The officers and men of the Armed I`urccs of the Philippines

■l'.\.\rB.\Il.\ 24 (200-): r5-188
An Insider's View on Military Intervention^
IVIilo D. Maestrecampo
Ecitor's note: Tht- authur had been eight years in service in the Philippine Army
(PA) when he joined the Magdnlo, a reform organization in the military that brake
away to stage thefntied Oakwood mutiny on 27July 2002. He wrote this discussion
(
fouryeats after Oakwood, while he was in detention and awaiting the sentence on
the guilty plea he filed before the military tribunal. On 22 August 2007. he was
dishonot ably el/sehaigedfrom militaiy serviceJor violation ofArticles of War 96.'
Intentions and obligations of soldiers
The officers and men of the Armed I'urccs of the Philippines
(i \ I 'P) rypical!\' begin their career in tlie service as junior troops
in the bat ilc'tront. I'pon entrv into the service, thev carry with
tlicm the rcvolLiti<)narv fer\'or, the ideals, principles, and patriotism, as
well as the desire for their service to contribute to the realization of
noble aspirations for the country and its people. The tours of duty in the
frontlincs expose the soldiers firsthand to the ill effects of this nation's
problems as seen in the lives of the ordinary people and in the experience
of the common soldiers. Amid the people's unabated suffering and the
itrational prnctices in the AFP that needlesslv sacrifice worthy men in
the frontlincs, the soldiers' revolurionarv fervor gains strength and the
quest for a desiraijie cliange becomes imperative. However, soldiers
jTiust be prudent and cautious in channeling their energy and efforts as
the)' tnke action to initiate genuine revolution. Whatever actions soldiers
f^ke, die consequences have the potential to be national in scope and
would act like a magnet to political forces out to take advantage of the
goldiers' noble intention.
Soldiers mn\" hn\'c pure intentions, but on their own, the\' do not have
the capability to sec through the achievement of the desired end-state. It
Mii.o D. MAi'.s
176
w
ould take tactical alliance with f)thcr sectors, a function tiint soldiers
uld be ill-advised to undertake as it overreaches the mandate ot the
wo
military in a democratic country such as ours. Should this happen, the
soldiers' desired end-state becomes pawn to unexpected consecjuences.
to whims and maneuverings, and the soldiers' role is reduced to plaving
support to the emerging political blocs out to make a power grab.
Even if the movement were to succeed in overthrowing the powers
that be, it would not be up to the soldiers to decide on the political
leadership that would replace those wko would have been deposed.
Neither would it be appropriate for the soldiers to hold political power
even if the intention were to use that power to ensure the political
reforms necessary to better the lot of the people in the countryside. In a
TAMBAR.\ 2-t
17
order to set the track toward genuine reforms that would expedite the
realization of the soldiers' desired end-state.
By the looks of it, military intervention has become a necessary
ingredient in working to realize a revolution. In truth,what the successful
ones accomplished had been merely to oust the sitting president. The
fruits of a genuine revolution had not been attained by these exercises.
However, for better or worse, the romantic notion that soldiers can
organize for reform movements within the .\FP had been set. The
1980s saw the formation of the Reform the Armed Forces,^ the Soldiers
of the Filipino People (SFP), and the Young Officers Union (YOU).
In more recent history, there are the Magdalo Group of the Oakwood
democracy, that is not the mandate of the militarw
mutiny, the Kawal, and the YOU - New Generation (YOUng).
Recent political developments are inadequate to explain the
emergence of these reform movements in the AFP. This revolutionary
A history ofmilitary intervention
fervor has its roots in the heroism of Andres Bonifacio and the KKK,^
and is embedded deep in the soul of every Filipino. It finds expression
Sincethe 1986HDSA People Power Revolution,military intervention
has gained prominence in the Philippines as an instrument to effect a
change in political leadership. In 1986. the tandem of AbP \'ice Chief
of Staff Fidel Y. Ramos(b\'R) and Defense Minister )uan Prince F.nrile
was responsible for a c'o//p de/c// against the Marcos presidency. F.DSA 1
installed Corazon C. Ac|uino as president. 1 lowever, just months after
she took over the reins of government, a restive militar\", impatient with
the slow pace of reforms undertaken by the .\ciuino administration,
sought to make its displeasure felt through a series of coup attetiipts. the
bloodiest being the otie that took place in December 1989.
