wax tokyo trip: recap - Wharton Asia Exchange

Transcription

Volume 2
Brought to you by
Spring 2010
WHARTON ASIA
JOURNAL
In Anticipation of the Shanghai Expo:
Pavilions and 70 million visitors
WAX Tokyo Trip: Recap
Wharton Asia Journal | Spring 2010
Top 10 Hidden Places to go in Beijing
1
Editor’s note
Welcome to the second issue of the Wharton Asia Journal! This journal is a subsidiary
publication under the Wharton Asia Exchange, a professional undergraduate student-run
organization of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. The purpose of this
journal is to expand on the goals of the Wharton Asia Exchange in educating the Penn community about the current Asian business, cultural, and political environment.
We saw a lack of publications on campus focusing on Asia, and we were inspired to spearhead an effort to revive the Wharton Asia Journal this year. Our committee (Jane Cheng,
Sussy Shi, Yaowen Ma) worked tirelessly to present this issue to you. We would also like to
thank our mentor, Jenny Fan, and the rest of the board of Wharton Asia Exchange for their
support. Lastly, we owe so much to our local sponsors, Koreana Restaurant and Sangkee
Noodle House, without whom we would not have been able to publish!
This issue includes a preview of the much-anticipated World Exposition 2010 in Shanghai, an interview with Richard Block (VP Marketing for Haier America), an insider’s guide
to Beijing, and a recap of WAX’s spring trip this year to Tokyo, among other articles. These
articles and our efforts will hopefully expand the scope of knowledge of business in Asia in
the university community. The Wharton Asia Journal is still developing, and if you like to get
involved with writing or publishing, please visit www.whartonasia.net/journal.
Tina Sun & Kelvin Poon
Contributors:
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Editors-in-Chief
Rachel Bleustein
Kelvin Poon
Tina Sun
T-off Chutima
Layout Editor
Jane Cheng
Managing Editor
Sussy Shi
Business Editor
Yaowen Ma
Jenny Fan
Jaesok Kim
Michael Ro
Sussy Shi
Tina Sun
Eli Tung
Student Advisor
Jenny Fan
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Jacques DeLisle
Sephen A. Cozen Professor of Law
The Wharton Asia Journal
is affiliated with the Wharton Asia Exchange (WAX)
student organization. The
views expressed by the contributors are not necessarily
those of the Wharton Asia
Journal or the Wharton
Asia Exchange.
Wharton Asia Exchange
[email protected]
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104
To submit an essay for review
and publication by the Wharton Asia Journal, or to subscribe to the Journal, please
visit:
http://www.whartonasia.net/
journal/
Cover image: http://vyonyx.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/vyonyx_foster_uae_expo_shanghai_03.jpg
Table of Contents
4
Changing Politics of Cultural Hierarchy in
South Korean Transnational Corporations
in China
Jaesok Kim
13
China Uses Currency Swaps to Avoid the
Problematic Dollar
Rachel Bleustein
17
Tokyo Trip
T-off Chutima & Eli Tung
20
Better City, Better Life: Shanghai World
Exposition 2010
Sussy Shi
22
Richard Block Teaches the “Haier” Way
Tina Sun
24
Beijing’s Top 10 for Stingy Students
Jenny Fan
26
Sponsored by
The Korean Wave and the Japanese Wave
from the Eyes of the Knee-Slap Shaman
Michael Ro
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The Korean Wave and the Japanese Wave
from the Eyes of the Knee-Slap Shaman
Culture
Michael Ro
Michael Ro is a junior at the University of Pennsylvania majoring in East Asian Languages and
Culture and Japanese Studies
In a November of 2007 episode of
“The Knee-Slap Shaman,” a popular
Korean talk show, a Korean ballad
singer named Si-Kyung Sung criticized the government regulations of
Korean public radio playing Japanese
music:
4
Japanese music cannot be
played on public broadcast. There
are many good songs, and culture
is culture […] since ten years ago
J-Pop has been entering Korea and
they exist in the broadcast companies but the reality is that J-pop is
not to be played. I think it is better that we fix such waste of energy
and discrimination.
(The Knee-Slap Shaman, translated by author, 11/1/2007)
He was listing his grievances regarding the current status of Korean
media and its limitations from the
perspective of a Korean singer and
a fellow radio DJ. The emcee asked
the singer whether he fears the response from the Internet users, and
upon broadcasting of the episode,
the press duly labeled him as a controversial figure. As a result, the
singer created a significantly large
debate within the Internet forums
regarding whether it was appropriate
for the singer to give such a direct
opinion against the Korean media
industry and the government.
The show provides a starting point
for this study in that its ratings often
average around fifteen percent, as
compared to other rival shows during the same time slot that remain in
the single digits, so “The Knee-Slap
Shaman” reaches a fairly large portion of the Korean public. The idea
behind the talk show is that Korean
singers, actors, and more recently,
non-TV personalities, come with
their problems for the Knee-Slap Shaman to solve. By asking these singers
and actors a variety of questions, the
Knee-Slap Shaman draws out honest answers regarding their personal
lives or views regarding Korean society as a whole. Furthermore, one can
view the immediate public response
and therefore what the citizens think
about these issues and problems via
the forum and discussion boards
dealing with each episode of “The
Knee-Slap Shaman” on the Internet.
Thus, the popularity of the show, its
emphasis on honesty of celebrity figures, and active participation of the
Internet community allow this study
to use specific episodes of the talk
show as an accurate scope to view the
current Korean media world.t
Image source: http://wonderfulsworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/
jyp-and-WG.jpg
Hosts of the popular Korean TV Show, The Knee-Slap Shaman
pop cultural flow between Korea and
Japan remains skewed. To do so, this
paper will explain what is known as
the Hanryu phenomenon in Japan,
and how similar effects did not occur in Korea. Then, it will cite two
widely accepted explanations for
such one-way flow of pop culture:
historical antagonism and institutionalization of anti-Japanese sentiments. This study will then offer an
additional explanation that scholars
previously have not considered as
one of the primary causes –nationalistic Korean netizens – to widen the
scope of view upon observing the
cultural flow between the two Asian
countries. Secondly, this paper demonstrates the importance of having a
corresponding Japanese Wave in Korea in order to allow for the possibility of creating a foundation for the
two countries to have a more positive
perception towards one another.
The Rise of the Korean Wave in Japan:
What is Hanryu?
Hanaki, Singhal, and others appropriately define the meaning of Hanryu in the following sentence:
Hanryu (literally ‘Korean wave’),
referring to the current fad for all
aspects of South Korean popular
culture –movies, music, online
games, hip-hop clothes, hairstyles
and cosmetics – is sweeping across
East Asia like a cultural tsunami
(Hanaki et al, 281).
Indeed, contrary to the expectations of many people who believed
in the absolute dominance of the
West in the East Asian pop culture
The purpose of this study then is
to ask what is it that made Si-Kyung
Sung give such an opinion regarding
the regulations. What are the reasons
that Korean public broadcasting still
does not allow J-pop? What do Korean citizens think about this? It is clear
that Korea has long since consumed
Japanese culture in various aspects:
karaoke and Japanese restaurants fill
the night streets of Seoul, mangas occupy their own section in the bookstore, and Korean media borrows
variety show formulas from Japanese
companies. With the recent Korean
culture boom in Japan, and given
the apparent constant interaction between Korean and Japan, one would
expect a reciprocal phenomenon to
take place in Korea, but the peninsula currently lacks the explicit craze
over Japanese culture, and the media
still maintains its conservative position towards Japanese pop culture.
On a bigger picture, this study
serves to achieve two goals. First, it
analyzes in-depth how and why the
On a bigger picture, this study
serves to achieve two goals. First, it
analyzes in-depth how and why the
pop cultural flow between Korea and
Japan remains skewed. To do so, this
paper will explain what is known as
the Hanryu phenomenon in Japan,
and how similar effects did not occur in Korea. Then, it will cite two
widely accepted explanations for such
one-way flow of pop culture: historical antagonism and institutionalization of anti-Japanese sentiments. This
study will then offer an additional
explanation that scholars previously
have not considered as one of the
primary causes –nationalistic Korean
netizens – to widen the scope of view
upon observing the cultural flow between the two Asian countries. Secondly, this paper demonstrates the
importance of having a corresponding Japanese Wave in Korea in order
to allow for the possibility of creating
a foundation for the two countries to
have a more positive perception towards one another.
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scene, Korean drama found its market in Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Taiwan, and made its way to Japan in
the 90s. With increasing number of
Korean TV shows broadcast in Japan
and their rising ratings, Japan eventually became the country that consumes Korean dramas the most other
than Korea itself by 2004, thanks to
the craze of Japanese women over a
Korean love drama named “Winter
Sonata.”
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Studies attribute the rise of the
Hanryu boom to a variety of causes.
Some Japanese appreciate the creativity found in the youth of the current
generation, some find attraction in
the freedom of expression deriving
from democracy in Korea, which
leads to more outgoing lyrics and
fashion sense for Korean idol groups,
or to “its characteristic dynamism (as
displayed in Korean dance music),
highly entertaining nature, admirable production quality, and niche
market position.” Because Korean
media companies put emphasis on
charisma upon raising popular male
idol groups, it is likely that the combination of manhood and mysticism
of the young idols appealed to the
Japanese population, based on the response of one middle-aged Japanese
woman to “Winter Sonata,” who
claims that Korean entertainment
provides a much more masculine image of an Asian man that Japanese
media lacks. Before moving onto
further discussing the Hanryu phenomenon, however, it is necessary to
further look into what was the driving force behind forming the Korean
Wave in Japan particularly – “Winter
Sonata”.
Winter Sonata and
Its Effects on Japan
At a first glance, the plot of Winter Sonata perplexes the audience
who has not previously experienced
similar kinds of drama. The main
character Jun-Sang falls in love with
a woman named Yu-Jin in high
school, but due to a road accident,
he loses his memory. Ten years later,
he comes back to Korea with the
name Min-Hyung and again falls in
love with Yu-Jin through multiple
coincidences. As they both battle
through oppositions from both sides
of the family, they work towards preserving their love when once again
Jun-Sang gets in a second road accident and this time becomes blind.
