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tr fPAPCH AMD ASWLTSIS BRAUCH ^ ^» >
tr fPAPCH AMD ASWLTSIS BRAUCH
BIOGRAPHICALT?-PORT
Hame:
''on PAPTTJ, Fran« 7
Rationality:
Gerrsan
"osit^ona:
^
^ » >->
ty~/
•
Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor), 2 June 1932 - 17 November 1932
Vizo-KanEler (Vic© Chancellor) 30 January 1933 - 26 July 1934
Keichskommisüar für das Saargebiet (Reich Commissioner for the Saar Torritory)f
14 November 19S3 - 26 July 1934
Deutscher Botschafter in besonderer Mission in "len (German Ambassador on
Special Mission in Vienna), 26 July 1934 - 4 iarch 1933
(After 25 July 1936t Ausserordentlicher und Bevollmächtigter Botschafter in
besonderer Mission in ^len - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on
SpeC*§X Mission in ViennaJ
Deutscher Botschafter in Ankara (German Ambassador in Ankara), 29 A p n i 1938 A"uguat 1944
— — —
Birth rate and Placet
29 October 1879, Werl in Westphalia, l/
Peligion:
Catholic, l/
Family History.
His father was a land owner. The family stems from the
"Krb'alzer of Werl and Neuwerte who had the license to produce salt in the
district of Soest as far back as the time of Charlerr,aOae. His ™othor was
a von Stollens. In 1905 Papen married Martha von Boeh, daughter of the
Geheime Korcmerzianrät von BochGalhan, co-owner of the famous firm of \fill3r0y
and Boch, producers of Ch'na ware and ceramics in '.rallerfangonj, Sa«r Territory*
He had four aughters» Antoine4»te, married to Baron von Stockhausen, former
kftndrat in Holdesheira; Margerite, Stefanie; Isabella; and one son FriedrichFrams, L/.
Military History?
After graduation fron; tho Korfettenaastalt (Cadet School) in
Berlin-Lichterfelde, he decided on a military earner* In 1898 he entered the
Fifth Regiment of the Ulanen (cavalry) in Düsseldorf and was comaisEioned a
lieutenant in the same year« He became a rider and took part in many horse
raceno In 1908 he was promoted to First Lieutenant. He later transferred to
the first Regiment of the Guard-Ulenen, in which he became a Rittmeister
(captüin)» During his military career he attended the Kriegsschule (Military
Academy) from which the graduated, securing tho right to enter the Prussian
General Staff. In 1922 hei-ae appointed Captain in the General Staff and was
one of the youngest officers of this grade in that department, l/, 9/.
Papen was sent to TTashington as Military Attache to the German Embassy in 1914*
Concurrently he was appointed Military Attache to the German legation in Mexico.
C01iFTD^T?lAL
Military History (cont'd.):
Vj
After the outbreak of war in 1914, ho is reported to hare tried to organize
large-scale sabota e of United rtates industry and «hipping which was working
for the Allies. He also was in contact with ihe ' exican bandit, Pancho Villa,
in orrler to create difficulties for the United States from this quarter. He
had some initial success until the Ame-fican authorities became aware of his
subversive activities» «hon it was clearly established that von Panen and his
colleague, the Naval attache, Poy-^d, were behind numerous plots against American industrial organizations, the United States love <. nment — at that time still
at peace with fformany — asked that he be recalled by his rrovoroment. On his
.jourroy hc«e he carried a list of the persons who had worked for him in the
United States and the ftts>a he had paid them, ^his list fell into the hands
of the Brit!sh who searched the ship whi ch on Papen had boarded. Back in
"errr.any, he was sent to the .festem front and became a staff officer in the
Fourth Infantry Division of the Imperial 3uard. He took pa t in the battles
of the Soirme and Arras. Later he i/as transferred to Turkey and appointed
chief of staff of the *ourth Osmanian Army, with tne rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
When the offensive launched by tne British Army forced him to retreat from his
headquartvrs, which wore located in Nazareth at the time, he left behind a box
containing hif^ily confidential material. After World ;.ar I, Papcn was released
from the army and retired to ais estate, Merfelda near '.Verl, Vertphalia, 1/3/ 4/9/*
Work and Political History!
