passenger station and terminal design for safety

Transcription

PASSENGER STATION AND TERMINAL DESIGN FOR
SAFETY, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE TO TERRORIST
ATTACK
Project nº:
FP7-SCPO-GA-2011-266202
Funding Scheme:
CP – Collaborative Project
Call (part) identifier:
FP7-SST-2010-RTD-1
D.7.1 – SOCIO ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IMPACT
Due date of deliverable:
30/11/2013
Start date of project:
01/06/2011
Organization name of lead for this deliverable:
Actual submission date:
29/11/2013
Duration:
36 months
ISDEFE
Revision:
1.0
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (2007-2013)
Dissemination Level
PU
Public
PP
Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)
RE
Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)
CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)
X
Date:
29/11/2013
Document ID: SECEST-WP7.1-ISD-DE-PU_V1.0
Revision:
1.0
Document Change Log
Revision
Edition Date
Author
Modified Sections
/ Pages
Comments
0.1
10/09/2012
Valeria Salaris
1,2,3
Initial draft
0.2
15/11/2012
Carlos Oliver
3
Methodology
0.3
21/01/2013
Carlos Oliver
2
State of the art
0.4
25/02/2013
Carlos Oliver
3
Updated Methodology
0.5
14/10/2013
Carlos Oliver
3,4,5
Final draft
1.0
29/11/2013
Carlos
Oliver,
3,4,5
M.Martin, partners
Final version and overall revision
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This project has been carried out under a contract awarded by the European Commission
No part of this report may be used, reproduced and/or disclosed in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the SECURESTATION project
partners.
© 2011 – All rights reserved
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30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 16
1.1.
Background .............................................................................................................................16
1.2.
Purpose and Scope .................................................................................................................16
1.3.
Applicable and reference documents ....................................................................................17
1.4.
Document Structure ................................................................................................................20
2. STATE OF THE ART ........................................................................................................ 21
2.1. Definitions ................................................................................................................................21
2.1.1. Risk and insecurity .............................................................................................................21
2.1.2. Security ..............................................................................................................................21
2.1.3. Resilience ...........................................................................................................................22
2.1.4. Terrorism ............................................................................................................................22
2.2. Economic impact of terrorist attacks .....................................................................................23
2.2.1. Direct and indirect costs .....................................................................................................23
2.2.2. Direct effect ........................................................................................................................24
2.2.3. Direct and Indirect micro-economic effect ...........................................................................26
2.2.4. Indirect macroeconomic effect ............................................................................................28
2.3. Scenarios .................................................................................................................................30
2.3.1. Attack with explosives.........................................................................................................31
2.3.2. Arson and IID .....................................................................................................................32
2.3.3. Criminal / Vandalism ...........................................................................................................32
2.3.4. Dispersion of toxic substances ...........................................................................................33
2.3.5. Sabotage ............................................................................................................................33
2.3.6. Computer hacking or cyber-attacks ....................................................................................34
2.3.7. Attacks with small arms ......................................................................................................34
2.3.8. Summary of scenarios ........................................................................................................34
3. METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................. 36
3.1. Methodology ............................................................................................................................36
3.1.1. Qualitative and quantitative approach .................................................................................36
3.1.2. Risk assessment methodology ...........................................................................................36
3.1.3. Risk mitigation and management ........................................................................................37
3.1.4. Consequences evaluation ..................................................................................................38
3.1.5. Costs of implementing security measures...........................................................................39
3.1.6. Cost efficiency calculation ..................................................................................................39
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The value of time ............................................................................................................... 42
4. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THREAT SCENARIOS ................................................. 44
4.1. Costs considered .................................................................................................................... 44
4.1.1. Capital expenditure or CAPEX ........................................................................................... 44
4.1.2. Operational expenditure or OPEX ...................................................................................... 45
4.2. Benefits considered................................................................................................................ 45
4.2.1. Consequences ................................................................................................................... 45
4.2.2. Fatalities and injuries ......................................................................................................... 46
4.2.3. Damages to assets, infrastructure, and reconstruction costs ............................................. 49
4.2.4. Income lost as a result of service disruption ....................................................................... 49
4.2.5. Costs of alternative means of transportation ...................................................................... 50
4.2.6. Income lost due to fear, anxiety, brand image degradation, etc. ........................................ 50
4.3.
Discount rate ........................................................................................................................... 51
4.4.
Results and sensitivity analysis ............................................................................................ 51
4.5. Scenario 1: IED in luggage left in the station’s cafeteria ..................................................... 53
4.5.1. Scenario description .......................................................................................................... 53
4.5.2. Consequences ................................................................................................................... 53
4.5.3. Security measure evaluated............................................................................................... 57
4.5.4. Results and sensitivity analysis .......................................................................................... 60
4.6. Scenario 2: Arson in commercial area .................................................................................. 65
4.6.2. Consequences ................................................................................................................... 65
4.7. Scenario 3: PIH dispersion in platform ................................................................................. 76
4.7.2. Consequences ................................................................................................................... 76
5. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 86
5.1.
Direct consequences .............................................................................................................. 86
5.2.
Indirect consequences ........................................................................................................... 87
5.3.
Cost-benefit analysis of security measures.......................................................................... 87
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Risk reduction from r1 to t2 (two-dimensional view)................................................................... 37
Figure 2. Risk reduction from r1 to t2 (three-dimensional view) ................................................................ 38
Figure 3. Standing crowd density of 0.5 people per square meter ............................................................ 47
Figure 4. Standing crowd density of 1 person per square meter ............................................................... 48
Figure 5. Standing crowd density of 2 people per square meter ............................................................... 48
Figure 6. Scenario 1, IED planted in cafeteria, areas of damage .............................................................. 54
Figure 7. Video monitoring and analytics system diagram ........................................................................ 57
Figure 8. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure.................................................................... 61
Figure 9. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure for ρmv 0.5 ................................................... 62
Figure 10. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure for ρmv 0.9 ................................................. 62
Figure 11. Egress count model for whole station ...................................................................................... 66
Figure 12. Sprinkler system diagram ........................................................................................................ 70
Figure 13 . Scenario 2. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.2 .................................................... 72
Figure 14. Scenario 2. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.1 .................................................... 73
Figure 15. Scenario 2. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.5 .................................................... 74
Figure 16. Example of toxic gas detection units used in a train platform ................................................... 80
Figure 17. Scenario 3. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.25 ................................................... 82
Figure 18. Scenario 3. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.1 ..................................................... 83
Figure 19. Scenario 3. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.5 ..................................................... 84
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List of Tables
Table 1 Estimated VSL in different cuntries R[30] .................................................................................... 25
Table 2 Consequences not taken into account in CBA analysis ............................................................... 46
Table 3 VSL values (fatalities and injuries) ............................................................................................... 47
Table 4 People densities used in the study............................................................................................... 49
Table 5. Scenario 1: Number of fatalities and injuries ............................................................................... 55
Table 6. Scenario 1: Consequences of fatalities and injuries .................................................................... 55
Table 7. Average construction rates in 2012 ............................................................................................. 55
Table 8. Scenario 1. Sum of all consequences ......................................................................................... 56
Table 9. Scenario 1, Net present values for different levels of consequences .......................................... 64
Table 10. Scenario 2. Fatalities and injuries ............................................................................................. 67
Table 11. Scenario 2. Sum of all consequences ....................................................................................... 68
Table 12. Cost rates of sprinkler system installation ................................................................................. 70
Table 13 displays the net present values for different levels of consequences and different
probabilities of successful attack Π1 (or PA1 V1). .................................................................... 74
Table 14. Scenario 2, Net present values for different levels of consequences......................................... 75
Table 15. Scenario 3. Fatalities and injuries ............................................................................................. 77
Table 16. Scenario 3. Economic value of fatalities and injuries ................................................................. 77
Table 17. Scenario 3. Sum of all consequences ....................................................................................... 78
Table 18. Scenario 3, Net present values for different levels of consequences......................................... 85
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List of Acronyms
CBA
Cost/Benefit Analysis
CBRNE
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CCTV
Closed Circuit Television
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
COUNTERACT
Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Antiterrorist
Activities
DfT
Department for Transport (UK)
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOD
Department of Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOT
Department of Transport
HAZMAT
Hazardous Materials
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning
HW
Hardware
IED
Improvised Explosive Device
IID
Improvised Incendiary Device
IM
Infrastructure Manager
ISO
International Standards Organization
IT
Information Technology
PBIED
Person Borne IED
PIH
Poisonous by Inhalation
PTA
Public Transport Authority
PTO
Public Transport Operator
SEST-RAM
SECURESTATION Risk Assessment Methodology
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SW
Software
TIM
Toxic Industrial Materials
VBIED
Vehicle Borne IED
VSL
Value of a Statistical Life
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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List of definitions
Aggressor /
Adversary
Any person seeking to compromise a function or asset.
Antiterrorism
measures
Measures, actions and tactics designed or used to combat terrorism and to
reduce the vulnerability and consequences of individuals, forces, and
property to terrorist acts.
Assessment
The process of acquiring, collecting, processing, examining, analysing,
evaluating, monitoring, and interpreting the data, information, evidence,
objects, measurements, images, sounds, etc., whether tangible or
intangible, to provide a basis for decision making.
Asset
Any person, part or feature of a system that has a value, such as physical
assets, human assets, soft assets (i.e., knowledge, experience) and
information assets.
Attack
A hostile action resulting in the injury or death of persons, or the damage or
destruction of governmental, public and/or private property.
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Devices of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear nature, which
may require a special response, such as post-incident decontamination of
people and/or assets. In particular:
Chemical: dispersion of toxic chemical agents or toxic industrial
materials (TIM) by non-military means, many with little or no clearly
evident characteristics. Symptoms (e.g., passengers collapsing) may
be the first indication of an attack.
CBRN devices
Biological: dispersion of disease-causing living organisms or replicating
entities (viruses) that reproduce or replicate within their host victims
and are used to kill or incapacitate humans, animals or plants.
Radiological: radioactive and/or radio-toxic material spread, usually
through the detonation of conventional explosives, in the form of an
IED or VBIED – as a ‘dirty bomb’.
Nuclear: a nuclear explosion and the consequent thermal and radiation
effects; a weapon of mass destruction potentially requiring a national or
multinational level response.
Closed circuit
television (CCTV)
An electronic system of cameras, control equipment, recorders,
monitors/screens and related apparatus used for surveillance or alarm
assessment.
Consequence
In the context of this project - the outcome of an incident. A single incident
can generate a range of consequences, which can have both positive and
negative effects on objectives. Initial consequences can also escalate
through knock-on effects.
Contamination
The undesirable deposition of a chemical, biological or radiological material
on the surface of structures, areas, objects, or people
Control
Any measure or action that modifies risk. Controls include any policy,
procedure, practice, process, technology, technique, method, or device that
modifies or manages risk. Risk treatments become controls, or modify
existing controls, once they have been implemented.
Controlled area
An area into which access is controlled or limited. It is that portion of a
restricted area usually near or surrounding a limited or exclusion area.
Counterterrorism
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
Crime
Any act or commission of an act that is forbidden, or the omission of a duty
that is commanded by a public law and that makes the offender liable to
punishment.
Crime Prevention
Through
Environmental
Design (CPTED)
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A multi-disciplinary approach to limit the opportunities for crime by focusing
on design and the creation of an environment not tolerating crime.
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Crisis
A situation, derived from natural or man-made causes, which has the
potential to compromise the safety (physical, economic, environmental etc.)
of an individual, a group, a community or an entire society. A crisis usually
triggers particular modes of governance, typically described with the terms
crisis (or emergency) management (or response).
Critical asset
An asset (human or material) the loss, denial or damage of which would
substantially compromise the main functions of the system / organization.
Critical
infrastructure
Assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
nation that the incapacitation or destruction of such assets, systems, or
networks would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of the above.
Cyber attack
Damage, unauthorized use, exploitation or destruction of electronic
information by means such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, phishing,
denial of service (DoS) attacks, unauthorized access and control system
attacks.
Cyber security
All means for protection against cyber-attacks, e.g. firewalls, anti-virus
software, intrusion detection and prevention systems, encryption, etc.
Decontamination
The reduction or removal of a chemical, biological, or radiological material
from the surface of a structure, area, object, or person.
Design Basis
Threat (DBT)
A set of assumptions regarding threats (number of adversaries, their modus
operandi, the type of tools and weapons they employ, etc.), to serve as a
point of reference when planning and designing the security systems /
measures to be implemented.
Emergency
An unforeseen or unplanned situation that has implications on the safety of
persons and assets and requires immediate attention.
Emergency
Operating
Procedure (EOP)
A pre-planned documented arrangement for managing or executing a set of
actions in an emergency situation, to ensure the safety of the people and a
predefined level of operations and/or services.
Emergency
services / First
responders
The external bodies, including, but not limited to, fire brigades, police and
medical units arriving to provide initial services when incidents occur,.
Explosive device
Explosive
Ordnance Disposal
(EOD)
Device, comprising explosive (or explosive components) and a detonator,
designed to cause an explosion. Explosive devices include military
ordnance, civil and industrial devices as well as improvised devices (IED)
meant to be used for terrorist or criminal acts.
Actions performed by specialists to neutralize devices such as IEDs, IIDs or
VBIEDs (see below).
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Hazardous
Materials
(HAZMAT)
Solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, other living organisms,
property, or the environment, including materials that are radioactive,
flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizing, asphyxiating, bio-hazardous,
toxic, pathogenic or allergenic. They are grouped by class, e.g., Class 1
Explosives, and identified by a United Nations number, e.g., 1005
Anhydrous Ammonia.
Hijack
The act of taking control of a vehicle (on land, sea or air) for terrorist or
criminal purposes. The use of the term hijack has been extended to the
virtual world (hijack a computer system, hijack someone’s identity etc.)
Impact
The consequences of an incident – harm to persons, physical damage,
direct and indirect costs- such as damage to reputation or perception of
security.
Improvised
Explosive Device
(IED)
An explosive device produced using available materials, e.g., timing
devices, means of detonation, explosives (commercially available or
improvised, i.e., ‘home made’) and articles, such as nails for additional
impact. IEDs may use components of military explosive articles and also
contain incendiary materials. A remote controlled device or timer
mechanism may be used for initiation.
Improvised
Incendiary Device
(IID)
A device produced from available flammable materials, intended to set fire
to the target and cause serious harm to persons and/or damage to assets
from the heat and the dense and toxic fumes produced, An IID may be
initiated manually on site, e.g., a Molotov cocktail, by a timer mechanism or
a remote controlled device. An IID may be combined with an IED.
Improvised
Radiological
Device (IRD)
A device intended to spread radioactive material, most commonly the spent
fuel from nuclear power plants or radioactive medical waste, usually by
conventional explosives, with the intention to harm, kill and/or cause major
disruption. Also known as a 'dirty bomb'. It is not a nuclear weapon as it
does not cause a nuclear explosion.
Infrastructure
Manager
The organisation responsible for providing, maintaining and controlling the
use of the infrastructure serving public transport operators. This
responsibility may be combined with that of a PTO.
Incident
Something that has happened and is likely to lead to some consequences.
It includes events of both internal and external causes, deliberate or
accidental, and not necessarily of negative consequences. In that sense, it
is a more general term than accident.
Intrusion detection
systems
Sensor based (optical, microwave, vibration, etc.) systems designed for the
detection (and consequent alarm) of intruders crossing a perimeter or
entering a protected area; they can be classified into perimeter protection
systems (along fences, open spaces, etc.) or built spaces.
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K9
K9 or K-9 is an abbreviation and homophone of 'canine', and refers to the
use of police / army dogs such as those used for bomb or drug sniffing.
Level of risk
Risk magnitude, estimated by considering and combining consequences
and likelihood. A level of risk can be assigned to a single risk or to a
combination of risks. In the context of this project - a consequence is the
outcome of an event and has an effect on objectives. Likelihood is the
chance that something might happen.
Likelihood
The chance that something might happen. Likelihood can be defined,
determined, or measured objectively or subjectively, and can be expressed
either qualitatively or quantitatively (using mathematics).
Mitigation
Reduction the loss of life and damage to property from natural and/or
manmade disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster.
Operations
Concept (CONOP)
A written document describing an overall picture of an operation or series of
operations frequently embodying operational strategies, methods,
principles, plans, policies also organization and command structures. It
identifies connected or separate operations to be carried out simultaneously
or in succession, by the entire organization or by one or more of its
operational bodies.
Perimeter security
A system of technical means, personnel and procedures aiming to ensure
that no one enters (or exits) a defined area except through the controlled
access points. It has three essential functions: Deter, Delay (or deny) and
Detect (& document) any intrusion; sometimes referred to as 3D.
Personal
Protective
Equipment (PPE)
Protective clothing, helmets, goggles, other garments or equipment
designed to protect the wearer's body from injury due to blunt impact,
electrical hazards, heat, chemicals and infection.
Poisonous by
Inhalation (PIH)
A gas that is (or is presumed to be) toxic to humans to a degree posing a
hazard to their health if inhaled even in minute concentrations.
Protective
measures
Elements of a protective system that protect an asset against a threat.
Protective measures are divided into defensive and detection measures.
Protective system
An integration of all of the protective measures required to protect an asset
against the range of threats applicable to it.
PTZ camera
A camera that has the capacity to pan, tilt and zoom, usually via remote
control, but at times also in automatic mode.
Public area
An area that is meant to be accessible to the general public; it can be an
area with free or limited access. In the latter case, access control is
generally limited to entitlement (confirmed by a ticket or an access/travel
card, but not identity control)
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Public entity
Body / organization, not necessarily of public (state) ownership, but of a
public character (i.e., serving the public or ensuring a public function).
Public
infrastructure
All infrastructures (i.e., equipment, constructions and areas) that are meant
to be at the service of the general public rather than the various specific
actors or professionals.
Public transport
operator
An organisation, public or private, that manages the operations of public
transport services concerned with the mass mobility of citizens. This
includes main line railway undertakings, metro, tram and bus operators
including their support facilities, such as rolling stock and maintenance
facilities, and involves international, national, suburban or urban networks.
Main line rail PTOs are also known as railway undertakings. A PTO may
also be an infrastructure manager.
Residual risk
The risk left over after a risk treatment option has been implemented. It is
the risk remaining after the risk level has been reduced, the source of the
risk removed the consequences modified, the probabilities changed and the
risk transferred or retained.
Risk can be defined in a number of ways:
The potential that a chosen action or activity (including the choice of
inaction) will lead to a loss (an undesirable outcome) - according to ISO
31000
Or:
Risk
The combination of the probability of an event and its consequences
(ISO/IEC Guide 73). In all types of undertakings, there is the potential for
events and consequences that constitute opportunities for benefit (upside)
or threats to success (downside).
Or:
The threat that an event or action will adversely affect an organization’s
ability to achieve its objectives and to successfully execute its strategies.
Risk (security)
The degree of exposure to a threat. The risk increases with the potential
impact and the probability of a threat materializing. Risk is measured in
escalating categories.
Risk assessment /
analysis
A step in a risk management procedure: the determination of a quantitative
or qualitative value of risk related to a concrete situation and a recognized
threat (or hazard). Quantitative risk assessment requires calculations of two
components of risk: R, the magnitude of the potential loss L and the
probability P that the loss will occur. Qualitative risk assessment is usually
performed where statistical data for a quantitative assessment is
unavailable. It usually involves the use of score matrices.
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Risk based
approach
A security risk management approach, based on categorization of the risk
level following a risk assessment, selection of risk mitigation safeguards
based on cost-benefit considerations, operational and technical feasibility,
and accepted risk management strategies.
Risk evaluation
A process that is used to compare risk analysis results with risk criteria, in
order to determine whether or not a specified level of risk is acceptable or
tolerable.
Risk identification
Sets out to identify an organization’s exposure to uncertainty. This requires
intimate knowledge of the organization; the market in which it operates; the
legal, social, political and cultural environment in which it exists; as well as
the development of a sound understanding of its strategic and operational
objectives, including factors critical to its success and the threats and
opportunities related to the achievement of these objectives (ISO/IEC
Guide 73).
Risk management
The identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks followed by
coordinated and efficient application of resources to minimize, monitor, and
control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events, or to maximize
the realization of opportunities.
Risk management
plan
Describes how the organization intends to manage risk. It details the
management components, the approach, and the resources that will be
used to manage risk. Typical management components include
procedures, practices, responsibilities, and activities (including their
sequence and timing). Risk management plans can be applied to products,
processes, and projects, or to an entire organization or to any part of it.
Risk management
process
A process that systematically applies management policies, procedures
and practices to a set of activities intended to establish the context;
communicate and consult with stakeholders; and identify, analyses,
evaluate, treat, monitor and review risk.
