The Politics of Merdeka - Some Aspects of Communialism in Pre

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Hak Cipta Terpelihara © 1977 – Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia
THE POLITICS OF MERDEKA
- Sume AspeeLS of Communalism in
pre-independence Malayan Poli tics
by
Kamarudin JaHar
j&baan Saini Polilik
Univenili Keb:tIliI.l,.. n "'hllYlia
Toward the middle of 1953 the
Deputy High Commissioner for the
Federation of Malaya, Sir Donald
MacGillinay, announced that the
Covernment, with the concurrence
of The ir High nesses the Malay
Rulers, was going to appoint a
Committee "to exam ine the
question of elections to the Federal
Legislative Council and future
constitutional changes arising from
there; and to make recommen·
dations".( I ) This announcement
led to a \'ery inten sive political
de\'elopment in Malaya and
culminated in the Federal dections
o f 1955 from which the Alliance
Party emerged as Ihe undisputed
leader on the Malayan political
scenc, This study will attempt to
analy~ the events during the first
haH of the 1950s and explain the
success of the Alliance Pany in the
1955 election in Ihe light of the
analysis,
The brief J apanese occupat ion
( 1942-45) during the 2nd World
War and the subsequent return of
the British both contributcd to
further worsening th" ddicatc
politi cal situation in Malaya which
'\faS caused by its multiracial popu·
lation.(2) The J apancsc did not
cncourage harmony between the
races du rin g their occupat ion of
M:llaya; in fact their polic)' cou ld
be said to be clearly that of
favouring the Malays at the expense
of the other races, The British
post,war proposal in 1946 for a
"Malayan Union" wh ich, interalia,
would abolish the sovereignty of
the Malay Rulers and bestow
Malayan citiz.ens hip on the
immigrant non-Mala)'s relativel),
easily, resulted in a sun den upsurge
of Mala)' nationalism, More im,
portant still, as a reaction to these
proposals, which were abandoned
as a result, the t>.falays formed an
organisation to light for their rights
and this organisation was named
ID1I\'O - The United ~'f ala)'s'
National Organiz.ation,
Oato Onn bin Jaafar, the Pre·
sident of UMNO,' led the party to
achieve its goals successfully - the
most notable of which was the
(t)
~"~In~ Council Debllu 61h and 71h
May 1953, Frd.. of Maia ya, 285-286
quotrd in G,P, Mum.,/tfIlUryJianPolitiLl,
London, 1970, lima)' b( nOlCd thai Ih(
nlHing Frderal l....t'1J..lative Council,
formed b)' Ih( Fedrralion of Mlbya
Alu......,nl of 1948. CQn';n(d of Iwenl)"
lix Ilrililh Offici..ai.a and fifty ' Unofficiall'
appoim(d by Ihe lI~h Commiuion(, 10
aprrl(nl "UioUI communilic, and
(conornicinlCre'Ii,
(2)
.'(d.. of Mlb YI t 9S7 Oruu.1 Rrporl shows
Ihal OUI of the total population of
6,278,763 Ih( Mala)', eonnitulrd juu
under 50"'; Chil'leK, 37"'; tndianl 12"
Ind 'Olhen' O,~
12
T"".II" A bd,,{ Rahm"" Pl.,.,,, A I-H.i" UI"
tUcriof1.lcllmp,,1,rL
fin"""" lPn:clt d"n""" 111, 19j5,menU
13
creation of the Federation o f
Malaya. in place of Malayan Union,
in 1948 - until he resigned five
years later in August 1951. His
resignation came about aJter his
failure to ge t the party to change its
co nstitutio n in o rder to allow its
membership to be o pen to the non·
Malays. In September 1951 he
formed the non·commun al Inde·
pendence of Malaya Party (IMP)
which believed that "uni ty through
communal co·operation was the
o nly road to independence for
Mal aya".(!) However, this new
party failed to attrac t tither the
Malays or the non·Malays. Siman·
djuntak attributed this failure to
"Dato Onn's leadership and to the
du al allegiance of ot he r le aders in
the party" .(4) To the majority of
the Malays Dato Onn was still
th o ught of as the UMNO leader
whi le the more sophi stica ted
Malay s and non-~talays were
suspicious of Govemment backing
since Dato Onn was then the
'Member' (i.e. Minister) for Home
Affairs. On the dual allegiance of
the o ther leaders, the best example
was probably that of Tan Cheng
Lock, the President of Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA), who,
in this speech as the chairman of
the inaugural meeting of IMP, made
" an earneS! personal appeal"(5) to
MCA members to "§i\.e their full
and active support't( ) to the new
party while, at the same time urging
them to main tain the part y's (i.e.
