Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist

Transcription

Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate
Neorealism and its Critics. by Robert O. Keohane; Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
Contemporary Debate. by David A. Baldwin
Review by: Robert Powell
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 313-344
Published by: The MIT Press
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Anarchyin international
relationstheory:the
debate
neorealist-neoliberal
RobertPowell
Robert0. Keohane, editor.Neorealismand Its Critics.New York: Columbia
University
Press,1986.
The Contemporary
David A. Baldwin,editor.Neorealismand Neoliberalism:
Press,1993.
Debate. New York: ColumbiaUniversity
relations
contemporary
approachesto international
Two ofthemostinfluential
theoryare neorealism and neoliberalism.The debate between these two
approacheshas dominatedmuchof internationalrelationstheoryforthe last
decade. It is now commonplaceforan articleabout some aspect of internationalrelationstheoryto beginbylocatingitselfin termsof thisdebate. These
two approaches and the debate between them have failed to contributeas
muchas theymighthave to internationalrelationstheory.These approaches
sufferfromserious internalweaknesses and limitationsthat the neorealistneoliberaldebate oftenhas tendedto obscureratherthanto clarify.Once we
we willbe able to
have exposedand clarifiedtheseweaknessesand limitations,
see severalimportantdirectionsforfuturetheoreticalwork.
Two books,Neorealismand Its Criticsand Neorealismand Neoliberalism:
The
to thisdebate.The former
contributions
Contemporary
Debate,makesignificant
offereda wide-ranging
critiqueof neorealismwhen it was publishedin 1986.
The latter,whichhas justbeen published,is morenarrowly
focused.It takesup
where some of the critiquesin Neorealismand Its Criticsleftoff.A reviewof
thesetwocomplementary
volumesaffordsan excellentopportunity
to beginto
and
limitations
that
the
some
of
the
weaknesses
identify
debate frequently
has obscured.
I am gratefulto Carol Evans, Jeffry
Frieden,JoanneGowa, JosephGrieco, ErnstHaas, Peter
Katzenstein,Robert Keohane, David Lake, JamesMorrow,JohnOdell, JaniceGross Stein,and
of an earlierdraft.I also thankGreg
KennethWaltz fortheirthoughtful
commentsand criticisms
Louden and Michael Sinatra for invaluable research assistance. I gratefullyacknowledgethe
supportof a grantfromtheNationalScience Foundation,no. SES-921959.
IntemationalOrganization
48, 2, Spring1994,pp. 313-44
?3 1994 byThe 10 Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
314 InternationalOrganization
In thisreview,I discussfourbroad avenues of criticismthatthese volumes
KennethWaltz's formulation
take in evaluatingneorealismand specifically
of
it.' The firstthree avenues are the originsof states' preferences,the agentof politicalstructure.These
structureproblem,and Waltz's specificdefinition
criticisms
generallydo notchallengethe logicalcoherenceofneorealism.They
focus instead on the limitationsof the theory.The firsttwo centeron what
neorealismtakes forgranted,e.g., preferencesand intersubjective
meanings
The thirdcriticism
ofstructure
and understandings.
findsWaltz'sdefinition
too
confining.The fourthavenue of criticismchallenges the internallogic of
neorealismdirectly.It argues that conclusionsclaimed to followfromthe
assumptionsof neorealismactuallydo not. The neorealist-neoliberaldebate
lies alongthisfourthavenue.
Three issues lie at the center of the neorealist-neoliberaldebate. In
reviewing
theseissues,I tryto bringimportantimplicitassumptionsto thefore
and showthatthoseassumptionsaccountformanyoftheimportant
differences
thathave been
betweenthe two theories.Moreover,manyof the differences
such as the difference
betweenrelativeand absolute
thoughtto be significant,
gains,are not. The firstissue at the heartof the debate is the meaningand
implicationsof anarchy.Althoughthenotionof anarchyhas servedas a central
relationstheory,the emphasison
organizingconceptformuchof international
anarchyis misplaced.What have oftenbeen taken to be the implicationsof
anarchydo not reallyfollowfromthe assumptionof anarchy.Rather,these
implicationsresultfromother implicitand unarticulatedassumptionsabout
the states'strategicenvironment.
The second centralissue is the problemof absolute and relativegains. I
argue that the controversy
surroundingthis problemgenerallyhas mistaken
for
that
this mistake has handicapped analysis of the
effects
causes and
I tryto demonstrate
problemof internationalcooperation.More specifically,
that the internationalrelationsliteraturegenerallyholds, if at times only
implicitly
so, thatthe extentto whicha stateis concernedabout relativegains
depends on its strategicenvironment,for example, the offense-defense
balance and the intensity
of the securitydilemma.But ifthisis the case, then
the degree to whicha state is concernedabout relativegains is part of the
outcometo be explained:it is an effectand not a cause. The extentto whicha
does not explainthe levelof
stateis concernedabout relativegains,therefore,
internationalcooperation.This realizationshould refocusour attentionon
whatdeterminesthedegreeof a state'sconcernabout relativegains.
There
The thirdissue is the tensionbetweencoordinationand distribution.
are oftenmanyways to realize the joint gains fromcooperation,and these
alternativesoften lead to differentdistributionsof those gains. Thus, the
potentialforjoint gains usuallycreates distributionaldisputes that tend to
concernsonlyrecentlyhave
impedecooperation.Althoughthesedistributional
Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979).
1. KennethWaltz,Theory
ofIntemational
Neorealismand neoliberalism 315
begun to receiveattentionin the debate betweenneorealismand neoliberalsome of the questionsthatactuallydo
ism,theyhold the promiseof clarifying
dividethesetwoapproaches.
Neorealismand thestructuralapproach
Much of the neorealist-neoliberaldebate can be seen as a reactionto Waltz's
Politics and a response to those reactions.A brief
Theoryof International
objectivesis essentialto understanding
discussionoftwoofthatbook's primary
the debate.2 One objectivewas to reiterate,reinforce,and refinea line of
argumentWaltzbegan inMan, theState,and War.3There,he had underscored
the importanceof third-imageexplanations.First-imageexplanationslocate
the causes of international
outcomes,say the cause ofwar,"in the natureand
behaviorof men. Wars resultfromselfishness,frommisdirectedaggressive
Second-imageexplanationslocate causes in the
impulses,fromstupidity."4
internal structureof the state. Imperialism,for example, results from a
international
particularinternaleconomicstructurelike capitalism;similarly,
Appealing
likedemocracy.5
peace resultsfroma particularformofgovernment
to Rousseau's staghuntand alludingto the thenrecentdevelopmentof game
theory,Waltz argued that first-and second-imageexplanationswere insufficient.6In a situationentailingstrategicinterdependence,such as thatof the
great powers, an actor's optimal strategydepends on the other actors'
strategies.If, therefore,we want to explainwhat the actorswill do, then,in
additionto lookingat the attributesof the actors,we must also look to the
constraintsthat definethe strategicsettingin whichthe actorsinteract.The
thirdimagelocates causes "withinthestatesystem."7
A simple example from microeconomictheoryillustratesthe potential
explanations.The price is higherand the outputis
importanceof third-image
lower in a monopolized marketthan in a competitiveone. But first-and
calls reductiveexplanationsin
second-imageaccounts,whichWaltzcollectively
Theoryof IntemationalPolitics,do not explain these differences.In both
of the actors,whichare firmsin thiscase, are identical:
markets,the attributes
everyfirmtriesto maximizeits profitsand consequentlyproducesthe level of
outputat whichmarginalcost equals marginalrevenue.What accountsforthe
variationin price and outputbetween these marketsis not variationin the
in
or marketstructures
oftheunitsbutvariationin theenvironments
attributes
whichtheyact. This is theessence ofthethirdimage.
2. For a summaryof Waltz's goals, see p. 323 of Kenneth Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof
" in Keohane,Neorealismand Its Critics,
Intemational
pp. 322-45.
Politics,
Press,1959).
3. KennethWaltz,Man, theStateand War(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
4. Ibid.,p. 16.
5. Ibid.,pp. 80-164.
6. Ibid.,pp. 172-86 and 201-5.
7. Ibid.,p. 12.
It is importantto emphasize two pointsabout the divisionof explanations
intoreductiveand systemicaccounts.The firstis an assumptioninherentin this
division:namely,thatwe can usefullyconceiveoftheactorsor unitsin a system
thatdefinethe strategicsettingin
as separateand distinctfromthe constraints
whichthe unitsinteract.The second importantpointis the kindof conceptual
experimentand explanationthatnaturallyfollowsfromthisdivision.Once a
itis naturalto ask one
systemhas been decomposedintounitsand constraints,
it is naturalto considertwotypesof
of twoquestions;or, to put it differently,
thoughtexperiment.First,how would some aspect of the units'behavior,say
ofstartinga war,varyifwe conceptuallychangesome attributes
theprobability
of the unitswhileholdingthe constraintsconstant?What,forexample,would
happen to the probabilityof war if a state's form of governmentwere
democraticratherthan authoritarian?Fixingconstraintsand varyingunits'
reductive
attributescomprisethe essentialconceptualexperimentunderlying
explanations.Second, howwould behaviorchangeifthe attributesof the units
remained constantand the constraintswere changed? What, for example,
would happen to the probabilityof war if the attributesof the units were
to multipolarofpowerchangedfrombipolarity
unchangedbutthedistribution
theconstraints
facingtheunitscomprise
andvarying
ity?Fixingtheunits'attributes
systemicexplanations.
underlying
conceptualexperiment
thefundamental
After emphasizingthe general importanceof third-imageor systemic
explanations,Waltz turnsto a second objective in Theoryof Intemational
conditions."8But statesmay
as a "set ofconstraining
Politics.He sees structure
of power,the natureof
be constrainedby manythings-like the distribution
or the state'scomparativeeconomicadvantage.A second
technology,
military
thatprovidea wayof
goal forWaltz is to specifya restrictedset of constraints
conceivingof a political systemand then to demonstratethe power of this
formulation
by showingthatit tells "us a small numberof big and important
in
thisset to threeelements,defininga politicalstructure
things."9He restricts
of the units'capabilities,and
termsof its orderingprinciple,the distribution
oftheunits.10
or nondifferentiation
thefunctionaldifferentiation
Two criteriaseem to have guided the selectionof these elementsand this
The firstis pragmatic.This definition
appeared
ofpoliticalstructure.
definition
to lead to interestinginsights,which,of course, is the goal of all positive
Waltz
theories.The second criterionis less generaland reflecteda trade-off.
triedto definepoliticalstructureso that"it would showus a purelypositional
picture.""1The advantageof a positionalpictureis thatmanysystemscan be
seen as similarregardlessof the particularsubstantivecontextin whichthe
units interact."Structure,properlydefined,is transposable."12Thus, firms
8. Waltz,Theory
Politics,p. 73.
ofIntemational
Politics,"p. 329.
