Literature Review - Locating Intersectional Discrimination

Transcription

Literature Review
Collected Summaries and Critical Review of Literature on Intersectionality
Project „Locating Intersectional Discrimination“
Apostolovski Veronika, Philipp Simone, Smith Sheena,
Starl Klaus
09.11.2011
Literature Review
Apostolovski, V./Philipp, S./Smith, S./Starl, K.
Content
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 6
Einleitung ................................................................................................................................................. 6
AKERMARK, Sia Spiliopoulou (2002): The Limits of Pluralism - Recent Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add
Anything?, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. ....................................................... 8
ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNGSSTELLE DES BUNDES (Hg.) (2010): Mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung, Teil I –
Begriffe, Theorien und juristische Analyse, Frankfurt am Main. ........................................................... 13
ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNGSSTELLE DES BUNDES (Hg.) (2010): Mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung, Teil I –
Begriffe, Theorien und juristische Analyse, Frankfurt am Main. ........................................................... 14
ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNGSSTELLE DES BUNDES (Hg.) (2010): Mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung, Teil II
– Eine empirische Untersuchung anhand von autobiografisch-narrativen Interviews, Frankfurt am
Main. ...................................................................................................................................................... 20
APPIAH, Anthony (1990): But Would That Still Be Me? Notes on Gender, “Race”, Ethnicity, as Sources
of “Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 10, Eighty-Seventh Annual Meeting American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct., 1990), 493-499 ....................................................... 21
ARNADOTTIR, Oddny Mjöll (2008): Multidimensional Equality from within: Themes from the
European Convention on Human Rights, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE, Victoria: European Union NonDiscrimination Law – Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law, RoutledgeCavendish, 59-89. .................................................................................................................................. 23
BAER, Susanne, SMYKALLA, Sandra (2009): Zur Bedeutung von Stereotypen für
gleichstellungspolitische Interventionen, in: BAER, Susanne, SMYKALLA, Sandra, HILDEBRANDT, Karin,
Schubladen, Schablonen, Schema F – Stereotype als Herausforderung für Gleichstellungspolitik, USP
Publishing, Kleine Verlag, Hamburg....................................................................................................... 24
BAER, Susanne (2010), A Closer Look at Law: human rights as multi-level sites of struggles over multidimensional equality, Utrecht Law Review 6/2, 56-76.......................................................................... 25
BAILEY, Alison (2010): On Intersectionality and the Whiteness of Feminist Philosophy, 51 – 70 in
YANCY, George (2010): The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness of
Philosophy, Lanham, Lexington Books .................................................................................................. 27
BELL, Mark (2007): Direct Discrimination, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar et al., Non-Discrimination Law, Hart
Publishing, Oxford and Portland. Zusammenfassung Section 2.3.1 Causation and Comparators, 205207. ........................................................................................................................................................ 29
BUTLER, Judith (2000): Appearances Aside, California Law Review 88, 55-63 ..................................... 30
BURRI Susanne, SCHIEK Dagmar (Hg.) (2009): Multiple Discrimination in EU Law: Opportunities for
legal responses to intersectional gender discrimination? European Network of Legal Experts in the
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Field of Gender Equality, European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs
and Equal Opportunities, Unit EMPL/G/2, Theme - Equality, Action against Discrimination: Legal
Questions, July 2009 .............................................................................................................................. 31
BURRI, Susanne (2011): Promises of an Intersectional Approach in Practice? The Dutch Equal
Treatment Commission’s Case Law, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON, Anna: European Union NonDiscrimination Law and Intersectionality – Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability
Discrimination, Ashgate, 97-110............................................................................................................ 35
CZECH, Philip, SALINGER Ulrike (Hsg.) (2011): Diskriminierung – Grundrechtsverletzung oder
Kavaliersdelikt. Das Gleichbehandlungsrecht in der Praxis, Menschenrechte konkret, Band 3, Salzburg
............................................................................................................................................................... 36
CARLES; Isabelle, JUBANY-BAUCELLS, Olga (2010): GendeRace. The Use of Racial Antidiscrimination
Laws. Gender and Citizenship in a Multicultural Context. Final Report ................................................ 39
COLLINS, Hugh (2003): Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion. The Modern Law Review 66, pp.
16 – 43 ................................................................................................................................................... 47
DEGENER, Theresia (2011): Intersections between Disability, Race and Gender in Discrimination Law,
in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON, Anna: European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality –
Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination, Ashgate, 29-46. ............... 58
DEUTSCH, Francine M. (2007): Undoing Gender, Gender & Society 21, 106-127 ................................ 59
DIETZE, Gabriele, HORNSCHEIDT, Antje, WALGENBACH, Katharina, PALM, Kerstin (2007): Gender als
interdependente Kategorie. Neue Perspektiven auf Intersektionalität, Diversität und Heterogenität,
Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich. ......................................................................................................... 60
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (FRA) (2010): Data in Focus Report. Multiple
Discrimination, EU-MIDIS, European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey 05......................... 61
FREDMAN, Sandra (2002): Discrimination Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press. ............................... 61
FREDMAN, Sandra (2005): Double Trouble – Multiple Discrimination and EU Law in: European AntiDiscrimination Law Review, Issue No. 2, October 2005, 13-18 ............................................................. 66
FREDMAN, Sandra (2010): Positive Duties and Socio-economic Disadvantage: bringing disadvantage
onto the equality agenda, European Human Rights Law Review, 290-304. ......................................... 68
FRERICHS, Petra (2000): Klasse und Geschlecht als Kategorien sozialer Ungleichheit, Kölner Zeitschrift
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 52, 36-59..................................................................................... 70
GOLDBERG, Suzanne B (2009): Intersectionality in Theory and Practice in: GRABHAM, Emily, COOPER,
Davina, KRISHNADAS, Jane and HERMAN, Didi (Hg.) (2009): Intersectionality and beyond: law, power
and the politics of location, Oxford, Routledge-Cavendish. .................................................................. 71
GRABHAM, Emily (2009): Intersectionality: Traumatic Impressions, in GRABHAM, Emily, COOPER,
Davina, KRISHNADAS, Jane and HERMAN, Didi (Hg.): Intersectionality and beyond: law, power and
the politics of location, Oxford, Routledge-Cavendish. ......................................................................... 74
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HANNETT, Sarah (2003): Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle
Multiple Discrimination, 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 65-86 .................................................. 77
JACOB, Jutta, KÖBSELL, Swantje, WOLLRAD, Eske (Hg.) (2010): Gendering Disability. Intersektionale
Aspekte von Behinderung und Geschlecht, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag. ............................................. 79
KERNER, Ina (2009): Alles intersektional? Zum Verhältnis von Rassismus und Sexismus, Feministische
Studien 1/2009, 36-50 ........................................................................................................................... 80
KLINGER, Cornelia, KNAPP, Gudrun-Axeli (2007): Achsen der Ungleichheit – Achsen der Differenz:
Verhältnisbestimmungen von Klasse, Geschlecht, „Rasse“/Ethnizität, in: KLINGER, Cornelia, KNAPP,
Gudrun-Axeli, SAUER, Birgit (Hg): Achsen der Ungleichheit. Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht
und Ethnizität, Frankfurt........................................................................................................................ 81
KNAPP, Gudrun-Axeli (2005): Intersectionality – Ein neues Paradigma feministischer Theorie? Zur
transatlantischen Reise von Race, Class, Gender, Feministische Studien 23, 68-81. ............................ 82
KUHAR, Roman (2009): At the Crossroads of Discrimination. Multiple und intersectional
discrimination, Peace Institute, Ljubljana ............................................................................................. 83
LUTZ, Mark A. (2001): On the Norm of Equality, International Journal of Social Economics; 2001; 28,
10-12, 782 .............................................................................................................................................. 84
MAKKONEN, Timo (2002): Multiple, Compound and Intersectional Discrimination: bringing the
experiences of the most marginalized to force, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University,
April 2002............................................................................................................................................... 86
MARCHETTI, Elena (2008): Intersectional Race and Gender Analyses: Why Legal Processes Just Don’t
Get It, Social and Legal Studies 17, 155-174.......................................................................................... 89
McCOLGAN, Aileen (2007): Reconfiguring Discrimination Law, Public Law, 74-94 .............................. 93
MIDDLEMISS, Sam and DOWNIE, Margaret (2009): Recent Changes in the Evidential Requirements in
Indirect Sex and Race Discrimination Cases, International Journal of Law and Management 51, 367 –
373 ......................................................................................................................................................... 98
MORAWA, Alexander H E (2002): The Concept of Non-discrimination: An Introductory Comment,
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe ...................................................................... 102
NIELSEN, Ruth (2006): EU Law and Multiple Discrimination, CBS Law Studies, Copenhagen Business
School .................................................................................................................................................. 104
PAREKH, Serena (2007): Resisting “Dull and Torpid” Assent: Returning to the Debate Over the
Foundations of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 29, 754-778 ................................................ 112
PATEL, Pragna (2003): Notes on Gender and Racial Discrimination: An urgent need to integrate an
intersectional perspective to the examination und development of policies, strategies und remedies
for gender and racial equality.............................................................................................................. 117
POST, Robert (2000): Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law,
California Law Review 88, 1 – 40 ......................................................................................................... 118
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POTHIER, Dianne (2001): Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real Peoples’ Real Experiences, 13
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 37 ...................................................................................... 122
RAAB, Heike (2007): Intersektionalität in den Disability Studies. Zur Interdependenz von Behinderung,
Heteronormativität und Geschlecht, in: WALDSCHMIDT, Anna (Hg.): Disability Studies,
Kultursoziologie und Soziologie der Behinderung: Erkundungen in einem neuen Forschungsfeld,
Bielefeld. .............................................................................................................................................. 125
SCHIEK, Dagmar (2009): From European Union Non-discrimination Law Towards Multidimensional
Equality Law for Europe, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE, Victoria, European Union Non-Discrimination
Law, Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law. Routledge Cavendish, London,
New York.............................................................................................................................................. 125
SCHIEK, Dagmar (2011): Organizing EU Equality Law around the Nodes of ‚Race‘, Gender and
Disability, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON, Anna: European Union Non-Discrimination Law and
Intersectionality – Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination, Ashgate.
............................................................................................................................................................. 129
SHESTACK, Jerome J (1998): The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly
20, 201-234 .......................................................................................................................................... 130
SOILAND, Tove (2008): Die Verhältnisse gingen und die Kategorien kamen. Intersectionality oder vom
Unbehagen an der amerikanischen Theorie, Querelles-Net, Rezensionszeitschrift für Frauen- und
Geschlechterforschung 26 ................................................................................................................... 134
SOLANKE; Iyiola (2009): Stigma: A Limiting Principle Allowing Multiple-Consciousness in AntiDiscrimination Law?, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE; Victoria, European Union Non-Discrimination Law,
Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law. Routledge Cavendish, London, New
York, 115-136....................................................................................................................................... 134
SOLANKE, Iyiola (2009): Putting Race and Gender Together: A New Approach to Intersectionality, The
modern law review, 72(5), 723-749 .................................................................................................... 137
WALBY, Sylvia (2007): Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social
Inequalities, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37, 449-470 ............................................................... 142
WINKER, Gabriele, DEGELE, Nina (2009): Intersektionalität. Zur Analyse sozialer Ungleichheiten,
Transcript Verlag.................................................................................................................................. 145
WINKER, Gabriele, DEGELE, Nina (2011): Intersectionality as Multi-level Analysis: Dealing with social
inequality, European Journal of Women’s Studies 18, 51-66 ............................................................. 149
CASES ................................................................................................................................................... 151
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Introduction
The ETC-project “Locating Intersectional Discrimination” (LID) seeks to apply the
intersectional theory to legal practice. It not only aims to reveal the relevance of intersectional
discrimination but also to investigate how intersectional discrimination could be regarded by
the existing legal norms. Therefore we conduct an interdisciplinary approach which
encompasses theoretical and practical parts. The LID project asks the following questions:
What are the characteristics and specifications of intersectional discrimination which
distinguish it from other ‘single ground models’?
How can intersectional discrimination be defined both in a legal and a social science context
and how can it be identified in practice?
To what extent do antidiscrimination laws cover intersectional discrimination?
How can intersectional discrimination be integrated into law and how can it be included into
legal practice, so that it is adequately addressed in legal proceedings?
Are there solutions to the problems of finding adequate comparators?
Does legal practice correspond to people’s real-life experience of intersectional
discrimination?
The collection of summaries was made for the purposes of research in the LID project. The
summaries are, for that reason, somewhat selective in terms of content and focus and are
not simply summaries of the articles; for example, any material judged to be irrelevant to the
project was excluded while, on the other hand, quotes that had potential importance to the
Locating Intersectional Discrimination were included so that this collection could function as a
quick-find resource. The summaries and analyses are in an alphabetical order by authors.
Some are in English, some are in German.
Einleitung
Das Projekt „Locating Intersectional Discrimination” (LID) strebt danach, intersektionale
Theorie auf die Rechtspraxis anzuwenden, um intersektionale Diskriminierung erkennen und
adäquat adressieren zu können. Es zielt nicht nur darauf ab aufzuzeigen, dass
intersektionale Diskriminierung relevant ist, sondern auch darauf zu untersuchen, wie
intersektionale Diskriminierung von den bestehenden Rechtssystemen behandelt werden
kann. Dazu wird im Projekt ein interdisziplinärer Zugang verfolgt, der theoretische und
praktische Ansätze beinhaltet. Die Forschungsfragen des LID Projektes sind:
Was sind die Merkmale und Besonderheiten von intersektionaler Diskriminierung und was
unterscheidet diese von den „single-ground Modellen“?
Wie kann intersektionale Diskriminierung im rechtlichen und sozialwissenschaftlichen
Kontext entsprechend definiert und in der Praxis identifiziert werden?
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In
wie
weit
decken
die
bestehenden
Antidiskriminierungsgesetze
intersektionale
Diskriminierung ab?
Wie kann intersektionale Diskriminierung in bestehendes Recht integriert und wie mit diesem
verhandelt werden, sodass intersektionale Diskriminierungen angemessen bedacht werden?
Welche Lösungsansätze existieren für die Problematik mit adäquaten Vergleichspersonen?
Decken
sich
Lebensrealitäten
und
Rechtspraxis
hinsichtlich
intersektionalen
Diskriminierungserfahrungen?
Im Rahmen des Projektes Locating Intersectional Discrimination (LID) wurde in Hinblick auf
die Forschungsfragen ein umfangreiches Literaturstudium betrieben und zu ausgewählten
Beiträgen Zusammenfassungen und kritische Auswertungen verfasst und zusammengestellt.
Diese Zusammenstellung dient interessierten Personen aus Wissenschaft und Praxis als
praktischer Ressourcen-Quickfinder. Zu berücksichtigen ist, dass die Auswertungen und
Zusammenfassungen in ihrem Fokus selektiv sind. Einerseits wurden Teile ausgelassen, die
für das Projekt von geringer Relevanz erschienen, andererseits wurden zahlreiche direkte
Zitate aus den bearbeiteten Materialien eingefügt.
Die Zusammenfassungen und Auswertungen sind alphabetisch geordnet. Sie sind teils in
englischer, teils in deutscher Sprache verfasst.
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AKERMARK, Sia Spiliopoulou (2002): The Limits of Pluralism - Recent Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the
Prohibition of Discrimination Add Anything?, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority
Issues in Europe.
Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms is the only explicit reference to minorities in that convention (Akermark p. 1).
Article 14’s accessory nature was established in Belgian Linguistic Case. (Akermark pp. 2 -3)
Protocol No 12 adapted to the European Convention on 26 June 2000 (Akermark p. 3), but in
2002 it still had not been ratified by enough states for it to enter into force (as 10 needed, but
only 2 had). (Akermark p. 4)
Protocol 12 was designed to be substantive (and so not an accessory like Article 14)
(Akermark p. 4):
“However, in Thlimmenos v. Greece, following the thrust in its earlier case law, the
Court explained that the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one
or more of any such provisions and to this extent it is autonomous. Instead, for Article
14 to become applicable it suffices that the facts of a case fall within the ambit of one or
more substantive provisions of the Convention or its Protocols.” (Akermark p. 4,
emphasis original)
Akermark noted that here the court took a liberal approach to interpretation, first of Article 9
(freedom of religion) and then even more so in regard to Article 14. Akermark provides the
following quote from the case as support:
“The Court has so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated
against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated
when States treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an
objective and reasonable justification .... However, the Court considers that this is not
the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. The right not to be
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention
is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different”. (Thlimmenos v.
Greece, Application No. 34369/97, Judgment 6 April 2000, para. 44 (emphasis added).
In Akermark p. 5)
In this case a Jehovah’s Witness refused to participate in military service and, as a result of
this refusal, got a criminal record which prevented him from practicing as an accountant.
From the judgment in this case Akermark draws two conclusions:
“In other words, the Court seems here to be doing two things: firstly, it is shifting the
burden of proof from the applicant to the respondent state. The applicant needs to
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argue only that the complaint concerns significantly different situations, which are
treated similarly. It is then up to the state to prove that the undifferentiated treatment
has a legitimate aim, which can be justified as objective and proportionate. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, the Court is arguing that the Convention imposes
positive obligations on the basis of the prohibition of Article 14, which is otherwise
usually perceived as a primarily negative obligation. The assumption is that different
situations should be treated differently.” (Akermark p. 5)
However, Akermark then discusses the more recent case of Podkolzina v Latvia which points
to a more conservative approach being taken. In that case Article 14 was not even
considered in addition to Article 3 of Protocol No 1, although it did seem to be open to
consideration. Here Latvia has strict language requirements as a basis for eligibility for
election, ruling out many members of minority groups. This leaves the status of Article 14 in
doubt. (Akermark p. 6)
Akermark’s method is to examine a selection of cases in two areas: 1) registration and
recognition of minorities and minority institutions; 2) right to respect for a traditional way of
life. (Akermark p. 8)
The first group fall mostly within Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) but also
Article 6 (right to fair trial), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and Article
10 (freedom of expression) taken alone and together with Article 14 (prohibition of
discrimination). Akermark also classifies this as the public sphere concern. (Akermark p. 8)
The second group mostly concerns Article 8 (right to private and family life) as such and in
conjunction with Article 14. Akermark classifies this as the private sphere concern. (Akermark
p. 8)
Registration and Recognition of Minorities and Minority Institutions
Akermark divides this further into two groups: 1) minority organizations, including political
parties; and 2) religious institutions. (Akermark p. 9)
The first cases concern the dissolution of political parties in Turkey on the basis of national
security, public safety etc. Against this the Court put the importance of political pluralism and
found Turkey in violation of Article 11 – it did not then need to consider other grounds such
as Article 14. (Akermark pp. 9 – 10)
In Refah Partisi v Turkey, however, the party dissolved was an Islamic party that was held to
breach Turkey’s policy of secular government. No violation of Article 11 was found and no
other violations were considered as the court said they would all concern the same facts as
those that failed to show a violation of Article 11. (Akermark pp. 11 – 12)
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Akermark criticizes the argument that Article 14 had been dealt with in the consideration of
Article 11. Akermark also thinks that this decision was inconsistent with the earlier decisions
that did find violations of Article 11.
Akermark suggests that perhaps the Thlimmenos approach of different cases being treated
differently explains it. Although he is very critical of what this would mean for democracy and
liberal individualism. (Akermark p. 13)
Also, in Gorzelik v Poland the Polish authorities refused registration of an organization but
the court found no violation of Article 11. (Akermark pp. 13 – 14) Akermark identifies four
steps in the reasoning of the court:
1) Democracy does not mean that the majority must always prevail.
2) Recognition of minority membership requires bilateral treaties or registration of
associations but this alone did not have consequences for Article 11 rights.
3) The name of the association, which was insisted upon, made it sound political.
4) It was reasonable for the state to protect its electoral system as it did. (Akermark p.
14)
Akermark notes the apparent contradictions in this reasoning and that the court failed to
address issues of discrimination even though both the government and the group had raised
it as an issue. (Akermark p. 14)
Akermark now moves to the second group of cases concerning religious institutions.
(Akermark p. 16)
In Canea Catholic Church v Greece, the court found a violation of both Article 6 and Article
14 taken together with Article 6. The group succeeded by comparing itself to both the Greek
Orthodox Church and the Jewish community and the government could not justify its
difference in treatment. (Akermark p. 16)
In Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France an Orthodox Jewish group wanted to secure ritual
slaughter rights according to its own standards which were different than those that had been
granted to the wider Jewish community. The court found no violation of Articles 9 and 14
considered together. The reasons seem to be based mainly around the proportionality of the
particular practice they wanted allowed within the right to religion and the state’s interest in
health etc. The fact that the meat they wanted could be imported and that the difference
between their own practice and the standard Jewish practice was seen to be minimal also
had an impact. (Akermark p. 16)
The dissenting judges, however, were very critical and felt that the fact that the group was a
minority of a minority had counted against it but that it should not have, even though allowing
minority groups to fracture in this way with regard to rights claims would be more work for the
state etc. (Akermark p. 17)
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In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v Moldova the court found the refusal to
recognize the church was disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and so amounted
to a violation of Article 9. It thought the claim under Article 14 was a repetition of the Article 9
claim. It also found a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy). Akermark is critical
of the court’s avoidance of the question of the status of the church – was it a splinter group or
something else? - he argues that this is necessary in order to assess discrimination.
(Akermark pp. 17-18)
Respect for a traditional way of life
Article 8 ECHR protects the right to private and family life – does this include the right to
respect for a traditional way of life?
Buckley v the United Kingdom 1996 – a Gypsy woman was denied permission to live in her
caravan on her own land. “The applicant claimed that the designation system under the 1968
Caravan Sites Act and the criminalization of “unauthorized camping” under the 1994 Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act discriminated against gypsies by preventing them from pursuing
their traditional lifestyle.” (Akermark p. 18)
The court found no violation of Article 8 although it did think that the case was admissible on
this point. This means that protection of a traditional lifestyle falls within Article 8. (Akermark
p. 19)
The court also found no violation of Article 14.
Akermark is critical of the court’s analysis, arguing that the court did not properly consider the
whole picture of the difficulties of Gypsy life in the UK and, in particular, that the court failed
to take into account that the applicant was a single mother of three children which made
many of the sites offered by the UK unsuitable. (Akermark p. 19)
A group of cases on the same topic as Buckley followed in 2001. Akermark focuses on
Chapman v the United Kingdom (Application no 27238/95). Here the court discusses the
situation facing Roma in the UK in more detail. It also held that being a member of a
traditional minority may have an influence on the manner in which laws were implemented.
From the judgment:
“As intimated in the Buckley judgment, the vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority
means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their
different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at
the decisions in particular cases .... To this extent there is thus a positive obligation
imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of
life.” (quoted in Akermark p. 20)
So a positive obligation on states was found. However, even though it is well established that
there are not enough camping places etc in the UK for Gypsies, this was not held to be a
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violation of Article 8. The court thought that Article 8 could not be interpreted to impose a
positive obligation that had such far reaching implications for social policy. There were
however dissenting judgments that did find a violation. (Akermark p. 20)
Problems that need to be addressed
There is uncertainty about when and why a court even considers Article 14 violations.
(Akermark p. 21)
“In general, the Court does not examine Article 14 violations if it has established a
violation of another substantive provision.” Although Akermark notes that this is not
always the case. (Akermark p. 21)
A reference to intersectional discrimination:
“A related matter is that of the theoretical and practical consequences (for instance
concerning procedural or compensation matters) as well as the advantages or
disadvantages of the identification of multiple, cumulative violations by the Court. This
would be particularly relevant to study in situations of so called 'multiple
discrimination'.” (Akermark p. 21 – reference to Makkonen omitted)
Akermark also notes that in order to consider discriminatory practices, the court requires a lot
of evidence – statistical and narrative – and that apart from the difficulty of obtaining the
statistical evidence that can exist, there can also be a tension between the subjective
experience of the applicant and the objective reality of the statistics. (Akermark p. 21)
Akermark argues that the Court uses faulty logic in dealing with indirect discrimination. The
legislation seems much more open to claims than the court admits. (Akermark p. 22)
Akermark also points out that the protection of minorities is not a consistent scheme in
Europe. The relationship between the European Convention of Human Rights and the
Framework Convention on National Minorities has been discussed in cases such as the
Gorzelik case and the Chapman case. (Akermark p. 22)
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ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNGSSTELLE DES BUNDES (Hg.) (2010): Mehrdimensionale
Diskriminierung, Teil I – Begriffe, Theorien und juristische Analyse, Frankfurt am Main.
A)
Diskriminierungsgründe benennen nicht Unterschiede hinsichtlich persönlicher Merkmale
sondern Lebensrealitäten als Diskriminierungserfahrungen. Es handelt sich hierbei um
Kategorisierungen, anhand welcher Menschen stereotypisiert und bewertet werden.
(Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes I. (im Folgenden: ADB I), S. 4) Es gibt eine
intersektionale Verwobenheit der Kategorien, daher ist davon auszugehen, dass
intersektionale Diskriminierung die Regel ist.
Es besteht ein Bedarf an interdisziplinärer Forschung zum Thema (ADB I, S. 5), auch in der
Erhebung von Beschwerdedaten muss intersektionale Diskriminierung berücksichtigt
werden.
Benennungen führen zu Kategorisierungen. (ADB I, S. 20) Auch die Benennung von
„Gründen“ im Recht kann zur Fortschreibung von Stereotypen führen. Man muss sich
überlegen, wie man über Menschen und ihre Erfahrungen sprechen kann, ohne
Diskriminierung sprachlich zu wiederholen. (ADB I, S. 21)
Baer spricht sich für das Wort Kategorisierung statt Gründe oder Merkmale aus. (ADB I, S.
26)
Sie verwendet prozessuale Begrifflichkeiten, um den konstruierten Charakter von
Kategorisierungen offenzulegen. Beispiele hierfür wären: ethnisierte Herkunft statt ethnische
Herkunft; „Vergeschlechtlichung“ statt Geschlecht; „Kulturalisierung“ statt
Religion oder
Weltanschauung; „behinderte Entfaltung“ statt Behinderung; „Bio-Chronologisierung“ statt
Alter; „sexuelle Normierung“ statt sexuelle Identität. Hierdurch wird klar, dass diese
Kategorien
nicht
Identitäten
sind,
die
Menschen
haben,
sondern
dass
es
um
Kategorisierungen geht, um Zuschreibungen durch andere, die sich in anderen, meist
übergeordneten
Machtpositionen
Selbstbeschreibungen
betroffener
befinden.
Diese
Personen
Kategorisierungen
übernommen
werden.
können
Der
als
Begriff
Kategorisierung weist auch auf den Zusammenhang von Benachteiligung und Norm hin.
Was/wer
nicht
normkonform
ist,
macht
mit
höherer
Wahrscheinlichkeit
Diskriminierungserfahrungen.
Gegen die Verwendung des Begriffes „Gründe“ hat Baer zu sagen, dass die Verwendung
des Begriffes juristisch sinnvoll ist, da sie im Gesetz festgelegt ist. (ADB I, S. 61) Darüber
hinaus sollte der Begriff jedoch nicht verwendet werden, auch in der Rechtspraxis nicht,
denn Gründe legen den Schluss auf Begründung nahe, also auf Motivation zur
Diskriminierung durch verschiedene Akteure (ADB I, S. 61), was für Diskriminierung
irrelevant ist. Es darf nicht um Hintergründe und Motive gehen. Gründe können auch an
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Ursachen denken lassen und mit einer (Teil-)Schuld der Betroffenen an ihrem Schicksal
einhergehen. Die Gründe für Diskriminierungen sind jedoch Zuschreibungen und
Kategorisierungen, die andere Menschen in meist höheren Machtpositionen gegenüber
anderen vornehmen. Dabei spielt die Norm eine wichtige Rolle, in anderen Worten das, was
als normal konstruiert wurde.
Gegen den Begriff Merkmal (ADB I, S. 62) hat die Autorin folgendes einzuwenden: Merkmal
scheint etwas zu bezeichnen, das Menschen innehaben (Wesenszüge etc.). Tatsächlich
werden diese Merkmale aber den Menschen zugeschrieben, weil sie außerhalb der Norm
stehen. Merkmal birgt die Gefahr, dass die Schuld bei den betroffenen Personen gesucht
wird und dass sich die betroffenen Personen auch mit diesen Merkmalen identifizieren.
Die Begriffe Grund und Merkmal legen zudem nahe, dass es sich bei den betroffenen
Personen um Gruppen handelt. (ADB I, S. 83)
Diskriminierung, Teil I – Begriffe, Theorien und juristische Analyse, Frankfurt am Main.
B)
Das
Allgemeine
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz
(AGG)
in
Deutschland
hat
zum
Ziel,
„Benachteiligungen aus Gründen der Rasse oder wegen der ethnischen Herkunft, des
Geschlechts, der Religion oder Weltanschauung, einer Behinderung, des Alters oder der
sexuellen Identität zu verhindern oder zu beseitigen“ (§ 1 AGG) Diese genannten ‚Gründe’
sind weder Unterschiede noch Diversität, sondern benennen Lebensrealitäten, nach denen
sich gesellschaftliche Chancen verteilen (S. 4). Anhand dieser Lebensrealitäten (Anm: die
sich durch Interaktionen immer wieder in abgewandelten Formen und Ausdrucksweisen
reproduzieren) werden Menschen stereotypisiert und bewertet. Es handelt sich daher um
Kategorisierungen
(wertende
Zuschreibungen
und
wertende
Einordnungen).
Diese
Kategorisierungen sind intersektional verschränkt, nicht eindimensional, sondern komplex
und werden auch als komplex erlebt. Die Lebensrealitäten als eindimensional zu behandeln,
stereotypisiert wiederum und verkürzt die Probleme, um die es geht (S. 4). Als
(mehrdimensionale) Diskriminierung beschreibt Baer die Erfahrung, in der sich bestimmte
‚Achsen der Ungleichheit’ (Klinger/Knapp) kreuzen und entlang derer soziale Positionen
eingenommen werden (Anm: zugeschrieben werden). Kategorisierungen sind demnach
Verhältnisse, in denen Menschen leben.
Die rechtlichen Konsequenzen mehrdimensionaler Diskriminierung sind weitgehend
ungeklärt, vereinzelt anerkennt der Gesetzgeber allerdings, dass Kategorisierungen
zusammentreffen. Baer unterscheidet zwischen den Mehrdimensionalitäten, ob erst die
Verschränkung zu Benachteiligung führt (Intersektionalität ieS) oder Kategorisierungen
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nebeneinander
wirken
(‚Multiple
Discrimination’)
(S.
4).
Die
Analyse
von
Gerichtsentscheidungen zeige, dass Mehrdimensionalität entweder nicht erkannt oder nicht
angemessen berücksichtigt wird.
Als wichtigster Schritt ist zuerst die Aufhebung der Hierarchisierung von Diskriminierungen
durch
unterschiedliche
Anwendungsbereiche
und
unterschiedliche
Begründung
zu
beseitigen. Strukturelle Diskriminierung bedarf der mehrdimensionalen Analyse. Dabei ist mit
dem Konzept der politischen Intersektionalität zu zeigen, wer von Diskriminierungen
profitiert, dh, Diskriminierung muss durch die Rechtsdurchsetzung unrentabel gemacht
werden.
Allerdings
bedarf
es
bei
der
Vorgabe
wirksamer,
angemessener
und
abschreckender Sanktionen noch eine rechtsdogmatisch befriedigende Lösung zu finden,
die mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung nicht additiv, sondern einzelfallgerecht berücksichtigt
(S. 6). In der Rechtsdurchsetzung müssen die Indizien für einen Anfangsverdacht mit
entsprechenden statistischen Daten unterlegt werden (zur Vermeidung des Phänomens, das
Smutny beschreibt, wenn es darum geht, das für die Diskriminierung ausschlaggebende
Motiv zu benennen, Smutny 2011).
Baer stellt fest, dass Diskriminierungsfälle in der Regel nicht eindimensional sind. Als
Beispiel bringt sie die Debatte um das muslimische Kopftuch (S. 7). Die Kategorisierungen
Religion, Geschlecht und ethnische Herkunft spielen eine Rolle. Aber auch der soziale
Status muss berücksichtigt werden, denn die Debatte betrifft zumeist etwa Lehrerinnen in
staatlichen Schulen und weniger Raumpflegerinnen in öffentlichen Gebäuden. Als weiteres
Beispiel nennt Baer den Zugang zu zB Diskotheken (S. 8), der beispielsweise arabischen
Männern verwehrt, Männern im Allgemeinen und arabischen Frauen jedoch gewährt wird. Es
handelt sich in Diskriminierungsfällen um Situationen sozialer Ausgrenzung. Damit sind sie
auch durch zB CERD oder CEDAW umfasst. Auch die Grundrechtecharta der EU ist so
auszulegen, dass Anti-Diskriminierungsrecht sowohl ungerechtfertigte Ungleichbehandlung
als auch soziale Ausgrenzung verhindern und beseitigen will (dazu auch Ulrich 2011).
Wichtig
ist
weiters,
dass
das
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz
nicht
darlegt,
welche
Beweisanforderungen für mehrdimensionale Diskriminierungen bestehen. § 4 AGG
behandelt ja auch nicht mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung, sondern die Anforderungen an
eine Rechtfertigung von Ungleichbehandlung (S. 8).
Begriffsklärungen
Abzuklären
sind
„mehrdimensionaler“
die
Bedeutungsinhalte
von
„mehrfacher“,
und „intersektionaler“ Diskriminierung.
„verstärkender“,
Intersektionalität
ist
der
Oberbegriff zur Beschreibung des Zusammenwirkens mehrerer Ungleichheitskategorien.
Crenshaw’s Anliegen war es, Sachverhalte nicht nach Kategorien zu zerlegen, sondern als
komplexes Geschehen zu verstehen. Ihr Einwand war rechtsdogmatisch: Aus dem
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allgemeinen Gleichheitssatz werden unterschiedliche Schutzniveaus konstruiert und deshalb
Menschen dazu gezwungen, sich exklusiv einer Kategorie zuzuordnen. Dies verhindere das
Erkennen von und den Rechtsschutz bei intersektionaler Diskriminierung (S. 11).
Intersektionale Diskriminierung bleibt unerkannt oder nicht anerkannt, wenn:
a) eine Benachteiligung weder hinsichtlich der einen noch der anderen Kategorie
nachgewiesen werden kann, sondern nur für beide Kategorien gemeinsam.
Insbesondere
handelt
es
sich
hier
um
Probleme
bei
der
Auswahl
der
Vergleichsperson;
b) die Kategorisierung, die aus der Verschränkung entsteht oder eine der verschränkten
Kategorisierungen nicht vom Schutzbereich umfasst sind;
c) die von Kategorisierungen betroffenen Gruppen als homogen angenommen werden.
Zur Behebung von b) schlägt Baer vor, im Gesetz bei den verpönten Motiven den Hinweis
„oder aus einer Kombination“ bzw. „oder beim Zusammenkommen oder -wirken“ anzufügen
(kritisch dazu Schiek 2011, durch die nachträgliche Einführung des Passus würde geklärt,
dass dies bislang nicht möglich wäre).
Als Ursache in der Nichterkennung von Mehrdimensionalität sieht Baer die Verharrung im
eindimensionalen Modell des Anti-Diskriminierungsrechts, das sich auf Hierarchisierung der
Motive, auf entsprechende Verhandlungsstrategien oder auf die Eigenwahrnehmung von
Betroffenen auswirkt.
Beispiele für Intersektionalitäten
Homosexualität: Geschlecht und Sexualmoral (S. 11).
Häusliche Gewalt: Geschlecht und Rechtsstatus
Pflege und häusliche Arbeit: Reproduktionsarbeit durch MigrantInnen begünstigt „Weiße“
Schwangerschaftsabbruch bei behinderten Frauen (Problem der Entsexualisierung, Fürsorge
statt „Enthinderung“).
Behinderte Frauen haben aufgrund ihrer Abhängigkeit ein höheres Risiko, sexueller Gewalt
und Belästigung ausgesetzt zu sein.
Kategorisierungen müssen konsequent interdependent gedacht werden (empirischer
Nachweis der Interdependenz durch Zick ua 2011), um Konstruktionen wie auch das
Konzept der Normperson zu durchbrechen (S. 13). Es müssen jedenfalls machttheoretisch
informierte Konzepte herangezogen werden (S. 16).
Zentrale Fragestellungen sind, ob es um Individuen oder Gruppenzugehörigkeiten geht und
ob es um subjektive oder zugeschriebene Identitäten oder um „natürliche“ oder soziokulturelle Merkmale der Betroffenen geht, oder um die Motive der TäterInnen (S. 17). Weiters
ist die Frage wesentlich, nach welchen Begründungen die Auswahl der Motive erfolgt.
Bleiben die Kategorien in allen Kontexten gleich relevant oder sind die Kategorien empirisch
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laufend neu zu bestimmen? Baer plädiert für eine offene Liste der Diskriminierungsverbote
nach dem Vorbild des Menschenrechtssystems (S. 18).
Konzepte
Baer stellt vier Konzepte vor: Achsen der Ungleichheit (Klinger/Knapp), Interdependenzen
(Walgenbach), Intersectionality (Crenshaw) und Mehrfachdiskriminierung (Makkonen). Der
erste Ansatz ist ein makrosoziologischer Ansatz. Walgenbachs Ansatz sieht eine genuine
Verschränkung der Diskriminierungsgründe, wobei nicht Wechselwirkungen zwischen
Kategorien betrachtet werden, sondern Kategorien selbst sollen als interdependent
aufgefasst werden. Ihre Herstellung erfolgt durch Sprache bzw. Sprechakte. Crenshaw’s
Konzept der Intersectionality bezieht sich auf die Benachteiligung, die durch das Recht
aufgrund der homogenen Gruppensicht und der Eindimensionalität nicht gesehen wird.
Makkonen wiederum unterscheidet zwischen Mehrfach-, Compound- und Intersektioneller
Diskriminierung (Beispiele zu Makkonen S. 23).
Zwischenfazit ist, dass die gesellschaftliche Chancenverteilung durch Kategorisierung – und
nicht zufällig – ungleich ist. Die Chancenverteilung erfolgt durch Ausschlüsse entlang von
„Achsen“ der Ungleichheit. Kategorisierungen entstehen durch Stereotypisierung und
wertende Zuschreibung. Ungleichheit ist funktional. Diskriminierung hat ihre Grundlagen in
kulturellen und symbolischen Ordnungen, ideologischen Verfestigungen und in Strukturen,
die sich verletzend und in nachteiligen Erfahrungen manifestieren (S. 25). Der Begriff
Kategorisierung soll erstens zeigen, dass es sich nicht um individuelle Merkmale handelt, die
eine Diskriminierung „auslösen“, sondern um Dimensionen von Benachteiligung. Zweitens
beschreibt der Begriff im Unterschied zur Kategorie ein aktives Handeln, es geht nicht
darum, was Menschen sind, sondern darum, was aus ihnen im Zuge von Machtdiskursen
gemacht wird (S. 26).
Rechtsetzung
Europäische
und
nationale
Anti-Diskriminierungsgesetze
beinhalten
(bislang)
keine
Legaldefinitionen von Mehrfachdiskriminierung. Inwieweit die diversen Formen abgedeckt
sind, ist einerseits interpretativ zu klären oder in der jeweiligen Fallkonstellation zu
analysieren. Rechtlich gesehen, sollten diejenigen Fälle keine Schwierigkeiten bereiten, in
denen Diskriminierungshandlungen oder deren Motivationen analytisch zu trennen sind, z.B.
bei sexueller Belästigung und rassistischer Beschimpfung, oder, wenn, aus welchen
Motivationen auch immer, die Diskriminierungshandlungen in einer zeitlichen Abfolge
erfolgen (Beispiele S. 33).
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Mehrdimensionale Diskriminierung ist laut Baer durch die gleichzeitige Diskriminierung unter
Zugrundelegung mehrerer Kategorisierungen, wobei diese verschränkt sein können, aber
nicht müssen. Zur rechtlichen Beurteilung sei die Zuordnung zu einer „Gruppe“ notwendig.
Die Zuordnung zu mehreren Gruppen ist zwar nicht ausgeschlossen, jedoch bedarf es zur
rechtlichen Beurteilung eines jeweils analytischen Vergleichs. Gerade dies ist aber bei
verschränkter (intersektioneller) Diskriminierung nicht möglich, weil erstens diese „Gruppe“
nicht im Gesetz benannt wird und zweitens die Bestimmung und Auswahl einer
Vergleichsperson schwierig oder unmöglich ist. Es ist klar, dass im Beispiel der
diskriminierten „Schwarzen Frau“ weder Männer noch Weiße adäquate Vergleichsgruppen
darstellen, allerdings ist auch das „Gegenteil“, nämlich der „Weiße Mann“ – um die beiden
Gegengruppen zu verschränken – nicht notwendigerweise die geeignete Vergleichsperson,
gleichwohl der hypothetische „Weiße Mann“ als Normperson im Verdacht steht, in der
vergleichbaren Situation anders behandelt zu werden.
Ein weiteres Problem besteht darin, dass zum Nachweis einer Diskriminierung ein Nachweis
der Kausalität zwischen Ungleichbehandlung und verpöntem Motiv erforderlich ist.
Monokausale Formeln (Nachweis des eigentlich ausschlaggebenden Grundes, vergleiche
auch Smutny 2011) sind bestenfalls für eine analytisch trennbare Mehrfachdiskriminierung
anwendbar. Bei Verschränkungen missachten monokausale Formeln entweder ein Motiv
oder im ungünstigsten Fall wird das Vorliegen einer Diskriminierung verneint („hidden
discrimination“).
Diese
Konstellation
kann
auch
durch
die
Hierarchisierung
der
Diskriminierungsgründe auftreten, selbst dann, wenn die Mehrdimensionalität erkannt wird.
Baer
schlägt
mit
Hinweis
auf
Zinsmeister
(Zinsmeister,
Julia:
Mehrdimensionale
Diskriminierung, Baden-Baden 2007) die inzidente Prüfung vor (S. 35). Dabei müsste im
Verdacht auf das Zutreffen mehrerer Kategorisierungen auch hinsichtlich aller geprüft
werden (kritisch dazu Makkonen, der den „intersektionalen Verdacht“ mit dem Hinweis auf
die Gefahr von Opferstigmatisierung ablehnt, Makkonen 2002).
Schließlich kommt noch das Problem des statistischen Beweises hinzu. Mehrdimensionale,
insbesondere intersektionale Benachteiligungen und Diskriminierungen sind mittelbar, weil
sie strukturelle Benachteiligungen sind. Nun ist der statistische Beweis anerkannt, jedoch
insgesamt nur aufwändig zu erbringen und im Fall von Intersektionalitäten auch häufig nicht
verfügbar, weil es keine Vergleichsgruppendaten gibt oder die von der spezifischen
Intersektionalität betroffene „Gruppe“ zu klein ist, um statistisch signifikante Daten aufweisen
zu können.
Baer argumentiert, dass die EU (S 42, KOM (2004) 379; S. 44 KOM (2008) 4261)
grundsätzlich das Problem von Mehrfachdiskriminierungen anerkennt und eine „kohärente
1
Der Vorschlag der Harmonisierungsrichtlinie soll die Hierarchisierung zwischen den Diskriminierungsgründen
aufheben und soll der Vervollständigung der Anti-Diskriminierungsgesetzgebung dienen. Weiters stellt die
Erwägung klar, dass es sich um die Konsistenz zwischen Diskriminierungsbekämpfung, Wachstumsstrategie
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und integrierte Vorgangsweise“ (Anm: durch die Mitgliedstaaten) gefunden werden muss.
Der nationale Gesetzgeber ist somit gefordert. Der Vorschlag, der Liste der verpönten Motive
den Zusatz „oder Kombinationen“ anzufügen, wäre ein einfacher Schritt. Die Aufhebung der
Hierarchisierung scheint jedoch (vorerst) an ideologischen Hürden zu scheitern, ebenso wie
die Öffnung der taxativen Liste, wie dies die Charta der Grundrechte vorsieht. Sowohl aus
dem Primär- als auch aus dem Sekundärrecht der Union kann ein entsprechendes
Handlungsgebot für die Mitgliedsstaaten abgeleitet werden.