MCA) existence and its semi·
po litical character. However, the
strenght and popUlarity of Da to
Onn and IMP vis·a·vis UMl\'O and
o ther po liti cal parties had yet to be
tested.
The opportunity ,\'as prm<ided
by the Kuala Lumpur municipal
ele ctions in February 1952. Despite
its poor general response, Kuala
Lumpur still offered IMP an ideal
electorate to caIT)' the elec tions
through. Being the capital of
Malaya, victory in the Kua.la
Lumpur elections was vital ro r the
future of the competing political
parties. For the IMP, Kuala Lumpur
o ffert=d them a distinct advantage
ove r the o ther parties because "tht=
Malays, the Chil1t=se and the Indians
had es tablished good rdations, and
the people or the city were general.
ly conceded to be more liberal in
their communal attitudes than
those in most other areas of
Malaya".( 7) Another advantage was
Ihat IMP was launched in K.L and
many of its strongest supporters
we re the governme nt se rvants
attached to the Federal rlepart·
menu. With the other parties being
regarded as cons id erably weaker,
,;ctory for the L\1P set= med assured
sin ce as early as five weeks before
the electio ns. (8)
Howe\'er, on J anuary 8, 1952,
the Selangor branches of UMNO
and MCA made a most unexpected
joint declaration that the two
pa.rties would can fest the K.L
elections together in a common
fro nt. Simandjuntak reft=rred to lhe
" 1:1It=nt hos tility" bt=twecn the local
branches of UMNO and MCA on
(')
B.
Simandjunta.t.. M..,.,<171
194H;J.
66.
"'cdcrJism
our, Kuab Lumpur, 1969,
p-
('1 llotd..p.61.
('I 11otd..p.66.
(61 Ibid..
(11 Mn ru,op.cit.. p. 1".
(')
Ibid.
14
the one side and the local branch of
IMP on the other as the cause for
this move.(S) A better explaination
for the UMNO·MCA alliance, how.
ever. was the common fear of an
i?"tP victory. To UMNO, an IMP
victory would imply a proportional
reduction in its strength and the
acceptance of Data Onn as the
to.blay political leader. The MCA,
on the other hand, were beginning
to suspect that Dato Onn's proposal
for extending citizenship to the
non-Malays might be a Malay·based
one, that is his tendency to define a
'Malayan' by refere~ce to the
Malays.(IO) Afterall in late 1951
Dato Onn made a bitter attack on
the Chinese by describing them as
"a community which desires to
control the destiny of this country
on the ground of its economic and
financial innuences".{J I)
Another reason that made this
UMNO·MCA alliance possible was
the existence of a personality clash.
It has been suggested that Col. H.S.
Lee. the MCA Sclangor President,
did not sec eye to eye with Data
Onn. On the contrary, the forrnl'r
was on friendly terms with Ule
UMNO Kuala Lumpur President,
Yahya.(12)
In contrast to L1o,1P's non·
communal stand. the ad hoc
Alliance still retained the communa! appeals of the two constituent parties. The communal
strategy of the Alliance was dearly
shov.TI in that the MCA candidates
contested in constituencies where
the Chinese were in majority while
the UMNO candidates contested
the predominantly .1o.blay constituencies.
