(fra) jdr-007_conflicts

(FRA) Joint Centre
for Concepts,
Doctrine and
Experimentation
This document does not constitute the EMA’s official view
Conflicts
in the next 15 years
and Operational Consequences
Joint Doctrinal Reflection
(FRA) JDR-007_CONFLICTS(2012)
No. 129/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 29 May 2012
1
This French Joint Doctrinal Reflection Conflicts in the
Next 15 Years and Operational Consequences,
(FRA) JDR-007_CONFLICTS(2012), respects the
graphic standards defined in the French Joint
Publication
PIA-7.2.4_RDRIA(2010),
no. 161/
DEF/CICDE/NP as of 18 June 2010. The
aforementioned graphic standards are themselves in
compliance with the prescriptions of the Allied
Administrative Publication AAP-47(A), Allied Joint
Development Doctrines. The front cover1 of this
document has been designed by the French Joint
Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations
(CICDE). Please note: the only official reference of
this document is the electronic French version
aligned on the Intradef and Internet websites of the
CICDE (http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr) in the
Corpus conceptuel et doctrinal interarmées (Joint
Conceptual and Doctrinal Corpus).
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2
La France, Antoine Bourdelle (1861-1929). The model of this statue of France as Pallas-Athenaeum was used to build the war memorial of
Montauban, birthplace of the sculptor. The copy no. 4 of this statue, a tribute to the soldiers of the Free France, is exposed at the Palace of
Tokyo, in Paris. The copy no. 3, exposed in the botanical garden Jardin d'essai in Algiers, has suffered an anti-Gaullist attack on 26
November 1961, resulting in the destruction of the snakes symbolizing Wisdom, as well as part of the spear and its olive branches. It has
been repatriated in France that same year to be restored and is now exposed at the Musée du Souvenir des Écoles de Saint-Cyr
Coëtquidan.
(FRA) JDR-007_CONFLICTS
(2012)
CONFLICTS
IN THE NEXT 15 YEARS
AND OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
No. 129/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 29 May 2012
3
Translated by Miss Cécile BOUTELOUP
Translation Service of the CICDE
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___________________________________________Foreword
Paris, 29 May 2012
No. 129/DEF/CICDE/NP
Major-General Vincent LAFONTAINE
Director of the French Joint Centre for
Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations
(CICDE)
This document's priority is to define the conflicts likely to occur within the next fifteen years based on the
objective observation of the main trends in the strategic evolution of the world and on the potential
breakthrough that may have an impact on them.
It sheds a complementary operational light on the geostrategic and technological approaches of the
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French Delegation for Strategic Affairs (DAS) and Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) respectively. It
contributes to general effort of the French Ministry of Defence about future trends identification.
This short and hopefully easy-to-operate document briefly exposes the character, issues and
consequences of future conflicts for the Ministry of Defence, by focusing on the most important features.
Although the question "what to defend?" is a key element to the upstream reflection on the defence tool,
it will not be discussed in this document. Indeed, it belongs to the political decision-maker to decide on
the priorities in such matter.
It is mainly the confrontation of Defence objectives and ambitions regarding the threats and risks likely to
reach or concern our country that will, in the end, determine the definition of the desired defence
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instrument .
Due to its long-term scope, this document avoids any conclusive affirmation: the margin of error intrinsic
to any attempt to predict the future requires a sense of humility.
However, humility should not be a reason for not committing. It is in this state of mind that partial
conclusions and orientations are presented here.
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In this paper, the term "conflict" is used to refer not only to armed conflicts as understood by the Geneva
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Conventions , but also to all kind of confrontations: wars, crises, and conventional and hybrid military
conflicts.
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Délégation aux affaires stratégiques.
Direction générale de l’armement.
To be distinguished from the actual military instrument, the construction of which results from taking into account other considerations,
namely budgetary and technical ones.
The French version of this document uses the neologism "conflictualité".
The definitions of international and non-international armed conflicts provided by the additional protocols of the Geneva Conventions
maintain their relevance. However, the following point could be subject to further reflection:
•
texts offering a minimum legal framework to non-international armed conflict (Common Article 3, Protocol II additional to the Geneva
Conventions);
•
a "law in time of crisis" based on the "law in time of peace" and completed by exceptions authorizing the use of force or constraints
under certain conditions.
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Indeed, the next fifteen years are likely to see the multiplication of types of conflicts, beyond their
traditional expressions, courses of action and fields.
The following elements will be studied:
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causes of conflicts;
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potential threats;
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character of future conflicts;
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and consequences on the strategic functions.
Table of Contents
Page
Chapter 1– Causes of Conflicts ...................................................................... 9
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
Geostrategic Characteristics of the Studied Period ...................................................... 9
Main Recurrent Causes of Conflicts .............................................................................. 9
1.2.1. Defence .......................................................................................................... 10
1.2.2. Preservation ................................................................................................... 10
1.2.3. Acquisition ...................................................................................................... 10
1.2.4. Conquest ........................................................................................................ 10
1.2.5. Values ............................................................................................................. 10
1.2.6. Outlet .............................................................................................................. 10
1.2.7. Emancipation .................................................................................................. 10
Situational Tension Factors of the Next 15 Years ....................................................... 11
1.3.1. Demographical Pressure ................................................................................ 11
1.3.2. Unequal Distribution of Wealth ....................................................................... 11
1.3.3. Struggle for Access to Resources and Security of Supply............................. 11
1.3.4. Possible Consequences of Industrial or Natural Catastrophes
or of Pandemics .............................................................................................. 11
1.3.5. Development of No-Go Areas within Fragile States....................................... 11
1.3.6. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................... 12
1.3.7. Proliferation of Technologies and Conventional Weapons ............................ 12
1.3.8. Effects of Globalization on World Security ..................................................... 12
1.3.9. Violent Expression of Ideologies .................................................................... 12
Chapter 2– Potential Threats and Confrontation Fields ...................... 13
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
Para-State Confrontations ........................................................................................... 13
Organized Crime ......................................................................................................... 13
Terrorism ..................................................................................................................... 13
Threats Linked to the New Fields of Confrontation ..................................................... 14
2.4.1. Extra-atmospheric Space ............................................................................... 14
2.4.2. Cyberspace .................................................................................................... 14
2.4.3. Field of Perceptions ........................................................................................ 14
2.4.4. Economic Field ............................................................................................... 15
Chapter 3 – Characteristics of Future Conflicts .................................... 17
3.1.
3.2.
Progression of Asymmetry and Hybrid Warfare .......................................................... 17
3.1.1. Asymmetry of Strategies ................................................................................ 17
3.1.2. Asymmetry of Norms ...................................................................................... 17
3.1.3. Hybrid Warfare ............................................................................................... 17
Technological Dimension ............................................................................................ 18
3.2.1. A Necessary Technology but not Sufficient ................................................... 18
3.2.2. Putting in Perspective the Technological Superiority ..................................... 18
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3.3.
3.4.
Evolution of the Military Commitment within the Next 15 years .................................. 19
3.3.1. Continued Importance of the Urban Environment .......................................... 19
3.3.2. On Theatres: Dilemma of an Impossible Ubiquity .......................................... 19
3.3.3. Protection of the Strategic Flows.................................................................... 20
Conflicts Parameters of the Next 15 Years ................................................................. 20
Chapter 4– Consequences on the Strategic Functions ........................ 23
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.5.
