Swedish Security Service 2006

SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
Swedish Security Service
17/01/2006 17.46.34
how to order: The publication can be found at www.sakerhetspolisen.se
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production: The Swedish Security Service
graphic design: Typisk Form designbyrå
photographs: Pontus Johansson – pp. 3, 8, 12, 20, 24, 26, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44 and 49.
The Swedish Security Service – pp. 5, 10, 11, 14, 16, 22, 25, 28, 34, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47 and 48.
European Community 2007 – pp. 18 and 42, Mark Earthy – p. 32, Anders Wiklund / Scanpix – p. 35,
Per Wikström / Scanpix – p. 36, Pelle Björkman – p. 37, Ulf Hinds – p. 50.
typography: Eurostile and Swift
paper: 300 g Munken Polar (cover) and 150 g Munken Polar.
printed by: Davidsons Tryckeri ab, Växjö, April 2007
INTRODUCTION
The Swedish Security Service is tasked with protecting Sweden’s
security and democracy and our citizens’ rights and freedoms.
This is one of the finest but also one of the most difficult tasks a
government agency can have. Threat pictures are subject to continuous change, affected as they are by the societal development
in Sweden and abroad. Moreover, threats have become increasingly complex and global, whereby an incident in one part of the
world may have repercussions in another.
Security Service activities in 2006 largely concentrated on two
areas; providing protection in connection with the parliamentary elections and countering terrorism. The election period was
the most intensive ever in Sweden, with a large number of
events and comprehensive media coverage. Our Dignitary
Protection Unit carried out more assignments in two months
than it normally does in one year.
Tackling international terrorism is a national as well as a
global task. The terrorist networks extend across many different
countries. A terror attack carried out in one country may have
been planned in another country and financed from a third. The
Security Service works to prevent terrorist attacks from being
carried out in Sweden, but also to prevent attacks against other
countries from being planned or financed from here. We also
take an active part in the international cooperation that has
become increasingly important over the past few years.
The fight against terrorism will be broadened and strengthened
in 2007. The allocation of an extra SEK 100 million to the Service,
for further development of our counter-terrorism and dignitary
protection work, will also enable us to strengthen other activities,
such as counter-espionage and protection of the Constitution. In
parallel with this, we will proceed with the organisational development measures initiated and launched by our recently departed
and greatly missed Director General Klas Bergenstrand already in
2004, now with a focus on further developing internal working
methods and procedures. Consistent with the overall objective of
protecting national security and strengthening confidence in the
Security Service, this will serve to make our work to protect Sweden even more effective and the results of our efforts even better.
Kurt Malmström
acting head of the swedish securit y service
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 5
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
5
THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE
FIVE AREAS OF ACTIVITY
10
A TWO-TIER ORGANISATION
OUR ACTIVITIES
9
10
13
COUNTER-ESPIONAGE
14
COUNTER-TERRORISM
15
PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
DIGNITARY PROTECTION
16
16
17
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
>> Regional units
17
19
THREATS AGAINST SWEDEN
21
THE TERRORIST THREAT IN EUROPE AND SWEDEN
22
POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH – TARGETS FOR FOREIGN SPIES
23
RECURRING CLASHES BETWEEN POLITICAL EXTREMIST GROUPS
SWEDEN MAY BE USED TO ACQUIRE PRODUCTS
FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
23
>> Countries assist each other in criminal investigations
A SERVICE ON THE MOVE
25
27
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
ANALYSIS AND DIGNITARY PROTECTION ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL WORKING METHODS
28
28
RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT
28
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT’S INVESTMENT
6 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
28
29
23
Suspected espionage against a Swedish university
31
Arson attack against Iraqi polling station in Stockholm
32
Swedish citizen charged with terrorist offences in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Invisible Party – a protest against the elections
34
35
Working together on unsolved crimes made it possible
to bring charges against 16 left-wing extremists 36
The Government Offices website was brought down by a DDoS attack
Security flaws found in authorities’ information systems
Providing a secure environment for
Government Offices staff and information
37
39
40
Contributing to the protection of EU classified information
42
Tightened export control on products with possible WMD applications
The election campaign and the election result
presented major challenges to the Security Service
43
45
Developing and strengthening our dignitary protection activities
46
Working together to counter terrorism
– national and Nordic co-operation 48
Investing in competency development
50
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 7
07/03/2006 01.14.26
THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE
The Swedish Security Service is an intelligence agency
with police duties. We prevent and detect offences against
national security, counter terrorism and protect the
central Government. The purpose of our activities is to
protect the democratic system, the rights and freedoms of
our citizens and national security.
The Security Service is an authority under the
Government. We have our own instructions, our own
Director General and we are funded directly by the
Government. At the same time we are part of the Swedish
National Police Board, albeit an independent part.
›› THE
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE
Secret wire-tapping (legal
interception) is a means to
access the contents of a suspect’s phone or internet communication.
Secret tele-surveillance provides access only to the technical data of phone or internet
communication and serves to
map the suspect’s contacts.
Phone numbers, call times
and positioning of mobile
phones are some of the data
that can be used in the mapping. Secret wire-tapping and
secret tele-surveillance are
both coercive measures.
Decisions regarding the use of
such measures are made by
the Court, following a request
by a prosecutor.
FIVE AREAS OF ACTIVITY
We engage in five main areas of activity:
• counter-espionage, which refers to the prevention and detec-
tion of espionage and other unlawful intelligence activities targeting Swedish interests in Sweden and abroad, and foreign
interests in Sweden.
• counter-terrorism, which refers to the prevention and detec-
tion of terrorism targeting Sweden or foreign interests in our
country, acts of terrorism in other countries and the existence of
international terrorist networks in Sweden.
• protection of the constitution, which refers to the preven-
tion and detection of illegal activities which, through the use of
violence, threat or force, aim to attain political goals or prevent
citizens from exercising their constitutional rights and freedoms.
• protective securit y, which involves advice to and inspection
of companies and government agencies, in the interest of protecting information of importance to national security and of
preventing terrorism. This also includes performing records
checks following requests from the authorities concerned.
• dignitary protection, which refers to guarding and security
work involving the central Government, the Royal Family, foreign
diplomatic representatives, state visits and similar.
The Security Service also engages in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to this, we provide
certain support to other police authorities. Our Bomb Data Centre
collects and analyses information on bomb related incidents in
Sweden and abroad, for communication to other law-enforcement
agencies. Moreover, the Security Service provides the technical
equipment for secret wire-tapping and secret tele-surveillance, and
operates a colour photo lab for all forms of media processing.
A TWO-TIER ORGANISATION
Approximately 900 persons work at the Security Service; most of
them in Stockholm, although we also have staff at regional units
across the country. Several professions are represented among our
employees, e.g. analysts, technicians, translators, economists, body10 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
guards, surveillance officers, investigators, interpreters and legal and
secretarial staff. Some 55 per cent of our staff have police training.