However, he regains the memory of
his high school days and with it his
first love for Yu-Jin and the drama
ends with Jun-Sang and Ju-Jin finally succeeding in bearing fruit to
their first loves.
Yet, this overly complicated love
story found its audience in Japan
and created a massive craze over the
drama and the actors. According
to Public Opinion Research Division of the NHK Broadcasting
Culture Research Institute, 38
percent of the entire Japanese
population had seen Winter Sonata at least once
in 2003. Along with
such craze, numerous associated
products
such
as calendars and
perfumes
were
sold to Japanese
women,
and
the actor who
portrayed JunSang,
YongJoon Bae, gained
Scene from Winter Sonata, the popular Korean drama
Image source: http://www.krystalheart.com/images/ws07.jpg
fame throughout Japan to a point
when he landed in Narita airport to
have a fan reception, over 3,500 fans
flooded the airport to greet him.
With the success of Winter Sonata,
more dramas found opportunities
for broadcasting in Japan, such as a
historical story about a cook and a
physician set in the Chosun era called
Dae Jang Geum, broadcast from late
2003 to early 2004, and more recently, Coffee Prince, depicting a relationship between a tomboyish girl
who pretends to be a male working
in a coffee shop, and a man who falls
in love with the girl, shown to the
Korean public in 2007. Some studies also point to the fact that with the
potryal of pure love in Winter Sonata
and ideas of right and wrong in Dae
Jang Geum, Korean dramas had the
effect of giving positive image of Korean culture to the Japanese public.
Indeed, one of the avid viewers of
the Winter Sonata
answered:
I had had a sort of hatred toward
Zainichi Koreans in Japan until
that time. But after watching Winter Sonata, I felt like the feeling of
hatred weakened to a certain degree, if not absolutely. I began to
feel closer to them and became interested in talking to them.
Thus, for many viewers, Winter
Sonata and subsequent rise of the
Korean Wave facilitated the overcoming of past historical tensions.
With a more positive image, the Japanese people became more receptive
towards Korean cultural products, as
shown by another interviewee who
changed her dietary habits to include
Korean dishes:
After watching Winter Sonata, I
became very interested in South
Korean dramas. I watched several
South Korean dramas, such as
First Love, Images of Love (True
to Love), and Hotelier, mainly the
ones starring Bae Yong-Joon, on
video. I started to pay attention
to South Korean sections of TV
schedules. I began to eat Korean
seaweed, barbecue, and kimchi.
Limits of Hanryu
Research
Before moving on to discuss the
Japanese side of this cultural flow,
however, it is important to note that
this study also reveals that studies
First, the study shows statistical bias
in that the number of interviewees is
significantly lacking to make concrete
conclusions about the Japanese society as a whole, as 31 interviewees cannot account for the entire island as
accurate representations of Japanese
sentiments regarding the drama and
Korea itself. The analysis also seems
exaggerated – 3,500 people did indeed fill the Narita airport, but that
is not a usual happening in Japan,
and the effects of Winter Sonata in
changing the perceptions of Korea is
stretched a bit too far.
It is impossible to deny that the
Hanryu boom happened in Japan,
but without a concrete tool to accurately judge how far the effects went
and how much it changed the perceptions of the Japanese people regarding
Korean popular culture, discussing
the lack of Japanese Wave in Korea
becomes much more difficult without a proper counterpart. Thus, more
scholars should look into researching
the widespread effects of the Hanryu
boom and then look into comparing
the Korean Wave with the Japanese
Wave.
Pervasiveness of
Japanese Culture
and the Lack of
“Japanese Wave”
In some ways, it is difficult to see
the imbalance of the pop culture
flow between Korea and Japan, because other cultural icons of Japan
have their incredible influence in Korea, similar to what other East Asian
countries are experiencing. However,
this study will provide case for the
existence of a skew in the culture
flow by first pointing out the vast effects of Japanese culture in the daily
lives of Koreans and then analyzing
the television and musical scene to
argue for the lack of equivalent craze
over J-drama and J-pop.
Manga, Sushi,
and Concept Trade
Firstly, manga and anime culture
thrives throughout East Asia, and
Korea is not an exception. Since the
1970s, Korea television has shown
Japanese cartoons to the general
public, albeit severely stripped of
its content that contains “Japaneseness.” Furthermore, once the Korean
government fully lifted the ban on
broadcasting of Japanese materials,
broadcasting companies began to
show more anime on television to a
point where today a significant portion of the time table of Tooniverse
, a cartoon network primarily aimed
at Korean children, provides Japanese cartoons for the general mass
and online sites provide manga to
children.
Even dietary habits in Korea are
beginning to feel the reach of Japan
via plates of sushi on Koreans’ dinner
tables. Korea, as one of the three main
sea powers in East Asia, continues to
buy fresh fish from the “moving auction” to serve the Japanese delicacy
to the general public. Nowadays, it
is not unusual to see Japanese restaurants serve raw fish in the middle of
busy city streets of Korea and attract
With Korean culture becoming
more familiar within the Japanese
population, more people became curious about the peninsula, which lead
to an increase in travel rates to Korea.
From Winter Sonata-related business
alone, Korean economy managed to
raise $12 million, which accounted
for a significant boost to Korea’s cultural export.
done on Hanryu and the Japanese
Wave up until now have been minimal and often times inconsistent.
While Hanaki’s work provides important insights into the interpretative analysis of the Hanryu wave, this
paper shows that as an accurate analysis of the Hanryu boom and subsequently as a tool for understanding
the Japanese pop-culture flow, it is
insufficient.
7
many customers. One can even expect to find pre-made onigiri of various flavors in any regular 7-Elevens.
Furthermore, despite the regulatory
aspects of the media and the government, Korean television programs allude to the pervasiveness of Japanese
culture by consuming the so-called
“concept trade” from Japan. In other
words, numerous Korean talk shows
and variety programs borrow their
show formulas from Japanese companies and tailor them to the Korean
public. This is best shown by comparing “Ningen Tetris,” a popular
Japanese program that requires contestants to take humorous positions
in order to pass through a moving
wall with oddly shaped holes, with a
Korean show called “Jungshin Tong
Ill.” One of its segments also featured
a moving wall with holes, and the
shapes often directly mirrored their
Japanese counterparts. Moreover, a
show named the “Warawanai Toshokan” that originated from Japan also
made its way to Korea and became
indigenized with the same name,
once again proving that even in the
television scene, Japanese culture indirectly exercises its influence.
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Where are the J-drama and J-Pop?
Despite the obvious acceptance of
Japanese culture into its daily life,
Korea still has not seen the Japanese
equivalent of “Winter Sonata,” of
Yong-Joon Bae, and of Japanese idol
groups. Said another way, there is
no explicit Japanese Wave in Korea.
This is a surprising result in that even
before the colonization of Korea by
Japan, the two East Asian countries
have interacted with one another
through diplomacy, and based on
their geographical and psychological
closeness, opportunities for sharing of
culture remained abundant through
the flow of time. Furthermore, Kore-
an and Japan had a correlation in the
growth of internet and in economic
activities prior to Japan’s recession,
creating a similarity in the kinds of
pop cultures enjoyed in both countries and their respective Internet usage in consuming pop culture, thus
making it reasonable to expect similar kinds of cultural phenomenon to
occur in both countries, not just one.
Yet, in terms of recent popular
culture, Japan has not fared well in
entering the Korean market. Following its fully open policy towards Jdramas and J-pop, the Korean government allowed cable and satellite
televisions to broadcast J-dramas in
2004; however the viewership ratings remain below one percent, a
number significantly lower than Kdramas that sometimes climb up to
30% range in Korea, and even American television programs that seem to
have gained a following, especially
“Prison Break.”
Most Korean teenagers continue to
watch up-to-date K-dramas tailored
for youth, and J-dramas remain for
the most hardcore mania fans mostly
consisting of Korean women who
seem to feel a sense of “contemporaneity” with the J-dramas. This is
nowhere close to the craze of 3,500
Japanese fans that filled the Narita
airport to see the so-called Yon-sama;
the Korean public cannot see Japanese actors coming to Korea in order
to promote their respective dramas.
The musical scene also refuses to
provide an opportunity for J-pop artists to properly enter the Korean market. As mentioned before, although
a radio station in Korea may play
modern American pop or rock music, the DJ never selects a J-pop song
for playing, or rather, has no choice
but to not select a J-pop song due to
the regulations within the broadcasting media companies. However, this
is not only an issue within the media and the government. Most of the
Korean public voluntarily listens to
non-J-pop music, as denoted by the
rankings within Korean music sites
like Inkigayo.
Even on the Korean MTV site,
despite the fact that the website contains a separate category specifically
for J-pop, Japanese songs never enter
the top of the rankings; only upon
clicking through numerous groups
can one finally manage to locate a
Japanese song, usually one that is
sung by popular Korean idol groups
who have made their debut in Japan
upon riding the Korean Wave. This is
in stark contrast to Korean artists like
BoA and Dong Bang Shin Ki who
have entered the top five of the Oricon charts in Japan numerous times,
and most recently, a popular Korean
idol group named Big Bang has successfully debuted in Japan with an
exclusive Japanese album and placed
third on the Oricon charts this year,
2009.
Two Common Explanations until Now
The above examples provide a legitimate case for arguing that popular culture flow between Korean and
Japan is skewed. Scholars have indirectly alluded to this phenomenon,
and from the various works that
this study has collected, two causes
– historical hatred theory and the
internalization of such animosity on
behalf of the government – were the
most frequently mentioned.
Historical antagonism
between Korea and Japan
Tensions felt by the Koreans towards the Japanese can be attributed
to three main causes: the colonization
of Korea by Japan, issues surrounding
comfort women during war times,
and the ownership controversy over
Dokdo or Takeshima.