Risk treatment
The process of selecting and implementing measures to reduce the risk.
Risk treatment includes, as its major element, risk control/mitigation, but
extends further to, for example, risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk financing,
etc.
Sabotage
Tampering intended to undermine the integrity of systems with the objective
of causing damage to assets, and/or harm to humans, and disrupting
routine operations; e.g., causing derailment, interfering with signalling,
power supply or communications systems.
Safety
The state of being free of risk or danger (natural or accidental); being in
control of recognized hazards and reducing risk of harm or damage as low
as reasonably practicable. The term ‘safe’, when used as an attribute,
encompasses all measures, actions or systems aiming at ensuring the state
of safety.
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Safety incident
An accidental event, of internal or external causes, that is likely to lead to
some negative consequences and compromise safety.
Security
The degree of protection against intentional danger, damage or loss
Also:
The set of means / actions through which safety is ensured, in particular
against intentional threats. Thus, the term ‘security’ encompasses all
measures, actions or systems aiming at preventing intentional threats from
compromising safety.
Security incident
Deliberate act intended to harm and injure persons and/or damage
equipment and infrastructure, disrupt operations and compromise safety.
Security plan
A document, usually based on the results of a security risk assessment,
defining the management chain and responsibilities in relation to security
and detailing the measures (protective and reactive) such as procedures,
systems, methods and staff, implemented at a particular facility or
organization for its protection against security threats and in response to
security incidents.
Security regulator
(Security
regulating body)
A public entity, governmental or recognized by the government, that is
responsible for defining statutory security requirements and for ensuring
their application.
Security risk
assessment
A process used to systematically analyses potential threats to a specific
target. The process includes identifying and classifying assets by their
criticality; the analysis of a range of potential threats and their probability of
being realized, and their potential impact. A vulnerability assessment may
be performed as part of a risk assessment.
Security risk
management
The process of identifying security risks and selecting and implementing
strategies to treat them.
Security threat
The expression of intention (or perception of a possible intention) to
provoke a security incident, i.e., to harm or injure persons, damage
equipment and infrastructure, disrupt operations, etc. Security threats may
materialize into security incidents that are a concern for safety.
Site (of an incident)
The area in which the response to an incident is managed.
Standard
Operating
Procedure (SOP)
A pre-planned documented
management of a task.
Surveillance
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arrangement
for
safe
and
effective
Observation from a distance, usually by means of electronic equipment
(such as CCTV cameras) or, sometimes, by no- or low-technology methods
such as human agents.
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Tactics
The deployment and directing of resources to handle an incident, in order to
accomplish the objectives defined by the organization’s strategy.
Terrorism
The intentional and unlawful use of force / violence, deliberately targeting or
disregarding the safety of civilians, with the intention of inflicting significant
harm to persons and/or damage to property; causing panic and fear;
intimidating or coercing a government or a civilian population to further a
religious, political or ideological goal.
Threat (specific)
A threat, which may indicate a particular time and target, e.g., a train,
station or other asset, and which may relate to the use of any type of tactic.
Specific threats may or may not result in an actual incident, but can result in
serious operational disruption, safety and cost issues.
Toxic Industrial
Materials (TIM)
A general description of any substance that is poisonous or harmful to
humans, animals, plant life or the environment.
Vehicle Borne
Improvised
Explosive Device
(VBIED)
An IED carried by a vehicle – usually containing a large amount of
explosives, intended to cause maximum fatalities and damage.
Vulnerability
A weakness, e.g., in physical structures, personnel protection systems,
process or other areas that may be exploited by adversaries
Also:
the probability or likelihood that an attack is successful in causing the
intended consequences.
Value of a
statistical life
Represents is the marginal cost of death prevention in a certain class of
circumstances. The VSL is the value that an individual places on a marginal
change in their likelihood of death.
Vulnerability
assessment
Any review, audit or other examination of the security of a public transport
infrastructure asset to determine its susceptibility to unlawful interference,
whether during conception, planning, design, construction, operation, or
decommissioning.
Also:
Evaluating the probability or likelihood that an attack is successful in
causing the intended consequences.
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1.
Introduction
1.1.
Background
The aim of the SECURESTATION project is to improve the resilience of passenger station and terminal
to terrorist attacks and safety accidents through technologies and methodologies enabling design to
reduce the impact of blast, fire and the dispersion of toxic agents on passengers, staff and
infrastructure.
One of the objectives of the project is to assess and facilitate the implementation of the
SECURESTTION results, a quantitative risk assessment methodology and a design handbook. As
such, one the relevant aspects is the socio-economic impact of the proposed security measures to
enhance the overall resilience of the passenger station infrastructures.
Socio economic impact analysis can help in determining whether the risk reduction measures under
consideration are necessary or desirable. It addresses the following:
how identified risks can be reduced through a risk assessment
what are the related benefits
who will be impacted by the measures being proposed
what will be the cost of implementing various security measures
how this cost will be distributed.
1.2.
Purpose and Scope
In recent years the level and perception of fear of personal security has greatly increased, mostly due
to the quantity of news about criminality levels and catastrophic events, which have had a great impact
on citizens and society, raising the feeling of insecurity.
The purpose of this document is to analyse the socio-economic impact in designing passenger
terminals and stations in order to achieve increased safety and security.
A terrorist attack can have severe consequences for both victims and society in general. The impact of
an attack can be classified in two groups: direct consequences and indirect consequences.
Direct consequences can be considered to be those that take place as an immediate result of the
attack, such as damage to buildings and property and loss of life and injuries. On the other hand,
indirect consequences are those that emanate from a change in the behaviour in society as a result of
the attack, such as changes in lifestyle, investment and consumption patterns, etc.
While direct consequences are usually straight forward to calculate, indirect consequences are more
difficult to estimate, and largely depend on factors such as the magnitude of the terrorist attack,
whether the attack is isolated or is part of a campaign of attacks, the perpetrators of the attack, the
country, and the method used for the attack, etc.
This document tries to describe both direct and indirect consequences of a terrorist attack based on
methodology, simulations and results from other SECURESTATION work packages R[1-3] together
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with published studies. It also provides a tool to perform cost benefit analysis of security measures,
estimating direct and indirect impacts for several scenarios.
1.3.
Applicable and reference documents
– SECURESTATION Risk
R 1.
SECURESTATION, SECURESTATION DELIVERABLE 3.2
assessment methodology (SEST-RAM). 2012.
R 2.
SECURESTATION, SECURESTATION DELIVERABLE D6.2 – Modelling And Simulation
Results Of Passengers Behaviour And Movement In Emergency Situations. 2012.
R 3.
SECURESTATION, SECURESTATION DELIVERABLE D5.1 – Physical
methodological approaches. Part B - Chemical dispersion modelling. 2012.
R 4.
John Mueller and Mark G Stewart, Terror, security, and money: Balancing the risks, benefits,
and costs of homeland security 2011: Oxford University Press.
R 5.
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, Patterns of transnational terrorism, 1970–1999: alternative
time series estimates. International Studies Quarterly, 2002. 46(2): p. 145-165.
R 6.
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The political economy of terrorism
University Press.
R 7.
Adam Z Rose, A framework for analyzing the total economic impacts of terrorist attacks and
natural disasters. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2009. 6(1).
R 8.
ASIS International and ASIS International Commission on Guidelines, ASIS General Security
Risk Assessment Guideline 2003: ASIS International.
R 9.
Adam Rose and Samrat Chatterjee, Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security
Measures in Urban Areas May 5, 2011. 2011.
resilience
2006: Cambridge
R 10. Discussion paper “Security, risk perception and cost-benefit analysis", in JOINT TRANSPORT
RESEARCH CENTRE. Round Table, 11-12 December 2008, Paris. 2009.
R 11. Discussion Paper "Improving the Practice of Cost Benefit Analysis in Transport.", in Summary
and Conclusions of the Roundtable on Improving the Practice of Cost Benefit Analysis in
Transport (21-22 October 2010, Queretaro, Mexico) 2010.
R 12. Guidance for conducting retrospective studies on socio-economic analysis - Environment
Directorate - Organization for economic co-operation and development. Paris 1999.
R 13. Tilman Brück, Marie Karaisl, and Friedrich Schneider, A Survey on the Economics of Security
2008: DIW.
R 14. John Mueller and Mershon Center, Establishing principles for evaluating measures designed to
protect the homeland from terrorism. Department of Political Science, Ohio State University,
Columbus, 2009.
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R 15. Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the
Basque Country. American economic review, 2003: p. 113-132.
R 16. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, Causality between transnational terrorism and tourism: The
case of Spain. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1991. 14(1): p. 49-58.
R 17. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, Terrorism and foreign direct investment in Spain and Greece.
Kyklos, 1996. 49(3): p. 331-352.
R 18. Zvi Eckstein and Daniel Tsiddon, Macroeconomic consequences of terror: theory and the case
of Israel. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2004. 51(5): p. 971-1002.
R 19. David Fielding, Modelling political instability and economic performance: Israeli investment
during the intifada. Economica, 2003. 70(277): p. 159-186.
R 20. Rafi Eldor and Rafi Melnick, Financial markets and terrorism. European Journal of Political
Economy, 2004. 20(2): p. 367-386.
R 21. Andrew H Chen and Thomas F Siems, The effects of terrorism on global capital markets.
European Journal of Political Economy, 2004. 20(2): p. 349-366.
R 22. Volker Nitsch and Dieter Schumacher, Terrorism and international trade: an empirical
investigation. European Journal of Political Economy, 2004. 20(2): p. 423-433.
R 23. Socio Economic impact analysis- HAL web-page http://www.hal.ca/index.php/services/
R 24. Walter Enders and Eric Olson, Measuring the economic costs of terrorism
Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.
2011: Oxford
R 25. Peter Navarro and Aron Spencer, Assessing the Costs of Terrorism. Milken Institute Review,
2001: p. 17-31.
R 26. Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, and Beverly Porter, Assessing, managing, and
financing extreme events: Dealing with terrorism,
2003, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
R 27. M Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Quantitative safety goals for risk management of industrial facilities.
Structural Safety, 1994. 13(3): p. 145-157.
R 28. Elena Ryan, US Customs, Border Protection, and Lisa A Robinson, Valuing Mortality Risk
Reductions in Homeland Security Regulatory Analyses. 2008.
R 29. HEATCO PROJECT http://heatco.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/.
R 30. J Nellthorp, T Sansom, P Bickel, C Doll, and G Lindberg, Valuation conventions for UNITE,
UNITE (UNIfication of accounts and marginal costs for Transport Efficiency), 5th Framework
RTD Programme. ITS, University of Leeds, Leeds, 2001.
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R 31. Mikel Buesa, Aurelia Valino, Joost Heijs, Thomas Baumert, and Javier Gonzalez Gomez, The
Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the direct economic cost of the terrorist attack on March
11, 2004 in Madrid. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2007. 19(4): p. 489-509.
R 32. Dick Kazuyuki Nanto. 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs.
Information Service, Library of Congress.
2004. Congressional
R 33. Friedrich G Schneider, Tilman Brück, and Daniel Meierrieks, The economics of terrorism and
counter-terrorism: A survey (Part II), 2010, CESifo working paper Public Finance.
R 34. Bruno S Frey, Simon Luechinger, and Alois Stutzer, The life satisfaction approach to valuing
public goods: The case of terrorism. Public Choice, 2009. 138(3-4): p. 317-345.
R 35. Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and
developing countries. Terrorism, economic development, and political openness, 2005: p. 17.
R 36. Dotan Persitz. The Economic effects of terrorism: counterfactual analysis of the case of israel.
in AEA Conference Paper. 2007.
R 37. Nikos Litinas Amalia Polydoropoulou, Athena Tsirimpa, Maria Kamargianni, Understanding the
Factors Causing Travelers’ Feelings of Security in Ports. 12th World Conference of Transport
Research (WCTR), Lisbon, Portugal, July 2010, 2010.
R 38. Edward Richards, Terry O'Brien, and Katharine Rathbun, Bioterrorism and the Use of Fear in
Public Health. Urban Lawyer, 2002. 34: p. 686.
R 39. Alexander Ramseger, Martin B Kalinowski, and Lucia Weiß, CBRN Threats and the Economic
Analysis of Terrorism 2009: NEAT, Network for the Economic Analysis of Terrorism.
R 40. Robyn Pangi, Consequence management in the 1995 sarin attacks on the Japanese subway
system. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2002. 25(6): p. 421-448.
R 41. Network Rail Limited. Annual report and accounts 2013. www.networkrail.co.uk. 2013.
R 42. David William Pearce and David Ulph, A social discount rate for the United Kingdom 1995:
CSERGE Norwich.
R 43. Turner And Townsend. Turner & Townsend. International construction cost survey 2012
http://www.turnerandtownsend.com/construction-cost-2012/_16803.html. 2012.
R 44. Corinne Williams, Jeremy Fraser-Mitchell, Stuart Campbell, and R Harrison, Effectiveness of
sprinklers in residential premises. BRE report, 2004. 204505.
R 45. Ganapathy Ramachandran, The economics of fire protection 2002: Taylor & Francis.
R 46. R Rutstein and R.A. Cooke, The Value of Fire Protection in Buildings, Fire Research Report
16/78, London: Home Office Scientific Advisory Branch. 1979.
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R 47. A Cost Benefit Analysis of Options to Reduce the Risk of Fire and Rescue in Areas of New
Build Homes Department for Communities and Local Government, UK. Fire Research Series
1/2010. February 2010, 2010.
R 48.
“Police Raid Cult, Find Gas Solvent -- Probe Of Tokyo Subway Attack”. 22 May 1995 Available
from: Seattle Times News Services.
R 49. Alim Ahmed Fatah, Guide for the selection of chemical agent and toxic industrial material
detection equipment for emergency first responders. Vol. 100. 2000: US Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Program, National Institute of Justice.
1.4.
Document Structure
Chapter 1 - “Introduction” provides a background concerning the deliverable, the purpose and scope,
the document structure and applicable and reference documents used for its elaboration.
Chapter 2 - “State of the art” is a brief summary of several concepts that affect the strategy and
methodology applied in the production of this deliverable.
Chapter 3 – “Methodology” describes the methodology used to analyse the inputs available from other
deliverables.
Chapter 4 - “Cost-benefit analysis of threat scenarios” provides a break-down and evaluation of both
direct and indirect costs and benefits.
Chapter 5 – “Conclusions” summarizes the findings and results from the analysis phase and lays out
the main conclusions from them.
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2.
State of the art
2.1.
Definitions
2.1.1.
1.0
Risk and insecurity
Insecurity is defined as the “aggregate, unquantifiable form of risk” and consequently security as the
absence of risk, i.e. zero probability for a harmful event to happen.
Risk is a known entity to the extent that its probability can be estimated, e.g. based on certain variables
which have been derived historically or through research; yet uncertainty implies the impossibility of
quantifying the likelihood of an event happening. In sharp contrast to natural disasters that are
somewhat predictable, terrorists deliberately seek to evade attempts for prediction thus increasing
uncertainty or creating an environment of “dynamic insecurity”
Not all threats of the same type are equally important considering that the threat of terrorism is dynamic
and able to adapt to current conditions which affect the likelihood of attack success R[4].
Any protective policy should be compared to a “do nothing case” where the money saved is used to
rebuild and compensate any victims. Given the low probability for an individual target to be hit, the
ability of terrorists to redirect their focus from one target to another and the cost of rebuilding an
attacked target, policy makers have to consider whether the proposed policy is more cost effective than
refraining from spending on a potential target or set of targets and then using the money saved to
rebuild, repair and compensate in case an attack on the target actually takes place.
As terrorism inflicts not only direct, but also indirect, costs R[5], it is obvious that any sensible
antiterrorism policy proposal must consider both direct and indirect cost that might flow from the policy.
While the direct cost of security measures is clearly sizeable, indirect costs appear frequently to be
ignored, since it is very difficult to estimate them accurately.
Protection policies may also undesirably enhance fear and anxiety which can have negative
consequences on health. An extreme example of how severe can these health effects can become is
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986.
It has been found that the largest health consequences came not from the accident itself (less than 50
people died directly from radiation exposure), but from the negative and often life-expectancy reducing
impact of the mental health of people traumatized by relocation and by lingering, and what turned out to
be massively exaggerated, fears that they would soon die of cancer.
It follows that protection and other policies that enhance fear unrealistically (as happened most notably
in Chernobyl) can have significant negative health consequences.
2.1.2.
Security
Security is now being addressed by enhancing systemic resilience in order to minimize negative
impacts if an attack occurs rather than seeking to protect potential targets against all possible risk
factors. It is believed that it may be more sustainable to minimize vulnerabilities and increase resilience
instead of focusing on particular instances of insecurity.
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Vulnerability is related to insecurity in the sense that the risk is defined not just by the threat per se but
also by the degree of systemic vulnerability. In current systems, there are interdependencies that cause
a local event to have global repercussions and as a result, a system of interconnected elements, has
its security defined by the vulnerability of its weakest element.
As individual decisions to invest in security are made independently the overall security of a system of
elements is partly dependent of these decisions. Therefore, it is important to have the right coordination
mechanisms to avoid uncertainty about the investment behaviour of others. Such uncertainty could
lead to sub-optimal levels of security.
The inner characteristics of the provision of security are such that some security investments can lead
to provide security benefits to a large group of individuals or to society at large while other security
measures only deliver benefits for the investor. For example, security measures put in place locally in
one country can provide improvements to the residents of the country, however, policies that target the
capture of terrorist leaders, or the dismantlement of a terrorist cell carry benefits to all the countries
targeted by the terrorists.
Although, theoretical models suggest that coordinated policies may yield higher benefits for all, it is
believed R[6] that protective policies are generally preferred due to the free rider effect (where others
can benefit from resources, goods, or services without paying for the cost) of more proactive measures
at an international level.
2.1.3.
Resilience
Resilience refers to the ability of an entity or system to maintain function when shocked. It is thus
aligned with the fundamental economic problem--efficient allocation of resources, which is made all the
more challenging by a disaster R[7]. Resilience is considered as static because it can be achieved
without repair or reconstruction work which may affect the level of activity.
There are other definitions which incorporate dynamic aspects, such as the capacity of a system or
entity to recover from a severe shock and return to a desired state (of activity). This aspect implies that
the system is able to recover from the shock, which may not be always the case.
2.1.4.
Terrorism
Terrorism can be defined as the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality
by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a
huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policymaking that the terrorists seek to influence
R[5].
However this definition does not encompass the wide variety of manifestations across the world and
historically, for example, there are large versus small scale attacks; continued versus isolated incidents;
and domestic versus transnational terrorism. Depending on the type of terrorism the security measures
may vary to provide a more effective protection.
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Economic impact of terrorist attacks
A terrorist attack can have dramatic consequences for both victims and society in general. The
estimation of its effects has taken a prominent role in the literature, and in some cases it has helped to
guide policy decisions R[8-11].
Although assigning monetary values to concepts like human life can be controversial, the use of a
common denominator when assessing the effects of a terrorist attack can help provide insight when
assessing the adequacy of implementing security measures. Through cost-benefit analysis it is
possible to make decisions that maximize the use of financial resources in security R[12-14].
When analysing the economic effect of a terrorist attack, the attack itself has to be put in context.
Isolated attacks have different consequences to similar attacks that are part of a campaign, for
example, as the level of fear and insecurity in the general public can be much higher when the attack is
part of a series, and can have a stronger influence in purchase and investing decisions. Therefore,
equal attacks in different contexts can have different economic effects.
Some costs and effects of terrorist attacks are difficult to evaluate, especially those that affect in an
indirect form the operation of the economic system. There are studies that measure the effects of
terrorism on some sectors of the economy, financial markets or the general economic output of a
country, see R[15-21] . But to date, there is no general model that can be applied in order to quantify
the indirect effects of a terrorist attack or a series of attacks.
Studies R[7, 15-18, 20-22] show that, in general, terrorism has a detrimental effect on the economy of
the affected country or area, but the investigations focus on particular periods of time in specific places.
Therefore, for an accurate calculation of all the consequences of a particular attack, an in-depth study
has to be performed, taking into account all socio-economic factors R[23] and the context in which the
attack takes place. If an isolated attack is taken and the context is not defined, many indirect
consequences have to be qualitatively described as it is not possible to quantify them.
The economic effects can be categorized according to different dimensions. The most common
classification found in the literature is direct and indirect. Direct costs are those that take place as an
immediate result of the attack, such as damage to buildings and property and loss of life and injuries.