The Security Service is a two-tier organisation, with a management tier and an operational tier. The Management is made up by
the Director General, his Deputy, five senior managers and two
executive secretaries. They are assisted by the nine functions of the
Management Secretariat. The operational tier is made up of 17 units.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE
MANAGEMENT BOARD
SECRETARIAT
• Aliens Affairs
• Information Secretariat
• Internal Audit
• Internal Security
• Legal Secretariat
• Management Support
• Planning Secretariat
• Secretariat of the Counter-Terrorism Co-operative Council
• Security Policy Secretariat
COUNTER-ESPIONAGE
THREAT
ASSESSMENT
REGIONAL UNIT SOUTH
REGIONAL UNIT WEST
COUNTER-TERRORISM
SURVEILLANCE
PROTECTION OF
THE CONSTITUTION
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
DOCUMENTATION
REGIONAL UNIT
LOWER CENTRAL
INTERNATIONAL
LIAISON
REGIONAL UNIT
UPPER CENTRAL
TECHNICAL
REGIONAL UNIT NORTH
DIGNITARY PROTECTION
PERSONNEL
ECONOMY
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 11
10/03/2006 22.19.57
OUR ACTIVITIES
The offences that the Security Service is tasked to
prevent and detect may have huge consequences for
society as a whole as well as for individual citizens.
Preventing an offence from being committed in the first
place, is therefore paramount. Our work mainly involves
preventing offences from being committed in Sweden, but
we also participate in international cooperation and
thereby contribute to preventing offences from being
committed abroad.
›› OUR
ACTIVITIES
An intelligence officer is
employed by a country’s intelligence service, for the purpose of gathering information
– mainly classified – about
another country.
In this preventive work, it is important to obtain information on
and have control over undemocratic currents in society. We obtain
such knowledge through what is known as intelligence work, i.e.
the focus, gathering, processing, analysis and communication of
information. The information gathered is used to determine the
protective measures and countermeasures to be taken.
When an offence is detected – within the framework of our intelligence activities or following a police report – it is investigated in
the same manner as other offences. The Security Service contacts a
prosecutor, who decides to launch an investigation. The prosecutor
always heads any such investigation, and our police work will be
conducted within its framework. If the prosecutor finds that there
is enough evidence for an indictment, the case will be tried by the
court, which will return a verdict.
COUNTER-ESPIONAGE
The Security Service works to prevent and detect espionage and other
unlawful intelligence activities targeting Swedish interests in Sweden
and abroad and foreign interests in our country. We also work to prevent and detect refugee espionage and industrial espionage.
Intelligence activities targeting Sweden and Swedish interests are
going on in Sweden and foreign states have intelligence officers
posted here. Some of these are declared as such; they conduct lawful intelligence activities, and we co-operate with them. Other intelligence officers are in Sweden under false pretences; claiming to be
for instance diplomats, journalists or businessmen. These persons
conduct unlawful intelligence activities, i.e. they try to obtain classified information the disclosure of which may prejudice national
security or cause harm to Sweden in e.g. intergovernmental negotiations. Intelligence officers often use other people to obtain classified information from authorities or companies. Persons attempting
to access classified information for the purpose of handing it over
to a foreign power are guilty of espionage. Our ongoing efforts to
prevent and detect such activities involve intelligence work, advice
and information to the authorities and companies handling classified information, and, in close co-operation with the parties concerned, continuous monitoring of activities assessed as requiring
particular protection.
The Security Service also works to prevent and detect unlawful
intelligence activities targeting exile groups and dissidents, i.e.
14 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
››
SECURITY SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT, 2003–2007.
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
SEK
SEK
SEK
SEK
SEK
547
596
641
699
784
million
million
million
million
million
The appropriations to the Security Service have seen
an increase over the past few years, largely due to the
fact that we have been given more resources for our
dignitary protection work. A Government decision to
invest in the Security Service resulted in a SEK 100
million increase in appropriations for 2007. This
increase is to fund developments in our counter-terrorism work, complete the investment in our dignitary
protection activities and strengthen our other activities.
800
700
600
500
400
0
2003
2004
refugee espionage. This may involve states engaging in intelligence
activities against each other in Sweden, or states gathering information on individuals, e.g. political refugees, in our country. Refugee
espionage is a reality in Sweden and it is therefore important that
these individuals are protected from what they have once fled from.
Counter-espionage also involves preventing and detecting
espionage against Swedish companies that is initiated by another
state in order to access information that may harm Swedish interests or national security. Cases where one company spies on another
in order to gain a competitive advantage are investigated by the
local police authority.
COUNTER-TERRORISM
The Security Service is responsible for countering terrorism in
Sweden. We work to prevent attacks in Sweden or against Swedish
interests. In this work, it is important to obtain information on and
have control over undemocratic currents in society. We therefore
engage in intelligence activities and work with other countries’
security and intelligence services.
It should not be possible to plan or support from Sweden the
mounting of a terrorist attack. The Security Service therefore works
to prevent Sweden from being used as a base for recruitment, logistic support, financing or planning of attacks. However, there are
individuals in Sweden who sympathise with and provide direct support to terrorist activities in various parts of the world.
Part of the preventive work consists in preventing foreign nationals who are active members of a terrorist network from visiting or
settling down in Sweden. We do this by checking some of the persons applying for visas, Swedish citizenship or a Swedish residence
permit. These checks are initiated by the Migration Board or by the
ministry concerned, but may also be carried out on our own initiative. We thereafter inform the authority concerned on whether the
persons in question pose a security threat to Sweden. The Security
Service does however not make the decisions. For secrecy reasons we
can never comment on security cases in the media.
The Security Service is also responsible for the prevention and
detection of illegal trade in products that may be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. This work is carried out in
close co-operation with other authorities.
2005
2006
2007
A security service works to
raise the level of security in its
own country, through e.g.
advice and inspections. The
service also works to detect
security threats against the
country.
An intelligence service is
active in the gathering, processing and communication of
information on which to base
decisions on future action.
Intelligence services gather
information via open and
secret sources. The CIA in
the US, the SVR in Russia
and the MI6 in the UK are
examples of intelligence
services.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 15
›› OUR
ACTIVITIES
The White Power scene is
made up of individuals, groups
and networks with right-wing
extremist views, who are
prepared to use violence for
political gain. The White
Power scene is rooted in
racial ideology, which is based
on the belief that humanity
can be divided into various
races, where the white race
is superior. There is also a
notion of a Jewish world conspiracy.
The autonomous scene consists of loosely connected networks of left-wing extremists,
using various organisation
names and action names. The
autonomous scene aims for a
classless and fair society and
advocates extra-parliamentary
methods to achieve this.
Many ideological currents are
represented; anarchism being
one of the fundamental ones.
PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Protection of the Constitution refers to the Security Service’s activities to protect national internal security. This involves preventing
and detecting activities which, through the use of violence, threat
or force, aim to change the Swedish Constitution, influence the
decision-making of authorities or political bodies, or prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights and freedoms.
As freedom of speech and freedom of association are guaranteed
under the Swedish Constitution, it is never illegal to be a member
of any organisation. It is however not allowed to commit offences to
advance political opinions. The Security Service’s work relates to
such offences. In Sweden there are mainly two groups who commit
politically motivated offences – the White Power scene and the
autonomous scene. Their most frequently committed offences are
unlawful threat, harassment, assault, violent riot, wilful damage
and graffiti.
Our work in this field mainly involves documenting the domestic
extremist environments that may pose a threat to Sweden. This
documentation serves to improve our knowledge of ideologies,
actors and modus. The Security Service also occasionally conducts
criminal investigations in this field, although most often such
investigations are carried out by a local police authority, to which
we lend assistance in the form of expertise, computer forensic
examinations and analysis.
PROTECTIVE SECURITY
The Security Service works to increase the level of security in society.
We do this through advice and inspection, in order to safeguard
national security and prevent terrorism.