A devout Catholic, Papen joined the Catholic (fcnter Party. This party elected
him to the Prussian kiet in 1921 and again in 1925. in the 1928 election,
however, he was not returned to the Prussian Diet because his ow.i party had
listed him only in tenth place for the constituency of Westphalia-North. As
a result of the death of one f the deputies, Papen a.^a'n served in the Prussian
Diet from 1930-1932, l A / V «
He belonged to the extreme right wing of the Center Part and v;as swTo-.-gly
opposed the collaboration of toe Center Party with tie Social De-ocrats in the
Heich and Prussian governments, 7/ 'j/. In 1325, when "ilhelm »*arx, tho leader
of t'.e nenter Pa'-ty, used a coalition of Centrists, Democrats, aid Social Democrats to form a Prussian government (which at that ti^:e had only a small working
majority in the Diet), Papen and two other ri.rht-wing members of the Center
Party oted a.^a'nst this government, almost causim; its defeat, J^/. Von Papen's
action aroused much bitterness arong the members of the Center Party. This
bitterness increased a few weeks lator whe- he opposed -iarx, his own party chiof,
and sided with i on Hindenburg in the election of a new Reich President after the
death of President Kbort. Thereupon the Westphalian provincial congress of the
Center 'arty asked on Papen for a-, explanation of his rebellious attitude.
4any delegates were said to havo favored his exclusion from the party. Papen,
however, defended himself in an impassioned speech which was a profession of
faith in the ideals of the Center Party. He closed his speech with t^e words:
I have lived as a faithful member of t..e Center Part,/ and I intend to die as
such. And when I shall have died you will write on ey tombstone: 'Here lies
a faithful member of the Center Party.«"9_/ Under the spell of this speech, the
majority of th:: delegates abstained fron expulsion and -voted instead for a
motion censuring von Papen because of his lack of party diaciplif|e,9_/.
COtlFID^TIAL
forfr and Political History (cont'd.)«
Papen became one of the loading 2.'.embers of the Horrcnklub in Berlin, a -atbcring
place for right-wing aristocrats, and bus'nes men. He became a close friend
of Colonel von H'ndanburg who served his ather as a ki ;d of adjutant. Papen
•aas also introduced to Genoral von Schleichor, the ^nfluenctial head of the
Heeresant (Army office.' 'n the W&r H<ni*try)« Schleicher saw in Papen a nian
who could win cons id'":-able parts of t ie Catholic population from the Center
Party nto the camp of the parties of the right, ^"hen the Pruning govornnent
as dismissed by Hirdenburg, because representatives of the big landowners in
Flastevn Germany had convinced ninder.burg that Drüning's agrarian policy would
lead to the "bolshovization" of Gerr.an agriculture, Schleicher suggested Papen
as Drüning's succ» ssor. Hirdenburg, who liked the former staff officer and
cavalryman, acaujescod immediately. Papen assured him that he would win the
support of the Canter Party. Although certain of his orination to the chancellorship, Vie atiil fouj.d it necessary to try to allay tho suspicions of the
Center rarty. The very day he was a- pointed Chancellor, he told the President
of t;.e Center 'arty, Prelate Ka- a, that he would not think of a-.:ceptin~ such
an offer. P?elate Kaas, therofore, was very rruch disturbed when he learned of
Papen's nomination and, in a now famous declaration, stigmatized him as the
"Judas 0? 'ne,Cem,er ^arty»" 9/. So unanimous was the irritation of the Centrists thpfc Papen's efforts to win at least sore support from Catholic circles
were a complete failure. The members of the Catholic hierarchy rejected von
Papea's ove -tures and considered him a traitor. Even the newspaper Germania,
the Berlin organ of the Center Party, wh'ch which he OYtaed shares, attacked
him i no uncertain terms, 9/,
H
Papen had rwned these Ge mania shares since 1921. Originally this stock had
be >"! the yrop-rty of "atthias Rrzber.:er, leader of the Center Party's left
win?, a^d one-time p<ich -iraster of Finance, who led the Center Party into
a coalition with the Social democrats, tn orr'er ^ot to be known aafcwner of
* nf pernania etock, Frzbefger had nomimally transferred ther to a certain Herr
Siam^rT & wealthy Catholic business man in Berlin« T/hen "rzbergor was assassinated in 1921, Papen, who knew that. Siemer was only the nominal owner of the
share;, persuaded the latter to sell him tho shar s and thus he became tho
ovner of the Germania. Source says that Papen clashed continously with the
administrators and the editors of the paper because of their adherenc- to the
official party line, 9/«
Papfvn first established contact with Hitlor in tho spring of lüo2, 6/,
In
vifur of the impending overthrow of Chancellor Brüning, Papen met with Hitlor
or 28 ..ay 1932 to discuss Papen's plans for forming a government, 6f9
In
raturn for tne promise that the Reichstag would be dissolved, new elections
!l
old, and the ban placed by the Brüning government on "itier's f+orm Troops
(SA), on uniforms, <ind political demonstrations would be lifted, Hitlor agr-ed
*o tolerate a Papon government, 6/*
On 1 June 1932 Hindcnburg appointed Papen Reich Chancellor. Papen set about
forming a Pr&sidialhtibinett, that is, a cabinet which did not reflect the
composition of the Ecichstag, but governed by virtue of trie act that it was
backed by tho Reieh President. Papen failed not only to fulfill Schleicher's
hope that he would win the supponrt of the Center Party or at least large parts
of the Catholic population. He also had some difficulties with the Nazis.