Die größten Probleme für die Anerkennung von mehrdimensionalen Diskriminierungen liegen
im Unwissen (der Insensibilität) und im Zwang zur Vergleichsgruppenbildung. Unter Hinweis
auf Burri und Schiek (Burri/Schiek 2009) wird die Verknüpfung von sozialwissenschaftlicher
und juristischer Herangehensweise empfohlen.
Menschenrechte
Baer verweist auf die neuen Ansätze in der Behindertenrechtskonvention, welche sowohl
„schwierige Bedingungen“, also Lebensverhältnisse, anerkennt, die zu Diskriminierung von
Menschen mit Behinderung (auch und zusätzlich) aus anderen Gründen (taxative, aber sehr
weit interpretierbare Liste) ausgesetzt sind (Präambel, zit S. 46). Das heißt, die
Behindertenrechtskonvention
anerkennt
den
mehrdimensionalen
Charakter
von
Diskriminierung, nimmt aber darüber hinaus auch auf die Benachteiligung und nicht nur auf
formale (und symmetrische) Gleichbehandlung Bezug. Grundsätzlich hält Baer das
Menschenrechtssystem mit seinem materiellen Gleichheitsanspruch und der Möglichkeit von
positiven Maßnahmen zur Herstellung von Gleichheit (Gleichstellungsgebot) für ein
geeignetes Instrument (S. 48). Daher folgert sie, dass das Gleichbehandlungsrecht im Lichte
der Menschenrechtsnormen ausgelegt und daran angepasst (Anm: gemessen) werden
müsse.
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Mehrdimensionalitäten können vor Gericht nur verhandelt werden, wenn sie auch
entsprechend thematisiert und vorgebracht werden. Ist dies der Fall, ergeben sich dennoch
die Probleme der Hierarchisierung der verpönten Motive durch die unterschiedlichen
Anwendungsbereiche, die eingeschränkte Liste verpönter Motive, die Schwierigkeit in der
Identifikation und Auswahl der Vergleichsperson bzw. Vergleichsgruppe, die Schwierigkeit
der Verfügbarkeit eines statistischen Beweises sowie das Problem der monokausalen
Begründung.
Allerdings belegen die bisherigen Forschungsergebnisse, dass Mehrdimensionalitäten im
Wesentlichen aus zwei Gründen gar nicht thematisiert werden. Zum einen sind sich die
(Lissabon Strategie), den Zielen des Sozialschutzes und der sozialen Integration in Übereinstimmung mit der
Grundrechtecharta handelt (S 3).
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Betroffenen der Mehrdimensionalität sehr oft nicht bewusst. Außerdem herrscht große
Unsicherheit bei den Beratungseinrichtungen, einschließlich RechtsvertreterInnen, so dass
diese ihre Mandantschaften auch nicht darauf aufmerksam machen. Zum Zweiten spielt das
verhandlungstaktische Argument in der Praxis eine große Rolle. Abgewogen wird die
Erfolgschance in einem kürzeren Verfahren nach den herrschenden Regeln nach einem
Motiv und der monokausalen Formel gegenüber einer aufwändigen Argumentation mit vielen
Unsicherheiten und großem Beweisrisiko. Eine kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung könnte helfen,
ist aber in den meisten EU Mitgliedstaaten nicht möglich (S. 51).
Baer argumentiert, dass die „Gründe“ nicht im Zentrum der gerichtlichen Prüfung stehen
sollten und führt dazu eine Entscheidung des EUGH (EuGH C-177/88, Urteil vom 8.11.1990
(Dekker)) an (S. 61), nach der es beim Diskriminierungsschutz nicht um Motive oder
Absichten gehen dürfe. „Gründe“ ließen sich sonst als Ursachen denken, was dazu führe,
dass der benachteiligten Person eine Verantwortung für ihre Benachteiligung zugeschrieben
würde. Der Grund liege vielmehr in den „Achsen der Ungleichheit“, womit Vorstellungen vom
„normalen“ Körper, von Geschlechterrollen usw. verbunden sind (S. 61).
Diskriminierung, Teil II – Eine empirische Untersuchung anhand von autobiografischnarrativen Interviews, Frankfurt am Main.
Ziel des Artikels: Autobiografische Interviews sollen ausgewertet werden, um zu erfahren, ob
Erfahrungen
mit
Personengruppen
mehrdimensionaler
besonders
betroffen
Diskriminierung
sind
und
gemacht
in
wurden,
welchen
welche
Lebensbereichen.
(Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes II (im Folgenden: ADB II), S. 3) Insgesamt wurden
290 Interviews geführt. Es wurde nicht direkt nach Diskriminierungserfahrungen gefragt.
(ADB II, S. 5)
Die Dimensionen Alter, Herkunft, Geschlecht und sexuelle Orientierung wirken verstärkend
aufeinander, Behinderung dominierend (Baer et al S. 6), Geschlecht zeigt sich fast immer als
relevante Dimension. (ADB II, S. 7)
Orte der Diskriminierung sind an erster Stelle die Familie (ADB II, S. 10, vor allem bei
sexueller Orientierung), gefolgt von Schule (Herkunft und sexuelle Orientierung) und Arbeit
(vor
allem
Herkunft
Alltagssituationen
und
(Herkunft),
Geschlecht).
am
Aber
auch
Wohnungsmarkt
bei
Behörden
(Herkunft)
und
(Herkunft),
in
in
stationären
Einrichtungen (Alter) findet Diskriminierung statt.
Da Diskriminierung nicht immer von den Betroffenen selbst so benannt wird, der Begriff
sogar oft zurückgewiesen wird, wurden andere Begriffe verwendet, wie zum Beispiel
„ungleiche Behandlung“, „mangelndes Zutrauen“, „Übersehen“, „Abwertung“, „Übergriffe“.
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Ressourcen und Rückhalt bieten die Familie (vor allem bei sexueller Orientierung,
Behinderung und Herkunft) und die Religion (Religion und Weltanschauung, allerdings nicht
bei sexueller Orientierung). (ADB II, S. 13)
APPIAH, Anthony (1990): But Would That Still Be Me? Notes on Gender, “Race”,
Ethnicity, as Sources of “Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 10, EightySeventh Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct.,
1990), 493-499
This article is old (1990) but is often referenced in more recent work. It may also form a
bridge
between
“French”/continental
philosophical
approaches
and
“Anglo-
American”/analytical ones. So although this article may be both a little too broad in its ideas
for anti-discrimination and too old for state-of-the-art, it remains useful and worth considering
as a foundational article.
It discusses why gender and ‘race’ are not simple categories. Appiah does this in very
traditional, analytic terms. He even uses Kripke, but it is not clear that this approach can
avoid some kind of biological determinism. It is true that discussing gender in terms of
chromosomal difference and physical appearance does create more than two categories, but
is still a rather crude way of classifying people. It would seem to mean that medical science
has the final say.
Appiah proposes that culture is more fundamental and longer lasting than ‘race’ as a
category.
He poses the question “What if I had been raised a girl?” (but he was still chromosomally a
boy). He proposes that, in such an eventuality, there is one way of looking at the question in
which he would still be himself, and another in which he would not. (Appiah p. 494)
He first considers the question changed to consider somebody who has undergone a sexchange:
“What answer I should give to the question under-stood this way depends on how
central my being-a-man is to my identity, not on how central I choose to make it.”
(Appiah p. 495)
He proposes that a transsexual would claim that this was the “Ureal me, the one I have
always really been all along” but Appiah’s answer is “No. A sex-change operation would
make of the (metaphysical) person a different (ethical) person.” (Appiah p. 495)
He now turns to identity and ‘race’ which he thinks is very complicated in that ‘races’ are not
clearly defined in the way gender seems to have certain physical signs (chromosomes etc)
even if this, too, can be complicated. Appiah does not deny that people can have identities
based on ‘race’ and that these can be externally determined. (Appiah p. 496)
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He proposes a hypothetical of ‘race’-change:
“Surely, in contemplating this possibility, she could ask herself whether, once these
changes had occurred, the resulting ethical person "would still be me." And, so far as I
can see, almost everyone who does contemplate this question in our society is likely to
judge that, whether or not these changes are desirable, the answer here must be 'yes'.”
(Appiah p. 497)
Appiah’s conclusion is that in the modern West, racial ethical identities are “Dapparently less
conceptually central to who one is than gender ethical identities.” (Appiah p. 497)
He improves the position:
“Nevertheless, even for those for whom being-African-American is an important aspect
of their ethical identity, what matters to them is almost always not the unqualified fact of
that descent, but rather something that they suppose to go with it: the experience of a
life as a member of a group of people who experience themselves as-and are held by
others to be-a community in virtue of their mutual recognition-and their recognition by
others-as people of a common descent.” (Appiah p. 497)]
He then discusses briefly the difference between ethnic and racial identities.
“People of Irish-American descent adopted and raised outside Irish-American culture
are still, perhaps, to be thought of as Irish-Americans; but they have a choice about
whether this fact, once they are aware of it, should be central to their ethical identities,
and their taking it as central would involve them in adopting certain cultural practices.
D So far as I can see, by contrast, African-Americans who respond in this way fall into
two categories, depending on whether or not their visible morphology permits them to
"pass," permits them, that is, to act in society without their African ancestry's being
noticed. If they cannot pass, they will often be thought of as inauthentic, D, though
they will not be thought to be dishonest, since their morphology reveals the fact that is
being denied. If they can pass, they will be thought of by many, as being not merely inauthentic but dishonest.” (Appiah p. 498)
Appiah thinks that this distinction between ‘race’ and ethnicity is based on false beliefs as the
distinction between ‘races’ is not even biologically determined. (Appiah pp. 498 – 499)
None of this is to suggest that ‘race’ and gender are not centrally important to people when,
for example, constructing their life plans. (Appiah p. 499)
But:
“We construct ethical identities-woman, man, African-American, ‘white’-in ways that
depend crucially on false beliefs about meta-physical identities; something like each of
them could be reconstructed out of other materials. But if we were to live in a society
that did not institutionalize those false metaphysical beliefs, it is unclear that the project
of reconstruction would be an attractive one. In a truly nonsexist, nonracist society,
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gender, the ethical identity constructed on the base of sexual differences, would at
least be radically differently configured, and might, like ‘‘race’,’ entirely wither away;
ethnic identities, by contrast-and this is something an African- American identity could
become-seem likely to persist so long as there are human cultures and subcultures,
which is likely to mean as long as people are raised in families.” (Appiah p. 499)
ARNADOTTIR, Oddny Mjöll (2008): Multidimensional Equality from within: Themes
from the European Convention on Human Rights, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE,
Victoria: European Union Non-Discrimination Law – Comparative Perspectives on
Multidimensional Equality Law, Routledge-Cavendish, 59-89.
Arnadottir stellt die Frage, ob aus dem einmaligen System der EMRK und Art. 14 etwas für
die multidimensionale Zukunft des EU Gleichbehandlungsrechts gelernt werden kann.
Vielversprechend an Art. 14 (und auch am gleichlautenden Artikel im 12. ZP) ist die nicht
abschließende Aufzählung von Gründen. Dadurch ist es möglich, dass ein/e Kläger/Klägerin
seine/ihre Beschwerde auf einer Vielzahl an Identitäten und Diskriminierungsgründen
gründet. (Arnadottir S. 54)
Wichtig in diesem Zusammenhang ist der Ermessensspielraum (margin of appreciation), den
der EGMR den Mitgliedsstaaten zuspricht - dieser ist in Bezug auf die einzelnen EMRK
Bestimmungen durchaus unterschiedlich ausgeformt. Dieser Ermessensspielraum fließt aus
dem Prinzip der Subsidiarität des Konventionsschutzes, d.h. die ursprüngliche Betrachtung
einer Rechtssache obliegt den Mitgliedsstaaten. Außerdem - da es innerhalb der
Mitgliedsstaaten kulturelle Diversität gibt - soll diesen auch durch den Ermessensspielraum
Rechnung getragen werden. (Arnadottir S. 58) In Art. 14 variiert der Ermessensspielraum in
Bezug auf die Umstände, die Sache und den Hintergrund (Rasmussen v. Dänemark, 1985).
Der Ermessensspielraum in der Geschlechterdiskriminierung ist sehr eng ausgestaltet, da
die Gleichbehandlung der Geschlechter als allgemeines Ziel in allen Mitgliedsstaaten
verstanden wird.
Zum Thema der Vergleichsperson führt Arnadottir aus, dass der EGMR keine strikten
Vorgaben hat, wie der Kläger seine Vergleichsperson präsentieren muss. Des Weiteren
weist die offene Liste an Diskriminierungsgründen in Art. 14 darauf hin, dass der Gerichtshof
auch
eine
Reihe
an
Fällen
untersucht
hat,
die
nicht
mit
den
üblichen
Diskriminierungsgründen zusammenhängen. Eine Case-Law deutet auf eine offene
Herangehensweise an die Konstruktion der Diskriminierung hin.
Artikel 14 ist nicht die allumfassende Lösung, jedoch sollte sein Potential nicht unterschätzt
werden. Eine Norm für alle Diskriminierungsgründe und ein menschenrechtlicher Ansatz
können manche Probleme im Umgang mit multidimensionaler Diskriminierung lösen.
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Nichtsdestotrotz müssen, so Arnadottir, diese allgemeinen Normen mit den konkreten
Normen für die einzelnen Gründe koexistieren, um sich gegenseitig zu ergänzen.
BAER, Susanne, SMYKALLA, Sandra (2009): Zur Bedeutung von Stereotypen für
gleichstellungspolitische Interventionen, in: BAER, Susanne, SMYKALLA, Sandra,
HILDEBRANDT, Karin, Schubladen, Schablonen, Schema F – Stereotype als
Herausforderung für Gleichstellungspolitik, USP Publishing, Kleine Verlag, Hamburg.
Gute und kurze Zusammenstellung von Definitionen von Stereotypen, Vorurteilen und ihrem
Zusammenhang mit Diskriminierung sowie eine sehr brauchbare Darstellung und
Argumentation, dass das EU-Antidiskriminierungsrecht (auch) Gleichstellungsrecht ist.
Obwohl (Geschlechter)Diskriminierung fortbesteht, und dieses Faktum aufgrund eines
großen Umfangs an Daten weithin bekannt ist, wird erstaunlich oft behauptet – auch von
Frauen, zB Richterinnen – Frauen wären gleichberechtigt: auch das ist ein Stereotyp und für
den Fortbestand von Diskriminierung (mit)verantwortlich. Welche Rolle spielen Stereotype
für die Gleichstellungspolitik?
Stereotype Vorstellungen binden Menschen an bestimmte und begrenzte Lebenslagen, sie
schaffen das Bild vom „Wir“ und vom „Anderen“ und wirken dadurch unreflektiert – häufig
unbemerkt und unbewusst – identitätsstiftend (S. 8). Wann wirken solche Bilder und
Vorstellungen? Verursachen sie geschlechterdiskriminierende Erziehung, heteronormative
und patriarchale Beziehungsvorstellungen, fehlende Vereinbarkeit von Erwerbs- und
Privatleben, segregierte Ausbildungsentscheidungen und schließlich geschlechterbezogene
Altersarmut? Ja, wenn sie institutionalisiert sind bzw. werden. Stereotype wirken nur im
Kontext, dh dann, wenn in Regelungen auf sie Bezug genommen und sie in pädagogische
Vorgaben einfließen.
Stereotype benützen eine allgemeine Markierung, um eine Gruppe zu benennen – somit wird
durch einen Oberbegriff eine Gruppe konstruiert (gute Beschreibung von Beispielen auf S.
9).
Baer grenzt die Begriffe Stereotyp, Klischee, Stigma und Vorurteile ab. Vorurteil ist ein
Stereotyp, das affektiv besetzt ist, wohingegen ein Stereotyp ein rationales „Muster im Kopf“
sein kann.
Ein Stigma ist ein sozialer Definitionsprozess, bei dem ein Attribut eine negative Bewertung
erhält. Stereotype bringen grundlegende Unterscheidungen zum Ausdruck, sie sind (auch)
Orientierungshilfen und entfalten ihren Sinn erst durch die Einordnung in bestimmte
Kategorien („Schubladen“). Sie sind damit ein Instrument zur Herstellung gesellschaftlicher
Werte und Normen und iwS eine Praxis der Kategorisierung von Menschen und
Verhältnissen (S. 10).
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Die Gleichstellungspolitik konzentriert sich zunehmend auch offiziell (EKommission 2006) auf
Interventionen
Schwerpunkten,
zu
S.
Stereotypisierungen
11).
Die
(einer
von
Gleichstellungspolitik
sechs
ist
gleichstellungspolitischen
jedoch
von
konjunkturellen
Schwankungen bedroht („zuerst Finanzkrise lösenU“), permanent mit einem Wechsel ihrer
Zielgruppen konfrontiert (Gruppendiversifikation, Diversity-Mainstreaming, usw.) und muss
sich an wechselnde Governancestrukturen anpassen, die nicht immer transparenzfördernd
sind (zB Auslagerungen). Zudem kämpfen Gleichstellungspolitiken gegen ein schlechtes
mediales
Image
und
schließlich
existieren
auch
innere
Spannungen,
wie
Geschlechterdifferenzierungen oder Reproduktionen von Ausgrenzung und Dominanz.
BAER, Susanne (2010), A Closer Look at Law: human rights as multi-level sites of
struggles over multi-dimensional equality, Utrecht Law Review 6/2, 56-76.
This article discusses conflicts between human rights relating to religion and equality, along
with the way that these disputes are framed. Baer uses examples such as headscarves and
swimming lessons and so centres the discussion on Muslim women and girls. She pays quite
a lot of attention to the conflict that can occur between a religious group’s interest in
maintaining strict gender roles and the individual’s freedoms to choose her own way of life.
Within this context she discusses ‘groupism’:
“Doctrinally, groupism is another problematic effect of symmetrical, Aristotelian equality
analysis, in that this needs fixed units to compare, to similarly situate. Instead, equality
is a right against groupism if it is understood as asymmetrical and substantive, a
difference I return to below.
Regarding religion, the difference is one between a concept of religious freedom tied to
a collective and religious freedom as an individual right which may eventually be turned
against hegemonic claims within a religious community.” (Baer p. 60)
In short, she links ‘groupism’ to equal treatment and argues that, in contrast, it is in tension
with substantive equality.
From the perspective of the project Locating Intersectional Discrimination, she also makes
some interesting observations about the ‘othering’ of sex inequality. These observations may
be generalised to protected characteristics in discrimination law more generally and do hold
a warning for an increased sensitivity to intersectional discrimination – it may lead to an
increase in ‘othering’ of discrimination and a popular backlash or devaluing of the importance
of discrimination (as it would be increasingly be viewed as a problem of the other etc).
“Othering is a strategy to locate a problem elsewhere and to remain categorically clean,
untouched; and orientalising is othering in a particular mode, establishing the occident
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as the unlabelled standard and the orient as different, dark, elsewhere, the problem. D
This is a move to protect majorities from challenges to the normalcy of privilege. They
are not unknown. Regarding gendered and sexualized violence, many societies have
labelled child abuse or the rape of married women by their husbands or domestic
violence generally as a problem of the lower classes, effects of little education, bad
habits, alcohol and other drugs, unemployment, poverty. Then, class is used to other
inequality. And nowadays, it is often religion, sometimes coupled with class, which
codes similar classifications. ‘Those’ immigrants, the mainstream story goes, do not yet
know about modernity, have traditional problematic habits, are often unemployed and
generally less economically successful than the rest of ‘us’.” (Baer pp. 61-62)
One should be aware that something similar could happen with intersectionality and multiple
discrimination. It could serve to make discrimination more removed from those in the
dominant group.
A rather uncontroversial and overarching point that may be of use to the LID project is that
Baer points out that one should look at the broader context in considering conflicts such as
the example of Muslim girls not attending swimming lessons in school.
“To understand conflicts in human rights, we however need to understand the specific
political, regulatory, or judicial procedures, the politics therein, the regulatory schemes
around it, the actors involved, the discourses and the governance arrangements.
So although it seems tempting to refer to ‘a case’ when it comes to very complicated
issues, to look at ‘a right’ as if it had clear meaning and as if it would be guaranteed on
one level, as if there were no competing claims of interpretation and on different levels
of regulation, that does not do justice to the conflict nor to the law.” (Baer p. 64)
Baer characterises this, however, as a kind of protest against the ‘fetishisation’ of law which
is more controversial and not entirely convincing.
She makes a more convincing case for pointing out the way that the equality vs religion and
secularism debate is played out in a way that privileges Christianity and that the real
problems are only emerging today when the religion concerned is Islam. Using Germany as
an example:
“Religions enjoy tremendous freedom to discriminate against all they define not to
belong, and women are thus excluded from several positions in Catholic churches as
well as Jewish communities. Now that Muslims claim such rights, conservatives call for
equality, to not extend the privileges (to discriminate!) that they enjoy. And, as
mentioned, the headscarf controversy has motivated some Länder to explicitly privilege
Christianity, yet keeping the taboo of the yarmulke (which would have certainly
shattered the Christian privilege in Germany), and never touching upon a Sikh turban,
which seems not to appear in Germany on a relevant stage.” (Baer p. 68)
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Her further analysis of this issue does reveal what appear to be some troubling assumptions,
though. In particular she states that “religious freedom often appears in the guise of culture”
and uses this to point out the link to racism. The link to religious freedom and concerns with
racism is solid, but the idea that religion “appears in the guise of culture” is a concern as it
seems to imply that religion, properly understood, is a matter of private belief, conviction and
spirituality. This itself seems to be a rather protestant Christian view of religion as private
faith. Other religions (and brands of Christianity) would seem to place much more emphasis
on ritual, community etc; which sounds a lot like culture. To see religion as merely a private
matter of belief would be to diminish its importance and limit its scope.
BAILEY, Alison (2010): On Intersectionality and the Whiteness of Feminist Philosophy,
51 – 70 in YANCY, George (2010): The Center Must Not Hold: White Women
Philosophers on the Whiteness of Philosophy, Lanham, Lexington Books
Philosophy has not engaged much with intersectionality debates at all. (Bailey p. 51)
Bailey is critical of feminist philosophy’s attempt to get closer to white, male philosophers
rather than feminist thinkers from other disciplines. (pp. 51 – 52) She is also critical of the
way that, when other feminists are encountered, they are measured against white, male
philosophical standards rather than measuring white, male philosophical standards against
the work of feminists. (Bailey pp. 52 – 53)
Bailey gives an outline of intersectionality (Bailey pp. 53 – 57) including a sketch of
Crenshaw’s three varieties of intersectionality as identified in “Mapping the Margins”:
structural, political and identity politics.
In terms of intersectionality and identity politics, Bailey thinks it might be described
philosophically as “an existential phenomenological approach that highlights human life from
the inside, as lived experience, rather than pretending to understand it from an outside
macroscopic point of view.” (Bailey p. 56)
Bailey suggests that philosophy is resistant to engaging in the intersectionality debate as it is
too Western, too tied to reason, valid arguments, theory, abstract argument and also, simply,
too arrogant. (Bailey pp. 57 – 60)
“So, intersectional approaches can place feminist philosophers in a disciplinary doublebind. If we theorize gender or ‘race’ too abstractly we lose sight of the diverse material
conditions of women’s lives, and if we begin arguments in specific locations with
women of color, then some will say that we are no longer doing philosophy.” (Bailey p.
58)
Bailey also thinks that it is just plain painful for white women to acknowledge intersectionality
as it complicates matters. (Bailey p. 60)
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Bailey suggests that it is worth pursuing the development of critical ‘race’ feminism in
philosophy along the lines of critical ‘race’ feminism in legal studies in order to overcome the
problems of philosophy being inherently white and male. (Bailey p. 61) She sees legal
studies as a good model as it has useful conceptual similarities and concerns to philosophy.
(Bailey p. 61)
She then outlines what such a critical ‘race’ feminist philosophy might do. (Bailey p. 62 ff)
She suggests starting with those concepts (such as person, rationality, objectivity) that
feminists attacked for being male, and ask whether and how they are also white and colonial.
(Bailey p. 62)
She uses feminist bioethics as an example of an area that chose its interests in terms of
what would be important to white, middle-class, Western women (high-tech issues such as in
vitro fertilisation) at the expense of the issues that affect (poor) women of colour. (Bailey p.
62)
To approach feminist bioethics intersectionally would mean starting anew. “Thinking
intersectionally about surrogacy in a global context gets us to ask a different set of questions
about the complex relationships between colonialism, capitalism, caste, and ‘race’ that are
not addressed by the earlier literature on white American women’s experience as
surrogates.” (Bailey p. 63)
Bailey thinks the choice of language has also been white. She argues that the terms ‘choice’,
‘liberty’ etc reflect “...the class and ‘race’ privileges of women with access to healthcare.”
(Bailey p. 63) Women of colour (and others) had different interests – such as involuntary
sterilisation. (Bailey p. 63)
For women of colour it seems to be more about justice than rights as such. Bailey thinks this
changes the focus from individuals to structures. (Bailey p. 64)
She cites work that has been done by men of colour (e.g. Charles Mills) to show that
philosophy is white, but points out that this did not include an argument about philosophy
also being gendered. (Bailey p. 65)
Bailey suggests de-colonial philosophy as a starting point for taking an intersectional
approach, citing the work of Maria Lugones. (Bailey p. 65) She discusses the way that
colonialism particularly required that women be divided into separate genders based on
‘race’, so that black women could be set to hard manual labour while the white women were
seen as chaste, delicate and mild etc. (Bailey p. 66) That is, the division between men and
women worked differently depending on whether they were colonists or natives. (Bailey p.
66)
Bailey suggests that philosophy can contribute to the intersectionality discussion by
clarifying, expanding and challenging intersectionality. (Bailey p. 67)
As an example, she suggests five premises on which intersectionality seems to rely:
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“1 Categories (i.e. ‘race’, gender) and systems (i.e. patriarchy, colonialism) are neither
separate nor competing frameworks.
2 The effects of categories and systems are multiplicative and cannot be derived
additively or independently from the effects of these individual systems or categories.
They cannot be clearly separated. ‘race’ and gender should be conceptualized not as
‘race+gender’, instead they should be discussed as ‘gendered racism’ or how ‘gender
is racialized’
3 Categories and systems cannot be ranked in terms of importance or influence. For
example, we should not think in terms of ‘race’ having a greater influence than gender
or sexuality on Latina’s lives because these influences are inseparable, imbricated, and
mutually coexist.
4 Categories and systems are neither reducible to nor interchangeable with one
another. That is, we cannot simply reduce questions of racism or white privilege to
matters of class.
5 All social frameworks and categories permeate, influence, align, and intermingle in all
social relations (eg reproductive rights, cancer research, family structure, job
discrimination).” (Bailey p. 67)
Bailey then notes that intersectionality cannot do everything and may sometimes cause
problems. (Bailey p. 68)
BELL, Mark (2007): Direct Discrimination, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar et al., NonDiscrimination Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland. Zusammenfassung Section
2.3.1 Causation and Comparators, 205-207.
Bell argumentiert die Grundfrage des Vergleichs mit der Frage des “Warum” einer
Ungleichbehandlung
(Benachteiligung,
less
favourable).
Entscheidend
ist,
ob
die
Unterscheidung aufgrund eines verbotenen Unterscheidungsmerkmals oder auf anderen, zB
funktionalen, Gründen beruht. Der Aristotelische Grundgedanke „Gleiches gleich zu
behandeln“ liegt dem Ansatz zugrunde, dass in einer vergleichbaren Situation ohne
Berücksichtigung irrelevanter Merkmale zwei Personen gleich zu behandeln sind.
Entscheidungen sollten daher fair und vernünftig (rational) sein und auf Verdienst (merit)
beruhen.
Bell diskutiert drei Probleme:
1. Gleiches gleich zu behandeln ist relativ inhaltsleer. Was ist gleich, dh womit (mit wem) soll
verglichen werden? Wer ist die richtige Vergleichsperson?
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Was ist die vergleichbare Situation? Beide Fragen sind eng verknüpft, bedingen sich bis zu
einem gewissen Grad (die vergleichbare Situation hat Einfluss auf die Wahl der
Vergleichsperson).
2. Die Vergleichsperson wird die „Normperson“ (Maßmensch). Die Normperson könnte zB
die Repräsentantin der herrschen Struktur oder Organisationskultur sein (Referenz auf
Fredman p. 98). Die Normperson verstärkt zugrunde liegende Ungleichheitsstrukturen.
3. Die Schwierigkeit, eine Vergleichsperson zu finden (zB Schwangerschaft).
Eine Vergleichsperson wird in der Literatur nicht unbedingt für notwendig erachtet:
Diskriminierung sei eine soziale Praxis, Mitglieder von Merkmalsgruppen seien aufgrund
spezifischer Zuschreibungen diskriminiert, daher seien auch Vergleiche nicht unbedingt
erforderlich (zit. Bamforth). Bell argumentiert, dass eine direkte Diskriminierung häufig ohne
Vergleich evident ist.
BUTLER, Judith (2000): Appearances Aside, California Law Review 88, 55-63
Butler draws a distinction between a concept of identity which is separable from appearances
and one which is not. She thinks anti-discrimination law tries mistakenly to work with both of
these ideas at once. She thinks Post’s (Post 2000) sociological approach puts appearance
as central to personhood, whereas the dominant approach he criticises assumes that there is
a transcendent self, beyond appearance and also that there is an ontological status that preexists any social status. (Butler p. 56)
Judges have a choice to endorse this idea of the essential worth of a person (that pertains to
persons as such) – “a Kantian soul with deontological value” - , or to look at technical skill “an
instrumental capacity, at which point the person is understood as an analogical relation to a
set of functions”. (Butler pp. 56 – 57)
Butler points out that the functionalist approach is still tied up with appearances as the skills
are judged and observable. (Butler p. 57)
Both deny persons as social beings. (Butler p. 58)
She says that Post wants “...to consider instead the way in which antidiscrimination law
ought to presuppose the person not only as one who is, by definition, engaged in a set of
social practices, but one who might be said to be a social practice, one whose ontology is
that of an ongoing and revisable social practice or set of social practices.” (Butler p. 58)
So there is no person prior to engaging in social practices.
Butler then goes on to question whether Post’s view of gender and gender stereotypes and
discrimination is too broad, and all encompassing. (Butler pp. 60 – 61) Is gender coextensive
with its stereotype? ‘Unclear’ says Butler at p. 61.
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Butler then goes on to question how law can abstract a person away from their
characteristics such as gender and ‘race’ – if a person is constituted by these social
practices. (Butler p. 61)
Butler thinks Post’s description of social reality is too conservative and actually reinforces
stereotypes even while asking the law to challenge them. (Butler p. 62)
Butler discusses assessing someone’s suitability for a job: “...it is not a matter of blinding
myself to how the person appears, but, rather, deciding what ought to count about that
person for the job in question from within the observational realm in which that person
appears ... Thus, it is not a question of blinding oneself to how a person appears, but a
question instead of how the way in which a person appears blinds one to the worth and
capability of the person.” (Butler p. 63)
BURRI Susanne, SCHIEK Dagmar (Hg.) (2009): Multiple Discrimination in EU Law:
Opportunities for legal responses to intersectional gender discrimination? European
Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, European Commission,
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Unit
EMPL/G/2, Theme - Equality, Action against Discrimination: Legal Questions, July
2009,
vgl: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=3808&langId=en
This paper is a strong summary of the current state of affairs in the EU in acting on ‘multiple
discrimination’ (which, as they define it, includes ‘intersectional discrimination’).
Burri and Schiek analyze ‘multiple discrimination’ first and foremost as a feminist issue. That
is, they are interested in ‘multiple discrimination’ primarily in terms of how it affects women.
Statistically this may very well account for the majority of intersectional discrimination.
However, there is also no obvious reason why this cannot apply to other intersectional
“hotspots”.
They point out that “intersectionality” is used to capture the thoroughly blended nature of
discrimination when it is due to more than one ground and these grounds cannot be
separated:
“‘Intersectional’ discrimination would refer to such discrimination against women where
the influence of various grounds cannot be disentangled, e.g. discrimination through
denying ethnic minority women or women with disabilities the right to bear children.
Those using the term ‘intersectional disadvantage’ often indicate a wish to move
beyond intersectionality (Hunter & Simone de 2009).” (Burri and Schiek p. 3)
The contrast is “compound” or “additive” discrimination where the grounds are separable.
(Burri and Schiek p. 3)
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They believe “multiple discrimination” is the overarching term and use it themselves due to it
having already gained wide acceptance in UN and EU documents. (Burri and Schiek pp. 3 –
4)
“Intersectional discrimination” means both more severe and also more specific (Burri and
Schiek p. 4) – that is, more than one ground and to a smaller group of people.
“Intersectionality” was originally used in legal and political discussions (Burri and Schiek pp.
4 -5). It has since been adapted to other purposes, including being caught up in controversy
regarding identity politics. It remains controversial.
The EU law in particular is a problem for intersectional analysis, as the hierarchy of grounds
issue is especially prevalent here. (Burri and Schiek p. 5)
They identify two sources of problems that EU law has dealing with multiple discrimination
(so that includes intersectional discrimination). First, there are problems based on the fact
that it is basically transplanted UK (and Dutch) law, conceptually speaking. (Burri and Schiek
p. 6) Burri and Schiek argue that the non-systematic nature of common law is a likely source
of difficulty for the EU here. (Burri and Schiek p. 6)
Second, there are problems stemming from the competing conceptual theories underlying
EU law (a result of its development):
“The values informing these layers include enhancing transnational competition
between individuals, supporting individual mobility and engendering European
employment markets, protecting against social exclusion, furthering group identities
and numerous others. Contradictory values will sometimes lead to clashes of norms
within the field. The problem of establishing hierarchies at the expense of gender
equality and in favour of racial and other equalities could, for example, be traced to
conflicts between a more socio-economic and a more human rights based approach to
equality law (Nousiainen 2009).” (Burri and Schiek p. 7)
So far the ECJ has not really dealt
with discrimination cases as cases of
multiple/intersectional discrimination as such. (Burri and Schiek pp. 7 - 8 including case
names) In these cases discrimination was considered without (explicit) reference to gender
and the possibility/probability that this dimension contributed to the discrimination in question.
The only case where there was a rather weak attempt made at this being Lindorfer.
“Multiple discrimination” is not used in legally binding provisions, but is used in European
Community’s non-discrimination policy and some directives. (Burri and Schiek p. 9)
Proposed and recent amendments (Burri and Schiek pp. 9 – 10) seem to contain some
problems: intersection of gender and ‘race’ omitted and discrimination within employment not
considered. (Burri and Schiek pp. 10 – 11)
There are some concerns that moving to a multiple discrimination framework will actually
diminish the acknowledgement of gender-based discrimination. (Burri and Schiek p. 11) But
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some predictions have also suggested the opposite: that this will enhance understanding and
recognition of gender based discrimination. (Burri and Schiek p. 12)
The discussion of cases put forward to demonstrate multiple discrimination shows that some
could have been dealt with on only one ground and with others there was a choice about
which combination of grounds was chosen. (Burri and Schiek p. 14)
In the UK case of Bahl v Law Society [2003] I.R.L.R. 640; [2004] I.R.L.R. 799 the court
refused to discuss intersectional discrimination. (p 15) Instead, both forms of discrimination
had to be proved independently. This greatly reduced the number of available comparators
and made the claim very difficult to maintain. Burri and Schiek suggest either using a fictional
comparator or that the claimant should have been allowed to use mixed statistics (“outlining
the combined relationship of age and gender”) or else the “non-statistical approach to indirect
discrimination which is provided for by the EU Directives on non-discrimination”. (Burri and
Schiek p. 16)
In regard to national legislation, multiple discrimination is not always explicitly acknowledged.
It may, however, be implicitly acknowledged, although Burri and Schiek still see a number of
barriers to the law recognising/acting on multiple discrimination. (Burri and Schiek p. 18)
Bahl is cited as prime example of the failure of the comparator approach, which is called “the
most difficult barrier to overcome”. (Burri and Schiek p. 18) There are two grounds, so there
are two comparators needed – one for each ground. The comparator approach was arguably
imported into domestic systems in continental Europe from UK via Community legislation.
Another big problem is that different grounds have different applicable legislation and so, for
example, different standards of proof. (Burri and Schiek pp. 18 – 19)
Two big reasons to acknowledge multiple discrimination:
“First, there are cases where the discrimination is such that it is only experienced by
persons who are ‘at the intersection’ of two grounds. For example, only women (not
men) with disabilities or from specific ethnic groups are subjected to involuntary
abortions. Or, to give another example, gender stereotypes about attractiveness and
age intersect, which results in specific detriments for older women on the labour
market. Some legal orders have difficulties acknowledging this kind of intersectional
discrimination at all because the concept of multiple discrimination is alien to them
(Ireland, UK). In many legal orders it is difficult to establish a case of intersectional
discrimination, which is why a number of experts raise the problem of proof. Second
discrimination on more than one ground has a stronger effect of exclusion than
discrimination on only one ground. For example, a woman who is bullied away from her
workplace on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnicity will also suffer intersectional discrimination
in finding a new occupation. Accordingly, as many experts also stressed, multiple
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discrimination can be considered as causing more harm and should attract higher
damages or more severe other consequences.” (Burri and Schiek p. 20)
The UK is an example of a country that needs community legislation. (Burri and Schiek p. 21)
“The UK and Irish experts make a convincing case that, within the specific legal
tradition of their countries, multiple discrimination cases are either not acknowledged or
not sanctioned adequately. The UK expert recommends the explicit inclusion of
multiple discrimination in the concept of non-discrimination in Community law. The Irish
expert requests clarification that discrimination on two or more compound grounds can
be investigated and proven together. For these legal traditions, a positive obligation on
Member States to make sure that the problem is tackled is seen as necessary.” (Burri
and Schiek p. 22 footnote omitted)
The definition of ‘multiple discrimination ’is helpful, particularly for countries such as the UK.
(Burri and Schiek pp. 22 – 23)
Part II
Report on Austrian situation – Burri and Schiek pp. 27 - 28
•
Multiple discrimination is explicitly prohibited, but no definition is given. (Burri and
Schiek p. 27)
•
It is taken into account for compensation. (Burri and Schiek p. 27)
•
An illustration is given. This also shows that discrimination on more than one ground
cannot give rise to cumulative claims for compensation. (Burri and Schiek p. 27)
•
No court case law yet, but one hearing by the Equal Treatment Commission (which
cannot impose sanctions). Grounds of sexual harassment and ethnic origin were
addressed separately – grounds from different legal provisions Para 6(1)1 and Para
21(1)1 of the Equal Treatment Act respectively. (Burri and Schiek p. 27)
•
Most interesting point is that Commission stated that sexism and racism often
appears combined (so they acknowledged intersectional discrimination). However,
not much more was said about it. (Burri and Schiek p. 28)
Report on United Kingdom – Burri and Schiek pp. 125 - 127
“Multiple discrimination” not used in any legislation and the phenomenon is not addressed.
(Burri and Schiek p. 125)
Bahl v Law Society
(Bahl v Law Society [2003] I.R.L.R. 640 and [2004]I.R.L.R. 799).
The Employment Tribunal originally found that Dr Bahl had been discriminated against as a
black woman (so intersectional), but this was overturned by the Employment Appeal
Tribunal, and the Court of Appeal rejected Bahl’s appeal. Elias J ruled that the tribunal erred
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in law ‘in failing to distinguish between the elements of alleged ‘race’ and sex discrimination’.
The court ruled that the tribunal had failed:
‘to identify what evidence goes to support a finding of ‘race’ discrimination and what
evidence goes to support a finding of sex discrimination. It would be surprising if the
evidence for each form of discrimination was the same (D) In our judgment, it was
necessary for the [employment tribunal] to find the primary facts in relation to each type
of discrimination against each alleged discriminator and then to explain why it was
making the inference which it did in favour of Dr. Bahl on whom lay the burden of
proving her case.’ (Burri and Schiek p. 125)
This means that under English law, “Dr Bahl would have had to make separate claims under
the Race Relations Act 1976 by reference to the treatment of real or hypothetical white
women, and under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by reference to Black men. If the
discriminatory treatment which she alleged was intersectional, that is, specifically connected
with her identity as a Black woman, the RRA and SDA claims could each readily be defeated
by evidence relating to the employer’s non-discriminatory treatment of Black men and white
women respectively.” (Burri and Schiek p. 125)
So, in English law, claimants must find single grounds of discrimination and no intersectional,
combined claims look possible. (Burri and Schiek p. 126)
The comparator – whether real or hypothetical - remains a major problem . (Burri and Schiek
p. 126)
BURRI, Susanne (2011): Promises of an Intersectional Approach in Practice? The
Dutch Equal Treatment Commission’s Case Law, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON,
Anna: European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality – Investigating
the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination, Ashgate, 97-110.
Die niederländische Equal Treatment Commission (ETC) beschäftigt sich seit 1994 mit
Diskriminierungsfällen und hat seitdem die EU-Vorgaben übernommen, ohne spezifische
nationale Features einzuführen. Auch das maßgebliche Gesetz (Dutch Equal Treatment Act)
folgt in seiner Struktur den EU Vorgaben. Die ETC versucht bei jeder Möglichkeit eine
intersektionale Herangehensweise zu wählen. Keine der rechtlichen Grundlagen erwähnt
Mehrfachdiskriminierung explizit. Bevor Burri auf die Fälle eingeht, erläutert sie noch einige
Spezifitäten des niederländischen Gesetzes. (Burri S. 101 f.) Sie diskutiert drei Fälle, die
Intersektionen beinhalten.
Seit 1994 hat die ETC nur ein Mal explizit von Intersektion gesprochen, nämlich in der
Entscheidung 2007-43, im Fall eines iranischen Mannes, der Diskriminierung auf Grund von
Religion und „Rasse“ vorbrachte. Die ETC verband beide Gründe, da es sich um eine
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simultane Interaktion beider Gründe handelte, die zu zusätzlicher Benachteiligung führte.
Jedoch gab es im Endeffekt keine Hinweise auf Diskriminierung, da die ETC zum Resultat
kam, dass einzig der Mangel an Arbeitserfahrung entscheidend für die Nichtanstellung war.
(Burri S. 104) In der Entscheidung 2006-256 handelte es sich um eine Antragsstellerin, die
Diskriminierung aufgrund von Behinderung und ethnischer Zugehörigkeit vorbrachte. Sie sah
sich benachteiligt durch einen Einstufungstest im Betrieb, der statt schriftlich plötzlich
mündlich (und nicht in Braille) durchgeführt wurde. Die Diskriminierung wurde festgestellt,
weil mündliche Prüfungen für blinde Personen mit Migrationshintergrund schwerer zu
bewerkstelligen seien als schriftliche. Dieser Fall ist ein klares Beispiel für intersektionale
Diskriminierung. (Burri S. 104 f.)
Neben diesen Fällen werden von Burri auch Fälle über compound discrimination diskutiert
(Burri S. 106 ff.) Zusammenfassend stellt Burri fest, dass die ETC nur wenige Fälle
intersektional behandelt und meist nur einen einzelnen Grund zur Betrachtung heranzieht.
Jedoch gibt es Indizien, dass die ETC sich für Intersektionalität interessiert und weiter in
diese Richtung arbeiten wird. (Burri S. 109 f.)
CZECH,
Philip,
SALINGER
Ulrike
(Hsg.)
(2011):
Diskriminierung
–
Grundrechtsverletzung oder Kavaliersdelikt. Das Gleichbehandlungsrecht in der
Praxis, Menschenrechte konkret, Band 3, Salzburg
Silvia Ulrich bietet in ihrem umfangreichen Beitrag „Die unionsrechtlichen Grundlagen des
Diskriminierungsschutzes seit dem Änderungsvertrag von Lissabon“ einen Abriss über die
geltende
EU-Rechtslage
zum
Nichtdiskriminierungsrecht,
wobei
insbesondere
die
Grundrechtecharta und deren Gleichheitsgarantien umfassend erörtert werden. Nach
Darstellung des sekundärrechtlichen Diskriminierungsschutzes wird untersucht, ob die
unionsrechtlichen Bestimmungen in Österreich ausreichend umgesetzt wurden. Kritisch wird
die Entwicklung der Schadenersatzregelungen beleuchtet, die zu keiner Zeit ambitioniert in
Richtung der vom europäischen Richtliniengeber geforderten „Abschreckung“ ausgestaltet
wurden. Die Novelle 2011 ist, wie Ulrich folgert, nur als kleiner Teilschritt auf dem Weg zu
einem
effektiven
Diskriminierungsschutz
zu
sehen
–
die
Fragmentierung
des
Diskriminierungsschutzes bleibt fortbestehen. Als größtes Hindernis zu einem adäquaten
Diskriminierungsschutz bleibt die Hierarchisierung zwischen den Diskriminierungsmotiven
bestehen. Ulrich liefert einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Verständnis und zur praktischen
Anwendung von Primärrecht im Bereich des Gleichbehandlungsrechts.
