THE 1982 NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLlC:

THE 1982 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLlC:
A Soeiologieal and Historieal Interpretation
MIRIAM OIAZ SANTANA
MARTIN F. MURPHY
Number
3
ANO
, 'I"f'
BLOQUE SOCIALISTA
PARTIDO OUISO.
DEMOCRA'
INSTITUTE OF CARIBBEAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
Caribbean Occasional Series
THE 1982 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:
A SOCIOLOGICAL AND
HISTORICAL
INTERPRET ATION
THE 1982 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:
A SOCIOLOGICAL AND
HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION
MIRIAM DIAZ SANT ANA
and
MARTIN F. MURPHY
THE INSTITUTE OF CARIBBEAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
·RIO PIEDRAS, PUERTO RICO
1983
by:
The Institute of Caribbean Studies
Box BM
University StatioD,
Univers ity of Puerto Rico
Río Piedras, Puerto Rico 00931
Published
Copyright
@
1983 by the Ih~titute
of Caí-ibbean
Studies-
AH rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Librar-y
f)f
Congress
Día? Sant.arra,
Cataloging
in Publicat íon Data
Miriam Milagros,
1946-
MUj phy. N,Íertin. Pranc is, 1949 _
"
To? 1982 Elections in the Dominican<.Republic:
and His tor-ica l Interpretatíon,
'Inst.itute
of Caribbean
Studies
Caribbsan
\. Caribb ean Ar ea . Sociology, Polities,
Librarv
,
of Congress
Catalog
Card Number
A Sociological
Occasional
History
- 83-082873
IB8N·0·936708.22-0
Hecho en Puerto Rico por:
Centro Gráfico del Caribe, Inc.
A ve. F, D. Roosevelt 1517
Apartado 10755
Caparra Heights, Puerto Rico 00922
Series, No. 3)
k
D
..
l ' tk h
For t e orrurucan. peop e ta
e ope
that soon they uiill succeed in their strug-
gle l'for an i~dependent
socially just PATRIA.
democratic and
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
ix
PART ONE
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
1.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
Introduction
3
The Trujillo Era. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .
The Balaguer-Ramfis Trujillo Government. . . . . . . . .
The Rise of the Inter-Bourgeoisie Struggle
for Control of the Sta tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Governments from 1961 to April 1965 . . . . . . . . .
The Revolution of 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Return of Balaguer. .. .. . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. .. .
A. The Economic Milieu oi 1966 and Balaguer's
Economic Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Balaguer's Political Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The National Elections During the Balaguer
Governmen ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano/Guzmán
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Guzmán's Economic Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Guzmán's Political and Social Policies . . . . . .
4
8
C. Partido
Revolucionario
Dominicano:
9
10
14
18
18
23
26
33
34
38
Govern-
ment and Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
PART TWO
THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE: 1982
1.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Demographic Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Economy of the Dominican Republic. . . . . . . . . . .
Employment, Underemployment and Unemployment
Distribu tion and Levels of Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Education and Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Electoral Laws of the Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . .
vii
44
45
46
47
47
49
PART THREE
THE ELECTIONS OF 1982
1.
The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano/Jorge Blanco
. ... .. ....... ... ....... .. ................
Campaign
52
11. The Role of the Partido Reformista. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54
IIl. The Role of the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana
in the 1982 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
IV. The Left and the 1982 Elections...................
59
V. Violenee in the Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
VI. Rumours of a Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
VII. The Results of the 1982 Electians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
VIII. The PoJitical Challenge Facing the Partido Revolu.
cionario Dominicano. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
67
IX. The Period of Transition Between Governments 16
May· 16 August 1982
.'...
68
PREFACE
¡
!
During the election campaigns of 1982 we spent many hours
discussing the fact that few people outside the Dominican RepubJic
were aware ofthe historical process that we were allJiving, that the
international press seldom mentions the country, and that few
knew the least bit about this Caribbean nation.
What Jittle was known about the country outside its borders
eentered around four topics: the Trujillo dictatorship, the United
States military invasion in 1965, recent eharges by international
organizations of the supposed use of Haitians as siaves on its plan.
tations, and Dominican migration to New York and Puerto Rico.
However, the country, its history, and its people are much more.
During the final days of the campaigns and shortly after the
elections, brief articles about the country and its political transformation began to appear in the international press. Of course we
1
were pleased that the Dominican RepubJic was finally being recognized for sorne of its positive rather than simply negative
traits.
However, we were struck by two facts: the perfunctory analysis of
the events and the fact that in many sources the recent events in
the Dominican Republic were he Id up as a model for "democracy"
for the rest of Latin America without an understanding of its history and contemporary
structures.
The country was maturing poJitically. Although economically
the country was in ruins, there was still something positive there.
Someone must write about this process, someone must write about
the challenges which still must be met; maybe sorne day we would.
A week after the 1982 elections, Sybil Farrell Lewis, Managing
Editor of Caribeari Studi.es, called us requesting an article on th e
elections. Here is the "art.icle" which kept growing and growing.
Miriam Díaz Santana
Martin F. Murphy
San to Domingo, 1983
viii
PART ONE
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
PART ONE
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The national elections celebrated on 16 May 1982 in the Dominican
Republic have been applauded nationally and internationally
as a
model for electoral conduct in the Caribbean and Latin Amér-ica.
These elections represent the first time in twentieth
century history of the Dominican Republic, that a true national referendum
was held with only limited violence and isolated examples of e lection fra ud. 1
The authors will herein present an analysis of Dominican
pol itical, eeonomic, and social spheres historically and sociologieally to demonstrate the origins and eharaeteristies
of the principal
aetors and interest groups in the 1982 eleetions; and test the
hypothesis that this demoeratie proeess represents
a model for
other nations of the hemisphere. To accomplish this, we cornmence
with the fall of the thirty-one year dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo and present a brief historical
aeeount of the principal,
economic, and social forces present in the last twen ty-five years of
Dominiean history and their general charactertstíca.
Our immediate task will then be to present an outline of reeent
national elections prior to 1982, and offer sorne understanding
of
eontemporary Dominiean soeiety by way of a diseussion of general
eeonomic and social eharacteristics
of the nation and its people.
These sections are followed by an analysis of the major Dominiean
1. At various points la ter
lenee are found. Also, readers
scene of política and society in
this study is current up to 15
on in this study discussions of electíon campaign vioare advised that beca use of the constantly changing
the Dominícan Republic, the information presented in
September 1982.
-~_._--
~---~
political parties which participated in the recent elections, their
orientation, campaigns and campaign strategies; the results of the
elections and the roles of the various socio-economic groups in this
process; and the challenges facing Salvador Jorge Blanco and his
party, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) during his
four-year tenure as President, which began on 16 August 1982.
i?dustrializa.tion basedon impo~t substitution. and the diversifica.
This econormc development was
facilit.atad by high world prices for traditional Domi~ica~ export
~roducts and the restrtctions that the díctator mamtamed on
Imports....
.Trujrllo dunng the decade of the 1950s inc\uded within his
national development policies the purchase of all North American
owned sugar milis (with the exception of Central Romana which
remained in the hands of the South Porto Rico Isicl Sugar Como
pany),
andt the
efe
thi nationalization
R b t C
• toft the banking industry. With
r rence o 18 o er o assa s a es:
tIo~,of Dominican agricultura.
n. THE TRUJILLO ERA
".
Rafael Trujíllo, a career soldier formed under the tutelage of the
.
..
North Amencan
military
occupation government of 1916 to 1924,
carne to power in 1930. Upon assumption of the presidency, he
•
.
. .
. .
imrned iately began the task of reorgaruzmg and moderníztng the
State and converting it into a true instrument of economic and·
political domination of the Dominican people.?
An accelerated process of capital accumulation based on the
use of the government, along with the development of a special type
of national bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie was initiated through
Trujullo's manipulation of the State, the Armed Forces, and the
National Police. This unprecedented accumulation of capital and
the development of these dominant c\asses subservient to Trujillo
were both undertaken under the shadow of the dictator's own
businesses and properties, accompanied at the same time, by strong
dependence on, and support from, North American financial
interests.
By the end of the 1930s, Trujillo was the owner of vast tracts of
land, \ivestock, banks, import and export concerns, salt mines, and
insurance companies. In addition, in terms of national accomplishments, the dictator had completely paid off the country's foreign
debts, which resulted in the return to Dominican control of their
custom houses which had been under United States administration
since 1907.'
During the 1940s, Trujillo took advantage of the post war
economic
crisis
in
the
developed
countries
by stimulating
...
2. There are numerous sources available on Truj illo, for example. Roberto
Cass~, Capitalismo y dictadura (Santo Domi.~go: Univ~rsidad ~utónoma de .Santt>
Domingo, 1982); Robert D. Craesweller, Trujilío: The Life and TImes ora Caribbeon
D' "
k' M acmr'11a~, 1966 ) ; and Jesus'. de Galfndee. La era de Trujillo
..
le a or lN. ew Yor...
(Buenos AIres: Editor-ial Americana. 1958>.
3. In
1907
the
Dominican-American
Convention
4 ._
wes signed.
by which
I
I
In spite of Its essential Iímít
1
1
t¡
a lOn5,
th
e process
o
fT
"11'
rUJI oiat post-
war industrialization, and principally in the 19508, was of tremendous importance for the subsequent history of the country. The
development of manufacture took a step toward industrial produc-
tion in the emporiumof the State and the personof Trujillo.5
;
I
I
j
í
This process constitutes the basis for the emergen ce, upon the death
of the tyrant, of a strong state capitalism that would be determinant in the characteristics of the subsequent c\ass struggles. Cassá
claims that in 1961, "... fif'ty-ona percent of industrial investment
was that of the Trujillo family and the Sta te, forty-two percent
foreign,. an~, as little as seven percent that of the national
bourgeoísie,
The process of capital accumulation realized by Trujillo was
combined with a political climate characterized by absolute represo
sion, AIl opposition to the regime was ruthlessly pursued; political
parties were effectively outlawed (with the exception of Trujillo's
own Partido Dominicano), and plunder, crime, and persecutions
were institutionalized. However, as Bosch notes, Trujillo was not
the only culprit.
United Statestookdirectcontrolofthe
Dorninican Cn t
H
F
. f
.
s oms ouses. or more rn ormation, see Melvin Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (New York: Vanguard
Prees, 1928); AntOnIO de la Rosa, Las finanzas de Santo Domingo y el control
americano (Santo Domingo: Editorial Nacional, n.d.).
4. See Cassé. Capitalismo y dictadura; Luis Gómez, Relaciones de producción
dominantes
en la sociedad dominicana 1875 _ 1975
d d (8
D.
y Omega, 1979).
rsecan e.
anto
ormngo: Alfa
5 Roberto Cassá Modos de producción clas s . 1
1 h
titi
(S
.
,
.
es OCIa es y uc as po tucas
anta
Domingo:
Alfa y Omega,
1978), p. 57.
6. Ibid .. p. 58.
the
5
f Trujillc's cr-imeswere not political they were crimes of
M
o,
theany
industrial
bourgeoisie in the period in which it developed. But
as Trujillo was at the time the governor,..., these crimes appeared to
be of a political nature. 7
These sanctions, coupled with previously mentioned factors,
.
such as, the faH of prices
and sumptuous spen dimg by t h e diicta t or,
created an atmosphere of distrust which completely
paralyzed
foreign and national investment in the Dominican economy. To
By the mid 1950s the situation took a negative turn for the dietatorship. In 1955, Trujillo eelebrated his own finaneially disastrous World's Faír, in whieh it is reported that he invested at
least 30 million dollars, or one-third of the national budget." To
further eomplicate matters, the priees for the Dominiean Republie's
major export produets began to fall, and both internal and external
further aggravate the situation, during this period Trujillo
exeeeded the national budget with exeessive spending in arma.
ments and withdrawals of enormous sums of money from the country.!? By 1959 a clan destine anti-Trujillo movement was developing
in the country. This movement, Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de
Junio (June 14th Revolutionary Movement), was eomposed of, and
led by, the youth of the urban middle class, primarily from the stu-
opposition
were growing.
dent and professional
During this period politieal ehanges in Latin Ameriea were crueial for the eountry. The dietatorships of Getulio Vargas in Brazil,
Perón in Argentina,
Odría in Perú, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Pérez
Jiménez in Venezuela, and Fulgeneio Batista in Cuba, were al!
overthrown. These events, and prineipally the Cuban Revolution,
created an international climate unfavorable tothe Dominiean dietatorship. Under these eonditions an invasion by Dominiean exiles
was organized. This attempt to reclaim the island from Trujillo was
launehed from Cuba; but, on their arrival in the Dominiean RepubIic on 14 June 1959, they were rapidly defeated by General 'I'rujil los forces. Nevertheless, the impaet that this movement eaused
in the country and internationally had enormous repereussions for
the dietatorship.
Trujillo, desperate, due to the internal crisis and external
politieal pressure, intensified his reign of terror. Within the country he dismantled the clandestine opposition movement through
murders and disappearances of a number of anti-Trujillo leaders,
and the imprisonment and torture ofmany of the members. The dietator's fury was also direeted against external ene mies, and this
included an attempt, in 1960, on the life of Romulo Betaneourt,
President of Venezuela." International reaetion to Trujillo's ínternal and external terrorist activity resulted in an economie and díplomatie bloekade of the island nation, organized by the Organization of American Sta tes in 1960.
7. Juan Bosch, Composición social dominicana,
y Omega, 1979), p. 263.
8. Crassweller,
Truíillo. p. 298.
9. Ibid., pp. 409·420.
__
__ 6
Tenth ed. (Santo Domingo:
_
Alfa
sectors.
However,
the organization
had a
rather short life span, it was dismantled by General Trujillo and his
forees in January 1960 after the majority of the leaders were either
I
I
I
I
I
murdered or imprisioned.
General politic al opinion in the United States of Trujillo and
his tyranny until the last years of the 1950s can best be deseribed by
the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, quoted by the historian.
Eric Williams: "He lTrujillo] may be a S.O.B., but he is our S.O.B."ll
In the waning years of the dietatorship, through nationalization (or
"Trujilloization") of many North American investments in the
Dominiean Republic, and the terrorist aetivities directed by Truj illo against other poli tic al leaders in the hemisphere,
the
Dominiean tyrant became su eh a serious threat that the United
States government deemed it neeessary that he be eliminated.
On the night of 30 May 1961 the dietatorship of Trujillo carne
to an abrupt end at the hands of assassins. It is essential that we
note here that the assassination of Trujillo was not realized by the
former mentioned sector of the rniddle class, or by the sector of
the dominant classes opposed to the regime. On the eontrary, the
exeeution was realized by members of the sector close to Trujillo
and reportedly instigated by the Central Intelligence Ageney of the
United States.'?
10. Crassweller states: "Another one hundred to two hundred million had been
invested or secreted abroad, mostly in New York, and mostly in the na me of the
nominees, ..." See Ibid.. p. 279.
'.
11. Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The Historv of the Caribbean. 14921969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 465.
12. The role of the eIA in the assassination
of Trujillo was brought to publ¡c
7
The Dominican assassins of Trujillo never realized their object
of a coup d'etat, and the tyrant's
eldest son, Ramfis Trujillo
inherited the national leadership, to be later succeeded by President Joaquín Balaguar.F' Nevertheless, the events of May and June
1961 were the dawn of a new era of history for the Dominican
masses. The people launched a spontaneous campaign in the streets
destroying
the symbols of the hated dictator and his oppressive
regime.
111. THE BALAGUER-RAMFIS
GOVERNMENT
IV. THE RISE OF THE INTER-BOURGEOISIE
FOR CONTROL OF THE STATE
and social conditions, the ParRevolutionary Party) returned to the country on 5 July 1961. This organization had been founded in exile in 1939, and on arrival in the
Dominican Republic was converted into the representative
of the
interests of the democratic faction of the national bourgeoisie, at
the same time attracting
members from the professional
and
intellectual sectors and a broad base of urban and rural workers.
Days later, on the 11 July, the Unión Cívica Nacional, UeN (The
National Civic Union) was born. Amaury Justo Duarte notes:
Under the afore-rnentioned
ne,,:"
ligb t through the Chure h CornmlSSlon
..
H eannRS
.
. th e Umit ed States Sena te. See
ln
Amaury Justo Duarte, Las luchas de clases en la República Dominicana. 1955.19';9
(Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega, 1979J.
13. Throughout the years Joaquín Balaguer was a faithful collaborator of Truj illo, holding numerous posit.íons in the dictator's governments. In 1960 Balaguer
became Trujillo's Vice President, later in 1960. one of Trujillo's puppet presidents, a
brother, resigned the position, and Balaguer became "Presiden t."
8
political
tido Revolucionario Dominicano, PRD, (The Dominican
TRUJILLO
On the death of Trujillo,. t.he
government
immediately
l~unched a two-pronged polit.ical policy, on the ane hand, they
vigorously pursued the perpetrators of Trujillo's death, while on the
oth~r hand, forced by inte:national
pressures, especially from the
Umted States, they perrnittcd the formation of political parties.
The United States government, then led by President John F. Kennedy, conditioned U.S. support and aid on the proviso that the new
Dominican government would hold free elections in the near future,
and through these elections the Dominican Republic would be able
to initiate the process of democracy.
This action by the United Sta tes was motivated by two forces.
On the one hand, pressures from North American sectors demanded
the complete and definitive end to dictatorship in the country, and
on the other, national fears that the Dominican Republic on its present course of instability was destined to become "another Cuba."
STRUGGLE
I
I
... the birth of the Unión Cívica Nacional was no more than a process, in virtue of the fact that it was a wing of the non-monopolistic
Dominican bourgeoisie, in opposition to the Tr uj illoiats fcr many
years, which developed into an independent party. 14
Another faction of the petit bourgeoisie, but not affiliated with the
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, was represented by the Mooimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio, which had been organized when
Trujillo destroyed the clandestine movement of the same name in
the initial months of 1960. Although in principIe it appeared to be
allied with the Unión Ciuica Nacional in its struggle against Trujilloism, due to its democratic and anti-imperialist
character, this
party played an important role in the political education of urban
based Dominican youth.
Trujillo and his cohorts had monopolized the principal means of
production by using the state apparatus
as an instrument
toward
accumulation of capital and the monopolization ofmarkets, thus at
the downfall of the Trujillo dictatorship,
the Dominican State was
in fact the principal owner of business and land in the country.
