Open File - International Recovery Platform

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9I<8BK?IFL>?
BREAKTHROUGH
Thousands of Paths toward Resolution
THE EXECUTING AGENCY OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR ACEH AND NIAS
(BRR NAD–NIAS)
April 16, 2005 - April 16, 2009
Head Office
Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20
Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh
Indonesia, 23247
Telp. +62‑651‑636666
Fax. +62‑651‑637777
Nias Representative Office
Jl. Pelud Binaka KM. 6,6
Ds. Fodo, Kec. Gunungsitoli
Nias, Indonesia, 22815
Telp. +62‑639‑22848
Fax. +62‑639‑22035
Jakarta Representative Office
Jl. Galuh ll No. 4, Kabayoran Baru
Jakarta Selatan
Indonesia, 12110
Telp. +62‑21‑7254750
Fax. +62‑21‑7221570
www.e‑aceh‑nias.org
know.brr.go.id
Advisor
: Kuntoro Mangkusubroto
Author
: Eddy Purwanto
Editor
: Cendrawati Suhartono (Coordinator) Gita Widya Laksmini Soerjoatmodjo Margaret Agusta (Chief)
Copy Editor
: Ihsan Abdul Salam
Writer
: Eddie Darajat
Erwin Fahmi
Intan Kencana Dewi
Ita Fatia Nadia
Jamil Gunawan
Nur Aishyah Usman
Raden Pamekas
Saifullah Abdulgani
Syafiq Hasyim
Vika Oktavia
Yacob Ishadamy
Photography : Arif Ariadi
Bodi Chandra
Graphic Design : Bobby Haryanto (Chief)
Edi Wahyono
Priscilla Astrini
Wasito
Final Reviewer : Aichida Ul‑Aflaha
Heru Prasetyo
Maggy Horhoruw
Ratna Pawitra Trihadji
Ricky Sugiarto (Chief)
Teuku Roli Ilhamsyah
Waladi Nur Akbar
English Translation
Editor
: Linda Hollands
Copy Editor
: Margaret Agusta
Translator
: T. Ferdiansyah Thajib
Oei Eng Goan
Development of the BRR Book Series is supported by Multi Donor Fund (MDF)
through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Technical Assistance to BRR Project
ISBN 978‑602‑8199‑49-0
With this BRR Book Series, the Indonesian government, its people, and BRR wish to
express their deep gratitude for the many kind helping hands extended from all over the
world following the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the March
28, 2005 earthquake in the islands of Nias.
Four years on, the once devastated landscapes are again vibrant with the sporadic
rhythm of human life. This achievement is the result of a steadfast commitment of the
local, national and international community, combined with the resilience of the people
who lost so much.
The dynamics and challenges encountered during the massive undertaking of
rebuilding homes, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure, while striving to empower
those who survived to reshape their future and redevelop their way of life, provide an
important understanding of the disaster-recovery process in Aceh and Nias.
In light of this, within the pages of this book, BRR would like to share those experiences
and the lessons learned as a small contribution to return the favor to the world for the
invaluable support it contributed to building Aceh and Nias back better and safer; as a
history of the humanitarian journey of a united world.
I am proud,
that we can share the experiences, knowledge, and lessons
with our fellow countries. I do hope that what we have done
can be a standard, a benchmark, for similar efforts
at the national and international levels.
Speech of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
at the Official Closing Ceremony of BRR at the State Palace, April 17, 2009
about the BRR’s trip to the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Conference
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, April 24, 2009
Two excavators continue working through the evening on the construction of coastal
protection barriers at a site in Gampong Jawa, Banda Aceh, August 29, 2005. The construction
of the barriers was completed in 2008 with an overall achievement exceeding initial targets.
Photo: BRR/Bodi CH
Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1. Passing the Normal Threshold Chapter 2. The Starting Line
It All Began as a Breakthrough BRR Organizational Uniqueness: Seasons Changed, So Did the Organization Chapter 3. Collage of Data and Activities PCN and RANdatabase –Super Express Line for Project Approval
and Support Information One Face for the Entire Units of UN in Aceh Reconstruction Based on the Geospatial and Territorial Approach:
the Most Complete Map is in Aceh
Geospatial Data on Construction – from Housing Support to Overall Assets:
Indisputable Facts x
1
9
9
16
23
23
33
37
41
Chapter 4. Donation Purse and State Expenditure for Aceh and Nias
47
Chapter 5. Operational Preparations 65
Donor Harmonization for Aceh-Nias Recovery
47
Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF): Mediating Mandate, Accelerating Benefit 53
BRR Multi-Year Contract and State Budget Carryover Funds 59
Goods and Services Procurement for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
of Aceh and Nias
Three Secret Formulas in Environmental Monitoring: Washing Up,
Empowerment and Vigilance
Special Office for State Services and Treasury (KPPN-K)
Chapter 6. Coordination and Management of Project Implementation
Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu): Public Service under One Roof
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): The Magical Triangle Framework
to Overcome Disaster
Regionalized and Decentralized Decisions, the Key to BRR’s Success Major Implementing Partner Relations Developing Large-scale Integrated Infrastructure:
Fishing for a Difficult Fish with a Huge Bait Immediate Action Program – Quick Action; “Half a Loaf of Bread is Better
than None” Quick Infrastructure Construction to Respond to Urgent Needs:
Building a Seaport in One Day 66
72
83
89
90
94
98
102
104
107
110
Chapter 7. Unique and Exemplary Projects and Policies
Village Mapping and Village Planning:
Application of Participative Planning System Sub-District (Kecamatan) Spatial Planning
Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP)
Lambung Village
Development of a Satellite City: Beuramoe New Town
Alternative Energy for the Interior Region:
A Taste of Development while Preserving the Forests
Developing Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment
in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias
Internet Network for Aceh – Nias: Developing Community Information Delivery
Regionalization of Water Treatment and Sanitation:
Economic Scale and Sharing of Natural Resources 115
115
122
125
127
131
134
137
140
Chapter 8. Supervision, Observation and Evaluation 145
Chapter 9. Conclusion
Notes
Glossary of Abbreviations
163
166
168
Beware … Be Very Aware …
Quality Control of BRR Project Construction Monitoring and Evaluating Project Implementation 145
155
158
BREAKTHROUGH: Thousands of Paths toward Resolution
x
Introduction
For
a period of three days, beginning on December 27, 2004, the Indonesian flag
was drawn to half mast, and a nation was in mourning. A national disaster was declared
and the world watched in disbelief. An earthquake, followed by a series of tsunamis,
struck the western-end of Indonesia, causing an unprecedented loss of life and the
obliteration of whole communities. For those who survived, their homes, livelihoods, and
prospects for the future were swept out to sea.
The earthquake, one of the largest in recent history measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale,
was the result of a convergence between two tectonic plates beneath the ocean floor.
Although dormant for over 1,000 years, with the buildup of pressure caused by one plate
slowly sliding under the other at an estimated rate of 50 mm per year, on December 26,
2004, these two tectonic plates ruptured along a 1,600 km length of what is known as the
Sunda mega-thrust.
The epicenter of this earthquake was located 250 km south-west of the Indonesian
province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Its rupture - a slippage of up to 10 meters,
resulted in the ocean floor being (permanently) lifted and dropped, pushing the entire
water column up and down, and generating a series of powerful waves. Tsunamis
swept violently up to 6 km inland over the shorelines of Aceh and surrounding islands,
beginning less than half-an-hour after the earthquake. A total of 126,741 lives were lost
and, in the wake of the disaster, an additional 93,285 people declared missing. Some
500,000 survivors lost their homes, while as many as 750,000 people lost their livelihoods.
The loss and damage of these regions did not end there and, on March 28, 2005,
another major earthquake measuring 8.7 on the Richter scale struck the nearby islands of
Nias in the Indonesian province of North Sumatera. This second natural disaster resulted
in the death of 979 people and the displacement of 47,055 survivors. The proximity of this
earthquake, a result also of two tectonic plates rupturing, slipping a length of 350 km,
directly beneath the Simeulue and Nias islands, resulted in massive damage to the islands’
infrastructure.
The eyes of the world once again watched in disbelief as the devastation of these
regions unfolded, and helping hands began arriving from all corners of the globe to
assist in the rescue and relief operations. Individuals of every race, religion, culture and
political persuasion across each and every continent worldwide, along with governments,
the private sector, non-government organizations and other national and international
bodies, reacted in an unprecedented show of human concern and compassion.
From the scale of the devastation wrought by both disasters, it was clear that it would
not be enough to simply replace the homes, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction program would need to embrace the rebuilding
of the social structures that once thrived along the shores of Aceh and within the
hinterlands of Nias. The trauma of losing friends, family and a means to support those
who survived required that the recovery program focused not only on physical, but also
non-physical, development, and on rebuilding an economy to a level that would ensure a
firm foundation for future (re)development and growth.
On April 16, 2005, the Government of Indonesia, through the issuance of Government
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2005, established the Agency for the Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) to coordinate and jointly
implement a community-driven recovery program for Aceh and Nias. BRR’s mandate was
to design policies, strategies and action plans, within an atmosphere of transparency and
Introduction
In the private sector, which constituted 78 percent of the destruction wrought by the
earthquake and tsunamis, up to 139,195 homes were destroyed or severely damaged,
along with 73,869 ha of land with varying degrees of productivity. A total of 13,828 fishing
boats vanished, up to 27,593 ha of brackish fish ponds disappeared, and 104,500 small-tomedium businesses ceased to exist. In the public sector, 669 government buildings, 517
health facilities, and hundreds of educational facilities were either destroyed or rendered
non-functional. The loss to the environment included 16,775 ha of coastal forests and
mangroves, and 29,175 ha of reefs.
xi
xii
accountability, and to implement them through effective leadership and coordination of
the combined domestic and international effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and
safer.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias have constituted a challenge
not only for the people and Government of Indonesia but for the entire international
community. That this challenge was overcome successfully is reflected in the
conclusions drawn in evaluations concerning the recovery program. In the final months
of the program, the World Bank among others concluded that the recovery was an
unprecedented success story and a model for international partnership - outcomes which
were realized through effective government leadership.
The nation’s management of the recovery program gained the confidence of donors,
both institutions and individuals, and through BRR’s anti-corruption policies and
processes, the trust of the international community. And without the cooperation of the
international community, the post-disaster situation in Aceh and Nias - the unparalleled
devastation - could never have been reversed.
In recording this humanitarian achievement, BRR has produced the BRR Book Series
containing 15 volumes that detail the processes, challenges, solutions, achievements and
lessons learned during the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh and Nias.
It is hoped that these books will function to capture and preserve the experience of the
recovery, and to establish guidelines for future disaster-recovery programs across the
world.
This book titled Thousands of Paths toward Resolution presents a number of ways taken
by the Government of Indonesia in response to obstacles and hindrances encountered
in the field. It may be in the form of conceptual innovations or system implementation. It
has a wide range of coverage, from the high level to the practical dimensions. Achieved
targets are in fact more effective and efficient, with uncompromised, even improved,
quality. In the end, the existence of these breakthroughs became even more crucial as the
impact and lessons learned hold great potential for replications in another contexts.
4-Year Achievement
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
635,384
people displaced
127,720
people killed and 93,285 missing
104,500 155,182
small-medium enterprises (SME) destroyed
laborers trained
195,726
SMEs received assistance
139,195 140,304
houses destroyed
permanent houses built
73,869 69,979
hectares of agricultural lands destroyed
hectares of agricultural land reclaimed
1,927 39,663
teachers killed
teachers trained
13,828 7,109
fishing boats destroyed
fishing boats built or provided
1,089 3,781
religious facilities destroyed
religious facilities built or repaired
2,618 3,696
kilometers of road destroyed
kilometers of road constructed
3,415 1,759
schools destroyed
schools built
517 1,115
health facilities destroyed
health facilities constructed
669 996
government buildings destroyed
government buildings constructed
119 363
bridges destroyed
birdges constructed
22 23
ports destroyed
ports constructed
8 13
airports or airstrips destroyed
airports or airstrips constructed
xiii
Chapter 1. Passing the Normal Threshold
Passing the
Normal Threshold
1
Nothing
was normal in Aceh and Nias after the tsunami hit the area’s 800 km of
coastline. Starting from the massive earthquake that struck on the morning of December
26, 2004, the intensity of the tsunami that caused widespread damage, the paralyzed
communication and activities in the aftermath, and the overwhelming number of
victims, to the scope of relief flowing in for the recovery process. None of it was normal.
Nevertheless, the number of survivors exceeded the fatalities and so there needed to be
a mechanism to sustain the living. It was, however, impossible to deal with these impacts
using normal procedures and practices.
Specifically concerning the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan
Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) of Aceh-Nias’ achievements, the breakthroughs
were conceptual innovations and working system implementations that enabled BBR
as a governmental agency to perform faster and better. The improved features were
indicated by the manner in which they were faster and of higher quality, lower cost and
better accuracy. As mentioned, breakthroughs were made not only by BRR. Even the
establishment of BRR was in itself a breakthrough for the Indonesian government. This
issue will also be further explored as one of the breakthroughs.
The scene at Ulee Lheue coast,
Banda Aceh, which was wrecked
by the tsunami, May 14, 2005.
Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi
2
The working mechanism and implementation during BRR’s term that received
acknowledgements from national and international agencies are also documented in
this book as a compilation of BRR breakthroughs. This book is Indonesia’s collection of
experiences in handling a disaster and implementing post-disaster reconstruction under
complex social circumstances, which can provide insights for other countries when
dealing with similar incidents.
International recognition of Indonesia’s performance in responding to the disaster and
forming an ad-hoc organization called BRR and BRR’s activities during its term do not
necessarily require a tangible token of appreciation such as a monument. An invitation to
present the working process can be another form of appreciation for the performance of
BRR’s work in rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh and Nias.
BRR frequently held teleconferences with Chinese officials and humanitarian volunteers
in Sichuan – a city in China struck by an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale
that claimed more than 12,000 lives – to share its experience with China’s Humanitarian
Taskforce. The experiences shared included those involving the adoption of emergency
response strategies, post-disaster economic development and coordination with
humanitarian organizations working to assist victims.
Not long after Myanmar was hit by Cyclone Nargis in early May 2008, BRR’s experience
and networking were made good use of by Association of South East Asia Nations
(ASEAN) countries in their subtle attempts to support the people and the state of
Myanmar. The attempts had to be subtle owing to the diplomatic tensions between the
government of Myanmar and external parties offering support that were results of major
disagreement concerning good governance. Requests for BRR involvement also came
from United Nations (UN) agencies, donor countries and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), as well as those who were involved and had experience in
working with BRR in Aceh and Nias. Implicitly, these requests strongly indicated that
BBR’s operations in Aceh and Nias were considered effective by those working under
BRR coordination. BRR was eager to help and after going through a long process of
multilateral diplomacy, ASEAN Secretary-General deliberated and approved the technical
prerequisites to implement recovery efforts in Myanmar with the support of the BRR
system and experiences.
Apart from this, there has also been a domestic request that BRR has not yet fulfilled.
Papua Governor Barnabas Suebu, who administers a Rp 16 trillion budget per annum, has
expressed his wish to adopt BRR’s human resources management system, planning and
programming systems, development supervision strategy, information and geospatial
systems, quality management and the budget reporting accountability system. In the
eyes of the Papua Governor, BRR is a model for better development. He even stated his
wish to adopt BBR’s style of management for Aceh-Nias 100 percent to build a better
Papua. This is a form of appreciation coming from a fellow Indonesian, which is principally
3
a similar but different implementation modality compared to the various forms of
international recognition.
The acknowledgment of BRR’s effectiveness is inseparable from BRR’s achievements.
BRR’s heavy mission was aggravated by the psychological burden. Not only did Aceh and
Nias have to cope with the aftermath of the 9.1 magnitude earthquake and the ensuing
catastrophic tsunami, but at the time the Indonesian government had only recently lifted
martial law in Aceh, which had been rocked by armed conflict, and replaced it with a state
of civil emergency. Public trust in the central government’s intention to improve people’s
welfare was very low. After the disaster, the government formed a special taskforce
(rehabilitation and reconstruction) and named a person who they considered part of the
‘enemy’ regime as its leader.
Rejection and pressure undermined BRR’s early operations. BRR emerged amid a
society that had experienced multi-dimensional crises, a society that had experienced 30
years of armed conflict and a horrible disaster. Theirs were a dense sentiment of distrust
toward the government. Their trust toward each other even had evaporated, and it was
only natural that their distrust would be greater for an institution formed by the central
government, whose realization of peace appeared to be partial. Every statement and
explanation issued by BRR was viewed with suspicion and criticism. People tended to feel
they could trust nothing attempted by BRR.
Junius Saringar Ulibasa
Hutabarat (Deputy for Planning
and Programming) and Eddy
Purwanto (Deputy for Housing,
Infrastructure and Coordination
of Spatial Planning), discuss
with a number of foreign aid
workers assisting the recovery
efforts in Aceh, May 13, 2005.
4
A return visit by BRR staff members
to the Papua Provincial Government
to share their experience in asset
management, Papua, January 12,
2009. Photo: Tomy Mulya Hasan
This skeptical stance was not only ubiquitous among laypersons but also among
the elite, who seemed to have an even deeper distrust. However, BRR dealt with the
unfortunate prejudice in a professional manner. Accusations of deception involving
house construction were countered with the presentation of solid data. Efforts were
made to overcome the skepticism. As a result, the people of Aceh and Nias learned about
the housing geospatial information system, which was developed as one of the most
sophisticated asset management systems in Indonesia.
Aside from the achievement in housing data verification, BRR also succeeded in making
a financing breakthrough in the infrastructural construction sector with its Immediate
Action Plan, which was devised to counter heavy criticism of slow performance and field
impediments voiced by local inhabitants who had difficulty in believing that they would
eventually receive the benefits. There were many more breakthroughs made during BRR’s
mission that will be further discussed here.
Evidently, a heavy responsibility often culminates in one of two outcomes: acute
frustration or creativity and innovation. The level of sincerity, motivation, perseverance
and intellectuality of the human resources determine which outcome will emerge. The
development is reflected in conduct and behavior, including organizational behavior.
Each innovation grew and thrived along the organizational evolution of BRR, which
carried out multi-function tasks, to accommodate circumstantial demand without
deemphasizing the main goals of the Aceh-Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction. The
breakthroughs are categorized as:
1. Conceptual breakthrough.
This is an original innovation in the operational and supervisory system that was
brand new and had never been implemented before.
2. Breakthrough in implementation
In this category, the main idea or system concept being addressed was not
totally new, but BRR succeeded in making some innovations during the concept
implementation and perfected its system so that better field performance was
achieved. In this section, the issues discussed are actions taken that made an
implementation a breakthrough.
The conceptual and practical innovations selected for this book are those that were
proven to be effective in the context of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and
Nias. Indeed, there were also several innovations attempted in Aceh and Nias of which the
results were not always as expected. One example was the establishment of the Village
Committee for Housing and Settlement Development Acceleration (Komite Percepatan
Pembangunan Perumahan dan Permukiman Desa, KP4D) that was not overly successful
in Aceh but worked quite well in Nias. These particular topics are not explained here but
are explored in detail in other books in this series, since this book involves more lessons
learned in various sectors.
Some of the issued regulations during BRR’s term to ensure the effectiveness of Aceh
and Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction are inseparable from the roles played by
BRR personnel, such as Presidential Regulation No. 69/2005 on Participation of Foreign
Institutions/Individuals in Grant Provision for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
the Regions and Community of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias Island in North
Sumatra Province by the Head of BRR Executing Agency; Presidential Decree Amendment
No. 80/2003 on Goods and Services Provision; on the employee system in BRR; bylaw on
Banda Aceh City Layout Planning and many more. The underscored innovation here is not
placed on the regulations’ substances but on the process of the regulation arrangements
that involved BRR from the legal drafting to the issuance of a particular regulation.
Such breakthroughs were also more related to the involvement of BRR personnel, and
the final results were not specific products of BRR and therefore will not be explained
This book elaborates the numerous innovations, called BRR breakthroughs.
Paradoxically, such as earlier illustrated, innovation is often prompted by negative
situations. Irritation and anxiety toward the system, procedures and situations in the
rehabilitation and reconstruction became the trigger that kindled the creative ideas that
constitute BRR breakthroughs, which this book tries to capture.
5
Figure 1.1 BRR Cycle of Activities
BRR Formation
BRR Work System
Deputy for Supervision
Supervisory Board
Integrity Pact
P4W
PPMK
SAK
6
Integrated Team
PRB
Regionalization
HMKU
IREP/IRFF
IAP
Malahayati and Meulaboh
PCN and
RAN database
UNORC
AGDC
Sample Project/
Policy
VM/VP
KSF-AP
Lambung
Beuramoe
PLTMH
Gender Policy
ICT
Regional Watsan
MDF
RANTF
Multi-years contract
Goods and services procurement
Admin lingkungan
KPPN-K
here in detail. This book focuses on 30 breakthroughs, both in conceptual or implemental
terms, which succeeded in resolving problems and expediting rehabilitation and
reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias.
The breakthroughs began with the formation of BRR with its inherent uniqueness
within the governance system of the Republic of Indonesia. Although BRR was often
compared to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan
Nasional, BPPN), BPPN’s authority and mechanism were not as extensive or as flexible
as those of BRR, plus agencies like BPPN can be commonly found across the world. In a
broader context, BRR was also a learning experience for international circles in emergency
response in a post-disaster and post-conflict setting. With the given authority and
mechanism, rehabilitation and reconstruction can be effectively and promptly completed.
It is this sort of breakthrough that is discussed in this book along with those categorized
as innovations in implementation. Examples of implemental breakthroughs are the
One example is in the regular development mechanism, in which the coordinating
activities of local programs and projects that extended from the village to the national
level would normally take three months. The process was known as the Planning
Development Forum, which was conducted annually. However, due to the integration
of PCN and RANdatabase concepts, the coordination process for rehabilitation and
reconstruction activities could be completed in two weeks or less.
It was similar with the Integrated Team. For a developed country like Singapore, a onestop policy mechanism is common, but Indonesia’s bureaucratic system was not familiar
with one-stop policy principles in its customs and duty department, not to mention with
decision-making in the capital, Jakarta. That was the breakthrough of the forming of the
Integrated Team for Aceh and Nias.
A breakthrough, whether it is an original or operational success, is ultimately measured
by its ability to overcome chaos. What was initially without order and inoperative in Aceh
and Nias, were given the attempts to resolve it, and succeeded; this is also considered a
breakthrough.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction activities were similar to the stages of a project
cycle. The activity cycle illustrated in the following diagram is a common tool used
in project implementation. The breakthroughs achieved by BRR were attempts to
strengthen its performance and services based on the challenges as well as experiences
in implementing the work cycle from one year to the next. It is this cycle that is the main
thread connecting the stories of BRR breakthroughs presented in this book.
Project Concept Note (PCN), the Recovery Aceh Nias database (RANdatabase) and the
Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu). The basic concept of the three operational innovations
are perhaps common in Indonesia and in other parts of the world, but adoption of the
systems enabled better implementation that supported rehabilitation and reconstruction
activities in Aceh and Nias.
7
Chapter 2. The Starting Line
The Starting Line
9
THE
course of a project begins with general planning, as was the case with the
formation of BRR. Ever since the idea of forming an ad-hoc executing agency and
rehabilitation and reconstruction coordinator was mooted, BRR had been a conceptual
breakthrough in itself. From the organization’s formation, through its stages of evolution
and toward the end of its mandate, there were many breakthroughs that made
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities more accurate, faster and prudent in terms
of financing. There are two breakthroughs worth noting in the general planning: the
formation of BRR and its unique internal structure.
It All Began as a Breakthrough
It could be said that the formation of BRR was percipient. What would anyone do when
dealing with a disaster so great and occurring at the other end of a vast country where the
local government had been paralyzed by the disaster? The most direct and simple answer
would be: send in the army!
But the problem was far more complex than that, since the area had long been plagued
by armed conflict and deploying the military would have posed another problem.
Moreover, what needed to be done was far more extensive than anything a normal
Tents in Deah Baro Village, Meuraksa
sub-district, Banda Aceh, were one
of the efforts undertaken in the first
phase of emergency relief. Refugees
lived in these tents before moving
into barracks then finally into their
permanent homes, May 14, 2005.
10
military assignment could have accomplished. Therefore, even though dispatching
the army may be a necessary step during an emergency relief phase, a special civil
assignment with a far-reaching scope within the limited time available was inevitable.
This was also a logical consequence of the breakthrough that occurred some 110 days
before BRR was formed. Soon after the disaster struck, the government recognized the
need to restore social conditions and gain momentum for peace, and made a courageous
political breakthrough: to open all relief access to Aceh. Whether or not it was realized,
the early breakthrough and its immediate impact became a defining point that could no
longer hold back the formation of a specialized agency such as BRR.
The initial breakthrough exceeded the paradigm shaped by assumptions about
Indonesian sovereignty and its stance on it, the secrecy behind the armed conflict, the
impact of transparency on international perception of local governance and central
government accessibility in managing the situation from afar. This paradigm was
overturned when humanitarian interest was accepted as the strongest motivation for
post-disaster recovery management. Imagine the impact of the massive breakthrough
on the perceptions about the Indonesian government: 10 days after the disaster the
Special ASEAN Laders Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquakes and Tsunamis was held in
Jakarta and attended by the UN Secretary-General and leaders of member countries, 24
days following the disaster the UN Flash Appeal was initiated at a meeting in Geneva
attended by State Minister for National Development Planning at the time, Sri Mulyani,
the day after that the UN Tsunami Resolution was ratified in New York under Indonesia’s
leadership. In the local Aceh context, military forces from 34 countries arrived to assist
under the command of Indonesian Brigadier General Bambang Darmono, as part of the
massive emergency relief program that was led by civilians, under the coordination of
the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Alwi Shihab. For the first time, a military
command controlled 88 modern helicopters the biggest unarmed military operation
after World War II.
Like an active volcano, relief erupted from across the globe to quickly fill the void.
Indonesia’s announcement that Aceh, the area most devastated by the disaster, would
be opened up spurred not only the spirit to assist but also the amount, type and
distributional means of relief. The UN noted that the emergency relief effort was worth
US$13.7 billion, which was a first in humanitarian efforts. Starting from the instant
noodles to the aircraft carriers sent to provide assistance to people and areas affected by
the disaster. There was also the relief distributed through various supply chains to areas
that appeared to some as mere dots on the map. Citizens of 34 countries representing
700 organizations arrived – some of whom knew exactly what to do and others who
were prepared to do whatever was needed; thousands of cargo containers, some without
clear destination, flooded the gates of a republic that was greatly unprepared. Chaotic
management systems began to form in the urgency. There was a myriad of imperfections,
but important lessons were produced.
11
At the same time, based on UN’s resourceful experience in facing disaster, a method
devised in 1973 to analyze the impact of tropical storms was applied. The Damage and
Loss Assessment (DLA) method developed by the United Nations Economic Commission
of Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) was proposed by the World Bank and
conducted under the coordination of the National Development Planning Agency
(Badan Pembangunan dan Perencanaan Nasional, Bappenas). This method demands the
participation of at least two experts in each sector for analysis (comprehensively in each
sector, starting from consultants in construction to fish breeding, from education to
early warning systems and ecology), and as such at least 150 experts and analysts were
mobilized.
This was no child’s play! Data was analyzed, including existing data from governmental
agencies, the Central Statistics Bureau (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS) and others as well as from
observation and reports of teams working in the field. The results were used to draft the
Master Plan, which was then propagated for public input. When the input was gathered,
the assumptions were modified. However, there was little opportunity for in-depth
analysis of the impact of the earthquake that shook Nias on March 28, 2005, and therefore
the Master Plan became ineffective for Nias and was deemed weak in early April.
Despite of still being in the emergency
phase, the Indonesian National
Army combs through Lhoong,
Lhkngo, Aceh Besar District, an area
considered the “red zone” for Free Aceh
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,
GAM) activities, February 20, 2005.
12
Figure 2.1 – The Extent of Work by the Recovery Partners on Aceh’s West Coast
Was it a breakthrough? Perhaps not entirely, but the experience attained from the
application of DLA led to new information that would prove useful in the future to
improve the analysis for the earthquakes in Yogyakarta and Bengkulu that followed.
The operational reality in the field was an instant lesson to the country and it was at
this time after a relatively comprehensive Master Plan had been laid on the table that
the government moved to formulate an organization that would oversee rehabilitation
and reconstruction. Here was an important breakthrough in organization formation. This
was not because the organization had to work across various sectors as stipulated in the
Master Plan, nor because it had to interact with state and international organizations
without Foreign Ministry mediation, since all of them were already involved in the field,
but because of the delegation of authority.
The most important breakthrough in the formation of BRR was the willingness of the
central government to delegate tremendous authority to an ad-hoc organization that
had been formed in such a short time, to realize a humanitarian mission, both in domestic
as well as foreign affairs. The headquarters of the organization was also not located in
Jakarta.
It can be said that the breakthrough in BRR’s formation was the result of a strategic
partnership between the President, the State Minister for National Development
Planning/Head of Bappenas, several key donors, ambassadors, such as of the United
States, Japan and Singapore, the World Bank Director and the main candidate for the
Head of BRR Executing Agency, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. This breakthrough was a
complete delegation of authority to execute a task that was tremendously heavy, in the
most effective and quickest fashion. BRR was given the authority to independently form
a structure, recruit and terminate staff by necessity, determine the salary structure and
ranking outside the government system, the authority to regulate grant funding with
donors (usually this was strictly coordinated with Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance and
other relevant ministries), the authority to implement activities without having to comply
with normal patterns and the authority to manage activities in general.
The professionalism, integrity, transparency, leadership skills and the capacity to make
decisions under difficult circumstances possessed by Kuntoro seems to be decisive
in the realization of this breakthrough. The strong support of donors as well as the
anticorruption stance of Kuntoro reinforced the decision for this breakthrough. Although
everything was laid out in Government Regulation No. 2/2005, which was validated
through Law No. 10/2005, the process toward it experienced various challenges, including
The Master Plan, often called the Blue Print, was a masterpiece of a prominent
institution such as Bappenas. New methodology, experts from a variety of sectors,
the complicated field situation and unsubstantiated information from various sources
enabled the Master Plan to be compiled within three months, encompassing a four-year
program worth US$7.2 billion.
13
14
limiting the authority of the State Secretariat, for example. This is understandable since in
the wrong hands such enormous power could be catastrophic for the State and Nation.
Even though the Master Plan was made official through Presidential Regulation No.
30/2005, the damage caused by the aftershocks could not be overlooked, nor things that
were unrecorded or even exaggerated in the damage estimations recorded in the Master
Plan. In other words, the actual damage could only be evaluated during the rehabilitation
and reconstruction process, in line with the fluctuating dynamics of the post-disaster/
post-conflict area. Thus, some of the performance criteria stated in the Master Plan were
evaluated halfway through rehabilitation and reconstruction implementation, in July
2007. The evaluation was referred to as the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which later became
the basis for significant revision of the Master Plan and made official in Presidential
Regulation No. 47/2008.
Another breakthrough related to BRR’s formation was the series of policies made by
the Head of BRR Executing Agency. Human resources recruitment came from a variety of
sectors – the civil service, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, including
former members of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) after the
August 15, 2005 Aceh peace agreement- and other innovative approaches will be
discussed subsequently.
Lessons Learned from BRR’s Formation
Soon after the peace agreement was signed by the Indonesian government and
GAM in Helsinki, Finland, there emerged new local leaders from different backgrounds.
Dealing with a bureaucratic system was their first test. There were apprehensions about
the motivation to build a better Aceh after the conflict and the tsunami. One interesting
example was when the East Aceh district chief proposed an Assistance Team from BRR
and other district chiefs followed suit even though this was not necessarily an urgent
matter.
BRR existed as a temporary entity for the paralyzed local government and gradually
positioned itself as a partner. Correct institutional development during rehabilitation and
reconstruction had positive impacts on the culture of governance in Aceh as well as on
Nias Island, North Sumatra Province. In mid-2007, 80 percent of BRR’s employees were
local residents of Aceh and Nias, both with civil service backgrounds and without.
One example of the governance culture being influenced was how the arbitrary custom
of appointing regional leaders was replaced by candidate screening. The screening
mechanism initiated in Aceh Jaya was followed by other districts, as well as by Governor
Irwandi Yusuf when he appointed Aceh government officials in 2008.
15
Potential for Replication
The formation of an ad-hoc agency such as this one is possible if the governing or
authorized institution is paralyzed. The tsunami and earthquake in Aceh and Nias resulted
in various government offices losing a majority of their employees. Apart from the loss
of human resources that were killed or went missing, various equipment and hardware
was swept away, communication and telecommunication systems were severed and
distribution channels were cut. The entire region of Aceh and Nias ceased to function.
This type of agency can be formed as an assisting entity for an institution or
government to rebuild a system that is weakened due to disaster or extraordinary
circumstances. An organization with a flexible and fast-moving operational system could
be useful for areas that are subject to disaster, underdeveloped or isolated. Under such
circumstances, this type of agency has the potential to become a reliable strategy-maker,
initiator, as well as development assistant to the main institution. The organizational
system, recruitment scheme and operational mechanism of this agency are supporting
factors for the aforementioned potential achievements.
Signing the Peace Agreement
between the Government of
Indonesia and the Free Aceh
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,
GAM), in Helsinki, Finland, August
15, 2005. Photo: Crisis Management
Initiative/ Jenni Justiina Niemi
16
BRR Organizational Uniqueness: Seasons
Changed, So Did the Organization
Unlike other government organization, BRR was more informal but solid. Its personnel
were from various sources, it had a different remuneration system and more dynamic
structure, faced tougher challenges in good governance and a working bureaucracy that
strived for professionalism instead of relying on rank and seniority.
Background
The institutional conditions of Aceh governance, as well as Nias and South Nias districts
after the disaster needed to be considered. When the tsunami hit Aceh, three district
chiefs perished. The corpse of the Banda Aceh Mayor was found after 20 days of searching
among the mud and ruins caused by the tsunami. At the time, Aceh Governor Abdullah
Puteh had been imprisoned for corruption and his authority transferred to Vice Governor
Azwar Abubakar. This consideration become one of the bases for BRR’s foundation: that
the lives of numerous local leaders had been claimed by the tsunami and government
services were totally paralyzed.
