How a Communications Campaign Saved Uber Billions

Transcription

“SEE WHAT HAPPENS”
HOW A COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN
SAVED UBER BILLIONS
2016 Arthur W. Page Society/Institute for Public Relations
Case Study Competition
This case study was submitted on January 15, 2016, to the Arthur W. Page Society and the Institute for Public Relations.
See What Happens: How a Communications Campaign Saved Uber Billions
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ 2
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 3
COMPANY BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3
History of Uber in the U.S. ............................................................................................................ 3
Corporate Culture and External Presence in New York City ......................................................... 3
COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN ....................................................................................................... 5
Campaign Stakeholders ................................................................................................................ 5
Campaign Objectives .................................................................................................................... 5
Campaign Messages...................................................................................................................... 5
Campaign Channels....................................................................................................................... 6
Campaign Result ........................................................................................................................... 9
PUBLIC RESPONSE ......................................................................................................................... 10
MEDIA RESPONSE .......................................................................................................................... 10
INDUSTRY RESPONSE..................................................................................................................... 10
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE AND REPUTATIONAL IMPACT ............................................................. 11
OVERALL STRATEGIC RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 11
APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF UBER COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN ................................................... 12
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 13
Page 1
ABSTRACT
Directly connecting campaigns to enterprise business value is something with which communicators across sectors
and industries often struggle.
The communications campaign undertaken by Uber in New York City in 2015 is a notable exception to this difficulty
of quantifying the value of effective communication. In June 2015, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio said he
would support legislation that would cap the growth of Uber in the city. Uber undertook an intense public relations
campaign in order to avoid losing its ability to grow its driver base, and therefore limit its access to the large source
of revenue in New York City. The month-long campaign combined strong digital storytelling, strategic advertising,
grassroots activation, and public affairs outreach and effectively secured Uber’s access to a $4.4 billion industry.
Keywords: Uber, Mayor Bill de Blasio, lobbying, advertisements, digital storytelling, advocacy, yellow taxi cabs,
grassroots activation, public affairs, New York City
Page 2
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Uber is a ride-hailing application that connects private drivers with people who want rides, and the app arrived in
New York City in 2011 (“Uber NYC,” 2011). By June 2015, Uber had established a strong presence in New York City.
The company was operating and growing by roughly 2,000 additional drivers per month (Isidore, 2015) and was
operating approximately 15,000 cars in the city (Hawkins, 2015). As Uber grew, it posed a significant business
threat to existing New York City yellow taxi cabs and other car services; from 2011 to 2014, the number of yellow
taxi trips taken in New York City fell by 11 percent (Rubinstein, 2015). Since its arrival in New York City, Uber has
provided approximately 82,000 rides per day (McAlone, 2015).
Citing concern about congestion on New York City streets, Mayor Bill de Blasio announced on June 30, 2015, that
he would support a bill by the city council that would cap Uber’s growth at 1 percent annually (or no more than
2,000 additional cars a year) until studies on the company’s impact to city traffic could be completed (Miller, 2015).
Uber reacted immediately, claiming the legislation was a political façade intended to protect the “big taxi owners”
(Campanile et al., 2015).
Uber then began an intense month-long advocacy campaign aimed at defeating the bill, utilizing strong digital
storytelling, strategic advertising, grassroots activation and public affairs outreach.
COMPANY BACKGROUND
History of Uber in the U.S.
In March 2009, Travis Kalanick founded UberCab in San Francisco after coming up with the idea for a low-cost
version of a black car service at a tech conference (McAlone, 2015). After compiling a team that included the soonto-be CEO Ryan Graves, UberCab launched in San Francisco in June 2010 to huge success, garnering millions of
dollars in additional seed funding by the following February (“Uber Crunchbase,” n.d.). In May 2011, the company
changed its name to Uber and launched in New York City (Uber NYC, 2011). By 2015, Uber had expanded to other
major cities like Washington, D.C. and Paris (“Cities,” n.d.). Uber has been immensely successful, and was valued at
$41 billion in 2014 (MacMillan, 2014).
