Report to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General

Report to the Minister of Justice
and Solicitor General
Public Fatality Inquiry
Alberta Provincial Court, 190 Chippewa Road,
Sherwood Park
WHEREAS a Public Inquiry was held at the
in the
County
of
(City, Town or Village)
on the
Fatality Inquiries Act
Strathcona
, in the Province of Alberta,
(Name of City, Town, Village)
25th & 26th
days of
November
,
2013
, (and by adjournment
year
on the
day of
,
),
year
Before
Bruce R. Garriock
into the death of
of
, a Provincial Court Judge,
Murray Francis McCoy
56
(Name in Full)
(Age)
51035 Range Road 223, Strathcona County, Alberta and the following findings were made:
(Residence)
Date and Time of Death:
Place:
January 16, 2011 at approximately 1655 hours
Near 51035 Range Road 223, Strathcona County, Alberta.
Medical Cause of Death:
(“cause of death” means the medical cause of death according to the International Statistical Classification of
Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death as last revised by the International Conference assembled for that purpose
and published by the World Health Organization – The Fatality Inquiries Act, Section 1(d)).
Multiple gunshot wounds.
Manner of Death:
(“manner of death” means the mode or method of death whether natural, homicidal, suicidal, accidental, unclassifiable
or undeterminable – The Fatality Inquiries Act, Section 1(h)).
Homicidal
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 2 of 26
Circumstances Under Which Death Occurred:
Introduction
1.
At approximately 0900 hours on January 16th, 2011, McCoy telephoned the RCMP
detachment in Sherwood Park, Alberta and advised that he was on a road outside of his
Residence and was going to shoot himself. The RCMP established a perimeter to contain
McCoy in close proximity to his Residence. Discussions then ensued between
negotiators for the RCMP and McCoy for most of the day. Eventually, when McCoy
confronted members of the ERT and he was observed to point his firearm at the officers,
he was shot at approximately 1655 hours and was pronounced dead at the scene.
2. In setting out the circumstances of McCoy’s death, I will deal with the following topics:
•
Preliminary Matters
•
Exhibits
•
Events Leading up to the Shooting – General
•
RCMP Confrontation with McCoy – the Shooting
•
Post Shooting
•
Autopsy
•
ASIRT Investigation
•
Submissions
•
Recommendations for the Prevention of Similar Deaths
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 3 of 26
3. Throughout this Report:
a)
all dates are in 2011 unless otherwise indicated;
b)
all events and locations are in Strathcona County, Alberta, unless otherwise
indicated;
c)
all times are on the 24 hour clock;
d)
“ASIRT” means Alberta Serious Incident Response Team;
e)
“ASIRT Final Report” means that report of the ASIRT dated July 7, 2011;
f)
“CNT” means the RCMP Crisis Negotiation Team
g)
“EMRT” means Emergency Medical Response Team;
h)
“ERT” means the RCMP Emergency Response Team
i)
“Inquiry” means this Fatality Inquiry;
j)
“RCMP” means the Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
k)
“RMI” means the remote mechanical investigator (a robot);
l)
“TAV” means tactical armored vehicle;
m)
“Residence” means the residence of McCoy and Cornelia (comprising buildings
and lands) at 51035 Range Road 223, Strathcona County, Alberta; and
n)
reference may be made to the following persons:
i)
Dr. Bernard Gerhard Bannach (“Bannach”), Assistant Chief Medical
Examiner for the Province of Alberta.
ii)
LS0338 (2014/05)
Dr. Alberto Lunyuen Choy (“Choy”), Forensic Psychiatrist
Report – Page 4 of 26
iii)
Gordon Frederick Corbett (“Corbett”), RCMP Corporal
iv)
Cornelia McCoy (“Cornelia”), spouse of McCoy
v)
Brian Charles Cottell (“Cottell”), RCMP Staff Sergeant
vi)
Ian Douglas Currie (“Currie”), RCMP Inspector
vii)
Stacey Dej (“Dej”), Justice Canada, Counsel to the RCMP
viii)
Christopher Richard Handy (“Handy”), RCMP Constable
ix)
Thomas Edward Kalis (“Kalis”), RCMP Sergeant
x)
Bradley Nels Scott Lundeen (“Lundeen”), RCMP Constable
xi)
Murray Francis McCoy (“McCoy”)
xii)
Brent James Mundle (“Mundle”), RCMP Sergeant
xiii)
Kim Palichuk (“Palichuk”), Inquiry Counsel
xiv)
Ernest Schreiber (“Schreiber”), ASIRT Investigator
xv)
Kenneth William Shamblaw (“Shamblaw”), RCMP Constable
xvi)
Jennifer Stengel (“Stengel”), Inquiry Counsel
xvii)
Kurt Thomas (“Thomas”), RCMP Constable
xviii)
Gregory Andrew Wiebe (“Wiebe”), RCMP Corporal
xix)
Wayne Michael Williams (“Williams”), RCMP Constable
Preliminary Matters
4. A Pre-Inquiry Conference was held before me on September 4th, 2013, at the Alberta
Provincial Court, 190 Chippewa Road, Sherwood Park, Alberta, T8A 4H5. In attendance
were Stengel, Palichuk, Dej and Cornelia. The following preliminary issues were
addressed:
a) It was decided that the Inquiry would commence at 0930 hours and continue for the
two scheduled days, November 25th and 26th, 2013, at the Alberta Provincial Court,
Sherwood Park, Alberta, in Courtroom #2;
b) Cornelia was provided with a copy of the Exhibit Binder (Items 1-27) pursuant to my
Order that she be bound by section 37.2 of the Fatality Inquiries Act with respect to
the contents of the Exhibit Binder;
c) The Fatality Inquiry Coordinator from Alberta Justice was to prepare the summonses
which would be sent to me for signature and then provided to the RCMP for service on
the witnesses; and
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 5 of 26
d) The RCMP were granted standing at the inquiry pursuant to s. 49(2)(d) of the Fatality
Inquiries Act.
5. At the commencement of the Inquiry, and before evidence was heard, I advised those
present of the provisions of section 49 of the Fatality Inquiries Act and the right of
interested persons to apply for standing at the Inquiry. No one indicated a desire to apply
for such standing.
Exhibits
6. Exhibits 1 and 2 were contained in two exhibit binders. Copies of indices to these binders
are attached to this Report. Exhibit 3 is a diagram prepared by Bannach documenting the
path of various bullet wounds in this case.