Die Gleichbehandlungsanwältinnen Birgit Gutschlhofer und Ulrike Salinger setzen sich mit
dem Gleichbehandlungsrecht in der außergerichtlichen Praxis auseinander. Einer kurz
gehaltenen Einführung zum geltenden österreichischen Gleichbehandlungsrecht folgt eine
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detaillierte
Schilderung
der
Arbeit
der
Gleichbehandlungsanwaltschaft
Gleichbehandlungskommission
samt
Schilderung
plakativer
Fälle,
und
die
der
wichtige
Klarstellungen und Hilfe zur Beurteilung von Diskriminierungsfällen bieten. Geht es im ersten
geschilderten Fall um eine Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund des Familiennamens durch ein
Finanzamt hinsichtlich Gewährung der Familienbeihilfe und die Überprüfung der Umsetzung
der
von
der
empfohlenen
Maßnahmen,
behandeln
Gutschlhofer und Salinger im zweiten Fall eine Altersdiskriminierung bei der Begründung
eines Arbeitsverhältnisses. In einem weiteren Fall wird das Diskriminierungsverbot bei
Assoziierung am Wohnungsmarkt besprochen. Im Fall der unterschiedlichen Tarife für
Frauen und Männer bei öffentlichen Transportmitteln sprechen die Autorinnen grundsätzliche
Fragen des Diskriminierungsschutzes an: Ist die Benachteiligung von Frauen beim
Einkommen ein hinreichender Rechtfertigungsgrund für eine Ungleichbehandlung nach dem
Alter? Fallen Begünstigungen im Sozialschutz unter die Ermächtigung zu positiven
Maßnahmen
nach
dem
Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz?
liegt
vor.
kein
rechtmäßiges
Gutschlhofer
und
Salinger
Nach
Ziel
Ansicht
im
geben
der
Sinne
einen
des
äußerst
brauchbaren Überblick über die Bandbreite praktischer Fälle und die Reichweite des
außergerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes samt Argumentationsmustern für eine erfolgreiche
Rechtsdurchsetzung.
Im Beitrag von Thomas Majoros wird die in der Praxis höchstrelevante Frage des
immateriellen Schadenersatzes bei Diskriminierung untersucht. RA Majoros diskutiert
anhand einer umfangreichen Judikaturauswahl zu Belästigungsfällen die Probleme der
Bemessung des immateriellen Schadenersatzes. In Hinblick auf die Vorgaben der EUAntidiskriminierungs-Richtlinien, nach denen die Entschädigungen wirksam, verhältnismäßig
und abschreckend sein müssen, entwirft Majoros einen Kriterienkatalog, nach dem die
Bemessung
erfolgen
sollte.
Behindertengleichstellungsgesetzes
Er
führt
aus,
wie
Dauer
der
dass
die
Diskriminierung,
Regeln
des
Schwere
des
Verschuldens, Erheblichkeit der Beeinträchtigung oder Mehrfachdiskriminierung auch in
Fällen, die unter die anderen Gleichbehandlungsgesetze fallen, anzuwenden sind. Zur
geforderten Abschreckung sei es notwendig, dass die Entschädigung über den Ausgleich
des erlittenen Schadens hinausgeht. Ein wesentlicher Parameter ist daher die wirtschaftliche
Leistungsfähigkeit
des
Diskriminierenden,
wobei
dieser
seine
wirtschaftliche
Leistungsfähigkeit zu belegen haben wird. Der Grad des Verschuldens ist nachvollziehbar
ein weiteres Kriterium. Schließlich wird die Bemessung des ideellen Schadens auch auf die
Folgen für das Opfer abzustellen haben. Insgesamt sollte die Höhe des Schadenersatzes im
Verhältnis zu den im Gesetz genannten Mindestbeträgen stehen. Majoros gibt damit ein
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konkretes Werkzeug zur Ermittlung und Begründung des zu begehrenden Anspruchs zur
Hand.
Anschließend befasst sich Petra Smutny mit der Bedeutung von Beweisfragen im
Gleichbehandlungsrecht, da es als Ausnahme zu den allgemeinen zivilprozessualen
Beweisregeln, Beweislasterleichterungen vorsieht. Anschaulich wird die Problematik
aufgerollt und erörtert und auch aus europarechtlicher Sicht beleuchtet. Als größte
Schwierigkeit in der Praxis sieht Smutny das Problem der Mehrzahl angebotener Motive, die
alle eine gewisse Glaubwürdigkeit besitzen, aber kein ausschlaggebendes Motiv (allein)
erkennbar
ist.
Dieses
Problem
hat
insbesondere
bei
Mehrfachdiskriminierungen
Auswirkungen, so kann dadurch eine Überschneidung von Motiven zur Ablehnung des
Begehrens führen, weil kein verpöntes Motiv als ausschlaggebend erkannt wird. Smutnys
Beitrag zeigt in ihrem Beitrag auf, welche Schwachstellen in den Vorbringen zu vermeiden
sind, um die Erfolgsaussichten im Prozess zu maximieren.
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CARLES; Isabelle, JUBANY-BAUCELLS, Olga (2010): GendeRace. The Use of Racial
Antidiscrimination Laws. Gender and Citizenship in a Multicultural Context. Final
Report,
vgl.:
http://genderace.ulb.ac.be/rapports/GENDERACE%20FINAL%20REPORT%20sent.pdf
Executive summary
Importantly, this report starts from an understanding of identity as having multiple aspects
and of discrimination being complex. (GendeRace p. 7)
“GendeRace advances the view that social relations based on gender and racialised
identities or ethnicity influence the perception and use of antidiscrimination laws. Whilst
both EU and national institutional frameworks may provide numerous responses
through action and conflict resolution, the project demonstrates that multiplediscrimination based on racialised identities and gender remains inadequately
addressed.” (GendeRace p. 7)
“A clear message arises from our results - that better awareness of civil rights must be
promoted and that existing resources for the making of complaints must be expanded,
especially for women. The development of a legal definition and a specific methodology
of multiple discrimination could allow an intersectional approach for dealing with
claims/complaints. In addition, we identify a clear need for inclusion of a gender
perspective within the treatment of discrimination cases and provision of specific
assistance and services according to the needs of the claimant/complainant.”
(GendeRace p. 7)
Key Findings
•
Racialised discriminations are often gendered
•
Gendered differences exist around access to and use of resources
•
Cases of multiple discrimination are not identified and treated as such
Recommendations
To improve the treatment of multiple discrimination:
At the European level
•
For explicit reference to be made to multiple discrimination as an especially
vulnerable form of discrimination within the new European Directive.
•
For the development of an operational definition of multiple discrimination that meets
the standards set out in the European Union’s ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’,
Article 21
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•
For the inclusion of a clause allowing complainants to lodge a complaint on several
grounds within the framework of a single legal proceeding
At the national level
•
To implement a specific legal methodological framework incorporating sociological
and socio-historical contexts
•
That civil society (trade unions, women’s ethnic minority and professional
organisations) in cooperation with lawyers and experts develops litigation strategies
and class action as a method to bring gendered and racialised discrimination to the
fore
•
To involve legal experts in the development of case law so that the implementation of
cases based on multiple discrimination may impact the legal framework
•
To implement awareness-raising and professional training on anti-discrimination laws
for legal advisors and counsellors, paying special attention to cases of intersectional
discrimination
•
To inform victims of the existence of multiple grounds of discrimination (GendeRace
pp. 9-10)
There is a need for standardised statistics on (multiple) discrimination:
At the European level
•
The adoption of the same criteria and indices for data collection, data recording and
public availability by national equality bodies.
•
The publication of cross sections of data on gender and other social categories by EU
agencies addressing information on the situation of groups subject to discrimination
At the national level
•
The adoption by organisations and institutions of common methods of collection at
national and local level to allow a national overview
•
The introduction in registration systems of socio-demographic data on complainants
to identify discriminated sub-groups. (GendeRace p. 11)
Part 1: Setting the Scene
Chapter 1: Rationale, Approach and Development
Introduction
Equality before the law and protection from discrimination is a human right. (GendeRace p.
15)
“Currently we can identify a number of official documents and studies commissioned by
the EC as well as further publications by researchers, lawyers, numerous NGOs and
other academics in the field that show the progress that there has been in this field in
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the last decade. It is particularly since the year 2000, that the European Union has
worked towards the development of a new legal framework for equality, which started
before then with the European Community law prohibition on discrimination based on
sex and nationality. With the adoption of the Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the
EU has enlarged its competence in the field of antidiscrimination. Based on this, the EU
adopted two new directives in that year, which broadened the scope of prohibited
discrimination by adding ‘race’ and ethnic origin, religion and belief, disability, sexual
orientation and age to sex and nationality.
Recently, further efforts have been made to extend discrimination on the grounds of
sex: two new directives have been adopted, one on gender equality in employment, the
other on occupation and provision of goods and services. And, in 2006 a Recast
Directive (Directive 2006/54/EC) was adopted to bring together a number of Directives
in the Gender discrimination field”. (GendeRace p. 15 – footnote omitted)
The report uses ethnic minority women as an effective example of the intersectional
experience. But it does acknowledge other kinds of intersectionality. (GendeRace pp. 15-16)
The report notes that there are not sufficient legal instruments and policies in place to
protect/assist vulnerable groups even though their vulnerability and disadvantage has been
acknowledged. (GendeRace p. 16)
“Despite the Community’s statement within the Race Directive of its intention to
eliminate inequalities and promote equality between women and men, EU policies and
legal framework against discrimination are fragmented, with grounds of ‘race’ and
gender addressed by separate directives and programmes. Consequently, the ground
of sex as a ground for discrimination is excluded from the 2000 antidiscrimination
directives and from the programme to combat discrimination.
Similarly, the question of multiple discrimination is insufficiently addressed at the
national level. Whilst the Commission does oblige member states to provide an
evaluation of the impact of the implementation on women in its report on the
implementation of the Directive 2000/43/EC, none have done so at the time of
publication.” (GendeRace p. 17 – footnotes omitted)
For the GendeRace project, ‘intersectionality’ is defined as “U the articulation of multiple
discriminations focusing on the question of gender and racialised identities or ethnicity at
different levels of the process of discrimination.” (GendeRace p. 17)
“To this aim, at the outset we advance the view that social relations based on gender
and racialised identities influence the perception and use of antidiscrimination laws. We
postulate that men and women experience different kinds of discrimination, reacting in
different ways to the phenomenon and this is often connected to other discriminatory
experiences in their daily lives, which may be related to structural and institutional
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discrimination. The institutional framework provides different responses according to
gender, in terms of action and conflict resolution. However, this does not imply that
multiple discrimination based on racialised identities and gender is adequately
addressed.” (GendeRace p. 17)
The report notes the single-ground focus of anti-discrimination law (and also institutions) and
that this has a bad effect on people suffering from intersectional discrimination – it is more
difficult to claim under the law and also makes some of the discrimination invisible.
(GendeRace p. 18)
1.2 Specific Objectives
The project’s objectives are:
•
“To deepen understanding of the impact of gender on the experience of discrimination
based on racialised identities or ethnic origin;
•
To improve the knowledge of the combined effects of racism and gender
discrimination in order to reveal the various forms of specific discrimination
experienced by women;
•
To progress understanding of the impact of gender on the treatment of complaints;
•
To improve knowledge of the motivations underlying the use of the law and of the
complainants expectations;
•
To test key theories concerning the effects of a ground-specific approach to
antidiscrimination legislation on the treatment of multiple discrimination based on
racialised identities or ethnic origin and that of gender;
•
To develop practical tools to assess the effectiveness of policy and practice in the
field of antidiscrimination to take into account the intersectional dimension of
discrimination.” (GendeRace p. 18)
1.3 Methodological Approach and Framework
The report is aware of three different terms being used to categorise complex discrimination
– multiple, additive and intersectional – and gives definitions for all three:
“Multiple discrimination occurs when an individual experiences discrimination on
several grounds. We understand compound or additive discrimination as that of
discrimination occurring on more than one ground in the same instance with
discrimination on the one ground adding to the discrimination on the other ground to
create an added burden. Intersectional discrimination occurs when two or more
grounds of discrimination interact concurrently. However for the latter, the grounds are
inseparable and the discrimination taking place cannot be captured wholly by
examining discrimination solely on one ground.” (GendeRace p. 19)
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1.4 Fieldwork Illustrations of Multiple Discrimination
The report notes that in cases of possible multiple discrimination, courts usually deal with
each ground separately. So courts ask: “Is there ‘race’ discrimination?” Yes/No. And then “Is
there sex discrimination?” Yes/No, rather than “Is there sex-race discrimination?” The
problem is that it can be very difficult to prove a single ground in cases of
multiple/intersectional discrimination. They provide two illustrations here that may be useful:
“For example, a restaurant may refuse to employ a black woman as a waitress. The
woman claims that this is discrimination precisely because she is a woman AND
because she is black, and this may deemed as multiple discrimination on grounds of
gender and ‘race’. If the court looks at the grounds of gender and ‘race’ separately, it
will not find discrimination. The restaurant employs both men and women as waiters,
so it is not treating women less favourably than men. It also employs black men and
thus does not treat black people less favourably. Only if the two grounds are taken
together will the discrimination be identified. So in this case the black woman would
only have a chance of success if she could claim discrimination on a combination of
grounds.
Another clear example would be a driving school which refuses to employ older
women: there would be no gender or age discrimination because they employ both
men and women and older men as driving instructors. But an older female applicant is
turned down because of the combination of age and gender. If she cannot claim
discrimination on the combined grounds, she will have no remedy in law.” (GendeRace
p. 20)
Two French cases
A French boxer was refused entry to a flight even though he had his paperwork in order. The
paperwork situation was a little unusual, involving an emergency passport etc, but it does
seem that he should have been let on the flight and so the refusal certainly raised the
question of racial discrimination. It seems that the airline employed profiling and thought that
as the boxer was of a male of North African origin, that he was a safety risk (potential
terrorist). (GendeRace p. 21)
The other case relates to a woman refused entry to a training course due to wearing a
headscarf. The course was run by a private organization which prohibited all visible religious
symbols. “This demonstrated refusal or conditional discrimination in providing access to
goods or services on the grounds of religion.” (GendeRace p. 21)
“In France, the prohibition of religious symbolism is applicable only to schoolchildren or
students in secondary schools in compliance with the principle of non-discrimination. In
addition, civil servants are required to maintain complete neutrality. The HALDE had to
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repeat in several deliberations that these are the only limits set out by the law under the
fundamental principle of religious freedom, which historically guarantees the principle
of separation between Church and State. However, this case was only dealt with by the
HALDE as discrimination based on religion. The gender aspect was overlooked while it
could have been interpreted as a form of multiple discrimination based on both religion
and gender.” (GendeRace p. 22)
Two cases in Spain
‘La Nena’: A Roma woman was refused access to a widow’s pension although she was
married for almost 40 years and had never worked outside the home. The marriage was a
traditional Roma ceremony and not entered in the public record. Her claim was refused until
it made it to the European Court of Human Rights. It was dealt with as racial discrimination
but her legal advisors described it as multiple discrimination as it was crucial that she was
not only Roma but also that she was a woman. (GendeRace p. 22)
The Beauty Solomon case: A woman with Spanish residency and of Nigerian origin was
physically and verbally attacked by Majorcan police officers. Her complaints were not acted
upon so the case is now going to the European Court of Human Rights as a case of
specifically multiple discrimination – the first ECHR case to be so defined. (GendeRace p.
23)
A German case
A woman was denied access to training as she wore a headscarf. She was told that no
women wearing a headscarf would be employed, so there was no point her doing the
training. (It was teacher training and no headscarves are allowed in schools – some states at
least have an explicit ban.) (GendeRace p. 23)
Two cases in Bulgaria
A Roma woman and business owner was accosted by a parking official:
“The officer insulted her based on her ethnic origin and as a conclusion ‘recommended’
that she ‘go back to her horse and cart!’ According to the victim, the insults arose not
only by the fact that she was a Roma woman but also by the fact that her car was
expensive. This stirred envy in the officer as many stereotypes depict Roma as lazy
and poor. According to the victim, the officer was provoked by the fact that a Roma
woman appeared to have achieved good social status, a view most insulting for the
complainant.” (GendeRace p. 24)
In another case a schoolteacher, a man, complained about being dismissed. He had worked
in the school for thirty years (but was still some years away from retirement). His claim is that
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he was dismissed for being an older man. For one thing, he claims the perception is that men
can find a job more easily. And for another, his age meant that he did not have children at
home to support. His claim of unequal treatment is based on gender. (GendeRace p. 25)
Two cases in the UK
A black woman bullied by a white male colleague and also students following the example of
the man:
“For example, when he asked her where she was from and she told him, he replied:
‘so, you are one of those people who commit fraud’. She was asked why she couldn’t
go back to her own country (although she has the same nationality as him); remarks
were made that people with plaited hair do not wash their hair. And, one of the students
said: ‘I used to have a childminder like you’. The male colleague did treat black male
colleagues in a different way and did not make the same remarks to them. This is
clearly a case of intersectional discrimination/harassment based on the combination of
‘race’ and gender, taking place because she was a black woman. The colleague and
the students would not have treated a white female colleague or a black male
colleague or a white male colleague in the same way.” (GendeRace p. 25)
In the second case an African woman working in a restaurant was treated badly by the white
male general manager when she became pregnant and so needed more rest and to avoid
heavy lifting (which was in line with the company’s stated policy of the appropriate treatment
of pregnant women). She was not paid for absences resulting from ante-natal appointments
(even though this was required by law) and also had her shifts reduced without consultation.
She then found out a white waitress was also pregnant and had been given better conditions
(the conditions that that the African woman had asked for). After finding out about this, the
African woman was finally convinced that her treatment was a case of discrimination. It also
seems to be intersectional discrimination as the white male manager got along well with the
white women and the black men. (GendeRace p. 26)
Two cases of multiple discrimination in Sweden
A woman was pushed and harassed by a female bus driver for wearing a veil. It was an
unprovoked racial attack. The authors note that it was also really intersectional, but it is only
being dealt with as a racial complaint. (GendeRace p. 26)
The second example is of a Finnish Roma woman. She dressed traditionally and notes that
discrimination occurred every day – for example, she was followed in shops and told that she
would be unable to get a job. The specific incident happened when she was at a conference
in a hotel and the hotel staff questioned her use of the in-house coffee machine. She showed
that she had keys to the room etc but was still looked at with suspicion. (GendeRace p. 26)
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Chapter 2 National Contexts and common trends of the EU framework
2.2 The European social fabric in relation to racism and gender discrimination
There are various protected minorities in Europe. The group that suffers the most consistent
discrimination is the Roma. (GendeRace p. 33)
Immigrants in general seem to be the most vulnerable to discrimination. And the status as
‘immigrant’ can still apply in terms of the perception in the general population even when the
people have citizenship. (GendeRace p. 33)
The authors give extra attention to the position of immigrants in some specific countries:
France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Sweden. (GendeRace pp. 34-36)
Kurzzusammenfassung deutsch
Genderace ist ein Programm, das sich mit „Gender and citizenship in a multicultural context“
beschäftigt. Das Projekt wurde von 2008-2010 im 7. Rahmenprogramm der EU abgewickelt
und im März 2009 auf der Konferenz in Leeds vorgestellt. Das Projektvolumen beläuft sich
auf knapp eine Million Euro.
In fünf Ländern (UK, Frankreich, Deutschland, Schweden und Bulgarien) wurden die
Intersektionen zwischen Gender und „Race“ untersucht, es wurde der Umgang mit
Intersektionalität besprochen und auch Interviews durchgeführt. Es wurden 914 Fälle und
120 in-depth Interviews mit betroffenen Männern und Frauen analysiert. Weiters wurden 60
Interviews mit Stakeholdern, NGOs und Sozialpartnern geführt.
Im Final Report finden sich die im Projekt verwendeten Definitionen zu Discrimination,
Intersectionality etc. (Carles S. 31)
Die
Studie
beschäftigt
sich
eingehend
mit
dem
Bericht
„Bekämpfung
von
Mehrfachdiskriminierung“ der Europäischen Kommission, analysiert das Buch von Schiek
und Chege, sowie auch jenes von Grabham. Außerdem wird Sandra Fredman ausführlich
zitiert:
“Finally, other US courts recognised that discrimination against black women can exist
even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women. This led to
the arguments that multiple discrimination should be restricted to a combination of only
two of the grounds. To date the impact of the other grounds for discrimination have
been ignored. The result is both artificial and paradoxical. The more a person differs
from the norm, the more likely is she to experience multiple discrimination, the less
likely is she to gain protection.” (Fredman, zitiert in Carles S. 104)
Im fünften Kapitel werden die Ergebnisse der Interviews zusammengefasst. In den fünf
Ländern wurden folgende (übereinstimmende) Erkenntnisse gemacht:
-
Frauen sind viel öfter Opfer von rassistischer oder sexueller Belästigung
-
Mehrfachdiskriminierung wird nur selten von den Opfern als solche identifiziert
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-
Diskriminierung innerhalb einer Gruppe wird nur sehr selten als eine solche
wahrgenommen.
-
Männer werden vermehrt in Freizeitbereichen diskriminiert (Bars, Nachtklubs und
Restaurants).
-
Es gibt gemeinsame geschlechtsbezogene Stereotypen – Männer die aus einer
ethnischen Minderheitengruppierung stammen werden oft als sexistisch und
aggressiv wahrgenommen, während Frauen aus diesen Gruppen als passiv und
devot wahrgenommen werden. (Carles S. 123)
COLLINS, Hugh (2003): Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion. The Modern Law
Review 66, pp. 16 – 43,
vgl.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1097547
Anti-discrimination laws cannot be reduced to equal treatment. (Collins p. 16) Rather, there
are three deviations from a principle of equal treatment:
1) Different treatment. The example of pregnant women is given. They are not to be
treated as men.
2) Equal treatment is not permitted when it causes indirect discrimination or has
“disparate impact”
3) Preferential treatment of certain groups is permitted (Collins pp. 16 – 17)
Collins notes that substantive equality is often introduced here to account for these
derivations. The problem then becomes “Uto restrain or confine the force of a substantive
conception of equality.” This is needed so that it does not counteract the principle of equal
treatment. (Collins p. 17)
Europe uses a “proportionality” test to balance these two visions of equality, but this leaves
the tension in tact:
“Wherever the line is drawn, a decision can always be criticized as displaying either a
slavish adherence to the equal treatment principle or a dangerous sacrifice of the
principle. The tension remains between, on the one hand, an aim of ensuring equal
treatment for all citizens regardless of certain characteristics such as sex and ‘race’,
and on the other hand, an aim of achieving a more equal distribution of welfare or
resources among all citizens that may require in some instances different treatment on
the grounds of those same characteristics.” (Collins p. 18)
Collins now turns to discuss the different approaches that can be taken to resolving this
tension. (Collins p. 18ff)
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One approach is to define substantive equality narrowly so that it hardly ever clashes with
equal treatment. Collins thinks “equality of opportunity” provides an example of this.
However, insofar as it has any content in regard to distributive justice, it must still come into
conflict with procedural justice, and the same tension arises. (Collins pp. 18 – 19)
A second approach would be to limit the equal treatment principle so that there was hardly
ever a clash:
“For example, it might be proposed that equal treatment should be rigorously observed
in hiring decisions, but with respect to training and other' outreach' measures, equal
treatment should be sacrificed in the pursuit of a substantive goal such as fair equality
of opportunity.” (Collins p. 19)
However, the law allows for equal treatment across the board and on what ground could this
be altered? (Collins p. 19)
A third approach removes “equal treatment” by redefining it as “equal worth”, “equal respect”
or “treatment as an equal” which all allow for different treatment as long as this does not
involve “disrespect of any group”. Collins is concerned, however, about abandoning equal
treatment altogether and notes that the current state of law would not allow this. (Collins pp.
19-20)
The final approach Collins considers is that of reducing the equal treatment to an
instrumental rule:
“This interpretation identifies a distributive goal as the dominant aim of the legislation,
and regards equal treatment as a useful guide to how the aim of the law should be
implemented, though whenever the substantive goal requires different treatment, the
principle of equal treatment should be ignored.” (Collins p. 20)
Again, Collins notes that the current anti-discrimination laws take equal treatment to be a
dominant principle. (Collins p. 20)
From the above approaches Collins concludes:
1) An account of the aims of anti-discrimination law must give an important role to the
equal treatment principle
2) The distributive aim of the legislation explains those cases when different treatment is
required
3) An additional principle “equal respect”/”equal worth” should be added to supplement
the equal treatment principle
4) The distributive aim of the legislation will, at times, clash with the principle of equal
treatment
5) “The final lesson to be drawn is that it may be possible to define a distributive goal
that entails the use of equal treatment as its operational principle, but which also sets
limits to its operation by reference to the distributive goal. The two main difficulties
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confronting such an interpretation of the aims of the anti-discrimination legislation are
to define an appropriate distributive goal and to explain why this goal requires
considerable weight to be attached to the equal treatment principle.” (Collins p. 20)
Collins thinks that more explicit discussion about the concept of equality may help resolve
the situation. (Collins p. 21)
He now turns to examine social inclusion.
Social Inclusion
Collins chooses the term “social inclusion“ partly to avoid sounding too idealistic and strongly
socialist. (Collins p. 22)
He states that social inclusion is an aim or principle of justice that is often mistaken for an
egalitarian notion of distributive justice. The difference is that social inclusion “Udoes not
seek the same or broadly equivalent outcomes for citizens. It concentrates its attention not
on relative disadvantage of particular groups in society, but rather on the absolute
disadvantage of particular groups in society. The objective is not some notion of equality of
welfare, but one of securing a minimum level of welfare for every citizen.” (Collins p. 22)
Social inclusion is also not equivalent to “equality of resources” for two reasons: The first is
that it is more targeted (so this is the same reason given above for why social inclusion is not
equivalent to distributive justice in general). It only aims to redistribute resources to particular
and particularly disadvantaged groups. The second difference, which Collins thinks is crucial,
is that social inclusion is about outcomes:
“It is not enough under the aim of social inclusion to give a bigger share of resources or
opportunities to disadvantaged groups, and leave them to choose whether to take up
the possibilities they provide. Social inclusion is committed to the achievement of
outcomes, not just life-chances.” (Collins p. 23)
The outcome sought “Uis to improve the welfare of disadvantaged groups” and this is
understood broadly to mean “well-being” which includes goods (e.g. food) as well as
opportunities (education, work). (Collins p. 23)
Collins claims that this vision of welfare is both subjectivist and objectivist. (Collins p. 23)
Social inclusion demands that governments provide not just material goods, then, but nonmaterial opportunities and this requires: “Ufirst, that the social organization of these activities
permits everyone to enter them without insurmountable barriers, and secondly, that each
person enjoys the ability to choose between a range of possible goals in relation to these
activities.” (Collins p. 24)
The aim of social inclusion is, in fact, social cohesion. It is a theory about creating harmony
and integration in society. (Collins p. 24)
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Social inclusion has paternalistic, coercive aspects. Here Collins uses employment as an
example, where both incentives to work and disincentives not to work are applied:
“Moreover, it is insisted that nearly everyone can work, provided that individuals
receive appropriate training and education, and that employers dismantle unnecessary
exclusionary rules. This coercive element distinguishes the principle of social inclusion
from even the broadest versions of equality of opportunity, which leave individuals with
the freedom and the responsibility to make their own life-choices, including indolence.”
(Collins p. 25)
Again, social inclusion’s emphasis on the role that non-material goods play in well-being
distinguishes it from egalitarian welfares’ policies. Social inclusion does not allow for a job to
be traded for the same money paid out in welfare payments, as a job is part of well-being in
ways that cannot be reduced to money. (Collins p. 25)
Collins then briefly outlines the historical context for social inclusion, claiming it arose in late
20th century Western in response to the existence of a problematic, disenfranchised element
existing in welfare societies. (Collins pp. 25 – 26)
Collins identifies four pillars of anti-discrimination laws from the perspective of social
inclusion:
“Uhow the social problem to be addressed by anti-discrimination laws is conceived
within the policy of social inclusion; how social inclusion justifies deviation from the
equal treatment principle; the methods of proof of unlawful discrimination; and the
extent of the requirement for positive discrimination in the pursuit of social inclusion.
This analysis enables us to identify the extent to which a social inclusion justification
may explain the aims and the content of the current law, though it also provides a
critical perspective on possible inadequacies in the legislation.” (Collins p. 26)
Structural disadvantage
Anti-discrimination laws address not just direct discrimination (equal treatment) but also
structural or systemic disadvantage for protected groups. “The notion of structural
disadvantage combines two elements: first, an appreciation that there are patterns of
disadvantage or that there are groups that seem to be disproportionately and persistently in
worse positions; and second, that there are certain permanent arrangements, practices,
institutions and social structures that produce this outcome. The way in which we define the
nature and sources of structural disadvantage provides a framework for the ambit of antidiscrimination laws.” (Collins p. 26)
Collins then sets out three elements of the problem of structural disadvantage and discusses
each in turn:
1) The composition of the disadvantaged groups
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2) The nature of their disadvantage
3) The nature of the structures that tend to produce that disadvantage (Collins p. 26)
Disadvantaged groups
Collins claims that equality justifications for anti-discrimination laws lack a determinate way to
constitute groups for comparison. Social inclusion does a better job of this: “The question is
whether the group is one that in practice has been disproportionately socially excluded
compared to the population as a whole.” (Collins p. 27)
“Notice as well that social inclusion is not interested in whether the group is classified
by
unalterable
genetics,
socially
constructed
qualities,
or
legally
imposed
characteristics, factors which are sometimes used to determine the scope of
discrimination laws under equality justifications. Nor is it interested in whether the
group is regarded with disrespect.” (Collins p. 28)
Nature of disadvantage
Again, Collins thinks that social inclusion does better than equality in picking out relevant
disadvantages. (Collins p. 28) In particular, he thinks that understanding social inclusion as
the underlying drive of anti-discrimination laws, helps make sense of the emphasis on
employment and why it is the distribution of jobs that matters, rather than just the economic
benefits of having a job – so, again, the idea is that the same money paid in welfare is not as
good. (Collins pp. 28 – 29)
Structures
“Both formal and informal institutional arrangements of our society tend to maintain
existing distributive patterns, even once direct discrimination is eliminated.” Here Collins
cites women being primary care-givers to children as an arrangement that disadvantages
them in the labour market. (Collins p. 39)
Women are disadvantaged through the combination of the informal arrangement that they
are primarily responsible for child-care, combined with the formal arrangements of
employment. Collins notes that the law “Uquestions the validity of the institutional rules,
though it leaves untouched and unquestioned the informal social norms.” (Collins p. 30)
Collins notes here that the equality justification seems to cause problems as it means that
the anti-discrimination laws rely on stereotypes in order to show structural, indirect
discrimination:
“Thus in Clymo v Wandsworth Borough Council, a rule against job sharing the post of
librarian was held not to be discriminatory against women, because the claimant had
had the choice to pay for full-time child-care. As soon as the court or tribunal denies or
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rejects the social stereotype – in this instance women typically stay at home to take
care of young children – the legal challenge to institutional discrimination begins to fall
apart.” (Collins p. 30 - footnote omitted)
“The ideal of equality respects the choices of individuals about how they should lead
their lives, but says the law should insist upon equal respect for those choices. Respect
for those choices means that the law should not question social norms in so far as they
are conventions and patterns produced by the choice of individuals. Under this equality
justification, the prohibition against institutional discrimination should concern only
those rules that, though formally neutral, have in their application a disparate adverse
impact on certain groups as a result of attributes of those groups which they have not
chosen.” (Collins p. 31 – footnotes omitted)
Social inclusion, however, is not neutral in regard to the chosen goals. “The social norms and
conventions are themselves a target for discrimination laws, if they have the effect that the
groups who make such choices are thereby excluding themselves from employment.”
(Collins p. 31)
Examining a rule against job sharing on the basis of social inclusion would reveal that
parents of young children may need part time jobs for their well-being. A rule against jobsharing obstructs those who need part-time work from entering the labour market. In terms of
social inclusion the law is discriminatory if it has an exclusionary effect. (Collins p. 31)
“It is possible to detect such a change in the new test for indirect sex discrimination in
employment. The amended Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 1(2)(b) drops the
former element that asked whether a disproportionate number of women cannot
comply with the hiring rule, and asks merely whether the rule has a detrimental effect
for a considerably larger population of women, thus avoiding the issue of choice and
social convention.” (Collins p. 31 – footnotes omitted)
Proving discrimination
Viewing anti-discrimination law as based on an equality principle requires a comparative
approach to proof. It is often impossible to find a man (or member of the relevant majority
group) in similar circumstances, so a hypothetical comparator must be created.
“This legal construction is often difficult to build, because a member of the majority or
privileged group is unlikely to have experienced structural disadvantages in a similar
way, so that it is hard to envisage how members of this groups could find themselves in
sufficiently similar circumstances for a fair comparison to be made.” (Collins p. 32)
Social inclusion, however, does not demand a comparator:
“The policy of social inclusion asks for proof that the rule or practice tends to reinforce
the exclusion of an individual member of an excluded group or most members of the
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excluded group. For example, if the employer’s rule forbids part-time work, this rule
reinforces the exclusion of any groups such as single parents that may require parttime jobs. Even if it is demonstrated that other groups are similarly or equally adversely
affected by the rule, the fact that this particular excluded group is disadvantaged by the
requirement is sufficient to provide a basis for a challenge to the rule.” (Collins p. 32)
Collins notes that the comparator test, based on the equality justification, is the dominant
approach to proof in anti-discrimination law. However, the exact notion of equality being used
is often disputed. He identifies the statistical approach as the source of this dispute:
“No doubt much of the difficulty here can be attributed to a combination of the lack of
precise statistical information combined with the complexity of the test. This test
requires a comparison between the ratios of the privileged group to the protected group
in two statistical pools. The equal treatment principle tends to confine the pools for
statistical comparison, whereas a substantive equality of results principle points to the
relevance of a broadly composed pool of comparison, usually consisting of the labour
market as a whole. In the case of a hiring condition such as a particular educational
qualification, for instance, the focus of the equal treatment principle is on whether the
condition disproportionately adversely affected a protected group within the set of job
applicants. The relevant statistical comparison under this approach is the proportions
between privileged group and disadvantaged group in the pool of job applicants
compared to the proportions in the pool of those employed. From the perspective of
equality of results, however, the relevant statistical pool should be defined at least as
those available in the labour market who could satisfy all the requirements for the job
apart from the disputed educational qualification. It is the proportions between
privileged and disadvantaged groups who can and who cannot satisfy the condition
that serves as the comparison for establishing indirect discrimination.” (Collins pp. 32 –
33 – footnotes omitted – some useful case citations in footnotes)
Social inclusion supports selecting the broader pool of statistical comparison, but it “Ddoes
not focus on the statistics for the labour market as a whole, unless the job concerned
requires minimal skills, because its concern is with those who possess the skills to benefit
from the job or those who could acquire them with training.” (Collins p. 33)
Collins argues that thinking in terms of social inclusion may help understand two other
problems of the comparative approach to proof.
1) The problem of interpreting statistical differences:
“The test for discrimination in EC law is not one of statistical significance in a
technical sense, but rather one that adopts a formula that there must be disadvantage
to a ‘substantially higher proportion’ of the protected group. The puzzle posed by that
test is why it detracts from the commitment to equality, which should require merely a
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test of statistical significance. There may be pragmatic considerations at work hereD
But an additional explanation D may be that the legislation implicitly acknowledges
that its distributive aim has to be more focused on rules that have a considerable
exclusionary effect, and has to refrain from assessments of the merits of every rule
that produces results that deviate slightly from a normal distribution.” (Collins p. 33)
2) The problem for indirect discrimination claims of the exclusionary effect of a
combination of rules.
“For example, an employer may use two hiring conditions such as a formal
educational qualification and a skill acquired through work experience. D The
problem may arise that, although any one hiring condition may not create a
substantial difference in the composition of the comparative pools, a combination of
two or more may have a significant exclusionary effect. There is a danger that under
the approach based on equality, an employer may be able to reject the inference of
indirect discrimination by insisting that each hiring requirement should be viewed in
isolation.” (Collins p. 34)
Collins thinks that social inclusion explains why this method of analysis is
unsatisfactory: “Social exclusion is often the product of a combination of factors, such
as being a member of a minority group in a particular neighbourhood. A
disadvantaged group is therefore often identified in theories of social exclusion by
more than one criterion. The aim of social inclusion thus perhaps explains our
intuition that the method of analysis that examines each hiring condition in isolation is
unsatisfactory, because it does not appreciate the multi-faceted sources of
disadvantage in many instances.” (Collins p. 34)
Direct discrimination and a justification defence
Using social inclusion, the direct comparative test is eliminated, but a justification defence
needs to be introduced. At the moment, this is basically restricted to indirect discrimination,
but Collins claims that it must apply to direct discrimination too. This is not possible at the
moment because of the equal treatment principle which “Ucreates a strong presumption
against the possibility of justifying intentional discrimination.” (Collins p. 34)
Social inclusion, however, can “Utolerate a broader range of considerations, provided that
the justifications are compatible with the aim of social inclusion.” (Collins p. 34)
Collins discusses the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 as an example of a law that does not
use the comparative approach and is based more on social inclusion than equality. The
specific example is of a hiring rule that restricts employment based on passing a medical
test, but the person with the disability cannot pass it because of the disability. “It is irrelevant
that the hiring rule applies equally to person without a disability, and it is not necessary to
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prove disparate impact. Once it is shown that the rule has excluded a disabled person, the
question is not whether there was unequal treatment, but whether the rule is justified in the
sense that the reason for the rule is both material to the circumstances of the particular case
and substantial.” (Collins pp. 34 – 35 – footnotes omitted)
This justification test is further refined in s5 (2), which creates a duty on the employer to
make “reasonable adjustments” to those arrangements that put the disabled person at a
disadvantage. It is, in short, a duty to treat disabled persons differently (so, again, not the
equality principle). (Collins p. 35)
What is considered to be a “reasonable adjustment” is guided by the statute and an
elaborate Code of Practice. The problem for the tribunal is to balance the cost to the
employer with the exclusionary effects of the hiring rules. (Collins p. 35)
In James v Eastleigh Borough Council pensioners could swim for free at the pool, but the
age for the pension was lower for women than men. On the basis of equality, this is a
problem, but social inclusion may explain it. The group under consideration is pensioners as
such – “Dthe excluded group can be defined by reference to the pattern of social exclusion –
persons of pensionable age.” (Collins p. 36) The Judicial Committee, however, upheld the
claim of sex discrimination, as the argument for equal treatment was compelling.
Positive Action
Equality of treatment finds positive action difficult to account for, and the tests of “strict
scrutiny” and “proportionality” are quite difficult to meet. (Collins p. 36)
If social inclusion is considered instead, then “...employers should be sensitive to difference
and make reasonable adjustments, in order to enable members of excluded groups to
overcome obstructions to their obtaining work suitable for their skills and capability. This duty
requires employers to consider amongst many things how the workplace is organised, how
jobs are structured, and how the skills and capabilities of the workers could be improved,
with a view to the reduction of barriers to employment for excluded groups.” (Collins p. 37)
Collins again cites the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 as an example of this approach.
(Collins p. 37)
Social inclusion does not demand quotas. (Collins p. 37)
Can anti-discrimination laws be interpreted in terms of social inclusion and include this
positive duty when appropriate, or do they forbid difference of treatment outright? Collins
thinks it is possible (although he does go on later to discuss ways in which it is not an exact
match):
“In a claim for indirect discrimination, once the indirect discriminatory effect of a hiring
rule is revealed by statistical evidence, the employer must justify the rule on business
grounds to avoid a successful claim of discrimination. The justification standard
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currently used in cases of indirect discrimination is under EC law a test of
proportionalityD.” (Collins p. 37 – citation for this is Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von
Hartz C-170/84 [1986] ECR 1607 ECJ; EC Directive 2000/78, Art 2(2)(b), 2002/73, new
Art 2(2).)
The way that this test has been applied in the UK, however, seems to have made it a little
weaker. Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1989] ICR 179 CA: “Ua
requirement to balance objectively the discriminatory effect of the rule against the reasonable
needs of the party imposing the condition. This justification defence requires the employer to
discover and reveal the potential costs of eliminating the hiring rule in rule in the same way
that the duty of accommodation functions as an ‘information-forcing rule’. Then the court
must balance those costs to the employer against the exclusionary impact of the rule.”
(Collins pp. 37-38)
The Hampson test “Uwas approved and described as an application for the EC test of
proportionality by Lord Nicholls in Burry v Midland bank plc [199] ICR 859, HL 870, and by
Sedley LJ in Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College [2001] ICR 1189 CA 1200,
though there seems to be a clear difference between a test of necessity and a mere
balancing of interests.” (Collins footnote 73, p. 38)
London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No 2) [1997] IRLR 157 EAT (affirmed [1999] ICR 494
CA) – the employer introduced a new shift-system, which resulted in a single parent
resigning. The court held that London Underground could have “Umade arrangements which
would not have been damaging to their business plans but which would have accommodated
the reasonable demands of their employees.” (Cited Collins p. 38)
Under the EC test of proportionality the key question “Uis often whether the employer’s rule
is necessary in the sense no other rule with less adverse impact on the excluded group
would satisfy the business needs of the employer. Arguments about justification in indirect
discrimination claims amount to more than an individualized claim for adjustment, because
the employer is required to justify the adverse impact of the rule on an excluded class, not
merely on a particular job applicant.” (Collins p. 38)
In the footnote Collins notes that this “Utest of proportionality is also being applied under the
Human Rights Act 1998, eg Wilson v First Country Trust Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 633,
[2001] 3 WLR 42 CA” (Footnote 78, Collins p. 38)
In terms of current law not exactly expressing the social inclusion aim, Collins thinks that the
“Ucentral difference concerns the potential width of justifications for indirectly discriminatory
rules.” (Collins p. 38) This is because the aim of social inclusion would allow for justifications
beyond business considerations, such as in Northern Ireland, having a rule to favour
unemployed persons, would also indirectly discriminate against Protestants, but would go to
assist the aim of including the Catholic community in employment. (Collins pp. 38-39)
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Courts do not always have broad discretion in these matters. Sometimes the legislation is too
specific for that and here Collins cites the legislation relating to maternity and parental leave
rights. Although, in this case, there is more discretion under the legislation dealing with time
off for family emergencies, which, Collins thinks, “Ucan be regarded as a determination of
the requirement of reasonable adjustment for parents, with their underlying goal being in part
the reduction of social exclusion.” (Collins p. 39)
Priority not equality
Four features to seeing anti-discrimination law in terms of social inclusion:
1) The primary target “Uis the allocation of jobs to groups that suffer persistent
disadvantage in the labour market.”
2) The proof of disadvantage should be evidence of disadvantage combined with
membership of a protected group “Uwithout the need to prove comparative greater
disadvantage than other groups.”
3) A broad justification for direct and indirect discrimination is possible, based either on
furthering the aims of social inclusion or “Ua claim that the discriminatory rule only
excludes those people who could not take advantage of the employment opportunity”.
(Collins p. 39)
4) It requires positive action: “Ua duty of reasonable adjustment.” (Collins p. 39)
Collins thinks new developments in anti-discrimination laws, ‘fourth generation duties’, fit into
the social inclusion picture. (Collins p. 40)
Collins emphasizes that social inclusion cannot be used to explain all anti-discrimination
laws, but he does think it is useful in those cases where different treatment is required. It can
help justify departures from the rule of equal treatment. (Collins p. 40)
Social inclusion is distinct from equality of welfare and equality of opportunity. However, it is
compatible with the aim of social inclusion for equal treatment to operate as the normal rule.
Indeed, equal treatment often furthers the aim of social inclusion. (Collins pp. 40 – 41)
Collins thinks equal treatment has such importance in anti-discrimination laws for two
reasons:
1) Equal treatment is required by the principle of respect for individual dignity or
individual worth. And this principle is expressed in Art 14 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (Collins p. 41)
2) Equal treatment is a dominant constitutional principle in Western legal system. “The
political goal behind anti-discrimination legislation becomes translated in the
operations of the legal system as a rule that like cases should be treated alike.