It is a common perception in Indonesia that coordination with ministries and
government agencies is time consuming due to bureaucratic red tape. Thus, there were
concerns that the central government located in Jakarta may be less than expedient
in any decision-making concerning Aceh. Hence, BRR was given the same standing as
a ministry or state agency so that decisions could be made without approval from the
corresponding ministry in Jakarta. In addition, the BRR main office had to be located in
Banda Aceh. Its vision, planning and implementation of programs had to be close to the
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction is highly complex because it encompasses the
recovery of physical and infrastructural conditions as well as all aspects of socioeconomic
conditions. Thus, although BRR was a governmental agency, the task implementation
would require competencies that most civil servants did not have. The BRR deputies for
the various sectors needed to be appointed through a presidential decree and did not
have to be state officials. BRR required professionals at the deputy level, as the second
layer after the Head of Executing Agency.
TOP SPEED
100
3,5
200
400
6
1,300
EXIT
7
1,200
17
Transition
Capacity
Building
1,700
2009
Round Up
2008
Acceleration
Devaluation
Centralized
12
2007
Decentralization
2006
Consolidation
2005
Figure 2.2 BRR’s Organizational Dynamic
400
5
100
Number of
employees
(people)
Amount of
DIPA budget
disbursed
(Rp trillion)
18
BRR Deputy Meeting discusses MidTerm Review of the rehabilitation
and reconstruction work in Aceh
and Nias. Banda Aceh, April 3, 2007.
The remuneration system for BRR employees was also distinct from the Standard Unit
Price (Harga Satuan Unit, HSU) in Indonesia so that the employees could work more
efficiently without having to look for side jobs for extra income. The salary rate was set
professionally, and was almost equal to expatriate salaries in Indonesia.
BRR’s human resources were recruited from many sources, such as the civil service,
university circles, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. There
were also expatriates (especially during the early phase) and former members of GAM,
particularly after the Helsinki peace agreement was signed. This was in order that tasks
would be carried out professionally, be completed on time and be of high quality.
Considering the conditions in Aceh and Nias in the disaster and conflict aftermath, the
working requirements were highly irregular. To promptly accommodate the shifting tasks,
the organizational structure of the BRR Executing Agency was also dynamic, and in reality
changed every six months.
In the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, it was important to build trust within
society, donors, NGOs and community members who contributed assistance at their
own expense. Therefore, BRR personnel had to be clean from corruption and work
professionally. One of BRR’s steps to maintain a professional reputation that was untainted
by corruption was to pay its employees salaries that were equivalent to that of private
sector employees so that they could fully concentrate on completing their tasks and
would be disinclined to seek extra earnings through corruption.
Positions within BRR were not strictly based on the rank structure of the civil service,
nor on tribal affiliation, race or societal group. Professionalism was the main consideration
in position placement and was determined according to task requirement. Performance
appraisal was based on work output or result. Assignment in BRR was therefore
impermanent and based on contracts spanning three, six or 12 months that were
extended if needed. Recruiting high-ranking employees would have necessitated the
issuance of laws and a presidential decree.
The professionalism and sincerity in conducting the humanitarian program became
the reason an attendance time clock was not used at the BRR offices, neither at the main
office nor at the district offices. Many BRR employees worked late, and some well into
the morning. There was no resentment toward those who went home earlier despite the
equal pay.
The informal working conditions were also clearly reflected and exemplified by the
Head of Executing Agency. There were no hierarchical barriers to impede the speed of
problem-solving or decision-making. All employees, including those at the lowest level,
could directly meet with the Head of BRR Executing Agency without too much difficulty.
Professionalism and independence enabled employees to arrange a meeting with their
superior or a forum with problem-solving alternatives. Coordination and decision-making
could be conducted through various communication channels (direct contact, via
telephone or text message) other than executive meetings.
Within a limited mandate period, BRR was obliged to participate in developing
the capacity of the local government to ensure program sustainability. Training/
empowerment was provided to local government employees through various programs.
This had been designed since the initial phase by the Head of BRR Executing Agency.
Hence, the development of capacity and good governance could be better guaranteed.
Other than special training, empowerment and capacity-building for government
employees and local communities, there was also the recruitment of numerous local
government workers, local university staff and NGOs as well as local private individuals.
By the end of 2007, 80 percent of BRR personnel were from local areas. Hence, after
BRR completed its assignments, they could return to their own working unit in Aceh
or Nias and strengthen the ability to introduce transparent and better development
implementation.
BRR Internal Working Mechanism – Navigating Bureaucracy
19
20
Meanwhile, organizational dynamics were needed to maintain a productive balance.
BRR’s structural changes were adjusted to the requirements and urgency at the given
time, in accordance with the recovery phase, rehabilitation and reconstruction. They were
also based on the priorities of sector management according to the progress/completion
of work at a particular location and deliberating fast/decentralized supporting needs
or referring to the shifting role from BRR to local government or relevant ministry. The
number of employees also fluctuated according to individual terms of service and the
workload for a particular year. The highest increase in BRR staff was from 1,073 people in
2006 to 1,576 in 2007, and by late 2008 to the closure of BRR on April 16, 2009, only 562
staff members remained.
Lessons Learned
The selection of professional employees paid decent salaries greatly supported the
speed and quality of performance and helped prevent corrupt practices. This in turn
earned public trust and thus increased incoming relief for Aceh and Nias. Ultimately, it
had the potential to benefit society as a whole.
In the four years of BRR’s operation, its overheads accounted for just four percent
of total reconstruction expenditure. The rest was used for program implementation.
Compare this to the expenses of other public institutions. The overheads of other
institution could be much higher than the cost of program implementation, and spending
could reach seven to nine percent of the total budget of a government institution/
agency in Indonesia. If unnecessary expenses or fictional costs were eliminated, the funds
saved could be allocated to staff salaries and thereby prevent corruption. Civil servant
remuneration in Indonesia includes allowances outside the basic salary, and their low
basic salary prompts them to find a means to supplement their basic salary through
allowances paid for attending meetings outside of town/the country or by working extra
hours to obtain overtime.
The dynamics of BRR enabled the organization to make self-adjustments with the
supporting needs of implementation during certain periods. It also had to develop the
productivity, competence and independence of each individual involved in order to meet
the changes and create a competitive climate.
21
Basically, an organization must always be adjusted to the needs. A highly dynamic
organization is perhaps more suitable for disaster management or other more complex
(multi-sectoral) work that requires operational speed. For a lengthier and more structured
assignment, a dynamic organization could be established but within a limited scope of
changes (not drastic).
The remuneration of civil servants could be increased to an appropriate and
respectable level, although it would not have to be identical to that of the private sector
as the employment duration is longer term and has retirement security. By bringing
salaries in line with competence and matching them to related institutional capacity, the
corruption and leakages that afflict many projects were prevented. The funds saved from
such practices could thus be used to pay better salaries. There would be no more excuses
for staff to commit corrupt practices or be unproductive. All this could be realized if
supported by employee rationalization and selective personnel recruitment.
Andy Siswanto (left) is inaugurated
as the Deputy for Housing and
Settlement along with appointment
of other deputies in the BRR
Executing Agency, September 20,
2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi
Chapter 3. Collage of Data and Activities
Collage of Data
and Activities
23
After
the organization was up and running, collection of detailed data on physical
conditions and reconstruction requirements in Aceh and Nias was required to ensure
the quality of project planning. In this endeavor, various breakthroughs on research
methods and data provision were made, as well as in project coordination data collection.
This section discusses Project Concept Note (PCN), Recovery Aceh-Nias Database
(RANdatabase), United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC), Spatial
Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), Aceh Geospatial and Data Center (AGDC), and
the Housing and Asset Geospatial System.
PCN and RANdatabase –Super Express Line for
Project Approval and Support Information
The PCN was basically a form that functioned as an analysis tool for the proposed
program on relief activities throughout Aceh and Nias. Whereas RANdatabase was a
database system that was periodically upgraded by the relief activities program officer.
The screening mechanism for the proposed program was called PCN Workshop. PCN
Approval Workshops were regularly held in Banda Aceh to coordinate, consolidate and
approve the programs and activities agreed upon to be implemented in the territorial
limits of Aceh and Nias, North Sumatra.
Recording houses and their
respective owners using a GPS
system, Alue Naga, Syiah Kuala subdistrict, Banda Aceh, January 9, 2008.
24
Decisions on activities made during the workshops were incorporated into
RANdatabase and were upgraded periodically by the implementing program officer. The
breakthrough of RANdatabase in Aceh and Nias was that it was enriched and adjusted as
required to monitor more Key Performance Indicators (KPI).
The continuously updated information on RANdatabase was used as reference for the
recruitment/assignment of foreign consultants, the basis for duty/tax exemption on relief
goods and services, the issuance of various permits, provision of various facilities and the
issuance of ID cards for staff of development agencies in Aceh and Nias. RANdatabase
ensured the sophistication, clarity and transparency of information on the development
and program results of rehabilitation and reconstruction.
The cohesiveness of PCN, PCN workshop mechanism, and RANdatabase facilitated the
progress of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. This reduced the project
and activity approval process, which could take months under normal bureaucratic
procedures, to three to four weeks or less. This kind of mechanism integration also
reduced the possibility of an overlap in activities.
Background
One of the most crucial issues in post-disaster management is the availability of accurate
data. The enormous attention from international and local institutions in designing and
implementing their programs/projects in Aceh-Nias was clearly a colossal responsibility. To
coordinate this required an information management system that enabled coordination,
monitoring and finally evaluation of the thousands of programs/projects implemented by
the dozens of organizations in almost every area of Aceh and Nias.
Figure 3.1 RANdatabase Homepage
Figure 3.2 Sample of PCN
Page 1 of 1
RAN Database - Details
Reference Number: SOCI 234 LN
Project Type: Off Budget
Title: ANTV Peduli Aceh "Tabahlah Indonesia" untuk bantuan korban Tsunami Aceh
Description: Bantuan ANTV Peduli Aceh "Tabahlah Indonesia" dalam masa recovery untuk membantu masyarakat korban Tsunami Aceh
1st Level Implementer
ANTV PEDULI/PT. Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (ANTV)
(s)/Funding Agency(ies):
Is this project related to tsunami/earthquake relief/reconstruction assistance? Yes
Is the project involved in the UN Flash Appeal?
No
Start Date (dd/mm/yyyy)
End Date (dd/mm/yyyy)
Duration (Months)
Project Implementation Status
01/02/2005
31/08/2008
43
Completed
Contact(s):
Contact Type
Name (Last, First)
Funding Source/Donor
Organisation
E-mail
PT. Cakrawala Andalas Televisi
(ANTV)
Rambe, Isro' Ayyubi (Primary)
Phone
[email protected]
021-30405615
Total Cost:
Currency
Total
USD
Indonesian
Rupiah
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
633,386
491,015
0
0
142,371
0
6,003,862,671
4,654,329,858
0
0
1,349,532,813
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
USD
0
0
0
0
0
Indonesian
Rupiah
0
0
0
0
0
Sector and Sub-Sector:
Sector
Sub-Sector
Education
Primary Education
Religion
Advancement of Religious Life
Cost (USD)
%
93,577
14.77
539,809
85.23
Location:
Kabupaten/Kota
Kecamatan
Desa/Kelurahan
Kab. ACEH BESAR
KOTA JANTHO
TEUREUBEH
Kab. ACEH BESAR
KUTA BARO
Desa to be Defined - KUTA BARO
Kab. ACEH BESAR
SEULIMEUM
SEULIMEUM
Funding - Funding Agency to 1st Level Implementer:
Funding Agency
%
93,577
14.77
48,794
7.70
491,015
77.52
(Commitments and disbursements)
1st Level Implementer
Date
PT. Cakrawala Andalas Televisi (ANTV)
ANTV PEDULI
01/02/2005
ANTV PEDULI
01/02/2005
ANTV PEDULI
01/02/2008
ANTV PEDULI
01/02/2008
Funding - 1st Level Implementer to 2nd Level Implementer
Funding
Agency
Committed
(USD)
Funding
Agency
Disbursed
(USD)
Balance
(USD)
Funding
Type
491,015
Grant
491,015
Grant
142,371
Grant
142,371
Grant
(Expenditure)
Would your organisation like BRR fund matching assistance?
Potential Additional Funding Agency
Cost (USD)
No
(Firm commitments not yet made)
Key Performance Indicators
Key Performance
Indicator
Sector
Education
Religion
(RELIG) Number of
mosques built/repaired
Religion
(RELIG) Number of
pesantren (religious
schools) built/repaired
Target
(#)
Progress
(# to date)
Location
(Kabupaten/Kecamaten/Desa)
Comments
Kab. ACEH BESAR/KOTA
JANTHO/TEUREUBEH
SD 3 Kota Jantho
1
1
Kab. ACEH BESAR/KUTA
BARO/Desa to be Defined - KUTA
BARO
Renovasi Mesjid Jamik Baitul Quddus Lamblang-Kuta Baro,
Aceh Besar
1
1
Kab. ACEH
BESAR/SEULIMEUM/SEULIMEUM
Pesantren Putri Ruhul Fatayat Seulimeum. Menampung
1000 santriwati, dan banyak menampung para anak-anak
yang menjadi korban tsunami.
1
1
(EDUC) Number of
elementary schools
built/repaired
Factors causing delays
Number of Beneficiaries:
Total FemaleChildren
Number of Households:
Thematic Marker(s):
Notes / Comments:
Attached Documents:
User Activity Log:
Name (Last, First)
Maria Ulfa
Username
Ulfa
Organisation
BRR
Modified On
Dec 15 2008 11:06AM
User Type
User
25
26
In relation to accountability and effectiveness of disaster funds, in January 2005,
Head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Jan Egeland, announced that the international community would devise an
information databases system that would illustrate that “we are up to the task, not only
in getting relief to the needy parties, but also in keeping track of every penny.” This
referred to the principle of accountability and transparency and the anticorruption
spirit as a new paradigm in recovery activities. The system that Egeland was referring to
was the Development Assistance Database (DAD) system, which was first introduced in
Afghanistan in 2003; the same system employed by the country that was hit by a tsunami
on December 26, 2004.
In the case of Aceh, prior to April 2005, the data used was manually collected and not
supported by a complex information system. Data collection was also still focused on the
data of existing or working stakeholders in the emergency response period. The embryo
of the RANRANdatabase system was very simple, being based on manual entry using a
simple Microsoft Excel program.
Taking the lead from DAD, to meet to the requirements stipulated in Law No. 10/2005
on BRR’s foundation on October 28, 2005, BRR launched RANdatabase. The coordination
process was conducted by a BRR team by requesting all stakeholders working for AcehNias recovery to upload the data on the RANdatabase website to be used as indicator
of progress. This system was then periodically refined, supported by other systems
integrated to optimize its performance.
The web-based application at http://rand.brr.go.id functioned to coordinate between
the stakeholders, such as donors, private parties, academics, the government and the
media in obtaining information on the recovery progress in Aceh and Nias after the
tsunami. Not only that, the RANdatabase also became a medium for implementing
partners in reporting to their funding agencies across the world.
Considering the massive number of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects
and activities in Aceh and Nias, as well as the involvement of various agents in the
implementation, the daily fulfillment of data and information collection become an
important part of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. Information was not only
crucial to BRR for internal requirements but also to other stakeholders. The information on
rehabilitation and reconstruction covered, among other things, the quantity and kinds of
requirements that were needed (project target output), the required resources (allocation,
commitment, fund disbursement), working process (program, project, activity, location)
and the progress of KPIs. Apart from data on program/project activities, information on
beneficiaries was also important.
Basically, data collection on rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh and
Nias was performed using two methods. First, as project/activity output that could be
directly accessed from data input results, which were supported by the RANdatabase
Table 3.1 The Numerous Projects and Implementing Agencies of MDF Funded Projects
27
Source: MDF In Depth Progress Report, as of March
2008.
application system. Second, through information obtained from surveys, which generally
required greater resources/funds and were conducted in certain periods – for example
annually, such as the Tsunami Recovery Indicators Package (TRIP) report that was acquired
from surveys or census conducted by either government agencies such as the Statistics
Center Agency (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS), local government agencies, NGOs or private
corporations such as Garansi, Surveyor Indonesia and Artistika. In addition, there were
also surveys on housing needs and displaced persons/temporary housing such as those
conducted by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Consortium for Assistance
and Recovery toward Development in Indonesia. The two data collection approaches
complemented each another.
As an example, the information on completed houses recorded by RANdatabase had to
be verified by field surveys based on population. Several data collection mechanisms at
the sub-district level were also developed by Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintahan Daerah (Local
Governance Innovation Foundation), the Local Governance Support Program and the
Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (Logica).
Data Collection and Implementation Coordination to Support
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Activities
The precursor of BRR data management was initiated in 2005 by the Operations
Center, which facilitated the coordination of donors and NGOs through the mechanism
of PCN Approval Workshops. BRR recognized the importance of transparency and
accountability in carrying out its mandate, and therefore all programs and rehabilitation
and reconstruction projects proposed by donors were discussed and evaluated by BRR
and all relevant stakeholders through PCN Workshops. The stakeholders included local
government agencies, experts and donor/NGO representatives. Project proposal analysis
was conducted to prevent an overlap of activities within one area or sector.
28
Figure 3.3 PCN Workshop Process
Registration and PCN data entry
by recovery partners and donors
Important information
needed:
- Key Performance Indicators
- Source of funds
- sector
- sector
- Dana Allocation
Workshop
Attended by BRR deputies,
BRR technical experts,
donor agencies or
recovery partners,
local government
Results
Project approved
unconditionally;
conditionally
or project is
not approved
(holding bay or unapproved)
Project Progress report
by recovery partners and donors
Data updating
for monitoring
evaluation
reporting and
analytical purposes
An uploaded PCN was classified according to assessment standards by the related BRR
department. Follow-up workshops were then conducted every two weeks (by sector
experts and BRR). The output of workshop deliberation was used to rate projects based
on three project categories. The first category was for approved projects, which can be
unconditional approval or conditional approval. The second and third categories were
respectively for projects that had been put on hold and those that had been rejected. In
short, the PCN was a tool for activity screening while the RANdatabase was an electronic
monitoring tool of activity implementation.
The project review results were confirmed with the proposing party to be implemented
or further consulted with the donor. The number of PCNs that were discussed in
workshops was very high in 2005 and 2006 (early reconstruction), averaging 150 per
workshop and decreasing to 20 to 40 proposals per workshop toward the end of BRR’s
tenure. In early 2009, new proposals were still coming in but in smaller numbers. During
the four years of BRR’s term of service, 48 batch workshops were conducted, and 1,700
proposals were approved out of some 1,800 programs/projects proposed.
By January 2009, 1,700 projects had been uploaded onto the RANdatabase website by
368 implementing partners and funded by 624 funding agencies. The total commitment
for the reconstruction fund was recorded at US$3.9 billion and fund disbursement
reached US$3.1 billion.
Data on project and activity implementation approved in the workshops were
documented on RANdatabase. The web-based monitoring program could be easily
accessed from anywhere in the world. RANdatabase was also a self-service system,
meaning that data suppliers were those with direct links to a given project. The public
could also access the data. Hence, the progress and results of rehabilitation and
reconstruction in Aceh and Nias could be more thoroughly and openly monitored from
different parts of the world.
In the second semester of 2006, the Operations Center was divided into the Center for
Data and Information (Pusat Data dan Informasi, Pusdatin) and the Center of Regional
Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Sektoral, P4W).
In the second semester of 2007, Center for Sectoral Project Control and Implementation
(Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Sektoral, P4S) was formed as an independent
With the considerable number of project proposals to be analyzed, a simple, fast but
manageable approval process was required. The first step was to make completion of
the PCN form easier. Indeed, the information required in a PCN was rather detailed,
covering activities, their type and scope, location, budget, timeframe schedule, work plan,
supporting elements and project impact. Nevertheless, the general scope of activities
could still be overviewed and forms were made simpler to fill out so that even a small
implementing partner could do so. Data on activities proposed to BRR could be manually
written or uploaded onto the RANdatabase website.
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30
The results of outreach effort to
monitor NGO and donor activities
in Aceh and Nias are compiled
by the BRR Center for Data and
Information, Banda Aceh, July 25,
unit of P4W. Subsequently, Pusdatin became a data and information center for practically
everything related to the rehabilitation and reconstruction process and was in charge
of managing RANdatabase and was comprised of data analysts and an Outreach Team.
Whereas P4W and P4S focused on program field monitoring and control of on budget
expenditure.
All parties related to activities and projects could provide updated reports by using
the RANdatabase at the BRR main office in Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh as a Drop in Center,
assisted by the Outreach Team. The team was formed to facilitate and increase the
compliance rate of reporting progress by all implementing partners. The outreach
personnel were also assigned to maintain relations with all organizations involved
in rehabilitation and reconstruction. Apart from encouraging the organizations to
update their project progress reports, they were also expected to play an active role in
contributing input to RANdatabase if a particular organization could not do it on its own.
After a project was listed, it could be updated by the organizations in collaboration
with Pusdatin. Information on progress was periodically updated on RANdatabase by
the implementing agencies. Overall achievements were regularly assessed based on the
updating process, by incorporating off- and on-budget data.
The PCN Approval Workshop mechanism, with its immediate approval of project
scope and activity, was one of the reasons that numerous projects could be initiated
and completed within the four years of BRR’s operation. Coordination with the local
government also ran smoothly because the program involved provincial government
responsibility for the sector. In addition, every proposal had to be recommended by the
relevant local government agency and the local community. An implementing partner’s
project proposal could be approved without delay (within three to four weeks after
submission to BRR).
RANdatabase’s distinctive features also included its function as a medium for
information exchange. For example, if organization A had sources of funding while
organization B had the capacity to execute the activities, through RANdatabase, an
exchange of resources could be performed. The database system also prevented project
overlaps. For instance, if NGO A wanted to build a school in area Z, through RANdatabase
it could obtain information on whether another organization was working in the area and
Figure 3.4 Homepage of www.e-aceh-nias.org
Lessons Learned
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Coordination meeting with NGOs
and donors at the UNORC Office
in Banda Aceh, February 1, 2008.
whether the project was still relevant. Lastly, RANdatabase also acted as a means and
manifestation of public transparency and accountability of all aid received.
Assistance for Aceh and Nias could be done individually. Numerous international
celebrities such as Alanis Morissette, Michael Schumacher and The Body Shop founder
Anita Roddick, made personal contributions that were documented in RANdatabase.
With publicly accessible features, people across the globe could learn who is doing what,
where activities are being carried out and the source of funding as well as information
on work progress. It could be viewed in table format, as a graphic or even as thematic
map. Aside from the information on donations and direct relief from various countries
and individuals, information on rehabilitation and reconstruction outcome, the source
of which was funds from the National Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja
Negara, APBN), was also consolidated in RANdatabase.
Apart from RANdatabase, information dissemination was also conducted through
report publications through printed and downloadable electronic versions from www.eaceh-nias.org. Information on activities, auctions for goods and services procurement
for BRR projects, press releases and staff recruitment for various funding agencies as well
as implementing partners could also be accessed from this website. The website also
RANdatabase implementation has received the international Government Technology
Award 2008 on Best Practice Information Management System from FutureGov. It was
selected from 450 nominations from 15 Asia Pacific countries. This award was the first of
its kind ever received by the Indonesian government. Winners under different categories
include the Malaysian State Police, the Singapore Land Authority and Hong Kong’s
Department of Census and Statistics.
Systems like RANdatabase can be implemented beyond Aceh Province and Nias Island,
North Sumatra Province. RANdatabase can automatically be utilized to sustain relief
management and provide information on assets given, since several donors/NGOs are
continuing their programs after the closure of BRR in April 2009.
As a database, RANdatabase can trace relief distribution. RANdatabase can also be
employed to monitor multiple projects/activities and is thus also suitable for the scope of
central and local government work that generally involves hundreds of projects each year.
Having a bimonthly PCN workshop was advantageous when there were multiple
proposals of projects/activities occurring simultaneously to ensure coordination and the
required approval for implementation. The ideal application is in disaster areas, such as
Aceh and Nias, that have garnered tremendous attention from numerous parties.
Local or departmental/central government projects that have many implementers and
funding resources requiring intense intersectoral coordination could apply a system such
as the PCN. Before programs and activities were included in the budgeting documents
(which was inherently more of an administrational requirement for budget approval), the
National Development Planning Agency, Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda), and other local authorities or disaster
response agencies at the central and local levels could also implement and manage such
a system.
UNORC is a unique office of the UN system focused on supporting recovery and
development in Aceh and Nias. It is unique because it was the first time the United
Nations established a unit with authority equivalent to other UN agencies dedicated to
a particular region in the world. This unit became the coordinator of all 23 UN agencies
working in Aceh and Nias,
facilitated a public forum in which users could give their input and comments, and receive
responses from the relevant parties.
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34
Background
During the emergency response period, numerous UN entities worked in Aceh and
Nias. At the same time however, UN-OCHA was still fully operating as the main gateway
for contact with the UN agencies operating in Aceh and Nias.
Although working under the auspices of the UN, each unit carried its own flag and had
its own procedures. This complicated BRR’s coordination task since, apart from these UN
agencies, there were other funding agencies, NGOs and individuals working in Aceh and
Nias as implementers, implementing partners or direct donors.
The activity of UN-OCHA was minimized after the emergency phase to continue to
support BRR’s mandate as the coordinator of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.
UNORC was formed in 2005 with the aim of improving the overall effectiveness and
coordination of international relief operations under UN entities and extend them into the
recovery phase through BRR.
The end of the emergency phase saw the beginning of the implementation of a
comperehensive and sustainable recovery phase for the people of Aceh and Nias. The
development activities prompted UNORC to extend its coordination function through
policy support for the government of Indonesia and its role in the development of
planning, coordination and implementation of mid- and long-term recovery and
reconstruction. With a wide range of actors still present in Aceh and Nias, the potential
for duplication, inefficient resource allocation and the inadvertent undermining of each
other’s efforts remained ever-present, making continued coordination crucial.
Establishment of UNORC
A Memoranum of Understanding (MoU) signed by BRR and UNORC on November 30,
2005 appointed UNORC as the primary point of contact between BRR and the UN. UNORC
took charge of coordinating the UN contribution in relief distribution as well as recovery
and reconstruction activities. UNORC also worked with BRR to identify outstanding needs,
develop policies and make strategic decisions affecting the recovery effort.
UNORC was based in Aceh’s provincial capital, Banda Aceh, and was led by the UN
Coordinator for Aceh and Nias Recovery. UNORC also maintained a substantial field
presence across Aceh and Nias through six field offices (Lhokseumawe, Meulaboh,
Takengon, Subussalam, Nias, and Banda Aceh). In addition, 25 district facilitation teams
worked at the district/municipal levels. UNORC was funded by UN-OCHA, United Nations
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and through bilateral donations from the
governments of Nigeria and Norway.
UNORC emphasized a One UN approach that sought to harmonize UN contributions
so as to maximize its impact in supporting the government and communities in recovery,
Given the political developments during the recovery phase – in particular the historic
peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM, and the following
elections in Aceh to elect a governor, district regents and city mayors – this support
evolved into support for tsunami and post-conflict recovery. UNORC served as a key
advisor to the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the governors of Aceh and North
Sumatra on a range of recovery-related policies, regulation, and programmatic issues
such as assuring international partners coordinate their work with the government.
Apart from that, the agency provides a range of independent analytical, statistical and
strategic information to assist the government and the international recovery community
in planning and monitoring humanitarian, recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration
activities.
UNORC manages a website offering a range of services for all stakeholders, as well
as easily accessible resources for the general public. It is periodically updated with
information on development progress and UN contributions.
Lessons Learned
Products/logos of activities carried out by UNORC
1. Providing Structured Platforms for Coordinated and Coherent Recovery Strategies
UNORC chaired a number of regular sectoral and thematic working groups that
promoted coordination and coherency in recovery planning, oversight, evaluation,
and operations. These included:
• Interagency Standing Committee (IASC)
• United Nations Area Team (UNAT)
• Public Information Working Group (PIWG)
• Several sectoral working groups
2. Managing the Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Partners
The UNORC chaired the UN Area Security Management Team (ASMT) to review current
security trends, situations and scenarios, as well as to assess the modalities and
readiness for evacuations or other rapid response measures.
3. Assisting the Decentralization of Recovery Coordination, Planning and Oversight
The District/City Recovery Forum (Forum Pemulihan Kabupaten, FPK) initiative
was developed at the insistence of mayors and district heads to empower local
governments/stakeholders through building their technical capacity for sustainable
recovery and development. FPK was chaired by a mayor or a head of district and
reconstruction and reintegration efforts. The office coordinated all UN agencies, funds
and programs to “deliver as one,” an aspiration outlined by the Secretary-General’s HighLevel Panel on System-wide Coherence (http://www.un.org/events/panel/). The work of
the office was recently recognized as a good practice at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable on UN
System Coherence.
35
4.
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5.
6.
7. comprised representatives of civil society, the private sector, former GAM members,
government agencies, and local and international partners. The FPK was guided by
principles of community-driven recovery, poverty reduction, gender equality and
democratic leadership in collective decision-making, problem-solving and planning.
Providing Strategic Information and Analysis on Recovery
UNORC’s Information Analysis Section (IAS) generated, coordinated and supported
the production of strategic information products to enable evidence-based recovery,
development planning, and analysis at provincial, district and local levels. IAS along
with Pusdatin produced the widely distributed, recognized and cited Tsunami
Recovery Indicator Package (TRIP) Report — part of the Tsunami Recovery Impact
Assessment and Monitoring System (TRIAMS) — as the definitive source of data,
maps, statistics and analysis in post-disaster Aceh and Nias. Up to now, there were
three editions of Tsunami Recovery Indicator Packages - each underwent continual
improvement from the previous.
Other UNORC and BRR collaborations were surveys and data verifications regarding
housing to ensure accuracy of data reported to BRR with houses built through donor
supports. Besides assigning UNORC and BRR’s Pusdatin personnel to the field, these
activities were implemented through supports from relevant sectors and regions.
UNORC also developed AcehInfo, a database consolidating all data related to
rehabilitation and reconstruction results in Aceh and Nias completed with data from
BPS and related institutions. In its daily operation, the collaboration between BRR and
UNORC were inseparable.
Strengthening Local Recovery and Development Capacity through Knowledge-Based
Learning and Sharing Forum
The Solutions Exchange is an initiative led by UNORC and approved by BRR to be
implemented in Aceh and Nias and launched in 2008. The Governor, management
level BRR staff, and the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias served as the
implementing committee. In 2007, UNORC facilitated extensive consultations and an
international mission study to tailor UN good practices in the Solutions Exchange to
the context and needs of Aceh and Nias.
Supporting and Strengthening BRR and Government Communication and Outreach
Capacity
UNORC assisted in the joint BRR-Provincial Government publication of the Aceh
Recovery Newsletter (ARN). This monthly newsletter was published electronically and
in hard copy – both in English and Indonesian – and distributed to 1,500 recipients
that included donors, local, provincial and central government, official partners and
beneficiaries. UNORC pledged to support 12 editions of the publication in 2008, each
of which was 24 pages covering news, updates, real-life stories and photos.
Ensuring UN System Transparency
At the request of BRR and the Indonesian government, UNORC compiled regular
accountability reports detailing the financial and programmatic contributions of the
UN system in Aceh and Nias. Reports were issued every semester since 2008, with
the last one submitted to the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the Government of
Indonesia in late February.
Coordination is a word often used in implementation activities. In concert with the
growing number of players involved, coordination is ever more required. Not only
between different organizations, even the units working under the UN tended to uphold
different working principles. This is where UNORC’s role and potential can be applied
elsewhere both in other parts of Indonesia and the world.
A mediating unit like UNORC is highly needed in a situation where the proposed
activities are copious and various procedures are imposed on one beneficiary. In this
context, BRR became the representative of the beneficiaries and local relief coordinator.
UNORC’s existence as the entry point for all UN units working in Aceh and Nias optimized
rehabilitation and reconstruction through facilitating communication between BRR and
the UN system. BRR did not have to contact each unit but simply did it through UNORC.
Reconstruction Based on the Geospatial and
Territorial Approach: the Most Complete Map is
in Aceh
The most detailed map of the Republic of Indonesia’s territory should have been in the
possession of the National Survey and Mapping Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi
Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional, Bakosurtanal). However, a deficiency in map provision to
support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, led to the formation of
the Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), a unit that worked with the Pusdatin
in the provision and management of geospatial information, specifically on Aceh and
Nias. This unit worked in parallel with the Aceh Provincial Government, and approaching
the end of BRR’s tenure, the unit was handed over to and became a part of the Aceh
Provincial Government as a unit called the Aceh Geospatial Data Center (AGDC). To date,
Aceh Province has the most comprehensive geospatial data among all the provinces in
Indonesia.
Background
During the early phase of reconstruction, BRR had difficulties in planning and
organization due to the lack of geospatial data and information. When BRR coordinated
with Bakosurtanal, the scale used in the available map was too large and the official
procedure entailed in having a more detailed version made would have taken too long.
This was exacerbated by the effects of the prolonged conflict, which had limited the
efforts for data updates.
The problem was solved when the United States government provided maps with
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38
Global Positioning System (GPS)
training to upgrade staff capacity
to apply the Geospatial Information
System at BRR, Banda Aceh, August
11, 2006. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi
scales of 1:2000 and 1:5000. Armed with these maps, opportunity to conduct further
updating, augmenting and integration was opened widely. One of the ways was
by combining data and information compiled when the tsunami struck with that
from Bakosurtanal. Aside form that, data nad information updates from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were also included.
Establishment of the SIM-C and Geospatial Data Development
Soon after the tsunami, the United Nations Humanitarian Information Center (UNHIC)
started collecting data from every party. In September 2005, UNHIC changed its name to
the United Nations Information Management Service (UNIMS). The data and information
from UNIMS was shared with the Indonesian government in February 2006. BRR used
this opportunity to establish the Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C), which
coordinated humanitarian agencies and contained Geographic Information System (GIS)
capacity. The center initiated the formation of the GIS Consortium Aceh-Nias, which
handled the coordination and capacity-building of various actors to avoid duplications in
the field.
