propaganda video;
•
Was publicly alleged to have been involved in GSJ-related terrorism but had not been subject to any
legal action (including, for example, numerous individuals from Minnesota who are believed to have
joined al-Shabaab).
In addition, each sample was divided into those who mobilized before and after 9/11 in order to evaluate
changes over time.[3] Finally, while Simcox and Dyer examined 11 variables (7 relating to demographic
backgrounds and 4 to operational behavior), the analysis here covers 14 (8 demographic, 5 operational and 1
relating to investigations).
Findings
The findings for demographic, operational and investigative variables before and after 9/11 are summarized
in Tables 1 and 2 below. In the ensuing discussion of results, American converts vs. non-converts are
compared first, followed by the equivalent comparison for the British sample.[4]
Table 1. Converts vs. non-converts involved in Islamist terrorism in the U.S. who mobilized before and after 9/11
(1980–September 11th 2013).[5]
*FTs refers to foreign terrorists.
ISSN 2334-3745
73
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Table 2. Converts vs. non-converts involved in Islamist terrorism in the U.K. who mobilized before and after
9/11 (1980–September 11th 2013).
*FTs refers to foreign terrorists.
Demographic Variables
More than 90% of all individuals in both the American and British samples, before and after 9/11 were
male. Although the number of females becoming involved has increased over time, there is no obvious
difference between converts and non-converts, or between the U.S. and U.K. While Simcox and Dyer found
that American converts were significantly older than non-converts, this result was not replicated here and
the average age in all groups was in the mid to late 20s. Nevertheless, in accordance with the previous study,
American converts were found to be much more likely than non-converts to be born in the U.S. (more than
80% compared to 13% of non-converts before 9/11 and 25% after 9/11). Similarly, U.S. converts were more
likely to be American citizens or permanent residents (almost 100% vs. 57% of non-converts in the pre-9/11
sample and 78% afterwards). By comparison, these differences were far less pronounced in the U.K. where,
for example, 83% of converts were British citizens/permanent residents compared to 74% of non-converts
after 9/11.
The remaining findings in relation to demographic variables are much more revealing. Simcox and Dyer
found that overall, American converts did not differ greatly from non-converts in terms of education,
although they were more likely to have obtained a college degree (20% vs. 8%). They further found that
converts were more likely to be employed and in particular to be in skilled occupations (35% vs. 15%).
In the present study, the figures are rather different. Among those who mobilized before 9/11, 28% of
American converts had obtained a degree, compared to 23% of non-converts, yet they were more likely
to be unemployed (12% vs. 4%) and less likely to be in skilled occupations (4% vs. 19%). During the same
period, British converts did not appear to differ significantly from either the rest of the British sample or from
American converts.
ISSN 2334-3745
74
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
After 9/11, however, there are some quite dramatic differences. Just 10% of American converts had obtained
a degree, compared to 17% of the rest of the U.S. sample. In addition, 25% of American converts had failed
to complete high school, compared to just 7% of non-converts. They were also less likely to be in skilled
occupations (4% vs. 10%) and much more likely to be unemployed (28% vs. 4%). Furthermore, American
converts were more than twice as likely to have a previous criminal record (56% vs. 20%) and were three
times as likely to have a documented history of mental health problems (25% vs. 8%).[6] By contrast,
although British converts were also worse off than their compatriots, the differences were generally less. In
terms of education, 3% of British converts had obtained a degree compared to 11% of the rest of the U.K.
sample, but just 1 convert (3%) had failed to complete high school compared to 3 non-converts. Just 3% of
individuals in either sub-sample were in skilled occupations; however, converts were much more likely to be
unemployed (31% vs. 16%). British converts were also more likely to have a criminal record (29% vs. 17%)
but there was little difference in terms of mental health issues (9% vs. 6%).
Operational Variables
Previously, Simcox and Dyer found that American converts were less likely to have received terrorist training
(25% vs. 51% of non-converts), equally likely to have combat experience (18%) but more likely to have
received training and then progressed to combat (54% vs. 33%). They further found that converts were less
likely to be connected to designated terrorist organizations (DTOs) (38% vs. 63%) and seemingly less likely
to be involved in terrorist plots against the U.S. (excluding plots involving undercover operatives).[7] Overall,
these results suggest that converts are less of a terrorism threat, compared to non-converts. Although the
findings from the present research generally confirm this, they also help to highlight important changes that
have taken place over time as well as differences on either side of the Atlantic.
In terms of links to foreign terrorists (DTOs or otherwise), American converts are indeed less connected
than non-converts (68% vs. 78% before 9/11 and 22% vs. 46% afterwards). Prior to 9/11, American converts
were more likely to have trained and/or fought overseas (60% vs. 42%). After 9/11, however, the pattern has
reversed – the respective figures being 12% vs. 22%. There has also been significant change in relation to
planning of terrorist attacks.[8] Before 9/11, there was very little difference: 16% of American converts and
15% of non-converts were actively involved in planning attacks. Yet after 9/11, the percentage of converts rose
to 44%, compared to 23% of non-converts. Finally, the number of lone-actor terrorists[9] has also increased,
in particular for converts where the figures rose from 0 before 9/11 to 16% afterwards (compared to an
increase from 2–8% for non-converts).
Although the changes that have occurred in the British sample have all been in the same direction, the
differences between converts and non-converts are less. Before 9/11, 92% of British converts had links
to foreign terrorists, compared to 90% of non-converts. After 9/11, the figures dropped to 31% and 38%
respectively. The findings for participation in overseas terrorist training and/or combat are similar to the U.S:
this applied to 72% of British converts and 49% of non-converts who mobilized before 9/11, then 6% vs. 26%
after 9/11. Unlike in the U.S., however, there has been little difference in terms of planning attacks: 23% of
British converts vs. 26% of non-converts were involved in attack planning prior to 9/11, compared to 20%
and 23% respectively since then. Lastly, when it comes to lone actors, the results are again very similar to the
American sample: among British converts, lone actors rose from 0–14%, compared to 2–7% among nonconverts.
ISSN 2334-3745
75
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Investigations
A final variable of interest for the purposes of this paper relates to the use of informants and/or undercover
law-enforcement operatives within CT investigations. Here there are very substantial differences. Prior to
9/11, 36% of American converts, vs. 25% of non-converts were caught in such investigations. After 9/11, the
respective percentages were 60% vs. 45%. Meanwhile, in the U.K., no converts and just 2% of non-converts
who mobilized prior to 9/11 were caught in investigations using informants/undercover operatives. After
9/11, these figures rose to 14% vs. 5%.
Discussion
The above findings clearly suggest that American converts in particular are far more likely to be socially and
economically marginalized on a variety of indicators compared to non-converts. They are also much less
likely to have trained or fought overseas and more likely to act alone, as well as more likely to be involved
in domestic attack plots and to be caught in sting operations. British converts also tend to be disadvantaged
(notably with regards to unemployment and criminality) but otherwise appear to be slightly better off than
their American counterparts and closer to the rest of the British sample. Similar to American converts, they
are less likely to have trained or fought overseas and more likely to act alone, but otherwise there are no
obvious, dramatic differences (bearing in mind that the number of British converts was smaller, meaning that
percentages were easily skewed).
The disparity between these results and those of Simcox and Dyer comes down to methodology. By utilizing
a wider sampling frame, the present study included a greater number of relevant cases, such as Jesse Morton
(one of the founders of Revolution Muslim, later convicted of soliciting murder[10]), Ruben Shumpert
(killed in a missile strike in Somalia in 2008[11]), Troy Kastigar (reportedly killed fighting for al-Shabaab
in 2009[12]), and Naser Jason Abdo, who was charged in 2011 (and later convicted) of planning an attack
on soldiers in the vicinity of Fort Hood.[13] Moreover, as the above results demonstrate, American converts
involved in Islamist terrorist activity have shown a rapid decline in socioeconomic status after 9/11 and so it
is equally important to measure changes over time.
Likewise, it is of course necessary to continually update analyses and this can obviously give quite different
results. Notably, several American converts accused of Islamist terrorist activity in more recent years also
appear to have been highly marginalized. These include Nicholas Teausant, who is believed to suffer from
schizophrenia and stands accused of planning to join the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) following his arrest in March
2014[14]; Zale Thompson, who had been arrested multiple times and been evicted from his apartment
before being killed in an attack on New York City police officers in October 2014[15]; Joshua Van Haften,
an ex-convict described as a “mentally ill loner” who was arrested at Chicago airport in April 2015 on
suspicion of attempting to join IS[16]; and Alexander Ciccolo, a young man with a long history of mental
health and behavioral problems who was arrested on July 4, 2015 on suspicion of planning domestic attacks.
[17] Although continued, systematic research will be required to confirm whether or not such cases are
indeed part of a continuing trend, they nevertheless provide anecdotal support to the findings presented in
this article, which suggest that American converts involved in Islamist terrorism tend to belong to a jihadi
“underclass”.
Given that this is the case, American converts appear to conform, perhaps more than any other group, to
the notion that people are drawn to Islamist terrorism as a result of being marginalized in society. Although
this has become a rather stereotyped explanation for involvement in terrorism which tends to ignore the
incredibly wide demographic profiles and diverse backgrounds of perpetrators, it at least appears to hold
ISSN 2334-3745
76
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
some truth for this category. Among the many thousands of people unable to achieve the ‘American dream’
who are left frustrated and resentful, a small number may thus find the answer in violent jihad as the
ultimate counter-culture – one that promises belonging and acceptance, whilst simultaneously providing
opportunities for excitement and fame and a chance to strike back against those who rejected them.[18]
Putting aside debates about the nature of sting operations, this may help explain the greater willingness
of American converts to attack their own country. It is also consistent with the suggestion that, for some,
converting to Islam in the post-9/11 (now post-IS) world is an act of rebellion and this in turn helps us
understand why there seems to have been such a dramatic shift in the average demographic profile of
American converts involved in Islamist terrorism.
Why, then, would the situation be any different in the U.K.? Of course, neither population of ‘terrorist
converts’ is entirely homogenous and so there is certainly overlap between the two. Nevertheless, there still
appears to be a relative difference which is not easily explained. Part of the answer may lie in the fact that
Islamist terrorism cases are far more geographically dispersed in the U.S., there are far fewer connections
between cases on the domestic stage and the Internet appears to play a comparatively greater role in processes
of radicalization[19] – meaning that violent jihadists in the U.S. often mobilize either by themselves or as part
of relatively self-contained groups and there are few barriers to ‘membership’ in the movement.
By comparison, Islamist terrorism cases in the U.K. are confined within a much smaller area (dominated
by four regional hotspots of activity) and there are many more connections between them.[20] This
is indicative of socially ingrained jihadist subcultures within Britain, manifest by way of networks of
likeminded individuals with varying degrees of involvement in extremist activism and terrorism-related
activities. Presumably, these networks exert a certain level of natural control over who is able to join,
which might therefore exclude people suffering from mental health disorders for instance. Moreover, the
relative continuity of extremist networks in Britain may also have preserved the ‘quality’ of ideological
understanding and expression in the sense that new recruits can often draw upon the knowledge and advice
of more experienced individuals. By contrast, terror networks in the U.S. were largely dismantled during the
1990s and those who radicalize today are more likely to be essentially self-taught – thereby allowing wider
participation and an apparently greater emphasis on specifically rebellious/counter-cultural elements over
time.
The more established presence of extremist networks within Britain might help to explain another possible
difference between these two countries. According to Simcox and Dyer, British converts (though fewer
in number than Americans) seem to be proportionally over-represented within Islamist terrorism cases
in the U.K., accounting for 15% of their sample of terrorists but only an estimated 4% of the U.K. Muslim
population.[21] Meanwhile, they found that the number of American converts involved in Islamist terrorism
was proportional to their place within the U.S. Muslim population (both 23%).[22] If true, the relatively
high proportion of British converts might be due to the fact that they are more likely to come into contact
with, and/or be deliberately targeted for recruitment by extremist networks (notwithstanding that 14% were
classed as lone actors). However, there is no register of converts in either country and the overall numbers
of Muslims are also approximations, meaning the above figures must be treated with caution.[23] Moreover,
recent research has suggested that converts are also over-represented in Islamist terrorism cases in the U.S. Of
71 people arrested in America on ISIS-related charges since March 2014, Vidino and Hughes found that 40%
were converts, compared to an estimated 23% for the Muslim population as a whole. [24] Although based
on a relatively small sample, this suggests that the proportion of converts involved in Islamist terrorism in
the U.S. has increased quite dramatically. Furthermore, the proportional difference is considerably greater
than appears to be the case in the U.K. If indeed this is now the case, it seems likely that it is connected to
ISSN 2334-3745
77
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
the increased significance of social media as a vehicle for terrorist propaganda and recruitment. Ultimately,
however, the reality is still very much unclear and there are no currently definitive answers which explain the
different profiles and rates of mobilization of British and American converts involved in Islamist terrorism.
Conclusion
The available data indicate that, contrary to previous research, American converts are in fact now worse off
than non-converts on socioeconomic measures and although this also applies to British converts, the latter
are much less distinct. Similar to previous research, the results here confirm that American converts in
particular present a much less capable terrorism threat and are more likely to be acting alone. Nevertheless,
they are also more likely to be involved in domestic attack plots within the U.S. and are more likely to be
caught in sting operations.
Since converts make up a significant (and apparently growing) proportion of Islamist terrorism cases in the
U.S., it is important to try and understand more about how and why such highly marginalized individuals
are drawn to violent jihad. Ultimately, this may lead to more efficient ways of dealing with them. Indeed, the
fact that American converts are especially likely to be caught in stings and often receive lengthy custodial
sentences, makes them an added burden on law enforcement and society. Given that these individuals
are socially and economically deprived and frequently suffering from mental health problems, intuitively
it seems they might be more amenable to practical, “soft” interventions that emphasize social, financial
and psychological support as opposed to more complex ideological “de-radicalization”. Of course such
interventions will not always succeed, but amidst the current climate of strained budgets and increased
mobilization to violent jihad, there is a clear need to look for alternative approaches to CT. Just as American
converts seem to be especially vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, they may present equally soft
targets for CT or for countering violent extremism (CVE). Whether or not this is true –and whether it might
also apply in Britain– will require further research.
Similarly, although British converts do not appear to be as distinct as those in the U.S., they exhibit relatively
high rates of unemployment and criminality and (though small in number) may be proportionally overrepresented in Islamist terrorism cases. It is therefore necessary to examine them more closely in order to
understand how and why they mobilize to violent jihad and just how different they are, both to non-converts
in the U.K. and to converts in the U.S. More generally, there is also a need to compare ‘terrorist converts’ to
non-violent converts in each country in order to establish whether the former are representative of the latter
in terms of demographic characteristics. Finally, it is of course necessary to update this research in light of
the significant increase in terrorist activity, largely inspired by events in Syria and Iraq, in which substantial
numbers of converts continue to be involved.
About the author: Sam Mullins is a Professor of Counter-Terrorism at the George C. Marshall European Center
for Security Studies, Germany, and an Honorary Principal Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia.
Appendix 1. List of American converts included in the sample
Converts included in the analysis are listed in chronological order according to when they began. Details
include individual names, brief case description, offence period, and classifications (grounds for inclusion at
the time the study was completed). Co-offenders are listed together.
ISSN 2334-3745
78
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Pre-9/11
1.
Wadih El-Hage. AQ operative. 1982–1998. Prosecuted.
2.
Ephron Gilmore. NY/NJ network, fought overseas. 1988–Unknown. Public allegations.
3.
Daniel Patrick Boyd and Charles Boyd. Trained in Afghanistan. 1989–1991. Confession/Public
allegations.
4.
Christopher Paul. AQ links, planning attacks. 1990–2007. Prosecuted.
5.
Abu Ubaidah Yahya. NY/NJ network. 1992–1993. Public allegations.
6.
Kelvin E. Smith. NY/NJ network, provided training. 1993. Prosecuted (non-terror).
7.
Earl Gant. NY/NJ network. 1993. Prosecuted (non-terror).
8.
Clement Rodney Hampton–El and Victor Alvarez. NYC Landmarks plot. 1993–1993. Prosecuted.
9.
Aukai Collins. Fought in jihadi conflicts abroad. 1993–1996. Confession.
10. Jason Pippin. Trained in Kashmir, involved with Tarek Mehanna. 1996–2003. Confession.
11. Abu Adam Jibreel al-Amriki. Killed in Kashmir. 1997–1998. KIA.
12. Adam Gadahn. AQ spokesman. 1997–Ongoing. Confession.
13. Jose Padilla. AQ operative. 1998–2002. Prosecuted.
14. Earnest James Ujaama. Oregon training camp. 1999–2001. Prosecuted.
15. Randall Todd Royer, Hammad Abdur–Raheem, Donald Thomas Surratt, Yong Ki Kwon. Virginia
jihad group. 2000–2003. Prosecuted.
16. Hassan Abu Jihaad. Disclosed navy secrets. 2000–2001. Prosecuted (non-terror).
17. John Walker Lindh. American Taliban. 2000–2001. Prosecuted.
18. Jeffrey Leon Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford and October Martinique Lewis. Portland jihad group.
2001–2002. Prosecuted/ Prosecuted (non-terror).
Post-9/11
19. Clifton L. Cousins. Threatened George W. Bush. 2001–2003. Prosecuted (non-terror).
20. Rafiq Abdus Sabir. Offered support for AQ. 2001–2005. Prosecuted.
21. Ryan Anderson. Tried to give military info to AQ. 2004. Prosecuted (non-terror).
22. Mark Robert Walker. Planned to join Somali jihadis. 2004. Prosecuted.
23. James Elshafay. NYC subway bomb sting. 2004. Prosecuted.
24. Kevin James, Levar Washington and Gregory Patterson. LA attack plot. 2004–2005. Prosecuted.
25. Justin Singleton. Discussed jihad online, lied to FBI. 2005. Prosecuted (non-terror).
ISSN 2334-3745
79
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
26. Paul Gene Rockwood Jr and Nadia Rockwood. Jihadi hit–list. 2006–2010. Prosecuted/Prosecuted
(non-terror).
27. Mohammed Reza Taheri–Azar. North Carolina vehicle attack March 3, 2006. Prosecuted (nonterror).
28. Russell DeFreitas. JFK airport plot. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
29. Ruben Luis Leon Shumpert. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2008. KIA.
30. Omar Shafik Hammami. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2013. Legal allegations/Confession/KIA.
31. Daniel Patrick Boyd. North Carolina jihadi plotters. 2006–2009. Prosecuted (repeat offender).
32. Carlos Eduardo Almonte. Conspiracy to join al-Shabaab. 2006–2010. Prosecuted.
33. Derrick Shareef. Mall attack sting. 2006. Prosecuted.
34. Daniel Joseph Maldonado. Joined al-Shabaab. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
35. Bryant Neal Vinas. AQ operative. 2007–2008. Prosecuted.
36. James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams and Laguerre Payen. NYC attack sting. 2008–2009.
Prosecuted.
37. Barry Walter Bujol Jr. Conspiracy to join terrorists overseas. 2008–2010.
38. Troy Matthew Kastigar. Minnesota jihadi network. 2008–2009. KIA.
39. Colleen Renee LaRose and Jamie Paulin–Ramirez. Conspiracy to support terrorists overseas. 2008–
2009.
40. Michael C. Finton. Springfield, Illinois attack sting. 2009. Prosecuted.
41. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad. Little Rock shooting, June 1, 2009. Prosecuted (non-terror).
42. Zachary Adam Chesser and Jesse Curtis Morton. Online threats, attempt to join terrorists overseas.
2009–2010. Prosecuted/Prosecuted (non-terror).
43. Emerson Winfield Begolly. Promoting terrorism online. 2010. Prosecuted.
44. Antonio Benjamin Martinez. Baltimore attack sting. 2010. Prosecuted.
45. Randy Lamar Wilson. Planned to go to Mauritania for jihad. 2010–2012. Prosecuted.
46. Marcus Dwayne Robertson and Jonathan Paul Jiminez. Jihadi facilitation network. 2010–2011.
Prosecuted/Legal allegations/Prosecuted (non-terror).
47. Walli Mujahidh and Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif. Seattle military attack sting. 2011. Prosecuted.
48. Naser Jason Abdo. Planned attack near Fort Hood. 2011. Prosecuted.
49. Jose Pimentel. NYC attack sting. 2011. Legal allegations.
50. Craig Benedict Baxam. Attempted to join al-Shabaab. 2011. Legal allegations.
ISSN 2334-3745
80
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
51. Arifeen David Gojali, Ralph Kenneth Deleon and Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales. Conspiracy
to join AQ/Taliban. 2011–2012. Legal allegations.
52. Shelton Thomas Bell. Attempted to join jihadists in Yemen. 2012. Legal allegations.
53. Justin Kaliebe. Attempted to join jihadists in Yemen. 2013. Prosecuted.
54. Erwin Antonio Rios. Plan to commit armed robberies to fund jihad (sting). 2012–2013. Prosecuted
(non-terror).
55. Matthew Aaron Llaneza. Oakland attack sting. 2012–2013. Legal allegations.
56. Nicole Lynn Mansfield. Killed fighting in Syria. 2012–2013. KIA.
57. Eric Harroun. Fought in Syria. 2013. Prosecuted (non-terror)/Confession.
Appendix 1. List of British converts included in the sample
Converts included in the analysis are listed in chronological order according to when they began. Details
include individual names, brief case description, offence period, and classifications (grounds for inclusion at
the time the study was completed). Co-offenders are listed together.
Pre-9/11
1.
David Sinclair. Killed in Bosnia. 1993. KIA.
2.
Xavier Jaffo. Killed in Chechnya, April 12, 2000. 1995–2000. KIA.
3.
Andrew Rowe. International terrorist. 1995–2003. Prosecuted.
4.
David Courtailler. FPM network. 1997–2000. Overseas conviction (France).
5.
Jerome Courtailler. FPM network. 1997–2001. Overseas conviction (Netherlands).
6.
Abdullah el-Faisal. Jihadi ideologue. 1998–2002. Prosecuted.
7.
Abu Abdul Rahman Roland. Killed in Afghanistan. 1998–1999. KIA.
8.
Richard Reid. Shoe–bomb plot. 1998–2001. Overseas conviction (US).
9.
Dhiren Barot. US/UK attack plots (AQ). 2000–2004. Prosecuted (non-terror).
10. Martin John Mubanga. Alleged terrorist activity. 2000–2002. Gitmo detainee.
11. Feroz Abbasi. Alleged terrorist activity/FPM network. 2000–2001. Gitmo detainee/Confession.
12. Binyam Mohammed. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002. Gitmo detainee.
13. Richard Dean Belmar. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002. Gitmo detainee.
Post-9/11
14. Jamal Malik al-Harith. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001. Gitmo detainee.
ISSN 2334-3745
81
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
15. Abu Omar. Fought in Afghanistan. 2001–2002. Confession.
16. Jamal Abdullah Kiyemba. Alleged terrorist activity. 2001–2002. Gitmo detainee.
17. Anthony Garcia. Fertilizer bomb plot (Operation Crevice). 2003–2004. Prosecuted.
18. AP. Went to join jihadis in Somalia. 2004–2006. Control order.
19. Atilla Ahmet, Kibley da–Costa and Mohammed al-Figari. UK training camps. 2004–2006.
Prosecuted.
20. Jermaine Lindsay. 7/7 bombings. 2004–2005. KIA.
21. Abu Izzadeen and Simon Keeler. Soliciting funds for terrorism (AM). 2004. Prosecuted.
22. Abdul Ishaq Raheem. Terror–supply network/Beheading plot. 2004–2007. Prosecuted.
23. Umar Islam. Aircraft liquid bomb plot (Operation Overt). 2005–2005. Prosecuted (non-terror).
24. Yeshiemebet Girma. 21/7 post–event assistance. 2005. Prosecuted.
25. Kevin Gardner. Army base attack plan. 2006–2007. Prosecuted.
26. Nicholas Roddis. Bomb hoax. 2007. Prosecuted.
27. Andrew Isa Ibrahim. Planned attack in Bristol. 2007–2008. Prosecuted.
28. Mohammad Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed–Alim. Attempted suicide bombing in Exeter, May 22, 2008.
Prosecuted.
29. M1. Suspected terrorist activity. 2008–2009. Deported.
30. Matthew Ronald Newton. Manchester terrorism recruitment. 2008–2009. Prosecuted.
31. J1. London Somali jihad cell. 2009–2010. Detention/Deportation.
32. Abu Bakr and Mansoor Ahmed. Killed in Pakistan. 2009–2010. KIA.
33. Richard Dart. (Attempted) overseas training/Planning domestic attack. 2010–2012. Prosecuted.
34. Minh Quang Pham. Joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 2010–2011. Legal allegations
(US).
35. Nicholas Roddis. Preparing for acts of terrorism. 2011–2012. Legal allegations (repeat offender).
36. Robert Baum and Christian David Erkart Heinze Emde. Possession offences. 2011. Prosecuted.
37. Samantha Lewthwaite and Jermaine Grant. Planning attacks (al-Shabaab). Legal allegations (Kenya).
38. Maryam. Joined jihad in Syria. 2013–Unknown. Confession.
39. Michael Adebolajo and Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale. Murder of Lee Rigby, May 22, 2013. Legal
allegations (non-terror).
40. Royal Barnes and Rebekah Dawson. Encouraging acts of terrorism online. 2013. Legal allegations.
ISSN 2334-3745
82
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Notes
[1] Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer, “The Role of Converts in Al-Qaìda-Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States” CTC Sentinel, 6 (3) (2013) https://www.ctc.
usma.edu/posts/the-role-of-converts-in-al-qaida-related-terrorism-offenses-in-the-united-states. Accessed April 2, 2013.
[2] These data were collected and analyzed by the author over a period of approximately seven years (see Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist
Terrorism in the US and UK (London: Imperial College Press, forthcoming).
[3] After also dividing each sample into converts versus non-converts, this resulted in 8 different sub-samples: For the U.S., the pre-9/11 sample consisted of 143
individuals (25 converts, 118 non-converts) while the post-9/11 sample included 222 individuals (51 converts –1 of whom was a repeat offender from before 9/11–
and 172 non-converts). By comparison, the U.K. pre-9/11 sample included 139 individuals (13 converts, 126 non-converts) and the post-9/11 sample included 288
(34 converts –including 1 repeat offender during the post-9/11 period– and 254 non-converts).
[4] Note that all percentages reported for the present study refer to the number of known individuals as a function of the respective sub-sample total.
[5] Note that the number of U.S. converts before and after 9/11 adds to 76, although the true number of individuals is 75. This is because one person (Daniel Boyd)
committed separate offences in both time-periods. All other repeat offenders, both American and British, are excluded from the totals in order to show the actual
number of people involved.
[6] This is consistent with research conducted by Kleinmann, who found that 19 of 32 American converts showed evidence of individual-level mechanisms of
radicalization (including mental health problems), compared to just 5 of 51 non-converts (Scott Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni
Militants in the United States: Comparing Converts and Non-Converts” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35(4) (2012) 278–297.
[7] Regarding involvement in terrorism plots, Simcox and Dyer do not report provide clear, comparative figures.
[8] Including plots involving undercover operatives and excluding attacks that were actually completed.
[9] Defined here as lone, untrained individuals acting independently of any organization or group (also excluding terrorism offenders who were caught in sting
operations where they plotted together with undercover operatives).
[10] “Leader of Revolution Muslim Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage Violent Extremism” US Department of Justice, February 9, 2012,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/02/20120209mortonnr.html. Accessed February 10, 2012.
[11] Sara Carter, “Somalis in U.S. Draw FBI Attention” The Washington Times, December 29, 2008 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/29/somalis-inus-draw-fbi-attention/print/. Accessed June 13, 2010.
[12] Laura Yuen, “Sixth Minn. Man Reportedly Dies in Somalia” Minnesota Public Radio, September 11, 2009, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/
web/2009/09/11/somali-death/. Accessed June 27, 2011.
[13] “Jury Convicts Naser Jason Abdo on All Counts in Connection with Killeen Bomb Plot” US Department of Justice, May 24, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/
txw/press_releases/2012/Abdo_conviction.pdf. Accessed May 25, 2012.
[14] Sam Stanton and Denny Walsh, “Lodi-area Man Charged with Trying to Join Islamic State May Be Mentally Ill” The Sacramento Bee, December 2, 2014, http://
www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article4248423.html. Accessed December 2, 2014.
[15] Michael Schwirtz and William Rashbaum, “Attacker With Hatchet Is Said to Have Grown Radical on His Own” The New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/nyregion/man-who-attacked-police-with-hatchet-ranted-about-us-officials-say.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes&_
r=0. Accessed October 26, 2014.
[16] “Mom: Son Arrested at O’Hare, Accused of Trying to Join Islamic State has Mental Illness” Chicago Tribune, April 8, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/chi-wisconsin-islamic-state-20150411-story.html. Accessed April 9, 2015.
[17] Bob Dunn, “Alexander Ciccolo: Adams Man’s Path Divided Between Peace and Violence” The Berkshire Eagle, July 16, 2015, http://www.berkshireeagle.com/
local/ci_28496106/alexander-ciccolo-adams-mans-path-divided-between-peace. Accessed July 26, 2015.
ISSN 2334-3745
83
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[18] This is not to suggest that these are the only motives for converting to Islam and becoming involved in Islamist terrorism, or that converts’ expectations are
always met. For more on these issues see: Jahangir E. Arasli, “Violent Converts to Islam: Growing Cluster and Rising Trend” Combating Terrorism Exchange,
1(1) (2011) https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/violent-converts-to-islam. Accessed November 29, 2015; Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, Controversies of
Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam (University of St. Andrews: Unpublished doctoral thesis, 2013) https://research-repository.
st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/3676/3/MonikaGabrielaBartoszewiczPhDThesis.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2015; M.A. Kevin Brice, A Minority Within a
Minority: A Report on Converts to Islam in the United Kingdom (Faith Matters: 2010) http://www.portmir.org.uk/assets/islam-and-muslims/a-minority-withina-minority—a-report-on-converts-to-islam-in-the-uk—faith-matters.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2015; Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown
Sunni Militants in the United States”; Leon Moosavi, “Are Converts More Likely to be Extremists than Other Muslims?” The Guardian, May 24, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2013/may/24/islam-converts-woolwich-attackers-extremists. Accessed November 29, 2015; Milena Uhlmann, “European
Converts to Terrorism” Middle East Quarterly, 15(3) (2008) http://www.meforum.org/1927/european-converts-to-terrorism. Accessed November 29, 2015.
[19] Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Simcox and Dyer, “The Role of Converts in Al-Qaìda-Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States”.
[22] Ibid.
[23] For a more detailed discussion relating to estimates of the number of converts to Islam in the U.K. see Brice, A Minority Within a Minority.
[24] Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa (George Washington University: Program on Extremism, 2015) 7, https://cchs.
gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf. Accessed December 2, 2015.
ISSN 2334-3745
84
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Terrorist Practices: Sketching a New Research Agenda
by Joel Day
Abstract
Contemporary approaches to the study of terrorism ignore the social practices that operate as ‘background
noise’ in daily life. Research focusing on goal-seeking and the ‘aims’ of terrorist organizations leaves little room
to analyze the performative, emotional, and ritual aspects of terrorism – key aspects of identity and disposition
formation. Just as in other social cleavages, terrorist ritual and community practices forge actor preferences
and passions. This note outlines puzzles which extant research agendas leave unanswered, proposes a ‘turn’ to
cultural practice as an important new research area, and offers an example of how to conduct mixed method
research on terrorist practices, looking specifically at how religious practice disaggregation predicts terror
campaign duration. The research note concludes with academic and policy implications.
Keywords: terrorism; research; methodology; practice; culture; religion; duration; ideology; disaggregation
Introduction
T
errorism is widely understood as an organizational and strategic endeavor. Leading lights in the field
argue that terrorism is a communication tactic, designed to produce political and social outcomes.[1]
Even if terrorists engage in activities that are not supported by any rational cost-benefit analysis, their
behavior is assumed to further organizational coherence strategies or ideological aims.[2] These mainstream
approaches result in studies linking financing, weapons choices, training, doctrines–the “raw stuff ” of what it
takes to “do terrorism”–with terror outcomes like body count and target selection.[3] Such research designs
leave little room to analyze the performative, emotional, and ritual aspects of terrorism – key aspects of
identity and disposition formation. Terrorism studies thus reflects a trend that parallels Ted Hopf ’s claim
that academic international relations has virtually ignored what “most people do most of the time in their
social lives.”[4] Essentially, contemporary approaches to the study of terrorism ignore the social practices that
operate as “background noise” in daily life.
This Research Note presents an argument that a more fine-grained disaggregation of everyday life within
terrorist groups is needed to help scholars understand differences within and between groups. Studying
the actual activities and practical enactments of everyday terrorist life turns scholarly attention away from
goals and ideas and towards social practice as the unit of analysis. Practice approaches are heterogeneous,
but share a core commitment to understanding knowledge as social practice rather than ideology or goalseeking. Ultimately, “turning” terrorism studies toward practice accommodates many epistemological
views and builds new ways of understanding terrorism.[5] The approach builds on a pioneering call by
Thomas Hegghammer to study “jihad culture.”[6] Hegghammer’s idea is part of a larger orientation in
international relations and security studies generally, joining other works on “practice” as a way to help
scholars understand gendered dimensions of diplomacy,[7] political bargaining,[8] security communities,[9]
deterrence,[10] and peacekeeping.[11]
The following four sections of this Research Note sketch what a practice turn in terrorism studies might look
like as a research endeavor. Section one displays how current theories in terrorism studies leave unanswered
puzzles and are based on unfounded assumptions of how human socialization functions. Section two outlines
a theoretical foundation for prioritizing everyday practice as a way to understand extremist groups, and
ISSN 2334-3745
85
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
describes a potential mixed method approach for studying the identifiable practices of extremist groups.
