hate crime and radicalisation

Transcription

REPORT 08
Hate Crime and Radicalisation
the German political experience and the Schellenberg Report
HATE CRIME AND RADICALISATION | THE GERMAN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE and the schellenberg report
Hate Crime and Radicalisation:
the German political experience
and the Schellenberg Report
Harald Weilnböck
November 2012
The Challenge Hate Crime project was financed by
the European Union’s Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III)
managed by the Special EU Programmes Body
Number 8 of 12
[email protected]
Harald Weilnböck’s areas of scientific expertise (PD/ Prof., Ph.D.) are culture/
media studies, social research, qualitative psychology, psychotherapy research and
interdisciplinary narratology. Harald Weilböck’s works as researcher, psychotherapist
and deradicalisation practitioner in prison and community contexts. He conducted
various EU research projects in this area and presently co-leads the EU Working
Group ‘Firstline deradicalisation interventions/ practitioners’ within the European
‘Radicalisation Awareness Network’ (RAN, Brussels/ EC DG Home Affairs).
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in these documents
do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission,
the Special EU Programmes Body, NIPS or NIACRO
Re-use of material:
Material may be re-used with acknowledgement of the source
ISBN: 978-1-909519-06-0
Contents
A
Some observations on party-political discourses ....................................... Party-political discourse on extremism in Germany.............................. The invention of “left-wing violent extremism” a discourse ................... deflecting from neo-Nazi extremism?
The discourse of the “New Bourgeoisie” ............................................. and its political consequences
Do we need “political discourse responsibility”? .................................. Comparing the Danish context
Is there such a thing as an “extremist anti hate crime facilitator?.......... In the shadow of political discourses that deny ................................... right-wing extremism – hatred and terror
Xenophobic murders and denial discourses: ....................................... twins of right-wing extremism in a society?
Party-political discourses are indispensable ........................................ – their quality and resilience are key
The example of Northern Ireland: the “Challenge Hate Crime” .............. project and the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network
B
The Schellenberg report on right-wing extremism and violence .................. Overview............................................................................................. The history and structure of the radical right ........................................... History........................................................................................... Actors of the far right and extremist right (1990 – 2008)...................... Local elections................................................................................ Subcultural milieu........................................................................... Dress codes and labels..................................................................... “Free comradeships” and “action alliances” ........................................ as forms of social interaction a focus on Saxony
Demographic structure of the voters and supporters.................................. - potential right-wing extremists - crimes and acts of violence
Activists and voters......................................................................... Potential right-wing extremists.......................................................... Crimes and acts of violence.............................................................. Political key topics – leitmotivs/topics within extremist right-wing ............... arguments – enemy images - political objectives – society’s perception
- to be reckoned with in any civic education setting
Concepts/images of the enemy......................................................... Right-wing radicals’ objectives.......................................................... Society’s perception of the radical right.............................................. Socio-political environment – widespread ethnic stereotypes, . ................... political fears and prejudices. A constant challenge for countering
hate crime and violent extremism
Some preliminary observations and conclusions . ................................ on the current situation with right-wing extremism
Shortcomings in data collection and monitoring - the current state ............. of data concerning the radical right in Germany
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Jurisdiction and law enforcement – legal strategies against ........................ the radical right
Basic Law and the German penal code............................................... Jurisdiction..................................................................................... The recording of criminal and unconstitutional acts ............................. – politically motivated crimes
Further relevant legislation............................................................... Protection from discrimination........................................................... Help for victims............................................................................... Legal pushes to ban the right-wing extremist NPD............................... Removing state support from radical right-wing organizations............... Increasing penalties for hate crimes................................................... The influence of EU regulations......................................................... Importance of national legislation...................................................... Effectiveness problems for the judiciary.............................................. Good practice in legislature and administration – strategic shortcomings ..... – proven measures in legislature – and strategic outlook
Good practice in legislature and administration.................................... Strategic shortcomings.................................................................... Proven measures............................................................................. • Judiciary.................................................................................... • Police........................................................................................ • Prison service............................................................................. Strategic outlook.................................................................................. Political actors, political institutions and Federal ministries ......................... in combating extremism - institutional responsibilities and
programs - ministries of the interior – successes and obstacles
Responsibility for federal programs.................................................... Subordinate authorities.................................................................... Higher-ranking state institutions........................................................ Successes and obstacles in countering right-wing extremism................. Further references on the political interaction with the radical right.............. Summary: good practice, shortcomings and strategic ............................... Outlook for institutional and political initiatives of Countering
(right-wing) extremism – according to Schellenberg’s report
Good practice................................................................................. Shortcomings................................................................................. Measures still lacking....................................................................... Program shortcomings..................................................................... Basic conditions to reflect on............................................................ Summary....................................................................................... Civic society – organizations and civic engagement.................................... 34
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A Some observations on the importance of party-political and media
discourses on issues of extremism:
The example of Germany and the need to address violent extremism
both on the level of social interventions and political (media)
discourses.
The relevance which the Challenge Hate Crime project (CHC) has for any future
initiative of preventing violent extremism in Europe cannot be overestimated. The CHC
project has been unique in Europe so far in approaching issues of hate crime on two
crucial levels simultaneously: (i) on the level of specialized social work interventions in
prison and community with offenders and at-risk young people – regarding sectarian
hate crime in particular – and (ii) on the level of the public discourses on sectarianism
and hate crime issues as they appear, most prominently, in political parties’
statements and in the media. Dealing with these two sides of the issue in tandem has
proven to be of crucial importance since areas of analysis, intervention and capacity
building are very much interconnected and cross-influence each other in many ways.
What is said about violent extremism by the political leaders, in media discourses,
any by the public authorities of a country – and how issues of hate crime and human
rights violations are dealt with in public speech – have often proven to be essential.
These discourses immediately affect any intervention programmes that attempt to
reduce hate crime and extremism on the ground. Moreover, they directly influence the
amount and degree of hate crime incidents that actually occur in a society. Above all,
however, political and media discourse directly influence actual policy making about
issues of prevention and intervention against hate crime and violent extremism.
Hence, we need to understand: acts of hate crime and violent extremism, while
they are perpetrated only by few, are a systemic phenomenon. They always affect
the whole of society in a much more direct and intense manner than any other sort
of crime does. Hate crime, thus, is interconnected with many sectors and actors of
a society – and many sectors and actors have to come together and contribute in
order to achieve sustainable successes in reducing extremism and radicalisation and
strengthening civil society’s resilience.
Hence, the results of the CHC project have powerfully underlined that any European
initiative on Radicalisation Awareness needs to take into account the key importance
that party-political and media discourses have for any initiative on the ground
that attempts to promote hate crime awareness and build resilient societies. In
particular, the CHC project’s cooperation with the Radicalisation Awareness Network
(EU Brussels, Home Affairs) – and its Working Group on ‘Firstline Deradicalisation’
– has made it evident: any given country that sets out to develop a programme of
preventing violent extremism, recruitment and hate crime, needs to address these
two aspects – developing/ implementing deradicalisation methods on the one hand
and addressing political and media discourses about issues of extremism on the other
– in tandem and concurrently.
In the face of this overall insight it proved particularly important to recognize the fact
that governments, party politicians and the media of most European countries are
reluctant to address issues of extremism, hostility, and hate crime in a clear, rational,
unambiguous, bi-partisan and self-aware manner. Moreover, governments and political
parties have the tendency to actively deny or downplay incidents of hate crime and
extremism, in particular if nationalist and right-wing extremism and xenophobic,
ethnic and gender related hate crime are at stake (except maybe acts with an Islamist
background that tend to be highlighted by the media). This has always been the case
– not only in Germany and Northern Ireland but throughout most Western countries/
cultures.
Hence, denial of hate crime through public and media discourses will remain a major
focus of concern for anyone who sets out to reduce the level of violent extremism
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and build societies that are resilient and conscious of the key importance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Hence, whoever has the ambition to promote a
sustainable national strategy to counter violent political and religious extremism will
have to make sure – like the Northern Ireland Challenge Hate Crime project did – that
s/he devotes attention and resources to working with the public discourses around
these issues.
Therefore, this paper which will deal with aspects of far right radicalism and neoNazi violence in Germany today, will – and has to – start with some observations
about current party-political and media discourses on extremism and hate crime. In
conclusion these observations will raise the question of what kind of measures could
possibly be taken not only in terms of radicalisation awareness and policy making but
also in terms of the accompanying party-political and media discourses – a difficult
question indeed since, clearly, in free and democratic societies we will never want to
tell media and politicians what to say and how to speak in public about any issue, let
alone about violent extremism.
Party-political discourse on extremism in German
The example of Germany up to the present, 2011 and 2012, attests to the high
relevance of political and media discourse in many ways. Before referring to Britta
Schellenberg’s and others’ work on German right-wing extremism over the last
twenty years (published in 2009), the more recent developments in public discourse
and policy making need to be looked at. To be sure, the most stunning news in
November 2011 that a neo-Nazi murder gang under the name of “National-Socialist
Underground” (NSU) had been active in Germany committing cold blooded ethnic
murders during a time period of about ten years, without being caught and even
without anyone of public standing mentioning and discussing the possibility of these
murders to be right-wing terrorist xenophobic attacks, has sent shock waves through
Germany – which, however, have mostly abated since. And yet, the issues of political
and media discourse that need to be mentioned here with regard to the last two or
three years are the same.
Particularly relevant to this paper are the ways in which political, public administration
and media discourses tend to downplay and deny the scale of right-wing violent
extremism and hate crime in various sectors of social life on the ground. To be
sure, throughout post-World War history right-wing extremism, and the attached
phenomenon of smaller-scale everyday neo-Nazi terror on the local level, have always
been downplayed or denied by the political discourses – of the ‘conservative’, centerright political parties, that is. For a multitude of reasons this holds especially true
for the rhetoric on right-wing extremism in the new Eastern German states after
reunification in 1989. In these states a significant up-surge of local neo-Nazi and
nationalist-xenophobic subcultures was experienced from 1989 onwards – including
massive xenophobic community rioting against ethnic minorities (which already were
quite small and isolated in the GDR) broadly reported on by the international media
(e.g. in Mölln, Rostock, Solingen, Hoyerswerda). Since then the number of incidents
with a right-wing extremist motivation has always been roughly double that of the
western states that formed the pre-reunification Federal Republic of Germany.
Especially in recent years – during which a center-right government has been in office
since Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2005 (until 2009 in a ‘big coalition’ with the
Social Democratic Party) – political and other public discourses have again increased
their rhetoric of downplaying and denying the scale of right-wing violent extremism
and hate crime in eastern regions. This occurred despite the fact that some 150
people, at least, were killed over the last 20 years in Germany as a result of incidents
of a violently xenophobic, hostile and/or right-wing extremist nature1 – leaving
1 Recent figures are again rising, as do figures about extreme-right and xenophobic attitudes among
pupils; see: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/gewaltstudie-rechtsextremismus-unter-schuelern-alarmiert-regierung-a-613844.html
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thousands seriously injured and traumatized and countless communities at risk, facing
some level of constant anxiety. Quite tellingly, the death toll of 150 which has been
determined through independent foundations’ research has never been recognized by
official statistics, which count roughly four dozen such casualties. Hence, the people
killed and tens of thousands injured in hate crime incidents of this kind since 1989
were not properly recognized as victims of right-wing violent extremism and neo-Nazi
everyday terror – and public discourse did not properly refer to the causes of their
death or harm.
Besides federal party-politics and national news media, it is above all local politics’
discourses where this kind of rhetoric unfolds most intensely. Moreover, the
conservative/ center-right party discourses which are the main focus of this paper, on
many accounts almost seem to be designed to serve these local contexts – and have
counter-productive effects for anyone working against hate crime on the ground in
vulnerable areas of social life. In this regard, the case of small town Mügeln in Saxony
in summer 2007 comes to mind as a characteristic example of the rhetoric within
center-right parties’ discourses on the community level – which in similar ways have
occurred countless times over the last two decades. A dangerous xenophobic incident
had taken place in Mügeln at that time in which eight people of Indian descent were
chased through the city (after some friction at a public city party) while Nazi slogans
were hurled, windows broken, police attacked, and kebab stands – being perceived
as Turkish places – demolished and set on fire, leaving the eight Indian people (and
two police officers) in part seriously injured. And yet, the mayor of Mügeln, Gotthard
Deuse, came out immediately after the incident and after the first reactions by
national media and “spontaneously denied that the acts of violence in his municipality
had any xenophobic or radical right-wing motives” (Schellenberg 223)2. The mayor’s
blunt response, refuting any ethnic or group-related hostility in his community –
after roughly 20 years with countless such incidents throughout eastern Germany
in particular – caused international incredulity and led some federal politicians to
distance themselves publicly.
However, the mayor barely reflected, back-tracked or rectified his statements. In
that his response was indeed quite typical for many such places and small towns in
which municipal representatives, when faced with racist or xenophobic hostility in
their community present themselves “as a victim of a malicious (press) campaign”
– in other words: blame others and claim oneself to have been wronged – and
point-blank deny any xenophobic or violently right-wing motives on the part of the
local population. Rather, the incident in the mayor’s view was supposed to just have
been ‘normal violence’ – whatever this means – or, should there indeed have been
unmistakable neo-Nazi slogans, signs, and gestures, as reported by some, these
must have come from people from outside the town. That local people would have
loudly assisted these slogans, the mayor refuted without having investigated it at all.
In consequence of such discourse patterns, local crime victims that try to get help or
press charges sometimes face great difficulties in doing so and are not assisted at all
in a professional manner by local authorities – especially when police officers share
xenophobic attitudes, as has been found in some cases especially in eastern regions.3
The reasons for such astonishingly recalcitrant denial especially on the part of local –
party-member – representatives are assumed to be a psychologically complex mixture
of motivations. These reach from concerns about losing out on possible outside
investors – especially international and non-European investors who, for obvious
reasons, view xenophobia as problematic – and the feeling of local pride about one’s
home town/village, combined with wishful thinking about its population. However,
arguably the most important reason is that party-political people in public office are
widely out of touch with many areas of social life in their community – and above all
are personally incapable of even recognizing xenophobia and neo-Nazi terror as such,
2 http://www.rundschau-hd.de/archives/1101/.
3 http://www.netz-gegen-nazis.de/frage/wie-alltaeglich-sind-diskriminierungen-durch-rechtsradikalepolizisten-0.
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let alone acting adequately to counter and prevent it. In other words one main reason
for this denial and incapacity is party-political discourses, because only these would
be in the position to make the party-political office holder aware of these issues and
empower her/him to act in the appropriate manner.
This would also encompass practical how-to knowledge about acting in the face of
theat. For other mayors or community representatives of comparable regions and
small towns in East Germany report that they just don’t dare to rule against public
neo-Nazi marches and similar extremist activities on the part of the local population,
or that they just don’t dare to appear at the awareness raising events of some
remaining civic society activists who attempt to counter neo-Nazi activities on the
ground in their communities – which have otherwise been unofficially declared to be
“foreigner-free zones” by these neo-Nazis. Instead, such activists have been and still
are routinely harassed, listed on the internet, anonymously attacked and seriously
injured – sometimes killed in the wake of violent assaults (Der Spiegel 24/2012, pp.
30).
Looking back historically, Social Democratic Party discourses on issues of extremism,
neo-Nazism, and hate crime in Germany have always been different, and somewhat
to the contrary – which would indeed deserve some more detailed discussion than
is possible here. In any event, during the chancellorship of social-democrat Gerhard
Schröder (1998-2005), the only SPD chancellorship during the last 30 years, the
initiative “Uprising of the Decent” was inaugurated in 2000, after a synagogue was
attacked (in Düsseldorf, West Germany) which was found out months later to have
been committed by two young men from North Africa and Lebanon out of hatred
against Israel. Nevertheless, the “Uprising of the Decent” was always also understood,
by center-left citizens and social work practitioners at least, to be a – long overdue
– response to the wide-spread mainstream xenophobia and numerous neo-Nazi
incidents in East Germany during the 1990s. It almost seemed to have needed the
slightly different symbolism provided by an attack on a synagogue in West Germany
for political reasons in order to get this initiative under way smoothly.4 Be this as it
may, the “Uprising of the Decent” brought about a large Federal Prevention Program
against ‘Right-wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism’ which funded many
interventions of anti hate crime and radicalisation awareness work by roughly €20
million a year5 (see Schellenberg for more details6).
The invention of “left-wing violent extremism” – a discourse deflecting from
neo-Nazi extremism?
Today, however, in a marked shift from these hopeful years of Federal Programmes
and Model Projects about how to reduce right-wing extremist hate crime, xenophobia
and anti-Semitism especially in post-reunification eastern Germany, today’s
conservative government had turned towards a different issue altogether in 2010/11
(while however not daring to cut funding for the existing programmes on the federal
level at least). It suddenly began to focus on left-wing extremism! The responsible
minister came into office in November 2009 (at age 32) and subsequently decided
4 This was preceded by an “Action programme against aggression and violence” launched in the 1990s
by the Kohl government (with Merkel being responsible for the programme) after the above mentioned internationally reported incidents of violent community rioting against ethnic minorities had
taken place. Notably, in those days the practitioners were strictly advised by Merkel to completely
abstract from and obfuscate the political right-wing extremism and neo-Nazi context of this kind of
violence and deal with it as a neutral matter of social work and anti-violence intervention (cf. Franz
Josef Krafeld [2012]: “Bedarf es seiner speziellen Pädagogik gegen rechts? Nein, aber!”, in Stephan
Bundschuh, Absgar Drücker, Thilo Scholle [ed.]: Jugendarbeit gegen Rechtsextremismus. Motive,
Praxisbeispiele und Handlungsperspektiven. Wochenschau-Verlag, Schwalbach.
5 E.g. since 2007: http://www.vielfalt-tut-gut.de/content/index_ger.html.
6 Britta Schellenberg (2009): Country Report Germany. In: Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. and published by Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Foundation), Bertelsmann Publishing.
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to put out an additional multi-million prevention programme against left-wing violent
extremism, implicitly turning the main focus away from neo-Nazi hate crime in
Germany.
Now, the government did so in spite of the fact that most experts agreed that leftwing violent extremism – if it had at all existed in the proper sense in Germany during
the last 20 years – did not in the same way constitute a serious and systematic threat
of group related hate crime as neo-Nazi subcultures do. Nor was it extremist in the
sense of being unconstitutional on the grounds of their ideological tenets – which
undoubtedly holds true for right-wing extremism, since the far left these days holds
mostly anti-capitalist views but is not anti-democratic and certainly not opposed
to fundamental rights. Quite on the contrary it generally is all for human rights,
fundamental freedoms and democratic principles. This is not to say that there are not
some more or less informal groups in some big cities, the so-called “Autonomous” – or
the Black Faction [“schwarzer Block”], which routinely get into street fights with neoNazis and the police. These, however, are deemed by experts to be more an issue of
social work than of violent political extremism.