The center also formed partnerships with numerous international institutions, such
Along with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), BRR also created a GIS capacitybuilding program for fishermen. Through the activities conducted by the Panglima
Laot organization, fishing communities were introduced to GIS technology, particularly
in the application of Global Positioning System (GPS) mapping and software to locate
fish populations. This involved not only fishermen but also students in implementing
community-based mapping to gather required oceanographic data. This activity also
presented a blessing with the discovery of several new coral reef ecosystem within
Indonesian territory. Two of which –named by the local fishermen- were Meulati
Coral and Bahwee (near the waters of Lamno, Aceh Jaya). Although small, aside from
expanding the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia, the discovery of these coral
can prevent ships from foundering or nets from ripping as often experienced by local
fishermen.
GIS for Accountability and Auditing Purposes
The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institution (INTOSAI) has developed
a program to monitor relief distribution in disaster situations. On February 2007, during
their visti to Aceh, a number of INTOSAI Tsunami Initiative Group delegates chose BRR as
the point of departure for auditing relief aid. They also surveyed the potential beefits of
using GIS and GPS software as instruments for accountability of post-disaster relief aid.
SIM-C supported the INTOSAI initiative and accepted the offer to conduct “the First
GIS Training for INTOSAI Auditors”. The experiences SIM-C shared with INTOSAI showed
how the application of GIS for auditors could be very helpful in auditing disaster and
humanitarian relief.
AGDC as a Legacy for Aceh Society
With the support of BRR, AGDC was situated at the Bappeda of Aceh Province in
December 2006. The purpose of the center’s establishment was to provide fast and easy
access to spatial data, promote the application and integration of spatial data in assisting
policy-making, and improve understanding and use of the geospatial system and data.
AGDC was the first step in realizing Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) in the entire province
of Nanggroe Aceh Darusssalam, as a database for spatial information to support economic
development, environmental management and policy-making in the territorial scope of
Aceh Province.
Lessons Learned
as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to produce aerial
photographs and develop the GIS system, with the Australian Government’s Overseas
Aid Program (AusAID) to collect geospatial data on Aceh and Nias, and with the French
government to conduct comprehensive surveys on urban areas in the entire Aceh region.
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40
SIM-C gained international recognition for supporting the recovery program of AcehNias in the aftermath of the disaster. Some of the lessons learned from SIM-C and AGDC
include:
First, the integration of GIS is vital in the planning for a post-disaster territory.
The system application not only assists in coordination but also in determining the
distribution of program implementation. The experience of SIM-C demonstrated that
integration since the preliminary phase is effective in supporting all parties in accessing
geospatial data and information. The policy to integrate this system does, of course,
require infrastructural support as well as support from policy-makers at the executive
level in order to ensure effective implementation.
Second, in the context of Indonesia, the application of a spatial data system and
information for the regional planning of such an extensive area remains inadequate.
The SIM-C experience in the context of disaster recovery illustrates that the geospatial
data and information that the government documented was not sufficient to become
a basis on which to build a geographical information system. A basic and territorial
map of a much larger scale was required to ensure data accuracy in some of the heavily
damaged areas in Aceh and Nias. Bearing in mind that Indonesia is an archipelagic nation,
the system’s development at the national level could support integrated development
planning as the geospatial data and information could always be updated.
Third, the geospatial system needs to be continuously developed beyond the context
of Aceh-Nias recovery after the tsunami to a national scale. This would enable more
accuracy in development planning and prevent problems related to inter-regional and
territorial coordination. Although the disaster became an entry point for the development
of a geospatial system in Aceh, the strengths and benefit of this system would be most
effective under normal circumstances, both for development planning and in mitigation
for disaster on a wider scale.
As an ad-hoc institution, SIM-C trained local government staff, transferred the system
to the local government, and created and developed a collaborative SDI system. This was
done by integrating the system with that of the provincial government of Aceh so that it
would remain sustainable even after BRR’s exit from the region.
SIM-C achieved this by developing SDI in Aceh Province, covering data collection,
software and hardware application to encode the system, development of system
guidelines, application know-how, management, dissemination and spatial data
exchange, data adjustment concepts and an internet-based development framework,
such as through a Data Catalogue. In this context, the implementation of SDI was also
supported by local bylaw (Qanun) so that Aceh Province could strengthen the system
application. A similar method could be developed in other regions if necessary.
Geospatial data included maps with coordinates and detailed information on every
house built in Aceh and Nias. The success in pinpointing housing sites was continued
with the mapping of overall assets resulting from development in Aceh through the
Asset Management Information System (Sistem Manajemen Asset, SIMAS). This was
widely implemented for the first time in Indonesia in Aceh Province and some parts
of North Sumatera Province, namely Nias and South Nias districts during the four year
reconstruction period.
Geospatial Data on Construction – from
Housing Support to Overall Assets: Indisputable
Facts
Background
41
At the end of October 2007, there were allegations that BRR – especially the Head of
BRR Executing Agency, Kuntoro - had misled the public when he announced success in
building 100,000 houses in Aceh and Nias. This allegation led to verification attempts
by the Geospatial Data Unit and the Deputy for Housing and Settlement. The team
performed intensive mapping of each house location while coordinating the system and
collecting data on housing beneficiaries. This effort resulted in indisputable information
on the actual number of houses built.
Geospatial Data Unit of Pusdatin is a derivative unit from SIM-C that was transferred
to Aceh Provincial Government as BRR approached its tenure’s end. Because its function
relates with data, by 2007, this unit was officially under the structure of BRR’s Pusdatin.
Geospatial Data Development for Reconstruction Reporting
Accountability
Mechanism of this system started with data gathering of every house built in Aceh
Province and Nias Island, whether constructed by donors under BRR coordination. Each
house was identified and its GPS coordinates were determined. For the purpose of
verification, every house was photographed, its form and condition recorded, the name
of the institution responsible for its construction and the house owner identified, and its
administrational location determined.
At the time of publication, the geospatial data of more than 109,000 houses had been
documented from the 140,304 built. This number will continue to increase as the activity
is still being conducted.
Hence the announcement that more than 100,000 had been built in Aceh and Nias was
factual after all.
After the data were presented on several occasions in Aceh and Jakarta, to central
government officials and legislators as well as to the international community, the
Figure 3.5 Information Presented through the Geospatial Data System
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geospatial data system received very positive response. This led to a need to use the
geospatial data system as a standard reporting system for asset provision, which was
not limited to housing. From January to March 2009, geospatial data collection was
conducted on various assets, such as infrastructure, health, educational and other public
facilities in Aceh Province.
The process was based on the Asset Management Information System. This system was
already utilized by BRR. The application initiated by the Finance Ministry had complete
features for asset management and transfer, inventory, follow-up, handover, removal and
termination. In its initial phase however, it covered textual data only and covered only
APBN-supported assets.
In the case of Aceh and Nias, not only this application compiled textual data, but also
completed with geospatial data. In GIS Housing, each asset was documented based on its
location, photo and detailed description. Moreover, non-APBN work result asset data was
also surveyed and compiled in this system. Even more detailed information on Nias can be
accessed through a system called Nias Island Reconstruction Asset Management (NIRAM).
Lessons Learned
Geospatial mapping of assets or support from donors/NGOs was the first of its kind
in Indonesia as well as the in world. This system has become the new standard for
accountability, especially to trace the disbursement of funds contributed by donors and
individuals.
The system is not difficult to operate, especially if data collectors and operators are
familiar with GIS data management. BRR developed this system by conducting a fourmonth survey without consultant support, thereby reducing costs.
For four years, BRR along with several donors and GIS partners/consortiums in Aceh
trained 40 GIS operators in Aceh and Nias. This expertise is actually quite prevalent. In
other Indonesian regions, commonly in departments or provinces in Java, many have
been trained in this field.
After collection, geospatial information is uploaded onto a website and is accessible to
everyone. This marks how BRR transparently ran and coordinated the reconstruction of
Aceh and Nias.
Institutions that saw how the system worked expressed optimism that it could be used
as a new accountability system in Indonesia. Several members of the Indonesian House of
Representatives asked Bappenas to implement the system in all strategic programs to be
developed and planned. The Aceh and the Papua provincial governments have requested
that BBR transfer knowledge of this system to enable the two administrations to collect
asset data.
When the system was presented to the The State Ministry of People’s Housing, it was
stated that the system could assist in information collection on the concentration of
apartment buildings and rented houses to determine the spread of housing provision.
In general, many people have stated that this system is acceptable and can be used to
collect data and information on development results in Indonesia.
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Donation Purse and
State Expenditure
for Aceh and Nias
47
AFTER
the requirement of data collection is met, one of the most primary stages of
planning concerns fund availability and resources. In the rehabilitation and reconstruction
of Aceh, many significant breakthroughs were made in funding and financing that could
become a development model for application in many parts of the world, especially in
developing countries.
Donor Harmonization for Aceh-Nias Recovery
The application of the Multi-Donor Fund (MDF) scheme to gather and distribute relief is
indeed known in other parts of the world, such as in Sudan, Afghanistan and Vietnam. The
World Bank is the administrator of aid to these countries. What is unique is that in MDF
disbursement for Aceh and Nias, BRR also played a key role in determining where and to
which projects the funds would go. BRR as a representative of the Indonesian government
for Aceh and Nias not only took the beneficiary position like other MDF beneficiary
countries but positioned itself as supervisor for fund channeling.
Billions of dollars circulated AcehNias during the reconstruction
period. To respond in kind to the
generosity of recovery partners
to the Government of Indonesia,
the professional management
of the funds was a pivotal issue
emphasized by BRR early on. This
poster is part of an anti-corruption
campaign, October 18, 2008.
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Background
The forming of a coordinating forum for development agencies involved in the
recovery of Aceh and Nias was one of the commitments of the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness signed on March 2, 2005. The Paris declaration emphasizes the
effectiveness of relief distribution. The Indonesian government, represented by the Head
of Bappenas at the time, Sri Mulyani, signed this agreement with more than 100 countries’
representatives as well as international development organizations working at both the
bilateral and multilateral levels. In compliance with the declaration, the Head of Bappenas,
BRR and several donor countries’ representatives and donor organizations agreed to form
a Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Aceh and Nias, which later became known as MDF.
Initially, the World Bank offered US$25 million in relief and the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) US$10 million for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias through the MDF. This offer
later developed into donor partnerships ranging from loans to logistics.
The procedure for fund distribution by each country and donor varied. MDF was
founded as a medium to manage trustee funds from various countries and funding
organizations with diverse procedures to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction
of Aceh and Nias. The proposed coordination mechanism was integrated, meaning
that all grant funds were deposited in a designated account and incorporated into the
Government of Indonesia’s Annual State Budget.
One Donor Purse
MDF comprised 15 countries and funding organizations that had pledged to contribute
a total of US$691.92 million in relief by December 2008. The organizations and countries
were, in order of their contribution, the European Commission, Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Canada, World Bank, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Finland,
ADB, United States of America, New Zealand and Ireland. MDF opened offices in Jakarta
and Banda Aceh. MDF leadership consisted of the Head of BRR Executing Agency as the
representative of the Indonesian government, the European Commission representing
donor countries as the largest donor, and the World Bank as MDF manager.
The MDF Steering Committee comprised of six Indonesian government officials, two
members of Aceh’s civil society nominated by the Indonesian government, one UN
representative and one international NGO representative. Other committee members
included representatives of each country or funding agency that donated at least
US$10 million. Some development aid agencies, such as from Australia and Japan,
acted as supervisors. The World Bank also played a supervisory role and assisted the
Steering Committee in cooperation with the European Commission and the Indonesian
government.
Table 4.1 MDF Member Countries and the Funds Committed
for Aceh‑Nias Recovery (as of December 2008)
Distinct from other MDF fund disbursement in
other countries, the BRR coordination function also
determined the amount of relief that MDF allocated.
In addition, through MDF, BRR also managed to
garner funding agencies from various countries to
issue an integrated planning policy for the area. The
funds disbursed to support a program or activity
needed approval by the donors, the government
and the public. MDF also took part in the PCN
workshops and reported project progress through
RANdatabase. This process was facilitated by BRR,
as it was with other stakeholders who would be or
were implementing a project or activity in Aceh and
Nias. This mechanism could prevent conflict risks
between funding agencies as well as with the NGOs
in implementing their respective programs.
Funding Commitment and
Mechanism
The Jakarta MDF office consisted of a manager
assisted by three external consultants and
secretarial staff. Meanwhile, the Banda Aceh Office
was run by a local staff under the direct supervision
of World Bank international staff as the project
coordinator in Aceh and Nias.
49
* Based on World Bank foreign exchange rates as of December 2008
During the recovery phase of Aceh and Nias after the tsunami, MDF provided two
kinds of support to the Indonesian government. First was the financing scheme for new
projects or components in project funding, including in the co-financing of new projects
supported by bilateral or multilateral development agencies. Second was assistance
support for programs included in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, whether
sectoral or multi-sectoral.
The two types of funding were run through a holistic financing management
system and structure, involving an overall management and participation process of
stakeholders. Approved regulations and procedures were effectively applied in project
implementation and financing. In both cases, most program expenses were channeled
through official channels of the Indonesian government through a strictly monitored
account. Rapid fund channeling was also enabled to accelerate and optimize usage.
MDF was the best forum for dialogue on the recovery of Aceh and Nias by the
Indonesian government and funding agencies. The European Commission became the
biggest funding source in the MDF scheme, followed by Netherlands, United Kingdom
50
and Canada. Based on an MDF report in December 2008, the amount of MDF funds
commitments reached a total of US$691.92 million with a total allocation to projects of
US$515.49 million.
In fund disbursement, MDF not only attempted to create an effective and efficient
system in the recovery of Aceh and Nias, but also tried to create better conditions for
both infrastructural development such as stipulated in the Master Plan of the Indonesian
government and in the reduction of poverty and improved welfare of the people of Aceh
and Nias.
Program Approach
The program approach funded by the MDF scheme put forward program impact that
supported physical output, since the recovery of Aceh and Nias was a disaster response
dealing with massive damage on a territorial scale that involved existing infrastructure.
The first approach proposed was restoring community infrastructure for the economic
recovery of the people. This was done by implementing a community-based approach in
the recovery of Aceh and Nias.
The main objective of MDF in the development of infrastructure in Aceh and Nias
was to reduce poverty impact and risk. The opening up of isolated areas and the
reconstruction of economic development infrastructure became the main paradigm
for the physical and non-physical programs agreed upon with the Government of
Indonesia. Programs funded by MDF emphasized accountability, transparency and
participation of all stakeholders, particularly the community. Bearing in mind that Aceh
was formerly a conflict area, the recovery program would also affect social integration.
In addition, environmental sustainability in the recovery program needed to be not
only about restoring environmental conditions but also about conservation. A gendersensitive approach was also prioritized in MDF programs, particularly in those related to
community participation.
Lessons Learned
Every program implementation and plan funding unanimously subscribed by MDF
referred to Indonesian government guidelines. As a coordination forum of donor agencies
involved in Aceh and Nias recovery, MDF took part as a partner to the governmental
and non-governmental agencies operating in Indonesia. In compliance with the Paris
Declaration, international development agencies were bound to adopting the system
used by the local organization receiving the aid, so that the principle of adjustment/
equality could be achieved and the sense of belonging was nurtured among beneficiaries.
BRR as the representative of the Government of Indonesia in Aceh and Nias succeeded
in changing the paradigm dominating the relations between international funding
agencies and the beneficiary country. By establishing itself in the Master Plan of
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction formulated by the Indonesian government, the system
51
developed by MDF changed the donor-driven paradigm into a local-needs oriented
program. This was also enforced by the joint-funded program of the government and
the MDF through collaborative planning. The joint-funding scheme specifically focused
on the infrastructure sector. The Government of Indonesia was accustomed to using
funds from the state budget for this sector. Once more, it is worth noting that MDF also
complied with the PCN workshop mechanism in channeling development funds, as
well as in deliberating new project plans and in recommencing previous projects. This
mechanism succeeded in increasing the commitment of various development agencies in
the MDF scheme compared to the preliminary phase.
Villagers produce coconut shell
charcoal as part of a livelihood
program funded by the Multi Donor
Fund. Meulaboh, May 19, 2009.
Photo: MDF/Geumala Yatim
52
Road construction funded by Multi
Donor Found and carried out by ILO
in Dahana Village, Gunungsitoli, Nias
Islands, North Sumatera, May 22,
2009. Photo: MDF/Geumala Yatim
According to an MDF report in December 2008, MDF had allocated US$515.49 million
for 18 projects. Meanwhile another US$89.85 million was committed to seven other
projects. MDF coordination occurred at many levels. In 2007, a series of meetings was held
to discuss the role of MDF after BRR ended its term on April 16, 2009. On July 28, 2008, an
agreement was made that MDF would continue its Aceh and Nias development operations
until December, 31 2012. With this agreement, approved programs are to be completed
and not halted midway, since some of the programs approved by the Indonesian
government and MDF could not be completed by end of BRR’s term in April 2009.
Bappenas became MDF’s partner after BRR’s closure. In the implementation of MDF’s local
system procedure in Aceh and Nias, the Government of Indonesia has been positioned as an
equal partner in controlling donor funding for the recovery of Aceh and Nias.
The Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF) was a facility to manage relief funds
overseen by BRR to manage grants from across the world, as well as corporate, social
organization, and private individual funding. This facility was needed as a medium
to channel grants from donors who were moved to help accelerate the recovery of
Aceh after the tsunami and earthquake, but at the same time avoid time-consuming
bureaucratic red tape.
Background
The 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the 2005 earthquake in Nias attracted
profound compassion from around the world. Participation and assistance from every
layer of society, both domestic and international, deeply heartened the people of Aceh
and Nias, who longed for the restoration of living conditions in the aftermath.
Several countries, corporations, social organizations and international agencies
requested information on how to channel their donations for tsunami victims without
having to go through various bureaucratic means and mediums like MDF. These included
Venezuela, which wanted to donate US$2 million, China with US$1 million and PT Exxon
Mobile, which were not interested in participating in the joint grant scheme.
In responding to the need to form a medium that accommodated the desires and
donations coming from the various parties, the Head of the BRR Executing Agency
decided to create the RANTF. The advantage of RANTF funds was the fast disbursement
process, which avoided a long bureaucratic procedure and time-consuming budget
revisions but still upheld the accountability principle.
RANTF: Embracing Donors and Implementing Mandate
The idea of collecting donations through the special RANTF scheme was initiated
by numerous parties, especially after the emergency phase ended. The enthusiasm of
donors to contribute was an opportunity not to be missed. Many donors also needed
the medium to pool their funds and provide assistance to realize the delivery of their
programs to the beneficiaries. In the rapidly changing conditions during the recovery,
there were many unanticipated necessities, particularly on how to cope with and mediate
discrepancies existing in inter-sectoral activities.
Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF):
Mediating Mandate, Accelerating Benefit
53
Figure 4.1 RANTF Committee Structure
54
Head of BRR
Executing
Agency
RANTF Committee
Committee Chairman :
Deputy for Operations
Members:
Deputy for Finance & Planning
Deputy for Economic & Bussiness Development
Director of Donor & International Relations
Executive Director of RANTF
Executive
Director of
RANTF
Program & Donor
Assistance Unit
Donor, Stakeholder,
Partners,
Communications and Media,
Tim Terpadu Relations
Coordination &
Project
Management Unit
Sector Deputies, Program Integration,
Pusdatin, Regional Office,
Center of Quality Control,
Asset Management
Administration &
Fund
Management Unit
Escrow Bank,
KPA Secretariat,
Accounting
Budget Authority
Officer (KPA) Unit
Bank Payment,
KPA Secretariat,
Accounting, Supervisory Board
As the party responsible for the coordination of rehabilitation and reconstruction of
Aceh-Nias, BRR was expected to come up with a flexible and adaptable breakthrough. In
accordance with the authority stipulated in Central Government Regulation No. 2/2005,
some BRR exponents were encouraged to creatively and proactively interpret the articles
by forming a special unit called the Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (ANTF). On January 4, 2006, the
Head of BRR Executing Agency changed the name of ANTF to RANTF, which was made
official by the head of the Implementing Agency through Regulation No. 1/PER/BP-BRR/
I/2006. In addition, five individuals were appointed members of the RANTF Committee,
which was in charge of and had the highest responsibility in determining/directing policy.
The committee held tri-monthly meetings to discuss progress, achievements and strategic
planning, as well as monthly meetings with donors and stakeholders to discuss progress.
To ensure the effectiveness of RANTF fund disbursement in supporting rehabilitation
and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias, RANTF was designed in such way that the
management was oriented toward process acceleration, particularly in projects handling
the emergency situation, and flexibility while still prioritizing transparency and reporting
accountability. The RANTF effectiveness was based on the three pillars of Speedy
Response, Flexibility, and Transparency.
Main RANTF Activities
1. Donor and Program Assistance. Together with other BRR units, RANTF served
numerous donors listed in the donor archives, such as partner countries, corporations,
state-owned enterprises and their affiliates, foundations and NGOS. The services
included coordination and assistance for programs implemented by donors and their
implementing partners, starting from planning to delivery to beneficiaries.
2. Fund Management. The RANTF taskforce and other BRR units pooled funds from
abroad, corporations, foundations, NGOs and the public. The pooled funds were
channeled to various programs through specified procedures, based on the
characteristics of donors, beneficiaries and other stakeholders as well as field
requirements. The RANTF team applied a ‘fund project
Figure 4.2 Three Essential Elements of RANTF
matching’ mechanism encompassing:
• Open purpose program involving funds and programs
for which allocation had not yet been specifically
determined by donors, so that it was open to
suggestions from the RANTF Committee, deputies
and other BRR units.
Transparency
• Flexible program involving funds and
programs of which allocation was partially
determined by donors, such as those in
which the donors ascertained which
sectors should receive funds.
• Earmarked program involving
funds and programs of which
allocation was specifically
determined by donors and
received by relevant deputies or
other BRR units.
Effective
Trust
Fund
Speed
Flexibility
55
Figure 4.3 Project Management Procedure
RANTF Committee,
BRR Deputies,
BRR Representative Offices
Flexible
Fund-Project
Matching
Open
Earmarked
Project initiation
√ Proposal
√ MoU
Approval/
Disapproval
√ Funds Usage Form
√ Project and Rating
√ Concept Note
√ Budget
√ Deputy Memo
56
Project Coordinator,
Project Manager,
Supervision
Project Planning,
Implementation,
and Supervision
√ Project chart
√ Tender Document
√ ToR
√ Contract
Payment request
√ Payment Approval
Record
√ Progressing Report
√ Update PCN
Verification
Payment deferral
Payment confirmation
Managed Fund
Admin Unit,
Budget Authority
Officer Unit
Verification reception
and payment
instruction processing
√ Bank instruction
√ Payment order
Instruction ,
Funds availability,
Procedur & other checks
√ Payment
authorization
√ Bank instruction
Permit
and certificate
Project Coordinator,
Project Manager,
Supervision,
Asset Management
Report processing
and final payment
Final report
Project handover
RANTF cooperated with five prominent international and local banks: HSBC, Deutsche
Bank, Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Niaga, and Standard Chartered Bank. The five banks
were responsible for holding the funds as well as fund administration, including issuing
periodical fund status reports.
RANTF was also supported by independent legal consultants, tax consultants, public
accountants and corruption watch groups. This support gave full guarantee that all
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Aceh and Nias funded by RANTF were fully
controlled, monitored, transparent, efficient and effective in accordance with regulations.
RANTF issued a pre-audit financial report every six months and public accountants
audited each report at the end of the year.
Lessons Learned
First, during the recovery phase, several mediating activities were needed to link the
projects conducted in different sectors and to anticipate disparities and urgencies. Fund
disbursement not involving a long bureaucratic procedure or time-consuming budget
revision but maintaining accountability was required, for which RANTF was created.
57
Second, to ensure that the goals and objectives of a trust fund were met, it was
necessary for this type of institution to ensure reliability, transparency and accountability
in implementing its tasks. Despite the dynamism in running the activities and flexibility in
managing the funds and programs, transparency and accountability had to be carefully
maintained.
Figure 4.4 Donor and BRR Program Coordination
- RANTF unit
- Sector Deputies/Region
- Integrated Program and Pusdatin
- Integrated Team
Program
PCN
PPMK and Supervision
Asset Management
Stakeholder and Partners
Handover
Donor
Recovery Partners
Implementing
Agency
58
Making the most of the riverside of
Krueng Aceh river as a public park
built through the RANTF funds,
Banda Aceh, September 9, 2008.
Third, strategic fundraising and efficient fund spending were achieved through
intensifying approaches and reporting activities to donors, rendering effective assistance
in program implementation as well as through the active involvement of beneficiary
communities. Hence, a donor could be reassured with results that made significant
contributions to the beneficiaries. In addition, pleased with the relief, the beneficiaries
could also continue its maintenance and operation so that the benefit would endure.
The Trust Fund as a grant management facility could be replicated to accommodate funds
coming from international donors, corporations, social organizations and other elements of
society. The collected funds could be used to support social and non-profit public activities.
Hence, the concept could be applied in running and managing funds for the development
of social facilities, scholarship grants, museum management and public activities, or even in
administering a retirement fund, social insurance or a social security net.
Basically, the innovative multi-year contract and carryover funds enabled an activity to
be conducted over two consecutive fiscal years without the administrational delay that
usually occurs at the start of each fiscal year. Unspent funds from one year’s budget could
be carried over to the following year with approval from the Directorate General of the
State Treasury.
Background
Normal procedures in state financial management require unspent funds from the
National Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN) at the end of
every fiscal year to be returned to the State Treasury. This applied to all funds listed by
the Issuance of Spending Authority (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran, DIPA) matched
against State Treasury data on disbursed funds. Normally if the funds are still required,
procedure requires that a new proposal be submitted for the following fiscal year.
This procedure burdened rehabilitation and reconstruction activities as it meant
ongoing projects would be halted, at least until after budget deliberation between the
Finance Ministry and the House of Representatives. Based on experience, the process of
deliberation could run through October in an ongoing year.
Two steps taken to overcome this delay were:
• Depositing the budget into a trust fund at the Special Office for State Services and
Treasury (Kantor Pelayanan dan Perbendaharaan Negara – Khusus, KPPN-K) in Banda
Aceh; and
• Using the unspent budget for an ongoing budget year in the following year’s budget
through the multi-year contract.
The legal basis for the application of the multi-year contract and carryover funds was
legalized in November 2003 through the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on
Guidelines of Government Goods/Services Procurement in order that activities funded
by the APBN or the Provincial Annual Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah,
APBD) could run effectively and efficiently. Article 30 of the decree defined the multiyear contract as a ‘contract on project implementation involving budget funds for more
than 1 (one) fiscal year’. According to the presidential decree, individual cases were to be
approved by:
• The Finance Ministry for procurements funded by the state budget;
• The governor for procurements funded by the provincial budget; and
• The district head/mayor for procurements funded by district/municipal budgets.
BRR Multi-Year Contract and State Budget
Carryover Funds
59
60
Meanwhile, the initiative to carry over funds came about due to delays caused in DIPA
issuances after the Indonesian government introduced the integrated budget system in
2005. This led to a reduction in disbursements during the ongoing budget year. According
to Finance Minister Sri Mulyani, almost all projects proposed in the Second Revision of
the APBN in 2005 or in the second semester of 2005 could not be implemented that year.
This was because budget deliberation between the government and the newly elected
House of Representatives had been completed only in October 2005. As a result, the
DIPA budget implementation statement, which was required as the basis for budget
disbursement for departmental projects, could not be issued until December 2005. Thus
the 2005 budget was still being disbursed up until April 2006, not only to BRR but also to
other governmental departments.
The main principle of carryover funds and the multi-year contract was to bypass
bureaucracy so that activities could be implemented without delays due to
administrational requirements at the start of the year. The goal was to accelerate the
implementation of projects/activities that would take more than one fiscal year to
complete.
Implementation of Multi-Year Contract and Carryover Funds
In November 2005, Presidential Regulation No. 70/2005 was issued regarding the
Third Revision of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 to bring it in line with Government
Regulation No. 2/2005 to expedite the task of BRR. Article 30, Clause (8) on multi-year
contracts was revised so that contracts could be executed with the approval of the Head
of BRR Executing Agency for Aceh and Nias on procurements funded by the APBN for
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. This policy certainly helped increase the speed
of implementation in BRR multi-year contracts.
This type of contract was devised to maintain the momentum in field activities that
were at their peak. This was in line with the urgency to accelerate rehabilitation and
reconstruction activities and the requirement to follow state budgeting procedure. In
other words, the multi-year contract meant that the organization did not have to adhere
strictly to the budget cycle, emphasizing instead the people’s demand that BRR complete
tasks as soon as possible.
The contract was not intended to endorse an increase in budget disbursement, but
was instead designed to maintain performance momentum in the field. However, this
indirectly affected the rate of budget disbursement.
The contract was also a form of budget provision commitment, meaning that
a contract’s budget availability was guaranteed in the following year’s budget
implementation statement. Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 states that multi-year
contracts are authorized for projects spanning more than one year. Projects/activities
61
based on BRR multi-year contracts were assignments that actually could be completed
in one fiscal year, but an exception was made in the BRR case. This was because under
normal circumstances in which the budget cycle was January-December, project
culmination usually occurred in October-November, whereas rehabilitation and
reconstruction activities had to be executed simultaneously and promptly in every field. If
there was a revision in planning, the DIPA could not be issued until August, hence in late
December many projects were still at the initial implementation stage. The peak activities
in project implementation usually took place four to five months after the issuance
(unless the project was for procurement). In view of this situation, BRR sought a solution
so that projects would not be halted just as they were progressing.
Project criteria for multi-year contracts were, among other things:
• Planning and Detail Engineering Design (DED) to support physical infrastructure for
housing and settlement areas and other strategic programs;
• Activities related to the recovery of socioeconomic conditions;
• Physical planning submitted the preceding year that received strong support from
the local government;
Signing of the “Budget Account
Code for Recovery” between BRR
and the House of Representative
(DPR), Jakarta, June 4, 2005.
62
The center of economic life of
Lampulo lies all along Krueng Aceh
river, Banda Aceh, April 3, 2009.
• Projects deferred due to problems related to land issues, delayed local government
approval, absence of beneficiary data and shifting consultancy design for which
funds had been allocated the previous year;
• Activities that were expected to be completed at the end of the year;
• Availability of minimum contract value, either physical or non-physical;
• Without price hikes; and
• Have a recommendation for a multi-year contract. The team in charge of
recommending projects for multi-year contracts was led by the Head of Procurement
Services Center. A project was then proposed to the BRR Deputy for Finance and
Planning, which would disburse the allotted funds.
Lessons Learned
Authorization of multi-year contracts and carryover funds enabled the momentum of
activities to be maintained and speed in field activities. They could be employed in largescale, strategic or urgent projects (such as in handling disasters). Even though the process
started at the beginning of the year and there were no constraints to delay project
completion, some projects could not be completed in one fiscal year due to their massive
scale, among other things. In cases where project implementation must be postponed,
it was because there were technical/non-technical obstacles because the tender process
If projects such as the abovementioned are urgently required by the people and their
termination would aggravate current conditions, employing a multi-year contract would
be the solution. Of course, to prevent actors from exploiting such opportunities by not
finishing their work due to minor problems and unreasonable excuses (more because
of a lack of competence) more precise and rigorous criteria must be formulated as
requirements for using a multi-year contract.
By employing such mechanisms and procedures, BRR could accomplish its
development target within its four-year mandate. This included project implementations
using international funds.
Many projects fall under the main criteria mentioned above, especially infrastructural
and highly strategic projects and projects in disaster areas where quick results are
required, as well as projects supported by international funds. It is vital to maintain the
momentum of economic growth, and therefore some projects are better implemented
when unrestricted by the fiscal year. If the reform of state financial management
materializes and the development process improves, more public investment projects
could be planned for the mid-range period (every five years) and better implemented.
had to be repeated or halted by the court because from the beginning it was known that
the activites could not be completed. There would also be projects of which completion
has been projected but were abandoned for reasons beyond a service provider’s control,
resulting in incomplete results at the end of the fiscal year.
63
Chapter 5. Operational Preparations
Operational
Preparations
65
Under
normal circumstances, a project can be implemented once all the
necessary tools are ready: complete system and organization, work list, sufficient data
and funding. There are two elements included in project preparation. The first is technical
project preparation, which relates to goods and service procurement, commonly known
as the bidding process. The second is pre-reconstruction activities. Primarily, in physical
infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction, feasibility studies or environmental
analyses are mandatory to fulfill construction requirements. Feasibility studies, whether
for economic, social or environmental projects, are required to justify the project.
Feasibility studies and environmental analyses are both part of the preparation phase.
After the project is fully completed, the wrap up procedure discussed here is payment
process. BRR made breakthroughs in preparation activities, including in goods and
services procurement and environmental study analysis. There was also an innovation
in the payment process for programs and national development activities in the
establishment of special payment office. The entire project preparation and conclusion
are covered in this chapter.
Prospective contractors sit and wait
following the tender bidding process
for physical projects at the BRR office,
March 8, 2005. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi
66
Goods and Services Procurement for the
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and
Nias
Goods and services procurement is a common procedure applied by projects and
activities funded by the APBN. In dealing with the limited human resources amid
the copious rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Aceh and Nias, some major
breakthroughs were made to ease the process of goods and services procurement
without compromising the reliability of the system. One breakthrough was a regulation
that the position of tender officer for rehabilitation and reconstruction projects can be
filled by non-civil servants. The policy of direct appointment was also regulated for Aceh
and Nias. Last was a breakthrough in electronic procurement for goods and services in
support of e-government development for the Aceh government. This system was the
first of its kind.
Background
Goods and services procurement is an activity to provide goods/services required
by government agencies. The most common procurement method is the tender.
Procurement includes goods provision, contractor services, consultancy services and
other services. In its procurement activities, BRR followed the standard state procedure
regulated by Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Guidelines of Implementation of
Government Goods and Services Procurement.