9. Waltz,"Reflectionson TheoryofIntemational
10. Ibid.,pp. 79-101.
11. KennethWaltz,"A Response to My Critics,"in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics,p. 330.
12. Ibid.
in an oligopolisticmarketmaybe seen to be in
facinga highriskofbankruptcy
an anarchical,self-helpsystemin muchthe same waythatstatesfacinga high
riskofwar in the internationalsystemare in an anarchical,self-helpsystem.13
If, therefore,anarchyimplies certain behavior, such as the tendencyfor
balances of powerto form,thenwe would expectto see thisbehaviorobtain
or street
"whetherthesystemis composedoftribes,nations,oligopolisticfirms,
is
ofa politicalstructure
The potentialadvantageofa spare definition
gangs."'14
inwhatinitiallyappeared to be verydifferent
thatitmayhelpus see similarities
is thatifthethree
domains.The potentialdisadvantageofthisspare definition
constrainthe
dimensionsWaltz uses to characterizesystemsdo notsufficiently
thenunitsin similarsystemsmaynotinteractin similarways.
units'interaction,
Ifthisis thecase, thenwe shallhaveto look elsewhereforexplanationsofthese
Waltzoptsfora spare definition.
variations.Recognizingthistrade-off,
Four avenuesofcriticism
Structuraltheories decompose a systeminto units and constraints.This
decompositionmakes these theories vulnerable to two broad avenues of
criticism.The firstcriticismaccepts thisdecompositionbut stressesthe need
for a theoryof preferenceformationto supplementthe structuraltheory.
theory,
Because theunits'preferencesare exogenouslyspecifiedin a structural
we need a theorythat explainstheirorigins.The second avenue rejectsthis
problem,arguingthatagents
decomposition.It emphasizestheagent-structure
and structureare inseparable.In additionto these firsttwobroad avenues of
of neorealtheory,like Waltz's formulation
anyparticularstructural
criticism,
The thirdfocuses
ism,is also subjectto a thirdand fourthavenue of criticism.
on and questionsthe specificdefinitionof structureemployedin the theory.
The fourthquestions whetherthe conclusionsclaimed to follow fromthe
theorydo indeed follow.
Preferencesare given exogenously
The firstavenue of criticismcenterson preferences.Structuralapproaches
taketheunits'preferencesas given.That is, thesepreferencesare exogenously
specified.They become inputs into the analysisratherthan the subject of
analysis.This maybe an importantweakness of the structuralapproach. As
RobertJerviscautions,"By takingpreferencesas given,we beg whatmaybe
the mostimportantquestionon how theywere formed.... Economic theory
but
treatstastesand preferencesas exogenous.Analysisis thereforefacilitated,
13. Waltz,TheoryofIntemational
Politics,pp. 105 and 111.
14. The quotationis fromp. 37 of KennethWaltz, "Realist Thoughtand NeorealistTheory,"
44 (Spring/Summer
JoumalofIntemationalAffairs
1990),pp. 21-37.
at the cost of drawingattentionawayfromareas thatmaycontainmuchof the
explanatory
'action' in whichwe are interested."'15
thatstructural
approaches
The firststepin assessingtheforceofthecriticism
twotypes
thecriticism
bydistinguishing
lack a theoryofpreferencesis to clarify
of preferences.The firsttype is preferencesover outcomes; the second is
thesetwotypes,considera
preferencesoveractionsor policies.To differentiate
form.The cells in the matrixcorrespondto potential
game in payoff-matrix
outcomes.The utilitiesthat appear in each cell in the matrixrepresentthe
players'preferencesoverthesepotentialoutcomes.That is, a player'sutilities
reflectits preferencerankingof the possible outcomes.Given its preferences
overoutcomesand itsbeliefsabout whatthe otherplayersare doing,a player
can rank its potentialactionsfrommost to least preferred.In a two-person
game,forexample,the rowplayercan rankitsactionsfrombest to worstgiven
itspayoffsand itsbeliefsabout whatthe columnplayeris doing.This induced
rankingdefinesa player'spreferencesoveractions.'6
Structuraltheoriesdo nottryto explainpreferencesof one typebutdo tryto
explain preferencesof the other type. Structuraltheories take the units'
lack a theoryof
preferencesoverpossibleoutcomesas givenand,consequently,
preferencesover outcomes. But structuraltheoriestryto make predictions
about the units'preferredactionsby combiningassumptionsabout the units'
preferencesover outcomes with other assumptionsabout the structural
constraintsfacingthe units. In this sense, structuraltheoriesclaim to be a
theoryof preferencesover actions.Game theory,forexample,is a theoryof
preferencesoveractions.It attemptsto predicttheunits'optimalactionsbased
on theirpreferencesover outcomes and the strategicsettingin whichthey
of neorealismtakes the units'preferinteract.Similarly,Waltz's formulation
whetherof internationalpolitics or of
ences as given. "In a microtheory,
economics,the motivationof the actors is assumed ratherthan realistically
In particular,Waltz assumes "that states seek to ensure their
described."'17
survival"and thenattemptsto predicttheunits'actions,albeitin a verygeneral
way,on the basis of this assumptionabout the units' preferencesand other
in whichtheunitsinteract.18
assumptionsabout thepoliticalstructure
conflated.For example,after
The two typesof preferencesare frequently
notingthat"economictheorytakes tastesand preferencesas exogenous"and
warningthatwe may be beggingthe most importantquestionsby doing so,
Jervisdiscusses some of the sources of these tastes and preferencesover
outcomes. These sources include transnationalforces, ideologies, beliefs,
15. RobertJervis,"Realism, Game Theory,and Cooperation,"WorldPolitics40 (April 1988),
pp. 324-25. For similarwarnings,see JosephNye,"Neorealismand Neoliberalism,"WorldPolitics
50 (January1988),p. 238.
betweenpreferencesoveroutcomesand overactionsis useful,but it should
16. The distinction
notbe pushed too hard.An outcomein one game maybe seen as a policychoice in a largergame.
17. Waltz,Theory
Politics,p. 91.
ofIntemational
18. The quotationis drawnfromibid.
He also sees realismas a source or theoryof
experience,and knowledge.19
preferencesover outcomes,saying,"Sometimeswe can deduce preferences
fromthe structureof the system,as Realism suggests.But even a structural
theoryof internationalpoliticsas powerfulas Waltz's has troubleproducing
precisedeductions."20
Jervisconfoundsthe twotypesof preferenceshere. He
correctlyobservesthat economictheorytakes preferencesover outcomesas
givenbut thentreatsneorealism,whichis a theoryof preferencesoveractions,
as a theoryof preferencesoveroutcomes.RobertKeohane similarly
conflates
the twotypesof preferenceswhenhe intendsto criticizeneorealismas a weak
theoryof behavior (that is, a weak theoryof preferencesover actions) but
describesneorealismas a weak theoryofpreferencesoveroutcomes.2'
thetwotypesofpreferenceshas at least twonegativeeffects.
Conflating
The
firstis to suggestthatwe cannotuse structural
or game-theoretic
approaches,
whichtake preferencesas given,to studythe effectson preferencesof changes
in beliefs,experience,or knowledge.22
This suggestionis simplywrongifwhat
we wantto studyis howchangesin thesefactorsaffectpreferencesoveractions
or policies.Indeed,one oftheprimary
uses ofincomplete-information
gamesis
to studyhowinteractionaffectsplayers'beliefsand,throughthesebeliefs,their
preferredactions.AndrewKydd,forexample,develops an interesting
incommodel of arms races that he uses to studyJervis'sspiral
plete-information
model of escalation.23The basic issue in Kydd's game is whethera state will
not to arm to preferring
to armbecause it interprets
change frompreferring
anotherstate's arms increase as a sign of hostilityratherthan of insecurity.
in whichtwostatesthathave
Kydduses thismodel to studythe circumstances
no hostileintentmightarmand eventuallygo to warbecause theyfearthatthe
otheris hostile.The formalstudyof dynamicinteractions
and thelearningand
signalinginherentin themis at an earlystagein international
relationstheory.
Manylegitimatecriticismscan be made of thiswork.24
But the claim thatthis
work has nothingto say about learningand changes in preferences(over
19. Jervis,
"Realism,Game Theory,and Cooperation,"pp. 324-29.
20. Ibid.,p. 325.
21. Robert Keohane, "Theoryof World Politics,"in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics,pp.
175-76. One factorcontributing
to thisconflationmay be thatboth Jervisand Keohane focus
on theprisoners'dilemma.There is no strategicinterdependencein a one-shotprisoners'
primarily
dilemma:a playeralwaysdoes strictly
betterby playingD ratherthan C regardlessof what the
otherplayerdoes. In cases in whicha player'soptimalactionis independentof whatothersdo, a
theoryof preferencesover outcomes also serves as a theoryof preferencesover actions. The
distinction
betweenthe twotypesof preferencesis meaningfulonlyifthe game entailsa situation
ofstrategicinterdependence
in whicha player'soptimalstrategy
dependson whatitbelievesothers
willdo.
22. Jervis,"Realism,Game Theory,and Cooperation,"p. 327.
23. AndrewKydd,"The SecurityDilemma,Game Theory,and WorldWar I," paper presented
at the annual meetingof the American Political Science Association,Washington,D.C., 2-5
September 1993. For Jervis'sinsightfuldiscussionof the spiral model, see his Perceptionand
inInternational
Politics(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Misperception
Press,1977).
24. For an excellentreviewof some of the limitations
of thisapproach,see David Kreps,Game
and EconomicModelling(New York: OxfordUniversity
Theory
Press,1990).
actions) because it takes preferences(over outcomes) as givenis not one of
thesecriticisms.
the twotypesof preferencesis that
The second negativeeffectof conflating
doing so confoundstwo objectionsto structuralapproaches that need to be
evaluatedseparately.The firstobjectionis thattheseapproachestaketheunits'
preferencesas given.The second is thatthese approaches offerat best very
weak theoriesof preferencesoveractionsand at worstmisleadingtheories.As
will be seen, the firstobjection is not very importantto the neorealistneoliberaldebate,whilethesecond objectionlies at the heartof it.
oftakingtheunits'preferencesas givenin a theoryor model
The significance
dependsverymuchon the theoryor model and the purposesforwhichit has
been constructed.In some models of nuclear crisisbargaining,forexample,
thereare onlythreeoutcomes:a stateprevailsin the crisis,it backs downbut
avoidsa nuclearexchange,or the crisisends in nuclearwar.25Preferencesover
these outcomes are exogenouslygiven in these models, but it would seem
bizarrenot to assume thata stateprefersthe firstoutcometo the second and
thesecondto thethird.Manysituations,however,are muchmorecomplicated
and whatto assume about preferencesover outcomesis not obvious.It is not
clear, forexample,what to assume about a state's preferencesover possible
Frieden,Peter Gourevitch,Peter
Here theworkof Jeffry
tradearrangements.
Katzenstein,David Lake, Helen Milner, Ronald Rogowski,and others in
of the originsof preferencesis veryimportant.26
developingan understanding
Similarly,a state'spreferencesover potentialnationalsecurityarrangements,
for example, possible arms control agreements,may not be obvious, and
theoriesmaybe needed to explainthesepreferences.27
That neorealismtakestheunits'preferencesas givenis of littleconsequence
forthe neorealist-neoliberaldebate. As will be developed more fullybelow,
thisdebate largelyfocuseson the likelihoodof cooperationin anarchyand on
in facilitating
cooperation.Neorealismmaintainsthat
the role of institutions
in an anarchicsystemcomposedofunitsthatprefer
cooperationwillbe difficult
survivalover extinction.Neoliberalismquestionsthis conclusionbut not the
in RobertPowell,NuclearDeterrence
25. See, forinstance,the modelsof nuclearbrinkmanship
Press,1990).
Theory(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
45 (Autumn1991), pp.
26. See Jeffry
Frieden,"InvestedInterests,"IntemationalOrganization
425-51; Peter Gourevitch,Politicsin Hard Times(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1986);
of WisconsinPress,1978);
Peter Katzenstein,ed., BetweenPowerand Plenty(Madison: University
Press,1988); Helen
and FreeTrade(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
David Lake, Power,Protection,
(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988); and Ronald
Milner,ResistingProtectionism
Press,1989).