Thus the control ofthe State and its economic resources became the
center of struggle
for the various
factions
of the national
bourgeoisie
and petit bourgeoisie. ....At this point in contemporary
...
.
Dominican history, we en ter a period of bitter and violen t in-fight-
14. Justo
D
L h
d
l
160
uarte, uc as e cases, p.
.
9
ing between various sectors of the dominant classes, while the vast
majority of the Dominican populace was still excluded from the
decision-making
process.
V. THE GOVERNMENTS
FROM
1961 TO APRIL,
1965
In November 1961, Ramfis Trujillo was, by popular pressure, forced
to abandon the country. Joaquín Balaguer made an attempt to
maintain power through the creation of a State Council (Consejo de
Estado) composed of seven members, which he headed. This Council
was formed on the first of January 1962, and lasted only until the
16 January, when Balaguer had to desert the country in the face of
a general workers' strike and the replacement of his Council by a
civilian/military
junta. This latter political group remained in
power for only two days, and was replaced by a second Consejo de
Estado headed by Rafael Bonnelly and composed of members from
the traditional Dominican aristocracy.
This second Consejo de Estado, dominated
by civilians,
governed for a total of thirteen months, although it became quickly
evident that the body was unpopular, anti-popular, and obeyed the
dicta tes of the Vnited Sta tes administration.
This particular
faction of the Dominican dominant classes took advantage of their rise
to power to consolidate themselves economically. Examples are seen
in the exemptions from customs taxes for the large importers and
exporters, and attempts to sell the business interests inherited by
the Dominican State from the Trujillo family to native and foreign
investors.15
The popularity of the Unión Cívica Nacional, which dominated
these governing bodies, was waning and the Dominican populace
.
".
..
began to rally around the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano. The
PRD's successes during this period are to be attributed
to their
broad based organizing efforts all over the country with promised
.
'.
programs of democra tic reforms, coupled with accusations
and
denouncements
against the unpopular Consejo de Estado and the
UCN. At the same time, the PRD was able to win the confidence of
.
.
.
.
sectors of the domiriant classes not alhed with the UCN, and In
'. particular measure especia
. lly favored the Italian
'. Dominican
'.
15. Th¡s
fam ily Vicini, owner of three sugar mills and numerous other enterprises in the country and
al so, prominent members of the sector then in power.
10
-----
addition,
the confidence
of the Kennedy
administration
in
Washington.
.
ith 58 72
In December 1962, the PRD won the open elections WI .
.
percent of the vote, while the VCN, its major opponent, trailed far
behind with 30.08 percent.I" This victory by the PRD IS especially
important
given the massive propaganda
campaign
launched
I
against its presidential candidate, Juan Bosch.!" whereby the traditionally conservative Catholic Church played an important role by
branding Bosch a communist.!" The Bosch government inaugurated
on 27 February 1963, immediately introduced a series of constitutional reforms which were interpreted
by the conservative sectors
of the society as a threat to their interests. Among other reforms,
Bosch ordered the prohibition of latífundia;'?
the redistribution
of
land, the prohibition
of land ownership by foreigners, and the
prohibiton of religious instruction in the public schools.
,
In addition to these constitutional
reforms, sorne of Bosch s
administrative
measures were also interpreted
as threatening
to
the interests of these sectors. In the list of these administrative
decisions were included a contract with a British company for the
construction
of infrastructural
works, refusing North American
offers."? the cancellation of a contract with Esso Standard Oil for
the installation
of an oil refinery, and the establishment
of a ceiling on profits from the sale of sugar, the country's major exporto
Not only did the Bosch government encounter resistance from
members of the national dominant classes and North American
16. Off'icial resulte frOID the Junta Central Electora (JCE), published in El
Nuevo Diario (SantoDomingo) 16 de mayo de ~982,.p. 16.
.
17 Bosch, one of the founders of the PRD m exile, was considered by conservative sectors to be strongly allied with the Left. In 1973, Bosch left the PRD and
founded the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLDL
..
18. For example, two days before the elections B.osch.was de~atIng wi th Rev.
Láutico Garcia who tried to demonstrate that the presidential candidate was a cornmunist. The Dominican Catholic Church throughout history had been very closely
identified with Trujillo's regime, and subsequent oppressive Dominican governments...
t
f 1 d
d ither by individuals or cor19. Latífundia refers to vast trae s o an owne el
.
.
porations.In Latin American history the word, latifundio, has been used prirrrartly to
denote immense cattle raising, however, not exclueively.
20. This particular decision by Bosch was interpreted by t~e United Sta tes
administration as an affront. Its age oId trading partner had decided to seek a US
$150000000
from
European
concerns.
For Editora
more information
see John 1975)
Bartlow
M
'. E' 1 d loan
.
d
..
o (Santo
Domingo'
de Santo Domingo
p.
art¡n,
estino omtmcan.
,
,
352.
---
11
interests,
but it also beeame isolated from its own power base, and
TABLE 1
its own party. The end result was that the government,
beeame
impotent. The United Sta tes Ambassador to the Dominiean Republie, John Bartlow Martin, during this period eommented on Boseh
and his government as follows:
While everyone was nervous because they thought that Bosch had
moved too far to the left, 1was worried beca use he had not moved at
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENTS
FROM THE DEATH OF
TRUJILLO
1961 TO THE REVOLUTION
OF 1965
GOVERNMENT
Balaguer
MEMBERS
Joaquín
Balaguer:
President
21
Francisco González Cruz: Seere-
found it necessary to go into exile and the high levelleaders
PRD were submitted to repeated and constant harassment.
of the
21. Ibid., p. 351.
22. In November 1963, 140 members of the Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de
junio launched an attack from the mountains under the banner of the return of the
Constitution of 1963.In less than one month they were all killed or taken prisoners
by the Dominican Army, including Manuel Aurelio Tavarez Justo, their principal
leader. With this defeat, the incipient DominicanLeft entered into a stage of retreat
that would last until 1965.
12
31 December 1961
1-8 October 1961.
tary of State of the Armed
Forces; Interim President
Consejo de Estado
I
J. Balaguer: President
R.F. Bonnelly: Vice President
EPresident
Read Barreras: 2nd VIce
1-16 January 1962
I
Members
Mons. E. Pérez Sánchez
N. Pichardo ..
T re
L.
A. Amiama
Imbert Barreras
cal group of the time, the 14th of June Revolutionary
Movement,
preferred to dedicate their energies to guerrilla warfare rather than
poli tical mobiliza tion. 22
The Triurnvirate
Government, under UeN control, aggravated
the economic crisis the country was experiencing. This government
was characterized
by wide scale corr uption, the use of State
mechanisms
to favor the sector of the dominant classes of which it
was composed, the repression of popular protest and of the opposi.
'.
tion.
Under these conditions
the overthrown President Juan Bosch
3 August 1960 .
I
al1.
On the 25 September 1963, the Boseh government and the PRD
were overthrown by elements from the ueN sector aided by neoTrujilloist
military forees and with the apparent ~upport of the
.
S tates government. A tr iumvir-a
.
. ta headed by Donald Reid
.
Umted
Cabral, one of the leading members of the dominant classes, was
installed in power to replaee Boseh. At this point there was no
irnrnediate popular movement against the overthrow of Bosch and
the PRD, for as previously mentioned, Bosch and his party, during
hi18 tenure
¡
enure In
governmen, t h a d manage d to a Íilena t e th emse Ives
from their power base. Meanwhile, the other anti-bourgeoisie
politi-
DATES
Junta Cívico.
Militar
H. Bogaert: President
M
I
b
A. Osear Paeh::
ers
L. Amiama Tió
I
I
16.18 January
1962
A. Imbert Barreras
Rear Admira~ E. Valdé~ V.
Pilot W. Medma Natal¡o
Colonel N.R. Nivar Seijaa
Consejo de Estado
Rafael F. Bonnelly: President
18 January 1962 .
27 February 1963
Members
E. Read Barreras
Mons. E. Pérez Sánchez
N. Pichardo
L. Amiama Tió
A. Imbert Barreras
D. Reid Cabral
Boseh (PRD)
Juan Bos'eh: President
13
27 February 196325 September 1963
TABLE 1 (Cont.)
GOVERNMENT
Junta
Provisional
de Gobierno
Triunvirato
MEMBERS
intention of this coalition of popular elements and the military was
the return of democracy and free elections to the Dominican Repub-
DATES
Formed by, and composed of,
25-26 September
25 Senior Offieers of the
Dominiean Armed Forees
1963
lic.
Consisting of Four Governments
-1- de 1os San t os: P resi id en t
E rmno
-1 Government
Donald Reid Cabral: President
26 September 1963
25 April 1965
I
-3 Governments
SOURCE: Frank Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 5ta. ed. (Santiago:
Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1980>, pp. 622.23. The reader will note the
repet.ition of many of the eame persons in different governments. This illustrates
another example that during this period of Domin ican history various representatives of the same social class were "jockeying for positions" of econornic and politic al
controL
VI. THE REVOLUTION
OF 1965
- _
__
_
_
Within a short time the opposit.ion agam began to orgamze, headed
by the PRD and composed of intellectuals,
members of the dominant classes, and young military officers not allied with neo-Trujilloism. On the 24 April, a coup d'etat was launched and led by
democratic-Ieaning
members of the military, with the purpose of
returning
the governmen t of Juan Bosch to power and the
reinstatement
of the Dominican Constitution
of 1963.
I
I
IDI men
1
re-establishment
radicalize to sorne degree, this movement.
2 1
-I'-t
t
th
U it d St t
d
. n mi 1 ary
errns,
e
ru e
a es mvasion
an
occupation allowed for the victory of the anti-constitutionalist elements of the Armed Forces and the National
Police. Indeed, after their victory these groups were
reorganized and revitalized through the provision of extensive military aid packages from the United States,
1. Reaction to this invasion,
it
t f
b t
ti 1
..
- ,
.
.
tended
.
Alberto Caamano Deno defeated the Army and the National Pohce
in three days, and took control of the country.F The expressed
23. After the Revolution of Apr-il, Caamaño Deñó was named to an essentially
diploma tic position in order to get him out of the country, and as part of
the agreement made to end the conflicto After leaving the country he expertenced a
honor-ar-y
14
15
_._---------
to reinforce
the com-
fD
..
iti ens to the
s an la group o
ormrncan el lZ
of the constitutional
government, and to
certain process ofradicalization which brought him to Cuba and later to invade his
home country in 1973 with a group of guerrillos. The invasion was very quickly
crushed and Caamaño Deño was killed in action.
24. For more information on the United Sta tes military intervention in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, see, for example, Dona Baron, "The Dominican RepubIic Crisis of 1965: A Case Study of the Regional vs. Global Approach to International
Peace and Secuirity," in Columbia Essays in Irüerncüional Affairs, vol. III, ed. Andrew
w. Cordier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Fred Goff, "Fruits of the
Invasión: U.S. Interests in the Dominican Republic Ten years Later," NACLA's
Latin American and Empire Report 9, no. 3 (1975): 3·12; Fred Goff and Michael
Locker, "The Violence of Domina tion: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic," in
Latín American Radicalism, ed. Irvin L. Horowitz (New York: Random House, 1969),
pp. 249-91); Carlos María Gutiérrez, The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and
Repression (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); José A. Moreno, Barrios in
Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo (Pittsburgh: Univerait.y of Pittsburgh Press,
1970); Jerome Slater, La intervención americana (Santo Domingo: La Editora de
Santo Domingo, 1976); Various Aqthors, La reoolución dominicana de abril vista por
Cuba (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1974), These cited
works together represent díverse political ideologies concerning the Revolution of
1965.
PRD, and concentrated mainly In the capital city of Santo Domingo,
This popular movement, allied with the democratic sectors of the
Dominican Armed Forces under the direction of Colonel Francisco
-
O a su
The military defeat ofthe constitutionalist
forces, obliged them
to make significant concessions in the negotiations
for the ceasefire, The negotiated
victories and concessions
made by these
The Secretary General ofthe PRD, José Francisco Peña Gómez,
delivered a speech by radio the same day calling for support from
h D
..
h
t e om m tca n people. T e response on the part of the populace,
especially the urban residents, was spontaneous, thereby converting the coup d'état into a popular urban insurrection
led by the
..
The response by the United States administration
under President Lyndon B. Johnson
was the military
invasion
of the
Dominican Republic which began on the 28 April 1965. This invasion and the four month occupation by the United States military
h f
id
forces occurred under the pretext of protectmg t e hves
.. o resi ent
United Sta tes citizens in the country.P What this military action
accomphshed was two fold:
---_
..-
patriotie
forees included,
the installation
of a provisional
govern-
ment that would celebra te eleetions within the near future, the surrender of arms by the members of the eonstitutional
forees, and, the
forced exit from the country of their leaders, who were given essentially honora~y diploma tic poaitions. "
The provisional government of Heetor García Godoy was effeetively subordinated
to the direetion of the invasion and oeeupation
forces. After a four months stay in the coun try, the United States
began to withdraw, but not without leaving extensively
supplied
Table
2 (Cont.)
GOVERNMENT
MEMBERS
bi
d R
A t ' 1 b t B
'
Go remo e econ- n omo ID er
arreras.
trucción Nacional
10 August
1965
Members
C, Grisolía Poloney
A, Zeller Coceo
B, Benoit
J,D, Postigo
I
¡
I
military missions whose task was to restructure
the state/military
apparatus
destroyed during the war. By the time the United Sta tes
governments
had "reorganized"
the Dominiean Republie and eleetions were he Id, seven governments had been in power in a little
more than one year. The following table lists these governrnents.
President
PERIOD
7 May 1965-
ierno d R
A t ' 1 b t Barreras'
Gobierno e econ- nomo m er
.
trucción Nacional President
(ID
Members
C, Grisolía Poloney
10-30 August 1965
A. Zeller Coceo
B. Benoit
T ABLE 2
DOMINICAN
GOVERNMENT
Comando Militar
Revolucionario
GOVERNMENTS
TO 1 JULY
FROM
1966
25 APRIL
MEMBERS
García Godoy
1965
PERIOD
Headed by the following members of the Dominican Armed
Forces:
V. Fernández
'Mohna Urena
L, Bernard Vázquez
Héctor García Godoy: Provi-
sional President
3 September
1 July 1966
1965-
SOURCE: Frank Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, 5ta. ed. (Santiago:
Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1980), pp. 623-24. The reader will note that
at certain points there were more than one government on the same date.
25 April 1965
(10:30 AM - 8:00
PM)
Pérez
G, Gutiér,:ez R,,-n;írez
F. Caan:ano ~eno
E, Ramfrez Sanchez
P . Bar t o1ome' Berror it
,
'JposeRdafatelMolma Urena:
The electoral eampaign of 1966 was initiated
in aclimate
of
intense harassment of the democratic and revolutionary sectors,
h
it ti
Ii t
b t t The
.
and espeeially against t e former constí u iona IS eom a an s.
PRD and its leaders, the principal propelling force s in the Apr il
1965 revolutionary
movement, were the objeet of an intense eam-
,
25-27 Apnl 1965
reSlen
..
No Offieial Government
,,
-"
Junta Militar
Bartolome Benoit.: President
d'
paign of defamation and terror, In this carnpaign, the PRD an ItS
leaders were attributed
virtually all of the negative eonsequenees
of the war. The party's presidential
eandidate,
Juan Boseh, particularly affeeted by this eampaign of repression and violence, cond
d hi
lecti
ian al
t ith
ti
'
his home 25
ucte
18 e echan carnpaign
a mas Wl ou eavmg 1
.
28 April 1965 1 May 1965
1-7 May 1965
Members
O. Santana Carrasco
E.A. Casado Saladin
Caamaño Deñó
Francisco A. Caamaño
President
Deñó:
25. Gutierréz c1aims that Bos~h'sfear to ~e~vehis horne during the el~ct~ons
labelled him as a coward in the eyeao.fth~ DOmlnlc.anelector-ate a~d was a principal
fact for his loas at the polls. See Gutíerrés, Rebellion: and Repreeeion:
4 May 1965 3 September 1965
16
--
~
17
~-_.
VII. THE RETURN OF BALAGUER
exports were extremely high. This allowed Balaguer to manage
sums unprecedented in the history of the country.P
In anticipation of the upcoming elections, Joaquín Balaguer, who
had been in exile since January 1962, returned to the country.
.
"
.
'"
Because of his expenence m managmg state affairs, his undemable
liti
I
bilití
d
k'll
bi
d
.
h
hari
.
po 1 ica a 1 1 les an s 1 s, com me wit e arisrnatic. qua l'it.ies,
Balaguer maintained the support ofthe majority ofthe members of
the dominant classes, and certain other sectors of the population,
especially the peasantry. The result was that Balaguer became the
preferred candidate of the United Sta tes government and the
Dominican dominant classes.s'' The margin of victory for Balaguer
and his Partido Reformista was impressive. The self proclaimed
"Peace Candidate" received 56.5 percent of the vote, while the PRD
trailed far behind with 36.8 percent."
.
On arrival of his government to the National Palace, Balaguer
found the country in a state of bankruptcy; the Armed Forces
divided and still not recovered from the "wounds" suffered during
the war; a~ inefficient state administration; the Left on the. rise,
although divided ínternally; and the lack of ~ state of political
hegem~ny by the domm~nt classes, a srtuation that Balaguer
imrnediataly began to rectífy.
2
.
Th AII'
B t
th 1 d tri I Agricultural Commere
zance e ween e n us na ,"
,
. I
d F'
. l Boureeoi
d Foreien Capital
cta ' an
maneta
ourgeo/.Ste an
'"
.
Through state concessions, such as the exemption from certain
taxes and the development of the construction industry, which
required many imported products, Balaguer created an
atmosphere for the accumulation of enormous sums of capital
by these sectors. At the same time, workers' wages were frozen.
3. Extensive Foreign Inuestment, Espeeial/y in the Mining Sector.
During this period the exploitation of gold and ferro-nickel was
initiated through contracts, onerous to the nation, with two
transnational corporations _ The Rosario Resource Cornpany,
and Falconbridge. In addition, through the cooperation of the
Balaguer governments, Gulf and Western Americas Corporation, a subsidiary of the New York based, Gulf and Western,
was producing one-third of the Dominican Republic's sugar,
and began an intensive investment program in the tourist,
I
finance, livestock and cement industries.
