The Dark Side of Volkswagen

The Dark Side
of Volkswagen
CONTENTS
Key facts
1
Summary
2
Driving climate change
4
Volkswagen Group: The big player 8
1. Slow progress on emissions
10
2. Greenwashing the fleet
12
3. Lobbying against progress
14
Conclusion: Capable of better
20
References
22
June 2011
Published by Greenpeace International
Ottho Heldringstraat 5
1066 AZ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Cover: ©Cobbing/Greenpeace Contents: ©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
www.greenpeace.org
KEY FACTS
1.
The Volkswagen Group is the largest car maker in Europe. One in five
new cars sold in Europe is a Volkswagen brand, and by 2018, the company
aims to be the biggest car maker in the world.
2. Volkswagen claims it also wants to be ‘the most eco-friendly automaker in the
world’, yet the company has dragged its feet in reducing the fuel consumption
of its vehicle fleet, and whilst it has developed the technologies to produce
highly fuel-efficient vehicles, it has not made them widely available.
3. As the biggest car company in Europe, the Volkswagen Group has the biggest
climate footprint of any car manufacturer in Europe.
4. Volkswagen penalises consumers wanting smarter, cleaner vehicles by
artificially inflating their price and making them marginal to its fleet.
5. Just 6% of the Volkswagen Group’s global sales in 2010 were of its most
efficient models.
6. Volkswagen has a history of diverting attention from its poor overall
environmental performance by developing super-efficient prototype car
designs which never come to mass production.
7.
Volkswagen were one of the driving forces in the lobbying campaign against
the introduction of vehicle efficiency standards in Europe. It has also been part
of efforts to oppose the introduction of strong US standards.
8. The Volkswagen Group has more positions on the board of ACEA (the car
manufacturers’ association and one of the most powerful lobby forces in
Europe) than any other company. ACEA has been leading the charge against
strong fuel efficiency standards in Europe.
9.
Despite its green rhetoric, Volkswagen is opposing two vital climate policies
in Europe which are needed to drive innovation and cleaner technology in
the car sector, save drivers money, and help Europe reduce its damaging
dependence on oil.
10. The company has the capacity to do so much better. If Volkswagen made the
most fuel-efficient cars it produces as standard, rather than offering efficiency
technology as an expensive add-on, it would be able to reduce its fleet
emissions and oil consumption dramatically. If it rolled out its best technology
across the fleet it would be transformational, not just to its own performance
but to the European vehicle fleet as a whole.
Commercial
Vehicles
2
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
SUMMARY
The Volkswagen Group is the largest car maker in
Europe. It has repeatedly claimed that it wants to be a
‘green’ company, but has so far failed to live up to its
green ambitions. It has been slow to make its fleet more
efficient, despite having developed the technology
to do so, and has actively worked to impede strong
European climate policies. The company must change.
Volkswagen’s significance in the car market should not be
underestimated. By 2018, the company aims to take the
number one spot from Toyota1 to become the biggest car
maker in the world.2 The Group comprises nine well-known
brands3 and also owns a controlling stake in Porsche. One in
five new cars sold in Europe is a Volkswagen brand and the
company hopes to attain global dominance by expanding sales
in the US market and the emerging markets of China and India.
the bulk of the Volkswagen
Group’s cars continue
to be amongst the most
polluting in Europe.
SUMMARY
The company has dragged its feet in reducing the
fuel consumption of its vehicle fleet, and whilst it
has developed the technologies to produce highly
fuel-efficient vehicles, it has not made them widely
available or affordable. And despite its green rhetoric,
Volkswagen is opposing two vital climate policies which
ive
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are needed to drive innovation in Europe and cleaner
technology in the car sector, save drivers money, and
help Europe reduce its damaging dependence on oil.
If the Volkswagen Group is to live up to its promises, the
company must rapidly improve the fuel efficiency of its
products, and put its weight behind strong climate change
policies in Europe. In particular, public support from the
Volkswagen Group for an European greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission reduction target of 30% by the year
2020 would be a powerful sign that the company wants
to be a genuine leader on green issues, whilst support
for stringent car efficiency legislation would show it was
serious about improving the efficiency of its vehicles
and driving down pollution from the car industry.
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©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
Volkswagen speaks of being ‘determined to become the
world’s leading automaker in terms of both economy
and ecology’,4 and some of its models regularly feature
in top ten ‘green car’ lists.5 The company emphasises its
commitment to environmental protection within much
of its public advertising.6 Yet the bulk of the Volkswagen
Group’s cars continue to be amongst the most polluting
in Europe compared to other volume brands.7
3
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
DRIVING
CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change is fundamentally reshaping our lives.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere now exceed
by far their natural range over the last 650,000 years,
due primarily to fossil fuel use.8 Despite repeated debate
at international summits and ongoing haggling over global
agreements, the international community has so far made
only tentative progress toward reducing global emissions.
The burning of oil in vehicle engines creates significant
amounts of GHG emissions. While the overall emissions
in Europe are falling, decreasing 11% between 1990 and
2008, those from transport increased by 24% in the same
period13, and are still rising.14 The European Environment
Agency estimates that cars are the single largest source of
transport emissions, representing around half of the total.
Europe is currently committed to unilateral action to reduce
its GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by the year
2020. Yet this target is now hopelessly out of date. It is not
ambitious enough to drive much needed investments in Europe’s
green economy. It does not reflect the scale and speed of the
growing clean technology sector in other major economies
(particularly China, now the world’s largest single investor in
renewable energy). It is also insufficient to ensure the continued
functioning of Europe’s flagship climate policy, the Emissions
Trading Scheme; or to ensure that Europe is on target to meet
its own long term goal of an 80–95% emissions cut by 2050.
This year, European governments are discussing the need to
strengthen the 2020 target, to a 30% cut below 1990 levels.
A study commissioned by the German government concluded
that such a target could boost investment in Europe’s green
economy and increase European GDP by ¤620 billion by 2020.9
Agreeing a 30% target for domestic emissions reductions
by 2020 is also a critical step in rebuilding confidence in the
international negotiations on climate change, where this
commitment would give new weight to Europe’s efforts to
build a broad coalition of nations committed to action.
Currently, the EU imports around 85% of the oil it consumes.
As its few domestic reserves are declining, this dependence
on imports may increase to at least 90% by 2030.15 If this
happens, risky and dangerous unconventional oil extraction
methods like deep water drilling and tar sands production are
likely to make up a greater proportion of EU oil consumption.
Globally, it has been estimated that up to 13% of oil production
currently comes from unconventional sources – with
probably more than 75% of this coming from deep water
oil, while the second largest contributor is tar sands.16 With
oil companies now eyeing up potential reserves in the Arctic
(which is thought to contain less than three years’ worth of
oil based on current global consumption17), it could only be a
matter of time before cars on Europe’s roads are fuelled by
oil coming from dangerous drilling in pristine Arctic waters.
The EU currently consumes around 670 million tonnes of oil
a year10 (equivalent to around 13.68 millions of barrels of oil
per day11), with the EU’s transport sector using around 60% of
that, a proportion that is projected to grow to 65% by 2030
without additional policy changes. Over half of the oil consumed
by the EU’s transport sector is used by cars and vans.12
It could only be a matter
of time before cars
on Europe’s roads are
fuelled by oil coming from
dangerous drilling in
pristine Arctic waters.