In section three, I offer a brief example of how to proceed within this research agenda. Here I disaggregate
religious practices of terror groups, using a model that helps predict which terrorist groups have longer
campaign durations. And the fourth section concludes by demonstrating the policy and research implications
of this new approach to research in Terrorism Studies. In essence, there is clearly support for the argument
that taking practices seriously will allow scholars to put aside “armchair analysis” and instead privilege
observable social action on its own terms.[12]
Unsolved Puzzles and Questionable Assumptions
Current approaches in terrorism research result in at least three problematic themes. These include 1) the
inability to answer puzzles about why terrorists often engage in aesthetic rather than strategic activities, 2)
puzzles concerning disparate findings across the discipline, and 3) fundamentally misplacing emphasis on
“thinking” as a principle social building-block and ignoring the more important role of “doing.”
First, there are many puzzles that current approaches simply cannot answer. What, for example, is the role
of emotion in violent extremist organizations and how do emotive elements within everyday life frame
passions and preferences of terrorists? Similarly, why do terrorists pursue art and aesthetics when such
energy should rationally be used to hide, plan, train, and kill? For instance, the Sovereign Citizens’ practice
of making artistically distinct forged documents is puzzling since many are intentionally poorly constructed,
mocking rules of grammar and punctuation. If these domestic terrorist groups were trying to avoid authority
interaction, why would they intentionally design forged documents to look suspicious and even comical,
raising red flags and increased police oversight? Aesthetic inclinations are important because they reveal how
elements of culture operate to shape and shove actors even without their overt mental processing. If terrorism
isn’t just about pre-planned strategic actions, but the almost subconscious activities that are a result of the
practices shaping day-to-day life, then current approaches to the study of terrorism are not doing justice to
that reality.
Second, research that privileges exogenous social factors—institutions, financing, ideological affiliation,
and politics—results in an inability to distinguish the difference among internal cultural characteristics of a
group. The unfortunate result is evident in studies of religion and terrorism: A sizable portion of terrorism
scholarship holds that religion is a secondary factor behind socio-political drivers like poverty.[13] However,
other scholarship finds religious affiliation to be a principle explanation of extremist violence.[14] Such
disparate findings indicate that over-aggregated measurements of religious affiliation (i.e. Muslim, Christian),
and too much attention on exogenous variables result in inconclusive findings. Over-aggregated approaches
also leave no ability to explain variation of activities within catch-all labels, such as why some Sufi groups
produce ISIS recruits while others remain quietist. Over-aggregation of religious labels leave scholars with
categories that lump actors like the Rainbow-Push Coalition and the KKK into the same analytical space
because they are both “Christian.” Such labels do injustice to understanding obvious variations within and
between groups.
Third, and perhaps most problematic, is the current literature’s assumption that meaning is created through
propositional knowledge, or terrorist’s thinking through goals, organizational ties, or doctrine.[15] Accurate
descriptions of goals or ideology requires a laborious amount of cognitive work for each and every actor in
a violent environment, which most work in terrorism simply “assumes” into quantitative models. Recent
work in this journal, for instance, has argued that differentiation between secular and religious terror groups
is entirely based on ideologically informed and articulated goals.[16] I maintain that it is highly improbable
ISSN 2334-3745
86
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
that actors search through an ideological or strategic “blueprint” for each and every action they take. If we
look further into terrorist action, my hunch is that some events are driven neither by ideals nor by goals, but
by unintelligible and unspoken “background” dispositions. For example, in my research on post-war Sierra
Leone, I came in a town in the district of Kono, where after the war, the only two buildings left standing
were the church and the mosque. When I asked former rebels about why they failed to raze the buildings,
they responded that nobody burned churches—it just wasn’t done. The justification given was about
organizational dispositions—“that’s just what we did,” not from consulting any prescribed cognitive blueprint
for action. Thus, to conceptualize goal-seeking behavior as a mere mental state takes out of consideration
the way that physical training (say, in training camps) constitutes violence as a practice of terrorism a priori.
[17] My argument joins Alasdair MacIntyre who maintains that most of what we see as goal-seeking behavior
(after the fact) is actually carried on unformulated, improvised, and non-representational ways.[18] The
processes of practice, alternatively, are where an actor taps into a “stock of unspoken know-how, learned in
and through practice, and from which deliberation and intentional action become possible.”[19] Practice
theory would instruct the methodologist to set aside research on ideas and goals, and instead start observing
the concrete proceedings of daily life as the central object of meaning-making in the world.
Social Practice and Terrorist Society
Studying terrorist everyday practices points away from organizational dynamics, tactical choices, and static
ideological ascription, and instead towards the background “noise” and aspects of society that are taken
for granted. Practice theory goes as far back as Aristotle, when he wrote of “practical wisdom” as a form of
knowledge.[20] Aristotle posited it is through practical wisdom that one does the “right thing” as part of her
disposition, not merely due to belief or cost/benefit analysis. Practice theory turns our attention to this sort
of “acting out” the “right thing” and instructs those interested in social outcomes, such as terrorism, to pay
special attention to the embodied, dispositional manifestations of how one goes about performing in their
day-to-day life.[21] The practice approach argues that “what we do together defines the question of who we
are” together.[22] To state more precisely, a practice-oriented approach seeks to “do justice to the practical
nature of action by rooting human activity in a nonrepresentational stratum,” meaning those activities that
actors may not think through in order to perform.[23]
These aspects of practical knowledge involve one knowing how to perform in ways that are socially expected
of them, whether in the practice of scripture reading, document forging, or taking a rest in the trenches.
Even ISIS’s method of beheadings could be understood as informed by the preferences forged by textualinterpretive tradition, mimicking, ritual, and belonging. Further, it is doubtful that the colorful orange
jumpsuits ISIS prisoners wear before beheading is something that the fighters “think through” every time
they force a prisoner to put one on – it is just something that is done. The ultimate argument is that social
practices—such as dress, textual interpretation, discussing dreams,[24] or naming one’s Kalashnikov, are
areas that produce relational power, internalized into daily routine by a process of bodily “disciplining.”
Ultimately, the practices of a group reveal the kinds of activities necessary for actors to be considered by the
organization as socially competent and a co-identity member.[25] Identity formation via ritual builds on
Whitehouse, who argues that everyday rituals “fuse” actors to their community so that group members are
not perceived as mere cooperators; they are kin.[26]
While practice opens the door for terrorism scholars to consider new types of social phenomena within
groups, it also directs the data-collection agenda towards observable, material manifestations of collective
identity. Prior study of practice theory has examined ritual performances, training manuals and meeting
minutes to observe how social expectations are internalized and perpetuated in group members. Like the
ISSN 2334-3745
87
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
method of process-tracing, tracing practices involves using evidence from within a case to make inferences
about causal explanations within that case.[27] Yet, as Pouliot argues, while process tracing identifies a
theoretically-informed causal chain “between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the
dependent variable,” practice-tracing is interested in how bundles of activities construct actors in particular
ways.[28] Thus, the practice approach lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative investigations. First,
case studies might consider singular local-level activities on a descriptive level, employing ethnographic
methods, interviews, and (difficult for the study of terrorism) participant observations. This work would
help us better understand particular groups, their processes of meaning-making, and social dispositions.
Qualitative comparative cases might then compare, for example, how variation in Koranic interpretation
between Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and ISIS impact elite instrumentalization of particular verses.
Likewise, veiling, purity of dress, dietary and fasting practices may vary within jihadi organizations, perhaps
explaining the variation in how jihadi members interact with local populations with divergent daily rituals.
Thus the job of the practice ethnographer is to find singular, local “causality” within a particular group that
might then be used to construct broader comparative categories for larger-N studies. In many instances,
ethnographic data may be readily available to construct datasets for comparing hundreds of groups over
space and time. For example, the work of art and music ethnography, food culture, and fashion studies,
have deep reservoirs of data on sub-national groups from which terrorist groups arise, but such data has
never been systematically applied to understand the effects of culture on terrorist preferences, passions and
outcomes. In sum, practice can be employed as a unit of analysis sequentially up the ladder of abstraction
from micro-level specific contexts up to large-N statistical models.[29]
Leveraging Practice Disaggregation: The Case of Religious Culture[30]
Practices are actions embedded in institutional and organizational sinew, evident and observable in member
performance. Religion is one area of human activity that requires one to not only profess, but practice
that profession in a visible way. One’s identity as a believer is thus profoundly not propositional—as extant
strategic, organizational, or ideological approaches assume—but a series of doings and sayings rooted in
dispositional knowledge.[31] Propositional approaches are problematic because religious socialization and
meaning-making may not necessarily be that which is deliberated, calculated, and operationalized. Rather,
ethnographic research in practical theology has found that persons participate from a dispositional “urge”
often explaining how “We don’t think about our rituals, we just do them,” or simply “It’s always been done
that way.”[32]
A Model of Religious Practice Disaggregation
To illustrate the argument and method described here, I collected data on several hundred terror groups’
practices, disaggregating the practices of actors in Asal and Rethemeyer’s BAAD dataset.[33] I code a
terrorist group memberships’ religious practices on several dimensions, adding them together in an index,
which serves as an explanatory variable for the outcome of campaign duration, while controlling for GDP,
regime type, religious difference, and ethnic, leftist, and territorial goals. The data are then analyzed using a
logistic regression.
The explanatory practice index has two components.[34] First, there are eight dimensions of religious
practice that are widely comparable and which vary considerably from group to group. These are not
arbitrary categories, but are core ways of describing the practical theologies as played out by religious
communities. Fortunately, and unique to the field of religious practice, the practices of religious communities
ISSN 2334-3745
88
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
have been recorded through extensive ethnographic work by religious sociologists.[35] Each element of
practice is discussed in the most popularly cited texts on religious life, such as the Worldmark Encyclopedia
of Religious Practice, which includes analysis on almost every religious community from 245 religious
scholars.[36] From localized, ethnographic sources, one can compare religious communities along eight
dimensions of practice: 1) orientations towards scripture, 2) defined leadership hierarchy, 3) practice and
rituals concerning an afterlife, 4) demarcations of sacred space, 5) practices of diet, 6) dress habits, 7) rites of
passage, and 8) prayer rituals. These dimensions are a kind of typology of religious practice and a cut at how
scholars can observe religious actors in action, helping answer recent calls in international relations to take
“thick” descriptive approaches to religion seriously.[37]
Second, each aforementioned dimension of practice is coded based on the level of exclusivity demarcating
who is allowed to participate. Such an approach is based on the Durkheimian definition of religion as a
separation of the sacred from the profane, as participating in ritualized life is fundamentally asserting
difference between communities, lifestyles and worldviews. Ritualization is the production of differentiation
between in-groups and out-groups, as practicing one’s religion is a way of acting in a particular way that
establishes a contrast of privileged being. Thus, the way to correctly categorize groups like ISIS/ISIL is not
“literalist” but rather “exclusivist” in that they appropriate their religion in a particular sort of way in conflict.
[38] I also code each dimension of religious practice based on the exclusivity of that practice. I employ a
0/.5/1 exclusivity scale per eight categories, thus a group’s membership can score between 0-8 in the index.
I code a practice as (0) when there is very little frequency, salience, or distribution of the practice within the
members of a group. I code a group this way when there is definitive evidence that membership explicitly
rejects the practice. For instance, many neo-Marxist groups explicitly prohibit public prayer. While some
membership may still engage in prayer, the frequency, group-wide salience and distribution is negligible.
In cases where I find mixed group practices I code the variable as (0.5). Instances in this category will have
evidence of some members participating in the practice while others may not, or will have contending
practices (i.e. Christian mixed with traditional religion). When specific percentiles are available, I code as
“mixed” any membership levels from 10%-50% engaging in the practice. I code the variable as (1) when
there is high frequency, salience, and distribution of a practice. Cases in this category include if there is
definitive evidence that majority of membership practices, if the practice is explicitly talked about in-group
memoranda, or if a group explicitly requires such orthopraxy as a condition of membership.
The outcome variable of interest is the duration of the terrorist campaign, from founding or first event to
the end of the campaign through die out, losing, winning, or other termination type. This is a good test
of the effect of exclusive practice on outcomes, since communities with dispositionally rigid practices are
theoretically less likely to give up fighting, even at great loss. Toft, for example, holds that religious groups
are likely to “lengthen time horizons” by factoring in the cosmic struggle of eternal good versus evil.[39]
A practice approach concurs with this finding, but revises the central mechanism at work. Rather than a
community propositionally thinking through violence with a cosmic cost-benefit analysis, practice posits that
the discipline of exclusive practices frame everyday life (not just the conflict at hand) in terms of cosmic time.
Rites of passage like baptism, for example, are mile-markers in a cosmic performance. Thus, extended time
horizons are not necessarily rationalized by cost-benefit analysis, but are part of everyday social structure.
Once conflict breaks out, those groups with more hardline dispositional realities are likely to bring extended
time horizons with them, approaching a violent environment with skewed time-frames. Those with everyday
practices that extend time horizons and set restrictions for who gains access to that afterlife are less likely to
give up their fight.[40]
ISSN 2334-3745
89
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Results
Model 1 tests how a practice index contributes to how we can explain the duration of terror campaigns. This
basic test refutes the null hypothesis. The results (shown in Table 1) indicate a positive and highly significant
correlation between a terrorist group’s exclusive religious practices and terror campaigns with longer
duration. Models 2, 3 and 4 include controls for ethnic, leftist, and territorial based conflicts, regime type,
GDP per capita, and a dummy variable indicating differences in religious affiliation between the terrorist
group and the state. When we control for these structural factors, secular goals, and difference in religious
identity markers, practice remains a significant indicator: higher levels of exclusive religious practices are
positively and significantly contributing to the duration of terror campaigns.[41]
Table 1: Effect of Exclusive Religious Practices on Terror Campaign Duration
The results of Model 4 are used to examine the predictive marginal effects of terrorist group practice on the
likelihood of conflict intensity, shown in Figure 1. For each index point change in terror group practice, we
see a corresponding rise in the likelihood of longer campaign duration. The most exclusive practicing groups
are about 20% more inclined to have longer campaign durations.
ISSN 2334-3745
90
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Figure 1: The Marginal Effect of Practice on Duration
The findings suggest that categorizing religious conflicts as simply one group versus another (Christian versus
Muslim, Sunni versus Shia), is an unhelpful variable to explain variation in campaign duration. Yet, when
one disaggregates groups based upon their observable practices, one can better explain duration of terrorist
campaigns.
Research and Policy Implications
There are important academic and policy implications for studying terrorist practices. On an academic level,
the approach directs researchers away from the requirement to “get inside terrorists’ heads” in order to access
information about their goals or ideology. One can then avoid assumptions about the effect of rhetoric or
rationality on mobilizing persons towards extremism. This is preferable since in order for religious rhetoric to
“work” on a population, there has to be some sort of framing device that triggers rhetorical and instrumental
effectiveness. Practice gets closer to embedding the study of terrorism within the relational and embodied
sites of society. Additionally, the choice to disaggregate groups based upon practices enables scholars to
empirically examine “what people are doing on the ground” as the basis for categorizing religion and other
social categories. Practice theory is thus better positioned to capture the activities of group membership, not
simply the goals or doctrines promulgated by leaders. Since elements of religious practice exist even within
groups that pursue secular goals, it is inappropriate to assume goals or ideology of elites are reflected in the
daily life of group members. Simply categorizing groups based on their objectives fails to capture how ritual
and practice frame dispositions of membership.
On a policy level, a practice approach argues that an understanding of violent groups should follow analysis
of their “walk,” not just their “talk.” If jihadi, sovereign citizen, the Klan, or other extremist identities are
forged less by propositional goals or beliefs and more through dispositional embodiment of social practice,
then analyzing how terrorists live in their “everyday life” could offer data that helps researchers better
understand group passions and preferences. Everyday practice offers a new, unexplored terrain for combating
ISSN 2334-3745
91
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
violent extremists. For instance, when not posting on social media about ISIS and jihad, do ISIS fans watch
Friends and cat videos? Answering this question could offer routes of mainstream connections for radicals,
who might prove moderated by meaning made in non-extremist practices. Finally, a practice approach offers
the ability to map and track specific activities in particularly problematic “hot-spot” areas. For example,
large-scale mapping of religious practice would predict areas of conflict that will experience longer campaign
duration. Mapping could thus be a predictive tool for the intelligence community by indicating zones of
culture where, say resource scarcity or refugee spillover (for example), would be amplified by particularly
exclusivist religious practices. Similar models could be constructed for other types of social practices
including disaggregation of identity labels like ethnicity and gender. This information could then be used by
academics, decision makers, and intelligence officers alike, to better understand the social culture of terror
groups.
A practice-oriented approach to the study of terrorism offers researchers an exciting new way to disaggregate
terror groups and thus better understand variation within and between them. Practice theory opens the field
of terrorism studies far beyond models that privilege representational goal-seeking or belief, and instead
positions scholars to deeply consider how art, diet, poetry, dress, religious ritual, and other dispositionforging practices constitute terrorist identities, passions, and preferences.
About the Author: Joel Day is Assistant Professor, School of Criminology and Justice Studies, and Research
Associate, Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell.
Acknowledgments:
This research was supported by the Office of University Programs Science and Technology Directorate of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB –
Center Lead) Grant made to the START Consortium (Grant # 2012-ST-61-CS0001). The views and conclusions
contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or START.
Notes
[1] Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379–99; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of
Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49–80; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Reprint edition (New York:
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006).
[2] Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 78–105; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global
Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd Edition, Third Edition, Completely Revised edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
[3] For instance, in their 2014 study, Horowitz and Potter demonstrate that lethality and sophistication of domestic terror attacks increases after financial and
tactical connections are forged with a larger transnational terror partner. Michael C. Horowitz and Philip B. K. Potter, “Allying to Kill Terrorist Intergroup
Cooperation and the Consequences for Lethality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 2 (March 1, 2014): 199–225, doi:10.1177/0022002712468726.
[4] Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 16 (2010): 539.
[5] For a comprehensive analysis of the “Practice Turn” literature, see Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, “The Play of International Practice,” International
Studies Quarterly 59: no.3 (2015): 449-460.
ISSN 2334-3745
92
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[6] Thomas Hegghammer. “Why Terrorists Weep: The Socio-Cultural Practices of Jihadi Militants.” Paul Wilkinson Memorial Lecture, University of St. Andrews,
16 April 2015. There are important differences, however. Hegghammer’s work on “jihad culture” is concerned with “what terrorists do in their off time” while
practice theory provides a focus on how meaning is created within jihadi culture, which integrates isolated activities like dressing together with violent practices
like beheading. My argument is that practice offers observable, material points of identity formation, thus entirely related to preferences and passion creation that
demonstrate in tactical choice and communication tactics. On the other hand, “culture” as conceived by Hegghammer seems to exist as a separate activity that
jihadis engage in when not fighting. I argue that practice constructs actors in special ways that they take with them into fighting.
[7] Iver B. Neumann, “The Body of the Diplomat,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 671–95,
doi:10.1177/1354066108097557.
[8] Erik Voeten, “The Practice of Political Manipulation” in International Practices, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
[9] Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, International Practices (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[10] Patrick Morgan, “The Practice of Deterrence,” in International Practices, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011).
[11] Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2014).2014
[12] Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2002): 627–51.
[13] Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
[14] Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2011); Isak Svensson, “Fighting with Faith Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (December 2007).
[15] Adam B. Seligman et al., Ritual and Its Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[16] Heather S. Gregg, “Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 2 (April 24, 2014), http://www.
terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/336.
[17] Andreas Reckwick, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2002): 252.
[18] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)..
[19] Adler and Pouliot, International Practices..
[20] The word used is phronesis. Otfried Höffe, Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” (Brill, 2010).
[21] Pierre Bourdieu elaborates a compelling theory of practice which mirrors Aristotelian phronesis. Using the term habitus, Bourdieu refers to a set of habit-based
dispositions (as opposed to thought-based propositions), where objective structures realize in prescribed actions of subjective agents.
[22] Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38.
[23] Theodore R. Schatzki, The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002), 177.
[24] Iain R. Edgar, “The Dreams of Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (July 31, 2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/
view/453.
[25] Pouliot, Vincent, “The Logic of Practicality,” International Organizations 54, no. 1 (2008): 257–88.
[26] Harvey Whitehouse and Jonathan Lanman, “The Ties That Bind Us: Ritual, Fusion, and Identification,” Current Anthropology 55, no. 6 (December 2014):
674–95.
[27] Vincent Pouliot, “Practice Tracing,” in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennet and Jeffrey Checkel (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 2014).
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 252. According to Pouliot “practices are perfect units of analysis to travel up and down the ladder of abstraction.”
ISSN 2334-3745
93
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[30] Codebook, examples, and replication data are available at www.joelday.org
[31] Seligman et al., Ritual and Its Consequences. Religion is, as sociologist Riesebrodt argues, “a complex of religious practices.” Martin Riesebrodt, The Promise of
Salvation: A Theory of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
[32] “Extreme Rituals Forge Intense Social Bonds – Dimitris Xygalatas – Aeon,” Aeon Magazine, January 21, 2015, http://aeon.co/magazine/society/how-extremerituals-bond-us-for-life/. [33] Victor H. Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Terrorist Organizational Characteristics and Organizational Lethality,” Journal of Politics 70,
no. 2 (2008): 437–49.
[34] Creating an index is helpful because the practices themselves are highly interdependent. The index is additive and unweighted for the sake of transparency and
simplicity – no extant literature suggests a reason why one practice operates as more “rooting” than others, nor is there a natural hierarchy among practices.
[35] Ethnographic work may be less available for say, Jihadi poetry or beauty practices of NeoNazis. In those cases, it would not be possible to create larger datasets
– it would be necessary to start with local ethnographic data collection, practice tracing, and participant observation.
[36] Thomas Riggs, ed., Worldmark Encyclopedia of Religious Practices, 3 vols. (Detroit: Gale, 2006).
[37] Ron Hassner, “‘Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art,’” in Religion, Identity and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence and Practice, ed. Steven
Lamy and Patrick James (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 37–56.
[38] Caner K. Dagli, “The Phony Islam of ISIS,” The Atlantic, February 27, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-muslims-reallywant-isis-atlantic/386156/.
[39] Monica Duffy Toft, “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War,” Security Studies 15, no. 1 (2006): 34–69,
doi:10.1080/09636410600666246.
[40] Again, the exclusivity measurement is helpful here since Unitarians may practice afterlife rituals, but have no limitations on the type of actions that gain access
to that afterlife.
[41] Exclusivity is perhaps another way of talking about “otherization” but specified in material, physical manifestations. For the connection between “othering” and
terrorist outcomes see Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” Journal of
Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): 437-449.
ISSN 2334-3745
94
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State:
Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit
by Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla
Abstract
This Research Note reports on preliminary results of the Islamic State Interviews Project, based here on a sample
of thirteen Syrian IS defectors who spoke on life inside the “Islamic State”(IS). A fuller and more systematic
account will be published in early 2016 in book form. According to what we learned, all IS cadres undergo
Shariah training in which they are imbued with a Takfiri ideology that allows them to deem all others, including
Muslims, who disagree with IS’ extreme ideology, as apostates who should be killed. Despite this indoctrination,
all of our informants (all Syrians) experienced their Shariah trainers as a positive influence since they allowed
them to deepen their own religious understanding. In this sense, these disengaged defectors remained radicalized
“true believers”. Following compulsory military training courses on weapons, explosives and physical fitness, they
were sentto the front. Syrians who join IS are rewarded with salaried jobs which for young men translates into
the ability to marry and for young women the money allows them to save their families from literal starvation.
Foreign fighters receive additional rewards: wives, sexual slaves, and sometimes homes and cars. Daily life
is punctuated by brutal practices – including floggings, torture and beheadings. Defections were the result of
exposure to extreme brutality, disgust over the slave trade, observations of deep hypocrisy–a total mismatch
between the words and deeds of IS. Charges of corruption and complaints about battlefield decisions that
produced unnecessary deaths in their own ranks were also causes of disillusionment . Our informants all had
come to hate IS and warn others not to join what they gradually came to see as a totally disappointing, ruthless
and un-Islamic organization.
Introduction
T
he Islamic State (IS) is the most powerful, ruthless, horrific and well-funded terrorist group in
recent history. Not only has IS managed to take and control a significant swathe of territory, it has
become a de-facto state. Since their 2014 claim of establishing a Caliphate, IS has also unleashed an
unprecedented and prolific social media recruiting drive that has enabled them to attract up to 30,000 foreign
fighters from more than one hundred countries. A steady stream of fighters continues to enter Syria and Iraq
on a daily basis - with some estimates placing their number at over one thousand new recruits per month.[1]
In addition, IS has created a “brand” that has been exported to over twenty hotspots around the globe. As IS
has arisen - seemingly out of nowhere - to become a powerful foe, the West has struggled to comprehend and
understand how to effectively counter it.
While a political solution in the war-torn area of Syria and Iraq is a necessary precondition to the defeat of IS,
discrediting the group’s ideology is also essential. Defectors from IS, who alongside the refugees pour out of
IS-controlled territory, are among the most powerful first-hand voices to speak out against the group. Indeed,
disillusioned cadres of those who can speak from experience and tell their authentic stories about life inside
IS may be the most influential tool for preventing and dissuading others from joining IS.
This Research Note, based on preliminary findings of the International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism’s IS Defectors Interview Project, reports on findings from thirteen interviews with actual IS
defectors currently hiding in Turkey. It throws light, in their own words on their experiences inside IS–
including their motivations for joining; their ideological indoctrination, their weapons and military training,
ISSN 2334-3745
95
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
battleground experiences, gender (mis-)treatment, the social everyday life in IS-controlled territory,
experiences with slavery and other forms of humiliation and cruelty. The interviews also highlight the factors
that ultimately led to disillusionment and defections. These first-hand accounts offer a harrowing ‘inside
account’ of how IS actually operates.
ISIS – A Brief Backgrounder
The border between Turkey and Syria, winding along Turkey’s southern flank, stretches out over five hundred
fifty miles of contiguous territory [2]. On the Turkish side lies the land of Sanliurfa, sharing over one hundred
thirty nine miles of border with Syria, one of the oldest settlements in the world, its history going back some
11,000 years. The largest province of southeastern Anatolia and the ninth largest in Turkey, its population
numbers some two million people. Yet most important today is that it also shares what has, and continues
to be, a highly porous border with Syria to the south–one that has allowed fighters against Bassar Assad’s
regime–ranging from the Free Syrian Army, (al-Jaysh -Ḥurr, FSA), Jabhat al-Nusra (also known as al-Nusra
Front, JN), Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and, in recent
years, IS cadres, to move freely across it. Indeed “Urfa” (short for: Sanliurfa) has often been referenced by
IS cadres as a rest and relaxation point from the battles in Syria and Iraq, as well as a meeting place inside
Turkey, for arriving foreign fighters before passing over the border into Syria. This Research Note is a report
on our preliminary findings from interviews with former fighters who moved in the opposite direction–
actual IS defectors. Yet before we focus on them, here is some necessary background on IS.
The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (IS) is formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) or the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and is also known in Arabic as ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī ‘l-Irāq
wa-sh-Shām, (i.e. Da’ish or Daesh). IS forces its subjects, i.e. the people under its control, to refer to it as adDawlah (the State) and severely punishes people who uses other names, including Daesh or IS. IS arose as a
proto-state during the Sunni rebel uprisings in Syria in 2013 but originates in Iraq, building on the legacy of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who, until his death in 2006, was al-Qaida’s emir in Iraq.
ISIS is led by and composed mainly of Arabs from Iraq and Syria, although it has also attracted 25 – 30,000
foreign fighters from around the globe. IS currently controls territory in both Syria and Iraq, about the size
of the UK, area that until recently was occupied by up to ten million people. IS controls the Iraqi city of
Mosul in Northern Iraq and is headquartered in Raqqa, Syria. Foreign intelligence estimates of the number
of fighters in IS vary greatly, ranging from thirty-five thousand to seventy thousand. Fuad Hussein, the
chief of staff for Kurdish President Barzani, argues that IS has at least two hundred thousand fighters, citing
their ability to rapidly mobilize Arab young men inside their territory into a large field army [3]. Indeed our
interviews tend to confirm such a high number.
ISIS claimed a worldwide caliphate on June 29, 2014 with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. With a highly
motivated and ruthless fighting force of tens of thousands, IS follows an apocalyptic vision of the future–its
ideologues proclaim that the “end times” are near, and that its fighters are about to be engaged in a final
cosmic battle to bring about a new world order. Many of the cadres are willing to die for the cause, believing
that becoming Islamic ‘martyrs’ secures them a place in paradise.
Al-Qaeda (central) and Jabhat al-Nusra (the local branch in Syria of al Qaida) both rejected IS’s declaration
of a caliphate and heavy fighting between the two factions continues to the present. While Jabhat al-Nusra is
one of the leading forces among the Sunni rebels fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, IS has broader
aims–to control territory in Syria, attract fighters from around the world, consolidate the self-proclaimed
Islamic State and then to launch a full invasion of Iraq and to expand from there. While IS claims to represent
ISSN 2334-3745
96
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
true Islam, its cadres are in fact known for their ideologically twisted interpretation of Islam and ruthless
treatment of fellow Muslims as well as subjugation of Christians and Yazidis.
The IS ‘caliphate’ has captured the imagination of many Muslims worldwide, resulting in a steady flow
of some thousand foreign fighters streaming into Syria and Iraq each month from all around the globe,
including five thousand or more foreign fighters coming from Muslim diasporas in Western Europe.[4]
Women have also gone to join IS–becoming brides of IS fighters, recruitment agents and even Shariah
enforcers in the form of morality police (hisbah).
ISIS is one of the most well-funded terrorist organization to date and relies on a steady stream of income
from illicit trafficking in oil, bank theft, war booty, extortion and “tax collection” from the people inside its
borders; kidnapping victims for ransom, female slave trade and from trafficking in stolen antiquities.[5]
As our interviews revealed, defections from IS territory and even from IS itself are not allowed. Those who
escape must do so surreptitiously, risking their own lives and often also those of family members they leave
behind. Fleeing fighters, and sometimes even ordinary citizens, caught while trying to escape the Islamic
State are generally not subjected to a court proceeding. Instead they are brutally executed on the spot. For
instance, one informant (Abu Nasir – not his real name) told us, “A European girl wanted to escape. Someone
tried to help her to go back to Urfa [Sanliurfa, Turkey], to escape. But they caught him and killed him right
there and took the girl back”. Stories of defectors who did not make it across the border to Turkey and were
beheaded on the spot were common in the accounts of those we interviewed.
Interview Protocols and Sample Description (n = 13)
This Research Note is based on our first sampling of defectors who made it across the border. Our
interlocutors were all Syrians–twelve men and one woman, ranging in age from fourteen to forty-five. They
were all Arabs. Three originated from Tell Abyad, four Raqqa, two from Aleppo, and one each from Tishrin,
al-Hasakah, el-Aziziye, and Deir ez-Zor. The men had all undergone Shariah indoctrination and military
training with IS and had sworn an oath of allegiance (bay’ah) to IS before becoming fighters for the Islamic
State. They spent between six and eighteen months as IS fighters and had defected within one year before the
interview. Three had been in leadership positions as commanders, one of them as Chief of Security at a base
in Raqqa and one of them was the Emir of a town under the control of ISIS before his defection. The rest
were ordinary fighters, a prison guard, and the minor, a fourteen year-old child had been groomed to become
a suicide bomber.
All of our subjects are now living in the Sanliurfa region of Turkey and all are in hiding, fearing the long arm
of IS. They were all married except for the minor, and all of them except for the youngest adult (who had
only married the week before the interview) had one or more young children. Our female informant was
a mother and was married to a defected IS fighter. She was considered by IS as a member by virtue of her
marriage to a fighter. Three of the males were college-educated, one was a law student in his last year, another
an Arabic language teacher and the third an Arabic literature teacher. Three were high school graduates. The
other adults we interviewed had not finished high school and one even had dropped out of primary school.
They were farmers and small business owners. The minor had his middle school education interrupted by the
conflict in Syria.
The interviews took place in the autumn of 2015 and are part of an ongoing effort by the researchers to
interview IS defectors. They were carried out anonymously, with the first six interviews taking place with
only the ‘fixer’ (i.e. the individual who arranged the interviews) being aware of the true identities of those we
ISSN 2334-3745
97
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
interviewed. Some of them knew the ‘fixer’ personally because he had been involved in their being smuggled
across the border. For these interviews, the ‘fixer’ also insisted on sending along his own interpreter, known
only to himself and the former cadres, to ensure that the interviews and the identities of those interviewed
would not be leaked to IS intelligence and also to ensure his life from the hands of IS.
