Ethnic Minority Policy and Identity in East Sea Rim: the Case of

Transcription

2012 HK International Conference
East Sea Rim Regional Discourses : Nation-states or Ethnicity?
Ethnic Minority Policy and Identity in East Sea Rim:
the Case of Ethnic Korean
Choi, Young Jin
HK Professor
IGA, Kyung Hee University
-1-
-2-
Introduction
For 150 years since the mid 19th century, the Korean people experienced separation,
spreading out to the world as diaspora, and division of the Korean peninsula. With continued
conflict and confrontation between both politically and ideologically differing Koreans, 20th
century was riddled with the history of dispersion for the Korean people. Korean diaspora
and the history of nation-state formation in the 20th century is closely interwoven with the
historical setting of imperial invasion, colonial rule, and establishment of the Cold War
system(Park, 2008: 1-3).
Present day Koreans are divided into different groups that share historical
experiences and memories so unique and different that it is difficult to categorize them into
one group. Placing too much emphasis or insisting on national identity, especially at times
where multiculturalism is becoming the norm, may end up encouraging exclusion.
Nation-state is a system where its members are divided into citizens and foreigners, and
provides exclusive protection only to the former. Colonial rule institutionalized
discrimination and exclusion in an obviously modern way. Moreover, Diaspora Koreans
share a peculiar state-experience. They have developed a strong sense of group identity in the
process of being included into a country with people of different cultural backgrounds and in
the process of creating a new state system.
Therefore, it is not only insufficient but also possibly erroneous to understand
national identity in relation to nationalism. Especially for Diaspora Koreans, national identity
is not to be associated with political identity, but is rather related to the problem of minorities
within a multiethnic society and their socio-psychological efforts to “find their root.” The
Korean people’s national identity has strong ethnic features including language, culture,
history, centered around lineage. (Ibid., 2008: 4). 1
Definitions of ‘ethnic group’ and ethnicity. The term ethnic group, (as shown in the word ‘jong(種), species’ in Korean)
connotes a biological meaning; Thus, observation of biological features (skin color, physique, physical disposition, etc)
becomes necessary when we first classify ethnic groups. However, ethnic groups are different from ‘racial groups’ that
solely focus on biological factors because ethnicity also reflect lineage, language, religion, material traditions including
food/clothing/housing, myths, historical consciousness, types of economy and territorial boundaries, etc. On the other hand,
ethnicity refers to people who are located where the state boundary (constituted by country, territory, and sovereignty)
coincides with cultural boundary (related to history, language, religion, etc). ‘ethnicity’ is at times better referred to as
legal members of a state, or citizens. However, the boundary of state and ethnicity may not nessarily coincide with one
another. BY the same token, the boundary of citizens and ethnicity may differ as well. Therefore, multi-ethnic states are
distinguished from nation-states based on ethnic homogeneity or the myth of ethnic homogeneity like Japan. (김광억, 2005:
20-21). In order to integrate various ethnic groups and ethnicity into a homogeneous cultural community, the state often
forces assimilation; nation-states, like nationality itself, may also be an imagined community.(Anderson, 1991).
1
-3-
National identity can be seen as a sense of belonging, felt by an individual, to a
certain nation group due to shared national features/characteristics that could be defined
broadly. The content or form of national identity embodies selective emphasis on, or
reconstruction and reinterpretation of various aspects of national culture, under social,
political, and economic conditions in which the group is placed. (윤인진, 2000). In other
words, as Frederik Barth has mentioned, national identity is a social construct analogous to
national boundary in the sense that they are both constructed and maintained by its members
and others.
Previous studies include a comparative study on the national identity of overseas
Koreans in Northeast countries that are located near Korea(Yoon, 2004; Konkuk Univ., 2012).
Their research, however, seeks to explain national identity from a synchronic perspective,
focusing only on a certain time period with limited type of questions; thus, their causal
analysis is deficient in some ways. Moreover, their analysis on the influence of class disparity
and generation gap on national identity is also insufficient. In addition, their research is
clearly limited in explaining the effects of ethnic minority policies adopted by East Sea Rim
countries on national identity of the different generations.
This paper aims to explore the structural conditions and circumstances shaped by
ethnic minority policies adopted by East Sea Rim countries that are located near the Korean
Peninsula with a large number of ethnic Korean residents. It will then reflect on the effects of
such ethnic minority policies on ethnic minorities – that is, Korean Chinese, Korean in Japan,
Goryeopeople in Russia. The conclusion will review policy implications on these overseas
Koreans.
Review of Previous Studies
Among previous studies include analysis of the level and form of national identity
and affinity of Koreans in the US and CIS; this study divided national identity into two levels:
national identification and social interaction(Yoon, 2000). Moreover, the study deals with
emigration, adaptation, and national identity of Korean Diaspora in China, Japan, CIS, and
the Americas in a comprehensive manner(Yoon, 2004). He borrows from J. Berry’ s
‘Acculturation theory,’ which classifies the socio-cultural adaptation methods of ethnic
minority immigrants into 4 types to explain the identity of overseas Korean Diaspora. Berry’s
-4-
model include: ‘Integrated individuals (type)’ who actively participate in the mainstream
society of the new country while maintaining their own culture and traditions, ‘Separated
individuals (type)’ who distance themselves from the dominant culture while strongly
maintaining their cultural identity, and ‘ Marginalized individuals (type) ’ who neither
participate in the dominant culture nor maintain their old culture (Ibid., 2004: 37). Korean
Chinese residing in China were the ‘Separated’ type in the past but have been transformed
into the ‘ Integrated ’ type that participates in opportunity structures of the Chinese
mainstream society while retaining their national culture and identity. Koreans in Japan
mainly belonged to the ‘Separated’ type, but the number of ‘Integrated’ individuals has
been on the rise since 1960s; among them, many have turned into ‘Assimilated’ individuals.
Goryeo people in Russia were predominantly ‘Separated’ individuals, but ‘Integrated’
types have increased since the mid-1950s. ‘Assimilated’ individuals reflect the current
tendency(op.cit., 2004: 319-320). The extreme prejudice and discrimination have also
operated as mechanisms to reinforce the ethnic identity for the ethnic Korean. For the identity
of ethnic Korean, lineage, common culture, historical experience and status consciousness of
minority would be important elements. (op.cit., 2004: 319-320).
Recently, there was a research that tried to quantitatively analyze national identity of
overseas Koreans by classifying it into cognitive, physical, and emotional aspects. (Konkuk
Univ., 2012). What is interesting in this research is that Korean Chinese living in China and
Goryeo people in Russia exhibit a clear difference in the word selection between ‘home
country’ and ‘motherland’. 91.9% and 86.8% of Korean Chinese and Goryeopeople chose
China and Russia as their ‘home country’, respectively. Nevertheless, only 24.9% and 21.8%
chose China and Russia as their motherland. On the other hand, only 16.9% of Koreans in
Japan chose Japans as their home country, and only 3.2% viewed Japan as their motherland.
More than 70% of Chinese Koreans residing in China and Goryeopeople in Russia
understand the term, home country as ‘the place where I was born or the place where I am
currently living in’. They chose the Korean peninsula, South Korea, or North Korea as their
motherland because Korea is where the ‘roots of their ancestors belong to.’ (ibid., 2012:
305-306). Koreans in Japan chose South Korea or the Korean Peninsula as their motherland,
providing ‘because my ancestors’ roots belong there’ and ‘because of my spirit and culture’
as major reasons.
-5-
These studies are helpful in understanding national identity of Korean people living
in East Sea Rim countries by a simple comparative analysis, focusing on a certain time period.
However, they only provide a simple explanation on the reason why they chose ‘home
country’ and ‘motherland’, thereby failing to thoroughly analyze the main factors that affect
national identity or state identity. Therefore, in order to understand how ethnic minority
policies have affected their national identity, research that undertakes a diachronic approach
is necessary.
Ethnic Minority Policies of China
The dominant attitude and stance of Han-Chinese intelligentsia and leaders towards
ethnic minorities in China around the Chinese Revolution in 1911 could be represented by
Sun Wen(孫文)’s conception. Sun Wen argued for the establishment of a Republic where 5
ethnic groups – Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibets– cooperate with each other.
However, Chiang Kai-Shek(蔣介石) of Kuomintang who came into power after Sun
Wen’s death placed emphasis on assimilation and carried out ethnic minority policies in a
rigid manner(Chung, 2008: 52-53) On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party was in
dire need of support from ethnic minorities who maintained a foothold in their regions in
order to overcome their inferior position against Kuomintang and Japan. In other words, the
Chinese Communist Party paid special attention to ethnic minorities residing in rural and
peripheral areas as a means to enlarge their strategic support base and to complete their
revolution (Ibid., 2008: 54-55). At the 1stGeneral Assembly of the Chinese Political
Consultative Conference held in September 1949, the Communist Party stated their
opposition against separation and independence of ethnic minorities. People’s Republic of
China was defined as “a big family where different ethnicities come together and cooperate.”
(op.cit., 2008: 56).
In the first 10 years, various ethnic minority policies were proactively
institutionalized from a standpoint favorable for ethnic minorities, based on the ruling party’s
past experiences. Such efforts were geared towards social stability and national integration.
Specific policies varied from region to region in accordance with regional conditions. Major
policy goals include: stabilization of ethnic minority areas, establishment of a system of
-6-
distinguishing one ethnic group from another, establishment of autonomous prefectures, and
training of ethnic minority cadres, etc. Autonomous prefectures that constitute the basis of
ethnic minority policies in China, is a system that allows a certain degree of administrative,
economic, and cultural autonomy to ethnic minorities in areas that are densely populated by a
certain ethnic minority(op.cit., 2008: 57-58).
The most important fact that the Korean Chinese have taken the Chinese national
consciousness was land reform and land distribution through collective farms after the new
China formed. Most of Korean Chinese who had difficult time were encouraged to have land
distributed for free offered by the Chinese Community Party(Chung, 2008; 157).
The 20 years, from 1958 to 1978 could be termed as the ‘chaotic stage of ethnic
minority policies.’ During this period, ethnic minority policies that were established around
the country’s founding were fundamentally repudiated, and ethnic minorities suffered a great
deal. This period could be divided into ‘period of mobilization system’(1958-1965) and
‘Cultural Revolution period’(1966-1976).
The mobilization system was a period where the whole country faced both political
and economic confusion; domestically, favorable attitudes and policies towards ethnic
minorities were soon converted to assimilation policies. Internationally, ideological clash
with Russia that began since the late 1950s and conflict over the border with India heightened
security concerns in the fringeland where ethnic minorities mainly resided in; this lead to the
pressuring of residents – ethnic minorities – in the area.
The situation of the already poor ethnic minority regions was exacerbated by a
natural disaster that struck China. To make matters worse, Chinese authorities relocated a
large number of Han-Chinese farmers to the border areas in order to increase food production;
as a result, grassland and woodland were converted into farmland, thereby destroying the
traditional economic foundation of ethnic minorities. Conflict between the Chinese
government and ethnic minorities, between Han-Chinese and ethnic minorities intensified
while grievance and animosity of ethnic minorities deepened. 2
During the Cultural Revolution stage, extreme ethnic minority policies such as the
abolition of ‘ Ethnic Regional Autonomy’ were put into practice under the idea that
2
Finally in 1959, the so-called Tibetan Incident - represented by an incident where the 14thDalai Lama sought asylum in
India - occurred. Uprising of ethnic minorities of the Xinjiang area broke out from 1961 to 1962, and in 1962, national
movements of the Mongols burst out from Mongolia Autonomous Regions.
-7-
“Ethnic/national problems are ‘in essence,’ the problem of class.” As a result, flexible
ethnic minority policies that were adopted in the early period and the uniqueness of ethnic
minorities were fundamentally denied, and assimilation policies were carried out once again
(op.cit., 2008: 59-60).
In the 11thThird Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party shifted China’s
developmental strategy towards ‘Reform and Open’ under Deng Xiao Ping’s leadership and
started to pursue a practical and gradual construction of socialism. Ethnic minority policies
were gradually moving from pluralism that recognized the diversity and uniqueness of each
ethnic minorities towards integration. (op.cit., 2008: 61)
A balanced development of the ethnic minorities region that was lagging behind was
seen as a pre-condition for the modernization and economic development of China. In the
process, mobilization of material and human resources of the region were to play in important
role. Efficient use of resources of the region and voluntary participation of ethnic minorities
thus became crucial. The Chinese government pursued ‘ economic integration ’
by
strengthening economic support to the regions.
The policies of this stage could be categorized into economic, demographic, and
cultural politics. In terms of economy, the ethnic minority regions were granted various
benefits and preferential treatments. Demography-wise, the Chinese government enforced ‘1
Family 1 Child’ policy on the Han-Chinese whereas ethnic minorities were allowed to give
birth to 2 children. Regarding cultural policies, Communist Party members who were
originally not allowed to engage in religious activities were exempt from such prohibition in
areas where most residents are religious, including XinjiangUygur and Tibet Autonomous
Region.
During ‘ethnic minority policy recovery stage ’ (1978-19881), the Chinese
government’s utter priority was given to economic development; politically, the government
granted autonomy to ethnic minority regions, and economically encouraged free trade and
boarder trade in such regions. ‘Stage of ethnic minority policies adjustment’(1984-1991)
began as ‘Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law’ was enacted in the National People’s Congress
is 1984. During this period, research on the language, culture, and history of ethnic minorities
expanded, and the government also allowed and encouraged freedom of press and publication
in different languages (languages of ethnic minorities) to a certain extent. Furthermore,
government support and funding to education and healthcare in the ethnic minorities region
-8-
increased as well. Market socialism, including the establishment of Township and Village
Enterprises, was also introduced to autonomy prefectures.
Ethnic minority policies of the ‘Full-scale open period’(1992-present), while aiming
at ‘co-prosperity’ among different ethnicities, could be distilled down to ‘proactive support
from the central government’ and ‘rehabilitation by own efforts of the ethnic minorities.’
(op.cit., 2008: 62-65).
<Table 1> Changes in Ethnic Minority Policies of China
Time Period
Before
Centralized
Control
Ethnic Minority Policies
Theory of
Ethnic
Equality(1911)
∙Sun Wen supported the establishment of a Repulic where 5
ethnic groups come together equally
Han Chauvinism:
국족동원론
(Kuomintang)
∙Chiang Kai-Shek reverted to ‘Han Chauvinism’,oppressing
ethnic minorities and carrying out forcible assimilation policies
Theory of Ethnic
Self-Determination
(1921∼49)
∙‘Autonomy’ granted to ethnic minorities under the pretext of
cooperation for ‘Anti-Japan and National Salvation movements’
Stabilization
Period (1949∼58)
∙A certain degree of autonomy granted to administrative,
economic, cultural sectors of Ethnic Regional Autonomy
Period of
Chaos (1958∼78)
PRC
Period of
Recovery and Reestablishment
(1978∼현재)
Mobilization
System
(1958∼65)
Cultural
Revolution
(1966∼76)
∙Large-scale assimilation. forcible control over
ethnic minorities
Recovery
Period
(1978∼84)
∙Ethnic equality and autonomy
∙Encouragement of free market and trade in
ethnic minority regions
Adjustment
Period
(1984∼91)
∙Approval of press and media using the
language of ethnic minorities
∙Permission of Township and Village
Enterprises
Full-scale Open
Period
(1991∼
Present)
∙Implementation of practical policies that
focus on economic development
∙Facilitation of Industrialization through
investment in infrastructure
∙Aggressive ethnic minority policies including
the abolition of ‘Ethnic Regional Autonomy’
Source: Chung, Jae-Nam.2008.
-9-
Identity of Korean Chinese
While Korean Chinese took up 73% of population in the YanbianKorean
Autonomous Prefecture when in was established in 1952, the ratio dropped down to 61% in
2005. This is in part because many Korean Chinese moved out to other areas; nevertheless,
the migration of Han-Chinese into Yanbian will be accelerated, increasing their politicalcultural influence on the region.
In general, under the ethnic minority policies of China, Korean Chinese are enjoying
their political, economic, cultural rights and duties as Chinese citizens with autonomous
regions of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Changbai Korean Autonomous
Country. Moreover, Korean Chinese have maintained multi-faceted national boundary and
plurality of national identity through mutual interdependence and interaction with other
ethnic groups.3
Korean Chinese strongly identify with both North and South Koreans. Such national
identification is not a result of cultural similarity but rather based on ‘ motherland
consciousness.’ From such standpoint, the division of Korea into North and South has
special significance on the self-consciousness of Korean Chinese. Up until the mid-1980s
when China maintained hostile relations with South Korea while allying North Korea,
Korean Chinese had to limit the scope of motherland to the Northern half.
Korean Chinese started to perceive South Korea as their motherland since the 1980s,
when open-door policy was adopted. Such “motherland consciousness” towards South
Korea experienced a stark increase since mid-1980s as economic exchange and visiting
became possible. The increase in “motherland consciousness” towards South Korea among
Chinese Koreans, despite the fact that an absolute majority of them were from North Korea,
could be explained by the fact that a high percentage of them had relatives in South Korea.
The major events that lead them to have amicable attitudes toward South Korea would be
Asian Games in 1986, and Olympic Games in Seoul, in 1988. Besides intellectuals, most
Chinese Koreans in Yanbian refer to South Korea as “wealthy homeland”(Han·Kwon, 1993:
98-100).
Park, Keum-Hae, “National Identity of Overseas Koreans and Hua-Yi-Bu-Dong (和易不同)”, Overseas Korean Newspaper
3
(2012.2.14.).
- 10 -
With the passing of time, Korean Chinese are facing greater challenges in
maintaining and developing their national community. The stagnation of population increase
and decrease of birth rate resulting from migration (either for employment or marriage) to
Korea or economically developed areas in China, and the severance of national education
from one generation to the next, etc has significantly weakened national identity of the young
generation. (op.cit., 2008: 85).
In a recent study, 91.9% of Korean Chinese chose China as their home country,
while 24.9% chose China as motherland. 73% of Korean Chinese understands the term
‘home country’ as ‘one’s birthplace or current residence’. Many of them chose the Korean
peninsula, South Korea, or North Korea as their motherland because their ‘ancestors’ roots
were there’ (Park·Huh, 2012: 169-170). Meanwhile, 38.3% chose ‘culture’ and 25.6%
chose ‘language·letter’ as an important indicator of national identity. On the other hand, the
respondents chose ‘preservation of Korean Chinese schools’ (34.3%) and ‘national history
and culture education’ (26.3%) as most urgent tasks necessary to protect national identity. In
this study, 81.5% responded that they have received national education.
This research can explain the difference between state identity and national identity
of Korean Chinese with a simple answer; that is, dual identity and racial discrimination
against Korean Chinese. However, it is insufficient in explaining the causes that have led to
such consequences. The fact that the Chinese government carried out policies aimed at
annihilating the national spirit of Korean Chinese during Cultural Revolution could be one
cause. For instance, they prohibited people from listening to Korean radios and burnt
genealogical records of ethnic Koreans. 4 Young Red Guards (middle school students) of
Yanbian roamed around and destroyed anything they deemed to be feudalistic or revisionist.
For examples, signs with the letter 'Bok(福)' - Bok-duk(福德), or Bok-heung(福興) - or those
that contained names of regions - ‘Incheon Cold Noodles(인천랭면옥) ’ , ‘ Ryongjung
Restaurant(룡정음식점)’, ‘Hamheung Restaurant(함흥식당)’, etc - were all destroyed for
being nationalistic(Ryu, 2007: 49). Secondly, Korean schools teach not only Chinese history
and culture but also that of Korean Chinese, which naturally leads to the differentiation
between state identity and national identity. Thirdly, ‘Reform and Open’ policy lead to the
4
Interview with Korean Chinese living in Korea (2012.9.8.): Korean Chinese who are originally from South Korea face
difficulties in recovering their citizenship because their genealogical records were lost during this period.
- 11 -
increase of both domestic and international migration, which in turn accelerated the
breakdown of Korean Chinese communities. The consequent weakening of national
education seems to affect national identity. Fourth, the Han-Chinese hold key posts of
YanbianAutonomous Prefecture such as mayor and party secretary whereas the highest post
available for Korean Chinese is deputy mayor. A glass ceiling exists for Korean Chinese who
aspire to hold high posts. In his discussion of autonomy, Potter is sharp to point out that
China only allows self-rule (自治, zizhi) while neglecting other two aspects of autonomy –
that is, independence (自主, zizhu) and self-determination (自決, zijue). (Potter, 2011) As a
result, Changbaishan(長白山, Baekdu Mountain) under the jurisdiction of ChangbaiKorean
Chinese Autonomous Region or Hunchununder the jurisdiction of Korean Autonomous