Also the government launched its programme while experts warned about how difficult
it will be to actually identify and reach a target group perceived as ‘young left-wing
violent extremists’ and to effectively work towards the programme’s objectives of
reducing hate crime in an impactful and economic manner. Looking back on this
political endeavor in 2010 from today it can be concluded that the attempt to find
and address this target group has indeed failed almost entirely – in part because
the target group, indeed, does not exist empirically in the shape and form that
was anticipated. Having found only one single person (in a prison) that roughly fits
the expectations of the minister, the programme has been criticized as ineffective,
wasteful and mostly pointless even by the respected Deutsches Jugendinstitut (DJI)
which is perceived to be very close to and is fully funded by the government.7
Already the party-political discourse in the narrow sense, as stated by the ministry
itself, did not make much sense and seemed quite far-fetched, from the very
beginning. From the onset, party and government spokespeople seemed eager to use
any opportunity to emphasize the leitmotiv of left-wing extremism – also to some
extent so-called ‘Islamist fundamentalism’. And while ‘Islamist fundamentalism’ in
Germany is indeed a different issue altogether, a common motive in the conservative
German government’s discourse about both phenomena seemed to be the loss of a
sense of adequate proportion.8 Strictly speaking, in some instances this seems to have
impaired the intact sense of ‘discourse responsibility’ vis-à-vis the social realities on
the ground and of the actual needs of policy making.
The decision to launch a counter left-wing extremism programme was by no means
taken at the spur of a moment by a very young incoming minister. Rather, the minister
just followed through with what was explicitly stated by the coalition agreement
drafted when this government (CDU, CSU and FDP) came into office in 2009. Then it
was clearly stated in view of the on-going social democrats’ (and the Green party’s)
programme to counter right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, what
in essence has always been any conservative German political party’s stance on this
issue: the coalition decided that “the previous government’s programme against right7 http://www.taz.de/!88482/
8 Besides drawing attention to “left-wing extremism”, some likeminded party-political and media
discourses have began to foreground the threats from Islamist and Jihadist groups. While religious
fundamentalism, without doubt, constitutes a risk of a quite serious kind it, however, doesn’t mean
that one may leave behind any sense of scale and proportion. Schellenberg resumes about one case
of such discourse:” Thus, Federal Interior Minister Schäuble announced when presenting the Report
of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in May 2007 that Islamic terrorism is the greatest
threat to Germany’s stability and security, even though the report had more to say about right-wing
extremism in Germany (about twice as much as about Islamic terrorism) than about any other topic.
There is a danger that the issue of preventing (right-wing) extremism will increasingly be supplanted
by the issues of terrorism and (internal) security” (Schellenberg 210).
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wing extremism will be transformed into a programme against extremism(s) at large
including left-wing and Islamist extremism.”9
Now, historically speaking, the ambition to relativize German right-wing extremism
and historical National Socialism of the Third Reich by offsetting it – and implicitly in
part excusing it – with left-wing violent extremism and historical Stalinism which was
perceived to historically precede – and in a sense provoke – the Third Reich and the
Holocaust, has always been a dominant ideological theme in German conservative
parties’ patterns of thought and discourse. This already showed quite prominently
when the first of the two post-war German social-democratic governments ended
and was replaced by Helmut Kohl’s center-right coalition in 1982 (lasting until 1998).
For, the beginning of this period was marked, among other themes, by the notorious
Historian’s Dispute from 1986/87 (between Ernst Nolte and Jürgen Habermas) in
which Nolte put forth this implicitly excusatory line of thought in view of Stalinism
and National Socialism.10 This debate was preceded and accompanied by the incoming
conservative chancellor Helmut Kohl coining his well-known phrase of the “spiritualmoral turnaround” (“die geistig-moralische Wende”) and – on his obligatory visit to
Israel – of the “mercy of late birth” (“Gnade der späten Geburt”) meaning that he and
his generation were born after the Third Reich. Shortly thereafter Kohl conducted a
wreath-laying ceremony at a soldiers’ cemetery where known SS officers were also
buried (in 1985, together with US president Ronald Reagan at Bitburg, Germany).
Chancellor Kohl in his “spiritual-moral turnaround” vis-à-vis the German history of
the Third Reich, evidently banked on a new relativizing perspective that allowed for
seeing Germany as victim as well as perpetrator. In particular, this worldview would
see Germany as a victim of Stalinism – perceived as historically preceding NationalSocialism – and then later on as victim of Moscow’s “red army” occupying east
Germany. Moreover, the majority of the conservative post-war German population
would also assume “Moscow’s communists” to be the driving force behind the 1960s
and 70s student revolution.
Hence, even today, over thirty years after Kohl came into office, it needs to be seen
in the context of this, quite traditional, party-political rhetoric, when government
spokespersons and the young minister make somewhat vague statements to the
effect that ‘left-wing extremism should not be forgotten nor underrated’. However, in
2010/11 these endless political themes about the leftist threat fell into a time period
in which there not only was no left-wing violent extremism in the proper sense, as
already mentioned above. Moreover, even the degree of – perceived leftist – rioting
which had always been around especially in Berlin on the occasion of May First
demonstrations had just abated substantially. Plus, this decrease in rioting might have
occurred for reasons which could raise questions about what kind of extremism one is
really talking about in the context of these riots. The Berlin May First demonstrations
seem to have become much more peaceful as a result of changes in police strategy
which from then on included de-escalation methods and community policing. This
strategic change in policing can in turn be attributed to the fact that for some years
there had been, never fully investigated, accusations by journalists that Berlin and
national riot police leaders consciously provoked violent escalations at May First
demonstrations so that the necessity for their current level of funding would be
vividly underlined for future years.
Hence, the vague and ominous statement that ‘left-wing extremism should not
be forgotten or underrated’ seems strangely out of place in 2010/11 – as was the
governmental programme. Even odder seems another statement which one could
hear on various occasions, namely that whenever one needs to counter rightwing extremism, ‘this then should by all means not be done by utilizing left-wing
extremism’. Now, the concept of ‘utilizing left-wing extremism’ in countering rightwing extremism seems quite nonsensical indeed. There has never been a method in
9 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/022/1702298.pdf.
10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Nolte#The_Historikerstreit.
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practice which pursues human rights awareness work or hate crime prevention by
means of left-wing violent extremist thoughts or actions – nor is such a method really
conceivable in the first place. All the more this raises the question of what exactly
motivates this and similar statements.
In any event, all these observations about the oddity, costliness, and idiosyncrasy
of the conservative party-political discourse on left-wing violent extremism are
mentioned here because they help to render more visible the high charge of
irrationality and ideology – also of trans-generational delegations of ideological
discourses onto a young minister – that was moving this governmental programme
from the very beginning. More precisely, it makes clearer the importance and
impact that party-political discourses have. For, as far-fetched and wasteful as this
programme evidently was (and still is), it both sprang from political discourses and in
turn had lasting repercussions on the political discourse of the time. In this respect,
the programme had an immensely discourse-formative power on the manner in which
not only conservative politicians but also wider parts of the general public and the
media in Germany began to think and talk about extremism. Above all, however, this
new discourse would, as we will see further below, turn out to have quite detrimental
consequences for anyone who concretely deals with radicalisation and hate crime in
social work on the ground.
With the rhetoric of the media it could be observed, for example, that some respected
national newspapers started to refer to anti-gentrification activists – or comparable
sorts of community and civil society activists – as “left-wing extremists” because
sometimes damage on houses or cars occurred in the wake of their political initiative
(e.g. Berliner Tagesspiegel 20.3.12, ‘Linksextremisten vertreiben Guggenheim aus
Kreuzberg’). Hence, the generalized blame of being a “left-wing extremist” took hold
in the language of previously even-handed national newspapers. This was particularly
true in the press coverage of a series of car burnings – mostly in Berlin and Hamburg
– that occurred during 2010 and 2011.
Already on the level of the statement’s accuracy this was not a precise reference, to
say the least. Even local police forces were quick to observe and communicate that
most cases of burning cars in 2010 and 2011 had nothing to do with any political
activism or ideology. Rather, these acts seem to have been committed by a quite small
number of individual people from no particular political orientation, all of whom were
affected by a complex set of personal and family problems. For instance, one person
that, in the end, was found guilty of having put fire to roughly 100 cars in Berlin in
summer 2011 – which the press widely and sensationally reported as acts of left-wing
extremists – a couple of months later had turned out to be an unemployed person
who was entirely apolitical but had social and mental health problems. He was living
with his disabled sister and his mother who had cancer in a little Berlin flat – and also
was engaged as a missionary for the Mormons (bz-berlin.de, 3.4.12). A year later a
quite similar case emerged about a middle aged citizen of Hamburg being strongly
suspected of having set fire to over 110 cars in Hamburg (Hamburger Abendblatt
13.8.2012). Moreover, it appeared in a recent trial that right-wing violent extremists
were at least in one instance found to have burning cars as one of their measures of
harassing human rights and anti extremism activists.11
Since the issue of car burnings has been the one key issue through which this kind of
political discourse about a so-called “left-wing violent extremism” connected best to
a wider public in 2010/11, the government – already on this single account – needs
to ask itself whether it has acted in a responsible manner when it put forth its acrossthe-board rhetoric of “left-wing extremism” discourses.
11 http://www.taz.de/Neonazis-vor-Gericht/!100011/
7
The discourse of the ‘New Bourgeoisie’ and its political consequences
Remarkably, the ease with which these discourse patterns – and policies – around
“left-wing violent extremism” can be proven to be factually misleading, far-fetched,
and out of touch with reality, and above all the fact that they in part can even be
demonstrated to be absurd or ignorant, is quite astonishing indeed. For politicians
usually pay a price for being out of touch and even more so if caught acting in
absurd or ignorant ways. This begs an explanation as to why such high political risks
were incurred – in other words: where the political gains are in these out-of-touch
discourses on “left-wing violent extremism” in Germany in 2010/11.
Having a look into the recent history of societal discourses during the last decade in
Germany may provide some insight. At the same time it will once again underline the
importance of party-political rhetoric especially with regard to issues of extremism and
hate crime. Above all, it will become quite clear: whatever the political calculations
were on the part of this German government, the actual losses and damages for
any on the ground work of reducing hate crime and supporting societal resilience,
especially among the young, are substantial.
The key sources of political gains that this conservative government may plausibly
expect to tap into by its “left-wing violent extremism” theme are hardly discernible
with the naked eye. For it most probably was not its main intention to win the support
of right-wing extremist organizations which did, of course, lavishly herald – and
celebrate – the minister’s new programme (and at least once seem to have attempted
to apply for governmental funds to work against “left-wing extremism”). Rather, the
key sources of political gains lie somewhat more towards the center of the political
spectrum – and rarely express themselves in fully spelled out political or ideological
language, or in writing, for that matter.
However, there has recently been at least one high profile author who has quite
expressively come forth with a kind of political discourse which seems to resonate with
certain aspects of the government’s vague – and peculiarly far-fetched – assumptions
about “left-wing violent extremism”: conservative-Christian top journalist Peter Hahne
in his 2006 book on ‘The End of the Fun Society’ (“Schluss mit lustig. Das Ende der
Spaßgesellschaft”). This book and its arguments have then provisionally been labeled,
for want of a better word, the rhetoric of the New Bourgeoisie – meaning a kind of
political worldview that formerly wasn’t recognized as part of the mainstream but
nowadays represents a section of mostly center-right, conservative, educated middle
aged and young citizens.
Especially, this book helps us to understand what might be behind the odd fear that
somebody could ‘utilize left-wing extremism’ when working against hate crime and
neo-Nazism. It sheds light on why that fear seems so strong and irrationally charged,
almost like a panic that envisions a general leftist cultural threat that is not only
extremist and violent but, in some way, even more existentially earthshaking and alldestructive – throwing Germany and its “values” into a void of absolute nothingness.
For, Peter Hahne in his best-selling book recurrently – and almost obsessively –
revolves around one single hypothesis: that the so-called 1968 generation of the
times of the ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ and the ‘student revolution’ mark the
beginning of the end of German culture and “roots”. Hence, in the eyes of Peter Hahne
and his followers it is the protagonists of this 1968 generation that are to be blamed
for every problem and illness of present German society. Because, it was the 1968ers
who, through their leftist way of life – and one may safely add: through their ‘sort of
leftist-extremist’ way of life – are the cause of all problems.
To mention just a couple of Hahne’s key points12: (i) the decline of the birth rate
in Germany is due to the overly hedonistic and egotistical ‘self-fulfillment ideology’
12 According to Christian Ricken’s quintessential review from the 3rd Dec., 2006, on http://
www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/wertedebatte-feindbild-68-a-453979.html.
8
(“Selbstverwirklichung”) of this generation, (ii) an alleged ‘crisis of education and upbringing’ was caused by the 1968ers’ anti-authoritarian education ideology which let
go of the values and virtues of leadership, cultural tradition, discipline, self-sacrifice,
devotion, and similar values etc., (iii) the break-down of the social welfare system
Hahne attributes to the inherent laziness of this generation and their reluctance
to strive for high-performance and merit, and (iv) their pro-diversity pluralistic
ideology is to be blamed for the evident lack of integration of ‘foreigners’ in German
society, since the students’ promiscuous “Multi-Kulti” attitude had effectively kept the
‘foreigners’ from learning German values and standards.
It goes without saying, in this world view of the New Bourgeoisie which attributes all
sorts of real and perceived problems to one single root cause – here: a leftist culture
since 1986 – even violent right-wing and neo-Nazi extremism would somehow be
automatically attributed to this cause.13 Hence, this most simple logic of discourse
is: leftists – or “left-wing extremists” – are to be blamed for everything. And should
there, in fact, be both right-wing and left-wing extremism in the world, than the
latter is, by nature, the far more serious problem because it is at the very root of the
problem. In other words, the left-wing extremism of today – following Bolshevism,
Stalinism, and other leftisms since the 19th century (as Nolte had it in his Historians
Dispute with Habermas) – is the source from which all other extremisms and all hate
crime sprang in the first place.
For a more inspirational and creative – but still quite substantial – interpretation of
Peter Hahne’s book and the New Bourgeoisie’s discourse which it thrives on, one may
want to click the Google pop-up rubric “It’s all the student revolution’s fault” (“68er
allem schuld”). Doing so, will most vividly – and creatively – bring to mind how much
these quite willful – and far-fetched – arguments about leftist radicalism tap into
thought patterns of the so-called New Right, the intellectual branch of extremist rightwing political organizations like the NPD and comparable right-wing extremist parties,
and, moreover, show rhetorical parallels to far-rightist and anti-Semitic discourses
around emerging National-Socialism in the 1930s. For, clicking this Google rubric (in
August 2012) one gets to two you-tube videos that appear right next to each other on
top of the link list: (1) comedian Rainald Grebe’s satiric song on the New Bourgeoisie’s
theme of the student revolution generation to be the beginning of the end of German
culture and values (“Die Achtundsechziger sind an allem schuld”, ‘The generation-68
is to blame for everything’14) which gives a good summary of the gist of this discourse
and (2) a video on the musical model upon which Grebe had build his song, thus
drawing attention to the risks of violent anti-Semitic hate crime that seem to be
attached to these kinds of thought patterns. This musical model is the satiric chanson
“An allem sind die Juden schuld” (“The Jews are to blame for everything”), written by
German composer Friedrich Hollaender in 1931.15
At this point, one thing becomes clear at last: The governmental programme against
“left-wing violent extremism” – albeit evidently far-fetched and in some respects
even ignorant – really marked a decisive point in political history. For, the minister’s
programme marked the moment in which certain aspects of the – heretofore off13 Another even more well-known protagonist of a similar New Bourgeoisie discourse may be seen in
Theo Sarrazin and his book ‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’ (which Wikipedia translates to “Germany Is
Doing Away With Itself” or “Germany Is Abolishing Itself”). However, having come from the socialdemocratic party Sarrazin does not narrow in on leftism but on Muslims. Sarrazin’s recurrent theme,
thus, is that Germany is taken over by Muslim migrant populations which lower all standards and
cause all sorts of social problems – statements which have since been proven as erroneous, misleading and far-fetched in terms of empirical reality as Hahne’s theses and the government’s assumptions
about leftwing violent extremism are. But Sarrazin has received as much – or even more – public
resonance in terms of leading best-selling lists and public debates in Germany.
14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq1NXaslraA
15 Friedrich Hollaender is one of the characteristic figures of the political cabaret scene around Max
Reinhardt in Berlin in the 1920s and emigrated in 1933; his song follows a tune from Bizet’s opera
“Carmen” and was presented by Annemarie Hase.
9
stream – political discourse of the New Bourgeoisie, and of the New Right, were
transformed into mainstream discourse and thus resulted in actual policies.
It becomes all the more evident how seriously these issues of party-political discourse
have to be taken and how much we should ask whether there is not a need to think
about a concept of “discursive responsibility” pertaining to all issues of extremism
and hate crime and a need to formulate a “code of ethics and discourse” regarding
these issues – at least for those occasions when they are dealt with on the level of
governmental rhetoric and of actual policy making.
Do we need ‘political discourse responsibility’? Comparing the Danish
context – “left-wing violent extremism” versus “far left-wing activist
environment”
A somewhat more balanced and responsible approach to dealing with discourse issues
of “left-wing violent extremism” is taken by the Danish booklet series on “Preventing
Extremism” – produced during the Danish presidency of the EU Council in 2012. And
yet, even there, some questions may be asked in terms of the implications that the
booklet has regarding matters of political discourse.
One of the five booklets describes “14 cases of handling radicalisation” from a
practitioners’ and social workers’ point of view. And one of these 14 cases regards
a 12-year old girl with ties to “a far left-wing activist environment”. Hence, this
environment is here not (!) called a “left-wing extremist” as the German newspaper
quoted above labels a comparable environment in Berlin. The booklet calls it an
“activist” environment – and overall foregrounds a rather empathic social worker
attitude in all five booklets of the series. However, the case of the 12-year old
girl – with many serious family and school troubles – is, here, still placed within
a publication on “Preventing Extremism” (!). In the year 2012 this generally
implies “violent extremism/ terrorism” which is aimed at abolishing human rights,
fundamental freedoms and democratic principles as Jihadism and neo-Nazism would
do.
Also, the two cases which the booklet mentions before the case of the girl regard
“Mentoring a young football fan affiliated with the right-wing extremist environment”
and “Counseling of parents of a young man involved in an Islamist movement”.
Moreover, among the other cases of the booklet one finds “Mentoring and counseling
of a man with an interest in militant Islamism”, “Preventive conversations with a
young man with extremist views (of an Islamist nature)”, and “Counseling of parents
of a young man involved in Islamist movement”.
Clearly, from a social worker’s point of view, this doesn’t really make much of a
difference, because all cases were young people who were in deep personal trouble
and are involved in causing damage – in the broadest sense of the word. However,
only the girl was affiliated with a social movement which generally does not commit
hate crimes or violate human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic
principles. Rather on the contrary, as already stated above, these “left-wing activist
environments” generally support human rights and fundamental freedoms – and/but,
in doing so, sometimes engage in physical fights and violent action.
Now, what is almost irrelevant from a social worker’s point of view, is all the more
important for the political discourse of a society which takes great pains to be and
stay a free and liberal society – being committed to democratic principles and human
rights. From the point of view of the political discourse of such societies it is, thus,
of crucial importance for all actors and speakers to make sure that one does not lose
sight of what is meant by human rights and fundamental freedoms – and how to
prioritize action in order to safeguard them.
