Denial, Polarisation and Massacre: A Comparative Analysis

The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 17, Mo. 4. July, 1986, pp.
293-314
Denial, Polarisation and Massacre: A
Comparative Analysis of Northern Ireland
and Zanzibar
J . L. P. T H O M P S O N
Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University
Abstract: T h e Zanzibar Revolution o f l 9 6 4 and the Northern Ireland conflict since 1968 are compared. T h e y
are similar in their polarisation processes, but differ in the level of killing, which is m u c h higher in Zanzibar.
Northern Ireland has, however, experienced the tinge of massacre. Denial of the severity of the ethnic conflict
is documented in both cases, and its impact on polarisation and the level of killing explored. It promotes
polarisation by precluding the application and development of the ability to negotiate and regulate conflict;
and it facilitates massacre by preventing its control by the public or the security forces.
I
INTRODUCTION
P
olarisation is " a process of increasing aggregation of the m e m b e r s of the
society into exclusive a n d m u t u a l l y hostile groups, entailing elimination of
the m i d d l e g r o u n d a n d of m e d i a t i n g relationships" ( K u p e r , 1977, p . 128).
Massacre occurs to t h e extent t h a t individuals a r e killed on t h e basis of m e m b e r ­
ship in a collectivity. It m a y be conceptualised as a v a r i a b l e which ranges from
no victims a t the low pole t h r o u g h the killing of isolated individuals t o , at the
u p p e r e x t r e m e , t h e massacre of large n u m b e r s of people w h o a r e m e m b e r s of a
p a r t i c u l a r social a n d / o r political category. Polarisation typically precedes
massacre, b u t does n o t necessarily result in it. I n this p a p e r I seek explanations of
t w o p a r a d o x i c a l a n d d i s t u r b i n g p h e n o m e n a . T h e first is t h a t after periods of
1
1. This conception is adequate for purposes of the present paper. I have proposed more detailed measures of
severity elsewhere (Thompson, 1985a, 1985b).
*I a m indebted to Christopher Hewitt, T o m Garvin, T o r m o d Lunde, Robert V . Robinson, M . G. Smith,
Murray Strauss, Dennis Wrong, and an anonymous referee for comments on previous drafts of this paper, and
to the members of a seminar on political violence organised by the Harry Frank G u g g e n h e i m Foundation,
N e w York, for their valuable input. Financial assistance from the Leverhulme Trust is gratefully
acknowledged.
relative quiescence, societies c a n suddenly e m b a r k on periods of rapid polarisa­
tion a n d conflict. T h e resurgence of the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict in the late
1960s is a case in point. T h e second p a r a d o x is t h a t " n o r m a l " people — w h o are
not social outcasts, not psychologically a b n o r m a l , a n d have no previous
personal history of violence — m a y stand by or participate in massacres com­
m i t t e d in their o w n society. In Nazi G e r m a n y , millions must have h a d some
awareness t h a t the genocide against the J e w s was occurring, b u t few protested.
A n d in the L e b a n e s e conflict:
2
Priests t o r t u r e d , as did devout Muslims. Y o u n g girls of the best Christian
society, petty bourgeois costumed at Pierre C a r d i n or Courreges, a d m i r e r s
of Brassens a n d Bob D y l a n , castrated prisoners; university faculty,
advocates of coexistence between the communities, e m b o d y i n g the wisdom
of Islam a n d of Christianity, gouged out eyes a n d disembowelled w o m e n
(Desjardins, 1976, p . 39, q u o t e d in K u p e r , 1981, p. 104).
H o w c a n these things be? T h e question is so t r o u b l i n g that it is often avoided.
H e r e it is explored t h r o u g h a c o m p a r a t i v e analysis of the Z a n z i b a r Revolution of
1964 a n d the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict since 1968. T h e first half of the p a p e r
provides a s u m m a r y introduction to Z a n z i b a r , establishes its c o m p a r a b i l i t y with
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , a n d c o m p a r e s the polarisation process a n d level of violence in
the two societies. T h e latter half examines the i m p a c t of denial on polarisation
a n d massacre.
II Z A N Z I B A R
Z a n z i b a r consists of two islands in the I n d i a n O c e a n which lie n e a r to the
coast of East Africa. Cyclical winds have historically exposed it to i m m i g r a n t s
from A r a b i a a n d India, a n d given it strategic i m p o r t a n c e . In 1830, after some
centuries of i n t e r m i t t e n t d o m i n a t i o n by Arabs, a n d a Portuguese interlude, it
b e c a m e a n i n d e p e n d e n t A r a b state h e a d e d by a Sultan. This regime exercised
sovereignty over towns a n d t r a d i n g centres on the African m a i n l a n d , a n d was a
centre for the slave t r a d e . After a brief period as the most powerful political force
in the I n d i a n O c e a n it c a m e increasingly u n d e r the influence of E u r o p e a n , a n d
particularly British, expansionism. U n d e r a P r o t e c t o r a t e a g r e e m e n t signed by
2. " . . . as the process unfolded, its requirements became more complex and its fulfilment involved an ever
larger number of agencies, party offices, business enterprises, and military commands." . . . "the very nature of
administrative planning, of the jurisdictional structure, and of the budgetary system precluded the special
selection and special training of personnel . . . . However we may wish to draw the line of participation, the
machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross-section of the German population. Every profession, every
social skill, and every social status was represented in it" (Hilberg, 1961, p. 640, p. 649).
the g o v e r n m e n t s of G r e a t Britain a n d Z a n z i b a r in 1890 the British in theory
shared sovereignty with the S u l t a n , b u t in practice d o m i n a t e d . H o w e v e r , until
their d e p a r t u r e in 1963 British officials conceived of the society as a n A r a b
n a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d evolve into a constitutional m o n a r c h y with the S u l t a n as
H e a d of State. T h e y a c c o r d e d preferential t r e a t m e n t to A r a b s for legislative a n d
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e positions, a n d p r e v e n t e d other c o m m u n i t i e s from challenging
the A r a b s ' p r e - e m i n e n t position (Lofchie, 1965, C h a p t e r 2).
In 1958 the p o p u l a t i o n of the larger of the two constituent islands, itself n a m e d
Z a n z i b a r , was 166,000, a n d of the smaller, P e m b a , was 134,000. T h e ethnic
composition of the society is s u m m a r i s e d in T a b l e 1. Some one-sixth of the
p o p u l a t i o n were Arabs. Shirazis, blacks indigenous to Z a n z i b a r w h o did not
identify themselves as Africans, constituted over half the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e y were
p r e d o m i n a n t l y e n g a g e d in a g r i c u l t u r e a n d fishing. T h e concept of Shirazi
identity denotes Afro-Persian a d m i x t u r e , originally caused by the t h i r t e e n t h
c e n t u r y influx of Persians from the principality of Shiraz w h o were a b s o r b e d by
the indigenous c o m m u n i t i e s (Lofchie, 1965, p p . 2 4 - 2 5 ; 1969, p . 285). In the
m i d - t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y it differentiated blacks indigenous to Z a n z i b a r from
recent African i m m i g r a n t s . T h e latter — " M a i n l a n d Africans" — constituted
one-fifth of the p o p u l a t i o n . Mostly m a n u a l workers, they were c o n c e n t r a t e d in
Z a n z i b a r t o w n , on the larger island, a n d not well integrated into the society.
T h e small Asian c o m m u n i t y d o m i n a t e d wholesale a n d retail t r a d e a n d the
m i d d l e tiers of the civil service.
3
Such a s u m m a r y neglects b o t h i n t e g r a t i n g elements a n d diversity within the
m a j o r groups. W h i l e t h e r e was some politically significant religious differentia-
T a b l e 1: Racial and ethnic groups in Zanzibar,
1948
Group
Number
Arabs
44,560
16.9
148,480
56.2
M a i n l a n d Africans
51,380
19.5
Asians
15,211
5.8
Others
4,531
1.7
264,162
100.1
Shirazis
Total
Percentage
Source: Z a n z i b a r P r o t e c t o r a t e 1953, T a b l e s I, X V .