Thus, on 3 June 1932, Hitler refused the Papen government a written Tolorierunggfrklftrung (declaration of tolerationV The Papen government was composed
CO'TFtn^TTTAL
ork^nd Political History (cont'd.):
exclusively of old Prussian conservatives, r-.ost of ther aristocrats, and the
economic and social policy which he adopted injthe face of the grave eoonomic
crisis of 1932 was merely a continuation of the deflationary policies of his
predecessor, Brüning, 9/. The Maria, capitalising on the disappointment of the
broad iaasses, therefore felt obliged to express their opposition to von Papen.
Paper, confuted the death sentence of two 3azi SA men who had been guilty of
murdering in cold blood a Polish youth in the villa e of Potemba, Upper Silesia*
Hitler later fr^ed these rur^ers. On 15 June 1932 Hitler called on Papen and
demanded the lifting of the ban a-a'nst the SA, 6/. Under this pressure, despite
the determined opposition of Bavaria, Württemberg", and Baden, Papen issued an
emergency decree (Notverordnung gegon politische Ausschreitungen) on 14 June
1932, removing the ban on the SA, uniforms, and political demonstrations, J/»
Meanwhile Papen planned his great coup d'etat.» One of his aims -.vas to overthrow
the Weimar coalition government in Prussia and to replace it witi a government
favorable to the Reichswehr and in sympathy with its rearmament projects« On
20 July 1932 Papen became Reichskoiuaisaar fur Preussen (Reich Commissioner for
Prussia) on the basis of Article 48 of the Republican Constitution, after
repeated demands to this effect hed been ade by Kerrl, % z i President of the
Prussian Diet, Papen promptly deposed the Braun-Severing Prussian government
with the support of the military. Then he initiated a sweeping purere of all
higher officials faithful to the Republic. The army supported von Papen and
the Nazis backed his coup d'etat in Prussia. The republican government abstained from counter-measures, s..ch as the mobilisation of the police forces
ftnd organisation of a general strike of the workers. The government merely
accused Papen of iolati :g the constitution and left his fate entirely in the
hands of the Supreme Court. The court ruled that Pep en was de jure a violater
of the constitution and that the old Prussian government was still in office,
but that von Papen should have the right to appoint commissioners to rule the
Prussian state da factoo r apen's coup d'etat in Prussif, which had aroused
bitter enmity in the ranks of the democratic forces in Germany, as had the
betrayal of Brüning, provoked the enmity of the Centrists. The coup thus
created another foe for von ^apen: the governments of the states in southern
Germany who feared for their own security after Papen's actions in Prussia«.
The prime ministers of Bavaria and Württemberg, Held and Pols, attacked him
strongly in a session of the Reichsrat, l/ 4/ 9/.
Meanwhile the hostility of the .Nazis was 'ncraasing. On $) August 1932, the
NSDAP negotiated with trie Center Party about the formation of a new government,
as a m«a e of bringing pressure to bear against ^apen, j>/. The Prussian Diet,
despite the opposing votes of the nationalist parties, voted for a non-confidence
motion for Papen as Reich Cormissionsr for Prussia, 6/. On 12 September 1932,
Goring, Nazi president of the Reichstag, in agreement with Hitler, decided to
take energetic measures against von Papen«
, T..•.^~-f1fäjK^.-. *>»**— .*.