Advice may be given in various forms. We have e.g. issued directions on how the legislation on protective security is to be applied.
Information and training are important features of this work,
which is why we issue information material and run courses for
heads of protective security.
The Security Service is a supervisory body for protective security
issues. This means that we have to check that authorities comply
with existing laws and regulations and that their protection is adequate in relation to the activities carried out. We visit the authorities to inspect the design of their protection measures. Any flaws
are pointed out during the visit, as well as in a report, and will also
16 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
››
SECURITY SERVICE COSTS PER AREA OF ACTIVITY IN 2005 AND 2006, IN PERCENTAGES.
2005
Counter-espionage
17
Counter-terrorism
23
Protection of the Constitution
9
Protective Security
10
Dignitary protection
37
Support to other police authorities
4
2006
14
25
9
8
41
3
Counter-terrorism and dignitary protection were the
two most resource-demanding areas in 2005 as well
as in 2006.
Support to other police
authorities 3 (4)
Counter-espionage 14 (17)
Dignitary
protection
41 (37)
Counter-terrorism
25 (23)
Protective Security 8 (10)
occasion a repeat inspection to be carried out in one or two years’
time.
Our protective security commitment also involves performing
records checks, which constitute a parameter in security screening
procedures carried out by other authorities and form a basis for
their decisions concerning employment. Such procedures serve to
assess a person’s suitability, loyalty and reliability from a security
perspective, which is necessary if the person is to take part in activities of importance to national security or important for the protection against terrorism. The Security Service performs records checks
following an application from an authority and consent from the
person to be checked. The person concerned is checked against the
criminal record, the suspects record and the Security Service central register. The records check may also be supplemented by an
individual personal investigation, which primarily includes an
examination of the person’s financial situation.
DIGNITARY PROTECTION
The Security Service is responsible for the security of the central
Government and also for personal protection granted following a
special decision by the National Police Board. We are also responsible for security during state visits and similar events, and for the
security of foreign diplomatic representatives when in Sweden. This
responsibility involves making threat assessments and taking suitable protective measures based on these assessments.
A threat picture is an overall assessment of the threats against a
person, and also the starting point when assessing the risk, i.e. the
likelihood that a threat will be realised. Thereafter, the consequences of a realised threat are assessed. Decisions regarding the deployment and nature of protective measures are based on this assessment. Protective measures range from informing the relevant police
authority that an event will take place in their area to providing
bodyguard protection in combination with police presence.
Protection of the
Constitution 9 (9)
Diplomatic representatives
belong to a country’s mission
in another country, such as
an embassy or a consulate.
The central Government is
made up of the Head of State,
the Speaker, the Members of
Parliament, the Prime
Minister, the Ministers and
the State Secretaries.
Bodyguard protection may
be temporary or permanent.
A bodyguard is a police officer
tasked with protecting a particular person from direct
physical attack or other
offensive behaviour.
Police presence to protect a
location or an area is a
measure taken by a local
police authority.
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
The Security Service engages in extensive national and international
co-operation, which, to a great extent, involves the exchange of information and experiences. We also provide and receive assistance in
various investigations and other activities.
On the national level, we work mainly with other intelligence
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 17
VÅR VERKSAMHET
ACTIVITIES
›› OUR
A liaison officer is the
Security Service’s contact
person in its dealings with
other security and intelligence
services. The liaison officer
may be based in Sweden or
posted at a Swedish embassy
in another country.
and law enforcement agencies. Although this work tends to focus
on the exchange of information and experiences, it also involves cooperation on an operational level. We may be assisted by police
authorities in our investigations, or lend them assistance in the
form of expertise, e.g. as concerns right-wing and left-wing extremism. In the area of dignitary protection, some protective measures
are the responsibility of the Security Service and others are the
responsibility of the local police authority, which is why we work
closely with them, both at the planning stage and during the actual
assignments. The Security Service’s protective security work is about
advice and inspection, and is carried out in consultation with the
authorities concerned, i.e. those covered by the protective security
legislation. The Security Service is also the initiator and convener of
the Counter-Terrorism Co-operative Council, which is made up by
eleven Swedish government agencies. The Council’s tasks include
co-ordinating the activities of these authorities and the exchange of
information between them.
The exchange of information and experiences is a key concept
also in our international co-operation. This exchange is effectuated
mainly via contacts with the security and intelligence services of
other countries. Much of the information exchange takes place
within the framework of the informal organisation The Club of
Berne which comprises the security services of a majority of the EU
countries. Moreover, the Security Service has liaison officers posted
to certain hubs in Europe. In addition to this, we represent Sweden
in a number of multinational bodies mostly concerned with
transnational activities such as terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism is a type of crime often conducted by loosely connected terrorist networks with extensive international links. Countering terrorism therefore requires in-depth cooperation with authorities in other countries, as the access to intelligence information from abroad is vital to the efficient running of
our operations. The importance of international co-operation is
evident from the strong increase in the number of international
contacts over the past few years. In 2006, we therefore invested in
developing our international co-operation, by introducing a system
of travelling liaison officers as well as other measures to strengthen
the contacts and relations with other countries.
18 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
Regional units
The offences which the Security Service is to prevent and detect may be committed anywhere in the country, which is why we have national coverage, organised into five
regional units with local offices. Each unit is responsible for Security Service activities
in a number of counties, with a focus on contact activities and intelligence gathering.
The regional units also participate in the protection of the central Government. When any
of our protected persons travel to another part
of the country, the unit concerned is informed
of this. In cases where there is a threat against
the person, the regional unit and the competent police authority coordinate local protective measures.
N
INFORMATION IS GATHERED VIA LOCAL
CONTACT NETWORKS
The Security Service works to prevent and
detect offences within the areas of counterespionage, counter-terrorism and protection of
the Constitution. The regional units participate in this work by gathering intelligence for
inquiries and criminal investigations. Their
good local knowledge and extensive contact
network make the regional units very useful.
CONTACT ACTIVITIES PREVENT CRIME
In their respective counties, the regional units
maintain an extensive network of contacts
with local police authorities, government agencies, municipalities and county councils. The
Service’s contact activities largely consist in
informing the above authorities on how to protect classified information and key societal
functions, as well as on how to protect themselves against terrorist attacks.
The Security Service also maintains contacts
with various anti-democratic environments, so
as to create a dialogue and build confidence.
ÖM
NM
V
S
N – Regional Unit North: Stationed in Luleå, with a
working group in Umeå. Covers the following counties:
Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten, and Norrbotten.
ÖM – Regional Unit Upper Central: Stationed in
Uppsala. Covers the following counties: Uppsala, Gotland,
Västmanland, Dalarna, Stockholm and Gävleborg.
NM – Regional Unit Lower Central: Stationed in Örebro, with a working group in Norrköping. Covers the following counties: Jönköping, Södermanland, Östergötland,
Värmland and Örebro.
V – Regional Unit West: Stationed in Göteborg. Covers
the following counties: Halland and Västra Götaland.
S – Regional Unit South: Stationed in Malmö. Covers the
following counties: Kronoberg, Kalmar, Blekinge and Skåne.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 19
27/03/2006 23.29.06
THREATS AGAINST SWEDEN
A country’s security cannot be regarded as something that
is isolated from the surrounding world. Today’s threats
are more complex, less predictable and more difficult to
detect than ever before. An increasing number of the
threats Sweden faces are transnational, and often global.
