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Philippine Political Science Journal 24 (47) 2003
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From llaqa to Abu Sayyaf:
New Entrepreneurs in Violence
and Their Impact on Local Politics in Mindanao
Eric Gutierrez*
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,The history of conflict in Mindanao is marked
by the violenceassociatedwith groups like the lIagas
and the Abu Sayyaf. Between them are many other
similar groups and individual young men - from the
different Tadtad cults to the range of ragtag, nonideological peasant supporters of the Moro
insurgencies - who have found varied uses for
violence. These are not the classic rebel fighters with
visions or political programs in mind. Rather, they
are of the more predatory variety who will attack
perceived enemies as easily as they would rob,
kidnap for ransom, or loot. Yet, they could not be
reduced to being simple instruments of local
politicians, or counter-insurgency tools of the
military, as they are often known to be. As shown by
events in the late 1990s, they appear to be evolving
to become political players intheir own right. Despite
high profile illegal activities they are involved in, they
move closerto rather than away from formal political
processes, entrenching themselves in such a way
thatthey become a persistent feature of local politics
in areas they operate in. These groups will not simply
go away and vanish, and in fact can be seen building
their reservoirs of social capital that they are likely
to stake in local political contests. They are therefore
an important point of inquiry into local politics, as
their existence causes a rethinking of both state and
civil society in southern Philippines.
• The outhor acknowledges the comments of an anonymous reviewer but
assumes full responsibility for the final paper.
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Introduction
The emergence of the Ilagas in the Cotabato region in
Mindanao, and the Abu Sayyaf in the Basilan-Sulu area,
remains a puzzle in the analysis of local politics in the
Philippines. These are men and women of violence - a poor,
largely uneducated but exceptionally intelligent lot considered
as operating on the 'fringes' of society - who escape
classification in the frameworks of analyses developed by
scholars over time in their study of Philippine local politics.
They are the outlaws, officially regarded by the state as
criminals, yet they enjoy considerable local support, and
have performed useful roles for various state actors like the
military and local politicians. They are an emerging new type
of bandit -local entrepreneurs in violence who are shaped
by the local politics they find themselves in, and in turn,
through their activities, hove started to structure local politics
as well and shape the outcome of political contests in the
areas they operate.
In order to pursue this argument, this article is going to
look at two individual cases that have much to tell about the
nature of 'bandit politics' in southern Philippines. First is the
case of the best known Ilaga, Norberto Manero Jr., or
Kumander Bucay, infamous for his cannibalism and terrorism
of Muslims and communist sympathisers in North and South
Cotabato. The second is Galib Andang or Kumander Robot
of the Abu Sayyaf, a group that gained international notoriety
for its kidnapping and decapitation of victims and which
later became linked to the AI Qaeda. This article will look at
their bandit careers, the context in which they emerged, and
their relationships with local communities as well as local
politicians.
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At first glance, Bucay and Robot appear to be opposites.
Bucay is anti-Muslim while Robot is not only Muslim but
regarded as an 'Islamic fundamentalist'. Bucay is known
for his alliances with local politici.ans and the military; Robot
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on the other hand appears as more of a classic rebel who
was first allied with the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), and then drifted to the more militant and extremist
Abu Sayyaf. What this article will show is that despite the
apparent differences of these two characters, both can be
seen as part of the same phenomenon, and therefore say
much about the realpolitik in the southern Philippines. Both
have noble goals as 'cover letters' for their acts of violence:
Bucay fights in the name of God against the Muslims and
the communists; Robot bats for a separate Islamic state
where laws will be derived from the Koran. Both stand out
in their use of symbols. Bucay is known for his shaven head
that had at one time, a tuft of hair in the shape of a question
mark, and at another, in the shape of a heart. Robot presents
himself as a very ordinary Tausog, without the emblems of
Islam, and de-emphasises his firearm whenever" in front of
cameras, unlike his comrades who revel in their firepower.
Initially, Hobsbawm's definition of social bandit has much
to offer for understanding these two characters I . They are
toong-Iobos (literally, men on the outside), officially regarded
by the state as criminals, but remain firmly within peasant
society where they have no lack of supporters who admire,
support, help them and consider them as champions. Bucay
and Robot both prey on those not found within the immediate
peasant society they come from. They do not rob or kill their
own like random criminals would do. Yet they are also
different. While Hobsbowm's bandits remain firmly outside
the law, Bucay and Robot both have well placed contacts in
both the state as well as mainstream society, who support
and oftentimes protect them. Bucay never lost invisible but
powerful protectors through the administrations of five
Philippine presidents. Robot's Abu Sayyaf band had been
able to expand their reach considerably, crisscrossing
territories controlled by local politicians, the MNLF, and
Philippine Marines at the height of their kidnapping caper
in 2000.
New Entrepreneurs in Violence/Gutierrez
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This article aims to break some new ground in the
general understanding of Philippine local politics The careers
of Bucay and Robot escape classification within the different
theoretical frameworks on Philippine local politics. They are
too 'wild' for any meaningful explanation within the patronclient framework. The 'machine politics' and political
modernisation theory have very little to offer for an account
of how they have emerged. Sidel's framework of bossism
appears as most persuasive. Bossism explains local politics
in terms of "peculiar institutional legacies of colonial rule
and state formation that facilitated the emergence and
entrenchment of small-town bosses, provincial 'warlords,'
and authoritarian presidents, that provided mechanisms for
private monopolization of the resources and prerogatives
of the state". But bossism focuses on those characters who
became politicians and firmly entrenched themselves in
positions in the state, took advantage of the distinctive pattern
of state formation, and engaged in private 'primitive
accumulation.' Less is said of those who remained outside
the state, like the bandit Leonardo Manecio (Nor-dong Putik,
Cavite's best known bandit) or Isabelo Montemayor (Cebu's
infamous pirate). (Sidel, 2000: 1-22; 90-100) In a sense,
this article extends the discussions started by Sidel - by
venturing into that still relatively unexplored politics of the
bandits, those who are in many ways like the local bosses,
but remain outside the state, and have nothing much other
than the capacity for violence on which to base their careers
on.
The careers of Bucay and Robot are stories of
exceptionally violent men. Both have maimed, killed and in
some instances decapitated their enemies. Battalions have
been sent after them. Politicians, the media and the various
faiths have denounced them. They instil terror wherever they
go. Yet they continue to get away with their deeds, in the
most highly militarised and armed region of the Philippines.
For some, the explanation is simple: Bucay and Robot have
unseen protectors in high places, they are tools of the
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powerful for some hidden and bizarre agenda. Robot
escapes military encirclement, while Bucay, the convict,
enjoys the life of a free man and continually mocks the justice
system, because they are 'allowed' to. What these conspiracy
theories fail to account for is that these two 'hideous
criminals' enjoy genuine popular support, coming not only
from the 'uneducated' and 'irrational' masses, but also from
respectable, middle-class and otherwise 'sane' people. The
conspiracy theories also dismiss an important point: that
men like Manero and Andang (who at first glance have no
credibility and legitimacy at all), actually have real powerautonomous power that is their own, that they stake and
further accumulate in the politics of the world they operate
in. This power is most efficient and effective in its negative
form - when it is used to prevent enemies from doing what
they want or when it is deployed for what is commonly
considered as criminal activity. But what is not seen is that
this power has a positive form as well. Both Bucay and Robot
have political dependents, local people who see themselves
as protected by these two bandits. In the unstable world of
southern Philippines where the state has no monopoly over
coercive capabilities, there is a constant need for protection
- whether from the military, the rebels, local politicians or
warlords, or bandits like Bucay and Robot. Ordinary
peasants with their small harvest of coconuts or their five
heads of cattle are always left open as prey if they are not
under this protection, even if they own guns themselves. They
need to link up with men of violence. In such a situation, it is
bandits who have greatest flexibility. Military and rebel
protectors are constrained by their organisations, and the
hierarchies they have to follow. Local bosses who become
politicians and occupy elective seats are equally constrained
by their position. But Bucay and Robot have no such
constraints. Even respectable businessmen therefore find it
extremely useful to link up with them. Bucay and Manero
can become 'equalisers' should the military try to extort from
their 'dependents', should rebels exact 'revolutionary taxes',
or should local politicians take over their assets. This power
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of bandits is recognised by local people, local politicians,
local military commanders, local rebel leaders, but not by
Manila, or the military brass, or by general mainstream
society.