Events Leading Up to the Shooting – General
a) Kalis
7. On January 16th, 2011, Kalis was a watch commander at the Sherwood Park, Alberta
RCMP detachment (which was, in Kalis’ words, “akin to a shift-supervisor”).
8. On that day, Sherwood Park RCMP dispatch centre received a telephone call about 0900
hours from a male who identified himself as either “Francis” or “Murray” and said that he
wanted to kill himself with a firearm. After determining that the address searched from the
telephone number of the caller was within Strathcona County, Kalis sent RCMP members
to assess the situation.
9. A male was observed walking along a road carrying a long-barreled firearm, so an RCMP
perimeter was established around this person and nearby residents were evacuated.
When this male (later identified as McCoy) moved, RCMP members on-site were
instructed to avoid challenging him directly. The perimeter was established and adjusted
to contain and minimize any danger that McCoy might be to himself or other people and
also to limit his movements.
10. The weather was -25 degrees Celsius, snowing and overcast. The roads were icy and
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 6 of 26
snow-covered. There was a concern as to whether the long-barreled firearm carried by
McCoy was a shotgun or a rifle; a rifle could shoot a bullet with an effective range of about
1 kilometer and the effective range of a shotgun is about 15 meters (but within those 15
meters is more lethal than a rifle).
11. McCoy often challenged the RCMP perimeter. Kalis instructed that the perimeter was to
be maintained in a dynamic fashion, moving people to make sure containment was
effected, but avoiding a confrontation that required the use of force. Kalis spoke to
McCoy twice that day on the telephone; during the second call, McCoy appeared very
angry and wanted to talk to his wife. Kalis said that McCoy was not interested in
engaging with him at all which, in Kalis’ opinion, was very uncommon.
12. Kalis assessed this situation as being beyond his detachment’s capabilities long term. He
made a request to the people who were better equipped and better trained to deal with
this sort of situation, namely the ERT and the CNT.
b) Cottell
13. Cottell, an RCMP Staff Sergeant at the time, testified that he was in charge of uniform
operations at the Sherwood Park RCMP detachment, ensuring quality control for
investigations.
14. While off-duty on January 16, 2011, Cottell received a call from Kalis as to the situation
involving McCoy. Cottell went to the detachment where he determined from checks of
various data bases that McCoy did not have a criminal record, that he was noted as the
complainant in a number of low-level matters (particularly complaints of recreational
vehicles on his property) and that he had no firearms registered in his name.
15. Thereafter, Kalis obtained a warrant granting judicial authorization for the RCMP to enter
the Residence to affect McCoy’s arrest. While in the Residence during McCoy’s absence,
three firearms were seized and Cornelia was removed from the Residence and taken to
the Sherwood Park RCMP detachment.
16. McCoy called the RCMP Sherwood Park detachment, the first of five conversations that
occurred between he and Cottell that morning. Cottell reported McCoy’s state of mind as
highly-agitated, raging, very emotional and close to breaking down. Throughout all of
these conversations, McCoy’s primary focus was to speak with Cornelia.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 7 of 26
17. Cottell indicated to McCoy that he would try to facilitate McCoy speaking to Cornelia.
However, Cottell was worried that if this occurred, McCoy might kill himself because
McCoy had stated that there was some sort of confrontation between he and Cornelia
earlier that morning. Another reason Cottell did not allow contact at that time was that he
felt that a CNT negotiator may be in a better position to allow contact between McCoy and
his wife under more controlled circumstances, including a possible condition that McCoy
give up his firearm.
18. Cottell stated that his role throughout his conversations with McCoy that morning was to
buy time – to forestall McCoy taking any action against himself, police or anyone else in
order to allow the ERT to get into place and commence negotiations with McCoy.
19. McCoy referred to “death by cop”, which Cottell interpreted to mean that McCoy was
suicidal and could put himself in a circumstance that may precipitate the RCMP having to
use lethal force. McCoy stated to Cottell that all he had to do was go outside and “raise
that shotgun at one of the officers and you guys will shoot me dead”.
20. For the rest of the afternoon, Cottell managed the operations at the detachment and,
shortly before 1500 hours, attended at the command post which was north of the
Residence.
21. In a truck which comprised the command post, five to six hours after his initial contact with
McCoy, Cottell was surprised that in the then recent communications between McCoy and
Mundle (the CNT negotiator), McCoy was still at a very elevated state of emotion and
raging.
c) Shamblaw
22. Shamblaw, a general duty RCMP member, testified that he was located approximately a
kilometer from the Residence and received updates via the radio.
23. Shamblaw took a witness statement from Cornelia who advised him that:
•
she and McCoy had been having marital issues;
•
there was a verbal argument which escalated to the point where allegedly McCoy
pushed Cornelia;
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 8 of 26
•
she had no idea that McCoy had called the RCMP;
•
McCoy had been diagnosed as a Type-2 diabetic, was depressive and had stopped
taking his medications;
•
during previous domestic arguments, McCoy would bring up one of his great-uncles
who had committed suicide;
•
McCoy had threatened to harm himself before;
•
McCoy had injured his hand which led him being unable to work as a tradesman; and
•
McCoy was estranged from his family.
24. Cornelia obtained a list of McCoy’s medications for Shamblaw which he passed on to
Cottell. Shamblaw then spoke with the CNT who were en route to the scene.
25. A statement from Cornelia to McCoy was recorded for possible future use.
d) Thomas
26. Thomas, a general duty RCMP member, stated that he and another RCMP member were
located south of the Residence at the intersection of Range Road 223 and Township
Road 510.
27. A short time after arriving, Thomas observed a male (who he learned later was McCoy)
walk down the Residence driveway with what looked to be a long-barreled firearm,
dressed for the winter weather (wearing a winter coat, gloves and winter boots). McCoy
walked southbound on Range Road 223 towards Thomas.
28. Thomas yelled out to McCoy to put the gun down, identifying that he was the police, but
McCoy kept challenging Thomas to shoot him.
29. Thomas stated that at one point, McCoy did put his firearm down, but would not leave it;
he put it beside his feet and he stayed there. McCoy appeared to be focused on wanting
to die; he called Thomas a coward for not shooting him.