3. Until 1963 the domain of the Sultan also included a ten-mile strip of the African mainland, which was
rented by the British and administered as part of Kenya.
tion, Z a n z i b a r was largely h o m o g e n e o u s in terms of religion, over 95 p e r c e n t of
its i n h a b i t a n t s b e i n g Muslims, a n d religion was a substantial integrating force.
N o n e of the ethnic sections was internally homogeneous. M a i n l a n d Africans
originated from a wide variety of East African tribes ( Z a n z i b a r P r o t e c t o r a t e
1953, p . 108; Lofchie, 1965, p. 82); some Asians h a d become wealthy land­
owners, a n d Shirazis were differentiated into H a d i m u , T i m b a t u a n d P e m b a ,
a l t h o u g h by the m i d - t w e n t i e t h century these distinctions had lost a good deal of
their force. T h e A r a b section ranged from established elite families t h r o u g h a
p e a s a n t class of small farmers a n d rural shopkeepers (the bulk of the A r a b
p o p u l a t i o n ) to M a n g a Arabs, low-status recent i m m i g r a n t s from O m a n whose
relationship to the A r a b elite was openly hostile (Lofchie, 1965, p p . 77-79).
Nevertheless, A r a b identity was prestigious, a n d m e m b e r s of other sections
could a n d did pass as Arabs. These included, b u t were not limited to, the lowstatus Swahili, w h o were stigmatised as being of slave descent (Lofchie, 1965, pp.
7 3 - 7 7 ; Bennett, 1978, p. 268). T h i s porosity of ethnic b o u n d a r i e s was a some­
w h a t general feature of Z a n z i b a r society. Africans of m a i n l a n d origin w h o
b e c a m e a c c u l t u r a t e d were r e g a r d e d as Shirazi ( K u p e r , 1977, p. 149), a n d after
the revolution of 1964 m a n y w h o o u t w a r d l y a p p e a r e d to be of African origin a n d
h a d passed as A r a b s reverted to a n African identity ( M a r t i n , 1978, p. 25). It has
been suggested (Bennett, 1979, p. 268) that the British m i g h t have ended ethnic
difficulties in the P r o t e c t o r a t e by e n c o u r a g i n g the tendency for lower-status
groups to pass as A r a b s . This is p e r h a p s possible, given the e x a m p l e of Mexico,
w h e r e extensive passing did result in substantial homogenisation of the p o p u l a ­
tion (van den Berghe, 1978, p p . 4 2 - 5 8 ) .
4
C o n t r a r y to a view which we will e n c o u n t e r below, a tradition of violence was
established in Z a n z i b a r society long before the Revolution. This is stated
explicitly by Lofchie (1965, p. 205). whose a u t h o r i t a t i v e account refers to m a n y
manifestations of it. T h u s in 1828 Sultan Seyyid Said had e n c o u r a g e d H a d i m u
a c c e p t a n c e of the legitimacy of his regime by positioning his entire fleet,
i n c l u d i n g n u m e r o u s warships a n d transport carriers for several t h o u s a n d
soldiers, directly offshore. A slave rebellion in 1840 proved beyond the control of
4. According to Lofchie (1965, pp. 12-13):
Islam in Zanzibar created a pervasive religious environment highly favourable to inter-racial political
solidarities. This environment furnished Arab leaders with the basic ingredient of an eifective appeal
for African political support: a c o m m o n faith. Arab and African Zanzibaris shared not only the same
theology, but all the various institutions and practices which accompanied it such as mosques, Koranic
schools and a host of identical holidays, rituals and ceremonies. These made Islam a highly visible
symbol of the c o m m o n religious identity of Zanzibaris of all races.
Lofchie adds that the Koran is explicit in making harmonious race relations a religious duty, and that the
Arab leaders in Zanzibar employed these precepts to foster a widespread conviction a m o n g Africans that the
Faith enjoined multiracial unity upon all believers as a holy obligation.
the substantial local A r a b forces, a n d c o n t i n u e d for six m o n t h s until military
reinforcements could be b r o u g h t in from A r a b i a . T h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n of H a d i m u
land in the 19th c e n t u r y involved violence. T h e S u l t a n ' s c a r a v a n s into the East
African interior were suffciently heavily a r m e d to be described as constituting
the first real invasion of the area. In 1893 the British secured the succession of the
least i n t r a c t a b l e of several contenders for the S u l t a n a t e by force. A "sort of
p r i v a t e blood feud" between O m a n i a n d M a n g a Arabs e r u p t e d into violence
a n d rioting in 1928. In 1936 there were riots over the imposition of quality
controls on cloves a n d copra. In 1938, w h e n the political a t m o s p h e r e " b o r d e r e d
on hysteria a n d racial violence", Asians instituted a clove boycott against Arabs,
a n d a r m e d b a n d s of the latter r o a m e d the rural areas i n t i m i d a t i n g Asian shop­
keepers, h o p i n g to pressure the Asian c o m m u n i t y to a b a n d o n the boycott. A
l a n d crisis sparked riots in 1 9 5 1 . '
In the 1950s this tradition was imported into a new a r e n a , as political conflict
developed between emergent nationalisms over the form which Z a n z i b a r society
was to take after the d e p a r t u r e of the British. T h i s clash was reinforced by pre­
existing, a n d persisting, economic a n t a g o n i s m between the ethnic groups. T h e
m a i n protagonists in the escalating conflict were the A r a b a n d M a i n l a n d
African sections. Both d e m a n d e d national i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t the former feared
African d o m i n a t i o n , a n d the latter sought an African majority rule which would
p r e c l u d e d o m i n a t i o n by Arabs. Africans were h i n d e r e d by poor organisation,
economic d i s a d v a n t a g e , a n d low e d u c a t i o n a l resources, a n d a British decree
b a n n i n g political involvement by civil servants, w h o constituted one of the few
pools of potential black leaders. T h e Arabs were first in the field with a political
p a r t y , the Z N P ( Z a n z i b a r Nationalist P a r t y ) , which e l a b o r a t e d a specifically
M u s l i m Z a n z i b a r i nationalism that e m b r a c e d the Shirazi b u t excluded M a i n ­
l a n d Africans. An African nationalist party, the A S P (Afro-Shirazi P a r t y ) ,
which mobilised in reaction analogously included Shirazis b u t excluded Arabs.
E a c h of these parties sought a coalition which would take the political spoils in
the new d e m o c r a t i c system while excluding its key ethnic antagonist. T h e
Shirazis, while c o u r t e d by both, were often reluctant to respond, particularly on
P e m b a island.
6
T h e process of polarisation intitially centred on Z a n z i b a r island, a l t h o u g h it
later spread to P e m b a . As the society b e c a m e intensely politicised a n d the
a n t a g o n i s m of the two m a i n c o n t e n d i n g parties m o r e intense, o u t b r e a k s of
5. For these events see Lol'chie (1965, pps. 35, 4 1 , 46, 50, 57, 121, 149-150, 205).
6. According lo Lofchie (1965, p. 172) " T h e disproportionate political influence of these immigrant minorities
[i.e. Arabs and Mainlanders] engendered a m o n g the Pemba Shirazis a sense that they were innocent
bystanders in a species of cold war waged on their soil by alien elements."