'- ^•^^'^''ft'frr'MMIl» *M*^ilwiMiiwi—iijiniiiMi!ii raeaBM^..^Hff|R^ At tue second meeting of
the new Reichstag, Gorin^ brought to a vote the C0ununist otion to lift the
Notverordnung zur gelebung der Wirtschaft (Fmergency Decree for the Reconstruction of German Economy; (decreed on 4 September 1932), combined with a
CO'IFTDT-MTIAL
HQrk and Political History (oont'd.):
non-confidence motion in the Papen government« These motions ware accepted
by an overwhelming vote (512-42). However, the motion remained without the
desired effect because Hindenburg had previously dissolved the Roiohstag
on tho basis of Article 25 of the Reich constitution, 6/ £>'•
Papen, however, showed no disposition to resign« Hitlerihen asked for an
audience wita Hindenburg but was not well received. Although the Deutschnationale (German nationlaust parties) were able to gain part of the two
million votes lost by the Nazis in the ensuing election, the Papen government was
still ">n a hopeless minority. Papen had just returned fro^ the Lausanne Conference. He pretended to have achieved acceptance in principle of Germany's
claim to equal rights in questions of armaments. At that time he thought that
he would be able to win the French over to his point of view. As a member of
the Franco-German Researoh Co*isdttee organized by tiie industrialists of both
countries, he considered himself a specialist in Franco-German questions. This
committee had been created on t- e initiative of the Luzembourg industrialist,
bayrisch, who as head of the fftmaus Abed concern, took a keen Interest in
Franco-German oartelization. From the days of his work on the Co rittee, ^apen
had certain sympathizers *n France, among them Pierre Vienet, who lived in
Germany for eight years as secretary of the Comndtiee and later became Under
Secretary of State in the Leon Blum Government, l/ 2/ 6_/ 9/
On 21 October 1932 Hitler published a let er which he had written to Papen
on 16 October 1932. The letter set forth Hitler's negative stand on Papen»s
domestic and foreign policies and replfed to Papen's speech on 12 October in
Munich where he had presented his justrfication of the results of the Lausanne
Conference, 8/« Less than a month later, n 13 November 1932, Papen invited
Hitler to come to Berlin to discuss the formation of a new government. Hitler,
however, declined and proposed, instead, a written exchange of views, 6/.
k
Finally Papen's erstwhile protector, General Schliecher, had to intervene and
convi ce Hindenburg that "this unpopular Chancellor would have to be dismissed»
Hindenburg agrood reluctantly and is aaid to have given his photograph to Papen
with tue inscription: "Ich hatte einen Kameraden" (I had a comrade), taken from
an old soldiers' song. Papen resigned as chancellor and as Reich Commissioner
for Fttusia on 17 November 1932,6/.
Psp en then tried with all m^ans at his disposal to undermine tie position of ids
successor. General Schleicher. Together with his friend, Osjcar von Hindenburg,
and with Dr. •ei aner, Under Secretary of Sirate assigned to the Reich President,
jjj was decided that the time had tome to approach ^*ie Nazis an<* *° of^*cr them
the Government. The necessary steps with President Hindenburg himself were to
be taken by his friends and neighbors, the representatives of the Prussian
landowner, whom he trusted most. They had to insinuate that Schleicher, too,
was contaminated by "agrarian bolshevism." 6/
The plans for removing Schleicher were skillfully drawn. The Junkers spoke to
Hindenburg and openly opposed the Reich Chancellor. IlindenburO Jr. and Meissner
approached the Nazis 'n Berlin. The decisive event, however, r,-as the meeting on
4 January 1933 of Papen and Hitler at the home of Kurt von. Schroeder in Colofme.
COKFIP^TTTAL
-5-r~
.