DWhatever the political aim behind anti-discrimination legislation, whether it
comprises equality of results, equality of opportunity, or social inclusion, that aim has
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to be modified to comply with the principle of equal treatment in order for it to be
accommodated with integrity within the legal system.” (Collins p. 42)
These reasons help explain why the laws do not match up with the aims of social inclusion
exactly; for example, that men get equal protection even though they would not be classed
as a protected group. (Collins p. 42)
So there are two aims to anti-discrimination laws: equal treatment and the distributive justice
aim. The distributive justice aim can often be understood in terms of social inclusion. Using
social inclusion would give a more determinate standard for the legitimacy of positive
discrimination laws than is currently the case: “It suggests that deviations from equal
treatment should be permitted where the discriminatory measure is necessary to achieve the
result of social inclusion for members of a group that are presently largely excluded.” (Collins
p. 42)
Thinking in terms of social inclusion also provides grounds for criticizing the current laws,
such as the case of free entry to swimming pools for pensioners when there are different
pension ages for men and women. On the basis of equal treatment, direct discrimination was
found, but what aim was this furthering? Social inclusion suggests that a deviation from equal
treatment may have been justified in this instance. (Collins pp. 42-43)
DEGENER, Theresia (2011): Intersections between Disability, Race and Gender in
Discrimination Law, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON, Anna: European Union NonDiscrimination Law and Intersectionality – Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender
and Disability Discrimination, Ashgate, 29-46.
Die Intersektionalitäten zwischen „Rasse“, Gender und Behinderung müssen laut Degener in
der rechts- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung erst entwickelt werden. (Degener S. 29)
Außerdem sind kaum Daten zu multidimensionaler Diskriminierung im Bezug auf „Rasse“,
Gender und Behinderung vorhanden. Degener spricht die Hierarchisierung der einzelnen
Diskriminierungsgründe an. So sind in Deutschland die Standards für „Rasse“ und Gender
strikter als jene für Behinderung. Diese Hierarchisierungen in Deutschland korrespondieren
mit den Hierarchisierungen in den EU Richtlinien. (Degener S. 31)
Degener gibt einen Überblick über den Umgang mit Diskriminierungen an den Intersektionen
von „Rasse“, Gender und Behinderung im Recht der Vereinten Nationen und den UN –
Konventionen und „Überwachungsorganen.“ (Degener S. 33 ff.) Positiv wird die UNBehindertenkonvention erwähnt, da diese Mehrfachdiskriminierung ausdrücklich normiert.
(Degener S. 36) Daraufhin geht Degener auf die Europaratsdokumente wie z.B. die EMRK
und
die
Europäische
Sozialcharta
ein.
Abschließend
wird
das
geltende
Antidiskriminierungsrecht der EU untersucht. Anschließend an die europäischen und
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internationalen Betrachtungen werden ausgewählte nationale Beispiele analysiert, z.B. hat
die Australische Human Rights Commission das Thema der intersektionellen Diskriminierung
aufgegriffen. Ebenso hat die US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2006
„Guidance Notes“ zum Thema intersektionale Diskriminierung veröffentlicht. Auch das
Diskussionspapier der Ontario Human Rights Commission von 2001 wird erwähnt. (Degener
S. 43)
Zusammenfassend stellt Degener fest, dass es kaum Daten zu den Folgen von
Diskriminierungen an den Intersektionen von „Rasse“, Geschlecht und Behinderung gibt
(Degener S. 44), weswegen auch die öffentliche Wahrnehmung gering ist. Selbst die
Betroffenen wissen oft nicht, wie sie die erlittene Diskriminierung benennen sollen. Obwohl
viele der gerichtsanhängigen Fälle Züge von Intersektionalität aufweisen, werden sie von
den RechtspraktikerInnen oft als single-ground Fälle vorgebracht.
DEUTSCH, Francine M. (2007): Undoing Gender, Gender & Society 21, 106-127,
vgl.:
http://www.smu.ca/academic/arts/sociology/bios/documents/DeutschUndoingGender.pdf
Ausgehend vom doing gender Ansatz nach West/Zimmerman stellt sich Deutsch die Frage,
wie dieser Prozess umgekehrt werden kann. Für Deutsch scheint der Ansatz, Ungleichheit
durch soziale Interaktionen hervorzubringen, so wie ihn West/Zimmerman darstellen,
hoffnungslos. Deutsch sieht soziale Interaktionen aber auch als Chance für Widerstand
gegen Herrschaftssysteme. (Deutsch S. 107)
Doing gender wirkt stärker als Sozialisierung. (Deutsch S. 107) Gender ist etwas
Dynamisches, das in Interaktionen immer wieder hervorgebracht wird. Daher ist hier auch
Widerstand gegen bisher herrschende Strukturen denkbar. Doing gender zeigt auch die
Schwächen deterministischer Erklärungsversuche (z.B. dass Männer weniger Hausarbeit
machen, weil sie mehr Geld verdienen als Frauen und daher mehr Macht besitzen. Männer
erledigen aber auch weniger Hausarbeit, wenn sie weniger verdienen als ihre Frauen).
(Deutsch S. 108) Gender ist konstruiert, folglich kann es dekonstruiert werden. (Deutsch S.
108)
Deutsch kritisiert das Wort doing, das den Fokus auf das Kreieren von Unterschieden statt
auf das Abschaffen ebendieser legt. (Deutsch S. 109)
Schwerpunkte der Forschung sind Hausarbeit, das Verhalten von Frauen in typischen
Männerberufen, Verhalten von ForscherInnen und Beforschten in Interviewsituationen
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(Deutsch S. 111 f.): Sie setzen sich mit dem Verhalten entsprechend von Normen
auseinander (Deutsch S. 113).
Neue Betrachtung von Interaktionen:
-
Interaktionen als Möglichkeit Geschlechterungleichheiten zu reduzieren. (Deutsch S.
114)
-
Gender kann in Interaktionen auch irrelevant sein. (Deutsch S. 116)
-
Doing difference muss nicht immer (benachteiligende) Ungleichheiten hervorbringen.
(Deutsch S. 117)
-
Zusammenspiel von struktureller Ebene und Interaktionen bei Veränderungen.
(Deutsch S. 117)
-
Interaktionen als Vorbild von Veränderung. (Deutsch S. 120)
Deutsch spricht sich dafür aus, den Begriff doing gender durch undoing gender zu ersetzen
(Deutsch S. 122), um Interaktionen ins Zentrum zu rücken, die Genderungleichheiten
reduzieren.
DIETZE, Gabriele, HORNSCHEIDT, Antje, WALGENBACH, Katharina, PALM, Kerstin
(2007): Gender als interdependente Kategorie. Neue Perspektiven auf
Intersektionalität, Diversität und Heterogenität, Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich.
Walgenbach kritisiert in ihrer Einleitung den doing gender/doing difference Ansatz als zu
verkürzt (Walgenbach et. al. S. 50): Es gibt eine wechselseitige Beeinflussung von
Strukturen und sozialen Interaktionen. Historische und materielle Aspekte von Ungleichheit
müssen mit einbezogen werden.
Nach Walgenbach (Walgenbach et. al. S. 56) gibt es strukturelle Dominanzverhältnisse,
welche die gesellschaftliche Realität fundamental auf materielle und diskursive Weise
bestimmen (die Wahrscheinlichkeit auf welche Schule man geht, ob man sich ungestört
fortbewegen kann etc.).
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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (FRA) (2010): Data in
Focus Report. Multiple Discrimination, EU-MIDIS, European Union Minorities and
Discrimination Survey 05,
vgl.: www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/.../EU_MIDIS_DiF5-multiple-discrimination_EN.pdf
Es werden neun Bereiche untersucht (FRA S. 7):
- Arbeitssuche/Arbeitsmarkt
- Arbeitsplatz
- Wohnungsmarkt
- Medizinisches Personal
- Soziale Einrichtungen
- Schule
- Cafés, Restaurants, Bars oder Clubs
- Beim Betreten eines oder in einem Geschäft
- Kontoeröffnung oder Kredit
Männer werden häufiger als Frauen diskriminiert und erleiden zudem auch öfter
Mehrfachdiskriminierung (FRA S. 14).
FREDMAN, Sandra (2002): Discrimination Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Equality: Concepts and Controversies
Fredman begins by discussing the different kinds of equality and, in particular, the way that
equal treatment can lead to unequal outcomes while unequal treatment may be necessary to
achieve equality. (Fredman p. 2)
She points out that these different views of equality are, in turn, driven by different views of
justice: consistency on the one hand, and substantive justice on the other. (Fredman p. 2)
Unequal treatment may be necessary, then, in order to address substantive, underlying
equality in terms of education, wealth etc.
She points out that the choice between these different kinds of equality is really a choice of
values or policy:
“Equality could aim to achieve the redistributive goal of alleviating disadvantage, the
liberal goal of treating all with equal concern and respect, the neo-liberal goal of market
or contractual equality and the political goal of access to decision-making processes. It
is striking that, despite the widespread adherence to the ideal of equality, there is so
little agreement on its meaning and aims.” (Fredman p. 2)
She also points out that there can be a tension between equality and difference, but that this
is not necessarily so. (Fredman pp. 2-3)
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She also points out that equality can be in conflict with other values such as freedom – for
example freedom of speech in the sense that someone might want to be free to make racist
comments etc. (Fredman p. 3)
The Principle of Equality
Fredman cites Locke as epitomising the blossoming of liberal ideology and the
accompanying rise in the importance of equality. (Fredman p. 5)
This equality was, however, selective. Women, people of different ‘races’, Jews etc were
excluded often and in important ways. (Fredman p. 5)
In a standard, yet nonetheless controversial move, she ties the exclusion of these groups to
equality’s link to rationality. That is, we are equal because and insofar as we are rational. If
some groups were shown to be more emotional and irrational, then they lost their claim to
equality. (Fredman p. 5)
Formal equality or equality as consistency
Fredmen cites Aristotle for “like cases should be treated alike”. (Fredman p. 7)
Fredman raises a few problems with this:
1) When are like cases really alike? And this links to the point that not all distinctions are
discriminatory – such as people being distinguished on the basis of income level for
tax purposes. (Fredman p. 7)
2) It is only a relative principle – for example, if an employer treats both men and women
equally badly, there is no sex discrimination. Also, it can be satisfied by levelling
down so that if a swimming pool denies entry to non-whites, it could just close down
rather than admit non-whites. (Fredman p. 8)
3) The need to find a comparator, which requires us to consider people in the abstract –
absent ‘race’ or sex. In fact, what this amounts to, is that the ‘universal individual’ is
really a white, middle-class, able-bodied, Christian, heterosexual male. (Fredman pp.
8-9)
4) The treatment of difference- “...there is no requirement that people be treated
appropriately according to their difference.” (Fredman p. 10)
5) It is extremely individualist. It argues that individuals are treated on their merits, but
this has meant that all group characteristics, and what they contribute to an
individual’s identity, have been discounted. (Fredman p. 10)
Equality of Results
There are also problems with this idea.
Are the relevant results:
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1) the impact on the individual?
2) the representation of the group? – so that, for example, if an organisation does not
have a reasonable number of people from a minority group a presumption of
discrimination is raised;
3) the proportionality of minority groups in organisations should be in line with their
distribution in the general population. Anything less is discrimination. This does not
examine why this disproportionality existed. (Fredman pp. 11-13 )
Equality of opportunity
This can be seen as a middle-path between equality of treatment and equality of results,
which aims to equalise the starting point. (Fredman p. 14)
This can be further refined into either a procedural or substantive equality of starting position
– the former emphasis removing procedural barriers, the latter “...requires measure to be
taken to ensure that persons from all sections of society have a genuinely equal chance of
satisfying the criteria for access to a particular social good.” (Fredman p. 15)
A value driven approach
“Equality laws have traditionally been founded and legitimated on grounds that they
further the liberal goals of State neutrality, individualism, and the promotion of
autonomy.” (Fredman p. 15)
Fredman argues that this is highly problematic, especially as it ignores the importance and
constitutive power of group membership. (Fredman p. 16)
She then investigates some alternatives:
Dignity
Many jurisdictions have used dignity as their basis for equality. (Fredman p. 17)
Fredman points out that “dignity” can be defined in various ways to make it strong or weak.
(Fredman p. 19)
Remedial and Restitutionary Aims
“In this more historically specific sense, equality is aimed at compensating individuals
for the detriment caused by prejudice and the ongoing effects of past discrimination.”
(Fredman p. 19)
Distributive Justice
“A third value underlying equality is more explicitly redistributive, aiming not just to
redress previous disadvantage but to achieve an equal distribution of social goods.”
(Fredman p. 20)
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Participative Democracy
“Given that past discrimination or other social mechanisms have blocked the avenues
for political participation by particular minorities, legal rights, particularly equality laws,
are needed both to compensate for this absence of political voice and to open up the
channels for greater participation in the future.” (Fredman p. 22)
The Scope of Discrimination Law
Which groups ought to be protected and how far should this protection reach (only in the
public sphere etc)? (Fredman p. 66)
Grounds of discrimination
Defining the grounds of discrimination: who decides and how?
Fredman makes a couple of good points about the power-play that is involved in the decision
of who should be protected from discrimination and why. For example, if it is left to popular
opinion, there is the danger that the very people who most need attention may miss out (a
majoritarian-type concern). (Fredman p. 67)
She outlines three responses:
1) [A] “U broad open-textured guarantee, stating simply that all persons are equal
before the law, without specifying any particular grounds. This approach takes the
decision out of the political process, and instead leaves it to judges to decide when a
classification is prohibited.” (Fredman pp. 67-68)
2) “Ulegislation containing an exhaustive list of grounds. This contrasts with the first
approach in that the choice of ground is made wholly within the political process with
no discretion left to the judges.” (Fredman p. 67)
3) “Ua list of grounds of discrimination, but indicates that the list is not exhaustive. D
This approach gives judges some discretion to extend the list according to a set of
judicially generated principles; but judicial discretion is bounded by the existence of
enumerated grounds.” (Fredman p. 68)
Searching existing categories: semantics or substance
Fredman gives a brief outline of the status of anti-discrimination law in the UK and the EU.
(Fredman pp. 68-69) The main point is that coverage is not complete; rather it varies from
ground to ground and also from group to group. (Fredman p. 70)
This has caused people to try to bring themselves within the established grounds even if it
seems to be a bit forced. Fredman cites a few examples: sexual orientation has had to be
argued for as a kind of sex discrimination; and Sikhs, Muslims, Jews and Rastafarians have
had to claim discrimination based on ethnic origin because religion is not included. (Fredman
p. 70)
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The leading case (at the time of writing) in the UK for ethnic origin versus religion was
Mandla v Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). (Fredman pp. 70-71)
Fredman then discusses the ECJ’s approach to sexual orientation as a basis for a
discrimination claim:
“Uit held that discrimination could only be established if the complainant had been
treated less favourably than a person of the opposite sex on grounds of sex (not sexual
orientation). Deverything then depends on who is chosen as the comparator. If a gay
woman is compared with a heterosexual man, there may well be discrimination. But if a
gay woman is compared with a gay man, the opposite conclusion can be reached. In
Grant v South West Trains, the ECJ held that the relevant comparator was not a
heterosexual, but a homosexual man. Since a man living with a male partner was
treated in the same way (ie equally badly) as the woman living with a woman partner,
she could not complain that she had been treated less favourably than a similarly
situated man. It was therefore held that there was no discrimination on grounds of sex.”
(Fredman p. 73 – citation omitted)
Generating Protected Grounds: Judicial Principles
Fredman examines the way various jurisdictions have dealt with discrimination legislation
that is made of non-exhaustive lists. (Fredman p. 76 ff)
This has not always produced consistent results. In particular:
“Courts in most jurisdictions have been concerned to prevent the equality guarantee
from reaching to the basis of the capitalist society – namely inequalities of wealth. For
example, in a US case, the system of funding local schools by local property taxes was
challenged on the grounds that this discriminated against poor districts, whose property
taxes were not of the standard of the richer areas, and therefore whose schools were
correspondingly less well resourced. The US Supreme Court held that none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness applied: there was no history of purposeful unequal
treatment or political powerlessness. It is difficult to see why this is the case.” (Fredman
pp. 79- 80)
Judicial bias was also evident in the reluctance of courts to see that there had been
discrimination against women until the 1970s – until then unequal treatment was seen to be
OK. (Fredman p. 80)
Scope of Discrimination Law
Sex, ‘race’ and disability discrimination
In the UK: “Existing ‘race’ and sex discrimination laws apply only to education, employment,
and the provision of services. D The Disability Discrimination Act is similarly limited to
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specific areas, namely employment, the provision of goods, facilities and services, premises,
education, and transport.” (Fredman p. 83)
Fredman also notes that there are significant exceptions, even within these areas. (Fredman
p. 83)
In terms of ‘race’ discrimination the exceptions relating to policing seem particularly
problematic and some steps were taken to address this. (Fredman p. 84)
The Human Rights Act 1998, incorporating the ECHR
Article 14 of the ECHR (the dependent one) has been incorporated into UK law through the
HRA, but Protocol 12 (the independent one) has not. (Fredman p. 86)
EU Law
EU law is driven by the fact that it was interested in discrimination that could affect “Uthe
creation of a European-wide labour market.” (Fredman p. 89)
FREDMAN, Sandra (2005): Double Trouble – Multiple Discrimination and EU Law in:
European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, Issue No. 2, October 2005, 13-18
Fredman erwähnt anfangs, dass die meisten Personen eine multiple Identität haben; wir alle
haben ein Alter, ein Geschlecht, eine sexuelle Orientierung und eine ethnische
Zugehörigkeit. Bei manchen kommt noch eine Behinderung oder eine Religion hinzu. Dies
bedeutet, dass Diskriminierung auch aufgrund mehrerer Gründe auftreten kann (Fredman, p.
13). Fredman verweist auf die Entwicklungen zum Thema der Mehrfachdiskriminierung in
den USA und auf Kimberlé Crenshaw. Weiters führt Fredman kurz in das Thema und die
Problematik der intersektionellen Diskriminierung ein (Fredman p. 13f).
Die synergistische Beschaffenheit von Diskriminierungen machte es schwierig, Politiken und
Gesetze so auszuformulieren, dass sie Mehrfachdiskriminierung adäquat adressieren.
RichterInnen und Gesetzgeber waren vorsichtig im Umgang mit dem Thema, um nicht die
„Büchse der Pandora“ zu öffnen (Fredman p. 14). Abgesehen von wenigen Ausnahmen
waren die US – Gerichte vorsichtig, da sie eine Flut an Klagen von allen möglichen
‚Untergruppen‘ (zB Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund, o.ä.) fürchteten. So wurde in den USA
festgehalten, dass sich Mehrfachdiskriminierung nur auf 2 Gründe beziehen dürfe. Das
Resultat ist paradox, weil es darauf hinaus läuft, dass eine Person umso mehr sie von der
Norm abweicht, desto weniger Chancen hat, Schutz zu erlangen (Fredman 14).
Ebenso führt die synergistische Beschaffenheit von Mehrfachdiskriminierung laut Fredman
dazu, dass es kaum brauchbare Statistiken hierfür in den Staaten gibt, da ‚Untergruppen‘
nicht erfasst werden. Insofern bleiben Personen, wie etwa MigrantInnen mit Behinderung, in
den Statistiken ‚unsichtbar‘ (vgl Fredman p. 14).
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Als wahrscheinlichste Opfer von Mehrfachdiskriminierung nennt Fredman Roma- und
Sintifrauen, wie eine Studie aus Deutschland zeigte.2
Fredman diskutiert die Frage, wie man Mehrfachdiskriminierung im EU Recht verankern
kann. Die Erfahrungen aus den USA haben gezeigt, dass man dazu tendiert,
Nichtdiskriminierungsrecht so zu verstehen, dass eine Diskriminierung jeweils eindeutig in
eine Kategorie fällt. Jedoch zeigt das internationale Menschenrechtssystem andere Ansätze
auf. Besonders wird hier die 4. Weltfrauenkonferenz in Beijing 1995 hervorgehoben
(Fredman, p. 16), da dort darauf hingewiesen wurde, dass Alter, Behinderung oder
sozioökonomische Position zu Barrieren für Frauen werden können. Auf der EU Ebene bietet
die Erweiterung der Diskriminierungsgründe neue Möglichkeiten für die Anerkennung von
Mehrfachdiskriminierung, jedoch schaffen die Strukturen der Richtlinien einige mögliche
Hindernisse. Das erste ist die Aufteilung in mehrere Richtlinien, ebenso die abschließende
Liste an Diskriminierungsgründen, die dem EuGH die Möglichkeit zur Ausweitung der Liste
an Diskriminierungsgründen nimmt. Dies steht im Kontrast zu Art. 14 EMRK, der eine offene
Liste an Diskriminierungsgründen vorsieht. Jedoch können neue Subkategorien geschaffen
werden, da die Präambeln der Richtlinien Hinweise zur Mehrfachdiskriminierung geben
(Fredman, p. 16f). Laut Fredman wäre die Schaffung einer nicht abschließenden Liste an
Diskriminierungsgründen
vermutlich
der
einfachere
Weg
zur
Anerkennung
von
Mehrfachdiskrminierung gewesen, wie es auch in manchen Mitgliedsstaaten umgesetzt
wurde.
Als schwierigeres Problem bewertet Fredman die unterschiedlichen Anwendungsbereiche
der Richtlinien und die unterschiedlichen Schutzniveaus in der Arbeitswelt und in den
sonstigen Bereichen. Dies würde es unter Umständen einem älteren Angehörigen einer
ethnischen Minderheit erschweren, Diskriminierung im Bereich des Wohnungsmarktes
geltend zu machen.
Ein möglicher Weg wäre der, dass die innerstaatlichen Regelungen über die Maßgaben der
Richtlinien hinausgehen und umfassenden Schutz für alle Diskriminierungsgründe bieten.
Dies wurde etwa in Belgien gemacht (Fredman, p. 17).
Das
Erkennen
von
Mehrfachdiskriminierung
ist
auch
im
Bereich
der
positiven
Diskriminierung und der Positive Actions wichtig. Hier würde es dazu dienen, dass die am
meisten benachteiligten Mitglieder einer Gruppe durch Actions erreicht werden könnten
(Fredman, p. 18).
Fredman betont abschließend, dass die Anerkennung von Mehrfachdiskriminierung ein
wichtiger Schritt in die richtige Richtung ist.
2
EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program/European Roma Rights Center, Shadow Report Commenting on the
fifth periodic report of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted under Article 18 of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2004).
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FREDMAN, Sandra (2010): Positive Duties and Socio-economic Disadvantage:
bringing disadvantage onto the equality agenda, European Human Rights Law Review,
290-304.
Fredman befasst sich mit dem UK Equality Act 2010, der die Einführung einer positiven
Verpflichtung von Behörden zur Beachtung von Gleichstellung aufgrund des sozioökonomischen Status – genauer: sozio-ökonomischer Benachteiligung – vorsieht. Obwohl
Fredman sich nicht explizit mit Mehrfach- oder intersektionaler Benachteiligung oder
Diskriminierung im Aufsatz beschäftigt, gibt das Papier einige wichtige Hinweise auf diese
Themenfelder: Mehrebenenansatz; Hinweise auf Single-ground Fokus der Rspr; Probleme
der klassischen juristischen Beurteilung und der Rechtsschutzschwächen; Substantieller
Gleichheitsbegriff durch Menschenrechtssystem; Capability approach zu social in/exclusion
nach Sen.
Traditionell
werden
Verteilungsungleichheit
und
Ungleichheit,
die
auf
unerlaubten
Unterscheidungsmerkmalen Geschlecht, „Rasse“ usw beruhen getrennt voneinander
betrachtet.
Die
Berücksichtigung
Gleichbehandlungsrecht
hat
von
Kontroversen
sozio-ökonomischer
und
Benachteiligung
Unsicherheiten
in
der
im
Diskussion
hervorgebracht, zB über eine mögliche Einschränkung oder Verwässerung der Wirksamkeit
hinsichtlich der Diskriminierungsbekämpfung aufgrund der „traditionellen“ Gründe (Anm.
Immutability). Allerdings wird die Abgrenzung zwischen beiden Formen von Ungleichheit
immer problematischer, weil es wichtige Zusammenhänge zwischen beiden gibt (Hinweis
Intersektionalität). Diese Zusammenhänge zu ignorieren würde Maßnahmen auf beiden
Seiten negativ beeinflussen. Verteilungsmaßnahmen und Gleichbehandlungsmaßnahmen
(„status-based“) sollten daher nicht isoliert voneinander gesetzt werden. (p 2).
Der
Zusammenhang
ist
bidirektional.
Armut
ist
nicht
nur
ein
Phänomen
von
Verteilungsungleichheit, sie hat auch stigmatisierende Effekte, wie sie sonst eher den
„Status“ Ungleichheiten zugeschrieben werden. Wenn es zu Stigmatisierung kommt,
verstärkt sich die Armutstendenz. Umgekehrt haben Verteilungsmaßnahmen auch Einfluss
auf die „Status“ Ungleichheit. Hinweis auf Intersektionalität ist zB, dass Maßnahmen, die auf
dem Haushaltseinkommen beruhen, die Frage außer Acht lassen, ob dies auch den Frauen
im Haushalt nützt. Der Zusammenhang von sozialem Hintergrund und Statusungleichheit
aufgrund des Geschlechts oder der ethnischen Zugehörigkeit – insb. Hautfarbe – ist immens.
Fredman geht damit bereits auf verschiedene Arten von Intersektionalitäten ein: Zwischen
individuellen „Merkmalen“ („Status“) – Gender und ‘race’; zwischen Kategorien – class, ‘race’
and gender; zwischen Ebenen – Strukturebene (class) und individueller Ebene als auch
zwischen Repräsentationen (Rollen, Stigmata) und Strukturebene (p. 3).
Ein Abschnitt des Aufsatzes befasst sich mit sozio-ökonomischer Benachteiligung als
Diskriminierungsgrund. In mehrerlei Hinsicht hat dieser Diskriminierungsgrund eine andere
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Qualität. Die gängige Rechtsprechung hat Anerkennungsprobleme: Armut ist nicht mit
„Rasse“ vergleichbar: Während die Zugehörigkeit zu einer ethnischen Minderheit „discrete
and insular“ sei, ist das bei Armut nicht der Fall. Allerdings wird Armut als
Diskriminierungsgrund in Kanada unter dem Aspekt diskutiert, dass Armut oft jenseits der
Kontrolle des Individuums begründet liegt und es daher ein unfairer Unterscheidungsgrund
sei.
Ein weiterer Qualitätsunterschied ist die notwendige Asymmetrie. Bei Verteilungsfragen geht
es um Nachteile. Regeln sollten nicht dazu führen, dass privilegierte Personen positive
Maßnahmen
für
Unterprivilegierte
anfechten
können.
(Anm:
der
Verhältnismäßigkeitsmaßstab wäre jedenfalls anzuwenden).
Ein weiterer Unterschied ist in der Frage zu sehen, ob eine Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund
des sozio-ökonomischen Status stattfindet oder ob der Status selbst die Ungleichbehandlung
darstellt. Im ersten Fall könnte die Unterscheidung tatsächlich gleich wie alle anderen
verpönten Unterscheidungsmerkmale gehandhabt werden, im zweiten Fall stellt sich die
Frage gänzlich anders: wer hat Schuld? Die Gefahr besteht, schnell in einen ideologischen
Kontext zu geraten, nämlich hat die Gesellschaft (und als Repräsentant derer der Staat) eine
Verantwortung für Gleichstellung (equality) und Verteilungsgleichstellung? Fredman geht
offensichtlich davon aus. Das CESCR Komitee ebenfalls: Im 20. General Comment
(E/C.12/GC/20) wird verlangt, dass Vertragsstaaten „economic and social situation“ als
Diskriminierungsgrund untersagen, darüber hinaus verlangt CESCR Gleichstellungsresultate
und nicht lediglich prozessorientierte Standards (p. 4).
Fredman gibt eine knappe und präzise Darstellung der Einschränkungen des „complaintsled“ Modells: Es obliegt dem Opfer, sich gegen Diskriminierung zu wehren, das kann
mühsam und teuer sein, daher bleiben viele Fälle ohne Beschwerde. Der Rechtsschutz ist
retrospektiv, ereignisorientiert und individualisiert.
Was
verlangen
sozio-ökonomische
Gleichstellungsbestimmungen?
Resultate,
Chancengleichheit oder angemessene Berücksichtigung von Auswirkungen auf Betroffene?
(Diskussion S. 5). Das UK Recht sieht lediglich prozessorientierte Vorgaben vor („it is about
to
promote
equal
opportunities
–
achievement
is
not
required“),
angemessene
Berücksichtigung solle behördlichen Entscheidungen vorangehen, Entscheidung unterliegen
einer diesbezüglichen Rechtfertigungspflicht. Transparenz und Verhältnismäßigkeit müssen
gewährleistet
sein.
Die Entscheidung
hat die
Notwendigkeit
zur
Förderung
von
Chancengleichheit festzustellen, nicht jedoch ein bestimmtes Ergebnis herzustellen. Zur
Feststellung von Chancengleichheit schlägt Fredman Sen’s Capability Approach vor (p. 6).
[Anm: Die Einführung von sozialen Kategorien führt nahezu automatisch und „natürlich“ zu
einer Öffnung des Single-ground Ansatzes, aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Qualitäten, des
Zusammenspiels von sozio-ökonomischen und anderen Gründen und durch die Tatsache,
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dass sozio-ökonomische Gründe eher struktureller Ursache sind und damit indirekte
Diskriminierung darstellen mit den direkten Gründen interseggieren.]
In der Diskussion über den Ausschluss von Asylwerberinnen und anderen argumentiert
Fredman mit dem Menschenrechtssystem bzw. dem materiellen Gleichheitsbegriff: Die
Rechte auf Wohnen und auf soziale Sicherheit können unter Art 8 bzw. Art 1, ZP1
subsumiert werden, dann trifft ein Land, welches diese als Rechtsanspruch normiert, auch
das Diskriminierungsverbot des Art 14 (p. 8).
Was ist nun die Verpflichtung? Offensichtlich geht es nicht um einen Diskriminierungsgrund
„sozialer Status“ (class im engeren Sinne), sondern um die Ungerechtigkeit von Ungleichheit.
Das ist nicht klagbar, aber eine indirekte Diskriminierung kann von den Gerichten geprüft
werden, dabei haben die Entscheidungsbehörden klarzulegen, ob sie den sozialen Status
der durch die Entscheidung betroffenen Personen angemessen berücksichtigt haben (p. 10).
FRERICHS, Petra (2000): Klasse und Geschlecht als Kategorien sozialer Ungleichheit,
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 52, 36-59,
vgl.: http://www.springerlink.com/content/h5g3954485718256/fulltext.pdf
Frerichs bezieht sich auf das von ihr durchgeführte Forschungsprojekt “Klasse und
Geschlecht”.
Klasse und Geschlecht sind zwei zentrale Strukturkategorien moderner Gesellschaften.
Daneben führt Frerichs noch die Kategorie der Ethnizität an: Klasse und Geschlecht
begründen soziale Ungleichheiten (unterschiedliche Positionen in der Arbeitsteilung und
beim Zugang zu Ressourcen). Darüber hinaus wird durch die Kategorie Ethnizität eine „wir
und die anderen“ Ab- und Ausgrenzung begünstigt, die auch über Klassen hinweg erfolgt.
Zur
Verquickung
von
Klasse
und
Geschlecht
gibt
es
zwei
Generalhypothesen:
Geschlechtsklassenhypothese (Klassen existieren in geschlechtsspezifischen Ausprägungen
und Ausdifferenzierungen, Männer und Frauen bilden differente Klassenstrukturen) und
Klassengeschlechtshypothese (jede Klasse hat ihre eigenen Vorstellungen von Geschlecht).
(Frerichs p. 40)
Interviews mit vier Paaren in verschiedenen sozialen Positionen wurden durchgeführt.
Abgefragt wurden Kindheit, soziale Herkunft, Lebenslauf, Lebenszusammenhang und
Lebensstil, um daraus Rückschlüsse auf den Habitus der jeweiligen Person ziehen zu
können. (Frerichs S. 40) Die Paare sollten sich in ihrem Kapitalvermögen deutlich
voneinander
unterscheiden.
Arbeiterpaar,
Angestelltenpaar,
Lehrerpaar
und
ein
Managerpaar. Interviews wurden getrennt, aber zur gleichen Zeit in den Wohnungen der
Befragten geführt. Interviews waren offen und dauerten etwa fünf Stunden. Daneben wurde
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alles das möglicherweise von Relevanz war (Kleidungsstücke, Einrichtung, Haltung und
Verhalten der Befragten) notiert. Zusätzlich führten die Befragten über den Zeitraum von
einer Woche ein Zeitverwendungs- und Ausgabenprotokoll. (Frerichs p. 41)
Zusätzlich
wurde
ein
quantitativer
Teil
mit
einbezogen
(Frerichs
p.
42).
Die
Geschlechtsklassenhypothese zeigt hier, dass Frauen in vergleichbaren beruflichen
Positionen durchwegs gleiche oder höhere Bildungsabschlüsse haben als Männer, beim
Einkommen liegen sie allerdings weit unter den Männern. (Frerichs p. 45)
Interviews wurden nach Grundmuster der Habitusformen bei Vorstellungen vom “guten
Leben” ausgewertet. Dadurch konnte auch die Klassengeschlechtshypothese bestätigt
werden (Die interviewten Paare weisen gemeinsame Wertmuster, Orientierungen und
Geschmacksausprägungen auf). (Frerichs p. 56)
GOLDBERG, Suzanne B (2009): Intersectionality in Theory and Practice in: GRABHAM,
Emily, COOPER, Davina, KRISHNADAS, Jane and HERMAN, Didi (Hg.) (2009):
Intersectionality and beyond: law, power and the politics of location, Oxford,
Routledge-Cavendish.
Goldberg uses the term ‘intersectional’ broadly to cover additive claims and maybe all multidimensional claims. Goldberg begins by pointing out that intersectionality runs into problems
as it seems to drift into smaller and smaller units of intersection. (Goldberg p. 7)
The article’s real contribution, however, comes from its attempt to discuss intersectionality in
terms of law cases, lawyering, legal strategies and other practical matters. In short, it seems
that those US law reform organisations that work with what might be described as
intersectional claims, couple a conceptually conservative approach with innovative practical
strategies:
“Although advocates share with theorists a desire for a world free of identity-based
harms, the bulk of their work, including their cross-identity projects, treats identity
categories as stable and embraces widely recognized distinctions among them rather
than attempting to destabilize their boundaries. When viewed through the theorists’
vision, advocates’ aims seem far less transformative and radical than they might
otherwise appear.
At the same time, however, advocates work with these purportedly stable categories in
litigation in strategic, instrumental, and dynamic way, suggesting that the variable and
contingent use of identity categories may be as important to our understanding of
identity as the content of the categories themselves. More specifically, concentrating on
the multiple roles and functions of identity categories may be a useful move for new
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theorizing about how the meaning and boundaries of identity categories take shape.”
(Goldberg, p. 126)
Intersectional claims are shaped by the needs of the advocacy groups even before they
reach the courts. Some of this is second-guessing what will succeed in court, but some of it
is simply that groups want to take on claims that advance their particular interests. Note that
these groups tend to be single-issue/single-identity groups, and in a way that rather mirrors
the law’s ideas about this – for example, treating these categories as stable even though
they can actually be broken down in a number of ways for different purposes. (Goldberg p.
125) Groups may work together, however, to address different aspects of an intersectional
claim. (Goldberg p. 127)
Goldberg suggests a few preliminary reasons to explain why legal advocacy groups continue
to work in the single-identity framework: 1). Although identity is complex, the singlecharacteristic approach is still socially salient (Goldberg p. 130). 2) By the time
intersectionality had become a mainstream concern, these single-characteristic groups were
already set up and working. This is related to other issues such as how funding is allocated
and the need for new groups to present themselves in a certain way in order to fit into the
current legal advocacy landscape (Goldberg pp. 130-131). 3) Law itself has a single-identity
focus, so it makes sense for advocacy groups to work with it as well. (Goldberg p. 132)
However, as noted above, sometimes groups do work together to address more than one
characteristic in an intersectional claim. Goldberg notes that the question of resources is
often critical here, (Goldberg p. 133) but she also identifies the “expressive functions” as
being of equal importance:
“Specifically, a leading function of amicus briefs is to communicate an organization’s
position, not only to the court but also to constituents and the broader public.”
(Goldberg p. 133 – reference omitted)
Groups will, then, balance the costs and benefits in terms of funds and reputation in order to
decide whether to participate in cross-category actions.
Goldberg identifies four interrelated “interests” that shape cross-identity relationships, which
she then proceeds to discuss in some detail:
1) The legitimation interest
2) The civil-rights friendly environment interest
3) The mutual interests in effective antidiscrimination law
4) The overlapping identities (Goldberg p. 136)
Goldberg points out that the reasons for advocacy groups taking on cross-identity claims are
not really aligned with intersectional theory. That is, the focus is on interests rather than
identity theory. (Goldberg p. 143)
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She goes on to note, though, that theory and practice are now converging, at least to some
extent. (Goldberg p. 143)
“Broadly speaking, cross-identity practice may signal ways to move beyond the
challenge that infinite complexity has posed for efforts to create a grand theory in this
area. At the same time, intersectionality theories offer important challenges for identitybased advocates’ relatively passive acceptance of the existing identity categories
paradigm.” (Goldberg pp. 136-137)
Intersectional theory is not all good news for advocacy groups, though, as it puts into
question their reliance on stable identity categories and so makes these claims less firm in
legal terms:
“To determine whether a party before the court is entitled to a remedy, for example, a
judge must first decide whether that party falls within a protected category. If the
category lacks clear boundaries, this task becomes difficult, if not impossible, for a
court to fulfil.” (Goldberg p. 144)
Advocacy groups could be thought of as using identity issues when and insofar as it suits
them to achieve their ends. (Goldberg p. 144)
“Identity theorists might also explore the move made in intersectional practice –
especially in connection with the overlapping identities interest – away from the
problematization of identity categories and toward expanding the conceptualization of
existing antidiscrimination principles to broaden restrictions on would-be discriminators.
A move in this direction could nicely compliment ongoing efforts to deconstruct the
ways in which identity categories are used systematically to subordinate marginalized
populations.” (Goldberg p. 145)
And on the other side:
“Advocates can likewise benefit from the insights of intersectional theorist, who have
observed, repeatedly, that to accept overly simplistic categories is to obscure lived
experience. Current cross-identity practices, as outlined above, do little to contest the
law’s tendency toward oversimplification.” (Goldberg, p. 145)
This does not sound particularly useful, however, until Goldberg spells out the long-term
benefits in the conclusion:
“As identity theory suggests, well-rounded protection can be achieved only by pressing
courts to understand the analytic error in treating identity categories as independent of
one another. By demonstrating, time after time, in brief after brief, that an individual
does not exist as a person with a ‘race’ in isolation from sex or sexual orientation, for
example, advocates could go a long way toward pushing back against and perhaps
even redirecting the judicial orientation toward simplification. Courts have little incentive
to do this themselves ... But if advocates were even to avoid some of the unnecessary
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reification of identity boundaries ... the project of cross-identity litigation would be more
profoundly transformative of the law and, likely, more protective of broader, more
complex identities.” (Goldberg pp. 145-146)
In short, the conclusion seems to be that it is up to advocates whether to be an active part of
the acknowledgement of intersectional theory and/or the complexity of identity, or whether to
take a conservative approach and continue to work largely within the single-identity
framework.
GRABHAM, Emily (2009): Intersectionality: Traumatic Impressions, in GRABHAM,
Emily, COOPER, Davina, KRISHNADAS, Jane and HERMAN, Didi (Hg.):
Intersectionality and beyond: law, power and the politics of location, Oxford,
Routledge-Cavendish.
Grabham discusses intersectionality primarily in terms of identity and whether it rather paints
itself into a corner, even while avoiding some traditional, limiting essentialist accounts.
(Grabham pp. 183 – 185) She hopes to overcome this through a reconsideration of Wendy
Brown’s analysis of “pain” and “injury”.3
“I argue that by investigating ‘trauma’ as the mundane experience of subjects under
liberalism, it is possible to develop a picture of intersectionality which does not rely on
governmentally produced identity categories.” (Grabham p. 186)
Grabham outlines the case-study of M, in which she attempted to craft an intersectional
discrimination claim, but with limited success. This particularly raised the question of how
and whether the law can deal with more complex versions of identity. (Grabham pp. 188-189)
Grabham now turns to the question of trauma and Brown’s theory that identity constructions
contribute to subservience and patterns of powerlessness. (Grabham p. 189) Brown uses the
concept of ‘resentment’ (in a recognisably Nietzschean way):
“All liberal subjects are situated within a realm that promises them equality – promises
them the conditions in which they can realise their dreams, and presumes that they
have the capacities to do so, but which is actually underpinned by a variety of social
inequalities that prevent them from achieving this.” (Grabham p. 189)
Identity constructed through resentment is locked in a relation with the oppressive conditions
against which it struggles – it is dependent on these conditions to exist and so has real
problems in overcoming them. (Grabham pp. 189 – 190) Nietzsche’s advice was to ‘forget’
but Brown instead argues for a shift from ‘being’ to ‘wanting’. (Grabham p. 190)
3
Wendy Brown (1995) States of Inquiry: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, Princeton University Press,
New Jersey
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Grabham argues that presenting intersectional claims to the legal sphere is an expressions
of resentment – externalising the pain etc. (Grabham p. 190) Further, she thinks
intersectionality is conceptually conservative in that it relies on the axes (the categories)
existing outside of particular combinations. (Grabham p. 191)
“On the one hand, intersectionality analysis is presented as a challenge to abstract and
depoliticised theories of identity formation... On the other hand, many forms of
intersectional analysis, and especially the way that I applied intersectionality to law in
M.’s case, do not interrogate social positions as effects of power.” (Grabham pp. 191192)
And further:
“Viewing intersectional analysis in the context of the genealogy of identity claims in
liberal society gives us more of an understanding, why it has not had the radical effects
in discrimination law that we might have wished for. If single-ground rights claims are
based on disciplinary identities, then intersectional rights claims (and many forms of
legal intersectional analysis) are no less bound to these categories. Using more
categories in legal analysis, or focusing on the intersections between legal categories,
does not of itself challenge the regulatory function of liberal identity.” (Grabham p. 192)
Intersectionality becomes merely a new kind of identity recognised at law, rather than
challenging the law’s restrictive use and ideas of identity in a fundamental way. (Grabham
pp. 192-193)
“Not only does intersectionality analysis in law fail to challenge categories, therefore, it
actually deepens and extends the law’s impetus towards the regulatory production of
identities. Intersectionality, on these terms, helps to produce the legal ‘truth’ of
inequalities through classification.” (Grabham p. 193)
Grabham now turns to Ann Cvetkovich’s work on trauma.4 In short, “Cvetkovich presents a
sex-positive approach to trauma, which focuses on the experiences of women, queers,
butches, femmes and Aids activists.” (Grabham p. 194)
“Where resentment aims to overcome the hurt, find a ‘culprit’ and displace the hurt
through assigning it to an external site..., Cvetkovich’s examples of trauma combine
responses to the hurt of anger and aggression with counter-cultural sexual practices or
politicised music, comedy or writing.” (Grabham p. 196)
She then discusses Sara Ahmed’s work on impressions.5
“In effect, impressions describe how emotions are socially and historically mediated,
and how they reside outside the individual subject.” (Grabham p. 197)
And further:
4
Ann Cvetkovich (2003) An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality and Lesbian Public Cultures Duke
University Press, Durham NC
5
Sara Ahmed (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotion Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, UK
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“Impression, as combinations of sensation and emotions, shape the movements of our
bodies towards and away from objects and each other in ways that replay racism,
colonialism and rigid gender norms.” (Grabham p. 198)
Tying this to intersectionality:
“...if emotions function as affective economies, then paying attention to the impressions
that subjects make on one another can allow for a political reading of encounters that
goes beyond the individual subject and beyond the law’s construction of individuals
through disciplinary identities. With this in mind, describing M.’s experience in legal
terms as ‘intersectional’ invokes her identity as a Tran’s woman and a lesbian but it
says nothing about the productive force of the encounter between her and her
colleague in aligning her body, through hate and fear, as a threat.” (Grabham p. 198)
Grabham now moves to her conclusion:
“Intersectionality has been an important contribution to feminist legal theory, in
particular, leading to much work that interrogates the silences, invisibilities and
oppressive effects of law on racialised subjects in particular. Yet the more disciplining
aspects of intersectionality discourse have been overlooked. Intersectionality is now
arguably the product of the law’s classifying impulse to the extent that focusing on the
‘intersections’ has merely resulted in the disciplinary production of more identities.”
