"Nazis Hoe Cotton": Planters, POWS, and the Future

"Nazis Hoe Cotton": Planters, POWS, and the Future of Farm Labor in the Deep South
Author(s): Jason Morgan Ward
Source: Agricultural History, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Fall, 2007), pp. 471-492
Published by: Agricultural History Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454754 .
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"Nazis Hoe Cotton": Planters, POWs, and the
Future of Farm Labor in theDeep South1
JASON MORGAN WARD
During World War II, thePOW
labor program provided cottonplanters in
the lowerMississippi Valley with a temporaryyet timely solution to an
increasinglymobile local labor supply.While war prisoners worked in a
varietyof crops and non-agricultural industries,one of thegreatest concen
trationof camps and captive workers devoted to a single crop occurred
along the southern stretchof theMississippi River. Cotton planters inAr
kansas, Mississippi, and northernLouisiana secured over twelve thousand
war prisoners from 1943 to 1946. German and Italian prisoners reinforced
a labor system based on boundaries of color even as theirpresence in the
fields revealed racial contradictions. Even as the inexperienced field hands
undercut planter profits, exposed racial tensions, and undermined racial
ized notions of work, theirpresence helped to extend the lifeof an exploit
ative plantation economy. Despite
rate of POW
the limited scope and dubious success
labor, cotton planters in theDeep South found a temporary
workforce to hold a place on theplantation forAfrican-American labor.
ON A BLAZING SUMMER MORNING IN 1943, dozens
of curious planters
gazed across a field full of white men chopping cotton. These
had gathered
to witness
at E. J.Mullens's
an unusual
plantation
"experiment." With
spectators
near Clarksdale, Mississippi,
the cooperation
of military
officials,local plantershad secured sixtyItalianprisoners-of-war
from
nearby Camp
Como. When
the POWs
arrived by bus, Mullens
put his
"regular hoe crew" of black farmhands on one side of the railroad and
the "Italian hoe hands" on the other. Noting
that theworkers
"operated
JASONMORGAN WARD is a doctoral candidate inhistoryatYale University.He is
currently
researchinga dissertationon segregationist
politicsin theSouth duringthe1940s
and theearly 1950s.
( theAgriculturalHistory Society,2007
471
Agricultural History
Fall
maintained that
slowlyand overworkedthe land,"Mullens nevertheless
the "willing"Italianswere "learningquickly."A visitingreporterfrom
Memphis predicted thatPOW labor "will be used extensivelyin the
MississippiDelta thisFall togather thecottoncrop."Observers praised
the cheerfuldisposition of theworkers,who "regarded the trip to
and thework here as a picnic and sang throughout the day."2
Clarksdale
During the summerof 1943, cottonplanters across theSouth con
ducted similarexperimentswith POW farmlabor.Allied advances in
and North Africa had spurred a massive
Europe
influx of German
and
ItalianPOWs to the continentalUnited States.Ultimately, thehome
during
fronthostednearlyfourhundred thousandAxis prisoners-of-war
of thispredominantly
German population
WorldWar II, and two-thirds
spent time in southern camps. As
the war effort lured millions
of rural
workers intomilitaryserviceand defensework,many anxious employ
ers turned to enemy captives for relief from an increasingly elusive labor
supply. While
across
Axis
the South,
in factories and
prisoners worked
their strongest impact was
in the fields. Prisoners-of
to peanuts, and thousands
war picked everything from peaches
to the Chesapeake
cotton fields from southern California
the greatest number of camps and captive workers
crop occurred
in the cotton counties
Mississippi
The
thousands
encountered
World War
of Axis
largely black workforce
South
seized
shipped
region of Arkansas, Mis
to the southern home
in the Cotton Kingdom.
that drove the plantation
for chopping
notes
stimulated
left cotton plantations
The
by the wartime
boom.
to join the military, take de
labor. As
local
for the remaining day laborers, the abysmal wages
and picking cotton began
that rural employers,
"became
front
economy of the Deep
fense jobs, or opt for the relative freedom of daily wage
employers competed
of op
several historians have argued,
the status quo
on new opportunities
African Americans
to a single
11,500 war prisoners.3
POWs
a society in transition. As
II threatened
Bay. However,
devoted
seized on this wartime window
sissippi, and northern Louisiana
portunity and secured around
toiled in
the southern stretch of the
along
in the Delta
River. Cotton planters
lumber camps
accustomed
to rise. Historian
to a surplus of cheap
obsessed with labor supply and control." With
of local officials, planters employed
Pete Daniel
labor,
the cooperation
a variety of strategies to limit black
472
2007
"NazisHoe Cotton"
mobilityand risingwages, butwartime changes threatenedto radically
alter southernsociety.4
The temporaryyet timelysolution of POW labor provided local
planterswith anotherway to sustainan increasingly
outmoded agricul
Morton Sosna pointsout, scholarsof the
turalsystem.
Yet, as historian
wartimeSouth have generallytreatedprisoners-of-war
as "an interest
inghistoricalfootnote."Those who have paid sustainedattentionto the
topic focus on the camps largely in isolation from the broader context of
wartime change.Some historianshave noted theundeniable economic
labor, and a few have even explored
impact of POW
the racial ramifi
cationsof thispeculiar episode in southernhistory.
Most, however,ac
cept theplantercomplaintsof labor shortagesand theirembraceof the
POW workforcewithout addressingmotivationsbeyond a basic desire
forprofit.IfhistorianNan Woodruff is correctin assertingthat"POW
labor representedtheplanters' response to thedemands of farmwork
ers fordecentwages," then the existinghistoricaltreatmentis insuffi
cient.Administered in themidst of a war withmomentous implications
for theAmerican civil rights
movement, thePOW labor programre
vealed
hopes
and
fears for race and
labor relations
in the postwar
South.s
During the latterhalf of thewar, thePOW labor programhelped
cottonplantersweatherwartime turmoilas theycontinuedtomodernize
theiragricultural
practices.Consequently,theyused theirpoliticalclout
within the federalagriculturalbureaucracyto barter for thousandsof
prisoners fromnearby camps. In practice,however, the POW labor
programrevealedwartimeuncertaintiesthatcomplicatedthe transition
model of cottonproduction.Even as inexperi
to a less labor-intensive
enced fieldhandsundercutplanterprofits,exposed racialanxieties,and
underminedracializednotionsofwork, theirpresencehelped to extend
some of themost exploitativepracticesof southernagriculture.
