Contributory Negligence October 2012
Transcription
Contributory Negligence October 2012
THE BLAME GAME The incidence of contributory negligence OCTOBER 2012 BPP LAW SCHOOL OPINION PIECE – THE BLAME GAME – OCTOBER 2012 0 ‘THE BLAME GAME’ – the incidence of contributory negligence THE LAW The law in this area is governed by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (‘the Act’), where it states as follows at sn1(1): ‘Where any person suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.’ Section 4 of the Act defines ‘fault’ as ‘negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence’. In practice the section applies not to impose a duty, but to remove the bar that existed at common law from any claim by the claimant when liability had been established on the part of the defendant, but where the claimant had contributed to his own loss. This contribution can be either by partly causing the incident in the first place (for example by driving too fast), or where the conduct of the claimant has partly caused the loss, by making the damage worse or more serious than it would have been otherwise (for example by not wearing a seat-belt). In either case, causation of the damage suffered by the fault or ‘blameworthiness’ of the claimant, must be established. Contributory negligence is most accurately seen as a question of causation rather than remoteness, so in an opinion it should always appear in the liability, rather than the remedies section. The Courts tend to take a common sense approach to this question. Lord Denning defined contributory negligence as the following in Froom v. Butcher [1976] QB, 286: ‘...a man’s carelessness in looking after his own safety. He is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonably prudent man, he might be hurt himself...’ The Act gives the Court a wide discretion to determine the damages awarded in accordance with what it considers to be ‘just and equitable’, by determining the percentage of responsibility borne by the claimant for the incident and ensuing damage. Figures that appear frequently are 20%, 25%, 40%. 5% is usually the lowest figure that is applied. The burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. The application of the Act is trite law. As such there is no need to refer to the statute itself, in an opinion, or to source the defence to statute in a draft. However, the defence of contributory negligence must be specifically pleaded, if it is to be relied upon. BPP LAW SCHOOL OPINION PIECE – THE BLAME GAME – OCTOBER 2012 1 WHEN WILL THE DEFENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BE AVAILABLE? It is available as a partial defence to all torts, except deceit, conversion and assault and battery (for which see Co-operative Group Ltd v. Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ. 329). It is, therefore, a (partial) defence to breach of statutory duty under legislation such as Highways Act 1980, Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and Consumer Protection Act 1987 (provided for in sn 6(4)). As a defence to a breach of contract claim Breach of contract is not ‘fault’ for the purposes of the Act, as it does not give rise to liability in tort. Further, except where liability arises for breach of an obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill (or similar), liability for breach of contract is strict and fault is irrelevant to it. However, whether or not contributory negligence will operate as a defence in any given breach of contract claim is not entirely straight-forward. In order to examine the law in this area, it is helpful to consider it in relation to the three-fold categorisation of contractual obligations suggested by Hobhouse J. in the case of Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v.Butcher [1989] AC 880 (HL). These were as follows: i. The defendant’s liability relies on a contractual provision which does not depend on negligence on his part. Examples of this would include breach of an agreement between seller and purchaser to deliver goods by a certain date, or breach of the requirement that goods be fit for a particular purpose, pursuant to the Sale of Goods Act 1979. No duty of care arises in tort in these examples, so contributory negligence on the part of the claimant will not be available as a defence. ii. The defendant’s liability arises from a contractual obligation of care, which is expressed in terms of a duty to take care (or similar), but does not correspond to a tortious duty of care which would exist independently of the contract. The Law Commission gives a number of examples of this situation in its report ‘Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract Law’, Law Com. No. 219, 1993, one of which is a company which engages an engineer to supply and fit a new transformer in its factory. The company’s foreman and the engineer work together in checking the circuitry and the foreman participates in the decision to go ahead with the installation. In fact the main cable is unable to cope with the increased power requirements and burns out leading to economic loss on the part of the company. The engineer was in breach of his contractual duty to take reasonable care in carrying out the work, but the foreman had also failed to take reasonable care in checking the circuitry. In the report referred to, the Law Commission argues that the law in this area should be reformed to alter the position, but currently contributory negligence would not be relevant to this category of case. iii. The defendant’s liability in contract is the same as his liability in the tort of negligence independently of the existence of any contract. For example, where work is carried out by a garage on a car, co-extensive duties arise in contract to exercise reasonable care and skill in carrying out the work pursuant to Supply of Goods and Services Act