The regulation’s basic assumptions are for normal circumstances, far different from
the conditions in Aceh and Nias. The principles that BRR had to implement were
efficiency, effectiveness, openness and competitiveness, transparency in terms of policy
and information on procurement technical requirements, as well as fair and nondiscriminative principles to prevent corruption, collusion and nepotism as well as state
losses and applying the accountability principle both in systemic and procedural activities
as well as in implementation.
Not long before BRR was established, Presidential Instruction No. 5/2004 on the
Acceleration of Corruption Eradication was issued. Clause 11 of the Instruction required
the Coordinating Minister of the Economy, the Minister of Finance. and the State
Minister of National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas to evaluate and try out
the e-procurement system to be used jointly by government agencies. Considering the
huge responsibility BRR was undertaking in terms of program value and the scope of the
working area, as well as potential problems and grievances if programs were delayed,
BRR integrated the e-procurement system in goods and services procurement. Bidding
activities to procure goods and services online (e-Proc) was a BRR breakthrough to
accelerate and expedite the financial and administrative process.
67
Exceptional Innovation in Goods and Services Procurement
BRR had the authority to operate several programs and/or inter-sectoral activities
because it was led by a ministerial level officer. Therefore, in the context of rehabilitation
and reconstruction related to goods and services procurement, the central government
twice revised the regulation on the procurement of goods and services, in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 to adjust to the needs and problems in the
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias.
The revised Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 enabled direct appointment from state
institutions for particular services to implement its tasks. The content of Presidential
Decree No. 61/2004 on Guidelines for Government Goods and Services Procurement as
the first revision of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 mentioned, among other things, that
in a disaster context as well rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, procurement
normally conducted through tender may be done through direct appointment ‘pertaining
to criteria related to emergency handling for state defense, security and the people’s
safety that requires a prompt response”.
Logistics procurement personnel
examines bid documents submitted
by companies participating in the
tender for BRR NAD-Nias projects.
Banda Aceh, June 14, 2006.
68
Another BRR breakthrough was the changes in the tender process from prequalification to post-qualification, thus screening for tender participants was based on
expertise and project experience. This approach was significantly different from the
dominant system applied in other technical departments in Indonesia. By applying
this system, BRR service procurement applicants were short-listed, and without past
experience one could not participate in a tender. In the second phase, after short-listing
service providers based on their experience, BRR would award a tender based on the most
competitive offer.
During 2005, BRR applied both pre-qualification and post qualification systems before
employing e-Proc principles. BRR started to implement this principle in the 2008 financial
year, two years after the preparation activities in 2006 and 2007 to set up programs,
facilities as well as human resources. Considering that almost half of the staff of BRR’s
regional office originated from local government circles, they were expected to maintain
the sustainability of the e-Proc system after returning to their respective offices.
Table 5.1. Comparison Between Face-to-Face Procurement and e-procurement
The Program Training Department of the Surabaya City Government not only gave
training but also assisted BRR in developing the system and software. Institutionally,
BRR legitimized the existence of a taskforce handling e-Proc through the Head of
BRR Executing Agency Decree No. 50/2007. Prior to e-Proc, BRR goods and services
procurement was managed by the BRR Center for Procurement Services without using the
internet.
Basically there is not much difference between the e-Proc system and the typical
tender system. The main difference is that bidding is not done face to face in e-Proc but
through the internet. The implementation of e-Proc also emphasizes convenience, speed
and integration, plus the whole process is swiftly managed. None of the partners can
manipulate data or information because they have to send it online in attachments. The
implementer and committee of goods and services procurement can quickly and openly
monitor the ongoing process online. Data input is actively done by bidding participants,
thus speeding up the short-listing process.
Systematically, the bidding document model implemented in the BRR e-Proc
system comprised three models: contractor services, consultancy services and goods
procurement. In the implementation of e-Proc, some phases could be bypassed and
accelerated, which ultimately increased the quality and speed of implementation.
BRR established an e-Proc facilities and secretariat at the governor’s office in Banda
Aceh. The facilities provided were 15 bidding rooms integrated with a server and
supporting hardware system, as well as a meeting room used jointly with the provincial
government. The e-Proc secretariat was in charge of holding Management Assessment
Meetings (Rapat Tinjauan Manajemen, RTM) to make sure that the management system
and procedure, which was ISO 9001:2000 certified, ran smoothly. RTMs were held at least
twice a year, but could be held outside the annual schedule should there be a crucial issue
related to the quality policy or target that required rapid follow-up. This whole sequence
was conducted to prepare for the transfer of the e-Proc system to the local government
after BRR completed its mandate in April 2009.
As one of the attempts to strengthen local economic conditions, BRR also optimized the
role of local service providers (in Aceh and Nias) to work together. However, local capacity
is usually insufficient to handle matters of a larger scope and so BRR invited nationalscale contractors, especially state-owned companies, to participate. This applied only to
programs that could not be handled by a local contractor.
A small team in charge of the development and preparation of e-Proc implementation
in Aceh through BRR was formed on July 19, 2006 by recruiting staff from BRR, the Aceh
Provincial Government, the West Aceh District Government and the Banda Aceh City
Government who joined a course for trainers facilitated by the Surabaya City Government
in East Java. The small team developed the system and infrastructure of e-Proc at BRR.
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BRR bidding implementation criteria were:
1. Applying the lowest bidding principle as the potential winning proposal. BRR always
implemented fund principles and efficiency so in general tender winners were those
who proposed a larger scope of work than others.
2. Could implement recurring bidding to optimize budget allocation in the current year
3. Physical development program implementation that complied with the Government
of Indonesia’s ideal standard and measurement (Indonesian National Standard, or
Standar Nasional Indonesia, SNI).
Conceptually and practically, the e-Proc system was not only related to communication
technology but also to the human resources running the program. In practice, the BRR
e-Proc system went through several upgrades as a result of hacking tests to check the
security and weaknesses of the system. This also related to internal barriers, as the system
eliminated the potential of direct interaction between BRR staff and the service providers
making a bid.
Since its implementation, BRR certified some 600 trained personnel to run the e-Proc
system, out of the 1,200 participants in the program. BRR’s vast field of work and
programmatic scope also created the need for a fast, efficient and transparent system.
Consequently, the number of taskforces was high and required good coordination and
communication to accelerate program implementation. E-Proc was the solution under
such circumstances, plus it could minimize problems and disclaimers after procurement
was realized.
Lessons Learned: Pursuing Speed, Enhancing Quality
With the application of information technology and the implementation of an
integrated bidding system, the number of personnel involved was reduced. E-Proc also
accelerated data and information management. Interestingly, e-Proc also indirectly
increased the quality of participants of open bids. The system required participants to
complete and provide required data, and they were expected to have an understanding
of and be active in the entire bidding process.
The internet-based system was also integrated with the databases of different
government institutions. Therefore, partners with questionable track records could be
directly monitored by the bidding and tender organizing committee. Additionally, unlike
the regular bidding system, by using the e-Proc system, all information and data related
to the bidding process could be accessed in its entirety. Competition among companies
participating in bids was more transparent and accountable, for both the participants
and the implementing team. The system also eliminated face-to-face interaction between
tender participants and members of the implementing team, since the whole process was
conducted online and on time to reduce the possibility of manipulation and corruption.
Since its implementation in 2008, three periods of e-Proc packages were conducted plus
one follow-up period.
Potential for Replication: Building Sustainability into the Future
To date, E-Proc has been implemented by several institutions and central government
departments, such as the Bappenas, the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, the East Kalimantan and Gorontalo provincial
governments, the district governments of Bogor, Lamongan and Balikpapan.
BRR applied the e-Proc system from Surabaya City Government as one of the best
practices in Indonesia. To achieve sustainability, E-proc is integrated with the system of
the local government, which will continue the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.
The first step in this was locating the e-proc secretariat at the Aceh governor’s office.
Transfer to the local government was conducted both directly and indirectly. The
direct process was conducted by the BRR e-Proc secretariat through propagation among
district/municipal governments. It is also supported by the secretariat’s location at the
governor’s office.
While indirectly, the transfer was performed by training BRR staff, half of which were
civil servants from various local governments. Once they returned to their original jobs
after the end of the BRR mandate, they will have the ability and capacity to improve their
colleagues’ skills. The training was not exclusively for BRR staff but also for vendors and
other staff working at the local offices of the Aceh Provincial Government.
In the future, this system will be applied by the Aceh Provincial Government and all
district and municipal governments in Aceh. The system will be integrated into the
provincial government system to be replicated by all districts and municipalities in Aceh,
much like the Spatial Information and Mapping Center system that was transferred to the
Aceh Geospatial Data Center.
Electronic bidding was also one way to reduce pressure from local government officials
who planned to organize a bid, and eliminated physical contact with intimidating
contractors and service providers. This method also enabled savings, since participants
could join without the expense of traveling all the way to Banda Aceh, thus reducing
bidding proposal amounts. This process also enabled the competency screening of a
particular company. For instance, if the Aceh local government wanted to organize a
tender for a computer and communication network system and software and a company
proved to be unable to use the system to submit its bid, there would be less probability of
it winning the bid as it could not demonstrate any competency in dealing with IT systems.
This was an empirical experience of the Communication, Information and Transportation
Agency of Aceh Province.
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Three Secret Formulas in Environmental
Monitoring: Washing Up, Empowerment and
Vigilance
The global environment is in a critical condition, thus no matter how urgent
the situation, the environmental aspect had to be taken into consideration in the
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Aceh and Nias. The first formula of
Environmental Washing Up was with the Environmental Management and Monitoring
Document (Dokumen Pengelolaan dan Pemantauan Lingkungan, DPPL). Through the DPPL,
the administrative process of environmental documentation was expedited. A DPPL was
compiled for both ongoing and completed projects.
The second formula was empowerment by conducting environmental impact analysis
(Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, Amdal) in clusters. With the cluster system,
environmental analysis of ongoing projects could be done effectively and economically.
The third introduced formula in Indonesia’s bureaucratic system included the Land
Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan, LARAP, Environmental Management Efforts
(Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan, UKL) and Environmental Monitoring Efforts (Usaha
Pengendalian Lingkungan, UPL) as the vigilant system in environmental monitoring. BRR
also endorsed eco-friendly attempts, ranging from broader policy context, program
selection and ongoing project assistance, as well as for completed projects in which the
results would be environmentally evaluated in the future. The key used to implement
environmental strategy was the inter-sectoral approach.
Background
The Master Plan Book1 was basically a guideline for environmentally friendly
reconstruction that was promoted by the Aceh Provincial Government through its
policy of “Green Policy Reconstruction for Aceh”. The policy aimed at improving the
living standards of society and individuals, while minimizing the negative impacts of
environmental reconstruction as well as preserving the natural diversity in the long run
and natural system productivity. The green policy then became the operational guideline
in the reconstruction process conducted by BRR and NGOs/international agencies as the
implementing partners.
The strategy for infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction was prompted by the
demand for logistical support in building housing, health and educational facilities. In
this way, the reconstruction process could be effectively executed and the socioeconomic
condition of the people could be quickly restored. It is worth noting that the activities of
rehabilitation and reconstruction were tied to physical, social and economic activities. For
example, a community of land owners and/or users and users of access roads could be
affected by project execution, as could forest cultivators whose wood may be utilized for
Infrastructure reconstruction would certainly change natural forms and landscapes.
Excavation activities, reshaping steep banks and re-positioning roads to construct
infrastructure would distort the geographical condition. This would be exacerbated by
the amount of landfill, gravel and other materials extracted from nature. To maintain
environmentally friendly principles, infrastructure planning and development is
regulated by Government Regulation No. 27/1999 on Amdal and an Environmental
Ministry Regulation covering the implementation of Amdal, which covers the guidelines
of implementation of Analysis of Environmental Impact (Analisis Dampak Lingkungan,
ANDAL, a detailed and in-depth research study on the significant impacts of a proposed
business or activity), the formulation of an Environmental Management Plan (Rencana
Pengelolaan Lingkungan, RKL) and Environmental Monitoring Plan (Rencana Pemantauan
Lingkungan, RPL), standardization of environmental quality, assessment guidelines
for environmental damage, as well as other regulations. The government regulation
stipulates that to anticipate critical impacts on the environment, an Amdal must be done
for any reconstruction activity that would transform the natural landscape and exploit
natural resources. If the impact is categorized as non-critical, it should be followed
by UKL and UPL. RKL and RPL or UKL and UPL are mitigation planning documents on
environmental impact that is just as important as other construction planning documents.
Therefore, there should be mitigation attempts on negative impacts caused by or
related to general construction activities as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction. This
mitigation must be specifically and well planned.
However, the damage caused by the tsunami was so great, the area so vast and
expediency in reconstruction so vital that normal procedures could not be followed.
Consequently, many of the implemented projects did not have an official document on
environmental impact mitigation plans. Therefore, a special policy on Amdal execution
for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process needed to be established and approved
by the Environment Minister. Through the project “Bridging Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA)” funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
this necessity was fulfilled by the validation of Environmental Ministry Regulation No.
308/2005 on DPPL stipulating Amdal implementation in the recovery of Aceh-Nias.
The special regulation was issued by the central government to solve BRR’s problem in
implementing Government Regulation No. 27/1999 (revision of Article 17, Clause (e) Law
No. 10/2005) on Environmental Impact Analysis, particularly during the initial phase of
BRR’s establishment.
Apart from that, the Cluster Amdal policy was applied as such a regional approach
could reduce data collection expenses. Environmental data (physical, biological, social,
economic, and cultural) for Amdal Guidelines were collected among one cluster. This
concept helped predict the accumulative burden of negative impacts caused by, for
construction material, etc. Such instances could entail potential conflicts of interest that
could disrupt the development process.
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instance, water, air and noise pollution, wildlife habitat encroachment, forest destruction
and reconstruction impacts. The negative impacts were jointly dealt with to save the time
and costs in each sector.
Implementation of DPPL
In early 2007, evaluation of the status and availability of documents on environmental
planning was conducted on every rehabilitation and reconstruction project implemented
between the 2005-2007 fiscal years. The results showed that many implemented projects
did not have comprehensive documents on environmental planning, including Amdal,
UKL and UPL. In response to this, BRR called upon the central government for technical
support to help solve the problem.
Environmental Ministry provided its technical support by issuing Environmental
Minister Regulation No. 308/2005 on the implementation of special Analysis of
Environmental Impact, Environmental Management Efforts and Environmental
Monitoring Efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The regulation stated
that the formulation of Amdal Guidelines in DPPL was to be conducted by a team of
experts formed by the Environmental Ministry and the Aceh Environmental Impact
Management Agency. The regulation enabled Amdal completion in one region to take
two months, instead of the normal six to 18 months or longer. This was achieved due to
the application of the cluster2 approach. Despite the flexibility this offered, standards in
environmental safety still had to be maintained.
DPPL was specifically designed for projects that had commenced but lacked the
documentation on environmental impact mitigation planning. DPPL became a faster and
cheaper alternative compared to an environmental audit for ongoing and completed
projects in Aceh and Nias. Similar to Amdal, DPPL offered recommendations on
environmental impact mitigation as covered in the Environmental Management Plan and
the Environmental Monitoring Plan. Impact mitigation was more directed at addressing
negative impacts after infrastructure was operational.
The DPPL format was legalize by Minister of Environment Regulation No. 12/2007, with
an implementation period from September 26, 2007 to September 2009. Based on the
ministerial regulation, BRR formulated DPPL in 29 project clusters in Aceh and six clusters
in Nias. The choice of clusters and implementation of DPPL had been approved by the
Environment Minister. The duty of BRR was to complete the identification process and
determine manners of addressing negative impacts before the termination of its term in
Aceh and Nias.
Generally speaking, the Master Plan had been used as guidelines to formulate the
Amdal terms of reference since it contained information on programs and projects being
executed. The ideal situation would be to formulate the ANDAL terms of reference or
a similar action plan by determining the number of Amdal or UKL and UPL documents
Table 5.2. Clusters in Aceh and Nias where DPPL is
Implemented
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
District/Municipality
Sabang
Banda Aceh
Banda Aceh
Banda Aceh
Aceh Jaya
Aceh Jaya
Aceh Barat
Aceh Barat
Nagan Raya
Aceh Barat Daya
11 Aceh Selatan, Gayo Lues
Selatan, Aceh
12 Aceh
Tenggara
13 Aceh Singkil
14 Aceh Singkil
15 Simeulue
16 Simeulue
Aceh Utara,
17 Lhokseumawe, Aceh
Tengah, Bener Meriah
18 Aceh Timur
19 Aceh Tamiang, Langsa
20 Aceh Besar
21 Aceh Besar
22 Aceh Besar
23 Aceh Besar
24 Aceh Besar
25 Aceh Pidie
26 Aceh Pidie
27 Aceh Pidie
28 Bireuen
1 Nias (Northern part)
2 Nias (central part)
3 Nias (Western part)
4 Nias (Southern part)
5 Nias Selatan (Mainland)
6 Nias Selatan (Islands)
Sub-district
ACEH
Suka Jaya, Suka Karya
Meuraxa, Jaya Baru, Banda Raya
Baiturrahman, Lueng Bata, Kuta Raja
Ulee Kareng, Kuta Alam, Syiah Kuala
Jaya, Sampoiniet, Setia Bakti
Krueng Sabee, Panga, Teunom
Samatiga, Arongan Lambalek, Woyla Barat, Woyla Timur, Bubon, Woyla
Johan Pahlawan, Meureubo, Kaway Enam Belas, Pante Ceureumen, Sungai Mas
Kuala, Seunagan, Seunagan Timur, Beutong, Darul Makmur
Babah Rot, Kuala Batee, Blang Pidie, Susoh, Tangan‑Tangan, Manggeng
Labuhan Haji, Labuhan Haji Timur, Samadua, Bakongan, Bakongan Timur, Pasie
Raja, Tapaktuan, Meukek, Blangkejeren, Dabung Gelang
Number of
disctrict
Number of
activity
2
3
3
3
3
3
6
5
5
6
319
5,634
2,838
4,788
3,785
3,225
2,721
6,349
2,753
864
10
374
Kluet Selatan, Sawang, Trumon, Kluet Utara, Semadam
5
342
Singkil, Singkil Utara, Kuala Baru, Kota Baharu, Gunung Meriah, Simpang Kanan
Longkip, Rundeng, Penanggalan, Sultan Daulat, Suro Makmur, Kepulauan
Banyak
Alafan, Salang, Simeulue Barat, Simeulue Tengah
Teluk Dalam, Teupah Barat, Simeulue Timur, Teupah Selatan
Muara Batu, Dewantara, Syamtalira Bayu, Samudera, Tanah Pasir, Seunuddon,
Baktiya Barat, Muara Satu, Muara Dua, Banda Sakti, Blang Mangat, Celala,
Pegasing, Kebayakan, Bintang, Silih Nara, Bandar
Madat, Simpang Ulim, Julok, Pante Beudari, Nurussalam, Darul Aman, Idi
Rayeuk, Banda Alam, Peureulak, Peudawa, Sungai Raya
Bendahara, Karang Baru, Seuruway, Langsa Kota, Langsa Barat, Langsa Timur
Peukan Bada, Lhoknga, Darul Kamal, Darul Imarah, Suka Makmur, Simpang
Tiga
Leupung, Lhoong, Kota Cot Glie, Kota Jantho
Pulo Aceh
Krueng Raya, Mesjid Raya, Seulimeum, Lembah Seulawah
Darussalam, Baitussalam, Ingin Jaya, Krueng Barona Jaya, Montasik, Kuta
Malaka, Indrapuri
Muara Tiga, Batee, Pidie, Kota Sigli, Grong‑Grong, Delima, Mila
Simpang Tiga, Kembang Tanjong, Geulumpang Tiga, Geulumpang Baroh,
Tiro‑Trusep, Bandar Baru, Pante Raja, Pekan Baro
Trienggadeng, Meureudu, Meurah Dua, Ulim, Jangka Buya, Mane
Samalanga, Simpang Mamplam, Pandrah, Jeunieb, Peudada, Peulimbang
NIAS
Sitolu Ori, Tuhemberua, Lotu, Sawo, Afulu, Lahewa Timur, Lahewa, Namohalu
Esiwa
Alasa Tumula, Gunungsitoli Alo’oa, Gunungsitoli Utara, Alasa, Gunungsitoli,
Tugala Oyo, Hiliduho, Botomuzoi, Hili Serangkai, Gunungsitoli Selatan
Mandrehe Utara, Mandrehe, Moro’o, Mandrehe Barat, Sirombu, Lahomi, Ma’u,
Lolofitu Moi, Ulu Moro’o
Gido, Gunungsitoli Idanoi, Samolo‑Molo, Idano Gawo, Bawolato, Ulugawo
Lolomatua, Lolowau, Gomo, Lahusa, Teluk Dalam, Amandraya
Hibala, Pulau‑Pulau Batu
6
570
5
2,938
4
4
1,943
1,984
17
4,209
11
840
6
217
6
5,940
4
1
4
4,491
577
4,058
7
5,744
7
2,923
8
2,862
6
6
1,914
5,523
8
1,112
10
2,779
9
840
6
6
2
1,368
3,052
57
Cluster
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that should be drawn up during the project planning stage, by referring to the programs
listed in the Master Plan. The Environmental Ministry Regulation No.308/2005 stated
that the ANDAL terms of reference will be carried out by a team of experts formed by
the Environmental Ministry Office and Bppedal Aceh Province. However, the fact of the
matter was that in the field, it was not always possible to use information on programs
and projects listed in the Master Plan as points of reference to determine the name and
location of projects that were to be complemented by Amdal, UKL or UPL. Through
discussions with Head of Project Implementing Unit (PIU), including chiefs of planning at
local administrative offices, it was possible to identify the number and types of required
environment planning documents. The number of clusters eventually agreed upon were
53 in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and four in Nias.
On the other hand, it should be noted that some projects scheduled for execution
in the 2009 fiscal year did not have their respective Amdal documents. Allocations of
funds to complete Amdal documents were also impeded by the limited budget for
reconstruction activities. Efforts were taken to overcome the problem by using funds
from the MDF. Since full approval had been given by the Provincial Environmental Impact
Management Agency and the Environmental Ministry, MDF approved the budget request
of US$2.7 million as part of its Technical Assistance allocated to BRR but managed by
UNDP. Projects with Amdal funded through this mechanism were for roads and bridge
construction and waterworks (dams, urban drainage and coastal enforcements), involving
20 projects with the Amdal projects classified into seven clusters and one individual
project.
Lingkup Amdal di lakukan pada wilayah yang lebih luas mencakup beberapa proyek
keuntungan lain hal ini adalah kajian lignkugan menjadi lebih komprehensif karena luas
wilayah studi tersebut – The scope of Amdal was conducted on a much larger area to
cover a number of projects. One advantage of this approach is a more comprehensive
assessment due to the breadth of the said coverage.
Implementation of Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action
Plan (LARAP)
A number of big projects had been postponed and some had even been completely
cancelled due to a string of problems that could not be overcome. For example, some
projects were scheduled for implementation in 2005 but were carried out only in 2006
and some in 2007. Generally speaking, the impediments involved land preparation and
permits.
Documents for the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP), RPLRKL and UPL-UKL were usually made as early as possible to anticipate possibilities of
rescheduling. RKL-RPL documents contained recommendations used by the respective
consultant to draw up technical construction specifications complete with the
A number of infrastructure reconstruction
works implemented in one area will bring
about connected environmental impact. For
this reason, a cluster approach was applied
raising effectiveness and efficiency.
Figure 5.1 Environmental Cluster System
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implementation schedule. In the event that the environment planning mechanism was
completed in parallel with technical planning, construction delays could be prevented.
All projects funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) required a
LARAP since both financing institutions had in the past experienced time-consuming and
complicated problems that resulted in sharp criticism during the implementation. With a
view to diminishing such risks, the LARAP had become a compulsory requirement in every
World Bank and ADB project.
By having LARAP during the design process, issues pertaining to the environment,
socioeconomic impact, land acquisition, relocation of people from a project site and
other problems could be anticipated. For example, if a project’s technical requirements
stipulated that the construction of a road or bridge should be complemented by UKL and
UPL, known as “UKL and UPL Technical Specifications”, it was then understood that those
technical specifications should always become an integrated part of the construction
work contract. Regrettably, quite a number of designers, planners and contractors did
not have a comprehensive understanding of the objectives of LARAP, UKL and UPL. They
just followed the stipulations in the actual contract, since they knew that they would not
be reimbursed if they deviated from it. It was not unusual for contractors possessing ISO-
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9000 (quality) certificates and 14000 (environment) to not understand the importance of
having UKL and UPL technical specifications attached to their work contracts.
Lessons Learned
Similarly to RKL and RPL documents, DPPL also contained recommendations
pertaining to mitigation of negative environmental impacts after the infrastructure
became operational. Since the Environmental Ministry had already approved the
condition to reduce such environmental impacts, almost all objections and inquiries from
environmental activists could be responded to and the project could proceed.
However, DPPL did not yield the expected results because expectations had been
too high while the allocated budget, implementation time and ability of professional
manpower, among other things, were quite limited,. The cluster system of DPPL was
applied to overcome this obstacle.
The drawing up an ANDAL terms of reference required a budget of Rp 300 million to Rp
400 million. The application of the cluster system as stipulated in Environmental Ministry
Regulation No. 308/2005 made it possible to jointly implement several projects located
within a certain area or cluster (according to the impact boundaries). The average budget
required would then be Rp 100 million to Rp 150 million for each project. Furthermore,
since the formulation of an ANDAL terms of reference also included field surveys and
reporting, the teams of evaluation and analysis could jointly do their work for several
projects and as such the whole process took just two or three weeks. UKL and UPL were
drawn up by always referring to the Framework of Reference made by project’s initiators
through their respective Work Units, but the appraisals of completed UKL and UPL
were done by an evaluation commission of the Provincial Regional Planning Agency.
Since evaluation of ANDAL terms of reference could be completed in a shorter period,
assessment on UKL-UPL and even on ANDAL, RKL and RPL could also be completed
in a shorter period, which was an indication that there had been an improvement in
competence on the part of the evaluation commission.
Due to the two aforementioned reasons, the condition to include LARAP and UKL and
UPL technical specifications, which were integral parts of the design and construction
work contract, was often dubbed “LARAP, UKL and UPL Readiness Approach”. With these
contract stipulations, environmental issues generally encountered in construction
activities could be preempted in a timely fashion. Since the construction of roads and
bridges was relatively similar to that of other physical infrastructure, the stipulation to
have LARAP, UKL and UPL technical specifications in road and bridge construction work
could also be applied to construction projects for irrigation, buildings and housing.
The inclusion of UKL and UPL into work contracts guaranteed that the respective
environmental impacts had already been determined. With this approach, environmental
issues were incorporated in the design work and construction implementation. Chapter 5. Operational Preparations
79
Besides fulfilling the necessary legal requirements when conducting its activities,
BRR also implemented environment-related policies in different ways. For example, it
established a disbursement system in the form of conducting environmental rescue
actions, like that applied to “Susi Air”, a local air transportation company that rented out
small planes in Aceh and Nias, especially during emergencies. At the time, the company
had developed into a local commercial company providing air transportation services
connecting different districts within Aceh. In emergency situations, Susi Air would be
prepared to accept payment from BRR for its services in the form of BRR prohibiting illegal
logging and promising to construct runways in Aceh and Nias.
Integrating environmental planning into the overall planning of infrastructure took
quite some time. A relatively long process and great patience were needed during which
officials and staff of the local administration were given ample opportunity to actively
participate in the reconstruction process, the process of formulating ANDAL terms of
reference, and in the implementation monitoring of RKL-RPL or UKL–UPL conducted
by the designers and contractors. This proved to be an effective manner in which to
improve their abilities and encourage a paradigm shift. The self-management mechanism
Imported wood ready for use
to construct houses in Teunom,
Aceh Jaya, March 2, 2007.
Figure 5.2 Proof of Payment for Chartering Airplanes by BRR
80
It should be mentioned that it was not easy to appraise the extent of capacity
improvement and paradigm shift experienced by the officials and staff of the local
administration. However, their spontaneous reactions to what took place in the field
and including them in making decisions were indications that they had improved their
capacities and shifted their paradigms. Following are examples of spontaneous reactions
on their part that indicated a process of on-site learning had occurred:
a. “Is this all it is?” (when observing road construction activities), “This kind of
construction does certainly not require an Environmental Impact Analysis, it would
suffice to do a UKL and UPL or apply Standard Operating Procedure.”
b. “The shrubs on the slope surely grow fast!” (when observing that shrubs that had been
previously cleared away).
c. “There has been no rain, yet there is water streaming across the road; won’t it damage
the road surface?” (when observing water on a road that had just been repaired)
d. “Heavy equipment is being used, yet why isn’t it very noisy?” (when observing heavy
equipment being operated and the blasting of boulders)
e. “So this is the base camp! Where are the facilities to collect oil drips, where
are the signs warning to prevent environmental pollution?” (when monitoring
implementation of UKL and UPL at the base camp)
f. “This is a protected forest, why is it being exploited?” (when observing logging
activities in a protected forest, along which a road was being constructed)
g. “Really, this road has just been surfaced; it will certainly soon be damaged again!”
(when observing a truck loaded with boulders passing a newly repaired road)
implemented by BRR, German Technical Cooperation (Gesellscaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), UNDP and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida)
provided several opportunities for the officials and staff of the local administration to join
the work in the field, thereby acquainting themselves with the infrastructure projects and
also the different local situations where the projects were being executed.
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Another indication that a paradigm shift had taken place was their response to
project reports. Previously, such reports were considered merely a means to record
project activities, but the tracer study drawn up by the Bapelda Aceh that kept track
of environmental impacts had been used as reference material to conduct several
environmental improvement activities. Some examples are:
a. The issuance of a letter prohibiting the construction of a military compound in Sabang
before the required Amdal had been completed and subsequently approved by the
Governor.
b. Annulment of land ownership located around Seulawah Forest Reserve that had been
bought by police officers, public officials (heads of sub-districts and villages) and by
private individuals.
c. The management of the Mobile Brigade in Sare was instructed by the Bapelda to dig
individual and communal absorption wells.
Drawing up a DPPL in the execution of a project can certainly be implemented in
emergency situations, such as in post-disaster reconstruction when repairs of damaged
infrastructure must be conducted even before documents on environmental impact
mitigation can be made. When there is ample time for preparatory activities, it would
certainly be best for the construction of large-scale infrastructure or other development
work (that result in considerable changes to the environment) to be conducted through
normal procedure by first drawing up the Amdal and the respective RKL and RPL,
which are prerequisites of proper planning as such studies diminish the impact on the
environment, and minimize the scale of environmental damage and as such extend a
project’s life and years of service.
The cluster approach endeavored to combine the ANDAL terms of reference of several
projects within a particular area into one larger study area as it would produce better
and more comprehensive study results. Furthermore, since the analysis and assessment
were done simultaneously, the number of staff responsible for conducting the studies
and the size of the evaluation team was also much smaller. Consequently, the main cost
component of the Amdal, which was the cost of environment experts, would certainly
also be much less and the time to complete the study much shorter. Conducting separate
Amdal for individual projects is more appropriate for projects that are not inter-connected
with other projects. However, for the implementation of several local administration
projects within one area/cluster, it would be far more appropriate to conduct Amdal
through a cluster approach. If such coordination among areas within a province could be
arranged, the cluster approach could be replicated at the national level.
Generally speaking, although it was not easy to evaluate the capacity improvement
and shift of paradigm that had taken place among the local officials and their staff, it was
fairly easy to observe the signs that such improvements and shifts had taken place. One
83
sign of this was their changed attitude toward project reports, which they previously
looked upon as a mere means to record project activities. However, the established “tracer
study” that kept track of environmental impacts became reference material to conduct
several environmental improvement activities. Examples of this include: land acquisition
activities to construct the ADB harbor road in Ulee Lheue, the ADB Ulee Lheue-Blang
Padang road, the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) escape road and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Banda Aceh-Meulaboh
road. These cases could be made into case studies of how to deal with land acquisition
problems, considering that although land acquisition in Aceh and Nias could be difficult,
their dealings with the parties involved were fairly well managed and completed within
the allocated time
Submission of SP2D by PPK at
the Special KPPN Office in Banda
Aceh on December 16, 2008.
84
Special Office for State Services and Treasury
(KPPN-K)
All disbursements for development activities were funded by the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia and implemented by the Office for State Services and Treasury
(Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara, KPPN). BRR was the sole official body of the
Government of Indonesia that was furnished with a Special Office for State Services and
Treasury (Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara - Khusus, KPPN-K). There are only 2
KPPN-K units in Indonesia; in Jakarta and in Banda Aceh.
Background
The world paid extremely great interest in Aceh and Nias after the disaster occurred,
and foreign aid streamed into the state budget. In addition, the government allocated
extra funds for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, where the number
of programs and projects to be implemented was of such great volume that a special
method of disbursement was necessary. Although the disbursement system remained
controlled by the Government of Indonesia, on-site payments were expected to be more
responsive, swifter and ready.
The establishment of the KPPN-K Banda Aceh was initiated by the Directorate General
of the Treasury at the Ministry of Finance. A team was designated to make the necessary
preparatory steps to establish the KPPN-K in Banda Aceh. Following the issuance of
Minister of Finance Decree No. 214/KMK.01/2005 dated May 25, 2005 the office was
officiated and immediately began operating. During the office’s early days, ADB played an
important role by providing technical assistance in operational disbursements.
Performance and Challenges: Cash Disbursements, Monitoring
of Goods
Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2005, Article 21 Clause 4 stipulated that
disbursements of recovery funds stated in DIPA (on-budget/on-treasury) were to be
implemented through the KPPN-K in Banda Aceh. The duties of this office were limited
to disbursing BRR expenditures, and to note down all assets that were built through the
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Aceh Province and Nias Island in North
Sumatra Province, which covered an extremely wide area, especially in comparison to the
number of staff and the total amount of transactions handled.
