236 `" ,

236
33
As much' as anyone else, Singapore worries about
of
disruptions in the Uow of ships through the Straits
Malacca., Singapor,e, thollgh agreeing with the
and I·ndonesian position that the
be responsible f?r_
sa~ety an~
littora~_
Malaysi~n
states should
navigatio,n in the Straits
of Malacca, has refused to go along wi,th their
p~sition
on de-internatio~alizing the Straits, preferring to ~~~~lY
take note of ,their position~O Foreign Minister s.
Rajaratnam expressed Si,ngapore ~ s conoerns in the
context of the follOWing pointst
1.
Insuri,ng,the safety of navigation,
2.
Avoiding contamination of the .Straits by
oil spillages,
3.
great
POW6,X'
InSl:1ring the. sec!Jrity of the Straits from
rivalry.,
4. "Expressing the view that responsibility' for
safety
i~
the Straits and, it's "inte;J:'national "tatus are
81
two differe~t, issues.
\{e~arding the impositiqn of .,tolls, the singapore,
evening ddly, The .New , Nation
(reflectillg.the
"
" '
"·,,b
view) in its editodal of;Marop
such an
impos~t~o~
2~,th,
o~ficia~
;.;"
,
1972, .ad.d, .that
,would!
tr~ff1c.l'
1.
Slow down
2•
c~use e~tra wOJ.;'~"
3.
Increase shipping\"costs"
4.,. Not. stop ships fro!1l
u.~ng
betuer P9~t,than, K1~nq or,~enanq).?2
Sin,llapore (a
'"
,
237
34
A Singapore official summed' up'<his country's
.views On unrestricted passage through'the Straits
,'Ii.
of Malaoca when he said,
OUr' eoo~omy_dependS .too much
on shipping
to.'permit 'any .tenlpednq with.,the free. ,access
to our .port facilities. ' . . • We cal)not.afford
restrictionswhtch·would hinder 'ollr,g>loWth 021
disru~t our, ~conQmx., 8 3
'
, ,.q . .-:1'\"1'
238
VII.
JAPAN'S POSSIBLE STRATEGIES IN VIEW OF
OBJECTIVES OF THE LITTORAL STATES
,In this section an attempt will be made to
graphically demonstrate possible Japanese strategies in
terms
of
accrued benefit to 'Japan
~nd
perceptual under-
standing by the littoral states of these strate9ies.
No
attempt will be made to analyze variabies affec~~ng:these
perceptions due to a
lack of available information
and a
desire on the part of the writer to use a more literary
approach in writing this paper.
When considering the attitudes and statements of
the leaders of the three littoral states, one must realize
there are variances in nuance.
In addition, as one might
have already observed, there is disagreement between
Singapore, on one hand
Malaysia and Indonesia on the
~nd
other regarding' certa~n pOints previOUSly' di~oussed.
A
basic assumption, however, ia that 'all thr.ee,,'_states-:::will
react similarly to Japanese initiatives, espedially if
they perceive these acts being of a
hostile'nat~re.
The, graph on the following page will try to
dorrolate fifteen strategies that aspen mi9ht follow
,
regarding the StraHs questton in tEl?""s ,9f the benefits,
each strategy mi'iJht acqrue
,;to
Jap';"
~s, welr',llS
degree of hostility each strategymighj;
3S
the, r"l,:rtive
,q~~'rat"" '
'J:1f,!s,e
239
36
fifteen strategies are divided into three groups representing actions of a positive-, independent (those
~olioie8
or actions having little.. direct impact on the littoral
States) and a hostile nature.
have
eithe~
Many of these strategies
been suggested or actually implemented, while
others remain purely theoretical.
The horizontal axis represents the existence (or
lack ~f) "hostilityll w~th greater nhos~il1tyll represented
by points plotted to the right
axis represents
o~
point X.
re~ative "benef~tsn
The vertical
aC,cruin,g to Japan as
a result of 'a particular policy with high, benefits signified
by points. plotted
tow~rdB
the top of the graph.
Point X
is the location where the two axis intersect forming four
quadrants, namely A, B, C and D.
Strategie,s falling within
quadrant A should be considered the optimal ones for Japan
since they return the, highest benefits and at the same time
cauSes the least hostility in the eyes of the littoral states.
Those strategies falling ·wlthin,:quadrant 0, on the other
h,and, are by far the least desirable since they indicate
that not only will one 'particular strategy return little
in terms,of material benefit to Japan but also create
"hostility" in' the minds of the leaders of the littoral
states.
Quacirants C and B represents areas, of high
benefit and highhostllity and low benefit and low
'h9st~lity.
The ,.thre~. st:i;'ategies 1, 8, 9' ·located Op the
axis 'Of "be:nef..it" because 1;l).ey fall withiin the category
of those pOlicies having Ii ttle or no direct impadt on the
240
37
,littoral States' and therefore ref'lect neither high or low
hostility.
Strategy 10, located on the axis of "hostl1ityi'
indicates that this strategy" reflects' 'neither high nor low
benefits accruing t'o Japan.
The significance of strategies l, 2' a'nd 3 being:
clustered together" at the extremes of high benef'i t an'd
low hoatHi ty indioatepolioies of a similar nature.
All
'three involva the contriJ>utions' of e1ther money, te'chnical
-assistance or both.
While definitely improving the ability
of ships (espeoially Japanese
oil
tankers) to safely
navigate the Strafbti' they would also be interpreted by
the litto'ral states as positive steps indicating Japan's
willingness to' coop,:erate w!'th South,-Eas't",Asian States' 'ahd
rernove'the on-US of Japan's· tarnished image in the -minds'
of
!'I8Dy,
241
38
HIGH
BENEFIT
1, 2, ,
•••
A.
LOW
8.
-=-
7
8
'5
'6
"12 '
HIGH
"-.,,If-='t-.....- - - - - -.... _TILITY
BOSTIIITYrt--.;;...--....
>,4,..
c.
"11
D.
Strategy and Notes
A.
posftl.ve ,(!>c\l1liesce and/or COOl>e~at1on) --in view'
,of littolt<!l: states.
'/:
1.
"
,,;,
Surlley'r~ura~ts
.",'
,
and dredge"channe1s with
Jali'al\~lIIe"fill'l\noia1 'lind material oontributions,
at 1ll)e,,:Lnvl.i:ation of the 11 ttora1 states.
")J;/lIi''IIn",rhas surveyed parts ,of' the Ma1acca
,;S1>lta~"t. rand she is planning toc!lo the
sal11O""tor "the Lornbok'llnd Malo" ••"r Strait••
ARJj,,,:'l!ay,l~73; p',
1839.
242
39
2.
Assist in formulating separation of traffic
Bchemes and contfibute and imp lace channel
markers and navigational devices.
sterba, N. Y. Times, March 13, 1972, p. 9.
Japanese industries offered to pay all the
costs of fitting Straits with radar buoys
and navigational aids.
3.
Make financial contributions to upkeep of
straits.
See Oliver, passim.
4 -.
Pay tolls in lieu of the above.
Interview with Japanese Military Official
and lmagawa Eiich!.
S.
Aid in construction of Semangka Transshipment
center.
State Department official indicated no action
is being taken or anticipated in the near'
future. See. also ARB, Sept. 1973,
pp. 2049-2050.
6.
-
Increase littoral states' dependence on
Japan, economically.
All information indiQ8tes a trend in
this qeneral direction. See Appendix 2.
B.
Actions independent of littoral states and having
no direct influence on them.
7.
Participate in 'the co_nstruc't.io;n of a canal
or pipeline""cross the lsthmU$dEt(ra.
i'
,-_
Japanese eXJ?Srts have, al"r:eadY -participated
in a survey"'of- partl',16f -;1t:he -tRja'-lsthmus.
However, due to'thedMII!(/jI'itnl't:he'l'ha:i
government,l" the ,outlOc>k' «!l)i>liatsto be very
uncertain. :tn- addition, ,'from the time
oonstruetiOn',l:)egine'Uod.t,s'esti1l1ated time of,
completi'on W'ou.ldL,-require 'ni-ne to ten years.
See ~, J'anuary' 2~,l973,p. 39.
8.
Development of
of fuel
alterhati~e
sources and types
Depending on lOcation, amouhts (numbers)
and types of energy alternatives to oil and
243
40
the Middle East may prove beneficial to
Japan. This includes oil tars in South
America, oil fields in Alaska, nuclear -,,'
energy, hydroelectric energy, etc'. ARB,
January 1974, p. 2386. Quoting a MI~
source ~ "'the Nihon Keizai Shimbun ~Of February
19, 1974 -said that Japan's reliance on oil,
"is going to be cut. II
March 27,'1974 on page
the Soviets have decided to
of an oil pipeline and replace
second Trans Siberian RailWaY~e' rmioastlch
editorial of March 26, 1974 ~
venture as; "too costly. II
9.
Circumnavigate
Australi~.
According to Miller, circumnavigating
Aus:tralia at the present time wou,ld add
at least an additional two to three dollars
to the cost of a barrel of oil-for Japan.
In addition, a Japanese source made it very
clear tha:t, so long of a detour ,'WOUld be
'''extremely da~gerous" in. a wartim,e situation
'-,since it would add ,an additional 8,000' miles
to th_e voyage from' the persian gulf to Japan,
e*:posing tankers to increased vernability to
both undersea and aerial interdiction.
c.
Actions paroel,v'ed as hostile by li~toral states.
10. Any unilate'ral aetion wjJthout the prior consent
of the llttoral states (particularly Indonesia
and ,Ma'l~y-sia)
.,. ' ,. not: amounting -to the use of force.
"
. ~uch an-- action might, include issuing statements
withclui!:it'l>" prior knowledge of the littoral
states'~ ":Se~ Bundy, Newsweek, April 10-; 1972,
p. '39.