©Arthur J D/Greenpeace
4
5
©Cobbing/Greenpeace
DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE
6
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
Above: Greenpeace scientists research depletion of
Arctic sea ice. ©Cobbing/Greenpeace
Right: As the ‘easy to reach oil’ is running out, oil
companies are turning to tar sands – the dirtiest of
all oil – to meet the demand. ©Rezac/Greenpeace
Far right: BP’s Deepwater Horizon explosion caused
the worst oil spill in US history, killing 11 workers
and leaking millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of
Mexico. ©The United States coastguards
These marginal barrels are expensive to extract, commanding a
high oil price to be profitable. High oil prices in turn contribute
to economic and geopolitical instability, both by driving up
transport costs for businesses, and by contributing to higher
food prices and increased military tensions in producer
regions. At the same time, high oil prices increase the risk of
a return to recession during a fragile economic recovery.
Regardless of their price, burning through the world’s
remaining fossil fuel reserves also exposes us to the risks
of catastrophic climate change. In the most recent World
Energy Outlook published by the IEA, the ‘business as usual’
scenario (including ‘business as usual oil consumption’) is
shown to be consistent with a six degree increase in global
average temperatures.18 The potentially devastating impacts
of higher atmospheric CO2 levels, combined with higher global
temperatures, are likely to be far reaching and could lead to the
extinction of many species, reduced diversity of ecosystems,19
and adversely affect hundreds of millions of people.20
The alternative is clear – the world needs to go beyond oil
by putting in place policies which will dramatically reduce
consumption of oil. The IEA World Energy Outlook suggests that
global oil consumption must peak in 2018 and drop below today’s
levels by 2030 (alongside cuts in emissions from other sectors)
if we want to prevent the worst impacts of climate change.21
One important step, along with other policies, is to improve
the fuel efficiency of vehicles and shift to smaller vehicles.
EU legislation passed in 2009 requires an ongoing improvement
in the fuel efficiency of new cars sold in Europe. Despite strongly
opposing the introduction of the legislation, the car sector has
since shown that fuel consumption can be dramatically reduced,
simply through the deployment of existing technologies. Several
car makers are now on track to meet their mandatory 2015
targets ahead of time, with Toyota having already almost met
its target six years early – yet Volkswagen has consistently
lagged behind.22 Car makers have also shown they are capable
of producing electric vehicles that produce no emissions at
all, if they are powered from renewable energy sources.
Tough but achievable vehicle efficiency standards of 50g CO2/km
for cars and 88g CO2/km for vans by 2030 could reduce the oil
consumption of the EU’s transport sector by around 13%, or
1.1 million barrels a day, compared to business as usual. 23 This is
equivalent to approximately the total petroleum consumption of
Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Finland combined24 and
would represent an economy-wide reduction of 8% in the EU.25
DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE
MEASURING EMISSIONS: WHAT THE NUMBERS MEAN
About 70% of the world’s transportation GHG emissions are
now under regulation by national governments. The United
States, European Union, Japan, China, Australia, Canada and
South Korea have all adopted vehicle efficiency standards.
In some cases these standards began as voluntary guidelines;
all but Australia’s are now mandatory. Mexico plans to announce
fuel efficiency standards soon, and India, Indonesia, and Thailand
are drawing up regulations.26
Around the world, the fuel efficiency of vehicles is measured in
different ways.
In Europe, vehicles are rated by how many grams of CO2 they
emit for every kilometre they are driven. This is described as
XXg CO2/km. Measurements are mandatory for all models and
carried out according to an EU procedure.
In Germany, it is also common to describe a car’s efficiency by
how many litres of fuel it consumes for every 100km travelled,
shortened to X L/100km.
The two values can be converted using a simple calculation since
one litre of gasoline produces, when burned, approximately
2.3kg of CO2 (petrol) or 2.6kg of CO2 (diesel) respectively.
For example, the usual way of describing the fuel consumption
of the ‘Golf 1.4 with 59kW’ is to say it emits 149g CO2/km,
or consumes 6.4 litres of gasoline.
In the US, vehicles are rated by how many miles they will go
for every gallon of fuel, described as XXmpg. Measurement
procedures differ so numbers cannot easily be converted
and compared with European values. However, these are the
approximate comparisons to help the reader:
EU
Germany
US
95g CO2/km
4.1 L/100km (petrol) 62mpg
130g CO2/km
5.6 L/100km (petrol) 52mpg
SEVERAL CAR MAKERS ARE NOW ON TRACK TO MEET THEIR
MANDATORY 2015 TARGETS AHEAD OF TIME, WITH TOYOTA
HAVING ALREADY ALMOST MET ITS TARGET SIX YEARS EARLY
WHILST VOLKSWAGEN HAS CONSISTENTLY LAGGED BEHIND.
7
8
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
volkswagen group:
the big player
Part owned by state-owned oil company, Qatar Petroleum,27
and the German state of Lower Saxony, the Volkswagen
Group operates 62 production plants in 15 European
countries and in the Americas, Asia and Africa.28 In 2010,
the Group increased the number of vehicles produced to
7.2 million, giving it an 11.4% share of the world passenger
car market.29 The Volkswagen Group sold nearly three
million passenger cars in Europe in 2010, meaning that
one in five new cars (21%) was a Volkswagen brand.30
This dominance is even more pronounced in particular
segments of the car market. Across Europe, the ‘compact’ or
small family car is now the most popular size of car in terms
of sales. In Germany, the biggest car market in Europe, the
compact class has, according to the German Federal Motor
Transport Authority (KBA), a share of nearly 28% of the
total market.31 In this segment in Germany, every third car
is a Volkswagen.32 The Volkswagen Golf is so popular that
the whole class is often referred to as the ‘Golf class’.33
The Volkswagen Group’s size, power and influence all make it
a major player in global car markets, and the dominant player
in Europe. That in turn means that its influence can be used
for good or ill when the need arises for car manufacturers
to shoulder their environmental responsibilities.
In recent years, despite claims to the contrary, Volkswagen
has used that influence to stand firmly against action on
climate change. It has done so in three key ways.
VEHICLE EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION
In 2009, a continental car efficiency standard was put in place
by the EU. It required that by 2015 the average emissions from
all cars sold in Europe must not exceed 130g of CO2 per km
driven. Under the legislation, each manufacturer was allocated
a different target, reflecting the differences in average weight
and CO2 performance of vehicles at the time of the introduction
of the law. The targets were based on the average weight of the
cars produced by each manufacturer. So, for example, BMW‘s
target is 138g CO2/km as they make big, heavy cars, whilst Fiat
has a target of 116g CO2/km, reflecting the fact that they make
small vehicles. Overall, the system is designed so that across the
whole European fleet, the average emissions of new vehicles
should be 130g CO2/km by 2015.
Volkswagen were one of the driving forces in the lobbying
campaign against the introduction of these vehicle efficiency
standards.
On 26 January 2007, Volkswagen joined other German car
companies to send a letter to European Commissioners asking
them to reconsider proposals to impose a mandatory target of no
more than 120g CO2/km for new cars sold in Europe by 2012.
The companies claimed that this target was ‘technically not
accomplishable’ and would constitute ‘a massive industrial
political intervention at the expense of the entire European,
and especially the German, automobile industry’. They did not
hesitate to evoke the spectre of massive industrial destabilisation.
‘The direct consequence would be the migration of a large
number of jobs from European production plants of automobile
manufacturers and the supplier industry’.34 From a huge employer
such as Volkswagen, this statement could be construed as a
serious threat, particularly as it came only two months after the
company had announced restructuring plans that could result in
the loss of up to 4,000 jobs in the Brussels region.35
In reality, these threats were unfounded. Several car makers are
now on track to meet their 2015 targets ahead of time, with
Toyota having already almost met its target six years early.36
When the vehicle efficiency legislation was set, a more ambitious
medium term target of 95g CO2/km was also included for 2020.
