Specific Reference to the Caribbean Region
Transcription
Specific Reference to the Caribbean Region
Specific Reference to the Caribbean Region 13th IADI Annual Conference “Updated Core Principles to Strengthen the Financial Stability Architecture” October 22-23, 2014 Antoinette McKain, CEO Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation Updated November 2014 Outline Key elements for an effective resolution regime for banks Overview of the financial/ banking system in the Caribbean Bank resolution/failures - last 3 decades in selected Caribbean countries Resolution and insolvency frameworks for Banks in the Caribbean: Overview Challenges/ Gaps Recommendations to enhance the framework International Standards: Key Elements for an Effective Resolution Regime IADI/BCBS Financial Stability Board Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2011) Basel Core Principles of Banking Supervision (2012) Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (2014) 1. Mechanisms for early detection and timely intervention/prompt corrective actions 2. Broad range of resolution options 3. Special resolution regime 4. Designated authority(ies) for resolution 5. Cooperation among relevant authorities domestic & cross border 6. Explicit depositor protection 7. Crisis management plans Overview of the Financial System- Caribbean The financial system in the Caribbean is largely bank- based (onshore and offshore banking) Offshore banking is the largest subsector in the financial system (Barbados, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands -BVI, Eastern Caribbean Currency UnionECCU & Belize) Non-bank financial institutions include credit unions; insurance companies; and securities firms Table 1: Structure of Financial System in Selected Caribbean Countries Total Assets (US$ millions) ECCU Barbados Bahamas BVI Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Belize Guyana 9,509 6, 240 12,100 2,500 8,724 17,891 1,319 1,590 Local 4,232 5,670 2,800 D.N.A. 5,226 D.N.A. 449 D.N.A Foreign 5,277 570 9,300 D.N.A. 3,498 D.N.A. 870 D.N.A Offshore Banks 2,402 42,638 582,900 D.N.A n/a n/a 301 n/a Credit Unions 682 842 300 D.N.A 526 1,524 306 21 Insurance Companies 637 1,521 2,500 D.N.A 2,511 4,768 97 157 Securities Firms D.N.A D.N.A. D.N.A D.N.A 8,328 D.N.A D.N.A D.N.A Total 13,230 51,241 597,800 2,500 20,089 24,183 2,023 1,768 Banks Key: D.N.A. – Data not available, n/a. – Not applicable Source: IMF WP/13/175 and country authorities Overview of the Banking Structure- Caribbean Total assets in the banking system as a percentage of gross domestic product is a measure of financial depth of an economy Total assets of the banking system (excluding off-shore) represents approximately 91 percent of regional GDP Total assets of the financial sector (excluding offshore banks) amounts to 124 percent of the regional GDP (IMF Working paper 13/175 - Financial Interconnectedness and Financial Sector Reforms in the Caribbean) Table 2: Structure of Banking System in Selected Caribbean Countries- Total Assets to GDP (%) ECCU Barbados Bahamas BVI Jamaica T&T Belize Guyana 176 135 150 268 68 77 89 64 Local 78 123 35 D.N.A. 41 D.N.A. 30 D.N.A Foreign 98 12 115 D.N.A. 27 D.N.A. 59 D.N.A Offshore Banks 45 928 7220 D.N.A n/a n/a 20 n/a Total 221 1063 7370 268 68 77 109 64 Banks D.N.A. – Data not available, n/a. – Not applicable Source: IMF WP/13/175 and calculations from country authorities Overview of the Banking System- Selected Caribbean Countries Table 3: Total Bank Assets to GDP– Global Comparison Country Banking Assets as a Percentage of GDP Barbados 135% Bahamas 150% Canada 212 % Jamaica 68 % Trinidad & Tobago 77% United Kingdom 463% United States 102% Source: IMF WP/13/175 and country calculations 2012 and 2013 Overview of the Banking System Interconnectivity and Dominance of Regional Banks Most banks are connected to non-bank financial institutions in the investments/securities insurance sectors through common ownership and Foreign banks account for approximately 60% of banking assets in the region. Primarily Canadian banks e.g. Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Republic Bank and Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) Table 4: Financial Sector Connectivity in the Caribbean Deposit Taking Institutions Related NonBanking Operations Bank of Nova Scotia Ltd Insurance & Investments RBC Royal Bank Ltd CIBC FirstCaribbean Bank Ltd Investments & Insurance Insurance, Investments & Real Estate Countries Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Kitts, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks and Caicos, St Maarten Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas , Barbados, Bonaire, Cayman Islands, Curacao, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saba, St Kitts, St Lucia, St Maarten, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago and Turks & Caicos. Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman, Curacao, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St Lucia, St. Kitts, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Netherland Antilles and Turks and Caicos Source: Respective Banks’ Websites Number of Countries 20 18 17 Table 3 : Financial Sector Connectivity in the Caribbean (continued) Deposit Taking Institutions Related NonBanking Operations Republic Bank Limited Securities Countries Number of Countries Barbados, Cayman, Grenada, Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago 5 Sagicor Bank Jamaica Insurance, Investments, Property Services & Employee Benefits Administration Jamaica, St Lucia and Cayman 3 Citibank N.A. Securities Bahamas, Barbados, Cayman, Dominican Republic ,Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and Trinidad & Tobago 8 Source: Respective Banks’ Websites Table 4: Bank Resolution over the last 30 years in Selected Caribbean Countries Country Bank Approximate Cost to the System Financial Sector Crisis, 1990’s – several banks and non-banks The Financial Sector Adjustment Company Limited (FINSAC) was created on January 29, 42% of GDP/ 1997 to treat with financial sector problems. US$3.1 billion Resolution strategies for banks included (2001) temporary management, capital injection in exchange for equity/assets; purchase and assumption; divestment; mergers and acquisitions. Bank of Credit & Commerce International 1991 Operations of Jamaican branch suspended Not available by the Ministry of Finance, following the Bank of England's directive. Deposits were fully repaid and operations closed. Bank of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI) 1991 Central Bank of Barbados intervened and Not available seized BCCI. In 1993, Mutual Bank of the Caribbean Inc. was set up by the Central Bank to manage the sale of BCCI. (In 1991 Bank of England ordered the bank to close its global operations) Jamaica Barbados Resolution Mechanism Table 4: Bank Resolution over the last 30 years in Selected Caribbean Countries Country Bank Resolution Mechanism Approximate Cost to the System Several banks A combination of resolution strategies were Not available during the period employed, including liquidation. 