In the second group of seven interviews, we made use of one of the IS defectors as our fixer and interpreter,
reducing the number of people involved and increasing anonymity and security for our informants. This
change in research protocol was deemed necessary and took place after an active IS cadre–claiming also to be
an IS defector–crossed into Turkey and won the trust of two journalist/activists (Ibrahim Abdul Qader and
Fares Hamadi) [6] from the group Raqqa is Silently Being Slaughtered. Gaining access to their apartment, he
murdered and beheaded them in the city of Sanilurfa.
Naturally, everyone who heard about this was terrified by this turn of events. At that point, our subjects were
reluctant to participate, but were persuaded to do so after we made improvements in our security protocols
to protect their identities. We began bringing them to interview locations alone rather than in groups–even
in those cases where they knew each other. We changed the interview locations frequently, in order to protect
them once we became aware that even with them living in Turkey, reprisals could occur.
We did not at any point inquire for names, nor record personal details of our interlocutors, in order to keep
the interviews truly anonymous. To protect those we interviewed, we asked only about the violent acts of
others, but not their own, so as not to involve them in incriminating themselves and to also avoid putting
ourselves in a position of responsibility to report a criminal activity. The first six informants agreed to audio
and written recording only. The second seven agreed to video recordings, but with their faces covered, and
with the understanding that we would alter their voices before making any of these interviews public.
Our informants agreed to cooperate in order to share with the world how IS recruits and operates. They also
volunteered to provide brief statements at the end of their interviews, directly addressing anyone considering
joining IS in the hope that these would serve in preventing and dissuading others–including foreigners–from
joining IS.
Complicating the sampling was the fact that the subjects feared IS intelligence and presence inside Turkey
and reprisals from the group against themselves or their family members who were with them, or relatives
back in Syria being killed as a result of their defections and participation in our interviews. They also feared
Bassar Assad’s intelligence and the Syrian regime’s presence inside Turkey and possible similar reprisals.
Given that there are over four hundred thousand Syrian refugees in Sanliurfa alone and that among them are
IS and Syrian regime intelligence members collecting information about these people, alongside the recent
murders of the two journalist/activists carried out by IS, these fears are not unfounded.[7]
Lastly they feared prosecution in Turkey for having been part of a terrorist group and were thus reticent to
admit to any crimes they had committed while inside IS. Their fears of prosecution by Turkish authorities
were heightened in October 2015, just after Ankara suffered a suicide attack (where 132 people died)
attributed by Turkish authorities in part to IS. Needless to say, their fears of IS reprisals were greatly
heightened by the recent double murders in Urfa, carried out by a claimed IS defector.
In this Research Note, we group some of the statements from the thirteen former IS fighters who granted us
interviews in a thematic way under various headings. A more complete account will be provided in the form
of a book to be published in early 2016.
ISSN 2334-3745
98
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
ISIS Governance Tactics
A tactic applied by IS, as underscored by our informants, is to quickly gain control of all the economic and
social infrastructures in an area–making it difficult to resist–thereby forcing the inhabitants to join in order
to survive, even to literally obtain food. IS cadres are also extremely ruthless, immediately demanding that
the local population bend to their rules.
“When Daesh took over they said, ‘You are either with us or not. They gave no food, no jobs except to people
who joined them, so the people got so hungry. Daesh also began recruiting twelve to seventeen-year-old to
become their soldiers. They provided well for them so they can feed their families. The [ISIS] shaikhs also
pulled the youth in. When IS came to Raqqa, all the people suddenly don’t have work. Some join immediately
for free food.” (Abu Walid).
Takfiri Practices
ISIS cadres claim to be following an authentic early version of Islam–following an extremist interpretation of
Wahhabi and Salafi practices, observing what they claim were the original customs followed by the Prophet
and his companions. IS cadres engage in takfiri (excommunication) practices–that is, they claim the right to
label other Muslims, to whom they object, “unbelievers” and exterminate all those who do not adhere to their
own extremist ideology. According to our informants, anyone who does not follow their extremist ideology is
labeled murtad (a Muslim renegade), infidel, or kafir (unbelievers)–categories of people that, according to IS,
can be killed with impunity.
One of our informants recalls that when IS moved into Raqqa, the local population were told that they
needed to follow the “true Islam.” “In November 2013, when IS took Raqqa,” our informant recalls, “they told
us, ‘You are not Muslim, you are kafir (an unbeliever/rejecter of Islam). You are infidels,’” (Abu Walid). As our
informants told us, those who have sinned according to IS dogma and agree to live under IS rule are required
to go through a process of tawbah (repentance), in which they openly have to declare sorrow over past sins
and pledge never to repeat them. Tawbah takes place in front of a Shariah judge and is to be followed by
announcing one’s allegiance to the Caliph. By this process the label of “kafir” can be shed and the person then
can live under the rule of IS as a “true Muslim” IS-style.
Morality Rules
Infractions with any hint of sexual impropriety are harshly punished under IS rule. One informant told us:
“A man in a small village went to visit his neighbor. He knocked on the door of a woman whose husband was
not there. He was caught waiting inside the front yard of the home [inside the outer gate of the yard] when
the husband was absent, so he was arrested. He was lashed forty times.” The lashing was so harsh that, “he
could not use the toilet and had to stay in bed for twenty days. Afterwards he was forced to take the Shariah
course for three weeks. The woman inside the house was lashed forty times as well because she opened the
door to the yard for him” (Abu Walid).
Intelligence Gathering and Intimidation Practices
The means by which IS operates include the sending of spies and paying local informants before taking
over territory, and then ruthlessly taking control, ruling by violent intimidation techniques–a page taken
directly from the standard operating procedures of Saddam Hussein’s police state. This is a result of former
ISSN 2334-3745
99
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Iraqi Baathists intelligence officers having joined and lent their support and expertise to IS. Already before
its establishment as a rogue state, IS had developed a very strong intelligence apparatus. It has now been
revealed by Christopher Reuter in documents captured from an Iraqi national spy chief, Haji Bakr, that the
security arm of IS was carefully organized, relying upon former Baathist experience with IS organized by and
using the same secret intelligence gathering techniques as previously used by the Sadaam Hussein’s regime to
instill fear in the targeted local populations.
According to documents captured at Haji Bakr’s residence, IS’ security division employed cadres sent out in
advance of invasions to recruit local informants in order to collect and immediately apply intelligence to gain
control the moment it decides to advance into new territory. This process includes: identifying the powerful
families and individuals in a given area, finding their sources of income, identifying rebel brigades and
their leaders by name, and learning about their Shariah violations so that on the basis of these they can be
blackmailed if necessary.[8] Our informants provided many examples of how this security apparatus worked.
One informant, for example, explained how this IS strategy eased their entry into Raqqa: “When Daesh came
to Raqqa, Jaysh al-Hur was in power, but Daesh took over for many reasons. First, Daesh sent small groups to
establish themselves inside the city. Secondly, they sent suicide bombers of young boys, especially to the gates
where Jaysh al-Hur had guards. This was very effective, as everyone feared the suicide bombers and it was
very difficult to distinguish if an approaching child was a suicide bomber or not. Being unwilling to shoot
a possibly innocent child, the sentries would run away and Daesh could enter. Lastly, Jaysh al-Hur began to
realize it was too late to fight against Daesh–because they had established themselves by using cells already
inside the city who began to explode things. So Jaysh al-Hur fighters left with hardly any fighting” (Abu
Walid).
Talking about his personal experience, he recalled, “When they came to Raqqa they came to me and asked,
‘Why you don’t come with us? We work together to make an Islamic government. Why you don’t you help
us?’ I answered, ‘Inshallah [God willing] after some time,’ but he won’t hear no. I knew if I said no, they will
kill me, so instead I said, ‘Inshallah.’ Someone from IS comes and takes many photos of me. He writes reports
of where I go and stay. They do this every one to three months” (Abu Walid).
Anyone can be subjected to mistreatment under IS. Indeed, the informants stated that if a fighter didn’t like
a local person they could make a false accusation and order the person into Shariah court, or have them
immediately punished, or even killed.
Torture
Having taken another page from Saddam Hussein’s manual of techniques of governance, torture is also a
central part of the IS repertoire. One informant who had been part of Jabat al-Nusrah but who was hiding
that fact recalls being put under interrogation when IS came to his region. “[They] took me by hand in iron
cuffs, to torture me. They spread my arms wide and hung me by my forearms and wrists, held by the iron
cuffs, from a steel bar. [i.e. he was hung there with his full body weight pulling down on him]. They left me
there for around two hours. I had so much pain, and started to cry many times from the pain in my hands
and my body. I cried and shouted. They did this again the next day and I cried and shouted again throughout
the day and night” (Abu Walid). [This went on for thirteen days.]
Beheadings, crucifixions, torture and executions are such a common occurrence and well publicized in IS
territory that everyone knows that life under IS is cheap and that not complying with their rules or wishes
can bring a swift, harsh and dire result. Abu Walid recalled that during one of the days of being held and
ISSN 2334-3745
100
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
tortured, “I thought they want to cut my head, because the soldier who cuts throats came toward me. Then,
I understood that I will die.” He continued, “The last day they took me again. This time they blindfolded me.
They told me, ‘You know where we take you now.’ I answered, ‘No I don’t know!’ They said, ‘Now we take
you out to kill you.’” Abu Walid was not killed however but intimidated into handing over his car, rifle and
information they wanted from him. He was also coerced into joining IS’ Shariah training class and making
his oaths of allegiance to IS.
Induction into IS
The process by which one is inducted into IS varies. However, according to our informants, everyone who
joins is required to take a training course in Shariah law. These courses are organized for groups as large as
fifty people, bringing together individuals with shared cultures and language (i.e. Syrians go to a different one
than Westerners for instance). The Shariah courses vary in content and length, depending on the background
and experience of students. Youth, for example, take a short ten-day course. Former fighters take a fifteenday course. From there, the prospective new IS members are put into military training which varies in length
from two to four weeks, and is given in different languages depending on the composition of the group. Upon
finishing each training session, the newcomers are invited (in fact heavily pressured) to make bay’ahs to IS.
Former Fighters
According to our informants, no one is forced to join IS as armed fighters—membership is voluntary.
However, young men are heavily coerced by the circumstances they find themselves in. For instance, those
who fought in militias other than IS, despite having a common enemy in the Assad regime, are immediately
executed unless they find a way to show repentance. The few that are spared are invited to join the Islamic
State but have to demonstrate loyalty and agree to renounce all past ties and swear their repentance for
former “misdeeds”. This is done before a Shariah court referred to as tawbah after which they are issued a
formal, written certificate of repentance.
One informant recalls being caught by IS and interrogated. They did not immediately realize he had been
in Jabat al-Nusrah. He stated, “After a few days [following interrogation], they sent again for me [inside the
prison] and asked, ‘Why you don’t come join ad-Dawlah [the State] with us and come for our training?’ I
agreed because I know they will kill me if I don’t”. This young man, Abu Walid, took their Shariah course but
did at first not enroll for military training. Instead he protested. “I have my family responsibilities, but I knew
that eventually, if I didn’t work with them they would put me in a prison in Raqqa. I was afraid. After two
months of them inviting me, I decided to escape. I know the area very well, so I took a motorcycle and came
across the border to Turkey.”
Men coming from other militias were either killed or forced to go through a process of “forgiveness” or
“repentance” in order to be eligible to join IS. One of them told us, “I was fighting for the Free Syrian Army
before IS captured Tell Abyad [the Syrian town just across from the Turkish border city, Akçakale]. When
they captured Tell Abyad, I fled to Turkey. [Later], I had people to talk to them and asked forgiveness so that
I could go back to my village and family. They said they would forgive on the condition that I fight for them.
When I went back, they detained me at the border, blindfolded my eyes and brought me before the Shariah
judge for my trial, only then uncovering my eyes. The judge concluded, ‘You helped the infidels and because
of this you are considered infidel as well. Now, ask forgiveness from Allah and promise us that you will never
draw a weapon to the Muslims and pledge allegiance to the Caliph al-Baghdadi so that we can forgive you.
Also, you have to help us whenever we need your assistance.’ I agreed and I was freed. However, this did not
ISSN 2334-3745
101
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
end there. They started to ask me to join the IS ideology classes [Shariah training]. I was forced to attend
those classes for three months. This is their ideological preparation stage” (Abu Jamal).
Motivations and the Positive Benefits for Those Joining IS
Control of Resources
Because IS takes control of everything in a community they can be very good at incentivizing membership–
particularly with young men who hope to be married. As one informant stated, “The IS guys speak with the
youth about what they are doing to build an Islamic state. They tell them, ‘If you want to work we can help
you and give you money. You can be married. We are the true Islam. We guarantee you. We are brothers, no
problem.’ Like this they win trust and make many people to join them. They join for a loaf of bread.” Because
of these factors, it was very easy for IS to recruit the youth inside Raqqa” (Abu Walid).
“If you do not fight for IS, you die from hunger as they would not feed or support you, or let you work. So,
eventually, you either fight for them or die,” one informant stated. “I could stand six months before I was out
of money and had to join them. If you fight for them, they pay two hundred US dollars per month, and also
supply all your needs. So, you do not need to spend any money. Two hundred dollars is a lot more than a
high-ranking judge can make in Syria today and equals to over sixty thousand Syrian pounds. When I joined,
they told me I need to go to fight in Ramadi for a year and then I will be free to go anywhere in the Caliphate.
They also give you a free house, furniture, all your needs in a house–even the money to purchase slave girls”
(Abu Jamal).
Cash Rewards
According to our informants, IS is flushed with cash. One defector recalls one of the cadres involved in the oil
sales tired of counting cash. He decided to weigh it instead to determine how much money he had taken in.
Another showed us pictures on his phone of IS cadres lying around with bundles of cash strewn about. Cash
payments were made as a reward to IS fighters for good “work”.
Learning About One’s Religion
Most of the IS defectors expressed gratitude for what they had learned in their Shariah training class–for
finally learning more about Islam, after having been largely denied religious education under the Assad
regime. “They taught us how to pray and taught us our religion. In Syria, the Sunni part of the country
was not taught religion properly. We felt a vacuum filled. We hadn’t learned in school our real history and
religion. Daesh filled an emptiness in us. We felt joy from this and anger at Assad” (Abu Walid). He added,
“Many people under Assad don’t know how to pray properly. The people are very grateful to learn how to
pray correctly.”
Embracing an Islamic Life
Our informants reminded us that as Sunni Arabs they were at first very pleased to be able to embrace a
strict version of Islam. While none of them, looking back at their experience under IS, endorsed the violent
enforcement techniques of IS, many expressed joy in embracing a strict Islamic course under IS. The minor
in our sample said that he was so deeply brainwashed by the IS claims to be in possession of the “true Islam”
ISSN 2334-3745
102
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
that it took him a year after escaping to fully realize that they were misguided. He stated that he was first
gratified when “They taught us how to pray, and how to perform zakat. They also stopped people from
drinking and using drugs. That was all good.” He went on saying, “I liked the prayer and the fasting and the
zakat [alms-giving] and the good things, that they didn’t let people drink, or take drugs or commit adultery
and do blasphemous things. That made the country better. There were fewer people stealing” (Abu Shujaa).
Attaining Paradise
ISIS promotes the concept of sacrificing oneself and others in suicide missions as a form of “martyrdom”
that they claim wins them all the rewards of Paradise. While Islam teaches the concept of forgiveness, belief
alone does not guarantee salvation in the afterlife and Islam also promotes the concept of a horrific hell and
damnation for anyone whose sins outweigh his or her good deeds on the Day of Judgment. Against this
background, anyone who has sinned badly may be attracted to carrying out a “martyrdom” mission in order
to gain eternal rewards. Our informants claim that the Shariah trainers are very good at selling the idea of
“martyrdom” and that foreign fighters in particular often join IS to clean their slates. “Some people join IS in
order to become ‘martyrs’ so that their past sins are forgiven. I spoke to one sheikh. He told me, ‘I am from
Saudi Arabia. I was very rich and I had committed most of the sins. I thought that I had to do something big
to be forgiven, so I left everything behind to fight here to cleanse my soul.’”
Fear of Worse Alternatives
A feeling of religious and cultural honor and a fear of life under the Assad regime as a worse alternative
was also cited as an inducement to join by some of those we interviewed. Fearing that other groups would
rape their women if they entered their territory, some of the strict IS practices concerning women were
comforting at some level. As one informant answered our question, regarding why he joined IS? “They go
talking to the people asking them, ‘How come you are living under Shia rule? This is degradation to live
under the Shia.’ They taught us, ‘You consider yourselves as Muslims, but you do not practice and live it, so
you are not Muslims. They taught us that all the others are murtads [infidels]. It was always, ‘You are either
with us or not’, no grey areas. If you are not with them you cannot do business. They tell the guys, ‘If Assad’s
army comes and you do not fight with us, they will take your car and rape your women. They will kill the
men and rape your women.’ It’s true their soldiers did rape women so everyone is afraid and believes them.
An older guy told us, Bassar’s soldiers came to a home, and told the father, ‘Send your daughter with us.’
Then they heard a gunshot. The father killed his own daughter, so they cannot rape her. Everyone knows that
Bassar’s soldiers will rape anyone they find” (Abu Walid).
Process of Indoctrination by Charismatic Trainers
The Shariah training that IS provides serves to indoctrinate future cadres. Highly charismatic and
knowledgeable IS teachers from Saudi Arabia and Jordan who are well trained in Islamic law, run the courses.
Everyone in our sample reported that the trainers were kind, gentle, charismatic and very convincing.
Many stated that when they had doubts they always remembered what they had been taught in the Shariah
class and how much they liked their trainer; that kept them going–despite serious doubts. Likewise many
consulted their former trainers to discuss issues arising from contradictions between what IS said and IS did.
“ISIS preachers are well-educated and impressive. They persuaded me to be a ‘martyr’ in just three gatherings
which lasted two hours each,” one informant stated (Abu Jamal – not his real name). It would appear that
ISSN 2334-3745
103
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
in terms of preparations for IS membership, the teachers inducted new IS cadres in ways similar to modern
criminal gangs or as child soldiers are incorporated into paramilitary groups. One of those interviewed
said that “At the third class, I declared that I was ready to be a suicide bomber as I was really affected by the
preaching of the teacher, so that you can understand how well they choose their teachers. There were three
hundred students like me. The classes lasted two hours per day. They usually lectured about the political
problems Muslims are facing around the world and about how Muslims were assimilated and how their lands
and wealth was imperialized. They spoke about how Bassar’s soldiers were raping our sisters and [that]we
should be sending birth control pills to our sisters if we chose not to fight Bassar and others. Also of course
they included ideological education, (Abu Jamal).
The first thing the Shariah instructors teach in their courses looks similar to first steps in cult practices –
emphasizing the rule of “hear and obey”. They teach that under any circumstances, without any questioning,
IS members must “hear and obey”. This is a must–members are obliged to obey and carry out the orders of
all IS sheiks and emirs. This part of the process is presented as essential in ideology and the indoctrination
process of “hearing and obeying” is presented as practicing holiness and keeping the order of Islam. Likewise
failing to do so is taught to be threatening to authentic spirituality by claiming that not obeying the IS emirs
is one of the greatest sins. Of course, added to this teaching are their sharp knives, they use to behead in
public anyone who refuses to “hear and obey”.
In content, the IS Shariah training program generally follows the al-Qaida takfiri ideologies developed long
before IS was created. It relies on the works of Ibn-i Tamiyyah, a thirteenth century scholar who was one of
the founders of Salafist Islamic interpretations.[9] According to our informants, the trainers make use of a
variety of Tamiyyah’s works, in addition to the book “Kitabu’t-Tevhid” which is presented as the main course
book. Titled The book of the Unity and Unique Oneness of Allah, it was written by Muhammad-ibn-Abd-alWahhab, the eighteenth century Salafist scholar who stood at the cradle of present-day Wahhabism, the Saudi
variant of Salafism.
Using these texts, trainers rely on twisted interpretations from the Holy Quran and from more or less wellknown Hadiths, thereby making use of the cultural capital of Islam. Invoking in such a way values sacred to
all participants, makes it difficult if not downright impossible for those undergoing such training to question
what they are being taught by the trainers. The students’ belief in the inviolability of the Holy Quran, coupled
with the powerful personalities of the teachers, makes them highly vulnerable to accepting the violent
interpretations of Islam without questioning or challenging teachers and texts.
It is worth recalling that most Syrians, even university graduates, were never taught even the very basic
features of Islam because the Assad regime controlled the educational systems. Therefore, for many of them,
the knowledge they had about Islam before they came under the tutelage of IS was based upon deficient and
incomplete narratives. This situation of spiritual emptiness, combined with a hunger to learn more about, and
practice “true” Islam considerably eased the task of the IS Sheiks.
ISIS trainers instill in their students the idea that only IS possesses the “true Islam”, with everyone else being
an apostate deserving death. “In the ten-day Shariah education course, they teach that all people not in IS are
murtad [apostates]. All governments who do not support IS are murtad. They teach the students how to pray”
(Abu Walid).
ISIS ideologues take a decidedly apocalyptic view of the future, teach their cadres that they are engaged in
a cosmic battle where normal limits are shed as they are meant to defend and carry out the will of Allah. As
one informant tells us, “Once I asked, why we don’t fight against Israel. The sheik told me that we have to first
ISSN 2334-3745
104
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
fight with the hypocrites and pretenders otherwise they will stab us in the back when we fight. He added that
the last war will be in Halep Dabiq, once we win over the hypocrites” (Abu Jamal). This references Islamic
apocalyptic prophesies of the End Times battle being fought in Dabiq, an area in Syria that IS has been sure
to control.[10]
Following the practices of many cults, violent gangs and leaders of child soldiers, IS teachers require
their students to carry out a barbaric act of violence against their enemies before graduating to become a
fighter. Enemy prisoners are housed near the training sites for that very purpose. As one informant told us,
“Graduation only happens when they feel a student is ready. At that point they demand that the student that
is going to become a fighter cut off the head of a prisoner–to demonstrate that he is ready” (Abu Jamal).
Military Training, Weapons, & Battle Field Practices
“Everyone who becomes a fighter takes both Shariah and military training. It’s both military and Islamic
training” (Abu Walid). These two courses—Shariah and military—are taught separately or combined into
one (with the Shariah training happening after nightfall or during breaks in the daytime), depending on
practicalities and the need of IS to move cadres forward into the battle space.
Military Training
As with Shariah training, IS cadres are organized and trained in military techniques in groups reflecting
members’ nationalities and /or language. The military training can be as short as two weeks or take up to six
weeks, depending on momentary needs for combat purposes.
“In military training, they teach them bombing and weapon tactics, fighting like an army and survival
training” (Abu Walid). Particularly violence-prone individuals and those with psychopathic traits who
take special pleasure in cruelty and infliction of pain are selected from among the trainees to become
executioners. Others are chosen for intelligence work; they soon become feared by all the rest. The ‘Cubs of
the Caliphate’; child soldiers have their own training camp and include boys as young as ten and eleven years
of age. There the child boys receive military training. As many as they can persuade are talked into becoming
suicide bombers, tasked with driving explosive-laden vehicles into enemy positions.
Weapons
A typical fighter is, according to our informants, equipped with, “one pistol–a Glock, a Colt, or a Smith and
Wesson; one rifle–an M-16, or an AK-47; at least two hand grenades; a backpack with medical supplies, food
and water; and at least five hundred bullets” (Abu Walid).
According to Abu Jamal, a former IS commander, “The weapons are coming from everywhere. But mostly
we take our weapons from other groups and from the battles we win. We had obtained a lot of Bassar’s army
warehouses as well. Bassar left all his weapons, including the tanks, to the PKK and PYD. We also took some
of them.”
Some of our informants also claimed that IS receives, unlike any other groups in Syria or Iraq, new weapons
arriving in wooden cases with nylon armor covers and slings. Abu Jamal claimed that he had seen unopened
AK-47 cases full of brand new rifles, BKC (Bixi) machine guns, a variety of mortars, and even anti-tank and
air missiles as IS cadres were unpacking and assembling the shipments, adding he did not know where they
originated from.
ISSN 2334-3745
105
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Battlefield Practices
Local fighters who have families or wives live at home, except when engaged in fighting. They see their
families frequently, according to those we talked to. Fighters leave the battlefield and go home every ten days
to visit their families, we were told. “During the battle days he follows the orders of the leader. After fighting
for ten days approximately he returns home for a week of rest with his family” (Abu Walid).
“The Daesh leaders are foreigners (non Syrian), [while] the soldiers are locals for the most part. There is no
difference in how soldiers are treated between locals and foreigners. [But, the] Syrians do not like the foreign
commanders” (Walid).
Nevertheless there is much loyalty to each other. “ISIS members support each other to death. The others are
not like that” Abu Jamal stated. Likewise the fighters are not afraid of dying and in fact embrace “martyrdom”
on the battlefield. As to IS’ military tactics, Abu Jamal told us “The strategy of IS before a battle is watching
the group being targeted. “They would kill the top commander in an ambush before they attack in battle,
so that the army or the group they are attacking would be without an experienced commander.” Executions
are carried out on the battlefield. Unlike other IS operations that are based on Shariah practices, with
investigations and with judges passing the final verdict, fighters bypass this. “Because they say they are at war,
they do not need a trial—so they execute [their prisoners] instantly without waiting and consulting anyone”
(Abu Jamal).
“During the Battle at the Al-Tabqa air base, the top commanders fled with a helicopter at night and
afterwards. IS captured and killed almost seven hundred soldiers there. Almost all were killed via beheading,”
an informant reported, showing us the videos of the beheadings he had still stored on his phone. “Two
hundred fifty of them were taken to the cities to be executed in front of the people to spread fear, the rest
were executed on the scene of the battle—during and afterward. The human blood from the executions ran
like a river” (Abu Jamal).
ISIS cadres’ reputation for brutal executions, use of suicide bombers and fierce tactics have made many
enemies cringe and withdraw in the face of IS fighters. “Thirty IS fighters won over four hundred Free Syrian
Army fighters very easily in taking over the border gate across Akçakale,” Abu Jamal told us. Perhaps because
there are few if any alternatives, after prison breaks, “Prisoners who were released by IS mostly join the
group” (Abu Jamal).
Battlefield Administration of Psychopharmaca
Two of our informants discussed how drugs were used to motivate cadres. The child soldier who had served
in a ‘Cubs of the Caliphate’ unit (Abu Shujaa) told us that children would be given drugs before they mounted
their bomb-laden vehicles to conduct suicide attacks. Abu Said who had been an IS commander confirmed
this.
Abu Said also detailed the battlefield use of a drug that appears to match the description of the amphetamine
Captagon.[11] “When we were fighting against nizam in Ras al-Ayn, there were loud sounds of explosions all
around me and I was very scared. There was this guy from IS, he looked at me and realized that I was scared.
Asked if I was afraid, I said, ‘Yes I am really scared. He gave me a tablet. It was very bitter and brown in color.
I swallowed it. In thirty minutes, I became a different man—as if I am a hero. I went into the battle very
bravely to the very fronts alone. My friends told me to come back, but instead, I went forward, and said, ‘No, I
want to die!’ I became so brave. I did not sleep afterward for three days. It gave me so much power. I felt as if
I am indestructible and unbeatable. I went back home on the fourth day without sleeping–after having taken
ISSN 2334-3745
106
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
this tablet. I sat together with my family. Then I laid down for three to four minutes and I felt like I had not
slept for years. At that moment, I could not move my arm and could not speak. I realized that it was because
of the drug, so I did not take it again. They told me that I would not become addicted if I kept using this
drug, but I didn’t. Many of the IS members use this drug. There are different varieties of it, some yellowish,
some light brown.”
Foreign Fighters
ISIS currently attracts about one thousand new foreign fighters per month and already has a foreign fighter
force estimated at twenty to thirty thousand–including some five thousand from Western Europe. Many of
our informants had contacts with, and knowledge about, these foreign fighters. Abu Jamal, a former regional
commander of IS, estimated that there are ten thousand IS fighters in Syria and twenty-five thousand in Iraq,
with sixty percent of the fighters consisting of Iraqis and Syrians and the other forty percent being made up
of foreign fighters.
The foreign fighters were seen as “true believers” by our informants who witness their dedication since they
had given up everything to come and join IS. Abu Jamal recalls meeting one and hearing his story, “Once
I took a French IS member to our truck while he was fleeing from the Kobanî battle. The French IS fighter
called the Arab IS fighters hypocrites and told me that they would not pray. ‘They are after money, not jihad,’
he said. He told me his story. After he converted to Islam, he flew with his wife and two children, to Istanbul
as a tourist. From Istanbul he came to the border where he was instructed to meet his handler. The handler
took him to a border village where they passed the border with the assistance of a smuggler. After their
arrival and settling in, he was given Shariah courses for two months. His passport and phone were taken and
destroyed. There was no Internet—it was not allowed. After Shariah training, he received military training for
around a month and became a fighter” (Abu Jamal).
“The foreigners’ camp is located at the Tabqa Dam, which is around twenty-five miles away from Raqqa,”
according to Abu Jamal. “ISIS has the control of this dam. All the foreigners arriving in Syria are transferred
to the camp there. Based on the language of the foreigner fighter, IS sends sheikhs to their camp. After the
ideological training, the trainees are then sent to military camp training for two months. The military camps
training names are al-Hasakah Osama bin Laden Camp, al-Raqqa Zarqawi Camp, al-Raqqa 17th Battalion
Camp and, for the boys between eight to seventeen, al-Shabaab Caliph Camp. The boys stay at this camp for
three months for indoctrination. They mostly become preachers for IS. However, they also receive military
training. In order to graduate from this camp, you have to cut the throat of a prisoner. The IS prisoners are
kept in the Tabqa Dam area for this purpose” (Abu Jamal).
Many nationalities are represented among the foreign fighters. “I have seen people from the USA, the UK,
Germany, France, Russia, Chechnya, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria,
Egypt, Palestine [limited numbers]), Lebanon, China, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan,” Abu Jamal stated. He
recalled that they were suspicious of the Russians. “We would consider them as agents because they were
blonde, real Russian-blooded people and we would not trust them as they would mostly claim that they had
been in the Russian Army and then converted to Islam and retired from their posts and came to fight for
IS. They were also mostly military strategists and were making the plans for assaults and battles. They were
effective on making strategic military decisions in IS.” Some of our informants wondered whether these
Russians were plants (i.e. spies or agents), coordinating things with Assad’s forces.
ISSN 2334-3745
107
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Chechens and Kazaks are the battle-hardened fighters and thus form the elite special forces of IS, leading
the regular cadres into battle. The two groups do not mix in battle. Many stories were told about Chechens
executing prisoners in a very ruthless and brutal manner–seemingly numb to any feelings of horror.
One Serbian foreign fighter was pointed out by some of our informants as a particularly psychopathic
executioner and more Serbians were seen as wanting to fulfill that role.
Regarding the Chinese foreign fighters, Abu Jamal recalls, “There is [a] Chinese village of IS fighters who
speak fluent Qur’anic Arabic. There are around five hundred of them with their families. They are settled in a
big village. I do not know how but they speak very fluent Arabic [Arabiyah al-fuṣḥa, according to him, which
means, the most eloquent and Qur’anic Arabic language] as they are genuine Chinese people.” When asked if
they could be Uyghur Turks, he said, “No, they are genuine Chinese people, I know Uyghurs”.
Each nationality has its particular reputation. Abu Jamal recalls that “the worst of IS are the Saudi fighters.
They are very brutal and violent. Once during a campaign, there was a group of one hundred Saudi fighters.
An American F-16 bombed them and around fifty died. They called for help, but were told to wait, and not
to leave the stronghold. They however abandoned it. When their commander learned it he ordered that ten
men be sent back to the IS command center. They were killed immediately as they had not listened to orders.
The other forty Saudis, with their commanders, fled and joined al-Nusra.” Saudis and Jordanians tended to be
well represented among the Shariah educators and judges. “The first judge of IS is from Saudi Arabia” (Abu
Walid).
One informant told us a story that many of the others also referred to, “The foreign fighters are corrupt
minded. For instance, one Tunisian guy wanted his two wives to be in bed with him together. His wives took
him to court over this. He was sentenced and put in a truck for twenty days and paraded around.”
Many of our informants stated that Westerners who joined were already heavily indoctrinated in Salafi
doctrine before arriving to IS. Unlike the Syrians, the Western cadres were, and generally remained
throughout their time with IS, “true believers”. “They usually recruit from the West over the Internet,” Abu
Jamal told us.
Western foreign fighters are kept separate from the ordinary Syrian fighters and given that they do not have
a common language they cannot get to know each other well. However, our informants noted that Western
recruits were obviously privileged in many ways above the regular Syrian cadres–often receiving homes,
wives, female slaves and cars.
Porous Turkish Border
Turkey’s border with Syria runs as far as the Tigris. That the Turkish government illicitly if not openly
supported the rebel movement in Syria is well known. Only recently has Turkey begun to control movement
of IS cadres across its southern borders, following pressure from Western powers. Turkey is a member of
both NATO and the OSCE and as such, its border forms an outer border of these two organizations. Likewise
because of the highly porous boundary for people smuggling between Turkey and the Greek islands as well as
between Syria and Turkey, Turkey has become a buffer zone for illegal migration into Europe. And as we saw
in the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Turkey has become important for controlling European IS
fighters from moving freely back and forth between IS held territory and European capitals.
Along the southern border of Turkey, four cities—Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Hatay—share this frontier.