The details of how that target must be achieved will be decided
in a review in the next couple of years. A new target also needs to
be set for 2025.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
9
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
Volkswagen has used its influence to stand
firmly against action ON climate change.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
10
1. Slow progress on emissions
The Volkswagen Group has the biggest climate footprint of any
car manufacturer in Europe. Figure 1 estimates that the new
cars sold by the company in 2009 emitted over five million
tonnes of CO2 per year,37 representing an estimated 23% of the
total oil use and related CO2 emissions of new European cars.38
The sheer scale of Volkswagen’s carbon footprint means
that any changes it makes have a big impact on European
vehicle emissions as a whole. Yet despite the company’s
claims to leadership, its performance to date has been poor.
Between 2006 and 2009, Volkswagen managed to reduce
its fleet’s average per-kilometre emissions by 7.8%, whereas
rivals BMW and Toyota achieved reductions of 18% and
14% respectively. Preliminary figures for 2010 show that
Volkswagen slightly accelerated progress during 2010, lowering
the CO2 emissions of its European fleet by about 5%, but the
company still lags behind most of the other volume brands.39
Whilst this progress should be recognised, it is important to
remember that the company has reacted late and only moved
FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS OF NEW CARDS SOLD IN EUROPE IN 2009
23%
Greenpeace calculation based on T&E data.
Fiat
Honda
Toyota
General Motors
PSA Peugot-Citroen
Mazda
Renault
BMW
Hyundai
VW Group
Suzuki
Nissan
Ford
Daimler
11
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
to do the absolute minimum necessary to comply with EU
legislation, of which the company was a powerful opponent
before it was agreed.40 Volkswagen only stepped up its
game on CO2 reductions once a legal framework was put in
place that forced all companies to make cleaner cars. When
compelled to improve its technology, Volkswagen proved that
its own objections to current standards were unfounded.
Volkswagen only stepped
up to reduce CO2 reductions
once a legal framework
was put in place that forced
companies to do so.
figure 2: Car manfacturers’ progress in reducing average fleet emissions
Reduction in CO2 emissions between 2006–2009 (%)
20
18
BMW
16
Bubble size refers to amount of annual sales.
Hyundai
14
Toyota
Suzuki
12
Mazda
Daimler
Ford
10
Fiat
Nissan
VW Group
8
6
General Motors
PSA Peugot-Citroen
4
Renault
Honda
2
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Distance from 2015 emissions target in 2009 (g CO2/km)
24
26
28
Volkswagen’s position in figure 2 shows it is both further away from its 2015 emissions target and has made less progress in reducing emissions than other volume brands
Source T&E.
30
12
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
FIGURE 3: Volkswagen GROUP EUROPEAN CAR SALES IN 2009 BY EFFICIENCY RATING
100
90
80
26%
>160g/km
Percentage of car sales
70
60
50
40
62%
>121–160g/km
30
20
10
0
11%
Less than 121g/km
More than 121g/km
Unknown
CO2 emissions
EU commission, 2009, Monitoring of CO2 emissions, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/cars_en.htm Source EU Commission.
2. GREENWASHING THE FLEET
Volkswagen may have been slow at reducing its fleet’s
emissions, but it’s not slow to boast about its supposed
green credentials. The company claims it wants to be ‘the
world’s leading automaker in terms of both economy and
ecology’,41 and its 2009 Sustainability Report went so far
as to say: ‘We aim to be the most eco-friendly automaker
in the world!’ 42 According to the same report, this will be
achieved by ‘setting new ecological standards in automobile
manufacturing in order to put the cleanest, most economical
and at the same time most fascinating cars on the road.’43
Yet these words are not matched by actions. Official EU
Commission figures for 2009 show that 88% of their vehicles
emitted over 120g CO2/km, and that the company sold over
twice as many cars emitting over 160g CO2/km than they
did of cars emitting under 120g CO2/km (see figure 3).
The Volkswagen Group’s models which regularly feature
in top ten ‘green car’ lists,44 and are used in company
advertising to emphasise its commitment to environmental
protection45 are limited versions of standard models –
not representative of the bulk of its actual sales.
In its 2010 Sustainability Report, the company itself admits
that ‘(b)etween 2007 and 2010, worldwide sales of efficiency
models of the Group’s Audi, Volkswagen, Volkswagen Commercial
Vehicles, SEAT and Škoda brands rose by a factor of 12, from
32,500 to 402,400 units’. 46 These brands make up 99% of the
company’s global sales, which means that even with this increase,
only 5.6% of the total sales for these five brands (and 6% of its
total global sales) were of models incorporating its most efficient
technology and standards.47 Currently, the Volkswagen Group
does not apply its most efficient technology and standards to
all its vehicle models. Only particular models are available as
‘efficiency models’, and these are sold under additional brands.
For example, the most efficient Škoda models are badged as
‘greenline’ models, whilst particular models of Volkswagen cars
can be bought with added ‘BlueMotion’ technologies which make
them more fuel-efficient. There are nearly 70 different variations
of the Volkswagen Golf. Its most efficient ‘BlueMotion’ model
has an efficiency rating of 99g CO2/km (3.8 L/100km, diesel).
But the majority of the Golf models without BlueMotion emit
more than 130g CO2/km (petrol) and 120g CO2/km (diesel),
with some variations emitting as much as 199g CO2/km
(8.5 L/100km, petrol). The cheapest and most basic model of
the Golf emits 149g CO2/km – emitting 50 grams more CO2 per
km than the most efficient BlueMotion version on the market.48
Volkswagen’s ‘efficiency’ versions of their cars are also sold at
a much higher price than the standard models. In Germany, the
Golf BlueMotion 1.6 TDI 77 kW is sold at ¤21,850, whereas
the comparable Golf 1.6 TDI 77 kW without BlueMotion costs
¤20,825, a discrepancy of nearly ¤1,000. Comparing costs
for the Volkswagen Polo, this discrepancy is even bigger.
The Polo 1.2 TDI (99g/km) is sold at ¤15,050 where as the
1.2 TDI BlueMotion version (87g/km) is sold at ¤16,675 – a
difference of ¤1,625.49 The actual cost of the technology
package, according to leading technology consultants PA
Consulting, would only be ¤260, suggesting that Volkswagen
is adding a considerable mark-up for the BlueMotion brand.50
Just 6% of THE Volkswagen
Group’s global sales in
2010 were of its most
efficient models.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
13
If Volkswagen incorporated the efficiency technology and
specifications of its current greenest cars ‘as standard’
rather than offering it only as an add-on and charging a
premium for it, the company could dramatically reduce
the carbon footprint of its vehicles, help consumers to
reduce their motoring costs and the oil dependence of
the economy. Continued innovation and investment in the
development of cleaner car technology and new hybrid and
electric engines can cut oil use and reduce emissions much
further. Other car companies are already demonstrating this.
Instead Volkswagen penalises consumers wanting smarter,
cleaner vehicles and makes them marginal to its fleet.
©Dott/Greenpeace
Rolling out BlueMotion standards across all the models of these
brands would considerably decrease oil consumption and CO2
emissions. According to Volkswagen’s own numbers the full
implementation of the existing BlueMotion package in the Golf
saves almost one litre of fuel per 100km or 20g CO2/km.51 This is
a dramatic difference in oil consumption, and would save drivers
significant amounts of money on the cost of fuel, particularly at
a time when fuel prices are high, and expected to get higher.
Volkswagen penalises
consumers wanting
smarter cleaner vehicles
and makes them marginal
to its fleet.