(Grabham, p. 199)
And:
“However, by investigating trauma as a mundane state of being, produced across
physical and emotional encounters, it is possible to approach the complexity of
inequalities without prioritising governmentally produced identity categories and without
thereby contributing to the production of ‘new’ categories.” (Grabham p. 199)
Grabham notes that she is “...not necessarily interested in what this ‘means’ for the conduct
of legal cases.” (Grabham p. 199)
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HANNETT, Sarah (2003): Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial
Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination, 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 65-86
A)
The suggestion is that discrimination should be thought of in terms of disadvantage rather
than difference. (Hannett p. 9)
As an illustration of the comparator problem she cites the case of a homosexual airman who
had to resign. He had to be compared to a lesbian and then it was seen that the treatment
would have been the same and so no discrimination was found.
Hannett mentions some signs of change in this area at least – so simple sex discrimination is
possible and, in the case of pregnant women, there is no need for a ‘pregnant man’ as a
comparator:
“In Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd the House of Lords held that less favourable
treatment on the basis of pregnancy must generally amount to discrimination on the
basis of sex, with no need for comparison with a man.” (Hannett p. 11)
Concise summary (footnotes omitted):
“The underpinning ideology of the anti-discrimination statutes, formal equality, or
equality of treatment, may be insufficient to tackle such disadvantage. The statutes are
individualistic: they demand an individual claimant, and award an individual remedy.
Inherent in the scatter-gun approach of current anti-discrimination law is the idea that
‘what is complained about is abnormal.’ This cannot provide acknowledgement or
redress for institutionalized or structural discrimination. Similarly, the symmetrical
nature of the statutes reflects the ideology of equal treatment: discrimination against
men is as impugned as discrimination against women; discrimination against whites is
as deserving of censure as discrimination against ethnic minorities. Accordingly, the
‘legislation is framed in terms of difference rather than disadvantage: it constructs the
problem to be tackled as ‘race’ and sex discrimination, rather than as discrimination
against and disadvantage of women and certain ethnic groups’. This model prevents a
remedial response targeted at disadvantage. Thus although a united anti-discrimination
statute may be one mechanism by which the problems of a claim of multiple
discrimination can be alleviated, the difficulties of those who attempt to claim multiple
discrimination are merely a further illustration of the lack of transformative potential of
an anti-discrimination regime premised on equality of opportunity.” (Hannett p. 12)
Hannett is, then, not in favour of symmetry in anti-discrimination laws. Also, she wants
recognition of the structural, institutional aspects of discrimination, rather than simply
focusing on the different personal characteristics of the person suffering discrimination.
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B)
Hannett
unterscheidet
nach
Crenshaw
zwischen
additiver
und
intersektioneller
Diskriminierung. Beide beziehen sich auf Diskriminierungen aufgrund unterschiedlicher
sozialer Charakteristika. Erstere bezeichnet Diskriminierungen, die Individuen betreffen, die
verschiedenen, diskriminierenden Praktiken ausgesetzten Gruppen angehören. Letztere
entsteht
durch
eine
unteilbare
Kombination
von
unterschiedlichen
Unterwerfungsmechanismen. Durch diese Form der Diskriminierung wird etwas Neues,
Einzigartiges,
von
eindimensionalen
Diskriminierungen
Unterschiedliches.
In
einer
essentialistischen Welt kann intersektionelle Diskriminierung nicht geklagt werden, schreibt
Hannett (S 3).
Der „allgegenwärtige“ weiße, männlich „Normkomparator“ und die Idee des „One-size-fitsall“,
welche
annimmt,
dass
Gruppen
homogen
sind
und
daher
einheitliche
gruppenspezifische Rechtsmittel existieren, macht (intersektionelle) Benachteiligungen
„unsichtbar“ (hidden). Strukturelle Benachteiligungen sind inhomogen und dadurch werden
spezifische intersektionelle Benachteiligungen übersehen.
Hannett’s Beitrag ist trotz inzwischen geänderter Rechtslage von großer Bedeutung. Hannett
analysiert anhand praktischer Fälle das Problem der Rechtsdurchsetzung in Fällen von
Intersektionalität und strukturiert die unterschiedlichen Probleme. So argumentiert sie, dass
im Fall des Zusammentreffens von direkter und indirekter Diskriminierung aus zwei
unterschiedlichen „Gründen“, die indirekte Diskriminierung große Beweisprobleme aufwirft.
Die einfache Regel, dass eine Bestimmung zu erfüllen, in der betroffenen Gruppe und in der
Vergleichsgruppe gleich wahrscheinlich sein muss, ist praktisch kaum bestimmbar oder
messbar, hängt von der Möglichkeit ab, eine Vergleichsgruppe definieren zu können und
zeitigt in intersektionellen Fälle reine Zufallsergebnisse.
Eine Kategorie von Fällen sind „under-inclusive cases“. Dabei sind Fälle zu unterscheiden, in
denen (einzelne) „Gründe“ nicht vom Gesetz geschützt sind, das Zusammenfallen von
Gründen nicht durch das Gesetz geschützt ist oder die Gerichte die Art des Schadens (type
of harm) nicht dem geschützten Grund zurechnen bzw. den Zusammenhang oder die
Kausalität ablehnen (S 8).
Ist es wichtig, ob die tatsächliche Diskriminierung und diejenige, die vom Gericht festgestellt
wird ident sind? Für Hannett ist dies eine grundlegende Frage der Gerechtigkeit von
Rechtssprechung und ist mit „ja“ zu beantworten (S 9). Hannett schlägt vor, in
intersektionellen Fällen, insbesondere in mittelbaren und strukturellen Benachteiligungen
immer die Frage zu beantworten, wem die Benachteiligung nützt. Während formale
Gleichheit symmetrisch ist, ist substantielle Ungleichheit asymmetrisch. Der qualitative
Unterschied liegt in der historischen Benachteiligung durch die Diskriminierung, es ist eben
ein sozialer Nachteil, kein Nachteil aus unmittelbarer Ungleichbehandlung (S 9).
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Die Vergleichsperson ist für Hannett ein prinzipiell zu überdenkendes Konstrukt. Erstens
steht hinter den Vergleichen immer eine „Normperson“. Zweitens werden bei der Auswahl
(zu) oft irrelevante Faktoren herangezogen und außerdem ist es nicht immer angemessen,
(scheinbar) Gleiches auch gleich zu behandeln, wenn zB Faktoren zu berücksichtigen
wären, die vor dem Gesetz jedoch formal keine anerkannten Faktoren sind. Hannett
verwendet sexuelle Orientierung zur Erklärung ihrer Überlegungen. Sie bezeichnet Fälle von
sexueller Orientierung zumeist als im- oder explizit intersektionell (mit Gender), womit sich
freilich die Frage stellt, wer ist die Vergleichsperson, homosexuell vom anderen Geschlecht,
heterosexuell vom gleichen Geschlecht oder die „Normperson“?
JACOB, Jutta, KÖBSELL, Swantje, WOLLRAD, Eske (Hg.) (2010): Gendering Disability.
Intersektionale Aspekte von Behinderung und Geschlecht, Bielefeld, Transcript
Verlag.
Wie Hutson ausführt (zitiert in Jacob et. al. p. 66), entsteht die Mehrfachverletzbarkeit aus
den entsprechenden Gesellschaftsstrukturen heraus. Das heißt, eine Person mag mehrfach
verletzbar sein, auch wenn sie es selbst nicht so wahrnimmt und auch wenn es nicht die
Absicht des Gegenübers ist, sie zu verletzen.
Zinsmeier zeigt auf (zitiert in Jacob et al p. 114 ff.), wie durch die intersektionale Analyse
statistischer
Daten
die
Häufigkeit
von
Diskriminierungsrisiken
von
bestimmten
Bevölkerungsgruppen bestimmt werden kann. Nicht jede soziale Ungleichheit ist rechtlich
relevant. Hierfür reicht es nicht aus, soziale Lebenslagen zu vergleichen (Jacob et al p. 118).
Hierbei geht es um einzelne Handlungen. Nicht jede Ungleichbehandlung ist eine rechtliche
Benachteiligung. Um die Intersektionalität einer betroffenen Person in einem speziellen
Einzelfall ausreichend berücksichtigen zu können, wird es notwendig, statistische Daten mit
einzubeziehen.
Ein
Beispiel
wäre
die
gerichtlich
angeordnete
Sterilisation
einwilligungsunwilliger betreuter Personen: Es müssen statistische Daten mit einbezogen
werden, wer von solchen verordneten Sterilisationen besonders betroffen ist, und ein
Vergleich
mit
der
Entscheidung
von
einwilligungsfähigen
betreuten
Personen
in
vergleichbarer Situation gezogen werden. Zinsmeier legt außerdem dar, wo intersektionale
Aspekte im deutschen Recht bereits berücksichtigt werden.
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KERNER, Ina (2009): Alles intersektional? Zum Verhältnis von Rassismus und
Sexismus, Feministische Studien 1/2009, 36-50,
vgl.: http://www.feministische-studien.de/fileadmin/download/pdf/Kerner1_09.pdf
Kerner unterscheidet im Bereich Rassismus und Sexismus drei Dimensionen: Eine
epistemische Dimension (Wissen und Diskurse, Symbole und Bilder zu Rassismus und
Sexismus), eine institutionelle Dimension (institutionalisierte Formen von Rassismus und
Sexismus, die strukturelle Diskriminierung bewirken) und eine personale Dimension
(Identität, individuelle Einstellungen, individuelle Handlungen und Interaktion). (Kerner p. 36)
Rassismus und Sexismus sind komplexe Machtphänomene, sie funktionieren unter Rekurs
auf körperliche Merkmale und sind daher naturalisierende Differenzzuschreibungen, etwa im
Gegensatz zu Klasse. (Kerner p. 37)
Um das Verhältnis von Rassismus und Sexismus darzulegen, schlägt Kerner vier Modi vor:
Ähnlichkeiten, Unterschiede, Koppelungen, Verflechtungen/Intersektionen. (Kerner p. 38)
1. Ähnlichkeiten:
Bei
beiden
werden
kategoriale
Unterschiede
konstruiert.
Verquickungen gibt es auch hier, indem z.B. Gehirne weißer Frauen mit denen nichtweißer
Männer
verglichen
werden
und
beiden
eine
geringere
Intelligenz
zugeschrieben wird. (Kerner p. 40)
2. Unterschiede: Sexistische Geschlechternormen sind reproduktionszentriert (Kerner p.
42), d.h. sie sollen die Reproduktion steigern. Rassistische Diskurse über dieses
Thema dienen dazu, Vermischungen zwischen “Rassen” zu verhindern.
3. Koppelungen: Sexistische Sorge um Reproduktion und rassistische Sorge um
Homogenität
können
sich
verknüpfen.
Z.B.
Förderung
der
Erhöhung
der
Geburtenrate von Inländerinnen und gleichzeitig restriktive Einwanderungspolitik.
Oder auch die “Ethnisierung des Sexismus”, in dem die anderen als noch sexistischer
als man selbst angesehen werden. (Kerner p. 44)
4. Intersektionen: Kerner entwickelt Intersektionen von Rassismus und Sexismus, die
eine epistemische, eine institutionelle und eine personale Dimension umfassen.
•
Epistemische
Dimension:
vergeschlechtlichte
rassifizierte
Rassevorstellungen
(z.B.
Geschlechtsnormen
Unterschiede
und
schwarzer
Weiblichkeit im Vergleich zu weißen Frauen, aber auch Unterschiede in den
Zuschreibungen zwischen schwarzen Männern und schwarzen Frauen).
(Kerner p. 47f.)
•
Institutionelle
Dimension:
Ineinandergreifen
der
Bedingungen
am
Arbeitsmarkt, familiärer Strukturen und bildungspolitische Situation (daraus
resultiert z.B. keine traditionelle Frauenrolle für Afroamerikanerinnen). (Kerner
p. 48)
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•
Personale Dimension: Verschränkung der Entwicklung von geschlechtlichen
und personalen Identitätsprozessen. (Kerner p. 48)
KLINGER, Cornelia, KNAPP, Gudrun-Axeli (2007): Achsen der Ungleichheit – Achsen
der Differenz: Verhältnisbestimmungen von Klasse, Geschlecht, „Rasse“/Ethnizität,
in: KLINGER, Cornelia, KNAPP, Gudrun-Axeli, SAUER, Birgit (Hg): Achsen der
Ungleichheit. Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht und Ethnizität, Frankfurt.
Klinger/Knapp schlagen zur Erforschung von Fragen sozialer Ungleichheit einen interkategorialen Ansatz vor. Die zentralen Fragestellungen sind demnach das Verhältnis von
Kontinuität und Wandel in den Formen von Ungleichheit einerseits und das Verständnis der
für die Gegenwartsgesellschaft relevanten Strukturgeber von Ungleichheit. Klinger/Knapp
identifizieren dazu die Achsen von Klasse, Ethnizität und Geschlecht als unterschiedliche,
aber miteinander in Wechselwirkung stehende Strukturzusammenhänge und plädieren für
die Entwicklung einer integrierten und kategorial erweiterten Analyse von Ungleichheit. Sie
betonen, dass Ungleichheit weder vorübergehende Erscheinung noch marginale Anomalie
der Gesellschaft sind (p. 19).
Ungleichheit ist funktional und besitzt systemischen und systematischen Charakter.
Klinger/Knapp beziehen sich auf eine moderne kapitalistisch organisierte Gesellschaft. Diese
Gesellschaft kann einerseits Gleichheit nicht herstellen und andererseits permanente und
persistente Ungleichheit nicht begründen oder rechtfertigen. Weiters wählen sie drei Achsen
der Ungleichheit, Klasse, Ethnizität und Geschlecht, weil diese alle Formen von
Gesellschaften nachhaltig prägen. Die Auswahl erfolgt vor dem Hintergrund aktueller
Problemlagen
und
weil
die
Achsen
in
die
Geschichte
der
gegenwärtigen
Gesellschaftsformation verweisen. Damit dienen sie als mögliche Unterscheidungen ebenso
wie als tatsächliche, begründet in der historischen Gesellschaftsentwicklung (p. 27). Die
Achsen der Ungleichheit sind Verhältnisse, in denen Personen leben.
Klinger/Knapp
verbinden
drei
Schulen
miteinander,
Ungleichheitssoziologie,
Gesellschaftstheorie und Gender-, (neue) Class- und (Critical) Race-Studies, um
„strukturierte Ungleichheit“ zu beschreiben, aber auch und vor allem zu erklären. Die
theoretische Anbindung erfolgt an die Kritische Theorie, wobei der Ansatz um die
systematisch integrierte Perspektive aller drei Achsen erweitert wird (p. 31). Damit
argumentieren Klinger/Knapp für einen Ansatz auf der gesellschaftlichen Makroebene und
wenden sich gegen die „Vereigenschaftlichung/Personalisierung und Privatisierung“
insbesondere
des
Geschlechts
als
eine
„Einhegung“
eines
gesellschaftlichen
Spannungsverhältnisses (p.S 32). Geschlecht und „Rasse“ sind sozial konstruierte
Kategorien und keine biologischen (biologistischen) „Natürlichkeiten“ (p. 33). Sie sind
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gesellschaftliche Strukturgeber (p.S 34). Beide zusammen werden selten in Frage gestellt,
alle drei Achsen gemeinsam wurden von der Theorie bis in die 1980er Jahre kaum
behandelt, anschließend fand der Diskurs eher auf der individuellen (mikro- bis
mesotheoretischen) Ebene statt. Dabei werden die Kategorien eher als Identitätskategorien
aufgefasst und auf der Subjektebene angesiedelt. Die Frage steht im Vordergrund, wie die
Individuen durch ihre Zugehörigkeit zu einem Geschlecht, einer Klasse oder einer Ethnie
betroffen sind. Der Fokus liegt auf Identität und Diskriminierung und vernachlässigt die
makrotheoretische Perspektive auf Achsen der Ungleichheit (p. 36).
Die Eigenständigkeit der Kategorien und ihr Zusammenhang müssen gleichzeitig bestimmt
werden (p. 37).
Anmerkung: Wir finden uns wieder in der Problematik, ob Diskriminierungsrecht auch
Gleichstellungsrecht ist (sein soll) bzw. wie weit es das ist. Als Gleichstellungsrecht hat der
Fokus auf gesellschaftlich strukturierte Ungleichheitskategorien gerichtet zu sein, dann kann
ein Gleichbehandlungsrecht im Einzelfall zur gesellschaftlichen Gleichheit beitragen. Als
Gleichbehandlungsrecht muss es logisch und konsistent auf Ereignisse und Individuen,
allenfalls auf Identitäten bzw. Identitätsmerkmale rekurrieren und symmetrisch sein, um dem
formalen Gleichheitsgebot gerecht zu werden. Die Frage ist, ob eine Kombination möglich
ist, tatsächlich handelt es sich ja um eine Kombination aus Gleichstellungs- und
Gleichbehandlungsrecht, das nicht nur aufgrund des Hinweises, der durch das Verbot
sowohl direkter als auch indirekter Benachteiligung gegeben wird.
KNAPP, Gudrun-Axeli (2005): Intersectionality – Ein neues Paradigma feministischer
Theorie? Zur transatlantischen Reise von Race, Class, Gender, Feministische Studien
23, 68-81.
Begriffe
der
Gegenwartsdiagnostik
sind
aufschlussreich.
In
der
feministischen
Gesellschaftsanalyse taucht der Begriff der Paradoxie auf. Der Begriff Paradoxie hat den
früher üblichen Begriff Widerspruch ersetzt. Dies kann entweder ein Hinweis darauf sein,
dass sich gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse verändert haben oder bewusst geschehen, um einen
Lern- oder Aufklärungsprozess in Gang zu setzen. (Knapp p. 2)
Interessant und aufschlussreich sind Knapps Dilemmata (Knapp p. 8 f.):
1. Gleichheitsdilemma: Gleichbehandlung Ungleicher führt zur Fortschreibung von
Ungleichheit, Differenz wird unsichtbar gemacht.
2. Differenzdilemma: Betonung von Differenzen schreiben Gründe für Diskriminierungen fort.
3. Identitätsdilemma: Annahme von Gruppen-Identitäten blendet Nicht-Identisches innerhalb
einer Gruppe aus.
Die Lösung dafür ist nach Knapp der Intersektionalitätsansatz. (Knapp p. 16)
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KUHAR, Roman (2009): At the Crossroads of Discrimination. Multiple und
intersectional discrimination, Peace Institute, Ljubljana,
vgl.:
http://www.mirovniinstitut.si/data/tinymce/Publikacije/Na%20kriziscih%20diskriminacije/At%20the%20Cro
ssroads%20of%20Discrimination.pdf
Diskriminierung wird als Praxis von Ungleichheit beschrieben. (Kuhar p. 15) In der EU sind
sechs Diskriminierungsgründe im Vergleich zu einer Normperson festgelegt.
Formen von Diskriminierung: Es gibt direkte und indirekte, individuelle und strukturelle
Diskriminierung,
Belästigung,
soziale
Exklusion,
Viktimisierung,
ethnic
profiling,
Diskriminierung durch Einrichtungen, Aufforderung zur Diskriminierung und Hassrede.
Diskriminierung geschieht häufig auch über Sprache. (Kuhar p. 19 f.)
Kuhar zeigt den Unterschied zwischen mehrfacher und intersektionaler Diskriminierung auf.
(Kuhar p. 34 f.)
Nach Verloo gibt es drei Dimensionen: Die Möglichkeit der Wahl, Sichtbarkeit und die
Wahrscheinlichkeit der Veränderung. (zitiert in Kuhar p. 36)
ForscherInnen führten 21 semi-strukturierte Interviews durch: Im ersten Teil konzentrierte
man sich auf Intersektionalität von Identität, der zweite Teil fragte nach der Bedeutung einer
bestimmten
Identität
im
Umfeld
der
befragten
Personen
und
nach
konkreten
Diskriminierungserfahrungen in Zusammenhang mit dieser Identität. Der dritte Teil versuchte
intersektionale Diskriminierungserfahrungen aufzuzeigen. (Kuhar p. 62 f.) Die Personen
wurden auch dahingehend befragt, wie ihr Leben wohl aussähe, wenn sie eine ihrer
Identitäten nicht hätten. Im vierten Teil fragte man nach der Position der jeweiligen Person in
ihrer Gruppe. Auch Kenntnisse über policies wurden erfragt (Kuhar p. 64). Darüber hinaus
wurden Fokusgruppeninterviews mit ExpertInnen durchgeführt.
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Angst, Probleme
Stereotype,
Vorurteile
Normperson
Attribute zuweisen
Person A
“wir; positiv”
Person B
“die anderen;
negativ”
Distanz
Soziale Exklusion
Belästigung
Viktimisierung
Ethn. profiling
Diskriminierung durch
Einrichtungen
Vorurteile
werden bestätigt
Self fulfilling
prophecy
LUTZ, Mark A. (2001): On the Norm of Equality, International Journal of Social
Economics; 2001; 28, 10-12, 782
Philosophy has a number of different notions of equality. Here Lutz’s interest is in
“descriptive” equality.
The claim that humans are ‘by nature’ equal, points to the idea that there is a kind of
“particular (non material) essence in the sense of an essential human characteristic that is
said to be common to all persons.” (Lutz p. 783) Several different varieties of this approach
exist:
1) The notion of a common humanity inherent to all. Lutz here cites Reck and Adler and
references Kant: “’Humanity’ for him is not a person but in a person.” He also points
out that this is linked to the next category of moral capacity. (Lutz pp. 783 – 784)
2) Human equality based on a common moral capacity. Again Kant, but not only Kant
held this view. Rawls is a prominent modern day thinker in this group. Lutz also cites
Coons and Brennan and their theory of “double equality”, which means that “a host
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property that could in principle be variable by degree, but in fact is not so.” They
propose that this “double equality” is our shared moral capacity. (Lutz p. 784)
3) Human equality based on equal human dignity. This is opposed to instrumental worth.
It is thus differentiated from merit (Hayek) and rationality (in terms of rational capacity
etc). Again Kant is a key historical thinker here, linking dignity to moral autonomy etc.
As a more modern source of this idea, Lutz cites David Thompson’s use of G K
Chesterton using the example of a penny: some pennies are dull, some are bright,
but they all have equal value. (Lutz p. 785 – 786)
4) Human equality based on equal human rights. Equal human rights can be either
based on natural law or on human equality. Locke is cited as the historical figure here
for the natural law approach and Kant, again, for the approach that takes equal
human rights to follow from the “metaphysical propositions of a common humanity,
moral capacity and especially human dignity.” The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights also takes this approach. (Lutz p. 786)
In contrast to all of these, there is the human–equality-as-a-norm idea that grew during the
19th century, so that it is not an “asserted fact, but a postulated ideal ... based in convention,
not nature.” (Lutz p. 786) In the 20th century this took on other forms such as Bernard
Williams’ use of the linguistic method. “According to this social logic, ‘the proper ground for
distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth’” (Lutz p. 787)
However, Lutz cites Guttmann’s objection of relativism. “For example, needs have not always
been understood as rights to their fulfilment”. (Lutz p. 787)
He also points out that pragmatism is a problem for equality as what if it does not promote
other ends such as democracy or liberty? (Lutz p. 788) Posner cited as wanting law to do
away with “relentless prating about such intangibles as the promotion of human dignity, the
securing of justice and fairness”. (Lutz p788)
“More constructively, on the perennial question of just what human beings ‘really’ are,
we are told that it is an issue that can only be understood and argued within a particular
community or tradition sharing a common language and culture of their own, that
human equality must be conversationally , not ontologically based; that whatever
objectivity that term has, will be owed to cultural uniformity rather than metaphysical
reality; that there are no normative concepts enjoying specific meanings able to
transcend time and place.” (Lutz p. 788)
Lutz expresses real concern about using a pragmatist version of equality; leaving it up to
chance that consensus can be reached: “If questions of equality cannot be guided by
reasoned argument, they may have to be left to power and conquest.” (Lutz p. 788)
The discussion then turns to the relation of descriptive equality to normative equality. Lutz
suggests thinking of equality as a presumption rather than a postulate. (Lutz p. 789)
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“In law, a presumption is an inference that a fact exists, and is based on a prior
establishing of other facts.” (Lutz p. 789)
MAKKONEN, Timo (2002): Multiple, Compound and Intersectional Discrimination:
bringing the experiences of the most marginalized to force, Institute for Human Rights,
Åbo Akademi University, April 2002,
vgl.: www.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/timo.pdf
Makkonens Artikel ist so weit ersichtlich der erste, der versucht, die rechtlichen
Möglichkeiten zur Bekämpfung von intersektionaler Diskriminierung auszuloten und
Definitionen für die unterschiedlichen Formen anzubieten.
Im ersten Teil wird ein konzeptioneller Rahmen entworfen und das Wesen des rechtlichen
Diskriminierungsgedankens samt Formen, „Gründen“ und Motivationen bzw. persönlichen
Bewältigungsstrategien beschrieben.
Makkonen
unterscheidet
zum
einen
zwischen
stereotypisierten Zuschreibungen und tatsächlichen Unterscheidungen als Begründungen für
Benachteiligungen. Weiters unterscheidet er zwischen direkter, indirekter als auch
institutioneller und institutionalisierter Diskriminierung. Letztere unterscheiden sich dadurch,
ob sie eine Absicht verfolgen oder unabsichtlich wirken. Institutionelle Diskriminierung
beschreibt er als Strukturen, die bestimmte Merkmale benachteiligen bzw. benachteiligende
Effekte für TrägerInnen dieser Merkmale bewirken. (Anmerkung: im europ. AntiDiskriminierungsrecht werden strukturelle, institutionelle, indirekte und institutionalisierte
Formen unter dem Tatbestand der mittelbaren (indirekten) Diskriminierung zusammen
gefasst, die Diskriminierungsabsicht spielt dabei keine Rolle – im Übrigen auch nicht bei
unmittelbaren
Diskriminierungen).
ereignisorientierten
und
Makkonen
prozessorientierten
unterscheidet
Konzepten
zum
weiters
hinsichtlich
Verständnis
von
Diskriminierung. Makkonen unterstreicht, dass Anti-Diskriminierungsrecht vordergründig auf
die ereignisorientierte Sicht abstellt, die prozessorientierte Sicht jedoch einen wesentlichen
Zugang zum Verständnis von Intersektionalitäten und intersektionaler Diskriminierung
eröffnet. (Anmerkung: unmittelbare Diskriminierung ist im Recht ereignisorientiert zu
betrachten, der prozessorientierten Sicht wird theoretisch und praktisch durch den
Chancengleichheitsansatz, positive Diskriminierung und den Gleichstellungsgrundsatz
entsprochen, die Ansichten der europ Gesetzgeber sind dazu extrem unterschiedlich.)
Makkonen stellt ein Modell von Diskriminierung als Zusammenhang von Vorurteilen,
Stereotypen, Haltungen und Einstellungen mit dem tatsächlichen Verhalten vor. Vorurteile
legten demnach die Tendenz einer Person zu diskriminierendem Verhalten fest. Abhängig
von Situation und Kosten der Diskriminierung (Sanktion) findet diese dann statt (oder auch
nicht). Dies überträgt sich gesellschaftlich: Haltungen führen zu Diskriminierung und zu
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sozialer Distanz. Diskriminierung führt zu sozioökonomischen Unterschieden, diese
wiederum führen zu sozialer Distanz und bestärken stereotypisierte Haltungen. (Anmerkung:
Machtunterschiede werden im Ansatz nur implizit mitgedacht).
Im Zweiten Teil bietet Makkonen Definitionsvorschläge an. Wenngleich diese logisch
argumentiert sind, weicht Makkonen von den soziologischen wie auch rechtlichen
Definitionen ab (Anm: Legaldefinitionen existieren bislang nicht, Makkonens Beitrag wurde
vor Umsetzung des Anti-Diskriminierungsrechts in den Nationalstaaten verfasst). Der Artikel
leistet jedoch einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Klärung der Konzepte, indem er auch den
Unterschied
von
Intersektionalität,
multipler
Verletzlichkeit
und
intersektionaler
Diskriminierung behandelt.
Makkonen zeigt, dass weder im Menschenrechtssystem noch in den Sozialwissenschaften
einheitliche
Definitionen
zu
finden
sind.
Verschiedene
Begriffe
werden
im
Menschenrechtssystem für dieselben Phänomene verwendet. Makkonen schlägt folgende
drei Definitionen vor: Als Mehrfachdiskriminierung bezeichnet er das Phänomen, dass eine
Person aufgrund verschiedener Merkmale zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten diskriminiert
wird. Mehrfachdiskriminierung wird also im eigentlichen Wortsinn verstanden, bezeichnet
also
unterschiedliche
Ereignisse.
Als
„verbundene“
Diskriminierung
(compound
discrimination) bezeichnet er, wenn in einem Ereignis eine Person aus mehreren Gründen,
also gleichzeitig, diskriminiert wird. Auch dies ist im eigentlichen Wortsinn richtig, wird im
Anti-Diskriminierungsrecht jedoch als Mehrfachdiskriminierung bezeichnet, wohingegen
Makkonens Definition der Mehrfachdiskriminierung nicht als solche anerkannt wird, sondern
als
jeweils
einzelne
Diskriminierungsfälle
behandelt
werden.
Als
intersektionale
Diskriminierung bezeichnet Makkonen das Phänomen, wenn eine Person aus verschiedenen
Gründen diskriminiert wird, und die Überschneidung der Diskriminierungsgründe zu einer
„neuen“ Form der Diskriminierung wird. Intersektionale Diskriminierung im engeren Sinn
„verlangt“ eine „Interaktion der Diskriminierungsgründe“ (p. 10). Als vierte Kategorie nennt
Makkonen noch die „überlappende“ (overlapping) Diskriminierung, wonach zu einem
Zeitpunkt Diskriminierung aus voneinander unabhängigen Gründen erfolgt (diese Form wird
auch als additive oder auch als kumulative (die Makkonen als sequentionelle behandelt) im
Recht bezeichnet).
Makkonen würdigt die Konzepte von Subordination, Verletzlichkeit und Benachteiligung,
stellt jedoch klar, dass diese Konzepte Hinweise vor allem auf indirekte Diskriminierung sind,
jedoch vom Tatbestand der Diskriminierung rechtlich zu unterscheiden sind.
Im dritten Teil argumentiert Makkonen, warum intersektionelle Diskriminierung meist im
Verborgenen bleibt und führt dabei zwei wesentliche Ursachen an. Erstens bezeichnet er die
essentialistische
Sicht
auf
Identitäten
als
Ursache
für
die
Unsichtbarkeit
von
Intersektionalitäten durch „Ausblenden“ von „Mehrfachidentitäten“ (narrow understanding of
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identity).
Zum
Zweiten
identifiziert
er
unter
Berufung
auf
Crenshaw
die
Gruppenbildungsprozesse und ihre Abgrenzungsmechanismen (narrow understanding of the
group) als wesentliches Element des „Single-Identity-Models“ und damit des Konzepts der
„Single-Ground-Discrimination“.
Der vierte Teil behandelt verschiedene Lebensbereiche, die Intersektionalitäten nahe legen
und somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit für Mehrfach- und intersektioneller Diskriminierung
erhöhen. Makkonen spricht sich jedoch insgesamt gegen den Ansatz aus, Diskriminierungen
grundsätzlich als intersektional zu betrachten. Zwar hält er die „intersectional terminology“ für
nützlich in der Analyse von Diskriminierungsfällen, sie sollte aber nicht andere, etablierte
Menschenrechtskonzepte ersetzen. Andererseits erkennt er in einem antizipierten
Opferverdacht
durch
die
Wahrscheinlichkeit
von
Intersektionalität
aufgrund
der
Überschneidung benachteiligter sozialer Positionen eine neue Gefahr von Stereotypisierung
und Stigmatisierung.
Im fünften Teil fasst Makkonen Stärken und Schwächen des Ansatzes zusammen.
Wichtigstes Argument gegen das Konzept ist für Makkonen die Gefahr des „automatically
presumed victim“ in die positive und negative Richtung, nämlich als Rechtfertigungsgrund für
begangene Diskriminierung einerseits oder die angenommene Unglaubwürdigkeit der
Opfereigenschaft von Personen, die nicht in das Schema intersektionaler Verletzlichkeit
passen. Die mögliche Schaffung von „victim identities“ durch das Konzept ist ein weiterer
Schwachpunkt des Ansatzes laut Makkonen. Allerdings relativiert er die Einwände dadurch,
dass er feststellt, dass statistische Methoden alleine keine Lösung für die Beurteilung
gesellschaftlicher Ungerechtigkeitskonstellationen darstellt. Dem stellt Makkonen zwei
enorme Stärken des Konzepts gegenüber. Den revolutionären Blick des Ansatzes auf
Diskriminierung und seine Auswirkungen auf das Verständnis von Diskriminierungen und
Menschenrechtsverletzungen und die möglichen Auswirkungen auf effizientere Politik zur
Bekämpfung von Diskriminierung auf gesellschaftlicher wie auch individueller Ebene.
Im sechsten Teil untersucht Makkonen die (grundsätzliche und theoretische) Fähigkeit des
Menschenrechtssystems, mit intersektioneller (und Mehrfach-)Diskriminierung umzugehen
und in wie weit das Menschenrechtssystem Intersektionalität anerkennt (Stand 2002).
Besondere Beachtung finden in der Analyse das Human Rights Committee (HRC), welches
den umfassendsten Artikel zum Diskriminierungsgebot behandeln könnte (Art 26 ICCPR),
CERD und CEDAW, welche das Problem von Mehrfachdiskriminierung und Intersektionalität
erkennen und behandeln. Makkonen kommt zum Schluss, dass es bei einigen UN Bodies
ein gewisses „Level of Awareness“ gibt und einige Aspekte tatsächlich ernst genommen
werden. Die Frage, ob eine explizite Anerkennung durch Dokumente oder Beobachtungen
der Bodies erforderlich ist, um im Menschenrechtssystem behandelt werden zu können,
beantwortet Makkonen nicht abschließend. Er belegt auch nicht hinreichend, ob das
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Menschenrechtssystem „in principle“ fähig ist, mit anderen als dem Single-ground Modell
umzugehen, gibt aber einige Hinweise dafür.
Der siebente Teil bietet Schlussfolgerungen für die Anwendung bzw. deren Möglichkeit des
Konzepts in der Rechtspraxis und Empfehlungen für Politik, Gesetzgebung, Wissenschaft
und Praxis.
MARCHETTI, Elena (2008): Intersectional Race and Gender Analyses: Why Legal
Processes Just Don’t Get It, Social and Legal Studies 17, 155-174.,
vgl. http://sls.sagepub.com/content/17/2/155.full.pdf+html
Marchetti argues that it is difficult to recognise categories of difference within a process that
is “framed within an ideology that emphasizes objectivity and universalism” (Marchetti p.
155).
This paper is written from an Australian perspective, but discusses issues of wider relevance.
It uses the example of the Australian Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody to
show that “Uthe dominant liberal ideology can, at times, operate to exclude racialized
women.” (Marchetti p. 155)
Marchetti points out that the law is reluctant to find substantive inequality at all and, when it
does, it deals with it on the basis of only a single characteristic. (Marchetti p. 156)
Marchetti also argues that “Uan intersectional approach is important because it circumvents
the dangers of considering ‘race’ in isolation from gender when making legal determinations
or when introducing new policies concerning Indigenous people.” (Marchetti pp. 156-157)
The commission is an interesting case as it made quite an effort to be racially sensitive.
However, it does seem to have excluded indigenous women; in other words, it could not
work intersectionally. (Marchetti p. 157)
Indigenous Women and the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
The commission began with rather a narrow focus, but grew to include consideration of the
underlying social, cultural and legal issues behind the deaths in custody. (Marchetti p. 158)
The report was criticized, however, for ignoring the “Uprevalence of family violence within
Indigenous communities” which resulted in the deaths of many more women than those that
died in custody. (Marchetti p. 158)
The report also failed to mention the “Uabusive and disrespectful manner in which
Indigenous women are treated by the police; the inadequacies of the custodial experience for
Indigenous women; the lack of trained Indigenous women to ‘investigate sexual offences’;
the silencing of Indigenous female voices in court processes and lack of community input in
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court to assist with social control; the over-representation of Indigenous women in relation to
public order offences; and the imposition of harsher penalties on Indigenous women for
minor offences.” (Marchetti p. 159)
Explaining the Failure to take an Intersectional Approach
Marchetti now goes on to explain the methods used to investigate why the Commission did
not adequately deal with Indigenous women. (Marchetti p. 160)
Seven reasons were found and these were divided into two categories: “(a) reasons that
related to the struggle between ‘race’ and gender politics; and (b) reasons that were
procedural in nature.” (Marchetti p. 160)
‘race’ and Gender Politics: Community (‘race’) Focus
A majority of the interviewees felt that the report was about Indigenous people, ‘race’ as
such, and that it was not about gender as a separate issue. (Marchetti p. 161)
Women were involved in the commission process, but they brought up issues generally
relating to indigenous people rather than specifically to women for various reasons, including
not wanting to have more men locked up and not wanting to be blamed for this if it
happened. (Marchetti pp. 161-162)
Also, the officers of the commission did not ask about issues specifically relating to women.
(Marchetti p. 162)
Marchetti also notes an important point made by the anthropologist Bell: “Uwhen arguing for
Indigenous self-determination, politics of ‘race’ become paramount and gendered
perspectives are set aside as internal affairs.” (Marchetti p. 162)
‘race’ and gender Politics: The large number of male deaths and the deep
disadvantage of young indigenous males
There were more male deaths than female deaths in custody. This influenced the focus of
the report and the female deaths were not treated as likely to be for different reasons, but
merely noted as a subset of the total figure. (Marchetti p. 163)
The idea emerged that young Indigenous males were more disenfranchised than Indigenous
females. (Marchetti p. 163)
This was accompanied by the often-used liberal division of life into public and private
spheres. The thought then became that damage in the public sphere (no chance of
employment) was much worse than anything that could happen in the private sphere (such
as having a child taken away by the authorities). (Marchetti pp. 163-164)
Marchetti notes that many of the interviewees think the focus might be different if the
commission were held today, merely for the fact that many more women are now being
locked up. (Marchetti p. 164)
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Procedural Reasons: The Terms of Reference
A sizeable minority of interviewees thought that the problems specifically affecting women
were not the business of the commission. (Marchetti p. 164)
Marchetti thinks that this denies the fact that the terms of reference of the commission were
open to considerable discretion in terms of their interpretation. For example, in the case of
male deaths in custody, there was often a link to family violence that could have been
investigated. (Marchetti p. 165)
The commission also pointed out that finding a direct cause of the deaths in custody was not
easy, as even a cause such as alcohol, which at first seemed simple, became more complex
on closer examination as the links to colonization etc emerged. So, again, family violence etc
could have been included in the investigation if the commissioners had wished. (Marchetti p.
165)
Procedural Reasons: The legal procedures used to investigate the deaths
The commission was focused on finding the “truth” of how the deaths occurred and this left
little time to consider if conditions were different for Indigenous men and women. (Marchetti
166)
The legal focus meant that factual, rather than sociological research was considered
important and relevant. Also, consideration of cultural and social issues was introduced too
late in the process to have enough of an impact. (Marchetti p. 166)
Procedural Reasons: Deep colonizing methodologies
The methods of the commission did not embrace “Indigenous cultural norms and
understandings” but were rather “’deep colonizing’ methodologies” (Marchetti p. 166)
The commission was ignorant, for example, of the reasons why Indigenous women may
have only discussed issues of general importance, rather than those that specifically related
to Indigenous women. (Marchetti p. 167)
“The cultural pressure not to speak up and the fear of retribution were reinforced by
community views which dismissed any mention of female-specific problems, such as family
violence, as ‘radical feminist lesbian hairy legged talk’”. (Marchetti pp. 167-168)
Procedural Reasons: Ideological Values of the Predominantly Male Senior People
Appointed
A sizeable minority of the interviewees noted a significant difference between male and
female commissioners. (Marchetti p. 168)
Most of the senior people were men from conservative backgrounds who adopted a legal
methodology. (Marchetti p. 168)
The few non-Indigenous women in reasonably senior positions may also have been under
pressure to act like men. (Marchetti p. 168)
There was also a lack of social science knowledge among the lawyers. (Marchetti p. 168)
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Procedural Reasons: Time and Resource Constraints
The time limit meant that only basic issues could be dealt with and in a straightforward way.
In particular, as issues such as family violence only emerged late in the process, there was
no time to deal with them properly. (Marchetti p. 169)
Conclusion:
“The commission failed to adopt an intersectional approach “D unintentionally and
largely as a result of the liberal legal ideology which was embraced by the inquiry. The
commissioners conducted a predominantly legally directed investigation about ‘race’
without realizing that by doing so, Indigenous males would be favoured. ‘race’-centred
politics (which Stubbs and Tolmie (1995: 129) describe as being ‘predominantly the
narrative of men’) and the formalistic nature of liberalism structured the ways in which
the terms of reference were interpreted, the ways in which evidence was gathered and
interpreted, and the RCIADIC’s inability to use decolonizing methodologies (see
Tuhiwai Smith (1999) for a discussion of how imperialism has directed the research
agenda in colonized nations). ‘race’-centred politics and liberalism inadvertently worked
together to erase the experiences of Indigenous women by making the experiences of
the minority group (and, as a result, minority men), paramount.” (Marchetti p. 169)
“In the course of a legal inquiry which contains questions of ‘race’, racialized women
become invisible. The formalistic notions of equality associated with liberal thought
tend to treat all members of a racialized group as being equally positioned. This
positioning, however, tends to privilege male experience. D Men are viewed as leaders
and builders of the next generation; women have children to keep them going and
there is no expectation that they will be leaders and builders. The concerns of
racialized women are put aside for the sake of saving racialized men from stateinflicted forms of violence and thereby saving the marginalized group as a whole. The
process by which this occurs hinges on a liberal ideology that cannot see beyond the
patriarchal and cultural values of the hegemonic state. It appears difficult for legal
processes to escape the influences of liberalism in order to be able to make
recommendations and determinations that include the experiences of people living at
the margins of multiple identities. As Crenshaw (1989: 14) points out, ‘problems of
exclusion cannot be solved simply by including Black women within an already
established analytical structure’. Without a conscious effort to adopt an intersectional
approach, there is little chance for the structures of law to be more inclusive. A
conscious effort would require any process to include a number of ‘narratives and
stories, accounts of the particular, the different, and the hitherto silenced’ (Harris, 1990:
615). Different dimensions of power, as they exist in the lives of both racialized women
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and men, need to be made explicit if the position of the most vulnerable is to become
known (Lucashenko, 1997). Such accounts, however, need to be actively sought by the
inquirers, not just left to surface of their own accord. In order to achieve this, the
processes used to obtain different narratives must be informed by culturally appropriate
practices, something which legal systems tend not to do (Rose, 1996). Legal processes
also require adequate resources and a sufficient amount of time for the collection and
analysis of the different narratives. Ultimately, however, without a full appreciation of
the risks involved in making recommendations and determinations that are not
informed by an intersectional analysis, superficial changes to legal processes will
simply continue to exclude the experiences of minority women.” (Marchetti pp. 169170)
McCOLGAN, Aileen (2007): Reconfiguring Discrimination Law, Public Law, 74-94,
vgl.:
http://droitsocialupx.free.fr/articles/Mc%20Colgan%20reconfiguring%20discrimination
%20law.pdf
McColgan provides a very useful summary of the issues with uni-dimensional identity as
used in anti-discrimination law. She sets out clearly the way in which people are viewed only
in terms of their “different” characteristic and the way that this is put against a “neutral” norm.
That means white people are ‘race’less, men are genderless or sexless, straight people have
no sexual orientation etc.
Discrimination law in the UK is undergoing reform.
