The Naval Review

-"
"c-
Vol. XLI No. 3
THE
NAVAL R E V I E W
FOUNDED IN I
gI
2
"Think Wisely. Plan Boldly. Act Swftly."
ISSUED Q U A R T E R L Y FOR P R I V A T E C I R C U L A T I O N
THE OBJECT
The object of THE NAVALREVIEWis to encourage
thought and discussion on such subjects as strategy,
tactics, naval operations, staff work, administration,
organization, command, discipline, education, naval
history, and any other topic affecting the fighting
efficiency of the Navy, but excluding much technical
detail, the naval officer being already well provided
for in that respect elsewhere. I t is hoped that this
will help to build up that body of sound doctrine
which is so essential to success in war, and to provide
a means of expression and discussion within the Service.
For the Regulations of THENAVALREVIEWsee overleaf.
It is important that they be carefully studied.
Copyrighted under Act of
I 91I .
HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.
IT is with the greatest possible regret that I have to announce the retirement
of our Secretary, Mrs. Owen. That regret will be shared by the many who
know her personally and, I think, also by those who have not that advantage
but who have corresponded with her on many occasions. Her name has been a
household word to members for a good few years. She has been a tower of
strength to the Hon. Editor and I know Admiral Webb would have said the
same. THE NAVALREVIEWhas an intimate character peculiar to itself and
Mrs. Owen has done much to foster it. We will return to this subject when we
meet on the 18th of December.
Mrs. Owen's successor will be Rear-Admiral (S) R. R. Wallace, C.B.E.
He will also be Treasurer. This is a new departure. Formerly that duty was
done by the Hon. Editor but the present Hon. Editor when he took over, felt
that the editorial work would take up all his attention and, so, Commander
J. H. Owen, one of our trustees, kindly undertook the financial part of the work
temporarily.
Admiral Wallace will take over on the 15th of December, after which date
members should send correspondence for the Secretary-Treasurer to him. His
address will be-Birch Hanger, Kingsley Green, Haslemere.
Members are reminded that their NAVALREVIEWnumbers can be bound
annually if sent to the printers, Bradley & Sons, Ltd., The Crown Press, Caxton
Street, Reading. The price of a volume is 17s. 6d. A reduction is made for a
number of volumes. The books, bound in blue cloth, look well on one's shelves.
The whole set gives one a mirror to naval thought over a period of great events
and change in our history.
All matter for the November number should reach me by the First of
October-earlier if possible.
IMPORTANT
GENERAL
MEETING
THIS will be held on Friday, the 18th of December, 1953, a t the Naval and
Military Club, 94, Piccadilly. Time 5.15 to 7 p.m. I t will be preceded by a
Committee Meeting at 4.15 p.m.
The first part of the General Meeting proceedings will be devoted to a
discussion on NAVALREVIEWaffairs, after which the gathering will become a
social one. Refreshments will be served and members will be requested to pay
for what they order.
The first of these meetings, which took place last year, was found to be
useful and popular and it is therefore hoped that all members who can make
it possible to come up for the occasion will do so.
" THE SEA AND THE AIR "-THE
OTHER SIDE'S
CASE.
IN the May number " R.A.C." contributed a temperate and cogently argued
article on this burning question. With a great deal of what he wrote, for
instance his repeated emphasis on the need for inter-service understanding
and co-operation, no reasonable person could possibly disagree. Yet one may
still feel that his solution to the problems of maritime air operations and
organization is not the best ; and this writer at any rate detects in the whole
of his paper the fallacy that appears almost daily in the public pronouncements
of our Air Force friends. Stated in its simplest terms " R.A.C." holds that
all that is needed is patience, the continuation of our present methods of joint
training, and faith in the infallibility of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and
all will come right-in the end. With the first two of these premises I have
no complaint. Patience is always a necessary quality in the fighting man.
John Buchan, in his splendid and insufficiently known analysis of the qualifications required of the leader put fortitude first and " patience, supreme patience
under the misunderstandings and muddles of others " second l . I do not think
that we of the Navy can be accused of showing impatience in this matter.
Nor can there be the slightest doubt about the value of the interchange appointments made to the Staff Colleges, nor regarding the work of the Joint Services
Staff College, the Joint Anti-Submarine School and so on. But I would remark
that these establishments do not fulfil a new need. .Though its form has altered,
the need is as old as strategy and tactics themselves. On the third of " R.A.C.'s "
premises, the suggested infallibility (he does not use that word but strongly
implies it) of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I must immediately take issue.
I imply no criticism of the C.0.S.s either as individuals or as a corporate
body. Unquestionably they study all the problems placed before them with the
utmost care and responsibility ; but on such matters as the allocation of inadequate resources they can only recommend to the political leaders : they
cannot decide. In the nature of things there will always be a tendency for
them to find a compromise. I t may be a good and wise compromise, or it may
later be shown to have been a wrong and dangerous one. Certainly no one
can guarantee that it will always be the former. Moreover their recomrnendations will have to accord with the general policy already decided by the
Government, and with that policy the Chiefs of Staff may well disagree.
Another factor is that on all Committees personality counts for very much ;
and in dealing with politicians it counts for still more. Consequently on any
Committee the most powerful character and most persuasive speaker is likely
to get the best hearing. But all this is, in a way, beside the point. What I
mean to rub home is that " R.A.C.'s " suggestion comes dangerously close
to the " Fiihrer-prinzip " theory. In a democratic system it is quite unacceptable ; and I suggest that the Chiefs of Staff themselves would be dismayed to
find that, on issues on which they could not be sure that they were right, their
1 See John Buchan "Homilies and Recreations," reprint of a lecture entitled "The
Great Captains."
views and recommendations were always met by public acclaim. Incidentally
before leaving this matter I would add that study of the public press leads
one to think that most prominent airmen agree with " R.A.C.'s " view of the
proper outlook towards the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A cynic might conclude
that a t present they are getting all, or most, of what theywant ; aphilosopher
would therefore demand to hear the other side's case.
So much for the premises put forward by our contributor. We will now
turn to what I have already suggested is a fallacy which vitiates much of
" R.A.C.'s " careful argument.
He is, as I have said, in good company here,
for it is certainly the case that most exponents of Air Strategy also labour under
it ; and it is this, not any bias nor jealousy nor ill-will nor " malice or other
uncharitableness," which makes us of the Navy so desperately anxious regarding the direction in which we, as a nation, are being led to-day. The fallacy
lies in the view that an immediate all-out bombing offensive (atomic and
everything else) is practicable in a future war, and secondly that it will be
decisive. I will pass over the question whether it is practicable briefly. Such
matters as the possession by the U.S.A. (not ourselves) of the stockpile of
atomic bombs, and the inevitable reluctance of Governments to incur the
odium of being the first to take such steps as atomic bombing (even Hitler
wished to avoid killing the first civilian in Britain), to suggest only that there
may be great and unforeseen difficulties in applying such a strategy. Is it
not almost certain that a British Government, of no matter what political
complexion, will do its utmost to avoid the use of any weapon of mass destruction ? Our attitude towards the use of gas in the last war certainly supports
that contention. This possibility leads the thinking man who is trained in a
different school to wonder whether it is not a little dangerous to make public
pronouncements such as that by the late Chief of the Air Staff that " atomic
air power is the decisive arm of the free world ".l
Now this urge to strike a t once, and with all one's forces, a t the enemy
is a natural and proper desire in the fighting man. I t is, in fact, a projection into modernity of the old maxim of seeking decision by battle. I t has
often been done a t sea ; and we sailors know that if enthusiasm for battle
outruns sound judgement, the blow is likely to fall wide. Many examples,
ancient and modern, could be quoted to illustrate this well-known danger.
But the difference between us and the Air Strategists lies deeper, muchdeeper,
than the question whether it is wise always to rush headlong into the offensive.
The Air believes that an offensive strategy can be applied from the first day
of a future war. We not only doubt it, but it leaves us aghast a t the dangers
consequential on using most of our resources to that end, and in gambling our
very safety and future on its possibility and success. We believe that the
nature of Britain's responsibilities, her geographic position and her form of
government all make it inevitable that our initial strategy in a major war
must be defensive. We are not an aggressive nation ; we shall never be fully
prepared for war, and we shall always struggle to avoid it. This is bound to
leave the initiative with the enemy a t first, and to force on us a period of the
strategic defensive (pace 1914-17 and 1939-41).
During that phase we must, first, keep these islands safe and intact-and
what a part the R.A.F. has to play once more in that ! Secondly, we must
mobilize our overseas resources, strengthen the defences of the key bases all
over the world, bring to these islands the food and raw materials we need and
win time to change our economy from a peace to a war footing. All of these
1
See "The Sunday Times " of May 17th, 1953-
requirements depend absolutely and completely on our sea and air forces being
successful in keeping the sea and air routes of the world open to our use and
denied to the enemy, and on keeping these islands intact. These are, in fact,
the well-established principles of a maritime strategy translated into a modern
context. " But," I can hear my Air friends saying " What a timid strategy !
Just sitting and waiting for it to come to you ! " To which I would reply " Far
from it. A defensive strategy has tremendous compensations. For, if the enemy
wishes to attack you he has to do so across seas and through skies which he
does not adequately control; and that is where we win our great victories." I
would also, though gently of course, remind him that that was why and how
his Service won the Battle for Britain in 1940. Our strategy was perforce
defensive, and the enemy could do no other than attack us in uncontrolled
skies. Incidentally, he did not dare to do so across seas which, so Raeder
warned Hitler, they could not control. But Goering, who knew nothing about
strategy, assured his Fiihrer that he could do the job without the Navy.
Let us therefore at once clear the airman's mind of the idea that a period
of the strategic defensive is one of enforced inactivity, leaving the tactical as
well as the strategic initiative to the enemy. The opposite is the truth. We
always have and we always must, during this period, lose no chance to seize
the tactical initiative. And well our leaders know it. After all, the Navy's
air attack on Taranto, the Battle of the River Plate, Matapan, 1st and 2nd
Narvik, the Battle of Britain, the sinking of the Bismarck, and so on and so
on, victories by air as well as by sea, were all fought and won during the 1939-41
period of the strategic defensive. So were innumerable sea-air convoy battles
in some of which, like the epic of H.G.76, the enemy took some very hard
knocks. And all the time, almost unseen, ships, tanks, aircraft, men of all
services and supplies of all natures were moving quietly, but in immense
numbers overseas to the key points and areas from which the Cabinet had
decided ultimately to turn to the offensive. And, let it be remarked, it was
we, not the enemy, who had chosen where we would fight on land.
Lastly on this particular theme I want to illustrate the Air fallacy by a n
argument which, although approaching a " reductio ad absurdum," is entirely
true. We not only deprecate dogmatic pronouncements such as have recently
appeared in the Press from the pens of prominent airmen, on the grounds that
they cannot be proved and that they sweepingly ignore all the strategic considerations of our experience, but because we think that, in spite of the power
of the heavy bomber, the ordinary foot soldier will still be the final arbiter in
war-and that we must still get him where he is needed. We believe that even
if air power (atomic or otherwise) successfully obliterates all but a few contestants on both sides, i t will still be necessary for the last few survivors of
the warring nations to be carried overseas, if need be in the last surviving
rowing boat, to settle the difference finally by land combat with whatever
weapons may remain to them. We do not believe that any war ever has, or
ever will be, settled by one arm or one Service alone ; and the claim that this
is now so strikes us as arrogant. I t was, therefore, with some astonishment
that I read " R.A.C.'s " statement that " Incidentally this dependence on
someone else is no new factor in naval warfare." Of course i t isn't ! And
precisely the same is true of the Army and, I add it in all humility, of the
R.A.F. too. To suggest otherwise would be very naive.
I would next like, if the reader will bear with me further, to illustrate the
dangers of the outlook of the Air Strategist. Mussolini, as Chief of the Armed
Forces, ordered " an offensive to the death a t all points," when he dragged
his nation into war. It wasn't a strategy and it wasn't practicable. The results
we know. Secondly, on all the evidence available to Hitler in 1940 the defeat
of Britain by the new strategic development of air power appeared certain.
With Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France all laid prostrate
under the swastika in a matter of days, it would have been difficult, nay impossible, for " Counsel for Britain " to argue before the court of Hitler's advisers
that the application of the same strategy to Britain would not bring the same
results. On all the evidence available and by all the precedents so recently
established Marshal Goering's case was irrefutable. Yet, in the event, his
strategic failure was complete. To us naval thinkers the analogy between that
failure and the arguments now put forward by our airmen friends is real and
vivid. Furthermore, any student who has waded through the published
extracts of Hitler's " Fiihrer Conferences " cannot but remark how, on strategic
matters, Raeder was always right and Goering, who fortunately for us had
Hitler's ear, always wrong. If Raeder had had his way the defeat of France
would have been followed by an all-out air and sea attack on our communications and our ports. And the first overseas object which he wished to
attack was -not Britain but Iceland !
If, then, the strategy of the air offensive is to be adopted by this nation
let its eyes be fully opened to its real implications. I t must, so we feel, lead to
vast dissipation oi our forces while we are in the stage of greatest vulnerability,
with our strength unmustered, our people unready and our economy wrongly
directed. Only in one set of circumstances can its prospects of success be
regarded as good. And that is if Britain and her Allies discard their age-old
forms of government and their traditional standpoint as the guardians of free
democracy, and themselves become the aggressor nations aiming at unbridled
power and world dominion. Such a change is obviously unthinkable-at any
rate without parallel world changes, discussion of which would take us far
outside our present field. If that be accepted, then the radical change in the
principles governing our strategy, advocated by the Air, is not only a gamble
which might have fatal results, but is also fissiparous between the Services
to no purpose, and will in the event prove impracticable.
So much for the strategic reasons for rejecting " R.A.C.'s " solution to
the problems of " The Sea and the Air." My airmen friends are entitled now
to ask what I propose instead. First, I would plead for a genuinely objective
approach on a high intellectual level to the problem of bringing Britain's ageold maritime strategy up to date, in the light of the new instruments of war
available to attack and defend our merchant shipping (and in due course our
transport aircraft too). Secondly, I want my air friends not to press, and
above all not to press publicly, in such a way as may mislead our politicians and
people while this matter is sub judice. I do not ask them at once to throw
overboard all their gallant offensive longings. The motive is splendid, but the
moment needs choosing. I ask them instead to accept, if only for the purposes
of argument and to satisfy a very small section of our population, one not very
vocal but which is deeply versed in war of one nature and intensely professional,
that they will make the safety of our convoys and merchant ships, the security
of our overseas bases and the immunity of our vital ports and harbours a
matter of the first concern to themselves ; that they will devote their best
resources to hose purposes and that they will tell us what they can do and
how they will do it. Lastly, that while this process is being undergone the
strategy of the immediate air offensive shall be put into cold storage ; for it
conflicts basically with our needs. Out of such deliberations there could, and
I believe would, emerge a new approach and a new outlook towards our strategy.
In return for this magnanimity by the Air, the Navy should, I suggest, accept,
though " without prejudice," that it will regard the question of the future
responsibility for Coastal Command as being in abeyance. Speaking only for
myself I do not mind whether men in light blue or in dark fly Coastal Command's aircraft-provided
that the Admiralty retains its " controlling "
authority (of which more later). But I and, I believe, all who saw or who have
studied what happened at sea last time feel most strongly that it is in maritime
affairs that our weakness lies to-day. If the R.A.F. retains Coastal Command
we claim the right to be assured that it is being adequately provided for.
I have, I hope, made it plain that I, and all members of this journal,
must be very grateful to " R.A.C." for writing as he did. I have tried, so far,
to reply to him in general terms only, but from our own standpoint. I trust
it will not be considered captious if I conclude by mentioning a few other
matters on which naval opinion may feel justified in disagreeing with him.
(1) I doubt whether, in the Atlantic, shore-based aircraft will ever be
" less susceptible to weather"
than those carrier-borne. The consequences
of fog, ice and snow on airfields may still be serious, whereas hundreds of miles
out at sea conditions may be quite favourable to carrier work. The reverse
is also, to some extent, true of course. Air defence of shipping needs both
types ; and above all it needs them as convoy escorts. Nothing is plainer from
the last war than the fact that it was air and sea escorts rather than forces
used in any other way, which defeated the U-boat. And carrier aircraft have
great advantages over those shore-based in providing continuous escort for
convoys. I cannot accept " R.A.C.'s " contention that only in the centre of
the Atlantic will carrier-borne aircraft be needed. The ideal to aim a t is to
have a carrier with every convoy, and shore-based reconnaissance and fightercover at both ends of the routes in addition.
(2) " Handling aircraft is an airman's job." We have all heard this
argument, in one or other form, before. Naval gunnery was once regarded as
a " black art " ! The R.N.V.R. and R.A.A.F. surely dispelled such illusions
once and for all in the last war ; and American experience went even further
than ours in showing the speed and adaptability with which young men can
be taught a complicated duty. There was a time when it was believed that
warships' guns could only be fought by soldiers. The discovery that seamen
could do it just as well led to a vast simplification of organization and administration. We regard the aircraft as a powerful weapon in the maritime
armoury, but still only one of the weapons. I t does not need a man in light blue
to fly them. I served a very happy Commission in an aircraft carrier before
the war, and the best lesson I then learnt was that each service could quickly
learn the other's job-and its way of life. Not once did I ever hear it suggested
by the Navy that our R.A.F. pilots were inferior in carrier work because they
had not " lived all their service life in a sea atmosphere." Such a suggestion
would have been as untrue then as it is to-day.
(3) The question of " keeping the Navy afloat " has long been exercising
naval minds. But I am inclined to think that, under modern conditions, its
importance is diminished. Here again the R.N.V.R. taught us a lot. But if
the argument that it would " add 20,000 shoremen to its ranks " is to be used
against the Navy taking over Coastal Command, may we gently point out that
taking over land-based guided missiles (as has been recently announced) will
presumably add a lot of men to the R.A.F. who will never fly. The same,
after all, is true of the R.A.F. Regiment. Why is it needed ? These tendencies
seem to show a desire to step far outside the R.A.F.'s real and tremendous
240
" THE SEA AND THE AIR "-THE
OTHER SIDE'S CASE.
responsibilities. We only ask to handle the weapons which contribute to
defending our ships and convoys. By the same standard shore guided-missiles
should surely belong to the Royal Artillery ? Bearing in mind the ultimate
dependence in war of each service on its sister-services, I cannot help feeling
anxious regarding this predatory tendency by the R.A.F. on matters which
do not lie within its field. The final state will, I suppose, be one vast SuperService under the sort of Super-C.-in.-C. beloved of our American Allies !
(4) I think " R.A.C." errs by implication, if not factually, when he says
that the Admiralty had powers " to issue orders direct to Coastal Command."
Under the arrangements made in December, 1940 (and actually introduced in
April, 1941), the naval C.-in-C. stated his needs to his air colleague (for instance
C.-in-C. Western Approaches to the A.O.C. No. 15 Group), and the latter did
his best to fulfil them. All such business was transacted on an inter-service
basis in the Area Combined Headquarters. I t is true that if the Home Fleet
was a t sea the Admiralty assumed a more direct measure of control through
the Headquarters of Coastal Command. But even in that case I feel sure the
Admiralty did not give orders to the C.-in-C. Coastal Command. The changes
made in 1941 were not, I think, as drastic as would a t first sight appear-at
any rate as they were made to work by the officers of the two services concerned.
(5) " R.A.C." asks, doubtfully, whether V.L.R. aircraft could have been
made available for the Atlantic Battle earlier had the Admiralty been responsible. I cannot answer so hypothetical a question, and I do not believe
the historians of the period will do so either. But I would like to remind readers
of a letter General Wave11 wrote from India a t one of the periods of our greatest
anxiety for the safety of our sea communications. The first 1,000 bomber raid
had just taken place. " I t certainly gives one furiously to think," wrote the
General when he read about it and considered what a tiny fraction of that
effort could have done to secure our greatly imperilled communications in the
Indian Ocean, on which our whole position in his theatre depended. I t is
just the same to-day. I t gives us also " furiously to think " what will happen
a t sea if the R.A.F. goes merrily ahead to put its own convictions into practice,
without regard to the strategic consequences elsewhere. We cannot say that
the Admiralty would have obtained more V.L.R. aircraft earlier. But we do
say that in the last war the single-minded devotion of the R.A.F. to its strategic
bombing programme kept the V.L.R. aircraft away from the Atlantic Battle
far too long ; that we suffered very nearly disastrous losses in consequence
and that those losses postponed the tide of our offensive strategy. The histories
and memoirs already published are unanimous that it was shipping, and
always shipping, which conditioned every strategic move by us and our allies
from 1942 to 1944. Our losses can be studied by anyone who takes the trouble,
as can the decline in our losses when the V.L.R. aircraft really set to the job.
As things are going to-day we are heading for a precise repetition of those
phenomena-offensive bombing failing of itself to secure a decision, and losses
a t sea preventing the Services, all together, from deploying the country's real
offensive capacity. " R.A.C.'s " question can therefore be answered without
awaiting any more histories, though not in the form for which he asks. And
we see the writing on the wall, because i t has always been written on Britain's
walls that " if she loses a t sea she loses the war."
S. W. R.
U.S.N.
VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION.
U.S.N. VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION.
THEREis a fair amount of criticism of British Naval Aviation in United States
Naval circles a t the present time, and it may be of interest to THE NAVAL
REVIEWmembers if I attempt to analyse it.
Probably any such analysis should begin bv making the point that much of
the criticism is ill-informed since it is based on a failure to appreciate the United
Kingdom situation in two major respects :-(a) The degree of co-operation between the British Services is still not
realized and it is wrongly assumed that inter-Service rivalry and
jealousies are much as they are in the United States.
(b) The Ministry of Supply's position is not understood. There is no
corresponding common procurement agency in the United States.
Be that as it may the United States Navy considers that British Naval
Aviation is in a bad way for quite a few reasons among which are :(i) Its aircraft are out dated and there are not enough of them.
(ii) British Carriers are never fully complemented with either manpower
or aircraft which results in lack of experience in the operation of
aircraft from carriers in large numbers and, as a corollary, false
deductions are being drawn as to what is or is not possible.
(iii) British Carriers are not organized in Carrier Task Forces with the
result that they seldom operate together (four Carriers in company is
considered the minimum which should form a Task Force) and even
when they do the Force is usually looked on as a Task Force rather
than a Carrier Task Force. This latter point is not such a subtle
distinction as it might appear to be since i t is based on the outlook of
the Task Force Commander and his staff.
(iv) Those comparatively few British officers who did have war experience
of operating Carrier Task Forces are in the majority of cases no
longer in appointments directly concerned with Naval Aviation.
Hence their experience is not being made use of.
(v) A large part of what should be Naval Aviation is not under the
Navy's control, i.e. Coastal Command. In the U.S. Navy's eyes
every maritime aircraft should be a naval one so as to avoid any
possibility of divided thought or control. I t is not a question of two
halves making a whole ; to their way of thinking no division is
acceptable.
This last point is of a different order to the remainder and, it is argued,
leads to other weaknesses which are :(a) Dual control is introduced which is anathema to the average
American. Our Maritime Command system is often referred to as
" a double-headed monster " and I must admit when tackled on this
subject Lloyd-George's remark when agreeing to Marshal Foch being
U.S.N.
VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION.
given sole Command of the Armies on the Western Front in World
War I always comes to my mind, " I can deal with a man but not
with a Committee ".
(b) The Force Commander at sea has not got a self--contained force
under his command and hence is liable to be influenced in his actions
by considerations outside his control.
(c) I t denies an adequate career structure to the Naval Aviator.
(d) I t results in an unnecessary duplication of training effort or
alternatively (since the average U.S. naval officer is vague as to the
training Coastal Command air-crews get), in shore based maritime
air-crews being given inadequate training.
I shall elaborate some of these points later on in this article but my object
at this juncture is to give a brief summary of the general run of criticism so as to
lead on to what are considered by the U.S. Navy to have been our two great
mistakes. They consider it is fundamental to retain direct control of :(i) all naval flying training, and
(ii) aircraft procurement,
and that our deficiencies stem from the fact that we have allowed these two
essentials to be taken away from us.
I t is in this respect in particular that their lack of knowledge of the United
Kingdom background leads them astray, and, incidentally, we never actually
did control these two features.
Consider training first. Basic Flying Training of our young naval aviators is
carried out by the R.A.F. Nobody could possibly cavil at the actual standard of
flying training given, but now that a fair number of naval aviators are taught to
fly by the American Navy in the United States under the mutual aid scheme two
points have become apparent-if indeed they were not apparent before. Both
profoundly affect the outlook of the young naval aviator during his impressionable years, and particularly so the short service aviators who have little general
naval background when they first start flying training.
The first point is that the naval aviator trained in America from the outset
is given a naval background. A small point you may say, but I do not think it is
so small. Your R.A.F. trained young man not only meets an entirely different
outlook on life to that which he is going to find later in the Navy, but it is a
" Camp-run-under-a-code-of-discipline-designed-for-shore-life" outlook. The
U.S. naval trained aviator on the other hand, though he is living in an air station
very similar to his confreres trained by the R.A.F., and under very un-English
conditions, is a t least from the outset working under officers whose code and
outlook is based on the requirements of life in a ship.
The U.S. Naval Aviators argue that neither system is correct but that if we
trained our own youngsters to fly they would from the start, and during their
impressionable early months, be trained in the same atmosphere that they are to
live in later. This they contend would prevent what they suggest occurs nowthe producticn of Aviators who fly from Carriers rather than Naval Aviators.
The second point is that the R.A.F. trained naval aviator does not land on a
Carrier, which after all is the reason for his existence, until he returns to the
Navy on completion of his basic flying training. The U.S. Navy trained
officer makes his first acquaintance with the deck about half-way through his
U.S.N.
VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION.
243
basic flying training. And there is even more to it than this. Not only is there a
considerable difference between the times when the trainees under the two
systems first land on a Carrier but those being trained by the R.A.F. never do
any form of Carrier drill until they come back to the Navy. Again, though the
trainees are better off under the U.S. Navy, they are not as well suited as they
could be if we trained them ourselves.
Both points support the U.S. Navy's contention that we ought never to let
other Services train our young aviators during their formulative period in the
Navy. I t is claimed that the result of their being out of our control during this
early period of their Service accentuates the difference in outlook between the
Aviator and the non-Aviator and, hence, the British Navy has not always
spoken with one voice on Maritime Aviation questions and has allowed what
ought to be part of it, i.e. Coastal Command, to slip from its grasp.
Aircraft procurement not being under the Navy's direct control is quite
another kettle of fish. Whatever arguments one advances to an American Naval
Aviator to explain the Ministry of Supply he replies, " Well it does not give you
worth-while aircraft does it ?"-and as things are a t present it is difficult not to
say " I agree " and close the discussion.
But that does not help this article and one must examine the American
views in detail. I think they argue like this : " Your Ministry of Supply, while
including Naval Aviators in its staff, aims at designing aircraft on a non-service
basis. I t does not attempt to produce an essentially naval aircraft unless the
requirements stated are such that the aircraft could not be used except from a
carrier, which is an unusual case. Rather it attempts to design an aircraft for
the R.A.F. which, in the case of fighter types may with a little luck also prove
suitable for the Navy with a few modifications. The latter probably spoil the
characteristics of the aircraft, which would not have been the case had it been
designed for the Navy in the first instance. (They then often add that in any
case you don't give the production of naval fighters any priority so none get
made-but that is perhaps irrelevant a t this juncture.) Apart from this, the
system results in none of the designers becoming ingrained with naval problems
and requirements, as is the case with the designers in American firms who
specialize in the manufacture of U.S. naval aircraft. The contrary is what we do.
Over the years we have built up a naval tradition in certain aircraft firms
whose existence largely depends on the construction of naval aircraft. They
know what we want and have a wealth of experience behind them which
ensures that the characteristics of the aircraft are not spoilt by making it
suitable for the deck. Hence by having procurement under our direct control we
get what we want when we want it ;you do not."
Much of the Ministry of Supply part of their argument is of course fallacious,
but one can quite see that it is a perfectly reasonable construction to put on the
present situation, which frankly amazes them. They cannot understand why the
Lords of the Admiralty are not raising hell because they are not getting the
modem aircraft they need for the Navy, particularly in quantity but also in
quality.
They are of course in clover with their direct control of procurement, and
there is a good deal to be said for their contention that our system results in our
not having the aircraft we really want and that this leads to some of our
current difficulties and, in their eyes, inefficiencies. Where they miss the point is
that it was not a case of our making a mistake in adopting the present system,
we never had the option of doing anything else since the Ministry of Supply
244
U.S.N.
VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL
AVIATION.
came into being, and later absorbed aircraft production, without the Admiralty
being allowed to do more than comment.
Hence I think that while admitting that there is considerable truth in the
American naval contention that allowing basic flying training and aircraft
procurement to slip out of our grasp is the indirect cause of many of our difficulties with aviation, i t is not correct to call these mistakes on our part because we
were never given the opportunity to take them over. Would that we could have
control of them.
Perhaps I might now expand in slight degree some of the reasons I listed
before why the Americans consider British Naval Aviation is in a bad way.
I have said all that is worth saying about the lack of modern aircraft so I
will turn to the complementing of the Carriers with aircraft and personnel. As
regards aircraft this of course directly derives from our lack of aircraft and since
there is no such corresponding shortage in the American Navy the small numbers
the average British carrier has embarked naturally strikes the American critic
as odd. The under complementing in manpower of a British carrier in peace
compared to an American one stems in part from a difference in the manning
policy of the two Navies. We keep ships short of complement and find men for
courses from the barracks and shore establishments ; the Americansman their
ships more fully but make the Fleet provide the men for most courses from
them. The American policy has the advantage that when you want all ships up
to complement for an exercise you withdraw men from the Fleet schools without
fuss or argument.
I listed the organization of Carrier Task Forces next. I t must be
remembered that more than one Chief of Naval Operations and many Fleet
Commanders in the American Navy have been Aviators and it is probable that
the U.S. Navy's belief in the Carrier Task Force as a unit, which was thoroughly
justified in the Pacific, grew from their influence. Perhaps when we have had
Naval Aviators in corresponding positions in our Navy our ideas on this subject
will undergo a change.
The last of these reasons I am going to remark on is why Coastal Command
is not part of the Navy. If all that has been written on this subject, even only in
THE NAVALREVIEW,was accumulated in one book it would be a fairly large
one, but the odd thing is that the American naval critic would not want to
write more than a few lines. The fact that having maritime shore based aircraft
under another Service does not permit an adequate career structure for naval
aviators is an important, but secondary, point ; the kernel of the question is, to
these critics, that being maritime aircraft they must essentially be part of the
Navy, since any form of dual control is bound to be unsatisfactory and inefficient. And there the matter ends ; no reasoning, no explanations, it is a
self-evident truth, but the British evidently do not think it is a self-evident
truth which shows confused thinking on their part on this all important
question of Naval Aviation.
Perhaps I have written enough to show how the wind blows-at any rate a t
the level in which I move. I doubt, however, if I have succeeded in bringing out
the main points as clearly as I should like-when one is living on top of a subject
one sometimes fails to stress points because they appear so obvious.
To wind up this article I want to draw attention to another aspect which
causes our American friends much annoyance. We have a tendency to make
~ l a i m for
s naval aviation which are not only unjustified but are ones about which
we have no right to be proud.
U.S.N. VIEWS ON BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION.
245
A good example was the caption under the photographs of the launch of
H.M.S. Hermes which appeared in " The Times" of Tuesday, the 17th of
February, which claimed that when completed she would be the most modern
carrier in the world. Now ; two American carriers building will complete before
her with equally, or more, modern equipment so that this is an untrue statement,
but apart from that the Americans know that we could, if we wanted, convert
existing carriers to her standard of " moderness " well before she completes.
That, however, we are not doing and yet the caption infers we shall be leading
the world in naval aviation and this grates on many American Naval Aviators.
We must be modest and let our achievements speak for themselves, because
we have much to offer the Americans even in the field of Naval Aviation, but
they will be less ready to accept it if we indulge in ill conceived propaganda.
THE ARMAMENT MOSAIC.
THE ARMAMENT MOSAIC.
ITwas inevitable that the two devastating wars of this century should have left
some scar on our national character. Our people revealed latent powers of
endurance, fortitude and courage which evoked the admiration of the world,
but the long strain undermined old standards and values, and the stolidity,
level-headedness, and wisdom that had illumined the progressive building of
an Empire dissolved into a volatility that has frequently bedevilled the conduct
of public business.
During that golden era when we pursued our course to Imperial greatness so
smoothly and so wisely we made few mistakes in the construction of our
armament mosaic ; we built and maintained a Navy powerful enough to
protect our sea-lines of communication against all comers and we recruited and
trained an army of sufficient strength to garrison the steadily increasing
number of colonies.
In warship design we led the world. During that long groping period
when naval architects were endeavouring to merge sail and steam power and
when their efforts often produced a ship that could neither steam, sail or fight,
the other maritime powers were content to copy our designs.
When with the building of dreadnoughts, destroyers and submarines the
composition of a navy was revolutionized, the other maritime powers built
ships of similar design.
Throughout that long period of history the other nations, crediting us with
cool-headedness and good sense, accepted our leadership. I t was shortly after
the 1914-18 war that we first showed signs of having lost some of our poise
and that we were in danger of losing our skill at fitting the right-sized pieces
into the armament mosaic.
A campaign conducted by an admiral and supported by a section of the
Press was launched to prevail upon the Government to abolish all larger type
warships on the grounds that they were now an easy prey to the submarine.
The strange feature of this campaignwas that we had just won a complete
victory over the German submarines. The campaigners ignored that achievement and prophesied that next time no battleship or cruiser would be able to
keep the sea. They over-played their hand and the campaign slowly died
away but it was the writing on the wall-a very large number of our public men
and our people had blindly accepted the claims of the campaigners and were
quite ready to believe that the Admiralty was wasting millions in order to
provide employment for admirals and captains.
Public men and the people again showed their vulnerability to propaganda
when shortly before the last war a campaign was launched to prevail upon the
Government to stop all warship building on the grounds that in future any ship
that ventured to sea would be sunk by aeroplanes.
This campaign was conducted with such vehemence that the Prime
Minister felt it necessary to appoint a Cabinet Committee to examine the
THE ARMAMENT MOSAIC.
247
claims of the campaigners. One argument that had carried great weight with
the public was that 1,000 aeroplanes could be added to the armament mosaic for
the price of one battleship.
The Committee were astounded when the Air Ministry stated that the
correct number was 37 medium bombers ; the Admiralty's estimate was
slightly higher--43 bombers.
When the Committee asked what would happen if the German capital ships
got astride of our Atlantic sea-lines outside the range of our aeroplanes and were
told that we would be beaten to our knees in four or five weeks they did not take
long to make up their minds The other maritime powers were astonished a t
the temporary success of this campaign ; they went on steadily with their
building programmes.
During the last war the three services became so closely integrated that i t
was anticipated that it would in future be little dissension when making up the
armament mosaic and that the old internecine struggle over the apportioning of
aeroplanes to the Air Force and the Navy was now dead and buried.
With the re-alignment of the powers and the beginning of the cold war it
became evident that the next war, if it came, would be fought to a new pattern
because Russia and her satellites were not dependent on sea-borne supplies and
so would have no sea-lines of communication to defend. The aircraft carrier
does not appear in their fleet because they will have no need of sea-aerodromes.
We are unable to cover our widely extended sea-routes with land-based planes
and so must employ sea-aerodromes, but the striking difference is that the planes
from our carriers will not meet in the air planes from enemy carriers but landbased planes. Whether our planes are flown from land or sea aerodromes they
will encounter the same enemy and therefore they all should be equally powerful unless we accept that our resources that are protected by carrier planes are
less important than those protected by land-based planes. Accepting that
might well lead to our defeat.
These are hard, indisputable facts and yet if recent debates in Parliament
and recent correspondence in the Press are any criterion the bellows are once
again being applied to the embers of that old and absurd internecine conflict
between the Ministries. Phrases such as robbing Peter to pay Paul " have
an ominous ring ; it is to be devoutly hoped that they do not herald a new
campaign to glorify one service a t the expense of the other two.
The task of fitting the right-sized pieces into the armament mosaic is
difficult enough without being be-devilled by inter-service rivalry and
propaganda. The danger is that a people who believed that palpable nonsense
about submarines after the first world war and in those outrageous 1,000
aeroplanes will believe anything.
W. M. J.
"
OPERATIONAL CONTROL O F MARITIME FORCES I N WAR.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARITIME FORCES
IN WAR.
IN several articles about the last war recently printed in this journal it is
possible to discern a thread of uneasiness about, if not of disapproval regarding
the methods whereby our maritime forces were controlled from 1939-45. In
particular there have been criticisms of certain Admiralty " interventions " in
operations, and from the fact that certain of those " interventions " had unhappy results a tendency seems to have arisen to condemn the whole principle
on which our forces were contro1led.l An issue of the first importance has thus
been brought before our members, and much may depend on sound conclusions
being reached with regard to it. To achieve that plainly desirable object it
is necessary that we should be fully and fairly informed about the system used
throughout the last two wars, that we should admit certain misuses which
we may now feel arose in the second of them, and equally that the successes
which can be attributed to it should be as impartially assessed as the misuses
are condemned. So far there has, perhaps, been too great a tendency to
condemn and too little effort made to examine the merits of the system and
to acclaim its successes.
For the benefit of our younger members, who may not yet have reached
a point in their careers where they have been able to study the problem, it
should, perhaps, first be stated that the Admiralty is an Operational Centre.
I n the Board is vested the power and the right to assume direct control of our
naval forces should they consider that such a need has arisen. Within the
Board of Admiralty the particular responsibility for the conduct of maritime
operations rests with the First Sea Lord and he, of course, is responsible to the
First Lord, who himself is answerable to the Government. I t is probable, therefore, that any intervention in operations will be made by the First Sea Lord in the
name of the Admiralty ; but he will obviously have consulted with the appropriate divisions of the Naval Staff or with the Vice and Assistant Chiefs of
Naval Staff before reaching what may well be a difficult decision. Secondly
i t must be understood that in this respect-that is to say in being an Operational
Centre-the Admiralty is unique. Neither the War Office nor the Air Ministry
holds a similar right and responsibility. This writer does not know how far
back the Admiralty's powers, outlined above, can be traced. Nor, for the
present purposes, does it matter ; but it would be interesting if some other
member could supply that knowledge. So much for the constitutional position.
Turning now to the translation of the Admiralty's responsibilities into
actual practice in time of war, it is necessary to understand that all naval
intelligence is collected, studied and its value assessed in the Admiralty ;
and that the constant flow of operational orders issued in the name of the
Board is based on a day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, study of that intelligence.
From this it will be plain that, as long as centralized collection and dissemination of intelligence is practised, the Admiralty is bound to be the best-informed
See for example " Command of Naval Operations
1953.
"
THENAVAL
REVIEW
for February,
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARITIME
FORCES IN WAR.
249
authority regarding the enemy's intentions. If that is the case-and surely
no one will deny the twice proven merits of our centralized intelligence systemthen the right to make the best use of it can hardly be disputed. Here, it is
suggested, lies the true justification for Admiralty interventions in operations.