10
Moreover, if one labels civil society activists promoting social causes as “left-wing
extremists” – because some of them sometimes also get into physical struggles
and use illegal means for these causes – a left-right symmetry with “violent rightwing extremism/ terrorism” is evoked suggesting the same level of threat/danger,
societal damage and criminality. However, such suggestions obfuscate the fact that
the damage which is caused by right-wing violent extremism and terrorism when
compared to far left-wing activism is quite different in scale and quality. Also it ignores
the fact that in Germany “violent left-wing terrorism” in the proper sense had only
existed during the RAF-terrorism attacks in the 1970s and 1980s. In its effects such
implied symmetry confuses the clear view of what a democratic, liberal and pluralistic
society has to focus on in order to safeguard itself.
Hence, to be able and willing, as the Danish publication did, to differentiate between
“far left-wing activism/ rioting” and “violent left-wing extremism/ terrorism” (e.g. the
RAF murder and terrorism attacks in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s) – or “violent
right-wing extremism/ neo-Nazi terrorism”, for that matter (e.g. the murder gang
‘National Socialist Underground’, active and undetected from 1998-2011 in Germany)
– seems quite important. For, such ability to engage in a differentiated, ethical, and
responsible political discourse seems directly connected with the clear vision for
actual societal risks and dangers – which is necessary in order to support successful
strategies of preventing hate crime and violent extremism in a free society.
Is there such thing as an ‘extremist anti hate crime facilitator’? The
government’s “extremism clause” – or: party-politics harm deradicalisation
work
Germany today, in 2012, as represented by the current right-wing government, seems
far away from such even-handedness and conceptual precision. Quite on the contrary,
as demonstrated above, through governmental initiatives some heretofore off-stream
political discourses of the New Bourgeoisie and the New Right – the intellectual arm
of right-wing extremist political organizations – were surreptitiously turned into
mainstream discourse and actual policies. Hence, for example, a specter of left-wing
violent extremism was conjured up and a largely senseless and wasteful programme
launched – at a time when actually a neo-Nazi murder gang was around killing
foreigners. Furthermore, it was subtly suggested that some social prevention work out
there in the field might actually ‘use left-wing extremist methods’.
So, evidently the government seemed ready even to incur quite some risk of
appearing out of touch and ignorant in order to promote these strains of partypolitical discourses. Most importantly, however, public administrations and the media
throughout the whole process seemed and still seem totally unaware of how much
actual damage is caused by such acts of policy making. Hardly anyone noticed how
detrimental this is for any on the ground work that promotes deradicalisation and
engages in prevention work against hate crime and neo-Nazi lifestyles in particular.
To make it even worse, the governmental programme did not remain the last step
into this direction of political discourse. Another piece of actual policy making on the
part of the ministry was announced late in 2010 and then implemented; and this
policy would turn out to be even more damaging than the out-of-place counter “leftwing violent extremism” programme was. Arguably as a response to the massive
public critique and resistance against the programme – and also to its ever more
visible practical difficulties and likeliness of failure – the minister seems to have,
quite irrationally, reacted by stepping up the confrontation on the level of political
discourse. The minister decreed that a Democracy Declaration to be signed by NGOs
would be introduced in 2011. This meant that every NGO receiving public money
for hate crime prevention, deradicalisation activities and similar social work had to
file what unofficially was called the “extremism clause”. This clause of the funding
contract contained a legally binding intelligence declaration stating that its employees,
11
associates and volunteers are not affiliated to any extremist organization – thereby
mostly implying ‘left-wing extremist organizations’.
In the past ten years of the federal programmes against right-wing extremism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism no one ever hit on the curious idea of demanding
such a declaration. Needless to say, there is no clear concept readily available
of what a “left-wing extremist organisation” might be. Nor can it be determined
who would have the means and power to clearly define such a concept and enlist
organisations and persons as “left-wing extremists” in any legally binding way. Also
it was quite predictable, as everybody knew at the time, that this clause will not be
legally tenable in the end – most of all because it would imply that NGOs and grossroot organisations leaders investigate or “spy on” their co-workers, associates and
volunteers in ideological terms and regarding their affiliations. In fact, the clause was
ruled untenable in a first instance court judgement in April 2012 – while the ministry,
of course, announced it would fight the judgement (and the procedure is quite likely –
and maybe meant – to take longer than the next federal elections in 2013).
In its effects, this – purely politically motivated – decree expressed suspicion and
in fact denigrated all those NGO and civil society workers as potential “left-wing
extremists” who were active in hate crime prevention and deradicalisation work
on the ground in difficult sectors of society. In fact, issuing the extremism clause
implicitly denigrated exactly those enthusiastic pro-human-rights workers who act
out of personal vocation and civic engagement – and who often did so in the face
of quite serious risks of suffering all sorts of harassment and violent attacks against
themselves and their families by local right-wing everyday terrorists. It weakened
those civil society activists who deal with the most serious social problems of hate
crime and threats to the democratic order – which the government itself, in the
perception of many, had dangerously neglected for many years.
But, as we saw already above, fueling suspicion against and implicitly denigrating
engaged pro-human-rights and anti-racism activists seems deeply entrenched in
German mainstream and conservative parties’ discourses anyhow. To be sure, these
activists overwhelmingly tend to vote for center-left parties and candidates rather
than for those of the center right. Moreover, some of these activists can, already at
first sight, be identified as adherents of – aesthetically vanguard – youth cultural
styles (as Punk, Emo, Indi etc.) which ‘ordinary citizens’ from the more conservative
societal spectrum tend to have more hostile than sympathetic feelings about.
Therefore, quite a proportion of mainstream citizens in Germany – especially those
who tend to feel that it all has been the student revolution leftist generation’s fault
anyhow – if comparing the risks of various youth radicalisms today are likely to hold
the view that it is “better to have a young extreme right-wing adolescent who, at
least, is orderly, clean and helpful to the elderly” than an “awkward and filthy looking,
possibly impolite Punk”.
So, there might be short-term political gains in fueling generalized suspicion against
and denigrating a certain social group – even if such a generalization is somewhat
extremist itself by nature. This is, however, totally paradoxical from a standpoint of
civic values and public safety, since such a “Punk” or “leftist student” is much less
likely to commit targeted hate crimes (of group-related enmity) while right-wing
extremism has caused tremendous numbers of victims and death casualties (some
150 killed in 20 years in Germany).
Why it is unreasonable, unwise and unethical as a government – or even as a political
party – to fuel suspicions against and denigrate anyone or any societal group, should
be pretty self-evident anyhow. Denigration is certainly violating human rights – and
it generally leads up to even more serious violations of human rights; and fueling
suspicion of such an unspecific and vaguely personality and group related kind (e.g.
12
referring to general life style) is very close to denigration anyhow. Nothing good, prosocial or peaceful will come from this.16
Should, nevertheless, there be a need to further explain and give a more lucid
illustration of why it is so unwise to denigrate a social group, especially if it is
promoting human rights and democratic values, the following recent incident from
Turkey may serve as a highly topical example for any ‘Western country’. And, indeed
in an intellectual climate defined by the New Bourgeoisie’s discourses there will always
be the need for lucid illustrations, since there always will be many people who – out
of historical unawareness – tend to sympathize with “extremism clauses” – or other
such a governmental clauses – and views will be expressed like: ‘Well, what is wrong
with signing such a declaration and doing a little spying on your fellows if nobody has
anything to hide anyway?’.
In this recent incident in Turkey (2011/12) a student born in France from a Turkish
family background went to east Turkey and Istanbul for an EU Erasmus student
exchange. In Istanbul she was arrested by police on account of having ties to a “leftwing extremist underground organization”. According to the official indictment the
young woman is accused of having visited a concert in Istanbul (apparently of a leftist
music band) together with tens of thousands of other young people and having taken
part in a May First demonstration carrying a banner demanding free education for
all citizens. The student was then kept in prison for three months, being released in
August 2012 only upon massive international media pressure – which hundreds of
ordinary Turkish students do not have at their disposal – but at the time of writing is
still awaiting her trial.17
To be sure, the political situation in Germany and Turkey in 2012 can hardly be
compared – and the level of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
might be quite different. Yet, the basic logic of thinking/ discourse and action on
the side of the state’s powers vis-à-vis its citizens does bear a particular parallel.
In both cases, albeit to a quite different degree, this logic is governed by a general
suspicion against – and denigration of – citizens who are perceived as a threat and
as “left-wing extremists”, while, in reality, they are actively promoting social and
humanitarian causes, fundamental rights and democratic principles. Hence, not only
do these citizens not ‘have anything to hide anyway’ – but they have much to offer to
a society which constantly has to face a certain level of risk through extremism(s)/
fundamentalism(s), violence, and hate crime.
In the Germany of 2012 such citizens, students or activists are by no means likely
to be arrested. But they run some risk of their financial means being taken from
them – and this wasn’t the case just since the 2011 “extremism clause”. Denigrating
engaged pro-human-rights and anti hate crime activists was a strain in center-right
political discourses and policy making in Germany long before. A case in point in
the more recent past is the fate of the NGO Miteinander in Saxony-Anhalt, a state
which is just about an hour’s car journey from where the NSU neo-Nazi murder
gang had originally formed (in Jena, Thuringia). The NGO Miteinander had been
instrumental in implementing a state government radicalisation awareness and antiextremism/violence programme in Saxony-Anhalt in the 1990s when public rioting and
harassment against ethnic minorities and neo-Nazi marches were rampant in the new
16 This is especially relevant if one takes into account the research that Brähler/ Decker (and
also Wilhelm Heitmeyer) did on the widespread prejudice and partially extremist right-wing
attitudes within a solid 15-20% of the German population, i.e. even with those who do not
vote for extremist parties and do not engage in overtly extremist actions: (1) Vom Rand zur
Mitte (From the Fringe to the Center) (Brähler / Decker 2007) and (2) Die Mitte in der Krise
(The Center in the Crisis) (Brähler / Decker 2010), both by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
(Social Democratic Party Foundation).
17 http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/sevil-sevimli-franzoesische-erasmus-studentin-
im-tuerkischen-gefaengnis-a-843787.html
13
eastern states after Germany’s reunification. Thus, the social workers and educators of
the NGO Miteinander had, at this point, given much proof of their professionalism and
expertise in the field of anti-hate-crime work and in consulting public administration
during the late 1990s (when a social-democratic state government was in office).
Yet, in 2002 the incoming center-right coalition government in Saxony-Anhalt decided
– in poor judgment of the situation of neo-Nazism on the ground – to view the NGO
Miteinander mostly as a party-political initiative of their political adversaries. The
coalition agreement thus stated that “the previous government’s lopsided support
of politically motivated NGO/ civic associations’ youth work has to be stopped
immediately and the freed resources have to be put into pluralistic kinds of youth
work”. In the wake of this agreement the NGO Miteinander lost all support and had to
close its office (and/or resort to private support) for a period of time.
In the shadow of political discourses that deny right-wing extremism
– hatred and terror: The neo-Nazi murder gang “National-Socialist
Underground”
It wasn’t until November 2011 that it became visible to a greater public how
important it would have been to support even more of the kind of work that NGOs
like Miteinander do when they engaged in anti hate crime and deradicalisation
interventions in these most vulnerable areas of German society. It also became
clear how important it would have been to have such NGOs more closely integrated
– not alienated – in a functional multi-agency collaboration with the state, police
and intelligence services, especially in eastern Germany. For in 2011 the neo-Nazi
murder gang “National-Socialist Underground” (NSU) was uncovered (by coincidence)
after having committed ethnic murders in Germany – over a period of ten years! –
randomly killing in execution style individual citizens with an immigrant background,
mostly of Turkish descent. It must have been around the time of the closing of
Miteinander – being labeled a “politically motivated NGO” which allegedly receives
“lopsided (political) support” – that the NSU neo-Nazi murder gang, still being
teenagers or young adults in the early 1990s must have got ready, just an hour away
from Miteinander, for its 10-year undetected killing spree against ethnic minorities.
In those days the NSU murder gang had sprung from a deeply entrenched milieu of
violent extremist right-wing organizations – including the parliamentary NPD – which
had quickly developed in East Germany after reunification. They were systematically
built up, promoted, and maintained by West-German neo-Nazi organizations which
went east in the 1990s. But they also sprang from a home grown neo-Nazi subculture
which had already evolved in the GDR during the socialist regime in the 1980s due
to factors intrinsically connected with the military and authoritarian structure of the
GDR state and society. Similar to the west, however, this neo-Nazi subculture was
steadfastly denied by the GDR regime while its intelligence service (Stasi) had full
insight into this scene.
Now, investigative journalists, field experts and human rights activists on the ground
had sufficient knowledge about the post-reunification neo-Nazi milieu in which the
NSU and other gangs18 were operating – causing fear and death around them. Just
as they knew all about the nationalist youth-culture/ sub-culture which was – and is
still – thriving in eastern Germany in particular, committing many kinds of everyday
terrorism mostly in rural and small town communities.19 But nobody would have
asked them – because nobody of importance really trusted them and still do not trust
them today, as we saw, since they tend to be perceived as being politically left and
maybe even as “left-wing extremist”. In the eyes of the general party-political public,
18 That the NSU might not the only gang of this sort is indicated by other evidence; see Der Spiegel
31/2012, p. 112, “Nazis in Rockerkutten”.
19 Also see: The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe. Dr Matthew Goodwin & Vidhya Ramalingam, Rachel Briggs (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, ISD), 2012, https://www.
counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/75.
14
these activists might have resembled this one “generation” of leftists/ revolutionary
students from the 1970s, which the New Bourgeoisie held to be the prime cause of
all problems in Germany – rather than a valuable source of knowledge and of much
needed solutions for the present. Hence, the east German neo-Nazi milieu was
downplayed, overlooked and/or denied (also by intelligence services20) so that the
three active murderers of the NSU had been able to live – and act – quietly in East
Germany for over ten years, being supported by a wider undercover neo-Nazi network
– also producing videos about its murders in which they denigrated and ridiculed their
victims.
Moreover, besides these grim facts, a specific linguistic phenomenon deserves to be
noted here about the media coverage of the murders committed by the NSU over ten
years. This phenomenon once again attests to the importance of political and media
discourses and to the strength of the New Bourgeoisie rhetoric. For, the media had
quickly come to refer to these unresolved murder cases by using the quite deplorable
misnomer “Kebab-Killings” (“Döner-Morde”, since some of the victims worked in Kebab
stands). They did so by assuming that mafia related quarrels must have led to these
murders. Yet, the police and the media had no indications or clues which would allow
for assuming that the perpetrators were from the same ethnic milieu as the victims,
let alone that the victims were implicated in criminal mafia activities. Moreover, they
did not consider the not too unlikely possibility of terrorist xenophobic killings. The
media proceeded in this way in their discourse in spite of the fact that the families
and communities of the victims – which lived far from and didn’t have any relation to
each other (while the victims had all been killed through one identical gun) – had in
a more or less vehement or subdued manner denied any mafia issues and expressed
their suspicions about a xenophobic motivation for the murders. None of the press had
picked up on this – and thus effectively reinforced xenophobic and resentful attitudes
in the population.
Hence, on the level of discursive dynamics, the psychologically quite well-known
inversion mechanism of ‘blaming the victims for being victimized’ took hold of
what was said and published about these murders by police and the media. This of
course works all the more easily if the group to be blamed had already, in previous
political and media discourses, become the object of a general resentment – such as
xenophobia and islamophobia against citizens from a Turkish background in Germany.
Now, looking back from here to the governmental ‘extremism clause’ and to its
inherent discourse dynamics makes us realize a basic structural congruence. In fact,
blaming victims for being victimized and blaming those who work to reduce hate
crime and violent extremism for being the real extremists in the first place, follows
just the same logic. This logic represents a most irrational and counter-factual manner
of mental coping: it blames others for an issue or problem (hate crime, extremism,
victimization, xenophobia/ Islamophobia) in a way that distances oneself maximally
from this issue/ problem. And ‘distancing’ here means concretely: to avoid facing the
question of whether the issue has something to do with oneself personally and/or
whether oneself personally can do anything to help resolve the issue. The emotional
logic of this coping mechanism – and discourse pattern – is fear and disgust (hate
crime, violence, extremism, victimization etc.) which is then turned into an aggressive
form of projecting the issues of fear and disgust onto others and thus personalize
them – preferably with those who are closest to the problem anyhow: the victims of
the issue and/or those who work most closely with the issue.
One point to be made here is: by virtue already of its irrationality, counter-factuality,
mono-causality and lack of complexity, this coping mechanism – if put in a more
political than psychological language – might itself be justly called ‘extremist’. This
would only depend on which concept of extremism one decides to apply. Without any
20 There were a couple of scandals during spring and summer 2012 when it became known that state
and federal secret service and intelligence agencies have destroyed sensitive files shortly after the
NSU was detected, dealing with issues around the individuals of the NSU or related affairs.
15
doubt, however, this pattern of projective blaming cannot be called a conducive or
responsible manner to engage in a party-political and media discourse on vital issues
of societal life. For, as all projection – and generalized blaming – it just aggravates the
problem and thus fuels even more hate crime, violence, extremism, victimization etc.
Xenophobic murders and denial discourses: twins of right-wing extremism
in a society? – a short history of German extremism discourses.
The shockingly murderous dimension that right-wing extremism/ terrorism in
Germany seems to have, given the discovery of the NSU murder gang – and the
impact of the political discourse of denial that allowed it to stay undetected for so
many years – impel us to go back into the post-war history of political discourse a
bit further than we have done so far. In doing so we will realize first of all, that there
has always been a continuous strain of right-wing killings and bombings in post-war
Germany.21 It’s just that we didn’t know, and to put it more precisely: that knowledge
was kept from the public as much as possible – by way of political and media
discourses that work along the same lines as the present governmental discourse on
left-wing extremism. Hence, besides the tradition of right-wing extremist murders in
post-war Germany, we realize that there also has been a tradition of party-political
and media discourses that denied these murders and/or deflected from them – and
instead attempted to put the blame on “left-wing extremists”. Quite notably, this we
can only know for sure since last year when relevant files were opened!
Almost forgotten today, it was about thirty years ago that Germany had experienced
its biggest terrorist attack. The 1980 Munich Oktober-Fest bombing had killed 13 and
injured about 200 people. This bombing was never fully investigated. Bavarian state
government at that time had kept the federal office of criminal investigation (BKA)
away from the scene – and the BKA had let itself be kept from the scene. In these
weeks Bavarian long-time president Franz Josef Strauß from the far-right Christian
Social Union was running for the federal chancellorship.
In the immediate reactions of Bavarian politicians and press commentators to the
bombing, some at first suggested it was committed by the left-wing terrorist Red Army
Fraction (RAF, which was active at the time in Germany abducting or assassinating
prominent figures from ‘the system’ of German politics and business perceived as neofascist, neo-Nazi or imperialistic). After blaming the RAF didn’t prove very convincing
to many – the bombing was quite evidently very different from any attack that the
RAF would have committed (random population, untargeted, no political claims made,
the killed attacker not at all affiliated with anything like RAF etc.) – Strauß and his
party colleagues personally came out indicating that an attack of this sort could only
be attributed to the east German secret service ‘Stasi’, Russian ‘KGB’ or to Gaddafi
who was perceived to be associated with Russia and the eastern bloc. Hence, the
direction of blame pointed clearly east, to “the communists” (Der Spiegel 43/2011).