How Bucay and Robot build their power is something
that this article has set out to investigate. Initially, what comes
out are that the two characters can best be described as
'survivors' - exceptionally intelligent but uneducated men
who know what it takes to survive and advance what they
want in the harsh environment they are in. But what appears
later on is something more. They are not taong labas
operating on the fringes - marginal characters who appear
only as footnotes in the local politics of these areas. Rather,
they are the main figures in an arena where the state is
absent, or else is of an extremely privati sed nature. Bucay's
Cotabato and Robot's Sulu are areas where the justice
system is fictional, where state functions remain only inside
the capital towns behind military barricades, where property
rights are not secure, where life and liberty are protected
not by state apparatuses but by the capacity of local people
to strike back and retaliate. As such, they are in the
mainstream of political contestations in these local areas.
Bossism is the political system that emerges in areas where
local despots take advantage of the peculiar state formation
that has emerged. Bandit politics emerges where this state
formation has been marginalized, and in its place the rule
of the survival of the fittest dcfminates.
The Hobbesian idea of the state is that institution set up
via a social contract to protect life, liberty and property. In
Bucay's and Robot's context, there is no social contract to
speak of. More importantly, what is known as the "state"
has often become the chief threat to the prototypical social
contract ~ the local arrangements on property relations and
access to resources and opportunities that local people
constantly negotiate and settle. The problems that Bucay
and Robot pose are not simple police or peace and order
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Philippine Political Science Journalza (47) 2003
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problems. They are problems in state-building and state
formation.
Norberto Manero Jr ond the Ilagos of Cotabato
Norberto Manero Jr, or "Kumander Bucay," was leader
of one of the most ruthless band of killers Central Mindanao
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has seen. Bucay first hit the papers when he and his
common-law wife, Leonarda Lacson alias "Kumander
Inday", reportedly executed and then ate parts of the bodies
of the Mamalumpong brothers in Kinilis, Polomolok, South
Cotabato in November 1977 (Coronel, 1993: 102-117).
He and his wife soon grew to become larger than life. As
Mindanao's top journalist described him, Bucay was "either
cursed or praised in North and South Cotabato." To his
enemies, "Bucay" easily became a word that elicited fearhis role was to terrify supporters of Muslim and communist
rebels. He built a reputation as a fearsome figure on which
legends were spun (Arguillas, 2001).
Yet despite the notoriety, Bucay enjoyed significant local
support. Despite the warrants issued for their arrest, the
couple easily moved from village to village, especially among
llonqqo-speckinq poor peasants that the communists
themselves were trying to win over to their revolution. Bucay
eventually became a major asset, serving various politicians
and the military strategy for Mindanao.
But Bucay's notoriety came to a point when even the
military could no longer protect him. He admitted once
displaying the heads of 30 Moro rebels at a checkpoint
they had set up (Patino, 2000: 21), but his best-known
exploit was the April 11, 1985 killing of the Italian priest Fr.
Tullio Favali in Tulunan. As Favali was shot and his skull blown
off, Bucay's band picked portions of the priest's brain and
ate it. With fragments of the brain still clinging to their clothes,
they resumed their drinking spree, loudly singing "Baliling,"
a Visayan folk song. Bucay later christened his brother
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Edilberto who shot the priest as "Baliling", in
commemoration of Favali's killing. (Coronel, 1993: 102-
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As a result, shoot-to-kill orders were issued by Manila.
Bucay was captured on Negros Island on July 16, 1985.
On October 3, 1985, Manero and fourteen of his men
were arraigned in Kidapawan, where they appeared with
their heads shaven save for a tuft of hair in the shape of a
question mark. Bucay's tuft was different - it was shaped
like a heart. Their lawyer made it a point to establish that
the Maneros surrendered and were not captured (Arguillas,
2001 )
Bucay and his men were in supposedly maximumsecurity prisons when the Marcos government was ousted
in 1986. But he was seen a number of times roaming
around Zamboanga City. On September 4, 1987, they were
found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
They would have been given the death penalty, had not the
newly reinstalled Congress abolished the death penalty a
few months earlier. Later that month, the convicts arrived in
Muntinglupa to serve their sentence. In a bizarre twist, on
February 1988, Manero became a Muslim, taking the name
Abdullah Manero Jr, a conversion facilitated by the University
of the Philippines Muslim Students Association. A year later,
his request to be transferred to the Davao Penal Colony
was granted. In comparison to the tough Muntinglupa
prison, the Davao Penal Colony was like a retirement home.
The transfer drew sharp criticisms from many quarters,
espedolly the church. By April 1989, Bucay was sent back
to Muntinglupa.
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Despite his notoriety, Bucay was never at a loss for friends
in high places. Aside from Col. Miranda and Army generals,
another known high-profile friend was Rep. Narciso Monfort
(a fellow llonqqo] who spoke on Bucay's behalf in February
1990 to request another llonqqo, then Justice Secretary
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Franklin Drilon, to transfer the convict to the Davao Penal
Colony. Drilon (now the Senate President), granted the
request on October 1990. On May 13, 1992, at the height
of frenzy around the presidential elections, Bucay quietly
walked out from prison. This was not discovered until
October 1992, when well-placed local businessmen
arranged for Manero to get a face-to-face meeting with
newly installed president Fidel Ramos on a visit to
Kidapawan. That audience with the President was scuttled
only because Kidapawan's newly-elected representative Gregorio Andolona - was around. Andolona, a church
counsel and the main lawyer of the case filed against
Manero, got the shock of his life on seeing Bucay waiting
for Ramos. With his cover blown and his living-out status
exposed, Bucay was sent back to Muntinglupa. In the
following years, he submitted petitions for amnesty. On
February 6, 1998, his four sentences, including his "evasion
of service of sentence" was commuted to 24 years (Arguillas,
2001 and Letters a, 2001). On December 1999, a new
president, Joseph Estrada, granted Bucay conditional
pardon. Bucay's arrival in Tulunan on January 20, 2000
sent witnesses against him scurrying in fear. But folk in Kinilis
met him with hugs, tears of joy and a solemn celebration.
Later in February, Southcom Chief Lt. Gen. Edgardo
Espinosa announced that the military was willing to accept
Manero back as a CAFGU or paramilitary volunteer. Other
local mayors in South Cotabato followed suit, saying Bucay
will be an asset for their municipalities' security. Justice
SecretarySerafin Cuevas, who was also a top-ranking official
of the Iglesia ni Cristo, defended Manero's release (ibid.).
In contrast, the Catholic Church was furious. They
petitioned Estrada to recall the conditional pardon. The
media was again in hot pursuit of Bucay. Pressed by an
enraged public opinion in Manila, Malacanang's
explanation was that someone secretly 'inserted' Bucay's
petition into a pile of papers waiting presidential signatures.