These towns have deep historical ties with Syria, and there are interactions with a spectrum of radical groups
ISSN 2334-3745
108
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
in Syria, including IS. The remaining border that southeastern Turkey shares with Syria faces down the cities
of Mardin, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, and Hakkari. But this stretch is controlled by militants from the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD).
The population of these four cities (i.e. Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Hatay) is a blend of Kurdish and
Arabic elements with local Turkmen populations inherited from the time when the Ottoman Empire
ruled the entire region from Istanbul across Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and along the southern shore of the
Mediterranean. Today, many Arabs and Kurds have relatives and family members across the border in Syria,
and even today intermarriage across the border is still a common practice. So the historic and ongoing
interaction of Arabs and Kurds across this often violent frontier stems not only from activities such as
smuggling or illicit trafficking in drugs or refugees, but are also based on family ties, which may also be used
to facilitate illegal activities along these routes. Lately, stretches of this border have also become a facilitator
for the objectives of IS as well.
The financing that IS enjoys primarily from its sale of oil but also other “goods” means that the group is flush
with cash which allows IS to pay smugglers and bribe border guards to gain easy entry into Turkey and to
operate from there. “ISIS members have a lot of money, so they can rent a house in Turkey for operational
purposes including to collect intelligence and use it for a maximum of ten days and then re-rent it again”
(Abu Jamal).
“The smugglers do this for money. It usually costs two hundred US dollars per person to cross, depends on
the situation. There is a coffee shop close to the border in Akçakale, anyone who wants to pass the border
goes there to meet with the smugglers. You can see the PKK and IS members sitting there together. But for IS,
the smugglers have to inform the IS handlers when they are assisting them passing the border from the other
side. In the Akçakale at the Tell Abyad border gate, there is a middleman called the alligator. He handles
everything in the name of IS. He is a very scary man. He works with the IS intelligence” (Abu Jamal).
With concerns that foreign fighters were using Turkey as route to slip into Syria and that extremist groups
such as IS were using Turkey as a supply source and transit route, Turkish officials have in the past months
cracked down on what previously was a relatively open border. The border has now been fortified with
two hundred miles of trenches, fifty-five miles of barbed-wire fence. Armed Turkish troops who have been
accused of shooting and killing at least thirty-one civilians who tried crossing into the country. 12 However,
most of the fences or trenches have not arrived to Sanliurfa or mainly IS controlled parts of the border,
making it quite possible for the IS members to still cross those sections of the frontier, although not as easily
as during past years and until mid-2015.
Some of the cities in Northern Syria actually border twin cities in Turkey. For instance the Syrian city of Tel
Abyad is directly across from the Turkish border city of Akçakale. Essentially the two run into each other. The
division between them is a two-meter cyclone metal fence that smugglers can cut through or put blankets
over the top late at night and thereby help people cross.
According to our informants, IS cadres still manage to penetrate the border. “Passing through the [Turkish]
border is as easy as eating cheese,” one informant told us (Abu Jamal). IS illicit movement across the Turkish
border is not limited to their cadres. According to Jamal, IS moved components for weapons from Turkey
across the Akçakale border gate into Syria. “They acquired long, strong pipes along with a lot of fertilizer.
The pipes and fertilizer along with LPG [liquid petroleum gas] tanks were used to make a kind of rocket in
Raqqa. These rockets are named hell-fire balls and are more powerful than other rockets. We produced and
ISSN 2334-3745
109
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
used thousands of them. I know that the total is over eight thousand, as we had that many LPG tanks when
we acquired the LPG tank factory. I do not know how they brought more tanks after that” (Abu Jamal).
Refugee Camp Involvement
Turkey currently has nearly two million Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR.[13] However the actual
number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, according to many NGO’s, may be closer to three million as most of
the Syrians entered Turkey illegally through borders that were open up until mid-2015.[14] Today, one can
see Syrian panhandlers and beggars all around the country at any given time, especially in large cities like
Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir but also in smaller cities in the West and central parts of Turkey.
Along the southern border of Turkey, a network of twenty-seven officially run refugee camps have been
opened for Syrians and their population is growing rapidly according to the Deputy Prime Minister of
Turkey.[15] There are five in Sanliurfa alone with around 150,000 refugees living in them. Some 25,000 Kurds
also live in the Suruc refugee camp, almost all from Kobani. Another 30,000 refugees in the Akçakale refugee
camp are mostly populated by Arabs, as the camp authorities carefully separate the two nationalities to avoid
conflicts. As many as ten members of a family may live in a sixteen square meter tent, where meals, free
medical service and medicine distribution, but also schooling are provided. Yet these camps may be serving
more than one purpose.
Abu Jamal estimated that Akçakale Refugee Camp had approximately thirty thousand refugees, mostly Arabs.
He said that in the Kobani battle it was found that many of the killed IS members were actually carrying
Akçakale Camp ID’s on their body. He went on to state that there are around twenty quarters in the Akçakale
Camp with each having it’s own mosque with its own Arabic imam or some other unofficial preacher. Jamal
stated that some of them recruit for IS inside the camp. As a result young boys leave the camps to join IS.
“These sheikhs preach that jihad is fard ayn [a mandatory individual responsibility] for every Syrian man
according to Islam, as Syria is in war,” Abu Jamal declared. Likewise he insisted when we interviewed him
that the IS recruiters pressure and threaten men to join without the camp authorities knowing they are doing
so. “They ensure you that if you die in battle, that they will take care of your family. If you do not want to join
IS then you have to flee the camp. They will not let you alone.”
Beyond their function of providing refuge for the people fleeing the violent battleground of Syria, the camps
sadly, are also home to a contagious despair that can infect young boys in particular, those who prefer action
to languishing unemployed, often fatherless, constantly looking back to Syria, while feeling devalued in a
camp. Our informants told us several stories of young boys being talked into joining IS and then running
away from their families. They all ended up dying- carrying out suicide missions. According to official
Turkish policy, Syrians can remain in the camps as long as they do not cause trouble inside Turkey.
Including the camp population, over 467,000 Syrian refugees live in Sanliurfa according to records of the
Turkish Ministry of the Interior [16]. Generally, those who are living outside of the camps are the more
affluent ones as they have managed to flee with some resources or have relatives abroad, allowing them to
rent houses and open businesses. In short, there is an already established population of Syrians in Sanliurfa,
accounting now for a fifth of the population. This allows Syrian terrorists and criminals to blend in easily and
to operate freely.
ISSN 2334-3745
110
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Humanitarian Aid
ISIS, like many other terrorist groups has figured out how to take advantage of humanitarian aid. One
informant told us, “The humanitarian aid passing from Suruc to Kobanî to aid the Kurdish people was mostly
being sold to IS fighters, around two thousand truckloads. There are very few [civilian] people living in
Kobanî, as the people of Kobanî did not go back. So, all those trucks loads of relief were mostly passed to IS.
There were even explosives hid under the cement bags sent there,” (Abu Jamal).
Female Involvement
The Hisbah
According to information gained from our interviews, female members of IS do not become fighters. They
can, however, join the hisbah (morality police), and many are quite brutal in this role. The female brigade
of women in the hisbah was formed by IS in Raqqa after inhabitants there got fed up with male morality
police beating and mistreating their women. At that time women were recruited into the hisbah to discipline
and enforce morality rules for other women. This brigade is named al Ketibet-el Khansaa. There is also a
foreigners’ hisbah formed of Western women. The Western group members carry AK-47s and they move
around freely without taking orders from anyone and they have more power and authority than the regular
women’s hisbah.
“The hisbah are like Shariah police. They steer people to mosques at prayer times” (Abu Jamal). “The alKhansaa women [female morality police] go three at a time with a driver. They go into the market and into
the village. They arrest and fine women who are out without niqaab and take some women even into the
prison. [Niqaab is the Arabic style black dress now required for women under the control of IS where all
parts of the body with the exception of the eyes are covered.] If there is a woman with no niqaab and no
socks, or if a colorful garment under the niqaab is showing, they take her to court and she receives a sentence
from ten to forty lashes” (Abu Walid). Most persons who fail to follow the strict rules of IS are punished in
public, as an example to others. While males are lashed with their skin exposed, females are lashed through
their clothing.
Marriage
ISIS uses the promise of marriage and female slaves as incentive for young men to join their ranks. One of
our informants pointed out that marriage is a powerful inducement for some foreign fighters coming from
poor regions of, for example Tunisia, a country that has had an inordinate number of foreign fighters joining
IS. “The prospect of marriage also attracts youth. Turkish youth who are poor sometimes go to IS just to
marry. They tell us, ‘I go there fight for them and get married’” (Abu Walid).
When IS controls all the jobs and resources in an area, the local Syrian young men can also be induced into
joining IS simply by gaining the promise of marriage. Thus a very real reward of becoming an IS fighter is not
only the imagined pleasure of the houris (virgins) in paradise if they are ‘martyred’ but the very real reward
of ‘sex now’ with the wife he will be able to marry only if he has a salary–something IS membership makes
possible. When an unmarried man takes his oath of allegiance to IS he is given a generous salary and a onetime marriage allowance. Foreign fighters who marry, or who are already married, are also provided with
living quarters and in some cases a car, in addition to a fighter’s salary.
ISSN 2334-3745
111
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
One informant told us how IS spoke in the first days of their arrival to the people in areas they conquered:,
‘All people come with us. We can give you a gun for fighting. Some people don’t have a wife—they can come
with us. We will give you money, so you can marry. We will give you about two thousand dollars, so you can
marry and a salary every month of two to three hundred US dollars per month. You need not be afraid. You
are guaranteed if you die, we will take care of your family with money and food. ‘ They tell their recruits,
‘Come take our ten days Shariah course. After you can be in IS. You can have money, a gun, a car, after. Now
you will be important’” (Abu Walid).
Our informants stated that Syrian women generally did not want to marry IS fighters but would when they
believed that doing so would rescue their families from starvation. In this way Syrian women are enticed to
marry local IS fighters by the money involved–to save their families.
Local women are also preyed upon by unscrupulous IS cadres who see them on the street and finding out
where they live, go to put pressure upon their fathers to give them in marriage. One father was pressured in
this manner and resisted it by quickly enlisting a cousin to marry his daughter—thereby taking her off the
marriage market.[17]
Young women who come from abroad are expected to marry the IS cadres in a short span of time. These
women are housed in a special “sisters house” and watched over by the hisbah until their marriages are
arranged. According to one informant, “The hisbah has a hotel for the women who come as marriage
partners, for the brides” (Abu Nasir).
Likewise there is, “a special marriage bureau that gives an order yes or no about marrying. A German for
instance comes and says, ‘I want to get married.’ He goes first to the bureau to get permission. The women
who come go to the Hizbah al-Khansaa and writes her name that she wants a husband. Then it is arranged
between them. When they come to the marriage bureau it takes time. The young man is studied for four to
six months by the bureau. They also make a study about the girl before they marry” (Abu Nasir). “There is a
marriage bureau – services where they register the young women who come and match them with suitable IS
cadres” (Abu Walid).
“There are many women coming from Tunis, Algeria etc. and they also want to marry. The Hisbah alKhansaa arranges it. Many of the foreign girls don’t want to marry a Syrian fighter. They usually want to
marry from their own group. For instance, the Europeans want to marry Europeans” (Abu Nasir).
Russia has been heavily involved in putting out pro-Assad and anti-rebel propaganda. One of their
propaganda themes involved the spread of information about the supposed practice of “jihad al-nikah”, a
practice which would be a total anathema to any Sunni Muslim, of a Sunni girl voluntarily offering herself to
rebel fighters to be “married” repeatedly in a muta marriage (Shia temporary marriage)–essentially to serve
as a prostitute. Our informants had also heard this piece of propaganda. They emphatically assured us that
it is false before we even had a chance to ask about it. “We heard about jihad al-nikah – Muslim girls coming
and giving their body as prostitutes for the mujahideen. It is absolutely not true’ (Abu Nisar).
In the case of widows of IS fighters up for remarriage, our informants stated that IS does not follow the
normal Shariah practice of iddah—having the widow wait for a period of four months and ten days to ensure
that she was not pregnant by her former husband. Instead IS widows are expected to remarry quickly, a
practices that serve the needs of IS cadres who are often single and sexually motivated. When a fighter is
killed in battle “his wife would wait for forty days and then get married to another fighter” (Abu Jamal).
ISSN 2334-3745
112
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
It’s unclear how the women themselves feel about these practices. However, a Western woman writing under
the pseudonym of Umm Layth, advises IS women to know their rights concerning widowhood–suggesting
perhaps that rights that are not well known or if understood, are violated.[18]
One informant explains how the IS widows are cared for in the event of widowhood. “Under IS, women
are kept very secluded. She can only see her husband or her brother. If her husband is killed as one of their
fighters, a woman from IS comes to her after three days. For a widow they come bringing two hundred US
dollars and they check on her regularly–to bring her money and ask whatever she needs” (Abu Walid).
One of our informants who had fought with Jabat al-Nusrah but was hiding that fact recalls that his wife
was pressured the entire time he was held in interrogation (two weeks) and that IS cadres tried to get her to
believe he was dead and to agree to marry them. “During this time while I was in prison, everyday they tell
my wife I died” (Abu Walid).
Like the foreign fighters, IS women from the West are particularly privileged in IS and often live in nice
homes and are given cars. They also are allowed more freedom.[19] A large group of western girls are,
according to one of our informants, gathered each day in a big house in Raqqa, where they simply work on
the Internet trying to recruit others. With their privileged lifestyles, these Western women seemed happy to
the Syrian cadres who viewed them from afar. “Some Western women are very happy. They go and wander
around outside with their weapons. After their husbands die, they remarry” (Nisar).
Female Slaves
ISIS has the practice of taking females captive–particularly the Yazidi women–and then selling or granting
them as sexual slaves to IS cadres. IS ideologues argue that Islam allows for taking and distributing slaves as
war booty, although many scholars would dispute this.[20]
While the press has reported on the practice of taking Yazidi women captive, our informants–one of them
heavily involved–told us that it is not only Yazidi women who are preyed upon but also the Sunni and Shia
wives of defeated enemy soldiers from the Iraqi army, the Free Syrian Army and from the Syrian regime
forces.
“There are special places in Raqqa where they sell slaves,” one informant told us. “It is in the center of the city.
It is only for Daesh. It’s in the building that was previously the government palace–the governor’s compound.
Daesh took it over. There they have the hisbah al khansaa. They [female morality police] are in charge of
everything about the slaves” (Abu Nasir).
The female slaves, known as “sabiyya”, are allowed only to the IS cadres. “Only a fighter can buy a slave
woman. He needs documents from the emir or the governor of IS in that region granting permission to him
to buy a slave and only after getting this permission he can go to hisbah and the slave market to buy slaves.
They are sold by dollars. The minimum price is one thousand USD and the maximum is three thousand
dollars. The slave girls can be sold between fighters, but only to the mujahideen, and there are rules, like you
cannot take a mother and daughter slaves sexually at once, as you can only be with one of them [following
Islamic incest rules]” (Abu Nasir).
Slaves are also given to the IS cadres as rewards–especially to the Westerners who do not have local wives.
They reside with the fighter like a wife until he discards her, giving or selling her to another fighter. There are
many rules governing the slave trade and how slaves ought to conduct themselves. For instance, “If the man
wants to marry the slave he can. She can come in the presence of other men to serve chai [tea], coffee. She
ISSN 2334-3745
113
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
does not require a marham [male chaperone]. And the slave women have different rules in terms of covering
themselves… When you have one, it’s like your wife. Although unlike wives, there is no limitation on the
number you can have. If you are with her and have a child with her, and she becomes a Muslim, she can
become your wife” (Abu Nasir). “The sheik had two slave girls,” one informant noted, indicating how higher
social status conferred more rewards (Abu Jamal).
The Long Arm of IS
All of our informants feared discovery by active IS cadres and feared that IS could reach them inside Turkey
and kill them for defecting–a fear greatly heightened after the double murder in Urfa, mentioned earlier.
Many had experiences of IS knowing about them inside Turkey. For instance Jamal reports, “ISIS has strong
intel in Turkey as well. They knew whom I befriended while I was here in Akçakale.”
One subject reports that he only goes out to work in the field early and returns home after dark so that
nobody sees him out. In this way he tries to ensure that he is not going to be caught by IS, and thereby ensure
his own and his family’s safety. He also does not allow his child to play outside alone, fearing kidnap.
Disillusionment with IS
While most of our informants bought into the IS ideology either before or during their Shariah training
and while they first had hopes that IS would bring about good for them, they became disillusioned when
witnessing the mismatch between the words and deeds of IS. “In 2014, I realized that Daesh were liars. For
instance, there was an IS guy who raped a woman, but got away with it” (Abu Walid).
Many were confused about how IS could sell oil to enemies such as the Assad regime, or why battles seemed
to end suddenly with IS probably having made a behind the scenes deal with the other side. One former IS
cadre reported about the confusion and disillusionment of his friend, Abdullah. “Once he told me, ‘I captured
the Mursitpinar Border Gate several times [between Syrian Kobani and Turkish Suruc]; however, each time
I was ordered to withdraw.’ He started to question IS in his mind, but not openly, otherwise they would kill
him. Before he tried to flee, however, he was killed in an F-16 raid” (Abu Jamal).
One informant stated, “what I don’t like if someone did something wrong they tried to water board him, that
I didn’t like.” He went on to add, “What I don’t like is that if they don’t like someone they just behead him. Or
if a woman is not wearing hijab they bring someone to flog her, or if someone doesn’t believe they cut his ear”
(Abu Shujaa).
All of our informants were tired of hypocrisy in IS noting that some were rapists, others themselves smoked,
while punishing ordinary citizens for smoking, etc. “I have seen IS members go to pray without ablution”
(Abu Jamal). Our informants found the IS cadres practice of quickly remarrying widows rather than allowing
them to observe the normal Islamic interval before being re-married [iddah] both disgusting and wrong.
All our informants also grew disgusted by the constant stream of executions and the cruel pleasure that some
IS cadres appeared to have when beheading and killing others. “There is a well by the name of Hute. There
they cover the eyes of the prisoners and tell them, ‘You are free now, just walk now, but don’t open your eyes.’
They walk and fall into the well. It smells horrible because of all the corpses inside the well. I know that over
three hundred people were thrown into that well.”
ISSN 2334-3745
114
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Our informants hoped that they could get rid of the Assad regime but now see all the death and destruction
that came with IS. One informant noted that, “when you go around the country, you do not see youth in the
villages. They are either fighting for IS, dead, or fled so as not to have to fight for IS.”
According to our informants, it is not only the defectors, but also ordinary Syrians as well who are
disillusioned with the false claims and unfulfilled promises of IS. “Everybody in Syria doesn’t like IS now.
When a fighter goes out to battle they say they hope he doesn’t come back” (Abu Walid).
One informant told us about how people began to understand that IS would not serve their needs, “But after
some time, in 2014, people feel that IS is not good, but bad. Why? Because what they promised to the people,
they did not keep. Where is this freedom they promised us?” (Abu Walid).
Our informants felt that many locals joined IS partly out of a hope in the proclaimed IS Caliphate and out of
respect for their fighting power – they hoped that IS would help them achieve real freedom, but that as time
wore on most joined IS out of desperation and hunger. One of those we interviewed stated that “now people
join only for food” and that most have grown disillusioned with IS. “The few people who join now do so only
because they need to eat. They are the ones who don’t have work. The rest try to escape to Turkey or Lebanon,
or go by sea” (Abu Walid).
Defecting from IS
“If someone is caught fleeing from IS, he is killed immediately”, Abu Jamal stated. He mentioned the case of
a fifteen-year-old Turkish fighter who wanted to quit serving IS. “He met with his father at the border gate
in Akçakale. His father did not want to let him return [to the fighters] but the boy said through tears to his
father, ‘They will kill me here right now, if I do not return with them now.’ Suddenly there were fifteen fighters
who emerged out of the shadows around the young man to ensure that he wasn’t going to return home with
his father.”
Most of our informants escaped IS by paying smugglers to get them across the Turkish border. Choice of
one’s smuggler is of paramount importance as “all the smugglers are forced and paid to inform about IS
members who are fleeing. The only way to ensure safe passage is to bribe the smuggler in high amounts, or
he will inform IS and you will be killed instantly. Also there are several checkpoints. If you are caught by IS at
the checkpoints, you also are immediately killed” (Abu Jamal).
Various authors have written about the importance of distinguishing between deradicalization and
disengagement.[21] In the case of the defectors who spoke to us, all of them deradicalized, in the sense that
they became totally and completely disaffected with IS and its extremist ideology. However, this process
was not always completed at the moment they decided to leave IS behind–disengaging from the group. Abu
Shujaa, for instance, told us that he continued to be a “true believer” in the Islamic State and its apocalyptic
vision for more than one year, despite having deciding to escape from the ruthless terrorist regime which had
fed him with End Times visions
Scott Atran writes about the confused state of “true believers” and their difficulty of leaving a group once
one has bought into their version of sacred values which are not open to negotiation.[22] Indeed all of our
informants felt that IS had deepened their understanding of Islam and they were grateful for having learned
how to pray properly and were given a chance to learn more about Islam. For them giving up IS did not mean
giving up their newfound deeper understanding of Islam and its practices. In fact, those things were sacred
and non-negotiable for them. However, the deep hypocrisy of the IS cadres and their violent and brutal
ISSN 2334-3745
115
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
treatment of women, civilians and of other IS members convinced them that while they would not abandon
their newly learned Islamic beliefs, they could walk away from IS.
In a study of open source reports of fifty-eight IS defectors, Peter Neumann, director of the International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) in London, teased out four themes
among the reasons they gave for defecting.[23] One was the extent of fighting with other Sunni rebel groups
and that “toppling the Assad regime didn’t seem to be a priority”. Our informants echoed the latter part
of this concern. Neumann also referred to “the leadership’s obsession with ‘spies’ and ‘traitors’ as being a
negative for them. This was true in our sample as well. A second theme was one of disillusionment and
outrage with the group’s brutality, especially toward civilians. Our sample concurred on this as well, although
our subjects–unlike Neumann’s media-based cases, showed compassion for the suffering of Yazidis and
other minorities targeted by IS. The third narrative noted by Neumann was corruption in the group and
special privileges granted to foreign fighters. Our sample also complained about corrupt and evil practices
by IS members and noted that the foreign fighters were indeed privileged although the latter did not seem
to cause them much concern. A fourth narrative identified by Neumann was that life under the Islamic State
was harsh and disappointing. Our subjects were indeed disappointed that life in Syria did not improve and
freedoms they had been willing to fight for did not materialize under IS.
Warnings to those Westerners Who Might be Attracted to IS
All of our informants felt very strongly that IS is an evil organization, one that others should not join. All
of them were more than happy to make a strong statement to their own people–fellow Syrians–and to
potential foreign fighters from the West, warning them about the evils of IS and telling them that under no
circumstances should they join IS. They made statements such as “ISIS is not helping the Syrian people”,
“Don’t come here, you won’t be able to leave,” “They are brutal, horrible rapists,” “This is not the true Islam
and not the Islamic State,” “Don’t be fooled, they are liars.”
Referring to Islamic scriptures about a renegade tribe in the times of the Prophet that also practiced takfir
[excommunication], Abu Walid stated, “They are the Khawarij tribe. I believed when they came to Raqqa
that they are not good. They kill anybody from us, just like the Khawarij did. They existed during those times
the same [in the times of the Prophet Mohammad]—with black clothes and black flags. Our scriptures warn
us, ‘When you see them don’t follow them.’”
About the Authors: Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism (ICSVE) and also serves as Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Psychiatry, Georgetown
University Medical School. She can be reached at at < [email protected] >.
Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D. is Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociology, Harran University, Osmanbey,
Sanliurfa, Turkey. He is currently on leave as a Research Fellow at the ICSVE in Washington, D.C.and can be
reached at < [email protected] >.
Acknowledgment: The first author thanks Visiting Assistant Professor Allison McDowell Smith for her work
in support of the project.
ISSN 2334-3745
116
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Notes
[1] See: Tim Mak, & Youssef, N. (March 3, 2015). IS ranks grow as fast as U.S. bombs can wipe them out. The Daily Beast. URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/02/03/isis-recruits-thousands-of-new-fighters-despite-u-s-bombs.html; Kirk, A. (August 12, 2015). Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are
fighting for Isil. The Telegraph. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11770816/Iraq-and-Syria-How-many-foreign-fighters-are-fightingfor-Isil.html; Neumann, P. (January 26, 2015). Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s. ISCR. URL: http://
icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ ; Schmid, Alex P.. Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates:
Conceptual and Data Issues. The Hague: ICCT, 2015, p. 11.
[2] Ahmet Atasoy, Reşat Gecen, & Hüseyin Kormaz. (August 2015). Siyasi Coğrafya Açısından Türkiye (Hatay) – Suriye Sınırı Turkey (Hatay) -Syrian border in
terms of political geography. URL: http://www.mku.edu.tr/files/1_dosya_1355572531.pdf
[3] Cockburn, P. (November 16, 2014). War with IS: Islamic militants have army of 200,000, claims senior Kurdish leader. Independent. URL: http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-islamic-militants-have-army-of-200000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html
[4] See: Tim Mak, & Youssef, N. (March 3, 2015). IS ranks grow as fast as U.S. bombs can wipe them out. The Daily Beast. URL: http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/02/03/isis-recruits-thousands-of-new-fighters-despite-u-s-bombs.html; Kirk, A. (August 12, 2015). Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are
fighting for Isil? The Telegraph. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11770816/Iraq-and-Syria-How-many-foreign-fighters-are-fightingfor-Isil.html; Neumann, P. (January 26, 2015). Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s. ISCR. URL: http://
icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/
[5] Levitt, M. (November 18, 2015). How do IS terrorists finance their attacks. The Hill. URL:http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/260597-howdo-isis-terrorists-finance-their-attacks
[6] Jones, S. (October 30, 2015). IS beheads two Syrian activists who documented terror group’s crimes. The World Post. URL:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
syrian-activists-documenting-isis-crimes-beheaded-in-turkish-border-town_563383dae4b0c66bae5c148d
[7] For a report on the number of Syrian refugees see: Gürcanli, Z. (May 25, 2015). İşte 3 yıl sonunda Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler’in durumu. Hurriyet. URL: http://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-3-yil-sonunda-turkiyedeki-suriyelilerin-durumu- 29098215 and Erdogan, M. M. (December 2014). Syrians in Turkey: Social acceptance
and integration research. URL: http://www.hugo.hacettepe.edu.tr/TurkiyedekiSuriyeliler-Syrians%20in%20Turkey-Rapor-TR-EN-19022015.pdf
[8] Reuter, C. (April 18, 2015). The terror strategist: Secret files reveal the structure of Islamic State. Der Spiegel.URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html
[9] Jamìat Ihyaa’ Minhaaj al-Sunnah. (1993). A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Da`wah. Ipswich, UK.
[10] Dabiq. (September 2014). The revival of slavery before the hour. (4). URL:http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue4-the-failed-crusade.pdf
[11] Lopez, G. (November 21, 2015). Captagon, IS’s favorite amphetamine, explained. Vox. URL: http://www.vox.com/world/2015/11/20/9769264/captagon-isisdrug
[12] Abdulrahim, R. (September 13, 2015). Syrians find it harder to flee country as Turkey tightens border control. The Wall Street Journal. URL: http://www.wsj.
com/articles/syrians-find-it-harder-to-flee-country-as-turkey-tightens-border-control-1442176477 .
[13] Abdulrahim, R. (September 13, 2015). Syrians find it harder to flee country as Turkey tightens border control. The Wall Street Journal. URL: http://www.wsj.
com/articles/syrians-find-it-harder-to-flee-country-as-turkey-tightens-border-control-1442176477
[14] Gürcanli, Z. (May 25, 2015). İşte 3 yıl sonunda Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler’in durumu. Hurriyet. URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-3-yil-sonunda-turkiyedekisuriyelilerin-durumu-29098215 and Erdogan, M. M. (December 2014). Syrians in Turkey: Social acceptance and integration research. URL: http://www.hugo.
hacettepe.edu.tr/TurkiyedekiSuriyeliler-Syrians%20in%20Turkey-Rapor-TR-EN-19022015.pdf
[15] Memurlar.net. (May 18, 2015). Kurtulmuş: Türkiye’de 27 mülteci kampı var. URL: http://www.memurlar.net/haber/515446/
[16] Gürcanli, Z. (May 25, 2015). İşte 3 yıl sonunda Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler’in durumu. Hurriyet. URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/iste-3-yil-sonunda-turkiyedekisuriyelilerin-durumu-29098215 and Erdogan, M. M. (December 2014). Syrians in Turkey: Social acceptance and integration research. URL: http://www.hugo.
hacettepe.edu.tr/TurkiyedekiSuriyeliler-Syrians%20in%20Turkey-Rapor-TR-EN-19022015.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
117
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
[17] (November 11, 2015). The true horrors of life under the Islamic State.URL:http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/11/11/who-picks-up-your-trash-whenyou-live-in-the-islamic-state/
[18] Layth, U. (2014). Diary of muhajirah. URL: http://fa-tubalilghuraba.tumblr.com/post/108838886229/diary-of-a-muhajirah-4
[19] Moaveni, A. (November 21, 2015). IS Women and Enforcers in Syria recount collaboration, anguish and escape. New York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/11/22/world/middleeast/isis-wives-and-enforcers-in-syria-recount-collaboration-anguish-and-escape.html?_r=0
[20] Dabiq. (September 2014). The revival of slavery before the hour. (4). URL: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue4-the-failed-crusade.pdf
[21] Horgan, J. (2008). Deradicalization or disengagement? Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(4). URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/
view/32/html and Silke, A. (January 1, 2011). Disengagement or deradicalization: A look at prison programs for jailed terrorists. Combating Terrorism Center. URL:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/disengagement-or-deradicalization-a-look-at-prison-programs-for-jailed-terrorists
[22] Scott Atran, & Axelrod, R. (July 2008). In theory: Reframing sacred values. Negotiation Journal. URL: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~axe/negj0708.pdf and
Shiekh, H., Atran, S., Ginges, J., Wilson, L., Obeid, N., & Davis, R. (2014). The devoted actor as parochial altruist: sectarian morality, identity fusion, and support for
costly sacrifices. Cliodynamics, 5(1).
[23] Neumann, P. (2015). Victims, perpetrators, assets: the narratives of Islamic State defectors. ICSR Report. URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf.
ISSN 2334-3745
118
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
III. Resources
Bibliography: Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation
Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes
[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism - BSPT-JT-2015-6]
Abstract
This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature,
bibliographies and other resources on homegrown terrorism and radicalisation. Though focusing on recent
literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to the middle
of November 2015. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery
sources in the field of terrorism studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been
employed to expand the search.
Keywords: bibliography; resources; literature; homegrown terrorism; domestic terrorism; homegrown
radicalisation; national security
NB: Publications focusing on Lone Wolf Terrorism have been largely excluded as the topic has been covered
in a previous bibliography compiled by Eric Price. All websites were last visited on 21.11.2015. - See also Note
for the Reader at the end of this literature list.
Bibliographies and other Resources
Andrusyszyn, Greta H. (2009, December): Domestic. In: Terrorism: A Selected Bibliography. Carlisle: U.S.
Army War College Library, 17-18. URL: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/terror09.pdf
EurActiv (2015, February): From 9/11 to Charlie Hebdo: The EU’s Response to Terrorism. URL: http://www.
euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/911-charlie-hebdo-eus-response-terrorism-311264
EUROPOL (2008, April-): EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Reports (TE-SAT). URL: https://www.europol.
europa.eu/latest_publications/37
Fairchild, Halford H. (2015, Fall): An Annotated Bibliography on Domestic Terrorism. URL: http://bernard.
pitzer.edu/~hfairchi/courses/Fall%202015/Sem%20Social/Domestic%20Terrorism%20Bib%20090115.pdf
King’s College London (2015): Homegrown Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Western Europe and
North America. (7SSWM053 Reading List). URL: https://kcl.rl.talis.com/lists/A176385C-490D-2FA1-3244DB0AD8CEC082.html
Scheinfeldt, Tom et al. (2002-): The September 11 Digital Archive: Saving the Histories of September 11, 2001.
URL: http://911digitalarchive.org
Stone, Amie (2014, July): Homeland Security: A Selected Bibliography. (U.S. Army War College Library
Bibliography). URL: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/Homeland_Security_2014.pdf
TSEC: The Terrorism and Security Experts of Canada Network (2014, May-): URL: http://tsecnetwork.
blogspot.de
ISSN 2334-3745
119
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
UK Web Archive (2005-): London Terrorist Attack 7th July 2005. URL: http://www.webarchive.org.uk/ukwa/
collection/100757/page/1
U.S. Department of State (2015): Country Reports on Terrorism 2014. URL: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/
crt/2014/index.htm
Books and Edited Volumes
Alexander, Yonah (2010): Terrorists in our Midst: Combating Foreign-Affinity Terrorism in America. Santa
Barbara: Praeger Security International.
Alexander, Yonah; Myers, Kenneth A. (Eds.): Terrorism in Europe. (Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism
and Insurgency). Abingdon: Routledge. (Original work published 1982)
Amghar, Samir; Boubekeur, Amel; Emerson, Michael (Eds.) (2007): European Islam: Challenges for Public
Policy and Society. (e-Book). Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). URL: http://www.ceps.eu/
publications/european-islam-challenges-society-and-public-policy
Argomaniz, Javier; Bures, Oldrich; Kaunert, Christian (Eds.) (2015): EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence:
A Critical Assessment. Abingdon: Routledge.