Any possibility of home grown connections to neo-Nazi organizations was discarded
entirely. Shortly thereafter, the police investigation was finalized relatively quickly.
The conclusion given was that the assassin – killed at the scene by the explosion –
proceeded as a lone actor, was mentally disturbed, had recently failed a university
exam and did not have any network or context of supporters.
Today, thirty years later some 50,000 pages of files (also GDR Stasi files) have been
opened and have reconfirmed what investigative journalism – which Bavarian and
Federal mainstream would have certainly shrugged off as “leftist press” at the time
– had already concluded not too long after the incident. The Munich terrorist bomber
had been seen by several witnesses shortly before the attack together with a group
of comrades in military outfit. He was not acting alone. Since he was killed at the
scene he was clearly identified as Gundolf Köhler whom the intelligence services at
the time knew quite well, which they, however, kept from the public entirely. Early
21 For a list of incidents see Der Spiegel 43/2011, counting 14 in the years 1978-84.
16
on in his life Köhler was deeply engaged in extremist right-wing groups of the most
violent kind (the paramilitary Hoffmann-Group, Viking Youth) and was also politically
engaged with the NPD since age 14. Köhler had quickly qualified as a most devote
follower of southern German neo-Nazism at the time. He collected Nazi items, had a
Hitler poster over his bed, was closely attached to an old SS-Nazi in his hometown
Donaueschingen, southern Germany, and was reported to state in his late teen years
that he expressively “endorsed the elimination of the Jews and the communists during
the Third Reich”.
In a conversation between Köhler and one of his comrades from the right-wing
extremist Tübinger students’ association months before the bombing, which was
recorded by the intelligence services, the talk was about the Bologna bombing in Italy
earlier in 1980. Already this bombing was at first attributed to leftist terrorists and
only later turned out to have been committed by Italian and international neo-Fascists
with the objective of influencing the Italian elections towards a center-right ballot –
which in fact did work out in the desired manner. Leading German neo-Nazi Hoffmann
whose paramilitary group Köhler belonged to early on, is known to have attended a
meeting in Bologna together with other international right-wing extremists some time
before this incident. In the conversation with his fellow student, Köhler was recorded
to have said: “One could stage a terror attack just like in Bologna, this could happen
in Munich, Cologne or Hamburg and after that one could blame it on the leftists – and
then the people would vote for Strauß”.
Köhler’s activities and his ties to the right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi scene were
well known to several state and federal intelligence agencies at the time – even before
the Munich bombing. And yet, witnesses were not interrogated, remnants of the bomb
seem to have been removed from the scene the same night and traces were not
followed or even concealed by criminal police and prosecution. When some press and
opposition parties brought up the neo-Nazi Hoffmann group which could rightfully be
suspected of engaging in violent extremist crimes of this sort, Strauß personally came
out in the Bavarian parliament and exculpated Hoffmann.
Internally, however, Strauß was quoted making statements that almost sounded as if
he had known what Köhler said to his fellow in the Tübingen student association about
“a terror attack that would eventually prompt people to vote for Strauß”. Because
Strauß himself seems to have said in reference to the bombing: “Well, let’s blame it
on the leftists”. Now, in all likeliness, while Strauß was certainly informed in detail
about Köhler’s neo-Nazi connections, he was probably not aware of what Köhler was
recorded to have said verbatim. But he didn’t need to at all. Statements like this
were commonplace among center right and conservative party politicians and their
electorate. Strauß was just following a very common standard discourse pattern of
the time that ‘blames everything on the leftists/communists’ (even if one knew full
well that this was not the case but rather the contrary was true) – a pattern which still
seems to be at work today as we saw with the 2012 minister of the CDU.
The overall objective for Strauß and the CSU was to avoid all investigation about
this – and continue the electoral campaign. And even today, in 2012, there are still
undisclosed files with the military intelligence services (“Militärischer Abschirmdienst”)
containing letters between Köhler and Hoffmann from that time. Had one begun to
further investigate the close ties Köhler had with right-wing violent extremism and
with Hoffmann in particular, the multitude of connections between CSU/ Strauß and
the German and international neo-Nazi scene would have come to the full attention of
the general public – weeks before federal elections. One of these issues, for example,
might then have been Strauß’ participation in the so-called Africa-Seminars, in which
far rightist CSU politicians, NPD members and neo-Nazi individuals from various
backgrounds had regularly congregated. The common political denominator of thus
seminar was that the “red danger” – i.e. “communism” during the cold war – was “the
biggest threat to Germany” and it has to be countered “already at the Cap”, meaning
in South Africa. Strauß and the seminar then proceeded to pay sympathy visits to
17
the South African apartheid regime in the 1970s, thus clearly following an agenda of
international racism and neo-Nazism.
As is always the case, when politicians and public service representatives from
criminal police and prosecution act unethically and lie to the public about issues
pertaining to hate crime and extremism – and when they, on top of this, turn towards
denigrating the political adversaries – the immediate consequences are not of a
merely political nature. Because then violent extremism thrives even more – and more
people get killed. In this instance it was a well known German-Jewish citizen and his
wife who were the victims.
Since politics and public prosecution went the way they did about the Munich
bombing, Hoffmann and his paramilitary group weren’t even interrogated about this
at all let alone investigated, as would have been in order given the evidence that
was there at the time and already before the bombing. Had the Hoffmann group
been investigated by criminal police and reported in the media, what occurred three
months later most probably would not have happened: Hoffmann’s then girl friend
and his second in command went to Nürnberg and killed Shlomo Levin, the nationally
renowned Jewish author, publisher and elder of the Jewish community of Nürnberg
and his wife Frieda Peoschke. Levin had repeatedly warned about the activities of the
Hoffmann group.22
In this case it was not left-wing extremists who were blamed (which would have
been entirely implausible since leftists, within these kinds of discourses, tend to be
associated as being Jewish or pro-Jewish). But the local criminal police (the federal
office, once again, was not called on the scene) and the media fell upon another
pattern of ‘blaming’ as defined above. In spite of the absence of any substantial kind
of lead or evidence the criminal police spent weeks searching for possible perpetrators
within the Jewish community. So, just like today, thirty years later, at the occasion
of the NSU murders which were called Kebab-Killings police and press already then
instinctively, and/or deliberately, blamed the victims, the Jewish community, for being
victimized. This occurred although Hoffmann’s girlfriend’s sunglasses had been left
at the crime scene and she was quickly identified as one possible owner. In fact the
police took five weeks to actually come around to interrogate Hoffmann who by that
time had been able to prepare comfortably. As a result, and since the perceived main
perpetrator, Hoffman’s second in command, had died in Lebanon shortly thereafter,
there was not enough evidence to level charges against Hoffmann for this murder.23
How much the pattern of ‘blaming’ and particularly ‘blaming left-wing extremists’ that
had occurred at the Munich bombing and in several other cases was commonplace and
not only due to the special situation of a Bavarian president running for federal office
at that time, can be recognized with yet another instance of terrorism in Germany:
the hostage taking of the Israeli Olympic team at the Games in 1972 in Munich which
was committed by the Palestinian “Black September” movement (a faction of the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO) – and eventually led to the killing of all nine
hostages and most terrorists.
Quite significant here again is the party-political discourse about this event at the
time and since. It had always been suggested by political rhetoric and media reports
that the PLO terrorists in Munich were supported by members of German left-wing
RAF terrorism (Red Army Faction). This didn’t sound implausible at all since the extraparliamentary opposition from the left in those days was generally sympathetic to the
Palestinian cause. Also RAF terrorists undertook training in PLO camps since 1970.
22 http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-81136824.html, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/
print/d-13512120.html.
23 The manner of public commemoration of this deplorable event of German post-war history tells
another quite significant story about discourse patterns. It wasn’t until 2010, thirty years later that
the city decided to name a street after the two victims. http://www.nordbayern.de/region/erlangen/
lewin-poeschke-anlage-erinnert-an-mordopfer-1.383868
18
Quite recently, in June 2012, the weekly magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ asked to see various
files about the 1972 attack which have become accessible after 40 years and which
subsequently gave some insight in what intelligence agencies have known all the
time – and had in fact, in part, known even before the hostage taking occurred in
1972: there wasn’t any German left-wing extremism involved at all with the Black
September terrorist movement and with the 1972 attack. Rather neo-Nazi individuals
and networks assisted the Black September hostage takers in their comprehensive
preparation work for the Munich attack – while it is not entirely clear to what extent
they assisted in actual transport of weapons or procured other relevant services.24
Hence, the discourse pattern was readily laid out and the public discourse was all set
when – some years later at the time of the Munich bombing – the Bavarian CSU party
leader and president Strauß suggested his ever recurring explanation: it must have
been “left-wing extremists and terrorists” – and right-wing violent extremism is not a
serious problem in Germany anyway. He did so knowing full well that this was untrue
– and that the contrary was true.
Party-political discourses are indispensible – their quality and resilience is
key
Now, basically in this paper I have just asked the simple question of what it actually
means that a young center-right minister in Germany in 2011 launched a strangely
far-fetched, wasteful and quite irrationally charged programme against “left-wing
violent extremism”– and that she then, on top of this, decreed an ‘extremism clause’
that put socially engaged civil society and community workers as well as hate crime
prevention practitioners from NGOs under suspicion of being (left-wing) extremists
– and, thus, in fact denigrated them on the whole as a group. But, in the course of
this paper it became quite obvious: The more one asks this simple question, the
more complex and shocking the issues of German right-wing extremism history were,
that came to mind – and the more troubling were the concomitant insights about the
dynamics and detrimental consequences of party-political discourses that routinely
deny right-wing terrorism and blame “leftists” of various definitions to be the root of
the problem.
To be sure, the young minster most likely was not aware of the degree of historical
interconnectedness that her rhetoric and action was embedded in – but she surely
should have been. Certainly, the elders of her center-right party, CDU, who (together
with the CSU and FDP) wrote the coalition agreement about extremism issues in
2009, should have been aware of this.25 But they were not – or chose not to be.
Hence, evidently, the party-political key persons did not know or consider the facts
and meanings of the Munich Oktober-Fest bombing of 1980, and of the subsequent
killing of Shlomo Levin, the nationally known Jewish publisher from Nürnberg, shortly
thereafter. They seemed to have had no idea about how out-of-place and detrimental
their recurring Blame-it-on-left-wing-extremists pattern actually is – and how much
it translates to a dangerously erroneous There-is-no-significant-neo-Nazi-extremismin-Germany. Hence, above all, they were not at all aware of what was and still is
pretty evidently the case in terms of the violent right-wing extremist subculture and
the everyday neo-Nazi violence especially in the eastern states of Germany since
reunification and today in 2012.
But, to make these observations about party politics and discourses even more
disheartening: the situation hasn’t changed at all! During the year since the shocking
discovery about the neo-Nazi murder gang “National Socialist Underground” was
24 http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-86486649.html, most recently there have even been
documents suggesting that there have been contacts between federal agencies and Arab
organizations which were implicated in the attacks and that for this reason there wasn’t any
prosecution in Germany about the bombing.
25 The coalition agreement from 2009: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/022/1702298.pdf.
19
made in 2011, the political discourses seem to be unaltered entirely. Rather, it became
painfully evident how rigid and unyielding these discourses are. Upon being asked to
reconsider its programme against left-wing extremism in view of the NSU murders,
the center-right federal government decidedly stated that it would nevertheless
continue with it. Also with regard to all other aspects of policy making about
countering right-wing extremism, nothing substantial has happened since – be it on
the national, state or local level. This is pretty disquieting indeed at a time when even
the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) has deemed it highly likely that small local
neo-Nazi terror groups will launch murderous attacks in the future in Germany.26
Another case in point with regard to the local level, the government of the state
of Saxony in which the NSU had lived for 12-13 years among its support network,
reiterated its perception that there is no serious problem of right-wing extremism
in Saxony. This is stated in the face of the fact that many areas and communities
in Saxony (and other eastern states) are practically under the rule of nationalist,
right-wing extremist subcultures – as was already mentioned in the case of Mügeln
above. These subcultures and organizations have, in fact, effectively infiltrated
nurseries (Kindergarten/ Kita), schools, and local governments. Also, they increasingly
manage to appear totally mainstream and even bourgeois – neo-bourgeois so to
speak – and give an air of being socially engaged for the civic society, which they, of
course, envisage to be a national German society without foreigners and minorities.
Moreover, these subcultures coincide, correspond with, and/or knowingly condone
violent extremist xenophobic factions among them that pose imminent threats to any
immigrants and civil society workers – or any perceived others – and create “zones of
fear” where hate crime incidents are quite likely to occur.27
Hence, party politicians – of the center-right parties in particular – are not aware
of the history and the actual consequences of the rhetoric they have routinely used
regarding issues of right-wing violent extremism. Not even the shocking news of the
NSU neo-Nazi murder gang was able to change this and make them more self-aware.
Why is this? It is party-political discourses that do this! These discourses seem to
be quite unchangeable and – extremely – irrational in their dynamic, and they seem
perfectly capable of sturdily defying any empirical evidence that disproves them.
In doing so, they determine to a large – and all too large – extent the content and
modes of thinking and arguing that the public and the media engage in about key
societal issues.
This notwithstanding, any free and democratic society – that is built on thinking and
arguing in the public space – depends on the quality and perceptiveness with which its
discourses evolve. This is because these discourses produce public awareness – and
consequently lead up to actual policy making. Hence, we cannot and do nor would we
want to do without political and media discourses!
This, once again, brings up our key question: What could possibly be done in terms
of rendering more resilient and responsible the ways in which political parties and
governmental representatives speak about the vitally important issues of terrorism,
extremism, and hate crime – and of effective ways of preventing it? This is a very
difficult question indeed: since, clearly, we cannot and do not want to tell politicians
what to say; nor should the media be told by anybody what to write and how to
write it. What still can be done, in order to render the party-political discourses less
misleading and detrimental as in the example above, will thus need some serious
thinking by a multidisciplinary group of people who are experts on issues of (de-)
radicalisation, politics, media and public discourses.
26 http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/extremismus-bka-warnt-vor-neuen-rechten-terrorzellena-816940.html
27 Der Spiegel 24/2012, pp. 30, “Florian, wir kriegen dich”.
20
One initial activity will certainly be of great value, namely: taking stock of political
discourses about extremism – i.e. collecting exemplary case stories throughout
EU Member States about party-political discourses and what particular impact and
consequences they have for dealing with hate crime, extremism(s) and the challenge
to safeguard and promote a free democratic society. Such collecting of case histories
about and analyses of ‘party-political discourses in action’ can be highly educational
for many, to begin with. Moreover, they eventually might also be inspirational for our
thinking about what can be done in order to secure quality and resilience with partypolitical and media discourses in general.
Also such case stories will by no means all be examples of the more problematic and
challenging kind – as the above case of the young conservative minister in Germany
of 2010-12 was. One only needs to think of the public discourse in Norway after
Breivik’s terrorist attack in 2011. This arguably was the most shocking, murderous –
and perplexing – terrorist attack in Europe since World War II. And it can certainly not
be blamed on any “left-wing extremism”, although Breivik himself and others might
not hesitate to find ways to point in this direction. In any event, the Norwegian king –
not precisely comparable with a political party – and the Norwegian civic society in an
impressive and unanimous fashion came out in those disheartening days saying that
this horrible incident will not be used as opportunity to blame anyone but instead will
be about coming together and reinforcing our common devotion to build free, diverse
and pluralistic societies in Europe.
Political parties – on the whole – should be able to do what a king can do, even if only
to show, as they claimed historically, that they can do a better job than aristocrats.
Hence, the ways in which the king of Norway and Norway’s political parties and the
public spoke would seem to qualify for a positive example of what political discourses
can do – and might be helpful for determining how other Member States and Europe
as a whole might get there in the long term.
The example of Northern Ireland: The ‘Challenge Hate Crime’ project – and
the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network
It has thus become all the more obvious: any systematic anti-hate crime and
radicalisation awareness work needs to follow the example of Northern Ireland’s
‘Challenge Hate Crime’ project (CHC). For the CHC project has systematically
approached issues of hate crime and violent extremism both on the level of targeted
social interventions and on the level of party-political rhetoric. From its very
conception the project attempted to develop and employ a preventive hate crime
intervention programme in prison and community work and at the same time produce
an analysis of the political parties’ discourses on violent extremism, group-related
hostility and on sectarianism in particular.
International exchange and best practice research further enhanced the CHC project’s
work on specialized interventions and political discourse analysis. This exchange
was at first engaged with the German NGO Violence Prevention Network (Berlin),
and then facilitated through the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which
was inaugurated directly by the European Commission in 2011 (Commissioner
Cecilia Malmström, EC Home Affairs). In particular the CHC project’s international
exchange was promoted through the RAN Working Group ‘Firstline Deradicalisation
Interventions’ which started its work in June 2012. This group’s international
participants in particular have been struck by the realization of how immensely
important the role is that party-political discourses play in all EU Member States’
efforts to engage deradicalisation, i.e. work on the reduction of hate crime and on
supporting the society’s resilience against extremism and fundamentalism.
But even this quite advanced project in many ways still is very much at the beginning.
While the project, by its new approach of addressing intervention methods and
political discourse awareness in tandem, clearly leads the way towards the future of
21
EU anti hate crime work, it will only be able to continue doing so by further enhancing
methodological development and international cross-fertilization.
One particular task that can be undertaken here, too, is – as mentioned above –
contributing to a collection of exemplary case stories about political discourses on
extremism and giving analyses of the particular impact and consequences these
discourses have for dealing with hate crime, extremism(s) and – most prominently in
Northern Ireland – with sectarianism. From here, and in close liaison with other states
and regions of the EU, these case stories and a working group will further pursue the
question of how, as a society, one can best develop one’s culture of political discourse
– so that a solid base of human rights awareness and societal resilience can be built
and maintained.
22
B The Schellenberg report on right-wing extremism and violence28
Overview
In Germany right-wing radicalism has always been “quite violent by comparison to
other countries” which have extreme right-wing movements and political parties.
Racist and xenophobic violence became a significant problem after Germany’s
reunification in particular, while it already existed on a steady level in the old Federal
Republic of Germany before 1989. The degree of violence “declined slightly in the
second half of the 1990s and has again been growing considerably since the turn
of the century” as Britta Schellenberger notes in her quintessential research on this
issue.
In east Germany, i.e. the ex-GDR states, the rates of right-wing incidents and violence
have been roughly double those in the old Federal Republic. Certain areas of east
Germany “are considered no-go areas” in which those parts of the population with an
immigrant background or who are perceived as other and foreign are at risk. Also,
the level of awareness and capacity of law enforcement and local governments is in
part inadequate in these areas. The reasons for this situation are complex. The three
major factors are: (i) the problematic economic and demographic situation in these
areas (ii) historically the fact that west German extreme right-wing structures and
political parties have invested substantial resources in east Germany in the years
after reunification, and (iii) the fact that under-cover and officially denied extremist
right-wing counter-cultures had already existed in the time of the socialist GDR
(Miteinander e.V. 2011, pp. 14)29. This situation has posed significant challenges for
any efforts to prevent hate crimes and violent extremism – coming mostly from westGerman traditions of social and civic educational work.