On February 25, 2000, Bucay turned up in Manila, and
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'surrendered' to PNP Director-General Panfilo Lacson
accompanied by Evelyn Silvestre (another common-law wife},
lawyer Ruben Platon, and retired Army Colonel RaffyGalvez,
.o respected officer and key member of the Reform the Armed
Forces Movement (RAM). Bucay asked Lacson to provide
him with security on his way back to South Cotabato. He
was also whisked around Manila in a Mercedes Benz, and
was billeted in a hotel. (Arguillas, 2001 and Patino, 2000:
13) On February 28, Bucay walked into the Sarangani
Provincial Jail as Prisoner 357. Eventually, other members
of the Manero gang were brought to the Sarangani Jail as
well.
While at the Sarangani jail, Joseph Estrada was ousted
in Manila on January 2001. Two months later, Bucay agciin
walked out of jail along with his first common-law wife
Leonarda Lacson, with the help of Julie Yee, the same
businesswoman who almost got him an audience with Fidel
Ramos in October 1992. A nationwide manhunt was
announced, and as the troops were looking for him, an
ABS-CBN crew interviewed a relaxed Bucay, 'somewhere in
General Santos City.' By this time, Bucay had become a
national symbol. To those who despise him, he symbolised
the incompetence and corruption of the government and
the justice system. To those who loved him, he had become
a national hero. Fr. Peter Geremia himself, the colleague of
Favali, observed that, "Manero has become a symbol of the
movement of fanatical groups and vigilantes, their most
famous champion." Geremia called for an investigation of
his protectors, to know their real motives and intentions for
continuing to terrify local people by aiding Manero. The priest
also called for an investigation of Manero's many 'commonlaw wives/ especially Julie Yee, to see if they were really
motivated by "faithful love or some other interest." Geremia
explained that the star witness in the Mamalumpong case
retracted her testimony after a visit by Julie Yee. Manero
had to be recaptured, if only to do justice to his victims which
Geremia estimated as running into hundreds (Geremia, 29
March 2001).
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In early April 2001, Manero's 'recapture' came in style.
Newly-appointed Presidential Assistant on Mindanao Affairs
Jesus Dureza presented the fugitive as a trophy to visiting
PresidentGloria Macapagal Arroyo. Arroyo shook Manero's
hands and smiled, sending church officials furious again,
saying it was sickening to see a Presidentsmiling and shaking
hands with an escaped, convicted cannibakriminal. Fr.
Eliseo Mercado Jr, president of Notre Dame University in
Cotabato City wrote, "there must be something surreal about
Manero ... his web of powerful connections and his women
are phenomenal." Mercado attributes Bucay's special status
to "the years of beneficial relations on both the side of
Manero and his band on the one hand, and the AFP and
local politicos on the other that created symbiotic relations
that continue to this day. Manero will always find 'padrinos.'"
(Mercado, 15 April 2000).
Bucay's padrinos remain mostly anonymous. One has
come out openly - the businesswoman and farmowner Julie
Yee. It appears that Yee, as she expanded her business into
the Koronadal Valley, fell victim to mulcters and petty bandits.
It was Manero who came to protect her. So great was her
debt of gratitude for Manero that in 1992 when Manero
was an escaped convict, she worked to secure his pardon.
A generous benefactor of church projects, Yee brought the
escaped convict in early October 1992 to the residence of
Fr. Ronilo Villamor, vicar-general of the Diocese of
Kidapawan, and asked the church to forgive Manero for
his crimes by signing a petition for his pardon (Arguillas,
2001). Yee would later be rumoured to have become a
mistress of Manero, which shocked people who know her
in General Santos City. She is described as a very respectable
and religious married woman, who in her student years was
a scholar sponsored by Senator Jovito Salonga (Letters b,
2001). Yee, like the Maneros, is a native of Janiuay, Iloilo. A
local newspaper reported her maiden name as Juliana delos
Reyes. She was later on reported as married to retired police
Colonel Alfonso Lumibao. In 1992, she was the Liberal Party
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coordinator for presidential candidate Jovito Salonga in the
Socsargen area. She also had attempted to donate an 8hectare property owned by Manero to the Bureau of Prisons.
She studied law at the Ateneo de Davao University and
became an insurance underwriter (Sunstar General Santos,
27 March 2001 b).
There are others, mainly landowning contract growers
of the Dole plantation in Cotabato, who like Yee enjoyed
Bucay's protection. Manero also served in the "Detach
Service" of DolePhil. They were were hired by the company
on a contractual basis, renewable every five months, and
used not only to provide security, but also union-busting
and intimidation of occupants of contested lands (Patino,
2000: 20). At some point, their 'services' are exported to
other provinces. Brothers Edilberto and Elpidio, both involved
in the Favali killing, once guarded the cacao plantation of a
big Manila businessman-politician in Agusan del Sur
(Coronel, 1993: 110). With the growth of Kumander
Bucay's reputation for violence, especially his vicious
cannibalism, petty mulcters and small-time bandits are easily
intimidated when potential victims - businessmen, traders,
truckers, landowners, and other property owners demonstrate their connection to, and therefore the
protection by Manero and his men. Even while inside prison,
his reputation was respected because a number of his
brothers and trusted men remained in their haunts, and
over the years, Manero himself displayed how easily he can
walk out of prison. The terror he instilled whenever he walked
out of prison was not only on those who testified against
him, but more importantly, on those who have crossed the
paths of the people he protected. A criminal on the run who
wishes to keep his freedom will hide deep, and avoid contact
especiallywith people who know him. Manero is exactly the
opposite. He goes back to his territory, roams around and
shows himself. This in itself is a political statement on the
power he possesses.
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Philippine Political Science Journal 24(47) 2003
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This underscores a crucial element - Manero plays a
crucial role in the local political economy. His visible role is
to terrorise; but his invisible role is that of an enforcer of one
set of property claims in a region where land rights and
other economic rights ore highly and continually contested.
In this sense, he has become indispensable to some people
with certain economic interests to defend. Church leaders
have asked that Monera's protectors and padrinos be
exposed. This is misleading because in many senses, it is
actually Manero who is the protector and padrino of those
who need his help. It is thus not surprising that many
municipal councils and local mayors, not only passed
resolutions endorsing Monero's application for a pardon,
but also eagerly offered him or his brothers with positions
like Chief Security Officer when they were released. Manero
was an incredibly important asset despite his notoriety.
Manero remains rooted firmly within his peasant society,
while he maintains key contacts with some local politicions.
Manero's career istraced back to the Ilagas. The Ilagas
are a dreaded group of armed men in the Cotabato region
that was created by the local politics of the area, having
been set up by the "Magnificent Seven" or the "Seven
Christian Datus" of the Cotabato provinces in the late 60s
(George, 1980: 145- 146). The Magnificent Seven
assembled an army dominated by llonqqos, with Tirurays
as the storm troopers. Feliciano Luces, an Iionggo Christian
and friend and protege of PC Colonel Manuel Tronco,
became the leader of these dreaded troops. He assumed
the name Kumander Toothpick, because of his thin frame.
His cousin who also became a commander in the Ilaga army
was called Kumander Toothbrush. Toothpick became a near
mythical character, not only because of his brutality (he started
the practice of cutting off the ears of the men he killed) but
also because he came to be regarded as a god-like figure
who was impervious to bullets (ibid.: 147-149). Bucay comes
from a whole family of lIagas. His father, Norberto Sr. - a
World War 2 veteran and originally from Barangay Madong
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in Janiuay, Iloilo - is proud that he produced nine sons all
of whom became anti-Muslim and anti-communist fighters.