Despite
the limitedscope and dubious success rateofPOW labor,cottonplant
ers in theDelta regionutilized thistemporary
workforcetohold a place
on the plantation
forAfrican Americans.
nor theonlycounterstrategy
POW contractlaborwas neitherthefirst
employedby cottonplanters tomaintain lowwages and preserve their
controlover local labor.Before theWar Department authorized the
POW
work program
in early 1943, cotton planters had already
473
tried a
Agricultural
History
Fall
varietyof tacticstomaintain a ready supplyofworkers. Initially,they
aimed to retainratherthanreplace theirdwindlingblackworkforce.The
wartimeboom gavemany ruralAfricanAmericans options forescaping
thedrudgeryof thecottonfields.
Many entered themilitaryormigrated
to the cities to take relativelylucrativejobs in defense industries.
As
African-Americansoldiersbegan to send theirpay home towives and
relatives,
women and childrenlefttheplantationsandmoved intotown.
With newfoundmobilityand independence,even thosewho remained
on the farmcould scoutaround forthebestwages and hire themselves
work.
out fortemporary
Many cottonplantersresortedtodeception,bribery,and intimidation
to counter thisincreasingindependenceandmobilityof blackworkers.
On both sidesof theMississippiRiver,planterspromised to securedraft
When workers
exemptionsforworkerswho signed lengthycontracts.
refusedsuch offers,plantersevicted themfromtheplantation.Planter
abuses
constituted
"a new
form of peonage,"
warned
an ally of the
SouthernTenant Farmers'Union (STFU). Formed inArkansas during
theGreat Depression, theSTFU was a biracialunion of sharecroppers
with locals throughouttheDelta region.From STFU
and farmworkers
headquarters inMemphis, union co-founderHenryMitchell kept up a
steady barrage of protests against the tactics of area cotton planters.6
Increasingblackmobilityand outmigrationforcedcottonplanters to
look for alternate
sources of labor. This strategy was by no means
un
precedented.Previous generationsofDelta plantershad attemptedto
Chinese and Italian
lessen theirdependenceon black laborby recruiting
While theselaborexperimentshad peteredout by theearly
immigrants.
twentiethcentury,thedemand forMexican migrantworkers increased
during thewar years despite
limited availability
in the Delta
region. But
racial anxieties,heightenedbywartime disruption,continued to com
While northernand
plicate thehunt fornontraditionalfarmworkers.
midwesternfarmerssuccessfullyrecruited
migrant labor fromtheCar
ibbean,several islandnations refusedto send theircitizens"southof the
Another potentialsource
Mason-Dixon line" forfearof discrimination.
of nonnative
labor appeared
with
the construction
of two Japanese
American internment
camps in theArkansas Delta. However, Gover
nor Homer Adkins adamantlyopposed Japanese-Americanlabor on
explicitlyracistgrounds,and most whites in the region followed suit.
474
"NazisHoe Cotton"
2007
When cottonplantersin theMississippiDelta inquiredabout employing
internedJapaneseAmericans, a prominentlocal bankerwarned that
"instead of havingone racialproblemwe will have two." In northern
Louisiana, a prominentplanterabandoned plans to recruittenantfarm
ers from the nearby internmentcamps when alarmed local citizens
warned thatthe former
Californiavegetable farmers
would "take over
theparish."7
In themidst of the scramble for farmlabor, theWar Department
announced thatAxis POWs could be used to ease shortagesacross the
Delta plantersbegan an aggressivecampaign to
country.Following this,
secureasmany prisonersas possible.When Clarksdale,Mississippi, cot
tonplanterPaul F. Williams learned thatItalianprisoners-of-war
had
arrived at nearby Camp Como,
he devised a plan to gauge "the attitude
of theprisonerstowarddoing such farmwork."Williams presentedhis
plan to theDelta Council, an organizationofwhite planters,politicians,
With the approval of theDelta Council,Williams
and professionals.
contacted the commandingofficerat Camp Como to request several
dozen prisonersto testthefeasibility
ofPOW farmlabor.While Colonel
H. L. Henkle claimed to be "very sympathetic"to the plightof the
planters,he initiallybalked at the idea of sending the Italiansnearly
sixtymiles away.Nevertheless, in late June 1943,Henkle sent sixty
POWs
to E.
J.Mullens's
for the first of many
plantation
days in the
cotton fields.8
Delta plantersand the local press enthusiastically
heralded the "suc
cessfulexperiment"on theMullens plantation.Despite public praise,
the local farmlaborcommitteeprivatelyadmittedthatPOWs mightbe
more expensive and less cooperative than local workers.Under the
Geneva Convention, theprisonerscould onlywork foran eight-hour
day. Chairman
Williams
reported
that when
travel and lunch, the Italians on theMullens
time was
deducted
for
plantation only worked
five
hoursper day.Although the
War Department requiredthattheplanters
pay the POWs
the "prevailing wages"
of the area, Williams
that the actual cost of hoeing one acre of cotton was
calculated
five dollars with
ItalianPOWs as opposed to threedollarswith local blackworkers.9
The
cautionary
report did little to dampen
the enthusiasm
of Delta
When thecommandingofficersfromCamp Como and Camp
planters.
McCain
attended a farmers' association meeting
475
a fewweeks
later,Mis
Agricultural History
Fall
sissippiDelta planters requested thirtythousandprisonersfor theup
coming cotton harvest.But even as cotton planterspressed hard for
POWs,
H.
L. Mitchell
of the STFU
feared
that a legion of captive
workerswould underminethewartimegains of ruralfarmlabor.When
Mitchell learnedof the laborexperimenton theMullens plantation,he
inundated federal agencies with letters of protest. In a memo
to theWar
ProductionBoard,Mitchell blasted "theuse ofprisonersofwar tobreak
down wages
maintained
war
and other standards of employment
had no objection
that the STFU
to harvest
for farmworkers." He
to the use of prisoners-of
food crops as long as they did not displace
domestic
workers.He questioned,however, the rationaleforassigningPOWs to
MississippiDelta cottonplantations"when thereis a surplusofAmeri
can labor available
in this area." Mitchell
for farm work
dismissed
the
cottonplanters'pleas for relieffroma cripplinglabor shortage.
