indonesia - World Bank

Transcription

Report No. 29506
INDONESIA
EDUCATION IN INDONESIA:
MANAGING THE TRANSITION TO
DECENTRALIZATION
(In Three Volumes) Volume 1
The World Bank
August 2004
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume 1
Page
FOREWORD
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
x
CHAPTER 1: INDONESIA’S EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES
1
Enrollment Expansion
1
Educational Challenges
Closing Large Regional Gaps
Reducing Inequality across Income Groups
Improving the Quality of Education
2
2
3
3
Decentralization: Promise or Peril for Education?
4
Topics for this Review
Governance and Management
Finance and Public Spending
Education Quality
Teacher Management
5
6
6
6
6
CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT
9
Legal Framework and Governance Structures
9
Basic Challenges in Governance and Management
Clarifying Governance Functions
Rebuilding Management Systems
Reframing the Role of the MoNE
Building Local Capacity
9
10
11
13
13
CHAPTER 3: FINANCE AND PUBLIC SPENDING
17
Financing Framework And Structures Under Decentralization
17
Expanding the Resource Envelope for Education
18
Making Education Expenditures Count
Spend Locally
Differentiate Assistance to Districts and Schools
Spend More Resources on Those Most in Need
Leverage Governmental Resources – But Consider Consequences of the Poor
Track and Monitor Spending
20
21
21
22
24
24
CHAPTER 4: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND IMPROVEMENT
27
Two Approaches to Improving Quality
Quality Assurance or Control
27
27
Quality Improvement
29
Policies to Improve the Quality of Education
Support National-Programs, District Projects,
and School-Improvements
Adapt a Balanced Scorecard Approach to Plan and Manage Support
to Districts and Schools
Address Structural Weaknesses of the System
Ensure Equity in Quality Improvement
Stimulate Demand for and Supply of Innovations and Good Practice
for Improving Teaching
From Setting Standards to Meeting Standards
CHAPTER 5: TEACHER MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE
32
32
33
34
35
35
35
37
Management Changes Under Decentralization
Responsibility for Teacher Employment and Deployment
Responsibility for Setting and Monitoring Teacher Performance Standards
Responsibility for Teachers’ Professional Development and
Career Development
37
37
38
Teacher Employment and Deployment
39
Teacher Professional Development
41
Teacher Compensation and Incentives
43
Using Teacher Management Systems to Achieve Education Goals
44
39
CHAPTER 6: THE WAY FORWARD: MAKING DECENTRALIZATION WORK
FOR EDUCATION
47
A Policy Reform Agenda
47
Implementing the Policy Agenda
Supply-Side and Demand Led Progress
Learning from Past and Ongoing Efforts
52
52
53
61
REFERENCES
ii
TABLES IN TEXT
Table 1.1
Table 1.2
Table 1.3
Table 1.4
Table 1.5
Table 3.1
Table 3.2
Table 4.1
Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 6.1
Rising education enrollment rates at all levels, 1995-2002
Inequality in enrollment rates: wider gaps within than between
provinces, 2002
Education equality at the primary level and increasing equality
at higher levels: Net enrollment rates by income quintile, 19932002
Student performance on mathematics and science tests: ranking
among 38 countries
Some challenges and issues in implementing decentralization in
education
Sources of local revenues, fiscal year 2001
Per capita education spending, 2001-2002
School committees still not fully engaged
Primary teacher absence rate in public schools, 2002-03
A proposed national framework for a teacher management
system
Proposed policy agenda for educational development under
decentralization
1
2
3
4
7
17
19
31
39
46
54
FIGURES IN TEXT
Figure 1.1
Figure 1.2
Figure 2.1
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 4.1
Figure 5.1
Gross and net enrollment rates in East Asian countries, 2000
Highest grade completed by 16-18 year olds, by income quintile
Flows of governance and managerial accountability in
decentralized Indonesia
Indonesia: Education spending by level of government, 2001
Relationship between two dimensions of educational
development
Balanced scorecard to determine appropriate action for each
district/unit
Districts vary in proportion of primary teachers with minimum
training qualification, percentage of teachers
1
3
10
20
22
34
41
BOXES IN TEXT
Box 2.1
Box 2.2
Box 4.1
Box 4.2
Box 5.1
Box 5.2
Box 5.3
Information systems and management in Brazil and Spain
Transforming the current organizational structure of the
Ministry of National Education
Minimum service standards
Improving the quality of madrasah education
A new teacher deployment scheme in the Philippines
Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial program
Brazil’s FUNDEF program and teacher compensation reform
iii
12
14
28
30
42
43
45
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume 2
CHAPTER 1: GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT UNDER DECENTRALIZATION
1
The Situation as Decentralization Gets Under Way
2
The Basic Challenge: Clarifying Governance and Management Functions
7
Are Current Policies Helping?
12
Minimum Service Standards
14
Governance and Management Systems Lacking
15
Governance and Management Development Tasks
20
References for Chapter 1
22
Appendix 1.1 List of Governance and Management Problems
25
Appendix 1.2 List of Interviewees
28
Appendix 1.3 Decentralization Case Studies
30
Appendix 1.4 Citizen Perception and Educational Reality: Insights
from the Governance and Decentralization Survey
Appendix 1.5 Organizational Issues for DEPDIKNAS Under Decentralization
37
47
Appendix 1.6 Minimum Service Standards as Management and
Governance Tools
56
CHAPTER 2: FINANCING EDUCATION UNDER DECENTRALIZATION
65
New Fiscal Structures under Decentralization
65
Public Spending for Education at the National and Local Levels
68
Private Spending for Education Remains Low
71
Equitable Financing in an Unequal World
73
Increasing Efficiency Under Decentralization
76
Summary of Implications for Policy
80
84
Appendix 2.1 Cost Implications of Quality Education for All
86
CHAPTER 3: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND IMPROVEMENT
89
Approach and Rationale
89
Methodology
90
Basic Terms
91
Quality Management
91
Quality Assurance
99
Quality Improvement
104
iv
Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations
111
112
Appendix 3.1: Quality Improvement Projects in Indonesia Since 1990
115
Appendix 3.2: A Quality Management Model
121
Appendix 3.3: A Case Study of Project-Based School Rehabilitation
125
CHAPTER 4: TEACHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
127
The Changing Context of Teacher Management in Indonesia
128
Transparent Employment Processes and Conditions of Service
137
School-oriented Performance Standards and Monitoring
146
Career-Long Professional Development
149
Using Teacher Management Systems to Achieve Education Goals
153
156
Appendix 4.1: What Teachers Need to Know and be able to Do
160
Appendix 4.2: Supplementary Information on International Experience
161
TABLES IN TEXT
Table 1.1
Table 2.1
Table 2.2
Table 2.3
Table 2.4
Table 3.1
Table 3.2
Table 4.1
Table 4.2
Table 4.3
Table 4.4
Table 4.5
Diagnosis of governance, management, and related
decentralized challenges
Public expenditures for education: How does Indonesia compare
with other Asian countries?
Household expenditures on education, by income quintile, 2002
Source of inequality in enrollment rates: Between and within
provinces
Determinants of education expenditures using APBD: Results
from regression analysis
Common uses of national and school-based tests in quality
assurance
Comparing the school effectiveness and school reform
approaches
Teacher management functions for public schools (except
Madrasahs) after decentralization
Average number of hours worked per week
The impact of corrupt practices with the education sector
Comparing two teacher performance evaluation systems in Chile
Potential policy tools for managing the teaching workforce
3
69
72
73
75
97
106
134
142
144
149
154
FIGURES IN TEXT
Figure 1.1
Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2
Figure 2.3
Flows of governance and managerial accountability in a
decentralized Indonesia
Post-decentralization financial structure
Education expenditures, 2001
Enrollment rates of children ages 12-15 by province
v
8
66
71
73
Figure 2.4
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Inequality in the distribution of 2001 education expenditures
from APBD and APBN allocations
Diagram of quality management system
Relationships between standard-setting entities being developed
74
92
94
BOXES IN TEXT
Box 1.1
Box 1.2
Box 2.1
Box 2.2
Box 2.3
Box 3.1
Box 3.2
Box 3.3
Box 3.4
Box 3.5
Box 4.1
Box 4.2
Box 4.3
Box 4.4
Box 4.5
Box 4.6
In South Africa, a lack of definition as to who could set
minimum standards, combined with sectoral collusion in teacher
management, led to the emergence of unfunded mandates and
fiscal problems after decentralization
In Brazil and Spain, devising good management information
systems under decentralization was difficult and problematic but
was possible with effort and partnership
Unequal education spending among districts
Brazil’s experience with municipalization
School funding – A gap in financial policy
Hypothetical use of performance information in a school
Information from a national evaluation system changed the
focus of debate in Brazil
Quality assurance of the teaching force
The New Zealand equalization program
School development plans and quality inputs
Cost-effective strategies for raising academic achievement
Permanent or contract teachers?
The importance of teacher quality
International evidence on schooling, resources, educational
institutions and student performance
Teacher education programs that made a difference
Mexico’s incentive scheme for teacher development
vi
18
19
72
77
80
92
98
101
108
110
130
145
147
148
151
153
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume 3
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
Table 13
Table 14
Table 15
Table 16
Table 17
Table 18
Table 19
Table 20
Table 21
Highest Level of Education as a Percentage of the Population, by Location
Net and Gross Primary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
Net and Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
Net and Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
Net and Gross Primary Enrollment Rates, by Location
Net and Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Location
Net and Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Location
Percent of Primary Students Enrolled, by Type of School
Percent of Junior Secondary Students Enrolled, by Type of School
Percent of Senior Secondary Students Enrolled by Type of School
Adult Literacy Rates
Primary School Classrooms and Teacher Profiles
Teacher Profile in Junior Secondary Schools
Teacher Profile in Senior Secondary Schools
Test Scores of Junior Secondary Students
Test Scores of Senior Secondary Students
Average Monthly Household Income
Education Expenditure as a Proportion of Total Household Expenditure
National Education Development Expenditure, 2001
Gross Regional Domestic Product at Current Market Prices, 1998-2000
Per Capita Provincial Revenues, 2001
vii
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
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FOREWORD
particular, significant steps have been taken
to decentralize authority for managing
education to local government and to build
partnerships with civil society to improve
the quality of schooling. While we join the
education community in applauding these
steps, we recognize too that many other
policies and actions are needed.
Improving the lives of its citizens is at the
center
of
Indonesia’s
development
challenge. Economic growth creates more
jobs and reduces hunger and poverty, but it
is clearly not enough.
It is widely
recognized that being literate, more skilled,
and more knowledgeable about the world
also gives people the capacity to control and
to enrich their lives. For this reason, it is
important that Indonesia continues to raise
educational levels, especially for poor and
disadvantaged people.
This Education Sector Review discusses the
issues and the range of options for policies
and actions around the issues of
management and governance, financing,
teachers, and quality of the education
system. It specifically addresses the complex
and changing nature of the relationships
between central and local governments that
have
resulted
from
Indonesia’s
decentralization process. The Review is a
collaborative undertaking by Government
and donors, and its broad consultation
process with many of stakeholders at the
national and local levels gives us also the
perspective of those who are closest to the
schools and the classrooms and has fuelled
profound discussions on the key challenges
of the sector. We trust that the reader will
find this report stimulating and enriching
reading.
Schooling will count for more when its
quality is improved. Indonesia achieved
significant progress in bringing children to
school during the last 30 years. Enrollment
rates at the basic levels are high, even as
compared to countries with higher incomes.
The key challenge now is to raise the quality
of education available to young people so
that they are well prepared to participate in
Indonesia’s ever more dynamic society and
economy. Schools must be well managed,
staffed with motivated and competent
teachers, and supported by a system that
both provides resources and requires
accountability.
Indonesia continues to make important
changes at all levels of education. In
Andrew Steer
Country Director for Indonesia, World Bank
David Ritchie
Australian Ambassador to Indonesia
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was prepared by a team consisting of
Audrey Aarons, Luis Crouch, Susiana Iskandar,
Jennica Larrison, H. Moegiadi, Fredi Munger,
Jerry Strudwick, Suheru Muljoatmodjo, and
Elizabeth King (Team Leader). It also benefited
from the helpful advise and generous
contributions of a large number of people—
many national education officials at all levels,
advisors
to
the
government,
regional
government officials, school personnel and other
stakeholders in various districts outside Jakarta.
For their time, advise, and candor throughout the
process of preparing this report, we are grateful
to the national education leaders, Baedhowi,
Secretary General, Ministry of National
Education; Boediono, now former Head of
Research and Development, Ministry of
National Education; Herwindo Haribowo,
Secretary, Research and Development, Ministry
of National Education; Indra Djati Sidi,
Director-General, Primary and Secondary
Education, Ministry of National Education; Fasli
Jalal, Director-General, Non-Formal Education;
Satryo Soemantri Brodjonegoro, DirectorGeneral, Higher Education; Ace Suryadi, Senior
Adviser to the Minister, Ministry of National
Education; Nina Sardjunani, Director, Education
and Religious Affairs, National Planning
Agency; A. Qodri Azizy, Director-General,
Development of Islamic Institutions, Ministry of
Religious Affairs; Bambang Indriyanto, Head,
Policy Research Center, Research and
Development, Ministry of National Education;
and a group of young technocrats in government
who are committed to Indonesia’s educational
development (Hamid Muhammad, Abdul Azis,
Renani Pantjastuti, Harris Iskandar, Suharti,
Totok Suprayitno, Ratna Kesuma, Agung
Purwadi, Agus Hariyanto, Yun Widiati, Slamet
Soleh, Husaini Wardi, Ninasapti Triaswati, and
Herry Sukarman). We thank Joel Friedman,
Frank Hijmans, Walter McMahon, and Blane
Lewis, technical advisers in the Ministry of
Home Affairs, Ministry of Education, and
Ministry of Finance; David Sloper; peer
reviewers at the World Bank, Marlaine
Lockheed, Lant Pritchett, and Haneen Sayeed,
and other colleagues including Vivi Alatas,
Michael Borowitz, Deon Filmer, Scott
Guggenheim, Bert Hofman, Robin Horn,
Emmanuel Jimenez, Kai Kaiser, Samuel
Lieberman, Jessica Poppele, Fadia Saadah,
Andrew Steer, and Christopher Thomas for their
comments on earlier drafts; Owen Haaga and Ali
Subandoro for their very able research
assistance; Fiona MacKintosh for her editorial
contributions; and Elsa Warouw, Idawati
Harsongko,
Dinni
Prihandayani,
Datty
Sembodo, Dety Palimbong, Imani Rasheeda
Haidara, and Dorothy Judkins for helping the
office processes go smoothly.
We acknowledge the faithful and vigilant
support of the donor community in Indonesia—
Asian Development Bank, Australian Agency
for International Development, European Union,
the Royal Netherlands Government, UNESCO,
and UNICEF—and especially the funding
assistance given by AusAID and the Royal
Netherlands Government for the preparation of
the report and the subsequent regional and
national consultation activities. Lastly, this
report benefited significantly from the comments
of many more leaders and experts who attended
the various consultative meetings that were
organized during the preparation of this report.
The Team wishes to honor the memory of Dr. H.
Moegiadi, professor, mentor, colleague, and
friend to many education leaders in Indonesia.
Dr. Moegiadi, who was part of the report team
during his last days, enriched the report with his
vision of educational development in Indonesia
and his experiences in working for that vision
while in government.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Acronym /Term
Bahasa Indonesia
English Equivalent
ADB
AKU
APBD
Bank Pembangunan Asia
Arah Kebijakan Umum
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah
Asian Development Bank
General Policy Directions
Provincial or district budget
APBN
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara
National budget
APPKD
Anggaran Penerimaan dan Pengeluaran Kas Desa Village budget
BAPPEDA
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah
Association of South East Asian Nations
Australian Agency for International
Development
Regional Development Planning Board
BAPPENAS
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
National Development Planning Agency
BAS
Badan Akredetasi Sekolah
School Accreditation Body
BKN
BO
BOMM
Badan Kepegawaian Negara
Biaya Operasi Sekolah
Bantuan Operasional Manajmen Mutu
BP3
Badan Pembantu Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan
Civil Service Board
School operation fund
Operational Assistance for Quality
Management
Parents' association
BPS
Bupati
Camat
CBBEP
CGI
CIDA
Biro Pusat Statistik
ASEAN
AusAID
CLCC
COPSEP
DAK
DAU
DBEP
DBO
DEPDAG
DEPDAGRI
DEPKEU
Desa
DFID
Dana Alokasi Khusus
Dana Alokasi Umum
DIK
Daftar Isian Kegiatan
Dana Bantuan Operasional
Departemen Agama
DDN - Departemen Dalam Negeri
Departemen Keuangan
Dinas
Dinas P & K
Dinas Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan
Central Bureau of Statistics
Head of district
Head of sub-district
Community-Based Basic Education Project
Consultative Group for Indonesia
Canadian International Development
Agency
Creating Learning Communities for
Children
Community Participation in Strategic
Education Planning for School
Improvement (JICA)
Special allocation fund
General allocation fund
Decentralized Basic Education Project
School block grant
Ministry of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Village
Department for International Development
(United Kingdom)
Routine or recurrent budget of a central
ministry
A Provincial, District, Sub-District Office
with sectoral responsibility
Provincial, District, Sub-District Education
Office with responsibility for education
Daftar Isian Proyek
Development budget of a central ministry
DPR
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Directorate for Islamic Schools
Development (MORA)
Legislative Assembly
DPRD
DSSD
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
EBTANAS
Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional
DIP
DISD
EFA
ESR
EU
Gaji
GER
GOI
GTZ
Guru
GPN
HRD
IKIP
Uni Eropa
Angka Partisipasi Kasar
Guru Pegawai Negeri
Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan
Instruksi Presiden
Regional Legislative Assembly
Capacity Building for Decentralised Social
Services Delivery (ADB)
National end-of-level examination
(formerly used)
Education For All
Education Sector Review (this Review)
European Union
Salary and wages
Gross enrolment rate
Government of the Republic of Indonesia
Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
Teacher
Government teacher
Human Resource Development
Teachers College
Presidential Instruction
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Social safety net program
Junior secondary education
Junior secondary school
District
Branch Head
Village Head
Head of the Sub-District Education and
Culture Office
INPRES
JBIC
JICA
JPS
JSE
JSS
Kabupaten
Kacab
Kades
Kadin P & K
(Diknas)
Kecamatan
Kakancam
Jaring Pengaman Sosial
Pendidikan Lanjutan tingkat Pertama
SMP – Sekolah Menengah Pertama
Kabupaten
Kepala Cabang
Kepala Desa
Kepala Dinas P & K (Diknas) Kecamatan
Kepala Kantor Kecamatan
Head of Sub-District office of central
Government ministry
Kakandep
Kepala Kantor Departemen (Kabupaten)
Head of District Office of Central
Government Ministry
Kakanwil
Kepala Kantor Wilayah (Propinsi)
Head of Provincial office of central
Government ministry
Kakua
Kepala Kantor Urusan Agama (Kecamatan)
Head of Sub-District Office of Religious
Affairs
Kancam
Kantor Kecamatan
Sub-District office of central Government
ministry
Kandep
Kantor Departemen
Kandep Diknas
Kantor Departemen Pendidikan Nasional (P &
K)
District office of central Government
ministry
District Education Office
Kanin
Kanincam
Kantor Inspeksi
Kantor Inspeksi Kecamatan
Inspection Office
Sub-District Inspection Office
Kanwil
Kantor Wilayah
Kecamatan
Kelompok
Kepala Desa
Kepmen
Keppres
KKKS (K3S)
Kota
KW
Kyai
Keputusan Menteri
Keputusan Presiden
Kelompok Kerja Kepala Sekolah
LKGI
LKMD
Latihan Kerja Guru Inti
Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa
LMD
LPMP
Lurah
LSM
Madrasah
Lembaga Musyawarah Desa
Lembaga Penjamin Mutu Pendidikan
Kewenangan Wajib (UU 22/99)
Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
Provincial office of central Government
ministry
Sub-district
Group
Village head
Ministerial Decree
Presidential Decree
Principal's working group
Autonomous city
Obligatory Functions (Law 22/99)
Veneration title for Islamic religious teacher
or leader
Training program for core teachers
Village community development council
Village council
Education Quality Assurance Institution
Village head (in urban area)
Non-Government Organization
Islamic school
MBBS
Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah
School Based Management
Menpan
Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara
Ministry of State Personnel
MESA
MGMP
SPPM (Studi Pengembangan Sub- Sektor
Pendidikan Madrasah )
Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran
MI
MKKS
MOF
MOHA
Madrasah Ibtidaiyah
Musyawarah Kerja Kepala Sekolah
DEPKEU - Departemen Keuangan
DEPDAGRI - Departemen Dalam Negeri
Madrasah Education Sector Assessment
study (ADB/AusAID)
Meeting of Working Group of Subject
Teacher of Secondary Schools
Islamic primary school
Meeting of Principals' Working Group
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Home Affairs
MONE
DEPDIKNAS - Departemen Pendidikan
Nasional
DEPAG - Departemen Agama
SPM - Standar Pelayanan Minimal
Madrasah Tsanawiyah
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
MORA
MSS
MTs
MPR
Negeri
NER
NGO
NZDA
LSM
PAD
Pejabat
PERDAS
Pesantren
PIU
PP
PROPEDA
LSM - Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
Pendapatan Asli Daerah
Peraturan Daerah
UPP - Unit Pelaksanaan Proyek
Peratuan Pemerintah
Program Pembangunan Daerah
Ministry of National Education
Ministry of Religious Affairs
Minimum service standard
Islamic junior secondary school
People's Consultative Assembly
State / national
Net enrolment rate
New Zealand Development Assistance
Regional own source revenues
Functionary, government officer
Local regulations
Islamic boarding school
Project implementation unit
Government Regulation
Regional Development Program
PROPENAS
PROPEDATA
RAPBS
Program Pembangunan Nasional
Program Pembangunan Daerah Tahunan
Rencana Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja
Sekolah
National Development Program
Regional Development Annual Program
School revenue and expenditure plan
Rp
SBM
SD
Rupiah
MBBS - Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah
Sekolah Dasar
Regional Educational Development and
Improvement Program (JICA)
Indonesian currency unit
School Based Management
Primary school
SLTP
SLTP Terbuka
Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama
Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama Terbuka
Junior secondary school
Open junior secondary school
SPM
SPPM
Standar Pelayanan Minimal
Studi Pengembangan Sub-sektor Pendidikan
Madrasah
SAB - Standar Analisa Belanja
Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional
(MSS) Minimum service standards
Madrasah Education Sector Assessment
study (ADB/AusAID)
Standard Spending Assessments
National Socio-Economic Survey
Private
Targeted Funding for Educational
Achievement (New Zealand case )
Sub-district Junior Secondary School
Development Team
REDIP
SSA
SUSENAS
Swasta
TFEA
TPK
Tim Pengembangan SLTP Kecamatan
UAS
Ujian Akhir Sekolah
UNDP
UNESCO
UNICEF
USAID
UU
Walikota
WB
WHO
WTO
Yayasan
Undang-Undang
Bank Dunia
Final school test (set nationally, marked at
schools)
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organisation
United Nations International Children's
Fund
United States Agency for International
Development
Law
Mayor
World Bank
World Health Organisation
World Trade Organisation
Private Non-profit Foundation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
problem is the failure to provide students with
the rudiments of instruction—textbooks, a
blackboard, writing supplies, and a teacher who
has mastered the curriculum and regularly
comes to class.
Indonesia’s population of school-age children is
one of the largest in the world. A sustained
drive to build schools across the country since
the 1970s has resulted in more and more of those
children attending school every year. This is an
impressive accomplishment. But there is a
widespread perception that several critical
barriers have prevented Indonesia from
achieving its goals of: (i) enrolling all students
through to the end of junior secondary level, (ii)
ensuring that poorer and disadvantaged children
have full and equal access to schools that
provide a safe and healthy learning environment
and effective instruction, and (iii) providing
education that is of acceptable quality and is
relevant to the economy and society.
Because Indonesia’s school system is immense
and diverse, it will be necessary to understand
these problems as they manifest themselves
across all of the regions of the country and
across all of its demographic groups, searching
for factors that explain the low quality of
education.
Decentralization
Indonesia’s ambitious decentralization program
is transforming the nature and level of public
service delivery, including education. How
decentralization applies to the education system
has been defined in Education Law 20/2003,
which transfers the principal responsibilities,
authority, and resources for the delivery of
education to lower levels of government, while
some decisionmaking power is transferred to
schools themselves.
First, behind the impressive increase in
enrollment at the national level, wide regional
differences remain, which means that the
likelihood of reaching junior secondary school is
very different for two young Indonesians, one
who resides in a well-to-do community in
Yogyakarta and the other in a poor rural area in
South Sulawesi. And even larger than this
between-province variation are disparities
among districts within provinces.
There
are
four
key
conditions
for
decentralization to overcome barriers and
stimulate educational development: (i) clear
division of responsibilities and power among the
different levels of government, (ii) greater
decisionmaking power and autonomy to local
governments, (iii) greater voice of teachers and
parents on how schools operate, and (iv)
effective accountability mechanisms and
financial structures that are consistent with
educational goals. By distributing power and
responsibility more widely throughout the
education sector, decentralization has the
potential to increase the efficiency of the system
and its responsiveness to the needs of its
constituencies. The freedom to experiment is
another potential benefit from decentralization,
and locally generated innovations can stimulate
continuing improvements in education if a
region can learn from the experiments carried
out in other regions.
Second, although Indonesia’s enrollment
expansion closed the enrollment gap between
males and females and across income groups,
especially at the primary education level,
striking inequalities between richer and poorer
children remain at the junior secondary and
senior secondary levels. While nearly all
children enter the early primary grades, those
who belong to the poorest income quintile drop
out first, thus completing much less than full
basic education, on average.
Third, the quality of schooling in Indonesia is
low and declining, and it is worst in the poorest
parts of the country. Decades of rapid expansion
of enrollment have not produced graduates with
the consistently high quality of knowledge and
skills needed to build a strong society and
competitive economy. Underlying the quality
x
able to restructure and re-equip themselves to
undertake their new roles.
However, despite its promising aspects,
decentralization is not a policy panacea.
Conflicts and inefficiencies can sometimes arise
when the goals of the different levels of
governments contradict each other. And even
when everyone’s goals are aligned, paternalistic
behavior left over from decades of centralistic
policymaking, on the one hand, and the extreme
dependency of some areas, on the other, can be
hard to change simply by edict. Inevitably, there
will be lags and variations in implementing
decentralization across the country. Thus, the
process of reform is likely to be a slow one,
punctuated by bursts of progress and frequent
setbacks that may lead to rising frustration and
mistrust among stakeholders if they do not
understand that these are inherent aspects of the
reform process.
Finance and Public Spending. Decentralization
has shifted the flow and allocation of fiscal
resources from the national government to the
district governments and from the district
governments to the schools. Are the fiscal
resources for education sufficient? Are these
resources being used more efficiently and more
equitably than before? How can the use of
resources be improved? What are the
implications of the new fiscal arrangements at
the school level and thus on educational
outcomes?
Education Quality.
Under decentralization,
improving quality will mean identifying those
institutional arrangements (such as standards,
structures, and incentives) that will improve
performance and accountability. What then are
the best ways to raise quality in the context of
local autonomy?
How can performance
standards be set, measured, and monitored
throughout the education system?
The Challenges of Implementation
Like other countries that have decentralized their
education system, Indonesia faces many
implementation challenges. However, most of
these challenges really stem from two
fundamental problems—unclear, incomplete,
and inappropriate assignment of governance and
management functions and a shortage of the
management and technical skills needed to
operate a decentralized education system.
Teacher Management.
In Indonesia, as
elsewhere, teachers are a critical element in the
process of educational development and,
reflecting this, their salaries and benefits account
for the bulk of resources spent on education.
How will decentralization affect the incentives
faced by teachers, how will it determine
teachers’ entry into and progression within the
profession, and what management systems are
likely to be effective in a decentralized context?
Numerous questions about decentralization have
emerged with its implementation. This review
focuses on four broad issues.
Governance and Management. Will the shift in
authority, responsibilities, and resources from
the central level to district governments and
communities help to achieve the desired
education outcomes in Indonesia? This depends
on how certain design and implementation
issues regarding governance and management
systems are resolved. These include how the
relationships between district governments and
district- and school-level service providers
change; what are the functions and roles of the
large number of decisionmaking bodies in the
sector; whether local government officials and
school staff have the capacity and skills to fulfill
their devolved functions and responsibilities;
and whether the central agencies are ready and
The following set of policy recommendations
emerged mainly from the meetings held by the
team that undertook this education sector review
with many stakeholders, including officials in
the central agencies, provincial and district
officials, teachers, head teachers, members of
school committees (including some parents),
national education experts, and the staff of aid
agencies. They are informed also by analyses of
enrollment, school supplies and public
expenditures data in Indonesia, and by the
xi
standard setting, teacher certification,
and school rehabilitation and repair, and
retire any leftover policies and programs
that undermine the goals under
decentralization.
lessons from experience of other countries that
have decentralized their education system.
Assign functions clearly and efficiently
within the education system and align them
with
appropriate
governance
and
management structures and financing
arrangements at all levels.
x Develop, test, and disseminate new
management and operations systems in
three areas—gathering and reporting
information, budget and expenditure
tracking, and planning, monitoring, and
evaluation of performance—at all levels
of government and at the school level.
The assignment of governance, managerial, and
financing functions in the education sector
remain vague. Similar functions and roles have
been given to different levels of government,
which is a recipe for replication, conflict, and
chaos. Also, functions and structures are not
aligned (for example, the central Ministry of
National Education is still quite large despite the
transfer of many of its responsibilities to lower
levels
of
government)
and
financing
arrangements do not conform to functions (as
illustrated by the many different sources of
financing for capital expenditures at the local
level). Moreover, some devolved functions are
best left to the national or provincial levels, such
as coordinating the strategic direction of the
education system and setting education
standards. Resolving these issues will require
reviewing and revising the decentralization laws
to clarify the assignment of functions, to correct
the misalignments between functions and
structures and between functions and financing
arrangements, and to follow through with
corresponding structural changes.
x Foster a national education information
system consistent with decentralization
with financial incentives offered to
districts for reporting information to this
national-level education database.
x Develop management and technical
capacities at all levels and define
performance standards and measures for
all decentralized functions and a
corresponding checklist of basic
competencies needed to carry them out.
Increase the resources that are available to
the district governments for education.
To implement their assigned functions under
decentralization, local governments should
manage far more educational resources than just
teacher salaries. Only a very small proportion of
the transfers to these governments is available
for non-salary expenditures. The result is either
that schools are starved of much-needed capital
investments or that capital investments in
schools are financed in a fragmented and
unplanned way by the central government or aid
agencies, robbing the districts of the ability to
manage their education systems. To rectify the
situation, the central government should expand
the education allocation through the block
transfer mechanism and should develop and
disclose a multi-year plan for financial, technical
and
management
assistance
to
local
governments.
These educational assistance
plans should be developed, in consultation with
local governments.
Reform the central Ministry of Education
so that it can articulate and harmonize
education policies and design an
implementation
program,
and
an
investment and funding plan for those
policies, while ensuring that local
governments and civil society have a voice
in this process.
The MoNE should be reorganized according to
its new major functions consistent with its
oversight role in a decentralized education
system. In particular, the Ministry should:
x Harmonize and link new education
policies and programs for example,
xii
quality standards, especially in poor areas. In
line with this, the central government should
adopt pro-poor education programs to stimulate
demand consistent with the goals of the global
Education for All initiative, and provide
adequate and timely technical assistance to local
governments to build the capacity of local
governments to carry out their new
responsibilities effectively. As for the central
government, the Indonesian government should
adopt a “one policy roof” for all schools, and, as
a first step, assess all religious and private
schools according to the same national minimum
education quality standards that apply to public
schools.
Require
provincial
and
district
governments to prepare and implement
multi-year regional investment and
financing plans as well as a corresponding
assistance plan for each school in
accordance with regional goals and with
school capacities and needs.
Giving transfers to lower levels of governments
is more effective when efforts are also made to
build local planning skills, to increase
transparency in the allocation and use of local
funds, and to require accountability in return for
the transfers. Start by replacing the budgeting
process that local governments and schools go
through each year and replace it with a multiyear investment plan and an annual spending
plan. In doing so, a clear funding mechanism is
also needed to transfer resources to schools that
is easy to implement and to monitor. Districts
should disclose publicly how much they will be
giving to each school well before the beginning
of the school year. A periodic financial audit of
schools is an input into the preparation of the
schools’ multi-year assistance plans and makes
the implementation of these plans easier. These
are concrete actions that provincial and district
governments can take together.
Establish a teaching service, separate from
the civil service, that includes a
transparent, system-wide appointment and
deployment process and a professional
development system that is school-based
and performance-led.
Our most critical recommendation is for the
establishment of a separate teaching service that
involves: merit-based appointments, transfers,
and promotions; school-based performance
evaluations; and professional development that
covers all phases of the teachers’ career
including their initial training, their induction
into the teaching profession, school life, and
continuous professional development.
This
service would need to be built up over time.
Help all schools to make and implement
decisions that will improve quality,
especially those in poor areas.
But more resources to schools are not sufficient
to improve them. Making schools the center of
a strategy that is performance based is. The first
step in improving school quality is to bring the
physical and human infrastructure up to
minimum standards for accreditation and to
ensure that schools are funded at least to the
minimum necessary for operations and
maintenance. This should be accompanied by a
periodic audit of schools on the basis of a
checklist of standards, require schools to report
their own expenditures in a timely fashion,
establish a proposal-based grants program that
would allow schools to request extra resources
for specific innovations and experiments, and
develop a policy for targeting special assistance
to those schools that do not meet the minimum
Finally, there is the question of how best to
implement these recommended actions. Both
supply-side and demand-side approaches will be
needed to fill existing policy and technical gaps.
Supply-side investments are needed to
strengthen the capacity of central education
agencies to make policy, to plan, to set
standards, and to measure the performance of
districts and schools. They are also needed to
stimulate the development of new solutions that
can be used by local governments. It is vital to
link all of the different supply-side investments
in one institution-building agenda instead of
xiii
undertaking
them
coordination.
separately
with
no
Conclusion
Many messages have emerged from the review,
but the two overarching messages are:
However, in the spirit of decentralization and in
recognition of the great diversity that exists
across Indonesia, demand-side programs are also
needed. First, the central government must
expand its use of block transfers to regional
governments, rather than move away from them,
as the channel for education resources, while
investing urgently in enhancing local capacities
to manage there resources well. Second, the
national government should establish grants
targeted to the poorest districts to fund projects
initiated by local schools and communities. To
encourage districts to collaborate to take
advantage of economies of scale, the grants
program could award more money to those
proposals that are submitted by associations of
districts. Third, as a managerial safety net, the
government should evaluate and support the
education management systems being developed
and used in different regions.
x Improving education quality across the
system is the key educational challenge
for Indonesia today, and even concerns
about equity and serving the poor must
be couched in terms of universal access
to education of acceptable quality.
x Decentralization can potentially help to
meet this quality challenge—by
spreading
the
governance
and
managerial responsibility for improving
better education across different
stakeholders,
by
strengthening
accountability mechanisms, and by
enhancing incentives to innovate.
However, any delays in clarifying and
rationalizing functions, structures, and
financing throughout the education
system and any lack of commitment
from the government to confronting
some difficult implementation issues
could erode the effectiveness of the
reform.
There is also a need to examine both past and
ongoing pilot initiatives in education - to build a
body of evidence-based, analytical lessons about
how to deliver education services of good
quality in the new decentralized education
system. An integral part of this evaluation effort
must be to establish a mechanism to ensure that
these lessons are widely publicized so that they
can be taken into account in national and local
policymaking and school-based management.
xiv
Chapter 1: Indonesia’s Educational Progress and Challenges
Enrollment Expansion
Table 1.1: Rising Education Enrollment Rates at all Levels, 1995-2002
1995
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
Indonesia’s population of
school-age children is one
Gross enrollment rate
of the largest in the
Primary level
107.0
108.0
107.6
108.0
107.7
106.0
world, but a sustained
Junior secondary level
65.7
74.2
73.4
76.1
77.6
79.9
drive to build schools
Senior secondary level
42.4
46.6
47.4
48.4
50.2
48.2
across the country since
the 1970s has resulted in
Net enrollment rate
more and more of those
Primary level
91.5
92.3
92.1
92.6
92.3
92.7
children attending school
Junior secondary level
51.0
57.8
57.1
59.2
60.3
61.7
every year. This has been
Senior secondary level
32.6
36.6
37.5
38.5
39.3
38.2
an
impressive
accomplishment for the Data sources: Pradhan (2001) and calculations using SUSENAS, 2002
country.
The primary
school enrollment rate has grown from 62
and to 80 percent in 2002. In 2002, the net
percent in 1973 to nearly universal coverage
enrollment rate was 62 percent. The senior
by 1983 and stayed high even through the
secondary enrollment rate has been rising
financial crisis of the late 1990s. In 2002,
too, though at a much more modest rate.
the gross primary enrollment rate exceeded
These enrollment rates, especially at the
100 percent, and net enrollment rate was 93
primary level, compare favorably with
percent (Table 1.1). The gross enrollment
enrollment rates in other countries in East
rate for junior secondary education showed
Asia with much higher per capita incomes
more marked increases, rising from 18
(Figure 1.1).
percent in the 1970s to 66 percent in 1995
Figure 1.1: Gross and Net Enrollment Rates in East Asian Countries, 2000
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
Indonesia
($710)
Philippines
($1020)
Thailand
($1980)
Primary Gross enrollment
Malaysia
($3540)
0
Korea
($9930)
Indonesia
($710)
Primary Net enrollment
Philippines
($1020)
Thailand
($1980)
Secondary Gross enrollment
Malaysia
($3540)
Korea
($9930)
Secondary Net enrollment
Notes: GNP per capita data (in parenthesis) are for 2002
Data sources: UNESCO, 2003 and World Bank Edstats (http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats)
1
Education Sector Review
Volume 1
in Sumatera Utara. At the junior secondary
level, net enrollment rates ranged from 40.9
percent in Nusa Tenggara Timur to 77.2
percent in Jakarta, and at the senior
secondary level, from 24.5 percent in Nusa
Tenggara Timur to 58.4 percent in
Yogyakarta.1
The financial crisis of the late 1990s
threatened to derail the educational progress
that Indonesia had made in the previous
decade.
Enrollment rates faltered
immediately after the crisis but have since
recovered. Impressively, large decreases in
enrollment rates were avoided even though
real household education expenditures—and
the share of education expenditures in total
household expenditures—declined by about
one-third from 1998 to 2000 (Pradhan,
2001). Perhaps this is partly attributable to
the national pro-poor scholarship and school
grants program that the government
launched at that time to mitigate the adverse
effects of the crisis (Cameron, 2002 and
Filmer et al, 2001), and perhaps also to a
more established demand for schooling in
Indonesia, even among the poor.
Even larger than this between-province
variation are disparities among districts
within provinces. Only about one-fourth to
one-third of the total inequality in
enrollment rates in primary to senior
secondary education is due to differences
between provinces; the rest of the inequality
is due to differences among the districts
within provinces (Table 1.2). This means
that how education resources are distributed
among districts within each province matters
more than how resources are distributed
among provinces if equality in education
outcomes is to be realized.
Educational Challenges
There is a widespread perception that
several critical barriers have prevented
Indonesia from achieving its Education for
All (EFA) goals of: (i) enrolling all students
through to the end of junior secondary level,
(ii) ensuring that poorer and disadvantaged
children have full and equal access to
schools that provide an appealing learning
environment and effective instruction, and
(iii) providing education that is of acceptable
quality and is relevant to the economy and
society (PROPENAS, 2000-2004 (Jalal and
Musthafa, 2001). These challenges are
discussed in this section.
Table 1.2: Inequality in Enrollment Rates: Wider Gaps
within than between Provinces, 2002
Source of
Junior
Senior
Primary secondary secondary
inequality
Gross
Between
enrollment provinces
30.5
29.2
27.5
rates
Within
69.5
70.8
72.5
province
Net
Between
enrollment provinces
39.2
35.8
29.9
rates
Within
60.8
64.2
70.1
province
Notes: The coefficients of variation for enrollment rates across the
years are small at the primary level (ranging from 4 to 7 percent
for net enrollment rates), as compared with those at the junior
secondary level (22-28 percent) and at the senior secondary level
(41-46 percent).
Data sources: District-level database for ESR, using data from
various years of SUSENAS.
Closing Large Regional Gaps
Behind the impressive increase in
enrollment at the national level, wide
regional differences remain. In a country as
large, spread out, and diverse as Indonesia,
differences among regions are to be
expected. However, extreme differences
mean that some regions have been lagging
for sustained periods and thus need extra
help. In 2002, net enrollment rates in
primary education ranged from 83.5 percent
in the province of Gorontalo to 94.4 percent
1
These comparisons exclude a few provinces where
the samples tended to be in urban areas. According to
the SUSENAS Work Manual (BPS, 2002), “Because
of the unfavorable security situation, in the following
provinces/regencies SUSENAS 2002 is only
conducted in Banda Aceh (Aceh), Ambon (Maluku),
Ternate (North Maluku), Sorong (West Irian Jaya),
Timica (Central Irian Jaya), and Jayapura (East Irian
Jaya).”
2
Chapter 1
Indonesia’s Educational Progress and Challenges
Table 1.3: Education Equality at the Primary Level and Increasing Equality at
Higher Levels: Net Enrollment Rates by Income Quintile, 1993-2002
Income
quintile
Poorest
2
3
4
Richest
1993
86.7
90.7
92.5
93.3
93.0
Primary
1997
90.3
93.0
93.4
93.5
92.4
Junior secondary
1993
1997
2002
22.6
37.7
45.5
37.5
52.2
57.9
47.5
60.0
65.1
61.3
69.2
72.0
72.5
75.1
76.9
2002
91.4
93.6
93.8
93.2
91.4
Senior secondary
1993
1997
2002
7.0
12.4
17.8
15.4
24.4
28.0
25.2
34.2
37.9
42.3
47.8
49.8
60.8
60.9
62.0
Q5/Q1
1.07
1.02
1.00
3.21
1.99
1.69
8.68
4.91
3.48
Data source: Calculations based on SUSENAS data, various years. Data exclude East Timor. 2002
exclude most of Aceh and Papua.
Figure 1.2: Highest Grade Completed by 16-18 year
olds, by Income Quintile
100
pe rce nt
90
richest quintile
80
70
60
Improving the Quality of Education
50
second poorest quintile
40
30
20
poorest quintile
10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
grade
was three and a half times that of the poorest
quintile (Table 1.3).
While nearly all
children enter the early primary grades,
those who belong to the poorest income
quintile drop out first, thus completing the
fewest years of schooling (Figure 1.2).
These patterns point to the critical junctions
in the school cycle when children from poor
households begin to fall far behind.
8
9
10
11
12
Data source: SUSENAS, 2002.
Reducing Inequality across Income Groups
Indonesia’s past enrollment expansion
closed the enrollment gap between males
and females and across income groups,
especially at the primary education level, but
striking inequalities remain at the junior
secondary and senior secondary levels. In
2002, the net enrollment rate in junior
secondary school of the richest one-fifth
(quintile) of the population was 69 percent
higher than that of the poorest quintile, and
their senior secondary net enrollment rate
3
There is a common perception that the
quality of schooling in Indonesia is low and
declining and that decades of rapid
expansion of enrollment have not produced
graduates with the consistently high quality
of knowledge and skills needed to build a
strong society and competitive economy.
National newspapers periodically comment
on the gap between what schools offer and
the desires of parents for their children to be
taught moral and religious rectitude, the
needs of civil society for an engaged
electorate, and the demands of the enterprise
sector for employees and entrepreneurs with
imagination and problem-solving skills.
According to the results of the 2002
examinations published on the National
Examination Center website, the more than
2.2 million students from nearly 20,000
schools who took the tests averaged scores
of 5.79 for math, 5.11 for Bahasa Indonesia,
and 5.29 for English, out of a possible 10
points for each subject area. These confirm
another piece of evidence—that eighth-
Volume 1
graders in Indonesia performed well below
most of its Asian neighbors on international
tests in 1999 (Table 1.4). However, this is
just the tip of the quality problem. National
averages mask wide variation across
provinces and across districts. In urban
areas alone, government expenditures per
school ranged from a minimum of Rp 3,000
to a maximum of Rp 460,000 in 2001
(McMahon, 2003).
This staggering
variation defines the starkly different worlds
of students around the archipelago.
Table 1.4: Student Performance on
Mathematics and Science Tests, Ranking
among 38 Countries
Country
Mathematics Science score
score & rank
& rank
Singapore
604 (1)
568 (2)
Korea
587 (2)
549 (5)
Taiwan
585 (3)
569 (1)
Hong Kong
582 (4)
530 (15)
Japan
579 (5)
550 (4)
Malaysia
519 (16)
492 (22)
Thailand
467 (27)
482 (24)
Indonesia
403 (34)
435 (32)
Philippines
348 (36)
345 (36)
Data source: Trends in International Mathematics
and Science Study, 1999.
Indonesia’s school system is immense and
diverse. In 2001/02, there were 28.9 million
primary school students and 1.4 million
primary school teachers in more than
171,000 primary schools across some 400
districts and municipalities. At the junior
secondary level, in grades 7 through 9, there
were 9.4 million students and about 680,000
teachers in more than 31,000 schools,
including general, religious, public, and
private schools. Raising the quality of
education in a system this large is not an
easy task. Underlying the quality problem is
the failure to provide students with the
rudiments of instruction—textbooks, a
blackboard, writing supplies, and a teacher
who has mastered the curriculum and
regularly comes to class. One in six schools
in Central Java and at least one in two
schools in Nusa Tenggara Timur are
reported to be in “bad condition,” according
to school survey data from the Ministry of
National Education (MoNE).
“If the priorities of South-East Asia’s
politicians are anything to judge by, few
subjects are more important than
education. … No wonder. Before the
crash of 1997, education was said to be
propelling South-East Asia’s breakneck
growth. Now it is billed as the factor
that could fuel another boom. In fact, the
region’s erstwhile tigers still scratch
above their weight in educational terms.
… But South-East Asian leaders are
terrified that their countries will lose out
on foreign investment and economic
growth unless they produce more skilled
workers” (Economist.com, 2003).
Decentralization: Promise or Peril for
Education?
Indonesia’s decision to decentralize its
government was driven primarily by
political considerations—a national call for
democracy, the end of the Soeharto regime,
and the failures of the highly centralistic
government, intensified by the financial
crisis of 1997. Its decentralization laws
(Law 22 and Law 25 of 1999) are based on
the principles of democracy, community
participation, equity and justice, recognition
of the potential and diversity among regions,
and the need to strengthen local governance.
This reform is also transforming the nature
and level of public service delivery,
including education. How decentralization
applies to the education system has been
defined in Education Law 20/2003.
The kind of education system that has
succeeded in expanding enrollment rates is
not necessarily the same kind of system that
can effectively address the kinds of
challenges related to quality.
To find
solutions, it is necessary to understand the
problem across all of the regions of the
country and across all of its demographic
groups and to examine the factors that
explain it. A December 2003 article in The
Economist emphasized that Indonesia cannot
afford to ignore the challenge of improving
education quality:
4
Chapter 1
lags and variations in implementing
decentralization across the country. Thus,
the process of reform is likely to be a slow
one, punctuated by bursts of progress and
frequent setbacks that may lead to rising
frustration and growing mistrust among
stakeholders if they do not understand that
these are inherent aspects of the reform
process.
According to this law, the principal
responsibilities, authority, and resources for
the delivery of education are transferred to
lower levels of government, while some
decisionmaking power is transferred to
schools themselves.
Can this reform cure what ails Indonesia’s
education system and help to stimulate
educational
development?
If
decentralization changes the distribution of
accountability
among
the
different
stakeholders in the education system and
focuses that accountability on measurable
educational outcomes, then the answer is
yes.
By distributing responsibility and
power more widely throughout the
education sector, decentralization has the
potential to increase the efficiency of the
system and its responsiveness to the needs
of its constituencies. It also gives the
freedom to innovate. In a large country like
Indonesia, local conditions vary widely
enough to make it rewarding and even
necessary to experiment, and locally
generated innovations can stimulate
continuing improvements in education if a
region can learn from the experiments
carried out in other regions.
For decentralization’s promise to be realized
in Indonesia, government commitment to the
reform is necessary but not sufficient in
itself. Four key conditions have to be met:
(i) a clear the division of responsibilities and
power among the different levels of
government, (ii) real decisionmaking power
and autonomy to local governments, (iii)
greater voice of teachers and parents on how
schools operate, and (iv) effective
accountability mechanisms and adequate
financial and technical resources that are
consistent with educational goals. Table 1.5
lists the supporting conditions that have
helped other countries to implement
decentralization and indicates whether the
conditions are present in Indonesia.2 Like
other countries that have decentralized their
education system, Indonesia faces many
implementation challenges. However, most
of these challenges really stem from two
fundamental
problems—unclear,
incomplete, and inappropriate assignment of
governance and management functions and
a pervasive lack of the management and
technical skills needed to operate a
decentralized education system.
However, decentralization also raises
difficult issues.
Despite its promising
aspects, it is not a policy panacea. Conflicts
and inefficiencies can sometimes arise when
the goals of the different levels of
governments contradict each other. For
example, the central government may want
to allocate public funds in such a way as to
equalize education indicators across the
country, which might be resisted by a
wealthy district that already has achieved a
high education quality level. How to resolve
such disparate education goals among
stakeholders in the sector is a permanent
challenge under decentralization. And even
when everyone’s goals are aligned,
paternalistic behavior left over from decades
of centralistic policymaking, on the one
hand, and the extreme dependency of some
areas, on the other, can be hard to change
simply by edict. There will inevitably be
Topics for this Review
Numerous questions about decentralization
have emerged with its implementation. This
review focuses on four broad issues, which
are discussed in this section.
2
The information is derived from a series of
interviews conducted for this report with various
policymakers, experts on governance and management
issues, and representatives from education boards and
school committees.
5
Volume 1
Education Quality
Will the shift in authority, responsibilities,
and resources from the central level to
district governments and communities help
to achieve the desired education outcomes in
Indonesia? This depends on how certain
design and implementation issues regarding
governance and management systems are
resolved.
These include how the
relationships between district governments
and service providers (district and schoollevel providers) have changed; what are the
functions and roles of the large number of
decisionmaking bodies in the sector;
whether local government officials and
school staff have the capacity and skills to
fulfill their devolved functions and
responsibilities; and whether the central
agencies are ready and able to restructure
and reequip themselves to undertake their
new roles.
Improving the quality of the education
provided in schools has emerged as a high
priority in the government’s policy and
issues papers. It has focused on how to
provide more and better inputs such as
textbooks and teaching aids to schools.
Under decentralization, however, improving
quality will mean identifying those
institutional
arrangements
(such
as
standards, structures, and incentives) that
will
improve
performance
and
accountability. What then are the best ways
to raise quality in the context of local
autonomy? How can performance standards
be set, measured, and monitored throughout
the education system?
Teacher Management
In Indonesia, as elsewhere, teachers are a
critical element in the process of educational
development. No systems for managing the
teaching force have been fully specified in
either the general decentralization laws or in
the new Education Law. Yet such systems
are vital for managing the employment,
deployment, and career opportunities of this
very large workforce and to ensure that
schools reach a level of performance that is
consistent with the country’s education
goals. How will decentralization affect the
incentives faced by teachers, how will it
determine teachers’ entry into and
progression within the profession, and what
management systems are likely to be
effective in a decentralized context?
Decentralization has shifted the flow and
allocation of fiscal resources from the
central government to the district
governments and from the district
governments to the schools.
While
Indonesia is no stranger to transfer
mechanisms, such as its current block grant
system to districts, it has now become one of
the most decentralized countries in the
world.
Are the fiscal resources for
education sufficient? Are these resources
being used more efficiently and more
equitably than before? How can the use of
resources be improved? What are the
implications of the new fiscal arrangements
at the school level and thus on educational
outcomes?
6
Chapter 1
Table 1.5: Some Challenges and Issues in Implementing Decentralization in Education
Common challenges in
implementing decentralization*
1
Clear and efficient definition and
assignment of roles and responsibilities
(function assignment)
2
3
Alignment of responsibility and authority
State or provincial governments sharing
authority
with lower levels of
government and with schools
Effective management systems and skills
(generic and system-based) to implement
the reform
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Community, parent, and private sector
participation
Organizational
and
individual
accountability
Information of high quality and
information about quality
Effective technical support and guidance
Equitable
educational
access,
opportunities, and quality
Efficient
and
equitable
resource
allocation
Support for decentralization and political
and legal support
12
Project design supports decentralization
objectives
13
Institutional and political predictability
14
Present in Indonesia?
No. Key features and elements of the new institutional arrangements
under decentralization remain unfinished, ambiguous, and controversial.
The law has specified the obligatory sectors for district governments, but
their functions within those sectors have yet to be decided. There are
inconsistent regulations that affect accountability and mismatches
between the functions of and resources available to the different
government levels.
Not yet; function assignment is not clear, even in the new Education Law.
No. Provinces do not have overall power relative to districts and schools.
No, though highly variable. Many districts do not have the skills to
implement education decentralization, though some do. There is no
serious (universal) diagnostic against a complete and detailed function
assignment, partly because function assignments are not clear. Some
samples have been done. Some districts are so small that they may never
have the skills.
Pilot projects suggest interest is high, but few opportunities exist for
participation.
No clear mechanisms but there is a proposal for obligatory functions.
No. Information infrastructure has to be rebuilt and needs to be linked to
performance.
No. Most instructions and guidelines and the regulatory tradition are
aimed at control rather than support.
No. There are large variations across districts and schools in indicators of
school quality.
No. Funding formulae are inefficient. Spending per student varies
greatly among districts and among schools.
Not a serious problem at local levels. Districts are interested in their new
powers. School-level decentralization has not yet been tested sufficiently
to assess degree of resistance. Some resistance at national level to
decentralization of certain functions, e.g., those related to teacher
management.
Does not appear to be a problem. There were decentralization pilot
projects ahead of the legislation and regulation, but there have been
problems in applying lessons from pilot projects to legislation and
regulation.
Appears to be a problem; policy vacillates and implementation sometimes
contradicts policy.
No.
Form and process of resolving disputes or
contested roles and responsibilities
Notes: *As captured by the knowledge management tools at:
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/06.GovernanceReform/governace_ref.htm.
7
Volume 1
8
Chapter 2: Governance and Management
“[there have been] apathies and
confusion
in
the
process
of
decentralization and autonomy in
education as it restructures the ways of
thinking, especially in issues related to
school
and
community
based
management, dichotomy between public
and private schools… and education
management and coordination.” (MoNE,
2003, p.29).
Legal Framework and Governance
Structures
Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999, as well as the
newly ratified Education Law 20/2003, have
firmly established decentralization in
Indonesia, but many important legal and
implementation issues remain unresolved.
The Education Law, which takes
decentralization a step further from the
district to the school level and which was the
subject of national debate, clarifies but does
not resolve all these issues. For example,
conflicts may arise from the fact that the
central government continues to be in charge
of setting pay rates for civil servants,
including teachers, even while district
governments have been given the
responsibility for hiring and paying teachers
in all public schools except madrasahs. In
fact, many districts use their legal
prerogative to provide supplementary
benefits and incentives to the teachers within
their jurisdictions.
Also, while initial
teacher training remains the function of
those universities that are accredited by the
MoNE’s Directorate General of Higher
Education, it is not clear who is responsible
for teachers’ continuing professional
development.
Basic Challenges in Governance and
Management
Education systems have many different
decisionmakers, actors, and stakeholders.
For decentralization to contribute to
educational development, it must transform
the relationships among these various
individuals and agencies. In Indonesia, this
means redefining the roles of the MoNE and
local governments; increasing transparency
and accountability at the local level from
principals and teachers to parents and
community and from the kepala dinas to the
DPRD and the education board; opening up
information flows among parents, students,
and school personnel; and ensuring that
local input is taken into account in the
learning process. In principle, these changes
in relationships should be facilitated by
corresponding shifts in the system’s
organizational structure.
Some
functions
may
have
been
decentralized too far, leaving district
governments to wrestle with very difficult
managerial and technical tasks that they are
unprepared for. It is possible for districts to
collaborate with each other and some are
creatively doing precisely that, but there are
hardly any guidelines, principles, or good
practice examples to inform this type of
collaboration. These conditions have caused
anxiety among education managers at the
local level, as the MoNE recognized in a
planning document in 2003:
Figure 2.1 reflects what is taking place in
Indonesia. In the figure, the governance or
representative line of accountability is
shown as separate from the management or
executive line of accountability. It also
shows that provincial governments are
essentially missing from the new functional
structure of basic education.
9
Volume 1
Figure 2.1: Flows of Governance and Managerial Accountability in Decentralized Indonesia
Management
or Executive Aspect of
Government:
Management Accountability
Governance or
Representative Aspect of
Government:
Governance Accountability
President of the
Republic
MPR
DPR
MoHA
MoF
Depdiknas
standard-setting
(sets standards of reporting
on financial and educational issues)
(accountability is around standards)
National
Level
report on
organization of
regional government
through MoHA,
reporting to standards
(Provincial Level)
DPRD
(Regional People's
Representative
Assembly)
Regents, Mayors
(Bupati, Walikota)
Education
Boards/Councils
Kabupaten/
Kota
Level
Head of District
Education Service
(Kepala Dinas
Pendidikan)
School
Committees
Principals
School
Level
policies, and regulations that are
independent of the executive or
management line.
This could be
achieved if local legislatures were to
provide research and analysis assistance
to governance bodies, perhaps through
consulting services.
Clarifying Governance Functions
There are several unexamined or unresolved
issues relating specifically to the governance
line. Here we highlight a few.
x To make well-informed decisions,
governance bodies at each level (in
other words, the DPR at the central
level, the DPRDs at the district level,
and the school committees at the school
level) need regular access to timely and
accurate information and to the results
of technical analyses.
Currently,
however, the governance bodies do not
have any systematic mechanisms for
evaluating the soundness of legislation,
x The role of the district education boards
needs to be revisited. These boards
consist of district leaders, including the
district head, and are supposed to assist
the DPRDs in making policy decisions
about education. However, the divisions
of labor between these boards and the
DPRDs, between these boards and the
10
Chapter 2
expanded roles. Management systems at all
levels of government that used to operate the
education system have broken down or are
now obsolete. New systems that will allow
local governments to perform the functions
that have been transferred to them under the
decentralization reform are just beginning to
emerge, but there is no national strategy for
encouraging
or
disseminating
good
practices. There is also some concern that
staff at the local levels are not sufficiently
trained and experienced to carry out their
new and expanded roles. Moreover, field
visits conducted for this review revealed that
there is a great deal of confusion
surrounding the functions related to, for
example, teacher management (including
training,
recruitment,
deployment,
performance evaluation, human resources
databases, payroll, and redeployment) or to
the allocation of resources to schools. We
highlight a few issues here.
kepala dinas, and between these boards
and the school committees do not appear
to be effective.
x As defined by ministerial decree
(KepMen
044/U/2002)
and
the
Education Law, the duties and powers of
the school committee need to be made
clearer and more efficient. In the case
of financial management, should school
committees have oversight over all
financial matters rather than just the
issues related to funds raised by parents?
Many of the duties of school committees
appear to require them to enter into
contracts, but do they have the legal
right to do so, and if so, how will this
legal status be supported? It would be
very inefficient if each of over 400
district governments had to resolve these
issues on its own.
x At the moment, many functions have
been decentralized too far, that is, down
to a level that does not have the capacity
to perform that function effectively.
Having recognized this, some districts
and provinces are coming together to
form agencies that can handle certain of
their functions on a collective basis (as
suggested in Law 22/1999).
For
example, various districts in East Java
are collaborating on the development of
student tests; each district develops the
exam for one academic subject and then
all of the exams are shared across
districts, thereby taking advantage of
economies of scale. Apart from this,
there are other tasks that are most
usefully undertaken in collaboration—
but
how
should
collaboration
agreements be developed?
x The MoNE stopped receiving regular
information through its past data
collection mechanisms because districts,
now being autonomous, no longer feel
compelled to transmit information
upwards. In 2002, the annual school
census yielded only a 30 percent
response rate from schools as compared
with 80 percent in 2000. As shown in
Box 2.1, this has also been the case in
other countries that have decentralized
their education sectors.
x The experimentation that follows from
the implementation of decentralization
makes it possible to adapt systems to
natural variations in local conditions.
For example, some districts have
experimented with upgrading their
budgeting and finance systems by
setting formulae for district–to–school
funding. One dynamic bupati in Bali
has managed to eliminate certain fees by
consolidating schools and reducing
certain types of expenditure, thus
making enough room in the budget to
eliminate school fees and still cover
costs. The lessons from these various
Rebuilding Management Systems
It is clear that the systems that are currently
in place at the lower levels of government
are not sufficient to perform the many
functions that have been devolved to them.
Nor do the staff at these levels have the
necessary skills to carry out those new and
11
Volume 1
Box 2.1: Information Systems and Management in Brazil and Spain
In Brazil and Spain, devising good management information systems under decentralization was difficult
and problematic but was possible with effort and partnership between the various levels of government.
Brazil. Until 1995, educational databases in Brazil were outdated and data collection was unsystematic.
Not only was there no up-to-date information available to guide policymaking but there was also no way to
monitor or follow up on policy actions. This caused a huge amount of waste in the use of funds. In the
absence of a standard national system of information and indicators, several states built their own data
gathering and processing systems that were not compatible with each other. As a result, Brazil could not
provide international organizations with consistent national data on education, and the available information
was neither sufficient nor reliable enough to be used as a basis for designing policies.
However, in 1995 the federal government issued guidelines for the creation of evaluation mechanisms to
monitor the country’s education system. Since then, the educational information system has been gradually
reformulated and now has an integrated but decentralized structure that meets the country’s monitoring and
evaluation needs. Several factors have contributed to this successful reorganization - the strong leadership
of the Ministry of Education in constant partnership with sub-national authorities and representatives of the
education sector, growing public support for systematic evaluations of schools and other educational
institutions, and multilateral cooperation in building capacity and disseminating the experiences of other
countries.
Spain. As the decentralization process unfolded in the 1980s, the country needed a planning mechanism to
coordinate the educational policies and programs being developed and executed by Ministry of Education
and the decentralized autonomous communities. One example of why such a coordinating mechanism was
necessary was the fact that soon after the decentralization process began the capacity to gather and
reproduce nationwide educational statistics was lost. Various regions had begun gathering their own data in
ways that could not be aggregated at the national level.
The Education Law of 1985 created the Conference of Counselors, with the Minister of Education and the
autonomous community counselors (chief educational officers) of the seven already decentralized regions as
members. Much of the work of the Conference (which meets at least once a year), is carried out by five
technical sub-committees each focusing on a specific issue (such as personnel, the curriculum, or statistics).
The Conference is an instrument of cooperation and not coordination because none of the decentralized
regions is obligated to carry out the decisions of the Conference when they believe their own statutes of
autonomy are being violated. Also, several autonomous communities worry that the Ministry may use the
Conference to control the actions of the decentralized regions. Another problem is that, even though issues
are brought to the Conference as technical problems, the proposed solutions tend to have heavy political
overtones. After all, the Minister and the Counselors sitting around the table are all appointees of particular
political parties, so political agendas are never far from the surface. Nevertheless, at times the Conference is
capable of reaching important agreements and carrying out complex actions.
Sources: Gumaraes de Castro, 2000 and Hanson, 2000.
to the districts, but if a district takes any
action that would result in changes in
the payroll database, it must report this
action to the national-level personnel
board, which has the power to veto the
action. With unresolved issues about
the assignment of functions, it is not
surprising that districts do not yet have
adequate teacher management systems.
experiments, however, have not been
systematically documented at the
national level or analyzed to see how
applicable they might be to other
situations. And even in those districts
that are experimenting, it is not always
clear if the evolving financial
arrangements are ideal or what functions
to decentralize to schools and why.
x At present, responsibility for personnel
management is nominally decentralized
x Increased
corruption
under
decentralization has been raised as a
12
Chapter 2
principles of the reform because it must be
willing to assume the costs involved in
changing its role in the management of
education (Box 2.2).
concern. The argument is that it is more
difficult to monitor 400 districts than it
is to monitor the central government.
In principle, however, decentralization
has the potential to reduce corruption.
Corruption can be kept under control if
resources are transferred to districts
using transparent allocation formulae,
such as a per student funding allocation,
if all actors know the amount of the
transferred resources and when the
funds are transferred, and if a culture of
public disclosure is engendered at all
levels of government.
Building Local Capacity
There has not yet been an audit of available
local skills covering all of the likely
functions that would need to be carried out
at the district level under a rationalized
model of decentralization. While districts
clearly must be responsible for raising their
own skills to the level necessary to carry out
their decentralized functions, the national
government is responsible for the
maintenance of standards. Therefore, it
seems appropriate that the central
government should be responsible for
carrying out a nationwide, district-level
audit of current management skills and
standards. At a minimum, the central
government should devise an instrument and
protocol for doing such an audit and for
compiling and communicating the results, as
having each district devise its own protocol
would be wasteful. It may be tempting for
the central government to slow down the
pace of decentralization for fear that district
and provincial governments do not have
sufficient capacity to carry out their newly
assigned
responsibilities
effectively.
However, there is greater capacity at the
local level than most central government
policymakers assume.
Since few real
decisions have had to be made locally
before, the actual extent of capacity and skill
at these levels has not been put to the test.
As decentralization proceeds, it may be that
existing local talents and capacities emerge
naturally, at least in some places. It is clear
that this is already happening in some parts
of Indonesia, as some districts have much
better and more talented bupatis than others.
The same process will undoubtedly occur
when authority is decentralized to the school
level; it will become clear that there are
many principals and community leaders
capable of wielding that authority
effectively.
Reframing the Role of the MoNE
Many major responsibilities and powers
now rest with district and provincial
governments. However, there are some
important policies and programs that these
governments have no incentive to carry out
because they cannot fully capture the
returns, because they are unable to perform
them well because of a lack of economies of
scale, or because they do not have sufficient
resources to undertake them. For these
reasons, the central government needs to
step in if such policies and programs are to
be undertaken. Such policies and programs
include setting goals for and standards of
service provision, experimenting when
needed, rewarding innovations from other
parts of the system, disseminating
information
widely
and
regularly,
establishing a transparent regulatory
framework and enforcing it, ensuring more
equitable
education
spending,
and
motivating districts and schools to adopt
national education goals.
Because these may be unfamiliar roles to the
central education agencies, they may be
tempted to hold on to their previous roles
rather than to redefine their mission (and
those of their deconcentrated units in the
provinces in the case of the MoNE), to
reorganize themselves accordingly, and to
update their own skills. Evidence from other
countries shows that the central government
has to be politically committed to the
13
Volume 1
process
known
as
“asymmetric”
decentralization). However, it is important
not to make the criteria that schools must
meet to be given decentralized powers so
strict that very few can meet them. This has
happened in some countries (for example, in
Colombia’s asymmetric decentralization
down to the district level) but not in others
(for example, South Africa’s asymmetric
decentralization down to the school level).
This is not to minimize the importance of
training and capacity building, particularly
on the question of inequality. In fact,
considerable emphasis is being placed on
this aspect in the various planning and
policy documents as noted above. One
possibility is to decentralize authority only
to those schools where capacity already
exists, while continuing to support those
schools that still need to develop it (a
Box 2.2: Transforming the Current Organizational Structure of the Ministry of National Education
Since the government of Indonesia has not yet arrived at a final and optimal function assignment and since
organizational form should follow function, it is difficult to suggest improvements for the Ministry of
National Education (MoNE) in any detail. However, judging by the organizational structure of the central
agencies of many countries that are decentralized or effective or both, Indonesia’s MoNE is not optimally
organized to provide support and guidance to lower-level government units and to schools.
The national level of modernizing and decentralizing governments, in other words, those that do not
implement policies but guide their implementation by local governments, is characterized by:
x
Less focus on traditional line functions such as early childhood, primary, and secondary education
and more focus on “transversal” support functions such as governance improvement, financial
equalization, and quality control.
x
Relatively less focus on supporting the direct execution of projects and hence fewer staff devoted
to the inspection and audit functions of these projects.
x
More focus on the procurement not so much of goods and construction services but of analytical
and developmental services.
x
The separation of those functions that support narrow issues of human resources or budgeting as
they apply to the MoNE itself and to projects run by the national level from those functions that
apply to the country as a whole.
With regard to size, it should be noted that central authorities in many decentralized countries have very
few staff. One extreme in the developed world is Canada, where the national education body functions
with a staff of only a few dozen, since there is no central authority but only a council of provincial
ministers with a very small secretariat. The United States functions with about 5,000 education staff at the
federal level. Developing countries such as China, Argentina, and South Africa have as few as a few
hundred to little over a thousand national-level staff.
The training and capacity of staff matter much more than the number. The dedication of staff time to
functions that have been appropriately assigned to the national ministry is also key. Staff who are highly
capable and whose actions create considerable leverage—because they are focused on overall direction,
policy, measurement, and comparisons—are much more important than the number of staff at the apex of a
decentralized system.
The proportion of the total budget spent by the national level in decentralized countries varies but is
generally higher than the proportion of staff working at the national level. At the pre-tertiary level in
decentralized countries, this ranges all the way from less than 10 percent (in China, the United States,
South Africa, and Hungary) to as high as 20-40 percent (in Australia, Poland, and Spain). As noted above,
the staff working at the national level in decentralized countries have a great deal more leverage over
resources than similar staff in a centralized system or than similar staff at lower levels of government.
14
Box 2.2: Transforming the Current Organizational Structure of the Ministry of National Education
continued
In sum, a central ministry in a decentralized system does not implement policies or interventions. Instead,
its functions should be to:
x
Set standards and measures of performance (ideally related to outcomes rather than inputs) and
ensure that the necessary information systems exist to collect and report them, (including and
engage in goal-setting or minimum service standard-setting, again outcome-oriented
x
Focus on institutions of delivery (for example, schools or colleges) rather than “levels” (such as
primary or secondary)
x
Ensure competition and emulation between decentralized regions
x
Ensure that decentralized units can raise their quality up to the necessary standard through systems
development, teacher training, and sufficient funding
x
Ensure that functions with large economies of scale are carried out at a level that takes advantage
of those economies of scale, perhaps by brokering associations between districts or provinces
x
Use funding or norming to correct spillovers between regions, for example in specialized areas of
education where one institution could serve more than one district
x
Defend equity in funding and outcomes by norming funding equity if possible and, if not, by
persuasion
x
Make planning, forecasting, and investment priorities for the whole education system, including
forecasting and analyzing teacher supply and demand
x
Encourage experimentation and disseminate any lessons learned from those experiments.
Chapter 1 in Volume 2 of this review contains a more considered discussion of these issues and proposes,
for discussion purposes, an organizational structure for the MoNE that might better suit Indonesia’s needs
than the current one.
15
Volume 1
16
Chapter 3: Finance and Public Spending
own-account revenues and shared revenues
for the remaining 30 percent (Table 3.1).3
This
significant
restructuring
of
intergovernmental transfers affects what
public resources are available for education
and who controls how those resources are
spent.
Financing Framework and Structures
under Decentralization
Decentralization has changed not only the
distribution of authority and responsibilities
within the education sector but also how
fiscal resources are generated and allocated.
Prior to decentralization, the central
government transferred public funds to the
regional
governments
through
the
Autonomous Government Subsidy (Subsidi
Daerah Otonom or SDO) and through
Presidential Instruction grants (Instruksi
Presiden
or
INPRES).
Now,
intergovernmental transfer arrangements
largely consist of block grants given by the
central government to district governments,
supplemented by an expansion of the
districts’ share of the revenues generated
from local economic activity and natural
resources. The new transfer system is a
combination of two grant channels—the
General Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum
or DAU) and the Specific Purpose Fund
(Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK)—and
In principle, the DAU allocation is based on
a formula that takes into account differences
in the needs and means of provinces and
districts; in practice, however, the central
government simply guarantees that a
province or district will receive an allocation
at least equal to the amount it received in the
past and that will cover its past wage
obligations. As long as a large part of the
block grants are protected under the “hold
harmless”4
components,
regional
governments will have little control over the
transfers that they receive, nor will they
have a strong incentive to spend those
resources efficiently. This is particularly
true in the education sector where the
salaries of the teaching force account for
more than 90 percent of expenditures,
leaving districts only a small fraction of
their budgets to allocate.
Table 3.1: Sources of Local Revenues, Fiscal Year
2001
Source
Carry-over from previous year
Own-source revenues
Transfers from central
government
Of which the DAU allocation
Other revenues
Total revenues
Source: Ministry of Finance
Rupiah
(Billions)
2,157
5,233
69,280
54,401
2,783
79,453
Percent
Law 34/2000 has given taxing authority to
district governments. Districts, but not
provinces, are now allowed to generate their
own taxes provided that the taxes are
authorized by the national government and
that they are in accordance with the
principles set out in Law 34/2000.5 Since
2.7
6.6
87.2
68.5
3.5
100.0
3
These new financial structures are described in
greater detail in various studies, including Hofman,
Kaiser, and Goga (2003) and Lewis (2001, 2002, and
2003).
4
This is to say that the central government is not
responsible if all of the block grant funding does not
reach the regional governments.
various revenue-sharing mechanisms. On
average, the DAU transfers account for
about 70 percent of the total revenues of
provincial and district governments, and
5
This is not a new phenomenon, however. Law
18/1997, the previous law on local taxes and levies,
was intended to stop the practice that then prevailed in
17
Volume 1
these expenditures (Hofman, Kadjatmiko,
and Kaiser, 2002). As district governments
increasingly exercise their right to borrow, it
will be necessary to improve the framework
of on-lending and on-granting mechanisms
that apply to the regions.
being given this authority, district
governments have been creating new taxes
aggressively (Lewis, 2002).6 In reality,
district governments have limited capacity
to raise taxes from their own resources such
as land, buildings, and natural resources, so
these constitute only about 5 percent of their
revenues. Provincial governments have a
larger own-resource base but must share this
with district governments. Moreover, the
revenue bases of provinces and districts are
highly unequal. For example, the per capita
non-oil and gas GDP of DKI Jakarta is
almost nine times larger than that of the
poorest province, East Nusa Tenggara
(Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002); in 2002, the
richest local government had 32 times the
revenues per capita of the poorest one
(World Bank, 2003b).
Expanding the Resource Envelope for
Education
In the past, Indonesia ranked lowest among
its Asian neighbors in the share of GDP that
is spent on education; in the late 1990s,
Indonesia spent just 1.4 percent of its GDP
on education compared with 4.7 percent in
Thailand and 4.6 percent in Malaysia. Since
decentralization, the total government
spending for education has increased
considerably. According to SIKD estimates,
education expenditures for primary and
junior secondary education in 2002 were 2.4
percent of Indonesia’s GDP at the district
level, totaling about Rp 43 trillion. This
spending may well have increased close to
the EFA cost implications for 2004,
provided that education spending increased
by the same projected percentage increase in
DAU transfers. (McMahon, 2003). In the
past, Indonesia was able to achieve
impressive progress in its basic education
enrollment rates, which was due in part to
the country’s sustained focus on boosting
primary education enrollments and in part to
the low cost of doing so.7 A greater focus
on education quality requires greater
resources and, more importantly, a more
effective use of those resources.
To supplement local financial resources,
district governments are allowed to borrow,
but are limited in the extent to which they
can go into debt. They must get the
approval from the Ministry of Finance in the
case of foreign loans and none of their loans
can be guaranteed by the central
government. Law 25/1999 prevents local
governments from borrowing except for
projects that will generate a financial return,
although this clause has been loosened up by
the implementing regulations.
At the
national level, about half of the development
budget (DIP) continues to consist of donor
project loans, and the central government
currently bears the debt-servicing burden on
local government of creating a plethora of local
government taxes. Many of these taxes had little
revenue potential but imposed high costs on the
taxpayer and the economy. Law 18 restricted regional
taxes to a specified list and made any additional taxes
conditional upon the approval of the Ministry of Home
Affairs with advice from the Ministry of Finance.
Some recent legislation has attempted to
secure a greater slice of the country’s
revenue pie for education.
The new
Education Law stipulates that a minimum of
20 percent of the central APBN budget,
6
Property taxes are administered and collected mainly
by the national government, although regional
governments assist with collecting these taxes in both
rural and urban areas. Until recently, the national
government retained 10 percent of total tax revenues
for its own use, 9 percent was provided to local tax
offices to assist with collections, 16 percent was given
to provincial governments, and 65 percent to local
governments (Lewis, 2002).
7
Duflo (2001) examined the effect of the large
number of schools built between 1973-74 and 1978-79
and concluded that each new school constructed per
1000 children resulted in 0.12-0.19 year more
schooling in Indonesia and 1.5-2.7 percent increase in
earnings for the first cohort that benefited fully from
the program. This result implies an economic return
to education of 6.8-10.6 percent.
18
Chapter 3
easy to monitor and to implement, is nondiscretionary, and depends on just a few key
measurable criteria. One important step is to
define minimum learning standards that will
be the basis for an agreed level of funding
per student. The advantages of this type of
funding mechanism are that it makes it
easier for local governments and schools to
plan ahead because they will know precisely
how much funding to expect. It is also more
transparent, which ensure accountability.
One of its disadvantages is that it relies on
the availability of accurate and timely local
enrollment data. If these are not available,
then the allocations to schools and districts
may either fall short of what is needed or
fall prey to corrupt efforts to use bloated
enrollment numbers (Ross and Levaþiü,
1999). This formula for funding should
become the routine way to allocate basic
education resources in Indonesia, and, in the
process, it will facilitate school-based
management by allowing schools to manage
assistance in cash rather than in kind.
exclusive of salary costs, and 20 percent of
the districts’ APBD budgets, also exclusive
of salaries, must be allocated to education.
Including salaries, districts now spend on
average about 40 percent of their APBD
budgets on education. Excluding salaries,
they spend less than 10 percent (assuming
that salaries are a modest 80 percent of
education spending out of APBD resources)
or less than one-half of what is stipulated in
the Education Law. To double the share of
education spending in APBD net of salaries,
districts will need to make significant
reductions in the shares of other sectors,
which may or may not be politically
possible.
Likewise, earmarking 20 percent of the
APBN when the MoNE is supposed to have
devolved most of its functions to local
governments may be well-intentioned but
has disadvantages. It puts pressure on the
MoNE to develop its own spending
programs in the regions, which would mean
that most of the capital investments in
education would be outside the control of
district governments. The experience of
other countries shows that this kind of
earmarking often leads to more spending but
not better outcomes because these centrally
initiated interventions guarantee the
provision of funds regardless of regional
performance
and
creates
multiple
opportunities for corruption. The challenge
then is to ensure that central and local
education budgets are indeed spent on
schools and students, that they cover the
basic operating expenses of schools besides
the costs of teaching and non-teaching staff
and their career development activities
(including instructional supplies, the routine
activities of the school committee, the
maintenance of a school database, the
dissemination of information to parents and
the community, utilities, and light repair of
the school buildings and other maintenance).
Table 3.2: Per Capita Education Spending, 20012002
2001 (Actual)
2002 (Planned)
Total
134,000
175,058
(1,586 – 463,753)
(1,193 - 540,479)
Routine
126,118
159,460
(998 - 450,789)
(1,013 - 539,287)
Development
16,185
21,692
(177 - 205,044)
(402 - 415,463)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate minimum and
maximum values.
Source: SIKD, Ministry of Finance
There has already been an attempt as part of
the Education for All effort to estimate the
per-student level of spending that would be
consistent
with
attaining
universal
enrollment and improving education quality
in Indonesia (McMahon, 2003). What needs
to be done is to open up this proposed
formula to national scrutiny and debate in
order to validate it and to obtain political
support for it. What also needs to happen is
for the funding formula to be applied to the
local processes of allocating the DAU, not
the DAK. Lastly, the funding mechanism
needs to take into account the extreme
Our principal recommendation about
ensuring adequate resources for districts and
schools is for the education system to adopt
a formula-based funding mechanism that is
19
Volume 1
are off-budget and local governments often
have no knowledge of them. In 2003, there
were around 400 different education projects
in operation in Indonesia, but there was little
coordination and information exchange
among them. During field visits for this
report, regional education officials in
Yogyakarta and Central Java expressed
frustration at not knowing the full extent of
the resources (in kind) available to them.
Without
information
and
without
transparency, it is very difficult for local
governments and schools to plan ahead, to
develop coherent and effective educational
programs, and to monitor and assess the
flow of funds through the system. Another
significant advantage of using the DAK
variation in the current per-student
allocation of the routine and development
budgets in the sector. Clearly, those districts
that are at the lower end of the range will not
meet any kind of education standard (Table
3.2), so the funding mechanism should be
designed to enable district governments to
mitigate specific inequalities among schools.
For example, the funding formula might
apply only to the per-student level of routine
operational expenditures.
Alternatively, the funding mechanism could
use a per-school rather than per-student
resource formula to deploy teachers and
other staff to schools and to determine
capital investments.
Many schools in
Indonesia have urgent development needs,
ranging from staff development to the
construction of a library or science
laboratory. Richer districts will be able to
undertake
these
capital
investments
themselves, but poorer districts will not, so a
pro-poor investment program will be
needed. In fact, because poorer districts
repeatedly find themselves unable to fulfill
their responsibility to deliver education of
acceptable coverage or quality (as is evident
from the strikingly wide range in the per
capita level of education expenditures across
districts), in the short-run, direct assistance
to schools in the form of cash would be
needed even to cover their basic operational
costs, perhaps through a special DAK
allocation.
Figure 3.1: Indonesia: Education Spending by
Level of Government, 2001
LG Capital
Expenditures
(APBD)
6%
Recurrent
penditures
(APBD)
60%
Central
Recurrent
Expenditures
(APBN)
12%
Central Capital
Expenditures
(APBN) 18%
Province
Recurrent
Expenditures
(APBD) 1%
Province Capital
Expenditures
(APBD)
3%
Source: APBN and APBD data
Notes: LG=Local government
Significant capital investments for education
can also be made through the DAK
allocation.