Prefecture were relocated upon request of the Jilin Province(吉林省) government to their
jurisdiction.
Ethnic Minority Policies of Japan
After liberation, 1.75million Koreans in Japan returned to Korea; however, 647,000
Koreans were registered in the census carried out by Japan during colonial rule in 1946. Most
of them also wanted to return home, but remains in Japan due to economic reasons or
political uncertainty. The returnees could not help possessing no more than 1,000 yen per
person. The remaining Korean in Japan did not want to abandon their wealth and it would not
guarantee for their living in Korea when they returned. These people constituted the Korean
society in Japan and have lived as ethnic minorities since then (Kim·Na, 2012: 267).
Right after liberation in 1945, Koreans in Japan voluntarily set up ‘Korean Language
Class’ all over Japanin order to learn their own language, history, and culture. The
Federation of ChosunResidents in Japan(재일본조선인연맹), founded in September 1945,
actively participated in the construction of schools since 1946. They established 525
elementary schools (42,000 students), 4 middle schools (1,200 students), and 10 Youth
Schools. They are the origin of Korean schools of nowadays.
The Japanese government and General Headquarters suppressed Korean residents in
Japan who tried to carry out autonomous education by force and closed down Korean schools.
A Korean resident in Japan was killed by the police force while protesting. This is called the
"Hanshin Educational Struggle", a national education struggle by Korean residents in Japan
- 12 -
that lasted from 14th to the 26thof April in 1948 at Hyogo Prefecture in Osaka. Korean schools
(Chosuns chools) were rebuilt after North and South Korea signed a cease-fire agreement.
(Suh, 2012: 194).
Japan, an unfair multiethnic nation, decided to construct an ethnically homogeneous
country after being defeated in war and separated citizens of different ethnicity. After
liberation, the status of Korean residents in Japan were left ambiguous; they held Japanese
citizenship, but they were foreigners at the same time. The vision of an ethnically
homogeneous country is maintained and reinforced by both the constitution and Nationality
Act. This law started to be implemented in 1950, 3 years after the Japanese Constitution came
into force. (Ibid., 2012: 161). Furthermore, based on the Treaty of San Francisco that restored
full sovereignty to Japan 1952, Korean residents were deprived of their Japanese citizenship
by the Japanese government that gave no consideration to the historical background
whatsoever and were registered as foreigners (Kim·Na, 2012: 267-268). For this reason,
during the period from 1959 to 1984, about 90,000 Korean left a uncertain journey for North
Korea in the hope of better lives (Morris-Suzuki, 2009).
As a result, Koreans in Japan not only lost their citizenship, but also various rights
attached to it. This was because the Japanese government limited the enjoyment of basic
human rights including the right to adequate standard of living and right of residence ‘only to
Japanese citizens’. Korean residents in Japan without Japanese citizenship had to live in
shabby houses located in ghettos because they were not eligible to move into public housing.
They were also burdened with full medial cost when they were ill because national health
insurance did not include them. Neither could they sign up for National Pension nor could
they hold public offices. Koreans in Japan were allowed to move into public housing and
register for National Public Service and Pension only after a long period of time (Suh, 2012:
140-141).
In 1965, Korea and Japan signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and
Korea; Japanese government agreed to grant a relatively stable right to residence to Korean
residents in Japan who have obtained Korean citizenship. Such measures, however, didn't
receive much support from Koreans in Japan because the Korean government had been
indifferent to their rights in the past.
Obtaining Japanese citizenship became easier as Nationality Act was amended in
1985 from patrilineal descent to ambirilineal descent. The second and third generations of
Koreans in Japan, in comparison to the first generation, have little historical and national
- 13 -
consciousness (Choi, 2008: 92).
Status of residence for foreign nationals living in Japan is classified into 7 types:
‘Special Permanent Resident’, ‘Permanent Resident’, ‘Spouse or Child of Japanese National’,
‘Long-term Resident’, ‘Trainee’, ‘Designated Activities’, and ‘Others’. ‘Special Permanent
Residents’ are legally defined as ‘People who had obtained Japanese citizenship before
August 1945 and has been living in Japan since then and their descendants’. It is a resident
status almost tailored for Korean residents in Japan. In 2010, the number of ‘Special
Permanent Residents’ marked 396,106 (‘Korea·Chosun’ making up the majority), showing
that there was a stark decrease of this status holders among 2ndgeneration of Koreans in Japan,
who are often referred to as ‘600,000 Korean residents in Japan’. 5 This could be a result of
natural reduction after generational shift or due to a dramatic increase of naturalization as
Japanese citizens. There is a ‘Re-entry Permit Period’ for ‘Special Permanent Residents’,
and they cannot go back once the period is over. Special Permanent Residents thus have to
check their re-entry period every time they go abroad (op.cit., 2012: 148-150). Foreigners
should carry their document with them all the time.
The Act was amended in July 2009, and a new system regarding foreign nationals in
Japan came into effect since July, 2012. The foreigner registration system is now abolished,
and replaced with a card system in order to efficiently manage undocumented migrants.
Ordinary foreign nationals in Japan will be given “ residence cards ” while Special
Permanent Residents will be given “Special Permanent Residence Certificate” cards with an
IC chip on it.
5
The number of Japanese citizenship holders is around 300,000, and the figure increases by more than 10,000 every year; the
number of North Korean citizenship holders is estimated to be around 40,000-50,000. (김익현·나지영, 2012: 268-269)
- 14 -
<Table 2> Changes in Ethnic Minority Policies of Japan
Time Period
Colonial Era
(1910∼45)
Ethnic discrimination, forced labor
Post Liberation
(1946∼Present)
Ambiguous status
(1946∼51)
∙Japanese citizenship holders but treated as
foreigner
Treaty of San
Francisco (1952∼64)
∙Loss of Japanese citizenship, registrated as
foreigner
∙Deprivation of right to adequate standard of
living and right to residence
Treaty on Basic
Relations between
Japan and Korea
(1965∼)
∙Granting of limited permanent residency to
Korean residents in Japan who hold Korean
citizenship
Amendment of
Nationality Act(1985∼)
∙ Amended from patrilineal descent to
ambirilineal descent
Special Immigration
Act(1991∼2011)
∙Granting of Special Permanent Resident
status to Koreans in Japan from both Korean
nationality and Chosun one
Foreigner
Management Act
(2012∼)
∙Abolition of Foreigner Registration System,
issuance of Special
Permanent Resident Certificate
Source: Kim·Na (2012).
Identity of Chosun people in Japan
Until the 1960s, the activities by the General Association of Korean Residents in
Japan based on nationalism towards the mother country had been influential. In the 1970s
Koreans in Japan had been keeping their identity as Chosunese, while having lived in Japan.
For instance, due to the nationality, a Korean Japanese, Park Jongsuk was refused to enter the
Hitachi manufacturer. And then he accused of the firm and started the strife against the
Hitachi’s job discrimination. Also, In the mid-1980s, the movement against the finger print
registration spread all over the country. Eventually, the Ministry of Justice in Japan abolished
the finger print system. As seen in these cases, Koreans in Japan took part in social
movement while they had kept their identity (Donomura, 2010: 500-503).
Living as a stateless in person in Japan is no easy task, so the number of people
- 15 -
obtaining Korean citizenship has been increasing as a result of ‘permanent resident ship
acquisition movement’ in 1969. As of year 2012, more than 80% of Korean residents in
Japan are estimated to have acquired Korean citizenship (op.cit., 2012: 143). Those who are
about 60,000 still remain stateless as chosun nationality so for the hope of unification,
because they cannot undergo the complicated procedure of citizenship acquisition, or because
they are deeply involved with North Korea.
As of 2012, there are around 100 Korean schools (ranging from pre-school to
university) all across Japan; these are the schools that started off as Language classes after
liberation. However, the Japanese government still refuses to recognize these Korean schools
as formal educational institutions defined in Article 1 of School Education Act. The number
of students attending these schools have decreased from 46,000 in the 1970s. According to
the Ministry of Education of Japan, there were about 8,300 students attending Korean schools.
Korean nationality and Chosun nationality each make up about half the number, and there are
some Japanese students as well (op.cit., 2012: 196).
In 1955 after the Korean War, General Association of Korean Residents in Japan(재
일본조선인총연합회) was founded, and Korean schools were rebuilt under their influence.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided a large amount of educational assistance
and scholarships. Besides these Korean schools (Chosun schools), there exist Korean Schools
(Hankuk schools) as well, although only 4 of them (1 in Tokyo, 2 in Osaka, 1 in Kyoto) are
functioning due to lack of support from Korean governments. Most of them educate students
according to the curriculum set forth by Japanese government, and provides national
education in addition to it.
The North Korea faced by the entire economic blockade after the nuclear crisis in
1994 was searching for a breakthrough to obtain economic assistance with the normalization
with Japan. After Koizumi made the Pyongyang agreement in 2002, the kidnapping issue
blew the Japan so that the Pyongyang declaration was cancelled. Above all, the most
sacrificed was Korean Japanese in the 3rdand 4thgeneration. At that time, everyday some
Japanese called the School with violent languages (such as “Korean go back to the home
country”, “The bomb was installed in your school”, “I will kill 50 Koreans within a year
and so forth”). As a result, like the time of the Korea-Japan Act in 1965, it seems the Korean
Japanese society would be accelerated to be split: some took assimilation to live in Japan,
acquired Korean nationality or openly reveal distrust toward the North Korea etc. The high
- 16 -
schools in Japan including international schools have been recently scheduled to receive
tuitions for free, but Chosun schools would not benefit from the policy measure since they ar
classified as the extra ones. If this situation would continue, the number of students in those
schools could decrease and then they might face to disappear their ethnic identities.
Korean residents in Japan may be seen as assimilating to Japan, but an increasing
number of young Koreans in Japan are using their real name. Reduction of discrimination
against Korean residents in Japan, the Korean Wave, and the enhancement of national
prestige of Korea opened up a new era where Koreans can reveal their national identity.
Although the number of people obtaining Japanese citizenship is on the rise, only 52.8% of
those in their 30s, 42% in their 20s, and 9% of teenagers aging between 15 and 22 wanted to
become Japanese citizens. In other words, more than 60% of the young generation of Korean
residents in Japan is willing to live in Japan as Korean or Chosun citizenship holders. 6 On a
personal level, they experience different kinds of national identity as some use their Korean
name as Japanese citizens. Some entertainers have recently expressed themselves as Koreans,
influenced by the Korean wave, although they had already acquired the Japanese citizenship.
In other words, national identity embody complex and diverse meanings for Koreans in Japan;
thus, it would be hasty to simply judge one’s national identity according to what citizenship
one holds. 7
Nevertheless, Koreans in Japan shared a strong sense of belonging to a unified home
country or motherland. Koreas in Japan have developed a unique identity as they have
experienced and have responded to discrimination from both Japanese people and South
Koreans. The national identity of Koreans in Japan has undergone change through the process
of fighting against, and adapting to discrimination and the culture/policies of exclusion. (Kim
·Na, 2012: 300). As a result, national identity of Koreans in Japan serves an important
condition for self-affirmation and recovery of rights; at the same time, it is interrelated with
the important issue of de-colonization and democratization of Japanese society. (Park, 2008:
6).
6
Survey Research by Itamashi in 1999 (1999년이타마시의조사)
Park, IL, “Taking Notice of the Changes in National Identity of Korean Residents in Japan”, Overseas Korean Newspaper,
7
(2010.9.10).
- 17 -
Ethnic Minority Policies of Russia
The Russian Federation nowadays recognizes equal rights for all ethnicities, and
guarantees maximum level of self-determination as long as the Federation remains intact.
However, during the era of Imperial Russia, Russianization that showed no regard for the
identity of ethnic minorities was enforced as a means to establish an Empire of ethnic
Russians. Imperial Russia pursued migration policies to the Far East in the 1860s to no avail
and carried out Integration Policies for the next 20 years.
Governor-general Korff who came into power in 1885 carried out suppressive
policies against ethnic Koreans to encourage European migration. Based on a closed
agreement in 1988, Goryeo people who crossed the border before 1884 (when diplomatic
relations were established between Russia and Chosun) were granted Russian citizenship
while other immigrants received limited permanent residency. (Kim, 2004: 10) Koreans in
PrimorskiiKrai suffered from fear and hardships for about 20 years, as ethnic minority
policies fluctuated between exclusion and inclusion everytime a new Governor-general came
into post. While acknowledging Goryeo people’s contribution to developing PrimorskiiKrai,
Governor-general Unterberger argued that Goryeo people were too different to assimilate and
also argued that their loyalty towards Russia could not be trusted. Based on such reasoning,
he re-claimed land and citizenship that were conferred upon Koreans and fired all Koreans
working in the mine or fishery.
Lenin affirmed the principle and policy of national self-determination in relation to
ethnic minorities. The third Soviet Congress, held in May 1925, declared that <the rights of
ethnic minorities in all regions should be protected completely> at the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee and prepared enforcement measures as well. 8 The revolutionary
government carried out a policy of appeasement to take advantage of Koreans who were
already participating in anti-Japanese movements; the revolutionary government of
Bolsheviks promised to distribute land to Koreans if they cooperated in war against Japanese.
8
Specific measures include: ensuring seats for representatives of ethnic minorities in all elected organizations, usage of the
language of ethnic minorities in the case where the minorities take up a majority in the regions, organizing schools and
courts that use the native language, etc. As the outcome of first open election campaigns, between 1925-1926, 14 Goryeo
people were elected as Soviet members of Vladivostok. (op.cit., 2004: 30, 33)
- 18 -
The Korean people achieved brilliant war results fighting alongside the revolutionary army in
anti-Japanese guerilla warfare, resting on the Bolshevik government’s promise.
However, once their goal had been achieved, the Soviet government refused to
recognize the contribution Koreans made in winning PrimorskiiKrai back and did not keep
their promise of land distribution. From the year 1923, when the Soviet government started to
distribute land to the Goryeo people, properties of Koreans were confiscated and farms were
collectivized. Even worse, Koreans in PrimorskiiKrai were forcibly deported to regions
including, Amur, Khavarovsk, and further up North with the pretext of boarder stabilization.
By 1935, more than 80% of farmlands owned by Goryeopeople were collectivized; about 200
GoryeoKolkhozs(collective farms) were created.
Stalin declared ‘the Great Russia’ and strongly pushed the Russianization of ethnic
minorities. He sent Russians to Republics of ethnic minorities, encouraged marriage between
Russians and ethnic minorities, and stressed the superiority of Russian culture. Furthermore,
in the 1930s, he purged and killed ethnic minorities elites while classifying some ethnic
minorities – including Goryeo people, Germans, Tatars – as ‘the enemy ethnic’. In 1937, he
deported a million people to Central Asia and Siberia by force, staring with the Goryeo
people. Baltic countries were annexed in 1940. In 1937, more than 170,000 Koreans residing
in the far eastern area including Sakhalin and PrimorskiiKrai were forcibly departed to
Central Asia. After deportation, Koreans were denied the right to move and were also
prohibited from using the Korean language; young Korean men were not allowed to go to
college or serve in the military. Instead, they were conscripted for forced labor in mines,
munitions factory, forest cutting in the Arctic, etc. (op.cit., 2004: 64-65).
Since the Korean riots had increased during the process of farm collectivization from
1928 to 1932, about 50,000 Koreans had to return to Chosun. As for Russia which have the
last match with Japan, the Korean ethnic ties or the role of spy by Koreans became a threat to
the Russian security. As aforementioned, it seems that the accumulated conflicts between
Koreans and Russian during the process of collectivization brought about forced
migration(Lee, 2007: 300-301).
After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev tried to appease discontent and anger towards a
system that was extremely controlling. One of his methods was abolishing or relaxing some
regulations on ethnic minorities and restoring their reputation. Nevertheless, Brezhnev retightened the grip on control of ethnic minorities. He declared that differences between
- 19 -
ethnicities had disappeared within Russia, and treated any kind of national demands as
treason and oppressed them.
Gorbachev who pursued Reform and Open policies after facing a total crisis of the
communist system granted political, economic, and cultural autonomy to ethnic minorities.
He even allowed the independence of some ethnic minorities(Lee et al., 2004: 57-59).
Russian Federation decided to recognize political and cultural developments of Koreans at
the 『Decision of Supreme Meeting of Russian Federation for Restoration of Reputation of
Ethnic Koreans in Russia 』 in April, 1992. This decision implied that the federation
recognizes the rights of deported Koreans to return to their original residence and that the
federation will support them. Moreover, it was announced that the federation will not oppose
mass relocation of Goryeo people in the process of Far East development.
Unlike other areas, PrimorskiiKrai has ‘settlements of the Goryeopeople’. The
migration of Goryeopeople back to PrimorskiiKrai was heavily influenced by 『Act for
Restoration of Reputation of Ethnic Koreans in Russia』that was adopted in April 1, 1993.
This act recognizes the fact that forced deportation of Goryeo people and oppressive policies
on them after relocation are both illegal and criminal. The act also found that Goryeopeople
have the right to restoration of reputation and the right to return to their residence prior to
deportation. Based on such guidelines of the federal government, the government of
PrimorskiiKraiissued Governor Decree, No. 64-P on January 19, 1998. Based on the Decree,
PrimorskiiKrai Asset Committee rented out five previous military bases and a large area of
farmland (about 1,901ha) to ‘Fund for Recovery of PrimorskiiKraiGoryeo People’ for free
as settlements for Goryeo people re-migrating to PrimorskiiKrai(Nam et al., 2005: 145-146).
On June 15, 1996, Yeltsin issued a presidential decree titled ‘Concept of State
National Policy of the Russian Federation.’ Included in this decree is an article that “confers
national-cultural autonomy to each ethnic group so that the autonomy and uniqueness of each
ethnic groups can be protected.” Fortunately, this article was enacted as a separate Act titled
“On the National-Cultural Autonomy.” National-Cultural Autonomy, as a trans-territorial
social organization, will enlarge the potential and responsibility of each ethnic groups by
carrying out policies that do not collide with the rights of constituents of the Russian
Federation (Hwang, 2008: 156-158). In 2000, “On the National-Cultural Autonomy of
PrimorskiiKrai” Act was drafted (op.cit., 2004: 67).
- 20 -
<Table 3> Changes in Russia's Ethnic Minority Policies
Period
Imperial
Russia
∙Policies of domination over ethnic minorities with the goal of establishingthe
Great Russia
Soviet
Union
Russian
Federation
Lenin
∙Self-determination of each ethnic groups equal cooperation
among ethnic groups
Stalin
∙Oppression over and Russianization of ethnic minorities, some
ethnic minorities forcibly deported
Khrushchev
∙Relaxation of control over ethnic minorities, recovery of
citizenship of 11 ethnic minorities
Brezhnev
∙Strengthened control over ethnic minorities
Gorbachev
∙Recognition of self-rule of ethnic minorities, independence
granted to some ethnic minorities
∙Principle of equality among ethnicities and self-determination
∙Autonomy of ethnic minorities enlarged, but disallowance of independence
Source: Lee, Song-Ho et al.2004.
Identity of Goryeo People
In the early period, Goryeo migrants were able to maintain their own lifestyle and
culture as they were equipped with farming skills. Group labor was necessary for farming, so
they lived as communities and retained their traditional religion. (Kim, 2004: 24).
After being forcibly deported to Central Asia, national identity and intellectual·
cultural influence of the Korean society in Russia were completely uprooted. Oppressive
policies, forced deportation, suppression, political and legal hierarchization on the basis of
ethnicity that occurred between 1930 and 1950s homogenized ethnic·cultural diversity; ethnic
communities were demolished.
In 1989, 8,454 Goryeo people were living in PrimorskiiKrai; among them, 6,700
were living in the city. As Uzbekistan gained independence in 1992, they once again returned
to PrimorskiiKrai, which was 6,000km far away. In 1996, the population reached 26,000 and
increased up to 3,000 within 2 years. It was estimated that roughly 36,000 were residing in
PrimorskiiKrai in November, 2000. Among them, around 15,000 live in Ussuryisk (Nam et
al., 2005: 145). They are still marginalized both politically and economically, while lacking a
- 21 -
proper center. In 1991, Arsenyevskii Korean Culture Center was established. Up until 1996, 5
Korean Culture Centers and Associations were operating in PrimorskiiKrai, and the number
increased up to 11 by the year 2001. National identity - especially its cultural aspect - is
reviving recently. While many Goryeo people in PrimorskiiKrai emigrated voluntarily, ethnic
Koreans in Sakhalin were forcibly deported; this could have created a difference between
national identities of these two groups. In addition, in the case of Sakhalin, ‘Sakhalin Woori
Mal Bangsong(TV Channel in Korean)’ airing Korean soap operas has a high viewing rate,
positively influencing national or cultural identity. (Kim, 2009: 48-49).
Conclusion
The national identity of overseas ethnic Koreans are inevitably dualistic, as their
Korean culture and lineage are passed down from their motherland, while they are entitled to
rights and duties as citizens of the country they reside in. The extreme prejudice and
discrimination have worked as mechanisms to reinforce the ethnic identity for the ethnic
