Campaign Finance - Platte Institute

Platte
Institute
policy
STUDY
October 2012
Capitol Gains
A Review of Money in Campaigns
for the Nebraska Legislature
in the Term-Limits Era
Capitol Gains | Platte Institute Policy Study
Table of Contents
Section
Introduction
Page
Introduction
2
Campaign Disclosure
3
Findings
4
Incumbency Stifles Competition
5
Incumbency Diminishes Demand for
Individual Contributions
5
Individual Contributions Make a
Difference for Non-Incumbents,
But Impact Has Diminished
6
The Timing of Contributions Effects
Outcomes
6
Business-Affiliated PACS Are the Greatest
Contributors to Legislative Candidates
7
Business Contributions Are Diversified
Across Party Lines; Labor Contributions
Favor Democrats
7
The Influence of Out-of-State Business
Interests Is Exaggerated
7
Democrat Candidates Are Competitive
with Republican Candidates
7
Political Party Influence
8
PAC Independent Expenditures
Are Increasingly Prevalent
8
Most Negative Independent Expenditures
Come from the State Teachers' Union
9
Conclusions
Endnotes
9
10
This analysis of campaign spending in Nebraska Legislative
races is based on public information predominantly
gathered from mandatory disclosures made with the
Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission. The
data gathered and evaluated includes all legislative races
and related campaign financing for the 2006, 2008 and
2010 election cycles.
In the spring of 1992, then State Senator DiAnna Schimek
of Lincoln co-sponsored the Campaign Finance Limitation
Act (CFLA) introduced by Speaker of the Unicameral
Dennis Baack, transforming the way state political
campaigns would be conducted in Nebraska.1 The CFLA
was an attempt to limit contributions to and spending by
campaigns. According to Speaker Baack, the CFLA was
intended to provide limits on spending by candidates for
legislature and other “covered elective office” to encourage
competition by lowering the cost to mount a viable
campaign and limit reliance on large contributors.2 Indeed,
the Legislature’s findings explicitly state that “many
qualified candidates are excluded from the democratic
system as a result of such rising cost … and that the
utilization of public financing of campaigns is a
constitutionally permissible way in which to encourage
candidates to adopt voluntary spending limitations.”3
In addition to limits on contributions and spending the
CFLA also established a public funding mechanism.
Statutorily, any legislative candidate who abides by the
CFLA’s aggregate spending cap and is able to raise one
quarter of the cap is eligible to receive public funds equal to
the difference between the spending cap and his or her
opponent’s aggregate spending amount.4
The inclusion of public funding, arguably the most notable
provision of the CFLA, is now constitutionally suspect
because of a recent Supreme Court decision in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett.5 In Bennett, the
Court found matching fund provisions, like those found in
Nebraska’s CFLA, to pose a substantial imposition to the
political speech of privately-financed candidates.6 As a
result, both the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure
Commission and the Nebraska Secretary of State have
effectively suspended enforcement of the CFLA for the
2012 election period.7
2
Platte Institute Policy Study | Capitol Gains
This analysis explores the impacts of both the CFLA and
the constitutional amendment passed by Nebraska voters
in 2000 to adopt term-limits of two, four-year terms for
state senators. As a result, this analysis provides a reference
point to examine how the suspension of the CFLA’s
restraint will impact legislative campaigns and political
speech in future legislative races.
The institution of term-limits and the suspension of the
CFLA have resulted in various hypotheses and
assumptions about how campaigns for the Nebraska
Legislature will be waged and won.
Using the rationale of the Bennett decision, since the CFLA
does not factor independent expenditures into its spending
restrictions, its campaign contribution limits could result in
increased independent expenditures by third party groups
like labor unions, corporate separate segregated political
funds (PACs), and political parties. Moreover, if PACs and
political parties make more independent expenditures it is
possible that the content of those expenditures could be
increasingly negative and that the expenditures could be
timed to prevent rebuttal.
Analysis of public data from the Nebraska Accountability
and Disclosure Commission compiled from 2005 through
2010 leads to several key findings about the role of money
in legislative races in the period after the implementation of
term-limits and before the suspension of the CFLA.