4.6.
Knowledge and Anticipation ........................................................................................ 23
Prevention ................................................................................................................... 23
Deterrence ................................................................................................................... 24
Protection .................................................................................................................... 24
Intervention .................................................................................................................. 25
Transversal Strategic Notions: Influence Strategy and Strategic Intimidation ............ 25
4.6.1. Influence Strategy .......................................................................................... 25
4.6.2. Strategic Intimidation ...................................................................................... 26
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 27
Annex A – Lexicon ................................................................................................. 29
Summary (back cover) ........................................................................................... 32
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Chapter 1
Causes of Conflicts
1.1. Geostrategic Characteristics of the Studied Period
Instead of providing a geostrategic analysis, this paper draws the main lines of the temporal time frame
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of the study, based on the works of experts.
The next fifteen years will be marked by:
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the expansion of globalization, resulting in the explosion of human, material and immaterial
flows of all kinds, the control of which has already become a key strategic issue.
Simultaneously, in response to this globalization, a form of protectionism could progress in
some states (strict borders control, taxes on imports, national re-industrialisation, etc.).
-
a relative decline of the American hyperpower, more and more exposed to competition and
important budgetary constraints, as well as the shifting of the American strategic priorities from
Europe to Asia.
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the transition towards a multipolar world where the rise of powers on the regional or
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international scene (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the progressive shift of
the world's centre of gravity to Asia will result in the re-definition of the balance of power and in
new practices in terms of international relations.
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the chronic instability in Africa, although its potential economic growth is encouraging. Africa will
remain coveted for its natural resources.
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a relative decline of Europe, namely in relation to the low dynamism of its economic growth and
demography, as well as to the regular reduction of its defence budgets while various nonoccidental states increase their effort in that area.
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the potential return of states as states in the international landscape as a result of the relative
impotence or weakening of great organizations and alliances that have emerged from World
War II. Likewise, future coalitions could be more unstable and rather based on ad hoc interests.
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the increasing rise of para-states or non-governmental actors.
1.2. Main Recurrent Causes of Conflicts
Causes of conflict in History have always been recurrent. It is thus necessary to classify them both for a
good understanding and a better anticipation of future conflicts. Causes refer to the timeless "nature" of
conflicts, while their "characters" refer to tension factors or forms of confrontations specific to the period
under consideration.
Regardless of the form under which they appear in the future, conflicts will be generally motivated by the
following wills, and possibly a combination of them (paragraphs 1.2.1 to 1.2.7).
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Within the geostrategic area, documents to refer to are:
•
the preparatory document to the updating of the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security (LBDSN-2008),
published by the French Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security (SGDN) in February 2012: La France face aux
évolutions du contexte international et stratégique (France face to the evolutions of the international and strategic context).
•
long-term and strategic studies conducted by the French Delegation for Strategic Affairs (DAS).
Cf. joint operational study on BRICS, EOIA-001, Panorama doctrinal des BRICS, no. 202/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 September 2011.
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1.2.1. Defence
This objective may conduct to the adoption of a strictly defensive position, as the potential aggressor is
not always identified, but also of an explicitly threatening attitude so as to prevent aggressive attempts
from a clearly identified adversary. This position aims to defend a territory, population, political system,
way of life, values, legitimacy, etc.
1.2.2. Preservation
The aim is to preserve the integrity of a state, empire or hegemony against any attempt of secession or
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defection. The motivations of such a posture have been identified by Thucydides as honour (keeping
the head high), fear (avoiding falling under the attack of an external enemy or sedition) and profit
(enjoying power and not letting possible defections benefit to the adversary).
1.2.3. Acquisition
A predatory and offensive posture—intensified in time of shortage—is adopted in order to capture
resources and/or advantages. Such an attitude is not meant to be a lasting implementation (incursions,
raids, piracy, etc.).
1.2.4. Conquest
In most of cases, a conquest aims to durably take over a given territory. This offensive posture reveals a
predatory or megalomaniac attitude, or the search of territorial advantages (creation of a glacis, access
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to the sea, etc.). It may also result from a nationalist or irredentist surge aiming to an ethnic or cultural
unity. It can also aim to fulfil a desire for revenge, namely after a national trauma (military defeat,
economical crisis, severe political failure, etc.). By extension, a conquest may express a search to
expansion or supremacy in a given field or area (colonisation, space conquest, commercial expansion,
etc.), at the risk of generating rivalries and tensions.
1.2.5. Values
Imposing one's values such as a political, moral or religious ideology can be a cause of conflict. The
designated opponent—internal enemy, state, group of states, or model of civilization or society—
embodies the "wrong" to punish or eradicate, the “lost” to convert, etc.
1.2.6. Outlet
Finding an outlet is an offensive posture adopted by a government confronted to internal difficulties and
aiming for a national mobilization either for a foreign policy matter, or an internal scapegoat selected
upon ethnic, political or social criteria. The opponent is clearly identified and stigmatized.
1.2.7. Emancipation
Secession, independence and liberation wars are undertaken under the name of emancipation.
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Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.75 and 1.76. Athenians must justify their hegemony on the Delian League Empire.
Irredentism is a position claiming territories belonging to other states but considered as national on the grounds of historical, linguistic,
geographical or ethnic bonds.
1.3. Situational Tension Factors of the Next 15 Years
Now that recurrent causes have been discussed in the section above, this section exposes more specific
elements that will, fifteen years from now, generate tension and will be likely to directly affect the form of
the crises and conflicts we will be confronted to.
1.3.1. Demographical Pressure
The demographic pressure constitutes a threat in terms of the available resources to sustain it. During
the considered period, the gap between developed, ageing countries and countries with a strong
demographical growth, namely in Africa and Asia, will increase. As a result, ageing countries will be
confronted to a migration pressure from outside, and countries with a strong demographical growth will
experience rapid, and possibly uncontrolled, urbanization.
Issues linked to communitarianism could also become more important. Moreover, "diasporas" could
generate internal disturbances in the event of a conflict involving the country of origin and the host
country.
1.3.2. Unequal Distribution of Wealth
The overall reduction of poverty worldwide should keep pace with the increasing gap between the rich
and the poor. The unequal distribution of wealth both within states and between states will continue to
generate social tensions, protestations and instability.
1.3.3. Struggle for Access to Resources and Security of Supply
The issue of the access to strategic raw material (energy, rare lands, etc.) will be even more urging as
the needs will keep increasing.
Moreover, food resources are affected by speculation and the low availability of arable lands. They will
thus remain a major factor of tension. In addition, the period under study could witness the first effects of
a climate change that will result in new shortages, namely of water. It could result in migrations and
territorial rivalries that could threaten the regional stability. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, we can
imagine the weakening of countries linked to France by defence agreements or hosting numerous
French nationals.
The issue on the access to resources can also affect supply flows as they are likely to become the target
of all forms of greed or blockade.
1.3.4. Possible Consequences of Industrial or Natural Catastrophes or of
Pandemics
Those risks are not specific to the given period. However, their consequences could be more significant
due to the weakening and dependencies fostered by technical advances. Natural or industrial
catastrophes are likely to occur at any time, any place, and can have a strong repercussion in terms of
defence, besides from the imperative necessity to protect populations. Thus, a major natural or industrial
catastrophe could weaken a state and lead it to chaos or political bankruptcy. This could result in a risk
of regional or global instability.