However, extremist right-wing parties are “relatively unsuccessful in Germany”
compared with their European counterparts. Since reunification these parties’
popularity “has shifted from the old German states to the new ones”, and “a clear
change in the ideological orientation of the parties” can be seen. The neoconservative
Republicans (REP) were successful primarily in southern Germany – historically the
region of origin of the Hitler movement in the 1920s and 30s – and the nationalist
conservative German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion, DVU) was relatively
successful in northern Germany in the early and mid-1990s. Both the DVU and the
National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands,
NPD) have been “successful in the new German states” since the late 1990s by
focusing “on social topics” in a populist and resentful manner and by creating a
nationalistic, racial platform that basically supports key tenets of historical national
socialism. Over the last years, the NPD has become a “reservoir for various radical
right-wing groups” and initiatives. “Comradeships” [Kameradschaft] and higherranking “action alliances” [Aktionbündnisse] have developed in many subcultural
milieus in east Germany. Moreover, these parties and structures provide “important
radical right-wing organizational models” in which so called “free nationalists” form a
loose group and undertake actions”.
The profile, approach, appearance and the support offered by extremist right-wing
groups to local communities have changed over the last decade. These groups have
become more attractive and to some extent more modernized and less anachronistic:
addressing “individual and societal problems”, picking up on adolescents’ “identity
issues”, producing rock music and providing leisure activities and using the Internet,
the radical right-wing has managed to get the attention of young people, in particular:
28 This section is largely drawn from: Britta Schellenberg (2009): Country Report Germany. In: Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. and published by Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Foundation), Bertelsmann Publishing. BS also refers to earlier studies by Stöss 2001, 2006,
Arzheimer 2004.
29 Hintergründe. Neonazismus und Demokratiefeindlichkeit in Sachsen-Anhalt. Ed. Miteinander e.V. Magdeburg, 2011.
23
“One effect of these changes is the DVU and NPD’s high approval ratings among young
voters in eastern Germany (10 percent to 20 percent)”.
In the past, the Federal Republic of Germany and its political system has always
conceived of itself as a strong and engaged democracy. The main objective always
was “to prevent history – the dominance of National Socialism – from repeating
itself”. An extensive legislation against radical right-wing actions was created whereby
right-wing extremism was always defined in terms of a direct “affinity for National
Socialism” which, however, needed to be unequivocally visible and attestable in
writing, symbolism, or in organizational structure. Of prime importance for warranting
any legal action was the attestable intention to overthrow the democratic state and
establish a one-party rule along the lines of the period of National Socialism during
the so-called Third Reich.
However, concerns of fundamental human rights and anti-discrimination issues have
never been in the forefront of these legislative endeavors. This has been implemented
only recently “through European Union directives”. In general, legislation is “typically
focused on offenders and does not take into account … the victims of radical rightwing and xenophobic offenses”. Moreover, incidents of ‘group-focused enmity’ as
defined by Wilhelm Heitmeyer, such as racism, xenophobia, sexism, disablist offenses
are not taken into account – and they are not recorded nor prosecuted as such under
this kind of legislature. These offenses are only noted if they are explicitly connected
with utterances of extreme right-wing attitudes.
Schellenberg summarizes: “In spite of the strength of the repressive approach –
embodied in particular by criminal legislation, constitutional protection authorities and
special police units – it has not been possible to slow the growth of radical right-wing
and xenophobic violence” especially in the east but also in the west of the German
Republic. What seems to be missing is a solid awareness in the judiciary and the
police of threats and risks caused by right-wing extremism and the readiness to work
with de facto and potential victims. Both the awareness in state institutions and in the
public and the media are at stake here and need to be supported.
In spite of the obvious fact that right-wing extremism has increased in scope and
intensity since the early 1990s, and especially since 2000, there is “neither a
central coordination office that could concentrate and guide political activities nor a
comprehensive strategy or action agenda”. Instead, various institutions of the state
and private sector take their own individual approaches without coordinating these
activities. The main problem here is the implementation of “short-term activities that
are not anchored structurally”.
However, there was some degree of systematic effort to counter the increase of
radical right-wing activities and hate crime violence. A specific Action Program
against Aggression and Violence (Aktionsprogramm gegen Aggression und Gewalt)
was initiated in East Germany in the 1990s, and a nationwide program ‘Youth for
Tolerance and Democracy – against Right-wing Extremism, Xenophobia and AntiSemitism’ (Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus,
Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus) started in 2001. In 2007 the program was
called ‘Diversity is productive. Youth for Diversity, Toleranz and Democracy’ (Vielfalt
tut gut. Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie). The Federal Program is still
in force in a somewhat changed form – also including the aforementioned initiative
against left-wing extremism and also against Islamism/Jihadism, and the respective
complications around party-political discourses and agendas.
Remarkably, the objectives and pedagogical perspective of these federal programs
and similar state and independent programs to prevent right-wing extremism have
changed over the last 20 years. They developed from being programs to prevent
violent behavior towards programs that primarily supported civic awareness raising
24
and democratic values in the general population and in at risk communities. Over
the last couple of years the programs attempted to compromise between the two
different approaches and “aim to promote diversity, tolerance and democracy to
various target groups”. The reproach against the earlier approach was – to some
extent justly to some extent unjustly – that the anti-violence training and the work
with disenfranchised and hard to engage young people in the east of the republic was
too sympathetic and too caring and did not confront them with the consequences of
their violent and extremist behavior and neo-Nazi ideology. The reproach towards the
more recent projects is that they hardly deal with the perpetrators and at risk young
people any more – not even with violent extremist offenders in prison and probation,
thus losing sight of the fact that these offenders have a recidivism rate of 80% and
already for that reason need to be subjected to special intervention programs.
As to the parliamentary procedures, it is regarded as a given for all political parties in
Germany that there will never be any cooperation with radical right-wing parties in the
state and local parliaments or elsewhere. However, there are some positions of rightwing radical party representatives which are not strictly and unequivocally refuted
by mainstream parties – especially by conservative party members, such as the call
for a stop to immigration or for the expulsion of unemployed or criminal “foreigners”.
Some of these stances are also discussed and in part defended by non radical parties
– attesting to the fact that party-political discourses are key for any initiative of
Radicalisation Awareness (see above).
Generally, however, civic society’s awareness about the nature of hate crime and
extremist attitudes and behaviors has clearly risen in comparison to the early 1990s
and “right-wing radicalism and xenophobic violence are being taken seriously” by
central government and civic society. This, however, does not apply to many local
communities, small cities and to all German states (see above on Saxony and other
states and regions in east Germany).
Especially in the west German states, civic society engagement against right-wing
radicalism is quite frequent above all in the major cities. There “spontaneous,
unorganized involvement of citizens against right-wing radicalism can be seen” as
for instance “candle-lit demonstrations after violent attacks, protests against the
construction of radical right-wing training centers and demonstrations against the
(extreme right-wing party) NPD”. However, in east German states (of the former
GDR), such civil society engagement is often missing. Britta Schellenberg and most
other experts suggest: “Government support is crucial to longer-term involvement”.
This also includes the activities of some foundations (EVZ, Amadeu Antonio, and
others). Also: as in many eastern European countries which do not yet have fully
fledged counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programs, “victim-assistance” and
monitoring programs “have proven to be especially successful in eastern Germany”.
These programs “provide aid to victims, document attacks and contribute significantly
to illuminating the victim’s point of view through public-relations work”.
Particularly important at this point in time seems to be the objective of addressing
right-wing and other forms of extremism as well as the issue of hate crime in local
institutions (also statutory, e.g. the police, nurseries) registered associations and clubs
(sports clubs) since they are subject to “radical right-wing infiltration strategies and/or
spread radical right-wing ideology”, in particular xenophobia and resentment against
other core target groups of hate crime. Especially within German soccer clubs and
associations there have been some initiatives and there are plans to do more. Britta
Schellenberg concludes: “On a critical note, civic actors seldom operate in a targeted
political fashion in the Federal Republic of Germany, e.g., they do very little to monitor
government reporting practices or pursue test cases to help shape case law.”
25
The History and Structure of the radical right
• History
Around 1900 German society changed to the effect that anti-Semitism increased in a
formerly relatively well-integrated society with many assimilated Jewish citizens and
the “initially liberally minded nationalism” changed “to a radical nationalism”: “The
cornerstone was laid for right-wing extremism”. Key factors for this change were “the
formation of the German nation-state in 1871 and the Industrial Revolution” which hit
Germany in a somewhat belated and yet all the more intense manner causing many
social problems and anxieties at the time.
Radical nationalism was a central motivation during the time of World War I.
Nationalism understood itself “as the true representative of the interests of the
German people” and as “opposition to the system”. Populist ideas and antiSemitic attitudes along with the racial theories emerged at the time. Moreover “an
authoritarian and aggressive attitude toward its enemies or opponents within and
outside Germany” developed. “National Socialism tied in directly with the nationalist
opposition before 1918”, but it amplified the “racist, anti-Semitic and anti-capitalistic
components” of such earlier discourses. Moreover signs of a “persecution complex”
on the level of national psychology appeared, including “conspiracy theories” and
irrational fears of overcrowding by foreigners, combined with a “megalomaniac sense”
of German identity which also encompassed the “myth of the master race”.
The extremist right-wing movement “was undergoing a serious crisis” after the two
world wars which left Germany destroyed, its size diminished and it being occupied
by the Allies. “National Socialism’s form of rule was discredited with the German
population to a great extent, although the ideology continued to be widespread.”
“After 1945, right-wing extremism in Germany had the option to tie into either
the ideological tradition of National Socialism or that of German nationalism. All
of Germany’s relevant right-wing parties and organizations oriented themselves –
personnel and platform – on National Socialism. They therefore are considered “old”
right-wing parties. “Attempts to establish a modern right-wing party free of the legacy
of National Socialism, such as the League of Free Citizens (Bund freier Bürger) or the
Schill Party (in the 1990s), have failed.”
“The relationship to National Socialism was most clearly revealed in the Socialist
Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands, SRD), which developed in the
immediate post-war period. Former NSDAP (Nazi party) activists were deliberately
recruited by the party leadership. Many of the NSDAP’s political objectives were
adopted. In 1951, the SRD won 11 percent of the vote in Lower Saxony and 7.7
percent in Bremen. In 1952, it became the first party in the country’s history to
be banned. An additional group that was close to both National Socialism and the
extreme wing of Weimar conservatism was the German Reich Party. It merged with
several other right-wing factions in 1964 to become the National Democratic Party
of Germany (NPD). The NPD platform initially included a varied mixture of National
Socialist, anti-communist and – at first – conservative Catholic elements. The core
demands of the party were German reunification and revision of the Oder-Neisse Line
(defining the border towards Poland after 1945). Between 1966 and 1968, the young
party was represented in seven state parliaments. After its astonishing failure in the
1969 Bundestag election (4.3 percent of the votes), it was torn apart by internal
squabbling over its direction and was not able to gain in strength again until 2000.”
“In the 1970s and early 1980s, right-wing radicalism underwent fragmentation and
radicalisation at the same time. It developed into three different forces: first, an
action-oriented wing from which neo-Nazi brigades formed, some of which engaged
in terrorist acts. These groups included Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann, founded in
1973. Second was a more intellectual wing, which sprouted national revolutionary
groups, some of which got involved in the environmental movement. Finally (there
26
were) the national-conservative forces from which the DVU formed in 1971, along
with the Republicans, which came on the scene a good decade later. Arising in
1983 from neoconservative circles out of discontent with the conservative parties
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Christlich Demokratische Union/
Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU/CSU), the Republicans aimed to bring about a right-wing
conservative ‘spiritual and moral reversal’.”
“In the early 1990s, the incidence of radical right-wing violence in Germany increased
significantly. West German cadres used the disbanding of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) to build up organizational structures in the new states. Since the
1990s, right-wing radicalism has been in flux: membership numbers for radical rightwing parties are decreasing while the relative prominence of the violence-prone
subcultures and neo-Nazis is increasing. No-go areas have developed in some areas of
the new states, where members of certain population groups face considerable threats
to their safety.”
• Actors of the far right and extremist right (1990–2008). Electoral success,
political parties
In her chapter on political parties, actors of the far right and extremist right and their
electoral success, Britta Schellenberg stresses: “The electoral success of radical rightwing parties is relatively low in Germany compared with the rest of Europe. Only in
state parliamentary and local elections have radical right-wing parties achieved any
(largely minor) success. At the national level likewise – with the exception of the
Republicans in 1994 – they are unsuccessful in European elections” (for the election
figures and tables see BS pp. 183).
“Support for the parties not only is relatively low in comparison to the rest of Europe
but also shows little continuity. Nevertheless, the latest electoral successes for the
NPD (and DVU) in eastern Germany, in particular, should be taken seriously, because
they are based on broader support, primarily from young voters who are being
socialized in radical right-wing subcultures. In 2004, before the Landtag elections in
Brandenburg and Saxony, the NPD and the DVU made an electoral pact called the
Germany Pact. Eliminating radical right-wing competition makes it more likely that
they can jump the five percent hurdle needed to gain admission to Parliament in
Germany. REP: 10.9 percent in Baden-Württemberg (1992), 9.1 percent in BadenWürttemberg (1996).”
The figures for the other states are comparable – and range between 4 and 12
percent. Particularly noteworthy in looking back from today is the scope and profile of
the NPD since it is to this day the most successful extremist right-wing party and was
indirectly implicated in the NUS murder gang support.
“The NPD has a nationalistic, populist platform that also includes anti-capitalistic
and national-revolutionary elements while advocating a national socialism. It openly
espouses biologistic racism and pursues policy on this basis … It is experiencing
electoral success in the new states, where it has a strong and steadily growing
base. After decades of low membership, its ranks are slowly swelling. In recent
years, the NPD has again developed into the most attractive radical right-wing party.
It integrates various radical right-wing organizations and groups, including the
comradeships. It intensively targets young people for example, in 2007 it distributed a
free CD, the NPD-Schulhof-CD (school yard CD) in various versions showcasing radical
right-wing singer-songwriters and musical groups, along with a comic book advertising
the movement.”
27
• Local Elections
“Representatives of the DVU, NPD and REP, as well as Citizens’ Initiative – No More
Foreigners (Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp) in Nuremberg and Munich, and PRO Köln
in Cologne, sit on some county councils, city councils, and municipal councils. PRO
Köln and Citizens’ Initiative – No More Foreigners primarily fuel xenophobic, especially
anti-Muslim, sentiments and are working against the construction of mosques, for
instance.”
“Taken as whole, these parties were able to win only isolated seats, largely in the new
states. However, these amount to more than 200 representatives of radical right-wing
parties sitting on German county councils – in eastern and western Germany.” (In
terms of percentage see BS pp. 185)
• Subcultural milieu – pop music, dress codes and labels, and comradeships
“Today’s radical right-wing scene can draw on a wide range of radical right-wing
music, clothes and stylish accessories and identifies itself using codes. All of these
reveal their connections to National Socialism. Radical right-wing music is increasingly
gaining in profile and popularity among young people – not least because its quality
and variety have improved. Offerings range from heavy metal to rock and schmaltzy
ballads. The Zillertaler Türkenjäger, Landser, Annett and Faustrecht are some of
the most popular right-wing rockers, though German bands by no means have a
monopoly.”
• Dress codes and labels – as being relevant for intervention and prevention
approaches
“Radical right-wing shops and mail-order companies selling stylish right-wing radical
outfits have also gained a foothold. Currently in vogue are dark T-shirts, hooded
sweatshirts, sneakers and shirts emblazoned with the scene’s names, codes and
symbols. In addition, certain clothing brands (Thor Steinar, CONSTAPLE and Walhalla)
signify affiliation with the radical right-wing scene. Going beyond the combat boots
and bomber jackets of yore today’s radical right-wing outfits appeal to many different
tastes.”
“Another typical part of the young radical right-wing scene is the codes that now
adorn street signs, subway entrances and building walls across Germany. The codes
(such as “88,” a reference to “Heil Hitler” – the eighth letter of the alphabet twice, or
HH) refer to symbols from and persons involved in the National Socialist movement.
These codes perform a double function: First, they are a way to circumvent repressive
state measures and second, they are a stylistic device – a kind of secret language that
right-wing radicals from different groups and areas can understand, integrating them
with each other.”
• “Free comradeships” [Kameradschaft] and “action alliances”
[Aktionsbündnisse] as forms of social interaction – a focus on Saxony
The forms of social organization and inter-group relations are key for any approaches
of preventive and intervention work. Moreover, in terms of legal action, only few of the
comradeships could be forbidden by state authorities.
“The radical and violence-prone segment of this somewhat unpredictable right-wing
scene is organized into local free comradeships, which are strongly networked and
to some extent affiliated in regional action alliances (Aktionsbündnissen). They see
themselves as a part of the “national resistance,” a radical right-wing united front. In
Germany, there are about 150 locally and nationally operating comradeships, each
with some five to 20 members. The stronghold is in Saxony, where there are about
40 comradeships. Both comradeships and action alliances are important radical rightwing organizational models in which “free nationalists” form loose partnerships,
28
primarily for social purposes. Examples of their activities include pagan celebrations
(summer solstice parties), going to concerts and travelling to demonstrations and
other radical right-wing events. Often they are also responsible for violent attacks and
for the establishment of “no-go areas” – regions where members of certain population
groups especially face violent attacks and where their safety is not guaranteed.
The comradeships’ loose‚ autonomous structures helped them avoid government
repression to some degree, and initially only a few comradeships were forbidden
(such as the Comradeship of Oberhavel and the skinhead comradeship Skinheads
Sächsische Schweiz).”
Demographic structure of the voters and supporters – potential right-wing
extremists – crimes and acts of violence
• Activists and voters – shift between the 90s and 2000 and young voters
“Until the mid-1990s, radical right-wing parties achieved better electoral results
in western Germany than in eastern Germany. Since the end of the 1990s, their
popularity – especially that of the radical NPD – is greater in the east than in the west.
Radical right-wing voters are frequently male, under 29 years old and members of
the underclass. Surprisingly, a particularly large number of young people in eastern
Germany vote for the radical right, although they belong to the generation that is
least attuned to the radical right-wing. Even in states like Saxony-Anhalt, where the
DVU could not get into Parliament, ten percent of those under 29 voted for a radical
right-wing party. In Saxony and Brandenburg, it was as high as 21 percent.”
• Potential right-wing extremists – 38,600 right-wing extremists?
“The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution” (Verfassungsschutz)
estimates that there could be as many as 38,600 right-wing extremists in Germany
(2006). Overall, figures have been falling for many years; this applies primarily to the
membership numbers of the Republicans and the DVU. In contrast, the number of
violence-prone right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis is increasing.”
“The loss of membership corresponds to a general decrease in party membership
in Germany, but it can also be traced to repression by the judiciary, the police and
the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. This repression has led,
among other things, to the fact that the scene is increasingly tending toward looser
organization (for example, in comradeships). Thus, the Interior Ministry’s findings
indicating a clear decline in the number of persons potentially involved in right-wing
radicalism must be put into perspective: current trends in right-wing radicalism make
it more difficult to record data about activists and scene members.”