1. Term-limits have not diminished financial support for
incumbents seeking their second term, despite
decreased contributions from individuals in nearly every
instance.
2. The majority of contributions received by incumbents
of both political parties are made by business-affiliated
PACs from within Nebraska.
3. Contributions made by labor-affiliated groups are
highly partisan.
4. A decrease in contributions from individuals in nonpresidential election cycles translates to diminished
influence of state political parties.
5. Independent expenditures by business and labor PACs
have increased each election cycle and are increasingly
negative.
6. Labor PACs spend significantly more on independent
expenditures than business PACs.
These findings paint a portrait of a political landscape in
Nebraska where individuals are less engaged in legislative
races, contributions heavily favor incumbency in spite of
term-limits, and races are increasingly influenced by thirdparty expenditures.
The evidence over the last three election cycles strongly
suggests that the objectives of the CFLA have not only
failed to be realized but also that the CFLA has contributed
to the “problems” it was designed to curtail. Campaigns
waged for a political position that pays $12,000 annually
have not experienced any significant increase in the ability
of challengers to adequately compete with incumbents, nor
have such campaigns required less money to be waged, nor
have such campaigns become less reliant on large donors.
Rather, it appears, that the opposite is now even more
prevalent than it may have been two decades ago and that
the most significant determinate of a competitive race for
legislature is whether or not the incumbent has any
reelection opportunity for a second term. From the analysis
below, in addition to being unconstitutional, it appears that
the CFLA is also a misguided effort to regulate the
marketplace of political speech that is ultimately not only
ineffectual but also wrong-headed and counterproductive.
Campaign Disclosure
The Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act
(the Act) of 1976, is divided into three separate areas:
campaign financing, lobbying, and public sector conflicts of
interest. Analysis of campaign finance in this paper is heavily
reliant on information from the Nebraska Accountability
and Disclosure Commission in the campaign financing area.
The Act requires candidate committees with aggregate
receipts and expenditures of $5,000 or more to report all
contributions in excess of $250, including details about the
source of the contribution. Under Nebraska law, there is no
limit on contributions from a single source. The CFLA did
impose limits on corporate, business and PAC
contributions but since it is not being enforced due to
constitutional questions, there is effectively no limit on
contributions from corporations, partnerships, PACs, or
labor unions in 2012.
The Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act
requires reports to be filed by political parties, independent
committees, out-of-state contributors, PACs, corporations,
3
Capitol Gains | Platte Institute Policy Study
independent expenditure “late” if it falls within
either of these two time periods, regardless of
the amount spent. Because some contributions
are made following the general election to the
winners of a given race simply due to the
candidate winning, effort has been made to
delineate between late contributions meant to
influence the outcome of the election and
contributions made due to victory or to retire
campaign debt.
unions and other associations. Committees must report
whether they support or oppose a candidate and delineate
which candidate each expenditure was made for or against.
These reporting requirements create a decent record of
contributions made to or on behalf of a candidate.
This study reviews the filings of 133 candidate committees
for office of state senator on the general election ballot, 107
PACs registered with the Nebraska Accountability and
Disclosure Commission, and state and local political
parties. The filings of candidates who did not advance
beyond the primary election cycle are beyond the scope of
this study. Campaign statements were analyzed for the
three legislative election periods between 2005 and 2010.8
This study does not take into account money received by
incumbents in years prior to these election cycles.
Discussion of money in politics is a challenge due to the
varying ways committees report contributions. For the
purposes of this study, all contributions received by a
candidate committee that are not attributable to a
corporation, union, separate segregated political fund
(PAC), other candidate committee, or political party, are
deemed individual contributions. These individual
contributions could be in the form of loans or donations
from individuals, loans or donations from the candidate, or
“in-kind” contributions. Individual money is distinct from
contributions, in-kind donations, and independent
expenditures made by any entity that is not an individual.
This study examines not only the amount, but also the
timing and type of contributions and independent
expenditures to review how expenditures are made during
the weeks immediately prior to an election. A “late”
contribution or expenditure occurs within the two weeks
prior to the election through the end of the calendar year.