Norberto Sr showed journalist Sheila Coronel in 1985 a
picture of his nine sons, all armed in front of their house. He
also disclosed that he himself killed one of these sons, whom
they buried in a tomb inside their house that serves as their
dinner table. (Coronel, 1993: 105) The Ilagas believed in
anting-antings, amulets that supposedly made them
invincible.
In 1972, many of the Ilagas became members of the
Civilian Home Defense Force. Carlos Cajelo, a constabulary
officer, started organising the CHDFs in the 1970s when
he became provincial commander and later on, governor
of Cotabato. Ilaga troops later on evolved into various
groups: the pulahans (reds), itumans (blacks), grenans
(greens) and putians (whites). The Maneros were from the
Pulahan group. These groups were essentially fragmented,
and were identified mostly through their kumander. They
mixed religious rituals with their armed activities. These
groups called their assembly the "Rainbow Coalition." They
would assemble during Holy Week in a place they called the
"New Israel" which was somewhere in the mountains of
North Cotabato, where they perform rituals, chant, pray
and make amulets, under the leadership of a Suprema or
high priestess. Special vests will be manufactured and blessed
by. the Suprema. The vests make the wearer invincible to
bullets. Bucay has his own vest. On certain occasions, they
invite special guests, including police and military officials,
businessmen and politicians to this assembly (Patino, 2000:
20).
Manero met Leonarda Lacson in the Rainbow Coalition,
and the couple grew to be major military assets when
Manero became commander of the entire CHDF formation
in North and South Cotabato. Leonarda became Kumander
Inday,2 and over the years, has managed to evade the
limelight. A local newspaper reported that she parted ways
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with Manero in the early 80s, hence there was no mention
of her in the Favali incident. She appears to have laid low,
but continued to move around South Cotabato. However,
when the Mamalumpong murder case was revived in 2000,
she surfaced and surrendered, and was brought as well to
the Sarangani Provincial Jail like Bucay (Sunstar General
Santos, 27 March 2001 a). There are indications that
Manero may walk out as a free man again, because some
of the witnesses in the Mamalumpong case have died, and
those that remain have disappeared (Letters b, 2001). And
Manero knows just what to do when that happens, he will
continue to play the role he has been thrust into. Shortly
after he 'surrendered' in April 2000, he called for an Ilaga
revival in Mindanao, because of the worsening peace and
order situation. He said his brothers will regroup and
strengthen the Ilaga, while he is inside the Sarangani
Provincial Jail. He will continue to be the terror, who knows
how to play his cards right.
Galib Andang and the VJolent Politics of Sulu
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He is the most unlikely role model for a rebel organisation
that styles itself as militant Islamic fundamentalist. He does
not hide his face, does not speak Arabic, and does not
pretend to know the few phrases that are chanted or painted
on the walls. He seldom wears military fatigues, and chooses
to put on simple T-shirts on his diminutive frame that is below
five feet. He prefers slippers to shoes or combat boots.
Government negotiators once poked fun at his limited
education and country ways. Yet he has become the best
known among the Abu Sayyaf leaders, a clever tactician
and skilful negotiator who engineered a four-month hostagetaking of foreign tourists to bag an estimated $20 million in
ransom money and another $12 million in 'donations' for
development projects in Sulu." As a result, he has been called
the "Bill Gates of the underworld" by a Philippine lawmaker
- a sarcastic tribute to his skill as an entrepreneur in violence
(Gomez: 2000).
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Little is known about Galib Andang, except that he is in
his 40s, a native of Jolo, had only a few years of primary
szhoolinq, and worked for several years as a servant in the
Tan household - now the dominant family of Sulu politics.
He joined the MNLF in the early 80s, eventually applied for
amnesty, but was rejected by government, forcing him to
stay in the jungle (Gomez: 2000).
•
Andang was a middle-aged member of the MNLF.with no clear future and uncertain status in the movement
--'- when the Basilan-based leadership of the AI Harakatul
cl Islamiya (the official name of what bas now been
commonly called Abu Sayyaf) moved to Jolo Island in April
1993 to escape the heat from the military operations on
their Camp al-Madina in Kapayawan, Basilan (POI, April
2001; Vitug and Gloria: 2000). When the Abu Sayyaf leader
Abdurajak Janjalani arrived in Jolo, he found the island
teeming with potential recruits for his cause. Idle since 1986,
there was growing disillusionment in the ranks of the MNLF's
Bangsa Moro Army. The Abu Sayyaf first linked up with
Radullan Sajiron, also known as Kumander Putol the onearmed bandit, one of the MNLF commanders in limbo. They
eventually managed to establish a foothold around Taglibi,
a coastal barangay of Patikul, and just 2-3 kilometers from
both the MNLF headquarters in Timbangan, and the last
Marine checkpoint from .lolo town. From this base, Janjalani
was able to establish contact and proselytise among other
MNLF fighters, including Kumander Robot. By 1995, Robot
had become a minor Abu Sayyaf leader (POI, April 2001) .
. This link with the Jolo-based restless middle-aged MNLF
fighters was perhaps the critical factor that consolidated
what has been a growing bandit tendency of the Abu Sayyaf.
While Janjalani took pains to build a genuine Islamic
fundamentalist movement, he was constrained by a reality
. that forced ~im to rely on recruits with more bandit-like rather
than fundamentalist tendencies. Janjalani was operating in
the Philippines' most violent and most impoverished region
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where the equilibrium of power between the military, the
different rebel factions and the local politicians and warlord
clans was delicately and finely balanced. Territories controlled
by each 'armed group were demarcated by invisible
boundaries known only to the locals. Given sufficient reason,
one group may challenge another. But like in any war, these
territories are intensely defended, and respected by the other
protagonists. The military are able totrovel across these
invisible territorial boundaries only if they came out in force
with their tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Under
such conditions, relative newcomers like Janjalani had to
rely on the pragmatic, streetwise everyday fighters like Robot,
whose instincts have been honed by the ruthlessness of war
and the unforgiving environment around them.
The young men in these areas commanded by Robot,
like himself, are typically not the ideological, visionary types
who have had some education. They are mainly semiliterate
youth who know little more than to fire a gun and are hardpressed for ways to raise money to sustain themselves. In
Basilan where he was based, Janjalani can in some ways
keep control of his men, but oftentimes had to turn a blind
eye to the un-Islamic atrocities they commit. In Sulu, it is up
for the likes of surrogates like Robot to keep control. Robot
does not think in ideological Islamic fundamentalist ways,
but in terms of a steely resolve to survive. If he needs to use
violence, he will have no hesitation to use it, as failing to do
so will diminish the threat that he poses next time he needs
to use violence again. As explained by Vitug and Gloria,
where Janjalani grew up was "a place where people of weak
resolve could give in to the challenges posed by power, either
the lack or possession of it. It certainly was not a place
conducive for reflection or reinforcing pure religious
thoughts" (2000: 206). Robot was evidently attracted to
Janjalani's cause. He even gave up his chain-smoking, which
is forbidden by the fundamentalists. But soon, as it turned
out, it was Robot and the other Sulu-based rebels who will
substantially change the Abu Sayyaf's Islamic
161
fundamentalism, and consolidate the group's bandit
tendencies.
