Know Your Enemy - The Viet Cong

DOD GEN-20
DA Pam 360-518
NAVPERS
AFP
15214
190-3-3
NAVMC
ARMED
FORCES
INFORMATION
AND
EDUCATION
l
DEPARTMENT
2608
OF DEFENSE
4
Literally
translated,
means
Vietnamese
Cong
employ
taught
Viet
and those
Communist
Cong
with
to call the
words
or weapons,
“liberation”
of
Vietnam.
military
and
civilian
Viet
of South
Cong
components
also
of the
(VC)
who are Viet
arsenal
A Viet Cong is a man, woman,
fighter,
Republic
2
phrase
Communist,
the whole
and violence.
a tough
the
of deceit
or child-
for what
he is
“Front”
or
Front
for
of
South
followers
they serve-but
Vietnamese
oppression
Liberation
To its deluded
NFLSVN).
is the government
of South
the
by the
the
Front
to the vast majority
it is an instrument
manipulated
Vietnam,
of terror
Communists
and
of North
Vietnam.
Vietnam-the
applies
National
to the
(the
The
within
Viet
Cong,
the
Republic
the Communist
of
Vietnam,
“Liberation
has
Army”
expanded
its
.._..4---
-3
7
/
3
numbers
enormously,
ties.
so-called
Its
despite
main
increasingly
force
has
heavy
grown
10,000men in 1960 to over 65,000.Several
RED
CH
I
N
A
of
the
North
Hanoi
Vietnamese
South
Vietnam
of
forces
in the
buildup
many are armed
with
wear
helmets
uniforms,
scarves
The
strength
of
as rapidly.
guerrillas
and
their
home
success
militia,
irregulars
black
still
support,
tion”
of
the Communist
Vietnamese
support
most often
secret
the latter.
agents
the people
.:
....a
even
of South
though
and
arsenals.
the
pay taxes
This is an impressive
and
Millions
to the militia
an estimated
is the
schools
out of friendship
they may also pay taxes
Government.
the rule of
the Front
operates
Vietnam
also
guide,
enforcing
It
Due largely
of the Party,
(worn
organizations.
areas in which
the Front
the
traditional
for the “libera-
possible
in the countryside,
factories
Cong
They
recruits
government.
clothing
peasant
also make
Front
Viet
the
of
to the
before,
uniforms).
and provide
They
are substantial
hospitals,
noir,”
not
100,000
vicinity
than
Vietnamese
Party
effective
trained
fatigue
has
are essential
“calico
of the local puppet
There
only
the
the
reinforce,
dictates
and to the whole
as
movement.
in the
force
wear
regulars
guerrillas
hamlets,
and
companies
more than
based
even
and regiments.
and
armed
pajamas
the
mostly
and
and
isolated
Cong
by
“regulars,”
weapons
or steel,
The estimated
villages
Better
As befits
to battalions
Viet
sent
Communist
imported
From
about
regiments
been
of the
of wicker
the
of the main
effort.
THAILAND
south.
late-model
have grown
increased
have
as part
for unit identification.
their formations
by
Army
into
casual-
from
and the
one-fourth
to the
of
or fear,
of
Front,
to the legitimate
record
for a shadow
government.
Initial
What
makes
so significant
assets,
tactics,
(of
and
munists
capacity.
few
the Viet Cong
they
had
subversion),
the
moral
throughout
They
thousand
support
of
the world.
experienced
hand,
in
a well-proven
knowledge
their
They
had no substantial
by Government
On the other
with so little in material
a belief
a thorough
100,000 supporters-mostly
visited
and their way of warfare
is that they started
although
doctrine
Resources
fellow
of its
Com-
had no industrial
armed
forces,
only a
guerrillas,
and
perhaps
in
areas
seldom
remote
representatives.
the Viet Cong
had hidden
stores
of weapons
and ammunition
left over from the war
against the French.
They had many trained and dedicated Communists
to provide leadership,
and access to
the resources
of the Communist
regime in the North.
1
Vietnam
type
as a whole
of warfare
is very
the Viet
side of this long,
narrow
river
seacoast
On
delta,
the
and
other
are
secret
and
is swamp
useful
government.
and
giving
troop
ground
transport
railroad
or the
limited
all very
easy to sabotage
The
people
who
basic
more
to
well
suited
and undemanding.
soldiers,
of
a
of rice
streams.
coastal
of highways,
munist
racial
and
(even
portant,
the false
kind
accustomed
ideals
of
relatives,
but it is better
the
friends
(or
non-enemies)
this
one for an enemy
friends
to treat
your
Com-
same
basic
he is in uni-
unless
Moreover,
his
men.
it is extremely
you.
and
Asia
sacrifice
fighting
at
for mistaking
far
of its
and South,
reason
an enemy
years
of communism).
excellent
this
do not
known
of great
non-Communist-share
For
is
in Southeast
people-North
child on the water buffalo
to this
has
capable
make them
shooting
recognition
They
Vietnam
known
mini-
philosophy
in the 2,000-plus
are
to identify
or
Their
and aggressive,
Vietnamese
difficult
his
peace
background.
form
yet
Vietnamese
qualities
The
and an absolute
fatalistic
or
war than
These
rations,
comforts.
for an ideal
or ambush.
are rice farmers,
war
meager
material
as energetic
overthrow
and
of
history.
or for-
an abundance
network
and
with
Much
mangrove
canals
like
other
are covered
would
Sea.
Cambodia.
must use the single
are equally
of them
essentially
three
and
movements.
by myriad
Modern
plateau,
ideal concealment
or mountain,
to those
On one
China
with
work,
to hard
mum
undeveloped,
Laos,
The delta produces
is crisscrossed
of war-most
South
rugged,
rain forest,
the coastline
est, equally
is the
China,
installations
for the
strip of mountains,
areas of the interior
dense tropical
ideal
is waging.
frontiers
countries-Communist
Substantial
Cong
the
mountainous
largely
nearly
makes
most
im-
makes him,
enemies.
The
may be a Viet Cong spyhim
as a friend
in case of
doubt.