"
11. Refusal to observe known draught limitations.
This would mO,st 'likely ·be the result of an
individual actiton rather, .. than the_ concerted
policy of Japan.'se 'gov&rnme~t.
12. Failure to pay fair aompensation for damages
caused by an ",coide"t or "il spillage •
Although an accident or oil spill is
po.sible, Japan is most likely to ,settle
promptly.
244
41
13. Failure to reform eoonomic policies over the
long rUJ;l.
It.would seem rational for Japan to do
this, but lmaqawa believes that this will
be a, difficult and painful process for
the Japanese.
14. Cutting-off or _drastically limiting economic
aseistanc.e •
This of course may be a tactic or retaliatory
move on the part of the Japanese to correct
some wrong done to them ,by one,of the littoral
states. In terms of economic leverage, this
strategy might be applied in the hope of
gaining some sort of concession.
15. Committing elements of the Maritime Self-Defenoe"
Force to the area, either to force the Straits
or to coerce one or more of the littoral states.
Irrational. However, as Axelb,ank notes,
"Most .conseX'Vstive leaders stress the need
to defend- ·the so-called 'Malaoca Straits'
defense line." See Axelbank, p. 16. lmagawa
see$: this faction as being part. of the '
Keidaren, the Japanese Federation of Economic
organization. In addition, there are some in
the Ministry of Defense in Japan who feel the
need to send ships into the Malaoca Strait& to
insure the safety of Japanese: ,tankers. Lee
Kuan Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister, has
openly sugges,t,d' ,that a multi-national task
force be formed to patrol the' sea lanes in
the ,rea. Th,is foro,e, consis~in,9' of J,pan-,
Australian, and US nav~l,. ele~t .. wou.1Cl," bunker
and base in Singapore. ,The.:..r:$'SpPDee, to this'
idea has been particularly, ,.,0001 11 "'n 'tokyo.
Most observers see thi's pro1?osal ,as difficult
to imp1ement be<;:!lu~eo~. the "pr<lvailing politioal
climate in Tokyo as well as the various legal
and constituti9nal -pre.• c;4ptions on deployment
of Japanese, ,forees ,over,,~s. HQWever, others
have argue.di" that. in sp"tl:e. of theBe prohibitions
the possibilities of regular patrols of elements
of the Japa1le.e""Mari1;~""'Se1f-l)efense Foroe is
not too far .o:ff: ,in tme, futu,re.
245
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS
The eviden ce in this paper sugges ts the existen ce
least a partia l state of econom ic interde penden cy
of
betwee n Japan on one hand, and the coasta l states of
at
Indone sia, Malays ia and Singap ore on the other.
littor al states depend
a:'~great
The
deal upon Japan for their
for
aid, commerce and trade, while Japan depend s upon them
a source of certai n raw materi als, a market for her goods
e
and their goodw ill insofa r as insurin g the unimpeded paSSAg
of her oil shipme nts throug h the area.
This interde penden cy appear s to be threate ned by
arroga nt econom ic polici es on the one hand by Japan and
by extrem e nation alists
pronou ncemen ts on the other by
Additi onally , it appear s that no one
nation would receiv e benefi ts substa ntial enough to justify
One form or anothe r of retalia tion for "wrong s" oommi tted
the littor al states .
The questi on is more a matter
of ration ality and oommon sense, diotat ing decisio ns in
terms of nation al intere sts, rather than profit and trade.
by one or the other party.
One of the most commoniy mentio ned of the littor al
states ' compla ints agains t Japan has been the latter 's
so-oal led "explo itive" busine ss practi oes. There is
substa ntial eviden ce to indica te that Japan has indulg ed
42
246
43
in practices such as floating loans at excessively high
interest r:ates as well as attaching all sorts of strings
to its aid.
Japan has also speculated in various commodity
markets and in the caSe of Indonesia, actively interfered
in the Japanese textile industries.
The behavior of the
Japanese (businessmen and tourists alike) too often has
been characterized by South-East Asians as boorish.
spite of this, suppose as a
reac~ion
In
to the hostility
generated by these methods and behavior as well as to the
increasing cost of fuel oil brought on by
extra~reqional
factors, Japan decided to pull-up stakes and go home?
move such as this would result
the region.
in.e~onomic
A
chaos throughout
While it could certain behoove the Japanese
to reform some of their methods, it would also. be incumbered
upon those receiving the benefits of Japanese aid and
assistance to be a little more tolerant.
The strategic
imp~rtance
of the Malacca Straits,
although not really disputed by anyone, should no longer
be used by. Japan and other states to justify a wide range
of policies which may have only se.condary relevance. There
are those in Japan, particularly among certain con.ervative
~ements
of the· business community, who have been making a
great deal of noise about sending elements of the Maritime
Self-Defense Force, south to insure Japan's continued
access to the Straits.
A number of these elements would
benefit by an increase in both the size of the MSOF and
its mission.
There are certain groups in Indonesia who
247
44
use the question of co'ntinued passage by the maritime
powers, particularly Japan through the Malacca Straits,
as a vehicle for gaining as much political mileage as
they can.
However, it is doubtful that the littoral States
are going to close the Straits to Japanese tankers; although
in the interests of safety and ecology, they will most
certainly impose lim! t8 as to ·the size and draughts of
ships permitted to navigate through the narrow straits.*
Too many nations ,have too,'much t.o lose to permit arbitrary
and unfair restrictions from being imposed
by
the littoral
States.
If the,; Japanese __ .are truly, ,worrieclt 'about, the Strai,ta
being closed then they perhaps should"think about projecting
a more positive image -6£ themselves in the area.
The image
they should -'Glndeav6't' 'tio project sh~uld be one of a fellow
Asian, though materially better off, whQ' lsees a considerable
stake in the region's
Economic measures,
~evelopment
;~:r.oitly,
and political stability.
handle,d will bring 'returns
measured in more ,thllndiVl.dendll'''8nd>\proUI!B
but>more
"'-- "--'" .. '!'i
,;.;
appropriately in pOli'tical cooperlltl.ol', a~<I regional
l" ':-: "" -':,
stability.
*See Appendix 8.
248
IX.
EVIDENCE AND DATA
45
NOTES
(London:
1.
B. Harrison, South-East Asia--A Short History
Maomillan and ,Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 22.
~.
Ibid., p. 52.
3.
ibid.
4.
Ibid., p. 117.
5. Seymour Brown and L,. Fabian" II,Diplomats at
Sea,1! Foreign Affairs- (January 1974), p. 364.
6.
H. F. Pearson,
1819-1960 (Singapore:
pp. 6-1.
Ea,stE;rn:t
7.
Ibid., p. 8.
9.
Harrison, pp. 255-256.
10. Peter
Asia (London: Ox.fo;,d
11.
Harrison, p. 241.
12.
Ibid., p. 244.
13.
Lyon, p. 21.
14,.
(Londont
D. G. 'Hall"
'A,'Hist()r~
of S. E' Asia,
Macmillan, 1955), p. 6 i.
pp. 92-130.
16.
U.S. Naval Institute 'Proceedings
(June 1973), p.
27.
17.
Ibid.
18.
Richard
Policies and Security, Adelphi
Iss, 1972),
p.
le.
249
46
19.
Oliver, p. 30 •
.20.
Ibid.
21.
J'8.0k-~D.
Salmon, "Japan as a Great Power--
The Military and Policy Option," Japan Interpretor
(Summer/Autumn, 1972), p. 402.
22. Capt. Richard A. Miller, U.S.N., "Indonesia's
Archipelago Doctrine and Japan's Juqular,"'U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (October 1972), pp. 30-31.
23.
Ellingworth, p. 19.
24.
Miller, pp. 29-30. See also Capt. Edward. F.
"Gargantuan Tankers--Privileged or
(Sept. 1970),
p. 40.
-;:;,••'. for a
200,000 dwt tanker are 40 cents' per barrel as compared
to 52 cents in a 70,000 tanker.
Oliver,
25.
Ibid., p. 3.
26.
Miller, p. 27.
~~ra1~,s,n
28.
the
1973),
International
Miller, p. 28.
29. 'Michael Leiter and Dollivet·, Nelson,
"Conflict" of Interest in the Malacaa Str~l~'s,"
International Affairs· (April' 1973 h
I
30.
Miller, p. 29.
31. James Sterba, "Japan Tighten. Her:.:Economic
Grip on the Nations ot; B.> & S. E. Asia,'" New ,YOrk. Tintes,
28 August 1972, p. 1.
32. Taira KOji, "Japan and theSmailer Stat&s
of Asia, II Current History (NoVember 1973).'
250
47
34,'. Masataka, Roeaka, o~tigns fbr Japanese
Foreign Policy, Adelphi Paper··f 7 (London:' SS,
1973),
p~
24_
,
35. Kitamur,a, H1rash!, '''Japan's' Economic policy
Towards S. E. Asia," A$ian Affai:t's (February 1972), p.:' 53.
36.
sterba, p. 1.
37. Far ,Eastern! Egonomic Review (F-BE!{:h·
Jan. 14, 1974,,';p. 11 ..
<"
,
38.
Ibid. , p. 12.
39,.
'sterba, p •. 1-
40.
Ibid.
41.
FEE~,
42.
~'. February 14, 1974, p. 9.
43.
~,
44.
Asian Research Bull!tin~ Feb. 1974, p. 2354.
45.
Interview with" m~e~,,: of Japanese:
March 18, 1974, p. 37.
Feb. 28, 1974, p •. 10.
Self-Defense Fo'ree •
.-
'
." ,
25,
---
46.
N. Y. Times, May
47.
~,Feb.
48,.
PEER, January '21, 1974, p. 13.
49.
ARB, !'el1""a"y,j.974,·P.,2361.