If there are key areas of
investments that are clearly called for by the
national education program, the MoNE
could consider setting aside a special DAK
allocation for those capital expenditures and
inviting local governments to submit
proposals for receiving a share of that
allocation. The advantages of using the
DAK allocation instead of the MoNE’s
development budget (DIP) is that local
governments can incorporate their DAK
grants into their overall planning and
budgeting processes, whereas DIP initiatives
allocation and minimizing DIP initiatives is
that, by increasing the transparency of the
distribution of development or capital funds
across regions, this would make it
considerably easier to use the DAU transfers
to increase equity among regions.
Making Education Expenditures
Count
Under decentralization, the impact of
education spending on education goals will
depend on how fiscal resources are spent at
20
Chapter 3
the central and local levels, on whether those
resources reach the schools, and, within the
schools, on how those resources are used.
Certain key actions can increase the
efficiency of these education resources.
government was successful in expanding
enrollment, but has not been effective in
raising the quality of education to a
minimum acceptable standard.
The
financing issue that most affects the quality
of education (the topic of the next chapter) is
whether budgets for schools are sufficient to
cover schools’ basic operation costs, let
alone to support their efforts to improve
quality. Many junior and senior secondary
schools now receive 50 percent or less than
their
pre-decentralization
budgets
(McMahon, 2003).9 Therefore it is important
to ensure that resources find their way to
schools and do not get appropriated –
whether legally or through corruption – by
the district governments.
Spend Locally
There are three important ways to make
expenditures more effective. The first way
is to change the pattern of spending on
education,
especially
by
district
governments. In the system as a whole,
three-quarters of resources are spent on
recurrent items, mostly on salaries and
benefits and a small amount on operational
costs and pedagogical supplies, and onequarter is spent on capital outlays (Figure
3.1). This pattern is more extreme at the
district level; in 2002, 95 percent of the
routine budgets of district governments was
spent on the salaries of teachers at the
primary and junior secondary levels and
other personnel.8 Often, even the tiny share
left over for development expenditures,
which is supposed to be devoted to building
new classrooms, repairing school facilities,
and teacher training, is occasionally used to
cover routine expenditures, especially staff
salaries. This expenditure allocation is
going to have to change if education quality
is to improve. Teachers do play the key role
in the teaching process, as will be discussed
in the next two chapters, but adequate
resources need to be devoted not only to
salaries but also to teacher professional
development and classroom supplies.
Differentiate Assistance to Districts and
Schools
When allocating DAK or DIP funds across
districts, it is crucial to differentiate among
districts based on their resources and needs.
Provided that reliable data on districts and
schools are available, the national
government should be able to develop an
assistance program to local governments
that is based on three indices: (i) an index
that characterizes educational progress in all
of the 400-plus districts, (ii) a financial
needs index, and (iii) an education
management capacity index that measures
the effectiveness of each district’s
performance
assessment,
information
system, and financial processes. All districts
can be ranked in a three-dimensional grid
defined by these indexes and grouped into
discrete categories that would correspond to
different packages of assistance from the
central government.
It is not a good idea for the central
government to step in to fill the capital
expenditure deficits at the local level. The
current system of development projects
designed and controlled by the central
For example, those districts with the worst
education index and the poorest financial
and management capacities would qualify
for the highest level of investment and
8
Article 49 of the new Education Law states that the
salaries of teachers and personnel appointed by the
central government will be paid out of the national
budget, the APBN. Presumably, the teachers and
personnel whose salaries were transferred to the
districts as part of the decentralization reform will
continue to be paid under the local budgets, the
APBD.
9
Districts with high levels of local revenue and
districts that are required to maintain particular levels
of funding to qualify for project funds have
maintained or increased their level of financing for
schools.
21
Volume 1
test scores.
Those
districts that appear in the
upper right-hand quadrant
are those that performed
Plot of individual districts by their average test scores and gross
the best in both respects
enrollment rate, with the effect of household incomes on test scores and
(enrollment rate and test
enrollment rates netted out
scores),
given
their
Residual total score variation
Linear trendline
income levels, while
those that appear in the
4
lower left-hand quadrant
12
are those that performed
11
11
13
3
11
the worst.10 Needless to
11
13
2
13
11
22 11 12 11
1312
12
20
11
11
17
13
say, those in the upper
33 10
13
29
20 11 201117
13
11
20
1113
13
22
11
31111
13
11
20
1111 10
13
13
11
3 13413
11
20411
10
1220
13
20
22
11
16
1123
3
11
10
10
13
13
13
20
20
20
13
1113
10
11
3
29
17
right-hand
quadrant
13
11
22
13
22
11
11
10
5
10
3
22
27
2213
1114 16813
13 1013
13
20 13
19
22 113 13
13
4
518 1020
11 28
18 20
17213
18
2029
13 1917
20
17
618
131620
419
20
4
17
20
17
13
4
should
not
be
receiving
10
20
10
10
3
14
10
3
4
20 10 20
0
19
19
203010 16
19
6
13
4 10
31616
3162415
302 13 2
22
10
5 17
2015
17 14
1610
14
15
28
619 4 22224
17416
55516
24 28
16
191514
30
52 10
27 614
28 24
218
2
the kind and level of
24
62885838 828108248223
5
14
1424 24
15 24
2 6 222
24
5
28
23
assistance that those in
24
14 21
27
23
21
21
21
the
lower
left-hand
23
-2
24
24
17
24
21
2424
quadrant should be. The
24
23
23
chart also shows that, in
general, districts that do
-4
6
better or worse in one
-2
0
2
-4
Residual gross enrollment variat
dimension also do better
Residual variation of total score and gross enrollment
or worse in the other.
Data source: 2002 EBTANAS test scores for junior secondary schools averaged by district;
However,
there
are
gross enrollment data by district from SUSENAS 2002.
districts
that
do
well
in
Note: The codes for the plots refer to the provincial affiliation of each district.
one dimension but not the
other, and the type and
level of assistance to them should be
technical assistance program for accelerating
different also.
educational development. In exchange for a
high level of financial assistance, these
Spend More Resources on Those Most in
districts would be required to agree to accept
Need
a correspondingly high level of technical
and managerial assistance from the MoNE.
A common concern about decentralization is
At the other end of the spectrum, those
that the transfer of authority and
districts with the best education index and
responsibilities to local governments
the highest capacities would qualify only for
weakens the central government’s ability to
enough assistance to enhance their
close gaps between the richest and poorest
educational development but would not be
areas of the country and thus inequalities
required to take technical or managerial
grow. Districts with the most resources are
assistance in exchange for financial help.
frequently those with higher enrollment
The idea behind the varying level of
oversight is that districts prefer to have more
autonomy (less technical and managerial
10
Regression analysis was used to identify the
support) than less autonomy (more technical
relationship between education outcomes (that is, test
and managerial support), so this acts as an
scores or enrollment rates) and the districts’ average
additional incentive for better performance.
household income levels. The regression results were
then used to obtain “residual” test scores and
To illustrate, Figure 3.2 portrays the
“residual” enrollment rates that could be attributed to
distribution of districts according to two
differences in the education systems and other factors
dimensions of educational development –
and not to differences in the economic status of the
school enrollment rates and average student
district.
Residual total score variation
Figure 3.2: Relationship between Two Dimensions of Educational
Development
22
Chapter 3
experience with its large scholarship and
school grants program, launched at the onset
of the recent financial crisis, can also be an
important input into the design of such a
targeted program.
rates and better schools, whereas districts
with fewest resources are those with lower
education indicators. The current formula
for the DAU allocations includes poverty as
one of its criteria (albeit affecting only a
small part of the allocation), but there is no
similar mechanism for ensuring that district
governments themselves use poverty as a
criterion for funding schools. In addition,
the trend towards local governments raising
their own resources may widen the gap
between those districts that have a strong
revenue base and those that are less
prosperous.
Currently, districts receive
twice
as
many
resources
from
intergovernmental transfers as from their
own revenues, so if transfers are used
equitably, they can be a powerful
mechanism
for
reducing
regional
inequalities.
One estimate of the cost of raising the
education of poor youths is given in the EFA
costing report for Indonesia (McMahon,
2003). The report recommends eliminating
fees.
Currently, fees are charged for
entrance; BP3; examinations; procurement
of textbooks, notebooks, and school bags;
transport; and so on. Districts and schools
would have to be able to forego revenues
from these fees while increasing the
enrollment of poor students and without a
worsening of education quality. At the
primary level, eliminating fees would mean
foregone revenues of Rp 13,000 per pupil in
2004 (2003 prices), on average. At the
junior secondary level, foregone revenues
amount to about Rp 57,000 per pupil.
Do district governments consider the same
factors as the central government does when
allocating their funds? When we examined
what factors appear to influence education
spending by districts, using their level of
per-student education expenditures (from the
2002 APBD allocation), we found that those
districts with greater fiscal capacity make
larger capital investments in education than
those districts with lower fiscal capacity.
Also, poorer districts (with the level of
poverty measured as the proportion of the
population below a certain poverty
threshold) do not spend more on education
from their budgets than richer districts
despite receiving a larger allocation more
from the DAU. Since the households in
poorer districts are less able to spend for
education themselves, both central and local
governments should be willing to
compensate for this deficit in order to reduce
inequality among districts.
The report also recommends an additional
grant for the poorest 18 percent of students
to cover the opportunity cost of schooling
incurred by their parents and the cost of
teacher salary supplements in their schools.
The report estimates a student grant of Rp
290,000 per pupil per year at the primary
level, which is more than doubling the
current grant by the government, and Rp
93,000 per pupil per year at the junior
secondary level. It would be advisable to
initiate pilot tests of these and alternative
grant amounts in order to ascertain the likely
responses of poor families across different
parts of Indonesia.
Lastly, the central government can influence
the allocation decisions of the better-off
districts, for example, by instituting a reward
system for those districts where the
education indicators of the poorest
communities or schools significantly
improve and, conversely, by taxing those
where indicators become worse.
To make pro-poor policies and programs
financially sustainable, it is important to
target them to those who need them most.
There are valuable lessons to be learned
from around the world (for example, from
Bangladesh, Brazil, and Mexico) on how
this can be achieved. Indonesia’s own past
23
Volume 1
society that exceed the benefits that they
yield to individuals, there is good reason for
society to subsidize the provision of basic
education. In addition, if the direct and
indirect costs of education are too high, they
deter poor children from going to school. In
the various sites that were visited for this
study, most schools seem to have granted
exemptions to those who could not afford
the fees, even in cases where the fees were
quite low, but this is clearly a situation to
watch as practice differs across districts and
across schools.12
Leverage Governmental Resources – But
Consider Consequences for the Poor
The total resource envelope for education
includes private expenditures as well as
public expenditures. The new Education
Law states that the financing of education is
a responsibility shared by the government
and the community (Articles 9, 47, and 54).
Indeed, students already pay a variety of
school fees, including monthly tuition fees,
entrance fees for new students, term and
final test fees, and extra-curriculum fees,
averaging an estimated Rp 213,000 per pupil
in primary and junior secondary schools
(McMahon, 2003). These fees together
constitute a substantial contribution to the
income of any school. One study found that,
on average, fees consist of about one-third
of schools’ non-salary expenditures, which
usually account for about one-fifth to onetenth of a school’s budget (McMahon et al,
2001).11 Schools also receive revenues in the
form of BP3 contributions and other
donations from parents, private foundations,
and NGOs.
Track and Monitor Spending
The importance of establishing an effective
information system has already been
discussed above. Having access to accurate
and timely information helps governments
to plan and manage the system, and sharing
the information with local stakeholders, such
as parents, through periodic reports may put
pressure on district officials themselves to
be more transparent and efficient. The focus
group meetings with teachers, principals,
and district officials undertaken as part of
this review indicate that decentralization,
while mostly a positive change, has created
more opportunities for bribery and corrupt
practices
(Vanwel,
Musthafa
and
Miftahuddin 2003). Bribes in money or kind
are said to be more costly, processes often
take longer than before, and the distribution
of grants, scholarships, and other school
funds is particularly vulnerable to
corruption.
Also, school principals
complained that the lack of transparency
about budget allocations at the central and
district levels prevents schools from
predicting how much revenue they will
receive except through fees collected at the
school level and makes it impossible for
Should schools be relying on students and
the local community for resources? There
are opposing views on this. On the one
hand, those schools that receive considerable
financing from the local community tend to
have greater parental involvement, to
operate more efficiently, and to have more
successful educational outcomes (Bray,
1997; Jimenez and Paqueo, 1996; and
James, King, and Suryadi, 1996). People
who pay at least a small amount directly for
education and other school services come to
value those services more highly than when
they receive those services for free. On the
other hand, if schools yield benefits to
11
A similar situation prevailed a decade ago when
public schools obtained 92 percent of their total
funding (both salary and non-salary) from government
allocations.
However, there was considerable
variation among regions. In Jakarta, public schools
depended on government resources for only 70
percent of their total budget, while in other parts of the
country, public schools depended on the government
for more than 90 percent of their budgets (James,
King, and Suryadi, 1996 and King, 1997).
12
At the beginning of the financial crisis in 1997, the
MoNE reminded schools that the school admissions
fee had been abolished in government primary schools
in 1984 and that BP3 payments were voluntary.
School revenues decreased in real terms by as much as
one-third because of the drop in the real values of fees
and government subsidies as well as an increase in the
non-payment of fees.
24
Chapter 3
them to do any multi-year improvement
planning. These problems are exacerbated
by the fact that district governments and
schools receive funding from a number of
different sources, often too many for them to
keep track of, all with different management
arrangements.13 Because of the fragmented
nature of the funding allocations at the
district level in Indonesia, it is almost
impossible for the ultimate beneficiary (the
school or the student) to know how much
funding they are supposed to receive and
whether the funds have been released. In
this situation, standards and information are
very important in increasing transparency
and compliance with policies, regulations,
and laws and in reducing corruption at all
levels of the system.
Smart, 2002). For Indonesia, this means
requiring local governments to prepare both
an adequate investment plan and an
adequate maintenance plan. Meanwhile, the
central
government
should
provide
technical assistance to help local
governments to develop plans, arrange
financing, and operate the local education
system as efficiently as possible. Also,
financial accounting and reporting processes
should become a standard part of the
operating procedures at all levels of
government and in schools.
At least as much managerial effort needs to
be spent on accounting and reporting
processes as is spent on planning and
budgeting. It is already clear that a program
for building the financial management
capacity of local officials and school
personnel is urgently needed. This capacity
building program also needs to focus on
reporting responsibilities and techniques.
The experience of countries around the
world shows that better information and
greater disclosure are key to maximizing the
effectiveness of decentralization (Bird and
13
This is not a new phenomenon. It was noted in
World Bank’s report “Education in Indonesia: From
Crisis to Recovery” (World Bank, 1998) that essential
information on the budget is “scattered among five
different ministries,” making the management of the
education system a very difficult task.
25
Volume 1
26
Chapter 4: Quality Assurance and Improvement
As already mentioned, there is a common
perception that the quality of schooling in
Indonesia is low and declining. In its final
report in 2002, Indonesia’s National
Commission on Education expressed
concern that the education system does not
provide Indonesia’s graduates with the skills
needed to compete successfully in a global
knowledge economy (MoNE, 2002a). It
may help to begin this chapter by defining
education quality, as the term can mean
different things to different people.
Education quality is typically defined in
terms of its instrumental value in increasing
student academic performance. In other
words, quality is usually defined as that mix
of inputs, classroom practices, school
environment, and school organization that
helps students to learn. This definition can
be broadened to include also those inputs
and practices that provide children with safe,
healthy, and pleasant places to learn
regardless of their impact on learning
achievement.
Quality Assurance or Control
Quality assurance or control refers to
processes for guaranteeing that schools meet
particular standards. It has three goals: (i)
equivalence – providing a basis for
comparing the credentials of teachers and
school graduates through programs that
include pupil and teacher certification; (ii)
equity – meeting the basic right of even very
poor children to get a decent education
through programs that ensure districts are
providing minimum service standards for
all; and (iii) groundwork – providing a level
of material and human infrastructure that is
equal and high enough for schools and
communities to improve quality as defined
by both national and local expectations.
Quality control is not new to Indonesia.
Indeed, there is hardly any aspect of the
education system that is not regulated, but
regulations and guidelines are often not
followed or implemented as intended for a
variety
of
reasons,
including
the
impracticality of the regulations, a lack of
resources to implement the guidelines, a
lack of incentives to encourage compliance,
and an absence of consequences for noncompliance. The current national education
reform accompanying decentralization aims
to control quality by specifying standards
and processes for certifying students,
teachers, and schools (Box 4.1). Quality
assurance pertaining to individuals (students
and teachers) is administered through
certification programs that are largely
examination-based.
The incentives for
compliance with standards are clear, as are
the consequences of failing; for example,
senior secondary students who do not pass
the final national examination are not
allowed to graduate, and candidate teachers
who fail knowledge tests are not certified.
Two Approaches to Improving
Quality
In Indonesia, there have been two
conceptually related policy approaches
towards improving the quality of
education—quality assurance or control and
quality improvement. Both approaches rely
on standards, measures, indicators of
performance, timely and accurate feedback
from schools, and strategic implementation
plans, but they use these to achieve different
ends. These approaches have been used by
government and by development agencies
that have supported programs in the sector.
However, the absence of a coordinating
policy framework to link these various
efforts has prevented them from being as
effective as they could be.
27
Volume 1
The standardized examinations14 for
competence of candidate teachers, though
far from ideal, are based on specified
curricular or professional competencies.
that are still being discussed are the
incentives for compliance, the consequences
of non-compliance with minimum standards,
and the mechanisms for undertaking
performance or process audits of more than
400 districts and 180,000 schools and
madrasahs.
The development of past
programs related to quality standards has
tended to be ad hoc, which has sent
Quality assurance as it pertains to individual
schools, or groups of schools as in a district,
is based on self-assessment against some
normative and some self-determined
Box 4.1: Minimum Service Standards
Since 2002, there has been an attempt in Indonesia to reach agreement on a set of minimum service
standards. Despite a rocky start, a model-building group led by the MoHA produced a set of draft minimum
standards for the education sector in 2003. A detailed analysis of these draft education standards
undertaken as part of this review suggests that they have several crucial failings that must be addressed
before they can usefully be applied to the sector’s governance and management.
Numbers. There are nearly 200 standards, which is too many. This will lead to a loss of focus and will
increase, rather than decrease, the transaction costs of accountability.
Type. Most of the existing indicators are not true service standards oriented at improving the delivery of
education (for example, the maximum number of days it should take the school to provide a service to
parents) or at increasing mutual accountability between service units (for example, the maximum number of
weeks it should take the Dinas Pendidikan to supply a school with books).
Motivation. The motivation behind these draft standards is overwhelmingly bureaucratic rather than related
to the need for accountability. The standards also appear to have been structured to protect special or subsectoral interests (for example, sports or teachers’ privileges rather than their rights and responsibilities)
rather than to improve the delivery of general and basic education.
Technical quality. Few of the indicators are measurable, at least as currently specified, either in theory or in
practice.
Level to be reached. For many of these indicators it makes little sense to specify an actual level to be
reached because the initial levels of those that can be measured vary tremendously and thus the rate of
change in levels might be a more sensible metric. Furthermore, those who are drafting these standards do
not appear to have seen the logic of allowing competition to determine the actual level to be reached. For
some key variables, the level should indeed be set centrally (albeit with some local input), but in other cases
there is no theoretical or practical justification for setting an absolute level.
Level at which measured. It would require a special effort to measure too many of the indicators; thus they
contain a built-in disincentive. Under the current system, there are few incentives for local education
managers to report even the most basic variables such as enrollment rates.
Source: See Volume 2, Chapter 1, Appendix 1.6 of this review.
standards rather than on external inspections
against absolute standards as in the past, but
the processes involved are still in the
planning phase. Some of the basic issues
conflicting messages to districts and schools
regarding
minimum
standards
and
procedures for quality assurance.
At
present, the directorate of the MoNE
responsible for basic education has 54
projects providing resources directly from
the central government to schools,
weakening
the
ability
of
district
governments to fulfill their obligatory
function to plan, finance, and manage
14
MoNE technical experts acknowledge that the
student final examinations (Ujian Akhir
Nasional) are not yet adequately standardized in
terms of test taking, although much progress has
been made in this direction.
28
Chapter 4
Quality Assurance and Improvement
education and making it impossible for them
to monitor centrally funded projects.15
them the most. The accreditation document
suggests that schools should apply for
accreditation after undertaking their own
evaluation to determine if their inputs and
processes meet national requirements and
their own expectations. If schools feel that
they are viable, then they should request a
visit from the local accreditation body.17
Accreditation must be renewed every four
years. It is unclear, however, what will
happen to those schools that do not meet
minimum accreditation requirements over an
extended period of time. It is anticipated
that many schools, particularly the numerous
small private madrasahs that provide
educational services to many poor children,
especially in remote areas, will fall far short
of the minimum accreditation standards
(Box 4.2).18 The school accreditation policy
states that the national government will
support and help all non-accredited and low
ranking schools, but it is not clear from
where the funding and technical support will
come.
In schools, the quality assurance system is in
its early stages. According to our focus
group discussions with school principals and
teachers in Lampung and Makassar, the
performance monitoring presently being
done in schools still concentrates largely on
financial matters.
The principals and
teachers in the focus groups said that they
had not yet discussed setting school
performance
standards,
and
school
supervision and inspection documents
collected during the focus group exercise
show that the tools used by inspectors in
Lampung and Makassar for supervising
schools still emphasize administrative issues
rather than professional development.
As set forth in the Education Law and a
ministerial decree (KepMen, 087/U/2002),16
the post-decentralization model emphasizes
the need for standards. This is evident in the
school accreditation process that is currently
being developed and that will apply to all
public, private, general, and madrasah
schools. Under this system, schools will be
accredited as either “viable” or “not viable”
by a school accreditation body (SAB).
Viable schools will be ranked into three
categories, with the lowest category
including schools that meet some absolute
minimum standards. The aim of the system
is to raise all schools within a district to the
highest category of accreditation by
targeting resources to the schools that need
Quality Improvement
Quality improvement is a different approach
that involves upgrading inputs, the learning
environment, teaching practices, school
organization, and school performance. In
Indonesia, these efforts have tended to be
limited to particular geographic areas and to
specific
supply
and/or
demand-side
interventions. Past projects have provided
schools with specific inputs (such as teacher
training, infrastructure repair, or textbooks)
or have funded processes (such as active
learning methods or continuous assessment)
15
Chapter 2 in Volume 2 of this review contains an
appendix showing the plethora of standard-setting
initiatives that are currently underway.
16
Article 60 of the Education Law stipulates that the
accreditation of schools will be the responsibility of
the government and/or an independent body. The
KepMen 087/U/2002, which predated the law,
established an independent accreditation body (BAS)
and listed nine school components to be evaluated
during accreditation including: the curriculum and the
teaching/learning process; school administration and
management;
school/institutional
organization,
equipment, and infrastructure; staffing; budgeting;
teachers and students; community participation; and
the school environment and culture.
17
Primary and junior secondary schools will apply to
the district body for accreditation, while senior
secondary schools will apply to the province.
18
In 2002, according to MoRA data, 5.7 million
children were enrolled in 37,362 madrasahs
(ibtidaiyah, tsanawiyah, and aliyah, which correspond
to the primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary
levels of regular schools). Numerous communityorganized madrasah diniyahs also serve a large
number of children, but no reliable enrollment rates
are on record for this type of school. In addition,
about 2.7 million children were enrolled in 11,312
pesantrens.
29
Volume 1
Box 4.2: Improving the Quality of Madrasah Education
approaches are appropriate when a lack of
on the supply side, and social mobilization
the keyof problem
in an
education
and
school
quality
improvement
grants
on
In 2002, according to SUSENAS data in 2002, fewer access
than 10is percent
all children
were
enrolled in
system,
as
was
the
case
in
Indonesia
until
the
demand
side.
The
assumption
has
been
madrasahs, except at age 14 when madrasah enrollment exceeds 10 percent. Over the last five years, however,
theregular
mid-1980s,
or when schools have
that, if inputs
are improved,
enrollment
in madrasahs
has grownthen
fasterteaching
than enrollment in
public schools.
physical, material, or teaching conditions
and management processes and, ultimately,
Enrollment
Rate in Regular Schools
Madrasahs
that are and
below
the minimum requirements.
school quality will improve.
Supply-side
100
90
Percent of children
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Age
Data source: SUSENAS, 2002
Average student test scores are lower in madrasahs than in regular public schools in 17 out of 26 provinces,
although their overall averages are not very different. Other evidence indicates that madrasahs lack adequate
school facilities, teaching and learning materials, and trained teachers. Those that are registered or accredited
are considered public madrasahs and receive some funding from the Ministry of Religious Affairs; however,
this funding is often not enough to meet their minimal operational and salary needs. Occasional public
subsidies are available also for private madrasahs (in the form of grants, teacher training, the provision of land
and teaching materials, and the secondment of government teachers), but these schools mostly rely on
community contributions and student fees.
Under the decentralization reform, the government is considering treating all schools (whether public, private,
or madrasah) exactly the same according to one policy under the governance of the MoNE at the central level
and of provincial and district governments at the local level. To integrate madrasahs into the regular school
system will mean not only reconciling the governance and funding structures of public and religious schools
but also addressing critical challenges related to quality. Thus, being integrated into the mainstream education
system will bring both benefits and costs to madrasahs. The benefits include the increased ability of madrasah
graduates to transfer to regular public schools and universities and to find employment. Also, they may receive
greater technical and budgetary support from district governments and communities than they now receive from
the national government. However, there is a risk that the opposite will happen – that madrasahs will receive
less support from district governments, partly because they will not be able to compete for resources against
regular public schools. They have to subject themselves to district oversight and of having to adopt the
district’s general curriculum, to hire qualified teachers, to use textbooks, and to build facilities such as
laboratories that are required by the curriculum. Madrasahs will face a double burden in that they must teach
the public school curriculum as well as a religious curriculum. The Islamic State Institutes (IAINs), which
currently produce the majority of the 450,000 graduates who become teachers in madrasahs, will need to be
integrated into the national teacher training system. Also, madrasahs may find it increasingly difficult to deny
admission to non-Muslim students.
Sources: Aziz (2002); Faiqoh (2002); Jalal (2000); Ministry of National Education/Office of Educational Research and
Development (2002).
30
Chapter 4
Indonesia has experimented with quality
improvement projects for over 30 years, but
the many lessons from these projects have
not been integrated into the way in which
teachers teach and principals manage
schools. This is partly because of low
political willingness at the national level to
follow through on successful models and
partly because there are not enough
professionals in the government and in
schools with the competence to implement
these good practices on a wide scale.
Table 4.1: School Committees Still Not
Fully Engaged
Percentage distribution by frequency of School
Committee meetings
Every week
0.5
Every two weeks
0.7
Every month
18.3
Every six months
43.7
Every year
20.5
Only once in awhile
16.3
Data source: Bali Impact Crisis Survey, 2003
20/2003). School-based management (SBM)
is a form of decentralization in which the
individual school is the primary unit of
improvement
and
the
transfer
of
decisionmaking authority to the school is the
primary means through which improvements
can be stimulated and sustained (Malen et al,
1990). Its purpose is to engage people from
the schools’ local communities in planning,
monitoring, and improving school quality by
serving on school committees (Article 56
Law 20/2003).20
Quality improvement projects have followed
two models – school effectiveness and
school reform in Indonesia. School
effectiveness models, which have been built
on a solid foundation of empirical studies in
developed and developing countries, are
about the mix of inputs that define “the
school climate” and about the “enabling
conditions” and “teaching/ learning process”
that most effectively produce cognitive
achievement. In Indonesia, these programs
were largely expert-driven and developed at
the central level. Very few projects became
nationwide programs, and innovations rarely
spread on their own from school to school.19
Our findings indicate that school committees
are in place in Indonesia but are not yet
operating as instigators of quality
improvement. For example, a survey of 425
schools in Bali in 2003 revealed that 97
percent of schools had a school committee,
mostly consisting of teachers, parents, and
honorary members who might include the
bupati. In more than 80 percent of these
schools, however, the committees met at
most once every six months and played only
a peripheral role in the schools’
decisionmaking processes (Table 4.1).
Similarly, we found in our focus group
discussions with teachers and principals in
Lampung and Makasar and our meetings
with school committees in Central Java and
Yogyakarta that there is confusion about the
role of these committees and a high level of
skepticism about what they can achieve.
Many principals had not yet discussed
performance standards or improvement
In contrast to school effectiveness models,
school reform models are inherently
grounded
in
management
theory,
particularly management for change. These
models emphasize relationships among
stakeholders and recommend making
decisions based on negotiation, standard
measures, comparative and publicly
available information, and accountability to
achieve school development goals. Under
decentralization, this is the key policy that
the Indonesian government has adopted for
improving school quality (Article 51 Law
19
Two
exceptions
include
the
active
learning/contextual learning projects (CBSA-SPP) that
established communication channels and innovative
teaching approaches through local teacher groups and
the new competency-based curriculum. The National
Curriculum Center reports that numerous teachers
from Jakarta’s private schools have requested
materials and have obtained guidance from the
Center’s website.
20
The model has been tested at the junior secondary
level (in the BOMM and JSE projects, for example)
and is a component of several large projects (such as
the DBEP, SIGP, and BEP).
31
Volume 1
information collection and processing
systems; and (vi) circulate information on
good practices to schools to spread effective
ideas for school quality improvement as
widely as possible.
planning with school committees, and there
were not enough public funds to sustain the
committees. This situation has created a
financial burden for parents that has led to
mistrust between schools and communities.
Nevertheless, the focus group participants
reported
that
decentralization
has
empowered teacher and principals and given
them more confidence in their ability to
manage the teaching/learning process.
Many districts are responding with
enthusiasm and initiative to their new
responsibilities.
Having
these
responsibilities is giving them a much
greater incentive to assess the education
provided within their boundaries. Because
of the magnitude of the changes involved,
however, the situation at the local level may
be chaotic for a while as institutions redefine
their roles and relationships, debate how
best to allocate and manage resources, and
learn to become more democratic and
accountable to civil society. In addition,
many districts lack the experience and
knowledge
to
develop
multi-year,
information-based plans that address issues
such as low completion rates, poor learning
achievement, and rigid teaching methods.
Inadequate information and obsolete
management information systems also limit
the extent to which districts can plan for the
future effectively.
In sum, significant
investment and time will be required before
districts will be able to develop and
implement information-based strategies for
educational development.
These mixed reviews were further
confirmed by a 2003 survey of 36 schools in
five districts undertaken by the Managing
Basic Education Project. The survey found
that school committees have been
constituted and that they meet two or three
times a year to discuss problems regarding
facilities and fundraising, but the teachers
felt that the committees were not active
enough.
Policies to Improve the Quality of
Education
We recommend the following policies:
Support National Programs, District
Projects, and School Improvements
As districts and schools begin implementing
both quality assurance and quality
improvement measures, the role of the
central government needs to be redefined.
Instead of undertaking new project-based
initiatives, the MoNE should: (i) phase out
any of their policies that inhibit schools
from managing their own plans; (ii) crack
down on entrenched behavior like patronage
and petty corruption that prevents the
effective use of resources in the system; (iii)
phase in programs that set standards and
rules but not targets for quality management;
(iv) adopt policies that foster quality
improvements, for example, by introducing
regulated market-based incentives to
encourage districts and schools to improve
their performance; (v) develop the central
government’s capacity to provide needed
services to districts, such as better teacher
training, student assessment mechanisms,
Everything that is measured, monitored, and
evaluated is aimed in the end at improving
the performance and practices of schools.
Hence, the bulk of investment in the new
decentralized education system must be at
the school level.
Likewise, these
investments must be planned, managed, and
monitored at the school level. Whether they
are meant to rehabilitate crumbling school
buildings or to revise teaching practices, if
they do not happen in and for the schools,
they simply will not yield the required
results – better education quality and higher
student academic achievement.
32
Chapter 4
for textbook approval are germane to
this component.
Adapt a Balanced Scorecard Approach to
Plan and Manage Support to Districts and
Schools
x Stakeholder
satisfaction:
This
component
includes
student
achievement, parent satisfaction, the
accomplishment of district and national
goals and targets, and the relevance of
schooling to the enterprise sector. All
standards, indicators, and targets for
student academic achievement, as well
as targets for district enrollment,
transition, and completion rates are
relevant to this component.
The balanced scorecard approach is a
concept that can help education managers to
plan and monitor performance measures
across multiple elements or components and
to respond appropriately to those results. 21
If this approach is adopted by districts and
schools, it will streamline the hundreds of
standards and indicators that are currently
being proposed, into a manageable number
of bell-weather indicators. Specifically, the
scorecard can have one to four components
that capture the key priorities of the
education system and the measures of
performance corresponding to each priority.
Four potential components of the scorecard
are :
x Governance and management: This
component includes processes for
making policies, regulations, or rules,
transparency
in
decisionmaking,
accountability for decisions, and
community participation. Progress in
implementing
school-based
management, whether schools and
districts comply with governance
procedures, transparency in teacher
posting and professional development,
and other school performance standards
pertain to this component.
x Finance: This component includes
human, material, and financial resources
provided to schools (and districts), and
the flow of provisions or funds from the
point of origin to districts or schools.
Current MoNE work on minimum perpupil expenditures, formulas for district
to school transfers, performance-based
accounting procedures, procurement
protocols,
and
accountability
requirements through public disclosure
can be included in this component.
For each of the four components, districts or
schools can be positioned along a continuum
of key indicators. This is the basic concept
behind school accreditation and district
monitoring, but we propose adding a second
dimension to capture the progress that each
school or district makes in implementing its
own multi-year quality improvement plan.
Taken together, the two dimensions give
four categories of districts or schools: good
getting better, good getting worse, bad
getting better, and bad getting worse (Figure
4.1). Different interventions can then be
determined for each category of district or
school, thus shifting the entire education
system away from a supplydriven, onesize-fits-all model. This adaptation of the
balanced scorecard approach recognizes that
performance is dynamic and that districts
and schools can get worse as well as better.
x Minimum conditions of learning: This
component includes safe and healthy
school buildings, equipped classrooms,
and certified and trained teachers. The
MoNE’s
work
on
accreditation
standards,
teacher
certification
standards, teacher licensing, and criteria
21
An article by Robert Kaplan and David Norton
entitled “The Balanced Scorecard - Measures that
Drive Performance” in the Harvard Business Review
in 1992 sparked interest in the method, and led to their
business bestseller, “The Balanced Scorecard:
Translating Strategy into Action,” published in 1996.
Since that time, many businesses, school districts, and
schools in the United States, Australia, and England
have adopted the method for quality management.
33
Volume 1
Figure 4. 1: Balanced Scorecard to Determine Appropriate Action for Each District or
School
Better than last performance evaluation
B AD SCH OO L S /DISTR IC TS G ETTIN G
B ETTER
x
x
x
G O OD
SC HO O LS / DISTRIC TS
GETTING BE TTE R
Look for innovation and best
practices
Eligible for increased funding
through block grants
Recognize achievement in public
forums
x
x
x
Below Standard
Block grant financing
Most resourcing through funds
(rather than materials or in-kind
services)
Eligible for special grants to
become “service providers”
Above Standard
Min im um Service Standard
B AD SCH OO LS /DISTR IC TS G E TTIN G
W OR SE
x
x
x
x
G O OD
SC HO O LS / DISTRIC TS
GE TTING W ORSE
Close attention from higher
authority
Earmarked funds
Intensive capacity building
At risk of losing accreditation
x
x
x
Very common in newly decentralized
systems
Examine regulatory framework to
remove policies that may be inhibing
performance (e.g. financing formula)
Site visit to d etermine cause for
performance d rop and collaborate on
remediation
Worse than last performance evaluation
providers of affordable and effective quality
improvement services for schools (such as
competent financial advisors, teacher
trainers, program planners, and information
systems specialists) outside the big cities.
At present, the central government has a
near monopoly on teacher training and the
development of education materials like
textbooks, and there are not enough
competent government and university-based
trainers to meet the growing demand for
such services under decentralization. The
central government can encourage the
development of these service providers by
instituting a program of competitive grants
that would stimulate a larger supply of
trainers.
Address Structural Weaknesses of the
System
Schools are no longer directly accountable
to the MoNE, but the MoNE is still
accountable for the performance of the
education system as a whole. Thus, the
national level needs to change its focus
away from specific interventions towards
programs that address underlying structural
weaknesses such as the vastly uneven
capacity of districts,22 the fact that there is
no incentive for improving school
performance, and the fact that there are few
22
Capacity in this context includes the district
governments’
policies,
infrastructure,
organization, and bureaucratic procedures, as
well as the skills and knowledge of their staff.
34
Chapter 4
the low attendance rate of children at junior
secondary schools is generally attributed to a
lack of schools of this level, the perceived
lack of relevance of secondary education,
and economic hardship. However, another
possibility is that these schools are not
providing instructional programs that are
sufficiently
challenging
and
developmentally appropriate for 13- to 15year-old students.
Ensure Equity in Quality Improvement
Indonesia has an admirable record of
adopting pro-poor policies, particularly
during the economic crisis of the late 1990s,
but these gains could be lost unless a propoor agenda is built into the national quality
assurance and improvement program. For
example, if poor communities are to be
expected to share the costs of repairing
schools, then there may be a drop in demand
for education among the very poor. Also, if
district minimum service standards are not
pro-poor, then they might have the
unintended effect of pushing poor children
out of the system unless the worst
performing schools are improved, they are
merged with stronger schools or closed, or
their students are subsidized so they can
afford to enroll in better schools.
From Setting
Standards
Standards
to
Meeting
Once the standards for minimum service,
accreditation, and certification are set, how
will they be implemented and what are the
incentives for implementation?
Local
education officials are now accountable for
their performance to two higher authorities –
the local legislature or executive and the
central MoNE. It is still unclear what
responsibilities the central government has
towards those districts that fail to meet
minimum standards over a period of time. If
there are no incentives for compliance or
consequences for non-compliance, then the
standards will not help to assure quality.
The critical unresolved issue of what to do
about non-compliant schools is a
governance issue that should not be left up
to the school accreditation body. Whether
or not to revoke a non-accredited school’s
right to enroll fee-paying students should be
decided by a policymaking level of
government rather than by an independent
body. Similarly, any decision to provide
targeted resources to unaccredited and lowperforming schools should be backed up by
a national commitment to provide districts
with these resources.
Stimulate Demand for and Supply of
Innovations and Good Practice for
Improving Teaching
While projects have helped specific districts
and schools to improve their management
and teaching practices, there is as yet no
systematic way to disseminate successful
ideas for improving teaching and learning
practices available across the whole
education system. Therefore, to encourage
the development of ideas for improving the
quality of teaching and learning, the central
government should set up a national grantmaking
institution
for
educational
development to provide competitive grants
to schools or clusters of schools who come
up with innovative proposals. This agency
should also encourage schools to implement
approaches that have already been proven to
improve teaching practices. For example,
35
Volume 1
36
Chapter 5: Teacher Management and Performance
The level of school performance and student
achievement is the result of several factors
but perhaps the single most influential factor
is the quality and performance of the
teaching force. When schools perform well,
it is due to a combination of effective
teachers and strong leadership by the school
principals. The education and experience of
teachers are all important factors in
improving student performance, but
teachers’ freedom to choose their own
methods and books and how much time they
spend on tasks such as preparing lessons and
marking students’ work are also vital
factors.23
individual schools. At the moment, there
are several projects in effect that are taking
various demand-driven approaches to
teachers’ in-service training, but no
systematic evaluation has been done of their
impact on student learning and teacher
performance.
Management Changes under
Decentralization
When teacher management systems are
changing, this can be a good opportunity to
implement new ways to achieve education
goals.
However, during the period of
transition, there can be tensions and
opportunistic behavior at the school and
district levels in the employment,
deployment, and promotion of teachers. The
implementation of the school-based
management approach and the creation of
district education boards are changing the
nature of teachers’ accountability and their
incentives to perform well. These changes
mean that decisions about a school’s
resources and goals are made by those who
are in the best position to understand the
circumstances that prevail at that school,
which is highly desirable. However, they
also put a heavier burden on teachers, school
principals, school committees, and parents
to work together to improve students’
achievement levels.
As discussed in the previous chapter,
minimum
service
standards
and
accreditation criteria for schools and
teachers are currently being developed.
However, it is not yet clear how the
information from the accreditation and
quality assurance processes will be used to
assist schools and teachers to improve their
performance. Nor is it clear where the
technical capacities would come from to
help schools and teachers. The centralized
top-down approach to in-service training is
no longer appropriate as it is supply-driven
and is divorced from the goals and needs of
23
What do we know about teachers in other countries?
Researchers in the U.S. have found that teachers’
higher cognitive skills, as demonstrated in
standardized tests, are associated with better student
outcomes (Strauss and Sawyer, 1986).
Recent
research has also found that on-the-job teacher
training is associated with improved student
performance (Angrist and Lavy, 2001). Rewarding
teachers for what they actually know and do in the
classroom is likely to have a considerable positive
impact on student performance (Odden, 2000), but
measuring and evaluating what teachers know and do
in the classroom is expensive and far from
straightforward.
Finally, an analysis of junior
secondary school data from the Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) (Woessman,
2001) showed how institutional characteristics as well
as teacher characteristics contribute to students’
academic performance.
Responsibility for Teacher Employment
and Deployment
At the time of decentralization, large
numbers of civil servants formerly
employed by central government agencies
were relocated to district governments along
with budget allocations to cover their
salaries. The district government became
responsible for employing all teachers in
public schools except those in madrasahs.
These include all civil service teachers
37
Volume 1
(pegawai negeri) in public and private
schools (mostly secondary schools), as well
as honorary teachers (guru honor) who were
previously hired and paid for by the central
government.
Also, some districts are
participating in projects that include contract
teachers (guru kontrak) paid for by donor
loans to the central government. The status
of the latter group will be reviewed when
these projects close, although attempts to
reach agreement with district governments
on exit strategies have been pre-empted by
the central government’s decision to recruit
an additional 190,000 contract teachers,
which it is no longer supposed to do.
were to rationalize their teacher/student
ratios or to adjust to lower enrollment due to
a declining school-age population, or to fire
non-performers. Currently, many teachers
feel that they cannot apply for vacancies in a
different district. But whether this is true in
the sense that districts may be constrained
by ceilings on civil service budgetary
resources or whether they hold this opinion
in ignorance of the government’s actual
policy on transfers between districts is not
clear.
Although
district
governments
are
responsible for hiring teachers and paying
their salaries, several ambiguities persist.
For example, those madrasah teachers who
are civil servants are still managed by the
MoRA, not by districts. Districts, through
the MoHA, have always been responsible
for deploying teachers, but with the
establishment of school committees, districts
might take on a greater role in selecting and
appointing teachers.
Three districts in
Flores, with the support of AusAID, are
piloting just such community participation
in determining the selection criteria for
teachers and head teachers and in the
selection process itself. However, district
governments are bound by a centrally
determined ceiling on the number of
additional civil servants they can recruit (for
any and all sectors). Hence, if a district
government wishes to hire additional
teachers above this ceiling, the district must
pay for them from its non-salary resources.
As already discussed, the MoHA has been
developing minimum service standards,
especially as they apply to districts’
obligatory functions, while the MoNE has
been developing performance standards that
will affect teachers. The Directorate of
Higher Education has developed standards
that must be met by teachers graduating
from the DII teacher education program (a
two-year post-secondary school teaching
diploma needed to teach in primary schools)
and is expecting to extend this exercise for
other initial teacher preparation programs
under its accreditation control (such as the
DIII, which is a three-year diploma required
to teach in junior secondary schools, and S1,
a four-year university degree).
These
standards apply to teacher education
programs and define in some detail what a
graduate teacher should know and be able to
do. Complementary to this, the Directorate
of Education Personnel is preparing teacher
competency standards to be used in
assessing
teacher
performance
and
identifying their professional development
needs. It is expected that these competency
standards will be used by quality assurance
teams in the provinces acting on behalf of
the MoNE.
Responsibility for Setting and Monitoring
Teacher Performance Standards
The salary levels and promotional and
reward systems for civil servants are still set
centrally, although many districts provide
teachers within their jurisdiction with
supplementary benefits and incentives.
While the districts have the option to
dismiss contract and honorary teachers or
not to renew their contracts, it is still not
clear whether or not a district government
can retrench or dismiss civil service
teachers, as they might want to do if they
Besides standards regarding qualification
and competency, monitoring is also essential
with respect to teacher behavior in school.
Teacher absenteeism is one of the reasons
why students do not learn. A multi-country
38
Chapter 5
Teacher Management and Performance
survey of teacher absences in primary
schools found that Indonesian teachers were
more likely to be absent from the classroom
than five of the eight countries surveyed
(Table 5.1).24
Responsibility for Teachers’ Professional
Development and Career Development
Initial teacher preparation programs for
upgrading teachers’ qualifications remain
the function of universities and teacher
training institutes that are accredited by the
Directorate of Higher Education. There is
an ongoing discussion of how to make both
the universities and the associated
accrediting board more autonomous and
how to make the process of accreditation
more competitive so that teacher education
programs will become more responsive to
the needs of schools around the country.
Who has the responsibility for the
continuing professional development needs
of teachers is more ambiguous. Most school
and cluster-based professional development
activities have been supported in the past by
projects funded by aid agencies or the
MoNE. Now districts are responsible for
providing
in-service
training
and
professional support activities, but few have
the resources to do so. Provincial teacher
training centers (Balai Pelatihan Guru and
Pusat Peninkatan dan Pelatihan Guru) are
deconcentrated branches of the MoNE and
as such are expected to provide both quality
assurance and in-service teacher education
support to districts.
Table 5.1 Primary teacher absence rate
in public schools, 2002-03
Peru
11
Ecuador
14
Papua New Guinea
15
Bangladesh
16
Zambia
17
Indonesia
19
India
25
Uganda
27
Source: Chaudhury et al. (2004)
The role of these quality assurance teams is
still being developed and, as yet, no clear
guidelines have been developed for district
monitoring activities but it is likely that
these will be based on criteria related to the
obligatory functions and minimum service
standards that are also being developed.
The ways in which the lifelong education of
teachers relate to teachers’ career,
promotion, and incentive structures have not
been clearly articulated. Districts now are
taking the initiative to link teacher
development programs directly to teachers’
classroom behavior as a way of improving
school quality and are putting a high priority
on providing teachers with adequate skills.
Indeed some school committees have been
using resources to allow teachers to attend
in-service or other professional development
programs.
24
Primary teacher absence rate is the percentage of
full-time teachers who were absent from a random
sample of primary schools during surprise visits.
Enumerators made two to three rounds of
unannounced visits to each school over a period of
weeks or months, to get a more accurate estimate of
absence and, after verifying workers' schedules,
recorded which of them were absent. The data
provide the number of teachers who were supposed to
be on duty but were in fact absent from the school,
without regard to the reasons for absence. Many
personnel were absent for valid reasons, such as
authorized leave or official duties. Nevertheless, these
absence rates are useful for two reasons: first, because
the reasons for absence given by facility directors
were typically not verifiable; and second, because
even authorized absences reduce the quantity and
quality of public services in these primary schools.
The study covered 147 public and private schools in
10 districts in Indonesia (Chaudhury et al., 2004).
Teacher Employment and
Deployment
In 2000, there were over 2 million teachers
serving the entire school system in
39
Volume 1
teaching load, regardless of the size of the
school where they are employed. Even
when the teacher/student ratio is calculated
using class teachers only, the national ratio
is 1:32, which is comparable with other
countries in the region.25 At the junior
secondary school level, the teacher/student
ratios are 1:16 in public schools and 1:10 in
madrasah schools. At present, teachers at
this level expect to teach only one subject,
and regardless of a school’s enrollment,
each school expects to have at least 18
teachers.
Indonesia, with 1.3 million in primary
schools and 600,000 in junior secondary
schools. It was a relatively young teaching
force, the majority of teachers (64 percent)
being under 40 years old. More than half
were employed in primary schools, and of
these, 93.4 percent were civil servants. In
comparison, only 62 percent of teachers in
junior secondary schools were civil servants.
The large number of teachers who are civil
servants means that districts have a large
wage bill inherited from the centralized era
when teacher-to-school allocation norms
were extremely, if not extravagantly,
defined.
To rationalize teacher salaries and teacher/
student ratios, several districts have been
merging several small schools into one and
redeploying school principals and teachers
to understaffed schools and are discussing
the relative merits of civil service teachers
and contract teachers.26 In cases where
schools have been merged and the number
of school principal posts have decreased,
there is the danger that tensions will arise
between those who lose out and those who
retain their jobs. As with primary schools,
many small junior secondary schools could
also be amalgamated to form more efficient
units, and many districts are now doing so.
This implies that junior secondary school
teachers will need to be able to teach more
than one subject, which has implications for
teacher training and teacher development
programs. Some small junior secondary
schools are already aiming to recruit
teachers who have majors in at least two
teaching subjects.
However, Indonesia’s birth rate is falling, its
primary enrollment rates already high, and
the supply of teachers at the primary level
plentiful, so the country is in a position to
reduce the size of the teaching force at the
district level. This would allow districts to
spend more of their resources on quality
inputs and to shift resources to the salaries
of additional teachers at the secondary level.
This does not mean that there are no teacher
shortages, but the shortages in the primary
sector are primarily problems of distribution
rather than supply.
For many districts, the most difficult
questions about increasing access and
efficiency at the primary and secondary
levels are about changing teacher/student
ratios (particularly at the primary school
level) and recruiting secondary school
teachers who are qualified to teach more
than
one
subject.
Nationally,
teacher/student ratios are generous at all
levels, but there are wide differences among
districts. At the primary level, based on the
total number of teachers including head
teachers, religion teachers, sports teachers,
and class teachers, the national teacher/
student ratio is 1:22 in public primary
schools and 1:14 in religious primary
schools. Only 68 percent of teachers are
class teachers; of the remainder, 13 percent
are religion teachers and 6 percent are sports
teachers. Head teachers, religion teachers,
and sports teachers rarely have a full
We recommend that districts develop their
own formula for calculating teacher
requirements that takes into account the
number of students enrolled in a school
rather than the number of classes. One
25
By comparison, the teacher-student ratio is 1:18 in
Malaysia, 1:35 in the Philippines, 1:20 in China, and
1:32 in Korea in 2000 or thereabout (World Bank,
2004).
26
These discussions are based on the pilot activities of
the District Basic Education Project, and the Unit
Fasilitasi, the MoNE, and Basic Education Project
reports.
40
Chapter 5
schools. The minimum qualification for
primary teachers was set in 1989 as a twoyear post-secondary school teaching
diploma (DII). Yet in 2002, only one-half of
all primary school teachers in Indonesia held
this certificate or a higher qualification. The
minimum qualification for teaching in junior
secondary schools is a three-year diploma
(DIII). By 2002, 67 percent of junior
secondary school teachers held this or a
higher qualification, while the remaining
one-third had only a two-year diploma (DII).
For many teachers, the opportunity to
upgrade to the 1989 standard came through
participating in Open University part-time
distance education programs. However,
there is very little school-based content and
practice in either the formal full-time
programs or the part-time programs, and
what does exist is poorly executed.27
proposal put forward in the past in Indonesia
laid out a sliding scale of teacher
deployment based on school enrollment
(Somerset, 1997). This scale takes into
account the needs of children in lower
primary school classes (highly dependent
learners) that should have fewer students per
teacher and in upper primary classes (more
independent learners) that should have more
students per teacher. Small schools where
multi-grade teaching is the norm often have
fewer students per teacher. To implement
this sliding scale of teacher allocation,
district planners will need timely and
accurate information on the number of
teachers and enrollment rates in each of their
schools. Also, the central government will
need complete information on districts’
needs as well and on how many students
graduates each year from universities and
other institutions in order to broker the
deployment process efficiently.
The distribution of those teachers with only
the minimum qualification is uneven across
districts and provinces (Figure 5.1). Because
many districts operate small school systems
and because the pool of qualified teachers is
likely to come from the province as a whole,
these disparities in the distribution of
qualified teachers will need to be addressed
at the provincial level. Provinces need to
find ways to fund and develop programs for
upgrading teacher qualifications that are
The MoNE can assist this process by
ensuring that adequate information about the
supply and demand for teachers is available
to local governments, schools, and teachers
themselves. A pilot scheme for identifying
those schools with too many and too few
teachers as a guide for deploying contract
teachers is being implemented as part of the
Basic Education Project. Hopefully, lessons
from this pilot scheme can be used to inform
efforts to deploy regular teachers as well. A
teacher deployment scheme in the
Philippines
also
provides
valuable
experience about how to deploy new
teachers (Box 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Districts Vary in Proportion of Primary
Teachers with Minimum Training Qualification,
Percentage of teachers
Sum atra
Sulaw esi
Papua & Eastern Is
Kalim antan
Java
Teacher Professional Development
In the past, teacher quality has been
measured mainly by the level of certification
rather than performance and classroom
results. This is now changing, as can be seen
in the efforts of different directorates in the
MoNE to prepare standards for new
graduates from teacher training courses,
technical competencies that serving teachers
should meet, and minimum service
standards and accreditation criteria for
0
20
40
60
80
Notes: The island categories pertain to all provinces in those islands.
Data Source: Ministry of National Education,.
27
A similar situation prevails in Nigeria where
research has shown that little value is added to a
teacher’s performance if he or she acquires a higher
qualification through full-time or part-time study.
41
Volume 1
Box 5.1: A New Teacher Deployment Scheme in the Philippines
The Philippines is conducting a pilot program to improve its system for deploying new teachers. Using
student-teacher ratios as the principal indicator, disparities in teacher provision at the regional,
provincial and school level were analyzed and the results were displayed in table form, and also through
GIS mapping. A color-coding scheme to identify areas with relatively generous teacher provision and
areas with teacher shortages of varying severity and estimates of a statistical measure of equity in
access to teachers were employed. It was found that while the national distribution of teachers among
regions (clusters of provinces) is fairly equitable, the distribution among provinces within a region and
the distribution within provinces themselves were much less equitable. In fact, there were highshortage schools even in provinces that, in aggregate, were relatively well supplied with teachers.
Older schools, especially those in areas of stable or declining population, tend to be generously staffed,
sometimes showing substantial teacher surpluses, while newer schools, many in poor areas, had
deficits.
This scheme was applied in 2002/3 to the deployment process of new teachers that takes place every
two years. In preparation, provincial teams were required to provide teacher-availability data for all
schools under their jurisdiction. These teams attended two-day workshops, conducted by the
Department of Education staff, to acquaint them with a new-teacher deployment request form and to
train them in using computer software designed to prepare data tables and teacher-deployment maps.
All schools complied with requests to provide the necessary data. The color-coded provincial maps
became the basis for all deployment negotiations among provinces, at the level of principals and with
parliamentary representatives who had a say in how education resources are allocated among schools.
As a result of the new system, of a total of 25,000 new teaching positions, 77 percent of elementary
school teachers and 71 percent of secondary school teachers were allocated to the teacher-shortage
areas. There were still wide variations, however. At the elementary level, one region achieved a
targeting proportion of 97 percent, while two others achieved only 31 percent and 54 percent. At the
secondary level, the range was equally wide: between 96 percent in the most effective region and less
than 50 percent in three less-effective regions. Further steps are to be implemented. In particular, it will
be essential to conduct further training to ensure that at all levels of government and the schools, there
is a critical mass of professional and administrative staff who understand the deployment system, know
how to apply it, and feel committed to its maintenance.
competency standards for teachers and ways
to measure their performance against these
standards. However, in line with the new
school-based management model, teachers’
professional development needs to be linked
much more closely to the context of the
actual classrooms in which they work and to
the monitoring of school performance and
standards. Teachers need to be given
opportunities to continue learning for their
own self-development, to gain their license
to teach (assuming that such a system is put
in place) or improve their performance, to
enable them to become mentors in induction
programs, and to enable them to be
promoted to posts of responsibility in
schools and/or training programs. This
assumes that appropriate reward systems are
qualitatively better than those that currently
exist and that are compatible with the
principles of school-based management.
There have been a large number of teacher
training projects in Indonesia over the past
30 years (Sweeting, 2001). These projects
have had various objectives including to
revise the curriculum in pre-service
education programs, upgrade the technical
capacities of teacher educators and teacher
education institutions, and develop inservice training and professional support
systems.
While there is considerable
experience to build on, it is time to consider
a new paradigm that takes school
performance as the focal point of the careerlong professional development of teachers.
Indonesia has begun to develop a set of
42
Chapter 5
Box 5.2: Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial Program
Mexico’s decade-old teacher incentive program, Carrera Magisterial, is a teacher compensation reform
program first implemented in 1994. Teachers who voluntarily join the program agree to participate in
annual performance evaluations and to have their annual salary increases linked to the results of these
evaluations. These performance evaluations, totaling 100 points, consist of: the performance peer
review (10 points), teacher subject matter knowledge as measured by the teacher’s test score (28
points); student examination scores (20 points); teachers’ educational attainment (10 points); their
completion of accredited courses to update their skills (17 points); and years of teaching experience (15
points). The wage bonus associated with the program consists of a percentage of the base wage and can
be quite substantial.
Although the program is voluntary, the number of teachers who have joined the program has increased
substantially since 1994—from 39 percent of teachers in its first year, to 49 percent after three years.
As a result, the proportion of students whose teachers are enrolled in the program more than doubled in
the period between 1994 and 1996 and is now around 25 percent of all students. In addition, in 1997
the percentage of all teaching positions that were filled by an individual participating in the program
was close to 50 percent. Of these, 22 percent have received promotions.
The Carrera Magisterial program appears to be having a significant impact on the Mexican education
system as a recent study found that those students whose teachers participate in the program have
higher average test scores than students whose teachers are not in the program.
Source: Lopez-Acevedo, 2001.
in
place
that
recognize
teachers’
contributions to school performance. It also
assumes that there are institutions available
to provide such school-based evaluation
programs. An example of such a program in
Mexico indicates its potential benefits (Box
5.2).
Teacher Compensation and Incentives
Designing teacher salaries and incentive
structures that attract and retain the best and
the brightest candidates to the teaching
profession is a complex enterprise. In
Indonesia, low salaries are often seen as the
main reason why teachers perform poorly,
have low morale, and tend to be poorly
qualified. However, studies have found that
most primary school teachers and junior
secondary school teachers have monthly
earnings equivalent to or higher than those
of other workers with an equivalent level of
education.28 Although teachers’ salaries in
However, how these teacher development
programs are to be financed is an important
planning problem. Certainly most districts
probably feel that their current education
budgets barely
cover their salary
expenditures and are concerned that teachers
they train may be move to other districts.
For these reasons, districts should not have
to fund teacher development fully.
A
mixture of teachers’ own contributions
(since they are the key beneficiaries) and of
proposal-based grants given by the central
government to schools and districts to fund
specific initiatives to improve teacher and
school performance is more appropriate.
Resources for these grants need to be built
into education expenditure allocations at the
district level.
28
An analysis of labor force data from 2000 (Filmer,
2002) indicated that teachers with qualifications below
the diploma level (about one-third of teachers) have
monthly earnings that are, on average, 22 percent
higher than the monthly earnings of other paid
workers with the same qualifications. The differential
(in terms of monthly salary) is smaller among those
with a first or second level diploma (DI/DII) and then
becomes negative. In other words, while less qualified
teachers seem to be overpaid relative to others with
the same qualifications, the 10 percent of teachers
with a third-level diploma (DIII) and the 24 percent
with a university degree are underpaid, earning 18 and
43
Volume 1
to work, the DAU allocations to districts
must be disproportionately targeted to
poorer districts so they can afford to add
sufficient incentives to the basic salaries to
ensure that teachers will have an incentive to
apply for jobs in those districts, even for
vacancies in remote schools.
Districts
should be responsible for determining
appropriate allowances and top-ups for
teachers working in remote locations or
under difficult conditions. This should not
be done centrally because if it were, then all
schools would try to be classified as
“difficult” so that their teachers would be
paid more. An approach like this has been
tried in Brazil (Box 5.3).
Indonesia may be lower than those in other
countries at a similar level of economic
development (such as Chile, the Philippines,
and Thailand), this is partially offset by the
fact that teachers in Indonesia work fewer
hours and have smaller classes on average
(OECD, 2001). MoNE studies of how much
time teachers spend on instructional tasks
indicate that teachers spend only about half
their time in school actually teaching,
perhaps because they are not aware of the
number of hours of instruction and school
days in a year they are obligated to work.
On a per hour basis, teachers earn more than
most other workers and have many more
days off per year. Indeed, during the 2003
national recruitment of contract teachers,
there were two applicants per vacancy,
indicating that current salaries do not appear
to be a major deterrent to aspiring teachers.
However, the situation is not the same for all
teachers, so a review of the entire salary
scale is warranted. In particular, teachers
with a university degree (that is, mostly
those who teach senior secondary students)
earn slightly less than other workers with an
equivalent level of education.
In most cases, it would be better to offer
bonuses
to
supplement
teachers’
remuneration instead of altering their basic
pay scales to reward teachers who take on
extra responsibilities or duties, to attract
better candidates to the teaching profession,
and/or to attract teachers to rural locations
where there is a scarcity of applications for
vacant teaching posts.
Using Teacher Management Systems
to Achieve Education Goals
Under decentralization, it is important to
ensure mobility in the teacher labor market,
even while decentralizing the employment
of teachers to, for example, the school level.
The best way to set up teachers’ salary
scales may be to have a national (or
provincial) pay scale or salary grading
system that is based on minimum pay levels
agreed between the central government and
teachers’
unions
and
professional
associations but to allow districts and
schools to offer supplemental benefits and
allowances to teachers according to their
own criteria.29 For this topping-up process
Decentralization in itself does not
automatically improve the performance of
schools and teachers, but effective teacher
management systems can help to do so.
Over the longer term, several actions are
needed: (i) to devise strategies to strengthen
the professional life of teachers (ii) to
develop transparent mechanisms for schools
to select their own teachers; (iii) to link
school
performance
and
teacher
performance reviews to teachers’ career
development and promotion; and (iv) to
37 percent less respectively than other paid workers
with the same levels of education.
29
After determining the base salary level, a study in
India (Kingdon, 1996) suggested that salary structures
for teachers were inefficient, with teacher
characteristics that improve student learning hardly
being rewarded while other teacher attributes that have
few discernible learning benefits for the students had a
significant salary pay-offs. This suggests that it would
enhance school efficiency to spend funds on school
facilities and materials, longer school days, better
management practices, and more skilled teachers, but
that investing in smaller pupil-teacher ratios (in urban
areas where there is no multi-grade teaching), and
investing in teacher experience, training, post-graduate
education, and higher across-the-board teachers’
salaries may not yield enough benefits to be justifiable
in a resource-scarce environment.
44
Chapter 5
Box 5.3: Brazil’s FUNDEF Program and Teacher Compensation Reform
In 1998, Brazil implemented an education finance reform called the Fund for the Maintenance and
Development of Primary Education and Teacher Enhancement (FUNDEF). The main objective of this
fund was to equalize educational opportunities across states and municipalities by guaranteeing a
minimum expenditure per pupil in primary schools throughout the country. Embedded in the reform
was a requirement that at least 60 percent of the additional funds provided by FUNDEF to local
governments must be spent on teachers’ salaries.
The program was expected to improve teacher quality and student outcomes in several ways. First, it
would increase the salaries of existing teachers in regions that, previous to the reform, had had
relatively low teachers’ salaries. This would make teaching a more attractive profession, particularly in
these regions. As a result, it would increase the number of individuals interested in entering teaching
and make teaching an attractive career to more highly skilled individuals, who prior to the reform
would have been likely to choose to enter other professions. Second, local governments could use the
increase in resources for teacher salaries not only to increase the salaries of existing teachers but also to
hire additional teachers, thus enabling them to reduce class sizes, which would probably also improve
student outcomes.
An assessment of the reform in 2002 revealed that regional disparities in teacher pay had been reduced
and that the number of teachers who had at least graduated from secondary school had increased. The
study also showed that the increase in teachers’ compensation and in the number of teachers with at
least a secondary education were positively associated with better student outcomes such as lower
dropout rates and higher pass rates.
Source: World Bank, 2002.
obligations for providing basic education of
high quality. They should be equipped to
advise districts on school improvements and
teacher development and to ensure that
teachers are deployed efficiently across
districts. District governments should be
responsible for the employment and
deployment of teachers across schools and
for paying their base salary (the national
minimum) and additional benefits and
incentives,
for
monitoring
teacher
performance, and for ensuring that teachers
have regular access to professional
development programs linked to their school
activities.
ensure
that
teachers’
professional
development covers their initial training,
induction into the teaching profession,
school life, and continuous professional
development. Teachers should be entitled to
support
services
and
professional
development programs.
Measures of
teachers’ performance need to be based on
what they add to the teaching and learning
processes in their own classrooms as well as
their contribution to the professional
education community.
In a decentralized teacher management
system, the main role of the central
government should be to set minimum
teaching standards and salary scales and to
develop guidelines for promotions and
incentives. The provincial education units
should be responsible for ensuring that
districts are able to meet their statutory
Table 5.2 illustrates what might be involved
in putting a national policy framework for
teacher management in place and suggests
who should be responsible for implementing
the various actions and strategies.
45
Volume 1
Table 5.2: A Proposed National Framework for a Teacher Management System
Enabling Policies
Actions/Strategies
Responsibilities
Establishing a transparent
teacher appointment process
based on efficient deployment
norms, school vacancies,
advertisements, selection
criteria, contractual
arrangements, and public
information
Teacher registration
Teacher deployment norms
Posts of responsibility
Administrative procedures for
districts and school for hiring
teachers
Establish a school
performance evaluation
process that is based on
teachers’ collective
responsibility and opportunity
for individual teacher
performance reviews on
request for career
development purposes based
on their value added to
education processes and
outcomes.
Minimum service standards
Teacher performance standards
Supervisors, evaluators trained in
performance review
Professional support activities
Performance incentives for
schools and teachers
Evaluation processes
Performance review guidelines
Feedback loops between
evaluators and teachers
Accreditation and information
system
Compensation system that
rewards teacher behavior that
improves student achievement
Establish a compensation and
rewards system that is clear,
transparent, and guided by
considerations of
qualifications, responsibilities,
and motivations for teachers’
continuous development
Put in place a teacher
professional development
system that is school-based
and performance-led.
School-based initial teacher
preparation
Induction to teaching and
licensing program that establishes
partnerships between districts,
schools, and licensing body
Teacher classroom performance,
value-added opportunities for
developing professional interests,
pedagogy, subject matter,
leadership roles; linked to rewards
– recognition, financial, and
promotion.
46
School – Identify teachers’ needs, review candidates,
and interview short list, select teachers, inform district
managers
District – Disseminate information on teacher norms
and conditions of employment; prepare initial short
list of candidates, accept school selection, and
advertise results
National – Set guidelines for teacher/student ratios,
posts of responsibilities, minimum qualifications and
experience, conditions of employment; pilot scheme
for identifying teacher-deficit and teacher-surplus
areas and allocating new teachers accordingly
Provincial – Provide quality assurance, facilitate
across-district appointments; assist national
government in piloting deployment scheme
School – Undertake internal self-evaluation
processes, feedback to whom? and incentives, school
development program, teacher development needs,
access resources for school improvement
District – Provide professional support such as
mentoring by better teachers, budgetary resources for
staff development, information systems on teacher
and school performance, disseminate best practices
National – Set minimum service standards and
teacher performance and accreditation standards
Provincial – Provide quality assurance, disseminate
information, identify resource pool for professional
support
District – Assess practice of top-up allowances and
clarify criteria for allocating allowances
National – Pilot and evaluate alternative incentive
systems for “difficult” areas
Provincial – Quantify supply of new teachers
School – Contribute to practicum, provide feedback
to training institutions and technical resource groups,
participate in action research for school development
District – Provide feedback to training institutions
and technical resource groups; placement of new
teachers, support and evaluate candidates, provide
resources for induction and professional development
activities
Province – Provide quality assurance, technical
support resources, disseminate best practices
National – Establish accreditation of teacher
education programs and institutions, respond to
employers’ and service providers’ needs..
Chapter 6: The Way Forward: Making Decentralization Work for
Education
system and any lack of commitment
from the government to confronting
some difficult implementation issues
could erode the effectiveness of the
reform.
This review of Indonesia’s education sector has
addressed the familiar issues of quality,
efficiency, and equity but through the special
lens of the current decentralization reform. It
has addressed how the country’s key education
goals (reaching universal enrollment in basic
education and improving the quality of
schooling) are going to be achieved in a system
that is supposed to be managed primarily at the
district rather than at the central level. The
introduction of decentralization three years ago
dramatically changed the rules and processes of
service provision, and all of the relevant
stakeholders are still in the process of
understanding, adapting to, and managing the
implications of those changes.
With this
paradigm shift in governance, how education
services are going to be delivered cannot be
“business as usual” for everyone. The review
has identified areas in the regulatory framework
and
implementation
processes
of
the
decentralization reform that need to be clarified,
improved, or corrected. Many messages have
emerged from the review, but the two
overarching messages are:
Based on the evidence discussed in the previous
chapters, this chapter presents a detailed policy
agenda that identifies core objectives, specific
recommendations
for
action
(with
a
corresponding assessment of how urgently those
actions need to be taken), and suggestions on
which agencies should implement each action.
This agenda is summarized in a policy matrix at
the end of this chapter (Table 6.1). Many
district governments and schools urgently need
some guidance on the extent of their
decentralized responsibilities and assistance on
how to carry them out, so the recommendations
of this review apply to them as much as to the
central government.
The following set of policy recommendations
stem from: (i) the observations and conclusions
of the team that undertook this review of
Indonesia’s education sector, (ii) numerous
documents produced by donor-assisted projects,
and (iii) discussions (in the form of meetings
and interviews) with many stakeholders in the
system, including officials in the central
agencies, provincial and district officials,
teachers, heads teachers, and members of school
committees (including some parents), national
education experts, and the staff of aid agencies.
In addition, in collaboration with the central
government, the team launched a much broader
consultative process with these various
stakeholders in December 2003-January 2004.
The team’s recommendations are as follows.
x Improving education quality across the
system is the key educational challenge
for Indonesia today, and even concerns
about equity and serving the poor must
be couched in terms of universal access
to education of acceptable quality.
x Decentralization can potentially help to
meet this quality challenge—by
spreading
the
governance
and
managerial responsibility for improving
better education across different
stakeholders,
by
strengthening
accountability mechanisms, and by
enhancing incentives to innovate.
However, any delays in clarifying and
rationalizing functions, structures, and
financing throughout the education
47
Volume 1
Reform the structure and processes of the
central Ministry of Education so that it can
fulfill its core functions of developing and
harmonizing education policies and designing
an implementation program, and an investment
and funding plan for those policies, while
ensuring that local governments and civil
society have a voice in this process.
Establish clear and efficient function
assignment within the education system and
align this with appropriate governance and
management
structures
and
financing
arrangements at all levels of the system.
As discussed in previous chapters, the
decentralization laws left the assignment of
governance, managerial, and financing functions
in the education sector vague. Similar functions
and roles have been given to different levels of
government, which is a recipe for replication,
conflict, and chaos.
Also, functions and
structures are not aligned (for example, a large
central Ministry of National Education continues
to exist despite the transfer of many of its
responsibilities to lower levels of government)
and financing arrangements do not conform to
functions (as illustrated by the many different
sources of financing for capital expenditures at
the local level). Moreover, some devolved
functions are best left to the national or
provincial levels. Some tasks that can most
efficiently and effectively be carried out at a
level of government higher than the district are:
coordinating the strategic direction of the
education system, setting education standards,
developing technical support systems, assessing
best practices, and encouraging the development
of markets.
At the moment, the MoNE is not organized in a
way that is consistent with its new core function
of quality management and with the spirit of
decentralization. Currently, the Ministry is
organized by levels of education, which has
tended to produce administrative silos and a
large, unwieldy bureaucracy. There have been
limited initiatives within the Ministry to fulfill
its functions given under the decentralization
reform, but these initiatives have been assigned
mainly to an existing unit (for example, the
Decentralization and Facilitation Unit). What is
needed instead is a fundamental change in the
way the Ministry operates. The MoNE should be
reorganized according to its new major
functions, consistent with its oversight role in a
decentralized education system. In particular,
the Ministry should:
x Harmonize and link new education
policies and programs, and retire any
leftover policies and programs that
undermine
the
goals
under
decentralization. Since decentralization,
various simultaneous efforts in, for
example, standard setting, teacher
certification, and school rehabilitation
and repair have been launched, but it is
vital to coordinate these initiatives to
prevent wasteful duplication and
contradictions. In addition, the MoNE
should participate in a permanent interministerial forum for resolving any
policy conflicts that affect different
sectors such as the current civil service
regulations that are not appropriate for
managing a decentralized teacher
service.
There are some other issues that need to be
resolved at a higher level than within the
education sector itself because they also pertain
to other sectors besides education. Resolving
these issues will require bold steps, including
reviewing and revising the decentralization laws
to clarify the assignment of functions, to correct
the misalignments between functions and
structures and between functions and financing
arrangements, and to follow through with
corresponding structural changes. Without these
bold changes, education stakeholders will not be
able to trust the central government’s
commitment to sharing authority and resources,
which will dissipate all of the current impetus
for reform.
48
Chapter 6
The Way Forward
central government can facilitate this
collaboration by giving financial
incentives for information reporting, by
reinforcing local pride at being involved
in producing a joint product (such as
standards and definitions developed
collaboratively over time), and by
stressing to weaker districts that
collaboration will enable them to learn
from what the stronger districts are
doing.
x Develop, test, and disseminate new
management and operations systems.
The
central
government,
local
governments, and schools all urgently
need new systems in three areas—
information, budget and expenditure
tracking, and planning, monitoring, and
evaluation. The existing system for
collecting and reporting information on
schools
has
collapsed
since
decentralization.
Nor is there any
effective system for keeping track of
district-level education expenditures or
for determining and tracking the
allocation of funding and resources to
schools.
There are some local
experiments and projects that are
addressing these issues, but these efforts
are largely sporadic and undocumented.
One of the responsibilities of the central
government is to encourage local
experimentation,
identify
good
practices, and build on these to create
management and operations systems
that will be effective in a decentralized
context.
x Develop management and technical
capacities at all levels. Running the
new management and operations
systems will require new skills. The
biggest bottleneck to implementing
devolved functions is the lack of
technical and managerial capacity at the
local level. Building this capacity must
begin with the MoNE defining
performance standards and measures for
all decentralized functions and a
corresponding checklist of basic
competencies needed to carry them out.
This checklist can then be used by each
level of government to assess their own
current capacity, design a program for
upgrading that capacity, and fill future
staff vacancies. Such a variety of skills
will be needed that it is highly unlikely
that a single service provider will be
able to meet all staff development needs.
However, since the current supply is
limited, the government should take
immediate steps to expand and diversify
the supply of service providers.
x Foster a national education information
system consistent with decentralization.
It is worth singling out this function
because having an effective information
system will be vital for the MoNE to
carry out any of its new functions,
particularly quality assurance. In order
to build an effective information system,
the MoNE should decide what kinds of
information the database should contain,
establish the most effective means for
sharing information between levels of
government, and design and test a
simpler data management system for
districts with very little
capacity.
However, any effective information
system requires reliable and timely
input, so collaboration between the
MoNE and the regional governments is
essential because the Ministry’s
bureaucratic power alone will not be
enough to ensure that local governments
and schools collect and report
information. Under decentralization, the
x Develop and disclose a multi-year plan
for financial, technical and management
assistance to local governments. During
the consultation meetings for this report,
some local leaders lamented the fact that
capital investments in schools are often
financed in a fragmented and unplanned
way by the central government or by aid
agencies, robbing the districts of the
ability to manage their education
systems. There are an estimated 400
projects currently managed by the
MoNE, accounting for the bulk of the
49
Volume 1
discretionary and that depends on just a
few key measurable criteria. Besides
these
“operational
funds,”
the
government should make additional
funds available through a proposalbased grants mechanism to cover the
costs of, for example, staff development
programs or the construction of a new
classroom or laboratory. This funding
channel is discussed in greater detail
below. Third, to facilitate school-based
management, the government should
give this assistance to schools in cash
rather than in kind.
APBN allocation for education and
controlling the capital and quality
improvements investments in the sector.
Require provincial and district governments to
prepare and implement multi-year regional
investment and financing plans as well as a
corresponding assistance plan for each school
in accordance with regional goals and with
school capacities and needs.
The experience of other countries has revealed
that giving transfers to lower levels of
governments are more effective when efforts are
also made to build local planning skills, to
increase transparency in the allocation and use
of local funds, and to require accountability in
return for the transfers. For Indonesia, this
means that the central government should:
x Disclose publicly the amount of funds
and other assistance that districts will
be giving to each school well before the
beginning of the school year. This will
give the school committee in each
school a chance to finalize its own
spending plan and to raise additional
resources if needed. This is complicated
by the fact that the district and school
budget years do not correspond (January
to December for districts, July to June
for schools). While it is not necessary to
align these budget cycles, local
governments should find a solution that
alleviates this problem for schools.
x Scrap the budgeting process that local
governments and schools go through
each year and replace it with a multiyear investment plan and an annual
spending plan. These plans should
specify the level, source, and type of
resources
needed
and
whether
investment activities would be under the
direct management of the local
government
or
of
the
school
committees.
x Conduct a periodic financial audit of
schools as an input into the preparation
of the multi-year assistance plan for
each school.
x Establish a clear funding mechanism to
transfer resources to schools that is easy
to implement and to monitor. First and
foremost, this means ensuring that
schools receive adequate block grants to
cover their basic operating expenses,
including the costs of teaching and nonteaching staff, instructional supplies,
some staff development, the routine
activities of the school committee, the
maintenance of a school database, the
dissemination of information to parents
and the community, utilities, and light
repair of the school buildings and other
maintenance.
Second, to increase
transparency in the allocation of funds
and to enable schools to plan ahead, the
size of these grants should be based on a
formula-based allocation that is non-
x Monitor
and
evaluate
the
implementation of school investment
plans by means of periodic progress
reports,
field
inspections,
and
evaluations of outcomes.
All
investment projects should also be
audited, and the results of these audits
should be made public.
x Ensure that routine allocation processes
are responsive to the needs of the poorer
districts and schools by adopting propoor education programs to stimulate
demand consistent with the goals of the
global Education for All initiative.
50
Chapter 6
The Way Forward
ensure that schools are funded at least to the
minimum necessary for operations and
maintenance. Other steps that are needed are to:
To achieve these changes, local governments
need adequate and timely technical assistance to
build their capacity to develop plans and budget
processes, arrange financing, operate the local
education system efficiently, and assist schools.
These technical assistance and training programs
do not have to be provided by the central
government. In fact, considering the size and
diversity of Indonesia’s education system, it
would be better to encourage the development of
a private supply of technical assistance and
training. Specific grants (possibly through the
central government’s development budget – the
DIP – or through the DAK) could be given to
the regions to allow them to procure the services
of national and international experts to help
them to develop their budgeting and planning
skills, to raise their revenues, to track their
expenditures, to manage information flows, and
to assess school performance. Ultimately,
regions will be expected to use their own
budgets to maintain their planning and
management skills and to purchase these
technical services from an organized
marketplace of suppliers.
x Begin a periodic audit of schools on the
basis of a checklist of standards,
produce scorecards on the basis of this
audit that rate the overall quality and
performance of each school, and
develop a protocol for the public
disclosure of these scorecards.
x Require schools to report their own
expenditures in a timely fashion, but this
will require switching to a multi-year
process in order to give schools enough
time to complete their expenditure
records before the next planning period.
x Establish a proposal-based grants
program that would allow schools to
request extra resources for specific
innovations and experiments. Some
schools are going to be much better at
preparing proposals than other schools,
so this grants program needs to include a
training facility to help build this
capacity in those schools that lack it.
Several ongoing donor-assisted projects
(for example, the DSSD and the DBEP)
have been building similar capacity in
selected areas of the country so some
local governments and schools already
have the required capability as well as
the ability to train school personnel.
Help schools to make and implement decisions
that will improve quality, especially those in
poor areas.
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a trend in
Indonesia towards school quality improvement
projects that are school-planned, school-based,
and school-monitored. This trend is consistent
with Education Law 20, which has empowered
schools to make decisions regarding their
governance and management. However, as this
review concludes, there is tremendous variation
in the capacity of schools to exercise the
authority that decentralization has given them.
A big challenge over the next few years is to
develop a viable strategy for raising the capacity
of schools to manage resources and programs.
Another challenge is to ensure that schools meet
the minimum requirements for accreditation as
defined by the central government and that
schools receive sufficient funds to cover their
basic operating expenses. This means that the
first step in improving school quality is to bring
the physical and human infrastructure up to
minimum standards for accreditation and to
x Develop a policy for targeting special
assistance to those schools that do not
meet the with minimum quality
standards, especially in poor areas.
As discussed above, one significant challenge
for the central and local governments is to make
policies related to education quality that
embrace all different types of schools. We
recommend that the Indonesian government
adopt a “one policy roof” for all schools and, as
a first step, should assess all religious and
private schools according to the same national
minimum education quality standards that apply
to public schools. This major task would fill the
51
Volume 1
information gap left by the collapse of the
national annual school census and would
underpin subsequent periodic assessments by
local governments. Also, as part of the school
registration and accreditation processes, local
governments should require these (private and
religious) schools to formulate a plan for
bringing their quality standards up to the
required level and a timetable of the specific
actions and the level of resources that they will
need to do so. Those plans would become
components of a regular accreditation process
for these schools, and their progress in achieving
its goals could be used as a basis for providing
them with targeted assistance in the future.
paying their base salaries (the national
minimum) and any additional benefits and
incentives, for monitoring teacher performance,
and for ensuring that teachers have access to
professional development programs. There are
also areas where cooperation among the levels
of government could be highly beneficial. For
example, as discussed in the previous chapter,
central and provincial governments could
increase the efficiency of teacher deployment by
helping districts to develop their own formulas
for calculating their teacher requirements that
take into account the number of students
enrolled in a school rather than the number of
classes in the school.
Establish a teaching service, separate from the
civil service, that includes a transparent
appointment and deployment process and a
professional development system that is schoolbased and performance-led.
Educators in Indonesia already feel that there is
a need for a new paradigm for the teaching
profession. Many elements of this new approach
are already in place or are being tried out in a
number of projects. However, developing an
overall framework that defines teachers’
professional development as a lifelong process
should be a priority. Many of the elements of
this framework could be tested in simultaneous
pilot projects by different institutions and in
different districts.