30. At that point, McCoy picked up what appeared to be a stick, a twig or a metal rod, placed
the butt of the firearm on the ground, leaned over the barrel and tried to put this device
against the trigger, like he was trying to activate the trigger, but he failed to pull the trigger.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 9 of 26
31. From his training, Thomas talked to McCoy, requesting that he put the firearm down and
also tried to obtain information for the other police.
32. After a couple of hours of walking back and forth, McCoy retreated back to the Residence.
33. Initially, Thomas thought that the firearm carried by McCoy was a shotgun with a scope
mounted on it, until McCoy moved his hand away; then Thomas saw what he believed to
be a bolt-action rifle.
e) Mundle
34. Mundle testified that he was part of the CNT, which, in turn, was part of the ERT – the
RCMP critical incident package.
35. Mundle testified that his role as a negotiator was to attempt to address a situation through
verbal communication before it escalated into anything else. Mundle was referred by
Stengel to the RCMP Tactical Operations Manual, Crisis Negotiation Responsibilities,
where it stated:
“The RCMP is committed to resolving potentially violent situations using the least amount
of force necessary. The RCMP recognizes that the use of trained negotiators is an
essential element of in the resolution of critical incidents. The primary objective of the
Crisis Negotiation Team at a crisis site is to negotiate the safe release of victims and the
surrender of offenders without death or injury to anyone.”
36. Mundle testified that in this situation he was the primary negotiator, the person
responsible for conducting negotiations with McCoy. Mundle stated that there was also a
secondary negotiator who provided support. The other members of the CNT were the
team leader (who acts as a liaison between the CNT and the incident commander) and a
scribe (who maintains a log of the negotiations and pertinent information).
37. The command post of the ERT was a large, enclosed truck located approximately a
kilometer north of the Residence, with two separate compartments; the lead compartment
contained the incident commander, his or her scribe, and any radio operators that
maintained communications for the team. The second compartment housed the crisis
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 10 of 26
negotiators.
38. At 1201 hours, Mundle began communicating via telephone with McCoy using a
negotiation model called the Behavioral Change Stairway. Mundle explained that the
initial component of this model is creating a situational assessment so that he can define
the individual into one of three categories which, in turn, determines how they move
forward. The second component is utilizing active listening skills so that he can engage
the individual, hopefully move onto rapport building and establish some type of influence.
Lastly, there is problem solving and the ultimate resolution of the incident.
39. Mundle stated that, despite having frequent contact with McCoy, he was not able to
establish a rapport with him; McCoy was extremely angry, confrontational, aggressive and
verbally abusive during the whole course of his conversations with Mundle. In Mundle’s
experience, most people cannot maintain that elevated anger level for such a long period
of time and eventually calm themselves to a point where meaningful discussions can
occur.
40. McCoy asked to speak to his wife multiple times as he wanted to say goodbye to her.
Mundle did not let this happen based on his concern that if this communication with
Cornelia was facilitated, McCoy would commit suicide shortly thereafter. This
assessment was reached after the other two members of the CNT spoke with Choy, a
psychiatrist. (Choy said that in 2011 he had an informal relationship with the RCMP; he
provided information from time to time to help the RCMP understand mental health
issues.) Choy advised the CNT members that it would not be conducive to resolving the
situation if McCoy was allowed to speak with his wife because he had a similar concern
with respect to McCoy committing suicide.
41. Mundle offered to play Cornelia’s recorded message to McCoy. That agitated McCoy and
he repeatedly said that he did not want to hear it.
42. Mundle requested that McCoy come out of the Residence peacefully, in which case,
Mundle would facilitate a face-to-face meeting with Cornelia and allow McCoy private time
for discussions. McCoy declined to do so.
43. During his conversations with McCoy, Mundle said that McCoy made repeated threats to
harm RCMP officers; he said that it was his intention to shoot an RCMP officer if he went
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 11 of 26
outside. McCoy also talked about sneaking out of the Residence and setting up an
ambush for the police officers outside.
44. Mundle suspected that McCoy had a plan of victim precipitated homicide with the police
(i.e., suicide by cop). This was confirmed by McCoy mentioning that he would shoot
himself, but that he would prefer if the police did it.
45. Mundle said that in his conversations with McCoy, he never reached the point where
there was actual bargaining for anything. McCoy was offered things during the day with
respect to food and talking to his wife, but he did not want to reach out and take
advantage of any of the suggestions.
46. McCoy suggested to Mundle that he had commenced drinking and that he was working
himself up to doing something. Mundle stated that as a negotiator, this raised concerns
as it moves the subject further away from being able to establish some kind of rational
communication and a meaningful discussion about resolving the issue.
47. Mundle advised McCoy that the police were in possession of a warrant allowing lawful
access to his Residence and that the gate thereto would be opened. Mundle asked
McCoy to prepare for this and to secure his dogs so that they would not escape. When
Mundle advised him that he would not be allowed to speak with his wife at that time,
McCoy’s response was “someone’s dead”. Then McCoy advised that he did not want to
speak to Cornelia anymore and that he just wanted to kill somebody.
f) Corbett
48. Corbett testified that the critical incident program triangle has a Critical Incident
Commander at the top and the other corners of the triangle have element leaders.
Corbett said that the tactical side was represented by the ERT, as led by him. The CNT
was represented by the senior negotiator on scene. Corbett stated that he took his orders
from Currie, the Critical Incident Commander. As the team leader, any option that Corbett
wanted to present as a plan had to be approved by the Critical Incident Commander.
49. Corbett said that his authorizations are derived from section 25 of the Criminal Code of
Canada (which authorizes the police to use as much force as reasonably necessary in
any circumstance to respond to any situation requiring police intervention) and from
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 12 of 26
directions of the Critical Incident Commander.
50. Corbett referred to the Incident Management Intervention Model in the RCMP Operation
Manual which is a guideline to RCMP officers regarding the use of different levels of
force; it is a tool to help teach a responsible use of force.
51. Corbett stated that after discussions with Currie about McCoy, it was determined to
activate the Critical Incident Team, comprised of the ERT and CRT.
52. Corbett testified that with McCoy not being contained, and therefore in a fluid situation,
the ERT provided guidance to the general duty RCMP members to make sure that
appropriate distances were kept and that they were not exposing themselves to risk.