7
violence grew m o r e severe. In 1955, in a highly charged a t m o s p h e r e , the Sultan
was assassinated by a d e m e n t e d A r a b . L a n d l o r d - s q u a t t e r conflict led to
violence, evictions, a n d fears of reprisals between Arabs a n d Africans in 1957. In
1958 "persistent outbreaks of disorder t h r e a t e n e d to engulf the society in chronic
racial w a r f a r e " (Lofchie, 1965, p. 188). By 1959 youthful supporters of b o t h
major parties p a r t i c i p a t e d in a r m e d p a r a m i l i t a r y youth wings which baited a n d
assaulted m e m b e r s a n d leaders of the opposite party. T h e elections of 1961 pre­
cipitated several days of uncontrollable rioting on Z a n z i b a r Island. Bands of
Africans r o a m e d the p l a n t a t i o n area, looting, pillaging, a n d m u r d e r i n g .
Political candidates were beaten, a n d 68 people died in riots, 64 of t h e m being
A r a b s . T h e a c t u a l revolution, which occurred in J a n u a r y 1964, just after the
w i t h d r a w a l of the British, was a decidedly "freelance" affair, a l t h o u g h it
unleashed violence far b e y o n d what was necessary to effect a seizure of power. Its
leader, J o h n Okello, was subsequently removed to the m a i n l a n d by r e m a i n i n g
politicians. O t h e r coups a n d plots were in the wind; Okello h a p p e n e d to be the
one w h o initiated the c o u p which allowed those inclined to massacre A r a b s to d o
so. S o m e 5,000 of the latter were killed, a n d there was a total decrease in the
A r a b p o p u l a t i o n , t h r o u g h m u r d e r , repatriation, a n d emigration, of some
10,000. Z a n z i b a r was reconstituted with a specifically African ethos. In 1964 it
u n i t e d with T a n g a n y i k a , its larger n e i g h b o u r , to form the state which was soon
named Tanzania.
8
T h e Z a n z i b a r revolution was the c u l m i n a t i o n of a n historical process in a
society in which a certain, a l t h o u g h not particularly high, level of economic a n d
ethnic violence was e n d e m i c . While the British c o n t r i b u t e d to this by buttressing
a n d p r o t e c t i n g the A r a b section, the A r a b / A f r i c a n conflict p r e d a t e d British
involvement, a n d before the revolution the British were a restraining force
( K u p e r , 1977, p. 156-157). T h e revolution is often referred to as simply a revolt
of Africans against Arabs, which it was. But it also involved massacre of parts of
the A r a b p o p u l a t i o n . While the Arabs are sometimes described as a n "alien
o l i g a r c h y " , this is a delegitimating stereotype r a t h e r t h a n a n a c c u r a t e descrip9
7. For the political developments see Lofchie (1965, pp. 127-281). Kuper (1977, pp. 145-170) focuses on the
polarisation process and violence.
8. Bennett (1979, p. 267) regards this as a conservative estimate. Lofchie gives an estimate of 3,000 fatalities.
9. Even the patently self-serving account of Okello acknowledges massacre, as in:
. . . in many cases, I ordered my men to burn Arab houses rather than kill the people. But the bitterness
of years of oppression inevitably produced many acts of vengeance; one day I accompanied m y men to
round up 41 Arab men who were hiding with 18 w o m e n and 10 children. I had left them under guard to
be collected by a lorry and taken to Zanzibar town for detention; but when the lorry arrived they had
all been killed (Okello, 1967, p. 153).
For a survivor's account referring to other such incidents see Kharusi (1967).
10
tion. T h e y were not aliens in a n y meaningful s e n s e , a n d the vast bulk of A r a b s
were not oligarchs. It is intriguing, given their use of violence in past history, that
the A r a b s were m u c h m o r e the victims t h a n the instigators of violence in the
revolution.
Ill C O M P A R I N G T H E C A S E S "
Both N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d a n d Z a n z i b a r are p l u r a l societies, characterised by
severe racial, e t h n i c , or religious conflict. T h e y fall, moreover, within t h a t
subset which displays two distinct tiers of d o m i n a t i o n . S o m e of this s u b g r o u p ,
such as Z a n z i b a r , R w a n d a , a n d B u r u n d i , were a lre a dy plural before a new
power imposed its overall d o m i n a t i o n : in others, such as N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , the
m e t r o p o l i t a n p o w e r introduced a new section which either was or b e c a m e
ethnically distinctive. But w h a t e v e r their genesis, plural societies with two tiers
of d o m i n a t i o n are typically highly complex in social structure, a n d often
c h a r g e d with a high potential for violence a n d even genocide ( K u p e r , 1981, p p .
6 1 - 7 3 ) . O u r two cases are similar in several specific respects:
12
1.
T h e i r de facto relationship to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . In constitutional terms,
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ' s position as p a r t of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m contrasts with
Z a n z i b a r ' s as a sovereign i n d e p e n d e n t state c a p a b l e of c o n c l u d i n g treaties,
such as the P r o t e c t o r a t e T r e a t y , with o t h e r states. But substantively the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a larger p o w e r u n a b l e in the e n d (in Z a n z i b a r ) a n d so far
(in N o r t h e r n Ireland) to impose an e n d u r i n g pax Britannica, d o m i n a t e s in
each case. (Interestingly, when Z a n z i b a r a m a l g a m a t e d with T a n g a n y i k a to
form T a n z a n i a , their constitutional relationship in the new entity was
modelled on t h a t between G r e a t Britain a n d N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d (Lofchie,
1965, p . 280)).
10. Bennett (1979, p. 252) cautions against regarding the Arab section as "alien" to Zanzibar society:
Zanzibar's Arabs, m a n y of them the issue of families resident in the islands for generations, were as
much integral members of the local society as Africans whose families were of similar local ancestry.
T h e Arabs of Zanzibar and Pemba were no more alien in their country than are the black American
inhabitants of the U n i t e d States: both groups differed in some ways from the more numerous elements
of the population of their native lands, but both were citizens sharing equally most of the c o m m o n
characteristics of their nation's makeup.
11. For relevant discussions of comparative analysis see Lijphart (1971) and Frcdrickson (1981, pp. xiii-xx).
Since accounts and summaries of the social structure, historical background, and tradition of political violence
in Northern Ireland are readily available (e.g. Darby, 1976 , 1983; Buckland, 1981; Farrell, 1980; Stewart,
1977), these topics were not reviewed here.
12. For the concept of the plural society see K u p e r and Smith, (1969) and for its application to Northern
Ireland and Zanzibar see, respectively, T h o m p s o n , (1983) and Lofchie, (1969).
2.
3.
4.
T h e position of the Z a n z i b a r Arabs a n d the N o r t h e r n Ireland Protestants.
E a c h g r o u p is simultaneously d o m i n a n t a n d precarious; each is indigenous
in any reasonable sense of the term; a n d each d e p e n d s in some substantial
measure u p o n British support. Lofchie (1969, p. 327) writes that " [ t ] h e A r a b
elite h a d b e c o m e wholly d e p e n d e n t u p o n G r e a t Britain for the preservation
of its position in society. W h e n Britain left, the Arabs were u n a b l e to m a i n ­
tain control on their o w n . " A c o m m o n Nationalist view, a n d widespread
Unionist concern, is t h a t the same would a p p l y in the N o r t h e r n Ireland case.
A n u n d e r c u r r e n t of intermittent, low-level political violence d u r i n g rela­
tively peaceful periods. In N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d o u t b r e a k s of violence such as
the sectarian clashes in Belfast in 1935, the I R A c a m p a i g n of the 1950s, the
T r i c o l o u r Riots of 1964, a n d the three m u r d e r s c o m m i t t e d by U V F
m e m b e r s in 1966 (see, for e x a m p l e , Farrell, 1980) correspond to the
examples from Z a n z i b a r given above.
T h e overall c h a r a c t e r of the political struggle. In b o t h societies there is a
collision between exclusive definitions of the c h a r a c t e r of the state a n d the
principles on which the ethnic groups should be politically i n c o r p o r a t e d
within it: between Z a n z i b a r ! a n d African nationalism in the one, a n d
U n i o n i s m a n d Catholic Nationalism in the other. Ulster U n i o n i s m being a
political aspiration for a form of state a n d society developed in exclusive
a n t a g o n i s m to Irish nationalism, to which no substantial fraction of Ulster
Protestants a d h e r e , this s t a t e m e n t is valid regardless of the extent to which it
is regarded as a n e x a m p l e of " n a t i o n a l i s m " .