What
lacked, he contended, was
planters
mobilized
for seasonal
farmwork at minimum
southern planters," Mitchell
of workers
Since
available
cotton prices
allowed
an excess of workers who could be
explained,
cost. "It is the custom of
"to always have a huge surplus
and to pick the cotton crop as rapidly as it opens."
fell steadily
throughout
the harvest,
this practice
to reap the largest profits in the shortest amount
planters
of
time.10
federal officials shared
Some
Mitchell
the POW
reported
sippi, to the War
Paul McNutt
tion. The
head
of the STFU.
in Coahoma
Commission
Manpower
called
the skepticism
experiment
agency
(WMC),
for an investigation by theWar
of theWMC
Rural
When
County, Missis
chairman
Food Administra
Industries Division
admitted
"prisoners of war have been used in agricultural employment
instances and perhaps at less than the prevailing wage of domestic
for similar work." Another
yet, no legal way inwhich
other work." He
top official acknowledged
that
in various
labor
that "there is, as
these prisoners may be assigned
to this or any
also noted that "some of the officers in charge of these
camps are not too sympathetic with the efforts of groups like the South
ern Tenant
Farmers' Union."11
Therefore, although cotton planters had found cooperative allies
among
local camp
commanders,
some
struggled
to convince
agencies of the severity of their labor shortage. On August
director of the Arkansas
Agricultural
476
federal
10, 1943, the
and Industrial Commission
in
"NazisHoe Cotton"
2007
formedGovernor Adkins that"all of theproposed sites formilitary
prison camps inEasternArkansas have been turneddown."Although
theUSDA had designated tenArkansas countiesas "criticalfromthe
farmlaborstandpoint,"some of thetopcottoncountiesin theArkansas
Delta had not made the list.While Arkansas planters dismissed the
laborcalculationsas ludicrous,
Mitchell argued thattheywere accurate.
laborsupplytomeet
"These countieswithoutexceptionhave a sufficient
declaredMitchell, "and it ismy opinion that
all normal requirements,"
the only reason forapplicationbeingmade for the establishmentof
these camps inArkansas is to hold down wages during the cotton
pickingseason thisfall."The consequencesofPOW laborwere not lost
on farmworkersin easternArkansas.When STFU organizerCharles
McCoy
told a local farmhand about
the plan to bring in POWs
to chop
cotton,theworker replied,"Americanscan eat rabbitstillcottonpicking
time." 12
After thecollapse ofRommel's forcesinNorthAfrica, theWar De
partmentbroughtthousandsofGerman captives intotheUnited States.
Only Texas
and Oklahoma
received more
of these prisoners
than Ar
kansas,Mississippi,and Louisiana. As theWar Department,WMC, and
theWar Food Administrationironedout the legal procedures forse
curingPOW contractlabor,cottonplantersrushedto secureextrawork
ers. Undaunted by theirearlier setbacks,Arkansas Delta planters
pressedGovernorAdkins to interveneon theirbehalf. In a telegramto
the regional POW
commander,
three thousand prisoners"
USDA
labor shortage
Adkins
pleaded
for two counties
for a "minimum
that had been
list. The governor warned
of
left off the
of an impending agri
culturaldisaster iftheWar Department refusedtoprovide laborersfor
plantersin
picking,ginning,and compresswork.Across theriver,thirty
Greenville,Mississippi, requestedan allotmentofone thousandGerman
soldiersfromCampMcCain. Engineers fromthenearbyairbase hastily
erected an experimental"branch camp" of two hundred tents sur
rounded by six guard towers and a barbed wire fence. In early October,
eight hundredGerman prisonersheaded out to the "fieldsof white
gold" on twentylocalplantations.
Meanwhile, inClarksdale, localplant
ers erected a "tent city" for one thousand Italians from Camp Como.
In
lateOctober, farmlabor officialsannounced thatAxis prisonershad
picked twomillion pounds of cotton in twoweeks. Like theircounter
477
Agricultural
History
Fall
parts inMississippi,Arkansas cottonplanterspooled theirresourcesto
build a few temporary work camps for the upcoming harvest season. By
November 1943,fourhundredfifty
prisonerswereworkingon the"larg
est cotton farm inArkansas"
The
near Wilson.13
use of POWs
sporadic
in the cotton fields of the Deep
as federal agencies
expanded
and local planters negotiated
South
the criteria
forcontractlabor.While the federalguidelines requiredpotentialem
ployers
to request workers
from theWMC,
planters could apply indi
rectlythroughtheirlocal agentof theAgriculturalExtensionService. In
to STFU
response
could not work
protests,
theWMC
on farms unless
counter the charge that POWs would
that war prisoners
maintained
an acute
labor shortage
existed. To
drive down local wages,
theWMC
requiredthatemployerspay prevailingwages fortheirwork. Such pro
nouncementsdid littleto reassureMitchell,who argued thatpowerful
planters could easily manipulate
tive labor. According
Committees
dominated
federal guidelines
to the monthly STFU
to secure cheap cap
bulletin, "the Farm Labor
in each county are either plantation owners or local officials
by the planters and these Farm Labor Committees
determine
the need and set the wage."'14
Some WMC
officials quietly agreed
out of the Delta
merited
a second
that the labor projections
look. The Washington
coming
office urged
Regional DirectorWillis Sloan "to be careful in thesedeterminations
because
Delta
low wages
paid
Area might come
stream of complaints
and possible
availability
of free labor in the
in for some close scrutiny." Noting
emanating
the steady
from that corner of the country, a
Washington officialquestioned "the contemplatedextensiveuse ofpris
oners of war." Sloan, who oversaw
the operations
of theWMC
swath of southern states, replied that he had already whittled
nal request of seven thousand prisoners
three thousand
altering
"on a well-distributed
the wage
and investigated
Cotton
rates suggested
office maintained
Washington
their demands
responded
basis."
Sloan
stopped
by local extension
that "such wages
to
short of
agents, but
the
should be scrutinized
to a skeptical bureaucracy
for POW workers. With
the POW
booming. Whereas
the origi
for the 1944 harvest down
if out of line."'5
planters
approaching,
across a
labor program
the harvest of 1943
478
by increasing
the 1944 cotton harvest quickly
in the Mississippi
involved
Valley
was
the scattered use of
"NazisHoe Cotton"
2007
POWs, plantersandmilitarypersonnel spent theoff-seasonexpanding
an extensivenetworkof "branchcamps."Local associationsof planters
pooled theirresources to build thesemakeshiftwork camps in their
may
townsand counties. "Any group ofmen in any one community
apply fora prisonerofwar camp" announced theDelta Farm Press, "if
theywant to pay thecosts of gettingthematerial here and gettingthe
camp constructed,guarantee 80 percentemploymentover a period of
one year and pay prevailing local wage rates."The military,in turn,
guards,and prisoners.16
would provide administrators,
From thebeginning,cotton interestsdominated the contractlabor
programin thealluvialplains along theMississippiRiver. Early in1944
over one hundredmembers of theMississippiCountyFarmBureau met
inOsceola, Arkansas, toplan a major expansionof POW laboropera
tions.Eventually,localplantersestablishedsixbranchcamps in this,the
nation's top cottoncounty.In nearbyBrinkley,aWar Department of
ficial reported that"therewere plentyof prisoners" and encouraged
planters"to rushconstructionof thecamps as fastas possible."When
federalofficialscut therequestedallotmentof tenthousandprisonersin
half, irate representatives from twenty-ninefarmers' associations
elected three representativesto take theirconcerns toWashington.