Effective teacher management systems in
schools are essential for achieving national
education goals. Table 5.1 in the previous
chapter lays out a list of appropriate policies, the
kind of actions required to implement these
policies, and some ideas about who should be
responsible for implementing those actions. The
most critical recommendation is for the
establishment of a separate teaching service with
the following characteristics: merit-based
appointments, transfers, and promotions; schoolbased performance evaluations; and professional
development that covers all phases of the
teachers’ career including their initial training,
their induction into the teaching profession,
school life, and continuous professional
development. This would need to be built up
over time.
Finally, we return to the question of how best to
implement the recommended actions outlined in
this chapter.
Supply-side and Demand-led Programs
Both supply-side and demand-side approaches
are needed to fill existing policy and technical
gaps. Supply-side investments are needed to
strengthen the capacity of central education
agencies to make policy, to plan, to set
standards, and to measure the performance of
districts and schools. They are needed also to
stimulate the development of new solutions that
can be used by local governments. These
investments can be made through a national
program or through discrete projects managed
by the central agencies. Either way, it is vital to
link all of the different supply-side investments
in one institution-building agenda instead of
In a decentralized teacher management system,
the main role of the central government is to set
minimum teaching standards and minimum
salary scales and to develop guidelines for
promotions and incentives. The provincial
education units are responsible for ensuring that
districts are able to meet their statutory
obligation to provide high-quality education.
District governments are responsible for
employing and deploying teachers and for
52
Chapter 6
The Way Forward
three decades. Many of these initiatives have
borne fruit and have provided valuable lessons
about what kind of programs are effective, but
many other initiatives have either failed to
produce results or petered out because of a lack
of attention from the government or donors.
Under decentralization, there is an even greater
need to learn from these initiatives. Two
immediate steps are needed. The first is to cull
lessons from past programs.
During the
preparation of this review, the team compiled all
available documents from or about these
programs and concluded that many types of
interventions have been implemented but that
evidence-based, analytical lessons about their
effectiveness or otherwise have seldom been
drawn. This review has cited lessons from these
past initiatives whenever they have been
available. It may be impossible to recover
lessons from or most of these programs, but it
would be useful for the government and the
donor community to try.
undertaking them separately with little or no
coordination.
However, in the spirit of decentralization and in
recognition of the great diversity that exists
across Indonesia, demand-side programs that
address the specific needs of provinces, districts,
and schools should be a cornerstone of education
policy. As already mentioned earlier, three
measures in particular need to be taken.
x The central government must provide
adequate block transfers to regional
governments, especially for those with
limited local revenues. The larger the share
of resources that is directed through this
channel rather than through specific
programs, the more it will support the
development of local governance and
management.
x The central government should establish
grants to fund projects initiated by local
schools and communities. These grants will
have the dual objective of stimulating
innovation and experimentation and of
reducing inequality of education quality
among districts. The law allows districts to
collaborate in initiating these projects and
applying for these grants so that they can
take advantage of economies of scale. To
encourage the formation of this kind of
association between districts, the grants
program could award more money to those
proposals that are submitted by an
association of districts.
The second immediate step is to identify
ongoing and planned programs that should be
rigorously evaluated. The aim is to build a body
of evidence-based lessons about how to deliver
education services of good quality in a
decentralized setting. It is important to extract
not just localized lessons but also broad ones
that reflect the wide diversity of contexts in
Indonesia. An integral part of this evaluation
effort must be to establish a mechanism to
ensure that these lessons are widely publicized
so that they can be taken into account in national
and local policymaking and school-based
management. Regional meetings held for this
review suggest that the demand for such lessons
exists.
x The central government should evaluate and
support the education management systems
being developed and used in different
regions.
Learning from Past and Ongoing Efforts
The government of Indonesia and its partners in
the donor community have invested in many
pilot initiatives in education over the past two or
53
Specific actions
Ź Build a national
education information
system consistent with
decentralization
Ź Align structure of
central education
authority to functions
assigned under
decentralization
Ź Finalize PPs for
Education Law 20 to
provide detailed
assignments of
governance and
management functions
to all levels
Test system and disseminate key findings
54
Design a prototype default system in a few districts that are weak but
willing to experiment and improve
Study already-existing cases of good practice of information use at
school and district level
Determine the information transmission standards between levels of
government, as information, not as software
Determine the informational base needed to implement and document the
policies at district level
Launch dissemination activities to inform local governments and schools
about this new structure
Restructure MoNE along function lines
Improve governance standards for Education Boards and School
Committees, and determine degree of need for national regulation.
Establish committee of technical and management experts to carry out
analysis and consultations, to review roles for national level and prepare
job descriptions for new national functions. and to determine degree to
which resulting assignments can be mandated
A. Core policy objective : To improve governance and management
immediate action”)
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
Table 6.1. Proposed policy agenda for educational development under decentralization
NG in
collaboration with
PG and DG
NG (MoNE, with
collaboration of
MoHA)
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
Implementing
agency
Bureaucratic power alone is not enough to
enforce compliance on information reporting.,
so (a) rely on incentives (e.g. conditional
supplementary grants to schools); (b) allow local
officials to work with information professionals
at central level to develop standards and test
systems; (c) ensure that product is better than
what is readily available from the market; (d)
customize local system to capacity of districts,
while ensuring comparability across Indonesia.
See Chapter 2, Box 2.5, and Volume 2, Chapter
1 for discussion.
Especially in the next three years, will need to
evaluate the assignment continuously to assess
their appropriateness and effectiveness
See Chapter 2 for discussion.
Comments
Obtain support for
educational goals and
strategies from civil
society, NGOs, and the
media
Create funding and selection mechanism to provide legislators with
demand-led access to academics or consultants to provide studies
Support capacity of
legislative bodies to
analyze education
policy
55
Improve capacity of the media to analyze and report on education issues,
by developing training materials for national and regional media and
instituting a yearly award for the best education reporting
Develop training program and materials for government officials on this
issue, and train government officials on role of civil society in policy
oversight
Analyze current role of civil society in education, from policy design to
policy oversight
Consider funding small technical unit or panel that can be drawn upon
repeatedly
Assess cost-benefit of private provision as it compares with public
provision
Develop monitoring and evaluation protocols for capacity development
programs
Based on standards, develop procedures for local governments and
schools to assess their own management capacity
Develop plan to restructure organizations and train staff to develop new
systems
Based on function assignments and standards, audit current management
systems and capacities throughout the system
Develop management standards that all government levels, and schools
should meet
Specific actions
Establish policy
towards private
provision, especially at
secondary and tertiary
education levels
ŹImprove
management capacity
throughout the
education system
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
NG and LG
DPR at NG level,
DPRDs at LG
level
All levels of
government
Schools (head
teachers, teachers,
and School
Committees)
All government,
levels, in
coordination with
each other
Implementing
agency
Democratization and decentralization require an
informed citizenry, ideally informed by highquality reporting.
As democratization and civil society activism
are relatively new in Indonesia, there are
dangers of misunderstandings and role
confusion.
Legislative bodies currently have to rely entirely
on executive branch for analysis of education
policy changes and the state of execution of
policy
Process will be ongoing.
Where needed and possible, use private
providers to conduct audit and systems
improvements
Many ongoing projects (e.g., DSSD, DBEP) do
this, so need to compile lessons, disseminate and
incorporate them into new systems.
Comments
Specific actions
Implementing
agency
Comments
Ź Improve the
transparency and
predictability of
assistance to local
governments
Ź Secure adequate
development resources
for education in regions
and in schools, esp. for
poor regions
Ź Secure adequate
operational budgets for
education at provincial
and district levels and
in schools
56
Publish plan so it is broadly known, and establish mechanism for
reporting on performance with respect to the plan.
Develop multi-year plan of financial, technical and management
assistance to district governments that is consistent with regional needs
and goals
Determine which development projects are best undertaken at regional or
national levels
Audit investment projects for schools and require public disclosure of
results of audit; develop monitoring and evaluation protocols for capacity
development programs
Evaluate lessons from current development projects throughout the
system, and develop a plan for consolidating or linking, and for scaling
up those that are effective and terminating those that are not
Establish tracking and reporting systems for regular monitoring and
analysis of education financing at all levels
Develop and implement per-school funding formula to determine staff
deployment
Develop and implement per-student funding formula to determine
operational education budget at district level
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
Data requirements: Up-to-date district-level
information on multiple education indicators,
resource levels, and capacity
Develop schema for determining level and
nature of needed assistance to regions:
Categorize districts according to performance
level on multiple education indicators, resource
levels, and technical and management capacity
While this should be initiated immediately, the
process will take a few years to complete.
To improve teacher deployment, base staff
deployment on a per-school rather than perstudent basis, with indicative teacher-student
parameters. See section D below.
The per-student funding formula is to be costindexed with adjustments for needs of
disadvantaged groups, using reasonable cost
estimate of enrollment and agreed-upon quality
standards and geographic-specific prices.
B. Core policy objective : To ensure adequate resources for education, improve the improve the efficiency and effectiveness of resource use, and address equity
concerns
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
57
Districts to launch their own similar program over the long-term
Transition step: Establish a special, finite-term, well-targeted pro-poor
national program to supplement district financing for schools and
students in selected areas
Evaluate the pro-poor nature of expenditure patterns at all levels of
government as part of regular performance audits
Invite these districts to submit well-focused proposals in line with their,
on condition that these districts will use oversight technical services from
NG or experts for the duration of the funded project
Initiate a transitional program of assistance to districts with greatest need
of support for their education programs and schools but with inadequate
revenues to implement their multi-year educational development plan
Publicize assistance plan so it is broadly known; meet with School
Committees to discuss plans and to disclose expenditures at the end of
each year
Each region to develop multi-year plan of financial, technical and
management assistance to schools
Specific actions
C. Core policy objective : To improve education quality
implement pro-poor
education programs for
schools and students
Ź Develop and
Ź Establish ongranting mechanism to
support educational
development plans of
regional governments
and schools
Ź Improve the
transparency and
predictability of
assistance to schools
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
Local
governments and
schools to inform
NG
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
Local
governments with
School Committee
in each school
Implementing
agency
These programs should be owned by districts
and provinces, using a DAK allocation.
Additionally, national government might want to
establish a mechanism to reward districts that
have achieved larger pro-poor progress.
Lessons are available from SGP and SIGP of
how these might be implemented.
There is wide variation in revenue levels among
districts. Use DAK mechanism and/or loan
funds to assist poorest districts and their schools
through on-granting, with matching funds to
ensure some additionality.
Up-to-date school-level information on multiple
education indicators, resource levels, and
capacity; data should be collected on a regular
basis
Use formula funding mechanisms that are nondiscretionary and that depend on a few key
criteria; see above.
Comments
Initiate creation of “one
regulatory roof” for all
encourage pro-poor
school quality
improvement
Ź Enable and
performance standards
for districts, provinces
and the central level
Ź Set pro-poor
measures and
monitoring mechanisms
for both institutions and
individuals
Ź Set standards,
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
Conduct an audit of district performance using the results of school
mapping and school audit activity plus education profiling of district,
to produce “balanced scorecard” for each district
Set service and performance standards for national level, and audit
performance of national level against standards
x
x
58
Using quality standards for regular schools, undertake a performance
audit of all religious and private schools
Stimulate the supply of pro-poor school improvement services
Locate and disseminate pro-poor good practices, and retire those that are
ineffective
Create regulations that empower schools to make decisions that improve
school quality
Provide adequate resources for school improvement through proposal
based grants to schools for quality improvements
Formalize minimum service standards for local governments in the
area education into appropriate regulation, and harmonize minimum
service standards developed under MoHA umbrella with standard
setting initiated under new Education Law
x
Initiate national media campaign to inform people
Develop policy on schools below standards on minimum accreditation
Develop protocol for public disclosure of balanced scorecards
Initialize school mapping and audit of schools on the basis of checklist of
standards, and produce “balanced scorecards” to rate overall quality and
governance performance of schools and districts.
Harmonize and link various standard-setting processes for schools and
teachers currently underway
Specific actions
PG and DG in
coordination with
Schools and all
levels of
government
NG in
consultation with
PG and DG
All levels of
government
Implementing
agency
The poorest children are educated in small
private schools and Madrasah.
Use information on population, status of
education and school mapping to plan for
school rehabilitation, rationalization and system
expansion
Risk of increasing inequity unless quality
improvement programs are pro-poor
Risk of increasing inequity unless district
standards are pro-poor
District capacities to manage standards
monitoring varies widely,
District capacities to meet national standards
even with flexible timeline is questionable
Separate efforts in MoNE have to define
performance and technical standards and
measures.
Some consensus within education agencies
about definition of minimum learning conditions
and service standards
Useful to assess also good international practice
and Indonesian experiments from other sectors.
Separate efforts in MoNE, Civil Service, and
MoF have begun efforts to define standards and
measures..
Comments
Establish a regular accreditation process for these schools using the
standards, and link this requirement to assistance to these schools
Require all these schools to formulate a plan of achieving quality
standards (providing a timetable of specific actions and level of resources
needed) as part of the registration and accreditation processes
Specific actions
Establish a separate
teaching service that
incorporates systemwide transparent
teacher appointment
and deployment
professional
development system
that is school-based and
performance-led.
Ź Establish a teacher
system for teacher
recruitment
Ź Establish a new
59
Prepare minimum teaching service standards including conditions of
service salary levels guidelines for career paths and compliance and
Prepare national legal framework for a teaching service cadre outside the
regular civil service that identifies the legal employer, defines the
conditions of teacher contracting, and the optional benefits packages that
would accompany various hiring and deployment strategies
Establish licensing scheme and require teachers to be licensed to teach,
i.e., to have approved qualification, have completed an induction period,
and have been assessed as fit to be licensed with periodic review to
renew licensing
Establish mechanisms for grant systems to schools for teacher
development linked to school performance
Measure schools and teacher performance and link this to teacher
development plans
Ź Accredit teacher education programs and institutions
Establish mechanisms for districts (as employers) to have access to data
on graduates from teacher education programs to assist their teacher
supply and demand planning
ŹPrepare guidelines on optional teacher deployment patterns
D. Core policy objective : To improve teacher management
schools
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
NG in conjunction
with DG (the
employers) and
PG (the quality
control
mechanism)
DG to work
closely with all
levels including
schools.
Districts to work
closely with all
levels including
schools
All levels of
government to set
national standards
NG to set national
standards
School
Committees
Implementing
agency
Requires substantial commitment from many
GoI agencies including MoNE, MoRA, MoHA,
MoF, BKN, Menpan.
Depends on the establishment of transparent
teacher appointment processes to be successful.
This system should be compatible with district
autonomy and the principles of school-based
management, and based on professional
partnerships among districts (as employer),
schools, and licensing body
Comments
Establish a National Teaching Commission to oversee the teaching
service, including initiating legal actions and defining norms or standards
service, salary levels, guidelines for career paths and compliance and
quality mechanisms
Specific actions
60
NG=National government; PG=Provincial government; DG=District government
Notes:
processes
(Ź means “For
Policy objectives
Implementing
agency
Deployment norms, career structure, and
employment procedures (that incorporate a
compensation and rewards system that is clear,
transparent, guided by considerations of
qualifications, responsibilities and motivations
for continuous development) need to be simple
to understand, relatively straightforward to
execute and accountable to the community.
Determine impact of separate national teaching
service on the existing civil service structure,
civil service regulations.
National consensus on definition of basic
competencies required of teachers at different
levels of education.
Comments
Chapter 6
The Way Forward
61
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63
Report No. 29506
INDONESIA
DECENTRALIZATION
The World Bank
August 2004
Chapter 1: Governance and Management
under Decentralization
The tools needed for governing and managing
a centralized system are relatively simple –
that is one of the apparent advantages of centralism. Decentralization has great potential
advantages, but it also requires more skill and
better systems and can, therefore, be a challenge.
thinking, especially in issues related to school
and community based management, dichotomy between public and private schools… and
education management and coordination.”
(MoNE, 2003). This chapter addresses the
sources of the confusion. It lays out the current challenges facing Indonesia in implementing the governance and management aspects
of a decentralized education system. It offers
suggestions for how to move forward.
As is the case in most of Indonesia’s public
sector, Indonesian education has traditionally
been quite centralized. Although there have
been some specific moves towards more local
management in the past, these have been limited to what might better be termed “deconcentration.” Local offices of the national
Ministry of Education were given management responsibilities, but they were not accountable to a local legislature or elected
politicians, and their ability to set policy was
limited. The ability of local citizenry to hold
officials responsible was, both in theory and in
practice, circumscribed. Recently, Laws
22/1999 and 25/1999, as well as the 2003 Education Act, constitute a firm thrust towards
decentralization.1 However, the basic decentralization laws are vague and the related regulations tend to be contradictory and often
unrelated to the higher-level Acts. Furthermore, according to interviews conducted for
this review, some policymakers are discussing
the potential benefits of re-centralization. Finally, there are implementation capacity challenges as discussed in Hickling Indonesia
(2001b) as well as in Depdiknas (2002), which
found uneven capacity across a range of districts. This uncertainty has created anxiety,
which was clearly expressed in a planning
document issued by the MoNE in 2003:
“[there have been] apathies and confusion in
the process of decentralization and autonomy
in education as it restructures the ways of
The chapter’s main message is that as implementation of decentralization occurred, in
2001 and 2002, policy as to who does what,
why, and with what legitimacy, appeared quite
confused. The current policy changes, starting
in 2003, are not making things much clearer,
and are often technically not the most appropriate. Finally, as ideas do get clearer anyway
(e.g., as practices emerge by default in districts willing to experiment, in spite of, rather
than because of, clear policy), and appropriate
ideas do emerge, the systems and skills needed
to implement the new, decentralized ways of
doing things, are often missing or not optimized. Furthermore, there are too few good
mechanisms for ensuring the lateral spread of
effective practices that emerge in various localities.
To support this basic story-line, the chapter is
organized as follows. First, the status of education governance and management in Indonesia, and the process of decentralization at its
beginning, are analyzed descriptively and in
comparative perspective. Second, some of the
sources of confusion are analyzed. A few important current policy changes, such as the
2003 Education Act and the process of setting
minimum service standards, are discussed. It
is explained that these might not improve matters very much, because the basic sources of
confusion are untouched. Third, assuming
some of the basic policy problems can be improved upon, some “technical” or “systems
development” challenges facing Indonesia are
1
Furthermore, planning documents such as MoNE
(2003) endorse the basic principle that the: “spirit of decentralization and regional autonomy will underline the
implementation process… the development planning
policy of each region will have a different priority.” p.2.
1
Volume 2
been, and there still is, widespread confusion
as to who does what, and why. This has been
the situation as decentralization gets under
way.
discussed. Finally, suggestions for improvement are made.2
The Situation as Decentralization Gets
Under Way
A Comparative Perspective
Detailed governance and management diagnoses have already been carried out in the last
few years, both by donors (Greene, 2000;
Hickling Indonesia, 2001a and 2001b; and
World Bank, 1998) and by Indonesian scholars (see Sudharto, 2002; Supriyoko, 2002;
Widarinata and Mudyahardja, 2002, and others in the same series). Some of the studies
document issues pre-dating the recent laws,
while others focus on the challenges presented
by decentralization. They generally agree that
there is a lack of clarity in the laws and a lack
of capacity at the local level. Thus, Indonesia
now has to continue its efforts to meet preexisting goals, such as widening access to
education and improving quality, but in the
new and complex context of decentralization.
Yet, in this section we will show that: a) from
an international perspective, Indonesia’s decentralization process is not yet sufficiently
well-embarked; b) based on empirical analyses
of data on local governance and management,
there appear to be serious problems, and relying on citizen pressure to solve these problems
will not be easy or automatic; and c) there has
Table 1.1 presents a list of the most common
challenges encountered in those countries that
have decentralized their education sectors.3
The table lists each challenge, indicates
whether the challenge appears to be relevant to
the current Indonesian situation, and assesses
whether the challenge in question seems to
impede Indonesia’s decentralization process,
and finally whether Indonesian policymakers
appear to be sufficiently aware of this challenge, and how it can be confronted. Whether
Indonesia faces these challenges was assessed
via a series of interviews conducted specifically for this report with various policymakers
and experts on governance and management
issues and with representatives from
Education Boards and school committees.
(See Appendix 1.2 for a complete list of the
experts interviewed.)
Judging
by
this
table,
Indonesia’s
decentralization is not yet well-embarked.
The experts running the sector are quite aware
of this, but they are often not clear on what to
do about it.
2
“Community participation” is not addressed in
this chapter under that name. However, it is clear
that, in discussing effective community-level governance through school committees or the role of
civil society in policy definition, we are addressing
the issues normally covered under the rubric of
“community participation.”
3
As captured by the knowledge management tools at
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/
06.GovernanceReform/governace_ref.htm.
2
Chapter 1
Governance and Management under Decentralization
Table 1.1 Diagnosis of Governance, Management, and Related Decentralization Challenges
LikeliClarity
hood to
among
impede
Awareexperts
ness
decenon how
tralizaamong
to
Generic Challenge
Present in Indonesia?
tion
experts
solve
1. Unclear or inefficient
Yes
High
Yes
No
definition and assignment
of roles and responsibilities (function assignment)
2. Misalignment of reDifficult to say because function assignment High
InsuffiNo
sponsibility and authority
is not clear but is likely to be a challenge
cient
given unclear legislation
3. State/provincial govNo. Provinces do not have excessive overall Low
NA
NA
ernment centralism
power relative to kabupaten/kota and (potentially) schools.
4. Lack of a) management Yes, though highly variable. Many kabuHigh
InsuffiNo
systems and b) skills (gepaten/kota do not have the skills needed to
cient
neric and system-based) to implement education decentralization,
implement the reform
though some do. No serious (universal) diagnostic against a complete and detailed
function assignment has been done, partly
because function assignment is not clear.
Some samples have been done. Some kabupaten/kota are so small it is doubtful they
will ever have the skills, or should, since
they handle just a few thousand students.
5. Lack of community,
Difficult to say because it has not been tested Medium
Yes
No
parent and private sector
through wide-scale policy. Pilot projects
/untested
participation
suggest interest could be high.
6. Lack of organizational/
Yes
High
Yes
No
individual accountability
7. Lack of quality
Yes. Both a lack of information that is of
High
Yes
No
information
high quality and a relative lack of information about quality. The former problem is
worse than the latter.
8. Lack of effective techYes. Most instructions, guidelines and tradi- High
InsuffiNo
nical support and guidance tion are aimed at control rather than support.
cient
9. Inequity of educational
Yes. Spending per student varies greatly.
High
InsuffiSome
access, opportunities, and
See the chapter on finance in this report.
cient
quality
10. Inefficient/unequal re- Yes. Funding formulae are inefficient. See
High
InsuffiSome
source allocation
the chapter on finance in this report.
cient
11. Resistance to decenThere appears to be some resistance at naMedium
Some
No
tralization and lack of potional level to decentralization of certain
litical and legal support
functions, e.g., those related to teacher management. Belief that certain functions
should be re-centralized is not uncommon.
NA
NA
NA
12. Project design does not Does not appear to be a problem. Decentralization pilot projects are ahead of the legsupport the decentralizaislation and regulation. Actual problem
tion objectives
seems to be rather in making sure the lessons
learned from pilot projects are taken into account in legislation and regulation.
13. Institutional and poThis appears to be a problem. Policy varies
High
Yes
Some
litical unpredictability
and is often unclear.
3
Volume 2
taining to education governance. An analysis
of this survey is presented in Appendix 1.4.
Here we summarize the results of the survey.
Most of the current challenges in Indonesia
stem from two fundamental problems: (i) the
lack of a clear and efficient assignment of
functions and (ii) a lack of general management skills and of the specific management
skills needed to operate decentralized management systems.4
Expert opinions of Dinas Pendidikan officials
and school officials regarding objective measures, such as the time it takes to procure
school books or the time it takes to register a
teacher promotion, suggest that the system is
slow and poorly managed. According to the
opinions of principals, it seems to take about
7.4 months to fulfill a school’s book requisition and 5.8 months to register a teacher promotion. Interestingly, the opinions on how
long it takes to accomplish these tasks differ
significantly between the school level and the
Dinas Pendidikan. The former estimate the
same tasks to take some 40 percent longer
than the latter. This in itself is suggestive of a
management problem and serious disconnects
in perception.
Almost all other problems derive from these
two. For example, the lack of effective technical support and guidance is part of the more
generic problem of the absence of management systems aligned with the new functions
and with the lack of operational skills.
Empirical Evidence from the Governance
and Decentralization Survey
The final goal of decentralization is to increase
transparency and accountability at the local
level, from principals and teachers to parents
and community, from Kepala Dinas to the
DPRD and the Education Board; to improve
information flows about what clients want
from schools; and to increase local input into
schooling production process and input costs.
What is the evidence on the current situation?
Both citizens and NGOs perceive education, in
general, to be among the most corrupt and
poorly executed of services in Indonesia, and
DPRD members suggest that they receive
more complaints about education than about
any other service. This may be a biased view,
of course, in the sense that education is a service that touches citizens’ lives every day and
in which perhaps the largest proportion of citizens participates on a daily basis. Thus, one
may be more likely to complain about education than about other services. Finally, DPRD
members perceived that only in about 28 percent of the cases is the sector regulated at district level—a year after decentralization is
supposed to have taken effect.
The Governance and Decentralization Survey
(GDS) carried out by the Center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) at the University of Gajah Mada, with World Bank funding,
is an opinion survey that was applied to many
levels of Indonesian society. The survey was
taken in 2002. It contains a few questions per-
4
In Indonesia, there is little historical precedent for
a style of governance that emphasizes selfregulation and accountability to citizens at the local
level. Historically, Indonesia transited from a political style that could be characterized as feudal
before colonization, to colonization under the
Dutch, which did not foster accountability to the
average person, and, after 1948, to a national liberation centralist government typical of 20th Century post-colonial societies. This explains partly
why there is little natural or instinctive understanding of how to develop policies and procedures that
are clear and lead to local self-governance. However, in this chapter we start with more proximate
causes.
Yet, if one asks citizens or parents about their
subjective satisfaction with their children’s
schooling, some 80 percent of parents are satisfied on issues such as fees, discipline, and
quality of learning.5 The range of satisfaction
opinions across districts is extremely narrow:
parents seem to respond very uniformly and
5
The phrasing of the question varied between “are
you satisfied” and “are you unhappy.” The percentages were roughly the same in either case.
4
Chapter 1
“help” with some function that belongs to
level Y. For example, according to PP
25/2000, the education Dinas at the province
level is supposed to “help” with providing
textbooks or to “help manage” higher education. It is difficult to interpret such regulations, and it is possible that such language
might exacerbate jealousy and turf battles
rather than alleviate them.
always slightly positively. Furthermore, parents’ opinions vary much less than principals’
opinions about management problems, and are
uncorrelated with the expert opinions on objective problems. Thus, in districts management tasks are particularly slow, for example,
parents’ opinions of the system are about the
same as in other districts.
All of these factors taken together suggest that
the sector is indeed poorly managed and governed but that citizens have fairly low expectations and uniformly so. This presents obvious
problems for decentralization, in terms of the
degree to which one can use citizens’ expectations to pressure for improvements in service
provision. Possible solutions might include
introducing a public information campaign
about the education system or encouraging (or
requiring) comparative ranking of schools using systems such as school or district scorecards. Culturally appropriate methods of
making citizens aware of their rights and of
the level of service they are entitled to expect
need to be developed. This is discussed further below in the context of Minimum Service
Standards (SPMs in the Indonesian acronym).
Functions are assigned vaguely. For example,
“books” (without specifying which aspect) are
the responsibility of the province. Some experts advocate that this function should be
given to the districts, but nobody specifies
precisely how the textbooks should be funded,
purchased, and distributed. For example,
Wiradinata and Mudhyahardja (2002) recommend that: “At least in the medium term, some
authorities of the Province (for example, book
supply) should be given to Kabupaten/Kota.”
Yet even though the law now stipulates that
“books” are no longer the responsibility of the
central government, DEPDIKNAS still includes the provision of books in its planning.
In fact, most education planning at the national level still includes functions that are (or
logically ought to be) assigned to lower government levels. However the MoNE seems to
spend little on the functions that are logically
nationwide functions like those involving
standard-setting, policy monitoring, training,
and research. Thus, for example, while MoNE
(2003) explains that decentralization is being
taken into account, most of the activities that it
proposes to undertake seem to involve construction or materials procurement, which are
not appropriate activities for a national ministry in a country as big as Indonesia, and with a
decentralized education system. 6
“Who Does What, and Why” Unclear
The various laws, decrees, and guidelines propose conflicting and overlapping functions at
the most fundamental level. In one example, a
MoNE report (MoNE, 2002) states on page 17
that “Education Boards and School Committees control educational management or output.” However, other pages in the same
document (as well as in Kepmen 044/U/2002)
describe the functions of these bodies as being
quite limited and as not really being to control
or manage educational output. In another example, according to PP 39/2001, the education
Dinas at the province level is responsible for
“providing education and training in Kabupaten/Kota” (Wiradinata and Mudyahardja,
2002) but this is contradicted by Law 22/1999.
Similarly, Keppres No. 165/2000 appears to
contradict Law 22/1999 with regard to the
level of status it accords to the MoNE. It is
quite common to find, in the regulations,
statements such as that level X is supposed to
6
For example, the activities in the basic education
area (MoNE, 2003, Table III.4) include: construction of junior high school (SLTP) buildings, construction of additional classrooms, renovation of
SLTP buildings, construction of laboratory rooms,
construction of library rooms, supply of sport and
musical instruments, supply of teaching aids for
mathematics, supply of teaching aids for pure science, supply of books for main subjects, and sup-
5
Volume 2
place at district level since it involves interdistrict spillovers.
Furthermore, some experts and policymakers
are still proposing function assignments that
seem to run counter to the spirit of decentralization, as was noted by several of the experts
whom we interviewed. This spirit is also evident in occasional proposals to re-centralize
(or to keep central) certain aspects of teacher
management. “Next to teacher supply, teacher
rotation needs to be nationally and intensely
managed” (Djohar, 2002, p. vii). As reported
by our interviewees, many aspects of teacher
management are still centralized, including
personnel database management, the registration of personnel actions, and the transmitting
of this information to the payroll system, even
when many of these aspects are decentralized
in theory. For example, personnel management and the payroll function take place at the
district level, but the recording of such actions,
in order for the action to trigger the payroll, is
still centralized.
Heads of the Education Boards/Councils often
do not yet have clear mandates or clear job descriptions, even in districts that are, by reputation, well-managed and are embracing
decentralization. As became clear in our interviews, many heads of Education Boards,
while dynamic, curious, and eager to help,
seemed unclear about what role they were expected to play in the new decentralized education system.
Although the central government, in principle,
is empowered to set standards, it has been
timid about setting governance standards, in
particular in defining clear roles for districts’
Education Boards and School Committees.
Similarly, there are no national standards for
school funding. This can be seen in Kepmen
No. 044/U/2002.
No means have yet been found to avoid particularism (meaning, for example, each district
wanting its own teacher training institution or
wanting to appoint only local teachers) while
staying within the spirit of decentralization.
Several interviewees gave us evidence of increasing particularism. This is a reflection
within the education system of a tendency that
can be seen in society at large, such as districts
creating fisheries rights for themselves and
creating local nuisance taxes. Finding a solution to these problems is part of the process of
clarifying function assignments. It will require both technical skills and consultations,
and it is hard to imagine that this can take
On the other hand, the central government has
retained those functions whose role and purpose in a decentralized system are not clear or,
if clear, not ideal. For example, the role of the
central inspectorate in the decentralized system is not clear. In the view of senior Indonesian analysts, the fact that the central
government is holding on to such functions is
not necessarily in the public interest and may
have more to do with either inertia or personal
interest.
There are no clear national standards for handling and reporting information or, if they are
clear, they are not being followed, since reporting is very poor. As a result, the education
authorities of the central government have insufficient information even on basic issues
such as enrollment. At this point, for example,
it seems as if basic Education Management Information System (EMIS) data on some 90
percent of the schools at the primary level are
missing from the national computer files,
meaning that only about 10 percent of schools
are reporting their data (or districts are forwarding the data) to the central government.
At the secondary level, it might be as high as
25 percent, but this is still far from ideal.
ply of books for libraries. While the MoNE’s Strategic Plan contains a chapter that refers to management development under decentralization, the
activities that it proposes are not really activities
but are re-statements of goals or of the findings of
studies or seem unrealistically limited. For example, the Plan states as one of its aims: “to develop a
system and mechanism of educational planning and
budgeting and also to describe the annual targeting
and budgeting,” but this receives no more description than is contained in this quotation and is
scheduled only as one activity (not described) per
year in the Plan. However, it does indicate that the
MoNE is at least aware of the issues.
6
Chapter 1
ting out the highest-order “functional” division
of labor: that between governance and management. The distinction between ideal governance and management roles is not a precise
science and the distinctions are often muddled
in most societies. But it is clear that the confusions in Indonesia are more fundamental
than in most other societies with serious
growth ambitions. It will be difficult to make
much progress unless there is some consensus
on such basic organizational issues. Outlining
in diagrammatic form how the sector should
function, along these two “lines,” may seem
risky and too prescriptive. However, the lack
of clarity is a real problem. Thus, to achieve
clarity, sooner or later such diagrams will need
to be created, and it is important that, when
they are created, they reflect a clear vision.
The fact that there is confusion at present is
evident in various documents. For example, a
MoNE report (MoNE, 2002b, p. 16) shows an
informal diagram of a section of the governance structure that implies that Bupatis are accountable to the DPRDs (or vice versa)
through the district-level Education Boards. It
is not clear that this is what Kepmen
044/U/2002 intended, nor is it clear that this
would be a sensible arrangement.
Schools can receive funding (for either recurrent or capital expenditures), projects, and inputs from any one of three government levels:
the district, the province, and the national government. There do not seem to be clear, functioning protocols that would prevent a
proliferation of procedures and orders and to
ensure that funding goes through a simple
management chain and is received by local
managers as single sources. (Though some
local managers have created “virtual” singlesource funding by internally consolidating the
funding sources. However, this requires considerable skill.)
The absence of clear definitions of functions,
the vacillation and tendencies to re-centralize,
tend to cause widespread anxiety (“apathies
and confusion” as expressed in a MoNE
document), expressed not only by respected
Indonesian education experts but also by international donors (Wiradinata and Mudyahardja, 2002, pp. vii-viii; Sudharto, 2002, pp.
2-3; Supriyoko, 2002, pp. vii, 18, 19, 26; and
World Bank, 2002b, p. 25).
The Basic Challenge: Clarifying
Functions
In various proposals it is suggested (or assumed) that School Committees be accountable to district-level education boards. Thus,
basic confusion around governance and management hierarchies that could work is quite
common.
The preceding section provides evidence that
the decentralization process is still quite confused, and that management and governance
of the sector are weak. This section turns to
the basic causes of confusion. As noted
above, two key challenges need to be addressed before any others: (i) the lack of clarity about the different governance “functions”
and (ii) the lack of clarity about the management improvements needed to implement
those functions. We now look closely at each
of these questions in turn.
Figure 1.1 represents a best attempt to interpret the law and to reflect what is taking place
at the district level based on our interviews. It
also represents a good organization of functions and responsibilities for a country of Indonesia’s size and complexity.7 An advantage
of diagramming these basic functions is that
this can clarify the differences between the
governance functions and the management
functions. For now, we present this diagram
as merely a work in progress. Clearly, a better
Unclear Sectoral Organization for
Management and Governance
It emerged during our interviews with experts
that there is as yet no clear agreement on a basic organizing diagram of the sector (not just
in Depdiknas but in the sector as a whole) set-
7
Particularly at the school level, since at this level
the regulations are still not finished.
7
Volume 2
Figure 1.1 Governance and Managerial Accountability in a Decentralized Indonesia
Governance or
Representative Aspect of
Government:
Governance Accountability
Management
or Executive Aspect of
Government:
Management Accountability
President of the
Republic
MPR
DPR
MoHA
MoF
Depdiknas
standard-setting
(sets standards of reporting
on financial and educational issues)
(accountability is around standards)
National
Level
report on
organization of
regional government
through MoHA,
(Provincial Level)
DPRD
(Regional People's
Representative
Assembly)
Regents, Mayors
(Bupati, Walikota)
Education
Boards/Councils
Kabupaten/
Kota
Level
Head of District
Education Service
(Kepala Dinas
Pendidikan)
School
Committees
Principals
School
Level
picture will emerge as a result of the discussions that this report will stimulate.
ity is strongly “horizontal” as befits a truly decentralized system.
For the sake of simplicity, the diagram skips
the provincial and sub-district levels. The following aspects should now be clear:
2. The whole notion of a governance
“line” is unfamiliar in the Indonesian context. Given the nature of
public sector management in the
past, the governance and management lines were essentially one
and the same, with governance being largely vertical, hierarchical,
and indistinguishable from man-
1. There is a clear governance “line”
that runs vertically down the lefthand side of the graphic and a
clear management “line” running
down the right side. Accountabil8
Chapter 1
should ideally be not more than
one management and one governance entity per level. Making
Education Boards and School
Committees play an advisory role
– a loose form of governance –
might make the most sense. Note
that this is quite different from the
role suggested for School Committees both in Figure 1.1 and in
various policy documents, such as
the new Education Act (at least if
one interprets it in that direction—
interpretation is key, as the Act
tends to be vague). The suggested
role for School Committees is indeed a true governance role with
respect to schools.
agement. In Law 22/1999 passed
in 1999, it was stipulated that
there should now be a governance
line and that it should be nonhierarchical and should have a
strong “horizontal” accountability
(for example, Bupati to DPRD).
Yet, the distinctions between the
governance and management lines
are not clear in this law or in subsequent regulations, nor do they
seem to be clear in the minds of
officials as reflected in conflicting
or confused viewpoints in various
official documents and interviews
conducted for this review. Further
policy dialogue and analyses will
be needed to clarify how this
change can work in practice.
6. Because there are no vertical lines
on the governance side, it is clear
that there is no hierarchy in the
governance of the decentralized
education system. It is also clear
that those in the management line
report to those in the governance
line because.
3. The diagram makes it clear that at
each level of government there is
one (and ideally only one) governance entity and one (and ideally only one) management entity.
4. The diagram highlights the role of
Depdiknas as a national standardsetting body. However, there are
other
important
but
nonhierarchical roles that Depdiknas
could or should perform, such as
disseminating best practices and
creating a training facility for upgrading management skills.
This diagram is not meant to be a prescription.
It is a good interpretation of what the basic
laws require, and of what best international
practice suggests. It also points out the importance of parental voice at the local level, via
horizontal accountability of schools to parents.
Yet it is meant only to suggest that Indonesians ought to try to achieve diagrammatic
clarity of this type in this area.
5. The governance line represents
the political entities that are closest to the citizen – the representatives of the electorate.
This
includes the DPR, DPRDs, and
School Committees. Note that the
Education Boards play an intermediate and (for now) ambiguous
role and, therefore, straddle the
two lines. The diagram makes it
clear that the concept of an Education Board is not entirely clear and
that thinking of it as either a governance or management entity is
likely to create problems as there
The Roles Assigned to the Central
Government are not Optimal
Aside from making clear distinctions between
the governance line and the management line,
it is also important to make sure that different
levels in the management line play roles appropriate to a system where governance is
horizontal and non-hierarchical. At the top of
the system, in Indonesia, this has not yet
started to take place. The lack of determination of a clear and appropriate role for the center of the system blocks the emergence of
9
Volume 2
has been much discussion on the issue (see
Jalal and Musthafa, 2001).
clear and appropriate roles for other levels,
because one of the key roles the center is not
performing well is precisely to help determine
an appropriate (appropriate to a nonhierarchical governance line) assignment of
functions for other levels.
The Current Internal Organization and
Size of Depdiknas Should be Improved.
Given that the role or task of Depdiknas is still
not truly appropriate, the internal organization,
it follows, is also not appropriate. Since the
government of Indonesia has not yet arrived at
a final and optimal function assignment and
since organizational form should follow function, it is difficult to prescribe improvements
for Depdiknas in any detail. However, judging by the organizational structures in the national-level education ministries of many
countries that are decentralized or effective or
both, it can be stated that Indonesia’s Depdiknas is not optimally organized to provide
support and guidance to lower-level government units and schools.
The central government has not yet adapted to
being at the apex of a decentralized system
rather being than the sole decision-maker as in
the past. The impulse of central politicians
and civil servants is to make things happen,
for example, by building schools or ordering
them to be built. It has not become second nature to them to steer and support, to set norms
and regulate wisely and unobtrusively, to research and disseminate, to encourage innovation, and to provide technical advice to the rest
of the system rather than actually to do the
“direct” work of education, such as managing
teacher deployment or textbook design and
procurement.
The national level of modernizing and decentralizing ministries is characterized by:
This is partly because central government staff
do not yet have the skills to perform their new
functions, and they are understandably wary of
performing functions for which they do not
have the requisite skills. It is also possible
that there are fewer rent-seeking opportunities
for them in their new functions than there
were in their old roles, and therefore they are
resisting abandoning their old ones, which
were more profitable. It is also likely that central government staff lack the process management and substantive skills not only to do
their new jobs well but to finalize the definition of decentralization. (For example, it takes
a combination of process management skills
and substantive knowledge of public management to arrive at solutions that are consensual—and hence likely to be implemented—as
well as technically sound.) This is logical.
Since decentralization, at least in initial design
aspects, is a one-off event, most staff naturally
have not had practice in designing decentralization processes. As an example, the critical
issue of teacher management, and which aspects of this function should be relatively decentralized or centralized is still unresolved;
there is also uncertainty about whether it will
be re-centralized, despite the fact that there
x
Less focus on traditional “level”
line functions such as early childhood, primary, and secondary, and
more focus on “transversal” support functions such as governance
improvement, financial equalization, and quality assurance. The
latter functions have more staff
and more status, in a decentralized
or modern ministry, relative to the
“level” functions.
x Relatively less focus on supporting direct execution of projects
and hence less staff devoted to inspection and audit functions, and
these functions tend to carry less
status.
x If there is procurement, focus is
on the procurement not so much
of goods and construction services
but of analytical and developmental services.
10
Chapter 1
cial ministers with a very small secretariat.
The United States, a country about 25 percent
larger than Indonesia, has around 5,000 education staff at the federal level. Some developing countries, such as China, Argentina, or
South Africa, have as few as a few hundred or
not much more than a thousand staff at the
federal or national level. However, this is not
a problem because the training and capacity of
staff matter much more than their numbers.
How much time that staff spend on highly leveraged task on appropriately assigned functions at the national ministry is also key. Staff
who are extremely capable and who focus
their work on the overall direction of the education sector, policy, measurement of outputs,
and comparisons between schools and between sub-national governments, are much
more important than sheer numbers at the apex
of a decentralized system. Sheer numbers
simply do not make up for a lack of ability in
the tasks that are required in a central ministry
in the context of a decentralized system. So
Indonesia faces the prospect of having too
large a staff, most of whom are not trained to
operate in the decentralized system. This not
only consumes resources needlessly but also
creates a built-in interest group that has an incentive to maintain things as they always have
been. This is a serious problem that must be
confronted. The size of the central bureaucracy is not just a technical problem, but one
that can politically slow down decentralization.
x A separation of functions between
organizational units supporting
narrow issues of human resources
or budgeting as they apply to the
national ministry itself and to projects run by the national level and
support functions that apply to the
country as a whole. For example,
in a modernized ministry, human
resource management, as it applies nationwide to, for example,
teacher evaluation, deployment,
and development, is quite separate
from human resource management as it applies to the staff of
the ministry itself. However, it is
important for the ministry units
working on policy issues to maintain practical links with units
working on internal issues, because the latter tend to have more
experience with practical administrative matters (such as the handling of personnel databases). If
the units dealing with national
policy on, for example, teacher
management, do not have experience with the practical issues, they
tend to become too theoretical.
Thus, it is a good idea for the
units making policy on the financing of schools, for example, to
collaborate with the units supervising the financial execution of
nationally run projects and to understand the policies and procedures used in this execution.
Size is also an issue when it comes to spending power. The proportion of the total education budget spent by the national level in
decentralized countries varies but in general is
higher than the proportion of staff working at
national level. This is because the staff working at national level in decentralized countries,
as noted above, have a great deal more leverage over resources than similar staff in a centralized system or than similar staff at the
lower levels of government in a decentralized
system. Spending by central education ministries as a percentage of total spending at the
pre-tertiary level in decentralized countries
ranges all the way from less than 10 percent
(in China, the US, South Africa, and Hungary)
Appendix 1.5 contains a fuller discussion of
these issues and presents, for discussion purposes, an organigram for Depdiknas that might
better suit Indonesia’s needs than the current
organigram.
With regard to size, it should be noted that national-level ministries in many decentralized
countries have very few staff. One extreme in
the developed world is Canada, where the national education level in fact functions with a
staff of at most a few dozen, since there is no
national ministry but only a council of provin11
Volume 2
ple, not to educational substance), effective
law should, among other things:
to as high as 20-40 percent (in Australia, Poland, and Spain).
Are Current Policies Helping?
x Make the rights and responsibilities of
specific actors (as people with the capacity to delegate) clear. For example, the law should say “The Minister
has the responsibility to…” or “parents have the responsibility to…”
x Specify responsibilities in terms of
governance procedures (for example,
procedures for electing governing
bodies to govern schools) as well as
substantive tasks (the actual duties of
governing bodies).
x Deal as much as possible with concrete institutions, such as “schools,”
rather than with abstractions, such as
“education.”
x Not give the same responsibilities to
more than one actor.
x Specify processes for resolving contradictions and differences between
actors.
x Deal with observable behavior, not attitudes or beliefs.
x Be as specific as possible, leaving
only truly technical details to be defined by subsequent regulations, and
no detail should be postponed until
regulation merely because it presents a
difficult policy problem or social issue.
x Duties and prerogatives as actions that
key actors must take, as opposed to
those that the actors may take, should
be specified. This makes the obligation to act clearer when the action is
something that an actor must do (an
obligation, responsibility, or duty), but
the right to act is also clearer, when it
is something the actor may do (a right,
or power). Thus, both rights and responsibilities are spelled out.
x Ensure that definitions are clearly a
matter of clarifying a concept and are
not mixed with statements of intent or
belief or with the specification of actions.
The problems described above were common
as Indonesian decentralization got under way
in 2002. We have seen that the division of labor between levels and branches of government is not as clear and productive as it could
be, and that central government has not restructured itself, yet, to fully support decentralization. But policy-making has not stood
still. Are the more current policies likely to
fully resolve these problems? In this section
we examine two recent policies or policy
trends, namely the recent Education Act and
the process of setting Minimum Service Standards. We find that the problems are not
likely to be fully resolved by these initiatives,
at least as they stood as of this writing. However, the currently evolving policies do often
point in an appropriate general direction. For
example, the Education Act does begin to lay
a better legal basis for school-based management or autonomy. Similarly, the notion of
defining standards is, at heart, a good one,
even though the specifics are not yet implemented as well as they could be.
The Education Act as an Instrument of
Governance Design
During the course of this Education Sector
Review, a new law to shape all of Indonesia’s
education system was produced by the Ministry of Education and passed by the legislative
assembly, the DPR. The result is Act No.
20/2003, the Act on the National Education
System (English version Gazette No. 78,
2003). An effective education law can be of
considerable assistance in clarifying rights and
responsibilities (or duties and powers) in an
education governance system. Naturally, an
effective law is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for an effective education system.
Examples of countries with clear
education legislation include South Africa,
Singapore, and Malaysia. Judging from such
examples (and noting that these pointers refer
exclusively to process and governance princi-
12
Chapter 1
tion system is the responsibility of the
Minister” (article 50). Though again,
the word “management” is vague and
open to interpretation, because specific rights and duties are not discussed.
x Key aspects of the way in which the
system functions are regulated
vaguely on the one hand but overregulated on the other. Just to take
one example, the vital issues of standard-setting, certification, evaluation,
and minimum standards is covered in
at least five different articles (or more
depending on how one interprets the
law) that define duties that are likely
to seriously overlap or duplicate each
other (articles 35, 59, 60, 62, and 66).
As the process of legal drafting proceeded, the
bill noticeably improved in several of these
dimensions. However, the law that was eventually signed by the President in July of 2003
is still far from ideal. For example:
x There are at least 35 calls for further
regulation in areas that require major
policy decisions rather than technical
details, thus glossing over key matters.
All of the further regulations appear to
be the duties or rights of the national
government. Should there be regulations issued by a regional government
that contradict the Act, it is not clear
which regulation should prevail.
x Rights and responsibilities too often
devolve on more than one actor (as in
“the [national] government and the regional government must guide and
develop educational staff”).
This
phrase appears about 15 times, often
in crucial contexts.
x The nature of the actors is left vague,
so that the Act often specifies that it is
“the government” that has a responsibility, not the Kepala Dinas, or the
Bupati/Walikota, or the national Minister.
x The language used in the law is often
quite vague, saying that some level of
government will “coordinate” or “facilitate” or “guide” or “assist” or “supervise” some function that another
level is actually in charge of delivering. Language such as “manage” or
“coordinate” or “facilitate” is often
used without any apparent substance
behind the language or without distinguishing what might be meant by the
different versions of the same concept.
x The law seems to attempt to take back
many functions that one would assume to be the prerogative of local
government, based on previous government legislation and regulations.
One example would be the issue of
teacher management and employment,
and another would be the notion that
“the management of national educa-
It may seem that all these issues can be resolved in later regulations. This is certainly
true in principle and happens in all countries.
However, in Indonesia there are two problems
with this.
First, the whole legal and regulatory approach
has been characterized by a lack of specificity,
with the resolution of important problems always being deferred to a later date. Also, once
the problem has eventually been specifically
addressed, it is often open to a very wide margin of interpretation. Thus, for example, if the
law appears to create overlaps (for example, as
noted above where five different articles of the
Education Act deal with standard-setting and
quality control), this will simply not be resolved during the regulation drafting stage,
because those who are drafting the regulation
work in separate groups, and thus have often
lost sight of the overall context.
A second problem with delaying the resolution
of important problems to a subsequent regulation is that this regulation is unlikely to be
taken as seriously as a fully fledged law
passed by the DPR. This means that there are
more opportunities for mistakes, uninformed
actions, a lack of transparency, and selfinterested actions on the part of the executive
branch (since it is this branch that drafts regulation), and other governance failures is much
13
Volume 2
in no small measure to a lack of clarity in the
legislation, including the definition of terminology (see Donor SPM Working Group,
2002, also GTZ-Support for Decentralization
Measures et Al, 2003). (This problem is compounded by the Education Law, No. 20/2003,
as noted in other sections of this chapter.)
However, in spite of a rocky start, the process,
under a MoHA-led “model-building” exercise,
had produced a set of draft minimum standards for the education sector by mid-2003
(Departemen Pendidikan Nasional/Unit Fasilitasi Desentralisasi Pendidikan, 2003).
greater than if the regulation was clearer to
begin with. In any case, in drafting the secondary regulation, it would be wise to follow the
principles of good education regulation, which
are similar to the principles of good education
legislation as listed above (while bearing in
mind that they refer to process and legal principles, rather than educational substance). In
particular, it would be a positive development
if the secondary regulation were sufficiently
specific not to require a third regulation to
clarify its details.
In spite of the above problems with the Act, it
is important to note that it does make positive
contributions. It, for example, lays out the legal basis for notions of school autonomy and
school-based management for the first time at
this high level. (In practice there are many pilot experiments taking place, but they have little high-level legal basis.)
In gauging the likely impact of minimum
standards on decentralized governance, it is
important to note that there is no accepted
body of theory or practice that can be used as
a solid basis for guidance (see Ferrazzi, 2002).
However, minimum standards can also be approached from the point of view of more generally accepted practical and theoretical
notions of decentralization and intergovernmental public finance (see Smoke, 2002 and,
for interesting similarities to a very different
sector with salutary lessons for education, see
Baker and Trémolet, 2000). It also makes
sense to anchor the discussion of SPMs in the
specific context of the overall process of decentralization in Indonesia. If one then adds
what little international evidence does exist,
one has some basis for judging the current
state of affairs with regard to education SPMs
in Indonesia according to the certain criteria.
A detailed analysis (contained in Appendix
1.6) of the current draft education SPMs suggests the following:
Minimum Service Standards
Minimum Service Standards (Standar Pelayanan Minimal–SPM) are a potentially useful
tool of management and governance. However, if misapplied, they can be a hindrance or,
worse, can actually undermine decentralized
governance. This section tackles the issue of
whether SPMs in Indonesia, as the situation
currently stands, are likely to be more of a
help than a hindrance. A more detailed discussion is presented in Appendix 1.6.
The basic decentralization law, No. 22/1999,
is silent on the issue of minimum standards. It
is Government Regulation No. 25/2000 that
calls for the preparation of guidelines for determining SPMs that must be “implemented”
by local governments. Other recent regulations, such as Government Regulation 105 of
2000, have specified that local government
budgets should be performance-oriented,
based on minimum standards that measure
performance. Government Regulation 108 of
2000 also calls for minimum standards in the
evaluation of local government performance.
In response to these various regulations, Indonesia began in 2002 to devise some SPMs
with some false starts and some confusion due
x Numbers: There are too many, nearly
200. This leads to a loss of focus and
increases rather than decreases the
transaction costs of accountability.
Reducing the numbers should be
strongly considered.
x Type: Most of the existing indicators
are not true service standards aimed at
improving service to citizens, such as
the number of days it takes the school
to provide a service to parents, or mutual accountability between service
units, such as the number of weeks it
14
Chapter 1
takes the Dinas Pendidikan to supply a
school with books or to get a teacher
promoted. Serious work should be
done to include more true service
standards.
x Motivation and use: The motivation
for adopting SPMs is too often the desire for bureaucratic reporting along
the management line rather than citizen accountability along the governance line.
There is insufficient
realization at the national level of the
usefulness of indicators in a decentralized and democratic system as tools
whereby horizontal accountability can
be monitored. There also appears to
be a motivation to protect special or
sub-sectoral interests (such as sports
or teachers’ privileges rather than their
rights and responsibilities as professional agents) via the setting of SPMs,
with a consequent loss of focus on the
most important issues, such as the delivery of general and basic education.
x Technical quality: The technical quality of a few of the indicators is low.
They are non-measurable, at least as
currently specified, either in theory or
in practice.
x Level to be reached: For many of the
indicators, it makes little sense to
specify an actual level to be reached.
Furthermore, the logic of setting up an
indicator framework and allowing
competition and emulation to determine the actual level to be reached
appears not to be understood, or, if
understood, utilized in the standardsetting exercise. For some key variables, in a country with as little experience with competitive electoral
processes as Indonesia and with poor
horizontal accountability mechanisms,
the level should be set by the central
government (albeit with a locally determined speed of approach to the
goal), but in other cases there is no
theoretical or practical justification for
setting a level.
x Level at which measured: Too many
of the indicators have little practical
manifestation at the level of the unit of
delivery and/or data on these indicators are often not routinely collected
and reported upward by the actual
service unit (for example, schools or
districts). Thus, it requires special effort to collect these data—a special effort that may be in no one’s inherent
interest, even under a good system of
horizontal accountability. Thus, they
will tend not to be collected or reported. These sorts of indicators need
to be reduced or eliminated. Note that
the current system is barely capable of
reporting upward even such basic indicators as enrollment data, or rather
there is a lack of incentive to do so.
It would appear that a large amount of work is
still needed on the education SPMs before
they can be an effective element of the sector’s governance and management. Standards
are necessary, in principle, however, and a
start has been made.
Governance and Management Systems
Lacking
So far this chapter has noted that policies have
been confusing and often inappropriate, that
there are objective, measurable problems in
the governance of the sector. The more recent
policies have attempted to clarify, and do help
in some ways, but they still need much work.
In particular, practical ways to implement current policies are needed. Furthermore, many
progressive districts have proceeded to implement in innovative ways, under the flexibility allowed by decentralization. In any case,
pilot projects, often donor-funded, have been
experimenting with techniques such as schoolbased management and more transparent
school budgeting for many years. However,
this experimentation has thus far taken place
without the education system as a whole
evaluating and learning from these experiences, at a central level (but not necessarily by
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Volume 2
Depdiknas)8, and then spreading them through
better norming and standardization around
good practices. Also, because experimentation and pilot testing has been largely up to
donors and innovative Bupatis, progress has
tended to be a hit-or-miss affair. To improve
on this, systematization of good practice is
needed. As central policy also improves, systems for implementing the improved regulation will be needed. This section lays out
some of these systems needs, as “technical
challenges,” first in governance and then in
management.
ized management but instead on random ideas,
tradition, and the experience of other countries
that ignores their different historical and political contexts. For example, some experts
are suggesting that the Education Boards
should have the same functions as similar
boards in other countries, despite the fact that
the Indonesian context is very different and
that, even in those other countries (such as the
US and Japan), the boards are controversial
and are still evolving.
Again, this is because of the absence of a
management and governance framework
within which these roles could be defined. At
the moment, it seems that each district is being
left to design these roles largely on its own.
(There are some donor projects working in
these areas, but the lessons provided by these
projects do not seem to become part of the
mainstream.) This is not a healthy approach to
decentralization. It leaves the lower levels of
government to wrestle with difficult conceptual tasks that may be beyond their capacity,
while taking away from them some of the actual management tasks, such as teacher management, that they may be more than capable
of handling. In a sense, the wrong functions
are decentralized.
Technical Challenges in Governance
There are several important issues relating
specifically to the governance “line.” For example, the governance bodies at each level
have no way to evaluate the educational appropriateness of legislation, policies, and regulations independently of the executive branch.
The lack of access by governance bodies to
technical analysis is a reason often given for
placing personnel appointed from the executive branch of government in governance or
legislative-like bodies. However, it would be
far better to develop research and analysis
mechanisms for governance bodies or to provide legislatures with research and analysis
consultants rather than to continue setting up
bodies with both elected and appointed members from the executive branch.
The duties and powers of School Committees
are a crucial matter to define clearly, and with
a view to autonomy and real school-based
management. Current legislation does not do
this. Current viewpoints, both in general and
relative to school principals, are not clear or
efficient, at least as they are currently defined
either in Kepmen 044/U/2002 or in legislation
such as the 2003 Education Law. For example, their roles in finance and teacher management as outlined in existing regulations
and legislation are not clear, conflict with each
other, and may be too demanding in certain
areas and not demanding enough in other areas. The fact that the Committees should, ideally, have oversight rights over all financial
matters, not just the issues related to parentraised funds, is not made clear. The relationship between the old BP3s and the School
Committees, and the question of whether BP3s
should even exist after School Committees are
The current role of Education Boards in the
kabupaten/kota is not necessarily efficient.
Specifically, the division of labor between
Education Boards and DPRDs, between Education Boards and kepala dinas, and between
Education Boards and School Committees
does not appear to be effective. Much of the
ongoing discussion in Indonesia on this issue
is not based on sound principles of decentral8
In Brazil’s CONSED, for example, it is the state education secretaries manage the organization, not the national
minister of education. And, as noted elsewhere in this
report, Canada does not even have a national Ministry,
but this does not mean national functions are not performed. There are many ways to perform national functions via bottom-up association, delegation to nongovernmental entities, etc.
16
Chapter 1
exam for one academic subject for madrasah
schools and then all of the exams are shared
by all of the districts, thus taking advantage of
economies of scale. However, no one has yet
researched the ideal features of this kind of
collaboration, such as what kinds of tasks
would most usefully be performed in collaboration and how to develop effective collaboration agreements.
in power, is not clear. The separation between
the governance and the professional management of the pedagogical process is not clear.
The legal status of the School Committees,
relative to their duties, is also not clear. Many
of their duties appear to require them to enter
into contracts with providers (e.g., for minor
physical plant improvements), but it is not
clear whether they have the legal right to enter
into contracts, and if so, how this will be supported with legal assistance to schools, should
they require it. Again, each district could
simply be left to determine its own issues and
design its own solutions, but this would be inefficient.
Technical Challenges in Management
In terms of management, it is clear that the
systems that are currently in place at lower
levels of government are not sufficient to perform the many functions that are being allocated to these levels in the decentralization
process. It is also clear that the staff at these
levels do not have the necessary skills to carry
out their new and expanded roles.
To study such issues and determine optimal
solutions would require a considerable degree
of technical skill, which is unlikely to be
available at the local level. Also, this kind of
organizational research is subject to economies of scale, meaning that leaving each one
of around 390 district governments to carry
out its own research and design would be quite
inefficient. Since there is plenty of international experience on these issues, it would
make sense for Indonesia to draw on that expertise at the highest level and for the government to ensure that effective norms or at
least examples of best practices are developed
and made available to districts. Deriving these
lessons and making sure that good practice
spreads is a central function, but not one that
need be performed by Depdiknas.
Some districts have conducted interesting experiments in improving their budgeting and finance systems. For example, projects such as
the DSSD have experimented with setting
formulae for district–to–school funding and
with simplifying budgeting formats. The experimentation allowed or encouraged by decentralization will also allow natural variations
in practices (e.g., budgeting systems) to
emerge. For example, one dynamic Bupati
has managed to eliminate certain fees by consolidating schools and reducing certain types
of expenditure, thus making room in the
budget to eliminate fees and still cover costs.
However, the lessons from these various experiments have not been systematically documented at the national level or analyzed to see
how applicable they might be to other situations. Also, even in those districts that have
been experimenting, it is not always clear that
their evolving financial arrangements are
ideal. For example, it is not clear how much
authority is really being devolved to schools,
even in these districts. It emerged during our
interviews that personnel at the district level
were not always clear about what functions to
decentralize to schools and why. Newer district-to-school funding approaches that were
called “block funding” were not really block
funding and seemed to be just as cumbersome
It is not yet clear how to organize the decentralized governance of religious and/or private
schools without unduly affecting their independence. Various interviewees highlighted
the need to resolve this issue carefully.
At the moment, many functions have been decentralized too far, in other words down to a
level that does not have the capacity to perform that function effectively. Having recognized this, some districts and provinces are
coming together to form agencies that can
handle certain of their functions on a collective basis (as suggested in Law 22/1999). For
example, various districts in East Java are collaborating so that each district develops the
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Volume 2
There has not yet been a universal (all districts, not just a sample) audit of skills at the
district level covering all functions that would
probably need to be performed at that level
under a rational model of decentralization.
While districts must be responsible for raising
their own skills to the necessary level to carry
out their decentralized functions, the national
government is responsible for the maintenance
of standards. Therefore, it seems appropriate
that the national government should be responsible for carrying out a nationwide, district-level audit of current management skills
and standards. At a minimum, the central
government should devise an instrument and
protocol for carrying out such an audit and for
compiling and communicating the results, as
having each district devise its own protocol
would be a waste of resources. Current information systems at the district level do not
seem to be capable of reporting reliable statistics on basic, fundamental issues such as enrollment to the central level. As is shown in
Box 1.2 and in Appendix 1.3, Case 5, this has
also been the case in other countries where
education functions have been decentralized.
This is a problem that needs to be addressed.
and intrusive as previous approaches. The
current laws and regulations often seem to
give away authority with one hand but take it
back with the other, leaving the system more
complicated than before and no more decentralized.
There is a great deal of confusion surrounding
the allocation of functions related to teacher
management (including training, recruitment,
deployment, performance evaluation, human
resources databases, payroll, and redeployment). For example, at present, even though
responsibility for personnel management is
nominally decentralized to the districts, any
personnel actions that would result in changes
in the payroll database must still be communicated to the national level BKN. Because
there are still tensions and unresolved issues in
the assignment of functions, it is not surprising
that districts do not yet have adequate teacher
management systems in place. It is vital to resolve the issue of who is responsible for which
teacher management functions because any inappropriate assignment of these functions (for
example, if the assignment is bureaucratically
unclear, if it sets up a conflict between bureaucracies, or if it is technically unsound) can
lead to financial and other problems. A case
study is shown in Box 1.1, and in Appendix
1.3, Case 2.
Box 1.1 In South Africa, a lack of definition as to who could set minimum standards, combined with
sectoral collusion in teacher management, led to the emergence of unfunded mandates and fiscal problems after decentralization.
[After decentralization] all provinces experienced similar over-spending, in large part due to implementing
nationally determined policies. This included the nationally negotiated salary agreement and new policies in
the education, health, and welfare sectors. Much of this problem was due to the lack of co-ordination between policymaking and budgeting, and the rapid creation of a decentralized system compounded this problem. The implementation of nationally agreed policies was not necessarily an unfunded mandate, however.
Such policies (in education, health, and welfare) were implemented with the full support of provincial line
function departments, who were also involved in developing the policies.
Sectoral collusion to secure more funds for a sector proved to be a far stronger factor in overspending than
unfunded mandates. Intergovernmental forums in education, health, and welfare developed national policy
[especially on standards] without taking into account budgetary resources. Many departments adopted an
aggressive policy to address backlogs in deprived black areas. For instance, differences in teacher-pupil ratios were reduced between black and white schools. The increase in personnel expenditure squeezed out expenditure in non-personnel inputs like textbooks, undermining the attainment of the desired outputs.
From: Momoniat, I.
No date.
“Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa: A Practitioner’s Perspective”
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/documents/South%20Africa.pdf
18
Chapter 1
Box 1.2 In Brazil and Spain, devising good management information systems under decentralization
was difficult and problematic but was possible with effort and partnership.
Brazil
Until 1995, Brazilian education data were outdated and unsystematic. Since there was no recent information
available, directing government policies in that area was a challenge as difficult as flying a plane in the midst
of a storm with no guiding instrument on board. Not only did the lack of up-to-date information jeopardize
the decision-making process, but it also caused huge waste in the allocation of funds. Furthermore, in the
absence of a standard nationwide system of information and indicators, several states had their own data
gathering and processing systems, which were not compatible with each other. For this reason, Brazil could
not even provide international organizations with consistent data on education.
By the beginning of 1995, the latest school census that was available dated back to 1989, and the last finished survey had been carried out in 1991. Therefore, there was not enough information available to inform
the design of actions aimed at improving the education system. From that year on, the Brazilian educational
information system has gradually undergone a complete reformulation into an integrated, decentralized and
comprehensive structure, which provides all levels and types of education, from early childhood to tertiary
education and more advanced programs.
Gumaraes de Castro, M.H. 2000. “Role and Value of International Education Indicators For National Policy Development.” Fourth General Assembly of the OECD Education Indicators Programme (INES). 11 - 13 September - Tokyo,
Japan.
http://www.inep.gov.br/download/internacional/idioma/Role%20and%20value%20of%20international%20indicators%2
0for%20national%20policy%20development.pdf.
Spain
As the decentralization process unfolded in the 1980s, the country needed a planning mechanism that would
coordinate the educational policies and programs being developed and executed by the MEC and the decentralized autonomous communities (de jure). One reason why such a coordinating mechanism was necessary
was that, soon after the decentralization process began, the capacity to gather and reproduce nationwide educational statistics was lost because various regions had begun gathering their own data using formats that
were not comparable and thus could not be aggregated at the national level.
From Hanson, M. 2000. “Democratization and Educational Decentralization in Spain: A Twenty Year Struggle for Reform.” Country Studies. Education Reform and Management Publication Series. Vol. 1, No. 3, June 2000.
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/pdf/hanson.pdf.
tion. On the other hand, having too many
funding and provisioning channels into
schools creates great opportunities for corruption or at least for waste. Funding and provisioning that is discretionary and not based on a
simple formula also creates opportunities for
corruption, waste, and patronage. However,
having too many controls could make systems
too cumbersome. Therefore, extreme care
needs to be taken in the design of such systems. What is crucial is to bear the potential
for corruption in mind when designing decentralized systems and to create the appropriate
The possible increase in corruption under decentralization has been brought up in the discussions held as a part of this review. In
principle, decentralization has the scope either
to increase or to reduce corruption – the key is
the actual design of institutions and systems.
For example, ensuring that resources flow as
per capita grants, ensuring that all actors know
the amount of the grants to which they are entitled and when the funds will arrive, and ensuring that actors have oversight over each
other (parents can check what the principal
does, and the principal can check what parents
do) can all help to limit the scope for corrup-
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Volume 2
proving and clarifying function definition can
be informed by emerging practice, in any case,
and because it will help further clarify and
validate experimentation.
checks and balances without paralyzing flows
of resources.
There is considerable inequality within districts in terms of both funding and education
achievement in Indonesia already, and it is not
clear that there are any effective mechanisms
for reducing this source of inequality in the
education sector. As we noted above, asymmetric decentralization of governance and
management, along with funding targeted towards the poorest districts and populations
within districts, may be one way to reduce excessive inequality.
Step 2: Thoroughly inventory existing management systems, skills stocks, and innovation
capacity at the local level. Based on how
functions are assigned in step 1, the next step
should be to carry out thorough inventory
management systems at all levels, particularly
in the areas of finance, the management of
personnel (particularly teachers), procurement,
and information management. This search
should be conducted by means of nationwide
consultations with both system users and system developers at all levels or by means of
empirical research. An integral aspect of this
stocktaking exercise should be to recommend
improvements and to develop a time-phased,
demand-led plan for improving management
systems. Another important aspect of the exercise should be to carry out an audit of the
current management skills of personnel at
every level of governance and to map the nation’s lack of and need for these skills. The
exercise should go on to suggest ways to develop a system (possibly run by outside providers) for upgrading skills and a facility for
continuously assessing both systems development and the skills upgrading system, including a yearly or twice yearly repetition of the
nationwide consultation process. The proposed
approach should constitute a program that is
flexible enough to be able to receive funding
from a variety of donors without each of these
donors having to develop a separate project
that would be expensive and time-consuming
to design.
Development Tasks
As this chapter makes clear, certain actions
need to be taken to clarify the roles and functions of the various levels of government in
the governance and management of the new
decentralized education system. These actions
are listed here, starting with the most important and urgent. It is important to note that
these steps are not equal in costs or in time.
Step 1: Clarify and assign functions. This is
the step that must, in principle, be taken before
all others because, without a clear assignment
of functions, nothing else can be clarified.
This can be done through a set of well-guided,
specific technical consultations. In other
words, it is possible to have a technically informed yet consultative process that leads to a
solid conclusion; it need not be left up to
chance, pure politics, or relatively nontechnical “least-common denominator” consultations. Furthermore, it is important that
the consultation process yields conclusive recommendations on the assignment of fairly detailed sub-functions. This consultative process
(which should last from about six months to a
year) can be seen as a preliminary form of dissemination of the conclusions reached as a result of the consultations, but true
dissemination should be a separate and ongoing process. In practice it may not be possible
to be fully sequential, and to take this step
first. Districts are moving ahead in any case.
However, it is still worth doing, because im-
Of all the existing systems and skills, perhaps
the most crucial one that needs to be further
strengthened, documented, and fed into a system (not necessarily central) of lessonspreading, is the set of relations of accountability between schools and parent community. This will not be an easy task, as many
parents themselves may have lowered expectations, conditioned by years of centralism.
20
Chapter 1
Step 3: Upgrade systems and skills. This step
will be the most costly and long-lasting by far.
In theory, it could go on forever, but in prac-
tice, it might be wise to set a five-year timeframe for completing the systems development
and skills upgrading process.
21
Volume 2
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Findings from a Follow-up survey of 600
Departamen Pendidikan Nasional, Balan Penelitan dan Pengembangan (Balitbang). 2002.
“Studi Kesiapan Propinsi dan Kabupaten/Kota
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Lewis, B. 2002. “Revenue-Sharing and
Grant-Making in Indonesia: The First Two
Years of Fiscal Decentralization.” Word
processed. Research Triangle Institute.
Schools.” The World Bank, pre-publication
version.
Furqon and S. Surapranata. 2002. “Evaluation, Examination, and Assessment of Education.” Policy Paper. Ministry of National
Malaysia. 1997. Educational Act 1996.
Mas’udi, M. 2002. “Corruption Through the
Perspective of Culture and Islamic Law,” in
Book Four. Jakarta: Aksara Foundation.
Greene, D. 2000. “Decentralization and Educational Reform in Indonesia.” Consultant’s
Report, Word processed. The World Bank
and Asian Development Bank.
Finance in Indonesia. Policy Research Center, Institute for Research and Development,
UNICEF and UNESCO.
Hickling Indonesia, PT. 2001a. “Education
Decentralization Policy Recommendations:
Human Resources.” Development Planning
Assistance Project. Final Report SP-16H.
March.
McMahon, W. and Boediono. 2001. “Improving Education Funding in Indonesia,” in
Finance in Indonesia. Policy Research Center, Institute for Research and Development,
UNICEF and UNESCO.
Hickling Indonesia, PT. 2001b. “Towards
Participatory Governance of Education in Indonesia. A Report on Regional Consultations
in West Sumatra on the Use of School Boards
and School Committees.” Prepared for Bappenas in collaboration with the Ministry of
Education and The World Bank. Draft 2.
MONE (Ministry of National Education).
2002. “Education for All: Situational Analysis
2002. Indonesia.” Draft Presented at the National Forum for Education for All, Jakarta.
Hum, F. 2002. “Development of Pondok
Pesanterens as Means of Community-Based
Education and Poverty Alleviation.” Paper
MONE (Ministry of National Education).
2003. “The Strategic Planning of The Development of Education, Youth and Sport, 20022004.” Limited Draft.
Ikshan, M. 2002. “Measuring the Economic
Costs of Corruption in Indonesia,” in Holloway, R., ed., Stealing from the Poor. Book
Four. Jakarta: Aksara Foudation.
Musa, I. 2003. “Reforming the Indonesian
Education Act.” Background report for Education Sector Review 2003. The World Bank.
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Special
Service
Agreement.
(SSA/IDSA/2003/00000199-0). January.
Jalal, F. and B. Musthafa. 2001. Education
Reform in the Context of Regional Autonomy:
The Case of Indonesia. Ministry of National
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Quality of Laws and Regulations: Economic,
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Techniques.
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Indonesia. Concerning The Education Council and School Committee.)
Said, S. and N. Suhendra. 2002. “Corruption
and Indonesian Society,” in Holloway, R., ed.,
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Stealing from the Poor. Book One Jakarta:
Aksara Foudation.
School Improvement Grants Program.” Draft
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Smoke, P. 2002. “Expenditure Assignment
under Indonesia’s Emerging Decentralization:
A Review of Progress and Issues for the Future.” Prepared for conference on “Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?”
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
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South Africa, Republic of. 1996. South African Schools Act, No. 84 of 1996. Available at
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Supriyoko, K. 2002. “Towards the Improvement of Quality and Equity of Secondary Education in Indonesia.” Policy Paper. Ministry
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Syarief, H. 2002. “Madrasah Education: Access, Quality, Finance, Governance.” Paper
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the Policies, Laws, and Institutions of Corruption Management in Indonesia, 1969-2001,” in
Book Four. Jakarta: Aksara Foudation.
Woodhouse, A. 2001. “The dynamics of Rural Power in Indonesia: Fighting Corruption in
a Community Development Project.” November. Word processed report, Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), The World Bank.
The World Bank. 2002a. “An Assessment of
the Scholarships and Grants Program and
24
Chapter 1
Appendix 1.1. List of Governance and Management Problems
a ministry. For example, several districts
could get together to create a multi-district
agency to carry out a certain task. In some instances, a ministry or some other agency may
have undertaken tasks on behalf of a district,
which is why the list for the “national” level is
longer than the list of issues at the local level.
We are not advocating a large role for the central government under decentralization. Nevertheless, clearly the national or provincial
governments could play an important role by
taking advantage of economies of scale in
helping districts to develop management systems. Finally, note that province-level issues
are not fully explained because, in large part,
function assignment itself is not finished and,
while the roles for the national and district
levels are relatively obvious and easy to suggest based on logic, this is not so much the
case for the province level.
In a discussion document of limited length, it
is not possible to list in detail all of the important issues that still need to be resolved. For
that reason, the following table contains a
more comprehensive catalog of such issues
than was possible in the main text but without
a full discussion of each one. Only a few are
discussed in greater detail in the main text to
give the reader a sense of the nuances involved in some of the most important cases.
In the table below, “national” does not necessarily pertain to a bureaucratic or organizational entity. Some of these functions are
indeed functions that need to take place at the
MoNE, but others can be performed by some
other national ministry. Still others could be
performed by a national-level organization (or
any organization at a level of government
higher than the district) but not necessarily in
National
level
Governance and Management Issues
Management “Line”
Governance “Line”
11.
Develop clearer sense and acceptance
1.
Increase the MoNE’s abilat the MoNE of its national role in a decentrality to assess decentralized best
ized setting. This needs to be done with more
practice by improving its monitortechnical proficiency and depth than has been
ing and evaluation functions/roles.
done thus far.
2.
Change the nature of the
12.
Finalize implementing rules and proInspectorate towards evaluating
cedures for Education Law
whether sub-national levels are fol13.
Resolve governance standards for
lowing general standards.
Education Boards as well as School Committees,
3.
Set up permanent facility
while making sure these align with the
for evaluating and improving stanforthcoming law. Standards should be
dards.
mandatory. If not, then DEPDIKNAS should
4.
Assess skills profile
offer more than one non-mandatory model with
needed to carry out assigned funcclear reasons for preferring one over another
tions at all system levels.
backed up by good research.
5.
Carry out systematic
14.
Develop criteria for asymmetric decenmanagement and governance skills
tralization, since not all schools are likely to be
audit against assigned governance
ready to take on new powers at the same time.
and management functions and the
15.
Resolve issue of decentralization of reskills required.
ligious and/or private education. Come up with
6.
Create, fund, and manage
feasible district-level governance model that is
a facility for upgrading managestandard across districts.
ment and governance capacity and
16.
Finalize initial standards and dissemiskills at sub-national levels accordnate this information.
ing to demand. Evaluate feasibility/
requirements of outsourcing if this
17.
Convene panel of experts to finalize
is an option.
function assignment in detail.
25
District
level
Volume 2
18.
Ensure the DPR has access to good,
7.
Begin formal and inindependent, technical advice.
depth process of “re-educating”
19.
Increase capacity of the media to reMoNE staff in their roles and funcport accurately on education issues for example
tions in a decentralized setting.
by training education reporters and instituting a
8.
Inventory (in all districts)
prize for the best education reporter of the year.
the existing financial management
20.
Produce “map” of civil society, includsystems, personnel (teacher) maning NGOs, to educate government officials on
agement systems, and educational
this nature of NGOs and civil society. Develop
materials procurement systems.
training materials and protocols for government
Evaluate problems, assess interestofficials on this theme.
ing experiments developed under
21.
Develop approach for ensuring subdecentralization, develop approach
stantive discussion of education issues in the
to funding, and develop systems
2004 elections.
usable by districts according to
22.
Develop “scorecard” system for ratdemand.
ing/ranking districts, Bupatis, etc., in their per9.
Assess and reproduce
formance of education functions.
methods whereby lower-level gov23.
Develop approach for improving polernments can collaborate to create
icy dialogue about education in government (ex“agency” bodies to take advantage
ecutive and legislative, at national and possibly
of economies of scale.
district level), in civil society, and between the
10.
Improve management
two.
and governance systems to reduce
24.
Train staff of lower levels to learn
corruption under decentralization.
from governance experience elsewhere as a
means of raising their own performance to standard.
31.
Apply processes for determining dis25.
Require districts to assess
trict-specific standards as well as socializing natheir own management and govtional standards.
ernance skills against their as32.
Ensure that DPRDs know how to hold
signed functions
Bupati/Walikota accountable for their education
26.
Start demand-led skills
responsibilities.
upgrading by creating and using
33.
Develop and apply better norms and
capacity-building facility
guidelines to the functioning of Education
27.
Boards and School Committees, or apply natheir practices against standards
tional ones.
and start reporting according to
34.
Apply system for dissemination and
standards, both up the management
reporting on school-specific performance against
line (to Bupati/ Walikota) and
standards. Ensure that Education
horizontally to the DPRD
Board/Councils, DPRDs, schools and School
28.
Develop or apply nationCommittees know about this system.
ally developed systems for provid35.
Train staff of lower levels in the meaning team-based, school-oriented (as
ing of new laws and regulations. Train them to
opposed to problem-oriented alllearn from governance experience elsewhere as a
school)response to schools not
means of raising their own performance to stancoming up to performance standard.
dards.
29.
Collaborate with each
other and with national or provincial governments in developing financial, personnel, procurement,
and information systems.
30.
Apply systems as developed.
26
Chapter 1
School
level
41.
Apply governance guidelines on
36.
School Committees.
their management and governance
42.
Train staff of lower levels to learn
skills against their assigned funcfrom governance experience elsewhere as a
tions
means of raising their own performance to stan37.
Start demand-led skills
dard.
upgrading by creating and using
43.
Train School Committees in assessing
capacity-building facility
their own schools.
38.
44.
Train School Committees in finances
their performance against stanand personnel management.
dards and start reporting according
45.
Train School Committees on how to
to standards, both up the managereceive and use information about how to raise
ment line and horizontally to the
educational quality up to standard.
School Committee
39.
Apply models for interacting with School Committee
40.
Apply decentralized financial, personnel, procurement,
and information systems
27
Volume 2
Appendix 1.2. List of Interviewees
Senior researcher, Indonesian Institute of
Sciences (LIPI).Sumarno M.A., Ph.D., Drs.
Vice-Director, School of Graduate Studies,
Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta.
Experts and Policymakers on Governance and
Management Issues
Asshidiqie, Prof. Dr. Jimly. Faculty of Law,
Universitas Indonesia. Center for Electoral
Reform.
Azra, Prof. Dr. Azyumardi.
Syarif Hidayatullah.
Supriyoko, Prof. Dr. Ki. Majelis Luhur
Taman Siswa. National Education Com..
Rektor, IAIN
Suyanto, Prof.
Yogyakarta.
Djemari, Prof. Mardapi. Director, School of
Graduate
Studies,
Universitas
Negeri
Yogyakarta.
Rektor, Universitas Negeri
Tobing, Drs. Jacob. Member of Parliament.
Commission
A
on
Constitutional
Ammendments to 1945 Constitution.
Madjid, Prof. Dr. Nurcholish.
Rector,
Universitas Paramadina.
Lecturer, Postgraduate Faculty, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah.