The reader who has persevered thus far may feel that it is the writer's
intention to justify all Admiralty interventions. I n order to demonstrate that
such is not the case some examples of unjustifiable interventions during the
last war will now be given. The published despatches and the Official History
of the Norwegian Campaign make it plain that several such occurrences took
place at that time. The order to the destroyers of " Force WV " (the Vestfjord
minelayers) to join the Renown on the 8th of April, 1940, was, perhaps, the
first1 ; and it seems to have resulted in Vestfjord being left wide open to the
Germans at a critical moment. The cancellation of Admiral Forbes' intended
attack on Bergen on the following day was a n ~ t h e r .The
~ Prime Minister has
revealed the origin of an intervention made towards the end of the pursuit
of the Bismarck, telling Admiral Tovey that he was to hold on towards the
French coast regardless of his fuel situation, and that he would be towed home
if necessary. Had this order been carried out it would surely have had disastrous
consequence^.^ The order to Convoy P.Q.17 to scatter, recently discussedin this
journal, can certainly be placed in the same class, and Lord Cunningham's
autobiography leaves the reader in little doubt how he regarded various orders
received by him during the Battle of Crete and prior to the bombardment of
Trip~li.~
So much for the wrong exercise by the Admiralty of an indubitable right.
What of the other side of the picture ? Surely the strategic dispositions which
led to the Battle of the River Plate were brilliantly conceived and executed ?
The formation of various hunting groups led directly to the enemy being
trapped in a position from which he knew escape to be impossible. Without in
any way wishing to minimize the gallantry with which our lightly armed
cruisers attacked and harried their formidable adversary, it was the Admiralty's
strategic dispositions which convinced the Graf Spee's Captain that an attempt
to escape from Montevideo was a hopeless proposition, and led to his decision
to destroy his ship without renewing the fight. Another, and even better
example, is the control of our forces during the pursuit of the Bismarck. Admiral
Tovey, in his despatch, pays a warm tribute to " the accuracy of the enemy
information supplied by the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed."
He added that " the balance struck between information and instructions
passed to the forces out of visual touch with me was ideal."5 One may hazard
a guess that he decided not to spoil his tribute to an admirable accomplishment
by making any reference to the signal already mentioned among our examples
of unjustifiable interventions. Though the pursuit of the Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau in February-March, 1941, did not provide the happy result finally
accomplished in the chase of the Bismarck, it seems that the Admiralty's
dispositions and precautions very nearly caught those two ships before they
reached Brest ; that they saved several convoys from destruction seems
certainly to be the case. Lastly, though it is not easy to quote chapter and
See T. K. Derry, " The Campaign in Norway " (H.M.S.O.), p. 26.
Ibid. pp. 32-33 and W. S. Churchill, " The Second World War," Vol. I, p. 470.
W. S. Churchill, "The Second World War," Vol 111, p. 282.
See Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, " A Sailor's Odyssey," pp. 375 and 341 respectively.
Supplement to the London Gazette of 14th October, 1947, paragraph 73.
250
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARITIME FORCES IN
WAR.
verse to prove the case, the protracted but decisive struggle in the Atlantic
must contain many examples where Admiralty orders successfully diverted
convoys from dangers whose existence had been revealed to the watchers in
the operations rooms, or where " Support Groups " were ordered from Whitehall
to search certain areas for U-boats-and dealt with them satisfactorily.
I t will probably occur to the reader that if the Admiralty should send an
order which the man on the spot considers unjustifiable or dangerous, there
remains the possibility of disregarding the order. More than once in our
history (e.g., Nelson a t Cape St. Vincent and Copenhagen) has a junior commander ignored his senior's instructions ; but for a Commander-in-Chief to
act in this manner towards the Admiralty would be an entirely different matter ;
for the latter has all the power and authority of the Government behind it.
I know of only one example from the last war where an Admiralty order was
disobeyed, and that was by a junior commander. Captain Vian had been
ordered to join Admiral Tovey with his destroyers to replace the battle
squadron's departed destroyer screen during the Bismarck operation. As
soon as he learnt that the enemy had been resighted he steered instead to
make contact with him-a course of action of which his Commander-in-Chief
wholly approved. I do not think that, under modern conditions, a Cornmanderin-Chief can possibly disregard an Admiralty order without risking chaos in
the whole field of maritime operations. I t is no reflection on the strength of
character of our leaders, nor on their readiness to accept personal responsibility
to say that, while it may in certain circumstances be possible to remonstrate
with the shore authorities, it is impossible for them to act in direct disregard
of their instructions.
Where, then, does this brief review of a delicate question lead us ? First
it is suggested that it is dangerous to quote isolated examples of unhappy
interventions, and to argue from those particular cases in order to condemn
the general principle involved. Secondly, one may conclude that, while the
principles on which our maritime forces were controlled are sound, it must
always be remembered in Whitehall that wind and weather hundreds of miles
away, the remaining full endurance of our forces and many imponderable
factors cannot be constantly assessed by those ashore. An intervention should,
therefore, not be made unless the Admiralty is possessed of intelligence of
which the Commander-in-Chief cannot be fully aware, and unless forces not
under his immediate (i.e., visual) control need to be redisposed. Finally, it seems
reasonable to assert that, while strategic co-ordination of our forces' movements must necessitate a constant flow of orders from Whitehall, intervention
in the field where strategy and tactics overlap and, still more, interventions
in the tactical conduct of operations should be quite exceptional. Lord
Falkland's famous aphorism that " when there is no need to change there is
need not to change " might well be hung above the Admiralty's operational
plots.
There is one other consideration involved in this difficult subject, of which
some readers may be unaware. After April, 1941, the Admiralty assumed
operational control of Coastal Command aircraft. Is it conceivable that the
Air Ministry would have agreed to control of its units being exercised by the
Naval Commanders-in-Chief ? Was not the successful co-ordination of our
air-sea operations entirely dependent on that control being exercised by the
Admiralty itself, with its intimate links with the Air Ministry and the other
air authorities concerned ? If that be accepted, a very powerful argument in
favour of the Admiralty remaining an operational centre has surely been
produced.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MARITIME FORCES I N WAR.
25 1
So much for the past. As to the future, this writer is unaware whether
any basic changes from the principles which governed the last war a t sea have
been made, or are likely to be made. But the fact that maritime forces will,
in a future war, be largely international in character must surely exert a profound influence on the methods used to control them. Doubtless this question
has been deeply considered by the responsible authorities in this country and
among the other N.A.T.O. powers. But one can hardly imagine the Admiralty
issuing orders to the British Senior Officer of a composite unit, over the head
of the N. A.T. 0 . Commander-in-Chief responsible for the conduct of that unit's
operations. So perhaps interventions comparable to the unhappy examples
quoted above from the last war will not recur in a future one, if for no other
reason than that they have become constitutionally unacceptable.
SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND
ATLANTIC.
S U P R E M E ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC.
" A n d they stared at the dead that had been so valiant and true, . . . and
had holden the power and glory of S p a i n so cheap that he dared her with
one little ship and h i s English few."
T h e " Revenge " by
LORDTENNYSON.
ABOUTtwo years ago some of the British Public and Press were stung into
furious indignation when the possibility of the appointment of an American
Admiral t o command part of the Royal Navy was mooted under the new North
Atlantic Treaty Alliance.
As a writer for THE NAVALREVIEWone would like to consider oneself a
cool-headed analyst not to be swayed unduly by emotion, but I confess I was
one of those who raged inwardly a t the proposal. Unfortunately one could
not join the controversy for it began to be tinged by politics. Nevertheless
I put my pen to paper and tried to argue the merits of the case.
Now that the Supreme Commander has been appointed I find the Article
makes interesting, even if academic, reading and reproduce it here.
The appointment of a Supreme Naval Commander of the N.A.T.O. is
proposed by the Standing Council in order to concentrate the forces of many
nations into a single large and flexible anti-submarine fleet.
2. The argument in favour of such an appointment is that with all
intelligence available to him the Supreme C.-in-C. is in a better position than
any single national C.-in-C. to ordain the strategic moves of the many and
varied A/S flotillas : by his unified command the forces available to combat
a heavy submarine attack would be used to the best advantage-that is in
concentration instead of the duplication and waste of effort by escorts.
3. This appears a sound argument to anyone, but before accepting its
theory the following practical considerations should be investigated :I t is axiomatic that for successful military operations a Commander should
be given,
( a ) A clear and unqualified directive,
(b) The maximum support, moral and material,
(c) Total and unqualified responsibility for carrying out the directive.
Any divergences from these three principles must weaken the command and
so poison the whole structure.
4. Obviously the best directive would be : " To keep the North Atlantic
Area free of enemy U-boats so that our seaborne trade and supply may be
maintained in that area without hindrance or obstruction." If this is to be
his function, it is only fair to give a Supreme C.-in-C. as many ships and aircraft as possible and to make as few qualifications to that directive as possible.
SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC.
253
5. However, the point has not yet been reached in the unification of the
N.A.T.O. nations, when one of the major powers is prepared to surrender
completely his Naval Sovereignty, and therefore qualifications there must be.
6. I t has been announced that, to carry out his task the Supreme C.-in-C.
is to be dependent on his own and foreign Admiralties allocating him so many
flotillas. With the Mediterranean, North Sea and Western Approaches
infested with hostile U-boats, is the British Admiralty going to switch vital
flotillas to the deep waters of the Atlantic Command, which is no longer their
responsibility ? Are they to transfer for example our light fleet carriers
(major units of our fleet, but most useful in an A/S capacity on occasion)
to this Command when the British C.-in-C. Home Fleet is begging for every
available unit to be given to him to meet the threat a t our gates ?
7. At this point it may be argued that the British C.-in-C. HomeFleet is
still responsible for the eastern half of the Atlantic. But who is the poor
man responsible to ? To whom does he place his demand for more ships ?
If the answer to this question is " The British Admiralty " surely there is
no point in having a Supreme C.-in-C.
If the answer is " the Supreme C.-in-C." I visualize the following situation.
Having completely lost a valuable convoy in the Western Approaches for
lack of an aircraft carrier and two flotillas in its escort, we find that there
was a French carrier in Brest giving well deserved leave to her company
preparatory to being put under the orders of the Supreme C.-in-C. for an arduous
term of duty : that there was a flotilla within two days of completion of their
working-up period at the Hague after which they too were to be sent to the
Supreme C.-in-C. : and that there was another Anglo Norwegian flotilla on
the point of completing a bombardment of the enemy coast, having been
lent by the British Admiralty to co-operate with General Eisenhower's Army.
Whose fault was it that the vital convoy was not detained for a week
until the escort was available for it ? This is a practical illustration of the
effect of divided command.
8. If a Supreme C.-in-C. is appointed surely he must be given supreme
responsibility for his area and supreme and direct control over all his forces
to make his position effective. In logic would this not involve the whole
Home Fleet and Coastal Command of the R.A.F. being placed under Admiral
Fechteler's orders ?
9. Would the function of the Supreme C.-in-C. in the circumstances not
be better fulfilled by a large Combined U-boat Information Centre (say in
Iceland or in a large ship) manned by personnel of all countries and receiving
intelligence of U-boats movements from every source on land and sea. This
centre could provide an up-to-date and continuous information service upon
which the various Admiralties, Cs.-in-C. and seaborne commanders could
base their dispositions.
10. A senior representative of each Navy should be appointed to form a
committee in the Information Centre which should be empowered to make
recommendations to the Admiralties and Cs.-in-C. as to the general strategic
switching of forces. The Atlantic would be divided into general areas of
responsibility as before.
11. The crux of the matter is this. The Supreme C.-in-C. with overall
powers over all the Navies and the overall responsibility of keeping the Atlantic
free of U-boats is the best theoretical answer. Whether he should be British
or American or whether either country is willing to sacrifice her Naval
254
SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND
ATLANTIC.
Sovereignty to the necessary extent is debatable. (In my opinion neither is.)
The next best alternative is certainly not the " watered down " C.-in-C. as
proposed, but probably is the Information Centre scheme outlined above.
After two years I find that I still cannot satisfactorily answer some of the
questions posed in this article-and I'm not entirely sure that anyone else
can. For instance has Saclant complete control over the Heavy Squadron
when there are two or three Sverdlov class cruisers loose in the Atlantic ? Can
he tell the Admiralty where t o send A/S squadrons and the Air Ministry
where Coastal Command squadrons are to be employed ? If he can't what use
is he ? If he can, let us be honest and substitute some other flag for the
White Ensign. (But I don't think the British Public will be very pleased
when they find out.)
I t may be that I am very ignorant of what has been accomplished in the
building of the Command structure, but if I, who am interested don't understand it I'm sure Able Seaman John Smith and Naval Airman Bill Jones
won't. And it is their hearts that win wars, they are the foundation stone
upon which all the mighty headquarters, staffs, ships, shore-bases and weapons
rest.
" For God, Queen and country is a simple slogan understood by all of us
and uniting the simplest and the most brilliant of us in a common aim. Have
we in our fear of the strength in the East allowed that enduring slogan to give
place to one of hasty convenience ? "
J. H. G.
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
A reference to the sinking of the ships of the interned German Fleet a t Scapa
Flow in 1919 has been given to the public in a book by an American gentleman,
Mr. Arthur J. Marder, which consists principally in a publication of the Diaries
of the late historian Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.
These diaries, which were obviously not intended for publication, contain
criticisms, many of them highly censorious, of naval events, decisions and
incidents which occurred in the 1914-1918war, and of the personalities concerned.
Amongst them are three and a half pages dealing with the Scapa sinkings, as to
which unfortunate event I am considered to be the " most to blame " and to
" bear a double responsibility."
Richmond's accounts were written two days
after the event, at which he was not present, and was obviously in entire
ignorance of the prevailing circumstances.
No Press reporters were present at Scapa Flow either at the actual time of
the sinking or subsequently, and it is perhaps for this reason that, as far as I
am aware, no comprehensive account of the circumstances has ever been made
public.
Richmond says that in his opinion the Germans " have made the British
Navy ridiculous." This article endeavours to give a full account of the
historical event, while expressing no opinion as to the responsibility of those
concerned.
On the 11th of November, 1918, the Armistice between the Allies and the
United States of America, and Germany, was signed ; it contained the
following provisions :Article XXII : Surrender to the Allies and the United States of
America of 160 submarines . . . with their complete
armament and equipment.
Article XXIII : The following German surface warships, which shall
be designated by the Allies and the United States of
America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter
interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, Allied
ports . . . and placed under the surveillance of the
Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left onboard ; 6 battle cruisers, 10
battleships, 8 light cruisers including 2 mine-layers,
50 destroyers.
Article XXXI : No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted
before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.
I t is to be observed that while the above terms differ only very slightly
from those originally put forward by the Allied Naval Council, one change of
high importance was made, i.e., the term " interned " was substituted for
" surrendered."
The Admiralty felt very strongly on this subject. They
considered that the surrender of the surface ships, as well as that of the
submarines, was within their rights.
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
They had pressed the Allied Naval Council accordingly, and their proposal
had received full consent with the partial exception of the American Admiral
Benson, who wished only for the internment of 10 battleships. The Admiralty,
with the strong support of the French Admiral De Bon, considered that, not
only was it within our rights to receive the surrender of these ships, but that
their continued internment would be an encumbrance, a responsibility, and an
expense to whatever nation undertook their charge ; that it was unthinkable
that Germany should retain these ships after peace was made and therefore
that they should be finally handed over forthwith ; and that, as must have
been evident to every naval officer, so long as an interned ship is left with any
of her crew on board, if they chose to ignore the terms of the Armistice, or
immediately on its termination, there was nothing to prevent them from
committing the act of war of sinking their ships before their custodians could
take preventive action.
Although the Allied Naval Council reserved their opinion, they were,
nevertheless, under strong pressure prepared to submit to the internment if the
acceptance of the Allied Terms by the Germans was to be facilitated thereby.
Marshal Foch had asked why we should be so exacting, as the (German) ships
had never been used, and when both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau
persisted, the Marshal said that the " action of the British Fleet was virtual
and not actual, and were we to continue the war solely to suppress the virtual
influence." Mr. Lloyd George said that " if the Germans accepted the land but
not the naval clauses, we should re-examine the situation, but should be taking
a very great responsibility in rejecting the recommendations made by the
Admirals."
Having observed that " Our Admirals have got their tails up and will not
move ", he therefore proposed, as a compromise, the internment of the whole
of the modern fighting ships under neutral or Allied supervision, and this was
eventually the decision taken, Sir Eric Geddes (First Lord of the Admiralty)
dissenting to the last and observing, supported by Admiral De Bon, that the
Allied Naval Council, without adhering to the decision to intern, " Submits
to the decision of Ministers " ; Mr. Lloyd George stating that it was so
important that there should be no breakdown in the Armistice negotiations that
he did not think it advisable to demand the surrender of the German Fleet.
Accordingly the (as events subsequently proved) unfortunate term
interned " was substituted for " surrendered " a t the very last moment
before the Armistice was signed in the early morning of the 11th of November.
Although the conditions of the Armistice (Article XXXI) provided that the
surface ships should, after being disarmed, be " interned in neutral ports or
failing them Allied ports . . . only caretakers being left onboard ", no neutral
could be found able and willing to take such a responsibility, and the Allied
Naval Council decided accordingly that the ships should be interned in Scapa
Flow under the direction of Admiral Beatty, the Commander of the British
Grand Fleet.
The surface ships, which included 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light
cruisers and 50 destroyers, were therefore escorted into the Firth of Forth by
the Grand Fleet, and after being inspected, moved in batches to Scapa Flow.
There they were to remain until their disposal should be decided by the terms
of peace, and in the meanwhile one of the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet,
with a proportion of destroyers, was detailed to take charge of the ships under
the conditions of the Armistice.
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
257
The control of the ships was exercised through the German Admiral
von Reuter, who flew his flag in the Friedrich der Grosse. The orders laid down
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet were to the effect that the
officers and men of the interned ships were not to be permitted to leave their
ships, or to communicate by signal or otherwise with each other. If medical
or spiritual help were required, they could inform Admiral von Reuter, who
was continuously in touch with the British Commander of the responsible
squadron and was accorded full facilities to visit his ships. If necessary, a
medical officer or a chaplain would be permitted to board a ship requiring his
assistance, but otherwise no one from outside was permitted to go onboard
the ships.
Obviously, such severe conditions would require some modification as time
went on. Arrangements for despatch and receipt of mails were made, and
supplies of provisions were provided by a two-monthly visit of German supply
ships, in which considerable numbers of the maintenance parties, which turned
out in the first place to have been inordinately large, were repatriated. Indeed,
by the time of the termination of the Armistice, the crews of the battleships
had been gradually reduced from about 400 in each ship to 130, and those of
other ships in approximately the same proportion.
In practice, a British drifter lay alongside the German flagship and
maintained any communication necessary between von Reuter and the British
Admiral, and also such inevitable communications as the distribution and
collection of mails, and medical attendance.
There was at one time considerable discontent among the German crews,
and Admiral von Reuter, who was in a poor state of health, complained that,
in his flagship, his men had shown their feeling by stamping over his head and
preventing him from sleeping. He asked permission to transfer his flag to a
light cruiser, and as his request appeared entirely reasonable, it was granted
and he moved to the Emden.
One could not help feeling a considerable sympathy with von Reuter in the
very unenjoyable position of being in nominal command of ships manned by
mutinous crews. Our restrictions gave him little opportunityto exercise command
of his ships, and requests for any assistance from us had to be made through
him. He was an easy and reasonable man to deal with, and a man of his word
who was never, except in one momentous instance, consciously disloyal to the
terms of the Armistice.
The instance referred to is the plan of preparation for the sinking of the
ships when ordered. These plans, as was found out later, were elaborate and
comprehensive, and intended to ensure as far as possible that, when ordered, the
actual sinking should take place rapidly. As the orders to the British ships
permitted no boarding of the Germans, no difficulty whatever was experienced
in making these preparations, since there was, of course, no necessity for
anything to show outboard. So that, when eventually the British boarded the
ships, they found not only the apertures which permitted the entrance of the
sea to be open, but the watertight doors and hatches so arranged that they could
not be effectively closed, and all the machinery for working the heavy anchors
and cables either destroyed or out of order, so that it would be a matter of
great difficulty to move the ships in time to shallow water.
Von Reuter had undoubtedly directed all these measures and it is obvious
that, even though communication with his ships was as little and as carefully
supervised from outside as possible. it would have been, as it was found to be,
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
practicable for him to get through orders to his Commanding Officers of the
caretaker crews. Although no surveillance of the ships inboard had been
permissible, a patrol of two trawlers moved continuously among the ships to
ensure that the instructions given to them were complied with, and, in addition,
two destroyers, with steam up, were always held available in case any force was
required.
The First Battle Squadron, consisting of the five ships of the Revenge class,
the most modern battleships of the world, had arrived at Scapa on the 18th of
May, relieving the Second Battle Squadron, of the Qz~eenElizabeth class, under
the late Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Leveson, in the supervision of the German
ships.
Leveson turned over to me verbal orders which had obtained since the
interned ships had arrived, and which were very simply to observe and enforce
strictly the conditions of the Armistice. He informed me that he had had no
trouble with von Reuter, and that there was no difficulty in securing compliance
with our requirements. Certainly the Germans on one occasion, the anniversary
of the Battle of Jutland, celebrated with a little too much exuberance, and it
was necessary to remove German ensigns and red flags. Generally speaking,
however, they appeared to be accepting their lot with submissive equanimity,
but towards the end in some spirit of discontent. One could not but be very
sorry for them, cooped up in their splendid ships which they must fully have
realized would no longer be able to assist in manning under the German flag,
no communications either with the shore or their own comrades in misfortune,
with no outlook but on the well-manned and busy British ships, and the bleak
surroundings of the moors which bounded the harbour.
Following the practice of the two squadrons which had preceded us, and i n
accordance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic
Fleet, Admiralsir Charles Madden, who was at Rosyth, we several times went
to sea for the day for tactical, gunnery and torpedo practices, and on no
occasion had any advantage been taken of our absence by the Germans.
On the 17th of June, in accordance, as has already been observed, with the
wishes of von Reuter, who was much perturbed as to the discipline of the men
of his ships, two thousand two hundred men were taken out of the ships and
repatriated in German transports, leaving only very small parties of caretakers.
No doubt the work of preparation for sinking the ships had been completed,
they were ready to be sunk at any moment at short notice, and there was
nothing to be gained by keeping more men onboard than the absolute minimum.
On the other hand, what number the German Admiral thought necessary was
immaterial to us, indeed, the smaller numbers were of some administrative
advantage, as there were fewer to receive and despatch letters, to require food
and other maintenance, and to ask for medical attendance.
The Armistice was to terminate on the 21st of June. I had received no
orders either from my own Commander-in-Chief, who was in the Firth of
Forth, or from the Admiralty, as to the disposal of the German ships and their
caretakers. I was aware of some slight indications of restlessness, in the
German ships. This, of course, was not unnatural, as their crews would be as
interested as we were with regard to the fate in store for them when their
durance was to terminate.
The Commander-in-Chief was, I knew, anxious to get the whole of the
Atlantic Fleet, which included, besides the smaller cruisers and destroyers,
the 1st battle squadron of 5 ships, the 2nd battle squadron of 4 ships, and the
battle cruiser squadron of 4 ships, together for a cruise probably to the Ports
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
259
on the north-west coast of Spain, as soon as ever the political situation rendered
it possible During most of this cruise, we should be exercising a t sea, and
when in harbour in a foreign port we should be precluded from carrying out
some of the periodical minor practices and exercises, many of them by individual
ships, which are necessary to full efficiency, as they involved the firing of
guns and small-arms, and the landing of armed men.
The Commander-in-Chief had impressed on me his desires in this respect,
and all the practices and exercises which were due had been completed, with a
single exception-the exercise of a daylight attack on a squadron in formation,
by a destroyer flotilla. I t is necessary that this exercise shall be performed in
reasonably fine weather, as a t certain moments a large number of torpedoes
will be in the water, and in any seaway it will be difficult to find them and
pick them up and many will be damaged in the process. The weather had been
bad, and as the termination of the Armistice came near, I had asked the permission of the Commander-in-Chief to defer this exercise until the Armistice
was over and the conditions of the Peace Treaty were known. He did not
approve.
Accordingly, at 7.30 a.m. on the 21st of June, the date on which the
Armistice was to terminate a t noon, the day being very fine, I went to sea with
my squadron of 5 battleships, and with 9 destroyers.
On the previous evening1 had seen a Press statement to the effect that the
date of the termination of the Armistice had been extended for 48 hours. This
had actually been done owing to the political changes in Germany, and the
Armistice was extended to 7 p.m. on the 23rd of June. I had received no
official intimation of this prolongation of the Armistice, but thought it proper
to communicate it to von Reuter in an official note.
The manoeuvres went well. At 12 o'clock the first attack which had been
arranged was finished, about 20 torpedoes were in the water, and the destroyers
were picking them up. We were in the open sea about eight miles from the
harbour and I had left the bridge for a quick lunch before re-forming the
squadron and the destroyer flotilla in preparation for another attack.
An excited signalman appeared in my dining cabin ; " Urgent signal from
Admiral Prendergast " (who commanded the naval base a t Scapa)-" German
ships sinking ; some already sunk." Leaving two destroyers to pick up
torpedoes, we returned a t the highest available speed into harbour. On the
way I gave hurried instructions' for our procedure To each of my five
battleshipswere allocated two large ships. They were to board them with strong
and suitably armed parties, to take any possible measures towards saving the
ships from sinking, and, if possible, to beach those still afloat. They were to
enforce the orders as to boats not being lowered, and rifle or pistol fire was only
to be used in the last resort with this object or to ensure obedience to other
necessary orders. The lives of our men were not to be risked by their remaining
too long in ships which appeared to be near capsizing, and they were to leave
such ships in good time in the boats of their own ships. Our boarding parties
were if practicable to lower the German boats, and leave them lying off their
own ships. This procedure, it was hoped, might encourage the men in some
ships to close valves and delay the sinking as they would have to remain onboard till the ship sunk, and then swim for their lives. The latter plan was
successful in one case only, that of the light cruiser Emden, von Reuter's
flagship ;in other cases we unfortunately did not arrive in time.
Similarly orders were given to the destroyers, the two of which were left t o
pick up the torpedoes were then to patrol the entrances to the harbour until
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
recalled, to ensure no German boats getting away. One hundred Royal Marines
were to be landed on each side of the harbour in proximity to anchorages of the
German Fleet, to arrest any men attempting to land. On no account were any
German seamen who had succeeded in getting away in their own boats, or were
swimming, to be fired upon, but they were to be taken prisoners.
These orders had, of course, to be thought out, and promulgated by signal,
very hurriedly, and they involved considerable preparation in the ships.
However, they were carried out with great alacrity immediately we had
anchored, which we did in close proximity to the German ships at about
2 o'clock. We found a scene of great confusion, many small craft and boats
from the base, as well as from our own destroyers which had been left in harbour,
were plying between the German ships which had hoisted their national
colours, picking up men from sinking or sunken ships, and in some cases
endeavouring to prevent men still onboard the ships from lowering their boats.
A few shots were fired with this latter purpose, the Captain of the Markgraf
battleship was killed on his quarter-deck, and the few casualties (ten men
killed and twelve wounded) suffered were incurred in this way ; and I can say
positively that, in spite of the excited feelings of our men who seemed to feel
that we, and our other squadrons, had had our long and tedious vigil to no
apparent purpose, there were no cases whatever of men in boats or swimming
being fired upon. All such as were picked up were taken to the nearest battleship, where they were held as prisoners.
Von Reuter's charges of " ferocity " and even inhumanity have no
foundation whatever. There was perhaps some slight foundation for his
strictures as to looting. In many cases German officers and sailors had taken
with them in their boats clothing and perhaps other articles which they valued ;
these were deposited in heaps on the quarter-decks of the ship to which the men
were taken and probably remained there for some time while their owners were
being mustered and examined and while accommodation was being prepared for
them. The British sailor has a strong fancy for mementoes and it is certainly
possible that in some few cases he may have helped himself from the heap.
By 4 o'clock all the ships had been sunk with the exception of the Baden
battleship and the light cruisers-Frankfurt and Niirnberg, these were beached
in such sheltered positions as were available, the Emden was afloat.
The drifter carrying von Reuter himself, who had made an unsuccessful
effort to obtain touch with the Admiral Commanding the base, had run on
shore, and the Admiral was eventually brought on board my flagship about
4 p.m.
I received him personally in the normal manner but without any of the
usual honours to which a foreign Admiral is entitled, and informed him that I
considered his order for the sinking, which had been given two hours before the
original termination of the Armistice and in all probability 48 hours before what
was eventually the terminal date of which he had been officially informed, was
a breach of the Armistice orders which had been signed by his Government,
and that I considered him guilty of treacherous conduct. A copy of von
Reuter's detailed orders for the sinking was found subsequently, dated the 17th
of June.
I could not resist feeling some sympathy with von Reuter who had preserved
his dignity when placed, against his will, in a highly unpleasant and invidious
position. I n his dealings with me I had found him an honourable man.
Nevertheless, as we discovered subsequently and without surprise, he had for
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
261
some weeks been making elaborate preparation to sink his ships immediately
on receipt of an executive order from him, and whatever the circumstances,
he had every intention of giving this order before the ships fell into our hands.
He considered himself bound to do so by the dictate of the " All Highest "
(who had by this time reverted from such a dignity to that of an ex-King in
exile), but in so doing he failed to give priority to the contract made by his
Government in Articles XXII and XXXI of the Armistice, which it was his
duty to execute.
Verily ; " His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
and faith unfaithful kept him falsely true."
At von Reuter's request, I permitted his Flag Lieutenant to accompany
him, and assigned to them for the night my own sea cabin, a small range of
cabins, with lavatory accommodation, underneath the fore bridge, and which
I habitually used when a t sea.
Having ascertained that the military authorities a t Invergordon were
prepared to accept the German crews in their prisoner-of-war camps, I
determined to lose no time in transferring them and having collected them all
in the approximate numbers of 300 to each ship, sailed a t 6 p.m. for Invergordon
with my five battleships.
A general order was issued by signal shortly before we sailed that the
Germans, having been guilty of a breach of the Armistice to which their
Government was a party, were to be treated as prisoners of war and to receive
no further consideration than the dictates of common humanity required.
I t was unfortunate that von Reuter heard this signal being dictated to the
signalmen on the fore bridge immediately over his head, and he sent his flag
lieutenant to me to remonstrate a t his having been, by implication, charged
with dishonourable conduct.
However, I saw no occasion to alter my opinion, and, indeed, as will be seen
later, I expressed it again formally to him and to his captains before they
quitted my charge.
By 6 o'clock all was quiet ; the German ships had sunk, some having
capsized, and others on an even keel, with the exception of the Baden and two
light cruisers, beached in Smoogroo Bay, a position which gave them some
shelter, the Emden still afloat, and about six destroyers beached. All German
officers and men had been distributed among the five battleships. As to the
casualties, Admiral Prendergast was requested to arrange for the burial of the
dead with the usual ceremonial, and the care of the wounded.
By the morning of the 22nd we arrived a t Invergordon and turned over our
prisoners to the military without incident, but before von Reuter left me, he and
his captains were mustered on the quarter-deck of the Revenge, and I addressed
them in English, admirably translated by my German interpreter, Lieut.Colonel F. L. Dibblee, of the Royal Marine Artillery, as follows :" Admiral von Reuter :
" I cannot permit you and your officers to leave naval custody
without expressing to you my sense of the manner in which you have
violated common honour and the honourable traditions of seamen of all
nations.
" With an armistice in full operation you recommenced hostilities
without notice by hoisting the German flag in the interned ships and
proceeding to sink and destroy them.
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
" You have informed my interpreter that
you considered the
Armistice had terminated.
" You had no justification whatever for that assumption.
" You would have been informed by me of the termination of the
Armistice and whether the representatives of your nation had or had not
signed the Treaty of Peace.
" Indeed, letters in readiness to send to you to that effect as soon as
I had received official intimation from my Government were written and
signed.
" Further, can you possibly suppose that my Squadron would have
been out of harbour a t the moment of the termination of the Armistice ?
" By your conduct you have added one more to the breaches of faith
and honour of which Germany has been guilty in this war.
" Begun with a breach of
military honour in the invasion of
Belgium, it bids fair to terminate with a breach of naval honour.
" You have proved to the few who doubted it that the word of the
New Germany is no more to be trusted than that of the old.
" What opinion your country will form of your action I do not know.
" I can only express what I believe to be the opinion of the British
Navy, and indeed of all seamen except those of your Nation.
" I now transfer you to the custody of the British military authorities
as prisoners of war guilty of a flagrant violation of Armistice."
They stood with expressionless faces, and when the short address was over,
clicked their heels and descended the accommodation ladder without a word.
The German officers and men were handed over to the military authorites.
Having, rather to my surprise, had no instructions whatever either from the
Admiralty or from the Commander-in-Chief as to how the Germans were to be
dealt with when the Armistice expired, I had prepared a plan for taking possession of the interned ships a t midnight when the Armistice should have
terminated. The reasons for choosing midnight were (1)that if the Germans
intended (as was the case) to sink their ships in any event, there was nothing I
could do to prevent it except to board them ; (2) that if we were to take
possession of them (as I expected) on the termination of the Armistice, it would
be better to do so as a surprise by night rather than by day, as by day they would
probably be on the look out for some action on my part, there would have been
opposition on board the ships to our confinement of their crews, as would have
been necessary in order to prevent them putting their sinking arrangements
into action, and this would probably have meant shooting a good many
unarmed men, and probably casualties on both sides from drowning if the
Germans succeeded in opening their valves, etc.
Accordingly, I had arranged for the operation to take place at midnight on
the 21st of June. All the ships were to be boarded with large forces from the
battleships. The orders to the boarding parties were to confine all officers
and men, to search the ships for indications of preparations for sinking, and as
far as possible, to keep the ships afloat. The orders as to opening fire or otherwise, and as to safe-guarding our own men were the same as were issued by
signal when on our passage to anchorage ; and the boarding parties were to
remain in the ships until further orders were received. The destroyer flotillas
were to conform. All tugs belonging to the base were to be alongside the
battleships a t 11.15 p.m. In order to keep my intentions secret, the envelopes
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263
containing the orders were not to be opened until 8 p.m. after which no one was
to leave the ships.
This plan had been forwarded for approval to the Commander-in-Chief
and approved by him, whether after informing the Admiralty or not, I do not
know.
The sinking of these fine modern ships was a historical event, the news of
which, a t the time a t any rate, was received with regret and disapproval in our
own country, and with many of our Allies, and did not, in all probability, a t the
time, redound to the credit of the British Navy, which had them in their
charge.
I have already observed that the sinking of a ship is a singularly simple
operation, and one that can be executed without any warning being
given until it is too late for any preventive action to be taken with
success. Every steamship has, of necessity, openings in her bottom which
admit the sea. The principal inlets are those by which the sea water
enters in order to cool the waste steam pipes and hot water in the condensers.
All steamships must have these inlets, and it is a very easy matter for any
engineer who is familiar with the ship's engine room to open the valves. Other
large inlets in battleships and battle-cruisers are those used for flooding the
submerged torpedo tubes before the torpedoes in them are fired. I t is a very
easy matter to open these doors, and, of course, a t the same time the inner
doors through which the torpedoes are pushed into the tubes, also adjacent
water-tight doors. To sink the ship quickly, and in such a manner as not t o
attract notice, it is only necessary to open these inlets and so to allow the sea
into the ship ; she will sink slowly and on an even keel, and it is practically
certain that the fact will not be noticed from outside until the ship very quickly
lurches over, and proceeds to sink, sometimes on an even keel, and sometimes
entirely capsizing in the process.
These are facts which are known to all naval officers and fully account for
the strong pressure put on during the negotiations for the terms of the Armistice,
by the Allied Naval Council, who pointed out repeatedly that the internment of
ships, in view of the restrictions of International Law, is not a working proposition, since the ships must remain in the charge of their own crews for the
purpose of their care and maintenance, and could therefore be sunk a t any
moment with no preparations noticeable from without.
The great men at Versailles did, however, indicate their appreciation of the
above facts by including in the terms of the Armistice (Article XXXI) the
provision that " No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before
evacuation, surrender, or restoration." The effect of this was, of course, that
a clear breach of the terms would be committed by the Germans if they sank
their ships, as actually happened. This opinion was definitely confirmed by
the Supreme Council at Versailles who, as a punishment for the " violation of the
Armistice," directed the German Government to surrender within 80 days, a
further five light cruisers and a large quantity of naval material.
The question of the duty of the guarding squadron on the termination of the
Armistice had, of course, been given very full consideration by me, as well a s
by my two predecessors in command of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the battle
cruiser squadron, Vice-Admirals Sir Arthur Leveson, and Sir Henry Oliver,
respectively. Both these officers had submitted reports and proposals on the
subject to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Madden, to which to the best of
my belief they had received no reply.
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THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
I also had received no instructions, but failing them, was entirely prepared
to act on my own responsibility. I have already indicated the action which I
had proposed to take, and which had been approved by the Commander-inChief and presumably by the Admiralty.
My intention was, of course, to do all that was practicable and possible to
prevent the ships being sunk, and afterwards to deal with them according to the
terms of the Peace Treaty, which had not been communicated to me.
I was not, however, surprised a t the Germans ignoring the solemn agreement of their Government in Article XXXI, and it is to be observed that the
operation of sinking actually began before noon on the 21st, the official date of
the termination of the Armistice, prior to its extension to which reference has
been made.
The only effect of my being a t sea with my squadron was that, had we been
in harbour, we should certainly have boarded the ships as soon as there was
indication of their sinking. A few of them might possibly have been kept
afloat, but the great endeavour to save the ships would infallibly have led to
conflicts and to many casualties amongst unarmed men in the attempt to
induce them to close the valves which had been opened.
I n this respect, nothing could have been done except to forbid sternly the
lowering of boats, up to the very last moment, so that the crews would in all
probability have to sink with their ships. The case of the Emden is indicative
of what might have happened under such circumstances. Von Reuter observes
in his book that he did not order the Emden to be sunk as, had he done so, the
excitement of the crew would have communicated itself to the British drifter
alongside and have facilitated any attempt to interfere with the sinking.
The fact is that the R.N.R. Lieutenant in the drifter acted with great
coolness and judgment. He fully appreciated that with his small crew of about
18 men it would be of no use to attempt to overcome any action taken on board
the Emden. Accordingly, he pushed off from the ship, took in tow all the
Emden's boats which had been lowered, and lay off the ship. Had the Emden's
crew sunk their ship, they would have had to swim for their lives, and they
preferred to keep their ship afloat, and remain in her until she was taken into
our possession.
Von Reuter, in his book " Scapa Flow ", is a t great pains to justify himself
for sinking his ships. He says that " to us officers it was unthinkable to
surrender defenceless ships to the enemy ", and t h a t . . . " we officers were
bound by a decision of the ' All Highest ' to destroy the German ships, to
sink them." He says, moreover, that " any attempt to take possession of
the ships without my express consent would have had the immediate
consequences of the ships being sunk." Indeed, he states that about the 31st
of May, having some (entirely erroneous) idea that we were about to seize his
ships, he ordered his commanding officers to be " prepared to sink their ships
if the enemy attempted to seize them ", and he states, moreover, that unless
he received orders to the contrary, he would have sunk the ships at the first
attempt to seize them. Evidently he entirely ignored the agreement of his own
Government to Article XXXI of the Armistice terms to which reference has
already been made. He was aware, however, that there was every probability
that by the terms of the Peace Treaty the ships would have to be surrendered,
in fact he was informed to this effect by an official statement in " The Times "
of the 16th of June, but he nevertheless anticipated the termination of the
Armistice by giving the order to sink a t 10 a.m., having seen that my squadron
had left harbour.
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
265
The fact was that whatever attempts von Reuter may have made to
justify his decision, he had every intention of carrying out the " wish of the
All Highest that disabled ships should be sunk ", and having made his decision
he was wise to take the opportunity of carrying it out in the temporary absence
of my squadron. As I have already observed, had we been in harbour, we
should have been bound to interfere, and though we might have saved a few
ships, there would have been a most unpleasant and regrettable massacre of
resisting and unarmed crews.