T h e s e parallels are e n o u g h to establish the comparability of the two societies.
(In terms of structure a n d politics Z a n z i b a r is m u c h m o r e readily c o m p a r a b l e to
N o r t h e r n Ireland t h a n are the U n i t e d States a n d South Africa, for example.)
But there a r e also some g e r m a n e differences. T h e most obvious is that no g r o u p
within N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d corresponds to the Shirazi, over half of the p o p u l a t i o n
of Z a n z i b a r . A n o t h e r is t h a t Z a n z i b a r is largely h o m o g e n e o u s in terms of
religion, whereas N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d is not. A third is t h a t in Z a n z i b a r ethnicity
was to a significant extent a n achieved status, whereas in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d it is
almost entirely ascribed. I n the latter, one is either a P r o t e s t a n t or a Catholic
from b i r t h . Passing from one ethnic c o m m u n i t y to the o t h e r is rare, a n d there is
little or no evidence t h a t it is considered desirable or a p p r o p r i a t e . A n d a fourth
contrast is t h a t N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d possesses, in b o t h relative a n d absolute terms, a
13. During the crisis of 1961, the 700-strong Zanzibar police were temporarily supplemented by two General
Service Companies of police and three companies of the King's African rifles, w h o were flown in from Kenya
(Great Britain 1961, pp. 1 0 - 1 1 , p . 18). Such reinforcements were of course unavailable during the revolution.
In 1979, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, including reserves, numbered over 12,000 (Flackes, 1980, p. 200).
British troop strength in Northern Ireland (including the Ulster Defence Regiment) reached a peak of 21,000
in 1972 (Barzilay, 1981, p. 237). T h e scale of the security operation in Northern Ireland is vastly greater than
that in Zanzibar.
m u c h larger security a p p a r a t u s t h a n Z a n z i b a r .
ences is assessed below.
13
T h e significance of these differ­
Polarisation and Massacre
In b o t h societies the polarisation process b e g a n in a context of (at best) uneasy
coexistence r a t h e r t h a n political consensus. But in each case it did start largely
with n o r m a l politics r a t h e r t h a n violence. In Z a n z i b a r it "resulted essentially
from n o r m a l political processes a c t i n g on a structure highly conducive to racial
conflict between m a i n l a n d Africans a n d A r a b s " ( K u p e r , 1977, p. 147), in which
e a c h g r o u p confirmed the other's t h r e a t e n e d feeling. In N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d it also
b e g a n with political aspirations unsurprising in such a plural society. T h e I R A
c a m p a i g n of 1956-1962 h a d collapsed for lack of s u p p o r t (Farrell, 1980, p. 221),
a n d a Civil R i g h t s M o v e m e n t e m e r g e d in the late 1960s. Polarisation
accelerated rapidly in each case, r e a c h i n g crisis levels despite the existence of a
m i d d l e g r o u n d which was substantial in n u m e r i c a l terms, b u t not well organised
or obviously politically effective. T h e polarisation processes in the two societies
are thus recognisably similar.
14
T h e same c a n n o t be said, however, of the severity of the killing. At the time
of writing, over 2,500 people h a v e died in the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d conflict since
1968. U n d o u b t e d l y , the tinge of massacre has been present on m o r e t h a n a few
occasions, such as the L a M o n a n d Bloody F r i d a y b o m b i n g s , Bloody S u n d a y ,
the activities of the Shankill butchers, the killing often w o r k m e n at Kingsmills in
J a n u a r y 1976 — the list could be e x t e n d e d . Nevertheless, the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
violence is m u c h less severe in p r o p o r t i o n a l terms. Given a p o p u l a t i o n of some
one a n d a half million, its d e a t h toll would h a v e to reach some 25,000 in oneyear to
m a t c h the p r o p o r t i o n of c a r n a g e in Z a n z i b a r . A n d even t h o u g h the R e p u b l i c a n
15
14. There has not been a great deal of comparative analysis of the violence in either Northern Ireland or
Zanzibar. T h e main exceptions are Kuper's accounts of the process of polarisation in Algeria, R w a n d a ,
Burundi and Zanzibar (Kuper, 1977), from which I have drawn; his discussion of Northern Ireland as a nongenocidal society in his comparative study of twentieth century genocides (Kuper, 1981); and Hewitt's analysis
of the effectiveness of anti-terrorist policies in Northern Ireland and four other societies (Hewitt, 1984).
15. T o give just one example, from January 1976:
T h e 10 victims, w h o all worked for C o m p t o n Spinning Mill in Glenanne, Co. Armagh, were a m o n g 12
workers travelling back to Bessbrook at around 5.30 p.m. w h e n their minibus was stopped by a gang of
between 10 and 12 armed m e n at the Kingsmills crossroads, just two miles from Whitecross where five
Catholic m e n had been killed by loyalists 24 hours earlier.
T h e g u n m e n , dressed in combat jackets and with their faces darkened, surrounded the bus and
ordered the workmen out onto the road. T h e y were each in turn asked their names and whether any of
them were Catholics. O n e m a n replied that he was, thinking that he was the target for the g u n m e n . But
he was told to walk the road "as fast as you can".
An assortment of weapons was then used on the remaining 11 Protestant workers. T h e shooting
lasted just a few minutes, and afterwards 10 men lay dead on the road and another was seriously
injured.
T h e sole survivor . . . was shot 18 times, but miraculously lived . . . (Kelly, 1986).
T a b l e 2: Agents responsible for casualties in the .Northern Ireland Conflict,
1969-1983
Agency
Number
Percentage
1,264
54.9
Loyalist P a r a m i l i t a r i e s
613
26.6
Security Forces
264
11.5
N o t classified.
163
7.1
2,304
100.1
Republican Paramilitaries
Total
Source: N e w I r e l a n d F o r u m 1983, T a b l e 4, p . 7
p a r a m i l i t a r i e s h a v e a clear lead in responsibility for killings (see T a b l e 2), they
d o not h a v e the n e a r m o n o p o l y t h a t m a i n l a n d Africans held in Z a n z i b a r .
T h e differences between the two societies noted above a r e not necessarily
e n l i g h t e n i n g as e x p l a n a t i o n s of this difference in the severity of the violence.
T h r e e of them — the large a n d relatively "unaffiliated" Shirazi section in
Z a n z i b a r , its c o m m o n religion, a n d t h e possibility of passing — a r e m o d e r a t i n g
elements w h i c h d o not exist in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . T h e y would, if a n y t h i n g , lead
us to expect t h a t Z a n z i b a r would be less at risk of massacre t h a n N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , yet it experienced m u c h the higher level of violence. T h e fourth differ­
ence is in the size of the security forces, whose i m p a c t on the violence in N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d is controversial. W e will r e t u r n to it after a discussion of the i m p a c t of
d e n i a l on polarisation a n d massacre.
IV D E N I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L C O N F L I C T
Politics m a y be seen, as E . E . Schattschneider (1957, p. 935) has suggested, as
the strategic activity of significantly a u t o n o m o u s agents whose central concern is
w h a t to do a b o u t conflict:
T h e g r a n d strategy of politics deals with public policy c o n c e r n i n g conflict.
T h i s is the policy of policies, the sovereign policy — w h a t to do a b o u t
conflict.