Representatives of Education Boards and of School Committees
We selected key members of Education Boards and School Committees in four rural and four urban
areas, yielding 34 interviewees.The urban districts chosen were Benkulu City and Mataram City
(classified as low income) andYogyakarta City and Banjarmasin City (classified as middle-income).
The rural districts included Wonosobo and Lamongan (classified as low income) and Bekasi and
Gianyar (classified as middle income).
Interviewees from Education Boards/Councils
District/City
Name of Respondent
Position
Yogyakarta City
H.M. Wasul Widyo Pranoto, B.A.
Drs. Asmuni
District of Bekasi,
West Java
H. Hanafi Ali
Noupal Al Rasyid
H. Rimin.
Drs. I Made Susila
I Wayan Sudamia, SH
H. Adnan Muchsin, Ssi
Drs. M. Tajuddin, M.Si
Drs. Sutrisno, S.A.
Djajadi Aliamar, B.A.
Drs. Z. Fauzi Hamid
Drs.H. Sultani
Member/Chief, Public
Relations Section
Member, Infrastructure
and Facilities Section
Vice-Chairman
Secretary
Member
Secretary I
Secretary II
Chairman
Secretary
Chairman
Vice-Chairman
Secretary
Secretary I
Slamet Rahardjo Budi
Drs. Slamet Witoro
Drs. Tsalist Fahami, MM
K.H. Abdul Fatah
Ir. Suhandoyo, SP
Chairman
Secretary II
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary
District of Gianyar,
Bali
Mataram City,
Nusa Tenggara Barat
Bengkulu City
Banjarmasin City,
South Kalimantan
District of Wonosobo, Central
Java
District of Lamongan, East
Java
28
Chapter 1
Interviewees from School Committees
Name of School
Name of Respondent
Position
SMU Negeri I,
Yogyakarta City
SD Negeri Jatimulya 04 Tambun, Bekasi
West Java
Ir. Sagoro Wedy, MM
Drs. Helly P. Soetjipto, MA
Bambang S.
Mirsod
Chairman
Member
Chairman
Member
SLTP Negeri I Gianyar,
Bali
I Pande Ketut Sutara
Chairman
SMU Negeri I Gianyar, Bali
SD Negeri 13 Ampenan,
Mataram, NTB
SLTP Negeri I Bengkulu
I Dewa Ketut Alit Budiana
Drs. Sugiyarno
Chairman
H. Sukiman, SE
Herlina Tobing
H. Iskandar
Yadi ES
Suratno
H. Pudjonartojo
Kidjo DH
H. Gholib Kastoer
Arifin
Vice Chairman
Secretary
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary
Chairman
Member
Chairman
Secretary
Chairman
SD Negeri Teluk Dalam 4,
Banjar-masin, South Kalimantan
SLTP Negeri I, Leksono, Wono-sobo, Central Java
SMK Negeri I Lamongan,
East Java
In addition, we interviewed representatives of the Bupati and the Dinas Pendidikan Office in the
Jembrana District.
29
Volume 2
Appendix 1.3. Decentralization Case Studies
educational governance has not been successful.
Case 1. Mexico: broad decentralization
success but a lack of definition and topdown implementation has led to insufficient
gains in local governance.
From: Ornelas, Carlos. No date.
“The politics of the educational
decentralization in Mexico.” At
http://www1.worldbank.org/educat
ion/globaleducationreform/pdf/orn
elas.pdf.
Despite erratic policies and political conflicts,
the decentralization of education in Mexico is
on the move. Whereas it does not represent a
complete devolution to the states—having
transferred significantly more management
functions but not full responsibility for curriculum content, academic evaluation, and
quality assessment—the states are assuming a
large measure of influence over education, and
this is getting larger.
Case 2. South Africa: minimum standards
and sectoral collusion in teacher management has led to unfunded mandates and fiscal problems.
[After decentralization], all provinces experienced similar over-spending, in large part because they were implementing nationally
determined policies. This included the nationally negotiated salary agreement and new policies in the education, health, and welfare
sectors. Much of this problem was due to the
lack of co-ordination between policymaking
and budgeting, and the rapid pace of decentralization compounded this problem. The
implementation of nationally agreed policies
was not necessarily an unfunded mandate,
however. Such policies (in education, health,
and welfare) were implemented with the full
support of education departments at the provincial level, who were also involved in developing the policies.
[However,] Chapter VII of the General Law of
Education (GLE) provided the basis for creating Councils of Social Participation in Education. These councils were designed to exist at
every level of the education system in a pyramid fashion from the bottom up, with councils
operating in every school, county, and state in
the nation including representatives from each
state council, plus outstanding teachers and
scholars, and other distinguished representatives of society. The GLE stated that parent
associations should not be involved in the details of school management but instead should
concentrate on larger issues.
The SNTE (teacher’s union) leadership did not
formally oppose the creation of such councils,
but some groups of teacher foresaw the intervention of “extraneous” people in school affairs, which they considered their exclusive
terrain. In their Educational Congress of
1994, foreseeing a threat to weaken the teachers’ monopoly in school management, the
SNTE’s national leadership ruled that at least
half of the members of such councils must be
teachers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores
de la Educación, 1994). Finally, in September
1999, the SEP (the national Ministry of Education) organized the national council with
many as members but without defining its
specific functions. So far, the use of councils
as a means of instituting wider participation in
Sectoral collusion to secure more funds
proved to be a far stronger factor in overspending than unfunded mandates. Intergovernmental agencies on education, health, and
welfare developed national policy [especially
on standards] without taking into account
budgetary resources.
Many departments
adopted an aggressive policy to address backlogs in deprived black areas. For instance, inequities in teacher-pupil ratios were reduced
between black and white schools. The increase
in personnel expenditure squeezed out expenditure in non-personnel inputs like textbooks,
undermining the attainment of the desired outputs.
30
Chapter 1
The national government was forced to intervene. It solved the problem of a lack of coordination by creating joint intergovernmental
forums between the Treasury and the relevant
national line ministries. For example, a committee was set up comprising the national
Ministers of Finance and Education together
with their counterparts in provinces, and this
met at least twice a year to co-ordinate policymaking, budgeting, and implementation.
These structures are supported by a range of
large and small technical forums of officials
from national and provincial treasuries and
line function departments. These forums ensure that budgets and national policy are
aligned and that provincial departments adhere
to their budgets. It has also reduced the
budget games played in such sectors.
educators to schools. These new national
guidelines specified a learner: educator ratio
of 1:40 in primary schools and 1:35 in secondary schools. However, because decisions
about educator numbers and salaries were
made at national level [in a process led by the
education authorities] while implementation
took place at provincial level [with budgets
determined by financial authorities], these
agreements were often unaffordable at provincial level.
The national process of educator provisioning
was abandoned, and it was decided that each
province would have its own target learner:
educator ratio [with affordability driven from
the budget side determining the number of affordable teachers in a province], but a nationally negotiated post-provisioning model would
guide its application in individual schools.
The attempt at equitable distribution of educators has not been ruined, however, since provincial education departments became
responsible for the process. The latest statistics released by the Department of Education
suggest that provinces have moved closer to
each other in terms of learner: educator ratios.
The implementation of these simple but critical measures helped to turn around provincial
finances dramatically. They ran a R500 million surplus in 1998/99 compared to a R5.5
billion deficit a year earlier. Provinces stabilized their personnel expenditures and began
shifting funds towards non-personnel budgets
and the payment of debts. The implementation of a multi-year budget [MTEF] from 1998
onwards also helped provinces to prepare
more realistic budgets. Provinces have run
surpluses every year since 1998 and had paid
off their debt by the end of the 2000 financial
year. This has put them in a strong position to
focus on the micro reforms necessary to improve the quality of spending in education and
health and on increasing their infrastructure
budgets.
Lange, M. 1998. “Opening Remarks,” Seminar on Democratic
Transformation of Education,”
Konrad Adenauer Foundation Johannesburg, at
http://www.kas.org.za/Publications
/SeminarRports/Democratictransformati
onofeducation/lange.pdf.
Case 3. USA and Japan: School Boards, an
old tradition—but sometimes a controversial one.
From: Momoniat, I. No date.
“Fiscal Decentralisation in South
Africa: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/pub
licfnance/documents/South%20Africa.
pdf
USA
From San Francisco to New York City, mayors and state legislatures are contesting local
school boards for control over classrooms.
It's a flat-out challenge to one of the deepest
traditions in American public education:
schools being run by boards that are anchored
in the community.
In 1994, gross inequalities in learner: educator
ratios were also identified as an important obstacle to equity, and plans were made to develop national norms for the provision of
31
Volume 2
While both mayoral candidates in last year's
election campaigned to keep control of the
schools in City Hall, opinion polls show a majority of voters want to go back to an elected
board.
The United States has long had the strongest
system of local control in the industrialized
world, and critics of the current takeover trend
worry that communities - and especially racial
minorities - are being disenfranchised.
But pressure for change, driven by sagging
student achievement and education's growing
role in state budgets, is formidable. Some 23
states have passed laws authorizing state or
city takeovers of school districts in crisis.
Indeed, the US tradition of local control runs
deep. Across the country, some 15,000 local
school boards handle everything from repairing gutters to setting educational goals. Of the
95,000 people on these boards, 96 percent are
elected.
"Mayoral control is a new phenomenon in
troubled urban school systems, and the early
signs in the cities that have moved this way
look promising enough for others to follow
suit," says Ted Sanders, president of the Denver-based Education Commission of the
States.
That system is now under siege in many urban
centers. Early takeovers in cities like Boston
(1991), Chicago (1995), Cleveland (1998),
and Detroit (1999) were prompted by a meltdown of school finances or governance. In
Baltimore (1993) and Philadelphia (2001), the
state engineered the takeovers.
Last week, San Francisco Mayor Willie
Brown called for returning that city to a
mayor-appointed board, after 30 years with an
elected board. The change would result in
more qualified people on the board and improvements in public schools, he said.
In some cases, elected school boards conspicuously mismanaged funds - overspending
credit cards or bungling millions in funding
for school construction. In others, petty
squabbles and erratic behavior spilled out onto
the front pages of local newspapers, undermining public confidence in the capacity of local
boards.
Meanwhile, New York City's new mayor, Michael Bloomberg, wants to abandon an appointed board in favor of a commissioner who
reports directly to the mayor. And last month,
New York Gov. George Pataki (R) called for
putting mayors in charge of schools in the
state's six largest cities, including Albany and
New York City.
More recently, pressure for change is coming
down to the central issue of student achievement.
Most students in urban public schools aren't
doing well. And with new state and federal
testing regimes, such failures are becoming
more and more conspicuous…
But current moves to center more control on
City Hall are already generating a backlash
from critics. They argue that the shift from
elected boards will distance poor and minority
voters from decisionmaking.
"The basic problem is that school boards are a
19th century idea that made sense when most
communities were small and self-governing,
and people tended to grow up and live and die
in the same place.... That has all changed
now," says Chester Finn, president of the
Thomas B. Fordham Foundation and an adviser to GOP presidents…
Cleveland - now starting a $1 billion schoolconstruction project - is gearing up for a vote
this fall on whether to return to an elected
school board after three years of control by
City Hall. Mishandling of a $60 million bond
issue was one reason the state turned control
of schools over to the mayor in 1998.
From Chaddock, G.R. 2002.
“Mayors, States, Push School
Boards Aside,” Christian Science
32
Chapter 1
lage school superintendents is an example. If
boards of education in neighboring villages
form liaison committees and share staff and
budgets, they would find it easier to pursue
bold policies.
Monitor, February 26, 2002 at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0
226/p01s01-ussc.html
Japan: School Boards—an unfinished agenda
The concept of a board of education was originally an organization to solicit opinions from
those in a community with children in school
and an interest in education. If parents and
residents use the forum wisely, the board of
education can continue to be very useful.
Editorial: School Boards Can Work
The forum, properly used, can inspire education. Many boards of education seem to be little more than a pipeline for carrying
instructions from the education and science
ministry to the schools…
From The Asahi Shimbun, Nov.
26, 2002), at:
http://www.asahi.com/english/oped/K2002112700673.html.
Many boards of education seem to be little
more than a pipeline for carrying instructions
from the education and science ministry to the
schools. Education board secretariat officials
in many municipalities set the agenda and
education board members are just figureheads.
Case 4. Brazil, Spain: Decentralization and
good management information—difficult
and problematic but possible with effort
and partnership.
It is not surprising that some critics say boards
of education have no value. Some even say
they should be eliminated and the mayor
should take over the administration of public
education. They also say that voters should
determine whether the mayor has performed
satisfactorily.
Brazil
The implementation of education reforms in
Brazil, where education systems are characterized by political-institutional decentralization,
necessarily requires sound mechanisms for
monitoring and following-up on ongoing actions and policies. Such managerial instruments help observe how reforms are
progressing and, more importantly, help identify the positive points and those needing adjustments. Those mechanisms also provide
unquestionable social gains that may be measured both in terms of greater efficiency and effectiveness, and in terms of the desirable
assurance of transparency and equity in governmental programs.
Those critics have a point. If the mayor appoints teachers on political grounds, however,
it would cause confusion in schools. A mayor
should instead challenge and make better use
of a board of education.
But some points require extra attention. Members of a board of education must be drawn
from a wide spectrum, including parents, education specialists, people in business and
young people. Those with an interest in education should be drawn upon to discuss their
perspectives and solicit their suggestions.
The use of information in educational management complies, therefore, with two basic
principles of democracy: accountability through the wide dissemination of results obtained in surveys and assessments - and permanent social control. Last, but not least,
educational evaluation and information systems play a strategic role in the planning and
prospective design of scenarios, for they contribute in no small way to the formulation of
It is also useful to have nonprofit organizations as full-time assistants to the board members and get them involved in policymaking.
And it is important to have cooperation among
members of boards of education in neighboring communities. The annual meeting of vil-
33
Volume 2
Several factors have contributed to the reformulation of the educational evaluation, statistics and indicators systems in Brazil. In the
domestic context, the strong leadership of the
Ministry of Education should be pointed out,
driving this initiative forward in constant partnership with sub-national authorities as well as
with representatives of the education sector.
Growing public opinion support to the systematic evaluations of the educational institutions has also been an extremely relevant
factor. In the international context, the importance of multilateral cooperation should also
be stressed, for the purposes of acquiring
knowledge, capacity-building, sharing experiences and comparisons with other countries.
new policies and programs that may provide
answers for new trends. In order to fulfill
these multiple purposes, information systems
must count on uniform and scientifically based
methodologies and survey instruments, updated and reliable databases, as well as agile
and precise dissemination mechanisms.
[But] until 1995, Brazilian education data
were outdated and unsystematic. Since there
was no recent information available, directing
government policies in that area was a challenge as difficult as flying a plane in the midst
of a storm having no guiding instrument on
board. Not only did the lack of updated information jeopardize the decisionmaking
process, but it also caused a huge waste in the
allocation of funds. Furthermore, in the absence of a national standard system of information and indicators, several states had their
own data gathering and processing systems,
not compatible to each other. For this very
reason Brazil could not even provide international organizations with consistent data on
education.
Gumaraes de Castro, M.H. 2000.
“Role and Value of International
Education Indicators For National
Policy Development.” Fourth
General Assembly of the OECD
Education Indicators Programme
(INES). 11 - 13 September - Tokyo, Japan, at:
http://www.inep.gov.br/download/i
nternacional/idioma/Role%20and%20val
ue%20of%20international%20indi
cators%20for%20national%20policy
%20development.pdf.
By the beginning of 1995, the latest school
census available dated back to 1989, and the
last finished survey was that of 1991. The information available was, therefore, inadequate
to provide support for the design of actions directed at improving the education system.
From that year on, the Brazilian educational
information system has gradually undergone a
complete reformulation, having acquired an
integrated, decentralized and comprehensive
structure, which includes now all levels and
types, from early childhood to tertiary education and more advanced programs.
Spain
As the decentralization process unfolded in the
1980s, the country needed a planning mechanism that would serve to coordinate the educational policies and programs being developed
and executed by the MEC and the decentralized autonomous communities (de jure). An
early experience signaled why such a coordinating mechanism was necessary; soon after
the decentralization process began the capacity
to gather and reproduce nation-wide educational statistics was lost. Various regions had
begun gathering their own data using formats
that could not be aggregated at the national
level.
This process was based on government guidelines for the creation of evaluation mechanisms to monitor the country's education
systems. As a matter of fact, nowadays all
programs and projects carried out by the Ministry of Education are based on diagnoses and
recommendations derived from statistical surveys and assessments on basic and higher education.
34
Chapter 1
The Education Law of 1985 created the Conference of Counselors, with the Minister of
Education and the autonomous community
Counselors (chief educational officers) of the
seven already decentralized regions as members. Much of the work of the Conference
(which meets at least once a year), is carried
out by five technical subcommittees each focusing on a specific issue (for example, personnel, curriculum, and statistics).
ion/globaleducationreform/pdf/han
son.pdf
Case 5. The United States: Data compliance in a large federal republic.
The United States is the second largest federal
republic in the world after India. Compared to
unitary republics, the federal level in the US
has relatively little control over education and
relatively little power to enforce or mandate
standards. It provides only a small amount of
funding, historically considerably under 10
percent of total education funding in the country. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to develop some uniformity of data at
the federal level. (Description of these data
can be found at the Web site on the Common
Core of Data—CDD—of the National Center
for
Education
Statistics—NCES,
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/aboutCCD.asp.) And,
given that control even in unitary republics
may be more illusory than real (generating
only the illusion of compliance), some of the
lessons from the US might be of interest, particularly to large, unitary republics undergoing
serious decentralization (to the degree that
some call them quasi-federal), such as South
Africa or Indonesia.
[It has been pointed out that] de facto the Conference is an instrument of cooperation and
not coordination because none of the decentralized regions is obligated to carry out the
decisions of the Conference when they believe
their own statutes of autonomy are being violated. Rather, the Conference operates as a
mechanism that brings together the chief educators of the decentralized regions and the
Ministry of Education and Science to discuss
common problems and to search for possible
avenues of collective action. Interviews with
observers of and participants in the Conference of Counselors reveals two underlying
problems that limit its effectiveness as a major
integrating force. The first problem is a generic distrust on the part of several autonomous communities that the Conference may
be used by the MEC to control the actions of
the decentralized regions. The second problem is that even though issues are brought to
the Conference as technical problems, the proposed solutions tend to have heavy political
overtones. After all, the Minister and the
Counselors sitting around the table all received their appointments as representatives of
a particular political party, thus political agendas are never far from the surface. Having
said that, it should be noted that at times the
Conference is capable of reaching important
agreements and carrying out complex actions.
In the US, uniformity and compliance by
states in the submission of data to the federal
level has been accomplished via a variety of
tactics.
x Least important is any form of mandate or obligation: these are the leastused means of ensuring compliance
and uniformity.
x The federal level does rely on the fact
that each state (generally, though it
varies) does have power to ensure
compliance from schools. Thus, the
federal level is mostly concerned with
communicating with 50 states, not
some 18,000 districts, or hundreds of
thousands of schools.
x Some compliance is required in federally funded programs; standard data
object definitions are published. But
From Hanson, M. 2000. “Democratization and Educational Decentralization in Spain: A Twenty
Year Struggle for Reform.” Country Studies. Education Reform and
Management Publication Series.
Vol. 1, No. 3, June 2000, at:
http://www1.worldbank.org/educat
35
Volume 2
most of the data gathered at federal
level does not fall under this category.
x Another incentive is that, as the quality of data have improved over time,
the federal government does use the
data in initial planning and indicative
resource allocation. The states know
this, and thus there is an incentive to
improve.
x A major incentive is maintenance of
close professional and personal relations between the data groups at federal level and each of the states.
x There are technical statistical working
groups that are cooperative in nature,
but exist on a permanent basis. These
groups generate awareness of the need
for standards, agree on definitions,
etc. The most important example is
the National Forum on Education Statistics
(http://nces.ed.gov/forum/),
which brings together public sector officials from education and other related sectors, but also from teacher
unions, and others concerned with
education. The forum is funded by
the federal government, which generates sustainability, but is not a government office.
Importantly, the
forum provides training, guidebooks
on definitions, etc. It meets twice per
year, though some sub-committees
meet more often.
x The federal level tries to make it as
easy as possible to submit data, accepting a wide variety of computer
formats.
x The system has evolved. Over the
past 15 years, the federal level has
emphasized networking, the build-up
of professional relations, allowing particular States to show off their best
practices to the other states, etc. This
has been a great help.
In short, a decentralized system can assure a
considerable degree of data compliance. The
key lessons are that it takes time, professionalism, nurturing of relationships, and, of course,
some sustainable budgetary allocations to ensure that the effort does not flag once it starts.
Compiled by Luis Crouch
from personal communications with the CDD and
NCES.
36
Chapter 1
Appendix 1.4. Citizen Perception and Educational Reality: Insights from
the Governance and Decentralization Survey
Second, when the few objective indicators of
quality of services that could be found were analyzed, it was found that service standards are actually fairly poor—schools claim it takes some
seven months to fulfill book orders, for example.
Furthermore, opinion from school-level stakeholders (principals) about these more objective
service standards varies a great deal more (some
10 times more) among districts than citizen’s
perceptions of quality, confirming that citizens
tend to have a range of opinions about quality
that is narrower than more objective indicators
or that they simply responded positively out of
politeness or because they thought this may be
what the enumerator wanted to hear. There is
also evidence that citizens place more value on
physical and business infrastructure than on
education, confirming the suggestion that perhaps their standards with regard to education
might not be very high.
(GDS) was a random sample survey carried out
in 2002 in a large number of Indonesian districts. It asked both citizens and officials for
their opinions about the quality of various services, including the effects of decentralization,
their perceptions of corruption, and other important issues related to the governance and management of service delivery. Most of the
questions elicited subjective opinions based on a
scale. A few questions asked for objective information such as the number of days required
by delivery systems (for example, education) to
perform a certain task (for example, to promote
a teacher).
Based on the results of the survey, which collected data on purely subjective opinions, citizens appear to be fairly happy with their
education services and seem to believe that these
services have improved since decentralization.
Third, when “objective” observers were asked
about their perceptions of corruption and citizens’ general complaints, education regularly
fared worse than other sectors.
This could have two quite opposite interpretations. First, if there was some sort of objective
correlate that suggested citizens have reasonably
high standards and are good judges of quality,
then this result would be a positive thing. Further improvements would always be possible, of
course. However, a second, more negative interpretation would be that if there are some objective indications, even within the survey itself,
that services leave a good deal to be desired,
then the fact that citizens appear somewhat
complacent makes the task of improving education seem even harder than it might otherwise
be. This is because in addition to delivering on
improvements, it may be necessary to overcome
existing complacency. This second interpretation appears the most likely for two reasons.
Finally, less than a third of districts seemed to
have had norms regarding education, at least in
the opinion of DPRD members, at the time the
survey was taken. All of these findings taken
together suggest that improving governance and
management in the sector will require not just
increasing citizens’ capacity and incentives to
press for better services but also the harder (and
chronologically prior) tasks of a) developing
demanding but reasonable standards and embodying them in norms, regulations, or guidelines, b) ensuring that citizens know what
standards they have a right to expect, and c) ensuring that, either through some form of mandates or moral persuasion and dialogue, local
areas give education the degree of local prioritization it deserves. These tasks are more involved—conceptually—than those involved
with simply training citizens to press for better
services. They also, as noted, need to be tackled
before raising citizens’ expectations, both logi-
First, when citizens were asked about their perception regarding education, there is some evidence that their range of response was very
narrow. Citizens seem to have responded in a
tight and marginally optimistic fashion, without
much deviation towards the negative or the positive.
37
Volume 2
d. Officers of the Dinas Kesehatan
(141)
e. Officers of the Dinas Pendidikan
(141)
f. Members of NGOs (563)
g. Members of the media (422)
h. Lawyers (133)
i. Officers of Puskesmas
j. Officers of schools (857)
k. Citizens or households (8579)
l. Representatives of private sector
(562)
cally and chronologically. However, they are
not much more labor-intensive.
Basic Facts about the Survey
(GDS) carried out by the Center for Population
and Policy Studies (CPPS) at the University of
Gajah Mada, with World Bank funding, was an
opinion survey that was applied to many levels
of Indonesian society.9 The survey was carried
out in 2002. The survey has the following relevant characteristics:
3. The list of districts where the overall survey
was carried out is shown in Table 13 (This
table is shown at the end of this appendix as
it is quite long.) Sixty households were interviewed in each district. (In one or two of
these districts both the kota and the kabupaten were sampled, for a total of 120 interviews.) It would be tedious to show the
geographical distribution of every type of
respondent, so only the list of districts is
shown.
1. It is largely an opinion survey, based on
scales, with only a few objective indicators
or judgments by enumerators trained to
evaluate a process or situation. The lack of
objective measurements (or judgment of
processes by trained enumerators) makes it
difficult to assess the objective quality of
governance. It also makes it difficult to corroborate opinions by seeing whether they are
correlated with the objective measurements.
Thus, the absolute value of the opinions is
not of very much interest. However, opinions can be compared with each other a)
across sectors and issues, to see whether
opinion about governance in some sectors or
issues is better or worse than in others and
b) for a given sector or issue across localities
and actors to see whether these opinions correlate with each other.
Initial Results and Puzzles
A logical place to begin, given the aim of this
appendix, is to see what the most “basic” or “final” respondents, namely parents and citizens
think about the quality of services and governance of the education sector, both at present and
over the past few years.
The following observations can be made from
the survey. First, the proportions of citizens
who thought, at the time of the survey, that services were at 3 (or 4) or better on a scale of 1 to
5 (where 5 is best) is as shown in Table 1.
Given the standard errors, differences between
proportions of more than .015 are generally significant at the 5 percent level. The data have
been sorted from the “worst” service to the
“best.”
2. The following actors—numbers of each in
the database are shown in parentheses—
were interviewed:
a. Officials in Bupati/Walikota’s office
and other general local government
(741)
b. Members of regional legislature or
DPRD (567)
c. Practitioners in the justice system—
judges and district attorneys (259)
9
For a fuller description of the survey see:
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/2500ec5f1
a2d9bad852568a3006f557d/f342ce243175816d4725
6c1a0015a2a0?OpenDocument.
38
Chapter 1
Table 1. Proportion of citizens scoring quality of services
as “medium” or better (3 or higher on a 1 to 5 scale)10
Proportion scoring the service Proportion scoring the service Std Error of
4 or better
Column 1
Service
3 or better
Police
0.722
0.324
0.005
Head of Sub-district office 0.844
0.488
0.004
Public Senior High School 0.859
0.574
0.004
Doctor of Puskesmas
0.878
0.542
0.004
Village Midwife
0.884
0.590
0.003
Public Junior High School 0.886
0.592
0.003
Public Elementary School 0.905
0.599
0.003
Puskesmas
0.915
0.508
0.003
Posyandu
0.927
0.649
0.003
Head of Kelurahan/village
Office
0.931
0.575
0.003
A majority of citizens think that services
have not changed, but far more think that
Generally, education falls in the middle of the
range. A very large majority of citizens seems
to think services are either “ok” (3) or better,
with the numbers thinking services are “better
than ok” (4 or higher) being a small majority
(except for in the police and sub-district categories). It would be hard to argue that in static
terms, and in terms of subjective opinion, education services are failing, either compared to
other services or in purely subjective absolute
terms.
services have gotten better than think they
have gotten worse (the middle category of “no
change” is the rest). Again, differences between services of more than about 0.015 in the
“better” column and of more than 0.003 in the
“worse” column are statistically significant. It
is true that the largest proportion of citizens
who think services have gotten worse is in
education, but 6.1 percent, while statistically
significantly different from the value for the
other services, is not striking from a social or
economic point of view. It is interesting to
note that, regarding education, fewer citizens
are in the middle and fewer are without an
opinion.
Second, citizens seem to think not only that
things are not bad, but also that services appear to be improving under decentralization, if
one goes just by citizens’ subjective opinions,
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Proportion of citizens who think services have
gotten better or worse since decentralization
Don’t
Better
Worse
Service
Know
School
0.396
0.061
0.045
Health
0.403
0.030
0.066
Village
0.397
0.026
0.032
Sub-District
0.318
0.017
0.142
District
0.264
0.021
0.298
Third, when citizens were asked to say
whether they were happy with particular
aspects of education, on average, across
most sub-aspects, about 80 percent said
they were happy, and there is not much
variability across sub-aspects.11 This is
shown in Table 3.
All this presents a puzzle. The experts
seem to think that the Indonesian education sector is in trouble, yet citizens appear not
to think so. One possible explanation is that
10
11
The source for all tables is our analysis of the
GDS itself. The source for each individual table is
therefore not listed.
The phrasing of the question was altered between
“are you satisfied” and “are you unhappy.” The
percentages were roughly the same in either case.
39
Volume 2
technically reasonable. Thus, this suggests a)
the need not only for School Committees and
other citizen groups to articulate demands and
hold service providers to account but also for
ambitious but reasonable standards of performance and b) citizens to realize what standards they have a right to expect.
the experts are wrong, that they are rentseeking in promoting a sense that education
has problems (because if they promote a sense
of crisis, there will be a higher demand for expert services). This may mean that the situation is in fact truly better than subjective
Table 3. Percentage of citizens satisfied
with various sub-aspects of education
School fees
71
Uniform prices
78
School achievement
82
School discipline
87
School learning process
86
PTA management
83
Extra-curricular activities
81
If the second explanation is true, this means
that parents and communities will tend to under-invest in education, which means that central budgetary pressure of some sort (some
earmarking or even mandates), as well as
training and moral persuasion, will be necessary to ensure that citizens recognize the nation’s needs as well as their own. Again, this
is likely to be a difficult task. We now turn to
the task of sorting out whether these two hypotheses might be true.
opinions would suggest or there may be at
least two other explanations.
One possible explanation is that citizens told
the enumerators what they thought they
wanted to hear and thus responded fairly positively to most questions even though they may
have thought otherwise, or citizens may simply have had very low expectations. If one
takes into account noise and randomness, then
there is some variation around a generally
positive, but somehow “standardized ok” outlook. The lack of many objective correlates to
the opinion questions makes it hard to assess
whether this is the case.
Sorting out the Puzzle
The first hypothesis, that there is some bias to
the positive middle, can be tested in at least
one simple way. We took all the responses to
the question on the degree of happiness with a
variety of services (the question underlying
Table 2). The range of judgment as to the
quality of services can go from 1 to 5, with 5
being the best. We averaged the valid responses for all services in each district. We
then ranked all of the 142 districts. The district falling at the boundary of the 1st and 2nd
quintiles (the average of the 35th and 36th) had
an average of 3.51. The district falling at the
boundary of the 4th and 5th quintiles (the average of the 106th and 107th) had an average of
3.69. The very worst district of the 142 had an
average rating of 3.23, nearly half-way between “fair” and “good,” and the very best
only 3.95, not quite “good.” The total range
from 3.23 to 3.95 is 0.72 or only 18 percent of
the total range of variation possible (4 points),
and the inter-quartile range is only 4.7 percent
of the total possible range of variation.
Another possible explanation is that citizens
genuinely perceived things to be going fairly
well in education, but there was a gap between
what they perceived and what is in the national interest—in other words, the survey assessed individual or local satisfaction rather
than collective need. Since the effects of education are perhaps 50 percent external to the
family and to a considerable degree external to
a village, it makes sense that villagers would
tend to under-invest in education and/or overestimate the degree to which it is provided at a
“good-enough” level compared to the national
need.
All this strongly suggests a pre-disposition to
respond with a bias towards the slightly positive above neutral. It is true that averaging out
all services produces an artificial uniformity
bias that may not be present in the responses.
If the first explanation is true, then citizens
need to be educated to have higher expectations. However, their expectation must also be
40
Chapter 1
Table 4. Time it takes to perform certain tasks (in months)
Dinas Pendidikan
Task
School
Changing the status of a position (promoting a position)
3.0
5.1
Promoting a teacher
3.7
5.8
Approving a student movement
2.0
2.2
Fulfilling book procurement proposal of the school
5.7
7.4
Percentage
difference
68%
58%
9%
30%
and of the schools. The services concerned
were:
1. Changing the status of a position
(promoting a position)
2. Promoting a teacher
3. Approving a student movement
4. Fulfilling the school’s book procurement proposal.
Thus, taking specific services one at a time,
the actual range of total variation between the
worst and best district is, on average, 24 percent of the possible range of variation, and the
inter-quartile range, service by service, is 6.3
percent of the possible range. Finally, the
worst service, policing, got an average rating
of 3.1, and the best, Posyandu, got an average
of 3.8, with the difference between the two being 16 percent of the possible range. This
confirmed the notion of a restricted range of
variation that sits right above the average.
The idea that this restricted range might be
“natural” still has to be dealt with—there is,
after all, no reason why citizens’ ratings would
have to be uniformly distributed or distributed
in any particular way. If the quality of services really is very tightly controlled by government and kept within a certain range, it is
entirely possible that the citizens’ reactions
might simply reflect this fact. We will return
to this when we have a way to test it.
The responses were in ranges (1 to 3 months,
4 to 7, etc.). Giving the middle value of the
range to each range, the approximate time in
months taken to carry out each of these tasks
from the points of view of the Dinas Pendidikan and the school is shown in Table 4.
This table is significant for various reasons.
First, taking 3.7, or even 3 months, to promote
a teacher, or taking 5.7, or even 5 months to
fulfill a procurement order, is a very low standard, and yet this is the perception of the Dinas Pendidikan. The perception of the school
is that the tasks take, on average, some 30 to
70 percent longer (44 percent on average), as
much as 7 months to fulfill book procurement
orders or 5 to 6 months to get a teacher promoted. One has to remember that “2” in the
table above really means 1 to 3 (months), so
one has to interpret the results cautiously.
Nonetheless, these are poor performance levels. When this is juxtaposed with parental
opinion, then, parents seem to have a bias towards the positive or to have low expectations.
We can now turn to the issue of whether the
range of citizens’ rating of services might be
“natural,” in other words, might reflect the
true range of objective variation in quality. To
check this, we assessed the coefficient of
variation between district averages of the time
it takes to perform various services as above.
These results are shown in Table 5.
Another way to test the notion of positive bias
due to a lack of objective scaling is that there
were at least some governance and management questions that were a) based on an objective scale (though not independently
measured) and b) asked of more than one type
of respondent. There was a question about
how long it took the Dinas Pendidikan office
to process a certain type of action. The same
question was asked of the Dinas Pendidikan
Second, the difference in perspective between
the Dinas Pendidikan and the schools is clear
and strong: 44 percent on average. The one
exception to this divergence of perception is
the time it took to approve a student movement. Schools’ estimates of the time required
for certain actions is much longer than those
of officials.
41
Volume 2
Table 5. Coefficient of inter-district variation
in time it takes to perform certain tasks and in citizen rating of various services
Dinas Pendidikan
School per- Citizen perTask
perception
ception
ception
Changing the status of a position (promoting a position)
0.68
0.38
NA
Promoting a teacher
0.88
0.40
NA
Approving a student movement
0
0.12
NA
Fulfilling book procurement proposal of the school
0.77
0.42
NA
Average across all tasks
0.46
0.24
NA
Citizen rating of basic education services
NA
NA
0.042
limited than the “real” range of quality as denoted by officials’ reported range of variation
in a few objective indicators of service quality.
Interestingly, the averages as perceived by the
Dinas Pendidikan are wider even than those
perceived by the schools. However, this is
due to the fact that within many districts the
Dinas Pendidikan officials answered simply
by choosing the lowest possible level (the
range 1-3). A few, however, appear to have
admitted that things take longer. This yielded
a wide range—a range greater than that reported by schools, which would otherwise
seem unlikely. The hypothesis suggests itself
that perhaps Dinas officers have been exaggerating at the low end. In any case, it is clear
that citizens’ range of expressed evaluation of
quality is much more restricted—by about
four-fifths—than the variation in this one objective indicator of quality of services as reported by the schools or—by nine-tenths—by
the Dinas Pendidikan.
Another way of assessing whether citizens are
“right” is to assess the correlation between
citizens’ opinion on the subjective scale and
the opinions of both Dinas Pendidikan officials and school principals on an objective
measure of the time it takes to perform tasks.
Some simple correlations between citizens’
opinions on various services were added as a
benchmark to allow us to judge whether citizens’ opinions, themselves, might be mere
noise. The results are shown in Table 6.
Note that citizen’s opinions do not seem to be
mere noise. Opinions on the quality of different levels of schooling are highly correlated to
each other and are highly correlated to the
opinions of village heads on educational quality (last row, third panel of the table).
This strongly suggests that citizens’ range of
perceptions of service quality is much more
While citizens’ opinions may not be mere
Table 6. Simple correlations between household opinions on school quality scale and officials’ opinions on
time it takes to carry out basic tasks for schools
Variables
Correlation
Dinas Pendidikan, Schools Opinions on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Primary Schools, Dinas Pendidikan Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Primary Schools, Schools’ Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Junior Secondary Schools’, Dinas Pendidikan Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Junior Secondary Schools’, Schools Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Senior Secondary Schools’, Dinas Pendidikan Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Senior Secondary Schools’, Schools Opinion on Task Time
Households’ Opinion on Primary Schools and Opinion on Junior Secondary Schools
Households’ Opinion on Primary Schools and Opinion Senior Secondary Schools
Households’ Opinion on Junior Secondary and Opinion Senior Secondary Schools
Households’ Opinion on Primary Education and Opinion on Head of Village
0.23
0.05
-0.08
0.03
-0.10
-0.02
-0.07
0.88
0.86
0.94
0.74
42
Chapter 1
also interesting that education is listed fourth
but a fairly distant fourth: the drop from third
to fourth place is from 18 to 9 percent. This
suggests, but only vaguely, that citizens might
be thinking of education in terms of its private
and local returns and that therefore they tend
to put a relatively low priority on education.
Improved health services are also given a relatively low priority. It is likely that here too
citizens tend to think not so much about public
health measures as about measures that apply
to themselves as individuals or perhaps as a
village.
noise, they are not very correlated with officials’ opinions regarding the time it takes to
perform certain tasks. This suggests that one
should be cautious when using task performance time as a measure of quality or taking
subjective quality perceptions too seriously.
Interestingly, while the correlation between
the Dinas Pendidikan officials’ and the school
principals’ opinion on task time is statistically
positive, 0.23 is low in substantive terms.
Our second hypothesis is that parents’ or citi-
Table 7. Investment priorities of citizens upon receipt of large
fiscal windfall for their municipality
Poverty alleviation
23%
Local physical development (means/ infrastructure)
19%
Increasing existing business capital
18%
Improving education service quality
9%
Agricultural development
7%
Other
5%
Improving health service quality
5%
Improving other public service quality
4%
Distributed to the people
4%
Financing manpower intensive projects
2%
Developing industrial factories
2%
Increasing salary
0%
Increasing the number of staff
0%
What Do More “Objective”
Observers Say?
One way to assess relative quality of services, even without objective measurements, is to see
what other “objective” observers
(other than parents since, as we
have seen, their range of reactions
seems biased towards the positive) might have to say. NGOs
are not likely to be truly objective, in that NGOs, as is the case
with most policy and service delivery analysts and advocates,
presumably benefit from the maintenance of a
perception that problems and crises exist.
(However, it is hard to imagine reasons why
they would tend to be more alarmist about one
sector than another; it would seem logical that
they would be about equally biased in all areas.) The proportion of NGO respondents
who said that in each of the areas shown there
were few or no complaints against local service providers is shown in Table 8.
zens’ opinions reflect a private or local view
of education that naturally tends to underestimate its importance and thus overestimate
the degree to which delivery is sufficient or of
adequate quality.
One possible way to test this is to assess the
degree to which citizens would want to invest
in education as opposed to other items if their
municipality were to receive a fiscal windfall.
The results are not an uncommon local prioritization: invest in economic assets that do
Table 8. Proportion of NGO respondents who report no comnot move. The results are as shown in
plaints or hardly any complaints, by sector or office
Table 7.
The top responses, if taken together,
suggest that citizens tend to want to invest in activities of fairly direct economic
benefit and that apply to fixed assets.
Notably, interest in direct investment in
work schemes or in investment projects
appears not to be high. In any case, it is
Program and project development and implementation
Education service
Health services
Regulation of informal economy
Land or building disputes
Human rights violations
Discipline violations in public service
Labor conflict
43
0.45
0.48
0.54
0.61
0.64
0.65
0.68
0.77
Volume 2
The only area “worse” than education appears
to be general program and project development. All services whose low-complaint proportions are statistically different from
education at the 5 percent level are shown in
italics. The number of low complaints in the
area of program and project development is
not statistically different from education.
Thus, education is, in a sense, the sector
against which there are most complaints or is
equivalent to the worst.
Table 10. Proportion of DPRD members or officials who reported no complaints, by sector
Education
0.19
Program and project development
0.21
Health
0.25
Land/building certification
0.37
Identity card
0.61
Amount of land/building tax
0.66
Again, education is at the bottom and indistinguishably so from program and project development. Note that the perceptions on this
score are similar to NGO perceptions. And, it
is noteworthy how different these numbers are
from citizens’ own responses about problems
and levels of satisfaction. The same idea, with
some refinement, is shown in Table 11. The
results are the same, placing education at the
bottom.
It may well be that there are more complaints
against education simply because this is the
social service that touches most people on a
daily basis. This cannot be tested.
To look at this issue further, we narrowed the
focus of management or governance complaints down to the issue of corruption. The
results are shown in Table 9. Sectors statistically different from education at the 5 percent
level are shown in italics.
Table 9. Proportion of NGO respondents who reported
low or very low levels of corruption, by sector or office
Head of District Office
0.23
Local Parliament
0.23
Land Certification Agency
0.21
Education Department
0.34
Health Department
0.34
Sub-district
0.4
Village
0.46
The absolute numbers above are of some interest: if 34 percent of the respondents were
reporting little or no corruption, then 66 percent were reporting some or more. This has
positive implications for the drive towards decentralization below the district level, as advocated in the Education Act, as the village level
is seen as the least corrupt.
Table 11. Proportion of DPRD members
or officials who report few or very few
complaints (within those who report some
complaints), by sector
Education
0.23
Program and project development 0.24
Health
0.27
Land/building certification
0.32
Identity card
0.39
Amount of land/building tax
0.41
Does Regulation Exist?
The DPRD members were asked whether
regulation exists, for some key areas and
their opinion of what regulation does exist.
The results are shown in Table 12.
This
is
a Table 12. Proportion of DRPD
somewhat ob- respondents saying regulation exists, by area
jective meas0.1
urement, and it Poverty alleviation
Education
0.28
is of some
0.53
concern that Health
KKN
0.05
only 28 percent of respondents seem to believe that the education
sector at the local level has been regulated.
This could be mere perception, but nonetheless it is the perception of the regional legislature, so it should be regarded as an important
issue.
Similarly, whereas the DPRD might be biased
in some general direction, it is hard to hypothesize that they would have particularly
strong sectoral biases. Thus, their perception
of citizens’ complaints is of interest. This is
shown in Table 10.
44
Chapter 1
Table 13 Districts Sampled
Alor, Nusa Tenggara Timar
Ciamis, Jawa Barat
Asahan, Sumatera Utara
Cilacap, Jawa Tengah
Badung, Bali
Cirebon, Jawa Barat
Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur
Dairi, Sumatera Utara
Bandung, Jawa Barat
Denpasar, Bali
Banggai Kepulauan, Sulawesi Tengah
Depok, Jawa Barat
Bangkalan, Jawa Timar
Donggala, Sulawesi Tengah
Banjar, Kalimantan Selatan
Dumai, Riau
Banjarbaru, Kalimantan Selatan
Flores Timur, Nusa Tenggara Timar
Bantaeng, Sulawesi Selatan
Gianyar, Bali
Bantul, D I Yogyakarta
Gowa, Sulawesi Selatan
Banyuwangi, Jawa Timur
Gresik, Jawa Timur
Batam, Riau
Hulu Sungai Tengah, Kalimantan Selatan
Bekasi, Jawa Barat
Hulu Sungai Utara, Kalimantan Selatan
Bengkalis, Riau
Indragiri Hulu, Riau
Berau, Kalimantan Timur
Indramayu, Jawa Barat
Bima, Nusa Tenggara Barat
Jember, Jawa Timur
Binjai, Sumatera Utara
Jepara, Jawa Tengah
Blitar, Jawa Timur
Kampar, Riau
Blora, Jawa Tengah
Kapuas Hulu, Kalimantan Barat
Bogor, Jawa Barat
Karang Asem, Bali
Bojonegoro, Jawa Timur
Karawang, Jawa Barat
Bolaang Mengondow, Sulawesi Utara
Karimun, Riau
Bone, Sulawesi Selatan
Kebumen, Jawa Tengah
Boyolali, Jawa Tengah
Kediri, Jawa Timur
Buton, Sulawesi Tenggara
Kendal, Jawa Tengah
Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara
Rembang, Jawa Tengah
Klaten, Jawa Tengah
Rokan Hilir, Riau
Klungkung, Bali
Rokan Hulu, Riau
Kota Baru, Kalimantan Selatan
Sambas, Kalimantan Barat
Kudus, Jawa Tengah
Sampang, Jawa Timur
Kutai, Kalimantan Timur
Sanggau, Kalimantan Barat
Labuhan Batu, Sumatera Utara
Sangihe Talaud, Sulawesi Utara
Lahat, Sumatera Selatan
Semarang, Jawa Tengah
Lampung Tengah, Lampung
Sidenreng Rappang, Sulawesi Selatan
Lampung Utara, Lampung
Sinjai, Sulawesi Selatan
Landak, Kalimantan Barat
Situbondo, Jawa Timur
Lima Puluh Koto, Sumatera Barat
Sleman, D I Yogyakarta
Lombok Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat
Solok, Sumatera Barat
Luwu Utara, Sulawesi Selatan
Soppeng, Sulawesi Selatan
Madiun, Jawa Timur
Sukoharjo, Jawa Tengah
Magelang, Jawa Tengah
Sumba Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur
Majalengka, Jawa Barat
Sumbawa, Nusa Tenggara Barat
Malang, Jawa Timur
Sumedang, Jawa Barat
Manado, Sulawesi Utara
Tana Toraja, Sulawesi Selatan
Manggarai, Nusa Tenggara Timur
Tanah Datar, Sumatera Barat
Maros, Sulawesi Selatan
Tanggamus, Lampung
45
Volume 2
Table 13 Districts Sampled
Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat
Tapanuli Tengah, Sumatera Utara
Medan, Sumatera Utara
Tapanuli Utara, Sumatera Utara
Metro, Lampung
Tapin, Kalimantan Selatan
Muara Enim, Sumatera Selatan
Tarakan, Kalimantan Timur
Muna, Sulawesi Tenggara
Tegal, Jawa Tengah
Ngada, Nusa Tenggara Timur
Temanggung, Jawa Tengah
Nganjuk, Jawa Timur
Timor Tengah Selatan, Nusa Tenggara Tim
Nias, Sumatera Utara
Timor Tengah Utara, Nusa Tenggara Timur
Ogan Komering Ulu, Sumatera Selatan
Toba Samosir, Sumatera Utara
Pacitan, Jawa Timur
Toli-Toli, Sulawesi Tengah
Padang Panjang, Sumatera Barat
Tuban, Jawa Timur
Padang Pariaman, Sumatera Barat
Tulungagung, Jawa Timur
Palembang, Sumatera Selatan
Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi Selatan
Palu, Sulawesi Tengah
Wajo, Sulawesi Selatan
Pangkajene Kepulauan, Sulawesi Selatan
Way Kanan, Lampung
Pasaman, Sumatera Barat
Wonosobo, Jawa Tengah
Pasir, Kalimantan Timur
Yogyakarta, D I Yogyakarta
Payakumbuh, Sumatera Barat
Pekalongan, Jawa Tengah
Pemalang, Jawa Tengah
Pematang Siantar, Sumatera Utara
Pesisir Selatan, Sumatera Barat
Pinrang, Sulawesi Selatan
Ponorogo, Jawa Timur
Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat
Probolinggo, Jawa Timur
46
Chapter 1
Appendix 1.5. Organizational Issues for Depdiknas under
Decentralization
The South African Department of Education
employs only some 500 employees in a
country with some 350,000 teachers and a
little less than one-third as many students as
Indonesia. The rest of the country’s education personnel are employed by the decentralized provinces. Argentina has a little less
than one-fifth as many students as Indonesia
and about 1,200 national employees. Even
decentralized countries can have fairly large
staffs at the central level if they can afford it
and depending on the degree of true decentralization.
Since function assignment is still being debated and since form should follow function,
it is difficult to be exactly prescriptive about
bureaucratic form for Depdiknas and other
national-level bodies such as MoRA, where
the assignment of basic decentralization
functions is even less clear. However, based
on the logic of decentralization that Indonesia has set out for itself as embodied in various laws and based on international
experience, a few pointers can be set out. It
needs to be noted that there is no necessary
correspondence between organizational
structure and performance, just as there is no
necessary connection between decentralization and educational performance. However, there are organizational structures for a
national ministry that make more sense than
others in a decentralized or decentralizing
education system. This section covers two
issues: a) size (which is subdivided into discussions of personnel and budget) and b)
structure.
Spending Size
Spending by central ministries as a percentage of total spending at the pre-tertiary level
in decentralized countries ranges all the way
from less than 10 percent (in China, the US,
South Africa, and Hungary) to as high as 2040 percent (in Australia, Poland, and Spain).
Spending at the central level is usually
higher as a proportion of total spending than
staffing at the central level. This is because
much national spending in decentralized
countries takes the form of grants, transfers,
or project support of various types to lowerlevel governments as opposed to the direct
purchase of inputs (including labor) into instruction or school administration.
Size
Personnel Size
Judging from international practice, for the
national level to have less than one in one
thousand of the total pre-tertiary education
staff in the country would be too few. At
one extreme, Canada has no national Ministry, so in a sense it has zero staff (though it
has a council of provincial Ministers with a
secretariat of 40 or so) at the national level.
A more realistic illustration might be China,
a nation with approximately six to seven
times more pre-tertiary students than Indonesia, which has only some 700 professional
employees at the central ministry level. This
is the case even though China has one of the
lowest ratios of central to sub-national personnel in the world across all governments
and though its education system is not necessarily an efficiently decentralized one.
South Africa’s national education workforce
is still lean but not at the Chinese extreme.
Structure
Indonesia’s education system is far from being effectively decentralized yet. Decentralization is not only new, but in its early
days, it has not been well-defined. Decentralization is a process that has taken some
20 years in Spain, and some 15 years in
Chile. South Africa started decentralizing in
1994, reached some degree of fiscal stability
in 1998 or so, and began reaping some quality improvements in 2001 or so. In a sense,
decentralization is never finished, as can be
seen in the constant re-design and reassessment of the systems in the United
47
Volume 2
States after 200 years as a decentralized society (for example, the ongoing debate as to
whether district education boards should be
elected or appointed or whether they, or
mayors, should control education in a municipality—see Case 3 in Appendix 1.3).
The functions that a ministry in a decentralizing country should perform are different
from those the same ministry might perform
in a country that is already effectively decentralized. Thus, looking at international
examples of countries that are already decentralized (such as the UK, Spain, and the
US) is of limited, but some value. Looking
at decentralizing cases is more interesting,
but there is a danger that one may try to
learn lessons from countries that are constantly decentralizing but getting there only
slowly (Colombia). Chile, South Africa,
Argentina, and Hungary are examples of
countries that have “achieved” some degree
of effective decentralization but are still sufficiently dynamic that there is an ongoing
decentralization process for the national
level to support. Judging by these cases, a
central ministry in a decentralizing system
should not implement education but instead
should:
6.
7.
8.
9.
1. Set standards and measures of
performance, ideally outcome
measures rather than input ones;
ensure that these indicators are
measured and reported (including information systems); set
goals and/or minimum service
standards,
again
outcomeoriented.
2. Focus on institutions of delivery
(schools, colleges) rather than
“levels” (primary, secondary).
3. Ensure competition and emulation between decentralized regions.
4. Ensure that decentralized units
can come up to standard through
systems development, training,
and by advocating for effective
funding.
5. Perform, or ensure performance,
of functions with large econo-
mies of scale, perhaps by brokering associations between districts or provinces.
Use funding or norms (such as
requiring districts to enroll children from outside the district,
and then funding them to do so)
to correct spillovers between regions, for example, in specialized areas of education where
one institution could serve more
than one district.
Keep up funding levels and encourage local levels to pursue
equity in outcomes by creating
regulation on the internal distribution of funding within districts if possible, and by moral
persuasion if direct regulation is
deemed too intrusive into district affairs.
Carry out overall system planning, forecasting, and investment prioritization, including
forecasting
and
analyzing
teacher supply and demand.
Encourage experimentation and
disseminate lessons learned
from that experimentation.
The organizational structure corresponding
to such a “modern” set-up can be seen in the
organigrams for two very different Ministries of Education: 1) Korea, an Asian unitary republic where students score extremely
well in international comparative assessments (Figure 1), and 2) Argentina, a Latin
American federal republic with an education
system of medium effectiveness by middleincome country standards (Figure 2).12 It
would be possible to produce organograms
for strongly decentralizing developed coun-
12
Note that, since the focus of this ESR is pretertiary education and education as such rather
than culture, science, sports, and other ancillary
functions often assigned to Ministries of Education, we have glossed over the details in the parts
of the organigrams that correspond to such functions.
48
Chapter 1
most modernizing and/or decentralizing
ministries seek to do.
tries such as Spain or unitary developed
countries that are still experimenting such as
the UK, as the organizational lessons are
almost exactly the same. As noted, it should
not be inferred that causality can be ascribed
to any particular type of structure. The point
is simply that, in modernizing and decentralizing countries, the bureaucratic structure at
the center tends to have certain functions,
but it should not be assumed that institutional reorganization at the center of the system will necessarily have a direct and
predictable impact on the quality of education. What ultimately matters is incentives
and behavior at the classroom and school
levels, but there are ways to organize levels
higher than the school so that they are optimized to support schools. This is what
It should also be noted that some countries
have quite a good decentralization structure
in terms of the relations between schools,
districts, or provinces (or some other intermediate level) and the national level, but the
internal organization of the national-level
ministry may still not be as good as it could
be. A good example of this is South Africa,
where the structure of decentralization, in
terms of the relations between national, provincial, and school levels, is well thoughtthrough and very close to international best
practice, but the internal organization structure of the national Department of Education
is old-fashioned and not optimally supportive of the decentralized structures under it.
49
Emergency
Planning
Women's
Education
Education
Facilities
Legal Affairs
Administrative
Management
Planning and
Budget
Planning and
Management
Inspection
Audit
Asessment and
Evaluation
Curriculum
Policy
School
Policy
School Policy
Inspector General
Teacher
Welfare
Teacher Education
and Development
Teacher Policy
Teacher Policy
Human Resources
Development
Vice-Minister
Minister
50
Lifelong and
Vocational
Educaiton
Various subunits
Local Education
Services
Internatinoal Cooperation
Information Technology Support
University Affairs
International Cooperation
and Information
Technology
Information Technology Planning
Figure 1. Structure of Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea
General Affairs
DG
Finance and
Management
Directorate:
Budget
DG
Legal issues
Directorate:
Accounting and
Finance
Subsecretary for
Administrative
Coordination
Directorate:
Human
Resources
DG
International
Funding
Minister of Education
51
National
Directorate:
Information and
School Quality
Secretary for
University Policy
National
Directorate:
Curriculum and
Teacher
Development
Various subunits
Secretary for
Science, Technology,
and Innovation
National
Directorate:
Targeted Funding
Subsecretary for
Quality and Equity
Secretary for
Education
Figure 2. Structure of Federal Ministry of Education, Argentina
Volume 2
and more prominent than the units
performing such functions internal
to the national ministry itself and
should be quite separate from them.
In a sense, these units should be
considered “line function” units just
as important as traditional line units
such as “basic” or “tertiary” or “vocational.” The structure of the Korean ministry is a good example in
this regard. At a minimum, such
units should be headed by a Director
General (and not the Secretary General) such as a Director General for
Policy and Planning, who would
cover not only the traditional policy
and planning issues but also these
issues related to administrative and
governance support to regions.
4. However, incentives should be created for staff working in such units
to work in tandem with the internal
Depdiknas staff because the latter
often have practical know-how,
such as how the personnel databases
operate. Without such practical
know-how, staff in such a Policy
and Planning Directorate General
will tend to be seen by their regional
counterparts as “mere theoreticians.” Some of these key support
functions would be:
a. Funding and developing financial norms, such as
model funding norms for
districts to fund or provision
schools.
b. Developing models and
tools for personnel (teacher)
management.
c. Improving procurement of,
for example, books.
d. Developing
information
systems.
e. Continuing governance and
management development.
5. The Directorate General for Policy
and Planning should be divided into
two (or more) broad areas, to handle
a) these financial, administrative,
and governance support functions
Based on these considerations, Depdiknas is
not currently optimized to support the
decentralization process or a decentralized
system. The following are suggestions for
ways in which it could be reorganized to
make it more supportive of a decentralized
education system:
1. In a largely non-implementing ministry there is no obvious need for a
large Inspectorate. This is not to say
internal audit functions and the audit
of sub-national units in charge of
projects should be neglected, but the
unit performing internal and special
project audit, while strong and wellstaffed, need not be very large. The
internal audit function should be
part of the internal ministry staff
function, in other words, organizationally it should be placed in a
manner similar to that of Korea.
2. A distinction needs to be made between the “staff” working on functions that are internal to the ministry
(generally associated with something like a Secretary General), such
as human resources, budget, procurement, on the one hand and support to decentralized regions
carrying out those same functions
on the other.
a. The offices performing
functions internal to the
ministry can be fairly small.
b. The technical focus of these
functions will need to
change. For example, procurement expertise should
shift from materials to technical assistance and research and development
contracts. This will also require better links between
technical staff and central
staff. It is likely to require
the retraining of some staff.
3. Units providing assistance to subnational governments in functions
such as human resources, budgeting,
and procurement should be bigger
52
Chapter 1
nance and Analytical Services.13
Note the focus on Schools (as institutions) rather than on “education”
as an abstraction, and note that only
one of the DGs, if that, is focused on
traditional “line” functions and the
others deal with analytical and support functions. This makes sense,
given that the goal of the Department is “only” to: “develop and implement policies and programs – by
setting the framework of standards,
accountability, devolution, and customer choice for each phase of education.”
x South Africa’s Department of Education has only one Director General and four Deputy Directors
General: three for line functions
(higher, general, and technical/vocational) and one for policy
and planning. The latter takes on
tasks such as setting norms for how
provinces fund their schools and
providing technical assistance in the
development of school-based governance and information. The policy and planning “branch” works
directly with the provinces when it
comes to implementation but also
sees the “line” branches as its clients
when developing norms or policies.
Traditional functions such as curriculum development are embedded
in the line functions. Staff functions
are performed within the policy and
planning “branch,” but that has been
an uncomfortable compromise. As
noted above, this is a relatively oldfashioned approach, and while
South Africa has a highly regarded
system of inter-governmental relations, it is not clear that the internal
structure of the national Department
and b) the traditional curriculum,
accreditation, and examination functions. Alternatively, there could be
two Directorate Generals, one for
these “systems” issues and another
for the more traditional educational
ones.
6. Given that the functions of Depdiknas will be evolving towards providing support and technical
assistance to lower levels, most of
its job descriptions will have to
change. In fact, thinking in terms of
describing jobs that exist to support
regions in the decentralization process is a fairly good way to establish
the new functions, since the new
functions are not to be performed by
the institution as an abstraction but
by people.
The following aspects of various existing
decentralized education systems around the
world illustrate the suggestions listed above.
There is naturally no perfect system, and all
of the systems below are simply compromises where the solutions to certain problems have created other problems.
x The higher-level organization chart
(as specified by decree) for Argentina’s national Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology does
not even refer to traditional lines
such as “primary” or “secondary.” It
has a Sub-Secretariat for Quality,
with Directorates for Information
and Assessment, Equity Programs,
and Curriculum and Teacher training; it also has a Directorate for
Technical-Administrative
Assistance. This is the case in Korea as
well. Note that in both cases the
emphasis is on supporting functions
and institutions, not traditional “levels.”
x In the UK’s Department for Education and Skills, there are five Directors-General for Schools, Youth,
Corporate Services and Development, Lifelong Learning, and Fi-
13
Not shown, but available at
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/deptreport2002/pdf/01Prelims.pdf.
53
Volume 2
of Education is optimal.14
x Organizational models such as those
suggested here are not unique to
geographically decentralized countries. Korea’s education system is
effective, but it is not decentralized
in a geographical manner similar to
those of countries discussed above.
Nevertheless, Korea’s Ministry of
Education is organized entirely
without the traditional line functions
that
usually
exist
in
an
“implementation” ministry, similar
to those of, say, the UK.
The main “line” headings in Korea’s
organization are: 1) Planning and
Management, 2) School Policy, 3)
Human Resources Development, 4)
Lifelong and Vocational Education,
5) University Affairs, 6) Local Education Services, and 7) General Affairs. The functions such as audit
and inspection are to the side of the
main headings to the main headings
(they are not line functions).
Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, Figure
3 on the following page sketches a possible
organizational structure for Depdiknas.
14
In South Africa, the Ministry as such is very
small and exists only to support the Minister as a
political appointee. The Department, which contains most of the employees, runs all of the bureaucratic and operational affairs and is headed
by a single technical appointee on contract who
answers to the Minister.
54
Research and policy
analysis on structural
issues, coordination of
policy support to
Minister
Governance and
management norming
and support to districts
and schools
Institution (schools.
colleges, universities)
measurement and quality
assurance
Information systems and
data gathering
Institutional Finance
(Funding formula
support, norming,
policy; budget dialogue)
Policy and Planning
Inspector General
(focus on financial and
audit issues only)
Teacher policy on
evaluation, in-service
training, pay,
deployment
Curricular analysis,
development, norming,
and support
General education
Minister
55
Higher education
Various subunits
Lifelong education
Figure 3. One possible organizational structure for Depdiknas
Other functions
internal to Ministry
or nationally-run
programs
Budgeting and
Financial Controls of
Ministry and
Nationally-Run
Programs
HR Internal to
Ministry
Secretary General
Volume 2
Appendix 1.6. Minimum Service Standards as Management and
Governance Tools
sector with salutary lessons for education, see
Baker and Trémolet, 2002). It also makes
sense to anchor the discussion of SPMs in the
specific context of the overall process of decentralization in Indonesia. If one then adds
what little international evidence does exist,
one has some basis for judging the current
state of affairs with regard to education SPMs
in Indonesia according to the following criteria:
Minimum Service Standards (Standar Pelayanan Minimal–SPM) are potentially a useful
governance and management tool. However,
if misapplied, they can be a hindrance or,
worse, can actually undermine decentralized
governance. This Appendix tackles the issue
of whether SPMs in Indonesia, as the situation
currently stands, are likely to be more of a
help than a hindrance.
The basic decentralization law, No. 22/1999, is
silent on the issue of minimum standards. It is
Government Regulation No. 25/2000 that calls
for the preparation of guidelines for determining SPMs that must be “implemented” by local
governments. Other recent regulations, such
as Government Regulation 105 of 2000, have
specified that local government budgets should
be performance-oriented, based on minimum
standards that measure performance. Government Regulation 108 of 2000 also calls for
minimum standards in the evaluation of local
government performance. In response to these
various regulations, Indonesia began in 2002
to devise some SPMs with some false starts
and some confusion due in no small measure
to a lack of clarity in the legislation, including
the definition of terminology (see Donor SPM
Working Group 2002, also GTZ-Support for
Decentralization Measures et. al. 2003). (This
problem is compounded by the Education
Law, No. 20/2003, as noted in other sections
of this chapter.) However, in spite of a rocky
start, the process, under a MoHA-led “modelbuilding” exercise, had produced a set of draft
minimum standards for the education sector by
mid-2003 (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional/Unit Fasilitasi Desentralisasi Pendidikan, 2003).
x Numbers: Are there too many or too
few? Are the numbers, by sub-issue
or sub-function, appropriate to the importance of the issue or sub-function?
x Type: True service standard or aggregate indicator?
x Motivation and use: Vertical reporting
or horizontal reporting? Accountability to citizens or to politicians and bureaucratic management?
x Technical quality: Are the SPMs wellspecified and measurable?
x Level to be reached: Are the levels of
the indicators to be reached too high
or too low?
x Level at which measured: Are the district-level indicators based on schoollevel or unit-level indicators? Are
they measurable as a by-product of
unit-level managerial needs?
Before applying these criteria to the draft education SPMs in Indonesia, it is useful to expand a little on these concepts, based on
decentralization and public finance theory and
practice and on what little international evidence does exist. Thus, in each case below,
we discuss first a little of the “theory” and then
apply the “theory” to the Indonesian education
case.
In gauging the likely impact of minimum standards on decentralized governance, it is important to note that there is no accepted body of
theory or practice that can be used as a solid
basis for guidance (see Ferrazzi, 2002). However, minimum standards can also be approached from the point of view of more
generally accepted practical and theoretical
notions of decentralization and intergovernmental public finance (see Smoke, 2002 and,
for interesting similarities to a very different
Numbers
Certainly, it is better to have few standards
than to have none. The usual reason given for
the desirability of standards is circular: standards are assumed to be self-evidently good
because no one would argue for things to be
sub-standard. But the more fundamental reason for having standards is that they lower the
56
Chapter 1
tention away from the more central and general interests, such as basic general education,
that have less organized defenders. Setting
minimum standards and obligatory functions
and maintaining a strong central role in policymaking can prevent this sort of “whipsawing” of local governments.15 However, as
will be seen below (where undue attention is
sometimes given to sports education or to
teachers in general), at the moment the central
government in Indonesia seems more likely to
abet special interests than to control them.
transaction costs involved when social or economic agents hold each other accountable.
Thus, the criterion by which to judge whether
an appropriate number of standards is being
used is whether the number of standards really
helps agents to hold each other accountable,
whether standards are in fact lowering transaction costs or increasing them, or whether the
transaction costs they avoid are worth the cost
entailed in tracking the standards. Furthermore, clearly those sectors where policymakers believe that accountability is most
important (perhaps because they require a
higher proportion of the national budget)
should have more standards. Having too many
standards can actually reduce accountability if
the number gets to the point where it is unrealistic to expect so many to be monitored.
Worse, a proliferation of standards, especially
if they are set too high or if their numbers are
out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of
the area in question, can be a signal that special interest groups are trying to capture budgetary resources, by mandating, say, that
schools or districts must have teachers teaching in specialized areas. Finally, the appropriate number of standards will also depend on
the type of standards in question. (See below
for a discussion of types.) If the standards being set are of the consumer-satisfaction or citizen-rights type, it is likely that the optimal
number may be fairly high. If standards are
for purposes of bureaucratic or political accountability and diagnosis, the optimal number
is likely to be much smaller.
In Indonesia, as the draft minimum standards
document currently stands, it appears that
there are simply too many standards, or, indicators, and that they are grossly out of proportion to the importance of the areas in question.
The draft contains 197 indicators, all with apparently equal priority. True, many of them
are repetitive, since, for example, the draft requires that data on enrollment rates be collected at the primary, junior secondary, and
senior secondary levels. Nonetheless, to expect managers to agree to be held accountable
for 197 indicators, without any real sense of
prioritization among them, seems either naïve
or cynical. Few competent managers would
agree to be truly held politically accountable
for that many indicators. Furthermore, the
numbers are out of all proportion to their intrinsic importance. While there are only 18
indicators related to primary schooling, there
are 22 indicators related to sports education,
and while there is an indicator that induces
better reporting of sports statistics, there is no
similar indicator inducing the reporting of
educational statistics. This is not necessarily
to suggest that the latter should be added; it is
more to suggest that the former is excessive.
One reason to prefer more, rather than fewer,
indicators, is that having a clear set of indicators allows local governments to stick to their
core mission. If DPRD members are seen as
venal or not very capable and local citizens are
prey to populist illusions such as “fiscal illusion” (the belief that resources that come from
a central level are “free”—see Dollery and
Wallis 2001), they can easily fall prey to special interests who try to force local governments to compete with each other in providing
non-essential services. By the logic of collective action, it is naturally the less “general” interests that are able to steer public funding
towards their favorite cause. Hence, it is possible that special interests could start races between local governments in providing services
or sub-services that are of more special interest
such as sports or music, drawing managers’ at-
The clear impression is that tracking this many
indicators will increase rather than lower the
15
“Whip-sawing” is a style of collective bargaining
in which a powerful union negotiates with more
than one employer, pitting one employer against
another and forcing each employer in turn to meet
or exceed the agreement that the union previously
made with a different employer. The same applies
to special interests pitting local governments
against each other and to any sort of negotiation in
general. A whip-saw is a saw operated by two
people, where the cutting requires a back-and-forth
motion.
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Volume 2
gated data as the gross or net enrollment ratios
that risk being too general to be useful at the
local level.
Of the indicators that we reviewed, only one or two would be of any interest to a particular parent, such as the
proportion of students who pass a given exam.
Few parents are likely to care whether the
gross enrollment rate is 70 percent or 90 percent as long as his or her child is enrolled in
school. Nor do the SPMs focus on workers
within the system and the accountability of
system units to each other. Similarly, they do
not contain any service indicators such as the
time it would take the Dinas Pendidikan to fulfill a school’s book order or how long it would
take to register a teacher’s promotion and notify the payroll system, and for the teacher’s
promotion to be reflected in his or her pay.
The whole ethos of providing parent-oriented
service indicators or indicators of mutual accountability is absent from Indonesia’s current
draft SPMs.
transaction costs related to accountability and
runs the risk of skewing accountability by
forcing managers and governors to concentrate
equally on essential and non-essential items.
Both the absolute numbers of indicators and
proportionality between them needs to be seriously revisited.
Type, Motivation, and Use
Across the world, the overwhelming majority
of “minimum service standards” are consumer-level or citizen-level standards of direct
service delivery. Some examples of these include citizens being notified more than 24
hours in advance of any planned interruption
in service or specifying that parents will be informed of their children’s end-of-year test
scores within four weeks or that a local education office will respond to any query from a
school within forty-eight hours or that parents
have a right to know the average test scores of
all the schools in the district. These standards
can be set irrespective of political ideology or
whether one regards the subject of service as a
“client” or “consumer” in a “marketized” approach or as a “citizen” with rights in a “human-rights” approach.
Thus, institutions
advocating quality improvements from a
rights-oriented viewpoint emphasize the individual-level service standards (see Theis,
2003) as much as traditional corporatist institutions. (For a discussion of the changes in
perspective and ideology involved in the
“Charterist” or MSP approach in the UK,
which applies fairly generally, see Falconer,
no date, or Wallis and Dollery, 2002.)
As noted above, when indicators focus on direct service provision, it may optimal to have
rather more indicators than when indicators are
used for upward accountability or horizontal
but political accountability. The reason for this
is because each individual client is likely to
want to hold service providers accountable according to the indicator that interests him or
her and because indicators bearing on direct
service delivery are likely to be more immediate to the actual process and characteristics of
service delivery and to the everyday tasks of
the service delivery agents. Furthermore, individual clients are less likely than system
managers to act as interest groups engaged in
rent-seeking; their actions are more likely to
be consistent with actual welfare. Thus, if indicators are oriented towards making service
providers accountable to clients, then there is
likely to be little loss of focus from having a
few more indicators.
If not at the level of direct service provision,
indicators should at least refer as much as possible to outputs of the system rather than inputs. In cases like governance, where process
is in effect the output, it is vital to have process indicators, such as ensuring that governance bodies (such as School Committees) are
working to norm, e.g., have the right number
of parents as opposed to teachers, and have
followed proper nomination procedures to
elect the members.
One suggestion would be for Indonesia to consider replacing many of its current aggregate,
top-down indicators, with citizen-level and
unit-level indicators that will enable both horizontal and reverse accountability. (Reverse accountability means, for example, Dinas
Pendidikan being accountable to schools for
book delivery, not just schools being accountable to the Dinas Pendidikan for the quality of
their education services.) Furthermore, the
At present, the draft Indonesian SPMs are designed to make schools and districts accountable to the central education ministry rather
than to clients or citizens. They are very often
input-oriented and tend to cover such aggre-
58
Chapter 1
teach and which are not weighted in
any way.
overall number of indicators should be reduced and those that remain should mostly be
indicators of output rather than inputs.
x Many districts in Indonesia are quite
small. Measurement of such key variables as dropping out or moving up to
a higher education level will therefore
generally be extremely unreliable. In
small and generally under-supplied
districts, transition rates will probably
appear to be very low. In large, wellsupplied districts that are situated next
to smaller and less well-supplied ones,
the transition rate to higher levels of
education (junior or senior secondary)
appear to be higher than 100 percent
because children are migrating, either
on a day-to-day basis, or sent to live
with relatives, to take advantage of
educational opportunities. This will
make indicators such as dropping out
and transition rates extremely difficult
to measure—in fact impossible, in
practice.
Technical Quality
To be useful, it is self-evident that SPMs have
to be measurable. Yet, according to the current draft of the education minimum standards,
a minority (but a fairly large minority) of the
Indonesian indicators are not measurable or
are specified too poorly to be measurable. For
example:
x There are indicators that specify that
systems will exist to allow teachers
access to certain levels of training, and
the indicator is set at, say, 50 percent,
without specifying whether this means
that the systems should be 50 percent
operational, whether 50 percent of districts should have operational systems,
or whether the systems should reach
50 percent of the teachers.
x Similarly, there are indicators for such
vague things as the percentage of
youths taking part in training that improves their character and attitude,
without specifying how one might
measure whether a program helps improve attitude or character, or whether
in fact the students’ character and attitude have in fact been improved. The
issue of self-selection (youths of fairly
good character are more likely to join
such programs) needs to be taken into
account. In principle, one could certify certain courses as being “character-improving” and then count those,
but this would require the onerous task
of certifying just about every course of
any kind available to students and still
avoids the fundamental measurement
issue.
It does not do any good to wish these matters
away: they are fundamental measurement
problems, and attempting to measure the unmeasurable creates, rather than reduces, social
and bureaucratic tension, and makes citizens
lose respect for the state. In short, there are
quite a few indicators in the draft document
that have simply not been well designed.
In the case of some of the indicators, even
though measurement is possible in theory, in
practice it will turn out to be very difficult because there are no actual delivery units on
whom it makes administrative sense to gather
the data. One example would be the proposal
to track the number of youths participating in
an economically meaningful activity. (See below on the importance of data being a byproduct of administrative practice.) It would
be possible in principle to use random sample
surveys to measure this indicator, but note that
random sample surveys are no good for tracking the data needed for accountability except
at the very highest and most aggregated level.
This is a much more serious problem than the
problem of the theoretical inadequacy of the
indicator.
x On a more important point that refers
to basic educational delivery, there is
an attempt to measure “teachers’
readiness to teach,” and a standard is
set at 90 percent. But the indicator refers to a number of extremely complex
variables for which there is little empirical evidence about their effectiveness in measuring actual readiness to
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invest. Finally, in situations where horizontal
accountability mechanisms (accountability of
local government to DPRD or citizens, for example) are still weak, it is justified for higherlevel government to set levels of key indicators, not just the indicator framework as such.
Level at which Indicators are Set, Level
to be Reached
In a competitive market or in a democracy,
government (in the case of markets) or higherlevel governments (in the case of governance)
need not in principle set the levels of any performance standards. The role of the government, for example, should be limited to
establishing the whole system of weights and
measures as a standard and ensuring that all
merchants sell in kilograms rather than some
in kilograms and others in pounds and others
in bushels (thus creating transparency for consumers). However, the government should not
tell merchants how much to sell or at what
price. Similarly, in a competitive political environment where local bureaucrats and politicians have to compete for votes and taxes,
higher levels of government should ensure that
lower levels of government can be judged
against a common set of standards but need
not necessarily set a level for those standards.
In either case, competition and emulation will
set the optimum level at which transactions
take place, in other words, the level that consumers want and at which producers can afford to produce. This will vary from place to
place and from person to person because everyone and every local government has different needs and different capacities. Setting a
fixed level is by definition sub-optimal, unless
every citizen has exactly identical preferences
and every firm and local government has exactly identical technology, natural resources,
and capital, which is never the case.
But the cases where specific levels are stated,
in Indonesia, are excessive, as they go beyond
the above-stated justifications. Even if, as
appears to be the case, the policy is that the indicators can be reached at different speeds by
different governments, having the same terminal point still does not make sense, in many of
the indicators. For example, it is not clear why
every local government should value sports
the same (and it is difficult to argue that sports
represent a serious externality) or why the
fight against HIV/AIDS or drug abuse should
be fought at exactly the same level of intensity
in every district, when it is well-known that
both HIV/AIDS and drug abuse tend to happen
in geographical clusters. Yet the SPMs are extremely detailed regarding sports indicators
(for example, something to the effect that 15
percent of athletes in every location should be
winning or should be competing at the highest
organized level!), yet totally silent on many
other areas of education for life, such as art or
music.
Perhaps some local governments
would rather have less sports education and,
say, more gamelan education. Yet music or
arts education is not at all covered. This is not
to say that arts and music education should be
covered; it is to say that the current coverage
of areas such as sport is extremely excessive.
And, this is only one example—there are quite
a few other such cases. One could argue that
this imbalance already represents a “capture”
of local government by special interests,
though in this case with the connivance of central government. It is clear that this is not
likely to be the intent, but it is nonetheless the
practical effect—hardly an optimal role for
central government to be playing.
In situations of monopoly, however, the government does set the actual level of expected
service provision, as is the case in the development of service standards for either public
or private public utilities that are “natural”
monopolies. These standards are, or should
be, contained in the licensing of new utilities,
such as cell phone or cable television licenses.
Similarly, in situations where local governments affect each other in non-measurable
ways (“externalities,” as in the case where citizens with secondary education are likely to
migrate from the areas where they were educated, thus benefiting the receiving areas with
services they did not pay for) it makes sense
for government to mandate certain levels of
provision that assure the national interest—
otherwise the local area has a disincentive to
The level (and the numbers) at which the indicators are set might also “set up” local government for failure, which would be an excuse
for the central level to “re-centralize.” Few
central organizations give up the privileges of
centralization willingly, so it is logical that
they would try to reassert control, and one way
to do so is to set the goals very high so that local governments fail. Even if the motivation
60
Chapter 1
ministratively within the delivery units themselves, and, furthermore, the administrative
recording should be such that it directly helps
the unit itself do a better job of delivering its
services.
were not so undesirable, a moment’s reflection
will suggest that the national government appears to want to hold local governments accountable with a degree of specificity and at a
level that it did not hold itself effectively accountable to citizens during the period of centralization. The fact that the standards
suddenly appear higher when it is someone
else (local governments) that is being held accountable should be cause of some concern regarding the sincerity of motivation in the
SPMs, and is likely to be noted by local authorities as a questionable intention on the part
of central government.
One solution that has been proposed to the
problem of under-reporting by schools is that
schools be supplied with the data that are
compiled by the central Education Management Information System (EMIS), so that they
see what is done with the data. But this is not
likely to be very motivating, except initially,
as a novelty. Another idea that is similarly
unlikely to be effective is the idea that schools
supply the EMIS with data and that the EMIS
somehow makes the information available
back to the school for management purposes
as a way of creating an incentive for them to
continue collecting and reporting data. This is
also likely an unworkable proposition, as any
data useful for management will be out-of-date
by the time it makes the round trip from the
school to the EMIS and back to the school. In
the end, the most effective means of ensuring
adequate reporting from schools and districts
is a combination of a) data reporting as a byproduct of routine administrative recording by
the delivery units and b) sheer bureaucratic
pressure from the center within a strengthened
administrative system. On the first score, the
idea is to make sure schools are directly accountable for certain services and feel pressure
to be so accountable, to make sure that they
understand what data helps them discharge
that accountability well, and to make sure that
the system for reporting data towards higher
levels of government mostly use the same data
as are needed at the local level, and which are
therefore reported as a by-product of good
administrative practice at the school level.
Finally, it should be noted that, with only one
exception to our knowledge (Lewis, 2003), no
one is estimating the costs of the levels at
which the indicators are being set. It is not
just a matter of financial cost—that is the easy
part. In many cases, the financial cost is lower
than the opportunity cost of scarce management talent, because the rationing of labor and
the allocation of labor to tasks, and in particular scarce high-level management talent, in the
public service is not very efficient and the human resource implications of meeting the levels of the various indicators are not being
calculated either. This suggests that much
more emphasis should be put on using the indicators as a framework of accountability in
which the level is not determined by fiat but is
determined through emulation and competition, for example through the issuance by central government of comparative score-cards on
service performance of local governments.
Level at which Measured
Indicators and minimum standards should
lower the transaction costs involved in agents’
holding each other accountable, but they
should do so without imposing complex bureaucratic requirements and measurement cost.
One way to do so is to make sure that the indicators are measured as much as possible as the
by-product of administrative systems that assist the actual delivery units (such as schools)
in the delivery process. Clearly, indicators
that are aimed at ensuring the quality of direct
service delivery to the client will accomplish
this more or less automatically (which is another advantage of such indicators), but that is
only one way. In general, the indicators
should be measurable as much as possible ad-
In Indonesia’s draft education SPMs, some of
the indicators are indeed a byproduct of good
administrative practice. The gross and net enrollment indicators, for example, are the result
of data that good schools should keep and use
in management in any case, such as records of
student numbers by grade and age (as well as
by gender). However, a few are difficult to
track because there are no units that currently
provide the services being tracked and in
whose interest it is to track the variable in
question. For example, there is an indicator
that refers to activities aimed at increasing
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Volume 2
livery units already exist that have an
interest in measuring these indicators
for their own administrative purposes
(if they are well-managed).
x set more indicators as direct service
delivery indicators, both for service
delivery to parents and students and
service delivery from unit to unit, and
set much fewer indicators of upward
bureaucratic or political accountability.
x limit the use of indicators that are not
measurable as an essential element of
the administrative capacity of service
delivery units.
awareness of the value of education. That is a
fine sentiment and lofty goal, but the indicator
is set at 80 percent, without specifying what
this means. It is not clear what the numerator
and denominator should be, nor in whose interest it is to track this, nor what classifies as
such an activity.