Indirect costs are those that result from a change in the behaviour of the economic system as a
consequence of the attack, such as changes in lifestyle, investment and consumption patterns, new
security measures put in place, etc. Costs can also be categorized according to the temporal
dimension in short and long term costs. Short-term costs materialize in the aftermath of the attack and
tend to disappear a few days afterwards. Short-term costs include first-response, hospitalization,
isolation of the affected area, etc. Long term costs take effect from the moment of the attack and
remain for a long period of time, years in some cases.
2.2.1.
Direct and indirect costs
Direct economic costs are seen, in general, as costs that occur as the direct consequence of the
destruction of physical assets. They comprise property, goods and infrastructures losses, and the value
of lives lost, etcetera.
Direct economic costs tend to be proportional to the magnitude of the attack, and the size and the
characteristics of the economy hit, at a local, regional and national level. In contrast, indirect costs
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include costs relating to the implementation of security measures in response to the terrorist attacks.
They also comprise costs tied to attack-induced long term changes in commerce, saving patterns,
investment, etc.
Additionally, indirect costs are the result of behavioural change in the public, which can induce a
decline of consumer and investor confidence, resulting in reductions in demands and shifts in
investment patterns. Therefore, indirect costs may materialize as reduced growth in GDP, decrease of
foreign direct investment, inflation and increased unemployment.
2.2.2.
2.2.2.1.
Direct effect
Direct damage and value of life
Direct damage includes the destruction of property and fatalities or injuries as a consequence of the
attack on the target and surrounding area. Estimating these impacts requires accounting for the
physical destruction of buildings and infrastructure and losses of human life or capabilities (through
injury) but also for the economic impacts resulting from actions to mitigate damages. In the case of an
attack with explosives, the property damage can be the dominant cost but in chemical and biological or
small arms attacks these effect may not be significant compared with the effect of business interruption
R[7].
Considering the case of the World Trade Centre attacks in 2001, as reported by Enders and Olson
R[24]the direct costs of the attacks included private property destruction (including the value of four
airplanes) of $14 billion and the loss of $2,2 billion of government entities. Wages and salaries lost as a
result of the work stoppage were $2,5 billion, and clean-up costs were estimated at $10 billion. Navarro
and Spencer R[25] calculate a total output loss of $47 billion as a consequence of the disruption
caused by the attack. Kunreuther. R[26] adds to the direct losses mentioned, the lost income from
business disruptions related to the attack and estimate that the total loss is in the range of $80-$90
billion.
Fatalities and injuries are in most cases the main impact of a terrorist attack, whatever the scenario.
One of the more controversial issues associated with cost–benefit analyses is how to place a monetary
value on human life.
There is no consensus for a standard definition for the value of a specific human life. However, an
examination of risk/reward trade-offs that the general public make with regard to their health, has
helped to develop the concept of the value of a statistical life VSL The VSL is the value that an
individual places on a marginal change in their likelihood of death, that is, how much the individual is
ready to spend in order to reduce the risk of death by a particular amount in a given period of time. It is
necessary to note that the VSL is different from the value of an actual life. It is the value placed on
changes in the likelihood of death. VSL = Willingness to pay /change in risk.
Several publications such as M.E. Paté-Cornell R[27] and Robinson R[28] place the value of a
statistical life somewhere between $2-$6,3 million.
The HEATCO project R[29] produced a series of recommendations regarding values of statistical life to
be used in the appraisal of transport investments, which in turn, are based on the recommendations by
the UNITE project R[30]. The recommendations of values are listed in the table below in 2002 prices.
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Country
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Fatality
1,760,000 €
1,639,000 €
704,000 €
495,000 €
2,200,000 €
352,000 €
1,738,000 €
1,617,000 €
1,661,000 €
836,000 €
440,000 €
2,134,000 €
1,430,000 €
275,000 €
275,000 €
2,332,000 €
1,001,000 €
1,782,000 €
2,893,000 €
341,000 €
803,000 €
308,000 €
759,000 €
1,122,000 €
1,870,000 €
2,574,000 €
1,815,000 €
Severe injury
240,300 €
249,000 €
92,900 €
67,100 €
272,300 €
46,500 €
230,600 €
225,800 €
229,400 €
109,500 €
59,000 €
270,100 €
183,700 €
36,700 €
38,000 €
363,700 €
127,800 €
236,600 €
406,000 €
46,500 €
107,400 €
42,100 €
99,000 €
138,900 €
273,300 €
353,800 €
235,100 €
1.0
Slight injury
19,000 €
16,000 €
6,800 €
4,800 €
21,300 €
3,400 €
17,300 €
17,000 €
18,600 €
8,400 €
4,300 €
20,700 €
14,100 €
2,700 €
2,700 €
21,900 €
9,500 €
19,000 €
29,100 €
3,300 €
7,400 €
3,000 €
7,300 €
10,500 €
19,700 €
27,100 €
18,600 €
Table 1 Estimated VSL in different cuntries R[30]
These values can be used to estimate the economic value of fatalities and injuries as a consequence of
a terrorist attack.
2.2.2.2.
First response
First response costs include the costs to alleviate the consequences of the attack on the people
affected. These costs would include medical attention to injured people, evacuation, sealing off the
perimeter to avoid further fatalities, containment of contaminants (in case of an attack with poisonous
substances), decontamination of the affected area and surrounding services, etc.
The Madrid attacks in 2004 R[31] resulted in high economic costs due to the scattered form of the
attack. The cost of the rescue activities and initial attention for the victims of the attack was estimated
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at €2.17 million; however this figure did not take into account the cost of the mobilization of the national
police, nor on the civilians that participated in them voluntarily. The cost of health care to the victims
rose to €5.15 million, which includes all hospitalized and non-hospitalized injured.
2.2.2.3.
Compensation to victims
The loss of human lives is always a delicate matter; however, it is clear that fatalities and permanent
physical disabilities involve an important cost for the whole society. Governments try to alleviate this
loss by offering compensation to victims of terrorist attacks. The compensations for the victims are
normally based on national legislation that establishes the minimum compensation and can be modified
by judicial action.
Some studies have calculated the compensation paid to victims of attacks. For the 9/11 attacks it is
estimated a total of $7000 million paid in compensation claims R[32]. In the case of the Madrid train
bombings in 2004 a total of €134 million R[31] were paid by the government and private insurers.
2.2.3.
Direct and Indirect micro-economic effect
When evaluating the impacts of terrorism at micro-economic level, three main types of agents can be
identified: households (consumers), the private sector (producers) and the public sector. All three
agents can suffer both direct and indirect impacts: direct in the form of physical losses and other costs
associated with the attack and indirect in the form of a modification of their normal socio-economic
behaviour R[33].
2.2.3.1.
Household
There is little analysis of the impacts experienced at household level as a consequence of a terrorist
attack. Some studies focus on valuing the loss in life satisfaction and welfare that the household
experience due to the fear induced by an attack (or campaign) R[34]. These studies combine welfare
indicators, with terror indicators in order to analyse the effect of terrorism on life satisfaction. The
results show that terrorism has a significant negative effect on happiness and general life satisfaction.
This effect is materialized in the citizen’s willingness to pay for a potential reduction of terrorism.
Other psychological factors may play an important role in the economic behaviour of households. Fear,
insecurity, uncertainty about the future, and other factors may translate in a change of consumption
and investment patterns at micro-economic level which can have aggregated consequences.
The impacts are not always negative, Enders and Sandler R[6] showed that after the 9/11 attacks
consumer confidence experienced an increase, which is explained by the “patriotic” sentiment held by
a considerable part of the US citizens after the attacks.
Warning of a threat can also have consequences on the patterns of consumption and investment.
Households may be inclined to consume certain goods prior to an anticipated attack, in the same way
as when a natural disaster is forecasted. Also, in the wake of a big terrorist attack, the expectation of
future attacks may induce a similar response in the public.
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2.2.3.2.
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Private sector
Private businesses and firms have been both direct and indirect victims of terrorist attacks.
Globalization has made formerly immune companies become potential targets as their operations are
expanded into areas affected by terrorism.
The direct effect on a particular company depends on the characteristics of the attack, which may result
in the loss of property, the payment of ransom for hostages or any other form of damage. However,
some studies R[35] conclude that even if some sectors face significant losses due to terrorism, they are
likely to recover quickly if the economy does not face sustained attacks.
While direct physical losses may be important, other indirect impacts may have an effect on the
performance of the private sector. Changes in the perceived market risk, credit or operational risk may
have a severe negative impact even if companies are not directly affected by the terrorist attack. In this
context, supply chain interruptions have been studied extensively, for example, it has been estimated
that business interruptions accounted for one third of the entire losses of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Companies affected by supply chain disruptions underperform their competitors not only in operating
performance but on stock performance as well.
Therefore, it is not only direct impacts which affect the performance of companies in the private sector
but also indirect shocks that modify risk perception and expectations. This is evidenced by the target
chosen for the 9/11 attacks, which had economic importance and caused immediate indirect effects in
the world economy. Other targets of political or symbolic importance are less likely to cause deep
distortions in the economy, and the effects may be only local.
As stated above, the private sector is not immune to the psychological effects of a terrorist attack. Both
managers and employees are under the influence of their own psychological reactions to the terrorist
events, and that can influence the way their decisions are made. These effects may imply the use of
resources to provide additional security measures, in order to reduce the anxiety and fear of the
employees. For example, some firms reported to the London Chamber of Commerce, that their main
expenditure with regards to the London attacks on July 2005 was to provide alternative means of
transport for their employees that were afraid to take the public transport system. Unfortunately there
are few empirical studies that investigate these effects.
2.2.3.3.
Public sector
Public sector policies both before and after a terrorist attack are fundamental to contain and reduce the
detrimental economic impacts of the attack and to speed up the recovery. Policies need to be focused
on preparedness for the attack and response.
Immediate response to attacks implies dealing mainly with emergency health issues, especially on
large scale attacks. The organization of the public health and disaster relief infrastructure is key in
order to minimize losses. This is specially the case for chemical, biological and nuclear (CBN) attacks,
where, even on a small-scale, can cause widespread confusion, fear, and psychological stress
reactions that may have long lasting effects on the affected public. Here, detection containment and
emergency health care play a very important role. Even though these types of attacks have occurred
sporadically, recent events show that terrorist groups may employ these techniques against the civilian
population due to the potentially high number of victims.
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The preparedness and immediate response to an attack have not been the subject of empirical
academic studies although they are key to PTOs and IMs. As it is an area of low interest for academics,
the costs associated have not been isolated and measured in the existing literature; and therefore, they
are difficult to estimate.
The immediate response and emergency action are only part of the impact on the public sector, dealing
fundamentally with direct losses. The public sector is also responsible for adopting adequate decisions
in order to restore confidence, and prevent the spread of panic and fear among the civilian population.
Even if proper measures are taken, the effects on the citizens and businesses can be detrimental to the
economy, as we have seen earlier. In order to mitigate the indirect effects in the population and
businesses, governments have to provide the right incentives in order to restore economic activity.
Policy measures such as tax cuts, distribution of rebates, stimulus packages and other security
spending can account for a significant part of the total cost of recovery after a terrorist attack. These
policies can become permanent if the attacks are part of a campaign.
2.2.4.
Indirect macroeconomic effect
There have been attempts to measure the effect on the economy of a sustained campaign of terrorist
attacks. Dotan Persitz R[36] estimates that Israel’s average potential real per-capita GDP in the third
quarter of 2003 in the absence of the “second Intifada” is 8.6% higher than the real per-capita GDP
actually measured. This means that the average Israeli citizen lost at least 12.2% of real income
relative to potential income during the first three years of the “second Intifada.”
Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal R[15] measure the impact that the terrorist campaign by ETA
has had on the Basque-Country’s economy. This campaign not only includes bombing-based terrorist
attacks, but also targeted assassinations and kidnappings. The authors show that the overall impact on
the economy has been negative. Furthermore, their study shows a 10% average gap between Basque
per capita GDP and the per capita GDP of a comparable synthetic region without terrorism, over the
period of two weeks.
2.2.4.1.
Impact on different sectors of the economy
Over the last few years, scholars have analysed the effects terrorist acts have on various sectors of the
economy.
Tourism
Tourists have become a frequent target of terrorist activities in recent years R[37]. Examples are the
Luxor massacre in 1997, with 58 dead foreign tourists, and the bombing of a disco in Bali in 2002,
costing the lives of almost 200 tourists. The rationale for these attacks indicates that individuals
planning their holidays are less likely to choose a destination with a higher threat of terrorist attacks.
Host countries providing tourism services are, therefore, negatively affected by terrorist attacks. Enders
and Sandler R[16] estimate that a typical terrorist act in Spain scares away over 140,000 tourists, when
all the monthly impacts are combined. They also quantify the present value of loss in tourism revenues
for some European countries. Austria, Italy and Greece lost $4538 billion, $1159 billion and $0,77
billion respectively between 1974 and 1988. For the same period, continental Europe as a whole lost
$16,145 billion due to terrorism. However it is worth mentioning that the estimated impact on the
tourism industry in a particular country can differ significantly due to the different structure of the
industry in each country and the different intensity of the terror campaigns around the world and over
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time. On the other hand, decreased inflows of tourists in some countries can impact the development of
the industry in other alternative destinations as tourists change their travel plans.
Foreign and local investment
Terrorism can also influence the allocation decision of firms investing money in real foreign assets.
Terrorists can attack and damage foreign owned firms, and disrupt their activities. Enders and Sandler
R[17] perform an analysis focused on Spain and Greece. They conclude that in Spain, terrorism is
estimated to have reduced annual foreign direct investment inflow by 13.5% on average for the period
1975-1991. Greece has suffered two major terrorist organizations, the 17 November and the
Revolutionary Popular Struggle and the reduction of foreign direct investment was estimated to be, on
average, 11.9% annually.
Local investments can be compromised as well if the risk of attack is perceived to be substantial. For
example, investment in construction can be considered much riskier than others such as machinery, in
areas where political instability or terror attacks are common. Fielding R[19] investigates the impact of
political instability on the level and composition of Israeli investments during the intifada, factoring in
numbers of both Palestinian and Israeli victims of attacks and growth of Jewish settlements. The results
show a negative relationship between the number of victims and investment in both manufacturing and
equipment. Estimates show that if terror campaigns were to stop increases in investment in
construction, machinery and equipment would significantly increase.
Consumption and savings
Terrorist acts can affect the perception of the risks associated with savings and consumption of
different goods. Individuals can opt to find alternative ways to employ their capital, away from the
country at risk. Eckstein and Tsiddon R[18] , find that for the Israeli economy from 1950-2003, the
effect of terrorism on consumption has been negative.
Stock markets
The effects on the stock market of terror attacks depend of the intensity and the coverage of such
attacks. The reactions of the stock market to a large-scale attack can be substantial, but if the attack is
isolated, a recovery phase takes place a short while after the attack, as reported by Chen and Siems
R[21] for the 9/11 bombings. Given that stock prices reflect the expected future performance of a
company, a terrorist attack may be perceived as an increased risk factor for the expected performance
to materialize. However it is difficult to isolate the risk factor derived from the effect of terrorism from
other factors in play. Abadie and Gardeazabal have measured the effect of a cease-fire in a terrorist
campaign by ETA in Spain R[15], finding that Basque stocks (Basque country was the region affected
by terrorism) outperformed non-Basque stocks during the cease-fire and showed relatively inferior
performance when the cease-fire ended. Eldor and Melnick R[20] have studied the effects of terrorist
attacks on Israeli financial markets. Their findings show that suicide bombings have permanent effects
on the market, while other kinds of attacks do not. Therefore a campaign with continuous attacks, even
on a small scale, may create lasting negative effects.
Foreign trade
A terror campaign or series of attacks can have a detrimental effect on foreign trade. The insecurity
associated with doing business in the affected country and the security measures needed to prevent
further attacks can affect demand and increase the cost of transactions. Attempts to measure the effect
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on international trade have been made by Nitsch and Schumacher R[22] finding that in general,
countries affected by terrorism are less likely to trade with each other.
Urban Economy
Cities are very attractive terrorist targets due to the concentration of population. Due to this fact, it may
be possible that terrorism is one aspect that is considered in people’s settling decisions and therefore
affect the growth of cities and the distribution of the population. Although the rationale for this effect is
correct, studies have yet to find any empirical links that establish a relationship between urbanization
and terrorist attacks, and therefore the effect can be disregarded.
2.3.
Scenarios
SECURESTATION deliverables D2.2 and D3.1 detail the central threats covered by the project. These
threats can be grouped in the following categories:
Attack with explosives
Criminal/Vandalism,
Arson and IID threats
Dispersion of toxic substances
Sabotage
Computer hacking or cyber attacks
Attacks with small arms
A classification of costs caused by the attack can be made in terms of time dimension: short vs. long
term. This classification helps to understand which costs instantly take place in the different scenarios
and which costs are present over a long period of time after the attacks.
Short term
Loss of life and injuries
Includes compensation paid as a result of fatalities. Includes costs of
short term hospitalization, on-site first medical response
Damaged property
Damage to physical assets, infrastructure, rolling stock, other
equipment. Includes the cost of repair and/or replacement of such
assets.
Clearing / isolation of
affected area
Includes the cost of clearing, and cordoning off the affected area, and
providing information to the public. It also includes the cost of cleaningup afterwards.
Loss of business to the
operator
Cost of lost business during the period of service disruption to the
operator, compensations to be paid to passengers and cost of
alternative means of transport. It also includes the extra cost of
alternative routing through the network during the period of disruption.
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Loss of revenue to businesses located in the premises.
Loss of revenue to other businesses as a result of the attack: employees
delayed or not able to travel, fear and insecurity. Cost of goods
Economic impact of service
destroyed or locked. Extra costs of congestion to other network
disruption to other
operators (goods and passengers). Decrease in productivity as a result
operators and general
of fear or insecurity. The effects on the stock market are not taken into
public.
account as they are normally followed by a recovery phase that
neutralizes them R[21].
Long Term
Long-term injuries
Compensation paid to long-term-injury victims
Other compensations and
pensions
Legal fees and cost of litigations related to the attack. Extra cost of
insurance premiums as a result of the attack.
Long term reconstruction
costs
Costs of rebuilding heavily damaged infrastructures.
Operator loss of income
due to operator’s image,
fear, etc.
Loss of revenue as a result of a deterioration of the operator’s image or
fear of using public transport. Cost of incentives (discounts, promotions,
advertising, etc.) to stimulate demand.
Economic impact to other
operators and general
public
Long term economic impact due to changes in the behaviour in the
public, changes in consumption and saving patterns, changes in risk
perception, etc.
New security measures
Cost of new safeguards to be put in place in order to prevent future
attacks.
2.3.1.
Attack with explosives
Attack using explosives includes the following scenarios - IED, PBIED and VBIED.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) with deferred or remote operating mechanism.
Improvised explosive devices, particularly relatively small ones, can be easily carried and
disguised. Normally, they are planted in advance by the attacker in a location where they are
least likely to be detected, but with high chances of causing considerable damage when the
device is detonated. The Madrid train bombings in 2004 followed this pattern; explosives were
planted inside the trains and were detonated remotely.
Personal IEDs, carried by the attacker. These explosive devices are carried by a person, a
suicide bomber, and are disguised in such a way that it doesn’t cause suspicion. The attacker
places himself in an area where the physical damage will be high, normally a crowded place,
and detonates the device there. Examples of this type of attack can be found in Israel during the
Intifada period.
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Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). This type of attack implies the use of a
vehicle operated by a suicide bomber or remotely controlled. The vehicle can also be planted,
such as the bombings in Madrid-Barajas airport in 2006. An operated vehicle can be detonated
on the move and close to a target area where the damage can be extensive.
The main economic consequences derived from this type of attack are direct. It is expected that
depending on the magnitude of the detonation, the level of harm to passengers can be substantial.
Many fatalities and injuries are normally the outcome of a bomb blast, be it mounted on a vehicle,
detonated by a suicide bomber or planted and operated remotely. The damage to infrastructure and
property is also expected to be significant. Depending on the origin of the blast, rolling stock and
infrastructure may be affected. In that case, the loss of business for the operator may be higher than if
the blast was located elsewhere. Severe damage in the infrastructure can render the station inoperable
for a long period of time and therefore the economic indirect consequences may be considerable.
2.3.2.
Arson and IID
This type of attack does not employ the same sophisticated means as other types, however the
damage inflicted can be substantial. Normally these kinds of assaults are carried out with the help of
some home-made device such as Molotov cocktail, or other IID. Attacks carried out in crowded areas,
or enclosed zones, can cause severe damage as the result of fire and smoke.
Generally these attacks are intended to attract the attention of the public towards the attackers cause,
and not to harm or kill people. Examples of these attacks usually take place during demonstrations in
open areas, such as streets and squares, and not so frequently in stations.