Figure 5.3 Internet-based Service System from KPPN-K Banda Aceh
B. Banking Sector
(Hub)
85
(Hub)
D. – Vera Section
Head Office
(Printer)
C. Public Sector
(Hub)
(Wireless)
Web Server
A. PHLN Section
SP2D Server
INTERNET
Final KPPN Server = Lokseumawe, Nias Meulaboh
86
The office was headed by Agus Santoso, who was assisted by 26 staff comprising
one head of general affairs, three section heads and 21 operational staff that included
seven contract staff. The KPPN-K had three branches located in Nias, Meulaboh (serving
Aceh’s west coast) and Lhokseumawe (serving the east coast). The value of transactions
amounted to Rp 61 billion.
The Banda Aceh KPPN-K was actively involved in improving the rate of fund absorption
and execution pertaining to Aceh-Nias recovery programs. The entire work procedure
was accelerated, with the maximal length of time for each operation determined to not
exceed 45 minutes, which was certainly much shorter than the national average time
of eight hours. This was made possible by entrusting any office staff member, even
administrative staff, to provide service. Furthermore, the entire work contract procedure
was conducted electronically and a well functioning system for Payment Order Letter
(Surat Perintah Membayar, SPM) and Fund Disbursement Order Letter (Surat Perintah
Pencairan Dana, SP2D) was established. In applying a “one-stop service” system, the
KPPN-K introduced an electronic signature specimen card, developed a contract card
procedure and developed a control card for petty cash/additional petty cash flow.
The Banda Aceh KPPN-K also employed an operation support system developed
internally by the KPPN-K staff with an investment of Rp 615.5 million. The operation
support system involved a database and an integrated network connecting the Banda
Aceh KPPN-K with its three branches. Through this system, the work of the treasury or the
authority of the general treasurer in fund disbursement was greatly accelerated. The funds
were derived from foreign loans and donations as well as from pure domestic sources.
By having the website www.danarraphbn.org, each transaction could be accessed in real
time. Cash reconciliation and forecasting were done through email, and as such, most of
the respective work unit personnel did not need to be physically present at the KPPN-K
office.
Service was also accelerated at the branches in Meulaboh, Nias and Lhokseumawe. It
was not necessary for personnel of BRR PIUs to go to Banda Aceh to disburse funds. The
Lhokseumawe branch was opened on April 17, 2007, serving BRR Regional II and Regional
III PIUs whereas the Meulaboh and Nias branches served BRR Regional I, IV, V and VI PIUs.
It should be noted that at the beginning of 2008, the Regional IV PIU was closed down
and parts of its area absorbed by Regional I and V PIUs.
At its initial operations, the KPPN-K faced several impediments in adjusting its
new budget pattern and system, resulting in delays of DIPA disbursements and the
establishment of work units. The other impediment was related to BRR PIU staff, some of
whom had not worked at government agencies and their knowledge and way of thinking
in connection to the realm of work at the KPPN-K was rather limited. After this had been
overcome, the reputation of the Banda Aceh KPPN-K emerged as an extension of the
State Treasurer’s Office. It was able to guarantee government financial liquidity for more
than three years during the recovery of Aceh and Nias. Its positive image was widely
acknowledged and received the “Quality Service of 2006” award, personally bestowed by
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
The average actual disbursement of the BRR budget was between 62 and 70 percent,
except in 2005 when it was only 28 percent, with the highest peak in 2006 and 2007.
The lower number of disbursements was due to the PIU codes being changed at the
start of each budget year, although the activities of PIUs remained relatively the same.
The changes presented certain difficulties to staff at the KPPN-K in finding the relevant
past disbursement processes pertaining to a PIU. Moreover, the frequent change in
personnel at BRR also impeded requests for payments. In addition, there were geographic
impediments, as well as natural conditions and situations at several BRR work areas.
Potential for Replication: Developing System and Trust
As an institution working under the authority of the Finance Minister, the Banda Aceh
KPPN-K successfully provided special service to BRR PIUs, with the objective of assisting in
accelerating proper fund disbursements pertaining to domestic financial resources as well
as foreign loans and donations. The centralized system, supported by the application of
information technology, did indeed improve the actual disbursement of the BRR budget.
The system developed to serve BRR was then replicated by several pilot KPPN around
the country. The following vision of Banda Aceh KPPN-K: “To become a professional state
treasury manager of international reputation, one that is transparent and accountable, to
support the recovery of the national economy”, proved to have succeeded in generating
trust and supporting efficiency in using the budget allocated for the recovery of Aceh and
Nias.
Lessons Learned
87
Coordination and
Management
of Project
Implementation
89
Before
a project could be carried out, coordination units had to be prepared to
ensure that all project implementation ran well. These units were not meant as evaluators
or to monitor project implementation. Coordination units act as facilitators, particularly
when implementation deviated from the original plan. Every projects needs to be
proceeded with flexibility and discipline accordingly.
In this case, coordination units were set up as problems arose. The Integrated Team (Tim
Terpadu) for example, were established when 1,431 containers had piled up in Belawan,
the main seaport in Medan, North SumatEra. Another example is, the Disaster Risk
Reduction (DRR) policy in disaster areas (especially in Aceh and Nias) implementation.
Even though it was already included in the Master Plan and stipulated in Presidential
Decree No. 30/2005, its application the implementation was in a constant improvement in
parallel with project implementation.
Breakthroughs described in this chapter were essentially breakthroughs made within
the implementation coordination system. This chapter will discuss Tim Terpadu, DRR,
representative offices and Joint Secretariats, Major Implementing Partners Relations
(Hubungan Mitra Kerja Utama, HMKU), Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program
(IREP), Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (IRFF), emergency infrastructure
plan and decision-making process in the beginning of the rehabilitation of the Meulaboh
and Malahayati seaports.
A row of names of NGOs and donors
involved in the recovery of Aceh-Nias
during the Coordination Forum for
Aceh-Nias (CFAN) in Jakarta, October
90
Integrated Team (Tim Terpadu): Public Service
under One Roof
BRR Tim Terpadu was a front line service unit under one roof established to accelerate
the recovery programs, especially in dealing with foreign organizations or individuals.
Located in Banda Aceh, BRR Tim Terpadu provided facilities for immigration papers,
consular affairs, work permits for foreigners, customs and excise, tax, industrial
administration, and letters of good conduct from the police. Members of BRR’s Tim
Terpadu comprised of officials from various ministries or relevant government agencies
who had been given the authority to make decisions directly in Banda Aceh without
having to wait for a green light from their head offices in Jakarta.
Background
BRR Tim Terpadu was set up following a bottleneck in distribution of humanitarian aid.
Around 1,431 containers of aid from various countries had piled up over four months
since April 2005 in Belawan seaport, North Sumatera, due to a lack of coordination and
ineffective regulations. Donors were unclear on the procedures of aid delivery and where
aid must be delivered.
While on the one hand, aid was much needed and eagerly anticipated by the survivors.
On the other, distribution of the aid was hampered by bureaucratic procedures and an
absence of coordination. As a result, a lot of food and medicines had past their expiration
dates by the time the goods arrived to the survivors, Indonesia had a negative reputation
for its poor management of aid distribution, along with the high cost attached as well.
The bureaucratic problem was resolved through a high-level intervention from
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and joint interdepartmental agreement.
Implementation in the field was entrusted to BRR. Although BRR did not have its
own fund, it nevertheless had a strong mandate to request help from partners in the
reconstruction work, the World Food Programme (WFP) for temporarily storing the goods,
the United Nations Joint Logistic Center (UN-JLC) for handling import documents, and 240
trucks from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Atlas Logistique for
distributing the aid to all areas in Aceh and Nias.
Upon observing how intervention by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs
had helped expedite aid distribution to beneficiaries, Head of BRR Executing Agency then
took the initiative to extend the service facilities regarding immigration permits, consular
matters, work permits, tax, customs and excise issues, and police permits for foreign
nationals taking part in reconstruction work in Aceh-Nias given the numerous foreign
workers in the area since the emergency relief phase.
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To simplify the above procedures while maintaining the country’s existing regulations,
the government then set up a legal basis for delegating interdepartmental authority to
Tim Terpadu. For this, a Presidential Decree No.69/2005 was issued on November 15, 2005.
Empowered by the Decree, the Head of BRR Executing Agency set up the Tim Terpadu on
December 5, 2005, as stipulated in the Agency’s Decree No.02/PER/BP/-BRR/IX/2005.
Challenges during Project Implementation
Working in an emergency situation with limited facilities, the Tim Terpadu had to
move its office from one place to another. Initially it had only five personnel in a poorly
equipped office, with only a couple of desks and chairs in Lueng Bata. Then the office was
moved to a disused train car and tent, also in Lueng Bata. Later still, the office was moved
to the provincial office of the Ministry of Trade and Industry at Prada, Banda Aceh. Finally
it was moved back to Lueng Bata. None of this deterred the working spirit of the Team.
Integrated Team visa and
work permit service for foreign
humanitarian workers in Aceh and
Nias. Banda Aceh, February 1, 2006.
92
Since its inception, the Team worked hard to accelerate procedures needed by relief
workers who had come from various countries. The short-cut procedure and one-day
service could be well implemented because of the delegation of authority by a number of
relevant ministries whose officials were included on the Team. The Tim Terpadu in Banda
Aceh could decide whether to grant or refuse facilities requested by parties. The Team
was managed by professionals who demonstrated integrity and gave prompt service.
Supported by the UNORC, the Team disseminated information on its activities among
local community members.
It is worth noting that, based on Article 5 of Presidential Decree No. 69/2005,
international communities involved in rehabilitation programs in Aceh-Nias were required
to abide by the code of ethics and guidelines of the Team. In addition, in line with the
regulation, they also had to report updated achievements of their programs to BRR. The
Tim Terpadu facilitated services to members of the NGOs and donor organizations, who
reported their achievements to the Team. This indirectly supported the development of
the RANDatabase system.
Table 6.1 Expedited Services Facilitated by Tim Terpadu
Great disasters require quick and effective relief handling while maintaining control
and supervision though good coordination, especially when dealing with the flow of
goods, services and human resources, including those coming from foreign countries.
The regular bureaucratic system cannot handle the problems during emergency as well
reconstruction periods.
The Indonesian government’s formation of the Tim Terpadu proved to be successful in
stepping up public services and in reducing red tape through the short procedure system
without violating prevailing laws and regulations.
The team could provide various public services in one day. A number of parties
considered this a good example and it enabled the Team to become a supportive
element in rehabilitating and reconstructing the disaster-hit areas in just four years. The
professional services offered by Tim Terpadu raised public trust, including that of foreign
donors, in the Indonesian government’s seriousness in helping them expedite their
aid to the people of Aceh-Nias. Such trust was necessary to ensure that they remained
committed to giving aid.
Hence, for every disaster relief handling project, in Indonesia or elsewhere in the world,
there needs to be a special unit, such as the Tim Terpadu. Providing services under the
same roof ensures the public of the standard of service they will get, the length of time
they have to spend for the process, the fee they have to pay (which in most cases, services
are given free of charge), and other requirements they have to fulfill. Such assurance will
boost their performance and cooperation in disaster areas.
Such services could be provided by the provincial government of Aceh and district
administrations of Nias and South Nias within the framework of economic development
in their respective areas. The one-stop service could have been a decisive factor in
capturing foreign investors’ attention to those regions.
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): The Magical
Triangle Framework to Overcome Disaster
All activities within the framework of comprehensive planning in disaster-prone areas
are aimed at reducing losses and damage in the social, economic and environmental
sectors suffered by the public and the state. The framework is known as DRR, the success
of which is judged not only by the smallest number of losses in public assets but also by
the least number of fatalities caused by a disaster.
Learning from Experience
93
94
Background
When the tsunami and earthquakes hit Aceh and Nias, it claimed thousands of lives
and caused extensive damage. This was because the public and the government were not
prepared to face the disaster. The same was true in other countries. In rebuilding Aceh
and Nias, various parties, including BRR, agreed to adopt the Hyogo Framework to reduce
the disaster risk by identifying a number of problems in offering the victims relief and by
formulating a global action plan.
Based on this framework, BRR encouraged public participation and made good
use of the social and cultural structures of the region in handling the aftermath of
the disaster, making cooperation a basic policy to rehabilitate and reconstruct the
regions’ environment and natural resources. BRR was fully aware that, regardless of
modern infrastructure, without public participation and understanding of their natural
environment, the disaster risk would not diminish. Hence a strong institution and public
awareness were needed.
Preparing DRR in Aceh and Nias
Infrastructure contributed a lot to protect the regions from future possible disasters.
Coastal embankments, flood control and a good drainage system are living examples of
infrastructure that can help reduce disaster risk. Besides, a scenario for evacuation needed
to be considered, evacuation that was supported by escape buildings and evacuation
routes and roads.
Cooperating with the Central Government and the Meteorology and Geophysics
Agency (Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika, BMG), BRR installed equipment that could
detect and warn of possible earthquakes known as the Early Warning System (EWS). The
infrastructure and software of the equipment were designated as a pilot project in several
other disaster-prone areas.
BRR, realizing it was important to raise public awareness of the danger of natural
disasters, held regular round table discussions with community members. The discussions,
initiated by geologists, were held once every two months. The forum was used as a
medium of communication and knowledge sharing on the dynamic forces of nature.
Disaster risks related to geological aspects were thoroughly studied. Geological maps
were drawn up and integrated with other thematic maps. The thematic maps were used
for policy analysis to determine action plans. The round table discussions were attended
not only by geologists but also teachers, town planners, academics, members of local
communities and NGOs, officials as well as members of the Parliaments.
Although the laws on disaster management had already been issued, they could not
be immediately implemented in Indonesia. The laws needed enactment regulations,
which took months to prepare. However, because BRR had been actively involved in
the recovery process work in the disaster areas, the Agency applied its experience
and knowledge to cope with all the problems. Hence BRR, working together with the
95
Provincial Administration, donor organizations, NGOs, the Indonesian Red Cross (Palang
Merah Indonesia, PMI) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), launched the DRR operation in Aceh and Nias.
A new building code, designed to ensure earthquake resistance up to a certain
magnitude, was jointly drawn up with the Ministry of Public Works, a number of
universities, and experts in disaster management. An institution in the Provincial
Government was immediately set up without waiting for instructions from the Central
Government, and the Vice Governor of Aceh was willing to accept responsibility for the
project in the region.
Considering that the Provincial Government would not be able to continually adapt
to the latest development of earthquake technology and expertise or conduct effective
training, BRR and the Provincial Government agreed to set up a center called the Tsunami
and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC). The Center was assigned to update
technology related to various natural disasters, to train local officials and community
members, and to conduct joint research with competent local and foreign institutes.
TDRMC is overseen by Syiah Kuala University and its building, constructed by BRR, also
functions as the escape building in Ulee Lheue.
Tsunami Museum in Banda Aceh,
April 3, 2009. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi
96
Evacuation roads are vital
facilities for residents of Meuraxa.
Banda Aceh, January 9, 2008.
Initially, the idea of relocating people to safer zones was met with opposition, and so
was the initial implementation of reconstruction. Hence, the construction of new houses
was carried out in the new zones or areas, partly to meet the need for houses for refugees
who previously owned neither land nor houses but had been tenants.
Several relocations in disaster free zones were set up. Residential areas were developed
in Beuramo, Aceh Besar, and its surrounding was equipped with public facilities. In
general, BRR provided ready-to-build plots and infrastructure in the residential areas.
Later BRR, along with China Charity Federation, Nurani Dunia Foundation, Buddha Tzu Chi
Foundation, Islamic Relief, the Australian Red Cross, ADB, and Saudi Charity Campaign,
built houses in those areas.
The triangle in DRR covered:
1. The structural aspect dealing with the construction of infrastructure for the
prevention of disaster risk along with its software,
2. The non-structural aspect dealing with culture, namely to raise public awareness in
facing disaster, and
3. The institutional aspect dealing with organizational issues and human resources.
Figure 6.1 The Disaster Risk Reduction Triangle
Lesson Learned
97
POLICY
(Institutional)
Provincial Organizations
Framework Policies of DRR
Local and Master Action Plans of DRR
NON
STRUCTURAL
(Community Awareness)
Training & Education
R&D
Alternative Technology
Community-based DRR
Cultural Identification
Emergency Response
Evacuation Drills (Tsunami Drill)
Mitigation Plan
Best Practices
Safe
Environment
STRUCTURAL
Seismic Monitoring
(with seismograph
accelerograph)
Sea Water Monitoring
(with buoy, tide gauge, GPS)
Sirene, Route, Evacuation Building/Hill,
Evacuation Tents
Coast and Coastline Protection
(sea wall,
vegetation, mangrove, silvofishery)
Village Planning
98
All three aspects, aimed at heightening the public’s culture of safety first, were called
the magical triangle framework to reduce disaster risk.
However, all the abovementioned facilities and infrastructure were only reactive and
curative in nature. According to the DRR concept, the above approach was only aimed at
reducing vulnerability to disaster. Another approach was needed and must adopted later.
This was known as the preventive approach and its target was to move people to places
far from disaster zones.
The culture of safety could be instilled effectively only when there is common
understanding and joint commitment to realize it. The culture of safety could be
enhanced when the community undergoes periodical training. Several tsunami drills
using infrastructure and facilities that had already been built were carried out in Aceh
and Nias by the International Red Cross, IFRC, BRR, the Sea Defense Consultants, and the
Banda Aceh City Government. A lot was learned from the drills, and the experience and
knowledge gained from it could be shared with people living in other disaster-prone
areas.
A lot of infrastructure, facilities and software that had been built, provided and installed
in Aceh could be used as an exemplary model for other regions to provide training to
learn about DRR. TDMRC at Syiah Kuala University had a very well trained and experienced
team to handle the disaster and could become the main reference body in Indonesia.
This is because the TDMRC team, along with BRR, had set up a research and network
system with the Center for Monitoring and Disaster Management at the national and
international levels. An annual international workshop was held in four successive years
and produced action plans that could be implemented by other regions.
Regionalized and Decentralized Decisions, the
Key to BRR’s Success
BRR had six representative offices at a regional level and 21 district offices in Aceh and
Nias. The initial concept for regional offices was:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Representative Office I (in Banda Aceh) overseeing districts in West and North Aceh
Representative Office II (in Lhokseumawe) overseeing districts in East Aceh
Representative Office III (in Takengon) overseeing districts in Central Aceh
Representative Office IV (in Meulaboh) overseeing districts in West and South Aceh
Representative Office V (in Singkil) overseeing districts in South Aceh
Representative Office VI (in Gunungsitoli) overseeing districts in Nias and South Nias.
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Since 2007, the regional and district offices had their own programs and budgets,
and full authority to decide which sector was to be prioritized. This was in line with
the agreement reached with the provincial, district and city governments via the Joint
Secretariat.
Background
After operating in Banda Aceh for six months and undertaking the recovery process
work through a sector approach, BRR found that the approach was not effective due to
the numerous projects it had to undertake in such a large area. If all decisions had to
be made by the head office in Banda Aceh, BRR would not be able to respond promptly
to the needs and demands of the public, local government, and the recovery partners
operating in districts and villages far from Banda Aceh. In fact, attempts to set up
Representative Office VI in Nias had been initiated two months after the establishment
of BRR, because the Agency found it difficult to properly coordinate its work from Banda
Aceh.
Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation
Research Building in Ulee Lheue,
Aceh Besar, on February 20, 2009.
100
Apart from attempts to set up the Nias Representative Office, BRR’s plan and strategy to
decentralize was only officially introduced in May 2006, during the Second Coordination
Forum of Aceh-Nias (CFAN-II)3. The strategy was designed to ensure sustainability
of rehabilitation and reconstruction works as the Provincial Government would be
involvement in the planning and implementation. It was hoped that as a result the
Provincial Government could take over the responsibility and asset management once
BRR ended its operation.
The aims of decentralization were:
• To encourage the Provincial Government and the public to be more active in
decision-making and problem-solving so that they could become partners in the
recovery process work;
• To ensure fair distribution of wealth and transparency, since BRR coordinated closely
with the administration and the public;
• To ensure more efficient and effective distribution of resources as decisions regarding
measures to reduce the disparity between rich and poor as well as relocation of
sources were made at the local level;
• To adopt a holistic approach to accommodate the aspirations of beneficiaries at the
local level;
• To improve beneficiaries’ access to information as their needs had been well
identified and relayed to the decision-makers.
Representative Offices and Joint Secretariat
The establishment of six BRR Representative Offices was an effort to implement
decentralization based on the principle “closer to the action”. This, in fact, was another BRR
response to the demands of the people and local government.
Integrated development as such was required considering that Aceh had been left
underdeveloped as a result of 30 years of armed conflict. Decentralization would pave the
way to integration of the Provincial Government’s programs, peace-building process, as
well as the recovery process programs.
Decentralization proved to be very successful in Representative Office VI in Nias,
Representative Office I in West-North Aceh, and Representative Office II in East Aceh. The
other Representative offices focused more on projects financed by BRR. Meanwhile, the
Provincial Government focused on the disbursement of its own budget.
In mid 2007, BRR financed the activities of the Joint Secretariat, which functioned as
the communication center for all parties taking part in the recovery of Aceh-Nias. The
secretariats, centralized at the office of Aceh Regional Development Planning Agency
(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda) as well as that of other districts,
functioned as a place to resolve problems and to coordinate the recovery process in a
district with larger areas.
Lessons from Decentralization
Since 2007, the Representative offices at the regional and district levels had proven
their ability to manage project activities effectively. At the end of 2008, their average
performance was better than that of sector deputies in BRR. The quality of construction
and buildings was also better.
Again, this was living proof that the decentralization system yielded better results.
At the same time, decentralization gave higher satisfaction to those who undertook
the recovery efforts and opened greater opportunities to local officials and the public
to participate in the projects. This was because more than 70 percent of BRR’s staff
comprised of local government officials. Their experience and work ethics while working
with BRR could be shared with their colleagues so as to improve the performance of
provincial government.
Improvement of local officials’ performance through direct assignments proved to be
more effective than mere training in classes that tended to be passive and did not give
them the opportunity to demonstrate their skills in management and construction.
Not only would decentralization accelerate development but also open more
opportunities to local officials and the public to swiftly build their capacity, paving the
way for local officials to handle the provincial budget and development programs. Prior
to this, many Central Government projects were undertaken by Jakarta without giving the
opportunity to the Provincial Government to take part in them.
Since 2006, BRR gave the Heads of its Representative Offices the authority to make their
own decisions. The results showed that reconstruction programs had taken less time to
complete and yielded better outcomes.
The Central Government needs to decentralize its agencies in the regions in
undertaking their own development, such as post-disaster or underdeveloped areas like
Aceh and Nias, to expedite the development process. At the same time, adequate training
should be given to local officials to improve their capability in making effective decisions.
Regardless of the facilities, only a few districts could optimize on the Secretariat’s
operation. The success of the Joint Secretariat depended greatly on the key figures of
each district.
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102
Major Implementing Partner Relations
Organizations that contributed more or less 75 percent to the Aceh-Nias reconstruction
were called major implementing partners. The greater the involvement of an organization
in the efforts, the more activities, and larger amount of donation involved, the higher
likelihood that they required supplemental attention. For this reason, BRR set up a special
unit to function not only as its public relations center but also as a gate keeper for direct
interaction with its main partners. It was called the Major Implementing Partner Relations
(Hubungan Mitra kerja Utama, HMKU).
Background
Despite their good intentions to help rehabilitate and reconstruct Aceh and Nias,
foreign organizations had to abide by prevailing regulations and respect the customs and
traditions in the areas in which they operated. Differences of cultures and work methods,
unavoidably, often sparked friction. Concentrated coordination was needed considering
the numerous parties involved and the circulation of enormous fund at the reconstruction
sites.
The tasks and responsibilities of each deputy in the recovery efforts were so great that
unintentionally direct communication with working partners weakened. In fact there
was already a unit in the Communication and Information Directorate that functioned
as liaison officer/ help desk for the working partners. The unit was called Account
Management Team (AMT). Because of communication problems, HMKU was established
through the development of the AMT.
HMKU was formed following the issuance Decree No. 30/PER/BP/BRR/XI/2006 by the
Head of the BRR Executing Agency. HMKU’s task was to ensure that the smooth flow of
communication and relevant information to and from both national and international
implementing partners, and to ensure that all their projects were completed properly and
on time. After HMKU’s mandate ended in December 2007, its task was taken over by the
representative offices.
Challenge in Implementation
In general, problems in coordinating with main working partners often arose from
conflicts among stakeholders due to the absence of work guidelines and procedures
within BRR. During its operation, HMKU launched a series of activities such as
coordinating with and visiting the major implementing partners, publishing educative
articles in local newspapers, holding workshops, resolving problems faced by the
international partners, and issuing practical guidelines.
Organizations categorized as the major implementing partners were the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Oxfam International, World
Vision International, CARE International, Save the Children and the Catholic Relief
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Services (CRS). HMKU actively represented BRR in a number of meetings with the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Public Information Working Group (PIWC)
and Communication Committee in disseminating information on BRR’s achievements
in 2007 to national and international interest groups. Internally, HMKU developed
communication and information lines for donors and stakeholders with BRR sectors.
Lessons Learned
The main activity of HMKU was communication, organizing meetings and media
conferences. Hence, its output in the form of notes, summaries, articles and proceedings
from the meetings were collected by the Unit and became the essential product of its
existence. The output was the factual documentation of all HMKU activities. A number of
lessons learned from the Unit were:
• Account management/help desk constituted of personnel specifically assigned to
interact with foreign donors and NGOs in Aceh-Nias, possessed all of their data, and
have a clear understanding of the working characteristics of major implementing
partners. The Help Desk became the gateway to interaction with BRR, ensuring that
coordination with BRR took place through one doorway.
Joint Secretariat coordination
meeting at BRR Nias Representative
office. Gunungsitoli, April 14, 2008.
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• Routine reports to disseminate information regarding the situation and problems
of the recovery expedited problem-solving process by facilitating communication
among stakeholders.
• Good office, a medium created by HMKU to facilitate the settlement of problems
arising in the recovery efforts in Aceh-Nias. Its function was to mediate disputes in
reconstruction through consensus, and instead of legal means. This, in fact, was the
breakthrough made by the Unit. Foreign organizations are accustomed to settling
disputes through legal channels, which often amplified the problem instead of
resolving them.
HMKU was more than just an ordinary communication unit for BRR. It had authority
to bridge the gap between disputing parties and to resolve problems in the recovery
process. The HMKU mediation approach could well be applied by various ministries or
Provincial Governments to settle project disputes, especially when outside parties are
involved.
Developing Large-scale Integrated
Infrastructure: Fishing for a Difficult Fish with a
Huge Bait
When dealing with a large-scale infrastructure project, it is necessary to have an
integrated control system. The Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program (IREP)
was a technical assistance program to undertake overall monitoring of the management
of infrastructure projects. IREP also included the empowerment of local government
officials to develop, manage and maintain the infrastructure after BRR ended its tenure.
Meanwhile, the Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility (IRFF) was an investment
program financed by the MDF). As consultation activities were directly managed by MDF,
both IREP and IRFF made breakthroughs in applying a comprehensive control system and
transparency on every infrastructure project in Aceh and Nias.
Background
Besides the development of housing and settlement, the construction of infrastructure
constituted the largest investment in the recovery of Aceh-Nias. However neither donor
nor NGO allocated their funds toward infrastructure. Nearly all infrastructure programs
were prepared and financed by the Indonesian government through BRR. Many donors
allocated their funds to programs that recovery of livelihoods and were of the opinion
that infrastructure it is best if provided by the Indonesian government. The gap in delivery
of infrastructure needs was great while other sectors had an over-commitment of funds.
To meet the future economic challenges, however, Aceh and Nias needed more than
just reconstructed damaged infrastructure. It was also important for the regions to have
infrastructure of better construction and materials.
To meet the goals, it was necessary for the government to implement integrated largescale infrastructure development. In order to do that, a certain strategy was required that
allows donors to support BRR’s undertakings with their attention and contributions.
Luring Donors to Contribute to the Infrastructure
in Aceh and Nias
The initial idea of infrastructure reconstruction was to obtain a large sum of additional
funds for the well-planned and well-monitored large-scale project. As it turned out, it was
difficult to convince donors to participate in the project through the first Coordination
Forum of Aceh and Nias (CFAN-I) . Hence, to lure donors to participate in the project, they
were asked to provide co-financing (to supplement the US$200 million of BRR funds with
US$100 million later covered by MDF as a grant).
New Town Road construction funded
by the Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Enabling Project (IREP) in Banda
Aceh, on January 25, 2009. Photo:
IREP/Riza Bahagia Nasution
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Because BBR showed high-priority and ownership of the project, MDF eventually
became interested in helping to co-finance it through the IRFF investment program. This
was beneficial to the Indonesian government, because BBR would in any case spend some
US$200 million to repair and reconstruct damaged infrastructure in Aceh and Nias, with
or without supplementary funds from donor organizations. More than that, BRR had yet
to spend larger funds on infrastructure programs other than IRFF that would similarly
require oversight of its implementation.
Obviously such a large-scale infrastructure project needed to be monitored
comprehensively. Integrated management and supervision required considerable
funding and technical assistance. Hence, before implementing the IRFF program, another
technical assistance program, IREP, was established. MDF financed IREP’s operations,
which amounted to US$42 million.
The US$42 million in aid was used to finance the operations of five IREP main divisions.
The first and second divisions covered the overall management of infrastructure
development, namely Infrastructure Project Management (IPM) and Financial
Management (FM). Other divisions dealt with reconstruction and development in the
worst hit areas in the western part of Aceh (Planning Design Construction and Supervision
– West Coast, PDCS), Nias Island (Nias-PDCS) and Strategic Area Infrastructure (Strategic
Infrastructure-PDCS). The total percentage value of IREP projects was far below that of the
cost of software in similar projects in other parts of Indonesia.
MDF designated the World Bank to manage the funds and oversee the implementation
of the programs. The World Bank assisted BRR, from making proposals to implementing
the IREP and IRFF programs. Fields financed by IRFF programs covered water supply,
sanitation, coastal protection, seaports, roads and bridges. The World Bank monitored all
project implementation from Washington D.C.
When BBR ended its term on April 16, 2009, several infrastructure projects had not
yet been completed. Hence it was necessary to transfer the responsibilities to another
implementing agency. To ensure the continuation of the projects during the transition
period, such as projects carried out under the Foreign Loans or Grants (Pinjaman
atau Hibah Luar Negeri, PHLN) scheme, as the programs covered infrastructure and
transportation, IREP/IRFF programs were transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and
the Ministry of Transportation with the World Bank as the partner agency. Meanwhile, BRR
also undertook coordination work with Sea Defense Consultants (Netherlands), Banda
Aceh Project Preparation Consultants (France), Port Development (UNDP-MDF), Water
Supply and Sanitation (United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF) and Banda Aceh Drainage
Urgent Works (Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA).
Lessons Learned
When the government has a vision, a clear plan, and technical capacity, along with a
strong sense of ownership, donors such as the MDF are willing to make a big contribution
Meanwhile, most of the guidelines on the use of funds from PHLN, the World Bank,
ADB, Japan, Germany and the Islamic Development Bank were more appropriate for
reconstruction under normal circumstances, and not in an emergency situation such as in
Aceh and Nias. Hence, BRR often urged the World Bank to hasten its response.
Hence a paradigm shift was needed on donor procedures involving disaster
management. Based on its experience, BRR found that donors should decentralize or
delegate their authority to the lowest level (or be closer to the field) to ensure the quick
implementation of the recovery process. If the government could play a more active role
in program implementation, other infrastructure projects carried out under the PHLN
scheme in Indonesia – most of which are between eight and nine years behind schedule
from the scheduled five years – could be accelerated to meet deadlines.
BRR’s experience in Aceh and Nias in building large-scale integrated infrastructure
in a relatively short time can be shared with other regions carrying out similar
projects, especially when the projects potentially involve huge amounts of funds. Such
means could occur with PHLN funds, wherein difficulties arise resulting in slow fund
disbursement. Examples of other provinces include Papua, East Kalimantan, Aceh, Riau
and Jakarta.
Immediate Action Program – Quick Action;
“Half a Loaf of Bread is Better than None”
Building infrastructure during the initial post-disaster rehabilitation period was in
itself a breakthrough. Comprehensive planning to repair badly damaged infrastructure
took time. In addition, there was also an interval: waiting for the impact of the disaster
to recede and making preparations for reconstruction. During this interval, BRR built
emergency infrastructure with off-budget funds from MDF, and not from APBN funds. This
program was named Immediate Action Program (IAP) and was implemented by NGOs.
Background
The road linking Lamno and Calang that stretches along the West Aceh coastline was
severely damaged by the tsunami. The road disappeared becoming a pool of mud. Many
vehicles were stuck on the road for three to four days. This hampered the distribution
of logistics support for the recovery process. Obviously the road had to be immediately
repaired to revive the social and economic life of Aceh Jaya and West Aceh communities.
(as reflected by the agreement to utilize the majority of the remaining unallocated MDF
funds for IRFF-2). The government should demonstrate capacity on a par with its donor
partners such as MDF so this infrastructure development plans or scenario remained in
the hands of the government.
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Although it had already been planned to construct a permanent road from Lamno to
Calang through financing by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), the road would not be fully constructed until 2010. Hence BRR took an
emergency measure to repair the road, using gravel to cover the road surface making it
accessible for vehicles.
The measure, however, raised criticism from the public, which denounced BRR for its
delays. Further, the repairs took place during the rainy season and continued through the
fasting month of Ramadan and Eid ul-Fitr. Hence planning for a massive volume of work
was hastily devised and several contractors were directly appointed to undertake the
repair work. As a result, the quality of the road was not optimal. It had to be maintained
every week because the gravel would wash away along with the tide and be damaged by
passing vehicles. Also, the wooden bridge had to be changed every month due to heavy
traffic as it was the only access road for logistics. The road, later audited by the BPKP, was
dubbed as a misstep in development planning and a total loss for the state.
Immediately Handling Emergency Situations
The dilemma faced by BRR personnel while undertaking development projects under
such conditions frustrated them, because they felt that whatever they did would never be
enough. Building a permanent road would have been in vain, because such a road could
only be built under the long-term USAID scheme scheduled for completion in 2010.