In comparison, Ford has said that one of its principles is
to provide ‘near-term solutions that are affordable for
our customers and available in high volumes.’52 Ford’s
new Focus model, the main competitor to Volkswagen’s
Golf, will come at less than 95g CO2/km in 2012.53
VOLKSWAGEN: A HISTORY OF GREENWASH
Volkswagen has a history of diverting attention from its poor
overall environmental performance by developing super-efficient
prototype car designs that result in the production of more
headlines than actual vehicles.
The most prominent of these was the 3-litre Lupo, launched in
1998. With fuel consumption of 2.99 litres of diesel per 100 km
and emissions of 81g CO2/km, it was a genuinely efficient car.
Two years earlier Greenpeace had helped to demonstrate that
affordable, efficient cars were possible by developing the SmILE
(Small, Intelligent, Light, Efficient) concept car, which emitted only
75g CO2/km. The SmILE project showed that the then existing
technology could be used to halve the fuel consumption of a
car without any loss of power, performance and comfort, and
importantly, without additional cost.54
Yet Volkswagen marketed its efficient vehicle at such a high price
that it simply didn’t sell. Today the failure of the Lupo is often
cited by Volkswagen to argue that customers don’t want to buy
fuel-efficient vehicles, but it is reasonable to argue that they
set it up to fail.
In 2005 at the Frankfurt International Motorshow, Volkswagen
then presented its version of the SmILE concept. But instead of
halving consumption, the new vehicle maintained the same fuel
consumption, using the efficiency savings of the new technology
to double the car’s performance in terms of horsepower,
acceleration, and speed. Thus the Volkswagen TSI, mass produced
from 2006, used cutting-edge efficiency technology to make no
carbon savings whatsoever.
In 2002 Volkswagen had presented the 1-litre CCO which needed
1 litre of fuel per 100km driven. Company chairman Ferdinand
Piech arrived at that year’s AGM in one of the concept vehicles.
It never entered into mass production.
At the 2009 Frankfurt motorshow Volkswagen exhibited the
1-litre CCO’s successor, the L1. Piech claimed that it was this car,
with a consumption according to Volkswagen of 1.38 litres of
diesel per 100km that was intended to be the basis for a mass
production vehicle in 2010. Again, the car never made it to the
mass market.
At the Qatar motorshow in January 2011, yet another new
version of the car was unveiled: a plug in diesel hybrid rated at
0.9 L/100 km or 24g CO2/km. This time the concept was called
‘near to series’ and Volkswagen claimed that this model would
enter mass production in 2013. According to reports however,
this is not the case and only a limited number will be produced.55�
It remains to be seen whether Volkswagen will ever become
serious about bringing genuinely high efficiency cars to the mass
market, and rolling out its BlueMotion standards across its fleet,
instead of only at the margins.
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
©Cobbing Greenpeace
14
3. Lobbying against progress
The EU is committed to reducing its GHG emissions by
20% below 1990 levels by 2020. This year, European
governments will consider whether to strengthen
this by moving to a 30% reduction target.
A growing movement of leading European businesses, the
European Parliament and Environment Ministers from Denmark,
UK, Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Germany and Spain, have called
for a move to a 30% domestic emissions reduction target
for Europe, arguing that it will boost the European economy,
keeping it competitive, drive investment in new technology
and help improve global efforts to prevent dangerous and
damaging climate change. Over 90 major companies such as
Google, Ikea, Sony, Unilever and Philips support a 30% target,
many of whom have signed public statements in support of this
more ambitious target.56 Companies, politicians and academics
say the targets can set the right incentives for businesses
to spur innovation and investment and create millions of
new jobs in a low carbon economy. Many of the businesses
have described a stronger target as a ‘win-win-win’.57
A 30% domestic emissions
reduction target for
Europe could boost
the European economy,
drive investment in new
technology and help
improve global efforts to
prevent dangerous and
damaging climate change.
These companies are acting with the support of their
customers. According to the latest Eurobarometer opinion
poll, a majority of Europeans consider that not enough is being
done to fight climate change and almost two-thirds think that
fighting climate change can have a positive impact on the
European economy.58 Several studies, including the European
Commission’s own analysis, demonstrate that Europe’s unilateral
commitment to reducing emissions by 30% by 2020 is not
only possible and affordable, it is necessary to create new
green jobs, guarantee Europe’s energy security, improve air
quality and ‘avoid stranded costs and very steep reductions to
be needed later on’59 which would be much more costly.60
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
15
Over 90 major companies
such as Google, Ikea,
Sony, Unilever and Philips
support a 30% emissions
reduction target.
Left: Clean graffiti by the European
Parliament demands more efficient cars.
©Reynaers/Greenpeace
Above: Greenpeace activists accuse car
companies of driving climate change.
©Beentjes/Greenpeace
Campaigning against change
Yet despite this clear popular and business demand, Volkswagen
has been actively lobbying against this crucial policy through
the European Automobile Manufacturer’s Association
(ACEA).61 In another letter dated 1 February 2011, replying
to a Greenpeace request to explain Volkswagen’s stance on
the 30% proposal, the company described it as a policy which
‘puts jobs at risk and results in de-industrialisation in Europe’,
reminiscent of language it used when lobbying against the
current vehicle efficiency standards. The company were
wrong about efficiency standards then, and their position
now on a future 30% target contradicts the findings of many
of the most respected bodies that have conducted extensive
analysis into the impacts of the target. The mainstream view
makes the case that benefits of the target could include new
jobs, increased investment, as well as increased GDP.62
Volkswagen seems increasingly isolated in its stance, however,
as other car companies appear to take a different view. For
example, General Motors (GM), despite stating that they
were ‘not in a position to speak for other industries and
as a consequence has no position on the 30% reduction
ambition level as such’, say that they, ‘agree with the need
to further reduce GHG emissions in road transport and are
involved in EU policies and legislation aimed to develop a
strategy to decarbonizes [sic] transport by 2050’.63
Renault meanwhile has said it ‘brings its support to the European
Commission, in order to evaluate the possibilities, the benefits
and the different impacts on the competitiveness of an EU
30% emission cut’.64 The Renault-Nissan alliance is a member
of the Prince of Wales EU Corporate Leaders Group on Climate
Change (EU CLG) whose mission is to ‘communicate the support
of business for the European Union to move to a low carbon
society and low climate risk economy and to work in partnership
with the institutions of the EU to secure the policy interventions
that are needed to make this a practical reality’.65 Renault have
signed a joint statement in support of a higher 2020 target,66
but haven’t yet openly supported a 30% reduction target.
Even BMW (a high end premium brand) says it is making the
changes to its fleet so that it will ‘contribute substantially
to the European Union’s existing 20% CO2 reduction target.’
It also says that ‘the 30% target under discussion for Europe
... might be attainable, but only as long as other industry
sectors pull their weight in equal measure and provided that
the policymakers of the individual member states strengthen
their efforts to work together in a more integrated way.’67
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
16
©Langrock/Zenit/Greenpeace
Right: Former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and
VW Board Chair Ferdinand Piech admiring the VW Phaeton
at a production factory in Dresden.
Volkswagen is openly opposed to an existing
democratically established standard that benefits
motorists, the economy and the environment.
But Volkswagen is not only opposed to the 30% emissions
reduction target – the company also argues that the EU’s existing
CO2 reduction target for new cars sold by 2020, set at 95g
CO2/km, is too challenging. This target was adopted in 2009
as part of Europe’s climate and energy legislation. Again, two
of Volkswagen’s major competitors, BMW and GM, appear to
accept this target as a legal obligation that should stay in place.68
But the Volkswagen Group describes the target as ‘not based
on sound impact assessment nor on a realistic appreciation of
the costs and technical progress necessary to meet the goal
within the timescale.’69 It is not inconceivable, given its past
record, that Volkswagen is lobbying, or will lobby, to get this
target weakened in the upcoming review of its implementation.