Associated Press, The (2015): The Boston Marathon Bombing: The Long Run from Terror to Renewal. New
York: Author.
Baker, Abdul Haqq (2011): Extremists in our Midst: Confronting Terror. (New Security Challenges).
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Beckman, James (2007): Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism. (Homeland
Security Series). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bell, Stewart (2005): The Martyr’s Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist. Mississauga: Wiley &
Sons Canada.
Berger, J. M. (2011): Jihad Joe: Americans who Go to War in the Name of Islam. Washington, DC: Potomac
Books.
Bleich, Erik (Ed.) (2010): Muslims and the State in the Post-9/11 West. Abingdon: Routledge.
Borgeson, Kevin; Valeri, Robin (2009): Terrorism in America. Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett.
Botha, Anneli (2008): Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism. Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies.
Charvat, J. P. I. A. G. (Ed.) (2012): Homeland Security Organization in Defence against Terrorism. (NATO
Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 97). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Chase, Alston (2003): Harvard and the Unabomber: The Education of an American Terrorist. New York: W. W.
Norton.
Clarke, James W. (2012): Defining Danger: American Assassins and the New Domestic Terrorists. (New ed.).
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
ISSN 2334-3745
120
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Cook, Alethia (2009): Emergency Response to Domestic Terrorism: How Bureaucracies Reacted to the 1995
Oklahoma City Bombing. New York: Continuum.
Coolsaet, Rik (Ed.) (2011): Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American
Experiences. (2nd ed.). Farnham: Ashgate.
de Koning, Martijn; Wagemakers, Joas; Becker, Carmen (2014): Salafisme: Utopische idealen in een
weerbarstige praktijk. Almere: Parthenon.
Emerson, Steven; Investigative Project on Terrorism, The (2006): Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant
Islam in the US. New York: Prometheus Books.
Foley, Frank (2013): Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the
Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Forest, James J. F. (Ed.) (2015): Essentials of Counterterrorism. (Praeger Security International Textbooks).
Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.
Forest, James J. F.; Howard, Russell D.; Moore, Joanne C. (2013): Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings
and Interpretations. (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gage, Beverly (2009): The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gest, Justin (2010): Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gonzalez-Perez, Margaret (2008): Women and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International
Terror Groups. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
Gumbel, Andrew; Charles, Roger G. (2012): Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed – And why it still
Matters. New York: William Morrow.
Haberfeld, M.R.; von Hassell, Agostino (Eds.) (2009): A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies,
Trajectories and Lessons Learned. New York: Springer. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0115-6
Hassaïne, Réda; Barling, Kurt (2014): Abu Hamza: Guilty: The Fight against Radical Islam. Faringdon:
Redshank Books.
Hennebry, Jenna; Momani, Bessma (Eds.) (2013): Targeted Transnationals: The State, the Media, and Arab
Canadians. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Herridge, Catherine (2011): The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda’s American Recruits. New York: Crown
Forum.
Hesterman, Jennifer L. (2015): Soft Target Hardening: Protecting People from Attack. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Hillebrand, Claudia (2012): Counter-Terrorism Networks in the European Union: Maintaining Democratic
Legitimacy after 9/11. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoffman, Bruce; Reinares, Fernando (Eds.) (2014): The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11
to Osama bin Laden’s Death. (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare). New York: Columbia
University Press.
ISSN 2334-3745
121
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Husain, Ed (2007): The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, what I Saw Inside and why I Left.
London: Penguin Books.
Katz, Samuel M. (2005): Jihad in Brooklyn: The NYPD Raid that Stopped America’s First Suicide Bombers. New
York: New American Library.
Kellner, Douglas (2008): Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the Oklahoma
City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre. (Radical Imagination Series). Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global
Terrorism Database. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
Lambert, Robert (2011): Countering Al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership. London: Hurst.
Leiken, Robert S. (2012): Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Levin, Jack (2006): Domestic Terrorism. (The Roots of Terrorism). New York: Chelsea House.
Marsh, Steve; Rees, Wyn (2012): The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Morag, Nadav (2011): Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons. Hoboken: Wiley.
Neighbour, Sally (2009): The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman’s Extraordinary Journey into Jihad.
Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
Nesser, Petter (2015): Islamist Terrorism in Europe. London: Hurst.
Neumann, Peter R. (2008): Joining al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe. (The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 48, Iss.
399). Abingdon: Routledge.
Pantucci, Raffaello (2015): “We Love Death as You Love Life”: Britain’s Suburban Terrorists. London: Hurst.
Pargeter, Alison (2008): The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. London: I.B. Tauris.
Pastor, James F. (2010): Terrorism and Public Safety Policing: Implications for the Obama Presidency. Boca
Raton: CRC Press.
Pick, Thomas M.; Speckhard, Anne; Jacuch, Beatrice (2009) (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO Science
for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Pisoiu, Daniela (2012): Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: An Occupational Change Process. (Political
Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.
Pisoiu, Daniela (Ed.) (2014): Arguing Counterterrorism: New Perspectives. (Routledge Critical Terrorism
Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
Posłuszna, Elżbieta (2015): Environmental and Animal Rights Extremism, Terrorism, and National Security.
Waltham: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Post, Don E. (2005): A Patriotic Nightmare: A Tale of Domestic Terrorism. Santa Fe: Sunstone Press.
Poynting, Scott; Whyte, David (Eds.) (2012): Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The “War on
Terror” as Terror. (Critical Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge.
ISSN 2334-3745
122
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl (2015): Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Radu, Michael (2009): Europe’s Ghost: Tolerance, Jihadism, and the Crisis in the West. New York: Encounter
Books.
Ranstorp, Magnus (Ed.) (2010): Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in
Europe. (Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge.
Rapoport, David C. (Ed.) (2006): Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science: Vol. 3: The Third or New Left
Wave. Abingdon: Routledge.
Rapoport, David C. (Ed.) (2006): Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science: Vol. 4: The Fourth or
Religious Wave. Abingdon: Routledge.
Sageman, Marc (2008): Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press.
Said, Behnam T.; Fouad, Hazim (Eds.) (2014): Salafismus: Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam. Freiburg im
Breisgau: Herder.
Schäuble, Martin (2011): Black Box Dschihad: Daniel und Sa‘ed auf ihrem Weg ins Paradies. München: Carl
Hanser.
Schäuble, Martin (2011): Dschihadisten: Feldforschung in den Milieus: Die Analyse zu “Black Box Dschihad”.
(Schriftenreihe Politik und Kultur, Vol. 12). Berlin: Hans Schiler.
Schirra, Bruno (2014): ISIS: Der globale Dschihad: Wie der „Islamische Staat“ den Terror nach Europa trägt.
Berlin: Econ.
Simcox, Robin et al. (2011): Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections. (Rev. ed.). London: Henry Jackson
Society, Centre for Social Cohesion.
Southers, Erroll (2013): Homegrown Violent Extremism. Amsterdam: Anderson Publishing.
Speckhard, Anne; Shaikh, Mubin (2014): Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18: Al Qaeda Inspired,
Homegrown, Terrorism in the West. McLean: Advances Press.
Spencer, Robert (2014): Arab Winter Comes to America: The Truth about the War We’re in. Washington, DC:
Regnery Publishing.
Storm; Morten; Cruickshank, Paul; Lister, Tim (2014): Agent Storm: My Life inside al-Qaeda. New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press.
Temple-Raston, Dina (2007): The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror.
New York: PublicAffairs.
Thomson, David (2014): Les Français jihadistes. Paris: Les Arènes.
Vohryzek-Bolden, Miki; Olson-Raymer, Gayle; Whamond, Jeffrey O. (2001): Domestic Terrorism and Incident
Management: Issues and Tactics. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
Waldmann, Peter (2009): Radikalisierung in der Diaspora: Wie Islamisten im Westen zu Terroristen werden.
Hamburg: Murmann.
ISSN 2334-3745
123
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Watts, Clint (2012, August): Radicalization in the U.S. beyond al Qaeda: Treating the Disease of the
Disconnection. (FPRI E-Books). Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). URL: http://www.
fpri.org/articles/2012/08/radicalization-us-beyond-al-qaeda
Welsh-Huggins, Andrew (2011): Hatred at Home: Al-Qaida on Trial in the American Midwest. Athens:
Swallow Press.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2005): Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Wright, Stuart A. (2007): Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing. (Cambridge Studies in
Contentious Politics). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theses
Bañez, Justin D. (2010, December): The Internet and Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism: Assessing U.S. Detection
Techniques. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://www.dtic.mil/
cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536371
Berkebile, Richard Evan (2012, December): Causes of Domestic Terrorism: 1970-2010. (Doctoral Thesis,
University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/16521
Caraig, Joanna Marie C. (2010, May): The Human Security Act of 2007 of the Philippines: Assessing the Law’s
Compliance with International Human Rights while Countering Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo,
Oslo, Norway). URL: https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/22869
Chowanietz, Christophe (2009, June): Politics in Extraordinary Times: A Study of the Reaction of Political
Parties and Elites to Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada). URL: https://
papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/3716
Coar, Kristen Rose (2013, Summer): Islamist Radicalization in the United States and the Influence of Western
Jihadist Ideologues. (Master’s Thesis, San Diego State University, San Diego, United States). URL: http://hdl.
handle.net/10211.10/4763
DeFoster, Ruth Maku (2010, May): Domestic Terrorism on the Nightly News. (Master’s Thesis, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, United States). URL: http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/93028/1/DeFoster_
Ruth_May2010.pdf
de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine H. (2014, January): Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: The
Connection between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and Terrorist Activity in the West. (Master’s Thesis, Utrecht
University, Utrecht, The Netherlands). URL: http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/290146
Everly, Macklin Keith (2014): Multicultural Public Policy and Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union.
(Master’s Thesis, Wright State University, Dayton, United States). URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/
view?acc_num=wright1409088787
Frisk, Daniel (2014, May): Poor Choices: An Empirical Study of Terrorism in Europe during the Economic
Crisis. (Master’s Thesis, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden). URL: http://fhs.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf;jsessionid=os-349ymycpqcY6JvY_w4dMUgUFPIlcSOWRSqAOk.diva2search8?pid=diva2%3A732785&dswid=4309
ISSN 2334-3745
124
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Ghatak, Sambuddha (2014, May): Challenging the State: Evaluating the Effects of Uneven Distribution of Public
Goods, Economic Globalization and Political Openness on Domestic Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, United States). URL: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2692
Green, David Benjamin (2010, November): The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Counterterrorism. (Master’s
Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: https://repository.library.georgetown.
edu/handle/10822/553502
Hayne, Spencer O. (2010, November): Borderless World, Boundless Threat: Online Jihadists and Modern
Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: http://pqdtopen.
proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/818725727.html?FMT=ABS&pubnum=1483143
Heller, David E. (2010, September): Designating Domestic Terrorist Individuals or Groups. (Master’s
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/
handle/10945/5213/10Sep_Heller.pdf
Holtgraves, Lindsey (2012): The Politics of Identity: The Roots of Radicalization and Home-Grown Terrorism
amongst Second and Third Generation Immigrants in Europe. (Master’s Thesis, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States). URL: https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/record/uuid:65b0a5f0-3ba1-4a2e-ab4a0f7ac37ecc41
Huffman, Alexia O. (2011, April): Homegrown Terrorism in the United States: Comparing Radicalization
Trajectories in Britain and America. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United
States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553516
Irwin, Travis Shane (2010, August): Social Structure and Culture: Applying Cross-National Indicators
of Criminal Violence to Domestic Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, Southern Illinois University Carbondale,
Carbondale, United States). URL: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/333
Kabatoff, Mathew Alexander Yuri (2010): Subject to Predicate Risk, Governance and the Event of Terrorism
within Post-9/11 U.S. Border Security. (Doctoral Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London, United Kingdom). URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/496
Kagioglidis, Ioannis (2009, September): Religious Education and the Prevention of Islamic Radicalization:
Albania, Britain, France and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California). URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4561
Kaupa, Clemens (2009, December): The Multi-Causal and Asynchronous Development of Terrorism Laws in
Germany from the 1970’s to the Present. (Diploma Thesis, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria). URL: http://
othes.univie.ac.at/7963
King, Michael (2012, May): The Radicalization of Homegrown Terrorists: A Social-Personality Model.
(Doctoral Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, Canada). URL: http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbinjump-full&object_id=110446&local_base=GEN01-MCG02
Lee, Belinda Yee-Wah (2012, April): Homegrown Islamic Extremism: Three Indicators of a U.S.- Targeted
Attack. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/10822/557664
ISSN 2334-3745
125
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Love, Karen (2009, April): From Deprivation to Detonation: Identity, Political Deprivation and Homegrown
Terrorism in the United Kingdom. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States).
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553267
Lundestad, Ingrid (2008, Spring): Strategies of Engagement: A Study of U.S. National Security Strategies from
the End of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism and their Implications for the Role of NATO. (Master’s Thesis,
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway). URL: http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-19686
Lypka, Andrea (2011, June): Framing 10/12 and 3/11 in American and European News. (Master’s Thesis,
University of South Florida, Tampa, United States). URL: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3222
Mabe, Matthew Steven (2013, April): Inciting Violent Jihad: Understanding the Impact and Appeal of EnglishSpeaking Radical Islamic Ideologues on International Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10822/558337
Mah, Richard (2014, Fall-Winter): Information-Sharing for Counter-Terrorism in Canada after 9/11: Issues
in the Administrative Coordination of Multi-Agency Intelligence: A Comparative Study between Canada,
the UK and Australia. (Master’s Thesis, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada). URL: http://hdl.handle.
net/1828/5862
Mason, Jonathan D. (2007): The Influence of the European Commission Data Privacy Directive on Third
Countries and the Passenger Name Record Controversy. (Master’s Thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville,
United States). URL: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0021477/00001
Mayer, Tamara M. (2009, December): Islam in America: Why U.S. Muslims are less Likely to Radicalize than
their European Counterparts. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United States). URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4487
McCallum, Neil J. (2012, March): The Justification of Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Australia and Canada
between September 17, 2001 and March 31, 2003. (Doctoral Thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia).
URL: http://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/view/rmit:160327
Miller, Warwick S. (2012, February): Homegrown Terrorism inside of Democratic States. (Master’s
Thesis, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia). URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA569742
Murthy, Arvind (2012, May): Protecting New York City from Homegrown Terrorism: The City’s Role in
Radicalization and Counter- Radicalization. (Master’s Thesis, Columbia University, New York, United States).
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:13385
Myers, Matthew Kendall (2010, March): A Tale of Two Countries: Why some British Muslims Turned to
Terrorism and French Muslims Did not. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United
States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5428
Nesser, Petter (2004): Jihad in Europe: Exploring the Sources of Motivations for Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in
Europe Post-Millennium. (Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway).
Nesser, Petter (2011): Jihad in Europe: Patterns in Islamist Terrorist Cell Formation and Behaviour, 1995-2010.
(Doctoral Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway).
ISSN 2334-3745
126
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Peery, William Joseph, III (2012, December): Lone Wolves: An Assessment of the Ideology behind Homegrown
Islamist Individual Terrorists. (Master’s Thesis, Baylor University, Waco, United States). URL: http://hdl.
handle.net/2104/8590
Robert, Emilie (2012, February): L’Etat de droit et la lutte contre le terrorisme dans l’Union européenne:
Mesures européennes de lutte contre le terrorisme suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001. (Doctoral Thesis,
University of Lille Nord de France, Lille, France). URL: http://www.theses.fr/2012LIL20001/document
Schlagheck, Heidi Michelle (2006, December): The Importance of International Law in Counter-Terrorism: The
Need for New Guidelines in International Law to Assist States Responding to Terrorist Attacks. (Master’s Thesis,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Cape Canaveral, United States). URL: http://scholar.lib.
vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12212006-142205
Simpson, Matthew Aaron (2014, August): Reanchoring Terrorism Studies: An Application of Social Movement
Theory to the Concept of Domestic Terrorism. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, United
States). URL: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/3209/rec/1683
Southers, Erroll Gregory (2013, December): Homegrown Violent Extremism: Designing a CommunityBased Model to Reduce the Risk of Recruitment and Radicalization. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, United States). URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/
p15799coll3/id/328935/rec/2849
Springer, Nathan R. (2009, December): Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs
of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in our Midst. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, United
States). URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=29620
Starr-Deelen, Donna G. (2012): United States Use of Force against Terrorism and the Threat of Terrorism:
An Analysis of the Past Four U.S. Presidents’ Use of Force to Combat International Terrorism. (Doctoral
Thesis, University of Bradford, Bradford, United Kingdom). URL: https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/
handle/10454/6309
Stott, Paul Vernon Angus (2015, April): British Jihadism: The Detail and the Denial. (Doctoral Thesis,
University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom). URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/53460
Stottlemyre, Sonia M. (2014, April): The Effect of Country-Level Income on Domestic Terrorism: A Worldwide
Analysis of the Difference between Lone-Wolf and Group Affiliated Domestic Terrorism. (Master’s Thesis,
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10822/709882
Uhlig, Christina (2015, June): Moving towards Securitization: How the Paris Attacks were Used to Justify
Extraordinary Measures. (Master’s Thesis, Linnaeus University, Växjö/Kalmar, Sweden). URL: http://lnu.
diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf;jsessionid=CHAjXQ9cuncS55p7B5eijw8G9pTjo5eWuVB9bQ2u.diva2search1?pid=diva2%3A824877&dswid=370
Vargas, Alejandro, Jr. (2011, June): Applying Psychosocial Theories of Terrorism to the Radicalization Process:
A Mapping of De La Corte’s Seven Principles to Homegrown Radicals. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, United States). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5619
Wesseling, Mara (2013, September): The European Fight against Terrorism Financing: Professional Fields and
New Governing Practices. (Doctoral Thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.397292
ISSN 2334-3745
127
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Westerhout, Thomas (2015, January): When Citizens Become Terrorists: A Within-Case Analysis of the Link
between Democracy and Domestic Terrorist Activity in Greece after Metapolitefsi. (Master’s Thesis, Leiden
University, Leiden, The Netherlands). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1887/32862
Wolfberg, William Seth (2012, October): The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization
in the United States and Europe. (Master’s Thesis, University of South Florida, Tampa, United States). URL:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4421
Zimmermann, Katie (2014, December): Terrorist Group Efforts in the Homeland and the Strategy to Combat
them. (Master’s Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, United States). URL: http://jhir.library.jhu.edu/
handle/1774.2/37312
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Abbas, Tahir (2015): Muslim Political Radicalization in the West. In: Roberto Tottoli (Ed.): Routledge
Handbook of Islam in the West. (Routledge Handbooks). Abingdon: Routledge, 272-286.
Acharya, Arabinda (2013): Group, Network or Leaderless Jihad? In: Ten Years after 9/11: Rethinking the
Jihadist Threat. (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series, Vol. 23). Abingdon: Routledge, 40-49.
Alexander, Dean C. (2012, Spring-Fall): Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Inspired,
Homegrown Terrorism in the United States. Defence Against Terrorism Review, 4(1), 31-46. URL: http://www.
coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume7/03-Al-Qaeda_and_al-QaedaintheArabian_Peninsula.pdf
Allan, Stuart (2014, August): Witnessing in Crisis: Photo-Reportage of Terror Attacks in Boston and London.
Media, War & Conflict, 7(2), 133-151. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750635214531110
Alschuler, Lawrence (2014): The Life Cycle of a British Islamist: A Jungian Perspective. Journal of Social and
Political Psychology, 2(1), 31-42. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.272
Aly, Anne (2013): The Policy Response to Home-Grown Terrorism: Reconceptualising Prevent and Resilience
as Collective Resistance. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 8(1), 2-18. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789594
Andre, Virginie (2015): Merah and Breivik: A Reflection of the European Identity Crisis. Islam and
Christian–Muslim Relations, 26(2), 183-204. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2015.1015246
Andre, Virginie; Harris-Hogan, Shandon (2013): Mohamed Merah: From Petty Criminal to Neojihadist.
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14(2), 307-319. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2013.792655
Andre, Virginie; Mansouri, Fethi; Lobo, Michele (2015): A Fragmented Discourse of Religious Leadership
in France: Muslim Youth between Citizenship and Radicalization. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 35(2),
296-313. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2015.1046743
Antonius Rachad (2013): A Mediated Relationship: Media Representations of Arabs and Muslims as a
Political Process. In: Jenna Hennebry; Bessma Momani (Eds.): Targeted Transnationals: The State, the Media,
and Arab Canadians. Vancouver: UBC Press, 110-128.
Antonius, Rachad (2015): National and Transnational Security Regimes: Canada. In: Suad Joseph (Ed.):
Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures. (Brill Online Edition). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Available
ISSN 2334-3745
128
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
from: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopedia-of-women-and-islamic-cultures/nationaland-transnational-security-regimes-canada-EWICCOM_0686
Antonius Rachad; Labelle Micheline; Rocher, François (2013): Multiculturalism and Discrimination in
Canada and Quebec: The Case of Arabs and Muslims. In: Jenna Hennebry; Bessma Momani (Eds.): Targeted
Transnationals: The State, the Media, and Arab Canadians. Vancouver: UBC Press, 89-109.
Archer, Emerald M. (2014): Crossing the Rubicon: Understanding Cyber Terrorism in the European Context.
The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 19(5), 606-621. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2014
.943495
Argomaniz, Javier (2015, June): European Union Responses to Terrorist Use of the Internet. Cooperation and
Conflict, 50(2), 250-268. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836714545690
Avella, Valerie (2006): The Domestic War on Terrorism: Fighting the Roots of Jihadist Extremism in the
United States. Defense Intelligence Journal, 15(1), 13-24.
Azzam, Maha (2007, Spring-Summer): The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and
Global Dimensions. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13(2), 123-134.
Bandyopadhyaya, Subhayu; Sandler, Todd (2014, February): Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism.
Journal of Public Economics, 110, 112-123. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.013 URL: http://
create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications//immigrationpolicyandcounterterrorism.pdf
Barbieri, Eliane Tschaen; Klausen, Jytte (2012): Al Qaeda’s London Branch: Patterns of Domestic and
Transnational Network Integration. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(6), 411-431. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/1
0.1080/1057610X.2012.675551
Bartolo, Romain (2011): Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a Global Social
Movement. Journal of Terrorism Research, 2(1). DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.173
Bartoszewicz, Monika G. (2013, June): Controversies of Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of
European Converts to Islam. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(3), 17-29. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/
pt/index.php/pot/article/view/265
Beebe, Sarah Miller; Pherson, Randolph H. (2012): Colombia’s FARC Attacks the US Homeland. In: Cases in
Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press, 155-178.
Beebe, Sarah Miller; Pherson, Randolph H. (2012): The Atlanta Olympics Bombing. In: Cases in Intelligence
Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press, 119-136.
Belarouci, Latéfa (2009): Islamism: The Process of Identity Formation. In: Thomas M. Pick; Anne Speckhard;
Beatrice Jacuch (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human
and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 3-17. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750075-9-3
Berczyk, Julia (2013): Community-Based Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Policies and the ZDK’s
“Community Coaching”. JEX, 2/2013, 100-122. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/25
Bergen, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Tiedemann, Katherine (2011): Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to
America and American Interests. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(2), 65-101. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.10
80/1057610X.2011.538830
ISSN 2334-3745
129
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Beyler, Clara (2006): The Jihadist Threat in France. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 3, 89-113. URL: http://
www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1357/current_trends_vol_3.pdf
Blackwood, Leda; Hopkins, Nick; Reicher, Stephen D. (2015, October): “Flying while Muslim”: Citizenship
and Misrecognition in the Airport. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(2), 148-170. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i2.375
Blumenau, Bernhard (2015): Taming the Beast: West Germany, the Political Offence Exception, and the
Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(2), 310330. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.806912
Brachman, Jarret M.; Levine, Alix N. (2011, Winter): You Too Can Be Awlaki! The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs, 35(1), 25-46. URL: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Fletcher-Forum/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/
Fletcher%20Forum/PDFs/2011winter/Brachman-Levine.pdf
Brandon, James (2015, August): Rise of Islamic State Reignites British Radicalization Threat. Terrorism
Monitor, 13(17), 7-10. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue17_03.
pdf
Brinson, Mary E.; Stohl, Michael (2012): Media Framing of Terrorism: Implications for Public Opinion, Civil
Liberties, and Counterterrorism Policies. Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, 5(4), 270290. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2012.713973
Brockhoff, Sarah; Krieger, Tim; Meierrieks, Daniel (2015, October): Great Expectations and Hard Times: The
(Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(7), 1186-1215.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520589
Brooks, Risa A. (2011, Fall): Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the
Threat? International Security, 36(2), 7-47. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00055 URL: http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Muslim%20Homegrown%20Terrorism%20in%20the%20United%20States.
pdf
Brown, Katherine E.; Saeed, Tania (2015): Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization at British Universities:
Muslim Encounters and Alternatives. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(11), 1952-1968. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/1
0.1080/01419870.2014.911343
Bures, Oldrich (2010): EU’s Fight against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and Unsuitable External
Models. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(3), 418-437. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550903463434
Capellan, Joel A. (2015): Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter
Events in the United States, 1970–2014. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(6), 395-413. DOI: http://dx.doi.or
g/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1008341
Carter, Jeremy G.; Carter, David L. (2012): Law Enforcement Intelligence: Implications for Self-Radicalized
Terrorism. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 13(2), 138-154. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1
080/15614263.2011.596685 URL: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/3857/Carter-2012Law-Enforcement-Intelligence.pdf
Celso, Anthony (2014): Al-Qaeda Plots and Attacks against the United States after 9/11. In: Al-Qaeda’s
Post-9/11 Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle against the Near and Far Enemy. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 159-180.
ISSN 2334-3745
130
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Celso, Anthony (2014): Al-Qaeda’s Role in the Madrid and London Bombings. In: Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11
Devolution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle against the Near and Far Enemy. New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
81-104.
Celso, Anthony (2014): Introduction: Al-Qaeda’s Post 9-11 Devolution and its Diffuse Network of
“Associates”, “Affiliates”, Insurgents, and “Homegrown” Terrorists. In: Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Devolution: The
Failed Jihadist Struggle against the Near and Far Enemy. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1-14.
Charles, Christopher A. D.; Maras, Marie-Helen (2015): Strengthening Counterterrorism from the
Information of a Successful Terrorist Attack and Failed Missions in the United States. Journal of Applied
Security Research, 10(2), 155-180. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.1004513
Chermak, Steven; Gruenewald, Jeffrey A. (2015): Laying a Foundation for the Criminological Examination
of Right-Wing, Left-Wing, and Al Qaeda-Inspired Extremism in the United States. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 27(1), 133-159. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.975646
Chin, Warren (2013): The War on the Home Front: Al Qaeda and Terrorism in the UK. In: Britain and the
War on Terror: Policy, Strategy and Operations. (Military Strategy and Operational Art). Farnham: Ashgate,
177-206.
Choi, Seung-Whan (2015): Economic Growth and Terrorism: Domestic, International, and Suicide. Oxford
Economic Papers, 67(1), 157-181. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpu036
Chuang, Angie; Roemer, Robin Chin (2013, March): The Immigrant Muslim American at the Boundary
of Insider and Outsider: Representations of Faisal Shahzad as “Homegrown” Terrorist. Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly, 90(1), 89-107. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077699012468740
Cilluffo, Frank J.; Cardash, Sharon L.; Whitehead, Andrew J. (2007, Spring-Summer): Radicalization: Behind
Bars and beyond Borders. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13(2), 113-122. URL: http://cchs.gwu.edu/
sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/HSPI_Journal_11.pdf
Crenshaw, Emlyn (2014): American and Foreign Terrorists: An Analysis of Divergent Portrayals in US
Newspaper Coverage. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(3), 363-378. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2
014.953306
Croft, Stuart; Moore, Cerwyn (2010, July): The Evolution of Threat Narratives in the Age of Terror:
Understanding Terrorist Threats in Britain. International Affairs, 86(4), 821-835. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00914.x URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/5571/1/WRAP_Croft_Evolution_
threat_narratives.pdf
Crone, Manni; Harrow, Martin (2011): Homegrown Terrorism in the West. Terrorism and Political Violence,
23(4), 521-536. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556
Dahl, Erik J. (2014): Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: The New York Police Department Model.
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 9(2), 81-97. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.
2014.940815
Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2010): Violent Radicalization in Europe: What we Know and what we do not Know.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(9), 797-814. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423
Daly, John C. K. (2014, November): Spain Grapples with Growing Islamic State Threat. Terrorism Monitor,
12(22), 7-9. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue22_03.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
131
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Daly, John C. K. (2015, February): Sweden Grapples with Rising Extremism. Terrorism Monitor, 13(3), 5-7.
URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue3_01.pdf
Dechesne, Mark; Meines, Marije (2012): What’s New about Radicalization in the Netherlands? The Rise of
Individualized Radicalization and its Policy Challenge. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward
terrorism and genocide, 5(1), 55-59. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2012.699083
Delia Deckard, Natalie; Jacobson, David (2015, September): The Prosperous Hardliner: Affluence,
Fundamentalism, and Radicalization in Western European Muslim Communities. Social Compass, 62(3),
412-433. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037768615587827 URL: http://www.academia.edu/15151488/
The_prosperous_hardliner_Affluence_fundamentalism_and_radicalization_in_Western_European_Muslim_
communities
Dienstbühl, Dorothee (2010, September): Jugendliche im Visier terroristischer Rekrutierungsarbeit:
„Homegrown-Terrorism“ und der Mythos Gottesstaat. Die Kriminalpolizei, 9/2010. URL: http://www.
kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2010/september/detailansicht-september/artikel/jugendliche-im-visierterroristischer-rekrutierungsarbeit.html
Edwards, Aaron (2011): When Terrorism as Strategy Fails: Dissident Irish Republicans and the Threat to
British Security. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(4), 318-336. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/105761
0X.2011.551720
Edwards, Jonathan J. (2015, March): Figuring Radicalization: Congressional Narratives of Homeland Security
and American Muslim Communities. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 12(1), 102-120. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2014.996168
Eijkman, Quirine (2014, August): The German Sauerland Cell Reconsidered. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(4),
82-90. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/363
Enders, Walter; Sandler, Todd; Gaibulloev, Khusrav (2011, May): Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism:
Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 319-337. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0022343311398926 URL: http://wenders.people.ua.edu/uploads/2/6/3/8/26382715/domestic_
trans_ms_final.pdf
Eroukhmanoff, Clara (2015): The Remote Securitisation of Islam in the US Post-9/11: Euphemisation,
Metaphors and the “Logic of Expected Consequences” in Counter-Radicalisation Discourse. Critical Studies
on Terrorism, 8(2), 246-265. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1053747
Fahmy, Shahira; Johnson, Thomas J. (2007): Mediating the Anthrax Attacks: Media Accuracy and Agenda
Setting during a Time of Moral Panic. Atlantic Journal of Communication, 15(1), 19-40. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/15456870701212583
Farrell, Laura C.; Littlefield, Robert S. (2012, June): Identifying Communication Strategies in Cases of
Domestic Terrorism: Applying Cultural Context to the Fort Hood Shooting. Journal of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, 9(1). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1547-7355.1949
Field, Clive D. (2011): Young British Muslims since 9/11: A Composite Attitudinal Profile. Religion, State and
Society, 39(2-3), 159-175. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.577201
ISSN 2334-3745
132
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Fodeman, Ari David (2015): Safety and Danger Valves: Functional Displacement in American Anti-Abortion
Terrorism. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7(3), 169-183. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10
.1080/19434472.2015.1021828
Freilich, Joshua D.; Chermak, Steven M.; Belli, Roberta (2014): Homegrown Terrorism in the United States.
In: Gerben Bruinsma; David Weisburd (Eds.): Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. New York:
Springer, 2336-2345.
Freilich, Joshua D. et al. (2015, September): Investigating the Applicability of Macro-Level Criminology
Theory to Terrorism: A County-Level Analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 31(3), 383-411. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10940-014-9239-0
Gad, Ulrik Pram (2012): Preventing Radicalisation through Dialogue? Self-Securitising Narratives versus
Reflexive Conflict Dynamics. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 391-407. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/175
39153.2012.723449 URL: http://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/128738210/2012b_Gad_CST_5_3_391_407_Preventing_
radicalization_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf
Gaibulloev; Khusrav; Sandler, Todd (2008, August): Growth Consequences of Terrorism in Western Europe.
Kyklos, 61(3), 411-424. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2008.00409.x URL: http://create.usc.edu/
sites/default/files/publications/growthconsequencesofterrorisminwesterneurope.pdf
Gallaher, Carolyn (2015): Contemporary Domestic Terrorism in the United States. In: Randall D. Law (Ed.):
The Routledge History of Terrorism. (The Routledge Histories). Abingdon: Routledge, 317-332.