53. The ERT team was composed of their optimum number of members that day, namely 12.
54. An “immediate action team” was deployed to the scene as quickly as possible in order to
give the general duty RCMP members some immediate help. Thereafter, a second
group, called the “deliberate action group” was deployed. During this time, the “deliberate
action plan” was developed that speaks to what they are hoping to accomplish to
encourage a successful and peaceful resolution.
55. From the incident command summary of the situation, the mission statement that was
given at 1047 hours was “to isolate, contain and negotiate the surrender of the armed and
barricaded male, ensuring public and police safety.”
56. Corbett stated that his tactical position was approximately 400 meters north of the
Residence on the Range Road and that the command post was further north of this
position.
57. Corbett received confirmation from the Critical Incident Commander that Corbett had the
ability to make decisions that he may not have time to refer to the Critical Incident
Commander and to use compromise authority, which means the use of as much force as
necessary under s. 25 of the Criminal Code.
58. Corbett authorized three observation posts to be set up around the Residence.
Snowmobiles were brought to the scene as a contingency based upon McCoy potentially
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 13 of 26
trying to leave the Residence other than via the driveway or the road. Further, there were
3 police dogs on scene. Corbett received information from the CNT about McCoy’s
intention to shoot the police. He was concerned with keeping McCoy contained in the
Residence and isolating his communication with the crisis negotiators, as well as with the
deep snow, cold weather and McCoy’s dogs.
59. At 1420 hours, it was reported that McCoy’s firearm was discharged. Corbett said that a
firearm being discharged is not indicative of moving towards a negotiated surrender.
60. Corbett stated that as tactical team leader, he was not trying to be intrusive or aggressive.
He did not want to come into McCoy’s yard. He wanted McCoy to come out.
61. At 1531 hours, McCoy was observed outside the Residence and appeared to be hunting
for RCMP member positions, which was putting himself at risk as well as RCMP
members. At this point, with the CRT having difficulties stabilizing McCoy, Corbett was
concerned that being winter, he was going to lose daylight and would not be in a strong
position to react to what McCoy’s actions may be. As such, he felt that he was going to
have a difficult time keeping his team safe.
62. As to the timeframe, at:
1420 hours - shot fired by McCoy;
1500 hours - TAV moved closer to the Residence;
1531 hours - McCoy seen leaving the Residence hunting for member positions;
1539 hours - spike-belt removed;
1622 hours - the Residence gate is breached by the TAV.
g) Currie
63. As the Critical Incident Commander, Currie testified that as part of the command triangle
he oversaw the CNT and the ERT along with other ancillary units which may respond.
Currie stated that darkness would afford some cover for ERT personnel, but because they
were not “tight to the Residence,” McCoy could emerge and not be visible. Currie felt that
the Crisis Negotiation Responsibilities (tab 23) and the Incident Management Intervention
Model (tab 27) were both followed in this situation.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 14 of 26
h) Handy, Wiebe, Williams and Lundeen
64. Inside the TAV were two EPS members and 4 ERT members (Handy, Williams, Lundeen
and Wiebe).
65. The TAV, a refurbished Brinks truck, was used in assisting to deploy a spike-belt at the
mouth of the driveway of the Residence and also to enable the ERT members therein to
get closer to the Residence for containment of McCoy.
66. At 1204 hours, Williams, received an update that McCoy advised that if he can’t speak
with his wife, he knows the police are outside and he will come out and shoot one; this
caused Williams to believe that they were dealing with a very distraught, unstable person
who was posing a significant risk not only to himself, but to every other police officer in the
area, especially the two ERT members who were the closest to the Residence providing
updates.
67. A little after 1503 hours, McCoy exited the Residence and came partway down the
driveway. He had no weapons visible in his hands. He was really aggressive,
challenging the police to jump out of the TAV and come and get into a fight with him.
Wiebe stated that the ERT members opted not to try and seize him at that time because:
a) there was still the gate in place with a lock mechanism;
b) there was a spike-belt across the driveway so they could not drive in; and
c) there was a lot of snow – waist deep in some places, so McCoy could easily get back
into the Residence and the tactical advantage would be on his side at that point.
68. Wiebe stated that, in his 10 years as a police officer, it was abnormal that a subject in
McCoy’s situation would state that he was going to murder one of the police members
and kill anyone he saw.
69. At 1528 hours, McCoy came out of the Residence with the firearm in his right hand,
pointed down and motioned for the police to come and get him. He then took a shooting
stance, squared his shoulders and legs and pointed his firearm at the TAV; this indicated
to Wiebe that McCoy knew how to use this firearm. After pointing his weapon for several
seconds at the TAV, McCoy went back into the Residence and then came out again
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 15 of 26
yelling at the ERT members to come and get him. McCoy went back into the Residence
once again and came out with the firearm.
70. Wiebe said that the members in the TAV heard via radio that McCoy told the negotiator
that he did not want to die on his property and he was going to come out on the road to
kill himself. He came down the driveway with the firearm and was again waving at the
ERT members to come and get him. He advanced about half way down the driveway.
Wiebe was a firearms instructor and examined the firearm carried by McCoy through his
binoculars. It appeared to him to be a fairly long barreled bolt-action rifle, but McCoy had
indicated that he had a shotgun. Although Wiebe did not know what kind of load was in
the shotgun, it was a concern as the longer the barrel, the tighter the spread of pellets and
the longer they are propelled without spreading. Therefore, in Wiebe’s words, McCoy
“could reach out and touch you at a much further distance with that. And you also have to
concern with a shotgun spread as it spreads out, its hitting things around you, behind
you…”
71. It was further communicated to the ERT members that McCoy had said that if he had a
clear shot, one of them would be down. The TAV was told to hold its position in order to
see if McCoy would become accustomed to it being there. Wiebe believed that if the TAV
was removed at that time and re-introduced, it could act as an agitator to McCoy, and
therefore, it was left in place so that hopefully he would become accustomed to it.
72. The RMI was deployed at 1620 hours on the driveway with a dual purpose – it had a
conducted energy weapon attached to it and it provided the ERT members with a closer
look at the Residence so that they might be able to see McCoy coming and going, which
they could not see from their vantage point in the TAV. The camera images from the RMI
were not directly viewed by the ERT members in the TAV; they were relayed information
as to what was being seen through telecoms.