Likewise, a large-scale pandemic could generate population displacements, an overall deterioration of
the health status, the disruption of trade flows, the suspension of the exploitation of some resources, and
the bankruptcy of the most dependent states.
In terms of risks, the media coverage of the events and the sensitivity of the public opinion should be
taken into account as the public is less inclined to accept those risks even if their occurrence is
unpredictable or caused by natural factors only that are impossible to prevent. This attitude could add to
the confusion.
1.3.5. Development of No-Go Areas within Fragile States
The phenomenon of fragile states will continue to exist and will remain a factor of regional
destabilization. Indeed, such states have governments unable to fulfil their sovereign rights due to
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misappropriation, corruption, traffics, shortages and inequalities. No-go zones—where criminal, terrorist
or belligerent organizations can foster—will thus keep on developing internally.
1.3.6. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
For the next fifteen years, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their vehicles,
namely ballistic, is most likely to increase. Such a proliferation will be favoured by the increasing number
of states possessing or being about to possess WMD, and by the development of all types of exchanges,
which ones facilitate the dissemination of knowledge and often dual technologies. If not contained, this
trend could lead to the most serious risks of the next fifteen years.
Moreover, a rupture of the nuclear taboo, i.e. the effective use of nuclear weapons, is unlikely to occur
but is not impossible. Such a situation, without necessarily provoking a generalized confrontation, will not
be accepted by powers, if not at the price of a significant loss of credibility. It would mark a major change
in the geopolitical context, the consequences of which should be anticipated.
1.3.7. Proliferation of Technologies and Conventional Weapons
The proliferation of technologies and conventional weapons will be eased by:
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an easier access to advanced technologies enabling to counter—more or less directly—the
capabilities of deployment and military engagement of a power (the existence of dual
technologies, designed for a civil use but likely to be used for military purposes, is an
aggravating factor).
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the globalization of the armaments market.
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the gap between signatory and non-signatory countries to international treaties and conventions
limiting the production and use of some war weapons.
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allotted investments of some states to reinforce their military instrument while European
countries reduce their defence budget.
This conjunction of trends on the medium term is expected to increase the potential of tension,
particularly since secondary actors are acquiring new means of action. Some actors qualified as
"delinquents" could become real troublemakers.
Moreover, the highly rapid dissemination of technology makes of this latter a less discriminating
comparative advantage, the consequence of which gives more importance to the number, i.e. to the
demographic factor.
1.3.8. Effects of Globalization on World Security
The interdependency between states, the dependency and vulnerability of modern societies in relation to
new technologies (space, networks, etc.) have already increased the risks of destabilization.
Globalization increases the effect of contagion of crises due to the material and immaterial connexions
existing at the regional and global scale. It also favours the development of all kinds of traffics and
criminal networks.
1.3.9. Violent Expression of Ideologies
Identity, national or religious extremists will keep on expressing themselves violently and will have a
better resonance thanks to the development of information and communication means.
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Chapter 2
Potential Threats and Confrontation Fields
Beyond their traditional form, threats could be characterized by an extension of the fields and means of
their expression during the next fifteen years. They could also be amplified by the factors of tension
mentioned earlier, which ones can be combined.
2.1. Para-State Confrontations
The progressive construction of a new global system—probably multipolar—will inevitably engender
frictions between powers. For some regimes, conflicts could also be considered as a solution to counter
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attempts of reform or destabilization . Thus, risks of conventional conflicts between states, mainly in
Asia and the Middle East, are not to be ignored during the next fifteen years. However, the likelihood of
their occurrence and scale, namely geographical, remain difficult to assess to this day.
In addition, the two elements that have limited the risks of an extreme escalation of violence until now
could weaken:
-
nuclear deterrence between responsible powers: it could be weakened by an uncontrolled
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nuclear proliferation and by the possibilities for circumvention by a hybrid strategy ;
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moral consensus on the reject of war and on the international rule of law, developed after the
atrocities of World War II: they could be threatened by an escalation of the nationalist fervour
likely to affect any state accessing to the status of power, or about to access or re-access it.
In addition to this new international context—potentially more unstable than the previous one—is the
multiplication of factors of tensions between rival powers (see Chapter 1) and their risk of ripple effect.
2.2. Organized Crime
Organized crime already exercises its power on entire territories by exploiting their failure to take power
and responsibility, and even, in some cases, by taking advantage of the complicity of some states.
Moreover, a transnational criminality able to weaken states or international systems on the economical,
financial and security levels will be considered as a new adversary.
As for terrorism, such a criminality will require a close coordination of the Armed Forces and law
enforcement forces to be countered since it is at the limit of the fields of action of defence and security.
Criminality could benefit of a relative impunity from the discontinuities between the national legislations
and the lack of coordination between states.
In addition, criminality might have enough resources to acquire capabilities surpassing the usual means
of a police and resist to opposing forces following asymmetric or symmetric courses of action. By
exploiting failures in the global system, it would evolve from a secondary phenomenon to the status of an
autonomous actor, able to develop its own strategies and ambitions.
2.3. Terrorism
Underlined by extremist ideologies, terrorism will keep on being a key threat. It will remain an efficient
and profitable asymmetric strategy for the weaker and the more relentless. Terrorism will benefit from the
increasing resonance of the information society and on the easy access to means of terror of higher
scale combining spectacular actions and strategy of influence. It would not hesitate in attacking our
nationals abroad.
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12
See Chapter 1; Main Recurrent Causes of Conflicts, section 1.2.2. Preservation and 1.2.6. Outlet.
i.e. a strategy combining conventional and non-conventional activities, conducted in diverse fields through military or non-military means,
and implemented by governmental or non-governmental opponents. This notion is explained in Chapter 3.
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The likelihood of a large scale CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) terrorist attack is
not excluded, even though, for the aggressor, its control remains complicated. This would represent a
major evolution of the terrorist courses of action.
2.4. Threats Linked to the New Fields of Confrontation
In addition to the traditional fields of confrontation are the extra-atmospheric space, cyberspace and field
of perceptions, the strategic importance of which is bound to be confirmed. Threats will also keep on
weighting on the economical field.
2.4.1. Extra-atmospheric Space
The extra-atmospheric space offers to nations able to control it autonomous systems of early warning,
assessment of the situation, communication, positioning and synchronization. Such a control constitutes
a crucial element of their influence and action capacity on the global level; it is an element of their
economic power. The extra-atmospheric space is thus a major issue.
Despite all the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—to which only France, the United Kingdom,
Russia and the United States of America belong—a progressive "weaponization" of the extraatmospheric space, i.e. putting weapons into orbit, should not be excluded. However, it remains unlikely
at the horizon of the period considered.
Nonetheless, the development of systems to neutralize or destroy satellites, operated from the Earth or
space, appears possible, but it would remain accessible only to the rare powers possessing the required
technological level and ability.
Finally, launch or control infrastructures could become favoured targets to an opponent.
2.4.2. Cyberspace
Cyberattacks are easy and inexpensive to implement but they have great potential of disturbance. They
already are an effective threat and are bound to develop due to the worldwide dissemination of New
Information and Communication Technologies (NICT). They can be conducted by diverse, in terms of
power and nature, governmental or non-governmental opponents. Reflections on Offensive
Cyberwarfare—conducted at several levels and in diverse countries—concretely illustrate that the
cyberspace has reached the status of a confrontation field.