The Equality Act 2006 has put in place the framework for the establishment of the
Commission for Equality and Human Rights; and Equalities and Discrimination Law reviews
are under way (as of time of writing – 2007). (McColgan p. 1)
Lots of issues raised that were/are in need of reform, including some related to
intersectionality, such as the current need to choose single grounds and the existence of a
hierarchy of grounds. (McColgan p. 1)
Grounds-based approaches to discrimination
The standard approach in the UK is a grounds-based approach and this is common in many
countries. This approach has two key questions that are interrelated:
1) Which grounds are regulated?
2) How are these grounds defined? (McColgan p. 2)
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McColgan notes that, in the UK, there used to be a choice only between the Race Relations
Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975; this lead to a push for broader interpretations
of ‘race’ and sex discrimination to allow other kinds of discrimination to fall under these Acts.
As a result, religious discrimination was partly accommodated as ‘race’ discrimination, but
sexual orientation was not accommodated as sex discrimination:
“The point here is not that purposive, expansive interpretation of discrimination statutes
is a matter for criticism. But the grounds-based approach may set in stone institutional
solutions to problems of a previous era and the courts may be unwilling, or perceive
themselves as unable, to shape interpretative outcomes so as to make such legislation
fit for current purpose.” (McColgan p. 2)
McColgan argues that the sex and ‘race’ discrimination acts were passed at a time when
these issues were seen as important and the issues of discrimination based on religious
grounds or because of sexual orientation were not.
Mandla v Dowell Lee – “ethnic group” discrimination broadened the understanding of ‘race’
discrimination to include some groups but not all. Importantly, not all religious discrimination
as such was included. Discrimination against Muslims or Christians was not included, but
discrimination against Sikhs and Jews was. Thus, what was an expansive approach in 1983,
to address a pressing social problem of the time, became a restriction later that prevented
the law from addressing new, but related, social problems. (McColgan p. 2)
Even when a long list of grounds, widely interpreted, is used (and here McColgan cites
Ireland as an example along with the UK’s Disability Discrimination Act 1995), problems can
emerge. The Disability discrimination Act has a three-part definition of disability which
excludes those who are discriminated against on the grounds of perceived rather than actual
impairments so that “Usomeone sacked because she was incorrectly thought to have
cancer, or a heart condition, or because her partner was known to be HIV positive, would not
fall within the protection of the Act.” (McColgan p. 3)
The Race Relations Act protects against discrimination based on the “race” of a person’s
partner or associates and this approach has been followed in other recent legislation relating
to sexual orientation or religion, but the Sex Discrimination Act applies only to the claimant
him/herself. (McColgan p. 3)
Although there are ways around these problems, McColgan argues that grounds-based
approaches have fundamental difficulties in dealing with the complexities of identity.
(McColgan p. 3)
The dilemma of unidimensionality
McColgan quotes Nitya Iyer in support of her claim that grounds-based approaches always
fail to capture the multi-dimensional nature of identity:
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“Once a characteristic is created as intrinsic to a group, and becomes its identifier, it is
regarded as wholly constitutive of the group’s social identityD[and] the social identity
constructed on the basis of this now ‘intrinsic’ difference is exactly the same for every
member of the groupU”. (McColgan p. 4)
“There is no such thing as an ‘unsexed’ black person or ‘homosexual’ or an ‘unraced’
woman or lesbian. Rather, according to Iyer, ‘other aspects of social identity are
rendered indistinguishable from the background norm’, that is ‘[t]he particular set of
social characteristics of the dominant social identity and its ideology Dagainst which
categorizations of difference are made in anti-discrimination law.’ The purportedly
‘neutral’ is in fact not so, but conforms in all respects (except that of the single
identifier) with the ‘background norm’: white, male, heterosexual, temporarily ablebodied, Christian or irreligious.” (McColgan p. 4 – footnotes omitted)
A grounds-based approach thus involves splitting a person’s identity into classified,
manageable aspects. A black woman = ‘race’ + gender, and so it is reasonable to discuss
these aspects separately. (McColgan p. 4)
The unidimensional approach in practice
Degraffenreid v General Motors – judge dismissed a claim that specifically black women
were discriminated against. If they could have shown that they were discriminated against as
women or as African American, then they would have had a claim, but as neither white
women nor black men were discriminated against as well, then they had nothing. (McColgan
p. 4)
Bahl v The Law Society – McColgan argues that this case shows that those suffering from
intersectional discrimination must present themselves as only suffering from one kind of
discrimination. (McColgan p. 5)
Canada v Mossop Canada’s Supreme Court – a gay man was denied leave for the death of
his partner’s father. He argued that the discrimination was based on his family status (which
was covered by the legislation), but the Court held that this was discrimination based on
sexual orientation which was not covered by the legislation. (McColgan p. 6)
Pearce – The House of Lords ruled that a lesbian was not subject to gender discrimination,
but rather discrimination based on sexual orientation which was not covered by legislation at
the time. (McColgan p. 6)
McColgan notes that it is very difficult for a gay man or lesbian to convince a court that
workplace harassment is due to sex/gender rather than sexual orientation. (McColgan p. 6)
Also, in regard to indirect discrimination- it is not sufficient to show that women of a particular
‘race’ are at a disadvantage, but that either women are disadvantaged compared to men, or
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both men and women of that ‘race’ are disadvantaged compared to those of other ‘races’.
(McColgan p. 6)
Acknowledging complex claimants?: the “sex-plus” approach
Degraffenreid was not widely followed in the US. Jefferies v Harris County Community Action
Association – the court allowed “sex-plus”. McColgan thinks this approach is flawed but still
an improvement on that of Degraffenreid and Bahl. In particular it was an advance in the
matter of proof as it was not enough for the employer to show there was no discrimination
against black men or white women. (McColgan p. 7)
Black women have been rejected as being representative in cases of cumulative
discrimination in class actions. That is, a black woman was held to be discriminated against
because she was a black woman and so could not represent white women (Moore v Hughes
Helicopter Inc). McColgan notes that “Uit misses the point that all women are ‘raced’, and
that a white woman seeking representative status in a sex discrimination claim is no more
characteristic of her black female colleagues than Ms Moore was of her white female
colleagues.” (McColgan p. 7)
Class actions are not common in the UK so this problem has not really emerged, however,
McColgan does point out that the “sex-plus” approach defines white women as “unraced”
which “Dhas profound repercussions for how ‘sex’ discrimination is conceptualised.”
(McColgan p. 7)
Even if we reconceptualise ‘woman’ to include race and ‘race’ to include women, this still
does not fully account for the multi-faceted nature of identity (such as sexual orientation etc).
At law, this is a real problem in terms of choosing or constructing the comparator. (McColgan
p. 8)
Problematising categories
McColgan argues that “Uthere is nothing preordained about the categories to which things,
or people, are assigned for the purposes of social or, indeed, legal organisation.” (McColgan
p. 8)
McColgan also points out that discrimination based on a mistake is just as disadvantageous
– so somebody fired for the mistaken belief that he/she has AIDS is still fired. (McColgan pp.
8-9)
Alternative approaches: lessons from Canada?
McColgan is keen that any alternative to a grounds-based approach does not collapse into
vacuity and she thinks that Canada may have the answer. (McColgan p. 9)
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Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia defined discrimination for the purposes of s15 of
Canada’s Charter of Rights as:
1) a distinction (intended or otherwise)
2) based on grounds relating to the personal characteristics of the individual or group
concerned, which
3) has the effect of imposing disadvantages or burdens not imposed on others, or of
withholding access to advantages or benefits available to others. (McColgan p. 9 – footnote
omitted)
This required a focus on grounds as a preliminary stage but in Egan v Canada a dissenting
judgment proposed an alternative test which suggested looking to the effects rather than the
constituent elements of discrimination. (McColgan p. 10)
Conclusion
Denise Réaume advocates the adoption of an open list, pointing out that “Uin no other civil
claim is it necessary to establish that there is a single, sufficient cause or explanation of the
harm suffered in order to succeed. Normally, all that matters is that the alleged wrongdoing is
a ‘but-for’ cause or necessary condition; the existence of multiple necessary conditions that
come together to create the harm is no bar to recovery, especially when both causes are
alleged to be unlawful behaviour and are combined in the behaviour of a single agent.”
(McColgan p. 11 quoting Denise Réaume – footnote omitted)
McColgan is unsure if this open list approach is workable. She points out that employers
could be said to discriminate in the sense that they may not hire someone based on
inadequate qualifications or low intelligence and that this could then be actionable as there is
no general justification defence. It may also be necessary to define discrimination in terms of
unfair or unjustifiable rather than different treatment. Also, McColgan sees this kind of
approach as giving a lot more discretion to the judiciary and she is unsure whether they are
trustworthy. (McColgan pp. 11-12)
Instead, McColgan proposes a closed but expanded list of grounds which particularly takes
into account multiply disadvantaged claimants. (McColgan p. 12)
In terms of the casual requirement, McColgan suggests “Uthat a finding of discrimination
requires only that the ground or grounds relied upon was a causal factor in the treatment
challenged.” (McColgan p. 12)
She also challenges the centrality of the comparator. (McColgan p. 12)
“Any new legislation ought to contain a strong purpose clause which makes specific
reference to the need to tackle the structural disadvantage suffered by particular
groups, many of them at the intersection of protected and other grounds. Crucially,
such legislation ought not to define terms such as ‘race’, ‘disability’, ‘sex’ and ‘sexual
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orientation’, and it ought expressly to provide that treatment resulting from perceptions
about the claimant’s membership of any group defined by reference to a protected
ground, or his or her (lack of) conformity to characteristics associated with such a
group, is covered by the prohibition on discrimination.” (McColgan p. 12)
McColgan is still in favour of detailed statutory framework but, following Hannett, she
advocates an approach based on disadvantage rather than difference. (McColgan pp. 12 –
13)
McColgan again returns to the question of proof. For example, in Dresdner Kleinwert
Wasserstein Ltd v Adebayo – when the black claimant could show that he was “at least as
well qualified” as the white candidate selected for the post, the burden of proof would shift to
the alleged discriminator to provide an explanation that would show no discrimination.
McColgan is concerned, however, that this approach could lead to multiple claims following
every promotion or appointment by all the unsuccessful candidates. (McColgan p. 13)
One way around this, McColgan suggests, is to draw a formal distinction between those
advantaged and those disadvantaged – so it makes a difference if it is a woman claiming sex
discrimination in a dominantly male workplace etc. However, if a woman is appointed to a job
in a dominantly male workplace, the non-successful males should not find it easy to claim
sex discrimination. (McColgan p. 13)
Another way of putting this is that McColgan thinks that the more open-ended discrimination
claims become, the more asymmetrical they need to be, to stop absurdity. Finally, she thinks
that it “Uis crucial that we move towards a definition of discrimination in terms of the
exacerbation of disadvantage.” (McColgan p. 14)
MIDDLEMISS, Sam and DOWNIE, Margaret (2009): Recent Changes in the Evidential
Requirements in Indirect Sex and Race Discrimination Cases, International Journal of
Law and Management 51, 367 – 373,
vgl: www.emeraldinsight.com/1754-243X.htm
This paper analyses the impact of recent case law on the evidential requirements of indirect
‘race’ and sex discrimination. They note that the law remains complicated and confusing here
and that there are several hurdles to be overcome for a claim of indirect ‘race’ or sex
discrimination to succeed. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 367)
Indirect discrimination has different evidential requirements than direct discrimination.
(Middlemiss and Downie p. 367)
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The changing definition of indirect discrimination
The starting point: Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof)
regulations SI 2001/2660 and Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005
Under the 2001 regulations “requirement or condition” under s1 of the Sex Discrimination Act
2 was replaced with the much broader “provision, criterion or practice” for important sections
of the Act 1 (1), (2) (b) including employment. “The new definitions avoid the need to comply
with the ‘absolute bar’ requirement in indirect discrimination casesD” (Middlemiss and
Downie p. 368)
The applicant has to show that the treatment complained of amounts to a “provision, criterion
or practice”. “It may be a written or oral instruction or it could be part of a policy, procedure or
collective agreement or be contained in a contract, letter or written particulars etc. It might
refer to specific practices or be one of several criteria used. It could apply to just one
employee or to a group of employees. It may even be sufficient to amount to a provision if
the conduct complained of has happened on only one occasion. Common examples of PCPs
include age limits, dress codes, refusal to allow part time working and imposition of mobility
clauses.” (Middlemiss and Downie p. 368 – footnote omitted)
The relevance of a particular pool for comparison
Once the “provision, criterion or practice” is established, the applicant has to prove a
“particular disadvantage”. The 2005 regulations removed some words, it may not be
necessary to produce statistics to prove this, but statistics are likely to remain an important
and commonly used method of establishing a “particular disadvantage”. (Middlemiss and
Downie p. 368)
This raises the question of the relevant pool for comparison.
In Jones v University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 193 a 46 year-old woman was excluded as
a student employment advisor because the university had an age limit of 27-35. The claim
was that women students tended to be older and so the age range was discriminatory as
fewer women could comply. The Court of Appeal rejected this and held the pool was all
persons meeting the relevant criteria. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 369)
The relevant pool is a matter of fact for the Employment tribunal to determine and they often
want a broad pool. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 369)
The courts have acknowledged that it is difficult to choose the correct pool. (Middlemiss and
Downie p. 369)
The Women and Equality Unit’s (2009) guide, Changes to Sex Discrimination Legislation in
Great Britain: explaining the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005,
emphasises the usefulness of statistics in establishing “particular disadvantage”. (Middlemiss
and Downie p. 369)
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Middlemiss and Downie think that the choice of comparator is more difficult in indirect ‘race’
discrimination as the Race Relations Act 1976 requires that the circumstance of the
comparator must be the same or not materially different. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 369)
Hanly v Norinchukin International – the case concerned the British workers being made
redundant. The court held they could not use the Japanese workers on secondment from
Japan as comparators as they were at no risk of dismissal. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 369)
BMA v Chaudhury – on appeal the group for comparison was defined in such a way that
nobody was in it. “It follows that there was no comparative disadvantage or advantage for
any racial group and no indirect ‘race’ discrimination against members of the racial group to
which Mr Chaudhury belonged.” (Middlemiss and Downie p. 370)
Detriment
The applicant must show that the inability to comply with the “provision, criterion or practice”
caused him/her to suffer detriment as set out in the following cases: (Middlemiss and Downie
p. 370)
Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1979] IRLR 436 – “putting under a disadvantage”
Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd [1977] IRLR 360 – it was not sufficient for a woman to be
required to wear a dress under company rules. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 370)
Ealing LBC v Gary [2001] IRLR 681 – detriment on basis of ‘race’ when an investigation into
her behaviour took much longer than for others (the candidate was not aware of that at the
time).
Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285 – Here it was
a loss of right to carry out appraisal interviews. The House of Lords decided that an
“unjustified sense of grievance” did not equal detriment. But the person did not have to suffer
economic or physical consequences. However, if there were no economic or physical
consequences then the “reasonable worker” test from Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980]
QB 87 had to be satisfied: “a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the
view that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to his detriment.” (quoted in Middlemiss
and Downie p. 370)
R exp Elias v S. of S. for Defence – “the focus is not on the difference in treatment on racial
grounds, expressed or implied, it is on the evaluation of the disparate and adverse racial
impact of the application of an apparently neutral and general provision, criterion or practice”
(quoted in Middlemiss and Downie p. 370).
Being forced to resign due to difficulty complying with a provision, criterion or practice would
be evidence of detriment but the causal link needs to be established. (Middlemiss and
Downie p. 370)
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Justification
The defence of justification is often available for indirect sex and ‘race’ discrimination.
Age discrimination – Employment Equality (Age) Regulations SI 2006/1031. Reg 3 – sets out
the general objective justification defence for direct and indirect age discrimination.
Ojutiku v MSC [1982] IRLR 418 CA – Court of Appeal - the standard for justification other
than sex should be “what was acceptable to right thinking people as sound and tolerable
reasons for adopting the practice in question.” (Middlemiss and Downie p. 371)
Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 – The approach of the ECJ here
is now enshrined in statute. The standard of proof required – “the objective of the employer’s
measure must correspond to a real need of the enterprise and the means used must be
appropriate with a view to achieving that objective and be necessary to that end.” (quoted in
Middlemiss and Downie p. 371)
The employer must show that the action complained of was proportionate to achieving a
legitimate aim. “The employer must demonstrate objectively justified factors which are
unrelated to discrimination based on sex. The employer must show that there is real
business need for the discriminatory outcome and the means chosen to achieve the outcome
are suitable and necessary.” (Middlemiss and Downie p. 371 – footnote omitted)
Hampson v Department of Education & Science [1989] IRLR 69 –
•
test for justification objective;
•
standard was the reasonable need of the undertaking;
•
the reasonable need might be (not confined to) economic or administrative
efficiency;
•
Employment Tribunal must strike an objective balance between discriminatory
effect of practice complained of and the reasonable need of the undertaking.
R (on the application of Elias v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] IRLR 934 CA) – threepart test for proportionality:
1) Is the objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right?
2) Is the measure rationally connected to the objective?
3) Are the means chosen no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective?
A common justification employers try to use is health and safety. The British Airways case
shows that this does not always succeed. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 371)
Cost implications are another commonly attempted justification. “The ECJ has held that
indirect discrimination cannot be justified by the aim of restricting public expenditure.” But
private organizations can take cost into account. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 371)
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Conclusion
Middlemiss and Downie note that the law remains complex and that the evidential burden on
the claimant remains high. (Middlemiss and Downie p. 372)
MORAWA, Alexander H E (2002): The Concept of Non-discrimination: An Introductory
Comment, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe
Article 26 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains both positive
and negative elements of discrimination. (Morawa p. 1) He begins by examining the negative
elements of non-discrimination.
Non-discrimination can be an accessory right (equality in regard to other substantive rights
such as Article 14 of European Convention of Human Rights) or an independent right
(demanding material justice such as Article 26 of the covenant and the new 12th Additional
Protocol to the ECHR). (Morawa pp. 1 – 2)
Morawa cites an important rule that is not often made explicit: “equal situations are to be
treated equally and unequal situations differently”. (Morawa p. 2)
Willis v the United Kingdom Eur Ct HR Appl 36042/97 “D[A] difference of treatment is
discriminatory if it ‘has not objective and reasonable justification’, that is, if it does not pursue
a ‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aims sought to be realised’”. “States will enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation when adopting measures they deem necessary;'however, that margin will be
quite narrow or, in other words, states would have to advance "very weighty reasons"" for
their measures to survive judicial scrutiny, when a differentiation is based solely on what may
be called a 'suspect criterion', such as ‘race’ or sex.” (Morawa p. 2)
He then turns to free speech and the case of a journalist criticizing a politician requiring a
broader interpretation of this than ordinary citizens. (Morawa pp. 3-4)
He compares this to the case of a Basque politician and journalist, Mr Castells, who criticized
the whole government. The court held that this requires an even broader right to freedom of
expression. (Morawa pp. 4-5)
Behind this differentiation of treatment is the importance of freedom of the press but also,
Morawa suggests that politicians are less vulnerable to criticism and more powerful than
ordinary citizens. (Morawa p. 5)
Morawa goes on to cases of the judiciary “which is explicitly mentioned as an entity that can
legitimately be protected against speech in paragraph 2 of Article 10. “ (Morawa p. 5)
“It all boils down to the ‘proportionality’ and ‘reasonableness’ standards the Court speaks of
in Willis, and to the extent of the ‘margin of appreciation’ a state may claim. Not every
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distinction is prohibited, not absolute equality is required, but relative equality, or
proportionality.” (Morawa p. 6)
Morawa now turns to positive aspects of non-discrimination:
“The 12th Additional Protocol to the European Convention adopted in 2000 elevates
the 'European' right to non-discrimination firstly to an independent - no longer
accessory - right and, secondly, to an at least somewhat positive obligation of states by
stipulating that ‘the enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, ‘race’, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.’ Thus, although it is ‘not intended to impose a general positive
obligation on the Parties to take measures to prevent or remedy all instances of
discrimination in relations between private persons,’ it may nevertheless under certain
circumstances engage the responsibility of a state if it fails to provide adequate
protection against discrimination stemming from non-state actors.” (Morawa p. 7,
footnotes omitted)
Again, Morawa identifies ‘vulnerability’ as the crucial factor in determining whether protection
is adequate. (Morawa p. 7)
X and Y v. the Netherlands: “a mentally handicapped sixteen-year old girl was sexually
assaulted in a privately-run home for handicapped children, but neither she nor her father
could press criminal charges against the perpetrator because a lacuna in domestic law
prevented both the victim (who was not capable of signing a complaint herself) and her father
(whose signature could not validly replace that of the victim) from formally initiating the
proceedings.” In other words, the most vulnerable group – handicapped minors as victims of
sexual assault – were prevented from filing criminal charges due to a gap in the law. The
court, however, somehow avoided determining whether this was discrimination. (Morawa p.
8)
Morawa raises the issue of affirmative action creating discrimination against other groups.
(Morawa p. 10)
“In sum, we may speak of three legal responses to different treatment: (a) where it is
prohibited, (b) where it is permitted and, (c) where it is mandated.
(a) Where situations are objectively equal, unequal treatment is prohibited, and so is
equal treatment of situations that are different. For instance, men and women in Austria
have "equal rights and duties [as] spouses, with regard to their income and mutual
maintenance.' They both are eligible for (widow's or widower's) pensions after the
death of their spouses. If widowers receive their pension payments only if they have no
other source of income, while widows receive them irrespective of that, they are being
discriminated against. By the same token, both nationals and foreigners lawfully
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working in Austria contribute equally to the public social security schemes. If under
such circumstances certain benefits are reserved for nationals that amounts to
discrimination. In both cases, no reasonable and objective criteria exist that would
justify a differentiation in treatment.
(b) In many instances different treatment will be permitted. But even permissible
differentiation faces its boundaries. It is, for instance, permissible to prescribe
"differences between military and national alternative service and that such differences
may, in a particular case, justify a longer period of service." But doubling the duration of
the alternative service from 12 to 24 months solely to "test the sincerity of an
individual's convictions" is not based on objective and reasonable criteria.
(c) Finally, international law may mandate different treatment. That is the tricky part.
The contributions in this special focus section will explore these issues further,
especially those related to positive discrimination, affirmative action, and the protection
of members of minority groups.” (Morawa pp. 10-11 footnotes omitted)
NIELSEN, Ruth (2006): EU Law and Multiple Discrimination, CBS Law Studies,
Copenhagen Business School,
vgl. http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/8791759013.pdf
Problems and main perspective
An initial point that is rather obvious but not always mentioned by others is that Nielson
observes that different grounds of discrimination can be in conflict. For example, religion can
be used to justify sexism etc. (Nielson p. 1 – citing the example of a case Leyla Sahin v
Turkey, Application no 44774/98, where the rights of Turkish women were balanced against
some Islamic practices)
Nielsen notices the different historical developments of equality laws in the US and Europe,
with the US (and UK) adopting ‘race’/ethnic anti-discrimination laws as one of their initial
legislative anti-discrimination attempts alongside gender equality. In the EU, however,
gender equality legislation came a decade before race legislation. (Nielson p. 2)
Nielson outlines the development of intersectionality from its origins with African American
women. (Nielson p. 2)
She notes that in the EU nationality and gender where the only legal equality issues from
1958 for a period of about 40 years. (Nielson p. 2)
Multiple discrimination was “Upractically not discussed in EU legal texts until the 1990’s. In
the practical application of EU law by monitoring bodies, etc it is still mainly up to the national
legal system whether or not multiple discrimination should be addressed.” (Nielson p. 3)
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“There is not much of an intersectionality approach in EU law apart from
gendermainstreaming. One of the main answers in EU policy papers to the question
how multiple discrimination should be tackled is by means of gender mainstreaming the
fight against discrimination on any other ground (ethnic origin, religion, age, etc).”
(Nielson p. 3)
She identifies three main approaches of EU law to the issue of gender and society:
1) A gender-as a variable perspective - for example the US study that found black
women got the worse price for cars, black men the next worse, then white women
and white men got the best of all (Nielson p. 3);
2) A feminist standpoint perspective - for example, approaches that argue that women
should be treated better (Nielson p. 3);
3) A late modern gendering perspective - for example, focusing “Uon the rules,
institutions and processes through which gender is created and/or reconstructed.
Gendermainstreaming is an example of a gendering process aimed at reconstructing
genderD” (Nielson p. 4).
“Gender equality is the opposite of gender inequality, not of gender difference, and
aims to promote the full participation of women and men in society. Gender equality
includes the right to be different. This means taking into account the existing
differences among women and men, which are related to for example class, political
opinion, religion, ethnicity, ‘race’ or sexual orientation, see further on the concepts
below.” (Nielson p. 4 – footnote omitted)
“There seems to be a trend at the EU level to treat some kinds of grounds of
discrimination (eg ethnic origin) more favourably than others (eg religion). Experts on
gender equality increasingly ask whether gender equality is becoming a second rank
priority.” (Nielson p. 4 – footnote omitted)
Overview of EU Law related to Multiple Discrimination
From an Internal Market to a Fundamental Rights Perspective
Early equality provisions were market orientated, but today equal treatment is protected by
EU law mainly as a fundamental right. (Nielson p. 4)
The Amsterdam Treaty (into force 1.5.1999) increased the number of articles dealing
explicitly with gender equality from 1 to 5. This also signalled a growth of gender equality
beyond the realm of employment law. (Nielson p. 5)
Since the ruling in Defrenne (1978), the EU considers gender equality a fundamental right
and general principle of law. (Nielson pp. 5 – 6 – footnote omitted)
Free Movement within the Union
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The EU Treaty guarantees the free movement of goods (Art 28), workers (Art 39), services
(Art 49), and capital (Art 56) as well as freedom of establishment (Art 43) by prohibiting
discrimination on grounds of nationality. (Nielson p. 6)
Any discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited under Art 12. Art 18 allows every
citizen of the union to move and reside freely within member states. Of course both of these
have to be read in context. (Nielson p. 6)
Note, too, that this is basically all confined to citizens of the EU. (Nielson pp. 6-7)
The Ethnic Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)
“The Ethnic Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of
racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the
principle of equal treatment. In the preamble to the Directive there is reference to the
general
human
rights
provisions.
There
is
also
explicit
reference
to
the
gendermainstreaming provision in Art 3(2) EC. The scope of the Directive is very
broad.” (Nielson pp. 7 – 8)
The list of areas (public and private) to which this applies is quite long.
The Framework Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)
“The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation
as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member
States the principle of equal treatment.” (Nielson p. 8)
The ECJ in Mangold v Rüdiger Helm – “Uthe principle of non-discrimination on the
grounds of age must thus be regarded as a general principle of Community Law.”
(Nielson p. 9)
As in the Ethnic Equality Directive (see above), the preamble mentions the fundamental
rights background as well as mainstreaming, but the scope here is much narrower. (Nielson
p. 9)
The Gender Equality Directive (2004/113/EC)
“Gender equality in employment and occupation is dealt with extensively in a number of
legal texts including Treaty provisions and a number of directives. In 2004 the scope of
the prohibition on ground of sex was extended to also cover access to and supply of
goods and services.” (Nielson p. 9)
Multiple Discrimination as a Specific Issue
In recital 4 of a Community Action Programme launched by the Council of Europe, in
reference to Art 3(2) EC it is mentioned that women were often the victims of multiple
discrimination. (Nielson p. 9)
In recital 5:
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“The different forms of discrimination cannot be ranked: all are equally intolerable. The
programme is intended both to exchange existing good practice in the Member States
and to develop new practice and policy for combating discrimination, including multiple
discrimination.” (quoted in Nielson p. 10)
This Programme ran from 2001-2006 and was meant to include a study on multiple
discrimination. (Nielson p. 10)
An annex to the programme also mentions multiple discrimination. (Nielson p. 10)
Concepts of Discrimination
Discrimination
ILO law provides fairly comprehensive definitions of discrimination – it is concerned with the
“Unullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.”
(Nielson p. 11)
Direct Discrimination
“Direct discrimination occurs where one person is treated less favourably, on grounds
of sex, ethnic origin, or any other of the protected criteria than another is, has been or
would be treated in a comparable situation.” (Nielson p. 12)
Nielson then goes on to discuss cases of multiple discrimination. (Nielson p. 12)
“Among women, pregnant women, single mothers and mothers of small children are
probably those who are most exposed to discrimination.” (Nielson p. 12)
Note that other articles suggest that it is migrant women (especially those from certain
backgrounds) that are most vulnerable.
“For men, sex discrimination often occurs in combination with age, eg discrimination
against young men in car insurance or D discrimination against older men who have
passed the pension age for women but have not reached the pension age for their own
sex.” (Nielson p. 12)
Nielson mentions the UK case, decided in the House of Lords, concerning free entry to a
swimming pool for pensioners. (Nielson pp. 12 -13)
Article 1(3) of the Directive on equal treatment in the provision of goods and services does
provide an exception here to account, for example, for same sex session held in swimming
pools. (Nielson p. 13)
No defence against direct discrimination
This is mostly true, however see above and also Article 6 of the Framework Equality
Directive (2000/78/EC), which allows for direct age discrimination on certain conditions.
(Nielson p. 13)
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Indirect Sex Discrimination
Nielson notes that the current definition was influenced by an ECJ decision on the free
movement of workers. (Nielson p. 14)
“Indirect discrimination is in the current equality directive defined as situations where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex, ethnic
origin, etc at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, etc
unless the provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.” (Nielson p. 14)
In Bilka the ECJ set out the three conditions to be met in order to justify indirect
discrimination.
“1) there must be a real need for the employer to apply the “suspect” criteria,
2) the means chosen by the employer must be necessary to achieve this goal, and
3) the means must be appropriate, ie there must be a reasonable proportion between
end and means.” (Nielson p. 14)
Harassment
There is a distinction made between harassment and sexual harassment. (Nielson pp. 14 –
15)
“Harassment (as different from sexual harassment) harassment occurs where
unwanted conduct related to the sex, ethnic origin, etc of a person is exhibited with the
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.” (Nielson p. 14)
Sexual Harassment
“Sexual harassment is unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual
nature.” (Nielson p. 15)
Gendermainstreaming
Definition(s) of the Concept of Gender Mainstreaming
Nielson notes that “gendermainstreaming” is not clearly defined. (Nielson p. 15)
Gendermainstreaming is addressed to law and policy makers at all levels. (Nielson p. 16)
Article 3(2) EC creates an obligation for all Community actors to contribute to gender
mainstreaming. There are considerable variations across countries. (Nielson p. 16)
Methods of Gender Mainstreaming
“Gender mainstreaming implies that the gender dimension is made visible and taken
into account at an early stage of the planning and design of rules and policies before
anyone has actually suffered discrimination so that sex discrimination (direct and
indirect discrimination, harassment and sexual harassment) is prevented from
happening. There is no general agreement on how this should be done. Different
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actors use different methods, often of a socio-economic and not strictly legal nature.”
(Nielson p. 17)
Socio-economic methods
Nielson cites the 3R method as it has been used in Sweden. (Nielson p. 18)
Case law and academic legal literature
Nielson argues for the usefulness of traditional legal sources such as case law and academic
literature to make “Uthe gender dimension of a particular area of law visible”. (Nielson p. 18)
Fragmentary duty to gender mainstream European law
“The mainstreaming principle was first applied in the context of international
development aid where it has been used since the mid 1980s.” (Nielson p. 19)
The EU duty of gender mainstreaming
EU has used soft law in the service of gender mainstreaming “Usince the early 1990’s in the
field of employment and occupation and increasingly also in other fields such as
development aid and research.” (Nielson p. 19)
The Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the gender mainstreaming duty. See especially Articles 2
and 3. (Nielson p. 19)
Also, see Article II-23 and Article III-3 of the draft Constitution for the EU. (Nielson p. 20)
The ECJ
Dory – AG Stix-Hackl argued that there is an obligation for the ECJ to interpret antidiscriminatory Community measures in light of the mainstreaming provision in Article 3(2)
EC. (Nielson p. 20)
National courts’ duty of gender mainstreaming under Community law
Relevant cases – Colson and also Harz – obligation to interpret national law in conformity
with Community law; and in Jongeneel Kaas the national courts were even described as
community courts. Nielson concludes that national courts presumably have similar
mainstreaming obligation to the ECJ. (Nielson p. 21)
Positive action
The Commission acknowledges that the equal treatment principle will not always be enough
to overcome disadvantage and that sometimes positive action is necessary. (Nielson p. 21)
Division of power between the EU and Member States
Positive action is an option but there is no duty to undertake positive action. Positive action
must also purpose a genuine equality purpose and not apply excessive means to achieve the
(lawful) purpose. (Nielson p. 22)
EU law
Statutory positive action provisions in the EU law:
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a) Article 141(4) EC which applies to working life
b) Article II-23 of the draft Constitutional Treaty which applies to all areas of law
including but not limited to employment. Nielson notes that this means that it is
probably in accordance with EU law “Uto take positive action to support subgroups
suffering from multiple discrimination.” (Nielson p. 23)
The case law of the ECJ
First, Nielson notes that Article 141(4) EC in the Amsterdam treaty overrides the old Article
2(4) of the Equal treatment Directive. (Nielson p. 23)
Commission v France – women given special rights at work and this was allowed by French
law. The Commission found that this was a problem for the Equal Treatment directive and
France was ordered to amend its legislation. The main problem was that the law allowed for
a too general exception and for an indefinite period. This was held to violate proportionality.
(Nielson p. 25)
Abrahamsson – this case addressed the interpretation of Article 141(4): “The ECJ confirmed
that positive action aiming to promote women in those sectors of the public service where
they are under-represented has to be considered as compatible with EU law. It clarified the
conditions in which positive action can be applied and stated that the male and the female
candidates must have equal or almost equal merits. The automatic and absolute preference
of a candidate of the underrepresented sex who had a sufficient but lower qualification was
by contrast incompatible with the principle of equal treatment.” (Nielson p. 25)
Schorbus – in Germany preference was automatically given to men who had completed
military service. (Nielson p. 25) The ECJ found that giving preference to persons who had
completed military service was indeed indirect discrimination in favour of men, but that this
provision was aiming to make up for the time lost to these men in their education etc. It was,
therefore, objective and had equality as its aim and, being proportional, was not contrary to
the Equal Treatment Directive. (Nielson p. 26)
Lommers – Women were given priority in regard to nursery places in the Netherlands. Men
could only get one if there was an emergency. This was held to be proportional and
compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive. (Nielson p. 26)
Nielson’s summary:
“To sum up, the ECJ disallowed positive action measures in the Commission v France,
Kalanke and Abrahamsson, and approved such measures in Marschall, Badeck,
Schnorbus and Lommers. Positive action is unlawful if the measure is very general and
applies for an indefinite period, or if the method selected is disproportionate to the aim
pursued (Abrahamsson). There is considerable latitude for applying gender quota
arrangements when appointing people to training places/positions (Badeck). Although
priority may be given automatically to one sex as regards access to employment and
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working conditions, eg nursery places (Schnorbus and Lommers), the opposite sex
must not be excluded from all possibilities of obtaining a position or a working condition
of the kind concerned (Kalanke, Marschall, Lommers).
The general principle underlying ECJ case-law on positive action is that the principle of
proportionality shall be observed. This means that any special measures that favour
one sex shall serve a lawful purpose, they shall be appropriate and necessary for the
attainment of this goal, and they must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.”
(Nielson p. 26)
Enforcement and Monitoring of EU Equality Law
Johnston – ECJ stated “Uthat all persons have the right to obtain an effective remedy in a
competent court against measure which they consider to be contrary to the principle of equal
treatment for men and women.” (Nielson p. 27)
National Autonomy to Choose Remedies and Procedures
In the absence of detailed EU rules, a lot is up to each Member State, for example, the
choice of penalties, however “Utheir choice must be exercised with respect for the general
EU law principles of equivalence, effectiveness and proportionality.” (Nielson p. 28)
Commission v Greece – The ECJ set out the conditions for acceptable national rules.
(Nielson p. 28)
Article II-47 of the draft Constitutional Treaty provides for a right to an effective remedy and
to a fair trial before a tribunal. (Nielson p. 28)
Nielson notes:
“A person who can only rely on the fundamental right not to be discriminated against on
grounds of sex is, however, in a fairly weak position if she wants to enforce her right. If
a door-step seller for example harasses a customer in her home the Directive on
doorstep selling provides for no specific remedy but the national courts must follow the
general principles of Community law and find an effective remedy.” (Nielson p. 29)
Member States may also have to comply with Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Directive of equal
treatment in the access to and supply of goods and services. (The term “may” is used as this
Directive had not been adopted yet and Nielson was not sure if it actually would be.) (Nielson
p. 29)
The principle of proportionality
Colson – ECJ held that sanctions are necessary. No particular kind of sanction is required to
implement the employment directives, but it should be “Usuch as to guarantee real and
effective judicial protection. Moreover it must also have a real deterrent effect on the
employer.” (Nielson p. 30)
The principle of effectiveness
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Comet – where “UCommunity legislation does not specifically provide any penalty for an
infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative
provisions, Article 10 EC requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to
guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law.” (Nielson p. 30)
Heylens – the ECJ found that there had to be a remedy of a judicial nature when a French
Minister did not recognize a diploma. (Nielson p. 30)
Johnston – the ECJ that this requirement is a general principle of community law. (Nielson p.
30)
Colson – the ECJ found that a German rule providing for reliance damages was insufficient
to act as a deterrent. (Nielson p. 31)
The principle of equivalence
UK – employers did not have to recognize voluntary trade unions:
“The ECJ considered this state of law incompatible with the duty of the Member States
to contribute to the effective application of Community law. In this case the UK
treatment of information and consultation of employees in matters covered by
Community law was the same as the treatment of information and consultation of
employees in national matters not covered by Community law, namely a totally
voluntary solution. The principle of equivalence was thus fulfilled but the principle of
effectiveness was violated.” (Nielson p. 31)
PAREKH, Serena (2007): Resisting “Dull and Torpid” Assent: Returning to the Debate
Over the Foundations of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 29, 754-778
Parekh divides common theories for the foundations of human rights into essentialist and
non-essentialist, and then adds Hannah Arendt to the mix.
Arendt discusses the impossibility of protecting human rights for the stateless in the time
around the Second World War. (Parekh p. 756)
Arendt was not a legal positivist, but she did think that human rights “...are made real only
through human involvement and commitment, which can only occur within a political
community.” (Parekh p. 757)
She understood “the right to have rights” as the right to belong to humanity as part of a
community, and she understood this both politically and ontologically. (Parekh p. 757)
The contemporary debate on human rights
The essentialist approach vs. non-essentialist approach:
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“The group labelled as essentialists are considered together because they base their
justification of human rights on some essential feature of the human being or morality.
Included in this camp are David Little, Jack Donnelly, and Amartya Sen. While there
are certain advantages to this way of arguing, it is also particularly vulnerable to certain
critiques outlined below.
On the other hand, the anti-essentialists have explicitly sought ways to avoid an
essentialist foundation for human rights. Michael Ignatieff, Richard Rorty, and Beth
Singer derive three distinct ways of justifying human rights that do not rely on any
essential property of human beings, nature, or morality.” (Parekh p. 763)
The essentialist approach
There were attempts to keep the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
neutral but, in the end, the assumption of the natural dignity of persons was included.
(Parekh p. 763)
David Little
Parekh now discusses David Little’s account of the naturalness and objectivity of human
rights in “The Nature and Basis of Human Rights”. (Parekh p. 764 ff)
For Little “human rights are grounded upon moral norms which exist independently of human
acknowledgement. D This view is based on a view of moral intuitionism – namely the
wrongness of certain actions are so intuitively clear that they do not require further
explanation or a theological ground to show why the action is wrong.” (Parekh p. 764)
This rational intuitionalism is meant to be distinguishable from the sensational intuitionism of
Hutcheson and Shaftsbury. (Parekh p. 765)
Parekh questions whether all human rights violations are transparently wrong in this way and
so rejects this approach as a suitable basis for human rights. (Parekh p. 765)
Jack Donnelly
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice: “Donnelly argues for the universality of
human rights which he understands as claims that are historically specific and contingent.”
(Parekh p. 765)
Donnelly discusses the possession paradox: “Dhaving human rights is only important when
one is in some sense denied them.” In other words, this is the distinction between
possessing a right and enforcing that right. (Parekh p. 766)
Donnelly situates the source of human rights in “man’s moral nature” and says they are
needed to sustain dignity (which he defines as the “inner (moral) nature and worth of the
person”). As Parekh points out, this is a rather problematic position as Donnelly, is at the
same time, suspicious of claims about human nature as such. “The problem with his view is
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that to posit human rights emerge out of moral nature and inherent dignity is to posit a
particular view of human nature, namely as being intrinsically moral and dignified.” It is
difficult to see how this position can be reconciled with his claim that he is neutral in regard to
a view of human nature. (Parekh pp. 766-767)
Amartya Sen
“Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”: “human rights are primarily ethical demands
that can survive open and informed scrutiny.” (Parekh p. 767)
Two aspects: first, human rights are primarily ethical rather than legal; second, they must be
open to public debate, Rawlsian style. On the second point, they are, then, somewhat
indeterminate and open to debate. (Parekh p. 767)
“On the surface it is not immediately clear how Sen is an essentialist. What makes Sen
an essentialist is that he seems to take for granted a kind of moral realism-that moral
principles exist independently of human recognition or power relations, and that they
simply need to be discovered. In other words, he is assuming that morality is in some
way natural and independent of human action. Consequently his view is open to the
usual critiques of moral scepticism. Sen does not take into account the argument that
morality is a human convention that masks power relations, which is particularly
important since his theory is intended to overcome scepticism.” (Parekh p. 767)
Parekh also questions the public reasoning side of Sen’s view by pointing out that this is not
neutral in regard to power relations and also that it gives too much importance to the role of
reason. (Parekh p. 768)
Summary of the essentialist positions
“They have in common a reliance on metaphysical principles, though there is
considerable variation in the principles on which they rely.” (Parekh p. 768)
Parekh points out the advantage of essentialist views: they provide good reasons for human
rights to be upheld. It also shows how human rights exist even when they are not recognized
by institutions, so it is reasonable to demand them even when they are not legally
enforceable. (Parekh pp. 768-769)
Parekh also rehearses the common problems: can we really support claims about human
nature or morality in this way and agree on the content? Parekh thinks these claims are, in
fact, unsustainable in a “post-metaphysical environment” (Parekh p. 769)
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The Anti-essentialist approach
Michael Ignatieff
For Ignatieff, human rights are political “Din the sense of being necessary for the
adjudication of conflicts (although not necessarily to bring them to a resolution) and grounded
on human history, not nature, the dignity of man, or morality. Ignatieff explicitly denies that
there is something important about being human or having human dignity that is entitled to
respect (as Jack Donnelly holds). According to what he calls a humanist position, there is
nothing sacred about a human being and nothing that entitles us to ultimate respect. The
only thing that can be said about human rights is that history has taught that they are
necessary to prevent violence and abuse, and this is why they are needed.” (Parekh p. 769)
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry: He claims that human rights are like a secular religion,
in that, being grounded in metaphysical assumptions; they are like an article of faith. He also
thinks grounding human rights in human nature confuses “is” and “ought”. (Parekh p. 770)
Rather than adopting a foundational approach, Ignatieff favours supporting human rights for
what we know they can do for people. (Parekh p. 770)
Parekh makes an interesting objection that if Ignatieff wants to hold that there is nothing
special about humans, then it is difficult to see why we should bother with human rights to
help them. (Parekh p. 770)
Richard Rorty
The starting point is deciding what counts as human because human rights violations are
often inflicted on a group seen as less than human. (Parekh p. 770)
He does not want to engage with foundational arguments but, rather, to make “human rights
culture more self-conscious and more powerful.” (Parekh p. 771)
“D [He] asserts that concern for human rights seems to come not from an increase in
moral knowledge, but in hearing sad, sentimental stories. It is more efficient, he argues,
if we concentrated our energies on ‘manipulating sentiments, on sentimental
education.’ The purpose of such an education would be to encourage people to see
others who are different than themselves as fully human.” (Parekh p. 771 – footnotes
omitted)
So Rorty is not interested in foundations and he wants human rights education to stop trying
to be rational as it is a waste of time. (Parekh p. 771)
Parekh points out, however, that Rorty does explain his own position in a rational manner.