Conclusion
In summary, the education SPM exercise may
be a good beginning. However, before these
indicators can be activated, very serious work
should be done to:
x radically shorten the list of indicators.
x reduce the number of the input indicators in particular.
x not set actual levels for many indicators and instead use score-cards and
other means of stimulating informed
competition so as to allow “natural”
levels to be found.
x keep levels as quantitative goals in a
few key output indicators.
x think through the technical problems
and costs of gathering the indicators,
including their definition, ways to
measure them, and whether local de-
If this is not done, the indicators are likely to
add more to transaction costs than they will
save in transaction costs, and on top of that,
they are likely to increase measurement and
bureaucratic costs. In that case, the natural reaction of local government and delivery units
will likely be to ignore the indicators, even if
they initially agreed to collect them. This will
tend to make enforcement costs very high, and
cause the effort to wither.
References For Appendix 1.6
mum Service Standards: A Proposal for Conceptual Development and Implementation,”
Jakarta: Word processed.
Baker, B. and S. Trémolet. 2000. “Regulation
of Quality of Infrastructure Services in Developing Countries.” NERA. Paper given at the
conference on Infrastructure for Development:
Private Solutions for the Poor, London, UK,
31 May – 2 June. Word processed.
Falconer, P. No date. “Public Administration
and the New Public Management: Lessons
from the UK Experience.” Department of Law
and Public Administration, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, Scotland, UK:
Word processed.
Departemen Pendidikan Nasional/Unit Fasilitasi Desentralisasi Pendidikan. 2003. “Kewenangan Wajib Dan Standar Pelayanan Minimal
Bidang Pendidikan, Pemuda dan Olahraga.”
Jakarta: Word processed.
Ferrazzi, G. 2002. “Obligatory Functions and
Minimum Service Standards: A Preliminary
Review of the Indonesian Approach,” GTZSfDM, Jakarta: Word processed.
Dollery, B. and J. Wallis. 2001. “A Taxonomic Analysis of Government Failure in Local Government.” School of Economics,
University of New England, Armidale, Australia. Working Paper Series in Economics No.
2001-7. Word processed.
GTZ-Support for Decentralization Measures,
USAID-Perform, USAID-MSH, ADB-Basic
Education, The World Bank-WBDTFID.
2003. “Draft Laporan Sintesa – Kegiatan
Model Building Kewenangan Wajib Dan
Donor SPM Working Group. 2002. “Local
Government Obligatory Functions and Mini-
62
Chapter 1
Theis, J. 2003. “Rights-based Monitoring and
Evaluation.” Save the Children: Word processed.
Standar Pelayanan” Minimal, Jakarta: Word
processed.
Lewis, B. 2003. “Minimum Local Public
Service Delivery Standards in Indonesia:
Fiscal Implications and Affordability Concerns.” Draft version. Research Triangle Institute International, Research Triangle Park,
North Carolina, USA: Word processed.
Wallis, J. and B. Dollery. 2002. “Styles of
Policy Leadership and Local Government Reform.” University of Otago Economics Discussion Papers No. 0206. Dunedin, New
Zealand.
Smoke, P. 2002. “Expenditure Assignment
under Indonesia’s Emerging Decentralization:
A Review of Progress and Issues for the Future.” Prepared for conference on “Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?”
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia,
USA. May 1-3. Word processed.
63
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64
Chapter 2: Financing Education under Decentralization
classrooms, then education outcomes will deteriorate under the new regime. Finally, the
chapter offers policy options for improving allocation mechanisms at all levels of government, for aligning resources and financial
management with the goals of the Indonesian
education sector, and for ensuring that schools
receive adequate resources.
Indonesia’s decentralization laws have not
only profoundly changed the distribution of
authority and responsibilities among different
levels of governments but also how fiscal resources are generated and who controls them.
The old transfer system, which was characterized chiefly by earmarked grants from the central government budget to provincial and
district governments, has been replaced by one
that consists largely of general grants from the
central government budget to local governments with expanded revenue sharing. Unlike
earmarked grants that have to be spent for
specified purposes, how the general grants are
used is left up to the discretion of the recipient
government. Also, the laws now allow regional—that is, provincial and district—
governments to retain an increasing share of
the revenues generated from local economic
activity and natural resources. By the time decentralization has been fully implemented, total regional government expenditures are
expected to account for about 10 percent of
GDP or more than 40 percent of total government spending (Hofman, Kaiser, and Goga
2003).
New Fiscal Structures under
Decentralization
Prior to decentralization, the national government transferred public funds to the regional
governments through the Autonomous Government Subsidy (Subsidi Daerah Otonom or
SDO) and through Presidential Instruction
grants (Instruksi Presiden or INPRES). For
more than 30 years before 2001, the SDO was
the basic grant mechanism for recurrent expenditures, while general- and special-purpose
INPRES transfers were the vehicle for development grants. The SDO financed almost the
whole bill for the salaries and allowances of
civil servants in regional governments, including the pay of primary school teachers. It also
covered routine expenditures such as those to
fund the operation and maintenance of school
buildings and administrative expenditures.
Meanwhile, INPRES grants, which began as a
simple block grant mechanism in the late
1960s, evolved into a diverse array of grants
with at least 15 different specific-purpose
transfers, including those for primary schools,
primary health care, roads, and agricultural extension among others (Silver, Azis, and
Schroeder, 2001 and Lewis, 2002). A lot of
the progress made in human development in
the regions has been attributed to the INPRES
grants,16 but this mechanism is said to have
been characterized also by excessive central
control, a lack of transparency in its allocation
procedures, and a lack of regional autonomy.
This fiscal and financial restructuring is likely
to affect how much public money will be spent
on education and also how efficiently those resources will be spent, although many of the
specifics of these fiscal structures have yet to
be defined or clarified. This chapter discusses
the implications of these new financial arrangements and identifies important issues that
should be addressed by policymakers. The
chapter begins by briefly contrasting the old
and new fiscal structures and the old and new
relationships between the central government
and the regional governments, and then goes
on to discuss the likely consequences of these
changes for the financing of education. Because financing education involves not only
increasing the amount of resources available
but also improving how those resources are
spent, the discussion covers both efficiency
and equity concerns. One important issue is
what happens within districts and within
schools. If regional governments fail to allocate adequate resources to schools or if those
resources somehow do not reach schools and
16
Duflo (2001) estimates that the INPRES program
raised the probability that a child would complete
primary school by 12 percent, and thus increased
the average years of schooling by 0.25 to 0.40 year
for the cohort of children during the period 197478.
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Volume 2
Figure 2.1 Post-Decentralization Financial Structure
DAU/Shared Revenues
Central
Government
DAK
Ministry of
Religious
Affairs
Ministry of
National
Education
General Flows
APBD
Earmarked Flows
Provincial
government
APBN
ABPD
APBN
District
Government
Dinas
Education
Spending
Dinas
Education
Spending
Public Schools
Religious Schools
Source: Hoffman, Kaiser and Goga, 2003.
DAU Allocations
Under decentralization, resource transfer arrangements have changed. The new transfer
system is a combination of two grant channels—the General Purpose Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) and the Specific Purpose
Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK)—and
shared revenues from natural resources (Sumber Daya Alam or SDA) (Figure 2.1).17 Provinces receive 10 percent of the total amount of
DAU transfers, while district governments receive 90 percent (Hofman, Kaiser, and Goga,
2002). In addition to these grant mechanisms,
the central government is able to expand the
resources available in the regions directly by
channeling funds from its own national budget
(anggaran pendapatan dan belanja nasional
or APBN) to public schools (through the
MoNE) and to madrasahs (through the
MoRA). The regional governments’ routine or
recurrent budgets (Daftar Isian Kegiatan or
DIK) pay for civil service expenditures, recurrent materials and the cost of goods, and subsidies (such as for fuel and electricity) in
schools, while their development budgets
(Daftar Isian Projek or DIP) are spent on capital projects such as school construction.
In FY2002, DAU grants from the central government accounted, on average, for more than
70 percent of the revenues of provincial and
district governments. In principle, these grants
are allocated according to a formula that takes
into account differences in local needs and in
local means. In practice, however, the formula-based part of the grant is only a fraction
of it. The formula continues to evolve, but in
2002 the total allocation to each provincial or
district government comprised three parts,
namely, a lump sum amount, a fiscal gap
amount, and a balancing factor amount (Silver,
Azis, and Schroeder, 2001; Lewis, 2002; and
Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez, 2002).
In 2002, the lump sum component for any particular district was 10 percent of the total DAU
amount divided by the total number of districts. The fiscal gap component was allocated
to each district based on the size of the district’s fiscal gap relative to the country’s total
fiscal gap, with the fiscal gap being defined as
the difference between estimated expenditure
needs and fiscal capacity. This component
was designed to take the expenditure needs of
each district into account when determining
the level of its transfer. This formula for the
fiscal gap component, which was based on actual expenditure amounts in the previous year
as given by the total regional government
budget (anggaran pendapatan dan belanja
17
By law, the annual DAU allocation is a minimum
of 25 percent of the central government’s total domestic revenues minus any revenues shared with
regional governments.
66
Chapter 2
Financing Education under Decentralization
daerah or APBD) and an allocation factor, has
been criticized for being mechanistic rather
than based on the real expenditure needs of regional governments.18
civil service wage bill. The fiscal gap accounted for 50 percent rather than the 40 percent that was the case with the allocation to
districts.
The third component, the balancing factor or
“hold harmless” factor, was meant to ensure
that no district would receive less than it had
received the previous year. In FY2001, this
amounted to 50 percent of the total DAU allocation, and the amount going to each district
was a function of the district’s share of the total civil service wage bill for the country. It
was supposed to cover the costs incurred by
districts in taking on the additional
responsibility for paying civil servants as a
result of decentralization. In FY2002, this
component funded 77 percent of each district’s
wage bill on average.
DAK Allocation
The DAK is a special-purpose transfer that is
supposed to finance capital expenditures that
cannot be predicted or accommodated using
the common allocation formula as well as
those that are national commitments or priorities. By law, this grant cannot be used for administrative costs or for the training and travel
of staff and other such costs. It has two components: one is based on national reforestation
measures, which stipulate that 40 percent of
state reforestation levies on forestry companies
should be returned to the district of origin for
exclusive use in reforestation activities; and a
second is the “real” special-purpose grant for
financing national priority infrastructure investments that are outside the scope of DAU
funding. The latter, designed as a matching
grant, requires that a region’s contribution to a
project be at least 10 percent of total project
expenditures and is designed to provide districts with incentives to build infrastructure
that meets national standards. In the past two
years, the DAK allocation has remained minimal compared with the DAU allocation.
However, the central government has reiterated its intention to use targeted DAK grants
to districts as a mechanism for ensuring equality among them and transparency in their operations (DSEF, 2002). This grant mechanism
continued to evolve in 2003.
The provincial DAU allocations were derived
using a formula similar to the one used for the
districts, except that the lump sum and balancing factor components were based on 20 and
30 percent respectively of the total provincial
DAU budget (Lewis, 2002). In FY2002, each
province received a lump sum allocation of Rp
46.8 billion and funding for 31 percent of their
18
Since about 70 percent of regional expenditures are financed through intergovernmental transfers, it makes
sense to examine the formula according to which these
transfers are allocated. The allocation criterion is an expenditure needs index for each district that is based on
four characteristics of the district – population, area,
poverty, and a cost index (Lewis, 2002). The 2002 formula for expenditure needs was: EN = APBD [0.4
RPop + 0.1 RArea + 0.1 RPovGap + 0.4 Rcost ], where
Rpop, Rarea, RpovGap, and Rcost represent the ratios of
a district’s population, land area, poverty gap, and cost
index to the total values for the country. These factors
were specified in Law 25/99; in 2001, they were given
equal weight. Local fiscal capacity is defined as the sum
of potential own-source revenues and shared revenues
from property taxes, personal income taxes, and natural
resource taxes. Of the four factors in the formula, population size and poverty together measure the potential
demands on the public education system. This formulabased allocation is similar to those used in several other
countries (Bird and Smart, 2002). For example, Japan,
Brazil, Nigeria, and Austria use similar systems in which
local governments receive a fixed share of national taxes,
and the resulting total is then distributed according to a
formula that takes into account such factors as population
and community size. In the Philippines, most funds
transferred to local governments come from a predetermined share of national taxes and are allocated according to population, area, and an equalizing factor.
Raising Own Revenues
In Indonesia, Law 34/2000 has given taxing
authority to district governments. Districts,
but not provinces, are now allowed to generate
their own taxes through local by-laws under
the condition that the taxes should be authorized by the national government and that they
should be consistent with the principles mentioned in Law 34/2000.19 Since being given
19
This is not a new phenomenon, however. Law
18/1997, the previous law on local taxes and levies,
was intended to stop the practice that then prevailed in local government of creating a plethora of
local government taxes. Many of these taxes had
little revenue potential but imposed high costs on
67
Volume 2
this authority, district governments have been
creating new taxes aggressively (Lewis,
2002).20 The reality, however, is that district
governments have limited capacity to raise
taxes from their own resources such as land,
buildings, and natural resources, which constitute only about 5 percent of their revenues.
Provincial governments have a larger ownresource base but must share this with district
governments. Moreover, there are large inequalities in the revenue bases of the different
provinces and of the different districts. For example, the per capita non-oil and gas GDP of
the richest province, Jakarta, is almost nine
times larger than that of the poorest province,
East Nusa Tenggara (Akita and Alisjahbana,
2002). The DAU allocation formula includes
a poverty measure and thus provides a means
of targeting those districts that are most in
need and for equalizing the potential resources
that are available to districts.
increasingly exercise their right to borrow, it
will soon be necessary to improve the framework of grants and on-lending mechanisms for
the regions.
In the future, provincial and district governments will be increasingly expected to mobilize their own resources in addition to their
transfers from central government in order to
finance their expanded responsibilities.21 This
may make public spending more efficient.
When people have to spend some of their own
money on providing services, they are more
likely to want to see the whole allocation spent
wisely and frugally. Also, local governments
may be able to spend money more effectively
than the national government because they
have more access to critical information about
local needs, inputs, and providers and because
they can (and are more motivated to) closely
monitor service provision.
A final point on local financial resources is
that district governments are allowed to borrow, although their borrowing is limited by a
formula that restricts the extent to which they
can go into debt, that requires approval by the
MOF in the case of foreign loans, and that
cannot be guaranteed by the central government. Law 25/1999 also restricts these governments to borrowing only for projects that
will generate a financial return, but this clause
has been loosened up by the implementing
regulations, which explain that this financial
return can either be direct or indirect. At the
national level, about half of the development
budget continues to be financed by donor project loans, and the national government currently bears the debt servicing burden on these
expenditures (Hofman, Kadjatmiko, and Kaiser, 2002). However, as district governments
Several questions arise with respect to the impact of the new fiscal structures on education.
Will the district governments’ expanded responsibility for education increase or decrease
the amount of resources available for education? Will the current transfer formula make
regions more or less equal in terms of their
ability to meet national standards of provision?
Are district governments allocating sufficient
resources to schools? The next section takes a
macro view of these questions.
Public Spending for Education at the
National and Local Levels
One commonly used method for assessing the
level of government spending is to compare
numbers across different countries. Based on
1998-2000 data from several countries, Indonesia ranked second lowest among its Asian
neighbors in terms of its share of education
expenditures in GDP (Table 2.1) with only
the taxpayer and the economy. Law 18 restricted
regional taxes to a specified list and made any additional taxes conditional upon the approval of the
Ministry of Home Affairs with advice from the
Ministry of Finance.
20
Property taxes are administered and collected
mainly by the national government, although regional governments assist with tax collection in rural and urban sectors. Until recently, the national
government retained 10 percent of total tax revenues for its own use, 9 percent was provided to local tax offices to assist with collection, 16 percent
to provincial governments, and 65 percent to local
governments. (Lewis, 2002).
21
With the transfer of authority and management to
regional governments in Indonesia, “it is hoped that
the local governments are capable of obtaining
more funds in their regions and in managing them
more efficiently and effectively. It is expected that
the local governments are able to use or exploit the
sources of funds in the regions, such as the private
sector and other education stakeholders, in funding
education” (National Committee for Education,
Sub-Committee III, 2001).
68
Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Public expenditures for education: How does Indonesia compare with other Asian countries?
Percent of education
Per student primary exexpenditures in total
Education expenditures penditures as a percent
public spending [c]
of GDP per capita [b]
as percent of GDP [a]
China
2.2
6.58
13.0
Indonesia
2.8
4.21
9.6
Vietnam
2.8
7.26
7.4
India
4.1
12.72
13.7
Singapore
3.1
7.00
23.4
Philippines
3.5
12.69
20.6
Japan
3.5
21.41
10.5
South Korea
4.1
12.30
17.5
Thailand
5.4
17.21
20.1
Malaysia
6.2
12.88
25.2
Notes: [a] From EdStats (http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats), World Bank; data from 2000 or latest two years, except for China, 1998, Vietnam, 1997 and Singapore, 1995; data are originally from UNESCO; [b] From EdStats and World
Development Indicators, World Bank; data pertain mostly to 2000, except for China, 1998 and Vietnam, 1996, Singapore and
Korea, 1997, or latest two years; [c] From EdStats; and UNESCO, 2000.
Estimates of the level of transfers that were
made to district governments in 2002 suggest
that, on average, districts have more resources
at their disposal than in the past, and the recent
trend in education spending suggests that districts are spending more of those resources on
education. Important questions are whether
these higher educational budgets are sustainable in the future and also whether they are
adequate for meeting the current responsibilities of districts for delivering services.
China ranking lower; however, Indonesia was
well behind China in regard to per student
primary expenditures as a percentage of GDP
and education expenditure as a percent of total
public spending. Indonesia’s education spending was 2.8 percent of GDP, as compared with
4.7 percent for Thailand and 4.6 percent for
Malaysia. As a share of total government
spending, Indonesia’s education spending was
slightly higher than Vietnam’s 7.4 percent but
was far lower than Thailand’s 20 percent.
Perhaps because Indonesia maintained its focus on getting more children in primary
schools and perhaps because the cost of inputs
was relatively low, it was able to raise enrollment rates with relatively meager resources.
The block grant system, which gives district
decisionmakers latitude to pursue their local
goals with funds that are not restricted to one
particular use, offers no guarantees. Local
decisionmakers may choose to spend most of
their transfers and own revenues on those
budget items that are likely to have a quicker
and more stimulating effect on the local economy than on education. Indeed, this desire of
local politicians to obtain quick returns for
public spending, coupled with the inability of
districts, being limited labor markets, to capture fully the human capital benefits of educating their children, may make investing in
educational development unappealing to them.
On the other hand, local leaders may be driven
to invest in education by the desire of local
voters for more and better schools or by the
fact that schools provide local employment or
that schools can be a source of prestige for the
community and its leaders. In a decentralized
setting, the outcome of these factors is uncertain, since the allocation is the result of a mixture of allocation formulae and procedures
In FY2001, total government (actual) expenditure for education was Rp 41 trillion, of which
about one-half was part of the APBD allocation. In FY2002, the APBD expenditures increased to Rp 25.5 trillion. In FY2003, total
government expenditure was expected to reach
Rp 370 trillion, of which nearly Rp 77 trillion
will make up the DAU transfer to regions and
less than Rp 3 trillion will make up the DAK
transfer. The total government budget represents a 13-percent increase over actual expenditures in FY2002, and total transfers to
regions have increased by 14 percent. If education expenditures increased by as much, then
districts’ spending for education have reached
about Rp 50 trillion in FY2003, with about Rp
30 trillion coming from the APBD.
69
Volume 2
as a way of anticipating issues that may arise
also in Indonesia. In Brazil, the “municipalization” of education resulted in a net loss of
$2.7 billion in total public education spending.
Between 1988 and 1991, spending on education at the federal level dropped by about onehalf, state-level spending remained approximately the same, and spending in municipalities rose by one-third but not by enough to
compensate for the decline in federal spending
(Workman, 1997 cited in Behrman, Deolalikar, and Soon, 2002). In contrast, in Argentina, total spending on education increased
with decentralization, but in Mexico, it did
not. Given the educational challenges facing
Indonesia, a reduction in education spending
in the next few years, especially in the wake of
the financial crisis, would certainly set the
country back with respect to educational development.
and, in very large part, on the willingness of
the regions to invest in education.
Recent legislation attempts to secure a greater
slice of the country’s revenue pie for education. Education Law 20/2003 stipulates that a
minimum of 20 percent of the central APBN
budget, exclusive of salary costs, and 20 percent of the districts’ APBD budgets, also exclusive of salaries, must be allocated to
education. Including salaries, districts now
spend on average about 40 percent of their
APBD budgets on education. Excluding salaries, they spend less than 10 percent (assuming
that salaries are a modest 80 percent of education spending out of APBD resources) or less
than one-half of what is stipulated in the Education Law. To double the share of education
spending in APBD net salaries, districts will
need to make significant reductions in the
shares of other sectors, which may or may not
be politically possible.
So besides the earmarking stipulated by Education Law 20/2003, what policies would encourage the regions to keep up education
spending? Given that DAU allocations are the
dominant means of transferring resources, the
key challenge is to encourage provinces and
districts to spend these block grants in a particular way (in other words, on education)
without relying on earmarking restrictions that
can undermine the autonomy of provincial and
district governments. Chapter 1 of this volume
discussed the intention of the central government to enter into agreements with provincial
and district governments on their obligatory
functions and on minimum service standards
as a way of influencing the expenditure
choices of local leaders. There have been significant developments and some pilot projects
related to these agreements in the past year;
within the MoNE, the unit charged with this
responsibility is Unit Fasilitasi. But these
compacts are not enforceable unless the central
government has enough information to monitor the financial choices that provincial and
district governments make, and such an information system has not yet been built.
Earmarking 20 percent of the APBN when the
MoNE is supposed to have devolved most of
its functions to local governments may be
well-intentioned but has disadvantages. It puts
pressure on the MoNE to develop its own
spending programs in the regions, which
would mean that most of the capital investments in education would be outside the control of district governments. The experience
of other countries shows that this kind of earmarking often leads to more spending but not
necessarily better outcomes because these centrally-initiated interventions guarantee the
provision of funds regardless of regional performance and creates multiple opportunities
for corruption. A big challenge is to ensure
that earmarked national and local education
budgets are indeed spent on schools and students, that they cover the basic operating expenses of schools besides the costs of teaching
and non-teaching staff (such as instructional
supplies, the routine activities of the school
committee, the maintenance of a school database, the dissemination of information to parents and the community, utilities, and light
repair of the school buildings and other maintenance) and their career development activities.
Another option for ensuring that regional governments spend enough on education is for the
central government to make transfers conditional on the money being spent on basic education services. The DAK allocation, which
requires matching funds, has a lot of potential
for stimulating essential education investments
It is useful to review some evidence from
other countries about what happens to the level
of funding for education after decentralization
70
Chapter 2
if the central government uses it to leverage
capital expenditures that will yield high benefits for education.
Figure 2.2 Education Expenditures, 2001
LG Capital
Expenditures
(APBD)
6%
In sum, legislation has expanded the revenueraising ability of district governments, and
regulations are allowing them to determine
their own financial management, accounting,
and procurement systems within broad guidelines. That district-level spending now dominates the country’s education expenditures is
seen in Figure 2.2. These are reforms that are
fully consistent with the goal of devolving decisionmaking authority and accountability to
regional governments. However, the effects of
this new authority are undermined by the fact
that the funding system remains too diverse
and fragmented, with separate agencies administering the relevant budgets at the national
level. During field visits made for this report,
regional education officials in Yogyakarta and
Central Java expressed some degree of frustration at not having a clear sense of the total
level of resources that are actually available
for education or of the total amount actually
being spent per pupil. Without information
and without transparency, it is very difficult to
plan ahead, to develop coherent and effective
educational programs, and to monitor and assess the flow of funds through the system.22
LG Recurrent
Expendit ures
(APBD)
60%
Central
Recurrent
Expenditures
(APBN)
12%
Central Capit
Expendit ure
(APBN) 18%
Province
Recurrent
Expendit ures
(APBD) 1%
Province Capital
Expenditures
(APBD)
3%
Source: Ministry of Finance, SIKD data.
estimate, fees contribute as much as one-third
of total primary school revenues that are not
allocated to salaries (McMahon and Suwaryani, 2002).23
Education expenditures in households that
have children of school age, on average, accounted for 3.4 percent of these households’
total expenditures and 8.5 percent of their nonfood expenditures in 2002 (Table 2.2).24 On
average, these households spent Rp 341,654
that year. However, there was a wide difference in such expenditures between poor and
non-poor households. Households in the
poorest quintile (with young children) spent
1.8 percent of their total expenditures (or 6.4
percent of their non-food expenditures) on
education, while those in the richest quintile
spent 4.6 percent (or 9.0 of their non-food expenditures) on average.
Private Spending for Education
Remains Low
Households, communities, and private organizations spend out of their own pockets to finance education in Indonesia in addition to the
resources spent by governments. Schools receive revenues in the form of BP3 contributions and other donations from parents, private
foundations, and NGOs. Students pay a variety of school fees, including monthly tuition
fees, entrance fees for new students, term and
final test fees, and extra-curriculum fees.
These fees together constitute a substantial
contribution to the income of any school, primarily to its non-salary expenditures, which
usually account for about one-fifth to onetenth of a school’s budget. According to one
To what extent should school finance depend
on students and the local community for support? There are opposing views on this. On
the one hand, there is some evidence that those
23
A similar situation prevailed a decade ago when public
schools obtained 92 percent of their total (salary and nonsalary) funding from government allocations. However,
there was considerable diversity among regions. In Jakarta, public schools depended on government resources
for only 70 percent of their total budget, while in other
parts of the country, public schools depended on the government for more than 90 percent of their budgets (King,
1997).
24
Moreover, this pattern is similar to the situation that
prevailed in 2000 when education accounted for 1.9 percent of households’ total expenditures and 7.1 percent of
their non-food expenditures (SUSENAS data).
22
This is not a new phenomenon. It was noted in World
Bank, 1998 (Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to Recovery) that essential information on the budget is “scattered among five different ministries,” making the
management of the education system a very difficult
task.
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Volume 2
Table 2.2 Household expenditures on education, by income quintile, 2002
Income quintile
All
Mean annual
expenditures
(Rp)
Coefficient of
variation
% share in total
household consumption
% share in household nonfood consumption
341 654
1.90
3.4 (1.2)
8.5 (2.5)
Poorest
75 656
4.43
1.8 (2.1)
6.4 (5.8)
2
126 713
1.67
2.1 (2.8)
7.3 (7.5)
3
195 455
1.48
2.5 (3.2)
8.0 (8.4)
4
325 833
1.38
3.0 (3.8)
8.7 (8.9)
Richest
1021 451
1.30
4.6 (5.2)
9.0 (10.1)
Notes: Data from the 2002 SUSENAS; standard deviations in parentheses.
of education can deter poor households from
sending their children to school. During the
recent financial crisis, school revenues decreased in real terms by as much as one-third
because of the drop in the real values of fees
and government subsidies as well as an increase in the non-payment of fees (Jones and
Hagul, 2001). In the various sites that were
visited for this study, it seemed common for
schools to exempt those who could not afford
the fees, even in cases where the fees were
quite low.
schools that rely more on parental or other local sources of finance are more likely to operate efficiently (Bray, 1997; Jimenez and
Paqueo, 1996; and James, King, and Suryadi,
1996). People who pay at least small amounts
of their money directly for services come to
value those services more highly than when
the services are given away free.
On the other hand, schools produce benefits to
society that are wider than the private benefits
that accrue to the local community, so there
are good reasons for society as a whole to subsidize at least some of the costs of local
schools. In addition, direct and indirect costs
Box 2.1 Unequal Education Spending among Districts
How can an effective and equitable financing system be created within the prevailing legal and regulatory framework in Indonesia? A component of the technical assistance project Capacity Building for Decentralized Social
Services Delivery (DSSD) of the Asian Development Bank has been studying alternatives for improving the allocation of resources to schools in three pilot districts. In these districts, the project has established a School Operation Fund (Biaya Operasion Sekola or BOS) to consolidate all resources available for financing school operations
from the district APBD and from central programs (DSSD, 2002). This is a mechanism for addressing a key
shortcoming of the current grants system—extremely fragmented sources of funds. The project stressed the importance of elaborating a formula to allocate the total BOS funding to schools and to use APBD funds to “balance” all
other funds. The rationale behind this approach is that, when schools are funded from national-level programs,
there is more likely to be a mismatch between the needs of individual schools and the “one-size-fit-all” approach
of the central programs and a lack of coordination that may result in some schools repeatedly receiving resources
while others are excluded from all schemes.
The three pilot districts for the project – Magelang, Purworejo, and Lampung Barat – are very diverse with respect
to financing, as shown by their per capita education budget using their APBD allocations. Purworejo, which allocates 52 percent of its APBD grant to education, has a per capita education budget that is less than one-half of Magelang’s which devotes 37 percent of its APBD grant to education. Lampung Barat, which allocates 41 percent to
education, has an even lower budget. And since regions do not control civil service pay, it is important to look at
the proportion of their education allocation devoted to development and non-salary routine expenditures over
which they do have discretion. The disparities among the three districts are even more pronounced in this respect:
Purworejo’s discretionary education budget is one-third that of Lampung Barat and only one-fifth that of Magelang’s. In all three districts, however, an overwhelming share of the education grant (79 percent to 94 percent) is
spent on salaries. Lastly, another critical statistic is the fraction of the non-salary education expenditures that
reaches schools directly. As a share of the total education allocation from APBD, this is miniscule, less than 5 percent in Magelang, 6 percent in Lampung Barat, and less than 2 percent in Purworejo.
72
Chapter 2
Figure 2.3 Enrollment Rates of Children Ages 1315, By Province
Equitable Financing in an Unequal
World
The trend towards local resource mobilization,
as discussed above, risks widening the disparities between those districts that have a strong
revenue base and those that are less prosperous. (An example of such wide disparities is
given in Box 2.1.) Consider an extreme hypothetical case in which district governments
must depend entirely on their own revenues
and do not receive any intergovernmental
transfers. In such a system, there would be no
mechanism for the national government to narrow disparities among districts. Even if districts themselves were to adopt equalizing
policies within their areas, this would eliminate only within-district disparities and not between-district disparities. Currently in
Indonesia, districts receive twice as many resources from intergovernmental transfers as
from their own revenues, so if transfers are
used judiciously, they can be a powerful
mechanism for reducing regional inequalities.25
Yogyakarta
Jakarta
North Sumatera
East Kalimantan
West Sumatera
Riau
Bali
Lampung
Central Java
Jambi
East Java
Bengkulu
Central Kalimantan
SE Sulawesi
West Java
West Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
South Sumatera
N.T. Barat
South Kalimantan
N.T. Timur
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
60
70
80
90
100
Source: Susenas 1998 and 2002
Notes: Figure reflects provincial divisions in 1998; the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku and North Maluku have
been excluded because their sample sizes in 2002 were very
much smaller and limited than in 1998.
Table 2.3 Source of inequality in enrollment rates:
Between and within provinces
Source
Enrollment rates vary widely across Indonesia’s provinces, with as much as a 25- percentage point difference between Yogyakarta and
South Sulawesi (Figure 2.3). Yet an even larger variation exists among districts throughout
the country. Looking back over data covering
the past six years, the source of inequality has
shifted towards within-province rather than between-province variation (Table 2.3). Indeed,
especially at the basic education levels, there
was a notable jump in within-province inequality after 1999. In the case of junior secondary education where the coefficient of
variation of enrollment rates ranged from 22 to
28 percent, the variation was increasingly due
also to differences within provinces. This pat-
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Primary
Junior sec- Senior secondary
ondary
Between
46.0
34.9
27.4
Within
54.0
65.1
72.6
Between
43.0
31.6
25.6
Within
57.0
68.4
74.4
Between
38.5
33.5
28.6
Within
61.5
66.5
71.4
Between
31.8
30.6
25.4
Within
68.2
69.4
74.6
27.3
Between
27.1
27.3
Within
72.9
72.7
72.7
Between
30.5
29.2
27.5
Within
69.5
70.8
72.5
Source: Various years of SUSENAS.
tern of educational inequality suggests that, if
the current formula for allocating transfers to
districts were able to redress the inequalities
among districts, then it would have a major
impact on equalizing educational development
across the country.
25
There are dangers to watch out for, however. Taken to
an extreme, a system with intergovernmental transfers (a
centralized system being one) creates its own problems
in that, if richer regions are taxed high enough and a
large proportion of those tax revenues are transferred to
poorer regions, it could induce both the rich and the poor
to migrate to the more lightly taxed, more highly subsidized jurisdictions, thus causing overcrowding in those
areas” (Prud’homme, 1995). The conclusion from most
analytical and empirical research is that “any reduction in
the importance of national budgets relative to those at the
subnational level … increases interjurisdictional disparities by reducing the impact of national policies designed
to correct regional inequities” (Prud’homme, 1995).
How then are education resources distributed
across districts? To illustrate the need for
policymakers to devote more attention to equity concerns, Figure 2.4 presents two concentration curves for the distribution of APBD
and APBN expenditures for education among
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Volume 2
Figure 2.4 Inequality in the distribution of 2001 education expenditures
from APBD and APBN allocations
Expenditure Concentration Curves
Districts Sorted by Mean Income
100%
Cum % Budget
80%
Education
Development from
APBD by Kabupaten,
2001
60%
Education
Development from
APBN, 2001
40%
20%
0%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Cumulative Percent of Population
100%
Education
Development from
APBN, 2001 without
Jakarta
Expenditure Concentration Curves
Districts Sorted by 2001 Junior Secondary Enrollment
100%
Education
Development from
APBD by Kabupaten,
2001
Cum % Budget
80%
60%
Education
Development from
APBN, 2001
including Jakarta
40%
20%
Education
Development from
APBN, 2001
0%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Cumulative % population
Note: Note that perfect equality would be represented as a 45 degree line.
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Chapter 2
Table 2.4 Determinants of Education Expenditures using APBD: Results from Regression Analysis
Variables
Total per student
expenditures [a]
Per student routine
expenditures
Per student development expenditures
% share of education expenditures in total DAU
allocation
Fiscal capacity (Rp tril)
0.798
(1.84)
0.334
(0.77)
0.554
(7.33)
364.19
(1.83)
Population (mil)
-0.566
(-4.22)
-0.429
(-3.22)
-0.143
(-6.77)
60.04
(0.98)
Land area (sq km)
-4.169
(-0.88)
-7.817
(-1.66)
3.582
( 4.25)
-2189.21
(-1.03)
Poverty [b]
407.43
(1.36)
378.72
(1.27)
22.76
(0.46)
-1498.56
(-0.01)
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. [a] Education data used pertain to APBD routine and development expenditures,
2002. A fixed-effects model was estimated to take into account unobserved sources variation within each province. [b]
Poverty as measured by the size of the population with incomes below a poverty threshold. Regressions using GDP per
capita, 1999, as an indicator of poverty yield similar results.
Source: Population data for 2000 from BPS website.
districts in 2001.26 These curves were obtained
by ranking districts from lowest to highest according to their mean income levels and according to their junior secondary education
enrollment rates and then plotting their APBD
and APBN education shares against their share
of the country’s population. The diagonal line
is the line of equality—a line showing that any
given proportion of the population receives
exactly that share of education resources.
this equalization scheme, regardless of which
measure of expenditure needs is used, the
variation in potential revenues was lower after
total DAU allocations were incorporated
(Lewis 2001). Those district governments
with more land and more poverty tend to receive higher per capita DAU transfers,
whereas those with larger populations tend to
receive smaller per capita transfers, perhaps
because large economies of scale are likely.
There is no such formula telling districts how
much of their revenues should be allocated to
education, only the aforementioned earmarking established by legislation. But do district
governments nevertheless use similar factors
as the central authority to determine their
budget allocation for education?
The estimated concentration curves indicate
that the district and central education expenditures, exclusive of spending in Jakarta, are unequally allocated with respect to income
levels, but that APBN expenditures, exclusive
of Jakarta spending, are more equally distributed than APBD expenditures. With respect
to enrollment rates, both types of expenditures
are fairly equally distributed among districts,
with a slight concentration in districts in the
middle of the enrollment distribution. When
APBN expenditures in Jakarta are taken into
account, expenditures are overwhelmingly
concentrated in Jakarta, as shown by the
curves that are farthest from the diagonal line.
For this report, we estimated a statistical relationship to examine the factors that affect district-level education spending. Using different
measures of education spending (from the
2002 APBD allocation) as the dependent variable in a multivariate regression analysis and
factors similar to those used in the DAU formula, we obtain the following results (Table
2.4): (i) Districts with a larger population tend
to have smaller per capita allocations for education, which suggests also economies of scale
in the provision of services; this result is statistically significant. (ii) Districts with greater
fiscal capacity tend to make larger per-student
capital investments in education. (iii) Districts
with more (or less) poverty, as measured by
the proportion of the population below a certain poverty threshold, do not have larger (or
smaller) per-student education allocations than
other districts. This result suggests that, although poorer districts may receive a higher
DAU allocation by virtue of the DAU transfer
As already mentioned, the DAU transfer formula takes into account the fiscal capacities
and needs of district governments. Because of
26
Concentration curves plot the proportion of total expenditures that is received by a given proportion of the
population. The 45-degree line is the line of equality, indicating, for example, that 10 percent of total expenditure
is received by 10 percent of the population, that 20 percent of total expenditure is received by 20 percent of the
population, and so on. The farther away a concentration
curve is from the 45-degree line, the more unequal is the
distribution of expenditure.
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What can the central government do to engender local capacity? It can: (i) Disclose the
amount of funds and other assistance that regional governments can expect to receive well
before the beginning of each school year to
give them a chance to finalize their spending
plans and to mobilize additional resources, as
needed. (ii) Give local governments more of
their resources through block transfers, rather
than through centrally-initiated and centrallymanaged projects. Indeed, the greater the
share of resources that are coursed through this
channel rather than through specific programs,
the stronger the support for developing local
capacity for governance and management.
There is some concern that local governments
and schools, lacking experience and skills in
managing considerable discretionary funds,
will use those funds inappropriately.
formula, the same districts do not necessarily
spend a larger proportion of it on education. In
a decentralized setting, central mandates become less and less effective, and so the central
government must turn to powerful incentives
to compel local governments to behave in a
desired manner. Brazil provides a good example of this (Box 2.2).
In sum, the inequalities among districts predate decentralization, but decentralization
could exacerbate them. Transferring fiscal responsibilities to local areas and a growing reliance on local resources and expertise is likely
to widen educational gaps between those areas
that have a strong revenue base and those that
are less prosperous, while weakening the central government’s ability to close education
gaps between the richest and poorest areas.
Extreme regional differences signal the need to
establish an effective equalization mechanism.
It is feared that corruption and fraud in the absence of effective controls and audits will
waste valuable resources and thus erode past
educational gains.27 These problems are exacerbated by the fact that district governments
and schools receive funding from a number of
different sources, often too many for them to
keep track of, all with different management
arrangements.28 Because of the fragmented
nature of the funding allocations at the local
level in Indonesia, it is almost impossible for
the ultimate beneficiary (the school or the student) to know how much funding they are
supposed to receive and whether the funds
have been released.
Increasing Efficiency under
Decentralization
Enhance Local Capacity to Manage
Financial Resources
While resources are important to sustain the
educational progress achieved by Indonesia,
higher spending alone does not guarantee better education outcomes. A critical bottleneck
in implementing the decentralized functions of
regional governments is often a shortage of
sufficient technical and managerial expertise.
In addition, the lack of viable and coordinated
management systems that link the operations
of central agencies to local governments and
schools exacerbate the problems that arise
from weak local capacity. With the new function assignments under decentralization, all
levels of government are effectively mandated
to train (or retrain) staff in financial planning
and budgeting, personnel management, information collection and communication, among
others. Given the collective inexperience with
decentralized management, these skills are
likely to be acquired not only through formal
training but also through learning-by-doing
within an enabling environment. For instance,
local capacity for financial management is
challenged and stimulated by changing the
manner in which funds are provided to the districts.
These are legitimate concerns, but the appropriate response is not to re-centralize financial
management. Rather, they call for establishing better accountability mechanisms —
27
Focus-group meetings with teachers, principals, and
district officials undertaken as part of this report indicate
that decentralization, while mostly a positive change, has
created more opportunities for bribery and corrupt practices. Bribes in money or kind are said to be more costly,
processes often take longer than before, and the distribution of grants, scholarships, and other school funds is
particularly vulnerable to corruption.
28
This is not a new phenomenon. It was noted in World
Bank’s report “Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to
Recovery” (World Bank, 1998) that essential information
on the budget is “scattered among five different ministries,” making the management of the education system a
very difficult task.
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Chapter 2
Box 2.2 Brazil’s Experience with Municipalization
During the period of 1996-1998, the Government of Brazil carried out a comprehensive educational policy
reform. A new national educational law, enacted in 1996, laid out new roles and responsibilities for all levels
of government, and introduced a simple mechanism that links resources to student enrollment, thus creating a
powerful incentive for schools to raise enrollments. This financing mechanism, called the Fundo de
Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério (FUNDEF), revolutionized the financing mechanism for sub-national governments by addressing the divergence between resource needs and revenue availability for education. The 1988 Constitution tied 25 percent of state and
municipal government expenditures to education, but a constitutional amendment in 1996 raised this to 60
percent for basic education (grades 1-8). In addition, it created a new mechanism to distribute tax collection
among states and municipalities. Each state, then, has its own FUNDEF, which corresponds to 15 percent of
revenue collection from specific tax and transfer sources. The total revenue collected within a given state, including tax revenue from the state and its municipalities, is divided according to the total population of students enrolled in that State within the previous academic year. The amount per student is then multiplied by
the current number of students enrolled within each sub-national government and distributed accordingly.
According to this new financing mechanism, each sub-national government contributes a certain amount of
resources to FUNDEF based mainly on their tax revenue per student, but receives a different amount based
on the current number of students they have enrolled in their respective basic education systems.
State and municipal governments are obligated to contribute a certain earmarked proportion of their revenues
to the FUNDEF fund for each state; the resources are then distributed to the state and each of the municipal
governments in that state on the basis of the number of primary education students enrolled by the respective
education systems managed by the sub-national entities. As each sub-national government contributes to
FUNDEF but receives money from the fund only according to its number of enrolled students, the new legislation created an incentive for sub-national governments to enroll as many primary education students as possible.
Some municipalities have done much better than others in making use of the additional resources that they
have received. These municipalities have invested adequately in upgrading and rationalizing school infrastructure, instituted transportation services for children, improved the quality of teachers, and provided them
with greater administrative and pedagogical support. At the same time, some municipalities still lack a coherent educational policy, and learning is poor. Municipalities that have received additional resources due to
FUNDEF have maintained their own contributions to educational expenditures. The fungibility of resources
means that municipalities may reduce their own expenditures when they receive additional transferred resources. However, the opportunities for such reductions have been limited because municipalities have faced
increased expenditure requirements for pre-school education, which does not benefit from FUNDEF resources. Pre-school education suffered a temporary setback as states stopped spending on this level of education as enjoined by the constitutional amendment of 1996 that established the FUNDEF mechanism.
However, municipalities have since picked up the reduction in state enrollments, leading to increase in the
coverage of pre-school education.
Among its significant contributions, FUNDEF created new administrative and teaching incentives within the
basic education system. Most importantly, it promoted an increase in enrollment pervasive across subnational governments. “As each sub-national government contributes to FUNDEF, but obtains receipts from
the fund only to the extent that is has enrolled students, the new legislation created an incentive to subnational governments to enroll as many primary education students as possible” (World Bank, 2002). In addition to the administrative incentive to expand access, legislation also specified that states and municipalities
spend a minimum of 60 percent of their FUNDEF funds on the payment of salaries of teachers and others involved in the provision of educational services. Ultimately, this centrally-driven policy helped improve regional disparities in terms of teacher salaries and subsequently of teacher profiles.
Source: World Bank 2002. “Brazil. Municipal Education Resources, Incentives, and Results.”
Standards and information are very important
in increasing transparency and compliance
with policies, regulations, and laws and in reducing corruption at all levels of the system.
defining performance standards and measures,
developing checklists of basic standards and
competencies, auditing current capacity and
performance on the basis of those checklists.
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Having access to accurate and timely information helps district governments to plan and
manage the system, and sharing the information with local stakeholders, such as parents,
through periodic reports may press district officials to be more transparent and efficient.
The government has promulgated several key
regulations governing information flows under
decentralization. The PP11/2001 on Regional
Financial Information provides for a comprehensive information system to be developed to
link national and district decisionmakers. It
obliges sub-national governments to submit
specified information to both the MoF and the
MoHA, thus giving national agencies the necessary data to develop a nationwide performance and financial monitoring system. A
further regulation is needed to require schools
to feed data back to district governments.
With improved accountability, it is possible to
use the potential ability of district governments and schools to use public funds where
they are most needed and where they can have
the greatest educational impact.
resources that are spent on the actual operations and maintenance of schools tend to be
very limited. Often, even the tiny share left
over for development expenditures, which is
supposed to be devoted to building new classrooms, repairing school facilities, and teacher
training, is used to cover routine expenditures,
especially staff salaries.
With such a minute share of education resources going to development expenditures, is
it possible to achieve needed improvements in
the quality of education? Teachers do play the
key role in the teaching process, as is discussed in the next two chapters, but adequate
resources need to be devoted not only to salaries but also to teacher professional development and classroom supplies.
Spend Locally
The impact of the current reform will depend
ultimately on how much of the fiscal resources
allocated to education actually reach the
schools and, within the schools, how those resources are put to use. Some issues are:
Spend Productively
Improving the efficiency of the education system requires spending educational resources
where they are most productive. This is not in
any way a concern that is unique to the decentralized reform. However, with responsible
parties spending more autonomously than before, it has become more difficult to coordinate the balance in the composition of
expenditures throughout the education system.
First, the level of funds available for education
within a district needs to be predictable and
assured and should be closely linked to education plans and standards at the national level
that have been discussed and negotiated with
local stakeholders. It is also important to have
clear, well-understood rules for allocating
these funds to schools so that schools know
the level of funding to expect each year from
the government at the beginning of each
school year. (Box 2.3) Schools in Indonesia
receive funding from a number of sources, often too many for the schools to keep track of
them all. These sources include public monies
from as many as seven channels, all with different management arrangements. During focus-group meetings for this report, school
principals complained that the lack of transparency about budget allocations at the central
and district levels prevents them from predicting how much revenue they will receive except through fees collected at the school level
and makes it impossible for them to do any
Consider that in the system as a whole, threequarters of resources are spent on recurrent
items, mostly on salaries and benefits and a
small amount on operational costs and pedagogical supplies, and one-quarter is spent on
capital outlays (Figure 2.2 above). This pattern is more extreme at the district level, where
governments spend more than 90 percent of
their education budgets on routine expenditures; in 2002, 95 percent of their routine
budgets was spent on the salaries of teachers at
the primary and junior secondary levels and
other personnel (McMahon and Suwaryani,
2002 and Clark et al, 1998).29 In contrast, the
tral government will be paid out of the national budget,
the APBN. Presumably, the teachers and personnel
whose salaries were transferred to the districts as part of
the decentralization reform will continue to be paid under
the local budgets, the APBD.
29
Article 49 of the new Education Law states that the
salaries of teachers and personnel appointed by the cen-
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Chapter 2
dance later in the year. It is also essential to
track how much of each school’s allocation is
actually received by the school and how much
goes astray. If schools provide appropriate
and timely information to the various levels of
government, this will help government personnel to plan and administer schools. Schools
should also provide this information to local
stakeholders such as parents, who can then use
this information to press district officials to be
more transparent and efficient.
multi-year improvement planning. In several
countries, the amount of funds allocated to
schools is based on the number of students expected to enroll in the school by means of an
agreed-upon cost-indexed per student allocation. This per-student cost is defined on the
basis of delivery of an acceptable standard of
service, which directly links the subsidies that
the school receives to its educational quality
and performance. The alternative, allocating
equal resources to each school regardless of
the number of pupils, gives schools no incentive to achieve cost-effective pupil-teacher ratios.. A formula-based allocation is equitable
in that every student is allocated an equal
amount of cost-indexed funds, but does not
preclude MoNE or the district governments
from establishing mechanisms for mitigating
specific inequalities among communities and
schools.30 This compensatory or equalizing
role is essential since communities are not
equal in their ability to mobilize extra resources for their schools and schools are not
equal in the educational challenges that they
have to face every day. District governments
should target these additional grants to schools
that are unable to mobilize sufficient resources
to meet minimum quality standards, but the
government should do so only in conjunction
with greater supervision of those schools and
performance evaluation against agreed-upon
indicators of progress.
Third, the capacity within schools for development planning, budget preparation and execution, and accounting also determines how
well they are able to use the decentralized fiscal structure to their advantage and how efficiently they are able to spend the resources
allocated to them. The largest single subsidy
to schools is in the form of teacher and staff
salaries, which means that schools’ discretionary budgets are often quite limited.
As districts and communities mobilize greater
resources to cover non-salary expenditures that
improve schools, they will need the skills necessary for preparing and implementing school
improvement plans. Past studies have suggested that the benefits of decentralization are
more likely to emerge when school councils
are able to exercise some autonomy over administrative and financial matters related to
the school (Reithwood and Menzies, 1998,
Jimenez and Sawada, 1999 and King and
Ozler, 2000). School Committees in Indonesia
have yet to be given clear functions and have
yet to take advantage of their supposed greater
autonomy. As school “governors,” these
Committees will need to make the hard decisions about how to spend school revenues.
Second, there must be a free exchange of information between the levels of government
and schools, and the data that are exchanged
must be accurate. Obviously, accurate enrollment numbers are essential. Many students
who will drop out tend to do so soon after the
start of the school year, so school subsidies
must be based not on enrollment at the beginning of the year but on average daily atten-
30
In the U.S., under most equalization programs, poor
school districts experience increased spending, but some
poor school districts actually receive lower per-pupil
school spending under equalization programs that attempts to level spending down a lot (Hoxby 2001).
Hoxby suggests that it is possible to minimize the negative effects of school finance equalization by combining
elements of categorical aid with property taxes. This
could mean redistributing grants among school districts
on the basis of their characteristics such as mean household income, poverty rate, and/or demographic variables,
such as the proportion of children who live in singleparent families.
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Box 2.3 School Funding – A Gap in Financial Policy
The mechanisms of finance under decentralization are still faulty, confusing, or absent (see McMahon and
Boediono, 2001). One critical gap has to do with school funding. The simplest possible school funding system would disburse all of the resources to each school on a per student basis rather than just providing it with
inputs. In such a funding system, as most of the funding would be given on a block basis, the tasks of financial management would be relatively simple, and keeping track of the funding would be relatively easy.
However, such a system may not be possible for a long time in Indonesia, at least for all schools. There may
be valid reasons not to adopt such a system at this point, and there may also be other reasons that are related
to inertia and tradition. A compromise would be to introduce this system on an “asymmetrical” basis, in
other words, only in those schools that already have financial planning capacity.
In the absence of such a system, there are likely to be various different sources of funding at the school level,
many of them earmarked, and some of the funding will take the form of providing inputs rather than money.
In this situation, the main task would be to develop a set of accounting tools and tracking systems at the national level that can follow (both budgeted and actual) expenditures down to the school level and can aggregate all forms of expenditure, including inputs, for each school. Two or three months before the beginning of
any school year, each district government should inform each school of the school’s total expenditure in the
most recent year available (there should be enough time to close the books so that final expenditure figures
could be reported), its estimated expenditure in the previous year, and its allotted budget for the current year.
This report should be as detailed as possible and should include a breakdown of items into those that were
merely inputs and those that were an actual financial transfer to the school. The report should also inform the
school (and its committee) of its per student expenditure and those of similar schools so the school can compare its expenditure with that of others. If the school’s per student spending is far above that of its peers,
then the district should make it clear that this cannot continue.
The national government can contribute by crafting a set of standards for financial management and then allowing various suppliers to develop competing financial management packages for schools and districts to
purchase, as long as their software meets the functionality requirements developed by the government. Even
if only one-tenth of schools successfully computerize their financial management systems, this would still
represent an attractive market that would be difficult for software vendors to ignore. It is unlikely that government or donor-based financial software development would be as successful as independent software development, but the software would be built to specified standards. One of the standards that such packages
would have to meet is complete manual-to-machine inter-operability and compatibility. The government
could then require schools to hand over the manual to other schools, thus forcing better-off schools to subsidize the development of the simpler manual package for the poorer schools and making it easy for schools to
change from manual systems to computer systems without having to change their service provider.
generation, allocation, and use of funds. Three
key messages on financing education are:
Summary of Implications for Policy
This chapter began with the proposition that
establishing appropriate resource allocation
and accountability systems for the management of those resources in Indonesia’s education sector is key to increasing its effectiveness
and attaining the country’s educational goals.
This message would have applied even if Indonesia had not embarked on its “big bang”
decentralization, but under decentralization,
the ways and forms in which these challenges
can be met have changed. Decentralization
has shifted the relative roles of different levels
of governance, from the central government
down to the regional governments and the
School Committees. At the same time, the
success or failure of the decentralization will
rest partly on how well these governance levels use their discretion and autonomy over the
Ensure that total education expenditures are
adequate to maintain educational development and increase the efficiency of resource
use.
This task requires strong leadership from the
central government, both in crafting an effective funding mechanism that is easy to monitor
and to implement and in building political
support for that mechanism among provincial
and district leaders. Earmarking the central
and local budgets for education, as the Constitution and the Education Law have done, goes
only part of the distance to ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the schools
where they can make a difference. The real
challenge is to ensure that earmarked national
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Chapter 2
fulfill their responsibility to deliver education
of acceptable coverage or quality. This is evident in the strikingly wide range of per-capita
levels of education expenditures across districts. However, a “sunset clause” should be
included in this special DAK allocation that
would ensure that it ended once the DAU
mechanism had been improved.
and local education budgets are indeed spent
on schools and students, that they cover the
basic operating expenses of schools besides
the costs of teaching and non-teaching staff
(such instructional supplies, the routine activities of the School Committee, maintaining a
school database and disseminating information
to parents and the community, utilities, and
light repairs of the school buildings and other
maintenance), and their development activities. Together with efforts to define a minimum standard of provision, it is possible to
design a formula-based allocation that is nondiscretionary and that depends on just a few
key measurable criteria.
In addition to a national investment plan for
education, Indonesia needs a multi-year education development plan for each region (province and/or district) that would spell out the
education goals and the implied resource requirements of those goals for each region.
This is not the same as the yearly budgeting
process to arrive at an annual budget for the
sector. What is needed is a resource plan that
is more closely linked to the educational development goals of the region than is the case
with the yearly budgeting process, that is the
product of a broad consultation with school
stakeholders, that specifies clear performance
indicators, that identifies the different intended
sources of funds and required management
and technical skills, and that is widely publicized among the various stakeholder groups in
the regions. In turn, there should be a regional (provincial and/or district) multi-year
resource plan that would specify all planned
investments in the improvement of all schools
within the control of the regional government,
including investments that go beyond the construction and repair of facilities. These multiyear assistance plans to schools would not just
be expenditure plans but also financial, staffing, and management plans. To formulate the
assistance plans to schools and, consequently,
the regional resource plan, what is needed is a
funding allocation formula that is based on a
cost-indexed, per-pupil basis and consensual
quality standards and region-specific prices.
The Education For All effort is already an attempt to estimate the per student level of
spending that would be consistent with attaining universal enrollment and improving education quality in Indonesia (McMahon, 2003).
What needs to happen is to open the proposed
formula to national scrutiny and debate in order to validate it and to obtain political support
for it. What also needs to happen is to apply
the funding formula to the local processes of
allocating the DAU rather than the DAK. This
formula funding mechanism should become
the routine way to allocated education grants
in Indonesia and, in the process, it will facilitate school-based management by allowing
schools to manage assistance in cash rather
than in kind.
The funding formula mentioned above should
apply only to the per student level of routine
operational expenditures. However, a perschool rather than per-student funding formula
is more appropriate in deploying teachers and
other staff to schools. In addition, many
schools in Indonesia have urgent development
needs, including staff development and the
construction of libraries or laboratories.
Richer districts will be able to undertake these
capital investments themselves, but poorer districts will not, so a pro-poor investment program will be needed. In fact, in the short run
(that is, until the DAU mechanism is fixed),
schools are likely to need direct cash assistance, perhaps through a special DAK allocation, to cover even their basic operational
costs. This is because the current DAU allocations are not equalizing the distribution of local resources, which means that poorer
districts repeatedly find themselves unable to
It is important to have an equivalent and parallel process of planning at the level of the central government. The regional plans can be
aggregated to formulate a multi-year plan of
assistance for educational development, and
this can be achieved using the different instruments available to the national government
in the new decentralized context. Because the
sum of regional demands is likely to exceed
the resources available to the national government, districts should be categorized according to their performance on multiple
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and an adequate maintenance plan. Second,
the communities or schools that receive transfers should be selected based on both their
needs and their capacity as well as of the economic viability of the project in question.
Third, the central government should make
adequate technical assistance available to local
governments to help them to develop plans, arrange financing, and operate the local education system as efficiently as possible. Fourth,
the central government should monitor and
evaluate the implementation of the investment
plans by requiring periodic progress reports
and by making field inspections and formal
evaluations of outcomes. Finally, all regional
governments that receive a transfer should be
required to testify about the condition of the
infrastructure on which the resources are to be
spent to enable the central government to
make an adequate assessment of the future
needs of local governments.
education indicators, their resource levels
(transfers as well as own resources), and their
technical and management capacity. This categorization would make it possible for the national government to prioritize the level of
assistance that it provides to provinces or districts. In recognition of the fact that resource
levels and technical capacities vary across districts in Indonesia, adjustments would have to
be made in the allocation amounts that are currently given to the disadvantaged areas. Using
this categorization, it would be possible to determine the notional level and nature of assistance for each region. This notional level of
assistance could then be the basis for the annual transfers to the regions, particularly the
DAK allocations.
Another important aspect of using performance-based or results-based funding schemes
to ensure that resources are used more efficiently is that this holds regional governments
and schools ultimately accountable for measurable indicators of progress within their jurisdictions. For the central government, this
means imposing a hard budget constraint on
regional governments, refusing to bail out
those that miss their goals because of bad decisions or poor implementation. At the same
time, the central government should help local
governments to build their capacity for efficient planning, budgeting, and fiscal management and to train provincial and district
officials to use data to target assistance and to
measure impact. There have been several efforts in the past at improving the planning and
budgeting processes in schools and districts,
such as the DSSD program. Although these
have been fragmented efforts, and often only
pilot programs, some lessons can still be
learned from these efforts that can be used to
guide a country-wide effort to formulate education investment and assistance plans at all
levels.
Because of the fragmented nature of the funding allocations at the district level in Indonesia, there are numerous opportunities for
corruption and leakage in the current system.
Information plays a critical role in improving
the quality of decisionmaking by policymakers. Information flows are likewise important
for improving the implementation of policies
and investment programs. They help to increase transparency and compliance with policies, regulations and laws and to reduce
corruption at all levels of the system. The regional education investment plans discussed
above should be based on regular, systematic,
and purposive collection and analysis of education data. Local governments are likely to
spend transfers for capital investments more
effectively if they know in advance how much
they are going to receive so they can devise a
coherent development strategy.
Similarly, it is important for schools to know
accurately and in a timely manner the size and
nature of the resources that they will be receiving so they can plan accordingly. This is difficult under the current system in which public
resources flow through many different channels, some of which are completely unpredictable or subject to being diverted by local
politicians. A formula-based allocation that is
non-discretionary and that depends on a few
key—and simple—pieces of information helps
to make allocations more transparent. When
Increase the productivity and effectiveness of
resources spent on education at the provincial, district, and school levels.
There are lessons from the experience of countries around the world about how to increase
the effectiveness of transfers that might be
useful to Indonesia (Bird and Smart, 2002).
First, regional governments should be required
to prepare both an adequate investment plan
82
Chapter 2
First, as mentioned above, the DAU mechanism needs to be improved so that it can help
to equalize the wide disparities in educational
outcomes across regions. Second, the central
education authority should support targeted,
pro-poor education programs, perhaps through
a DAK allocation. Indonesia’s past experience
with its large scholarship and school grants
program, launched at the onset of the recent
financial crisis, can inform the design of a targeted program. To make such a program financially sustainable, what is needed is the
political will to keep it well targeted to those
who need it most. There are valuable lessons
from around the world (for example, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Mexico) on how this can be
achieved. Third, the national government can
use incentives to influence the allocation decisions of the better-off districts, for example, by
rewarding those districts that are able to make
large improvements in the education indicators
pertaining to the poorest communities or
schools within their jurisdiction and, conversely, by taxing those with worsening indicators. Indonesia is very capable of doing this
type of monitoring because of its longstanding
experience with fielding large household surveys, such as the SUSENAS.
school committees know in advance how
much of a subsidy they are due to receive from
the regional government, they can compare
that amount with what they actually receive,
which thus serves as an effective check on corruption in local public spending.
Focus education resources on those who
need them most.
In Indonesia, as in many other developing
countries, a more pressing concern than efficiency is often the inability to meet the demand for services, especially the demand from
the poor and disadvantaged. Districts that
have higher enrollment rates and better quality
are frequently those with more resources,
whereas districts that have low education indicators are typically also the districts with
fewer resources. To improve education outcomes in Indonesia, it is imperative to serve
the needs of those districts that are in greater
need and to tailor the type of assistance provided to the type of need manifested. Under
decentralization, whether or not adequate resources are allocated to pro-poor services depends on the priorities of local leaders and
communities. This is one of the dangers of
decentralization.
83
Volume 2
Duflo, Esther. 2001. “Schooling and Labor
Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual
Policy Experiment,” American Economic
Review 91(4): 795-813.
Akita, Takahiro and Armida S. Alisjahbana.
2002. “Regional Income Inequality in Indonesia and the Initial Impact of the Economic
Crisis,” Bulletin for Indonesian Economic
Studies 38(2): 201-22.
Hofman, Bert, Kai Kaiser, and Soraya Goga.
2003. Decentralizing Indonesia (A Regional
Public Expenditure Review). Washington
DC: The World Bank.
Alm, James, Robert H. Aten, and Roy Bahl.
2001. “Can Indonesia Decentralize Successfully? Plans, Problems, and Prospects,” Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies 37(1):
83-102.
Hofman, Bert, Kadjatmiko, and Kai Kaiser.
2002.
“Evaluating Indonesia’s Fiscal
Equalization.” Washington DC: The World
Bank. Processed.
Behrman, Jere R., Anil B. Deolalikar, and
Lee-Ying Soon. 2002. Promoting Effective
Schooling through Education Decentralization in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Philippines. ERD Working Paper Series No. 23,
Asian Development Bank.
Hoxby, Caroline. 2001. “All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created
Equal,” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
116(4) : 1189-1231.
Bird, Richard M. and Michael Smart. 2002.
“Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Some
Lessons from International Experience,”
World Development 30(6): 899-912.
Brodjonegero, B. and J. Martinez-Vasquez.
2002. “An Analysis of Indonesia's Transfer
System: Recent Performance and Future
Approaches.” Can Decentralization Help
Rebuild Indonesia, Stone Mountain Park,
Atlanta, Georgia, Georgia State University.
Jalal, Fasli and Bachrudin Musthafa. 2001.
Education Reform in the Context of Regional
Autonomy: The Case of Indonesia. Ministry
of National Education and National Development Planning Agency, Republic of Indonesia, and the World Bank.
James, Estelle, Elizabeth M. King, and Ace
Suryadi. 1996. “Finance, Management, and
Costs of Public and Private Schools in Indonesia,” Economics of Education Review
15(4): 387-398.
Bray, Mark. 1997. “Community Financing
of Education: Rationales, Mechanisms, and
Policy Implications in Less Developed
Countries.” In Christopher Colclough (ed.),
Marketizing Education and Health in Developing Countries: Miracle or Mirage? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jimenez, Emmanuel and Yasuyuki Sawada.
1999. "Do community-managed schools
work? An evaluation of El Salvador's
EDUCO program." World Bank Economic
Review (International) 13(3): 415-41.
Clark, D. et al. 1998. Financing of Education in Indonesia. Asian Development Bank
and the University of Hong Kong.
Jimenez, Emmanuel and Vicente Paqueo.
1996. "Do Local Contributions Affect the
Efficiency of Public Primary Schools? "
Economics of Education Review 15(4): 37786.
Decentralized Strategy for Education Finance (DSEF) Project. 2002. Education Reform in the Context of Decentralization
(Strategy and Action Plan for Decentralized
Financing of Education). January 29 Draft
Report. Processed.
Jones, G. W. and P. Hagul. 2001. “Schooling in Indonesia: Crisis-Related and LongerTerm Issues,” Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies 37(2): 207-231.
Decentralized Social Services Delivery
(DSSD). 2002. “Draft Analysis No.2 on
District Financing of Schools,” Asian Development Bank.
King, Elizabeth M. 1997. “Who Really Pays
for Education? The Roles of Government
and Families in Indonesia,” in Colclough,
Christopher, ed., Marketizing Education and
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tion Finance in Indonesia. Policy Research
Center, Institute for Research and Development, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, and
UNICEF and UNESCO.
Health in Developing Countries: Miracle or
Mirage? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
King, E. and B. Ozler. 1998. “What’s Decentralization Got to Do with Learning?
The Case of Nicaragua’s School Autonomy
Reforms.” Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Educational Research Association held in San Diego, CA
referenced in World Bank 2003.
Ministry of National Education, Government
of Indonesia. 2002. The Existence of Madrasah, Diniyah Education and Pesantren in
the National Education System. Office of
Educational Research and Development.
National Committee for Education, SubCommittee III. 2001. Decentralization of
Education. Draft Report, June 14. Processed and translated into English.
Leithwood, K. and T. Menzies. 1998.
“Forms and Effect of School-based Management: A Review.” Educational Policy
summarized in World Bank, 2003.
Lewis, Blane D. 2001. “The New Indonesian Equalization Transfer,” Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies 37(3): 325-43.
Prud'homme, Remy. 1995. "Dangers of
Decentralization." World Bank Research
Observer (International) (10): 201-20.
Lewis, Blane D. 2002. “Revenue-Sharing
and Grant-Making in Indonesia: The First
Two Years of Fiscal Decentralization,” in
Paul Smoke (ed.), Intergovernmental Transfers in Asia. Manila, Asian Development
Bank.
Silver, Christopher, Iwan J. Azis, and
Larry Schroeder. 2001. “Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralization in
Indonesia,” Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (3): 345-62.
McMahon, Walter. 2003. “Financing and
Achieving ‘Education For All’ Goals.” Final Report for the Ministry of National Education, BAPPENAS and the World Bank,
Indonesia.
The World Bank. 1998. Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to Recovery. Report No.
18651-IND. Washington, DC: The World
Bank.
The World Bank. 2002. “Brazil. Municipal
Education Resources, Incentives, and Results.” Policy Report. Washington, DC.
The World Bank.
McMahon, Walter and Nanik Suwaryani.
2002.
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Methods in Indonesia,” in Walter W.
McMahon, Nanik Suwaryani, Boediono and
Elizabeth Appiah (eds). Improving Educa-
85
Volume 2
Appendix 2.1. Cost Implications of Quality Education for All
BP3, examinations; procurement of
textbooks, notebooks, and school bags;
transport; and so on. At the primary
level, eliminating fees mean foregone
revenues of Rp 13,000 per pupil in 2004
(2003 prices), on average, increasing to
Rp 38,000 per pupil in 2008. At the junior secondary level, the amount is about
Rp 57,000 per pupil.
x In addition, a student grant of Rp
290,000 per pupil per year for 18.2 percent of all primary school students,
which is more than doubling the current
grant by the government, will cover the
opportunity costs borne by parents and
for teacher supplements and BP3. The
corresponding grant is Rp 93,000 per
pupil per year.
The Education for All (EFA) goals are to increase net enrollment rates at both primary
and junior secondary education levels,
reaching out even to the poor and disadvantaged populations, and to improve the quality of education available.
The cost
implications of these goals have been calculated by Professor McMahon (McMahon,
2003). A key concept for his costing is adequacy, or “what it takes in terms of textbooks, teaching materials, teacher abilities
and qualifications, school libraries, and so
forth to produce an educationally adequate
education for each child” (McMahon 2003).
McMahon’s estimates, developed on a perpupil basis, are based on the following assumptions, among others:
x The EFA goals are to achieve 100 percent net enrollment rate by 2008 in primary education and 95 percent in junior
secondary education by 2008, and to assure that this education is of acceptable
quality.
x A recently conducted survey of schools
provide data on what schools are actually spending. These data provide the
current or base cost of schools.
x What the “best practice” schools are currently spending is the measure of what
inputs are needed and “most cost effective” to improve learning in schools. The
“best practice” schools, those that have
experienced increases in EBTANAS test
scores, have been found to have more
books and teaching materials for every
pupil, and salary supplements for teachers are larger. For example, in expenditure terms, the average schools is
estimated to spend Rp 15,000 per pupil
on teaching aids while the “best practice
schools” spend Rp 21,745 per pupil, on
average.
x The corresponding cost estimate for junior secondary education is 1.5 times the
cost above for primary education.
x To increase the enrollment rate of the
poor and disadvantaged population requires additional resources, largely for
the purpose of eliminating fees. Currently, fees are charged for entrance,
Table 1. Cost estimates for EFA
Primary
2004/5 2008/9
Per-pupil cost (Rp thousands)
Incremental cost
of EFA
Current cost
Total
Secondary
2004/5 2008/9
179
209
509
834
966
1,145
966
1,175
1,449
1,958
1,449
2,283
Total cost (=Per-pupil cost x students enrolled)
(Rp billions)
Incremental cost
of EFA
Current cost
Total
5,061
5,702
5,331
10,245
27,255
32,316
26,397
32,099
15,476
20,807
18,049
28,418
Source: McMahon (2003)
Note: All estimates are in 2003 prices.
The estimates per pupil for 2004/5 indicate
that the incremental costs associated with
EFA would be 18 percent of the current
(2004) per-pupil cost at the district level for
primary education and 35 percent for junior
secondary education (Table 1). These represent a significant increase in per-pupil
spending. Primary and junior secondary
education costs would total Rp 53 trillion in
2004. According to SIKD estimates, education expenditures in 2002 were 2.4 percent
of Indonesia’s GDP at the local level, or totaling about Rp 43 trillion. This spending
may well have increased close to the EFA
cost estimates by 2004 if education spending
increases by the same percentage as the projected percentage increase in DAU transfers.
86
Chapter 2
Lastly, there are several ways to improve the
existing EFA cost estimates while maintaining the basic principles of McMahon’s estimation model. Examples are: Improve the
reference used for the level of spending per
pupil needed to raise quality. The assumption used was that the “best practice”
schools are not able to reduce their cost per
pupil without quality reductions (thus, that
they are at optimal efficiency). To what extent this is true would require more studies
on the gains and cost of increasing school efficiency. And improve the estimate of what
is needed to raise the enrollment of poor
youths. Impact evaluations of the national
scholarship program initiated in the late
1990s would be able to inform this.
Thus, while the EFA cost implications as estimated by McMahon (2003) will mean a
significant rise in education per-pupil spending, the implied total expenditure is not far
off from the total education expenditures already being made at the district level.
Is EFA by 2008 guaranteed then? No, by no
means is EFA guaranteed without the necessary accompanying changes in the management of schools and the education system as
a whole. Costing EFA is an important step
in understanding what is required to fulfill
this national commitment, but more resources are not enough. The changes for
better quality are discussed in Chapter 3 of
this volume.
87
Volume 2
88
Chapter 3: Education Quality Assurance and Improvement
of secondary education beginning in the
1980s (Jones, 2001). Unemployment among
high school graduates is also high and remained so even during the 1990s, a time of
unprecedented growth in the labor market.
In 1996, BAPPENAS published data collected since 1990 on unemployment rates
among general secondary school graduates.
At that time, 25.47 percent of high school
graduates were unemployed, despite a
growth of 13.4 percent in employment opportunities for people with that level of education (BAPPENAS quoted in Soedijarto,
2003). Business leaders interviewed as part
of the district consultation process for this
sector review commented that it takes high
school graduates about six months before
they are able to complete the most basic
workplace functions, such as coming to
work on time or following instructions
(SAGRIC, 2004).
The biggest challenge in the development of
national education is enhancing the quality
and relevance of education (MoNE, 2001a).
Expectations for the basic education system
are high. Parents want the system to prepare
their children for productive employment
and a moral life, while the state wants
graduates who can contribute to a growing
economy with high productivity, particularly
the types of productivity gained through participation in the knowledge economy
(MoNE, 2000). The state also wants the social benefits associated with education –
lower birth rates, better health practices, and
more active participation of citizens in a
democratic civil society (Republic of Indonesia, 2003). Achieving these goals requires
two things: that children have access to education, preferably by attending formal
schools, and that the education they receive
is of acceptable quality. Volume I reports
that the net enrollment rates for Indonesia in
2002 were 92.7 percent for primary schooling and 61.7 percent for junior secondary
schooling up from 91.5 and 51.0, respectively, in 1995. With these gains in enrollment levels, Indonesia is now at the
historical point where countries start to emphasize quality as much as continued growth
in access. In Indonesia, two forces shape the
quality agenda: the increasing demand for
quality improvement from journalists and
policymakers and the political pressure of
the decentralization agenda.
Furthermore, what quality improvements
there have been so far appear to be inequitable. In Chapter 2 on finance, we reported
that public spending on education barely
covers teachers’ salaries and the routine operating expenses of public schools. Parents
fill this financing gap through various school
fees both in public and private schools.31 As
pointed out in Chapter 2 on financing, inequalities in per-pupil spending are high, both
within districts and between districts. In
practice, this means that the schools that
serve poor children get worse and the
schools that serve higher-income children
get better (ADB, 2000).
Most official reports on educational quality
in Indonesia, such as the Education for All
Situational Analysis (Education for All,
2002a), express dissatisfaction with the current level of quality and cite as evidence the
poor showing of Indonesia in the 1999
Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study. Out of the 38 countries included in this study, Indonesia ranked 34th in
mathematics and 32nd in science. An Indonesian report in the mid-1990s stated that the
quality of the typical upper secondary
graduate declined to a level that was probably equivalent to lower secondary education
before the beginning of the rapid expansion
Approach and Rationale
The previous chapters discussed the risks
and benefits inherent in decentralization and
raised general issues about the basic education governance, management, and finance
systems that are currently being debated or
put into place in Indonesia. Implicit in those
chapters was the notion that the principles of
decentralization, if applied to the reform of
31
For affiliated private schools and madrasahs, foundations sometimes provide additional support.
89
Volume 2
make it difficult to improve quality in the
sector. Second, the lack of technical capacity at the district and school levels to implement and sustain quality assurance and
quality improvement programs, as evidenced
failures to sustain or mainstream the majority of good practices developed under projects.
education system management, governance,
and finance, will enable Indonesia to meet
its goal of providing all children with nine
years of high-quality basic education. This
favorable result is not expected to derive
automatically from decentralization. Some
research warns of a decline in general quality or an inequitable rise in quality after decentralization (Galiani and Schargrodsky,
2001), while other studies report a general
improvement in school quality (King and
Ozler, 1998).
Methodology
The methodology for this chapter consisted
of a review of documents on educational
quality such as newspapers, strategic and
annual action plans, laws, decrees, guidelines, background papers, policy documents,
conference presentations, and the text of
speeches from the Minister and Directors
General of Education to capture a sense of
the national government’s strategic intentions on the issue of quality management.
Interviews with officials in the top two echelons of the MoNE provided us with guidance
on how policymakers are conceptualizing
future quality control and quality improvement efforts. In additional interviews with
the national staff and consultants responsible
for managing the quality improvement projects funded by the central government, we
learned about the difficulties that they face
in mainstreaming lessons learned from projects.
In this chapter, we propose a break with past
approaches to quality management that relied on centrally managed projects. Instead,
we propose an approach that: (i) links quality assurance and quality improvement, (ii)
clearly allocates functions to specific levels
of government, (iii) incorporates quality improvement and assurance into the routine
operations of the central government, districts, and schools, and (iv) uses projects judiciously as part of an overall development
plan for district education. We then review
the quality assurance and quality improvement efforts that are already in place or are
proposed under the policy framework currently being prepared by the MoNE. At the
school level, this is school-based management, while at the district level, it is performance-based budgeting. Details on how
school-based management can be modified
to address the quality issue more directly
appears in Appendix 3.2. Throughout this
chapter, we include a few international comparisons to illustrate how other countries
have managed the issue of improving quality
under decentralization. The chapter concludes with a summary of recommendations
for taking a program approach to quality
management.
We conducted two kinds of activities at the
school and district levels. On field visits to
selected districts and schools, we interviewed officials and held group discussions
with school committee members and school
heads to gain insights into the challenges
that they face in trying to raise quality at the
local level under decentralization. We also
organized a series of focus groups at the
school and district levels to provide us with
insights into how schools and districts carry
out quality control and teacher management.
This process included three half-day consultations with groups of 8 to 10 bupatis from
rural and urban areas in the same province.
The rationale for this program approach is
that the quality of education in Indonesia is
not improving for two reasons. First, the
lack of political will at the central and district levels to tackle the quality problem as
evidenced by: the low level of public financing of schools and of the sector overall, the
absence of formal systems of incentives for
improving quality and of consequences for
not meeting minimum quality standards, and
an organizational structure of the MoNE and
personnel policies of local governments that
Finally, we solicited comments on an earlier
draft of this chapter from Indonesian officials at the National Evaluation Center, the
Directorate for Junior Secondary Education,
the Basic Education Planning Division of the
Directorate for Primary and Secondary Edu-
90
Chapter 3
grams is to improve school conditions and
raise school performance.
cation, and from consultants working on
project evaluation and management. These
inputs have been incorporated into the text.
Quality assurance refers to processes for
guaranteeing that schools and districts meet
particular standards. The quality assurance
activities in Indonesia have three compatible
goals: (i) equivalence – ensuring a basis for
comparing the credentials of teachers and
school graduates throughout the archipelago
through programs that include examinations
and certification; (ii) equity – meeting the
basic rights of even very poor children to receive basic educational services that meet
minimum service standards through a program that holds districts accountable to national standards for their performance; and
(iii) groundwork – ensuring that schools
have a basic minimum amount of material
and human infrastructure that is both large
and equitable enough to improve quality.
Under the new Education Law (No.
20/2003), the mechanisms for achieving
these ends consist of accrediting schools,
certifying teachers, and setting graduation
requirements for post-primary students.
Basic Terms
This chapter uses several terms that are open
to interpretation and have no universally accepted definition. These “terms of art” are
briefly described below, and more complete
explanations are given later in the chapter.
Quality is typically defined in terms of its
instrumental value in increasing students’
academic performance. In other words,
quality is usually defined as that mix of inputs, classroom practices, school environment, and school organization that adds
value to student learning. This chapter expands that definition to include an additional
intrinsic dimension to the definition of quality. We take the position that children have
a basic right to attend schools that meet the
minimum conditions of learning as stipulated in the Education Law and that any investments in improving the quality of
unsafe, unhealthy schools staffed by unqualified teachers to minimum standards are
by definition investments in educational
quality regardless of their impact on children’s academic performance. Expanding
the definition to include the health, safety,
and welfare of students aligns this definition
of quality with Indonesia’s Education Law
and its commitment to educational quality
for all (Education for All, 2002b) as both a
basic human right and an instrument for
economic and social development.
Quality Management
Quality management means linking quality
improvement and quality assurance through
a common set of standards and measures.
Under this approach, information from periodic performance evaluations guide both
quality assurance and quality improvement
activities, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 and described in Box 3.1. The new Education Law
provides part of the framework for quality
assurance by establishing a body that will set
national standards and evaluate performance. However, the law does not specify the
relationship between national standards and
quality improvement at the district or school
levels. In this section, we discuss progress
and issues in setting national standards and
measures and in establishing a nationwide
system for reporting on performance.
Quality improvement simply means upgrading inputs, learning environments, teaching
practices, school organization, and school
performance to bring them closer to the expectations of both the state and parents. In
Indonesia, recent quality improvement projects have involved training and managing
teachers, revising curricula, providing textbooks, rehabilitating classrooms, supporting
school-based management, and promoting
packaged inputs both on specific subjects
(for example, the Science Education Quality
Improvement package or SEQIP) and on
modern teaching methods (for example, the
Creating Learning Communities for Children’s “joyful learning” package or CLCC).
The purpose of quality improvement pro91
Volume 2
Figure 3.1 Diagram of Quality Management System
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
COMPONENT
Uniform Standards
Uniform Measures
Recognition for Positive
Result
Correction for Negative
Result
Positive
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Monitoring
Results
Negative
Information
Based Planning
QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT
COMPONENT
Milestones
Mobilizing Resource,
Implementing Plans
Improvement
Plan
Box 3.1 Hypothetical Use of Performance Information in a School
A hypothetical school is evaluated by an accreditation body and is performing just at the minimum
standard level. On the quality assurance side, the school receives an incentive for performing up to
minimum standards, in this case a certificate of accreditation that carries with it certain privileges.
This certificate qualifies the school to send representatives to an annual conference of accredited
schools offered by the district. On the quality improvement side, the school uses the performance
evaluation to prepare a school improvement plan and at regular interval checks to see if it is on
course to achieve these milestones. In this case, the school evaluation shows that many grade 4
students are not able to read at the 4th grade level; so the school introduces a daily program of
30minutes of sustained silent reading for students in grades 2 and 3. Teachers from grades 4 and 5
agree to monitor the progress of the children every two months. If the program works well, the
school will make 30minutes of sustained silent reading part of their daily teaching practice.
standards will be the conceptual link between
the quality assurance and quality improvement
systems, for example, by aligning school performance evaluation (quality assurance) with
school development planning (quality improvement) to the same set of national standards. Second, the national standards will
coordinate the activities of different agencies
operating at the same levels, for example, by
focusing independent accreditation bodies and
district school inspectors on the same set of issues or by focusing public and private providers of teacher training services on the same set
of competencies. Finally, as the function of
quality management has been allocated to
more than one level of government, the national standards will help to ensure that all
these different agencies carry out these quality
functions towards the same end. For example, while the central government will be responsible for setting minimum standards for
tests of basic student competencies, districts or
Need for Common Ground
A quality management approach requires a set
of standards and measures to serve as common
ground for quality assurance and improvement. The standards and measures must be
uniform across the education system, although
performance targets can vary to take into account differences in conditions between districts or schools. For example, the standards
of teacher competence must be the same in,
say, Mataram, East Java and Kupang, NTT.