Rogowski,Commerceand Coalitions(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
27. For example, Adler uses the concept of epistemiccommunitiesto explain American
aboutarmscontrolagreements.See EmanualAdler,"The EmergenceofCooperation,"
preferences
InternationalOrganization46 (Winter 1992), pp. 101-46. For attemptsto explain a state's
relationsin determining
preferencesover militarydoctrinesand the importanceof civil-military
those preferences,see Barry Posen, The Originsof MilitaryDoctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press,1984); JackSnyder,TheIdeologyoftheOffensive
University
Press, 1984); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensiveand the Originsof the First
9 (Summer1984),pp. 58-107.
WorldWar,"International
Security
assumptionthat units are minimallymotivatedto survive.Indeed, it would
Thus,the
seem bizarrenotto assumethatunitsprefersurvivaloverextinction.
to the
thatthesepreferencesare specifiedexogenouslyis unimportant
criticism
debate about the likelihood of cooperation in anarchy. The potentially
importantcriticismis thatthe conclusionsclaimedto followfromneorealism's
spare assumptionabout units'preferencesand about the politicalstructurein
whichthese unitsinteractactuallydo not follow.This is the fourthavenue of
whichwillbe discussedbelow.
criticism,
The inseparabilityof agents and structure
approachdecomposesa systemintounitsand theconstraints
The structural
facingthem.The second avenue of criticismdenies the separabilityof agents
theoriesin sociology,Alexander
and structure.Drawing on structurationist
Wendt argues that agents and structureare "mutually constitutiveyet
distinctentities.Each is in some sense an effectoftheother;they
ontologically
are 'co-determined.'"28
If agents and structurewere conceptuallyinseparable,two consequences
the structural
would follow.First,the twoconceptualexperimentsunderlying
approach fromwhich this approach derives its explanatorypower would
become problematic.We would no longerbe able to studythe constraining
effectsof structureby theoreticallyholdingthe units and theirpreferences
constantwhile varyingthe structurein which they interact.If units and
structureare inseparableso thateach is at least partlythe effectof the other,
willalso changetheunits.
thenvariationin the structure
Second, challengingthe separabilityof unitsand structuremakes the units
an object of inquiry and directs our attentionto systemicchange and
If units and structureare mutuallyconstitutive,then it is
transformation.
natural to ask, How do theyevolve, and How do theyinteractover time?
Thinkingof the unitsas being endogenousshiftsour attentionaway froma
model. In a
positionalmodel to what David Dessler calls a transformational
positional model like Waltz's formulationof neorealism,"structureis an
in which action takes place. Structuremeans the 'setting'or
environment
'context'in which action unfolds."29Structureis, in other words, a set of
that
In a transformational
constraints.
theory,"structureis a mediumofactivity
Structureshapes action and is
in principlecan be alteredthroughactivity."30
of a transformational
theoryis to explain
shapedbyaction.The goal,therefore,
how structureand agent interact.To do this, Robert Cox, Dessler, John
Problemin InternationalRelations
28. See p. 360 of AlexanderWendt,"The Agent-Structure
41 (Summer1987),pp. 335-70.
Organization
Theory,"International
29. The quotationis fromp. 426 of David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure
43 (Summer1989),pp. 441-70,emphasisoriginal.
Debate," IntemationalOrganization
30. Ibid.,p. 461.
Ruggie,Wendt,and othershave emphasizedidentities,interests,rules,roles,
and meanings.3'
understandings
and intersubjective
theforceof the second avenue depends
As withthefirstavenue ofcriticism,
verymuchon the particulartheoryor model beingcriticized.Cox's distinction
theoriesand criticaltheoriesis helpfulhere.32The
betweenproblem-solving
formeruses the ceteris paribus assumptionto restrictthe statementof a
specificproblem"to a limitednumberof variableswhichare amenable to a
relativelyclose and precise examination."33Among the many thingsthat
theoriesmayexcludebytakingthemas givenand unproblemproblem-solving
and expectations.The ceterisparibus
understandings
atic are intersubjective
freezes and therebyassumes away the interactionof
assumptioneffectively
unitsand structure.
It seems entirelyappropriateto assume awaythisinteractionin a problemor domainofthetheoryis understood
solvingtheoryas longas the applicability
rightly
argue
to be boundedbytheceterisparibusassumption.Structurationists
are partofwhatis beingtakenas givenor
understandings
thatintersubjective
and meaningsdiffer
in thisassumption.If theseunderstandings
unproblematic
fromthose presumed in the ceteris paribus assumption,then
significantly
theoriespredicatedon that assumptionmay be of littleuse. Of course, the
ceterisparibusconditions-be theyabout interestsand identitiesor about the
satisfied.We
manyotherfactorsleftout of a specifictheory-are neverstrictly
in interestsand identitiesor in the
do not knowa prioriwhetherdifferences
The bestwe can do is tryto determinethe
otherexcludedfactorsare important.
theoriesby usingthemin different
domainof applicabilityof problem-solving
settings.Powerfultheorieswillworkin a large domain because the excluded
factorssubsumedin the ceterisparibusassumptiongenerallyare insignificant.
Weak theorieswill have a verylimiteddomain. The sociological approach
makes a serious and importantcriticismand contributionin stressingthe
and the interacmeaningsand understandings
importanceof intersubjective
tionbetweenagentsand structure.
of unitsand structure.
The sociologicalapproachstressesthe inseparability
thiscriticism
withthisparticularapproach.A
notto identify
But it is important
second line of research is also predicated on the interactionof units and
structureor, more precisely,the interactionof states and the international
argumentis that
The essence ofGourevitch'ssecond-image-reversed
structure.
31. See RobertCox, "Social Forces,States,and WorldOrders,"in Keohane,Neorealismand Its
Debate?"; JohnRuggie,
Critics,pp. 204-54; Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure
in World Polity,"in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics;John
"Continuityand Transformation
and Beyond," InternationalOrganization47 (Winter 1993), pp.
Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality
Problemin InternationalRelations Theory"; and Alex139-74; Wendt,"The Agent-Structure
46 (Spring1992),
Organization
ander Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It," International
pp. 391-425.
32. Cox, "Social Forces,States,and WorldOrders,"p. 208.
33. Ibid.,p. 208.
the internationalstructureshapes domestic institutionsand states' preferinteract.
ences: statesand structure
are inseparableis
thatagentsand structure
This secondformofthecriticism
problemmay
the
agent-structure
it
shows
that
reasons.
First,
for
two
important
and
as given
that
take
interests
identities
arise even in rationalistapproaches
the
self-interest.
Second,
in
own
narrow
their
and assume that the unitsact
with
this
form
of
the
of
trying
to
deal
a
way
literature
illustrates
existing
problem.The potentialsolutionis to redefinethe unitsin the
agent-structure
system.Rather than treatingstates as unitaryactors,states are decomposed
intomorebasic units.The hope here is thatwe willbe able to separate these
facingthem.
morebasic unitsfromtheconstraints
To illustratethisapproach to dealingwiththe interactionof statesand the
internationalstructure,considerRogowski'sworkon the effectsof internaAt the
tionaltradeon domesticpoliticalalignmentsand states'preferences.34
ofhisanalysisgraveinjustice,Rogowskidecomposesa
riskofdoingthesubtlety
countryintothreegroupsor units:landowners,capitalists,and labor.A state's
preferencesemergethroughcompetitionamong these units.Moreover,anyaffectsthe terms of internationaltrade shiftsthe
thing that significantly
distributionof domestic political power among the units. For example,
technologicalor politicalchanges,like the adventof railroadsand steamships
or the riseof Britishhegemony,reduce the cost or riskof internationaltrade.
These changes favorand enrichdomesticgroups that benefitfromgreater
trade.By assumption,benefitedgroupsbecome morepowerfuland the state's
preferencesgenerallybecome more reflectiveof the preferencesof these
favoredgroups.35
Rogowski'sanalysisillustratesa rationalistversionof the agent-structure
problem.Capital, land, and
problemor, more accurately,the state-structure
labor in Rogowski'sargumentare actingin theirown materialself-interest.
are not at issue here.
meaningsand understandings
Changingintersubjective
Nevertheless,we cannot decompose the internationalsysteminto units and
structureif we treat states as the units. For example, a change in the
internationalsystem,like the rise of Britishhegemony,thatreduces the risk
and thereforeincreases the expected returnto internationaltrade will also
34. Rogowski,Commerceand Coalitions.
35. Rogowskireadilyacknowledgesthathe is makingassumptionsabout the domesticpolitical
processand does not have a theoryof the state.He also emphasizesthatalthoughchangesin the
termsof trademaymake some domesticgroupsmorepowerful,theystillmaylose in the domestic
politicalstruggle(ibid.,pp. 4-5). The powerof Rogowski'sanalysis,of course,lies in its abilityto
identifythe groupsthatwill benefitfromgreatertrade and the domesticcleavages thatgreater
trade will tend to create. Appealing to the Stolper-Samuelsontheorem,Rogowskiargues that
greatertrade favorsthe domesticgroup that controlsthe relativelyabundant factor.So, for
example,land was abundantand capital and labor were scarce in the United States in the latter
part of the nineteenthcentury,while labor was abundantand capital and land were relatively
scarce in Germany.Accordingly,
agriculturein the United States and labor in Germanyshould
have supportedgreateropenness,whilecapitaland laborin theUnitedStates and capitaland land
(pp. 3-20).
in Germanyshouldhave unitedin supportofprotectionism
tend to change states' preferences.States and structureare interdependent;
each is in partan effectoftheother.
This briefillustration
also suggestsa wayoftrying
to deal withthisversionof
the agent-structure
problem:namely,to decompose the systemintodifferent
unitsthathopefullycan be separatedfromthe structureconstraining
them.In
we enlargethe game bytrying
to breakwhatwe previouslytookto be a
effect,
Of course,enlargingthe
unitaryactor,namelythestate,intomorebasic units.36
game to include the interactionbetweendomesticand internationalpolitics
makesanyanalysismuchmoredifficult.
Needless to say,an approachto dealing
with the inseparabilityof states and structureis not a theoryof their
interaction.Much importantworkremainsto be done on the interactionof
statesand structure.37
In sum,theoriesthattake intersubjective
meaningsand understandings
as
interaction.Structuraltheories
givenassumeawayone formofagent-structure
thattake the stateto be a unitaryactoralso assume awaya rationalistformof
interaction.
These theoreticalsimplifications
agent-structure
maybe appropriate forsomequestionsand notforothers.We need to do moreto identify
those
domains in whichthis interactioncan be disregardedand those in whichit
cannot.
Waltz's definitionof structure
The firstand second avenues of criticismare directed at the structural
approach in general. The thirdand fourthavenues of criticismapply more
to neorealismand to Waltz'sparticularformulation
of it.The third
specifically
criticismfocuseson Waltz's spare definition
of structureand generallyargues
thatotherelementsbe includedin thedescriptionof a system'sstructure.