73. The ERT members in the TAV received updates as to McCoy’s state. They were told he
was crying, that he was going to come out gunning for them, that he was highly agitated,
that the police had ruined his life and that he no longer wanted to talk to his wife; he just
wanted to come out and kill them on sight. The ERT members in the TAV were updated
when McCoy advised the negotiator that was putting more bullets in his gun. They were
told that McCoy called the police derogatory names and said that he was a good shot and
he was yelling to police to just shoot him.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 16 of 26
74. While McCoy was on the phone, Wiebe and Lundeen exited the back of the TAV with
Wiebe carrying a shield and went up to the main gate and removed the spike-belt and
then went back into the TAV. They did not want to deal with the lock on the gate as they
did not want to extend their time in the open.
75. The TAV breached the gate at 1622 hours. McCoy came out, saw what had taken place
and then went back into the Residence.
76. After the gate was breached, the armored vehicle backed up a little bit to create a bit of
space and to show that it was not aggressively going onto McCoy’s property.
77. At 1643 hours, McCoy came out of the Residence and walked down the driveway – he
had put on a different jacket and was wearing a toque, which Wiebe interpreted as McCoy
intending to be outside. McCoy walked through the open gate and shut it behind him. He
had a shotgun in his right hand pointed toward the ground. McCoy appeared to be very
focused and had a purpose to his walk.
78. At this point, Wiebe was alarmed as McCoy had earlier stressed that he was going to
come out and murder somebody. He was now dressed for the weather, he had left his
safe zone or protected area to go outside and he closed the gate behind him, so he could
not get back in. Wiebe viewed these factors as an act of finality by McCoy and believed
that McCoy was going to try and get into an armed confrontation and gun fight with the
ERT members.
79. McCoy walked right past the RMI and came toward the gate; the RMI was fairly large and
to not take any interest in it was concerning to Lundeen.
80. By McCoy closing the gate behind him when he exited the property, Lundeen believed
that McCoy had decided not to go back to the Residence and was looking for a
confrontation at that point in time. Williams felt that the situation was very unstable; it was
escalating as opposed to the goal of de-escalation.
81. After McCoy unsuccessfully attempted to get into the TAV, he turned and started walking
north toward the command post which was set up with civilian and general duty members
who were not as well equipped as the ERT members. Wiebe believed that McCoy knew
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 17 of 26
that people were there and that was where he was going. He was using profanity and
calling the members names; to Handy, it felt like McCoy was looking for a confrontation
with police.
82. Wiebe thought that the ERT members in the TAV could possibly use the taser on McCoy
through an open port, but McCoy did not stay in place very long and was wearing a thick
jacket that could defeat a taser. Further, Handy was concerned that if they opened a port,
McCoy could put the barrel of his gun through the port and discharge it into the TAV.
83. Up to that point, Handy had been on about 70 ERT calls and he had never had someone
break basic containment and go where he wanted to go. To Handy, McCoy was looking
for a confrontation with police and he was heading toward the command post area, which
was fairly vulnerable, with a firearm.
84. The last time Williams saw McCoy walking down the driveway, he appeared very goaloriented, focused and continued to walk in the direction of the gate and the TAV. This
was in contrast to his earlier appearances outside the Residence. The action of McCoy
closing the gate as he passed, signified to Williams that McCoy had no intention of
returning to his property, committing to either a confrontation or committing suicide.
85. After McCoy could not gain entry to the TAV, Williams’ immediate concern was that
McCoy was goal-oriented on encountering police in a lethal confrontation; if McCoy could
not engage the ERT members inside the TAV, Williams felt that he would focus on the
first police officer he could find.
86. When Corbett observed McCoy leave the Residence for the last time and walk in
Corbett’s direction after stopping at the TAV, Corbett asked the ERT members in the TAV
to exit the TAV and challenge McCoy to drop his firearm. Corbett said this was not what
they work towards and they wanted to avoid it. However, the situation they were left with
was a confrontation because McCoy had a firearm and he was going to be asked to drop
the firearm by police officers who were armed as well.
RCMP Confrontation with McCoy – The Shooting
87. When the ERT members exited the TAV and told McCoy to drop his gun, McCoy was
approximately 25 meters from the back of the TAV and the ERT members were
approximately 10 meters from the back of the TAV.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 18 of 26
88. The ERT members (Handy, Wiebe, Williams and Lundeen) verbalized that they were the
police; a lot of challenges were given to McCoy by at least 3 out of the 4 ERT members.
McCoy was walking away from the ERT members and, when challenged, he turned and
faced them with the firearm in his hand. McCoy said he wanted to speak with his wife.
a) Handy’s Description of Events
89. When Handy exited the TAV, he was holding his weapon on McCoy with the safety off.
90. After McCoy turned around to face the ERT members who exited the TAV, the other ERT
members were still giving challenges while Handy went quiet because he wanted the
commands to be clear. McCoy raised his gun up toward the ERT members and then put
his arms out into a ‘T’ position, his right arm with the firearm pointing west and his left arm
pointing east. From there, he brought the gun down by his side and looked at it. He then
basically flicked and jostled the firearm, brought it down, adjusted it and then the barrel of
the gun came up in the direction of Handy and Williams.
91. Handy feared for his life and discharged his service carbine; he shot until he felt the threat
was stopped. During the shooting, McCoy stiffened up and fell to his left like a tree that
had been cut down, and, as he did, he turned slightly.
92. At the time, Handy estimated that he fired 7 times. Handy was aware that Williams was
shooting beside him and that there was a lot of gun fire, but the sounds were distorted to
him as he was wearing ear muffs. He realized that one shot occurred to his right and that
was from Wiebe. Handy could not remember if McCoy was wearing gloves or mitts at the
time. To the best of his recollection, McCoy’s hand was not on the trigger-guard when he
was pointing the rifle outward, it was just ahead of it. However, when McCoy brought the
firearm down and up, his hand did move back toward the trigger-guard, but McCoy’s
finger was not on the trigger.
93. When asked why the TAV could not simply follow McCoy up the road, Handy stated that
the concern was to keep McCoy from going to the command post area, which was
vulnerable, and have him focus on the ERT members.
b) Wiebe’s Description of Events
94. After being told it was the police, to stop and drop the gun, McCoy stopped and turned
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 19 of 26
around to face the ERT members. At that point, McCoy’s gun was pointed at the ground.
Wiebe told him that he needed to put the gun down. McCoy yelled at Wiebe to “just shoot
me.” Wiebe told McCoy that nobody wanted to shoot him and reiterated his request to
McCoy to put the gun down, which continued in excess of a minute.