• Crimes and acts of violence – significant upward trend
“After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the number of radical right-wing crimes and
acts of violence increased dramatically. Only in the second half of the 1990s did it
fall slightly, and then in 2000 it resumed a significant upward trend. In the last six
years, it has climbed by 12.2 percent (see figure). At this stage, the recorded offenses
have regrettably reached a new high, at almost 17,600 criminal acts and about 1,050
acts of violence. This means that, on average, two or three violent radical right-wing
attacks take place in the Federal Republic of Germany every day. The probability of
becoming a victim of radical right-wing violence is four times as high in the new states
as in the west.”
“About half the right-wing extremist acts of violence recorded by the Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution in 2006 were xenophobic (484) or anti-Semitic
(43). Another substantial share of the violence is directed against (putative) left-wing
extremists (302) and other political opponents (91). These acts of violence are almost
exclusively bodily harm. According to victim reports compiled by NGOs and journalists,
between 131 and 135 victims died from 1990 to 2006.”
29
“Most of the criminal acts are propaganda offenses (12,627). These include activities
(such as the use of anti-constitutional symbols) whose prohibition must be understood
as a characteristic feature of Germany’s “fortified democracy” and which are not
prosecuted at the European level. Comparisons can be made with the situation before
2001 only to a limited extent, as the Federal Office changed the recording method in
2001.”
“This means that in Germany one right-wing extremist criminal act is recorded almost
every hour.”
Political key topics – leitmotivs/ topics within extremist right-wing
arguments – enemy images – political objectives – society’s perception – to
be reckoned with in any civic education setting
“The platforms of radical right-wing parties and organizations have their roots in
National Socialism. Dominant elements are as follows:
- sharp criticism of the established parties, which are represented as betrayers of
the national interest
- the intention to overthrow the existing system
- anti-Semitism
- anti-Americanism
- xenophobia and racism
- efforts to relativize and glorify National Socialism
- the desire to restore the ‘German Reich’
In recent times, radical right-wingers have increasingly devoted themselves to social
topics and tried to position themselves as advocates for disadvantaged people. Among
the current topics are
- protesting against Hartz IV (basic benefits for the unemployed and welfare
recipients)
- criticism of globalization
- anti-capitalism
In contrast to Marxist criticism of capitalism, they blame neither ‘capital’ nor ‘class
injustice’ for the (supposedly) difficult circumstances of society. The fault lies with
the ‘enemies’ of the right-wing radicals, such as foreigners and Jews. This self-styled
victimhood is typical of the radical right.”
• Concepts/ images of the enemy – hence, implicit target groups of hate
crime
“All groups and individuals that could detract from or change the’ homogenous
German nation’ and the ‘will of the People’ count as enemies. In particular, these
include Jews, immigrants or foreigners, blacks, Asians, homosexuals, people with
disabilities, punks, left-wingers, elites and the democratic, constitutional state and its
representatives (above all politicians, police and the judiciary). These ‘enemies’ are
seen as a ‘misfortune’ for the ‘people.’ In texts and speeches, reference is often made
to the respective enemy groups and to individuals (‘the Jew’).”
• Right-wing radicals’ objectives – potential of threat – thus, key issues for
concept of prevention
“The objectives of right-wing radicals (destruction of the basic liberal democratic order,
aggressive expansion of German borders, combat against or destruction of “enemies”
within and beyond Germany) are diametrically opposed to those of the basic liberal
democratic order. At present, actually implementing these objectives is utterly
unrealistic.
30
However, right-wing radicals pose an immediate danger in the following areas:
- Threats to people through radical right-wing discrimination and acts of violence.
- Threats to maintenance of public safety in areas where the radical right has a
strong presence. Establishment of no-go areas for “enemies” of the right-wing
radicals.
- Threat of an exodus of immigrants from areas where the radical right has a strong
presence.
- Creeping acceptance of right-wing radicalism and the propagation of radical rightwing attitudes through the spread of radical right-wing music among young people
as well a growing presence on the Internet.
- Expansion of the scene through radical right-wing leisure activities in areas with
weak infrastructure and few other offerings for young people, as well as through
partial infiltration in clubs and associations.
The spread of radical right-wing, primarily xenophobic attitudes among the German
population (see below) suggests that right-wing radicalism has not reached its full
potential and could well endanger social cohesion in a pluralistic society.”
• Society’s perception of the radical right
“Currently, radical right-wing parties are making little headway and gaining little
credibility, in part because of incompetence, corruption and inadequacy among
their ranks and in part because their closeness to National Socialism goes far to
discredit them. The NPD is trying to counteract reservations through such activities as
launching ostensibly independent citizens’ initiatives against foreigners moving in or
against the construction of mosques. Above all, the xenophobia widespread in some
segments of the population gives right-wing radicals a foothold. At present, they can
make their mark primarily through social topics”.
BS further remarks that nowadays “criticism of capitalism, vilification of politicians
and criticism of the system’ … skepticism about democracy “find a wide audience in
general and have to do with “fears of economic losses and worry about their future”.
Also relevant is the research done by Brähler / Decker on the widespread prejudice
and partially extremist right-wing attitudes within a solid 15-20% of German
population. This research appeared after BSs study in 2007 and 2010 in two major
studies:
(1) Vom Rand zur Mitte (From the Fringe to the Center) (Brähler / Decker 2007) and
(2) Die Mitte in der Krise (The Center in the Crisis) (Brähler / Decker 2010)
by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democratic Party Foundation)
Socio-political environment – widespread ethnic stereotypes, political fears
and prejudices. A constant challenge for countering hate crime and violent
extremism
“Opinion polls show that about 16 percent of Germany’s population is right-wing
radical, and 20 percent to 50 percent is xenophobic. According to a study by the
University of Leipzig on behalf of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, nearly 70 percent
of Germans believe there are too many foreigners living in Germany. Nearly 40
percent believe that the Federal Republic of Germany is ‘being watered down to a
dangerous extent by so many foreigners.’ More than 45 percent agreed somewhat or
completely with the statement ‘Foreigners are coming here only to take advantage
of our welfare state’ (Decker and Brähler 2006: 32–34). Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s study
on group-focused enmity (GFE) determined similarly high approval figures for
xenophobic statements. The study, which has collected data annually since 2002 and
can therefore highlight developments, documents an almost continuous increase in
31
xenophobia over the years; it has also shown an increase in anti-Semitic attitudes
and above all a precipitous climb in Islamophobia among the German population.
According to the latest survey, 20.9 percent of Germans agree with the statement that
it would be ‘better not to have any Muslims in Germany’ and 24.3 percent agree with
the statement that Muslim ‘immigration to Germany should be prohibited.’ The study
further shows an interrelationship among various prejudices – a ‘syndrome of groupfocused enmity.’ Increasingly, prejudice is also being directed at the homeless and the
unemployed (Heitmeyer 2002–2007). Another recent development is the spread of a
new form of anti-Semitism.”
“… approval figures for openly anti-Semitic statements are relatively high. More than
13 percent of those surveyed in 2005 and 2006 agreed with the statement ‘the Jews
are more prone than other people to use nasty tricks’ and ‘the Jews simply have
something unusual and peculiar about them and do not fit in well with us’ (Decker and
Brähler 2006). “
• Some preliminary observations and conclusions on the current situation
with right-wing extremism
In her outlook in the year 2008 Schellenberg concludes that the upward trend in hate
crimes and acts of extremist motivated violence ought not be overlooked nor belittled.
The “magnitude” of these occurrences “has been growing for many years” and there is
no decline in sight.
Today, in the year 2012 this judgment must be reaffirmed. Indeed, the extremist NPD
party has been on an “upward trend” ever since – and it remains to be seen whether
the uncovering of the personal ties between NPD people and the NSU neo-Nazi murder
gang in the late 90s and early in the 2000s will have any effect on the further success
of the NPD today: “The party and the radical right in general could experience an
increase in prestige if they continue to gain legitimacy among the population.”
It has often been remarked how “paradoxical” the situation is with the NPD being a
part of the German party system. For, the NPD is a party which can openly be accused
of being a “threat to the constitutional order”. And there is plenty of evidence that
proves this. However, the legal attempts that have been made to ban the NPD and
which would take quite substantial monetary funds from them, have failed. This was
because it was found that there are too many undercover secret service people in the
NPD and in too high level positions to make a ban of the party legitimate – without
uncovering these secret service agents.
Indeed, whoever studies the NSU murder gang case will be struck by the fact that
the young NSU members had contact with the local leader of the NPD and of the
“Thüringer Heimatschutz”, another local extreme right organization. Both of these
leading figures for the young soon to be murderers were undercover agents! – or
rather: they were hired in that function by the service.
The first futile attempt to ban the NPD was undertaken in 2001 and it took until 2003
before it became clear that the Intelligence Service will not reveal its agents. Thus, an
unconstitutional party remains a legitimate, active party – a contradiction which does
not help to restore public trust in the state and in liberal democracy.
All the more effective will be the NPD party’s strategy of “using citizens’ initiatives
(such as Citizens’ Initiative – No More Foreigners)” to gain further popularity and win
support for radical positions. There were also citizens’ movements against the building
of mosques or against reintegrating sexual offenders in the community – and many
other sensitive issues like this. In this sense it is social and community topics which
the NPD and any other extremist organization will continue to hinge on. Especially
“Islamophobia and xenophobia” will constitute the major risks for societal resilience.
32
Schellenberg further concludes that it, however, “remains doubtful whether they (the
NPD and extremist forces) can summon the strength and consistency to establish
themselves as political actors to be taken seriously” and that some signs indicate that
“in the near future in Germany, the left is more likely to attract these voters to its
party ranks”. Here, much will depend on how the Internet will be used and protected,
how successful radical right-wing actors will be in continuing “to forge ties with young
people and families through leisure activities and outreach” thus promoting the
“creeping acceptance of right-wing radicalism and radicalisation of young people” and
how the “propagation of radical right-wing music” will proceed “which is proving to be
a ‘gateway drug’ into the radical right-wing mindscape”.
The latter point especially must be emphasized today, since it was the UK based Blood
and Honour group, spreading rightist music and ideology, which seemed to have been
most influential during the formative years of the NSU murder gang.
This all will “depend on repression and prevention measures, as well as government
programs”.
Shortcomings in data collecting and monitoring – the current state of data
concerning the radical right in Germany
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) rates the quality of
the ‘official criminal justice data collection mechanisms on racist crime/violence’
in Germany as ‘good’ and … as those of Austria and Sweden, “exemplary in their
recording of radical right-wing activities”. “Like France, these countries also document
anti-Semitic incidents.” The higher rating, ‘comprehensive data-collection’ mechanisms
was only reached by Finland and the United Kingdom. This comprehensive data
collection also provides information “about characteristics of the victims and the
attack’s location”. However, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of
‘politically motivated crimes’ plays the most focal role in order to protect the basic
liberal democratic order from extremist endeavors to overthrow it. Thus, violations of
human rights are not necessarily the parameter of this ambition – and they are not
registered as extremist offenses.
Especially the Brandenburg Victims’ Perspective association (Opferperspektive
Brandenburg) seems to be outstanding in Germany in collecting extensive data about
the victims of radical right-wing violence.
Shortcomings of data-collecting according to Schellenberg are as follows:
- “Offenses are recorded exclusively as ‘politically right oriented’ and are assigned
to the sphere of ‘right-wing extremism.’ Improved data collection would have
to record racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts as such. They are not always
motivated by right-wing extremism or the political right.
- The statistical methods of data collection must be further developed so that cases
of discrimination and racist or hate crimes are recorded systematically, thereby
meeting the requirements of international government reporting (cf. Human Rights
Forum 2007a). Currently, only acts relevant to criminal law are recorded. Thus,
discrimination in the workplace or housing market, for example, has (thus far)
remained unmentioned.
- There is no overview of the (potential) victims and the places the attacks
took place. No data are recorded regarding this. These statistics could provide
information for improved prevention work as well as for improved criminal laws.
- There is no cooperation between governmental and civic organizations in collecting
the data. No official data comparison takes place.
- There are no public data about the location and number of persons belonging
to specific minorities that have not yet been settled for a long time in Germany.
Effective legislation (e.g. victim protection) and initiatives could be developed from
here.”
33
Jurisdiction and law enforcement – legal strategies against the radical right
Everybody in Germany knows the concept of ‘wehrhafte Demokratie’ which translates
as ‘fortified democracy’ and means that – in the wake of National Socialism – all
government organizations strive “to prevent history – namely, the dominance of
National Socialism – from repeating itself”. Legislation is one major aspect of this
overarching effort: “German law is directed strictly against all actors and efforts
showing a relationship with National Socialism”. Germany’s political system rests
on a concept of a liberal and open-minded democratic order and is intent to defend
this concept – which however, is not identical with protecting human rights and
acknowledging victims of hate crime.
“Against this backdrop, the comprehensive legislation against offenses described
as right-wing extremist in Germany is to be understood as follows: Anything that
is hostile to the Constitution or demonstrates an affinity for National Socialism,
whether in writing, speech, symbolism or structure, is banned. The high tally of
propaganda offenses (for instance, wearing of Nazi symbols) recorded annually
proves that the legislature pays close attention to the surface structure of criminal
acts. However, neither the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) nor the German penal code
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) explicitly addresses (potential) victims of right-wing radicals
and their protection. Protection from discrimination and esteem for (cultural) diversity
are ideas that still sound rather new and unsettling in public debates in Germany.
Presently, group focused enmity as the motivation underlying radical right-wing acts is
not necessarily prosecuted”.
• Basic Law and the German penal code
“The following repressive legislation has been enacted against any extremism
considered anti-constitutional, which includes all forms of Nazism:
- A ban on anti-constitutional political parties (GG, Art. 21, Para. 2) by the Federal
Constitutional Court.
- A ban on anti-constitutional associations (GG and §3 I VereinsG [Association Law])
by the national and state interior ministries.
- A ban on anti-constitutional publications (BVerSchG §§3.4 [Constitution Protection
Law]).
- Penalties for banned political activities: violating a ban of an organization (§85
StGB), disseminating propaganda of unconstitutional organizations (§86 StGB),
using symbols of unconstitutional organizations (§86a StGB), publicly inciting to
crime (§111 StGB), forming terrorist organizations (§129a StGB), disseminating
writings that agitate the people; approving of, downplaying or denying the
Holocaust; publicly approving of, glorifying or sanctioning the rule of National
Socialism in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace and violating the
dignity of the victims (§130 StGB); glorifying violence (§131 StGB).
- The dissolution of public gatherings and bans on demonstrations by the police and
courts. New legislation: as of 2005, it has been easier to enact appropriate bans or
restrictions at certain memorial locations associated with National Socialism. A ban
on demonstrations applies, among other places, at the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe in Berlin (Versammlungsgestz [Assembly Law] §15 Para. 2).”
Since 1992, the federal Ministry of the Interior and state ministries of the interior/
senates “have banned 26 extreme right-wing organizations”. However, in some local
communities – e.g. in Saxony – mayors hesitate to press for such bans because of
the dominant power structures and the fear of being harassed. Also current forms of
extremism are difficult to struggle against by means of legal action – and show the
importance of intelligent methods of preventing and countering hate crime and violent
radicalisation.
34
“As an example, -- the judgment against the radical right-wing music band Landser
(whose name is an old word for a German private army after WW I) set a precedent
for a judgment against radical right-wing music and musicians. The three band
members were convicted in 2005 of forming a criminal organization that, through the
manufacture and distribution of CDs, committed such criminal acts as agitation of the
people, dissemination of propaganda of unconstitutional organizations, disparagement
of the state, and so on. These proceedings were initiated because it was determined
that listening to Landser music, such as Africa Song (Afrika-Lied), results in radical
right-wing acts of violence. The case shows how complicated it is to take action with
established legal instruments against current forms of right-wing extremism, e.g.,
bands and comradeships. Although members of bands conceal their identity to evade
repressive pressure, and right-wing extremists now form ‘loose’ comradeships, this
has done little to reduce right-wing extremism and its threat. On a critical note, the
conviction of the band Landser in no way diminished the music’s popularity with its
listeners, which was the starting point for the proceedings. On the contrary: Landser
and its lead singer ‘Lunikoff’ – who has since been released – have attained cult status
on the scene. ‘Free Lunikoff’ campaigns that started as a result of the conviction
actually bonded the scene.”
• Jurisdiction
“The federal and state interior ministry-based authorities focused on protecting the
Constitution are required to conduct surveillance on endeavors that are incompatible
with the Basic Law. They are charged with informing the people and the Parliament
about such activities and carrying out a threat assessment. Annually, and in some
cases every six months as well, corresponding Constitution protection reports are
published. The surveillance of right-wing extremism plays a prominent role. (www.
verfassungsschutz.de)” .
“In most cases, jurisdiction for prosecuting criminal acts committed by right-wing
extremists lies with the states. If the act is directed, however, at compromising
the nation’s internal structure or its constitutional principles, the attorney general
prosecutes the case at the Federal Constitutional Court. From 2001 to 2005, the
attorney general handled seven cases.”
“The states can be supported by the federal police (e.g., in the case of radical rightwing demonstrations). The number of these support deployments has increased
substantially in recent years.”
• The recording of criminal and unconstitutional acts – ‘politically motivated
crimes’, a new concept since 2001
“In 2001, with the introduction of a new reporting and logging system, the focus was
expanded from (right-wing) extremist acts to politically motivated crimes in general.
An act is considered to be politically motivated if the circumstances of the act or the
attitude of the offender allow one to conclude that the act was directed against a
person on account of his or her politics, ethnicity, nationality, race, skin color, religion,
ideology, origin, sexual orientation, handicap, physical appearance or social status.
Also, the new Criminal Investigation Registration Service – Politically Motivated Crime
(Kriminalpolizeilichen Meldedienst – Politisch motivierte Kriminalität, KPMD – PMK) has
made it possible to collect statistics throughout Germany.”
“The precise recording of criminal acts motivated by right-wing radicalism, or
criminal acts that are directed against the Constitution, has always been a concern for
Germany – as a way to deliberately distance itself from National Socialism.”
The move towards the concept of ‘politically motivated crimes’ is in principle helpful
– and might be considered a first step to a more comprehensive and practical
perspective on violent extremism and hate crime.
35
If one were to be critical, however, the criterion ‘politically’ imposes restrictions on
the usefulness of the term in countering hate crime – and incidents of ‘group-focused
enmity’ (a concept by Wilhelm Heitmeyer) in society. “No record is kept of ‘ordinary’
crimes – such as arson, bodily harm and slander or libel – that qualify as hate crimes.
The recording criteria fall short here, most of all because group-focused enmity (such
as racism) is reduced to politically motivated right-wing extremism. This creates
problems for good record-keeping.”
The fact that “the penalties for such crimes are not necessarily increased on account
of the perpetrator’s motivation” and the group-focused enmity and hostility, might
be seen as controversial. While Schellenberg tends to critique this fact and argue for
tougher sentences, the experience has been that tougher sentences do not really have
much of an effect if they are not followed by intense deradicalisation work done in
prison and probation.