A. THE ECONOMICMILIEU OF 1966 AND BALAGUER'S
4. The Fortification. of the State, and its Level of Efficiency.
These factors together with the control by the Executive
Branch of a very large percentage of the national budget,
allowed Balaguer to achieve an elevated degree of State
autonomy with respect to the Dominican dominant classes. For
example, between the years 1974-1978, President Balaguer personally managed more than 45 percent of the national budget.
This centralization of the control of the budget allowed
ECONOMICMODEL
Faced with the aforementioned conflicts, Balaguer's first task was
the reorganization of the State, to reshape it into a dynamic and
efficient instrument of control. The'principal characteristic of the
Dominican economy during this period, and Balaguer's economic
policies during his twelve year rule (1966-1978), are as follows:
Balaguer to create his own base of support in the population
independent of the dominant classes, who in turn found themselves dependent on the Chief Executive.
1. High Prices for Exporls.
During the major part ofthis period, the late 1960s and the earIy 1970s, the world market prices of the country's principal
26. See, for example,
Susanne
Jonas,
"Trade
Union Imper-ial ism in the
Dominican Republic, NACLA 'e Latin American and Empire Report9, no. 3 (1975): 13
28. For example, during the period 1970-1975, the country was experiencing
its
own "Danza de los mil lionee" (Dance of the Mil lions) like Cuba in the laet century,
. 30.
as world market príces for sugar reached approximately
the pricea have gone below US $ 0.06 per pound.
27. See Table 4 for election
resulte.
18
-_.__
19
.
~---
US $0.70 per pound. In 1982
TABLE 3
EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
1966-1977
'further
(In RD, thousands of Dominícan Pesos) *
virtual!y al! areas of the eeonomy - land, industry, eommeree,
banking, finanee, and used their influenee in the government to
.
.
.
.
develop their busmess mterests. Through substantial
concessions, Balaguer was assured the uncondi tional backing of
the military and the poliee. During his governments the number of general s reaehed forty and in many cases, they held key
positions in publie administration,
that is to say, they were
INSTITUTIONS
1966-1969
%
1970-1973
Presideney
119,152
14.2
509,100
39.4
1,121,840
45.5
Interior, Poliee,
and Armed
Forees
234,023
27.9
244,753
19.0
403,782
16.4
Edueation and
Fine Arts
115,289
13.7
158,157
12.2
306,234
12.4
Publie Health
67,308
8.0
76,788
5.9
126,221
5.2
Balaguer's eeonomie model was based on the stimulation
Publie Works
and Cornrnuniea- 65,477
tion **
AH other inatitutions
237,869
TOTALS
839,118
%
1974-1977 %
Direetors of the Post Offiee, Customs, Immigration, etc. It is
interesting to note that many of these generals, foreed into
retirement under the Guzmán administration,
1978-1982, are
curren tly prosperous industrialists, merchan ts, financiers, and
f
t t
t
f l d
owners o vas
rae s o an.
·c
.
1 d
d
D
..
f h:
6. Ttie Construction n ustry an
the 'ynamization. o t e
Economy.
C
ofthe
7.8
50,595
3.9
53,694
2.2
econorny through construction. According te a study undertaken by Pedro Catrain, during the final years of Balaguer's
reign:
28.3
252,062
19.6
453,971
18.3
The priority in public investment was centered on the construetion industry, in this sector the Exeeutive direetly
managed one billion ÍDomirrican pesosl in the period, 19661976, which represents
100.0 1,291,455 100.0
2,465,742 100.0
more than 50 percent of the monies
that would be adrninistered during his entire governrnent. Of
this one billion, more than 25 percent was concentrated in the
city of Santo Domingo.é''
SOURCE: Pedro Catrain, "Estado, hegemonía y clases dominantes en la República
Dominicana, 1966·1978" Paper presented at the II Congreso Dominicano de
Sociología, October, 1980, p. 50.
7.
"Offícially, the Dominican peso is at par with the U.S. dallar (RD $l.OO=US $1.00);
however, on the legal parallel money market is presently, in 1982, exchanged at the
Balaguer, together with the development of a new industrial,
commercial, and financial bourgeoisie and a related rise in and
strengthening
of the new militarylbureaucrat
capitalist class,
promoted the development of the middle class, through its
rate of US $1.00=RD
••..
$ 1.50.
.
Public Works and Communication" constitutes only a small sbare of the total
funds expended on public works and construction projects. The vast majority of
these monies carne from the "Presidency" budget lineo
The Rise of the Middle Class.
direet participation
in the Sta te as administrators
and. with
. '.
ample opportunítíes
to ennch
themselves.
The pohcy of
stimulation
of the construction industry was al so an important
factor in the rise of this social class. Hundreds of publie works
eontraets were awarded to young professionals allied to the sec-
5. The Emergence of a New Type of Bourgeoisie
This group was prineipal!y
government
officials
whose
.
rrususe, of State
resourees.
eomposed of generals and high
capital carne from the use or
'..
'I'hia new monied class invested
20
' .
In
29.. ~edro Catrain, "Es:~do, hegemonía y clases dominantes en la. República
Dominicana, 1966·1978. (Paper presented at the II Congreso Dominicano de
Sociología, Santo Domingo, October 1980), p.18.
21
tor in power. Other thousands ofprofessionals secured lucrative
employment in the construction industry, banking, and commerce. A large sector of the contemporary Dominican middle
class was thus developed. It was composed of professionals and
technicians who carne to fill the requirements of the modernization of the national economy, in both the state as well as
the private sector.
ii. Concentration of land ownership by both foreign and
native investors, while small parcels of land were
redistributed; and
iii. The rate of redistribution was so slow that even excluding the purchase of land by large investors and natural
population growth, equitable land tenure patterns in
the Dominican Republic would not be achieved in more
than one hundred years. 31
8. The Manipulation of the Peasantry.
9. Personalism, Paternalism, and Caudillismo
F· Il B l'
.
d l
d
f th T ..11
ma y, a aguer s econormc mo e ma e use o
e rUJ1 o
t l
t
li ! dil li
hi h II
d hi t t k
Iiti
s y e, pa erna 18mhcau 1 19ID,W
le
a
owe
im
o
a
e po 1 1S
.
cal advantage of t e use of tate resourees. In this regard, all of
the works performed by the government during the Balaguer
hibit d th
I
I f th P
id t F
I
years ex 1 1 e
e persona sea o
e resi en. or examp e,
the distribution of bags of food and other gifts to the poor were
Ii d b BId
b
f his i
d· t f ·1 '2
rea ize
y a aguer an mem ers o 18 ImIDe la e arm y.'
.
In the elections of 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, and 1982, Balaguer
. .
demonstrated pol itical strength in the rural areas. There are
ti
II
th
essen la y ree reasons f or t hi18:
..
....
1. H1Spaternalistic/caudillíst¡c
manner, which will be disd 1
.. cu.sse ater;
11.H1Sgood fortune that for the majority of his tenure,
.
agricultur-al
product priees were relatively high on the
world markets; and
iii His manipulation of agrarian reform and land distribution projects.
B. BALAGUER'SPOLITICALPOLICES
Upon assumption of power in January 1966, Balaguer immediately
introduced a policy of disarticulation of the democratic and revoluttonary movements. This poliey was manifested in different forms
and passed through various stages, however, its general charaeteristics are noted:
This last point is especially important and deserves further
discussion. As in the case of most Latin American countries
in the decade of the 1960s the Dominiean Government as a
party to the Charter of Punta del Este and recipient of funds
and goods from the United States Alliance for Progress and
other programs, was obliged to make an attempt at
redistributing land in the countryside. Without presenting
an indepth analysis of land redistribution under the twelve
years of Balaguer's rule we can summarize the basic facets
j
1. Reign of Terror Directed Against the Opposition.
Al h
.
t ough there are no exaet numbers, it has been calculated
that thousands of the members of the Left and of other opposihan parties were murdered, disappeared, were forced into exile,
as"
.
or were jailed and tortured, during Balaguer's
power.33
twelve years in
i. Highly publicized land granting ceremonies, with President Balaguer personally handing over land titIes to
landless
30. An interesting
e
peasants.P?
note
concerning
land titles
presented
under these
land
reform projects is that the title does not give inalienable usufruct rights to the
beneficiary. At any time, through the deciaion of the Director of the Instituto Agrario
Dominicano these titles may be revoked. See Ivonne Troncoso González Proteccion
Social a la' población rural (Santo Domingo: Instituto Dominicano de Seguros
Sociales,
1982).
22
-~-
31. For more information on Dominica~ land ~enure patterns, see Carlos Dore y
1 abra.l, Problemas de la estructura agraria dominicana (Santo Domingo: Taller,
979}, ~nd by the same author Dore y Cabral, Reforma agraria y luchas sociales en la
Republtca Dominicana, 1966·1978
(Santo Domingo: Taller, 1981).
32. The majority of charitable donat.íons made during the Balaguer years were
per~o.nally managed by Joa.quín Balaguer'a sister under the Cruzada de Amor. No
"ecrpíent of goods under thia program-could ever forget the source of this charity,
[et.t» to the extreme where la trines donated to rural populations exhibited in bold
etters the .na~es, Cruzada de Amor and ~oaquín Balaguer.
33. It lS wídely assumed that approximately 2,000 persone loat their Iives duro
---
23
---
._--_.-- ---
--.-
2. Compromising the Opposition.
the burgeoning movent to create a national labor confederation.36
.
Especially during the first years of Balaguer's presidency, there
existed a policy of offering governmental positions to leaders of
th e opposiitiIOn par tiles, Wlith specia
'1 emp hasi
Id'
asrs pace
on trying to
coopt the leaders of the PRD, In addition, Left militants were
enrolled by Balaguer forces into paramilitary organizatíons,
such as La Banda.r: In this way, President Balaguer became
cognizant of the internal structure and leadership of many of
the Leftist organizations as members of La Banda also served
as informan ts, The most populous, caneen trated, and vocal
opposition to Balaguer's regime was present among the students of the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, However,
as Kryzanek notes, even members of this group were eventual1y
neutralized by Balaguer:
4, Absolute Control,
AII of the former cited forms of repression passed through
various stages during Balaguer's governrnents. In his first term
of office, 1966 to 1970, politically motivated crimes and violence
were attributed to so called "uncontrollable forces." President
Balaguer himself declared publicly that he had no control over
these forces and that these crimes were the resul t of the chaotic
situation created during the Revolution of 1965, However, it
was publicly recognized that these "uncontrollable forces" were
composed of soldiers, ex-soldiers,
policemen,
and followers
of
Balaguer's Partido Reformista, and their rage was directed principally against ex-cornbatants of the constitutionalist forces of
It is important to stress that the economic and social
dernands of Dominican society necessitate that many students
play the game and reject radical pcl it.ics. The basie reason for
this ís that the largest employer in the nation is the governmentoThus if you want to work, it is important to have a clean
recordor at least be repentant for your past transgressions.35
the Revolution
of 1965.
.
. In 1970, ~alaguer repression took on a new forrn, the previously mentioned Banda, a gang composed of street thugs and
ex-militants of the Left whose activities were coordinated by
the police, began its reign of terror, This group was responsible
3. Prohibition and/or Persecution of Trade Unions.
for assassinations,
In addition to opposition political parties, the trade unions were
a favori te target of Balagusr. Free and vahd trade unions were
constantly harassed, and their leaders capriciously jailed, while
Balaguer set up aclimate for the creation of "yellow,' or company unlOns to take the place of the more combative labor
of private property. In 1972, internal pressure and an international campaign developed by the PRD, forced Balaguer to
order the dissolution of La Banda and give certain characteristics of "Iegality" to the repression.
With the State in possession of the social control agencies
and the opposition debilitated through jailings, forced exile,
' I e l'irmna
inati IOn o f many o f 1its mem b ers
coop t a tiIOn, an d ph ystca
organizations.
...the government .." has encouraged independent business
concerns to form company unlons' ", Balaguer has .., thus
placed the government squarely behind actions to break
strikes, fire labor organizations, and, whenever possible, crush
J
disappearances,
assaults,
and leaders, repression
became institutionalized
Dominican Republic. La Banda and other elements
lO
opposing
the government;
however,
"
no ene really
and Repressíon; pp. 15-28.
"Díversion,
Subversión
and Repression:
The
it.ics in Balaguer's
Dom inican Republic," Caribbean
1977); 93.
24
_._-
~
in the
of the
unco.n~rollable. forces, were no longer used to control the
oppositíon. During the last years of Balaguer's reign, the
repression had become more centralized and organized in the
hands of the national social control agencies,
ing this twelve year period for
knows the exact number.
34. See Gutierréz,
Rebellíon
35. Michael J. Kryzanek,
Strat.egies of Ant.i-oppoeit.ion Pol
Studiee 17, nos 1·2 (Aprtl - July
and destruction
36. Ibid., fn., p. 96.
25
C. THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS DURING THE
2. The Elections of 1974.
BALAGUER GOVERNMENTS
During
We have briefly deseribed the eleetions of 1966 whieh brought Joaquín Balaguer to power. Now we address the three subsequent eleetions that were eelebrated and "orchestrated"
during the Balaguer.
unify parties of opposing ideologies and politieallines,
with the
objeetive of eonfronting Balaguer in 1974. The first eoalition of
this genre to be formed was called Bloque de la Dignidad
Nacional; National Dignity Block, with the PRD, still headed by
years.
Reformista.
see Juan Bosch, Dictadura con respaldo popular (Santo
Max, 1971L The central theses of this work were developed
late 1960s.
31·32.
26
--_._-
were made to
Juan Bosch, as the primary force, and cooperation from both
parties from the Left and the Right. Nevertheless,
in 1973
internal division within the PRD itself resulted in the resignation of Bosch. The ex-President then founded the Partido de la
Liberación Dominicana (PLD) and initiated a slur campaign
against
his former coalition,
the Bloque de la Dignidad
Nacional; and his former party, the PRD.
At this point, a second attempt was made at a coalition of
diverse parties through the Acuerdo de Santiago, Accord of San.
tiago. Through this agreement, anti-Balaguer
parties from the
Right - Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata (PQD) and the Partido
Revolucionario Social Cristiano, (PRSC); the Center _ Partido
Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD); and the Left _ Movimiento
Popular Dominicano (MPD) united for the purpose of defeating
Balaguer and the Reformistas in 1974.
This Acuerdo de Santiagoproposed Antonio Guzmán as their
presidential
candidate and eonducted an intensive and extensive political campaign
throughout
the coun try, with the
majority of his support coming fr orn the urban areas.
Balaguer's response was simple. He mobilized a11 available
financial resources and placed government agencies at his disposal to insure his re-election. He also used state monies to
finance a multi-million
dollar campaign, placed at his service
the majority of the country's communication
media, and distributed vast quantities of food and domestic articles to members of the most impoverished quarters.
However, the principal instrument
which Balaguer utilized
in the 1974 electoral campaign was "official" violen ce. Members of the Armed Forces and the National Police paraded in
the streets
exhibiting
Balaguerista
syrnbo ls, and they
unleashed a violent reign of terror directed against the PRD
and the other opposition parties. These forces even went so far
as to proclaim that they would only permit Balaguer to govern,
and taunted the Dominican po pula ce with different variations
1. The Elections of 1970.
By 1970 Juan Bosch, the former President on the PRD ticket in
1962, and still the principal leader of the party, had begun to
present various theses with a certain trend towards radicalism."? Although the PRD did not participate in these elections,
Balaguer
took advantage
of the "radical"
nature of these
speeches and publications
by Bosch to present himself to the
electora te as the only guarantee for the maintenance
of "peace"
and the "unity of the Dominican farnily.'
Balaguer, as el candidato de la paz, the peace candidate, eontinued his reign of terror directed against the opposition. He
used the Armed Forces and the National Police, and other
groups such as La Banda to terrorize anti-Balaguer
areas, particularly the slum areas ofthe capital city. The end results were
that the PRD did not participa te in the elections, Balaguer's
Partido Reformista obtained 52.8 percent of the vote, the
remaining parties received a combined 47.2 percent of the vote,
and voter absenteeism
reached 32 percent, or more than
500,000 eligible voters.
The fact that five parties, who traditionally
showed little
popular support, together controlled 47.2 percent of the votes in
the 1970 elections, is especially irnportant.:" Given the non-participation of the PRD in these electios, it can be deduced that a
significant
percentage of the electorate was in effect· casting
their ballots not in favor of these traditionally
weak parties,
but rather a pro test vote against Balaguer and the Partido
37. For example,
Domingo: Publicaciones
and dissemina ted in the
38. See Table, 4, pp.
the period from 1970 to 1974, attempts
--
27
of the cry: Ustedes tienen los votos y nosotros las botas ("You have
the votes lbut l we have the boots").
Faced with this intervention by soldiers and police in the
electoral process and a decree from the Junta Central Electoral
(The Electoral Commission) which allowed voters to cast their
ballots in any location which they chose,"? the Acuerdo de Santiago withdrew from the elections only hours before their
celebration. Forty-four percent of the eligible voters abstained
from the elections, only one party chal!enged Balaguer, and the
President received 84.6 percent ofthe votes cast."?
3. T'he Eleetions of 1978.
In August of 1974 Balaguer began his third consecutive term of
office. However, his popularity had diminished significantIy,
evidenced by the poor voter turnout that year, and the fact that
PRD's call for change echoed in all corners of the country, and the
party found strong support especially in the urban areas, its tradítional area of support. In addition, with the State being the principal employer and source of capital accumulation in the country _
the resuIt of the nationalization of the TrujilIo empire _sectors of
the dominant, middle, and working cIasses out of power were
demanding their opportunity to share in the wealth that the
Balaguer governments had denied them. AIl in all, the time was
right for the PRD. The Dominican people were tired of 12 years of
repression, censorship, unemployment, spiraling inflation (in the
last years), and administra ti ve corruption.
With a political platform that would offer no true structural
change, the PRD proposed Antonio Guzmán as presidential candidate and conducted the campaign based on promises of civil liberties, respect for human life, release of politic al prisoners, and the
his economic "miracle" was beginning to crumble.
During the period 1974 to 1978 four factors negatively
return of those citizens foreed into exile.