The European Commission for Industry and Enterprise, in a report
about European industries post-recession, recently reported that
the car sector is structurally unprepared for the future. They
said, ‘demand is increasingly shifting towards more fuel efficient
vehicles and vehicles with alternative power trains […] The issue
of further restructuring in favour of more fuel efficient vehicles
and vehicles with alternative power trains still needs to be faced.
Existing capacities thus feature significant structural weaknesses.
[…] Growing competition from third countries producing cheaper
cars and limited access to emerging markets are key issues
as well. The need to continually improve the environmental,
energy and (active) safety performance of vehicles leads to
both new challenges and new opportunities for the sector.’72�
Yet research shows that the shift to tighter fuel economy
standards can create jobs, drive innovation and foster
high-tech industries supplying additional manufactured
components, as well as reducing consumption of expensive
and polluting oil. As chairman and CEO of Cummins, the US
diesel engine manufacturer explains, ‘tighter regulations are a
fact of life. Back in the ‘90s we saw this as burdensome, but
we now see this as an advantage. If we have the advantage,
either in fuel economy or emissions or both, we’re going
to gain market share, we’re going to be able to enter new
markets. As a result, we secure employment and grow the
business.’70 Former Vice-Chairman of General Motors, Bob
Lutz, argues that part of the reason why GM failed in the
US was because of poor US fuel economy standards.71
The truth is that the Volkswagen Group has lagged behind
its competitors for years. It only stepped up progress on CO2
reductions once a legal framework was put in place that forced
it to do so. It has shown no ability or willingness to voluntarily
deliver the innovation or technology changes required. Now
Volkswagen is openly opposed to the agreed 2020 standard that
would benefit motorists, the economy and the environment.
In taking this stand, the company not only betrays the fact
that it would rather keep its own vehicles’ emissions high, but
also threatens to undermine the framework which will help
the whole car manufacturing sector to clean up its act.
THE 30% TARGET: POWERING INVESTMENTS
By 2050, Europe has committed to reduce its climate
emissions to close to zero, by cutting them by between
80 and 95% below 1990 levels. Currently, it has a legally
binding mid-term target of a 20% reduction by 2020. EU
leaders are now discussing whether this should be tightened,
to drive investment into the vital clean technology sector,
and ensure that Europe is on the most cost effective
and secure pathway to achieve its long term goals.
This discussion is taking place against the backdrop of an
economic and energy crisis. Spiking fuel prices, energy
risks, climate change, resource constraints and increasing
competition with emerging economies should mean that
‘business as usual’ is not an option for the European economy.
To secure our future energy security, and build a prosperous
and resilient European economy, we need policies that will
drive investment into green technologies, goods and services,
including renewable energy and efficient, and ultimately zero
carbon, transport. Europe’s current climate target is not strong
enough to deliver that investment. Instead, the mountain of
unused emission allowances in the EU’s Emissions Trading
Scheme, the result of a weak target and too many free
allocations to polluters, means that at present there is little
reward for efficiency, action and innovation. Only a tougher
climate target – a minimum 30% domestic emissions reduction
by 2020 – can restore confidence in Europe’s clean technology
sector, and create the industries and jobs of the future.
Findings from a study73 in March 2011 commissioned by the
German environment ministry and conducted by researchers
from across Europe found that a climate target of 30%, if
accompanied with adequate and consistent policies, could:
PBoost European investments from 18% up to 22%
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
PCreate up to six million additional jobs;
PBy 2020 increase European GDP by ¤620 billion
or by 0.6% above business as usual trends;
PHelp European industry to maintain and enhance
its competitiveness.
These gains would come irrespective of an international climate
agreement, and show that the green economy is more than
another fashionable phrase. In fact, in 2010 the clean energy
sector grew globally by 30% and delivered a record ¤168 billion
in investments.74 In addition, the EU Commission has calculated
that stepping up to a 30% target would save the EU about ¤40
billion in oil and gas imports by 2020, and this is assuming a
very conservative oil price projection of 88 USD by 2020.75
On the international stage, it is also vital that Europe is seen
to be implementing and benefiting from the climate policies
it advocates globally. Demonstrating commitment to a
green economy, and showing leadership in supporting low
carbon technologies, is the surest way to restore trust and
confidence in negotiations on climate change. Ultimately,
the success of these negotiations remains vital if we are to
ensure that action keeps pace with the risks posed by rising
temperatures, and that this action is transparent, effective
and just. In the run up to the next round of climate talks in
Durban in South Africa in December 2011, a new European
target would be a significant step towards a functioning
and constructive global dialogue on climate change.
©Dott/Greenpeace
17
©Picture Alliance
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
18
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
Volkswagen has an ongoing close relationship with
the German government:
Above: Chancellor Angela Merkel poses for cameras in a
VW UP at the International Automobile Trade Fair in Frankfurt.
©Frank May/Picture Alliance
Right: Former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder awards
VW Board Chair Ferdinand Piech a state medal.
©Holger Hollemann/Picture Alliance
As one of the most powerful companies in Europe,
Volkswagen spends at least ¤2.3m per year on EU
lobbying alone.
Lobby groups and revolving doors
The Volkswagen Group is not just a big economic player in Europe,
it is a political player too. Its executives are warmly received in
European halls of government, particularly in their home country,
Germany, where Volkswagen is part-publicly owned by the state
of Lower Saxony, which has a 20% share of the company’s voting
rights and two places on its supervisory board. As Prime Minister
of Lower Saxony, this meant that Gerhard Schroeder sat on
Volkswagen’s board before he became Chancellor.
Volkswagen demonstrates a classic example of a revolving door
arrangement, in which the relationship between government
and business is extremely close. Government members and
officials are hired at Volkswagen, while former Volkswagen
employees go on to work in politics. For example, a former
spokesman for the German Federal Ministry of Transport,
Hans-Christian Maaß, is now the Head of Volkswagen‘s
Representative Office in Berlin, while Reinhold Kopp, a former
Minister of Economy in the federal state of Saarland, then
became Head of Government Relations for Volkswagen. The
former Head of Volkswagen’s Liaison Office in Brussels, Elisabeth
Alteköster, went on to become the Director of Transport
Policy at the General Secretariat of the Council until 2010.
As one of the most powerful companies in Europe, Volkswagen
spends at least ¤2.3m76 per year on EU lobbying alone. Due to
the restricted nature of the information, it is hard to know the
full extent of their lobby efforts, but Volkswagen has a history
of lobbying against climate legislation both independently and
through the European Automobile Manufacturers Association
(ACEA), the car industry’s manufacturers’ association.
European car companies are supposedly unified behind one
industry-wide lobby group: ACEA, which is one of the most
powerful lobbying forces in the EU. Of the 16 companies that
are members of ACEA, three belong to the Volkswagen Group,
and each of them – Volkswagen, Porsche and Scania – have a
place on ACEA’s Board of Directors. Volkswagen Group therefore
has more positions on ACEA’s board than any other company.
ACEA says that all companies pay ‘a standard fee’ to join,
but would not disclose the exact figures. We have therefore
assumed that, because it has three companies involved,
Volkswagen contributes three times the amount of money to
ACEA’s lobbying work compared to other member companies.
If so, we have calculated that last year the company spent
more than ¤2m on its contributions to ACEA alone.77 As the
biggest contributor, we can assume that Volkswagen has a
powerful influence over ACEA’s activities. In addition, the
Group, being part of ACEA’s ‘A members’ (as opposed to
non-European companies who are classed as ‘B members’
like GM, Ford and Toyota), also regularly seconds its staff
to the ACEA secretariat in Brussels. Peter Kunze from Audi
is currently Director of Environmental Policy for ACEA.