Korean in East Sea Rim. On the other hand, assimilation seems to be a necessary process for
ethnic Korean minorities to survive in the dominant society as immigrants. 9
While Korean Chinese have preserved their own traditional culture, due to the
Chinese government's policies that grant a certain degree of autonomy to ethnic minorities,
the Goryeo people show a high level of assimilation in terms of language and culture due to
Russia's policies of oppression and dispersion. Koreans in Japan are biased towards socialism
because many had received national education supported by North Korea, which was carried
out as a backlash to Japan's exclusive discriminatory policies. National identity of Koreans in
Japan is nowadays mixed; increasing number of people are obtaining South Korean
citizenship, in part as an effect of Korea's economic development and 'Korean Wave', while
the number of people naturalizing as Japanese citizens are on the rise simultaneously.
This paper criticized previous studies that undertook a quantitative approach and
reviewed the effects of ethnic minority policies of East Sea Rim countries on the national
identity of overseas Koreans through historical comparison. Quantitative research hereafter
should consider region, settlements, generation, class (divided into income or occupation) as
Yoon, In-Jin, “The Identity Problem of Overseas Korean”, Overseas Newspaper.
9
- 22 -
major variables, and should also pay due attention to various aspects of national education,
including language, culture, history, etc. The role of broadcast media and cultural institutions
should also be considered as parameters. If the multicultural experiences of Korean Diaspora
are studied in depth, it would broaden the horizon of Korea's multicultural studies, for
instance by providing policy suggestions on Overseas Koreans Act enacted in 2003 that
turned out to be discriminatory against ethnic Koreans residing in East Sea Rim countries.
- 23 -
References
[in Korean]
Choi, Young-Ho. 2008.“Formation of Korean Communities in Japan and Transformation of their National
Identities”, 「Studies on Korean History」pp.68-97
.
Chung, Jae-Nam. 2008. 『Ethnic Minorities in China』, Geonggi: Salim.
Donomura Masaru. 2010. 『Historical Studies on Chosun People Society in Japan』, Nonhyung.
Han, Sang-Bok·Kwon, Tae-Whan. 1993. 『Korean Chinese in Yanbian of China: Social Structure and
Change』, Seoul: Seoul National University Press.
Hwang, Dong-Ha. 2008. “Ethnic Policy and History in the Modern Russia: the Relationship between Russia
and Uklaia”, Ryu, Han-Su et al. 『Ethnic Policy and History in Russia』, Seoul: Foundation of Northeast
History.
Im, Chae-Wan, 2002, “Survey Research on the Ethnic Identity of Koreans in the Maritime Provinces of
Russia”, 「Studies on Unification」, No. 38, pp. 175-210.
Kim, Ik-Hyun·Na, Ji-Young. 2012. “Ethnic Identity and Border of Chosun People in Japan”, Konkuk
University Unification Humanity Research Unit. 2012. 『Korean Ethnic Identity』, Seoul: Sunin.
Kim, Kwang-Uk et al. 2005. 『Tribe and Ethnicity: Beyond the Single and Universal Myth』, Seoul: Acanet.
Kim, Natalia. 2004. 「A Study on the Features of Korean Diaspora Community in Primorskii Region in
Russia: Comparative Perspective with German Diaspora Community」, Thesis Master of Arts in Korean
Studies. The Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University.
Kim, Sang-Ho. 2009.“Korean Broadcast and Ethnic Identity in Sakhain”, a presented paper on Korean
Broadcast Association.
Konkuk University Unification Humanity Research Unit. 2012. 『Korean Ethnic Identity』, Seoul: Sunin.
Lee, Chae-Moon. 2005. 『Diaspora on the Frozen Land』, Daegu: Kyungbuk National Univ. Press.
Lee, Song-Ho et al. 2004. 『Primorskii Region and Goryeo people』, Seoul: Baeksanseodang.
Lee, Yoon-Gi. 2005. 『Forgotten Land Kando and Primorskii Region』, Seoul: HwasanMunhwa.
Nam, Hye-Kyung. 2005. 『Demographic Migration of Goryeo people and Economic Environment』,
Geonggi: Jibmundang.
- 24 -
Park, Min-Chul·Chung, Jin-Ah. 2012. “Ethnic Identity and Pride of Goryeo People in Russia”, Konkuk
Park, Myung-Kyu. 2008. “Multicultural Phenomena and Ethnic Identity of Korean in the 21th Century”, a
Lecture in the Foundation of Education and Promotion for Ethnic Korean. July 26th.
Park, Young-Kyun·Huh, Myung-Chul. 2012. “ Korean Chinese and Ethnic Double-Identity”, Konkuk
Ryu, Eun-Kyu. 2007. 『Yanbian Cultural Revolution: Ten Years’Promise』, Geonggi: Tohyang.
Suh, Kyung-Sik. 2012. 『Witness of History: Chosun People in Japan』, Seoul: Danbi.
Yoon, In-Jin. 2004. 『Korean Diaspora: Migration, Adaptation, and Identity of Overseas Korean』, Seoul:
Korea University Press.
Yoon, In-Jin. 2000. “Ethnic Identity and Affection of Overseas Korean: A Comparative Study of Overseas
Korean in the U.S. and Formerly Soviet Union”, Korean Sociological Association.
[in English]
Anderson, B., 1991, Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Potter, B., 2011, Law, Policy, and Practice on China’s Periphery: Selective Adaptation and Institutional
Capacity. London: Routledge.
Ryang, S. & John Lie (eds.), 2009, Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan. CA.: University of
California Press.
Morris-Suzuki, T., 2009, “Freedom and Homecoming: Narratives of Migration in the Repatriation of Zainichi
Koreans to North Korea”, In Ryang, S. & John Lie (eds.), Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in
Japan. CA.:University of California Press.
- 25 -
- 26 -
Neural Network Analysis of Mutual Perceptions in East
Sea Rim Region
Kim, JungHyoun
HK Professor
- 27 -
- 28 -
Introduction
It is not surprising issues that Japan has been embroiled in heated disputes with South
Korea, China, and Russia. Four states of East Sea Rim region –Japan, China, Russia, and
South Korea – have involved in the world’s most vexing territorial disputes over small
islands and rocks located from the northern East Sea Rim through the East China Seas.
Nationalist feelings based on historical grievances and the economic beneficiary expectations
that the disputed areas contain are the fundamental reasons behind these disputes. Animistic
feelings against each other, in particular, between South Korea and Japan has never been
banished or alleviated.
Although all states in the disputed areas clearly recognize their feelings of
antagonism related on the territorial disputes, they acknowledge the urgent necessity of
collaboration for developing not only their domestic economy but also accomplishing
political stability in East Sea Rim region. This is an irony of international relations which is
rooted in the multilayered relations. Because the multilayered relations contain two or more
agents and agent’s diverse purposes of exchanges in different levels, it becomes very difficult
to predict how the relations between two or more states would be changed and what factors
would play an important role in driving the relations.
Based on the basic proposition of international relations field - domestic politics (in
general, public opinion or feelings)influence the relations with other states outsides by
directly impacting on foreign policy making process, this study tries to answer the following
questions: Is there any difference in the Japanese public opinion about territorial disputes
between China and South Korea? If so, is there different or variation between two dimensions
of Japanese nationalism (negative aspect of nationalism or positive aspect – so called,
constructive nationalism) related to their territorial disputes? Related to Chinese and
Korean’s nationalism, is there any difference of their opinion about territorial disputes? What
are the implications of this psychological gap among three countries in their future relations?
Finally, how can we better understand the non-linear, random-effect, and non-parametric
characters of three countries’ people?
- 29 -
What we find from this study is that “For Japan and South Korea, nationalism
(excessive feeling of nationalism) has been an important role in driving the public opinion
about territorial disputes. Yet, nationalism of Chinese people does not influence
peoples’opinion about the disputes.” In terms of methodological issue, the paper suggests that
people’s opinion about territorial disputes tends to be subjective not to their level of
nationalism but to objective and real power of the opposite country.
In order to get some answers to questions above, this study uses “Structural Equation
Model with Neural Network Analysis” which helps us investigate nonlinear and sigmoid
relationship between two psychological attributes- Nationalism and feeling of compromising.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes ongoing territorial disputes
among Japan, South Korea, and China and variations of the public’s perception about their
territorial disputes would be. Section 3 presents the methodological issue of neural network
analysis. Section 4 presents data and formulates hypothesis. In final, section 5 presents
findings and comments which are related to the future of three countries relations.
Ongoing Squabbles on Small Islands and Rocks and Japanese Perception
of the Disputes
East Sea Rim region is boiling pot with the world’s most vexing territorial disputes.
It is not necessary for these territorial disputes to cover the entire soil of a particular country
in order to seriously strain interstate relationships, such as the cases of the two Chinas and the
two Koreas. Even small, barely habitable offshore islands can serve as the most persistent and
explosive bone of contention. Besides the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in East China Sea, such
unresolved island disputes take places with competing sovereignty claims to the
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, the Northern Territories/Kurile
Islands in the Northwest Pacific Ocean, the Islands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan in the
Celebes Sea, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
First, related to the relations between China and Japan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
dispute dates back to the 1970s. Recently, when China and Taiwan protested Japan’s
- 30 -
declaration of a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the features, it
erupted into the public feelings in June 1996. The eventual owner between China and Japan
could claim some 11,700 square nautical miles of maritime space and continental shelf, as
well as the resources therein. On 26 May 1997, a flotilla carrying Taiwan and Hong Kong
activists attempted to land people on the islands as a challenge to Japan’s claim of sole
sovereignty over them. However, this time Japanese coast guard vessels successfully
prevented a landing. This provocative public feeling of Chinese nationalism was a predictable
response to a well-publicized visit to the rocks earlier that month (May 6) by Japanese
nationalists led by Shin Nishimura, a member of the opposition New Frontier Party. On 5
September 1999, another landing was carried out by three members of the Japan Youth
League, a Japanese nationalist group. This landing was presented as a protest against an
increased presence of Chinese survey vessels in the vicinity. In the aftermath of the landing,
China again demanded that Japanese government punish the offenders and take all possible
measures to prevent future landings. Both governments feared that this incident would
rekindle the domestically sensitive ownership issue in their countries.
According to the survey data that was conducted for Japanese adults in 20081, less than 9% of
survey respondents agree to two countries’ peaceful-diplomatic solution for the territorial
dispute.
Japanese Perception of Senkaku D ispute against China
Japan should be willing to compromis e the conflict
Japan should not be willing to comrpomis e the conf lict
Don't Know
<Figure 1> Japanese perception of Senkaku Dispute against China
1
“Soft Power in Asian Survey, 2008” provided by ICPSR. Data Downloaded on Sept. 6. 2012 from
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/TERMS/25342.xml
- 31 -
According to Figure 1, whereas people who think“Japan should not be willing to
compromise the conflict against China” is just little over of 37% in Japan, Figure 2 shows
that people who think “China should not be willing to compromise the conflict against Japan”
is a little over 87% in China. In other words, Chinesefeeling level of hate against Japan is
twice more than Japanese feeling of hate against China. What does make such a huge gap of
people’s feeling of hate against each other country regards to the territorial dispute issues?
The main reason for the gap between China and Japan can be different occupation status, for
instance, Japan has occupied the island (Senkaku/Tok-do) with an exclusively endowed right
of actual effect domination. Therefore, Japanese people do not have to take any actions in
urgent which might stimulate Chinese feeling of hate against Japan.
Chinese Perception of Diaoyu Dispute against Japan
Should be willing
Shou ld not be willing
Don't Know
<Figure 2> Chinese Perception of Diaoyu Dispute against Japan
In terms of the Tok-Do/Takeshima dispute between Japan and South Korea (Korea
hereafter),the dispute over two barren rocks raised its ugly head. These rocks could allow
claims to about 16,600 square nautical miles of sea and seabed and their associated. (Valencia
n.d., 2)
They have been in dispute since the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation,
and the tension increased when both Japan and Korea announced in February, 1996 that
- 32 -
theywere extending their respective 200-nautical mile EEZs to encompass the disputed
features. Korea held military maneuvers around the islands and constructed a wharf on one of
them. Japan’s foreign minister demanded that the construction be halted and reiterated
Japan’s sovereignty claim over the islands. This generated a outrageous response in Korea:
for instance, there were massive protest rallies in major cities, and Japanese national flags
were burned.
Japanese Perception of Takeshima Dispute against Korea
Should be willing
Don't K now
Should not be willing
<Figure 3> Japanese Perception of Takeshima Dispute against Korea
The dispute erupted again in 1998 when the two countries failed to agree on a modus
operandi for Tok-Do/Takeshima and the surrounding waters. And Japan unilaterally
terminated its fisheries agreement with Korea. Korea responded by lifting all restrictions on
Korean fishing boats operating in Japan’s claimed waters, prompting Japan to begin arresting
Korean fishing boats within its territorial seas. Korean public got angry enough to raise antiJapanese demonstrations. The fisheries dispute was resolved with a new agreement in 1998.
Currently, president of South Korea, MyoungBak Lee visited Dok-Do/Takeshimaisland in
2012 and announced territorial sovereignty over Dok-Do. He was the first president who
visited Dok-Do since Korea made its official diplomatic relations with Japan. Korean
president’s visit to Dok-Do pushed Japanese government to recall its ambassador from Korea.
- 33 -
In terms of Japanese and Koreans’perceptions about territorial dispute, Figure 3 and
4 shows that there is similarity between two countries’ public opinion about DokDo/Takeshima territorial dispute.>2 In this study, three countries’perceptions about territorial
disputes in East Sea Rim region are used as dependent variables for analyzing the relationship
with each country’s level of nationalism.
Korean Perception of Tok-Do Dispute against Japan
Should be willing
.
Should not be willing
<Figure4> Korean Perception of Tok-Do Dispute against Japan.
Theoretical Background of Relationship Between Nationalism and the Public’s
Perception of Territorial Disputes: Negative Aspect of National Identity or Positive
Patriotism Matters?
For shedding some light on the relationship between nationalism and the public’s
perception of territorial disputes in East Sea Rim region, this study tries to conceptualize
“nationalism” as a multilayered concept which consists of two different types of national
identity: “nationalism” and “constructive patriotism”(Davidov 2009). National identity
represents different aspects of an individual’s relationship toward his or her nation. Generally
2
Both Japanese and Korean public tend not to support for their governments’ any effort to solve the territorial conflict.
Whereas about 39% of Japanese respondents are not likely to force their government to compromise the territorial dispute,
about 36% of Korean respondents are not likely to force their government to compromise.
- 34 -
speaking, what it describes is the intensity of feelings and closeness toward one’s own nation
(Blank and Schmidt, National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An
Empirical Test with Representative data 2003).Previously, empirical work has treated it as a
one-dimensional construct. Only a few studies argued that national identity is twodimensional (Sommerville 1981). Researchers arguing two-dimensionality of national
identity are used to distinguish between two types or forms of national attachment, each one
differing in the conception of how the relation between the individual and the nation is
structured. They regard one aspect of national identity as blind, militaristic, ignorant,
obedient, or irrational and the other as genuine, constructive, critical, civic, reasonable, and
disobedient. The first is related to negative aspect of national identity that has been labeled
“nationalism, pseudo-patriotism, chauvinism, or blind patriotism,” and was found to be
associated with authoritarianism (Blank 2003). The second has been labeled constructive or
positive patriotism that has been labeled civic or political national pride based on being proud
of the country’s political institutions, culture, economy, and social welfare system (Hjerm
1998).
According to Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, there are two types of patriotism: blind (or
nationalism) and constructive patriotism (1999). They describe blind patriotism as “a rigid
and
inflexible
attachment
to
country,
characterized
by
unquestioning
positive
evaluation”(Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999, p. 153). In contrast, they define constructive
patriotism as “an attachment to country characterized by critical loyalty”(Schatz, Staub and
Lavine 1999, p. 153). The blind patriot considers criticism of the state as disloyal, whereas
constructive patriots may even criticize the state themselves, if they feel that the state violates
their ideology or if they believe the state is mistaken.
Following the line of thoughts of Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999), Blank, Schmidt,
and Westle also propose the consideration of two types of national identity: nationalism and
constructive patriotism (2001). They argue that one should distinguish between them both
conceptually and empirically. Nationalism should reflect the idealization of one’s own nation
and its history. However, according to Adorno et al. constructive patriotism is defined as the
“love of the country” and attachment to its humanistic and democratic values (i.e., support for
- 35 -
“humanistic” government, support for “democratic principles,” support for advanced system
of social welfare, etc.) (1950). Blank and Schmidt (2003) describe nationalism and
constructive patriotism as more specific expressions of national of national identity, whereas
national identity is the more general concept (Bar-Tal 1997). From this point of view, they
argue that nationalism is characterized by idealization of the nation: a feeling of national
superiority; an uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities; a suppression
of ambivalent attitudes toward the nation; an inclination to define one’s own group by criteria
of descent, race, or cultural affiliation; and derogation of groups not considered to be a part of
the nation. By contrast, constructive patriotism is viewed as having the following aspects: the
nation is not idealized, but critically evaluated; support for the system as long as the nation’s
aims are in accord with humanistic values; support for democratic principles and an advanced
social system; rejection of an uncritical acceptance of state authorities; and acceptance of
negative nation-related emotions (Blank and Schmidt 2003).
However, because this study is aimed to look into the solid relationship between
nationalism and the public’s perception about territorial disputes, it is necessary to break
down the concept of nationalism into two different types of national identity: “nationalism (or
blind patriotism) and constructive patriotism.”For empirically testing of how these two
different types of nationalism influence the public’s thoughts about (the realistic and possible)
solutions for territorial disputes, this paper operationalizes the concept of nationalism as
psychologically multi-dimensional feelings representing three aspects: (1) nationalism (blind
patriotism), (2) constructive patriotism, and (3) blind & constructive patriotism. Figure 5
shows a diagram of operationalization for the concept of “nationalism.”
- 36 -
<Figure 5> Multi-dimensional Aspects of Nationalism
First, in terms of blind patriotism aspect, respondents of the survey were asked to
answer the following two questions: (1) How proud are you of [country] “our political
system”? and(2) How proud are you of [country] “our history”?3 Relates to the relationship
with dependent variable – the public’s perception of territorial dispute – it is expected that
there is a negative impact of “blind patriotism” on “the public’s support for compromising the
conflict.”The first hypothesis would be:
<Hypothesis 1>[country]’s people with high level of nationalism (blind patriotism) are
not likely to support for compromising their [country]’s territorial dispute.
Second, in terms of constructive patriotism aspect, respondents of the survey were
asked to answer the following two questions: (1) How proud are you of [country] about
“what our economy has done for our people?”and (2) Do you think East Asian countries,
including South Korea, China, and Japan, should or should not integrate into a regional
community, similar to the European Union?4 In contrast to the aspect of blind patriotism,
3
Respondents choose one of the following: (1) very proud (2) somewhat proud (3) not very proud (4) not at all proud and (99)
DK/NA (don’t know)
4
Respondents choose one of three : (1) Yes, they should, (2) No, they shouldn’t, and (3) Don’t know
- 37 -
constructive patriotism is expected to have positive impact on dependent variable. Thus, the
second hypothesis would be:
<Hypothesis 2>[country]’s people with high level of constructive patriotism are likely to
support for compromising their [country]’s territorial dispute.
Relates to the third aspect of nationalism, psychological dimension of the
concept,“pride of nationality” implies its ambivalent characteristic, so called ‘sigmoid type of
impact on dependent variable.’The sigmoid type of impact represents non-linear, nonparametric, and random effect on dependent variable. The sigmoid effect can be presented as
the following graph (figure 6).
<Figure 6> Sigmoid Effect Graph
The line of sigmoid represents an important fact that there is a critical point (“0” in
the case of figure 6). This point divides the graph into two parts: positive and negative impact
on dependent variable. In other words, when the level of this factor goes up, there would be
positive impact on dependent variable, and vice versa. Respondents were asked to answer the
following question: In terms of your identity, how much do you think of yourself as
[statehood or nationality]? Please use scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you don’t think of
yourself this way at all and 10 means this is the main way you think of yourself.”In order to
- 38 -
measure the sigmoid effect of this factor, the raw data for this survey question is transformed
based on one of Neural Network Analysis assumptions. The sigmoid type of data was
calculated by the following equation.
What we can expect from the sigmoid type of independent variable is that there could
be some variations among different countries, for instance, positive or negative impact on