To overcome the problem, BRR proposed that emergency infrastructure be built using
off-budget funds from donors instead of APBN. The off-budget funds could be used
not only to repair the Lamno-Calang road but also the drainage system in Banda Aceh,
as rainwater often inundated the city and caused havoc for the many refugees living in
emergency tents. The proposal, called Immediate Action Program (IAP) was proposed to
MDF and was later agreed upon as a priority program.
Then arose the question of who to implement of the construction work? Use of PHLN
funds would require a tender, and that would take time. BRR finally decided that the
implementing agency should be NGOs working near the location with the capacity to
undertake the work. This required them to have heavy equipment, construction materials
and manpower. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS), who was building houses and public
facilities in Calang, was willing to carry out the work.
Using a similar approach, BRR sought another NGO that was building houses near the
drainage zone. As gauged by their commitment, the choice fell on Muslim Aid.
Developing something useful that was greatly needed by the public in a disasterhit area will not guarantee a positive appraisal by public auditors. On one hand, in
undertaking such a difficult task, one had to be unencumbered by of legal penalties. On
the other hand, regulations to prevent corruption and state losses were only applicable in
normal development projects carried out under normal circumstances and conditions, far
different from disaster areas such as Aceh-Nias.
The irony is that while natural disasters and emergency situations often occur, there
are no audit regulations and procedures that can be applied to a post-disaster situation.
The absence of such procedures had led to state auditors applying their conventional
methods rigidly, insensitive to the local conditions. As a result, there is a negative
perception on the agency’s performance, tainting the government’s image even more.
Under such an emergency situation, BRR often took the risk of being blamed for
circumventing the conventional regulations as long as it brought the needs of the local
communities and did not bring about state losses. In such a case, instead of playing it
safe, the government must take firm measures and act as public authority to resolve the
problem.
BRR was given the opportunity to make use of off-budget funds unconstrained to
rigid government regulations that were not flexible in meeting the needs of emergency
situations. It is advisable for the government to study the situation and issue more
appropriate regulations for quick emergency response.
Emergency situations require prompt government response. It is true that a set
of regulations have to be issued to prevent officials from abusing their power, but
the regulations should by no means deter officials from carrying out emergency
measures that are much needed by and beneficial to the people. BRR’s decisiveness and
accountability in its undertakings could be taken as examples by other government
agencies to strive for the public’s interest.
Lessons Learned
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Quick Infrastructure Construction to Respond
to Urgent Needs: Building a Seaport in One Day
At the beginning of its tenure, BRR felt it was necessary to immediately undertake
several main infrastructure projects. The urgency encouraged experienced professionals
to promptly decide on the starting point to build a seaport in Aceh. It was a breakthrough
that had never been undertaken in Indonesia, because planning and building a seaport
at a particular location at a provincial level usually entailed a long and complicated
bureaucratic process.
Background
In May 2005, when BRR began its operations with only a handful of staff members,
the Singapore Red Cross (SRC) paid a friendly visit to Head of BRR Executing Agency,
inquiring about what help it could offer to the people of Meulaboh. As the facilities for
sea transportation on the province’s west coast were badly damaged by the tsunami and
earthquake, BRR suggested that SRCS help rebuild the seaport in Meulaboh to expedite
reconstruction work by providing the only access to West Aceh.
SRCS, which initially planned to build a hospital, eventually agreed to also finance the
construction of the port. When asked about the construction cost, BRR estimated that
it would amount to US$ 6 to 7 million. Once agreed upon,the Head of BRR Executing
Agency indicated that port construction work could begin the following day. The financial
agreement was written during the meeting.
Quick Decision to Build Meulaboh Seaport
Before BRR was established, the Provincial Government had repeatedly reported to the
Ministry of Transportation to no avail that the Meulaboh Port had been damaged. Now
with the opportunity at hand to develop the port with funds from Singapore, BRR in no
time assigned Djoko Sasono, a staff from Ministry of Transportation who had joined BRR,
to accompany the SRC team to Meulaboh the next day. BRR also asked the Ministry of
Transportation to send representative to decide on the initial coordinates of the port’s
construction.
A similar decision was made in early 2006 when the Dutch government helped
reconstruct the wharf at Malahayati port. Despite the damage, the wharf could be used
temporarily. The Dutch government, choosing its own consultants and contractors, built
the wharf at a cost of US$8 million. The construction of the wharf and rehabilitation of the
port buildings were well completed and only took seven months.
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Also in mid 2005, when the BRR Deputy for Housing, Infrastructure, and Spatial
Planning Coordination visited Nias, the location of the temporary Gunungsitoli port
was immediately decided. The decision was made based on the consideration that
due to the logistical burdens, the existing port could collapse at any time. In addition,
the construction of a more permanent port at a previous location would take a much
longer time. The same was true when BRR rebuilt the wharf at Lahewa port. For this,
BRR employed local contractors who were building schools and who had materials
concessions nearby.
At several distribution points like Calang, Simelue and Nias, BRR, along with donor
agencies and NGOs, also set up temporary piers by using empty containers. The
containers were piled one upon another to a height suitable for loading and unloading
cargo from a ship. It took only 10 days to build such an innovative pier. It was both
effective and relatively cheap, costing about Rp 200 million.
Temporary road built by CRS in Lhok
Kruet, Aceh Jaya, March 19, 2006.
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Malahayati Port after reconstruction
with aid from the Dutch Government
in Krueng Raya, Aceh Besar, August 30,
Lessons Learned
During its term, BRR more often than not made very quick decisions, which under
normal circumstances would require more time. Quick actions and decisions were
important not only to meet public demands but also to accelerate other reconstruction
works. For example, the construction of seaports, the emergency road to West Aceh
ensured the flow of materials to those areas. In concert with, the opening of these
gateways , development and reconstruction continued, reviving local economic activities.
Such methods were not popular. To decide upon a location for a seaport usually
require a thorough study and carried out over a longer period of time. Despite all this, the
Meulaboh Port has become the backbone of goods distribution to the western coastal
areas of Aceh Province.
As time passed, it was proven that the quick decisions to build temporary ports at
the present location truly hit the mark. Results from a feasibility study determined the
permanent site of the ports were not far from the temporary locations. In future, it would
be better for the government to have data on water depths in harbor areas from previous
studies or through a quick assessment so as to ensure safe sailing lanes.
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Unique and
Exemplary
Projects and
Policies
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AT
the project implementation phase, the aforementioned breakthroughs were
made in reference to core project activities. Projects classified as unique or pilot projects,
as described in this chapter, pertain to the following activities: village mapping and
planning; sub-district spatial framework and action plan (KSF-AP), Lambung village in
Meuraxa, Banda Aceh; Beuramo housing project; micro hydropower plants (PLTMH);
gender issues, Information Communication Technology (ICT); and regional water supply
and sanitation.
Village Mapping and Village Planning:
Application of Participative Planning System
Before the disaster, development activities in Aceh and Nias were carried out in
a top-down approach. After the disaster, the community became actively involved
and participated in the mapping and planning activities at the village level. Such a
participative development method, involving outside funding and active involvement
of end beneficiaries, was carried out for the first time in Aceh and Nias. It had a more
significant impact as it was applied to a community that had just experienced a major
tragedy, was suddenly being exposed to the outside world and was effectively still
profoundly traumatized. It should be further noted that the implementation of such a
Parking area for motorized rickshaws
in front of the Ulee Lheue Seaport,
Banda Aceh, February 19, 2009.
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participative approach was at the time a new concept in Indonesia that previously was
only a subject of discourse at the village level.
Background
The participative approach in village mapping and planning, especially pertaining
to Aceh, was used to achieve the following objectives. First, to respect the local people
as “owners” of the area. In Acehnese tradition, ureueng po rumoh4 or holders of ethical
authority, decide how houses or settlements should be developed in the future. Whereas,
ureueng lingka5 are free to assist or facilitate as long as decision-making still lies with
ureueng po rumoh.
Second, this approach was incorporated into the Government Regulation in lieu of Law
No. 2/2005 and which was eventually enacted as Law No. 10/2005.6
Next to producing a product of planning that had been jointly approved, the
redevelopment program was also envisaged to become a forum of trauma healing for
the disaster victims. The people who participated in the planning process were coached
to become spatial planners of their own settlements. As a rule, the process started by
determining a vision for the village. Although many people were satisfied and happy
when their houses were rebuilt, a number of people considered the discussion on the
village vision, the mapping of boundaries and the finalization of planning as important
foundations of the settlement where they were eventually going to live. Their active
participation also served as a kind of “healing process” to overcome the trauma caused by
the disaster as well as a psychological exercise for disaster victims. They were given the
opportunity to visualize their dreams, to jointly discuss and decide how their settlement
should be further developed. As such, the community would hopefully possess a stronger
sense of belonging in the program that they had jointly planned.
Implementation: Guidelines for Matching Minimal Standards of
Rural Planning
Village mapping and planning were facilitated by several donor institutions like Up-link7
and Mercy Corps, sometimes each of them using different methods and techniques but
always applying the participative approach. The different methods and techniques used
required common guidelines to define the minimal processes and products of a village’s
planning. In June 2005, BRR published Guidelines of Village Planning and Development
(BRR Guidelines No. 1/2005) that in April 2006 was enacted into Guidelines of Village
Planning (BRR Guidelines No. 1/2006),8 which was of a more technical nature.
The guidelines described the planning phases that could be generated, such as the
participative planning process, participative mapping, discussion on space or landuse, planning of basic community infrastructure and facilities, disaster mitigation and
spatial planning. Planning was mainly focused on identifying areas that were considered
ecologically vulnerable. The guidelines were then complemented by rural development
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plans, including economic (means of livelihood, utilization of local resources), and social
development.
The People’s Collective Dream: Visualization of the Future
‘Gampong’
Village planning started with land mapping. The physical boundaries of individual plots,
of green areas and even of the village property were mapped out. The whole process was
conducted in a participative manner, involving the local people. The involvement of local
people was not only technically important but also normatively important.
The product generated by mapping activities was the visualization of the initial
situation of the gampong (village). Through participative mapping, conflict among the
people of a village or of several villages concerning land boundaries could be prevented.
In other words, participative land mapping was the initial step of social legitimization of
the next process. With the generated and jointly approved village map, the process of
participative village planning could be carried out.
The village plan served as the framework to construct the necessary infrastructure
for decent and habitable settlements that were instrumental to creating an improved
integration of economic, social, political and cultural networks. Following participative
Villagers read housing maps
approved in a planning meeting in
Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar, August 7,
Figure 7.1 – Village Planning Map
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mapping, the locations of basic community infrastructure and facilities were discussed
as part of participative village planning activities, which also included disaster mitigation
planning to minimize the impact of future disasters. Another factor that was also dealt
with in the process was the participative identification of areas that were considered
ecologically vulnerable.
Learning: Monitoring and Evaluation of Village Planning
Implementation
There were quite a number of challenges facing participative village mapping and
planning, such as insufficient professional manpower, since participative village mapping
and village planning were still unknown procedures in Indonesia. Moreover, the village
people as a rule did not possess enough patience to follow the whole participative
planning process, especially when their basic necessities were still insufficiently provided.
Participative planning and mapping generated a common map that was meant
to serve as the basis for subsequent recovery programs. Not infrequently, the local
people behaved inconsistently, changing their ways of thinking and conduct, especially
pertaining to joint agreements on, for example, the extent of their land to be contributed
for the development of roads or schools. The mutually agreed upon joint agreements on
private land sections that were to be used for common objectives were often annulled as
the people demanded financial compensation for their land. Another impediment was
that in villages where village planning was conducted together with the construction
of houses, the respective building contractors tended to ignore the plans that had been
created and were difficult to amend.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings, 647 of the total 650 villages conducted village
planning activities and from the monitoring and evaluation on the implementation of
village plans in 3467 of the 647 villages9 that possessed their own respective plans, it was
evident that some village redevelopment activities had not been conducted according
to the respective village development plans, with varying degrees of inconsistencies
among the different villages. Land-use planning10 and rehabilitation of nature and the
environment11 proved to play an effective role in village planning although a number of
deviations did take place pertaining to the number of houses, extent of land use, social
facilities, and village development plans.
The process of village mapping and planning in Aceh and Nias was then integrated into
the ongoing process of rehabilitation and reconstruction, which was the identification of
beneficiaries of housing and village development plans as well as of the overall spatial
planning; it also included securing land (particularly for relocation purposes) and the
eventual issuance of the respective land titles, designing and construction of houses, and
of basic infrastructure and facilities. In addition, activities were carried out to improve the
economy and small-scale enterprises, which in turn contributed to the recovery of the
local economic network.
Among the co-working partners, people’s participation developed in several other
forms, such as community contracting initiatives carried out by UN-Habitat. Groups
of villagers were involved as building material suppliers and/or contractors under the
supervision of the aid providers. The benefit of such a system was that besides motivating
people to render maximal quality construction work, since the dwellings would eventually
belong to them or their relatives, the people were also able to rebuild the economic
network that was to support them in the future.
Approaching the termination of BRR’s tenure, several discussions took place among
several groups. The Governor’s Assistance Team, for example, applied the village plans
as an instrument in providing and dispersing governor grants to each village in Aceh.
Successfully implemented, this initiative would indeed be most effective as it would (a)
shorten the cycle of project identification in the village, which previously was conducted
through “village development deliberations”, (b) strengthen village autonomy while at the
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New land consolidation of
Lambung village, Meuraxa,
Banda Aceh, December 8, 2006.
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same time deter the myopic village elite from interfering with development funds. This
system also has the potential of ushering village plans to their next development phase,
transforming them from rehabilitation and reconstruction activities into instruments for
regional development that included actions to overcome poverty.
Sub-District (Kecamatan) Spatial Planning
Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP)
The majority of districts/cities in Aceh and Nias had never possessed proper spatial
plans. What was left of the bureaucracy and manpower of other institutions in each
district or city had never known spatial planning or acquainted themselves with how to
generate such plans as stipulated in the existing laws and regulations. The Kecamatan (or
sub-district) Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP) was designed to meet such a need.
Background
In the efforts to accelerate the normalization of the people’s economic and social lives,
it was necessary to have the village planning process supported by more comprehensive
planning at the sub-district level. This necessity generated the breakthrough of the
second spatial planning at the beginning of 2006: the Kecamatan Action Plan (KAP) which
eventually developed into the Kecamatan Spatial Framework and Action Plan (KSF-AP).
The Law on Spatial Planning acknowledges Sub-District or Detailed Regional Spatial
Planning (Rencana Detail Tata Ruang Kota, RDTRK) or District or Urban Spatial Planning
(Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kota, RTRWK). The problem was that both RDTRK and RTRWK
were political products requiring a lengthy process in their formulation and legislation,
and to some extent were full of uncertainties. In the meantime, for rehabilitation and
reconstruction purposes, it was necessary to have a technical product that could guide
the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction that was conducted at quite considerable
speed and immediacy. It was therefore necessary to have another means that could
run parallel with the normative spatial planning that was to run according to existing
regulations; this was necessary to prevent the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities
from being impeded or implemented without any guidelines.
Implementation of KSF-AP
Law No. 10/2005 on BRR, Article 5(a) distinctively stipulated that reconstruction activities
should also include spatial planning. This meant that the rehabilitation process also had
to be an effort to plan the region and town, with the objective of eventually generating
orderly, livable and secure human settlements. This stipulation was in accordance with
BRR’s motto of “build back better”. Even though regulations stipulate that the authority to
Distrcit Head & BAPPEDA
Meeting
Sub-district
Consultation
Field Survey
&
Initial Proposal
Questionaire
Community
Consultation
Proposal Assessment
with Sub-district Head and
Other Stakeholders
Revision and
Field Re-survey
Project Action Plan
Draft
Core Team Functions
Field Team Functions
Combination of Core Team and Field Team Functions
conduct spatial planning lies with the local administration, the KSP-AP was implemented
with the full knowledge of the respective district and urban administrations.
The KSF-AP was fully supported and financed by ADB grants, executed through ETESP
programs. Technically it was more detailed than RDTRK, and was planned for one subdistrict.11 The main output was the identification of strategic infrastructure projects and
means of livelihood within a sub-district. In order to be operational, the identification of
strategic projects was complemented with project sheets that functioned as pre-feasibility
studies.
It was necessary for the KSF-AP to refer to the pre-agreed upon spatial planning or
RDTRK and/or RTRWK if any, and also to village planning. Formulation of the KSF-AP was
Consultation and
meeting with the
relevant
stakeholders:
UN agencies,
NGOs, BRR and
other government
agencies
Illustration 7.2 - KSF-AP Scheme in the Indonesian Spatial Planning Constellation
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124
Helicopter evacuation practice at
the Emergency Rescue Building
(Gedung Penyelamatan) in Banda
Aceh, on November 1, 2008.
conducted in a participative manner, through public consultations at the sub-district and
district levels. Consultations were carried out not only with the local people, community
leaders and officials from the sub-district/district, but also with several NGOs and
international institutions that worked in the respective region. It was envisaged that such
a process would avoid an overlap of activities among the various parties involved.
In time, the scope of the KSF-AP developed; at the beginning of 2006 the geographical
coverage was only the parts of a sub-district that were most severely damaged by
the disaster, and was focused on identification of rehabilitation and reconstruction
projects pertaining to infrastructure and means of livelihood that would accelerate the
normalization of people’s lives.
Lessons Learned
After Phase I of KSF-AP was completed, it was proposed to conduct an overall
improvement in order that the recommended infrastructure development would possess
strategic value for mid- and long-term regional development. By referring more closely
to existing RTRWK and/or RDTRK, Phase II of KSF-AP was carried out for 28 sub-districts,
under the name of KSF-AP. Overall, KSF-AP covered 63 sub-districts including Nias and
South Nias sub-districts to compensate for a limited number of village plans.
Within the context of the Law on KSF-AP was a technical plan and elaboration of
RDTRK and RTRWK. In the absence of those two normative plans, or when they had not
been enacted, the KSF-AP was still implemented to fill the absence of guidelines for the
acceleration of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The KSF-AP could be referred
to RDTRK and/or RTRWK since the draft had already been openly discussed through
several phases, and hence it was envisaged that its legislation would not undergo
significant changes; similarly with village planning output, if any. Besides being a public
agreement that should be honored, village planning was needed to formulate technical
formulation at the sub-district level.
Although it was designed to facilitate rehabilitation and reconstruction activities,
not all the projects that had been identified in the KSF-AP could be realized during the
rehabilitation and reconstruction period. Some projects that were mentioned in the
KSF-AP, complete with their financing and feasibility reports, have not been realized;
nevertheless they should be carried out as part of the long-term recovery process.
Therefore, within the context of regular development activities that would be conducted
by the local authority, an already formulated KSF-AP should be able to shorten the
process to be conducted by local development deliberation at the sub-district level or
even at the district level.
Lambung Village
Lambung village in Meuraxa sub-district, Banda Aceh, has often been considered an
example of a good breakthrough in village redevelopment, particularly in Aceh. The
village was, like most villages in Indonesia, not properly planned. During the process
of its redevelopment, the spatial planning was better organized, which produced a
much more orderly end result. People did not put too much emphasis on their original
land boundaries, but were more focused on redeveloping their village according to the
principles of spatial planning.
Background
The village head, Zaidi M. Adan, explained that the idea to wholly re-plan the village was
the result of an agreement reached among several survivors, of which only 276 of the village’s
original 1,600 inhabitants were found to be alive 10 days after the disaster. Their wish to
rebuild the village into a better organized settlement was further developed by BRR.
The idea emerged to consolidate land-use, like “abolishing” previous land boundaries
followed by a redrawing of boundaries and land-use pattern, which was conducted with
the participation of all survivors. The new land-use pattern was carried out by professional
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rural spatial planners with the objective of improving the village environment. BRR
facilitated in making the idea a reality by coordinating the people with the several donors
in the reconstruction of Lambung village.
Development of Lambung Village
Witnessed by about 200 inhabitants, the groundbreaking ceremony was conducted
in May 2006. The Multi-Donor Fund began constructing a total of 309 houses through a
program called Community Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project
(CSRRP or ReKompak). The houses were built on stilts and each cost Rp 58 million. At
present, more than half of the houses - of which the detailed engineering drawing (DED)
was completed by Sogreah (a France agency) - are occupied.
The settlement, which consists of about 310 households, has become a village that
possesses an open green area, and all the land has been properly consolidated. With the
people’s approval, roads were re-planned and built, with a minimal width of four meters.
In May 2007, the roads were totally completed, with a construction cost of Rp 20 billion
from BRR. The total length of sealed asphalt roads amounts to 8,425.96 meters with
reinforced concrete drainage.
During the construction, all the inhabitants were persuaded to wholeheartedly
participate in the activities. Some even freely relinquished land for the construction of
roads or public buildings without demanding any compensation. A number of problems
that previously plagued the people have now been overcome. For example, the issue
of clean water facilities; previously existing water pipes were not interconnected to
the arterial water mains of the local Tirta Daroy state water company. The provision of
secondary feeders was funded by the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) while
the tertiary pipes and connections to individual houses were funded by BRR, costing
Rp 331,390,000. The issue of education was also addressed with the construction of an
integrated school compound consisting of kindergarten, elementary, junior high and
senior high schools. The two-story schoolhouse stands on a 6,000-square-meter plot
that is the result of donations collected from viewers of private television station RCTI,
amounting to Rp 12 billion. The construction of houses and settlements in Lambung village was conducted with
full participation of the people, with the end objective to minimize disaster-generated
risks, be an environmentally friendly and well-planned village. An earthquake-proof
escape building has also been constructed, complete with the necessary safety trails and
direction signs. JICS also constructed three three-story buildings, with each story having a
floor space of 25.2 meters by 15.2 meters.
The three buildings have been designated as centers of community activities where
people try to find and formulate ways to improve their means of livelihood and skills in
disaster management. Immediately after the disaster, the buildings acted as evacuation
Apart from that, evacuation drills were also conducted in order to train the community
to be prepared for disasters. The buildings and the nearby roads (which were also
constructed by JICS) are evidence that the people’s readiness to face disasters has been
greatly improved; they also serve to promote the community’s economic efforts in
facilitating future investment and development.
Lessons Learned
Although it took quite some time to apply the participative approach in Lambung, its
success in this village illustrates that it is extremely important to adopt. By participating in
assuring that their future houses would be of good quality, the owners strengthened their
social-communal relationships and established good governance. Village head Zaidi once
remarked, “All the village inhabitants must arrive at a common agreement pertaining to
redrawing the village map. It was a difficult task, but we accomplished it.”
Spatial re-planning can in principle be conducted at any site as long as the local
inhabitants come to a common agreement. What should be taken into consideration is their
temporary housing during the construction. Furthermore, the best way to increase the local’s
commitment so as they feel they will benefit from the development must also be considered.
It should be emphasized that spatial re-planning and redevelopment have the
objective of improving the quality of the environment and even of the people’s lives.
Applied in urban areas, a better planned and organized environment results in a rise in
land prices. The people should also be made aware that they will individually benefit from
the exercise. If necessary, land evaluation could be done prior to and after the re-planning
and redevelopment.
Development of a Satellite City:
Beuramoe New Town
Beuramoe New Town is situated in Aceh Besar District, approximately 10 kilometers east
of Banda Aceh city. Beuramoe is also considered a breakthrough in settlement development
in that it was the first satellite town in Aceh to be furnished with all the necessary facilities.
The town was built on a site where even in normal times it would be difficult to construct
buildings. It was a site that attracted very few people to settle and build a life.
Previously, this new town was called Kota Baru Labuy, This name could be found in
a number of assessments and brochures. On July 30, 2008, during the inauguration
ceremony of the new town by the Head of BRR Executing Agency and the Aceh Besar
centers, as they are earthquake- and 10-meter-high tsunami-resistant structures. Each
building can accommodate 1,000 people.
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Relocation housing complex
in Beuramoe Village, Labuy,
Aceh Besar, on April 3, 2009.
Bupati, or Head of District, the latter officially declared the new town as “Kota Baru
Beuramoe”. While Labuy indicates the name of one gampong in the area, the name
“Beuramor” is an old name given to the entire area. As such, by using this name,
resentment among locals from different, neighboring gampong is avoided.
Background: Why a New Town?
Initially it was in response to the challenges posed by the rather unfortunate condition
of the approximately 140 hectares of hilly land, strewn with an abundance of boulders,
situated around Labuy and Neuheun villages, in Aceh Besar District. Was it possible to
develop the land? If it proved impossible, should it then just be abandoned so as not to
become a burden to the local administration? To leave it unoccupied was certainly not an
option because there was a great shortage of land for the relocation of people and houses
from areas that were destroyed in the disaster.
The Deputy for Operations proposed using the boulder-strewn site for housing
construction. In order to push through the project, the said deputy “challenged” donor
agencies to develop the topographically difficult terrain. China Charity responded
to the challenge, acknowledging that the most important task was to relocate the
people despite not all of the available land being favorable. Furthermore, through the
development activities they saw an opportunity to prove the quality of their aid.
The area needed to be developed with several separate residential areas as such a
project would solve several problems and at the same time meet a number of objectives.
First, to house people who rented homes and other refugees through a relatively
affordable development budget (the price of land was relatively low and it was financially
feasible to develop socio-economic facilities and infrastructure). Second, by developing
an urban system, employment opportunities would be generated that would reduce the
number of commuters. Third, developing infrastructure on a relatively large scale would
be more efficient.
Development of Beuramoe New Town: Ideas and Achievements
The Outline Plan of Kota Baru Beuramoe was drawn up in 2006 by ADB through
the Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ADB-ETESP). Kota Baru
Beuramoe consists of two service centers, the China Charity housing area, as the main
center, and the Buddha Tzu Chi/BRR housing area as the secondary center. During the
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, the following projects were also developed with
the objective of supporting the new town:
• Residential compounds developed by a number of organizations, such as the Islamic
Relief (150 houses), ADB (286), ARC (98), UNEP (four), BRR (110), SCC (336), all located
on 52.5 hectares of land situated in the Central-East areas; outside the 52.5 ha of land,
other housing projects were also built by China Charity (606), Buddha Tzu Chi (780)
and Nurani Dunia (75).
• Economy-supporting facilities such as the Fish Auction Market, as well as trade and
storage facilities in order to encourage people to work in the town; and in addition
the Siron 3 (40 liter/sec.) water plant was also constructed to complement Siron I
water plant (60 liter/sec) in serving Aceh Besar District, and Siron 2 (20 liter/sec) to
serve Banda Aceh; to complement the water plant, 19 kilometers of transmission
pipes were laid between Siron and Beuramoe New Town and a water reservoir was
also planned to be constructed at Neuheun, with a capacity of storing 1,000 cubic
meters of water; the Siron 3 water plant is expected to serve up to 3,400 households,
or about 80 percent of the area’s population;
Additionally, the construction of two drilled wells each with a capacity of 1.5 liter/second;
the construction of roads and bridges to secure easy access to the new housing areas; along
with the construction of places of worship (mosques), playgrounds, bus shelters and/or
public health clinics in each housing area were carried out to support the new town.
Before the disaster occurred, 900 houses had been built by the Perumnas state housing
company on a nearby site. After the disaster, a number of residential areas emerged
around the site, each with 25 to 900 houses. Within a radius of three kilometers, there
were no fewer than 11 new and old residential areas with the number of inhabitants
eventually reaching 4,051 households or 16,000 to 40,000 people. This situation led to the
idea of developing the area into a new town.
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Lessons Learned: Prospects and Challenges
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Villagers use electricity from microhydro resources in Putri Betung
Village, Gayo Luwes. December 22,
Kota Baru Beuramoe is an example of the development of a self-contained
satellite town in Aceh, with Banda Aceh city being the main city. The satellite town
functions as a secondary support unit for the main city. The knowledge gained by the
development of Kota Baru Beuramoe was that the state budget invariably tended to be
insufficient to realize such ideas, and that it was necessary to seek support from private
investors and from the people, which could become the main source of funding. During
the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, the development of Kota Baru Beuramoe
was a minor initiative that still required a number of other activities. It also became
apparent that development of the administrative system within Aceh Besar District
must be further improved in order to secure the provision of goods and public services
(pertaining to the inhabitants welfare, community security, and issuance of building
permits). It also became most important to obtain the full involvement of Banda Aceh
Municipality and Provincial Administration to support the exercise.
Development of an urban economy should also be conducted in a sustainable manner,
for example by facilitating private investment in a new town, through simplifying the
Conflicts between newcomers and established residents have been well managed, to a
certain extent, through the development of an “interaction and cooperation space”, thus
ensuring that the social and economic benefits derived from the development of this
new town can be enjoyed by all. On a more technical level, it should be mentioned that it
would be advisable to cease the exploitation of the hilly areas east of the new town as a
quarry for building material, since the activities pose a great danger to the housing area
below as landslides could easily occur.
The initiative to develop a new town like Beuramoe was eventually also proposed
and implemented in other places and on different scales, for example in Singkil, where
the Pulau Sarok housing area was developed by BRR, and in Arongan (Lambalek) where
housing areas were developed by CRS and BRR.
Alternative Energy for the Interior Region:
A Taste of Development while Preserving
the Forests
In thinly populated isolated areas, a breakthrough in the provision of electricity was
also endeavored by exploiting existing resources. The micro hydropower plant is a
pilot project that provides electricity by using water to produce a medium volume of
electricity. Such an electricity plant can also be easily managed by the people themselves.
Background
The socio-economic condition in the interior and rural areas in Aceh or in Nias, being far
from densely populated or urban areas, are generally speaking underdeveloped. Structural
poverty occurs because of the isolated location, particularly because the people are not
able to send their produce to nearby urban sale centers. Furthermore, it is extremely
expensive to develop infrastructure in areas that are not included on the priority list.
As a whole, the interior and rural areas have been increasingly left behind in terms of
development activities. Their isolated location has led to a high cost of oil-based fuel.
Introduction of Alternative Energy in Aceh and Nias
In conducting reconstruction activities in Aceh, BRR firmly applied the environmentally
friendly approach and did its utmost to preserve the forests of Aceh. Areas prioritized
for reconstruction activities were those that had been devastated by the tsunami and
procedure to obtain the necessary permits, with the ultimate objective of creating a selfcontained new town. The new town should also not be too closely linked to the main city,
in this case Banda Aceh, in order to prevent ribbon development, which is inefficient for
optimal usage of infrastructure. A second support area should therefore be developed
between the main city and the new town.
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earthquake. The areas located in the center of the region, such as the Leuser National
Park and the Ulu Masen conservation zone are not included on the list of prioritized areas.
Until the second year of the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, not much attention
was given to the central region. Inevitably, dissatisfaction emerged as the discrepancies
grew bigger between areas that were not destroyed by the tsunami and the coastal areas
and towns that were severely damaged.
The people saw opportunities to earn money in the reconstruction activities. One way
was by providing the necessary wood by cutting down the trees in their vicinity, having
no other means to obtain a decent living. BRR formulated a solution and proposed the
micro hydropower plant project.
The power plant uses the waterfall within Leuser park and was funded by the Multi
Donor Fund (MDF). With this project BRR, endeavored to give a taste of development
activities to the isolated interior area, and at the same time educate the people to
preserve the forest. They were taught that the forest required constantly running river
water, which at the same time could turn the turbines of an electricity plant, thus
providing electricity to the rural inhabitants.
Despite it proving to be a good project, at the end of 2005 MDF rejected the project
since the area was not considered a disaster area. At the same time, however, the Spanish
government offered a grant and a loan to the government of Indonesia and BRR proposed
that the Spanish grant be used to conduct a feasibility study on developing several
alternative energy projects. The proposal was accepted and a study on wind energy in
Nias was conducted while in Aceh alternative water energy was chosen because of the
abundant water supply in the area.
Micro hydropower plants are generally too small to be managed by the State Electricity
Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN), while on the other hand, the people had no
experience in managing one independently. Therefore, prior to the development of
the micro hydropower plant, the necessary information was disseminated and several
community-enabling activities were conducted. This was done by an NGO that had the
required public communication expertise. The problem was that the BRR Electricity PIU
was not used to working with NGOs and conducted a project tender as if for a project
funded by the APBN. Eventually the work was offered through a work contract to an
ordinary contractor.
Lessons Learned
Fortunately, the People Centered Business and Economic Institute (IBEKA), an NGO
that has considerable experience in Subang in West Java and in Krueng Kala, Aceh Besar,
offered its services in assisting in the implementation of the project. The necessary funds
for this experimental pilot project were obtained from the RANTF, which was more flexible
in its operation as it was self-managed. The project also had the objective of obtaining
information on implementation standards and cost to build micro hydropower plants.
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After conducting onsite studies and disseminating information to the public, a cost
estimate was submitted to the RANTF. Since the manager responsible for the pilot project
was also the BRR program manager, a similar micro hydroelectric power plant program
was proposed for funding through the APBN, using the method of establishing work
contracts with known partners.
For houses situated outside the area that were served by the state electricity company,
50 watts of electricity per house was provided free of charge through a solar power plant.
In the whole of Aceh province, 3,962 houses were served by solar power and several
NGOs were reportedly also building similar solar power plants in Aceh and Nias. In areas
with waterfalls that had the potential to turn turbines, micro hydropower plants were
developed. BRR energy pilot projects were mainly in the hilly areas around Gayo Lues,
Bener Meriah and Central Aceh. There was in total seven locations, five of which were
funded by the state budget and developed by BRR contractors, while the remaining two
were funded by RANTF and constructed by IBEKA Foundation.
Of the two different types of implementation, it became evident that the one
conducted by NGOs was better in terms of financing and acceptance by the people and
as such the projects’ sustainability is more secured. IBEKA provided training in operation
Pipe network built by RANTF for
micro-hydro power station fed by an
Alas river tributary in Putri Betung
Village. Gayo Luwes, December 22
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and maintenance in West Java, established a referral workshop and trained the necessary
technical staff in Bireuen to conduct repair work. It also chose mechanical and technical
components that are readily available around Aceh and Medan.
Both types of alternative energy supplies are certainly the most feasible to be
implemented in other interior areas or isolated islands not yet served by the state electricity
company. Considering the available local capacities and the great distance from big cities,
micro hydropower plants should use components that are easily obtained, and the necessary
workshops should also be developed in the nearest city. These are the keys to successful
maintenance. If these conditions are properly met, many areas in Indonesia would have the
potential to establish micro hydropower plants as alternative energy sources.