Within a matter of days, thedelegates reportedthattheyhad success
fullylobbied for three thousandextra POWs to help fill the cotton
camps of the Arkansas
failed to establish
Delta.
Planters
on the other side of the river
as many branch camps as their Arkansas
neighbors,
was equally apparent.Follow
but thepredominanceof cotton interests
ing the example of the experimentalbranch camp inGreenville,Mis
sissippi,plantersquicklybuilt sixmore branchcamps in fiveof the top
cottoncountiesin thestate.Not tobe leftout,Louisiana cottonplanters
erected
a handful of camps
as well. Although
sumed themajority of the POW manpower
sugar plantations
con
in the state, cotton planters
innorthernLouisiana eventuallyhosted two thousandwar prisoners.17
As
the branch camps fanned out across the alluvial plains, the STFU
continueditslonelyyetvigorousprotestfrom
Memphis.When German
prisonersentered thecotton fieldsjustacross theriverin theArkansas
Delta,
the STFU
claimed
that there were
as many as five thousand
idle
workers inMemphis. "With 1,000prisonersnow located inCrittenden
County,Arkansas," warned the union'smonthly, theMemphis Farm
479
Agricultural History
"the planters can fixwage
Worker,
force American
the STFU
a new
anticipated
looked
season. As
rates at starvation
levels and thus
citizens to accept the same pay." As winter approached,
threat to the local workforce. With
tent cities to "winterized"
transition from seasonal
planters
Fall
to utilize
for ways
their prisoners beyond
of prisoners-of-war
hundreds
the
branch camps, local
the harvest
to enter gins, ware
prepared
houses, and compresses inNovember 1944, theSTFU convened for its
inLittle Rock. Members
annual convention
voted unanimously
to adopt
a resolution calling for pickets of cotton facilities that employed
ers. Undaunted,
work
in the Arkansas
compress operators
them picket or no picket." By
Delta
prison
pledged
"to
the end of the year, thirty com
presses in the state employednearly seven hundredprisoners-of-war.
Mitchell
contended
that the use of POWs
in these rural industries de
prived unemployed
farmhands of winter
employment.
WMC
Paul McNutt, Mitchell
Chairman
claimed
In a letter to
that the Federal
Com
press andWarehouse Company inLepanto, Arkansas, employed fifty
POWs
despite
a local labor surplus. "In
"there are not less than 200 unemployed
an opportunity
workers,
argued,
workers who would welcome
to get a job at this plant." Gin
faced the same labor challenges
In addition,
this town," Mitchell
as the planters
and compress
owners
that fed their operations.
their labor shortage was not simply a lack of any available
but often a drastically
reduced
local
labor pool with more
lucrative
wartime employmentoptions.18
As planters and politicians
Axis
prisoners
ployers
adjusted
to pay prevailing wages,
agreed
ceived eighty cents in canteen coupons
camp, war prisoners
and personal
formore
clamored
to life in the Cotton
could
redeem
items. The balance
POWs,
the captive
pointed
determining
soldiers only re
of theirwages went directly into federal
rate for agricultural
in the place of available
reliable method
the STFU
substantial
labor. While
clared publicly that war prisoners could not work
enforce. WMC
at the
the currency for cigarettes, candy,
out, local farm agents wielded
the wage
of
their em
for their daily labor. Back
coffers to help defer the cost of their imprisonment. As
peatedly
thousands
Belt. Although
re
latitude in
theWMC
for reduced wages
de
or
local labor, such requirements were difficult to
officials quietly admitted
for determining wage
480
that few states actually had a
rates or labor supply. In many
2007
"NazisHoe Cotton"
ruralareas, countyagentswould simplypoll planterstodeterminewage
rates or to assess
Although
the local labor supply.19
planters used
their influence to keep wages
as low as pos
sible, theinitialperformanceof theinexperiencedfieldhandswas barely
adequate.
Edwin Pelz, a German
POW
incarcerated at aMemphis
army
depot, learned firsthandthatpicking cottonwas miserably difficult
work. On his firstday in the fields of eastern Arkansas,
the young soldier
worked "like a foolwithout a break or interruption."
Despite his best
efforts,
Pelz could not keep up with thebackbreakingpace of cotton
picking. "By noon my sack was full and so heavy I had difficulty pulling
itbetween the rowsof cottonplants," rememberedPelz. Although he
was
sure that he "had broken
all cotton picking records,"
prisoner had only picked forty pounds.
the German
"There were aches and pains all
across my back," he recalled, "I was half dead." Only with the help of his
more experiencedcomradescould Pelz meet his dailypickingquota of
one hundred
twenty pounds. He
finished the last few rows of cotton
undermoonlight.20
War prisonersquicklydiscoveredways tomeet the relatively
modest
set by their employers. After
quotas
discovered why he had so much
his first day
in the fields, Pelz
trouble keeping up with his comrades.
"They put dirt, stones, and anything else
they could
find into their
sacks," to increase theweight,he discovered.Although theprisoners
improved
as they gained
their performance
few had any
experience,
thing positive to say about tending and picking the despised
Some
expressed
their misery
sabotage. One German
POW
and
resentment
in Lake Village, Arkansas,
dragging cotton sacks through mud puddles was
war on a lower level." Even
fighting back." Captive
local workers
German
made
in the fields, he explained,
the rather modest
prisoners
that
of the
"we were
still
the effort. If they refused to
their picking quotas,
other privileges. However,
to exceed
reasoned
"a continuation
laborers failed to rival the output of experienced
and had little reason tomake
work or failed to meet
"tree wool."
through subtle acts of
there were
they forfeited wages
few motivations
expectations
in Indianola, Mississippi,
and
for the workers
set by their supervisors. After
met
their daily quota,
a few extra cents by secretly selling their additional
they
cotton to local
black pickers who were paid by the pound.21
Many
planters did not seem overly concerned with the efficiency and
481
Agricultural History
output
of their POW
laborers. E.