ACEA has consistently opposed CO2 emission targets for the
car industry. When, after years of voluntary targets being
ignored by car companies, the EU Commission decided in 2007
to propose mandatory targets, ACEA made a case that their
failure to meet their voluntary targets was caused by external
factors: bad regulation on recycling, low demand for efficient
vehicles and poor car sales.78 In other words, it was not the fault
of their members. They also suggested that politicians should
seek emission reductions elsewhere other than the car sector.79
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: THE BIG PLAYER
19
Greenpeace calls on MEPs to vote for cleaner,
more efficient cars and stronger targets.
©Reynaers/Greenpeace
ACEA lobbied hard against the introduction of the standards
and the Commission then decided to water down the proposed
target from a maximum of 120 to 130g CO2/km for EU average
CO2 emissions. ACEA called even this lenient target ‘arbitrary and
too severe’.80 In the negotiations with the EU Member States and
Parliament, the standard was eventually delayed by three years.
After it successfully managed to weaken proposals to reduce
CO2 emissions from cars, ACEA set to work trying to water
down new CO2 emission targets for vans, which were proposed
by the European Commission in October 2009.81 When the
proposal was put forward, ACEA called for a delay to the
proposed introduction of the new rules.82 They complained
that the Commission’s proposal ‘does not ensure sufficient
industrial lead-time and proposes an unfeasible 2020 limit
value’.83 Eventually the proposed legislation was delayed
and the 2020 limit value watered down substantially.
In fact, none of ACEA’s complaints have been borne out in
reality. In 2009, when the finally agreed car targets were known,
manufacturers reduced average CO2 emissions from cars by over
5%,84 and new figures show they have been equally successful in
2010.85 On vans, major manufacturers including Volkswagen had
already made good progress on individual van models by the time
the CO2 standard for vans was proposed. The new T5, launched in
2009 had about 10% lower CO2 emissions than its predecessor.86
ACEA, like Volkswagen itself, has also taken an obstructive
position on the proposal to increase the EU carbon emissions
reduction target to 30%. In January 2010, ACEA joined other
industry lobby groups in calling on EU bodies to make no further
commitments to emission reductions until ‘it is certain that
other major economies have also made substantial and binding
commitments’.87 They argue that ‘Copenhagen has demonstrated
that [other countries] are not willing to take comparable or
equivalent actions to those proposed by the European Union.
It is, therefore, evident that any increase in the European Union’s
proposed target will not have any impact on the decision of
other countries to reduce their own emissions.’ Evidently,
ACEA are downplaying or ignoring evidence of the benefits
to the European economy and European competitiveness of a
stronger climate target, that would be gained independently
of an international post-2012 climate agreement, and do not
consider it important for Europe to adopt a cost effective
pathway to meeting its commitment to an 80–95% cut by 2050.
Volkswagen also has a history of opposing fuel economy
standards outside of Europe. The US equivalent of ACEA, the
National Automobile Dealers Association, of which Volkswagen
is a member, have vigorously opposed congressional efforts to
pass legislation to curb GHGs from cars, and other industrial
sources, saying it would harm the economy. But a recent
challenge by the Association against California’s right to
bring its own strong CO2 standards to car emissions recently
failed when the court ruled that the car makers had failed
to prove the standards would result in economic harm.88
In contrast, it has been reported that Toyota has commended
the Obama administration’s preliminary proposal to increase
fuel economy standards,89 which could be set at 62mpg for
2025 vehicles if the most fuel-efficient proposal is adopted.90
20
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
CONCLUSION:
CAPABLE OF BETTER
Volkswagen likes to boast of operating ‘binding global
environmental principles’ by which each model of car produced
must outperform its predecessor in all environmental
areas, including fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
Moreover, the company’s stated aim is to ‘lead the field in
terms of fuel consumption in every class of vehicle’.91 Yet
despite these claims the company has been slow off the
mark to make necessary changes to drastically reduce its
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. It has developed the
technologies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles, but
it has not yet made these widely available at an affordable
price. And it has lobbied hard against necessary change.
But it has the capacity to do so much better. If Volkswagen
made the most fuel-efficient cars it produces as standard
rather than offering efficiency technology as an expensive
add-on it would be able to reduce its fleet emissions dramatically.
If it rolled out its best technology across the fleet it would
be transformational, not just to its own performance but to
the European vehicle fleet as a whole. As the single biggest
car player in Europe, what Volkswagen chooses to do has a
significant impact across the whole European economy.
The European climate footprint of new cars being produced
should be zero before 2040. This would ensure that by 2050,
GHG emissions from car use will be almost zero, as new cars
powered by renewable energy replace existing oil-powered
ones on the roads. To achieve this, car companies must
fast-track efficiency increases on conventional vehicles, and
turn to alternative propulsion technologies that will permit
the use of sustainable renewable energy in the long term.
Large companies like Volkswagen can and should exploit
economies of scale to improve faster than others. While
the company has begun to develop and make marketing
for their first serial electric car, the e-up! ­which they say
will enter the market in 2013, this cannot be a substitute
for drastically reducing the oil consumption across the far
larger segment of its conventional fleet in the short term. If
the Volkswagen Group really is aspiring to be the leader in
environmental performance that it claims it wants to be, the
company must push the EU to establish the most ambitious
climate change policies in the world, to stimulate the market
in efficient and low carbon technology. It must also support
tougher car standards to ensure that all car manufacturers
have to improve their fleets together to the highest shared
goal rather than staying at the lowest common denominator.
Greenpeace is calling on Volkswagen to live up to its stated
ambition and become a genuine leader in both policy and
practice – supporting policymakers who want to move
the wider economy forward with higher standards, and
changing its own technology to meet those standards.
In doing so it will bring innovation and competitiveness
back into the European economy, help reduce European
oil dependency, cut the cost of motoring and play a huge
role in reducing Europe’s climate changing emissions.
Specifically Greenpeace is calling on the Volkswagen Group to:
PStop lobbying to oppose key European energy laws designed
to reduce our dependence on oil and:
. Publicly support the EU target of 30% emissions reductions by 2020.
. Publicly support the agreed vehicle efficiency fleet average target for new cars of 95g CO2/km by 2020,
and go further to support even stronger targets for cars
of 80g CO2/km by 2020 and no more than 60g CO2/km by 2025.
PIn line with this stronger target, commit to making significant
year-on-year reductions so that its average fleet emissions
are no more than 80g CO2/km by 2020.
PRoll out full BlueMotion across its Volkswagen fleet and fit
its best efficiency technologies as standard across all other
brands, without increasing weight or power of the vehicles.
PEnsure the next best-selling Golf (VII) consumes less than
78g CO2/km (3 litre/100km, diesel).
PSet out its plan to make its entire fleet oil-free before 2040.
Volkswagen has the ability and the size to make a difference.
It has the responsibility to do better. It has the responsibility
to help lead Europe and the world away from oil.
©Cobbing/Greenpeace
As the single biggest car player in Europe,
what Volkswagen chooses to do has a significant
impact across the whole European economy.
22
THE DARK SIDE OF VOLKSWAGEN
1 www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/24/toyota-world-number-onecarmaker
2 Statement by Martin Winterkorn, CEO, October 2010. http://timesnewsworld.
com/072119/volkswagen-car-maker-plans-to-be-number-one-in-the-worldby-2018
3 Volkswagen, Audi, SEAT, Skoda, Volkswagen Commercial Vehicles, Bentley, Bugatti,
Lamborghini and Scania.