The best way that Robot's character can be appreciated
is to look deeper into the context in which he developed his
skills, as well as the political and moral dilemmas he may
have confronted. Robot was for many years a servant in the
Tan household. Incumbent Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan
claims that the nickname "Robot" came from his own
mother. Andang would supposedly dance robot-like,
imitating Michael Jackson at the request of Tan's son, hence
the monicker (Gomez, 2000). If Sulu is a place not conducive
to reflection or reinforcing pure religious thoughts, the Tan
household is not the place for developing political and moral
scrupulousness of would-be Islamic fundamentalists. The
Tans are a warlord clan that have survived through and now
dominate the violent politics of Sulu. Aside from their relative
success in gaining ascendancyoverthe Magic Eight, a group
of eight surrendered Moro rebels who became Marcos
henchmen in Sulu, some members of the Tan household
are considered ruthless plotters as well, after being implicated
in the murder of Sulu bishop Benjamin de Jesus in February
1997. Sulu's police responded immediately and a certain
Hayudini from Zamboanga was implicated. When a photo
of the alleged gunman was broadcast on television, the
father and brother of the suspect immediately paid
Abdusakur Tan a visit. Amman Hayudini, along with his son
Maumar who was a student at Notre Dame College Jolo,
came to tell the Governor that his other son was not the
bishop's killer. Instead, the two Hayudinis were never released.
An announcement was made two days later that the gunmen
have been positively identified and arrested. A municipal
policeman named Tolosa who was in the employ of the Tans
executed a sworn statement that the Hayudinis were the
gunmen (Letters c and d, 2001). The Hayudini clan, in
Tausog tradition, sent the oldest member of their clan to tell
the diocese that it was not their relatives, but Jolo Mayor
Suod Tan who masterminded the assassination. The
Hayudinis knew a witness, an arthritic ex-policemen norned
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Umad Adil, who saw the killing as he could not run when
the commotion started. Adil identified the killer as Mubin
Mandangan, a notorious character known in Jolo as a gunfor-hire, and associated with the Tans. With him was his
brother Kimar. The driver of the Ford Fiera was identified as
a certain Agnan, reportedly a private security guard of Suod
Tan. An off-duty policeman was resting in the plaza when
De Jesus was shot, saw the commotion, and fired at the
gunmen. Mubin Mandangan was wounded, and they
reportedly ran in the direction of the Tan compound (Letters
d, 2001). But nothing came of the case as the witness died
before his testimony could be perpetuated, and the Judge
who handled the case fell to a mysterious illness.
The Tans' association to the killing of the bishop and
their possible motive became a puzzle to many. What is most
curious is that this sensational killing of the bishop - the
highest ranking official of the Catholic church killed in
Mindanao - was not the handiwork of the Abu Sayyaf. Some
say the motivation is a bizarre land dispute involving the
Tans and the Diocese (Letters c, 2001) .
Such is the context in which simple but intelligent men
like Robot thrived. Politicians like the Tans will plot selfinterested politico-economic moves; rebel-chieftains like
Misuari will talk about the reconstruction or rehabilitation
of a Bangsamoro homeland; fundamentalists like Jonioloni
will imagine visions of an Islamic state. But it is ordinary
men like Robot who does the dirty work for them. Robot
brings his 'usefulness' to politicians, rebels or
fundamentalists, and then makes the most of what he can
get from this relationship. The only capital he needs to engage
in this 'market' is his gut for violence, and his steely resolve
to kill or maim when needed. He may come across as a
simple bandit for observers from Manila. But for many locals
who know the internal logic, Robot is a much more complex
being. In the end, what needs to be looked at is whether
Robot and his kind oresisnple instruments manipulated by
those recognised by outsiders as the real protagonists, or
163
whether it is Robot himself who consciously or unconsciously
structures the nature of political contestation in such a
context .
... Robot's.handling of the kidnapping of 21 foreign tourists
in Malaysia in April 2000 illustrates how he can structure
the political fortunes or misfortunes of the 'main' protagonists
in the province. In March 2000, the Basilon-based Abu
Sayyafabducted 23 teachers and 30 students, including
C1aretian missionary Fr Rhoel Gallardo. Some 3,000 Army
scout rangers were. deployed in Basilan to track down the
kidnappers. Two schoolteachers were eventually beheaded,
while Fr Gallardo was tortured until he died (Torres Jr, 2001).
Apparently, Robot's April 23 kidnapping in Malaysia was
an attempt to divert attention and ease the pressure on his
Basilan-based comrades. This seemed to have come too
late as by May 3, the government launched a rescue that
ended the Basilan kidnap. But by kidnapping foreign
hostages in Malaysia - which included French, German,
Finn, South African, Lebanese and Malaysian nationals Robot raised the ante: it 'internationalised' the string of
incidents and effectively brought in other powerful players.
Soon, worried French, German and Finnish Foreign
Ministers, and former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
of the European Union, trooped to Manila to personally get
government guarantees that negotiations with the hostages
will be started and that the hostages' safety will be given
priority. The Europeans sought the help of Libya, especially
since Libya's former ambassador to Manila, Rajab Azzarouq,
had dealt with kidnappers before, and was always successful
in getting the hostages out. TheSulu kidnapping soon
eclipsed.the Basilan hostage-taking (Shahar, 20 Aug 2000).
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The.vounqer Abu Sayyaf leaders immediately moved to
gain. the most political mileage from the Sulu abduction.
Well-written and.grammatically correct statements in Englisb
came out frdm,;the jungle, reiterating the Abu Sayyaf's
demands foron.independent Islamic state and the release
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of Muslim extremists in the United States. It now appears
that the person who drafted these letters was Nadmzie
Saabdulla (Kumander Global), an educated ex-MNLF
commander who drifted to the Abu Sayyaf. Saabdulla was
to impress the foreign journalists they captured later on with
his articulateness (PDI, 10 July 2001). Robot himself gave
an interview wherein he toed the line, restated the demands
of his group for an independent Islamic state:
Robot, however, was not a senior Abu Sayyaf
commander. Hence, there were attempts by these senior
commanders, like Kumander Global, to take control of the
'situation. Soon, Aldam Tilao - better known as Abu Sabaya
- slipped from the military cordon in Basilan and went to
Sulu to be the Abu Sayyaf's official spokesman for the
duration of the negotiations. Tilao based himself in
Kumander Putol's camp. But Robot knew this was his
ballgame, and he had control over the hostages. This drew
him naturally into the limelight and into the frontline of the
negotiations. He soon controlled the talks with a singleminded pursuit of cash, negotiators say. He also demanded
dalanghita (a local citrus), coffee and mango plantations
for his relatives and four wives, three of whom were obtained
by kidnapping. Soon, hundreds of volunteers, many of them
his relatives, trooped to his jungle hideout literally looking
for work to do. They volunteered as camp perimeter guards,
as drivers, as handymen to purchase food and cook for the
hostages, as guides, as spies in town to collect information,
etc. Robot saw his power growing, and moved in to
consolidate it.
This earned Robot the ire of the other more senior Abu
Sayyaf commanders in Jolo Island. But they could not do
anything as Robot held the main bargaining chip - the
hostages - and like a seasoned poker player, knew how to
play his cards right. By this time, Jolo Island has turned into
a media circus with scores of journalists, their rented boats,
helicopters and telecommunications equipment jammed into
165
Jolo. It took no time for enterprising individuals and other
armed groups to cash in on the situation. Relatives of Robot
and his men offered to be middlemen for journalists to
interview a hostage, in return for a fee of up to $500 per
hostage. A group called the 'Chinese', acting like subcontractors, pounced on eight French and one Norwegian
journalist who slipped out of Jolo town scouring the Island
for a scoop, and offered to sell them to Robot. Another Abu
Sayyaf commander took them and negotiated separately
for the ransom. Kumander Global himself joined the frayhis group held ten journalists working for German news
agencies in June and were released after the payment of
US$25,000. By early July, a group of 13 'prayer warriors'
-'- members of a Manila-based Christian born-again group
. called Jesus Miracle Crusade - went into the jungle to "pray
over" the bandits to end the kidnap crisis. Robot immediately
seized them and declared them as hostages as well. Der
Spiegel correspondent Andreas Lorenz was held by another
group which was reported as able to get up to US$l million
I in ransom money from the German newspaper. Lorenz was
freed after 25 days in captivity. On July 9, another three
French journalists for France-2 Broadcasting were captured.