It has also been proven that the people are able to operate and render maintenance to
micro hydropower plants producing 20 to 500 kilowatts of electricity, provided that they
receive training and enabling courses before the construction of the plants. In certain
cases, the oversupply of energy produced by micro hydropower plants could be sold to
PLN provided there were sufficient support networks and the earnings could be use to
strengthen a village’s economy. This mechanism could be further developed by providing
opportunities to the rural population to start small-scale businesses using electricity, as
well as providing an alternative, cheaper electricity supply for PLN.
Developing Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias
Introducing a policy on gender in Aceh and Nias posed its own challenges to BRR
because the local people were doubtful about women’s abilities. BRR, on the other
hand, did not differentiate between the genders when recruiting staff and offered
equal remuneration. Besides having its own internal policies, BRR also made several
breakthroughs during its mandate period. The Joint Land Titling (JLT) project, which
strongly stipulated gender equality as it was a program of land titling involving a husband
and wife as tsunami survivors. In Aceh, prior to the disaster, women’s right to property
was not recognized. The successful accomplishment of Joint Land Titling was indeed a
breakthrough in Aceh and Nias.
Background on BRR Implementation of Gender Policy
The gender issue was acknowledged at the very beginning of the establishment of
BRR. It became a cross sector issue that was taken into consideration in all strategies and
policies. It could be said that women in Aceh and Nias are considered second-class and
marginal citizens compared to men. Although their rights and duties as stipulated in
Islamic law are recognized, in daily life those rights and duties have become rather blurred
when compared to the rights and duties of men.
First Strategy: Gender Mainstreaming
Four main policies were carried out by BRR in implementing its gender policy
throughout all sectors of activities. The first was to establish a gender quota policy in
all the work programs conducted by all BRR PIUs. Second was to create and develop
support tools as the main instruments to secure the application of gender commitment
in the field. Third was to establish gender focal points (GFP) in all BRR work sectors and
representative offices. The establishment of gender focal points made it much easier to
coordinate between the various departments of BRR and its Gender Unit. Fourth was to
implement the gender policy in the process of post-disaster land titling. This proved to
be a most phenomenal step, particularly because it was taken for the very first time in
Indonesia. In cooperation with the Council of Clerics and the Islamic Court of Law, BRR
took the initiative to introduce joint land ownership.
Second Strategy: Special Programs for Women
BRR drew up the following special programs for women. First was the program to
improve women’s capacity to become leaders, which was also known as creating a “pool
of women leaders”. This was BRR’s response to meet the civil and political rights of women
in Aceh and Nias. Second was a program pertaining to the development of women’s
institutional and organizational capacity and developing facilities and infrastructure for
women in several areas. Included in this program were the establishment of 23 integrated
healthcare centers for women and children (Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Untuk Perempuan
dan Anak, P2TP2A) and the development of 48 Ureng Inong (Women’s Halls) in several
villages in all districts/cities in Aceh Province. Third was to render financial assistance as
part of the BRR livelihood programs, by providing access to economic activities and thus
improving the finances of women and children. Fourth was establishing programs that
provided legal assistance to women and children. These programs were designed to be in
harmony with programs of the local authorities for further development on a wider scale.
Gender Exit Strategy BRR
Since its inception, BRR was known as an ad hoc institution, and hence gender
integration was emphasized in the transition process from BRR to the local authority.
In order to facilitate the acceptance of gender integration by the local authority, a
On September 26, 2006, the Head of BRR Executing Agency launched a gender policy
to be applied in all BRR activities. The objective was to optimize women’s equality and
enabling efforts. Indeed, BRR was strongly committed to upholding gender equality,
especially considering that the displaced in Aceh and Nias were women and children.
They faced the greatest impediments whether pertaining to obtaining their social and
economic rights, or the provision of facilities and infrastructure, as well as to cultural
matters where the issue was the strongest since theirs was a patriarchal culture.
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gender exit strategy was drawn up as a method and means to ascertain that the gender
perspective became the focus and foundation in establishing development policies after
the termination of BRR’s mandate on April 16, 2009.
Joint Land Titling (JLT)
The disaster destroyed data on land ownership, and even on land boundaries in
several regions of Aceh. Through the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System
(RALAS), supported by MDF, BRR established work collaboration with the National Land
Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN). RALAS had the objective of restoring and
providing assurance of land rights, and was a program that aimed to prevent future claims
from unlawful persons. It also became the legal foundation to reconstruct houses by
several donors/NGOs/the government.
The considerable number of widows, victims of the tsunami who possessed no rights
to the land owned by their deceased husbands, had given rise to the idea of conducting a
Joint Land Titling program by which the respective legal rights could be secured through
the issuance of land titles under the name of both husband and wife. Based on MDF’s Indepth Progress Report, issued December 2008, it became evident that of the total 126,106
land titles registered at the National Land Agency, 112,460 land titles were issued, with
11,500 of them being in the joint names of husband and wife.
Lessons Learned
A number of valuable lessons learned by the Gender Unit of BRR could have a strategic
impact in the future.
First, the program of enabling women and children after the end of the armed conflict
and post-disaster should be conducted by completely comprehending the social and
cultural structure of the local community. There is certainly no ideal program, and there
are bound to be contextual differences because of the different areas where the program
is implemented. Pertaining to land titling, the open-minded and democratic attitude
of the people of Aceh became the entry point to underline women’s rights on land and
houses. Although percent-wise it concerned only 12 percent of the population, it was still
a phenomenal achievement as it was the very first time that such an endeavor had been
undertaken after the end of the armed conflict and post-tsunami.
Second, in extensive or localized disasters, gender integration as a program indicator
should be ensured by the government as the party responsible for post-disaster recovery.
Third, policies should be allocated in conjunction with budget allocation designated
to enable women. This is because without sufficient funding, programs to enable women
could not be undertaken optimally and would instead remain stagnant.
Fourth, providing access to data and information for women is of utmost importance in
giving women direct access to development programs at local and national levels.
The fact that BRR was able to conduct gender mainstreaming and programs for
women within the limited rehabilitation and reconstruction period indicated that such
undertakings could be even better implemented in other permanent institutions with
longer programs.
The feasibility to implement JLT would not only better secure women’s rights within
the family, but would also enable the community to free themselves from the shackles
of poverty. It is sincerely hoped that the central and local governments will in the future
implement this program as a model of gender mainstreaming in land reform programs.
Internet Network for Aceh – Nias: Developing
Community Information Delivery
Although the internet is a widely used tool across the globe, the successful provision
of the necessary internet network in the area after the disaster was an achievement in
itself, considering that the entire communication network had been destroyed, making
even conventional interactions difficult. Another challenge was the dissemination of
information on internet usage to every corner of an area that had never employed such
technology. The provision of an Information Communication Technology (ICT) network
in the Province of Aceh-Nias could well be claimed to be the biggest government
telecommunication project in Indonesia located outside of Java at the time.
Background
At the emergency relief phase, the internet played a most formidable role in assisting
volunteers. Initially, the facility was provided by the Air Putih Foundation and funded by
several donors. Through this facility, volunteers, donors and NGOs were able to send data,
photos and disaster program implementation plans to their headquarters, and at the
same time receive the necessary approval for their plans and funding in Aceh.
Afterwards, considering the usefulness of such a facility in the development process,
BRR then programmed the provision of the basic infrastructure ICT network for the local
administration and community. The facility functioned as an alternative media to send
pertinent information in the quickest time possible, and to reach areas needing such
information.
ICT was also used to replace conventional the telecommunication infrastructure
that had been damaged in the disaster, which required a huge amount of funds for
reparation. Conventional communication was extremely expensive, whereas the need
for communication was gradually increasing as the rehabilitation and reconstruction
activities and improving the community needed to be accelerated.
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Implementation of ICT Development in Aceh – Nias
The involvement of the people in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process was
greatly facilitated by the establishment of the ICT infrastructure and internet access in
all the cities and districts in Aceh-Nias. Public participation functioned as an interaction
facility among BRR, local administration, NGOs and the outside community, and at the
same time functioned as an alternative media to create a caring, participative and aspiring
community culture.
The technology could simultaneously be used to conduct community development
programs as a means to stimulate the acceleration of economic growth, the dissemination
of science and technology as well as improve education standards. The facility also
became an incentive for the development of business and investment in information
technology, particularly the internet business at the local level.
With the completion of this program, Aceh became the first province in Indonesia to
have an internet network covering all of its districts and cities. At the beginning there
were only three Wi-Fi zones, namely government offices, schools and/or other public
facilities. Then the district and urban authorities each developed new Wi-Fi spots. The
Aceh Provincial Authority also supported the facility by increasing the bandwidth capacity
to 8 megabytes per second and in 2009 implemented the Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access (WIMAX).12
Lessons Learned
As the community came to depend more and more on the internet, the computer
business also expanded and the need for appropriate personnel also increased. The
immediate impact of ICT development was the emergence of the need for human
resources capable of operating the Wireless Local Loop Internet. The number of such staff
that the local authority had to provide was around 125 people.
Another positive consequence was the change in people’s lifestyles. In everyday
activities, more and more people began using a computer as an information and
communication tool. Informal computer education and training also took great strides,
particularly in cities and even in main towns in the districts. In government offices, the
availability of internet systems also generated the provision of better public services and
ICT-based best-practice of good governance, which played a facilitative role in political
education, democracy and transparency.
However, the people also became worried as there was an inflow of information that
clashed with local traditions and culture. Technically this could be prevented through
filtering techniques, such as through the Community Development Program through
which information dissemination and community enabling activities were conducted,
thereby educating the people how to differentiate between useful and negative
information. In order to prevent information distortion, the people were encouraged to
use information technology as a tool to produce and disseminate information appropriate
to the actual conditions in the community.
Difficulties in accessing the internet could result in the local authority and the majority of
the people lacking the necessary information needed to develop their social and economic
lives. Such was formerly the case when it was extremely expensive to establish fixed telephone
connection, which was monopolized by two state enterprises. At present, however, the
availability of the ICT network for the internet has overcome the problem in Aceh-Nias.
With competition increasing among internet service providers, the cost of internet
access is no longer a problem. This development has a positive impact in developing
countries like Indonesia. Such healthy competition, which is common in other places,
eventually lowers costs even in a duopoly market. The increase of internet users is in line
with the increase of people having telecommunication access through mobile telephones.
PDAM Siron water company central
distribution network facility for
distributing water to Aceh Besar, July
139
140
PDAM Lambaro water company
central distribution network facility
for distributing water to Banda
Aceh city. Aceh Besar, July 14, 2008.
Photo: BRR/Oni Imelva
Regionalization of Water Treatment and
Sanitation: Economic Scale and Sharing of
Natural Resources
Clean or potable water and sanitation services in Indonesia are managed by each
respective local administration. On the other hand, administrative boundaries are not
based on the respective geographical character that plays a determining role in planning
the exploitation of environmental and natural resources, in particular pertaining to
potable or clean water and waste disposal. Starting with Banda Aceh city and the district
of Aceh Besar, the Aceh Province endeavored to go, for the very first time, beyond
administrative boundaries in establishing cooperation in the exploitation of natural
resources. Potable water management and sanitation systems in these two areas are now
based on regional systems.
Background
Generally speaking, the provision of potable water and sanitation services in urban
areas in Indonesia are impeded by systemic problems and bad utility service, due to
the partitioning of the service unit/local company as a result of regional expansion
and autonomy. In the end, the local service unit/company decreases in size, becomes
Observing such trends, BRR proposed the establishment of joint potable water supply
and sanitation services at the regional level. There were several groupings of areas
that could be considered by Aceh Province in the implementation of joint river water
resources exploitation, such as Banda Aceh City with Aceh Besar District, Lhokseumawe
City with North Aceh District, Langsa City with Aceh Tamiang District, and Meulaboh City
with Nagan Raya District. Those proposals were positively responded to by the World
Bank, which then conducted several workshops and discourses about the matter, and
rendered technical assistance in the formulation of the cooperation framework among
the respective local authorities.
Developing a Regional Potable Water and Sanitation Service
In general, local companies providing potable water were not in good shape due to
mismanagement. The financial scale of their entrepreneurial management was too small
and the water rates too low in relation to ever-increasing production costs. Consequently,
the companies were unable to gain a profit to pay back their principal loans, which kept
accumulating while debt repayments keep being hampered, making it difficult for the
companies to obtain the new loans necessary for expansion and improvement of obsolete
facilities.
Low revenues also forced the companies to limit maintenance activities, causing their
production facilities and their output to dwindle in quantity and quality. In the end, they
were unable to provide good service, and were certainly not in the position to develop
their production and distribution, particularly to poor people.
The water companies were forced to charge very low water rates, even lower than
production costs. The Regional House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Daerah, DPRD) maintained the low water rates with the objective of protecting the poor,
whose condition ironically become worse as they were forced to buy potable water
from other private water suppliers at a much higher price. DPRD also argued that since
the service was bad, which was evident from the amount and quality of water, it would
not approve an increase in water rates. All of these policies further pushed the water
companies into a bad spiral. In order to improve the revenues of water companies,
BRR proposed establishing regional water companies to jointly serve nearby cities and
districts.
The cleaning services responsible for maintaining public sanitation also faced
considerable impediments since it was difficult for them to charge sufficiently high
garbage collection fees, which in any case the people were unwilling to pay. The people
had become used to irresponsibly disposing of their garbage in inappropriate places,
such as in rivers or by roadsides – as long as it was not in their own yards, or Not In My
Backyard (NIMBY), as the saying goes.
economically unviable and the situation is made worse by the struggle for power and
influence because of the exploitation of the same resources.
141
142
The case of household waste collection is different in Java where the people collectively
collect their waste and deposit it at temporary garbage disposal centers from where the
municipality transfers it to the municipal dump. Working as garbage collectors is looked
down upon in Aceh-Nias, making it impossible to implement the same household waste
collection system as conducted in Java.
The problem pertaining to waste collection in Java is that municipality A refuses
to accept waste from municipality B, even though there may be no land available in
municipality A to be used as a municipal dump. In order to stop the problem from
worsening, waste disposal based on wider boundaries, such as regions, has since early
times been proposed for certain cities and districts.
Lessons Learned
Regionalization of potable water supply for Banda Aceh City together with Aceh Besar
District eventually took place. The water companies in both places have begun to use the
same water source at Lambaro/Siron, drawing water from the same river.
Reconciling the cost balance of both water companies is currently being done as
the first step in merging the two companies. The problem is that there has never been
uniformity in determining water rates. The water company in Aceh Besar District has
already adjusted its water rates while the company in Banda Aceh has yet to start. With
regionalization of water supply, all customers in the two local administration areas will
receive the same service and pay the same water rates.
Managing potable water supply is generally conducted in conjunction with managing
waste disposal/sanitation. The problem facing waste disposal in Banda Aceh is not
confined to cleaning and waste collection but more importantly, the city has very limited
space to be used as a central garbage dump. The final waste collection at Kampung Jawa
in Banda Aceh, in spite of having been rehabilitated under UNDP and further enlarged by
BRR with funds from MDF, can only accept garbage for the next two years.
A new and bigger site needs to be acquired and after it starts functioning, the old
garbage dump in Kampung Jawa can be closed. It is recommended that the central dump
for both regions be located near Sultan Iskandar Muda Airport, in Aceh Besar District.
Since it concerns garbage from two different administrative regions, a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) has been drawn up between Banda Aceh Municipality and
Aceh Besar District, stipulating the collective management of the facility. Coordination
approaches have already been started by Aceh Provincial Government. The MOU has been
signed and preparatory action has begun. Funding will come from Aceh Province, MDF,
UNDP and BRR.
The efforts to establish regionalization of waste disposal were also impeded by political
issues. During each phase of the process, each regional legislative council (from Banda
Regionalization of water supply is highly feasible in other places, particularly in
municipalities and districts that are located in relative proximity, especially because both
the suppliers and the customers would benefit. Considering the trend of globalization
and development of public administration in Indonesia, local administrations would not
be able to keep on functioning independently but instead would be forced to establish
collaboration and become interdependent among each other. Regionalization of public
utilities would become an inevitable choice and initiatives to start consolidation should
be commenced as early as possible, to reduce future problems.
By establishing joint management on a bigger scale, efficiency could be increased
(there would only be one group of manpower and one management); furthermore,
management transparency would also ameliorate the company. It should be noted that
currently, transparent management of public utilities is still very limited, which tends to
invite fraudulent actions.
It must be acknowledged that merging two or more businesses that have become
large entities, with huge liabilities, would be much more complicated (especially in
big cities); however, if agreements could be reached at the early stages, solutions to
the impediments could be formulated jointly. The water supply company “Tirtonadi” in
Medan, which is a joint enterprise of all water companies in North Sumatra, is a good
example of how regionalization of potable water supply could be established. Customer
satisfaction is much higher, the quality of services rendered keeps on improving and
expansion through investment can done by obtaining loans from the Ministry of Finance
and donor agencies, because the company’s credit rating would be positive.
Aceh City and Aceh Besar District) often put forward its objections to the regionalization
of the service. The issues that were most often mentioned were the separation of balance
sheets/assets and the different amount of potential income. Both councils put greater
importance on the issue of compartmentalization of authority rather than on providing
the best service to the public. Their objections are actually of less importance compared
to the benefit that would be derived from the saved costs and improved service to
customers in both areas. In responding to the objections raised, it is necessary to show
to both councils the potentials of a regionalized water supply and sanitation services. At
present, the process toward regionalization is still running smoothly, but the momentum
should be maintained to prevent it from breaking down.
143
Chapter 8. Supervision, Observation and Evaluation
Supervision,
Observation and
Evaluation
145
THE
adage that “power corrupts” inspired the BRR Executing Agency. Having vast
power and an enormous amount of funds, BRR considered it necessary to have stratified
supervision and monitoring system. Supervision began with a personal commitment
as stipulated in the Integrity Pact, followed by an independent unit called the AntiCorruption Unit (Satuan Anti-Korupsi, SAK) and the Deputy for Supervision within the
Executing Agency. There were also the Supervisory Board, an entity outside the Executing
Agency but still a part of BRR, and other monitoring units such as the Center of Regional
Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian Program dan Proyek Wilayah, P4W)
and the Center of Sectoral Project Controlling and Implementing (Pusat Pengendalian dan
Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral, P4S) and evaluate the output of each program through the
Center of Construction Quality Control (Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi, PPMK). All
the strata were designed by BRR to gain trust from both the national and the international
communities.
Beware … Be Very Aware …
One way to reduce the possibility of corruption by all BRR staff members was through
supervision. The breakthrough in supervision of rehabilitation and reconstruction of
Aceh-Nias was in its layered approach.
Trophy and award certificate from
BPK for BRR’s Financial Report in
2007, receiving an Unqualified
Opinion. Photo: BRR/Bodi CH
Figure 8.1 A Sample of BRR NAD-Nias Financial Report
BRR NAD IAS
2007 FINANCIAL REPORT
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency
(BRR) for Aceh and Nias
Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20 Banda Aceh 23247
Phone. +62-651-636666 Fax. +62-651-637777
Website: www.e-aceh-nias.org
BUDGET REALIZATION REPORT
FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006
UPIAH
146
2007
No.
2006
Description
Budget
Realization
%
Realization
A.
Revenues
A.1
Domestic Revenues
0.00
304,512,342,842.00
0.00
4,641,593,291.00
Non Tax Revenues
0.00
304,512,342,842.00
0.00
4,641,593,291.00
0.00
304,512,342,842.00
0.00
4,641,593,291.00
7,842,028,375,000.00
5,210,833,580,102.00
66.45
9,039,086,622,981.00
590,277,970,000.00
487,882,273,606.00
82.65
373,413,936,333.00
Good Expenditures
1,003,813,795,000.00
599,683,584,777.00
59.74
1,211,359,240,927.00
Capital Expenditures
3,783,956,356,000.00
2,449,730,727,379.00
64.74
4,564,330,077,049.00
Social Expenditures
2,463,980,254,000.00
1,673,536,994,340.00
67.92
2,889,983,368,672.00
129,530,620,000.00
23,164,658,050.00
17.88
0.00
213,400,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Good Expenditures
47,210,820,000.00
23,164,658,050.00
49.07
0.00
55,826,400,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Social Expenditures
26,280,000,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2,449,862,426,000.00
1,298,844,473,744.00
53.02
937,591,303,803.00
27,303,429,000.00
18,266,102,589.00
66.90
2,074,272,530.00
Good Expenditures
421,611,610,000.00
121,893,103,425.00
28.91
115,581,409,071.00
796,159,236,000.00
266,508,468,361.00
33.47
69,529,269,315.00
1,204,788,151,000.00
892,176,799,369.00
74.05
750,406,352,887.00
10,421,421,421,000.00
6,532,842,711,896.00
62.69
9,976,677,926,784.00
A.1.a
Total Revenues
B.
Expenditures
B.1
State Expenditures
B.1.1
Domestic Expenditures
Employee Expenditures
B.1.2
Loans
B.1.3
Grants
Social Expenditures
Total Expenditures
ACCOUNT
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in Treasurer’s Bank
Trust Fund’s Cash
PMU ReKOMPAK’s Cash
Medical Scholarship Committee’s Cash
Advance on Capital Expenditures
Prepaid Expenditures
Inventory
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
FIXED ASSETS
Land
Machinery and Equipment
Bulidings
Networks, Irrigations and Streets
Other Fixed Assets
Construction in Progress
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS
2007
3,584,330,754.00
0.00
59,060,265,372.00
45,266,594,517.00
1,203,629,376,124.00
4,163,320,063.00
79,057,282,798.11
1,394,761,169,628.11
661,558,584,250.00
1,267,341,040,658.40
962,184,487,864.00
1,943,615,382,745.00
17,892,662,934.00
2,592,836,178,072.00
7,445,428,336,523.40
2006
14,114,115,312.00
2,213,702,756,920.00
158,504,274,302.00
53,737,252,900.00
581,822,001,519.00
13,017,659,220.00
452,392,778,617.00
3,487,290,838,790.00
163,574,708,198.00
733,888,261,632.00
416,397,950,498.00
491,645,399,585.00
15,976,301,914.00
2,269,797,749,321.00
4,091,280,371,148.00
OTHER ASSETS
Other Assets
486,293,304,867.00
121,021,665,470.00
TOTAL OTHER ASSETS
486,293,304,867.00
121,021,665,470.00
9,326,482,811,018.51
7,699,592,875,408.00
3,584,330,754.00
105,954,502,049.00
109,538,832,803.00
109,538,832,803.00
14,114,115,312.00
2,425,944,284,122.00
2,440,058,399,434.00
2,440,058,399,434.00
1,207,792,696,187.00
79,057,282,798.11
1,286,849,978,985.11
594,839,660,739.00
452,392,778,617.00
1,047,232,439,356.00
Invested on Fixed Assets
7,443,800,694,363.40
4,091,280,371,148.00
Invested on Other Assets
TOTAL INVESTMENT EQUITIES
486,293,304,867.00
7,930,093,999,230.40
121,021,665,470.00
4,212,302,036,618.00
TOTAL EQUITIES
9,216,943,978,215.51
5,259,534,475,974.00
9,326,482,811,018.51
7,699,592,875,408.00
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES
Due to KPPN
Short-term Debts to Third Parties
TOTAL SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES
TOTAL LIABILITIES
EQUITIES
CURRENT EQUITIES
Advance/Prepaid Expenditures Reserves
Inventory Reserves
TOTAL CURRENT EQUITIES
INVESTMENT EQUITIES
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITIES
1. BRR NAD-Nias’ 2007 Financial Report received “UNQUALIFIED” opinion as stated
in the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) Report number 126/S/XVIII. BAC/08/2008
dated 11 August 2008
2. BRR NAD-Nias consists of the Advisory Board, Supervisory Board and Executing Agency
Banda Aceh, 30 August 2008
HEAD OF THE EXECUTING AGENCY
KUNTORO MANGKUSUBROTO
BALANCE SHEET
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2007 AND 2006
UPIAH
147
148
The supervision maneuver BRR adopted incorporated not only two approaches, but
began from a personal realm, through a private commitment through the Integrity Pact.
Along with that, there were also the independent, internal Anti-Corruption Unit and the
Deputy for Supervision, an internal audit unit of BRR, and the Supervisory Board, as an
separate entity under the BRR umbrella.
Background
A few weeks before the tsunami hit Aceh, the President of the Republic of Indonesia
had issued Decree No. 5/2004, stipulating that all line ministries and provincial
governments must optimally apply good governance. This was in contrast to the reality
when BRR was established by the Indonesian government in 2005. An anticorruption
organization called Transparency International (TI) had earlier released the results of its
annual surveys on corruption. Indonesia was among the lowest of 145 nations surveyed,
the country is perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world. Meanwhile, the Aceh
governor had been detained and charged with corruption.
It was not a good picture, especially when coupled with the enormous amount of
funds pledged for Aceh in the post-tsunami period, while the supervision system and
control mechanism within BRR was not yet optimal. One of the criticisms lodged by
the public was aimed at the tender procedure. Some bid winners could not implement
the programs, others were “expired”, or did not have the qualifications to undertake a
particular project. To BRR, this signified two things. First, the supervision mechanism
and internal control was very weak, and second, tenders should be carried out more
professionally.
Public pressure and control heightened after the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan
Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK) publicized the results of an audit in 2006, regarding BRR’s
operations in 2005. BPK stated that the performance of BRR Executing Agency did
not justify their remuneration. It also concluded that the BRR Executing Agency,
which functioned as the coordinator of rehabilitation and reconstruction works, had
underperformed. The audit analyzed the policy, flow of funds, organization of manpower
and weaknesses in the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. The
audit focused on a number of sectors, covering infrastructure, housing, land, education,
health, economy and business.
Under such circumstances, it was necessary to adopt a cultural, structural and institutional
approach to heighten the integrity of BRR personnel and to prevent them from corruption.
The breakthrough in BRR’s work system was not in supervision. Supervision is a standard
procedure in every organization in the world, especially in construction activities. But to
make a multilayer supervision system, like the one introduced by BRR, was unique because
it dealt with all possible means of preventing corruption, collusion and nepotism (Korupsi,
Kolusi, dan Nepotisme, KKN) as well as ensuring integration among the different layers.
The different components of supervision complemented one another and generated an
integrated system to prevent KKN from emerge in BRR.
The multilayer system to prevent corruption and other irregularities evolved and
developed during BRR’s term in Aceh-Nias. For example, the Integrity Pact comprised of
several pages and had to be signed by all BRR staff when they began their employment
contract with BRR. It was true that, conceptually, there was nothing new in the Pact, as
each point was usually stipulated in every work contract. It was the implementation and
the integration of the Pact in daily work that made it unique.
The role of the SAK was different. In any Indonesian organizations, especially
government agencies, there had never been an independent unit to monitor possible
corruption within its own work such as the SAK. Along with preventing corruption,
this independent unit within the BRR conducted monitoring to prevent KKN. SAK
had the right to investigate reports from the public about irregularities in BRR project
implementation.
In addition to the Integrity Pact and SAK, BRR also adopted another supervisory unit,
much like an inspectorate general in a ministry – the Deputy for Supervision. The deputy
was assigned to help the Head of BRR Executing Agency in undertaking functional
oversight of implementation units of the rehabilitation and reconstruction.
The aforementioned three-layer supervision was endorsed in Law No 10/2005 and
Presidential decree No. 63/2005, which stated that the three interrelated agencies were
to supervise the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of post-disaster Aceh-Nias.
The Advisory Board is tasked with providing the terms of reference and policies for the
recovery program. While the Supervisory Board, a functional instrument, was entrusted
with the authority and responsibility to ensure rehabilitation and reconstruction activities
run efficiently, effectively, and based on the real needs. The Supervisory Board is the outer
layer of the supervision strata. While it is distinct from the BRR Executing Agency and its
members consist of local figures, the Supervisory Board is a part of the BRR structure.
The Integrity Pact In line with Presidential Decree No. 8/2006 regarding the Fourth Amendment on the
Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Procurement of Goods and Government Services,
the Integrity Pact was defined as a statement signed by Contract Preparation Officer
(Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen, PPK) or officials and members of the Procurement Unit as a
solemn oath to avoid KKN when procuring goods and offering their services. As the first
supervision layer in BRR, the signing of the Integrity Pact was done by all employees of
BRR, from the Head of the Executing Agency down to the lower staff members. Such as
including those who dealt with BRR tenders.
The first group of people signed the Integrity Pact at the Aceh Governor’s Office on July
11, 2005, witnessed by provincial officials, journalists from the print and electronic media.
The event was administered by Head of BRR Executing Agency, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto,
Chief of the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komite Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana
Denouncing Corruption
149
150
Korupsi, KPK) and the Head of the Supervisory Board. The signing of the Integrity Pact
by Kuntoro was done in front of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. BRR
personnel who were employed at later dates signed the Integrity Pact at the same time as
they signed their work contracts.
The Anti-Corruption Unit (Satuan Anti-Korupsi, SAK)
The integrity commitment was bolstered by the SAK, which was established in August
2005, under the Head of BRR Executing Agency and technically supported by USAID
and UNDP. The SAK was designed to uphold the integrity of of the agency through an
autonomous internal mechanism. Based on this objective, SAK became an official part of
the Supervisory Board on June 27, 2007.
The SAK was not a law enforcement unit, an investigative agency nor and audit body.
Its approach was focused on:
• Prevention, a measure to improve procedures that could be easily violated. For
example, to prevent the possibility of corruption during the procurement of goods,
an improvement in the procurement system and process was carried out preempting
and eliminating potential misconduct. The role of the Supervisory Board in providing
recommendations to the President of Indonesia was strengthened by the SAK vis-àvis the prevention and advocacy program.
• Education, enhancing capacity on anti-corruption through targeted and general
programming via information dissemination and training to BRR staff and the
general public. A sample information packet for staff members covered the range of
elements associated with integrity, such as staff recruitment or completion of Asset
Inventory for Government Officials report (Laporan Harta kekayaan Peyelenggara
Negara, LHKPN). Meanwhile information packet for the general public and BRR
stakeholders included the campaign known as “refrain from giving gifts” to BRR
staff, contractors or NGOs. Information for local communities also covered general
information on the dangers KKN posed on their own welfare.
• The SAK along with KPK as well as the NGO Indonesian Procurement Watch carried
out educative programs and trainings to help maintain the integrity of BRR as an
organization and to respond to reports or findings of irregularities committed.
• Enforcement, ensuring administrative compliance and supporting other law
enforcement agencies. SAK did not seek cases or findings; it worked depending on
claims submitted. However, SAK did not have the authority to investigate the level
of compliance to regulations for all parties related to BRR. The basis for investigation
for SAK remained within the realm of compliance to the Integrity Pact signed and the
adherence to BRR’s code of ethics in program implementation.
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Figure 8.2 The BRR Integrity Pact
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152
The said investigation was limited to review of evidence related to the reported case.
Based on the outcome of these investigations, the SAK then submitted recommendations
to BRR senior level management including Deputy Directors heading the PIU subject to
investigation.
The findings or reports of claims could be directly handled by SAK and Supervisory
Board. Some findings could be resolved by the Supervisory Board and the Executing
Agency. Others requiring legal actions had to be handled by the KPK and the police,
depending on the complexity of the case.
The SAK also had the right to intervene in a tender, including to order partial re-tender
or complete cancellation of a tender if corruption had been indicated. It also had the right
to revoke a contract. The SAK could recommend the suspension or even the dismissal of
any employee if involved in wrongdoing.
The SAK protected the identity of the people reporting misconduct. Many who
report allegations of corruptions often feel scared have their lives threatened. To ensure
their safety, two forms separating their personal information from their reports on
irregularities. SAK also accepted anonymous reports. This was in line with SAK’s paradigm
of prioritizing on the substance of the reports, not necessarily on the information or
intention of the people reporting. In practice, the number of anonymous reports was low
and the majority of those reporting clearly provided their identity.
SAK did not refuse any reports despite its lack of relevance to the recovery efforts in
Aceh-Nias. In the event the case fall under the jurisdiction of other institutions and had
nothing to do with BRR, SAK passed the report on to the relevant agencies. This was due
to the SAK’s commitment to build communication with KPK and the Business Competition
Supervisory Commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha), the BPK, the Financial
and Development Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan,
BPKP), numerous student and organizations and NGOs, such as TI Indonesia, Indonesian
Corruption Watch (ICW) and Gerak, and even with the World Bank. The SAK maintained its
neutrality, without affiliation to any political party or prejudice.
Between 2005 and 2006 alone, there were a total of 1,030 reports on irregularities
from the public and BRR’s internal audit unit, 40 percent of which concerned tender
procedures, 16 percent program deviations, 7 percent complaints regarding bureaucratic
procedures, 9 percent about potential irregularities and 14 percent about corruption.
Deputy for Supervision
Although the Integrity Pact was signed by all staff members and SAK followed up on
reports of misconduct, BRR still considered it necessary to build an internal audit agency
that would function much as the inspectorate general in various ministries. In February
2006, the Internal Supervisory Unit (Satuan Pengawas Internal, SPI) was set up and
endorsed by Presidential Decree No. 76/2006. The Unit officially became BRR’s Deputy for
Supervision.
1. Monitoring the flow of funds for BRR rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, by
stressing transparency and accountability;
2. Maintaining professionalism and a corporate culture by reporting and providing
recommendations on internal indicators such as the efficiency, effectiveness and
compliance level on the resolutions and policies established by Head of BRR Executing
Agency;
3. Taking follow-up action on suspected corruption cases;
4. Ensuring follow-up of recommended actions are carried out on publicized findings;
5. Implementing functional monitoring based on Law No. 28/1999;
6. Maintaining the performance of the staff by referring to the Basic Guidelines
for Employees in line with Law No.43/1999, and Inspection of Management and
Accountability of State Funds (Law No.15/2004).