The first cause most frequently referred to by the scholars and the media alike is what the Koreans call Iljae
Gangjumgi, or the Japanese Forced
Occupation. Following the victory
of Japan over Russia in the RussoJapanese War, Japan made Korea its
protectorate under the Eulsa Treaty in
1905, which eventually evolved into
full annexation in 1910. Under the
Japanese imperial rule, the Koreans
were forced to change their names
to Japanese, a system known as the
changssi gaemyung, and to speak the
Japanese language, which is the reason why older generations even today
still retain the ability to communicate
in Japanese. The Japanese government
then assimilated the Korean royal
court and drafted significant number
of Koreans to the Japanese military to
support the Pacific War.
Secondly, the recent issues surrounding comfort women once
again made the two countries revisit
the unsolved problems of the colonial ruling era. During the occupation, numerous women from Korea
were drafted or forcibly taken from
households to serve as sexual slaves
for the Japanese military, and many
were released well after the war.
Upon observing the bettering relations between Korea and Japan over
time, ex-comfort women called for
media attention and demanded the
Japanese government for an apology
for the war crimes, but once again
Japan restrained from offering a full
apology to the public and dismissed
the issue, infuriating many of Korean officials and causing public anger in many of older generations in
Japan.
Finally, the ongoing issue of
whether Japan or Korea has the
rights over Dokdo Island or Takeshima continues to cause public debate
and delays improvement in diplomatic relations between Korea and
Japan. Economically, the island
holds significance in that the ownership of the island gives large amount
of sea control for the fishing industry of either country to take advantage of. More importantly however,
this battle has been an ideological
one, with both sides arguing that
they had ownership of the island
first. There have been many movements in Korea to fix the denotation of the island from Takeshima
to Dokdo Island on the map. A
popular Korean singer named Jang-
Hoon Kim personally convinced the
New York Times to create a full-page
article discussing the issue surrounding the island, and to denote the waters around the island as the East Sea
before calling it the Sea of Japan. Issues like these often make even the
general public to have some form of
anti-Japanese sentiment in the form
of nationalism, creating a subtle bias
against even Japanese popular culture.
The government must heed to antiJapanese sentiments among the older
population because South Korea,
being a democratic state, largely depends on the older population rather
than the youth for voting results, as
older people vote more often than
the younger ones. Since earlier times
in history, the South Korean government has always been shaped by public opinion, and regarding the media
is also no exception. It is clear from
Young-Han Kim’s thesis that the citizens of South Korea banded together
to boycott KBS by starting the broadcasting audience movement, which
effectively changed the media broadcasting policies of the media companies and the government. This shows
that the people in Korea have the
power to change things even politically, forcing the government to heed
to such anti-Japanese sentiments
made by the people to avoid losing
authority.
Institutionalization of
Anti-Japanese Sentiment
Explanation
Some scholars take this historical
antagonism explanation further and
add the dimension of institutionalization of such sentiments by government into the media. In other words,
the government regulates television
and radio so that the media would
More significantly, some scholars
accuse imperial Japan of committing
a cultural genocide in Korea, meaning
the Japanese government purposely
attempted to destroy the cultural roots
of Korea and replace it with Japanese.
Education and textbooks were altered
to justify the occupation and to morally train the Koreans as to reduce the
anti-Japanese sentiments. The imperial rule also interfered with the traditions so as to make Korean citizens
gradually lose awareness of their own
history, eventually losing their “Koreanness” and becoming Japanese. The
controversy continues even today as
Japan refuses to apologize for many
of its actions during the colonial rule,
and the textbook controversy, which
involves Japanese textbooks selectively omitting several details of the
unjust actions done against Korea,
aggravates the relations between Korea and Japan even further for many
older generations.
9
portray Japan in subtly more negative
light to the general public. In addition, to this day, Choi’s paper makes it
clear that the Korean government still
has powerful censorship and control
over what makes the broadcast and
what does not, thus making it easier
for the government to affect selective
exposure of the citizens and thereby
make institutionalization of Anti-Japanese sentiments very possible. Going
back to the context of the Knee-Slap
Shaman, an episode with a former ssireum – Korean traditional wrestling –
champion Man-ki Lee demonstrates
this idea. The ex-wrestler, also a former ssireum sports caster, recounts an
experience when on a public broadcast ssireum match he accidentally
used the Japanese word “shobu” instead of the Korean word for finishing
up the match, and the media officials
chided him harshly for a mistake that
would be considered rather minor in
other countries. The public response
was also rather negative; one schoolteacher even went as far as sending a
personal letter to criticize his mistake
and demanded a public apology.
10
With the Korean government everso sensitive to public demands and
voting, it must cater to the demands
of the citizens. Studies have shown
that televisions and radios have large
roles in shaping the public opinion
towards government administrations,
thus the sensitivity to references to
Japanese things in the media in response to older generations is unavoidable if the Korean government
seeks to improve its approval rating.
Even news and documentaries dealing with nationalistic issues then becomes influenced by the government
to have certain degree of anti-Japanese
sentiments, thus negatively affecting
the import of Japanese popular culture into the Korean media.
With the control over what the
general public sees and hears, it is
not surprising that the Korean public opinion itself is very nationalistic
as well, especially when it comes to
a form of rivalry against Japan. During the first World Baseball Series
when Korea and Japan met as opponents, a middle-aged Korean man
was interviewed, and he commented
that Korea in fact has to win because
the game is against Japan. Such public attitude then may get passed onto
other citizens in Korea and eventually to younger generations as well,
which affect their consumption
of Japanese culture and encourage
them towards limiting their exposure to Japanese pop culture in the
media.
New Explanations to
Consider
The above explanations that
scholars have often espoused until
now are legitimate and important to
understanding the one-way flow of
popular culture between Korea and
Japan. The biggest problem with
most studies, however, is that almost
all of the scholars used in this study
attribute only one of the explanations to discussing this phenomenon and fails to mention the others.
Given the complexity of the flow of
culture, using only one of the explanations is not enough; these different aspects should be considered at
the same time to provide a clearer
picture of the problem. In fact, this
study suggests that an additional explanation should be added to the list
in accordance with the power of the
Internet age, and that is the influence from the Korean netizens.
Nationalism, Internet,
and the Netizens
Once again it is worth beginning
the discussion in the context of the
Knee-Slap Shaman. A highly rated
episode featured a fourth-generation
Zainichi UFC fighter who, due to
unfortunate circumstances and discrimination in the Korean judo scene,
left Korea to enter judo competitions
in Japan and became naturalized –
Sung-Hoon Chu, or Yoshihiro Akiyama. As expected from the previous
discussion of institutionalization of
anti-Japanese sentiments, the emcee
asked for forgiveness of the audience
upon beginning the talk show, stating that Chu is not quite proficient
in Korean and may accidentally use
some Japanese words throughout the
episode. His stories of endeavors in
both the Judo world and the mixed
martial arts world were edited with
subtitles and explanations so that it
would evoke a nationalistic feeling
on the Korean side and the interview
emphasized his Korean nature rather
than his current Japanese citizenship.
In the end, his wish of improving the
conditions between Japan and Korea
came to be spun by the media as Korea offering a warm gesture towards
Japan.
What is important here, however, is
the reaction of netizens – blog users,
Internet forum users, and subscribers
who leave daetgeul - or comments - on
Internet articles or videos. With the
rise of Korea as the Internet technology powerhouse, Korea came to have
the population that uses Internet the
most extensively, and the so-called Internet culture developed along with
it. Moreover, Korea has constantly
dealt with economic recession that
started many years ago, and due to
the economic correlation and similarity of societal structure between Korea and Japan, a phenomenon similar
to the freetas in Japan came to exist in
Korea as well, as more and more unemployed citizens spent time at home
surfing the internet and leaving comments on articles and videos as a form
of stress relief.
With rising power of the internet,
both the media companies and the
government must pay attention to
the response of the netizens, as demonstrated by the fact that when a popular comedian spoke negatively about
Does Korea Want
Japanese Wave?
This study proved that the pop
culture exchange between Korea and
Japan remains mostly as a one-way
flow. It also listed the obstacles for
J-pop and J-drama in entering the
Korean media industries. But why
is this important? Should the Korea care that its government and the
older populations refuse to allow the
public to craze about Japanese pop
culture products other than sushi
and manga? The research used in
this study makes it clear that a sense
of necessity in making the pop culture exchange between Korea and
Japan into a two-way flow just does
not seem to exist yet.
Nevertheless, going back to the
discussion of Ryu and Lee reveals
that despite the correlation in Korean and Japanese economic development, Korea-Japan relations in
economics has remained a parallel
one since the end of the occupa-
tion, meaning that actual instances
of economic transaction between
the two Asian countries does not exceed a very small number. Historical
antagonism also applies here – the
pressure against forming an extensive
economic relationship with Japan
from the older population remains
far too large for the Korean government to push forward any more open
policy towards Japan. Given the rise
of Korea as a stronghold within the
Internet technology world, some may
even consider Korean economy as a
self-sustaining one, rendering the
need to further interact with Japan as
an unnecessary one.
However, Befu ’s discussion of
concept trade proves that “Japaneseness” works in Korea – given just
how many Korean entertainment
programs borrow their ideas from
Japan – thus providing the incentive
for Japan to further its cultural influence in Korea and thereby raise the
possibility of forming the foundation
for economic transactions. As for the
Korean public, it should take the effects of “Winter Sonata” in Japan as a
call towards having a more open approach in allowing Japanese popular
culture to enter Japan. Hanaki’s study
shows that “Winter Sonata” not only
created a twelve million dollar market
in Japan through Bae Yong-Joon, but
it also created a more positive perception towards Korea, creating an opportunity for Hanryu to continue
and for more Korean pop cultural
products to enter Japan, which is an
increase in economic interactions between Korea and Japan.