dependent variable can be always changeable depending on conditional changes.
<Hypothesis 3>A country with strong influential power of [a sigmoid type of variable]
tends to be changeable in the condition of foreign-policy making process.
It would give us some important clue for foreseeing the future relationship of two
countries which are currently in conflict situation. In other words, if blind patriotism has
played an important role in a country’s territorial dispute, the conflict situation wouldn’t be
demolished but it will get worse than the situation of beginning.
SEM (Structural Equation Model) with NNA (Neural Network Analysis) of
a Survey Data
For scientific empirical testing of three hypothesis above, this study uses SEM
(Structural Equation Model) with NNA (Neural Network Analysis) of a survey data –“Asian
soft power 2008.”5
5
The survey was fielded on January 17th 2008 to a total of 1,470 panel members age eighteen years of age or older who
represented a general population sample. The interview completion goal was to collect a minimum of 1,000 completed
interviews.
- 39 -
SEM is a statistical technique that combines elements of traditional multivariate
models, such as regression analysis, factor analysis, and simultaneous equation modeling.
SEM can account for less than perfect reliability of the observed variables, providing
analyses of attenuation and estimation bias due to measurement error. The SEM approach is
sometimes also called causal modeling because competing models can be postulated about
the data and tested against each other. Many applications of SEM can be found in the social
science, where measurement error and uncertain causal conditions are commonly
encountered. Figure 7 is a diagram that is designed to analyze the dependent variable,
“Japanese Perception about Territorial Dispute against S. Korea.”
<Figure 7> Structural Equation Model of Japanese Perceptions about Territorial Dispute
against S.Korea
This model consists of four groups of independent variables: (1) Blind Patriotism /
Nationalism (“Proud of Politics & Proud of History”), (2) Constructive Patriotism (“Proud of
Economic System& Support for Regional Community”), (3) Control variables (“Age ,
Income, and Education”), (4) Non-linear/non-parametric variable (“Pride as Japanese).
Econometric model of this SEM with Neural Network Analysis consists of three-staged
equation with linear/non-linear and direct/indirect effect.
- 40 -
…………….. (1) non-linear& non-parametric independent variable
……..(2) Indirect effect of Latent (Hidden) variable.
……(3) SEM with NNA
In terms of NNA (neural network analysis), the estimation procedure involves two
step. In step one, each variable is normalized by subtracting its mean value and divided by its
standard deviation to have zero mean value and unity variance for all variables. As a result,
we will not have an intercept in our result of the step one and we can determine the relative
importance of each-variable based on its estimated. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is
estimated for each independent to identify causes of mulicollinearity. In the step two, Neural
Network Analysis helps us look into the indirect effects of blind/constructive patriotism.
Moreover, the estimating problem of the model would be reduced. Figure 8 shows the
diagram of Neural Network.
<Figure 8>Neural Network model.
Using a latent variable of this model lets us to capture the non-linear relationship
between variables. In terms of neural network analysis, NNA consists of an input layer, an
output layer and one or more intervening layers, also referred to as hidden layers. Each layer
consists of multiple neurons that are connected to neurons in adjacent layers. Since these
networks contain many interacting non-linear neurons in multiple layers, the networks can
- 41 -
capture relatively complex phenomena(Pao 2008). Related to a complexity and indirect
aspect of “nationalism”, SEM with NNA is considered as an appropriate model to investigate
the effect of nationalism on the public’s perception of territorial disputes.
Results of SEM with NNA and Findings
<Table 1> shows the statistical analyzed estimates of variables in SEM with NNA model.
<Table 1> SEM with NNA of Mutual Perception about Teritorial Disputes in East Sea Rim Regional States
Japanese Public Opinion
Structural Equation Model with Neural Network
Analysis
Standardized
Coef.
p-value
Chinese Public Opinion Koreans Public Opinion
Against China
Standardized
Coef.
p-value
Against Japan
Standardized
Coef.
p-value
Against Japan
Standardized
Coef.
p-value
Proud of Politics
0.1804
0.0570
-0.2105
0.0240
0.0027
0.9110
-0.0154
0.9100
Proud of Economy
-0.1658
0.0800
-0.2106
0.0240
0.0593
0.0100
-0.0029
0.9780
Proud of History
0.0552
0.4110
0.0497
0.4540
0.0076
0.7520
0.0200
0.8510
Support Regional Community
0.1707
0.0100
0.1249
0.0590
0.0340
0.3300
-0.0206
0.7560
Age
0.4345
0.5230
0.0548
0.4140
0.0227
0.0300
-0.0683
0.3610
Income
-0.0647
0.3220
-0.0539
0.4240
0.0370
0.0060
-0.0772
0.2980
Education
0.0578
0.3930
0.0524
0.4330
0.0190
0.1820
-0.0078
0.9030
Pride in Nationality
0.0984
0.1410
0.2072
0.0010
1.0900
0.0190
0.0146
0.8150
Latent(Hidden) Var.
0.0707
0.0000
0.7071
0.0000
1.0000 (constrained)
0.7071
0.0000
Constant Var.
2.8678
0.0000
2.3683
0.0000
0.0206
0.0285
0.9900
Blind/Contru
ctive Var.
Structural Effect
on Latent Var.
Control Var.
Non-linear
Var.
Effect on D. Var.
Against S. Korea
0.5690
N
428
433
410
512
Log-likelihood
-9288.5888
-9340.0165
-2935.9388
-11007.525
Relates to the first group of independent variable-Blind/Constructive patriotism-,
Constructive Patriotism(CP) seems to play an important role in forming the public’s
perception about territorial dispute in Japan and China. Yet, the coefficient estimates of two
independent variables which represent the aspect of CP there is diagonal effect on the public
perception. People with high level of supporting a regional community in Japan tend to be
willing to compromise territorial disputes against S.Korea (Dok Do/Takezima) and China
(Daiyu/Senkaku). This result confirms the second hypothesis partially. Regards to “Proud of
Economy”, the result shows that people who think their economic system is better than that
of others are not likely to support for compromising territorial disputes. It seems that over 18
years of economic depression in Japan make Japanese people change their perspective of
economic system from positive to negative one. Thus, people with negative perspective of
economic system are not likely to support for compromising territorial disputes against S.
- 42 -
Korea and China. In the similar context, people with positive perspective of economic system
in China are more likely to support for compromising territorial dispute against Japan. Rapid
economic development of China seems to make Chinese people more tolerable than in the
period of economic difficulty.
Relates to Blind Patriotism (BP), the results of analyzing coefficients of estimates
imply that there is some meaningful difference within the two cases of Japan. According to
table 1, Japanese people with high level of pride about their political system tend to have
ambivalent feelings about territorial disputes against S. Korea and China. Whereas they show
strong will to compromise territorial dispute against S. Korea, they show that they don’t like
to any peaceful ways of compromising dispute against China.In other words, the result
confirms in part the assumption of hypothesis 1.
In terms of non-linear/non-parametric independent variable – pride in nationality-,
table 1 shows that there are positive effects on dependent variable in both cases of Japan and
China. The current conflict situation between Japan and China can be understood as a
situation which each country’s perception about territorial dispute is related to a negative
aspect of nationalism (Blind Patriotism). Unlike the case of Korea in which there is no
statistically significant estimates, Japan and China have some hostile type of relationship
based on psychologically melted feeling of superiority in their nationality. However, this
result suggests the possibility of third hypothesis assumption: Japan and China might have a
chance to get together in near future because the conflicting relationship against each other is
rooted on an exchangeable factor with sigmoid effect. Regards to the Hidden variable in the
model, two countries (South Korea & Japan) out of three cases seem to have strong positive
relations with each other. In terms of demographic variables, only individual’s age and
income level have played some role in shaping the public perceptions of territorial disputes in
China only. The result implies that the old and rich Chinese people are less likely to support
for compromising type of solution. In case of Korea, statistical significance level of
coefficient estimate of Hidden variable is less than 0.00001. This implies that Neural
Network Model can be a fitted model that may allow a researcher to investigate of overall,
indirect, and non-linear style of relationship with dependent variable.
- 43 -
Conclusion
This study is designed to shed some light on the possible variation of the public’s
perceptions of territorial disputes and its solutions. In order to check into the multidimensionality and multi-staged feature of two nations’ recognition of “nationalism”, this
study generates three hypotheses with three types of independent variables. The result of
SEM with NNA model implies that both Japanese and Chinese perceptions of territorial
disputes represent more hostile and unstable (or changeable) relationship than the case of S.
Korea against Japan. What we find in this research is that the negative aspect of patriotism
(Blind patriotism) tends to function as a disrupter in making a difficult relationship into a
better and closer one in a certain region including East Sea Rim region.
- 44 -
References
Adorno, Theodor, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford.The
Authoritarian Personality.New York: Harper & Row, 1950.
Bar-Tal, Daniel. "The Monopolization of Patriotism."In Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals
and Nations, by Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, 246-270. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1997.
Blank , Thomas, and Peter Schmidt. "National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or
Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative data." Political Psychology 24 (2003):
289-311.
Blank, Thomas. "Determinants of National Identity in East and West Germany: An Empirical
Comparison of Theories on the Significance of Authoritarianism, Anomie, and General Selfesteem." Political Psychology 24 (2003): 259-288.
Blank, Thomas, Peter Schmidt, and Bettina Westle. "A Contradiction, A Possibility, or an
Empirical Reality? 'Patriotism'."ECPR. Grenoble, France, 2001.
Davidov, Eldad. "Measurement Equivalence of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism in
the ISSP: 34 Countries in a Comparative Perspective." Political Analysis 17 (2009): 64-82.
Hjerm, Mikael. "National Identities, National Pride, and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four
Western Countries." ActaSociologica 41, no. 4 (1998): 335-347.
Pao, Hsiao-Tien."A Comparison of Neural Network and Multiple Regression Analysis in
Modeling Capital Structure."ScienceDirect 35 (2008): 720-727.
Schatz, Robert, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine. "On the Varieties of National Attachment:
Blind versus Constructive Patriotism." Political Psychology 20, no. 1 (1999): 151-174.
Sommerville, Johann. "Patriotism and War."Ethics 91 (1981): 568-578.
Thomson, Ann M., James Perry, and Theodore Mille."Conceptualizing and Measuring
Collaboration."Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2007: 1-34.
Valencia, Mark J. "Domestic Politics Fuels Northeast Asian Maritime Disputes." Asia Pacific
Issues, n.d.: 1-8.
- 45 -
- 46 -
Export-oriented Development of the Russian Far East:
Myth or Reality?
Irina A. Korgun
HK Research Professor
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
- 47 -
- 48 -
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that export plays a crucial role in the development of
economies either on state or regional levels. World practice is abundant with examples of
successful stories. Russian Far East, which neighbors several of the biggest trading countries
in the world and the three biggest economies of Asia, seems to have many advantages and
even natural predisposition for export-led development. However, the reality shows a
different picture: socio-economic situation remains highly unfavorable and export patterns do
not change over years.
Meanwhile, federal programs for the development of the Russian Far East, or Far
Eastern Federal District (FEFD), are presumably based on the premises that export will be a
centerpiece of development strategy for the region. This point is implicated in theirobjectives
that call for development of resource-based industries and building of the oil pipe-line East
Siberia – Pacific Ocean and in the end for the integration of the Russian Far East into AsiaPacific region. Besides, analysis of materials from other sources like newspapers and reports
show that they have a very pro-export-oriented focus. But considering many unfavorable
conditions it is natural to doubt possibility of such path of development. Development
process implies not only numerical growth of major indexes but also improving quality of
growth, structure of the economy, general sustainability and resistance to external shocks.
This perspective makes one to reconsider objectives and look closer at the constraints.
In this paper we would like to address issues of export-led development in FEFD. As a matter
of fact our focus will directed mostly to those factors that stand in the way of export-based
development. Many of the things might not look new since there was a lot of discussion on
the problems of the Russian Far East development both domestically and internationally,
various aspects, especially in respect to the advantages of the region and its natural
propensity to export, received a close attention from academic and expert communities. But
we believe that as long as plans are drafted there is a need to talk about current problems
under different angles. We will also try to make some suggestions what can be done if not to
reverse but to improve the state of things. The general logic of the paper will follow the
- 49 -
method of SWOT analysis but in a slightly changed order – threats will come before
opportunities and the section about opportunities will also be a concluding part of the paper.
Strength (potential to export)
Russian Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD) –tha includes Far Eastern regions
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (further Chukotka AO), Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), Magadan
oblast, Kamchatka krai, Primorskykrai, Khabarovsk krai, Amur oblast, Sakhalin oblast,
Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Jewish AO) (Figure 1). It is a common fact that this Russian
region is characterized by advantageous geographic position and abundant natural resources
that can become a good base for development. To be more precise, the region has an inland
border with China, the second largest economy in the world, a sea border with Japan, is
located not far from the other major East Asian economy –South Korea. Also, sea routs allow
to go from its ports to all of the Asia-Pacific countries. Resource endowment does not need a
detailed explanation an important point in connection to this is that high demand for
resources makes FEFD a desirable trading partner but in reality attractiveness ends at this due
to many weakness deeply rooted in the regional economies.
- 50 -
<Figure 1> Regions of Far Eastern Federal District
Source: Adapted by author from http://freelance.ru/users/andreychan/?work=402121
One more factor that speaks in favor of export-led pattern of development is low
intensity of trade with other Russian regions. In his study on the nature of intraregional trade
between Russian regions A. Gusev shows that regions of the RFE are less involved in the
intraregional trade with other regions of Russia. In 2009 only 0.28% of goods shipped by
FEFD was shipped to other regions of Russia, it makes up only 0.45% of Gross Regional
Product of the FEFD (Table 1). In fact, trade of regions of the Russian Far East between each
other also does not play any significant role. According to Gusev, FEFD regions sold only
1.33% of all the goods shipped to other regions of FEFD, which is equal to 2.12% of FEFD’s
GRP. Meanwhile Asian countries are much closer than any of the Western regions of Russia
or even other regions of FEFD.
- 51 -
<Table 1> Trade of Russia’s Federal districts
Goods shipped to regions of other
Goods shipped to regions of the
FD
same FD
As a share of
the total
No.
Federal District
volume of
goods
As a share of
GRP of FD
As a share of the
total volume of
goods shipped, %
As a share of
GRP of FD
shipped, %
1
Central FD
13.94
3.37
27.57
6.66
2
North-West FD
15.15
12.29
3.76
3.05
3
South FD
4.89
6.80
1.50
2.09
1.82
6.31
0.16
0.55
4
North-Caucasus
FD
5
Volga FD
13.36
7.50
5.19
2.91
6
Ural FD
2.09
0.15
1.38
0.10
7
Siberia FD
3.26
2.66
4.31
3.51
8
Far Eastern FD
0.28
0.45
1.33
2.12
Total
54.8
45.2
Source: adapted to English from A. Gusev «Торговая»
угрозатерриториальнойцелостностиРоссии / Капита Страныhttp://www.kapitalrus.ru/articles/article/194876/
In contrast with domestic trade exporting activity of FEFD regions develops more
vibrantly. Through 2000’s Far Eastern regions exhibited a steady tendency towards increase
of foreign shipments. In the total between 2000 and 2010 total export of FEFD grew fivefold,
Primorskykrai and mostly Sakhalin oblast accounted for a lion’s share of this increase.
Exports by Sakhalin oblast rose from mere 425 million US dollars to more than 11 billion US
dollars in 2010 and 15.6 billion US dollars in 2011 (Figure 2). Behind this growth of
- 52 -
Sakhalin oblast’s exports lies launch of gas supplies to Korea and Japan under shelf projects
and constant increase in prices of oil (and consequently of gas prices as well since equation
for gas price is tied to the price of oil). Dependence of regional economies on export earnings
is also high though varies according to theregional situation. It is the highest in
Primorskymacrozone where exports reach as much as 33.9% of Gross Regional Product (for
Sakhalin oblast this indicator is 73%). This once again demonstrates close connections that
already exist between export and development process in some regions of FEFD. The reality
is that at present FEFD has no other option but to export in order to survive though it does not
bring them full benefits enough for a balanced and sustainable development.
A large construction project aimed to build an oil pipeline from the East Siberia to
Pacific Ocean will make a contribution to further export-orientation.It is projected to supply
Northeast Asian consumers with Russian oil. Consequently, export dependency of several
regions – especially that of Primorskykrai –will rise. The total projected capacity of the
pipeline is estimated around 80 million barrels of oil per year, which makes it more that the
capacity of another Russia’s major oil pipeline that transports gas to Europe is around 70
million barrels per year. Russian giant "Gasprom"also considers building a parallel gas
pipeline. If this plan is to be realized export dependency of FEFD will continue to increase.
Improved transport logistics as a result of large-scale infrastructure projects undertaken by
the federal government will contribute to facilitation of exporting activity as well.
Government programs aim to improve Trans-Siberian railroad, ports of Primorskykrai,
automobile roads especially those that represent bottlenecks like roads near Amur River in
Khabarovsk krai.
- 53 -
<Figure 2> Export flows of the FEFD regions
Source: made by the author based on the data from Federal State Statistics Service
Weaknesses
In this section we would like to consider some domestic factors that create
constraints for export-oriented development. One of the trickiest questions that influences all
the process of development is territorial configuration: what to regard as the Russian Far
East and regard it as a single territory or not. For most foreigners Far East is associated with
Siberia –all the territory lying to the East of Ural Mountains meanwhile for Russians Siberia
and Far East are different. To avoid this ambiguity Russian government has separated the two
by creating federal districts: Siberia Federal District and Far Eastern Federal District.
Nevertheless the question of integrity still persists because FEFD is comprised of the regions
that are very much different from each other. They differ in size, climatic conditions,
endowment of natural resources, types of regional economies. For example, Khabarovsk krai
is reach in mineral resources and is characterized by a strong machinery industry; Sakhalin
oblast, Sakha Republic and Zabaikalskykrai are oriented to primary industries such as
diamond mining, oil- and gas and fish. Amur oblast represents an energy-producing center
with strong agriculture and timber industries, while in Magadan fishing and mining are the
- 54 -
largest sectors of the regional economies. Primorskykrai has almost no natural resources
comparing to other regions but possesses good transport facilities. Even reliance on natural
resources, that in general is higher than the average level in Russia, differs from region to
region. Mining and quarrying industry that occupies around 12-13% of Russia’s’ GDP makes
up 25% of FEFD economy. In Sakha Republic and Chukotka its share goes as high as 40%,
in Sakhalin –almost 60% but in Prymorskykrai it does not go over 2% of the regional
economy. That is why pattern of development based on export of natural resources cannot
suit all the regions, each should be approached individually.
<Figure 3> Changes in the geographic composition of the Gross Regional Products of
the RFE, 2000-2010, % of the RFE total.
Source: made by the author based on the data from Federal State Statistics Service
Economic activity in FEFD is not equally dispersed and tends to concentrate in
several major centers. Analysis of the structure of the Gross Regional Product in 2010 reveal
that four regions produce 80% of the RFE’s GRP, namely Primorskykrai with the share of
22.1%, Sakhalin krai with 23.4%, Sakha Republic with 18.3% and Khabarovsk krai with 16.7%
(Figure 3). Taken into account vast territories, it becomes clear that benefits of the
exportoriented development will be hard to spread from centers to periphery regions. The
most successful cases of export-oriented development produced territorially small countries
like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Besides, major centers compete between
- 55 -
each other for leadership in the FEFD which distracts resources from productive and nonproductive activities. Strong inter-regional ties between industrial complexes are virtually
non-existent.
Poor state of manufacturing industries represents another basic weakness for export
development. This also makes a goal of better integration into Asia-Pacific region a more
challenging task. It is well-known that nature of integration here is highly trade-oriented due
to unique value-chains. In order to become an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region not only
geographically FEFD should be involved manufacturing and trade in parts and components
that at present make up more than 60% of the intra-Asia-Pacific trade. Electronicindustry
possesses a special importance because most of the countries of Asia-Pacific developed
unique industrial ties between each other based on ‘slicing up’of value added. Unfortunately,
over years situation in manufacturing had deteriorated. Consequently, export structure
increasingly has become resource-oriented. Even three major economic centers –
Khabarovskykrai, Primorskykrai and Sakha Republic – that during Soviet times represented
industrial center of FEFD grew too much resource oriented. Export structure of the three