S c h a t t s c h n e i d e r argues t h a t this concern with conflict provides t h e central
d y n a m i c in the political system; a n d certainly in N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d
Z a n z i b a r , the question of w h a t to do a b o u t the ethnic a n d racial conflict over the
very definition of t h e state a n d society is b o t h d y n a m i c a n d central. Given t h a t
conflicts of this type a r e notoriously difficult to resolve (e.g. Geertz, 1963; Rose,
1976), a n d the e x t r e m e " s o l u t i o n " of e x t e r m i n a t i n g the o p p o n e n t relatively
rare, the question of w h a t to do a b o u t it tends to recur as a chronic d i l e m m a .
In such situations, one possible orientation to the conflict is to deny it. In the
most general terms, denial m a y be defined as the explicit rejection of a proposi­
tion which has high d e m o n s t r a b l e t r u t h v a l u e . It is not a n u n c o m m o n reaction
to difficult situations, a n d m a y occur on the individual level (Freud, 1946), or
the collective, as in the rejection of evidence t h a t the Holocaust was u n d e r way
(Fein, 1979, C h a p t e r 12). M y focus is on its collective aspect, a n d there is no
assumption of individual p a t h o l o g y in my discussion. T h e y key question is
w h e t h e r there is evidence of denial in the Z a n z i b a r a n d N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d
conflicts, a n d if so, w h a t is its i m p a c t on the processes of polarisation a n d
massacre.
T h r o u g h o u t the period leading u p to the revolution there was in Z a n z i b a r a
widespread insistence, not justified by the historical record, t h a t this was a
virtually idyllic society, long characterised by h a r m o n i o u s ethnic relations.
Bennett (1978, p. 251) describes the British c o m m i t m e n t to this view:
16
T h e existing differences between the several c o m m u n i t i e s of Z a n z i b a r a n d
P e m b a , intensified by over half a c e n t u r y of British racially inspired
policies, blocked any quick resolution of the difficulties e n c o u n t e r e d on the
road to the p r o t e c t o r a t e ' s first election. Yet the British acted as if the
incessant verbal strife between A r a b a n d African was unnecessary. ' T h e
P r o t e c t o r a t e is a very h a p p y c o u n t r y now', intoned Acting British R e s i d e n t
E. A. J . D u t t o n in N o v e m b e r 1951, ' a n d it would be a sad pity to introduce
political strife in the guise of constitutional reform.' Z a n z i b a r ' s rulers
a p p a r e n t l y h a d b e c o m e victims of their o w n oft-repeated d i c t u m s
describing the s u l t a n a t e as a c o u n t r y possessing model ethnic relationships.
Such views were not confined to British officials. T h e representatives a n d
spokesmen of the o t h e r ethnic groups also insisted t h a t serious violence was
inconceivable. A m o n g those giving evidence to the Commission which investi­
gated the riots of 1961 m e m b e r s of all the political parties were n u m e r o u s a n d
p r o m i n e n t . T h e view of Z a n z i b a r as a c o u n t r y in which different races lived
together in peace a n d h a r m o n y before 1957, a p a r t from a few isolated incidents,
"seems to h a v e been well a c c e p t e d " by t h e m ( K u p e r , 1977, p. 160). M o r e con­
cretely, the Commission was informed t h a t " w h e n e v e r the likelihood of trouble
o c c u r r i n g on election d a y , 1st J u n e , was discussed at Election C o m m i t t e e meet­
ings, the representatives of the political parties would invariably say, ' W e
Z a n z i b a r i s a r e peaceful people. T h e r e w o n ' t be any t r o u b l e ' " ( K u p e r , 1977, p.
16. This formulation acknowledges that some propositions are either true or false, while others have a more
relative character.
156). D e n i a l was thus a n o r t h o d o x y shared by the conflicting parties, w h a t e v e r
their o t h e r disagreements.
T h e r e is m o r e evidence of denial in the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d case, a l t h o u g h this
seems to reflect the m u c h greater volume of research there, r a t h e r t h a n any great
difference in the prevalence of the p h e n o m e n o n in the two societies. W h i l e
c o n d u c t i n g field research in West Belfast in 1972 I e n c o u n t e r e d the assertion,
from both P r o t e s t a n t a n d C a t h o l i c residents of areas that h a d k n o w n m o r e t h a n
their share of t u r b u l e n c e , t h a t "before the T r o u b l e s " they used to coexist in
h a r m o n y , p a y i n g no a t t e n t i o n to w h a t an individual's religious affiliation m i g h t
be. A l t h o u g h delivered with great earnestness, these remarks posit a construc­
tion of reality radically different from t h a t which we know to prevail in N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , namely, a hypersensitivity to ethnic identification in face-to-face inter­
a c t i o n . T h e y are also at odds with the k n o w n historical record, a n d the e t h n o ­
g r a p h i c evidence, formal a n d informal, which we possess from the " p r e T r o u b l e s " period (e.g., H a r r i s , 1972; H a r b i s o n , 1960).
17
A similar d e n i a l of the relevance, or even reality, of ethnic cleavage was a pro­
n o u n c e d feature of the early phase of the Civil R i g h t s M o v e m e n t . C o n o r Cruise
O ' B r i e n e n c o u n t e r e d it w h e n he gave a lecture on civil disobedience at Q u e e n ' s
University, Belfast, in late O c t o b e r , 1968. T h e a u d i e n c e reaction was negative:
W h a t I was criticized for, q u i t e heatedly, was for mentioning a n aspect of
reality: the existence of two s e p a r a t e c o m m u n i t i e s , Catholics a n d P r o ­
testants.
This was held to be " i r r e l e v a n t " , a favourite all-purpose s t u d e n t knock­
out w o r d at the time, in Belfast as well as in N e w York. " R e l i g i o n " , one
s t u d e n t said, "is a red h e r r i n g " , I said if so it was a red h e r r i n g a b o u t the
size of a whale. " N o , n o " , said a n o t h e r student, " n o one in Ulster is the
least bit interested in religion", " N o t even in S a n d y R o w ? " I asked.
A n o t h e r s t u d e n t said he himself c a m e from S a n d y R o w , a n d could report
" t h a t no one there c a r e d w h e t h e r a m a n was a C a t h o l i c or P r o t e s t a n t " .
This t h u m p i n g lie was loudly a p p l a u d e d ( O ' B r i e n , 1974, p. 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 ) .
W h i l e these examples on their o w n are not e n o u g h to establish t h a t denial is
widespread, o t h e r research confirms its a p p a r e n t l y systematic character. Nelson
(1975, p . 160) reports the results of " a b o u t fifty" informal interviews with
P r o t e s t a n t respondents:
18
17. K n o w l e d g e of ethnic identity is treated as essential in day-to-day negotiation of the social world in
Northern Ireland. See for example Burton's discussion (1978, p. 4, p. 37 and passim) of "telling".
18. O n l y those unfamiliar with Northern Ireland politics will require the information that Sandy R o w , a
Protestant working-class district near to the University, is renowned as a bastion of ethnic solidarity.
I o p e n e d m y discussion of " d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " with respondents with the
question: t h e r e ' s been a lot of talk in N o r t h e r n Ireland a b o u t " d i s c r i m i n a ­
t i o n " against Catholics. D o you think this existed or not? . . . the reaction of
the majority was denial
But the denial was almost w i t h o u t exception
qualified d u r i n g the discussion which followed, so t h a t virtually all respon­
dents h a d a d m i t t e d to some forms of a n t i - C a t h o l i c discrimination at least
by the conclusion of the interview.
In a study of i n t i m i d a t i o n , D a r b y (1985) reports 4 d e n y i n g mythologies as
p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m m o n in his study area: a nostalgia m y t h , which looks back to the
early 1960s as a golden age of h a r m o n y " w h e n people lived together in peace
a n d happiness w i t h o u t a t h o u g h t a b o u t each others' r e l i g i o n " ; a n invasion
m y t h , a c c o r d i n g to which all personal acts of intimidation were carried out by
outsiders to the area; a conspiracy m y t h t h a t i n t i m i d a t i o n was highly organised,
usually by a p a r a m i l i t a r y organisation; a n d a v a n d a l i s m m y t h t h a t it was only
m e m b e r s of " t h e o t h e r side" w h o vandalised homes which they were forced by
i n t i m i d a t i o n to leave. D a r b y also gives a quintessential e x a m p l e of a y o u n g
w o m a n w h o refused to accept that any Protestants h a d been forced to leave the
a r e a in which she lived. She was living at the time in a house from which P r o ­
testant residents h a d been forced to flee.