Likewise, the instruments used to measure
teacher competence, such as public examinations on subject matter plus observed teaching
practice, must be the same in both places.
However, the scores that teachers must receive
to be certified or promoted can vary depending
on the needs and resources of each district.
A single, well-considered set of national standards is seminal in several ways. First, these
92
Chapter 3
Education Quality Assurance and Improvement
independent bodies will be responsible for developing tests that meet those standards.
1. The school accreditation body (BAS) is
setting minimum standards for the accreditation of schools and is defining a
process for monitoring and improving
school quality.
2. The decentralization facilitation unit
(UFD) is working under the MoHA umbrella to develop minimum performance
standards for the districts.
3. The national evaluation center is developing standards and tests of students’
mastery of basic competencies and the
general and subject knowledge of trainee
teachers.
4. The national curriculum center is defining basic competencies in all subject areas.
5. The textbook and academic publications
center is defining technical standards for
print and graphic teaching materials.
6. The teacher training department is developing teacher competency standards.
Under decentralization, the central government
is responsible both for setting national standards and measures and for evaluating the performance of the education system overall. The
MoNE is currently undertaking several parallel
standard-setting activities, and Figure 3.2 on
the following page contains a diagram of the
standard-setting activities begun in 2003. The
most important of these standard-setting exercises are the National Education Standards for
schools, Minimum Service Standards for districts, and Teacher Performance and Certification Standards. Each is being developed by a
different working group, and, as yet, there is
no standing body to coordinate their activities.
The absence of a steering body on standards
has two dangers: first, that the cumulative
number of standards may be too many to manage and, second, that the standards being developed may not be compatible and may
therefore send different messages to teachers,
schools, and districts about what they need to
achieve. The Education Law mandates the
formation of a standardization and evaluation
body that will, among other duties, specify national education standards.32 Among its other
duties, this new body will have to coordinate
the following standard-setting activities:
Until this body is established, we highly recommend forming a steering committee for
harmonizing standards.
32
Law No. 20/2003 Chapter IX, Article 35 and Chapter
XIV, Articles 57-59.
93
School
Committees
KepMen
44/U/02
Teacher Certification
School Accreditation
Body (BAS) KepMen
87/U/02
KepMen 39/O/03
Student Certification
KepMen 114/U/01
KepMen 11/U/02
94
Students and Teachers
Public and Private General Schools and Madrasah
District Education Systems
Provincial Quality Improvement Institutes
(LPMP)
KepMen 87/O/03
MSS (MoHA)
PP/25/00
PP/108/00
Technical Standards for Inputs
Including:
- Textbooks
- Local Curricula
- Infrastructure
Various KepMen
IN EFFECT
MSS (MoNE)
KepMen053/U/01
Figure 3.2 Relationships between Standard-setting Entities being Developed or in Effect
UNDER DEVELOPMENT OR REVISION BY CENTER
School Inspection
KepMen20/U/98
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Chapter 3
school performance. The national education
standards are not at present formally linked to
the district minimum service standards that are
currently in draft form. The reason for this
lack of connection is structural; the Education
Standards will be developed by an independent body and formalized as Ministerial Decree,
while the Minimum Service Standards are being developed by MoNE technical staff under
the auspices of the Ministry of Home Affairs.33
In 2001, a Ministerial Decree34 established a
set of standards for kindergartens, primary
schools, and junior secondary schools. These
standards will be retired when the independent
body formulates the new national education
standards. The current standards have not
been effective for several reasons, principally,
because there are too many categories (eight)
and indicators (30-40) and because the guidance for their implementation is burdensome.
Because the central government has not provided schools with adequate funds for training
their administrators and teachers in the use of
these standards and because the central government has no statutory authority to compel
districts to use them, the existing national education standards have not been enforced. It is
not clear whether the independent standardization body that will manage the school standard-setting process will also oversee the
district minimum service standards.
Standards
Chapter 4 of this report on teacher management discusses the standards currently being
developed for initial teacher certification and
their subsequent performance evaluations and
how these can be used in a career-long teacher
management and development program. In
this section, we discuss the National Education
Standards for schools and Minimum Service
Standards for districts.
Legal and Regulatory Basis
The 2003 Education Law devotes an entire
chapter (Chapter IX) to the issue of national
education standards. That chapter mandates
that standards be developed and codified for
educational content, process, graduation competencies, teaching force, infrastructure, management, budgeting, and evaluation. It also
calls for these national standards to be the basis for developing curricula, the teaching force,
educational infrastructure, management, and
budgeting. Among the 14 regulations currently being prepared is a draft regulation
(RPP) that addresses the articles in the Education Law on national education standards. The
draft RPP does not contain standards per se
but states that national standards should be developed, implemented, reported on, and evaluated by an independent educational
standardization and assurance body that reports to the Minister of Education and this independent body will organize standardization
and certification nationwide (RPP, 2003). In
the interests of public accountability and
transparency, the law requires that citizens be
given an opportunity to comment on these
draft regulations at public hearings. This
process of public hearings will begin in mid2004, and the independent education standardization and assurance body is not likely to
be constituted before 2005. Therefore, there is
an ample timeframe for the government to
recommend standards and standard-setting
processes for consideration.
Minimum Service Standards for Districts
Since decentralization, quality control in Indonesia has been moving towards adopting a performance-based type of management and
establishing quality control systems that are
transparent, equitable, and collaborative and
are consistent with the quality improvement
agenda.
This progress can be seen in the
work of a special Decentralization Facilitation
Unit (DFU) within the MoNE, which under
the guidance of the MoHA, has undertaken a
model-building exercise for setting district
minimum service standards. The Unit has
been conducting pilot studies in three provinces (West Java, East Java, and NTB) and
Education Standards for Schools
The independent body mentioned above will
set standards for schools and oversee school
quality assurance. Under the legal framework,
these education standards will be used as the
basis for both a school accreditation system
and as a sector evaluation system based on
33
Although there will be an umbrella Presidential Decree
authorizing Minimum Service Standards for several sectors, the standards themselves will be set by the Minister
concerned through Ministerial Decrees, in this case the
Minister of Education.
34
Ministerial Decree 53/2001.
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control quality and put district educational authorities in a difficult position.
five districts (Cianjur, Cirebon, Kota Surabaya, Kota Malang, and Lombok Timur). The
piloting began in the provincial capitals with
discussions with local government officials
about the concept, function, and types of standards. The process continued at the district
level where various interest groups came together to discuss standards for 10 obligatory
functions and 24 types of services. This
model-building exercise defined about 173
minimum service standards for education (excluding higher education), with each service
type having as many as 19 or as few as two
performance indicators (Hijmans, 2003). The
set of standards that are currently being developed include access, equity, and quality indicators such as enrollment rates, dropout and
completion rates by gender, students’ academic performance, and the percentage of the
APBD directed to the basic education sector
excluding teacher salaries. These are a mix of
input (technical) and output (performance)
standards. The minimum service standards for
districts are critiqued in Chapter 1 on governance and management in this volume.
Lead and Lag Indicators
Quality management systems are most effective if they are based on standards that include
both “lead” and “lag” indicators.” Lag indicators describe what has been accomplished so
far. At the school level, for example, the
number of qualified teachers is a lag indicator,
while the number of teachers sent for specialized training is a lead indicator. At the district
level, the participation rate is an example of a
lag indicator, while the number of “at risk”
children receiving scholarships is an example
of a lead indicator. We recommend that the
standards for schools and districts contain a
mixture of lag and lead indicators.
Measures
Setting standard measures for quality indicators is also an important element of a nationwide quality management system. For quality
management systems, the most important performance measure is student learning. There
are many approaches to measuring student
learning, some being appropriate for quality
assurance and others for quality improvement.
Each approach has specific advantages and
disadvantages for Indonesia. For quality assurance, many countries use standardized tests
at the end of an educational cycle as one of the
factors that determine whether students have
learned enough to qualify for diplomas or certificates of completion. In a large decentralized system, equivalence among various
private or public providers of examinations
can be assured by accrediting the testing institutions based on the rigor of their test development process, the reliability of the
instruments that they prepare, and the validity
of their test administration and scoring protocols. Another alternative is to use samplebased national assessments early or in the
middle of an education cycle to measure students’ performance against national standards.
Table 3.1 below shows how different types of
standard learning assessments can be used in a
quality management system.
Local Targets – National Standards
The national education standards were originally intended to be set in an open process in
which the central government and the regions
would negotiate region-specific targets on the
basis of indicators set by the central government. However, the MoNE now plans to have
national targets but flexible timelines for
achieving those education targets. Setting targets at the national level is problematic for
several reasons. First, it impinges on the prerogative of local governments to chart their
own course. Second, it makes local education
officials accountable for their performance to
two higher authorities, not only the local legislature/executive but also the central MoNE.
This is less troubling if all of these authorities
have the same performance expectations but
can be problematic if the national and local
performance expectations are very different.
Third, it is unclear what responsibilities the
central government will have towards those
districts that fail to meet minimum standards
over a period of time. If there are no incentives for compliance or consequences for noncompliance, then the standards do not help to
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Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Common Uses of National and School-based Tests in Quality Assurance
High Stakes:
x Determine future opportunities for test takers
x Tied to performance incentives/ corrections
systems for schools
x Expensive to develop
and implement
x Prone to corruption
Middle Stakes
x Tied to performance incentives/ corrections
system for schools
x No consequences for
test takers
and implement
x Somewhat prone to corruption
Low Stakes
x Information for planning purposes only
x Not tied to performance
incentives/ corrections
system for schools
test takers
x Expensive to implement
x Not prone to corruption
Sample-based
x Information for planning purposes only
x Not tied to performance
incentives/ corrections
system for schools
test takers
x Relatively inexpensive
to implement
x Not prone to corruption
High Stakes
x
Open to corruption
Norm Referenced
Nationwide or Regional
Filtering: Rank students in percentiles to determine which students may pass to favored
schools at the next level
Competency Referenced
Qualifying: Determine which
students obtain diplomas or certificates.
Formerly used in Indonesia
(EBTANAS)
Currently used in Indonesia
(UAN)
Comparative ranking of schools
or districts: Used to rank order
schools or districts to determine
which schools are eligible for
benefits, remediation or correction
Diagnostic: Used to recommend
specific quality improvement inputs for particular schools
Not used in Indonesia in education sector, (an analogy can be
drawn with the Human Resource
Index which is used to rank districts to determine welfare eligibility)
Informational ranking of schools
or districts
Not yet used in Indonesia but can
be used in conjunction with accreditation system or Provincial
Quality Improvement Institutes
(LPMP)
Informational for district or
school planning purposes only.
Not used in Indonesia in education sector, (an analogy can be
drawn with rankings on Human
Resource Index
International tests, such as
TIMSS, used to rank countries
for informational purposes
Assessment of overall system effectiveness for policy and program planning
Used in Indonesia
Not yet used in Indonesia
School-based
Competitive ranking of pupils for
purposes of screening admissions
or awarding prizes or benefits.
Entrance exams are used in Indonesia to screen applicants.
Qualifying: Determine which
students obtain diplomas or certificates.
Used in Indonesia (UAS)
Informational ranking of students Information on individual student
Low Stakes
performance
x Not expensive to develop or implement
Not used in Indonesia
Used in some classrooms
x Very demanding of
teachers
Note: EBTANAS = Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional, UAN = Ujian Akhir Nasional, and UAS =
Ujian Akhir Sekolah.
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Box 3.2 Information from a National Evaluation System Changed the Focus of Debate in Brazil
Brazil is a large, decentralized country like Indonesia. Its decentralized structures and systems are heterogeneous to
the point where there are almost as many different education systems as there are states and cities. In such a system,
information is especially critical.
The evaluation system introduced in the 1990s has three components: a school census, a national assessment, and
public examinations at the end of the basic education cycle. Brazil has built up a very useful professional expertise
on the application of sample-based standardized student assessment tests that bring educational quality into the forefront of policy formulation and implementation. The active dissemination of test results, together with results about
resources and school operating standards, are fuelling competition among municipalities to improve their schools.
This practice puts a high value on the importance of establishing feedback mechanisms for ensuring that information
is shared across and within sub-national entities and community organizations.
Information derived from the evaluation tools focused the educational debate in Brazil on equity in the distribution of
public resources and conditions of instruction, the quality of instruction at various levels and in the various school
systems, teacher training, school autonomy, and management models. More specifically, after the census revealed
financing inequities among districts, the government redistributed about $10 billion among all public schools in different localities, which benefited 30 million students throughout the country. As a result of the national assessment,
policymakers introduced accelerated learning programs for students who were at least two grade levels behind their
age group and a training and certification program for teachers. Also, introducing a requirement that students had to
pass public examinations to graduate from secondary school created a standardized credential that is useful to both
higher education institutes and employers.
Source: World Bank, 2002.
targets. Brazil has a large, decentralized education system in which performance information is used to inform policymakers’ decisions.
A brief description of how pupil assessment is
managed in Brazil is provided in Box 3.2.
Although information from standard tests can
be used to devise and implement improvements within schools, most systems rely on
school-based tests or continuous classroom assessment to monitor and upgrade the progress
of individual pupils. These methods require a
great deal of time and attention from teachers.
Recommendations
We make the following recommendations in
the area of quality management.
Information
We discuss the need for a robust information
system in Chapter 1 on governance and management. At its most basic, the information
system must collect information relative to the
national standards using the standard metrics.
One critical function of the information system
is to provide reports to all levels schools,
districts, provinces, and the central government. For quality management purposes, information on performance is most useful if it
includes three types of information each
school or district’s performance relative to national standards, their own past performance,
and the performance of other districts or
schools. In this way a district or school can
monitor changes in its performance over time.
Although the results of performance assessments can be reported as a single number by
using a formulated index, if the results are disaggregated by topic, this can help districts and
schools to meet specific quality improvement
x Under a decentralized program approach to quality management, a
permanent capacity for reviewing
standards and measures is required.
The national Education Law (No,
20/2003) requires the establishment
of an independent body reporting to
the Minister of Education that is responsible for standardization and
evaluation. Until such a body is established, we recommend that the
MoNE appoint a standardization
steering committee to oversee the
several parallel standard-setting processes that are already underway.
x In the interest of imposing discipline
and rigor on the standard-setting
process, we recommend that staff
who are qualified, experienced, and
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Chapter 3
pendent institution. Further, it specifies that the community and/or
professional organizations can form
independent bodies to undertake those
evaluations of learning outcomes.
x The article on accreditation (Chapter
XIV, Article 60) stipulates that the
government and/or independent bodies
will accredit programs and schools in
the interests of public accountability.
Furthermore, the law states that accreditation will be based on “open criteria” that are not further explained.
x The article on certification (Chapter
XIV, Article 61) states that certification will be in the form of “diplomas”
(ijazah) and certificates of competency. Diplomas will be awarded to
students in acknowledgement of their
learning achievement and/or their
completion of a level of study after
passing an examination organized by
an accredited school. Schools and
training institutes will give competency certificates to learners and
community members in recognition of
x their competency to undertake specific
work after passing competency tests
organized by an accredited school or
certified institution.
empowered to make difficult decisions actively participate in or steer
the standard-setting body. In Indonesia, policies are not set by law or
even by decree, which are often
vague and contradictory. Rather, the
policies are embodied within operational guidelines written by midranking professionals or even independent bodies. In a sense, the difficult job of policymaking has been
delegated to a level of staff who are
not sufficiently qualified, experienced, or empowered to set policies.
x We recommend an international peer
review through a seminar and followup workshops before the national
education standards and minimum
service standards are finalized. Hosting international seminars has raised
awareness within the MoNE that
standard-setting activities are instrumental to assuring and improving
educational quality. The MoNE has
recently completed drafts for both
kinds of minimum service standards
but would benefit from additional input before codifying those drafts into
regulation.
Quality Assurance
In theory, these stipulations will be clarified
through government regulations (RPPs), Ministerial Decrees, and procedural manuals.
The Education Law mandates the preparation
of 14 Government Regulations (RPPs), and the
drafting of one additional law on the legal
status of schools (BHP). As we discussed in
the section on standards above, a draft RPP is
currently being prepared that addresses both
Chapter IX on National Education Standards
and Chapter XIV on evaluation, accreditation,
and certification summarized above.
This section describes the status of quality assurance in the education sector using examples
from current practices. The link between the
quality assurance organizations is not clear,
and there is potential for them to produce conflicting messages and for there to be duplication in their efforts.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
The New Education Law (No. 20/2003) devotes an entire chapter to the issues of evaluation, accreditation, and certification (Chapter
XIV, Articles 57-59).
Current Practices
Currently, there are several quality assurance
mechanisms practiced in Indonesia. These can
be organized into two groups: mechanisms
that apply to individuals (students and teachers) and mechanisms that apply to institutions
(schools and local government). The mechanisms are falling short of expectations due to
issues such as tension between the center and
districts regarding roles and responsibilities for
x The law calls for the evaluation of
learners, institutions, and programs.
Although the law is vague and somewhat contradictory, it seems to stipulate two kinds of learner evaluation:
continuous assessment by teachers and
the periodic evaluation of learners,
schools, and programs by an inde99
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and replaced at the junior and senior secondary
levels only with the Ujian Akhir Nasional
(UAN) and the Ujian Akhir Sekolah (UAS).
The UAN covers three core subjects (Bahasa
Indonesia, Mathematics, and English) and
draws the multiple-choice items from the same
item bank for schools nationwide. The items
on the UAN still mostly require only factual
recall and rarely measure competencies, especially in subjects like Indonesian in which language competency is the core of the
curriculum. The UAS is the test for all national subjects other than Bahasa Indonesia,
Mathematics, and English as well as local content chosen by the districts and can include essays, portfolios, laboratory work, and other
assessment methods. However, at this stage,
the UAS also mainly relies on multiple-choice
questions. Tests can be, and often are, set by
individual schools or, in some cases, as the result of agreements among groups of teachers at
the district (junior and senior secondary) or
sub-district (primary) level.
quality assurance and technical matters like the
lack of capacity to implement policies pertaining to school and district educational quality
assurance.
Students and Teachers
At the present time, quality assurance programs for students and teachers are examination-based, routine, and structured as part of
the normal course of doing business. There
are clear incentives for students and teachers
to comply with standards, as there are clear
consequences for failing (for example, senior
secondary students who do not pass the final
national examination are not allowed to graduate and candidate teachers who fail knowledge
tests are not certified). The standard examinations for measuring student achievement and
the competency of candidate teachers, though
far from ideal, are reasonable. Technical experts at the MoNE acknowledge that students’
final examinations are not yet adequately standardized, although much progress has been
made in this direction.
The parliament decided to permit the 2004
public examinations to go ahead but stated its
intention to discontinue allocating public funds
for that specific purpose in the future. As a
newly elected parliament will be responsible
for appropriations in 2005, it remains to be
seen whether the 2004 public examinations
are, indeed, the final finals.
Student Diplomas. In Indonesia, academic
quality is monitored through students’ end-oflevel examinations. School certificates are
granted or withheld on the basis of the students’ examination scores. These certificates
grant, but do not guarantee them access to the
next level of study. In the 1980s, the Evaluasi
Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional (EBTANAS)
was introduced as a national test. Originally
intended as a tool to assess and control the
quality of the education system, the tests
quickly became high-stakes public examinations that determined which students would be
able to continue their education and the kind
of school to which they could hope to gain
admission.35 Due to widespread criticism of
expense, corruption and lack of usability of the
public examination system, the EBTANAS
was abolished by ministerial decree in 2002
Teacher Certification. Teachers are the single
most important determinant of students’
performance and school quality, and teacher
issues are discussed in depth in the next
chapter. Therefore, the management of the
supply of this most critical “input” must be the
first step in ensuring that the teaching
workforce meets the country’s minimum
standards of quality through the process of
certification. There are currently four types of
teachers in Indonesia (see Box 3.3), two of
which are certified. Teacher certification is
managed by an appointments procedure,
which takes into account their performance on
standardized tests.
35
Although the EBTANAS was a nationwide public examination, it did not meet the standard for a standardized test. Provinces were sent alternative questions and
could choose easier or harder questions to suit the ability
of students in their region. The formula to work out the
final score also varied by region to make sure that any
differences in final scores between regions were not too
great, although in practice the differences in scores between provinces were considerable.
For the last six years, graduates of accredited
institutions of higher education who wish to
become junior or senior secondary teachers or
contract teachers must take a public
examination, which tests their general
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Chapter 3
Box 3.3 Quality Assurance of the Teaching Force
x
x
x
x
Public teachers are civil servants and have minimum teaching qualification (for a new SD teacher, D2,
two year degree and post SMU, for new SMP/SMU teachers, this is S1, a four year university degree).
Contract teachers are fixed term contract teachers, normally engaged as part of education projects but
with the same qualifications as public teachers.
Permanent teachers are engaged by foundations to teach in private schools. Those in better schools
have to have all of the required minimum qualifications described above, but in poorer schools, many
have less qualifications.
Temporary teachers are employed in all kinds of schools (private and public) to fill shortages and are
normally paid by the scholl committee or a foundation. These teachers vary widely in their
qualifications, some have only the minimum qualification and many in poorer schools lack even the
minimum. Their wages are often very low, sometimes less that Rp. 100,000 per month.
knowledge,36 subject mastery, and scholastic
aptitude. As of this year, 2004, primary
teachers will also take the examinations. Due
to the large numbers of candidates taking the
tests each year (in 2003, 500,000 candidates
took the examination as part of the application
process for advertised junior secondary
education positions), a test of teaching
competencies has not been included. The
results of six years of testing will provide a
rich resource for future research into the
specific strengths and weaknesses of the
current teaching workforce.
school accreditation body (BAS), listed the
key aspects of accreditation, and stated that the
new ranking will be used to provide guidance
on quality improvement to schools. The
accreditation procedure itself involves seven
steps. The first step involves each school
doing a self-assessment of whether it meets the
national requirements. If the school feels that
it is in compliance with the standards, then it
requests an audit from the local accreditation
body.38 If the school passes the audit, then it
receives accreditation for a four-year period.
It has not yet been decided what will happen to
those schools that do not meet the minimum
accreditation requirements over an extended
period of time. It is anticipated that many
schools, particularly the numerous small
private madrasahs that provide educational
services to many poor children especially in
remote areas, will fall far short of the
minimum accreditation standards.
Schools and Local Government
School Accreditation. In the future, schoollevel quality will be maintained and improved
through an accreditation system established
under the new Education Law.
This
accreditation system will apply to all schools,
whether public, private, general, or madrasah.
Accredited schools will be ranked into three
categories, and the lowest category will
include schools that meet the absolute
minimum standards. Thus far, the ranking of
schools under the new system is not much
different from the existing system for ranking
schools. A Ministerial Decree (KepMen
087/U/2002)37 has established an independent
The accreditation system is an interesting approach to quality assurance but tough policy
issues remain unresolved. To ensure that difficult policy decisions are aligned with national priorities, policymakers rather than the
independent accreditation body need to make
some difficult decisions about which incentives and sanctions to put in place for those
schools that do and do not meet the minimum
accreditation standards. As the policy reads
now, the purposes of accreditation are twofold:
(i) to ensure that even disadvantaged children
attend schools that meet the minimum condi-
36
General knowledge tests include Bahasa Indonesia,
civics, public policy, English, and mathematics.
37
Article 60 of the Education Law stipulates that the accreditation of schools will be the responsibility of the
government and/or an independent body. The KepMen
087/U/2002, which predated the law established an independent accreditation body (BAS), lists nine school
components to be evaluated during accreditation including: the curriculum and the teaching/learning process;
school
administration
and
management;
school/institutional organization, equipment and infra-
structure; staffing; budgeting; teachers and students;
community participation; and the school environment
and culture.
38
Primary and junior secondary schools will apply to the
district body for accreditation, while senior secondary
schools will apply to the province.
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tions of learning and (ii) to provide continuing
guidance to schools to help them to improve
their quality. Assigning two technically demanding functions to bodies that have not yet
been established needs further consideration.
The guidance concept is appealing, but unless
it is accompanied by a serious commitment of
financial and technical resources, this guidance
will have little effect. The responsibility for
schools has clearly been assigned to the districts, but no legislation or regulation defines
how districts can be persuaded to spend scarce
resources on programs to ensure that schools
meet national minimum accreditation standards. Furthermore, there is no explanation of
where the local accreditation bodies will find
the human and financial resources required to
conduct audits of every school and madrasah
every four years and to provide them with continuing guidance.
Institutional Framework
There are several bodies that will be responsible for implementing the new quality assurance mechanisms.
National Agencies
The task of coordinating the quality assurance
system is, under the Education Law, assigned
to a quality assurance and standardization
body, to be known as the National Standardization Body. As mentioned previously, the
government regulations associated with that
article of the law are currently being prepared,
and the particular institutional framework for
managing quality assurance has not yet been
formalized.
There is no provision for a national center to
set nationwide public examinations as a means
for quality assurance under the Education
Law. This has opened debate about the future
existence of the National Evaluation and Testing Center, which until now has been responsible for setting, overseeing, and managing the
marking of the current high-stakes public examinations at the end of the basic and secondary cycles.
Districts
At present there is confusion about what
mechanisms apply for ensuring the quality of
education services managed by districts. As
mentioned above, minimum service standards
for education are being prepared, along with
standards for other decentralized sectors.
Eventually, these service standards will become part of the government’s performancebased budget procedures described in Law
17/2003. This law requires district and national budgets to be prepared based on activities that are justified against performance
standards. It is not yet clear how central financing for districts will be tied to their actions or their performance against standards.
Nor is it clear if districts will need to justify
funding items in terms of their actions or past
performance. The education sector is increasingly using the DAK mechanism for financing
national education priorities such as the Education for All initiatives. DAK financing is
proposal-based, and the central government
could require districts to use service standards
as a basis for those proposals. By using performance standards to justify both block and
earmarked grants, the national government can
use financing as a quality assurance tool.
Once national policies on district level accountability for educational quality are clarified, mechanisms for quality assurance at the
district level can be refined and coordinated.
Prior to the passage of the Education Law, the
Ministry of Education established an Educational Quality Assurance Institution (Provincial Lembaga Penjamin Mutu Pendidikan or
LPMP) by Ministerial Decree (KepMen
87/O/03). This decree transformed 30 provincial teacher training centers into 30 branches
of the LPMP. The core functions of these
branches are to support school and teacher
quality assurance including:
x Measuring and evaluating the implementation of basic and secondary education.
x Building models, including teaching/learning models, that will help
schools to meet national quality standards.
x Assisting teachers in measuring and
evaluating the outcomes of learning.
x Helping teachers to manage educational resources for quality improvement.
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Chapter 3
The LPMP is not mentioned in the Education
Law, and the law assigns most of the 40 tasks
included in the LPMP’s terms of reference to
the National Standardization Body and to the
district governments. It is not clear whether
the LPMP will be continued after the accreditation bodies and district quality evaluation
bodies have been formally established.
School Committees
The national policy on school-based management includes the function of quality assurance at the school level. The Education Law
specifies this function assignment and, in Article 51, stipulates that school management must
be based on minimum service standards and
on the principle of school-based management
(Law No. 20/2003, Chapter XIV, Article 51,
paragraph 1).
Continuing the LPMP and its branches might
be beneficial if the institution does not actually
set standards but limits its activities to providing performance evaluation services under the
direction of the school accreditation body
(BAS). The overlap of its functions with those
of the districts might be more problematic.
The following list highlights a few of the overlapping tasks:
The school-level body responsible for evaluation and quality assurance is the school committee; these committees are discussed in
Chapter 1 on governance and management.
Teachers are assigned the responsibility for
quality assurance through classroom practices
such as continuous assessment.
Assessing the competency of and certifying educational institutions and
staff in the provinces.
x Undertaking EMIS services including
data collection and school quality
mapping, and maintaining the database for and disseminating information on primary and secondary
information to schools.
x Supervising and evaluating primary
and secondary education in the provinces.
x Certifying educational quality in the
provinces.
x
Recommendations
School-level quality control under decentralization is shifting from a system dependent on
external inspections against absolute standards
to a system reliant on self-assessment against
national, local, and school-based standards
backed up by occasional external audits. Indeed, there are far too many schools to be
monitored entirely through a system of external inspections. Ideally, the results of both the
schools’ self-assessments and occasional external audits will serve as inputs to the process
of improving school quality, thereby linking
the quality control and quality improvement
efforts. Towards this end we make the following recommendations:
School Inspectors
At present, districts still use a system of circuit
inspections for quality assurance. Primary
school inspectors operate out of sub-district
offices, while junior secondary school inspectors operate out of district government offices.
Although school inspectors are supposed to
provide feedback and guidance to schools on
teaching practice, most school principals and
teachers who participated in our focus groups
described the inspections as focusing almost
entirely on administrative matters. Inspectors
visit schools only infrequently, particularly
those schools located far from the sub-district
offices. In the past, many school inspectors
were retired teachers, but recently younger
people have been recruited who have been
trained in modern teaching practices and who
are physically more able to get to remote
schools.
x We recommend that the MoNE develop a model for enabling citizens to
participate in preparing and refining
regulations. The model-building exercise could be implemented by : (i) organizing information campaigns about
government regulation aimed at all
education sector stakeholders, (ii)
conducting public hearings, and (iii)
updating and finalizing the government regulations.
x Indonesia lacks a standardized test of
learning to provide geographically
comparative information on students’
academic performance. While there
are one or two internationally comparable tests, there are no domestic ones
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claim that the certification process is
not transparent and that the extortion
of sums of money by officials in
exchange for favorable appointments
is a common practice. Indeed, the
practice is so widespread that poor
parents of junior high students feel
that the teaching profession is closed
to their offspring as they cannot afford
the illegal payments (World Bank,
2001). However, once these anticorruption activities are implemented,
the quality of the teaching force will
no longer be undermined by corrupt
practices like these.
that give an accurate picture of the
state of learning within Indonesia. We
recommend introducing a periodic national assessment of learning, particularly at the lower grades, which would
yield useful information about the
overall performance of the education
system.
x Although some progress has been
made in establishing a system for
school accreditation, many difficult issues are left unresolved. For example,
at present there is no incentive system
with rewards and corrections for encouraging schools and districts to
comply with national standards. Nor
does the policy include a process for
resolving disagreements over accreditation or monitoring results. Also
lacking is a system for gathering data
on quality indicators to be used for
quality control and resource allocation
purposes. Until the specifics of the
compliance and implementation processes are sorted out, the new accreditation system is not likely to serve its
purposes. We recommend an international peer review of the proposed accreditation
system through an
international conference and a series
of follow-up workshops with policy
makers to resolve difficult issues.
Quality Improvement
This section places quality improvement in the
context of Indonesia’s experiments with quality improvement, the current legal and regulatory
framework
governing
quality
improvement. We then tie failures to improve
quality to underlying structural issues such as
inadequate sector finance and absence of a
system for sustaining quality improvement that
is integrated into routine sector management
practices.
The Indonesian Experience in School
Quality Improvement
Indonesia has been experimenting with quality
improvement for over 30 years. During this
time, public support for quality improvement
has been project-based and channeled from the
central government while private support has
been school-based and channeled through
school fees and other household contributions.
Remarks made by school committee representatives and school principals during the district
consultation process during the preparation of
this report revealed that the dynamic that propels schools to improve quality is marketbased; better public and private schools can
charge higher fees for services. Two factors
limit the effectiveness of the market dynamic:
the limited supply of quality improvement
goods and services and the modest purchasing
power of even the most successful schools.
Indonesia has been expanding the supply of
government-provided goods and services
through centrally funded projects for over 30
years. Since the 1990s, Indonesia has been
experimenting with giving government grants
to schools for quality improvement. Donors
x Assuring quality in districts and
schools through minimum service
standards is still in the planning phase.
We recommend that quality assurance
be linked to annual performance-based
budgets prepared by schools and districts. In this way, the quality assurance system will become a routine part
of financial planning and performance
reviews.
x Indonesia is currently planning some
comprehensive
anti-corruption
activities that will include monitoring
independent from the government. We
recommend
that
anti-corruption
activities be considered part of the
quality assurance process. The Social
Assessment for the Basic Education
IV Project reports that many teachers
104
Chapter 3
have been active in the sector guiding and investing in many publicly financed projects that
fund school rehabilitation, textbooks, libraries,
teacher training, technical advice, and other
inputs.39 With all this experience, donor guidance, and investment, why has the quality of
education overall not improved?
Research Underlying Quality
Improvement Projects
The quality improvement projects over the last
decade have been based on practices derived
from two main research areas – school effectiveness and school reform.
Researchers have built up a foundation of longitudinal, quantitative, and empirical studies in
developed and developing countries about
what mix of inputs into “the school climate,”
“enabling conditions,” and “the teaching/
learning process” influence students’ cognitive
achievements. Unfortunately, the results of
these studies have not yielded a sequenced list
of investments guaranteed to improve performance. School reform research is grounded
in management theory, particularly management for change, and is primarily based on
qualitative research and case studies. School
reform emphasizes improving the withinschool decisionmaking process, enhancing
school/community relations, encouraging the
generation of ideas from within schools about
how to improve quality, and in-house capacity
building. Unfortunately, research into the impact of school reform on school performance
is not conclusive. Indonesia has experimented
with projects derived from each of these research areas. Table 3.2 compares the attributes
of the school effectiveness approach and
school reform approach.
Project Approach
The problem is structural in that quality improvements are project-based and not part of a
school’s or a district’s routine operations. Project-based interventions such as cluster-based
in-service training, library construction, or
proposal-based grants for quality improvement
are sometimes successful during the life span
of the project, but nearly all prove to be unsustainable in the long run due to high unit or
high recurrent costs. In addition to a short life
span, quality improvements are seldom evaluated in terms of their impact on school performance and they rarely spread spontaneously
to those schools that were not project beneficiaries. One approach that has not yet been applied in Indonesia is to incorporate quality
improvement into the routine operations of
schools or districts by: (i) including quality
improvement activities in a consolidated
budget for school financing that is transferred
from districts to schools either as part of the
school’s block grant or as earmarked funds
depending on the school’s capacity for planning and accounting, and (ii) using a performance-based budgeting system that holds
districts accountable for schools’ minimum
service standards.
39
A summary of 25 donor-supported projects appears in
Appendix 1.
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Volume 2
Table 3.2 Comparing the School Effectiveness and School Reform Approaches
School Effectiveness
School Reform
Research area
Cognitive science (theory into
Management science (practice
practice)
into theory)
Research thrust
Teaching and learning process
Managing for quality improvement
Classroom teaching practices
Managing for change
Allocation of production functions
School control over resources
Research variables
Inputs
Research methods
Classroom processes
School governance structures
Learning achievement
Longitudinal, quantitative, and
empirical studies
School management processes
Qualitative studies to explain the
highly context-specific nature of
quality improvement
Rigorously designed sequential
studies
Examples of projects/programs in
Indonesia
(Some have elements of both: the
projects are categorized by their
major thrust and intention)
Major inputs
Methodologically complex analysis using statistical techniques
such as multi-level modeling to
large data sets
SPP-CBSA
SSEM
PEQIP
SEQIP
PJSE
B&R
BEP (MoRA)
BEP (MoNE)
PGSD
PGSM
CLCC
Pre and in-service teacher training
Educational materials
Weaknesses
Key findings from research
Evaluations of individual improvement initiatives
COPLANER
Cosep
BOMM
REDIP I and II
DSSD
DBEP
CLCC
MBE
School and kecamatan management capacity building
School Improvement Grants
School rehabilitation
Limited demand for quality improvement services in non-project
schools
Limited supply of quality improvement services
Does not explain how to make ineffective schools effective
Does not explain how to improve
quality of teaching and learning
Defines effectiveness in terms of
cognitive and academic outcomes
rather than social and effective
ones
Influence of student background
on performance
Importance of “proximal” factors
over “distal” ones
Differential effectiveness within
schools
106
Management of change
Improvement as a process at system, school, and classroom levels
Descriptive analysis of in-school
cultures and power relationships
Chapter 3
Interventions
School Effectiveness
School Reform
Interaction of factors within
schools
Technical and professional
Centrally defined, standard package of inputs
Decentralized decisionmaking
External pressure to change practices to meet technical or professional standards
Support for changing practices
that can be sustained by the
school over the long term
Note: A brief description of each project featured in this table appears in Appendix 3.1.
The legal obligations of the central government in school financing are limited to paying
teachers’ salaries through the wage transfer
portion of the DAU formula. Although the
constitution and the Education Law (No.
20/2003) stipulate that 20 percent of the national budget and 20 percent of the block
grants to districts must be spent on education,
there is no regulation that establishes a funding
floor for schools. Indeed, there is no national
law that regulates within-district transfers of
APBD funding to schools. If the government’s
appropriation to the education sector does not
increase to the level stipulated under the constitution and the decentralization laws, quality
will not improve equitably. Channeling quality improvements through the DAK mechanism could ensure that funds allocated for
education are spent for schools and by schools.
This chapter on quality recognizes but does
not address the issues of the 7 to 15-year-old
children who do not attend school. Under the
law, they are entitled to receive their fair share
of public spending on education, but in practice this already disadvantaged group receives
far less than the young citizens who are enrolled in school.
Current Legal and Regulatory
Framework for Quality Improvement
Unlike quality assurance, there is no chapter in
the Education Law that specifically addresses
the issue of quality improvement. However,
quality improvement is mentioned several
times, both as a general agenda item and as the
specific goal of several statutes. For example,
in Article 56 on education boards and school
committees, the law stipulates that the role of
the community in improving quality in schools
should include planning, monitoring, and
evaluation. Prior to decentralization, the routine management of the primary school system
was assigned to local governments, and responsibility for educational quality improvement was assigned to the central government.
Under decentralization law 22/1999, these
functions were reunited and districts were
given responsibility for the education sector
overall. A national policy of school-based
management through school committees and
district education management by education
boards was formalized by a Ministerial Decree
(KepMen 44/U/02). Under this policy umbrella, schools are responsible for improving
the quality of education while districts are responsible for improving the quality of the
management of educational services.40
Whether this transfer of authority translates
into a transfer of assets or of liabilities depends upon two things: (i) the condition of the
schools and the capacities of the district and
(ii) the amount of the public budget allocated
to education.
Project preparation documents for the World
Bank’s Basic Education IV project underscored the need for quality improvement in
early childhood and early grade education.
Background papers reported that teachers
spend most of their classroom time in grades 4
and above on remedial teaching rather than on
helping students to master grade-level skills.
This pattern will continue unless the government adopts programs that prepare children for
schooling and strengthen the early childhood
component of basic education.
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Volume 2
Financing the Quality Improvement of
Schools
Box 3.4 The New Zealand Equalization Program
What kind of value is the Indonesian state and
are Indonesian families getting for what they
spend on basic education? The Education for
All (EFA) task force has estimated that compulsory academic fees for primary and junior
secondary average about Rps 213,000 per pupil. These fees are used to cover schools’ operating expenses and improvements in the
quality of its physical assets, teachers’ salaries,
schoolbooks, learning materials, and equipment. This implies that public spending on
these basic conditions of learning is inadequate. At the district level where education
personnel constitute over half of all public
employees, up to 60 percent of the routine and
development district budget (APBD) is spent
on education, primarily on routine expenses
such as teachers’ salaries. Educational facilities constitute more than half of the assets held
by many local governments. The central government has no formula for equalizing district
expenditures on quality improvements and no
means to ensure that districts allocate their
education resources equitably. The current
practice of channeling quality improvement
inputs to schools directly through centrally
funded projects exceeds the two-year time
limit for direct transfer of resources that was
set in Law 25/1999.
There is a tendency in decentralized education
systems for differences in quality to increase between wealthier and less wealthy areas unless explicit corrective measures are taken. In New
Zealand, the original design of the school-based
management reforms did not include mechanisms
to ensure the equitable financing of schools. In
response to this absence, the government created
the Targeted Funding for Educational Achievement (TFEA) as a component of schools’ operating grants. The TFEA is targeted to specific
schools to enable them to overcome the barriers
to students’ learning that are associated with socioeconomic disadvantage.
All schools are
ranked by decile, and per-student funding increases as the school’s decile declines.
Organizational Systems for Sustaining
Quality Improvement
In this section, we discuss the organizational
frameworks for sustaining quality improvement, namely school-based management and
district development planning. School-based
management is not only a policy of the MoNE,
but is also mandated under Law 20, article
51(1). District development planning is required under Law No. 17/2003 on performance-based budgeting. Although neither of
these systems deals directly with the quality
issue, both systems have some potential for
sustaining quality improvement. District development planning is discussed in Chapter 1
on governance and management. In the section below, we focus on school-based management.
In Chapter 2 on financing, we pointed out that
Indonesia is spending less on education than
might be expected given its per capita income
level. The introductory chapter showed that
Indonesian children perform worse on standardized international tests than children in
neighboring countries but better than children
in some countries that spend about the same
proportion of public money on education.
Taken together, the data show that Indonesian
parents and the state have been getting reasonable value for their expenditure compared with
other countries; in other words, they spend little and get little. Furthermore, Chapter 2 on
financing revealed that spending on education
in Indonesia is inequitable, resulting in unequal access and quality. Box 3.4 describes
New Zealand’s approach to equalizing quality
in a decentralized system.
School-based Management
In Indonesia, the strategy that has been
adopted to improve schools over the long term
is school-based management (SBM). The intention behind school-based management is to
engage the wider local community through
school committees in planning, monitoring,
and improving school quality (Article 56 Law
20/2003). Very preliminary findings from our
consultations with district-level officials indicate that school committees have been set up
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Chapter 3
Background papers on school-based management written for this report acknowledge that
participatory management and adequate school
resources are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for improving student achievement.
They also recognize that schools require,
among other elements, performance information (through both school profile statistics and
self-assessments) and accountability systems
(Umaedi, 1999). Although the MoNE has disseminated guidelines to schools for carrying
out performance self-assessments that incorporate these concepts, none of the schools included in the focus groups mentioned using
them.
but are not yet active in the area of quality improvement.41
School-based management does not guarantee
quality improvement. International research
reveals that the link between SBM and quality
improvement is inconclusive. According to a
recent review of 83 studies of SBM programs
around the world, there is no universally positive relationship between school-based management and school performance or school
quality improvement (Leithwood and Menzies,
1998). In fact, the authors conclude that SBM
fails to improve students’ academic achievement or to reduce dropout and repetition rates,
even though SBM does increase parents’ and
communities’ say in decisionmaking, teachers’
participation in developing school improvement plans, and administrative efficiency in allocating scarce resources effectively. Other
research indicates that it is not school-based
decisionmaking per se that improves learning;
rather, it is the type of decisions that schools
are entitled to make for themselves. Schools’
autonomy in making personnel decisions,
teachers’ autonomy in choosing which teaching methods to use, and teachers’ involvement
in procurement decisions are particularly influential (Woessmann, 2001).
In response to studies indicating that school effectiveness inputs are not always used and
maintained,42 Indonesia has been experimenting with pilot programs that require schools to
prepare improvement plans designed to improve teaching and learning. Since 2000, many
quality improvement programs have been providing small grants to schools to implement
their school development plans. These plans
reveal much about the gap between the priorities of education professionals and the priorities of school managers. Box 3.5 contains a
description of the typical content of most
school development plans.
Despite several well-known shortcomings,
SBM is the best method available in Indonesia
for making quality improvement a part of routine school operations. Thirty years of projects have yielded insights into what
methodologies work best in classrooms to increase student achievement and to make
schooling a pleasant experience for both
teachers and students (for example, active and
contextual learning). Unfortunately, systemic
and structural barriers, such as a lack of accountability, insufficient human and technical
resources, and widespread corruption, prevent
good practices from spreading spontaneously.
However, there are many steps that can be
taken that move beyond the limited scope of
most school improvement plans. One such step
involves package-based improvement grants.
In Indonesia, under the SIGP program of
2001-2002, the central government gave a
grant package to all schools that met all of the
necessary requirements and conditions. SIGP
funds could only be used for seven purposes:
buying books and stationery, hiring teachers,
purchasing teaching aids, renovating buildings, repairing classrooms and library furniture, installing water and sanitation facilities,
and introducing school-based teacher training.
Each school received a set amount depending
41
Focus group discussions with teachers and principals
in Lampung and Makasar as well as meetings with
school committee members in Central Java and Yogyakarta revealed that many principals have not yet discussed performance standards or improvement planning
with school committees. Some focus group members
also commented that the performance monitoring presently being conducted by school committees, an essential
element in sustaining quality improvement, concentrates
only on financial matters.
42
For example, staff from the MBE project in East Java
and Central Java reported that several of the libraries in
the 36 schools that they visited appeared to be unused
judging by the dust on the books and the records. Also,
staff from the JBIC team on field visits to recently constructed junior secondary schools in 2002 reported that
over half of the new school stock was not being regularly
maintained.
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Volume 2
on its level of poverty, the condition of its
physical plant, and safety considerations. District committees selected the schools and determined the amount of the grant. REDIP also
used a menu of restricted choices for school
grants and required schools to produce simple
proposals written to a template. Packaged
grants require less planning capacity on the
part of schools than SBM but remove responsibility from the school and community for
self-assessment and program development.
x The absence of knowledge and information about education quality improvement at the district level is a
major inhibiting factor. Projects such
as the DBEP that used proposal-based
grants in an attempt to enhance districts’ ability to improve school quality have shown that districts lack the
experience and knowledge to develop
multi-year programs to improve education quality. We recommend making a significant investment in
building the technical and managerial
capacity of districts to improve quality.
Box 3.5 School Development Plans and
Quality Inputs
There has been no research published yet on the
comparative results of school reform projects.
Anecdotal evidence provided by field workers
from the Managing Basic Education (MBE) Project indicates that the school development plans
from participating schools are confined largely to
physical conditions such as rehabilitating buildings and providing more books. A recent visit by
MBE project teams to REDIP sites in Central
Java found little change in teaching as a result of
the program. Likewise, a review of DBEP school
improvement proposals confirmed that schools
tend to request the rehabilitation of their facilities
and the provision of more library books and other
material inputs rather than teacher training. The
focus on physical inputs is partly the result of the
lack of teacher trainers. The demand is there, but
there is no supply to meet it. The CLCC project
is slightly different in that it focuses on SBM in
order to improve teaching and directly tackles the
training issue by increasing the supply of trainers.
x The supply of competent government
and private sector trainers and consultants is a compounding and binding
constraint. Therefore, we recommend
making a significant investment in developing the capacity of public and
private providers of quality improvement services. Indeed, knowledge
about how to improve school quality
already exists in Indonesia; the bottleneck is that there are not enough high
quality “service providers” (such as
competent and informed teacher trainers) to apply this knowledge in every
school. Centrally planned quality improvement projects are often wellconceived packages that, in their pilot
phases, are usually successful in
achieving their objectives. In the pilot
test phase of such projects, project
teams generally provide services to
schools directly, but it is impractical to
extend this pilot approach to all of the
one and a half million teachers in Indonesia’s 180,000 schools. To overcome this challenge, we recommend
using some variation of a cascade
model, in which the people who best
understand the intervention (project
designers) train others who then train
teachers, which means that there can
be as many as three or four layers of
training in between the project team
and individual teachers. If anyone in
the chain does not fully understand the
intervention or training methods, this
can result in poor performance further
down the chain. As a result, there are
few examples of improvements lasting
Recommendations
If simply providing inputs improved quality
and school performance, then district educational planning would simply be a question of
channeling inputs to schools. Unfortunately,
the link between specific inputs such as teachers’ salaries or textbooks and particular outputs such as better student test scores is not
straightforward, and process functions can either enhance or inhibit progress towards that
goal. The use of textbooks, for example, is
nearly as important as their availability; nor is
the availability of particular teaching materials
as significant in raising learning achievement
as teachers having a say in which materials are
procured (Woessmann, 2001 and Pritchett and
Filmer, 1999).
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Chapter 3
Whether the expense is borne by parents or by
the public is a matter for policymakers. Second, schools must receive funds based, at least
in part, on a transparent, per-student formula
that factors in enrollment or attendance rates
as recommended in Chapter 2 on financing
and in the EFA Summary Report.
beyond the life of the project or of
good practices spreading spontaneously to other schools.43
x Schools are asymmetrical in their ability to implement quality improvement.
Also, school performance can deteriorate as well as improve under decentralization. Therefore, we recommend
taking into account the performance of
schools relative to national standards
and to their own past performance
when formulating school or district
budgets and education development
plans. One such approach, an adaptation of the “balanced scorecard” is
presented in Appendix 3. 2.
Third, schools must receive their share of sector development money in cash rather than in
kind, either through an earmarking or proposal-based budgeting process. In terms of
sustainable improvements, schools must have
some discretion to choose the quality improvement interventions that they are willing
and able to implement. This will require that
they have a supply of proven quality improvement packages from which to choose,
cadres of competent providers of quality improvement services, and a flexible system for
determining the relative ability of each school
to implement independent planning and block
grant financing.
Conclusion and Summary of
Recommendations
We conclude that the reason why the quality
of education overall has not improved in recent years lies deep within the sector’s structural and financing systems and that quality
must be addressed by changing the sector’s
organizational structure, financing, and operational systems.
Finally, we recommend that the effort to ensure education quality be seen holistically as
an enterprise consisting of both assurance and
improvement functions linked by a common
set of simple standards and measures.
Some of the required changes in the area of
sector finance are not under the sole control of
the MoNE. To improve quality, Indonesia
must first spend more and spend wisely.
43
Several projects have experimented with this system in
reverse, with school-based interventions shared among
clusters of several local schools, which are also shared
with local government school supervisors and so forth up
the chain of command via workshops. Occasionally, as
with the CBSA, this leads to an adjustment in national
policy and the innovation becoming an established part
of the education sector.
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Said, S. and N. Suhendra. 2002. “Corruption
and Indonesian Society,” in R. Holloway (ed.),
Stealing From The Poor. Book One, Jakarta:
Aksara Foundation.
MoNE. 2001a. National Report on the Development of Education, Country: Indonesia. Yakarta.
SAPS team for JBIC. 2002. “Final Report on
Special Assistance for Project Sustainability
the Junior Secondary School Building Construction Project in Indonesia.” Project Report.
MoNE. 2001b. “Pedoman Penyusunan Standar
Pelayanan Minimal Penyelenggaraan Persekohahan Bidang Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah” Keputusal Mendiknas 053/U/2001, April
19.
Soedijarto, M.A. 2003. Kebijakan Nasional
Tentang Akreditasi Sekolah. MONE Policy
Paper.
MoNE. 2001c. “Toward Quality and Equity in
Basic Education: Report of the National
Commission on Education.” In Indonesian.
Somerset, Tony. 1994. “Some Basic Number
Skills in Twelve Primary Schools: An Exploratory Study.” Processed.
113
Volume 2
UNESCO, UNICEF, MoNE. No date. “Creating Learning Communities for Children: Improving Primary Schools through Schoolbased Management and Community Participation” Pamphlet. Jakarta.
Suryadi, A. 1989. Improving the Educational
Quality of Primary Schools. Jakarta: Balitbang
Dikbud.
Sweeting, Elizabeth. 2001. “Booklet for Kabupaten Education Planners.” Background
paper prepared for the MoNE and World Bank
as part of the Basic Education IV Project Development. Unpublished draft. Jakarta.
World Bank. 2003.
SBM Resource Kit.
Decentralization and
World Bank. 2001a. “Social Assessment Pilot
Activity Basic Education IV.” Draft report.
Jakarta.
Umaedi. 1999. “School-based Quality Improvement Management.”
In Indonesian.
MoNE (Ministry of National Education).
World Bank. 2001b. “Early Childhood and
Early Grades Education” Draft report, Jakarta.
USAID. 2003. “Managing Basic Education
Project Initial District Surveys Phase 1 Districts.” Project report.
World Bank. 1996. Background Paper to
Textbook Project. Mimeographed.
Woessmann, Ludger. 2001. Schooling Resources, Educational Institutions, and Student
Performance: The International Evidence.
Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute of World Economics.
114
Chapter 3
Appendix 3.1. Quality Improvement Projects In Indonesia Since 1990
The project provided teacher training in science, mathematics, Indonesian, English and
social studies, helped districts to initiate cluster-based training for teachers, provided funding for science equipment, and helped to
develop a national test item bank and provincial-level teams to improve the testing of students.
In Indonesia during the 1990s, the government
and donors spent hundreds of millions of dollars on over 25 projects to improve the quality
of primary and junior secondary education.
Various lessons can be learned from these projects, and these are summarized below.
SPP-CBSA/ALPS
Active Learning through Professional Support
to Teachers (1979-1994). UK Government
through Balitbang.
Management capacity was strengthened by
conducting studies to establish EMIS to help
the MoNE with school data collection and
management training workshops.
Areas: One district each in West Java, NTB,
North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, East Java,
Lampung, South Kalimantan, Central Java,
South Sumatra, and Jakarta.
Follow-up projects include the JSE and the
BEPs.
COPLANER
Community Participation in Planning and
Management of Educational Resources (19911995). UNDP/UNESCO. Through the MoNE
and BAPPENAS.
The purpose of the SPP-CBSA was to enhance
the quality of teaching and learning in primary
schools by promoting active learning and a
professional development system based on
teachers’ working groups. The design used a
bottom-up approach that viewed teachers as
the main stakeholders of change. The design
recognized that teachers do not work in isolation from: (i) how they were trained, (ii) the
curriculum that they teach, (iii) the financial
and administrative conditions under which
they work, and (iv) the support that they receive from principals, supervisors, parents,
and the local educational administration.
Areas: East Java, South Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and NTT (24 kecamatan total)
The objective of COPLANER was to improve
the quality and increase the relevance of education by piloting a model of community support for and participation in bottom-up
education planning and school resources management within a supportive structure at the
sub-district (kecamatan) level. COPLANER
was built upon a prior UNDP/UNESCO/GoI
project that had the same objectives but was
implemented only at the province and district
levels. COPLANNER was an exploratory project to discover how to do bottom-up planning
at the school, community, and sub-district levels.
SSEM
Second Secondary Education and Management Project (1990-1997) World Bank through
the MoNE’s Division of Junior Secondary
Education.
Areas: National but most activities focused in
West Java, Yogyakarta, Central Kalimantan,
South Sulawesi, and NTB.
Follow-up projects have included the REDIP
and the CLCC, which have both used kecamatan-level community participation in planning.
The objectives of the SSEM were to improve
the quality of secondary education and to
strengthen management capacity in secondary
schools.
PEQIP
Primary Education Quality Improvement Project (1992-1999). World Bank through the
MoNE’s Division of Primary Education.
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Activities included giving fellowships in curriculum development and teacher training as
well as providing some facilities and equipment for the MoNE’s national-level curriculum center.
Areas: Aceh, West Sumatra, Yogyakarta, and
Bali NTT
The project’s objectives were to improve the
quality of primary education through improved
teaching and learning activities, to increase
districts’ capacity to manage a quality improvement program, and to provide special assistance to poor, remote, and under-served
schools through block grants. The PEQIP had
too many sub-components and relied too much
on the cascade model for teacher training. The
legacy of the PEQIP is the school cluster approach.
The follow-up consists of the SJSE in the five
provinces considered to be most in need.
SEQIP
Science Education Quality Improvement Project (1994-ongoing). Germany through the
MoNE’s Division of Primary Education.
Areas: Jakarta, Central Java, East Java, South
Kalimantan, NTB, South Sulawesi, and West
Papua
No follow-up projects.
PGSD
Primary School Teacher Development Program (1992-1999). World Bank through the
MoNE’s Division of Higher Education.
The SEQIP’s purpose is to improve the quality
of science teaching in primary school grades 3
and 6. This is being accomplished through a
package of inputs that addresses all factors affecting classroom activities simultaneously.
The logic is that sustainability at the classroom
level is ensured by a package approach. The
package includes: in-service training for selected teachers in active learning methods, in
lesson planning, and in using a SEQIP science
kit; training for principals and school supervisors so they can support the teachers, science
kits for teachers and students, and a system for
kit maintenance; teachers’ guides on how to
use the kits in lessons and guidelines on using
new pupil textbooks; improved end of term
test items to match the new emphasis in science teaching; and a project monitoring system.
Areas: Nationwide through teacher training
colleges
The project’s objective was to enhance the
teaching/learning process in primary schools
through a new higher education teacher diploma course (D2) for both pre-service and inservice training.
The new pre-service primary teacher education
curriculum for D2 is used by all teacher training colleges.
JSEP
Junior Secondary Education Project (19931998). Asian Development Bank through the
MoNE’s Division of Junior Secondary Education.
MDLCC
Managing the Delivery of Local Content Curriculum (1995-1997). UNDP through the
Area: Nationwide but emphasizing un-served
and under-served areas and disadvantaged urban areas in Sumatra and Java.
Areas: Lampung
The project’s goals were to support the government in the delivery of compulsory education by improving academic supervision and
student assessment processes, implementing
Curriculum 1994, and strengthening the institutional capacity of the MoNE and the MoRA.
The purpose of the project was to develop
policies and strategies to enable junior secondary schools to attract and retain pupils and to
develop links between post-primary education
and income-generating opportunities.
Project activities included designing and refining management for local content delivery and
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Chapter 3
producing case studies on difficulties encountered in delivering local content to primary
levels.
CJ-JSE
Central Java Junior Secondary Education
Project (1996-2002). World Bank through the
PJSE
Private Junior Secondary Education Project
(1995-2001). Asian Development Bank
through private junior secondary schools.
Area: Three districts in Central Java and all
districts in Yogyakarta
All of the World-Bank-financed JSE projects
had the same objectives: to expand access to
junior secondary education in a cost-effective
and equitable way; to improve the quality of
junior secondary education; and to strengthen
management capacity at the school level. For
each JSE project, priorities and needs were defined at the provincial level along with the institutional capacity to implement chosen
interventions. All stakeholders at the province, district, parent association, school, and
foundation levels (for private schools) were
involved in developing project proposals
within each province.
Areas: Lampung, Jakarta, South Kalimantan,
and South Sulawesi.
B&R
Book and Reading Development Project
(1996-2001). World Bank through Sarana.
Area: National
The objectives of the project were to improve
the quality of education by improving the production and distribution of textbooks and by
helping teachers to use textbooks in a more effective way.
Access was expanded through a school construction and furnishing component, the hiring
of contract teachers for remote areas, expanding the open junior secondary program by
supplying books and reference materials and
by covering its operating costs, and the provision of scholarships to needy students. Quality was improved through in-service training at
the district level, cluster-level teacher support
groups, and the supply of teaching materials
and libraries to rural schools. Training was
provided to province- and district-level staff
on managing information systems to enable
them to analyze trends and identify problems.
At the school level, training was provided in
school-based management and professional
support to teachers.
The project’s activities included supplying
textbooks to all junior secondary schools in all
EBTANAS subjects and teachers’ guides in
non-examined subjects; establishing the National Textbook Evaluation Commission in the
Book Center to evaluate the quality of private
junior secondary books; holding workshops on
writing textbooks for publishers: producing
guidebooks for teachers; and developing a
media campaign to promote reading.
PGSM
Secondary School Teacher Development Project (1996-2001). World Bank through the
MoNE’s Division of Higher Education.
Area: National
The economic crisis and mid-term review
caused resources to be redirected to scholarships and school grants.
The project’s objectives were to strengthen
pre- and in-service teacher education and the
links between teacher training colleges and
secondary schools.
S-JSE
Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project
(1996-2002).
World Bank through the
The project’s activities included improving the
curriculum, procuring science equipment, developing textbooks, establishing student support centers, and providing scholarships to
needy teachers to upgrade to S1.
Area: Aceh, West Sumatra, Jambi, Lampung,
and South Sumatra
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quality improvement activities focused on the
subject knowledge and teaching skills in core
non-religious subjects of madrasah teachers
and introduced a six-month certification process and in-service program through clusterbased training. Equitable access was increased
by rehabilitating schools and funding scholarships for the poor, particularly girls. MoRA
management was strengthened at all levels.
School accreditation, management, and supervision were improved by the production and
provision of training and manuals. The MoRA
also used a model approach in which selected
schools were upgraded to provide model madrasahs that demonstrated good teaching practices and good school management.
Upgrading involved the rehabilitation of
schools and the provision of materials such as
libraries, laboratories, and extra classrooms.
EI JSE
Eastern Islands Junior Secondary Education
Project (1996-2002). World Bank through the
Area: East Java and NTT
COSEP
Community Participation for Strategic Education Planning for School Improvement (1997ongoing). JICA through the MoNE’s Division
of Junior Secondary Education.
Areas: North Sulawesi and Central Java
The objective of this project is to improve the
quality of education by strengthening bottomup planning skills and processes to promote
community participation and school-based
management.
CCP
Curriculum Capacity Project (1998-2000).
UK through Balitbang.
Activities include holding planning meetings
and facilitator workshops, establishing an education planning committee in each participating kecamatan, holding workshops on locallevel quality improvement planning, and developing kecamatan basic education improvement plans.
Area: Central MoNE and Jakarta
The objective of the CCP was to develop staff
capacity in the MoNE to manage, develop, and
evaluate the curriculum.
Activities included short training courses, both
in-country and overseas, research and field
studies to improve the curricula in core subjects, and the development and implementation of a curriculum evaluation and
development cycle.
BEP (MORA)
Basic Education Project – Ministry of Religious Affairs.
(1997-2002).
Areas: West Java, Central Java, East Java,
Lampung, NTB, and South Kalimantan
SJSE
Second Junior Secondary Education Project
(1997-2003).
through the MoNE’s Division of Junior Secondary Education.
The objective was to upgrade the quality of all
madrasahs serving primary and junior secondary students to provide better education, particularly to girls and the poor. This was the
first donor project to focus solely on madrasahs. Previously only about 10 percent of
donor resources were channeled to madrasahs
through MoNE projects.
Areas: East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan,
and Central Sulawesi
The objectives of the SJSE were to increase
junior high school enrollment, to upgrade general junior high schools and madrasahs, and to
build institutional capacity.
This project had three components: improving
quality, promoting equitable access, and institutional strengthening. The project was designed to help the madrasahs adjust to their
new task. Up until 1994, madrasah education
had focused solely on religion. After 1994,
many madrasahs used both the MoNE curriculum and the MoRA curriculum. The project’s
Activities included strengthening school management and supervision by providing block
grants (BOMM) to 1,000 junior secondary
schools, providing in-service training to teach118
Chapter 3
ers and administrators, and enhancing resources such as libraries, science laboratories,
textbooks, and teaching materials. The project
also trained district and provincial managers to
monitor the provision of junior secondary education.
BEP II
Sumatera Basic Education Program (19992004). World Bank through the MoNE’s Directorate of Primary and Secondary Education
Areas: North Sumatra, Riau, and Bengkulu
The objectives and activities of the BEP II are
the same as for the BEP I as described above.
WJBEP
West Java Basic Education Project (19982003). World Bank through the MoNE’s Directorate of Primary and Secondary Education.
BEP III
South Sulawesi and Eastern Islands Basic
Education Program (1999-2004). World Bank
through the MoNE’s Directorate of Primary
and Secondary Education.
Areas: Selected sub-districts within all districts
Areas: South Sulawesi and Maluku
The goals of the project were to improve the
quality of primary education, to expand access
to the JSE in poor and remote areas, and to
strengthen planning and management of the
education system at all levels. The project was
the first to focus on decentralization and implementation to the district level with support
from the province. Primary-level quality improvement activities focused on rehabilitation,
school consolidation, and teacher redeployment; training for teachers, principals,
supervisors, and community leaders; the provision of books, teaching aids, and materials;
scholarships for poor students; and fellowships
to upgrade teachers’ credentials.
The objectives and activities of the BEP III are
the same as for the BEP I as described above.
REDIP
Regional Educational Development and Improvement Project (1999-2001).
JICA
through Balitbang.
Areas: Central Java and North Sulawesi
(seven districts, 15 sub-districts in the pilot
phase)
The objectives of this project are to improve
the quality of junior secondary education by
building the capacity of local education administration and schools and by increasing
community awareness of and participation in
education.
Activities to improve quality in junior secondary schools included school construction using a community-managed approach, contract
teachers, in-service training for teachers, principals, supervisors and community leaders,
and the provision of books and scholarships to
poor children.
The project’s activities included two components: (i) the development of the capacity of
sub-district committees and (ii) a choice of one
from five school-level interventions such as
cluster-based training, textbooks, block grants,
and parent council development. The school
grants that were introduced under the REDIP
are managed at the kecamatan level and are
the same for all schools in the kecamatan. The
sub-district committee plans all kecamatanlevel activities and writes and costs proposals
for funding with the help of project consultants. The committee then provides technical
assistance to the grantees to support the implementation of grants.
Management was strengthened at the district
and province level through school mapping,
the integration of all ministries’ activities in
basic education, an assessment of staff capacity, and administrative retraining of staff at the
district and province level to enable them to
manage the project.
DPAP
Development Planning Assistance Project
(1998-2001). Policy Studies. CIDA through
BAPPENAS.
CLCC
Creating Learning Communities for Children
(1999-ongoing). UNESCO/UNICEF through
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Volume 2
the MoNE’s Directorate of Primary and Secondary Education
the MoNE’s Directorate of Primary and Secondary Education.
Areas: Central Java, East Java, and South Sulawesi
Areas: NTB and Bali
The objectives of the DBEP are to create a
model for increasing equitable access to nine
years of basic education for all children by
making proposal-based grants to schools for
rehabilitation and quality improvement, making grants to districts for education development and improvement, and creating a unit
within the MoNE to track the impact of decentralization on school quality and on the provision of education services at the district level.
The objective of the CLCC is to develop models to improve the quality of primary schools
through active teaching and learning as well as
school-based management and community
participation.
Activities include providing models for childfriendly schools, assessing school-based
training trainers in active learning, providing
packages of training, grants, and other inputs
to participating schools, and conducting a
community mobilization media campaign to
raise awareness of the importance of educating
children.
DBEP
Decentralized Basic Education Project (2003ongoing). Asian Development Bank through
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Chapter 3
Appendix 3.2. A Quality Management Model
the language arts portion of future examinations.
The balanced scorecard is a concept that helps
managers at all levels to monitor results in
their key areas of responsibility. An article by
Robert Kaplan and David Norton entitled "The
Balanced Scorecard - Measures that Drive Performance" in the Harvard Business Review in
1992 sparked interest in the method and led to
their business best selling book, The Balanced
Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action,
published in 1996. Since that time, many
businesses, school districts, and schools in the
United States, Australia, and England have
adapted this method for quality management.
Basically, the balanced scorecard is a method
of designing, organizing, and communicating
performance measures across three to five dimensions utilizing both short- and long-term
time horizons.
The Balanced Scorecard
Standards should be set and measured in dimensions that capture the values and priorities
of the education system. For example:
x Finance: Including the human, material, and financial resources that are
provided to schools (and districts), the
flow of provisions/funds from the
point of origin to schools, and public
accountability for expenditures.
x Basic Rights: Minimum conditions of
learning to which every child has the
right such as safe and healthy school
buildings and certified and trained
teachers.
x Stakeholder Satisfaction: Student
achievement, parental satisfaction with
the results of their children’s schooling, and the accomplishment of district
and national goals and targets.
x Governance and Management: Processes for making policies/regulations/
rules, transparency in decisionmaking,
accountability for decisions, and
community participation.
For each dimension, there are a set of minimum service standards and associated key performance measures that include both “lead”
and “lag” indicators. In brief, “lag” indicators
describe what has been accomplished so far.
For example, students’ scores on Indonesian
language tests are a lag indicator. “Lead” indicators predict future performance. For example, time spent by students on reading
improvement programs such as “sustained silent reading” or “writing across the curriculum” is a predictor of their improved scores on
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Volume 2
Table 1 Indicative Indictors for Education System Balanced Scorecard
Basic Rights:
Finance
District (service
management)
Lag indicators
% APBD
actually
spent on
non-salary
education
Stakeholder Satisfaction:
Lead Indicators
Proportion
of school finance provided by
funds
Lag
indicators
Numbers
of classrooms instead of
repair
Lead Indicators
Number of
community
based school
rehabilitation
efforts
Lag indicators
Numbers of
out-ofschool children
Lead Indicators
Number of
community
forums to
discuss education concerns
Proportion
of schools
receiving
minimum
per student
costs
Proportion
of unqualified teachers
Number of
teachers participating in
teacher training programs
Student performance on
standardized
tests
Number of
“good practices” and
local innovations identified
Numbers of
schools accredited
Performance-based
budget for
district education service.
School (service provision)
Proportion
of school
finance
provided
by funds
Integrated
school
budget
Minimum
conditions
of learning
met
Plans for
school improvement to
MCL
Minimum
per student costs
received
on time
and in full
amount
Student
achievement
on tests of
basic skills
Governance and Management:
Lag indi- Lead Indicacators
tors
Number of
Timely
public acdelivery
count-ability
of goods
forums
and services to
schools
District
education
Leakage
service
of funds
structure
intended
appropriate
for edufor current
cation
functions
units
Teachers
paid on
time and
in the
correct
amount
Appropriate
payroll and
teacher
management
system
Numbers of
teachers participating in
teacher training
School
rules enforced
Attendance
records by
teachers and
students
Schoolbased quality
improvement
program
such as
“writing
across the
curriculum”
or remedial
program for
failing students
Teachers
and students
provided
with
needed
materials
and supplies on
time
Proportion
of unaccredited
schools with
school improvement
plans
Standards and the Balanced Scorecard
ment. The targets can be set nationally or negotiated with districts.
Minimum service standards and associated
“lag” indicators can be set for each of the four
dimensions by the national level. The districts
and/or education units themselves should set
the “lead” indicators linked to the “lag” indicators. Each dimension should have no more
than three standards each with one or two key
“lag” performance indicators. The service
standards, indicators, and measures should be
standardized and set by the national govern.
For each dimension, districts or schools can
then be positioned along a continuum based on
their performance on the key “lag” indicators.
This is the basic concept behind Indonesia’s
current school accreditation and district monitoring programs
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Chapter 3
Figure 1 The Balanced Scorecard Continuum
Below Standard
Above Standard
Minimum Service Standard
and getting better, good and getting worse, bad
and getting better, and bad and getting worse.
Different interventions can then be determined
for each category of district or education unit,
which illustrates how the entire education system has moved further away from the supplydriven, one-response-for-all model.
By adding a second dimension for performance on lead indicators, each school or district
can be described using the grid in Figure 2.
Their performance can be reported and verified as part of each funding cycle. Taken together, the two dimensions yield four
categories of districts or education units: good
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Volume 2
Figure 2 Using the Balanced Scorecard
Better than last performance evaluation
BAD SCHOOLS/DISTRICTS GETTING
GOOD SCHOOLS/DISTRICTS GETTING
BETTER
BETTER
Look for innovation and best
practices
x Eligible for increased funding
through block grants
x Recognize achievement in public
forums
Block grant financing
Most resourcing through funds
(rather than materials or in-kind
services)
x Eligible for special grants to become “service providers”
x
x
x
Below Standard
Above Standard
Minimum Service Standard
BAD SCHOOLS/DISTRICTS GETTING
GOOD SCHOOLS/DISTRICTS GETTING
WORSE
WORSE
Close attention from higher authority
x Earmarked funds
x Intensive capacity building
x At risk of losing accreditation
Very common in newly decentralized
systems
x Examine regulatory framework to remove policies that may be inhibiting performance (e.g. financing formula)
x Site visit to determine cause for performance drop and collaborate on
remediation
x
x
Worse than last performance evaluation
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Chapter 3
Appendix 3.3. A Case Study Of Project-Based School
Rehabilitation
Table 1 Number of Classrooms Needing Rehabilitation 2000/2001
Type and Level of school
Light
Num
%
Moderate
Num
%
Heavy
Num
%
Total
Num
%
Primary Level
PS public and private
MI public
MI private
Total Primary Level
377,198
6,005
56,348
439,551
41.6
59
48.4
316,915
2,752
38,365
358,032
35
27
33
212,280
1,430
21,675
235,385
23.4
14
18.6
906,393
10,187
116,388
1,032,968
100
100
100
157,753
9,360
28,183
195,296
87.5
73.6
60.8
16,415
2,221
12,902
31,538
9.1
17.5
27.8
6,118
1,135
5,280
12,533
3.4
8.9
11.4
180,286
12,716
46,365
239,367
100
100
100
JS Level
JS public and private
MTs public
MTs private
Total JS Level
Source: ADB MESA report (ADB, 2003).
Primary schools in Indonesia are not in good
condition. According to an inventory of assets
conducted by the MoNE in 2000, more than
half of all public general school classrooms
(530,000) were in fair or bad condition, and
about 14 percent of the junior secondary classrooms (22,600) needed moderate or heavy repairs (see Table 1).
Kerusuhan) spent a portion of Rp 241.23 billion on rebuilding and rehabilitating classrooms. Several donor-financed projects have
also included a classroom rehabilitation component since 2000 (see Table 2).
Taken together these massive efforts have rehabilitated about 30 percent of the classrooms
that needed the heaviest repairs or about 13
percent of the classrooms that needed heavy or
moderate repairs. According to figures provided by the government and donors, 82 percent of the junior secondary classrooms that
needed moderate to heavy rehabilitation were
repaired. The huge repair bill is due primary
to two factors sub-standard construction
and no routine maintenance. Future repair
bills can be lowered somewhat by including
maintenance costs in the formula for calculating a school’s operating budget. Indeed, if
minimum maintenance is not carried out, the
classrooms will require massive rehabilitation
about every 10 years. Sub-standard construction is due in part to a lack of competent construction engineers and construction workers
and to corruption in various forms, such as
contractors billing for materials that meet construction specifications but substituting inferior materials on site.
The government responded to the findings of
the 2000 survey with a two-pronged strategy,
which, according to the Education for All draft
costing tables, aims to complete the rehabilitation of classrooms by 2015 through a series of
projects. In 2001, Rp 3.55 trillion44 was spent
on the school rehabilitation component of the
Bantuan Khusus Sekolah (BKS) program,
which also expended a considerable sum on
scholarships. In addition, the centrally funded
Imbal Swadaya program provided Rp 267 billion in 2003 for both new school construction
and classroom rehabilitation (Rp 30,000 in 75
percent matching grants to 8,900 schools).
Also in 2003, a significant DAK transfer (Rp
625 billion) was made specifically for school
rehabilitation. In addition, a centrally funded
program aimed at remote and conflict areas
(Daerah Tertinggal Bencana Alam dan
44
Rp1.144 trillion from the oil subsidy money was
used in 2001, with another Rp 2.41 trillion coming
from other sources in 2003.
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Volume 2
Table 2 Classrooms Rehabilitated by Government and Donors, 2000-2003
Primary Classrooms RehabiliJunior Secondary Classrooms
tated
Rehabilitated
Donor/Project
GoI Projects
BKS (2001,2003)
32,000
18,000
Imbal Swadaya (2003)
8,900
8,900
Pemberdayaan
Di
Daerah 6,220
2,775
Tertinggal (2001,2002,2003)
ADB
MoRA (1996-2002)
1,210
920
RNG
SIGP I (2001, 2002)
8,865
1,250
SIGP II( (2002)
8,000
1,200
World Bank
Basic I, II, III
JSE (1998-2003)
TOTALS
12,000
3,340
36,385
77,195
Sources: ADB Project Completion Report BDP Project, BKS implementation Unit, Ibdal Swadaya Implementation
Unit, SIGP Implementation Unit, JSE Implementation Unit, Basic I, II, and III monitoring reports, JBIC Evaluation Report, MoNE Proyek Pemberdayaan Pendidikan, Didaerah Tertinggal, Benchana Alam dan Rerusuhan Jakarta year end
summary reports.
Note: This assumes two primary and two JSS classrooms per school.
competence to sustain and propagate the innovations have cost more than Indonesian politicians have been willing to spend. Projects still
have a vital role to play in trying out new
ideas for improving teaching, for pilot testing
school quality management models on a small
scale, for determining the management and
technical capacity required to implement particular quality control approaches, and for increasing the supply of quality improvement
service providers. The projects approach is
simply not up to the job of improving the quality of this enormous and varied education system overall.
Transition from Projects to Program
The advent of the new planning period presents policymakers with a historically unique
opportunity to change the country’s quality
improvement strategy from the current series
of discrete and disconnected projects into a
cogent and comprehensive quality management program that integrates quality control
and quality improvement into the routine operations of schools and districts.
Quality improvement projects have accomplished a great deal in a few areas, but the unit
costs and the need for high levels of technical
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Chapter 4: Teacher Management System
creasing the qualifications and technical capacities of teachers and head teachers as a way
of increasing the professionalism and improving the welfare of teachers, enabling them to
implement a new curriculum that aims to
make students more creative and to make
teaching more efficient and effective.” In order to “achieve the education goals, these
strategies are to be supported by evaluation
mechanisms that will function as a quality
control system and by increased supervision of
schools and accountability for school performance.” In 2003, the MoNE began working in
collaboration with line agencies (such as the
MoHA, the MoF, the BAKN, and the MoRA)
to develop a clear regulatory framework for
teacher management, including assigning responsibilities for hiring teachers as civil servants or as contract teachers.
Teachers are the most important asset in Indonesia’s education system, both because they
are the primary determinant of school performance and because their salaries consume
most of the public spending on education. In
this chapter, we argue that a new paradigm for
teacher management is necessary to ensure
that Indonesia derives maximum value from
its teachers in terms of the academic achievements of their students while adhering to the
principles and legal requirements of decentralization.
The Indonesian debate about teachers, teaching, and teacher management predates decentralization by at least three decades and many
of the teacher management concerns discussed
in this chapter are not new, nor do they all
arise directly from the post-decentralization
forms of education governance, management,
and financing discussed in previous chapters.
Some persistent issues that need to be resolved
in the era of decentralization include teachers’
remuneration, incentives, career structure and
promotion, their recruitment and deployment,
their education and competence, their career
development and in-service training, and their
empowerment in the context of school-based
management. Indeed, the empowerment of
schools and district governments under decentralization provides a welcome opportunity to
revisit long-standing issues and to examine
how introducing a new paradigm into teacher
management can contribute to improving
teaching and school performance.
We believe that the regulatory framework,
standards, and monitoring systems currently
being developed by the MoNE, though ambitious, do not go far enough. This chapter identifies several key teacher management issues
and recommends three systemic actions that
need to be taken: (i) setting teacher professional standards and performance monitoring
criteria that are based on their classroom and
school performance; (ii) developing a new
paradigm of career-long teacher professional
development that is school-based and classroom performance-led and (iii) de-linking the
management of teachers and their conditions
of employment from the civil service and creating a teaching service that reflects the needs
of the educational system and the development
of teaching as a profession. The aim of these
recommendations is to encourage the development of a professional teaching force that is
consistent with school-based management and
improves school performance, and students’
learning outcomes.
Since decentralization went into effect in
2000, the MoNE has been employing a twopart strategy for improving the quality of
teachers and teaching. The first part sets standards for teachers and head teachers and develops quality assurance monitoring systems;
the second part builds the capacity of provincial institutions and district governments to
carry out their new roles relating to teacher
management. This approach was described in
the Government of Indonesia’s Strategic Plan
for Education 2002-2004 and relies on “in
This paper draws heavily on the work of several teacher policy reform groups that existed
from 1999 onwards. The proposals from these
groups are reflected in the National Commis-
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Finally, we propose some policies and strategies and outline the kind of timeframe that is
likely to be required to implement the proposed policies.
sion on Education’s 2001 report called “Education Reform in the Context of Regional
Autonomy: The Case of Indonesia” and in the
Government of Indonesia’s Strategic Plan for
Education 2002-2004. The analysis of teacher
management issues in this chapter uses the
principles of decentralization and schoolbased management systems to review progress
to date, to identify areas of concern, and to
propose some possible ways forward. It discusses the information, incentives, and accountability systems relating to teachers that
will be needed to support decentralized management systems and the goals to improve
school quality.
The Changing Context of Teacher
Management in Indonesia
At the time of the decentralization reform, district governments inherited a school system
that operated according to centrally determined rules governing the employment and
deployment of teachers, the curriculum, teachers’ education, school inspections, teachers’
performance, and information systems. The
system was designed and structured in such a
way that districts and provinces fed educationrelated information upwards to the central
government (without receiving any information in return. In turn, the central government
made all decisions pertaining to the procurement and distribution of all education inputs
such as school buildings, books, teachers, and
in-service training.
The analysis in this chapter is based on: (i) a
review of Indonesia’s laws, regulations, policy
documents, implementation guidelines, project
reports, statistics, and media surveys; (ii) an
international literature review; (iii) interviews
with key stakeholders and focus group research in Jakarta, Bandung, Makassar, and
Bandar Lampung (with additional focus
groups to be conducted in three rural districts
by the end of November); and, (iv) a forum
held by the Government of Indonesia and its
development partners and feedback on early
drafts of this chapter from experts in Indonesia
with extensive knowledge and field experience
of the education system. The chapter reviews
proposed strategies, current practices and relevant international experience to construct a career-long
teacher
development
and
management framework. Some elements of
this framework are already being discussed by
the MoNE and various districts, while others
represent a major departure from the current
and proposed teacher management systems.
However, the situation was more complex
than this summary might indicate. For example, public primary schools (sekolah dasar)
were managed by the MoHA at the district
level; specifically, the local government was
responsible for the 3Ms (manpower, money,
and materials) for primary schools, while the
curriculum and quality issues were managed
by the MoNE representative at the district or
province level. On the other hand, the MoNE
managed public secondary schools. Public
schools in the madrasah system were, and
continue to be, centrally managed by the
MoRA. Public teachers were, and still are,
civil servants (pegawai negri) who taught and
still teach in public, madrasah, and private
schools. In addition, there were contract
teachers (mostly employed through central
projects financed by donors and “voluntary”
teachers who were paid an honorarium (guru
honor) from the parents’ contribution to their
children’s school or through the school’s
foundation (yayasan).
Contract teachers
mostly taught in public schools, while voluntary teachers could be found in both public
and private schools.
The chapter is organized in the following way.
First we look at some key characteristics of
schools and teachers in the changing context
in Indonesia. Second, we review the main
changes in teacher management arising from
decentralization and education laws, stakeholders’ perceptions of these changes, and the
initiatives being taken by district governments.
Third, we discuss the main issues related to
teacher management in Indonesia and look at
some lessons from international experience.