95. McCoy then brought his arms to a ‘T’ position, then dropped them to his side and became
silent, which raised Wiebe’s concerns. McCoy had a blank stare and Wiebe figured that
he was going to shoot him or some other member of the ERT team. Wiebe had his
firearm already pointed at McCoy and, at that point, Wiebe pulled his trigger, firing one
shot.
96. When he pulled the trigger, McCoy’s right arm started to come up and McCoy fell to his
left. When Wiebe followed him to the ground, he noted the rifle was now in front of
McCoy. Wiebe heard the reports from the M16’s being fired beside him, very muffled. As
time has progressed, Wiebe stated that either he could not remember or he had no clear
vision of the weapon being brought up by McCoy, but Wiebe made the decision to shoot
prior to McCoy raising the rifle because he believed that McCoy was going to shoot them.
Wiebe did not know if McCoy was wearing gloves or mittens, or if his finger or hand was
on the trigger-guard.
c) Williams’ Description of Events
97. Williams stated that when McCoy was walking away from the ERT members he placed
his carbine with his sights on McCoy and then began to give him verbal commands saying
“it was the police, stop, drop the gun and do it now” and repeated these commands.
98. McCoy turned around with the firearm in his hand, brought his arms to a ‘T’ with the
muzzle of the firearm pointing west and then brought the firearm muzzle down pointed
towards the ground.
99. While Williams continued his commands, McCoy said “shoot me” and asked why they
broke his gate. They continued to tell McCoy to drop the gun, but he did not. McCoy’s
gun muzzle started to come up pointing at Williams and Handy.
100. Williams shot his carbine at what he perceived to be a threat to himself and Handy. His
only thought was to stop McCoy before he or another ERT member was shot. Williams
recalled Handy firing simultaneously, but he was not aware of anyone else firing.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 20 of 26
Williams believed that he fired between 5 and 7 rounds. He stated that his common
practice was to load his magazine with 28 bullets, even though it holds 30, but he could
not confirm whether there were in fact 28 rounds loaded. When he turned his firearm in
after the shooting, there were 23 rounds remaining in the magazine.
101. Williams could not recall if McCoy was wearing gloves or mittens. Williams testified that
McCoy’s hand was on the wooden stock near the trigger mechanism, but could not recall
specifically if McCoy’s finger was on the trigger or on the frame.
d) Lundeen’s Description of Events
102. Like the other ERT members, Lundeen raised his rifle towards McCoy and gave
commands to McCoy to drop the gun. On the initial commands, McCoy turned to face
them holding the rifle downward with his right hand, barrel pointed toward the ground.
McCoy’s hand was covering the trigger-guard, and Lundeen could not tell if his finger was
on the trigger or not. Lundeen could not recall if McCoy was wearing anything on his
hands.
103. McCoy commented on the fact that they broke his gate. Through their communications,
Lundeen could hear that other RCMP members were moving toward them from the south,
but had a great deal of distance to come on foot. It seemed at least 30 seconds or so
while the ERT members continuously yelled at McCoy to drop the gun.
104. At this point, Lundeen stated that he feared for his life should McCoy raise the rifle.
Lundeen knew that if McCoy had any skill with a weapon and if he raised and shot that
gun at any one of the ERT members, even with Lundeen’s gun pointed at McCoy,
Lundeen would not be able to react fast enough. Through his training, Lundeen said that
if he waited for a gun to be pointed right at him and shot, he would not have time to react;
the other 3 ERT members would, but Lundeen would not as the target. He was very
concerned about that even though McCoy’s gun was still pointed at the ground.
105. Lundeen described McCoy raising his arms in almost a ‘T’ position, then bringing the
gun back down to the ground to the original stance and then the barrel of the gun began
to be lifted towards Lundeen.
106. At that point, Lundeen shot McCoy at least 2 times. McCoy started to fall and he started
to bring the gun upwards more towards the ERT members, at which point Lundeen shot
one more time. At the time, Lundeen was wearing soft-body armor, as well as ballistic
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 21 of 26
plates and a helmet specific to the ERT. Lundeen heard additional shots from his right
and observed rounds hitting the ground in front of McCoy.
107. Lundeen stated that if he’d been hit with a rifle round in the trauma plate, the plate
probably would have stopped the round, but had the round gone to his face, his shoulder
or any critical part of his body, he would most likely have been killed, if not seriously
wounded.
108. Lundeen said that his usual practice was to load 30 rounds in the magazine and then
remove 2 rounds.
Post Shooting
109. After the shooting had stopped, Handy called for the EMRT. Handy remained to cover
the other ERT members in case something happened and McCoy went for the firearm
again or there was some other threat to deal with. After McCoy fell to the ground, Wiebe
stated that he started moving toward him, but somebody grabbed and held him for a
second and told him to wait until a shield was obtained. Once that was in place, Wiebe
moved forward and grabbed McCoy’s left arm. The EMRT arrived on scene, opened
McCoy’s jacket which disclosed numerous wounds, and the EMRT advised that McCoy
was deceased.
110. After the shooting, McCoy’s firearm was handed to Thomas. He identified it as a 12gauge Gamester H&R Arms Company bolt-action shotgun. When the firearm was
handed to him, the safety was off. As the firearm had been struck by two bullets, Thomas
was unable to open the bolt to confirm if the chamber was empty or contained a live
round.
Autopsy
111. Bannach, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the Province of Alberta, conducted
the autopsy of McCoy and reviewed and signed the Certificate of Medical Examiner on
August 12th, 2011. The immediate cause of death was described as “multiple gunshot
wounds” and the manner of death was listed as “homicide”. Bannach opined that McCoy
died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 22 of 26
112. The autopsy report outlined that there were 17 gunshot wounds to McCoy’s body (with 8
bullets recovered), as well as multiple exit wounds. Major damage was done to the heart,
aorta and pulmonary artery with involvement also of the right and left lungs, stomach,
multiple small intestinal loops and the right kidney. There was extensive fracturing of the
left forearm and right and left knees.
113. The blood alcohol level of McCoy was over twice the legal limit to operate a motor
vehicle and there was reference to recent exposure to cannabis. As well, a small amount
of the anti-depressant drug Citalopram was detected.