In the attempted justification of his action, von Reuter makes great play
with the fact that he was not acquainted with the extension of the Armistice
until the evening of the 21st of June. Nor was I , officially, though I had
assumed it from Press information, and as I have already said, had informed
von Reuter accordingly. However, this quibble is of no importance whatever,
seeing that from the beginning the Armistice was to terminate a t noon on the
21st, and von Reuter gave his fatal order at 10 a.m. I t can only be assumed
that his loyalty to the word given by his own Government took second place to
that of the earlier order of the " All Highest."
Half von Reuter's book is directed to justification of his procedure, but
nothing could alter the plain words of the Armistice, signed by his own
Government, and of which he was fully acquainted. The wording of Article
XXXI was quite clear-" No destruction of ships . . . to be permitted before
evacuation, surrender, or restoration." The Armistice was terminated by the
Peace Treaty of which he had been made aware, and which stated that the ships
were to be surrendered. His order was given while the Armistice was still in
force. He therefore violated the terms of the Armistice, and was consequently
guilty of the treachery with which I charged him-a charge which he evidently
took very much to heart.
Papers found in the Baden, the originals of which were immediately
forwarded to the Admiralty, appeared to afford ample evidence that, in principle,
scuttling would be carried out by Admiral von Reuter with the approval of his
Government. At the time, however, the German Government said that
" Scuttling had been carried out by Admiral von Reuter and his subordinates
without the knowledge or wish of any German civil authority " and yet as late
as the 27th of November, 1919, they wrote a Memorandum to the British
Government remonstrating as to the scuttling and endeavouring to justify it.
Von Reuter was in the main an honest man, who was faced with a very
difficult duty under a Government in which he had no confidence, and his
integrity failed him when he was required to make a decision, by which as their
servant he was bound, and he fell back on the out-dated order of a disowned and
self-exiled superior.
The experiences of my flag-captain, Captain (afterwards Vice-Admiral)
G. T. Swabey, on this occasion as related in his journal (kindly lent to me by his
widow), is of considerable interest. In allotting the ships to be boarded, the
duty of the Revenge was to the German Baden. Captain Swabey says :
" I went on board her, a few of the Baden's men with us, we could
get nothing out of them as to the position of the sea cocks which had been
opened to cause the flooding. I t is not difficult to imagine what it was
like down in the bowels of a strange ship, minutely sub-divided, as all
German ships invariably are, with no lights barring a hand torch, and
knowing that she was sinking and that a t any moment she might heel
over and go to the bottom."
266
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
Captain Swabey, however, succeeded in keeping the Baden afloat sufficiently to enable her to be towed into shallow water, where she grounded and
was eventually salved, the only one of the large ships.
Captain Swabey also recorded another incident which occasioned the only
censure the Admiralty has ever in the course of my 45 years service inflicted
on me. He says in his journal :" An incident occurred in another battleship whilst the squadron
was on its way to Invergordon. A party of German petty officers under
escort were being marched forward during the night to the lavatories,
when a shot was fired and a German Chief Petty Officer fell dead. This
naturally caused a tremendous outcry from Germany, which reached the
Dutch Embassy, acting for the German Government This unfortunate
occurrence was made known to the Government by the Dutch Embassy
before the Admiral had reported it owing to the stress of other duties.
The Admiralty were very rude to the Admiral about this. Many Courts
of Enquiry were held to try to ascertain who was the culprit who fired
the fatal shot, but it was not until the last Court was held (January, 1920)
that a seaman volunteered to give evidence, and told the whole story of
how a young ordinary seaman, whose family had suffered very much in
the war, and whose mind was set on revenge, had obtained a rifle and
ammunition from the stores got ready for the landing parties to scan the
coasts of Scapa Flow. With these he had taken up his position behind one
of the forward turrets awaiting such an opportunity as that which occurred.
He had later deserted but was found and arrested by the police in
Scotland, and was tried under the Scottish Civil Law, when a verdict of
' Not Proven ' was given."
The Admiralty certainly were " very rude " to me. When the incident
occurred, I had seen no occasion to report to the Admiralty until I had some
detailed information, and I accordingly ordered a Court of Enquiry, to be
presided over by my Second in Command, Rear-Admiral Hon. Sir Victor
Stanley, whose flagship had been the scene of the incident.
That officer had been endeavouring in Smoogroo Bay, on the opposite side
of the Flow to the anchorage of the other battleships, to salve the Baden and
two light cruisers. He had actually succeeded in refloating all three ships, but a
heavy gale had sprung up, and he had been obliged to flood them again and
beach them. The gale had also rendered boatwork between the opposite sides
of the Flow impracticable.
Admiral Stanley was suddenly and unexpectedly drected by Admiralty
telegram to proceed south at once in his flagship and himself to report in
London and to make arrangements for the accommodation on shore of the
officers and men who were to take part in a great Naval Review and March Past.
The Admiral had been busily engaged in his salvage operations, and the unfortunate victim being dead, had not worried to assemble his Court of Enquiry.
Accordingly, I directed him to proceed forthwith with the Enquiry, and to
report the result direct to the Admiralty. Unfortunately the report did not
arrive before the Admiralty had been informed of the incident from another
source. The Admiralty despatched to me an immediate expression of censure,
which they repeated after my remonstrance to the effect that I had been
censured before any account had been received from me.
I was consoled by the consciousness that under similar circumstances,
my action, or inaction, would have been the same, and would be taken with a ,
well meant attempt to save the Admiralty from superflous correspondence. I
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
267
have always thought that it was a very small matter to evoke such a crushing
action as the censure of a Vice-Admiral in the exercise of his command.
Another extract from Captain Swabey's journal, written a t the time, is also
of interest :
" In some cases the feeling against Germany ran high in the Navy
and it was fortunate that more regrettable incidents did not occur.
I t speaks very well for the discipline of the men of the Grand Fleet which
had been waiting for over four years to play their part, and had been
denied it because the German Fleet would not come out and accept
battle."
The immediate reaction of the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty (Lord
Wester Wemyss) to the news of the sinking is of considerable interest. I n his
" Life and Letters " by Lady Wester Wemyss, he is quoted as having written
on the very next day :
" I look upon the sinking of the German Fleet as a real blessing.
It
disposes once for all of the thorny question of the distribution of these
ships, and eases us of an enormous amount of difficulties. The terms
(of the Armistice) only interned these ships and did not make them our
property. I suppose there will be an outcry a t the beginning, but when
the facts of the case became known, I think that everybody will probably
think like me, ' Thank the Lord '."
And, further, the biographer states that Wemyss in answer to Press and
Parliamentary attacks " recalled how during the Armistice negotiations he and
Admiral de Bon had pressed for the surrender of the ships, pointing out the
possibility of what he had just occurred, but how they had been over-ruled by
Lloyd George, Admiral Benson and Marshal Foch." The biographer stated,
moreover, that in a debate in the House of Commons on the 26th of June,
Wemyss was triumphantly vindicated.
My despatch on the subject of the sinking was never acknowledged, and I
received no comment, approval or censure either from my Commander-in-Chief
or the Admiralty.
The story is hardly complete without a record of the eventual disposal of
the German ships.
At the time of the sinking there were a t Scapa, 11 battleships, 5 battle
cruisers, 6 light cruisers and 50 destroyers. Of these, the battleship Baden, and
two light cruisers were aground in shallow water in process of being salved ;
the Emden was afloat undamaged, and a small number of destroyers were either
aground in shallow water or afloat. All these craft were, on the signature of the
Peace Treaty, to have been surrendered, but their disposal amongst the Allies
was complicated-by the ships having been sunk before the Treaty had been
signed.
The United States had adhered to the view that all the ships should be
sunk or broken up ; France, Italy and Japan had put forward certain claims,
and not until the end of December did the Supreme Council decide that " we
could not allow to pass without penalty the violation of the Armistice Terms
in the destruction of the German Fleet a t Scapa Flow. . . and Germany was
therefore required to hand over 5 light cruisers and a large quantity of naval
material such as floating docks, cranes, etc., to the extent of a displacement of
100,000 tons."
The eventual decision of the Supreme Council was that the enemy tonnage
of surface warships was to be divided between the Powers in accordance with
the losses sustained in the war, i.e., Great Britain 70 per cent., France and
268
THE SCAPA SINKINGS.
Italy 10 per cent., Japan 8 per cent., the United States of America 2 per cent.,
and that Greece, Roumania and Portugal were each t o be given a small vessel.
The Inter-Allied Commission was to be responsible for the execution of the
above terms.
If blame is to be attached anywhere in this unfortunate event, it must rest
primarily with the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, who
admitted the provisions of " internment " in the Armistice terms a t the instance
especially of Marshal Foch and contrary to the advice of the Allied Naval
Council ; and secondarily to Admiral von Reuter who preferred what he called
the German " naval tradition " and the order of a self-exiled Kaiser to adherence
to the solemn signature of the Government which he was serving.
Great Britain, the Power which had the highest claim to the ships, did not
want them, neither did the United States. To other Powers the expense of the
inevitable restoration and adaptation t o suit their special requirements, and of
their maintenance in a period which promised to entail a long peace, would have
been unprofitable. Their sinking relieved the tired negotiators of Armistice
and Peace Terms from many international discussions which might have proved
acrimonious, and there can be little doubt that the cause of International Peace
and goodwill was best served by the ships being at the bottom of the sea, or their
relegation to the ship breakers' yard.
Of the ships salved, the battleship Baden was handed over to Great Britain
and was sunk off the Casquet rocks in August, 1921, after being utilized for
various trials. Of the light cruisers, the Emden was handed over to France,
and before being sunk in 1921 was used as a target ship. The Niirnberg was
allocated to Great Britain and was eventually broken up. The Frankjurt was
handed over to the United States and was sunk by a bomb in deep water.
As to the ships which were sunk and subsequently salved and which have
not been mentioned :Five destroyers and the light cruiser Bremen were broken up a t Scapa.
The following ships were salved, in most cases bottom up, towed to Rosyth, and
broken up in Rosyth Dockyard by Messrs. Cox and Danks, Ltd., between 1924
and 1933-twenty-six destroyers, light cruiser Bremse ; battleships Moltke,
Kaiser, Prinz Regent Leopold ; battle cruisers Seydlitz and V o n der Tann.
The following were similarly treated by Metal Industries, Ltd., between
1933 and 1938-battleships Bayern, Konig Albert, Kaisern, Grosser Kurfurst,
Freidrich der Grosse.
In the autumn of 1938, salvage operations were commenced by Metal
Industries Ltd., on the last ship, the battle cruiser Hindenberg, which lay in 20
fathoms of water in a somewhat exposed position. She was raised bottom up,
in about 8 months, a very fine feat of salvage. But no dock was available for
her, the war came and she remained for 7 years afloat a t Scapa, with seven
men onboard as ship-keepers. I n 1946 she was taken to the Clyde and
broken up a t Roseneath.
So ended, in a sordid atmosphere of dishonour, the existence of the greatest
fleet that Germany has ever possed, constructed and maintained under the
influence of Kaiser Wilhelm 11, and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, as " the
embodiment of Germany's will to achieve world domination."
I n truth ; once more in our history :" The fleet of the foemen of England hath found not one but a
thousand graves ;
And he that shall number and name them shall number by name
and by tale the waves "
LORD BEATTY'S " BATTLE CRUISER ORDERS."
THEmore important orders that Lord Beatty issued to his Fleet in his B.C.O.s,
were neither lengthy nor numerous. He hoisted his flag in Lion in March 1913
and remained there for nearly four years, during which time he issued some
41 B.C.0.s. They comprised three groups, Tactics and Operatiol~al; Gunnery
and Torpedo ; Miscellaneous ; the first being, to any reader to-day, much the
most interesting. In this group there were only 19 orders, of which 13 were
issued before the battle of Jutland and several of them before the war began.
In THE NAVALREVIEWfor November, 1950, an official letter from Lord
Beatty (to Admiral Sir G. Callaghan) was printed, showing how he would have
wished the Grand Fleet destroyers to be used in a Fleet Action.
As there are very few copies of the B.C.0.s now existing or accessible, it
may be of interest to reprint certain of Beatty's views on Tactics, Training, etc.
which helped in his day to produce valuable results.
I t is thought that some of the following extracts may be worth remembering
in a future war, not so much as regards the particular situations they were
intended to deal with, but because they indicate the importance that Beatty
attached to such things as the offensive spirit, forethought, realistic training, the
co-operation of all arms, and the development of initiative in Captains and
subordinate commanders.
B.C.O. No. 1.-General Principles.
1. From a study of the Great Naval Wars it is impressed upon one that
Cruiser Captains and Battle Cruiser Captains, to be successful, must possess, in
a marked degree, initiative, resource, determination, and fearlessness of
responsibility.
To make the best use of these qualities they must be given a clear outline
of the functions and duties of the forces to which they belong, and of the
principles by which the Admiral is guided in handling them.
War is a perpetual conflict with the unexpected, so that it is impossible
to prescribe beforehand for all the circumstances that may arise.
.
The Admiral will therefore rely on Captains to use all the information a t
their disposal so as to grasp the situation quickly and anticipate his wishes,
using their own discretion as to how to act in unforeseen circumstances and
carrying through every operation with resolution and energy.
2. Cruiser Captains cannot be too often reminded that, in war, there is an
immense increase in those things which occur to distract a man's judgement and
overwhelm him with uncertainty. As Clausewitz has said, in war much
information is contradictory, more is false, the greatest part is doubtful.
In all doubtful cases a carefully considered first opinion should not be
abandoned until a clear conviction forces us to do so. That line of action which
promises the greatest possible damage to the enemy is seldom wrong.
3. As a rule, instructions will be of a very general character so as to avoid
interfering with the judgement and initiative of Captains.
Orders should be complied with in spirit, but it is not desirable to be tied by
the letter of a standing order in circumstances where perhaps it was never
intended to apply.
Orders issued by signal frequently indicate the Admiral's intentions or
requirements ; they may perhaps have to be obeyed literally by some ships and
not by others. For example, a course signal when ships are widely spread
would probably indicate that the Admiral and ships near him will steer the
course indicated. More distant ships may find that a slightly different course
will better suit their requirements.
No. 2.-Battle
Cruisers.
3 (b) I think it has been clearly demonstrated that supports should never
b e divided so that any portion of them could be overwhelmed in detail by a
superior force of the enemy. Even when spread, the Battle Cruisers should
always be in sight of one another.
There can be no certainty of effecting a rapid junction with ships out of
sight and dependent on wireless.
The support should be of such strength as to be a t least equal to the greatest
force of Enemy Battle Cruisers that can be brought against them.
( d ) The Battle Cruiser Squadron in performance of support duty must be
prepared to man and fight every gun of its Anti-Torpedo Armament at the same
time as its main armament, by day as well as by night.
(h) I t is essential that vessels which would co-operate with the Battle
Cruiser Squadron in war should be frequently exercised with it in peace.
6. Tactical. I n tactics, even more than in strategy, what we specially
need to practise is the concerted action of all arms in a simultaneous offensive.
The following should be exercised :-
(b) Joining the Commander-in-Chief for a general action ; first, when
detached out of sight ;second, when keeping touch with the enemy's
fleet.
(c) Taking up preliminary station ahead of Commander-in-Chief and
thence operating to drive back enemy cruisers and gain information
of enemy's fleet.
(e) Falling back to form a fast division of a battle line. This entails
first manoeuvring for a good tactical position, then closing to
engage simultaneously with our main fleet but never before it.
(f) Practise concerted attacks on van or rear, battle cruisers co-operating
with light cruisers and flotillas. Also practise co-operation of the
same forces for repelling attacks by the enemy's flotillas.
(g) Exercise as in (f) but firing salvoes of torpedoes sometimes from a
Battle Cruiser Squadron and sometimes from the light cruisers or
flotillas.
KO.3.-Battle Orders for the B.C. Fleet.
6 . Much must be left to the initiative and judgement of Captains. They
are relied upon to act promptly in battle on their own initiative for dealing with
all cases such as the following :(a) Two or more ships requiring to concentrate fire on one of the
enemy.
(b) Altering course to avoid torpedoes, or extending gaps in the line as
a precautionary measure.
(c) Making small alterations of course to fire torpedoes.
N.B.-Care should be taken t o right the helm and resume station as
soon after as possible.
(d) Hauling out of the wake of the next ahead to avoid smoke or backwash.
(e) Altering line of bearing from Flag in order to get a clearer arc of fire
or to close nearer the enemy.
(f) Or in any other case in which Captains consider that prompt action
is needed, and their movements are such as the Vice-Admiral would
certainly approve if they could be made known to him beforehand.
The chief limitation in these cases is that no movement must mask
the fire of other ships or in any way inconvenience them from a
manoeuvring point of view.
8. Should any ship or squadron find itself being heavily hit, it is permissible
to alter course 1 or 1Q points to upset the enemy's control. In doing this,
however, it is most important nqt to drop astern nor to make the line so ragged
as to interfere with manoeuvring.
9. If ordered to form on a line of bearing or reform while engaged, the
smallest possible amount of helm should be used consistent with rapid execution.
10. If, as may happen, the Admiral is not leading the line, the leader is t o
hoist 4 Pendant without signal.
11. Re signals in action ; guiding principle in single line, " Each ship is
responsible for her next astern."
No. 4.-Tactics.
The following principles are to be accepted as a guide for concentrating
and forming line of Battle :4. Concentrating must be understood to mean placing each ship as rapidly
as possible in a position to support her consorts by engaging the enemy with
effective gunfire. This naturally does not require that all ships shall be in close
order, but those near one another must form line of battle a t the first opportunity
after concentrating ; leading ship automatically taking guide.
5. Ships that are able to close must form line ahead roughly a t right angles
to bearing of enemy, in the order in which they then are, leading ship taking
guide, all without signal. Those ships farthest ahead of the enemy should not
sacrifice their position in order to take station on others abeam of him, nor is it
desirable to form in close order if heavy smoke on the engaged side is liable to
mask the guns of ships astern. These exceptions must of course depend on
existing circumstances.
6. When ships are widely separated and perhaps on opposite sides of the
enemy, they are to hoist action signal 98 to indicate " I am now nearly in range
of the enemy and will close to engage as soon as sufficient support has come up."
Each detached ship should, a t her discretion, close and engage the enemy a t
the earliest moment she thinks justified, without waiting for further orders.
The signal should be repeated by searchlight, and if necessary by wireless.
Ships of Battle Cruiser Fleet are to note the above signification in pencil against
action signal 98 in the signal book.
7. If possible no signal other than this will be used. Ships must never
suppose that the absence of a signal implies that any given action is not
sanctioned by Flagship ; on the contrary it usually denotes that the Admiral
relies on each ship to take whatever action may be necessary without waiting
to be told.
8. The above principles apply equally for separated divisions of 2 or 3 ships
when concentrating to attack a superior Enemy Squadron. The sole object of
these instructions is to enable ships to understand beforehand the principles of
rapid co-operation, so that the enemy may be brought to action at the earliest
possible moment without any ship needing or wishing to wait for detailed orders
from the Admiral.
(Note.-Admiral Harwood told the writer that it was in accordance with
the procedure described in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above, as subsequently taught
a t the Naval Staff College, that he fought the battle of the River Plate.)
No. 5.-Training.
I t is desired that all exercises and training for battle shall be, so far as
possible, carried out with a view to practising the conditions and operations
described in my " Orders for Battle."
2. A few of the principal requirements are as follows :(a) That guns shall be able to shoot effectively when ships are steaming
a t full speed and perhaps making frequent alterations of course.
(b) That ships shall be able to carry out concentration of fire, either with
ships of their own squadron, or with others firing from a different
direction.
(c) That turrets in local control shall be able to make good shooting a t
both long and short ranges.
(d) That ships shall be able to steam full speed, and keep roughly in
station, while closely engaged.
le) That ships while engaged shall be able to fire torpedoes steadily and
accurately until every torpedo is expended.
and repel torpedo attacks while
(f) That ships can man theirjight
simultaneously engaged with armoured vessels.
(g) That arrangements be made to keep a good lookout, throughout an
action, for the enemy's submarines or torpedoes (the latter are not
likely to be visible unless running shallow), also for minelayers or
destroyers laying mines ahead.
3. The above requirements must be kept constantly in view, and every
effort made to comply with the principle that " Any exercise or training which
does not reproduce as closely as possible the actual conditions of war is almost
inevitably bad ".
4. I t is desired to impress on all officers that the object of training is not
merely to attain success in target practices and competitions, but to ensure that
the fighting value of the Squadron as a whole shall be as high as possible. To
this end it should be remembered that good comradeship and coidial cooperation are among the first essentials for success in war.
No. 6.-Principles for Light Cruisers.
As the Light Cruisers have never come under my orders for peace training,
I wish to inform them now of certain principles by which I should like them to be
guided.
2. When the L.C.S. and B.C.S. are working together, our main object is to
cut off and destroy all enemy ships that we can locate. For this work no
detailed orders will suffice and I wish it to be understood that all orders issued
by me are to be read as INSTRUCTIONS indicating my requirements or
intentions. They are not to be interpreted literally in circumstances where
they obviously would not apply. The best results can only be obtained when
each Captain cultivates and exercises those qualities which Cruiser work
specially requires, and which make the issuing of orders unnecessary. These
are : Independence, self-reliance, initiative, promptness in making a decision and
acting upon it, and a fixed determination that an enemy once sighted shall never
escape us.
3(f) Officers in command of supports must remember that it is very
important for the ships in touch with the enemy to know exactly what their
supports are doing.
(g) Also never forget that if the enemy and our supports steam on opposite
courses for a quarter of an hour a t 20 knots, and a chase then ensues, it may take
ten hours to catch them. Hence the need for quick signalling and prompt
action.
(h) When endeavouring to cut off an inferior enemy it is desired, if possible,
to get between him and his base. The bearing on which he should actually be
engaged may depend on the direction of the wind or other factors.
4. These remarks are intended*for the guidance of Cruiser Captains and
should not be allowed to hamper their initiative or judgement. When in touch
with the enemy they can never be wrong.
(i) In shadowing a superior force, or
(ii) In endeavouring to destroy an equal or inferior force.
No. 10.-Ships damaged i n Action.
When in action at a distance from the Grand Fleet, ships of the Battle
Cruiser Fleet may be liable to embarrass our movements if their speed is much
reduced. Should this occur when pursuing the enemy or steering towards his
main Fleet, the following principles are to apply.
2. The rapid destruction of the enemy is the first consideration. Ships
compelled to reduce speed should therefore form up in rear of the line and
continue fighting while their guns will bear. When no longer in range they
will report their condition to the Senior Officer of their Squadron and are to be
guided by his orders as to when or in what direction to retire.
274
LORD BEATTY'S "BATTLE
CRUISER
ORDERS".
3. Damaged ships will then make their way towards the nearest support,
or steer for harbour if this seems necessary. In no case, however, should a ship
proceed to harbour till ordered.
4. In this connection, Captains should not lose sight of the importance of
their Seconds in Command being in possession of such information and intelligence as would be required by them in the event of having to assume
command at short notice.
No. 31.-Prevention of Ships falling into Enemy's Hands.
If a ship, owing to serious damage in action, should find herself in imminent
danger of capture, provision is necessary to ensure that it shall under no
circumstances be possible for her to fall into the enemy's hands.
2. In deep water this can best be effected by opening the Kingstons. If
the ship is aground, demolition would be necessary, as for example by a guncotton charge placed on a war-head and fired by Bickford fuze, or on a pile of
shells if no war-heads are left.
I wish details to be considered and all Officers acquainted with them, so that,
no matter who may be left in command, prompt action may be taken if occasion
arises.
3. Every effort to save life should be made at the same time, but it is
essential that the destruction of the ship should be complete if she is about to
fall into the enemy's hands.
No. 38.-Lessons learnt from action on the 31st of May, 1916.
The following important lessons may be learnt from the action of the
31st of May. I t is hoped that they will be fully applied when the next opportunity occurs.
2. I t is of paramount importance that an enemy force once brought to
action should not escape in fog, under a smoke screen, or in gathering darkness,
and it must be the duty of Destroyers as well as Light Cruisers to assist in
making sure that no chance of escape is allowed to his heavy ships.
3. I t has been proved again and again that nothing is more fatal than
" waiting for orders." The Senior Officers may be closely engaged, their
signal apparatus may be destroyed, or for many other reasons they may be
unable to issue orders by signal. I t therefore becomes the duty of subordinate
leaders to anticipate the executive orders and act in the spirit of the Commanderin-Chief's requirements. There are only two and they are very simple. So
long as the enemy heavy ships remain afloat we must " locate and report ",
" attack and destroy ". But to perform either duty without the other is to fall
short of that co-ordination which ensures success, nor should it be thought that,
to perform one duty efficiently, it is necessary to abstain from the other.
5. In future, at nightfall or at any time when the enemy appear to be getting
out of sight, Light Cruisers or Destroyers that are in a position to do so must
move off without orders and get in touch.
8. I t is imperative in the next action that no opportunity should be missed
for firing torpedoes from Battle Cruisers and Light Cruisers. Every effort
should be made to seek positions where torpedoes can be fired effectively at the
enemy's line. A good position to fire torpedoes is a good tactical and good
gunnery position. Having found such a position it should be the aim of each
Captain to fire every torpedo in his ship. Therein B.C.O. 15 should be taken
as a guide.
LORD BEATTY'S
"
BATTLE CRUISER ORDERS ".
275
11. At nightfall it is important for our Destroyers to be informed, if possible,
as to the position and movements of our own and the enemy heavy ships. Flag
and Senior Officers should give them visually any information they possess and
the Captain's D or Flotilla Leaders should make enquiries, without using
wireless, if they are not given the information they need. The ideal is that our
own ships should haul off and leave the whole area occupied by enemy free for
our Destroyers to operate in. In practice this is doubtful of attainment and
it is possible that our Destroyers searching for the enemy may meet some of our
Light Cruisers trying to keep touch with him. Hence the necessity for all
information being given to Captain D as referred to above.
12. When Destroyers sight a column of ships which, if enemy, would form
a favourable target, it is imperative when in doubt that steps should be taken to
identify them. If friends, there may be risk of being fired on, but at all costs
we must avoid letting an enemy squadron escape through believing erroneously
that they are friends.
N.B.-This happened at Jutland on at least one occasion.
13. A re-perusal of B.C.0.s Nos. 1to 8 will show that the main principles
governingmost of the items above referred to have been clearly laid down two
or more years ago.
No. 39.-Fighting
Orders.
5. Spotting by outlying ships.
On both the 24th of January, 1915 and the 31st of May, 1916 outlying
ships, Light Cruisers and Destroyers, were able to observe the fall of shot from
our heavy ships a t times when any information would obviously have been of
assistance to the control Officers. The attention of all ships is called to B.C.0.8,
paragraph 6, which is also to be taken as applying to Destroyers. Light
Cruisers and Destroyers not actually engaged should use every endeavour to
observe the fall of shot from the Battle Cruisers and should not hesitate to pass
any information as quickly as possible. Such information may prove of the
utmost value.
6. Signal to open Fire.
In the presence of the Enemy, ships are to open fire without signal, provided
only that the signal " A.N. " (" Fire is not to be opened until ships are directed
to do so by signal ") has not previously been made.
No. 40.-Attack
by Torpedo Craft at Night.
2. On exceptionally clear nights when attacking craft may be seen without
searchlights, they are not to be switched on.
3. From experience, the effective range of searchlights is not more than
2,000 yards. If the range for the night is greater than 2,000 yards, searchlights should not be switched on until attacking boats get within that distance.
6 . Should any ship other than Flagship sight enemy torpedo craft, she will
act according to the principles in paragraphs 2 and 3 if enemy are certainly
committed to attack. She will report immediately by auxiliary WIT, making
signal " NM " and relative bearing.
7. If the Battle Cruisers are steaming a t night in more than one column
the following action is to be taken by the various columns. The column
sighting or attacked by Enemy's Torpedo Craft will turn away as described above,
making the signal " NM " and relative bearing of enemy, followed by a signal
indicating the course to which the column has turned. On receiving this,
or as soon as they have any indication of which way the attacked column
turned, the column or columns towards which it turned are to alter course so
as to preserve roughly their compass bearing and distance from the column
attacked.
8. The column or columns that the attacked ships turned away from will
maintain their course unaltered unless the Senior Officer directs otherwise or
circumstances make an alteration desirable.
The above are of course only extracts, not complete orders, and they date
back nearly 40 years. But they have the merit that they were compiled by
men who had experience of battle, added to the stimulus of continuous war
experience. It therefore seems worth while to rescue them temporarily from
oblivion.
R. P. D.
THE TEST OF THE FIRST BRITISH ATOMIC
WEAPON IN OCTOBER, 1952.
JUST over two years after Mr. Attlee announced in the House of Commons the
decision of the Government to proceed with the development of a British atomic
bomb, the first weapon was tested in the Monte Bello Islands off the N.W. coast
of Australia. The full story of the development of the weapon itself and of the
design, construction and operation of the plants which produced the fissile
material itself may not be told for many years, but no such cloak of secrecy
surrounds the trial of the weapon. The planning, and also to some extent the
execution, of this enterprise present some unusual features, involving as they
did very close co-operation between the three fighting Services, including those
of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the civilian organization of the Ministry
of Supply, and it is thought that a brief account of the operation may be of
interest to the readers of THE NAVALREVIEW.
In order to fill a gap in our knowledge of the effects of atomic attack, it
was decided that the test should be carried out to simulate an atomic explosion
in a harbour. After a preliminary survey of the Monte Bello Islands, off the
N.W. coast of Australia about 800 miles north of Fremantle, in the autumn of
1950 had established their suitability for the purpose, and the implications of
staging the test in such a remote area had been examined, i t was decided that
it should be carried out as a military operation under the command of a Flag
Officer of the Royal Navy. Events proved this decision to have been a wise one,
for it is quite clear now that to have done the job on a civilian basis would Kave
been far more expensive in resources and time.
Preliminary service planning started in March, 1951, and the formation
of an inter-departmental co-ordinating committee under the chairmanship of
D.C.N.S. and the appointment of the Naval Commander (Designate) in early
May ushered in the detailed planning stage. The date of the trial itself was
fixed within fairly narrow limits by the necessity of avoiding the season of
tropical storms off N.W. Australia, which lasts from December to March. All
the preparatory work, the test itself and the withdrawal from the site had
therefore to be executed between April and November. I t was therefore
decided that the test should be planned for late September or early
October, 1952, by which time it was expected that all the necessary equipment
would be ready. In the event, it was found that planning had started none
too soon.
The Naval Commander (Designate) set up his headquarters in the
Admiralty on the 7th of May, 1951, gathering round him during the next .few
weeks a comprehensive operational and administrative planning staff, and
functioning as a self-contained planning section on the staff of the D.C.N.S.
The scientific planning was carried out under the superintendence of Dr. (now
Sir William) Penney by a Deputy Chief Scientific Officer, with the title of
Technical Director, located a t a Ministry of Supply experimental establishment
outside London. The two organizations necessarily worked in very close cooperation. Much difficulty was experienced in the early stages through the
high degree of secrecy which cloaked every detail of the enterprise. When the
Naval Commander (Designate) started work he found that everything so far
written on the subject had been graded Top Secret, that few people in the
Admiralty knew of the project, and that higher authority was reluctant to
allow any relaxation of this standard of security. This was all very well while
the project remained in the discussion stage, but not so convenient when
concrete plans and preparations had to be made. Faced with the tasks of
obtaining the allocation of the ships, agreement on staff requirements for their
conversion and the production of the necessary drawings, the allocation of work
to the shipyards and its progression for completion to a programme which it
was already evident was going to be a fairly tight one, and the complementing
of the ships for their special service, together with the investigation and solution
of a whole host of technical and personnel problems requiring the agreement
of many different authorities, the Naval Commander not unnaturally viewed
the prospect of negotiating the whole on a Top Secret basis with some alarm.
An immediate offensive launched to secure the down-grading to " Confidential "
of all aspects which only required normal treatment achieved final success
three months later ; in the meantime much time was wasted and unorthodox
methods had to be used to get things started.
In a complicated enterprise such as this, in which so many different interests
were involved, it was necessary that spheres of responsibility should be clearly
laid down, and this was done. Responsibility for the scientific and technical
conduct of the trial lay with the Ministry of Supply. The Naval Commander
was responsible for the conduct of the operation as a whole, for the safety of
all concerned, and for meeting the requirements of the Ministry of Supply as
represented to him by the Technical Director, who headed the whole Ministry
of Supply team. As between the Services, the division of labour was broadly
as follows. The Royal Navy transported the expedition, housed and fed it, and
provided it with communications, local air and water transport, and some
labour a t the site. The Army carried out the civil engineering and construction,
and provided labour for moving stores and equipment ashore. The R.A.F.
provided air transport from the United Kingdom, and personnel for certain
scientific tasks. The Ministry of Supply designed the test, and provided all
the scientific apparatus and the personnel for installing and operating it.
The test called for instrumentation on a very large scale, involving the
provision of a number of buildings and other works of various descriptions.
The plan provided for this work to be executed by a detachment of the Royal
Engineers. The Commander, Royal Engineers, a Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.,
was appointed in May, and after some weeks of consultation with the scientific
planners left his staff to proceed with detailed design work and its translation
into terms of R.E. stores and equipment required for the job and paid a visit
to the site to study the problems on the spot. With him went a scientific
officer, and they were able to take passage to the islands in H.M.A.S. Warrego,
then engaged in making the necessary detailed hydrographic survey. Meanwble,
a detachment of some 200 sappers, specially complemented with the necessary
trades, was formed in South Wales. In the autumn the detachment moved to
Longrnoor Camp in Hampshire, where the troops carried out specialized training and collected and packed the constructional plant, equipment and stores.
The two landing ships which were to transport the sappers and their stores
to the site and accommodate them while there were allocated in July and taken
in hand for refit and conversion at civil shipyards. H.M.S. Zeebrugge accommodated the Captain, Fourth Landing Ship (Tank) Squadron, and carried
five L.C.A.s, while H.M.S. Narvik carried five L.C.M.s and two L.C.A.s, all
the minor landing craft being manned by Royal Marine crews. Between them,
the two landing ships carried the Royal Engineer detachment of about two
hundred officers and men and a thousand tons of military plant and stores ; in
addition, the Zeebrugge was fitted with a elaborate chemical laboratory, which
to save stowage space was dismantled and stowed on her tank deck for reerection at the site. The remaining ships of the force, H.M.S. Campania, a
third L.S.T., H.M.S. Tracker and H.M.S. Plym, a river-class frigate, were
allocated to the expedition and taken in hand for refit and conversion during
the late summer and early autumn.
In October the Naval Commander accompanied by one Staff Officer visited
Australia to make contacts and view the site. After conferences at Melbourne
with the inter-departmental committee which was supervising the arrangements in Australia, he travelled to Fremantle and Onslow by air and on to the
islands in a hired local craft, accompanied by the D.C.N.S. Australia, the
A.O.C. Western Area, and the naval representative on the U.K. Services
Liaison Staff at Melbourne, a very pleasant three-day picnic under fairly
rugged conditions. The Monte Bello Islands are a group of small uninhabited
islands laying some 45 miles from the mainland and 90 miles from Onslow, a
small township with a wooden pier and an airstrip. They are low, of limestone
formation and covered with spinifex scrub, and enclosed a shallow lagoon
with a small deep water anchorage and a narrow and difficult entrance which,
however, is safe for an L.S.T. at high water in fine weather. A small Australian
Meteorological party was established there to make observations for a few
weeks covering the season of the test, and some heavy plant had been landed in
anticipation of the commencement of work in the spring. The party spent
twenty-four hours in the islands and in order to avoid punching back to Onslow
against a head wind returned to Roeborne, about a hundred miles to the eastward, where their aircraft awaited them. This was a useful visit, enabling the
Naval Commander to appreciate some of the difficulties with which the expedition might be faced, in particular the exposed nature of the anchorage for
the base ship outside the lagoon and the conditions for boatwork in view of the
long distances involved and the limitations imposed by shoal water everywhere amongst the islands.
By the end of December, 1951, H.M.S. Zeebrugge and Narvik were in
commission and busy storing and making ready for their long voyage. The
two ships were loaded with military plant and stores quickly and most
efficiently at the R.E. Depot at Marchwood on Southampton Water early in
February, and after embarking the 71st Field Squadron R.E. at Portsmouth
on the 18th of February, Captain L.S.4 in Zeebrugge with Narvik in company
sailed on the following day for the Monte Bello Islands, proceedmg via Suez,
Colombo, Cocos Islands and Fremantle. The day before they sailed, a brief
Government statement was issued to the Press saying that it had been decided
to test an atomic weapon during 1952. Very soon after planning started it
had become apparent from enquiries addressed to the Chief of Naval Information that in spite of the emphasis on security the Press knew very well that
something was in the wind. Much speculation in papers abroad was reprinted
in the United Kingdom press, but the latter had in the main loyally observed
the spirit of the restrictions on publication of matters concerning atomic weapon
development. But it was no surprise when the issue of the official announcement was the signal for the publication of a good deal of information which
it had been the policy to keep secret ; in particular, of course, the site for the
test and the identity of ships taking part were matters for wide speculation.
The reports were officially ignored and no further official announcement was
forthcoming until May.
Limitations of space had made it impossible to do much to improve accommodation in the L.S.T.s, the ships were crowded and full of stores, and the
slow passage through the tropics proved trying. Once through the hot weather,
and throughout the six months stay at the islands when tank decks were
generally clear and sorpe of the soldiers were living ashore, conditions onboard
were reasonably comfortable.
About the middle of March, while Captain L.S.4 was on passage, a small
detachment of some 30 Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Construction Corps
landed at the Monte Bello Islands to carry out some preliminary road making
and pier and hard construction, using plant which had been landed there the
previous autumn. The work of this party gave the sappers a flying start when
they arrived, and the detachment remained in the islands with their plant
until September, working as an integral part of the force under the direction
of the C.R.E. and performing invaluable service.
Captain L.S.4 replenished at Fremantle, and also embarked there a considerable deck cargo of stores. On sailing, the L.S.T.s took in tow respectively
a refrigerator lighter and a water lighter belonging to the R.A.N., both selfpropelled and loaded with equipment destined for Onslow where the Australian
Army had undertaken to open a transit camp for the expedition. Off Onslow
the lighters were turned over to H.M.A.S. Warreen, a small tender provided
by the R.A.N. to run a mail and ferry service between Onslow and the islands,
after unloading at Onslow all three ships proceeded to Monte Bello and remained
attached to the force throughout the operation. Captain L.S.4 arrived at the
islands and entered the lagoon on the 27th of April, the two ships securing to
buoys which had been laid for them by H.M.A.S. Karangi.
Three months of hard work followed for the advance party. There was a
very heavy programme of work to be done, and it had to be completed to time
table if there was to be no delay when the Main Force arrived. The two ships
had been to some extent tactically loaded, and the initial disembarkation of
stores to the two main store parks was rapidly completed. The landing ships
were not beached as, apart from the fact that the beaches were not very suitable
no risk of damage to the ships could be accepted. The heavy plant was landed
without difficulty by driving it through the bow doors into an L.C.M. which
had " beached " over the lower ramps of the L.S.T.
The construction work was located in the main on four of the islands, but
there were many outworks on other islands and islets, some of which were
difficult of access except in very fine weather. Once the plant and stores were
ashore, the first task was to open up stone quarries to produce aggregate for
the vast amount of concrete work. A camp was built for one troop of sappers
on Hermite to enable them to live near their work and avoid the frequent sixmile boat trips which would otherwise have been necessary. The remainder
of the sappers lived onboard and landed daily. During these three months the
sappers worked a six, and sometimes a six and a half, day week, putting up
concrete blockhouses, steel-framed buildings, steel scaffolding towers for
cameras, piers, large numbers of Nissen huts for a variety of purposes, and a
whole host of minor works, and they did a magnificent job. There is no doubt
that in planning this phase was under-estimated ; the difficulty was that the
requirements for the test continued to expand long after it had ceased to be
possible to increase men and material to meet them.