Usually, this type of attack does not carry severe economic consequences as their intent is not to
cause severe damage but to draw the general public’s attention towards a cause. However, if the
attack manages to cause a severe fire in a station, the consequences can be catastrophic. Smoke
inhalation can be the main source of fatalities due to the toxicity of its components. Fire can also have
an impact on the structure of the building causing it to collapse and multiply the damage in terms of
human fatalities and injuries and property damage. As in the case of an attack with explosives, service
disruption will depend on the location of the source of the fire and whether or not rolling stock and
infrastructure are affected. In order to minimize the adverse consequences, it is essential to detect the
origin of the fire as soon as possible.
2.3.3.
Criminal / Vandalism
Regular crime and vandalism acts do not normally imply loss of life, only cases of extreme violence can
cause some fatalities, but such extreme cases are very rare.
Vandalism normally causes minor or moderate economic losses and targets structures or rolling stock,
not people. These actions can stem from anger or envy or hate towards the target or society. Examples
of vandalism include breaking windows, spraying paint on walls and other elements, placing glue into
locks, etc. Vandalism could potentially cause service disruptions if vital components of the service are
targeted, for example, control rooms.
By criminal actions it is understood theft, pickpocketing and other forms of larceny. Violence may be
used when committing criminal acts but normally, the victim takes minor injuries.
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Dispersion of toxic substances
These kinds of attacks aim at dispersing poisonous substances with the intention of killing people.
Poisonous substances can be delivered through ventilation systems in buildings, dispersed with the aid
of explosive devices or merely released into the air R[38, 39].
Possible attacks include R[39]:
Chemical attacks
o Nerve agents (SARIN, VX)
o Blood agents (hydrogen cyanide)
o Choking agent (chlorine)
o Blistering agents (mustard gas)
Biological attacks
o Poison (ricin, botulin toxin)
o Viruses (smallpox, viral haemorrhagic fevers, flu)
o Bacteria (anthrax)
Radiological attacks
o Radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb)
o The spread of radioactive contaminants without a bomb or device
o Poisoning of food or beverages with radioactive isotopes
Toxic materials are normally easier to obtain or synthesize and are used more frequently than
biological ones (viruses, bacteria, etc.) and therefore are more likely to be used.
An example of this type of strike can be found in the 1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway that
caused 12 deaths R[40].
The main economic consequences of these strikes are derived from the human fatalities and injuries.
As the attacks do not harm property, or infrastructure, disruption of service is normally lower than in
other kinds of strikes. Short term costs will include compensation cost and hospitalization of victims,
evacuation and cordoning and decontamination of the affected area. Long term consequences will
depend on the toxic substance released, and whether or not the exposure can carry long term effects
on health.
2.3.5.
Sabotage
This scenario contemplates the use of infrastructure systems such as signalling, telecoms, etc. by an
attacker in order to cause service interruption and damage. It includes physical access to systems in
order to modify their normal behaviour and cause malfunction of the service.
The economic consequences of this type of attack can vary depending on whether or not critical
systems are compromised. Signalling failure can cause accidents with people injured and even
fatalities, whereas the malfunction of other non-critical systems can cause service disruption but no
other consequences.
As an example, a sabotage attack took place in Bristol, UK in 2012. Signalling cables in the rail network
were destroyed causing severe delays and cancellation of services. There were no injuries or mortal
victims caused by this attack.
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Computer hacking or cyber-attacks
Computer security vulnerabilities may expose critical infrastructure control systems to malicious
operators. Attackers may gain access to such systems and modify their behaviour or render them
useless. This may cause failure in critical systems or service disruption. Service interruption caused by
a cyber-attack can be long if no business continuity plans exist.
As it happens with the sabotage scenario, the economic consequences of such an attack may vary
depending on which systems are targeted. Damage can be caused by rendering IT systems useless,
for example with a DoS (Denial of Service) attack, or virus-based attack. If the system is critical, there
is a high probability of a service disruption or even an accident. If the system is not critical, such as
online ticket reservation, there will be some alteration of normal operations but no severe economic
harm.
An example of a cyber-attack can be found in 1999 where NATO computers were targeted. Machines
were blasted with e-mail bombs and hit with DoS attacks by so called “hacktivists”. The main purpose
of this attack was to protest and draw media attention to their cause. The effect was not severe
although it caused service disruption.
2.3.7.
Attacks with small arms
This scenario is characterized by the use of firearms, grenades and other small arms against targets.
Attacks are carried out in busy areas where the number of fatalities can be large. When combined with
explosives this type of strike can cause significant damage. An example can be found in the 2008
Mumbai attacks where twelve coordinated shooting and bombing strikes were carried out across
Mumbai, killing 164 people and wounding at least 308.
Unless explosives are used, the main damage caused by these types of attacks is derived from dead
and injured victims. Depending on the number of attackers and their ability with weapons, the
consequences in terms of number of fatalities can be devastating. If the attack uses explosive weapons
like grenades, or other types of IEDs, it is expected that some damage will be caused to the station
infrastructure, and depending on the location of the blast, rolling stock can also be affected. If that is
the case, the service interruption can be severe and therefore cause losses to both operator and
customers.
2.3.8.
Summary of scenarios
The table below shows a summary of potential costs that can be caused depending on the type of
attack. Some scenarios present a high potential of causing severe costs in economic terms, although
as stated earlier, that will depend on the circumstances and characteristics of the attack. For example,
an attack based on time-deferred explosives has a high potential of producing great economic costs in
terms of fatalities and injured victims and damaged property and infrastructure. However, if the
explosive device is located in an area where there is no critical infrastructure and low concentration of
people, the resulting consequences can be lower than in an attack with small arms. Therefore, the
table represents the potential for causing losses.
The colours in the table represent the potential for causing losses and also the scale of these losses in
monetary terms, from tens of thousands of Euros to hundreds of thousands of Euros.
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Very High
Hundreds of millions
High
Tens of millions
Medium
Millions
Low
Hundreds of thousands
Very Low
Tens of thousands
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operators and general public
Operator loss of income due to
operator’s image, fear, etc.
Long term reconstruction costs
pensions
Long term injuries
disruption to other operators and
general public
Long term
costs
Loss of business to the operator
Clearing / Isolation of affected
area
Damaged property
SCENARIO
Loss of life and injuries
Short term
costs
Explosives
Arson and IID
Criminal /
Vandalism
Dispersion of
toxic substances
Sabotage
Computer
hacking or
cyberattacks
Attack with small
arms
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3.
Methodology
3.1.
Methodology
3.1.1.
Qualitative and quantitative approach
In a socio economic approach, normally two levels of analysis must be considered. The first is the
matter and the second is the audience. Benefits and costs of many programs are not easy to measure
and different stakeholders are interested in different benefits and costs. Consequently, benefits and
costs cannot be expressed only in monetary terms
Socio economic analysis can go through two approaches: a formal cost benefit analysis or a socio
economic assessment. A cost –benefit analysis is based on a monetary evaluation of the proposed
initiative. All costs and benefits must be translated into a common measure and at a common point of
evaluation (through the net present value calculation).
A standard economic approach to policy design is to evaluate the costs and benefits of various policy
options (projects). In order to make sense, a project’s benefit should exceed its costs and when
choosing between different alternatives, ranking alternatives according to their net benefits helps inform
policy decisions.
The methodology will focus on:
Analysis of different baseline scenarios;
Analysis of the cost resulting from the implementation of security measures with respect to the
baseline scenarios both in technology or process-related solution
Evaluation of the risk reduction (previous risk versus residual risk)
Cost comparison: reduction in risk/consequences of the attack versus the costs of implementing
security measures.
3.1.2.
Risk assessment methodology
SECURESTATION Deliverable 3.2 R[1] contains the risk assessment methodology used to evaluate
risks and their consequences. As detailed in the methodology, a typical security risk assessment
includes the following four key steps:
(1) Risk and safeguards identification;
(2) Risk analysis;
(3) Risk reduction and assessment;
(4) Cost-benefit and feasibility analysis.
The risk analysis phase evaluates the probability of a threat materializing, and then the consequences
of that threat are evaluated and converted to a common monetary denominator. On the third step, a
risk reduction assessment is performed based on the inclusion of specific safeguards. The fourth step,
consists of a cost benefit analysis, that will take into account the risk reductions achieved by the
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safeguards, and the consequences of the attack, together with the cost of implementing such
safeguards.
3.1.3.
Risk mitigation and management
SECURESTATION Deliverable 3.2 R[1] shows that quantification of the risk is based on the likelihood
of attack, system vulnerability and the consequence of the attack. Comparing different risks of an
attack before and after the inclusion of safeguards, Risk 1 (r1) is greater than Risk 2 (r2) if the product
of the factors (likelihood, vulnerability and consequence) of Risk 1 are greater than those of Risk 2, i.e.,
r1>r2.
Likelihood of
adversary attack (1)
X
Likelihood that the
adversary succeeds (2)
X
Consequences of
the attack (3)
=
Risk
Where
(1) the probability that an adversary will perpetrate an attack (specific asset and tactic, for example:
shooting at a passenger train);
(2) the probability that the attack will succeed, from the adversary's perspective; and
(3) its potential results in economic terms.
The mitigation of risk can imply a reduction of the consequences and/or a reduction of the probability of
a successful attack both in terms of likelihood of the attack (PA) and likelihood of success (1-PE), as it is
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2:
Figure 1. Risk reduction from r1 to t2 (two-dimensional view)
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Figure 2. Risk reduction from r1 to t2 (three-dimensional view)
3.1.4.
Consequences evaluation
Consequences of the attack are assessed in terms of costs. A summary of costs associated with the
consequences of an attack is shown below. Costs are categorized in two groups: direct and indirect, as
described in section 2.2.1
Direct costs
D1.
D2.
D3.
D4.
D5.
D6.
D7.
D8.
D9.
D10.
D11.
Loss of life and Injuries
Damaged physical assets and infrastructures
First response costs
Hospitalization costs
Clearing / Isolation of affected area
Loss of revenue due to service interruption PTO/IM
Compensations to passengers PTO/IM
Loss of revenue (other PTOs/IMs)
Loss of revenue (other businesses)
Costs of diverted transportation services
Economic loss due to transport service unavailability (supply chain and passengers)
Indirect costs
I1.
I2.
I3.
I4.
I5.
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Loss of income to PTO/IM due to fear, anxiety, brand image, etc.
Loss of income to other PTOs/IMs due to fear, anxiety, brand image, etc.
Insurance costs (increased premiums, extended insurance, etc.)
General impact on economy (GDP, trade, tourism, investment, etc.)
New security measures put in place
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Some of these costs can be obtained directly from the simulation of each scenario; however, other
costs must be described in a qualitative way as it is difficult to infer whether or not there would be an
impact. For example, it is difficult to know the effect of fear and insecurity and whether that has an
impact on PTO/IM income and the general economy; the effect will be different if the attack is isolated
or part of a campaign of attacks. Moreover, costs related to congestion in other transport networks, or
loss of revenue to other businesses will depend on the structure of the transport network, and therefore
can be difficult to estimate. It is important to recognise that the costs arising from an attack are
distributed between different entities (e.g, IM, PTO, member state, private sector, insurance companies
etc.). This enables benchmarking of costs that can be measured and which are directly associated to
the railway sector.
3.1.5.
Costs of implementing security measures
Security measures aim at reducing the likelihood of a successful attack taking place or at minimizing
the consequences of an attack. There is a wide range of measures to be put in place according to the
different types of attacks. Safeguards range from detection systems (such as smoke or toxic materials)
to the procedure of physical and baggage checks.
The costs of implementing such measures can be categorized in two groups: direct and indirect. Direct
costs represent the expenditure being made in order to implement the security measures, such as
installation costs, staff, maintenance, etc. Indirect costs include the effect that such measures have on
the PTO/IM business. These indirect costs include extra delays in passenger flows, loss of income as a
result of increased hassle for passengers due to the implementation of security measures (random
checks, dogs, surveillance cameras, etc.), loss of income due to the modification of the station
premises in order to accommodate safeguards (fences, walls, etc.).
As it occurs with the evaluation of consequences, direct costs can be easily calculated while indirect
costs are difficult to estimate and have to be described qualitatively.
3.1.6.
Cost efficiency calculation
As we have seen, each scenario will provide two different risks evaluations:
(1) Baseline, where the security measures have not been implemented – represented by R1
(2) After the implementation of safeguards – represented by R2
It is expected that the implementation of safeguards will reduce the initial risk (R1), either by reducing
the consequences of the attack (for example, by strengthening the station infrastructure), by reducing
the likelihood of an attack and/or decreasing the probability that the attack will be successful
(decreasing the target’s vulnerability).
It is important to note that the cost-efficiency evaluation will be used on a single case basis, given that
the security measure analysed will be implemented to protect the target against a particular tactic or
type of attack.
Therefore, in the baseline scenario (where the security measures have not been implemented) the risk
is defined by:
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Where,
PA1 – is the probability that the attack will take place during a certain period of time
V1 – is the vulnerability, the probability that the attack will be successful
PI1 – is the probability that the attack will be deterred
C1 – represents the consequences of a successful attack in monetary terms.
R1 – represents the risk associated with the scenario prior to the implementation of safeguards.
And after the implementation of security measures the residual risk is defined by:
Where,
PA2 – is the probability that the attack will take place during a certain period of time, after the
implementation of safeguards.
V2 – is the vulnerability, the probability that the attack will be successful
PI2 – is the probability that the attack will be prevented after the implementation of safeguards.
C2 – represents the consequences of a successful attack after the implementation of
safeguards in monetary terms
R2 – represents the risk associated with the scenario after the implementation of safeguards.
Since PA1, PI1, PA2 and PI2 are non-dimensional probabilities, risks are expressed in monetary terms.
As it’s indicated before, it is expected that the implementation of security measures will lead to:
A reduction of the consequences of the attack, so that C2 < C1, or
A reduction of the probability that the attack will take place PA2 < PA1, or
A higher probability of preventing the attack PI2 > PI1.
Therefore, the implementation of security measures will have an impact by reducing the total risk, R2 <
R1.
In order to assess whether the safeguards are cost-efficient, the risk reduction during a certain time
interval has to be compared against the cost of implementing and maintaining such measures during
the same time interval.
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The difference between both risks represents the mitigation effect of the security measures put in
place.
The risk reduction effect has to be compared with the cost of implementing and maintaining the security
measures: Q.
The cost-benefit evaluation is performed as follows:
Thus, the mitigation effect of the security measures has to be greater or equal than the cost of
implementing such measures in order to be cost-efficient.
In order to simplify, risks can be defined as:
Where Πi is the probability that the attack will take place and be successful, that is
Thus, the risk reduction effect of the implementation of the security measure implemented can be
defined by:
As it is defined in 3.1.3, any security measure can modify the probability of attack, the vulnerability (the
probability that the attack will be successful), and the consequences of the attack. Therefore, both the
probability of a successful attack and the consequences of the attack after the security measure has
been implemented can be expressed in terms of the probability and consequences before its
implementation.
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Thus:
Where
ρm is the probability reduction factor of the security measure
φm is the consequences reduction factor of the security measure
Therefore, the total risk reduction factor achieved by the implementation of the security measure RRm,
can be expressed as
Both ρm and φm are dependent on the particular security measure implemented and their values
range from 0 to 1, since it is expected that the security measure will reduce either the probability of
attack, the vulnerability (probability that the attack will be successful) and/or the consequences of the
attack.
For the purposes of the cost benefit evaluation, the higher the reduction factor it is, the more costeffective the security measure will be, since it reduces in a larger scale either the probability of
successful attack, the consequences or both.
For example, a CCTV and video analytics system can reduce both the probability an IED attack and
the target’s vulnerability by detecting suspicious behaviour and objects. However consequences are
more difficult to reduce by the use of the video surveillance system, unless the station is evacuated
before the device is detonated. Therefore, it can be assumed that the system only modifies the
probability of a successful attack (probability of an attack together with vulnerability) by reducing it to a
half of what it was before, it will have a ρm of 0.5 and φm of 1.
3.1.7.
The value of time
In most projects which require an investment, the costs and benefits are spread out over time. Since
people are not indifferent with respect to the timing of costs and benefits, it is necessary to calculate
the present value of all costs and benefits. It is therefore important that the valuation of costs and
benefits takes into account the time at which they occur, since it is generally preferred to receive
benefits as early as possible and pay for costs as late as possible.
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The standard approach to valuing costs and benefits that occur at different times is based on the fact
that a monetary unit today is worth more than a monetary unit tomorrow. The approach reduces a time
stream of costs or benefits to an equivalent amount in the price year’s monetary units. This amount is
known as the present value (PV) of the future costs and benefits.
In the case of the evaluation economic impact of a security measure, the present value is calculated
using the method of compound interest and the rate that converts future values into present value
monetary units. The present value of costs and benefits can be expressed as follows:
Where:
Qn = Costs in year n, both capital expenditure and operation expenditure, expressed in
constant monetary units
RRmn = Risk reduction effect of security measure “m” in year n expressed in constant monetary
units. Mitigation effect is assumed to be equal during the whole lifespan of the security
measure.
r = real discount rate
n = evaluation period in years, lifespan of the security measure.
Thus, the net present value (NPV) of a security measure can be expressed as the following formula:
The discount rate is used to convert costs and benefits that occur in different time periods to present
value so that they can be compared. It is based on the principle that, generally, society prefers to
receive goods and services now, rather than later, and to defer costs to the future. The selection of the
discount rate has an impact on the magnitude of the reported results.
The generally preferred approach is to use a real discount rate, that is, to exclude any inflationary
component of market rates. Inflation must be treated consistently across both the applied discount rate
and the costs and benefits components of the evaluation. However, it is noted that if costs and benefits
are measured in nominal (or current) monetary units, then a nominal discount rate should be used. For
the purposes of this study, a nominal discount rate will be used.
The present value of costs and benefits are measured over a set evaluation period. In this case, the
evaluation period will depend on the economic life of the security measure to be used. The economic
life of a security safeguard is the period of time over which the benefits to be gained from the project
may reasonably be expected to accrue. The key issue is to ensure that the period chosen is sufficiently
long enough to ‘capture’ all potential costs and benefits of the project.
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Cost Benefit Analysis of threat scenarios
In order to illustrate a cost benefit analysis focused on a particular security measure implementation, a
series of scenarios will be simulated, calculating the possible costs and benefits. This analysis will be
performed from the point of view of a public transport operator or infrastructure manager that is facing
the decision of whether or not to implement a particular security measure.
The scenarios are intended to be a reference for a cost-benefit analysis of a determined security
measure. However, as the scenarios are based on a reference model of a station, both costs and
benefits will be dependent on the station itself and would not be applicable to other stations.
Nevertheless, the methodology used, can be applied to other stations by altering some parameters
such as the cost of implementation of the security measure analysed or the probability of a successful
attack.
As both costs and benefits in economic terms can vary from country to country, there is some degree of
adjustment that would have to be made. As stated before, these costs refer to a “reference station”,
and the station should be in an “average” European country.
In addition, stations are not usually managed individually, but as part of a network. A particular public
transport operator may manage several stations in the same city, region or country. This implies that
both costs and benefits are evaluated not on a station by station basis but at a global network level.
This calculation depends on the size of the operator’s network, the structure of the network and the
relationships with other operators. Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish a framework of how costbenefit evaluations can be carried out. Therefore, in order to simplify the evaluation and focus on the
relevant factors, a single station will be considered.
In the analysis, the station model developed for other SECURESTATION Work packages will be used,
in order to keep consistency with the simulations of different attacks performed in other Work Packages
in SECURESTATION.
Finally, a sensitivity analysis is carried out for each scenario in order to analyse the cost-efficiency of a
security measure depending on the probability of a successful attack and the economic value of the
consequences of the attack.
4.1.
Costs considered
Costs of implementing and operating a particular security measure are spread across the total lifetime
of the measure, from first installation until retirement or replacement. The total cost of ownership will
include not only costs related with the implementation of the security measure but also the operation,
training, maintenance etc. In order to reflect these costs in a time frame, the total cost will be divided in
two: capital expenditure and operational expenditure.
4.1.1.
Capital expenditure or CAPEX
Capital expenditure or CAPEX is defined as the amount spent to acquire assets or improve the useful
life of existing assets in an organization. Normally, it is expected that capital expenditures will produce
future benefits.
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In the case of security measures, the total capital expenditure taken into account comprises:
Retail costs
Installation costs
Initial training of personnel
Software licences
Other licenses, permissions or taxes needed to operate the security measure
Capital expenditure can be financed through several methods, though for the purpose of this analysis it
is assumed that the expenditure takes place in time 0, that is, just before the measure is operative.
4.1.2.