'1971-
1974, p. 2361-
50. Jon Halliday "'and
Im,erialism Today- tNew 'Yorks
19 3)', p. 34.
:I
G~i~~~'~~C~~"k~'· Japan•• e
Month~y .. Re"i';'"
Press,
I
51.
~,loIa"Qh
52.
FEER>A:U9ust'13,1973;,p': 36.
1972, ,po
~98
I'
53;,. ~,La,!~_.n~.,",Ol13on,_ Jagan. -in iostwar Asd;a
(New York: praeqer 'l?:~c9ss,-_,1§7: ,L, p. $$. ,
54.
55; .
ARB, Feb. 19N, p. 2360.
A!!!: March 1912, p.699.
'I:: '
251
48
56. Mihon .1I~~l'i.Shimbun, :Lndustrial Review'of
Japan--1914 ('lOkYC;>,;lleoembe,'1973), p •. 27.
57.
~,
58.
Miller,
59.
Oliver, p. 29.
February ,26, 1973, p. 14 •.
p.29(~ee
1
Chart).
60. Al,bert Axelbank, "Will Japan Re~rm? II 1J1.
Livingston, Moore and Oldfathers, Postwar Japan
(New York, pantheon,1973), p. 16.
'
61. Cap't.: Edward E. Oliver, "Ga:rqantuan Tankers-priviieged or l,\U·rdened," u.s.. Naval Institute Proceedi'nqs
(Sept. 1974), p; 40.
62. L. Griswold, IIBy.passing Malacca," u.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (June 1973), p. 106.
63.
~,Feb.
1974, p. 2361.
64.
Interview with Imagawa"Eiichi.
65 •.,
~l>id.
66. Str!l,1ts 'limes (K., L. Edition), March 20,
1972, p. 1.
67.
Gr1swol!1',;
p •. 1Q7.
68'. lntervieww4;:\lh o~.tld.II,!<" of the
of Malaysia.
'
" ,.
"
:; ':,('\.
69.
Ellingworth, i'p. 19'.
70.
illl!,
n.
Ibid.
April 1972, p.
Emba~sy
·1~,~.
12. 'In:herview with Il)<\onesian ofi~,,+al
.•,
"'.'" ,','.,
73: Ministry of FOreign Affairs 'Forra~,'" "
.
Affairs, Malaysia, Vol • .,s, No.·4 (~eoember 1 1~~,t '~;{'l)l·~:.'
74.
N. Y. Times, Oct. 24,,·'1968,
75.
~,Feb. 26, 1973, p. 3'.
76.
Ibid.
p,'.
3.•~;
252
49
77. ' Robert S. Mathews,""Singapore,"
Defense Transportation (Jan./Feb. 1973), p. 42.
78.
!]!!, May 14, 1973, p. 43.
79.
~,
80.
Ibid. , p. 772.
81-
Ibid.
82.
The New Nation (Singapore) Marchi 1972.
83.
Interview with official of Singapore Embas,sY.
April 1, 1973, p. 773.
253
50
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Gordon, Englewood
Bernard K:":li.~~~~~~~~~~~fI~~~ll
C
%nc., 1969.
Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia.
St. Martins press, 1964.
New York:
Halliday, Jon and McCormack, Gavan.
Today. New York, Monthly Re,d'iWP
Harrison, BrianoMaaRIlli :.~~~~~~~~~!!!2!X..
London:
~
Olson, Lawrence. Japan in Post-war Asia.
praeger Press, 1970.
New York:
Pearson, H. F. siniapore: A Popular History--1819-1960.
Singapore:
astern unIversIties Press, 1961.
Wilson, Dick.
Asia Awakes.
New York:
Weybright and
Talley, 1970.
Monographs
Kunio.
~~![~~~~~iss,
1973.
Kosaka Masataka. Options for Japanls Foreign PolicY-Adelphi Papers No. 97. London:
.SS, 1973.
254
51
Periodicals and .,.-;Journals
,
Miller, Riohard A. Capt., U.S.N. "Indonesia's
Archipelago Doctrine and Japan's Jugular."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1972):
27-33.
Oliver, Edward E. Capt. USCG.
"Malacca: ,Dir,ia Straits."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1973).
27-33.
Interviews
Desk officers,
D~pt.
Of. State.
Malaysia/Singapore.
, . Indonesia.
'
.!J'apan.
Officers on Staff of the following. l!:mba'ssiesl
Japan.
Indones:ia,
Malaysia;
Singapore.
Academic Community
Dr. Martin We~nstein·,Br60kinIlB Institute •.
PrOfeSBOr Itniiqawa,' E:1ichi, Bt.()okiilqs Institute.
255
52
APPENDIX 1
MAJOR SEA ROUTES Itl THE SOUTlI- EAST ASIAN ARCA
Source:
Miller. p . 1.
256
53
APPENDIX 2
JAPAN'S TRADE WITH,' EAST AND SOUTH EAST ASIA
(1960-1970 WITH PROJECTION FROM 1970-1980)
40%
percentage of
area "s total
imports coming
from Japan
50%
peroentage of
Japap I,S total
exports going
to area
-
20%
,p.eraentill$'e', of
Japan '8-\ :\).0;1-a1
---
10%
1970
Source 1',
Jameis,
:~U,.erba,
imports -091n9
from' the area
1980
New -York Times,
August 28, 1972, J?
.,to
(~.t • .)
257
54
APPENDIX 3 •
(A) JAPAN' 5 TRADE WITH SINGAPORE. MALAYSIA AND
INDONESIA: 1973
U.S. $
million
Japanese Imports
Value % increase
Japanese Exports
Value
% increase
Japanese
Balance
Singapore
930.0
32.0
223.1
84.5
706.9
Malaysia
447.6
69.6
775.7
96.1
-328.1
Indonesia
903.7
46.8
2212.4,
84.7,
-1308.7
(B)
JAPANESE INVESTMENT ABROAD
March 1973
March 1980 (est.)
U.S. $ Million
Value
'of total
Value
% of total
Europe
1,659
24.5
6,250
14.7
North America
1,549
22.9
7,505
17.7
S.E. Asia
1,390 "
20.5
10,48.0
24.7
Middle East
606
8.9
6,490
15.3
Africa
148
2.2
1·,050
2.5
Oceania
432
6.4
3,335
7.9
Lat"in America
989
13.3
5,730
13.5
1,640
3.9
42,480
100.0
cit'hers
Total
6,773
Source:
~,
100.0
Mar9h' 18, 1974.
258
55
APPENDIX 4
JAPAN'S INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON OIL
,PER CENT
,~,
.
, ----+--:=,.-....:;:..---...::,.
- - -......
"
COld. & LlGNIlI
~
,"~
.
'1
12.3
(
"
1' ..
1.9'
OJ
Source t
capt. Richard A. ,Miller, "Indonesia's
'Arohipelago Doctrine and Japan I s
Jugular," U.S. Naval Institute
proceedings (ootober 1972), p. 30.
259
56
APPENDIX 5
~PP
FIVE SUPPLIERS OF OIL TO JAPAN
1972
country
Iran
36.6
Saudi Arabia
15.4
Indonesia
13.2
Kuwait
·8.,9
l\bu Dhabi
6.1
SoU roe :
, ',-"
~ndustrial R~~ie,,!, ':of ~apan"'-'.
1974,Nihon Keiza.i Shimbun.
(Deqem\)el' 1~7 3),'P.•. i i~.'.
,( --i/ , -, .
.<,
<'. ~ •
"
260
57
APPENDIX 6
COMPARISON OF NAVIES
Japan
Singapore
Navy: 39,000.
11 submarines.
1 SAM destroyer with Tartar.
27 destroyers.
12 destroyer escorts/frigates.
20 submarine chasers.
2 minelayers.
42 coastal minesweepers.
5 motor torpedo boats (2 less
3
1
6
"42
Navy~
600
1 seaward defence
boat.
6 fast patrol
boats.
1 landing ship.
2 landing craft.
than 100 tons).
tank landing ships.
medium landing ship.
landing craft.
small landing craft
(less than 100 tons).
Naval air component: 200 combat
aircraft.
9 maritime recce sqns with
SP-2H, S-2F, P-2J,
PS~l, and others.
About 60 helicopters incl S-6l,
8-62, Vertol 107, CM-34,
and UH-19.
RESERVES, 300.
Indonesia
Malaysia
Navy: 34,000 (incl. 14,000
Marines). (Only a small
part of the navy is
Navy: .),500.
12 ~Egi:ii~~:ll!x
W-class).
1 cruiser (ex-Soviet Sverdlov-class).
4i destroyers (ex-Soviet Skory-class).
11 frigates (including 7 ex-Soviet
(Riga-class) •
. . sovd.et
18 coastal" esoorts" (14 ex-Soviet,
4 ex-USA).
12 Komar-class patrol boats with
Styx SSM.
S
patrol boats.
21 torpedo boats.
6 fleet minesweepers',e
20 coastal minesweepers (6 ex-USA).
18 motor qunboars.
25 sea~ard defence boats
6
7
2
2
frigates (1
with Seacat SAM).
6 coastal minesweepers.
4 fast patr()~ boats
(less than 100
tons).
24 other patrol
boats (less than
100 tons) (4 more
to be delivered
in 1972).
. 1 landinq ship.
A number of river
~SW
craft . .
RESERVES:
600.
(less than 100 tons).
landing ships.
landing craft.
Marine brigades.
Sou,rce .. Mqttary Balance, 1973, Institute for Strategic Studies, Londott973
,.