This is true not least with regard to terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 21
›› THREATS
AGAINST SWEDEN
Weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons and
their carriers, e.g. missiles.
Reactions to events in the world around us are almost instantaneous, due to the rapid dissemination of information, e.g. via the
Internet and text messages. The spread of the Mohammed cartoons
initially published by a Danish paper and the subsequent reactions
are a clear example of this.
The Security Service closely monitors the developments in the
world and the threats targeting Sweden. Threats, risks and vulnerabilities must be identified and assessed, so that we can safeguard
national security. We produce both short-term and long-term assessments, to enable Sweden not only to take measures today but also
to lay the foundations for long-term planning.
THE TERRORIST THREAT IN EUROPE AND SWEDEN
The terrorist threat in Europe has increased since the attacks in the
US on 11 September 2001. The attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in
London in 2005, as well as a number of averted and failed attacks in
2006, point to an increasing threat against several European countries.
The threat has become increasingly complex over the past few
years. In more than one case attacks have been planned or carried
out by networks or structures only ideologically linked to known
terrorist organisations and therefore unknown to the European
security services. It has also emerged that the perpetrators in several
cases grew up in the societies that they came to turn against. These
persons are young and radicalised, and driven by factors such as the
glorification of violence, a feeling of alienation from society and
perceived injustices in world politics.
Global and local political developments have an impact on the
threat against Sweden. The country’s political stance in international conflicts and issues may rapidly change the picture of Sweden
abroad. Domestic policy issues may also be of importance in this
context.
Terrorism of today is transnational in nature. Hence there is a
high risk that Sweden may be used as a base for recruitment, logistic support and financing. There is also a risk that our country may
be used for the planning of attacks abroad.
There are individuals in Sweden who sympathise with or even
directly support terrorist activities in various parts of the world. In
2005, a Swedish court convicted two persons of financing terrorism
in Iraq. In our assessment, similar activities are still conducted in
Sweden.
22 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
››
››
››
In 2005 the Security Service Registrar recorded
29,318 documents. In 2006, the number was
31,713.
In 2005 the Security Service performed 69,585
records checks, and in 2006 the number was
64,738.
In 2005 the Security Service received visits from 25
researchers on 44 separate occasions. In 2006 we
received visits from 17 researchers on 28 separate
occasions. On each occasion, they studied information
from our archives.
››
THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WHO REQUESTED DATA
FROM THE SECURITY SERVICE CENTRAL REGISTER IN
2005 AND 2006 IN RELATION TO THE NUMBER OF
GRANTED REQUESTS.
Requests
Granted requests
2005
283
141
2006
799
151
In 2005 there were 283 requests for data from the
Security Service central register, and in 2006 there were
799 such requests. Data was provided – in part or in full
– in 141 cases (50 per cent) in 2005 and in 151 cases
(19 per cent) in 2006. In the cases where no data was
provided this was either because the register contained
no data on the person in question or because the data
was subjected to secrecy under Swedish legislation.
POLITICS, TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH
– TARGETS FOR FOREIGN SPIES
Intelligence and espionage activities are going on against Sweden
and Swedish interests, and foreign powers are working in our country on a broad and systematic scale, mainly to access information in
the fields of politics, and advanced technology and research. This
applies not least in the field of what is known as refugee espionage,
i.e. intelligence activities targeting refugees and immigrant communities.
The need for intelligence has increased in recent years, not least
due to international terrorism, and has led to increased resources
and a broader mandate for intelligence services in many countries.
This may have the long-term effect of increasing the number of foreign intelligence actors engaging in illegal operations in Sweden.
RECURRING CLASHES BETWEEN POLITICAL EXTREMIST GROUPS
Political extremist groups currently pose no tangible threat to the
Swedish Constitution. They may however pose a threat to public
order and security, and to individuals and their property. Both the
White Power scene and the autonomous scene contain actors who
have shown that they are prepared to use threat, violence or force
to attain their political objectives. In some cases their actions are
directed against authorities or political parties represented in parliament, but most often persons from the autonomous scene attack
White Power supporters or vice versa. The two groups also engage in
mapping the opposite camp. The increasing tendency to resort to
violent clashes has become a recurring problem in various Swedish
localities. It is also alarming that actors in the autonomous groups
have on several occasions been prepared to use various types of fire
bombs.
SWEDEN MAY BE USED TO ACQUIRE PRODUCTS FOR
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The world still faces a considerable WMD proliferation threat. North
Korea’s detonation of a nuclear weapon in the autumn of 2006
bears witness to this. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programme also
continued to attract attention during the year. Moreover, it is feared
that non-state actors, such as terrorist networks, may have the ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
There is no direct threat to Sweden as concerns the use of
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 23
›› THREATS
AGAINST SWEDEN
weapons of mass destruction. It is however possible that Sweden
may be used to acquire components, technology, systems and
expertise for the production of such weapons. There is also a risk
that Sweden may be used as a transit country in the transport of
products for weapons of mass destruction.
24 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
Countries assist each other in criminal investigations
Sweden is bound by international conventions to assist other countries in their criminal
investigations. Should another country need assistance from Sweden in a criminal investigation, they can submit a request for legal assistance. Likewise, Sweden can submit a
request to another country, should we require their assistance.
On 1 October 2000, the Act on International
Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases came into
force. The act regulates requests for legal assistance submitted to Sweden by other countries
and vice versa.
Requests for legal assistance submitted to
Sweden are forwarded to a prosecutor or a
court for an assessment of the case. Legal assistance shall be granted under the same circumstances that apply to a corresponding measure
in the course of a Swedish criminal investigation or trial. In some cases the request can be
granted only if the crime in question is punishable also under Swedish law.
Requests for legal assistance in the domain
of the Security Service are forwarded to the
Prosecution Office for National Security.
If the requested legal assistance can be provided, the prosecutor, depending on the measure, may apply for the Court’s permission for
the measure or forward the request to the relevant police authority, along with instructions
and a request to carry out the measure in question. Such measures may include interrogating
a person, searching a flat or carrying out secret
wire-tapping. Representatives of the country
concerned may sometimes be allowed to be
present when the measures are being carried
out, and may also ask questions. When the
measures have been carried out, the material is
presented to the prosecutor, who then sends it
on. At this stage, it is often possible for the foreign representatives to receive a copy of the
material, to ensure swift processing of the case.
The information contained in a request for
legal assistance is classified as secret by virtue
of a provision in the Swedish Secrecy Act which
explicitly concerns requests for international
legal assistance.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 25
09/05/2006 10.41.16
A SERVICE ON THE MOVE
The Security Service’s reform process continued throughout 2006, with a focus on internal development, as part of
which planning and management tools and models were
devised and internal working methods refined. Some new
functions were set up and there were a few minor organisational changes. We also invested in strengthening our
competency through recruitment, training and competence building.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 27
›› A
SERVICE ON THE MOVE
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT
Developing Security Service activities to allow for a greater element
of management by objectives and performance management is part
of the reform process. In order to achieve this, tools and models were
devised during the year, including new models for activity planning
as well as for monitoring and evaluation. A planning secretariat has
been set up to address these issues, and we have also created a special
function to co-ordinate the development initiatives.
A management development programme aiming to develop our
corporate governance practices and performance culture was
launched in 2006 and will continue in 2007. This is a comprehensive
programme which will be offered to all heads of units and sections.