The outcome of the elections
was a resounding victory for the
Alliance inter·communal experi·
ment, for they won nine or the
twelve scats contested. The two
seats which were won by IMP were
actually MIC (The Malayan Indian
Congress) candidates contesting on
IMP tickets while the twelfth seat
went to an Independent, a Sinhalesc, who contested in a strong
lndian ward.(U)
These elections results were to
playa very decisive role in shaping
the pattern of Malayan politics and
political parties during the sub·
sequent years. To the Alliance their
victor" was a clear signal of the
utility of the strategy and therefore
led them to put a permanent seal
on their partnership. As will be seen
later, the area of compromise
expanded from allocation of scats
based on communal factors to
allocation of scats based on intercommunal factors, a change which
was very fundamental to the estab·
lished aims of cach constituent
party_
To Dato Onn his defeat to the
communal strategy of the Alliance
was a severe blow to his noncommunal ambitions. A direct
reaction to this was a reappraisal of
his non-communal policies and, as
will be observed later, a return to
his UMNO·days stand, while, it is
interesting to note, UMNO itself
had by then left that stage.
(9)
Simandjunt.1r.,op. ciL, Po 68.
(10) MnOl,op.ciL. p.I".
(Ii)
II. Milkr. I'n'rll:t .",d hemin (london.
i9~9). p. 110, quoled in Sil'nandjuntak,
op. cit.. p. 68.
(i2)
The .ulhQr U grateful 10 Prof. Zain.al
Abidin Ab_ W.hid for enlislhlening him on
Ihis
poim.
(13) Simandjuntak.,ibkt
15
independence.(I~) In the following
two years both parties stepped up
their demands for ~1crdeka (independence) with mure practical
actions, with UMNO being far more
militant in their tactics.
1953 saw three important
events occuring on the Malayan
political scene. They were the
Malayan National Conference called
by IMP leaders, the Federal
elections announcement made by
Sir D. MacGilJi\Tay and the
Na tional Com·ention led by liMNOMeA. The National Conference,
which was called and led by the
Menteris Besar (Chief Ministers),
who were all L\iP supporters,
demanded an elected minority in
the Federal Legislative Council, the
election for which should be held
toward the end of 1956. 1161 The
Alliance·organised National Can·
vention, held in the latter part of
1953, demanded a three-fifths
elected majority in the Legislative
Council the election for which
shou ld be held not later than 1954.
nle Convention also called for the
extension of the franchise to all
adults who were either citizens,
subjects of the Rulers, British
subjec ts or born in Malaya and who
had lived in "'1a1aya for five
years. 1I7 ) TIl esc Alliance demands
were in fa ct early indications of the
party's emerging multi·racial stan d;
the cal l for an extension of the
franchise, for example, if imple.
mented, result in greatl)' increased
number of Chinese \'oters. The IMP
Besides converting MCA into a
complete politi cal party, converting
the Alliance into a permanent
entity and making IMP reverse: its
policies, the 1952 K.L Municipal
elections can also be said to have
quickened the staging of the first
Federal elections in Malaya. This is
due to the fact that both the
Alliance and lAW had their own
reasons to believe that an
immediate Federal election would
bring victOry to their respective
parties. The Alliance interpreted
the polling returns at the KuaJa
Lumpur eJections as reflective of
the country's support for them.
Dato Onn and I~W, on the other
hand regarded the Ulo.1NO·MCA
Alliance as being merd}' a Kuala
Lumpur phenomenon and were also
hoping to usc their majority in the
nominated Federal Legislative
Council to draft election ordinances
which would suit their party. It was
not surprising therefore that
immediately after the Kuala
Lumpur elections were over both
parties started agitating for
elections to the Federal Legislature.
In December 1952, six muni·
cipalities in the Federation held
their municipal elections which
resulted in UMNO·MCA winning 26
sealS while IMP on ly managed to
retain one seat in Kual a Lumpur
out of a total o f 37 sealS. lI ") The
continuing victory of the Alliance
and humiliating ddeat of Ir..IP set
the stage for a bitter struggle ill
1953 between the 'elected majori.
ty' and 'nominated government'.