Unlike the Act, this study deems a contribution or
4
These delineations are intended to identify
the source of negative campaigning. A determination of
whether an independent expenditure is “negative” is based
on whether the PAC, union, or corporation making the
independent expenditure states that the expenditure is
made in opposition to a given candidate on its “B-4” form at
the Commission. This study also attempts to differentiate
between sources affiliated with business interests and those
affiliated with labor interests. To safeguard accuracy,
entities that either have no such affiliation, those that have
an approximately equal proportion of both “labor” and
“business” clients, or candidate committees regardless of
political affiliation, are not labeled as either “labor” or
“business.”
Findings
Contributions to Nebraska's legislative races have
fluctuated over the past three election periods. In 2008,
total campaign spending hit a high of over $3.6 million, up
nearly half a million dollars from 2006. In 2010 spending
declined to just over $2.1 million. The downward spending
on legislative campaigns is attributable to a drop in
spending by individuals from approximately $1.4 million in
2008 to just over $600,000 in 2010. The 2006 and 2008
election periods exhibited individual contributions that
were competitive with contributions made by nonindividuals such as corporations, unions, and political
action committees. One contributing factor is likely the
fewer number of competitive legislative races. When termlimits first took effect in 2006, twenty-one of the twentyfour legislative seats up for election had no incumbent and
only one was uncontested. In 2010, of those same twentyfour legislative districts, fifteen were contested and only
three were without an incumbent candidate.
Platte Institute Policy Study | Capitol Gains
Incumbency Stifles Competition
It is difficult for challengers to raise funds against
incumbents. Only during the 2008 calendar year did total
contributions directed to challengers by organizations
exceed that provided to incumbents, and only by a ten
percent margin.9 Individual spending on challengers
exceeded incumbents during 2008 and 2010, but at a
negligible margin and, in 2010, not nearly enough to
overcome organizational contributions to candidates.10
This disparity between incumbent and challenger
fundraising ability is perhaps best illustrated in the fact that
of the twenty contested races in which an incumbent was
challenged, only Susan Scott in 2007 (who ran against a
gubernatorial appointee versus someone elected on the
ballot) and former State Senator Thomas Baker in 2009
were able to raise contributions from any source in the first
year of their election periods, and neither exceeded
$12,000.11 Moreover, Baker was the only candidate to gross
more contributions than his incumbent opponent, Sen.
Mark Christensen of Imperial, in any election period.12
The overwhelming financial advantage enjoyed by
incumbents is a leading reason why there have been only
three successful attempts to unseat an incumbent recently:
Scott Price in 2008, and Lydia Brasch and Tyson Larson in
2010. As noted below, Price's win over Gail Kopplin in
2008 can be attributed, in part, to an advantage in support
from individuals, business interests, and expenditures made
by the Nebraska Republican Party. Senator Brasch did not
have the advantage of greater support from individuals or
business interests in her successful bid to oust Kent Rogert
but did have an advantage in independent expenditures
from the Republican Party and like-minded independent
expenditure committees, such as Nebraskans for Fiscal
Accountability.13 Senator Larson, in facing fellow
Republican, Cap Dierks of Ewing, was not a beneficiary of
political party expenditures but did garner an advantage
over Dierks in contributions from business entities.
Incumbency Diminishes Demand
for Individual Contributions
When term-limits were implemented, total individual
contributions to legislative candidates reached $285,000 in
2005 and nearly $1 million in 2006.14 Among winning
candidates in open races in 2006 the average total
contributions from individuals was approximately $33,000
per candidate. The average total individual contribution to
those same candidates when they ran as incumbents in
2010 was just 35 percent of what was four years earlier.15
This decrease in individual contributions is most apparent
in the filings for the year prior to the general election year.
At the start of 2006, candidates who would ultimately win
their elections saw their contributions from individual
donors average just under $10,000. Those same
candidates showed average individual contributions for
2009 of just one-third of that amount.
By contrast, the average amount for contributions to
these incumbents in 2010 from PACs, corporations,
unions, and other organizational contributors increased
over three times from the average contribution in 2006.