J.Mullens,
Fall
the Coahoma
County
planterwho had hosted the firstPOW farmhands,stated flatlythathe
had no desire to push theseworkers beyond theirminimum quotas.
"The government
day," Mullens
requires each of you to pick 150 pounds
of cotton a
to a newly arrived crew of German
announced
"I
POWs.
shall notwatch you pick it,"he continued,"I will give you credit for
having been gentlemen
before
the war and I shall treat you as gentle
men." Of course, the regulationsregardingthe treatmentofwar pris
oners ensured thatGerman and Italian soldierswould escape theworst
abuses of southernagriculturallabor.The Geneva Convention shielded
realities of the cotton fields. In a manual
them from the harshest
dis
tributedtoemployersofPOW laborers,theArmy cautionedsupervisors
against harsh treatment. "You will find it unwise and at times impos
sible,"warned theArmy, "to use all of the supervisorytechniquesyou
may have used
to advantage
in supervising
the work of free American
labor." The fact that enemy laborersenjoyed legal advantages over
southernfarmhandsunderscoredtheharsh realityof lifeon thecotton
plantation.But asMullens's declaration to his POW workers suggests,
the racial assumptionsof many southernwhites made militarypro
nouncementsagainstworker abuses largelyirrelevant.22
Many
cotton planters had no intention of subjecting POWs
to the
harshestconditionsof plantation labor.The fewwho did violated local
standardsof white privilege.When a planter inOsceola, Arkansas,
pushed his German workers too hard, a visitingminister took their
complaintsto federalofficials.Reverend F. W. A. Eiermann reported
that the prisoners were
parching
"being forced to work
sun." Concerned
that many
ten hours per day in the
of the men would
"fall out and
sufferfromsun stroke,"Eiermann argued thattheprisonersshouldnot
be required towork the blisteringschedule "fixedby the plantation
ownerswho have heretoforeemployedNegro labor." In a societythat
had long rationalizedthe subjugationofAfricanAmericans througha
racialized division of labor, subjecting fair-skinned
men to grueling
physicalworkwas a sensitiveissue.While manyDelta plantersregularly
hired localwhiteworkers,many also continuedtomake explicitlyracial
distinctionsin theirexpectationsand management of labor.Thus the
utilizationofwhite POWs requiredeitheran adjustmentof prevailing
racial assumptionsor an extensionof special privilegestoAxis prison
482
2007
"Nazis Hoe Cotton"
ers.Of course,southernplantersknew thatno amountof leniencycould
renderthecotton fieldsa suitableplace for"gentlemen."Nevertheless,
theirrefusalto implement"all thesupervisorytechniques"alluded toby
militaryofficialssuggeststhatracialcustomsoftenundercutefficiency.23
The racistpracticesof theruralSouth leftan indelibleimpressionon
many plantationPOWs. One of the statedgoals of the laborprogram
was to expose citizensof theAxis powers to theAmerican way of life.
"Labor PresentsAmerica to thePrisonerofWar," announcedanArmy
manual for supervisorsof war prisoners."The prisonerof war labor
programgives theprisonersa chance to closely observe the average
American citizen,theway he lives,theopportunitiesaffordedhim in the
United States, and his relationships
with his governmentand with his
fellowcitizens."The militarywarned that"careless talkabout ... our
racialproblems"could undermine"theopinions theprisonersholdwith
regard toAmerican lifeand ideas." But, while theWar Department
hoped thatthe laborprogramwould serveas a showcase forAmerican
democracy,POWs on southernplantationsoften learneddifferentles
sons.Hein Severloh,a German corporal,was astonishedby theplightof
theAfrican Americans who picked cotton in theMississippi Delta.
"They requiredus togather100 lbs.of cottona day," he remembered,
"but of the Blacks,
they demanded
two or three times more."
A
self
described "agriculturalist,"
Severlohwondered how anyone could en
dure such wretched
conditions.
"For them itwas worse
than for us," he
noted,describingtheirhomes as "veryugly,veryprimitive."Seeing that
blacks in thecottonfieldswere "oppressedand trulyinmisery,"Sever
loh and otherprisoners"tried to explain to themwhatNational Social
ismwas."24
Although some POWs rememberedsimilarencounters,others ob
served that theirwhite supervisorspreferredto isolateprisonersfrom
Morton Sosna,
local blackworkers. "Some Germans," notes historian
"sensed theiremployers'uneasinesswhen local blacks saw so many
whitemen working in the fields."AlfredAndersch, a German deserter
and futurefictionauthor,noticed similarpracticesworking in thecotton
Louisiana. In one of his shortstories,Andersch
fieldsof northeastern
to
the
strict
alluded
segregationof theplantationworkforce.Describing
a fictional crew of German
cotton pickers, Andersch
483
noted that "even in
Agricultural History
the distance
they saw no Negroes
Fall
in the fields; itwasn't
working
thought
fittingthatNegroes should see whitemen pickingcotton."25
The
sight of Aryan
the Deep
"supermen"
South challenged
ern society. On plantations
over in the cotton fields of
stooped
some of the bedrock
assumptions
of south
that had previously relied on black labor, the
of white field hands served as an unnerving reminder that the
spectacle
wartime upheaval
a time when
threatened to turn the social structure on its head. At
any deviation
from the segregated
status quo encountered
vigorous resistance,thedisruptionof traditionallabormores harbored
explosive potential.Wartime changes forced southernplanters into
some uneasy compromises.
The POW
labor program helped many
cot
tonplanters to continue labor-intensive,
low-wagepractices in the face
of increasing mechanization
and outmigration. Yet,
at the same
time,
southernracialcustomsoftenensured thatwar prisonersenjoyed lighter
workloads and better treatmentthanblackworkers.
The
relatively lenient treatment and extra privileges enjoyed by war
prisoners
laid bare
the contradictions
of American
war
aims.
In the
cottoncountiesof theMississippiValley, AfricanAmericans resented
the privileges afforded enemy prisoners. Delta
veteran Nathan
they got more
recalled
they brought
privilege
that "if you was
those Germans
outside. Even
II
a black boy here
in
over here as prisoners
than you did as a citizen." Stories circulated of
work crews eating in Jim Crow
German
waited
Harris
when
Mississippi,
native and World War
as white Arkansans
cafes while
their black guards
barred black citizens and in
ternedJapaneseAmericans fromtheirsegregateduniversities,a large
number of German and Italian POWs enrolled in correspondence
courses.26
Although
white
elites preferred
to focus on the positive
aspects
of
POW labor, a buildingchorus of criticismundercut theirrosyassess
ment. From theoutset, theSTFU had highlightedthe shortcomings
of
POW
labor. "War Prisoners Can't
Pick Cotton,"
announced
theMem
phis FarmWorker. "Surveyson theuse ofwar prisonersnow employed
on farms show that they are very poor workers,"
monthly.