5
Finally,
the Vietnamese
Communists-North
and
South-were
united in their determination
to use whatever means were necessary to bring the whole country
under Communist
domination.
Without
massive U.S.
and free world support,
South Vietnam
might already
have been
As
added
in
conventional
armed
might
came
obvious
South
could
began
after
sending
infiltrators
that
of
Communist
fight
their
numbers
arms,
than
have
was
experiencing
was
undergoing
great
edly facilitated
(RVNAF),
have
increased
equipment
Cong.
its
at a pace
However,
greatest
while
growth,
in
of South Vietnam
stress
These
the growth
and ammuthe so-called
Forces
their
political
of administration.
other
(DRV).
1963 and 1964, the free Government
changes
key
and
weapons
support,
the Viet
The
to assume
China
Armed
we
far greater
the
of infiltrators,
Vietnam,
of Vietnam
and improved
in
Hanoi
North
North
the
Front
Vietnam
Communist
freedom
its
it be-
by land and sea.
in the
of Vietnam
for
When
force,
have supplied
Republic
The Republic
of
stream
through
expanded
military
Vietnam
trained
countries
side
started.
without
leadership.
Democratic
each
had
Republic
a growing
primarily
whose
the
into South
were
positions
wars,
the war
not be taken
and supplies
nition,
to the list of lost countries.
and
factors
frequent
have undoubt-
of the Front,
but they have
not stunted
the growth
of the RVNAF,
nor shaken
their determination
to resist Communist
aggression
and
preserve
the freedom
and independence
The success of an unconventional
government
from
build
the people
up by Communist
and the resources
to destroy,
is cause
the reasons
for this,
tacks,
or they
Viet
Cong
five
or literally,
three
support
cannot
Yet
the
tional
Viet
man
war
actually
be
such at-
again.
"10 feet
thousands
understand
tall,”
on the
Nor
average
is he
of Viet Cong
attributed
RVNAF
The
either
every
entirely
an
desert
year.
to the
have received
from abroad.
Cong
who
under
to the average
has
conditions
orthodox
of his country
developed
is capable
of waging
that
soldier.
Cong and his way of warfare
thing
and
in height.
he receives-the
far more assistance
fighting
being
inches
must
again
is not
largely
to defeat
to the side of the Government
effectiveness
outside
how
be repeated
man
direction,
of a state they seek
We
and learn
fanatic-many
or go over
His
will
feet
incredible
for concern.
fighting
figuratively
only
of the country.
army and a shadow
would
into
a kind
of
an unconvenseem
To understand
hopeless
the Viet
one must first know
some-
and his background.
7
Roughly
40
Chi Minh,
of Vietnam
paign
take
to
began
the
leadership
and
independence
was
later
force
(League
in 1940,
that
for
the
time
Independence
launched
an
eight-year
struggle
they returned
in 1945.
Like the later Viet
start-but
formidable
defeats
Bien
had nearly
number
in
Phu
the Viet
than the Viet Cong
the Viet Minh
an equal
Cong,
they became
and
unable
solve
Viet
Vietnam),
against
grew
the
P
from
and much more
regulars
The
battles
to
Minh
are today.
160,000
of militia.
conventional
larger
the
of
soon
Viet-
a coalition
was
French
a modest
for
Communist
This
which
after
dominating
control,
formed.
of
Japanese
Communists
Under
Communist
was
the
near.
step
in the
a part
the
all of Indochina,
believed
cam-
first
was
When
the fall of France
alike
their
Their
Vietnam
Ho
Republic
the leadership
time.
and occupying
independence
under
planning
Asia.
rule.
at
nationalists
namese
Communists
Southeast
French
in after
the French
Minh
North,
over
Indochina
moved
the
of the Democratic
was to seek to seize
opposition
French
ago,
president
in the
to
in Vietnam
and
years
now
French,
By mid-1954
and perhaps
stunned
such
as that
the
problems
by
at Dien
of
the
new kind
of war waged
to negotiate.
in the summer
of Great
was
half,
controlled
Democratic
Under
to move
to move
lowed.
the
the
the
of
terms
of
to whichever
Nearly
south
the
of
Minh
army,
of
or
northern
the
so-called
free
southern
agreement,
Com-
an opportunity
of the divided
people,
Viet-
The
of Vietnam.
were given
to freedom
thousands
the
armistice
half
war-torn
became
Republic
a million
90,000
Some
Viet
Union,
parallel.
Vietnam;
independent
and anti-Communists
preferred.
Tens
17th
by Communists,
Republic
became
munists
at the
ready
in Geneva
over by representatives
and the Soviet
divided
were
conference
of 1954, presided
Britain
nam
half
by the Viet Minh,
At an international
country
they
from
the North
were
during
the brief
period
mostly
future
Communists
men
recruits,
and
able
al-
and boys of
went
north.
sizable
stocks
of arms and ammunition
were left in the South to assure
an ultimate
takeover.
Communist
i .
The 17th parallel
“political
Geneva
ballot”
was not intended
or
territorial
agreed
on
to be held
a “free
This
would
themselves
their
political
the
country.
with
winning
The
the election.
doubted
and because
the possibility
proper
international
more
for
reunify
populous
were confident
tion.”
still
for
the
Such
welcome,
munist
tion.
means
Occasional
ism seemed
emphasis
been
to say how
vigorously
and openly
vote
in
not have been
supervision.
Communists
After
a stronger
1956
effort
and expanding
the
Stronger
comrades
Communists
in the South.
their
personnel
Measures
began
to prepare
Viet
for
in the
reorganizing
force
there,
military
militia.
both
and
Cong
of
the
own
terrorism
was
and
It
2,000
In 1959 it was decided
much
alarmed
impoverished
by
and
Cong
their
em-
the prosperity
dictatorship.
in 1958,
intensified
regulars
to act more
by the impatient
how
between
year the Viet
the main
Government.
decision
were
contrast
and their
than
and
coali-
acts of terror-
of subversion
legal
their
who
anti-corn-
but initially
was influenced
North
of that
more
the
South
soluwould
neutralist
and other
much
by the obvious
by the end
This meant
undermine
in
strongly
on a campaign
is difficult
would
the
a controlled
and proper,
was not held because
to
a “political
the Communists
assassinations
propaganda
of the South
Adopts
with
necessary
had
to achieve
which
replacing
Government
barrassed
Hanoi
struggle
a solution,
of
of an honest
the election
by secret
to decide
it would
in the
state control,
The election
the North
under
and
at
at the end of
the people
future,
political,
delegates
election
Vietnam
Communists
the South
held
allow
their police
The
general
throughout
two years.