In 1978 President BaIaguer again attempted
his re-election,
and utilized the same methods which had proven successful on prior
occasions, but this time they did not produce the same results. His
i. The significant drop in the worId market prices of
Partido Reformista had been corrupted by its long tenure in power
many Dominican exports.
and carried away with notions of its own irnmortality. Its leader,
ii. The astronomical rise in petroleum prices.
Joaquín Balaguer, who up to this point had maintained absolute
iii. Spiralling world and domestic inflation rates, and
control over the party and personal!y directed al! of his election
iv. Extensive and increased corruption in government.
campaigns, now found himself faced with deteriorating visión,
which Iimited his ability to travel al! over the country and assess
In addition to these economic problems the President had to control
his political possibilities. He had to rely on information provided
the rivalries that were developing between the Balaguerista mem~Im by his advisors, who at times told him what they thought he
bers of the Armed Forces and the new State created bourgeOiSie.¡
wanted to hear, and not what was the reality."! Added to this form
With his usual skill, Balaguer managed to control the situaof deceptlOn there ~ere ~lso numerous cases in which monies sent
tion, at least on the surface. However, the growing contradictions in
by Balaguer to the interior of the country for the campaign were
his policies and the discontent of the majority of the population sigdiverted mto the pockets of local Reformista leaders. In sum, now in
nal!ed the imminent fal! of the Balaguer regime.·
his seventles, the elderly and ailing Balaguer had lost both his
Meanwhile the PRD was dedicated to a process of internal
physical and political "vision" and therefore absolute control of the
reorganization revision of its policy of abstention in the last two
pohtlcal situation which he had dominated for years.
national elections and a wide range political education campaign
The results of the elections celebrated on 16 May 1978
. the intsntion
.'
.
.
.
a great polarization in the vote _.The PRD received 51 7
aH wlth
of preparmg
for the elections
of 1978. The'demonstrate
affected Balaguer's policies:
39.
mitting
vote in
40.
This decisíon by the Junta Central Electoralwas interpreted
by ma ny as pero
electoral fraud through ballet box stuffing. Under this system persone could
various polling places, as many times as they wished on the same day.
See Table, 4, pp. 31·32.
28
41. There, are even stories coace rni ng Balaguer giving speeches lo sparse
crowd,s and being told by his, aides that indeed the trees he waa confusing for people
were m fact ~housands of his loyal supporters. In effect. his aides only wanted to
olease, when In fact they were deceiving him.
------
---
29
---~-
percent
of the votes, and the Partido Reformista obtained
cent. In other words, these two political parties
controlled
42.2 per93.9 per-
~
percent.
The election defeat surprised
O
~
the most recalcitrant
Reformista
~
co
"
"
"
""
~
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
~ ~
~
~
~
t-:
~
I
I
I
I
I
~
:;
~
:;
:;;
:;
~
~
~
I
1
I
1
I
Z
Z
Z
o
•
o
,..;
o
.
o
o
.
o
o
.
o
o
.
o
o
••
o
o
o
t;::;
politicized members of the Armed Forces. In the early morning
hours of 17 May, they forcefully burst into the Junta Central Electoral and confiscated the ballots and tabulation
sheets in an
attempt at a coup d'état. A massive wave ofprotest quickly surfaced
from the Dominican populace. The group of conspirators
found
neither support among the most reactionary
Right sectors of the
coun try, nor from the majori ty of the mili tary, nor from the Carter
g
r;J
~
~
•.•
~
o:
~
~
~
~
O
00
~
o.::::
r..
mento Backed by these two sources, world opinion forced Balaguer
to respect the legitima te and lawful choice ofthe Dominican people,
~
~~
~
*
o
~ .,
~ g;
00
c4
in volved in
".
~
this coup attempt, he did not condemn it. In effect, he justified it
~
~
and used the situation to his own poli tic al advantage. The opportunity was there for Balaguer to claim that the elections were rid-
~
~ ~
~
dled with fraud and corruption, evidenced by the seizure of the Junta Central Electoral, Thus the Partido Reformista began its lengthy
~
~
*:*
argument to the JCE, claiming that the en tire electoral process was
nothing more than a gigantic fraud orchestrated
by the PRD. The
Reformista charge is especially weak when it is noted that the PRD
,
han been out of power for more than fif'teen
years and therefore had
no control over the basic structures of the electoral system. In spite
of this fact, the Reformistas continued with their charges. Pressured
by the Dominican military and United Sta tes mediation, the PRD
had to accept the provisions of the negotiated settlement that conditioned their assumption to power.
In July 1978, the JCE emitted what was called El Fallo
Histórico (The Historical Decísion), through which the Partido
Reformista was awarded four seats in the Sena te and one in the
Chamber of Representatives,
formerly won by the PRD. With this
resolution, although Balaguer lost the Presidency, the Reformistas
numerically outnumbered the PRD and dominated the Sena te, in
addition they also controlled the Judicial branch. This left the PRD
00
'"
30
ci:;
~
15
in Washington.
was directly
g
<D.,
~
The PRD victory was supported internationally
by the Internacional Socialista, to which thr PRD is affiliated, and the U.S. govern-
as clearly expressed in the voting booths.
While there is no proof that Balaguer
~
~
~
8
sector, producing an unauthorized reaction on the part of the most
administration
~
e
cent of the vote, while the remaining ten parties only obtained 6.1
io
io
~
~.-l
~
z
g
~
ec
el
o
o
00
t-
~~ ~_
m
~_
~
~
O
~
~
;:,
•
g3
g3
g3 ~
CI
CI
CI
CI
c:3
C"l
o
0:0
'<f<
o
ec
,.....¡
o
io
.....i
o o
ec
'"
.,
o
o..,.
;1;_
~_~_
0:0
lf'J
z
~_
o
~
g3
~
~_
co
0:0
~_
co
rl
,....;
Q
:;:
o
o
g¡ _
'5 O '5 o.. ~
~.§:;:.§ ~·3
Z
&i
~
Po::
~
t--
¡ ~~ ~ ?J
¡e
:e~
.
ID
'S
g,
g ,~~
c8 ~ g ~ ~
>c
~
~
~
~ .~
~ ():~
.g 'S
.g ,~
c.-.'"
~
t
'-28
'-2-~
Il..
~
~
~
~m
6,
§
O ~.2
~
O Z
:§ g
:3
31
;!!
.a ~ ~ g ~
:3 ~
~;'~
~
,
,ª ~15.3
'C>CZ::'2
s-. o
~O
~
Q
o,
:3
g.
~
:g
~ ""
~
.§
.g.5
.g~
,~
b:o,~ ~
~·s J:
~
~:C
~,t i '~ i ,~:-e o:
~ ~ ~"~
~
,....;
•...
'ª
~
¡
I
~
ec
00
o
o
o
o
M......
l.l':l
o
o......
d
o
~
(!)
1:1:g
so
~
6
l.l':l
~
00
~
¡;;
:;;
""
g:
o
o
~
~
~
",'
I
00
.,;
00
~
:':
..<
~
~
~
~
o
o
..,.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
~
o
o
o
o
~
i
~
.
~
.
.
I
:i
j
.
~
I
z
i ~, i i
I
~
~
00
25
6
:
ce
~
:
:¡f
~
i' ~
'"
~..,.
o~
oo'
~
;:c
:6
;r;
VIII. THE PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO/
GUZMAN GOVERNMENT
<-'
Ü
d
.
:¿
with the Presidency, Vice Presidency, and control of the Chamber of
Representatives, but with seriously limited powers.f?
""1'
~
ó
d
.
i
.
~
6
d
z
.
j
~
Ü
<.O
:
d
o~
oo'
C!
o
~
o
~
o
.
~
o
C!'~
o
_
:;¡
~
~
W
..,.' i
.
.
.
.
.
~
~
~
~
~
. 4l
i
i
j
~
Ü
!Z,
S
.::
,
o
~
:~ 'g
e~
¡x:
~
~
tlLl~
,
.....0
Q.l •.:..
.¡..;>.,;.
'o
~
~
eo
~
~l-'J
c::
c::Z
'~,
-e
.8 ~
0::E
~
] ~O
~ ~ -(
~
.~ Cl P::
~
g.o z
~ .~ ~
.8
Z
«j
¡:;o
°O'~
]
'ü ,~
s....8 t)
~
s::
es El
Z ::E G'3 ~
'Cl:l,
Cl)t)Cl3
·
..•
o.¡..;>
o~
.5 8'2
~
::E
Q
,
:"E ~
'
t e
~
J! uz
·•••
~
° ::E
U~
~ ~
.8
8
:;;
'e p.¡
g~
:§
~ '1
Q.lZ
1'""1
-~
§:~ ¡;
Os
Cl:l
Q)-
:S p.¡ ~
~ ~ ~
.5 -s .5 ,5 ~ o.
~ ~ ~ 'c t: d:
~
::E
~
32
Q)
~
t
~
.~
§
Cl
,g
e
Cl
t),'
Cfl -(
~~
.s b
<
§
8
o
o
Gp.¡
~ g
t es
.s
Q
o
e
~ ~
~
~ ::E ~
.8 .;
~
-
~
Cl
·3 ~. s... .s; 'g en
c::
c:: «j
Q»
,u
....•
= .... o~ ~c::
o· ...•~~
Q)
:::
.~
>
¡:; «j
Q.lC::
·..•
0
.'
~
Ü
.5·~
~
>
~
~ '2 ~
z;:J
In the history of the Dominican Republic, the presiden tial elections
have been won in the majority of cases by men who were great
caudillistic personalities. In 1978, just as in 1962, the elections
were won by a polítical institutíon, the Partido Revolucionario
Dominicano. However, from the day of his inauguration, President
Guzmán began to disassociate himself from the party which
brought him to power. The broad based popular support received by
the PRD and the dynamic leadership of its Secretary General, José
Francisco Peña Gómez, whose participation in the Revolution of
1965 and supposed radical ideology, inspired distrust of the PRD
within the most int1uential sectors of Dominican society. Apparently, one of the conditions made by the members of the politically
powerful sectors through El Fallo Historico was tha t Antonio Guzmán separate himself and his Presidency from the PRD.
This separation by the President from his party represents an
important factor in his own consolidation oí power and the subsequent relations between the Presidency and the PRD. The propaganda campaign against Peña Gómez, launched by conservative
sectors and supported in sorne degree by Guzmán, becarne so
threatening to the party, that Peña Gómez went so far as to publicly
state that he was willing to leave the country so that no one could
destabilize the government and the party.
One of the most important traits of this 1978 - 1982 period is
the dichotomy in the roles for the PRD which were both,
eimultaneoualy, the government and the opposition party. Antonio
G'
.
uzman
b and hIS followers were the government and rnost of the
m~m ers of the party were the opposition. Dominican democracy is
still very weak and among its principal weaknesses is precisely the
.
.
42 .. ~ee sectíon of this study "Dominican Electoral Laws" for a discussion of the
COmpOSltIon
and responsibilities of the three branches of the Dominican govern-
ment.
33
fact that personalities are often more important than institution
For
.
s.
. thís reaso n, Iit iIS not very remar k a bl e to see t h e President
of the
R epu bliIC a Iilena t e hiimse If from his
. party and that any member of
.
3. Attempt
at
Dynamization
S
di
pen tng.
of the Economy through Excessive
his family could have more power than the principalleader of the
party, the Secretary General.
Relations between the Antonio Guzmán government and the
PRD reached such a critical stage on sorne occasions that it wa
feared that the two would split. The party's Secretary General,
Peña Gómez, often delivered scathing discourses in which he co :
demmed various actions and measures taken by the Guzmái
government. On one occasíon he even aecused the President's,
economic team of being in opposition to the party and the party's
pIa tf orm, th e type of remark that was rare in Dominican politics up
to this point, as former presidents maintained strict control over
their parties and members.
While Guzmán was alienating himself more and more from the
PRD, he was becoming much closer to sorne of the important power
sectors of Dominican society. Under these conditions, he turned to
representatives of the dominant classes from Santiago, the second
largest city, and the Armed Forces. Guzmán's estrangement from
his party and its leadership would be present throughout
the tenure of his government and would condition his actions in the
political and econornic realms. We will now consider various aspects
of the Guzmán government.
At the very beginning, Guzmán's administration suffered from
a lack of confidence among the capitalist class because of the
rumored left leaning tendencies of his government. Later during his tenure in office the same class showed the same lack of
confidence, not beca use Guzmán had proven to be a leftist, but
because his administration had demonstrated that it was inept
in the economic sphere. To further aggravate the situation,
prime interest rates in the United Sta tes reached unprecedented heights during Guzmán's term and there was a clear
indication of the flight of Dorninican pesos converted into U.S.
dollars and invested in North American money markets.
A. GUZMAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES
5. Growing Defieit in the Balance of Payments.
1. The Lack of an Economi.c Policy.
It can be said that the principal characteristic of the Guzmán
government in the economic area was precisely the absence of a
coherent economic policy. The government was characterized
by improvization in economic policy decisions; reactions to
existing problems, rather than planned actions taken to avoid
future problems.
.
.
2. The Increase m the Foreign Debt.
In 1977, the foreign debt was one billion and eighty-four million
pesos. In 1982, it was calculated to be one billion, five hundred
and ninety-one míllíon.s"
43. See ,Banco Central de la República Dominicana,
(Santo Domingo: Banco Central, 1982), p. 133.
34
Boletin
_
de mayo del 1982
Guzmán's government overextended government funds simply
by spending more monies than were allocated in the national
budget. An example ofthis is presented in the fact that between
1980 and 1981 there was a 54.9 percent increase in the number
of civil servants in the Gobierno Central, Junta Central Electoral; Congreso, and Cámara de Cuentas, this in crease in personnel coupled with increases in salaries and employee benefits
resulted in a 159.0 percent increase in government costs.v'
4 L k fe
't lIt
t
. ac o api a nves men .
Due primarily to low world market prices for traditional
Dominican exports _ sugar, gold, coffee, cocoa _and the maintainance of high prices for imports, especially petroleum, the
Dominican Republic incurred deficits of 184.2 million pesos in
1978, 186.0 million in 1979, and 463.9 million in the balance of
payments for 1980.45
.
6. Increase m Domesti.c Inflation:
With the establishment of the legal minimum wage of RD
$125.00 as base, Ceara Hatton has calculated that for the urban
<
44 Qu't . Ced - "E
.•
d
'.
1 erro
eno, n el penado 1978·1982 el
emocracla, ahora quién pagará la dei periódo 1982·
agosto de 1982, p. 5
~5. Secretaria de Estado de Finanzas, Boletin
Domtngo: Secretaría de Estado de Finanzas, octubre
~
35
•
Gobierno pago la factura de la
1986?" El Nuevo Diario 30 de
'
Estadístico,
Il, No. 8 {Santo
_ diciembre de 1981), p. 169.
based worker who received RD $125.00 per month in 1978 and
whose salary had been effectively frozen at that level until
1982, his wage is now worth only RD $83.39 in purchasing
power.:"
TABLE 5
EXPENSES
INCURRED BY THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
FOR THE PERIOD 1979-1981
7. Priority on Agricultural Production with Little Land Dístríbution.
D1VISION
1979
1980'
19813
The Guzmán government, recognizing that the country is primarily agraria n and possibly attempting to secure votes for the
1982 elections from the peasant sector traditionally
allied with
B a Iaguer an d t h e P'arti 'd o R e¡;ormista;
.. mcrease d t h e na tiiona I
b d t Ii
f
. It
h
.
ffi
47 B
1981
u ge
me or agricu ure eac
year m o Ice.
y
agriculture
was allocated RD $173,278,000 or 15.8 percent of
the government
budget. However, there is a glaring contradiction in this policy as the Guzmán government continued the
nation's snail pace in the redistribution
of land. Although during this period 1978·1982 the Instituto Agrario Dominicano
redistributed
37,958 hectares of land to 9,871 families, like
Balaguer administrations
the Guzmán government
was not
even beginning to meet the needs of the landless peasan ts4R
Again, as in the period 1966·1978,
the last fOUT year rate of
redistribution
will not realize its supposed goal of equitable
Ian d d·18t rtib U tiIOn In
. th e D ormrncan
..
R epu bl ile f or ano th er 100
Finance
Presidency
Armed Forces
Education
. 1
Agncu ture
Interior & Police
Public Health
AH Other Divisons &
Branches
258,465
187,977
108,904
107,232
96843
,
60,099
83,604
237,376
146,151
99,353
114,795
154045
,
65,045
98,076
162,166
162,527
116,151
131,238
173278
,
71,252
98,571
115,740
150,691
182,949
1,018,884
1,065,532
1,098,132
years. In general,
the basic structures
of land tenure
TOTALS
'
SOURCES,
1. Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Ejecución Presupuestaria,
Domingo: Oficina Nacional de Planificación, 1979).
2.
3. ¡bid,
Ibid, 1980.
1981.
1979 (Santo
have be en
left intacto
9. Continuation of Privileges for the Dominant Classes.
8. The Continuation of Adm.inistrative Corruption.
Guzmán found himself unable to significan tly limi t the privileges enjoyed by the dominant classes simply beca use they
wield so much power in the Dominican Republic. Even when
attempts were made to ass laws which would redistribute
the
Dominican wealth evenPSlightly, such as a project proposed to
tax property these bilis were defeated in the Reformista controlIed Congross.
'.
.
Government
con:uptlOn. endemic under Balaguer
c~ntmued
under the Guzman admí nistrat ion, the same state or iginated
bou:geoisie cla~s continued to enrich itself at the expense of t~e
nation. The difference
between the Balaguer
and Guzman
periods lies only in the fact that many of the actors had
changed. Many of those allied with Balaguer found themselves
out of work under Guzmán, however as a social class we are
speaking of the same social configuration.
~6. bMigduel19CSe2araH att 0 n,
"La congelación de salarios, "El Nuevo Dl:a60, 2 de
6 1 2
septíem re e
,pp.,.
47. SeeTable 5, p. 37.
48. Arismendy Calderón, "En veinte años el IAD logra captar más de tres milliones de tareas," El Nuevo Diario, 28 de abril de 1982, p. 5.
36
10. Natural Disasters and Loss of Liuestoch.
.