19
T h e r e is also evidence of denial t h a t m e m b e r s of one's own ethnic g r o u p were
responsible for killings. Nelson (1984, p. 122), for e x a m p l e , in discussing the first
book to publicise the fact t h a t in 1972-1973 m a n y sectarian assassinations were
carried out by P r o t e s t a n t m u r d e r squads (Dillon a n d L e h a n e , 1973), makes the
following c o m m e n t s :
People would speak with distaste or c o n d e m n a t i o n a b o u t sadistic killings,
sometimes openly, in conversations on the street, or privately in areas like
G l e n c a i r n w h e r e h o o d e d bodies were found with some f r e q u e n c y . But
even in areas w h e r e militants c a m e from, m a n y people simply would not
believe Protestants h a d d o n e the killings at all. O u t s i d e these areas, dis­
belief was still m o r e c o m m o n . O f course, parties to wars everywhere are
r e l u c t a n t to believe their own side's atrocities: w h a t was striking is the
length of time the belief persisted. It is interesting t h a t while few p a r a militants denied the substance (if not the detail) of Dillon a n d L e h a n e ' s
book was a c c u r a t e , m a n y Protestant civilians a n d politicians seemed
u n a b l e to accept its conclusions several years later.
20
19. This replicates m y finding noted on page 304.
20. Note that there is an implication here that people did not speak with distaste or condemnation about "non
sadistic" killings. M y ongoing research shows that most killings were "non-sadistic".
Since Nelson's a n d D a r b y ' s subjects are m a i n l y working class, it is clear t h a t
denial is not a n elite prerogative. N o r are outsiders i m m u n e to it. In the 26
counties of the Irish R e p u b l i c the d e n y i n g principle t h a t there can be no
insuperable cleavage between the e t h n i c groups in Ireland is a central
Nationalist tenet. T h e book in which O ' B r i e n ' s vignette a p p e a r e d is a n
onslaught against denial in I r e l a n d as a whole, a n d as such a t h r e a t to the
legitimating m y t h o l o g y of the Irish state (Brown, 1981, p p . 283-291). A n d m a n y
British politicians, p a r t i c u l a r l y m e m b e r s of the L a b o u r P a r t y , have a p p r o a c h e d
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d with the perspective, articulated in policy d o c u m e n t s a n d else­
w h e r e (e.g., British L a b o u r P a r t y , 1981), t h a t its politics are primarily class
politics. T h i s view, a n ideological a n d cultural p r o d u c t of British society, is
conducive to denial w h e n applied in a political milieu, such as N o r t h e r n Ireland,
in w h i c h class conflict is not d o m i n a n t ( T h o m p s o n , 1979, 1980).
V T H E UNASSAILABILITY O F DENYING R O U T I N E S
W h i l e there is evidence t h a t denial is a widespread orientation, its significance
remains to be established. T o the extent t h a t it is easily challenged a n d over­
ridden, it is not likely to be consequential. T h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of O ' B r i e n ' s
a c c o u n t of his lecture at Q u e e n ' s University in 1968 is suggestive here. H e
describes the reaction to the stout d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the residents of S a n d y R o w
were indifferent to e t h n i c identity:
H e a r i n g the a p p l a u s e , the speaker seemed to have some d o u b t s a b o u t w h a t
he h a d u t t e r e d . H e a d d e d , hesitatingly, " T h e y just come out w h e n the
d r u m s beat, you k n o w . " W e knew. But why did they c o m e out w h e n the
d r u m s beat? S o m e o n e said, r a t h e r dreamily: " W e l l , anyone w o u l d . " T h e
m o r e o r t h o d o x answers soon followed; people c a m e because they h a d been
b r a i n - w a s h e d , d u p e d by the bosses. But were the bosses really so clever, the
workers so d u m b ? A n d why should P r o t e s t a n t workers be d u m b e r t h a n
C a t h o l i c workers? Well, the P r o t e s t a n t workers did h a v e some privileges,
small ones, w h i c h the bosses e n c o u r a g e d t h e m to over-value. In a n y case, it
was waste [sic] of time to speculate w h y these things should be so. T h e
i m p o r t a n t t h i n g was action; solidarity of Protestant a n d Catholic workers,
d i c t a t e d by basic, c o m m o n class interest, would grow out of the struggle
itself, dissipating false consciousness, while destroying the structures which
p e r p e t u a t e d it.
It was easy to k n o w that would not h a p p e n . . . (O'Brien quotes survey
evidence [Rose 1971] t h a t e t h n i c loyalties in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d were far
stronger t h a n those reflecting class.)
T h e speaker from S a n d y R o w , h a v i n g second t h o u g h t s , " a d m i t s " w h a t every­
one present is routinely a w a r e of— t h a t the residents of S a n d y R o w a r e highly
responsive to e t h n i c a p p e a l s ( " ' T h e y just c o m e out w h e n the d r u m s beat, you
know.' W e k n e w " ) . T h e m e m b e r s of the a u d i e n c e then begin to c o n d u c t the
discussion on the basis of the premise t h a t they h a d j u s t a t t a c k e d O ' B r i e n for
articulating, i.e., t h a t their society is in fact riven by ethnic cleavage. T h i s
indicates t h a t their starting position was indeed denial. T h e fact t h a t they do
not, as a g r o u p , critically a t t a c k the speaker for his volte-face, b u t co-operate in
it, w i t h o u t a p p a r e n t strain, suggests that his reversal is a m a n o e u v r e with which
they are q u i t e familiar.
T h e next step is a n o t h e r defensive a n d d e n y i n g enterprise, this time in the
form of offering e x p l a n a t i o n s of the ethnic cleavage in terms of class. T h e theories
offered in e x p l a n a t i o n a r e i n a d e q u a t e as an a t t e m p t at intellectual u n d e r ­
standing, as O ' B r i e n ' s critique, a n d o t h e r e v i d e n c e , m a k e clear. But his objec­
tions are dismissed, a n d the need for the course of action based on the initial
denial is affirmed. Such switching between c o n t r a d i c t o r y positions, w i t h o u t
challenge by collaborators w h o share a n inability or unwillingness to
acknowledge the p r o b l e m s of e t h n i c a c c o m m o d a t i o n , illustrates the co­
operative a n d s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l element in denial.
21
T h e i n t e r v e n t i o n by O ' B r i e n , a n outsider both sufficiently knowledgeable a n d
sufficiently belligerent to issue a public challenge, was exceptional — a fact
which itself implies t h a t denial was the m o d a l orientation of his a u d i e n c e . T h o s e
w h o intervene in such a deflating way c a n h a r d l y expect affectionate e m b r a c e ,
a n d his a u d i e n c e exorcised him as quickly as possible. I n so doing, they collec­
tively regressed to the original premise which they h a d t e m p o r a r i l y a b a n d o n e d
u n d e r his first a t t a c k . T h e overall response to challenge was a reaffirmation of
denial. T h e e x c h a n g e as a whole suggests the unassailability of e n t r e n c h e d deny­
ing routines. Since they are not readily a m e n a b l e to successful challenge, they
m a y be r e g a r d e d as p a r t of a s t a n d a r d repertoire of techniques of collective
action (Tilly, 1978, p p . 151-156). As such, they m a y h a v e significant conse­
quences, b o t h i n t e n d e d a n d u n i n t e n d e d .