North,
to be a permanent
boundary.”
had
supplemented
that the political
and
an armed
by
struggle
9
must
be aided
began
by a major
in 1960,
regimental
with
armed
the
headquarters
effort.
Open
overrunning
warfare
of an RVNAF
Sup on 20 January.
at Trang
The Lao Dong
its Third
tended
Creates
Congress
rebellion
in Hanoi
acted to establish
ing and formalizing
control
ethnic
religious
groups
to impart
the
in
public
to set up
The
effort
to conquer
Committee
The Reunification
controls
who
infiltrate
Intelligence
into
activities
The
the
merged
original
the
Communists
directs,
from
Vietnam’s
Lao
the
Dong
into
the
In
of
a central
Research
munist
activity
highest
Communist
administrative
the
Viet
Office
“brain”
in the South
Party
headquarters
Minh,
for
South
been
Vietnam
coordinates
all Com-
and all relations
and
in
have
government
with
the
echelons
in
Vietnam.
In South Vietnam
itself, the Communists
a show of legitimacy
Liberation
quarters
presidium,
committee
of
level,
through
South
the
which
Vietnam.
Front
take
Party
At the
has a central
their
of the People’s
the Communist
have created
the National
orders
for the
national
head-
committee
from
Revolutional
in South
Front
Vietnam.
Party
the
and
control
(PRP)-
central
the
in
the extent
and
make
it
organiza-
PRP
were
all
were made
in the North,
committee
sets policy and
Next
30
and organization
(persuasion
in the
provincial
headquarters,
and propaganda)
are responsible
are 7 zone headquarters,
in the
of the men
Central
Front
crea-
(PRP)
counterpart
of the 3 interzone
and training.
in Hanoi-the
Central
consists
trination
addition,
central
hierarchy
govern-
for the Liberation
Command
was the
Party
of several
of
decreed
The next level in the Communist-dominated
of the Northern
an elaborate
intelligence
network
and directs the extensive undercover
This
ing.
ugitpvop
High
already
for admission
for planning
and which
South.
from
national
determine
the
Communist
The Front’s
also is responsible
guidance
Front
members
for the PRP’s
strategy.
out
of the
the
government,
of this was to screen
is composed
an-
for
in September.
deception
but qualifications
broad
maps
Front
met
they
the Lao Dong Party.
controls,
ultimately
Congress
domination
less strict than
Front.”
training
inherited
(COSVN).
10
The
Communists,
of the Viet Cong.
two
South,
North
tions.
of legitimacy
Communist
Vietnam
the manifestoes
Revolutionary
The object
the Front
for the military
organization
Agency-maintains
in South Vietnam
People’s
that
All control
and the Military
is responsible
the
all major
There
a shadow
act of Communist
of
appear
of Vietnam.
Commission
Another
South
of the National
Party
of
by
and military
North
issued
Communist
claiming
and
Saigon.
Vietnam,
liberation
Cong political
which
the National
South Vietnam,
North
of
Party,
South
faithfully
tion
and to represent
in Hanoi
Viet
of
of life
of
of
formation
the necessary
Liberation
military-comes
(Communist)
ment
the illusion
the Republic
and
Central
for
activities,
regime
the entire
-political
struggle
a “National
Communist
and supplies
operation
and about to be taken,
movement
decided
which
northwest
the
the South.
Viet Cong
people,
taken
forest
Liberation
of a local
of it.
a true
and
the
by the
at the same time simplify-
of being
an oppressed
At-
all over Vietnam,
the appearance
while
To give the whole
to actions
from
held
1960.
in September
representatives
in the South,
appearance
Party of Vietnam
of individuals
all walks
nounced
Screen
(Communist)
by Party
the Congress
a
a group
virtually
in
Hanoi
1960,
In December
to represent
Front’s
Under
the interzone
which
structure
committees-its
for political
are their
buildFront
which
policy
indoc-
headquarters
sub-offices.
are the approximately
chief
operating
units.
These
committees
direct
the Communists
propaganda
the South Vietnamese
the
central
assign
the
of course,
sent down
In
addition-and
to
this
Communists-
the
Viet
Cong
and cells in South
and villages
make
spiderweb
spread
land.
dominated
In
the
units
free of Government
interference
political
struggle,
local Viet
or guerrilla
Cong
tasks
they
In the areas controlled
under
Viet
Cong-
as they carry out their
and
train
men
for
and carry out the military
by the legitimate
Government,
and grass-level
front members
cover
to overthrow
or
they are in the open,
are assigned.
of course, the Communists
remain
part
like an evil shadow
recruit
units,
Vietnam’s
up the largest
“liberated,”
areas of South Vietnam,
so-called
efforts
of
The committees,
duties
committees
towns,
of the Communist
must
and
support
levels the orders
for the provincial-level
military
Front’s
their
associations”
indoctrination
in their provinces.
districts,
over
their
committee.
role
operating
The
people.
to subordinate
is a major
they
“liberation
and to gain the often-unwitting
also transmit
from
the
use to spread
and
work
in secret
the Government
in their
of the Republic
of
Vietnam.
Since the Communists
are using
tion
Front
to camouflage
ties,
their
People’s
organization
from
the
The
with
military
arm
the war
struggle,
forces
ganization
primary
at least
action,
the
forces
must conform
to political
(Viet
is a fighting
centralized
must
with
and men,
that
of the
level,
South
and
a
Cong
aggression
Vietnam.
booklet
the
inferiors
that organization
obeying
and that
or-
Army
must
be
superiors-
the army’s
political
unity between
cadres
out that
action
these
three
is subordinated
principles
to political
army
is united,
with
the army.
united
continuous
maintain
political
political
units.
indoctrinators
The
Viet
armed
forces
Vietnam’s
soldier
take him
not highly
The
is engaged
name
(GPA).
has
the
army’s
so-called
officer
are assigned
are the political
to
watchdogs
Liberation
Army.