261
58
APPENDIX 7
THE STRAITS OF KALACCA AND THE THREE TENTATIVE
CANAL ROUTES ACROSS THE ItRA ISTHMUS
Souree.;
Lawrence Gri~ld. -Bypa.sing
Malacca,- U.S. Naval Institute
Proceeding. {June 1§7Jj. p. 106.
pUblic Information Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affaira,
Japan, Infor.ation Bulletin,
Vol. XVII. No. 20 (october 15,
1970) •
262
59
APPENDIX 8
TRIPARTITE MEETING ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN
STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
June, 25-26
In
ke~ping
joint statemen't.
with the decisions contained in the
ot,· November
1971, in which the three
coastal States had-agreed, to co-operate on the safety
of navigation in the Straits of' Malacca and ;Singapore
and as a follow-up -to the meeti'ng held in Jakarta in
July :\.972, the delegation of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore met in Kuala Lumpur ot:l June' 2,S"and 26, 1973.
The meeting reviewed the progre~s,of the studies
made by the' respective Governments on matters relating
to navigational' saf,ety measures raised at the Jakarta
meeting last year. The meeting was satisfied that there
has '-been_ ste~dy 'progress towards the atta,inment of the
objective of ensuring the safety of navigation in the
St;ai ts o.f MaJ.;acca and Singapore.
The meeting agreed that there is a need for a
limitation of draught of vessels passing through the
Straits, having regard to the physical limitations of the
St.raits. It was also agreed that-a ,group· ,of e~perts from
the three cO\,1ntries:' Should, 'carry out further studies wi~h
the view to establiShing a Traff:Le $eparation Scheme for
the Straits of'Malacca and Singapo~e. The group of experts
would work out'the details of the ,scheme taking into account
a safety margin compatible with, ,the interests of the coastal
States tQ ensure the safety, of tbe- coastal States, AS well
as the interests of the users of the Straits.
The meeting also agreed to establish a body for
co-operation and ¢o-ordinat.i:on of effortfS in the Strai t8
o,f.,'Malacca and Singapore as envisaged in the joint statement
of November 1971. The de'tails:'of the structure, scope and
responsibility of this body will be worked 'Out by the'
three Governments.
The meeting' agreed to oontinue, the oonsultation-
in the spiritbf tripartite co-operation.
Source I
Ministry of Foreign',Affairs, Malaysia',
rO~eign Affai,rs
Malaysia, ,Vol. 6,
No;. 2 {JUlie 191 S)"pp. ·1,6-77.
'
"THE CO-RESPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY"
COMMENT
COMMENT, ON' QUESTION £8 TO WHETHER THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAS
Co-EQUA'L :OESP'ONSIBILITIES IN THE AREA OF FORErON AFli'AIRS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION;' O'J!' T1fE UNITED 'STATES BASED ON THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONEITITUTION IN 1787
From: Thomas R. Kennedy, Staff Consultant, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee.
To,: Hon. Robert N. G. Nix,'M.C., Chairman ..
Material :' Hearing Record -of Subcommitte'e during 08rd Congress, Article Seton
Hall Review, "Separation of Powers tn: the'IDomain of Foreign Affairs: The
Intent 'of the Constitution Historically Examined," Arthur Bestor, 5 Seton
HaU La,w, Review, 527-665, "Imperial Ptesidency." Arthur Schlesinger,
Houghton-Mifflin Co., "The Constitution and What It Means'Today," Edward
S. Oorwin; 1978 Edition Princeton University Press, and "The Federalist
Papers, Hamilton, Madison, ,Tay, M'enton Book Edition.
PROPOSITION
That' the Oongress of the Un~ted States Ilnd the' President of the United
States have a joJ,nt'responsib1Uty in Foreign Affairs, with the full support of
the historical evidence as to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution
at the Oonstitutional Oonvention in 1787.
HEARINGS:
u.s.
POLICY AND PROGRAMS IN CAMBODIA SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
~ND. PACIFIq AFFAIR~, "MAY 9-1(1, 1973.
;On 'May, 9th, -(in page .15 of the Hearing Record, the following e:x;i;!hange takes
place between Mr." Nix,' OhairmRll of the Subcommittee and Mr. Bi-Qwer, Acting
Legal Adviser; Department of ,State in regl,lrd to the bombing 'being carried, on
in: Oambodia ,by -American forces:
'_
,, , '
'
, MIl;' NIX. Mr. Brower, the question put to you was 'by what constitutional
" authority'-is the bombing beblg ordered,' ft} :Cambodia,? As I understood your
,'ans-wetl, fI-rst' you said"no ,t\lddlUhnll!}J a1.it:h6rity"'was 'u,ee<ied. the assumption
being the 'authority ,alreadlt,· existed j 'but '~9U' did' notl;,~ive 'us 'the source of
'.that ·.uthOrity; You ,folloWed' that by safljjg that article· 20. (Truce Agree" m~nt}1 ,Wtts."(:not necessary' and it gave' -no independent autiiority for the
,r"""President,'s'(lction,'
"
'Mr~ BROWER. Briefly stated, the President's,ntlthority Is' derived from article
2 of the~U.:!h:{~onstitution ,as:' Comlllander-In~Chlef of' the' Armed Forces a-n(1.
Ohlef r'mt::ecut1.ve, in the' cot)du'ct of OUr foreign relatioill;f; bO,tli' to guide: aO,d
i('
order'tbe'coiii1uctofoUrtoJ.lces,w:hlch,we'retben'. . J.;. , ,I': .'. "
.,' i'~
·,Senator G.ol<l~~e. who app.eat!'M·,'before the Sl1bcommlttee'on the followl\ig
day,of.thea.~'.MO;rJiI\.·II" $tated 11111.n..afll.cle.w.. t!I. ttell"~I))·,the Virginia. J.oUfnal of In..•.
ternatlbnalH,,,,w·jim1978 that· (~8'CVlfi'I'ntrr,: 468:·'465,466,·11178): ' . ,...
'
..... The F~"lnorsof tho (J0ll.llt\l1lll)jj'.(ln".Q~.d; the€)hlemll"eeutlve·wtth thO tor'
. ' eign. poll~'!ll'f)Jklhl pow.r~eca~.0611"':' .eal,...t1oh;.t!lat~.lllgl.ln:dIV1Q)l~lwtth
life... 1>owe'tl!wo1)id' notlle 'dlstit.i!ea,;by1lh.'WI~t1c.'bt1lbe mOnlent. He would.loo~
. to,tbe)ollg oottr.eof history an:d:u.e..hl~·'poWe""I,Inllre Wi••ly that a Oongr•••
wbleh 1o, eonstantly lbOklng toward· the'pol!tlcalr••ults: 11: Is nlythought that the
Founding Fathers_'understlood that- releon:~res)!l.tdlv;J.ae{l, -aJbopgst :minority' jnterestf;!
mlirhtln some crucial moment, In'hl8tiJ\')I ~!Floath 1:0·81"0' proper dlreci:lon tiJ a
Ringle ·necessary American course. "1'hus!,:tpey- 'f'o'qUQ' it prope~ to place the' power
of ,external af&:\irs tn a single person \~ere 'the probahility of minority weight
w~UId,be,mu.'b\e.sl!kely to·have this effect;".··
..,' . . •
, ;:rJ.ihe vle:WS'·'e~p.tessed IbY; tJhose'<favorlpge~e:view at"a neaf)lionopoly of Prest:
dentlallnflrteri@ imd 'Powe" III Foreign A1l!.I~.' have. a long 'a.M ·honoral)le h1.t~ry
Ill' .4Jmerlcan I1f'Hbilt It 18 'based e••elitlit)ly 'on a ease byeali. development that
,.i'·.,,,:U . .'
' . '(2.~3)
, .. ,."
",
;<\ '
264
expands on incidents which took place in the Oivil War, the First World War,
Second World War and the Cold War. At such times in 'Our history, Congress and
the Judiciary have not sought to assert thei.r jurisdiction against the Executive
. Branch. The point is that the Constitution- as it has developed and .RS it was
fO'rmed would not forbid such activity by the Legislative or-Ju,dicial:Branches of
Government, There is almost no material in the -Constitutional Convention itself
to support the view that the President has Dear plenary powers in Foreign M·
fairs. What evidence can be 'Offered for such a view relates to Presidential as~
sertiveness in the more than 180 years since the adoption of the Constitution,
wlJthout Congressional 'Or Judicial intervention.
Alexander Hamilton, the leading proponent of a strong executive at the Constitutional IConvention,' in No. 75, of the Federalist Papers, which commented on
the new Constitution, said in ,;part: HThe history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and, momentous a kind as those whi'Ch concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate
created and circumstances as would be a President of the United IStates."
Tbe Brower-Goldwater view is contradicted by the Arthur BestQr article in the
Seton Hall Law Review cited above.
,Mr. Bestor's view is that the United States Congress has joint .powe~ to act in
matters of Foreign Affuirs, ,based on the Advice and CQnsent clause which originally empbasized the advice as well as the consent role of the United 'States Senate
and the Power 'Of the PUrse which was in large measure the pOwer of the United
States House 'Of Representatives, where money 'bills originate.
THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE LANGUAGE OF 'l'HE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIQN
A. The United States 'CQnstitution was the direct descendant of the Articles of
Confederation. Business at the Constitutional Qonvention WaS not conducted with
the thoughtA.n min,-d that the delegates were there tQ limit 'Or even tQ expand the
powers of a. central execut~'ve. There had ,be~n no natiQnal e:x:ecu'tive, since' the
Congress cQnducted the national business. The mere creation (Jf a natiQnal executive dQes-not lead to the conclusion that this was; the main thrust of the eonven·tion. The creatiQn of a central government which could deal with, the common
interest ~s opposed to' the sec'tionttl interests of·tl;l:e states was the main thrust 'Of
the convention and thifJ included the creation of all three branches.