Since its arrival in New York City, Uber has been plagued by various crises that posed threats to its reputation. In
2013, Uber New York manager Josh Mohrer and his team were caught ordering and then canceling thousands of
rides from competitor Lyft (Griswold, 2015). In 2014, it was discovered that Uber was able to “spy” on riders by
reporting their location information with permission (Whitehouse and Dugan, 2014). In June 2015, right before de
Blasio’s proposed growth cap, the Taxi and Limousine Commission of New York City seized 496 cars currently
affiliated with Uber’s bases between April 29 and June 15 for picking up street hails, an action not approved for
UberX drivers (Harshbarger, 2015). Overall, Uber has struggled through multiple controversies, including assaults
on Uber customers by Uber drivers, which led to criticisms of the company’s background check policy (Huddleston,
2014). This, however, has not dampened the company’s success: Uber was valued at $41 billion in 2014
(MacMillan, 2014).
Corporate Culture and External Presence in New York City
Corporate culture refers to “the shared values, attitudes, standards, and beliefs that characterize members of an
organization and define its nature” (Corporate culture, n.d.). Uber’s corporate culture is that of a disruptor: a
company—usually a startup company—that disrupts existing industries (CNBC’s Disruptor 50, 2014). Uber
disrupted the existing yellow taxi cab and limousine services in New York City by offering a more convenient
Page 3
option. No longer were New Yorkers required to stand out in the street and hail a cab. Instead, they pressed a
button and waited for the car to come to them. This disruption is in line with Uber’s corporate mission, namely
that Uber “is is evolving the way the world moves. By seamlessly connecting riders to drivers through our apps,
[Uber makes] cities more accessible, opening up more possibilities for riders and more business for drivers” (About
Us, n.d.). Uber effectively disrupted the New York City car service options by providing jobs to private drivers and
excellent experiences to consumers. Altogether, Uber’s various offerings (including the low-price UberX, the nicer
UberBlack, and even UberSUV) were directly in competition with the green, low-price taxis, the traditional yellow
cabs, and even the black car/livery services already working in New York City.
Uber’s business model of providing jobs to private drivers is in contrast to the existing New York City taxi service
that artificially depressed the supply of cabs and provided rich profit to taxi moguls (Zuylen-Wood, 2015). To do
this, New York City restricts the sale of taxi licenses, known as “medallions,” and the taxi moguls that own
hundreds of medallions run lucrative businesses by selling and renting the medallions to taxi drivers.
Disrupting these lucrative industries, however, has required Uber to constantly defend itself from various attacks.
New York taxi mogul Gene Freidman called Uber the “nastiest, most morally corrupt company ever” (ZuylenWood, 2015). Uber has also impacted the value of having the license to drive a yellow cab in New York City, which
is another main source of revenue for the taxi moguls. Zuylen-Wood (2015) adequately described the issue Uber
has caused in New York City by looking at the decreasing value of the taxi cab medallions.
To own a cab in New York, you need a medallion—a metal shield displayed on the vehicle’s hood—and
there are a fixed number issued by the New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission (TLC). Until very
recently, medallions were a good thing to have a lot of. In 1947, you could buy one for $2,500. In 2013,
after a half-century of steady appreciation, including a near-exponential period in the 2000s, they were
going for $1.32 million.
Then came Uber. Since the arrival of the car-by-app service, valued at about $50 billion, taxi ridership is
down, daily receipts have declined, and drivers are idling—or going to work for Uber. Add it up, and
desperate medallion sellers are trying to fob off their little tin ornaments for as little as $650,000.
Therefore, not only did Uber operate as a major competitor to the taxi industry in New York City at the time of de
Blasio’s announcement, it was also a threat to the value of the industry as a whole.
Uber’s corporate culture also involves an intense focus on consumer experience. Unlike competitor Lyft, tipping is
not a part of Uber’s presence. In response to why Uber does not allow tipping on the app, Uber replied, "With
Uber, there is no need to tip (…) Riders choose Uber for a seamless experience—a cashless and hassle-free ride.
However, if a rider absolutely insists on providing an additional cash tip, drivers are of course free to accept it”
(Riesman, 2014). By focusing on the consumer experience, Uber continues to fulfill the part of its mission that
states, “Uber's rapidly expanding global presence continues to bring people and their cities closer” (“About Us,”
2015). Many Uber customers choose to take Uber in New York City because it is “cleaner, easier, and I don’t feel
like I’m being an inconvenience by asking to be driven all the way to Brooklyn” (Author personal communication,
2015).
Uber’s other minor competitors include similar ride-hailing apps, such as Lyft. However, while Uber currently
operates six driver bases in New York City and its boroughs, Lyft only operates two (Ruble, 2015; Bhuiyan, 2014).
Page 4
Any legislation on the cap of Uber drivers would have also likely impacted Lyft, so in the case of this
communication campaign, Lyft was not regarded as a competitor.