Liberation
Army,
The other
People’s
Army
forces
consist
Cong
in
far from
whose
almost
who
is a part-
duties
do not
In addition,
he is
politically.
name
the Popular
The paramilitary
military
his community.
indoctrinated
(PAVN).
of two basic elements,
a local civilian
or guerrilla,
half comprises
of Vietnam
and the full military.
is generally
Front’s
originally
They
people
of the army
the
or commissars,
in all Vietnam.
the paramilitary,
time
orientation
over
the
is about one half of the total Communist
North
Cong
that
political
of the Front’s
Cong,
South Vietnam
Viet
and
control
officers,
Cong
The Viet
on the
army and therefore
and
all Viet
the army and the people.
pointed
military
Viet
political
declared
maintaining
and between
booklet
that
are closely
corps,
Communists
lines; that the Liberation
be discipline;
tasks are fundamental,
lowest
the
in the name of the
indoctrination
of its armed
into
to be primarily
duty
that
to Liberate
Front
Cong)
Vietnam
by the Communists
Movement
A 64-page
insure
that
on the Front
at all organizational
the Vietnamese
in South
the
to the
found
Since
is to support
conducted
National
The
to
Party
and
integrated
the very top
representatives
political
there
committee
is completely
from
military
highly
structure,
To insure
of the Front.
consider
being
activi-
level.
structure
levels
Front
central
Libera-
(Communist)
keeps a tight control
top-level
military
Front
the
apparatus
provincial
the National
anti-Government
Revolutionary
parallels
Communist
their
for
its
Army.
exclusively
been
expanded
At the
hamlet
paramilitary
However,
in guerrilla
to Guerrilla
level,
the GPA
force
was
since this force
warfare,
Popular
unit
the
Army
is either
11
formed, and
. ._. per’_
rely
primarily
they are dependent
.1
on local populations,
ward
supply
need
weapons,
attack
of their
tactics.
ammunition,
support
can’t simply
to a depot.
Instead,
or other
a Government
Since
logistical
their commanders
requisitions
they
on guerrilla
for much
military
base or unit
for-
when
they
hardware
and try to cap-
ture what they want.
The
Regional
gionals,
tees,
Forces,
are units
which
activities.
provide
leadership
and
Force operates
or Re-
district
commit-
direct
pretty
their
much in one
area.
The
elite units
of the so-called
the battalions
of the Main
the
“Hard
name
of
fiberboard
gional
helmets
Forces
and
provincial
level
tary operations
and
because
the
metal
from
food
or
the Re-
paramilitary
guerrillas.
These
committees
at the
range
farther
of the Main
1965 there
of
them
are
acquired
by the Front
Force,
have to perform
producing
Army
have
afield
in their
than do the units of the Regional
As members
don’t
They
distinguish
the
are directed
Liberation
Force.
Hats”
that
battalions
Cong
Territorials
by Front
their
A Regional
general
also called
established
the
“Hard
non-military
or transporting
were over 65,000
Hat”
work,
supplies.
miliForces.
Viet
such as
By the end of
of these
Hard
Hats fight-
ing in South Vietnam.
This
organization
of command
military
practice
of command
Gong’s
political
Communist
at the top
top
pattern
a direct
the
military
at lower
chain
the Viet
conforms
strong
chain
to orthodox
However,
structure
of
and operations
and
in contrast
to bottom.
and military
Communist
all levels,
cumbersome
and slow,
of establishing
from
classic
with
seems
indirect
central
level
to the
authority
decentralized,
Party
control
over the government
and political
control
over
the military
at
at all
levels.
The
Although
the
1960’s,
those
paigns
of
units
also
serve
Viet Cong’s full military
The Viet Gong’s
into
Force.
army
two
types-the
They
units.
as manpower
full military
Regional
units
for
the
element
Forces
are
also is divided
and
the
Main
like orthodox
self-contained,
not
uni-
He
except
those
who
were
were
policeman,
late
the victims
assassination,
well
aware
of cadres-trained,
the countryside
Operates
immediately
was on in the
terrorism,
leaders
A cadre’s
are not set up or operated
Their
pools
units.
war
Vietnam
thousands
munist
guerrilla
few,
realized
rural
Cadre-How
and military
1950’s
affected,
and
early
of the savage
cam-
and
of it.
kidnapping
dedicated,
hard-core
officers-who
fanned
to win support
for the insurgent
role can be described
as a combination
and propagandist.
Front
in the countryside
operate
is graphically
hamlets
described
in
So too were
He is the Party
and villages.
by one of them,
the
Comout in
forces.
priest,
and the
How they
Captain
Lam.
13
“We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a
wedge between the people and their government-to
make the people hate their government, and the Americans. Our second objective is to get people to join our
(VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them
to increase their production of food, and give the increase to us.
“Our cadre go into each village to study the situation and the people. Once they know the people and
their problems, our cadre can explain how these problems are the fault of the government,
and how the
people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In
this way we make the people hate their government, and
can destroy the government in their village. Then we
guide them in forming their own government
(under
our control) and in organizing their own armed forces,
which of course are our auxiliaries.
“Of course we cannot do this right away in those
villages and districts where the government is strong.
There we concentrate on educating people politically
to hate their government, and on forming both open
and secret organizations which can support us, or embarrass the government.
Every little bit helps. Any
voluntary action of the people, from organized protests
to simply slowing down on work ordered by the government, is a clear gain for us.
“Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe,
very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism,
and the emotions of each individual according to his
situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a person is arrested by government forces we try to contact
him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him,
arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him.
Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village
so that the people may see how we are suffering for
them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every
possible way to create hatred for the government and
the Americans, to separate the people from the government and to make them see that we are their only
hope.”
Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more
emphasis is placed on terror and murder (“destroying
the village government”)
and less on persuasion.
Organizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum
effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still emphasized as essential to Viet Cong success.