THE TEST OF THE FIRST BRITISH ATOMIC WEAPON IN OCTOBER,
1952.
281
There was not much time for recreation, but a canteen was established on
Trimouille, with a football ground and a wired bathing place nearby, to serve
the needs of the landing ships. Similar provision was made later on Hermite in
readiness for the arrival of the Main Force. Sea fishing was very good, and a
most popular pastime, and when weather permitted there was sailing in the
lagoon at week-ends ; generally, however, conditions did not favour the small
boat. Each ship visited Fremantle once during this period for leave, replenishment and top up stores. Among other things, Zeebrugge brought back with
her was the first class mooring for Campania, which was then laid by H.M.A.S.
Karangi.
The climate at the islands was generally excellent. Throughout the whole
period April to November it was never too hot to work ashore, and there was
nearly always a breeze to keep the ships cool. The wind was the chief worry ;
it was treacherous and liable to blow up very quickly without warning, and the
southerly blows raised a heavy top in the lagoon which made boat work difficult.
The heavy ship anchorage was exposed to winds from north-east ta south-west,
easterly winds in particular producing a troublesome swell which sometimes
made boatwork difficult or impossible for several days a t a time. The Monte
Bello Islands provided an excellent school for seamanship in boats and minor
landing craft, and the Royal Marine crews of the latter soon became very
skilful .
To return now to the United Kingdom and the remaining ships of the
expedition. H.M.S. Plym, a river-class frigate, was taken in hand at Chatham
for conversion for the special role of weapon ship, which involved very large
alterations to accommodate special equipment. After completion in February,
1952, she carried out a big programme of trials for the Ministry of Supply,
which in the event took considerably longer than had been expected, before
returning to the dockyard for the inevitable last minute alteration. H.M.S.
Tracker (L.S.T. (3) ) had to be equipped for the special role of radiological safety
vessel, which was done at a civil yard on the Clyde. I t involved the building
into the tank deck of compartments to contain the clothing and equipment of
the radiological survey parties, dressing rooms and decontamination arrangements for men and equipment, the installation of telemetry and radiological
countering equipment, and workshops for the servicing and storage of the
special instruments. To drive all this, additional generators had to be installed ;
they also went into the tank deck, but even so there was still room for between
four and five hundred tons of Ministry of Supply stores and equipment of all
kinds. Like Zeebrugge, Tracker also carried five L.C.A.S., two a t davits and
three on deck.
Lastly there was the base ship. Plans for the conversion of H.M.S.
Campania were complete when she was received back from the clutches of the
Festival of Britain in early October and taken in hand by Carnmell Laird's a t
Birkenhead. The requirements for her were considerable. Accommodation was
required for up to 200 Ministry of Supply staff. In the event the maximum
number turned out to be about 180, and this number was only embarked for
about eight weeks. To provide this accommodation the wardroom and cabin
capacity had to be doubled. Storage space was required for some 180 tons of
cased and miscellaneous scientific stores, a proportion of which were " wanted
on voyage " so that work could continue on apparatus during passage to the
trial site ; a large workshop or laboratory, as the scientists preferred to call it,
had also to be provided, while stowage and servicing facilities were needed for
very large numbers of batteries. Eight 35-foot motor pinnaces had to be added
to the ship's complement of boats ; these were carried on trolleys on the flight
282
THE TEST OF THE FIRST BRITISH ATOMIC WEAPON I N
OCTOBER, 1952.
deck and handled by crane. The space required for the additional accommodation was found by building a false deck into the after half of the hangar, on
which the scientific stores were carried, and the accommodation built beneath.
Additional distillers were placed in the lift well, limiting the travel of the lift.
These two alterations involved the abandonment of the hangar for stowage
of aircraft, and the three helicopters and two Sea Otters were stowed and
maintained on the flight deck, the remaining half of the hangar providing a
most valuable space for church, cinema and recreation of all kinds. The fore
end of the flight deck was kept clear as a helicopter landing space, and was in
great demand as a deck hockey field.
By the end of April all three ships of the main force were at Chatham, and
during May stores were embarked and many last minute alterations made by
the dockyard. The delay in completion of Plym's trials had the unfortunate
effect of correspondingly delaying the packing and delivery of the scientific
stores which were still arriving a fortnight after the date when all should have
been delivered. Previously prepared stowage plans were thus rendered nugatory
and orderly stowage impossible, with the result that the whole of the scientific
stores embarked in Cam+ania had subsequently to be sorted and re-stowed
during the passage out.
On the 14th of May, the Naval Commander hoisted his flag in H.M.S.
Cam$ania a t Chatham, with the title Flag Officer, Special Squadron. On the
same day a further Government announcement was made, disclosing the site
of the trial, naming the Naval Commander and stating that the scientific
direction would be under the charge of Dr. Penney. H.M.S. Tracker loaded to
capacity, sailed for Fremantle on the 5th of June, proceeding via Suez and
Colombo. H.M.S. Campania flying the flag of Flag Officer Special Squadron
called a t Portsmouth to embark her aircraft, the final consignment of scientific
stores and some eighty-five Ministry of Supply personnel, and sailed on the
10th of June. H.M.S. Plym, who had proceeded independently owing to fog
in the Channel, was picked up off Finisterre and the two ships proceeded in
company to Gibraltar.
For security reasons it had been decided that Cam$ania and Plym should
be routed via the Cape. From Gibraltar the two ships sailed for Simonstown,
calling at Freetown for a few hours to fuel Plym. This portion of an uneventful
passage was enlivened by the customary " crossing the Line " ceremonies, the
vast majority of the ships' companies as well as the Ministry of Supply staff
being presented to Their Oceanic Majesties for the first time. A five day call at
Simonstown and three days at Port Louis, Mauritius, for fuel and recreation
provided welcome breaks in the long voyage, the Squadron being hospitably
entertained at both places. Fremantle was reached on the 31st of July, Tracker
having arrived the previous day after a rather stormy passage. Captain L.S.4
and the C.R.E. had flown to Fremantle to meet Flag Officer Special Squadron,
and were able to report that progress with the preliminary works was up to
programme, and that with minor exceptions all would be ready by the time
he reached the islands.
Opportunity was taken while a t Fremantle to hold conferences with a
number of Australian authorities involved in the operation, and perhaps this
is the right place to say something about Australian co-operation in the test.
The Australian contribution was no mean one. Mention has already been
made of the R.A.A.F. Construction Corps party in the islands, and of the
transit camp set up by the Army at Onslow. The Army also provided security
personnel and loaned camp equipment. The R.A.A.F. organized their air
transport service taking mails and perishable fresh provisions to Onslow,
provided aircraft for security patrols during the installation phase, and undertook important air commitments in connection with the trial itself. A special
meteorological station was set up on the mainland and facilities a t other stations
strengthened, special communication and cryptographic facilities were provided,
and two civilian meteorological forecasters were lent to Campania. But by far
the biggest single burden was shouldered by the Royal Australian Navy. I n
addition to the tender and auxiliaries already mentioned, H.M.A.S. Hawkesbury
was attached to the force as guardship from the commencement of the installation phase until the end of the operation, afterwards remaining in the islands
for security duties for a further period ; she performed much useful work in
addition to her guardship and patrol duties. Another frigate acted as special
meteorological observation ship for a period of about a fortnight at the time
of the test. Mention has been made of the hydrographic survey of the islands ;
in addition, all the navigational buoys and marks, and all the moorings required
by the Special Squadron were provided and laid by the R.A.N., with the single
exception of Campania's first class mooring which was supplied from U.K.
resources and laid by H.M.A.S. Karangi assisted by H.M.A.S. Koala. Australia
bore the whole cost of the logistics required by the expedition while in Australian
waters, and the State Shipping Line brought fresh provisions at roughly ten day
intervals direct to the islands. A special pipeline was laid on the mainland to
afford an auxiliary water supply in case of need, the islands themselves being
waterless. Lastly, the Australian Fleet came specially to the area to provide
air and sea patrols over the actual period of the test. In sum, all this amounted
to a very massive contribution, and presented an enormous saving on the
resources which would have been needed had all these services been provided
by the United Kingdom.
Flag Officer Special Squadron sailed from Fremantle in Campania with
Plym in company on the 5th of August, H.M.A.S. Hawkesbury had joined his
flag at Fremantle, and she and Tracker had been sailed independently the
previous day. Arrival at the islands on the 8th of August was timed for high
water so that Tracker and PZym could enter the lagoon at once. The Special
Squadron, or Task Force Four as it was known for communication purposes
was thus assembled for the first time, at the very day and hour planned over a
year previously.
Four days of exceptionally fine weather followed, during which nearly the
whole of the scientific stores and apparatus brought out in Campania was
landed and a good start made with unloading Tracker. Four days of bad
weather followed, a strong easterly wind raising a sea and swell in Parting Pool
which brought all boat traffic to a standstill, although for most of this time
unloading could still proceed inside the lagoon. A limited number of Ministry
of Supply personnel were landed by helicopter to superintend the dispersal and
unpacking of stores, but these four days were a frustrating period. As soon as
the weather improved, steps were taken to establish two shore camps for
Ministry of Supply personnel, using the large Nissen huts which had been
provided as lunch messes and the adjacent tented camps which had been set
up for emergency use. The sappers quickly improvised additional cooking and
fresh water supplies, salt-water washing facilities, etc., and these camps were
used throughout the remaining seven weeks of the installation period, run by
Campania as off-shoots of the Wardroom Mess. The scientific staff returned to
Campania for week-ends, to enjoy fresh water baths and softer living.
A large contingent of scientific staff arrived from the United Kingdom by
air on the 11th of August, travelling from Onslow in H.M.A.S. Hawkesbury, and
another large party arrived about a month later, completing the Ministry of
Supply team. Installation proceeded very rapidly ; there was little bad weather,
though conditions were often such as to hamper boat work in Campania's
anchorage. Surprisingly little damage had occurred to even the most complicated of the scientific apparatus in transit. The dry climate enormously
facilitated the work of erection and maintenance ; there was little dew, and
apparatus could be left in the open and unguarded with the certainty that it
would not be interfered with or damaged by rain or damp.
The servicing of the apparatus, and particularly of the vast number of
batteries which in addition to over twenty diesel and petrol generators were
needed to drive the mass of electrical apparatus strewn about the islands,
necessitated a complicated boat routine, and in general the large number of
boats and landing craft ran to capacity. All were fitted with radio, and
controlled on a special boat wave. This organization worked very well indeed,
the coxswains who had been trained on passage, soon becoming proficient at
using the radio. Each boat reported its arrival a t and departure from its
destination as a matter of routine, and boats could be recalled or diverted at
will, thus greatly facilitating their economical use.
Opportunity, and indeed demand, for recreation was not very great. The
long boat trips-about five miles-from Cam.ania to the canteen on Hermite,
combined with the early tropical sunset, meant that this amenity was little
used except at week-ends. A wired bathing beach on South-East Island, about
a mile from the ship, was popular, and a small beer bar was set up there. As
mentioned previously, sea fishing was excellent and large numbers of fish,
including some sharks, were caught from the ship. Trolling from boats or
landing craft was, however, a more rewarding method. By far the most popular
diversion, however, was the " pictures." All ships were equipped with 16 mm.
projectors, Campania having the very newest type ; a large number of programmes were brought out in the Squadron and more were flown out as required,
the " used " programmes being dispatched to the Far East Fleet. Campania
ran three programmes a week. Arrangements had also been made for a limited
number of U.K. Sunday papers ordered by ships to be flown out free of charge.
A great deal of work was done on the natural history of the islands.
Previous work in the Monte Bellos had been scanty, and scientific bodies were
concerned lest the activities of the expedition should destroy rare species and
natural life which might be peculiar to these isolated islands. Collecting teams
were organized by the Principal Medical Officer and very large quantities of
specimens were collected and preserved, besides some lizards which eventually
reached the London Zoological Gardens alive.
By the third week in September installation was complete and on the
19th a full scale rehearsal of the test took place, all ships proceeding to sea and
almost every detail of the procedure being exercised. Two days later Dr.
Penney arrived, bringing with him three fellow scientists, two Australians and
one Canadian. At about this time, too, a tanker arrived to fuel the L.S.T.s
and we were fortunate in experiencing two days of absolutely calm weather
enabling fuelling to be carried out a t anchor in the open sea outside Parting Pool.
On the 27th of September the Australian Fleet which had been cruising
to Manus and Darwin, closed the island from the northward, with some difficulty
owing to the presence of uncharted shoals. Flag Officer Special Squadron called
on Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet by helicopter and mails were
collected, after which the fleet hauled off to replenish and commence a pre-
viously agreed system of air and sea patrols which were continued until the
test had taken place.
By the end of September the last of the installation work and the alterations made as a result of the rehearsal had been completed and on the 1st of
October the stand-by period commenced. For safety and other reasons a very
particular set of meteorological conditions were necessary for the test, and the
right combination could only be expected to occur on about three days during
October. As the whole day previous to the test was required for bringing all
the recording apparatus to a state of readiness, the right conditions had to be
forecastable at least 36 hours in advance ; experience a t Monte Bello soon
revealed that this would be very difficult. I t was therefore expected that the
stand-by period might be a long one, a possibility which was viewed by the
scientists with considerable alarm. However, fortune favoured the expedition,
for after only one day in the stand-by state a suitable condition was forecast
and the elaborate routine of preparation of apparatus, evacuations and redisposition of personnel, withdrawal of ships, landing craft and boats, and the
final preparation of the weapon was commenced. In spite of strong winds
during D-1 day and the succeeding night, all went well and the meteorological
conditions remained favourable. With a few minor exceptions the planned
procedure was completed successfully, and the last small party left the Plym
a t about 0630 hrs. The final decision to carry out the test was taken after the
wind structure had been checked by balloon ascent an hour later, and soon
after 0900 hrs. the firing sequence-the automatic arrangement for starting all
the recording apparatus, culminating in the triggering of the ultra high speed
At about
cameras only 0.2 seconds before the explosion itself-commenced.
0930 hrs. spectators turned their backs to the islands, and a few seconds later
turned about to view the sight which has been illustrated in so many press
photographs. The noise of the explosion was much less than would be expected, and sharp, rather like a small gun ; there were two distinct reports.
The requirements of security forbid any detailed account of the re-entry
into the islands for the purpose of recovering records and material. Suffice to
say that, apart from special measures taken to obtain the most important and
perishable records, the general method was to send in land and water survey
teams with instruments and thus to map the area of contamination. Once
this had been done, " clean " and " dirty " areas could be delineated. Recovery
from the former then proceeded by normal methods, while from the latter it
was carefully planned and executed deliberately so as to avoid danger to
personnel.
The arrangements for health control in H.M.S. TracEer worked admirably,
but her capacity for handling personnel constituted the limiting factor throughout the recovery operations. " Dirty " boats, too, were a special problem, for
once contaminated they could not return to their parent ships. Arrangements
had been made to move them out, but there was no sheltered water within a
reasonable distance, and several craft were lost or damaged through breaking
adrift or swamping at moorings.
Great care was taken to avoid all risk of ships becoming seriously contaminated, and re-entry into the lagoon proper was not attempted by anything
larger than a minor landing craft. Ships were able to return permanently to
the outer anchorage in Parting Pool on the 22nd of October, nineteen days
after the testing. The last week was spent in back-loading stores and plant and
decontaminating small craft.
The Special Squadron finally withdrew from the islands on the 31st of
October, exactly four weeks after the test and six months after the arrival of
the first two ships, leaving a guardship to protect the site from possible snoopers
for a further period. All ships proceeded to Fremantle to give leave and replenish for the voyage home. Dr. Penney and a small party of Ministry of
Supply staff had returned to United Kingdom direct from Onslow shortly after
the test ; of the remainder, the vast majority flew home from Fremantle, leaving
a small contingent to make the passage by sea.
The Squadron received much hospitality from Fremantle and Perth. The
Admiral, accompanied by naval and scientific staff officers, had the honour of
being entertained to lunch by the Government of Western Australia at Parliament House, Perth. This party took place on Melbourne Cup Day, and the
race was broadcast during luncheon, the excellence of which did something to
console those present for an almost universal failure to pick the winner. A big
farewell cocktail party was given onboard Campania, and the Admiral paid a
flying visit to Melbourne and Canberra to tender thanks to the Defence Committee and the Commonwealth Government for the great assistance given to
the expedition.
The return voyage was uneventful. All ships returned via Suez, H.M.S.
Campania proceeding direct to Aden and arriving at Chatham, after a call at
Portsmouth, in good time for Christmas. The Fourth Landing Ship Squadron
arrived in mid-January and on the 27th the Flag Officer, Special Squadron
struck his flag and the operation was over.
Although, naturally enough, some mistakes were made both in planning
and execution, in the main it is fair to claim that this quite complicated enterprise, in which so many diverse authorities and organizations were involved,
went off without a serious hitch of any kind. With so many unknowns and
imponderables this was an achievement of which all concerned have a right
to be proud ; the secret of success lay in the careful planning and excellent
staff work of a first-class team, and the high morale which, springing from a sense
of the special nature and importance of the operation, was maintained throughout and enabled all who took part, scientist, technician and service man alike,
to give of their best. So far as the Services were concerned, the operation
afforded excellent and varied training, and not least among the benefits was
the experience gained at all levels of working closely with one another and with
the civilian scientists and technicians in the field. As between the Services and
the civilian scientific staff, contacts made and familiarity gained of each other's
ideas and way of life cannot fail to be of lasting benefit.
A. D. T.
THE FOUR DAYS FIGHT AND ST. JAMES'
DAY FIGHTS.
(The l s t 4 t h June and the 25th July, 1666.)
INthese two great battles, virtually one with an interval for refit, our forefathers hammered out both the way to fight a t sea and the instrument with
which to do it-the engagement broadside to broadside on the same course, and
the Ship of the Line. On tbe 10th of June, Pierce, the surgeon, told Pepys
" that the Duke of Albemarle is as high almost as ever, and pleases himself
t o think that he hath given the Dutch their bellies full, without sense of what
he hath lost us ; and talks how he knows the way now to beat them." What
Albemarle had found out was how to make the best use of the heavy gun. In
the Four Days Fight, the fleets engaged, for the most part, by " passing " on
opposite courses a t a range of 200 yards or more. There were a t least 10 such
passes, each taking about 3 hours ; the English ships carried 40 rounds per
gun and no ship had less than 10 remaining ; this gives an average expenditure
of 3 rounds per gun per " pass " or, overall, about one round per gun per hour.
In the St. James' Day Fight fought on parallel courses a t about 50 yards or less
the action was decided in about four hours : " It's thought," says the journal
of Vice-Admiral Jordan, " never more guns discharged in so short a time."
I have relied almost entirely upon journals, reports and letters written
immediately after the events they describe.l Accounts compiled a t a later date
though often illuminating are generally coloured by the wish to defend some
act or to bring home some lesson. De Guiche, the French observer attached
to de Ruyter, was there for the purpose of telling the budding French Navy how
he thought they ought to fight, not t o tell students of history what really
happened. His accounts are difficult to reconcile with others, but his opinions
are full of interest. Perhaps he anticipated Pooh-Bah's advice : " with a
wealth of corroborative detail to add an air of artistic verisimilitude to an
otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative." But I suspect the truth to be
that he wrote or rewrote his memoirs, printed in 1744, after he got to know the
views of Tourville and Hoste, and half-unconsciously put in what backed them
UP.
When France and Denmark declared war against England on the 16th of
January, 1666, it was naturally expected that the Toulon Fleet of some 20 sail
would try to join the Dutch for the summer campaign, picking up the Brest
ships on the way north. No sooner had the joint commanders, Prince Rupert
and the Duke of Albemarle, hoisted their flag a t the Nore where the fleet was
assembling, on the 28th of April, than the idea was set afloat, apparently by
Sir Edward Spragge, that the French fleet was about to concentrate a t Belleisle,
and that there would be time to deal with it there before the Dutch fleet was
ready for sea. There was " Intelligence from Holland," never verified by
1 Authorities-See
Article, " Sandwich and the Ship of the Line ", in THE NAVAL
REVIEW,May, 1953. There are two descriptions from the English side, the " Account "
and the " Narrative" : both unsigned but apparently semi-official, and both in Dr.
Colenbrander's Dutch volume.
reconnaissance and perhaps deliberately put about, that the Dutch fleet would
not be ready for sea for six weeks ; and there is a story that the Elizabeth,
Captain Talbott, escorting trade towards Gibraltar, sighted a Spanish squadron
off Lisbon, took it for the French and " flew homewards top and topgallant "
with this false news.
On the 11th of May the Admirals sent Sir Edward Spragge up to Lord
Arlington, the Secretary of State, submitting that if the King wished an attempt
made on the French fleet " it will do well to do it speedily." On the 13th of May
Arlington told the Council that " the Dutch were not yet well manned " and
that the Duc de Beaufort, who commanded the Toulon fleet, had already sailed
from Brest. Both statements were wrong. As the King, with his usual sense of
reality, would take no resolution until he knew the Admirals' opinion, Sir George
Carteret and Sir William Coventry were sent down to the Fleet. Reaching the
Royal Charles on the afternoon of the 14th of May, they found Albemarle alone,
as Rupert had gone ashore " to divert himself in shooting." (What game can he
have found on the Isle of Grain in May ? Hares, perhaps.) Albemarle liked
the idea and said, " Leave us 60 sail and we shall do well enough." He agreed
that 20 out of the 80 a t the Nore should go. When Rupert came on board, he
asked for the better sailers, and said that the King had already promised him
the command, probably when in the Charles on the 4th of May. Thus Rupert
had started this hare without his colleague's knowledge, a week before the joint
official letter wassent up by Spragge. He was strongly in favour of the proposal; in
his statement to the House of Commons on the 31st of October, 1667, he said :
" We concluded that there could be no probable danger from the enemy in case
they should come out, because the same wind which would bring them into the
Channel would serve to bring down our fleet to a conjunction with the squadron
under my command." Albemarle in a similar statement said that he was
surprised by the proposal and if it was resolved in London to send Rupert
away, he would not be able to engage the Dutch until " recruited." The
Admirals also recommended that the whole fleet should proceed to the Downs
and if Rupert's squadron was detached, to proceed t o the Gunfleet and there
await reinforcement from the ships in the River. The Council may haye
thought that in combining the boldness of Rupert with the prudence of
Albemarle they had given the Fleet the ideal commander-in-chief who would
command the confidence of both courtiers and tarpaulins ; the King may have
thought that by confining rivalry to the Great Cabin of the Charles he would
spare himself the need to deal with a new intrigue like that which had driven his
brother and Lord Sandwich from command afloat ; but it seems that Rupert
was anxious to get away by himself and Albemarle was not sorry to see him go.
" Two minds with but a single thought."
On the 17th of May Coventry wrote that the King had approved the
Admirals' proposals, adding that on the 14th of May 18 Dutch ships had left the
Wielings for the Texel ; on the 23rd of May the Fleet left the Nore and on the
27th anchored in the Downs. On arrival the Admirals received letters dated
the 24th of May, one directing Rupert to sail for Belleisle and seek the French
fleet ; the other, a warning from Arlington that the Dutch fleet " would be
suddenly out." Acknowledging this letter, Albemarle asked for the ships in the
River t o be hastened out t o him, as he would have but 56. " If we could make
up to 70 sail, I should be very confident to meet the Dutch anywhere, and on the
other side I should be loath to retreat from them, because it goes against my
stomach to do it." This last sentence goes far to explain his subsequent
decision to fight.
THE FOUR DAYS FIGHT AND ST. JAMES' DAY FIGHTS.
289
On the 29th of May Rupert sailed ; he prudently arranged to call off
Portsmouth, Portland and Plymouth for letters.
That same day Albemarle learnt that the Dutch fleet was leaving its ports.
Next day, the 30th of May, the Kent broughtin a report from a Swedish ship that
75 sail had left the Texel on the 21st of May, picked up 18 more from Zeeland,
and were standing to the NW. Albemarle sent the news to Coventry that night,
repeating his request for ships, but took no steps to recall Rupert. The King,
however, lost no time. He got the news on the evening of the 30th of May,
called a Council, and sent off orders to Rupert to return to the Downs or, not
finding there the fleet, to the Gunfleet. Rupert received the order by ketch on
anchoring a t St. Helens a t 10 a.m. on the 1st of June, and sailed again a t
4 p.m. with a strong west wind and the tide behind him. He was too late.
This miscarriage was mainly due to Arlington's misplaced confidence in
" intelligence " from abroad, never verified by adequate reconnaissance.
The
proposal put forward by Spragge and backed by Rupert would not have been an
unreasonable one, had the information on which it was based been correct ; in
fact, the Toulon fleet had only reached Lisbon, after a slow passage, on the
30th of May. Louis, in fear of Beaufort being attacked before he could join the
Dutch, had ordered him to await orders there. The Brest ships, under orders
to take the new Queen to Portugal, were still at Rochelle. The Dutch fleet,
organized for battle, had put to sea on the 27th of May. Only the King comes
clear ; evidently doubting the wisdom of the scheme, he gave Albemarle a
chance to reconsider it, and, when disaster was in sight, he it was who took
immediate action. Had Albemarle stood firm, the King and Council would
surely have supported him. Though he tried to pass it off on to the Council, the
main responsibility is his. " I t is not unlike," says a contemporary critic,
" he was greedy to engross all the glory of beating the Dutch to himself."
Albemarle left the Downs on the afternoon of the 31st of May, the wind
then North, with the intention of proceeding to the Swin (instead of to the
Gunfleet where an east wind might have held the fleet subject to surprise
attack by fireship) ; thence, after receiving reinforcements, to Sole Bay. While
under way he received a letter from the Duke of York informing him that
Rupert had been recalled and that " by Saturday or Sunday, if the wind favours,
the Sovereign and five or six ships shall sail towards you ". At 10 p.m., in a
fresh SW gale, the fleet anchored a t the back of the Goodwins. At 3 a.m. on
the 1st of June Albemarle weighed and stood to the northward. At 6, being then
18 miles NE by N from the North Foreland, the Bristol, 6 miles NE, reported
the enemy in sight. They were a t anchor, about 28 miles ENE from the North
Foreland. At 7 the Admiral called his flag-officers to council. He had 54 ships
with him and one scouting towards Dunkirk ; the Dutch had over 80. " Considering the condition I was in (most part of the soldiers and sailors being gone
with the Prince and that those with me were heavy ships and many of them
merchantmen and Dutch prizes) I thought it fit to advise if we might get into
the river without fighting, and in order thereto I called together all the flagofficers and captains on board, who after some consideration agreed that in
regard most of our ships were heavy we could not avoid fighting, and thereupon
it was resolved to fall upon them as they lay a t anchor." Jordan's Journal
says : " For that the General (and the rest) thought it not convenient, safe nor
honourable to decline the Battell (though much inferior in number and strength)
lest it might take off the resolution and courage the Seamen then were in, which
to have fled before the enemy might have abated their vigour." This journal,
probably written up a t the time, is likely to present a more faithful picture than
statements made after the battle had been fought and lost and controversy had
begun. Pepys and Penn were prejudiced, for Pepys' patron Sandwich, and
Penn himself, had been ousted from command afloat by Albemarle's political
supporters. Penn told Pepys on the 4th of July, that two-thirds of the
commanders " durst not oppose it at the Council of War, for fear of being called
cowards " ; Harman, who had fought most gallantly, told Pepys on the 11th of
June that " it was against his reason to begin the fight then, and the reasons of
most of the sober men there, the wind being such, and we to windward, that
they could not use their lower tier of guns." The " Notes " by the unknown
critic already quoted, written a few years later, repeat Harman's point and
add : " He did questionless expect, that all his captains would fight with as
much resolution as he did ; but I am sure he was mistaken, for some of the
captains had their tampions in the guns the next morning. There was a want
of courage in some, and of conduct in others, during all the first day's engagement . . . If the General had had the patience to come to an anchor on Friday,
as divers advised him and an easy gale, he might in all probability have beaten
the Dutch, or at least made good his ground without any other aid or assistance."
For Albemarle, brought up in the traditions of the Grenvilles, the true
reason for fighting was the one he had given to Arlington on the 28th of May :
" I should be loath to retreat from them, because it goes against my stomach
to do it."
The last word on this subject, I think, should be the sentiment which
Nelson told Cornwallis he had imbibed from him : " it was always to err on the
right side to fight."
Contrary winds and calm had prevented the units of the Dutch fleet from
uniting until the 27th of May, when de Ruyter put them into three squadrons :
the ships of Zeeland and Friesland under Cornelis Evertsen in the van or right
wing ; those of the Maas and North Holland in the centre, under his own command ; those of Amsterdam in the rear or left wing, under Cornelis Tromp. He
had 84 ships, 9 fireships, 20 galiots and some advice boats. On the 29th of May
he learnt from a foreign galiot that the English fleet of 70 sail was in the Downs.
Foul winds delayed him reaching the Maas till the 30th of May ; on the 31st,
the wind becoming more favourable, he set course WSW for the Channel.
About 7 or 8 at night it began to blow hard from the SW, obliging the fleet to
heave to, and about 6 a.m. on the 1st of June de Ruyter anchored 28 miles
ENE from the North Foreland. The fleet had apparently been in order of
sailing on a course of about WNW, for Tromp with the left wing or rear was
anchored about SSW and to windward of the centre, and Evertsen about NNE
and to leeward of it.
At 9 a.m. the scouts reported the English fleet in sight to the NW. De
Ruyter ordered Evertsen on no account to leave his station, and directed
Tromp to await the enemy and to commence the action as soon as they came
within gunshot, holding the attack and standing on under easy sail until the
other two squadrons had worked to windward. At 11, preparations for battle
having been completed, the enemy was seen approaching with all sail set.
Neither the Orders of Battle nor the exact composition of the two fleets are
available, but a rough comparison can be made. Not only were the enemy
superior in numbers, but in accordance with our usual custom, we had allowed
him to get well ahead of us in new construction. Since 1660 the Dutch had
built 42 ships of 60 guns or more ; we had built 7 and rebuilt 2.
The exact composition of the fleets and squadron is uncertain but was
approximately as follows :
Rate.
Albemarle
Rupert .
De Ruyter
......
........
......
1st
2
1
3
2nd
10
1
10
3rd
13
6
17
4th
29
12
39
5th
-
15
Total
54
20
84
F.S.
(4)
(4)
(9)
Rupert had the best sailers, built during the First Dutch War ; of
Albemarle's fleet, four 3rd-rate and fourteen 4th-rate had been taken from the
Dutch, and four were hired merchant-ships-only 32 out of his 54 were built by
us for war, and many of these were old and heavy sailers of deep draught. One
of the oldest was the Prince Royal, built in 1610 by Phineas Pett for James I,
and rebuilt in 1641 and again in 1663. Probably little of the original ship
remained but the name and the guns, which still bore the cipher of Elizabeth.
As the Resolution, she wore Blake's flag a t the Battle of Portland in 1653 ; as
the Prince, that of Sandwich a t the Battle of Lowestoft in 1665. She was very
stoutly built, but a heavy sailer, due to the deep draught which was to cause
her end.
As the English ships, though old, are said to have carried more men and
guns than their establishment, there was probably little difference in the weight
of metal carried by English and Dutch ships of similar size. The lst, 2nd and
later 3rd-rate ships carried 32-prs. on the lower deck, with a few 42-prs. in the
1st-rates ; the earlier 3rd- and larger 4th-rates, 24-prs. ; the remainder 12-prs.
The 12-pr. had a greater range and accuracy than the heavier shorter guns.
On the first day of the Four Days Fight, heavy weather prevented the English,
who were to windward, from using the lower tier.
The advantages of the new ships probably lay mainly in better sailing
qualities and better facilities for serving and loading the guns, rather than in
weight of broadside. I t is worthy of notice, too, that on the 4th of July Pepq's
records that the King and Council resolved that the ten new ships to be built
were " none to be under third-rate."
The English fleet was organized as usual in three squadrons and nine
divisions, but the post of Admiral of the Blue had been kept open for Sir Jeremy
Smith, who had been away up the Straits and had not yet joined. If the Order
of Battle was on the same lines as that of 1665, the position in line of the
Flag-officers was as follows :
In the van, the White-Sir William Berkeley, Vice-Admiral, in the
Swiftsure, a t the head of the line, with one of his seconds ahead of him : Sir
George Ayscough, Admiral, in the Royal Prince, a t the centre : John Harman,
Rear-Admiral, in the Hen1.y a t the rear, with one of his seconds astern of him.
In the centre, the Red-Sir Joseph Jordan, Vice-Admiral, in the Royal Oak,
at the head ; the Duke of Albemarle, with Sir John Kempthorne captain under
him, in the Royal Charles, in the centre : Sir Robert Holmes, Rear-Admiral, in
the Defiance, at the rear.
In the rear, the Blue, perhaps in two divisions only-Richard Utber,
Rear-Admiral, in the Rupert, a t the head : Sir Thomas Teddeman, Vice-Admiral,
in the Royal Katherine, a t the rear.
In Rupert's squadron, which had been drawn equally from all three
squadrons, the Union Flag was worn-Sir Christopher Myngs, Vice-Admiral,
in the Victory, at the head : Prince Rupert, with Sir Thomas Allin, Vice-
Admiral of the White, as a kind of First Captain, in the Royal James, in the
centre : Sir Edward Spragge, Rear-Admiral, in the Dreadnought, at the rear.
The position of the 16 Flag-officers in the Dutch fleet is not known with
certainty ; as already stated, Cornelis Evertsen, Lieut.-Admiral, commanded
the van ; de Ruyter, Lieut.-Admiral, in the Seven Provinces, the centre ; and
Cornelis Tromp, Lieut.-Admiral, the rear. Owing to the position in which the
fleet had anchored, the rear became the van.
The wind was SW or SW by W, strong, with a heavy sea. At 11Albemarle
made the signal to draw into a line of battle. De Guiche, in one of de Ruyter's
seconds, says that " differences in sailing and the strength of the wind had
extended the length of their line, and when the head of it was closing us, we
could hardly see the rear." Nevertheless, at 12, being 49 miles in the wind of
the Dutch, our fleet, except some of the White squadron, bore down on the
enemy with the wind astern. Owing to the Prince Royal being a heavy sailer,
it is probable that Ayscough and his division were far astern of station ;
there were only 34 or 35 ships in the line. De Guiche thought that if the Duke
had waited for his rearmost ships to come up, he could have engaged part of
the Dutch fleet or forced it to retire'in disorder and reform ; he attributes the
mistake to the Duke's disdain of us and his haste to fight." The lesson was
not forgotten.
When the English fleet bore up, Tromp cut his cables, set his sails, hauled
his wind on the starboard tack and a t about 1.30 p.m., opened fire. On
reaching close range, the English also hauled their wind on the starboard tack
and stood to the southward. The centre and van of the Dutch fleet also cut
their cables and made sail, but they were outside effective range, and the
weight of the attack fell on Tromp. He however had 28 ships in his squadron,
and Albemarle had no more than 35-a year later he called it 25. Tromp,
in spite of his orders, hugged the wind, which enabled him to close the range,
but must have delayed the centre and the van in bringing him support ; de
Ruyter with part of his squadron managed to get up during the afternoon.
Berkeley passed within musket-shot of Tromp, became closely engaged with
two of his squadron, and had his mainsail shot to pieces. He had come under
some imputation of cowardice a t the Battle of Lowestoft the year before ;
" the disgrace lay like a load upon his mind, and his valour, or his rage,
engaged him so far among the enemy, that neither his discretion nor his friends,
knew how to bring him off." Jordan was standing on with the leading division
of the Red to assist him, when he observed that Albemarle's ship was so much
disabled that she had tacked to the northward and anchored to make repairs, and
that Holmes, his Rear-Admiral, in the same condition, had anchored close by him.
Jordan therefore tacked to the northward to support his Admiral, and the
remains of the White squadron were left without support. The Swiftsure
and her two seconds-the Sevenoaks, a prize from the Dutch, and a hired
merchant ship-wererun aboard by some of Tromp's ships, and taken. Berkeley
fought gallantly to the last ; after the battle, the Dutch as a mark of respect,
sent his body to King Charles.
At 8 p.m. Albemarle cut and cast to the northward, then tacked to the
southward aild passed again through the body of the Dutch fleet. About 9 he
tacked to the northward. But in so doing he let the Dutch get the wind and
Evertsen's squadron a t last got into action.
Harman, Rear-Admiral of the White, had meanwhile been attacked by
three fireships sent in by de Ruyter ; with great skill and courage he got himself
"
clear, extinguished the flames and escaped to the eastward and so to Harwich.
His last shot killed Admiral Evertsen. His second the Rainbow could neither
stay nor bear up when the English fleet tacked to the northward, so she stood
on to the southward, anchored off the Spanish port of Ostend till morning, and
made her way back to the North Foreland.
About 10 p.m. the Dutch tacked to the southward and the fleets separated
for the night. Three English ships had been taken, and two had had to run
for port, all from the White squadron ; two Dutch ships had caught fire and
burnt, one from the centre and one from the van-the former being that in
which de Guiche was accommodated ; Tromp and van Nes his Vice-Admiral had
t o shift flag and send their ships into harbour.
De Guiche and the Prince of Monaco, who was with him, were saved with
difficulty by de Ruyter's brother-in-law, who sent him down to serve a gun.
He got on deck in time to see Albemarle " pass proudly a t the head of his line
across the squadron of Zeeland and North Holland."
Albemarle's bold attempt to exploit what looked like a wonderful opportunity for snatching victory from a superior opponent failed. Many a theory has
been put forward and many a plan devised, on the assumption that the enemy
will stay where he is or will do what his opponent wants. In this case, the
Dutch were remarkably quick off the mark ; if Tromp had obeyed de Ruyter's
instructions to hold the attack under easy sail instead of hugging the wind, we
might have suffered more severely. Our failure was largely Albemarle's own
doing. To hint cowardice is more likely to produce precipitate actions like
Berkeley's, than to engender that mutual confidence which gives cohesion to a
fleet, and which Nelson took such pains to foster. Further, Albemarle's hasty
launching of the attack while his fleet was still strung out and his leading
squadron only up to half its strength made mutual support unduly difficult,
even if the courage and conduct of all his captains had been beyond reproach.
This was probably in Penn's mind when he said to Pepys on the 4th of July ;
" We must fight in a line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter and
demonstrable ruin : the Dutch fighting otherwise ; and we whenever we beat
them. We must not desert ships of our own in distress, for that makes a captain
desperate, and he will fling away his ship, when there are no hopes left him of
succour." The Duke never made this mistake again.
The Fleet had suffered a disappointing reverse, but nothing had happened
to quench its spirit, and the night was spent preparing to renew the battle next
day.
During the night the two fleets lay by the wind refitting, and a t daylight
of the 2nd of June, their relative positions were little changed. The wind was
light and variable, from the SW quarter-west a t first, backing to the southward towards evening. De Guiche, now with de Ruyter, observes that as the
weather was calm, fire was accurate ;but the risks attendant on closing, and the
need to watch the wind, " inclined one to keep a t a respectful distance."
At 2 a.m. the English tacked to the south-eastward ; a t 3 they discovered
the Dutch fleet on the lee bow and a t 5, 12 ships on the weather bow-perhaps
that part of Tromp's squadron which had taken the Swiftsure and her seconds
and chased the Rainbow into Ostend. The Dutch were about 80 strong, the
English only 44.