economic centers of the macrozones exhibits a greater degree of diversification than of the
zones on the whole. Fish makes up 40% and wood products more than 20% of exports of
Primorskykrai while small shares of fish, fuels, chemical and machinery are found in the
export structure of Khabarovsk krai (Figure 4).
- 56 -
<Figure 4> Export structure of three leading centers of the RFE,
Source: made by author on the basis of data of Far Eastern Branch of Russia’s Customs
Office
Domnich E. points out that it is difficult to develop any serious manufacturing like
production of machinery or equipment (and in many other industries as well) because these
industries are not united into a solid regional cluster or at least a production complex existing
facilities vary a lot in their efficiency, besides cooperation ties between them are week.
Recent financial crisis has made another blow to the region’s manufacturing thus worsening
stagnation. Together with overall declining of competitiveness, FEFD manufacturing
industries beganreorientation towards local demand instead of foreign markets. This demand
is generated not by the local needs but by the government. The biggest single generator of
demand for products manufactured regionally remains a mechanism of government purchases
concentrated mainly in strategic sectors or military sectors. But even their volumes are not
stable, insufficient to maintain effective manufacturing process, difficult to estimate
beforehand and make future plans. Generated though such purchases demand does not reflect
the situation in international markets, it is follows an already familiar scheme developed
during Soviet times and appears to cement the current state of things.
In regard tomanufacturing industries it is also impossible to overlook a problem of qualified
specialists and general insufficiency of workforce. This matter is discussed on different levels
by officials, scholars, business but nothing seems to change as the most intelligent and
- 57 -
qualified workers continues to leave. According to official statistics population of RFE makes
up only 4.4% of Russia’s total population and decreased to 6.3 million people by 2012 from
6.9 million in 2000. These figures though include thosepeople who came to the RFE from
other countries. If we consider the number of people who left the RFE only the situation will
change drastically: within ten years between 2000 and 2010 1.5 million people left RFE
which makes more than 20% of the population as of 2000. Places of educated and skilled
workers are usually taken by poorly educated low-skilled workers, immigrants from former
Soviet Republics or neighboring China. As a consequence of these peculiarities of migration
process social degradation in FEFD is progressing.
Government policies and development programs are not adjusted to the situation in
the regions. These programs are set to develop energy sector, modernize leading industries
(which are solely represented by resource-based sectors), improve transport infrastructure and
invest into social infrastructure. These are very general goals very much similar to those
found in plans for modernization of the Russian economy in general. Clearly, program for the
development of FEFD was fitted into the general energy-based pattern of development
realized from the beginning of 2000’s on the macro-level. On the one hand, it will help to
make the region a constant supplier of natural resources thus integrating it into supply chains
of Asia-Pacific. Also it might make a contribution to a stronger political control in FEFD. But
from the other hand, such policy cannot produce many long-term benefits. On the contrary,
inclination for manufacturing activity may diminish further since resources will be directed to
the so called rent-seeking.
In fact, one can find many similarities between programs under way in FEFD,
especially Primorskykrai and Vladivostok, and programs realized in the North-Western
Leningrad oblast and Saint-Petersburg. It refers not only to pipeline construction but also to
construction of automobile plants (Ford, Toyota, Hyundai, etc. in Saint-Petersburg and
Nissan, Ssangyoung in Vladivostok), reconstruction of shipyards. But above that,both cities
are positioned as dialogue centers with Europe in one case and Asia in another. However, if
many policies can work in Saint-Petersburg that is close to the federal center and the
government they necessarily will in Vladivostok. Remoteness of FEFD that makes decision- 58 -
making a lengthy and more tiresome procedure should be regarded as one of the biggest
obstacle for realization of nay development plans.
A paradoxical thing is that despite abundant natural resources FEFD regions belong
to the most subsidized regions in Russia. In other words, income generated by the regions is
not enough to cover their own expenses, they have to rely heavily on government funding.
Sakha Republic, major world diamond production center, gets almost 10% of all federal
subsidies to regions, or 39 200 910.4 thousand rubles. According to Russian law export
proceed from natural resources go to the federal budget and then are redistributed between
the Russian regions. On the whole FEFD receives one quarter of the total. Subsidies comprise
as much as 60% of the budget of Chukotka AO, 50% of budgets of Kamchatka krai and
Jewish AO, 40% of the budget of Amur oblast and Sakha Republic, up to 30% in regional
budgets of Primorskykrai and Sakhalin oblast and more that 20% of the budget of
Khabarovsk krai. №2 (22) 2010. стр.69.Lack of their own resources limits local
governments in their decision-making activity and instead makes them spend efforts on
competition for state funds. Far Eastern scholar Tersky M. point out that the RFE becomes
more and more autarkic because of a rigid government policy that limits private initiative and
adds to the problems abundant in the RFE.
Threats
Treats represent those elements of international environment that are not favorable
for export-led development of FEFD. And among of the first we should mention a very high
level of competitiveness of the Asia-Pacific region.For now one of the biggest manufacturing
and trading nations are present here together with emergent economies like Vietnam,
Thailand, Malaysia, etc. High level of competition drives level of expenses down, and
Russian regions with their persisting problems just cannot match that level. Neither these
countries would like to see FEFD as their competitor, they would be more interested in
supplying Russian territories with manufactured products while having them as suppliers of
resources. The competition will only increase in the near future as new industrial policies in
- 59 -
China that will follow the upcoming change of leadership. Experts say that it will become
more import-substituting by nature since the new administration will place emphasis onto
nurturing nascent parts and components, equipment producing sectors. And at some point
Russia’s neighbor will be willing to sell them over the border. Taking into account
remoteness of the FEFD from central regions of Russia and high level of delivery expenses it
can be a good option for satisfy existing demand for such types of products.
Natural resources represent another area of tough competition. Many scenarios for
development of the RFE are built on the presumption that most countries need Russian
resources, and competition from other producers is not always taken into account. But
among Asian countries there are producers of wood products, fish, etc. Indonesia, Malaysia,
Australia, Vietnam –all of them offer different types of natural resources and in numerous
cases they can substitute shipments from FEFD. At present Russian resource suppliers do not
control Asian markets and will not be able to influence the situation to bend it into their favor.
It is very doubtful that there are specialists that are well aware of the current state of things in
Asia-Pacific.
At present Russian export is characterized by a low level of diversification not only
from the point of view of product composition but also from the point of geographical
structure. Three biggest economies of East Asia dominate as prime destinations for export
shipments, only small volumes go to other countries like India (560 mln dollars in2011),
Thailand (410 mln doll), Philippines (240 mln dollars), Vietnam (62 mln dollars), DPRK (13
mln dollars), Mongolia (15 mln dollars). Looking at the numbers one might be surprised that
China does not make up the biggest share, it was around 17% in 2011, while Korea and
Japan’s shares were 34% and 27% respectively. Korea and Japan account for larger shares
due to their participation in shale-gas projects in Russia’s Sakhalin Island while China shows
little interest in this commodity still expensive forits expanding economy. Shares of Korea
and probably Japan can be expected to grow further after second order of the gas pipeline will
be finished in the fourth quarter of 2012. But behind this numbers there is a more important
thing, by physical volume of shipments China is far ahead of either Japan or Korea. For
example, 57% and 37% of fish goes to China and Korea respectively, 58% and 32% of coal
- 60 -
are bought by Japan and China, 57% and 31.5% of oil products got to Japan and China
respectively. Chinese domination is strongest in the Southern regions of FEFD that share the
longest border with this country and are main wood producers. Export of wood and wood
products accounts for 93% of total foreign shipments of Jewish Autonomous Okrug, 41.5%
of Khabarovsk krai and 32% of Amur Oblast; almost all of it goes to China. Also Chinese
might control up to 20-30% of pollack trade and large shares of herrings and cod. If the trend
continues, trade in some commodities will become more and more China-centric and
uncontrolled by the Russian side causing some serious security concerns.
As it was previously mentioned, Far Eastern regions of Russia are not independent
in building their export strategies.And with new energy projects it is even more. In large
extent configuration of regional ties with other countries in APEC will depend on Russia’s
strategy of cooperation on the government level. Signing of regional trade agreements could
help in the development of the Russian Far East but even in this sphere Russian failed to
follow the global trend. Government directed its efforts to creation of pacts with former
Soviet Republics but Far East has almost no trade ties with them. Free trade agreements can
facilitate integration into Asia Pacific and provide necessary framework for cooperation.
Opportunities
The present state of things in the Russian Far East makes a classic variant of exportled development based on growth of manufacturing production a very challenging task.
Highly competitive international environment of Asia makes the situation even more
complex. But does this mean that such plans should be abandoned whatsoever? It is of course
not thecase, and will be impossible to do. Trade has proved to be one of the strongest stimuli
for growth. Despite some worries about energy resource export to the Asian countries it looks
more probable. When Russia began a project for building pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the
Pacific Ocean there were concerns about shipments to Japan or South Korea. Now after a
powerful earthquake made a blow to Japan’s nuclear industry the country was left with little
choice but to increase energy imports. This opens good prospects for Russian gas.
- 61 -
But apart from there is a need to correct programs and general approach, choose a new focus
for development plans.
In the first place as much as possible benefits should be derived from the export-led
resource-based development. In the end welfare of many countries is closely connected with
resources. But in order to maximize the outcome all exports of resources should be controlled
by suppliers not buyers as it is now. It will only benefit exporters if they solidify and
coordinate their actions instead of acting on their own. While foreign shipments of oil and gas
as well as of diamonds and gold are controlled by the government shipments of other
resources are not.
Multi-level, structured approach to the economic development of FEFD may bring
more benefits. Role of the government is very important for creating a common favorable
climate that would facilitate development, for example, build transport infrastructure, ensure
social stability, securing adequate level of education. At the same there should be also a room
for region- and industry-specific policies. It might be rational to create industrial clusters
uniting producers from different regions. Under such circumstances regions will have to
cooperate and coordinate resources instead of competing with each other in an unfavorable
external environment. Anothercrucial thing that needs to be remembered is that due to vast
territories and diverse types of the economies of FEFD regions it will be impossible to make
the process of development balanced with results equally spread across the whole territory.
Neither should it be done this way because it will infringe big expenses with practically now
revenues. It is important to involve into cooperation only those regions that have the most
potential for this while reorient other regions to domestic economy. And here we again come
back to the issue of building strong relations between Russian regions.
Long-term relations with foreign partners are very important but at the same time
very difficult to build. A key to effective partnership lies, to our opinion, in the countryspecific approach. Under this we mean work with each country of the region and offer them
what they need. A good example here can be wood industry. Each Asian country has its own
standard for product sizes they would like to buy Russian wood cut according to the
proportions they need. But because producers in majority of cases do not cater to buyers
- 62 -
needs and follow only Russian standard volume of deals is considerably less than it could
potentially be. Also, because they lack knowledge of the international environment Russian
producers follow the simplest way: selling all they have to those who can buy. As a rule
buyers are Chinese companies. There numerous similar cases in other industries as well.
Integration into the Asia Pacific region should begin with small steps rather than big
moves. Small advances into one sphere or into one single process, at a start and then expand
slowly. This will help to secure a place in the net and get to know the situation better. Besides,
this will give time to foreign partners to get used to Russian manufactures, build trust. The
fact that Russia was absent from Asian markets for a considerable number of years cannot be
neglected.
All the plans for development should be adjusted for the low number of population. It
is evident that this trend will not be reversed in the near future. Thus, in development plans
emphasis is better to be put on industries that do not demand large number of workforce but
at the same time produce products and services with higher value-added. At the same time it
is important that these policies would help to integrate FEFD not only industrial or transport
space but into cultural and psychological space of Asia and involve youth into this process.
No one can deny that at present Russian Far East is regarded with a great deal of suspicion by
many in Asia. Consequently, people try to withhold from the unknown. That is why changes
should be made on psychological level as well. Taking into account high importance that
sport sand culture has acquired as a tool of public diplomacy a lot can be done and should be
done here. Bordering regions like Prymorskykrai can become a place for different events like
playing soccer, baseball, or even built Formula-1 facilities. Such events will contribute not
only to generate revenues from tourism but build loyal people in countries of Asia Pacific.
- 63 -
References
Aw B.-Y., and A. R. Hwang. (1993). Productivity and the export market: A firm level
analysis. Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA.
Bhagwati J. "Export-Promoting Trade Strategy: Issues and Evidence" in "Political economy
and international economics", ed. by Douglas A. Irwin. USA: MIT Press, 1996
Judith A. Thornton Institutional Change and Economic Development in Siberia and the
Russian Far East
Krueger A. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. // American Economic Review.
1974. 64 (3). P. 291303.
Maurer A. Made in the World From Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks. // Materials of
presentation given at OECD URL:
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm
Mikhail L. Titarenko Russia's Strategic Partnerships in Asia : The Asian Dimension of
Russian Federation Foreign Policy China Report 44 : 3 (2008): 281–295
Page J. The East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9, pp.221-269
Pitigala N. What Does Regional Trade in South Asia Reveal about Future Trade Integration?
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3497, February 2005.
Schiff M., Winters A. Regional Integration and Development. // The World Bank, 2003.
Stiglitz J. The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 11, no. 2 (August 1996).
The demographic Yearbook of Russia, FSSS, 2010.
The European Union's Trade Policies and Their Economic Effects. // OECD, 1998.
Weiss J. Export Growth and Industrial Policy: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle
experience. // ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 26, pp.2-8.
WTO,IDE-Jetro. Trade patterns and global value chains in East Asia: From trade in goods to
trade in tasks. WTO, 2011.
Yeats A. Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are their Implications for Regional
Cooperation and Growth? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3084, June 2003.
- 64 -
Впрограмме развития Дальнего Востока – пригласить граждан Вьетнама, Таиланда и
Японии выращивать на наших землях сою, рис и зерно 31.01.2012
http://www.vz.ru/economy/2012/1/27/557137.html
Власти пока бессильны остановить отток населения с ДальнегоВостока // Вестирегион.
04.11.2011 г. URL: http://vestiregion.ru/2011/11/04/vlasti-poka-bessilny-ostanovit-ottoknaseleniya-s-dalnego-vostoka/
Власюк Л.И., Мотрич Е.Л., Найден С.Н., Прокапало О.М., Хван И.С. К вопросу
обэконом ическом районировании на Дальнем Востоке России. Пространственная
Экономика 2005 №3 С 106-120.
ВСТО окупится в 2019-2020 гг., БТС-2 - в 2020-2022 гг. – Транснефть // URL:
http://www.oilcapital.ru/transport/152881.html
Гурдин К. Минфинманятзолото и алмазы. // Аргументы недели14 (255) URL:
http://www.argumenti.ru/economics/n284/102075 Date of access: 10.04.2012.
Гусев А. «Торговая» угроза территориальной целостности России / КапиталСтраны
http://www.kapital-rus.ru/articles/article/194876/
Деваева Е.И., Котова Т.Е. Товарные рынки Северо-Восточной Азии: ориентиры
дляэкспорта Дальнего Востока России. Пространственная экономика 2010 №4 С.82-105.
Домнич Е. Л. Экономическое положение отраслей машиностроения Дальневосто
чногоФедерального округа в 2008-2009 гг. // ПространственнаяЭкономика 2011. № 2. С.
146—168.
Ишаев мог поссориться с Дарькиным из-за денег саммита АТЭС – эксперты URL:
http://www.pk25.ru/news/primorye/01_03_12_ishaev_mog_possoritsya_s_darkinim_izza_d.
html
Китайцы ловят российскую рыбу инвестиционными сетями 25 Января 2012
http://www.stringer.ru/publication.mhtml?Part=48&PubID=19532
Коваленко Ю.В. Приграничные транспортныесвязи Дальнего Востока России и
Северо-ВосточногоКитаяВестник ДВО РАН. 2006. № 6 C. 21-26
Леонов
С.Н.
СтратегическоеразвитиеДальнегоВостока:
угрозыкризиса.
/
Пространственная экономика 2009.№3 С. 126-133; Демьяненко А.М. Районирование в
контексте стратегий регионального развития / Вестник ДВО РАН. 2006. № 3 C. 11-12.
Минакир П. Деваева Е. В режимемеждународнойкооперациию / «ЭкспертСибирь»
№24 (212) /16 июн 2008 URL:
http://expert.ru/siberia/2008/24/razvitie_dalnego_vostoka_rossii/
- 65 -
Михеев В.В. Интеграционное пространство
Пространственная экономика 2005 №2 С 27-45
Восточной
Азии
и
Россия
Потапов Л.В., Атанов Н.И. Модернизация, инновации и стратгеирование
пространственного развития экономики России Пространственная экономика 2010 № 4
С. 154-162.
Стратегия социально-экономического развития Дальнего Востока и Байкальского
региона на период до 2025года. Минитерство регионального развития РФ. URK:
http://www.minregion.ru/
Строительство мостана Сахалин может отодвинуть Приморьеот "бюджетногопирога"
URL:http://primamedia.ru/news/dv/16.08.2011/167177/stroitelstvo-mosta-na-sahalinmozhet-otodvinut-primore-ot-quot-byudzhetnogo-pi.html
Терский М.В. СтратегияразвитияДальнегоВостока и Байкальскогорегионадо 2025
годаАзиатско-Тихоокеанскийрегион: Экономика, политика, право №2(22) 2010 С.7-20.
Филипенко. А.В. Отчет о результатах контрольного мероприятия «Комплексная
проверка соблюдениязаконодательства, эффективности использования бюджетных
средств при исполнениибюджетасубъектаРоссийскойФедерации, местныхбюджетов –
получателей межбюджетных трансфертов из федерального бюджета в 2009 году и
истекшемпериоде 2010 года (принеобходимости в болееранниепериоды) в
Камчатскомкрае,
включаязакрытоеадминистративно-территориальноеобразование».
Бюллетень Счетной палаты Российской Федерации №7 (163), 2011.Стр. 19-20. // URL:
http://www.ach.gov.ru/ru/bulletin/663/ Date of access: 10.04.2012.
Финансовая несостоятельность регионов и межбюджетные отношения. // URL:
http://www.kapital-rus.ru/articles/article/176802/
Шейнгауз А.С. Природопользование российского Дальнего Востока в аспектесвязей с
Северо-ВосточнойАзией: проблемы и перспективыВестник ДВО РАН. 2005. № 3 C. 1127
Internet resources
Far Eastern Branch of Russia’s Customs Office // URL: http://dvtu.customs.ru/
Federal State Statistics Service // URL: www.gks.ru
Ministry of Regional development of RF // URL: http://www.minregion.ru/
- 66 -
Discovery of Ura-Nihon and East Sea Rim
Kanazu Hidemi
Professor
Korea University
- 67 -
- 68 -
Introduction
Considering the Term, Ura-Nihon1
The region of the main island of the Japanese archipelago which faces the East
Sea2 was used to be called ura-nihon, which literally means the rear coast of Japan,
while the other side of main island of Japan which faces the Pacific Ocean was deemed
as omote3, the fore coast of Japan. Despite the fact that these words have not been often
used since 1970s when the term ura was regarded to imply discriminatory expression in
contrast with the term omote, the word ura-nihon still intimates and conjures the image
of an asymmetric property with the disparity with omote-nihon. The formation process
of the asymmetric concept of ura-nihon and omote-nihon was already appeared Tokuji
Chiba’s works in 1960s.Chiba (1964)argues that the term ura-nihon was generalized by
late 1890s based on two traditional perception:(1) Japan’s arc-shaped archipelago
recalls the concept that outside of a bow is regarded the fore, which represents the
Pacific side of Japan while inside of it is regarded the back, which represents the East
Sea side (Ogawa 1904), and(2) the front door of traditional Japanese-style house
structurally faces south, which represents the Pacific Ocean while the back door faces
north, which represents the East Sea (Yazu 1910).He (1964) also points out that
ura-nihon was a neutral word until early 20th century when the industrial revolution in
Japan caused economic disparities, and this change in the society cause the term ura
intimating discriminatory expression as today contrasting with omote.
A research on this conceptual transformation of the term ura-nihon from neutral
to a discriminatory word introduced by Chiba was turned over by successors and their
works4, particularly Tsunehisa Abe, who has conducted a research on conception of
ura-nihon after 1980s.Abe(1997)particularly focuses on the fact that the term ura-nihon
first appeared in geography textbooks for secondary education, and discovers the origin
1
Ura is a Japanese word means rear or back and nihonmeans Japan.
2
In the original paper, the East Sea is described as the Sea of Japan, and the same shall apply hereinafter.
Omote is a Japanese word means fore or front.
4