14
The
nearly
half
million
men
up the civil and military
army
and
its shadow
are as diverse
tion
and
as those
Perhaps
from
are incessantly
told,
and
they
do,
everything
Cong.
knowledge,
and
caused
to repeat,
mittee
and later a District
anywhere.
District
the
they
the
and their
in some of their own state-
“hard
the story of Captain
the
core,”
advantage
which
of
backbone
the
welcomes
by the
of the
return
One of the real
movement,
Government’s
the
Chieu
to loyalty
Hoi
later,
struggle
munist
in Central
Vietnam
because
they
said
the French
Party.
As
that
in
country.
“In 1960, I was
1954,
I joined
Officer,
after
promoted
Minh.
I swear I am prepared
to
my
namese
last
I went
the
division
to Senior
2.
ers,
I swear
and
without
I
gerous.
retreat
4.
true
aggression
to obey
absolutely
them
to
go
5.
secret
and
wealthy,
my
and
secrets
unit’s
of
in
to
for
“Finally
I
Vietnam.
to
make
orders
from
my
people
even
combat
if
6.
accurately.
at all
complaint
is hard
better
the
seeking
shape
to
make
people
like
their
lives
even
and
five
other
young
the Government
but that
men,
would
if we came with
they
taken
other
in
the
enemy
and
not
the
name
to work
be
I will
torture.
not
I will
br:bed
by
the
unity
to
love
of
cooperatively
with
reveal
any
remain
in-
faithful
enemy.
my
them
friends
in
in combat
my
and
times.
I swear
are
by
inhuman
never
to
maintain
damaged
and
protect
or captured
my
weapons.
by the
ensuring
enemy.
into
American
Vietnam
a
im-
demo-
do
I swear
three
tect,
that
things
and
help
inconvenience
in
and
my
relationships
eschew
three
the
people;
the
people.
to
indulge
I will
I
will
with
things.
not
do
the
people
I will
respect,
steal
from,
threaten,
all
things
to
win
I will
pronor
their
confidence.
organizational
the
would
never
myself
invading
They
the poor
sacrificed
in the village
under
Revolution
I swec~r
9.
and
if
even
as myself,
8.
or don-
will
strong.
preserve
I swear
to the
and
fear,
The
Cong
OF HONOR
without
life
in a main
May 1960.
people.
me,
us away for the army,
unit
without
leader
until
that they were good men
and
take
command-
promptly,
told
and
of Sergeant
taxes.
if we stayed
formation
Vietnam
squad
collect
that
will
Viet-
the words
and
to the poor
they
for the people,
but the Viet
struggled
if
in the Com-
my village,
and wanted
they
live in
so I did.”
to defend
loved
two
to see
was to join the forces
who
to give rights
colonialism,
order
the
battling
servants,
plans,
other
all
thing
a 31-year-old
at night
I began
live in the South
fighting
“I was a farmer
to come
but after
I lost my faith
them,
OATH
Cong,
the way the people
consider
controlled
North
CONG
in or-
very
tell us, and we believed
involved.
fight
soldier
I swear to
Long,
battalion:
7.
all
discouraged
learn
their
in
for
of suffering
to
revolutionary
cratic,
firmly
forward
regardless
Anh
us, that
and
of the
successful
of Vietnam,
By way of contrast,
united.
wholeheartedly,
fght
becoming
will
I swear
perialists
all
and
and
I sweclr
of the Republic
of the
Captain,
imperialism,
democratic
executing
3.
against
traitors,
independent,
to sacrifice
breath
in the
the Com-
VIET
1.
Two
a11 leaders
should,
its Political
my company
fight
that the only right
used
in 1947, when
years old, to join the Viet
against
claim that we were
force
misled
[Secretary
between
munist
and
Com-
were
in governments,
decided
nearly
Commissar
and the way they would
Government
“I left my village
years
the change
After
destination
of the Province
the Viet
not for this war.
Vo
program
of those
expanding
it were
he took
Communists.
I was eighteen
with
Lam.
and
the North
Viet
ments.
Consider
years,
and
my
member
We
the real difference
reasons
supporting
Committee).
ganizing
apart
the South.
I reached
in motiva-
of their diversity,
is found
liberate
travelling
at first a political
that sets them
including
to go to help
months’
became
Front,
is the way in which
The best illustrations
common
six
the National
thing
Vietnamese
for
ordered
and government
important
fellow
make
Cong
in origin
of any army
the most
their
government,
divergent
who
of the Viet
and women
components
name
revolutionary
of
units.
secrecy,
my
unit
and
commander,
to
keep
and
10.
dier
Army
I swear
of
the
or
Revolution,
and
in
self-criticism,
never
to
harm
to
be
either
a
the
model
sol-
Liberation
Vietnam.
15
them
for
a week
guerrillas
of training
and defend
but then
go to a long
training
course.
training
camp,
the
months
and then
“I soon
hard,
could
but
the
that
cadre
gloriously,
splendidly.
kept
that
I accepted
this.
three-man
must
I knew
We
studied
every
we
prepared
I had
was
been
die
of
us
to
night
the
Government
district
outpost.
South,
they gave
to hide
The
Viet
Cong
force
came
and
to help
“I stayed
from
with
them
Eventually
my family,
Government
A few
for four years, fighting
I could
and
no longer
so I ran
stand
away
in many
being
and
me a gun,
and
When
the
After
the
said that
a RVNAF
but they found
Viet
Scholar
or street
tion-of
away
joined
the
side.”
more
now
further
illustrate
the
diver-
urchin,
me
that
force, because otherwise
my mother’s
“I was
farming
drafted
my group
join
the
the Viet Cong might
district
of a hero,
haps
burn down
officer
in the
{People’s
me, gave
US
down
but
Army
last year
not
help
to liberate
Now
here.
training,
is
when
posed
are reviewed
Viet-
and he is told by his leader
asked
be.
the South,
“I did
want
I am in a transporta-
to become
a soldier
it would
disgrace
I used to get drunk
criticized
several
I was ashamed
my comrades
and sleep
times
and
but the
After
Viet
too late, and after
did not reform
orders
from
my
superiors
2.
3.
4.
things
5.
I will
6.
I will
7.