'I'he ent.ira economic situation
was further
aggravated
by
natural disasters and livestock diseases. In the autumn of 1979
large areas of the country were destroyed by Hurricanes David
and Frederick, and an epidemic of Afriean Swine Fever resulted
in th
t t l Ii
.
f h
'.
dI'
.
e o a e írmna tion o t e porcme In ustry resu hng In
multi-million dollar agriculturallosses.
37
5. Relations Between the Administration and the Armed Forces.
B. GUZMAN'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POLICIES
,
The Guzmán government had its major successes in the political
sphe:-e, aithough sorne notabl~ contradictions are, presento The basic
political and social charactenstlcs
of the Guzman government are
Guzmán displayed his political savvy by maintaining
excel!ent
relations with the Armed Forces and the National Police. During his term of office he was successful in replacing most of the
deeply entrenched high level Balagueristas
from both organiza-
hsted here:
tions, replacing
1. Establishment of aClimate of Relative Civil Liberties and Pro-
them with "apolitical"
tion of these two groups was essential
PRD government.
leaders.
This manipula-
for the survival
of the
tection of Human Rights.
A nomo
t
. G uzman
'k
. pledge, al though he had to
ept hiIS campaign
be pressured
to do so, and relea sed al! political prisoners,
repatriated
the exiles, eased censorship, and, to a certain
degree, respected the right of the Left to existo
6 . Separation of the Powers of State.
2. Repression. of the Trade Unions.
With few exceptions in Dominican history, the Presidency has
been the control!er of the legislative and judicial branches, to
the point where these government powers act as rubber stamps
for the former. It was not necessarily because Antonio Guzmán
wanted it this way, but during the 1978-1982 period we see
While the government was making al!owances for extended
human rights, at the same time it continued
the age-old
Dominican
practice of harassing
trade unions, jailing its
leaders in the event of strikes, and maintaining the climate for
the existen ce of "yellow" or company, unions.
presidential vetos of legislators' proposals, legisla ti ve vetos of
presidential
proposals, and judicial decisions which did not
always go the way the President wished.
'.
..
.
.
7. Adhenng to United States Policy m International Affaire.
3. The Government as a Clique.
In terms of presidential
appointments,
the Guzmán government is best described by the words - nepotism, and the "good
old boy systern.' Ability was not considered as important in
nominating
persons to top level posts, as was kinship and
friendship.
The administration
was filled with in-Iaws,
cousins, and oId friends.
4. Conflict with the Party and its Membership.
T o b e consiid ere d f or me
. IUSlOn
.
. t h e a d minístratíon
..
.
In
ane did
1 not
only have to be PRD member, but also a member of Guzmán's
tendencia. within the party.49 Conflicts within the party were
manifested by contradictions
between the President's
policy
decisions on domes tic and in terna tion al affa irs, and the party
C. THE PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO:
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
platform.
We previously discussed the rift between the Guzmán administrat~on and the PRD, however, there is another aspect to this separation that is to be found in the Dominican Republic's newly born type
of democracy and the basic cohtradictions with which the PRD now
faced. In the first place Dominican democracy necessitates
the
eventual
t f'
Iiti Id bt Th PRD
h 1978
repayrnen O many po 1 ica
e s.
e
won t e
49. The work tendencia literally translates from the Spanish as tendency.
Howev~r in contemporary Dominican polit.ícs. tendencia refers to the following that
a
The Guzmán government demonstrated an international
policy
closely allied to United States interests. Examples include the
State's recognition of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship
in
Chile, and backing the United States in the case of El Salvador,
in direct opposition to the PRD's declared support of the Franco-Mexican cal! for recognition of the FMLN - the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional: This last case is ofparticular importance as it was in direct contrast with the policy of
the Internacional Socialista to which the PRD is allied, and that
of one of its principal leaders, French President Francois Mitterand .
candidan, maintains
Blanco tendencia, etc.
wi thi n his party; that
38
is
the Guzmán
tendencia,
the Jorge
39
elections through the support of various divergent and conflicting
interest groups, We have, in this study, repeatedly used such labels
as, the "bourgeoísíe," "the professional class," "urban-basad
workers," to mention a few. At this point it must be emphasized
that for a variety of political and economic reasons each of these
social groups consists of members who may have different
preferences and therefore support different political parties. In the
case of the PRD victory in 1978, support carne primarily from seco
tors of the bourgeoisie not allied to Balaguer, sectors of the growing
middle and professional classes, especially from Santo Domingo,
alienated from Balaguer's politics, many urban-based workers and
the unemployed, in addition to many sugar industry workers from
the eastern regian ofthe island, and to a lesser extent, workers from
other agro-industries.
Virtually each and every voter who cast his ballot in 1978 for
the PRD expected to receive sorne sort of direct benefit that is to
say, employment in government, or indirect - economic and political
advantage for his group in general - when Antonio Guzmán and the
PRD assumed power on 16 August 1978. Even with the most basic
.
soci t y, 1it Wl
·11be
compre h ensron
of a ThiIrd WorId economy an d socie
'.
'.
immediataly recogmzed that concessions made to large landowners
nega tirveIy a ffrec t l.andiess peasan t s, and by th e same t oken, coni th e s h or t run, re duce
SIidera tilOns ma de t o wor k ers, Wl·11,a t Ieas t In
profits for industrialists; thus the lists of the repayment of political
d bt b
t
bl
ti
e s ecame mos pro ema ic,
Th e PRD faun d it
. th e u ne nvra. bl e pOSlitiIOn o f bemg
.
1 se lf t o b e In
. debt t o d·lame tri
m
rrca IIy opposed groups. It h a d condemne d th e
. treatment given
.
prefereritial
to the monied classes at the expense of
the poor during Balaguer"s terms in power, however the PRD
directly owed something to at least sorne sectors of this former
social group. At the same time, the PRD was indebted to members
of th e I a tt er group, an d both groups were deman diing paymen t .
To further complie te
tter the PRD owed indireet debts.
a ma
s,
Debts to the most eeonomically and politically powerful sectors of
Dominican
society,
the monied classes
in general,
and the Armed
Forces and the National Police. These debts were not direct in the
sense that the PRD was reimbursing those sectors for their support
'. the elections. They were however indirect
.
.
.
m
debts, for without
at
'.
least a promise of non -agression the PRD would never ha ve
. d iIn offiIce for th e en tiire t erm.
assume d power nor r'ernarne
To pay all these direet and indireet debts the opposition, which
was now the government,
had to make certain compromises
40
--
in t he
application of their political ideology. To be precise, the dominant
classes suffered little under Guzmán and the impoverished and
political1y and economically marginal social groups, such as
workers and peasants, received little.
At the point in time that the PRD and the Guzmán administrat'ion were attempting to repay debts, they found themselves to be
experiencing a collective identity crisis. Since 1939 when the party
was founded in exile, through the seventeen years since its arrival
in fhe country, the PRD had always been in the opposition, always
in conflict with the policies of the existing government. Now, the
PRD was the government and had to make and follow through with
difficult and often unpopular political decisions. What developed
was a certain split within the party, described in previous sections
of this study, between the government and opposition contingents
of the same party.
1. Salvador Jorge Blanco as the Opposition.
, ,
.
.
In this climate, and with Guzman s campaign prormse and
reiteration
ofthat. promise
tenure as
ofnot
.
S I dduring
J his BI
b president
t
.
seeking
re-election
a
va
or
orge
anco
egan
o
acqurre
.
I
.
'H
h di
h
id ti I
. t.
nationa prommence.
e a .. ost t e presi
en la nomma IOn
.
.
on the PRD ticket to Antomo Guzman m 1978,
. , . and settled
. for
the position of Senator from the National, District. Imrnediataly
upon the commeneement of the Guzman government, Jorge
BI
d hi
S
. iti
hi bid f th
anco use". lS exposure as enator to
e
. mi late lS
. .1 or
1982t presidential
The basic character iatics of the
Se
' t t . elections., II
- na or
---s s ra egles are aa ro aws:
.
1.
He develo~ed a wide ranging campaign of opposition to
the Guzman government. This strategy of ~Imost constant disagreement
.
. with the government s decisions
ereated two situations - it allowed Jorge Blanco to
. t .
d
f h
rnain am a recor clean o t e errors and transgresslons. of the
go~e~nment,
and
it gen.erated
much
enemIty and hostility between the President and the
1·'· SIenhator·1
S
he
d
d
.
I
. dn lS rotie as tenator h.iehíntro uce va rrou
d b s Gaws of. a
y
uzman .
Femocra lC na ure w ic were oppose
or. example,
.
. he .proposed the immediate release of all
polítrcal prisoners, the return of the exiles, and the
í
legal recognltion of the Lbeftist pa~ties. AH of which
were campaign promises
y Guzman, that the Preai-
41
---
dent tried to forget and/or impede upon his assurnption of power. 50
iii. He created a political and technical team who
designed a far-reaching and effective organizational
and propaganda strategy.
iv. He designed and orchestrated a methodical project to
develop a power base within the PRD, which would be
capable at the party convention to confront the high
and middle level structures controlled by the Guzmán
tendencia.
In his last year in office Guzman's government found itself in
shambles. It had lost its initial dynamism and evidenced a complete
inability to come to terms with the country's gravest problems. Coro
ruption had reached the highest levels of the government, with
news of multi-rnillion dollar scandals almost commonplace in the
newspapers. The economy of the coun try was virtually paralyzed.
The Dominican peso experienced a real, although undeclared,
devaluation of 50 percent with respect to the U.S. dollar. The
government was unable to pay foreign debts and employee salaries.
These factors, coupled with Jorge Blanco's effective pre-convention and convention strategies brought him the party's presiden ti al nominatíon. With the loss of the candidacy by Jacobo
Majluta Azar, the Vice President of the Republic and the Guzmán
government's
candidate, Antonio Guzmán and his followers
reduced their hopes ofmaintaining political influence after leaving
office. The end result was government inaction and an extraordinary rise in administrative corruption.
o
~
1::
o
o.
§"
~
~
o
~
s
rs
~
00
§
~
•>
';;
~
o.
§
"O
•
N
'2
~
o
.9
~
:;:•
)
,, 8
e
)
,
.
¡¡¡
.,~
,s
¡;f
p.,
•
:;
~
o
•e
M
;;
o.
E
~'"""
j
s:: .9
o ,
.- o
~Q
> o
eo •'
50. Shortly befare tbe 1978 ná tional electíons the Balaguer government recogniaed the Partido Comunista Dominicano, and this group was permitted to partidpate in the elect.ions. However, this party was the only one from the Left that was
officially recognized befare Guzmán's landmark decree.
~~
M0.'"
~'o
~ »
eM·
•
-í: 1::
" "8
el
42
¿-;
0--
~"'i::
•,--•
-",
o.~
0.-o.
O
•
••
-5.<:
~~
O~
-~
-~
-·.•
O
0'<:
~ '"
~:5
O •
O",
0.0
.
"'".
.'"
.<:
~
N
O
>
S<
·.-.
.",
•
O
"
,"
'.~"0's-,
U
"
--"
-"",
---·"
••
ñ
]
~
~
O
~
~
~
t
l..
S
8 8
o.
U
.
"; '"O
~
O
";
Ul
"
S 1;;
-~~
:::: o
oo-
.
-,;:
'".5 .;:::~
.o
-- .........•
O
~ o ,
Ql
E
>..g
_
•e Q
o
t'Il
El ~
"'.<: "
;:<;:! ~
'"O~~
oc ....
'"- •:t oe-,
~.~
~
»• -
"'.<: o
"
~
~...t;l~
~
• o.~
" • o
PHOTO 2
While Balaguer, limited by his advanced age and loss of vision, managed most of his
campaign from bis heme; the Jorge Blanco campaign reeched even the smallest villages in the country (Photo court.esy of El Nuevo Diario)
~ 600':
-;~::::
'"e JO
•
Q,~
'- ;:l .-<n '"O
._
C' JO
-e
• ~ o
o o •
",-u
i;
"'o
"'~
0>0
e
•
~"
"'~
e .
;¡;
~
",e
e- ~
·
~
]
O>
•
~"
~
~
••
~ .m
"
u
.·".
e~
so
;g,"
~
~
'o
.o~
m~
"O
.c
"O• o
~
> o
~
.S .5
]
~ m
~
" m~
o
.
.s
.~
e .-
:: .:-
E
•
H
1:: e
•
:5
.~
~
-c
~
¡¡,
.11
:a~
o •
0.0
~~
. .3:-S
w.~~
10
O
E-o
~]
~ Q:I
""o
O
:r: •
C.
~c.
-e •
~
~
~"
.-~-a
~
.
•
l·
".
~
•>
:;;:
•
~
•
-e
;¡;
s"
••
1
•
O
"-,
e
:
o
"
~i;;
O o
-'~
~-a
C.
o
••
e >
.-s".
0-",
• o
"¡:
Q:I
o~
O e
e':
'o Q)........;
·.
.•...•
(,)
e
00
Q:I .••.•
,
~ b·~
.oeO
.......•o
-''''o
CI:lo
~
•...•'-;<~
.~
~¡:::-
•••
.~
..... _ o
>
o.3~
"'.~
"t!~~
ll.
• .....•
o .•...,
~ ~
g ;:$"
~'
~
'"@
8
t E
~ ...•e
~
.~
.~ §
i::'"
··
• •"
~
.
~"t:I:
E-< .5
o~
..,
~
.<:• e
E
~
g
-
0.0.
~
u
~'"
eo "•
•
~
¡;¡
~
o
•~ g•
-; .8.
"• 8""
a~
•
,.8:.:;-
s-,
~
,
o
tia;
•
té
o
E e
6
E~
_lo
g
~ ••...
o
o
•
E-<
t;
o
r::
«l.S
::r: ~"';;
p..
u
2o
;;
~
",.
, g
."'~.
.~
-.
0'-
"'-o"~•,
~
..:
u _
"
o
E"
ci
r..:
E
o c3
E-<
•
o ~
::r::
.~
o. E
..e"
•
'"~•
~
8
:;
._ o
2
r::~.!:
~
.~
'"·.-"
•"'..:•
-.
~
",~
• ,J
8
"•
:;
"'~
É'"O
"
g¡,
:;
5;.,
.~~
c;~
.¡¡E
.
.- .
·
O""
"
0.,
~
.5 .c;
~~
o •
'O
s
.a "
e.D
~-g
.: ~
e
~
U
;;
"O
o
~
•o'
'"
,S
"O
•
ª
~
e
~
""8
§
Q
o
e
~
¡¡¡
.
'~
o
• ec
o
== .::
~
-s
"
0_
"00
as";::
> ~
<3
--
~~
- e
~~
~q
00
.
~-
0'-
••
tl.";:!
0
-e ~
>
~
"a; Z
"OQ
o..~
,-e o"
.'
~.
~ÑI
o o
~t,
~~o:
ClI
t) ¡
~'"
-u
~.;
~Ul
"O
'~
~
"",U
o..
S"
.;::~
~s
e o
-.o
oc.
E
o
~
'~
'_
u
E ~
Qo",
-"':S"'".
'5
~
'_ o
o eo
:S
• l-.
o
o.
,,••
~
¡t
~ e
o o
0.,,,,
° ~
0_
,-
~ e
E ~
~.
'"·
'~
- o.
"~
~'"
1:':2
"~-c e
d;~
.. g
;:;;:¡
_
- ..
N
o
~"
,-
N
~
;:;:"
o a
.Q"
oa
u "
~
..,0.
.
'- ..
~g
.'-.
o."
~ o
~
"
'~
o
~Q
ª'~
~.§
o o
~Eg
o "
'- o
"'.
-;:¡
~~
- o
'o~
O"
ád:
~~
-a
~'~
'¿P:
.~
"'~
.8",
Ul_
,.:
~
p.
oi
00
~
'"
•
·a
-e
O
.;;
•
'E-"
~
~
~
-e
ec
.~~
O
¡:¡
~
~
«
=-o
"'.E
-
~
¡;
::;
>~
]
'"«
'"
:I:
E-
-o
1!
.~
O
o.
zo
1i
;t
'"]
~
8
«
.;¡•
..,t:
e:u
z
~
<l
z•
~
!l
~
§
."~
o;
'O
¡
~
~
PARTTWO
THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE: 1982
PART TWO
THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE: 1982
: efore an analysis of the 1982 political campaigns and national
Ilections
is undertaken,
a brief discussion
of the general
r:
'aemographic, economic, and social characteristcs
of the presen t day
WJominican populace is necessary. Through this analysis the reader
rill have a better picture of the country's social and economic
and the needs of the average Dominican citizen.
1. DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA
[he total population of the Dominican Republic in 1981 was calcu¡ated by the Oficina Nacional de Estadística to be 5,647,977, with
percent of the population classified as urban and the remaining
f8.1 percent rural.s! Two important tendencies are noted in the
{ilopulation data from the Dominican Republic in this cen tur-y:
11.9
1. The extremely rapid growth rate due to in-migration of Br-itish West Indian residents during the first decades of the century, Haitian in-migration throughout the century, and one of
the highest natural growth rates in the world.P
2. A drama tic shift for the majority of the population from
rural to urban residence.53 In addition and of particular importance for the national elections of 1982, is the fact that 2,805,-
51. See Table 6
52
. According to the World Bank, the rate of population growth for the period
·1975 wae 3.0. See Wor-IdBank, Latín American and the Caribbean Regional
'(ice, Dominican Republic: Its Main Economic Problems (Washington
De· The
orld Bank, 1978), "Country Data," p.!.'
...
53. See Table 6.
970
________
AS
--
h
were 18 years of age or
ulation
445,
49.7
percent eligible
of t e pop
older, orand
therefore
to vo t e. 54 '
TABLE 7
MAJOR EXPORTS FOR DOMINICA N REPUBLIC
PRODUCT
T ABLE 6
POPULATION ESTIMATES:
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1920-1981
PERCENTA GES
ZONES
YEAR
TOTAL
URBAN
RURAL
URBAN
RURAL
5
148894
745,771
16.6
8~'6
1920
1935
1950
1 :~~'~~7
2'135'872
3'013'525
26Ú65
508408
91Ú81
1,212,852
1,627,564
2,095,544
18.~
23.
30.5
~6:2
695
60:3
1960
4'009'458
5:647:977
1,593,299
2,935,860
2,416,159
2,712,117
39.~
51.