Two of them would later escape. Many more would follow,
including two Filipino journalists from ABS-CBN who were
'abducted by the group of Muin Sajiron, nephew of Kumander
Putol, after they came from an interview with Abu Sabaya.
This incident exposed how Abu Sabaya was just one among
many players in a booming market place for kidnappers
(AFP, 17 May 2000; POI, 26 July 2000; POI, 1 Aug 2000;
POI, 2 Aug 2000, PDI, 18 Aug 2000; POI, 10 July 2001).
Through all this time, Robot revelled at the attention he
got. Media interviews near his camp would be followed by a
'cherry-picking' session - his men would pick and steal the
cameras, wallets, jackets and shoes of the journalists - while
Robot watched and laughed. On August 9, Robot even
kidnapped for himself a· bride - Nelma Bassal Agsa - a
social worker who lived in Talipao. Towards the end of August,
Robot sent two of his men on a test mission - in their scruffy
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clothes, they went to a Zamboanga City bank with a bag
stuffed with US$245,OOO in cash, and tried to change it to
pesos. Bank officials alerted the police, and the two emissaries
were arrested. There were other nearly-hilarious side events
to the kidnapping. A local soft-porn actress, Marinello
Moran, offered a 'week of pleasure' with Robot for the
release of the hostages. The Philippine government declined
to relay the offer (POI, 11 Aug 2000; POI,' 24 Aug 2000;
POI, 28 Aug 2000).
Robot's familiarity with Abdusakur Tan, who was one of
the government negotiators, may have been crucial in
gaining for him control of the negotiations and to sideline
the more senior Abu Sayyaf leaders. It was Tan who
'presented' Robot to the media, after which the negotiations
took place. Slowly, the hostages were released, beginning
with the Malaysians. On August 7, before the majority of
the hostages was released, Armed Forces Chief of Staff
surprised the Cabinet when he admitted in a briefing that
Andang had already received PhP 245 million in ransom
money (US$ 5.5 million). Most of the hostages were released
only on August 27 (POI, 8 Aug 2000). Robot reportedly
gave up to PhP 50,000 each to more than 2,000 followers
and relatives. Robot and Mujib Susukan got the lion's share
of the loot. They were also reported as giving thirteen other
Abu Sayyaf commanders PhP 5 million each. Some of these
commanders, including Abu Pula Jumdail and Nadzmie
Saabdulla (Kumander Global) complained of not getting
their fair share of the loot. On September 9, Andang was
escorting two government emissaries when they were
ambushed in Sitio Tambis, Oali, Talipao town. Three of his
bodyguards were killed and 25 wounded. The attack delayed
the release of the remaining two Finns, a German and a
Frenchman who were to be plucked by military helicopter
from the camp along with the government emissaries. The
simmering feud between the bandits finally erupted into open
confrontation. Robot was ambushed because he refused to
help another kidnapper who had two captive French
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journalists. Robot's prestige and credibility had soared so
high that negotiators would only pay ransom to him, because
he delivers, even when the real captors of the other hostages
were other Abu Sayyaf commanders (PDI, 17 Avg 2000;
PDI, ·24 Aug 2000).
Smarting from his debacle with Robot, Abu Sabaya
staged his own kidnapping a yeqr [cter in May 2001,
ostensibly also to put the weight of public cttentlon back to
the real leadership of the Abu Sayyof. Twenty people, including
three Americans, were taken from thf;l Los Palmas Resort in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and brouqh] to Bosilon. Robot
immediately distanced himself from this kidnapping and told
controversiaillocos Sur Governor Lvis "Chavit" Singson that
he was ready to surrender to the government. He asked for
safety guarantees and promised cooperation in the possible
arrest of the Abu Sayyaf leoders, inc:luding Abu Sobayo (PDI,
15 Jun 2001). It is not deer whot impact this hos had on
AQl,J $gb-gyO'§ or;>E:)rgtign5. Bvt it WQS evident thct Robot has
stQrted to 'drift gwgy from the movement, He has become
his own,..,. 9 10(':01 QQndit gnd skilled entrepreneur in violence.
Indl,Jly, ~ing$Qn gdmitted lhet hE:) hod lostcontcct with Robot.
GCllib AndQn~ hm disQpprpmed bock into anonymity, for
the moment.
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A P-ri:!liminqry Anqlysis Qlld Some Conclusions
Through this artic:le, Q number of questions have been
raised with rElgard to devE)loping 0 framework for
undi:!r§tgnding NorbertoMonero Jr end Golib Andang. How
Qre they shcped by the 10<::91 politiq they ore inend how do
they through their activities shor;>e lhis leecl politics in return?
What is there in the context thE:)y ernerqed from that shaped
them into whQt they ere? In vn<;;Qvrpring the qnSWE)rs, more
questions emerge. Whgt is thf? ngtlJrfil of their relationship
with local people thgt gllows them, despite the notorietyand
terror theycreate, to acquireand enjoy 9 significant rneosure
of local pogLJlgr support? Why ore they regarded as
champions and not qs <::riminols by some local people who
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may be made worse off by the activities they do? And then
again, what is the nature of their relationship with agents
and institutions of the state? Why is it that they appear to
have hidden protectors in government as well as
'mainstream' society? This following section will attempt to
consolidate some answers as well as present a preliminary
understanding on these entrepreneurs in violence and their
impact on local politics in southern Philippines.
As has been shown, an understanding of the local
context is crucial in explaining why Bucay and Robot are
what they are. Under Philippine law, both are simply
criminals. But this is only the 'official' definition' which may
drastically be reinterpreted across the different groups within
their domain.
Bucay sees and prides himself as a frontline fighter
against the 'enemies of freedom.' doing a service similar to
what soldiers and policemen do. His cannibalism, in some
ways, is justified by some local values and beliefs in the
peasant society he came from. Members of the Rainbow
Coalition, for instance, are known to practice eating their
victim's liver because they believe that by doing so, they not
only absorb the dead man's strength, but also acquire
protection so the soul of the dead cannot go after them to
take revenge. As Patino pointed OLJt, they do this only to
victims they perceive to be stronger than themselves.
Chopping off heads has some similar connotations,
although this may be seen now more as getting trophies of
victory over their opponents (Patino, 2000: 21). Robot on
the other is the quintessential Robin Hood who has robbed
the rich and distributed the spoils to his fellow poor. The
P50,000 each he reportedly distributed to his followers and
relatives is what an educated schoolteacher would normally
earn in a year in a province where illiteracy goes as high as
67%. The 'official interpretation' therefore is that they are
bandits and criminals; the local interpretation is something
else.