Even before the 'second round'
of municipal elections, in Septem·
ber 1952, both the IMP and UMNO
had already dr;lfted their proposals
for the the attainment of Malayan
op. cil. p t H.
(H)
~k"r ...
( t ~)
!bid.. p. 141.
(16) IbWl... p. 14'.
( t7)lbiJ...p.IU.
16
leaders, on the other hand, finding
that they could neither attract a
significant number of political
parties to participate in the Conference nor were the few participating non· Malay parties (e.g.
MIC) impressed by their stand.
decided to be more explicit in their
pro· Malay attitude by launching a
new party in place of IMP. The
name chosen for this new party,
which was launclu:d in Febmary
195-1, was Parti Negara. (18) This
name was designed to attract the
~1al:tys who always associated their
political detl'lands with nado.
nalism.(19)
The third evcnt in 1953 was
Ma cG illivray's announcement
which is quoted in the early part of
this paper. Since th e El ection
committee members were drawn
from the Federal l1gisiati\'e Council, ilS rcport, presented in January
1954 naturally reflected the com·
position of the Council. Hence the
Majority Report was very similar to
the that of the IMP-led National
Conference while the minority
proposaJs were \'el)' similar to that
of the Alliance-led National Con·
\·enlion .
The situation again provided
the Alliance with the opportun ity
to display to the electorate its
mililant anti·colonial government
policy. The Alliance demanded that
the minority proposals be accepted
and backed up this demand with an
impressive series of actions which
induded the reconvening of the
National Convention, desp3tching
of a three·man Alliance delegation
to London to meet the Colonial
Se ere ta ry despite the 13tter's
publicly announced refusal for such
negotiations, and a boycott of all
go\'ernment councils and officials
bodies by Alliance members. Finally, on 7 July 1954, MacGillivray,
who was by now the new High
Commissioner, laid down a compromise solution which gave an
elected majority of six and the right
of the elected majority to be con·
suited over the appointment of five
nominated members. This decision
....'3S interpreted as another victory
to the Alliance though, in actual
fact, it met, half·way, to only one
of Ole Alliance six·point demand.
Parti Negara whose demands were
similar to the colonial government's
initial stand had again appeared to
the emerging Malayan electorate to
be defending British views,
Hence, by August 1954. when
the Bill concerning the introduction
of Federal elections was passed; the
Alliance had shown its ability to
win elections, its willingness to
orfer a 'fair deal' to the non·Malays
and its staunch determination to
obt3in independence as early as
POlisible. Parti Negara, on the other
hand, became too pro·Malay to be
attractive to lhe non-Malays and
too much identified with lhe
British to win Malay support. These
qualities of the respective parties
were 10 play an important role in
determining their manifestos, their
candidates ,md the results or the
first Federal elections which were
held on 27th July 1955.
The Alliance c3mpaign cenued
around the call for 'Merdeka'. (20)
(l8) ":"iqV1l" mu.ru 'Nlion' or
'natio~',
(I9) for a dcfinicion of 'Maby NatioRl!r d,
Ralllall\, Com" ..",oli"n .nd 1M Politic"l
l
ProUH I" MaUry", (K.L.. 1965). fOOlnotc
!I9,p.2',
(20}/bid., P. 19...
17
Their manifesto, a booklet entitJed
'111e Road to Independence', promised independence within fOllr
years. On the question of citizen·
ship, the manifesto called for the
setting up of a 'Special Independent
Commission' to study the situation.