The cyber threat is characterized by:
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the rapid and constant advances of its courses and means of action;
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the extreme diversity of its potential targets;
-
and the difficulty in identifying and/or localizing the aggressor.
Contemporary societies are more and more dependent on NICT, on their associated networks and
computer-controlled systems. As a result, they present vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a
governmental, para-state, organized or isolated criminal cyberadversary. Such a cyberadversary can
attack individuals, companies or public services, and can affect the social link, economical life, continuity
of public services and national security.
More particularly, a cyber threat can reduce the command and control capabilities of the armed forces of
the developed countries, which are increasingly depending on them. It would thus affect one of the main
elements of their supremacy and directly affect their capacity of response.
2.4.3. Field of Perceptions
In the field of perceptions, public opinions will remain a favoured target since they are subject to constant
flows of information and disinformation. In that area, the adversary will exploit the resources provided by
the increasing availability of information and communication means:
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it will exploit the sensitivity of occidental public opinions regarding the legitimacy of the military
engagements;
-
it will exploit their increasing reluctance in giving a long-term support to activities involving
human losses and financial efforts (this reluctance will be even stronger in case of stalemate or
when operations are not perceived as producing rapid tangible results);
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it will intensify the anti-occidental perceptions;
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and it will intend to give a spectacular dimension to its actions, resulting in a better media
coverage.
The adversary will also use social networks as:
-
a vector of influence (proselytizing, intoxication, psychological pressure, destabilization or
manipulation of targeted individuals, etc.);
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and as a management and conduct tool for its own network (recruiting, morale
education, mobilization, coordination, etc.).
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and technical
2.4.4. Economic Field
The economic field is also likely to be threatened. It is not to be considered as a new confrontation field;
however:
13
14
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the pursuit of globalization will offer to some governmental or non-governmental entities new
possibilities in terms of destabilization of the financial markets or creation of dependencies
(monopoly, oligopolistic arrangement, subvention, redemption of public debt, etc.), and will
make the protection of industrial secrets and intellectual properties harder;
-
the economic warfare could intensify between poles of development to the benefit of actors who
have little respect for the competition rules, ignore human rights to better exploit people, have
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no concern for intellectual properties, counterfeit, etc.
Here, "morale" is to be understood as a matter of spirit rather than as a matter of morality.
Mutatis mutandis, it refers to a normative asymmetry, in the field of economics, comparable to that of armed conflict, as described in the next
chapter.
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(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
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Chapter 3
Characteristics of Future Conflicts
3.1. Progression of Asymmetry and Hybrid Warfare
Symmetric forms of confrontation, i.e. two armed forces engaging in a "classical" or "conventional" fight,
will still exist, as for the risk of a conventional armed conflict between states. Conflicts within the next
fifteen years should be characterized by the progression of two noticeable phenomena: asymmetry,
visible on the strategic and normative levels, and hybrid warfare, characterizing both threats and courses
of action.
3.1.1. Asymmetry of Strategies
An asymmetry of strategies is a situation in which two adversaries conduct their respective strategies on
15
different levels. This asymmetry could be:
-
imposed, when the strength of one party in a particular area (often on the conventional level)
constrains the other to consider its action in other fields (field of perceptions, terrorism, etc.);
-
or sought-after, namely by a governmental actor possessing a large range of means of action.
Such an adversary would implement, simultaneously or one by one, the most diverse strategies
in the most diverse fields, following an approach of opportunity and synergy of effects (see
below, Hybrid Warfare).
3.1.2. Asymmetry of Norms
Our armed forces and that of our partners might be more and more frequently confronted to an
asymmetry of norms, i.e. to adversaries that will present one or several of the following particularities:
-
difficult characterization of the protagonists under international law.
-
non-observation of the legal, ethical or deontological rules codified by law or by common
practice. This type of adversary could intend to exploit the possible inhibition of forces more
16
constrained by their legal framework or rules of engagement.
17
This normative asymmetry is sometimes referred as "irregularity" . However, such a notion does not
have a legal definition under the Humanitarian International Law (HIL), the only reference in that matter.
Likewise, HIL does not take up the notion of "illegal combatant": it only makes the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, each having a particular status.
3.1.3. Hybrid Warfare
Even if they would have a superiority ensuring success in a classical military conflict, our future
adversaries will not fight our armed forces only. They will seek the advantage by the use of a large range
of means, courses of action, actors and techniques. Conventional and non-conventional actions are
likely to be conducted simultaneously, in the most diverse fields, through military or non-military means,
and implemented by governmental or non-governmental adversaries.
15
16
17
The French joint glossary of operational terminology, PIA-7.2.6-3_GIAT-O(2012) (Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle, no.
001/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 03 January 2012) defines asymmetry as: the "complete or highly pronounced difference of war aims, and of the
nature of the chosen means and courses of action, to the point that the way to think and to act of one of the parties remain powerless to
provide ad hoc answers to the issues exposed by the other party's system of thought; the reverse not being necessarily true".
The strict compliance to ethical rules, laws and regulations contributes to build the legitimacy of the action. However, attention must be paid
so that the legal dimension does not hinder or inhibit the armed forces. Thus, even if evolutions of the national and international law are likely
to be transposed to the rules of engagement, the introduction of new constraints, namely legal or environmental, must be considered
carefully and the specificities inherent to the engagement of the armed force must be fully taken into account.
Cf. (FRA) JC-3.4.4_IRAD(2008), Operations Against an Irregular Adversary, no. 131/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 22 May 2008. The French use of
the term "irregular" is not necessarily synonym to "illegal". For instance, the francs-tireurs of 1870 were legal and only defined as irregular by
comparison with the regular army.
17
The increasing hybrid character of threats and their seemingly lack of coherence, considering their
multiplicity and diversity, will significantly increase their ability to cause troubles while making them
harder to anticipate. In addition, they might bypass nuclear deterrence.
Finally, if asymmetry and hybrid warfare are often merged, they are to be distinguished. Indeed:
-
asymmetry can take the form of a favoured or exclusive use of a type of action instead of the
combination of actions of diverse nature;
-
on the other hand, two adversaries on the same footing may simultaneously use hybrid courses
of action in a symmetric way.
3.2. Technological Dimension
3.2.1. A Necessary Technology but not Sufficient
A long-term technological defence analysis is provided by the Prospective Plan of the French Defence
18
Policy in 30 years established by the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA), and will thus not be
discussed here. However, during the period under study, inputs from technology in terms of operational
efficiency are most likely to remain significant. Most particularly but not only, they should enable to:
-
strike further or from further, more surely, with more precision and less collateral effects;
-
better detect, monitor and localize while being less detectable;
-
optimize the collect of information and process it faster in spite of its volume;
-
facilitate communication and data transfers (improvements in the times taken, rate, system
security, data protection, etc.);
-
and better protect combatants or reduce their exposition (stealthiness, use of robots, etc.) while
increasing their performances and endurance, etc.
In addition, the likelihood of a technological breakthrough likely to deeply change the art of war is to be
considered, as was the case of the invention of artillery, submarines or aeroplanes, leading combats to
new confrontation fields. It is however impossible to this day to assert in which domain such a
breakthrough could occur and provoke a form of strategic surprise.