Operational expenditure or OPEX
Operational expenditure or OPEX is defined as the expenditure that an organization incurs when
performing its normal business operations. In the case of security measures, it is the expenditure
associated with the operation of that particular measure. Therefore the following costs will be taken into
account:
Maintenance costs
Salaries of personnel associated with the operation of the security measure
Software Licenses (recurring payments)
Service fees
Operational expenditure is assumed to be paid annually and to be a fixed amount for the lifetime of the
security measure. Therefore, average calculations will have to be performed where expenses vary with
time.
4.2.
4.2.1.
Benefits considered
Consequences
As it is explained in section 3.1, benefits are expected to be derived by a reduction of risk that can be
achieved either by a reduction of the probability of a successful attack, by a mitigation of the
consequences (in economic terms) of the attack or both.
Therefore it is necessary to perform an evaluation of the consequences, in order to have an estimation
of the benefits that the security measure will provide.
The consequences to be accounted are:
Fatalities and injuries
Damages to assets, infrastructure and reconstruction costs
Income lost as a result of service interruption
Costs of alternative means of transportation provided to passengers.
Income lost as a result of fear, anxiety, brand image degradation, etc.
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Consequences not accounted are displayed in the following table together with the reasons why they
are not taken into account:
Consequence
Reason why it is not included in the calculation
Clearing / isolation of affected area
These costs are usually borne by the local, regional or national
authorities and are transparent to the operator.
disruption to other operators and
general public.
Even though these costs can be significant in the aftermath of
an attack, they are borne by the other operators and society in
general. The effects on the operator’s income is estimated in
section 4.2.6
Compensation due to long-term
injuries, and fatalities
pensions, insurance premiums, etc.
operators and general public
These costs are usually borne by national authorities.
These costs are difficult to estimate and depend not only on
the type of the attack but also on the national regulation and
the operator’s obligations. In some cases, no other insurance
premiums or extra costs arise from an attack, in others, such
costs can be significant.
These costs are not borne by the operator.
Even though the installation of additional security measures as
a response to an attack can be attributed to the attack itself, it
is highly dependent on the operator’s management team and
the conditions and context in which the attack takes place.
Table 2 Consequences not taken into account in CBA analysis
4.2.2.
Generally, costs derived from fatalities and injuries are not directly borne by the station operator,
although there may be some costs implied in insurance premiums. For the purposes of this analysis,
these costs will be taken into account as they are of great importance and the main reason to
implement the security measure in particular.
The HEATCO Project R[29] provides data that can be used as a reference, as it is shown in section
2.2.2.1. However, in order to consolidate a single figure for each value (fatality, serious injury, and light
injury) an average of the different values for the European countries has been made.
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Euro values in Table 1, have been adjusted to 2012 Euros considering the Eurozone inflation, and a
weighted average has been performed taking into account the country’s population. The results can be
found in Table 3.
VSL values (fatalities and injuries)
Weighted Average by population
Fatality
1,785,000 €
Severe injury
Slight injury
240,000 €
19,000 €
Table 3 VSL values (fatalities and injuries)
4.2.2.1.
Standing crowd density
In order to evaluate the number of victims of a particular attack, it is essential to know the average
number of people present in the station at the time of the attack. Usually, the effect of an attack
(explosion, PIH dispersion, etc.) is described as an area affected by the attack. Depending on the
number of people present in that area the number of fatalities will vary.
In the particular environment of the station, the density of people varies with the time of the day,
existing peak density phases associated with rush hour periods and other with low density phases
when the station is not so busy. It will be assumed that there is also a variation of the density of people
associated with the different areas of the station. In the cafeteria area or in the platforms area, for
instance, the crowd density will be higher than in other areas such as corridors.
A visual representation of crowd density can be seen in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5:
Figure 3. Standing crowd density of 0.5 people per square meter
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Figure 4. Standing crowd density of 1 person per square meter
Figure 5. Standing crowd density of 2 people per square meter
For the purposes of this study and for the different areas considered the following people densities will
be applied.
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Cafeteria
High density
period
0.5 p/m2
Average density
period
0.3 p/m2
Low density
period
0.1 p/m2
Platform
Commercial area and corridors
0.7 p/m2
0.3 p/m2
0.3 p/m2
0.2 p/m2
0.1 p/m2
0.1 p/m2
Table 4 People densities used in the study
4.2.3.
Damages to assets, infrastructure, and reconstruction costs
When an attack occurs part of the building and some of the fixed assets in the station are expected to
be damaged.
For the purposes of this study, an estimation of the damages borne by the station building and
infrastructure will be carried out, based on publications of data regarding reconstructions made after
similar attacks. The amount estimated depends on the type of attack. While explosive devices and fire
can cause great damage R[31], PIH dispersion causes very little damage to the building and fixed
assets R[40].
4.2.4.
Income lost as a result of service disruption
From the time of the attack until the time of fully recovery, the station remains inoperative. During that
time, all essential functions are not carried out and therefore the income derived from them can be
accounted as losses derived from the attack.
For the purposes of this analysis this income will be calculated as two separate streams:
Income from sales
Income derived from other services: advertising, rent, etc.
The amount lost by ticket sales, passengers unable to use the station due to service unavailability, will
follow the following formula:
Where
Atp:
Average ticket price = €15
Appd:
Average number of departing passengers per day = 75,000
Nds:
Number of days of unavailability of service (not counting the day of the attack,
where an alternative bus service is provided, see section 4.2.5)
This equation leads to a daily income loss of around €1,125,000.
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The amount lost by other services will depend on how the station is designed, what is the number of
retail centres and real-state area available, the advertisement real-state and whether or not some of
these services are outsourced or managed by the station operator. Network Rail in the UK can be
taken as a reference R[41], where around 4% of its revenue comes from commercial rents and
advertisement. Therefore if we assume the average ticket price, number of passengers per day
indicated above, the daily income lost attributed to other services will be around €45,000.
The number of days that the commercial space is not available to be used may in most cases differ
from the number of days of lack of service, since all the assets related to the essential service are
usually given priority in the recovery phase.
Thus, the total lost income as a result of a service disruption will be:
Where
Nds: Number of days of unavailability of service (not counting the day of the attack, where an
alternative bus service is provided, see section 4.2.5)
Ndc: Number of days of unavailability commercial space.
4.2.5.
Costs of alternative means of transportation
In case of a service disruption, due to a terrorist attack or any other cause, passengers are unable to
reach their destination. Some of these passengers may have already purchased the corresponding
ticket and find that there is no service available to them. It is typically the case that the operator
provides all passengers with alternative means of transport, while the service is being restored.
Usually, a bus service is provided that covers the need of passengers to get to their destination. The
service is offered for free for customers that have purchased a ticket, and in some cases, to other
customers as well.
For the purposes of this analysis, the cost of a complimentary bus service provided to passengers is
taken into account. The service is provided on the day of the attack, reimbursing all other passengers
that may have already purchased a ticket for the subsequent days (this cost is accounted as loss of
income due to unavailability of service see section 4.2.4).
An average cost of renting a bus service with capacity for 55 passengers can be approximated to
around €700 per day (a trip would be completed in a day). Therefore, assuming all 75,000 passengers
would need to be transported to their destination, the total cost would come to around €950,000.
4.2.6.
Income lost due to fear, anxiety, brand image degradation, etc.
The effects of a terrorist attack go well beyond physical aspects causing changes in the behaviour of
the population, even among those not directly affected by the attack R[36].
The effect of fear, insecurity and anxiety could be translated to choosing other means of transport of
altering the schedules of travels. In the wake of a terrorist attack in a public transport facility, the public
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normally chooses not to travel unless strictly necessary or turns to other means of transport that are
considered to be less risky. This change in behaviour can have a detrimental effect in the operator’s
income statement, causing a drop in passengers in the aftermath of the event and subsequent months
(besides the period of unavailability of service derived from the attack).
It is difficult to assess the length and the depth of this decrease in passengers, and it depends highly
on the type and severity of the attack, whether it is part of a campaign of attacks or an isolated attack,
the perpetrators of the attack, etc.
Studies from Abadie, and Gardeazabal R[15] show that the global effect of a terrorist campaign can
damage the global annual output of the economy of the region affected by around 10%. As an
approximation, for the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the impact in the operator’s income will
be the same, a -10% drop in annual sales, that is around 42M€.
4.3.
Discount rate
Discount rates used to evaluate different investment projects vary from country to country and from
company to company. The nature of the investment project may also modify the discount rate applied,
although usually the same discount rate is used to evaluate projects within an organization. The nature
of the organization, whether it is public or private may also lead to a different discount rate R[42].
In the transport sector very different discount rates are used, while in Mexico the discount rate used is
around 12% in France it is 3% R[11]. The higher the discount rate, the less value future monetary flows
will have in the present. Generally, in the European transport sector the rate used is between 3% and
6% R[11]. The discount rate to be chosen for this analysis is 4%.
4.4.
Results and sensitivity analysis
The results of the analysis of the different scenarios show whether the security measure implemented
is cost-efficient or not.
As it is shown in section 3.1.6 the risk reduction factor depends on the initial risk: the probability of an
attack and the consequences of the attack in monetary terms. Therefore, the cost-efficiency of a
particular security measure will not only depend on the capacity of the security measure to reduce the
probability of the attack or the consequences but also on the probability and consequences that the
attack has before the introduction of the countermeasure.
Given the difficulties of estimating the probability of an attack and its monetary consequences, it is
desirable to perform a sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis can be based on two variables, the
probability of attack and the monetary consequences.
Thus, the probability of an attack and the consequences are represented in a matrix and the costefficiency of the security measure calculated for each of the combinations of probability and
consequences.
It is expected that for low probabilities and small economic consequences most security measures will
not be cost efficient, as the benefit they produce (risk reduction) will be small compared to the total cost
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of ownership of the security measure. The level of risk for this combination, may be acceptable for the
organization, thus no measure should be taken to reduce it. But if the security measure is cost efficient
even under these circumstances, its implementation should be considered.
For high probabilities and large economic consequences, even if the security measure reduces either
the probability or the consequences by a small factor, it is likely that it will be much larger than the total
cost of ownership, making it cost-efficient. If a security measure is not cost efficient in these
circumstances, then its implementation should not be considered.
When the combination of consequences and probability does not fall in the extremes, the level of risk
may not be acceptable to the organization and it is advisable to take actions to reduce it. In this case is
useful to consider the cost-efficiency of the implementation of the security measure as it can be an
important factor in the decision making process.
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4.5.
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Scenario 1: IED in luggage left in the station’s cafeteria
4.5.1.
Scenario description
This scenario is based around the presence of an IED in the cafeteria area at level -1. This area is
located at the intersection of two corridors, the first corridor leads to the metro platform while the
second corridor leads to the train platform. In both corridors commercial areas are present.
The IED is an explosive charge of 15kg of Semtex. The explosive contains 5mm steel balls used as
shrapnel. This is the DBT for a worst case scenario.
The device is concealed in a rucksack or travel bag and planted in the cafeteria area, left there
unattended and detonated remotely.
The time of the attack coincides with a period of high density of in the morning rush hour.
4.5.2.
4.5.2.1.
Consequences
Figure 6 represents the different areas affected by the explosion. Considering the steel balls as
shrapnel, the area in which people will suffer serious injuries is enclosed within a radius of 32.2 m,
whereas in the area between 32.2 m and 39 m, and greater than 39 m, the shrapnel will cause
moderate injuries and slight injuries, respectively.
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Figure 6. Scenario 1, IED planted in cafeteria, areas of damage
In order to assess the number of victims the standing crowd density of the area must be considered. As
the attack occurs during a period of high density of people, the considered density in the cafeteria area
is 0.5 p/m2 and 0.3 p/m2 in the commercial area and corridors, so an average of 0.4 can be considered
for the whole area. The area corresponding to the parking zone will not be considered as is has walls
and doors blocking the effects of the blast.
The area most affected by the blast in which fatalities will occur, corresponds to a 32m-radius circle,
which represents an area of around 3,217 m2. The area that relates to severe injuries corresponds to a
7m width ring adjacent to the 32m-radius circle which represents an area of 1,561 m2. Similarly, the
area where light injuries occur corresponds to a 61m-width ring adjacent to the severe injuries area,
which represents an area of 26,637 m2. However, a significant part of these areas, corresponds to
zones outside the building or spaces behind walls and doors, and cannot be considered in the
calculations.
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Therefore, considering the people densities above, and the areas affected, the approximate number of
fatalities and injuries will be:
Fatalities
200
Severe Injuries
Light Injuries
127
190
Table 5. Scenario 1: Number of fatalities and injuries
Considering the values of Table 3, the consequences in monetary terms are:
Fatalities
357,000,000 €
Severe Injuries
Light Injuries
TOTAL
30,480,000 €
3,610,000 €
391,090,000 €
Table 6. Scenario 1: Consequences of fatalities and injuries
4.5.2.2.
Assets, infrastructure and reconstruction costs
Considering the effects of such a blast, a number of systems will be affected; however no major
structural reconstruction will have to be made. Similar reconstructions took place in Spain after the
March 11th attacks in 2004 R[31].
In order to assess the costs of reconstruction a reference can be taken from the average construction
costs of developing public buildings. The Turner & Townsend survey R[43] assesses the average rates
of developing different types of property in different countries. Prices vary from commercial property to
residential property, office buildings, airport, etc. Table 7 shows the 2012 prices of different property
types.
Commercial Building
929 € per m2
Germany
Ireland
United Kingdom
Average
Airport terminal
1,125 € per m2
2,550 € per m2
3,500 € per m2
2,728 € per m2
3,791 € per m2
2,805 € per m2
2,069 € per m2
Table 7. Average construction rates in 2012
As the train station will have commercial areas and most of the characteristics of an airport terminal, an
average between the two rates would be reasonable to use as the rate for the reference station, that is
a cost of around 2,400 € per square meter.
Thus, assuming that most of the -1 level is destroyed and some of the surrounding spaces, a total area
of around 15,000 m2 would correspond to a total cost of around 36 M€
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4.5.2.3.
1.0
The attack in the cafeteria area, does not affect critical service infrastructures necessary to provide
service. Therefore it is expected that under such attack, the amount of time necessary to recover the
service will be around one or two days. Assuming a worst case scenario of 2 days without service, and
using the data in section 4.2.4, the total income lost will be around: 2,250,000 M€.
The number of days of unavailability of the commercial areas is different from the core transportation
service. As the explosive is detonated in an area surrounded by commercial space, it is expected that
the reconstruction time to recover functional service can be longer. Reconstruction time to achieve full
operation could take between 30 to 45 days. Assuming the worst case scenario and using the data in
section 4.2.4. the total income lost is around 2.025 M€.
Therefore, total income lost as a result of service disruption would be around: 4.275 M€
4.5.2.4.
Costs of alternative means of transport
As indicated in section 4.2.5, it is considered that complimentary service will be provided on the day of
the attack. The following days of service unavailability will be considered in the section 4.5.2.3.
Therefore, considering the assumptions in section 4.2.5, the cost of alternative transport will be around
€950,000.
4.5.2.5.
The assumptions described in section 4.2.6 indicate that an approximation to the income lost due to
psychological and perception factors will be around 10% of the total yearly income. For this particular
case, the income lost will be around 42 M€.
4.5.2.6.
Sum of all consequences
Total costs described in previous sections are represented in the following table:
391,090,000.00 €
82.5%
Asset damage and reconstruction
Income lost (service disruption)
Alternative means of transport
Income lost (fear, anxiety, etc.)
TOTAL
36,000,000.00 €
4,275,000.00 €
950,000.00 €
42,000,000.00 €
474,315,000.00 €
7.6%
0.9%
0.2%
8.9%
100.0%
Table 8. Scenario 1. Sum of all consequences
As expected, for this kind of attack, the main part of the total consequences corresponds to Fatalities
and injuries (82.5%), therefore, the cost-benefit analysis will highly depend on this factor. As indicated
in section 4.2.2, these costs are usually not directly borne by the public transport operator, however, as
the main purpose of the security measure is to reduce this effect, they are considered for the analysis.
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4.5.3.
1.0
Security measure evaluated
4.5.3.1.
Description
The countermeasure analysed is a wireless IP video surveillance and analytics system. As indicated in
section 3.1.6 the analysis will be carried out on an individual target-tactic pair base, that is, the system
is intended to protect the station against an IED attack.
Video surveillance systems give the user the ability to perform real-time monitoring of the environment,
people, and assets and providing recording for investigative purposes.
The system has the following components:
cameras,
cabling (power, video if wired system)
power adapters / power distribution block
video recording system (DVR)
monitors
Figure 7. Video monitoring and analytics system diagram
The system also comprises a video analytics subsystem that is used to detect threats based on an
analysis of video feeds coming from the cameras. These systems use video analysis algorithms to
detect different events based on the user configuration. Usually these systems have the following
capabilities:
Tripwire: Identifies user-defined objects that move in a specified direction as they cross over a
line (tripwire) drawn within the camera's field of view.
Object classification: Differentiates between a person, vehicle, or other objects.
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Camera tampering detection: Identifies any event that significantly changes the field of view of
the camera.
Loitering: Detects when a person or vehicle remains in a user-defined area of interest for a
configurable length of time.
Take away events: Detects when an object has been removed from a user-defined area of
interest.
Multiline tripwire: Enables the association between two virtual tripwires with respect to
crossing one before the other and relative time between crossing both.
Leave-behind events: Detects when an object has been left behind or inserted in the full view
of a camera.
Enters/exits events: Detects when an object enters or exits a specified area of interest from
any direction within the camera's field of view.
Occupancy: Provides information about the number of people in a user-defined area of
interest.
Dwell time: Provides data about the length of time each person spends in a user-defined area
of interest.
The system uses as input the video feeds from the cameras and use specialized software to detect
events and raise alarms. Alarms and notifications can be distributed through different interfaces, and
even transmitted to mobile devices to security agents on site.
For this particular case, a limited number of fixed IP cameras (around 45) will be needed to cover the
station area under protection: cafeteria, surrounding commercial areas, platforms, corridors and
exterior perimeter. Together with the security cameras, a storage and video analytics system is
required. It is also assumed that in order to operate the system a trained security guard will be needed.
Even if alerts and notifications are automatically transmitted to security guards on site by mobile
devices, another security guard will be needed to supervise the system and detect incidences that
bypass the video analytics software and possible false alarms.
Considering all the above, the approximate CAPEX and OPEX and expected lifetime are:
CAPEX, includes installation, training, software licenses : 1,01 M€
OPEX, includes extra security personnel, maintenance costs, repairs, upgrades: €400.000
Expected lifetime: 10 years.
4.5.3.2.
Risk reduction effects
As indicated above the risk mitigation effect provided by the security measure can be defined by:
Where, φm and ρm are the probability and consequence reduction factors, and Π corresponds to the
probability that there is an attack and it will be successful, that is:
- 58 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
It is expected that the use of a video analytics and surveillance system will have an impact on the
vulnerability, that is, the ability to detect and foil an attack that has been attempted. This is achieved by
the detection of suspicious behaviour or objects thanks to the use of the video analytics system. An
IED planted in the area covered, can be detected prior to its detonation, allowing the neutralization of
the device or the evacuation of the affected area. In order to simplify the analysis, it will be assumed
that the security measure acts only on the vulnerability and not on the consequences, that is, if the
attack is not detected, consequences will remain equal before and after the security measure is
implemented, as the security measure contains no passive components. However if the attack is
detected, it will be completely foiled, with no consequences.
Thus,
As it is assumed that the security measure contains no passive components that can mitigate the
consequences once the attack has been successfully carried out:
Therefore,
The value of ρm needs to be assessed on two components: probability of attack and vulnerability, that is
the influence that the assimilation of the security measure will have on the probability that the attack will
take place, and the capability to deter an attack that has been attempted
- 59 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
For this particular case, it will be considered the worst case scenario where the implementation of the
security measure does not affect the probability that the attack will take place, that is, the adversary
does not modify its intention to attack in the light of the security measure implementation, leaving ρma =
1.
According to the SEST-RAM methodology R[1] the implementation of a video surveillance and
analytics system will reduce the vulnerability by 90%, provided that the system is fully implemented.
Therefore, ρmv=0.1. Considering the above equations:
4.5.4.
As it is shown in section 4.5.3.2, the risk reduction is defined by
The net present value of the security measure will be defined by
Where
CAPEX: is the capital expenditure or initial investment, assumed to take place in time 0
OPEX: is the annual operative expenditure
RRmn: is the Risk Reduction factor of the security measure “m” in the period “n”
As the Risk Reduction factor depends on PA1, V1 and C1, that is on Π1 and C1, it is useful to consider,
how the present value of the investment in the security measure varies with Π1, given that the
consequences are those described in section 4.5.2.6.
The following graph represents the present value of the investment with respect to Π1.