B. The first problem to be solv~d, was,to'establish a national judiciary; and a~
to Foreign Affairs, insure, a strong judiciary capable of establishing judicial
supremacy in matters of the interpretation of treaties. State GQvernments had,
as it suited them, ignored treaties.
O. ,The, second problem was- to maintain the- unity of the Nortbern and' 'Southern states which h8,-cl' been strained over a commercial treaty: negotiated by the
Cpngress with Spain; which was to the dlsadMntag'e of the Sollilhanll the' adl"an·
tl1ge, of the .North. South~rn :$ta~es had insisted,' ,as a -condUlion ot' negotiation
wi,th, Spain, ,the obtaining' of 1~painls' consent to treating the Mississippi River as
an'International Waterway- open to the, AmertC8,'D states where' it flowed through
Spani$4 territory .. Voting in the Oopgvess- QQ,'tweaty matters was-'by' State, ,with
'One, vo~ ,per state. A. two-thirds ,majority of',nine',$tates was nee_d~,,~,ratify a
treaty. Jobn Jay of. New York negotiated tll,,·,treaty with Spain; 11II\0r!ng the
SQuthern' States' desire for terms on ,fr~':p'f,1.,ssage, over ·the ,.Missis$,tppi, 'and
t/J,e N<>rthern States attompted to ratify the. treaty .with .eWl voto~ rather than
nlne. The treaty ~as signed regardless of the l!IhovtfaU Qf:two.v'otes. This led to-the
feelil)g on the ,pa.rt of the Southern states ,lthat they must have a two-thirds
requirement written into the .new ,co,nstitution which woul4 make any" other,
attemptod treaty with Jess support a null)ty,
D. Because of the suspicion between .~he two sectional blocs,-Q:f Statesj a ,cO:tnpromise was reac»~(1- whereby treat~es 'would only go tnto etreet;, if the United
Stlltes S~l\ate ratl!ied sucb, treaties by .. two·thirds vote of t;hos. Senators
vresent. The. Senate waschos.n as t)le treaty rattfylng llpdy,sll\ce Senators
represen. ted, States;, If the, House, 'Of R~prese.ntati'Ves had been. included in. the
ratification process, the power of the· small~r states would have been' diluted,
since the House was to represent population rather than, states.
This compromise was balanced by providing that mQney bills would: originate
in the Hous. of Representatives. Originally the Committee ot netalls drafl
265
proposal had provided that the Senate might not amend money bills. This pro"
vision was struck by the Full Convention.
E. Thus the key issues during the convention were sectional Rnd economic
issues. There was little comment on establishing a powerful presidency, let alone
one which would have an all powerful role in Foreign Affairs,
THE PRESIDENT AS OHIEF EXEOUTIVE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Article II of the Constitution begins; "The Executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States."
Article X of the Draft Oonstitution presented to the Convention for action.
contained similar langutlge but also provided for the appointment of Amb.assadors
by the Legislative Body, and provided the legislature with the power to "make
war" :and to "make treaties.," Under the Artieles of Confederation, Congress had
done both. Thus the change in favor of the Executive Branch by the Convention
can only be understood in terms of specific grants of foreign affairs powers since
the Oonvention worked by parpeUng out gra;nts of power, and left portions of the
"making of war". and:~ :'~aking 'of peace" powers with the Congress.
Edward,iSy-Corwi.n, In -his boOk ''The ':President, Oftlce and Powers," New York
Urliversity Press, 1008, page 171, says in part;
'~e -,question in which we are interested demands, therefore, a somewhat
precise statement. It-may be put thus: Where does the,Constitution vest authority
to determine the course of the United 'States as a sovereign entity at international law_ with respect to matters in which other shnUar entities may choose to
take an Jnterest~ Many persons are, inclined to answer "hi the President"; but
they ,-would be hard put to it, if challenged., to point out !lUY definite statement to
this effect in tbe 'Constitution, itself. What the Constltution does, and aU that it
does, is to conter on the Presidept certaPl,powers capable of, affecting our foreign
reiationsi!'fJJn(l,(l'ertain other powers. Q( t~e same general kind on the Senate, and
$tJUL othet sucb powers on Congress:, but which of theBe organs shall have the
decisive ,and final voice in determi:ning the course of the American Nationls left
for events to resolve."
.
T~E
PliESIDENT ,AS COMMANDER-IN-OHIEF AND. THE WAR POWERS
Alexa.Dder Ham,ilt.on, In No. 69 of the FederaUst Papers, pointed out that the
power Oof _the President to act as Oommander~ In-Chief of the Armed Forces was
mucl1"infertof"to the power of the King of England, because he said: "While, that
of the. Brili1$JI'Klng'e;nends to theDe<llaring of War and to the raising and
,regulating of,tleets and,'armies;, ,all whiCh by ,the C~nstttution under consideration,
would apJ)ertQ,ln to the legtslattlre/'
"In short, ,the power of ,the'-Oommander-Iu-'Ohlef as _firs~',soldier was to issue
oroers, to' the Armed Forces within ~ framework established by Congress. The
«,-asire -of the Congress in cr,~'ating ,such a post 'was not aqventurism in Foreign
Affairs, :but to establish civilian control of-the military. The keen desire of the
Convention 'to Umit military power can be ShOWn by the 'tact tllat even the Con~
1{resB was limited to appropria'ting money to the military for two years at a'time.
Congress was to retain not only the' power to declare war but to issue commis1$:100$ 'tp, privateers, to make rules concerning captures of land'l!.:h'd_ water and to
, 'dedne and punish Piracies and offenses agalJlBt the law of na~ons wllieh mlg)lt
be Considered powers dealing with half war situations. (Barb;';ryl'lrates.)
;-.' The debate on war powers in' the drafti!! offered to the Conyenti'on in which
Virginia delegates, Madison and ¥asoJ)., u~d successfully that -the Congressional
power to "make war" be,a-.J:p.ended to read to "declare war.." -only shows'that the·
delegates wiShed to protec!: .the Executive's Right to FIght.llack In matters of
surprise attaek and to',protect the Executive's' rower ,To Manage A War once it
was declared, from a"future misinter.pJ:etation by- COngress, In, summary, the
power of Congress was so strong in the 'matter of national defense,that clarification was needed to- protect new preside~tla:l powers.
GONt:::l~USION
',: The derivation of the terms of tile d~hstltUt1on of the United States ,from the
Articles <Y1' Confederation Is the key to .the deliberations of the delegates at the··
Constitutl6nal Convention.
The" 'OOll'gress, as has been previoQsly\ said, conducte'-' the national' business
lnclud;t}r.:torei,gn, affairs under_the :A)jtldles of Confederation. 'Foreign Affairs was
condnct&l):,through:the
Secretary of, its
Department
of For,elgn
Affairs. John Jay
.'.",:!.-'
"
"
'.-'
-,
';if'
.:;\>
.
266
of New York, one of ~he authors of the Federalist IJapers, served ill this post, and
he Was a convention ,delegate. Notes ,Oll' the convention" debates were kept by
James Madison, -tater President of -the 'United States. His views as to what
o~urred 'at the convention'"are con1h1m:ed by the FederaUst Papers and correspondence of those associated with the convention ..
'~'nere is almost no historical evidence,that the delegates intended' to create a
.presidential monopoly in foreign affairs. Thett,e Is every reRson to "believe that
they meant that "Advice and COllseht" were tWo concepts and that the-Senate
should participate in treaty matters ,before the raUOcation stage was reaOhed. 'As
it turne(i out, the Senate itself, 'hI its procedural formula, 'lAter took the' position
tha,t it 'WQUld,' rat1~y Ohly ahd disapprove lJy means' of -:l.'eservatioll; The :l;ormula
used is l\~,.fonows: "Resolved ('l'wo-thirds of ,the Senators present concurring
therein),,_ that the Senate adviS'e',ana: consent to the ratttl'cation of"IThe Treaty'·lln
question.,"
I
Chang,es demanded in a' treaty are-li'sted as reservations., _,
'__
)
The uhiquely, American view 'of"Ex~utive Power', (bl' at least its vieW- contrasted
wltp England's, can be exaJuined ~n: l1~ht _'of, the, dIt,'l'erences between ,Blackstone's
'views and those of the Con'stitutiohal "d~leg'ates.· They: regarded fDreign at'tairs as
not a matter Df rOY,a} or ex;e,cut1ve prerogative; this was in di,reet '(~Dn:flict wlth
the English or Blackstone position: In::c<mtrast, they did U'se some of'the experience o~ their EngU~h forf{bears!:in pf(rlh,\m~nt's battle with'lKings. 'The phrase,
Advls,e and Consent, has ,.betlh 'contained h'l':lthe enactit1!{"clause' ot, every }!Jngl1sh
statute since the late 17tleCentury., that is': "Be,it enacted ''by the 'King's most
excellen_~:jtUa'j~sty-, b,Y artd ,*,1th, the advie,e and consent of"the' Ltords Spiritual and
Tempora" ~and the CoIrt~Qns, in this pi'~~nt parliament assembled, and by the
~.uthority ofthe same." '" .,'
""
,";'. '
, " .,
Therefore;' it would seeJll that 'the origitud iltt~lit of ' the Framer.e -of the CDn..
st\tutfon' was, to cr,~~te branches ot GOVe1',Otilent 'cb:.eq'Ual'1n ForeigivAttatrs as in
Domestic At'tair,s.)jjvent~ have c'reated ~ 'prlnlttry place for the',Ex~cut1ve Branch
In Foreign Affairs, but It I. only pollCl' con$lder.tlons which restrain the. Judl'
, cia,ry and the Legislature tr.om playing a more active role.
>
•
.:"
'"
:
THE DEFENSE MONITOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
ARTICLE ENTITLED "U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN
OCEAN: BUILD UP OR REDUCE?"