(Parekh p. 771)
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Beth Singer
Singer rejects the a priori and essentialist accounts of human rights. “Instead she argues that
human rights are conferred by a community through the establishment of norms and thus
rights are not a priori or antecedent to membership in a community. This is because, in order
for a right to be ‘operative,’ that is, for a right to exist, it must be institutionalized in a
community.” (Parekh p. 772 – footnote omitted)
If a right is not operative, this means that we think that persons should have this right, rather
than that we have the right, but it is just not protected. (Parekh p. 772)
“For Singer D human rights are characteristic of the communities in which they are
operative, they are not the characteristics of persons, since rights are ultimately social
institutions.” (Parekh p. 773)
Parekh points out some gaps in Singer’s theory: “Singer does not explain why people enter
this normative community in the first placeD. Further, she does not account for why we
‘ought’ to have human rights when we are denied them.” (Parekh p. 774)
Summary of the Anti-essentialist positions
•
A refusal to employ metaphysical principles.
•
Not as forceful or convincing as essentialist theories.
Arendt and the contemporary debate
Parekh promotes Arendt’s position as a third way between essentialist and non-essentialist
theories.
She is non-essentialist in that she denies that we can know our essence or nature (and
maybe even denies that we have such a thing). Instead, she sees us as conditioned beings
and grounds human rights upon “the human condition, the conditions under which life is
given to us.” (Parekh p. 774)
Parekh claims that this does not “posit any natural features of human nature” (Parekh p. 775)
Arendt is also distinct from non-essentialists: “For Arendt, human rights are the conditions
which make possible human life, understood biologically and existentially, and consequently
these rights are both important and necessary. Arendt's position, then, gives strong reason to
believe in human rights without relying on a naturalistic conception of them. For Arendt,
human rights which are created by determination create the possibility of both equality and
distinction. For Arendt, equality is not something natural, but something for which we create
the conditions. Yet equality is one of the conditions for political action-we can only act with
others who are our equals. In this sense, the conditions for action rest upon human rights
insofar as they guarantee our equality”. (Parekh p. 775)
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Conclusion
Parekh expands on Arendt’s contribution to human rights: “For Arendt, the right to belong to
a political community is primary for two reasons. First, it means that one's human rights can
be protected by a government. Although they may exist in theory without government
protection, Arendt's experience as a stateless person taught her that this step was no small
part of the meaning of human rights. Second, belonging to a political community means that
individuals have a place in the world where they can speak and act meaningfully. This means
that life, in both its biological and existential sense, can be protected.” (Parekh p. 777)
Importantly, Arendt’s theory makes it clear that stateless people need to be given the
conditions under which their human rights can be realized (a political community) as a matter
of utmost importance. (Parekh p. 777)
Arendt also shows us why we need to be vigilant in relation to human rights. (Parekh p. 777)
PATEL, Pragna (2003): Notes on Gender and Racial Discrimination: An urgent need to
integrate an intersectional perspective to the examination und development of
policies, strategies und remedies for gender and racial equality,
vgl.: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/Patel45.htm
Patel beschäftigt sich mit der Kombination von gender und „race“/ethnicity. Sie benennt die
Schwierigkeiten einer lediglich eindimensionalen Sicht auf Diskriminierung. (Patel p. 9) Patel
legt den Schwerpunkt auf häusliche Gewalt in Zusammenhang mit Einwanderungsrecht,
Strafgerichtswesen und einem multikulturellen Ansatz. Gegen Ende des Artikels gibt Patel
Empfehlungen für Regierungen und das UN System ab, um die Situation zu verbessern.
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POST, Robert (2000): Prejudicial Appearances: The
Antidiscrimination Law, California Law Review 88, 1 – 40,
vgl: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/192#
Logic
of
American
Robert Post: Discussion of affirmative action (Santa Cruz ordinance). He claims that it was
not about equality as such (in the sense of dragging everyone down to the same level) but,
rather, about equality of opportunity, “...allowing all to compete on equal terms for the title of
‘best-qualified person’”. (Post p. 5)
As the Santa Cruz ordinance was about discrimination on the grounds of appearance, Post
also makes some observations about what this means in terms of self-expression and
communication for both employer and potential employee:
“The theme of self-expression, however, rests on the seemingly paradoxical notion that
persons have the right both to use their appearance to communicate meanings,
including messages of "threat," and simultaneously to require others to ignore these
messages. If we concentrate on employment relationships, we can see that the selfdetermination of the employee must be set against the autonomy of the employer to
present a particular image of her business.” (Post p. 5)
The Santa Cruz ordinance tried to get around this by only banning discrimination based on
those aspects of the candidate’s appearance that were beyond his/her control. The
overarching ground the law tried to capture could be described as fairness. (Post pp. 5 – 6)
Outlawing discrimination on the basis of appearance, however, seems very problematic as it
is very vague, potentially very broad, and may lead to excessive government intervention. It
may be described as the reductio ad absurdum of anti-discrimination law. (Post pp. 7 – 8)
Summary of anti-discrimination law:
“Antidiscrimination law in America characteristically presents itself according to a very
definite logic. It is a logic that springs from a firm sense of the social reality of prejudice.
Antidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize widespread forms of prejudice that
pervasively disadvantage persons based upon inaccurate judgments about their worth
or capacities.” (Post p. 8)
Traits need not be immutable for discrimination to be unfair – for example, religion or marital
status. (Post p. 8)
Difference between judgments on a person’s worth and a person’s capacities: (Post p. 9)
“Taken as a whole, American antidiscrimination law thus follows a simple but powerful
logic. In the context of ‘race’-based discrimination, Paul Brest has authoritatively
summarized this logic as an "antidiscrimination principle" that "lies at the core of most
state and federal civil rights legislation," and that "disfavour[s] classifications and other
decisions and practices that depend on the ‘race’... of the parties affected.' As a result,
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American antidiscrimination law typically requires employers, except in exceptional and
discrete circumstances such as affirmative action, to make decisions as if their
employees did not exhibit forbidden characteristics, as if, for example, employees had
no ‘race’ or sex. This is what underwrites the important trope of 'blindness" that "has
played a dominant role in the interpretation of antidiscrimination prohibitions." (Post p.
11 – footnote omitted)
Post questions how/whether it is possible for employers to act as if blind to all the
characteristics of a person that would normally be relevant to everyday social life. (Post p.
12)
Here Post discusses the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” as something analogous and equally
problematic. For Rawls this creates the “original position” from which we can view humans as
rational beings with their own ends. (Post p. 12) Post points out that if anti-discrimination law
is meant to strip people down to their intrinsic worth that this is no basis for comparison as
our intrinsic worth is, by definition, equal. (Post p. 13) So, it cannot be that, rather antidiscrimination law wants people to be judged based on individual merit – in short, a person’s
ability to perform the job. (Post p. 13)
Another term used here is “functional rationality”. (Post p. 14)
“For this reason, John Schaar has criticized the equality of opportunity celebrated by
antidiscrimination laws as resting on a conception of the person that reduces her "to a
bundle of abilities, an instrument valued according to its capacity for performing socially
valued functions with more or less efficiency.” (Post p. 14 – footnote omitted)
Post gives the example of orchestra auditions in the States where the auditionee is hidden
behind a screen so that he/she is meant to be judged only on the sound produced.
Four points from this:
“First, it is no small irony that American antidiscrimination law, which springs from the
noble liberal impulse to protect persons from the indignities of prejudicial mistreatment,
should in the end unfold itself according to a logic that points unmistakably toward the
instrumentalization of persons.” (Post p. 15)
Second, it assumes that musicianship and job performance in general is not connected to
gender. It assumes, in other words, that gender does not have an impact on the auditionee’s
playing; that there is no “male” or “female” style. Third, the screen worked, in the sense that
the number of women in orchestras increased. (This would seem to support the previously
mentioned assumption.) Fourth, the screen could not continue into the actual employment –
once the audition was over, the musician had to work with the orchestra is full view and could
still be a victim of ongoing discrimination. Being a musician in an orchestra is not all about
the music, but all aspects of the job. (Post pp. 15 – 16)
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Post wants to argue that “the dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law,
distorts and masks the actual operation of that law, and by so doing, potentially undermines
the law’s coherence and usefulness as a tool of transformative social policy.“ (Post p. 16)
First Post points out that we have anti-discrimination laws on subjects like ‘race’ and gender
as these matter to us, socially, in our cultural context. He then adds this to the fact that the
law is also a social institution. Anti-discrimination law is, then, “... itself a social practice,
which regulates other social practices, because the latter have become for one reason or
another controversial.” (Post p. 17)
Post then goes on to discuss sex discrimination as an example of the way the law tries to
theorise itself in Rawlsian terms, but shows that it is really a social practice.
He points out that we always encounter men and women, not non-sexed rational beings:
“Sex is thus pervasively important in our understanding of the capacities of persons.
This is as true for those who make and apply the law as it is for those whom the law
seeks to regulate.” (Post p. 20)
Post says that as we are not sexless, anti-sex-discrimination laws must mean that we are
challenged to see sex differently, requiring us “to sever the connection between gender and
some capacities, such as strength.” (Post p. 20)
Post discusses the example of a security company that wanted an exception to allow
discrimination and not hire women as guards because they argued that their customers
considered women weaker and would therefore not use their company if they had women
guards. This claims that gender is, in this case relevant to functional rationality and that
functional rationality can reinforce traditional gender understandings. (Post pp. 20 - 21)
“Sex blindness does not make sense unless these characteristics are understood to be
fundamentally disconnected from functional rationality. The coherence of the dominant
conception requires us to conceptualize the trait of musicianship as statistically
distributed between the sexes, like the trait of physical strength”. (Post p. 21)
It is not that women are necessarily worse as security guards; it is rather that the customers
of the company think that they are. Therefore hiring women, even if just as strong as the
male candidates, could hurt the company as its customers would be put off using them, as
the customers may have the perception that women are weaker etc. Hence Post describes
the problem as functional rationality rather than job performance as such. (Post p. 22) He
points out that if the company is not profitable, that there are simply no jobs to perform, so he
thinks that functional rationality takes precedence over job performance. What if functional
rationality is affected by sex and gender? At least it sometimes is, says Post, so how about
asking which capacities are not?
Post then discusses Wilson v Southwest Airlines. The airline wanted an exception so that it
would hire only attractive female flight attendants as this was crucial to its success as a
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business. The court refused as it was an airline, so primarily a transport company rather than
a business selling sex in some form. Sex was not relevant to employee capacities in a
transport company. (Post pp. 22 – 23)
Contrast this, however, with the case of Craft v Metromedia Inc, in which a female TV news
anchor complained that she had to meet a higher and different standard of appearance to
her male colleagues. The court held that the TV business expected presenters to dress to
community accepted standards and that, in the conservative area in which this company
operated, that included more feminine clothing for women etc. The court did not redefine the
primary purpose of the business to clash with that argued by the company. So no distinction
was made between “disseminating the news and the requirements of generating an
audience” (Post pp. 24 – 25). Thus, the company could treat the anchor not as sexless, but
as a woman, and so impose different drew code on her.
A third case: Fesel v Masonic Home of Delaware Inc which refused to hire male nurse’s
aides. (Post p. 25) Most of home’s residents were female and the aides had to do a lot of
personal care. The court held that here the sex of the aide was crucial to job performance
even though the preference for female aides was seen to rest on stereotypes. The
stereotypes were seen as legitimate. (Post pp. 25 – 26)
Contrast to Griffin v Michigan Department of Corrections, in which the court criticised the
state for not allowing women to work in men’s prisons. The court stated that the policy was
“...based on a stereotypical sexual characterization that a viewing of an inmate while nude or
performing bodily functions, by a member of the opposite sex, is intrinsically more odious
than the viewing by a member of one's own sex.“ (quoted in Post p. 27)
What is the difference between these two cases? Post argues that this illustrates that as:
“gender norms come to seem more fundamental to a court, it will be correspondingly more
reluctant to disturb them. Norms that are fundamental are those that are significant and
uncontroversial when seen from the perspective of those implementing the law.” (Post p.
28)
Courts are very unwilling to stop employers imposing different standards of appearance,
dress, grooming on the sexes as long as these are in line with community standards. (Post p.
29)
Post contrasts the dominant perception of anti-discrimination law with his own, which he calls
the sociological account. (Post p. 31)
“According to the sociological account, antidiscrimination law must be seen as
transforming preexisting social practices, such as ‘race’ or gender, by reconstructing
the social identities of persons.' The sociological account does not ask whether
"stereotypic impressions" can be eliminated tout court, but rather how the law alters
and modifies such impressions.” (Post p. 31, footnote omitted)
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It is not that the sociological account is always incompatible with the dominant account, (Post
p. 31) but the sociological account can explain what is going on in court decisions in ways
that the dominant account cannot – see, again, the previously discussed cases. (Post pp. 32
- 33) He also gives another personal appearance, grooming case Willingham v Macon
Telegraph to show courts upholding sex-based differences in grooming standards as long as
these conform to community expectations. (Post pp. 33 – 34)
Because the dominant conception does not allow courts to discuss what is really going on, it
also undermines the law’s “internal architecture and integrity” (Post p. 36)
Also: “If the point of antidiscrimination law is to transform existing social practices, then
courts must ask what purpose the law expects to accomplish by such transformations. The
dominant conception systematically obscures this question.” (Post p. 36)
And: “A virtue of the sociological account is that it has the capacity to tame this irresistible
impulse to suppress explicit racial and gender classifications. If antidiscrimination law were to
reorient itself around the project of purposively reshaping the social practices of ‘race’ and
gender, explicit racial or gender classifications may or may not be suspect, depending upon
whether they affect ‘race’ or gender practices in ways that are compatible with the purposes
of the law.” (Post p. 38)
Post thinks that Brennan managed this somewhat in United Steelworks v Weber and
Johnson v Transportation Agency, by taking account of the historical context in those cases.
(Post pp. 38 - 39)
POTHIER, Dianne (2001): Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real Peoples’ Real
Experiences, 13 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 37
Pothier is in favour of retaining a grounds-based analysis. In support of her position in favour
of specific, exhaustive grounds, she has an interesting historical example of a general call for
“equality” being used in the American constitution to allow particular kinds of inequality to
continue. That is, the general call for “equality” was less strong and demanding than if the
grounds had been specified. (Pothier, p. 40)
Introduction
“The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that a thorough understanding of the
grounds of discrimination, including intersecting grounds, provides an opportunity for a
more complex and richer understanding of equality of discrimination, which thereby
enables anti-discrimination law to be relevant to real people’s real experiences.”
(Pothier p. 39)
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Grounds of Discrimination: Distraction or Illumination?
American Constitutional History shows a general ground of “equality” may actually have a
limiting affect on discrimination claims. More limiting, that is, than when specific grounds are
identified. (Pothier p. 40)
Are grounds disconnected from real experiences? Pothier thinks, no, that instead grounds
provide “U an important means of providing the necessary history and context of
discrimination.” (Pothier p. 40)
“Grounds of discrimination are not a purely legal construct. They reflect a political and
social reality to which the law has, belatedly, given recognition.” (Pothier p. 41)
Pothier critically discusses the approach of Canadian judge Justice L’Heureux-Dubé who
prefers to move away from grounds to a more open definition of discrimination based on
human dignity. The idea is to look at the impact (discriminatory effect) rather than the
constituent elements (the grounds). Grounds would then become a secondary, rather than
primary aspect of discrimination analysis. (Pothier p. 41)
L’Heureux-Dubé also emphasizes the social vulnerability of affected individuals in
determining whether discrimination has occurred. (Pothier 42)
Pothier, however, wants to maintain grounds: “Using domestic workers as an example, the
fact that they are predominantly immigrant women of colour is, in my assessment, of greater
significance than simply background social context. The grounds of gender and ‘race’ are a
crucial part of the explanation of why domestic workers have such poor working conditions
and such weak legislative protection.” (Pothier p. 43)
Human Rights Cases
Grounds are central here. (Pothier p. 45)
Gender Analysis
British Columbia Government and Service and Employees’ Union v British Columbia (Public
Service Employee Relations Commission) – Tawney Meiorin was laid off as a forest fire
fighter after failing a fitness test (she had to run 2.5km in 11 min and she missed by 49
seconds). This test was likely to be more difficult for women than men. The Court decided
the test was not a reasonably necessary occupation requirement. It had been designed
based on the fire fighters working at the time which were mostly men. (Pothier p. 45)
Pothier is critical of the judge’s attempt to play down the importance of grounds in reaching
this decision. (Pothier p. 45)
Disability Analysis
The British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of
Human Rights) – a bus driver was denied a license as there was a ban on anyone with a
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certain eye condition holding such a license. The court emphasized that individual
circumstances needed to be taken into account. (Pothier pp. 46 – 47)
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand
(City) – Pothier argues that this demonstrates how flexible a grounds-approach can be.
These were three related cases where people were hired or fired based on medical
conditions that were not producing any symptoms at the time. The employer wanted to avoid
future problems. The ground in question was “handicap”; so the question was whether these
people were “handicapped” or not. (Pothier p. 47) Again, Pothier thinks that analysis with
regard to grounds is useful here:
“The purpose of having protection against disability discrimination is not to give
persons with disabilities a right to do things they cannot do. Rather, the dual purpose is
to take proper account of what cannot be done owing to a disability as well as to give
persons with disabilities the right to do things that they are able to do, notwithstanding
any functional limitations, despite perceptions that they cannot do these things. Thus,
protection against disability discrimination has everything to do with countering
stereotypical perceptions of ability based on an able-bodied frame of reference.”
(Pothier p. 48)
Pothier points out that the employers were preoccupied with having “normal” employees –
also into the future. She thinks it is important to understand that people who are not “normal”
are more vulnerable to being excluded. The judge in the Boisbrand case also made a point
about disability discrimination being about “Uobstacles to the full participation in society
rather than on the condition or state of the individual”. (Pothier p. 48)
Pothier sees nothing inherently contradictory between taking a relation approach and a
grounds approach. (Pothier p. 49)
Constitutional Jurisprudence
It was in the context of the Charter that judge L’Heureux-Dubé spoke out against the grounds
approach. (Pothier p. 49)
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RAAB, Heike (2007): Intersektionalität in den Disability Studies. Zur Interdependenz
von Behinderung, Heteronormativität und Geschlecht, in: WALDSCHMIDT, Anna (Hg.):
Disability Studies, Kultursoziologie und Soziologie der Behinderung: Erkundungen in
einem neuen Forschungsfeld, Bielefeld.
Interdependenz von Behinderung, Heteronormativität und Geschlecht werden erörtert.
Intersektionalität wird als Analysemodell verwendet, um der tatsächlichen Bandbreite von
Behinderung gerecht zu werden. Die Analysekategorien sind nicht hierarisch geordnet.
(Raab S. 128) Behinderung wird erörtert als soziokulturelle Praxis, in Zusammenhang mit
Macht und sozialer Ungleichheit. (Raab S. 29) Konstruktionen von Behinderung bringen
durch Abgrenzungsprozesse Differenzen hervor.
„Rasse“, Geschlecht etc. sind Differenzierungskategorien. (Raab S. 133)
SCHIEK, Dagmar (2009): From European Union Non-discrimination Law Towards
Multidimensional Equality Law for Europe, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE, Victoria,
European Union Non-Discrimination Law, Comparative Perspectives on
Multidimensional Equality Law. Routledge Cavendish, London, New York.
EU Gleichbehandlungsrecht ist multidimensional. Erstens in seinen konzeptionellen
Ansätzen hinsichtlich Form und Inhalt, hinsichtlich der Frage, ob Individuen oder Gruppen
adressiert werden und hinsichtlich der Frage, ob es um Ergebnisgleichheit (Gleichstellung)
oder
um
Gleichbehandlung
geht.
Weiters
ist
es
hinsichtlich
Unterscheidungskriterien mehrdimensional. „The notion of
der
verpönten
multi-dimensionality thus
encompasses the interrelation of different conceptions of equality law as well as the
intersections between discrimination grounds.” (S 3)
Das geltende EU Nicht-Diskriminierungsrecht ist aus Art 13 EUV (Amsterdam) abgeleitet.
Die Auswirkungen dieser Bestimmung wurden von den Staats- und Regierungschefs bei der
Beschlussfassung wohl kaum bedacht. So kam die Kommission sehr schnell mit den
Richtlinienvorschlägen für die RL 2000/43/EG zur Gleichbehandlung aufgrund der
ethnischen Zugehörigkeit, die über die Grenzen von Arbeitsrecht und Sozialpolitik
hinausgeht, und für die RL 2000/78/EG, welche mehrere Gründe umfasst, den
Anwendungsbereich jedoch auf die Arbeitswelt (iwS) beschränkt. Der Sozialschutz wurde in
letzterer
ausgeklammert,
findet
sich
traditionell
in
der
Geschlechtergleichstellungsgesetzgebung. Bis dahin (2000) war der Rechtsschutz zur
Gleichbehandlung auf Geschlecht und Nationalität beschränkt. RL 2002/73/EG und
2004/113/EG entwickelten die Gesetzgebung zur Geschlechtergleichstellung weiter.
Letztere, die auch den Zugang zu Gütern und Dienstleistungen schützt geht allerdings nicht
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so weit wie die RL 2000/43/EG und klammert die Bildung (aus nicht ersichtlichen Gründen)
vom Gleichbehandlungsgebot aus.
Die Genderdebatte unterstreicht die Spannung zwischen dem Gedanken der formalen und
der materiellen Gleichheit. Der asymmetrische Charakter von Diskriminierungen in der
gesellschaftlichen Realität und die Schwierigkeiten in der individuellen Rechtsdurchsetzung
führten zur Forderung nach wirksamen Rechtsmitteln einerseits und begleitender
institutioneller Unterstützung andererseits. Der EuGH hat diese Forderungen mit
entsprechender Rechtsprechung unterstützt (Beispiele S. 4). In Art 3 EUV wurde eine
Gender-Mainstreaming Klausel eingefügt.
Durch die Diskussion im Vereinigten Königreich, dass trotz „Rassengleichheitsgesetzen“
institutioneller
Rassismus
persistent
ist,
entstand
die
Überlegung,
durch positive
Maßnahmen als Verpflichtung für Institutionen statt mittels individueller Rechtsdurchsetzung
diese
Defizite
zu
beseitigen.
Diese
Entwicklung
wird
als
4.
Generation
des
Gleichbehandlungsrechts bezeichnet, allerdings fanden diese Überlegungen noch keinen
Eingang in das europäische Gleichbehandlungsrecht (besser: Gleichstellungsrecht).
All diese Entwicklungen und unterschiedlichen konzeptionellen Ansätze führten zu einem
sehr fragmentierten Gleichbehandlungsrecht auf europäischer Ebene. Die konzeptionellen
Ansätze sind zum Teil sogar widersprüchlich. Die RL, zusammen mit der Rechtsprechung
des
EuGH
beinhalten
substantielle
Gleichheitsaspekte
und
gehen
über
formale
Gleichbehandlungserfordernisse hinaus. Ein Beispiel dafür ist die Rechtsprechung und
schließlich Normierung, dass die Diskriminierung von Schwangeren eine sexuelle
Diskriminierung darstellt.
Aufgrund der sozialen Realität sind asymmetrische Zugänge zu Gleichheit erforderlich.
Außerdem sind die wechselseitigen Verbindungen der Diskriminierungsmotive zu beachten.
Durch die Zersplitterung der Rechtsmaterie und durch die unterschiedlichen Schutzniveaus
und Schutzbereiche ist dies allerdings erschwert. Dies führt zu einer essentialistischen
Auslegung (Betonung durch den single-ground Ansatz) (S 6). Es ist an den Mitgliedsstaaten,
einen „body of equality law“ zu entwickeln.
Das EU Gleichbehandlungsrecht muss im Kontext der europäischen Integration gesehen
werden. Diese hat sich von einem marktorientierten Projekt zu einem breiten Politikkonzept
entwickelt, das im Vertrag von Lissabon gipfelte. Dabei steht die EU noch immer im
Wettbewerb mit ihren Mitgliedsstaaten, was sich in der Sozialpolitik besonders ausdrückt,
weil hier die Kompetenzen besonders zersplittert sind. Zu Beginn meinte man, durch einen
gemeinsamen Markt harmonisiere sich die Wirtschaftspolitik, führe zu höherem Wohlstand
und bringe damit ohne weitere Intervention sozialen Zusammenhalt hervor. Diese Meinung
wurde wohl mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht aufgegeben, die EU blieb aber vorerst in erster
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Linie Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Nicht-Diskriminierung und Gleichstellung hatten jedenfalls
einen hohen Stellenwert, sind sie doch auch Grundlagen für einen offenen und freien Markt.
Dazu gehört auch die Mobilität von Arbeitskraft. Was also Marktintegration war, entwickelte
sich zu einer Basis für individuelle Ansprüche auf Gleichbehandlung und Anerkennung von
Qualifikationen.
Die EU Bürgerschaft wurde mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht eingeführt (gleichzeitig mit der
Währungsunion). Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum freien Personenverkehr hat zusätzlich
auch den Zugang zum Wohlfahrtsstaat für Drittstaatsangehörige bzw. deren Angehörige
geklärt. Citizenship und Nicht-Diskriminierung sind eng miteinander verbunden. Das zeigt
sich nicht nur in Art 12 (Citizenship) und 13 (Gleichbehandlung) EUV. Die Bestimmungen
begründen Gleichbehandlung von BürgerInnen unterschiedlicher Nationalitäten. EU
Citizenship ist ein Beispiel „multipler Identität“ (S 8) und erfordert Diversity Management und
Förderung von Integration. Nicht-Diskriminierungsrecht ist also eine Notwendigkeit für ein
„cosmopolitan citizenship“. Gleichbehandlungsrecht geht weiter als Citizenship. Haben
Drittstaatsangehörige
einen
legalen
geschützt.
Aufenthaltsstatus,
Weiters
kann
sind
auch
auch
die
RL
sie
durch
das
2000/43/EG
trotz
Einschränkung dahin gehend interpretiert werden, dass auch im Immigrationsverfahren
Gleichbehandlung geboten ist.
Der Vertrag von Maastricht führte mit Art 6 EUV eine Referenz zu Menschenrechten ein. Für
den
Bereich
der
Gender-Gleichstellung
war
es
schon
früher
der
EuGH,
der
menschenrechtliche Gesichtspunkte vertrat. Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH ist eine
wesentliche
Quelle
Menschenrechte,
für
die
Entwicklung
Citizenship-Law
und
eines
gemeinsamen Grundrechtskatalogs.
Nicht-Diskriminierung
spielen
in
der
Rechtsentwicklung der EU eine wechselwirkende Rolle. Zwischen Menschenrechten und
Gleichbehandlungsrecht existieren aber auch Friktionen, zB in der Abwägung von
Geschlechterungleichheit und Religionsfreiheit, wie am „hijab-enigma“ gezeigt wird (S 9).
Das EU Gleichbehandlungsrecht ist auch weiter entwickelt als das Diskriminierungsverbot in
der EMRK. Das kann zu Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere bei der Beurteilung von
intersektionellen Fällen, führen. So ist zB zu erwarten, dass der EuGH Kopftuchverbote
anders beurteilt als der EGMR.
Das
als
Diskriminierungsverbot
entwickelt
sich
zum
Gleichstellungsrecht unter Berücksichtigung von New Governance Ansätzen. Bislang
konzentriert sich das EU-Gleichbehandlungsrecht auf das Diskriminierungsverbot samt
Rechtsdurchsetzungsmöglichkeiten.
Die
Politik
entwickelt
sich
jedoch
in
Richtung
Gleichstellung. Das Verhältnis dieser beiden Entwicklungen ist noch ungeklärt (S 10). Die
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Debatte ist kontroversiell. Gleichheit bezeichne den gewünschten Zustand, welcher durch
Gleichstellung und Diskriminierungsverbot herzustellen wäre (S 10).
Zusätzlich zum Diskriminierungsverbot enthält der Vertrag von Amsterdam auch eine
Verpflichtung zum Gender-Mainstreaming, der im Vertrag von Lissabon durch Art 3 (2) zu
einer allgemeinen Verpflichtung zum Gleichbehandlungsmainstreaming erweitert wurde. Der
Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der EU nennt in Art 5a alle in Art 13 EUV genannten Gründe
als Mainstreamingmaterie. Mainstreaming zielt auf Änderungen in den Politikinhalten in Form
von Reorganisation, Verbesserung
und Evaluation von
Prozessen ab,
um
eine
Gleichstellungsperspektive in allen Politikfeldern auf allen Ebenen in allen Phasen
einzubeziehen. Mainstreaming ist demnach ein Instrument zur strukturellen Gleichstellung
(new governance structures, S. 11). Mainstreaming beinhaltet partizipative Prozesse und soll
im strukturellen Bereich eine größere und nachhaltigere Wirkung entfalten als traditionelles
„hard law“. Die Open Method of Coordination (OMC) soll die Notwendigkeit von EU
Gesetzgebung in sozialpolitischen Feldern umgehen. Mit diesem Instrument sollen die
Mitgliedsstaaten überzeugt werden, Gleichstellungsziele durch freiwillige Maßnahmen und
durch Lieferung und Austausch von Good Practice zu erreichen.
Trotz der Erwartungen, die in die New Governance Structures gesetzt werden ist die
individuelle Rechtsdurchsetzung für die von Intersektionalitäten betroffenen Menschen
wichtig. Die Ausgewogenheit zwischen New Governance Instrumenten und durchsetzbaren
Rechten ist noch zu finden.
Die Herausforderungen für ein mehrdimensionales Gleichstellungsrecht sind vielfältig. Je
mehr „Gründe“ das Anti-Diskriminierungsrecht umfasst, desto wahrscheinlicher wird es mit
Mehrdimensionalität der Realität umgehen können. Das wird umso bedeutender in
Situationen, in denen unterschiedliche Ausschließungsmechanismen wirken. Unterdrückung
zu
lokalisieren
ist
nicht
notwendigerweise
eine
rechtliche
Frage,
Sozial-
und
Politikwissenschaft haben hier wesentliche Beiträge geleistet. Gleichstellung ist auch im
Sinne von Interdisziplinarität mehrdimensional.
Welche
Formen
von
Mehrfachdiskriminierung
sind
zu
unterscheiden?
Mehrfachdiskriminierung oder Multidimensionale Gleichheit (Anm. als Synonym verwendet,
S. 13) sind als Überbegriffe zu verstehen. Weiters werden additive und intersektionale
Diskriminierung unterschieden. Additive Diskriminierung bezeichnet Diskriminierungen, bei
denen mehrere separate Gründe (nebeneinander) wirken. Intersektionelle Diskriminierung ist
eine unsichtbare Interaktion von Diskriminierungsgründen, die als solche betroffene
Personen benachteiligt. Additive Diskriminierung ist weniger schwer zu fassen als
intersektionelle, weil „alle“ Mitglieder von zB ethnischen Minderheiten dieselben Erfahrungen
machten und „alle“ Frauen ebenfalls, während bei intersektioneller Diskriminierung eben
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„nur“ Frauen mit einer ethnischen Minderheitenzugehörigkeit betroffen sind. Allerdings ist
wiederum zu bezweifeln, ob es eine reine Form additiver Diskriminierung überhaupt gibt. (S
13)
SCHIEK, Dagmar (2011): Organizing EU Equality Law around the Nodes of ‚Race‘,
Gender and Disability, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, LAWSON, Anna: European Union NonDiscrimination Law and Intersectionality – Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender
and Disability Discrimination, Ashgate.
In diesem Artikel spricht sich Schiek für eine Ausweitung der Diskriminierungsgründe aus. Es
würden mehr Fälle durch das Nicht-Diskriminierungsrecht abgedeckt werden, mehr
Betroffene würden Gerechtigkeit erfahren und das öffentliche Bewusstsein würde steigen.
Ein negativer Effekt ist die Hierarchie; das Feld könnte sich dadurch aufweichen. Um die
positiven Effekte zu erreichen und die negativen zu vermeiden, strukturiert Schiek
Diskriminierungsgründe um die drei „Knoten“: „Rasse“, Geschlecht und Behinderung.
Im
ersten
Abschnitt
Diskriminierungsgründen
zeigt
in
Schiek
den
das
unterschiedliche
verschiedenen
Ausmaß
internationalen
an
verpönten
Konventionen
und
Dokumenten auf. (Schiek S. 11-14) Sie befasst sich mit der Hierarchisierung der
Diskriminierungsgründe und deren mangelnder Begründung bzw. wenig überzeugenden
Rationalität.
Die Gleichbehandlung aller Gründe (auch ausgeweitet) ist nicht unbedingt notwendig.
Allerdings birgt die unterschiedliche Behandlung unterschiedlicher Gründe die Gefahr einer
Hierarchisierung.
Durch die Anordnung von Diskriminierungsgründen als Knoten kann eine Hierarchisierung
vermieden werden. Jeder Knoten hat ein Zentrum (Geschlecht, „Rasse“ oder Behinderung)
und eine Peripherie. Je nachdem können sich andere Gründe näher oder weiter entfernt vom
Zentrum befinden. Durch das Überlappen können die Positionen anderer Gründe auch in
Hinblick auf zwei oder sogar drei der Knoten bestimmt werden. (Schiek S. 19)
Schiek begründet die Auswahl der drei Knoten sowohl über formale als auch über
konzeptionelle
Argumente.
Formale
Argumente
sind
die
drei
Nicht-
Diskriminierungskonventionen der UN (CERD, CEDAW und CRPD). Konzeptionell ist der
Zweck des Anti-Diskriminierungsrechtes. (Schiek S. 20 ff.)
Gender hat die längste Tradition im EU Recht (Schiek S. 23): Verbunden mit diesem Knoten
sollten sein: Diskriminierungen wegen Nicht-Erfüllens der mit der jeweiligen Gender-Rolle
verbundenen Erwartung, sexuelle Orientierung, Schwangerschaft, sowie das nichtgendergerechte Erscheinungsbild einer Frau/eines Mannes.
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„Rasse“ wird nach CERD definiert als: Hautfarbe, Sprache, Abstammung, nationale oder
ethnische Herkunft. Schiek fügt dieser Liste Religion hinzu. (Schiek S. 25)
Behinderung: In diese ohnehin schon weite Definition inkludiert Schiek noch Alter (Schiek S.
26), und eventuell auch Schwangerschaft als besonderen Zustand.
Durch die Anordnung der Gründe in und um die Knoten herum, können Intersektionen
besser fassbar werden. (Schiek S. 26-7)
SHESTACK, Jerome J (1998): The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, Human
Rights Quarterly 20, 201-234,
vgl.: http://www.jstor.org/stable/762764
This article includes a quick tour of the historical development of human rights and the
theories that accompanied this development. He cites religion; natural law (the autonomous
individual); positivism; Marxism; the sociological approach and utilitarianism.
He has quite positive things to say about religion as a source of human rights – citing the
idea that we are all made in the image of God as a strong foundation for rights claims.
(Shestack, p. 206)
Under the natural law heading he discusses Locke and others and mentions a couple of the
big problems with this theory:
“Critics pointed out that most of the norm setting of natural rights theories contain a
priori elements deduced by the norm setter. In short, the principal problem with natural
law is that the rights considered to be natural can differ from theorist to theorist,
depending upon their conceptions of nature”. (Shestack p. 208)
The big criticism of positivism:
“Under this view, rules of international law are not law but merely rules of positive
morality set or imposed by opinion. Furthermore, by emphasizing the role of the nation
state as the source of law, the positivist approach produces the view that the individual
has no status in international law.” (Shestack p. 210)
The problem with Marxism:
“On an international level, Marxist theory proved incompatible with a functioning
universal system of human rights. The prior claims of a Communist society do not
recognize overruling by international norms.” (Shestack p. 211)
On the sociological approach, Shestack gives a fleeting overview, primarily discussing
Pound. He concludes:
“The sociological school does not answer the logical question of how a normative
conclusion about rights can be derived empirically from factual premises such as
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having interests. A descriptive science in the social human rights field is helpful, ‘but is
not enough’ to satisfy the need of goal identification. The sociological approach thus
provides a useful method, but a method in need of a philosophy.” (Shestack p. 212,
footnote omitted)
In regard to utilitarianism, he briefly rehearses the theory of classical utilitarianism, using
Bentham, and then outlines the standard criticism that utilitarianism does not take individuals
or rights seriously and can lead to abuses of majoritarianism. (Shestack p. 214)
Shestack now turns to modern (post World War II) theories of rights. He concludes that the
dominant approach is a qualified natural rights theory. He sees Kant as the underlying
theoretical driving force. (Shestack pp. 215-216)
He then observes how this theoretical commitment to individual autonomy plays out in
modern theories:
“In variant forms, modern human rights core theories seem to be settling for concepts
of natural necessity. By necessity one means prescribing a minimum definition of what
it means to be human in any morally tolerable form of society. Put another way, some
modes of treatment of human beings are so fundamental to the existence of anything
that one would be willing to call a society that it makes better sense to treat an
acceptance of them as constitutive of man or woman as a social being, rather than as
an artificial convention.” (Shestack p. 216)
This section closes with the question of how one moves from the foundation value of respect
for autonomous individuals to a fully fleshed out system of rights.
Rights based on Justice
The section has a considerable discussion of Rawls, beginning with basics of the “veil of
ignorance”. (Shestack p. 218 ff)
“The answers given by those in the original position may then be taken as a blueprint,
or as a pattern for the establishment of laws that are worthy of the universal assent of
citizens everywhere.” (Shestack p. 218)
And what will they chose? The two principles of justice, both aimed at “fairness”. The first is
related specifically to liberty and the second to distributive justice:
1) "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." (Rawls, cited in
Shestack p. 219, footnotes omitted)
2) "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle,
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.” (Rawls, cited in Shestack p. 219, footnotes omitted)
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Shestack then outlines some problems for Rawls’ theory in the real world. In regard to the
first principle, clashes can occur between liberty and “efficient measures to ensure public
health and safety”:
“To solve this conflict, Rawls suggests a Principle of Reconciliation under which basic
liberties may be restricted only when methods of reasoning acceptable to all make it
clear that unrestricted liberties will lead to consequences generally agreed to be
harmful for all. This Principle of Reconciliation is that of the common interest. A basic
liberty may be limited only in cases where there would be an advantage to the total
system of basic liberty.” (Shestack p. 220)
Shestack thinks that the problems with the second principle are more serious. A): Rawls is
committed to equality of opportunity, but, in accounting for different starting points
(educational levels etc), there may be tension between egalitarian and utilitarian approaches
(such as controversy surrounding some affirmative action programmes).
And B): and Shestack thinks more seriously, Rawls’ principle of a more equal distribution of
economic benefits, raises questions of how much action should be taken here as it seems
clear that this cannot be secured by mere negative restraints on government. (Shestack p.
221) And this is a problem domestically for individuals as well as internationally for
disadvantaged nation-states. (Shestack p. 222) If it is accepted that some countries are
disadvantaged due to the behaviour of other countries (colonialism etc), this provides a
different and possibly stronger ground for redistribution of resources than if more developed
countries think it is merely a utilitarian good or matter of self-interest (so worth helping
disadvantaged countries in order to develop markets etc). (Shestack p. 222)
Shestack mentions that Rawls’ theory may have been intended for domestic not international
law, but that it still applies internationally. (Shestack p. 223)
Rights based on reaction to injustice
Here Shestack briefly discusses the theory of Cahn, who was in favour of identifying injustice
from particular examples rather than justice as an abstract, theoretical concept. (Shestack
pp. 224 – 225)
Rights based on Dignity
This is often a religious project; however Shestack cites McDougal, Lasswell and Chen as
providing a secular expression of this idea. (Shestack p. 225). They provide a list of eight
values that they believe flow from respect for human dignity and then an enormous list of
demands that satisfy these values. Shestack criticizes this:
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“Their list of demands is huge; no hierarchical order exists; both trivial and serious
claims are intertwined; and it has a utopian aspect that belies reality.” (Shestack p.
226)
Rights based on equality of respect and concern
Ronald Dworkin tries to reconcile natural rights and utilitarian theories. Under a broad
utilitarian principle Dworkin thinks that states are permitted to do a lot to advance social
welfare, however he thinks that some rights need to be protected, not because of their
content but because these are the rights that would be limited if only utilitarian concerns are
considered. (Shestack p. 227)
Theory based on cultural relativism (versus universalism)
Shestack is critical of the philosophical claims of cultural relativism. He points out that there
were some traces in Greek philosophy, but that it was really Herder’s ideas that gave the
theory strength in the 18th/ 19th century.
“Johan Gottfried von Herder, dissenting from Enlightenment philosophy, claimed that
all nations had a unique way of being; only regional and contingent principles existed.
Condemning universal values, he introduced the concept of Volksgeist, the spirit of the
people.
Von
Herder's
view
influenced
German
romanticism
and
French
counterrevolutionary writers who glorified the aggregate of local customs and
prejudices under an umbrella called ‘culture.’” (Shestack p. 229)
Cultural relativism was also adopted post World War II as a way to counter the previously
dominant colonial/imperialistic approach to non-Western cultures. (Shestack p. 229)
Shestack thinks it cannot be sustained, however, and cites Finnis’ empirical research as
proof that there are universal values, identifiable across all cultures as a matter of fact.
(Shestack p. 231)
More convincing is the evidence that “cultural relativism” is used by tyrants as a shield in
order to behave terribly. (Shestack pp. 231-232)
He then argues that some cultures are just bad and that suffering and abuse are simply not
culturally authentic values. (Shestack p. 232)
Also, cultural relativism often seems to view cultures as static, denying the fact that cultures
change over time and in response to different circumstances. And modern technology has
probably made change both, more likely and faster. (Shestack p. 232)
Finally, history has overtaken this argument as human rights are now accepted
internationally as universal. (Shestack p. 233)
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SOILAND, Tove (2008): Die Verhältnisse gingen und die Kategorien kamen.
Intersectionality oder vom Unbehagen an der amerikanischen Theorie, Querelles-Net,
Rezensionszeitschrift für Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung 26,
vgl.: http://www.querelles-net.de/index.php/qn/article/view/694/702.
Im
Intersectionality
-
Konzept
vereinen
sich
zwei
Strömungen:
Eine,
deren
Erkenntnisinteresse Kategorien grundsätzlich kritisiert und eine, die versucht, die
Komplexität sozialer Ungleichheitslagen adäquat zu erfassen. (Soiland p. 2) Im
deutschsprachigen Raum ist vor allem letzteres bedeutend. Hier wird nach intersektionalen
Betroffenheiten von Ungleichheitslagen gefragt. (Soiland p. 3) Untersuchungsobjekt sind hier
Effekte von Segregation und die anschließende Frage, wie aufgrund dieser Segregation die
Gruppen gedacht werden können.
SOLANKE; Iyiola (2009): Stigma: A Limiting Principle Allowing MultipleConsciousness in Anti-Discrimination Law?, in: SCHIEK, Dagmar, CHEGE; Victoria,
European Union Non-Discrimination Law, Comparative Perspectives on
Multidimensional Equality Law. Routledge Cavendish, London, New York, 115-136.
Solanke leitet den Aufsatz mit dem Fall Bahl vs. Law Society ein, wo der
verhandlungsführende Richter feststellte, dass rassistische Diskriminierung und Gender
Diskriminierung nicht als gemeinsamer Diskriminierungsgrund (combined single ground)
geklagt werden können. Beide Motive seien separat zu behandeln. Daraus ist zu schließen,
dass, wenn eine Schwarze Frau nicht Opfer einer Diskriminierung aufgrund der „Rasse“ und
des Geschlechts sein kann, das Gesetz nicht mit komplexen Diskriminierungsfällen umgehen
kann. Es bedarf daher einer Veränderung des Single-Ground Modells zu einem Bewusstsein
multipler Identitäten (multiple-consciousness). Dazu sei es notwendig, argumentiert Solanke,
über das Intersektionalitätskonzept hinauszugehen, weil es durch die Verwendung von
„Diskriminierungsgründen“
auf
die
Logik
der
Unveränderbarkeit
von
Merkmalen
(Immutability-concept) zurückgreift.
Solanke stellt als Alternative die Idee des Stigmas vor. Immutability schafft begrenzte
Kategorien, während Stigma ein Spektrum an Charakteristika ermöglicht, von denen
unveränderliche Merkmale nur ein Aspekt sind (p. 117). Solanke argumentiert gegen das
beschränkende
Prinzip
der
Unveränderbarkeit,
merkt
jedoch
an,
dass
Anti-
Diskriminierungsrecht Beschränkungen in den Anwendungsbereichen benötige (ohne dieses
Argument jedoch weiter auszuführen) (p. 118).