Similarly, once J-pop and J-drama
fully enter the Korean market on the
same level as how K-pop and K-drama
had entered Japan, Korean perception
towards Japan will soften, reinforcing
the appeal of Japanese culture and
This study then looked at the immediate comments left on the youtube clip of Sung-Hoon Chu talking
about his controversial MMA match
against another Japanese fighter, Misaki. The subscribers, almost all of
them leaving comments in Korean,
viewed Sung-Hoon Chu strictly as a
Korean person, and their attitudes towards Misaki, who violated the rules
by attacking Chu while he was down,
were very anti-Japanese and harsh.
Similarly, the first youtube clip that
came up upon typing the word “Japan” into the search box dealt with
Japanese war crimes against the Koreans, and once again the comments
left were negative, many of them
even violent. The qualitative analysis
of the comments that netizens leave
on blogs and websites would need to
expanded to include major Korean
websites such as Daum and media
company forums to provide a more
accurate picture of the behaviors of
netizens, but from the videos that this
study went through it can be concluded that netizens, under the veil of
anonymity, take nationalism and the
institutionalization of anti-Japanese
sentiments to the extreme and leave
aggressive words on the web. Indeed,
anonymity lets an Internet user escape with many unethical, aggressive
behavior because it is difficult to track
down the owner of the message.
the candle light demonstration – a
public demonstration against the
Korean president Lee Myung Bak’s
decision to import American beef
over 30 months that raised concerns regarding the mad cow disease
– on her radio, the netizens reacted
violently, constantly called radio station, and even sent numerous death
threats, eventually forcing the comedian to leave the entertainment.
Given the aggressive nature of these
netizens, the internet serves as a
catalyst in both amplifying and reinforcing the institutionalization of
anti-Japanese sentiments, acting as
the most threatening force in preventing the Japanese pop-culture
from even entering via the Internet.
11
thereby allowing the Japanese Wave to
take place. Then, the positive perception of Japan will allow for decreased
pressure on the government to restrict
Korea-Japan economic transactions
and in turn increase both economic
and cultural flow between Korea and
Japan, resulting further globalization of
both Asian countries. Thus, in a sense,
deconstructing the three obstacles and
letting J-pop and J-drama thrive in Korea serve as a foundation for having a
friendlier relationship between the two
countries and thereby as a basis for globalization of both.
Concluding Thoughts
and the Knee-Slap
Guru’s Solution
12
This study provides another element
in analyzing the cultural flow between
Korea and Japan. As mentioned before,
the problem that the MMA fighter
Sung-Hoon Chu brought to the KneeSlap Guru was that he wished to build
a bridge between Korea and Japan, and
the corresponding solution the KneeSlap Guru gave to Chu consisted of
working towards doing away with the
past and the history and building a
more positive attitude towards one another. Rather than giving a spin to this
episode only to serve the nationalistic
interest of the Korean population and
the government, Korea should expand
the Knee-Slap Guru’s prescription to
an industry-wide initiative in the media to reduce the historical antagonism
and institutionalization of such sentiments both online and offline to serve
the global interest of Korea and Japan
together.
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view/stview.php?no=200806061210251217
9&type=1&SVEC>.
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2009.
<http://www.cgs.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
workshops_e/w_2004_02_23_e.html>.
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2009. <http://www.mtv.co.kr/music/hotmv.
php>.
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Flow? Japanese Popular Culture in Asia.” Visual Communication (2002): 229-54. Print.
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2009. <http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-MorrisSuzuki/2373>.
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Changing Politics of Cultural Hierarchy in
South Korean Transnational Corporations in China
Jaesok Kim
Jaesok Kim is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania
foreign management usually assume
their role as the agents of enlightenment or universal modernization,
whose task is to transform the local
people into modern industrial workers with high-level discipline. The
foreign management believes that
they are located higher than the local
people in the hierarchical structure of
the universal modernization process.
The local or, sometimes, “indigenous”
people have to be changed, the management believe, because they are
deeply embedded with the local culture, which is parochial, pre-modern,
or retarded. The culture of the local
people, in this sense, contrasts with
the management’s culture, which is
cosmopolitan, modern, and superior.
II.
of the transnational corporations,
South Korea, created much complicated relationships between the foreign management and the Chinese
employees, which cannot be neatly
explained by the dichotomy of modern/pre-modern or cosmopolitan/parochial. During the 1980s and until
the mid-1990s—the early periods of
their businesses in China—the Korean management’s attitudes to their
Chinese employees were not much
different from those of their western
counterparts. Most of Korean managers considered
China is still struggling with its
Maoist past and lagging far behind
their modernized mother country,
South Korea. They believed that Chinese employees lacked key elements
of labor discipline and were spoiled
by the socialist inefficiency and hapForeign management, the alleged hazard egalitarianism.
agents of the universal modernizaThe exact disciplinary measures
tion, is not always from “the West.”
My research about several South Ko- they used for creating “ideal workers,”
rean transnational corporations in however, were different from their
China reveals how the foreign man- western counterparts. Their emphasis
agement with a non-western origin on company training program, collechave created a unique corporate hi- tivism, worker deference to manageerarchy, and added new dimensions ment’s order, and disciplinary methto the relationship between foreign ods targeting both mind and body
originated from the multilayered hismanagement and local labor.
tory of South Korean management:
Studies about transnational corFirst of all, the non-western origin memories of the Japanese colonial
porations commonly indicate that
Transnational corporations constantly relocate from one place to
another to find bigger profits. The
actual relocation of transnational corporations, however, is not a purely
economic process based on the calculations of profits and losses. It is a
process involved with the transfer and
encounter of different expectations
about precision, punctuality, workplace authority, bodily discipline,
proper compensation and “humane”
treatment. This made the workplace of
a transnational corporation a particular space, where the daily encounters
of people with different expectations
often cause mutual misrecognitions
and misunderstandings. This, as a
consequence, creates tensions between foreign management and local
employees. For the foreign management, existence of such tensions only
justifies the need to transform the
“untrained” local people into “ideal
workers,” living up to the managerial
standards of efficiency and discipline.
The ideal workers, however, cannot
be created overnight. The history of
modern manufacturing clearly shows
that the establishment of labor discipline has been one of the key targets
of management.
Culture & Business
I.
13
Korean-Chinese?
We can find answers in the Korean
management’s two discourses: First,
the discourse of Korean cultural superiority; second, the discourse of one
Korean nation unified by their shared
The company hierarchy of Kore- blood or common ancestry.
an transnational corporations more
clearly distinguishes them from other
First, Korean managers often refer
transnational corporations. In the to the allegedly exceptional Korean
Korean corporations, Korean man- national characteristics, such as diliagers occupy the top portion of the gence, endurance, and high intellihierarchy, while most Han-Chinese gence as evidence for their cultural suemployees, the absolute majority of periority. They believed that the long
the workforce, are located at the bot- survival history of Korean nation—
tom. Between the Korean manag- despite the numerous invasions from
ers and the Han-Chinese workers, a China—and the rapid development
small group of Korean-Chinese, one of Korean economy during the past
of the fifty-five ethnic minorities in thirty years demonstrated their culChina, take the role of intermediary tural excellence.
managerial staff. This corporate hierarchy is highly unusual because, in
Second, Korean managers used the
China, Han-Chinese have priorities discourse of one Korean nation to
in economic activities, national poli- justify the overrepresented Koreantics, and cultural policies.
Chinese among the managerial staff.
The managers argued that
What created this reversed ethnic
Korean-Chinese have superior
hierarchy between Han-Chinese and group characteristics same with those
of the Korean people, because they
share their ancestors or, “blood,” with
other Koreans, especially those in
South Korea. Korean-Chinese knowl-
domination, experiences about the
post-colonial factory regime of transnational corporations in Korea, and
the highly militarized modernization
process during the 70’s and 80’s.
14
The Chinese and Korean flag, melded as one.
Image source: http://www.treehugger.com/japan-china-south-korea-flag-01.jpg
edge about Korean culture, therefore,
is not what one can acquire through
casual learning. Rather, the knowledge is quasi-genetically “written in”
the blood of Korean nation, transmitted from one generation to another.
For this reason, Korean managers believed, it would be virtually impossible for Han-Chinese to have the similarly high level of knowledge about
Korean culture. This impossibility,
again, justifies the reversed ethnic hierarchy in the Korean transnational
corporations. Korean managers used
to say that having Korean cultural
knowledge is different from acquiring
Korean language skill.
Han-Chinese, for example, could
speak Korean maybe more fluent than
Korean-Chinese if they spent plenty
of time in learning Korean language.
They could never reach, however, the
level of cultural knowledge same with
that of the Korean-Chinese, because
they do not have the right membership of Korean people.
III.
New market situations after the
late 1990s, however, have changed
the workplace hierarchy of South
Korean transnational corporations.
The most important change is the decreasing number of Korean-Chinese
among the intermediary managerial
positions. There are some easy-to-find
“sinicization” bring any fundamental
changes to their belief in the concepts?
If so, how can we evaluate the changes?
Although they do not completely
abandon their belief in the concept,
Korean managers are now less vocal
in expressing their cultural superiority. We can find one of the reasons of
such subdued belief in China’s fast
economic development. As previously
mentioned, the commonest evidence
for the Korean cultural superiority is
Korea’s fast economic development
during the 70’s and 80’s. Korean
managers, however, now observe that
China’s economic development is fast
and, oftentimes, faster than that of
South Korea, measured either by its
GDP growth rates or by their personal observation of the rapidly changing
landscapes in China.
If China’s economic development
is faster than that of Korea, doesn’t it
mean that the “cultural superiority” is
not an exclusive characteristic of the
Korean people? Furthermore, if China sustains its economic development
faster than that of Korea, doesn’t it
indicate China’s potential cultural superiority over Korea? To these questions about the possible change in the
cultural hierarchy, Korean managers
kept uneasy silence or evaded definite
answers, showing their collective anxiety about the resurging China.