Additionally, Uber posed a threat to the New York City public transportation system, the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA). Yellow taxis and other car services are required to pay taxes to the MTA, whereas
Uber drivers are not. Rubinstein (2015) predicted that if Uber continued its rate of growth, the MTA’s taxi-derived
revenues would decreased from $94 million in 2015 to $91 million in 2019. Overall, Uber entered the New York
City transportation market and disrupted major industries not only by pulling from its customer base, but also by
decreasing the value of the entire industry and decreasing its tax revenue.
COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN
Campaign Stakeholders
Uber identified many stakeholders in its campaign to defeat the cap legislation. The first and most important
stakeholder group was comprised of the politicians responsible for supporting and voting on the proposed
legislation. Uber needed to effectively communicate to this group without being accused of improper influence of
political leaders, as well as to maintain ethical public relations behavior. The second stakeholder group was
comprised of New York City Uber consumers, as they would immediately be affected by a cap on the growth in the
number of available Uber drivers. The third stakeholder group was New York City Uber drivers, who would also be
negatively affected by a driver cap. Finally, the fourth stakeholder group was Uber’s other U.S. counterparts,
including Uber drivers and Uber consumers. Legislation that succeeded in capping Uber’s growth would serve as
warning sign to Uber regarding its other markets – if Uber could be restricted in New York City, it could be
restricted anywhere. Therefore, Uber needed to communicate to its global stakeholder group of drivers, consumer
and politicians that Uber would not cower before legislation that benefited private interests and harmed drivers
and consumers.
Campaign Objectives
Uber’s first objective was behavioral: to stop the advance of de Blasio’s suggested restrictive legislation. Uber’s
second objective was informational: to notify its stakeholder groups about the negative effects of the legislation
and to ensure their support of Uber’s campaign. Uber’s third and final objective was motivational: to continue to
build and maintain positive feelings toward Uber in New York City and around the globe.
Campaign Messages
Uber’s campaign messages focused on the human stories behind Uber. The first key message was that a cap on
Uber’s growth would irreparably and seriously inconvenience the Uber consumer. The second key message was
that a cap on Uber’s growth would greatly harm the livelihood of the thousands of Uber drivers operating in New
York City. The third message used was that the presence of Uber was a net benefit to New York City by providing a
way for car owners to make money by helping those who don’t own cars. Finally, the fourth, and more masked
message, was that the proposed cap on Uber’s growth was not, as it was advertised, to address congestion.
Rather, it was a poorly disguised façade to protect political interests of the taxi/car service lobbies and the MTA.
Uber shared these messages through a variety of channels, but focused on strong digital storytelling, strategic
advertising, grassroots activation, and public affairs outreach.
Page 5
Campaign Channels
One major channel Uber used to communicate
its message that a cap on Uber’s growth would
inconvenience the Uber consumer was digital
storytelling. In July 2015, Uber implemented a
prank “de Blasio” mode on its app (Lapowsky,
2015). When consumers opened the app, they
had their usual array of Uber choices—UberT,
UberPool, UberX, UberRUSH, and Eats–but
there was an addition of a “de Blasio” option.
When selected, the consumer would see a
longer-than-usual wait time, with an ominous
message that said, “See What Happens” (Image
1.a) instead of the traditional “Set Pickup
Location” (Image 1.b). When the consumer
clicked on “See What Happens,” the original
message would disappear, and the consumer
would read that there were no cars available to
Image 1.a
Image 1.b
pick them up (Image 1.c). When the consumer
clicked on the message, a new window would open that was titled “De Blasio’s Uber.” The message read, “Take
Action. This is what Uber will look like in NYC if Mayor de Blasio’s Uber cap bill passes. Email the Mayor and City
Council. Say ‘NO’ to de Blasio’s Uber!” The message was then followed with a link to email local politicians. “Keep
NYC moving forward,” the message implored (Image 1.c).
This channel was immensely effective. Users took to Twitter
and other social properties to express the surprise and
frustration about the (hypothetical) wait time. The app
feature itself garnered thousands of media placements,
including in the New York Times. For New Yorkers that had
not heard about the bill, the app feature immediately
spurred their interest, and sparked conversation on forums
like Reddit. Uber then invited de Blasio to an online debate
regarding the cap, which he rejected, saying, "Uber is a
multibillion-dollar corporation, and they're acting like one,"
(“Mayor de Blasio rejects,” 2015). By using its app to
engage in its messaging, Uber effectively targeted one of its
main stakeholder groups, New York City Uber consumers. It
also served to support all three major objectives, to stop
Image 1.c
the advance of the legislation (the call to action to contact
politicians), to inform stakeholders about the legislation, and to build and support positive feelings of Uber
(showing that Uber would no longer be as convenient with a cap in place.)