PIDTTAL
!'Qrk and Political History (cont'd.):
Schroeder was a Rhenish banker and industrialist who had been supporting Hitler
and his party financially for some time. Papen had arranged for the meeting
and had convinced Hitler on tho one hand and the loaders of the old reactionary parties—the industrialists, the monarchists, the military, and the great
landowners—on the other hand, that the hour had come to bring the Nazis into
the government and to abolish the Republic. Papen's biography in Das Deutsche
Führerlexikon (1934-1935) correctly asserts that his political activities made
possible the rise of Hitler to power, 2/. In Schroeder's home the schedule for
the distribution of the portfolios in the proposed Hitler government -as agreed
upon. On 18 January 1933 Hitler and Papen continued their discussions. Minden burg was easily convinced. Oh Hindenburg's behalf Papen carried on "the very
difficult negotiations" concerning the formation of a new government* Papen
finally succeeded in persuading Hugenberg, leader of turn industrialists, to
agree to the appointment of Hitler, iß/ 7/. Thus, when tie Schleicher Cabinet
resigned on 28 January 1933, the chancellorship was offered to Hitler.
»
Paper became Vice-Chancellor in the Hitler government which took office on
30 January 1933. He held this position until 26 July 1934. On 6 February
1933, Papen-.vas also appointed Reich Commissioner for Prussia, with the
authority previously vested in the Staatsministerium (State Ministry), l/ 6,/.
This latter position, however, he held only until 10 April 1933.
On 5 February 1933 Papen received the Bavarian Staatsrat (State Councilor)
Schfiffer who presented a memorandum from the Bavarian Prime '"inister protesting aga'nst the centralization of authority in Berlin.» papen undertook to
reassure SchEffer of his (Papen's) belief in the federalistic foundation of the
Reich and in the rights of the individual states. Papen further maintained that
these ears on the part of the Bevarian government with respect to the newly
aopointed Reich (Hitler) government were unfounded. Nevertheless, Schfiffer
returned to Munich completely dissatisfied with Papen's concept of law. The
following months were to confirm Schiffer*s apprehensions, Tj (p. 44).
v -
Papen and Labor Minster Seldta reached an agreement with Hugenberg (10 ^sbruary
1933). The latter two, running for the Reichstag on the German National ticket,
decided to use the motto: Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot. Papen supported this
group but did not himself run. Instead he was elected to the Reichstag on the
Reichswahlvorschlag, that is, he >vas sent to the Reichstag on the PeUtschnationale
Vblkspartcju (German "ational People's Party) ticket at large on 5 iiarch 1933.
He remained" a r>eraber of the Reichstag (as a visito^ until 1945, 7/ z/,
On the occasion of sheeting of nationalist student fraternities of Berlin
Univeristy (21 February 1933), von Papen delivered a significant address.
The following pertinent words are quoted: 7/ (p. 65)
The national movement has seized power. ff« know that it is rr-ore
difficult to maintain power than to Seize it. flnd the leadors of
the national movement ought not to :ake the mistake of thinking
that power can be maintained by intellectual maniDulation. Rather,
it "s necessary to carry the spirit of, future developments within
oneself and r;ive it expression. This is possible only if we gain
a perspective of the political forms in which the national movement
CCSFIDEETIAL
n PA?T-1J, Frans
-7-
cy
P"tDT:"TlAL
irk and Political history (cont'd.):
cam© to power. Sie nave appealed to the nasses and nave nationalized
them. Tnia was necessary and must be carried out completely. But no
one denies that the parties standing left of UB lovo their native land
and affirm their nationality. But in return, these parties should break
with all pacifistic and demoralising, tendencies. Then the road will be
clear and we will not be forced to conduct this cleansing process by
force.
When the Reichsstatthaltergesetz (Reich Governor Law, for the coordination of
the tie-man states) was proclaimed (11 April 1933), von Papon resided as Reich
Counissioner because, under the now law, Hitlor was empowered to function as
Reichssta+thalter (Governor) of Prussia and also had the# right to appoint a
Prussian Prime Minister. Thus he appointed Goring as oh>ef of-the Prussian
Government. Actually, Papen then had to write an official letter askingihat
he be released from his position as Reioh Coronissionor. Hitler thanked Papen
for "his great service -n removing dualism between the Reich and Prussia and
) for spreading the idea of a unified political leadership in the Reich and the
Lfinder (states)." j / (p.171).