Representative examples are as follows: (1) Abe, Tsunehisa. 1997. How the Concept of Ura-Nihon was
Established? Tokyo: Nihon KeizaiHyouronsha. (2) Furumaya, Tadao. 1997. Ura-Nihon: Re-question
Modern Japan. Tokyo:IwanamiShoten. (3) Yoshii, Kenichi. 2000. Changes in the East Sea Rim Region.
Tokyo: Aoki Shoten.
3
- 69 -
of this word ura-nihon in the terminology, “surface5” and “reverse6”, used in geological
theories7 in physiography in 1880s. He concludes that the term ura-nihon then was
physiographic and neutral expression without any concept of economic gap. The content
of regional disparities was added to this terminology after 1990s, when socio-economic
differences between the areas along the Pacific Ocean and the East Sea became
significant (Abe 1997)8. The framework of this argument that Japanese capitalism
caused and has widened socio-economic and regional gaps by linking these disparities is
affirmative. On the other hand, this framework postulates geographical neutrality, that is,
the belief in scientific nature of natural science. In other words, the researchers
absolutely trust natural science since as long as their hypothesis incorporates in natural
science, it contains neutral property.
I once argued this issue relating with Shigetaka Shiga’s political geography by
mainly referring his work Nihon-Fukeiron9. This paper’s argument, unlike then thesis,
focuses on the phase of ura-nihon later in 1910s to 1920s and approaches the phase
after the period of Japanese colonialism and current issues in East Sea Rim.
Geographical Approach According to “Nihon-Fukeiron”
Ingenious Shifting of the Text in Early Edo Period
Nihon-Fukeiron, which starts off with the poem “kozanjumbikorewagakyo10”, is
Shigetaka Shiga’s representative work and made him a literary fame. He (1995) grasps
the features of Japanese scenery as “shosha11”, “bi12”and “tetsuto13”, and describes its
5
In Japanese, the word “surface” (hyomen:表面)includes a Chinese character the same asomote(表).
In Japanese, the word “reverse side” (uramen:裏面)includes a Chinese character the same as ura(裏).
7
Example:Harada, Toyokichi. 1888. “Geologic Theories in Japan”. Geology Report, December.
8
Tree main causes of regional disparities are given by Abe (1997): (1) population outflow from 1884 to
1991 due to deflation, (2) delay in constructing industrial infrastructure such as ports and railways, and
(3) delay in establishing state-advanced education institutes. Furumaya (1997) points out that regional
gaps were formed through the process of primitive accumulation, and the system transporting value of
capital, labor, food supplies and energy from the East Sea side to the Pacific side existed then.
9
This paper overlaps the argument about Shigetaka Shiga with the article, Kanazu, Hidemi. 2010. “The
Dimention of Shigetaka Shiga’s Nihon-Fukeiron: Political Geography of ‘Omote and Ura”. Journal of
Foreign Studies 14, 2: 511-28.
10
“What beautiful mountains and rivers! This is my home.”–“江山洵美是吾郷” in original text.
11
Elegancy
12
Beauty
13
Spaciousness
6
- 70 -
physiographical characteristics from four aspects; various climate and ocean currents,
quantities of water vapor, many volcanoes and drastic erosion by flowing water in Japan.
In Nihon-Fukeiron, Shiga characterizes the landscapes as nation-wide scale through the
grass roots’ sense and affection for their home (Maeda 1978).Shiga also quotes various
Japanese poems which describe scenery and description from MeishoZue14written in
Edo period through his work while his main focuses are describing physiographical
features such as topographical and geological characteristics, as well as the opening
paragraph. He then continues following to “kozanjumbikorewagakyo”:
Everybody claim how wonderful their own homes are. This is a sort of ideology.
However, the reason why the Japanese emphasize beauty of nature in Japan is not
only because it is our own home land, but also because the nature is literary
wonderful. All foreigners have no hesitation considering Japan as Heaven and
respect its nature. Sanyo Rai, for instance, expresses the beauty of nature in his poem;
‘look out over the dawning sky in Yoshino in the spring brighter than flowers, and
Chinese and Korean people must feel Japanese spirit’. Nature in Japan is absolutely
distinctive in the world, I think, due to the concentration of the ultimate in beautiful
natural structure in Japan; for example, elegancy, beauty, spaciousness in scenery in
Japan.
Many examples of quoting poems written about the landscapes are seen in
Nihon-Fukeiron. The word “foreigners”, for instance, refers to not only East Asians
such as Chinese and Koreans but also westerners. Furthermore, the expressions which
preach superiority of elegancy, beauty and spaciousness of Japanese scenery can be
observed throughout his work.
Shiga also quoted Norikane Gyobukyo’s poem with a sublime expression of
autumn in Japan: “when the wind blows to Mount Nagara where autumn leaves are
falling, the shores of Lake Biwa become multicolored like brocade.” Shiga’s intention
of quoting this poem is to stress on the elegancy and beauty of autumn which derived
from particular geographical environment in Japan, and does not exist in Western
14
MeishoZue (名所図会) is an illustrated book of famous places in Japan written in the second half of Edo
period, late eighteenth century and first half of nineteenth century. The places are described with their
history, legends and related sites, as well as realistic illustrations.
- 71 -
countries. Thus, according to him, “it seems to be impossible to picture this elegancy
and beauty of Japanese scenery even in William Wordsworth’s mind, who observes
European natural scenery in detail and dearly lover it”, and “autumn in Britain is
nothing compared to that in Japan” (Shiga 1995). Kanzo Uchimura (1894) states this
superiority in Japanese scenery and wonderfulness to feel it in his book15 which was
published shortly after Nihon-Fukeiron.
Shigetaka Shiga, who is a propounder of is ultra nationalism, is purely Japanese. He
sees all the beauty of the world on a blooming Oriental insular country. […] Japan
itself is beauty. Its horticulture, floriculture, and parks are beautiful. However,
foreign countries also have wonderful scenery; the great beauty such as a view of
Monte Rosa from Aosta and Mount Everest from Darjeeling seems to be deficient in
Japanese scenery. On the other hand, scenery in our country fascinates people. The
beauty which enriches human beings, in other words, the beauty which enriches
myself exists nowhere in the world except in Japan.
Incidentally, the opening poem “kozanjumbikorewagakyo” is derived from
Bankei
Otsuki
“kozanshinbikorewagashu”.
Shiga
replaces
“shinbi”
with
“jumbi” 16 and“shu” with “kyo” 17 . These replacements, which accentuate on the
uniqueness of home town’s scenery ― scenery in Japan, influence Uchimura’s
perspective of exclusive beauty of the scenery and indicate that Uchimura is played into
Shiga’s tactics reading home town as Japan.
Identifying Scenery in Japan with Nature of Japanese People
Nihon-Fukeiron(1995)commented by Nobuyuki Kondo is closed with a line:
15
KanzoUchimurapublished Geographical Notion (1984), which was retitled to The Earth and Man
around the same time when Nihon-Fukeiron was first published in 1984. His geographical and scenical
perspective has to be argued since Uchimura explains the relationship between geography and history.
For instance, Norihisa Suzuki compares Shiga’s perspective on scenery with Uchimura’s one and
discusses historical and thought backgrounds in UchimuraKanzo and His Period (1975). He
concludesthat Shiga considers geographyas tools of national benefits in Nihon-Fukeiron while Uchimura
spiritually grasps it as a “God’s vessel”. Leaving the Suzuki’s controversialcomparison of Shiga
andUchimura with Christianism basis behind, this renewed discussion on geography and scenery in this
period should be given a thought.
16
The replacement “信美” with “洵美” attaches a new meaning of novelty.
17
The replacement of “州” with “郷” literally changes the words from “homeland” to “home town”.
- 72 -
“Japanese community should strive to preserve landscapes in its scenery in order to
edify future humane studies in Japan.” Kondo (1995) also suggests that Shiga’s “out
pouring enthusiasm and affection toward Japanese national land still remain alive. […]
He tells us what the scenery is for human beings”. Kondo’s reading scenery in home as
Japanese national land here proves that he is also obsessed by Shiga’s statistics―
geographical features in landscape exist as Japan’s unique scenery. The first quotation
above appears in context as follows (Shiga and Kondo 1995):
The natural wonder and plant diversity are the motivation for Japanese people to
develop sensuousness in the past, present and future. Neglecting this motivation is
tantamount to ignoring humanities in the future in Japan. Moreover, being
indifferent and sticking to benefits and achievement at head, people recently go back
on important affairs. Not a few of them are also prone to neglect Japan’s nature by
disforesting, depleting water and catching birds leaving few. Besides, destroying
historic scenes disrupts historic ideology and might as well bare the national land.
Japanese community should strive to preserve landscapes in its scenery in order to
edify future humane studies in Japan. MeishoZueis the on of them should be
preserved since it was valuable for taking people travel and encouraging great taste
of nature, and has many descriptions which should be conformed today.
In the text, Kondo’s nationalistic perspective, that is, criticism of disruption of scenery
carried under the guise of cultural enlightenment is observed. He (1995) sees Japan’s
scenery consisted of plants, which is due to variable climate and ocean currents, as basis
of Japanese people’s trait with examples of a pain tree: “high rise shaft of a pine tree
piercing sky […] and enduring solitarily the wind” is Japanese people’s true nature; and
“its standing on precipitous and proudly crashing down having no regret when it cut
down with an ax” is Japanese people’s disposition. Abe’s explanation that Japan has the
most diverse coniferous trees in the world with detailed examples implies that his
national geographical perspective is linked to nationalistic ideology.
Yin and Yang ― Mountains and Humans
Although Shiga does not use the terms, ura-nihon and omote-nihon, in
- 73 -
Nihon-Fukeiron, the comparison of the Pacific coast with the East Sea coast, first
appears in The Geography(Shiga 1889), and Abe (1997) sees this confrontation as
anthrop geographical regional disparity. This comparison by Shiga is in the very
beginning of Nihon-Fukeironand could be an evidence of variables of nature, if not
rushed into a conclusion. However, putting aside whether this hasty conclusion is right
or wrong for now, Shiga’s comparative geographical methodology is examined.
His
scheme
which
focuses
on
contrasts
remains
coherent
even
in
1990s.Geography for Junior High School Students: Japan (1903) in which he first
refers to the word ura-nihon, for instance, he claims that the location of Japan among
the world and ideology of contrasting facts should be emphasized when geographical
knowledge is taught.
Shiga splits the main land of Japan into two, between the Pacific and the East Sea
coastal areas, since the Great Central Mountains run through the island nation Japan
from northeast to southeast, in parallel with the shoreline. It is no wonder that this
mountains range interdicts people’s traversing and sets a boundary geographically and
culturally (Shiga 1906).Once having begun using the terms of ura-nihon and
omote-nihon, he (1906) clarifies that the area on the north side of mountains and facing
the East Sea is named ura-nihon. The area on the south side of mountains and facing the
Pacific Ocean, on the other hand, is named omote-nihon. This dichotomization is, thus,
relevant to how to perceive the mountains. Shiga’s approach to mountains and humans
already appears in the Geography(1889).
It is obvious that the Great Central Mountains in Japan splitting yin and yang are
relevant to human cultural formation: the mountains which divide sanyo 18 and
sanin19significantly differentiate human nature. Many travelers have been told that
they feel gloomy and hazy when being in sanin region, while they feel expansive in
sanyo area after crossing the mountains. In total, it is dim on the yin side of the
mountains and blight on the yang side.
The mountains are, in fact, what distinguishes yin and yang, in other words, north and
south of the mountains and what sets a boundary of spirits as well as climate in each
18
19
The area on the south side of the Great Central Mountains;San refers mountains, and yo refers yang
The area on the north side of the Great Central Mountains; San refers mountains, and in refers yin
- 74 -
region. This mountains’ delimit-ness is expanded to the worldwide: “the Himalaya
Mountains and Indian Plateau distinguish the degree of civilization in China and India”
and “India’s civilization towards west […] not only flew and spread into West Asia […]
but also influenced largely to civilization in European nations such as Greece and
Rome”(Shiga 1889).Shiga’s view of mountains as a boundary also applied to Europe.
Dividing the old world into south and north, northern part, which is considered as
yin area, has cold and extreme climate; it is brutally hot in summer; the land is
covered with snow and frost all through year, poor and open-plane without
undulation; it has few islands and peninsula. This region is “poor” as once called “a
dark world” by Homer. In contrast, southern part, which is considered as yang area,
has warm and moderate climate; it has appropriate amount of rainfall, fertile soil and
narrow but many undulating lands and peninsulas. Cultures such as civilization in
ancient China, Sanskrit and Assyria, ancient Greek art and ancient Rome’s legal
code were, thus, aroused in the south. It makes sense that an Indian ancient text
describes Iran locates on the south side of the mountain as “good” nation, while
Turan20 locates on the north side of the mountains as “evil”.
Needless to mention further examples, mountains, especially which run from east to
west, is nothing except for the wall for Shiga. Japanese Great Central Mountains
conjure an image of a border which divides yin and yang as an Indian example, which is
created by Sakhalin Mountains and Kunlun Mountains. Given this perception, the
Pacific coastal region in Japan is understood as an extension of the part of yang where
civilization and culture was steamed, while the East Sea coastal region as extension of
the part of yin.
Ura-Nihon as Omote and Center
Another aspect of Ura-Nihhon as Omote
Shiga’s argument as above should enhanced by taking his theory on the Southern
Expansion Doctrine since 1880s in account if the map with “the Japanese archipelago is
20
A name of place in ancient Persia
- 75 -
like Asian continent’s bow securing the continent from danger as defensive barrier”
(1903). Reconsidering Shiga’s theory in according to “Current Affairs in Southern
Ocean”, Shimizu (1991b) points out that “Shiga intended to place Japan as one of the
islands on the Pacific Ocean opening its arms not toward Asian Continent but toward
the Ocean”. However, the fact that Yazu’s theory (1910) also refers to “the Japanese
archipelago as a bow”as a metaphor, which Abe conceptualizes as natural geographical
ideology, suggests the perception of the Pacific coast as omote and the East Sea coast as
ura is significantly relative to Japan’s imperialism. To analyze the discourse of
ura-nihon at the time of Japan’s imperialism, that is, during Japanese colonization in
Korea, Ura-Nihon published in 1915 by Kunitake Kume is addressed.
Kunitake Kume, who had visited Sanin region to campaign21 with Shigenobu Ohkuma
since early summer in 1912, wrote a compilation work, Ura-Nihon (Kume1915, 15).
The main contains of this book is topography of Tamba province22, Tajima province23,
Izumo province24, Hoki province25 and Inaba province26. In Ohkuma’s words in preface
(Kume 1915, 11), the book is reminiscent of a “handbook for travelling Sanin region”.
Opening new railways between Kyoto and Shimane combined with double-lining the
Tokaido line, Sanin region, at that time, had just been integrated into transportation
network through whole a country from Tokyo. Furthermore, around the time of
Russo-Japanese War. Expansion oftrade with opposite shore by utilizing this new
transportation was much expected as clinching a break fromura-nihonin the Pacific
coastal region (Yoshii 2000).
Ura-Nihon begins with Okuma’s forewords (Kume 1915, 1); “although this book
was titled ura-nihon, ura does not mean a corner. Japan’s ura is omote faces the world.”
Okuma’s claim in Ura-Nihon written in 1912, which the East Sea coastal region as
“omote faces the world”, is obviously responding to Japan’s annexation of Korea. He
depicts Japanese history and ethnicity evoked facing to the East Sea as below:
21
According to Tadaichiro Tanaka’s foreword in this book, after leaving Osaka, the party canvassed in
Tottori and Shimane and delivered thirty-four speeches for a total of 50,000 people during eleven days of
round trip.
22
An old province of Japan in the area that is today both the central part of Kyoto Prefecture and the east
central part of Hyogo Prefecture
23
An old province of Japan in the area that is today the northern part of Hyogo Prefecture
24
An old province of Japan in the area that is today the eastern part of Shimane Prefecture
25
An old province of Japan in the area that is today the western part of Tottori Prefecture
26
An old province of Japan in the area that is today the eastern part of Tottori Prefecture
- 76 -
Viewing “Japan here and there Korea” from the East Sea, Japan had pursued to link,
check, conciliate and dominate Beidi27, Emishi28, Okjeo29 and Sushen30. The scenes
during then in the East Sea such as frequent interchanges of people and various ships
gathering at coast might be visualized. […] Even if not, crossing the narrowest
straits on the East Sea is not difficult at all. Imaging such scene, we should depart
from little world such as national isolation in Edo period and recall brave ancestors’
ethnicity, who came and went across in the sea. To do so, start with reading this
book first31.
Although it is well-known that Okuma had advocated invading Korean peninsula and
Asian continent by stressing sovereignty and benefit frontier of the Empire of Japan,he
repeated his argument even expanding it to the basis of history and topography at the
time of Japan’s colonization of Korea. He embeds Japan’s ambition of colonialism then
into both history and topography in the book Ura-Nihon re-installing the region which
surrounds the East Sea as in ancient time and invoking the closure of the nation in Edo
period. Okuma's argument was, however, not the result of current situation which was
historically derived from ancient history and topography, but what he discovered on the
basis of colonialists’ ambitions and re-recognized ura-nihon as “omote faces the world”.
Kume’s Ura-Nihon given meaning by Okuma sustains this inverted Japan’s ambitious
with its historical and topographical contents. Nonetheless, this perspective of ura-nihon
as an imperialistic frontier includes no attempts to reverse the perception of the Pacific
coast such as Yokohama and Kobe. Although Kume (1915) refers little about the Pacific
coastal region, his intension is not reversing ura-nihon and omote-nihon but establishing
another omote. Therefore, the aspect of considering the East Sea as a center is still under
developed and such debate appears later in 1920s.
27
Various ethnic groups who lived in northern China during the Zhou Dynasty
A group of people who lived in northern part of main island of Japan
29
Korean tribal state which arose in the northern Korean peninsula from second century BC to fifth
century
30
An ethnic group who dwelt in the area of modern Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces in the Zhou Dynasty
28
31
Kume, Kunitake. 1915. Ura-Nihon [The East Sea coastal area of main island of Japan]. Tokyo:
KomindomeiShuppansha: 3-4.
- 77 -
Ura-Nihon as Center
Kenichi Yoshii (2000), who argued the consciousness against the other side of the
East Sea in order to consider social community in the period of democratizing,
re-considers democratic ideology predominantly argued by Sakuzo Yoshino and others
by referring Kosaburo Matsuo, Kako Ohba and Ryutaro Nagai's works. Conceptual shift
of ura-nihon argued earlier by Okuma and Kume to a center of Japan throughout the
end of First World War, raise of nationalism and national movement such as March first
Movement is analyzed by introducing Matsuo's debate in Theory on the Japanese Sea
Centralism: Consciousness as Isolated Island(1921) in this section.
Yoshii (2000, 152) assesses Matsuo’s argument “rearranges unequal development
policy by centralized government in modern Japan from the aspect of social equality”.
This evaluation on Matsuo’s debate was derived from historical perception of
“capitalistic omote-nihon and ethnic ura-nihon” which Matsuo accords to. Despite
Matsuo’s implication of colonialism, Yoshii (2000, 153) recognizes it as “one of the
peace visions mediating armament reduction in the East Sea Rim region” as a whole.
The question here is that why he concludes Matsuo’s aspect as “one of the peace visions”
even though recognizing imperialistic view. Furthermore, the reason why this
uniqueness of Matsuo’s point of argument is labeled as “ethnic” should be concerned
through colonial situation then as well as domestic antilogy in historical background.
After the Second World War, Tanzan Ishibashi declared in an editorial that Japan
should have waive Kwantung Leased Territory, Shandong Peninsula, Korea and Taiwan
with the “preparedness to give up everything” and developed a theory on classical
economic
liberalism
considering
overseas
territory
causes
economic
disadvantage 32 .Matsuo (1921) also discusses that an occupation of the territory is
militaristic and outdated, and a sense of public morality is needed regardless of rich or
poor. He, indeed, develops the same argument as Ishibashi as what solves problems is
not territorial ambition but progress in trade, manufacture and maritime transportation
(Yoshii 2000, 149). However, the fact that Matsuo’s “peace policy in the East with the
East Sea as a center” is legitimatized by the rhetoric such as “ethnic justifiable defense”
as “stable existence” should not be overlooked. Matsuo (1921) states as follow:
32
TanzanIshibashi, Weekly Toyo Keizai, 1921.
- 78 -
A continental state’s expanding its territory for its own glory using its power is
militarism, thus, imperialism. On the other hand, when an insular country on the
verge of famine does invade other’s territory in order to get enough food, the action
is perceived differently from that of the former. Therefore, to securepeace in the East
Sea Rim region in order not to be threatenedJapan’s collectivistic ability,
self-defense tools such as military power and armament are necessary for people in
island nation to gain stable life. […]just like Japanese chivalry which is based on
individual self defense, it is valid to be never off guard and get ready to response to
every situation in order to survive33.
Matsuo’s perspective on “people in an island country” is underpinned by “ethnic
ura-nihon”, in the contrast with the western “capitalistic omote-nihon” (Matsuo 1921,
26-32).The term ura-nihon gained the ideology as “ethnic” back in Edo period, and it is
linked to the East Sea (Matsuo 1921, 32-36). It is no doubt that “people in an island
country” here refers people who live in interior of Japan.
Conclusion
The Discussion on East Sea Rim was rekindled as “theory on ownership of the
East Sea” through 1930s to 1940s. Yoshii (2000) quotes Masao Mastuoka’s argument
(1932) as follow:
In time immemorial and anciently, the East Sea was by far more approachable for
Japanese national than what is today. […] Once modern people also know the
method, they will cooperate with people in northern part of Korea and in northern
part of Manchuria and greatly contribute to peace and glory in the region by