At 7 the English " plyed to windward to engage the enemy afresh " ; then,
having gained the wind of them " bore up round upon and stood to the westward "--that is, about NW. The Dutch tacked and stood to theSE. " The
English fleet," says de Guiche, " came back in admirable order ; it advanced
in line like an army, and when i t approached, deployed and turned to bring its
broadsides to bear." At 8, a furious fight began.
I t would have been difficult to deduce the manner of fighting from the
times and movements sparsely and vaguely recorded, but fortunately the
English " Account " gives a clear description of it.
" The manner of fighting a t that time was that each fleet lay in a line, and
when the ships of one fleet lay with their heads to the northward, the heads of
the other lay to the southward, the headmost ships of our fleet engaging first
the headrnost of theirs : so passing on by their fleet in a line, firing all the way,
and as soon as the rear of one fleet was clear from the rear of the other, then each
fleet tacked in the van, standing almost stem for stem with one another t o
engage again ; by which means there was a t least an hour's respite between each
encounter."
I t was almost the last time this method of " passing " was employed on
such a scale, except as an opening move. Being accepted practice, no one has
explained its point, and I must try to do it for them. I t enabled a small
4th-rate or a hired merchant-ship to use her guns and musketry without having
to withstand, for more than a few minutes, the full weight of a 1st-rate's
broadside. I t gave a damaged ship an interval to recover from a battering or
to refit. The freedom of movement gave opportunity to gain or keep the wind,
and offered less opening to attack by fireship or boarding.
On the other hand, as de Guiche says of the fourth day's fighting, " When
one passes from ship to ship stem to stem, the direction of movement separates
them quickly ; but when one engages broadside to broadside, one has the time
and the means to take fair aim."
At 10 the English tacked to the southward, the Dutch to the northward.
Towards the end of this pass Tromp, commanding the rear, seeing that the line
ahead of him was in some disorder and taking advantage of the greater length
of the Dutch line, luffed up and tried to gain the wind of the English van as it
came up. De Guiche says he tacked, but a short tack would gain him little
ground to windward. Some ten ships followed him, but he failed and, says
de Ruyter, " fell into the body of the enemy's fleet; where fighting was furious."
Thereupon the Admiral in the Dutch van, followed by his Vice-Admiral and
other ships, seeing Tromp cut off, bore away and ran to leeward. De Ruyter,
with a few ships from his own squadron and the van, " put as good a face on it
as he could," hoisted the signal for close action, and tacked back to Tromp's
help, saying to de Guiche, " he must go to help them, though they had shown
little sense or loyalty."
twelve o'clock," says the English " Account," " we thought
" About
we had routed the enemy ; but de Ruyter, with great courage and skill, got
them together again in good order." He extricated Tromp, reformed his line
on a southerly course, and passed to leeward of the English ; as he reached the
end of the English, his own flagship was disabled. Tromp's ships had suffered
severely ; one, the Lantman, was burnt by a fireship ; Vice-Admiral van der
Hulst was killed ; both flagships had such heavy casualties and so much
damage that they had to make for port. The English ships had suffered such
damage that they could not profit by their temporary advantage. About 2
the English fleet resumed its course to the north-westward, weathered the
Dutch and drew together. The Spread Black Eagle, a prize from the Dutch,
had sunk ; other ships, much disabled aloft, " stood for England without
acquainting the General." As soon as the rear was clear of the enemy, the
General called a council of Flag-officers and " perceiving there were but 34
ships left, it was resolved to continue on the course for England, and the Dutch
tacking only in the van as they used to do, by that means we got a t least a
league before them." There was " a fine gale " at WSW and SW.
The St Paul, another prize from the Dutch, having many feet of water in
her hold was burnt by the General's order to prevent her falling into the hands
of the enemy. The General put the ships in worst condition in the van, and
himself, with the best, brought up the rear. " At 7 at night," the " Narrative "
says, " they got our wake and by 9 came up with most of us, the wind favouring
them 2 or 3 points, so that they came upon us with a flown sheet. At night it
proved calm."
The Dutch followed the English all night and next day, Whitsunday the
3rd of June ; there was scarcely any wind and they made little headway. The
number of ships running into port alleging disablement gave the Duke of York
so much concern that he seat Penn down the River on the 4th of June with the
full authority of the Lord High Admiral to send out reinforcements, to send
maimed ships in for repair, to take men from them and from small ships, to
distribute the powder and shot sent by the Ordnance Board to the Rolling
Grounds off Harwich and " to do what you shall find best upon the place."
At 3 or 4 a.m. on the 3rd of June a small breeze sprang up at NE. At a
council of Flag-officers " the Lord General resolved to draw our fleet into a rear
line of battle and make a fair retreat of it." He placed 16 of the best ships in a
" line abreadth "-a
formation instituted by Sandwich in February 1665-with-the weak and disabled ships before them. The best sailers of the Dutch " came
first in parties, but finding it too hot service to attack him stayed for the rest
of their fleet." Jordan adds : " Some shot they spent (to little purpose) which
we slighted, our Stern pieces outreaching their broadsides, made divers of them
go off again. "
I t was about 2 when the leading Dutch came within shot. Just before
that time the topmast lookouts discovered a fleet of 20 sail standing towards
them. Judging them correctly to be Prince Rupert's fleet, Albemarle edged up
towards them on a course of W by S and WSW.
Rupert had reached Dover thk previous afternoon. Having received
a message from a ship of Newcastle which had seen the two fleets on the 1st of
June and " judged they might engage that day ", Rupert made sail to pass
outside the Goodwins, but the wind dropped and he had to anchor. When the
flood ceased at 5 a.m. he weighed and when some 10 miles outside the Goodwins,
he tacked to the NE, stretched outside the Kentish Knock and there sighted
Albemarle's fleet before the wind making a retreat and the Dutch following
them. The wind was now about E by S.
Albemarle's new course of WSW unhappily led him upon a tail of the
Galloper Sand ; the Charles and Katherine touched and came off, but the
Prince stuck fast. " The various courses our fleet had stood in fighting had
' amused ' all our pilots and put them out of their reckoning."
Sir Thomas Clifford-" Clifford of the Cabal "--who with Lord Ossory had
ridden through the night to Harwich and joined the Charles as a volunteer on
the previous afternoon, and to whom we owe the best accounts of these battles,
says : " The Dutch with their small frigates immediately made towards her,
attended with a fireship or two, and we sent four or five frigates to defend her,
that drew least water, and we ourselves would come as near as we durst for the
sands ; but to the wonder of the whole fleet, we saw the flag and ancient struck,
E
and she yielded when she had not herself either shot ten guns in her defence or
received ten shot from the enemy ; 15 of their men came to us in their boats . . .
a little resistance would have preserved her . . . She was like a castle in the sea,
and I believe the best ship that ever was built in the world to endure battering."
Sir George Ayscough would have blown her up, but his men struck the
flag. The Dutch took out the Admiral and his men and what they could carry
away, and-to Tromp's disgust-burnt her. So ended the Royal Prirtce, the
pride of James I and Phineas Pett, the last link with the Great Ship of the
Tudors, and the parent of the three-decker.
De Ruyter sent out a party of 20 sail to draw Prince Rupert on to the
Galloper, but a ketch from Albemarle had given him warning and he kept clear.
After the junction of the fleets Albemarle went on board the Royal James
where a council of Flag-oficers decided to fall upon the enemy next morning
and that Rupert with his fresh squadron should take the van. On the approach
of the English now over 50 strong, the Dutch stoodoff to the north-eastward.
The English " rammed against a tide all night to get to the North Head of the
Galloper."
At daylight on Monday the 4th of June the wind was SW ; the Dutch
were out of sight but were soon discovered some 12 miles to the southward.
They were 64 strong, the English about 60. The Dutch lay sails to the mast to
stay for us, apparently heads to the NW. The Generals made all sail towards
them on the starboard tack (about SSE), in very good order, and our frigates
ahead lay by for the fleet to come up. Our van division was led by Myngs in
the Victory, followed by the divisions of Rupert in the James and Spragge in the
Dreadnought ; the composition and order of Albemarle's squadron are not on
record. The Dutch van was under Hiddes de Vries, the centre and rear as
before under de Ruyter and Tromp.
Firing began about 8. Soon afterwards part of the Dutch fleet-which
and how many is not on record, presumably the rear-bore away " to fall into
the middle of our line " ; as soon as Myngs " had their wake " he tacked t o the
NW and then stood in, followed by the whole of our line. The van became
heavily engaged ; Myngs was mortally wounded, Narborough his captain took
over, and they were forced to leeward (North). Rupert kept the wind (course
about WNW) and led the line through the body of the Dutch fleet, which must
now have been standing to the SE, the rest of our fleet following in good order.
Then a large part of the Dutch van and some of the centre, bore down upon the
English van, and a re'gular dog-fight ensued, in which Tromp joined. De
Ruyter, with 11ships, held close to the wind. Between de Ruyter and the dogfight to leeward, the ships remaining with Rupert and Albemarle, some 40
strong, plyed to and fro, NW and SE, engaging mainly the ships in the dogfight to leeward. Upon the fifth return, the English then standing NW, de
Ruyter hoisted the signal for close action and bore down to succour his ships to
leeward. Rupert weathered him, but Albemarle apparently went into the
dog-fight to leeward. Rupert lay by for a short time to repair his rigging, but on
bearing away to break into the Dutch fleet, everything aloft except the foremast " came down about o m ears. . . we had much ado to get from them,
they maiting sail to cut us off from the Charles and party to leeward. And
seeing the Charles and many other ships laying sails aback to stay for them,
bore away to leeward and glad to part." So says Allin.
Rupert made sail to the NW ; Albemarle tacked and stood the same way ;
de Ruyter followed until Rupert and Albemarle had rejoined. Then, says the
" Account," " there fell a fog, but lasted not long, during which the Dutch
steered away to their own coast, and the English towards theirs ; parting in the
midst of the Channel about 7 or 8 o'clock in the evening." The Dutch Narrative
says that de Ruyter was about to " charge " them when the fog shut down ; he
could not risk running aground so near the enemy's coast, and had not powder
enough for another day's fighting.
The English in withdrawing, left four ships behind them in the hands of the
Dutch.
The English lost 10 ships : on the first day, three boarded and captured ;
on the second, one sunk, one burnt by us to avoid capture ; on the third, the
Prince, through grounding ; on the fourth, the above four. Five of these ships
were prizes from the Dutch, one from the Portuguese, and one a hired merchantship. The number of killed and wounded is said t o have been 5,000 besides
3,000 prisoners. Among the killed were two Flag-officers, Berkeley and Myngs ;
both had led the line into action. Six fireships were expended.
The Dutch lost four ships : on the first day, two caught fire and burnt ;
on the second, one burnt by fireship ; on the fourth, the same. 2,000 are said
to have been killed or wounded ; among the killed, two Flag-officers, Evertsen
and van der Hulst. Five fireships were expended.
The English had been defeated with heavy losses, but the fighting had
shown that in discipline and seamanship they were better than the Dutch, and
that they might hope for victory when they met again on equal terms.
The Dutch owed their victory to the skill with which de Ruyter timed his
attacks on the second and fourth days, under the signal for close action. On
the fourth day, he seems to have kept a part of his fleet in reserve to windward
for this express purpose. Rupert's attempt to do the same failed owing to
the disablement of his flagship.
The English Fleet anchored off Harwich on the evening of the 5th of June.
Next day Penn came round the ships with the full authority of the Lord High
Admiral, to put in hand what was needed. I n spite of this Albemarle and his
officers complained of the delay, particularly in fitting out and manning the
new ships, and sent officers and men t o bring them down the River.
The
Fleet began to reassemble a t the Buoy of the Nore on the 27th of June, but
waiting for men delayed them moving down the River till the 19th of July.
De Ruyter got to sea with 59 ships, soon joined by others, on the 25th of
June. On the 1st of July they were off the back of the Long Sand ; a proposal
to enter the River and attack was dropped for lack of competent pilots ; on the
3rd of July de Ruyter anchored off the King's Channel. To deter any such
attempt we sent a force of frigates and fireships to move the buoys and lie off
the Middle Ground and on the 6th of July the White Squadron moved down to
the Buoy of the Oaze to back them up.
On the 29th of June a council of Flag-officers was held " to see how His
Highness had divided the fleet into squadrons and divisions, who altered very
little of what he had designed." Rupert's Order of Battle is not forthcoming,
but it seems likely that with it he issued the three Additional Instructions
signed by him, but not dated, found in Spragge's Sea-Book, and printed in
Corbett's " Fighting Instructions," p. 129. Rupert was in sole command from
the 6th of September till the 6th of October, after Albemarle, recalled to London
upon the outbreak of the Great Fire, left the Fleet for the last time " with
tears in his eyes," but the character of these Instructions suggests the earlier
date.
E2
The 1st directs that if a flagship drops out of station or is likely to do so,
the ships belonging to that flag are to keep up with theAdmira1 of theFleet,
notwithstanding the signal for the Line of Battle having been made.
This plainly arises from incidents in the Four Days Fight : for example,
when on the first day the ships of the White centre seem to have stayed with the
Prince instead of going ahead to support their van.
The 2nd directs that when the Admiral makes a weft with his flag the
best sailing ships are " to make what way they can " to engage the enemy, to
allow the rear to come up ; and " so soon as the enemy makes a stand then they
are to fall into the best order they can."
This seems to be the first time this signal appears on paper, but it had been
put into practice with the heavy frigates at the Battles of the Gabbard and
Scheveningen in 1653, and had a long and distinguished career before it.
The 3rd gave authority to a Flag-officer whose ship was disabled to transfer
his flag into any other ship of his division.
This plainly arose from Rupert's own experience on the fourth day, when
the sudden disablement of the Royal James prevented his squadron delivering
what should have been a final counter-stroke. I t was already the practice in
the Dutch fleet.
Now the first article opened and closed with the following words : " The
commander of every ship is to have a special regard to the common good. . .
and is to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of the enemy,
which is always to be made the chiefest care." The late Sir Julian Corbett
seems to have taken these phrases to indicate a swing, on the part of Rupert and
Albemarle, away from the observance of the line and an inclination " to take
tactical risks and unfetter individual initiative." Considering the context and
what had happened in the late battle, I can find little ground for his view. On
the contrary, the object of the first article seems to be the re-establishment of
the line on the Admiral of the Fleet if the flagshipof a division is out of her place
init. And it is hard to believe that after seeing both Berkeley and Myngs
" engage themselves so far among the enemy " that the ships astern could not
give them the support they needed and Tromp twice put his own fleet in peril
by independent action, there would be a swing in favour of such action.
Rupert's language was a reminder of the object and, as later experience was to
show, a very necessary one. The reason why it was not put out to the fleet in
1666, nor in 1673, when the purport of these instructions was included in those
issued during the Third Dutch War, was probably that at that time everyone
looked on his words as representing accepted practice. Had they been included,
we might have been spared some of the " half-begotten battles " of the 18th
century.
On the 18th of July another Council was held on board the Royal Charles
in the Sledway, in the presence of the King and the Duke of York. Jordan's
Journal summarizes its conclusions as follows : " We should endeavour to keep
the wind of them, not to begin the Battle till the van of our fleet should get up
with theirs, and then the rest to fall in close in their lines appointed, that the
Enemy (which usually and might lay in an Half-moon) should not be able to
tack upon us to gain the wind." This is just what took place in the coming
battle, and justifies the boast of Albemarle that " he knows now the way to
beat them." It avoids the mistake made by Berkeley in pushing on before
the centre was able to support the van.
The Council also approved three additional Fighting Instructions.
Corbett thought these Instructions were issued in 1672, but added : " I t is
possible that they were not entirely new in 1672, but that their origin, a t least
in design, went back to the close of the Second War."
(Footnote.
Colenbrander 1,414 ; Corbett, 134,148.)
These are the first known Instructions to distinguish clearly between the
attack from to windward of the enemy and the attack from to leeward of
him. The former was put into effect in the coming battle, for the first time ;
and in many to follow, the French finding a reply to it. The French showed us
that it was necessary not only to prevent the enemy tacking in the van or rear,
but to stop him bearing away and reforming his line to leeward. The attack
from leeward remained in the Instructions until they were replaced by the
signal books, but never actually took place in the form this Instruction
prescribed. A third Article repeated the direction to keep the line and " on
pain of death . . . fire not over our own ships."
The first Article, summarized by Jordan above, ran as follows :
" I n case we have the wind of the enemy and that the enemy stands
towards us and we towards them, then the van of our fleet shall keep the
wind, and when we are come to a convenient distance of the enemy's rear
shall stay until our whole line is come up within the same distance of the
enemies van, and then our whole line is to stand along with them the
same tacks aboard still keeping the enemy to leeward and not suffering
them to tack in their van. And in case the enemy tack in their rear first,
then he that leads the van of our fleet is to tack first, and the whole line
is to follow, standing all along with the same tacks aboard that the
enemy does."
This method of fighting deployed the fleet along the whole length of the
enemy's line, in a series of ship to ship actions, and relied on a superior volume
of hitting, not without justification, for the rest. Its intention was to prevent
the enemy's fleet or any part of it from getting to windward ; there was no idea
of containing a part of it, but none the less it came to pass.
The English had 89 ships, the Dutch 88, besides fireships and small craft.
On the English side, a t least 23 were fresh ships ; these included the Loyal
London as flagship of the Blue squadron, 4 other new ships, and the Sovereign.
These brought a real accession of strength ; the remainder were of the same
character as the rest of the fleet and about one-third were prizes from the
Dutch. The Dutch had brought forward a t least 8 fresh ships, of which some
at least were new two-deckers.
Our Order of Battle is not available, but the position of the nine Flagofficers in the line of battle was as follows : The White, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas
Teddeman in the Royal Katherine, Admiral Sir Thomas Allin in the Royal James,
acting Rear-Admiral Richard Utber in the Rupert ; The Red, Vice-Admiral
Sir Joseph Jordan in the Royal Oak, Joint Admirals Prince Rupert and the Duke
of Albemarle (commonly referred to as " The Generals ") in the Royal Charles,
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Holmes in the Henry ; The Blue, acting Rear-Admiral
John Kempthorne, Admiral Sir Jeremy Smith in the Loyal London, ViceAdmiral Sir Edward Spragge. The Dutch van was commanded by Lieut.Admiral Jan Evertsen, the centre by Lieut.-Admiral de Ruyter, the rear by
Lieut.-Admiral Cornelis Tromp. They had 17 Flag-officers.
The English Fleet sailed about 6 a.m. on the 19th of July, the White
leading ; they had a slow and tiresome passage through the sands-not without
risk, for on the 22nd of July the enemy were in sight to the eastward ; on the
.
afternoon of the 24th, says Clifford, " if they had not been afraid to engage so
near our sands, they might have taken great advantages upon us, for we were
not only disordered and out of our line, but very much separated and scattered
from one another by so much endeavouring to get ahead. . . a t 9 our affairs
looked with a scurvy face, but the enemy tacked and stood from us." At
8 p.m. both fleets anchored-the English 33 miles east of Orfordness, the
Dutch 12 miles south-east of them.
About 2 a.m. on the 25th of July-St. James' Day-the English Fleet
weighed with a " fine gale " a t NNE, and stood to the eastward. At 4 the
Dutch Fleet was discovered bearing SE by S 12 miles, also on the port tack.
" We bore lasking upon them to engage van to van."
Their rear was seen to be
lying with their foretopsails to the mast so that, as we supposed, they might
bring their fleet into a half-moon form, the better to avoid fireships and to
enable the van or the rear by tacking to weather the whole or part of our fleet.
De Ruyter however remarks : " to my surprise and that of others Admiral
Tromp with his sails brailed up remained too far astern of me and the van was
too far ahead, so that the enemy got himself into the middle."
About 9.30 the White Squadron had nearly come up with the Dutch van,
and the latter opened fire. At 10 the Generals gave the signal " to bear in in a
line." The Anne, our leading ship, opened fire and presently the whole of the
White squadron was in action. Allin remarks : " our peopIe were very awk to
get into a line and some never d i d . . . but those shot through several of our
ships contrary to a strict order. . . Sir Thomas Teddeman fought bravely upon
his party, although the St. George and Anne did him little service and the Old
James did us as little. The Richard and Martha went away from us. The
Rear-Admiral's division -(Utber was his brother-in-law) -did us little help."
At 11the Red opened fire, and a t 12 the Blue.
De Guiche was not with the fleet, but his account is of interest, though not
correct in detail. " The English let the Dutch pass without firing ; as soon as
they had tacked "-(they bore up)-" they closed to musket shot and it is
thus that one should fight ; the rest causes more noise than hurt, and barring
accidents, when fleets remain a t extreme gun range, it is a spectacle but little
perilous does not justify the name of danger."
By 1 p.m. Evertsen, Hiddes de Vries and Koenders had been killed,
Banckert's flagship had been set on fire by a fireship and he had to shift his flag ;
of the six Flag-officers in the van, only the two Rear-Admirals remained in
control. The leading ships began to bear away. Our White squadron had also
suffered ; Teddeman's flagship and two others came out of the line "to mend
their hurts," followed by the Rear-Admiral.
Tromp, in command of the Dutch rear, did not follow the line, but hugged
the wind. " Being to leeward of the enemy we closed him and got the weather
gage, and separated their rear from their centre." The train of events is hard to
follow. The Resolution, of the Blue, much disabled, fell to leeward. Tromp,
or one of his Flag-officers, came with a fireship and burnt her-the captain and
most of the crew were saved. Kempthorne, leading the Blue squadron, tacked
about to help her, and Admiral Smith and 8 or 10 of his squadron stood after
them-Smith had to tow his ship round. By evening the Dutch rear and the
Blue squadron were round on the starboard tack, standing to the westward,
while the rest of the two fleets stood south-eastward. If Tromp's squadron was
in fact the strongest and Smith's the weakest, then Smith performed a useful
service in containing the Dutch rear and depriving de Ruyter of its support, of
which he was in great need.
Fighting in the centre had been severe. De Ruyter says : " There was a
furious fight between the ships of my squadron and those alongside them. . .
but they were received in such fashion that after three hours they were obliged
to withdraw, and we saw General Monck's flag shifted. This gave us a short
rest, but being unable to refit, we saw our van draw off more and more with all
sail set ; we could not get them to return though recalled by gunfire, seeing
which the English General turned upon me and tHe few ships with me. We
endured this furious attack in the hope that we should be reinforced either by
Admiral Tromp from the rear, or by Admiral Evertsen from the van, but all in
vain . . . I could not close Admiral Tromp who was to windward of me ; though
he could easily close me he did not, I know not why. We then retired fighting
towards the South, for the light wind gave us little headway, which gave us
hope that the rear would join us under cover of darkness and allow us to renew
the battle together."
The Royal Charles, having engaged de Ruyter " much within musket shot,"
was much disabled aloft and had to come out of the line for an hour to repair.
There is no mention from the English side of the flag being shifted, but the
Sovereign took the Charles' place in the line. The Charles bore in again, and
after " an hour and a half's dispute more," de Ruyter gave way. The Charles
was so much shattered that she had to be towed out of the line by her boats.
Clifford continues : '*Now a t 4 of the Clock de Ruyter began to make all the sail
he could and run, but with great gallantry would make several tacks to fetch
off his maimed ships, and once endangered himself very much for the rescue of
his second, who a t last was so disabled that he could not get off, but then like a
very knowing seaman he chopped to an anchor, which presently brought us to
leeward of him." Jordan says : " a very smart battery till about 2 in the
afternoon (it's thought never more guns discharged in so short a time) then the
enemy bore away large from the East to the South East ; we striving to get up
with them, it being little wind, prevented us."
Allin led the pursuit. " We followed them so close upon the rear, they being
come to fire only their stern guns. The Sneek of Harlingen yielded ; a ship of
66 guns, the first voyage, 320 men, but great store killed and wounded. She
was much disenabled to sail. . . and we desirous to follow our service set
her on fire . . . He yielded about 6 o'clock . . . About 7 Vice-Admiral Banckert
forsook his ship in his boat and the Captain of the ship . . . the Tholen, 60 guns,
and being much disenabled and much water in h e r . . . set her on fire also
about 9 o'clock a t night . . . Our fireships lost very foolishly ; they going on
without order were torn a-pieces and then forced to burn themselves without
doing any execution upon the enemy."
Jordan in the Royal Oak with two frigates had been ordered to keep touch
during the night ; a t daylight he was " not much above musket-shot from
under de Ruyter's lee." The wind was too light to enable the fleet to form a line
and close de Ruyter, and the Dutch retired within the Wielings, covered by 20
ships under Vice-Admiral Banckert. The little Fang Fang, a sloop belonging
to Prince Rupert " made up with her oars to de Ruyter . . . and for near an hour
continued plying broadside and broadside, which was so pleasant a sight, . . .
that all ours fell into laughter." About 10 the Sovereign running into shallow
water, tacked, followed by the rest of the fleet except a few frigates, who chased
the enemy into the Wielings. At 2 the wind veered round westward to the NE.
The Blue squadron and Tromp came in sight. Daylight had found them in the
neighbourhood of the Galloper ; the change of wind put Tromp to leeward of
Smith but to windward of the main body. Tromp says : " Seeing the enemy
would not stand for us, we were advised to join de Ruyter. Seeing this,
the enemy followed us under easy sail, when we found to leeward of us the
main body of the enemy working towards us, without knowing anything of de
Ruyter or of the other Flag-officers, or of our ships." About 5 the Generals
tacked towards the shore, hoping to prevent the Dutch getting into harbour ;
about midnight the Charles anchored, so that the leeward tide should bring them
down t o her, but the rest of t h e fleet did not do so and drifted away. Smith had
been persuaded by his pilot to stand off from the shoals, for which he was heId
to blame by an enquiry. The morning of the 27th of July found Tromp
between theEnglish Fleet and the shore, and he had little dfficultyin slipping into shelter.
The Dutch had lost only two ships, but they are said to have suffered
7,000 casualties, including four Flag-officers killed. The English had lost one
ship, burnt, and are said to have lost only 300 men. For the time, their victory
gave them a complete command of the sea and enabled them to carry out a very
successful attack on the shipping in the Vlie, known as " Sir Robert Holmes'
bonfire." But the Dutch Fleet put to sea again on the 26th of August, a
month after its return to harbour, and moved towards the Straits of Dover to
meet the long-expected French fleet, now 40 strong. On the 31st of August
the fleets got into touch off the North Foreland, but a gale drove both to
shelter. The Charles and Katherine again touched the Ghlloper Shoal. The
Dutch were a t sea again on the 8th of September, the English on the 13th of
September. On the 14th of September the French fleet a t last reached Dieppe,
but the French King changed his mind, and recalled it to Brest, where i t arrived
in safety about the 20th.
The Dutch had met the English on equal terms and suffered a heavy
defeat, though they had been saved from its material consequences by the skill
and courage with which de Ruyter had covered the retreat of his fleet, and by
the nearness of the sands and our lack of knowledge of them.
Our victory was due, in the first place, to the guns of the two leading
divisions of the White squadron, which in three or four hours overcame the
resistance of the Dutch van and compelled them to withdraw ; secondly, to the
close support given them by our centre, which prevented the Dutch centre from
supporting their van. If Tromp's squadron was in fact superior to that under
Smith, we may give the latter credit for his conduct in containing a force greater
than his own, and thus contributing to the defeat of the Dutch van. Tromp
was dismissed.
The Instructions under which the Fleet fought so successfully on St. James'
Day were reissued in 1673 with only minor alterations and remained in force
until the Signal Book superseded them. But the traditions which governed
the actions of the men who fought the Dutch were gradually forgotten, and
blind obedience instead of the destruction of the enemy became the
" chiefest care."
On the material side, although the form of battle followed on St. James'
Day called for a homogeneous line of battle, and a start had been made to build
3rd-rates, it was not until Pepys and Deane began the reconstruction of the
Fleet in 1677 that the 70-gun ship began to push the 4th-rate out of the line of
battle. I n 1666 41 out of 74 ships or 55 per cent. were 4th-rates ; in 1672, 20
out of 52, or 38 per cent. But the hired merchant-ship had gone for good.
STAFF COURSES.
STAFF COURSES.
A glance through an up-to-date Navy List (if you can get hold of one) will show
that a t the present time (June, 1953) Senior Naval Officers are being appointed
to no less than six different courses.
(a) The Senior OfficersTechnical Course (S.O.T.C.)
(b) The Senior Officers War Course
(c) The Tactical Course
(d) The Staff Course
(e) The Imperial Defence College (I.D.C.)
(f) The Joint Services Staff College (J.S.S.C.)
The S.O.T.C. is normally housed in the Vernon, but pays a large number of
visits to other establishments.
The S.O.W.C. and the Staff Course are housed together a t Greenwich, the
Tactical Course at Woolwich, the I.D.C. at Belgrave Square and the J.S.S.C.
at Latimer.
That is a brief survey of the Naval and Joint side alone. In addition, of
course, the Army and R.A.F. also run Staff Colleges.
I t is my contention that there is a considerable amount of overlap between
all these courses.
Let us first of all consider the overlap between the three Services' Staff
Colleges. I admit I do not know what is taught in the Army and R.A.F. to their
budding Staff Officers, but I am quite sure that if we find it necessary to teach ours
such things as Communism, Parliamentary Procedure, Civil Defence, Economics
(to mention only a few of our outside lectures) the other Services must find it
necessary also. In fact, what it amounts to is that the same lectures are given
in three or more different places probably two or three times a year.
Now let us examine our own overlap. The Senior Officers War Course, the
Tactical Course and the Staff Course all receive identical, or anyhow similar,
lectures on a number of subjects. The Senior Officers Technical Course overlaps the Tactical Course in a number of places as Tactics depend so much these
days on Technics. The S.O.T.C. is, however, in a slightly different category to
the remainder and this overlap would probably have to be accepted.
The I.D.C. and the J.S.S.C. are both Joint Colleges. I t is true that one is
the sixth form and the otheronly about the fourth, but, for all that,many of the
problems studied must to a large extent be very similar, yet each is in its own
establishment, each has its own library, its own domestic staff and its own
colossal overheads.
Again there is overlap between these joint colleges and the Staff Colleges of
their own particular Service. It is for instance by no means unknown for a
member of the Directing Staff of the J.S.S.C. to deliver a lecture on the same
subject as is being expounded, very often almost at the same time, at the
R.N. Staff College.
304
STAFF COURSES.
I t appears to me, therefore, that time and money are being wasted by all
three Services and we cannot in this modern age afford to waste either of these
precious commodities.
What then is the solution ? Surely it is to have all the courses in one vast
establishment which might well be called the Defence War College.
My Defence War College would be near London, for obvious reasons, and
would have to contain living accommodation for some 300 officers. I t should,
I think, be under the Command of an Admiral, a General and an Air Marshal in
turn, and would have to have a large joint Directing Staff.
I am, however, not suggesting that all the courses should be " joint." It
would still be necessary, for instance, to have a purely R.N. Tactical Course and
there is no doubt that quite a number of lectures in the Staff Courses would
have to be delivered to one Service only.
What I am suggesting, however, is that these various courses could join
together for outside lectures and since these lectures would have to be delivered
far less frequently, and to a much bigger audience, a higher grade of lecturer
might be obtainable. Further, what a wealth of experience would be gathered
together in one room a t discussion time, and although possibly the more junior
officers might be overawed by the amount of " brass " in the front row they
should learn a lot even if they did not contribute to the discussion.
One can think of a hundred and one other advantages of such a scheme :
The saving in overheads
The communal library
The common mess and the opportunities for discussion in the mess
The saving in Directing Staff Officers
to list but a few.
Such a scheme for the Navy only is in force in the United States in the
shape of their Naval War College, which combines all our Technical, Tactical
and Staff Courses into one big establishment. The Americans, however, go one
stage further than us, they run correspondence courses too.
Our Directing Staffs a t present could not cope with correspondence
courses, but under my unified scheme, there should be enough Officers left over
to run some form of Correspondence Staff Course.
Not all Officers can go through a Staff College, however big it is, but I see
no reason why Staff and Tactical Training could not be extended to the others
by means of correspondence.
I t might be argued that this, to a certain extent, is already done by means
of THE NAVALREVIEWand there is no doubt that in these pages the student of
war can glean a great deal of knowledge and a t the same time add his own
contribution. Excellent though this means of expression is, it does not quite
fulfil the functions of a proper course. I t would on the other hand provide an
excellent medium in which those who have done a course could exchange views.
I t is perhaps a somewhat futuristic idea, but would it not be possible for
the " prize " for passing a correspondence course to be a subscription to THE
NAVALREVIEWfor say five years ? The student could then continue his very
necessary post graduate training by reading and contributing to this periodical.
Many Officers have plenty of leisure in which to read or write, but what is
so urgently needed is some direction to these Officers as to what to read and how
to write.
STAFF COURSES.
305
To sum up then, my recommendations are :(a) A large college, one might almost term it a University, in which all
Staff and Tactical (and possibly Technical) training of Senior
Officers of all three Services is centred.
(b) The " University " to run voluntary correspondence courses on
Tactical and Staff matters for Officers a t sea or ashore who have not
been fortunate enough to be selected for a course.
I t might be interesting to hear other people's views.
BALANCE.
BALANCE.
A YEAR ago the present writer ventured a few remarks in THENAVALREVIEW
on the subject of a naval officer's education. He was not conceited enough to
believe that all readers agreed with him : rather did he hope (a hope no doubt
shared by the Hon. Editor) that there would be a strong body of opinion to
take issue with him in subsequent numbers of THE NAVALREVIEW.This did
not happen, however, and he is emboldened, still with due diffidence, to expand
his argument by attempting to suggest not so much what should be offered to
the naval officer in the way of formal education as what the officer should
himself be encouraged to assimilate of matters outside the immediate scope of
his " compulsorily acquired " professional, technical knowledge.
One must use, as a starting point, the somewhat trite hypothesis that we
are living through a revolution in human relations which is quite unprecedented.
The comparison between East and West is between man and man, as it has
always been. But whereas i t has hitherto been a match of skill, of cunning and
of physical strength, i t is now in addition a contest between spirit and spirit.
The whole man is involved. And it is maintained that the more technical and
mechanical a man's profession is, the more necessary is i t for the purely intellectual side of the mind to be nurtured and cherished, particularly when
the first requirement of that man is that he should be a leader of men. War
is above all an art, and perfection in the artist can only be achieved by the
full cultivation of all his intellectual faculties and not only those directly
concerned in the flowering of his particular genius. There is, however, more
to it than that. This revolution in human relations has developed contemporaneously with another revolution which for the world as a whole began on
an August day in 1945 when the first atom bomb struck Hiroshima. This
event placed on the human race as a whole, and the fighting man in particular
(as the first potential user of atomic energy) a new and terrifying responsibility.
The secret of the fundamental structure of the universe had now been grasped
by mankind and henceforward there could be no place for the incorrigible
materialist. As the master of forces which could destroy him in an instant or,
alternatively, provide him with undreamed of material advantages, man must
rise to a moral and intellectual level never before achieved : a level sufficiently
high for him t o appreciate not only his own potentialities but also-more
important-his o m insignificance, for " after all man knows mighty little
and may some day learn enough of his own ignorance to fall down and pray.':
The naval officer, then, as a fighting man and as a citizen of a world which
for the sake of its own survival must soon learn not to fight, needs a considerable
endowment of intellectual equipment-far more than can be provided for him
by formal education. This applies to officers of all three Services, no doubt,
but it is the writer's contention that it is particularly necessary for the naval
officer because of his potential contacts in the four corners of the world and
his essential preoccupation with global strategy. He starts, too, with the
notable advantage of a great inherited tradition : global strategy was earlier
and more readily appreciated by the British sea officer than by any other
community of professional fighting men, for he was concerned with it long
BALANCE.
307
before anyone else. Instinct and tradition play a large and usually underestimated part in these things : underestimated both unconsciously because
of the modern world's incessant and voracious demand for " concrete evidence,"
and consciously because it is the fashion to decry anything which suggests
reliance upon outworn convention (even if that convention is not, upon close
investigation, found to be so outworn after all). But these are not enough in
themselves. Every man worth his salt will strive to bring to his profession,
whatever it may be, the best-educated mind he can ;more than that, he should
strive to be able to offer something of himself to those with whom he comes in
contact, something on a higher plane than that of the professional technicalities
which are his daily preoccupation. The need for the cultivation of the intellect
was never more necessary than now in an age of " super-specialization." Man,
it is suggested, was never meant to specialize ; therefore, in our own case, when
the exigences of the naval service demand that we should devote so much of
our attention to comparatively narrow professional issues we should ensure
that our intellectual capacity as a whole is not allowed to become lopsided.
The fighting services, and particularly the Royal Navy, are notoriously
suspicious of the " intellectual ", and rightly so in the sense in which that
misused word has come to be accepted : its use conjures up at once the vision
of the " professional type " whose head is in the clouds and whose feet are far
from solid ground, and who has nothing in common with the man of action.
It must be made clear at once that the writer's conception of the cultivated
mind has nothing whatsoever to do with " being highbrow " : there is, of course,
little danger of the naval officer, however well cultivated his intellect, floating
away into that unfortunate state, because the very nature of his general
training and the atmosphere in which he lives combine to prevent it. What,
then, is this conception ? I t is best described by drawing attention to two men
of action who were yet, in addition, giants in the intellectual sphere : one of them
sailor, naval historian and finally Master of a Cambridge college ; the other
soldier, author, M.P. and Governor-General of a Dominion. Herbert Richmond
and John Buchan had much in common, but in each the most marked
characteristics were mastery of the English language and the history of the
British people and a consuming devotion to the interests of British youth.
That few of us dare aspire to be a Richmond or a Buchan goes without
saying ; that none of us will fail to profit by studying their example is equally
certain.
Admiral Richmond led the way in the establishment of THENAVALREVIEW
because he believed it to be essential to the welfare of the Royal Navy to enable
young officers to study the higher problems of their profession and to have the
opportunity of airing their views without fear or favour. An enthusiastic
and erudite historian himself, he realized from the outset the immense practical
value which the careful and detailed study of history affords to the naval officer :
the task of assimilating this knowledge he himself made immeasurably easier
for his successors by his own brilliant books. Richmond's ideas, his insistence
upon the necessity for the naval officer being the intellectual as well as the
technical master of his trade, have borne fruit a t last-mostly posthumously.
In 1925, after a series of important Admiralty and seagoing appointments, he
was unemployed for two years because (writes Admiral Thursfield) " the
material school a t the Admiralty regarded him as necessarily an impractical
theorist-no practical naval officer, they held, could possibly have acquired
his learning or literary ability." From 1927-29 he was the first Commandant
of the Imperial Defence College and " set himself with energy to the work of
deducing, from the experience of the past applied to the conditions of the
308
BALANCE.
present and the future, a British scheme and policy of defence, or British way
of war, and seeing to it that his students should neither neglect what history
had to teach them on that theme nor tolerate any loose thinking in reaching
conclusions. . . " Yet despite this the prejudice remained, and it was from
afar, in " retirement " (if such a ridiculous word can be applied to such a man)
that Richmond saw the War and General Education Course established at
Greenwich, its object not so much that of pumping knowledge into SubLieutenants as of leading them on to acquire knowledge for themselves. Here
they do what Richmond's lone voice in the wilderness pleaded for them to be
allowed to do twenty and more years ago-they learn the British " way of war "
with its background of the British way of life in all its aspects, its history,
language, literature, music and art ; here they learn something of the world, of
the background of other nations as well as their military fapades as potential
friends or foes in war ; from here they go on to their technical courses capable
of a wider perspective than they have hitherto possessed.