Ganor, Boaz (2011): An Intifada in Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Processes among
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza versus Muslim Immigrants in Europe. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 34(8), 587-599. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.582629
Ghatak, Sambuddha (2014, August): Willingness and Opportunity: A Study of Domestic Terrorism in PostCold War South Asia. Terrorism and Political Violence. Advance Online Publication. DOI: http://dx.doi.or
g/10.1080/09546553.2014.902813 URL: http://www.sambuddhaghatak.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Willingness-and-Opportunity-A-Study-of-Domestic-Terrorism-in-post-Cold-War-South-Asia.pdf
Giesecke, James et al. (2014): Regional Dynamics under Adverse Physical and Behavioral Shocks: The
Economic Consequences of a Chlorine Terrorist Attack in the Los Angeles Financial District. In: Peter
Nijkamp; Adam Rose; Karima Kourtit (Eds.): Regional Science Matters: Studies Dedicated to Walter Isard.
Cham: Springer, 319-350. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07305-7_16
González, Alessandra L.; Freilich, Joshua D.; Chermak, Steven M. (2014, October): How Women
Engage Homegrown Terrorism. Feminist Criminology, 9(4), 344-366. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1557085114529809
Grewal, Harjeet (2013): Regarding the Face of Hatred: On Visions of Homegrown and Domestic Terror. Sikh
Formations: Religion, Culture, Theory, 9(3), 409-416. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448727.2013.828859
Gruenewald, Jeff; Chermak, Steven; Freilich, Joshua D. (2013, February): Distinguishing “Loner” Attacks
from other Domestic Extremist Violence: A Comparison of Far-Right Homicide Incident and Offender
Characteristics. Criminology & Public Policy, 12(1), 65-91. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12008
URL: http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/volume-12-issue-1.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
133
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Gunaratna, Rohan; Haynal, Cleo (2013, June): Current and Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The
Case of the Boston Bombings. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(3), 44-63. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.
com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/267
Hafez, Mohammed; Mullins, Creighton (2015): The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of
Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(11), 958-975. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375
Haglund, David G. (2012): Orders and Borders: Unipolarity and the Issue of Homeland Security. Canadian
Foreign Policy Journal, 18(1), 9-25. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2012.674383
Haglund, David G.; Lauzon, Dru (2014): “Homegrowns” in North America: The Changing Face of Radical
Islamism, and its Implications for Canada–United States Relations. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 20(3),
Harris-Hogan, Shandon (2013): Anatomy of a Terrorist Cell: A Study of the Network Uncovered in Sydney in
2005. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 5(2), 137-154. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
19434472.2012.727096
Harris-Hogan, Shandon (2014): The Importance of Family: The Key to Understanding the Evolution
of Jihadism in Australia. Security Challenges, 10(1), 31-49. URL: http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/
ArticlePages/vol10no1Harris-Hogan.html
Hegghammer, Thomas (2013, February): Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western
Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. American Political Science Review, 107(1), 1-15.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000615 URL: http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_
Should_I_stay_or_should_I_go.pdf
Hegghammer, Thomas; Nesser, Petter (2015, August): Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking
the West. Perspectives on Terrorism, 9(4), 14-30. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/440
Hellmich, Christina (2014): Reply to Christine Sylvester, “Terrorwars: Boston, Iraq”: An Examination of
Differences between Counter-Terrorism and War as Seen through the Iraqi Experience of Occupation.
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(3), 472-478. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.953307
Hellmuth, Dorle (2015, August): Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism. Advance Online Publication. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076277
Hellmuth, Dorle (2015, Fall): Countering Jihadi Radicals and Foreign Fighters in the United States and
France: Très Similaire. Journal for Deradicalization, 4, 1-43. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/
article/view/24/
Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie (2015): Viewing Jihadism as a Counterculture: Potential and Limitations.
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7(1), 3-17. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472
.2014.977326 URL: https://counterideology2.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/jihadism-as-counter-culture.pdf
Henderson, James R. (2009, Winter): Home-Grown Jihadism and the Factors of Terror.
Yale Journal of International Affairs, 4(1), 59-71. URL: http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/01/094105henderson.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
134
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Herrington, Lewis (2015, January): British Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Declining Significance of AlQaeda and Pakistan. International Affairs, 91(1), 17-35. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12184
Hesterman, Jennifer L. (2013): Domestic Terrorism and the Homegrown Threat. In: The Terrorist-Criminal
Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups. Boca Raton: CRC
Press, 93-132.
Hildebrand, Sean (2015, May): Coerced Confusion? Local Emergency Policy Implementation after
September 11. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 12(2), 273-298. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1515/jhsem-2014-0054
Hinkkainen, Kaisa (2013, August): Homegrown Terrorism: The Known Unknown. Peace Economics, Peace
Science and Public Policy, 19(2), 157-182. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/peps-2012-0001
Hinkkainen, Kaisa (2014): A Comparative Analysis of Homegrown Terrorism. In: Raul Caruso; Andrea
Locatelli (Eds.): Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective. (Contributions to Conflict
Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 22). Bingley: Emerald, 193-216.
Hirschmann, Kai (2010, August): Fanatiker in unserer Mitte: Das Phänomen der “Homegrown Jihadsts”. KAS
Auslandsinformationen, 8/2010, 21-43. URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.20257
Hoffman, Bruce (2007, Spring-Summer): Terrorism in the West: Al-Qaeda’s Role in “Homegrown” Terror.
The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13(2), 91-99.
Hoffman, Bruce (2009, June): Covering the Waterfront: The Continuing, Myriad Threats from both LeaderLed and Leader-Less Terrorism. inSITE, 2(6), 3-6. URL: http://sitemultimedia.org/docs/inSITE_June_2009.
pdf
Hoffman, Bruce (2010, April): Connecting the Dots of Americans Joining the Jihad. inSITE, 2(11), 6-10.
URL: http://sitemultimedia.org/docs/inSITE_April_2010.pdf
Hoffman, Bruce (2010, July): Al-Qaeda’s Continuing Threat to the Homeland: “Diversity Is Definitely the
Word”. inSITE, 2(12), 6-9. URL: http://sitemultimedia.org/docs/inSITE_July_2010.pdf
Hörnqvist, Magnus; Flyghed, Janne (2012): Exclusion or Culture? The Rise and the Ambiguity of the
Radicalisation Debate. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 319-334. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.
2012.717788
Jongman, Albert J. (Berto) (2009): Radicalisation and Deradicalisation: Dutch Experiences. In: Thomas
M. Pick; Anne Speckhard; Beatrice Jacuch (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO Science for Peace and
Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 32-50. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-32
Jordan, Javier (2014): The Evolution of the Structure of Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of
Spain. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(8), 654-673. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921770
URL: http://www.ugr.es/~jjordan/Jihadist-Terrorism-Spain.pdf
Kamolnick, Paul (2014, December): Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism?
A Case Study of Ideological Contradictions. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(6), 36-62. URL: http://www.
terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/390
ISSN 2334-3745
135
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Kana, Rozila; Dore, Rupert (2014-15, Winter): Countering Radicalisation across Europe: The Pioneering
ISDEP Project. Journal for Deradicalization, 1, 23-25. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/
view/3
Karagiannis, Emmanuel; McCauley, Clark (2006): Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a
Radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2), 315-334. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550600570168
Kaunert, Christian; Léonard, Sarah (2011): EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy:
An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(2), 286-309. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/09546553.2010.538276
Khosrokhavar, Farhad (2013): Radicalization in Prison: The French Case. Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14(2),
Kim, MoonSun; de Guzman, Melchor C. (2012): Police Paradigm Shift after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: The
Empirical Evidence from the United States Municipal Police Departments. Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical
Journal of Crime, Law and Society, 25(4), 323-342. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2012.707014
King, Michael; Taylor, Donald M. (2011): The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of
Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(4), 602-622. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.587064
Kirby, Aidan (2007): The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and
the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(5), 415-428. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/10576100701258619
Kitchen, Veronica M.; Molnar, Adam (2015): The Promise and Perils of Integrated Models of Public Safety
in Canada. In: Martin Bouchard (Ed.): Social Networks, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Radical and
Connected. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 175-195.
Kleinmann, Scott Matthew (2012): Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United States:
Comparing Converts and Non-Converts. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(4), 278-297. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656299
Knapton, Holly Melissa (2014, March): The Recruitment and Radicalisation of Western Citizens: Does
Ostracism Have a Role in Homegrown Terrorism? [Literature Review] Journal of European Psychology
Students, 5(1), 38-48. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/jeps.bo
Kohlmann, Evan F. (2008, July): “Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest
Front. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 95-109. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317203
Komen, Maria M. (2014, Spring): Homegrown Muslim Extremism in the Netherlands: An Exploratory Note.
Journal of Strategic Security, 7(1), 47-53. URL: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss1/5/
Kowalski, Jeremy D. (2013): “Framing” the Toronto 18: Government Experts, Corporate Media, and the
Orientalizing of the Other. In: Jenna Hennebry; Bessma Momani (Eds.): Targeted Transnationals: The State,
the Media, and Arab Canadians. Vancouver: UBC Press, 129-156.
ISSN 2334-3745
136
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Krueger, Alan B. (2008, December): What Makes a Homegrown Terrorist? Human Capital and Participation
in Domestic Islamic Terrorist Groups in the U.S.A. Economics Letters, 101(3), 293-296. DOI: http://doi.
org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.09.008
LaFree, Gary; Bersani, Bianca E. (2014, August): County-Level Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the United
States. Criminology & Public Policy, 13(3), 455-481. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12092 URL:
http://criminology.fsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/Volume-13-Issue-3.pdf
LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): International and Domestic Terrorism. In: Putting Terrorism
in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon:
Routledge, 146-172.
LaFree, Gary; Dugan, Laura; Miller, Erin (2015): The Spatial Distribution of Terrorism around the World
and in the United States. In: Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism Database.
(Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 49-69.
Lambert, Robert (2008, January): Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London
Counterterrorism Case Study. PS: Political Science & Politics, 41(1), 31-35. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S1049096508080049
Lambert, Robert (2009): Police and Muslim Communities in London: Countering Al-Qaida Influence and
Islamophobia. In: Thomas M. Pick; Anne Speckhard; Beatrice Jacuch (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO
Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press,
51-73. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-51
Lebl, Leslie (2014, Summer): The Islamist Threat to European Security. Middle East Quarterly, 21(3). URL:
http://www.meforum.org/3837/the-islamist-threat-to-european-security
Lehrke, Jesse Paul; Schomaker, Rahel (2014): Mechanisms of Convergence in Domestic Counterterrorism
Regulations: American Influence, Domestic Needs, and International Networks. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 37(8), 689-712. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921769
Leuprecht, Christian; Hataley, Todd; Skillicorn, David B. (2013): Cross-Border Terror Networks: A Social
Network Analysis of the Canada–US Border. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 5(2),
Levin, Brian (2015, November): The Original Web of Hate: Revolution Muslim and American
Homegrown Extremists. American Behavioral Scientist, 59(12), 1609-1630. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0002764215588815
Lindekilde, Lasse (2012): Introduction: Assessing the Effectiveness of Counter-Radicalisation Policies in
Northwestern Europe. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 335-344. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.
2012.723522
Lindner, Evelin G. (2009): The Relevance of Humiliation Studies for the Prevention of Terrorism. In: Thomas
dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-163 URL: http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/evelin/
PreventionofTerrorismBudapest08.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
137
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Lischin, Luke (2013, Spring): Assessing the Terrorist Threat: The Primacy of Domestic Terrorism. The Journal
on Terrorism and Security Analysis, 8, 46-59. URL: http://satsa.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013Journal-on-Terrorism-and-Security-Analysis.pdf
Lombardi, Marco (2015): Violent Radicalization Concerns in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. In: Marco
Lombardi et al. (Eds.): Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism.
(NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 118). Amsterdam: IOS
Press, 83-100. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-470-1-83
Malmström, Cecilia (2013): EU versus Extremism: Europe must Respond to the Threat of Radicalisation,
before it Turns even more Violent. JEX, 2/2013, 1-3. URL: http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/
view/17
Malreddy, Pavan Kumar (2014): Domesticating the “New Terrorism”: The Case of the Maoist Insurgency in
India. The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 19(5), 590-605. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1084877
0.2014.943529
Malthaner, Stefan (2014): Contextualizing Radicalization: The Emergence of the “Sauerland-Group” from
Radical Networks and the Salafist Movement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(8), 638-653. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.921767
Maras, Marie-Helen (2014): Homeland Security. In: The CRC Press Terrorism Reader. Boca Raton: CRC Press,
123-134.
Maras, Marie-Helen (2014): International and Domestic Terrorism. In: The CRC Press Terrorism Reader. Boca
Raton: CRC Press, 27-46.
Maras, Marie-Helen (2014): Regional Focus on Terrorism. In: The CRC Press Terrorism Reader. Boca Raton:
CRC Press, 181-244.
Martin, C. (Clarence) Augustus (Gus) (2014): Domestic Terrorism in the United States. In: Essentials of
Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 181-206.
Martin, C. (Clarence) Augustus (Gus) (2014): Homeland Security. In: Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and
Controversies. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 233-260.
McCoy, John; Knight, W. Andy (2015): Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends.
Mcdonald, Laura Zahra (2011): Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its
Implications for Security. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 177-189. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/096374
94.2011.584712
McGilloway, Angela; Ghosh, Priyo; Bhui, Kamaldeep (2015): A Systematic Review of Pathways to and
Processes Associated with Radicalization and Extremism amongst Muslims in Western Societies. [Literature
Review]. International Review of Psychiatry, 27(1), 39-50. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/09540261.2014.992
008
Mellen, Cyndi (2012): When Harry Met Salafi: Literature Review of Homegrown Jihadi Terrorism. [Literature
Review]. Journal of Applied Security Research, 7(2), 239-252. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2012.6
56257
ISSN 2334-3745
138
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Michael, Lucy (2011): Islam as Rebellion and Conformity: How Young British Pakistani Muslims in the UK
Negotiate Space for and against Radical Ideologies. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 209-227. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2011.584752
Michaelsen, Christopher (2010): Australia and the Threat of Terrorism in the Decade after 9/11. Asian
Journal of Political Science, 18(3), 248-268. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2010.527212
Mohamed, Feisal G. (2007, Winter): The Globe of Villages: Digital Media and the Rise of Homegrown
Terrorism. Dissent, 54(1), 61-64. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/dss.2007.0033
Mueller, John; Stewart, Mark G. (2015): Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Internet: The American Cases.
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide, 8(2), 176-190. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/17467586.2015.1065077
Mullins, Sam (2007): Home-Grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications. Perspectives on Terrorism, 1(3). URL:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/12
Mullins, Sam (2011): Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the “Home-Grown”
Threat. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(2), 254-285. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.53571
7
Mullins, Sam (2013): “Global Jihad”: The Canadian Experience. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(5), 734776. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.693552
Mythen, Gabe (2012): “No one Speaks for us”: Security Policy, Suspected Communities and the Problem of
Voice. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 409-424. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723519
Napps, Cameron; Enders, Walter (2015): A Regional Investigation of the Interrelationships between
Domestic and Transnational Terrorism: A Time Series Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 26(2), 133151. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.893705 URL: http://time-series.net/yahoo_site_admin/
assets/docs/NappsEnders01282014.4175604.pdf
Nash, Rebecca; Bouchard, Martin (2015): Travel Broadens the Network: Turning Points in the Network
Trajectory of an American Jihadi. In: Martin Bouchard (Ed.): Social Networks, Terrorism and CounterTerrorism: Radical and Connected. (Contemporary Terrorism Studies). Abingdon: Routledge, 61-81.
Nesser, Petter (2008): Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared,
and Executed Terrorist Attacks. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(10), 924-946. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/10576100802339185 URL: http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/
subsites/cir/pdf-filer/chronology.pdf
Nesser, Petter (2011): Ideologies of Jihad in Europe. Terrorism and Political Violence, 23(2), 173-200. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.537587
Nesser, Petter (2014): Toward an Increasingly Heterogeneous Threat: A Chronology of Jihadist Terrorism in
Europe 2008-2013. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(5), 440-456. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/105761
0X.2014.893405
Nesser, Petter (2015): Appendix: Chronology of Jihadism in Europe 1994-2015. In: Islamist Terrorism in
Europe. London: Hurst. URL: http://www.hurstpublishers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IslamistTerrorism-in-Europe-Appendix-1.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
139
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Nesser, Petter; Stenersen, Anne (2014, December): The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(6), 2-24. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/
view/388
Neumann, Peter R. (2006): Europe‘s Jihadist Dilemma. Survival, 48(2), 71-84. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/00396330600765518
Neumann, Peter R. (2013): Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States.
URL: https://counterideology2.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/options-n-strategies-for-countering-onlineradicalization-in-the-us.pdf
Nischler, Christiane (2009, June): „Home-Grown“: Terrorismus und Radikalisierungspotenziale in
Deutschland: Hintergründe und präventive Ansätze aus polizeilicher Sicht. Die Kriminalpolizei, 9/2009. URL:
http://www.kriminalpolizei.de/ausgaben/2009/juni/detailansicht-juni/artikel/home-grown.html
Olsson, Peter A. (2013, Summer): Homegrown Terrorists, Rebels in Search of a Cause. Middle East Quarterly,
20(3), 3-10. URL: http://www.meforum.org/3539/homegrown-terrorists
O’Toole, Therese; DeHanas, Daniel Nilsson; Modood, Tariq (2012): Balancing Tolerance, Security and
Muslim Engagement in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the “Prevent” Agenda. Critical Studies on
Terrorism, 5(3), 373-389. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.725570
Qvortrup, Matt; Lijphart, Arend (2013): Domestic Terrorism and Democratic Regime Types. Civil Wars,
Pantucci, Raffaello (2008, October): Operation Praline: The Realization of Al-Suri’s Nizam, la Tanzim?
view/59
Pantucci, Raffaello (2015): Innovation and Learning in the British Jihad. In: Magnus Ranstorp; Magnus
Normark (Eds.): Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and beyond. (Political
Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 213-231.
Pantucci, Raffaello (2015, January): Britain’s Terror Threat from the Levant. CTC Sentinel, 8(1), 14-17. URL:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Sentinel-January-2015-vol-8-issue-116.pdf
Pantucci, Raffaello (2015, August): Al-Muhajiroun’s European Recruiting Pipeline. CTC Sentinel, 8(8), 21-24.
URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue811.pdf
Pearson, Elizabeth (2015, September): The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online
Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad. Policy & Internet. Advance Online Publication. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/poi3.101
per Concordiam Staff (2015): The Risk from Returnees. per Concordiam, 6(2), 60-63. URL: http://
perconcordiam.com/perCon_V6N2_Eng.pdf
Perkins, Brian M. (2015, March): Following the Peshawar School Attack, Pakistan Moves against
Domestic Terrorism. Terrorism Monitor, 13(5), 5-7. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/
TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue5_02.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
140
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Perlmutter, Dawn (2004): Domestic Terrorist Religions. In: Investigating Religious Terrorism and Ritualistic
Crimes. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 45-82.
Pick, Thomas M. (2009): Societal Fit and Radicalisation: Poorly Managed Absorption of Immigrants and
Poor Fit between the Society of Origin and the Host Society as Predisposing Factors to Radicalisation. In:
Thomas M. Pick; Anne Speckhard; Beatrice Jacuch (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO Science for Peace
and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 207-226. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-207
Pisoiu, Daniela (2013): Coming to Believe “Truths” about Islamist Radicalization in Europe. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 25(2), 246-263. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.659361
Pitcavage, Mark (2015, November): Cerberus Unleashed: The Three Faces of the Lone Wolf Terrorist.
American Behavioral Scientist, 59(13), 1655-1680. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764215588817
Post, Jerrold M.; Sheffer, Gabriel (2007, Spring-Summer): The Risk of Radicalization and Terrorism in U.S.
Muslim Communities. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13, 101-112.
Powers, Samuel Tyler (2015, January): Expanding the Paradigm: Countering Violent Extremism in Britain
and the Need for a Youth Centric Community Based Approach. Journal of Terrorism Research, 6(1), 19-26.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1074
Prager, Fynnwin et al. (2011): Exploring Reductions in London Underground Passenger
Journeys Following the July 2005 Bombings. Risk Analysis, 31(5), 773-786. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01555.x URL: http://create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
exploringreductionsinlondonundergroundpassengerjourneysfollowingthejuly2005bombings_0.pdf
Pratt, Douglas (2015): Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,
Pratt, Douglas (2015): Reactive Co-Radicalization: Religious Extremism as Mutual Discontent. Journal for the
Academic Study of Religion, 28(1), 3-23. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/jasr.v28i1.26800
Probst, Peter S. (2009): Political Warfare, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Targeting of America. In: Thomas
dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-127
Ramsay, Gilbert A.; Marsden, Sarah V. (2015): Leaderless Global Jihadism: The Paradox of Discriminate
Violence. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5), 579-601. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1032
408
Reinares, Fernando (2010): The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism. Survival, 52(2), 83-104. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764629 URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1073/The%20Madrid%20
Bombings%20and%20Global%20Jihadism
Roex, Ineke (2014, June): Should we be Scared of all Salafists in Europe? A Dutch Case Study. Perspectives on
Terrorism, 8(3), 51-63. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/346
Roy, Abhra; Paul, Jomon Aliyas (2013, December): Terrorism Deterrence in a Two Country Framework:
Strategic Interactions between R&D, Defense and Pre-Emption. Annals of Operations Research, 211(1), 399432. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1431-3
ISSN 2334-3745
141
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio; de la Calle, Luis (2013): Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political
Violence. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 31-49. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
polisci.12.031607.094133
Sandler, Todd (2010): Terrorism Shocks: Domestic versus Transnational Responses. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 33(10), 893-910. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.508485 URL: http://create.usc.
edu/sites/default/files/publications//terrorismshocks-domesticversustransnationalresponses.pdf
Santifort, Charlinda; Sandler, Todd; Brandt, Patrick T. (2013, January): Terrorist Attack and Target
Diversity: Changepoints and their Drivers. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 75-90. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0022343312445651 URL: http://create.usc.edu/sites/default/files/publications//terroristattackand
targetdiversity-changepointsandtheirdrivers.pdf
Scahill, Timothy (2006, Spring): The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: A Glimpse into a PostPATRIOT Act Approach to Combating Domestic Terrorism. CR: The New Centennial Review, 6(1), 69-94.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2006.0024
Schuurman, Bart; Eijkman, Quirine; Bakker, Edwin (2014, June): The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning
its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network. Terrorism and Political Violence. Advance
Online Publication. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.873719
Schuurman, Bart; Eijkman, Quirine; Bakker, Edwin (2014, August): A History of the Hofstadgroup.
view/362
Schuurman, Bart et al. (2014, August): Operation Pendennis: A Case Study of an Australian Terrorist Plot.
view/364
Sedgwick, Mark (2012, December): Jihadist Ideology, Western Counter-Ideology, and the ABC Model.
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 359-372. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723520
Shipler, David K. (1988): Future Domestic and International Terrorism: Media Perspective. Terrorism, 11(6),
543-545. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576108808435752
Shterin, Marat; Spalek, Basia (2011): Muslim Young People in Britain and Russia: Intersections of Biography,
Faith and History. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 145-154. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.201
1.605926
Simcox, Robin; Dyer, Emily (2013, March): The Role of Converts in Al-Qaìda-Related Terrorism
Offenses in the United States. CTC Sentinel, 6(3), 20-24. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss32.pdf
Skillicorn, David B.; Leuprecht, Christian; Winn, Conrad (2012, December): Homegrown Islamist
Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey. Canadian Journal of Political Science,
45(4), 929-956. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423912001023 URL: http://post.queensu.ca/~leuprech/
docs/articles/Skillicorn_Leuprecht_%20Winn_2012_Homegrown%20Islamist%20Radicalization%20in%20
Canada_Process%20Insights%20from%20an%20Attitudinal%20Survey_Canadian%20Journal%20of%20
Political%20Science.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
142
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Skjoldager, Morten (2015): Terrorists Lack Imagination when Choosing Targets in Denmark. In: Magnus
Ranstorp; Magnus Normark (Eds.): Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and beyond.
(Political Violence). Abingdon: Routledge, 232-250.
Sole, Jeff (2015, June): Under the Microscope: Abuse of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Determination
System. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, 7(5), 4-9. URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/CTTA-June-2015.pdf
Sorell, Tom (2011): Preventive Policing, Surveillance, and European Counter-Terrorism. Criminal Justice
Ethics, 30(1), 1-22. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2011.559057
Southers, Erroll G. (2015): Homegrown Violent Extremism. In: Robert J. Bunker et al. (Eds.):
Counterterrorism: Bridging Operations and Theory. (Terrorism Research Center Book). (e-Book).
Bloomington: iUniverse.
Spalek, Basia (2011): “New Terrorism” and Crime Prevention Initiatives Involving Muslim Young People in
the UK: Research and Policy Contexts. Religion, State and Society, 39(2-3), 191-207. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/1
0.1080/09637494.2011.577202
Speckhard, Anne (2009): The Militant Jihad in Europe: Fighting Home-Grown Terrorism. In: Thomas
dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-60750-075-9-143
Stan, Mariana (2010): Islamic Terrorism in Europe. In: Hans-Liudger Dienel et al. (Eds.): Terrorism and
the Internet: Threats – Target Groups – Deradicalisation Strategies. (NATO Science for Peace and Security
Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 67). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 41-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.3233/978-1-60750-537-2-41
Sylvester, Christine (2014): Let’s not Jump (over) the Guns: Response to Christina Hellmich. Critical Studies
on Terrorism, 7(3), 479-483. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.960212
Sylvester, Christine (2014): TerrorWars: Boston, Iraq. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(1), 11-23. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.881202
Taarnby, Michael (2007): Understanding Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. In: Magnus Ranstorp
(Ed.): Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction. (Political Violence). Abingdon
Routledge, 164-186.
Torelli, Stefano Maria (2015, May): The Jihadist Threat in Italy. Terrorism Monitor, 13(11), 6-7. URL: http://
www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue11_02.pdf
Torok, Robyn (2010): “Make a Bomb in your Mums Kitchen”: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of “White
Moors” and Home Grown Jihadists. In: Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University (Ed.): Proceedings
of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Duxton Hotel, Perth, Western
Australia, November 30–December 2, 2010, 54-61. URL: http://igneous.scis.ecu.edu.au/proceedings/2010/
actc/torok.pdf
van Buuren, Jelle; de Graaf, Beatrice (2014): Hatred of the System: Menacing Loners and Autonomous Cells
in the Netherlands. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(1), 156-184. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553
.2014.849932
ISSN 2334-3745
143
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Van San, Marion (2015): Striving in the Way of God: Justifying Jihad by Young Belgian and Dutch Muslims.
Veldhuis, Tinka M.; Lindenberg, Siegwart (2012): Limits of Tolerance under Pressure: A Case Study of
Dutch Terrorist Detention Policy. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 425-443. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.108
0/17539153.2012.723518 URL: http://lindenberg.academiaworks.com/articles/2012%20Veldhuis%20&%20
Lindenberg%20Limits%20of%20tolerance%20under%20pressure.pdf
Vermeulen, Floris (2014): Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies
of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(2), 286-306. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.705254 URL: http://www.wageningenur.nl/upload_mm/b/0/
b/4e8bcaed-f74d-41a5-b4e3-d5d41effd102_4d162e2c-9f13-483f-998f-fb1874bb82e0_Understanding%20
radicalisation%20%28III%29%20-%20Floris%20Vermeulen%2024%20march%202015.pdf
Viano, Emilio C. (2015): Investigating and Preventing Terrorism in Multicultural Urban Settings: Is a
Balanced Approach Possible? In: Marco Lombardi et al. (Eds.): Countering Radicalisation and Violent
Extremism among Youth to Prevent Terrorism. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and
Societal Dynamics, Vol. 118). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1-10. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-4701-1
Vidino, Lorenzo (2007): The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 30(7), 579-592. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701385933
Vidino, Lorenzo (2008, August): A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands.
CTC Sentinel, 1(9), 12-16. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CTCSentinelVol1Iss9.pdf
Vidino, Lorenzo (2009): Europe’s New Security Dilemma. The Washington Quarterly, 32(4), 61-75. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01636600903224100 URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09octobervidino.pdf
Vidino, Lorenzo (2009): Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and
Occasional Phenomenon? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(1), 1-17. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/10576100802564022
Vidino, Lorenzo (2012): Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional
Phenomenon? In: John Horgan; Kurt Braddock (Eds.): Terrorism Studies: A Reader. Abingdon: Routledge,
469-484.
Vidino, Lorenzo (2013, November): The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise in Homegrown Radicals. CTC
Sentinel, 6(11-12), 17-20. URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CTCSentinelVol6Iss11-12.pdf
Vidino, Lorenzo (2015, April): Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy. Perspectives on
Terrorism, 9(2), 2-16. URL: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/415
Wallace, Don, Jr. et al. (2015, March): Europe: Quo Vadis? Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives.
Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base, 4(2). URL: http://www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org/
seminar-reports/europe-quo-vadis
Weinberg, Leonard (2014): The Islamic State and American National Security. Democracy and Security, 10(4),
ISSN 2334-3745
144
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Weine, Stevan et al. (2013): Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism. Democracy and
Security, 9(4), 327-333. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.766131
Weinhauer, Klaus (2012): Religiös motivierter Terrorismus in der europäischen Diaspora: Transnationale
Netzwerke, lokale Kleingruppen, Medienkommunikation. In: Klaus Weinhauer; Jörg Requate (Eds.): Gewalt
ohne Ausweg? Terrorismus als Kommunikationsprozess in Europa seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am
Main: Campus, 301-316.
Wilner, Alex S.; Dubouloz, Claire-Jehanne (2010, February): Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative
Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization. Global Change, Peace & Security,
22(1), 33-51. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956
Youngs, Gillian (2010, July): The “New Home Front” and the War on Terror: Ethical and Political Reframing
of National and International Politics. International Affairs, 86(4), 925-937. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-2346.2010.00920.x URL: https://www.e-education.psu.edu/drupal6/files/sgam/virtual_space/
thenewhomefront.pdf
Zammit, Andrew (2013): Explaining a Turning Point in Australian Jihadism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
36(9), 739-755. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.813264
Zegart, Amy (2015, Summer): Insider Threats and Organizational Root Causes: The 2009 Fort Hood Terrorist
Attack. Parameters, 45(2), 35-46. URL: http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/
Summer_2015/7_Zegart.pdf
Zelin, Aaron Y. (2015, March-April): New Zealand’s Jihadis. New Zealand International Review, 40(2), 13-17.
URL: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/nziemarch-april2015-new-zealands-jihadis-by-aaron-zelin.
pdf
Zhou, Yilu et al. (2005): US Domestic Extremist Groups on the Web: Link and Content Analysis. IEEE
Intelligent Systems, 20(5), 44-51. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2005.96
Zuhur, Sherifa (2009): Decreasing Violence in Saudi Arabia and beyond. In: Thomas M. Pick; Anne
Speckhard; Beatrice Jacuch (Eds.): Home-Grown Terrorism. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E:
Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 60). Amsterdam: IOS Press, 74-98. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/9781-60750-075-9-74
Grey Literature
Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) (2014, September): The Transformation of Jihadism in
the Netherlands: Swarm Dynamics and New Strength. (Report). URL: https://www.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd_nl/
documenten/publicaties/2014/06/30/the-transformation-of-jihadism-in-the-netherlands/jihadisme_eng_
definitief_b5_formaat_webversie.pdf
Antonius, Rachad (2009): The Perceptions in Arab and Muslim Communities of Security Trials in Canada.
(Research Report for the Ministry of Justice Canada). URL: http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/spip.php?article9444
Atran, Scott et al. (2009, August): Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization: Understanding
the Evolution of Ideas and Behaviors, how they Interact and how they Describe Pathways to Violence in
Marginalized Diaspora. (ARTIS Case Studies). URL: http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/ARTIS_
Theoretical_Frames_August_2009.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
145
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Bakker, Edwin; de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine (2015, October): Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon
in Western Europe: A Low-Probability, High-Impact Threat. (ICCT Research Paper). URL: http://icct.nl/
publication/jihadist-foreign-fighter-phenomenon-in-western-europe-a-low-probability-high-impact-threat
Bakker, Edwin; Donker, Teije Hidde (2006, December): Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and
the Circumstances in which they Joined the Jihad: An Exploratory Study. (Clingendael Security Paper). URL:
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/jihadi-terrorists-europe-their-characteristics-and-circumstanceswhich-they-joined-jihad
Bergen, Peter et al. (2014, September): 2014: Jihadist Terrorism and other Unconventional Threats. (Bipartisan
Policy Center Report). URL: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/2014-jihadist-terrorism-and-otherunconventional-threats
Bigo, Didier et al. (2014, April): Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU. (Study
for the LIBE Committee, PE 509.977). URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2014/509977/IPOL-LIBE_ET%282014%29509977_EN.pdf
Bjelopera, Jerome P. (2011, June): Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress. (CRS Report for Congress R40901). URL: http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/166837.pdf
Bjelopera, Jerome P. (2013, January): American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. (CRS Report
for Congress R41416). URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf
Bjelopera, Jerome P. (2014, February): Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. (CRS Report for
Congress R42553). URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf
Bjelopera, Jerome P. (2015, June): Sifting Domestic Terrorism from other Illegal Activity. (CRS Insights
IN10299). URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/IN10299.pdf
Briggs, Rachel; Fieschi, Catherine; Lownsbrough, Hannah (2006): Bringing it Home: Community-Based
Approaches to Counter-Terrorism. (Demos Report). URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Bringing%20it%20
Home%20-%20web.pdf
Briggs, Rachel; Silverman, Tanya (2014, December): Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Responding
to the Threat. (ISD Research Paper). URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2784_Western_foreign_
fighters_V7_WEB.pdf
Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (2014, June): Homegrown Terrorism: Causes and
Dimensions. (COE-DAT Activity Report). URL: http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/workshop_
reports/02-Homegrown_Terrorism_Workshop_Report.pdf
Cohen, J. Richard (2015, July): The Rise of Radicalization: Is the U.S. Government Failing to Counter
International and Domestic Terrorism? Testimony presented before the Committee on Homeland Security,
United States House of Representatives, 1st Session, 114th Congress. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
HM/HM00/20150715/103739/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-CohenJ-20150715.pdf
Cooper, Barry (2013, February): Homegrown Jihadists and the Evolution of al-Qaeda. (CDFAI Policy Paper).