BPP LAW SCHOOL OPINION PIECE – THE BLAME GAME – OCTOBER 2012 2 1982, and in tort to avoid personal injury or damage to other property arising from a failure to carry out the work with reasonable care. As such where an accident takes place which is caused by a breach of these duties, but contributed to, for example, by the speed at which the claimant was travelling, contributory negligence will be available to reduce the damages payable to the claimant. When will co-extensive liability arise? Scenario iii. is not as straight-forward as it could be in that the existence of concurrent duties in tort and contract have been the subject of consideration by the Courts over the years, in particular since the concept of assumption of responsibility for economic loss was established in Hedley Byrne v. Heller [1964] AC 465, and developed more recently in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] AC 145. In the very recent Court of Appeal case of Robinson v. P.E Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9 this area was re-examined in detail, and it was held that liability in tort for economic loss arising from a latent defect in a house by the builder, who was also the vendor, did not arise in the absence of an assumption of responsibility along the lines of Hedley Byrne (ibid). This is a developing area, and the potential for co-extensive liability in contract and tort may be diminishing. However, it remains settled law that a tortious duty to take reasonable care to avoid personal injury or damage to other property is owed by a builder or a vendor of goods to those who foreseeably own or use them (see Jackson LJ in Robinson (ibid) at para 68). In relation to the person who first acquires the building or chattel, the relationship between the parties will primarily be governed by the contract they have entered into, and contributory negligence will not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract. Further, the existence of concurrent duties in tort and contract that arise in relation to professionals was clearly re-affirmed by the Court of Appeal relatively recently in the case of UCB Bank Plc v. Hepherd Winstanley & Pugh (a firm) [1999] The Times, 25 August 1999. The same principle of co-extensive duties also extends to making contributory negligence available as a defence in negligent misrepresentation claims, where a cause of action in negligent misstatement at common law would be available concurrently (Gran Gelato Ltd v. Richcliff (Group) Ltd [1992] Ch 560). Clearly, when drafting a defence, it is important to be able to determine which category of case you are responding to: where there is a reasonably arguable case for co-extensive liability in tort, contributory negligence should be pleaded. RECENT DECISIONS This is generally not a dynamic area of law, but recent cases of interest involving contributory negligence include Anderson v. Newham College of Further Education [2002] EWCA Civ 505 where the Court of Appeal held that it was unhelpful to refer to ‘100% contributory negligence’ since in a case where the accident was entirely the fault of the Claimant, it could not be said that the Defendant shared any responsibility for the damage. In Badger v. Ministry of Defence [2006] 3 All ER 173, it was held that the defence could be BPP LAW SCHOOL OPINION PIECE – THE BLAME GAME – OCTOBER 2012 3 triggered where the claimant continued to smoke cigarettes in the knowledge that this was adverse to his health. In Smith v. Finch [2009] EWHR 53 (QB) it was decided that failure of a cyclist to wear a helmet could be subject to a finding of contributory negligence, if injuries would have been reduced or prevented by wearing a helmet. However, in that case it was found that the wearing of a helmet would have made no difference to the injuries sustained as the Claimant hit the ground at a speed greater than 12 mph. In Tolley v. Carr [2010] EWHC 2191 (QB), a motorist who was seriously injured when he tried to move another motorist’s vehicle that had become stranded sideways and jutting out into the fast lane after the driver lost control of it, was found not to have been contributorily negligent in that his actions as an amateur rescuer “fell within the category of brave and commendable, not the foolhardy and the unreasonable”. In Hughes v. Williams [2012] EWHC 1078 (QB) contributory negligence principles were applied where the relative contribution between joint tortfeasors had to be determined. A mother was found 25 percent responsible for injuries to a child sustained in a car accident, injuries which could have been avoided if she had placed the child in the child-seat with a five-point harness, which was the correct seat for the child’s age and weight, rather than a booster seat. CONCLUSIONS This in an area of law which is ubiquitous in civil claims, and which, on the face of it, is often reduced to a question of where the Judge feels true responsibility for the incident lies. However, the issue of contributory negligence as a defence to breach of contract claims brings it to the forefront of developments in the modern law of tort, in particular in relation to co-extensive liability in tort and contract, and the developing doctrine of assumption of responsibility for economic loss. BIBLIOGRAPHY Clerk and Lindsell on Torts. 20th Ed, incl sup. Chapter 3, section 3.Sweet and Maxwell Halsbury’s Laws of England. Vol 78, 2010. 5th Ed. Para 5(1). Butterworths Lunney M. and Oliphant K., 2010. 4th Ed. Tort Law: Text and Materials , chapter 6, section III. Oxford University Press AUTHOR Rebecca C. Bensted is an Associate Principal Lecturer at BPP Law School where she is subject leader for Drafting on the Bar Professional Training Course. Her areas of interest are opinion writing and drafting in a civil law context. BPP LAW SCHOOL OPINION PIECE – THE BLAME GAME – OCTOBER 2012 4