In 1992, PVR became president. It was at this time that the nation
was seemingly coup-free. Ramos was succeeded by )oseph b.jercito
Estrada in 1998.
given the call of the times..\s society evolves, it brings about new forms
of oppression to the common people. Flowever it is achieved,seeing the
abject condition of the people awakens the soldier's revolutionary fervor
and fans the flame for the quest for genuine reform. The formation of
reform groups are just symptomatic of the revolutionary fervor that lies
in the heart of ever\- Filipino soldier.
Flowever, change should not be sought for the mere purpose
of change. The bitter lessons learned from the history of military
interventions in this country should be heeded. While there indeed is
just cause to seek a specific set of conditions that have to be in place
for a revolution to spell a success, it is paramount that any act toward
this end should first be well-considered and only taken when it is sure
to culminate in the attainment of no less than the objective. Simply
In 2001, Estrada was ousted from power through FiOS.\ 2, an
said, responsible revolutionaries should abstain trom initiating military
event that had the decisive lactor in the form of military inter\'ention
intervention when the attainment of the desired end-state is clearly out
consisting ot the withdrawal ot support bv the .XFP through its (.hu-t ol
of sight and the costs and negative trade-oils required in mounting it are
dangerously imminent. That will be doing more harm than good.
Staff himself,.\ngclo Reves.
President Ciloria Macapagal Arroyo(CM.\) was carried to power in
the wake of Estrada's ouster. She had barely warmed her seat as president
of the land when junior officers and their men undertook the Oakwood
mutiny on 27 juiv 2003. This was an attempt to unseat the president in
MUX)D. MAl£S i Ri:c:.\MPO
178
TAMBAIE\ 24
179
which it started out. By no means were their signatures on the manifesto
a rubber stamp on the existing corruption and wrongdoings in the AFP
Lessons learned from military intervention
organization.
As a caveat, what follows in this section is not intended to prescribe
Rather, those who signed this manifesto recognized that the
post-Oakwood developments pushed the Magdalo to where it had no
intention of going—the domain of politics. For some, however, finding
to the reader a certain form of action. Rather, this is to provide an inside
view on the intricacies of staging an exercise at military intervention.
Inasmuch as it has been the experience of the writer, the (^akwood
mutiny is referred to as an example where necessary.
the movement in this unexpected and unwanted situation was taken as
an opportunity for them to engage the politicians, this time with the
intention to align against the current administration."^
Intentions. A rightist movement or military intervention stems
from numerous intentions—patriotic, noble, and genuinely borne from
the heart of a revolutionist. Reform is the primarv battlecry of every
soldier, and rightfully this is reasonable as the country and its people
But at the end of the day, the Magdalo are soldiers, not politicians.
Soldiers should remain soldiers, and the Magdalo soldiers who signed
the manifesto to adhere to the AFP did so as an act of closure to their
involvement in a futile exercise that had been put to issue bv unscrupulous
politicians in order to further drag down the Filipino nation.
are indeed mired in undesirable social and economic conditions. It is
recognized that ultimately the political system requires retorm for this
country to take its rightful place among other nations.
Coalition offorces. Considering that the Filipino society is so
complex, the military faction alone will not be able to effect substantive
change. There are many sectors representing various interests that have
to be considered, as they would become crucial to the attainment of the
goal. Any movement for reform has to factor in alliance with the sectors
that can provide the necessary resources for the planned mobilization.