As one of BRR’s entities, all auditors of Deputy for Supervision had to follow the
regulations established by Head of BRR Executing Agency. While undertaking internal
monitoring, the auditors were to act professionally and abide by the regulations of the
Indonesian government and the ethical code of conduct from the Head of the Executing
Agency. After an audit, they were required to diligently, meticulously and clearly complete
Work Audit Reports (Kertas Kerja Audit, KKA). The KKA will support the called Audit Results
Report (Laporan Hasil Audit, LHA). The results of these reports are closely monitored by
the audit team along with the internal and external (BPK and BPKP) monitoring officials.
Every finding must be discussed with the party audited so as to engender common
understanding.
Auditing an ongoing project was important to quickly resolve any deviations in
programs already mapped out and to monitor early signs of irregularities. It was, in fact, a
preventive measure. However, due to the circumstances at the time, there were occasions
when projects were audited once it had been completed, or a post-audit. In this case, the
evaluation was repressive in nature.
The Deputy for Supervision audited all the programs and performance of the staff
including a comprehensive operational report, performance audit, and specific audits
with a certain objective, and reviewed all BRR’s financial reports. These audits were in line
with the Annual Work Program Monitoring (Program Kerja Pengawasan Tahunan, PKPT)
that were then distributed to Inspectors I, II and III within the Deputy for Supervision. In
the event of special cases, special auditing would be conducted or Non-PKPT Auditing.
Control and evaluation of the Deputy for Supervision performance was undertaken by
the chief officer at the Secretariat and Manager of General Administration and Monitoring.
Skills and capability of all personnel of the Deputy for Supervision were upgraded from
time to time so that they would have a similar perception while carrying out their duties.
The Deputy for Supervision was assigned not only to oversee professional ethics such
as corruption, collusion and nepotism within BRR but also to monitor the professional
conduct of BRR staff. As an internal audit body, it took on the role of:
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154
From 2006 up to December 2007, of the 187 assignments, the Deputy for Supervision
found 1,669 cases of irregularities from all units of BRR. Of these, 1,376 cases, or nearly
82.4 percent, were followed up and as a result, a total Rp 69.5 billion in state funds was
saved.
Supervisory Board
As an agency directly set up by the President, members of the Supervisory Board were
directly appointed by the President along with the Head of BRR Executing Agency and
the Advisory Board. The Supervisory Board was chaired by Professor Abdullah Ali (now
deceased) who was later replaced by Naimah Hassan. Its secretary was Professor Junaidi
Hadi Samito, and its members comprised Professor Emil Salim, Mar’ie Muhammad,
Lieutenant General TB Silalahi, Kanaka Puradirejam, Major General Djali Yusuf, and Kemal
Stamboel.
The task of the Supervisory Board was to apply a standard for transparency and a high
degree of accountability in the Aceh-Nias recovery programs. This was why members
of the Supervisory Board consisted of local figures, professionals and high-ranking
government and non-government officials. The Supervisory Board focused more on
policy and program concept, unlike the SAK and Deputy for Supervision, which controlled
the operation and implementation of programs.
When SAK became a part of the Supervisory Board, the results of monitoring were not
only recommendations in nature but also operational as the Board received reports of
possible state losses through the SAK. Prior to directly submitting recommendations to
the President, the Supervisory Board shared them with the Head of BRR Executing Agency
through consultation meetings or in writing. The Supervisory Board could independently
appoint or hire professional auditors or other technical expertise to assist its task. Working
in a conceptual domain, the Supervisory Board ensured that BRR implement programs
according to the Master Plan.
The Supervisory Board did not wait for report and relevant information from the
Executing Agency, as mentioned resources were recruited to directly conduct monitoring of
implementation. It was not rare that the Supervisory Board’s evaluations were reported by the
mass media, as one channel to inform the public that BRR’s undertaking were both transparent
and accountable. The monitoring was carried out on a macro level in terms of policies, but also
on a micro level with direct evaluation mechanism on ongoing recovery efforts.
In the context of BRR’s assets, the Supervisory Board focused its work on things that had
not been fully evaluated in previous years. Its recommendation, again, was to improve the
performance and strategic policy in management, coordination and control systems that
could benefit the general public.
BRR continued to improve its performance by conducting surveys to detect overall
implementation and application of the Integrity Pact in its operations. The result of this
internal evaluation showed that most BRR employees signed the Integrity Pact without
being fully aware of the importance of the personal control demanded by their signing.
BRR acknowledged that this was one of the weaknesses of the Integrity Pact and hence
monitoring by the SAK, Deputy for Supervision and the Supervisory Board was necessary
to complement each other.
The Deputy for Supervision created a coordination system for internal BRR and other
organizations within the BRR agency as well as internal monitoring department. The
implementation of post-audit was carried out consistently and rigidly. Prevention from
ambiguity and misinformation was carried out through daily consultation with a number
of stakeholders in BRR at the sectoral and the PIU levels. The Supervisory Board also
compiled and followed up on reports and findings originating from the locals. Through
sustainable coordination and a stratified monitoring mechanism, monitoring was can be
implemented in all layers.
An organization that deals with a large number of projects and an enormous amount
of funds involving various interest groups will require a stratified monitoring system.
Aware of this fact, BRR made the Integrity Pact, which reflected a change of paradigm
of imposing personal self-control. Although such a control covered personal matters, it
nevertheless did not compromise the trust in the professionalism and ethics of those
employed by BRR.
Such awareness needed to be supported by another layer for monitoring. The Deputy
for Supervision served as BRR’s internal audit. By integrating SAK and the Supervisory
Board, the role of recommendations and response could be executed by the Supervisory
Board simultaneously. In the case of BRR, tight monitoring was applied without limiting
the flexibility of the recovery players. While reports on findings could be submitted to the
President, there was always a mechanism to resolve the said findings. The controls were
also aimed at reducing state losses.
Quality Control of BRR Project Construction
Under BRR’s work system, quality assurance (QA) was conducted by a separate unit
called the Center of Construction Quality Control (Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi,
PPMK). The unit was assigned to evaluate every project financed by APBN that had been
completed by contractors or consultants following quality control (QC).
Lessons Learned
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The QA system itself was not popular among government agencies as it was applied
only by private companies. Government projects only dealt with QC by the consultants
without rechecking the results of such control. To BRR, QA was needed to ensure that the
work of the PIU and PPK were supervised by consultants and progressed smoothly.
Background
The plan to assure quality began at the establishment of BRR, because rehabilitation
and reconstruction work will be entrusted to the Provincial Government.
At that time, there was a question as to what control system BRR would use in
implementing its programs. The answer was the No Objection Letter (NOL) for results
of procurement, payment as well as handover. As such, there would be an overflow of
administrative tasks. Aside from that, would BRR be able to issue NOLs according to the
prevailing procedures? The answer was that BRR would hamper or become a bottleneck
to the reconstruction process.
Based on that consideration, BRR eventually relinquish the verification task to the ahead
of PIU and PPK without the NOL mechanism. BRR adopted only the QA system, namely
rechecking reports on the quality of projects made by supervising consultants. The
rechecking process was carried out randomly from time to time.
Quality Assurance Implementation in BRR
The first QA team comprised consultants from Cardino-Acil for Technical Assistance for
Procurement and Quality Assurance Management (TA for PQAM) overseen by the Deputy
for Planning and Programming. Payment for the consultants came from the Technical
Assistance to BRR project funded by the MDF and managed by UNDP. Unfortunately, the
quick phase of construction was not met by the speed of work of PQAM consultants so
that BRR did not always obtain the latest report on the progress of projects. Besides not
making very clear-cut reports, the consultants also gave weak recommendations.
When the QA task was taken over by BRR’s Deputy for Infrastructure, the system for
quality management was studied and improved by experts from the Indonesian Research
Affiliation Institute at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Lembaga Afiliasi Penelitian
Indonesia-Institut Teknologi Bandung, LAPI-ITB) and the Syiah Kuala University, Aceh. The
study showed that the new system was superior to the one applied by PQAM consultants
and so the contract with PQAM was terminated while the funds already allocated for
it was channeled to cover other technical assistance costs. The flow of information on
projects swiftly reached BRR. The findings of the QA team became the new reference for
technical actions toward PIUs and PPKs.
The new mechanism proved to be very helpful. Hence the QA Team was further
strengthened and provided with transportation and laboratory equipment. It was also an
advantage for BRR because the findings from the project sites were varied, such as quality
justifications, insufficient thickness, volume shortage, and technical and administrative
Lesson Learned
The PPMK’s main activities were to present and report its findings, to be followed up
by sectoral deputies or heads of representative offices. This method proved to be more
effective than onsite inspections by other BRR officials. Onsite inspections by the Head of
BRR Executing Agency or the head of local administration agencies could never obtain
such detailed findings.
This was the reason strengthening the QA units in the respective government agencies
became very important in helping government management. Government agencies
that had their own laboratories could implement the QA program periodically by
strengthening their employees and covering field inspection costs. Creating such a unit
outside the government technical office could help the government improve its capability
in quality management and even become a “sparring partner” for government technical
office in heightening the overall accountability and integrity of the team as a whole.
Based on reports from PPMK, the Deputy for Operations along with other BBR officials
made a list contractors, consultants and even suppliers that underperformed. If they were
previous warnings given to them went unheeded, sanctions would be imposed and they
would not be allowed to participate in BRR tenders in the following year.
Government agencies were not used to imposing such sanctions. To BRR, however,
evaluating the performance of those involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction
work was part of enhancing the QA system. BRR had thrice publicized the names of blacklisted companies. The first time listed 58 companies, the second time 105 companies,
and the last time 129 companies. Although the sanctions were imposed only by BRR, the
Aceh Provincial Government later used the list and adopted the system as a guideline for
regional development.
Given the benefit of its formation in BRR, similar QA units would be advantageous for
in other government PIUs. The QA unit could be a tool for control and give early warnings
on the quality of construction. It could also be useful as a sub-team of an internal
control along with SAK (that normally focused only on accounting matters and financial
management). A QA team is highly expected to provide recommendations or resolutions
for construction works, or to reduce the scope of work as necessary. Further, the QA team
could put forward objective opinions in the event of disputes between consultants or
contractors and PIUs or PPKs regarding the quality of a construction.
errors. These findings enabled BRR to provide an objective opinion. To give the QA Team
greater independence to work beyond infrastructure issues, it was moved and included in
Deputy for Operations so that QA could be applied in all sectors of BRR, otherwise known
as PPMK.
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Monitoring and Evaluating Project
Implementation
The Center of Regional Program and Project Controlling (Pusat Pengendalian
Program dan Proyek Wilayah, P4W) and the Center of Sectoral Project Controlling and
Implementing (Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan Proyek Sektoral, P4S), present
the progress of all BRR activities in every sector, from the progress of each packet,
consolidation of sector and regional progress in an array of perspective. Information on
overall achievement was consolidated into one S-Curve and presented to the Agency’s
management board. The report was updated almost every minute during a span of 24
hours. This was a breakthrough in monitoring government activities.
Background
In general, BBR projects were comprised of sector projects managed by Deputy heads
and by regional projects lead by Head of representative offices at the regional or district
level. Responsibility for project implementation were therefore divided into two as well
with the P4W and P4S.
Onsite monitoring was intensively carried out by involving various parties, such
as representatives of the P4W and P4S, the SAK, the Agency’s Secretary, Head of
Representative offices and Sector Deputies. To accelerate the attainment of goals in
rehabilitation and reconstruction work, the Deputy for Operations focused the work of the
P4W on project implementation management. Reports of the monitoring were presented
and jointly analyzed. For this reason, problems can be mapped out and presented at the
bi-weekly meetings of the BRR management board.
From Monitoring and Evaluating Team to Problem Solving
Initially, both the P4W and P4S. teams focused only on monitoring project
implementation by making onsite visits. But as time went by, the teams were often asked
to solve practical problems on the field. Their valuable field experience had enabled the
teams to quickly detect and be responsive to the probably of success of a project.
During a Board meeting in Banda Aceh, the teams presented their reports by using
various media that directly illustrated their findings in monitoring, such photographs
and video recordings, serving as solid evidence of the progress. Parties responsible for
providing an explanation and argumentation on the cause of delay and the appropriate
next steps were discussed openly.
To accelerate the coordinated action plan process, the units were then given greater
responsibilities. They also handled the approval of projects, DIPA, and construction
implementation. A number of projects previously overseen by the Deputy for Finance and
Planning and the relevant sector Deputies were transferred to P4W and P4S.
Broadly speaking, P4W and P4S compiled their data by using a system much like that
used by other government agencies, namely by consolidating and analyzing basic data.
In short, they simplified dozens of data sheets into a single sheet and even into a single
figure. This process was supported and assisted by all deputies and representative offices.
Lessons Learned
To BRR, monitoring through real-time updates was very useful because it enabled the
agency to instantly assess progress and make quick decisions. At its onset, consolidating
all information into one format agreed upon by all parties was not easy. Apart from that,
the management board meetings fostered an open leadership, decision-making, and
discussion style. If this model was used by other ministries/government agencies, it could
speed up slow bureaucratic procedures. BRR’s monitoring system could be taken as an
example by provincial governments and other development projects.
Through various processes, the monitoring format used by BRR was well tested and
improved upon. Besides being effective in solving problems in the field, the system is easy
to apply, in just one or two days. The reliability of the system applied in P4W and P4S is
in the discipline of the team to jointly use the agreed upon format and their diligence in
updating information.
In the case of BRR, some 30 professionals were involved in collecting data from the field
to prepare reports and make action plans for each unit before presenting the reports as a
dashboard of progress to the management board. Similar mechanism can be adopted by
central and provincial governments.
Eventually, a leader and leadership pattern of an organization becomes a key factor in
determining the success of a massive project. Success can be easily achieved when the
leader demonstrates political will and consistently turns his ideas into reality, maintaining
it as a valuable “best practice”.
Fund usage was monitored through SPM at the KPPN-K13 , while physical progress from
the P4W and P4S team monitoring were integrated with the financial disbursements. The
information then appeared in real-time on TVs placed at strategic locations and at the
office of the Head of BRR Executing Agency as dashboard to keep everyone up-to-date on
a project’s progress at any given time.
159
Figure 8.3 BRR Performance Dashboard
160
161
Conclusion
163
THE
breakthroughs described in the previous chapters were completed with the
group of innovative steps in monitoring and evaluation phase. This was not without
purpose. In implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, BRR ensured
that every stage of project development was keenly monitored and regulated. Results
of evaluations were used as lessons to be learned, that feed back into the cycle as it
continues to turn. First came planning, followed by updated data, project identification,
review of funding resources, preparation, management, project implementation,
evaluation and so forth. A cyclic process of a government agency’s undertakings takes
one fiscal year.
Entrusted with a four-year mandate, BRR underwent four cyclic processes, namely the
fiscal years of 2005 to 2008. In the 2009 fiscal year, BRR received no further special funds
from the government as its term ended on April 16, 2009.
No matter how unique BRR was compared to other government agencies, it
nevertheless was a government body that operated under the state budget scheme. At
times, the Agency had to undergo several processes before it could make a breakthrough,
after careful planning and improving its performance.
A playground at the drifted
PLTD (Diesel Powered Plant
Center) a notable tsunami site,
Banda Aceh, February 19, 2009.
164
The BRR flag is lowered for the last
time in a ceremony marking the end
of four years of hard work toward the
recovery of Aceh and Nias after the
tsunami. Banda Aceh, April 15, 2009.
Photo: Ricky Sugiarto
The international commitment to help the recovery process after the greatest natural
disaster of the early 21st century could be said to be extraordinarily unusual. This was
due to the innovative measure taken by the Indonesian government to set up BRR. The
breakthroughs described in this book were possible because they were supported by
strong pillars, namely accountable program management and the transparent flow of
funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction work. Transparency boosted the trust of a
number of countries as well as national and international donor organizations in the
recovery work.
To maintain international trust and commitment, BRR designed a work system that
reduced complicated bureaucratic procedures. The Agency tried to create a user-friendly
work system as well as friendly atmosphere for all parties involved in rehabilitation
and reconstruction activities. Not only was the system applicable, it also reduced the
risk of deviations and irregularities. In line with the growing trust of the international
community, aid commitments to Aceh and Nias also increased.
International support grew as the various innovative measures taken and
breakthroughs made by BRR proved to be efficient and effective in rebuilding the disaster
The breakthroughs, either conceptual or procedural, were like a refreshing breeze
sweeping BRR along to perform better. Better here meant working faster while
maintaining the targeted quality of rehabilitation and reconstruction. A better work
system obviously facilitated both the government and donor organizations to undertake
development projects in disaster-hit areas in Aceh and Nias.
In fact breakthroughs are needed not only to achieve a better quality of development
but also to simplify bureaucratic procedures so that the government can offer quick
services to the public and improve their welfare. Obviously certain conditions need to be
taken into consideration to make breakthroughs in particular sectors.
Evidence of the breakthroughs could be seen in the fact that 93 percent of the
pledged international aid was disbursed. This illustrates that breakthroughs made by any
government agency can boost an agency’s performance no matter where it operates.
An organization with a flexible work system is very useful for disaster-prone regions.
Likewise, an ad hoc organization can be more functional operating in areas with damaged
infrastructure and facilities. BRR is a good example of such a combination.
BRR made various breakthroughs in Aceh and Nias – regions that are prone to natural
disasters and armed conflict. Similar measures could be applied in other remote areas, not
only in Indonesia but also elsewhere in the world.
areas. This prompted international parties to give various grants that had never been
extended to Indonesia before. More than that, BRR also lobbied and cooperated with a
number of countries, some of which even participated in reconstruction projects. All of
BBR’s efforts were like building a stairway to gain greater international trust.
165
166
Notes
1 Presidential Decree No. 30 Year 2005 on Master Plan revised through
Presidential Regulation No. 47 Year 2008 on Master Plan Revision.
2 Clustering of several projects in one environmental report, such as DPPL and
Amdal. This was based on the consideration that the impacts of facilities and
infrastructure constructed in adjacent locations could share similarities.
3 CFAN was held four times during BRR’s mandate. CFAN 1 in 2005 was was
held in Jakarta.
4 Literally meaning house owners; figuratively meaning local people
5 Literally meaning neighbors; figuratively meaning outsiders providing
assistance
6 Considering point c: “that rehabilitation and reconstruction … should be
conducted in a special, systematic and wholly integrated manner through
participation, and by respecting the community’s aspirations and needs …”
7 A group supported by the Urban Poor Consortium, Jakarta.
8 Through collaboration of NGOs and several international institutions such
as AIPRD Logica (Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and
Development Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh),
Mercy Corps, UN-Habitat, and during the process of formation supported by
US-AID (United States Agency for International Development).
9 The number of villages that were monitored and evaluated: Banda Aceh 35,
Aceh Besar 35, Aceh Jaya 72, West Aceh 43, Aceh Singkil 12, Simeulue 10,
Pidie 34, Bireuen 38, North Aceh 10, East Aceh 6. In total: 346 villages.
10 Deviations in the implementation of village planning programs were
calculated by adding (a) programs that had not yet been implemented to
(b) implementations that were not conducted according to the respective
detailed programs. Deviations of implementation were classified similarly as
deviations of village planning documents.
11 As described below, KSF did not directly cover the whole sub-district as it
did in 2008 and 2009. Previously it only covered 19 sub-districts due to the
limited available time and the focus was on areas that were destroyed by the
disaster, which meant, mostly to coastal areas.
12 WIMAX is Broadband Wireless Access technology with high-speed
accessibility with a wide coverage. WiMAX is an evolution from the previous
BWA technology, with more attractive features. (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/
WiMAX)
13 The Special Office for State Services and Treasury set up to pay the
expenses of reconstruction work in Aceh and Nias.
167
Glossary of Abbreviations
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
ADB
Bank Pembangunan Asia
Asian Development Bank
AGDC
Pusat Data Geospasial Aceh
Aceh Geospatial Data Center
Amdal
Analisis Mengenai Dampak
Lingkungan
Analysis Concerning Environmental
Impact
AMT
Tim Pengelola Hubungan Mitra Kerja
Account Management Team
ANTF
Dana Perwalian Aceh Nias; Cikal bakal Aceh Nias Trust Fund; Later becomes
Dana Perwalian Pemulihan Aceh Nias Recovery Aceh‑Nias Trust Fund
(RANTF)
(RANTF)
APBD
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja
Daerah
Provincial Annual Budget
APBN
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja
Negara
Government of Indonesia’s National
Annual Budget
ASEAN
Perhimpunan Negara‑Negara Asia
Tenggara
Association of South East Asia
Nations
ASMT
Tim Keamanan Wilayah (unit
keamanan Perserikatan
Bangsa‑Bangsa)
Area Security Management Team
Bakosurtanal
Badan Koordinasi Survei dan
Pemetaan Nasional
Indonesia’s National Coordinating
Agency for Survey and Mapping
Bapel
Badan Pelaksana
Executing Agency
Bappeda
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Daerah
Regional Development Planning
Agency
Bappenas
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional
National Development Planning
Agency
BPK
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan
Supreme Audit Agency
BPN
Badan Pertanahan Nasional
National Land Agency
BPPN
Badan Penyehatan Perbankan
Nasional
Indonesian Bank Reconstruction
Agency
BPS
Badan Pusat Statistik
Statistic Center Agency
BRA
Badan Reintegrasi‑Damai Aceh
Aceh Peace‑Reintegration Agency
BRR
Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi
Wilayah dan Kehidupan Masyarakat
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
dan Kepulauan Nias Provinsi
Sumatera Utara
Agency for the Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of the Regions
and Community of Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam and the Nias Island of the
Province of North Sumatera
168
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
CDP
Program Pengembangan Komunitas
Community Development Program
CFAN
Forum Koordinasi untuk Aceh dan
Nias
Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias
CRS
Pelayanan Tanggap‑darurat Katolik
Catholic Relief Services
DAD
Pangkalan Data Dukungan
Pembangunan
Development Assistance Database
DLA
Asesmen Kerusakan dan Kerugian
Damage and Loss Assessment
DED
Desain Enjinering Detail
Detail Engineering Design
DIPA
Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran
Issuance of Spending Authority
DPPL
Dokumen Pengelolaan dan
Pemantauan Lingkungan
Environment Management and
Monitoring Document
DPR
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
House of Representative
DPRA
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh
Aceh’s Regional House of
Representative
DPRD
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
Regional House of Representative
DPRK
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Kabupaten/Kota
District’s House of Representative
DRR
Pengurangan Risiko Bencana
Disaster Risk Reduction
EIA
Asesmen Dampak Lingkungan
Environmental Impact Assesment
e‑proc
Pengadaan barang/jasa secara
elektronik
E‑Procurement
EWS
Sistem Peringatan Dini
Early Warning System
FM
Manajemen Keuangan
Financial Management
FPK
Forum Pemulihan Kabupaten/Kota
Kabupaten/ Kota Recovery Forum
GAM
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Free Aceh Movement
GFP
Pihak yang diandalkan untuk
penyebaran dan penerapan informasi
isu gender
Gender Focal Point
GIS
Sistem Informasi Geospasial
Geospatial Information System
GoI
Pemerintah Republik Indonesia
Government of Indonesia
GPS
Sistem navigasi satelit
Global Positioning System
GTZ
Gesselschaft for Technische
Zusammenarbeit (Kerja Sama Teknis
Indonesia-Jerman)
Gesselschaft for Technische
Zusammenarbeit (German Technical
Cooperation)
HMKU
Hubungan Mitra Kerja Utama
Key Account Relations
HSU
Harga Satuan Umum
Standard Unit Price
IAP
Investasi dan Akses Pasar
Market investment and access
169
170
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
IASC
Dewan Koordinasi antar Donor di
Aceh Nias
Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICT
Teknologi Informasi dan Komunikasi
Information and Communication
Technology
ICW
Pemantau Korupsi Indonesia
Indonesia Corruption Watch
IFRC
Federasi Palang Merah Internasional
dan Komunitas Bulan Sabit Merah
International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies
Inpres
Instruksi Presiden
Presidential Instruction
Intosai
Organisasi Internasional Badan
Pemeriksa Keuangan se‑Dunia
International Organisation of Supreme
Audit Institutions
IOM
Organisasi Internasional untuk
Migrasi Penduduk
Internal Organization for Migration
IPM
Indeks Pembangunan Manusia
Human Development Index
IREP
Program Pemampuan Rekonstruksi
Prasarana
Infrastructure Reconstruction
Enabling Program
IRFF
Sarana Pendanaan Rekonstruksi
Prasarana
Infrastructure Reconstruction
Financing Facilitiy
JICA
Badan Kerja Sama Internasional
Jepang
Japan International Cooperation
Agency
JICS
Badan Jepang mengenai Sistem Kerja Japan International Cooperation
Sama Internasional
System
JLT
Sertifikat Kepemilikan Bersama atas
Tanah
Joint Land Titling
K/L
Kementerian Negara/Lembaga
Ministry/Institution
Kabapel
Kepala Badan Pelaksana
Head of Executing Agency
KAP
Kecamatan Action Plan
Rencana Aksi Kecamatan
Kasatker
Kepala Satker
Head of Project Implementing Unit
Keppres
Keputusan Presiden
Presidential Decree
KKA
Kertas Kerja Audit
Audit Worksheet
KKN
Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme
Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism
KP4D
Komite Percepatan Pembangunan
Perumahan dan Permukiman Desa
The Village Committee for Housing
and Settlement Development
Acceleration
KPPN
Kantor Pelayanan dan
Perbendaharaan Negara
Office for State Services and Treasury
KPPN‑K
Kantor Pelayanan dan
Perbendaharaan Negara‑Khusus
Special Office for State Services and
Treasury
KSF‑AP
Kerangka‑kerja Tata Ruang dan
Rencana Aksi Kecamatan
Kecamatan Spatial Framework and
Action Plan
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
LAPI‑ITB
Lembaga Afiliasi Penelitian
Indonesia‑Institut Teknologi Bandung
Indonesian Research Afiliation
Institute‑ Bandung Institute of
Technology
LARAP
Rencana Aksi Akuisisi Lahan dan
Pemukiman‑kembali
Land Acquisition and Resettlement
Action Plan
LHA
Laporan Hasil Audit
Audit Report
LHKPN
Laporan Harta Kekayaan
Penyelenggara Negara
Asset Inventory of Government
Officials
LSM
Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
Non‑Governmental Organization
(NGO)
MDF
Dana Multi‑Donor
Multi‑Donor Fund
MDTF
Dana Perwalian Multi‑Donor; Cikal
bakal Dana Multi‑Donor
Multi‑Donor Trust Fund; Later
becomes Multi‑Donor Fund
monev
Pemantauan dan evaluasi
Monitoring and evaluation
MoU
Nota Kesepahaman
Memorandum of Understanding
MPR
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
People’s Consultative Assembly
MTR
Evaluasi Paruh Waktu
Mid‑Term Review
NAD
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province
NASA
Badan Antariksa Nasional Amerika
Serikat
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
NGO
Organisasi nonpemerintah/ Lembaga
Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM)
Non‑Governmental Organization
NIRAM
Pemetaan aset Pemulihan di
Kepulauan Nias
Nias Islands Recovery Asset Mapping
Nisel
Kabupaten Nias Selatan
District of South Nias
NISM
Pertemuan pemangku kepentingan
Kepulauan Nias
Nias Islands Stakeholder Meeting
NOL
Surat Pernyataan Tidak Berkeberatan
No Objection Letter
OC
Sebuah unit di bawah Deputi
Operasi yang kemudian dipecah
menjadi Pusat Pengendalian dan
Pelaksanaan Proyek Wilayah (P4W),
Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan
Proyek Sektoral (P4S) dan Pusat Data
dan Informasi (Pusdatin)
Operation Centre (a unit under BRR’s
Deputy of Operation)
off‑budget
Anggaran non‑Pemerintah Indonesia
(non‑APBN)
Non‑Indonesian state budget
on‑budget
Anggaran Pemerintah Indonesia
(APBN)
Indonesian state budget
171
172
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
P2TP2A
Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu untuk
Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak
Integrated Service Centre for Women
and Children
P4S
Pusat Pengendalian dan Pelaksanaan
Proyek Sektoral
Center of Sectoral Project Controlling
and Implementing
P4W
Pusat Pengendalian Program dan
Proyek Wilayah
Center of Regional Program and
Project Controlling
PBB
Perserikatan Bangsa‑Bangsa
United Nations (UN)
PCN
Nota‑Konsep Proyek
Project Concept‑Note
PDAM
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum
Regional Potable Water Company
Pemda
Pemda
Regional Government
Pemkab
Pemerintah Kabupaten
District Government
Pemprov
Pemerintah Provinsi
Province Government
Perpres
Peraturan Presiden
Presidential Regulation
Perppu
Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti
Undang‑Undang
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
PHLN
Pinjaman/Hibah Luar Negeri
Foreign Soft Loans/Grant
PIWG
Kelompok Kerja Informasi Publik
Public Information Working Group
PLTMH
Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Mikro
Hidro
Micro Hydro‑powered Electrical
Generator
PLTS
Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Surya
Solar‑powered Electrical Generator
PMI
Palang Merah Indonesia
Indonesian Red Cross
PMT
Pengakhiran Masa Tugas
Exit Strategy
PNS
Pegawai Negeri Sipil
Civil Servant
PP
Peraturan Pemerintah
Government Regulation
PPK
Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen
Contract Preparation Officer
PPMK
Pusat Pengendalian Mutu Konstruksi
(dalam BRR)
Center of Construction Quality Control
(within BRR)
PQAM
Nama konsultan di bidang
Pengelolaan Pengadaan Jasa dan
Penjaminan Mutu
Procurement and Quality Assurance
Management
PRB
Pengurangan Risiko Bencana
Disaster Risk Reduction
Pusdatin
Pusat Data dan Informasi
Center for Data and Information
QA
Penjaminan Mutu
Quality Assurance
QC
Pengendalian Mutu
Quality Control
RANdatabase
Basis‑data Pemulihan Aceh‑Nias
Recovery Aceh‑Nias Database
RANTF
Dana Perwalian Pemulihan Aceh‑Nias
Recovery Aceh‑Nias Trust Fund
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
RDTRK
Rencana Detail Tata Ruang Kota
A standard nomenclature of
Indonesian (Partial/ Subdivisions of)
City Plan
Renaksi
Rencana Aksi
Action Plan
Renstra
Rencana Strategis
Strategic Plan
RI
Republik Indonesia
Republic of Indonesia
RKL
Rencana Pengelolaan Lingkungan
Environment Management Plan
Rp
Rupiah
Rupiah (Indonesian currency)
RPL
Rencana Pemantauan Lingkungan
Environmental Monitoring Plan
RTRWK
Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kota
A standard nomenclature of
Indonesian City Plan
SAK
Satuan Antikorupsi
Anti‑corruption Unit
Satker
Satuan Kerja
Project Implementing Unit
SBY
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (presiden
keenam RI)
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (the 6th
president of Indonesia)
SDI
Data Informasi Tata Ruang/ Spasial
Spatial Data Infrastructure
SDM
Sumber Daya Manusia
Human Resources
Sekjen
Sekretaris Jendreal
Secretary General
Simas
Sistem Informasi Manajemen Aset
Asset Management Information
System
SIM‑C
Pusat Informasi Spasial dan
Pemetaan
Spatial Information and
Mapping‑Centre
SK
Surat Keputusan
Decree
SMS
Layanan pesan singkat
Short Message Service
SNI
Standar Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian National Standards
(published by the Department of
Public Works)
SOP
Prosedur Operasi Standar
Standard Operating Procedure
SP2D
Surat Perintah Pencairan Dana
Fund Disbursement Order Letter
SPI
Satuan Pengawas Internal
Internal Supervisory Unit
SPM
Sistem Pengendalian Manajemen
Management Control System
Sumut
Sumatera Utara
North Sumatera
TA
Tahun Anggaran
Fiscal Year
TDMRC
Pusat Riset Tsunami dan Mitigasi
Bencana
Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation
Research Center
TGLL
Hikmah Ajar Global Tsunami
Tsunami Global Lessons Learned
TII
Organisasi nonpemerintah (LSM) yang Transparency International Indonesia
berfokus melawan korupsi
173
174
Abbreviations
Indonesian
English
TPA
Tempat Pembuangan Akhir
Final Disposal Area
TPI
Tempat Pelelangan Ikan
Fish Auction Market
TPS
Tempat Pembuangan Sementara
Temporary Disposal Area
TRIP
Daftar Indikator Pemulihan Tsunami
(Berupa Buku Laporan per tahun)
Tsunami Recovery Indicators Package
UKL
Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan
Environmental Management Effort
UN
Perserikatan Bangsa‑Bangsa (PBB)
United Nations
UNDP
Program Pembangunan Perserikatan
Bangsa‑Bangsa
United Nations Development
Programme
UNECLAC
Komisi Ekonomi Perserikatan
Bangsa‑Bangsa untuk Amerika Latin
dan Karibia
United Nations‑ Economic
Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean
UNHIC
Pusat Informasi Kemanusiaan
United Nations Humanitarian
Information Centre
UNICEF
Dana Perserikatan Bangsa‑Bangsa
untuk urusan Anak‑anak
United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIMS
Sistem Manajemen Informasi
United Nations Information
Management Systems
UNJLS
Pusat Gabungan Logistik Perserikatan United Nations Joint Logistic Centre
Bangsa‑Bangsa
UNOCHA
Badan Perserikatan Bangsa‑Bangsa
mengenai Koordinasi Urusan
Kemanusiaan
United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNORC
Badan Perserikatan Bangsa‑Bangsa
Koordinator Pemulihan khusus untuk
Aceh dan Nias
United Nations Office of the Recovery
Coordinator for Aceh and Nias
UPL
Upaya Pemantauan Lingkungan
Environmental Monitoring Effort
US$
Dollar Amerika Serikat
American Dollars
USAID
Badan Amerika Serikat untuk
Pembangunan Internasional
United States Agency for International
Development
UU
Undang‑Undang
Law
UUPA
Undang‑Undang Pemerintahan Aceh
Law on Governing of Aceh
VM
Pemetaan Desa
Village Mapping
VP
Perencanaan Desa
Village Planning
Wanrah
Dewan Pengarah
Advisory Board
Wanwas
Dewan Pengawas
Supervisory Board
Wapres
Wakil Presiden
Vice President
WFP
Badan Pangan Dunia
World Food Programme

Open File - International Recovery Platform

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