Offensichtlich verwendet Solanke US-amerikanisches Recht als Referenz. Die Prüflogik folgt
der Struktur zu fragen, ob Evidenz für eine Geschichte bezweckter (purposeful)
Diskriminierung der benachteiligten „Gruppe“ gegeben sei, die „Gruppe“ nicht die Macht
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besitzt, Abhilfe zu schaffen und in einer Art betroffen ist, dass das Ausmaß an Unfairness
das
Erfordernis
gleichen
Schutzes
verletzt.
Solanke
geht
von
einem
engen
Intersektionalitätskonzept aus, nämlich der Intersektionalität zwischen „Gruppenmerkmalen“.
„Intersectionality remains grounded in the logic of immutability.“ (p. 120) Stattdessen schlägt
sie eine Gruppeneinteilung nach Stigmata als abgrenzendem Kriterium vor. Dies bedeutet
zunächst lediglich, dass die konservativen Aspekte des Antidiskriminierungsrechts
beibehalten werden. Solanke erwartet von der Anwendung des Stigmakonzepts offenbar ein
Aufbrechen des Immutabilitykonzeptes.
Es bleibt offen, ob damit ein anti-kategorialer Ansatz verfolgt wird oder ob sie damit lediglich
eine Alternative als ungleichheitsgenerierendes Prinzip zur Bildung von Kategorisierungen
vorschlägt. Stigma ist sicher als symbolische Repräsentation (vgl. Harding 1986) ein viel
versprechendes Konzept. Es greift aber theoretisch zu kurz, weil es die strukturelle und
individuelle Ebene kaum berücksichtigt. Solanke bezeichnet die von Stigma betroffenen
Menschen wiederum als soziale Gruppen. Dies ist offenbar der gängigen Rechtspraxis
geschuldet. Allerdings löst die Änderung des beschränkenden Prinzips nicht andere
grundlegende Probleme des Single-ground approach. Warum sollte ein Gericht sich
überschneidende Stigmata eher anerkennen als sich überschneidende unveränderliche
Motive? Stigma löst freilich das Problem der „Enge“ der anerkannten Diskriminierungsgründe
und wird den sozialen Realitäten besser gerecht. Bis zu einem gewissen Grad kann es das
Problem der adäquaten Vergleichsperson dadurch lösen, dass das Stigma als solches den
Kausalitätsbeweis darstellt, eine Vergleichsperson also nicht notwendig wird. Sie ist implizit
vorhanden, indem durch das Stigma bereits die Unterschiedlichkeit und die Benachteiligung
(durch negative Konnotation) belegt sind.
Offen bleibt jedoch die wichtige Frage, ob durch die Betrachtung als soziale Gruppen (und
nicht als Individuen) das Problem der konkreten, individuellen Betroffenheit adäquat
behandelt werden kann. Insbesondere die Frage, wie dies zu geschehen habe, wäre zu
klären. Welche Stigmata und deren Verbindung sind anzuerkennen? Sind nur diejenigen
anzuerkennen, die eine soziale Gruppe schaffen oder auch andere, die ausschließlich
individuell wirken? Ein spezifisches Problem der Intersektionalität ist ja, dass die
Überschneidung von Kategorisierungen in einem konkreten Anlassfall und für eine individuell
betroffene Person eine Individualisierung schafft, die durch Gruppenzugehörigkeit nicht
adäquat gelöst werden kann.
Solanke definiert Stigma als negativ konnotierte Zuschreibungen zu sozialen Kategorien wie
Geschlecht, Hautfarbe usw. Stigma bezeichnet die Interaktion von Attribuierung und
Stereotyp. Stigmata können auf unveränderbare oder temporäre Merkmale bezogen sein.
Sie können rassistisch, physisch, verhaltensbezogen, ererbt, angeboren usw. sein. Sie
beziehen sich auf einen kulturell-geographischen Kontext oder globale Gültigkeit haben.
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Stigmatisiert zu sein, bedeutet, von der Norm (Anm. wohl der mehrheitsgesellschaftlich
definierten) ausgeschlossen zu sein. Stigmata wirken sozial-strukturierend und kontrollierend
(Funktion), sind also machtbasiert. Entmenschlichung der betroffenen Person(en) ist der
Wirkungsmechanismus des Stigmas. Die Verbindung mit Diskriminierung wird hergestellt,
indem Stigma ie „Begründung“ liefert, Menschen unterschiedlich zu werten (als ungleich) (p.
121).
Die rechtliche Analyse soll daher davon ausgehen, welche sozialen, politischen und
wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen mit einem (bestimmten) Stigma verbunden sind (p. 122). Die
Analyse sollte dann folgende Fragen klären:
-
Worauf zielt das vorliegende Stigma ab?
-
Ist die betroffene, durch das Stigma abgegrenzte, beschränkte Gruppe „discrete, insular
and powerless“?
-
Führen die Stigmata zu sozialen, politischen oder wirtschaftlichen Benachteiligungen?
-
Gibt es Hinweise, dass die Stigmata zur beklagten Behandlung beigetragen haben?
Solanke demonstriert das Modell anhand eines britischen Falles. Die Eltern zweier
Schwarzer Schüler klagen die Schulleitung auf rassistische Diskriminierung. Nach einer
Rauferei zwischen zwei weißen und zwei Schwarzen Schülern werden letztere von der
Schule verwiesen und in Folge ausgeschlossen. Das Gericht konnte in der Entscheidung
keine rassistische Motivation seitens der Schulleitung erkennen. Solankes These ist jedoch,
dass bei Berücksichtigung des Stigmas, das über junge, schwarze Männer vorherrscht, die
Entscheidung hätte anders ausfallen müssen. Die Argumentation ist plausibel. Für die Praxis
bleibt jedoch eine Reihe von Schwierigkeiten bestehen. Welches Stigma kann angeführt
werden? Das „intersektionale“ Stigma im beschriebenen Fall ist durchaus geeignet, aber gilt
das auch für andere, viel individualisiertere Kombinationen? Wie ginge eine betroffene
Person damit um, wenn es kein argumentierbares Stigma gibt? Was, wenn das Gericht die
Argumentation nicht anerkennt, welche „Ziele“ ein Stigma verfolgt? Ist dann bereits das
Erfordernis der Plausibilität nicht erfüllt? Der Nachweis der sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und gar
politischen Benachteiligung ist generell nicht einfach zu erbringen, bei vielen Kombinationen
mangels statistischer Daten unmöglich. Diese Fragen sind keine Fundamentaleinwände
gegen das Konzept, es bringt sicherlich eine Weiterentwicklung auf dem Weg zu einer
realitätsnäheren Rechtspraxis, allerdings kann es für sich die rechtspraktischen Probleme
nicht lösen.
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SOLANKE, Iyiola (2009): Putting Race and Gender Together: A New Approach to
Intersectionality, The modern law review, 72(5), 723-749,
vgl: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2009.00765.x/full
Solanke advocates three steps to improve the European response to intersectional
discrimination:
1) Clarify the qualitative difference of intersectional discrimination claims
2) Replace the conceptual framework of immutable, underlying grounds with something
“...more aligned to social realities, such as stigma.” (Solanke p. 726)
3) Develop a method so that courts can incorporate social context into judicial decisionmaking. (Solanke, abstract p. 723) She follows an approach of Bob Watt to develop
her own account of ‘social framework analysis’ (Solanke p. 726)
Introduction
Solanke sees no inherent reason for discrimination law to be organised in terms of
categories. (Solanke p. 723)
USA and Britain has an exhaustive list of categories, but Canada and the EU (in terms of the
European Convention on Human Rights at least) do not. (Solanke p. 723)
She gives a brief, historical outline of the way that discrimination was fought bit-by-bit, so that
some groups such as black women were excluded. (Solanke pp. 723-724)
“The single-issue focus did have an important advantage – it facilitated the creation of
specific remedies which would to some extent be tailored to each bias. D In order for
law to provide an effective remedy for persons who suffered detriment due to a
particular characteristic, that characteristic had to be isolated and magnified, bracketed
from all other aspects of identity.” (Solanke p. 724)
However, the rigidity of these grounds has caused problems and this is clearly seen in
intersectional cases. (Solanke p. 725)
“The two European Union (EU) Directives based on Article 13 EC now mention multiple
discrimination. Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment in relation to ‘race’ and ethnicity,
and Directive 2000/78 establishing equal treatment in relation to religion or belief,
disability, age and sexual orientation in employment and occupation state in their
preambles that the Community, in implementing the principle of equal treatment,
should ‘aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between man and
women, especially since women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.’”
(Solanke p. 725)
Solanke’s approach is to compare and contrast first the two kinds of multiple discrimination
(additive and intersectional) and then to compare and contrast how these varieties of
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discrimination have been treated in the UK and the USA with comments about the EU as
well. (Solanke p. 726)
Additive and Intersectional Discrimination
Solanke gives a quick, historical outline of the development of the recognition of multiple
discrimination in the EU. Of particular interest is that she notes that it was in response to a
resurgence of nationalism in Austria that the Commission submitted an Action Plan Against
Racism and two Community Directives: Directive 2000/43 and directive 2000/78. Both called
for multiple discrimination to be recognized, but without defining what it was. (Solanke p.
727)
Additive discrimination is sex- or ‘race’-‘plus’. (Solanke p. 728) Nwoke v Government Legal
Service shows that this can be successfully pleaded under UK law. A Nigerian woman
applied for a post in the Government Legal Service and was given a very low ranking after
the interview. All white applicants, even those less well-qualified, were graded higher. So this
was ‘race’ discrimination. In addition, even the white women were unlikely to be offered a job
and those that were got lower pay. This was sex discrimination.
Another case of additive discrimination is Ali v North East Centre for Diversity and Racial
Equality – a Pakistani Muslim woman harassed due to her sex and ‘race’. (Solanke p. 728)
Solanke notes that tribunals in the UK have been sympathetic to intersectional claims but
that Bahl shows that when these claims go to a higher court (Bahl was a court of Appeal
case) that they are likely to be overturned. This is apparently the opposite of the situation in
the USA where lower courts reject intersectional claims but then higher courts overturn these
rulings. (Solanke pp. 729- 730)
The cases where British tribunals have shown sympathy to intersectional claims are Lewis v
Tabard Gardens – a black woman was treated very harshly after she criticized a colleague
(Solanke pp. 729-730); and Mackie v G & N Car Sales – where an Indian woman was
summarily dismissed when others would not have been. (Solanke p. 730)
US cases where higher courts overruled unfavourable findings of lower courts: Jefferies v
Harris City Commission – Federal Court overruled District Court to say that “Ublack women
could be discriminated against even in the absence of discrimination against black men or
white women.” (Solanke p. 730) And Degraffenreid v General Motors – Federal Court
reversed District Court and said that “absent a clear Congressional statement of intent not to
protect black women as a group distinct from women and blacks, it would not condone a
result which leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.” (Solanke pp. 730-731)
Also, Lam v University of Hawaii – The Federal Court rejected the District Court’s
‘mathematical’ approach of searching for distinct, separate evidence of racism and sexism.
“The Federal Court rejected the reduction of the claim to distinct components as an attempt
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to ‘bisect a person’s identity’ which would distort or ignore the particular nature of the migrant
woman’s experiences.” (Solanke p. 731)
Solanke notes that in Lam and Degraffenreid the US Federal Courts recognized that it was
necessary to recognize intersectional discrimination, otherwise these women would have no
remedy at all. But the UK courts have not discussed this. In fact, they seem to be under
some false impressions such as when, in Bahl, Gibson J remarked that it was very rare to
find a woman guilty of sex discrimination against another woman. “Underlying Justice
Gibson’s remark is the erroneous assumption that the experiences of black women are
analogous to those of white women.” (Solanke p. 731)
The qualitative difference of ‘race’/gender intersectional discrimination
Solanke uses empirical studies to make her point about the qualitative difference of
intersectional discrimination. She outlines some of the stereotypes and prejudices that attach
specifically to black women and the effects these have on their lives. (Solanke pp. 731-734)
A qualitatively different approach
Solanke now moves on to the second and third of her proposals for improving the treatment
of intersectionality in British courts.
Beyond immutability: stigma as a threshold concept
Solanke suggests “stigma” as an alternative to the exhaustive list of grounds approach.
(Solanke p. 736) This is, “stigma” is meant to provide guidance for an open-ended or nonexhaustive list of grounds such as that found in Article 15 of the Canadian charter of Rights.
Solanke asks the question what currently guides the creation of ‘grounds’ in law. (Solanke p.
737)
She argues that immutability has been a key concept here (so features where there is
permanence and an absence of choice) (Solanke p. 737)
However, the introduction of religion and sexual orientation show that immutability is not
strictly adhered to now. But, nevertheless, traces of it remain. (Solanke p. 737)
Solanke does not think immutability is a good principle for non-discrimination law. However,
she does think that some kind of principle is needed to identify “socially salient” injustices
and this is what “stigma” may do. (Solanke p. 738)
Solanke recognizes that the breadth of the concept of “stigma” could work as both an
advantage and disadvantage. To make it more manageable, Solanke proposes “Uthat
discrimination law focus on those stigma(s) which are both difficult to escape and make a
significant difference to individual access to and acquisition of resources in key areas, such
as health, housing, education, training and employment. These are attributes which, even
though not necessarily immutable, ‘tarnish’ the whole identity of an individual, so that other
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‘characteristics’ ‘are subordinated to or negated by this trait, which is immediately felt to be
more central to the “actual” identity of the individual.” (Solanke p. 738, footnote omitted)
The advantages of using “stigma”: “Ufirst, stigma legitimates the use of law beyond the
permanent/produced dichotomy: it includes immutable characteristics but it not limited to
them. Secondly, it is flexible enough to facilitate both additive and intersectional
discrimination: discrimination can travel alone, but also in aggregate and interacting forms.
However thirdly and perhaps most importantly, stigma widens the spotlight of discrimination
law to situate the individual in society. Stigmas are by definition contextual: they are socially
determined and maintained, and to focus on them is to prioritise social meanings.” (Solanke
p. 739)
‘But for’ revisited
Watt suggested a subjective nuance for ‘but for,’ but Solanke favours a social one. (Solanke
p. 739)
Discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Solanke cites James v Eastleigh Borough Council – the case where pensioners were able to
get a discount for the local pool, but as the pension age for men is older than for women, Mr
James brought a discrimination case. The case went all the way to the House of Lords where
his claim was upheld – ‘but for’ his sex, Mr James would have received the same treatment
as his wife. (Solanke p. 740)
Solanke notes that Lord Ackner’s symmetrical approach excluded consideration of motive –
the only two relevant questions were:
1) Had there been unfavourable treatment?
2) Did the complainant belong to a group protected by the act? (Solanke p. 740)
Only Lord Griffith and Lord Lowry disagreed with this test with Griffith favouring a substantive
approach that would consider both motive and context. (Solanke p. 740)
Watt drew on Griffith and Lowry’s ideas to propose that motive be formally included in the
assessment of discrimination: “In other words, did the respondent impose that unfavourable
treatment because of the complainant’s membership of a group defined on the basis of a
forbidden ground? DThe focus therefore moved from ‘but for’ to ‘but why’?” (Solanke p. 741)
Solanke cites Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as evidence of
the use of a ‘but why’ approach when Lord Nicholls encouraged tribunals to investigate why
the claimant had been treated as she was and whether this reason was a prohibited ground.
(Solanke p. 741)
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Griffiths-Henry – “Plainly there cannot be a finding of sex or
‘race’ discrimination every time an employer carries out a selection process unfairly to the
detriment of somebody who is black or female.” (Solanke p. 741 – footnote omitted)
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In order to incorporate social context (which Solanke thinks has not been sufficiently done),
Solanke suggests that courts ask ‘but how?’ instead of ‘but why?’ (Solanke p. 741) “It
encourages an observation of society in order to excavate deeply embedded stigmas and
stereotypes which underlie discrimination. It does not ignore individual actions but throws a
spotlight upon the context of actions to identify a relationship between a social stigma(s) and
individual decision-making.” (Solanke p. 742)
The social framework analysis
Social framework analysis is used in the US. “Social framework analysis refers to the use of
general social science research to ‘construct a frame of reference or set of background
context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.’” (Solanke p.
742)
In discrimination cases it is used to establish the role of discriminatory stereotypes. In
employment discrimination it offers “Uinsight into the operation of stereotyping and bias in
decision-making, social framework experts can help fact finders to assess other evidence
more accurately.” (Solanke p. 742)
Solanke outlines the use of the social framework analysis in a case of sex discrimination.
There, a psychologist explained to the court that stereotyping may have influenced the
partners at Price Waterhouse to reject the sole female candidate for a partnership. The
female candidate was advised by a colleague to wear more make-up and behave in a more
feminine way to help her chances. The evidence of the psychologist established that there
was a general risk of discrimination as the management decision may have been influenced
by stereotypes. (Solanke pp. 742-743)
Beck v The Boeing Company; Dukes v Wal-Mart – both cases used experts to show how
stereotyping may have informed company employment practices. (Solanke p. 743)
Applying ‘but how?’
Experts are sometimes used in UK cases, but Solanke thinks there is no reason why the UK
could not adopt the full US “social framework analysis” approach. This would work for
intersectional discrimination. (Solanke p. 744)
Bahl – what would have happened if a “social framework analysis” had been used? The
Employment Tribunal would first have “Uasked whether there had been unfavourable
treatment, and secondly by what means or to what extent stigma informed the unfavourable
treatment complained of. In order to answer this second question, it would be necessary to
consider whether any stigma attached to the group of which the defendant claimed
membership, followed by the use of the social framework analysis to elucidate the nature and
consequences of the stigma and finally an evaluation of the extent to which this stigma did or
did not influence the decision complained of.” (Solanke p. 745)
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Solanke notes that Dr Bahl was a member of a stigmatized group. Also that charts, reports,
personnel policies etc could have been brought as evidence of the culture of the law society.
This culture could then have been placed in the context of stereotypes about black women
and Solanke thinks that all this would have let the claim of intersectional discrimination be
treated seriously even though the outcome might have been the same. (Solanke p. 746)
Solanke also thinks that social science research could re-set the balance in regard to the
burden of proof. Article 8(1) of the EU Race directive is now in the Race Relations Act
through a new S. 54A. The burden is shifted if on regard to all the evidence (from both
claimant and respondent) there is a prima facie case of racial discrimination. (Solanke p.
747)
British courts now often take the explanation of the defendant into account at this initial
stage. Solanke thinks that these explanations should be set within a wider social context.
(Solanke p. 747)
Conclusion
“Intersectionality highlights that anti-discrimination laws have posited discrimination as
a zero-sum game: if one form, then not the other. However, discrimination is not zerosum at all: it is often not just one of the other ground but can be many acting together in
addition or intersecting. Victims of bias should not have to approach discrimination law
as consumer, and make choices where none actually exist.” (Solanke p. 748)
WALBY, Sylvia (2007): Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting
Social Inequalities, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37, 449-470
The article aims to use complexity theory to revise the concept of system in social theory.
(Walby p. 449)
“Not only is the intersection of gender with class important, but also those with
ethnicities, nation, religion and other complex inequalities. While there is a wealth of
empirical material on these intersections in sociology and other social sciences, their
theorization remains difficult and contested. Their theorization as intersecting systems
is challenged by the critique of the old systems theory, but the major alternative
theorization within postmodern paradigm has a tendency to fragmentation and to micro
or cultural reductionism especially in the use of the concept of identity.” (Walby p. 450)
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Intersectionality
Walby describes intersectionality as “...a relatively new term to describe an old question in
theorization of the relationship between different forms of social inequality.” (Walby p. 450)
Walby argues for the importance of dealing with intersectionality as such, and not just double
or triple disadvantage (the additive approach), as the disadvantages may at least in part
constitute each other. Again, she emphasises that this is not a new idea, but that the
Crenshaw work reshaped and revitalised the issue. (Walby p. 451)
Walby identifies five different approaches to intersectionality, divided into two types: those
that reject the concept of social system and those that use it. (Walby p. 451)
She notes that intersectionality theories usually begin by pointing out the inadequacy of over
generalisation in terms of class, ‘race’ etc, which is a good and straightforward point, but she
is cautious about its links to “...a more general turn in social theory toward the particular and
a critique of the so-called meta-narratives...” as this is more controversial. (Walby p. 451)
The other main approach that intersectionality challenges is the reduction of multiple
inequalities to one, overarching inequality. For example, to see everything in Marxist terms,
would be to explain all inequality as reducible to class or capitalism explanations. In
response to these theorists that first tried to include gender and class as articulating systems
– this attracted criticism for its use of the concept of system. (Walby p. 451)
A third approach is micro-reduction which grew out of rejecting “... the conceptualization of
social relations in terms of systems.” (Walby p. 451)
Intersectionality often focuses on neglected intersections, and does this by case studies,
ethnographic and narrative methods on enquiry. But this interest in being ever more specific
and particular is not without its own problems:
“This has tended to become a strategy of seeking out ever finer units for analysis, in
pursuit of a pure intersecting category. But, there are no pure groups; there are always
more forms of difference; there will still always be some differences within the group
being researched. There is also a tendency to cultural reductionism; and the use of
rather static identity categories, even though it was a critique of the restrictive use of
the concept of ‘identity’ that was the starting point for Crenshaw’s analysis.
Furthermore, with such a micro approach it is hard to address larger questions, such as
those involving a global horizon.” (Walby p. 452 – footnotes omitted)
The fourth approach is the rejection of categories altogether:
“Analytic categories were seen as not only never adequate representations of the lived
world, but as indeed potentially pernicious in their potential for false sedimentation of
these categories in practice. Hence a focus on difference was preferred to that on
identity.” (Walby p. 452)
Walby’s observation about deconstruction seems worth noting:
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“However, such radical deconstruction and destabilization of categories makes
substantive analysis, which requires distinctions between categories, rather hard.”
(Walby p. 452- footnotes omitted)
The fifth approach is the segregationary reductionist approach:
“Rather than rejecting categories, instead the analytic strategy is to build up a better
analysis of each of the sets of social inequalities as part of the process of analysing
their intersection. Each set of social relations as identical or parallel, is considered to
have a different ontological base.” (Walby p. 452 – footnotes omitted)
“This approach segregates the bases of each of the categories: class is grounded in
the economy; gender is a discourse about sexual and biological differences; ethnicity
relates to discourses about exclusion and inclusion. The implication appears to be a
relatively simple base-superstructure understanding of each set of social relations.”
(Walby p. 453)
Walby notes that this approach makes theorization in terms of intersectionality difficult:
“Since each category has a separate ontological base, how can they, in theory,
mutually constitute each other?” (Walby p. 453)
Nevertheless, Walby sees the fifth approach as a step in the right direction, but advocates
two improvements:
“First, it is necessary to theorize more fully the ontological depth of each set of social
relations. Rather than there being merely a single base to each of these sets of social
relations, there is a much deeper ontology, including the full range of domains:
economy, polity, violence nexus, and civil society. Within each domain (economy,
polity, violence, civil society), there are multiple sets of social relations (e.g. gender,
class, ethnicity). D. Second, it is necessary to theorize more fully the relationship
between systems of social relations and how they affect each other together with the
dynamics of social change.” (Walby p. 454 – footnotes omitted)
Walby outlines why she believes that this approach has been seen as too theoretically
problematic to adopt.
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WINKER, Gabriele, DEGELE, Nina (2009): Intersektionalität. Zur Analyse sozialer
Ungleichheiten, Transcript Verlag.
Einleitungskapitel: Was ist Intersektionalität? (Degele und Winker p. 11)
Die historischen Wurzeln der Intersektionalität bilden Erfahrungen schwarzer Frauen,
insbesondere schwarzer Feministinnen.
Als Konsequenz forderte die Verwobenheit zwischen verschiedenen Formen der
Ungleichheit eine erweiterte Analyse von „Rasse“, Klasse und Geschlecht. (Degele und
Winker p. 12) Crenshaw bringt 1989 dafür den Begriff der Intersektionalität auf und
verwendet das Bild der Verkehrskreuzungen. Soiland kritisiert daran, dass sich der Vergleich
mit Kreuzungen zu sehr auf die Zusammensetzung von Gruppen konzentriert, statt auf
gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse.
Daher sprechen sich manche für den Begriff der Interdependenz statt Intersektionalität aus
(Dietze et al.): Der Begriff soll wechselseitige statt monodirektionale Abhängigkeiten
beschreiben. Hier geht es nicht um wechselseitige Interaktion zwischen Kategorien, sondern
darum, dass soziale Kategorien in sich selbst interdependent sind. Die Autorinnen sprechen
sich allerdings gegen diesen Begriff aus, weil er das Problem auch nicht klarer mache. Es
bleibt also die Frage offen, was als interdependent zu denken ist. (Degele und Winker p. 13)
So sieht auch Davis die Aktualität gerade darin, dass das Konzept vage und unklar ist und
sich darin viele verschiedene Richtungen tummeln, deren einzige Gemeinsamkeit
“Geschlecht als zentrale Kategorie” ist.
Es gibt zwei verschiedene Schwerpunkte: Während es in den USA um das Empowerment für
diskriminierte Frauen geht, diskutiert man in Europa die Dezentrierung und Dekonstruktion
von Geschlecht. In den USA gibt es nach wie vor die Kategorien von „race“, class und
gender (triple oppression, vgl. Yuval oder Mehrfachunterdrückung vgl. Lutz), in Europa
hingegen entstehen heftige Diskussionen über die Verwendung dieser Kategorien.
Die
Autorinnen
verstehen
Intersektionalität
als
Wechselwirkungen
zwischen
Ungleichheitskategorien. (Degele und Winker p. 14) Die Autorinnen bemühen sich um eine
Definition, die empirisch geeignet ist. Sie möchten illustrieren, „wie die Verwobenheit von
Ungleichheitskategorien auf verschiedenen Ebenen theoretisch zu fassen und im
empirischen Forschungsprozess zu analysieren ist.” (Degele und Winker p. 15)
Intersektionalität
ist
die
an
soziale
Praxen
ansetzende
Wechselwirkung
ungleichheitsgenerierender sozialer Strukturen (Herrschaftsverhältnisse), symbolischer
Repräsentationen und Identitätskonstruktionen.
Welche Kategorien wie verbinden? (Degele und Winker p. 15)
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„Race, “ class und gender kommen aus dem US-amerikanischen Kontext und können nicht
so einfach auf europäische Verhältnisse übertragen werden. Verloo und Weber etwa
plädieren für vier Kategorien, mit Sexualität als vierte Kategorie. Lutz und Wennig schlagen
13 Linien der Differenz vor.
Die Auswahl der Kategorien hängt immer vom untersuchten Gegenstand und der
Untersuchungsebene ab. (Degele und Winker p. 16)
Im Status Quo gibt es verschiedene Ungleichheitskategorein, sie sind kontextspezifisch
verschieden wirksam und sie müssen über reduktionistische Ungleichheitsbeschreibungen
hinauskommen. (Degele und Winker p. 18)
Welche Ebenen wie verbinden? (Degele und Winker p. 18)
Hier besteht bislang noch weniger Einigkeit als bei den Kategorien.
Die Autorinnen schlagen daher einen Mehrebenenansatz vor (Degele und Winker p. 18):
Dieser berücksichtigt sowohl gesellschaftliche Sozialstrukturen (auf der Makro- und
Mesoebene), sowie Prozesse der Identitätsbildung (Mikroebene), als auch kulturelle
Symbole.
Auf den Ebenen von Sozialstrukturen wird Geschlecht als Strukturkategorie begriffen, das
heißt als Ursache sozialer Ungleichheit, die sich nicht auf andere Ursachen reduzieren lässt.
Ein Beispiel dafür ist die gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit von Männern und Frauen am
Arbeitsmarkt und in der Familie, also die einfache Vergesellschaftung (Männer) und die
doppelte Vergesellschaftung (Frauen nach Becker-Schmidt). (Degele und Winker p. 19)
Den Prozess der Identitätsbildung erklären die Autorinnen nach dem Ansatz von West und
Fenstermaker: AkteurInnen bringen ungleichheitsrelevante Kategorien in Interaktionen
hervor (doing gender beschreibt den Prozess des Entstehens). Geschlecht ist (eine von
mehreren) Kategorien, über die sich Personen selbst definieren. (Degele und Winker p. 20)
Identität bezeichnet das Verhältnis zu sich selbst. Geschlecht ist ein Ergebnis sozialen
Handelns, eine Leistung, die in Interaktionen immer wieder neu erbracht wird.
Symbolische Repräsentationen sind Verbindung zwischen untersuchten Phänomenen und
Prozessen mit Normen und Ideologien (Degele und Winker p. 20), wie beispielsweise Bilder,
Ideen, Gedanken und Alltagswissen. Butler etwa legt dar, wie gender als kulturelle Form der
Erfahrung dem Faktum sex zugrunde liegt. (Degele und Winker p. 21)
Knapp oder McCall versuchen, Intersektionalität auf der strukturellen Ebene zu behandeln:
Ihre Herangehensweise ist eine gesellschaftstheoretische. (Degele und Winker p. 22)
Ansätze des doing difference beschäftigen sich hingegen nur mit Interaktionen, um
Erfahrungen von Menschen und die damit verbundenen Identitätskonstruktionen zu
beschreiben.
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Butler hingegen betrachtet die Ebene der symbolischen Repräsentationen und spricht sich
für eine offene Kategorienliste aus. (Degele und Winker p. 23)
Bourdieu und Giddens bemühen sich, zumindest zwei Ebenen miteinander zu verbinden.
(Degele und Winker p. 23)
Die Ebenen sind genau wie die Kategorien je nach Untersuchungsebene verschieden
relevant. McDowell plädiert für Vergleich von Einzelfällen, wie auch von sozialen Gruppen,
um über Fallstudien hinauszukommen. (Degele und Winker p. 24) Dazu sollen quantitative
Analysen mit einbezogen werden.
Zusammenfassung: Methode der Mehrebenenanalyse
In ihrer Einleitung arbeiten die beiden Autorinnen die Diskussion auf, die zum Thema
Intersektionalität und intersektionale Diskriminierung in den Anfängen der 1970er Jahren
aufkam. Sie beschreiben, wie das Konzept der Intersektionalität zunächst rund um schwarze
Frauen entstand, ehe es auch auf andere Ungleichheitskategorien ausgeweitet wurde. Die
Diskussion, welche Differenzkategorien mit einbezogen werden sollen, hält allerdings immer
noch an. Dabei bevorzugen ForscherInnen in den USA immer noch die Trias „race“, class
und gender, während die europäische Forschung die Auswahl der Kategorien noch heftig
diskutiert. Darüber hinaus ist noch die Frage offen, wie die Unterscheidung der
ausgewählten Kategorien zu denken ist. Welche Untersuchungsebenen sollen gewählt
werden?
Die Autorinnen sprechen sich für drei Untersuchungsebenen aus (Degele und Winker p. 25):
1. Strukturebene: Strukturelle Herrschaftsverhältnisse
Hier definieren die Autorinnen vier Kategorien:
•
Klasse: Vermögen, Bildung, Netzwerke ( Klassismen)
•
Geschlecht: biologisches Geschlecht, Geschlechtsidentität, Sex. Orientierung
( Heteronormativismen)
•
„Rasse“: Hautfarbe, Nationalität, Ethnie, Religion, Weltanschauung (
Rassismen)
•
Körper: Gesundheit/Schönheit, Alter, Behinderung ( Bodyismen)
Diese vier Kategorien tragen in einem kapitalistischen System zur möglichst kostengünstigen
Vermarktung der Ware Arbeitskraft bei (Degele und Winker p. 51). Über sie entstehen aber
auch für die Individuen je nach Zugehörigkeit unterschiedliche Einkommensniveaus.
2. Repräsentationsebene: Symbolische Repräsentationen
Normen, Werte und Stereotypen stützen die oben dargestellten Herrschaftsverhältnisse und
tragen zu Identitätskonstruktionen bei. Im Neoliberalismus wird die Eigenverantwortung
eines jeden Individuums betont (bei Körper und Klasse), nicht hinterfragt bleiben dagegen
„Rasse“ und Geschlecht.
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3. Identitätsebene/Interaktionsebene
Doing difference - Ansatz: Geschlecht entsteht gleichzeitig mit Ethnizität und Klasse.
Relevante Kategorien auf dieser Ebene sind prinzipiell offen. Hier gibt es keine
Einschränkungen.
Verbunden sind diese drei Ebenen durch kapitalistische Akkumulation und durch soziale
Praxen des Einzelnen. Subjekte entwerfen sich selbst durch Identitätskonstruktionen über
soziale Praxen (Handeln und Sprechen), verstärken oder vermindern den Einfluss
bestimmter symbolischer Repräsentationen und stützen gesellschaftliche Strukturen oder
stellen sie in Frage. Diese drei Ebenen bilden aber auch den Rahmen für soziale Praxen.
Methodologie: Praxeologischer Intersektionalitätsansatz (Degele und Winker p. 63)
Verbindung der drei Ebenen durch einen an Bourdieu angelehnten praxeologischen Ansatz
(das auf Körper und Wissen basierte Tun von Menschen, inklusive Sprechen). Die Analyse
beginnt im Alltag der Menschen: Welche Probleme, Themen, Fragen bestimmen ihr
alltägliches Tun? Welche Differenzkategorien nutzen Individuen, um sich selbst und ihren
Alltag darzustellen? (Praktiken der Unterscheidung nach Wacquant, zitiert in Degele und
Winker p. 64) Darauf aufbauend werden Strukturen und Repräsentationen analysiert, die
diese Praxen fortschreiben und aus ihnen resultieren.
Acht methodische Schritte der intersektionalen Analyse (Degele und Winker p. 79)
Block I: Auswertung einzelner Interviews:
1. Identitätskonstruktionen beschreiben: Menschen beschreiben sich selbst mit Hilfe von
Differenzierungskategorien. Diese können explizit oder implizit sein. Vor allem
Privilegierte benennen keine Privilegien (z.B. weiße Männer in Führungspositionen).
Möglichst alle Differenzierungskategorien sollen herausgeschrieben werden.
2. Symbolische Repräsentationen identifizieren: Werte, Normen, Ideologien explizit
machen, die eine Person erwähnt. Stereotype, Erklärungen etc. notieren.
3. Bezüge zu Sozialstrukturen finden: Strukturelle Zusammenhänge (Gesetze etc.)
herausarbeiten, auf die die interviewten Personen verweisen. Diese dann den vier
Kategorien Klasse, Geschlecht, „Rasse“ und Körper zuordnen.
4. Wechselwirkungen zentraler Kategorien auf drei Ebenen benennen: Wichtigste
Differenzierungskategorien für die jeweilige Person herausarbeiten, dann auf drei
Ebenen beziehen.
Block II: Analyse aller Interviews einer Untersuchung:
5. Identitätskonstruktionen vergleichen und clustern: Vergleich aller durchgeführten
Interviews.
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6. Strukturdaten
ergänzen
und
Herrschaftsverhältnisse
analysieren:
Auf
der
Strukturebene sollen zusätzliche Datenquellen mit einbezogen werden. Strukturelle
Herrschaftsverhältnisse analysieren.
7. Analyse von benannten Repräsentationen vertiefen: Zusätzliche Datenquellen mit
einbeziehen.
8. Wechselwirkungen in der Gesamtschau herausarbeiten: Verallgemeinerungen
jenseits des einzelnen Falls herausarbeiten.
Beispielhaft
wird
die
intersektionale
Mehrebenanalyse
dann
in
der
Auswertung
durchgeführter Interviews mit nicht erwerbstätigen Frauen dargestellt. (Degele und Winker S.
99)
WINKER, Gabriele, DEGELE, Nina (2011): Intersectionality as Multi-level Analysis:
Dealing with social inequality, European Journal of Women’s Studies 18, 51-66
This article is basically an English language summary of their book. The style is rather
dense.
They identify a lack of attention being given to methodology in intersectional literature. They
follow Leslie McCall and also Sylvia Walby in identifying three versions of complexity
currently discussed in intersectionality: anticategorical, intracategorical and intercategorical.
Each of these has a different focus. Winker and Degele want to adopt “...a multi-level
intersectional approach that encompasses differentiation and inequality on the levels of
representation, identity and structure.” (Winker and Degele p. 53)
Further:
“We suggest a multi-level approach in line with the epistemological reflections of
Sandra Harding (1986) when she discusses the symbolic, structural and individual
aspects of social genders. Accordingly, we understand intersectionality as a system of
interactions between inequality-creating social structures (i.e. of power relations), symbolic representations and identity constructions that are context-specific, topicorientated and inextricably linked to social praxis. The multi-level approach we suggest
will be able to analyse the interactions of categories of difference on both a single level
and throughout all three levels.” (Winker and Degele p. 54)
They identify three structural levels:
•
Identity constructions
•
Symbolic representations
•
Social structures
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Praxeological intersectionality
“The three structural levels we are concentrating on are linked through the social
practices of individuals. Through social practices like social action and speech,
individuals delineate themselves in social contexts, construct identities, process
symbolic representations, support social structures or challenge them. Conversely, the
three aforementioned levels construct a framework for social practice. Thus, social
practices are intrinsically linked to each other through categories of difference and
those three levels. For this reason it is social practices that serve as the methodological
starting point of our intersectional multi-level analysis.” (Winker and Degele p. 56)
Note that Winker and Degele here are following Bourdieu’s “Theory of Practice”.
Intersectional analysis in eight steps pp. 58 - 62
Step 1: Describing identity constructions
Step 2: Indentifying symbolic representations
Step 3: Finding references to social structures
Step 4: Denominating interrelations of central categories on three levels
Step 5: Comparing and clustering of subject constructions
Step 6: Supplementing structural data and analysing power relations
Step 7: Deepening the analysis of denominated representations
Step 8: Elaborating interrelations in the overall demonstration
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CASES
Bahl v The Law Society, also known as The Law Society v Bahl [2003] I.R.L.R. 640;
(2003) 147 S.J.L.B. 994
The sexism and racism claims were not the original point but came in response to allegations
of bullying made against Dr Bahl. She was viewed as a very, very unsympathetic figure. This
may have had an impact on the outcome. The tribunal mentions at the outset that some of
her claims are ridiculous and so seems to agree with her ex-colleagues that she is a difficult
trouble-maker.
Of course a question might be whether this very negative perception of Dr Bahl was a result
of racial and gender stereotypes etc. The recitation of the facts does not really explain why
she was so disliked. For example, is it not possible to argue that, yes, she was authoritarian
and rude, but many white male CEOs act like this and are seen as real, decisive leaders?
The account of the facts leading up to the allegation of sex and ‘race’ discrimination is very
depressing reading. It is the record of a lot of personal squabbling at work that got very nasty
indeed. Dr Bahl had a long history of antagonizing people at work (she is described as a
bully) and the reactions to this built and built. Eventually everyone turned on her and it
became really unpleasant and personal – it is at this stage that the allegations of ‘race’ and
sex discrimination emerge. Arguably there is at least the appearance of a bitter element of
revenge in the behaviour of the law society members when the momentum swung the way of
attacking Dr Bahl.
Direct discrimination: undisputed principles - paras 80 -90
Grounds of appeal – including specifically that it is an error in law to deal with discrimination
intersectionally rather than ground by ground – paras 154 on
158. Plainly it is possible for a tribunal to infer that there may be discrimination both on
grounds of ‘race’ and sex after considering the evidence in respect of each. But if the
evidence does not satisfy the tribunal that there is discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ or
on grounds of sex, considered independently, then it is not open to a tribunal to find
either claim satisfied on the basis that there is nonetheless discrimination on grounds
of ‘race’ and sex when both are taken together. That would fail to give effect to the fact
that the burden of proof is on the applicant. Nor can the tribunal properly conclude, if it
is uncertain about whether it is ‘race’ or sex, that it will find both.
One disturbing aspect of this is that the failure to disentangle the grounds of ‘race’ and sex is
linked to a failure of reasoning, or, more specifically, of clarity of reasoning.
Tribunal also did not identify a hypothetical comparator (I think it would need to have two –
one for each ground).
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There is a lot of discussion about the antagonism and hostility and the importance of proving
that this had a discriminatory basis or character. Also, the situation is complicated as Dr Bahl
was hired partly to provide diversity to the law society and partly to reform the law society,
yet it may be that they did not want to change in fact. Her approach and reforms were,
perhaps, a step too far for the culture of the law society and what were originally viewed as
Dr Bahl’s strengths became problems for the law society.
Perhaps this points to a difficult aspect of discrimination: the way in which Dr Bahl performed
her job, the very things that her colleagues were unhappy with, could have had cultural
and/or gendered aspects.
The use of the hypothetical comparator here shows that the white, middle-class male is
indeed the norm. This conceptual situation seems to be almost this: that it is discrimination if
this person (who is not a white, middle-class male) was acting like a white, middle-class
male, and yet not treated as well as a white, middle-class male. Immediately there is a
problem even with this, however: as it has often been noted that behaviour that would, for
example, be considered assertive in a white, middle-class male, might be considered rude or
aggressive when performed by a woman or someone of a different ‘race’ or class.
Anti-discrimination legislation still seems to work on the myths that 1) we all interact with
each other behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance and 2) that there is a neutral, human space
that is genderless, ‘race’less etc.
O’Reilly v BBC
In the tribunal case of O’Reilly v BBC, the BBC tried a line of defence that stated that it had
discriminated against O’Reilly on the combined basis of her age and sex and that this was
not prohibited under English law (relying on Bahl). The tribunal rejected this.
However, it should be noted that the tribunal was also sympathetic to the intersectional
argument in Bahl and yet the Court of Appeal dismissed this. How can this be reconciled?
One suggestion from the O’Reilly judgement itself, is that the Bahl decision should not be
understood as rejecting intersectional discrimination as such as that it pointed out that, in that
case, there was insufficient evidence to ground a claim of either sex or ‘race’ discrimination,
even considering that neither sex nor ‘race’ discrimination would need to be the sole cause of
the bad treatment, but only a significant cause.
O’Reilly v BBC was only a tribunal decision at first instance. It is not binding. It has been
published, however, and subject to considerable attention, both of which are unusual, so the
signals are that this may indeed be a good indication of the current state of English law on
this point.
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To sum it up on para 245: “...the prescribed reason need not be the sole reason, or even the
principal reason, why a person suffers detrimental treatment. Part of the reason that a
woman over 40 is precluded from applying for a job, in the above example, is that fact that
she is a woman. Another part of the reason is that she is over 40. Both of them are
significant elements of the reason that she suffers the detriment. In such circumstances, we
consider it is clear that the woman is subject to both sex and age discrimination.”
Note that O’Reilly actually only succeeded on the age discrimination claim, though, and not
the sex discrimination claim. The issue we might ask is this: given that her treatment did
seem to be on the basis of being an older woman, why do the courts chose one
characteristic and not the other? They can see that discrimination exists, but the current UK
law does not allow them the concept of intersectional discrimination as such to describe it
accurately. The choice in terms of which characteristic or both, seems rather arbitrary and
again, comes down to the question of the choice of comparator.
And para 246:
“The way that this can be fitted with the comparative exercise set out in the legislation
is that a woman over 40 can compare her treatment to a man over 40; by which
exercise the sex discrimination element of her treatment is established. Similarly, the
woman over 40 can compare her treatment to another person under 40, thereby
establishing the age discrimination element.”
This confirms that two separate comparators are required. The woman over 40 is not
compared to a man under 40 but to a man over 40 for sex discrimination and to a man or
woman under 40 for the age discrimination requirement.
And para 248 on why Bahl failed:
“The error was not as to the possibility of there being combined discrimination, which
was not expressly considered in the case; but of analysis of the evidence which
requires a conclusion that age and/or sex were significant factors in the decision that
was made before liability can be established. It is not sufficient to conclude that the
evidence does not support a finding of either sex or age discrimination, but that it must
be one or the other, or both.”
So this is still anti-intersectional, but the thinking of practitioners (and this includes those
sitting on the tribunal) seems to be that this would hardly ever have an impact in a real case.
That is, because the grounds need only be a significant cause of the disadvantage and not
the sole or primary cause, many cases of combined discrimination may be able to meet this
requirement. There seems to be a statement of faith that intersectional discrimination can be
dealt with well-enough as if it were additive or single-ground discrimination. When the
tribunal here talks of “combined” discrimination, then, one should probably read “additive”
discrimination.
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Literature Review - Locating Intersectional Discrimination

Transcription

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