"Plantation
of holding down wages
continued
the union
owners who sought to use enemy labor as a means
ofAmericans
rumble of planter discontent
... are not pleased."
lent credence
An
to this claim. After
increasing
the 1944
harvest,cotton planters inMississippi County,Arkansas, complained
484
2007
"NazisHoe Cotton"
that many
of their 2,500 war prisoners had engaged
in "petty acts of
sabotage" such as draggingcottonsacks throughthemud, addingclods
of dirtand rocks to theirsacks,and pullingwhole stalks."Offensesare
enough toworrya farmertodeath," reportedone supervisor.
A county
agent inSunflowerCounty,Mississippi, reportedthat"the pickingand
pulling of cotton by German
prisoners of war
in this area as a rule has
been very,veryunsatisfactorily
[sic]."Local planterscomplained that
the "trashy" cotton was
so full of stalks and mud
that it could not be
ginned.While frustrated
planters admitted thatPOW workerswere
"better than no help at all," many agreed that theywere "so much worse
thanany labor theyever used thattherecan be no comparison."One
alarmed local criticized the lenient treatmentof German prisoners,
sending theDelta Farm Press a photographof POWs "playingon the
levee"with only a "negro truckdriver"to supervisethem.In response,
theeditorurged supervisorstoget toughwith theircaptive laborcrews.
"The prisonersofwar shouldbemade towork,"he declared,"or else."27
Due to theseasonalnatureof cottoncultivation,
plantersstruggledto
provideconsistentdailywork fortheprisoners.Traditionally,plantation
owners relied on a systemof partial employment,floodingthe fields
with farmhandsduringpeak periods of thecotton season.These prac
with themilitaryrequirementsformaximum
tices,however,conflicted
of war
employment
prisoners.
In many
areas
of the country, POWs
rotated from farm to farm and crop to crop in order tomeet
the demand
for labor. In Louisiana, for example, planters shuttledwar prisoners
between
cotton, rice, and sugar operations. However,
in a region pri
marily devoted to cotton cultivation,plantersoften failed to provide
alternative employment options
for their POW workers.
In early 1945 a
laborreportshowed thatArkansasDelta plantersonlyutilized their
war
prisoners
for "37 to 38 per cent" of their maximum
work hours. Con
sequently,governmentofficialsthreatenedto transfertheworkers to
pulpwood plants. InMississippi, congressmanand Delta planterWill
Whittington
pressed
urged area planters
theWMC
now stationed
formore
in the Delta
to keep
their prisoners busy even as he
captive workers.
"It is essential
to be utilized whenever
work on the plantations," warned Whittington,
for those
it is practicable
to
"or we are likely to lose
what we have."28
of POW labor,many cottonplanterswere
Despite theshortcomings
485
Agricultural
History
Fall
generous in theirpraise.Planters frequently
emphasized thedemeanor
and discipline
man
of the POWs
in Coahoma
POWs
rather than their productivity. When
Ger
struggled to pick fiftypounds
County
a day
duringtheirfirst
week in thefields,plantersneverthelessnoted thatthe
workerswere "interestedand conscientious."
Military officialsreported
thatmany planterswere satisfied
with thePOWs "althoughtheprison
ers did not pick as much cotton" as local workers. War
prisoners, plant
ers contended,were "thoroughto a fault."Other supervisorsadmired
the intelligence,
pride,and vigorof theyoungGerman soldiers.Accord
ing to one study of POWs
racial preferences
in Louisiana,
some whites
by admiring the physical appearance
"expressed
their
of the fair com
plexionedAryans."Many plantersand agriculturalofficialscreditedthe
POWs
with rescuing the cotton crop from ruin. After
the extension
agent in Coahoma
County,
declared
the 1944 harvest,
that the POWs
had
"done an excellentjob" pickingnearly twomillion pounds "thatother
wise might have rotted in the fields." Across
the river,Arkansas
Delta
plantersdeclared that"the prisonershave saved thecottoncrop."29
Even as plantersdescribed theirPOWs inheroic terms,theyopenly
questioned the patriotism,morality, and intelligenceof theirblack
neighbors.As an increasingnumberofAfricanAmericans abandoned
debt peonage forwage labor,cottonplanterssteppedup theircriticism.
Contributors
to the Delta
Farm Press regularly berated
their refusal to remain on the plantation. One
for being "lazy and wasteful"
and claimed
selves "unworthy to have good wages."
warned Delta
paper
even
scolded
them
that theywere proving them
The author of this advice column
blacks that "even Mrs. Roosevelt
with you." The
local blacks for
columnist
introduced
is getting out of patience
a section
targeted at African
Americanworkers entitled"The Colored People's Messenger." Under
thisbanner,white columnistsargued that local blacks were "helping
Hitler
and Tojo"
declared
by leaving
the editor, "You
the plantation.
"You
are not patriotic,"
are not a loyal citizen." The diatribe contin
ued. "If your husband or son is in the army and he comes home with one
leg or one
arm,"
the "Messenger"
warned,
"it may
have
been
your
fault."93O
Despite such threats,localwhite elites fullyrealized the importance
of black
labor to their continued
"The Negro must not be allowed
predominance
to leave
486
in the postwar world.
the Mississippi
Delta,"
de
2007
"NazisHoe Cotton"
clared JohnLynch fromGreenville.According to Lynch, the "Delta
economyhas alwaysbeen based upon theNegro and not cotton."Oth
ers agreed thatsouthernplantershad to finessethetransitiontomecha
nized farminginorder to retainblack laborersforthetimestheyneeded
them.
Warning that"mechanizedfarmingison theverge of depopulat
ing the Delta,"
Lynch argued
that planters and regional leaders had to
"coordinatethe inflowof industry
with therateof displacement."
Mod
ernizationof agriculture,
he advised,shouldonly takeplace when other
industriescould absorb a displaced and unskilledblack labor surplus.
The Delta
Farm Press assured
its readers that such a scheme would
not
underminewhite supremacy."While such a plan may work directly
towardeconomicequalitybetween races,"noted theeditor,"ithas noth
ing todo with social equality."The sluggish
modernizationof southern
agriculturehad allowed theDelta to retainpoor black workers,but
wartimeopportunitythreatenedto scatterthemacross thecountry.