But Papen continued to serve the Basis as Vice Chancellor and was useful to
them in his religious status as a devout Catholic. In July 1953 he was sent
to Rome with the Bavarian Nazi leader and Ministerialdirektor imttnann to
negotiate tne Reich Conoordat with the Holy Soe. This oo.cordftt, extremely
favorable to tue Churoh, was therefore greeted with enthusiasm by ecclesiastical circles and b, broad masses of the faithful in Germany. But the ink of the
signatures wa* scarcely dry when the *"azis began to violate most of the articles
of tne agreement, 6_/ 7/ 9/.
A national referendum was held on 13 Kovenber 1933 to "confirm'' Hitler's
decision to withdraw from t e League of nations. In t e name of the Reich
Government, Papen reaffirmed his loyalty to Hitler a d expressed admiration of
the "genius of Hitler's leadership" which had placed the National Socialist
• !'overrent in command of the total state, 7/ (p. 558).
At a session of the Reich cabinet (14 November 1933), Hitler gave Psp en a new
assignment. Papen became Saarbefollmaohtirter der Seichsregierung (Reich
Plenipotentiary for the Saar), for the paroose of carrying; on German propaganda
in this, the home district of his wife. It is significant tnat he employed
methods which he had first used when he was German Military Attache in the
United S+ates. His assignment having been carried out. he resigned as Sa>?r
Commissioner on 28 Ju'y 1934, l/ Z/ 6/ 7/.
Papen was involvod in the purge of 20 June 1934. This purge was directed against
the "radical" leaders of the SA (so that Hitler wight enjoy the unlimited supPort of the Reichswehr and tne industrialists) and a anst the "reactionaries"
(so tnat the totalitarian regime might never pass into hands othor than tnose
of the Tiazi leaders). Rapen had a nigh pk ce on the list of reactionaries.
Knowing tnat Hitlor wanted to strike the radical»", Papon had advocated for
some time a certain moderation of the Hazi dictatorial system. In nid-Juno
CONFIDENTIAL
"1 ran»
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CO"FIDT"*TIAL
orgjgd Political History (cont'd.)s
19S4 he made a spoech in Marburg, in which he declared that the Third Reich
should cease to be a one-party state, that certain liberties should bo given
back to t »e press arid other institutions of public opinion, and that the
restoration of the monarchy should be considered a possible forrr. of government for Germany. This spoech, written by one of Papon's secretaries, the
journalist, Jung, infuriated the Hazis. Only tie intervention of Hlndenburg
and apparently the feeling of the Na*is that Papen could be useful for diplo~
watic and related missions rescued him from the list of the intended victims,
drawn up for Berlin and Northern Germany by CSrin^, Papen's personal adversary.
His secretary, Jung, however, and another of lis secretaries, a von Bose, were
killed, 9/4/.
Several weeks later, on 26 July 1934, open's usefulness was demonstrated.
A*ter the assassination of t e Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, by
Austrian Na*is and the ill-fated intervention of the German Minister in
Vienna in their behalf, the tension between Berlin and Vien» was so great
"that t e position of the German "inister in Vienna, in nor.^al times a sinecure, had beoore the r.ost difficult task a German diplomat could face. Hitler
°pfored Papen this position—with the title of Deutscher Botschafter in besonderer Hission in »a en (German Ambassador on Öpjcial Mission to Vienna) —
presuming that Papen would rake a good impression on Austrian Catholic circles.
™hev first revolted at the i dea of liavino to acoept the "Judas of * he Center
Party" (see above) as German ?£inister rn their ridst. The new Chancellor, Kurt
von Schuschnigg, was prepared to refuse Papen's acceptance. Then the head of
the association of Austrian Catholic Noblemen, the Duke of Schönburg-Hartenstein,
intervened and asked the Austrian Chancellor to accept Popen, lest the Nasis
assassinate him (Schuschnigg). Schuschnigg thereupon agreed and von Papen proceeded to Vienna. He had to ove with great caution» his forrer activities had
provoked too many suspicions to allow him quick action, in view of his goal,
namely the r alieation of the Anschluss (incorporation of Austria with Germany),
y y y I/On the second anniversary of his appointment to t.iepost in Vienna, Papen was
honored b^ Hitler with the new title of Ausserordentlicher und Bevollmächtigter
Botschafter in besondered r.ission in Wien (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Speical Mission in Vienna), 6/. Papen remained in this position
until 4 February 19i>8, at which tiire—but a" few days before the Anschluss apparently his mission was accomplished,6*/.