Then, what are the implications
of the most visible result of sinicization—the replacement of KoreanChinese with Han-Chinese employees—to the two concepts? First of all,
the change in the ethnic composition of the intermediary managerial
positions reflects the management’s
devaluation, or, using their words,
“more objective” evaluation of Korean-Chinese. In the recent evaluation, Korean-Chinese are considered
still holding their membership of the
a country where they make product
for export profits. During that time,
the managers regarded their companies’ foreignness — highlighted by
the privileged status of Koreans and
Korean-Chine se — as a necessary
condition for their smooth business
operation in China. More recently,
however, Korean managers began to
think that they should make the foreignness less visible and, instead, further localize their corporations. This
change is closely related to the management’s changing view of China,
from its blue-collar, industrial image
of the world’s factory to its potential
image of the world’s largest consumer
Hiearchies
market. To make their corporations
Image source: http://www.onlineinvesting.org.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/
look more like Chinese is one of their
pyramid_scheme_by_khrawlings.jpg
new strategies to keep their access to
reasons for the change. First, the ever- the future consumer market in China
intensifying global competition has open.
pressured management to cut labor
What is the meaning of localization
costs. In the Korean transnational
corporations, Korean-Chinese em- in the daily operations of transnational
ployees usually receive higher wages corporations?
Originally used in management
and more benefits than Han-Chinese,
studies,
the term often means for
thanks to their privileged status as the
Korean people. A corporation, there- management to increase the number
fore, could reduce its labor costs by of local people among their employreplacing expensive Korean-Chinese ees and incorporate some local busilabor with cheaper labor of Han-Chi- ness practices into the existing ones.
nese. Second, Korean management’s Interestingly, the management of the
growing confidence in their “local South Korean transnational corporaknowledge” of China decreased their tions prefers a different term, “sinidependency on the Korean-Chinese cization,” to localization, which has
as cultural and linguistic mediator more nuanced meanings. For the
With their business experience in Korean management, the new term
China now well over ten years, grow- means the gradual replacement of
ing number of Korean managers feel Korean-Chinese with Han-Chinese
more confident in their ability doing at the intermediary managerial posibusiness in China, without the same tions. This does not imply any changKorean-Chinese assistance as they es at the top of the corporate hierarchy, where South Koreans are still the
needed during the 1990s.
absolute majority.
The recent managerial campaign
How can we relate the Korean manwith its slogan of “localization” only
agement’s
sinicization effort to the two
speeds up the change. During the early periods of their Chinese operation, concepts—Korean cultural superiority
Korean managers regarded China as and the unified Korean people? Does the
15
“because their Korean appearance
ations and regional power structure.
unified Korean people. This member- conceals their Chinese-ness.”
ship, however, is only partial and thus
It is a common understanding that
As the Korean management quesdoes not guarantee them the desirable
cultural characteristics of the Korean tioned their full membership of the national or ethnic identities are not
people. Korean-Chinese are Koreans, unified Korean people, Korean-Chi- simply given and unchanging; they
but deteriorated, either due to the nese are now in their head-to-head are constantly made and unmade reharmful influence of the socialist or competition with Han-Chinese for sponding to the changing political
communist regime, or, surprisingly, intermediary managerial positions. demands and power relations of the
due to their historical minority status Korean management’s new agenda of people engaged in a given politicalsinicization made their competition economic arena. My case study invesin China.
harder, because many Korean manag- tigated some extreme cases about the
How do the Korean managers ex- ers now prefer Han-Chinese to Kore- political use of ethnicity and nationplain the dramatic demotion of Kore- an-Chinese. Again, the reason of the ality, which has been initiated by the
an-Chinese, from the right members new preference is very simple: to hire cross-border movement of transnaof the unified Korean people to the more Han-Chinese makes Korean tional corporations. With the study,
group with an imperfect member- transnational corporations more look I argue that the actual manipulating
ship, tarnished by their socialist past like Chinese. For the same reason, it process of ethnicity and nationality
and minority status? The manag- does not make much sense to give could be highly complicated when it
ers said that their early belief in the privileges to Korean-Chinese, because is embedded with the multi-layered
Korean-Chinese cultural superiority the management now regarded them, and dynamic local history of South
had originated from their collective at best, as a “more or less smart” eth- Korea and China.
misrecognition of Korean-Chinese nic minority in China. “We should
identity. This misrecognition, once hire more Han-Chinese,” a Korean
widely shared among South Koreans, manager insisted, “because they are Works Cited
was caused largely by their excitement China’s mainstream.”
Bartlett, Christopher A. and Sumantra
about the historic reunion with KoGhoshal. “Managing Across Borders: The
rean-Chinese, long anticipated since
Transnational Solution.” 1991. Boston: Hartheir loss of contact with Korean-Chivard Business School Press.
My study about Korean transnanese, brought by the Cold War confrontation between South Korea and tional corporations revealed how the Thompson, Edward P. “The Making of the
China. The mass-media version of cross-border movements of corpora- English Working Class.” 1966. New York:
Korean-Chinese history further rein- tions with a non-western origin creat- Vintage
Books.
forced the collective misrecognition, ed a particular workplace situation in
which depicts Korean-Chinese as the China. I analyzed how the concepts Moon, Seungsook. “The Historical Roots
descendants of the anti-Japanese Ko- such as Korean cultural superiority and the Rise of Militarized Modernity” 2005.
rean combatants during the Japanese and unified Korean people reversed
colonial period. The following twen- the dominant ethnic power relation- Moon, Seungsook. “Mobilized to Be Martial.” 2005.
ty-year period after their historic re- ship between Han-Chinese and Kounion with Korean-Chinese was only rean-Chinese. My historical-ethno- Barth, Fredrick. 1969. “Introduction,” in
a gradual process for South Koreans graphic research further investigated Fredrick Barth (ed.). “Ethnic Groups and
to get disillusioned with Korean-Chi- the changing cultural politics and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culnese. “Korean-Chinese?” a Korean strategies of Korean management, ture Difference.” Boston: Little, Brown and
manager argued, “They are Chinese especially how they came to discred- Company. p.9-38.
who can speak Korean language.” it the discourse of Korean-Chinese
Another Korean manager advised me cultural superiority in their effort to
not to be fooled by Korean-Chinese, respond to the changing market situ-
IV.
16
China Uses Currency Swaps to Avoid
the Problematic Dollar
Rachel Bleustein
Rachel Bleustein is a freshman at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
Business
interest payments. With a currency
swap, companies can buy yuan from
a bank with their own currency, and
then use the yuan to buy from China,
and vice versa. China has arranged
currency swaps with six countries, totaling 650 billion yuan, or around 95
billion USD, since December 2008.
China also agreed to a trade settlement, which does not involve re-exchanging currency at a later point in
time, with Brazil and Hong Kong.
($10.2 billion) (38 billion ARS )
on April 2, 2009
Thailand is looking into a possible
currency swap agreement with China,
as well. All the arrangements are for
a period of three years and may be extended by an agreement of both sides.
Currently, most payments for China’s exports and imports, as well as
investments in China from abroad,
are made in USD. With the currenThe six countries China has ar- cy swaps, China and the respective
ranged currency swaps with are:
countries theoretically do not need to
Republic of Korea: 180 billion use the dollar during trade. For examyuan ($26.3 billion) (38 trillion ple, a company in China could save
money by paying for a purchase in
won) on December 12, 2008
yuan from one of the swap agreement
Hong Kong: 200 billion yuan countries without having to pay a
($29 billion) (227 billion HKD)
A currency swap is when two on January 20, 2009
countries agree to exchange specified Malaysia: 80 billion yuan
amounts of their own currencies over ($11.12 billion ) (40 billion RM)
a given period, usually at a fixed ex- on February 8, 2009
change rate. Currency swap arrange- Belarus: 20 billion yuan ($2.9
ments are flexible and can be extended billion) (8000 billion BYR) on
past the original end date, but at the March 11, 2009
end of the agreement, the currency
must be returned to its original own- Indonesia: 100 billion yuan
The Chinese Yuan in comparison to the
US Dollar.
er at the exchange rate determined at ($14.7 billion) (175 trillion IDR)
Image source: http://www.chinathe beginning of the arrangement. A on March 23, 2009
daily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-03/01/
currency swap also usually involves Argentina: 70 billion yuan
xin_08030401161616013781142.jpg
China, with most of its 2 trillion
USD in foreign exchange reserves invested in US dollar denominated assets, is concerned that the dollar will
depreciate due to the US dollar’s current volatility and the US’s substantial borrowing. Because China cannot
begin divesting itself of its dollar reserves without decreasing the value of
its holdings, China has arranged six
currency swaps and two trade settlements as part of an attempt to diversify its assets . China hopes to strengthen the currently non-convertible yuan
and increase its global influence with
these arrangements so that the yuan
may become an important reserve
currency by 2020, and possibly even
displace the dollar as the main reserve
currency.
17
transaction fee to have a bank exchange
yuan into dollars. The countries with
which China has made currency swaps
are hoping to gain different things from
the agreements.
18
South Korea and Indonesia could
benefit from the currency swap by being able to bypass the dollar in trade
because they have been having a shortage of dollars. South Korea also hopes
the new access to funds will prevent a
repeat of the 1997 currency crisis that
required a 57 billion USD bailout from
the IMF. Argentine officials hope the
currency swap will signal that people
should have confidence in the peso and
in the government’s ability to manage
the peso’s value. An Argentine bank official said, “Even if none of this money
is ever used, its mere existence should
serve to boost confidence in the currency.” In Malaysia, the swap was arranged
for the purpose of increasing two-way
trade and investment. Regardless of
whether Malaysians choose to take advantage of the swap, Zeti Akhtar Aziz,
the Malaysian central bank governor,
said that it would provide extra flexibility for companies under pressure.
Belarus’ purpose for the currency swap
is to promote trade and investment,
and to pay China for costs related to
projects like new power plants. The apparent advantage to Hong Kong of a
currency swap is to provide short-term
liquidity support and to help Hong
Kong maintain economic growth and
financial stability. However, the main
purpose of the swap appears to be the
use of Hong Kong as a bridge to promote the yuan for future wider use in
international markets.