Interestingly, this dramatic difference in organizational
contributions does not persist throughout the election
period in that such contributions, on average, are only
sprinkled through the general election year. The result is
that the average organizational contribution to
incumbents in 2010, just over $35,000, is nearly identical
to that when they ran in 2006.16 These figures may be
explained, at least in part, from an offset of funds created
by an increase in business entity contributions and a
corresponding decrease in labor interest contributions, a
topic to be examined further.17
Senator Annette Dubas of Fullerton exemplifies both
individual versus organizational contributions and labor
versus business contributions as she moved from openseat candidate to incumbent. Dubas entered the 2006
5
Capitol Gains | Platte Institute Policy Study
election with over $10,000 in individual contributions and
no organizational contributions and ended the cycle with
approximately $15,000 more from individual
contributions than from organizations. As an incumbent,
however, Senator Dubas raised over $12,000 from
organizational contributors entering into her re-election
campaign. Senator Dubas completed the 2010 election
with less than $19,000 in individual contributions and over
$41,000 in contributions from third-parties. Likewise,
Senator Dubas received substantial assistance from
organized labor when first seeking office in 2006 and
relatively little from business interests. In 2010, however,
her contributions from business entities totaled nearly
$29,000, while labor contributions dwindled to
approximately a third of her total from her first
campaign.18
Individual Contributions Make a Difference for
Non-Incumbents, But Impact Has Diminished
Contributions from individual donors are critical for nonincumbents in open races. Of the thirty-nine open races
from 2006 through 2010, winning candidates out-raised
their opponents in individual contributions twenty-eight
times. The importance of individual contributions is
particularly clear for non-incumbent candidates who
faced a general election opponent registered with the
opposing political party.19 In 2006, six candidates won
election to the unicameral despite less contributions and
independent expenditures than their opponents.20 Four of
those races were between candidates of opposing parties,
and in each case the candidate with greater monetary
support from individuals was the winner.21 In 2008, two
victorious candidates, Scott Price and Bob Giese, held the
individual contributions advantage over their betterfunded opponents. However, Price and Giese were only
two of the five under-funded candidates that prevailed in
6
2008.22 In 2010, despite five successful underdogs, only
one, Jim Smith of Papillion, held an individual
contribution advantage.23
The 2008 challenger, Senator Scott Price of Legislative
District 3 in Sarpy County, managed an $8,000 advantage
in individual contributions against his incumbent rival,
former Senator Gail Kopplin, despite Kopplin's nearly
$20,000 overall advantage over Price. A former schooladministrator, Kopplin received considerable support,
over $28,000, from the Nebraska’s teachers’ union as well
as lobbying and PAC money typically given to
incumbents.24 The vast majority, 95 percent, of the
support Kopplin received from the NSEA's PAC was in
the form of independent expenditures supportive of
Kopplin with approximately one-third of those
expenditures occurring within the last two weeks of the
election.25 Price, however, garnered more contributions
from individuals and business-affiliated PACs, and was the
beneficiary of more independent expenditures opposing
Kopplin from the state’s Republican party.26 Although
significant, Price’s advantage in individual contributions
likely did not determine the outcome of the race. The
Price-Kopplin contest is notable not only because a
challenger defeated an incumbent, but also because it is
indicative of several recurring themes, particularly the
partisan nature of support from labor organizations, the
role of party expenditures in the 2008 cycle, and the
degree of influence of PACs.
The Timing of Contributions Effects Outcomes
In the fifty-nine competitive races during the term-limits
era, the candidate who raised more money over the course
of the election period won 81 percent of the time. Those
candidates who raised more than their opponents during
the period from the beginning of the election year through
the primary or from the beginning of the election year to
submission of the second general election statement won
68 percent of the races. Yet those candidates who raised
more than their opponents in the first year of the election
period—the “run-up” year—secured victory at a rate of
nearly 80 percent. This suggests candidates with a “war
chest” at the beginning of the election year, historically
incumbents, have an advantage and late contributions have
less of an impact. Late independent expenditures, however,
appear more significant.