URL: http://www.cdfai.org.previewmysite.com/idevicepapers/HomegrownJihadists.htm
Crone, Manni; Harrow, Martin (2010): Homegrown Terrorism in the West, 1989-2008. (DIIS Working Paper
2010:30). URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/56264/WP2010_30_homegrown_terrorism_web.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
146
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Engebrethsen Smith, Tuva Julie (2015, Spring): Islamic Radicalization in Norway: Preventative Actions. (ICT
Articles). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1339/Islamic-Radicalization-in-Norway
Fenstermacher, Laurie et al. (Eds.) (2010, January): Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic
Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs
for Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement. (Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment [SMA] MultiAgency / Air Force Research Laboratory Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support of Counter-Terrorism
and Counter-WMD). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/U_Counter_
Terrorism_White_Paper_Final_January_2010.pdf
Fleisher, Blake (2015, Spring): Islamic Radicalization in New Jersey. (ICT Articles). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/
Article/1369/Islamic-Radicalization-in-New-Jersey
Frampton, Martyn (2010): The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism. (ICSR Policy Report).
URL: http://icsr.info/2010/11/return-of-the-militants-violent-dissident-republicanism
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Grossman, Laura (2009, April): Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. (FDD Study). URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/
media-hit/homegrown-terrorists-in-the-us-and-uk/
General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) ; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
(NCTV) (2015, September): Salafism in the Netherlands: Diversity and Dynamics. (Report). URL: https://
english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2015/09/24/salafism-in-the-netherlands-diversity-and-dynamics
Gill, Paul et al. (2015, November): What Are the Roles of the Internet in Terrorism? Measuring Online
Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists. (VOX-Pol Report). URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf
Global Center on Cooperative Security; Human Security Collective (HSC); International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT) (2014, December): Addressing the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon from a European
Union Perspective. (ICCT Policy Brief). URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/addressing-theforeign-terrorist-fighters-phenomenon-from-a-european-union-perspective
Gruenewald, Jeff et al. (2014, June): Violence Perpetrated by Supporters of al-Qa’ida and Affiliated Movements
(AQAM): Fatal Attacks and Violent Plots in the United States. (START Report to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/violence-perpetrated-supporters-al-qaida-and-affiliated-movements-aqam-fatal-attacks-0
Gruenewald, Jeff et al. (2015, February): Validation of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)
Initiative: Identifying Suspicious Activities from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and the American
Terrorism Study (ATS). (START Report to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). URL: http://www.
start.umd.edu/publication/validation-nationwide-suspicious-activity-reporting-sar-initiative-identifying
Hahn, Gordon M. (2014, April): Assessing Terrorism in the Caucasus and the Threat to the Homeland.
Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. Congress, on April 3, 2014. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
HM/HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-HahnG-20140403.pdf
Hasan, Usama (2014, April): USA vs. Babar Ahmad. USA vs. Syed Talha Ahsan. (Quilliam Expert Witness &
Personal Testimony). URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/
expert-witness-statement-usama-hasan-150414.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
147
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Hedayah et al. (2015): Guidelines and Good Practices for Developing National CVE Strategies. URL: http://
www.hedayah.ae/pdf/guidelines-and-good-practices-for-developing-national-cve-strategies.pdf
Jenkins, Brian Michael (2010): Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United
States since September 11, 2001. (RAND Occasional Papers, OP-292-RC). URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/
occasional_papers/OP292.html
Jenkins, Brian Michael (2014): When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners
Returning from Syria and Iraq. (RAND Perspectives, PE-130-1-RC). URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/
perspectives/PE130-1.html
Jenkins, Brian Michael (2015, March): Containing Middle East Terror: Measures to Reduce the Threat Posed
by Foreign Fighters Returning from Syria and Iraq. (RAND Testimonies, CT-427). URL: http://www.rand.org/
pubs/testimonies/CT427.html
Jenkins, Brian Michael (2015, March): There Will Be Battles in the Heart of your Abode: The Threat Posed by
Foreign Fighters Returning from Syria and Iraq. (RAND Testimonies, CT-426). URL: http://www.rand.org/
pubs/testimonies/CT426.html
Kean, Thomas H. et al. (2014, July): Today’s Rising Terrorist Threat and the Danger to the United States:
Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of The 9/11 Commission Report. (Bipartisan Policy Center Report). URL:
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/rising-terrorist-threat-9-11-commission
Kis-Katos, Krisztina; Liebert, Helge; Schulze, Günther G. (2010, September): On the Origin of Domestic and
International Terrorism. (University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy, Discussion
Paper Series, No. 12). URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/fre/wpaper/DP12_kiskatos-liebert-schulze_
dom-intl-terror.pdf
Klausen, Jytte (2010, September): Al Qaeda-Affiliated and “Homegrown” Jihadism in the United Kingdom,
1999-2010. (ISD Research Report). London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD).
Kuchins, Andrew C. (2014, April): Terrorism in the Caucasus. Testimony presented before the House
Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, U.S. Congress,
on April 3, 2014. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05Wstate-KuchinsA-20140403.pdf
Kühle, Lene; Lindekilde, Lasse (2010, January): Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus. (CIR
Research Report). URL: http://cir.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/radicalization_
aarhus_FINAL.pdf
Kurzman, Charles (2013, February): Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining further. (Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security Report). URL: http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/11/Kurzman_
Muslim-American_Terrorism_final2013.pdf
Kurzman, Charles (2014, February): Muslim-American Terrorism in 2013. (Triangle Center on Terrorism and
Homeland Security Report). URL: http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_
Terrorism_in_20131.pdf
Kurzman, Charles (2015, February): Terrorism Cases Involving Muslim-Americans, 2014. (Triangle Center
on Terrorism and Homeland Security Report). URL: http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_
Terrorism_Cases_Involving_Muslim-Americans_2014.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
148
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Landau, Edan (2012, May): “And Inspire The Believers”. (ICT Articles). URL: http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/
tabid/66/Articlsid/1074/currentpage/1/Default.aspx
Leahy, Peter (2014, October): Another Century, another Long War. (ASPI Strategic Insights, No. 75). URL:
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/another-century,-another-long-war
Lebl, Leslie S. (2014, May): Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (SSI Monographs). URL: http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1206
Levitt, Matthew (Ed.) (2015, April): From the Boston Marathon to the Islamic State: Countering Violent
Extremism. (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus, No. 139; Stein Counterterrorism
Lectures, Vol. 6). URL: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/from-the-boston-marathonto-the-islamic-state-countering-violent-extremism
Maher, Shiraz; Frampton, Martyn (2009, March): Choosing our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with
Muslim Groups. (Policy Exchange Report). URL: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publications/category/
item/choosing-our-friends-wisely-criteria-for-engagement-with-muslim-groups?category_id=24
Malet, David (2015, July): What does the Evidence Tell us about the Impact of Foreign Fighters on Home-Grown
Radicalisation? (PACCS Briefing). URL: http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/malet-foreign-fightershome-grown-radicalization
Manning, Ruth; La Bau, Courtney (2015, August): “In and Out of Extremism”: How Quilliam Helped 10
Former Far-Right and Islamists Change. (Quilliam Report). URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/in-and-out-of-extremism.pdf
Margolin, Ephraim (2015, Summer): Islamic Radicalization in California. (ICT Articles). URL: http://www.ict.
org.il/Article/1444/Islamic-Radicalization-in-California
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander (2011, September): As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became
the Face of Western Jihad. (ICSR Policy Report). URL: http://icsr.info/2011/09/as-american-as-apple-piehow-anwar-al-awlaki-became-the-face-of-western-jihad
Miller, Erin; Kammerer, William (2015, July): Use of Firearms in Terrorist Attacks in the United States 19702014. (START Background Report). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/use-firearms-terroristattacks-united-states-1970-2014
Miller, Erin; Smarick, Kathleen (2014, July): Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States. (START
Research Highlight). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-perpetrators-terrorism-unitedstates-research-highlight
Mulligan, John (2015, June): n.t. Testimony presented at the Hearing before the House Homeland Security
Committee “Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond”, June 3, 2015. URL: http://
docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150603/103513/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-MulliganJ-20150603.pdf
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) (2014, December): Global Jihadism:
Analysis of the Phenomenon and Reflections on Radicalisation. (Report). URL: https://english.nctv.nl/Images/
globaljihadism-uk-webversie_tcm92-575175.pdf
Nelson, Rick “Ozzie”; Bodurian, Ben (2010, March): A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown”
Extremism in the United States. (CSIS Report). URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_Nelson_
GrowingTerroristThreat_Web.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
149
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Nesser, Petter (2004, April): Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in PostMillennium Europe. (FFI/RAPPORT-2004/01146). URL: http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/04-01146.pdf
Neumann, Peter R. (2011, June): Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. (Bipartisan Policy Center
Report). URL: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf
Neumann, Peter R. et al. (2007, December): Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement
in Europe. (King’s College London Study carried out for the European Commission). URL: http://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf
Oftedal, Emilie (2015, January): The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe. (FFI-rapport 2014/02234).
URL: http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf
O’Neil, Siobhan (2007, May): Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress. (CRS Report for
Congress, RL34014). URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34014.pdf
Page, Jacqueline (2014, September): The “Home Game”: Countering Violent Extremism within NATO. (NATO
Research Paper No. 104). URL: http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=711
Pandith, Farah (2015, July): The Rise of Radicalization: Is the U.S. Government Failing to Counter International
and Domestic Terrorism? Testimony presented before the Committee on Homeland Security, United
States House of Representatives, 1st Session, 114th Congress. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/
HM00/20150715/103739/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-PandithF-20150715.pdf
Peil, Florian (2012, October): “Inspire”: Das Jihad-Magazin für die Diaspora. In: Guido Steinberg (Ed.):
Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Perspektive. (SWP-Studien, 2012/S 23). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, 32-44. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/
article/jihadismus_und_internet.html
Phillips, Peter J. (2014, December): Terrorism Perpetrated by Individuals in the United States and Canada.
URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262106
Precht, Tomas (2007, December): Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: From
Conversion to Terrorism. (Research Report Funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice). URL: http://www.
justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/2011/2007/
Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_
factors__2_.pdf
Pregulman, Ally; Burke, Emily (2012, April): Homegrown Terrorism. (CSIS AQAM Futures Project Case
Study Series, No. 7). URL: http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism
Quiggin, Tom (2014, May): The Muslim Brotherhood in North America (Canada/USA): Version 1.0. (TSEC
Network Report). URL: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6tM70447biiTmotZUF0MWV0Nnc/edit
Quilliam Foundation (2010, October): Radicalisation on British University Campuses: A Case Study. (Quilliam
Briefing Paper). URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/
radicalisation-on-british-university-campuses.pdf
Quilliam Foundation (2014, August): The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK. (Quilliam Submission to the
National Security Secretariat, United Kingdom). URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/publications/free/the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-uk2.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
150
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Rasmussen, Nicholas J. (2015, February): Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign
Fighters and Homegrown Terror. Testimony presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security,
February 11, 2015. URL: http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Countering_Violent_Islamist_Extremism.pdf
Roggio, Bill (2014, April): Assessing Terrorism in the Caucasus and the Threat to the Homeland. Testimony
presented before the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism
and Intelligence, U.S. Congress, on April 3, 2014. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/
HM05/20140403/102041/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-RoggioW-20140403.pdf
Russell, Jonathan; Theodosiou, Alex (2015, July): Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7. (Quilliam
Report). URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counterextremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf
Schanzer, David; Kurzman, Charles; Moosa, Ebrahim (2010, January): Anti-Terror Lessons of MuslimAmericans. (Duke University / University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Research Project Report). URL:
https://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/1255
Schmid, Alex P. (2013, March): Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual
Discussion and Literature Review. (ICCT Research Paper). URL: http://icct.nl/publication/radicalisation-deradicalisation-counter-radicalisation-a-conceptual-discussion-and-literature-review
Schmid, Alex P. (2015, October): Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues. (ICCT
Policy Brief). URL: http://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighter-estimates-conceptual-and-data-issues
Silber, Mitchell D.; Bhatt, Arvin (2007): Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. (NYPD Report).
URL: http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.
pdf
Simcox, Robin (2014, May): American Links to Jihadist Combat Abroad. (Henry Jackson Society Briefing).
URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2014/05/30/american-links-to-jihadist-combat-abroad
Simcox, Robin (2015, September): “We will Conquer your Rome”: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in
the West. (The Henry Jackson Society Report). URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2015/09/29/we-willconquer-your-rome-a-study-of-islamic-state-terror-plots-in-the-west-2
Simcox, Robin; Dyer, Emily (2013): Al-Qaeda in the United States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses.
(Henry Jackson Society Report). URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/AlQaeda-in-the-USAbridged-version-LOWRES-Final.pdf
Sinkkonen, Teemu (2015, January): War on Two Fronts: The EU Perspective on the Foreign Terrorist Fighters of
ISIL. (FIIA Briefing Paper 166). URL: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/470/war_on_two_fronts
Slootman, Marieke W.; Tillie, Jean N. (2006, October): Processes of Radicalisation: Why some Amsterdam
Muslims become Radicals. (IMES Report). URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11245/2.80473
Steinbach, Michael B. (2015, June): n.t. Testimony presented at the Hearing before the House Homeland
Security Committee “Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond”, June 3, 2015.
URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150603/103513/HHRG-114-HM00-WstateSteinbachM-20150603.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
151
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Stuart, Hannah (2014, September): British Jihadists: Preventing Travel Abroad and Stopping Attacks at Home.
(CRT Policy Paper No. 1). URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2014/09/12/british-jihadists-preventingtravel-abroad-and-stopping-attacks-at-home
Stuart, Hannah (2014, September): Disrupting Extremists: More Effective Use of Existing Legislation. (CRT
Policy Paper No. 3). URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2014/09/25/disrupting-extremists-more-effectiveuse-of-existing-legislation
Taylor, Francis X. (2015, June): Statement for the Record. Testimony presented at the Hearing before the
House Homeland Security Committee “Terrorism Gone Viral: The Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond”,
June 3, 2015. URL: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150603/103513/HHRG-114-HM00Wstate-TaylorF-20150603.pdf
Thachuk, Kimberley L.; Bowman, Marion E. “Spike”; Richardson, Courtney (2008, May): Homegrown
Terrorism: The Threat within. (CTNSP Defense and Technology Papers). URL: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA482139
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) (2008, May):
Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat. (HSGAC Majority & Minority
Staff Report). URL: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) (2012,
February): Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat of
Homegrown Terrorism. (HSGAC Majority & Minority Staff Report). URL: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL%20REPORT(1).pdf
Vidino, Lorenzo (2009, December): The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland. (ARI Paper
171/2009). URL: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI171-2009
Vidino, Lorenzo (2011): Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe.
(RAND Occasional Papers, OP-333-OSD). URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP333.html
Vidino, Lorenzo (2013, November): Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland. (CSS Study). URL: https://edit.
ethz.ch/fsk/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=2752
Vidino, Lorenzo; Hughes, Seamus (2015, June): Countering Violent Extremism in America. (Program
on Extremism Report). URL: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20
America%20.pdf
Weine, Stevan; Ahmed, Osman (2012, August): Building Resilience to Violent Extremism
among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul. (START Report to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security). URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_
BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf
Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2004): Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam. (Rhodes College Research
Paper). URL: http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Wiktorowicz.Joining-the-Cause.pdf
ISSN 2334-3745
152
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Note
Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been
provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories or
on author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please
note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published
versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might, therefore, not have passed through all editorial stages publishers
employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only
be cited after getting consent by the author(s).
About the compiler: Judith Tinnes, Ph.D., studied Information Science and New German Literature and
Linguistics at the Saarland University (Germany). Her doctoral thesis dealt with Internet usage of Islamist
terrorists and insurgents. Currently, she works in the research & development department of the Leibniz Institute
for Psychology Information (ZPID). She also serves as an Editorial Assistant for Perspectives on Terrorism.
ISSN 2334-3745
153
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
IV. Book Reviews
Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 40 Books on Terrorism &
Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects
Reviewed by Joshua Sinai
This column consists of capsule reviews of recent books from various publishers.
Rajeev Bhattacharyya, Rendezvous With Rebels: Journey to Meet India’s Most Wanted Man (Noida, Uttar
Pradesh, India: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2014), 328 pp., US $ 5.80 – US $ 12.86 [Paperback], ISBN:
978-9351363163.
This is a fascinating and well-informed account by a prominent Indian journalist, of his several-months’
long risky journey (with another fellow journalist) to visit rebel bases in eastern Nagaland in Myanmar, from
where Indian separatist insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK) and the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) launch their cross-border operations into India. These visits entailed extensive
interviews with the leaders and operatives of these groups, especially those associated with the UPPK. The
author concludes that prospects for peaceful resolution of these separatist insurgencies depend on improved
cooperation between the Indian and Myanmar governments on these issues and increased acceptance
of the primacy of the sovereignty of Assam within the context of the northeast “as the core issue” of such
negotiations (p. 291).
Gerhard Bowering (Ed.) Islamic Political Thought: An Introduction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2015), 304 pp., US $ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 9780691164823.
The contributors to this edited volume present a comprehensive overview of the origins and evolution
of Islamic political thought from the birth and rise of Islam in the seventh century to the current period.
Following the editor’s introductory overview, the chapters cover topics such as the role of authority and
governance in Islam (particularly in the aftermath of the Prophet Muhammad’s life), for instance, as
expressed in the concept of the Caliphate; the Quran as Islam’s ‘holy book’; the roles of Shari’a (religious law)
and the ulama (the body of religious scholars) in society; how the religion views different forms of jihad
(e.g., how they are expressed internally and externally); how Islam regards women and minorities; and the
nature of the relations between Islamic fundamentalism, revival and reform, and modernity. As an overview
of these components of Islamic political thought, most of the chapters are authoritatively and clearly written.
The chapter on “Modernity” by Armando Salvatore, however, is one of the book’s weakest, as it is filled with
academic jargon that makes little sense to those who understand the components of modernity, such as
his conclusion that “the significance of Islamic globalism at the present stage of entanglement of multiple
modernities might support the decoupling of modernization from Westernization and a reconstruction
of modernity along specific civilizational paths conforming to their foundational images, symbols, and
discursive patterns….The growing Islamic focus on transnational interconnectedness transcends a
Eurocentric modernist approach to modernity confined within the rationale of nation-states or of new
aggregations thereof, like the European Union” (p. 150).
ISSN 2334-3745
154
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
James Defronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements [5th edition] (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
2015), 520 pp., US $ 50.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 9780813349244.
This textbook is a comprehensive and interesting account of important political revolutions in the 20th and
21st centuries, based on a conceptual framework for each case that examines “the significance of factors that
appear necessary to the success of all revolutions,” how individual revolutionary conflicts played out, and
“the history and unique social characteristics generating the essential revolution-promoting factors.” (p. 5)
Beginning with an introductory overview of social movements and revolutions, case studies are presented
of the revolutions in Russia and Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran (and Islamic
Fundamentalism), South Africa, what the author terms as ‘democratic revolutions’ in Venezuela and Bolivia,
and the Arab revolutions in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. The concluding
chapter presents comparisons between the case studies, a critique of certain prominent theories of revolution,
and prospects for the future. Each case study concludes with references for further readings, including
selected film documentaries.
Phil Gurski, The Threat From Within: Recognizing Al Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism In The West
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 162 pp., US $ 75.00 [Hardcover], US $ 32.00 [Paperback], ISBN:
978-1-4422-5560-9.
This is an interesting conceptual and empirical examination of the pathways of radicalization into
terrorism in Western countries, with a special focus on al Qaida type groupings and the lone wolves they
inspire, including those that operate in Canada. The author, a recently retired veteran analyst in Canadian
intelligence, is well positioned to discuss these issues, including the application of practical methodologies
to analyze them. The book is divided into five chapters: the first chapter examines the key conceptual
drivers, ranging from socio-economic backgrounds and psychological characteristics to physical venues
(such as religious institutions, schools, the Internet, and foreign conflict zones) that underlie radicalization
into terrorism; the second chapter presents key concepts from Islam and Muslim history that characterize
al Qaida-type narratives that help to shape an “extremist mindset”; the third chapter discusses what the
author considers to be 12 key behaviors and attitudes that characterize those that embark on such violent
radicalization (such as intolerant religiosity, rejection of Western ways and policies, and obsession with
violent jihad and martyrdom); the fourth chapter summarizes major Canadian cases of al Qaida-inspired
terrorism since 9/11 (including the “Toronto 18” and Canadian Somalis);while the fifth chapter discusses
the author’s recommendations for effective counter-extremism and counter-terrorism strategies. Although
the book was written before the emergence to prominence of the Islamic State (IS/ISIL) as the most lethal
expression of al Qaida-type Jihadist terrorism facing Western countries, the author’s excellent analysis also
can serve to understanding and countering it better.
Bill Harlow (Ed.), Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Study of Its Detention and
Interrogation Program (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 392 pp., US $ 16.95 [Paperback], ISBN:
978-1-59114-587-5.
This book is a rebuttal by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its former top officials to what they
considered to be inaccuracies in the 6,000-page report issued in December 2014 by the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), which was highly critical of the CIA’s detention and interrogation of al
Qaida terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11. The volume is divided into three sections: short rebuttal articles by
eight of the CIA’s former top officials, including George J. Tenet, Porter Goss and General (Retired) Michael
ISSN 2334-3745
155
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
V. Hayden; the official CIA response (with classified details redacted); and the Minority Report issued by the
SSCI’s Republican Senators. This volume is an important and indispensable contribution to understanding
the factors underlying the detention and interrogation component in America’s counterterrorism campaign
in response to al Qaida’s horrific attacks in 9/11 and its aftermath.
Larissa Van Den Herik and Nico Schrijver (Eds.), Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International
Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 798 pp., US $ 155.00
[Hardcover], US $ 49.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1107025387.
The contributors to this edited volume, who are prominent legal scholars from around the world, examine
the roles and applications of international legal instruments in enhancing the legal basis for governments’
counterterrorism measures. With acts of terrorism defined as “criminal” in nature, the book is divided into
three parts: improving international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts, the
legal basis for the use of force against terrorists, and the intersection between international human rights
law and international humanitarian law in counter-terrorism. An Annex provides the “Leiden Policy
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law.”
Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of
Terrorism (New York, NY: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015), 108 pp., www.economicsandpeace.org.
This third edition of the Global Terrorism Index provides a comprehensive summary of the key global
trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 15 years, with a special emphasis on 2014. The monograph
consists of key summary findings on terrorism trends, the economic cost of terrorism, and correlates and
drivers of terrorism (such as the presence of political violence, the nature of a country’s safety and security
environment, pervasive lack of respect for human rights, with different drivers operating in wealthier than
in poorer countries). Among the report’s numerous findings is that terrorism has continued its escalatory
trajectory, with the total number of fatalities from terrorism reaching 32, 685 in 2014, constituting an 80
percent increase from 18, 111 the previous year. The top ranked countries in terms of their fatalities from
terrorism in 2014 are (in order): Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, India, Yemen, Somalia, Libya,
and Thailand. In another interesting ranking, the report finds that the most lethal terrorist groups during
the period of 2010-2014 were Boko Haram, ISIL, the Taliban, al-Shabaab, and another Nigerian group,
the Fulani militant group. In terms of the economic cost of countering terrorism, the report finds that the
United States “accounts for 70 percent of total global spending on national security agencies.” (p. 64) The
report also includes contributions from other experts, who discuss issues such as a portrait of the Islamic
State (IS) and the challenges and opportunities of measuring terrorism. The Annex includes an explanation
of the methodology used in formulating the Index. The report is produced by the Institute for Economics
and Peace, based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is collected by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland,
College Park.
William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 256 pp., US $ 26.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1250080905.
This book examines the “religious fervor, strategic calculation, and doomsday prophesy” that play a role in
shaping the Islamic State’s (also known as IS, ISIL or ISIS) terrorist warfare and global ambitions. Despite
the book’s relatively short length: some 160 pages of text, 20 pages of appendices, and 50 pages of detailed
ISSN 2334-3745
156
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
footnotes, its use of primary sources in Arabic, such as ancient Islamic texts and al Qaida and Islamic State
documents (some of which are included in the appendices) and the author’s expertise on these issues, make it
a highly authoritative examination that will be indispensable to those interested in understanding the nature
of this group and its ever widening areas of operation.
Farish A. Noor, The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation (Amsterdam, The
Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press/Distributed by The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 280 pp., US
$ 99.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-90-8964-576-0.
This is a highly detailed and comprehensive examination of the origins and evolution of the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (PAS) from its establishment in 1951 until the current period. The author concludes that
“the viability of the various discourses within PAS, and the viability of PAS itself as a party, depend on
the structural-economic circumstances that may or may not allow Islamism to present itself as a genuine
alternative to the dominant paradigms of capital-driven development and the modern postcolonial nationstate” (p. 239). Such insights also apply to other Islamist-based parties around the world that attempt to
capture state power against their secular competitors through an electoral process.
Thomas Small and Jonathan Hacker, Path of Blood: The Story of Al Qaeda’s War on the House of Saud (New
York, NY: The Overlook Press, 2015), 480 pp., US$ 32.50 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1468310603.
An interesting account, based on the authors’ investigative reporting, of al Qaida’s ambition to attack and
undermine the Saudi Arabian regime, which it claims has no religious legitimacy to rule over Mecca and
Medina, the two holiest places in Islam. Al Qaida also hopes that by conquering the birthplace of Islam, it
would succeed in re-establishing a Muslim Caliphate (Empire) that would stretch worldwide. With al Qaida
‘Central’ and its affiliate Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continuing to target Saudi Arabia,
whether through cells in the Kingdom itself or from its bases in Yemen, and the Saudi-led military campaign
against al Qaida’s forces and Shi’ite tribes in Yemen, the accounts presented in this book are especially
pertinent. The authors are prominent British documentary producers and experts on the Middle East.
Brian Stewart and Samantha Newbery, Why Spy? The Art of Intelligence (London, England: Hurst
& Company/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 288 pp., US $ 29.95 [Hardcover], ISBN:
9781849045131.
This is a highly informative examination of why governments engage in espionage and how intelligence
products impact on policy-making. The book is based primarily on Brian Stewart’s extensive practitioner
work in British intelligence. Following an introductory overview that includes a definition of intelligence
terms, the book is divided into four parts: case studies of British intelligence operations in which Mr.
Stewart was involved such as the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, Vietnam, and China; a discussion
of the organization and methodology of intelligence; prominent cases of intelligence failures, such as Pearl
Harbor, Cuba (in terms of the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis in the early 1960s), and Iraq (the intelligence
imbroglio over the supposed weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein’s regime); and the use of “noninformation” gathering intelligence operations in the form of special operations, deception operations and
assassination.
ISSN 2334-3745
157
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, (Eds.), Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2015), 246 pp., US $ 155.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781138018174.
The contributors to this edited volume, which is part of the discipline of “Critical Terrorism Studies,”
examine the important topic of how the academic fields of terrorism and conflict resolution can be
harnessed to inform each other to more effectively resolve terrorist conflicts rather than let them continue
protracted and unresolved. This objective is attempted through the first part’s discussion of the theoretical
underpinnings of both fields (chapters 2-5) and the second part’s case studies (chapters 6-11). As is the
case with other volumes in “Critical Terrorism Studies”, this attempt is marred by the authors’ over-use of
academic jargon in their writings. Examples include the following: “the ontological and epistemological
status of security,” “the dysfunctionality of the liberal peace and the opportunities offered by post-liberal…
peacebuilding frameworks” (p. 2); “The lack of reflexivity on the ontological status of its central concepts
and assumptions is a serious obstacle, and one that is largely the consequence of the domination of the
field’s positivist orientation” (p. 8); and, rather astonishingly, arguing that, in terms of a supposed similarity
between Islamist ‘networks and groups’ and their Western counterparts, “there is very little to separate neoMarxist, postmodern and post-Gramscian approaches from the ideological underpinnings of al-Qaeda and
similar Islamist and jihadist groups.” (p. 8) For those inclined to follow such academic jargon, the volume’s
conceptual chapters will be of interest, although some of the case studies on the conflicts in Colombia, the
Basque region in Spain, and Northern Ireland, do provide insight that will benefit all readers.
Lorenzo Bosi, Charles Demetriou and Stefan Malthaner, Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented
Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2014), 320 pp.,
US$ 134.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4094-4351-3.
The contributors to this edited volume examine the processes in which terrorist type violence emerges,
escalates, and, in some cases, declines, by focusing on “the recurring causal patterns that shape trajectories
of radicalization.” (p. 2) The book is divided into four parts: the dynamics that lead to violent conflict in the
interaction between oppositional movements/groups and the state; the dynamics that lead to conflictual
intra-movement interactions (such as in the cases of Northern Ireland in 1968-1969 and the South African
Liberation Movement); the dynamics that lead to the transformation of social movements (such as the
Islamization of Palestinian nationalism); and the dynamics of transnational diffusion (such as the role of the
Anarchist Diaspora in radicalizing the insurgent opposition in Franco’s Spain, and the diffusion of political
violence in Europe in the 1968 protest revolts in Turkey, Paris, and elsewhere over the Arab-Israeli conflict).
In an interesting chapter, Ekaterina Stepanova, of the Institute of the World Economy and International
Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia, discusses the evolution of al Qaida-type terrorism which makes
possible a “post-Qaeda” configuration, since it is not dependent on ‘networks’ with its “actor-oriented
approach and the mobilizing potential of its extremist ideology providing it with asymmetrical advantages
over its more powerful state adversaries”. The concluding chapter by Martha Crenshaw, of Stanford
University, provides an excellent discussion of the volume’s main findings.
ISSN 2334-3745
158
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Kathleen Gleeson, Australia’s ‘War on Terror’ Discourse (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 286 pp, US$ 134.96
[Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4724-1985-9.
Using Australia as its primary case study, this book is an interesting textual examination of how politicians
in such a representative democracy “justify their policy decisions” in countering terrorism. The post 9/11
period of 2001 until the end of Prime Minister John Howard’s government in November 2007 serves as the
primary time period for the textual examination, although other relevant periods in Australian history are
discussed as well. Expressions of dissent against government counter-terrorism policies are also examined.
The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s key findings and argues for a “less dangerous path” in
counterterrorism political discourse than the one employed by the Howard government, with a focus on
why terrorist acts, such as 9/11 were committed, accompanied by increased use of “consultation and open
dialogue between many nations” in crafting response measures, all the while respecting and preserving “civil,
legal and human rights and uphold[ing] democratic principles” (pp. 231-232).
Rebecca Richards, Understanding Statebuilding: Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), 228 pp., US $ 107.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-47242589-8.
This book’s objective is to provide a framework for conceptualizing what the author terms “acceptable
statehood” within the overall context of externally-led state-building in what are considered fragile and
failing states. Using Somaliland as the primary case study, the author attempts to demonstrate that by
assuming “local ownership and legitimacy” (especially through the incorporation of clan-based politics)
Somaliland has succeeded, at least to a certain extent, along the path of a viable state-building process, while
Somalia itself is riven by internal strife.
Joseph Cirincione, Nuclear Nightmares: Security the World Before It Is Too Late (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2013), 280 pp., US $ 26.95 [Hardcover], US $ 18.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 9780231164047.
This is a well-argued account of the threats presented, as the author explains, by “the current global arsenal of
some 17,000 nuclear weapons and the risk of their use, whether by accident or design”(p. 1). Also discussed
are issues such as the spread of nuclear proliferation and the cost of such weapons. The book discusses
which countries possess the largest nuclear arsenals, and, among them, who poses the greatest danger. It also
addresses future trends in nuclear proliferation, the damage caused by nuclear detonations, and international
efforts to reduce and eliminate these threats. With regard to the possibility of a terrorist group’s acquisition of
a nuclear weapon, the author writes that this is of major concern since “terrorists could acquire an assembled
nuclear warhead or enough fissile material to construct a bomb,” and that militant groups in Pakistan “have
staged major attacks on military bases, including ones suspected of housing nuclear weapons” (p. 121).
Charity Scribner, After the Red Army Faction: Gender, Culture, and Militancy (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2015), 312 pp., US $ 50.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9780231168649.
This is an interesting account of what the author terms “post-militant culture – the charged field of literature,
art, and criticism that responds to militancy and political violence,” which, in this case, is applied to analyzing
the long-lasting impact of the Red Army Faction during and following its period of operations in Germany
from the 1970s to the 1990s.
ISSN 2334-3745
159
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2015), 272 pp., US $ 45.00
[Hardcover], ISBN: 9780231170000.