China’s exports have suffered due to
the global financial crisis, and one of the
reasons it has arranged currency swaps
is to promote exports, as the countries
China has made agreements with can
only use the non-convertible yuan with
China. The hope is that a country will
be more likely to trade with China
because it does not have to change its
currency into dollars, thus avoiding the
volatility of exchange rates and likely
saving money in bank transaction fees.
Other reasons for the currency swaps,
besides helping exports, are the internationalization of the yuan and the reduction of reliance on the dollar. The
following are recent issues regarding
the dollar that China has raised:
The Chinese central bank report
released on June 26 said, “An international monetary system dominated by
a single sovereign currency [the dollar] has intensified the concentration
of risk and the spread of the crisis."
China worries that the massive borrowing the U.S. government is doing to support stimulus
spending may lead to inflation,
which would harm the value of
China’s foreign exchange holdings, most of which are in dollars.
PBC deputy governor Hu Xiaolian
said that the IMF should strengthen
its surveillance of the economic and
financial policies for the countries
that issue the main reserve currencies.
As a solution, China has called for
a new, super-sovereign reserve currency that would somehow remain
stable regardless of world economic issues. Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of
the People’s Bank of China, proposed
in a speech on March 23, 2009 that
the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights, or
SDR, could be used as a super-sovereign reserve currency. SDR is not an
actual currency but a unit of account
based on the U.S. dollar, euro, Japanese
yen, and pound sterling. The exchange
rate is the sum of a certain amount of
each of the currencies and is valued in
U.S. dollars. A country is allotted a
certain number of SDRs according to
how much it contributes to the IMF. If
a country needs to borrow money from
the IMF, it uses some of its SDRs and
The Yuan as a New
Reserve Currency?
While China hopes to make the yuan
convertible by 2020, in line with the
goal of making Shanghai an international financial center by that point,
China may encounter some difficulties.
If the yuan were fully convertible, it
would be almost impossible for China
to control the value of the yuan. Most
economists agree that the yuan is undervalued, so if floated, the yuan would
likely have a sharp rise in value, disastrously affecting thousands of China’s
export factories.
China and the IMF
Meanwhile, China is pushing for
more power at the IMF. China has fewer votes in proportion to the size of its
economy compared to other countries.
However, a country’s number of votes
at the IMF tends to correlate with the
amount of money directly contributed,
not the size of a country’s economy. Instead of a direct contribution, China
has said it wants to buy 50 billion USD
in SDR denominated bonds, issued by
the IMF on July 1, 2009. China is hoping that buying bonds from the IMF
will help increase its say in the governance at the IMF. It is also another
way for China to diversify its currency
reserves in the wake of the dollar’s current problems.
The call for a new reserve currency
occurred right before the meeting of
the G20 in April and appeared to be a
means to bring attention to the problems of the dollar as a reserve currency,
as opposed to a sincere proposal for a
new global currency based on SDRs.
US analysts and others have said that a
global currency would not be practical
and may be impossible to actually implement, and China’s vice foreign minister, He Yafei, said the SDR proposal
was merely an academic exercise. Even
as China formalized its call for a new
reserve currency on June 29, by bringing the issue up at the G8 meeting
in Italy, Chinese officials were saying
that they would not be making sudden changes to China’s foreign reserve
policy, and that the dollar is likely to remain dominant for a while yet. Instead
of a new global reserve currency, it appears that China is hoping the yuan
will eventually become the next major
reserve currency and has been taking
steps to achieve that goal. Besides the
currency swaps, China opened a pilot
program on July 6, 2009 that allows
companies in Shanghai, the province of
Guangdong, Macau, and Hong Kong
to settle trades in yuan. Certain banks
in Hong Kong can now issue bonds denominated in yuan as well.
However, China has a long way to go
before the yuan becomes a global currency because it is not yet convertible.
If companies choose to trade in yuan,
including those in countries with cur-
rency swap agreements, they will still
have to face the fact that most commodities are priced in dollars since the
rest of the world continues to use the
dollar. Those who trade using yuan
in Hong Kong have very limited opportunities for investment. The trade
settlement agreement with Brazil seems
unlikely to be utilized. Most goods and
commodities in the global marketplace
are priced in dollars, and if companies
in Brazil accept a payment in yuan,
there is little they can do with it since
it is not convertible. Chinese exporters
are also unlikely to accept the very unstable Brazilian real.
Image source: http://www.disco-tech.org/DSC00045d.JPG
receives its own currency at the current rate. Zhou Xiaochuan said in his
speech that “The basket of currencies
forming the basis for SDR valuation
should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies.” China has
the world’s third largest economy and
wants the yuan to be part of the SDR
calculation.
19
Tokyo Trip
Toff Chutima and Eli Tung
Toff Chutima and Eli Tung are both freshmen at the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania
Culture
Every spring break, the Wharton Asia Exchange organizes a trip to a city in
Asia. The purpose of the trip is to give participants an opportunity to learn about
the business environment in the destination city and to experience the local culture.
This past spring break, which took place from March 6th to March 14th, 30 of us
travelled to Tokyo, Japan. We chose Japan because it is famous for both its economy
and its culture.
20
Our first company visit was to Seibu Holdings Inc. Seibu
is a domestic conglomerate specializing in railways, shopping
malls and hotel developments. Because Seibu’s operations involve a lot of land developments around residential areas, its
main value is to maintain a positive relationship with local
communities – something we found very fascinating. After
our visit to Seibu we travelled to Shinjuku for some afternoon shopping. Here we split into groups to tour the streets
of Shinjuku, visiting shops like Mitsukoshi and Uniqlo. The
next day we visited Morgan Stanley Japan, where we learned
about the two factors that has contributed to its success. Firstly, the company has established a partnership with MUFG,
Japan’s largest bank. This partnership gives Morgan Stanley a
solid and stable source of funding. Secondly, Morgan Stanley
focuses heavily on its employees. It was ranked the best
workplace in Japan in 2009. We also had the chance
to meet the CEO, Mr. Jon Kindred, a Wharton
alumnus over lunch.
A great highlight to this trip was a visit to Hitotsubashi University – the
only Wharton affiliated university in Japan. We had a chance to tour the
campus and meet Professor Hiroshi Ota, who gave a valuable presentation
about studying at Hitotsubashi as an exchange student. On Wednesday, we
visited ABeam Consulting, a leading firm in Japan for implementing SAPs, a
software solution for businesses. ABeam, being a true consultant, gave each of us
a personalized gift by deducing our likes from our resumes. After our visit to Abeam, we crossed
the Kachidoki Bridge to Ginza, known for its delicate souvenirs and expensive restaurants. Here
it was free time for everyone to enjoy lunch and some more souvenirs shopping before we
headed off to Nomura.
At Nomura, we learned a little bit about its recent growth in the
global market. We also had a glance at Nomura’s busy trading room,
a sight to remember. On Thursday, we visited the Sumitomo Mitsui
Banking Corporation (SMBC). The presenter, Mr. Hiroshi Irie gave
us an insight into the current condition of the Japanese economy.
Although growth has reached a standstill in Japan, it is still a large
economy with a lot of opportunities especially in industries such
as life insurance, which focus on the elderly population. After
the presentation, we also had a chance to look at SMBC’s trading room, which was very different from the one at Nomura
because Nomura is an investment bank and SMBC is a retail
bank. Hence the focus is different.
From Sumitomo, we travelled to Harajuku for the afternoon.
At Harajuku we got a glimpse of traditional Japanese culture by
walking around the Meiji shrine, where many wrote down their
new-year wishes. We also experienced the youth culture and
the Japanese fashion scene by walking along Takeshita Dori.
Some of us also travelled to Shibuya nearby and continued
our shopping spree there. On Friday we travelled to the
famous Asakusa temple. For lunch, we went to Akihabara, the electric district of Tokyo. Here, some of
us ventured into a maid café for the first time.
Then we headed off to our final company in Tokyo, the
much anticipated Sony headquarters. There, we were given a
one-hour tour of Sony’s VIP Showroom. We saw the high-definition camera used by George Lucas in the filming of “Attacks of
the Clones” and a variety of Sony’s latest products. One of the main
highlights was the demonstration of TransferJet technology. This
technology allows devices such as a camera or a digital photo display
to exchange data by touching them or putting together.
Overall, our corporate visits and cultural endeavors had
given us new, interesting and informative insights to
the business and culture in Japan, making the trip a
highly successful one.
21
22
Shanghai World Exposition 2010
Better City, Better Life:
Event
“Better City, Better Life.”
“Better City, Better Life.” That is the
theme for the 2010 World Exposition. It
represents the mutual wish of all nations
for better living in urban environments.
Held in Shanghai, China, the 2010
World Expo will take place this year
from May 1 to October 31. The main
focus of this year’s exposition is urban
civilization and development. During
the 184 days, 200 participants will display the full potential of urban life and
urban evolution, while an expected 70
million visitors from China and abroad
will exchange cultural experiences of urban development and explore new approaches to lifestyle and working conditions in the new century.
World expositions are displays of inspiration and thought and have been
held as early as 1851. They are large
public exhibitions held in different parts
of the world. It was first held in London
and has attained increasing significance
over the years. It serves as a platform for
displaying and exchanging innovative
ideas and cultural experiences. In addition, it has influenced the advancements
of various aspects of society such as international relations and art and design.
There are two types of world expositions:
registered expositions and recognized
expositions. Registered exhibitions call
for many large events and generally last
from six weeks to six months. Recognized exhibitions, on the other hand,
are much shorter in duration. Currently,
registered world expositions are usually
held every five years, and this year, the
Shanghai World Expo will be the first
registered World Exposition in a developing country, which signifies the importance of China’s development.