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Chapter 4
Teacher Management System
Then, as now, there is a wide variation among
districts in their capacity to meet national targets and to provide a supportive environment
for teachers and for schools. Variations in
population density, financial resources, administrative capabilities, and progress in meeting
the national education goal (nine years basic
education for all) make it impossible for central policymakers to develop an effective onesize-fits-all formula for teacher development
and management. For example, some districts
are experiencing periodic civil disturbances
(these include not only Aceh but also districts
in Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and parts of
Papua), thus making it difficult for them to
employ and retain teachers. In other districts,
where most of the population lives in accessible areas, it is relatively easy to provide
enough schools, to staff them adequately, and
to give teachers regular professional support.
However, many districts have low population
densities and limited infrastructure, which
makes the task of teacher deployment much
more difficult.45
cruiting teachers to remote schools, and to develop school support systems to meet the
needs of small schools in isolated areas or
conflict plagued environments. Districts in
these situations may not have enough technical and financial resources to meet the needs
of large numbers of remote schools, although
the districts within any given province often
vary considerably in the amount of resources
that they have available to provide incentives
to teachers (according to provincial economic
data from The MoNE’s Research and Development Center (Balitbang). On the other
hand, in other parts of the country, there are
large urban districts where land is scarce and
past policies created multiple primary schools
on a single site, each with its own administrative system. Most of these local governments
are now streamlining these schools into a single institution and teacher management system, thus reducing the numbers of head
teachers, administrative staff, and specialist
teachers as well as rationalizing the use of
various physical resources.
Decentralization provides an opportunity for
each district to create a teacher management
and development system that meets its unique
needs, but few districts have the financial or
technical capacity to do so. For example, in
the province of East Kalimantan, some districts are able to equip their schools and to
provide teachers with financial incentives and
access to professional support systems even in
remote areas, but other districts do not have
the same level of local resources to draw upon.
There are many rural, remote districts such as
those in the eastern islands and in mountainous environments such as in Papua, Java, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi that have difficult
decisions to make about how best to spend
scarce resources, to provide incentives for re-
Some districts are beginning to reorganize
their teacher management systems to align
them with the newly decentralized decision
making structure by adopting information systems that are more open to the public by involving local communities in education
decision making, and by setting staffing and
performance targets that are appropriate to
their particular circumstances. Now that they
have greater control over their budgetary resources, district governments are becoming
more aware of inefficiencies that were inherent in many previous policies. For example,
in the past, primary schools were expected to
employ a minimum of nine teachers regardless
of the number of students that were enrolled,
while in junior secondary schools, teachers
were often employed to teach only one subject
regardless of the school’s size and need.
Some districts are already distributing and using teachers more efficiently in their schools.
45
Although four provinces have population densities between 500 to 1000 people per square kilometer, more than half of the provinces have
population densities of fewer than 100 people per
square kilometer. The extremes are Papua with five
people and DKI Jakarta with 12,645 people per
square kilometer.
Indonesia is not alone in struggling with
teacher
management
issues
under
decentralization.
A group of education
planners in several Latin American countries
assessed the impact of different policies to
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Box 4.1 Cost-effective Strategies for Raising Academic Achievement
A group of education planners from a number of Latin American countries examined the cost-effectiveness
of about 40 policy interventions that aimed to raise students’ academic achievement. The group measured the
cost-effectiveness of the interventions according to the estimated impact of the intervention on academic
achievement (as measured by a standardized test of mathematics and reading at the primary grade 6 level),
the probability of the intervention being properly implemented, and the estimated cost of implementing the
intervention. Of the 40 policy interventions examined, the top five most cost- effective interventions were
(starting with the best): (i) assigning the best teachers to the first grade, (ii) enforcing the official length of
the school year, (iii) not switching classroom teachers during the school year, (iv) testing 10 percent of grade
4 students annually and distributing the results to teachers, and (v) decentralizing school management. The
first three of these interventions are not very costly but greatly increase teachers’ productivity and school performance.
The group found that four policy interventions had the greatest possible impact on improving school quality
and learning achievement. These were (starting with the most effective): (i) providing teaching and learning
materials and training teachers to use them, (ii) providing self-directed learning materials to teachers without
any accompanying teacher training, (iii) providing a package of interventions to at-risk schools including
self-learning materials, training in active and cooperative learning, hands-on workshops on modern teaching
methods community involvement in school decisionmaking, school-based management, formative evaluation
of the intervention package, and systematic testing and feedback, of student learning, and (iv) paying teachers higher salaries to work in rural areas and assigning the best teachers to the first grade of primary school.
All of these interventions have costs attached, and the probability of them being fully implemented is lower
than the chance that the five most cost-effective interventions above will be implemented.
Source: Schieflebein et al, 1998.
tricts to produce some school-age population
projections (say, for 10-15 years ahead) and
then to match these to projections of primary
school enrollment rates and to the qualifications and age group profiles of the existing
population of certified teachers.
impact of different policies to improve school
quality that the governments of these countries
had introduced over time (Schieflebein et al,
1998). The education planners ranked the impact of these policies on student achievement,
taking into account the cost and degree of difficulty of introducing each innovation. Several of these have implications for teacher
management. The results of this exercise are
summarized in Box 4.1.
The decentralization legislation clearly allocates the responsibility for teacher management to the districts. Given the vast range of
different types of schools and of varying district capacities, the national and provincial
governments will have to continue to play an
important role in teacher management and development in the medium term. For example,
the provincial quality assurance institute described in Chapter 3 on quality can help districts to build their capacity to monitor
teachers’ performance so that this monitoring
system can contribute to the lifelong professional development of teachers and head
teachers.
One of the key challenges in teacher management is estimating the number of teachers that
will be needed in the future. Districts may
require financial and technical assistance from
higher levels of government so that they can
build their capacity to gather information
about the supply of and demand for teachers in
the future. The demographic shift caused by
declining birthrates and rising primary and
junior secondary school enrollments implies
that there is likely to be a decrease in the demand for primary school teachers and an increase in the need for secondary school
teachers in the future. The central and provincial governments might consider helping dis-
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Chapter 4
Allocation
Functions
of
Teacher
Management
Changes in Teacher Management
Systems as a Result of Decentralization
When teacher management systems are changing, this can be a good opportunity to implement new ways to achieve education goals.
However, during the period of transition there
can sometimes be tensions and opportunistic
behavior at the school and district levels in the
appointment, deployment, and promotion of
teachers. Because of the magnitude of the
changes that have been taking place since
2001, there is likely to be a certain amount of
confusion and upheaval as local governments
redefine their roles and relationships, debate
how best to allocate and manage resources,
and learn to become more democratic and accountable to civil society. We look at some of
these changes in this sub-section through the
lenses of the regulations that govern the management of teachers, the perceptions of stakeholders, and the experiences of district
governments.
The implementation of the decentralization
laws is changing how civil servants, including
teachers, are managed. At the time when decentralization was introduced, large numbers
of civil servants who up until then had been
employed by central line agencies, such as the
former Department of Education and Culture,
were reassigned to district and provincial education units along with budget allocations to
cover their salaries. A freeze and budgetary
ceiling on civil service recruitment (including
public teachers) have been in place ever
since.47 The government has begun to introduce civil service reforms in line with the decentralization of governance and management
structures, including revisions to salary scales.
It is also reviewing some teacher management
systems, especially those relating to performance standards and recruitment and deployment.
Because of ambiguities in the
decentralization law and regulations regarding
the assignment of some key teacher management functions, there is still some overlap and
duplication between the districts and those
agencies who were previously responsible for
carrying out those functions in the predecentralization era.
In a decentralized teacher management system, the main role of the central government
should ideally be to develop a national teaching service that sets minimum teaching standards and minimum salary scales and develops
guidelines for promotions and incentives. The
provincial education units would be responsible for ensuring that districts were able to
meet their statutory obligations for providing
basic education of a sufficiently high quality.46
They would also be equipped to advise districts on school improvement and teacher development and to ensure that teachers could be
deployed across districts if and when required.
District governments would be responsible for
the employment and deployment of teachers
and for the payment of their base salary (the
national minimum) and any additional benefits
and incentives, for monitoring teacher performance, and for ensuring that teachers had
regular access to professional development
programs linked to their school activities.
The implementation of the school-based management of education and the creation of district education boards is changing the nature of
teachers’ accountability and their incentives to
perform well. These changes mean that the
decisions about a school’s resources and goals
are made by those who know are in the best
position to understand the circumstances that
prevail at that school, which is a highly desirable outcome. However, they also put a heavier burden on teachers, school principals,
school committees, and parents to work together to assess the school’s performance and
to achieve better student learning outcomes.
A number of projects are currently helping
46
47
This proposal should be vigorously debated as it
does not conform to the principles of decentralization in Indonesia.
However, the recruitment of contract teachers is
a special case. This is discussed later in the chapter.
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benefits and incentives. While the districts
have the option to dismiss contract teachers48
or not to renew their contracts, it is still not
clear whether or not district governments can
reduce the teaching force by dismissing some
civil service teachers, as they might want to do
if they were to rationalize their teacher/student
ratios or to adjust to lower enrollment due to a
declining school-age population. Currently,
many teachers are under the impression that
they cannot apply for vacancies in a different
district, but this may be because districts want
to retain the civil servants whom they already
employ. Nor are there any good mechanisms
by which schools and districts can advertise
teaching vacancies beyond district boundaries
to recruit those teachers who may be best
suited to that particular school.
teachers, head teachers, and school supervisors
to develop the necessary capacity to meet the
requirements of school-based management
and to improve school performance. District
education managers are receiving technical
support and training under ongoing MoNE
projects (such as the DBEP, the BSE, the JSE,
and the Unit Facilitasi in areas of school mapping), teacher deployment, and quality improvement planning to help them to fulfill
their new obligatory functions. However,
there are over 420 district governments in Indonesia with very different capacities, and not
all of these activities are taking place in all
districts, which means that progress is very
uneven.
Responsibility for the Employment and
Deployment of Teachers
Although district governments are responsible
for hiring teachers and paying their salaries,
some ambiguities remain in the system. For
example, madrasah teachers who are civil servants are still managed by the MoRA which,
unlike the MoNE, has not been decentralized.
Districts, through the MoHA, have always
been responsible for deploying teachers, but
with the establishment of school committees
and education boards, schools and districts
may take on a bigger role in selecting and appointing teachers, especially head teachers.49
District governments are bound by the central
government’s zero recruitment policies for the
civil service, which have been implemented
over the past few years. This applies as much
to teachers as to other civil servants. For example, if a district government wishes to hire
any additional teachers, the district must pay
for them from their own resources. The Ministry of Finance will not grant districts any in-
Under the decentralization laws, the district
government is responsible for employing all
public school teachers except those in madrasah schools. This includes all the civil service teachers (pegawai negeri) in public and
private schools (mostly secondary schools)
who were previously hired and paid for by the
central government. Wages for public teachers are transferred to the districts’ budgets
(APBD) as part of their block grant (DAU)
from the central government. There are also
districts that have hired contract teachers
(guru kontrak) as part of projects funded by
loans made by donors to the central government. The salaries of these teachers do not
appear in the district budget but are funded by
these MoNE-managed projects through the
DIP mechanism. The status of these contract
teachers will be reviewed when these donorfunded projects end, although attempts by donors to design an exit strategy have been preempted by the central government’s decision
to recruit an additional 190,000 contract
teachers, which it is no longer supposed to do.
48
Contract teachers are not civil servants. They are
contracted to the MoNE for a period of three years
at fixed rates.
49
Three districts in Flores, with the support of
AusAID, are piloting just such community participation in determining selection criteria for teachers
and head teachers and in participating in the selection of teachers and head teachers.
The salary levels and promotional and reward
systems for civil servants are still set centrally,
although many districts provide teachers
within their jurisdiction with supplementary
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Chapter 4
creases in their budget allocations to recruit
additional civil servants (see Chapter 2).
Responsibility for Teachers’ Professional
Development and Career Development
Responsibility for Setting and Monitoring
Initial teacher preparation remains the function
of universities and teacher training institutes
that are accredited by the MoNE’s Directorate
of Higher Education. This applies also to programs for upgrading teachers’ qualifications
and to further education courses for teachers.
There are ongoing discussions about how to
make both the universities and the accrediting
board more autonomous and how to make the
process of accreditation more demanding and
competitive so that teacher education programs in universities will become more responsive to the needs of schools (the service
providers) and district governments (the employers). Where the responsibility rests for the
continuing professional development of teachers is more ambiguous. Most school-based
and cluster-based professional development
activities carried out in Indonesia (for which it
has a well-earned reputation) were supported
in the past by projects funded by donors or by
the MoNE. Now districts are responsible for
providing in-service training and professional
support activities, but few have the resources
or the motivation to do so. Provincial teacher
training centers (Balai Pelatihan Guru and
Pusat Peninkatan dan Pelatihan Guru) are deconcentrated branches of the MoNE and, as
such, are expected to provide both quality assurance and in-service teacher education support to districts.
As discussed in Chapter 3 on quality, the
MoNE is developing minimum service standards for districts’ obligatory functions and
education standards for schools through several different parallel processes. Associated
with these activities (or independently of them
in some cases), different units of the MoNE
are developing performance standards that will
affect teachers.
The Directorate of Higher Education has developed standards that trainee teachers must
meet to be allowed to graduate from the DII
teacher education program (a two-year postsecondary school teaching diploma needed to
teach in primary schools) and is expecting to
continue this exercise for the other teacher
preparation programs under its accreditation
control (such as the DIII, which is a three-year
diploma required to teach in junior secondary
schools, and S1 or undergraduate degree).
These graduating standards apply to the accreditation of teacher education programs and
define in some detail what an Indonesian
graduate teacher should know and be able to
do. Complementary to this, the Directorate of
Education Personnel is preparing teacher
competency standards for serving teachers to
be used in assessing their performance and
identifying their professional development
needs.
The ways in which the lifelong education of
teachers relates to their career, promotion, and
incentive structures have not been clearly articulated in the past. This needs to be addressed, especially in the context of decentralization. We will look at these issues in
more detail later in the chapter.
It is expected that these competency standards
will be used by quality assurance institutes in
the provinces acting on behalf of the MoNE.
The role of these quality assurance institutes is
still being developed, and, as yet, no clear
guidelines have been developed for their
monitoring activities, but it is likely that these
will be based on criteria related to the obligatory functions and minimum service standards
that are also being developed.
Table 4.1 summarizes the changes in teacher
management functions for public general
schools (not madrasahs) resulting from decentralization.
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Table 4.1 Teacher Management Functions for Public Schools (except Madrasahs)
after Decentralization
Decisionmaker
Decisionmaking Process
Pre-decentralization
Post-decentralization
Management function
Teacher employment, deployment
x Selection
x Appointment
x Deployment
x Transfer
x Promotion
x Conditions of service (salary
scales, incentive systems)
x Dismissal/rehiring
Public teachers: By central
authority deconcentrated to
provincial government.
Process governed by civil
service regulations and uses
credit point system
Contract teachers: Through
centrally funded projects,
not subject to civil service
regulation
Public teachers: By local government under national civil service
guidelines
Contract teachers: Unchanged
Permanent teachers: Unchanged
Temporary teachers: Unchanged
Permanent teachers: By
private foundations, not subject to civil service regulation
Teacher performance
x Standards setting
x Performance monitoring
x Sanctions and remediation
Temporary teachers: By
schools, not subject to civil
service regulation
Primary
Public Teachers: By the
MoNe and monitored by district circuit inspectors based
in sub-districts
Contract Teachers: By centrally funded projects
foundations and foundation
inspectors
schools
134
Primary
Public Teachers: By districts and
schools
Contract Teachers: Unchanged
Chapter 4
Management function
Decisionmaker
Pre-decentralization
Decisionmaking Process
Post-decentralization
Junior secondary Public
Teachers: By the MoNE and
monitored by national circuit
inspectors working out of
the provincial MoNE offices
Junior secondary
Public Teachers: By districts
Contract Teachers: By centrally funded projects monitored by projects and by
circuit inspectors
foundation
Teacher professional development
x Initial preparation
x Induction
x Continued professional development
school
Public teachers: By centrally
accredited teacher training
institutions, through public
examinations, by individual
opportunity through credit
system
Contract teachers: By centrally accredited teacher
training institutions, through
public examinations, by individual opportunity through
project
Public Teachers: Unchanged
school
school
held that brought all teachers, head teachers,
and supervisors together. The focus group facilitators then discussed the findings of all of
the group sessions with a representative group
of district managers. The district education
officers in Bandar Lampung and in Makassar
chose which teachers and head teachers would
participate in the focus groups on the basis of
sampling criteria agreed between them and the
ESR team. These teachers were representative
of primary and junior secondary schools in the
public, private, and madrasah sectors and included both public servants and contract
teachers as well as equal numbers of male and
female teachers. The district managers were
Stakeholder Perceptions of Teacher
Management
As part of the consultative processes of the
World Bank’s Education Sector Review, a
number of focus group meetings were held to
learn about the experiences and perceptions of
key stakeholders regarding decentralization
and its impact on teacher management issues.
Two initial sets of meetings were held in Bandar Lampung and in Makassar over the course
of a week. Separate focus groups of teachers,
head teachers, and school supervisors all discussed the characteristics of good teacher
management. In addition, one meeting was
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Volume 2
cess by the results of the students’ final
examination and by how many children
are accepted by the secondary school of
their choice. Teachers who have benefited from performance monitoring
pointed out that at least now this is done
at the district level and not far away in
Jakarta, which they saw as an advantage.
On the other hand, the school supervisors, who were formerly accountable for
school monitoring, felt that the district
government was now taking over this responsibility, leaving them with less of a
role in supervising schools and teachers.
represented by local government personnel
from the district parliament and education and
planning offices (Dinas Pendidkan, Dinas
Agama, Pemda, and Komisi A).
Here are a few highlights to illustrate the
views that emerged from the focus group exercise:
x Since decentralization, teaching vacancies are advertised in the local media.
These advertisements provide the public
with information about the position and
location of the job and invite interested
teachers to apply. However, since decentralization, it has become more difficult for teachers to apply for transfers or
promotions out of their original districts.
The teachers and head teachers in the focus groups were concerned about this.
They also expressed considerable concern about the lack of transparency involved in the appointment, transfer, and
promotion of teachers under decentralization and about the high cost to individuals arising from the ”fees” (bribes
and other payments to facilitate results)
that they have to pay to assist these
processes. In many cases, these payments (in cash or kind) are beyond the
means of teachers who might otherwise
be eligible for a position. The teachers
claimed that this kind of rent seeking has
become worse since decentralization.
x Except for teachers in schools that are
part of ongoing projects (such as the
BSE, the JSE, and the DBEP) funded by
the national government, there are few
resources or opportunities for teachers to
participate in any kind of professional
development programs (such as inservice training or workshops). Education managers themselves said that district education budgets are not large
enough to fund teacher development activities on a regular basis.
Further focus group meetings of education
stakeholders are planned over the next few
months in a wider range of districts, including
districts in rural and island areas and districts
with different levels of prosperity and with
different population densities and numbers of
schools. As the first two sessions were held in
urban districts, it is planned to include rural
and remote districts in the next round to get a
balanced perspective.
x Although this is not a specific impact of
decentralization, teachers were concerned about the infrequency of performance evaluations and the poor
quality of performance monitoring (by
head teachers or district school supervisors). They considered supervision to be
too focused on administrative aspects
and not sufficiently on giving teachers
feedback about their teaching methods.
However, as the teachers also pointed
out, there are few opportunities for promotion or any other incentives for either
school managers or teachers to justify
more frequent performance evaluations.
Parents tend to measure a teacher’s suc-
District-led Initiatives
Many districts are responding with enthusiasm
and initiative to their new responsibilities,
which are giving them a much greater incentive to examine the quality and efficiency of
the education provided within their boundaries. Because resources are now allocated by
democratically elected district parliaments, the
district planning office is taking a greater role
in both preparing budget proposals and defending the allocation of resources.
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Chapter 4
These days, education initiatives often originate within district governments (in other
words, within the leadership of the Bupati
through the Bappeda to the Dinas units), especially as they examine ways to use their resources more efficiently. Several districts have
been merging several small schools into one,
redeploying school principals and teachers to
understaffed schools based on more efficient
student/teacher ratios, and are discussing the
relative merits of civil service teachers and
contract teachers.50
instead are buying books and learning materials.
Need for a New Teacher Management
Framework
Good governance and management require information, accountability, and incentives.
From the examples given above, it can be seen
that districts and schools now have much
greater incentives to make use of information
that formerly was only passed up to the central
education authorities. For example, many districts are seeing that the analysis of these data
can help them to use their resources more efficiently. Now that elected local governments
are making decisions about budget allocations
and schools have a greater say in how they are
managed, there is increasing evidence of both
better planning and greater accountability to
the community. However, the central government still has an important role to play in
advertising examples of good practice and in
providing incentives and technical support to
district governments who wish to try out innovative ideas and who need to develop the capacity to do so.
In cases where schools have been merged and
the number of school principal posts have decreased, there is a danger that tensions will
arise between those who lose out and those
who retain their jobs. District governments
are finding ways to deal with these situations –
for example, school principals who had previously been evaluated and had lost their jobs
due to poor performance as administrators
have been asked to return to teaching. In
some cases, natural attrition by retirement
solves the problem; in other cases, school
principals may have chosen to retire or to seek
other work. School committees in some welldeveloped areas have been using their resources to allow teachers to attend in-service
or other professional development programs
(as is happening in several districts in East
Java under the UNESCO/UNICEF project). In
many cases, this builds on practices begun under such projects as the Junior Secondary
Education and Basic Education projects.
Most of the key issues on the subject of
teacher management are the same after decentralization as they were before. The relevant
question is how these issues have been altered
by decentralization and how to create an effective teaching service within the context of
autonomous district governments and of
school-based management systems. We propose a new teacher management framework
consisting of three teacher management subsystems: teachers’ employment and conditions
of service, teaching performance standards
and performance monitoring, and teachers’
professional development. These are discussed in the next three sections.
Districts now are taking the initiative to focus
directly on teachers’ classroom behavior as a
way of improving school quality rather than
relying solely on physical inputs such as
school buildings. The teacher is seen as being
central to this goal, and thus districts are putting a high priority on ensuring that they have
adequate skill levels. For example, some districts have put a temporary embargo on funding physical infrastructure programs and
Transparent Employment Processes
and Conditions of Service
Advocates of decentralization contend that the
more that school managers and teachers can
participate in making the decisions that affect
their schools, the more likely it will be that
those decisions will meet the needs of their
50
Based on the pilot activities of the District Basic
Education Project, Unit Facilitasi, the MoNE, and
the Basic Education Project.
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teachers and 6.2 percent are sports teachers.
Head teachers, religion teachers, and sports
teachers rarely have a full teaching load, regardless of the size of the school where they
are employed. When the student/teacher ratio
is calculated using class teachers only, the national ratio is 32:1, which is still reasonably
low compared with countries at a similar level
of economic development.
students. Similarly, if school managers (as
opposed to higher-level education authorities)
can make the decisions regarding the hiring
and firing of teachers in their schools, then
they will be able to build a strong teaching
force. Some of the burning questions being
considered at all levels of government revolve
around who determines the number of teachers
that are required, who determines how much
teachers should be paid and why, and what
elements should comprise their pay. We have
two policy recommendations: (i) establishing
a transparent teacher appointment process
based on efficient deployment norms, school
vacancies, advertisement, selection criteria,
contractual arrangements, and public information and (ii) establishing a compensation and
rewards system that is clear, transparent, and
guided by considerations of teachers’ qualifications, responsibilities, and motivations for
continuous development. Implementing these
policies would require a dramatic shift from a
focus on numbers of schools to numbers of
students and from teachers’ credentials to
classroom practices.
Student-based
Formula
Teacher
As in primary schools, the national student/teacher ratios for junior secondary
schools are 16:1 in public schools and 10:1 in
madrasahs.51 Junior secondary school teachers
expect to teach only one subject52 and, no matter how small the school, each school expects
to have at least 18 teachers. The mean enrollment size of public junior secondary
schools (SMP) is 358 students, and in religious junior secondary schools (madrasah
tsanawiyah), 182 students. At the primary
school level, 93.4 percent of teachers are national civil servants. The remainder are voluntary teachers (guru honor) or teachers
employed by the school. Compared with primary school teachers, only 62 percent of junior secondary school teachers are permanent
civil servants (who, like primary school teachers, are employed by the district governments), which means that a much higher share
of these teachers are employed by the schools
or as contract teachers than in primary
schools.
Allocation
Indonesia uses a formula for teacher allocation
and deployment that is based on the number of
schools not on the number of students. As a
result, nationally, average class sizes and the
ratio of students to teachers are both low at all
levels of education, although there are differences among districts and between schools in
rural areas and those in urban areas. Based on
the total number of teachers in primary
schools (including head teachers, religion
teachers, sports teachers, and class teachers),
the national student/teacher ratio is 22:1 in
public primary schools (sekolah dasar) and
14:1 in religious primary schools (madrasah
ibtidaiyah). These low ratios are not an efficient use of resources, especially when there
are few resources available for other quality
inputs (such as textbooks, library books,
equipment, and in-service training for teachers). However, in public primary schools,
only 68.4 percent of teachers are class teachers. Of the remainder, 12.9 percent are religion
The introduction of decentralization has created an opportunity to link teacher management to local education priorities.
Past
policies on teacher recruitment and deployment are being revisited as local governments
try to balance their allocations of resources to
the budget for teachers’ salaries and to the
51
The MoRA has pointed out that many teachers in
madrasahs are part-time teachers, and it is not clear
that this estimate is based on full-time teaching
equivalents. The Madrasah Education System Assessment (MESA) team is investigating this further.
52
Also, in junior secondary schools, there may be
differences in the availability of teachers of different subjects.
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Chapter 4
students and total number of teachers to manage). Planners might consider a sliding scale
so that smaller schools have more generous
student/teacher ratios than larger schools. In
India, each community with 40 children is entitled to one teacher per school, and schools
are allowed one extra teacher with every 40
additional children enrolled.53 The principle
behind a sliding scale is that small schools
where multi-grade teaching is the norm should
have fewer students per class (and thus per
teacher) than bigger schools where the teacher
only has to teach one grade level.
budget for other quality inputs to schools. For
many districts, the most difficult questions involved in widening secondary school access
and increasing efficiency at both the primary
and secondary school levels are likely to be
about changing student/ teacher ratios (at the
primary school level particularly) and recruiting secondary school teachers who are qualified to teach more than one subject.
For example, at the primary school level, there
may be a justification for locating schools as
close as possible to where children live. In
many districts, this would result in a large
number of small schools (sekolah kecil), especially in the eastern islands, Papua, central Kalimantan, and other rural districts throughout
Indonesia. This would mean a policy change
in that teachers would have to be recruited on
the basis of a school’s enrollment rate rather
than its number of classes as is presently the
case. Small schools often require teachers
who are trained to teach multi-grade classes
and need to be supported with learning materials that enable students to work in groups.
Therefore, there is likely to be a significant
need for incentive schemes and professional
support services to encourage teachers to acquire the necessary skills for teaching in small
rural schools.
Teacher Surplus. Up until the 1990s, the
struggle was to maintain parity between the
supply of teachers and the growing numbers of
schools. At this juncture, however, it is necessary to re-examine the commonly held assumption among policymakers that Indonesia
suffers from a shortage of teachers. We contend that this assumption is false and that gaps
in coverage are due to inefficient teacher distribution rather than to a teacher shortage.
This apparent teacher shortage is a result of
the allocation formula used to calculate the
number of teachers required in each district.
Indonesia’s annual population growth is 1.6
percent (compared with 1.1 percent in East
Asia and the Pacific as a whole), and the birth
rate is falling. Of course, this does not mean
that there are no gaps in coverage in Indonesia, but the gaps in the primary sector are
problems of distribution rather than supply. In
many parts of the country, there are pockets of
teacher shortages alongside pockets of surpluses. In one district in West Java, for example, shortages range from an extreme of 173 in
an isolated rural school far from public trans-
Many existing small junior secondary schools
could also be amalgamated to form more efficient units. If this is to happen, then junior
secondary school teachers will need to be able
to teach more than one subject, which has implications for teacher training and teacher development programs.
We recommend that district planners consider
a new formula for calculating teacher requirements. This formula should be based on
the number of students enrolled in a school
rather than the number of classes. In addition,
all teachers (including sports and religion
teachers) should have a full teaching load and
be included in the formula on that basis. Head
teachers, especially in small schools, should
also be class teachers with amounts of nonteaching time to be calculated on the basis of
the school’s size (that is, the total number of
53
One proposal put forward in the past in Indonesia (Somerset, 1997) laid out a sliding scale based
on school enrollments for calculating the provision
of teachers, which would be more efficient than the
present formula. Small schools with fewer than
130 students would be eligible for one teacher for
every 30 children, larger schools with between 130
and 200 students would be eligible for one teacher
for every 35 children enrolled, and schools with
over 200 students would be eligible for one teacher
for every 40 children enrolled.
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throughout the country. There was no shortage of applicants – over 400,000 people applied. Teachers will be contracted to the
central government for four years and will receive Rp. 460,000 as monthly base salary from
the central government, with any additional
benefits expected to be funded by the district
governments.
portation and other services to only 9.4 in a
small school in a peri-urban area near the district’s center. This is not uncommon as will
be seen in the discussion below. In the past,
the MoNE assumed that all primary schools
needed one teacher per grade level plus two
additional full-time teachers, one for physical
education and health and one for religion as
well as a non-teaching head teacher. The
MoNE continued to use this formula in its recent recruitment drive for contract teachers.
This formula substantially overestimates the
number of teachers needed in schools, especially in small schools. For example, in one
school in a district in Java with a student/teacher ratio of 9:4, the average class
consists of only 11 children, with 66 pupils
distributed among only six classes (Weston,
2003). This school currently has seven teachers, but according to the MoNE’s teacher formula, the school still “needs” an additional
teacher, which would give it a student/teacher
ratio of 8:3. If the formula is applied to all
schools in the district and all these teachers
were supplied, the student/teacher ratio for
that district would drop to about 13:1, which is
even lower than in the most developed countries of the world.
The role of the central government in recruiting teachers has become a sore point for many
districts, especially those that are themselves
in the process of rationalizing schools and reexamining the formula by which teachers are
appointed to schools (Weston, 2003). These
new teacher appointments have been spread
across districts but are not based on actual
need. Seven districts in Java and Sulawesi
that do not have large shortages of teachers are
all due to receive between 300 and 800 contract teachers, and another district, which can
only be described as having a potential surplus
of teachers, is to receive 399 contract teachers.
Donor-funded education projects are also supporting the salaries of contract teachers. Under project-related agreements between district
governments and donors, contract teachers
hired under these projects are supposed to be
employed by the districts directly while the
donors guarantee their salaries. However, the
central government has by-passed these arrangements by going ahead and recruiting
contract teachers directly and paying them
from the national budget.
With high enrollment rates and an already
plentiful supply of teachers, Indonesia is in a
position to rationalize and upgrade the teaching force at the primary school level. This
would allow districts to channel more of their
resources into quality inputs and to fund the
salaries of the additional teachers that will be
required at the secondary level, which is
where the education system will be expanding
in the future.
The district governments surveyed by Weston
(2003) would like teachers to be selected and
employed at the district or even the school
level, with the central government having no
power to select or employ teachers. This is
compatible with the intention of Indonesia’s
decentralization laws and the purposes of the
general allocation funding to districts. A new
system is needed for selecting, appointing, and
transferring teachers based on student/ teacher
enrollment needs and other criteria related to
the need for multi-grade teaching in small
schools. Also, the rules governing the employment, deployment, and transfer of teachers need to be sufficiently flexible to allow
Centrally Recruited Teachers. Despite the decentralization of education management to the
district level, the MoNE is still funding and
managing the appointment of contract teachers
across the country. The MoNE is testing applicants, determining who can be employed,
issuing their contracts, and paying their salaries. The MoNE has recruited 190,000 contract teachers in 2003 to be deployed across all
levels of the school system, 20 percent of
whom are to be employed in private schools
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Chapter 4
cult” so that their teachers would be paid
more. If each district has the power to set topup allowances for its own schools in a transparent way, then this would be an efficient
way to attract teachers to rural areas. Brazil
has tried such an approach, and the results are
included in Appendix 4.2 on relevant international experience.
schools to hire teachers from outside their own
districts and for teachers to be able to transfer
to other districts when appropriate.
Performance-based Compensation and
Rewards
Designing teacher salaries and incentive structures that attract the best and the brightest to
the teaching profession and retain them is a
complex enterprise. In Indonesia, low salaries
are often seen as being an important contributing factor to poor teacher performance, low
teacher morale, and the low quality of entrants
into the teaching profession, but is this actually so? Research from Indonesia indicates
that teacher salaries are not low compared
with other professions and international research draws no correlation between teacher
salary increases and improvements in teaching
performance.
Policy decisions about teacher salaries also
need to be informed by research about the
most effective way to spend resources on education inputs. Research on education expenditure allocations (Pritchett and Filmer, 1999)
has shown that the marginal benefits per dollar
of inputs that are not associated with teachers’
salaries are commonly 10 to 100 times higher
than those of direct inputs to teachers’ welfare
(that is, their salaries and incentives). This
implies that too much is generally spent on inputs that provide direct benefits to educators
(like teachers’ wages) relative to the amount
spent on other inputs that contribute directly to
learning such as books or instructional materials.
We recommend that under decentralization,
teachers’ salary scales should have a national
base and then districts should be allowed to
top up salaries. This topping-up process
would need to be monitored by the central
government to ensure that the DAU allocations to districts are made sufficiently propoor so poorer districts can afford to add sufficient financial incentives to retain teachers,
especially if many of these are posted to remote schools. Care should be taken not to increase teachers’ base salaries to unsustainable
levels. Where material incentives seem to be a
useful policy tool, it would be better to offer
bonuses to supplement teachers’ remuneration
instead of altering their basic pay scales. Such
bonus systems could also be used to reward
teachers who take on extra responsibilities or
duties, to attract better candidates to the teaching profession, to encourage schools to improve their performance, and/or to attract
teachers to rural locations where there is a
scarcity of applications for vacant teaching
posts. Districts should be responsible for determining appropriate allowances and top-ups
for those teachers who work in remote locations or under difficult conditions. This should
not be done centrally because, if it were, then
all schools would try to be classified as “diffi-
Recent research shows that most Indonesian
primary school teachers and junior secondary
school teachers have earnings equivalent to or
higher than those of other workers with an
equivalent level of education. Teachers with a
university degree (that is, mostly those who
teach in senior secondary schools) may earn
slightly less than other workers with an
equivalent level of education.
However,
teachers earn more per hour than most other
workers and have many more days off per
year.
An analysis of labor force data from 2000
(Filmer, 2002) indicated that teachers with
qualifications below the diploma level (about
one-third of teachers) have monthly earnings
that are, on average, 22 percent higher than the
monthly earnings of other paid workers with
the same qualifications. The differential (in
terms of monthly salary) is smaller among
those with a first or second level diploma and
then becomes negative; in other words, the 10
percent of teachers with a third level diploma
and the 24 percent with a university degree
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schooling earn 61 percent more per hour,
teachers with first and second level diplomas
earn 32 percent more, and those with third
level diplomas earn 5 percent more than other
workers with the same levels of schooling.
However, among workers with a university
degree, teachers earn 19 percent less than others.
earn 18 and 37 percent less respectively than
other paid workers with the same levels of
education.
Hourly earnings follow a different profile
since teachers tend to work fewer hours but
are typically paid more per hour than other
workers. Teachers consistently work fewer
hours than other workers, regardless of their
level of education. Teachers in the study reported working about 34 hours per week while
other paid workers with similar levels of education reported working between 43 and 46
hours per week (see Table 4.2). Not only do
teachers work a shorter week than other paid
workers, but they also have more holidays per
year. Thus, teachers with senior secondary
Hence, after controlling for individual characteristics and the respondents’ region of residence, the study found that teachers earn 7.9
percent less per month than other paid workers, but at the same time they earn 18.9 percent more per hour than other workers. See
Table 4.2 for a comparison of the hours
worked by different types of teachers.
Balitbang of time spent on instructional tasks
indicate that teachers may spend only about
half of their time in school actually teaching.
The above-mentioned labor force study also
noted regional differences in teachers’ earnings. For example, in West Sumatra, the study
found that teachers earn 7.3 percent less per
month than teachers in West Java (controlling
for age, gender, urban residence, and educational attainment). Other workers in West Sumatra, however, earn 32.3 percent more than
workers in West Java do. Other places where
the differentials are large are Riau (20.7 percent), South Sumatra (19.3 percent), DKI Jakarta (28.2 percent), and Central and South
Kalimantan (24.3 and 35.3 percent). These
are provinces where teachers earn substantially less than other workers. The same
places have large differentials in terms of
hourly earnings as well. Conversely, there are
two provinces where teachers earn substantially more per month than other workers –
NTB (35.7 percent) and Central Sulawesi
(16.3 percent). In the case of hourly earnings,
two additional provinces make the list –
Yogyakarta (20.9 percent) and West Kalimantan (20.6 percent).
Table 4.2 Average Number of Hours Worked per
Week
Not
Teacher
All workers
2000)
a
Teacher
34.0 (8.5)
(SAKERNAS
44.7 (13.1)
Public school teachers (IFLS
2000)
Primary schools
--
33.6 (7.4)
Junior secondary schools
--
24.1 (7.9)
Primary schools
--
29.6 (10.3)
Junior secondary schools
--
21.8 (9.8)
Private school teachers (IFLS
2000)
Source: Filmer, 2002.
Notes: Data derived from SAKERNAS 2000 and from the
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 2000.
To compensate for this, managers need to be
concerned about teachers’ productivity, and
teachers need to be aware of the statutory
numbers of hours of instruction and school
days in a year that they are obligated to work.
School managers should be able to hold
schools and teachers accountable for their
productivity. For example, it is common in
many secondary schools for students to attend
Indonesian primary teachers have salaries that
are comparable to those paid to other workers
but are lower than the salaries paid to teachers
in other countries. However, this is partially
offset by the fact that they have smaller
classes, although they may work longer hours
than teachers in other East Asian countries
(OECD, 2002). However, studies by the
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Chapter 4
money against their future earnings. The incentive to meet these payments is, of course,
the increased salary and benefits of the promotion, but it also has to do with the increased
opportunity to generate additional income
from, for example, fees for after-school tuition
and examinations and commissions on the sale
of textbooks and school uniforms. Any study
of teachers’ earnings and salaries should take
into account the high cost to teachers (and to
the credibility of the whole education system)
of these kinds of “fees” and other rent-seeking
activities.
school only part-time in the last three weeks of
the term and to spend the rest of that time on
“home study” to prepare for the end-of-term
tests. After taking the test, the students might
not be required to attend school for up to one
week while their teachers mark their test papers. In return, school managers should be
able to ensure that teachers are deployed efficiently so that no teacher is burdened with
very large classes while others have small
classes. District governments (and supporting
institutions at the national level) need to consider these points as they try to balance their
expenditures on salaries with their expenditures on other valuable and complementary
inputs to schools.
Transparent teacher management systems
need to be put in place, and mechanisms must
be developed to address grievances. Indonesia
is not alone in recognizing the damage done to
the education system by poor teacher management practices. Issues of transparency (information, accountability, and incentives) and
what rights teachers have to receive redress for
their grievances about poor teacher management processes are being faced by a number of
countries. At the UNESCO International
Institute of Education Planning in Paris in
2002, meetings were held on the subject of
corruption in education in which several
countries admitted to having this problem.
For example, in Mexico, the high cost to
society of corruption was estimated to be
around 15 percent of GNP. In Ghana and
Nigeria, corruption abounds in school admissions, the payment of teachers’ salaries, and
the leak of examination questions to students.
In South Africa and Pakistan, public resources
were being diverted to fictitious schools,
teachers, and pupils as a result of poor data
monitoring and mis-reporting.
The research findings reported in this section
raise questions about the relationship between
teachers’ productivity and earnings. If the
number of applicants for vacancies is anything
to go by, the recent national recruiting exercise for contract teachers had a ratio of two
applicants per vacancy, which seems to indicate that teachers’ salaries are not a deterrent
to applicants.
The Impact of Corrupt Practices on
Teachers and Teaching
What Indonesian teachers earn and what
wages the teachers actually receive are not always the same. The ESR focus groups in
2003 found that teachers face high transaction
costs in the form of bribes during the process
of, for example, being employed, transferred,
promoted, or selected for in-service training.
A recent small survey of 70 schools with 130
teachers in eight provinces (Keluarga Sekolah
Indonesia, 2003) indicated that 80 percent of
teachers do not receive the full amount of their
pay and that 30 percent or more of their pay is
unofficially deducted by the education office
or by their school principals beforehand.
Hong Kong has been addressing corruption in
society in general. It established an anticorruption commission in 1973, which has a
sub-committee on education that deals, in particular with inappropriate allocations of funds
and with teachers’ inadequate professional
practices. Table 4.3 summarizes some of the
main ways in which corrupt practices in
teacher management affect quality, equity, and
ethical standards in the education sector.
In some cases, teachers seeking to be promoted to a head teacher position have had to
pay the equivalent of six to twelve months of
their salary to the education officials responsible for appointments in order to win the post.
Many teachers use their savings or borrow this
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Table 4.3 The Impact of Corrupt Practices within the Education Sector
Area of management involved
Recruitment, promotion, and appointment of teachers (including
systems of incentives)
Conduct of teachers
Allocation of specific allowances
(compensatory measures, fellowships, subsidies to the private sector etc)
Examinations and diplomas
Supply and distribution of equipment, food, and textbooks
Building of schools
Corrupt practices/ opportunities for corrupt practices
x Irregular recruitment and
unjustified allocations
x Unjustified promotions
x Training and scholarship
allocation by criteria
based on passing
x Payment of salaries and
allocations to ghost teachers
x Ignoring posting and
transfer criteria for teachers
(arising from favoritism, nepotism, bribes and pay-offs,
by-passing criteria)
x Teaching hours paid for as
opposed to the number
really delivered
x Ghost teachers
x Bribes and pay-offs (for
school entrance, for the
assessment of children,
etc)
x Use of fees requested from
pupils
x Favoritism
x Nepotism
x Bribes and pay-offs
x By-passing criteria
x Selling information
x Favoritism
x Nepotism
x Bribes and pay-offs
x Academic fraud
x Closed processes in public
tendering
x Embezzlement
x By-passing criteria
x Closed processes in public
tendering
x Embezzlement
x School mapping
Source: Hallak and Poisson, 2002 (adapted).
144
Elements of education systems
most affected
Quality
Access
Quality
Equity
Ethics
Access
Equity
Equity
Ethics
Equity
Access
Equity
Chapter 4
Box 4.2 Permanent or Contract Teachers?
Ibu Guru [the teacher’s real name has been changed] has been a primary school teacher for nine years. She
trained as a religion teacher. She was locally hired and is employed and paid directly by the school. Her
monthly pay is Rp. 100,000 and she teaches grade 1. She uses up-to-date pedagogic approaches and
achieves excellent results with her students. Her outstanding performance as a teacher came to the attention of education managers, and she was recruited to train teachers in other districts and provinces.
Most madrasahs and many primary and junior secondary schools rely on locally hired teachers who may be
paid in the range of Rp. 50,000– Rp. 125, 000 per month compared to the Rp. 500,000 and more per month
paid to teachers who are civil servants.
District managers (from 30 districts in 10 provinces) have acknowledged their reliance on locally hired
teachers and on the professionalism of many of these teachers. However, they have pointed out that, when
these teachers become members of the civil service, their performance often deteriorates.
The managers expressed the view that hiring new teachers on limited-term contracts would place them on a
similar basis to many private sector employees. Under-performing teachers could be more easily made redundant – good teachers need never fear redundancy. It would also mean that teachers could be placed in
schools as and when they are needed and the level of their wages tied to working in a particular school.
Source: Weston, 2003.
Teacher Motivation and Incentives
We recommend the creation of a teaching service that links the licensing of teachers, their
professional rights and obligations, their conditions of employment, and their career incentives and promotional paths to the needs of
schools and classrooms. Under the new system, teachers’ unions and associations would
protect teachers’ rights and thus empower the
members of this hitherto powerless profession.
What motivates teachers to enter and remain
in the profession is not solely related to their
salary levels. Other aspects of professional
life matter as well, including recognition from
the local community and from their peers, opportunities to share their experiences and to
learn from others, access to continuous professional development, and pride in their students’ achievements (see Box 4.2 below).
It is important to preserve a flexible teaching
force and a national teacher labor market as
much as possible. This would require putting
mechanisms in place to allow teachers to apply for vacancies in any district and for
schools to have a say in the selection of their
teachers. Districts need to be able to meet
supply and demand in more flexible ways than
is currently possible. The functioning of the
teacher labor market may well need a certain
degree of central direction and management
(in the form of standards and licensing) to ensure that it stays national, but the responsibility for allocating teachers to vacant posts in
schools can be decentralized. This would be
the best of both worlds. There should be a national pay scale or salary grading system based
on pre-set minimum pay levels, with districts
and schools having the option, as discussed
De-linking Teachers from the Civil
Service
The majority of school teachers are civil servants. However, a civil service exists to control and operate a bureaucracy, and it can be
argued that school teaching is not a bureaucratic activity. The teachers’ unions and other
professional associations are already discussing how best to establish a separate teaching
service. The benefits of having such a service
would be that it would better meet the professional needs of teachers by developing specific criteria for teachers’ professional career
development and reward systems rather than
using administrative criteria as happens now.
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above, to provide their teachers with supplementary benefits and allowances according to
criteria determined at the district or school
level. The minimum pay scales and conditions of service should emerge from a collective bargaining process between the national
government and teachers’ unions and professional associations. Through such a process, a
better balance could be struck between national and district priorities and the needs of
teachers than is currently the case.
School-oriented Performance Standards
and Monitoring
When schools perform well, it is due to a
combination of effective teaching and of
strong professional leadership by the school
principal. Under decentralization, school
committees and district governments expect to
hold schools and teachers accountable for
learning outcomes, but the way in which
school performance is currently measured is
not always based on the most value-added inputs, as became clear from the focus group
discussions discussed above.
The Indonesian Teachers’ Association (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia or PGRI)
represents the vast majority of teachers in Indonesia (1.4 million) and is naturally protective of its members. Since decentralization, it
is learning (with the support of the ILO) to act
in the interests of its members. The national
teachers’ association now has greater freedom
to act as a labor union with collective bargaining rights. Most teachers would probably regard salary increases as a higher priority than
other professional issues such as performance
monitoring or access to in-service training.
The PGRI was founded on November 25,
1945 and for several decades was a New Order organization representing teachers as civil
servants and Golkar party members rather than
a trade union. Newly founded independent
teachers’ unions cannot compete in size or
match the PGRI’s infrastructure, which it
holds from its pre-trade union existence (for
example, 17 out of 29 PGRI provincial committees have their own buildings and many
have teacher training institutes). The demand
for increases in salaries comes mainly from
teachers who, with the advent of local democracy and their newly unionized teachers’ association, are an increasingly powerful lobby.
However, teachers and their unions are selfinterested and are not always able to see the
public interest of the nation and to accept the
most efficient use of resources. Teachers tend
to assume that the two are the same thing, but
they are not.
Teaching is a complex operation. As summarized by Brophy and Everston (1976), effective teaching requires the ability to implement
a very large number of diagnostic, instructional, managerial, and therapeutic skills, with
teachers having to tailor their behavior in specific situations to the needs of the moment
while still performing effectively in the classroom.
Indonesia’s current standards for
evaluating teachers rely heavily on their credentials and years of experience, even though
research has demonstrated that having a more
educated and experienced teacher does not
necessarily lead students to learn more or better (Woessmann, 2001). However, research
has also shown that what teachers know and
are able to do does improve the academic performance of their students. For example, researchers in the U.S. have found that the
greater a teacher’s cognitive skills as demonstrated in a standardized test, the better his or
her students perform academically (Summers
and Wolfe, 1977; Strauss and Sawyer, 1986;
and Ferguson, 1990). Thus, rewarding teachers for what they actually know and do in the
classroom is likely to have a much greater impact on student performance than rewarding
them for their academic credentials and years
of experience (see also Darling-Hammond,
1997).
146
Chapter 4
Box 4.3 The Importance of Teacher Quality
A review of the literature indicates that a range of factors relating to teacher quality affects student performance (see OECD, 2002). However, the literature also reveals the limitations of the
information provided by the more measurable characteristics of teachers. Researchers have often
found it hard to isolate the effect of characteristics such as knowledge of subject-matter,
qualifications, academic ability, pedagogical knowledge, or teaching experience on student
outcomes. The evidence predominantly shows that all of these teacher characteristics have a
positive impact on student learning but to a lesser extent than might have been expected. One
possible explanation is that research studies looking at individual school systems with relatively
uniform teacher characteristics have not been able to observe sufficient variation in such factors
to be able to measure the difference that they make. In addition, for most of these characteristics,
a “threshold effect” is likely to apply; teachers need a certain level of qualifications or experience
to be effective, but further attainments beyond those levels may have progressively less of an
impact on student performance.
A further possible explanation is that the teacher characteristics that are typically measured in research studies may explain less of the variation in teacher quality than other characteristics that
are more difficult to measure. Such characteristics may include the ability to convey ideas in clear
and convincing ways, to work effectively with colleagues and the school community, to use a
wide range of teaching strategies appropriate for students’ needs, and enthusiasm, creativity, and
commitment to the students’ success. The literature reviewed in OECD (2001) includes recent
studies that point to the importance of such variables in influencing student learning. This suggests that policymakers need to take account of the potentially substantial variation in quality that
exists among teachers whose easily measured characteristics are similar.
Source: OECD, 2002.
We recommend that Indonesia should establish a
process for evaluating school performance that is
based on individual teacher performance reviews
that assess their value added to education processes and outcomes.
classrooms also remains to be accomplished.
Also, the teacher competencies and the school
performance measures that are currently being
developed are too centrist in their approach.
The OECD has analyzed what teacher characteristics have the greatest effect on improving
quality (see Box 4.3), and this analysis provides a good example of meaningful teacher
performance standards for a decentralized
education system. However, Indonesia has
begun to develop a career-long set of competency standards for teachers and ways to
measure their performance against these standards. Research from elsewhere in the world
has indicated which teacher characteristics and
behavior contribute the most to improving the
academic performance of students. An analysis of junior secondary school results from the
Third International Mathematics Survey
(Woessman, 2001) gave some illustrations of
teacher characteristics and behavior at the
school level that seem to improve students’
Furthermore, we recommend that those who
define the criteria for effective teaching in Indonesia (currently the MoNE) should more widely represent the key stakeholders in education. These
recommendations are based on our assessment that
current standards and performance assessment
practices have failed to improve the quality of teaching in Indonesian schools. International best
practices provide strong support for this recommendation as will be seen in Box 4.4.
The definition of effective teaching in the diverse environments of Indonesia’s schools is
still far from clear in the context of the new
decentralized education system. Designing
monitoring tools and training inspectors in
how to assess the many aspects of teaching in
147
Volume 2
Box 4.4 International Evidence on Schooling, Resources,
Educational Institutions and Student Performance
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Students of female teachers score higher than students of male teachers in both mathematics and science.
School autonomy in the purchase of supplies is associated with good academic performance by students.
Students in schools that were responsible for hiring their own teachers performed significantly better
in mathematics and science; thus school autonomy in personnel management seems highly conducive
to good student performance.
When individual teachers can choose which teaching method to use on the basis of what they think
would be best for their students, this helps students to learn more. Positive effects on students’ test
scores were also observed when individual teachers could influence how the curriculum was taught
in the school and when teachers were responsible for the purchase of supplies.
The longer the instruction time that students have in school, the better their academic performance.
Centralized examinations (that is, tests and examinations set independently of the school) that make
students’ learning efforts more visible to external observers were shown to have a positive impact on
students’ educational achievement.
The more time that class teachers spend outside the formal school day on preparing or grading their
students’ work, the higher their students’ test scores in mathematics.
It seems that assigning homework less often but on a more ambitious scale is particularly conducive
to students’ learning.
Source: Woessmann, 2001.
performance (see Box 4.4). These characteristics
are a good place to start in devising ways to measure how teachers perform in terms of meeting
teaching and learning standards.
The international literature provides several promising models for setting standards and monitoring
teacher performance. The best known of these, the
UK school inspection system (Ofsted, 2003), is
described in Appendix 4.2. Recently, Chile has been
developing new models for evaluating teacher performance, although these have been complicated by
long negotiations between the municipalities that
employ teachers and the teachers’ unions that exist
148
to protect the interests of teachers. In Indonesia,
the processes of democracy are still being developed, and much of the standard-setting of the recent past has been centrist and from the top
down. Education stakeholders at the local level
have not yet had much opportunity to discuss,
adapt, or reject the standards and performance
monitoring guidelines that are being developed.
A study (Avalos, 1998) reviewed the battle for
and against the performance evaluation of municipal teachers in Chile. (A summary of the difference between the proposed evaluation system
as it was set out in the government statutes and
the final negotiated system is in Table 4.4.)
Chapter 4
Table 4.4 Comparing Two Teacher Performance Evaluation Systems in Chile
Evaluation System
Purpose
Who is to be evaluated
The Statute System
To assess teacher’s “functionary” or contractual
performance.
All teachers who have been employed for at least
six months
Frequency of evalua- Once a year
tion
Content of the evalua- x
Professional and contractual responsibility
tion
x
In-service courses taken and evidence of
self-improvement (research or publications)
x
Performance indicators including student
results according to contexts
x
Exceptional evidence such as design of
school or classroom improvement projects.
Procedures
Ratings in a “evaluation record” and evidence
from the teacher’s “life-history record.”
Rating scheme
A point-scheme from 1 (deficient) to 5 (excellent)
Who evaluates
A committee composed of the school head or
municipal head, a teachers’ representative, and a
municipal representative
The above committee
Who decides
Right of appeal
Effects
Coordination of the
system
Funding
A committee including the municipal Mayor, the
Head of the Municipal Education Corporation,
and a school representative.
Teachers deemed “unsatisfactory” in two consecutive evaluations may be dismissed. Highly
rated teachers may be eligible for in-service
courses and funding of innovation projects.
Municipalities
Municipal budgets
The New Agreed System
Teaching performance, not contractual obligations
Gradually to cover all teachers in municipal
schools with one or more years of service, over a
period of four years.
Every four years
Specified in the National Set of Criteria: Framework for Good Teaching.
It covers four domains:
x
Preparation for teaching
x
Developing an appropriate classroom environment
x
Classroom teaching
x
Professional responsibilities beyond the
classroom
Each domain has four or five standards or criteria to guide the assessment.
x
Portfolio with evidence of teaching and assessment materials (may include a video)
x
Self-evaluation sheet
x
Structured interviews
x
Head teacher report form
Four categories based on ratings from examined
evidence: outstanding, competent, basic, and unsatisfactory.
Experienced teachers who are specifically
trained and checked for inter-rater reliability
A municipal evaluation committee on the basis
of the evaluators’ reports.
Not specified
Teachers deemed “basic” or “unsatisfactory”
will be offered support to improve and will be
assessed up to twice more before being dismissed. Highly rated teachers will be offered extra opportunities for professional growth.
x
A national system under the Ministry of
Education.
x
A three-party technical committee: the
teachers’ union, municipalities, and academic institutions.
A national fund equivalent to 1% of teacher salaries to pay for in-service provision organized by
municipalities.
Source: Avalos, 1998.
There are lessons from Chile that Indonesia
might want to consider. Avalos (1998) points
out that the most important difference between
the two systems lies in the fact that the new
system has a well-developed set of criteria or
standards against which to compare teaching
behavior, which the statutory system did not
have. These standards can also form the core
competencies for a career-long professional
development system.
Career-Long Professional Development
There have been a large number of teacher
education and training projects in Indonesia
over the past 30 years (Sweeting, 2001).
These have aimed at revising the curriculum in
pre-service education programs, upgrading the
technical capacities of teacher educators and
teacher education institutions, and developing
in-service training and professional support
systems based on concepts of school clustering and teacher mentoring. However, there are
still many complaints about the fact that most
149
Volume 2
ance in the classroom or add value to their
students’ learning.
in-service training does not improve teacher
quality, which reinforces the public’s opinion
that the quality of most teachers in Indonesia
is low (Sweeting, 2000).
Initial Preparation of Teachers
The minimum qualification for primary teachers was set in 1989 as a two-year postsecondary-school teaching diploma (DII). Yet
in 2002, only one-half of all primary school
teachers in Indonesia held this certificate or a
higher qualification. For junior secondary
schools, the minimum teaching qualification is
a three-year education degree (S1), and in
2002, only 50.7 percent of teachers held this
or a higher qualification. Research consistently indicates that the most successful
teacher education programs require trainee
teachers to spend a high proportion of their
time in teaching and other practical and internship experiences in schools (see Box 4.5 below).
We recommend a new paradigm for teacher
training in Indonesia, one that takes as its
starting point the career-long professional development of teachers. This would cover
teachers’ initial training, their induction into
school life, their professional registration, and
their continuing professional development.
This continuum of professional development
needs to be linked directly to the actual classrooms and schools in which teachers work.
This means that colleges and universities need
to be much more responsive to the demands of
schools and of the district governments that
employ teachers. They also need to be responsive to the professional demands of teachers
who wish to deepen their experience and
knowledge of teaching to add value to what
they do in classrooms and in collegial activities with their colleagues (for example, mentoring newly licensed teachers). The notion of
teacher preparation is now being redefined to
include reflective teaching approaches and
classroom-based action research collaboration
among teachers, effective communication, and
other characteristics that contribute to lifelong
professional development (see Appendix 4.1
for a fuller version of what teachers should
know and be able to do).
International research indicates that:
x The most competent teachers are
those who have a good mastery of
the subject to be taught and have
also studied Education.
x Teachers with more training in
teaching methodology are more effective than those with less.
x Teachers who have spent more
time studying pedagogy are better
teachers, especially when it comes
to encouraging higher-order thinking skills in their students and catering for their individual needs.
x How well trainee teachers perform
in well-assessed practice teaching
is the best predictor of their future
success in the classroom.
While there is constant discussion about requiring higher levels of certification for teachers, there are issues that need to be addressed
beforehand about the kind of teachers that
schools need and the relationship between
formal qualifications like the DII or S1 and the
actual lives of teachers. These issues include
how to organize learning in multi-grade
schools, what are the most appropriate methods for teaching literacy to young learners,
and how to approach teaching in multilingual
environments. There also needs to be more
discussion about whether or not resources
spent on constantly upgrading teachers’ qualifications will actually improve their perform-
The main implication of these findings for initial teacher preparation and for continuing professional development programs is that
training institutions will need to send trainee
teachers to practice in schools in a wide range
of different environments.
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Chapter 4
Box 4.5 Teacher Education Programs that Made a Difference
Research on teacher education programs in the USA has shown that the most effective programs have these
characteristics:
x
x
x
x
x
x
A common vision is expressed in the coursework and in the clinical experiences or practice teaching
sessions.
They set well-defined standards of practice and performance.
Graduates are expected to know content-specific pedagogy, child development, learning theory, and
student assessment methods.
They provide extended clinical experiences (lasting a total of 30 weeks in a four-year degree program).
They have strong partnerships with universities and schools.
They make extensive use of case methods, teacher research, performance assessments, and portfolio
evaluations.
Source: Darling-Hammond, 2000.
censing boards with responsibility for initial
teacher licensing and for performance monitoring at the renewal stages. In Ireland, for example, a Department of Education Inspector
assesses each new teacher for certification
purposes during an initial probationary period
following his or her appointment to a full-time
teaching post. Most new teachers complete
the certification requirements within two and a
half years of their graduation. Malaysia and
Australia also have systems that require teachers to register after completing their initial
teacher education programs (Acedo, 1998).
Induction of New Teachers into School
Life and Classroom Teaching
There is currently no formal school induction
process for newly graduated teachers even
though this is an important stage in their professional development. Most professions have
internship systems that lead to registration and
entry into the profession. It provides an important link between the employer, the service
provider, and those who educate and train professionals. An induction process also provides
a supportive environment for new teachers
when they are first being held fully accountable for a class of children and their learning
to parents and colleagues. Looking at the
OECD’s extended list of what teachers should
know and be able to do (see Appendix 4.1), it
is obvious that no new graduate could possibly
have all of these characteristics at the start of
his or her career. The Directorate of Higher
Education at the MoNE is currently identifying what new graduates are expected to know
and be able to do and what beginning teachers
should know and be able to do in order to be
licensed.
A major unsolved problem in teacher licensing
in Indonesia is that no criteria exist for determining when a prospective teacher is fully
ready to take responsibility for teaching a
classroom full of students. In most countries,
teachers simply have to pass all of the courses
in an approved teacher education program.
However, because Indonesian policymakers
did not believe that this route necessarily
demonstrated that prospective teachers were
fit to practice, they imposed additional tests of
basic skills, subject matter, and pedagogy on
trainee teachers.
Introducing an induction stage into teacher
development in Indonesia would require establishing an internship system that links potential employers, schools, and licensing boards,
developing mentoring systems for interns,
providing incentives for employers and
schools to support interns, and establishing li-
The Indonesian system consists of paper and
pencil tests with mainly multiple choice questions in standardized tests of basic skills, subject matter, and pedagogical knowledge as
well as classroom observation sessions in
which candidate teachers are assessed against
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Volume 2
a checklist of designated kinds of teaching behavior. Neither the standardized tests nor the
observations based on the checklist adequately
reflect the extent of a candidate’s knowledge
base and, thus, improve the quality of candidates’ preparation for teaching. Similar tests in
the USA were abandoned in the mid-1980s in
favor of performance-oriented assessments
because of the following problems:
x Teaching is a function of both
content and pedagogical knowledge.
x Combining support and assessment is essential to the evaluation
of teachers’ professional competence.
x The tasks in the assessment must
represent authentic exhibitions of
teacher-related activities.
x Professional judgment and expertise are key dimensions in assessing
teacher
performance
(Pecheone and Carey, 1990).
x Only 10 percent of the questions
actually asked about the candidates’ knowledge about teaching
and learning.
x Over 40 percent of the questions
were so poorly specified that they
either had no clearly defensible
right answer or had an answer
based solely on ideology rather
than on knowledge of research
(Darling-Hammond, 1986).
x The tests did not allow candidates
to demonstrate their knowledge,
judgment, and skills in the kinds
of complex settings that characterize real teaching.
x They represented a narrow behavioristic view of teaching that oversimplifies the nature of teachers’
decision making.
x The exceedingly brief statements
of professional problems failed to
represent the complexity of teachers’ decision making processes or
the full range of their professional
knowledge base.
x The questions failed to provide
sufficient information about the
context for and goals of teaching
decisions to allow candidates to
give sensible answers.
Continuous Professional Development
In many areas of Indonesia, teachers act as
mentors to other less experienced teachers either in professional development activities at
the school or through teachers’ meetings at the
school cluster level or in district in-service
training workshops. However, reports indicate
that in many cases this system breaks down
because mentoring does not provide the mentors with any opportunity to deepen their professional experience nor are the resources
available for them to do so (Nielsen 1996).
The main sources of funding for professional
development activities in the past have been
externally funded projects or the central government’s project funding.
When these
sources are not available, there are only limited resources available to pay for any schoolbased professional development activities. To
date, few district governments have allocated
any budgetary resources to in-service training
activities. Some teacher training institutions
and universities, again with project funding,
have established applied research activities in
schools in which teachers have been able to
participate, and reflect on their practice, and
develop ideas for improving teaching practices at their schools. Some schools have used
project money to pay for experts to work with
them on specific teaching and learning issues,
but these examples are not common.
We recommend that Indonesia develop performance-oriented assessments for teachers
grounded in four assumptions about teaching
and learning:
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Chapter 4
Box 4.6 Mexico’s Incentive Scheme for Teacher Development
Mexico’s Carrera Magisterial (CM) Program, first implemented in 1994, ties teachers’ compensation to their
professional development. Teachers who voluntarily join the program agree to participate in annual performance evaluations and to have their annual salary increases linked to the results of these evaluations. These performance evaluations consist of the following components: teacher performance evaluations (composed of a
combination of self-assessments and peer reviews); an annual written examination of the teacher’s professional
skills; written student examinations; educational attainment; the completion of accredited courses to update
skills; and years of teaching experience.
Although the program is voluntary, the number of teachers enrolled since 1994 has increased substantially, beginning with 38 percent of the total number of teachers and rising to 49 percent after just two years. Indeed,
the proportion of students whose teachers were enrolled in the program more than doubled during that period,
reaching around 25 percent of all students. In addition, in 1997, the percentage of all teaching positions that
were filled by teachers who were participating in the CM program was close to 50 percent. A recent study
found that students whose teachers are in the CM program have higher average test scores than students whose
teachers are not in the program. Thus, after 10 years, the CM program has already had a considerable impact
on the Mexican education system.
Source: Lopez-Acevedo, 2001.
Using Teacher Management Systems to
Achieve Education Goals
The existing credit point system that is used to
assess whether teachers are ready for promotion needs to be revamped to create more incentives for teachers to upgrade their skills
and update their knowledge on a regular basis.
Also, universities and other education institutions need to be more responsive to teachers’
professional needs by providing them with
short vacation courses and flexible modular
courses that would allow them to deepen their
knowledge and widen their experience without
necessarily committing themselves to longterm, full-time academic programs. Teachers’
professional development programs should be
linked to school and teacher performance
monitoring. There is much work to be done in
this area, but there is also a lot of Indonesian
experience to build on. Also, other countries,
such as Mexico (see Box 4.6 below), have also
been experimenting with tying teachers’ compensation to their professional development
and providing teachers with professional suport. This professional support can consist of
peer mentoring within schools, opportunities
to work alongside experienced teachers in
their own or other schools, visits to other good
practice schools and classrooms, or bringing a
teacher-designated “expert” to the classroom
to encourage teachers to reflect on their teaching behavior and to try new approaches.
Educators in Indonesia probably already feel
that there is a need for a new paradigm for the
development of the teaching profession. Many
elements of this new approach are in place or
are being tried out in a number of projectrelated activities. However, developing an
overall framework that incorporates these activities into a lifelong perspective on teachers’
professional development should be a priority.
Having effective teacher management systems
in place in every school is essential for achieving Indonesia’s national education goals. The
policy framework that we are proposing aims
to improve schools by creating a professional
teaching service with the following characteristics: merit-based appointments, transfers,
and promotions; school-based performance
evaluations; and career-long professional development. These characteristics mirror three
longer-term policy goals: (i) creating a teaching service in which the professional life of
teachers is central to the management system
and in which schools select their own teachers
in a transparent way; (ii) linking the monitoring of schools and teachers by adding performance reviews as part of teachers’ career
development; and (iii) developing the various
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Volume 2
their teachers’ performance, which would be
evaluated in terms of the value that the teacher
adds to student learning in the classroom, to
the professional life of the school, and to the
wider educational community. These attributes would be the basis of any recognition,
promotion, or rewards given to the teacher as
well as of the renewal of their contracts and of
the provision of assistance in improving their
classroom performance. Teachers at the start
of their careers would be expected to exhibit
these attributes in order to be hired. In return,
the school would have an obligation to provide
the teacher with professional development opportunities.
phases of teachers’ professional development
including initial preparation, induction into the
teaching profession, school life, and continuous professional development.
These policy tools are based on some assumptions about how schools would benefit. For
example, under a school-based management
system that involves the local community in
making decisions about how the school is
managed, the school should have the right to
choose its teachers. This would result in implicit contractual agreements between the
school that selected the teacher and the teacher
who selected the school. Schools and districts
would have specific expectations regarding
Table 4.5 Potential Policy Tools for Managing the Teaching Workforce
Demand-side tools
Supply-side tools
Matching process tools
Class size
Attractiveness of the profession Bargaining mechanisms
Set of mechanisms for bargainMonetary incentives
ing: setting of salaries, pay differ-relative salaries
Teaching loads
entiation to account for shortages,
-career structure and salary scale
Required learning time for stu- -other (e.g. merit-based awards, opening of profession to internasigning bonuses, differentiated tional markets.
dents
pay, housing subsidies, childcare,
Level of centralization of barUse of teaching assistants and income tax credits)
gaining
other support staff
Degree of autonomy of schools
Non-monetary incentives
regarding recruitment, selection
-vacation
time,
flexibility
to
take
Use of technology and distance
and assignment of teachers; and
leave
learning
-working conditions: opportuni- setting of incentive structure.
Structure of curriculum and edu- ties for collaboration and decision
making, school safety and student Recruitment
and
selection
cational programmers
discipline, class size, working processes
Starting and ending age of com- loads, quality of facilities and in- Organization; definition of qualification requirements; delegation
structional materials
pulsory education
of authority to recruit; select and
Academic standards defining re- Teacher education and certifi- assign teachers; methods for
screening candidates; emergency
cation
quirements for graduation
Teacher initial education and pro- recruitment programs.
fessional development: supply,
structure, content, and accreditation of teacher education programs; incentives to engage in
teacher education; induction and
mentoring programs; provision of
professional development activities.
Certification of teachers: definition of certification standards; alternative certification programs.
Source: OECD, 2002.
154
Chapter 4
in putting in place such a teacher management
framework, we have given some examples in
the matrix below of appropriate policies to
adopt, the kind of actions required to implement the policies, and some ideas about who
should be responsible for implementing them.
The most critical point in our proposals is the
establishment of a separate teaching service.
This would need to be built up over time. It is
also essential to examine how teacher salaries
depend upon districts’ budgets and how this
affects the degree to which schools can recruit
teachers. To illustrate what might be involved
155
Volume 2
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159
Volume 2
Appendix 4.1. What Teachers Need to Know and Be Able to Do
Content knowledge:
x Understanding subject matter deeply and flexibly to help students to create cognitive maps, link
ideas, and address misconceptions
x Seeing how ideas connect across fields of knowledge and to life
x Making ideas accessible to others and understanding the perspective of the learner
Learner knowledge:
x Knowledge of child and adolescent development and how to support cognitive, social, physical, and
emotional growth, to interpret learners’ statements and actions, and to shape productive learning experiences
x Understanding of and respect for differences in culture, family experience, forms of intelligence, and
approaches to learning and the ability to teach in a way that connects with students
x Inquiring sensitively, listening carefully, looking thoughtfully at student work, and structuring situations to allow students to express themselves
Motivating students:
x Understanding what individual students believe about themselves, what they care about, and how to
give them encouragement
Knowledge about learning:
x Deciding which type of learning is most appropriate in specific circumstances and which materials to
use when and for what purpose
x Ability to use different strategies for teaching, evaluating students’ knowledge, and assessing their
learning
x Capacity to understand the strengths of individual students
x Capacity to work with disabled students
x Understanding of how students acquire language (the gateway to learning) to build their skills and
create accessible learning experiences
Knowledge about curriculum resources and technologies:
x Allowing students to explore ideas, acquire and synthesize information, and frame and solve problems
Knowledge about collaboration:
x Structuring student interactions for shared learning
x Collaborating with other teachers
x Working with parents to learn more about their children and to shape supportive experiences at
school and home
Capacity to reflect:
x Assessing their own teaching practices and how to refine and improve them
x Continuously evaluating students’ progress and reshape lesson plans accordingly.
Source: OECD, 2002.
160
Chapter 4
Appendix 4.2. Supplementary Information on International Experience
result, it would increase the number of individuals interested in teaching and make teaching an attractive career to more highly skilled
individuals who, prior to the reform, would
have been likely to choose to enter other professions. Second, local governments could
use the increase in resources for teacher salaries not only to increase the salaries of existing
teachers but also to hire additional teachers,
thus enabling them to reduce class sizes,
which would probably also improve student
outcomes.
This appendix provides supplementary information on international experiences in the areas of teacher salaries and teacher
performance standards.
Teacher Salaries
A number of countries have begun to link
teachers’ pay directly to measures of student
outcomes, but this has become highly contentious in many cases. Chile has the most extensive program of performance-based teacher
compensation, while other countries such as
Colombia and Mexico have smaller, experimental programs. However, giving performance-based salary incentives to individual
teachers within a school can have negative effects. These can inhibit teamwork among
teachers in a school, which is a core principle
involved in improving the overall quality of
education provided. It can also create unproductive competition between teachers within
the same school. Education policymakers in
Brazil, India, and Kenya have considered
compensation and performance issues. Their
experiences are described below.
An assessment of the reform that was carried
out in 2002 revealed that regional disparities
in teacher pay had been reduced and that the
number of teachers who had at least graduated
from secondary school had increased. The
study also showed that the increase in teachers’ compensation and in the number of teachers with at least a secondary education were
positively associated with better student outcomes such as lower dropout rates and higher
pass rates (Gordon and Vegas, 2004).
India
Brazil
A study of teacher salaries in India found that
the salary structures for teachers were inefficient, with those teacher characteristics that
have few discernible learning benefits for students being rewarded in salary terms whereas
those that improve student learning were not.
The study suggested that spending more
money on school facilities and materials,
longer school days, better management practices, and more skilled teachers would enhance
school efficiency but that investing in smaller
pupil-teacher ratios (in urban areas where
there is no multi-grade teaching), in teacher
experience, training, and post-graduate education, and higher across-the-board teachers’
salaries may not make sense in a resourcescarce environment. Moreover, it suggested
that more emphasis should be put on the quality of teachers’ education (in other words,
their knowledge of subject matter and their
cognitive skills) when selecting and remuner-
In 1998, Brazil implemented an education finance reform called the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Primary Education
and Teacher Enhancement (FUNDEF). The
main objective of this fund was to equalize
educational opportunities across states and
municipalities by guaranteeing a minimum
expenditure per pupil in primary schools
throughout the country. Embedded in the reform was a requirement that at least 60 percent
of the additional funds provided by FUNDEF
must be spent on teachers’ salaries.
The program was expected to improve teacher
quality and student outcomes in several ways.
First, it would increase the salaries of existing
teachers in regions that, previous to the reform, had had relatively low teachers’ salaries.
This would make teaching a more attractive
profession, particularly in these regions. As a
161
Volume 2
ensure that his or her students perform
well academically. This is a measurable
task – through student test scores, for
example. However, another of their objectives is to ensure that students are socially and emotionally well adjusted.
This objective is not easily measurable.
Therefore, if an incentive is based on the
measurable objective, teachers will tend
to focus on that task above all others and
may neglect the other non-measurable
but equally important tasks.
x Fourth, teachers object to being judged
based solely on their students’ academic
performance if they are teaching a difficult or disadvantaged population, perhaps because the school is located in a
poor community where student performance has historically been weak. In this
case, it would not be fair to have teachers in better-off communities judged by
the same criteria as those teaching in
disadvantaged communities.
x Fifth, basing teacher incentives on students’ test scores can cause teachers to
neglect or force out weaker students in
order to concentrate on those students
who will perform well on the tests
(Glewwe et al, 2001).
ating teachers than on their years of schooling,
training, and experience, since these inputs
were not significant in explaining variations in
school outcomes. These findings are also
likely to apply to education in Indonesia
(Kingdon, 1996).
Kenya
Kenya has pilot-tested a performance-based
incentive system that would reward all teachers in a given school based on improved student performance in grades four to eight in
that school. There were two ways in which
schools could distinguish themselves in this
performance-based scheme – either by having
the highest test scores of all of the schools in
their district or by having the most improved
test scores of all of the schools in their district.
The pilot project set out to measure the impact
and cost-effectiveness of this performancebased incentive system that rewarded all
teachers in schools whose performance had
improved. The program was designed to take
note of five important criticisms of performance-based incentive systems in which performance is judged by student outcomes:
x The first objection is that teachers are
not solely responsible for the academic
performance of their students. In order to
produce good student outcomes, teachers
in a school need to cooperate with each
other, and it is important that they do so
rather than competing against each other.
x The second objection to performancebased incentives is that a teacher’s performance is largely unobservable, and,
even when it can be observed, it is difficult to verify objectively. What constitutes good performance by a teacher is
not simple or easily quantifiable; therefore it is difficult to compensate teachers
based on their performance.
x The third difficulty in establishing performance-based incentives is that a
teacher’s job involves many different
tasks, some of which are easily measurable and some of which are not. For instance, one objective of a teacher is to
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) school inspection
system sets performance standards and, on
school visits, its inspectors ask questions such
as: How high are standards in the school
(based on the school’s results and achievements)? How well are the pupils taught?
How good are the curricular and other opportunities offered to pupils? How well does the
school care for its pupils? How well does the
school work in partnership with parents? How
well is the school led and managed? What
should the school do to improve further? The
Office of Standards in Education (Ofsted) prepares detailed inspection reports and sets priorities for school and teacher development
programs. The key question asked in reviewing classroom teaching is: How well are pupils
162
Chapter 4
quality of education. During the school
observations conducted for the Indonesian
Primary Education Quality Improvement
Project, many management-related problems appeared, such as frequent teacher
and student absenteeism, inefficient use of
instruction time, and under-qualified or
unmotivated teachers. The principals of
the project schools focused too much on
administrative tasks (for example, keeping
records of students’ test results and financial tasks) rather than on educational leadership tasks. An evaluation of the project
as well as international research into educational effectiveness has shown that effective principals generally undertake the
following activities: sitting in on classrooms to observe the quality of teaching;
creating conditions for teachers to improve
their teaching skills; selecting high-quality
teachers, guiding less able ones, and replacing those who do not improve; reinforcing teachers’ motivation; ensuring that
school time is used efficiently; preventing
teacher and student absenteeism; controlling the implementation of the curriculum
in all grades; promoting an orderly and
friendly school climate; and getting parents and the community involved effectively in school matters. These aspects of
effective educational leadership should be
included in management training for principals, which will mean changing current
training methods and content(Van der
Werf et al, 2002).
taught? The assessment is based on classroom
observations of teaching; interviews with parents, teachers, school principals, and students;
and reviews of teachers’ and students’ portfolios of work. The kind of suggestions that inspectors make are reflected in this extract from
a school report (available on the Ofsted website, www.ofsted.gov.uk):
x Review the curriculum (as
taught), ensuring that it has appropriate breadth and balance
and that the required coverage is
provided for subjects other than
the core subjects of English,
mathematics, and science.
x Improve and broaden the range
of teaching approaches that are
often adopted in the non-core
subjects, particularly where
teachers feel constrained by the
detail of the lesson plans.
x Improve the quality of assessment in the non-core subjects.
x Give more attention to educating
pupils for life in a multi-cultural
society.
x Ensure that training is provided
for staff in child protection and
in health and safety issues (Ofsted, 2003).