However, linking with these sectors necessitates that the revolutionists
give in to trade-offs, allowing the interests of these groups to dilute the
pure and noble intentions of the movement. Also, access to resources
has a way of dividing the revolutionaries on the matter of decisionmaking. Military intervention has an ad hoc structure, and this allows
for the possibility that whoeyer controls the movement's access to
resources controls the group's direction. It is also not totally impossible
that control extends to grafting the resources.
The 160,000-strong AFP is only a small part of the Philippine
From the selfless point of view of a revolutionist, to fight tor
the common Filipino is an expression of service. But perhaps just as
compelling are the specific intentions with which revolutionists interpret
and justify their actions as a fight for the common Filipino. I hese include
the need to realize a reformed AFP, reform the government, institute
systemic and structural reforms, cleanse the bureaucracy (executive,
legislative, and judicial), arrest poverty, eliminate graft and corruption,
bring prosperity to the countryside, resolve insurgency and secessionist
problems, and contribute militarily in the revolution. The desired endstate, to the view of the revolutionist, must achieve all the foregoing
conditions. Anything less would fall short of the mark.
W hat about ideology? Ideology is basically the doctrine, deep belief,
or strong opinion espoused by a group of people which prescribes a
definite course of action to achieve genuine revolution. The Magdalo
does not have this.
The Magdalo was a composite of units and individuals that joined
society. The AFP on its own, much less so just a small fraction of it,
together in just a short span of time. Each of them held a different
opinion and belief on how to go about realizing the reform agenda.
With no single track to follow, as in the ideokigy prescribed by hardline
could not effect substantial change and reform without involving the
broad spectrum of society. Coalition is a necessity. As a result, the
objectives and aspirations of the group will have to be realigned with
communists, the members became highly \'u]nerable to the influences
the interest of the other forces, especially the political forces that have
engulfing them. This was clearly evident when a f action of the Magdalo
Group signed a manifesto signifying intent to go back to the .\FP, for
the reason that the Magdalo was not anymore true to the intentions with
much to gain in the success of the exercise.
1 hree things could happen with these alliances: 1. The military
faction could preserve its interest by handling the other forces in a way
i
TA.\n3AlL\ 24
MILO D. MAI'STRI-CA-NfrO
180
181
was the bitter experience of the Magdalo to have been taken advantage
of by political and other interest groups. Then, too, with the Magdalo
as to exact from these the rccjiiireci resources, and drop them when the
objective has been secured;2. I he other forces could handle the mihrarv
soldiers in detention after Oakwood, their fate was not anymore within
faction in a way that the latter secure their objective, upon which rime
their control and opportunists wasted no time to use the movement for
their own purposes.
The RAM and the Magdalo experiences have shaken out of the
woodwork all those forces that would be among the most interested in
the event of a military intervent ion. These parties will have to be taken
into consideration by future military interventionists as these forces will
they drop the soldiers; and 3. A compromise to reconcile interests and
share the spoils of victory—if and when achieved is hammeied out.
I.et us examine briefly thir lessons to be learned trom the expei ii fu i
of the RAM in undertaking the 1986 military intervention exeic ise.
perceived bv manv to have been a success because it had culminated
in the ouster of Marcos. But a closer look would show that the turn ot
events thwarted the achievement ot the RAM's initial goal and deflected
definitely try to influence events to serve their own distinct interests.
There is the Philippine Left that will support any campaign for
military intervention as it would be beneficial to its broader, ideologybased struggle. An alliance with the military, or even with just a fraction
the RAM from the execution of its plan. In order tt) achieve its objective,
the RAM found that it had to make and accept compromises with an
overwhelming number of societal forces; The Church, civil society, the
C.ory supporters, the militant elements, and the Pihpino masses that
of the AFP, would already be a tactical victory that the Left could
exploit for its formidable propaganda potential. Any form of political
flooded RDSA on 22-25 February 1986.
destabilization erodes the strength of the state machinery, a condition
that benefits the l.eft, as it moves the nation closer to conditions ripe for
General Offensive and General Uprising.