Nevertheless, technology will remain a tool and not an aim, and will not be the only guarantee of
superiority or success. As of today, its efficiency will require a strong conceptual and doctrinal base as it
can ease the conception of such an instrument upstream, or contribute to the optimization of its
employment afterwards.
3.2.2. Putting in Perspective the Technological Advantage
If its technological level is inferior to ours, the adversary will not accept to remain under the conditions of
a combat that disadvantages it. Moreover, advances in geographical positioning, surveillance of the
battle space and fire precision will constrain the adversary to dispersion and stealthiness. As a result, it
will seek environment to use as "levellers", i.e. environments which can limit advantages linked to
technology (urban area, for example) and where to use hybrid courses of action—cost effective if
possible—to avoid direct confrontation when needed.
On the other hand, investments allotted by some states to reinforce their military instrument while
19
European countries are reducing their defence budget, as well as the rapid availability to technology
could make of technology a less and less discriminating advantage. In terms of tactics, it would result in
the regain of importance of numerical superiority.
Regardless of the considered type of force, the control of the environments in the long term will always
require enough material and human resources, especially considering the need to regularly relieve
troops: technology fails in offering a substitute to such a demand.
18
19
18
Plan prospectif à 30 ans, PP30.
The availability of technologies is also made possible through the dual character of some of them (e.g. communication or computing): some
non-governmental actors can thus have the possibility to access to a higher technological level and increase their ability to cause trouble.
Finally, new technologies are likely to engender new vulnerabilities for the adversary to exploit.
Consequently, it will be necessary to ensure the resilience of the developed technical systems. This
implies not only their robustness to counter adverse actions but also the possible use of redundancies,
degraded modes or substitute processes, the financial impact of which should not be under-estimated
during their development or acquisition.
3.3. Evolution of the Military Commitmentt within the Next 15 years
3.3.1. Continued Importance of the Urban Environment20
Future conflicts will involve all environments, material and immaterial. However, they will always
necessitate the control of territories, especially in the finale phase and more particularly the ones where
populations are denser, mostly in urban environments: indeed, urbanization is in constant expansion,
namely in countries of high demographic growth.
Cities are particularly good levellers: in such environments, our forces could be more vulnerable and the
adversary could minimize, if needed, our technological advantage. Moreover, combats in urban
environments blend combatants and populations. Consequently, the adversary can take advantage of
21
the occidental forces’ concern to avoid collateral damages.
So it seems preferable to avoid as far as possible a potentially long, difficult and costly (humanly and
materially) urban combat. Cities are nevertheless places of power. If not systematically, it will however
be frequently necessary to engage in those environments.
In addition, this political dimension gives to cities a strong symbolic importance: their fall proves to be a
tactical as well as a strategic success, which has a significant psychological impact on the public opinion
22
and on the determination of the adversary . The ability to fight and last in an urban environment will thus
continue to be a major asset.
Fighting within cities will require even more adaptation capacities since the urban environment, from one
continent to another, within a same country and often a same agglomeration, has extremely diverse
characteristics: variable density, rigorous arrangement or chaotic development, etc.
3.3.2. On Theatres: Dilemma of an Impossible Ubiquity
Confronted to some adversaries, occidental armed forces, namely European, are more and more likely
to be at a numerical disadvantage. Indeed, when it is necessary to control large air-land and/or air-sea
spaces with the available resources, it can diffuse and weaken the system. In addition, it encourages the
adversary to implement weariness strategies so as to lead operations to a stalemate. The adversary
could affect the determination of occidental public opinions that are reluctant to support the effort in the
long-term in the absence of tangible results.
Since ubiquity is impossible, solutions must be developed to enable to be at the right place, at the right
time, in order to produce the right effect by seizing opportunities. This implies to be well-informed and
able to react quickly in areas where we are not necessarily deployed for the long term, and to focus our
efforts on:
20
21
22
-
capabilities of surveillance, acquisition and development of the good understanding and
assessment of the situation;
-
the ability to get support from local actors, which implies the familiarization of our personnel to
the multicultural and multinational environments;
-
and on the operational and tactical readiness, i.e. the ability to act quickly and strike hard on
short notice, in any environment and at any place.
Cf. French joint concept on urban operations, (CIA)-3.2.2_OPURB(2010), Opérations urbaines, no. 234/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 30 September
2010.
The urban environment presents the four characteristics of the future battle field as described by the British document Future Character of
Conflict, published in February 2010 by the Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre (DCDC): congested, cluttered, contested, and
connected.
As transcribed in the newspapers: "The fall of [Berlin, Saigon, Tripoli, etc.]". Conversely, Stalingrad did not fell in 1942-1943, giving to Staline
the psychological advantage and putting an end to the myth of the German invincibility, but at a huge human cost.
19
Relative to this last point, the ability to conduct strong-dynamic activities on a theatre, in the spirit of a
rapid reaction force, can enable to weight within a coalition while preserving an overall operational vision.
This ability implies to be able to identify and designate targets at the appropriate time, regardless of the
selected course of action.
3.3.3. Protection of the Strategic Flows
The pursuit of globalization will intensify the need for the circulation of people, goods and information,
and thus the strategic importance of the protection of our maritime, air and land approaches, as well as
the preservation of the data flows relative to space and networks of all kinds.
More specifically, our ability to project forces and access to theatres will have to be ensured in all
circumstances. Likewise, the mobility of our forces and continuity of the flows, namely logistics, towards
and within the theatres should be preserved. It will thus be important to highlight our capacity to secure,
in a dynamic way, all routes and maritime, air, land and immaterial networks. This will imply not only ad
hoc detection, protection and response measures but also the capacity to be flexible, evolve and
reconfigure.
Finally, the protection of flows will call for an increasing need for coordination and interoperability, not
only at the joint level but also with our allies and partners: within the framework of an activity in coalition,
the protection of flows will be a shared task. Likewise, an attack to the freedom of circulation at a
crossover point of global concern (straits, etc.) will necessarily provoke an international reaction, the
efficiency of which will depend on a good coordination.
3.4. Conflicts Parameters of the Next 15 Years
To sum up the elements mentioned above, future conflicts could be characterized by the conjunction of
the following parameters:
Parameters
AGAINST WHOM?
Key points
•
Increasing diversification of actors.
(various actors
involved)
WITH WHOM?
•
Evolution of alliances and coalitions
towards a more important
commitment of the national actors
depending on their specific
interests.
•
Diversification of the threats and
risks requiring the use of a larger
range of competences.
(allies and partners)
20
Observations
•
Governmental and para-state actors.
•
Terrorists, criminal organizations.
•
More difficulties in distinguishing
combatants, civilians, and "irregular"
adversaries.
•
More difficulties in identifying the
source of the aggression.
•
Evolution of the notion of coalition
(volatility, opportunism, alliances more
defence-oriented rather than
intervention-oriented, etc.).
•
Temptation of some states, namely
Europeans, to reduce their defence
budget in favour of their network of
alliances.
•
Within alliances, temptation of the
specialization of some states
depending on their capacities,
resources or on their own legal
constraints, at the risk of losing their
autonomous capacity of action or
decision.
•
Implication of other ministries as well
as non-governmental civil actors.
•
Need for command capabilities
enabling an efficient coordination at the
joint, interministerial and interallied
levels.