When
would
men
are
of
primarily
which
under
all
which
It also
thinking.
the
maintained
through
is applied
to the mind
will
and
immediate
gives
every
lets the
This
constant
actions
cir-
8.
I
will
follow
cadre
the
cell
cri-
to the
program,
system
to every possible
All
things
(usually
unit.
are the principal
of the people
and
for
the people.
never
take
anything
from
the
people,
not
even
a
not put group
return
that
be polite
be fair
property
which
to my own
is borrowed,
to people,
and
staying
my own
9.
I
will
information
use.
make
restitution
for
house.
in
respect
just in buying
people’s
and
and
houses
love
treat
persons
them
as
I
I
unit secrets absolutely
will
encourage
and
will
never
disclose
or relatives.
the people
to struggle
and
support
the
Revolution.
11.
them.
selling.
I will
10.
keep
even to closest friends
12.
affection
I
will
be
alert
to
spies
close
to
and
will
report
all
suspicious
to my superiors.
I will
and
remain
love.
the
people
and
maintain
a
know
contributes
surveillance
and the heart
the slogan:
he
man
CODE OF DISCIPLINE
damaged.
I will
is an almost
three-man)
or thread.
I will
I will
and deed.
I was
cumstances.
needle
his
sup-
his own shortcomings
in thought
barred,
his
his reactions,
fight
there
Per-
by the group,
what his future
explain
and criticize
no holds
effectiveness
reinforced,
and discussed
of the
role.
unit’s daily
In this, his
session.
and
to let off steam.
Appeals
the
confess
I was ban-
WET CONG
obey
with
what
But
ished from my unit.”
1. I will
he must
every
chance
to desert,
in the cell.
this,
and weaknesses
tique,
Cong came and took me. Then
because
After
must publicly
I want to go home.”
not
motives
this
is his
self-criticism
continued
and a
and protector
to forget
reminder
and
tion unit and have to carry 32 kilos of rice for 12 miles
every day.
effective
emotion,
to memorize
put him in the po-
a friend,
allowed
indoctrination
of (North)
me six weeks’
if it would
and marched
North,
most
human
oath of honor
which
a patriot,
He is never
the
every
or farm
indoctrina-
is required
(a lo-point
indoctrination
house.”
I was 20 the PAVN
nam}
I must
on
The soldier
code of discipline)
people.
told
came
me.”
professional
playing
applied.
basic codes of conduct
sition
sity.
*‘My uncle
I must
company
Cong Discipline
discipline
constantly
12-point
statements
hamlet
troops.
attacked
them.
boy, they all tell the same story of relentless
battles.
so of
for the Government
I had
to save my life.
a
by two
others.
16
to the
ses-
belonged
cell, so that every man was watched
guerrilla.
One
I tried
fooled,
a village
told me I must watch
fight
I was an officer of the
to come
chief
battle
were
to
and had self-criticism
Each
day.
Cong
Vietnam.
ordered
I came.”
“I was
six
leader.
that
be
that
for
North
I was
course
for months
of a Viet
emphasizing
“I am from
PAVN.
I must
I studied
as a squad
life
we
Although
sions almost
We marched
the
local
with them,
of my ability
where
was graduated
realized
become
We went
they told me that because
to reach
living
we
our village.
their
way in which the Viet Cong seeks to control
Regular
tesy,
phasis
appear
duty,
units
and
strict
is placed
employ
obedience
on making
to be voluntary.
if such
standard
normal
forms
is always
expected,
compliance
For
those
punishments
its members.
of military
with
who
cour-
but emregulations
fail
as public
in their
criticism,
extra
duty,
and brief
the penalty
is often
man feel a traitor
The
of
the
fear
less
individual
do not bring
in terms
and an outcast
from
of corporal
importance
confinement
discharge,
punishment
although
or his relatives.
either
that
reform,
make
the
the human
or death
seems
race.
to be
may be visited
on
It has been
said that the Viet
is told the reason
quently
for everything
and in greater
detail
the world.
Almost
the reasons
for his actions
Every proposed
it
and
bystanders,
by
the
than
more
any other
than
everyone
innocent
soldier
he is required
action is discussed
is taken-and
targets
certainly
Cong
probably
that he does more
fre-
soldier
in
soldier.
from all angles before
except
almost
“gets
“After
studying
studies
it from
the political
the
forces
Concerning
commented
on the bombing
the
and
of the
a blast
tary studies
benefactor
Captain
action
18
of all the people.”
Lam’s
against
an
description
RVNAF
what
outpost
happens
is
after
recommended
and
to make
performs
perhaps
“Once
the proposal,
all points
effects,
sure
his
Provincial
that
assigned
the
it to the head
Committee.
and the relative
RVNAF.
He then
Committee
capabilities
it to the
of the
Party.
it sound
Party Committee
especially
of our
If he approves
he presents
it and if he thinks
approve
I report
Affairs
of view, considering
of the
operation
ing of the whole
of
effort
word”
Military
those
proposed
of the U. S. Embassy,
“If a few people get killed from
it is a risk of the war.
The Front is the
incredible
the
of the Provincial
the
bystanders.
one Viet Cong
the
duties.
to explain
any other
concerned
shows
everyone
of
Secretary
The
Secre-
he calls a meet-
to study,
discuss,
and
the proposal.
proposal
is approved
by the
Party
Com-
haps
directs
some
will
approve
mittee
political,
this
and
is
take
from
difficulty
to
he is supposed
detail
when
and
necessary
laborers
dead,
to give
their
to carry
We
proper
bears
it
whether
an attack,
planned
and rehearsed
troops
out,
units
The
militia
to provide
off the
which
are
booty
and
will
comfort
of the rest.”
seems fantastic,
out.
but account
A~zJ~ planned
operation,
or a raid on a hamlet,
in great
detail-and
then
moment
when
factor
doctrine
is explicit.
last
will
and
the morale
an ambush,
off at the
to do it, and
try to carry away all our
burial,
preparation
account
called
always
the
just what
force
units.
supplies,
and strengthen
Such detailed
after
main
and militia
them
families
the
the
if any,
will
on
will be planned
to guide
to carry
our dead,
depending
every man knows
where
prac-
This practice
a month,
of the action
the local force
always
begin
or an actual
to do, how he is supposed
Every
including
units
on a sandtable
until
Com-
favorable.
all
of the target.
days
of the target,
when.
meet
either
Party
if all conditions-
logistic-appear
replica
five
The
only
accomplished
for the attack,
stake-and-string
action.
the attack
military,
“After
ticing
additional
some
is
often
has
changed.