1986 -1993 Trinidad and Tobago Antigua CLICO Central Bank intervention and liquidation. Over US$3 Investment Bank Depositor reimbursement by DICTT & billion to date 2009 government guaranteed payments CLICO Group Bank of Antigua BOA (owned by Stanford Financial Group) 2009 Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) intervened through recapitalization and liquidity support. ECCB’s intervention facilitated the acquisition of certain assets and liabilities of BOA by Eastern Caribbean Amalgamated Bank in 2010 which is currently in operation. Not available. ECCB loan to Government of Antigua and Barbuda – approx. US$33 million Bank Resolution over the last 30 years in Selected Caribbean Countries - Causes Inadequate regulation and enforcement/ supervision on the part of bank regulators and supervisors Unsound banking practices, for example, poor liquidity; inadequate capital Poor corporate governance Absence of special insolvency laws for banks Rapid expansion of companies within conglomerates and complex group structures resulting in fraud, concealment and parent/group contagion Overview of the Current Legal and Supervisory Framework for Banks Some common features of the current legal and supervisory framework for banks in Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda; British Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and OECS: The legal framework is generally clear on responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks (Supervision devolved - Central Bank; Monetary Authority; The Financial Services Commission) Banking laws confer powers on bank supervisors to prescribe prudential and other requirements; take corrective and sanctioning actions Overview of the Current Legal and Supervisory Framework for Banks Some common features of the current legal and supervisory framework for banks in Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda; British Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and OECS: Range of intervention and resolution powers between the Supervisors and the Deposit Insurers and at times resolution powers are also vested in the Minister responsible for the financial affairs of the country Legal framework is generally clear on the responsibilities of the Deposit Insurer Overview of the Current Legal and Supervisory Framework for Banks Bermuda Monetary Authority has proposed a framework for a special resolution regime for banks licensed in Bermuda The Bill seeks to provide the authorities with the necessary stabilisation powers to transfer part or all of a failing bank’s business to a private sector purchaser, assume control of part or all of a failing bank’s business through a bridge bank and acquire temporary public ownership of a bank where required. Deposit Insurers (in T&T, Jamaica, Barbados and Bahamas) may act as liquidator or receiver for the winding-up of banks however only when advised or guided by the Central Bank and /or the Minister of Finance; or the courts as is the case for the respective country Overview of the Current Legal and Supervisory Framework for BanksInsolvency Laws The general insolvency framework for companies and administered by the court is applicable for winding-up insolvent banks in most countries i.e. there are no special insolvency laws for banks in these countries. Barbados has a framework which implements some of the more modern best practice recommendations worked into their Financial Institutions Act, Cap324A, 2006. The Barbados Financial Institutions Act instructs that in the case of deposit taking institutions the Deposit Insurance Corporation shall be the liquidator and shall be responsible to the Court for the winding-up of that institution (Section 69 (b)) Table 5: Overview of the Legal and Supervisory Framework for Banks in Selected Caribbean Countries Country Lead Authority Responsible for Supervision of DTIs Authority to Wind Up Bank Bahamas Central Bank of the Bahamas- Office The Governor after advising the of Inspector of Banks (Inspector) Minister applies to the Supreme Court Barbados The Central Bank of Barbados The Central Bank after notifying through its Supervision Department the Minister, applies to the High Court Bermuda Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) BMA through a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) in conjunction with the Minister. Where public funds are involved, then the Government will take control. Table 5: Overview of the Legal and Supervisory Framework for Banks in Selected Caribbean Countries Country Lead Authority Responsible for Supervision of DTIs British Virgin Islands The Financial Services Commission Jamaica The Central Bank through its Governor. The Central Bank through a Supervisory Committee determines whether a member institution is insolvent Organization of Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Eastern Caribbean (ECCB). The ECCB is the Monetary States (OECS) Authority for a group of eight members/island economies Trinidad and Tobago The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago – Inspector of Financial Institutions Authority to Wind Up Bank The Financial Services Commission by Court Order. The Central Bank through the Supervisor of Banks and after consultation with the Minister of Finance. The Minister, acting on recommendation of the Central Bank. The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago on the recommendation of the Inspector of Financial Institutions. Challenges -Regulatory/Insolvency Regimes to Address Bank Resolution 1. Structure of the Banking System Small number of banks account for the majority of market share Interconnectedness and concentration of banking system Impact of a bank resolution may be exacerbated by these features given the relatively small size of respective Caribbean countries 2. Intervention and Resolution Framework Further work needed in the reform of resolution regimes and resolution planning Legal, operational and financial barriers to the feasibility of an effective resolution regime Costs associated to complying with regulations Challenges -Regulatory/Insolvency Regimes to Address Bank Resolution 3. Legal and Judicial Framework Court proceedings not handled quickly to restore confidence in the banking sector and maximize/preserve the value of bank assets Insolvency laws and laws governing the winding up of banks not harmonized throughout the region Current insolvency frameworks in the region are not well suited to deal with serious cross-border problems 4. Cross-border Information Sharing The framework for cross border sharing of information among regulators still a work in progress 5. Financial literacy Low levels likely to impact financial system confidence in a crisis Challenges -Regulatory/Insolvency Regimes to Address Bank Resolution 6. Political implications of a bank resolution Potential political implications may delay/ influence timely decision making/prompt corrective action by authorities 7. Available resources for bank supervision/ resolution: Attraction/retention of key technical expertise/human resources Small pool of skilled professionals in the region - may give rise to conflict of interest in the resolution of a bank e.g. auditors; liquidator. 8. Explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes Only four countries in the Region have a Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) and are also members of IADI (Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. BVI is in the process of establishing a DIS.) Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 1. Establish Special Resolution Regime (SRR) for banks Clearly defined rules based or statutory trigger mechanisms for intervention and resolution of banks Adequate resolution powers and options that are clearly outlined in legislation Assignment of designated/lead resolution authority and/ or resolution agent to execute selected resolution options with adequate powers Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 1. Establish Special Resolution Regime (SRR) for banks Law should allow and/or establish appropriate framework for designated resolution authority/agent to have powers to collaborate and share information with foreign resolution authorities/agents wherever possible Regulatory intervention and resolution actions should be largely administrative and expressly have primacy over court process. Laws should clearly allow for Set-off, netting, the finality of payment and settlement and the prohibition on acceleration of termination rights Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 1. Establish Special Resolution Regime (SRR) for banks- Separate Insolvency Framework Assess adequacy of general insolvency laws/ framework for the timely and orderly resolution of banks Bank insolvency laws should be designed to operate independently from general insolvency laws National laws and regulations should not discriminate against creditors on the basis of their nationality, the location of their claim or the jurisdiction where it is payable Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 1. Establish Special Resolution Regime (SRR) for banks- Separate Insolvency Framework The statutory mandate of a resolution authority/agent should allow for cooperation with foreign resolution authorities/agents and the treatment of assets in cross border insolvency should be understood in advance The treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency should be harmonized across borders and adequately disclosed to depositors, insurance policy holders and other creditors. Equity holders should bear first losses Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 2. Establishment of crisis management plans at various levels: Institutional level – develop plans for the recovery and resolutions of firms that could be systematically significant Relevant authorities/FSSN Partners (Supervisor, Ministry of Finance, Deposit Insurer etc) - Develop individual Crisis Management Plan National level – FSSN Partners - develop National Crisis Management Plan Regional level – authorities should have the power in governing legislation to share information where possible. Establish MOU with regional authorities including collaboration on crisis management issues Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 3. Enhance collaboration among financial system safety net partners (FSSN) – domestic and regional Roles and responsibilities of FSSN within each country should be clearly defined Collaboration should be enhanced among the FSSN specifically for cross border banking groups/regional financial conglomerates Where a bank has branches in other Caribbean regions, the relevant authorities should clearly and in advance establish (i) which jurisdiction is responsible for providing deposit insurance coverage to the depositors of each branch, and (ii) the rules governing insolvency. Collaboration to increase the levels of financial literacy in the region should be strengthened in compliance with the IADI Core PrinciplesPrinciple 10- Public Awareness. Recommendations to Enhance the Regulatory/Insolvency Framework 4. Establishment of Deposit Insurance Schemes Establishment of DIs within other Caribbean countries will strengthen the regional financial sector; better harmonize the protection of depositors and lessen the propensity for runs on banks The deposit insurer should be operationally independent Establish regional DIS resource pool (funding & technical expertise to enhance prompt bank resolution) Deposit insurance agencies should have statutory powers to act as liquidator or receiver or judicial manager for winding up banks THANK YOU