48.1
i;~~
G
'tez Protección
'Corural (Santo
iled
.. SOCUl. I a la población
SOURCE:Ivonne
rodeSer
L mpr
.
1 tit to'I'roncoso
Dominicano
de egurosSociales '. 1982),AnexoNum.
1 d Estadística
Santo
Dommgo:.
ns 1census
u.
N~c.lOna
~
ld e E stadística,
from various
pu blications of the Oficina
1 Oficina
Naciona
P
D
ommgo,
bl . ,
v: oíenda
198 1(eS'an t o Domingo: Oficina Nacional
·
República Dominicana.
Se,e,.
for exam
VI Censo Nacional de Po acion y ~
de Estadística, 1982), p. L
REPUBLIC
ECONOMY OF THE DOMINICAN
.
t a classic Third World country
The Dominican Republic repr~se:n~ exports. Its exports come from
in terms . ofItits pr
incipal
imporsecct or s , while its principal imports are
I and
mmmg
the agrrcu ura
d
producing substances.
manufactured
goods an. energyp t
e items whose prices are subThe prirnary Domiriican ex :: world markets. For example, the
ject to violent fl uct.uat.ions o~ t 1981 was down more than 40 pervalue of Dominican exp,orts .or I
th Dominican government
198055 This situa tion paces
e
h
in
cent
..
in theover
unenviable
market
posi TIOn o f being
.
prices rather
VALUE IN MILLIONS <RD$)
Sugar (Raw)
290.2
Gold
Ferronickel
Coffee
227.3
101.3
51.8
Cocoa
Tobacco
51.1
34.8
Silver
Bauxite
33.0
18.5
III. EMPLOYMENT, UNDEREMPLOYMENT
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Almost 90 percent ofthe economically
is engaged in either the agricultural
than planmng
,.
sector
e
57. José del Castillo, Ensayos de sociologia dominicana
19811, p. 88.
t'
the
that a 19.3 percent unemployment
rate was present m the capItal
city of Santo Domingo.58 César García has estimated unemployment
in the rural areas to be as high as 45 percent,59 and the World Bank
56.p.World
Bank, Lcuin America and the Caribbean
Data",
1.
54. Oficina Nacional de Estadística,
E dí tica 1982), p. 1. See Section The
1981 <Santo Domingo: Oficina Nacional de .;ta
I of voter eligibility entena.
D
for further
clan
.
" L'is t tn- Diario , 9 de
o minican
. delea
281 millones.
55. JoséElectoral
Romero,Laws"
"Exportación
descien
enIOn
agosto de 1982, pp. 1, 12.
is not, however,
only problem, the real problem is the lack of employment
opportunities throughout
the entire economy. Estimates
of the levels of
unemployment
a nd underemployment
vary substantially.
Nevertheless, a study undertaken jointly by the Oficina Nacional de
Estadística and the Oficina Nacional de Planificación in
. 1979 noted
.
forced
to growth.
react to c anges
conomic
"n y .Viuienda
VI Censo Nacional de P o bl actO
"
",,,
active Dominican population
or service sectors with the
. . 10 percent in the industrial
.
remaining
sector.56 Of this
10 percent
the
maJorlty " are scattered throughout ".
the country m small facto.
h
rres. An estImated
• 47
of the
ave
" percent
••
. . industr íal enterprfsssb
57 and an addi tionnj 29 percent have
less than 6 employees
etween
6 to 25 employees,"
The lack of jobs in the industrial
n. THE
IN 1989
Regional
Office, "Country
(Santo Domingo: Taller,
58. Julio Montolío, "Disminuye el desempleo, los servicios y el comercio Son los
mayores
12.
empleadores, revela estudio del 79,"
. El Nuevo Diario, 5 de junio de 1982, p.
59. César García, "Evaluación de la industria azucarera dominicana". Paper
presented at the Seminario Nacional. Industria azucarera y el desarrollo nacional,
San Pedro de Macorís, República Dominicana, 21 . 23 de noviembre de 1980, p. 18.
47
I
t·
estim6aOted
undetr6~mp oymen
near
percen.·
ISTRIBUTION
th
m
rural
are as for the 1970s to be
e
AND LEVELS OF INCOME
IV - D
Th e D ormrncan
..
Republic is characterized
by gross inequities d hin Id
land
hi
di
tr
ibution
with
the
top
10
pereent
of
the
lan
o
ers
owrrer'a rp 18,
.
61
h
.tI,
11
·
627
pereent
of
the
land
and
meome.
In
t
e
capi
contro mg
.
..
f Ia ,
o ess
S an t o Domingo ,.853 pereent of the workers receive mcomes
k
in the
than RD $200 per month, and 92 pereent of the wor ers I
e tire urban population of the nation receive les s than RD $200
n
thl
hile only 06 percent
of the economieally
n:tíonon receive
y,w mcomes
I
o·f RD $500 or more.
literates, and those who have received sorne formal education, are
scant . and often. conflicting and confusing. However,
and basically
.
as a simple guide, we note that the World Bank clairned a 51 percent
rate for the year 1972.62 In addition, the following
table, originally published by the Oficina Nacional de Estadistica,
notes that in 1970, 31.5
.. pereent of the en tire population 5 years old
or more, had not receivsd a. formal educatíon,
and 75.7 percent of
'"
the eountry s rural population falls wi thiri this category.
adult literacy
TABLE 9
active popula-
POPULATION FIVE YEARS OR MORE
WITHOUT FORMAL
19709 EDUCATION
ENTIRE
COUNTRY
TABLE 8
AVERAGE MONTHLY IN COMES OF ALL URBAN
WORKERS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
IN COME
LEVEL
RD$
RD$
RD$
RD$
% OF WORKING POPULATION
0.00
50.00
100.00
200.00
RD$ 500.00
'
- 49.99
- 99.99
- 199.99
- 499.99
~:.~
.
21.9
~.~
or more·
"..
Total Population
5 years or more
%
3,330,112
URBAN
%
RURAL
%
1,345,784
40.4
1,984,328
59.6
Population 5
years or more
without formal
edueation
1,047,687 31.5
254,476
24.3
793,210 75.7
SOURCE: Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia, Oficina Nacional de Planificación, Indicadores sociales (Santo Domingo: Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia,
1981), p. 65. Cited in Ivonne Troncoso González, Protección social a la población rural
(Santo Domingo: Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales, 1982), p. 82.
TABLE 10
1 desempleo: Los servicios y el comercio son
SOURCE,Julio IModntoho,Dl:mm~~: del '79" El Nueuo Diario, 5 de junio de 1982,
los
mayores emp ea ores, reve a es
p.12.
,
AVERAGE LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION FOR THE
POPULATION FIVE YEARS OR MORE
Total Population
V EDUCATION
AND LITERACY
.
.
I
I f
ulaSorne knowledge of the edueational
and Iiteracy eve ~ to~O~liti_
ti
is essential to an appreciatton of the mtelleetualle
e
P .
IOn
.
D t
ning the pereentage of the Domiriican
cal camparg'ns.
a a conc~r 1
e truly functional
population classified as hterate, those who ar
60. World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, "Country
Data," p. iii.
61. Ibid., "Country Data," p. 1.
d
3.4 Years of Education
4.6 Years of Education
2.3 Years of Education
Urban Population
Rural Population
_....
._
SOURCE,s.c:etana de Estado de EducaclOny Bella~ Artes y Organización de los
Estados Amencanos, Estudio y análísie de la educación de adultas en la Republica
Dominicana (Santo Domingo, n.d.). Cited in Ivonne Troncoso González, Protección
social a la población rural (Santo Domingo: Instituto
Sociales, 1982), p. 83.
62. Ibid.
O
Dominicano de Seguros
VI. ELECTORAL
LAWS OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
\ccording to the present law, the elections for national and
nunicipallevel offices are to be organized, directed, and under the
.ontrol of the Junta Central Electoral (JCE). This organism, comoosed of a president, two members and ancillary staff, is
autonomous and its decisions may not be appealed. In each
nunicipality and the Distrito Nacional there is a branch of the Junta
Central Electoral which has local jurisdiction and is directly depen:lent on the head office of the JCE in Santo Domingo.
Voting in the Dominican Republic is direct, that is to say, without the introduction of a parliament, and all Dominicans of 18 years
of age or older, with the exception of the Armed Forces, the Police
and convicts, have the right to vote. Since the mid 1970s, an effort
has been made to minimize election fraud through the use of voter
registration. Before the application of this system one needed only
to present his cedula, or personal identification card, at any voting
center in the country. In many cases, what occurred was that sorne
Domi.irucan
.
government organization are quite similar, although
~~t I~enhcal In terms of responsibilities and relationships between
th e U ree branches, to the three branches of the same categories in
e nited States.
people were voting numerous times at various polling stations.
Now, ane may on1y vote at the station where one is registered, and
the index finger is dipped into a semi-permanent ink to identify
that that person has voted, and he is thus prohibited from casting
another ballot the same day. Due to the high level of illiteracy
extant in the country, color coded ballots are utilized. Each party
throughout the campaign repeats the name of their color which has
its own distinct hue.
Elections are celebrated every four years through which the
President and Vice President of the Republic, Senators, Representatives, Mayors, Councilmen, and the replacements for the latter
two positions,
in the event of their resignations,
are chosen. The
offices of President, Vice President, Senator and Mayor are won by
simple majority, while those of Representative and Councilman are
awarded according to the votes obtained by each party in a specific
locality. Presently there are 27 Senators, one for each province and
the Distrito Nacional, and 120 Representatives, whose distribution
is determined in accord with the number of inhabitants in each province and the Distrito Nacional.
The Dominican government is comprised of three branches the Executive branch, composed of the President, Vice President
and all of their administrative dependencies; the Legislative
branch, consisting of the Chamber of Senators and the Chamber of
Representatives; and the Judicial branch. These facets of the
."
.,
PARTTHREE
THE ELECTIONS OF 1982
PARTTHREE
THE ELECTIONS OF 1982
By the end of the PRD national convention of November 1981, at
which Salvador Jorge Blanco won the presiden ti al candidacy with
Manuel Fernández Marmol as his Vice Presidential
running mate,
the eventual results of the elections were obvious to al! political
observers and those citizens cognizant of the national
reality.
Throughout 1981, the propaganda or promotion tea m structured by
Jorge Blanco had functioned with such efficiency that it managed
to convert the figure of a Senator into a symbol which combined the
two principal qualities
for which the Dominican
people were
searching - abili ty and morali ty.
1. THE PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO!
JORGE BLANCO CAMPAIGN
The rise of Jorge Blanco was so impressive that none of his competitors, in the party or outside, could deny it. This rapid ascent to
national prominence was based on two points:
1. A campaign which mobilized the majority of the party membership and brought about a significant change in the party convention balloting procedure.P
63, The nomination system for the PRD presidential candidate was modified for
this convention. Previously, party committeea would elect a delega te befare the convention, who usually waa the Secretar-y General of that committee. This person personally voted for the pre-candidate of his choice a t the convention. Th¡s system lent
itself to influence buying and corruption ("the purchase of delega tes"), Under the
new system, each committee meets behind closed doors wi th each committee member voting for the pre-candidate of his choice. The results of this ballot is then
signed by a committee representative and sent to the convention in a sealed
envelope where it is opened in front of the party's electoral comrnisaion. In this manner, the delegate Is only the bearer of the decisions of the members of the committee.
2. An extremely well managed multimillion dollar pro,:,otion
ign which exploited all the communication media and
reached 11
t ofthe country.f"
reac e a par s
Meanwhile Jorge Blanco proposed the formation of a group external
to the PRD that would aid his candidacy. This association, called
the Avanzada Electoral (Electoral Advance) played an important
role in Jorge Blanco's triumph. Through this organization the car;didate solicited the support of thousands of non PRD members primarily from the professional sector and the middle class, rmxing
elements from the Right and the Left. The Avanzada Electoral was
such a success that it was perceived as a threat to the party by
many members of the PRD. Jorge Blanco was accused of constructing the power base for the creation of a new political party m the
event that the Senator lost the party's nomination at the PRD
national convention. What the Avanzada
Electoral actually
accomplished was two-fold. It helped to achieve for the Senator and
the PRD the presidency, and it swelled the ranks of the party, as
many members of the Avanzada Electoral la ter registerd as members of the PRD.
With the support of the PRD, the Avanzada Electoral and a
dynamic promotion team, Jorge Blanco toured the entíre country
promoting his program, Concentración Nacional (NatlOnal Concentration). The basic points of this program were:
h d
.
.
1. A plan of economic austerity throug re uctions m government spending and restrictions placed on many imports.
2. Stimulation of exports.
3. The creation of employment through housing construction.
4. An end to administrative corruption.
Wh'l
bilit morality energy and youth of the PRD candidate
e a I I the
y, propaganda
'.
h
alted
carnpaign of the party and te.
were ex
,
I
e
th
64. Sa Iva dor J orge BIanco 's nam e can only be described as an ad man's. dream.
"Salvador" means savior in Spanish, and the Domin.i~an~eople w.ere loo~m.g.far a
"Savior" in the Dominican elections of 1982. In addition, in Spanish an 1ndlVld~al
uses both the family names of his father and mother, i~that arder, ~owe;er, d~m,g
the campaign the Jorge Blanco publicity team emphasieed the candidate s mot er s
last name Blanco
'
(Wh't
1 e.IN ot on
onlv
y 18
i th e,PRDpartycolorwhite
but that color connotes pur-ity and honesty.
.'
.
The exact amount of money spent on the Jorge Blanco ~ampalgn and :he orrgm
h f d
tk
h
'nsidesourceshaveclatmedthattheflgurewas
oft
un s are and
no substantial
nown, owever,1
.
.
in thee millions
contributions were obte ined
from powerful sectors In
the country. '
,,"-
Avanzada Electoral ernphasized the advar;ced age and physical
limitations of its prmcipal opponent, Joaqum Balaguer. Above all,
owing to the complete failure of the Guzmán administration in the
.
h
th
.
. d th f
d . . t
econormc sp ere, e carnpaign recogrnze
e ormer a rmrns fation's accomplishments in the area of civil liberties and human
rights and stated that what the country needed was a continuation
of these liberties, but with an emphasis on cleaning up the government, and stimulating the country's economy.
At the same time, the repression, assassinations, forced exiles,
tortures, and jailings that were commonplace under the Balaguer
regime were repeatedly cited during the campaign. This strategy
proved to be so effective that Balaguer was forced to call a public
news conference to defend himself and his administration against
these accusations. Interestingly enough, in this session Balaguer
never clearly denied the accusations, but instead attempted to
make a case against the denial of civilliberties under the Guzmán
administration.
Salvador Jorge Blanco was projected as a symbol ofmorality, in
a country tired of administrative corruption and scandals. In an
economy which was experiencing inflation, a real devaluation of its
currency, unemployment, and actual starvation among a large percentage of its population . Jorge Blanco's supposed ability in the
economic sphere inspired enthusiastic support and hope. In this
way, the PRD candidate received the confidence of powerful and
influential sectors of the country such as certain members of the
dominant classes. He also received support from liberal s, democrats,
sorne leftists, and the working class in general.
n. THE
ROLE OF THE PARTIDO REFORMISTA
".
.
. .
'..
The Partido Reformista; the principal
opposition force . m this period
..
faced the elections of 1982 debili tated by numerous mternal probo
lems. The principal problem was the physical limitations of its
leader, Joaquín Balaguer. The ex-President now 75 years old, and
his 1088 of vis. ion so severe
that he is virtually blind and cannot. get
C.
around by hirnself. ognlz~nt of these ,facts: many people beheved
that Balaguer would decline the president ial candidacy
and surrender it to another member of the Reformista party or from the
.
.
his íd
.
dommant classes. allíed to lSl eology.However,thesespeculahons
.
proved to be ummportant
when two factors were considered:
'B a 1aguer srmp
.
ly was not wil. li
1. J oaqum
ling to aban d on hi18
t f
h
.d
ques or t e pr'eat ency.
""
2. The Reformista party and the sector of the bourgeoisie
which supported that party did not have another leader with
the charisma and ability to attract the necessary popular support to win the elections.
It must be noted that the Partido Reformista is a caudi!!istic
run polítical organization which is centered around its leader,
Balaguer. Party committees do not meet regularly, make few policy
decisions and never contradict the leader. Balaguer is then the
guide and driving force behind the party even at the very lowest
levels of party organization. The control which Balaguer exercises
over his party is so absolute that its membership is more
Balaguerista than Reformista.
Once the presidential candidacy was decided, an intense struggle developed around the vice presidential nomination. Traditionally, the slot of Vice President in the Dominican Republic is not a
very attractive position. It is generally a post with little economic or
polítical cIout, and under Balaguer it was even less important than
under Guzmán. However, the vice presiden ti al candidate for the
Partido Reformista in 1982 was of enormous interest to party mernbers.
In the event of Balaguer's triumph in the 1982 elections, considering his advanced age and poor health, the probability seemed
high that the Vice President would eventually become the Presi..
Repu blíle eonst.itu
. tion
., s provrsion
.. for
den t·,glven th e Dormmcan
succession. The struggle for this candidacy then became rather
heated and even vicious at times, to the extent that Balaguer began
to lose control over his party. This was cIearly evidenced by the fact
that the vice presidential nomination was won in a landslide victory
by Fernando Alvarez Bogaert in spite of the fact that Balaguer had
,
.
.
..
demonstrated on numerous occasions,
and through varrous
indications that he did not favor this candidacy.s!
The principal factors working against the Reformista ticket in
the 1982 elections are here listed:
.
.
,.
.
1. Discredit produced bythe party s long tenure ~n.offlce:1966·
1978, its repressive policies and widespread adminiatra tive corruption while m power.
65. Balaguer even went to the extreme of resigning from the party's presidential candidacy for two days, in an attempt to force the party to reconsider its select.ionof Alvarez. This manoeuver preved fruitless, and Balaguer was forced to present
himself to the electora te along wíth Alvarez Bogaert as his running mate. In the
..
summer of 1982 Balaguer then expelled Alvarez from the Partido
Reformista:
,
~
2. Alíenation, in the last four years, from the economic and
social control power structures of the country which had been
decisive in previous Reformista victories.
3. Virtual inactivity of party structure during its four years as
the opposition.