ANALYSIS AND DIGNITARY PROTECTION ACTIVITIES
Our analysis activities have been strengthened through the recruitment of a number of new analysts and the setting up of a security
policy secretariat. These measures aim to improve the information
on which we base our decisions and to ensure a more accurate
assessment of threats against Sweden. One of the tasks of the
security policy secretariat is to provide the Management with relevant decision-making data on potential key areas for future focus.
Our dignitary protection work has also seen some positive changes
during the year. The Threat Assessment Unit, which assesses the
threats against our protected persons, and the Dignitary Protection
Unit, which is responsible for the protective measures, have been
brought closer together. We are now reviewing our activities in this
field, with a view to tailoring them to the existing requirements and
threat picture, for greater efficiency and flexibility.
INTERNAL WORKING METHODS
A review of the Security Service’s working methods was carried out
in 2006. An evaluation of our intelligence work resulted in the
development and implementation of a new model for such work.
This new model contains tools and procedures to ensure a more
planned approach, drawing on well defined objectives, deliverables
and clear intelligence requirements.
28 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
››
THE NUMBER OF BODYGUARDS WITH
THE SECURITY SERVICE, 2003–2006.
2003
2004
2005
2006
››
65
95
110
120
This is due to an increase in the number of assignments given to our Dignitary Protection Unit, coupled
with a greater need for protective measures following the assassination of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh.
THE NUMBER OF ASYLUM, CITIZENSHIP AND VISA
CASES SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY SERVICE FOR
COMMENTS IN 2005 AND 2006, IN RELATION TO
THE NUMBER OF CASES WHERE THE SECURITY
SERVICE RECOMMENDED REJECTION.
Cases submitted
Recommended rejections
2005
4,030
61
2006
3,557
65
1.5 per cent of the cases submitted by the
Migration Board or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
to the Security Service in 2005 were assessed to
represent a security risk to Sweden. The figure for
2006 was 1.8 per cent.
RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT
In 2006, the Security Service invested in recruitment, training and
competency development. Our trainee programme continued – a
second batch of trainees started in September and in December
preparations were underway to recruit a further 30 trainees for a
third programme. A number of in-house training initiatives have
also been carried out, such as an 18-month specialist programme
for desk officers in operational units. Tests and interviews for a second programme were held in the autumn of 2006. In addition to
this, all Security Service employees attended a three-day conference
where particular emphasis was put on performance management
culture, various aspects of counter-terrorism and internal co-operation.
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
INVESTMENT
2007 will see the continuation of our reform initiative. Internal
development will still be a priority area, with the objective of making Security Service activities even more effective, and the results of
our efforts even better. Working methods, technology, regional
activities and competency in the field of IT security are some of the
areas that will be given particular attention during the year.
The Government’s decision in 2006 to invest in the Security
Service reflects their concern about the threat from international terrorism and threats to democracy and important public institutions.
We have thus been allocated the resources necessary to further
strengthen our activities. The ongoing reform initiative in combination with the Government’s investment will represent a significant
challenge to the Security Service in 2007.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 29
27/02/2006 20.18.39
Suspected espionage against
a Swedish university
A visiting scholar from Russia lost his residence permit and a Russian intelligence officer with a cover position as a diplomat was declared persona non grata following a case
of suspected espionage against the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) in
Uppsala. On behalf of the Russian intelligence officer, the visiting scholar had gathered
data on SLU research and on the personal circumstances of his colleagues. This was
then handed over to the intelligence officer in a series of clandestine meetings.
On 15 February 2006, the Security Service arrested a Russian man; a visiting scholar at the SLU,
on suspicions of espionage, alternatively aggravated industrial espionage and unlawful intelligence activities. The arrest took place in central
Uppsala, during a meeting between the visiting
scholar and a Russian intelligence officer working as a diplomat at the Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Stockholm. The latter had already
been identified by our Service as an intelligence
officer belonging to the Russian civilian intelligence service SVR; formerly the KGB.
RESEARCH INFORMATION AND
PERSONAL DATA WERE HANDED OVER
In connection with the arrest, a house search
was carried out in the home of the visiting
scholar. The police found written instructions
from the intelligence officer, detailing the
kind of information he wanted the visiting
scholar to gather: information about the
research carried out at the department where
the visiting scholar worked, and information
relating to certain Swedish biotechnology companies. The intelligence officer was also interested in information on the visiting scholar’s
colleagues. These questions were very detailed
and related to e.g. marital status, drinking
habits, interest in women, hobbies, height,
hair and eye colour. The likely purpose of gathering this information was that it may be useful, should recruitment of one of these persons
be of interest some time in the future.
Our investigation found evidence that the
visiting scholar had gathered and documented
the requested data and thereafter handed it
over to the intelligence officer. In this way, a
considerable amount of information on SLU
research and data on the personal circumstances of the visiting scholar’s colleagues
came to be forwarded to an outsider. The handover took place through a series of clandestine
meetings, during which the visiting scholar
received money as well as other gifts from the
intelligence officer.
ESPIONAGE COULD NOT BE PROVED
The investigation was closed on 7 April 2006,
since the authorities assessing the information
handed over came to the conclusion that its
disclosure did not cause harm to the total
defence or to Sweden’s security. The prosecutor
therefore could not prove espionage. Nor was
the disclosed information considered a trade
secret. The gathering of sensitive personal data
is a punishable offence only if carried out on
an extensive scale. As the Security Service was
able to interrupt the visiting scholar’s handing
over of data on his colleagues at a relatively
early stage, his action in this respect was not
considered a criminal offence.
The visiting scholar was released from custody on the day the investigation was closed,
but lost his Swedish residence permit. In early
April 2006, the Government declared the intelligence officer persona non grata (PNG), i.e. not
welcome in the country. This meant that he
had to leave his post at the Russian Embassy
and go back to Russia. He will not be allowed
to return to Sweden.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 31
Arson attack against Iraqi polling station
in Stockholm
A polling station set up for the Iraqi parliamentary elections was attacked in
December 2005 by three politically motivated perpetrators using Molotov cocktails.
Two of them were also planning an attack on a free church in Uppsala.
At 00.25 hours on 15 December 2005, a Molotov
cocktail was thrown against the windows of a
building in Kista, a Stockholm suburb. At the
time, the premises were being used as a
polling station for exiled Iraqis voting in the
Iraqi parliamentary elections. The glass bottle
containing petrol smashed the outer window
pane, but was then caught in the Venetian
blind between the panes. This prevented the
fire from breaking out as the petrol did not
come into contact with flammable material.
Two guards in the building heard the sound of
breaking glass and rushed out, thereby preventing the throwing of the remaining bottles,
as the perpetrators fled from the scene. No one
was injured in the attack.
Later that day, Swedish newspapers and a
TV station received written statements signed
by Tanzim Qaeda’t Al jihad al Soed, claiming
responsibility for the attack. The statements
had been posted in Sundsvall, in northern
Sweden, the day before, and were also sent by
e-mail.
A POLITICAL MOTIVE BEHIND THE ATTACKS
Already at an early stage in the investigation,
three persons had attracted the interest of the
Security Service. The technical investigation
gave further support to our suspicions. The
three were arrested in January 2006; two of
them on charges of having attempted to commit a terrorist offence, whereas the third person was charged with preparation, alternatively conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence.
Our investigation also found proof that two
of the men had planned to carry out an attack
on the Livets Ord (Word of Life) church in
Uppsala. It is suspected that their motive for
this was Livets Ord’s positive attitude to Israel.