XX'hile the People Power Re\'olution was initiated by the military
faction of Ramos and Fmrile, with Gregorio Honasan as the combat
commander, the revolutionists found themselves marginali/.eil when
There arc the politicians, especially those that are shut out from the
corridors of power, who would welcome military intervention inasmuch
the smoke cleared. Worse, Aquino's agenda for dividing the spoils of the
victory prioritixed benefits ft>r the Philippine Left, the military's sworn
enemy. Ironically, in committing the sacrifice to rectify injustice and
as it has come to mean the alternative route to power. The political
scene in the Philippines is fragmented, as shown for example by the
serve the people, the efforts of RAM ultimately earned for the soldiers a
distinct lack f)f appreciation from those who benefited the most. Worst.',
2004 Presidential elections that had the different factions of Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ), GMA,Panfilo Lacson, Raul Roco, and Eddie Villanueva
battling it out. In the sidelines arc the networks that could be called
it made possible the realignment of Leftist elements into positions where
they could inflict major damage to the AFP.
The RAM leadership realixed that the gains from the People Pow er
into play by FA'R, FTlgardo .\ngara, Eduardo Cojuangco, and other
emerging political stalwarts.
One feature in common among these political factions, be it in the
Revolution were a far crv from what thev initially set f)ut to do. Fhis was
one of the compelling reasons whv coup attempts were made during the
Opposition or in the Administration, is that they all have influential
Aquino presidency.
What exactly did the 1986 military intervention achieve, if any thing?
It ciianged the leadership, but it did little to change the living conditions
of the vast majority of the Filipiiif) people. In this sense, there w as no
genuine revolution.
In comparison,the 2fll)3 milit a r\ intervention by the Magdalo C ir< )up
was intended to correct conditions of systemic graft and corruption
and address the issue of .XFP reform to imprtwe the living condition
crooks, corruptors, and bad elements within their ranks. Their presence
underlines the need for the military to be insulated from politics.
However, this becomes impossible during a military intervention. It is
more realistic to assume that coalition and alliances would be made.
The danger here, as was said before, is that the genuine and noble
intentions of the soldiers would be compromised by their alignment
with unscrupulous political animals. And when the smoke clears even
in victory, the military interventionists would likely find themselves
among those shut out from the corridors of power.
of battlelr(ait soldiers, among other imperative issues tor the G.VIAs
uoyernment to address. 1 iowever, m mounting the()akwood exi-rcise. it
A.
182
TAMBARA 24
MILO D. MAHSTRI-CAMPO
183
units are constantly rotating, a fact that makes difficult the developi
There,too,is the formidable force of the(Church. In the Philippines,
the adherence to the principle of separation of the C.hurch and the State
of cohesiveness and interoperability required for the execution of such
)ment
a delicate mission. .\nd even before the problem of task organization
is purely superficial/' However, the religious sector is acknowledged to
be the decisive factor in bringing the multitude out on the streets for
becomes a matter for consideration, there has already been the difficulty
posed in constituting the membership of the group," as there is the high
a convincing display of people power. The Church has the resource to
gather the civilian component and provide the moral guidance in the
execution of the revolutionary action. This kind of clout could not be
probabilit}' ol the recruitment being monitored.
lightly dismissed by anyone planning to stage a successful operation.
In addition, there are the civil society groups, the business sector,
with a meager and non-cohesive organization whose chance for success
greatly depends on the sympathy and turnaround of other military units
the elite, the student sector, the academe and the intelligentsia, among
and the civilian sectors. With so much that is not within the soldiers'
control, so many things are bound to go wrong, and the desired end-
On D-Day then, the military intervention group is likely to move
others. Each among these groups could generate strength to iiiBuence
state will drift well out ot sight.
events as they unfold and derail the revolutionist movement from its
intended path.
Indeed, there are so many factors and considerations that may
Planning a military intervention is not limited to the military aspect
only. The political and higher level aspect need to be planned as well,
and this necessitates liaising with civilian elements. In the experience of
the Magdalo, some of the members toyed with the idea that the group
could make use of the resources of the civilian political component
not immediately be factored in by a group of soldiers that moves to
undertake military intervention.