•
Use of intermediaries: local forces,
Private Military Companies (PMCs),
etc.
HOW?
•
(means and courses
of action)
Permanence of conventional forms
of confrontation.
•
Development of asymmetry and
hybrid warfare.
•
•
•
Rise to power of adversaries, from
"delinquents" to the status of real
troublemakers, by the access of means
increasing their capacities and ability to
cause trouble.
Direct or indirect intervention (use of
intermediaries).
•
Potential threats on the material and
immaterial flows.
Diversification of the modes of
aggression (cybernetic, extraatmospheric space, finance,
blockade or trade diversion,
environmental threat, etc.).
•
Important increase of the influence
strategy.
•
Necessity to be simultaneously
informed on various fields, and thus to
process great quantities of data so as
to correlate and discriminate them.
•
Intensification of the engagements
resulting from the advances in the
equipments levels and rational
asymmetries (fanaticism, ignorance or
disregard for the Law of Armed
Conflict, etc.).
•
Imperative of legitimacy for democratic
actors.
•
On technological equal grounds, regain
of importance in number as a factor of
superiority; in case of its technological
inferiority, attempt of the adversary to
bypass our advantage in this field.
Reduction of the technological gap
that used to benefit to occidental
countries.
WHERE?
•
•
(fields of
confrontation)
Permanence of the traditional fields
of confrontation (land, air, sea).
Confirmation of the strategic
importance of the urban environment.
•
Increasing strategic importance of
"new" fields of confrontation (extraatmospheric space, cyberspace,
field of perceptions).
•
•
Pursuit of globalization.
Affirmation of the cyberspace and field
of perceptions as a power issue, as
well as the extra-atmospheric space for
states possessing the technological
capacity.
•
Search of the adversary for an
environment to use as a leveller to
reduce our technological advantage.
•
Issue on the freedom of use of the
23
global commons , and more
particularly of the freedom of
movement of forces within those
spaces.
•
Increase of the effect of contagion of
crises and of the difficulty in containing
them within a limited theatre, taking
into account the material and
immaterial connexions at the regional
and global scale.
•
Repercussions of the crises on the
national theatres (globalization,
"diasporas", etc.).
•
Reaffirmation of the importance of
knowledge/anticipation as a strategic
imperative.
•
Need to develop shared knowledge.
WHEN?
23
•
•
More difficulties in assessing the
speed of extension, duration and
predictability of conflicts, sudden
trigger.
Global commons usually refer to the common or collective use of spaces, which ones are more and more interconnected, and where no
national sovereignty apply: high seas, international air space, extra-atmospheric space, and cyberspace (the incorporation of the cyberspace
into the global commons remains controversial due to the location of the material elements constituting networks on sovereign territories, or
to the property rights of the material vectors: cables, satellites, etc.). Although global commons do not come under any national sovereignty,
they are not to be considered as no-go areas with respect to the international provisions that govern them (Outer Space Treaty, Montego
Bay Convention, etc.). However, further progresses should be made in terms of regulation (particularly as far as cyberspace is concerned)
and control.
21
Moreover, a strategic surprise—by definition difficult to anticipate or characterize—always remains
possible. Strategic surprise can be understood as a sudden or unexpected questioning of the preexisting strategic balances. Thus, social, political, military or technological advances or events could
profoundly alter the strategic landscape to the point that existing or considered models of armed forces
would be inadequate.
The headings of the table above offer an analysis matrix of what factors of surprise could be:
24
22
-
against whom?: underestimation of the adversary, unexpected adversary or adversary
different from the one expected, reversal of alliances, geopolitical upheaval.
-
with whom?: voluntary or involuntary defection of an ally or partner, assessment error on its
capacity or will to engage, reversal of alliances, geopolitical upheaval.
-
how?: emergence of new technical means, new strategies or new tactics.
-
where?: action of the adversary in an unexpected environment or place, major evolution
24
affecting an environment or confrontation field, opening of a new strategic field.
-
when?: intervention of a strategic upheaval at an unexpected time, brutal acceleration of an
evolution though already identified, surprise of the tempo of the adverse action (unexpected
execution rapidity, etc.).
As for the emergence of the submarine warfare during the First World War.
Chapter 4
Consequences on the Strategic Functions
The five strategic functions knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection and
intervention form a common referential that is not formally questioned by the predictable evolution of
25
conflicts within the next fifteen years. Moreover, those functions have the advantage of covering the
whole strategic spectrum and facilitate the politico-military dialogue thanks to their clarity. In this chapter,
they will facilitate comprehension and will be successively examined at the light of the trends identified
earlier.
4.1. Knowledge and Anticipation
In a fast-changing world, knowledge and anticipation remain essential to assist the decision and define
the strategy. Moreover, the knowledge and anticipation function has a transversal character: it feeds all
the other strategic functions and benefit in return from the contribution of all the actors and systems,
beyond the dedicated means.
Knowledge and anticipation must lead to a deep analysis of our weaknesses and new vulnerabilities,
with respect to the expected evolution and the event of a possible strategic surprise. It would thus be
necessary to implement elements of surveillance and indicators enabling to extend the available time
needed for ad hoc capabilities prior to crises.
However, it would not be possible to plan and identify everything. Thus, knowledge and anticipation
cannot substitute the capacity of action. Indeed, it cannot be guaranteed that an effort to rebuild a
capability will be achieved in due time if conducted under the pressure of events.
Furthermore, recent experience has highlighted the difficulty in anticipating strategic upheavals which,
even if logical, were surprising by the suddenness of their trigger and rapidity of their development. It is
thus necessary to develop our analysis capacities to distinguish among the multiplicity of the perceived
signals those, as weak as they can be, that will announce real crises. To this regard, Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) proves to be relevant by the addition of its precision, criticism and judgement as early as the
data collection phase. Our network of defence attachés and pre-positioned elements will remain a
precious watch and early warning instrument too.
Finally, due to the complexity of future threats, the knowledge and anticipation function will have to
enable the confirmation—in full national autonomy—of an aggression in the different possible fields of
confrontation in order to define the best possible response according to the criteria of opportunity,
legitimacy and efficiency.
4.2. Prevention
The prevention function will more likely be developed with regards to the increasing risks of contagion of
crises and to the concern to avoid future engagements that will be humanly, politically and militarily
important. It will imply a decision-taking as upstream of potential crises as possible, based on the
adhesion of the nation and excluding any excessively interventionist policy.
25
However, the identification of those five functions results from a constant evolution of the French strategic thought in accordance with the
geopolitical landscape. Those functions are part of it and their identification is not absolute: indeed, the 1972 French White Paper, focused
on deterrence, did not formally discuss the notion of strategic function while the 1994 White Paper identified four of them: deterrence,
prevention, projection, protection. Other schemes are possible. As an example, a distinction could be made between:
•
sovereign functions (or protection function), i.e. deterrence, as in today's meaning, and protection, understood in a “broader way”
and extended to European solidarity. Those two functions are at the core of national defence and come under the fundamental
sovereign responsibilities of the state towards the nation. They require the possession of autonomous national capabilities, regardless
of the possible support from solidarity (European Union, NATO, bilateral agreements, etc.).