Waltz defineda politicalstructure
byitsorderingprinciple,the distribution
of the
of capabilities,and the functionaldifferentiation
or nondifferentiation
units. This definitionthus implies that the nuclear revolutionin military
technologyis a unit-levelchange and not a structuralchange.38JosephNye
finds it "particularlyodd to see nuclear technologydescribed as a unit
characteristic."39
He and Keohane argue thatsuch factorsas "the intensity
of
internationalinterdependenceor the degreeof institutionalization
of internationalrulesdo notvaryfromone stateto anotheron thebasis of theirinternal
... and are thereforenot unit-levelfactors."40
characteristics
They conclude
36. Clearly this approach does nothingto address the importantconcerns raised in the
sociologicalapproachto the agent-structure
problem.
37. For suggestivediscussionsof the interactionbetween states and structurein different
Revolutionand PoliticalChange(Princeton,
substantivecontexts,see Brian Downing,TheMilitary
N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1993); Katzenstein,BetweenPowerand Plenty;and CharlesTilly,
Capitaland Coercion(New York: Blackwell,1990).
" p. 327.
38. Waltz,"Reflectionson Theory
ofInternational
Politics,
39. Nye,"Neorealismand Neoliberalism,"p. 243.
40. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, "Power and Interdependence
Revisited,"Intemational
that"makingtheunitlevel the dumpinggroundforall unexplainedvarianceis
an impedimentto thedevelopmentoftheory."41
It is clear whyWaltz would not want to include militarytechnologyin his
definition
of structure.Recall thatone of his goals in fashioninghis definition
was to give a purelypositionalpictureof a systemso the notionof structure
would be transposablefromone substantivecontextto another. One can
of capabilitiesfromthe internareadilytransposethe idea of the distribution
tionalsystemwherestatesare theunitsto,forexample,an oligopolisticmarket
where firmsare the actors. But what is the analogue to havinga secure,
technologyin
second-strike
forcefora firmin an oligopoly?Includingmilitary
the definition
of structurewould seem to make the conceptless transposable.
Of course, greater transposability
comes at a cost. Waltz's theorycannot
ofwar thatmaybe due
accountforvariationsin outcomeslike the probability
we have to look to other
to thenuclearrevolution.To understandthoseeffects,
theories.
Althoughit is evidentwhyWaltz would notwantto includedimensionslike
technologyin his notionof structuregivenhis goal of transposability,
military
of capabilitiesacross states "be included in the
whyshould the distribution
definitionand not other characteristicsof states that could be cast in
distributionalterms?"42The answer seems to be a pragmaticone. Waltz
of powerthanwith
believesthatstate "behaviorvariesmorewithdifferences
differencesin ideology,in internal structureof propertyrelations,or in
That is, Waltz believes that a definitionof structure
governmentalform."43
based on the distributionof capabilitiesratherthan on the distributionof
somethingelse seems more likelyto have greater explanatorypower.44In
partofwhatis beingevaluatedis
evaluatingthetheorybased on thisdefinition,
ofcapabilities.
theusefulnessoffocusingon thedistribution
the prevalenceof criticismsof Waltz's spare definitionof
Notwithstanding
structure,there is often a certain hollownessto debates about the proper
definitionof structure.Surelythe effectsof, say, the nuclear revolutionon
internationalpolitics do not depend on whetherwe attach the appellation
"4structural"
or "unit-level"to thischange.Puttinga highvalue on transposability,Waltz opted for a definitionthat made the concept of structuremore
readilytransposable.Other theoristsworkingon other questionsmay value
The importantissue,
less and maydefinestructuredifferently.
transposability
however,is not whetherthe consequencesof the nuclearrevolution,different
or changes
formsof propertyrelations,varyingdegreesof institutionalization,
Organization41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 725-53, and especiallyp. 746, fromwhichthe quotationis
drawn.
41. Ibid.
" p. 329.
42. Waltz,"Reflectionson Theory
Politics,
ofInternational
43. Ibid.
44. Buzan, Jones,and Littlemake a similarpointin BarryBuzan, CharlesJones,and Richard
Press,1993),pp. 54-56.
(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Little,TheLogic ofAnarchy
are called "structural"or somethingelse. The issue
in othersetsof constraints
Whenwe debatewhat
is to developtheoriesthatexplaintheseconsequences.45
to call these changes rather than develop and test theories about the
consequencesofthesechanges,we appear to believethatthename impliesthe
consequences.
Neorealism and its implications
alongthefourthavenue
The neorealist-neoliberal
debate developsprimarily
of criticism.This criticismquestionsthe conclusionsclaimed to followfrom
Waltz's assumptionsand those of neorealismmoregenerally.Neorealism,for
play a minimalrole in shaping
example,claimsthatinternationalinstitutions
internationalpoliticsand that the prospectsforcooperationin anarchyare
bleak.46Neoliberalismquestionsthese claimsin twoways.First,it challenges
to showthatthereis
thelogicalcoherenceof theneorealistargumentbytrying
power
a mistakein thelogic.Second,neoliberalismarguesthattheexplanatory
of neorealismis weak when comparedto neoliberalism.I trace the developdebate in theremainderof
mentof thiscriticismand theneorealist-neoliberal
thissection.I examinethreemajordisputesin thedebate in thenextsection.
In his contributionto Neorealismand Its Critics,Keohane surveysthe
neorealistresearch programand questions its predictivepower.47He then
describeswhat a "modifiedstructuralresearchprogram"would look like. It
and rulesthandoes
would"pay muchmoreattentionto therolesofinstitutions
of the emergenceof
StructuralRealism. Indeed, a structuralinterpretation
internationalrulesand procedures,and of obedience to thembystates,is one
of the rewardsthatcould be expectedfromthismodifiedstructuralresearch
program.1148
Keohane challengesneorealismmore directlyand developsan institutional
The centralquestion is,
approach more fullyin his work,AfterHegemony.49
"Under what conditionscan independentcountriescooperate in the world
politicaleconomy?"50Can, forexample,statescooperate in the absence of a
hegemon?Keohane beginshis analysisof thisquestion"withRealist insights
about the role of power.... [Keohane's] centralargumentsdrawmoreon the
tradition,arguingthatcooperationcan undersome conditions
Institutionalist
interestsand thatinstitutions,
broadly
develop on the basis of complementary
In short,institutions
defined,affectthepatternsofcooperationthatemerge."'51
todo this,see ibid.
45. Fora recenteffort
in Baldwin,Neorealism
and
and the Limitsof Cooperation,"
46. JosephGrieco,"Anarchy
Neoliberalism,
pp.116-42andpp.118-19inparticular.
ofWorldPolitics."
47. Keohane,"Theory
48. Ibid.,p. 194.
Princeton
Press,1984).
49. RobertKeohane,
University
After
Hegemony
(Princeton:
50. Ibid.,p. 9.
51. Ibid.,p. 9.
factorin promotinginternational
maybe a significant
cooperationin waysthat
neorealismhas failedto appreciate.
Keohane challengedboth the logicalcoherenceand the explanatorypower
ofneorealism.Attackingthelogic,Keohane writes,"I propose to show,on the
basis of theirown assumptions,thatthe characteristic
pessimismof Realism
does not follow.I seek to demonstratethatRealist assumptionsabout world
politicsare consistentwiththe formationof institutionalized
arrangements,
containingrules and principles,which promote cooperation."52In sum,
Keohane intendsto startwiththesame set ofcore assumptionsthatneorealism
does and thenshowthatcooperationis compatiblewiththeseassumptions.
Keohane attemptsthis demonstrationin the context of the repeated
prisoners'dilemma.There are two steps to the demonstration.
The firstis to
argue that the repeated prisoners'dilemma is a reasonable model for the
internationalsystemenvisioned in neorealism,that is, that this model is
compatiblewithrealism'scentralassumptionsabout the internationalsystem.
Althoughhe does not develop thispoint at length,Keohane claims,"Not all
situationsin worldpoliticsor international
politicaleconomytake the formof
Prisoner'sDilemma,but manydo."53As further
supportforthe claimthatthe
repeatedprisoners'dilemmais generallyseen to be compatiblewithrealism's
basic assumptions,he mightalso have referredto Jervis'sbeliefthatthisgame
is an appropriatemodelforstudying
thesecuritydilemma.54
The secondstepin
Keohane's argumentis to appeal to the Folk theorem,whichshowsthatthe
mutuallycooperative outcome can occur in equilibriumin an infinitely
repeated prisoners'dilemma if the actors do not discount the futuretoo
much.55These two steps takentogetherimplythatcooperationis compatible
withrealism.
Writingin 1983, Keohane believed his neoliberal institutionalapproach
would prove to have greater explanatorypower than neorealism. But, a
definitivetest of his institutional
approach was not yet possible because the
worldwas "onlyjust enteringtheposthegemonicera."56It was too soon to test
the explanatorypower of an argumentthat predicted that international
institutions
and cooperationwould persistdespitethe absence of a hegemon.
Instead of a test,Keohane offereda "plausibilityprobe" of his institutional
approachin thecases of international
trade,finance,and petroleum.57
One can envisiontwo general typesof response to Keohane's neoliberal
challengeto neorealism.The firstaddressesKeohane's challengeto thelogicof
52. Ibid.,p. 67.
53. Ibid.,p. 68.
54. Robert Jervis,"Cooperation Under the SecurityDilemma," WorldPolitics30 (January
1978),pp. 167-214and p. 170 in particular.
55. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin, "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with
Econometrica54 (October 1986),pp. 533-54.
Discountingor withIncompleteInformation,"
56. Keohane,AfterHegemony,
p. 218.
57. See Robert Keohane, "Institutionalist
Theoryand the Realist Challenge Afterthe Cold
War," in Baldwin, Neorealismand Neoliberalism,pp. 269-301, and particularlyp. 292; and
Keohane,After
Hegemony.
neorealism's analysis of the problem of internationalcooperation. This
responsewould showthatKeohane had reallynot based his argumenton the
same set of core assumptionsthatneorealismdoes. If thiswere the case, then
Keohane's argumentthat neorealism'sconclusions about the prospectsof
cooperationdo notfollowfromitsassumptionswouldbe invalid.
international
the repeated prisoners'dilemma is incompatiblewith
If, more specifically,
neorealism'score assumptionsabout the internationalsystem,then showing
thatcooperationin thisgame is possiblewould saynothingaboutwhatfollows
fromneorealism'sassumptions.
The secondtypeof responseis moreempirical.It would saythatneorealism
neverclaimed thatinternationalcooperationwas logicallyincompatiblewith
neorealism'sassumptions.So, showingthatcooperationis possiblegiventhese
assumptionsdoes not contradictneorealism.The real question is how much
cooperationexistsand whetherneorealismor neoliberalismdoes
international
a betterjob of accountingforthe observedpatternof internationalcooperation. This response would then go on to compare the relativeexplanatory
powerofthesetwoapproaches.
Joseph Grieco developed both types of response to the institutionalist
challenge.58He arguedthatKeohane had not startedwiththe same assumptions neorealismdoes. In using the repeated prisoners'dilemma,Keohane
implicitlyhad assumed that states try to maximize their absolute gains.
Accordingto Grieco,however,neorealismrequiresa state'sutilityfunctionto
reflecta concernforrelativegains.59Consequently,Keohane does not "show,
on the basis of their [realists'] own assumptions,that the characteristic
pessimismof Realism does not follow," as he claimed.60In Cooperation
Among Nations, Grieco tried to assess the relative explanatorypower of
He considersthe case of negotiationsover
neorealismand institutionalism.
nontariff
barriersduringthe Tokyo Round of the General Agreementon
Tariffsand Trade, a case thathe believes poses a hard testforrealism,and
The
concludesthatrealismexplainsthiscase betterthandoes institutionalism.
latest round of the debate between realism and liberalismwas now fully
engaged.6'
to this
David Baldwinbringsa numberofpreviouslypublishedcontributions
62 Baldwin provides an
debate togetherin Neorealismand Neoliberalism.