4 VW report, Looking back to the future, p26. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/
vwcorp/info_center/en/publications/2011/04/looking_back_to_the.-bin.acq/
qual-BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/110421_VW_TE_engl_BRO_DINA4_lowres.pdf
5 For example, The Green Car Website currently lists the VW POLO DIESEL
HATCHBACK 1.2 TDI BlueMotion 3dr within the top 10 green cars.
www.thegreencarwebsite.co.uk/top-10-green-cars.asp
6 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2010/02/
think_Blue.html
7 In terms of CO2 averages only Nissan, which has much lower sales, performed
worse out of the non-premium volume brands in 2009. ‘How Clean are Europe’s
cars? An analysis of carmaker progress towards EU CO2 targets in 2009’. Transport
& Environment, November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/
prep_hand_out/lid/610 Figures for 2010 suggest VW is still lagging behind other
volume brands despite modest progress. ‘Rich nations falling behind Europe on car
CO2 emissions’. JATO. March 2011. It is important to note that JATO figures do not
include figures for the entire VW Group. www.jato.com/PressReleases/Rich%20
Nations%20Falling%20Behind%20Europe%20on%20Car%20CO2%20Emissions.
pdf
8 IPCC, ‘Key findings and uncertainties contained in the Working Group contributions
to the Fourth Assessment Report’, 2007, p5. www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf
9 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. A New Growth Path for Europe – Generating Growth
and Jobs in the Low-Carbon Economy. Synthesis report. March 2011.
www.newgrowthpath.eu/
10 DG TREN, 2008, European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 2007.
This anticipates that in 2010 the EU would consume 674 million tonnes of oil.
This is consistent with recent actual figures from BP which estimated the EU’s oil
consumption in 2009 to be 670.8 million tonnes. BP 2010a. BP Statistical Review
of World Energy, June 2010. www.bp.com/statisticalreview
11 2010 figures, CIA factbook. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2174.html
12 DG TREN, 2008, European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 2007.
13 European Commission www.vwec2010.be/notulen/VWEC2010_sessie_3_Tom_
Van_Ierland.pdf ; European Environment Agency (EEA) www.eea.europa.eu/
data-and-maps/indicators/transport-emissions-of-greenhouse-gases/transportemissions-of-greenhouse-gases-7
14 EEA, 2010, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2008
and inventory report 2010. www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-uniongreenhouse-gas-inventory-2010
15 IEA, 2009 World Energy Outlook, 2009; DG TREN, 2008. (IEA 2009 says 91% by
2030, and DG TREN 2008 says 95% by 2030).
16 Skinner, I., 2010, Steering clear of oil disasters. www.greenpeace.org/raw/
content/eu-unit/press-centre/reports/steering-clear-of-oil-disaster.pdf
17 The United States Geological Survey estimates that there are 90 billion barrels
of technically recoverable oil in offshore reservoirs in the Arctic. Gautier, D.L. et
al. 2009. Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic. Science 29 May
2009 324: 1175-1179. Global oil consumption is approximately 85 million barrels
a day.
18 IEA 2010 World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris.
19 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden
and C.E. Hanson, Eds.), ‘Ecosystems and biodiversity, Assessing Key Vulnerabilities
and the Risk from Climate Change’ Schneider, S.H., S. Semenov, A. Patwardhan, I.
Burton, C.H.D. Magadza, M. Oppenheimer, A.B. Pittock, A. Rahman, J.B. Smith, A.
Suarez and F. Yamin.
20 Nature 470, 316. 2011. Increased flood risk linked to global warming, February
2011, doi:10.1038/470316a ; IPCC (2007). ‘5.2 Key vulnerabilities, impacts
and risks – long-term perspectives’. In Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and
Reisinger, A. (eds.). Synthesis report. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
21 IEA 2010 World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris. 450 Scenario.
22 Transport & Environment press release, ‘Carmakers exaggerated time needed for
CO2 cuts’, 4 November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/news/2010/11/
carmakers-exaggerated-time-needed-for-co2-cuts
23 Skinner. Op Cit. This assumes that no additional policy interventions are
implemented in the EU to reduce CO2 emissions or the consumption of oil.
24 US Energy Information Administration. www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=
consumption#countrylist In 2009 Austria consumed 0.27 million barrels of oil per
day, Denmark 0.17, Portugal 0.27, Norway 0.22 and Finland 0.20, which in total
was 1.13 million barrels.
25 Skinner. Op Cit. This assumes that no additional policy interventions are
implemented in the EU to reduce CO2 emissions or the consumption of oil.
26 ICCT, The Regulatory Engine: How Smart Policy Drives Vehicle Innovation, January
2011. www.theicct.org/2011/01/the-regulatory-engine/
27 Qatar Holding owns 12.3 % of the Volkswagen AG and has 17% of voting rights
in the board. The company is a ‘fully owned affiliate of Qatar Petroleum’. Qatar
Intermediate Industries Holding Co. Ltd., ‘Qatar Intermediate Industries Holding
- Welcome page,’ 2011, www.qh.com.qa/qh/index.aspx (accessed February 10,
2011). Their vision is ‘to become the Middle East’s leading manufacturer and
marketer of intermediate petrochemical and non-hydrocarbon products.’ Qatar
Intermediate Industries Holding Co. Ltd., ‘Qatar Holding - Vision And Mission,’
2011, www.qh.com.qa/qh/content.aspx?secid=5&parentid=1 (accessed February
10, 2011). Qatar Holding said ‘the state is set to take a seat on its supervisory
board, underlining the more active role Gulf states are playing in the German auto
industry.’ ArabianBusiness.com, ‘Qatar becomes major shareholder in Volkswagen Energy,’ December 19, 2010, www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-becomes-majorshareholder-in-volkswagen-9923.html (accessed February 9, 2011).
28 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html
29 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html
30 ACEA, ‘New Vehicle Registrations by Manufacturer’, passenger cars. www.acea.
be/images/uploads/files/20110221_07_2010_vo_By_Manufacturer_Enlarged_
Europe.xls
31 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/
Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.html
32 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/
Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.htmlKBA Mit 3,8 Millionen Einheiten
trägt jeder 3. Wagen in dem Segment das Wolfsburger Emblem.
33 www.kba.de/cln_015/nn_124384/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/
Segmente/2010__b__segmente__kompakt.htmlKBA Die Kompaktklasse wird auch
gern als ‘Golfklasse’ bezeichnet.
34 German carmakers’ letter to the European Commission, 26 January 2007.
35 This restructuring had nothing to do with environmental measures and came at a
time where Volkswagen’s profits continued to rise.
36 Transport & Environment press release, ‘Carmakers exaggerated time needed for
CO2 cuts’, 4 November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/news/2010/11/
carmakers-exaggerated-time-needed-for-co2-cuts
37 For simplicity, this notion of ‘climate footprint’ is based solely on the CO2 emissions
that are caused by the use of the companies’ products. It excludes emissions from
the production and disposal of cars, and from the production of the fuel used, which
typically adds another 30% to the emissions from the ‘use phase’ (EEA 2010).