•
power functions, i.e. the trilogy of prevention, intimidation, and coercion. Those functions mainly contribute to indicate the position our
country aims to hold among nations (while indicating additional factors such as the possession of the nuclear weapon, our economical
and cultural importance, our colonial past, etc.). They offer a larger scope of collaborations and more choices in terms of opportunity of
engagements and effort to invest, in the margin of initiative that alliances and treaties involving France leave to our Nation, and
considering its particular position of permanent member of the United Nation Security Council.
23
Prevention will always be based on multiple means (diplomatic, economical, military, cultural, legal),
coordinated and implemented at the national or international level. The network of defence attachés,
structural cooperation system, pre-positioned systems—the joint dimension of which will remain
essential—and, if needed, use of dynamic pre-deployments in the vicinity of centres of tension will
preserve their relevance.
It will be particularly important to help local actors in ensuring the security of their own state and control
of the regional context by themselves. In such a case, our armed forces will keep on contributing to the
construction of local military capabilities and thus form a pool of available forces to the benefit of peace
and stability.
4.3. Deterrence26
The bases of deterrence will persist during the next fifteen years. As it is a key element of our defence
system, it will continue to demonstrate our permanent will and capacity to make a state fear
unacceptable and out-of-proportion damage compared to the issue of the conflict in the case such a
state would attack France's vital interests.
Deterrence will thus continue to rely on the possession of a credible nuclear instrument as well as on the
clearly stated determination of the nation. There will always be a need to affirm the well-founding of our
conception of deterrence in answer to initiatives aiming to contest the legitimacy or legality of nuclear
weapons.
However, it is obvious that deterrence is not designed to answer any type of threat. Moreover, the
asymmetry and hybrid character of future conflicts, as well as the increasing involvement of nongovernmental adversaries, sometimes difficult to identify, will increase the risk of bypass of the
deterrence system. In the context of inevitably constrained budgets, finding the right level of necessary
investment is recommended in order to preserve the credibility of the deterrence system with regards to
the necessary expenditure to other strategic functions. In other words, the effort to be invested in nuclear
deterrence, as legitimate as it can be, should not conduct to a form of conventional impotence.
Moreover, the credibility of the conventional instrument, in its entire joint dimension, is a concrete
translation of the national will to defend. Thus, it contributes to the promotion of the deterrence function,
which one is based on capacity and will.
4.4. Protection
The protection of the population, nationals abroad, national territory and its approaches—in France and
overseas—will remain at the core of the national security strategy, as it covers security abroad and
internal security.
The protection function thus requires the implementation of a complete and autonomous range of land,
air and maritime capabilities. The geographical discontinuity of the national territory and the global
scattering of our nationals require even more such an implementation. Furthermore, instead of focusing
on the national sanctuary only, the protection function must be understood in a further and "broader
way", especially in the context of a globalized world. The notion of homeland security must be adapted to
this extended definition of protection.
In addition, technological outputs during the next fifteen years will benefit to the protection of forces,
populations and territory. However, choices in such matter will require good judgement. For instance,
27
ballistic missile defence must be analysed in relation to its cost efficiency and to the whole range of
threats: in other words, the effort to invest must not only be proportionate to the specific efficiency of the
system but also not put a strain on our overall capacity to protect ourselves from other threats.
In order to answer to the requirements of the protection function, the armed forces will have to develop
their own resilience so as to be able to keep on acting efficiently at any time, in spite of a degraded
environment or despite the human, organizational and technical prejudices they would have suffered
from (ballistic, terrorist or cyber attack, materialization of a threat or CBRN risk, natural or industrial
catastrophe, etc.).
26
27
24
Here, deterrence is to be understood as the definition given by the three successive French white papers, i.e. nuclear deterrence.
Cf. (FRA) EJC-3.3.12_BMD(2012), Ballistic Missile Defence, no. 121/DEF/CICIDE/NP as of 29 May 2012.
In addition, the protection function requires to retain sufficient human and technical capabilities so as to
be able to deal with a large scale catastrophe—always possible and potentially sudden—and to avoid or
protect from its consequences (individual and collective protection, capacity to overcome obstacles and
power cuts, etc.). Moreover, the protection function will imply, without confusing their respective
missions, an ever closer collaboration of the whole of public services for the sake of relevance in terms
of strategy, economy of means and effects synergy.
Finally, the respect of our alliances and defence agreements as well as the duty of solidarity and mutual
assistance will require from France to be able to contribute to the protection of other nations.
4.5. Intervention
If France has the ambition to remain a major military and diplomatic power, it has to answer to the
expectations of its alliances and agreements, and to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the
UN Security Council. Except in the event of a weakening of the international landscape, the intervention
function will remain relevant and particularly decisive in relation to the dimensioning of our armed forces
(to act by themselves or within a coalition on several simultaneous theatres for the long term or on an ad
hoc basis, etc.).
Moreover, the intervention function supports other strategic functions by extending or promoting them:
what would be the point of knowing and anticipating if not able to act? Could we really deter an
adversary without giving a tangible sign of our will to defend through the maintenance of a real capacity
of conventional action? Would it be possible to protect our fellow-citizens, wherever they are? Without a
significant power of coercion, how important would be our activities of prevention?
In terms of intervention, the multiplicity of courses of action likely to be implemented by the adversary,
the diversity and interconnection of the confrontation fields and areas of action will require an increasing
effort of synergy, on the joint level as well as on the civil-military level. They will require more than ever
flexibility and a capacity of adaptation. They will also imply focusing efforts, amongst other means on
missile defence and cyberdefence, in order to preserve our capacity to enter on theatres of operations
and our freedom of action in all environments.
Finally, several of our interventions are most likely to be conducted within a multinational framework. The
capacity to ensure the command of a multinational force or to play a role that matches our rank will
remain a major issue. This last objective can be reached, namely through the development of an
operational readiness (cf. Chapter 3, section 3).
4.6. Transversal Strategic Notions: Influence Strategy and Strategic
Intimidation
Some strategies are transversal to all strategic functions and, in the case of a comprehensive approach,
conducted in synergy with the whole of entities contributing to the desired end state. They would thus
benefit from being further developed. For example, the influence strategy and strategic intimidation are
28
both likely to be part of a "smart power" approach.
4.6.1. Influence Strategy
The predictable evolution of conflicts highlights the necessity to develop a military influence strategy.
Influence activities aim to progressively shape the perceptions of the public opinions and actors of the
crisis. They will keep on having an increasing importance in the whole strategic spectrum, namely with
the expansion of information and communication technologies and capabilities.
28
Referred as "juste puissance" in French, “ability to combine the force (hard power) and persuasion (soft power) for the success of a given
strategy. At the strategic level, it implies the use of diplomacy, persuasion, power projection and influence in a way to reach the best return
on investments of the engaged means. It is mainly an engagement in support of the diplomatic activity in all its forms and of the military
force. It implies the control of the conducted activities, their legitimacy and a capacity of adaptation.” (French joint glossary of operational
terminology, PIA-7.2.6-3_GIAT-O[2012], Glossaire interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle, no. 001/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 03 January
2012)
25
Thus, in a non-exhaustive way and in the continuity of the current practice, the military influence strategy
will aim:
-
at the national and interallied level, to encourage and sustain the support of the opinion to the
military engagement, and to reaffirm the determination and cohesion of the Nation, alliance or
coalition;
-
in relation to the adversary, to affect its determination, cohesion and decisions, deprive it from
its supports, and counter its action in the field of perceptions;
-
on the theatres, to increase the acceptance of the presence of the deployed forces, make
admitted the legitimacy of the engagement and conducted activities (at least so as not to be
hindered in the action, at best to get help), and encourage political sympathies and leader
engagements, etc.