The three men are thought to have acted
from political rather than religious conviction.
They met over the Internet and maintained
contact via various chat rooms. The two perpetrators behind the attack against the polling
station had not met in person prior to the
attack.
TERRORISM CHARGES AMENDED TO
ARSON BY THE COURT OF APPEAL
The Stockholm City Court found one of the
men guilty of attempt and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence, and another of complicity to an attempted terrorist offence and of
conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. The
third man was found guilty of conspiracy to
commit a terrorist offence. All three appealed
to the Svea Court of Appeal, where charges
were amended to attempted arson and conspiracy to commit arson. Two of the men were
convicted under the lessened charges, whereas
the third man was acquitted.
32 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
19/05/2006 01.08.53
Swedish citizen charged with terrorist
offences in Bosnia-Herzegovina
A Swedish citizen has been arrested and charged with terrorist offences in BosniaHerzegovina. He is suspected of having planned and prepared a terrorist attack against
political and social structures in the country. It is suspected that the planning took
place in several countries, including Sweden. A Swedish criminal investigation has been
carried out, involving judicial cooperation with Denmark and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On 19 October 2005, a Swedish citizen was
arrested in Sarajevo on suspicions of preparation to commit terrorist offences. Arrested
with him was a Turkish citizen domiciled in
Denmark. The Swedish citizen was arrested
while in the process of flattening explosive
paste into sheets and wrapping these in cling
film. In his trouser pocket was a video tape
with instructions on how to make a timebomb. The flat he was in was also found to
contain 30 kilos of explosives and a loaded pistol.
THE SWEDISH INVESTIGATION
Following the arrests, a Swedish criminal investigation was launched, to find out whether the
suspects had planned to carry out a terrorist
attack in or from Sweden. The investigation
showed that the Swedish suspect had made
contact with his co-defendants in connection
with a trip to visit his relatives in Sarajevo. It
also showed that shortly before his second trip
to Sarajevo he had ordered some military
equipment and handbooks via the Internet. His
computer contained a military-type equipment
list and a Muslim will.
The Security Service, accompanied by a
Swedish prosecutor, visited Sarajevo to interrogate the arrested Swede. In this context, he
was notified by the prosecutor that he was
under suspicion of preparing terrorist offences.
The Swede was suspected of having, during the
period April to October 2005, planned and
made preparations to commit a terrorist
attack, with the intention to destabilize or
destroy fundamental political and social structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The planning took
place in Sweden, Denmark and BosniaHerzegovina.
On 13 April 2006, the Court in Bosnia34 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
Herzegovina confirmed the indictment for terrorist crime against the Swedish citizen and
his friends. For this reason, the Swedish prosecutor, on 20 April, decided to close the Swedish
investigation into the suspected preparation of
terrorist offences. On 10 January 2007, a Sarajevo court sentenced the Swede to imprisonment for 15 years and 4 months.
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION
By way of mutual legal assistance, Sweden and
Bosnia-Herzegovina have been able to share
criminal investigation material with each
other, and Swedish authorities have provided
Bosnian prosecutors with copies of documents
seized from the Swedish citizen in Sweden and
material found in connection with an analysis
of his computer. Denmark and Sweden have
also assisted each other by way of mutual legal
assistance. The Swedish citizen and the Turkish
citizen domiciled in Denmark have both had
frequent contact with a number of persons in
Denmark. The Danish trial against these persons started on 6 December 2006, and a verdict
is expected in February 2007.
The Invisible Party – a protest against the elections
The autonomous scene protested against the election campaigns under a joint action
name – Osynliga partiet (The Invisible Party) – using peaceful as well as criminal methods. The Security Service investigated the crimes committed and provided protection
measures to ensure safety during the election period.
The Osynliga partiet was launched by the
autonomous scene in the spring of 2006. The
intention was never to run in any of the
national or local elections but to provide an
umbrella for protests against the election campaigns.
Several groups and networks of the autonomous scene carried out actions in the name of
Osynliga partiet. Although such actions most often
took the form of peaceful protests in connection
with public meetings, etc., there were also incidents involving crimes such as violent riot, aggravated wilful damage and unlawful threat.
The Security Service engaged in intelligence
work targeting the extremist environments
throughout the election period, so as to be
able to prevent crime and ensure safety. One
outcome of this work was that we are able to
ensure adequate personal protection for those
campaigning.
WILFUL DAMAGE TO CENTRE PARTY
PREMISES
During the election period, a number of actions
targeting the Centre Party were carried out in
the name of Osynliga partiet, some of which
resulted in wilful damage to party premises on
various locations around the country. The
actions were intended as a protest against the
party’s proposed changes to labour legislation
that would affect job security for young people.
The actions against the Centre Party caused
the Security Service to provide security measures for the party and its leader. We also conducted criminal investigations into the crimes
committed.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 35
Working together on unsolved crimes made it possible
to bring charges against 16 left-wing extremists
Some 30 unsolved crimes in Västra Götaland were linked to the autonomous scene. An
attack against the national headquarters of the Nationalsocialistisk Front (NSF,
National Socialist Front) in Tråvad and another against McDonald’s in Nyköping led to
close co-operation between the local police authority and the Security Service. After a
couple of months’ work it was possible to bring charges against 16 persons.
One of the groups within the autonomous scene
that stood out in 2006 was Antifascistisk action
(Afa, Anti-fascist action) in Skaraborg. The
Security Service and the Västra Götaland police
authority have worked closely together to investigate some 30 unsolved crimes linked to Afa
Skaraborg and the autonomous scene. The local
police authority was in charge of the investigations whereas the Security Service contributed
analyses and intelligence information, and provided technical examinations of seized computers and assistance with house searches.
A FIRE BOMB AT MCDONALD’S
On 4 February 2006, a fire bomb was found
behind the ceiling panel in one of the toilets at
McDonald’s in Nyköping and police were alerted. Four days later, the Swedish news agency
TT and the local newspaper Södermanlands
Nyheter received a statement where McFuckergroup claimed responsibility for the attack. The
stated purpose was to draw attention to the
36 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
unsatisfactory working conditions at the
restaurant. The persons behind the attack
belonged to Afa Skaraborg.
Another attack for which Afa Skaraborg
claimed responsibility was the arson attack
against the national headquarters of the NSF in
Tråvad on Christmas Eve 2005. In a house search
of the home of one of Afa Skaraborg’s leaders
the police found pepper spray, axes, CO2 air pistols, flammable liquid and explosives.
16 INDICTMENTS AND TWO CONVICTIONS
The investigations resulted in 16 persons standing trial at the Göteborg City Court in the
spring of 2006. Two of them were found guilty
of having manufactured the fire bomb and
placed it at McDonald’s in Nyköping. They
appealed against their sentences and Court of
Appeal proceedings began in December 2006.
The legal measures taken against Afa Skaraborg have led to a significant decrease in their
activities.
The Government Offices website was brought down
by a DDoS attack
Discontent with the Justice Minister and the Police led to an attack on the Government
Offices website in early June. Using a special programme, a large number of persons
repeatedly downloaded several large-size images, thereby blocking all other traffic.
During the night between 3 and 4 June it was
not possible to access important information via
the Government Offices website, due to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. A large
number of persons simultaneously accessed the
website to download images of ministers and
government buildings. The relatively large
images were downloaded using a program capable of repeating the measure an infinite number of times. The overload made all other traffic
to and from the website impossible.