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. Another important consideration for understanding the
phenomenon of Bucay and Robot is the particular character
of state presence they have come to know. While there is no
lack of soldiers in their areas (it is often reported that at any
given time at least 60% of the Armed Forces' strength is
deployed in Cotabato and Sulu areas), there is a sheer lack
of those offices and institutions that provide necessary public
services - teachers, health care workers, agricultural
extension officers, judges, etc. There is an absence of
administrative state structures as illustrated by the 'retreat'
of local civil registries. The western side of Jolo town proper,
for instance, is the area where the mayors of Sulu province's
18 municipalities have established residences. This area's
counterpart in Cotabato City is the Datu Piang Subdivision
on the road towards the airport. These private residences of
the mayors double as the municipal halls and civil registries
'in exile.' This is where a constituent can get an audience
with the mayor, have a baby registered for a birth certificate,
file an application for a marriage license, and so on. The
'retreat' of these administrative institutions had resulted
mainly from the rebellion. It is a public secret in Sulu and
Cotabato that there are many mayors who are elected to
their positions without even having set foot on the territory
of their towns. The January 27, ·1997 incident in Buldon,
Maguindanao shows the difficulty of projecting this local
quthority, when an encounter occurred between the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the military. The MILF
said it attacked a military unit that had entered their defense
perimeter in Galigaya, Buldon. The military said they were
merely escorting Buldon Mayor Macarampat Manalao into
the town center (poblacion). Since his election in May 1995,
Manalao had not been able to hold office in Buldon's town
center. He has been running Buldon by 'remote control' from
the safety of military-secured Cotabato City. On his first
attempt to enter his town, Manalao triggered a gun battle
that left 22 people dead (Gutierrez, 2000c: 279).
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What emerges is an area where the state's coercive
apparatuses are in abundance, but where its 'positive' side
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is almost negligible. 'Remote control' local governments are
only one part of the equation. The absence of a real one!
effective justice system creates even more serious problems
- there is no way of consistently enforcing individual and
property rights other than through the use or threat of
violence. This is the tricky part because on the surface, local
governments and a justice system appear to be in place.
There are mayors and town officials elected periodically every
three years who are duly noted at the Department of Interior
and Local Government. There are judges appointed to their
posts. There are teachers and other civil servants appointed
to line agencies that extend various services to these areas.
The reality on the ground however is different - these
instruments of the state are oftentimes limited physically and
operationally only to within the confines of the capital towns.
With a state that is absent or privatised by local politicians,
the space for bandits like Manero and Andang expand
considerably. Normally, they would appear as operating on
the fringes. On the ground, however, they would appear
more as main and more real figures that matter.
Looking at 'bandit politics' from its context is a
micropolitical approach for explaining how power is acquired
and contested in these areas. The conflict and violence is
explained in terms of the 'local concerns' - the more
situational, more practical aspects of everyday life. What
may appear inconsistent to non-locals will suddenly make
sense. Beyond the killer that he is, Manero is needed by a
local constituency who are desperate to have their individual
and property rights protected. In some ways, Manero is a
more efficient enforcer of these rights for those under his
protection. For others, he is the most visible violator of these
rights. In Andang's Sulu, it is also evident that land titles,
legal entitlements and individual rights won't be upheld unless
privatised violence is there to back it up. Even a bishop who
stands in the way will be dispensed with. In such situations,
ordinary men like Robot, with his proven capacity for violence,
emerge. Robot is the neighbour or the distant cousin you
171
can run to, in case somebody takes your harvest. But what
Robot showed was that he can play 'big time' as well. He
gambled, staked all with his kidnapping of the 21 foreign
tourists, and won. Apart from the millions in cash he received,
the more important capital he gained was an enormous
increase in his personal prestige. This is manifested in the
ease with which he has accumulated his wives, a quality
that Manero has displayed as well.
Thomas McKenna's study of popular participation in
the Bangsamoro rebellion offers many insights into this
micropolitical approach. He observed that ordinary
adherents of armed nationalist movements "are more
discerning, and less ideologically incorporated,. than
anticipated by analyses keyed to the hegemonic effects of
nationalist (and also perhaps, fundamentalist) discourses."
He concludes that these ordinary adherents "have not
depended on elite-generated language and image to make
sense of power relations" (McKenna, 2000:279,emphasis
mine).
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Local politicians are the first to recoqnise and take
advantage of the utility that these men provide. Mayors and
other would-be politicians would welcome association with
them, like those who passed municipal resolutions to
endorse Manero's petition for pardon, or like Governor
Abdusakur Tan who eagerly revealed rather than concealed
his association with Andang. But this relationship between
local bosses like Tan or the Cotabato mayors on one hand,
and bandits like Manero and Andang on the other, are much
more complex. It can be characterised as a curious mix of
one needing the other as they try to manipulate each other
since they can also limit the reach and potential of each
other. Perhaps the best way of describing this is through the
use of Mancur Olson's idea of a stationary and roving bandit.
A stationary bandit is one who has successfully monopolised
the theft in his domain, such that his victims do not need to
worry about theft by others. The theft by this stationary bandit
becomes regular and predictable, such that it becomes a
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form of taxation. The victims then, have an incentive to
produce, because they know that "they can keep whatever
proportion of their output is left after they have paid their
'taxes'. Since all of the settled bandit's victims are for him a
source of tax payments, he also has an incentive to prohibit
the murder or maiming of his subjects." In contrast, the
world of roving banditry is that where there is little or no
incentive for anyone to produce or accumulate anything
that may be stolen (Olson, 1993: 568).
It can be argued that local bosses like Abdusakur or
Suod Tan are in some ways like a stationary bandit who
have not quite succeeded in monopolising 'theft' in their
domain. Andang on the other hand, is like a roving bandit
who lives inside the settled bandit's domain. As long as the
roving bandit preys outside that domain, it is to the settled
bandit's interest to keep him and give him space, as the
roving bandit brings in spoils from outside into this domain.
On the other hand, it is to the roving bandit's interest to use
the space in that domain as a refuge. This relationship stays,
as long as the roving bandit does not decide to seize the
domain himself. This is quite a simplification, but it
nevertheless describes in broad strokes the relationship
between local politicians and the bandits.
In sum, what this article has developed is a preliminary
framework that can be used to explain what can be termed
as bandit politics in southern Philippines - how new
entrepreneurs in violence structure and are structured by
the formal local politics in the areas they operate in . •:.
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Notes
I Hobsbawm, 2000: 7-34. Bandits was originally published in 1969,
where Hobsbawm defined the social bandit as those regarded by the
state or lords as criminals, yet firmly remain within peasant society
where they enjoy admiration, support and protection. This type of bandit
was also differentiated fram the petty, predatory criminal who chose
victims at random. Hobsbawm's social bandit has been taken up by
scholars analysing such phenomenon as the 'Robin Hoods' of modern
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politics, to explain frontier violence, and even peasant rebellions. This
has inspired a new field of historical study - bandit history. Hobsbawm
updated his idea of social bandit, in response to a number of critical
commentaries, and came out with a new 2000 edition.
2 There is another Kumander Inday Ligaya of the lIagas. Inday Ligaya is
the 53-year old younger sister of Feliciano Luces. Inday Ligaya was the
Ilaga 'kumander' brought to Malacanang on September 2, 1996, to
witness the signing of the PeaceAgreement between the government
and the Mora National Liberation front. Her presence was cited by Fidel
Ramos as proof of multi-stakeholder support for the peace process. She
was interviewed once in Bukidnon, but for many years was based
anonymously in the squatter communities of General Santos City.
Eventually, she became involved in urban poor organisations set up by
left-wing activists in the city. Inday Ligaya once told a community
organiser that she was able to fly on top of coconut trees while shooting
it out with enemies. Her children now live in Fatimo Village, an area
occu pied and later on awarded to squatters. (Letters b. 2001) The two
Indays show that women too playa role in this violent enterprise.