The main attractions at world expositions are pavilions built by participating
countries. Each pavilion must reflect
the theme the world exposition. Furthermore, these pavilions are the most
expensive and remarkable parts of the
Expo; they require great investments
and are built from the ground up. Many
countries are skeptical about the benefits
of participating in world expositions because of the large investments they must
contribute. However, some studies have
estimated that pavilions may generate
vast potential revenues for the economy. Most of the pavilions can be disassembled after the exposition; however,
some pavilions can be moved
overseas intact or have
remained in
xposipating
reflect
Furmost
of the
ments
Many
enefits
ns bemust
s have
nerate
conodisaswever,
place, such as the Eiffel Tower. In addition, some world exposition sites have
been converted into recreational parks
that can display the exposition structures.
This year, the China Pavilion is designed with “Oriental Crown” in mind.
The pavilion appears to be a wooden
structure in the color of red, a red that
can be seen in the structures at the Forbidden City. This color represents the
spirit of the Chinese culture. Some of
the other pavilions include international
pavilions such as Venezuela Pavilion,
Nepal Pavilion, Turkey Pavilion; domestic pavilions such as Hong Kong Pavilion and Macau Pavilion; and corporate
pavilions such as Cisco Pavilion and
Aurora Pavilion. Organizers say that the
US pavilion will be ready by the opening world exposition date.
The Shanghai Exposition is held at a
site that covers an area of 5.28 square kilometers to accompany the
types
of events that
take place during the exposition. The
master plan shows that the Expo will
be held in five-level structure of park
and enclosed space and clusters. There
are events held during the preparation
for the Expo and during the Expo. The
former starts on April 30th and these
events are prepared and hosted by the
host country. Events that take place during the duration of the Expo can be organized by the host, participants, or by
other parties such as corporations and
media groups.
The 2010 Shanghai World Exposition
promotes the happy reunion of people
from all over the world, even for those
who cannot make it there personally.
Those who are interested in the Exposition can sign up to tour and experience
it on Expo Shanghai Online . There, visitors can interact with organizer and participants to fully experience and explore
the Exposition. This happy reunion is
the reason why the emblem of this year’s
Expo is an image of three people: you,
me, him/her holding hands. In fact,
the image of these three people forms
the Chinese character for “world.”
It symbolizes the family of
mankind getting together, looking
into the future.
Model of the Chinese Pavilion, to be shown at the Shanghai Expo.
Image source: http://www.e-architect.co.uk/shanghai/jpgs/shanghai_wan_sna161008_1.jpg
ns call
ly last
Recoghand,
rently,
sually
ar, the
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devele im-
By Sussy Shi
Sussy Shi is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania studying communications.
23
People
Photographer: Rachel Bleustein
Richard Block
Richard Block, VP of Marketing for
Haier America in the Huntsman Forum
Teaches “The Haier Way”
Tina Sun
Tina Sun is a freshman at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania
24
Richard Block states that he had “accidentally” stumbled into the position
of VP of Marketing for Haier America, a branch of the Haier Group. The
Haier Group was founded in China in
1984 and since then, it has grown to
own over 240 subsidiary companies,
run over 110 design centers, and employ more than 500,000 employees
around the world. Haier produces everything from refrigerators to TVs to
dorm organizational cubes to washing
machines – you probably own one of
their products.
Mr. Block was here at Penn on October 31, 2009, the first day of his vacation week from work, as the keynote
speaker at the Wharton Asia Exchange
(WAX) Spotlight Asia event. He spoke
with humor as he described the background story of Haier America and
Haier China and then spoke of how
Haier America became so successful
and how he plans to lead the company
to more national recognition in the future.
Haier is established in the world market as an affordable brand with many
different products for the average family. The company has dealt effectively
with the recent economic conditions
here and in China because it focuses
on marketing affordable products at
stores such as Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club,
and Costco. In the near future, Haier
America sees a potential challenge in
the rise of other Asia-based brands in
America such as Samsung.
Mr. Block is clearly a very successful figure in his industry, and he looks
for specific traits in potential employees. When asked what he looks for
in employees, he immediately stated
that the candidate must always be on
time. The candidate must also dress
appropriately and be a self-starter and
always take initiative with projects.
That said, he wishes to leave students
with a sound piece of advice for the
future: “leave your department or
company in a better place than you
found it.”
In terms of the challenges of effectively marketing a global brand, Block
spoke of the importance of having effective leadership in every country.
There are differences in products as well
as marketing in different countries.
For example, in China, when there is
a problem with a Haier refrigerator,
a team of literally eight to ten Haier
China employees goes to the home to
fix the refrigerator until it is in perfect
working condition. In America, this is
just not feasible. American consumers
want products that work instantly and
smoothly without problems. Marketing techniques also differ greatly. In
China, Haier products exist under the
“Haier” brand so the brand name is
well known. In America, Mr. Block’s
job becomes especially difficult because Haier products exist under other
brands such as Black & Decker so the
brand does not have great name recognition.
On a more personal note, in an interview following the keynote presentation, Mr. Block spoke of his love for
the work he does. He advises students
to choose a concentration or job
suitable for themselves because “you
should be happy doing what you do,”
and you shouldn’t resent your work.
Ironically, however, being VP of marketing for a global appliance company
was not what he had originally wanted to do. He describes his ideal job as
getting involved with sports marketing. He has implemented this passion for sports marketing in his current job by partnering Haier America
with the NBA.
25
BEIJING’s
Top 10
for Stingy Students
Travel
Jenny Fan
26
Jenny Fan is a sophomore at the
Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania
Whether you are studying abroad
or working over the summer in China’s capital, navigating around Beijing
can be intimidating. Visiting Beijing
with an organized Chinese learning
group, such as Penn Abroad in Beijing, Princeton in Beijing, or Columbia in Beijing offers a more structured program with the camaraderie
of fellow students, but many of the
best opportunities are organized independently. I was fortunate enough
to be able to stay at Beijing Normal
University (BNU) for a month last
summer while working on an independent research project, offering
me direct access to one of the city’s
arterial public transportation lines
(Subway Line 2). Aside from visiting the Tour Guide’s Musts, such as
the Great Wall, Summer Palace, and
Forbidden City, here are my picks for
great places to see and things to do
in Beijing when you’re with a small
group of people and want a true taste
of the city. If you want a wholesome,
comprehensive, bank-breaking trip
through Beijing, feel free to consult
another travel guide. This is for the
little things that sometimes get overlooked.
Beijing at night.
Image source: http://cache.virtualtourist.com/852556-Night_Beijing-Beijing.jpg
1
Feast your eyes
onWangfujing’s
Gourmet Street
2
Polyglots and
Violent Thoughts
while Bargaining
at the Silk Market
After the food feast at Gourmet
Street, if you can still summon up
the energy to shop, it’s worth taking a
trip to the Silk Market on the eastern
side of the Subway Line 2. Living at
BNU, which is in the northwest corner of the Subway Line 2, allows easy
access to many of the city’s popular
modern destinations, which can all
be accessed either on Subway Line 2
(the smallest loop around the city),
Subway Line 1 (a straight line which
runs through Tiananmen Square and
Wangfujing, among other popular
destinations), and Subway Line 10 (a
If you’ve got any amount of foodie
in your veins, you’ve probably seen
a Food Channel feature on Beijing’s
DongHuaMen Night Market and
some of the spectacularly creepy food
items, like starfish, crickets, and the
tentacles of various cephalopods.
If you like eating that kind of stuff,
more power to you, but I’m here to
tell you about the street next to it.
Before you make the turn down to
the bustling night market, take the
Subway Line 1 to Wangfujing and
check out what modernization has
done to the face of China. The lux-
ury shopping in this area is highly
upscale, with department stores and
department store prices often going
from 500 to 3000 RMB for designer
clothing. Wangfujing also has one of
Beijing’s best foreign language bookstores, which might actually have
some of your Penn textbooks for a
marginally smaller cost than the Penn
Bookstore. (Hauling them back to
America, however, is your call). Outside of the buildings in the market
area, there will often be street merchants peddling their wares of varying levels of legitimacy. Wangfujing
is one of the most obvious symbols of
China’s dualistic modernization. The
familiar curved cinnabar rooftops will
sit atop sparkling new stores, featuring the best of eastern and western
goods. Inside the Gourmet Street,
however, is where the influence of
two hemispheres really collides. The
indoor “gourmet street” features delicious eastern and western delicacies,
including various types of bubble tea
drinks, green tea cakes, frozen yogurt, gelato, southern-style dim sum
(called dianxin, in Mandarin), and
various local Beijing treats. Only here
will you see Ajisen, a famous Japanese
noodle chain in China, sit adjacent
to a store that sells Shanghai-style
steamed soup buns, which is adjacent
to a classier version of KFC. Sitting
down at a restaurant and going all out
is almost a shame, because the colorful variety of sweet and savory treats
is enough to make even the wariest
of travelers want to pull an Augustus
Gloop in Willy Wonka’s chocolate
factory. Before you end up binging
and have to be rolled out of Wang Fu
Jing, I recommend walking through
the area and trying a little at each
place. It’s cost effective, and gives you
the best taste of what modern Beijing
has to offer.
27
African Muslim woman’s offense
when a young girl attempted to sell
her booty shorts. As you walk from
stall to stall, capitalism reeks in every
“I Love Beijing” tourist t-shirt. Adam
Smith would be proud.