Cot
ton planters,determined to continue theiroperations in the face of
wartime disruptions,continued to experiment
with new labor sources.
Nevertheless, visions of a pliable and predominantlyblack postwar
workforcepersisted.31
Emboldened by theirabilitytomanipulate federalagriculturalpoli
cies during thewar, cottonplanterscampaigned successfullyfora fed
eral ceilingon cotton-picking
wages for the1945 harvest.Planters jus
tifieda wage ceilingusing thesame rationalethathad deliveredover ten
thousand
war prisoners.They claimed thata severeshortageofworkers,
aggravatedby labor recruiters
and risingblackmobility,was thesource
of theirlaborwoes. They alsomaintained theneed tomodernize their
operations gradually. "Without a ceiling,"warned National Cotton
Council presidentandMississippi planterOscar Johnston,"wewill have
to rush intomechanization."Lamenting the trendtowardswage work,
Johnston
declared that"wemust protectourselvesagainstthelossof the
tenantsystemaltogether."
Although thousandsof POWs would remain
formonths after theGerman surrender,planters realized that their
captivework forcewas pickingon borrowed time.Cotton baronshoped
to counter the increasingassertivenessof STFU members who were
demandingasmuch as $3.50 per hundredpounds of cotton.During the
summerof 1945,Delta planters successfully
petitioned theUSDA to
appoint state wage
boards
thatwould
487
oversee hearings and elections
in
Fall
Agricultural History
each county regarding the proposed
pay cap. In the late summer, the
cotton countiesofMississippi and Arkansas establishedwage ceilings
hearingsand referendums.32
througha seriesof planter-dominated
Having devised theirplan fora postwarplantationeconomy,cotton
war prisonersto ease the transition.
planters looked to theirremaining
As
in Europe
the war
to a halt, a POW
ground
camp
inspector in the
Deep South reported that "the replacementof Prisoners ofWar in
... will constitute a real problem." He warned
agriculture
gration of workers now employed
that the "mi
inwar plants in the larger cities, back
... will be very slow" due to "harder work,
to farmwork
longer hours,
Arkansas Congress
and lesspay."Months aftertheGerman surrender,
man Ezekiel Chandler Gathings declared thathis Delta constituents
were "absolutelydependentupon the reliefthatcan be obtained from
prisoner-of-warlabor." In Mississippi, local agriculturalofficials la
the challenge
mented
of matching
cotton planters with a lim
desperate
"We have about as many
ited supply of war prisoners.
to pick cotton as we have prisoners," declared
prisoners
county agent. "Numbers
and numbers
prisoners more
than anybody
an exasperated
of farmers come
every day and others call us over the phone
for
applications
to the office
insisting that they need
they know." While
labor remained high, the war prisoner population
the demand
dwindled
the
for POW
in the post
war months.33
By the end of 1946, the last of the war prisoners had returned home.
with POW laborwas over. Furthermore,planter
The briefexperiment
through a wage
attempts to regain control over their workforce
ceiling
did not survivethepostwar transition.In 1947 PresidentTruman lifted
all wartime wage
controls. But
the fleeting nature of this episode
in
southernhistoryshouldnot obscure itsrelevance to thewider struggle
to sustain white supremacy
white
elites
in the Delta
in the postwar world. During World War
II
a variety of strategies
to
region employed
ensure theircontinuedcontrolover a largelyAfrican-Americanwork
force. Even
as planters adapted
to changing circumstances
to sustain profits and predominance,
notions
the POW
of race and place.
This
in an attempt
labor program
labor
chal
replacement
lenged
southern
scheme
reinforced the southern racial hierarchy even as it blurred
color line. German
workers were not the perfect placeholders
488
the
for rural
"NazisHoe Cotton"
2007
blacks,but theirpresence helped planters to retaina semblanceof an
increasingly
embattledand outmodedplantationsystem.
NOTES
1. The
to thank Glenda
author wishes
and J. Edwin
the memory
the POW
for her help in revising thismanuscript
of this project. The article is dedicated
to
"Nazis Hoe Cotton,"
is the title of an article profiling
Hendricks
of Samuel
Gilmore
for his encouragement
Lee Morgan.
in the South. See, "Nazis Hoe
farm labor program
Cotton,"
Business
Week,
June
19, 1943, 18.
2. P. F. Williams
Farmers'
and Harris
Union
Southern
Barnes
to L.
Historical
Papers,
of North Carolina,
University
Chapel Hill
Picked by Italian Pirsoners
[sic]," Memphis
3. Morton
I. Jones, Aug.
4, 1943, Southern Tenant
Louis
Round Wilson
Collection,
Library,
STFU
"Cotton May
be
(hereafter
Papers).
Commercial
Appeal,
June 25, 1943, 7-A.
Review
2:1
Stanford Humanities
in the cotton fields of the Ark-La-Miss
(1991): 38. The
of 11,500 war prisoners
Delta
region is
inArkansas, Merrill Pritchett and
compiled from several sources. In their study of POWs
William
Shea estimate that seven thousand men lived in the branch camps of the Arkansas
Sosna,
Dixie,"
"Stalag
estimate
Delta.
See, Merrill
1946," Arkansas
cotton workers
Pritchett
and William
in Arkansas,
1943
Shea, "The Afrika Korps
37
14.
The
estimate
of
three
thousand
Quarterly
(Spring 1978):
inMississippi
is a conservative
estimate that comes from the correspon
Historical
dence
of theWMC.
Conversation
Between Mr. Kvam and Mr.
See, Report of Telephone
and Mr. Willis Sloan, Region VII, Atlanta, Georgia,
June 21, 1944,
Gray inWashington
Box 1, Records
of the WMC,
and Records Ad
Entry 175, RG 211, National Archives
The tally of 1,500 cotton workers
in
Park, Md.
College
(hereafter NARA).
comes from data compiled by Matthew
northern Louisiana
J. Schott and Rosalind
Foley,
ministration,
Bayou Stalags: German Prisoners
Louisiana
Press, 1981), 5.
4. Pete
ofWar
in Louisiana
(Lafayette: University
of Southwest
to World War
Southern Reactions
II,"
Among
Strangers:
77
889.
Daniel
that
in this "transitional
argues
History
(Dec. 1990):
farmers experimented with a variety of labor arrangements
that
stage into mechanization,"
blended elements of the labor-intensive plantation
system with more modern
agricultural
Journal
Daniel,
"Going
of American
labor program, he notes, was a strategy used to "ease the perceived
The POW
of
rural
labor"
and hold down wages. "The obsession
for control," Daniel
argues,
shortage
a wide
"created
that in some cases blurred the line
spectrum of labor arrangements
practices.
between
slavery and freedom."