The websites of the Police and the Social
Democrat Party were subjected to other forms
of IT attacks at approximately the same time.
POLICE RAID TRIGGERED PROTESTS
The reason for the attack was discontent with a
police decision to take legal action against the
Pirate Bay website and with the then Justice
Minister Thomas Bodström’s stance on the
issue. The police raid on the Pirate Bay was carried out due to suspicions that they provided
links to copyrighted material that had been
copied unlawfully, without providing financial
compensation to the copyright holders.
THE INITIATOR REMAINS UNIDENTIFIED
The Security Service investigated the attack,
together with the IT crime unit of the National
Criminal Investigation Department. A large
number of the persons taking part in the attack
have been identified. It was however not possible to prove who initiated it, and the investigation was therefore closed.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 37
02/06/2006 10.07.36
Security flaws found in authorities’
information systems
The Security Service is a supervisory body for protective security issues, and as such
performs security audits. Our audits of authorities and businesses in 2006 identified
various flaws in information security and IT security. These flaws may have consequences for the authorities as well as for national security.
Government agencies and businesses have
often not paid sufficient attention to information security and IT security concerns. Sensitive information is handled in IT systems with
external connections that do not provide adequate security, thus making it possible to
access internal – and in some cases classified –
information from outside.
Moreover, authorities and businesses often
link various types of networks; something that
makes it difficult to get an overview. This also
makes it hard to assess the secrecy level for the
total amount of information in the system –
which is something that the authorities and
businesses covered by the protective security
legislation are obliged to do. It has been known
to happen that authorities and businesses
assign a lower secrecy level to the information.
This simplifies communication and makes it
possible to avoid costly and time-consuming
investments in protective security measures
needed to protect the information.
AUTHORITIES FACED COMPUTER SECURITY
INTRUSION
Several important public institutions faced
advanced computer security intrusion
attempts in 2006, a small number of which
were successful. Such attempts are very difficult to notice, as they may not always be
detected by the usual security systems such as
firewalls and anti-virus programmes. As a
result, certain functions may suffer serious
consequences – some serious enough to have
an impact on national security.
QUALIFIED IT THREATS ARE DIFFICULT TO
DETECT
Flaws in IT security are most often down to
carelessness and insufficient knowledge. The
general level of awareness of qualified IT
threats is low, and very few people have the
knowledge needed to detect attacks. It is our
assessment that we will see a substantial
increase in such threats in the future and that
coordinated national resources are necessary
to counter them.
FLAWS IDENTIFIED IN SECURITY
AUDITS OF BUSINESSES AND
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN 2006:
• Insufficient understanding of the concept
of national security.
• Insufficient understanding of protective
security legislation and its interpretation.
• Nonexistent or incomplete security
analysis.
• Nonexistent or weak protective security
organisation.
• Unsatisfactory information classification
and handling of secrecy in regard to
national security. One example is the
absence of established plans and
protocols for information security.
• Nonexistent plans, protocols and internal
instructions in the IT area.
• Nonexistent protective security training for
staff handling classified information in an
IT environment.
• No regular IT security training for all
members of staff.
• Classified data can be found in open computer networks connected to the Internet.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 39
Providing a secure environment
for Government Offices staff and information
The Security Service provides advice on protective security issues. In 2006 we concentrated on advice to the Government Offices, with a focus on IT security. We were also
involved in a major reconstruction project, where we contributed advice on physical
protection.
The Government Offices’ extensive reconstruction and renovation project involves almost all
Government Offices buildings and is expected
to be completed in 2012. Our role, as advisors in
this project, is to contribute to adequate and
flexible protective security measures that are
up-to-date and based on the existing threat
assessment.
In 2006, our protective security advice
focused mainly on the subproject involving the
reconstruction of a Government Offices’ building located in Vasagatan in Stockholm.
40 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
SECURITY IN COMPUTER NETWORKS
Our advisory activities targeting the Government Offices have focused on information
security in the IT environment; with the aim of
improving security in the Government Offices’
internal computer network RK-lan. We have also
provided advice on information classification,
information security strategy and directives on
protective security. Our work with the Government Offices IT environment was carried out in
collaboration with the National Defence Radio
Establishment.
22/01/2006 13.46.06
Contributing to the protection
of EU classified information
The European Union has information that must be protected and its Member States
are obliged to participate in this work. Swedish efforts to this end are headed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Security Service plays an active part in the Swedish
work, in terms of inspections as well as in the design of regulations.
The Security Service participates in the work to
protect classified information in the European
Union (EU). Under EU security regulations, the
Member States are to set up a National Security
Authority (NSA), tasked with safeguarding the
EU’s interests of protecting its information.
The Swedish NSA is placed with the Government Offices and its activities are headed by
the MFA Secretariat for Security, Public Access
to Official Documents and Contingency Planning. The Security Service has participated in
the work of the NSA since the outset in 1998–
1999. We were also an active contributor to the
EU security regulations adopted in 2001. In
March 2003, the Government decided that our
input of expertise to the NSA should continue.
REGULATIONS UNDER REVIEW
EU security regulations – and those of the
intergovernmental organisation European
42 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
Space Agency (ESA) – are currently under
review. The 2006 review of the EU security
regulations included a comparison with corresponding regulations within ESA and Nato. The
NSA has forwarded the results of the review to
the Ministry of Justice in view of possible
changes to the Swedish legislation. Sweden’s
opinion on the regulations has also been presented to the EU security committee.
INSPECTIONS IN OTHER MEMBER STATES
The European Council and the European
Commission carry out joint security inspections of Member States, intergovernmental
organisations and third countries. The NSAs of
the Member States are given the opportunity to
participate actively in these inspections, and
are urged to do so. The Swedish Security
Service has taken part in inspections in Estonia
and at ESA.
Tightened export control on products
with possible WMD applications
Internationally speaking, 2006 was a turbulent year. The uncertainty still surrounding
the Iranian and North Korean weapons programmes triggered UN action, and UN
Security Council resolutions led to tightened export control measures in several
countries, including Sweden. The Security Service’s non-proliferation efforts in 2006
concentrated on informing cutting-edge technology businesses about the risks, and on
monitoring businesses acting as intermediaries.
Swedish export control measures were tightened in 2006 due to North Korea’s missile and
nuclear tests and the uncertainty surrounding
Iran’s uranium enrichment. Iran’s actions led
to strongly worded UN Security Council resolutions, urging member states to be particularly
vigilant as concerns exports to Iran of dual-use
products, i.e. products that may be used in the
production of both civilian products and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Following
another UN resolution, an international ban
on exports of dual-use products to North Korea
has, in practice, been in place since the
autumn of 2006.
The acquisition in Europe of dual-use products for suspected WMD programmes follows
a long-established pattern. Quotation requests
and purchases are effectuated through large
purchase organisations in the countries seeking to acquire the products or via front companies that are sometimes found in neighbouring
countries. The end user of the product, to be
stated in the export licence application, is
often a large corporation with civilian as well
as military production. This makes it very difficult to determine whether the product is to be
used for civilian or military purposes.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS CRUCIAL
Close international cooperation is crucial to
effective export control. Countries with interesting products or technologies work together in
various control regimes to establish common
and secure export regulations. There is also
international cooperation, introduced a few
years ago, to monitor transports by land, sea
and air. Moreover, countries cooperate through
the exchange of experiences and information.