3
Shopping at
Subway Stations
(like Market East
without the ghetto)
If you haven’t been to The Gallery
at Philly’s Market East station, you’re
either lying or have never taken SEPTA in your life. But for Penn kids,
whether you take the Gallery seriously is another matter. Shopping at
a subway station malls in Philly may
not even be an option, but Beijing’s
subway stations are a different matter. In Beijing, commercial activity
follows the people, so business is automatically attracted to transportation hubs. Though it’s easy to spend
hours sucked into exploring what the
many street merchants have to offer
near major subway stations, the established stores in the area are also a
lower-priced alternative to high end
department stores. The clothing styles
you find here are completely hit or
miss: foreign shoppers may find great
deals, but many of the styles may be
impossible to wear in America. Either way, when these destinations are
at every subway station instead of an
hour away from home like King of
Prussia, it’s still worth a visit. Nearly
every station on the Subway 2 line
is in close proximity to a shopping
area, so give yourself ample time to
browse if you’re going somewhere on
a schedule.
newer line on the north side of the
2nd loop). In terms of shopping destinations, the Silk Market is a little
farther than other closer, cheaper alternatives, but as a tourist experience,
it is a must. Any single merchant here
would probably break the curve of
an OPIM 291 Negotiations class, as
their bargaining skills are unparalleled. Silk Market is a popular destination for foreign tourists, and as a
result, the storeowners here have mastered basic bargaining phrases in at
least seven or eight languages. In the
process of attempting to buy a (probably fake) Adidas jacket, I heard one
store owner run through Spanish,
Italian, Russian, French, German, before even considering using English.
Don’t expect real goods here, but for
fake goods, their quality is substantially higher than anything you’ll find
on the streets. Cultural clashes here
are common: I saw firsthand a North
28
Concept of Beijing skyline.
Image source: http://springcreekacq.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/images/Beijing_Skyline_Future.78232615_std.jpg
Chinese feast.
Image source: http://manifestic.com/images/chinese_food.jpg
McDonald’s in China.
Image source: http://blog.foreignpolicy.
com/files/images/mcdonald_beijing_0.jpg
Deep-fried starfish.
Image source: http://i225.photobucket.
com/albums/dd90/vincesoberano/
Art%20of%20Eating%20Out%20
Part%201/daac.jpg
Fish burger sold at KFC in China.
Image source: http://images.dahongbao.
com/add/70/125570_middle.jpg
4
Beijing Foods
You Can’t
Miss Out On
5
When the
Western Food
Craving Kicks In
It’s hard to miss Crown Fried
Chicken when you’re in Beijing, but
there were times when I just craved
a good ol’ Philly cheese steak. On
the BNU campus, Hollywood was
a popular fast food restaurant frequented by many foreign exchange
students. As a fusion East-West fast
food chain, it served everything from
rice combo platters to tuna salads to
cheese steaks (score!). In China as a
whole, global fast food chains have
taken a unique approach to presentation. Rather than being the scum of
low-end American cuisine, Chinese
branches of McDonalds, Pizza Hut,
and KFC are not only high-end, but
their prices are also several times more
expensive than local options. Of the
three listed, McDonalds is closest to
preserving the plastic ambiance of its
American counterparts, and serves a
mostly similar menu with a few localized options. Pizza Hut, which suffered when it first opened in China,
has since then entirely revamped its
menu, offering classy Western pasta dishes, rice combo platters, and
smoothie drinks. It’s entirely possible
to eat at Pizza Hut for a week without
ever ordering pizza, but the prices do
add up.
So, I will admit
that I wasn’t adventurous enough
to try the starfish at DongHuaMen.
(Nor do I have a stomach lined in
steel. Not a fan of the echinoderms.)
But, many of the local foods that
make Beijing’s cuisine famous are
worth trying. At the top of my list
is Peking duck, which can sometimes go to outrageous prices at the
city’s famous restaurants, such as
Quanjude. Barbeque pork, beef, and
lamp kebobs are also quite popular,
along with a type of Chinese yogurt
that comes in a little ceramic pot.
Northern Chinese food is famous
for its grain-based food while southern Chinese is famous for rice-based
food, so the noodles and baked goods
you’ll see in Beijing are radically dif-
ferent from Southern hotspots such
as Shanghai and Hong Kong. Beef
noodle soup is common here, but
Beijing is better known for its zhajiangmian, a thicker noodle with black
bean sauce. Because of the city’s historical significance, many restaurants
will boast about their several hundred
years of service. For those restaurants,
make a reservation in order to secure
one of the highly coveted spots.
Chestnut double chicken ptty burger, offered at KFC in China.
Image source: http://daban5.com/uploads/allimg/090729/2005192515-0.jpg
29
6
guancun’s significance mostly lies on
the companies that operate here, and
The Giant Gundam
less so on what it can offer to visitors.
at Zhongguancun
There are, however, several parks scattered throughout the Zhongguancun
Technology Zone.
I didn’t go to Zhongguancun, the
self-dubbed “silicon valley” high-tech
central of Beijing, just for the Gundam, but it was pretty cool. For anyone looking to buy computers, mp3
players, cameras, or other electronic
goods and would like for them to actually work after purchase, this area
is probably your safest bet. All of the
stores around here are catered toward
tech savvy customers, and due to its
proximity to Beijing’s prestigious Peking and Tsinghua Universities, the
government is hopeful for its technological and economic development in
coming years. Though it is an important hub for the city and may appear
on many other tourist guides, Zhong-
30
7
A hutong.
Image source: http://117.
photo.pp.sohu.com/images/
blog/2007/9/11/0/8/1158a7de873.jpg
The Famous
Hu Tongs
of Beijing
(Hu tong? What
the heck is
a hu tong?)
I had no idea what a hu tong was
going into Beijing, and even after
I’ve left, I’m not quite sure how they
became so famous. Hu tongs are the
small, narrow alleyways sprinkled
throughout old Beijing. Certain alleyways have more significant histories than others, but for tourists, it is
always a pleasure to rent a bike and
navigate through the winding streets.
In a city that has been so heavily consumed by consumption and modernization, these alleyways are a quaint
reminder of Old Beijing. In some
hu tongs around the lakes of central Beijing, merchants have opened
small shops with a variety of amusing
baubles to browse through at highly
affordable prices.
8
Hou Hai.
Image source: http://static.panoramio.
com/photos/original/3142714.jpg
Feeling Hip
at Hou Hai
Known for its popular bars, the experience of Hou Hai is entirely different from what you would expect
from a western bar. Hou Hai is one of
a series of lakes around central Beijing
that features a chain of small lounges
and bars. Though there may be a few
dance clubs around the area, Hou
Hai emits a more sophisticated, classy
appeal to people in their twenties,
particularly expats. On breezy summer nights, the experience is unparalleled. The menu at each bar along
Hou Hai is almost exactly the same,
with anything except for beer going
at rather marked up prices. In this
astonishingly accurate depiction of a
real life perfectly competitive market,
the only differentiation from lounge
to lounge is the musicians that they
offer to accompany your Tsingtao.
(Legal drinking age in China is eighteen, folks.) On nice nights, the owners bring large, over-stuffed couches
outside so you can enjoy the breeze
and colorful lights reflecting in the
lake, as a variety of up-and-coming
singers sing everything from smooth
melodies to Western pop hits. I also
heard many of Jay Chou’s ballads
while wandering through this area.
The calming atmosphere of an otherwise bustling nightlife scene is almost
worth the scores of young men each
bar hires to hover outside and harass
anyone walking by, trying to bring in
potential customers.
9
Mu Tian Yu,
the Other
Great Wall
As touristy as it is, it’s a shame for
visitors not to visit the Great Wall,
China’s long-time historical and
national symbol. Unfortunately,
popular Great Wall destinations like
Badaling are overflowing with people, resulting in most of your time
spent getting your heels stepped on
by the guy behind you rather than
enjoying one of the great wonders
of the world. For the adventurous,
there are some ruins along the Great
Wall that are technically accessible
(though perhaps not legally permitted), but a more reasonable alternative is Mu Tian Yu. There’s much less
tourist traffic, and the view is incredible. Almost as thrilling as the climb
up, however, is the descent down,
where droves of shopkeepers scream
and accost you to buy their Great
Wall paraphernalia. The amount of
selective targeting towards non-Chi-
nese guests is incredible, and anyone
that doesn’t look like they speak Chinese is deluged with cries of “Mao
Zedong t-shirt! Very cheap! One dollah!” like something out of a Russell
Peters sketch.
10
Fighting for
Your Life at the
Beijing Train
Station
Though Beijing is enough to spend
years exploring and never reach
the end, the eighteen hour flight to
the other side of the world is worth
spending a few extra bucks to visit
other cities in the area. A train ride
to Shanghai takes about twelve hours
and is best done on an overnight train
or by plane, while a trek to western
parts of China could take much longer. Plane tickets are the most expensive by far, and a train ride to another
city is not only cheaper, but can also
be an experience in itself. Overnight
rides offer sleeper cars in comfortable
four-bed compartments, but cheaper
tickets for as little as 60 RMB (approximately $9) can get you a comfy
airplane-like seat for the ride. The
ease of city-to-city transportation
“Unruly conglomeration of people” at the
Beijing Train station.
Image source: http://img.club.pchome.
net/upload/club/other/2009/11/8/pics_
cwhanson_1257674645.jpg
The ten places I noted were destinations I highly enjoyed during my stay,
but for the nation’s capital, there is an
endless amount of things to do in Beijing. Of course, I also paid my dues
and traveled to must see destinations
– Tiananmen Square, Mao Zedong’s
mausoleum, my great grand-uncle’s
house, and the like. Your trip to Beijing is going to be what you make of
it, so make public transportation your
best friend (those RFID cards are da
shiz) and explore! But don’t get into
one of those black taxis with no labeling on it.
That’s just asking for trouble.
Mu Tian Yu.
Image source: http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3286/2750271958_f9087486b6_b.jpg
is slightly dampened by the unruly
conglomeration of people that is the
Beijing Train Station. The station is
like Grand Central and SEPTA combined, with Grand Central’s proportions and SEPTA’s surliness. Many
of the workers here are from other
parts of China, and speak with local
dialects unintelligible to even fluent
Mandarin speakers. Trying to catch a
cab out of the station requires a substantial wait, so the subway to the station is probably most convenient if
you don’t have much luggage. Even if
you do have luggage, you’re likely to
get pushed and tossed around by the
crowds if you arrive in peak hours, so
the maxim of “pack lightly” could not
apply more.
31

wax tokyo trip: recap - Wharton Asia Exchange

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