traveling in the East Sea like their ancestors. The method is introducing a new
channel at first. In other words, opening a new route between ports in ura-nihon such
as Tsuruga, Fushiki, Niigata and Sakata and ports locate on the east coast of Korea
such as Wonsan, Seohojin, Seongjin, Rajin and Woonggi encourages Japanese
33
Matsuo, Kosaburo. 1921. Koto no jikaku [Consciousness of isolated islands]. Tokyo: Kaikoku Kourons
ha: 188-90.
- 79 -
people to expand into Gando in northern Korea and northern Manchuria, to
compensate what locals lack, and to exploit natural resources as well as to maintain
public order which is essential for economic life. […] In this way, who has initiative
for peace in the East Sea Rim region is no one but Japanese citizens. For this reason,
we support the governmental policy that attempts to acquire the ownership of the
East Sea34.
This argument have remained and shifted to the debate on aiming to “establish the Great
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” in 1940s:
Manchurian Incident erupted in 1931, the plan of opening a new railway between
Dunhua and Tumenjiang was accelerated, and the railway between Changchun and
Chonjin was opened in October 1933. Combing northern Korean route operated by
Kita Ninhon Kisen, it was then highlighted as the route connecting Japan and
Manchuria, and rose with the interests toward Asian Continent. In this way, the
theory on territorialization of the East Sea has developed, and a theory on
centralization of the East Sea has risen as a methodology of managing oversea
territories. Port Seongjin, thus, became the focus of attention as a strategic spot. […]
when Port Rajin was newly opened in November 1935, three ports in northern Korea,
Seongjin, Rajin and Woongi, assumed their own mission and literally the
territorialization of the East Sea was achieved with ports in the opposite shore. […]
Needless to say, northern Korean route is not only for Koreans but northern arterious
which connects Japan and Manchuria across the East Sea. Cooperation between
Japan and Manchuria should be reinforced to establish Great East Asia. […] the
route which links inland Japan, Korea and Manchuria should be militarily,
economically strengthened35.
In this paper, theoretical expansion of the terrirorialization of the East Sea in 1930s to
1940s does not be referred. Further investigation is required to consider development of
theories on ura-nihon, centralization and territorialization of the East Sea combined
with the Empire of Japan which shifted its policy to the Southern Expansion Doctrine in
late 1930s.
34
Masao Matsuoka, “The Ownership of the Japanese Sea,”Tokyo NichiNichiShimbun, 5 and 6 January,
1932.
35
History of Seongjin Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 1944.Seongjin Chamber of Commerce and
Industry: 207-8.
- 80 -
References
Abe, Tsunehisa. 1997. How the Concept of Ura-Nihon was Established? Tokyo: Nihon
Keizai Hyouronsha.
Chiba, Tokuji. 1964. “The conception of So-called Ura-Nihon: Historical Geographic
Approach”. Annals of Historical Geography 6: Historical Geography around the
time of Industrial Revolution: 165-80.
Fukui, Nanako. 1992. “Shigetaka Shiga’s Perspective on Japan in Echo”. Kansai
Universoty Journal of Literature 41, 3.
Furumaya, Tadao. 1997. Ura-Nihon: Re-question Modern Japan.Tokyo:Iwanami
Shoten.
Haga, Toru. 1972. “Fukeiron in Modern Japan: Shigetaka Shiga as a Reader of
Fukeiron”. Journal of Japanese Literature: Interpretation and Research in
Materials 17, 7.
History of Seongjin Chamber of Commerce and Industry.1944. Seongjin Chamber of
Commerce and Industry.207-8.
Kanazu, Hidemi. 2010. “The Dimention of Shigetaka Shiga’s Nihon-Fukeiron: Political
Geography of ‘Omote and Ura”. Journal of Foreign Studies 14, 2: 511-28.
Kanzo, Uchimura. 1894. “Shigetaka Shiga’s Nihon-Fukeiron”. RikugoZasshi 168
(December).
Karatani, Kojin. 1980. The Origin of Japanese Modern Literature. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Kume, Kunitake. 1915. The East Sea Coastal area of Main Island of Japan. Tokyo:
Komindomei Shuppansha.
Kojima, Usui, ed. Shigetaka Shiga. [1894] 1937.Nihon-Fukeiron. Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten.
Kondo, Nobuyuki, ed.Shigetaka Shiga. [1894] 1995.Nihon-Fukeiron. Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten.
Maeda, Ai. 1978. The Illusion of Meiji. Tokyo: Asahi Sensho.
Matsuda, Michio. 1959. “The Japanese Intellectuals”. In History on Modern Japanese
Philosophy. Tokyo: ChikumaShobo.
Matsuo, Kosaburo. 1921. Theory on the Japanese Sea Centralism: Consciousness as
Isolated Island.Tokyo: KaikokuKouronsha.
Ogawa Takuji. 1904. “Read Japan in the Beginning of Twenty-first Century”. Journal
of Geography 16, 7 (October): 455-9.
Sadahira, Motoshiro. 1972. “Shiga Shigetaka: Personality and Ideology”. Kwansei
- 81 -
Gakuin University, School of Sociology and Social Work Journal 24: 33-38.
Shiga, Fujio, ed. 1995[1927-1929]. Shiga Shigetaka’s Collected Works. Tokyo: Nihon
Tosho Center.
Shiga, Shigetaka. 1889. The Geography. Tokyo: Keigyosha.
Shiga, Shigetaka. 1903. Geography for Junior High School Students: Japan. Tokyo:
Fuzambo.
Shiga, Shigetaka. 1904. Geography Textbook: Japan. Tokyo: Fuzambo.
Shiga, Shigetaka. 1906. The Geographic Discourse. Tokyo: Waseda University Press.
Shimizu, Hajime. 1991a. “The Original Model of the Southern Expansion Doctrine and
the Framework of Pan-Pacific Region in Late 1980s and Early 1990s (I):
Focusing on Shigetaka Shiga’s Current Affairs in Southern Ocean”. Asian
Economies 32 (September): 2-20.
Shimizu, Hajime. 1991b. “The Original Model of the Southern Expansion Doctrine and
the Framework of Pan-Pacific Region in Late 1980s and Early 1990s (II):
Focusing on Shigetaka Shiga’s Current Affairs in Southern Ocean”. Asian
Economies 32 (October): 27-44.
Suzuki, Norihisa. 1975. KanzoUchimura and his Era. Tokyo: Board of Publications the
United Church of Christ in Japan.
Yano, Toru. 2009. The Lineage of the Southern Expansion: Japan’s Perspective on
History of the Southern Ocean. Tokyo: ChikuraShobo.
Yazu, Shoei. 1910. “Snow in Japan”. Journal of Geography 22, 3 (October): 239-48.
Yoshii, Kenichi. 2000. Transformation in the East Sea Rim Regional Society. Tokyo:
Aoki Shoten.
- 82 -
Historical and Cultural Study on Formation and
Growth of Overseas Korean-Chinese Entrepreneurs
Development in China
Yeh, Dong Guen
Professor
Pukyung National University
- 83 -
- 84 -
Introduction
Even though “The enterprises Act” was passed in 1993 for the first time in China,
its economic environment has not been changed enough yet. It explains China has not offered
good condition for businessmen working normally even if it changed its economic system to
market opened.
"The miracle of Han River" in Korea stands for "compression increase" which focus
on high growth instead of making more stable, predictable system. It became an important
role model of Asia. For Example, achievement story of Jung Joo Young, who is the
establisher of Hyun Dai, is very helpful to understand the first generation in the period of
"compression increase".
China is also following the "compression increase" model.The enterprises Act for
running business well in boundary of law was passed in 1993, The Law of Realty for
protecting private property was passed in 2007. Most Korean businessmen in China has tried
to run their business in very poor surroundings.
This article will show that the occurrence, growth, differentiation and restructuring
process of Korean businessmen in China in the reflection of China's history and social status.
In addition, we need to get organize the history of people who are the Korean businessmen in
China because It's a high time to inter-Korea economic cooperation as the trade between
Korea and China become more active, more excessive.
Furthermore it's very meaningful to observe the Korean businessmen's positive sides
because 'the businessmen in China' are normally devaluated even though many people envy
their wealth.
Occurrence and growth of Korean businessmen in china after China's
reform and opening up(1978-1992)
There were two types of huge flow before China's reform and opening up.One is
"Manchu style industrialization", the other is "조약항 style industrialization". In 1949, when
the People's Republic of China was established, the legacy from the second world
- 85 -
war(Japanese colonial period) belonged to the Communist-Party as state-owned enterprise or
collective-typed enterprise.
As a result, this fact had affected to the Korean businessmen's business start-up with
personal relationships, technical experience, a method of management from state-owned
enterprise after China's reform and opening up. In the process of growth, the first generation
of businessmen began around Manchu area. the second generation has grown around 조약항
area.
This article will classify 3 stages: 1978-1992 for 1st generation, 1993-2001 for 2nd
generation and 1993-present for 3rd generation.
Social background about the appearance of 1st generation of Korean businessmen in
China
As Teng Hsiaoping returned the leader of China in 1978, China took place a huge
social revolution. He sped up its industrialization through the introduction of foreign capital
and opening its market to the outside world. However In the view of financial market, There
was just 1 bank as well as no insurance company in China. Total revenue of the state-owned
company include the nationwide treasury revenue has only 108,990,000 yuen which occupied
83.4% of whole bank's rate of savings. In other words, most Chinese couldn't save their
money to the bank. From 1958 to 1978 for 20 years, Chinese laborer's GDP was less than 4
yuen, farmer's GDP was also less than 2.6 yuen.
In this situation, Teng Hsiaoping focused on 5 sea sides exclusive industrial zone,
invested intensively as a strategy of "selection and concentration". It caused disadvantage of
economic development in Manchu area because there were most heavy industries and stateowned business area in Manchu. Moreover most Korean-Chinese did farm work. That's why
they didn't have enough chance to run their own company there.
However in the early of 1980' Soek San Rim and Choi Su jin who were very famous
for Korean businessmen in China. They had a decisive effect on the history of private
enterprise.
- 86 -
The Indigenous entrepreneurs in the 1st generation
Soek San Rim(65,male) is the establisher of "Chang Nyung Cooperation(CNC)". He
was born and grew up in Manchu where was most heavy industries area in China. As China
began to reform and open the market, many areas became urbanization. they created large
scaled apartment complex. At that time, Soek San Rim invented water-supplied facilities
technology and began to produce them. he also supplied them to the construction company.
In the early of 1990's he became a famous private enterprise in China.
He had a special emotion of nationalism. he has run his company "Chang Nyung
Cooperation" based on ethnic community. "Chang Nyung" was his grandfather's hometown
in Korea. that's because he named his company "Chang Nyung". Now(2010) many
businessmen relate to "Chang Nyung Cooperation" and they have developed as big
cooperations based on water-supplied facilities business. Soek San Rim relocated his
company "Chang Nyung Cooperation" to “Shin sung" county, the village of ethnic Koreans
living in China.
“Shin sung county" gave the autonomy in management and the right to use for lands
in Shin sung county to "Chang Nyung Cooperation(CNC)" while CNC paid to the authorities
in money 10,000 yien every year. During the period, his company was growing very fast. It
means that the 1st generation like Soek San Rim had to have a clandestine relationship with
leaders of administrative officers to run their company safely. The law was not valid in China.
Running the business in Personal connections were much more important than in Law.
"Chang Nyung Cooperation(CNC)" had strived to keep focusing on both
effectiveness of business and social responsibility as an ethnic enterprise community. In its
beginning period, CNC found "Chang Nyung Performing Arts Company" and supported
enthusiastically to the projects for Korean in China.
However The company began to be extended from only Manchu area to all over the
country so that National characteristics have weakened gradually as hiring other people.
Recently many Korean-enterpriser in China try to deviate from nationalism on purpose. They
don't want to be exposed to Korean-Society.
- 87 -
"Soek San Rim" succeeded quickly in monopolizing markets with the technical
development and the capital strength in the underdeveloping situation all over the country.
On the other hand, "Choi Su Jin" succeeded in trading to North Korea with special
relationship. At that time, the highest Building in Harbin was a symbol of his success.
Appearance of self-employed based on national culture
In the middle of 1990's, many self-employed who had carried on tourist business to
South Korean created their technics, capital and chance to enhance their business as 2nd
generation businessmen. After China's reform and opening up, "To be rich is to be proud"
slogan swept over the country. That's because many Korean-Chinese moved to big cities to
get money same as industrialization-urbanization period in Korea.
They made money as running small stores selling traditional foods-Naeng
Myun(Korean style cold noodles), tteok(rice cake), dog meats and gaining customers from
Korean tourists and sojourning employees. They also concentrated on keeping learning skills
and manage from Korea. In addition, they developed many skills for foods -sheep barbecue,
dressing-from the Ethnic Minorities of Western China so that those foods became the most
representative foods in Korean-Chinese Society.
One of successful restaurant business Brand is "Han Na San" that was from selling
"Kimchi as small business. Now It has expanded its business to the various service business
types like hotels, business centers so that makes money more than 500,000,000 yuen per year.
From the end of 1980's to the early of 1990's, women moved to the cities more actively than
men did. Women worked in self-employed business as like running Kimchi stands. Gaining
money they ran small restaurants and after all they expanded the scale to the bigger luxury
restaurants or switched the business.
On the other hand, There were "Peddler" groups membered middle-aged-women
who imported clothes, cosmetics from Korea, Japan and sold them to YoenGil-SimYang in
China. Women Power in restaurant, service business and trades for fashion items is still
outstanding.
Since the middle of 1990's, Korean-Chinese society has became Koreanization as
- 88 -
Korean electronic goods, foods and various culture occupy Korean-Chinese culture. Since
then Many Korean-Chinese have moved to Korea to work for making money. In 2010 now,
400,000 Korean-Chinese reside in Korea. Total home remittance was 876 million dollars in
2005 that took up 32.8% of Yanji city(연변)'s GDP.
Korean-Chinese business' high growth and development after KoreaChina's diplomatic ties
Golden period came to Korean-Chinese business in 1993. they had two big chances.
One was starting to reform the state-owned companies, the other was Korea-China's
diplomatic ties.TengHsiaoping who had supreme power opened markets to the Western and
recovered good relationship with them. Jiang Zemin who was supported by Teng Hsiaoping
accelerated a capitalistic economy. “The enterprises Act” was passed in 1993 for the first
time. In 1995, Many state-owned companies turned to Private-owned companies on a large
scale. China's markets could be full of energy, started to head for world markets positively.
Since Korea-China's diplomatic ties in 1993, major companies of Korea have advanced to
China in earnest that were followed by many minor business companies as substitutes with
components supply. Especially "Wang jing Korea town" has more than 50 thousands Korean
people and 100 thousands Korean-Chinese residents. this is very special collective business
style which has been formed at 5 special economic zone in China. The emergence of
"Collective enterprise" based on the big change of China.
The second generation of Korean-Chinese businessmen could be classified 3 types of
self-made businessmen, government-friendly and collective business in rural China.
The emergence of Self-made businessmen
The most feature of 2nd generation is that they are high educated-people and
professional having managing experiences. Nam Yong(57, Yanji) is an enterpriser of
manufacturer of medical instruments and equipment. His father came from Choong Chung
Do in Korea. He graduated from Sun Yat-sen University, one of prestigious university in
- 89 -
China, studied abroad to Japan, came back to have experience in Chinese major company and
a foreign-affiliated form.
Kim won Joon(47,Kirin) is almost same as Nam Yong. He graduated from Xian
Jiaotong University. he worked in State-owned enterprise and studied abroad to Korea to get
MBA. After coming back to China, worked as a public servant in State-owned enterprise so
that he could make more personal connections. finally he founded a logistic company with
alumni in 1999, It became a major logistic company whose assets were over 3억5천만yuen
in 2006.
As a result, two businessmen who have big companies show several characteristics
of 2nd generations of Korean-Chinese. They have good educational backgrounds, experience
in major companies. Their attitudes to the outside world are also flexible to diversify due to
study abroad. In addition, using the personal connections across the mainstream society in
China, they adventure the home-market around Beijing, Shanghai.
The emergence of government-friendly businessmen
China has begun privatizing state-run firms since 1995. Under privatizing, specialexperienced people who had worked state-run firms had powerful personal connections with
government. It caused the emergence of government-friendly businessmen.
Jeon Gyu Sang(57, Yanbian) is a typical government-friendly businessman. He is a
2nd generation Korean-Chinese. He was graduated from 길림성건축공정학원, entered a
company of Yanbian 건축본사설치회사, he graduated from 상해동오제대학경제관리학
원again which is the best school of architecture. after that he became a CEO 연변건축본사,
state-run company, worked for 10 years. During this period, he founded "천우 company" in
1999, switched it to the Cooperation. At last "천우 company" became a Incorporated
company in 2005. It runs construction, property, trade business. President Jeon has special
connections with China government that's because he has held dominant positions about
many government-planned projects for example 연변대학교종합관, 훈춘발전소.
However It's still under the power of government even though it was privatized from
- 90 -
government in law.
The emergence of collective business in rural China.
In the middle of 1990, the symbols of rural development in China were restructuring
of township and village enterprises and high economic growth. Many Korean-Chinese in
Manchu resided around rural area. They comparatively tend to be rich because they had the
lots of rights of cultivation. While Coast areas of China began to industrialize, many
township and village enterprises developed so fast. However, the civilization around Manchu
was comparatively too slow as being far away from the coast area. In 2000, As big cities in
Manchu had expanded their administrative districts, Many Korean-Chinese had chances to
switch their agricultural lands to the industrial sites. A representative sample area was
"HwaPyung Chon“ that had formed "Hwa Shin group” that all residents possessed lands,
stocks of company.
Joining of China's WTO membership and differentiation and development
of Korean businessmen in china (2001-present)
China's economic environment changed too fast after joining WTO membership in
2001. China became the most trade partner to Korea. As Many Korea Companies moved to
Beijing, Tenjin in San Dung province, mass migration of Korean-Chinese across the China
came vigorously.
The movement of population made economic environment being changed in the 3rd
generation of Korean-Chinese businessmen. First, small-sized stores and companies have
revived vigorously around the 5 special economic zones. Second, The brisk overseas labor
movement markets have made Korean-Chinese companies be Koreanization as language
education and lodging industry and brokerage markets have expanded. Third, As China
government has begun to focus on high- technology development, the 3rd generation
businessmen who run venture companies that have emerged.
- 91 -
Korean-Chinese business' expansion to the whole country and development
Korean-Chinese companies were about 20,000 in 2008. In Jilin Province, KoreanChinese companies are about 2,800 that work for indigenous products, manufacturing,
clothing, restaurant, entertainment business. One of the most representative businessman is
Chen Moon You who is the president of Jilin National Electronic Development Corp. He is
responsible for Association of Jilin Businessmen. The other is Guy Gwan Lee who is the
president of Jilin Baek San Group corporations. In Heilong Jiang, Korean-Chinese companies
are about 2,000. 10% of them work for manufacturing business. For example, water
equipments, Heat & Boiler, and Production of heavy instruments. They were full affected
from San Leem Seok, the 1st generation businessman, who founded 창녕company.
In Liaoning Province, Korean-Chinese companies are about 3,000 that are gathered
around big cities like Dea Lyun. One of major company is Shim Yang Hwa shin group that
produce high-technology products like GIS, LBS, Automatic electronic products. Suh Top
Industrial area is called "Korea town" that has a lot of self-business as like hotels, restaurants,
agent. In Beijing, Tianjin , Korean-Chinese companies are about 3,000. Most of them are
working for service business. For example, Han Na San, Pyung Yan Ok RYugwan are the
restaurants for foreign investors. In Kwangtung, Korean-Chinese companies are about 2,000
that are gathered around samsoo, gwangjoo, hey joo. 10% of them are high-technology
business.
In advance, more than 5 hundred thousand people have entered the global markets
like Japan, Korea, Russia, U.S.A etc and have achieved success.
The emergence of the 3rd generation Korean-Chinese enterpriser and the paradigm
shift of business development
As the China government has begun to focus on IT business, it has given special
preference to Hi-technology business around Beijing, Shanghai where are concentrated Major
universities and talented people. They have studied finance, communication, management,
law etc. and entered good positions in markets.
- 92 -
The development of IT business accelerates cultural, educational business. for
example, animation making, entertaining contents, on-line edu systems are good fields for the
3rd generation enterprisers to expand their new business without any direct competition with
the 1st, 2nd generation enterprisers.
Boong Hwak Lee(38) came from Heilung province and graduated from ChingHwa
university that is the best college in China. He founded a venture company for IT business,
focused on on-line education program as China's private education market is outrageously
growing. He collaborated with Korean on-line education company "Han-sot", brought
technique, capital, skilled experience. At last, His company became 2nd biggest on-line
education company in China.
Yong Hae Kim(45) came from Yong Jeoung, Jilin province and graduated from Jilin
university. He studied abroad to Japan and got a job in IT company in Japan. He was on
detached duty at a branch office to his own country, China. During this period, he founded
NSS(Network System Service) company that was a subcontractor from major companies like
NTT, Hitachi, Toshiba etc.
The emergence of Korean-Chinese business organization and build the network
Many kinds of Korean-Chinese business organizations have emerged and made
important roles since 2000.First, As the development of Internet network, there are active
exchange of technique and information among the Korea-China-Japan. Now most of KoreanChinese businessmen graduated from college, they are good at three languages-Korean,
Chinese, Japanese- very well. That's because they can do an important role to cooperate in the