38 Greenpeace calculation based on T&E data, ‘How Clean are Europe‘s cars? An
analysis of carmaker progress towards EU CO2 targets in 2009.’ Transport &
Environment, November 2010. www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/
prep_hand_out/lid/610
39 Ibid. Figures for 2010 suggest VW is still lagging behind other volume brands despite
modest progress, JATO, ‘Rich nations falling behind Europe on car CO2 emissions’,
March 2011. It is important to note that JATO figures do not include figures for the
entire VW Group. www.jato.com/PressReleases/Rich%20Nations%20Falling%20
Behind%20Europe%20on%20Car%20CO2%20Emissions.pdf
40 German carmakers’ letter to the European Commission, 26 January 2007.
41 Volkswagen report, Looking back to the future. Op Cit.
42 Volkswagen, Sustainability Report 2009, p9 www.volkswagenag.com/.../
sustainability_report0.../VW_Sustainability_Report_2009.pdf
43 Ibid, p10
REFERENCES
44 For example, The Green Car Website currently lists the VW POLO DIESEL
HATCHBACK 1.2 TDI BlueMotion 3dr as within the top 10 green cars.
www.thegreencarwebsite.co.uk/top-10-green-cars.asp
45 www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/themes/2010/02/
think_Blue.html
46 Sustainability Report 2010, p47. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_
center/en/publications/2011/05/Report_2010.-bin.acq/qual-BinaryStorageItem.
Single.File/VWAG_Nachhaltigkeitsbericht_online_e.pdf
23
70 ICCT, Op Cit.
71 www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110523/OEM02/30523996
1/1432#ixzz1NBkqyFJV
72 DG Industry & Enterprise, ‘EU Manufacturing Industry: What are the Challenges
and Opportunities for the Coming Years?’, April 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/economic-crisis/files/eu_
manufacturing_challenges_and_opportunities_en.pdf
73 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. Op Cit.
47 VW Annual Report 2010, p154. www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_
center/en/publications/2011/03/Volkswagen_AG_Geschaeftsbericht_2010.-bin.
acq/qual-BinaryStorageItem.Single.File/GB_2010_e.pdf The total sales of those
five brands in 2010 were 7.134 million whilst the company’s total global sales
were 7.203 million.
48 www.volkswagen.de/konfigurator
49 VW Konfigurator. www.volkswagen.de/de/CC5.html
50 PA Consulting group, cited according: E.Wimmer/M.Schneider/P.Blum, ‘Antrieb fuer
die Zukunft’, 2010, Schaeffer-Poeschel- Verlag. They have estimated that adding
BlueMotion would cost the company 260 EUR per car, on the basis of the Golf 1,4
TSI.
51 Volkswagen Konfigurator. www.volkswagen.de/de/CC5.html The Golf 1,6 TDI 77
kW (Blue Motion Technology or full Blue Motion) = 119 grams; Golf 1.6 TDI 77
kW ‘Blue Motion Technology’ = 107 grams; Golf 1,6 TDI 77 kW ‘Blue Motion’ =
99 grams. (As a comparison: The basic Golf 1.4 Gasoline 59 kW needs 6,4 Liters
gasoline and emits 149 grams of CO2).
52 ICCT, The Regulatory Engine: How Smart Policy Drives Vehicle Innovation, January
2011. www.theicct.org/2011/01/the-regulatory-engine/
53 www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/8432669/80mpg-Ford-Focus-for-2012.html
54 www.greenpeace.de/themen/verkehr/smile/
55 www.independent.co.uk/life-style/motoring/volkswagen-to-power-up-newhybrids-from-2013-2281799.html
56 See for example, Joint Declaration of 3 business leaders’ groups:
www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/JointBusinessDeclaration-June-3.pdf
(Greenpeace has no association with The Climate Group and does not endorse
all of its policy positions). Also: FT: Business backs higher emissions goals. 20 July
2010.
57 The Climate Group, EU 30 per cent initiative, statement by businesses,
‘Increasing Europe’s climate ambition will be good for the EU economy and jobs’.
www.theclimategroup.org/EU-30-per-cent-initiative
58 Eurobarometer: Climate change the second most serious problem faced by the
world today. http://tinyurl.com/33gacpp majorities from 55% to 72% think that
not enough is done to fight climate change.
59 Communication of the European Commission (2010): Unlocking Europe’s potential
in clean innovation and growth: Analysis of options to move beyond 20%.
(‘Stranded Costs’ describes existing investments which may become redundant in
a competitive environment).
60 The International Energy Agency estimates that in the energy sector each year of
delay will cost an extra ¤336 billion globally. International Energy Agency, World
Energy Outlook 2009.
61 ACEI (The Alliance for a Competitive European Industry) letter, 21 January 2010.
The letter called on the Council, Parliament and Commission to stick to a 20%
target. ACEA is a member of ACEI, and ACEI lobbies on their behalf.
62 Jaeger, Carlo C. et. al. Op Cit.
63 Letter to Greenpeace, 21 December 2010.
64 Letter to Greenpeace, 26 January 2011.
65 www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-Corporate-LeadersGroup-on-Climate-Change/EU-CLG.aspx
74 The PEW Charitable Trust. Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race? 2010 Edition.
www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/G-20ReportLOWRes-FINAL.pdf
75 CEC, 2010, Analysis of options to move beyond 20% GHG emission reductions
and assessing the risk of carbon leakage. COM (2010) 265. Brussels, 26.5.2010.
76 This figure is the estimated VW Group spend on ACEA (ACEA’s yearly income is
¤10,112,343, divided by 15 members – there are now 16 members, but Volvo
only joined in October 2010 - plus their declared spend on lobby interests, which
for 2009 was ¤200,000– ¤250,000 for VW itself, excluding contributions
to groups like ACEA. https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/
consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=6504541970-40. This does not include
any internal figures, or fees to Weber Shandwick, the lobby company they use in
Brussels. According to an industry insider, it is highly likely that contributions were
much more than this, but ACEA refuse to give Greenpeace actual figures. ACEA
themselves refused to tell Greenpeace the exact spend of each company, but said
each member pays ‘a standard fee’.
77 See above.
78 Committed to reducing CO2, ACEA website, accessed 15 March 2007.
79 ACEA stated: ‘Reducing further CO2 emissions through vehicle technology only is
the most expensive and least cost-effective option for society. (…) More can be
done for the environment, at lower costs’. ACEA press release, ‘Car industry wants
fact-based policy on CO2 reductions’, Brussels, 26 January 2007.
80 Ibid.
81 European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/
vans_en.htm
82 ACEA press release, ‘Auto industry pushes hard to reduce CO2 emissions and needs
supportive, realistic legislative framework to succeed’, 28 October 2009.
www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/auto_industry_pushes_hard_to_
reduce_co2_emissions_and_needs_supportive_real
83 ACEA press release, CO2 proposal for light commercial vehicles must be modified,
Hanover, 21 September 2010. www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/
co2_proposal_for_light_commercial_vehicles_must_be_modified
84 European Commission, 2010, Monitoring the CO2 emissions from new passenger
cars in the EU: data for 2009.
85 JATO Consult, Rich Nations Falling behind Europe on Car CO2 Emissions. Op Cit.
86 www.volkswagen.co.nz/media/country/nz/x/company.Par.0054.File.pdf/
vwmr0909_new_generation.pdf
87 ACEI letter. Op Cit. www.eurofer.org/index.php/eng/content/
download/8541/44459/file/2010-01-21ACEIOpenLetter.PDF
88 See http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2011/04/california-auto-cleancar-standards.html and www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentID=4192
89 www.autospies.com/news/Toyota-s-Jim-Colon-praises-US-government-sproposal-on-fuel-economy-standards-61281/
90 EPA/NHTSA Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish 2017 and Later
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and CAFE Standards.
www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420f10051.htm
91 VW sustainability report 2010, Op Cit.
66 www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Leaders-Groups/The-Prince-of-Wales-Corporate-LeadersGroup-on-Climate-Change/~/media/Files/Resources/Press_Releases/8th_
March_EU_CLG_Press_Release.ashx
67 Letter to Greenpeace, 3 May 2011.
68 Letters to Greenpeace: BMW, 8 July 2010; GM, 20 August 2010.
69 Response to Greenpeace, 14 June 2010.
Das Problem.