4. The physical limitations of Balaguer.
5. Internal conf1ict among the party's principalleaders.
6. Poor scheduling of the party's convention and the launching
of the election campaign. The convention was celebrated only
three weeks before the elections and the party went to the polls
sti!! racked by internal dissent. On the other hand, the PRD
allowed itself six months to recuperate from internal division
and was already actively campaigning six months before the 16
Mayelection.
.
.
In. spite of a~l these negattve factors working against the Reforml~t~party, íts cam.paign of ~enouncements of Guzmán's economic
policies and nostalgic memones of the days of economic well-being,
Balaguer and his party only gained second place in the elections.
However, the party's second consecutive defeat has served to create
a new stage which demands a complete restructuring
and
reorganization of the party. Thro,:gh its dis.astrous convention, the
control of the party by Balaguer is now bemg questioned, and the
struggle for power wi thin the party has been brought to public
hght.
111.THE ROLE OF THE PARTIDO DE LA
LIBERACION DOMINICANAIN THE 1982 ELECTIONS
Th thi d ooliti 1f
f maior !
e Ir po itíca orce o major ímportancs in the campaign and
the election was
..
(PLDl
'. the Partido de la Liberaciori Do m~nzcana,
whose leader lS the ex-Prasident Juan Bosch. As previously mentionedvBosch was.one of the founders of the Partido Revolueionario
Dominicano m exile. On his return to the country in 1961, Bosch
took on the task of reorganizing the party. During this period, he
was the principalleader of the PRD and won the presidential elections on that party's ticket in 1962. After his overthrow by the military in 1963, Bosch went into exile, to return after the Revolution of
1965. He was the PRD presidential candidate in 1966, he lost the
elections, and again went into exile and returned in the early
1970s.66 For a variety of reasons,
including conflicts with fellow
h
66 'I'hi t d
'B
h
1
h
b . . 15 en eney In ose to eave t e country every tiime th ere was t rou bl e
as een mterpreted by many of the voters as a sign of cowardice. The PRD and the
59
party members over strategies and political ideology, Bosch
divorced himself from the PRD m 1973. Th? same year the ex-Presid t f nded the Partido de la Liberacián Dominicana with the
en ou.
following of a small group of middle class youth, rnany of whom
were ex-members of the PRD.
AII three ofthese characteristics define the party as one ofthe most
militant in Dominican polities, and the last two traits were
.
d
'.
mterprete by many observers and a large portion of the population
as indicating that the PLD was a more potent force in 1982, than it
really was,
Juan Bosch and his party maintained, and still maintain: an
undefined position in national politics. While part of the Right
accuse the party ofbeing leftist, a part of the Left accuse the PLD of
being rightist. This confusion arises from the fact that Bosch has
never clearly defined his position in matters such as the soc,~1class
of his party, private property, land tenure, and other questions of
importan ce to the Dominican electorate. Sorne observers have
interestingly considered the PLD as the party of the new
Dominican middle class which represents the contradictions and
indefinition of this social class.
In the national elections of 1978, Bosch and his party received
only 18,375 votes, or 1.1 percent ofthe total ballots cast.s? Realizing
that the party needed to be reorganized, the PLD during the Guzmán/PRD government considerably augmented its following among
students, principally at the Universidad Autónoma de Santo
Domingo, young professionals, and sorne of the sugar cane workers
from the eastern region of the country.
From 1978 to 1982 the PLD conducted a constant campaign of
denouncements, taking advantage of the slightest error or mistake
made by the Guzmán government, backing virtually all protest
movements, and proposing solutions to the country's problems, but
without any concrete platform. In sum, this party constituted the
most persistent and effective vocal opposition to the PRD governmento
..
The PLD of 1982 can best be described by three basic charaeteristics:
1. Strict, non-questioning obedience by party members to its
I d
ea ero
2. A leader, Juan Bosch, who exhibits strong caudillistic traits.
3. Great discipline, dedication, and a reputation, among PLD
members, for following through on responsibilities.
Months before the elections a group of leftist organizations _
Partido Socialista, Nucleo Comunista de los Trabajadores, Partido de
los Trabajadores Dominicanos. attempted to arrive at an accord
with Bosch and the PLD, with the intention of running together in
the elections. However, this proposed coalition never materialized,
as Bosch declared that he would accept the support of the other parties only under the condition that no concessions be made by the
PLD and that the elective posts eventually won by the coalition not
be distributed among the parties.
At roughly the same time, the PLD was having rather friendly
relations with Balaguer and his Partido Reformista, considered by
the Dominican Left to be its principal enemy because of the persecution unleashed against these parties during Balaguer's governments. Bosch justified his amiable relations with Balaguer by stating: "1 am not as crazy as to fight on two fronts."68 However, this
apparent, although informal, coalition between the PLD and the
Reformistas was taken advantage of by the PRD, who emphasized
the tie between the two old caudillos.
The PLD campaign was based on denouncements
of
administrative inefficiencies and corruption in the Guzmán government, without ever presenting its own party platform. It can be said
that the PLD campaign was characterized by negativism and
denouncements, rather then positivism and constructive plans for
the improvement of the Dominican Republic. Regardless of this, or
maybe because of this, during the 1982 election campaign the PLD
achieved such an apparent increase in support that a month before
the election, its leaders began to predict their party's victory. Few
people in the country believed that, but the PRD was afraid that the
PLD could displace the Reformistas as the second party, or between
h
.
h
Id b
l"
t e two partíes t e vote wou
e sp it m such a manner that one of
them, and probably the Reformistas, could win the elections. A more
probable scenario, presented by sorne PRD leaders, was the
possibility of both parties receiving enough votes for legislative
Avanzada Electoral took substantial advantage of this opinión in the election campaign of 1982.
67. See Table 4, pp. 30·31.
68. Cornment made by Bosch on numerous occasions during the campaign.
60
6L
seats that they together would block proposed legislation by the
future PRD President.
The PRn and the Avanzada Electoral; faced with Boseh's
apparent sky-rocketing
rise in popular support, developed during
the last month of the carnpaign such an effective counter offensive
that Bosch was put on the defensive and his support weakened considerably. The PRD Secretary-General,
Peña Górnez, delivered a
series of discourses by radio which exposed in detail the contradictions in Bosch's polities, statements, and actions over the last twen.
ty years. Meanwhíle,
Jorge Blanco ,s A uanza d a Ele e t ora 1 b eg a ~ a
beaten by over zealous polieemen for selling legally recognized
newspapers or for distributing
leaflets on street corners.s? Even
given these Iirn ita tions to the right of the Left to legally exist in the
country, the Left was able to establish non·clandestine
headquarters and meetmg places, and participa te in national politics without
serious problems.
In general, the Left enjoyed conditions during the Iast four
years s.o that they could orgamze and present their program to the
Dominican people. However, for three major reasons WhICh we now
cite, the Left has not adequately taken advantage
of these new
found freedoms:
propaganda campaign through television and newspaper advert isements listing sorne ofthe unpopular measures thatBosch h~d ta~en
during his short term of office m 1963. Along with these sms of
Bosch it was emphasized that he had a tendency to leave the country whenever there was trouble, and this was clearly evidenced by
1. A tremendous fragmentation
which still exists
Left '. There are more than a dozen organizations
argumg among themselves on the matter of which
authentic representative
ofthe interests and ideal s
ing class and the peasantry.
his many periods in exile, and in addition, Bosch had pubhcly torn
his election ballot in half during the 1978 elections, c1aiming that
he did not believe in elections.
The counter offensive of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
and the Avanzada Electoral pro ved to be very effective. A week
2. A lack of policy or platform which truly represents
the
interests of these politically and economically marginal groups
at this time in Dominican history, and the lack of a real
ideological and physical incorporation
of members of these
groups.
before the 16 May eleetions the PLD showed signs of losing
popularity, and the opinion polls taken at this time confirmed this
fact. Although the PLD in 1982 multiplied the number ofvotes that
it received in 1978 by almost ten-fold, the final tally showed that
the party trailed far behind the second place Partido Reformista.
3. The inability of a portion of the Left to function under relative liberty. Accustomed to the experience
of persecutions,
many leftist organizations
and their leaders had based their
existen ce on accusations,
maintaining
a certain ideological
indignan ce. In the last four years the Left has found it neces-
IV, THE LEFT AND THE 1982 ELECTIONS
A1though in quantitative.
. d a very sma 11 pe:terms the Left recerve
within the
and parties
party is the
of the work-
sary to openly participa te in public debate, present concrete
programs, and not just simply decry government policies. Many
members of the Left have found this transition
anywhere from
difficult to impossible.
centage of the total vote, its participation
in the elections of Hffi2 lS
very significant. These elections represent the first time that the
Dominican electora te had been offered a v~ry different option. For
this reason its participation
deserves special atterrtion here.
The parties and organizations
of the Left were officially recognized in 1978 shortly after Guzmán entered
office. Although
through this recognition and legalization of their status, they were
Many attempts have been made to unify the Left, or at least present
a united front on sorne issues. In the last two elections in 1978 and
1982, certain advances ha ve been made towards unity, however,
these coalitions are temporary and many organizations
refused to
participate in the election coalitions.
no longer subjected to assassinations
69. The "communist" phobiaamong the Dominican National Police and Milita~y is ~til.lrampant. Th¡s situation- is further aggravated by a propaganda campargn sti ll in effect among the Natíonel Police which is repreeented by signs in each
police stat¡
. di
ffi
tha t: Mili
El.
...
.
. lOn
remm mg o lcers
ato
l itor:
(" Soldier:
Communism
is your principal
enemy"). comUfHsmo es su entmrgo principal;
and detent ion of their leaders
as was the case under Balaguer, during the period 1978~1982 these
did
te J'oy absolute Iiber ty either Public demonstrations
gr
oups 1 no . n
.
. .. ly,. dispersed, an d in
. many cases
were often officially
or extraofficial
militants
of the Left were stil! being eapriciously
arrested and
,,?
63
Months before the 1982 elections, various coalitions were
attempted. The one with three parties from the Left and Bosch's
PLD never materialized, as was ear lier discussed. Nevertheless, two
coalitions were formed and they participated in the elections. The
first was that of the Bloque Socialista (Socialist Block), composed of
the Partido Comunista Dominicano (PCD), the Partido Socialista
Popular (PSP), and the Movimiento por el Socialismo (MPS). The
second coalition, the Izquierda Unida (United Left), was comprised
of the Union Patriotica Anti-Imperialista (UPA), the Partido
Socialista (PS), the Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos (PTD),
and the Nucleo Comunista de los Trabajadores (NCT).
Other Leftist parties, including the Partido Comunista de la
República Dominicana (PACOREDO), the Movimiento Popular
Dominicano (MPD), and the Partido Comunista del Trabajo (PCT)
did not participate in the coalitions nor in the elections. The first
two parties claimed that they were still organizing their power
base, while the last group stated that elections are a farce.
The campaigns of the participating leftist parties were not
especially notable, other than by the simple fact that they participated. The inclusion of the Left presented a completely new element
to these elections, and made them the most democratic in
Dominican history. This was the first time that the Dominican election slate was composed of parties of all ideological positions, from
the extreme Right, to the Center, to the extreme Left.
In spite of the predictions made by members of the Left and
some political observers, that the Left would receive a susbstantial
percentage of the vote and therefore obtain some congressional and
municipal representation, few voters cast ballots for either of these
coalitions. The self-imposed and structurallimitations
that the Left
encountered, and its own inexperience in the electoral process
proved to be decisive in the voting. For the Left to be successful in
future elections it must first resolve its own internal conf1icts, and
second, gain the confidence of the workers, peasants and other
marginal sectors of the population that it aspires to represento
V. VIOLEN CE IN THE ELECTIONS
When we consider
we
. the
., elections of 1966, 1970, 1974
. .and 1978,
d
note among their principal features the use of official an extra..
.
ff.. I . I
official violence to guarantee the results. In 1982, o icia VlO ence
was reduced almost to a minimum. In general, the police as an
64
.
~nstitution .did not disrupt political gatherings, stage their own
;monstratI~ns,
nor were the crrmes against the Left organized.
ow.ever, vIOlen~e. was still present in the 1982 elections
mamf~sted by individual policemen acting with a certain degree of
,:"pumty, and by, and between, militants of the major political parties, the PRD, PR, and the PLD. The violence was not organized, but
spontaneous.
d
Although there are no government statistics concerning the
eaths a~d mjurres incurred during the three month official campal~ period, March toMay 1982, lamentably, approximately thirty
,~d,v,duals lost their lives during this periodo The scenario for this
violence was usually spontaneous, emotional fist fights, and rock
thro~Ing sesstons, and even isolated pistol duels between principalIy mlilt~~ts of the PRD and the PR, which arose when their respectlV':'política¡ campaign caravans crossed paths."? The other type of
'~Cldent whích unfortunately occurred frequently was violent reactions, usually ~onslstIng of rock throwing, on the part of residents
of the slum neighborhoods of the capital and other principal cities
against the Reformista caravans. This violence was apparently a
:eactiOn agal~st the 12 years of political repression excercised durmg Balaguer s reign, and principally directed against Leftists and
residents of the urban slum areas.
Lamentably, as was earlier mentioned, approximately thirty
persons lost their Iives and hundreds were injured through vi I t
acts assoc~ated with the political campaigns. However, sirnply
because thís violence was not organized, this demonstrated a great
change m the natíon.
70. The campaigns in the Dominican R
bli
methods of reaching the voters caravans of :l~~ le lneble one of their ~rincipal
non
tor-i d hi
'
imagma e types of motoriaed
d
the ~~~a~~~ewi:~
~~!:sÚThfc~~jor party mi~itants ~f a specific distrtct comme~~e
with banners of the pa~ \ e 1p t~~ks equipped with loudspeakers and festooned
areassolicitingotherstOJ'~i
.o~~.
eYdtrawv~I
~hrough both the urban and rural
b
nm
e para e. ithin a short time th
~composed of thousands of indíviduals chanting the
f h . ese c~rava.ns may
dídate or party Very ft
l'
name o t eirpresidentialcanperso ns who Wl:11vote oforen,
a
arge
percentage
of
the
participants
are not the same
that partic 1
"along for the ride." Regardl
th u arb~~rty~rather individual s who are simply
the impression that they are all f ese ~o 1 ízations of thousands of índíviduals give
erven supporters of that particular party.
65
VI. RUMOURSOF A COUP
VII. THE RESULTSOF THE 1982 ELECTIONS
In April 1982, the Washington based syndicated columnist, Jack
Anderson, reported that certain elements in the Dominican Armed
Forces led by General Manuel Lachapelle were preparing for a coup
d'état in the event of Jorge Blanco's víctory." According to Anderson, two Dominican residents in the United Sta tes, Morris Rubin
[sic] a psychiatrist and César Ballester, a Dominican born retired
United Sta tes Army major, were visi ting the halls of the United
Sta tes Capitol and the Pentagon attempting to convince legislators
and United States military leaders that the PRD candidate was in
reality a communist. In addition, according to Anderson, these two
lobbyists had secured "1,200 M.16 automatic rifles, two cargo
On 21 May 1982, the Junta Central Electoral (JCE) released their
final decision on results of the national elections of 16 May. The
official data of the JCE is cited in Table 11. As can be observed the
PRD triumphed with 46.76 percent of the vote, the Partido R~for.
mista placed second with 36.60 percent, followed by the PLD with
9.69 percent. The other ten parties together received the remaining
6.95 percent of the vote. These ten parties represent, in general
terros, the extreme Right and Left of Dominican politics. The Right
. the PNVC, PAC, PQD, MIDA, PAN, and UCN obtained a little
more than 4 percent of the votes cast, while the Left . the UPA, BS,
PCD, and MPS received less than 2 percent of the total.
helicopters, three A·37 Bravo attack jets, one PTF ·23 patrol boat,
and spare parts" for General Lachapelle.I''
As history shows, the Dominican Armed Forces did not inter.
h
vene in the elections celebrated
on 16 May, nor in the inauguration
.
,
of Jorge Blanco as President on 16 August 1982, However, t e ques. .'as to the veracJty
.'
tion remains
of Anderson s.' charges. We do not
.
have any inside information which
could verify Anderson s story,
and of course the story. was demed
by,.General Lachapelle.
h
' What
d we
h
can offer the reader IS a bt-ief descnptJOn of t e scenano an t e
.'
.
actors.
In present day Washington, under the Reagan admirristration,
.'
there is without doubt, a pervasive communist phobia
through
"
. " every rock m the Caribwhich "communists"
are being found under
bean and Latm America. In the Dominícan Repubhc the red scare
tactic has been used repeatedly and usually successfully by the
Right to discredit centrist candidates.P To add to this, various elements of the Right, especially in the Armed Forces and the
National Police, really believe their own propaganda.
Regardless of Anderson's claims, Salvador Jorge Blanco has
given his vote of confidence to General Lachapelle by naming him
Sub-Secretary of State of the Armed Forces. This appointment
apparently demonstrates the invalidity of the Anderson story.
71. This was a syndicated column published in most majar United Sta tes
dailies. For example, Jack Anderson, "Coupin the Dominican Republic?" The Miami
Herald, (Intemat.ional Edition) 20 April 1982, p. !lA.
..
Intere~tmg observations can be deduced from the information
presented m Table 11, for example:
1. The PRD a n d th e PR both r-eceive
' d a smaller share of the
m
pas
e
ec
ions.
e
res
u Its of the 1982 election
vote than .
t I ti
Th
demonstrat e a grea tI y reduce d bilpOIarrza
' tíon
, of votes compared s
partíes
to the last t WQ eIec tiions, Wl ith th e pr incipal
..
. togethe
obtaining 8336
r
' percen t of th e vot e,74
In
2. The t remendous, amos
I
t t en- foId,lncrease
.
. votes for the
r-,
UL
~ eracwn
Partido
d e 1a Lib
"D om~n~cana
..
(PLD) as compared t
1978,
o
eeism, as m
high
3' Voter ab sen teel
. 1978 remamed
'
. in 1982 with
staymg
away from
26,1 perce n t of th e regls
' t ere d voters
'
.
' the
polls.
TABLE 11
FINAL RESULTSOF THE 1 8
9 2 ELECTIONS
Registered
2601684
Votes Cast
1'922'367
Rate of Absenteeims
'26.1%
PARTIES
Partido Revol ci
.
mcano
VOTES
.