Platte Institute Policy Study | Capitol Gains
average contributions by labor interests per Democrat
candidate were nearly five times greater than the average
received by Republican candidates in 2006 and nearly ten
times greater in 2010. Labor contributions in 2008 showed a
Democrat advantage less than twice that of Republican
contributions, however, that cycle can be largely attributed to
significant labor-affiliated contributions made to Republican
candidate Carl Lorenzen in his race against Republican
Business-Affiliated PACS Are the Greatest
Contributors to Legislative Candidates
Over the course of the term-limits era, the total itemized
contributions to legislative candidates from non-individual
sources is nearly $3.5 million, just slightly more than the
aggregate contributions from individual donors. Business
entities have contributed the bulk of these campaign dollars
with a total of over $2.6 million over the course of three
election cycles, and reports reveal nearly three-quarters of
these contributions are made by business-affiliated PACs.
In contrast, direct contributions from Nebraska
corporations and small businesses to legislative candidates
comprise less than half a million dollars.27 Despite multiple
PACs affiliated with business interests and new PACs each
cycle, approximately half of contributions made by business
PACs are from six long-established business PACs that
clearly favor incumbents.28
Business Contributions Are Diversified Across Party
Lines; Labor Contributions Favor Democrats
Although business-interest contributions comprise a
majority of overall campaign dollars from non-individuals,
the recipients of business money are not monolithic in terms
of party affiliation. Average contributions by business
interests per Republican candidate were approximately twice
that received per Democrat candidate in 2006, only onethird greater in 2008, and actually showed a significant
advantage for Democrat candidates in 2010. In contrast,
gubernatorial appointee Sen. Scott Lautenbaugh.29 Data
suggests a political bias for Democrats by labor, while
business-affiliated contributions favor incumbents regardless
of party affiliation. In both 2008 and 2010, both with greater
numbers of incumbents than 2006, the average business
contribution to incumbent candidates, regardless of political
affiliation, was greater than that of the average contribution
to either Democrats or Republicans.
The Influence of Out-of-State Business
Interests Is Exaggerated
The bulk of non-individual contributions originate from
corporations and business-affiliated PACs, but not by
national corporate interests. Although contributions from
outside corporate interests increased 27 percent from 2006
to 2010, these contributions made up less than 12 percent
of all business-affiliated contributions.The influence of
outside corporate interests on legislative campaigns is
approximate to the influence of outside labor interests in
contributions—around 8 percent.
Democrat Candidates Are Competitive
with Republican Candidates
The disparity in contributions between business and labor
donors to Republican and Democrat candidates creates
parity in the total non-individual contributions of
Republicans and Democrats. In 2006, the average total
non-individual contribution to a Republican candidate was
less than $1,000 more than the average total non-individual
7
Capitol Gains | Platte Institute Policy Study
contribution to a Democrat candidate.30 In 2008, the
margin increased for Republican candidates to just over
$3,000. In 2010, the average total non-individual
contribution added up in favor of Democrat candidates to
nearly double that received by Republican candidates.
Total contributions from both individuals and nonindividuals were roughly parallel in both 2006 and 2008,
with Republicans averaging just slightly more total
contributions. With the previously noted decline in
individual contributions in 2010, average total
contributions favored the incumbent Democrats who had
first won office in 2006.31
$147,000 and Republicans spending over $196,000 on
negative independent expenditures.
In 2008, Republicans spent over $56,000 against Rex
Moats, and Democrats spent nearly $30,000 against
Republican James Jeffers – both efforts were rewarded
with Sen. Beau McCoy defeating Moats and Sen. Ken
Haar defeating Jeffers by a mere twenty votes.33
Democrats continued directing expenditures into
negative messages in 2010. However, the total
expenditures by Democratic sources was less than
$18,000. Republican independent expenditures also
decreased in 2010, but the amount spent on supportive
advertising nearly doubled from 2008 to 2010.
PAC Independent Expenditures
Are Increasingly Prevalent
Political Party Influence
The influence of political parties on legislative races has
fluctuated over the last six years. Over the course of all
three cycles, direct contributions from political parties
totaled less than $14,000. In 2006, independent
expenditures by the Nebraska Republican Party were
nearly ten times more than the expenditures made by
Nebraska Democrat Party.32 In 2008, Republican
independent expenditures remained constant, but
Democrats significantly increased expenditures. In 2010
expenditures by both parties decreased significantly, with
Republican and Democrat expenditures falling below
2006 levels.