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
Export control in Sweden involves close cooperation between a number of authorities. The
Security Service is responsible for the gathering of intelligence on suspected violations of
export control regulations. This intelligence is
then communicated to the regulatory bodies,
mainly to the Inspectorate of Strategic Products and the Board of Customs but also to the
Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The Security
Service also provides information and advice to
businesses, universities and colleges. In 2006,
the Security Service and the authorities concerned have focused in particular on businesses acting as intermediaries for suspected acquisition companies.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 43
29/10/2006 19.59.01
The election campaign and the election result
presented major challenges to the Security Service
The threat against the persons whose security is our responsibility increased in the
period leading up to the election. We intensified our work to enable them to carry out
their commitments in a safe and secure environment. We worked closely with the
local police authorities throughout the election period, which was the largest single
event for the Swedish Police in 2006.
A large number of the persons for whose security the Security Service is responsible – the Prime
Minister, the other ministers, the leaders of the
parties represented in Parliament, and the MPs
– campaigned during the election period. Our
intensive efforts enabled them to do so in a safe
and secure environment. For this assignment,
we worked closely with all police authorities
across the country. The local police authorities
were responsible for providing protection from
a distance, such as uniformed police presence.
A SAFE AND SECURE ELECTION PERIOD
Our planning in view of the elections began
already in the spring of 2005. It formed the
basis for a safe and secure environment, so
that the election campaigns could be carried
out without any serious incidents.
In the autumn of 2005, a long-term assessment of the threats was made, and work intensified as of April 2006, when the specially set
up election organisation became operational.
This organisation handled a very heavy workload – in August and September it handled
more assignments than the Dignitary Protec-
tion Unit does in a normal year, and each event
was assessed individually. The intensive work
placed particular demands on Security Service
and other Police staff.
PROTECTION MEASURES FOR THE NEW
GOVERNMENT
The election result meant a new Government
for Sweden for the first time in twelve years.
The outgoing government was to step down
and the new one to come in. This shift entailed
a greater workload and a challenge for the
Security Service, as threat assessments had to
be made for members of the outgoing as well as
the incoming government. Protection measures
that were no longer needed were removed. For
the incoming ministers, the procedure was the
opposite, i.e. necessary protection measures
were applied. The Security Service has also met
individually with all new ministers to inform
them of their personal security. They have also
been assigned a contact at the Service and have
been given information on our threat assessment and on the security-enhancing measures
to be applied.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 45
Developing and strengthening
our dignitary protection activities
The Swedish Security Service is responsible for the security of the central Government
and for security during state visits. We assess threats and risks for the individuals and
visits concerned. We plan and apply protection measures. This work never stops, but
goes on every day, around the clock.
Our dignitary protection activities have seen
considerable developments since the assassination of Sweden’s Foreign Minister Anna Lindh
in 2003. Our remit from the Government has
been widened and the need for protection
measures has increased. One effect of this is
that the number of bodyguards has doubled. In
2003, there were 65 bodyguards with the
Security Service and in 2006 there were 120.
46 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
The figure will rise also in 2007, as a further 20
bodyguards will be recruited.
We are currently in the process of developing our working methods in the area of dignitary protection. The extensive review launched
in 2006 will continue into the summer of 2007,
with a view to making our work even more
effective and the protective measures more
flexible.
SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006 • 47
Working together to counter terrorism
– national and Nordic co-operation
National and international co-operation is of major importance in the fight against
terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Co-operative Council plays a vital role in establishing
contacts between Swedish authorities, but also with authorities and organisations
abroad. This co-operation may take the form of joint exercises or unified action in
response to particular incidents.
In 2006, the Council Secretariat, placed with
the Security Service, participated in the planning and carrying out of a number of exercises
in Sweden as well as abroad. These include the
Government Offices’ annual exercise, this time
on a terrorist attack theme, held on 16–17 May;
and the Nordic coordination exercise on the
subject of terrorism, held in Denmark on 19–21
September and attended by all the Nordic
countries – Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland
and Iceland. The Council Secretariat is also
involved in the planning and design of the scenario for SAMÖ 2007. This exercise, which will
be carried out in the spring of 2007, is a coordination exercise for the Mälar Valley region,
involving the Government Offices and all
authorities and municipalities concerned.
A JOINT ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT
AGAINST SWEDEN
On 11 August, the Security Service convened all
members of the Council for an extra meeting,
due to the arrest of suspected terrorists in the
UK the previous day and the threat against
British and American airlines. The meeting discussed these issues and their possible consequences for Sweden, and made the joint assessment that they had not lead to an increased
threat against Sweden or Swedish interests.
This assessment was communicated to the public via the Security Service website as well as in
the form of a joint press release.
48 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
THE SECURITY SERVICE IS
THE INITIATOR AND CONVENER OF THE
COUNTER-TERRORISM CO-OPERATIVE
COUNCIL, WHICH IS MADE UP OF
THE FOLLOWING SWEDISH AGENCIES:
• The Board of Customs
• The Coast Guard
• The Defence Radio Establishment
• The Defence Research Agency
• The Economic Crimes Bureau
• The Emergency Management Agency
• The Migration Board
• The Military Intelligence and Security
Directorate (MUST)
• The National Police Board
• The Public Prosecution Office
• The Security Service
SÄKERHETSPOLISEN ÄR INITIATIVTAGARE OCH SAMMANKALLANDE I
SAMVERKANSRÅDET MOT TERRORISM SOM BESTÅR AV FÖLJANDE MYNDIGHETER:
• Ekobrottsmyndigheten
• Rikspolisstyrelsen
• Försvarets radioanstalt
• Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut
• Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten
• Tullverket
• Krisberedskapsmyndigheten
• Åklagarmyndigheten
• Kustbevakningen
• Hemliga uppgifter förekommer i öppna
datornätverk som är anslutna till Internet.
• Migrationsverket
17/12/2006 11.19.42
Investing in competency development
Changes in the world around us place new demands on the Security Service.
One approach that we have taken in order to meet these demands is to invest in
competency development. Two training programmes will begin in 2007; the third
trainee programme and the second specialist desk officer programme.
The Security Service trainee programme aims to
ensure a long-term supply of desk officers for
our operational activities, by way of broader
competency development. On completion of the
programme, the trainees are placed with one of
the units for counter-espionage, counter-terrorism or protection of the Constitution.
In view of the third programme, some
changes have been made. The programme has
been shortened from 18 to 12 months, the
group will consist of 30 instead of 20 trainees
and the time for practical work experience has
been shortened to a total of 12 weeks. These
changes are based on experience from the two
previous programmes.
50 • SWEDISH SECURITY SERVICE 2006
COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT FOR DESK
OFFICERS
Desk officers from the units for counterespionage, counter-terrorism, protection of the
Constitution and protective security have
attended a special 18-month training programme – the specialist desk officer programme.
This included university courses in cultural
studies and political science plus practical
exercises in crisis management and leadership.
The first batch of specialist desk officers completed their programme in January 2007. The
35 desk officers of the second batch will
embark on their course later in the spring of
2007.
The Swedish Security Service is successful in
protecting Sweden’s security against criminal
attacks. We thereby safeguard the Swedish
democracy and its institutions, our citizens’
fundamental rights and freedoms as well as
national security.
Swedish Security Service
Box 8304
se-104 20 Stockholm
phone +46-8-401 26 00
fax +46-8-401 48 65
e-mail [email protected]
www.sakerhetspolisen.se