3 There are various estimates on the money Andang was able to rake in.
Former Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes admitted in a briefing to the Cabinet
that Andang got the equivalent of at least PhP 245 million - a figure five
times more than the provincial government budget. This disclosure was
made only after a handful of hostages was released. Robot's raised the
ante by demanding US$1 million for each hostage, when he had a total
of 28 hostages left. (POI, 21 Aug 2000). A Libyan foundation was
reported as preparing $12 million donation to support development
projects in the impoverished province. This was after Robot accused
Libyan negotiator Rajab Azzarouq of bad faith after he produced only
US$4 million in one meeting. (POI, 22 Aug 2000)
•
.
•
References
Books and publications
Arguillas, Carolyn. 2001. "Manero Time Line." Unpublished.
Coronel, Sheila. 1993. "Missionaries and Cannibals" in Coups, Cults
and Cannibals. Anvil Publishing: Pasig. (The article was originally
published in the Philippine Panarama, June 16 and 23, 1985).
•
George, TJS. 1980. Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine
Politics. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Gutierrez, Eric. 2000a. "In the Battlefields of the Warlord" in Rebels,
Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War
in Southern Philippines. Institute for Popular Democracy: Quezon
City.
174
•
•
-----=---:--
. 2000b. "New Faces of Violence in Muslim Mindanao" in
Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and
the War in Southern Philippines. Institute for Popular Democracy:
Quezon City.
- - - - . 2000c. "The Unfinished Jihad" in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama:
A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the Wur in Southern Philippines.
Institute for Popular Democracy: Quezon City.
Hobsbowrn, Eric. 2000. Bandits. Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London.
•
McCoy, Alfred W, (ed). 1993. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family
in the Philippines. University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian
Studies: Madison.
McKenna, Thomas M. 1999. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics
and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. University of
California Press: Berkeley.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development" in
American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, Issue 3, 567-576.
Patino, Patrick I. 2000. "The Manero Question" in Con;uncfure, Vo1.12,
No.2, March-April 2000. Institute for Popular Democracy: Quezon
City
•
T. 1999. Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the
Philippines. Stanford University Press: California.
Sidel, John
Torres, Jose Jr. 2001. Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf.
Claretian Publications: Quezon City.
Vitug, Marites and Glenda Gloria. 2000. Under the Crescent Moon:
Rebellion in Mindanao. Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public
Affairs: Quezon City.
Letters received
by
the writer
a) Various letters from Carolyn Arguillas, former Mindanao Bureau Chief,
•
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2001 .
b) Letterfrom Ben Sumug-oy, former Barongay Affairs Co-ordinator of the
City of General Santos, 15 August 2001.
c) Three letters from various members of the Oblate Missionary Fathers of
the Philippines, May-June 2001
d) Two letters from Aquilino Pimentel, Philippine Senator. May 21 and 22,
2001.
•
175
On-line news clippings and e-group sources
•
ABS-CBN News (8 April 2000) "Manero calls for lIaga revival in
Mi ndanao," http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/a bs/inews-May2000 .nsf!
Provincial/20000503006
ABS-CBN News (2 May 2000) "Monera Faces Trial Anew." Accessed
online fram http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/abs/inews-May2000.nsf!
Pravincial/20000503006
Agence France Presse (17 May 2000) 'At the Mercy of the Pirates of the
Abu Sayyaf
BBC News (12 September 2000) "Timeline: The Jolo Hostage Drama"
http://news.bbc.co. uk/hi/eng lish/world/asia- pacific/
newsid 914000/914809.stm
•
CBS News (12 April 2001) "US Hostage Freed in the Philippines" http://
cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,283170-412,00.shtml
Geremia, Peter(29 March 2001). "Statement About Monera." Releaseby
PIME Philippines.
Gomez, Jim (27 August 2000) "Muslim Rebel Has Unlikely Path." Associated
Press. http://www.amana-online.de/pp/news/amana-news/
mail44.shtml
Mercado, Fr Eliseo RJr (15·ApriI2000) "PGMA Meets Monera", posted at
the Mindanao 1081 @yahoogroups.com listserve.
Philippine Daily Inquirer (28 February 2000) "Report details Manero's
links with military, police officers" by Dave Veridiano and Aquiles
Zonio.
•
Philippine Daily Inquirer (26 July 2000) "Bandits Want P10M for two
journalists" http://www.inqu irer.net/issues/ju 12000/juI26/news/
news 2.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 August 2000) "German PaperAdmits Ransom"
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug01 /news/news_1 .htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (2 August 2000) "Cash, guns paid for hostages"
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug02/news/news_3 .htm
•
Philippine Daily Inquirer (8 Aug 2000) "AFP chief admits P245M paid for
hostages' release" http://www:inq7.net/issues/aug2000/aug08/
news/news_3.htm
176
•
•
Ehilippine Doily Inquirer (11 Aug 2000) "Robot Kidnaps a Bride" http://
www.inq7.net/issues/aug2000/aug11/news/news_l O.htm
Philippine Doily Inquirer (18 Aug 2000) "International efforts behind deal
to free hostages" http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug 18/
news/news_7.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (21 Aug 2000) "Abu wants $12M more" http://
www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug21/news/news_l .htrn
Philippine Daily Inquirer (22 Aug 2000) "Libya to pay $12M more" http:/
/www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug22/news/news_1 .htrn
Philippine Daily Inquirer (24 Aug 2000) "Sayyaffrees worker but grabs 2
brides" http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug24/news/
news 11.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (1 7 Aug 2000) "HowAbu Sayyafdivided P245·
M loot" http://www.inquirer.net/issues/aug2000/aug 17/news/
news 2.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (28 Aug 2000) "Mission Impossible" http://
www.inqu irer. net/issues/a ug2000/a ug28/opinion/main. htrn
Philippine Daily Inquirer (4 Setpember 2000) "Gov't probes Schilling
'arms deal' with Abu" http://www.inquirer.net/issues/sep2000/
sep04/news/news_main.htm
•
Philippine Doily Inquirer (1 0 Sept 2000) "Abu ambushes Abu: 3 dead, 25
wounded," http://www.inquirer.net/issues/sep2000/sep 1O/news/
news 2.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 2001 ) "AI Harakatul allslamiya: The
beginnings of Abu Sayyaf." http://www.inq7.net/specials/
inside_abusayyaf/200 l/featu res/formative_years.htrn
Philippine Doily Inquirer (15 June 2001) "Chavit on Robot negotiations:
It's for country, not money." http://www.inq7.net/brk/2001/jun/15/
brkpol_29.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (6 July 2001). "'Robot' WithdrawsSurrender
•
Plan." http://www.inq7.net/brk/2001/juIl06/text/brkpol_4.1.p.htm
Philippine Daily Inquirer (10 July 2001) "Low profile intellectual behind
Abu Sayyaf" http://www.inq7.net/nat/2001/juIl1 0/nat_5-1.htm
Shahar, Yael (20 Aug 2000) "Libya and the Jolo hostages: Seeking a new
image or polishing the old one?" http://www.iet.org.il/
•
177
Suns/or General Santos (27 March 2001 o] "Prospects of Manero pardon
dim: lawyer" http://www.sunstar.com.ph/gensan/03-27-2001/
topstories1.html
Suns/or General Santos (27 March 2001 b) "Yee responsible in Manero's
pardon" http://ww~.sunstar.com.ph/gensan/03-27 -200 1/
topstcriesZ.htmI
•
•
178
•

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