58. See the followingworks of Joseph Grieco: "Anarchyand the Limits of Cooperation";
"Realist Theoryand the Problemof InternationalCooperation,"JournalofPolitics50 (Summer
Press,1990).
AmongNations(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
1988),pp. 600-624; and Cooperation
of
59. Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsof Cooperation,"p. 129. Gowa made the same criticism
Axelrod'suse of the repeatedprisoners'dilemma[RobertAxelrod,The Evolutionof Cooperation
(New York: Basic Books, 1984)] when he used this game to model internationalpolitics.See
Organization40 (1986), pp.
Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy,Egoism, and Third Images," International
167-86 and particularly
pp. 172-79.
60. Keohane,After
p. 67.
Hegemony,
61. See Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," and the referencescited therein for an
introduction
to earlierroundsofthisdebate.
62. These contributionsare: Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "AchievingCooperation
overviewof the debate, and Grieco and Keohane offertheirreflectionsand
appraisalsof the debate in new essays.This volumecomplementsand extends
some ofthelinesofanalysisdevelopedinNeorealismand Its Critics.Neorealism
and Its Criticsincludesbothinternaland externalcritiquesof neorealism.The
approach,whilethe latteradopt a
formershare neorealism'sproblem-solving
criticalapproach.63The scope of Neorealismand Neoliberalismis narrower,
more focused, and whollyinternal.Ali of the contributionsexemplifythe
problem-solvingapproach and address various facets of the neorealistneoliberaldebate.Three issueshave dominatedthisdebate,and an assessment
ofitrequiresan examinationofeach.
At issue
debate are themeaning
The threeissues at the centerof neorealist-neoliberal
and implications
ofanarchy,theproblemofabsoluteand relativegains,and the
In what follows,I make three
tensionbetweencooperationand distribution.
points about these issues. First, although anarchyis often taken to be a
relationstheory,theemphasis
organizingconceptin international
fundamental
on anarchyis misplaced.What have oftenbeen takento be theimplicationsof
anarchydo not reallyfollowfromthatassumption.Rather,theseimplications
resultfromotherimplicitand unarticulatedassumptionsabout states'strategic
environment.Second, the controversyover the problem of absolute and
relativegains generallyhas mistakeneffectsfor causes in its analysisof the
prospectsfor internationalcooperation. Finally,althoughthe debate only
concerns,the analysisof these
recentlyhas begun to considerdistributional
concernsmay help to clarifythe differencesthat do divide neorealismand
institutionalism.
The meaning and implications of anarchy
Much of the neorealist-neoliberaldebate centers on the meaning and
implicationsof anarchy.Accordingto Grieco,neorealismentailsfiveproposiUnderAnarchy,"WorldPolitics38 (October 1988),pp. 226-54; Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsof
and NationalPower,"WorldPolitics43
Cooperation";StephenKrasner,"Global Communications
(April 1991), pp. 336-66; Charles Lipson, "InternationalCooperationin Economic and Security
Affairs,"WorldPolitics37 (October 1984), pp. 1-23; Michael Mastanduno,"Do Relative Gains
16 (Summer1991),pp. 73-113; Helen Milner,"The Assumptionof
Matter?"International
Security
Studies17 (January1991),pp.
Anarchyin InternationalRelationsTheory,"ReviewofInternational
67-85; RobertPowell,"Absoluteand RelativeGains in InternationalRelationsTheory,"American
PoliticalScienceReview85 (December 1991),pp. 1303-20;Duncan Snidal,"RelativeGains and the
Patternof InternationalCooperation,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview85 (September1991),pp.
36 (Spring
Organization
701-26; and ArthurStein,"Coordinationand Collaboration,"International
1982),pp. 294-324.
63. For an example of the former,see Keohane, "Theoryof World Politics"; forone of the
latter,see RichardAshley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics,
pp. 255-300; and Cox, "Social Forces,States,and WorldOrders."
anarchyis the
tions.He definesthe last threeof these as "Third,international
principleforce shapingthe motivesand actions of states. Fourth,states in
anarchyare preoccupiedwithpower and security,are predisposedtowards
conflictand competition,and often fail to cooperate even in the face of
affectthe prospectsfor
commoninterests.Finally,internationalinstitutions
The pointof departureforKeohane's analysis
cooperationonlymarginally."64
inAfterHegemonywas to use the prisoners'dilemmato showthatanarchydid
not implya lack of cooperation.Grieco respondedby arguingthatKeohane's
because he neglectedstates'concernsforrelativegains.
modelwas misspecified
Duncan Snidal then tried to show that anarchydoes not implya lack of
cooperationevenifstatesare concernedwithrelativegains.65
A review of the neorealist-neoliberaldebate about the meaning and
implicationsof anarchyshows that our continuingemphasis on anarchyis
misplaced. Many of the purportedimplicationsof anarchymay be more
facingtheunits.This
usefullytracedto otherassumptionsabouttheconstraints
suggeststhat we should focus less attentionon anarchyand much more
thestrategicsettingsin whichtheunitsinteract.
attentionon characterizing
In reviewing
thedebate about anarchy,itis necessaryto beginbydistinguishof anarchy.The firstis thatanarchymeans the
ingbetweentwoformulations
thatcan enforceagreementsamongthestates
"lack ofa commongovernment"
or more generallyamongthe units.66Robert Art and Jervistogetherexplain
that "internationalpolitics takes place in an arena that has no central
governingbody. No agencyexistsabove individualstateswithauthorityand
and
power to make laws and settledisputes.States can make commitments
treaties,but no sovereignpowerensurescomplianceand punishesdeviations.
This-the absence of a supreme power-is what is meant by the anarchic
environment
ofinternational
politics."67
of anarchysays nothing
It is importantto emphasizethatthisformulation
theirends.
aboutthemeanstheunitshave at theirdisposalas theytryto further
existsthatcan preventthemfromusingthe
It saysonlythatno higherauthority
maybe
meanstheyhave.Thus,forWaltz,firmsfacinga highriskofbankruptcy
in an anarchicself-helpsystemeven thoughthe means available to themto
theirinterests,like cuttingpricesor formingalliancesto distributethe
further
64. Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsof Cooperation,"pp. 118-19.
65. Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Patternof Cooperation."For Grieco's critiqueof Snidal's
analysisand Snidal's response,see Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The
Relative Gains Problem for InternationalCooperation,"AmericanPoliticalScience Review87
(September1993),pp. 729-43.
66. The quotation is fromp. 226 of Axelrod and Keohane, "AchievingCooperation Under
Anarchy."Also see KennethOye,"ExplainingCooperationUnderAnarchy,"in KennethOye,ed.,
CooperationUnderAnarchy(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1986), particularlypp.
1-2.
International
67. RobertArtand RobertJervis,
Politics,3d ed. (Boston: Harper Collins),p. 1.
costsof researchand development,have nothingto do withthe use of military
system.68
force,whichis one ofthemeansavailableto statesin theinternational
One advantageof defininganarchywithoutreferenceto themeans available
to the unitsis that it makes the concept of anarchyreadilytransposableto
different
substantivedomains.As discussedabove, Waltz weighedthisadvantage heavily in constructinghis formulationof structure,so it is hardly
of anarchy.But he certainly
thathe would adopt thisfirstdefinition
surprising
conceptsofanarchyshows.69
is notalone, as Milner'ssurveyof different
The second notionof anarchyrefersto the means available to the units.In
"Coordinationand Collaboration,"ArthurSteinbeginsbyobservingthatmany
relationsscholarsuse anarchyto describe"the classiccharacterinternational
ization of internationalpoliticsas relationsbetween sovereignentitiesdediultimatelyable to depend only on
cated to their own self-preservation,
themselves,and prepared to use force."70In effect,this second formulation
namely,thatone of
adds anotherdimensionto the lack of a centralauthority:
themeansavailableto theunitsis theuse offorce.
The additionof thissecond dimensionhas twoconsequences.First,itmakes
of the concept of anarchymore problematic.What, for
the transposability
example, is the analogue to using force for a firmfacing a high risk of
If thereis no analogue,thena groupof firmsfacinga highriskof
bankruptcy?
If
would not forman anarchicsystemaccordingto thisdefinition.
bankruptcy
the
for
establishing
are
criteria
an
analogue,
what
is
that
there
to
argue
we want
thatone ofthemeansopen to a firmis analogousto a state'sabilityto resortto
may
force?Of course,a definitionof anarchythatreduces its transposability
have compensatingadvantages.Whetherthesepotentialadvantagesoutweigh
willbe discussedbelow.
thedisadvantageof a less transposabledefinition
Second, adding anotherdimensionraises importantquestionsforinternationalrelationstheory.Do the patternsof behaviorgenerallyassociatedwith
anarchicsystems,
suchas thetendenciesforbalances ofpowerto formand-at
least for neorealists-the limited prospects for internationalcooperation,
Or, are thesepatternsmoreheavily
resultfromthelack of a centralauthority?
influencedbyimplicitand unarticulatedassumptionsabout,say,the natureof
of anarchy?
forcethatare subsumedin thesecond definition
military
Two argumentssuggestthatour emphasison anarchyhas been misplacedif
These argumentssuggest
by anarchywe mean the lack of a centralauthority.
thatconclusionsoftenclaimedto followfromtheabsence ofa centralauthority
do not. These conclusionsrequire other supportingassumptions.The first
argumentis reallyan empiricalobservation.Keohane notes in his assessment
of the debate between neorealismand neoliberalismthat the modernstate
68. Waltz,Theory
Politics,pp. 105 and 111.
ofInternational
69. Milner,"The AssumptionofAnarchyin InternationalRelationsTheory."
70. Stein,"Coordinationand Collaboration,"p. 30.
dated from1648,has alwaysbeen anarchicin the sense
system,conventionally
that it lacked a common government.71 Thus, anarchy,while perhaps a
necessarycondition,is certainlynot sufficient
to explainanyof thevariationin
internationalpolitics duringthe modern era. In particular,anarchycannot
account forwhatevervariationin the level of internationalcooperationand
institutionalization
therehas been.
The secondargumentis moretheoreticaland beginswitha recentattemptto
To summarizethe model,
formalizethe classic guns-versus-butter
problem.72
thereare twostates.In each perioda statemustdecide howmuchof itsoutput
to consume,how muchto allocate to itsmilitary
sector,and whetheror not to
attack the other state. Each state's utilityis the discounted sum of its
consumptionin each period. As long as neither state attacks,the game
continues.If a state attacksat some time,the game effectively
ends in one of
two ways.Eitherone state or the otherwill prevailby conqueringthe other.
The odds thata statewillprevailare simplytheratioofitsmilitary
allocationto
ofvictory
theotherstate'smilitary
allocation.The factthata state'sprobability
depends on its militaryallocation creates a trade-offbetween currentand
expectedfutureconsumption.The morea stateconsumestoday,thesmallerits
militaryallocation,and the higherthe probabilityof defeat. Because defeat
means a loss of futureconsumption,consumingmore todayreducesexpected
futureconsumption.The formalanalysisof the game determineseach state's
equilibriumlevel of consumptionand militaryspendingthat balances this
trade-off.
The guns-versus-butter
model shows that our emphasis on anarchy is
misplaced.Neorealismexpectsbalance-of-power
politicsto prevailwhenever
the systemis anarchicand the unitswant to survive.73
model indicatesthatthisexpectationis too broad. Whetheror not the states
balance in the model depends on an assumptionabout militarytechnology.