Also of note is the changing nature of partisan
expenditures. In 2006, the GOP spent almost double on
positive expenditures supporting GOP candidates than
on negative expenditures against Democratic candidates;
in the same year, Democrat expenditures were 90 percent
supportive of Democratic candidates and only ten
percent negative against Republicans. In 2008, both
parties spent approximately the same amount on positive
expenditures but the level of negative advertising rose to
unprecedented levels with Democrats spending over
8
Independent expenditures have increased during the
term-limits era by both business and labor. In 2006,
business-affiliated independent expenditures totaled over
$85,000, increasing to nearly $167,000 in 2008, and
remaining at just under $120,000 in 2010. Labor-affiliated
independent expenditures have outpaced business
sources during each cycle, with labor spending over
$137,000 in 2006, nearly $185,000 in 2008, and over
$215,000 in 2010.
Platte Institute Policy Study | Capitol Gains
funding Nebraskans for Responsible Government’s negative
advertising efforts, the NSEA PAC also spends more than
any other PAC on supportive expenditures. It appears
negative expenditures may have had some effect over the
outcome of two of the four legislative races that Nebraskans
for Responsible Government contributed to in 2010.35
Conclusions
Most Negative Independent Expenditures
Come from the State Teachers' Union
A trend has emerged of greater negativity in expenditures by
PACs, particularly those PACs affiliated with labor interests.
In 2006, labor PACs outspent business PACs on
independent expenditures by over $50,000, with no
expenditures made in opposition to a candidate. But in
2010, negative expenditures from labor PACs skyrocketed
to $107,500, constituting half of total labor expenditures.
Negative expenditures by business PACs totaled $19,737,
less than one fifth of labor in 2010. These negative
expenditures are increasingly made the two weeks prior to
the general election. The only source of negative
expenditures from labor affiliated PACs in 2008 and 2010
was Nebraskans for Responsible Government. This PAC is
funded primarily by the Nebraska State Education
Association (NSEA) PAC, the Nebraska Trial Lawyers
Association, and the Teamsters' Union's state PAC (NE
State Transportation Political Education) which received
over $142,000 for the 2010 election cycle.34 In addition to
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s finding that the state’s
campaign finance law is unconstitutional will likely result in
more corporate and union contributions and expenditures
being made earlier in the campaign cycle. However, because
incumbency seems to be the primary driver of fundraising
success and third-party support, the chance that the political
landscape will experience a notable change is low. No
pervasive relationship can be established between the CFLA
and the incidence of independent expenditures, but if trends
continue, independent expenditures are likely to continue to
increase and be negative. Business and labor contributions
are likely to fluctuate based on the number of open seats, but
the reality is that business interests heavily favor incumbents
and labor interests heavily favor Democrats.
The CFLA should be viewed not in light of what it was
intended to accomplish, but rather in light of the fact that
its misguided regulation accomplished little more than
adding bureaucracy.
The CFLA didn’t create electoral competition when only
three challengers in six years were successful. The CFLA
didn’t diminish the importance of large contributors when
individual contributions trailed off as PAC expenditures
increased. The CFLA didn’t lower the cost of waging a
campaign, in fact, the cost increased each election cycle.
In short, the CFLA was both unconstitutional in its
restraint on political speech and unsuccessful in its quest to
level the electoral playing field.
As lawmakers undoubtedly will review the law and consider
alternatives, they should note that while its reporting
requirements increased transparency – the other tenants of
CFLA resoundingly failed.
In Nebraska it appears that retail politicking has real
importance, out-of-state financial influence is relatively
minimal, and the individual contributor’s dollar can prove
influential. State campaigns, like financial markets, function
best when not overly regulated.
9
Capitol Gains | Platte Institute Policy Study
1
See, LB556, 92nd Legislature , 2nd Session (1992).
19 The forty-nine senators that comprise the unicameral legislature are
officially non-partisan. A general election ballot for legislature thus may
have two candidates from the same party.