The U.S, spends about $20 billion anmially to prepare fur
war in the Pacific Command area, and maintains a force of
military personnel for, that contingency, Pacific
Command forces located in the U,S, include three Army
divisions and three brigades, a Marine Division and Air·
wing,
DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF
650;000
• There are 200,000 U.S. troops In Asia aftcr U.S.
Withdrawal from Vietnam and the Pentagon plans to build
new bases In the Pacit1c and Indian Oceans. The time is at
hand to make some tough choices about the nature uftut:ure
U.S. mUliary involvement in Asia. The Center has reached
the following c()ncluslons:
• The U.S. could bring home the 88,000 mlHtary personnel
from its bases on tile mainland of Asia and Taiwan without
having any impact on the U.S. defense posture. There Is no
military threat to the area unless it be the Soviet·Chlne«:
dispute along China's border, and it would not he in tlie best
New Bases
Indian Oceanl Diego Garcia
Interests of the U.S. to become Involved in a war between
China and the Soviet Union.
• Then: Is much sentiment throughout Southern Asia and
the Padllc for U.S. military withdrawal from the ar(la.
Japan has nogteat need for the U.S. ships and troops based
there, Nuclear weapo;Tls on any U.S. ships based In Japan are
in ~iolat!un of Japan's polley that prohibits the presence of
nudear weapons.
• The constru¢tlon orand e~panslon of U.S. military base~
In the Pacific and IndIan <k~an ar(l unIWcessary and
probably will increase mllltary tensions In the area. Coun·
tries that rlnl the Indian Ocean W<luld like It to be a
nuclear·free demilitarized zone.
• U.S. F'on:es stationed In countries controlled by die·
tatorshlps such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Sooth
Vietnam, do not enhance U.S. foreign ot domestic pol/cles,
Well tlver haifa million out of a total of ~.Z million active
duty U.S. military personnel are deployed outside the
United Slates, Three hundred twenty, thi>usand are in
Europe and "the North Atlantic and 250 thousand ,in Asia
and the-Paclfic area. Forty·five thtlusand ,mmtat}r:~rsonmjl
are based in HawaU. There 4.te ~~2 ~ajor'" U.S; military
installations \'Iverseas. excluding Southeast,Asia} 13'111'<: hI
the Pacilic command; In southellst Asia thei-e'are j major
bases' in Thall~nd,
'
"
','!'
:ni,Il'U~S; Paci,fic 'Command ~lth headquartdrs hi' Ha~n
_,re~~hes:ha_lfway ro~nd the w~rjd and 'i~dlld'e,s' the PIl.dJlc
Ocean, Bering Sea. Indian Ocean, lapan, KOfet\, Clilba,
- India and !Ill coulitrl¢s in Southeast and Southern As.la, aWd
islands from the west cbast of North and South America
to the East Coast of Africa. At present the Pacillc Com·
niand is headed by Admiral Noel Gaylor, USN,
Since March, 1973, the U,S, has maintained a low fre·
quency communications station for contacting strategic
missile SUbmarines at Diego Garcia, a small Island in the
middle of the Indian Ocean, There are similar stations at
Australia's Northwest Cape and at Asmara, Ethiopia, on
the eastern coast of Africa (see map), The Pentagon wants to
expand Diego Garcia and has requested 529 million to ex'
tend the Island's airfield runways, add fuel depots for ships
and planes, and deepen and, widen the barbor.
Expansion ofthe Diego Garcia base will signal a growing
U.S, military presence in the Indian Ocean,_even though
most nations that rim the Ocean would like to see It com·
pletely demilitarized, Expansion of the Diego Garcia base
will also enhance its' capabilities to serve as a base against
Soviet subs which may come in search of U.S. missile sub·
marines. It announces the beginning of a new navat arms
race in the area,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India claims U.S. and
British plans to develop a nuclear base at Diego Garda adds
to India's external dangers. Diego Garcia will Increasingly
assume "strategic" importance as the U.S, increases the
military utility of the base, and within a few years will prob·
ably require the formation of a permanent Indian Ocean
Fleet to protect the new base.
The Indian Ocean is an additional convenient area from
which to operate ballistic missile subs, but U,S, submarines
have been operating In the Indian Ocean for years without a
land base as contemplated on Diego,Garcia.
p.elnc Ocellonl~~tI!aIl'''Ian.d
The MicronesiAn Islands inclUding Tlnian were given in
trust to the U;S. bythe'U,N. to adminIster after World War
II. The U,S. is converting many o,f them to military use,
speaklng'of Tinian Island. U.S. Ambassador Williams
"'A major base is defined as one which employs a minimum
said. "U,s.land needs are'extensive ",' so much so that we
feel we shOUld acquire t,he northern two, thirds of the island
of SOIl milltary personnel
COPYRIGHTC 1974 by the Center fOlr Defense Information. All rights reserved. The Center for Defem.e InfOlrmation encourages
~uo1<llion of uny uf the material herein without permission, provided the Center is credited. The Center,requests a copy of any such use.
all
(267)
268
for military purposes. We feel we should also ask to acquire
the southern third. "
There are current plans to build, 1975-1982, an airfield,
port, logistics complex. training area, and support facilities,
all of which will cost an estimated $188 million. When the
base is completed, there will be 2600 U.S, military pel'sonnel
on Tiniml.
U.S. Military Bases In Pacific Command
There are at least 73 major U.S. military bases spread
throughout the Pacil1c area; most are in Korea. Japan, and
Okinawa. Others are in the Philippines. Taiwan, Thailand,
the Marianas. Australia. New Zealand, Midway Island, and
Wake Island.
The Navy has based one carrier in Japan. and 14 other
ships in Japan. the Philippines and Guam. The U.S. main·
tains 925 military aircraft at major air bases in seven roun·
tries: Guam. Japan, South Korea, Okinawa. Philippines,
Taiwan, and Thailand. There are Military Assistance Advisory Groups in nine countries: Japan. Korea, Philippines,
Taiwan, India. Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Iran.
There are 8 U.S. naval carrier task forces stationed in the
Pacilic with 720 aircraft: three of these carriers make up the
7th ileet in the Western Pacilic and one of them periodically
now patrols the Indian Ocean. Sixteen submarines and 32
surface ships are based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The U.S.
Strategic Air Command base~ 50 long·range B-52 bombers
in Thailand and 25 in Guam. for combat with non-nuclear
weapons, although there are nuclear weapons available for
them.
Special Forces (Green Berets)
Fifteen hundred military personnel in the lst Special
Forces Group (Green Berets) based' at Okinawa have helped
in counter·insurgency in the southern Philippines and are
activc in the Marshall Islands. A Battalion (300) of the 5th
Special Forces Group is In Thailand, divided amollg 6 detachments at 9 locations . They train Thais in counter·insurgency operations. and advise and assist the Royal Thai
Army Special Warfare Center which includes training Cambodian Special Forces and Cambodian infantry units.
Special Forces are trained in the SPARTAN (Special Profi·
ciency at Rugged Training and Nation Building) program at
the JFK Center for military assistance at Fort Bragg, N.C.
CIA
The Central Intelligence Agency operates its own airline,
Air AmerIca. from Taiwan for intelligence missions about
the Far East: its subsidiary, Air Asia, provided service and
overhauls for jet I1ghters that fought In Vietnam. Air
America operates in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. As reductions have occurred in Southeast Asia in U.S. military
personnel, CIA's Air America has doubled its Defense De·
partment contracts from $17.7 million in 1972 to 541.4 mil·
lion in 1973. The CIA contingent in Thailand numbers ISO
personnel. CIA also maintains paramilitary advisors in
Cambodia and Laos, who train and pay thc Lao "irregu·
lars".
Strategic Submarines
Ten U.S. strategic ballistic missile-carrying submarines
are based at Guam. Thirty-one ballistic missile submarines
are based in Spain, Scotland, and South Carolina. Nor·
mally, 10 U.S. ballistic missile subs are available in the
Pacinc and Indian Ocean in position to attack the Soviet
Union and China. Thesc ten Paclfic and Indian Ocean subs
can carry about 480 ready nuclear weapons.'"
Construction is underway of a fleet of ten of the huge Tri·
dent missile submarines to be based at Bangor, Washington. for operations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Each
Tridenl sub is to carry 24 nuclear missiles, every missile
with about '17 separate nuclear weapons. These subs will
bring a total of 4,080 additional nuclear weapons to the
Pacil1c and Indian Ocean area. By the mid 1980's the U.S.
would have about 4,500 undersea nuclear weapons in the
Pacitlc and Indian Ocean .
• When Poseidon subswilh MIRVed misslles are in the area
the number of nuclear weapons will be much larger.
Treaties
The most frequently given reason for stationing troops in
Asian countties is the SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Or·
gnni7.lltion) treaty, signed in 1954 by Australia, France, New
Zeuland, Pakistan, Philippines. Thailand, the United Kingdom and the U.S. It does not call for the stationing of U.S.
troops in any country. SEATO at present, is useless as a
military alliance. Pakistan withdrew from the organization
in November 1973, France has long been inactive and is
stopping dues payments; New Zealand is phasing out its
]lHticipation: Australia did not participate ill 1973 naval
maneuvers: Secretary·General Sunthorn Hangladarom has
suggestcd that SEATO begin to serve more as a deterrent
against subversion and insurgency. and be a clearing house
for intelligence information for the benel1t of member COUIItries and an aid in their economic development. SEATO is a
weak excuse for stationing troops abroad if the signatory
countries themselves are questioning its proper role.
The many separate bilateral mutual security treaties and
executive agreements that have been signed by the U.S. with
China (raiwan), Fiji. Indonesia, Cambodia, Korea, Laos,
Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam. 'Singapore. and Thailand
do not provide for the stationing of U.s. troops in any particular country.