Generalizingbeyondthismodel,whetherunitsbalance or notdependsas much
on otherfeaturesdefiningthe strategicsituationin whichtheyinteractas it
does on thepresenceof anarchy.
To see that balancingdepends on underlyingassumptionsabout military
technology,note that the guns-versus-butter
game presumesa conventional
inwhichtheprobability
ofvictoryor defeatdependson the
military
technology
relativesizes of the opposingmilitaryforces.Given this stylizedassumption
the statesbalance againsteach otherin thewaywe
about military
technology,
would expect the units to do in an anarchic system.74
Now suppose that
71. Keohane, "Institutionalist
Theoryand theRealist ChallengeAftertheCold War."
72. RobertPowell,"Guns, Butter,and Anarchy,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview87 (March
1993),pp. 115-32.The presentdiscussionextendssome oftheobservationsmade in thatessay(see
pp. 126-27).
73. Waltz,Theory
ofInternational
Politics,p. 121.
74. Externalbalancingthroughalliances is impossiblewhen thereare onlytwostates.Rather,
the statesengage in internalbalancing.For a discussionof internaland externalbalancing,see
Waltz,Theory
ofInternational
Politics,p. 168.
the states' strategicsettingis different.
Formalizingand stylizingthe nuclear
assumethatthereis, to use BernardBrodie's
revolutionin military
technology,
term,an absoluteweapon.75The probabilityof victoryno longerdepends on
the relativesize of the states' militaryforces.Rather,once both states have
attainedsecuresecond-strike
forces,waris certainto takea tollfarhigherthan
any potentialgain. If we solve the model based on this assumptionabout
militarytechnology,the states will spend enough to acquire second-strike
forces.But theywill not spend more even ifthe otherstate does. There is no
balancinghereeventhoughthesystemremainsanarchicand theunitsstillseek
to survive.76
The firstnotionofanarchy,albeitverytransposable,does notimply
balancing.
model,likemanymodels,makesmanystarksimplificationsand, accordingly,
mustbe used cautiously.On the plus side,models,in
part because of these simplifications,
let us vary one factorwhile holding
else constant.Models therebypermitus to isolate the effectsof
everything
different
factorsin ways that historicalcases rarelydo. When we use the
model to isolate the effectsof anarchy,we find that
guns-versus-butter
conclusionsclaimedto followfromthe assumptionof anarchydepend at least
as muchon otherunarticulatedassumptionsabout theunits'strategicenvironment.
The firstdefinitionof anarchyis in some sense too transposable,whilethe
seconddefinition
is nottransposableenough.As we have seen,ifdefinedas the
absence ofa centralauthority,
anarchyencompassessystemsinwhichstatesdo
and do not balance. Conversely,ifwe defineanarchyby addingthe notionof
the potential use of force to the lack of a central authority,we findthe
of the conceptto be greatlylimited,even ifunitsgenerallywill
transposability
balance in such a system.The disadvantagesof thisverylimitednotion of
anarchyare quite high.In particular,thisnotiondoes not applyto systemsin
whichthe use of force is for all intentsand purposes not at issue. Even if
neorealism'sexpectationsabout anarchicsystemsin whichthe use offorceis a
seriouspotentialconcernare correct,the argumentsunderlying
theseexpectationscannotbe transposedto systemsin whichthe use of forceamongunitsis
not at issue. Neorealistexpectationsabout these systemsmay of course still
proveto be correct,buttheylack theoreticalfoundations.
75. Bernard Brodie, Strategy
in the MissileAge (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,
see RobertJervis,TheMeaning
1959). For otherdiscussionsof theeffectof thenuclearrevolution,
of theNuclearRevolution(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1989); Robert Powell,Nuclear
DeterrenceTheory(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1990); Thomas Schelling,Armsand
Influence(New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1966); and Glenn Snyder,Deterrenceand
Defense(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1961).
76. Buzan, Jones and Little reach the same conclusionin The Logic of Anarchy.They and
Morrowofferthe expansionof the Roman empire as an importantexample of the failureof
balances to form.See James Morrow,"Social Choice and SystemStructure,"WorldPolitics41
(October 1988),pp. 75-97.
thatis less transposablethanthe firstand more
The absence of a definition
transposablethan the second poses an importantproblemfor international
relationstheoryafterthe cold war. The problemis evidentin some recent
efforts
to use neorealism'sanalysisofanarchyand theproblemof absoluteand
relativegains to outlinethe post-cold war contoursof internationalpolitics.
The neorealistanalysisargues that stateswill startcompetingand balancing
overeconomicissues afterthe cold war muchas theycompetedand balanced
over securityissues duringthe cold war. Samuel Huntington,for example,
bases his assessmentof the continued importanceof U.S. primacyon a
neorealistanalysis.77Yet, he and others also believe that the prospectsof
"militaryconflictbetween major states is unlikely."78The discussion of
shows that neitherdefinitionof anarchyprovides adequate
transposability
politicsiftheuse
theoreticalsupportfortheneorealistanalysisofinternational
offorceis nota relevantconcern.The firstnotionof anarchycan be transposed
readilyto a systeminwhichtheuse offorceis notat issue. But as we have seen,
this definitiondoes not supportthe neorealistclaims that anarchyimplies
The second notionof anarchy,whileit mayimply
politics.79
balance-of-power
balancingwhen forceis at issue, cannotbe transposedto a domain in which
forceis presumednotto be at issue.
Huntington,believingthat the politicsof internationaleconomicsis more
like a systemwithconventionalmilitary
technology,
arguesforthe importance
of internationalprimacy.Jervis,believingthat the politics of international
economics is more like a systemwith an absolute weapon, questions the
In eithercase, theneorealist-neoliberal
primacy.80
importanceofinternational
is misplaced.As Charles
debate's emphasison the lack of a centralauthority
to theBaldwinvolume,"The idea of anarchy
Lipson putsit in his contribution
relations.... Butwhatwasonce
is,in a sense,theRosettastoneofinternational
a blindinginsight-profoundand evocative-has ossifiedand become blinding
in theothersense of theword-limitingand obscuring."8'We need to develop
ofthestrategicsettingsinwhichunitsinteractifwe
a morecarefulspecification
are to be able to explainthe patternof theirinteractions.Characterizingthis
is an important
relationstheory.
structure
open questionforinternational
The problem of absolute and relativegains
The second majorissue at the centerof the debate betweenneorealismand
institutionalism
is theproblemof absoluteand relativegains.In whatfollows,I
17 (Spring
77. Samuel Huntington,
Security
"WhyInternationalPrimacyMatters,"Intemational
17 (Spring
Security
1993),pp. 68-83. See also RobertJervis,"InternationalPrimacy,"Intemational
1993), pp. 52-67; and Kenneth Waltz, "The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics,"
IntemationalSecurity18 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79. Jervisuses a neorealistperspectiveto framehis
fromHuntington's.
discussion,buthisconclusionsdiffer
78. Huntington,
"WhyInternationalPrimacyMatters,"p. 93.
79. For a differentview, see Waltz, "The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics,"
especiallyp. 74.
80. Jervis,"InternationalPrimacy,"pp. 57-59.
81. Lipson,"InternationalCooperationin Economicand SecurityAffairs,"p. 80.
firstbrieflysummarizesome aspectsof the debate about thisproblem.Then I
argue that in a narrowermethodologicalsense this debate reflectsa basic
oftherole ofmodels.More broadly,thedebate surrounding
misunderstanding
absolute and relativegains generallyhas mistakeneffectsfor causes and,
therefore,contributedlittleto the analysisof the problemof international
we again see the need to
cooperation.Once we separate causes fromeffects,
focus our attentionon a more elaborate characterizationof the strategic
states.
settingsconfronting
To reviewthe debate, neorealismassumes that states are concernedwith
relativegains.For Waltz,"statesthatfeel insecuremustask how the gainwill
be divided.Theyare compelledto ask not 'Will bothof us gain?' but 'Who will
gain more?' 182 In mountinghis institutionalchallenge in AfterHegemony,
to maximizetheirabsolutegains,thatis,
Keohane assumesthatstatesare trying
the states' preferences"are based on theirassessmentsof theirown welfare,
He thenanalyzesthe problemof cooperationin termsof
notthatof others."83
the repeatedprisoners'dilemma.Grieco in turncriticizesKeohane's assumptionthatstatesattemptto maximizetheirabsolute gains. Grieco assertsthat
"realismexpectsa state's utilityfunctionto incorporatetwodistinctterms.It
the realistviewthat
needs to includethe state'sindividualpayoff... reflecting
states are motivatedby absolute gains. Yet it must also include a term
integrating
boththe states'individualpayoff... and thepartner'spayoff... in
thestateadd to itsutility
while,moreimportantly,
sucha waythatgaps favoring
gaps favoringthepartnerdetractfromit."84 In sum,the debate about absolute
and relativegainsbecame a debate about whatto assume about states'utility
functions.
The key to understandingthis debate is to distinguishbetween two
possibilities.The firstis thata state'sconcernor,moreprecisely,the degreeof
in
its concernfor relativegains is the productof the strategicenvironment
whichthe statefindsitself.If so, thenthe degreeof concernis likelyto varyas
of the securitydilemma,varies.In thiscase,
the environment,
saythe intensity
the strategicsettingfacingthe stateinduces a concernforrelativegains.The
second possibilityis thata state's degree of concerndoes not varyand is the
same regardlessofitsenvironment.
Both neorealismand neoliberalismappear to agree that this concern is
to relativegains
induced.Grieco,forexample,believesthata state'ssensitivity
These
"willbe a functionof,and willvaryin responseto, at least sixfactors."85
of poweracross issues,the lengthof the shadowof the
includethe fungibility
or economic
future,and whethertherelativegainsor losses occurovermilitary
matters.86Neoliberalism also assumes that the degree of concern varies.
Indeed, Keohane emphasizesthatbothneorealismand neoliberalismpresume
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Politics,p. 105. See also Waltz,Man, State,and War,p. 198.
Waltz,TheoryofInternational
p. 66.
Keohane,AfterHegemony,
Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsof Cooperation,"p. 129,emphasisoriginal.
Grieco,"Realist Theoryand theProblemof InternationalCooperation,"p. 610.
Ibid.,pp. 610-11.
that the concern for relative gains is conditionalin his appraisal of the
debate.87
Two importantimplicationsfollowfromthe conclusionthatthe degreeof a
state's concernfor relativegains is conditionaland varies fromsituationto
situation.The firstis that the debate about what to assume about a state's
preferencesor utilityfunctionis largely irrelevantand reflectsa basic
induce a concernfor
of the role of models.We can formally
misunderstanding
that
representtheconstraints
relativegainsin twoways.First,we can explicitly
lead to thisconcernin the model. This is the approachI followedin analyzing
to
I assumedthatstateswere trying
the absoluteand relativegainsproblem.88
maximizetheirabsolute gains. But the strategicsettingin whichtheywere
to do so induced a concernforrelativegains. The second way to
attempting
induce a concernforrelativegains is to representthisconcernin the state's
utilityfunction.When done in thisway,the model is in effecta reducedform
for some more complicatedand unspecifiedmodel in which the strategic
constraintswould induce this concern.Grieco's analysismay be seen as an
attemptto workwitha reduced form.Rather than specifyinga model that
explicitlyrepresentsthe six factorshe believes induce a concernforrelative
of
gains,he abbreviatestheinfluencesofthesefactorsthroughhisspecification
functions.89
thestates'utility
Which approach to modelinga state's concernis better?I do not believe
thereis an a priorianswerto thisquestion.Models are tools and askingwhich
approachis betteris akin to askingwhethera hammeror a saw is better.The
answerdepends on whetherthe task at hand is drivingnails or cuttingwood.