Page 6
Image 2.a
Another channel Uber used in its month-long campaign against the driver cap
legislation was strategic advertising. The advertising included television ads,
mailers and digital ads, and cost Uber an estimated $3 million (Zuylen-Wood,
2015). The television ads Uber ran in protest of the proposed legislation focused
on the human interest stories behind Uber. One advertisement focused on the
stories of the Uber drivers (Lapowsky, 2015). “I was pretty much struggling to
make ends meet,” one Uber Driver-Partner, Jashiel, says in the advertisement.
“When I finally came to Uber, it was probably the best thing that’s happened in
my life. It’s been a blessing” (“Uber,” 2015). “I make more money and spend
more time with my family,” another Uber Driver-Partner, Lassana, added. The
advertisement continued with text that read, “Mayor de Blasio is pushing the
agenda of his big taxi donors to limit Uber cars and drivers, killing thousands of
jobs around the city.” The advertisement then turned to focus on de Blasio, with
another Uber Driver-Partner saying, “He should know the struggles that most
New Yorkers go through and embrace the fact that people want to go to work,”
while another calls out de Blasio’s political interests as his reason for trying to
cap Uber. The advertisement ends with a call to action for viewers to tell the
mayor that, “You promised to end income inequality. Don’t put taxi donors
ahead of jobs” (“Uber,” 2015).
An additional advertisement that Uber used was titled, “Don’t let Mayor de
Blasio strand New Yorkers.” The advertisement, again circulated on local
television, still focused on human interest stories, but in this case the stories
were of Uber users. The advertisement takes the viewer through various
scenarios, like a nurse needing to get to the night shift from the Bronx, a father
needing to take his baby to the hospital in Queens and a college student trying
to get to the airport from Brooklyn. All of the mentioned areas are New York
City neighborhoods that yellow cabs will often “refuse” service to (“Uber,”
2015). The advertisement states that, unlike cabs, “Uber is there, taking more
people to and from communities outside Manhattan than anyone” (“Uber,”
2015). The advertisement then ends with a call to action, asking viewers to tell
de Blasio not to strand New Yorkers who are not serviced by yellow cabs to
serve his own political interest (“Uber,” 2015).
Uber’s television advertising utilized three of its key messages: that a cap on
Uber’s growth would greatly harm the livelihood of the thousands of New York
City Uber drivers, it would seriously inconvenience Uber consumers and that
the cap served only to protect political interests of transportation lobbies
Image 2.b
that donated to de Blasio. The call to action at the end of the advertisements
supported the first objective of stopping the legislation, while the human interest stories of the drivers and
consumers supported the second and third objectives of informing stakeholders about the effect of the proposed
legislation, as well as to build and support positive feelings toward Uber. Through this advertisement, Uber
positioned itself as the savior to many New Yorkers who were employed by Uber, communicating that Uber was
Page 7
akin to the Robin Hood fighting against New York City’s version of Sheriff Nottingham by stealing from the rich
(politicians and taxi lobbies) and giving to the poor (the thousands of predominantly minority Uber drivers and all
Uber consumers).
Both Uber’s digital storytelling and strategic advertising contributed to
another important communications channel – grassroots activation.
While both channels were effective on their own, when combined, they
served to energize Uber’s stakeholder base to speak out against the
proposed legislation.
Image 3.a
Image 3.b
Uber drivers and supporters protested in front of the offices of the Taxi
and Limousine Commission in New York City, and others took to social
media to express their support for Uber. It was not just the everyday New
York City Uber consumer who was speaking out on social media. Major Alist celebrities came out in favor of Uber and its campaign against the
proposed ban. Kate Upton tweeted to her 2.19 million followers,
“.@BilldeBlasio Why do you want to return to days when only those in
Midtown & Lower Manhattan could get a ride? #UberMovesNYC”
(Edelman et al., 2015) and was retweeted 883 times. New Yorker Neil
Patrick Harris also joined the fray, tweeting “.@BilldeBlasio: 25K new
residents use @Uber_NYC each week. How is a fixed # of cars supposed
to serve this demand for rides? #UberMovesNYC” (Harris, 2015) to his
21.3 million followers, and was retweeted more than a thousand times.