269
Under the !flu!l.!al,sec}ll'ity treaty signed with I!lpan, there
is a further agreement on facilities and status or 0.5. forces
in Japan; and thel1lts an agreement signed In 1963 which
permits the U.S. to:station a Nlke and 2 'Hawk air defense
missile batalllons in' Japan. A provision of the "mutual defense" treaty with the Republic of China gives the U.S. the
rlgM to station military forces In and about Taiwan; ,the
"Formosa Resolution", passed by Congress In 1954 gave
prior authority to the Presldent"lo employ U.S. fo~s to
defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. Since the renewilill of
U.S. retations with China, h(jwever, the "Formosa Resolution" is no longer considered a valid authority.
MlDtary Alslltance and S,les
U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Paclfio :and East
Asian countries In FY 1972 amountq<j to over $5 billion. the
bulk going to, Vietnam. In FY 1974 Over $3 billion (not',lnclu~ing cash sales) will,be provided for mnltary aid,and ,assislll;nce to Ea~t,Asla and PaclRc area. Under thl' naval
sen/)~n program, 118 naval vessels are on loan to the Pacific
.,countries, In almost all cases ships loaned are never returned.
;
.
•"
, ':"i Fu,nds lor aid and'traitimg of Internal P?lice forces, under
Ihb beading, ~bltc Safety. wi!1 be golnll:lo ThaUllnd,', Laos
~nd _t~e ,Jlhlflpp1nes·ln 1974,-, although Congress Is having
Ihls prog,ratnwfl'ased out beginning ,FY ,1974. allOWing no
now conlr~~:':qr _e~t~nslons of existing contracts to be
fundll4 "y tb~~i.\;S. _8_oVernment.
_'
Largt:lliereaseS,-'.ln,;c«s)l sales 'of'mlllt!iry equipment are
. ~enttpl:.'t(l, the. N1x9,U,_'iloctrlno;!. DoO'111UJt(uy cash sales
, ''worldwltflrlilive:-It\¢'N!aied from $2.9 bllUonrln' 1972 ·to an
e$tlmateq:,$'3::V)llIlon 'in~ 1274;,rommllf9I.I, arms sales In~~~~ fI'b~~$~~:?IIII.o~,to:"n estlro.~l~ $726 million In
ves-
Office, reported 'that the :'U.S.
t4om-1n Qunboota,ha,s belln
petformllJlI as 'a mUltir¥'Is- i,
with milltary.plan$, operat·
I
system.
ll;S,
U.S. Pays to Train ForeJan,Mlllt.!l,';'(
Requested' FY. 1974 military training ""~"". m"'A~"
and ihe Paclf1~ were:
.
u.S.!~.nil.~ovlet Naval Forces In the Paclnc
Nuclear-Ships
Aircraft Carriers
Frigates
Submarines
U.S.
Soviet
I
none
none
3
Conventional Ships
Aircraft Carriers
Helicopter Carriers
Cruisers
Frigates
, DestroYers
. i~ Destroyer Escorts
,Large Amphibious Ships
Submarines
Total
Aircraft Patrol Sq'uadrons
33
36
,
1
3
none
none
12
3
28
24
18
4S
37
31
2
II
43
187
15'
12
2
Source: DoD and Center for Defense Information
U.S. and:Sovl~ Naval Forees
The Soviet Navy Is no match ,for the .U.S. Navy, In the
Pacific. In addition, the Soviet Navy may have to contend
with a number of submarines and other ships of the Chinese
tleet. The threat to U.S. fOmls and interests In the Pacific
from China lind the Soviet Union has been greatly diminished in recent years because of growlqg antagonism be·
tween those two countriei<
,T~e: Soviet Pacific Fleet has no aircraft carriers to project
'powey as~ore or to allllck the U.S. fleet.
',' 01l,land. the Soviet Union has about 40. divisions along
the,(lhlnase border, and,another 5 to 10 divisions elsewhere
. In Asiatic Russia.
ladlan Ocean
S.ovlet ships first appeared frequently in the Indian Ocean
in 1968. and they h!lve operated from 8. to 1I10glsllc ships
sm,all .warship'~ In the a~a. On rare occasions the
.~i:;~;.',~:;;!~t;:'~;'~':"I"~'::'}I.~n. the Indian Ocean.
CambOtlia·,,·,
ROC (Tlil\\,'art)' ,
Indonesia'." .
K,orea t
,:~
Malaysi;!' "~I
PhHlppiillls t '
'ThailllOd
, Regional Cosis
Total
$13,1'12,000
.. These countries permit no political 9PPositidn ..
I
'1
Indian 0ceM (lannot-be
Soviet Unl(ln all~lnst its
United States.
;,'
U••••• R.
,. . .....-.: ,......
t- ....'I..
•
1
1 -..
U •• • T..... T..........
--
-
,...... Ocoon
_
.. ...... -U.S. FOfcee
In thII PIICHk:
x~
•
u,., ....., "--nMI
)( U ••• CIII'I'II
",'.
I"u.•. a 1 ........ -
Ic",-
271
Strategic :Submarlne Nuclear Weapons In the Padne Area
• The
USSR
os'
II submarines carrying 137
strategic nuclear missiles
(includes 3 H·class with
3 mbslles each)
10 sub'marines carrying 160
missiles that bave multiple nuclear
weapons: 480 In all
'
US.al~~ has tho~sands (If'tacttcal nuclear weapons on ships and on land in Korea, Okinawa and·Guam for use in
missiles lind Air Force aircraft. ' ,
. . ,
Iflhere Is a wllr, the major Soviet naval effort-will
Okinawa were deployed to the Southern Philippines in the
be directed against the Atlantic, Paciflc, and Medi.
tetranean lifelines of the Western powers: and the
later part of 1973. In addition, there are 14,000 U.S. mill·
taty personnel at 6 bases In the Philippines. The U.S. Naval
Base at SUble 'Bay"is the'largest naval base in II foreign
country In the Paultlc.' It'ls frequently used bY',Navy ships for
repair' and oVerhauls 'an'd one submarine Is permat).~ntly
based there.
Clark Air Force base Is home for a large number of
U,S.A,F. aircraft and personJilel.
Indian Oceani~,an only he of ml\rQlnallnterest to
them.
'
On the other, band, for the United States the
Indian Ocean is a major offensive development
area for their ballistic submarines against the Sovl·
et Union" ._,"
U.S. Troops Defend Dlctatonhlps
Soutb VletlIatt..
tr~~'p!i have been withdrawn from South Vietnam,
yetthe~' are over &,000 "non·milltary" U.S. personnel and
approximately 200 m!litary personnel there. Most of the
non'mllitarY,afe Defense Department contract person,nel.
\Vho~'f)l;nctl~jlIS military training, Intel1lsen~, operations
\lndWa~on with Vietnamese forces. Many former U.S.
.~1II1~rji tne" are employed In these roles.
u:t
South Kol'QSouth Korea has' beent under martial law since October
.1912'. Setilite FsSreign Relations Committee stall members
,',~hO vls,lted there In November, reported "The Assembly
'had been dl5solved, an action not. provld~d for In the
constitution, and there were tanks (p'rovlded by the United
-States U)lder the MIlitary Assistance Program) in front of
the National Assembly buUding. ,government ministries,
newspaper'-offices and universities." President Park has
been giv,en greater powers a\ld there i~__ no limit to the
numberof b·year terms tQ which he can;~~Je.elected. The
U,~-. has spent 536.9 biIUM, In South ~oNa 1946·1972 for,·
war costs. er:onom1c and,ilrl'_ll,tar): as~lslllnc'c)-i\liiJ 'to maintain
forces th~l'e. Cu!"en$l1't~,l\Iril a~ 4,~qOp~~\SHtooPS at over
4O.facmt.I~~ III I\Ql'lIl\ K;o.~l..'''I. ,~,~._~i.lit:j411uaffeB. f()r;tl;itl'8t.~:>
Artny, t~e U.~: ¢pmmamlltb,lhtIU.S. Foree', and Arltly.tl
~ofps', 'with ,~1445'-,m,IUtati·, l~rsonl\l\Il ,assl~ed to,,,theso
hl\ladquat16r~~"
- i" -'
,
'fhe Philllt~~"'.
: :::,. Jlresld~ -,,~tC'os instituted' martial law. jp, Sbptembet
; t.f1:2, A:n,ew:jl!,!:l)stit,utlon gave Marcos the p!)wers-'of'bpth
p.~,lden~ and prime. mlnlsler for lis long as he likes. Arrest
and 'suppression' of rebels contlnu~; particularly In the
Solitherp ,Phmppines, 'looale 'of Muslenf Insurrection.
. Special ~or~s from the 1st Special Forces group based on
ii';·
Thailand
There are 39,000 U.S. troops In Thailand, ,the 13th Air
Force with 50 8·52 bombers, 19 KC·135 fuel tankers" and
230 combat aircraft. The U.S. bas 6 air bases in Thailand, 3
are major bases. The' U.S. bases in Thailand p.r:~lVide
loglstlcs support to Laos and Cambodia. Also in Thailand
are the U.S. Support Activities Group (which replacClC! the
Ml11t!lry Assistance Command, Vietnam), a U.s: Special
For~1IS Battalion, the U.S. Military Assi~hlnce Command,
apd 2,300 U.S. m!lItary internal security personnel.
Republie of China tralwaa)
There are 8.000 l:l.S. officers and men,on.'Talw~~'an'd 54
aircraft at ,three major bases. Taiwan Is 'also the head·
qUarters- for Air Asia; subsidiary'to Ihe CIA·owned ~Ir
America airline, which carried out overflights of China and
Tibet and was Involved In CIA's secret war In Laos.