The three-and-a-half ysars that von Papen spent in Vienna apparently were full
°f intrigue. On the one hand, he did all in his powar to satisfy Hitler and
the Nasig and to lure the Austrian government into Hitler's power. Thus, after
great difficulties had been overcome, he brought about the treaty of friendship
and non-aggression signed between Germany and Austria in July 1956, jS/, (This
»uccess tuw well have earned him tie title bestowed on him by Hitler a short
time later).
The forrrer secretary to the Austrian Federal President, Guido Sehridt, whom
Schuschnigg appointed Under Secretary of State and feting Foreign Minister
and who became Foreign Minister after the Berchtesgaden agreement, was Papen'.«?
COKFTDF'TIAL
• .,, i-raua
-9-
CCrFTDTTTTAL
orte^and Political History (cont'd.)?
Austrian partner. Schnidt, according to reports, was "one of the most
clever and i: moral traitors" in Schuschnigg'o personal entourage«. On
the othor hand, while von Papen conspired aga'nst Austria's independence
a^d tried to find ways and means to accomplish tbe Anschluss, he"as also
conspiring against the Nazis» His secretary, Raron von Ketteler, a scion
of the famousfcTestphalianfamily of aristocrats and a aincere anti-Nazi,
brought copies of numerous secret documents and other information to the
Austvi-sn authoriües, informing them of most of the important happenings
in Germany and warning the Austrian government of all significant steps
to be taken by the Nazis» Papenv;as well aware of these activities of
bis secretary and encouraged him, only to betray and desert him when,
afte the occupation of Austria,, the Gestapo learned what had become of the
secrets of the German legation during the preceding years, 9/.
Papen knew that the Nazis were also plotting against him» On the occasion
of a raid on t;ie illegal Nazi center on Teinfaltstrasse, Vienna, the Austrian
police found the R.H. Document (frequently referred to as the Tavs Document).
j R»H. (Rudolf Hess) was the author of a plan to find the pretext for invasion
of Austria by German troops. Nazi agents disguised as Austrian patriots were
to : urder von Papen and thus give the German government the opportunity to
assure control op Vienna. The Austrian Government informed Papen about the
R. H. project. The result was that Papen redoubled his efforts to please
Hitler and to make him a gift of his homeland. Armed with the R.H. Document,
Schuschnigg thought it wasy to confront Hitler and to accuse him of having
violated the Austro-Geraon treaty of July 1936. But Papen and Guido Schmidt
lured him into the trap set at Berchtesgaden, the outcome of which was that
Schuschnigg as confronted with an ultimatum which virtually made it impossible
to continue an independent Austrian government. A few days before the meeting«
Papen was mysteriously recalled to Germany from his position in Vienna, met
with Hitler, and returned to Austria with an invitation for Schuschnigg to go
to Berchtesgaden. Papen's mission to Austria had been fulfilled and he resigned
as German Ambassador to Austria on 4 March 1938, one week before the Anschluss
was proclaimed, 6*/. He retired temporarily to his wife's estate in -Vallerfangenj,
|
Saar District. X few weeks later, the body of his secretary, Baron von Ketteler,
was found floating in the Danube, Z[ 6/ 8/
9/.
For one year, Papon's retirement was complete. He is not known to have taken
part in the crisis over Chechoslovakia. On 29 April 1939, as the war clouds
were gathering, he was appointed German Ambassador to T u r key and remained in
this post until Turkey severed diplomatic relations with Germany in August
1944, 6/ 10/. His mission in Ankara was also clear. He had to win Turkey
°ver to the Axis or at least to prevent her from entering the war on the side
°f the Allies. He was, furthermore, said to have been the head offlie large
network of German spies and agents scattered throughout the Middle r'ast, 11^.
Tbe same source credits Papen in large part for the arrangement of the RussoGerman pact of non-aggression in August 1939 which enabled Hitler to undertake
the war a-ainst Poland« This source tells of secret meetings between Papen
and the Russian Ambassador to Turkey on a fishing boat onlhe Bosporus» This •
^port, however, is as yet without confirmation» In Angara Papen was extremely
active but in retrospect does not appear to have been really successful. He
could not win Turkey over to the Axis and prevented her from joining the United
Nations only so long as Germany had a chance to win the war, d/,
COKFIDENTIAL
1
"• rana
^10-
CO';FIDFltTTAL
gor^ and Political History (cont'd.)s
On 25 February 1942 an attempt wa3 made on Papen's life in Ankara, 12/.