2
See, Nebraska Attorney General Opinion 11003, issued August 17, 2011,
Page 5, citing Committee Records on LB 556, 92nd Leg. , 1stSess. ,
(Introducer’s Statement of Intent) (February14, 1991).
20 Senator Steve Lathrop (LD12), Senator Amanda McGill (LD26), Senator
Bill Avery (LD28), Senator Annette Dubas (34), Senator Tom Carlson
(LD38), Senator Tom Hansen (LD42).
3
See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-1602(1).
21 Senator Steve Lathrop, Senator Amanda McGill, Senator Bill Avery,
Senator Annette Dubas.
4
See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-1604 through 32-1606.
5
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 2818
(2011).
6
Id., at 2823.
7
See Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission, “Important
Information for 2012 Election Candidates About the Campaign Finance
Limitation Act.” August 30, 2011,
http://nadc.nol.org/pdf/CFLACandidateLtrAug11.pdf
Endnotes
8
See, Neb. Rev. Stat. 49-1455(2); Neb.Rev.Stat.32-1603(1)(a).
9
In 2008, the total contributions to candidates challenging an incumbent
was $230,813.30, whereas the total contributions to incumbents in 2008
was $209,999.55.
10 Individual contributions to candidates challenging an incumbent totaled
$111,445.10 and $170,445.24 in 2008 and 2010, respectively.
Contributions from non-individuals to incumbents in 2010 was
$340,095.80 and far exceeded the $154,493.63 contributed by individuals
to incumbents in 2010.
11 Baker for Legislature committee reported a total of $1,240 in contributions
for 2009. Susan Scott for Legislature committee reported $10,385 in total
contributions for 2007.
12 Total reported contributions for the 2010 election period for Baker for
Legislature committee was $81,252.68, whereas the total reported
contributions for the 2010 election period for the Mark Christensen for
Legislature committee was $57,731.46.
13 Lydia Brasch received a total of $44,621.95 in both supportive and
negative independent expenditures from Nebraskans for Fiscal
Accountability. Kent Rogert received a total of $43,592.26 in both
supportive and negative independent expenditures from Nebraskans for
Responsible Government and the Nebraska State Education Association
PAC.
14 Aggregate spending by individual donors to candidates running without an
incumbent was $285,801.22 in 2005, and totaled $966,007.61 in 2006.
15 Average contributions by individual donors to incumbent senators in 2010
was $11,670.63. Average contribution by individual donors to the same
candidate in 2006 was $32,920.84.
16 Average contribution from non-individual donors for the election period
of 2009-2010 was $34,922.30. Average contribution from non-individual
donors for the election period of 2005-2006 was $34,305.11. Average
donation from non-individuals for 2009 was $13,516.34, while the same
was $3,697.28 in 2005.
17 Business interest contributions for incumbents in 2010 averaged
$25,017.02 per candidate and averaged $22,574.31 in 2006, whereas labor
interest contributions for candidates in 2006 averaged $8,108.91 and
decreased to $5,494.56 in 2010. Total non-individual reported
contributions averaged $31,609.64 in 2006 and remained steady at
$31,085.71 in 2010.
18 Senator Annette Dubas raised $20,850 from labor interests in 2006 and
only $7,600 in 2010. Her contributions from business interests increased
from $5,013.15 in 2006 to $28,933.28 in 2010.
10
22 Senator Tanya Cook (LD13), Senator Ken Haar (LD21), Senator Colby
Coash (LD27).
23 Senator Jim Smith, Senator Paul Schumacher, Senator Lydia Brasch,
Senator Tyson Larsen, Senator Mark Christensen.
24 The Nebraska State Education Association reported $28,394.12 in support
of the Kopplin for Legislature committee in 2008.
25 Independent expenditures by the NSEA PAC in support of Kopplin for
Legislature amounted to $26,878.93 with $8,956.22 in independent
expenditures in the final two weeks of the general election.
26 The Nebraska Republican Party reported $31,972.89 in independent
expenditures opposing the Kopplin for Legislature committee in 2008.
27 Total contributions by businesses with situs in Nebraska to candidates
reviewed in this analysis was $405,877 from 2005 through 2010.