With John Buchan we in the Navy have no direct link. But most of us
have read a t least some of his novels, an increasing number of us have found
delight in his masterly biographies, and we all know of his record as one of the
greatest Governors-General any Dominibn has ever had : it was apt indeed
that Buchan's career should have reached its culmination as leader of a country
of far horizons and a youthful nation which perhaps more than any other bids
fair to dominate the future world scene. Here was the man of action in his
element. In his books the world may see the ideal combination, not merely
of brains and brawn (the fire that was John Buchan blazed in a frail body !)
but of sheer intellect and incisive executive skill. His biographies deal almost
exclusively with men like himself in one way or another-Julius Caesar,
Augustus, Cromwell and Montrose-and few of us need reminding of such
fictional characters as Hannay, Leithen or even Dickson McCunn the retired
Glasgow grocer. Fact or fiction, they were all supremely men of action in their
different spheres, but their experiences were adventures of the mind and the
spirit as well as of the body. Buchan might well have said that one of the
secrets of his success was the company of his friends; and what a company it
was ! His own appreciation of them is embodied in many of his fictional
characters, though which is a portrait of whom is immaterial : one issure they
are all there. At the time of his death the Editor of " The Times " said that
never had that newspaper received so many tributes to a public figure : they
poured in from men in all walks of life, from highland croft and city suburb,
from the new oil towns of Alberta and the old gold towns of the Rand, from
Whitehall and Washington. This was the wider circle, wide as the world is
wide, but there was a narrower circle of more intimate friends whose very
names reveal the expanse of Buchan's vision. At Oxford, among many others,
there were Hilaire Belloc and F. E. Smith, the present Lord Halifax and
Auberon Herbert (who when he was shot down over the Somme in 1916 a t the
age of 40 had already achieved a rowing blue, distinguished service in the Boer
War and the rank of Cabinet Minister). In South Africa Buchan added to this
circle the great Cecil Rhodes and Lord Milner, not to speak of the soldiers who
were to become famous in the first world war. So the sequence went on, and
this humblest of men became not only the friend but on occasions the mentor of
scholars, soldiers, cabinet ministers and kings. " He could be happy in any
society where men pursued a calling . . . he plied miners and aviators, sculptors
and cowboys with questions, not from inquisitiveness, but because they were
contributors to the sum of human experience, and might, who knows, have
pure gold to offer."
BALANCE.
309
The writer offers no excuse for-so it may seem-harping so long upon the
characteristics of two outstanding men, for one of them was one of ourselves
and devoted his love and his vision t o the service of the young naval officer and.
the other surveyed and nurtured the whole potential of the youth of the British
Commonwealth. Buchan's great fear must serve as a warning to us who, ten
years and more after his death, face the situation he foresaw with mch foreboding : he foresaw the increasing enslavement of human beings, and the
younger generation in particular, to the office chair and the machine, unrelieved by the full exercise of the mind. He dreaded the possibility of British
youth having its potentialities dulled by neglect of the intellect. " As we
grow older," he said, " we escape from the tyranny of matter and recognize
that the true centre of gravity is the mind." But he hoped, as we must hope,
that the point of recognition should come earlier rather than later, for
" believing that most human pursuits, whether riding or governing or writing,
were worthy of study and perfection, he held that the fully adult man
should enquire widely and despise little."
The future policy regarding the education of naval ofiicers is now once
more in the melting pot. The present writer does not intend to enquire deeply
into the pros and cons of the different schemes for Dartmouth : other pens than
his are better qualified to do that. But there are observations which may be
permissible in the light of this article. One wonders a t the depth of ignorance
prevailing among the general public (or to be more accurate, that section of it
which writes to the newspapers) as to what really goes on a t Dartmouth :
many of them seem to regard it as a sort of concentration camp, because they
fail to realize the essential balance that is maintained between general and
professional education and between school (or adolescent) and service (or adult)
discipline. I t is considered that the 16-year old entry jeopardizes this balance
because of the general mental strain inevitable in the boy of that most critical
age being increased so enormously by the sudden change in his entire environment, a strain which is not apparent in the 134-year old or the 18-year old.
Evidence given before the Dartmouth Committee was overwhelmingly in favour
of the re-introduction of the early entry so far as the naval witnesses were
concerned : is it too much to hope that a t least some of the general public will
agree that this is because naval officers know what they are doing and not
because they wish to perpetuate a " reactionary " habit ? The 138-year old
entry was called in question six years ago largely as a political, doctrinaire
matter. I t was abolished and recruitment declined in quantity and quality as
a result. Now if one's own preference is heavily in favour of its re-introduction,
and a majority of naval officers agree on this, it is not because of any outworn
blimpishness (the " catch them young " theory died years ago) but because one
believes that the spirit of adventure can and should be instilled a t the outset of
a career of wide horizons, untrammelled by the chains and anxieties of an
education which is necessarily directed to the feverish competition for the
office chair or the laboratory bench. Those of us who are fortunate enough to
know something of the civilian educational problem of to-day and to be able to
combine it with a knowledge of naval education may go so far as to assert that
the Navy as a whole and Dartmouth in particular are far more aware of the
vital need for a strong counterbalance to the " tyranny of matter " than are a
great many civilian schools. The syllabuses of Dartmouth and Greenwich
show more than ample evidence of this, because of recent years, a t least, the
Admiralty has become convinced that the professional skill of the man of action
grows with the cultivation and expansion of all his intellectual faculties.
310
BALANCE.
One of these days, perhaps, the true aim and nature of the education of
naval officers may filter through into the comprehension if not the sympathies
of the critics. Meanwhile one is confident that the Navy will remain faithful
to its trust which is in this sphere is still the pick of the nation's youth, as it
always has been. But alongside and complimentary to its eternal vigilance
over those who pass upon the seas on their lawful occasions there must remain
the thought, voiced eighty years ago but since 1945 more true than its author
ever dreamed, that " the welfare of mankind does not now depend on the State
and the world of politics : the real battle is being fought in the world of
thought
CLIO.
'I.
RESERVE FLEET-ITIS-A
REPLY.
RESERVE FLEET-ITIS-A
REPLY.
(See THENAVALREVIEW,May, 1953.)
" ACTIVIST'S
" article is a pretty strong criticism of
the Reserve Fleet's
organization as he knew it, and I think much of his condemnation is sound.
He will be glad to know, then, that very active measures of far-reaching effect
are being taken to re-organize the Reserve Fleet-measures which were planned
some two and a half years ago and which have been coming into force, as
quickly as resources will allow, during the last year.
Before describing these measures, I think it is fair to readers of this THE
NAVALREVIEWto discuss the points made by " Activist." I am in a good
position to do so, for I am serving in the same Reserve Fleet Division as
(apparently) he did, and I think my job gives me a slightly better all-round
picture of the work of the Division than his gave him.
I think there are two equivalent objectives for the Reserve Eleet to aim atnot one. They are :1. To maintain and preserve as economically as possible the ships in
Reserve at their prescribed notice.
2. To be able to mobilize these ships efficiently in an emergency, i.e., as
fast as crews can be sent to man them.
There is no doubt that those ships which are kept a t the very highest state
of readiness in peace-time must be so maintained by men who will in fact form
the nucleus of their crews when they are mobilized-men who know their ship
and equipment intimately,
For these ships, then, the second aim has an over-riding effect on the first
aim, and it is clear that whilst in Reserve they must be maintained by Active
Service ratings.
Ships which are not required by the Admiralty to be maintained a t such a
high degree of readiness need not, in peace-time, necessarily be manned by naval
crews, as the time factor allowed to carry out the second aim is greater.
" Activist's " argument, therefore, could apply to these ships.
As I understand
it, it is briefly as follows :A. Such ships could be better (more economically) maintained by
equivalent man-power drawn from civilian sources.
B. The large numbers of naval personnel a t present (or rather, recently)
employed maintaining these ships would be better employed
elsewhere.
Now " B " is a highly desirable outcome to any plan for re-organizing the
Reserve Fleet ; indeed, if one thinks for a second of the critical man-power
problems which have faced and which continue to face the post-war Navy it
becomes a necessity. But I don't think " A " is a good enough substitute as it
stands. My reasons are as follows.
Much of the Reserve Fleet (and this Division in particular) is berthed, for
obvious physical, geographical and strategic reasons, in waters which are
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RESERVE FLEET-ITIS-A
REPLY.
inconveniently far from sources of industrial man-power, i.e., large industrial
towns or cities. I t would therefore be extremely difficult-I
should say,
impossible-to recruit civilians either in the large numbers required or with the
right technical qualifications to maintain warships.
The institution of a Reserve Fleet Service is an attractive idea to be added
to other similar ideas for providing long-service careers for ratings, but I think
it falls over since it would involve provision of accommodation for them and their
families near the Reserve Fleet bases.
Assuming, however, that it is possible to obtain the necessary civilian
labour, I do not think there would be any significant improvement in the hours
worked tabulated by " Activist." He has selected a particular case and I shall
use that case for my argument. Civilians require the same amount of time for
shifting in the morning, cleaning in the evening, standeasies, lunch hour, etc., as
sailors. The ships concerned are berthed 45 minutes boat journey from the
nearest source of civilian man-power. All this takes place in paid time and I
reckon that under these conditions civilian hours worked would be no more than
22 hours per man per week. Absence of a living ship means special provision of
washing and lunching facilities. (To provide less is out of date-ask the Trade
Unions.) In addition, there is the question of ship-keepers. These ships are
berthed in what is in fact an open anchorage. Ship-keepers are provided out of
working hours from their naval " Duty Parts " ; it is an essential and useful
work-though admittedly not " constructive "---and the hours put in should be
added to the naval working hours. Again, there is a large number of trained
sailors accommodated in the living ships where they are quickly and easily
available in an emergency-and such emergencies do and have arisen in this
Division. Using civilian labour, ship-keepers would mean recruiting numbers
additional to the " equivalent " civilian complement and a reserve of trained
seamen for emergency would be impossible. Nor am I impressed by any
arguments that civilians (in these days of man-power shortage) work any better
than sailors.
Two further points in " Activist's " estimates : the battleships now supply
much smaller numbers to their living ship than (apparently) in his time ; the
excess may perhaps be explained by the fact that his living ship was being
prepared for and is now in service in the Mediterranean-she went there under
her own power. Where there is a clear saving in man-hours, midday dinner
(and grog) is now consumed on board the ships where the men work instead of in
their living ships.
With regard to the training aspects of " Activist's " criticism, I agree that
there is little or no action or weapon training in the Reserve Fleet, and this has
clearly a more serious effect on seamen than on men in other branches. We try
to counteract this by running a major landing craft as a sea-training ship ;
other Divisions have similar arrangements, I believe. From the professional
side of seamanship, I think sailors lose little and gain quite a lot from a spell of
service in the Reserve Fleet : ship maintenance is an extremely important side
of their duties-and its decorative aspect is subsidiary to its preservation aspect.
I don't think the Active Fleet can teach the Reserve Fleet anything in this,
rather the reverse. Moreover, the drafting cycle of Foreign, Home-Sea, and
Home-Shore Service, dictated, I understand, by recruiting requirements,
enables men to spend at least one commission in the United Kingdom and I
reckon that time is as well spent in the Reserve Fleet as in R.N.B.
I am afraid I don't understand " Activist's " remarks on discipline.
" Autres temps, autres moeurs."
As we run a t present, I should say that it is
RESERVE
FLEET-ITIS-A REPLY.
313
only in the narrow sense of work not being " carried out by numbers " that there
can be said to be a relaxation ; otherwise ordinary naval discipline is formally,
'and in fact, applied and applied successfully. We maintain the same number of
"parades," too, as the Active Fleet-Daily Divisions followed by prayers and a
formal Divisions once a week ; guards are paraded for visiting Senior Officers,
and so on. (And if anyone thinks that formal parades are not necessary to
obtain that cohesion which produces good morale he is invited to take note of
the Spanish Republican Army Commanders during their Civil War, who, having
first abolished " parades," soon had to re-institute them again.) I don't
consider that a naval discipline system which provides a good working framework for running such diverse units as submarines, air stations, battleships,
destroyers and fast patrol boats is rigid-rather the reverse-though not of
course perfect. There is but one sense in which the application of this discipline
is hindered in the Reserve Fleet : it is caused by our critical man-power situation
which in turn produces a drafting " through-put " of very considerable dimensions ; no company can be properly knit together under these conditions, and
the remedy is not yet near.
Let us turn now to the Reserve Fleet's answer to the serious problem
" Activist " has posed.
After the war, a large number of ships were placed in
Reserve more or less higgledy-piggledy and many in a very bad state of maintenance. The first task was to decide which to retain in the post-war Navy
and which to send to the ship-breakers. Those which were retained had then to
be carefully reduced to Reserve so that they were properly preserved and their
exact state of repair discovered and recorded. A very large programme of
refit, made possible by money voted as a result of the deterioration of international affairs since 1947, was then put in hand and is just about completed.
Another programme of conversion and modernization was super-imposed on top
of this to bring the whole Navy, including many ships in Reserve, up-to-date ;
this programme is in full swing. Finally, permanent arrangements for the
preservation of the Reserve Fleet had to be made once the programme of refits
was completed. They are as follows :1. Ships at the highest state of readiness to be maintained by Naval
crews in the Main Reserve Fleet Divisions.
2. Ships at a lower state of readiness to bere-deployed to a large number of
small, little-used (in peace-time) commercial ports throughout the
United Kingdom.
3. These ships to be handed over to the charge of commercial firms who
are responsible for their security and for the preservation of the abovewater areas of the hulls and the superstructures.
4. The interiors of the ships to be sealed up completely and dynamically
dehumidified to a degree of humidity a t which no further rusting can
take place.
5 . The under-water areas of the hulls t o be protected from electrolytic
corrosion by a method of cathodic protection.
6. Guns, mountings, directors and delicate equipment on the upper
decks to be sealed up in " koon-koted " cocoons and dehumidified.
7. The commercial firms to be supervised by an Admiralty Overseer
assisted by a Reserve Fleet Officer with a very small staff ; the ships
to be inspected and certain routine tests carried out by the technical
staffs from the Main Reserve Fleet Divisions.
The advantages of this plan are a t once obvious : it effects a strategic
dispersal of ships ;main preservation is done by " mechanical " means ;only small
3 14
RESERVE FLEET-ITIS-A
REPLY
numbers of relatively unskilled civilian workers are required for the preservation of the exterior of the hulls and superstructures ;naval man-power allocated
to the Reserve Fleet can be very considerably reduced ; a multitude of small
firms which are needed by the Navy in war are kept interested in the Navy in
peace ; finally, and most important of all, it ensures far more efficient preservation, for years to come, than would ever be possible by " handraulic " means.
This change in Reserve Fleet organization is well under way-in fact it is
50 per cent. completed. I think it's a good modem answer to the problem of
how to preserve modern ships with their thin shell-plating, delicate instruments
and complicated machinery. Don't you ?
I was surprised when " Activist " referred to life in the Reserve Fleet as a
dull, dead-end job. Actual preservation is dull, but as a unit of a Fleet we have
many other and interesting duties. We have some 27 major warships ; 20
minor warships, and over 100 minor landing craft and we help to administer
quite a busy port. Last month our 60 Officers and 1,200 men trained a contingent (for 6 weeks) for the Coronation Procession ; trained 300 men to line the
streets for a royal visit and organized the training, feeding, movement and
positioning of some 1,000 men for this occasion : provided security parties for
eight LST and one depot ship which are refitting ; provided towing parties for
fifteen LST movements to and from refitting, reduction or storing berths ;
accepted one LST into Reserve after refit ; sent one fully-manned LCT (8) to
the Review-this craft also took part in two amphibious exercises in the period ;
prepared for ocean tow and despatched five LCT (8) ; moved 16 LCA from sea to
dry-stowage on land and 6 LCA from land to a ship for despatch to another
port ;docked one LCT in our own floating dock which we man entirely from our
own resources ; painted one battleship overall, and then made her open to
visitors for five days, having scrubbed her upper and main decks as an
evolution ; rigged dressing lines for this ship and a complete set of outline
illumination circuits for her and a living ship as well (and very nice they looked) ;
held a pulling regatta with over 30 whalers' crews ; ran three sailing dinghy
races and one sailing whalers' race a week (evenings). We also help to man a tug
and a destroyer and supply the staff for one of the aforesaid commercial ports.
I don't think that's dull-but I do think the name " Reserve Fleet " is
dull : I would change it to " Emergency Fleet "-or " War Fleet "-after redeployment.
LAMPRAY.
THE NAVY AND PIRACY IN THE RED SEA,
1902.
T H E NAVY AND PIRACY I N THE R E D SEA, 1902.
FROM THE PAPERS OF THE LATE VICE-ADMIRAL EARL GRANVILLE,
K . G . , K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., LL.D.
I t was but a short time ago that I asked Lord Granville to let me have notes
from his papers for T H ENAVALREVIEW, on his Red Sea exploits. He had been
very ill for some time but a$peared to be better, though I think this appearance
was due to a great effort not to show his suffering. He died shortly after our talk.
A t the time of the incidents recounted in this article he was Sub-Lieutenant, and then
Lieutenant, The Hon. W . S . Leveson Gower-" L.G." from " Britannia " days
onwards to all who knew him. Those who did know h i m are well aware of his
splendid qualities. Those who did not know him and who read this article will
see from the initiative, the adventurous and jghting spirit shown by him as a very
junior officer that he was the type the Navy most admires.
These are the original notes of a young officer. I have edited them as little
as possible.
HON. EDITOR.
IN January, 1902, I was a sub serving in H.M.S. Scout stationed in the Red Sea.
During the first four months of that year I was boat cruising off the Sudan
Coast, and captured altogether four slave dhows. But we found our service
boats (mine was a five-oared whaler) sailed too slow for dhow catching also
we were always seen from the coast and signal fires used to be lit. The dhows
captured we took on each occasion by surprise at dawn. We recommended
the Admiralty to hire or buy native craft. We were then given a holiday from
the Red Sea heat and sent to the station ship at Constantinople in May. That
June I was promoted to Lieutenant and was very shortly after moved to a
battleship in the Mediterranean Fleet. I joined her at Mudros. I hadn't been
there a week, when our recommendations to the Admiralty bore fruit, and a
signal was made to the Fleet that two armed dhows were to be commissioned
for service in the Red Sea and calling for two subs to volunteer for command.
I went to my captain and asked him to see the C.-in-C. on my behalf, as I was
no longer a sub, but my claims were that this was the result of our experience
earlier in the year, and that I had the advantage of this four months' experience.
I also pretended to a greater knowledge of Arabic than I possessed. Of course
every sub in the Fleet had volunteered, so I was most unpopular with them
when I was selected instead of another sub and also with the lieutenants for
similar reasons. My colleague, to be, was a friend of mine called P1owden.l
1
The late Rear-Admiral R. A. A. Plowden, D.S.O.
After going to Malta to collect men, guns, stores, etc., we went to the Red
Sea in the Harrier, a gunboat, and our dhows were fitted out a t Perim. We
were now engaged in the suppression of Piracy on the Yemen Coast and incidentally gun runners too. This piracy had been getting worse and worse, the
British and Italians being the principal sufferers, and the Turks wouldn't do anything about it. Things came to a head when the pirates crossed over and raided
an Italian island off Massawa, getting away with a lot of pearls and other loot,
and a t about the same time they captured an Egyptian coastguard craft that was
carrying the pay to the coast stations, killed the escort and got away. So the
British and Italian governments told the Turks that if they couldn't do their
own police work we must do it for them in their own waters. So we were not
very popular with any Turkish authorities.
When cruising in a whaler we were five seamen, a Somali who was Arabic
interpreter, and myself, and we carried a week's provisions and water. We did
not have very much room. When we could, we camped on shore for a night.
We lived chiefly on bacon and fresh fish of which we could always catch any
amount by trolling with blue and white or red and white bunting round a hook.
The fish were mostly bonito. We seldom got a fish whole, as a shark would
usually take a snap of half of one, before we could get it in.
In my armed dhow my crew consisted of a leading seaman ; ten able
seamen ; my marine servant ; my Somali interpreter and myself and a native
crew of an Arab captain and twelve natives who were a mixture of Sudanese
and Arabs. I also had an additional man later on-an Abyssinian who had been
a slave and had escaped and come off to me. I freed him by waving the white
ensign over his head, and as he seemed a likely fellow I enlisted him in my
crew. He was quite a good shot and in one action he himself got a slight graze
across the nose with a bullet.
Our armament consisted of a three-pounder in the bows which we kept
covered up and a maxim-gun more amidships which we could shift from side to
side however desired.
We always went disguised as a trading dhow. My white crew and myself
were in native dress and we, like Q-ships in the War, waited to be attacked.
When we were we then hoisted the white ensign, uncovered our guns and let
them have it ! Of course, we were often fired on by peaceful dhows who mistook
us for pirates.
We were provisioned for a month, but we often went six weeks before
getting reprovisioned. But we were not short of food as one doesn't eat much
in that heat, and again we lived mostly on fish. We used to get our provisions
and stores from the gunboats, usually meeting them off Hodeida or on the
island of Kamaran, the pilgrim quarantine station ; or they would be sent up
to Hodeida by steamer from Aden. But water was our great difficultyalthough we stirred it steadily t o aerate it, it always smelt abominably, and
whatever we were drinking-tea or cocoa or rum-I usually held my nose
while drinking.
As an example of what little damage a rifle bullet could do, and the
insensibility to pain of blacks, we were having a scrap a t a place called Khor el
Wahla and a one-eyed Sudanese of my crew for some reason or other was
standing on the gunwhale holding on to the rigging, when a sailor looked up and
saw blood trickling down his leg, and said " Hullo, One-eye, what's up with
your bloody leg ?" on which One-eye looked down, then proceeded to collapse
having been apparently unaware of being hit until then. The bullet had gone
clean through his thigh. I dressed and bandaged it and when three weeks later
we met a doctor, One-eye was walking about again and there was nothing more
to be done.
I didn't get any prisoners until we had been a t it nearly a year but had
already made it safer for trading and pilgrim dhows along this coast. Then in
June, 1903, I got a haul of prisoners when I captured three pirate dhows. I
managed eventually after some exciting episodes to get them to Hodeida to
be tried by the Turks, whose sympathies were with the pirates. I will return
to this later.
We had been for some time looking for a British dhow that had been
captured by pirates, and eventually discovered her in a creek up in the northern
part of my beat. We got alongside her, finding that although she had been
looted she still had her sails and necessary gear. As the wind was blowing in to
the creek, we had to kedge out, which took us nearly two hours, under a heavy
rifle fire all the time from the shore. We were very fortunate and nobody was
hit, chiefly because we kept the empty dhow alongside us on the engaged side,
but our small boat working the kedge anchor had a hot time of it.
I put a prize crew aboard this dhow, making us both a little short-handed,
although my sailors knew now how to work a dhow as well as the natives.
We had news that a likely place to find pirates was a couple of islands which
formed a natural harbour between them, which we came to next day and
sailing in through the entrance we found three pirate dhows which were hauled
up on the shore having their bottoms cleaned. The pirates lined a sand beach
commanding the narrow channel we had to go through. Both sides opened a
heavy fire. Again nobody was hit on either side. Having anchored off where
their dhows were, we fired a round or two from our three-pounder deliberately
close alongside them without meaning to hit them. They surrendered.
My next difficulty was to get my prisoners and prizes down all the distance
to Hodeida. The pirate dhows themselves were worked by blacks, the Arabs
merely being the fighting men, like in olden days of European naval warfare.
I divided the blacks between my four prizes, that is, the three pirate dhows
and the recaptured British dhow, and I put in each of them two able seamen
and two of my native crew, keeping the Arab prisoners in my dhow with the
remainder of my white and native crews. This meant that I must make the
Arab prisoners work my dhow, and when I gave orders to weigh and sail, my
Arab prisoners refused to work, saying that they did not know the work, and
also it was beneath their dignity, so I was in rather a quandary, but I had the
number 2 pirate captain up, had him lashed to the mast, the rest of the prisoners
lined up and covered with the maxim and rifles and had my large marine servant
all ready to administer a flogging. I then warned them, and I gave them five
minutes to decide. If they still refused I should first have the Arab captain
flogged, and if they still refused I should then shoot him and then the other
Arab captains. What I can't quite remember is why I chose the number 2
captain instead of number 1, but I must have had some reason for it ! Much to
my relief, before the five minutes were up, they gave in. But they were extraordinarily bad seamen.
Before long we found we were short of water, and it was absolutely
necessary to put in somewhere to water. We were then close to a place called
el Wasm, a place which had been up till recently a great port for landing slaves
for the Jedda market. By then I was on quite friendly terms with the pirate
captains, and they said that we could not go into el Wasm as there would surely
be a fight because they had captured a dhow belonging there, and had cut the
throats of the local crew. But still there was nowhere else where we could get
water and so we had to chance it, and sure enough when the young men of the
place found who we had got they wanted to slit their throats. I got hold of the
Sheiks and explained that these were my prisoners and that I was taking them
to be tried for piracy and that it was very much on my face that I should
produce these prisoners for trial. The Sheiks quite saw my point, but feared
they would not be able to control their young men. Things looked very unpleasant and my prisoners asked me to give them back their arms, and swore
by their beards and by the prophet and everything else that they would
surrender again as soon as we had fought our way out. I was not a t all sure
whether their oaths would last successfully if it came to that, and they could
easily have overpowered us at close quarters if they had their arms back.
Still I did decide that if it came to fighting our way out, the only plan was to
rearm them, but we managed to get our water and get away without having to
do so.
Our dhows were now paid off, but I was ordered to remain a t Hodeida
t o see to the trial of my prisoners. I lived a t the Consulate with Dr. Richardson,
a most able man a t his job. The trial dragged on, and then the Turkish Cadi
gave his judgment which was to the effect that the prisoners were innocent and
peaceful citizens, and that I was the villain, having deserted from my ship at
Aden and had been spending the last year harrying the law abiding and peaceful
subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan " May Allah preserve him ".
We naturally didn't accept this and after wiring the Ambassador, the sublime
Porte sacked the Cadi, for which he tried to get me assassinated one night, and
a fresh Cadi was despatched to conduct another trial. So I had to hang on in
Hodeida and it's not a cool health resort in the summer.
The new Cadi arrived and we got our trial through more or less satisfactorily.
I was sorry for our prisoners, and used to visit them every day to see that the
Turks treated them all right and we were very good friends especially after
being shipmates for some time during which we once had nearly to fight side by
side to save all our skins. My orders now, were that, when I could do no more a t
Hodeida, I was to make my way to Aden and then get a passage home.
Richardson was as keen as I to get up into the Yemen, so I suggested we might
bluff the Turks by pretending to be still dissatisfied and say we must go and see
the Vali a t San'a. The local steamer had gone and there wouldn't be another for
some time so I cleared my conscience by saying I was making my way to Aden
over1and.l We went to the Governor who kicked a good deal and when we said
we were starting the next day he said there was no escort available. We said
we didn't need one. But that was insisted on and we never got away from one
the whole journey. The first of these was the smallest. I think an officer, a
sergeant and a dozen men. Escorts were changed at each military post. Our
largest was in the south with a whole battalion through one district and always
'' I made this journey with no scientific object but just for the sake of adventure and a
natural desire to see this almost unknown land, and I knew the War Office and the Foreign
Office wished for information. Various people had tried to enter but had always been
stopped by the Turks. Eleven years before, Walter Harris went through from the opposite
direction and not quite the same route. In about 1760 Zeidbukr the Dane went up to San'a
from Mocha, and since then in 1922 Ameer Rihari an American Syrian or Syrian American
went through by the same route as Harris."
two or three local native gendarmes. The Yemen was always more or less in a
state of rebellion, so escorts were a mixed blessing, as we were often fired
on solely on account of the Turkish soldiery. But our native gendarmes always
hailed the rebels and explained our presence and who we were. This may
appear difficult but it is extraordinary the distance the human voice carries in
that mountain region, especially the high-pitched Arab voice.
We started the next day about an hour before sunset, a broiling hot July
evening, our party consisting of Richardson and self, a hill Bedouin who had
been in Hodeida for some time and was by way of being our servant, our
escort and an elderly Jew from San'a who had asked us to let him come with us
to take advantage of our escort. He was a nice old gentleman and with him was
a pretty granddaughter, but alas ! I saw very little of her. We were all mounted
on mules. Camels or horses would have been quicker for crossing the 80 miles
of desert across the Tehama, but we had to have mules for the mountains.
Night is the only time to cross the Tehama. The heat of the day would be
unbearable, but the nights are not so bad ; hot, of course, but a heavy dew
freshens the air and the scent of the mimosa a t night is delicious and there is a
great charm and fascination in the desert a t night, the wonderful stillness and
the sweet scented air and the going under foot quite good.
We spent two nights crossing the Tehama starting before sunset and with a
rest about midnight going on till after sunrise when it a t once became blazing hot
again. Resting through the day under mat shelters. Too hot to sleep. First
night a t Bajil, second a t Hojeila.
We now came to the foothills and travelled by day instead of night.
Usually starting a t dawn, a halt for breakfast a t an inn called Samsarah, and a
good halt in the heat of the day and then on to our resting place for the night.
The first morning just above Hojeila we saw a small fight going on about two
miles away between Turkish troops and tribesmen. What it was all about
neither our Turks nor Arabs knew, but good and keen fighting men as they all
were, they were naturally interested and all eyes remained on the fight as long
as we were in sight. We steadily climbed out of the foothills till we came to
Wisil in which neighbourhood we got our first view of typical Yemen mountain
scenery. We were now about 8,000 feet up. We had been all day climbing on
the western sunscorched side of the mountains. Blazing heat and it was about
here came a moment I shall never forget. About an hour or more before sunset
we came to a sharp corner and stepped straight from the broiling Red Sea and
desert heat into another world. A cold wind blowing straight out of the
mountains. The air was like drinking champagne, and it really,did intoxicate us
all. We one and all, British, Turks and Arabs stood and shouted. After those
months of great heat to step straight into a high Swiss air seemed miraculous.
From now on all our nights were cold.
We were getting up to 10,000 feet and gorgeous scenery. We climbed up
and down steep valley sides, a t the bottom of which we found tropical fruit,
mangoes and bananas and, higher up, figs and olives, grapes ; while still higher,
pears and walnuts, etc. We passed villages all perched on what looked like
inaccessible heights, each looking like a mediaeval castle. The Turk was unable
to get a t most of them and collected his taxes on the coffee on the road. Talking
of roads it was hardly what would be a path in England and, sometimes so
narrow with loose stones underfoot and a precipice on one side, that I often
preferred my own feet to my mule, surefooted as those animals were.
To give some idea of the natives I might quote from my report to the War
Office :" Every man and nearly every boy from three years old is armed. I n
the littoral from Hodeida and all through the mountains up to the
neighbourhood of between Ta'iz and Kataba, about nine out of every ten
men I met carried a rifle. Between Ta'iz and Kataba only every other
one. Men without rifles carry long spears and, sometimes short swords.
In fighting they seldom charge, the riflemen having no bayonets and
only occasionally carrying swords. They are good a t taking cover. .
" All men, down to boys of six or seven years of age, carry knives
and are very quick to use them, always stabbing for the liver.
" They are nearly always in a state of revolution, and are very
fanatical. Some, especially on the coast, carry also a sort of cross between
a short sword or long knife, called sabikah, which is carried athwartships.
They always carry arms-even tilling the fields a man has his rifle on
him, as there is constant intertribal warfare and also personal blood feuds.
" The Turkish soldiers in the interior are a very fine lot of men in
splendid condition from always marching through the hills and constantly
fighting. They are cheerful and contented in spite of their pay, which is
3s. 4d. a month, of which they get on an average four months' pay a year.
Their chief grievance is being sent out for three years and being kept for
a t least ten.
" The discipline is very strict.
" There are a large number of native gendarmerie all over the
country, most of them mounted on small ponies, others on mules. These
are chiefly employed in trying to collect the taxes. These men are
excellent guides and keep the bad tracks on dark nights with perfect
ease."
From San'a to Dhamar (about 70 miles) the country was flat and the track
broad and good ; with the exception of an hour and a half steep descent about
15 miles north of Ma'bar, and a small rise half-way between Ma'bar and Dhamar.
From Dhamar to Yerim the track was fairly good but hilly, rough and narrow
in parts ;the rest of the country is mountainous, and the track narrow and bad.
To quote again from my Report.
" From Hodeida to Ajeela a traveller should go on a horse ; after
Ajeela mules are absolutely necessary. Camels can go the whole route
(Hodeida, Menakha, San'a, Yerim, Ta'iz, Kataba) but are very slow and
cannot carry much of a load like they do in the desert. The whole
country is mountainous and would be easy to defend with the cooperation of the inhabitants. I t took the Turks four months to get
from Ajeela to Menakha, about 25 miles by road, not more than 12 or 15
as the crow flies.
" Every house is built of stone and with very small windows and
loopholed all round. All villages are walled and placed in commanding
positions, and have the appearance of mediaeval fortresses.
" The air being so rarified, the people often talk from village to
village across the valleys.
" There is abundance of good water and the country is well cultivated. The best part I saw was the neighbourhood of Yerim, Somara,
Ibb and Ta'iz, where the country was like a good part of England."
The temperature is almost the same in summer as in winter and is very
temperate. The climate is very healthy, being never hot.
Passing through Bauan, we found a battalion and a half of Turkish troops
and a mountain battery engaged with a local rising. After passing Metneh we
came to where the mountains suddenly drop to the long level plateau. We were
at a height of about between 9,000 and 10,000 feet, and from there 2,000
feet below us we got our first view of San'a, with its white houses and green
gardens. There were cries of joy from our Arabs-" Ya a1 lulu medina "" Oh, pearl of cities."
On arrival we had a charming house placed at our
disposal with fruit in the garden and, luckily as usual, a courtyard. Our first
step was to secure mules for our journey south. These we hired and put them
in our courtyard. I then went to pay my respects to the Vali. His name I am
afraid I forget, but he had an extraordinary resemblance to General Kitchener,
and he was very proud of this resemblance, and so naturally on the first
opportunity I remarked on it ! He himself is a first-rate Turkish General, and
was very much liked by his troops. He lived in the field with them under the
same conditions as they did, which were pretty hard. Paying my respects, I
apologized for not having any uniform or respectable clothes with me, but
explained I was travelling as light as I could on my way to Aden. This remark
-" on my way to Aden " took him very much by surprise, and he at once said
that it was impossible for me to go south to Aden. I asked him why, and he
said, " Oh, it is too dangerous. Also there are no roads." As a matter of fact,
some of the track to the south was a great deal better than the one by which we
had come up from Hodeida. I expressed disbelief of the danger and said I could
not believe that any territory of His Imperial Majesty The Sultan of Turkey
administered by such a famous General as himself could possibly be anything
else but safe. We carried on with the usual exchange of compliments and lies
and our audience came to an end. Luckily, we had already secured those mules,
as he had at once given orders that we were not to be supplied with any camels,
mules or horses.
During the time that we were at San'a I wandered about seeing the town,
mostly with a Turkish military doctor, who I suppose was sent with me to make
sure we never had any private conversations with the leading Arab Sheiks
though of course throughout our journey we often did. In one of our wanderings
in the market, we saw two hillmen quarrelling. This was about the price of three
figs, and eventually they both drew out their jumbaiyahs and killed each other.
Our Turkish doctor at once went to them but there was nothing to be done. I
perhaps unconsciously enhanced the British reputation for cool indifference by
strolling on, but the real reason was that the sight of blood always makes me
sick !
As soon as we had got our military mules, we wasted no time in starting
south in case the Vali changed his mind again.
We passed through several villages, and then before amving at Dhamar
one gets a view of an extraordinary range of mountains called the Jebel Dhuran
(Rio de Janeiro : Lagar Loaf) I. We got into mountainous country again after
Dhamar, went on to Yerim, to Seddah ; from there my route was different from
Walter Harris's, and from there we went to Ibb. From Ibb we headed for
Ta'iz, but getting near there we found there was too much fighting going on
and we had to avoid it and head east again through Mawiya, making for Kataba.
From Kataba we went straight down to Ad Dhala and there we found the
This name cannot be traced.-HON
EDITOR.
Aden Frontier Commission encamped. They were very surprised to see us
come over the border, which they were not allowed to put their noses across.
We gave them a good deal of information about the country we had seen during
our last two or three days' travel which they wished to know.
The Head of the Commission was Fitzmaurice who, the previous summer,
when I was at Constatinople, was the Dragoman of the Embassy. A curious
thing which we then reminded each other of was a riding picnic when a girl who
professed to do palmistry read both our hands at the same time. Several things
she foretold for me had come true and she also had said that Fitzmaurice and I
would meet again in a far away and strange part of the world.
On crossing the Frontier we said farewell to the last of our Turkish
escorts. The journey was ended.
T H E GUINEA'S STAMP.
. . . T h e rank i s but the guinea's stamp,
"
T h e man's the gowd for a' that."
THE above couplet, taken from Robert Burns' " For a' that and a' that ",
and all that, is frequently invoked in life ashore as a sort of consolation prize
for not having got anywhere near the top of the tree, and sometimes even as an
excuse for failure. I t crops up repeatedly in the autobiographies of the less
successful-those minor characters who played a part that was interesting
enough to be set on record, but not of sufficient importance to be remembered
otherwise.
I like to think that this couplet has very little validity in the Royal Navy.
I t might have some measure of application oh the lower deck, and it certainly
did before the war, when too many officers were continually doing the work of
the Petty Officers, and the ratings who offered themselves for advancement were
by no means always the best of the bunch. I do not believe, however, that
there has often been more than a grain of truth in it as applied to the quarterdeck. There the rank is a great deal more than the guinea's stamp, or the
higher ranks are anyway. I t is a certificate of assay ; we don't mint guineas
-except from gold. That a t any rate is my belief, which I know to be widely
shared.
I believe, moreover, that confidence in the fairness with which naval officers
are selected for promotion is a factor that does and has done much to preserve
the popularity of the Navy as a profession. You don't have to be rich ; you
don't have to have sixteen quarterings ; you don't have to have influence ; you
just have to do your job and do it well, and you will rise. The three qualities
I have mentioned might seem trifling enough in these days, but they are qualities
that have weighed very substantially in Service promotion, and in our own time,
too. Not ten years have elapsed since the Prime Minister found it necessary
to round off one of his famous minutes-addressed this time to the War Officewith the exasperated remark " the high commands of the Army are not a
club."
In the years between the wars, when brass hats were very hard to come by,
I once served in a destroyer whose captain, though unable to ride, thought it
would help him to promotion if he affected to do so. He therefore obtained a
set of jockey kit, complete with polo mallets or sticks or whatever they are
called, and thenceforth was to be observed earnestly striding about the Club
premises a t the Marsa between chukkers. I mention this because it was not
only the first indication I ever saw that anything except professional competence
and character might be held to influence promotion, but also the last. (And,
I may add, in this case it did not work either.)
I thought about all this when, earlier in the year, I attended a re-union
dinner of a Term that joined Osborne in World War I nearly a hundred strong, in
company with a majority of the earthly survivors. Here, a t any rate, I thought,
is a living proof that merit is rewarded. One had always known that old Baggs
would get on ; and Caggs, too ; and here they were, splendid as post-Captains.
One might not like Daggs, but one had to admit that the Navy needed senior
officers like him, or a few of them anyway. As for Faggs and Gaggs, propping
up the Ministry of Fish and Chips in some dim semi-technical capacity-well,
what else could you expect ? And though my middle name is Faggs, I found
myself muttering-with some elliptical reference to an inscription I once saw
in India-" If you seek fairness and justice on earth, it is here, it is here, it is
here !"
This particular Term was not especially remarkab1e.l I t was one of seven
affected by a variant of the " Geddes Axe " which applied a so-called 40 per cent.
reduction ; actually in this case 20 Cadets were eliminated from a total of 83.
Of 48 who became Lieutenants in the executive branch, 40 reached LieutenantCommander, 21 Commander, and 10 Captain. Hence it appeared that, taking
this Term as a guide to current form, the contemporary probability of the average
Lieutenant's becoming a Captain was about 0.2, or say one chance in five.