Viet
Cong
marized
means
tactical
in four
Fast
Advance,
the Battlefield,
*.jr._
the Military
liminary
sends
Affairs
tasks among
a military
point
mock-up.
The
the civilians
Committee
its three
a reconnaissance
divides
staffs.
the pre-
The Military
unit to study the objective
Fast
Staff
thorough
swift
and to prepare
a sandtable
Staff sends a cadre to contact
in the area, to learn
their
reaction
to the
preparation
action,
always feature
Attacks
maximum
and a secondary
a?zd a careful
usually
deployment
of
several
recent
attack.
It a 1so studies the morale of the
to see if they are mentally and emotionally
preIf they are not, the Political
[logistics)
Staff
removal
another
the leaders
reviews
if the
The Rear Services
civilians
including
can furnish
that needed
meeting.
If the majority
the
This
Affairs
will
for
Commit-
be attended
of the Committee
be made,
Provincial
the proposed
of
based on Slow
they report
Party
problem
deliberate
believes
to another
Committee,
which
and the solution
by
in the
that
efforts
In the past
avoid defensive
theless
on a primary
mutually
forces
have
to
been
and ambush
by
almost
supporting,
intercept
that may be brought
there
to entice
and
or
in.
In
indications
of
helicopter-borne
again
even
positions,
in case they
these
dikes
look
an ambush.
for defense,
separating
like canals.
especially
rice
are
fields
breaks
Where
in the so-called
Never-
with alternate
do decide
positions
seem to be merely
trenches
will permit,
prepare
Frequently
existing
placements
have usually sought to
they had the battlefield
that it was essentially
switch
a stand.
into
the Viet Cong
combat unless
they carefully
meet-
and per-
battles
followed
troops.
so organized
the Military
of all the units that will be involved
the attack should
of
out
and labor,
all this is done,
tee holds
ing
finds
Staff must take the
them.
of the dead and of any booty.
“When
attack.
to prepare
food
This
Clearance
use of explosives
[proposed)
the necessary
Fast
on strongpoints
objective,
troops
measures
Assault,
Slow.
for any contingency,
is grasped.
any reinforcements
necessary
It is sum-
One
that is new or unusual in Viet Cong
once the basic principle
of careful,
ambush
pared.
Fast,
and Fast Withdrawal-all
There it little
tactical doctrine,
from
of view,
Political
Four
Preparation.
*a
?
mittee,
words:
to make
incorporated
so that
em-
in the walls,
and
the water
level
secret base areas,
19
elaborate
tunnels
are often
and for concealment
the Japanese
constructed,
from
in World
ground
War
both
for cover
and air forces.
II, the Viet Cong
Like
are tire-
less diggers.
Controlled
land
detonated
when
mines,
buried
a Government
have long been a favorite
method
of
destroying
opponents.
usually
mistake
psychological
civilians.
at
for
purpose,
and
“spike-boards”
are often
used
in preparing
placed
naturally
in the covered
of booby
Government
as Viet
this,
so they
their
only hope.
Even
though
Cong,
the
in proportion
corresponding
ously
than
a
drop
unexpected
poor
impairs
the
quick,
planning
actual
successful
these
same
than expected
achieved,
there
is a
and combat
effectiveness.
by Republic
of Vietnam
resistance
inflicted
is unsuccessful,
Cong
leaders
or months,
would
counteraction
and seri-
can
longer
warrant.
Only
overcome
this
effect.
Cong
“Persuasion”
Much is said about the Viet Cong use of terror, which
seems to be increasing.
This is natural as the pace of the
war steps up and support
requirements
grow
voluntary
Taxes
been
peatedly
tary
20
Cong
are faced
any government
The
contributions.
in some areas.
recruiting
Viet
every
Cong
effort
of Vietnam
the
been
used,
proves
have
faster
than
raised
re-
“Draftees”
must fill in as volun-
inadequate.
Terror-punishment
many
in
areas,
the
problems
of war-and
are
the
support
Armed
beginning,
made
of members
of the
Forces
as well as the sup-
Generally
similar
tactics
always
the benefits
have
to the
in-
moral and patriotic
worth of
‘Serve your country against
in allegiance.
such a shift
the American
because
from
emphasizing
the
in
in time
the
civilians.
and
it eventually
they succeed
the administrative
have,
of
but
as a result.
to secure
Republic
dividual
with
support
port
high
imperialists,”
the Americans
they say.
“Don’t
be fooled
are more clever than the French;
motives
are the same, but they use you as
puppets.”
The
keep
general
the
preference
Communists
whole
garrisons
seems
appropriate
to frighten
the
posts
area.
Not
not
by torture,
determined
when
it
resistance
or
infrequently
murdered
The dependents
Threats
does
often
they overwhelm
to punish
in the
“soft-sell”
killing,
will be brutally
to the others.
same fate.
for
from
of small
others
or two leaders
one
as an example
of the men may meet the
of reprisals
against
families
are some-
times used as well.
Within
the
last 6 years
major
program.
A favored
speaking
small
garrisons,
lives
for
have
mercy
their
Viet
as sisters
families’
sake,
None
success.
to serenade
precious
imploring
of these
Homesickness
in the RVNAF,
a
is the use of girls
to save their
and
Vats
become
or mothers,
to them
cause of desertion
Bid
Cong’s
call it-has
practice
calling
on civilians.
had noticeable
the
as they
program--“proselyting,”
them
programs
has been
to
has
a major
and this has plagued
the Viet Cong as well.
Prisoners,
ploited,
poses.
to the
primarily
Thus,
guerrilla
Cong,
There
prisoners
were
and
to sign
documents
was reported
held-and
or three
for some
hamlets,
put
that
could
months’
reeducation
or brutal,
in which
American
exhibited
pressure
be used
to get
for
in
them
worldwide
and then
released.