28 Total aggregate contributions from: AGC (Highway Improvement) PAC,
NE Bankers State PAC, NE Chamber of Commerce and Industry PAC,
Nebraska Farm Bureau PAC, Nebraska Realtors PAC, and the
NEBRASKA PAC, totaled $1,489,368 and comprises contributions made
to candidates who both were and were not listed on a general election
ballot in 2006, 2008, or 2010.
29 In 2008, labor-affiliated contributions to the Lorenzen 2008 committee
totaled $23,950 or approximately 8 percent of the total for such
contributions during the 2008 election period. Labor contributions to
republican Carl Lorenzen in 2008 were only surpassed by contributions to
democrats Jerry Joy and Robert Giese.
30 The average aggregate non-individual contribution amount to democratic
candidates was $28,591.24, whereas the average aggregate non-individual
contribution amount to republican candidates was $29,449.48.
31 In 2010 the average aggregate non-individual contribution amount to
democratic candidates was $43,070.24, whereas the average aggregate
non-individual contribution amount to republican candidates was
$24,223.63.
32 Republican party independent expenditures totaled $256,154.11 in 2006.
Democratic party independent expenditures totaled $26,873.44 in 2006.
33 James Arthur Jeffers' total combined contributions in 2008 equaled
$132,527.76 to Ken Haar's combined contributions of $87,433.22. The
final vote count was Haar (7806) to Jeffers (7786).
34 See B-4 Campaign Statement of Nebraskans for Responsible Government,
February 11, 2011.
http://nadc.nol.org/ccdb/search.cgi?page=formb4&IDNO=06IRC0047
5&OFFREC=02/01/2011.
35 In 2010 Nebraskans for Responsible Government expended the following
amounts in opposition to the opponents of: Teresa Whitehead ($27,325
against Sen. Jim Smith); fmr. Sen. Kent Rogert ($26,719 against Sen. Lydia
Brasch); Sen. Norm Wallman ($28,329 against John Knabe); and Sen.
Danielle Conrad ($25,125 against Chad Wright).
Platte Institute Policy Study | Capitol Gains
The Platte Institute for Economic Research: Leading the Way
Our Mission: Advance public policy alternatives that foster limited government, personal responsibility and free enterprise
in Nebraska. By conducting vital research and publishing timely reports, briefings, and other material, the Platte Institute
will assist policy makers, the media and the general public in gaining insight to time-proven free market ideas.
Platte Institute Board of Directors:
Pete Ricketts
Director and president of
Platte Institute. He is the
founder of Drakon, LLC,
an asset management
company in Omaha,
Nebraska. He is also a
member of the TD
Ameritrade Board of
Directors. Pete serves on
the board of the Chicago
Cub’s baseball team.
Gail WernerRobertson
Warren
Arganbright
Director and prominent
Omaha businesswoman
and philanthropist.
Director and noted northcentral Nebraska lawyer
and water resources
activist. He has practiced
throughout Nebraska
and South Dakota and has
represented the Niobrara
Council since its creation.
Michael Groene
Travis Hiner
Director and farm
equipment sales
representative. He is
co-founder of the
Western Nebraska
Taxpayers Association.
Former president and
chairman of Hiner
Implement, Inc., and
president/chairman of
Hiner Lease Company.
He has served as a board
member of the Kosman
Banking Family since
1990 (now Platte Valley
Companies).
Executive
Director:
Jeff Dinklage
Owner and operator of
Herman Dinklage, Inc.
A 4th-generation cattle
feeder, he served on the
Nebraska Cattle Board for
four years and was a bank
director for 20 years. He is
also an avid Husker fan
and enjoys flying.
John S.
McCollister
He recently capped a
35-year career with
McCollister & Co. and
served five terms on the
publically elected
Metropolitan Utilities
District Board of
Directors.
900 South 74th Plaza
Suite 400
Omaha, NE 68114
402.452.3737
www.platteinstitute.org
A non-profit foundation,
the Platte Institute relies
on the resources and
innovative thinking of
individuals who share a
commitment to liberty and
the best possible quality
of life for Nebraskans.
11
www.platteinstitute.org