I t occurred to me that it might be interesting to make a more general
examination, covering a much wider period. The idea was to pore over the
Navy List a t different dates for the purpose of discovering how the prospects
of advancement had fluctuated over the years. One would select the Lieutenant
as the norm of the qualified officer-one who has settled down in his profession
and means to continue in it ; and try to see what were his average chances of
becoming a Captain. An officer who reaches Post rank can, after all, be said to
have established himself. Even if he gets no further he has enjoyed a full
career, for he does not have to retire until he is 55, by which time he should have
been able to rear a family and has earned a reasonably decent pension. The same
cannot be said of Commanders and mere two-and-a-half stripers ; therefore it
seemed fair to take the rank of Captain as the level to be equated with success.
In order to be able to make comparisons over a wide period, it was necessary to
restrict the analysis to the executive branch. Further, it was necessary to
exclude Lieutenants of more than eight years' seniority from the count before
1915, as the rank of Lieutenant-Commander was not introduced until 1914.
The result of such an analysis is shown in the accompanying Table, which
really speaks for itself. Some explanation is required of the differentiation as
between columns (d) and (e), representing apparent and actual probabilities
respectively ; so let us take an example. In 1845, a Lieutenant surveying the
contemporary Navy might have said to himself ; There are 643 Lieutenants
under 8 years' seniority, of whom I am one ; and there are 467 Captains on full
pay. Therefore it looks as if I have a very good chance of becoming a Captain
provided I stay alive and don't make a fool of myself. " His apparent
probability of reaching Post rank was 0.7. The actual probability, however,
was much lower. The Lieutenant with four years' seniority, who is in the
middle of the batch and therefore representative of it, cannot expect to become
a Captain until some fifteen years have passed-and incidentally that interval
has been assumed to be a constant factor throughout in column (e). Our
Lieutenant of 1845 would certainly have had the sense to add : But the Navy
is still in the process of running down its strength after the Napoleonic wars,
witness the 250 Captains a t the top of the list all on half pay. My chances can't
really be as good as they now seem, because by the time I am due for promotion
"
"
The record of this Term as i t stood in 1941 was examined in THENAVAL
REVIEWin a
paper " Twenty Years After " (Feb. 1942, p. 54) by the contributor " Nobspil ", who,
however, by a characteristic feat of arithmetic managed t o make out that the Term joined
Osborne 116 strong.
we probably shan't have anything like 467 Captains on full pay."-Not being
clairvoyant, our Lieutenant could not have predicted that by 1860 the number
of such Captains would have fallen to 186 ; thus his actual chance of becoming
one of them was rather less than one in three.
Captains
(on full
YEAR
pay)
Lieutenants
(under ,8
years
seniority)
Average
probability of
Lieutenant
becoming
Captain :
Remarks
(a)
(b)
(4
(f)
0.5
0.6
certain
0.5
0.4
certain
certain
0.5
0.7
certain
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
certain
0.7
certain
certain
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.6
certain
0.5
0.5
certain
certain
0.6
0.7
certain
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
?
?
?
?
1750 list not available.
1800 list not available.
excludes 250 Capts. on half pay.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
excludes 170 Capts. on half pay.
do.
do.
do.
do.
includes 321 Acting Lieutenants.
I hope this explanation is satisfactory. Of course, a mere counting of
heads-which is all that an overall numerical analysis can achieve-cannot take
personal qualities into account ; the probabilities indicated by it are, after all,
average probabilities only. They don't alter the fact that " if you're good,
THE GUINEA'S
STAMP.
327
you'll get on," but they do show that at some periods the race has been very
much to the swift, while a t other periods even the mediocre could hope to win a
prize.
I t may be objected that it was quite indefensible, in computing the actual
average probabilities, to assume that the time interval between Lieutenant and
Captain has always been about fifteen years. Clearly that interval tends t o
shorten in wartime and to lengthen in long spells of peace ; all one can say is that
fifteen years is " of the right order "-to use the phase beloved of real statisticians when they have to justify approximations.
Some findings could have been made without going to the trouble of
compiling an elaborate Table. For instance, it is obvious that prospects must
be below average in the years immediately following a major war. However,
looking a t the figures for the mid-Victorian era, it is plain that the Admiralty
was much too soft-hearted over laying the axe on the Captains' list-there can
hardly have been any justification for keeping some 500 Captains on full pay
until 1850, thirty-five years after the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, the congestion
had still not been wholly relieved by 1870 ; and it is for this reason that the
chances of advancement continued to be favourable throughout the era.
Incidentally, the average probabilities cannot have fluctuated as violently in
this period as the Table indicates ; they really require " smoothing ".
I n 1920, we find the number of Lieutenants almost as high as it had ever
been, many of them still "acting " because they had had no opportunity to take
their qualifying courses for that rank. I t was on the Lieutenants of this period
that the " Geddes Axe " fell with terrible ferocity in 1922 ; I remember no
fewer than four thus being shied out from the ship in which I was then serving.
The axe somewhat improved the prospects of the survivors ; but, before it fell,
the Lieutenant's chance of becoming a Captain was one in eight-the lowest i t
has ever been.
In World War 11, the R.N.V.R.-formed in 1903-is seen to have been a
more effective buffer against undue expansion of the Lieutenants' list than it
had been in World War I. In the earlier war, the Lieutenants increased by
over 50 per cent. ; in the later war the increase was less than 25 per cent.
The only comment I feel inclined to make about the most recent figures in
the Table is that, while it is rather puzzling to find no perceptible effort made t o
reduce the Captains' list below what was presumably its peak strength of 1945,
the post-war ratio of Lieutenants to Captains is still about five to one, which is
what it was before the war.
The main conclusion one can draw is that the prospects of advancement have
not improved in the present century. Column ( e ) , giving the average actual
probability, shows a falling trend, with a tendency to stabilize round about
0.25, or a one in four chance. I do not think this is very startling ; it is about
what one would expect. Nor do I think that anyone in the Service would for
one moment say that it was unfair, and that the chances of promotion were too
low, and that the Royal Navy was therefore an unattractive profession. After
all, most professions are like that; I should suppose that the ratios of barristers
to Queen's Counsel, and of incumbents to Archdeacons, are much less favourable.
There is this in it, though ; that while the barrister who does not take silk
and the doctor who does not become a consultant may nevertheless continue t o
enjoy prolonged active employment, the " passed-over " in the Navy is liable
to find himself on the beach a t 45 or 50 with a somewhat bleak further outlook.
Which is outside the scope of this article, but that does not mean that it can be
altogether be ignored.
The only remaining question arising from the present paper is whether the
degree of competition for commissions in the Navy would be sensibly reduced
if the average prospects of advancement were known to the public. In the
summer of 1952, 427 candidates competed for the age sixteen entry to
Dartmouth, and 22 of them became executive Cadets. I t is of course perfectly
proper for the Admiralty (or any other employer) to say " our standards are
very high, and by and large we reject nineteen candidates out of twenty " ; and
in effect they do say this, because they send a full list of results to the parents
of each candidate. But supposing they went on to say :-" Of the successful
candidates, allowing for the elimination of a small percentage during the early
years for one reason or another, the odds are about three to one against
employment after the age of fifty." Would this, one wonders, make any
difference to the numbers competing for admission ?
I t is, perhaps, rather a fruitl&s speculation ; because nobody is likely to
publicize statistics of this sort. I raise the point only because I seem to detect
among present-day Headmasters-and, more significantly, among present-day
boys-a tendency to be " career-minded" and to ask awkward questions about
this sort of thing. E.g., " at what age does one have to retire ? ", and " what
pension does one get ? ", etc., etc. If there is in fact a problem here-and I
have no other worth-while evidence that there is-it is likely that the solution
lies along the lines of improving the prospects of the officer passed over for
promotion ; for example, by making him eligible to a greater extent than now
for " desk " jobs in the Admiralty service. That, however, is outside the scope
of the present article.
A MEASURE OF INTELLIGENCE.
A MEASURE OF INTELLIGENCE.
THEREare certain subjects which seem to excite the interest, often ferocity, of
the public as a whole ; and newspaper editors can always rely on these controversies to enliven the correspondence columns of their journals when things
are becoming dull. Capital punishment for instance, or the right age for
retirement are both old favourites, but recently a new one has been added. . .
the use of intelligence tests as a criterion for entry into schools or professions.
For some time past the Navy has been giving a standard intelligence test to
certain of its new entries, the results of which are entered in an appropriate
column of the Divisional Record sheet, form S. 264. Presumably these tests
are used in the initial selection of personnel for their branches but in as much as
the results of the tests are entered on the S. 264, it is evident that they are
intended to act as a guide in assessing a man's aptitude a t any stage of his
career.
The average officer,however, who is called upon to assess a man's suitability
for some particular job, pays little attention to the results of the test ; and even
if he takes the trouble to read the explanation, barely understands what it is all
about or what purpose it serves. And yet tests of this type were evolved and
sponsored by commercial firms before the war as a money saving proposition.
They were then used by the Services during the war as an economic necessity,
to prevent unsuitable people from wasting their own time and the nation's
money in doing long courses of instruction which they could never have had any
chance of passing.
In order then that the right use can be made of intelligence tests, it is
clearly necessary that officers should be enlightened a t some stage of their
career as to the nature of any test given and the use to which it can be put. I t
will also clearly be necessary at the same time to break down the barrier of
prejudice which always tends to exclude something new, the advantage of which
is not immediately obvious, and which therefore gives rise to feelings of uncertainty, if not insecurity.
The word " insecurity" is used deliberately, because in a sense the
unpopularity of the intelligence test is due to the challenge it brings to our
sense of security and complacency, because it may tend to show in fact that we
are not as clever as we thought we were, or that our children are not the little
genii that we took them to be ; all of which is a blow to our pride. Or perhaps
in reverse, we might discover that we had far more intelligence than somebody
who had done very much better than us in life, and this in itself might be cause
for some heart-searching or jealousy. I t is this that in part explains the fierce
interest that is taken by many leading people, including retired as well as
serving officers, in trying to debunk both the theory and the mechanics of such
tests.
The tests themselves are in fact designed by trained statisticians, to measure
powers of reasoning, quickness in the uptake, and special aptitude for particular
types of work. They are based on a considerable amount of research over a
330
A MEASURE OF INTELLIGENCE.
number of years, and few of the " decriers " of these tests have ever thought to
examine the evidence on which they are based, although it is to be found in
numbers of well-documented publications.
Broadly speaking the great asset of the intelligence test is that it enables
quickness and powers of deduction to be measured, regardless of education or
background. But in as much as a certain level of education may be necessary to
a particular type of job, so the test may be devised so as to demand the possession
of that level of education-and this is to some extent true of the naval aptitude
tests.
A test may be purely general and capable of rapid solution by a clever but
illiterate person, or it may have a strong mathematical bias to find suitable
candidates a t an early date for, say, insurance work. To those that think that
intelligence tests give an advantage to the " Smart Alec " or the precocious
youngster, the answer is, that that entirely depends on the skill and experience
of the devisor of the test, and the purpose for which i t is being set. For which
reason a good deal of research and experiment has gone into the matter.
There are probably few who would decline to believe that a test could be set
which would establish differences of intelligence within broad limits. Is it
therefore unreasonable to suppose that, with a considerable amount of careful
study, these limits could be narrowed down to provide a working basis on which
to judge a candidate's ability to tackle a particular course ; or looked a t from
another angle, which is probably almost as important, to say that a particular
candidate has no chance, however hard he may work, of passing a particular
course or examination.
And it is this that is in many respects the heart of the matter. For if an
officer is able to say a t a glance, and with certainty, that a person cannot,
however hard he tries, pass a certain course, a very great deal of time and effort,
and also disillusionment, is going to be saved. I n fact the test on these broad
lines which is in fact given to some naval personnel, does enable an officer to do
this. But lack of understanding of the nature of intelligence tests causes such
aids to be disregarded ; or else it is forgotten that an intelligence test is only an
aid, and must be combined with a close examination of a candidate's personal
qualities, such as determination, capacity for work, etc., as well as his past
record and achievements ; and of course if he is not known personally, it must
also be combined with a short interview.
For anyone to imagine that he can assess the intelligence of a person he has
only known for a short time, without any form of test, is in itself a form of
vanity and apt to be misleading. Frequently it becomes a matter of individual
opinion, which is in itself unfair.
Recently a well-known peer,l in condemning intelligence tests as a
qualification for entrance to a secondary school, stated that they merely showed
up a certain quality of mechanical aptitude, and gave no scope to the boy of
creative or imaginative ability ; and he stated further that if every candidate
were given an essay to write instead of the test, he could soon pick out the
candidates of real promise. What in fact this statement would appear to mean
is t h a t the author would be able to pick out the essayists of high quality, and
reject those of low quality ; but how he would be able to distinguish between
the many that fell in between the wide limits, it is difficult to say ; and it seems
that it would be purely a matter of opinion. This method would also give a
great advantage to those that had been previously well-schooled or who have
1
Lord David Cecil.
A MEASURE OF INTELLIGENCE.
331
the particular knack of writing, and the statement itself shows a complete
ignorance of the fact that a standard intelligence test is invariably accompanied
by an interview and examination of past record ; all of which can perfectly
well, if necessary, take into account other advantages of background or physique
or whatever else may be required.
The intelligence test in fact takes the form of a scientific yardstick which
may be used by an interviewing officer or board to show within certain limits,
that a particular candidate is or is not capable of passing a course or examination
for which he has applied. I t is only a guide and should not necessarily be the
only criterion by which the man is judged ; for whether or not he eventually
passes may depend on many other qualities. The test should, however, be a
considerable help in sorting out many cases otherwise difficult to decide, and in
eliminating a large number of expensive failures.
D. D.
THE EARLIEST DAYS O F THE KING'S SHIPS.
T h i s i s a brief history of the Royal Navy in early mediaeval times. Starting from the days of
King Alfred, the development of the ship itself. of the organization of the Navy and of naval
tactics are shown side by side. I t was during this period that the tradition of England's
supremacy at sea, at bast in European waters, wasfcrmly established.
KINGAlfred is traditionally regarded as the Father of the Royal Navy, and
indeed there is a great deal of truth in this idea. Offa, King of Mercia, was the
first English ruler to appreciate fully the importance of seaward defence, but
Alfred was the first king with sufficiently wide power and ability to effect it.
The English coasts were ravaged by pirates and adventurers from the North,
and Alfred realized that the best way to defend England was to meet the
enemy at sea. We have only vague and sketchy records of Alfred's own ships,
but they were evidently very similar to Scandinavian ships of the same age, and
of these we have several well-preserved examples.
A ship of this period, in a remarkably good state of preservation, has been
found at Gokstad in Norway. She was of the familiar Viking ship type, a long,
narrow, double-ended, clinker-built vessel. The fastenings consisted of iron
nails or rivets and leather thongs, and the seams were caulked with wool. In
earlier days, leather lashings and wooden pins had been the only fastenings
available, but nails, rivets and wooden trenails were coming into use,
though they did not completely supersede lashings for some hundreds of
years.
This ship carried a mast just forward of amidships and was fitted with
sixteen pairs of oar ports. The remains of a row of shields fitted over the oar
ports were with the ship. The shields were perhaps carried here when in harbour
Or when under sail, but would have to have been removed when rowing. The
ship was steered by a large paddle lashed to a chock on the starboard quarter
and operated by a tiller arm lying at right angles across the boat.
Judging by contemporary writings and illustrations, vessels of all sizes were
built on these lines. In Canute's time ships appear to have been built 200 feet
or more in length with as many as sixty pairs of oars, but such vessels must have
been very difficult to handle, and about 50 to 100 feet in length was certainly a
more common size. These ships could use their sails only with a following or
quartering wind and it was usual to go into battle under oars alone for the sake
of manoeuverability.
The double ended, one-masted ship, propelled by a single sail and oars,
remained the standard type for another three centuries. King Harold's ships
differed little from King Alfred's in appearance, but there had been some
improvement in woodworking tools and methods of construction, so ships
became more numerous and larger fleets could be collected for military purposes.
Ships were still used primarily for transporting troops rather than for purely
naval actions.
In the spring of the year 1066, when William of Normandy began to
assemble his invasion fleet, Harold also gathered together some hundreds of
ships on the south and east coasts so that he could make the English Channel his
first line of defence. William did not intend to become involved in a fight at
sea, so he persuaded the Scandinavians Hardrada and Tostig to raid the
south-eastern coasts of England and thus draw off Harold's fleets.
During the summer there were frequent clashes with these raiders and they
were gradually driven round the coast northwards and finally defeated on land
at York and at sea off the Humber. Harold marched south again with his
army to face the real invasion, but his fleet dispersed. In those days, when
most of the ships were owned by merchants, and the seamen were also traders
or fishermen, it was impossible to keep a large naval force together for many
months. Thus, a t the end of September when he crossed the Channel, William
found the coast clear and was able to land in Pevensey Bay without opposition.
This strategy of William's in distracting and wearying Harold's naval forces was
an important factor in the success of his invasion and illustrates well the
impossibility of maintaining a continuous sea defence in mediaeval times.
In the course of the next few centuries ships developed slowly. There was
little increase in length, but they were built more beamy and deeper, so as to
provide a greater cargo capacity. As the draught became greater, ships were
able to sail closer to the wind and so more use could be made of sail, the oars
becoming gradually less important. In any case, the fuller, ballasted hull,
while it could carry a larger sail area, was less suitable for pulling than the more
skiff-like Viking hull.
As the sail was trimmed closer to the wind, shrouds to support the mast
from the side became more important, and the appearance of these in contemporary pictures indicates the progressive development in the use of sail.
Bowlines were attached to the sides of the sail to keep the luff from falling away
when sailing on the wind, and to enable these to be carried well forward, a
bowsprit was fitted to the ship. Two of the earliest representations of ships
fitted with bowsprits and adequate shrouds are those on the town seals of
Sandwich and Ipswich. The pictures of ships on the seals of maritime towns
form a very valuable source of information on the mediaeval ship.
The ship from the seal of Ipswich shows another very important feature
the stern rudder. A rudder hung on the sternpost appeared first towards the
end of the twelfth century, but the side rudder continued in diminishing use for
another two hundred years. The stern rudder was a great aid to sailing on the
wind, since with a ship heeled on the starboard tack, a side rudder fitted to the
starboard quarter would be almost out of the water. For ease in hanging the
rudder the sternpost became straighter and more upright, thus the advent of the
stern rudder ended the age of the perfectly double-ended ship.
In mediaeval times there was no regular Royal Navy and, as Harold's
failure to ward off invasion showed, the sea could be cleared for a time but could
not be permanently controlled. The King drew his fleets from three sources.
First, he and his nobles possessed a number of ships which they used for fighting,
and hired out to merchants in time of peace. Second, the towns of Hastings,
Winchelsea, Rye, Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich, all fishing and trading
ports, were required under charter to supply the King with a total of fifty-seven
ships, victualled and manned, for a fortnight in each year. Other ports also
were from time to time impressed into providing ships and men.
-"-.The third source was the trading craft of London and other ports which the
King commandeered in time of war. When a merchant ship was impressed,
normally her Master and crew were taken with her. The King then put a body
of troops in her, and appointed a military officer as Captain in command.
Under this arrangement there was no need for difference of design in the
merchant ship and the ship of war. The trading ship could be fitted with fore
and after castles, a fighting top and, later, guns when taken over for a naval
action, and the King's ship could have some of her military trappings removed
when used for trading. In any case, the merchant ship had to be prepared to
defend herself against pirates, and the after castle at least became a permanent
feature.
King John's reign was an important period in the development of the
English Navy, since John, whatever his faults, took a keen interest in his fleets
and in the ship building industry. Two engagements which occurred at this
time are worthy of mention. In 1213, King Philip of France assembled a fleet
a t Damme with the intention of invading England, but William Longsword
attacked first and destroyed the French fleet before it left port. This action
was the first to employ the vital, and to the mediaeval outlook remarkably
far seeing, strategy of defeating the enemy before he could launch his attack.
The next action illustrates well how sea battles were fought at that time.
In the year 1217, when the Barons were in revolt but were being overcome, a
force was despatched from Calais to land in the Thames estuary with reinforcements. Hubert de Burgh, the Governor of Dover Castle, called together the
forces of the Cinque Ports and set out to intercept. The wind was southerly, so
Hubert sailed eastwards till he was directly to windward of the French fleet,
and then turned before the wind and attacked. When nearly upon the enemy,
the English forces fired arrows and threw quicklime downwind, blinding and
confusing the French, then boarded and finished the action off with sword and
axe.
Ships were improving in seaworthiness, but it was not until the full-rigged
ship appeared that a fleet could be kept at sea in almost any weather or could
sail with much success against contrary winds. Thus continuous patrolling
and policing of the seas could not be effected and the fine tradition of the
Freedom of the Seas, maintained by the Royal Navy in later centuries, could
not yet be born.
Although England, by virtue of strength and numbers, could maintain a
somewhat sporadic control of the seas around her coasts, lawlessness abounded
and feud was rife, particularly between the English and French. The Isle of
Wight, Portsmouth, Southampton and other south coast towns were frequently
raided ostensibly in revenge for attacks on the French coastal towns. Many of
these cross-channel raids were really just displays of high spirits of a type quite
common a t that time. In 1293 a particularly vicious feud developed between
English and Norman fishermen, raid following raid until the peaceful pursuits
of the sea were brought to a standstill. At last it was agreed by common
consent to fix a day and fight it out. On the 14th of May a pitched battle took
place in mid-Channel in which Dutch, Flemish, Portuguese and Irish ships also
took part. Records are contradictory on the subject, historians of that time
being very susceptible to National bias, but it seems that after much bloodshed
the French and their allies were overcome.
King Edward, I1 towards the end of his reign neglected his fleets, and the
towns of the south coast suffered in consequence from French incursions.
Edward 111, however, was fully aware of the importance of sea power and in his
reign England gained two more notable sea victories. In 1340, a t the battle of
Sluys, a French invasion fleet was again destroyed before it could leave harbour.
Ten years later, a large Spanish trading fleet returning from an expedition to
northern Europe was intercepted and looted by an English force led by the
Black Prince. This was in revenge for a number of previous attacks by Spanish
ships on English trading vessels. In justice, the only major English defeat at
sea at this time should also be mentioned. At the Battle of Rochelle in 1372
an English fleet sent to the relief of Edward's forces in France was broken up
and soundly defeated by the Spanish and French.
In the illustration is shown a vessel of the late fourteenth century which
represents the one-masted ship a t the peak of her development. Contemporary
writings are so vague and pictures so stylized that one can only conjecture a t the
exact size and proportions of the mediaeval ship. However, this ship may be
taken as typical. She is about 100 feet long, 25 feet beam and 250 tons capacity.
The single yard is hoisted by means of a halyardand two lifts. The sail is trimmed
by braces and sheets taken aft, and wartacks and bowlines taken forward, the
latter to the end of the bowsprit. The after castle is a permanent structure
and has, in fact, developed into the raised quarterdeck, but the forecastle and
top castle can be removed. The ship is decked, with a large removable cover
over the hold.
I t was in the fourteenth century that the Kings of England began to claim
Sovereignty of the Seas. Although, as has been mentioned, the seas could not
then be policed by the Royal Navy as they were later, any trading expedition
proceeding through the Channel could be intercepted by the English fleet.
The King of England claimed sovereignty extending from Finisterre to Norway
and the King's ships insisted on the homage of salute from Dane, Frenchman
and Spaniard alike. The tradition of England's supremacy a t sea was, in later
centuries extended to all the oceans of the globe. The foundation of this
world-wide supremacy was laid in European waters in these early Mediaeval
times, the days of the one-masted ship.
NAVAL CADET ENTRY.
NAVAL CADET ENTRY.
INJuly of last year, a Committee was set up by the First Lord of the Admiralty
with terms of reference which included the investigation of alternative methods
of officer entry into the Royal Navy.
In May of this year the Report '! Cadet Entry into the Royal Navy"
(Cmd. 8845) was published. I t contains some 115 pages and it is thought that
many naval officers, both serving and retired, may not have had either the
opportunity or the time to study this most important document.
The writer, a comparatively junior officer, therefore intends to discuss
some of the recommendations in Part 3 of the Report which deals with " A
new approach to the problem of Cadet Entry."
Let us be quite sure in our own minds why the Committee was formed in
the first place.
From approximately 1849 to 1948, the majority of officers entered the
Service as cadets when about 13-14 years of age. In January, 1948, the Government abolished the 13-year old Dartmouth Entry and the present 16-year old
Entry was substituted. I t was officially stated a t the time that this step was
no reflection whatever upon the success of the old system which had stood the
supreme test of two world wars and had provided officers who had served
their country with great distinction. The new scheme was necessary, it was
said, to meet the changed circumstances of the day " particularly with national
education."
The 16-year old entry has been in force for five years, and from the start
has failed to fill the vacancies. The cumulative shortfall in numbers since 1948
amounts to 77 out of 500 vacancies or 15.4 per cent. of the total. The quality
of the candidates has also given cause for concern. The Interview Board has
admitted that the Admiralty through lack of good candidates has been forced
to take practically every boy whom the Board did not judge to be unsuitable,
including those whom it passed with misgiving.
To present a solution which would provide a sufficient number of potential
naval officers of the required standard was thus the main problem before the
Committee.
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE.
There were twelve members, the chairman being the Judge Advocate of
the Fleet.
I t may be thought strange that there were but two naval officers on the
Committee, one being an Executive officer and the other an Instructor officer,
337
NAVAL CADET ENTRY.
and that although the Headmaster of Dartmouth College was a member, the
Captain was not.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE-A
SUMMARY.
Boys should enter the Royal Naval College a t approximately 13
and 16 years of age.
(B) They should enter without commitment to a naval career though
with the intention a t the time of entry of becoming naval officers.
They would have to decide on reaching the age of 18.
(c) Boys should be selected a t 13 by means of a written examination
specially adapted to the needs of grammar school boys and also by
means of an interview before a small Board. 60 per cent. of the
vacancies should be reserved for grammar school boys, the remaining
40 per cent. being open to all boys including grammar school boys.
(D) The College should be re-organized : a civilian headmaster should
be in sole direct charge. Naval House Officers would remain but
non-resident House Masters should be in charge of the Houses.
I now intend to discuss the above points.
(A)
The 16-Year Old Entry.
The Committee recommends that this entry should continue (but without
commitment).
I would like to quote what the committee said in paragraph 37 of the
Report : " The overwhelming opinion of the educational bodies and naval
witnesses we have consulted is that 16 is not a good age for recruiting future
naval officers."
Why then is the Committee in favour of continuing a method of entry
which it virtually admits a failure, unless it is scared of certain sections in the
House of Commons ?
.
The 13-Year Old Entry.
The Committee recommends that this entry should be re-introduced (but
without commitment).
The Committee reports that the great preponderance of naval evidence
was in favour of this age of entry but that the weight of educational opinion
was against it. The naval witnesses were concerned above all, it is stated,
with the quality of the future naval officer. They pointed out that the Navy is
a profession with exceptional conditions demanding an exceptional sense of
dedication and service. They also stressed the importance of a proportion of
naval officers being brought up to their vocation from an early age in the
atmosphere of Service Discipline and naval tradition. They reminded the
Committee of the conduct of the Royal Navy in two world wars, when the
regular officer complement was so largely a product of this young entry.
Spokesmen of the various bodies connected with the public system of
education were not impressed by the naval arguments.
They pointed out that to commit a boy a t 13 to a naval career ran counter
to the modem tendency of professions generally to defer recruitment till as
late as possible. They maintained that 13 was an impressionable age and
that it would be unfair therefore to take advantage of what might only be a
338
NAVAL CADET ENTRY.
transient fancy. Their other main argument was that selection a t that age
would be very difficult if not impossible. In addition the grammar school boy
would be at a disadvantage with preparatory school boys.
Finally they said that the old entry of 13 was in fact done with : " the
clock could not be put back."
This last sentence is indeed a strange comment on a scheme that has
proved its worth over and over again throughout this century.
Can it be that the only reasons for rejecting it, in spite of overwhelming
naval opinion in its favour, is that political and educational considerations have
been taken very much into account ?
One of the main arguments put up against the 13-year old entry is that
it is virtually impossible to select boys as suitable potential naval officers at this
early age. Yet throughout this century, till 1948, interviewing boys of this
age proved remarkably successful. Why then has it become " virtually impossible " in the last few years ?
Commitment to a Naval Career.
As has been said before, the naval witnesses have been wholeheartedly in
favour of a return to the 13 entry while the educational authorities have been
opposed to it.
To appease both points of view, it seems that the Committee has recommended a " good old British compromise." I t has accepted the fact that 13 is
a reasonable age to recruit a proportion of our naval officers, but has insisted
that the boys should not have to make a final decision until they have completed
four to five years training at the College.
In spite of, I quote, " Evidence gave us no cause to suppose that any
substantial number of naval officers who have entered upon their careers as
boys of 13 later regretted their own or their parents choice," the committee
goes on to say " we fully accept the argument that the age of 13 is a far too
early one a t which to expect a boy to commit himself to a career for life."
The real value of an early entry with commitment is that from the start
of his training, the boy is surrounded by naval atmosphere and tradition so
that he becomes imbued with a sense of service long before he goes to sea.
I think it can safely be said that the Admiralty would never refuse a
request for withdrawal if there were reasonable grounds for it : it is essential,
however, for efficient training in the qualities necessary in a good naval officer,
that a boy of 13 should commence his training at Dartmouth in the firm
knowledge that the natural outcome of his four years there will be the Fleet.
The Qzlota System.
The Committee recommends that 60 per cent. of the vacancies in the 13year old entry should be reserved for grammar school boys.
In the introduction to the New Scheme of Entry, the Committee writes
" the system of selection must manifestly be a fair one offering equal opportunities to all comers." This recommendation is surely the very negation of
" equal opportunities to all comers."
Admittedly the Committee asks that
it be borne in mind that the selection at this point is for a school and not for a
career, but it must be presumed that the Committee hopes that the vast
majority of pupils would eventually enter the Service.
NAVAL CADET ENTRY.
339
The Re-organization of the Royal Naval College.
The Committee recommends that under their new scheme, as the College
would approximate more nearly t o that of a normal secondary school, a civilian
headmaster should supersede the naval captain in direct day-to-day charge ;
civilian housemasters would be in charge of houses although non-resident, and
that naval house officers should remain.
I t will be remembered that under this new method of entry every boy a t
Dartmouth will have signed a statement to the effect that on entry he intended
to become a naval officer. I t is therefore difficult to understand why the
Committee recommends the removal of the naval officer in charge of the college
and also considers it desirable that naval officers should no longer be in charge
of the houses.
The Report then goes on to make this remarkable statement, " there is
no reason why this arrangement should diminish the close contact which
naval house officers have always had with the boys, and which we consider
essential."
In concluding, the Committee says " We have no doubt whatever that it
(the new scheme) could be accepted without in any way impairing the College's
historic role, since the naval atmosphere and tradition would be fully preserved."
In conclusion I would like to say just this.
Whatever systems of entry into the Naval College are to be accepted by the
Government, they must be solely those which are best for the Navy, and not
those which will be acceptable to certain sections in the Country. I t isregrettable that the recommendations in Part 3 of this Report appear to be influenced
throughout by the fear of political and public reaction, and that the overwhelming naval advice seems to have carried so little weight with this
Committee.
To those people who approve of political intervention in the selection of
future naval officers, let me say this : since 1948, the quality of some of the
junior officers has caused uneasiness in the Fleet, and is still doing so, and it
should be remembered that the quality of the cadet entered to-day will be
reflected in the efficiency of the Navy a generation ahead.
The Navy is the best judge of naval officers : let us face the fact that if
the best type of potential naval officers telzds to come more from independent
schools than from grammar schools, then let us have the honesty to admit it.
Surely it cannot be too late to ask that this great Service of ours be lifted
above the chances and changes of political clamour and that the Service itself
be allowed to judge its own requirements.
ASTRAEA.
BOOKS.
"
THE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY."
(Constable & Co., Ltd.
1953. 15s.)
INthe spring of 1945, when some severely cut sequences of Belsen Camp were
shown in a news-reel in London, a number of people in the audience were
heard to remark : " Of course, it's only propaganda."
This lack of imagination and of belief in unpleasantness (to put it mildly)
outside the run of their normal experience has at times been a source of strength
to the British people, but it helped to bring on the second World War and at
the present moment is positively dangerous. British ideas on fair play can
also handicap us in a contest with an unscrupulous enemy. Commander KingHall quotes the case of a newspaper which published a rosy and demonstrably
false account of life in Russia. To a critic the Editor replied : " We had our
reserves about this, but too much publicity has been given to the other side "i.e. the facts about life under the Communists. In other words, the editor
appeared to believe that if he published a column of truth on a subject, he was
under a kind of moral obligation to publish a column of lies on the same subject.
Senator McCarthy's sensational, vote-catching approach would be out of
place in this country but there is an urgent need for much greater awareness of
Russian aims and methods. The small number of votes obtained by Communists
in elections is apt to mask the influence they have obtained in some key Trade
Unions, the extent to which the man in the street is beginning, quite unwittingly,
to echo the party line on the Americans, and the wishful thinking that allows
many people who should know better to suppose that a change in Russian
tactics may represent anything more than that. " The Communist Conspiracy "
is a powerful corrective to apathy and as such, should be required reading for
every citizen.
As readers of The National News Letter will be aware, Commander KingHall is anxious to dispel the idea that war is confined to military operations
and that " peace " consists merely in their absence. He points out that " war "
is derived from the Anglo-Saxon " werre," meaning conflict or strife generally,
and it is at bottom a conflict of ideas. The fact that it can be conducted
effectively-and more economically-by Brains as well as Bodies was not lost
on the Nazis and is to-day exploited in " the most ruthless, highly organized
and powerful conspiracy which has ever darkened the pages of human history."
Concurrently, force is employed as a threat to make the democracies re-arm and
thus strain their economy, to hot up the cold war when this seems expedient
as in Greece and Korea, and in the last resort to be available for a full-scale
assault if weakness in the West should invite this.
To meet this threat the democracies require armed forces as a deterrent
but more positive action is required. In this book, however, Commander King-
Hall confines himself to an analysis of the conspiracy which must be defeated.
I t is not always easy to know what goes on behind the Iron Curtain or in the
minds of the gangsters in the Kremlin but Commander King-Hall presents a
notable selection of the best available evidence, namely their own words and
the record of their actions. In considerable detail he exposes Communist policy
and methods, the Soviet mythology, the spurious Peace Appeals which identify
" peace " with anything promoting Soviet aims and " aggression " with anything resisting them, the naked imperialism underlying double-talk about
Soviet democracy, and the real facts of life in the workers' paradise.
Marx declared that religion was the opium of the people. To-day, communism seems to be the opium of a few intellectuals and perhaps some others
less highly gifted. (The chief impression left on one of the audience at the
Ottawa spy trials was the insignificant personalities of the accused.) Their
attitude to anything outside their own field is so unscientific that they will
accept communist theory even when it flies in the face of obvious facts. No
doubt " The Communist Conspiracy " will be lost on them but to anyone
with a reasonably open mind it supplies nearly all the answers to Soviet claims.
I t also makes it clear that to believe in the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of democracy and present-day communism is to imagine a vain thing
and that it would be extremely dangerous to rely on internal weaknesses in
Russia to provide an easy way out, with no effort on our part.
" Some instinct seems to tell this author that something may be on
the move in Russia which may prove one day to be fissionable political
material. If this surmise proves to be correct, then a very dangerous
moment in world history will arrive when the Communist Party, if it
is to survive in control of the Soviet State, might be faced with the
necessity of inverting itself and becoming democractic in the sense in
which that word is used in the West. As, in fact, it could not survive
in these conditions, desperate men might be driven to desperate deeds.
" Faced with this dilemma, the Communist Party, in order to
reinforce its hold over the Russian people, might seek escape from an
internal contradiction by indulging in external adventures disguised as
crusades for peace or as necessary precautionary actions of self-defence
against Imperialist aggressors. Such policies might take the form of
telling the satellites to attack Yugoslavia, or the East German Communists might be instructed to seize Berlin. The Kremlin would be
ready to disown these adventures if they collapsed or intervene with the
formidable Russian military machine ' in the interests of peace ' if that
course of action seemed likely to be profitable. I t is to guard against
this possible development (amongst others) that the western world must
become much stronger militarily and much more united politically than
it now (1953) is.
" To think otherwise is to be in a dream world from which a horrible
awakening is inevitable, unless we are to assume that everything the
Communists have done, are doing, and say they intend to do to overthrow freedom on a. world scale is not fact but fiction."
The author's intellectual background, clear thought and remarkable
sources of information are always evident, but one or two passages show traces
of rather more hasty writing than usual. With these few exceptions, however,
the book is not difficult reading and is strongly recommended.
"
NAVAL WARS I N THE
LEVANT-1559-1853."
" NAVAL WARS IN T H E LEVANT-1559-1853."
By R. C. ANDERSON.
(Liverpool University Press.
30s.)
HOWmany years of research have gone into the making of this book I do not
know. Some idea of their number can be guessed from the author's mention
in his preface that he was able, some thirty years ago, to find a helper capable
of selecting suitable documents from the Venetian archives and providing the
necessary transcripts, and from footnotes which reveal that two short chapters
are reproduced from an article in the R.U.S.I. journal of 1916. The bibliography contains the names of works in many different languages, though Dr.
Anderson has to admit that he has used but one Turkish source. The general
reader cannot fail to be impressed by the immense care that has been taken
by cross-checking of all available material to present an accurate account of
the naval operations of many warring powers in a particular area over a period
of almost 300 years.
Following a maxim of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, the author has
attempted to be accurate and lucid, but has " left strategy and tactics alone."
I t may be that, as far as tactics are concerned, the decision was a wise one.'
The information about how the battles were fought is all here, and the student
can draw his own conclusions. But maritime strategy cannot be deduced from
the movements of fleets alone, and though we are given short background
paragraphs on the political events which gave rise to wars, and to the military
operations which the fleets supported, it is very hard to judge the pattern of
seaborne trade. I t is by virtue of the action of fleets that seaborne trade by
belligerents or neutrals continues or stops, but the influence of this factor on
the decisions of commanders is not to be determined from the long and detailed
account given in this book.
And it is both long and detailed. Anybody wishing to know what naval
forces of what powers were operating in the eastern Mediterranean at any
particular date will find the answer here. As a result, there are fairly lengthy
passages which make dull reading, for the author seems determined to omit
nothing from his story. One more adverse criticism which must be made is the
absence of a map of the whole area. There is a useful map of the Aegean,
without which much of the descriptive writing would be incomprehensible,
but the book treats of the whole eastern basin of the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea, with mention of ports and islands in the western basin. A general
map should certainly have been provided.
TURKS AND CHRISTIANS.
In naval history as it is (or was) taught in our naval colleges, galleys make
only a brief and ineffective appearance on the scene during Drake's attack on
Cadiz, but in the Mediterranean they continued in use for well over another
hundred years. The early part of the book is concerned with the almost continuous sea warfare between Christians and Turks, and opens with a disaster
for the former when their galley fleet was annihilated off Jerba in 1560, the
"
NAVAL WARS I N THE
LEVANT-1559-1853."
343
Turkish Fleet, at the zenith of its power, returning with 20 prizes to Constantinople. The victory opened the way for the siege of Malta in 1565. The
Maltese galleys, whose depredations had encouraged the Turks to attack the
island, would have been better employed by joining the allied fleet so as to
assist in the relief expedition ; instead they were ingloriously abandoned under
the walls of St. Angelo. The 8th of September is still celebrated in Malta.