VI T H E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F DENIAL
In 1961 the representatives of the political parties in Z a n z i b a r held that, given
the p e a c e a b l e disposition of their constituents, violence at the polls was incon­
ceivable. As a result, they did not co-operate in c r e a t i n g a structure for conflict
m a n a g e m e n t . British officials were in a p o o r position to p e r s u a d e t h e m to do so,
21. Detailed re-analyses of Rose's data which confirm this provided by T h o m p s o n , (1983) and Kelley and
McAllister, (1984). See also W h y t e , (1978).
since they officially subscribed to the same view. T h e o u t c o m e was t h a t 68
people died in the ensuing violence.
I n N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d denial, w h e t h e r the v u l g a r Marxisant v a r i a n t of the
radical elements of the Civil R i g h t s M o v e m e n t , or the other types discussed
above, does not c h a n g e the political reality t h a t e t h n i c cleavage p r e d o m i n a t e s ,
b u t leads to a v o i d a n c e of t h a t reality, a n d contributes to the process of ethnic
polarisation. T h e same holds for denial by involved outsiders. A result of the
S o u t h ' s tenet t h a t there can in principle be no insuperable cleavage b e t w e e n
e t h n i c groups in I r e l a n d is t h a t a n y limited co-operation is interpreted as b o t h a
practical a n d symbolic d e m o n s t r a t i o n of m o v e m e n t t o w a r d s an all-Ireland unit,
r a t h e r t h a n a n end in itself. T h i s helps to r e n d e r such limited a c c o m m o d a t i o n
difficult or impossible. British a n d other orientations to the N o r t h e r n Ireland
p r o b l e m which t r e a t it in class terms have the same consequences, as was d e m o n ­
strated for e x a m p l e in the Ulster W o r k e r ' s Council Strike of 1974 ( T h o m p s o n ,
1980).
T h e r e is, then, s u p p o r t for the proposition t h a t to the extent t h a t mobilisation
in m o v e m e n t s w h i c h seek, or claim to seek, political a c c o m m o d a t i o n between
ethnic sections is informed a n d s t r u c t u r e d by denial, the prognosis is likely to be
failure, possibly l e a d i n g to further polarisation. T h e failure does not arise
because a c c o m m o d a t i o n which d a m p e n s polarisation a n d leads to de-escalation
is inherently impossible even in societies like Z a n z i b a r a n d N o r t h e r n Ireland. It
occurs because such a c c o m m o d a t i o n can h a r d l y take place if the p a r t i c i p a n t s
are i n c a p a b l e of a r t i c u l a t i n g in public a recognition of the real n a t u r e of the
society, the cleavages within it, a n d the difficult political p r o b l e m s which they
generate. It is not so m u c h w h a t people " k n o w " privately t h a t is significant: it is
w h a t it is possible for t h e m to accept publicly. T h e former is u n d o u b t e d l y
i m p o r t a n t , b u t the latter is of central concern because solutions, compromises
a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n s to overt ethnic conflicts must be publicly argued,
defended a n d a c c e p t e d .
VII T H R E E EXPANSIONS
Within-group denial
In N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , contact b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of different ethnic groups is
r a r e in c h i l d h o o d , most political socialisation a n d e d u c a t i o n occurs within the
e t h n i c g r o u p , a n d adults a r e uncomfortable in discussion of central political
cleavages with o u t - g r o u p m e m b e r s even in relatively peaceful periods ( M u r r a y
1983; D a r b y et al. 1977; Devlin 1969; M c C a n n 1980; H a r b i n s o n 1960; H a r r i s
22
22. N o substantial literature on Zanzibar deals with the topics mentioned in this paragraph.
1972). W e m a y therefore suggest t h a t it is largely within the g r o u p t h a t the
repertoire of e n t r e n c h e d d e n y i n g routines is created.
By the n a t u r e of d e n y i n g statements, a n d the aggressiveness with which they
are d e l i v e r e d , they are difficult to challenge. O n e tends to let t h e m pass, there­
b y reinforcing t h e m . This alerts us to one of their key uses in internal "discus­
sions": as a way of suppressing heterodoxy. If unrealistic a n d d e n y i n g definitions
of the situation are routinely enforced within the g r o u p , a n d w i t h d r a w a l from
t h e m is defined as a desertion of g r o u p solidarity, as disloyalty, then realistic
w i t h i n - g r o u p discussion of political c o m p r o m i s e a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n c a n be
expected to be b o t h difficult a n d rare. In the short t e r m , this has the result t h a t
we have a l r e a d y noted: no discussion of the basis of conflict, or of w h a t m i g h t be
a n a c c o m m o d a t i o n to some of the concerns of the o t h e r c o m m u n i t y , can begin.
T h e long-term o u t c o m e is the refurbishment, or institutionalisation, of a. denying
culture, i.e., the construction, codification, a n d refinement of a s t a n d a r d
repertoire of e n t r e n c h e d d e n y i n g routines. A further l o n g - t e r m result m a y be
that w h e n the conflict eventually becomes so overt a n d severe t h a t m e m b e r s of
the society wish to regulate it — for e x a m p l e w h e n polarisation reaches a n
e x t r e m e point, or killing t h r e a t e n s to get " o u t of h a n d " — they a r e i n c a p a b l e of
doing so. T h u s we m a y partly explain the a p p a r e n t inability of the major partici­
p a n t s in the N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d conflict to actively e n g a g e in p r o d u c t i v e political
negotiation.
23
The consensus of opponents: between-group denial
Despite the a b o v e — a n d partly because of it — diverse elements w h o a r e
otherwise fierce political o p p o n e n t s m a y converge or collaborate in denial. T h u s
in Z a n z i b a r the British a n d t h e e m e r g e n t nationalists c o n c u r r e d in the public
definition of the society as one of idyllic h a r m o n y in its racial relations; in 1972
b o t h my P r o t e s t a n t a n d C a t h o l i c respondents insisted on the u n p r o b l e m a t i c
bliss of the p r e - T r o u b l e s period. Such consensus in denial by antagonists has
special significance for polarisation precisely because the parties to it are
o p p o n e n t s . T h i s very fact gives their d e n y i n g consensus a curious, malign
legitimacy. For if m e m b e r s of two groups k n o w n for their a n t a g o n i s m share a
relatively b e n i g n analysis of the conflict, h o w c a n outsiders challenge it?
In Z a n z i b a r , as the conflict b e c a m e m o r e overt, the British took strenuous
security m e a s u r e s . K u p e r (1977, p. 156-157) argues convincingly t h a t w i t h o u t
these, violence would h a v e been m o r e severe. T h e s e actions show b o t h t h a t
violence was for the British e m i n e n t l y conceivable, a n d t h a t in a crisis their pre­
vious d e n y i n g o r i e n t a t i o n did not prevent t h e m from a u t o n o m o u s preventive
24
2.3. I was struck by this during my ficldwork in 1972.
24. See note 13.
action; the i n d e p e n d e n c e of ideology a n d action is (once more) d e m o n s t r a t e d .
Nevertheless, they were u n a b l e to p e r s u a d e the o t h e r parties to j o i n t h e m in co­
operative restraining measures, which could reasonably be expected to further
r e d u c e the level of violence. T h i s m a y have been partly because the British h a d
p r o m o t e d the d e n y i n g position for some time, a n d h a d not previously facilitated
political representation for a n d co-operation b e t w e e n the s u b o r d i n a t e groups.
T h e y were therefore, as I suggested above, badly placed to a r g u e for new action
which recognised their a n t a g o n i s m .
This suggests a sense in which denial a m o n g o p p o n e n t s is m o r e conducive to
polarisation t h a n denial a m o n g allies. Let us assume that, u p to a certain level,
polarisation c a n be c o n t a i n e d by a u t o n o m o u s action, b u t beyond t h a t , co­
o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n o p p o n e n t s is required. This seems quite realistic. Since a u t o ­
n o m o u s preventive action is relatively u n p r o b l e m a t i c , it follows t h a t the
polarisation process m a y be relatively slow u p to t h a t point, even if there is
denial. But b e y o n d it, an acceleration in the r a t e of polarisation m a y be
expected, since the necessary co-operation is less likely to be forthcoming.