The' U.S. commitment to the-defense of Taiwan and the
Pescadores Islands Is lessening since Congress withdrew tbe
prior authotlty previously given to the President. It is
doubtful If Taiwan-contributes in any way to the defense of
the United States,
--
The, .U.S •. h.as 85 "~,~Sj, at1(\. military 'In'stallations, and
l,q,OOl,ftnl1lta'ry pellonnel . stftt_ionedJn Japan., The Navy for
the IlrsHime In history tills, based III Japan I attack carrier
and assocla'fed a!nying,),;j,J1ld~ mlssll.e Iitlht cruiser, 6
destroyer·type shlp,s"lInd:,Z,.'¢OmPat stOJil_,,·ships. The U.S.
alrqrllrt carrier caplibio':Of.c~~rxt.~8, n,""l~~;w~apQns ,violates,
the Japanese pollCY',wh!\ih ,prohibits -nuclear weapons In
lapan. There has',b~n: opposition ~n Japan to the U.S. Jap$l)ese allreefl1~f!t:t~at.,a_uthoflz.es :the U.S" to ,maintain
I1).Ui!,iIry force".,ln' Jllpan/MQI'Qover, sln~ Japan's recog'
nition of Chlnidn 1972, the. 'continued need for large U.S .
.
272
military forces in Japan is no longer as Important as It once
was. Tile U.S. plans a token reduction of military personnel
of lO%and the relocation of some Japanese bases ove,r the
next three years. There will be'some construction of new fa·
cllitles at semi·permanent U.S. bases to replace those that
the U.S. is giving up elsewhere, Planned reduction of mlli·
tary personnel in Japan Is only 2,100. Japan herself has a
modern growing military "self·defense" fOl'Ce of:
13 submarines (newly constructed In Japan)
166 surface combatants
110 naval aircraft
386 Air Force aircraft
266,000 military personnel
39.00q, reserves
120 surface·to·air missile launchers
HAWK mls·
slles
Thll constitution of 1947, prohibits the Japanese.from
maintaining armed forces. Japa)lls·ln the process ofdeeld·
Ing Y{~at level of U.S. presence is n~ded. A,sign,flcaht reo
for
ductlon ofthe u.s. military presence In Japan would seem a
logl~al course in any event. The U.S. has withdrawn from
Vletnam"and boQ! the U.S. and Japan are on Improved
terms with the People's Republic of China. Japan is strong
enough economically and advanced technologically to
mainlain, her own defense again's! any likely Chinese threat.
Okinawa
Once again part of Japan, Okinawa has a lolal of 77 U.S.
bases. properties, and facilities, and 37,000 U.S. military
personnel. The 1st Marine Airwing is based,there, with 92
aircraft. Air Force high flying long range ,oleclronic In· c
lel1lgence,aircraft rotale through Kadena, Okinawa. The
flrst Special Forces Group (Green Berets) Is ~ased' on
Okinawa. U.S. Installations (In Okinawa are'to.be reduced
oVer the_next three years to 70 and of th,9Se, 13 will be reo
duced In size. There is no planned reduction in numb61'S of
military personnel.
U,5. M1l1tllry Pt1'8Ol\Jlellb the Pacific
South Korea
Thailand
Japan
Okinawa
Philippines
Taiwan
Guam
Australia
Midway
u.~
Vietnam
Cambodia
At1(lat ~W~I p;a~lfic)
Total
42,000
,,"""
19.000
37,000
14,000
."""
14,000
1,000
1,000
237
22S
111 '
29,000
204~l3' '.
South Korea
Thailand
Philippines
Taiwan
Laos
Vietnam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Relllo~al
Total
31,6,000,000
99.000,000
31,000,000
69,000,000
372,000,000
2,i33,ooo.ooo
381',000;000
3J.,000,()~)(L
19,000,000
9,000,000
53,460,000,000
273
U8 PORIION ICONOMIO AND MILITARY AB.ISTANCI TO
lAST A81A AND TNE PACIFIC
1041·10' ........ , ..• 100 BILLION
(Sourcs- House of Representattv8s
,Rapor! No. 93·694
December 4.1973)
Vietnam
"41
Other $4
Indonesia S:2
Thailand $2
Laos $2
Philippines $ 2
Japan $4
Republic of Chln~ $6
Korea 531
THE STAFF
D~IN:
; Rear Admiral ~ne R. La -Rocque,' US Navy (Ret.)
f)lnctlll' if Res"",..,",
~~~~!~I\l"n
David 1OIIn500
Bill Gulledge
Dirutof'
if Publ{~ J/lftmltg'WnI
Duan Rudoy
Cons'","", Matthews
,
SmlotEdltof'.
,"blSlUe
S.lLyAndellon
Re.!~"'Adl3umce,
Robert QUIIIIIIQ
The Center for Defense Information is a'project'ofthe'Futl'~
for :Pellce.
'
.
ADDITIONAL INI!~ORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CE-STER FOR
DEFENSE INFORMA1'ION
ClilNTER' FOB
DEFENSE INFOBMATION,
WasMngton, D.O., October 30, 1974.
HOll. ROBEBT N. C. NIX, M.C.,
Ohairman, Asian ana ,Pamfl,o AfJa4!rs Subcot1'll1rltittee, O(;m,rn;ittee on Foreign Af-
fairs, House of Representatives, WasMngtoo, D.O.
DEAR REiPltESENTATIVE NIx: When I testified before the committee earHer thIs
month, you asked me if I could substantiate Admiral La Rocque's remarks about
the danger of the theft of American nuclear:weapons abroad by terrorist groups.
I indicated at that time that I would like. to· provide tbat .information for the
record. That information follows. ,r would 'greatly appreciate if you would add
it to the record of the hearings. Tom Kennedy also asked for an explanation
of the statistics of 'm1Utary and economic aid reported on p'age eight of the
March, 1974 Defense Monitor. That infQ,mation is also provided below.
The danger that U.S. nuclear weaPQns abroad could be 8tol(>11 by terrorists
and used for nuclear bhickmail is real.
1. Recent press ··repor,ts indicate tl},at in an exercise, U.S; Green Ber",ts suc~
ceeded in penetrating the security s,vstems designed to protect nuclear w",apomo!.
If the Green Berets cQuid do it, te~t:orist8' could do it.
2. The U.S. has at least 15,000 mi,~leal" weapons in the U..s. and around the
world. Periodically, they have to be ~sted. If one proves defective in some way.
it 'has to be replaced by another weapon. As ,a r~s\\1t, U.S. nuclear weapons are
regularly transported to m,any loca·tions around the world., The danger of ac~
cident ,or theft increases ,in direct proportion to' the frequency of these ship~
ments. Furthe,.rmore, ,these' weapons are moved frequ~ntly al'! part of varlouA
mmtary exet:~~es. This also increaBes the danger.'
"
3.' Another;,l)l,dication tbat this "1s a serious problem Is the concern recently
sbown by the::';Pentagon for hnproving weapon security alld safeguards. In a
statement be:(ore the Senate Foreign Relat1lms Committee Subcommittees on U.S.
Security Agi~eements and CornmJtments Abroad and"A;rins Control, .Inter~~tional
Law aoOd' Organization, on. April 4, 1974, Secretary i-of Defense Schlesinger de·
scribed a.1Qng list of steps'that the Pentagon.is tR'kihg'totmprove nuclear weapon
security. 'The tact that the ,Pentagon is undertaldng these stepR iB' clear evidence
that they 'regard the problem as_, serious. The stePB 'in('lude:- 1) reduction of
weapon movements, 2) consol1daUon of Weapon storage sites, 3) increased Bite
defense and improved training for security: for®s, 4) improvements in the siteR
thern:iselves ·~uch as llghtlng, road barrie,rs. ft:nd weapons security devices. Re/:Iea·rcb is being conducted on ,,-:ays of deteqtln~PJIlallt,llor,:i~ed intrmdon, denYing
,access to anQ" disabling (denial/disable'systems) nuclear,weapon$,. Ba<:8.use this
problem is so important" the Congress should .,closely monitor the progress of
these'l programs to in$utte: fgl1 and complete implementation.
'
The military and ec:ohomic asRistan,ce fhcul'es provIded in the March 1974
Defense Monitor, page' eight, are from the House' of' Repr:~sentat1'Ves Report No.
98-694. They lnclude net economic and mUitary assistance, including that military ,asSistance fi:nanced frop} the DepRrtment of Def~nse, and are for the fiscal
years ,1946 to 1978. There are essentially two dill'eren~s between the figures
provided by earlier witnesses ·before the com~ltt~e, and mir' 'figUres :"~l) :figures
g1~en ,to thf' committee are ,for the yMrs ,1946 t().191~,i :whi~,e our:fi~re$ are for
1946 to 197,', 2) the $87 b!llUm fI~ure that we,g~v~ fO~:B:orea Inr\M~ $21! blll!on
financed by the Department of·Defertse Which I~ not IhCluded Inth~"1Igt\re8 given
to the committee by earUer witnesses, Whs,1f the .$21$ b!U!on 'flIillncedby the
Defense Department 18. addedto:,the ftPl>rdi,ihnateLv$12 b!Ulon·'!n rumt.:1';\' and
economic d!l to' Korea reported~!by .~I\'Vl1er WItnesses one arrtve-s at the figurp
of $37 b!lllon: reported II) page elght'~t'a'''. fMf¢n8e M onittYl'.
TIlankY0)l forg\!1ng ni.,,'t4~'Nllii<1rtun!ty of tesUfylng on thl. Important
matter. I share your 'i!<mcern('iw:JilJh!·: A.rher.i9au., 'Forces, in Asia. I hope we haye the
opportunity to'sbare our viewf!:: ,W)'t.h' you 1n the near future.
SincerelY,
' '..'
::
,
.
.STEFAN H. LEADER,
Sta.f! Associate.
(274) ,