Actor Ashton Kutcher tweeted 26 times in support of Uber during the
campaign, reaching his 17.3 million followers with messages like
“.@NYCCouncil is considering a bill that threatens to destroy 10,000 NYC
job opportunities. @deBlasioNYC, oppose ban on new @Uber_NYC cars”
(Kutcher, 2015). By having famous actors and actresses speak out in
support of Uber, Uber was able to mobilize a stakeholder base that was
far larger than just New York City Uber consumers. It is not known
whether these 3rd party advocates were enlisted by Uber. However, if
their involvement was unprompted, it indicates a massive public relations
win for Uber, as Uber’s messaging was shared with a much larger
audience through their support.
Another example of Uber’s grassroots activation was its support by outer borough politicians like Brooklyn
Borough President Eric Adams and Bronx Assemblyman Michael Blake, who both criticized de Blasio’s proposed
legislation for reducing job and transportation opportunities for minority New Yorkers, especially in the outer
boroughs. Assemblyman Blake said at an Uber-organized event,
If you have been a person of color and you stood out on the sidewalk and a taxi passed you by, if you are
someone that is trying to figure out how to make ends meet from our communities, and ‘I just need a job
to make sure I have an opportunity for my family,’ if I’m just trying to figure out how to have more justice
Page 8
in my communities, that’s why you stand on the side of Uber (…) This legislation is wrong, plain and simple
(Bredderman, 2015).
By engaging key politicians, Uber was able to exponentially improve its efforts of grassroots activation. Uber also
provided free UberPOOL rides to those seeking to attend an Uber-organized rally at City Hall, another instance of
grassroots activation to strengthen support for the campaign (Kosoff, 2015).
Finally, the last channel Uber utilized in its campaign was public affairs outreach. Uber hired a large team of
lobbyists and communicators to reach out to the politicians that could influence and/or would vote on the
proposed legislation. Rubinstein and Nahmias called it “an assertion of political muscularity by a private interest
that was unrivaled in recent New York history,” as Uber’s efforts to sway councilmembers in their favor was,
“relentless and overwhelming (…) by [the end of the campaign] City Hall and the City Council were ready to give in,
even though many participants, including City Hall officials, contend de Blasio had the necessary votes to pass the
cap” (para. 40-42, 2015). Working in tandem with its digital, grassroots and advertising channels, Uber’s lobbyists
focused on three major rules: “Spend whatever it takes to hire a critical mass of the best operatives in New York
City, exploit existing rifts between the mayor and fellow Democrats, spend millions on ads and direct mail, and find
a way to create trouble for de Blasio with his base” (para. 9, 2015). Uber’s public affairs efforts led to success,
including a statement by Comptroller Scott Stringer opposing the ban, New York City Council member Dan
Garodnick saying he planned to vote against the bill, and even New York Governor Andrew Cuomo blatantly
opposing the cap in a radio interview (Lapowsky, 2015). Uber’s public affairs outreach can be shown in its
pursuance of Governor Cuomo’s support – according to Rubinstein (November 2015), Uber executives had met
with Governor Cuomo and essentially asked him to possibly overrule de Blasio's Uber cap with an executive order
if the legislation passed (para. 13). Uber also used other forms of public affairs outreach, including sending mailers
to the constituents of the City Council members to encourage them to contact their councilors in support of Uber
(Kosoff, 2015).
Uber’s public affairs outreach, while operating out of the spotlight, likely included all four of Uber’s key messages
to convince councilmembers to rise up against the mayor. This channel also served two of Uber’s objectives. First,
it went to the source of support for the bill to stop the advance of the legislation by de Blasio. Uber also informed
the city council members, an Uber stakeholder group, about the negative effects of the legislation in order to stop
the legislation from advancing.
Campaign Result
On July 22, 2015, de Blasio’s office capitulated to the growing pressure to abandon the proposed legislation, and
instead announced the city would conduct a study in partnership with Uber on New York City traffic congestion to
further illuminate whether Uber and other ride-hailing apps were contributing to congestion (Lapowsky, 2015).
The city had approached Uber with a revised plan the week before, which the company rejected because the plan
still proposed a cap; however, the day before de Blasio announced the agreement with Uber, Uber called for a
closed-door meeting with the administration to discuss a deal (Bhuiyan, 2015).