114. Bannach explained that certain gunshot wounds evidenced other than front entry; those
labelled AA, BB, GG, DD and U were all posterior entry wounds. Bannach said that the
reference to the back or posterior of the body described a position on the body in relation
to what is known as the “anatomic position,” which is a person standing straight upright
with their head pointing forward, their arms down at their side and their palms facing
forward.
115. Bannach’s explanation as to why some of the gunshot wounds would have entered from
the posterior side is that either the shooter was standing behind the individual and
discharged a firearm, or the individual moved in relation to the shooter. A number of the
wounds as referenced (AA, BB & GG), indicated shots that all came from the left hand
side of the body toward the right hand side of the body. Bannach testified that if an
individual turned with the left side of his body toward the shooter who was initially
standing straight in front of them, these shots could come across the body in that way.
For the wound labelled as DD, the individual would have turned a little more than 90
degrees and similarly, for the arm wound labelled U, the individual could have turned or
an arm could have been brought up in front of the body receiving a gunshot wound to the
back of the forearm which, if it was in the anatomic position, would be coming from
behind, but this potentially would be coming from the front.
116. When asked if the force of being struck by the bullets would have turned a person,
Bannach said that it is a misconception from the movies that individuals who are hit by a
bullet will spin, as bullets do not enough power to do that. As such, the actual force of
bullets striking the body does not spin the body, but a person who is struck by a bullet
may flinch away as a result of being struck. However, this would be an involuntary motion
from the person and not the actual force of the bullet spinning the body. As to what would
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 23 of 26
cause multiple exit wounds from one bullet, such as on the left arm and left leg, these are
bullets that have struck bone causing the bullet to break up which, together with bone
fragments, create multiple exit wounds.
117. Of the 17 gunshot wounds, 12 entered from the front of the body and 5 from the back.
ASIRT Investigation
118. Schreiber was the primary investigator in relation to this incident and prepared the
ASIRT Report marked as tab 11 of Exhibit 1.
119. Schreiber testified that the ASIRT was formed as an initiative of the Chiefs of Police of
Alberta in conjunction with the Solicitor General to investigate incidents involving either
serious injury or death, or to investigate incidents that are deemed to be sensitive
allegations, such as sexual assault or corruption type files.
120. Regarding this incident, ASIRT’s investigative team arrived at the Sherwood Park
RCMP detachment at 18:30 hours on January 16th, 2011.
121. Handy, Wiebe, Williams and Lundeen were identified as “subject officers”, being those
directly involved in the incident that related to McCoy’s death; the officers who pulled the
triggers on their respective firearms. As well, 38 “witness officers” were identified, being
those who were otherwise involved in the investigation (i.e. having spoken to McCoy, as
negotiators or otherwise, and officers who were holding containment points). All of the
witnesses and subjects were either interviewed or references were made directly to the
police reports that they submitted.
122. Through the video and/or audio from the RMI, at 1641 hours, the RMI moved up the
driveway of the Residence. At 1646 hours, McCoy exited the Residence, walked past the
RMI down the driveway. What is next seen are the ERT members exit the TAV.
Thereafter, out of video sight, the audio recording revealed that at 1648:58 hours, there
were voices and repeated commands made to drop the gun, followed by McCoy
complaining that they broke his gate – there was a constant “back and forth” between
McCoy and the EMT members.
123. At 1649:33 hours, McCoy said “shoot me”, followed by several “drop the gun” comments
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 24 of 26
from the ERT members. Constant similar verbal exchanges thereafter occurred.
124. At 1649:50 hours, McCoy said, “all I want to do is go for a walk” followed three seconds
later by ERT demands “drop it, drop the gun” and, at 1650:01 hours, “put it down”. Then
there were further indiscernible verbal exchanges.
125. At 16:50:06 hours, the ERT command, “drop the gun now” was made, and at 1650:08
hours, the sound of multiple gunshots.
126. Schreiber stated in the ASIRT Report that the standoff lasted one minute and eight
seconds and the gunfire lasted less than two seconds (subject to echo and sound travel).
127. Schreiber was asked about the significance of the gunfire lasting that short period of
time. He responded “Well what it tells me as an investigator . . . is that all of the
members in the emergency response team were reacting and acting at the same time.
They were - - this wasn’t a situation where one member perceived a threat and then later
somebody else perceived another threat. This was a - - a reaction that they all had at that
instant and they all fired their weapons pretty much simultaneously”.
128. Schreiber testified that the ASIRT Report was sent to Clifton Purvis, the Executive
Director of ASIRT, who determined that the ERT members who shot McCoy were acting
lawfully within the parameters of section 25 of the Criminal Code.
Submissions
129. Submissions were made by Dej to the effect that despite the efforts of no fewer than 37
RCMP personnel, 2 EPS members and 3 emergency medical staff who attended to help
McCoy for several hours on a cold day, McCoy’s actions forced the RCMP to use lethal
force.
130. Dej pointed to the following actions of McCoy which left the RCMP no other choice:
•
McCoy was very distraught, verbally abusive, highly agitated and very angry, all of
which continued throughout the day.
•
McCoy was suicidal and made repeated threats to kill himself and anyone he saw.
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 25 of 26
•
McCoy did not respond rationally to the various efforts by the RCMP to assist him or
their entreaties to drop his weapon.
•
It appears that McCoy intended to engage the police in a confrontation to end his life.
•
McCoy expressed persistent and serious threats of death and harm to various police
officers over the course of the day.
•
He commented about setting up an ambush, that he would shoot himself, but he
preferred if they shot him.
•
In the final confrontation with ERT members, McCoy refused to comply with numerous
police requests to drop his weapon.
•
McCoy started drinking, had medical issues (depression and diabetes) and had
ceased taking his medications.
•
The transcript of McCoy’s conversations with Mundle over approximately four hours
revealed that he would not leave his guns outside, even to facilitate a conversation
with Cornelia. McCoy rejected all offers for assistance. When he expressed that he
did not want to talk to Cornelia any more, he said he just wanted to kill somebody.
•
When McCoy left the Residence for the last time, he was dressed for the weather,
unlike his earlier exists. He walked down the driveway with what appeared to be a
focus and a purpose that was not previously exhibited. He went through the gate and
closed it behind him. He tried to gain entry into the TAV. He started walking toward
the command post.