• Further relevant legislation – Citizenship and immigration law (jus
sanguinis versus jus soli)
“After the change of governments in 1998, Germany began to understand that it had
become a magnet country for immigration. This contradicted the conventional notion –
in line with radical right-wing convictions – of a German people based on blood lines,
to which individuals who are not of German descent cannot belong. The conviction
that Germany is a magnet country for immigration has only recently taken hold in
all parties – except the right-wing radicals. Demographic change and a shortage of
qualified skilled workers argued for a new immigration policy.”
“The reformed Citizenship Law (Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht) from 2000 contradicts a
purely ethnic definition of German nationality. Until that point, the descent principle
(jus sanguinis, citizenship by blood) from 1913 applied. The new Citizenship Law
added the territorial principle (jus soli, citizenship by birth). Under the new law,
foreigners born in Germany can automatically acquire German citizenship if they
meet certain requirements (depending on the parents’ residency status.). This change
in the Citizenship Law was accompanied by intensive public debates. Human-rights
organizations lament that the concept of ‘nationality’ based on a blood relationship
lingers in legal practice and in people’s minds (Human Rights Forum 2007a: 6).
In addition, more recent debates have shown that hurdles should be built into the
acquisition of citizenship, especially for Muslims, which has already had an impact on
practice.”
“The Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) of 2002/2004 reflects Germany’s new
self-image as a magnet country for immigration. In addition, the new Immigration Act
has made it easier for foreigners to move to Germany. This new law has initiated a
master plan that encompasses all areas of immigration, thereby allowing management
of immigration. At its core is the reorganization of the Aliens Act/Residency Act
(Ausländerrecht/Aufenthaltsgesetz). Although the Immigration Act was embraced by
the majority of organizations (such as trade unions and churches), human-rights and
refugee organizations criticize parts of the act as discriminatory and restrictive. And
in fact, although the act reflects the new German self-image as a magnet country for
immigration, it was also adopted against the backdrop of integration, terrorism and
security debates.”
• Protection from discrimination
“Although combating radical right-wing actors and activities is taken very seriously in
Germany, there is no tradition of punishing discrimination offenses, which belong to
a gray area of right-wing radicalism. The General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG), which took effect in August 2006, implemented
four EU directives to protect against discrimination. They require member states to
protect all people from discrimination in their employment and careers, as well as in
the general civil and legal relations. With its wide area of application (labor law, civil
36
law and public law), the AGG has initiated a comprehensive anti-discrimination law
in Germany for foreigners (Immigration Act) (Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung
der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern [Zuwanderungsgesetz]) dated July 30, 2004. §1 AGG
states that no person may be disadvantaged for reasons of race or ethnic origin, sex,
religion or ideology, disability, age or sexual identity.”
“The adoption of the law guaranteeing protection from discrimination was
accompanied by critical public comments about the bill, and it was achieved only in
a compromised form and after many years’ delay. NGOs are critical of the new antidiscrimination law because they think that it has numerous weaknesses and has
discrepancies with EU law (Will and Rühl 2004; ENAR 2007: 28).”
• Help for victims
“There are no explicit legal methods (such as specific rehabilitation measures)
especially for victims of radical right-wing violence or victims of discrimination.
(However, the federal government has established a voluntary fund especially for
the victims of right-wing extremist attacks.) There are laws regarding compensation
for victims of violence – the Victim Compensation Act (OEG Opfer-EntschädigungsGesetz, OEG) – and crime victims – the Victim Reform Act (Opferreformgesetz,
OpferRRG). However, these apply explicitly only to German victims. A step toward
an improved legal fight against racial discrimination was Germany’s declaration in
2001 that it would work to implement the individual appeal procedure according to
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Corresponding legal practice is still lacking.”
• Legal pushes to ban the right-wing extremist NPD
“The proceedings to ban the NPD instituted in 2001 before the Federal Constitutional
Court by all three constitutional bodies (the federal government, the Bundesrat and
the Bundestag) authorized to do so were halted in 2003 by the court on a technicality.
Since fall 2006, debate about banning the NPD broke out once again and became a
never-ending discussion in 2007 and 2008. In particular, each time xenophobic or
radical right-wing attacks receive a great deal of attention from the public, a ban is
hotly debated. At the end of October 2007, the SPD decided at its national convention
in Hamburg to try to ban the party again. The response of the CDU, CSU, FDP and
Greens to the SPD initiative was restrained. The ministers of the interior of the various
states had similar responses. The fear that proceedings to ban the party could fail
once more because of a technicality is widespread. The NPD is still believed to be
infiltrated by undercover agents of the federal and state constitutional protection
authorities (von Mallinckrodt 2007). Thus, the Greens are demanding that the
informants be removed so that banning proceedings can begin. A debate about a ban
without consequences is counterproductive, they say, because the NPD would gain
attention and the ban would achieve nothing substantive. Some reject an NPD ban
because they assume that a ban would only ‘treat the symptom’ and would complicate
political debate with right-wing extremism, making it undesirable from liberal and
democratic points of view. The BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior) has thus far –
because of fear of failure – refused to initiate banning proceedings (Jansen and Knapp
2007). Currently, five German states have collected evidence showing the necessity of
an NPD ban, but this evidence remains under wraps for the time being, reportedly for
tactical reasons.”
• Removing state support from radical right-wing organizations
“Along with the discussion about a renewed attempt to ban the NPD, there are
thoughts about how the government could remove financial support for the NPD.
According to Germany’s Law on Political Parties (Parteiengesetz), all parties may claim
funds from the government (§§18, 20 Law on Political Parties). Thus far, the idea of
eliminating government financing for the NPD still does not have full support among
the state ministers of the interior. On the suggestion of Berlin’s Interior Senator Erhart
37
Körting, an ‘inter-state task force’ gathered information about financial resources for
the extreme right and came to the conclusion that the NPD is largely financed by tax
money (41.8 percent in 2005) (Berlin Senate Committee on Interior Affairs and Sports
2007). The ministers of the interior agree that tax money should not go to support
anti-constitutional organizations. Also, radical right-wing associations should not be
recognized as charitable organizations. In April, the ministers of finance presented a
draft of the 2009 Tax Act, which contains a bill to that effect. The cabinet approved
the Tax Act in early June (Hulverscheidt 2008).”
Apparently it is still not feasible to withdraw state funding from the NPD. Currently,
there is a new debate about a second attempt to ban the NPD in light of its implication
in the NSU neo-Nazi murder gang.
• Increasing penalties for hate crimes
“The group-focused enmity (including racism) that often underlies radical right-wing
acts should involve stiffer penalties when it is the motive for any kind of criminal act.
Following similar proposals from international organizations (ECRI 2004: 10; CERD
2004), the states of Brandenburg (Ministry of Justice of the state of Brandenburg
2007), Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania are demanding this as well.
As a response to the high number of these offenses, they presented in August 2007 a
bill to stiffen the criminal code. The bill called for taking into account as aggravating
circumstances motives such as a xenophobic attitude or the victim’s ethnicity,
nationality, race, skin color, religion, ideology, origin or physical appearance, disability
or sexual orientation (Cf. Mut-gegen-rechte-Gewalt, dated Nov. 21, 2007). In addition,
for hate crimes prison sentences are imposed instead of fines and only in exceptional
cases can prison sentences be exchanged for probation. As a rule, prison terms last
up to six months.” (ibid 200)
“In September 2007, the bill was introduced in the plenary session of the Bundesrat
and was then transferred to expert committees for consultation. The Bundesrat’s
judiciary committee decided on Jan. 30, 2008 to introduce the bill from the states
of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt on fighting hate
crimes to the Bundesrat (”härteres Vorgehen gegen extremistische Straftäter“). A
decision has not yet been made.
The objectives are as follows:
- Deterrent effect through more severe punishment.
- Sensitization of law-enforcement agencies to hate crimes.
- Making the public more aware of the problem.
- Alignment with EU legislation.
- Consideration of international recommendations.
Not only the text of the law, but also the effectiveness of the legislation and the
implementation of the law will be fundamental for a sustainable strategy against rightwing radicalism.”
Data as to the implementation of the law have not yet been published. The stiffer
law discussion („härteres Vorgehen gegen extremistische Straftäter“) has since been
reiterated concerning left-wing radicalism and Islamist/ Salafi groups’ initiatives.
• The Influence of EU regulations on German legislature
“Incidents such as the surge in radical right-wing and xenophobic violence in 2000 had
an immediate effect on initiatives for national political control. The federal government
responded quickly to right-wing extremism with a federal program worth millions,
thereby strengthening, among other things, victim assistance and protection against
discrimination in Germany (Bosch and Peuker 2007: 43 f.). However, protection
against discrimination received a legal framework only with the implementation of the
EU directives.”
38
“Three examples make clear how the importance of the EU in national legislation
varies. They show that Germany undertakes initiatives relating to (right-wing)
extremism (such as the OSCE anti-Semitism conference 2004) and the EU helps shape
them. On the other hand, the EU is helping to implement broader strategies targeting
the right-wing radicalism of the ‘gray area’ in Germany.”
“1. Four EU directives were implemented in the General Equal Treatment Act of 2006.
Passing this law would not have been possible in Germany without European pressure.
Introducing this law sparked public debate, particularly in factories and companies,
and has already contributed to strengthening potential victims and raising awareness
of the problem. The influence of the EU directive will be felt even more strongly in the
medium and long term.”
“2. The federal government put the EU framework decision on combating certain
forms and modes of expression of racism and xenophobia back on the agenda during
the German EU Council presidency. In April 2007, political unity was achieved among
the member states. Formal adoption is expected after consultation with the European
Parliament. The major prohibitions are as follows:
- Public incitement to violence or hatred.
- Public insults or threats.
- Publicly condoning genocide and crimes against humanity as defined in the statute
of the International Criminal Court.
- Publicly disseminating or distributing tracts, pictures or other material with racist
or xenophobic content.
- Leading a racist or xenophobic group.
In addition, from now on racist or xenophobic motivation should be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance when determining a sentence for a
common offense.”
“Some of these are already criminal offenses in Germany; however, the EU directive
puts the focus more on racism/xenophobia and less on right-wing extremism and a
relationship to National Socialism than German law does. Increasing penalties on the
basis of racist and xenophobic motives would be – as described above – something
new to German law. Germany was not able to put through a ban on certain Nazi
symbols, such as the swastika.”
“3. In the Council of Europe, a Convention on Cybercrime was developed on Nov. 23,
2001 and signed by 26 member states, among them Germany. On the initiative of
France and Germany, an additional protocol for the Convention on Cybercrime was
created concerning ‘racist and xenophobic acts committed by means of computer
systems.’ The conventions stand in the tradition of German jurisprudence, which
thereby extends its scope across national borders.”
• Importance of national legislation – repression alone does not reduce
extremism
“A multitude of organizations and labels have been banned on the basis of the
extensive legislation against right-wing extremism. Repression has not led to a
reduction in radical right-wing orientations in Germany or a decrease in violent
right-wing radicalism. Instead, a stronger European (and international) alignment of
right-wing radicalism took place, including relocation of some activities abroad. The
scene is also trying to escape repression through name changes or by forming new
organizations. In addition, the concept of comradeships developed as a response
to the surge in bans in the mid-1990s. Those involved aimed to evade further
bans through loose structures without a steady organizational framework and by
spontaneous-seeming actions carried out by different groups of people (Röpke
and Speit 2004: 8). Although some ministers of the interior are also taking action
against the less-concrete comradeships (banning SSS and Sturm 34), radical right-
39
wingers can often avoid repression through these structural changes. In this respect,
legislation and government monitoring have led to changes in the structure of the
radical right-wing scene in Germany. But inconsistent implementation of the legislation
has consequences as well: the quarrel about a ban has lent legitimacy to the NPD.
This also contributes to the party establishing itself as a power for assembly and
organization on the radical right-wing scene.”
• Effectiveness problems for the judiciary – cases of abuse of immigrants by
the police forces and lack of adequate intervention – lack of police training
– ‘massaging’ of offense statistics
“During the years after reunification, the police force was repeatedly accused of
failing to deal with right-wing radicalism. NGOs and opposition parties lamented that
radical right-wing acts of violence were not being punished enough. During this time,
a slogan about the federal republic’s justice system was revived: ‘Justice is blind in its
right eye.’ A prominent example of this failure of police and policy are the xenophobic
riots in Rostock-Lichtenhagen from Aug. 22 to 28, 1992. For days, the police did
nothing to prevent pogrom-like activity, and the behavior of the police was the focus
of strong international criticism. Although there have been no comparable severe
xenophobic riots and no other allegations of this magnitude against the police and the
judiciary, there are still some problems of effectiveness within the police in dealing
with right-wing extremism and xenophobia. Likewise during the 1990s, but also even
today, the police are attracting attention for racist incidents and severe mistreatment,
in particular of foreigners and immigrants. Corresponding reports from international
organizations, as well as studies about radical right-wing voters among police officers
drew attention to internal police problems. The BKA spoke of substantial indications of
the propagation of anti-foreign and anti-minority attitudes within the police force and
criticized – just as the BMI, BMJ and NGOs did – a lack of awareness of the problem
among a substantial number of police officers (Kleffner and Holzberger 2004; Falk
2001: 14; BMI/BMJ 2001: 270). The federal government also expressed concern (BMJ
2006: 50; German Institute for Human Rights 2007). Accusations that foreigners
were victims of police abuse were taken very seriously by the federal government.
It stresses good training for all police officers and severe disciplinary action against
the offenders (BMJ 2006: 50). Nevertheless, in the cases examined by Amnesty
International, the offenders were rarely convicted or subjected to disciplinary action.”
“Although Amnesty International is now reporting fewer of these cases, it is not clear
whether this is due to a shift in public discourse (to Islamic terrorism and immigrant
integration) and a changed focus for Amnesty International or whether the number
of the cases has actually decreased. Current abuse allegations (Berlin) and deaths
(Hagen and Dessau) of immigrants and asylum seekers at police stations indicate that
such incidents continue to occur (Brüning 2008).”
“Lack of awareness of the problem: in recent years, radical right-wing and antiSemitic crimes and acts of violence have been prosecuted by the police with
increasing consequences. Nevertheless, in some states – primarily in eastern Germany
– failures are still piling up. And while experts warn that the security of members of
potential victim groups cannot be guaranteed in some areas, the police responsible for
those areas often do not recognize associated problems.”
“It has also been suggested that statistics on right-wing extremism are being
massaged (in particular with regard to propaganda offenses), according to accusations
against Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg and Berlin early in this decade
(Selkens and Wilde 2002: 15; Kleffner and Holzberger 2004). Currently (in 2007 and
2008), Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia are facing criticism: Saxony-Anhalt is accused
of having changed the statistics criteria for radical right-wing criminal acts and of
thereby not recording all offenses. And in Thuringia it is said that cases are reported
only ‘on request.’”
40
“Nonetheless, the case in Saxony-Anhalt also shows that those with political
responsibility (such as Minister of the Interior Hövelmann) are not ‘creating’ problems
by publicly examining the cases; rather, they are beginning to solve them. In contrast
to that are the states, like Thuringia, where radical right-wing and xenophobic
behavior is not viewed as a problem; it is rarely broached as an issue and there is no
real backlash against it. In these areas, problems will presumably increase in future.”
“In the view of civic organizations, there are considerable shortcomings in the
education and training of the police, prison officers and lawyers – in particular in
questions of the protection of human rights under international law and in dealing with
racism. In recent years, steps have been taken here: police officers and prison officers
are trained through initiatives and special events about racism, right-wing extremism,
xenophobia and the culture of human rights (BMJ 2006: 73 f.). The problem is that
these training sessions are not a standard part of the curriculum. They are apparently
offered randomly and with arbitrary content and do not have a long-term effect.”
“The Rechtsstaat is largely effective in enforcing laws. However, the failure to ban the
NPD points to significant problems. The structural changes of right-wing radicalism,
which increasingly prevent government mechanisms for control and punishment from
having an impact, have helped forestall proceedings to ban the NPD – although there
is wide-ranging consensus about the party’s anti-constitutionality. The main reason
for this is that the removal of the undercover agents and the associated reduction in
government monitoring are seen as a risk for democracy. With the informants still
in place, the proceedings to ban the party will presumably fail, as they did in 2001.
Granted, it is not easy to ban parties in Germany, and for good reason. Nevertheless,
it can also be seen as a problem that, contrary to German law, a party hostile to the
Constitution has not been prohibited.”
Good practice in legislature and administration – strategic shortcomings –
proven measures in legislature – and strategic outlook
• Good practice in legislature and administration
“As a supplement to repression, the following recent initiatives and their
implementation are seen as valuable in fighting right-wing radicalism:
-
-
-
-
-
Reform of police recording criteria.
Reform of citizenship law.
Adoption of the Immigration Act.
Adoption of the General Equal Treatment Act.
Sensitization and training programs for the police.”
• Strategic shortcomings
There are strategic shortcomings in the following areas:
- “no ban of the anti-constitutional NPD and legitimization of the party through
agitated political debates without any consequences;
- no systematic punishment of hate crimes;
- no systematic education and training on relevant subjects (see above);
- too few police officers with an immigrant background;
- no systematic anchoring of assistance for victims of radical right-wing and hatebased acts of violence (compensation, rehabilitation measures and support for
corresponding studies). This is an important way to strengthen the (potential)
victims and to raise awareness of the problems.”
41
• Proven measures
“Effectively combating right-wing extremism requires legislation oriented toward the
current position of right-wing radicalism, as well as the engagement of insightful and
sensitive people. It requires clear statements by responsible institutions (judiciary,
police, prison service), so that right-wing radicalism and group-focused enmity are
recognized as a problem. Especially promising for improved dealing with right-wing
radicalism are internal measures (such as sensitization measures) in the education
and training of corrections officers (police and the justice system).”
“In conclusion, I would like to present some relevant measures, programs and
projects:”
Judiciary
“On account of the federal system, it is a particular challenge to push through
nationwide changes in Germany. For some years now, the German Judicial Academy,
which is sustained and financed jointly by the federal and state governments,
has hosted conferences on the topics of right-wing extremism, National Socialism
and xenophobia, serving as continuing education for judges from all jurisdictions
across the country as well as for public prosecutors (BMI 2007: 72). The respective
states are responsible for other continuing education institutions for judges, public
prosecutors and those in other legal occupations. Although programs leading to
progress with the application of the existing sanctions are being implemented in some
states, other states still lack such measures (ECRI 2004: 10 f.).”
“A product of civic engagement, the German Bar Association Foundation against Rightwing Extremism and Violence (DAV-Stiftung contra Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt)
is successfully supporting victims of radical right-wing aggression. It was founded in
December 2000 by the German Bar Association (Deutscher Anwalt Verein, DAV) and
has established a fund to provide financial support, legal help and legal representation
to victims of political violence. Since 2001, it has received 176 applications for cases
dealing with everything from racist insults to murder.”
Police
“Measures have been implemented to better fight right-wing radicalism within the
police force as well. One of the best known (also internationally) is the Special
Commission on Right-wing Extremism (Sonderkommission Rechtsextremismus, Soko
Rex), formed in response to growing radical right-wing and xenophobic violence. Since
1991, the commission has combined repressive measures and prevention measures,
seeking to unsettle the scene at hot-spots through unremitting prosecutorial pressure
and a police presence. Soko Rex writes to potential offenders before radical rightwing events or visits their homes to highlight the consequences of additional criminal
acts. In addition, it has instituted measures to accept and support young people.