The Alliance partners also (which
now included the MIC) pledged
themsel\'es to safeguard the special
position of the Mala)'s and to
uphold the position of the ~'Ialay
rulers as constitutional heads of
their respective states. A very
striking feature of the Alliance
manifesto was, as Ratnam put it,
"the fact that the more controversial issues, such as tJlose pertaining to education and language,
re m a i n cd conspic uously
vague" (21)
AJliance and Negara again displayed
their contrasting views. The 1955
e lectorate was highly Malaydominated - in terms of percentage, the Malays constituted
84.2 per cent; Chinese 11.2 per
cent; and Indians 4.6 per cent. In
terms of constituencies. of the total
of 52, the r..lalays were in the
majority in fifty constituencies and
making up more than 7.r.. per cent in
thiny-seven of them. (2~)
Had the Alliance wanted to
conlest the elections on strict
communal lines, it would have
fielded its non-Malay candidates in
on ly the two non-Malay dominated
constituencies, while fielding Malay
cand idates in the o thers. However,
UMNO, the strongest partner in the
Alliattce, decided to abide by their
inter·communaJ policy by allocat ing itself onJy thirty·five seats,
with MCA being allocated fifteen
seats and MIC t....·o. Party Ne6ara.
on the other hand, put up thiny
c;mdidates of whom twenty·nine
were Malay and one Chinese. This
racial com position of their candi·
dates was a clear indication of
Negara's reliance on communal
voting.
When the polling results were
known, the Alliance won 51 seats
with the remaining seat going to the
Pan·Malayan Islamic Pany (PMIP)
who ddeated on Alliance candidate
with a narrow margin of 450 Vales.
The Alliance obtained 79.6 per cent
of the total votes while Parti Ne~ara
In contrast to the Alliance,
Parti Negara's campaign focused
upon Malay demands and "practically ignored the cxi~tence of the
non-Malay electorate". \:t2J As earl)'
as March 1955, their leaders proposed a motion in the Legislative
Council making MaJa)' the sole
official lanRUage_ In its manifesto
it proposed immigration restrictions
to avoid the growing "imbalance
between the three major races"
because "\VC are against an)'
attempt at domination by a section
of the Chinese community in this
country". (U) In his speech over
Radio Malaya on July 5, Data Onn
explained his immigration res·
trictions proposal in the light of the
increasing binh rate among the
Otinese and Jndian communities
and of the Malay desire to "avoid
the fate of being made a racial
minority in their own coun·
try".(24)
In the selection of candidates,
(21) Ibid.
(22)
Mtaru.op.eiL. p,UII.
(23)1bid..p..1S9.
(24) Ralrwn.OP. e'L.p. 192.
(2~) Ibid.. pp. 186-7.
18
nantly Malay electorate, let alone
the non-Malay voters. This poor
Malay response to Negara's communal stand was pt"rhaps due to the
community's confidence in the
ability of UMNO which promised a
'special' position for the MaJays in
an early independent Malaya, and a
lingering distrust for Dato Onn who
had left UMNO to form the noncommunal IMP. An interesting
feature III pre·mdependent Malayan
politics, then, was the 'double turnabouts' by Data Onn - from being
the father of Malay rights in m-fl'JO
to attempting to become a noncommunal Malayan statesman in
IMP and later returning to the role
of a MaJay communalist politician
in Pani Negara - while at the same
time UMNO itself had moved from
possessing a pure·and·simple communal interest to having an intercommunal and national out1on~
through the formation of the
Alliance.
obtainerl only 7.6 Rer cent.(26)
Data Onn himself faced the humi·
liation of obtaining only 22.4 per
cent of the votes in his home cons·
tituenC)' of Johon: Bahru. 127 )
The results showed clearly that
the electorate voted for a. party
which could satisfy their 'national'
as well as communal interests. The
Alliance won because of their im·
pressive record as a mil itant party
in demanding a quick Merdeka
from the British and as a inter·
communal party on other national
issues. Equally important, howe\'er,
is the fact that the Alliance,
through their communal cons·
tituent parties, succeedc;d in
meeting 1/1e communal demands of
the country's three major com·
munities.
Parti Negara's defeat. similarly,
was due to their failure to satisfy
the dual interests of the electorate
mentioned above. The party's views
on Merdeka were seen as being
'soft' and could easily be identified
....;th those of the British them·
selves. On communal issues,
Negara's explicitly pro-Malay stand
did not SCl."m to attract the domi-
(26)
Rllrwn,op. cit.. p.
196.
(27) Man .. op. rit.,p. 167.
19

The Politics of Merdeka - Some Aspects of Communialism in Pre

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