•
He refused repeated requests to drop his weapon from the ERT members who
confronted him on the road, despite their weapons all being trained on him. This
ultimately caused all four of them to perceive the same risk of death and/or grievous
bodily harm at the same time and react together by discharging their firearms at
McCoy.
131. Dej submitted that the RCMP and the EMT made sincere and professional efforts to
LS0338 (2014/05)
Report – Page 26 of 26
help McCoy as well as to keep Cornelia and members of the public safe.
132. Neither Dej nor anyone else made recommendations to this Inquiry that could have
prevented McCoy’s death or that could prevent similar future deaths.
Recommendations for the Prevention of Similar Deaths
133. I concur that the evidence supports the foregoing submissions. I am satisfied that the
RCMP members and the ERT members who were involved, did all that was reasonably
possible to achieve their goal, as outlined by Corbett, to contain, isolate and encourage
McCoy to arrive at a peaceful resolution through negotiation. I feel that the CNT adhered
to its objective of a peaceful resolution of the incident according to the hereinbefore
mentioned RCMP Tactical Operations Manual. McCoy left the TAV and started toward
the RCMP command post carrying his weapon and thereafter refused to comply with the
repeated demands to drop his weapon given by the four ERT members who then
confronted him. The actions of McCoy were perceived as a threat and reacted to by all
four ERT members simultaneously according to their training. This sadly resulted in
McCoy’s tragic death.
I have no recommendations for the prevention of similar deaths.
DATED
December 9, 2014
,
Original signed by
at
St. Albert
, Alberta.
Bruce R. Garriock
A Judge of the Provincial Court of Alberta
LS0338 (2014/05)
Justice and
Solicitor General
AXbeibk
I^)C
t; fc-f
PUBLIC FATALITY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
McCOY, MURRAY FRANCIS
EXHIBITS
iQ^^g^gg^gl^WgWJIItaBHHHHHH
Pages
MEDICAL EXAMINER'S DOCUMENTS
1.
Fatality Review Board Case Summary Recommendations
00001
2.
Certificate of Medical Examiner
00002
3.
Toxicology Report
00003
4.
Confidential Autopsy Report Form
00004
5.
Autopsy Report
00005-00013
EMS DOCUMENTS
6.
Strathcona County Emergency Services Ground Patient Care Report
00014-00015
7.
Strathcona Emergency Services Incident Report
00016-00018
RCMP DOCUMENTS
8.
RCMP K Division Occurrence Details
00019-00060
9.
O/C Criminal Operations - Administrative Review - McCoy Sudden Death
00061-00066
10.
Member-Firearm Discharge "K" Division - Independent Officer Review
00067-00088
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
ERT Debriefing Report - ICS Form #1225e
Handwritten IA/DA Emergency Operational Plan
Handwritten Radio Log (audio not included)
Notes - Cpl. Corbett, Team Leader
Curriculum Vitae - Handy/Lundeen
Edmonton Fall Qualification Scores (Handy, Lundeen, Wiebe,
Williams)
Sgt. Mundle's notes (audio and video not included) and
transcribed negotiations
Edmonton ERT Incident Command Summary
Mandate Memo, dated 2011.01.20
Critical Incident Program CIC - Insp. Steinke, Incident
Commander
ASIRT report - see Tab 11
'K' Division ERT Organization Chart and Policy
Supt. Lee's notes
00089-00091
00092-00095
00096-00108
00109-00120
00121-00149
00150
00151-00404
00405-00424
00425-00458
00459-00463
00464
00465-00470
00471-00474
PUBLIC FATALITY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF M C C O Y , MURRAY FRANCIS
PAGE 2
EXHIBIT BINDER
1 Tab
Description
Pages
ASIRT
11.
ASIRT Investigation into Homicide - Officer Involved Shooting Final Report
00475-00507
12.
Statement of Cst. Christopher Handy
00508-00511
13.
Statement of Cst. Brad Lundeen
00512-00516
14.
Statement of Cst. Wayne Williams
00517-00521
15.
Statement of Cpl. Gregory Wiebe
00522-00529
16.
Interview and Walkthrough Summaries of Cpl. Gord Corbett
00530-00537
17.
Interview Summary and Summary of Negotiator's Recordings of Sgt. Brent
Mundle
00538-00548
18.
Interview Summary, Supplementary Occurrence Report and Briefing NOK to
Criminal Operations of Sgt. Tom Kalis
00549-00556
19.
Interview Summary of Cst. Joe Tassone/interview transcript
00557-00564
20.
Interview Summary of Cst. Scott Innes/interview transcript
00565-00578
21.
Interview Summary of Cst. Kurt Thomas, Cst. Thomas' Supplementary
Occurrence Report
00579-00584
22.
Summary of Review of Video Incident Capture (VICS) Recordings
00585-00598
RCMP POLICIES
23.
RCMP Tactical Operations Manual - Crisis Negotiation Team s. 3.1
Crisis Negotiation Responsibilities - Version in place in 2010
00599-00604
24.
RCMP Tactical Operations Manual - Crisis Negotiation Team s. 3.1
Crisis Negotiation Responsibilities - Current Version
00605-00612
25.
RCMP Tactical Operations Manual - Crisis Negotiation Team 3.2
Selection, Training and Equipment - Version in place in 2010 and
present
00613-00614
26.
RCMP Tactical Operations Manual - Crisis Negotiation Team 3.3 Crisis
Negotiation Responsibilities - Version in place in 2010 and present
00615-00616
27.
RCMP Operational Manual - Incident Management Intervention
Model
00617-00639
Justice and
I Solicitor General
^Albert*.
t>cL trf- o^
PUBLIC FATALITY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF
McCOY, MURRAY FRANCIS
ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS
Tab
Description
Pages
CURRICULUM VITAES
1.
Dr. Bernard Bannach
00640-00644
2.
Dr. Alberto Choy
00645-00653
3.
S/Sgt. Brent Mundle
00654-00665
4.
Cpl. Gregory Wiebe
00666-00679
5.
Cst. Wayne Williams
00680-00711
6.
Cpl. Gordon Corbett
00712-00715
7.
Insp. Ian Currie
00716
OFFICER NOTES
8.
Cst. Thomas
00717-00719
9.
Cst. Shamblaw
00720-00723
10.
Cst. Chris Handy
00724-00732
11.
Cst. Wayne Williams
00733-00742
12.
Cpl. Gregory Wiebe
00743-00749
13.
Insp. Ian Currie
00750-00757