One advantageof a reducedformis thatit is likelyto be simplerand easier to
use analytically.A disadvantageis that as long as the more complicated
model remainsunspecified,we cannot analyze the purportedlink
underlying
between the constraintsthat are believed to induce a concern and the
realizationof thisconcern.The linkthus remainsproblematic.Whetherthe
balance of advantages and disadvantagesfavorsan approach based on a
formdepends on the model as a
reducedformor on a moreexplicitstructural
whole and on the substantiveproblem.Thus, debates about what to assume
about preferencescannotbe resolvedwithoutreferenceto an overallevaluation of the entire model and the substantiveproblem being modeled. By
focusingsolelyon what to assume about preferencesand not evaluatingthis
Theory and the Realist Challenge Afterthe Cold War," pp.
418-25.
88. Powell,"Absoluteand RelativeGains in InternationalRelationsTheory."
89. See Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsofCooperation,"as wellas his"Realist Theoryand the
AlthoughGrieco'smodel
ProblemofInternationalCooperation,"and CooperationAmongNations.
maybe seen as a reduced form,it is not clear thathe sees it as such. His assertionthata state's
itsconcernforabsolutegainsand one reflecting
utilityfunctionmustincorporatea termreflecting
itsconcernforrelativegainsmaybe trueof a particularmodel,but it does nothold forall models.
His apparentclaimthatit is trueforall models suggeststhathe does not interprethis model as a
reducedform.
assumptionin theoverallcontextoftheentiremodel,theneorealist-neoliberal
debate about states' preferencesseems largelyirrelevant.It reflectsa basic
ofthe role ofmodels.
misunderstanding
A second importantimplicationfollowsfromthe conclusionthatthe degree
ofa state'sconcernforrelativegainsdependson,or is a functionof,itsstrategic
This dependencymeansthattheconcernforrelativegainsis part
environment.
of the outcomeand notpartof the explanation.A concernforrelativegainsis
an effectand not a cause. We cannot explain the presence or absence of
internationalcooperationbecause of the presence or absence of significant
concernsfor relativegains. Cooperation and concernfor relativegains may
co-vary,but one does not cause the other. The causes for both are the
thatjointlyinduce a
underlying
featuresof the states' strategicenvironment
concernforrelativegainsand therebymake cooperationdifficult.
Existingwork in internationalrelations theoryhas to varyingdegrees
recognized firstthat relative gains concerns do not explain the level of
strategicenvironcooperationand second the need to look to the underlying
in
differences
the
strategicenvirontries
to
relate
ment.Lipson,forexample,
in states'discount
mentsinherentin military
and economicissuesto differences
in thosediscountfactors,to thelikelihood
factorsand,throughthe differences
Jervisexplicitly
in
and economicaffairs.90
international
military
of
cooperation
to maximize
under
states
seek
which
need:
"The
conditions
this
recognizes
theirrelativeas opposed to theirabsolutegainsneed moreexploration."91
A possibleexplanationoftheconcernforrelativegainsmightat firstseem to
leads to balancingand a concernfor
be anarchy:a lack of a centralauthority
relativegains.This answer,however,failsforat least tworeasons.Anarchyhas
system.It cannottherefore
been a constantfeatureofthemoderninternational
accountforvariationin thedegreeof a state'sconcernforabsolutegains.And,
as we have seen above,anarchydoes notimplybalancing.
As emphasizedabove, modelsoftenmustbe judged in lightof the problem
theyare designedto address.If we wantto studythe problemof international
cooperation and its relation to concerns for relative gains, modelingthat
concernin termsof state preferencesseems likelyto prove a poor approach.
The reducedformwouldbe leavingimplicitand unspecifiedpreciselywhatwe
to
wantto knowmoreabout,i.e., thelinkfromthestates'strategicenvironment
theirconcernforrelativegains and the prospectsforcooperation.Tryingto
make thislinkmore explicitby elaboratinga state's strategicsettingand the
connectionbetween this settingand the induced concernfor relativegains
seems likelyto provea morefruitful
approach.As in our discussionof anarchy,
we are led to the need to focus our attentionon a more sophisticated
theunits.
characterization
ofthe strategicsituationsconfronting
in Economicand Security
Affairs."
See also Joanne
90. Lipson,"International
Cooperation
Political
Science
andInternational
"PowerPolitics
Trade,"American
GowaandEdwardMansfield,
Review
87 (June1993),pp.408-20.
andCooperation."
91. Jervis,
"Realism,GameTheory,
In sum,the debate surrounding
the problemof absolute and relativegains
has betrayeda fundamentalmethodologicalmisunderstanding
of the role of
models. The debate has also mistakeneffectsforcauses. Unfortunately,
the
methodologicalmisunderstanding
has reinforcedthe substantivemistake.By
focusingon whatto assume about states'preferences,the debate has made it
more difficult
to correctthe mistakeof seeing effectsas causes. In a reduced
formin whichthe concernforrelativegainsis representedin the states'utility
functions,
thedegreeofthisconcernis formally
an independentvariable.Thus,
itis easyto imagineholdingeverything
else constantand askinghowchangesin
thedegreeofthisconcernwouldaffectcooperation.The difficulty
is,of course,
thatifthedegreeofconcernis reallyan effect,
thenone cannothold everything
else constantwhilevaryingthisconcern.Althoughformally
independentin the
reduced form,the degree of this concern is substantively
dependent. The
reducedformthusmasksthisdependenceand makesitmoredifficult
to correct
the mistakeof seeingeffectsas causes. Once we separate effectsfromcauses,
we also appreciate the need for a more careful specificationof the units'
strategicsetting.
Coordination and distribution
The debate betweenneorealismand neoliberalismrecentlyhas focusedon a
thirdissue. A centralcontentionof theneoliberalapproachis thatinstitutions
matter.In particular,theycan help states cooperate: "institutions,
broadly
defined,affectthe patternsof cooperationthat emerge."92In analyzinghow
institutionsmatter,Keohane emphasizes marketfailuresand explains that
institutions
can help independentactorsovercomethese failuresbyproviding
information
and reducingtransactions
costs.93
In short,institutions
maymakeit
possible to realize joint gains and move out towardthe Pareto frontier.But
thereare oftenmanywaysto realizethesegains,withsomewaysgivinga larger
shareto one stateand otherwaysgivinga largershareto anotherstate."There
are," as StephenKrasnerobservesin his contribution
to the Baldwinvolume,
"manypointsalongtheParetofrontier."94
These multiplewaysofachievingthe
joint gains fromcooperationcan create conflictsover how thosegainswillbe
distributed.
As Geoffrey
GarrettobservesoftheSingleEuropean Act,"the EC
[European Community]membersshared the commongoal of increasingthe
competitivenessof European goods and services in global markets.It is
apparent,however,that there were also substantialdifferencesin national
preferenceswithinthisbroad rubric."95Reflectingon the debate, Keohane
92. Keohane,After
Hegemony,
p. 9.
93. Ibid.,p. 246.
94. Krasner,
"GlobalCommunications
andNationalPower,"p. 235.
95. The quotationis fromp. 535 of Geoffrey
Garret,"International
Cooperationand
Institutional
46 (Spring1992),pp. 533-60.For another
Choice,"Intemational
Organization
ofconflicting
discussion
seeAndrew
theSingleEuropeanAct,"
interests,
Moravcsik,
"Negotiating
45 (Winter1991),pp. 19-56.
Intemational
Organization
U2
A4
3
A
A2
XA
I
ofstate1 (SI); U2 = the
conflicts:
U1 = theutility
FIGURE 1. Distributional
A4 = possibleagreements
utility
ofstate2 (S2); Q = statusquo; Al through
alongtheParetofrontier
issues and the complexinow believesthathe underemphasized"distributive
I will
ties they create for internationalcooperation" in AfterHegemony.96
the
between
tension
cooperation and
suggest that a careful analysis of
distribution
can illuminatethe debate betweenneorealismand neoliberalism
by clarifyingsome of the differencesthat actually do divide these two
approaches.
The distributive
problemarises because thereare manywaysto dividethe
cooperativegains.Figure1 illustratesthisproblemwhentwostates,SI and S2,
are tryingto cooperate.SI's utilityis measuredalong the horizontalaxis,and
S2's utilityis measuredalongtheverticalaxis.Q is thestatusquo.Al throughA4
are possibleagreementsthatlie alongtheParetofrontier.
BothA2andA3lie on
the Pareto frontier
to Q; i.e., bothS, and S2 preferA2
and are Pareto-superior
to Q andA3 to Q. A2 andA3 are different
waysof realizingthejointgainsfrom
cooperation. But, S, prefersA2 to A3 because A2 yields a higher utility.
conflictoverA2 and A3.
Similarly,S2 prefersA3. Thus, thereis a distributive
More generally,S, prefersagreementscloser toAl and S2 prefersagreements
closertoA4.
Krasner recentlyhas used these distributionalissues to challenge the
neoliberalapproach.97The thrustof Krasner'scriticismis that"the natureof
of national
institutionalarrangementsis betterexplainedby the distribution
Theory and the Realist Challenge Afterthe Cold War," pp.
446-47.
97. Krasner,"Global Communicationsand NationalPower." See also JamesMorrow,"Modelforthcoming.
Organization,
ingInternationalRegimes,"International
power capabilitiesthan by effortsto solve problemsof marketfailure."98In
termsofFigure1,themorepowerfulSl, thegreaterwillbe itsshareofthejoint
gainand thecloserthe agreementwillbe toA1.
matterin termsofdistributional
Viewingthequestionofwhetherinstitutions
If cooperationcan take many
and
that
question.
refine
clarify
issues helps
consequences,
different
formsand these alternativeformshave distributional
then the arrangementsthemselvescan become the object of negotiation.
the statescannotbind
Indeed, giventhe absence of a supranationalauthority,
arrangementand correspondthemselvesto anyparticularinitialinstitutional
ing allocation of cooperativebenefits.The institutionalstructureis always
ifa statebelievesitworthwhile.
subjectto renegotiation
The perpetual possibilityof renegotiationraises an importantdynamic
questionthatmustbe separatedfroma more staticissue. That is, institutions
mightmatterin eitheror botha staticand a dynamicway.The staticwaythat
mightmatteris thattheymightbe a means of overcomingmarket
institutions
failuresor, more generally,of realizingjoint gains fromcooperation.As a
means to an end, the structureof the institutionbecomes somethingto be
structure,Keohane emphasizes
explained.In his explanationof institutional
In emphasizingthesefactors,he is trying
and reducinguncertainty.
monitoring
can serve as a means to achievingthe joint gains
to explainhow institutions
fromcooperation.Krasner focuses on anotheraspect of the explanationof
that
arrangement
He arguesthattheactualinstitutional
institutional
structure.
thatfulfill
the
arrangements
willemergefromthe set of potentialinstitutional
functionsKeohane describes will tend to reflectthe desires of the more
powerfulactors.Thus, Keohane's and Krasner's analysesof the staticissue
complementeach other.
may matter.If
There is also a second, more dynamicway thatinstitutions
institutionsdo matterin this second sense, then theywould be part of an
explanationand notpartofthe outcometo be explained.Figure1 can be used
to illustratethissecond way.Suppose thatat some timetotwostatesare at Q.