Indonesia
Management at the school level is the
most important factor for improving the
163
Volume 2
164
Report No. 29506
INDONESIA
DECENTRALIZATION
STATISTICAL ANNEX
The World Bank
August 2004
34.93
36.66
11.88
15.18
20.44 43.15 15.86 36.25 15.2
INDONESIA
32.77
25.82
43.18
38.70
28.40
46.63
27.85
43.77
33.02
32.34
30.48
35.03
26.58
29.35
8.06
10.39
30.09
16.41
20.16
12.49
20.70
15.08
14.34
11.15
14.64
10.08
34.4
34.87
26.61
38.91
40.42
42.76
21.20
42.25
32.15
30.21
29.66
31.74
25.87
34.87
33.71
25.52
34.98
13.9
30.1
2002
Urban Rural
4.84
9.77 20.98
12.29 32.93
6.55 21.71
11.16 27.90
12.36 31.85
9.88 31.68
17.04 31.39
19.94 35.23
6.70
14.58 28.68
19.60 32.03
13.29 21.28
16.33 32.01
10.64 36.11
12.00 22.39
24.15 34.89
12.67 36.28
17.99 37.02
10.26 21.82
15.64 37.80
11.11 22.92
11.76 24.35
9.26 22.09
12.56 29.45
10.99 23.82
22.08 44.20
2.06 1.35
13.56 12.82
1.88 2.21
22.77
23.10
31.59 49.83 32.57 49.20
33.30 45.27 33.96 46.84
25.38 39.94 25.07 39.37
30.17 42.36 30.50 43.33
37.28 27.54 41.88
2002
Urban Rural
12.76
23.21 38.42
19.35 29.95
21.25 48.40
27.37 43.29
29.59 47.64
19.08 39.56
26.36 41.17
33.29 49.78
21.27
33.02 55.82
33.05 48.24
22.91 42.89
31.36 47.43
21.74 46.64
27.79 42.57
26.46 36.14
21.97 43.69
24.10 36.99
27.29 46.23
27.90 39.15
23.21 41.05
18.25 38.21
23.09 47.75
20.84 37.39
18.88 36.92
24.72 36.12
18.27 52.70
19.05 56.37
13.85 53.32
18.25
15.61
14.97
14.91
17.18
9.70
9.37
7.84
14.73
10.50
15.19
8.72
13.28
14.63
12.11
12.37
14.65
11.98
7.04
7.76
12.63
8.82
12.85
13.65
15.08
17.48
21.53
15.99
17.86
21.35
15.66
14.69
16.47
10.39
10.89
7.43
13.40
17.60
9.67
14.49
16.46
13.40
13.41
16.61
17.61
15.77 8.01
15.69 9.51
16.40 14.53
18.32 10.62
18.46 11.09 17.83 12.62 19.12 11.78
7.10
8.10
6.74
6.87
14.57
7.28
11.26
13.01
9.73
10.59
11.09
5.82
6.70
11.71
7.15
Junior Secondary School
1998
2000
Urban Rural Urban Rural
18.81 14.23
19.51 18.23 19.93 18.78
17.90 12.24 15.75 14.69
20.04 14.48 19.28 15.08
18.44 11.25 18.81 15.15
17.36 10.77 17.08 11.87
17.83 10.60 19.16 10.90
14.65 9.48 16.22 10.82
11.63
12.12
13.39
17.15
16.70
15.51
15.78
17.14
17.61
14.79
14.76
14.18
16.21 11.97 19.16
11.22
12.36
15.35
13.67
15.99
14.24
14.38
17.52
15.55
12.89
11.97
18.53
14.13
14.18
14.62
14.99
1995
Urban Rural
16.83 12.17
21.04 13.94
14.71 11.09
20.80 11.21
18.13 9.09
14.21 8.04
17.23 9.88
14.80 8.34
2002
Urban Rural
14.29
22.33 21.65
17.68 16.95
20.10 15.46
17.49 14.54
16.85 11.76
18.71 13.91
17.58 15.41
17.29 7.85
18.15
15.70 8.20
15.43 10.06
16.18 15.16
17.06 10.46
18.47 10.33
12.40 12.89
12.80 12.50
14.97 8.80
16.97 14.04
19.35 19.49
16.44 11.75
19.08 17.40
19.39 17.25
16.11 14.81
14.45 14.84
15.89 17.50
16.32 9.71
17.90 12.83
20.63 14.52
17.71 24.46
28.6 38.6 28.24 42.06 28.7 42.4 28.10 45.90 15.6 8.25 16.6 9.93 16.9 11.2 16.91 12.17
18.85 36.71 20.25
40.57
31.49
38.26
26.87
43.45
33.60
33.00
34.12
40.61
35.96
35.89
44.62
42.35
40.28
37.11
Primary School
1998
2000
23.18 39.09
25.45 37.65 24.53 35.65
21.51 30.10 20.22 29.48
25.05 43.95 22.69 38.51
26.38 37.80 24.15 36.46
30.03 39.02 26.77 44.13
22.70 36.17 20.86 37.40
26.91 40.50 27.42 36.59
27.91 43.95 28.60 41.18
23.87 30.54 22.45 30.95
22.29 40.66 21.37 40.93
23.83 24.86 23.16 32.98
21.21 30.33 28.15 47.71
29.37 44.56 26.16 36.21
26.81 34.42 22.94 39.08
23.40 34.42 23.36 36.87
21.75 35.57 21.88 41.17
20.71 41.88 20.11 34.96
23.14 34.17 19.45 36.51
22.82 38.75
26.07 42.94 24.88 45.28
30.44
23.59
24.02
26.52
29.25
27.95
25.23
24.80
24.25
24.44
19.74
26.72
31.19
32.76
26.19
29.20
1995
Urban Rural
24.25 38.45
24.83 31.79
22.65 30.33
24.57 40.09
29.86 38.11
28.81 36.75
22.95 34.38
24.56 33.17
1
Sample size for all individual SUSENAS data: 1995 - 873,647; 1998 - 879,936;2000 – 780,141; 2002 – 862,210
Missing values due to civil unrest or governmental changes (as several provinces developed post 1999)
Source: SUSENAS, several years
Notes: Population defined as over 24 years old
8.96
14.46
26.40
17.34
14.38
22.05
11.64
19.75
17.30
15.90
13.63
14.95
17.35
7.78
9.05
15.38
19.06
16.86
15.96
32.10
46.89
42.96
56.88
30.82
48.94
39.86
35.17
36.84
38.21
35.10
35.11
37.82
29.17
38.74
17.51
27.03
21.48
28.19
15.45
26.32
19.20
17.87
14.95
17.31
19.20
8.34
16.99
20.63
16.55
16.86
43.27
42.79
31.11
47.00
10.79
21.56
25.13
20.09
24.65
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
North Maluku
Irian Jaya
Province
Less than Primary School
1995
1998
2000
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
10.54 33.18 11.40 28.46
21.74 43.55 15.15 29.55 11.66 29.21
17.49 43.45 12.25 40.21 14.57 37.18
14.54 37.76 10.51 30.41 11.60 33.94
15.45 42.96 15.83 36.76 15.27 35.96
24.74 47.57 18.03 40.00 18.97 32.82
14.23 40.79 11.05 38.82 10.55 37.34
26.53 48.79 21.61 39.23 17.25 42.02
Table 1. Highest Level of Education as a Percentage of the Population, by Location
9.20
12.97
36.17
35.04
27.11
INDONESIA
29.76
42.62
32.56
28.24
35.74
33.33
29.92
32.55
28.84
32.62
34.90
36.44
34.02
33.35
38.32
37.36
27.17
23.37
29.72
27.63
9.81
14.05
16.65
13.47
10.76
27.70
11.06
11.44
11.44
16.65
14.44
12.97
15.30
17.08
11.36
6.49
7.43
14.85
8.26
10.02
18.14
15.45
9.30
9.64
12.27
10.49
13.01
14.16
14.03
16.39
18.33
6.64
8.19
16.11
9.15
29.72 10.16 30.03
36.35
35.61
26.92
36.55
28.70
29.61
29.32
34.87
33.14
37.88
37.13
39.54
36.04
28.12
23.53
29.73
27.32
9.65
2002
Urban Rural
44.99
35.55 16.77
34.79 15.57
42.41 12.56
33.39 11.52
31.71 7.68
37.09 12.70
28.48 10.25
24.14 5.52
36.78
27.31 5.60
22.35 7.44
32.10 16.48
26.07 7.99
35.08 6.18
33.03 17.66
27.11 14.06
36.69 9.08
30.24 10.25
32.89 10.69
29.95 8.81
36.83 16.00
39.86 17.83
38.15 12.90
37.92 14.61
38.18 17.75
29.51 7.73
45.34 27.72
36.82 15.43
50.37 15.56
2
Note: Population defined as over 24 years old.
16.08
11.65
9.73
8.62
10.26
9.06
14.33
15.01
11.40
12.71
15.71
30.85
25.54
28.05
27.03
29.05
24.94
31.61
31.88
32.12
32.54
33.80
8.57
5.64
6.92
14.43
7.30
33.22
25.60
22.00
28.67
23.88
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
North Maluku
Irian Jaya
Province
Senior Secondary School
1995
1998
2000
36.41 12.91 35.39 14.78
25.40 9.54 31.99 13.08 34.71 14.62
33.27 12.77 34.77 14.20 34.45 15.39
32.54 9.45 35.24 9.75 36.73 11.14
28.00 8.95 29.92 11.95 31.14 10.68
25.70 6.82 28.04 8.84 26.80
9.98
34.35 13.20 36.66 12.97 38.29 12.21
24.36 8.44 26.10 9.64 30.39
9.26
Table 1. Highest Level of Education, cont.
8.27
12.47
9.68
9.98
11.48
11.09
4.59
10.26
6.55
9.59
7.93
13.13
12.81
15.29
10.73
7.53
5.93
10.43
7.28
1.42
2.57
0.95
4.15
1.87
2.31
0.76
0.91
1.12
1.56
2.69
1.42
2.52
2.21
0.66
1.25
2.46
1.44
1995
Urban Rural
11.97 3.29
6.99
1.18
11.87 2.36
7.55
1.50
8.56
0.89
6.53
0.82
11.25 1.74
9.74
1.26
9.58
10.33
13.45
9.38
11.24
11.31
10.13
10.93
8.81
9.53
9.84
14.42
13.14
12.31
9.85
13.29
8.63
7.72
13.45
8.16
1.94
3.27
3.88
3.45
2.03
4.31
1.47
0.96
1.66
2.63
3.02
2.56
3.13
2.93
2.04
1.54
1.72
3.42
1.82
9.41
8.93
12.56
6.88
10.58
10.50
8.21
7.82
9.24
7.81
13.43
13.43
14.46
14.20
8.16
7.76
11.94
7.90
2002
Urban Rural
23.12
9.14
2.18
15.89 4.60
9.68
1.87
10.59 2.75
9.49
1.06
15.24 2.15
10.54 1.78
5.34
1.63
17.10
9.38
1.70
9.57
2.24
15.52 4.20
9.19
2.11
14.07 0.74
14.79 4.50
9.47
2.41
13.70 2.16
10.69 1.70
10.22 1.77
10.07 2.50
9.77
2.64
10.74 2.36
13.39 2.45
14.22 3.72
16.06 4.01
7.36
2.24
16.43 5.40
9.93
0.86
16.19 4.45
1.85 11.05 2.20
1.44
3.68
3.80
1.92
1.23
1.23
1.39
1.27
2.29
1.74
3.50
2.68
1.28
1.74
4.46
1.92
Higher Education
1998
2000
11.22 3.45
7.90
1.49
9.18
1.74
13.57 3.25 15.01 3.26
9.16
1.41
9.70
1.34
9.42
2.25 10.62 1.75
6.53
1.37 10.38 1.19
11.77 1.43 11.14 2.16
10.74 1.14
8.72
1.33
91.38
91.53
92.33
77.69
92.07
81.17
92.05
90.77
79.16
94.03
90.69
86.52
70.68
88.02
94.68
93.17
92.93
90.06
90.04
85.75
89.93
92.11
91.53
79.77
93.06
91.52
88.74
69.55
89.09
93.00
92.12
92.09
90.86
89.74
88.33
90.49
92.13
92.45
82.77
89.04
94.83
92.77
92.15
90.79
91.59
89.08
90.43
90.02
93.77
92.15
90.83
90.04
90.60
88.13
88.57
81.03
93.01
91.65
90.00
93.68
88.19
87.96
91.62
92.97
93.74
95.25
92.43
93.33
89.74
86.67
70.64
84.53
94.39
91.70
91.10
87.94
92.95
87.75
88.43
91.28
92.35
93.98
93.49
92.24
93.67
87.38
84.71
72.93
84.65
94.39
92.07
93.19
87.64
89.46
85.46
88.74
92.47
93.11
94.30
95.20
91.55
93.01
92.53
94.31
92.91
93.07
92.75
91.37
93.63
95.75
92.49
93.56
90.36
94.27
95.25
93.44
92.65
89.95
94.23
90.92
92.21
87.67
89.81
88.84
90.60
78.15
87.42
95.46
94.53
92.75
88.94
93.78
92.53
91.57
87.74
90.49
89.11
88.77
83.84
86.42
94.33
90.59
2002
Male Female
91.49
92.42
93.99
93.59
92.38
92.22
94.16
94.29
93.70
92.43
91.84
91.19
92.44
92.54
92.91
93.26
92.49
94.39
89.96
91.62
93.59
94.07
94.46
93.70
93.41
93.03
93.15
93.24
92.49
93.74
93.28
90.98
92.70
93.77
86.59
87.59
3
Note: Missing values due to civil unrest or governmental changes (as several provinces developed post 1999)
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Net Primary Enrollment
1998
2000
Male
Female
Male Female
93.23
93.12
93.87
93.77
94.47
93.97
92.57
92.45
92.86
92.44
94.12
94.31
94.11
93.77
91.34
90.61
92.52
93.05
91.16
91.75
92.48
92.07
91.97
92.12
91.82
91.20
93.08
91.94
93.56
92.80
1995
Male Female
91.43
92.55
93.75
93.90
91.84
92.64
95.31
93.15
90.86
91.12
89.20
89.74
92.20
90.55
91.25
92.57
Table 2. Net and Gross Primary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
112.95
97.61
107.23
102.38
108.51
92.34
108.09
114.92
107.66
113.26
105.04
110.16
100.86
107.04
107.28
103.75
109.19
111.04
107.80
106.88
98.45
110.77
101.63
109.89
90.19
112.51
116.55
110.35
113.18
109.95
108.08
98.98
106.22
108.75
105.22
110.80
110.32
110.41
108.25
97.58
110.76
101.54
111.34
90.21
111.06
113.23
107.23
110.15
111.64
108.59
103.08
106.65
108.12
105.60
110.75
110.48
106.52
104.30
107.73
111.17
108.43
108.50
109.05
106.80
102.65
103.90
108.55
102.10
110.88
105.72
105.09
111.80
109.93
108.32
101.41
111.54
113.65
107.73
114.51
107.66
110.96
103.90
103.00
109.50
102.32
110.50
108.59
104.39
110.22
110.69
107.03
Gross Primary Enrollment
1998
2000
Male
Female
Male
Female
106.72 106.09
111.32 108.79 110.32 108.99
107.92 107.33 110.40 107.59
108.19 108.92 108.46 107.40
106.14 104.66 108.67 109.74
107.35 105.52 108.28 105.42
111.65 106.28 109.14 105.24
107.03 106.84 113.45 110.15
107.31 106.67 107.95 107.22 108.03 107.30
112.84
103.35
106.45
100.82
104.97
93.83
106.69
110.10
109.22
114.03
105.00
104.28
100.45
106.64
110.00
103.14
111.37
115.02
110.28
1995
Male
Female
106.25 104.53
109.02 109.25
107.66 107.09
112.27 109.58
106.75 104.04
104.82 104.81
110.57 106.55
105.88 108.54
105.98
110.53
110.39
103.58
108.29
101.64
104.88
100.60
104.20
88.13
98.52
106.29
116.07
105.98
107.18
112.54
104.55
107.90
105.85
106.94
100.40
102.83
98.17
109.51
107.40
103.92
2002
Male
Female
97.88
96.62
107.71
106.89
104.11
103.91
107.88
106.88
108.79
106.87
108.45
107.49
107.37
107.50
106.54
105.42
108.56
107.60
102.85
105.99
104.34
104.58
108.54
107.79
106.36
103.06
107.15
107.30
103.27
105.26
106.48
103.31
102.20
104.72
106.45
107.02
60.74
55.21
58.04
59.06
61.56
82.10
62.51
77.64
83.20
74.29
41.85
61.64
54.97
53.51
67.13
65.84
55.39
51.41
46.79
40.23
55.81
67.53
60.30
64.87
77.71
66.50
60.57
75.54
48.24
64.93
59.57
53.33
60.18
64.07
69.77
70.21
83.93
Female
4
51.24 56.25
39.77
64.63
51.44
60.92
50.70
31.45
56.91
54.26
49.21
INDONESIA
44.88
56.06
56.99
50.62
48.40
66.27
59.26
66.88
40.76
57.92
55.22
48.20
48.70
64.69
58.56
North Maluku
38.92
46.00
48.68
48.69
50.86
61.68
62.11
54.07
56.33
40.43
Southeast Sulawesi
45.52
45.79
56.15
56.88
62.07
53.73
43.33
Irian Jaya
48.28
South Sulawesi
42.50
54.38
60.59
59.58
50.02
44.95
70.94
43.56
Central Sulawesi
54.26
59.05
46.60
52.65
49.09
46.19
44.13
North Sulawesi
46.09
51.96
42.23
37.12
Maluku
47.65
East Kalimantan
50.58
46.66
39.61
34.41
36.59
42.97
53.96
South Kalimantan
34.19
33.50
32.02
Gorontolo
49.96
44.64
Central Kalimantan
33.98
West Kalimantan
24.58
34.53
59.51
29.37
31.97
57.77
65.52
East Timor
27.24
58.63
74.85
29.43
50.22
64.18
East Nusa Tenggara
48.94
71.22
69.24
38.74
58.08
40.46
62.49
66.15
64.68
West Nusa Tenggara
62.07
75.53
Bali
59.15
78.74
61.20
58.78
72.31
62.99
60.98
Banten
52.19
72.56
64.62
58.78
52.28
69.72
60.60
56.73
74.90
61.89
58.72
East Java
72.16
62.34
56.21
79.34
57.04
58.87
53.81
61.88
66.06
59.51
53.01
75.01
57.55
55.89
60.85
56.92
DI Yogyakarta
53.86
47.57
76.86
56.22
55.33
58.34
56.04
63.67
50.63
71.04
54.56
46.74
54.46
52.25
64.54
62.15
47.61
52.33
Lampung
51.98
54.95
53.35
61.03
66.59
67.94
76.37
Central Java
48.58
Bengkulu
43.24
47.03
60.72
59.47
68.02
Male
West Java
45.55
South Sumatera
57.03
65.02
66.47
Female
79.46
46.68
Jambi
48.97
59.17
65.28
57.65
Male
72.98
52.69
Riau
62.19
61.29
58.89
Female
2002
Jakarta
52.91
West Sumatera
60.06
50.85
Male
2000
42.33
61.80
Female
1998
Net Junior Secondary Enrollment
Bangka Belitung
53.59
North Sumatera
Male
Aceh
Province
1995
Table 3. Net and Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
66.34
65.32
63.84
60.66
56.91
55.84
62.15
71.08
57.16
64.95
49.58
52.84
44.45
52.62
87.22
68.11
86.83
64.85
61.64
97.62
69.27
65.61
60.86
61.54
68.20
73.85
77.84
67.65
Male
64.94
55.47
63.09
65.52
57.01
50.65
72.31
76.77
56.50
67.89
53.86
45.86
38.91
48.33
70.09
65.43
89.36
68.19
58.16
93.43
67.78
67.38
57.02
59.93
63.92
79.34
74.85
63.67
Female
1995
73.31
64.55
79.41
71.78
62.75
63.14
68.02
76.83
70.23
64.46
61.25
57.26
47.84
61.99
91.17
75.58
89.29
76.23
66.33
101.57
74.54
64.46
73.46
77.17
72.53
77.37
83.32
73.38
64.53
73.38
76.07
59.78
62.08
69.48
77.14
69.62
63.89
60.37
52.69
50.30
61.55
81.98
75.27
89.77
77.46
68.38
95.74
77.06
71.37
68.16
71.90
73.61
85.40
82.51
69.68
Female
1998
74.90
Male
77.24
50.53
76.12
66.12
66.38
78.88
85.42
63.61
78.48
68.10
48.55
77.81
91.58
83.58
90.30
79.70
71.83
102.93
73.67
74.78
76.70
80.23
80.35
81.02
78.02
59.35
81.59
69.07
60.78
80.36
78.30
67.16
79.23
64.16
54.63
69.39
78.18
83.21
93.25
81.30
72.36
93.11
82.11
77.15
75.44
77.08
85.94
87.11
85.02
Female
2000
82.78
Male
Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment
79.35
84.72
96.24
95.95
59.99
74.37
65.58
69.85
87.34
85.65
75.15
66.85
62.82
57.04
74.33
90.28
75.26
83.38
100.80
81.68
75.87
104.39
58.33
79.88
76.59
72.25
80.36
85.02
85.01
87.19
80.41
98.27
100.53
101.75
56.59
83.47
71.95
72.11
87.84
89.16
75.32
70.27
64.01
61.68
69.03
88.36
73.53
83.77
100.10
83.74
76.09
96.76
61.07
84.20
78.01
72.27
79.10
81.67
93.84
88.97
101.81
Female
2002
98.17
Male
35.11 30.67 38.22 36.82
37.68
69.66
78.28
63.78
27.01
39.61
33.28
28.31
47.98
48.30
27.21
30.56
26.18
23.50
35.37
46.09
37.36
38.80
60.85
37.36
30.66
50.56
33.82
31.49
43.95
34.76
35.00
42.10
51.89
48.88
76.77
Female
44.60
38.35
44.67
46.60
40.16
33.98
38.82
51.45
33.74
38.90
30.68
43.38
30.65
39.36
63.77
45.62
76.99
43.57
37.52
83.12
38.70
40.86
32.11
36.24
36.91
47.95
57.20
44.05
Male
40.21
38.00
51.26
44.70
41.33
37.62
44.71
48.84
34.03
38.80
26.04
36.70
24.60
29.44
52.44
38.45
70.42
36.73
32.24
62.54
38.14
47.70
36.61
34.41
35.09
56.44
53.61
37.04
Female
1995
5
33.47 31.70 37.46 37.45 38.63 40.07
38.79
Source: SUSENAS
INDONESIA
74.81
70.94
31.93
32.50
North Maluku
28.61
41.14
35.88
23.75 26.75 29.73 32.92
35.60
35.44
25.49
Irian Jaya
35.21 35.32 36.93 36.96
Southeast Sulawesi
34.60
31.68
39.50
41.57
71.69
28.19 32.86 33.59 32.37
South Sulawesi
29.43
38.20
39.57
34.28 36.53 39.25 44.23
26.40 29.10 24.88 30.56
Central Sulawesi
41.15
44.92
28.76
30.11
23.22
20.10
Maluku
28.94 32.88 35.85 38.76
North Sulawesi
31.57
33.36
26.50
20.39
19.31
39.08 39.71 44.39 42.66
East Kalimantan
30.53
34.25
20.75
20.57
Gorontolo
31.30 32.27 23.57 29.95
24.07 26.91 30.83 30.26
21.15 18.75 24.90 26.11
West Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
18.26 17.86 19.48 23.65
East Timor
Central Kalimantan
17.76 16.12 23.18 21.51
36.44
East Nusa Tenggara
36.64
54.82
55.27
33.80
27.78 24.02 30.54 24.12
West Nusa Tenggara
53.00
49.72 40.88 53.40 47.33
Bali
39.03
38.17
41.41
56.45
Banten
39.65
63.09
38.97
35.24
East Java
58.91
38.63
36.05
52.48 56.79 56.82 57.46
30.55
DI Yogyakarta
38.09
35.93
56.93
30.74
29.77
34.12 30.21 35.05 35.60
60.85
31.79
44.63
33.88
36.42
28.80 25.69 34.97 33.71
29.92 30.71 30.31 28.76
Lampung
35.01
39.63
35.99
Central Java
29.01 38.15 34.77 40.37
Bengkulu
35.43
36.13
39.28
West Java
23.34 28.09 32.29 33.26
South Sumatera
40.33
45.60
65.39
24.91 26.90 26.43 31.14
Jambi
38.80
53.33
49.31
77.39
60.99 47.99 67.96 60.80
27.37 27.05 32.94 34.24
Riau
44.36
52.98
Jakarta
36.05 44.89 44.37 51.05
West Sumatera
49.58
36.92
43.05 41.86 45.20 49.40
Male
2002
Bangka Belitung
32.01 29.20 37.19 35.90
North Sumatera
Female
2000
Male Female Male Female Male
1998
Net Senior Secondary Enrollment
Aceh
Province
1995
Table 4. Net and Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Gender
48.08
45.04
52.73
47.53
43.89
34.93
46.88
57.74
38.62
30.73
35.99
41.42
36.18
36.10
64.44
48.23
75.36
43.96
44.81
88.36
38.80
45.39
41.54
34.65
42.40
54.18
57.54
46.78
42.82
54.95
49.87
40.27
37.98
49.70
58.05
37.70
40.58
35.02
37.45
29.77
29.64
57.99
45.46
69.71
42.79
41.26
76.43
40.42
50.57
41.79
40.42
43.32
64.65
62.08
45.16
Female
1998
46.94
Male
50.66
45.47
44.46
46.01
39.72
50.86
67.89
40.20
43.86
28.37
30.92
45.03
66.41
51.49
76.54
49.79
45.83
81.04
42.99
48.04
46.06
44.61
53.35
61.82
49.76
39.80
53.33
47.05
38.54
49.44
55.02
37.02
42.22
37.40
29.07
49.29
69.56
50.59
75.46
47.09
42.65
72.77
40.01
57.31
51.25
43.80
50.92
68.24
65.91
Female
2000
65.00
Male
Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment
49.39
88.24
95.10
93.63
27.21
44.83
44.62
35.97
51.24
59.40
35.65
40.10
31.86
30.78
41.85
68.93
46.75
50.77
72.90
49.65
44.07
79.37
50.06
38.20
38.66
46.15
44.81
52.44
59.39
60.87
46.89
88.89
95.09
83.92
39.31
44.78
41.26
38.55
63.06
63.65
33.30
41.64
34.66
31.74
40.43
57.21
46.07
48.30
78.41
47.19
36.00
62.18
45.90
39.13
57.93
45.56
44.39
51.26
66.02
61.30
94.12
Female
2002
90.48
Male
93.70
88.08
85.00
70.88
82.94
95.30
91.47
92.23
87.06
90.90
85.25
88.41
92.36
77.58
93.10
91.07
90.60
83.40
92.28
90.54
92.97
92.11
90.06
91.59
90.78
89.35
91.35
87.48
88.57
93.16
93.24
92.47
90.73
89.98
88.56
92.74
91.78
91.88
87.60
89.78
89.05
89.09
92.75
93.60
94.26
92.47
93.36
91.82
75.63
93.76
90.80
87.18
68.11
88.53
94.09
93.02
93.14
91.35
89.94
86.24
90.54
92.20
94.33
95.59
91.84
79.10
89.03
94.34
92.92
91.50
91.03
91.19
88.60
89.50
91.36
93.99
91.37
91.37
88.93
90.59
88.52
89.29
91.24
94.30
91.13
88.80
92.58
94.21
94.16
91.48
92.10
87.13
89.80
91.45
92.74
93.25
94.50
93.69
90.18
91.46
91.40
91.56
85.75
86.97
88.83
90.33
85.95
86.73
95.92
90.99
6
92.80
89.25
94.90
91.86
92.33
88.75
90.78
89.02
89.60
79.06
87.76
81.14
100.00
2002
Urban Rural
91.91
93.31
94.11
90.82
92.92
94.31
94.17
90.38
94.14
89.70
92.43
89.84
93.57
94.21
92.79
89.88
95.35
90.73
93.15
94.53
93.27
94.67
93.31
93.14
93.46
93.02
94.07
92.11
91.80
92.58
94.12
92.74
89.89
86.59
92.64 90.90 92.85 91.69 92.49 92.16 92.55
90.46
93.98
94.54
92.61
93.17
91.45
93.92
96.48
93.89
Note: Missing values due to civil unrest or governmental changes
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Net Primary Enrollment
1995
1998
2000
92.38 91.90 92.23 93.43
94.06 93.69 92.60 94.62 93.86 94.47
92.04 92.27 93.10 92.33 91.85 92.92
96.23 93.39 93.58 94.50 93.99 93.92
91.72 90.76 91.69 90.74 89.33 93.74
89.42 89.49 91.22 91.53 90.43 93.10
92.50 91.10 90.67 92.48 93.24 90.89
92.58 91.77 92.45 92.54 93.86 93.05
Table 5. Net and Gross Primary Enrollment Rates, by location
112.57
100.00
105.53
101.35
106.39
91.60
105.36
114.33
108.71
116.81
102.91
106.59
98.93
106.49
102.55
110.24
111.99
109.19
103.85
107.42
111.09
104.25
111.81
110.84
110.39
114.12
106.45
108.27
107.33
104.98
101.24
106.78
108.45
107.52
110.23
106.25
108.43
108.51
95.48
110.59
101.05
110.44
88.09
112.14
115.05
109.79
114.99
111.85
109.25
100.79
106.32
103.80
111.02
114.72
108.56
105.66
110.93
108.68
105.88
111.70
109.96
104.76
101.53
103.51
108.41
99.51
106.82
107.13
105.90
109.80
109.09
108.38
102.15
109.29
113.41
109.06
110.83
107.71
109.68
103.84
103.46
109.43
103.45
111.31
103.76
111.73
111.52
107.26
Gross Primary Enrollment
1998
2000
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
108.02 105.99
109.88 110.25 107.57 111.05
109.08 107.19 107.10 109.69
109.45 108.11 106.89 108.59
107.35 104.75 105.12 110.32
109.68 105.31 106.04 107.24
107.25 109.60 106.30 107.48
108.39 106.69 108.19 112.75
107.88 106.59 108.29 107.24 107.19 107.97
114.42
103.56
109.71
102.92
108.90
111.27
116.46
103.70
107.77
110.12
111.68
108.39
106.10
108.28
108.69
104.82
110.47
114.17
108.77
1995
Urban
Rural
105.42 105.39
107.12 110.27
109.12 106.92
112.21 110.40
107.31 104.85
106.40 104.25
109.21 108.44
109.81 106.72
105.54
107.27
105.82
102.64
106.56
106.41
103.72
100.01
103.83
101.19
104.73
108.14
110.43
106.30
109.42
113.36
104.80
109.99
101.95
106.29
100.69
103.48
89.96
100.04
87.38
107.99
2002
Urban
Rural
97.30
106.12
108.10
101.89
104.89
107.10
107.61
103.78
109.46
106.62
108.65
103.49
109.05
104.64
106.34
103.34
110.68
104.31
104.92
103.96
106.79
109.13
104.48
105.10
107.16
107.27
105.95
102.49
105.68
104.28
105.41
102.37
106.43
106.77
73.43
46.34
32.40
47.03
41.38
57.18
47.10
57.61
61.59
43.69
50.48
55.53
53.76
49.77
89.87
70.68
90.74
73.01
86.09
99.53
80.44
93.14
86.36
85.50
75.80
88.25
94.46
95.30
7
55.21
44.19
59.70
84.27
58.89
95.48
81.34
81.01
92.05
82.58
1995
Urban Rural
88.62
60.89
87.45
70.15
97.89
70.24
91.58
54.39
94.45
48.18
82.95
48.07
91.59
58.25
80.59
66.24
66.51 42.65 69.74 49.63 70.53 53.44 71.90 54.13 85.19
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Net Junior Secondary Enrollment
1995
1998
2000
2002
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
69.16 48.70 69.15 55.39
80.19
69.81 55.95 67.61 60.33 74.10 62.95 73.96 65.50
70.72 53.61 72.15 58.53 70.03 60.78 73.50 62.93
70.67 41.77 71.86 52.79 73.32 56.08 76.57 56.12
73.39 36.93 68.78 45.84 72.90 50.82 73.72 55.97
62.47 36.21 68.35 48.35 67.19 55.80 70.72 44.89
70.53 43.63 68.69 44.71 70.00 52.23 68.50 55.14
65.79 51.07 69.77 54.36 66.09 57.53 69.70 61.07
64.16 30.96
71.99
75.89
77.01
77.49
64.44 35.25 67.84 43.08 68.15 48.12 70.08 50.05
63.54 46.91 69.60 56.19 69.60 58.22 70.28 60.76
72.89 65.38 78.06 63.26 78.85 71.46 78.55 74.26
66.37 45.13 72.03 51.91 74.15 55.88 73.42 56.68
76.51 44.00
68.76 59.02 75.14 63.68 73.77 68.10 73.18 63.66
53.92 36.63 55.22 48.32 59.83 57.31 61.82 54.97
64.45 21.48 64.21 27.00 68.17 27.21 68.19 32.68
40.05 25.73 56.06 31.47
61.13 26.08 56.05 36.77 66.65 40.13 66.50 37.97
73.68 43.77 63.42 41.47 71.99 56.99 66.74 47.87
65.61 37.47 67.53 45.52 66.08 44.80 72.51 48.38
72.28 43.12 70.53 47.05 65.43 53.45 67.77 56.63
63.15 47.35 66.52 50.97 74.24 58.44 70.76 64.23
69.60 35.59 66.37 42.71 66.57 43.96 67.14 47.52
61.10 38.83 64.71 41.66 62.58 48.53 66.27 48.04
70.33 42.00 61.84 53.98 66.32 59.22 76.08 53.91
61.42 34.50
69.41 38.79 76.66 50.62
73.15 71.37
68.10 30.73 73.70 31.66 66.69 24.57 84.50 57.22
68.10 30.73
72.74 68.87
Table 6. Net and Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Location
89.44
105.41
103.17
92.63
68.10
89.89
88.13
86.45
88.55
90.10
90.56
87.05
84.25
80.29
83.56
98.52
83.82
87.43
97.95
92.06
63.78
67.21
50.96
83.48
60.34
40.83
51.34
53.87
57.22
60.96
63.48
61.84
55.95
53.33
70.35
53.07
71.12
79.94
66.47
90.82
68.83
37.91
57.46
74.69
56.54
73.92
72.20
58.82
62.97
75.75
90.81
91.30
83.22
87.78
97.08
82.35
79.69
91.17
103.84
80.34
70.59
42.50
58.71
74.60
86.26
75.44
91.93
78.95
94.98
97.78
86.67
89.92
96.44
94.97
Gross Junior Secondary Enrollment
1998
2000
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
92.53
66.94
91.61
77.08
95.10
76.90
93.83
76.96
95.09
80.52
90.93
64.77
95.35
75.33
97.10
64.78
100.87 70.87
89.77
61.94
88.96
69.57
94.20
58.58
90.46
70.06
94.28
72.17
86.42
75.29
93.53
93.21
92.00
97.12
95.23
96.23
96.88
88.48
99.80
79.99
96.83
97.40
93.66
69.74
53.66
60.10
65.34
78.40
82.39
64.70
60.95
73.59
49.32
109.37
114.60
75.15
2002
Urban
Rural
100.01
96.10
82.28
100.23
85.04
98.18
74.39
100.37
71.49
99.65
58.39
94.41
69.98
93.00
79.22
87.27
39.01
100.55
89.45
60.39
90.92
76.84
100.50 100.39
96.19
74.56
91.40
56.33
99.18
79.55
77.81
67.72
95.99
51.90
8
50.01 20.86 55.48 24.20 55.15 26.36 52.95 25.41
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Net Senior Secondary Enrollment
1995
1998
2000
2002
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
57.13 23.44 55.77 30.49
77.11
55.62 32.70 60.55 36.12 63.55 42.34 58.42 41.02
57.59 33.30 66.94 38.86 67.50 40.34 65.26 41.02
51.47 15.52 55.30 22.42 61.41 25.12 58.35 28.30
58.07 13.32 55.10 15.99 63.13 23.11 58.84 25.30
47.74 14.42 55.33 20.11 58.65 23.99 59.52 18.02
62.18 22.41 63.82 25.38 66.86 27.00 59.32 24.55
57.65 23.78 51.85 23.42 58.50 23.24 47.54 25.79
57.49 12.41
53.87
64.21
58.83
57.44
42.27 14.01 49.52 18.87 49.17 20.50 45.12 17.64
46.28 24.19 50.45 26.09 50.62 29.17 48.98 29.31
58.05 49.79 61.81 50.67 64.40 54.81 63.23 50.67
49.74 22.69 56.07 25.32 58.64 26.86 53.80 26.73
58.06 15.72
62.57 34.82 64.52 40.25 62.92 45.15 61.31 38.00
47.26 18.52 41.65 23.21 49.19 27.07 48.33 27.94
53.86 8.40 58.32 10.49 59.85 9.97 62.19 10.33
35.98 15.82 43.91 17.36
51.77 10.07 50.96 15.96 48.41 12.38 49.21 15.96
61.74 18.33 54.74 15.32 62.90 20.32 54.01 18.95
50.03 15.46 52.80 18.67 50.48 19.97 44.89 18.05
56.37 20.70 59.80 24.32 57.10 19.77 56.09 29.06
50.05 24.82 50.33 31.22 52.85 34.13 56.58 34.59
60.76 16.39 60.13 14.58 58.06 20.61 58.52 18.02
54.80 19.82 54.87 21.76 53.61 26.34 53.49 25.21
63.71 23.02 61.19 25.31 66.62 27.03 65.48 27.14
44.85 13.42
65.79 21.25 73.42 24.54
73.85 43.84
54.91 12.61 60.65 15.09 58.48 14.82 79.55 37.39
73.48 44.64
Table 7. Net and Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment Rates, by Location
28.35
19.62
90.09
82.57
27.13
46.28
24.29
13.44
36.16
14.38
21.48
19.28
25.62
34.19
21.52
25.94
29.76
77.70
62.84
88.66
72.04
73.27
77.67
70.04
72.26
65.55
77.28
73.99
82.45
65.12
17.85
29.98
63.85
29.19
71.86
54.25
58.25
80.39
63.30
1995
Urban
Rural
75.23
31.17
71.02
43.86
74.98
42.56
69.72
19.77
78.83
18.38
63.64
19.40
77.43
31.36
69.06
31.15
70.65
91.87
83.36
81.17
51.42
82.24
74.32
72.71
70.42
64.83
78.26
69.47
77.75
71.23
77.89
82.12
62.70
62.60
78.45
70.82
30.36
33.13
22.00
46.88
27.56
16.59
33.45
21.59
21.42
23.93
33.86
38.50
19.93
27.07
34.65
23.03
31.69
64.29
31.09
71.05
33.15
20.08
17.42
26.60
24.94
32.72
43.05
25.28
33.72
35.63
66.89
78.53
62.51
80.52
66.76
77.59
73.95
81.76
83.71
56.12
33.23
14.91
23.54
36.33
70.02
33.85
80.15
71.07
86.63
76.76
62.02
64.58
79.27
73.95
Gross Senior Secondary Enrollment
1998
2000
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
74.86
36.98
76.77
45.50
81.39
53.87
82.20
49.01
88.61
54.30
71.24
28.25
81.43
32.75
70.88
21.34
77.52
28.25
71.36
25.03
78.11
29.82
82.32
32.14
86.18
36.93
66.37
32.14
79.11
30.53
67.10
64.10
72.98
53.40
75.60
76.97
80.65
66.91
80.98
65.16
98.20
98.46
93.19
31.64
22.27
25.44
23.36
41.55
43.07
25.11
31.07
33.41
18.92
51.80
49.85
50.22
2002
Urban
Rural
92.13
73.34
50.42
87.10
51.41
73.60
36.63
73.83
31.43
81.79
22.65
78.90
31.52
62.45
31.16
78.76
16.03
70.15
55.10
21.17
63.87
35.78
82.62
63.53
69.17
33.53
70.98
19.70
75.90
47.81
55.96
31.64
85.21
15.90
9
87.73 87.38 88.23 88.43 3.91 6.59 6.30 5.81 2.34 1.04 0.90 1.37 6.02 5.00 4.56 4.39
81.45
66.12
94.53
91.89
56.24
89.34
93.12
94.77
85.06
91.95
82.86
95.14
95.15
97.20
79.13
91.40
87.41
81.60
81.67
1995
87.47
86.25
96.14
95.92
97.30
93.10
96.19
91.74
INDONESIA
Province
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Primary School Students Enrolled
Primary School Students Enrolled
Public School
Private School
Public Madrasah
Private Madrasah
1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002
91.16
76.70 0.91 1.78
4.73 10.18 6.02
18.58 1.44 1.04
0.00
86.39 85.40 87.22 11.21 11.85 13.55 11.50 0.97 0.91 0.57 0.94 1.58 0.85 0.48 0.33
96.57 96.51 96.00 2.02 2.54 2.90 2.96 1.03 0.54 0.39 0.88 0.82 0.35 0.20 0.15
91.60 91.34 92.79 2.01 5.24 7.28 5.25 0.61 0.94 0.28 1.45 1.46 2.22 1.10 0.51
95.56 96.64 96.09 1.57 2.13 1.91 1.99 0.97 1.20 0.96 1.36 0.16 1.10 0.48 0.57
93.82 93.49 92.27 2.47 4.44 4.38 5.72 1.26 0.59 0.41 1.18 3.17 1.15 1.73 0.83
98.20 97.26 96.23 0.39 1.00 1.78 1.29 1.00 0.63 0.81 2.20 2.42 0.17 0.15 0.28
93.97 91.25 90.55 1.65 3.25 3.49 4.56 2.51 0.79 0.66 1.27 4.09 1.99 4.61 3.62
91.54
4.35
3.92
0.19
78.16 79.49 80.69 13.11 17.09 17.54 16.31 2.04 0.99 0.65 1.27 5.72 3.76 2.32 1.73
90.65 92.38 91.61 2.22 3.79 3.09 3.03 1.99 1.04 0.83 1.32 4.39 4.52 3.70 4.03
87.03 87.22 87.47 1.68 3.56 3.57 3.51 2.92 0.99 1.23 1.53 7.99 8.43 7.99 7.48
83.80 82.73 85.31 4.59 14.73 16.55 13.08 2.32 0.82 0.30 0.82 11.49 0.65 0.42 0.79
80.56 82.76 81.52 3.14 5.54 4.61 4.96 3.09 0.94 1.36 1.63 12.09 12.96 11.27 11.89
89.22
6.03
1.36
3.39
96.15 94.65 94.49 3.72 3.26 4.10 4.09 0.85 0.24 0.91 0.65 0.90 0.36 0.34 0.78
92.96 91.72 95.53 0.30 1.14 0.96 1.33 1.87 0.55 0.98 0.90 5.94 5.35 6.35 2.24
57.76 61.08 59.84 15.16 40.10 38.15 38.19 3.11 0.43 0.21 0.91 25.49 1.72 0.56 1.06
85.94
3.39 13.40
2.90 0.27
4.37 0.39
89.68 90.95 89.83 3.91 5.25 6.39 6.34 1.05 0.64 0.58 1.06 1.91 4.43 2.08 2.76
92.40 93.83 95.98 1.96 2.51 2.40 1.21 1.26 1.10 0.51 1.22 2.02 3.99 3.27 1.59
85.20 88.22 88.30 1.47 3.75 2.42 2.25 4.13 3.60 3.95 4.25 9.35 7.45 5.41 5.21
93.08 93.77 93.78 5.88 5.57 5.05 4.29 0.54 0.86 0.36 1.12 1.63 0.49 0.82 0.80
78.33 79.78 74.55 5.54 20.72 19.58 23.65 2.70 0.33 0.38 1.28 8.90 0.62 0.26 0.52
94.84 96.82 94.84 2.35 4.39 2.38 3.83 0.70 0.57 0.49 0.87 1.81 0.20 0.32 0.46
95.23 95.09 96.17 1.61 2.52 2.22 1.82 1.91 0.94 0.82 0.73 1.33 1.32 1.87 1.28
97.76 98.15 97.15 1.12 0.82 0.80 0.88 1.27 0.86 0.91 1.22 0.42 0.57 0.14 0.75
95.77
1.09
1.51
1.63
78.74
89.67 14.23 19.14
7.01 1.34 0.56
1.85 2.97 1.56
1.47
63.43 68.36 84.44 19.42 35.81 30.94 13.29 5.43 0.63 0.49 0.65 9.04 0.13 0.21 1.63
90.75
8.54
0.71
0.00
Table 8. Percent of Primary Students Enrolled, by Type of School
Junior Secondary School Students Enrolled
Public Madrasah
Private Madrasah
1995 1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002
11.14 6.04
8.98
4.25 0.81
0.90
2.67 1.45 1.92 1.79
9.95 7.66 7.58 7.99
13.26 11.84 10.88 12.21
7.07 4.42 4.26 4.47
7.88 5.11 4.26 3.81 10.52 10.90 9.44 9.10
9.77 13.54 12.52 10.80
5.87 3.83 7.72 8.89
5.09 2.33 3.03 3.60
9.34 5.86 6.15 4.34
4.51 2.61 4.13 6.09
1.97 1.45 0.92 2.20
6.56 4.07 3.70 3.26 13.40 10.97 13.39 9.84
0.79
8.20
2.96 0.55 0.98 1.27
5.39 4.11 2.11 2.41
6.55 2.75 3.05 3.12 11.03 11.77 11.20 9.78
7.01 3.32 3.49 3.58 15.95 12.83 12.08 13.10
7.54 4.44 4.22 1.75 18.14 1.55 0.44 0.78
7.20 4.38 5.33 5.01 17.57 15.23 13.97 15.37
3.25
14.57
0.87 1.45 1.02 0.62
2.47 0.11 0.07 0.16
6.64 4.36 3.58 5.10 23.23 21.36 21.24 13.93
7.95 0.77 1.10 1.51 16.88 0.48 0.90 0.98
3.62 0.00
4.92 0.00
4.68 2.81 4.78 1.68
6.63 7.29 5.46 5.38
7.60 7.31 3.59 3.08
2.77 10.37 5.46 6.37
18.55 20.96 21.21 20.42 21.51 17.27 14.20 15.25
4.26 3.33 3.05 1.54
7.77 6.01 5.72 3.68
4.32 1.20 1.05 0.48
6.32 1.46 1.11 0.52
5.19 3.68 4.13 3.65 10.92 6.79 6.47 4.95
7.07 3.17 2.88 2.35
7.24 4.82 4.75 3.82
5.67 3.63 3.44 5.28
4.90 5.87 2.12 3.55
5.85
3.14
5.01 2.47
0.85
2.56 4.53
0.00
3.95 0.33 1.01 0.00
5.66 0.72 0.36 0.00
1.67
0.00
10
63.37 63.54 66.29 67.05 18.42 22.99 20.22 19.55 6.46 3.69 3.91 3.84 11.76 9.77 9.58 9.56
77.64
83.07
75.32
65.96
53.57
84.77
67.62
81.22
52.12
68.97
81.39
75.55
76.27
84.46
64.00
62.78
62.30
51.50
54.93
1995
80.59
54.36
75.40
72.35
76.09
63.57
90.36
50.34
INDONESIA
Province
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Junior Secondary School Students Enrolled
Public School
Private School
1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002
89.21
89.22
4.03
3.94
0.90
53.81 59.13 58.62 33.02 37.08 31.37 31.60
78.62 80.17 79.51
4.26
5.13
4.69
3.81
68.76 67.97 74.99
9.25 15.24 18.32 12.10
74.22 72.13 70.08
8.27
8.42
7.63 10.24
62.92 69.07 71.56 21.99 28.88 21.76 20.50
91.83 89.53 87.41
3.16
4.10
5.42
4.31
49.65 52.33 60.29 29.69 35.30 30.59 26.62
71.11
19.90
63.03 65.57 64.20 27.65 32.32 31.35 32.13
61.94 65.14 66.04 19.64 23.54 20.61 21.05
62.11 65.15 63.85 14.74 21.74 19.29 19.47
63.02 69.04 77.32 22.82 30.98 26.31 20.15
54.52 60.13 60.57 20.30 25.87 20.57 19.04
58.14
24.05
74.82 79.74 78.20 21.34 23.61 19.17 21.02
70.80 72.21 76.12
4.17
3.49
2.96
4.85
63.84 63.76 65.97 21.61 34.91 34.24 31.54
84.00
6.69 16.00
65.61 61.95 69.52 21.07 24.29 27.80 23.43
71.61 82.87 85.51
8.42 10.70
8.08
5.04
53.11 58.22 59.85
7.83
8.66
6.37
4.49
70.99 74.19 80.75 18.99 19.67 17.04 14.03
78.49 81.80 82.46
7.97 18.85 16.04 16.54
83.21 83.79 84.48
8.34
6.33
5.61
6.92
80.59 83.04 85.35
9.42 11.43
9.33
8.48
88.49 90.63 88.91
4.97
2.02
3.80
2.26
91.01
0.00
77.47
93.27 14.79 15.53
5.88
82.63 86.20 94.27
7.32 16.32 12.43
5.73
92.39
5.95
Table 9. Percent of Junior Secondary Students Enrolled, by Type of School
11
54.67 55.45 56.38 55.96 33.65 35.84 34.85 33.58
76.92
74.59
51.47
68.21
49.33
81.30
58.85
78.11
55.84
59.61
83.57
80.21
71.07
89.30
52.18
52.75
49.58
44.75
42.68
1995
83.01
42.39
75.06
70.36
70.78
51.43
78.46
53.27
INDONESIA
Province
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
3.79 3.48
3.64
4.11 7.90
5.23
5.13 6.35
Senior Secondary Students Enrolled
Senior Secondary Students Enrolled
Public School
Private School
Public Madrasah
Private Madrasah
1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002 1995 1998 2000 2002
87.12
86.08
7.21
5.96
4.64 7.71 5.72
8.51 2.07 1.20
0.77
45.99 48.95 45.58 47.38 46.43 44.26 46.88 2.16 1.67 1.87 1.80 8.06 5.90 4.92 5.74
71.94 77.05 76.53 14.39 16.07 14.26 11.61 6.14 8.65 5.44 8.08 4.41 3.34 3.24 3.79
66.07 72.27 77.07 18.26 18.04 19.38 15.25 7.92 7.24 3.66 4.46 3.47 8.65 4.69 3.22
70.63 70.78 62.47 15.39 15.55 13.96 20.15 10.54 7.99 9.55 9.63 3.29 5.84 5.71 7.75
48.14 45.75 54.36 37.97 48.02 47.83 41.96 3.08 1.40 3.08 1.32 7.52 2.44 3.35 2.36
81.05 81.98 81.73 13.34 14.57 11.14 12.35 3.58 3.34 6.43 5.92 4.62 1.05 0.45 0.00
45.82 53.60 53.54 36.50 43.15 39.38 37.38 3.79 4.98 2.18 2.70 6.44 6.05 4.85 6.37
53.01
37.88
1.99
7.12
47.17 45.58 48.58 41.33 50.66 52.14 48.06 1.93 0.71 0.47 1.05 4.57 1.46 1.80 2.30
51.56 56.70 55.75 38.78 38.83 36.75 34.44 2.70 3.33 2.26 3.77 5.77 6.28 4.29 6.04
52.70 51.79 52.41 33.09 37.06 38.10 35.89 4.41 3.64 3.67 4.16 12.92 6.59 6.44 7.55
51.92 50.36 57.73 30.56 43.27 42.72 36.93 3.86 4.29 6.03 3.65 20.82 0.52 0.89 1.69
45.22 45.23 43.83 41.90 41.94 38.81 38.42 4.07 4.06 6.31 5.34 11.35 8.78 9.65 12.42
41.72
40.37
7.17
10.74
56.06 56.38 57.17 47.25 43.45 42.15 42.36 0.11 0.48 1.12 0.47 1.17 0.00 0.35 0.00
61.34 59.73 65.30
8.91 13.62 13.44 12.96 7.96 6.92 9.52 9.22 14.92 18.12 17.31 12.52
62.01 61.92 58.83 25.61 37.41 36.88 40.31 6.18 0.46 1.20 0.86 18.88 0.12 0.00 0.00
80.68
12.18 19.17
1.79 0.00
4.73 0.15
59.29 56.61 56.40 36.05 36.07 36.53 36.12 1.94 2.13 2.34 3.12 3.16 2.51 4.52 4.36
79.76 85.15 82.25 14.11 13.15
8.73
9.65 4.52 3.74 4.63 4.72 3.26 3.34 1.50 3.39
52.15 64.35 55.58 20.40 18.33
9.56 13.95 13.39 16.59 17.57 19.13 10.38 12.93 8.52 11.34
60.81 68.03 70.03 32.70 32.76 23.72 25.68 2.15 3.36 5.10 2.18 5.55 3.07 3.15 2.11
83.22 90.75 77.54
6.49 14.75
7.55 21.87 4.81 1.90 1.62 0.12 5.13 0.13 0.08 0.47
82.56 86.16 84.60 11.00 10.48
5.70
6.99 5.36 2.78 3.66 2.82 3.44 4.18 4.48 5.59
76.85 75.22 79.45 21.06 16.66 19.11 14.44 4.05 3.60 2.54 3.75 3.82 2.88 3.13 2.36
89.09 86.96 87.40
5.45
4.41
8.99
5.51 3.51 1.87 2.49 3.30 1.74 4.63 1.56 3.79
78.96
0.47
10.96
9.60
72.95
84.59 15.73 21.67
13.37 4.52 3.40
2.03 2.83 1.98
0.00
72.08 77.45 91.68 11.30 27.50 22.33
8.32 2.33 0.22 0.22 0.00 11.78 0.20 0.00 0.00
88.13
6.78
2.54
2.54
Table 10. Percent of Senior Secondary Students Enrolled, by Type of School
81.49
61.73
77.70
37.29
75.14
93.98
90.26
91.18
97.03
90.96
78.64
83.17
94.60
65.45
97.45
91.38
93.54
74.13
94.48
98.64
97.91
98.31
98.07
97.03
94.96
96.53
97.52
85.07
95.83 84.18
96.81
89.28
84.37
87.21
79.02
99.67
98.46
98.33
99.06
96.78
55.94
75.73
53.14
36.90
30.30
42.11
9.42
41.42
74.18
66.05
62.60
90.00
63.55
42.63
44.29
82.19
60.15
43.41
41.63
39.36
Ages
25-54 Over 55
89.56 64.74
95.68 74.92
93.10 74.14
92.31 72.75
89.43 65.27
91.75 65.14
91.62 65.78
90.97 56.27
Ages
15-24
97.70
99.02
98.18
97.54
97.87
97.92
98.33
98.55
1995
87.59
71.88
84.08
42.31
83.13
95.61
93.90
93.18
98.07
93.35
84.59
88.12
80.53
60.89
47.49
39.04
48.45
9.39
53.82
80.83
71.13
69.80
93.37
72.46
50.92
55.29
94.74
71.47
83.33
73.72
81.57
47.29
84.14
95.11
92.45
92.87
97.64
92.71
82.56
87.35
97.99
92.09
84.23
81.17
80.78
Over
55
Overall
71.58 91.97
80.59 95.65
80.86 93.81
81.21 95.36
76.63 92.77
72.93 93.06
71.38 92.55
59.18 90.51
98.42 90.23
93.53 70.95
89.09 51.19
90.18 41.74
84.63 48.24
Ages
25-54
92.86
97.33
95.48
95.89
93.09
94.59
93.76
93.52
98.84 95.94
82.85 67.31
98.22
93.54
95.11
76.58
97.47
98.98
98.47
99.10
98.95
98.30
95.71
97.34
99.57
99.21
98.87
99.05
97.40
Ages
15-24
98.54
99.14
98.84
99.00
98.60
98.53
98.55
99.09
1998
12
83.72 96.81 88.57 64.08 87.37
93.13
70.24
78.31
65.81
76.90
45.56
77.44
93.48
89.77
90.92
96.37
89.90
78.35
83.01
96.41
87.85
80.23
80.37
75.75
Overall
89.03
93.93
91.27
92.11
89.59
90.42
90.77
89.07
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Table 11. Adult Literacy Rates
61.37
53.57
81.17
71.77
68.93
94.65
74.56
51.96
56.81
49.36
42.70
50.39
87.74
70.65
53.26
41.69
47.90
83.23
83.19
81.34
74.84
76.46
65.33
62.25
Over
55
70.11
85.24
95.68
92.21
93.73
98.10
92.89
83.64
88.76
84.23
76.32
82.83
97.56
92.49
85.63
80.51
81.74
96.21
94.99
95.80
94.43
93.98
91.54
90.91
Overall
97.59 90.95 66.05 89.15
66.59
85.26
96.19
93.37
94.58
98.57
93.74
86.27
89.81
97.12
98.97
98.98
98.99
99.00
98.37
96.10
98.03
80.13
88.93
75.15
85.76
98.20
94.25
90.34
90.82
86.17
97.51
96.86
96.45
95.74
95.61
93.06
93.67
Ages
25-54
98.49
94.91
95.25
99.75
99.25
99.04
98.50
97.97
99.41
98.93
99.33
99.38
98.49
98.79
99.05
Ages
15-24
2000
87.53
97.33
94.65
96.17
99.02
94.52
86.57
90.31
96.25
99.62
98.81
97.13
Ages
25-54
98.47
97.66
96.55
96.79
95.88
95.69
95.07
94.99
94.40
98.74
95.28
91.19
92.84
87.83
94.73
89.29
76.73
88.04
56.77
79.99
73.77
74.78
96.96
73.39
51.96
54.36
86.49
99.48
87.00
93.73
86.75
96.32
93.29
95.19
98.79
93.32
83.47
88.24
95.21
99.50
97.93
97.74
Over
55
Overall
84.05 97.34
82.56 96.11
84.67 95.15
85.42 96.56
77.65 94.71
75.40 94.11
68.93 93.04
70.81 93.00
66.88 91.74
90.89 98.23
72.64 93.11
51.33 85.66
48.13 83.81
49.80 83.19
73.53 93.84
50.44 84.19
45.31 77.87
51.04 84.13
98.47 93.94 71.94 92.05
97.12
99.47
98.47
99.23
99.40
98.57
95.29
96.99
96.81
99.30
100.00
99.80
Ages
15-24
99.79
99.15
98.77
99.07
98.96
98.85
98.59
98.91
97.52
99.57
99.45
99.17
99.36
98.46
98.81
97.65
95.72
95.86
2002
20,107
18,094
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
1,142,161
Sample Size: 172,457 schools
Source: 1999 MoNE School Survey
INDONESIA
10,339
16,608
East Kalimantan
Bengkulu
22,172
North Kalimantan
15,915
11,941
Central Kalimantan
Irian Jaya
27,157
West Kalimantan
28,596
42,132
Lampung
East Nusa Tenggara
44,873
South Sumatera
22,544
20,173
Jambi
West Nusa Tenggara
28,647
Riau
16,882
29,183
West Sumatera
17,067
69,864
North Sumatera
Bali
25,972
Aceh
Maluku
172,542
East Java
53,964
16,289
DI Yogyakarta
12,482
163,506
Central Java
Southeast Sulawesi
207,618
West Java
South Sulawesi
27,494
Number of
classes
Jakarta
Province
451,490
3,873
6,708
8,797
10,284
8,710
5,181
3,965
22,464
5,204
10,705
5,836
7,950
3,531
7,070
15,493
16,236
7,922
9,421
11,696
30,566
11,741
81,319
7,243
72,779
58,370
18,426
Good
condition
352,388
3,387
3,113
8,559
6,296
5,739
4,155
3,854
15,772
5,453
6,169
4,881
7,862
3,085
8,419
11,102
11,620
5,925
7,589
10,263
22,491
7,330
56,568
6,626
59,164
63,698
3,268
Fair
condition
Classrooms
182,290
1,713
2,835
9,284
2,431
2,722
4,642
2,714
7,908
4,447
2,728
2,558
4,506
3,499
5,076
5,579
7,093
3,134
4,690
3,628
8,926
3,608
22,021
1,969
20,554
43,204
821
Poor
condition
97.6%
95.7%
94.7%
90.4%
97.3%
96.4%
99.4%
98.2%
97.9%
97.8%
95.4%
88.6%
93.2%
95.9%
87.3%
87.4%
86.4%
87.4%
96.8%
90.7%
96.1%
82.1%
97.4%
92.6%
90.8%
73.1%
Civil
Teachers
13
1,280,798 90.36%
12,362
16,649
28,247
27,133
22,756
16,152
13,605
59,117
18,044
25,255
19,129
26,553
13,315
29,055
48,431
50,649
22,504
30,486
31,852
80,176
28,832
210,017
21,276
194,261
190,633
36,597
Total
Number
Table 12. Primary School Classrooms and Teacher Profiles
9.64%
2.4%
4.3%
5.3%
9.6%
2.7%
3.6%
0.6%
1.8%
2.1%
2.2%
4.6%
11.4%
6.8%
4.1%
12.7%
12.6%
13.6%
12.6%
3.2%
9.3%
3.9%
17.9%
2.6%
7.4%
9.2%
26.9%
1.60%
0.7%
0.9%
1.3%
0.3%
0.1%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
1.1%
0.8%
0.7%
1.5%
0.7%
1.2%
1.8%
3.4%
2.1%
1.3%
0.5%
1.4%
0.8%
3.6%
1.8%
1.5%
0.8%
1.4%
Non-Civil SLTP
2.10%
1.5%
0.8%
5.3%
1.6%
2.5%
2.0%
2.9%
1.1%
0.4%
0.6%
2.1%
1.6%
1.2%
0.5%
3.3%
3.0%
1.3%
1.5%
1.3%
2.0%
2.0%
3.1%
2.0%
2.4%
1.1%
2.9%
SLTP
teaching
71.71%
74.9%
93.7%
83.7%
73.6%
69.5%
84.7%
81.0%
78.6%
85.6%
90.6%
76.0%
69.4%
80.4%
86.4%
71.4%
76.0%
78.5%
76.7%
73.4%
87.8%
75.2%
58.5%
59.8%
72.4%
63.2%
61.4%
2.86%
0.6%
0.9%
0.7%
4.6%
0.4%
1.0%
0.5%
0.7%
0.9%
0.3%
1.7%
3.4%
2.3%
1.0%
3.1%
3.8%
1.3%
4.6%
1.0%
1.9%
1.0%
6.7%
0.1%
2.6%
2.6%
2.2%
SMU
SMU non
teaching teaching
15.04%
19.6%
2.0%
7.4%
12.9%
18.0%
10.4%
12.4%
10.8%
10.0%
5.5%
13.6%
21.3%
13.1%
8.1%
14.0%
11.0%
14.1%
12.1%
20.3%
3.4%
16.8%
13.2%
26.9%
15.8%
26.6%
18.5%
DII
Degree Held by Teachers
DIII
2.34%
1.0%
0.5%
1.1%
2.6%
1.4%
0.4%
0.4%
3.1%
0.4%
0.7%
1.2%
0.9%
1.2%
1.6%
2.1%
1.0%
1.1%
1.2%
1.4%
1.5%
1.6%
4.7%
4.8%
2.2%
2.0%
5.1%
4.36%
1.7%
1.2%
0.5%
4.5%
8.1%
0.8%
2.2%
5.0%
1.5%
1.4%
4.8%
2.0%
1.1%
1.3%
4.2%
1.9%
1.7%
2.6%
2.1%
2.1%
2.7%
10.3%
4.6%
3.1%
3.8%
8.6%
Above DIII
776
Riau
1,226
570
287
264
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
Irian Jaya
Bengkulu
Sample size: 8793 public schools
50
330
Southeast Sulawesi
152
473
318
North Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
252
East Kalimantan
Central Sulawesi
57
147
North Kalimantan
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
984
754
Lampung
533
582
West Sumatera
2,284
1,050
North Sumatera
South Sumatera
1,249
Aceh
Jambi
580
8,446
6,900
Central Java
East Java
7,613
West Java
DI Yogyakarta
2,413
Total
Teachers
Jakarta
Province
2%
16%
4%
8%
4%
16%
21%
5%
25%
13%
6%
2%
4%
5%
2%
2%
4%
1%
2%
2%
3%
7%
4%
5%
3%
Civil
Servants
98%
84%
96%
92%
96%
84%
79%
95%
75%
87%
94%
98%
96%
95%
98%
98%
96%
99%
98%
98%
97%
93%
96%
95%
97%
Non-Civil
Servants
24%
25%
26%
21%
12%
21%
18%
21%
16%
26%
15%
48%
27%
20%
27%
21%
21%
9%
18%
14%
22%
13%
19%
24%
11%
Under 5
22%
27%
12%
21%
9%
21%
14%
19%
8%
20%
10%
18%
12%
20%
18%
13%
15%
12%
13%
10%
12%
7%
10%
16%
11%
5-9
26%
28%
23%
23%
23%
22%
25%
26%
23%
33%
28%
23%
27%
28%
25%
32%
24%
30%
25%
25%
29%
16%
25%
23%
17%
10 - 14
14
21%
12%
26%
25%
35%
24%
27%
25%
34%
16%
35%
10%
24%
20%
20%
23%
27%
32%
28%
36%
24%
30%
26%
22%
34%
15 - 19
1%
5%
12%
8%
15%
9%
9%
6%
14%
3%
8%
1%
9%
9%
7%
8%
10%
11%
10%
12%
7%
18%
10%
8%
19%
2%
3%
1%
3%
6%
3%
7%
2%
5%
2%
3%
0%
2%
2%
4%
3%
3%
6%
6%
3%
6%
17%
10%
7%
7%
20 - 24 Over 25
Years of Teacher Work Experience
Table 13. Teacher Profile in Junior Secondary Schools
139
160
26
171
168
472
171
86
76
North Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
Irian Jaya
Bengkulu
Sample size: 2385 public schools
6
136
Central Kalimantan
225
201
South Sumatera
West Kalimantan
826
Jambi
Lampung
264
209
Riau
571
396
West Sumatera
519
Aceh
North Sumatera
523
3,341
2,829
Central Java
East Java
1,853
West Java
DI Yogyakarta
1,480
Province
Jakarta
Total
Teachers
9%
9%
10%
9%
7%
19%
4%
11%
8%
22%
0%
12%
11%
4%
3%
4%
2%
10%
10%
4%
10%
6%
14%
3%
Civil
Servants
91%
91%
90%
91%
93%
81%
96%
89%
92%
78%
100%
88%
89%
96%
97%
96%
98%
90%
90%
96%
90%
94%
86%
97%
Non-Civil
Servants
55%
67%
50%
35%
22%
11%
47%
27%
59%
62%
96%
53%
40%
34%
58%
24%
10%
14%
15%
6%
24%
9%
7%
5%
Under 5
18%
20%
17%
27%
13%
18%
18%
17%
19%
9%
2%
15%
25%
22%
13%
24%
18%
18%
17%
14%
12%
14%
22%
15%
5-9
17%
9%
19%
22%
31%
39%
21%
29%
13%
17%
2%
19%
22%
25%
15%
28%
34%
29%
34%
40%
22%
36%
36%
29%
10 - 14
15
7%
2%
10%
9%
17%
18%
9%
13%
7%
7%
0%
6%
8%
11%
9%
15%
23%
21%
22%
25%
17%
21%
23%
27%
15 - 19
2%
1%
3%
5%
10%
9%
3%
8%
2%
4%
0%
4%
4%
5%
4%
6%
10%
12%
9%
10%
13%
13%
7%
17%
0%
1%
1%
2%
7%
6%
2%
5%
0%
2%
0%
2%
1%
3%
1%
3%
4%
6%
4%
5%
12%
7%
6%
7%
20 - 24 Over 25
Years of Teacher Work Experience
Table 14. Teacher Profile in Senior Secondary Schools
4.87
4.86
5.08
4.64
5.07
4.55
3.29
4.62
4.27
4.58
4.65
11,123
7,896
107,108
12,795
2,802,523
4.90
5.12
3.98
4.47
4.62
2.47
2.93
75th
percentile
5.13
4.93
5.02
5.255
4.97
5.18
4.89
4.87
4.96
4.83
4.91
4.68
4.7
4.92
4.94
4.9
5.32
5.1
5.45
4.02
43,478
8,306
43,943
25th
Total Students percentile
135,221
4.37
446,250
4.48
484,636
4.5
48,346
4.49
465,770
4.53
62,888
4.78
217,434
4.46
75,150
4.42
68,585
4.55
34,377
4.42
98,558
4.47
110,017
4.37
45,637
4.43
19,783
4.36
35,296
4.66
36,303
4.53
25,116
4.53
26,058
4.5
103,330
4.51
29,119
2.7
4.70
4.72
4.11
4.86
4.54
4.84
4.89
3.22
3.87
Mean
4.87
4.77
4.83
4.94
4.82
5.01
4.71
4.68
4.79
4.58
4.62
4.57
4.60
4.64
4.82
4.72
4.89
4.81
5.02
3.46
4.69
4.45
4.32
4.4
4.37
4.79
4.74
3.67
4.35
25th
percentile
4.8
4.72
4.96
4.93
4.8
5.58
4.31
4.76
4.59
4.35
4.4
4.45
4.44
4.59
4.65
5.05
4.51
4.47
4.55
4.06
5.26
5.11
5.44
4.98
4.94
5.53
5.5
5.04
5.07
75th
percentile
5.77
5.28
5.72
5.73
5.45
6.09
4.81
5.44
5.17
4.95
4.99
4.91
5.03
5.07
5.12
5.52
5.09
5.06
5.25
4.94
LANGUAGE
4.99
4.76
4.89
4.67
4.71
5.15
5.09
4.48
4.70
Mean
5.30
5.01
5.34
5.33
5.14
5.85
4.58
5.09
4.88
4.57
4.60
4.70
4.74
4.81
4.88
5.28
4.78
4.74
4.91
4.49
28.54
27.345
25.2
27.41
26.67
28.19
28.29
20.99
24.5
16
30.50
29.835
30.72
30.31
29.01
31.79
31.94
27.21
28.54
75th
percentile
32.6
30.8
32.01
33.1
31.2
34.09
29.75
31.18
30.545
29.84
29.84
29.11
29.49
30.16
30.3
31.28
31.73
30.73
32.27
28.48
TOTAL SCORE
25th
percentile
27.84
28.15
28.76
28.945
28.34
31.78
27.01
28.39
27.98
26.98
27.25
27.12
27.25
27.645
28.17
29.01
28.4
27.76
28.27
23.12
Source: EBTANAS 2001/2002 school year
Note: Individual Subjects scores out of a possible 10; total scores out of a possible 60 points; missing figures due to lack of reporting
Sample Size: 2,802,523 students
INDONESIA
Province
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Lampung
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
North Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Maluku
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
Irian Jaya
Bengkulu
North Maluku
Gorontalo
Banten
Bangka Belitung
MATH
Table 15. Test Scores of Junior Secondary Students
29.44
28.57
27.98
28.93
28.24
29.85
30.14
24.77
26.47
Mean
30.57
29.67
30.58
31.23
30.00
33.02
28.50
29.89
29.33
27.96
27.89
28.27
28.45
28.76
29.25
30.05
29.85
29.13
30.32
25.69
Source: EBTANAS 2001/2002 school year
Note: Total Scores out of a possible 60 points,
Missing figures due to lack of reporting
Sample Size: 1,263,767 students
446,342
23.10
23.02
21.28
22.73
2,304
974
20,430
1,594
INDONESIA
21.43
24.61
18.57
17.07
17.07
43.26
43.26
34.66
35.55
39.22
34.07
39.95
33.72
26.15
34.89
32.99
35.37
20.87
21.34
24.09
19,349
38,924
6,884
6,838
3,430
41.57
37.61
36.53
37.39
33.79
34.53
34.43
37.42
33.02
High
score
41.61
37.34
41.17
38.23
29.13
21.87
21.42
21.30
20.61
19.96
18.87
20.46
19.41
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
Bengkulu
North Maluku
Gorontalo
Banten
Bangka Belitung
Low
score
24.03
20.51
24.35
22.46
64,066
15,839
44,162
10,828
7,394
4,082
13,997
10,982
3,929
2,719
3,675
5,371
4,390
3,420
# of students
28,399
57,720
54,530
10,112
East Java
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Lampung
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
North Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
Province
28.27
31.83
28.21
31.70
24.87
21.03
26.82
29.59
28.26
27.04
29.98
30.70
34.90
28.56
26.66
28.26
26.31
26.41
25.22
27.38
25.31
29.36
26.80
26.88
29.07
55,880
350
470
11,716
2,214
7,095
4,942
3,534
2,420
515
1,020
529
505
99
221
347
391
1,663
238
1,782
807
5,656
Average
# of
score students
31.93
1,324
27.75
4,021
31.51
4,021
29.21
Natural Sciences Track
Table 16. Test Scores of Senior Secondary Students
17.5
19.85
18.21
18.45
20.88
19.02
21.47
17.00
15.76
19.70
21.06
19.17
17.52
23.55
18.06
19.70
18.43
17.67
19.69
18.04
19.41
Low
score
23.04
21.27
24.23
17
39.58
33.34
30.60
32.09
32.99
33.58
37.28
32.06
27.15
35.48
36.36
36.65
31.81
38.11
37.06
34.58
33.80
34.78
33.55
31.32
35.02
High
score
39.58
36.23
39.24
Language Track
26.87
26.81
25.89
29.37
23.89
20.99
26.11
25.51
24.32
25.03
27.55
28.30
27.89
23.85
30.53
27.49
26.14
25.67
25.63
26.70
24.35
26.19
30.86
Average
score
31.68
29.13
31.87
761,545
3,396
1,901
43,104
3,841
25,087
62,559
10,433
15,715
11,659
106,301
14,476
49,782
23,706
19,760
10,298
29,256
23,065
13,183
5,299
9,479
9,171
6,392
7,131
# of
students
52,642
91,417
96,588
15,904
37.33
31.42
31.48
32.57
31.43
30.27
33.90
29.90
24.87
35.13
35.89
32.76
32.41
28.36
28.09
30.51
32.02
28.19
32.78
30.27
29.34
29.60
High
score
36.27
33.05
36.40
34.74
13.57 37.33
18.81
17.39
16.27
17.93
18.23
16.63
17.67
13.91
13.57
24.65
19.96
17.15
16.89
14.80
14.52
14.74
15.69
14.72
16.17
16.12
17.04
17.51
Low
score
18.93
16.50
19.26
18.43
23.78
24.66
22.87
25.39
20.74
18.45
24.07
24.87
23.81
22.89
24.74
24.90
29.46
27.23
23.54
23.85
20.92
20.78
21.65
22.84
20.65
23.69
22.39
22.88
22.94
Average
score
27.46
24.34
27.48
26.37
Social Sciences Track
167,000
170,000
151,000
309,000
364,000
308,000
218,000
145,000
145,000
163,000
211,000
210,000
174,282
227,000
163,000
177,000
161,000
158,000
310,000
205,000
295,000
267,000
360,000
313,000
300,000
390,000
251,000
303,000
275,000
305,000
441,000
424,000
504,000
484,000
323,000
392,000
393,000
527,000
458,000
444,000
537,000
366,000
442,000
402,000
315,000
738,000
445,000
315,000
361,000
350,000
185,000
142,000
156,000
142,000
456,000
323,000
218,000
239,000
269,000
243,000
243,000
231,000
316,000
213,000
215,000
212,000
281,000
317,000
278,000
337,000
240,000
233,000
247,000
251,000
269,000
213,000
248,000
204,000
1998
Urban
Rural
424,000
278,000
422,000
286,000
460,000
297,000
583,000
349,000
444,000
267,000
370,000
245,000
394,000
251,000
401,000
213,000
1995
Urban
Rural
307,000
186,000
299,000
185,000
311,000
203,000
346,000
236,000
290,000
189,000
288,000
177,000
267,000
180,000
276,000
170,000
666,000
1,219,000
944,000
973,000
1,231,000
954,000
977,000
950,000
948,000
659,000
1,103,000
1,076,000
1,104,000
18
554,000
621,000
698,000
610,000
758,000
646,000
588,000
564,000
590,000
409,000
754,000
1,116,000
721,000
2002
Urban
Rural
1,161,000
1,049,000
634,000
1,081,000
707,000
1,395,000
781,000
868,000
592,000
984,000
506,000
863,000
553,000
793,000
521,000
968,000
766,000
1,998,000
970,000
537,000
756,000
505,000
922,000
555,000
798,000
494,000
1,272,000
635,000
1,244,000
812,000
677,000
497,000
889,000
462,000
405,000 1,043,000
314,000
480,000
510,000
441,000
512,000
418,000
445,000
434,000
435,000
878,000
708,000
705,000
803,000
632,000
716,000
698,000
679,000
733,000
582,000
397,000
373,000
414,000
358,000
360,000
340,000
768,000
493,000
703,000
1,050,000
656,000
507,000
508,000
520,000
Rural
466,000
546,000
584,000
449,000
440,000
445,000
382,000
2000
701,000
768,000
961,000
654,000
691,000
636,000
599,000
Urban
Notes: Figures rounded to nearest thousand
Sample size for all household SUSENAS data: 1995 - 201,421 households; 1998 - 207,645; 2000 – 189,339; 2002 – 212,646
INDONESIA
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
Province
Table 17. Average Monthly Household Income
(Rupiah)
9.22
5.76
7.37
3.73
4.92
5.66
6.82
5.77
5.83
7.78
8.70
7.20
5.09
5.06
3.35
2.58
2.79
1.53
2.20
2.21
3.01
2.87
2.32
2.43
3.38
2.53
2.57
1.83
7.71
13.60
9.48
7.28
16.24
7.48
6.17
3.99
3.53
8.15
3.16
3.25
Std dev
9.39
9.23
7.54
6.46
8.07
6.46
6.48
11.49
Mean
3.79
4.37
3.61
2.28
2.81
3.08
2.98
4.18
2.85
2.51
1.64
2.98
1.67
2.25
1.40
1.97
1.78
2.07
2.96
2.19
2.35
2.56
1.94
7.34
3.41
3.33
7.32
2.94
Mean
2.57
3.46
3.29
2.63
2.37
2.64
2.99
2.54
INDONESIA
Province
Aceh
North Sumatera
West Sumatera
Riau
Jambi
South Sumatera
Bengkulu
Lampung
Bangka Belitung
Jakarta
West Java
Central Java
DI Yogyakarta
East Java
Banten
Bali
West Nusa Tenggara
East Nusa Tenggara
East Timor
West Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan
South Kalimantan
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Gorontolo
Maluku
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
1995
1998
7.06
4.62
3.82
6.31
4.17
7.41
3.29
4.70
4.71
9.15
6.12
7.97
5.21
6.20
6.26
18.57
9.42
7.47
15.48
7.06
Std dev
5.09
7.48
8.42
5.36
5.36
6.05
8.88
6.15
2.38
19
6.67
3.47
4.91
3.43
5.18
4.99
4.44
5.96
6.34
4.98
1.86
1.23
1.51
2.22
1.38
1.61
1.79
1.57
1.24
4.91
4.80
4.18
2.17
1.68
1.43
10.87
6.66
6.07
23.52
5.78
7.08
8.05
4.96
6.89
9.26
7.82
5.54
2.82
2.59
2.08
2.00
2.70
2.52
1.97
4.86
2.43
2.53
8.50
2.41
Std dev
Mean
2000
2.02
1.31
1.24
1.09
2.38
1.83
1.16
1.72
1.52
0.99
2.32
2.27
3.70
Mean
4.08
2.24
2.11
2.00
1.51
1.98
2.04
1.61
1.31
2.91
1.80
2.32
4.99
2.01
1.74
1.90
1.12
1.48
5.86
4.19
3.78
3.23
6.78
5.71
4.72
4.76
7.23
2.30
5.83
6.40
12.33
Std dev
12.61
4.96
6.53
5.74
4.71
6.46
6.61
3.67
2.84
5.52
5.25
6.59
14.10
5.08
3.76
5.87
3.17
4.99
2002
Table 18. Education Expenditure as a Proportion of Total Household Expenditure
Source: 2001 APBN
INDONESIA
Province
North Maluku
Maluku
East Kalimantan
Bali
Bengkulu
Jambi
West Nusa Tenggara
Irian Jaya
West Kalimantan
East Nusa Tenggara
Southeast Sulawesi
Riau
Lampung
Central Sulawesi
West Sumatera
North Sulawesi
South Sumatera
DI Yogyakarta
Aceh
South Sulawesi
Central Kalimantan
North Sumatera
Central Java
North Kalimantan
East Java
West Java
Jakarta
7,310,000
Total Development
Expenditure Rp ('000,000)
16,500
37,500
47,000
49,200
51,600
52,700
54,700
59,900
60,300
63,200
64,000
76,600
80,100
89,300
95,200
104,000
108,000
127,000
136,000
142,000
146,000
153,000
188,000
192,000
253,000
442,000
4,420,000
100%
% of total
0.23%
0.51%
0.64%
0.67%
0.71%
0.72%
0.75%
0.82%
0.82%
0.86%
0.88%
1.05%
1.10%
1.22%
1.30%
1.42%
1.48%
1.74%
1.86%
1.94%
2.00%
2.09%
2.57%
2.63%
3.46%
6.05%
60.47%
Table 19. National Education Development Expenditure, 2001
20
51,505
9,449
6,630
21,951
4,377
5,226
19,053
955,753
East Kalimantan
North Sulawesi
Central Sulawesi
South Sulawesi
Southeast Sulawesi
Maluku
Irian Jaya
INDONESIA
4,633,626
8,578,823
4,334,990
2,403,250
2,723,575
2,988,593
4,696,093
20,978,608
4,101,848
4,636,511
3,627,735
1,231,694
1,882,891
4,292,385
3,902,783
3,159,242
2,709,346
3,995,686
16,516,472
2,741,551
21,099,480
994,105
17,746,783
3,558,759
4,152,339
4,352,575
6,348,920
Note: Discrepancies due to rounding
Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, www.bps.go.id
8,610
14,635
West Kalimantan
12,245
4,868
East Nusa Tenggara
South Kalimantan
7,549
West Nusa Tenggara
Central Kalimantan
13,526
9,864
DI Yogyakarta
135,753
84,610
Central Java
Bali
142,764
West Java
East Java
18,482
138,564
33,072
Bengkulu
Jakarta
6,859
South Sumatera
Lampung
17,643
42,838
Jambi
West Sumatera
Riau
50,706
17,643
North Sumatera
24,957
GRDP
GRDP per
(Billion Rps) capita (Rp)
Aceh
Province
1998
100%
2.14%
0.59%
0.49%
2.47%
0.75%
1.06%
5.79%
1.38%
0.97%
1.65%
0.55%
0.85%
1.52%
15.26%
1.11%
9.51%
16.05%
15.58%
2.08%
3.72%
0.77%
4.82%
1.98%
1.98%
5.70%
2.81%
% of total
1,290,684
20,714
4,531
5,730
26,596
8,240
11,762
72,178
17,688
10,871
17,863
6,329
11,937
16,510
177,274
12,965
118,405
181,630
188,036
23,253
45,669
9,061
55,430
55,430
22,368
68,212
28,626
GRDP (Billion
Rps)
6,257,419
9,326,707
3,758,485
3,146,132
3,299,905
3,714,330
5,845,640
29,398,970
5,925,152
5,854,066
4,427,894
1,601,355
2,977,357
5,239,337
5,096,476
4,152,430
3,791,515
5,083,469
22,413,407
3,449,264
29,136,192
1,313,250
22,963,354
11,180,752
5,264,383
5,855,281
7,282,293
GRDP per
capita (Rp)
2000
21
100%
1.78%
0.39%
0.49%
2.28%
0.71%
1.01%
6.19%
1.52%
0.93%
1.53%
0.54%
1.02%
1.42%
15.20%
1.11%
10.15%
15.57%
16.12%
1.99%
3.92%
0.78%
4.75%
4.75%
1.92%
5.85%
2.45%
% of total
Table 20. Gross Regional Domestic Product at Current Market Prices, 1998-2000
31,000
8,000
Irian Jaya
North Maluku
48,000
130,000
14,000
6,000
7,000
9,000
11,000
7,000
1,657,000
72,000
102,000
10,000
3,000
16,000
2,000
1,000
5,000
1,000
2,000
8,000
11,000
25,000
32,000
8,000
97,000
32,000
863,000
8,000
6,000
276,000
Share non-tax
from natural
resources
24,000
107,000
24,000
14,000
14,000
23,000
18,000
19,000
136,000
38,000
52,000
21,000
14,000
16,000
33,000
33,000
21,000
20,000
12,000
22,000
289,000
33,000
13,000
19,000
24,000
33,000
88,000
20,000
27,000
28,000
Share tax
632,000
1,315,000
662,000
448,000
535,000
377,000
549,000
486,000
761,000
399,000
589,000
421,000
577,000
344,000
426,000
158,000
265,000
366,000
266,000
179,000
92,000
351,000
272,000
494,000
247,000
451,000
479,000
442,000
299,000
538,000
DAU 2001 +
contingency
Note: Figures rounded to nearest 1,000
22
Hofman, Bert, Kai Kaiser, and Soraya Goga. 2003. Decentralizing Indonesia. The World Bank, Jakarta.
Source: MOF Budget Department, SIKD, and Staff Estimates
25,000
Maluku
67,000
East Kalimantan
20,000
40,000
South Kalimantan
22,000
33,000
Central Kalimantan
Gorontolo
23,000
West Kalimantan
Southeast Sulawesi
14,000
East Nusa Tenggara
31,000
22,000
West Nusa Tenggara
South Sulawesi
215,000
Bali
35,000
38,000
Banten
38,000
31,000
East Java
Central Sulawesi
45,000
North Sulawesi
27,000
DI Yogyakarta
14,000
Lampung
Central Java
22,000
Bengkulu
29,000
22,000
South Sumatera
West Java
33,000
Jambi
34,000
66,000
Riau
202,000
31,000
West Sumatera
Jakarta
31,000
North Sumatera
Bangka Belitung
23,000
Aceh
Province
Own source
revenue
Table 21. Per Capita Provincial Revenues, 2001
23

indonesia - World Bank

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