One American
executed
in June
1965 in reprisal
of a Viet Cong terrorist.
as
of an Asian
six months,
under
pur-
treated
anti-Communist
have been instances
held
to be ex-
psychological
by the standards
two
villages
propaganda,
and
are often
if not notoriously
released.
are objects
political
be expected
army-for
then,
execution
Viet
for
prisoners
well as could
and
Viet
Today,
afflict
and women,
If
for weeks
damage
Viet
has its disadvantages.
by Viet
effectiveness
by the
power.
losing voluntary
results,
use it unless
Viet
forces.
dis-
are heavier
attack
the
if the com-
planned,
to benefits
when
as
ourselves.”
on carefully
in morale
serious
especially
indicates
if losses
Cong
and the dug-
to
us to protect
to
anticipate
the Viet
grateful
actions
fails,
in anti-
are likely
fully
are provoked
emphasis
important
by Government
often
“helping
forces
for the civilians
shelled
are
most
the trenches
attacks
rehearsed
such an action
An
or
Viet Cong’s
forces,
would
the hun-
civilians
to support
protection
for
the
The villagers
forced
people
and
seen,
Their
implicate
Secondarily,
these
provocateurs
often
Government
is bombed
or not
foot-mines
or an ambush,
“liberated,”
meaning Viethave some value if a Viet
Cong.
feel
outs do provide
cussed,
simple
areas the ambushees
to fight there.
is to
actions.
treat them
The
from
explosive
trench-works
villages
really,
munity
or
complete
fastest
who
that
traps around
unit decides
function,
seizing
the
those
the Americans’
Cong-controlled,
Cong
are mined,
political
seek.
Like the elaborate
dreds
their
uncooperative
for a battle
to produce
against
Viet Cong
targets
ranging
to
them,
discouraging
specific
traps,
and
is over
as warning
booby
deadfalls
being
least
some
such
Homemade
target
nonmilitary
or
highways
and an economical
or
Occasionally
by
in
seems
reacts
prisoner
for the
In little
forces
to
more
have
one
that
equipped,
than
grown
includes
highly
mere
their
shadow
in some
taxes
Communist
ercises
civil
on
Party,
of considerable
under
Party,
Democratic
Republic
of portable
war materials
army
North
well-
The
of engag-
duration.
grown
four
times
a
which
as much
Vietnam.
expanded
North
of Vietnam.
the
control
Vietnam-the
The
Substantial
have been brought
it exso-called
quantities
into South
by land
and
Vietnamese
Communist
As Viet
Confrom
substance,
South
Vietnam
its cover name of the People’s
has
of
of
armed
capable
has
almost
Cong
guerrilla
uniformed,
of limited
Republic
behalf
of
organization
collects
the
Viet
regulars
operations
provinces
Revolutionary
regiments
to one
as does
the
an essentially
foot-mobile
ing in conventional
currently,
five years
from
buildup
Cong
directly
felt obliged
into
crease
their
other
their
influence.
spent
much
food
until
1964,
r,eillance
Most
to 10,000
1964
their
regular
their
have grown,
units.
the
civilians
to draft
They
rates of taxation
on
alone.
is continuing.
have
and inin areas
Logistics requirements
for food
have greatly increased.
Even regular
of their
may render
significant,
year
and capabilities
demands
as well as weapons
units
as 8,000
the
They have been forced
to redouble
under
in
in the South
resources
so have their liabilities.
teenagers
sea, as well
soldiers
time in producing
a practice
which
increased
their own
air
sur-
unprofitable.
and most
dangerous
for both sides,
21
the Viet Cong
“people’s
introduction
forces
fails,
as well.
The
war
by their
Johnson
to achieve
armies
“is a different
or
have joined
But
we must
solemn
the
is to conquer
to extend
the Asiatic
The
Cong
Vietnamese
kind
to
of war,”
“There
declarations.
are
mask
the
than
central
the South,
Viet
It
is
to defeat
dominion
Our military
achieving
progress
so long
in
that
enemy,
impossible
effort
the
American
power
but
and valiantly
to
predict
of Vietnam
nor is he
how
in Vietnam
is an essential
of
freedom,
country
for those goals.
long
it
and the United
his aggression.
war-torn
and
no tougher
to stopping
objectives
Viet-
Its goal
He is not a superman,
States are committed
in
by North
China.
of communism.”
is a tough
his opponents.
invincible.
It is guided
by Communist
will take, but the Republic
Some
in the attack on their own Govlet this
it is spurred
stepped-up
and possible.
28, 1965.
and
Vietnamese
at times with understandable
not
fact that this is really war.
nam
a quick victory
of the free
on July
of South Vietnam,
grievances,
own
by
they say they are quite prepared
in Vietnam
marching
ernment.
scale of North
support
Vietnam
destroyed
for 10 or 20 years if necessary
President
citizens
22
to assure,
truly a South
being
If this effort
as our increasing
continue
no
of being
rapidly
equipment-and
is intended
said
is
on a growing
and
actions
pretense
army”
which
element
peace,
has
and
fought
THE
SECRETARY
OF
DEFENSE
Washington
March 8, 1966
KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE VIET CONG (DOD Gen-20)This official Department
of Defense publication is for the use of
personnel in the military Services.
By Order of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force:
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
Gene&, United States Army,
Official :
Chief of Staff.
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.
B. J. SEMMES, JR.,
Vice Admiral, United States Nav):
Chief of Naval Personnel.
J. P. MCCONNELL,
General, U.S. Air Force,
Official :
Chief of Staff,
R. J. PUGH,
Colonel, USAF,
Director of Administrative Services.
H. W. BUSE, JR.,
Lt. General, U.S. Marine Corps.
Deputy’ Chief of Staff (Plans amd
Programs).
:
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-4
Air Force: X: One for every six active duty military members.
Marine Corps: MARCORPS:
Table 4, plus 7000-140 (5)
Distribution
Army:
7130/7150/7352/7587
requirement
for TROOP
TOPICS.
(1)
23