Plan and execution. Blunders, irregularities, and commitment
violation are a fact of military intervention. These result in the break
in cordial relationships between otherwise reasonable and good people.
The tactical blunders jeopardize the mission and remove any chance
to attain the desired end-state. As objectives have to be won through
for the Magdalo to mount the Oakwood exercise used their investment
to derive returns in the political arena, and this they did without feeling
firefight and skirmishes,violence and bloodshed become imminent when
the need to seek the permission ot the Magdalo.
soldiers embark on their execution of a plan that requires the seizure of
The usual paradigm ot a military intervention has the ingredients
of the 1. Situation; 2. Mission; 3. Execution; 4. Service support; and
because they thought that when success would have been achieved, the
Magdalo would still have control over how things would proceed. Of
course, this never happened. 1 he civilians who provided the resources
Malacanang and key installations, to include Camp Aguinaldo, Camp
Crame, and Villamor Airbase, seaports, business centers, airports,
5. Command and Signal. In the case ot Oakwood, there was a clear
power and communication facilities, as well as media outfits.
situation that deserved correction. Similarly, the Magdalo Group was
ready for the mission to secure the military objectives. However, at the
point of execution, it had been the painful experience of the Magdalo that
those who committed to the mission did not show up,leaving the soldiers
to face all the negative consequences. In addition, the /weorganization
of the Magdalo made command and signal blurred and confusing.
The 1986 People Power Revolution prescribed the model that
subsequent attempts at military intervention sought to tollow. In order
to oust a sitting president, two basic elements shtiuld be present: 1.
The military element; and 2. The civilian element where the political
component will emanate. The model for People Power Revolution has
been doctrinized in such a way that tactics and strategy evolved as a
formula for toppling down a president—a formula that everyone seems
But perhaps the most bitter lesson learned from Oakwood has to do
with the utilization of ser\-ice sup|")ort. In the .ATP, there is a valid gripe
with how the top level is not able to bring the resources to the field and
to want to try and achieve for his or her self-interested ends.
Planning and executing this model is difficult because of the ud hoc
the line units that need it. In the Magdalo experience, the very same
structure of reformist membership. Up to the moment of execution, the
military planner cannot ascertain what units to utilize for what task. AFP
level of the movement got more ot the resources and the comforts that
gripe it fought against teatured in its operations, d'hose at the higher
L
MUX)D. M.\i:STRRCAMPO
TAxMBARA 24
184
185
All these battletronts had to be fought simultaneously and the
went with these. The civilians antJ militaty elements that composed the
decision-makers conducted their meetings in high class liotels. I hose
in the field and line units had to be content with aM-ro and sardines
playeis that assembled tor the skirmishes were just mind-boggling in
number. These included the forces of the Philippine Left, the political
Opposition, administration, civil society, business community, media
networks, religious groups, the Social Democrats, parliamentary
as provisions for the execution phase. How can that be revolutionary?
That was hypocrisy!
Muslim community, the secessionists, and the terrorists,
to name a few. I hen there was the reaction from the international
Uncontrollable battlefield. Once actions for military intervention
are initiated, the tide carries the revolutionaries to uncharted waters of
community, especially the United States that is ever so wary to protect
its investments in the country.
Any move tor military intervention puts the soldiers in a situation
political maneuverings for which they arc ill-prcparcd to control. The
trade-offs erode the purity of noble intentions. And the soldiers, despite
the full intention to be patriotic, ironically find themselves committed
where they arc at the mercy ot the events as they unfold.The revolutionists
open themselves up to be taken advantage of by opportunists. An
example in the experience of the Magdalo Group was the directive of
Ka Roger Rosal of the CPP/NPA/NDF" which gave instructions to
to actions that endanger the nation and its people.