4.6.2. Strategic Intimidation29
It is easy to imagine various situations not calling for a nuclear response or large-scale military
intervention but still requiring an action. So as to encourage the adversary in renouncing to initiate or
develop an aggressive action, the use of intimidation can be considered, through the threat or, at the last
phase, ad hoc and limited use of conventional means.
Strategic intimidation can also be used through a whole range of means and processes of pressure or
action—military or non-military—from influence to coercion, and enabling a gradation of the signal given
to the adversary.
Such a concept is not new but deserves to be taken into account with regards to the predictable
evolution of the forms of conflicts. Indeed:
-
it is a form of response to the risk of bypass of the nuclear deterrence system by some
adversaries (namely non-governmental adversaries, against which nuclear deterrence is
irrelevant);
-
it can help in delaying the trigger of a large-scale military operation (deployment of a task force,
etc.), which is always likely to last and cost in the human, material and financial dimensions;
-
it gives to the political decision-maker an option allowing to anticipate or prevent crises before
they escalate.
Rather than a function, strategic intimidation is more of a strategic option and does not interfere with the
deterrence function. Actually, it establishes a form of continuity between prevention and intervention.
Moreover, it requires a particular effort in knowledge and anticipation in order to adapt the intimidation
activity to the particularities of each situation and adversary.
29
26
For more information on that subject, confer to the French joint doctrinal reflection (RDIA)-006_IS(2012), Intimidation stratégique, no.
026/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 26 January 2012.
Conclusion
A defence system requires a significant political, financial and morale effort, as well as an investment in
the long term. It is more than ever necessary to consider the defence system as a safety insurance, even
a life insurance, and an ultimate resort considering an environment where trends will get harder and
harder to apprehend. Reflection is guided by an approach on risk management, which one requires to be
conducted in the long term and to take into account effective and potential threats.
An attempt to define the characteristics of future conflicts highlights their polymorphous character:
multiplicity of actors, diversification of threats and risks, variety of courses of action or expansion of
conflicts to new fields of confrontation, etc. Other striking characteristics include the potentially sudden
trigger of crises, their increasing capacity to spread over, or the potential emergence of a strategic
surprise.
The ability to take into account such diverse parameters will require to use evolving strategies and
courses of action. It will become necessary not only to develop joint interallied synergy but also, in most
of cases, to combine strictly military actions to non-military processes, to which the armed forces will
bring a crucial contribution.
When considering conflicts as becoming more and more protean, it seems difficult to be able to counter
all the threats, especially since the effective budget requires to make choices. It might thus be better to
develop our aptitude to detect and prevent crises before they escalate, and rely on the flexibility,
readiness and versatility of our forces.
Those qualities will, after all, mirror the effort invested by the nation for the protection of its population
and territory, for the preservation of its interests, the affirmation of its rank among nations and the
promotion of its values.
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Annex A
Lexicon
A1.
Initialisms and Acronyms
A1.1. Initialisms
Each letter of an initialism is pronounced separately as though separated by periods.
A1.2. Acronyms
Acronyms are made up of several syllables which can be pronounced as a single word.
A1.3. Graphic Charter of the Lexicon
In this lexicon, the characters which constitute an initialism, acronym or abbreviation are written in
capitals so that the reader can memorize their meaning.
French initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in bold, italic, Arial font, size 9, in red
Roman characters. Anglo-Saxon initialisms, acronyms and abbreviations are written in bold Arial font,
size 9, in blue Roman characters.
A1.4. List of Initialisms and Acronyms Used within this Document
AAP
AD-DS
AJP
BMD
BRICS
CBRN
CICDE
DAS
DCDC
DGA
EMA
FRA
HIL
HUMINT
JDR / RDIA
LBDSN-2008
NICT
PIA
PMC
PP30
Allied Administrative Publication
Assistant Director for Doctrinal Synergy (CICDE)
Allied Joint Publication
Ballistic Missile Defence
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentation
Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrines and Experimentations
Délégation aux affaires stratégiques
French Delegation for Strategic Affairs
Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre (UK)
Direction générale de l'armement
French Defence Procurement Agency
Etat-major des armées
French Defence Staff
France (NATO country code)
Humanitarian International Law
Human Intelligence
Joint Doctrinal Reflection
Réflexion doctrinale interarmées
Livre blanc sur la défense et sécurité nationale
French White Paper on Defence and National Security
New Information and Communication Technologies
Publication interarmées
French Joint Publication
Private Military Company
Plan prospectif à 30 ans
Prospective Plan of the French Defence Policy in 30 years
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SGDN
UN
USA
WMD
A2.
Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale
Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security
United Nations
United-States of America
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terms and Definitions
Smart power
Ability to combine the force (hard power) and persuasion (soft power) for the success of a given
strategy. At the strategic level, it implies the use of diplomacy, persuasion, power projection and
influence in a way to reach the best return on investments of the engaged means. It is mainly an
engagement in support of the diplomatic activity in all its forms and of the military force. It
implies the control of the conducted activities, their legitimacy and a capacity of adaptation.
(source: French joint glossary of operational terminology, PIA-7.2.6-3_GIAT-O[2012], Glossaire
interarmées de terminologie opérationnelle, no. 001/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 03 January 2012)
Strategic intimidation
Strategy based on the threat or limited use of conventional capabilities and courses of action,
and aiming to prevent a potential or actual adversary to initiate, develop or pursue an
aggressive action, by affecting its determination through the dread of the consequences it would
have to suffer in the event it would pursue its action.
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Summary
(FRA) JDR-007_CONFLICTS(2012)
This document defines the conflicts likely to occur within the next fifteen years based on the
objective observation of the main trends in the strategic evolution of the world and the potential
breakthrough that may have an impact on them.
It sheds a complementary operational light on the geostrategic and technological approaches of
the French Delegation for Strategic Affairs (DAS) and Defence Procurement Agency (DGA), and
contributes to the long-term efforts of the French Ministry of Defence.
This document is intentionally broad and does not aim to be conclusive: it must evolve and be a
starting point for ulterior further reflections, namely in the conceptual and capacity areas.
This document will discuss the following points:
-
perennial or cyclical causes of confrontations;
-
potential threats and confrontation fields;
-
character of future confrontations;
-
and consequences on the five strategic functions.
This document has been developed by the (FRA) Joint Centre for Concepts,
Doctrines and Experimentation (CICDE), a joint agency working on behalf of
the French Defence Staff (EMA). For any information, please contact the
CICDE at:
CICDE
École militaire
1, place JOFFRE
75700 PARIS SP 07
Phone: (+33) 1 44 42 83 38
Instead of a physical library, the CICDE has chosen to limit the paper publication of its documents
in favour of a unique and up-to-date virtual library to make it available from any computer with
Internet connection. Classified documents may be downloaded on protected networks only.
The electronic version of this document is available on line on the Intradef and Internet websites of
the CICDE at htpp://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr in the section entitled "Corpus conceptuel et
doctrinal interarmées français" (Joint Concept and Doctrine Architecture).
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