international network. Second, Original Korean companies in China became good models to
systematize organizations. They have organized the Chamber of Commerce & Industry and
Association of Korean, focused on co-development between business and Korean community.
Third, to cultivate China's huge market, they have to band together because they need to
expect big capital and know-how to flow into globalization. This way can make to reduce
high risks, reinforce confidential relationship.
Last, China government has supported Korean-Chinese businessmen to make special
- 93 -
economic zone and inflow of a foreign capital. For example 심양시정부offered KoreaStreet, Korea-county, Free-space for the Association of Korean to attract Korean companies.
Nowadays, the 3rd generation enterprisers are growing fast with a rising industry,
combination of trade, benefits of international languages and culture and overseas managing
experience. It means they are holding qualifications to compete other countries'.
Conclusion
We look deep into history of Korean-Chinese businessmen's development for 30
years. I classified in 3 parts every 10 years. China has followed the compression increase like
Korea. Korean-Chinese businessmen were born, growing, classified and re-formed as it has
grown from early-staged to high-tech level for only 30 years.
This article cannot describe disappeared businessmen who were in keen competition
for 30 years. They might reflect the spirit of the age in Korean-Chinese business history.
- 94 -
Reference
Jang seup Lee, Chae Wan Leem, 2006, 『Korean-Chinese Entrepreuners' Activities in
China』, Book Korea.
SeungRyul Lee, 2007,『Korean-Chinese in the Era of Northeastern Asia』, Park&Young
publishers.
Dong GeunYeh, 2010,「Wang Jing Korea Town Development in the Transforming Period of
Chinese Reform Policy 」, Ethnic Studies 43 Aug. 2010: 159-185.
陈桂隶，春桃，2009，『小岗村的故事』，华文出版社。
吴晓波，2009，『激荡三十年：中国企业1978-2008』，中信出版社。
吴晓波，2009，『激荡一百年：中国企业1870-1977』，中信出版社。
- 95 -
- 96 -
Disaster Narrative and Nationalism in
East Sea Rim Region:
Focused on Films and Novels Containing Flood and Tsunami as a
Subject in 2000s
Shin, JinSook
HK Research Professor
- 97 -
- 98 -
Introduction
This paper is designed to speculate the relationship between 'disaster narrative' and
'nationalism' in the East Sea Rim region. Disaster Narrative implies all kind of literature
which includes any kinds of disaster as its subject. In other words, disaster narrative includes
all kinds of cultural expressions such as films, fictions, and cartoons, in which roots in "the
imagination of disaster." Writings based on the imagination of disaster cover any events that
the human can't control it. Disaster narrative reproduces non-controllable natural disasters as
main theme, for instance the stories about floods, tsunami, and earthquakes, and so on.
Natural disaster implies all events which are able to destroy peoples' lives. The fundamental
nature of disaster is its destructive character which may demolish ordinary, repeated, and
regular lives of human beings. People experienced natural disaster tend to be extremely
chaotic in their social relations and psychological status. According to Bauman, disaster has
power to change a situation once predictable into another situation unpredictable now (2009).
Another characteristic of disaster narrative is to cover such a mass-destructive stories in that
more than one people's lives are demolished. Therefore, disaster stories tend to be expressed
as collective events rather than individualized ones. Disaster has destructive effect that can
dismantle fundamental foundation of individual as well as collective human lives. In other
words, disaster narrative consists of not a single human being's tragedy but multiple or the
entire human beings' tragedies.
In terms of the structure of story, there is a regular pattern of disaster narrative. In
general pattern, people experienced a terrible situation and down into a harsh environment
overcomes all obstacles and finds out possible solutions for surviving. People who read a
disaster narrative can experience extreme fear that they never have experienced. Thus, the
most popular pattern of disaster narrative stories is to express the limit of human being's
capacity when they face to a disaster. However, most disaster narrative show possible
solutions for any kinds of problems. It is no doubt that each pattern of solutions has its own
feature. In disaster narrative stories, disaster situation tends to be solved either by a chance or
by strategically planned action. According to Sontag, there is a common theme in disaster
- 99 -
narrative - disaster narrative has a similar ending pattern which shows that people always find
out solutions right after getting out of from a destructive spectacle(2002). A group of people
shares desire to overcome disaster as well as feelings of fear. Therefore, disaster narrative has
an effect to concentrate of group membership by using the feelings of fear as emotional
vector.
In that context, the subjective boundary of disaster narrative discourse expands to
nationalism or statism discourse. In case of a disaster narrative story with nationalism
discourse, the structure of the story is that membership of a nation can be intensified among
members who has experienced such a fear of disaster and begun to imagine a nation
community. Disaster tends to be regarded as something outside of a nation in the perspective
of traditional nationalism. It is a hidden strategy that relationship of a national community
can be strongly tied up by overcoming difficulties of a disaster from outside of national
community. According to Anderson, states in the initial stage of establishment make their
people as a national people who reside within states' territorial boundaries(2002). Thus,
natioanlism consists of three things together: territory, people (whom nationalized), and state.
Yet, because all kinds of nationalism have its own feature, nationalism itself is diverse.
Diversity of nationalism is fueled with regional identity that includes not only territory,
history, and ideology but also political system, social, and economic development. Given that
context, Takahara (2002) argues that it is necessary to differentiate the meaning of "national".
Relates to Takahara's aruments, he categorizes nationalism into two types - High Growth
Nationalism and Individualistic Anxiety Nationalism. The classification of nationalism by
Takahara is based on both the developmental level of capitalism and the variation of social
structure changes. There are three stages in the way of social development. The first stage is
the period of expanding middle class in society. Industrialization and high level of
employment rate are the locus of development in the first stage. The second stage is postindustrialized period. In this stage, centralized bureaucracy is firmly founded. The third stage
accelerates the speed of social mobility. In the third stage, a society experiences a rapid
change from strongly organized bureaucracy system to individualized or personalized system.
According to Takahara, all three countries of Northeast Asia (Korea, Japan, and China) get
- 100 -
close to the final stage of social development process. Takahara suggests that as a society
moves from the first stage to the third stage, the characteristic of nationalism changes from
"High Growth Nationalism (HGN) model" to "Individualistic Anxiety Nationalism (IAN)
model." Unlike HGN which is designed to promote national unification feeling or statecentered development, IAN needs to get support from new people who criticize the statecentered development policy. In other words, for IANists, socially individualized people who
are not protected by their government or enterprises tend to be interested in finding a job than
in state-centered development. IAN is similar to western style of nationalism. Although
Korea, China, Japan, and North Korea are located in Northeast Asia, their style of
nationalism should not be regarded as a single or very similar style of nationalism.
However, there is a debatable issue related to the discourse of nationalism. For
instance, there may be different thoughts about nationalism based on the different places even
though people live in a same country. For China, there are 55 racial minorities which is over
64% of total population. China tries to maintain her racial policy, so called, "Pluralistic Unity
of the Chinese Nation" Racial minorities do not follow mainstream of Chinese culture but
their own culture and identity. It is so obvious that there is a huge gap between mainstream of
Chinese culture and those of racial minority. With this context, the characteristic of Northeast
Asian Nationalism becomes clearly understandable one when we investigate it by dividing
into two regions: Yellow Sea Rim and East Sea Rim. Analyzing a certain region by dividing
into local levels is helpful for us avoid any type of analytic limits rooted in state-level of
analysis.
This paper is designed to look into the relationship between disaster narrative and
nationalism among people in East Sea Rim regional countries. In particular, it is to shed some
light on how disaster narrative of that region influence people's nationalism. The findings of
this study lead us to investigate the relationship between the politics of disaster and disaster
narrative in a certain region.
This study focuses on the films and novels of floods/tsunami as disaster narratives in East Sea
Rim region. The scope of the study includes disaster narratives which were published in
North/South Korea, China and Japan after the 2000s. Thus, the study selects the following
- 101 -
films and novels as disaster narrative in East Sea Rim region:"Megaflood" (2009, KoreaChina),"Influential Craze of Ranam" (2004, North Korea), "Japan Sink" (2006, Japan) and
"Haeundae" (2009, South Korea).
The Styles of Nationalism Reflected on Disaster Narrative of East Sea Rim
region
Korean-Chinese' Status of Position and the Memories of Disaster: "Megaflood"
"Megaflood" was written in 1975 by Hong Gyu Lee and Hyun Sook Choi who were
Korean-Chinese novelists in 1975. Yet, the novel was first published in 2006. The spatial
background of "Megaflood" is a Korean-Chinese village and the temporal background covers
from 1960s to 1970s when was the great cultural revolution period of China. Main characters
are Korean-Chineses and some other racial minorities. Most of them are farmers and some of
them are professionals or technocrats for building a dam. This novel is a typical type of
disaster narrative which represents a floods story.
"Megaflood" is successful in showing the "dualistic identity of disaster" The novel
represents natural disaster as the same of social disaster. Social disaster of which KoreanChinese people were vulnerably open to political violence during the Cultural Revolution is
regarded as a natural disaster, Megaflood in the novel. This happening implies KoreanChinese social position at that time which represents the social minority positions of KoreanChinese. Historically, Korean-Chinese have lived where they moved into. In general, they
have shared their own culture. Cultural Revolution made Korean-Chinese culture as antirevolutionary culture. Thus, For Korean-Chinese, Cultural Revolution was regarded as a
political prosecution.
"Megaflood" has two meanings given the context of Cultural Revolution. First,
Korean-Chinese writers began to write novels with their own history background. Their
writings give Chinese an opportunity to be concerned their own history. Second,
"Megaflood" provoked nationalism of minority for sustaining the lives of minority. Such
- 102 -
nationalism was not similar to Sino centrism given the context: the life and property damage
of natural disasters are evenly distributed to the people but the political and social damage of
disasters are not evenly shared by the people. According to Bauman, most disaster narratives
tend to be described the results of any disasters are evenly shared by the people. But, the
results of disasters are much more serious harmful to the poor than the rich. In "Megaflood"
Chinese government ordered an embargo to Korean-Chinese villages which were destructed
by the flood. Chinese government did not have any concerns about Korean-Chinese
community. This kind of irrational decision by the Chinese government worked as an initiator
to fire up the Korean-Chinese nationalism. According to Dai Jinhua, Chinese people are
likely to overlap the unhappy memory of natural disasters with the image of hard time history.
North Korean Style of Nationalism and Disaster Concealing: "Influential Craze of
Ranam" (2004)
"Influential Craze of Ranam" is not a Disaster noble but a blue-color novel. North
Korean government prohibits writers to write any kind disaster narratives because these
works describe North Korean people's painful living conditions.
However, this work represents how North Koreans consider or think about natural
disasters. The author of this novel is Bo Heum Baek. What features of this novel can be
regarded as a disaster narrative? First, in this work, natural disaster can be overcome by
human beings. The main plot is related to the historical event, "March of Ordeal" According
to the main theme of this work, every Disaster can be overcome by reinforcing the Jucheism"
Training of Jucheism is more important than training of disaster overcoming. Second, this
work shows that all disaster are coming from outside. In general, USA is pointed as the cause
of such disaster. The North Korean government tries to rule by isolating the North Korean
people from the world outside. By doing so, the government can moblize the people's loyalty
to the state.
Disaster narrative of North Korea is impacted by North Korean style of nationalism.
Since the 1980s, North Korea has been followed its unique style of socialism. It was unique
- 103 -
style of socialism because North Korean government developed new type of socialism by
connecting Jucheism to traditional socialism. Kim Jung Il made strong and exclusive
nationalism by modifying Jucheism of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jung Il's nationalism was called as
"Joseon Minjok Jeil Juei" which implies that Joseon race (in general, North & South Koreans
together) is the best nation in the world"
Kim Jung Il wanted to protect North Korean society by reinforcing strong
nationalism among the people. The unique style of North Korean nationalism is
"Trinitarianism of Leader-Party-People" Kim Il Sung emphasized 'socioplitic life' which
means that all human beings have two type of life: political life which can be obtained only
by Kim Il Sung and blood-related natural life. In short, according to North Korean
nationalism, people who are following their Party Leader and party's policy making process
can be regarded as Korean race.
In terms of economic policy, North Korean government designed a new plan for
economic development, 'self-reliable North Korean economy' In the novel of "Influential
Craze of Ranam" presents an utopian image of North Korean society which is based on North
Korean unique system of political and economic Jucheism.
Kim Jung Il government uses this nationalistic rhetoric of Jucheism to construct
'Great Nation of Super Power' That is why disaster narratives in North Korea are not showing
actual damage of disaster. Disaster narratives are regarded as obstacles against the North
Korean government policy orientation, developing its economy and industries. Politics of
disaster in North Korea is similar to those of undeveloped states' nationalism: state-centered
economic development.
Fright of Consumption and Disastrous Nationalism: "Japan Sink" (2006)
Japanese movie, "Japan Sink" shows that huge tsunami from the Eastern ocean sinks
Japan. The novel in 1970s written by Komatsu Sakyo is the original story for this film
production. This film presents humanism in a desperate situation. In general, humanism is
always the main theme of most of disaster narratives. Actors face to fright of disaster and
- 104 -
solve the problems which are related to conflicts among the people. Hostile feelings are
changed into humanistic feelings through the way of out from the disaster situation (Sontag
2002).
"Japan Sink" becomes a masterpiece of disaster narrative in Japan because it deals
with natural environment of Japan. In fact, Japanese does not think that they won't be faced to
tsunami in their life-time.
However, is there any similarity between a novel in 1970s and a film in 2000s? First,
while as the Japanese government conducted as an actor whom was supposed to deal with the
tsunami, ordinary people performed as an actor who overcame the uncontrollable situation in
the film of 2000s. Yet, this difference shows a superficial and slight different, and main
theme is the same as the other. The background theme of these works is that Japanese people
are invincible even though physical territories sank into the ocean. This kind of feelings is
strictly related to the right in terms of ideological position. Psychologically, the novel of
1970s provokes the feeling of authoritarian nationalism.
Yet, there are something different from the novel of 1970s. In particular, nationalism
in the 2000s is not same as one of 1970s. According to Takahara (2006), current Japanese
nationalism can be defined as Individualistic Anxiety of Nationalism (IAN) which followed
the 1970s type of nationalism-High growth Development Nationalism (HGD). In the past
period of Japanese history, Japanese economy was developed by the governmental policymakers. In politics, leaders and government officials all agreed to the state-centered economic
development. Yet, this kind of a planned economic developmental policies have their own
limitation which represents a long-term economic down-high rate of interests of banks,
inflation and decrement of income so on. Such unstability of state economy situation makes
the people anxious and unstable. Given this context, current long-term economic depression
makes the people anxious to the future and forces them to find any enemy outside Japan for
reducing their feelings of anxiety. This is what Takahara mentioned as IAN.
"Japan Sink" tries to connect nationalism with people's fright of disaster. Thus,
humanistic feelings of the people becomes a new type of nationalism which is embedded with
- 105 -
people's anxiety. However it carries out of a strategy that makes fright of disaster
commercialized. Nationalism around disaster is also a part of commercialized strategy.
Spectacle of Disaster and Post-Nationalism : "Haeundae" (2009)
Korean movie “Haeundae” shows Spectacle of Disaster which changes from the pain
of disaster to esthetic pleasure. According to Sontag (2002), imagination of disaster is the
process of irony in which spaces for normal life is transformed to spaces in ruin because of
disaster's destructive power. In particular, the films, one of disaster narratives, help spectators
overcome the fear of disaster by visualizing their unconscious feelings of fear.
People in movie don't know tsunami would terribly happen to their life. But disaster narrative
provides paradoxically pleasure even though it's terrible. Shocking spectacles about disaster
can make people experience fear of disaster strongly in quick. These destructive scenes also
provide the chance to release people's destructive feelings in their mind. Haeundae has these
kinds of many features of disaster movies. In Haeundae, in order to maximize the destructive
power of tsunami, the film's plot is designed to describe more about the ordinary livings and
their lives than that of tsunami. The reason for why people feel so scary is that people can't
control such unexpected happenings-disasters.
However, Haeundae don't make us remind the imagination of nationalism, which is
different from the Japanese film, "Japan Sink" In Haeundae, people's feeling of fear is not
changed into certain ideology. Also, this film does not have any intension to provoke Korean
nationalism or authoritarian political entity. This film shows us not an universal standard of
humanism but a small and family-oriented type of humanism. Family-orientism emerges
from this film and is regarded as exclusive.
The limit of the Haeundae is that exclusive family-orientism prohibits people get
together for solving social problems. In other word, Korean type of nationalism is definded as
family-orientism developed from expansion of Individualism.
- 106 -
Politics of Disaster and Disaster Writings
This paper focuses on the relations between disaster narratives and East Sea Rim
region. It finds that there are a couple of styles of nationalism in the disasters narratives. It
seems that there is relationships between regionness of East Sea Rim area and nationalism. In
the case of Korean-Chinese minority, disaster narratives represents their history as a small
size of minority culture. For North Korea, disaster narratives are not allowed to be popular
because North Korean government prohibits writers or producers use such topics as their
theme. In Japan, disaster narratives present Individualistic Anxiety Nationalism which is
based on capitalistic consumption culture. For South Korea, disaster narratives show postnationalism that replaces traditional nationalism with family-orientism. However, it is just
another form of individualism.
This paper argues that disaster narratives are closely related to the politics of disaster.
In terms of politics of disaster, all human beings' lives can be evaluated and it is justified by
the political legitimacy. In East Sea Rim region, the politics of disaster tends to emphasize
authoritarianism through the superficial expression of nationalism. In other words, politics
divides a group of community inside from outside. This paper suggests that such a politics
needs to be critical. Also, this paper suggests that disaster narratives are better understandable
when we look into local or minority than center or majority culture.
- 107 -
Reference
高原基彰, 不安型ナショナリズムの時代, Jung Ho Suk(trans), Seoul: Samin, 2007.
戴錦華, 隱形書寫 : 90 年代中國文化硏究, Oh Kyung Hee, Shin Dong Soon and Cha Mi
Kyung(trans), Seoul: Sookmyung University, 2006.
Agamben, Giorgio, Homo sacer, Kim Hnag(trans.), Seoul: New Wave, 2009.
Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid fear, HamGyuJin(trans.), Seoul: WJ Think Big, 2009.
Kang, Yun Ju and Yun, Jong Uk, “The Representation of Fear in the Natural Disaster Film,”
Korea Humanities Contents, Vol. 22, Korea Humanities Content Society, 2011, pp.137-161.
Kim, Eun-Jung, “A series of “Influential Craze of Ranam” and the concealed Politics of
Desire,” The Research of International Language and Literature, Vol. 39, 2007, pp. 257-287.
Kim, Hong Joong, The Sociology of Mind, Seoul: Munhakdongne, 2009.
Kim, Hyung Gyu, Korean Chinese Novels and Establishment of Minority Nationalism,” The
Journal of Korean Fiction Research, Vol. 40, The Association of Korean Fiction Research ,
2009, pp. 81-101.
Kim, Hyung-Rae, “The Aesthetic of Ugliness in the Film Spectacle,” The Research of
Humanities and Science, Vol. 22, Institute of Humanities and Science, 2009, pp. 265-288.
Kim, Jung Il, Kim Jung Il’s selected works 9, Pyungyang Korea: Chosun Nodongdang
publishing company, 2006.
Sontag, Susan, Against interpretation: and other essays, Lee Min Ha(trans). Seoul: Ihoo, 2002.
- 108 -

Ethnic Minority Policy and Identity in East Sea Rim: the Case of

Transcription

Similar documents

Korea Herald

Korean Preview_b

panmunjom axe murder

20160121 smile通信vol.06英語版

AFPS 2013 -

Open as PDF - ePaper

ArCHiteCture

Untitled - Korea.net

pdf version - The New Educational Review

Japan in a Box! - The Scout Association

July / August 2013 - De La Salle Araneta University

family preparedness guide - Early Learning Coalition of Broward

I Love Korea!

Activism and Identity: How Korea`s Independence

Contemporary Japanese Design

The Fusion of Various Food Cultures Yields a New American

Syllabus for FYS173J, Nationalism

North Korea - West Point

Final Report Presentation - Asian Disaster Reduction Center（ADRC）

Writing Real World - University of San Francisco

theorizing the korean wave a

Volume 13 No. 2 - Nikkei National Museum and Cultural Centre