.
U lOnano Dorni-
839,092
- PRD
72. Ibid.
73. It has been noted throughout this study that all progreseive or liberal politi-
cal candidates at one time or another in the laat twenty years bave been Iabelled as
"communists-" Consider Juan Bosch, Antonio Guzmán, and now Salvador Jorge
74. See Tablea 4 and L'l.
Blanco.
~~
67
%
o
OF TOTAL
46.76
TABLE 11 (Cont.)
PARTIES
VOTES
Partido Reformista - PR
656,672
Partido de la Liberación
Dominicana - PLD
%
OF TOTAL
36.60
173,896
9.69
Partido Quisqueyano Demócrata - PQD
33,991
1.89
Partido Nacional de Veteranos Civiles - PNVC
28,066
1.56
Partido Comunista DominicanoPCD
11,180
0.62
.,
., .
..
..
Unión Patriótíca Anti-impertalístaUPA
.
.
,
Alianza Social DemocrataASD
. .
. .
Movimiento por el SocialismoMPS
9,035
0.50
8,879
0.49
7315
.
0.41
Unión Cívica Nacional -UCN
7,035
0.39
Movimiento de Integración
Demócrata - MIDA
7,034
0.39
Bloque Socialista - BS
5,906
0.33
Partido de Acción Nacional - PAN
3,676
0.20
Partido Acción Constitucional - PAC
2,567
0.14
SOURCE: El Nuevo Diario, 21 de mayo de 1982, p. 24. Final Election Results
released by the Junta Central Electoral were published in all dailies in the
Dominican Republ¡c.
Three other questions of major political importance arise from the
election results of 1982 which were not represented earlier:
1. First, ohce again the PRD won the elections fundamentálly
with the support of the urban based electora te, while the Reformistas maintained their major support in the rural areas. Of
the fifteen principal municipalities, where 62 percent of the
eligible voters reside, the PRD won thirteen.75 In these cí ties,
where the major industrial and agro-industrial activities are
centered, the PRD represents a major force among the workers,
and in the capital of Santo Domingo. It is precisely in the capital
where the PRD has traditionally obtained its greatest advantage over the opposition, while on the three occasions when the
PRD defeated the PR, in 1962, 1978 and 1982, the former party
lost the rural areas to the Reformistas. This suggests two important considerations:
i. If the PRD were to maintain its support in the urban
sector, and the PR its support from the rural sector,
based on the information provided in Table 6 concerning
the relative growth of the urban population over the
rural, the PRD will have an even greater advantage
over the PR in the years to come.
ii. Obviously Antonio Guzmán's priority in government
investment in agriculture was not effective enough to
t B l'
t
h
coun er a aguer s suppor among t e peasantry.
2. The second observation which can be made from the election
results centers around the surprising resilience of Balaguer
and the Reformistas. Four years out of power, losing his previous economic and military control over Dominican politics; in
addition, aged and almost completely blind; with only three
weeks before the elections, his party in shambles from internal
conflicts; and after an intense propaganda campaign directed
against the party by the PRD, Balaguer and the PR were still
able to obtain more than one-third of the votes casto While
many in the country had predicted that Balaguer was finished
in politics and would not obtain half a million votes, Balaguer,
the Reformistas, and allied parties - PNVC, MIDA, PA:!-!_
received almost 700,000
votes, almost 40 percent of the total,
.
75. See Map, No. 1.
~
Y
and trailed the front runner PRD by less than 10 percent of the
vote. Balaguer's power is still strong among the dominant
.
t
f th
iddl
I
th
t
eIasses, cer t am sec ors o
e IDI
e e ass,
e peasan ry,
women, older citizens, and among those sectors which have
been traditionally
conservative
and socio-economically
marginal. Obviously, his paternalistic policies are still appreciated, evidenced by remarks from many of the poor who claim
that the PRD has not resolved the conuntry's problems, nor distributed funditosl''
3. Thirdly, not only did the PRD win the presidential and vicepresidential posts in the 1982 elections, they also won control of
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The composition of
the first legislative body between 1982 and 1986 is twentyseven PRD members and ten PR members for a total of 37,
while the Chamber of Deputies consists of sixty-two PRD representatives, with fifty from the PR, seven from the Partido de la
Liberación Dominicana (PLD), and one from the Partido de
Acción Constitucional (PAC)_ Unlike the 1978-1982 period of
PRD control of the presidency, in the next four year period,
the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano will have virtually
undisputed control of the legislative branch of the Dominican
government. Even if the PR and the PLD Deputies vote as a
bloc, they can be outvoted by the sixty-two PRD members.
However, al! of this depends on whether the PRD can maintain
a united front.
VIII. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGEFACING THE
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIODOMINICANO
The PRD victory of 1982 gives the party another opportunity;which
many of its leaders have termed decisive, to govern. Its previous
tenure, presided over by Antonio Guzmán, initiated sorne positive
reforms and will be remembered for establishing aclimate of relative civilliberties never enjoyed before in the Dominican Republic.
Most importantly, the Guzmán government will be remembered as
the first .'constitutional government to keep
of
. its campaign promise
.'
not seekmg re-election and for transfernng power to the mcornrng
76. Referring to Balaguer's tache of distributing ltttle bags, "fu.nditas," of food
to the poor.
70
t .
f I
governmen m a peace u and orderly manner. With a twentieth
century history of dictatorships, semi-dictatorships coup d'états
d U it d S
. .
.
.
'
,
an
ni e
tat~s ml1.1~ary
lnv~s~onsand occupations, the simple
fact that a ~ertam political stability and respect for human rights
was mairitained for four years lS an extraordmary accomplishment.
t Howeve:, ~he l~efflcency m economic affairs and inability to
con rol adminístratíve corruption brought the PRD government
discredit m its last days and left the country in bankruptcy, Politicalliberties and stability unfortunately cannot satisfy al! the needs
of the nation. The people cannot live solely on liberties; the
workers, the unemployed and the peasants paid a high price for this
form of dernocracy, they were forced to limit their economic
demands for four years in order to nurture these liberties. These
relative liberties were maintained precisely through the contradictory and violent manner in which the government reacted to the
few strikes and protests that occurred. 77
If the most conservative sector of the dominant classes have
accepted the PRD, and this acceptance is at best tentative, it is precisely because the government never represented a serious threat to
their interests, and indeed, because the workers and revolutionaries
"were well behaved." But, up to what point can this temporary
equilibrium be maintained? How long will the peasantry endure its
landless condition? The workers endure starvation wages? The
unemployed endure its present plight? Indeed, how long will the
population in general tolerate the lack of adequate housing, education and public health facilities to continue?
The second consecutive PRD presiden ti al victory has demonstrated that the Dominican electora te does not wish to return to the
past which Balaguer represents, however, if the PRD maintains a
political and economic climate in which only the powerful classes
benefit, the Domiriican people will soon seek other options.
IX. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION
BETWEENGOVERNMENTS,16 MAY - 16 AUGUST 1982
We were srill wr iti ng thi18 s t U dy w h en we were s h ock ed by a tragic.
nationalloss. In the early morning hours of 4 July 1982,the country
77 S
' .,
,
. . ee f?r example, Míriam Diaz Santana s discussion of the repression of the
trade umons In the 19805.In El Nuevo Diario, 11 de febrero de 1982, p. 7.
71
I
I
awakened to the incredible news that President Antonio Guzmán
had died from a bullet wound to the head, suffered in his own office.
In years past, the average Dominican would have immediately
thought that a military coup had begun. The official reports termed
the death to be accidental, but the citizenry "knew" that the President had committed suicide. The motives behind this act fall in the
area of speculation, nevertheless, general public opinion, and also
proposed by José Francisco Peña Gómez, Secretary General of the
PRD, claims that Guzmán took his life as a result of severe emotional depression caused by the scandalous corruption in which
many of his most intimate friends and advisors had been involved.I"
Further demonstration of the resilience of the new Dominican
political stability, was the fact that the succession process continued in accord with the Constitution. Vice President Jacobo
Majluta Azar was immediately sworn into office as President, and
successfully completed the term of office with the transition to
power of Salvador Jorge Blanco on 16 August 1982.
Of the forty-two days government of Majluta, we can state that
he enacted various mea sures which have been interpreted as the
base for his presiden ti al candidancy in 1986.76 The major measures
enacted by President Majluta were:
1. Dynamization of government activities which had been virtually paralyzed during the last months of the Guzmán governmento
2. Reduction of the prices of basic foodstuffs sold to primarily
the urban poor by the Instituto Nacional de Establización de Precios (National Institute of Price ControD.
3. Disbursement of government payments which were in
arrears to private business and government workers.
4. Initiation of government audits to detect corruption.
5. Authorization to public hospital s to purchase medicine.
I
'
On t.he 16 August 1982,Salvador Jorge Blanco was sworn in as
the Pr~sIdent of the Dominican Republic. In his inaugural address
he outlmed the general policies of his government of Concentración
Na.clO~al <National Concentratjon), with particular emphasis on
austenty an.dmorality in governmsnt.w The principal points of his
speech are hsted below:
I
¡
1. The establishment of an austerity plan which would be
mamfested through the following measures:
i. Salary reductions for all government employees who
earn more than RD $375.00 per month.s!
Freeze on wages for all employees in the private sector.
~". Freeze on prices for basic foodstuffs.
IV. Strict ~o.ntrol on all government spending.
v. Proh~bltlOn of the importation of numerous items.
2. Increase m property and in come taxes.
3. Strict controls to be placed on the management of government revenues.
4. Creation of jobs through a program of housing construction.
y.
During the first three weeks in office, the Jorge Blanco government
has de~onstrated a certain seriousness and a capacity for work and
frugahty. However, it has also demonstrated an indecisiveness in
carrymg out its plans. For example, in less than three weeks the
plan for the reduction of government employee salaries has been
drastically modified twice to exclude certain economic and interest
groups.
In general, the reaction by the public to Jorge Blanco's measures
has bee~ one of resignation. On the one hand, the people support the
emphasis on austenty m the control placed on the bureaucracy and
A
80. Text of Inauguration Speech published in all Dorninican
dailies on 17
Ug~~t 1982 .. F~r example, see Listin Diario, 17 de agosto de 1982 pp. IDA _ llA
. As ortgtnally planne~, al! government employees who eam more then
RD
78. Peña Gómez juatiñed Guzmán's suicide by classifying it as "Act of Responeibjlity.' See Peña Gómez's speech published in a11 Dominican national dailies on 7
July 1982.
.,
Id
. 1
79. Jacobo Majluta Azar has expressed interest In seekmg the PRD presi enria
,
. for 1986. In the 1982 elections
.
nommat.icn
he was selected as Senator an d f or th e
..
Senate, w hiIC h 15
. cer taam
i 1y
next four year period will be the leader of the Dominican
an excellent position from which to launch his campaign.
72
$3i5 p;r month, would expenence·substantial salary reductions based on-a sliding
~c;6e. or example, those who. previously earned RD $500 per month. would have
o¡ercent
reduced from their pay checks, or RD $31.30; at RO $700 per month
Al'
i~rcentd~rRD $91.30; at RD $1200 per month, 22.82 percent or RD $273 85'
m~s. I~methlately, t~e new government began to modify this program to excl~de'
or mmlmlze
e reductíons of
, t erest and economic groups. As of this wr-it.
t
.
cer tal
am. In
mg, curren,
up
. program has been signifi
a ti
diñunttl
d' 15 Septemb
. er 1982,eth sc heme of thís
1 IC n yh' mo 1 le
twice durlng Jo rge BIanco 's
s f¡irst month in office and the
program as yet to go into effect.
13
73
the powerful classes. But on the other hand, the working and lower
middle classes cannot undergo more sacrifices, for while the cost of
living is increasing, salaries are being reduced or frozen. These
reductions and wage freezes have created an atmosphere of wide
spread resentment that could, in a short period, translate into class
struggles. This situation is further aggravated by the apparent
decision of the PRD to once again apply its pol icy of borrón y cuenta
nueva (erase and start anew), which signifies not prosecuting the
culprits
for the theft of government funds which occurred in the
past years.
.
.
.
TABLE 12
PR
E E~~~(~~~~IiES¡ATE
.
OF THE
UBLIC
Import Payments in Arrears, Realized
F by Part Government
orergn Debt D
. 1982
ue In
Balance of Payrnents Deficit
.'
All th ings considered, the times ahead will demand major
sacrifices. The government finds itself bankrupt, the currency is
experiencing an almost daily real devaluation within the economy
and in relation to the U.S. dollar, and it must be noted here that the
United States is the Dominican Republic's major trading partner.
. .
S
US$ 370000000
'
,
US$ 458000000
Projected
•
at Levels Higher than
'
Central Government Budget Deficit,
as of August, 1982 .
Losses of the Sugar MI]]s of State
Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del Azúcar)
.....
US$ 440,000,000.
RD$ 166000000
'
,
.
RD$ 80000000
Losses of the Business Enterprised of
caRDE (State a wne d B'usmesses )
In addition, foreign lending inst.itutions are denying loans, and
those who are offe~ing loa~s ,such as, the Inte.rnational Monetary
Fund are demanding
conditions which are ínterpreted
bere as
threatening
to the sovereignty of the nation. Table 12, clearly
demonstrates
the seriousness of this crisis.
RD$
Losses of th~..Dominican Elect.r¡c Corporation
(~orporaclOn Dominicana de Electricidad)
Capital Losses of the Institute for
the ~tabilization of Prices
Instituto para la Estabilización de
Precios·INESPRE)
Current Expenses In Personal Services
Expense Accounts, Representation
'
SI'
a arres, an da' thers
1977
****
.
.
.
,
'
,
21000
.
RD$
'
,000.
88000000
'
,
.
RD$
23,700,000.
RD$ 182,131,527.
RD$ 375,150,354 .
1980
SOURCE:
..
G overnt
brElhNuevo
d hi Diario.
. 4 de septiembre de 1982 ' p. P Th e DOmInlCan
enpu IS e t 15 paid adverttsement in all Dominican dailies on 4 September
1g
82.
a. Al.1~tate owned businesses other than the Consejo Estatal del A'úca
C
.
Domínicana de Electricidad, and INESPRE.
.• r, orporacion
<J>.
ffi
I
74
75
The Dominican Republic national elections and the peaceful transitions of power inthe last months represent an outstanding success
in the political arena. We have described Dominican political history from 1930 to 198,2,so that the reader may have a clear idea of dietatorships, revolution, military coups, foreign military intervention, semi-dictatorship, fraudulent elections, repression of politic al
sectors, and to the present, in 1982, with the first valid elections in
Dominican history and the first examples of the peaceful transition
of power from one government to another.
Indeed, it has been a tremendous accomplishment. However,
the people of the Dominican Republic realize more than any political observer or social scientist that the new Dominican democracy
is indeed still very fragile and that the elections of 1982, do not
indeed represent a model for Latin America and Caribbean
democracy. Rather, the 1982 elections represent a model for the
beginnings of the democratic process in other Third World countries
of this hemisphere. The Dominican people have too many times seen
the democracy that they have struggled for, fought for, snatched
from their grasp by foreign invaders, their own Armed Forces, or by
members of the native dorninant classes. Unlike the correspondents
for newspapers and magazine s in foreign countries, the average
Dominican is fully aware that the country has only just begun a
new chapter in history, and that it is very possible that at any time,
at a very moment's notice, that this very fragile newborn can be
destroyed by a coup d 'état or cooption of the governmen t.
There is indeed another aspect of democracy that the
Dominican Republic has yet to realize. The Partido Revolucionario
Dominicano
achieved power through free elections, now this party
must represent the interests of all Dominicans. But as we have
noted, the majority of the population, those politically marginal
groups such as the peasantry, worker, the unemployed, have still
not been adequately incorporated, represented, and their interests
defended by the PRD. Until these groups are proportionally represen ted in Dominican politics, we cannot speak of democracy in the
nation. The elections of 1982 were a healthy and encouraging start,
a very important
beginning,
for democracy
in the Dominican
Republic. Now the challenge is to nurture, develop and guarantee
this form of government.
7fi
ESTE LIBRO
FUE IMPRESO
EN EL
CENTRO GRAFICO
DEL CARIBE, INe.
SAN JUAN.
1984
P.R.
THE 1982 NATIONAL
REPUBLIC:
ELECTIONS
IN THE DOMINICA N
A Sociological and Historical Interpretation
With a history of foreign military interventions and occupations,
possibly the most famous Latin American dictatorship, and a tradition
of political
repression
and
orchestrated
elections,
the
Dominican Republic celebrated its national referendum in 1982
with relative calm: elections in which all political parties, from the
extreme Right to the extreme Left, were allowed to participa te.
This study examines the historical antecedents to these
national elections, the social and political milieu within which they
were celebrated, and question whether the new-born democracy in
the Dominican Republic should be held up as a model for ot.her
Caribbean and Latin American nations, as the international corn-
-
munity and press observers have claimed. In this work the authors
question whether there exists in the Dominican Republic the true
I
economic democracy and justice
I
tolerance of the na tion.
I
tú complement
the new political
I
MIRIA M DIAZ SANTANA
I
,
I,
1I
_11
is Professor of Sociology at the
Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, the same university
from which she received her Licenciatura degree. In addition tú her
position at the university, she is a150 a columnist for the Dominican
daily, El Nuevo Diario and President of the Dominican Association
of Sociologists.
Professor Diaz has presented various papers at national and
international conferences and is presently working on research on
her experiences in the wornen's movement and politics during the
turbulent years, 1966-1976, in the Dominican Republic.
MAR TI N F. MURPHY is presently Special Professor of
Anthropology at the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo and
¡
Researcher at the Museo del Hombre Dominicano. Professor Murphy received his Licenciatura degree in Mexico, Master degrees
from Syracuse University and Columbia University and is a candi-
date for the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the latter institution.
Professor Murphy has published various articles and presented
numerous
conference
industry, Haitian
modern plantation
papers
concerning
the
Dominican
sugar
of the
books on
migration, and the social consequences
economy. Presently,
he is preparing
street vendors in Santo Domingo and labor utilization strategies on
sugar cane plantations
in the Dominican
Cover Design by Jack Delano
Republic.
ISBN 0-936708 - 22- O
,