Soko Rex provides awareness training and does public-relations work. The staff has
been reduced significantly since the commission was founded, and now there is
some discussion of increasing personnel and expanding its jurisdiction (announced
in February 2008). The success of the work thus far remains extremely controversial
because Saxony has developed into a center for radical right-wing activities in
Germany – despite the efforts of Soko Rex. The state of Brandenburg is considered
relatively successful in the fight against right-wing extremism; its work includes
the Mobile Unit against Extremism, Violence and Xenophobia (Mobile Einheit gegen
Extremismus, Gewalt und Ausländerfeindlichkeit, MEGA), which is similar in design to
the Soko Rex in Saxony (German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer 2001:
79; Baier and Feltes 2003: 3; Aktion Zivilcourage 2008; Lichdi 1998).”
42
“One of the latest campaigns by the police shows how much they rely on preventive
measures in addition to repressive measures: in 2006, federal and state police crimeprevention units jointly launched with the state ministers of the interior a nationwide
campaign against right-wing extremism called ‘Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing.’ The goal
of this initiative is to draw the attention of school pupils to the concept of right-wing
extremism and to provide teachers with tools to combat it. The campaign includes
an instructional package with films for the school, as well as a film competition for
pupils.”
“The police union, an institution regarded unfavorably in some police circles, has also
issued clear demands. At its national convention in 2006, the German Police Union
(Deutsche Poliziegewerkschaft) approved a resolution to step up the fight against
right-wing extremism. It emphasized that police initiatives should work with civil
society and that the police must act as role models in their behavior toward social and
ethnic minorities.”
“Education and training measures are especially promising for improved deployment
of the police against right-wing radicalism. In this sense, for example, training for
national higher level criminal services addresses the topics of human rights and antiracism, as well as xenophobia and the police. At a state level, individuals can be
influential in setting a direction: for instance, Berlin’s chief of police, Dieter Glietsch, is
especially involved in the fight against right-wing extremism.”
Prison service
“The topics of right-wing radicalism, racism and xenophobia are rarely addressed
in the education and training of prison service staff. However, there are individual
courses that inform staff about right-wing radicalism and sensitize them to it (BMI
2007: 71). The most important actor is the Violence Prevention Network e.V.
Headquartered in Berlin; it works with other German states to develop programs
(educational, civic education) in the fields of the judiciary, youth welfare service,
and education to prevent violence, xenophobia and extremism. It primarily serves
offenders but also trains skilled workers, including prison service officials.”
• Strategic outlook – and summary
“German legislation defines right-wing extremism – summarized simply – as anticonstitutional activities related to National Socialism, including anti-Semitic activities.
There is extensive legislation against these central points of right-wing extremism,
and offenses are strictly punished. However, it is extremely problematic that these
extensive repressive tools cannot put a stop to the steady growth of radical right-wing
violence. It is necessary – as has already begun – to implement preventive measures.
The legal approach alone does not suffice and must be complemented by other
dimensions.”
“The legislative, judiciary and executive branches of government take too isolated
a view of the extreme right. Fighting of right-wing radicalism in ‘gray areas’ must
be judged as deficient. In spite of recent developments initiated primarily by the
European Union, here there is a lack of well-functioning instruments and, in particular,
insufficient awareness of the problem among those responsible for combating it, such
as the police. Cases of discrimination‚ ‘everyday racism’ and xenophobic violence are
often not countered authoritatively enough. This is especially important, however,
because xenophobia (at present, Islamophobia in particular) is the most fundamental
component of right-wing extremism – and a component that the extremist movement
tries to use strategically to mobilize segments of the population (demonstrated by
such Islamophobic and xenophobic citizens’ initiatives and parties as PRO NRW / PPO
Köln and Citizens’ Initiative – No More Foreigners in Nuremberg and Munich).”
43
Political actors, political institutions, and Federal ministries in combating
extremism – institutional responsibilities and programs – ministries of the
interior – successes and obstacles
“Combating and recording politically motivated crimes and extremism are
a main focus of the responsibilities of the Federal Ministry of the Interior
(Bundesinnenministerium, BMI). The subject interests the BMI as a problem of public
security and as a basic principle. The BMI’s scope of operations includes the following
relevant subordinate authorities and initiatives:
- The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Annual Report of the
Office for the Protection of the Constitution).
- The Federal Criminal Intelligence Service (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) and the
Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz, BGS).
- The Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).
- The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz,
founded by two German ministries, Interior and Justice, in 2000).
The Forum against Racism (Forum gegen Rassismus). (The dialogue begun
during the ‘European Year against Racism’ in 1997 between the government and
nongovernmental organizations is being continued by the national German followup committee ‘Forum gegen Rassismus,’ which now includes some 80 organizations,
among them 60 nationally active NGOs. It also acts as a national round table, as
advocated by the Fundamental Rights Agency in Vienna.)”
“Currently the BMI is developing a national action plan to fight racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related intolerance – corresponding
to the Durban Accord. The draft of the action plan, which also sheds light on dealing
with right-wing radicalism, was presented to the public in November 2007 and was
criticized sharply by civic organizations. (This is not an action plan but a somewhat
incoherent listing of measures, and civil society is insufficiently integrated into the
development of the plan. The Human Rights Forum presented a parallel report in
June 2008; Stoltenberg 2007; Human Rights Forum 2007c.) No new draft has been
presented.”
“The subject of terrorism, in particular Islamic terrorism, has taken on greater
significance within the BMI’s work recently, somewhat overshadowing the fight
against right-wing extremism. Thus, Federal Interior Minister Schäuble announced
when presenting the Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in May
2007 that Islamic terrorism is the greatest threat to Germany’s stability and security,
even though the report had more to say about right-wing extremism in Germany
(about twice as much as about Islamic terrorism) than about any other topic. There
is a danger that the issue of preventing (right-wing) extremism will increasingly be
supplanted by the issues of terrorism and (internal) security.”
“Each state’s own ministry of the interior is responsible for dealing with right-wing
extremism. Preoccupation with right-wing extremism is universal. The work of North
Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of the Interior is practical and promising. In fighting
right-wing extremism, the ministry focuses on information and prevention. Every
six months, it publishes a state Constitution-protection report, provides detailed
information, develops prevention materials (such as the comic book Andi) and offers
training sessions (e.g., for police officers and teachers).”
• Responsibility for federal programs
“In response to radical right-wing and xenophobic violence, programs have been
initiated on a national and state level to counter right-wing extremism and promote
democracy and/or diversity. The Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and
Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, BMFSFJ) uses
the programs ‘Diversity is Good’ (Vielfalt tut gut) and ‘Competent’ (Kompetent)
44
to combat right-wing extremism. The federal program is overseen by GSUB
(Gesellschaft für soziale Unternehmensberatung mbH), a consulting company.
Relevant subordinate authorities are the Federal Department for Media Harmful to
Young People (Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Medien, BPjM) and the Federal
Anti-discrimination Agency (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes). The Federal
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales) is
the authority responsible for administering programs and is a national coordination
center for the implementation of the ‘Xenos’ program (detailed below). The content is
determined in close collaboration with the BMFSFJ. State programs against right-wing
extremism mostly fall to the ministries of the interior (e.g., Rhineland-Palatinate) or
the commissioner for integration and migration (e.g., Berlin).”
• Subordinate authorities/institutions
“The mission of the Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, BpB) is to promote democratic consciousness and political participation
among the citizens. It takes on current topics (through events and print and online
offerings). Together with a nationwide network of central offices in each state,
educational establishments and institutions, it is involved in civic education and
culture. It has an Extremism Department that focuses on dealing with right-wing
extremism. (www.bpb.de/ Feb. 22, 2008). Offerings on the Internet include extensive
dossiers on the topics of right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism: www.bpb.de/
themen/R2IRZM,0,Rechtsextremismus.html (Feb. 22, 2008); www.bpb.de/themen/
GX51KQ,0,Antisemitismus.html (Feb. 22, 2008).”
“The Federal Anti-discrimination Agency (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes,
ADS) was founded in response to related EU directives and counsels disadvantaged
persons. The center pursues its objectives independently. Every four years,
together with the responsible authorized representatives of the federal government
and the Bundestag, it presents a report and recommendations to the German
Bundestag (first report in 2009). Some states (Berlin, Brandenburg and Saxony)
have established anti-discrimination centers. (NGOs are critical of the fact that the
BMFSFJ’s anti-discrimination office serves only as a contact point for people who suffer
discrimination and does not have the capacity to handle cases directly. ENAR 2007:
28).”
“The German Institute for Human Rights (Deutsche Institut für Menschenrechte,
DIMR) was founded as a nonprofit association in 2001 (based on a Bundestag
resolution) and is a national human-rights institution accredited by the United
Nations. It is financed from the budgets of the Federal Ministry of Justice
(Bundesjustizministerium, BMJ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges
Amt, AA) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ). Its
job is to protect and promote human rights in Germany and other countries. The
institute offers a forum for human-rights discussions within the political arena, civil
society and academia. (The draft of a national action plan against racism presented by
the BMI in November 2007 was discussed with civic organizations here.)”
• Higher-ranking state institutions
“A Coordination Group against Right-wing Extremism (Koordinierungsgruppe gegen
Rechtsextremismus) was founded in November 2006. The objective of this group
is to monitor ‘current and planned measures to fight right-wing extremism’ across
departments. The coordination team is composed of representatives of the BMI,
the BMFSFJ, respective partner departments in the new states and Berlin, and local
government central associations. The group works to develop recommendations and
concrete proposals against right-wing extremism to be implemented by the federal
government, states and municipalities. (As to the evaluation: so far not much has
happened – other than press releases that the group puts together, no real stimulus
can be felt.)”
45
• Successes and obstacles in countering right-wing extremism
1. “There are different approaches to this subject. Fundamentally, they are often
based on two concepts of the problem of right-wing radicalism. Developing a
strategy against right-wing extremism has largely been seen as a legal matter,
with the objective being to defend the Constitution. A more recent concept of
strategies against right-wing radicalism relates to human rights, protection from
discrimination and the fight against racism and is reflected by international and
European accords. Institutions such as the German Institute for Human Rights
and the German Bundestag’s Human Rights Committee were founded in response
to international requirements. Internationally operating NGOs have also used
this understanding as a starting point. Because these two perspectives are not
adequately combined, the overall work suffers.”
2. “There is still no comprehensive strategy for different levels and responsibilities,
no agenda for action that brings together proven strategies from different arenas.
However, important fundamentals for a coordinated agenda can be seen in reports
from the federal government and ministries (see above).”
3. “There is no centralized coordination center to concentrate and manage the
activities, although a step has been taken in this direction with the establishment
of the Coordination Group against Right-wing Extremism. The European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommends that Germany
form an independent body to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism
and intolerance at a national level. This can be done using various models: a
national commission, an ombudsman, or a center or office. The Human Rights
Forum (Forum Menschenrechte) suggested, among other things, expanding the
responsibilities and authority of the Federal Anti-discrimination Agency along these
lines (Human Rights Forum 2007b: 4).”
“An effective agency would
-
-
-
-
Be made up of independent experts.
Have access to its own resources (including expert personnel).
Set specific goals and deadlines.
Regularly coordinate and integrate key areas of responsibility (including the BMI,
BMFSFJ and new states/Berlin, as well as the BMAS, the western German states,
and other authorities and organizations listed above).
Responsibilities could include the following:
- Writing periodic reports and developing recommendations for the federal
government and states as well as civil society.
- Raising public awareness.
- Coordinating measures and programs against right-wing extremism.
-- Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of programs and measures”.
4. “The systematic collection and description of the initiatives as well as the academic
work can form an important basis for political steering measures. It would make
sense to assign this task to the Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance or the
Federal Agency for Civic Education.
Still of interest is the suggestion (bandied about for years and now making the rounds
again) to establish a foundation or commission through which programs to counter
right-wing extremism could be coordinated and financed in the longer term.”
46
Further references on the political interaction with the radical right
Schellenberg’s comprehensive report proceeds to give basic information on the
•
“Backlash from other parties” (214).
•
“Influence on political debates and decisions” (215).
•
“Consequences of radical right-wing statements” (215).
•
“Governmental Measures, programs and projects against the radical right” (216).
•
“European cooperative alliances” (221).
Summary: Good practice, shortcomings and strategic outlook for institutional
and political initiatives of countering (right-wing) extremism – according to
Schellenberg’s report
• Good practice
- “The round tables on the topic of right-wing extremism and the action alliances
initiated in municipalities and cities can be seen as a step toward a more proactive approach to right-wing radicalism. They are composed of representatives
from various realms, such as the political arena, the police, education and
administration, civil society and business.
- The establishment of an interdepartmental task force against right-wing extremism
by the BMI and the BFMFSJ is to be greeted as an important step in the direction
of improved planning and coordination of strategies against right-wing extremism.
Nevertheless, for this project to work effectively, other state actors should be
included (for instance, why is the BMAS not involved?) and concrete goals and a
timeline must be set.
- The notable increase in awareness of the phenomenon of right-wing radicalism
at the national level and to some extent at a state and municipal level must be
embraced. This awareness of the problem can be used to even greater effect in
remedying existing shortcomings. Nevertheless, a corresponding awareness of the
problem is still not a matter of course everywhere at the state level and especially
at the local level. On the contrary, there is some very problematic behavior,
especially (but not only) in the rural areas of eastern Germany; these incidents
include the Mügeln case and an incident in which the NPD managed to ban an
anti-right concert by renowned left-wing singer-songwriter Konstantin Wecker.
Often problems are not dealt with openly and there is a lack of sensitivity for the
(potential) victims. Here, as well, internal party talks and guidelines and public
statements and analyses can be essential building blocks for greater awareness.
- The federal and state programs against right-wing extremism are fundamentally
welcome measures. With them, the political arena is sending a clear signal. They
are examples of political ways of promoting democracy.”
• Shortcomings
“The political arena must take the offensive against the socio-political challenge of
right-wing radicalism. There is little readiness for openly discussing such matters,
but it has increased in recent years. It has become rare for participants to abandon
parliamentary sessions or round tables when radical right-wingers take part –
although this was a common response a few years ago. Democratic politicians
would prefer not to allow right-wing radicals on the public stage anymore, and their
interactions with radical right-wingers are frequently awkward.”
47
• Measures still lacking
- “There is no central coordination office with comprehensive responsibilities that can
develop a strategy.
- Measures to reduce Islamophobia.
- Offerings dealing with discrimination work in the political and administrative realm.
- Educational measures (sensitization, dissemination of facts, argumentation
strategies) for politicians (primarily on a municipal and state level).
- Victim assistance should be established or expanded in state institutions, and/or
civic victim counseling centers should be expanded and supported financially.”
• Program shortcomings
- “Knowledge gained from the programs rarely leads to systemic consequences.
(Here Germany’s federal system turns out to be inflexible and obstructive.) The
measures must be more strongly anchored structurally to be effective and lasting.
Therefore, dovetailing with regular social work is fundamental (cf. also Klein 2007:
10). Examples include support for (continued and more intensive) collaboration
between schools and youth work, systematic improvement of staff qualifications,
integration of project modules into standard lessons and special option subjects (at
general schools, e.g., in the form of school field trips) and initiation of reflection
processes for institutions to guarantee institutional collaboration and transfer
(BMFSFJ 2007: 22).
- The current federal program is to be expanded and its quality improved to the
point that all quarters, municipalities and rural districts in which radical right-wing,
xenophobic and anti-Semitic activities are especially frequent and intensive are
taken into consideration. A map of radical right-wing, xenophobic and anti-Semitic
activities could be generated as a foundation for making such decisions.
- With the current federal program, cities and municipalities are supported financially
in their work against right-wing extremism and the like. This is beneficial for
sustainability and effectiveness, but steps must be taken to ensure that the civic
organizations that are active in hot-spots receive the necessary support.”
• Basic conditions to reflect on
- “Socio-political involvement must also refer to the basic economic conditions
that have proven susceptible to radical right-wing orientation. Insecurity, fear of
unemployment and fear of social decline are the feelings that radical right-wing
groups are acting on today and that are associated with xenophobic or antiSemitic resentment. Against this backdrop, the particular focus is on areas of the
population that are especially affected by societal change. Thus, for example,
tradesmen and skilled workers must not only accept a loss of status in the
information age but also expect financial losses or unemployment in the wake of
globalization.
- In addition, underdeveloped regions and ‘societal hot-spots’ need well thought out
economic and social support. The federal programs here and in other areas are
welcome. Still, there is a need for action with regard to economic and employment
policy, as well as social, family and education policy.
A need for action with regard to social inclusion also exists in the area of migration
and interculturalism in eastern Germany. There is a danger that people with immigrant
backgrounds will increasingly move away, especially from strongly xenophobic and
right-wing radical areas. Here, support for social inclusion of the population segments
with and without an immigrant background is more important than government
integration support (cf. also ENAR 2007: 6).”
48
• Summary
“Many good individual measures and steps, such as round tables, have been taken.
The thematically comprehensive and financially well-equipped federal programs
against right-wing extremism are a milestone in the effort. Among other things, they
have led to much greater sensitivity to and awareness of the problem of right-wing
extremism and xenophobic violence in the political arena (above all at the national
level). These programs, which reach countless members of the population and the
general public, must be seen – with some reservations, as outlined above – as good
practice in comparison to other European countries.
Major problems are, on the one hand, the short-term nature of the supported projects
and the fact that they are to a great extent models that do not allow for lasting and
broad implementation. On the other hand, a clear problem lies in the splintering and
even outsourcing of responsibilities along with the associated lack of coordination
between the programs and institutions. There is nothing along the lines of a center of
excellence that enables long-term, targeted political management of efforts against of
right-wing extremism.
Last but not least, there is a danger here – like the one described in the Legal
Order and Law Enforcement chapter – that the spotlight on right-wing extremism
is too narrow and the underlying syndrome of group-focused enmity, and especially
xenophobic and Islamophobic statements, are not sufficiently treated as a problem.”
(For more summary information also see “Overview” above.)
Civic society – Organizations and civic engagement
Schellenberg’s comprehensive report gives some basic information on the:
•
Important civic actors and their financially difficult situation (226).
•
Support and/or restriction by the state (231).
•
Non-organized forms of civic engagement and their activities (231).
•
European cooperative alliances (234).
•
Good practice, strategic shortcomings and strategic outlook (235).
49
50
51
52
The organisations which delivered
the Challenge Hate Crime project were:
Northern Ireland Prison Service
www.dojni.gov.uk/index/ni-prison-service.htm
NIACRO
www.niacro.co.uk
……✦……
Carecall
www.carecallwellbeing.com
Corish Film Productions
www.corish.tv
Institute of Conflict Research
www.conflictresearch.org.uk
Mediation NI
www.mediationnorthernireland.org
Violence Prevention Network
www.violence-prevention-network.de
REPORT 08
The Challenge Hate Crime project was financed by the European Union’s Programme for Peace
and Reconciliation (Peace III) managed by the Special EU Programmes Body
ISBN: 978-1-909519-06-0
Hate Crime and Radicalisation
the German political experience and the Schellenberg Report

hate crime and radicalisation

Transcription

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