- 60 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Figure 8. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure
As it can be seen in the graph when the probability of a successful attack (before the implementation of
the security measure) Π1 (or PA1 V1) is higher than 0.12%, the net present value of the security
measure is positive, that is, the security measure considered is cost-efficient. As expected, the higher
the probability, the more cost-efficient the security measure is.
With regards to the vulnerability reduction ρmv, it is expected that the higher it is (i.e. the less the
reduction in vulnerability), the higher the probability of a successful attack will have to be in order for
the security measure to be cost efficient.
Therefore, if we assume that ρmv is 0.5, meaning that the vulnerability is reduced by 50% thanks to the
security measure implementation, we find that for Π1 = 0.22% the security measure is cost-efficient. For
ρmv =0.9 (10% reduction in vulnerability), Π1 = 1.1%.
Below are represented the net present value graphs for values of ρmv 0.5 and 0.9
- 61 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Figure 9. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure for ρmv 0.5
Figure 10. Scenario 1, Net present value of security measure for ρmv 0.9
With respect to the consequences, as it is sometimes difficult to assess exactly the monetary
consequences of an attack; a simulation with different levels of consequences has been performed.
- 62 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Table 9 displays the net present values for different levels of consequences and different probabilities
of successful attack Π1 (or PA1 V1).
- 63 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.00E-09
1.5E-09
2.25E-09
3.375E-09
5.0625E-09
7.59375E-09
1.13906E-08
1.70859E-08
2.56289E-08
3.84434E-08
5.7665E-08
8.64976E-08
1.29746E-07
1.9462E-07
2.91929E-07
4.37894E-07
6.56841E-07
9.85261E-07
1.47789E-06
2.21684E-06
3.32526E-06
4.98789E-06
7.48183E-06
0.00112%
0.00168%
0.00253%
0.00379%
0.00568%
0.00852%
0.01278%
0.01918%
0.02876%
0.04314%
0.06472%
0.09707%
0.14561%
0.21842%
0.32762%
0.49144%
0.73716%
1.10573%
1.65860%
2.48790%
3.73185%
5.59777%
8.39666%
12.59499%
18.89249%
28.33873%
42.50810%
63.76215%
95.64323%
100.00000%
1.0
1,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,355 €
-4,244,354 €
-4,244,351 €
-4,244,348 €
-4,244,342 €
-4,244,334 €
-4,244,322 €
-4,244,305 €
-4,244,278 €
-4,244,237 €
-4,244,177 €
-4,244,086 €
-4,243,950 €
-4,243,745 €
-4,243,439 €
-4,242,979 €
-4,242,290 €
-4,241,255 €
-4,239,704 €
-4,237,377 €
-4,237,059 €
10,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,354 €
-4,244,352 €
-4,244,349 €
-4,244,344 €
-4,244,337 €
-4,244,327 €
-4,244,311 €
-4,244,287 €
-4,244,252 €
-4,244,199 €
-4,244,119 €
-4,244,000 €
-4,243,820 €
-4,243,551 €
-4,243,148 €
-4,242,542 €
-4,241,634 €
-4,240,272 €
-4,238,229 €
-4,235,164 €
-4,230,567 €
-4,223,672 €
-4,213,328 €
-4,197,813 €
-4,174,541 €
-4,171,360 €
100,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,355 €
-4,244,353 €
-4,244,350 €
-4,244,346 €
-4,244,340 €
-4,244,331 €
-4,244,317 €
-4,244,296 €
-4,244,265 €
-4,244,218 €
-4,244,148 €
-4,244,043 €
-4,243,886 €
-4,243,650 €
-4,243,295 €
-4,242,764 €
-4,241,967 €
-4,240,771 €
-4,238,977 €
-4,236,287 €
-4,232,251 €
-4,226,197 €
-4,217,117 €
-4,203,496 €
-4,183,064 €
-4,152,417 €
-4,106,447 €
-4,037,491 €
-3,934,057 €
-3,778,907 €
-3,546,181 €
-3,514,378 €
1,000,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,355 €
-4,244,354 €
-4,244,351 €
-4,244,348 €
-4,244,342 €
-4,244,334 €
-4,244,322 €
-4,244,304 €
-4,244,276 €
-4,244,235 €
-4,244,174 €
-4,244,082 €
-4,243,944 €
-4,243,736 €
-4,243,425 €
-4,242,959 €
-4,242,259 €
-4,241,209 €
-4,239,634 €
-4,237,272 €
-4,233,729 €
-4,228,414 €
-4,220,442 €
-4,208,484 €
-4,190,547 €
-4,163,642 €
-4,123,284 €
-4,062,746 €
-3,971,941 €
-3,835,732 €
-3,631,418 €
-3,324,948 €
-2,865,243 €
-2,175,686 €
-1,141,349 €
410,155 €
2,737,412 €
3,055,448 €
10,000,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,354 €
-4,244,352 €
-4,244,349 €
-4,244,344 €
-4,244,337 €
-4,244,326 €
-4,244,310 €
-4,244,286 €
-4,244,250 €
-4,244,196 €
-4,244,116 €
-4,243,994 €
-4,243,812 €
-4,243,539 €
-4,243,129 €
-4,242,515 €
-4,241,593 €
-4,240,211 €
-4,238,137 €
-4,235,027 €
-4,230,361 €
-4,223,362 €
-4,212,864 €
-4,197,117 €
-4,173,496 €
-4,138,065 €
-4,084,919 €
-4,005,199 €
-3,885,619 €
-3,706,249 €
-3,437,194 €
-3,033,613 €
-2,428,240 €
-1,520,180 €
-158,091 €
1,885,042 €
4,949,742 €
9,546,792 €
16,442,368 €
26,785,731 €
42,300,776 €
65,573,342 €
68,753,704 €
CONSEQUENCES
100,000,000 € 1,000,000,000 €
-4,244,358 €
-4,244,351 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,347 €
-4,244,357 €
-4,244,342 €
-4,244,356 €
-4,244,334 €
-4,244,355 €
-4,244,321 €
-4,244,353 €
-4,244,303 €
-4,244,350 €
-4,244,275 €
-4,244,346 €
-4,244,234 €
-4,244,340 €
-4,244,171 €
-4,244,330 €
-4,244,078 €
-4,244,316 €
-4,243,937 €
-4,244,295 €
-4,243,727 €
-4,244,264 €
-4,243,411 €
-4,244,216 €
-4,242,938 €
-4,244,145 €
-4,242,227 €
-4,244,039 €
-4,241,162 €
-4,243,879 €
-4,239,564 €
-4,243,639 €
-4,237,166 €
-4,243,279 €
-4,233,570 €
-4,242,740 €
-4,228,176 €
-4,241,931 €
-4,220,085 €
-4,240,717 €
-4,207,948 €
-4,238,897 €
-4,189,742 €
-4,236,166 €
-4,162,434 €
-4,232,070 €
-4,121,473 €
-4,225,925 €
-4,060,030 €
-4,216,709 €
-3,967,865 €
-4,202,884 €
-3,829,619 €
-4,182,147 €
-3,622,249 €
-4,151,042 €
-3,311,195 €
-4,104,384 €
-2,844,613 €
-4,034,396 €
-2,144,740 €
-3,929,416 €
-1,094,931 €
-3,771,944 €
479,783 €
-3,535,737 €
2,841,854 €
-3,181,427 €
6,384,960 €
-2,649,961 €
11,699,619 €
-1,852,762 €
19,671,607 €
-656,964 €
31,629,590 €
1,136,734 €
49,566,564 €
3,827,280 €
76,472,025 €
7,863,099 €
116,830,216 €
13,916,828 €
177,367,504 €
22,997,421 €
268,173,434 €
36,618,311 €
404,382,331 €
57,049,645 €
608,695,675 €
87,696,647 €
915,165,692 €
133,667,149 € 1,374,870,718 €
202,622,903 € 2,064,428,256 €
306,056,534 € 3,098,764,563 €
461,206,980 € 4,650,269,023 €
693,932,649 € 6,977,525,714 €
725,736,262 € 7,295,561,843 €
10,000,000,000 €
-4,244,285 €
-4,244,249 €
-4,244,194 €
-4,244,112 €
-4,243,989 €
-4,243,804 €
-4,243,527 €
-4,243,111 €
-4,242,487 €
-4,241,552 €
-4,240,149 €
-4,238,044 €
-4,234,887 €
-4,230,151 €
-4,223,048 €
-4,212,393 €
-4,196,410 €
-4,172,436 €
-4,136,475 €
-4,082,533 €
-4,001,621 €
-3,880,252 €
-3,698,199 €
-3,425,120 €
-3,015,501 €
-2,401,072 €
-1,479,429 €
-96,964 €
1,976,733 €
5,087,279 €
9,753,097 €
16,751,825 €
27,249,917 €
42,997,055 €
66,617,761 €
102,048,821 €
155,195,411 €
234,915,295 €
354,495,122 €
533,864,862 €
802,919,472 €
1,206,501,387 €
1,811,874,260 €
2,719,933,570 €
4,082,022,533 €
6,125,155,979 €
9,189,856,148 €
13,786,906,401 €
20,682,481,781 €
31,025,844,851 €
46,540,889,456 €
69,813,456,363 €
72,993,817,656 €
100,000,000,000 €
-4,243,628 €
-4,243,263 €
-4,242,716 €
-4,241,895 €
-4,240,663 €
-4,238,815 €
-4,236,043 €
-4,231,886 €
-4,225,650 €
-4,216,295 €
-4,202,264 €
-4,181,217 €
-4,149,646 €
-4,102,290 €
-4,031,256 €
-3,924,704 €
-3,764,877 €
-3,525,137 €
-3,165,526 €
-2,626,110 €
-1,816,985 €
-603,299 €
1,217,231 €
3,948,025 €
8,044,217 €
14,188,505 €
23,404,937 €
37,229,585 €
57,966,556 €
89,072,013 €
135,730,199 €
205,717,477 €
310,698,395 €
468,169,772 €
704,376,837 €
1,058,687,435 €
1,590,153,332 €
2,387,352,176 €
3,583,150,444 €
5,376,847,845 €
8,067,393,946 €
12,103,213,099 €
18,156,941,827 €
27,237,534,920 €
40,858,424,560 €
61,289,759,018 €
91,936,760,707 €
137,907,263,239 €
206,863,017,038 €
310,296,647,736 €
465,447,093,784 €
698,172,762,855 €
729,976,375,784 €
1,000,000,000,000 €
-4,237,059 €
-4,233,409 €
-4,227,934 €
-4,219,721 €
-4,207,403 €
-4,188,925 €
-4,161,209 €
-4,119,634 €
-4,057,272 €
-3,963,729 €
-3,823,415 €
-3,612,943 €
-3,297,235 €
-2,823,674 €
-2,113,331 €
-1,047,818 €
550,452 €
2,947,858 €
6,543,966 €
11,938,128 €
20,029,371 €
32,166,236 €
50,371,534 €
77,679,479 €
118,641,398 €
180,084,277 €
272,248,594 €
410,495,070 €
617,864,784 €
928,919,356 €
1,395,501,213 €
2,095,373,999 €
3,145,183,177 €
4,719,896,945 €
7,081,967,596 €
10,625,073,574 €
15,939,732,540 €
23,911,720,989 €
35,869,703,663 €
53,806,677,673 €
80,712,138,689 €
121,070,330,213 €
181,607,617,499 €
272,413,548,427 €
408,622,444,820 €
612,935,789,409 €
919,405,806,293 €
1,379,110,831,618 €
2,068,668,369,607 €
3,103,004,676,589 €
4,654,509,137,063 €
6,981,765,827,773 €
7,299,801,957,061 €
Table 9. Scenario 1, Net present values for different levels of consequences
As it can be seen on Table 5, if consequences are on the 100,000 € range (this would imply that there
are no fatalities), even if we have full certainty that an attack will occur and will be successful, the
implementation of the security measure is not cost-efficient.
- 64 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
4.6.
1.0
Scenario 2: Arson in commercial area
4.6.1.
This scenario is based around an arson attempt made in the commercial part of the concourse area in
level -1. The fire is initiated in a poorly attended area which allows the arsonist to operate without being
detected. The fire spreads quickly reaching a point where it can’t be controlled, thanks to the lack of fire
detection and suppression system.
It is assumed that there is a visual signalling system in place so that the occupants of the buildings can
identify clearly the exits and escape. However the efficiency of the signals is reduced after a short
period of time due to the effects of the smoke.
As there is no automatic fire detection system, there is no automatic alarm sounded off. However there
is a manual alarm system that has been activated letting the passengers know that there is a fire and
that they need to evacuate the building.
4.6.2.
Consequences
4.6.2.1.
The basis for the behaviour of the public has been taken from SECURESTATION Deliverable 6.2 R[2],
where the following assumptions have been taken:
Number of passengers in Level -2 (Platform/metro): 1,539.
Number of passengers in Level -1 (concourse): 668.
Number of passengers in Level 0 (street level): 214.
All passengers begin to evacuate at the same time.
The evacuation choice is by shortest distance egress points available.
Given those assumptions the evacuation curve (egress count) for the whole station is represented in
Figure 11.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Figure 11. Egress count model for whole station
The main results from the simulation are:
Level -2 clears in 2 minutes and 43 seconds.
Level -1 clears in 3 minutes and 32 seconds.
Entire model clears in 4 minutes and 3 seconds
However, it is expected that the effects of the fire and smoke will alter these results. Fire spread by
convection is very dangerous and causes large number of injuries and deaths. When fires start in
enclosed spaces such as buildings, the smoke rising from the fire gets trapped by the ceiling and then
spreads in all directions to form an ever-deepening layer over the entire room space. The smoke will
pass through any holes or gaps in the walls, ceiling and floor into other parts of the building. The heat
from the fire gets trapped in the building and the temperature rises. Smoke produced by a fire also
contains toxic gases which are harmful to people. A fire in a building with modern fittings and materials
generates smoke that is thick and black, obscures vision, causes great difficulty in breathing and can
block the escape routes.
Therefore, it is expected that even though the station has been designed to speed up the evacuation
process there will be some fatalities and injuries due to the effects of the fire.
Although there are no general rules in the literature to assess the number of fatalities and injuries given
a particular fire, there are a number of software tools that can be used to simulate the effects of the fire.
As a general approximation and in a worst case scenario, the following victims will be considered:
1% of the total occupants of Level -1 in the station at the time of the incident result in fatalities
10% of the total occupants of Level -1in the station at the time of the incident result in serious
injuries
15% of the total occupants of Level -1in the station at the time of the incident result in light
injuries
- 66 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
However, the effects of increasing or decreasing number of victims can be seen in the consequences
sensitivity analysis.
The total number of victims and its cost can be seen in Table 10 .
7
11,923,800 €
67
16,032,000 €
100
1,903,800 €
29,859,600 €
Fatalities
Severe Injuries
Light Injuries
TOTAL
Table 10. Scenario 2. Fatalities and injuries
4.6.2.2.
Assets, infrastructure and reconstruction costs
If the fire has grown to be uncontrollable before the fire squads appear, it is reasonable to assume that
most of the building will have been damaged, particularly the -1 and -2 levels.
The total cost of reconstruction will be inferior to the cost of construction because part of the systems
and installations will not suffer extensive damage and will not need to be completely replaced, but it
can be used as a rough approximation.
In order to assess the reconstruction cost the reference figures from the Turner and Townsend report of
construction costs R[43] and the average value of 2,400 € / m2 from Table 7 are used. Hence, the total
cost of reconstruction if damage in two levels is assumed, will be an area of approximately 31.000 m 2
which has a cost of around 74,4 M€.
4.6.2.3.
The attack in the commercial area, does not affect critical service infrastructures necessary to provide
service. However, if the fire grows uncontrolled, it will surely affect operational infrastructures. If that is
the case, then the service unavailability time will be longer, as these structures will have to be repaired
or substituted.
Therefore, considering that service infrastructure is damaged by the fire, the amount of time necessary
to recover the service will be assumed to be six days for this scenario. Taking a downtime of 6 days,
and using the data in section 4.2.4, the total income lost will be around 6,750,000 €
The number of days of unavailability of the commercial areas is different from the core transportation
service. As the fire is ignited in the commercial area it will be the most affected by the damage. For the
purposes of this study, a total of 45 days of downtime in the commercial area will be used. Taking into
account the data in section 4.2.4, the total income lost is around 2,700,000 €
Thus, total income lost as a result of a disruption both in the primary service and in the commercial
area would be around 9,450,000 €
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Date:
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Revision:
1.0
4.6.2.4.
Therefore, considering the suppositions in section 4.2.5, the cost of alternative transport will be around
€950,000.
4.6.2.5.
Although the assumptions described in section 4.2.6 indicate that an approximation to the income lost
due to psychological and perception factors will be around 10% of the total yearly income, these
conditions can change due to the nature of the attack. An attack with more traditional means like
explosive devices (vehicle borne, personal or planted) is bound to cause a different level of fear and
anxiety and fear than an arson attack as the potential effects are more devastating (higher number of
fatalities), even if they are performed by the same individual or organization. Even though the amount
of income lost may be different, for consistency reasons, the same figure as in other scenarios will be
considered.
4.6.2.6.
Total costs described in previous sections are represented in the following table:
TOTAL
29,859,600 €
19.1%
74,400,000 €
9,450,000 €
950,000 €
42,000,000 €
156,659,600 €
47.5%
6.0%
0.6%
26.8%
The main proportion of the total consequences (47.5%) is the damage and reconstruction costs, while
fatalities and injuries is around 19% of the total consequences.
4.6.3.
The security measure evaluated is a fire detection and suppression system which is comprised of three
main components:
Fire detection subsystem
Fire suppression subsystem: sprinklers
Control subsystem
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Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Fire detection
A key aspect of fire safety is to identify a developing fire emergency in a timely manner, and to alert the
building's occupants and fire authorities. Depending on the fire scenario, type of building, and number
and type of occupants, fire detection systems can provide several functions. First they provide a means
to identify an emerging fire; they alert building occupants to a fire emergency and the need to evacuate.
Another common function is the transmission of an alarm notification signal to the fire department or
other emergency response organization. They may also shut down electrical, air handling systems or
special process operations, and they may be used to initiate automatic suppression systems.
Smoke and fire detectors are crucial in life safety applications. As the name implies, these devices are
designed to identify a fire while in its smouldering or early flame stages, replicating the human sense of
smell. The most common fire detectors are spot type units, which are placed along ceilings or high on
walls. They operate on either an ionization or photoelectric principle, with each type having advantages
in different applications. For large open spaces such as galleries and atria, a frequently used smoke
detector is a projected beam unit. This detector consists of two components, a light transmitter and a
receiver, that are mounted at some distance (up to 100m) apart. As smoke migrates between the two
components, the transmitted light beam becomes obstructed and the receiver is no longer able to see
the full beam intensity. This is interpreted as a smoke condition, and the alarm activation signal is
transmitted to the fire alarm panel.
The key advantage of smoke detectors is their ability to identify a fire while it is still in its incipiency. As
such, they provide added opportunity for emergency personnel to respond and control the developing
fire before severe damage occurs.
Control subsystem
The control panel is the "brain" of the fire detection and alarm system. It is responsible for monitoring
the various alarm "input" devices such as manual and automatic detection components, and then
activating alarm "output" devices such as horns, bells, warning lights, emergency telephone dialers,
and building controls. Control panels may range from simple units with a single input and output zone,
to complex computer driven systems that monitor several buildings over an entire area.
Fire suppression
For most fires, water is the ideal extinguishing agent. Most systems use fire sprinklers to deliver water
by direct application onto flames and heat, which causes cooling of the combustion process and
prevents ignition of adjacent combustibles. They are most effective during the fire's initial flame growth
stage, while the fire is relatively easy to control. A sprinkler with an integrated detector will identify the
fire's heat, initiate alarm, and begin suppression within moments after flames appear. In most instances
sprinklers will control fire advancement within a few minutes of their activation, which will in turn result
in significantly less damage than otherwise would happen without sprinklers.
Sprinkler systems are essentially a series of water pipes that are supplied by a reliable water supply. At
selected intervals along these pipes are independent valves known as sprinkler heads. Some sprinkler
systems also include an alarm to alert occupants and emergency forces when sprinkler activation (fire)
occurs.
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partners.
Date:
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Revision:
1.0
Figure 12. Sprinkler system diagram
4.6.3.1.
Cost of the security measure
The Turner & Townsend survey R[43] provides cost rates (€ per square meter) for installing fire
detection and sprinkler systems in different countries around the world, which include the cost of the
system itself. CRTM (Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid) has also provided rates for the
installation of such systems in Spain. Table 12 shows the different cost rates.