To the soldier, the objective of the military interventK)n, while
national in scope, is at first glance simple enough to realize. It is after
all just another kind of battle. Soldiers begin toying with the idea of a
military intervention bearing in mind the kind ot battlefield for which
the military has trained for. But in the soldiers paiadigm of battle, the
enemy is identified and the path toward the desired end-state is perfectly
clear. During the engagement of fipposing foues, doctiines ot wai
through tactics and strategy are applicable. .And when the smoke clears,
the line units to encourage defection by ground army units to the New
People's .Army (NPA). I lis directive attached the letter signed by the six
core leaders ot the Magdalo. While this Magdalo letter was authentic,
it was a letter tor the dependents intended to be read out during mass.
It was a sad development that the communists managed to covertly
infiltrate the ranks ot the junior officers. Ka Roger's use of the letter for
his purpose created the impression that the Magdalo had aligned itself
the result could be ascertained with the decisive route of the enemy.
with the CPP/NPA/NDF.
However, for military' interventionists, it is not as easy as it looks.
The action will bring the soldier to an uncontrollable battlefield where
his paradigm of battle would be rendered inadequate to allow him
to comprehend, much less take control. I'or one, the players are not
limited to two opposing forces. Rather, there will be a multitude of
players, each fighting to secure what is to his interest. 1 he entry of these
identified and unidentified players makes the arena more complicated
and infinitely more difficult to understand. 1 his was the situation that
the Magdalo Group found itself in almost immediately after it made its
move and even during the detention of its mcnibers.
The bigger picture. The economy takes a battering. Statistics show
that military intervent ions plunge the country into a worse condition,the
very opposite of what it seeks to bring about, and it does so immediately.
While the Oak wood exercise was still playing out, for example,the Swiss
and French Ambassadors described it as an incident "that had further
eroded the already tainted the image of the country in the international
business communit)."
The comment was not off mark. Consider that in 2003, the gross
domestic product (CM^P) grew at a measly 4.2 percent, instead of the
projected 5.2 percent. Gross national product (CiNP) grew at 5.4
There was the media battlefront where the Magdalo had to fight it
out to win the battle ofpublic impression. 1 here was the legal battlefront
where the odds of winning are heavily in favor ot those who can exploit
the technicalities, something that the soldier has not been trained to do.
There was the political battlefront where the soldier had to detend the
percent, instead ot the targeted 5.7 percent. The dollar exchange rate,
while already exhibiting a downtrend at mid-year, further deteriorated
to its lowest levels in the aftermath of Oakwood. From an average
of PhP51.60 to the USDl in 2002, the peso dramatically devalued to
an average of PhP54.20 in 2003. In the international scene, exports
platform on which his claim for posterity was premised. 1 heie was the
moral battlefront in the ultimate struggle for the moral high ground in
order to win the hearts and minds of the populace.
rife
TAMB.\R.\ 24
MILO o. MAF-:S'rRi:C.\MPO
187
186
dropped after the incident and the Philippines fell fro.n eighteen to
twenty-two out of thirty Asian countries surveyed by the Interrianona
Management Development (IMD) that year on competitive.iess to
The natural complexity ofsociety. Ideology, politics, and aspects of
national situation arc dynamic and evolving. They cannot be designed
or pre-projected. Proper calibration of actions must be undertaken in
attract foreign investment.
order not tt; do more harm than good. To assume that revolutkjnists
could direct the course of ideology, politics, and aspects of the national
situation is to arrogantly and erroneously overreach the soldiers"
Indeed, the Oakwood incident was not the only reason or t le
reversal of fortune suffered by the Philippines in 2003. Ihcic was the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) scare in Asia and the Iraq
war that took their toll on the Philippine economy. Still, it would be
training, understanding, and capability. These are things beyond the
soldiers' power to control. To be responsibly productive, soldiers need
prudent to say that Oakwood did not help stabilize the conditions in the
not initiate radical societal phenomena, but should limit themselves to
Philippines under which the vast majority f)l juople were sulleiing.