The genesis and constraint of massacre
O n e analysis of the genesis of massacre in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d on which o u r
c o m p a r i s o n casts some light is O ' B r i e n ' s recently reasserted " m a l i g n m o d e l "
(O'Brien 1985). A c c o r d i n g to it, one reason for r e c u r r i n g violence in N o r t h e r n
I r e l a n d , a n d one which suggests t h a t still m o r e serious violence is possible in the
future, is the denial by b o t h constitutional N a t i o n a l i s m a n d physical force
R e p u b l i c a n i s m of the d e p t h a n d n a t u r e of the gulf b e t w e e n t h e m a n d the
P r o t e s t a n t c o m m u n i t y . R e g a r d i n g Nationalists, O ' B r i e n writes of: —
the t r a d i t i o n a l — a n d a p p a r e n t l y incurable — p a n - N a t i o n a l i s t incapacity
to see the N o r t h e r n Unionists as a n a u t o n o m o u s force, with d e e p convic­
tions of its own.
For m o r e t h a n a c e n t u r y now it has been Nationalist d o c t r i n e that, once
D u b l i n a n d L o n d o n are in accord, the Ulster Unionists will have no choice
b u t to toe the line. T h a t this doctrine does not fit the facts was d e m o n ­
strated in 1912-1914 a n d again in 1974. But the doctrine, a l t h o u g h objec­
tively refuted, r e m a i n s subjectively intact.
T h e R e p u b l i c a n v a r i a n t , t h a t the British are the cause of political violence in
I r e l a n d , t h a t their d e p a r t u r e is a precondition for a solution, a n d t h a t in their
absence it will not get out of control, is a sweeping denial of the severity of the
internal e t h n i c cleavage. In b o t h cases, the efforts to impose all-Ireland institu­
tions c a n be expected to lead to a n increase in violence, a n d the n e a r e r they come
to "success", the g r e a t e r the likely increase in violence.
Since the m a l i g n scenario was e n a c t e d in Z a n z i b a r , a n d since our c o m p a r a ­
tive analysis finds considerable similarities b e t w e e n it a n d N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , the
reasonable conclusion is t h a t the malign m o d e l is relevant to the latter case. T o
reject it, plausible restraining factors, present there and absent in Zanzibar, must be
identified. T h e obvious possibility suggested by the analysis is the c o n t i n u i n g
presence of the security forces. O n e relevant element seems simply to be the size
of the force deployed. T h u s K u p e r concludes t h a t in Z a n z i b a r , h a d the British
not i n t r o d u c e d m o r e troops in 1961, the d e a t h toll in the riots of t h a t year would
h a v e been higher. O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t this is simply a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t
this seems u n t e n a b l e , since soon after the w i t h d r a w a l of the British, a n d their
security resources, there was massacre.
T h e effects of a larger security a p p a r a t u s , however, a r e c o n d i t i o n a l on its
orientation to o u t b r e a k s of killing. This can vary i n d e p e n d e n t l y of size, as the
N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d case shows. In the 1972-1973 period, police spokesmen offi­
cially treated the sectarian assassinations, most of w h i c h were c o m m i t t e d by
Protestants, as "motiveless m u r d e r s . " This orientation c h a n g e d over time, how­
ever, a n d by the late 1970s a n d early 1980s the police were p u r s u i n g Protestant
p a r a m i l i t a r y m u r d e r e r s with m u c h greater vigour. T h i s is evident in police
statistics a n d reports (e.g., R o y a l Ulster C o n s t a b u l a r y 1983), the use of super­
grasses (or converted terrorists, in official terminology) against Loyalist as well as
R e p u b l i c a n p a r a m i l i t a r i e s , a n d the greatly increased a n t a g o n i s m of Loyalist
groups to the police. T h e reasons for this shift, which m a y include political direc­
tion from the top, a n d increasing police professionalisation a n d organisational
a u t o n o m y , merit investigation, b u t the c h a n g e in o r i e n t a t i o n , a n d the decline in
the assassinations by P r o t e s t a n t paramilitaries, is not in d o u b t . W h i l e o t h e r
factors are involved, it is h a r d to d o u b t t h a t the c h a n g e in the a t t i t u d e of the
police was o n e reason for this d o w n t u r n .
F r o m a policy perspective, the orientation of the security forces to such killing
is i n d e p e n d e n t of the imposition of all-Ireland institutions. W h e t h e r the c u r r e n t
police stance, a n d its restraining effects, will c o n t i n u e , a n d w h e t h e r these will be
o u t w e i g h e d by the polarising effects of efforts to impose all-Ireland institutions,
is a m a t t e r of no small i m p o r t a n c e .
VIII
CONCLUSION
O n the general level, this p a p e r has a d v a n c e d two propositions. T h e first is
t h a t denial is one possible response to p r o b l e m a t i c political, as t o o t h e r , conflict.
T h e second is t h a t if actors c a n n o t publicly a c k n o w l e d g e a conflict a n d its
c h a r a c t e r , they c a n n o t negotiate or regulate it efficiently. T h i s a p p r o a c h c a n be
further developed in m a n y ways. Explorations of the conditions u n d e r which
denial is most likely to occur, the p a r t i c u l a r aspects of a conflict which are most
likely to be denied, a n d w h o is most likely to engage in denial, are possible. Since
denial is a response to " t r o u b l e " , two possible general hypotheses are t h a t it is
the most p r o b l e m a t i c aspects of a conflict which are most likely to be denied, a n d
t h a t it is those w h o are least e q u i p p e d with the ability to negotiate them w h o are
most likely to deny t h e m . T h e s e c a n be treated, in keeping with the level of
analysis here, as propositions a b o u t collective a n d c u l t u r a l resources. In a d d i ­
tion, denial is only one possible orientation to conflict, a n d not even the only one
which leads to a failure to address it. A comprehensive typology specifying all the
possible orientations, a n d their likely consequences, m i g h t therefore be sought.
T h e o r i e s a c c o u n t i n g for the different orientations, a n d changes in t h e m , could
then be formulated.
In terms of specific applications in this paper, e n o u g h has p e r h a p s been said to
suggest the utility of the two general propositions in e x p l a i n i n g r a p i d polarisa­
tion a n d the genesis of massacre in the cases studied. O n e obvious p r o b l e m which
deserves a final c o m m e n t is that of how to establish empirically t h a t denial is
occurring. I n principle, it is possible to decide w h e t h e r or not a disputed proposi­
tion a b o u t social reality has d e m o n s t r a b l e validity: if it does, we h a v e denial. In
practice, however, given the n a t u r e of denial, the prospect for polemics is high.
But h e l p m a y be at h a n d from a s o m e w h a t surprising q u a r t e r . T h e examples
considered a b o v e suggest that actors themselves often display some level of
awareness t h a t they are in fact e n g a g i n g in denial. T h u s , as K u p e r (1977, p.
163-164) notes, the R i o t Commissioners in Z a n z i b a r were not surprised t h a t the
racial a n d e t h n i c h a r m o n y to which those a p p e a r i n g before them testified
d e t e r i o r a t e d rapidly, which suggests an awareness t h a t discord lay only a short
w a y below the surface of the society. Nelson needed only to let h e r Protestant
respondents c o n t i n u e to talk, a n d their admissions t h a t discrimination existed
consistently e m e r g e d ( a l t h o u g h one senses that if asked the same question again
later, they would be likely to begin with a similar d e n y i n g response). W e will be
on solid g r o u n d if we a d o p t the following criteria for establishing denial: either
firm, publicly available evidence that the disputed proposition is invalid; or
retractions such as those elicited by Nelson.
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