Germany
77 € / m2
Ireland
United Kingdom
Spain (source: CTRM)
AVERAGE
70 € / m2
37 € / m2
33 € / m2
54 € / m2
Table 12. Cost rates of sprinkler system installation
For the purposes of this study, an average of the different cost rates has been taken. That would lead
to a total installation cost of around 1,700,000 €. As the system is almost fully automated, there will be
little need for training or other expenses. Therefore, the CAPEX will be equal to the installation cost.
Annual operation costs for this kind of systems can be disregarded as it is very low compared to the
installation costs. Annual operation costs include inspection, maintenance and replacement costs.
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Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Sprinkler systems generally have a long life-span and evidence suggests that they require limited
maintenance overall, however a value of 2,000 € per year will be used for the study.
Regarding the average lifetime of fire detection and suppression systems, R[44] suggests a lifetime of
50 years, while R[45, 46] use a period of 20 years. For the purposes of this study, a period of 20 years
will be used as average lifetime of the system.
4.6.3.2.
As we have seen before, the Risk Reduction factor is defined by.
probability that there is an attack and it will be successful, that is:
For the purposes of this study it is assumed that the probability reduction factor is 1, that is, the
probability of a successful arson attack is not modified by the installation of the fire detection and
suppression system (Π1 = Π2), only the consequences are affected.
Some publications R[45] indicate that the installation of fire detection and suppression systems shows
a reduction in damaged area by 73% ~ 82%. Other publications R[44, 47] estimate the effectiveness of
the systems in three different categories: Fatalities, 70% reduction, Injuries 30% reduction and Property
damage 50% reduction. SECURESTATION SEST-RAM methodology R[1] estimates an 80%
reduction, i.e. a φm factor of 0.2
For the purposes of this study a global consequence mitigation factor φm of 0.2 is used, that is, the total
monetary value of the consequences is reduced by 80% (C2 = 0.2  C1). Therefore
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
4.6.4.
1.0
As it is shown in section 4.6.3.2 the risk reduction is defined by
Where
CAPEX: is the capital expenditure or initial investment, assumed to take place in time 0. 1,7 M€
OPEX: is the annual operative expenditure : 2,000€
RRmn: is the Risk Reduction factor
Given that the Risk Reduction factor depends on Π1 and C1, the cost efficiency of the investment in the
security measure varies with Π1, provided that the consequences are those described in section
4.6.2.6.
Figure 13 represents the present value of the investment with respect to Π1.
Figure 13 . Scenario 2. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.2
For the conditions defined for this scenario, cost efficiency is achieved when Π1 is around 0.10%.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
It is useful to compare the effects of different consequences reduction factors to analyse the costeffectiveness under different circumstances. The lower φm is, (the more the consequences are reduced
by the use of the security measure) the lower the probability of succesfull attack will be necessary to
achieve cost-effectiveness. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the cost-effectiveness of the security
measure for two different values of φm. When φm is 0.1 (which means that consquences are reduced
by 90%), cost-effectiveness is achieved for probablity of successful attack of Π1=0.09%, while when φm
is 0.5 (consequences are reduced by 50%), cost-effectiveness is achieved for Π1=0.16%.
Figure 14. Scenario 2. Cost-efficiency of security measure for φm=0.1
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Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
With regard to the consequences, a sensitivity analysis has been performed in order to explore how the
cost-effectiveness of the security measure varies with the monetary value of the consequences.
of successful attack Π1 (or PA1 V1).
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Date:
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Revision:
1.00E-09
1.5E-09
2.25E-09
3.375E-09
5.0625E-09
7.59375E-09
1.13906E-08
1.70859E-08
2.56289E-08
3.84434E-08
5.7665E-08
8.64976E-08
1.29746E-07
1.9462E-07
2.91929E-07
4.37894E-07
6.56841E-07
9.85261E-07
1.47789E-06
2.21684E-06
3.32526E-06
4.98789E-06
7.48183E-06
1.12227E-05
1.68341E-05
2.52512E-05
3.78768E-05
5.68151E-05
8.52227E-05
0.00013
0.00019
0.00029
0.00043
0.00065
0.00097
0.00146
0.00218
0.00328
0.00491
0.00737
0.01106
0.01659
0.02488
0.03732
0.05598
0.08397
0.12595
0.18892
0.28339
0.42508
0.63762
0.95643
1.00000
1,000 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,178 €
-1,727,176 €
-1,727,174 €
-1,727,170 €
-1,727,165 €
-1,727,157 €
-1,727,145 €
-1,727,127 €
-1,727,101 €
-1,727,060 €
-1,727,000 €
-1,726,910 €
-1,726,775 €
-1,726,572 €
-1,726,268 €
-1,725,811 €
-1,725,127 €
-1,724,100 €
-1,722,559 €
-1,720,248 €
-1,716,782 €
-1,716,308 €
10,000 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,178 €
-1,727,177 €
-1,727,174 €
-1,727,171 €
-1,727,167 €
-1,727,160 €
-1,727,149 €
-1,727,134 €
-1,727,110 €
-1,727,075 €
-1,727,022 €
-1,726,943 €
-1,726,824 €
-1,726,646 €
-1,726,379 €
-1,725,978 €
-1,725,377 €
-1,724,476 €
-1,723,123 €
-1,721,095 €
-1,718,052 €
-1,713,487 €
-1,706,640 €
-1,696,370 €
-1,680,965 €
-1,657,857 €
-1,623,195 €
-1,618,458 €
100,000 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,178 €
-1,727,177 €
-1,727,175 €
-1,727,173 €
-1,727,168 €
-1,727,162 €
-1,727,153 €
-1,727,139 €
-1,727,119 €
-1,727,088 €
-1,727,042 €
-1,726,972 €
-1,726,868 €
-1,726,712 €
-1,726,477 €
-1,726,125 €
-1,725,598 €
-1,724,806 €
-1,723,619 €
-1,721,838 €
-1,719,166 €
-1,715,159 €
-1,709,148 €
-1,700,132 €
-1,686,607 €
-1,666,320 €
-1,635,890 €
-1,590,245 €
-1,521,777 €
-1,419,075 €
-1,265,021 €
-1,033,942 €
-687,323 €
-639,955 €
1,000,000 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,177 €
-1,727,176 €
-1,727,174 €
-1,727,170 €
-1,727,165 €
-1,727,157 €
-1,727,144 €
-1,727,126 €
-1,727,099 €
-1,727,059 €
-1,726,998 €
-1,726,906 €
-1,726,769 €
-1,726,563 €
-1,726,254 €
-1,725,791 €
-1,725,096 €
-1,724,054 €
-1,722,490 €
-1,720,145 €
-1,716,627 €
-1,711,349 €
-1,703,434 €
-1,691,560 €
-1,673,750 €
-1,647,035 €
-1,606,962 €
-1,546,853 €
-1,456,690 €
-1,321,444 €
-1,118,576 €
-814,274 €
-357,820 €
326,860 €
1,353,880 €
2,894,411 €
5,205,207 €
8,671,400 €
9,145,080 €
10,000,000 €
-1,727,181 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,178 €
-1,727,176 €
-1,727,174 €
-1,727,171 €
-1,727,167 €
-1,727,159 €
-1,727,149 €
-1,727,133 €
-1,727,109 €
-1,727,074 €
-1,727,020 €
-1,726,940 €
-1,726,819 €
-1,726,638 €
-1,726,367 €
-1,725,960 €
-1,725,350 €
-1,724,435 €
-1,723,063 €
-1,721,004 €
-1,717,915 €
-1,713,282 €
-1,706,333 €
-1,695,909 €
-1,680,273 €
-1,656,820 €
-1,621,639 €
-1,568,869 €
-1,489,713 €
-1,370,979 €
-1,192,878 €
-925,726 €
-524,999 €
76,092 €
977,729 €
2,330,184 €
4,358,866 €
7,401,889 €
11,966,424 €
18,813,227 €
29,083,430 €
44,488,735 €
67,596,694 €
102,258,631 €
106,995,430 €
CONSEQUENCES
100,000,000 €
1,000,000,000 €
-1,727,180 €
-1,727,170 €
-1,727,179 €
-1,727,164 €
-1,727,178 €
-1,727,156 €
-1,727,177 €
-1,727,144 €
-1,727,175 €
-1,727,126 €
-1,727,172 €
-1,727,098 €
-1,727,168 €
-1,727,057 €
-1,727,162 €
-1,726,995 €
-1,727,153 €
-1,726,902 €
-1,727,139 €
-1,726,763 €
-1,727,118 €
-1,726,554 €
-1,727,087 €
-1,726,240 €
-1,727,040 €
-1,725,770 €
-1,726,969 €
-1,725,065 €
-1,726,863 €
-1,724,007 €
-1,726,705 €
-1,722,420 €
-1,726,467 €
-1,720,039 €
-1,726,109 €
-1,716,469 €
-1,725,574 €
-1,711,113 €
-1,724,770 €
-1,703,079 €
-1,723,565 €
-1,691,028 €
-1,721,758 €
-1,672,951 €
-1,719,046 €
-1,645,836 €
-1,714,979 €
-1,605,164 €
-1,708,878 €
-1,544,156 €
-1,699,727 €
-1,452,643 €
-1,686,000 €
-1,315,375 €
-1,665,410 €
-1,109,472 €
-1,634,524 €
-800,617 €
-1,588,196 €
-337,336 €
-1,518,704 €
357,587 €
-1,414,466 €
1,399,971 €
-1,258,108 €
2,963,546 €
-1,023,572 €
5,308,910 €
-671,767 €
8,826,955 €
-144,060 €
14,104,023 €
647,500 €
22,019,625 €
1,834,840 €
33,893,028 €
3,615,851 €
51,703,132 €
6,287,366 €
78,418,289 €
10,294,640 €
118,491,023 €
16,305,550 €
178,600,125 €
25,321,915 €
268,763,778 €
38,846,463 €
404,009,257 €
59,133,285 €
606,877,476 €
89,563,518 €
911,179,804 €
135,208,867 €
1,367,633,297 €
203,676,891 €
2,052,313,536 €
306,378,927 €
3,079,333,894 €
460,431,981 €
4,619,864,431 €
691,511,561 €
6,930,660,237 €
1,038,130,932 €
10,396,853,946 €
1,085,498,927 €
10,870,533,895 €
1.0
10,000,000,000 €
-1,727,072 €
-1,727,018 €
-1,726,936 €
-1,726,814 €
-1,726,630 €
-1,726,355 €
-1,725,942 €
-1,725,323 €
-1,724,394 €
-1,723,001 €
-1,720,911 €
-1,717,776 €
-1,713,074 €
-1,706,021 €
-1,695,441 €
-1,679,572 €
-1,655,767 €
-1,620,060 €
-1,566,500 €
-1,486,160 €
-1,365,650 €
-1,184,885 €
-913,737 €
-507,015 €
103,068 €
1,018,192 €
2,390,879 €
4,449,908 €
7,538,453 €
12,171,270 €
19,120,495 €
29,544,333 €
45,180,090 €
68,633,725 €
103,814,178 €
156,584,857 €
235,740,876 €
354,474,905 €
532,575,947 €
799,727,511 €
1,200,454,857 €
1,801,545,876 €
2,703,182,405 €
4,055,637,197 €
6,084,319,387 €
9,127,342,670 €
13,691,877,596 €
20,538,679,984 €
30,808,883,566 €
46,214,188,939 €
69,322,146,999 €
103,984,084,089 €
108,720,883,579 €
100,000,000,000 €
-1,726,093 €
-1,725,550 €
-1,724,734 €
-1,723,511 €
-1,721,677 €
-1,718,925 €
-1,714,796 €
-1,708,604 €
-1,699,316 €
-1,685,384 €
-1,664,486 €
-1,633,138 €
-1,586,117 €
-1,515,585 €
-1,409,788 €
-1,251,091 €
-1,013,046 €
-655,979 €
-120,378 €
683,023 €
1,888,125 €
3,695,778 €
6,407,258 €
10,474,477 €
16,575,306 €
25,726,549 €
39,453,413 €
60,043,711 €
90,929,156 €
137,257,325 €
206,749,577 €
310,987,956 €
467,345,524 €
701,881,877 €
1,053,686,405 €
1,581,393,199 €
2,372,953,388 €
3,560,293,673 €
5,341,304,099 €
8,012,819,739 €
12,020,093,199 €
18,031,003,389 €
27,047,368,674 €
40,571,916,601 €
60,858,738,492 €
91,288,971,328 €
136,934,320,582 €
205,402,344,463 €
308,104,380,285 €
462,157,434,018 €
693,237,014,617 €
1,039,856,385,517 €
1,087,224,380,417 €
1,000,000,000,000 €
-1,716,308 €
-1,710,872 €
-1,702,718 €
-1,690,487 €
-1,672,140 €
-1,644,619 €
-1,603,339 €
-1,541,418 €
-1,448,536 €
-1,309,214 €
-1,100,231 €
-786,757 €
-316,545 €
388,773 €
1,446,750 €
3,033,716 €
5,414,164 €
8,984,837 €
14,340,846 €
22,374,859 €
34,425,879 €
52,502,408 €
79,617,203 €
120,289,395 €
181,297,682 €
272,810,114 €
410,078,761 €
615,981,731 €
924,836,187 €
1,388,117,871 €
2,083,040,397 €
3,125,424,186 €
4,688,999,869 €
7,034,363,394 €
10,552,408,681 €
15,829,476,612 €
23,745,078,508 €
35,618,481,352 €
53,428,585,618 €
80,143,742,017 €
120,216,476,616 €
180,325,578,515 €
270,489,231,363 €
405,734,710,634 €
608,602,929,542 €
912,905,257,903 €
1,369,358,750,445 €
2,054,038,989,258 €
3,081,059,347,478 €
4,621,589,884,807 €
6,932,385,690,801 €
10,398,579,399,792 €
10,872,259,348,794 €
As it happens with Scenario 1, when consequences are on the level of hundred thousands of Euros,
even if there is absolute certainty that a successful attack will take place, the inclusion of the security
measure will not be cost-efficient. However, it is difficult that these conditions will materialize, because
even a small fire can cause damages beyond that figure. Therefore, this security measure can be
considered to be highly cost-efficient.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
4.7.
1.0
Scenario 3: PIH dispersion in platform
4.7.1.
This scenario is based upon the release of a toxic gas: Sarin. The gas is released by one individual
(one single source of contamination) using an aerosol container in the -2 level of the station, the
platform area. The attack is carried out during the morning rush-hour period.
Sarin is a human-made chemical toxic agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most
toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. Sarin is a clear, colourless, and
tasteless liquid that has no door in its pure form. Sarin is the most volatile of the nerve agents; it can
evaporate quickly from a liquid into a vapour and spread into the environment. People can be exposed
to the vapour even if they do not come in contact with the liquid form of Sarin. Because it evaporates so
quickly, Sarin presents an immediate threat.
The amount of harm caused by Sarin depends on the method used for its release. The more effective
the release method is, the greater the damage is caused. For example in the 1995 Tokyo subway
attacks the Sarin was released by piercing container that contained Sarin in liquid form R[37]. This
attack resulted in twelve fatalities and 5,000 people injured; however, the method used was not very
effective. If a more sophisticated method of attack had been used (such as aerosol canisters), the gas
could have been more easily dispersed and the potential damage to people could have been much
greater.
The extent of poisoning caused by Sarin depends on the amount of Sarin to which a person was
exposed, how the person was exposed, and the length of time of the exposure. Symptoms likely will
appear within a few seconds after exposure to the vapour form of Sarin. People may not know that they
were exposed because Sarin has no door. People exposed to a low or moderate dose of Sarin by
breathing contaminated air may experience some or all of the following symptoms (among others)
within seconds to hours of exposure: eye pain, blurred vision, cough, diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting,
drowsiness, weakness, altered heart rate and blood pressure. Exposures to large doses (for a large
period of time in low concentration or for a short period of time in large concentration) may lead to loss
of consciousness, paralysis, and respiratory failure and death.
4.7.2.
Consequences
The consequences of a toxic gas attack are mainly fatalities and injuries, as normally no assets or
structures are damaged. Nevertheless once the attack is detected and the station is closed, some
decontamination activities need to be carried out before the station can be reopened. Therefore, there
will be income lost due to the lack of service. The income lost as a result of fear, anxiety etc. is also
reflected in the consequences.
4.7.2.1.
The number of fatalities and injuries can be estimated by using the exposure levels tolerable and the
results from the simulations from in SECURESTATION Deliverable 5.1 Part B R[3]. The simulations
output the area affected where the concentration reaches levels that can be harmful to the human body
at a particular height (1,50 m average mouth and nose height), 3 minutes after the toxic agent is
released (the amount of agent used in the simulations is supposed to be fully dispersed in 180
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seconds). Therefore it is possible to estimate the approximate proportion of passengers who may suffer
injury or fatality, using the standing crowd density and the affected areas. The effect of a coming train,
which produces a significant change in the air distribution, has not been considered in this particular
case.
The number of fatalities is highly dependent on the efficiency of the dispersion method, for example,
the Tokyo Sarin attacks resulted in only 12 fatalities R[40]. The US Government Accountability Office
estimates that a similar attack carried out in a more efficient way in New York could cause up to 6,000
fatalities R[24].
Depending on the crowd density in the station, fatalities and injuries vary substantially. In a crowded
platform during the rush hour period, the density could be 0.5 p/m 2 and higher. However, during low
traffic periods the density can be 0.1 p/m2 and lower. Table 15 and Table 16 show the number of
fatalities and injuries and the economic value for the scenario considered with different standing crowd
densities.
Therefore, the economic value of the fatalities and injuries can vary from 35 M€ to 172 M€. For the
purposes of this study, a value of 103.6 M€ will be used, which correspond to a density of 0.3 p/m 2.
Area
2
Fatalities
333.8 m
Severe Injuries
69.9 m2
0.1 p/m2
17
0.3 p/m2
50
0.5 p/m2
83
20
60
100
Table 15. Scenario 3. Fatalities and injuries
Fatalities (€)
Severe Injuries (€)
TOTAL
0.1 p/m2
30,345,000 €
0.3 p/m2
89,250,000 €
0.5 p/m2
148,155,000 €
4,800,000 €
14,400,000 €
24,000,000 €
35,145,000 €
103,650,000 €
172,155,000 €
Table 16. Scenario 3. Economic value of fatalities and injuries
4.7.2.2.
Decontamination
The train cars and subway stations exposed to Sarin in the Tokyo incident were decontaminated with
water and detergent combined with industrial-strength cleansers. It was quickly applied and then
washed off. The decontamination was performed by both military personnel and fire fighters. It took
about 3 hours and 20 min on two of the lines, and was completed 9.5 hours after the release occurred.
On the third line it took about 15 hours and was completed 21 hours after the release.
In the case under study the decontamination would be similar to the Tokyo attacks, and it would be
carried out by local, national or regional authorities, therefore, the cost would not be borne by the
station and/or train operator . Consequently, this cost will be excluded from the consequences analysis.
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4.7.2.3.
1.0
The attack in the platform area, affects critical service infrastructures. The decontamination process
involved would involve closing the station for some time to perform the necessary actions to ensure
safety for the passengers. The Tokyo subway was reopened two days after the attack R[48], therefore,
considering a similar attack, but with better release mechanisms (aerosol canisters instead of
punctured containers) a 3-day decontamination process would be reasonable. Using the data in section
4.2.4, the total income lost will be around 3.375 M€
The number of days of unavailability for the commercial would be the same as for the core
transportation service area, as the decontamination would affect the whole station (and probably
surrounding areas) using the data in section 4.2.4. the total income lost is around € 135,000
Therefore, total income lost as a result of service disruption would be around 3.51 M€
4.7.2.4.
Therefore, considering the assumptions in section 4.2.5, the cost of alternative transport will be around
€ 950,000.
4.7.2.5.
The assumptions described in section 4.2.6 indicate that an approximation to the income lost due to
psychological and perception factors will be around 10% of the total yearly income: 42 M€.
4.7.2.6.
Total costs described in previous sections are represented in Table 17:
TOTAL
103,650,000 €
69.0%
- €
0.0%
3,510,000 €
950,000 €
42,000,000 €
150,110,000 €
2.3%
0.6%
28.0%
As expected, for this kind of attack, the main part of the total consequences corresponds to Fatalities
and injuries (69 %), the other important factor is the income lost to fear, anxiety, etc., which amounts to
28%.
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4.7.3.
1.0
The security measure used for this study is a toxic gas detection system capable of detecting several
types of toxic gases like Sarin, Tabun, Soman, Cyclosarin, Mustard Gas, Hydrogen Cyanide, etc.