But perhaps more alarming among the consequences ot the Magdalo
options within their mandate and their capability.
intervention was the way it had set the precedent to license the seeming
Conclusion
rebellion of junior officers against the AFP leadership. And while the aim
of the Magdalo was to reform the AFP and not to destroy it, the horizontal
divide it caused in the ranks could only be beneficial to the enemy. \X ith a
This paper w as conceptualized from the perspective of a former
military interventionist who. despite whatever legal and professional
broken AFP,the Left would have a field day pushing its agenda.
consequences ins actions would merit, has held on to the ideals of
patriotism and service to the people in his recognition of a desired
Hypothetical assumption ofan end-state. The path has been laid out
that would allow them to be more productive and efficient in the service ot
end-state for the good of the AFP and the nation. It is his experience
and observation that sometiines, in the soldiers' quest to find personal
relevance to their service to the country, they try to accomplish great
the people. A desired end-state is an ideal. As a tool to achieve it, military
things wiihoLii realizing that liie greatest tasks tt> be done are in fact
for the officers and men of the AFP to follow. There is no alternative path
intervention is inappropriate. Understanding the odds, the probabilities,
and the futilities of employing it would be fruitful learning.
VC'^here will the end of the road be for the military interventionist?
History shows that there are three end-state scenarios; 1. Oefeat makes
detention a likely proposition. Those who would defy this would find
themselves taking on fugitive status. Worse, they may turn rebels; 2.
Protracted struggle may ensue from a stalemate. Confrontation will
escalate and there will be a polarization of forces leading up to the
likelihood of a civil war. Destruction of lives and property, economic
breakdown, and political uncertainty will be in the cards; and 3. 1 he
optimistic assumption is that the intervention will result in success.
Assuming that the battlefield was controlled and all the forces agree
to somehow unite to bring about change,is there a chance for the military
idealist to realize his initial well-defined objectives for the AFP,the ccmntry,
and the Filipino people? History shows that it is not to be. In the aftermath
of EDSA 1 and EDSA 2, the AFP remained rife with corruption and the
vast majority of the Filipino people continued to suffer.
the little ones. In the course- of a soldier's service to the country, he may
at one time find himself at a crossroad where he has to consider what
action to take.
Consider the path analogy: There is a yellow path and a red path.
Everyone seems to think that when you are taking the yellow path, you
are bv deduction and false conclusion in the red path. They fail to see
that there is a white path where the people walk with courage, integrity,
and loyalrv; a path whe re- one need not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate
those who dei. This path is \ er\- hard to discern because the white path
sometimes crosses the \ e-llow and the red. But it is there lor men with
the right heart and mind whose intents are aligned with Clod.
Patriotism, idt-alism, and principles make soldiers desire to take
huge leaps, but true ri-s]Tonsibiliiv requires that the little tasks be also
seen to. There, too, is a kind » >t greatness in seeing to it that the soklier
takes his responsibilii ies si-nousK.
MILO D. MAl-S rilECAMPO
188
Notes
• Condensed by Gail Ilagan from the discussion points written by .Iilo
Maestrecampo.The original version was intended to accompany a Power Point
presentation. The publication of this article has the author's permission.
" Conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman.
^ The RAM has since been renamed the Rebolusyonaryong .\lyansang
Makabayan (RAM).
* Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang na Katipunan nang manga .\nak ng Ba\an, a
revolutionary movement that sought liberation from Spanish colonial lule in
the late 1800s.
"* Former Magdalo spokesperson Antonio Trillanes 1\, for example, refused
to plead guilty to the crime of rebellion and even ran for senator in the 2007
national elections under the banner of the United Opposition. He won.
'•Editor's note; Taking its mandate from the compendium of Catholic Social
Doctrine, the Catholic Church in the Philippines exercises strong commitment
in teaching the faith as constitutive to the teaching of social justice. It,
therefore, considers participation and engagement in the sociopolitical arena
as a manifestation of its prophetic function.
'Cooking pot.
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National
Democratic Front.