This is a provocative account of what the authors term “the ambiguities and dissonances – the puzzles
and enigmas – in the contemporary appreciation and practices of counterinsurgency: an idea that in the
first decade of the twenty-first century assumed a prominent position in Western military and strategic
thought.” (pp. ix-x) Although one may argue that this discussion overlooks a large body of literature on
counterinsurgency (COIN), the authors do make a valid point that some of the writings on COIN are “highly
ideological in orientation,” and tend “to mythologize the past, distort historical understanding, ignore
contingency, and obscure complexity…” (pp. 182-183).
Tal Jonathan-Zamir, David Weisburd and Badi Hasisi (Eds.), Policing in Israel: Studying Crime Control,
Community Policing, and Counterterrorism (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 263 pp., US $ 79.96
[Hardcover], ISBN: 9781498722568.
The contributors to this volume are prominent Israeli criminologists. They examine three significant aspects
of policing in Israel: crime control (e.g., analyzing crime “hot spots”, measures to ensure road safety, and the
impact of the organization of the criminal justice system on crime rates); police and community (e.g., the
relationship between the police and minority communities, such as Israeli Arabs); and policing terrorism,
with the Israeli police also responsible for maintaining internal security. Also discussed is media coverage of
police performance, including in confronting terrorism. Although the Israeli police has recently experienced
several high-profile scandals involving financial corruption and mismanagement of criminal cases, it is hoped
that the installation of Roni Alsheikh, the former deputy head of the General Security Service (Shin Bet) as
Police Commissioner, will restore the type of efficient policing that is so well discussed in this important volume.
David Lowe, Policing Terrorism: Research Studies into Police Counterterrorism Investigations (Boca Raton, FL:
CRC Press, 2016), 203 pp., US $ 71.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781482226836.
Written by a former British counterterrorism detective, this highly useful practitioner-focused book
is divided into two sections on policing terrorism. The first section, “The Law Governing Terrorism
Investigations,” addresses issues such as how terrorism is legally defined, government policies and statutory
preventative measures against terrorism, the need to balance the interests of national security and individual
civil liberties in conducting surveillance and information sharing on terrorist suspects and how terrorism
is funded. The volume also includes a comparative study of how terrorism-related laws are applied in a
number of states. The second section, “Investigating Terrorism,” discusses issues such as the need for police
officers to understand the levels of legal powers granted them to track the radicalization of individuals into
terrorism. The volume also discusses how to recruit and handle informants, including when it comes to court
presentations.
Elena Mastors, Breaking Al-Qaeda: Psychological and Operational Techniques [2nd edition], (Boca Raton, FL:
CRC Press, 2014), 241 pp., US $ 55.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781482230116.
This book is a comprehensive examination of the types of psychological and operational techniques that are
effective in countering and defeating the terrorist threats presented by al Qaida and its affiliates. The author,
a former U.S. government intelligence analyst and currently an academic, is well positioned to analyze
ISSN 2334-3745
160
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
these issues. In this new edition (the 1st dates from 2010), the author discusses the magnitude of the threats
presented by al Qaida, including its motivation and the socio-demographic background of its operatives; the
measures introduced by the U.S. government after 9/11 to counter al Qaida in the form of the establishment
of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Patriot Act to upgrade surveillance and
arrest capabilities. The remaining chapters discuss the nature of intelligence collection against terrorism; the
use of psychological influence techniques to undermine terrorist propaganda; understanding the nature of
terrorist leadership, including their personal characteristics, their operating environment, their reliance on
“advisers”, and their “information” environment; how to break terrorist groups by identifying their fissure
points, security vulnerabilities, competition over internal resources that can be exploited; and the use by
governments of psychology-based information campaigns to weaken terrorist groups on the individual,
group, and intra-terrorist group levels.
Malcolm W. Nance, The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraqi Insurgency 2003-2014
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 404 pp., US $ 59.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1498706896.
With the resumption of the civil war in Iraq following the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in December
2011, this book is an important contribution to understanding the strategy and tactics being employed
by the al Qaida/Islamic State insurgency and the measures required in response to defeat them. In this
comprehensive and detailed account, the author discusses the nature of the insurgency; the groups that
compose it (ranging from al Qaida to the Islamic State); their strategy, tactics, internal organization, and
weaponry; and the nature of the foreign volunteers that have joined their forces – all the components that
need to be considered in formulating effective countermeasures.
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb (Eds.) Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 312 pp., US $ 55.96 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4822-4765-7.
The contributors to this volume examine the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency in all its
dimensions. This ranges from a discussion of how to conceptualize insurgencies, counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, to analyzing case studies of insurgencies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Indonesia,
Mali, Burma, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Also analyzed are various types of insurgencies such as those
marked by a “nexus” between crime and terrorism, and global insurgencies by groups such as al Qaida and
its affiliates. The volume’s chapters are accompanied by numerous illustrations, tables, and chronologies of
incidents, making it a valuable textbook.
Arabinda Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? (London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2015),
312 pp., US $ 115.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1783263899.
This is a comprehensive and well-organized account of the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia since
the October 2002 Bali bombings, which were carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaida’s regional affiliate.
Utilizing a differentiated approach to analyze the region’s terrorist-based conflicts, the book’s chapters
examine topics such as the relationship between Islamist militancy and terrorism, the maritime dimensions
of terrorism as well as the responses to terrorism by individual states and regional organizations. Among the
author’s well-informed conclusions is the following insight: “the terrorist threat is neither uniform across
the region nor an existential concern for all the concerned countries, despite the manner that it is framed in
securatization scholarship. Such a discourse, moreover, fails to take into account the varied political cultural
and historical contexts in which the conflicts themselves are embedded in the region” (p. 251).
ISSN 2334-3745
161
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Bin Ali (Eds.), Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-terrorism
(London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2015), 272 pp., US $ 95.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-78326743-9.
The contributors to this volume examine the role of terrorist rehabilitation (which is also related to
countering violent extremism and disengagement from terrorism), which constitutes, when applicable,
an important tool in counterterrorism. Following an overview of the evolution and future direction of the
practice of terrorist rehabilitation (and its related components), the chapters discuss rehabilitation programs
in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Sri Lanka, as well as more general approaches to counter al Qaidatype extremist religious beliefs such as Jihad, Salafism, and Takfir (the practice of excommunication) and the
notion that “Islam is under attack.” The final chapter provides a useful assessment of the elements involved in
tracking the outcome of terrorist rehabilitation programs and the steps that are necessary to implement best
practices in regional contexts.
Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Jerard and Salim Mohamed Nasir (Eds.) Countering Extremism: Building Social
Resilience Through Community Engagement (London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2013), 228 pp.,
US $ 58.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-908977-52-6.
A central theme running through this edited book is that with extremism constituting one of the precursors
to terrorism and insurgency, it is essential to counter and moderate extremism at the local level in order
to promote resilience in susceptible communities. Specific cases of community engagement and resilience
building are discussed for Singapore, South Asia, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom, as well as
on a general level, with accounts of countering extremism on the Internet. This book is the outcome of a
conference held in Singapore in September 2011.
Muhammad Haniff Hassan, The Father of Jihad: Abd Allah Azam’s Jihad Ideas and Implications to National
Security (London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2014), 368 p., US $ 125.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 9781-78326-287-8.
This is a valuable account of the writings and life of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, one of the iconic figures in
shaping the Jihadi religious ideology of groups such as al Qaida, of which he was one of the founding
members. Azzam, a Palestinian Islamic scholar and theologian, was subsequently assassinated under
mysterious circumstances in Peshawar, Pakistan, in November 1989. The author’s utilization of a qualitative
literature review to examine Azzam’s books, articles and transcripts of his sermons and speeches, makes
this volume an important contribution to the scholarship on Jihadi theologians, as it also makes extensive
reference to Azzam’s theological predecessors, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. One of Azzam’s theological
innovations, according to the author, was his call for making it a “duty” for Muslims “to reclaim all past
Muslim territories that are currently part of, or occupied by, non-Muslim states, and…to wage jihad al-talb
(offensive jihad) against non-Muslim territories until they are either part of Dar Al-Islam or submit to the
rule of Dar Al-Islam.” (p. 2) The author also discusses the implications of Azzam’s ideas for current national
security and provides theologically-based recommendations for countering Jihadism.
ISSN 2334-3745
162
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Jolene Jerard and Salim Mohamed Nasir (Eds.), Resilience and Resolve: Communities Against Terrorism
(London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2015), 180 pp., US $ 85.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-78326773-6.
The contributors to this volume examine the role of local communities in mitigating the threat of terrorism,
with a focus on countering al Qaida-type Islamist terrorism. To achieve community resilience against
terrorism, the contributors propose countering and deconstructing extremist ideologies, promoting religious
harmony, and ensuring that state agencies that counter terrorism, such as law enforcement, are used in ways
that promote community resilience.
Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyya and the
Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007 (London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2015), 304 pp.,
US $ 105.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-78326-485-8.
This is an examination of how the process of Islamist radicalization might eventually result in al-Jamaah
al-Islamiyyah-type terrorism through a case study of how such processes played out in the town of Poso,
in Indonesia, during the year 2000 to 2007. The author focuses on the causal factors that play out in the
radicalization process: disaffected persons, an enabling group, and its legitimizing ideology. What is
especially important about this study, as the author concludes (and which this reviewer concurs), is its
usefulness in providing a theoretical framework for policy interventions that could be applied (once adjusted
to the local context) to regions that “have become targets of Islamist radicalization, such as conflict areas like
Maluku (Ambon),,the southern Philippines as well as non-conflict areas like Java” (p. 238) as well as other
areas around the world.
Erik Nemeth, Cultural Security: Evaluating the Power of Culture in International Affairs (London, England,
UK: Imperial College Press, 2015), 312 pp., US $ 110.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1783265480.
With the widespread plunder, illicit sales, and destruction of cultural and historical antiquities by terrorist
groups ranging from the Afghan Taliban to the Islamic State, this book’s examination of this aspect of
‘cultural security’ is of great importance. The volume is divided into three sections: the history of cultural
plunder and destruction (including by the Nazis in the Second World War), measures to counter such illicit
activities through intelligence, including monitoring art sales around the world, and incorporating the
securing of such cultural property into states’ foreign policies.
Maria A. Ressa, From Bin Laden to Facebook: 10 Days of Abduction, 10 Years of Terrorism (London, England,
UK: Imperial College Press, 2013), 308 pp., US $ 35.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1908979537.
An interesting account by a veteran journalist of the role of the Internet’s social networks in radicalizing
adherents and mobilizing them to engage in al Qaida-type Islamist terrorism around the world, with a special
focus on the Philippines and Indonesia.
ISSN 2334-3745
163
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Albrecht Schnabel and Rohan Gunaratna, (Eds.), Wars From Within: Understanding and Managing Insurgent
Movements [Second Edition] (London, England, UK: Imperial College Press, 2015), 496 pp., US $ 145.00
[Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-78326-556-5.
This is a revised and updated edition of the editors’ 2006 volume Understanding and Managing Insurgents
Movements (published by Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore). Following an introductory overview
of challenges presented by contemporary insurgencies, the chapters are divided into two parts: first, a
classification of insurgencies as ethnic, religious, ideological, as well as a discussion of the Internet as a force
multiplier for modern insurgencies; and second, case studies of insurgencies in the Balkans, India, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, Lebanon (the case of Hizballah), as well as al Qaida as a global insurgency. In the concluding
chapter, the editors discuss the challenges involved in addressing contemporary insurgencies.
Javier Argomaniz and Orla Lynch (Eds.) International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation: An
Interdisciplinary Approach (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 288 pp., US $ 100.00 [Hardcover],
ISBN: 9781137347107.
The contributors to this volume examine the diverse experiences of victims of terrorism and the types of
responses by governments to their plight. The plight of victimhood is complex, according to the book’s
preface, because it involves “the interactivity at times between victims and perpetrators, the potential for
counter-terrorism measures to create victims and a complex lifestyle relationship between being victimized
and the potential for politicization, media intrusion and re-traumatisation” (p. viii). To examine these issues,
the book is divided into three parts: victims’ experiences (e.g., in general and in the cases of the victims of
the Spanish ETA’s violence and the traumas experienced by child soldiers in Sri Lanka); support for victims
(e.g., providing financial compensation and public health treatment for victims of terrorism); and victims of
counter-terrorism campaigns (e.g., the victimization of some Muslim youth in Western countries, the impact
of drone attacks and suicide bombings on their respective Pakistani victims, and the consequences of targeted
policing by the New York Police Department against the city’s Muslim communities).
Colin Wight, Rethinking Terrorism: Terrorism, Violence and the State (New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan
Education, 2015), 272 pp., US $ 95.00 [Hardcover], US$35.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-230-57376-5.
This is a theoretical account of contemporary types of terrorism and their impact on the international system.
The author, a Professor of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, Australia,
was part of a group that developed the sub-discipline of “Critical Terrorism Studies.” This book, which is
clearly written and well-reasoned, presents a comprehensive overview of the interplay between terrorism,
here interpreted as a violent form of protest, and its state adversary. These issues are covered through an
examination of the historical development of the modern state, types of violent and non-violent protest
against the state, the nature of terrorism and state-terrorism, how terrorist actors justify their use of violence
as a form of political activity, how terrorist groups are organized and the tactics they employ in their warfare,
and the nature of international terrorism and the counterterrorism responses by the threatened governments.
The final chapter, entitled “Rethinking Terrorism,” presents the author’s conclusions and includes a discussion
of recent terrorist attacks, including the nature of the Islamic State (IS), which “stands as the archetypical
Islamic terrorist group” (p. 225).
ISSN 2334-3745
164
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
David L. Altheide, Terror Post-911 and the Media (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2009), US $
111.95 [Hardcover], US $ 37.95 [Paperback], ISBN 978-1-4331-0366-7.
This is an interesting discussion of the logic, rhetoric, and discourse revolving around the issue of terrorism
and how to counter it, especially since 9/11. A central theme is that public discourse on terrorism tends to be
“more associated with victimization and fear, even surpassing linkages with crime” even when evidence may
point to a diminished threat. The book’s chapters examine the relation between terrorism and propaganda,
the politics of fear and moral panic, the problem of evidence in demonstrating the supposed severity of the
threat. A separate chapter examines similarities and differences in the way the April 1999 school shootings at
Columbine and terrorism are covered by American media.
Josef Schrofl, Sean Michael Cox, and Thomas Pankratz (Eds.) Winning the Asymmetric War: Political, Social
and Military Responses (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2009), 366 pp., US $ 83.95 [Paperback],
ISBN: 978-3631572498.
The contributors to this volume examine the nature of asymmetric war and the comprehensive responses
required to defeat asymmetric actors. The book is divided into four chapters: a theoretical analysis of
asymmetric warfare, including in the form of a terrorist insurgency; cases of asymmetric conflicts in Africa,
al Qaeda as an asymmetric group; and strategies to counter asymmetric threats.
Lori J. Underwood (Eds.) The Root of All Evil? Religious Perspectives on Terrorism (New York, NY: Peter Lang
Publishing, Inc., 2013), 153 pp., US $ 72.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4331-1929-3.
The contributors to this volume examine the question of whether a causal relationship between organized
religions and terrorism exists as a way to ascertain if “removing adherence to religion” might ameliorate
the problem of terrorism. These issues are discussed in cases such as the Islamic context of global Jihadism,
confronting Buddhist terrorism, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, and Hinduism and terrorism. In the
concluding chapter, the volume’s editor writes that while “looking at the world unreflectively and being
willing to objectify others for the sake of sanctifying one’s own personal causes” is one of the explanations
of terrorism, “that process is psychologically independent from any psychological attachment to organized
religion.” (p. 143) As a result, organized religion should not necessarily be blamed for what terrorists do,
“bend and twist [such] religions into a weapon” in their warfare (p. 143).
Laurie R. Blank and Gregory P. Noone, International Law and Armed Conflict: Fundamental Princples and
Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War (New York, NY: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2013), 736 pp.,
US $ 106.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1454817727.
This comprehensive textbook on international law and armed conflict (also known as Law of Armed Conflict
– LOAC) is divided into five parts: basic principles of LOAC and the nature and classification of armed
conflict; the designation of combatants, civilians and the nature of their battlefield status in armed conflict;
identifying legitimate targets and protected objects, including designating weapons and tactics in attacks; and
training military judge advocates and ensuring accountability for violations of LOAC. As a textbook, each
chapter is accompanied by questions for discussion.
ISSN 2334-3745
165
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Geoffrey S. Corn, Victor Hansen, Richard B. Jackson, Chris Jens, Erik Talbot Jensen, and James A. Schoettler,
Jr. (Eds.), The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach (New York, NY: Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business, 2012), 648 pp., US $ 205.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1454806905.
This textbook on international humanitarian law is crucial, according to the editors, “to the planning,
execution, and critique of military operations”(p. xxv). The volume’s chapters cover topics such as the legal
basis and principles governing the use of force in armed conflict; how combatants, civilians and other
belligerents are covered by the law of armed conflict (LOAC); the application of LOAC in targeting, weapons
use, and tactics; the treatment of “wounded and sick” under LOAC; detention under LOAC; applying LOAC
to military occupation, termination of hostilities and transition to other types of post-conflict situations; the
application of LOAC to naval warfare, including neutrality; LOAC and war crimes; and military command
responsibility and compliance mechanisms under LOAC. Each chapter includes a series of study questions
for further discussion.
Stephen Dycus, William C. Banks, Peter Raven-Hansen, and Stephen L. Vladeck (Eds.), Counterterrorism
Law [Second Edition] (New York, NY: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012), 912 pp., US $ 209.00
[Hardcover], ISBN: 9780735598638.
This textbook presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of counterterrorism law within the larger field
of national security law. The book is divided into eight parts: an introduction, authority and its limits in the
war on terrorism, detecting terrorist threats, detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects, criminalizing
terrorists, prosecuting terrorists and their supporters, applying counterterrorism law in homeland security,
and applying “noncriminal sanctions” against terrorists and their supporters by means of public sanctions
and launching lawsuits against terrorists and their supporters. The textbook’s chapters are accompanied
by excerpted sections from relevant criminal codes and criminal cases, including notes and questions for
discussion.
About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of ‘Perspectives on Terrorism’. He can be
reached at: [email protected].
ISSN 2334-3745
166
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
V. Notes from the Editor
A Word of Appreciation for Our External Peer Reviewers
from the Editorial Team
Perspectives on Terrorism is the product of volunteer efforts – academics, professionals and practitioners –
who for nine consecutive years have been giving their time and providing their expertise to keep this free
online journal alive and even increasing in circulation to more than 5,800 subscriptions. While the main
burden of producing six issues per year rests on the shoulders of the Editorial Team and those of the Editorial
Board members, there are many others who assist us in bringing out timely articles and research notes.
The seven Editorial Team members and the twenty Editorial Board members alone would not be able to
handle and review the growing number of articles that reach us now on an almost daily basis. We could not
deal with this volume of submissions without the selfless help of our esteemed external reviewers. Once a
year we wish to thank them publicly by listing their names.
For reviewing article submitted to Perspectives on Terrorism in 2015, we wish to thank the individuals listed
in the following table.
THANK YOU to our Peer Reviewers for Perspectives on Terrorism, 2015
Wale Adeboye
Sajjan Gohel
Petter Nesser
Ehsan Ahrari
Muhammad Feyyaz
Brian Nussbaum
Omar Ashour
Max Boon
Frank Bovenkerk
Michael Boyle
Tina Christensen
David Cheney
Christina Cliff
Orville Shawn Cupp
Joel Day
Leah Farrall
Heather Gregg
Aaron Hoffman
William Hansen
Thomas Hegghammer
Donald Holbrook
Jack Jarmon
Paul Joosse
Paul Kamolnick
Brynjar Lia
Michael Loadenthal
Miroslav Mares
Sarah Marsden
Jonathan Matusitz
Assaf Moghadam
Allan Orr
Anita Peresin
Nico Prucha
Gilbert Ramsay
Don Rassler
Ineke Roex
Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn
Bart Schuurman
Mubin Sheikh
Haldun Yalcinkaya
Ahmet S. Yayla
We also wish to thank our regular members of the Editorial Board. They were approached most often and
asked again and again to give us their professional assessment regarding the quality of the submissions
reaching our journal.
Thank you all for making Perspectives on Terrorism a success!
Alex P. Schmid & James J.F. Forest (Editors)
Robert Wesley (Founding Editor)
Joseph J. Easson (Associate Editor for IT)
Joshua Sinai (Book Reviews Editor)
ISSN 2334-3745
167
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Jared Dmello (Editorial Assistant)
Eric Price (Editorial Assistant)
Judith Tinnes (Editorial Assistant)
ISSN 2334-3745
168
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
TRI Award for Best PhD Thesis 2015: Call for Submissions
The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of Terrorism
Studies. For this purpose it has established an Annual Award for the Best Doctoral Dissertation on Terrorism
and Counter-Terrorism. The TRI Award jury identifies among the submissions three finalists and among them
the winner. The Award for the best thesis submitted in 2013 went to Dr. Tricia Bacon (American University,
Washington, D.C., USA) and the winner of the 2014 Award was Dr. Anneli Botha (Institute for Security
Studies, Pretoria, South Africa).
With the present announcement, a call is being made for Ph.D. theses submitted or defended at an academic
institution in the year 2015. Doctoral theses in the field of terrorism- and counter-terrorism studies can be
submitted either by the author or by the academic supervisor, and should be submitted in electronic form
to the chairman of the jury, Prof. em. Alex P. Schmid, at [email protected], together with a
cover letter (1-3 pp.), highlighting the merits of the submitted Ph.D. thesis. Submissions have to be in English
(or translated into English)
The deadline for entries (in English, or with translation into English) is 31 March, 2016.
The TRI Award jury, consisting of the three directors of TRI (Robert Wesley, James Forest and Alex P.
Schmid) will evaluate and compare the submissions in the months of April and May 2016 and inform the
three finalists in the course of June 2016. The winner among them will be announced in the summer of
2016 and can expect an Award of US $1,000, plus a certificate of achievement signed by the President of the
Terrorism Research Initiative, acknowledging the granting of the TRI thesis award. The other two finalists
will receive a certificate of achievement. For all three finalist theses, TRI will assist the author in finding
a publisher. The winner of the 2015 TRI Award will also be invited to submit an article for publication in
Perspectives on Terrorism, summarizing the winning thesis’ main results.
ISSN 2334-3745
169
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
TRI National/Regional TRI Networks (Partial) Inventory of
Ph.D. Theses in the Making
by Alex P. Schmid (Network Coordinator)
The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to stimulate research in various ways, one being the annual
competition for the best Ph.D. thesis in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Another effort involves
the organization of national or (sub-) regional networks of researchers engaged in writing a doctoral
dissertation on (counter-) terrorism or a closely-related subject at a recognized academic institution. There
are a dozen TRI Theses Writers Networks in existence, some functioning better than others. Below, the
reader will find a list of two dozen doctoral theses in the making. In each case the (working) title of a thesis
is given, followed by the name of the Ph.D. researcher and the one of the university where the thesis is being
written. The expected date of completion is given at the end. In addition to the networks listed below, there
are also (proto-) networks in existence in Australia, Canada, Greece, the Netherlands (incl. Flanders in
Belgium), Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom.
Graduate students who wish to join a network should contact the network coordinator at < apschmid@
terrorismanalysts.com >.
Austrian-German-Swiss Network (Coordinator: Johannes Saal)
1. Les Femmes Musulmanes Occidentales dans le Jihad Contemporain: Une Armée de Roses entre Soutien
Visible et Invisible à l’Utopie Jihadiste dans une Conception Féminine du Fard Al Ayn [Western Muslim
Women in the Contemporary Jihad: An Army of Roses between Visible and Invisible Support for the Jihadist
Utopia in a Feminine Conception of Fard Al Ayn]
Géraldine Casutt
University of Fribourg (CH) and EHESS-Paris
Expected date of completion: 2017.
2. Switzerland and the Origins of International Counterterrorism: Crisis Management, Multilateral
Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969-1977)
Aviva Guttmann
University of Bern and Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV),
University St. Andrews
Expected date of completion: February 2016.
3. Policies of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan toward Afghanistan: Common Structures, Varying Outcomes
Azamjon Isabaev
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg
Expected date of completion: September 2016.
ISSN 2334-3745
170
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
4. The Dark Social Capital of Religious Terrorists: Analyzing Radicalization, Recruitment and Dynamics of
Jihadist Networks in Europe
Johannes Saal
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences (GSL),
University of Lucerne
Expected date of completion: Summer 2018.
5. Ermittlungen gegen Organisierte Kriminalität: Ein Vergleich des deutschen und kolumbianischen Rechts
[Investigations on Organized Crime: A Comparison between German and Colombian Law]
Angélica Romero Sánchez
University of Freiburg (D) and International Max Planck Research School for Comparative Criminal Law
(IMPRS-CC)
Expected date of completion: December 2016.
6. The Military Organization of State Repression
Adam Scharpf
Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences, University of Mannheim
7. The Illicit Business of Terrorism: Assessing the Resourcing of Terrorist Campaigns
Julia Sammelbeck
Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences, University of Mannheim
8. Preemptive Self-Defense Aspect of the Laws of War: U.S. Drone Strikes Inside Pakistan
Imdad Ullah
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt.
Expected date of completion: not determined.
9. Filling the Gaps: Hamas and Hezbollah between Inclusion and Exclusion: A Multi-Dimensional Framework
based on Sociological Systems Theory
Dennis Walkenhorst
Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology, University of Bielefeld
ISSN 2334-3745
171
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
South(ern) Africa Network (Coordinator: Petra Harvest)
10.The New Insurgencies and Mass Uprisings in Africa and International Involvement: Selected Case Studies.
Samuel Adotey Anum (Ghana).
University of Pretoria
Expected completion date is 2017.
11. Counter-terrorism and Civil Society in Nigeria
Emeka Thaddues Njoku
University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Expected completion date: 2016.
12. The Westphalian Model and Trans-Border Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi,
Mozambique and Zambia. Happy Kayuni (Malawia)
University of the Western Cape
Expected completion: early 2016.
13. Nuclear Proliferation.
[Name cannot be released as author is government official]
University of Pretoria
Expected completion date: 2016.
Norwegian Network (Coordinator: Cato Hemmingby)
14. The Terrorist Target Selection Process: Influencing Factors with regard to Terrorists’ Choice of Targets.
Cato Hemmingby
Norwegian Police University College
15. Helicopter Emergency Medical Services in Major Incidents: Patterns of Use and Influence on Outcome
Anne Siri Johnsen
University of Stavanger
16. Far-Right Violence in Europe 1990-2012: Patterns and Processes.
Jacob Aasland Ravndal
Norwegian Defence Research Institute, Terrorism Research Group
ISSN 2334-3745
172
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
17. From the Extreme to the Mainstream: the Politics of Anti-Islamic Movements and their Rhetoric
Lars Erik Berntzen
Department of Political and Social Science, European University Institute Florence
Expected date of completion: Spring 2017.
United States Network (Coordinator: Matthew Sweeney)
18. Net-Nazis: Framing Hegemonic Ideologies of the White Power Movement through Racist Humor
Steven Windisch
University of Nebraska – Omaha
19. Political Crimes and Responses to Them:Terrorism, Expectations of Interactions, and Trust
Erin Kearns
American University, Washington D.C. Expected date of completion: 2017.
Brazilian Network (Coordinator: Prof. Jorge Lasmar)
20. The Pedagogy of Martyrdom in Shia Narratives
Patricia Prado
PUC Minas
21. Terrorism Risk Analysis: A Comparison of Different Risk Models
Suzane Vasconcelos
PUC Minas
22. Gender Issues and the Role of Women in Terrorism
Luisa Novaes Tolledo
PUC Minas
23. The Interplay Between Macro-, Meso- and Micro-Factors in the Decision of Becoming a Foreign Fighter:
The Case of Syria
Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
PUC Minas
ISSN 2334-3745
173
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
24. Cosmopolitan Uncivil Societies and the Problem of Terrorism
Adriana Neves Gomes de Azevedo
PUC Minas
Expected date of completion: August 2017.
ISSN 2334-3745
174
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
Job Announcement: Open Rank Faculty Search at CTSS, UMass
Lowell
The School of Criminology & Justice Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell seeks to fill one
interdisciplinary position in Security Studies at the rank of Assistant/Associate/Full Professor for September,
2016. The candidate may be hired with tenure if he/she currently holds tenure at another institution.
Applicants must hold a Ph.D. in Criminology, Criminal Justice, Political Science, International Relations,
Psychology, or a field relevant to Security Studies.
Candidates must demonstrate a record of scholarship and publications in respected peer-reviewed journals,
or evidence of future scholarly productivity, and expertise in advanced quantitative and/or qualitative
research methods. Additionally, senior faculty hires (Associate or Full) are expected to come with a track
record of procuring and serving as a lead investigator on externally funded research projects, and will be
evaluated in part on this criterion. Assistant professor candidates would not have this requirement, but
should have demonstrated capacity for such activity in the future. Candidates with research specialization in mass atrocities, political violence, national security policy,
cybersecurity or countering violent extremism are strongly encouraged to apply. Applicants must
demonstrate the ability to teach courses and play a role in the university’s degree programs, including
Security Studies, which offers concentrations in international security, homeland security, industrial &
economic security, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and weapons of mass destruction. The
successful applicant will also teach and mentor students in the Terrorism Studies Option track of the Ph.D. in
Criminology & Criminal Justice. The successful applicant will be expected to play a major role in the Center
for Terrorism & Security Studies at UMass Lowell, and may be eligible for joint faculty appointments in the
Departments of Political Science, Psychology, or other academic unit within the University related to the
candidate’s academic discipline.
School of Criminology and Justice Studies
The School enrolls over 1,200 students across its programs, and is the largest component of the College
of Fine Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. The School has 16 tenured and tenure-track faculty with a
blending of senior and junior colleagues. The faculty has expertise in a wide range of topics in criminology
and criminal justice and extensive research and scholarly productivity. Faculty research is currently
supported by several million dollars in external grants from the National Institute of Justice, the Department
of Homeland Security, and other major funding agencies. We offer a Bachelor of Science, two Master’s
degrees, graduate level certificates in six specialized areas, and a Ph.D. Our faculty lead several research
centers and serve as editors of 3 top academic journals.
Center for Terrorism & Security Studies
The Center was established in 2013 in connection with the University’s growing academic enterprise in the
field of terrorism and security studies. Concurrent with the Center’s growth in recent years, the College
of Fine Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences has established a terrorism studies option within the PhD
program in Criminal Justice housed in the School of Criminology and Justice Studies, launched M.S. and
M.A. degree programs in Security Studies, initiated a PhD program in Global Studies, and hired several new
social science faculty with research programs in the areas of security, terrorism, and international conflict.
Additionally, a significant number of faculty within both the University’s College of Engineering and its
ISSN 2334-3745
175
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
College of Sciences are extensively engaged in funded research programs focused on matters of national and
international security.
Salary commensurate with experience. Review of applications will begin February 1, 2016 and continue
until the position is filled. The University is committed to increasing the gender and racial/ethnic diversity
of its faculty to match that of our student body. Candidates who can contribute to that goal are strongly
encouraged to apply, and should identify in their cover letter how their personal and professional experiences
can help us achieve this goal. Applications must be submitted online at: http://www.uml.edu/jobs
Please direct inquiries to the Chair of the Search Committee:
Professor James J.F. Forest
Director, Security Studies Program
University of Massachusetts Lowell
School of Criminology & Justice Studies
113 Wilder Street, Suite 400
Lowell, MA 01854-3060
Tel: 978-934-4337
Email: [email protected]
ISSN 2334-3745
176
December 2015
Volume 9, Issue 6
About Perspectives on Terrorism
Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered
in Vienna, Austria, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS), headquartered at the Lowell
Campus of the University of Massachusetts, United States of America.
PT is published six times per year as a free peer-reviewed online journal available at www.terrorismanalysts.
com. It seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering
the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism, Political Violence and Conflict Studies. The editors invite readers to:
•
present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
•
submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
•
use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.
Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some
of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at
short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper
journals. Our free on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content,
style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.
The journal’s articles are peer-reviewed by members of the Editorial Board as well as outside experts. While
aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and
conflict-waging. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to
adhere to.
Editorial Team of Perspectives on Terrorism
Alex P. Schmid, Editor-in-Chief
James J.F. Forest, Co-Editor
Joseph J. Easson, Associate Editor
Joshua Sinai, Books Reviews Editor
Jared Dmello, Editorial Assistant
Eric Price, Editorial Assistant
Judith Tinnes, Editorial Assistant
ISSN 2334-3745
177
December 2015

this PDF file - Perspectives on Terrorism

Transcription

Similar documents

5. Die Britse militere diens: Plaaslike Burger

TERRORISM_MRMI 2015 locandina_080615

ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﲔ ﺍﻷﺭﻫﺎﺏ ﺍﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﻰ ﻭﺍﳉﺮﺍﺋﻢ ﺍﳌﻨﻈﻤﺔ

Stony Brook Press V. 23, N. 03 - DSpace Home

PDF (Author`s version) - OATAO (Open Archive Toulouse Archive

The New Wave of Terrorism: The ISIS Case

A Comparative Study of Terrorist Offences, Crimes Againist

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

XGames.ESPN.go.com