Usually, this type of detectors uses a 2-array sensor solution. The first array consists of Surface
Acoustic Wave (SAW) micro-sensors used to detect nerve and blister agents. SAW sensors are
piezoelectric crystals that detect the mass of chemical vapours absorbed into chemically selective
coatings on the sensor surface. This absorption causes a change in the resonant frequency of the
sensor. The internal microcomputer measures these changes and uses them to determine the
presence and concentration of chemical agents. The secondary array is an optional configuration of
electrochemical cells and is employed for broad detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs).
A series of fixed units containing these detectors can be placed in areas in the station at risk, as well as
in the ventilation system. Commercial units are capable of communicating with a wide variety of
systems through both wireless and wired connections. A central control system
Basic considerations for installing a fixed system are:
To install it so that it will monitor every part of the station or premises where a risk exists.
The system must give early warning of the presence and location of gas in order to initiate one
or more of the following:
o evacuation of the premises
o control of ventilation
The units draw air from the surroundings 6-20 meters around through fans and continually monitor the
presence of toxic substances (each 5 seconds for electrochemical cells and 30 seconds for SAW
sensors). Once the substance is detected, an alarm is raised in the detection unit and it is
communicated to the central control system, then, the threat protocol can be initiated, which will involve
control of the ventilation and evacuation of the premises. Commercial units, normally have both
acoustic and visual alarms. The fixed units are placed 6-20 meters apart, to allow detection in the
whole area.
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Figure 16. Example of toxic gas detection units used in a train platform
In the station model used for the simulations, the two rail lines are around 16 meters apart, which would
mean that a series of detection units would be needed in each of the three platforms. Given this
condition, around 15 detection units (5 for each platform) would be needed to cover the entire platform
area.
4.7.3.1.
The Risk Reduction factor is defined by.
probability that there is an attack and it will be successful.
For this particular security measure, it is expected that the assimilation of the detection system would
interfere in the intention of the adversary to attack, knowing that the attack will be less successful by
the presence of the security measure, thus altering the probability of attack, but for simplicity purposes
it will be disregarded. Consequently, it is assumed that the security measure influences only in the
reduction of the consequences of the attack.
The consequences reduction factor assumes that in order for the security measure to be effective,
there should be an evacuation procedure in place and both security and operational personnel should
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have received training in order to lead the evacuation of the station. There is also the assumption that
the detection system is connected to the HVAC system, so the air flow can be modified as a response
to an alarm being raised. Simulations R[3] show that the effect of ventilation can be detrimental
depending on the number of changes of air per hour. From the simulations performed for Sarin and VX
agent, slow ventilation (3 air changes per hour) cause a small improvement, reducing the area over
which fatalities will occur. However, at the higher rates there is a greater dilution and mixing of the
Sarin and VX agents with air, causing them to be dispersed at still lethal concentrations over a wider
area.
The SEST-RAM R[1] indicates that a the assimilation of a system for the detection of biological hazards
would reduce the consequences up to 75%, consequently a value for φm 0.25 will be used.
Thus, the Risk Reduction factor would be:
4.7.3.2.
Cost of the security measure
A guide published by de Department of Justice of the US R[49] provides a review and description of the
available sensor / detection systems in the market for both military and civil applications. Together with
the description an indication of unit costs (cost of the equipment including the cost of all consumables
and support equipment) is provided, which includes an average of service and maintenance costs.
For fixed detection systems, an average value is around 106,000 $ (in 2012 prices) per unit, which
would translate to around 78,250 €. Bringing the total cost of the equipment to around 1.17 M€.
The installation cost of the system varies depending on the nature of the detection unit. A wireless
system doesn’t need data cables to be laid out, thus reducing the costs of installation. For the purposes
of this study the installation cost is estimated to be 100,000 € which is around 10% of the total cost of
the equipment.
Therefore the total CAPEX would be around 1,27 M€.
The guide by the US DoJ R[49] provides information about average maintenance cost of detection
systems. The sensors inside the detection units are the critical part of the system and need to be
calibrated regularly, this process can be expensive. The guide by the US DoJ R[49] estimates that for
some fixed systems the annual maintenance cost provided by the manufacturer can be between 1020% of the unit cost. Assuming a 20% factor, the annual OPEX would be around 235,000 €.
As modern systems are relatively easy to operate, with the application graphical user interfaces and
central control, the training cost of the personnel can be disregarded.
The average lifetime of commercial detection systems is between 10 and 20 years, including a change
of sensors every 2-3 years. In this particular case a lifetime of 15 years will be used.
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4.7.4.
1.0
Where
CAPEX: is the capital expenditure or initial investment, assumed to take place in time 0. 1,27
M€
OPEX: is the annual operative expenditure : 235,000€
RRmn: is the Risk Reduction factor of the security measure “m” in period “n”
As the Risk Reduction factor depends on Π1 and C1, the cost efficiency of the investment in the security
measure varies with Π1, given that the consequences are those described in section 4.7.2.6
Figure 17 represents the present value of the investment with respect to Π1.
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For this scenario, cost efficiency is achieved when Π1 is around 0.33%.
As with the other scenarios, the effects of different consequences reduction factors are analysed in
order to test the cost-effectiveness under different circumstances. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the
cost-effectiveness of the security measure for two different values of φm, that is, two different levels of
consequences reduction. When φm is 0.1 (which means that consquences are reduced by 90%), costeffectiveness is achieved for probablity of successful attack of Π1=0.26%, while when φm is 0.5
(consequences are reduced by 50%), cost-effectiveness is achieved for Π1=0.47%.
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A sensitivity analysis with different levels of economic value of consequences, from 1000 € to 1 Billion
€ has been performed in order to explore which probability of attack values make the security measure
cost-efficient.
of successful attack Π1 (or PA1  V1).
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1.00E-09
1.5E-09
2.25E-09
3.375E-09
5.0625E-09
7.59375E-09
1.13906E-08
1.70859E-08
2.56289E-08
3.84434E-08
5.7665E-08
8.64976E-08
1.29746E-07
1.9462E-07
2.91929E-07
4.37894E-07
6.56841E-07
9.85261E-07
1.47789E-06
2.21684E-06
3.32526E-06
4.98789E-06
7.48183E-06
1.12227E-05
1.68341E-05
2.52512E-05
3.78768E-05
5.68151E-05
8.52227E-05
0.00013
0.00019
0.00029
0.00043
0.00065
0.00097
0.00146
0.00218
0.00328
0.00491
0.00737
0.01106
0.01659
0.02488
0.03732
0.05598
0.08397
0.12595
0.18892
0.28339
0.42508
0.63762
0.95643
1.00000
1,000 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,567 €
-3,886,566 €
-3,886,563 €
-3,886,559 €
-3,886,553 €
-3,886,544 €
-3,886,530 €
-3,886,510 €
-3,886,479 €
-3,886,433 €
-3,886,364 €
-3,886,260 €
-3,886,104 €
-3,885,871 €
-3,885,521 €
-3,884,996 €
-3,884,208 €
-3,883,026 €
-3,881,254 €
-3,881,012 €
10,000 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,568 €
-3,886,566 €
-3,886,564 €
-3,886,560 €
-3,886,555 €
-3,886,547 €
-3,886,535 €
-3,886,517 €
-3,886,490 €
-3,886,450 €
-3,886,389 €
-3,886,298 €
-3,886,161 €
-3,885,956 €
-3,885,649 €
-3,885,188 €
-3,884,496 €
-3,883,459 €
-3,881,903 €
-3,879,569 €
-3,876,068 €
-3,870,817 €
-3,862,940 €
-3,851,124 €
-3,833,401 €
-3,830,979 €
100,000 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,568 €
-3,886,567 €
-3,886,565 €
-3,886,562 €
-3,886,557 €
-3,886,550 €
-3,886,539 €
-3,886,524 €
-3,886,500 €
-3,886,464 €
-3,886,411 €
-3,886,331 €
-3,886,211 €
-3,886,031 €
-3,885,762 €
-3,885,357 €
-3,884,750 €
-3,883,839 €
-3,882,473 €
-3,880,424 €
-3,877,351 €
-3,872,740 €
-3,865,825 €
-3,855,452 €
-3,839,892 €
-3,816,553 €
-3,781,544 €
-3,729,031 €
-3,650,260 €
-3,532,105 €
-3,354,872 €
-3,330,652 €
1,000,000 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,567 €
-3,886,566 €
-3,886,563 €
-3,886,559 €
-3,886,553 €
-3,886,543 €
-3,886,529 €
-3,886,509 €
-3,886,477 €
-3,886,431 €
-3,886,360 €
-3,886,255 €
-3,886,097 €
-3,885,860 €
-3,885,505 €
-3,884,972 €
-3,884,173 €
-3,882,973 €
-3,881,175 €
-3,878,476 €
-3,874,429 €
-3,868,358 €
-3,859,251 €
-3,845,591 €
-3,825,101 €
-3,794,366 €
-3,748,264 €
-3,679,110 €
-3,575,380 €
-3,419,784 €
-3,186,391 €
-2,836,301 €
-2,311,166 €
-1,523,463 €
-341,910 €
1,430,421 €
1,672,623 €
10,000,000 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,571 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,568 €
-3,886,566 €
-3,886,564 €
-3,886,560 €
-3,886,555 €
-3,886,547 €
-3,886,535 €
-3,886,516 €
-3,886,489 €
-3,886,448 €
-3,886,386 €
-3,886,294 €
-3,886,155 €
-3,885,947 €
-3,885,635 €
-3,885,167 €
-3,884,465 €
-3,883,413 €
-3,881,833 €
-3,879,465 €
-3,875,911 €
-3,870,581 €
-3,862,586 €
-3,850,594 €
-3,832,606 €
-3,805,623 €
-3,765,149 €
-3,704,438 €
-3,613,372 €
-3,476,772 €
-3,271,873 €
-2,964,523 €
-2,503,499 €
-1,811,964 €
-774,660 €
781,296 €
3,115,229 €
6,616,130 €
11,867,480 €
19,744,505 €
31,560,043 €
49,283,351 €
51,705,366 €
CONSEQUENCES
100,000,000 €
1,000,000,000 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,565 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,563 €
-3,886,570 €
-3,886,559 €
-3,886,569 €
-3,886,552 €
-3,886,568 €
-3,886,543 €
-3,886,567 €
-3,886,529 €
-3,886,565 €
-3,886,508 €
-3,886,562 €
-3,886,476 €
-3,886,557 €
-3,886,429 €
-3,886,550 €
-3,886,357 €
-3,886,539 €
-3,886,250 €
-3,886,523 €
-3,886,090 €
-3,886,499 €
-3,885,850 €
-3,886,463 €
-3,885,489 €
-3,886,409 €
-3,884,948 €
-3,886,328 €
-3,884,137 €
-3,886,206 €
-3,882,920 €
-3,886,023 €
-3,881,094 €
-3,885,749 €
-3,878,355 €
-3,885,339 €
-3,874,247 €
-3,884,722 €
-3,868,085 €
-3,883,798 €
-3,858,842 €
-3,882,412 €
-3,844,978 €
-3,880,332 €
-3,824,182 €
-3,877,213 €
-3,792,987 €
-3,872,533 €
-3,746,195 €
-3,865,515 €
-3,676,007 €
-3,854,986 €
-3,570,725 €
-3,839,194 €
-3,412,802 €
-3,815,506 €
-3,175,917 €
-3,779,973 €
-2,820,590 €
-3,726,674 €
-2,287,599 €
-3,646,725 €
-1,488,113 €
-3,526,802 €
-288,884 €
-3,346,918 €
1,509,959 €
-3,077,092 €
4,208,224 €
-2,672,352 €
8,255,622 €
-2,065,242 €
14,326,719 €
-1,154,578 €
23,433,363 €
211,419 €
37,093,331 €
2,260,414 €
57,583,281 €
5,333,907 €
88,318,207 €
9,944,146 €
134,420,597 €
16,859,504 €
203,574,181 €
27,232,542 €
307,304,557 €
42,792,098 €
462,900,120 €
66,131,433 €
696,293,466 €
101,140,435 €
1,046,383,484 €
153,653,937 €
1,571,518,512 €
232,424,191 €
2,359,221,054 €
350,579,573 €
3,540,774,866 €
527,812,645 €
5,313,105,585 €
552,032,801 €
5,555,307,145 €
1.0
10,000,000,000 €
-3,886,515 €
-3,886,488 €
-3,886,446 €
-3,886,383 €
-3,886,290 €
-3,886,149 €
-3,885,938 €
-3,885,621 €
-3,885,146 €
-3,884,434 €
-3,883,365 €
-3,881,762 €
-3,879,358 €
-3,875,752 €
-3,870,342 €
-3,862,228 €
-3,850,056 €
-3,831,798 €
-3,804,412 €
-3,763,333 €
-3,701,714 €
-3,609,285 €
-3,470,642 €
-3,262,677 €
-2,950,730 €
-2,482,810 €
-1,780,929 €
-728,108 €
851,124 €
3,219,971 €
6,773,242 €
12,103,148 €
20,098,008 €
32,090,297 €
50,078,731 €
77,061,383 €
117,535,360 €
178,246,325 €
269,312,773 €
405,912,445 €
610,811,953 €
918,161,214 €
1,379,185,107 €
2,070,720,946 €
3,108,024,704 €
4,663,980,342 €
6,997,913,799 €
10,498,813,984 €
15,750,164,261 €
23,627,189,677 €
35,442,727,801 €
53,166,034,987 €
55,588,050,590 €
100,000,000,000 €
-3,886,015 €
-3,885,737 €
-3,885,320 €
-3,884,695 €
-3,883,757 €
-3,882,350 €
-3,880,239 €
-3,877,073 €
-3,872,323 €
-3,865,200 €
-3,854,514 €
-3,838,485 €
-3,814,443 €
-3,778,378 €
-3,724,282 €
-3,643,137 €
-3,521,421 €
-3,338,845 €
-3,064,982 €
-2,654,188 €
-2,037,996 €
-1,113,709 €
272,722 €
2,352,368 €
5,471,838 €
10,151,043 €
17,169,849 €
27,698,060 €
43,490,375 €
67,178,848 €
102,711,557 €
156,010,621 €
235,959,218 €
355,882,112 €
535,766,454 €
805,592,966 €
1,210,332,735 €
1,817,442,388 €
2,728,106,867 €
4,094,103,586 €
6,143,098,664 €
9,216,591,282 €
13,826,830,209 €
20,742,188,599 €
31,115,226,184 €
46,674,782,561 €
70,014,117,127 €
105,023,118,977 €
157,536,621,750 €
236,306,875,911 €
354,462,257,152 €
531,695,329,013 €
555,915,485,037 €
1,000,000,000,000 €
-3,881,012 €
-3,878,232 €
-3,874,063 €
-3,867,809 €
-3,858,428 €
-3,844,356 €
-3,823,248 €
-3,791,587 €
-3,744,095 €
-3,672,857 €
-3,566,000 €
-3,405,714 €
-3,165,286 €
-2,804,644 €
-2,263,680 €
-1,452,234 €
-235,066 €
1,590,687 €
4,329,316 €
8,437,260 €
14,599,175 €
23,842,048 €
37,706,358 €
58,502,823 €
89,697,520 €
136,489,565 €
206,677,633 €
311,959,735 €
469,882,888 €
706,767,618 €
1,062,094,712 €
1,595,085,354 €
2,394,571,317 €
3,593,800,261 €
5,392,643,677 €
8,090,908,801 €
12,138,306,487 €
18,209,403,016 €
27,316,047,809 €
40,976,014,999 €
61,465,965,784 €
92,200,891,962 €
138,303,281,228 €
207,456,865,128 €
311,187,240,977 €
466,782,804,751 €
700,176,150,413 €
1,050,266,168,905 €
1,575,401,196,642 €
2,363,103,738,249 €
3,544,657,550,659 €
5,316,988,269,274 €
5,559,189,829,513 €
As it happens with other Scenarios, when consequences are on the range of hundred thousands of
Euros, even if there is absolute certainty that a successful attack will take place, the introduction of the
security measure will not be cost-efficient. Nevertheless, it is difficult to envisage that an attack with
Sarin gas will result in this level of consequences, as even the Tokyo attacks which were considered to
be relatively inefficient resulted in 12 fatalities.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
5.
1.0
Conclusions
A terrorist attack can have dramatic consequences for both victims and society in general. A socioeconomic analysis tries to assess all the effects of a terrorist attack, not only those directly related to it.
The impact of a terrorist attack can be divided into direct and indirect consequences of it, as well as
short and long lasting consequences.
It can be considered as direct consequences those that take place as an immediate result of the attack,
such as damage to buildings and property and loss of life and injuries. Conversely, indirect
consequences are those that result from a change in the behaviour of the social patterns or the
economic system as a consequence of the attack, such as changes in lifestyle, investment and
consumption patterns, new security measures put in place, etc.
While direct consequences are usually straight forward to calculate, indirect consequences are more
difficult to estimate, and largely depend on factors such as the magnitude of the terrorist attack,
whether the attack is isolated or is part of a campaign of attacks, the perpetrators of the attack, the
country, the method used for the attack, etc.
5.1.
Direct consequences
With respect to direct consequences, the most challenging to calculate is the economic value of
fatalities and injuries. Even though there are many approaches to this evaluation, one of the most
widely used is the evaluation used is the one based on the willingness to pay (WTP) which leads to the
value of a statistical life (VSL), injury, etc. However, this methodology produces different values
depending on the general socio-economic level of the state or region for which it is calculated, as the
willingness to pay to reduce the likelihood of fatalities is different depending on the economic status.
Despite of this fact, it is recommended to use this methodology to establish the economic value of
fatalities and injuries.
Direct consequences are easy to calculate ex-post. However, it is difficult to estimate the economic
value before the attack has taken place. Thanks to computer simulation techniques it is possible to
estimate the areas of impact of an attack with explosives, fire or other types of attacks. The area of
impact of the attack can be used to estimate many direct consequences derived from the attack such
as:
Number of fatalities and injuries and their value
Hospitalization costs
First response costs
Damaged assets and property
Clearing/isolation of the area under impact
Other direct consequences estimations can be based on the activity of the station, or network. The
amount of passengers and flow of trains, subway trains, and buses can be used to estimate the cost of
a period in which the station would be closed as a result of an attack. It can also be used to estimate
the number of passengers that would need to be transported by alternative means to their destinations.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
5.2.
1.0
Indirect consequences
Indirect consequences are much more problematic to estimate, as they arise as the result of a change
in behaviour in the public in general, caused by the terrorist attack. Although there are studies that
analyse the indirect impact of several terrorist attacks, like 9/11 or the Madrid Bombings, there is no
general model that can be used to estimate indirect consequences ex-ante.
Some of the indirect consequences are borne by the public transport operator (PTO) like the loss of
income as a result of passengers modifying their normal usage patterns of public transport, while other
consequences are borne by society in general, like the impact on the tourist industry as a result of
tourists cancelling travel plans to the region or country in the wake of an attack.
Indirect consequences include:
Loss of income for the PTO/IM and other PTOs/IMs due to fear, anxiety, brand image, etc.
Extra insurance costs derived from the attack
General impact on the economy.
The general impact on the economy at macroeconomic level depends on many variables; however
detrimental effects in various sectors of the economy as a result of terrorist attacks have been
documented:
Tourism
Foreign and local investment
Consumption and savings
Stock markets
Foreign trade.
Urban economy
5.3.
Cost-benefit analysis of security measures
When facing the decision of investing in a security measure, a number of considerations need to be
made, and among them, the cost-efficiency of the security measure should be taken into account.
The most used tool to evaluate the profitability of an investment is a cost benefit analysis of the security
measure. The analysis is based on the monetary evaluation of the benefits and costs that the
implementation of the security measure would bring.
The evaluation of the cost of a security measure should take into account the expenditure being made
in order to implement the security measures, such as installation costs, staff, maintenance, etc. and
other costs that include the effect that such measures have on the PTO/IM business, such as the
acceptability of the security measure by the passengers, the changes in the management of operations
(increased delays caused by screening, modification of the station premises in order to implement
particular safeguards, etc.).
Benefits can be evaluated by using the SEST-RAM methodology R[1], calculating the risk reduction
effect that the implementation of the security measure would cause, either by reducing the probability
of attack, the vulnerability and/or mitigating the consequences of the attack.
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partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Given both, costs and benefits, the present value of the costs and the benefits is calculated in order to
measure the cost-effectiveness of the security measure.
As the benefits depend largely on the probability of the attack, vulnerability and consequences
reduction effect, it is recommended to perform a sensitivity analysis using different values for these
parameters in order to explore the cost-effectiveness under different circumstances.
- 88 -
partners.
Date:
30/11/2013
Revision:
1.0
Annex A. Generic tool for calculating cost-efficiency of
security measures
See MS. Excel file attached.
- 89 -
partners.

passenger station and terminal design for safety

Transcription

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