5. Sosna,
Farm
Labor
"Pick or Fight: The Emergency
60; Nan Elizabeth Woodruff,
"Stalag Dixie,"
in the Arkansas
and Mississippi
Deltas
II,"
Program
During World War
in the Deep
History 64 (Spring 1990): 74-85. Scholars of the POW experience
Agricultural
South during World
the rationale
War
II acknowledge
the protests of organized
labor yet they accept
was
of
workers
the
sole
farm
shortage
impetus for the POW
in America
See, Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners
of War
(New York:
that a wartime
labor program.
Stein and Day,
Shea on POWs
in
1979) and the articles by Merrill Pritchett and William
as well as
Arkansas
and Mississippi,
the aforementioned
inArkansas,"
"The Afrika Korps
"The Enemy
inMississippi
Journal of Mississippi
(1943-1946),"
History 41 (Nov. 1979):
489
Agricultural History
Fall
labor program, some historians of the region
dealing briefly with the POW
the question
of a labor shortage. Jeannie Whayne
that the war
argues
in the Arkansas
a severe labor shortage,
Delta
helped cotton planters weather
351-72. While
contextualize
prisoners
but notes
that "by its very existence
in a labor-scarce economy,
the POW
labor program
some landless farmers to move
farm wage rates and may have encouraged
to
in war industries." Jeannie M. Whayne,
A New Plantation
South: Land,
employment
and Federal
Favor
in Twentieth-Century
Arkansas
Labor,
(Charlottesville:
University
depressed
Press of Virginia,
1996), 223. See, also, James C. Cobb, The Most Southern Place on Earth:
The Mississippi
Delta
and the Roots of Regional
Identity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 199.
to Victor Rotnem, Aug.
12, 1943, STFU Papers
(microfilm edi
on
For
the
of
the
information
H. Grubbs, Cry From the
see, Donald
STFU,
tion).
origins
Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and theNew Deal
(Chapel Hill: University
6. Frank McCallister
of North Carolina
and
Life
Times
Press,
of H
in This Land: The
1971); H. L. Mitchell, Mean
Things Happening
L. Mitchell,
Co founder of the Southern Tenant Farmers'
Union
Osmun,
(Montclair, NJ: Allanheld,
1979).
7. In the late nineteenth century, Delta
immi
planters recruited hundreds of Chinese
as
laborers.
Most
of
those
who
remained
in
the
did
not
grants
agricultural
region, however,
in
work.
James
The
Chinese:
Between
Black
and
See,
Loewen,
stay
agricultural
Mississippi
White
ment
University Press, 1971). For more on the short-lived experi
see, Bertram Wyatt
Plantation,
immigrant labor at the Sunnyside
and Italian Peonage
in the Mis
Percy and Sunnyside: Planter Mentality
Harvard
(Cambridge:
with Italian
Brown,
"Leroy
in Shadows Over Sunnyside:
sissippi Delta,"
1945, ed. Jeannie M. Whayne
(Fayetteville:
An Arkansas
Plantation
in Transition,
of Arkansas
1830
77-94.
Press, 1993),
University
laborers had been brought
Early in 1944 the Delta Farm Press noted that, while Mexican
in to the area in past years, "No Mexican
labor is available
now." See, Clarksdale
(Miss.)
Delta Farm Press, Mar. 9, 1944. Nan Woodruff
notes that as many as ten thousand Mexi
cans worked
African
2003),
Views
inMississippi
during the war. Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, American Congo: The
American
Freedom
Struggle in the Delta
(Cambridge: Harvard
University Press,
to Bring in Bumper
and "Caddo
Citizens Express
207; "100,000 Needed
Crop"
on Jap Farmers," Shreveport
the introduction of bracero
labor
24. For a brief description of
Times, Aug. 1,1943,11,
into the Arkansas
Delta
in the immediate postwar
South,
period, see, Whayne, A New Plantation
Their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers
and
The Fruits of
Cindy Hahamovitch,
theMaking
of Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945
Press, 1997), 177.
of North Carolina
(Chapel Hill: University
8. P. F. Williams
to L.
and Harris Barnes
223-24;
I. Jones, Aug.
4, 1943, STFU
Papers.
9. Ibid.
10. Inspection Report: Camp McCain, Mississippi,
Box 2666, Records
July 20-21,1943,
of the Provost Marshal
General's
Office, Prisoner ofWar Division,
1941-1946, Entry 461,
RG
389, NARA,
1943;
to Clinton
p. 5; Mitchell
S. Golden,
11. F. W. Hunter
to Clinton
S. Golden,
to H.
to C. B. Baldwin,
June 29,1943;
July 30, 1943, STFU Papers.
L. Mitchell, Aug. 27, 1943, STFU
July 20, 1943, Box
3, Records
toMarvin
Papers;
of the WMC,
Jones, June 29,
Nelson
Cruikshank
Entry
11, RG
211,
NARA.
to Homer M. Adkins, Aug.
12. H. K. Thatcher
10,1943, Folder 91, Homer M. Adkins
Little Rock
to
Papers, Arkansas History Commission,
(hereafter Adkins Papers); Mitchell
Clinton S. Golden,
to
Charles
STFU
Mitchell,
July 30,1943;
McCoy
Papers.
July 3,1943,
490
"NazisHoe Cotton"
2007
13. Sosna,
in Pritchett
1943 quoted
Greenville
Papers;
"The Enemy
and Shea,
toMajor
M. Adkins
91, Adkins
1, 29, 1943; "War Prisoners
Register, Oct.
(Nov.
41, 61; Homer
"Stalag Dixie,"
20, 1943, Folder
van, Aug.
Can't
General
Delta
Oct.
Democrat-Times,
inMississippi,"
368-69;
Pick Cotton,"
Memphis
Clarksdale
8,
Daily
Farm Worker
3
1.
1943):
14. "War Prisoners
Pick Cotton,"
Can't
1.
of Telephone
Conversation
Between Mr. Kvam and Mr. Gray
ton and Mr. Willis Sloan, Region VII, Atlanta, Georgia,
June 21, 1944.
15. Report
16. Delta
More
War
for Farm Labor,"
Prisoner
inWashing
6, 1944.
Farm Press, Apr.
17. "War Prisoners
Need
Dono
Richard
Osceola
Osceola
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