- But the premature explosion of the bomb saved his life» Papen demanded
an investigation. 1'he plot was attributed to several "Yugoslav Communists"
who were afTRssted and imprisoned until Turkey severad diplomatic relations
with Germany in 1944.
On 25 July 1944, five days after the abortive anti-Hani putsch, Papen sent
Hitler a telegram from Ankara, in which he reaffirmed his loyalty to the Führer,
13/. After his return to Germany, Papen received the Ritterkreuz (Knight's
Cross) from Hitler (15 August 1944) in recognition of his services to the German
government, 14/*.
»
In recent years there have been countless rumors about Papen's activities. He
was said to be trying to negotiate peace with the Allies. He was often reported to be in disgrace with tue Führer and at other times was said to be
the mos t influential man in Hitler's councils«. On numerous occasions it was
said that Papen would be ready on short notice to remove Hitler, form a government, and make peace with the Allies. Again, he w as mentioned as about to
leave Ankara for a post in Li sbon or Madrid. On 8 February 1345 it was even
reported that Hitler planned to relinquish the chancellorship to Papen with
a view to getting Germany out of the i.ar, 15/. JJoBt of these rumors, no doubt,
were greatly exaggerated although they give an indication of the vast intrigues
in «hi ch Pap envas engaged.
After his return from Turkey, ^apen rotired. Nothing more was heard about his
activities—if any—thereafter. H e was captured by U S troops at a hunting
lodge near Stockhausen, Ruhr District, 15 April 1945, 16/. As of 15 June 1945,
Papen vas listed among the high ranking personalities in custody at the Allied
detention camp, ASHCAH, 1 7 / .
Fran» von Papen has had a long career in the service of the German government.
under the Snpire he served as Military Attache to the German Bnbassy in Washington. Under the Republic he was a membeijof the Prussian Diet, and, in 1932,
Reich Chancellor. He was the prime figure in the events which led to Hitler's
assumption of power« Under Hitler he was Vice Chancellor for a time. In 1934
he became German Ambassador to Austria and in this capacity aided substantially
in Undermining the independence of Austria. He became German Ambassador to
Turkey in tiarch 1938 and held this position until Turkey severed diplomatic
relations with Germany in August 1944.
Papen has thus been a political opportunist throughout his career. He has
represented reactionary policies in Germany and has engaged in widespread
intrigue and espionage abroad« Above all, his connivance did much to bring
N» < S *° P0*01"« Although von Papen was never formally affiliated with the
«ati Party, evidence indicates that he has been a Nazi collaborationist of
the highest order and an instigator of Nazi aggression.
CO-.'FIDEWTIAL
Franz
Soloes;
-11-
CONFIDENTIAL
1/ Tier I s t ' s 19S5
2/ Das Deutsche Fflhrerlexikon, 1934/35
Z/ Der Srossdeutsche Reichstag, 1938
4 / Current Biography, 1941
5 / I n t e r n a t i o n a l Who*a Who, 1942
6/ Volt, Hans:
Daten der Geschichte der NSDAP, Berlin 1939
7/ Horkenbaoh, Guno:
Berlin 1935
Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 b i s Heute (1933),
8 / RGhle, Gerdt Das D r i t t e Reich / Dokumentarische Darstellung des
Aufbaues der Nation, I T I , 1934
9/ OSS Source T, 3 August 1945
m
10/ New York Times, 7 August 1944
11/ Koeves, Tibor:
H/
The Devil in Top Hat, New York 1941
Mew Y
orfc Times, 25 February 1942
13/ Hew York Times, 24 July 1944
14/ New York Times, 16 August 1944
i5/ N e w York Times, 8 February 1945
16/ New York Times,
15 April 1945
17/ OSS Source S, 2
June 1945
18/ OSS Source T
BR - 1
30 August 1945
ni
s record is a summary of such intelligence (from one or more sources as indicated)
as was available at the time of preparation. It may consequently be subject
to amendment by additional or irore recent intelligence« Index numbers and
letters are solely for indexing statements in t he report«
CONFIDENTIAL