A statement from New York First Deputy Mayor Anthony Shorris said that the agreement “sets in motion a plan to
guide a comprehensive and fair public response, driven by data, to the increase in for-hire vehicles. And it ensures
that the future growth of this industry matches the values and the interests of New Yorkers” (para. 3). Uber
responded with a statement of its own through its general manager of New York City, Josh Mohrer. Mohrer said,
Page 9
We’re pleased to have reached an agreement with Mayor de Blasio’s administration and the City Council
to collaborate on a joint transportation study and to work together on ways to continue expanding
economic opportunity, mobility and transportation access in the city (…) Together, we can build an even
better, more reliable transportation system. This is great news for all New Yorkers, including Uber riders
and drivers (para. 7).
Uber also agreed to more widely share its rider and trip data to assist in the study, and the deal allowed the city to
re-visit a cap on Uber’s growth in the future (Lapowsky, 2015).
PUBLIC RESPONSE
In response to Uber’s campaign, New Yorkers sent nearly 50,000 emails to
the mayor’s office and the City Council, and posted more than 18,000 tweets
in support of the company, with more than half of the tweets using the
hashtag #UberMovesNYC (Nichols, 2015). When the mayor’s office
announced it was dropping the cap legislation, many New Yorkers lauded de
Blasio’s decision to drop the legislation and shared their opinions on social
media.
MEDIA RESPONSE
Image 4.a
The media extensively covered the month-long Uber campaign. The campaign generated thousands of articles,
including significant coverage from the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other top-tier
outlets. Much of the coverage focused on aspects related to Uber’s key messages, noting the public opinion that
de Blasio’s proposed legislation was related to donations to his campaign from taxi/transportation groups, and
that a cap on Uber would hurt both Uber New York City consumers and drivers. Overall, coverage was neutral;
however, a few high-profile pieces focused on Uber’s excessive lobbying and use of corporate muscle to pressure
New York City politicians to capitulate to Uber’s demands. Mayor Bill de Blasio also published an op-ed in the New
York Daily News addressing his proposed Uber cap – however, the op-ed was widely regarded as weak
(Palagashvili, 2015).
INDUSTRY RESPONSE
Ride-sharing services similar to Uber lauded de Blasio’s decision to drop the proposed growth cap, as the cap
would have seriously limited them, as well. In a statement, Lyft, an Uber competitor, said in a statement, “We
thank the City Council for listening to our concerns about removing carpooling options, which we see as part of the
solution to traffic congestion (…) We will continue working together with the City Council and the TLC to build a
more sustainable future for New York” (Lapowsky, 2015).
Statements from taxi-related associations were less laudatory. Bhairavi Desai, the executive director of the New
York Taxi Workers Alliance, said the mayor “just basically caved” (Flegenheimer, 2015). Gene Freidman, taxi mogul,
expressed frustration with the politics behind the legislation. Zuylen-Wood reported that Freidman had stopped
going to City Council, calling the council “irrelevant” (2015).
Page 10
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE AND REPUTATIONAL IMPACT
Increase in Uber Drivers, March October 2015
40,000
30,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
13,000
0
(Hawkins, 2015).
Since Uber’s campaign ended, the ride-hailing company has
grown its number of Uber drivers from approximately 13,000
drivers in March 2015 to 30,000 drivers in October 2015. Fare
revenue for Uber drivers also increased 6.3 percent, from
$36.96/hour in 2014 to $39.30/hour in October 2015
(Hawkins, 2015). Overall, Uber’s reputation improved in New
York and in other cities, as its victory effectively showed any
effort to block Uber’s entrance and growth was ill-fated. In
summary, by engaging in proactive, powerful
communication, Uber solidified its ability to grow in an
industry worth billions, both in New York City and around the
globe.
OVERALL STRATEGIC RESULTS
In regard to the communication field as a whole, the case study of Uber’s campaign shows the quantifiable value of
the profession. By engaging in consumer and stakeholder relations, Uber gave the public relations field verified
insight into the tangible business value of a well-executed communications campaign. By engaging in this
campaign, Uber secured its right (at least for the following months) to grow its driver base to gain even more
access to the $4.4 billion transportation industry in New York City.
However, Uber will continue to face challenges in 2016. After the congestion study is completed, Uber will need to
grapple with the results and any further efforts to cap its growth in New York City. If the congestion report does
implicate Uber for increased congestion, Uber will need to engage in further proactive and reactive communication
across a variety of channels to continue its access to the New York City consumer base.
Page 11
APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF UBER COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN
July 22, 2015, 5:15 p.m.
Mayor Bill de Blasio announces he will no longer support a cap on Uber
growth until congestion study is completed.
Page 12
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Images (in order)
Title Page
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Page 15

How a Communications Campaign Saved Uber Billions

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