To thisend,theycreatean
Bothstateswantto moveout to theParetofrontier.
in the wayKeohane
thatreducestransactioncosts and uncertainty
institution
is a meansto theend of realizingthejoint
describes.In thiswaytheinstitution
so both states
conflicts,
gainsof cooperation.But thereare also distributional
in order
arrangements
also use theirpoliticalpowerto shape the institutional
to obtaina largershareofthejointgains.AssumethatS1 is morepowerfuland,
as Krasner argues,the institutionthroughwhichthe states realize the joint
gains will give S, a largershare of the benefits.In particular,suppose the
movesthemfromQ toA2. AtA2,S, receivesa largershareof the
arrangement
joint gains,whichreflectsits greaterpower.A2 thus reflectsKeohane's and
Krasner's complementaryanalyses of the static dimensionof the way that
institutions
maymatter.
and NationalPower,"p. 235.
98. Krasner,"Global Communications
To examinethe dynamicaspect,suppose further
thatat some latertime,say
t1,the balance of power has shiftedin favorof S2. Indeed, assume thatif the
institution
created at timetodid not existand that the stateswere tryingto
de novo at tl,thenS2's greaterpowerwouldmean thatthe
createan institution
institution
thatwouldbe createdwouldmovethestatesfromQ toA3. AtA3,S2
obtainsmoreofthegains,presumablyreflecting
itsgreaterpower.
But the states are not creatinga new institutionat tl, fortheycreated an
institutionat to that moved them fromQ to A2. How does the fact that an
institution
alreadyexistsat tl,whenthestatesmustdeal witha newdistribution
ofpower,affecttheinstitutional
arrangements
and distribution
ofbenefitsthat
willbe devisedat thattime?There are twopossibilities.
First,the institutional
arrangements
existingat toare irrelevant.Institutions
adjust smoothlyso that the distributionof benefits always reflectsthe
ofpower.In termsofFigure1,thestateswillbe atA3 at
underlying
distribution
t1 regardlessof the existenceof an institution
at to.In brief,historydoes not
matter.
The second possibilityis thatthe institutional
thatexistat to
arrangements
affectthose that prevail at tl. To illustratethis possibility,
let A in Figure 1
denotethe arrangements
and associateddistribution
of benefitsthatexistat t1
giventhe arrangements
existingat to. Then A will in general differfromA3,
whichis whatwouldhaveprevailedhad therebeen no preexisting
institution
or
ifinstitutions
thefartherAis fromA3,themore
adjustedsmoothly.Intuitively,
A moreconciseway
currentarrangements
are shaped bypast arrangements.99
of describingthis second way that institutionsmay matteris that history
In termsof Figure 1, the neoliberalclaim thatinstitutional
matters.100
history
mattersin international
relationsmeansthatAwilloftenbe verydifferent
from
A3. Moreover, the fact that the states originallycooperated means that
cooperationis less likelyto collapse and A is more likelyto lie on the Pareto
frontier.Cooperation will often continue in the face of a change in the
ofpower.
distribution
underlying
The possibility
thatinstitutions
maynotadjustsmoothlyand thattheexisting
institutionalarrangementsand distributionof benefitsmay not reflectthe
of poweris a recurrentthemein internationalpolitics.
distribution
underlying
Robert Gilpin, for example, sees this as the cause of hegemonicwar. A
hegemon establishes an internationalorder and associated distributionof
benefitsthat favorsthe hegemon.Over time,the hegemon'srelativepower
declines because of uneven economic growth,and the existingorder and
ofpower.This setsthe
distribution
ofbenefitsno longerreflectthedistribution
99. To simplify
matters,I have assumedthatinstitutions
are efficient
in thattheymovethestates
out to the Pareto frontier.Of course, institutionsneed not be efficient.For a discussionof
institutions
and efficiency,
see Douglass North,Institutions,
Institutional
Change,and Economic
(New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press,1990).
Performance
100. Northanalyzestheproblemof institutional
in ibid.
changeand stability
Similarly,a disparitybetween the
scene for another hegemonicconflict.'01
distributionsof benefitsand power is inherentin Krasner's metaphorof
tectonicplates.102When regimesare firstcreated,theygenerallyreflectthe
distribution
ofpower.But thepressureto changetheregimebuilds
underlying
ofpowerchanges.In the tectonicplate metaphor,
overtimeas thedistribution
thispressuredoes notlead to a smoothadjustment.Rather,thepressuregrows
untilitis suddenlyrelievedin an earthquakeinwhichtheregimealtersin a way
ofpower.
thatrealignsitwiththedistribution
In the neorealist-neoliberaldebate, Keohane generallyemphasizesmarket
and institutions
as imporinformation,
failures,transactioncosts,uncertainty,
tantmeans of cooperation.But he also argues thatinternationalinstitutional
or regimesare established,actorsbehave in
historymatters.Once institutions
waysthat,whetherdeliberatelyor not,make it costlyto changethe regimeor
ofpowerunderlying
the
builda newone. Thus,eveniftheoriginaldistribution
regimeshifts,the now morepowerfulstateswillnot changethe regimeunless
ofpowerhas shiftedto suchan extentthatthebenefitsofa new
thedistribution
ofpower,outweighthecostof
regime,whichwouldreflectthenewdistribution
newregimes
changingtheexistingregime.The costofchangingor constructing
thusgivesexistingregimessome resilienceto shiftsin the balance of power.
help existingregimespersist."1103
"The highcostsofregime-building
do not matterat
In contrast,Krasnerargues thatregimesand institutions
least in thecase ofglobalcommunications:
questionshave precipitatedconflictoverthe
In recentyearsdistributional
telecommunicaallocationof theradio spectrumand overinternational
bythe
tions.The outcomeofthesedisputeshas been determinedprimarily
previousinstiturelativebargainingpowerof the statesinvolved.Whereas
new interestsand powercationalchoiceshad notimposedmuchconstraint,
arpabilitiesconferredbynew technologieshave led to new institutional
rangements.
were everirrelevant:
This is notto saythatinstitutional
arrangements
indeed,theywere necessaryto resolvecoordinationproblemsand to estabWithoutregimesall partieswould have been worseoff.There
lishstability.
the natureof instituare, however,manypointsalongthe Pareto frontier:
is betterexplainedbythedistribution
of national
tionalarrangements
to solveproblemsof marketfailure.104
powercapabilitiesthanbyefforts
In brief,institutionsmay serve as a means of achievingthe joint gains of
cooperation.But institutionalhistorydoes not matter.Previousinstitutional
Press,
101. RobertGilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
1981).
102. Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism," in Stephen Krasner, ed.,
International
Press,1983),pp. 355-68.
Regimes(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
103. Keohane,After
p. 103.
Hegemony,
104. Krasner,"Global Communicationsand NationalPower,"p. 235,emphasisadded.
arrangeaffectthe futureinstitutional
choicesdo not constrainor significantly
ofbenefits.
mentsand thefuturedistribution
claimsabout the
debate leaves us withcontrasting
The neorealist-neoliberal
These claimsin turnpose twoquestionsfor
history.
importanceof institutional
or regimesactuallyadjust smoothlyto
futureresearch.First,do institutions
matter?Second,
history
ofpower.Does institutional
changesin thedistribution
what factorsaffectthe stabilityor rigidityof a regimeor institutionand the
rates at whichit adjusts? In particular,are therefactorsin the international
less stablethan,
thatmake internationalregimesand institutions
environment
of the medievallaw merchant,the Declarationof
forexample,the institution
changesfollowingthe GloriousRevolution
Rightsand associatedinstitutional
in
in England, or the currenteffortsto establishconstitutionalgovernments
Russia and Eastern Europe?105Douglass North and others offermany
examplesin whichinstitutionalhistoryseems to be profoundlyimportant.106
We need a betterunderstandingof the conditionsunderwhichinstitutional
historymattersand the extentto whichthe internationalsystemsatisfiesthese
conditions.Work on these questions holds the promise of a more unified
ofinstitutions
and cooperation.
understanding
Before thisworkcan be done, however,two obstacles mustbe overcome.
First,we need a way of measuringor assessing the constrainingeffectsof
institutions.Figure 1 helps us visualize the issue, but much more than a
visualizationis required.Second, we need more powerfultheoriesthatmake
more specificclaims about the extent to which institutionsshape future
decisionsand actionsthanneorealismor neoliberalismpresentlydoes.
Conclusion
debate sometimeshas obscuredas muchas
Althoughtheneorealist-neoliberal
ithas clarified,thisdebate has forcedus to examinethefoundationsof some of
This is an
theoriesof international
politicsmorecarefully.
our mostinfluential
of these
Such examinationsdeepen our understanding
contribution.
important
in
clarifications
and
weaknesses.
These
their
theoriesby clarifying
strengths
to
and
lead
for
work
ultimately
future
directions
turnmaysuggestimportant
power.
bettertheorieswithgreaterexplanatory
As we have seen, both neorealism and neoliberalismsee the effectsof
anarchyand the degreeof concernabout relativegainsto be conditional.The
in the
105. See Paul Milgrom,Douglass North,and BarryWeingast,"The Role of Institutions
RevivalofTrade: The Law Merchants,PrivateJudges,and theChampagneFairs,"Economicsand
Politics 2 (March 1990), pp. 1-23; Douglass North and Barry Weingast,"Constitutionsand
JoumalofEconomicHistory49 (December 1989),pp. 803-32; and BarryWeingast,
Commitment,"
Hoover Institution,
"The PoliticalFoundationsof Democracyand the Rule of Law," manuscript,
February1993.
Institutional
Change,and EconomicPerformance.
106. North,Institutions,
taskahead is to specifytheseconditionsmoreprecisely.We mustalso explain
how these conditionslead to particularoutcomes like
more satisfactorily
balancingbehaviorand a concernforrelativegains.Griecomakesa usefulstart
sixfactorsthatmayaffectthedegreeof a state's
in thisdirectionbyidentifying
concern for relativegains.107The next step is to develop a more explicit
ofthestrategicsettingsthatyieldoutcomeslikebalancingand
characterization
concerns.
relative-gains
When we look beyondthe narrownessof the neorealist-neoliberaldebate
about anarchyand the relative-gainsproblem,we see that this debate has
setofissues.These are the
focusedour attentionon a verybroad and important
or cooperativegains,the
the
for
joint
potential
absence of centralauthority,
and therolesofcoercion
engender,
conflict
these
potential
gains
distributional
in realizingand allocatingthesejointgains.This nexusofissues
and institutions
also lies at the heart of the expandingliteratureson constitutionaldesign,
108That a core of commonissues
governingthe commons,and stateformation.
underliesthese seeminglydisparatesubstantiveconcernsmakes it possible to
imagine movingbeyond what has become a rathersterile debate between
neorealismand neoliberalismin a waythatdrawson and contributesto these
otherliteratures.
107. Grieco,"Realist Theoryand the Problemof InternationalCooperation,"pp. 611-13. See
also Gowa and Mansfield,"Power Politicsand InternationalTrade."
Journalof
108. See, forexample,BarryWeingast,"Constitutionsas GovernanceStructures,"
Economics149 (March 1993), pp. 286-311; Elinor Ostrom,Governing
Institutional
and Theoretical
Press,1990); and Tilly,Capitaland Coercion.
theCommons(New York: CambridgeUniversity

Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist

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