This is the day on which the Turks abandoned their trenches and returned on
board their transports. What I believe is not generally known is that they
landed again on the 10th and fought and lost a battle with the Spanish relieving
army, finally departing during the night of the llthll2th. Lepanto, the best
known pitched fight between galley fleets, took place six years later. Although
it resulted in a resounding victory for the Christian Fleet, only 50 out of 230
Turkish vessels escaping, it was not a decisive action, for the Christians failed
to follow it up, and it did not compensate in any way for the previous loss of
the whole island of Cyprus.
For the next seventy years there were almost yearly expeditions of
Christian galleys to the Levant or Turkish galleys to the central Mediterranean,
but nothing very definite was accomplished by either side. Venice, who stood
to lose most by being involved in hostilities, kept out of the fighting, and the
remaining allies often quarrelled among themselves. In 1645, however, the
irresponsible actions of the Knights of St. John led to open war between Turks
and Venetians and to the eventual loss of Crete. The reduction of the island
took 25 years to achieve and led to a number of naval actions. By now the
sailing ship had appeared in both the rival fleets, but galleys were still included.
There was a remarkable series of clashes a t the entrance to the Dardanelles,
where three years running the allied fleet lay a t anchor to await the Turkish
sortie, improving each year its capacity to inflict damage and destruction.
From Crete the land war shifted to the Morea, which the Venetians conquered between 1684 and 1690, though the war dragged on for a further nine
years. There were many naval actions, but all were indecisive. The combination
of sail and oars never seems to have been happy on either side. The galleys had
their uses in a calm but were always something of a liability in anything more
than a breeze ; since their value depended so much on weather conditions no
inclusive method of using them in conjunction with the sailing fleet ever seems
to have been worked out. After a peaceful period of 15 years, broken only
by the irrepressible Knights of Malta and the African corsairs, war between
Venice and Turkey was resumed in 1714. Corfu was successfully held against
a Turkish siege, but the Morea again changed hands.
THE RUSSIAN FLEET.
I t was left to the Russians to show that a Turkish fleet could be decisively
defeated in the Aegean. The Russian Fleet had made a brief beginningin the
Black Sea at the turn of the century, building ships on the Don and its tributaries, but peace in 1711 gave the Russians no outlet to the sea and the fleet
was broken up. In 1736 they tried again, and this time succeeded in holding
Azov at the peace in 1739, though a sizeable fleet was once more broken up.
When war between Russia and Turkey broke out for the third time in 1769,
the Czarina decided to send a detachment from the Baltic fleet to bring the
Turkish Navy to action in the Mediterranean. After an inauspicious start due
to rough weather the Russians slowly assembled a squadron of 9 battleships and 3 frigates in the Aegean, and in July, 1770, inflicted a serious
defeat on a fleet of 20 or more battleships and frigates off Tchesma, on the
344
" NAVAL
WARS I N THE
LEVANT-1559-1853."
Turkish mainland opposite Chios. But the victory could not be exploited so
far from home and with but small military backing. The Russian Fleet returned
to the Baltic in 1775. This short war saw their Black Sea fleet finally established
with bases in Russian territory from which it could in future operate. Between
1787 and 1791 there was a determined effort on Russia's part to gain control
of the Black Sea. This led to some interesting actions, well described with
adequate plans. The Russians scored no great victory but their superiority was
not in doubt.
NAPOLEONIC WARS.
The Nile campaign has often been described, and Dr. Anderson covers it
with the same precision as the rest of his story. But whereas most accounts
return from Aboukir Bay to the rejoicings of Naples and the gambling tables
of Palermo, here our attention is kept firmly on the resulting naval situation
in the Levant. A combined Russian and Turkish fleet appeared from the
Bosphorus and was soon engaged in the blockade of Corfu, while Malta, where
fortifications built up over a period of 250 years had surrendered almost without
a shot to the name of Bonaparte, was watched by a combined British and
Portuguese squadron. Venice and its fleet had ceased to count, and the Russians
operated freely in the Adriatic. By 1802, with the capture of Alexandria, the
French Fleet had been driven from every port in the Mediterranean except
Toulon and those a t the head of the Adriatic.
The alliance between Russian and Turk was short lived. By 1806 they
were at war again and in 1807 there was a most interesting naval engagement,
little known hitherto, off Mount Athos in Greece. The Russian admiral, repeating the essence of Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar, achieved a concentration from
his two columns of 9 battleships against 6 in the Turkish van. The result
was not quite of the same order, and it took longer to achieve than Nelson's
victory. Collingwood is said to have described Athos as " a sort of battle,"
but the fact remains that of the 20 Turkish ships which had left the Dardanelles
only 12 returned. The Russian Mediterranean Fleet soon afterwards perished
miserably by surrender to the French in Adriatic ports or to the British at
Lisbon. Hoste, and later Fremantle, kept up the pressure on France in the
Adriatic until peace came at last in 1815.
FINAL CHAPTERS.
While the Napoleonic wars had been going on various maritime powers
had been trying to stop for all time the interference to trade caused by the
corsairs of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. This brought the navies of Denmark,
Sweden and the United States into the Mediterranean, with results which are
described.
The Greek War of Independence, with its scrappy but violent fighting,
next occupies the scene and brings on it the first steam man-of-war to see
action in these waters. She was the Karteria (Perseverance), built at Deptford
for the Greeks, and armed with eight 68-pounders. After the destruction of the
Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarin in 1827, the war came slowly to an end.
An account of Stopford's bombardment and capture of Acre in 1840, a
last flicker of Venetian naval power against Austria in 1848-49, and the
opening action of the Crimean War in 1853 occupy the final chapter. At
Sinope in the latter year a Russian squadron of eight sailing men-of-war,
heavily gunned and equipped to fire shell instead of shot, destroyed a Turkish
fleet of ten sail and one steam vessel. A solitary steamer escaped from the
pursuit of three Russian steamers.
I t was the end of the sailing era, it was virtually the end of any pretension
to Turkish naval power, and it left Russia ready for a trial of strength with the
navies of Britain and France. It was a well-chosen point to bring this important
study of naval warfare to a close.
T. P. A.
"
LANDSMAN HAY ."
Edited by M. D. Hay.
(Memoirs of Robert Hay 1789-1847.)
(Rupert Hart-Davis 15s.)
" PROPERTY
would have only led me into follies and have made me forget
that in this world we are to live so as to prepare ourselves for another." This
is not a quotation from the book under review, but it might well have been.
" ' I thank you kindly for your good intentions towards me, but there is One
above . . .', etc., etc., replied Ready," will place it for those who are acquainted
with the works of the late Captain Marryat, Royal Navy.
I t was the fashion of the period to moralize on any possible occasion when
writing a book of whatever kind ; such moralizings were, in fact, a necessary
concomitant with any claim to literary good form. Robert Hay was no exception,
but the difference between the fictitious Masterman and the real person whose
memoirs are contained in Landsman Hay seems to me to be that whereas
Marryat's hero really meant all that he said and was a Good Man, albeit
acknowledging various lapses of the past, Robert very clearly had his tongue
in his cheek and was merely conforming to a convention.
Prospective readers, however, must not be daunted by the numerous
excursions into Fairchild Family journalese, for they will find Robert excellent
company when he confines himself to his actual adventures during his eight
years or so at sea. His account of his life reads as the actual antithesis of
Masterman Ready whose motto was service for service sake. Robert worked
all his jobs for his own personal advantage and did not believe in service a t
all, unless it produced some benefit to himself.
When he felt that the Merchant Service offered better prospects than the
King's Service, he didn't hesitate to abandon the latter, and was rather hurt
when the press got him back. He made no claim to patriotism, when given a
second chance to volunteer and " ran " again as soon as he got the opportunity.
His getaway was a really fine effort of physical courage and determination, I,
personally, would have thought several times, whatever the inducement, before
I took my chance on a couple of bladders in the estuary of the Tharnes to reach
the shore " six or eight miles away," starting in a gale of wind on a cold October
night, even if accompanied by a friend, who actually, in the sequel, proved
himself to be the weaker vessel of the two.
Robert, one of a long family born of poor parents and very strictly brought
up, ran away to sea from his native Paisley a t 13 with the intention of getting
a berth in a merchant ship a t Greenock, but failed. Hunger led him to the
King's Service in which most of his sea life was actually to be spent. I t was
after he had eventually run from the wreck of the Ameythest at Plymouth
and gone for his only merchant voyage that he was pressed when trying to
get home at its conclusion. He was for most of his time an officer's servant
although also serving for a period as carpenter's crew.
His description of life in a man-of-war gives a much less harsh impression
than is usually the case in such biographies and the senior officers appear in
much more benevolent guise than is usual. Collingwood had no flogging in his
flagship, Pellew-later to be Lord Exmouth-was almost patriarchal. In fact,
Flag Officers in his day would appear to have concerned themselves rather
more in the running of their flagships than a Flag Captain of to-day would
submit to if he was to command his ship at all !
Mind you, I have little doubts that our Robert took great pains to be on
the side of the angels if at all possible, but his story is remarkably interesting
nevertheless. He was, I think, a bit of a fraud, but, an entertaining one nevertheless ; and died in the odour of sanctity, no doubt as an elder of the kirk,
soon after retiring from the editorship of The Glasgow Courier-a post which
demonstrates that he did not lack abilities.
"
BETTER ENGLISH."
By G. H. VALLINS.
(Pan Books. 2s.)
A GENERATION ago only a small proportion of naval officers were required by
their duties to put pen to paper. Ability to write lucid English was not an
important qualification. Now, however much we may regret it, times have
changed. We are lucky if we fare better than two years afloat in six : the
greater part of our time must be spent ashore and the larger proportion of this
is a t an office desk. If there we fail to express our thoughts on paper in a
logical manner, if we neglect the elementary rules of grammar and punctuation,
if we are needlessly verbose ; if, in short, we fail to write lucid English, we
achieve little. Our chairborne brothers curse our turgid prose which must be
read through several times before they comprehend our arguments. Indeed,
we are lucky if they trouble to do so, for they are busy men. We, being also
daily faced with an overflowing " In " basket will mutter imprecations against
those of our brothers who are themselves similarly guilty.
The plain truth is that ability to write lucid English is now not just an
asset but a necessary qualification for a naval officer. For a very few this comes
as a natural gift ; by most of us it must be learned, as indeed it can.
How ?
One answer is to write for THENAVALREVIEW: the mere fact that our
article is to appear in print acts as a spur to improvement. And the Hon.
Editor's comments on our effort will be salutary as well as helpful.
But we need other beacons to guide our faltering steps. Mr. vallins, in the
book under review, has provided one. No dry text-book this, but an eminently
readable exposition of the art of writing lucid English, with numerous examples,
quoted for the most part from journals that should know better, of how not
to do it. And the price, for an original work, not a reprint, is absurdly cheap.
Your reviewer is all too conscious that, in writing this notice, he has almost
certainly fallen into many of the traps which Mr. Vallins exhorts us to avoid.
Nevertheless, that others may be enabled to do better, I venture, at the Hon.
Editor's suggestion, to add the following brief list of other books which all who
try to write lucid English will find helpful.
An English Dictionary ... to consult when we are doubtful of the
meaning of a word or its spelling.
" Roget's Thesaurus "
... " A Treasury of Synonyms and Antonyms " : to enlarge our vocabulary.
" Mind the Stop " ...
... b y G. V. Carey (Cambridge University
Press)-an excellent little guide to punctuation.
" Modern English Usage " . ..
by H. W. Fowler (Oxford University
Press)-a classic.
" Plain Words "
...
... by Sir Ernest Gowers (H.M. Stationery
Office, 2s.) and its sequels-admirable
correctires for all who by force of habit
write in " Whitehallese."
" Good
English : How to
...
... by G. H. Vallins (Pen Books, 2s.)Write it "
the predecessor to the book now under
review, and as valuable.
WALRUS.
" MANUAL OF SEAMANSHIP," VOL. 11.
ON first examining this manual you are at once struck by its handsome binding
and general format, its size (854 pages against the 357 of the 1932 Vol. 11),
the clarity of its layout; and the excellent illustrations.
As well as the coloured plates of signal flags, and much improved plates
for " Rule of the Road," there are over 400 admirable line drawings and
diagrams, all clearly annotated, to illustrate the adjacent text.
The index is unusually comprehensive, so that any subject can be found
at once without having to search for it under possible alternative nomenclatures.
Noteworthy also are the four appendices which include : an excellent glossary
of nautical terms and expressions with many of their origins, lists of questions
on the information given in each chapter, and the " Rule of the Road, 1948
Regulations," which had to be included as an eventual substitute for Chapter
XVIII, " Rule of the Road, 1910 Regulations," as the latter were still in force
in July, 1952, when the volume was published.
The lists of questions are intended only as a guide to the knowledge required
for passing seamanship examinations, and the introduction states that they
are not for use as stock questions for examinations. In fact, they are so comprehensive that it will be difficult to avoid using them when setting a seamanship
paper. For Midshipmen they will take the place of Sir Christopher Craddock's
useful little book Queries i n SeamansF;ip, which 40 years ago was to be found
in every gunroom locker ;for the Lower Deck they are a most useful innovation.
That this new Volume I1 is more than twice the size of the old one is not
the whole story-because yet a third volume, " comprising information on the
more advanced aspects of seamanship, and intended as a book of reference
for all seamen of experience," has now gone to the printers and will be published
early in 1954. And a comparison of the 27 chapters of the new Volume I1 with
the 18 of its predecessor shows to what extent and in which directions seamanship has developed in the past 20 years.
Nowhere perhaps has the knowledge required of a seaman advanced more
as a result of the Second World War than in matters of ship safety, fire fighting
and damage control. In the 1932 volume these were dealt with very briefly on
the basis of peace-time evolutions only, and coping with the different forms of
damage received in action was not even mentioned. In the new manual three
chapters totalling over 50 pages are devoted to these vital subjects.
" Replenishment at Sea," another branch of seamanship which was greatly
developed in the late war, is now dealt with extensively. All the different rigs
and methods of transfer, of both liquids and solids, are fully described with
the aid of admirably clear and well annotated line drawings. On this subject
the 1932 volume had no illustrations, and barely more than one page of text,
dealing only with fuelling destroyers at sea. The Navy's rapid development of
those logistic operations was, of course, due mainly to our co-operation with the
United States Fleet in the Pacific during the last year of the war-but it is
worth recalling that it was we who carried out the initial experiments of fuelling
a t sea shortly after oil fuel was introduced, and then practised this art in the
First World War.
" Ship Recognition " is another new subject introduced in this volume, of
which it forms the first chapter. It is very fully dealt with, both as regards
different types of warship---Russian, French and American, as well as our
own-and all types of merchant ship. A " hallmark " is established for each
type, and the salient features of each are described and illustrated by black
silhouettes. Actually, there are two hallmarks for each type, the first showing
the outline of the ship as seen from a distance or in low visibility, and the
second as seen from the air. Included also are useful tables and diagrams for
estimating the course and speed of ships sighted, and the gross tonnage of
merchant ships.
So much may depend upon instant recognition of ships sighted that the
comprehensive nature of this chapter is probably justified. And a seaman
lookout-whose duty is usually so boring-will be much keener if he has been
taught intelligently what to look for, and why. Doubtless for some good
reason, the recognition of aircraft is not included in the Manual of Seamanship.
Though a separate chapter now deals with different types of aircraft, and
how to manhandle, tow and rescue them, the information given appears to
be only a bringing up to date of that in the 1932 volume. In Volume I of the
new manual, however, the layout and general arrangements of modern aircraft
carriers are described, also the organization and equipment for flying off and
landing on.
As in the new Volume I, the two longest chapters are devoted to " Rope
and its Usage," and " Rieing." These subjects, especially the former, are
dealt with so comprehensively and in such detail that I doubt whether the
"
SAILING TO FREEDOM."
349
Boatswain or Master Rigger of a Royal Dockyard could add to them. From
the point of view of present day practical seamanship, much of the information
given--on the manufacture and characteristics of different kinds of cordage,
for examplemight perhaps have been omitted. Much of it will in practice
only be useful to Dockyard officers.
Two most valuable chapters in both volumes (which never overlap, the
second volume always giving more advanced informatiori than the first) are
on " Naval Communications " and " Ceremonial." In the second volume are
included excellent instructions on drafting, passing and distributing different
kinds of messages, on the recognized abbreviations and prosigns, and on signal
and message procedure generally. The chapter on ceremonial will be invaluable
to Officers and Midshipmen-of-the-watch and quartermasters ; and like the
glossary of nautical terms it will help to imbue the Lower Deck with pride in
understanding the traditional ceremonies and customs of the Service.
In this volume also are chapters on tidal streams and currents, ship's
compasses and terrestrial magnetism, charts and chart work and the use of
other hydrographic publications, the solar system, time and the stars, weather
and meteorology, and elementary pilotage. Their inclusion in the Manual of
Seamanship is now logical. Ratings seldom had access to the Manual of
Navigation or the old Handbook of Pilotage, which formerly were the only
Admiralty books dealing with these subjects, and such knowledge is necessary
to coxswains of boats and senior seamen ratings in small craft.
A review of this book would be incomplete without mention of its clarity
of expression and the good English in which it is written. Nowadays, when
ratings as well as officers have to absorb such a mass of complex technical
information, it is essential that the Navy's manuals and textbooks should be
written in the simplest English, entirely free from ambiguity. In a book which
will be regarded universally by the greatest maritime race as the standard
work on seamanship, it is also good to find in it a simple dignity of phrasing,
and the use of the traditionally correct nautical terms. This is perhaps all the
more important at a time when even the Admiralty's " handouts " to the Press
have sometimes referred to Her Majesty's Ships as " it," and use such expressions as " aft of the funnels " and " forward of the beam " ; and when,
through our close co-operation with the United States Navy, there is a tendency
to use certain jargon which has no seamanlike origin.
G. A. B. HILLS.
"
SAILING TO FREEDOM."
By VOLDEMAR
VEEDAMand CARLB. WALL.
(Phoenix House, Ltd.
12s. 6d.)
THE E ~ m awas a Swedish sloop, 36 feet long, 50 years old, with only four
sleeping berths. She was rotten in many of her planks and had a number of
copper " tingles " to patch her up. Into this wretched old " Tore-out " climbed
sixteen men, women and children, of Estonian nationality, fugitives from the
Russians. It took them just under six months to cross from Goteborg to
Norfolk, Virginia ; and that they succeeded must be regarded as something
of a miracle. They suffered all that the sea could do to them and, worse still,
ran out of food and drink, but they survived without a single casualty, in
conditions which can best be appreciated by those who sail in small boats ;
for example your Reviewer himself owns a boat, six feet longer than the Erma,
though admittedly not so beamy, and once had seventeen people onboard for
one hour. To have sailed across the Solent with that number would have been
an all-time epic, but . . . 8,000 miles-men,
women and children ! The
Russian menace can be no myth, for these people faced an almost certain death
rather than be taken by their mortal enemies.
The story is well told by the joint authors and was presumably written in
English in the first place, since no mention is made of a translator. The literary
style is modern, in that the many hair-raising adventures are written down
instead of up. Thus the reader has constantly to pinch himself into remembering what an extraordinary thing is happening before his eyes. Many ships, less
suitable than Erma, have crossed the Atlantic, but it is doubtful whether a
worse-found vessel has ever succeeded.
The persistent courage and cheerfulness of the adults, and the pathetic
acceptance of an overcrowded cabin, primitive sanitation and constant wetness, due to the leaky condition of the boat, by the children, who went on
" cutting out " pictures from old magazines in the height of the bad weather,
tells the same story-that the Estonians have a quality of resoluteness which
one day may well enable them to free themselves from the tyranny of their
Russian masters.
Strongly recommended by this Reviewer as well as by the Book Society.
"
UNBROKEN."
The story of a Submarine.
By ALASTAIRMARS, D.S.O., D.S.C.
(Frederick Muller, Ltd.
AND BAR.
12s. 6d.)
THISis the personal story by the author of his own " war " which he fought
while in command of the submarine Unbroken, and for which his gallantry was
recognized by the award of a D.S.O. and a D.S.C.
I t is written with a forcefulness which is characteristic of a man of action,
without false modesty and with a natural literary touch which succeeds better
than more closely-considered ventures on paper. I t is intensely readable and
gives a better insight into the state of affairs in our own Submarine Branch
than any book so far written (and that includes " One of our Submarines ").
The author starts with a staccato resum6 of world affairs in November,
1941, when his story begins and, in a few pages he drops us back into those
grim days ; thence takes us by the hand to Vickers Yard a t Barrow-in-Furness
to Unbroken as she then was : " speckled with rust, she was far from completion-She made me think of a sorely battered hulk, salvaged from the ocean
depths. Only the barnacles and seaweed were missing."
After completion, working-up practices, and some preliminary cloak-anddagger work in the western Mediterranean, Unbroken went to Malta and began
a series of patrols, each of which was of epic quality, and Alastair Mars brought
his command back after every sortie with a record of destruction of enemy
vessels which earned awards for him and many members of his crew.
The outstanding quality of this book is that it shows better than any other
one the effect of the heavy casualties on those who remained to c a n y on the
fight ; for, in that generation of " submariners " the casualties were shatteringly
high. That morale remained so consistently good was due not only to the quality
of leadership in the submarines themselves by such men as Mars, but also to
the guidance and cheerful encouragement given by the senior officers whose
invidious task it was to sit a t home and send their charges out to face heavy
odds.
The Mediterranean Flotilla under the command of " Shrimp " Simpson,
fought a tremendous battle, but not without price. I t is well that one a t least
has survived to give a clear and undramatized account of what the submarine
war was like in the hottest spot of all. I t is a grim story, written not without
humour of its sort, and it will take its place worthily on the book-shelves of all
whose interests lie in stories of bravery, skill, and well merited success.
A REPLY TO
"
A REPLY TO CRITICISM "-I.
SIR,-In his article entitled " A Reply to ' A Reply to Criticism ' " in the
May number of THE NAVALREVIEW,S.W.R. has sought to perpetuate a
popular but dangerous misconception as to the degree of our preparedness to
meet the potential menace of the German magnetic mine.
I t is my understanding that S.W.R.'s primary concern is to ensure the
adequacy of our preparations to meet a future crisis. Further, it is my understanding that he is in agreement, albeit somewhat reluctantly, with the generally
accepted proposition that an intelligent interpretation of past events is an
essential preliminary to the formulation of a sound forward policy.
If these assumptions are correct, then I feel it to be incumbent upon those
of us who are aware of the facts to place them on record, so that anyone who
wishes to accept S.W.R.'s invitation " to think out the reasons" for the
existence of the state of affairs which he describes so categorically may at least
be spared the trouble of lending a local habitation to the airy nothing, as
Shakespeare so neatly puts it.
First, then, S.W.R. states that " the arrival of the German magnetic mine
caught us by surprise." The implication here is that not only had we never
heard of a magnetic mine, but that we had done nothing whatever to develop a
counter thereto.
The facts are that in the year 1935 the development of our own magnetic
mine had reached a stage at which the need to provide an antidote to such a
device had become apparent. It may be remarked in passing that our new
mine differed materially from the World War I design, and was in all respects
superior to the German version, as subsequent events were to show. As a
result, therefore, of strong representations by V e r ~ o nan
, Admiralty committee
was set up to consider the problem, and from then on a vast amount of work
was done on the accumulation of a store of basic knowledge concerning the
nature of the magnetic fields in the vicinity of different types of ship, in the
investigation and practical trial of various methods for the self-protection of
ships, and of different methods of sweeping. The latter included the use of a
ship carrying a large electro-magnet in the bow, similar in design to the German
" sperrbrecher," but not very effective, as the Germans themselves were later
to discover to their great discomfort.
It is, therefore, perfectly fair to ask why we were not in a position to deal
fully with the German magnetic mine as soon as it was laid. There are two
semi-technical answers to this question. First, we did not know that it was a
magnetic mine (it might have been one of at least four other types), and
secondly even had we known that it was a magnetic mine, there would have
been a fifty per cent. chance that the blind application of any particular form of
counter would have been disastrous. The essential need was to discover the
manner in which the enemy had applied the magnetic principle.
353
CORRESPONDENCE.
None the less, it is equally fair to enquire why we did not at least have
available a few samples of every conceivable type of counter, so that by a
process of trial and error we could have established which was the correct one
to provide in quantity. That we were saved from this costly, hazardous, and
time-consuming process by the early recovery of an actual German mine does
not relieve us from the necessity to seek the reasons for our failure to provide a
complete set of clubs from which to select the proper one for the particular shot
in question.
There were two principal reasons for this apparent failure :
(a) lack of time, money, and manpower. I am afraid that S.W.R. must
accept this proposition, which was largely a reflection of national
policy. The effects were aggravated in the particular case of the
Admiralty for the reasons contained in the second limb of this
answer, i.e.,
(b) a very strong body of opinion that mines of any kind, whether used
by ourselves or by the enemy, coupled with the failure (not, be it
noted, for want of trying), on the part of those who had studied the
question, to establish the contrary view. Neither minelaying nor
minesweeping, in fact, cut much pre-war ice, in spite of the lessons
of World War I. The position is very different to-day.
We may now turn to S.W.R.'s second statement, to the effect that " even
With
our enemies were astonished that we had not got an antidote ready
great respect, I absolutely refuse to believe this statement, which not only runs
directly counter to my own personal knowledge, but is not in accord with the
actual events. The Germans (for some odd reason) were convinced that they
had a monopoly in this particular sphere of underwater warfare, and embarked
on their campaign with a stock of only one hundred magnetic mines, the
assumption being that it would take us at least two years to develop an antidote.
This would have been perfectly sound reasoning but for the fact that, as
already stated, we did not start from scratch.
Thus, when the recovery of an actual enemy mine provided us with the key
wherewith to unlock our store of basic knowledge, the Germans were astonished
at the rapidity with which we dealt with the situation, and their whole minelaying
set-up fell into disrepute. Technically, we kept ahead of them for the rest of
the war, but in any event the operational handling of both their minelaying and
their minesweeping resources was inept by any standards.
At this point, one might as well digress for a moment to answer the
question : " If all this be true, why did the Prime Minister have to broadcast
an appeal for assistance in meeting this ' new ' menace ? ", because sooner or
later someone is bound to ask it. The answer is that he did not have to make
such an appeal at all, and the question should read " Why did he do so ? "
To sum up, it is in my submission altogether misleading for S.W.R. to
imply that we started from scratch. It is, however, abundantly clear that for
the reasons to which I have alluded we started much too near to scratch for
anybody's peace of mind, and it therefore seems only proper to try to suggest
some steps whereby a recurrence of the situation in which we found ourselves
in 1939 may be avoided. The principal of these steps I conceive to be as
follows :(a)the allocation of a proper proportion of our available scientific
manpower to basic research, so that when the time comes we may
have at hand an adequate supply of data upon which we can draw to
meet any particular situation ;
'I.
CORRESPONDENCE.
(b) the establishment of a standard system of reporting the occurrence of
underwater explosions, designed to provide as much useful information as possible for analysis by those responsible for diagnosing the
cause of the explosion ;
(c) the inclusion of mine warfare, in all its aspects, as an integral part of
naval education and fleet training, at the same level as that accorded
to the other facets of war at sea ;
(d) the appointment to the Board of Admiralty and to the Naval Staff of
a representative body of officers, i.e., no one branch of the service should
be in a position to upset the balanced distribution of our available
resources.
All the above steps are, to the best of my knowledge, being taken, but I
must, nevertheless, take pains to warn S.W.R. and any others interested that in
the sphere of mine warfare the potential developments are so varied and so
intricate that the best we can possibly hope for is to be in a position to reduce to
a minimum the gap between the advent of a " new " weapon and the provision
in bulk of the antidote. To expect to eliminate this gap completely is to cry
for the moon (and a dashed badly designed moon at that).
Finally, I wish to make it quite clear that I have no vested interest in this
question, neither do I seek to grind an axe. As one who so happened to be
in a position to observe events, however, I believe it to be my duty to ensure that
due credit is accorded to those principally responsible for proving to the
Germans how wrong they were, that is to say,(a) those scientists and engineers who, working in an atmosphere of
pre-war financial stringency, contributed so much to our knowledge
of the problem ;
(b) those whose skill and courage in the recovery and stripping of an
enemy mine enabled that knowledge to be applied ; and
(c) those in the electrical engineering industry who spared no effort to
provide and instal the necessary equipment in an incredibly short
space of time.
Yours truly,
A REPLY TO
"
A REPLY TO CRITICISM ".-11.
SIR,-In the article " A Reply to ' A Reply to Criticism ' " in the May, 1953,
THENAVAL
REVIEW(NO.2, VOL.XLI) reference is made to alleged shortcomings
in minesweeping methods and depth charges in September, 1939. The following
information may be of interest.
1. Mznesweeping.-The ground magnetic mine used by the British in 1918
was not a successful unit. I t consisted of a magnetic needle mounted in the
horizontal plane and suffered from inherent defects. I believe that it neither
had any success against the enemy nor were any swept subsequently by
magnetic sweep in 1919. During the following 20 years the British magnetic
355
CORRESPONDENCE.
mine was developed on an entirely different principle. This excellent mine had
passed its design tests and was in production in September, 1939, the first units
being ready for operational use in the spring of 1940. In July, 1939, a magnetic
sweep for this mine had been devised and tried out in the waters between
Cowes and Spithead. This sweep was indeed rather clumsy and the attachment
of the magnets as the wires were veered was tricky but, as a magnetic sweep for
our own mines, it was successful. Came the war and the sweep was used, with
never a bite. On recovery of the first German mines the reason was plaina technical matter on which I will not enlarge here.
While on this subject I wouldlike to mention that before the 1939 war, rninesweeping was looked upon as essentially a seamanship problem and the experts
were to be found in the flotilla at Portland. In the Vernon there were two
Technical Officers in the Mine Design Department and one Lieutenant-Commander (non-specialist) under the Mining Commander. All these, of course, did
their best, but it was not a really satisfactory arrangement and it had the added
disadvantage that, on a threat of war, the flotilla with the expqts evaporated
into thin air, having gone to its war station. This has now, happily, been
remedied.
2. Deph Charges.-Before the war started the Navy had expected to use
an R.A.F. weapon (the 250 pound bomb) for aircraft attacks on submarines.
I am in no position to say why this bomb was not forthcoming but I can state
that no trials with depth charges from the air were carried out before the war.
There was " no requirement." Unfortunately, when it became apparent that
depth charges would have to be used it was immediately found that the existing
charge (as carried by ships) had such poor flight in air and performed such
extraordinary gymnastics on hitting the water, that it could not be used and a
new and smaller design had to be commenced. This, subsequently, had a
successful career.
Yours truly,
S. B.
TECHNICAL ARTICLES.
SIR,-I noticed that in the report of the General Meeting in February's
issue, the cry was again raised for articles of a technical nature.
I am most thankful that you were firm in your refusal, as there is already
such a glut of technical literature in existence that it is quite impossible to read
even the limited amount dealing with one's own specialist field, so please leave
THENAVAL
REVIEWexactly as it is, an excellent source of general information
on naval matters.
Yours truly,
F. R. B.
CORRESPONDENCE.
CRUISERS.
"
More about Cruisers," See THE NAVALREVIEW,February, 1953.
SIR,-I
" Annin
was interested in a recent article
"
More about Cruisers " by
". I am not altogether sure what is meant nowadays by the term
" cruiser ".
Originally the term must have come, literally, from a ship that
cruised, normally on her own, and the most essential qualities were perhaps
seakeeping and endurance. In more modern times the cruiser type came to be
used in the fleets, mainly for scouting, and later for other functions as well. In
the last war period most people came to think of a cruiser by size rather than
function and I suppose the Washington 10,000tons was considered the maximum
cruiser size. At the present time, however, the Americans build 17,000 ton
cruisers, and we call the 3,000 ton Darings light cruisers. They are very
different ships. I assume " Annin " had the 10,000 ton type of ship in mind
when he wrote " More about Cruisers ".
When discussing the best force for searching for surface raiders, he says that
he feels that a pair of modern destroyers would be a better escort for a carrier
than a cruiser. That seems a reasonable view, but surely the same sort of
argument holds good in greater degree for most of the other functions that he
puts forward for the cruiser in the future. Below I list them briefly with my
own remarks :-
(a) As counter to a surface threat to convoys. I n the future this
function will mainly fall to the strike aircraft. The large cruiser
may be required for sometime yet.
(b) As heavy A.A. escort. The size of ship is a technical gunnery
matter but I see no intrinsic reason for a heavy ship ; the larger the
ship the bigger target for attacking aircraft. Accurate fire control
with a medium or small gun may well be more effective than a big
gun big ship. I would rather have a Daring or even a Battle to
defend me than any of our present cruisers.
(c) As air warning pickets.
I do not think that it is generally agreed
that " a cruiser is the natural choice ". The Americans used
destroyers successfully in the last war, and now seem interested in
submarines. Surely the smallest ship that can carry the radar and
other special gear is the requirement and it would be rash to say this
will always be a 10,000 ton ship.
(a)
For offensive raids on convoys and shipping. The torpedo or underwater weapon is the most effective for sinking ships and a destroyer
or smaller " torpedo boat " should be more effective than a cruiser,
if indeed surface ships are ever used for this purpose again.
(e) For bombardment. There have been occasions when the heavy
gunfire of a cruiser or battleship has been invaluable to the army,
but the more usual bombardment tasks can now be adequately
fulfilled by destroyers. We cannot afford cruisers for those special
occasions only.
357
CORRESPONDENCE.
(f) In peacetime for showing the flag, or making a show of force. I t is
agreed that a cruiser gives a better cocktail party or dance, that she
makes a better ship for a flag officer and that she can make a bigger
landing party ;but again we cannot afford the immensely expensive
cruisers for these functions only, and we must get used to carriers or
destroyers doing them.
To summarize therefore, it seems to me that the functions which " Annin "
assigns to his 10,000 ton ship should be done by one or more 2 or 3,000 ton ships.
The latter also have the priceless advantages of being able to look after themselves against submarines, and of being less vulnerable to mines, these being two
of the major threats in the immediate future.
I hope we may have some further views on the functions of cruisers.
Yours truly,
"
NOTHING ELECTRIC IS RELIABLE "-A
REJOINDER.
(See F.0.I.C.-11, Correspondence, THE NAVALREVIEW,May, 1953.)
s~~,--The commendation of such an engaging writer as " A.W.C." and
the witty criticism of Sugar Peter S.P." hereafter) do enhance the pleasures
of THE NAVALREVIEW.
('I
In my article " F.O.I.C." the aphorism " nothing electric is reliable " is
mentioned on lines 5 and 6 and a palliative is forthwith provided. I agree
with " S.P." that after electrical failure it is far too easy to murmur " nothing
electric is reliable " but let us be " timeous " (a word favoured by canny old
Scotsmen) and " beforehand with the world " (a baptismal advice to parents
in the north)-in short, " S.P." don't " miss the bus." Counters and precautions for gyro compass and telegraph disasters will, for example, be found in
a work with which I burdened the world 20 years ago (still procurable !j.
Since this letter was begun to-day, and not for the first time, our district
and (now I'm telling ye) it includes the Royal B.urgh of Auchterarder together
with Muirton, Muthill and much of Perthshire (it's no laughin') has been
deprived of light and power, all despite the proclaimed blessings of the North
of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board.
Electricity and whisky have it in common to give comfort to a number of
people but, had any other commodities been as effective without causing so
much trouble, both would have been superseded long ago !
" S.P." condemns me to the last exaction of the law. May I plead for the
electric chair when my time comes ? Who knows, perhaps the fuze may go,
the wiring burn out or the whole outfit oblige by " coming off the board " ?
358
CORRESPONDENCE.
" S.P."
I cease to chide and, assuming that you will with accurate attention assimilate my admonitions, I will try always to think of you when the
Minister gives out Paraphrase No. 11.
" 0 happy is the man who hears Instruction's warning voice."
Yours truly,
J. A. G. T.
MEDALS.
s~~,--Manyreaders like myself will have enjoyed Admiral Sir William
James' article in the May number " A Lost Opportunity " on the question of
decorations and medals, and will agree with most of the points that he raised.
There is no doubt that the authorities faced with the problem of awarding
either of the above have a very difficult task, albeit a rather fascinating one.
Whatever the results of their labours, they will never satisfy everyone, but I am
sure that it is better to err on the side of too FEW ribbons than too many.
As regards the 1914-1918 war, naturally I am not old enough to speak with
any authority, but I recall to mind some remarks of my father's on the subject.
I remember him saying what an honour it was to be able to put up the " 1914
red, white and blue " ribbon, which showed that the wearer had been serving in
the first few months of the war. In the case of the Army, also, it indicated in
most cases that the wearer was one of the " Old Contemptibles ".
This was the ribbon referred to as Pip, but I do not think that it lost any of
its value by such a nickname, which was merely a light-hearted expression
typical of the British fondness for slang.
This point, however, leads on to something which has always puzzled me
personally in connection with ribbons issued after the last war. I refer to the
1939-1945 Star, in actual colours a very attractive one, but I submit, with all
deference, that its value is very largely " nil ". My opinion is backed to a
certain extent by the fact that it is almost universally known as " the NAFFIE
medal ". (Not that any slight is intended to that admirable body, the
N.A.A.F.I., but it merely indicates by inference that the medal was so easy to
obtain that one merely had to walk into the nearest canteen and ask for it.)
Now my point is this. Had that ribbon been designated the " 1939 Star ",
or even the " 1940 Star ", then it really would have been worn with pride by
those who were serving at the outbreak of war, or even during the time of
" their finest hour ".
I t would have been comparable with the 1914 ribbon.
As it is designated, the same ribbon is now worn by a man who was in uniform
on the 3rd of September, 1939-and subsequently had six months active
service, as was almost universally the case-and a man who joined up and had
six months active service in 194.5. To my mind, that makes the ribbon almost
valueless, and that is why it has been nicknamed " the Naffie medal " in tones
of ridicule, as opposed to the " Pip " of the 1914-1918 war, which was referred
to with pride.
359
CORRESPONDENCE.
As regards campaign medals, there again the Committee (or Government)
concerned had a very difficult task to define the qualifying periods of service, or
other qualifications. But if I may be allowed to quote a personal case, here is a
striking example of anomaly. By virtue of the fact that the ship in which I was
serving was east of a certain longitude in August, 1945 (AFTER V-J Day, as it
happened !) I am qualified to wear the Burma Star.
This is a very attractive ribbon, earned a thousandfold by those who fought
in the jungles of Burma, took part in naval operations in that area, or who flew
over those parts ; but NOT earned at all by those like myself who never
fought in that part of the world at all !
From a naval point of view by far the best campaign ribbon is the Atlantic
Star, both from its attractive colouring and the fact that the Battle of the
Atlantic was so vital and non-stop from September, 1939 to April, 1945. But
there again, it is a matter of opinion whether the qualifying period of six months
(out of a total of sixty-eight !) is too short.
The North Africa Star follows as a close second for those who earned it in
the tense Mediterranean struggle ; but I seem to remember that it was not until
late 1944 that it was announced that the defenders of Malta were allowed to put
it up.
The " Italian ", " France and Germany ", and the " Pacific " campaign
ribbons were well-earned by those who fought in them, albeit the operations
were of shorter duration. But I do think that ribbons should only be worn by
those who were fortunate enough to see active service. A friend of mine who
sports the Pacific Star never left the hospitable shores of Australia, where he
spent his time in a rest-camp as a spare with many others, awaiting the
casualties which fortunately never occurred. He is always the first to admit
that his service, though active, was not in the category intended for qualification
of the ribbon.
I t all boils down to this. Let the man who fought wear the ribbons. Any
naval man who was unlucky enough to spend long periods on his base at a base
should not wear the same ribbon as his opposite number in a sea-going ship on
active service. Tough luck on the former, but there it is. The Defence medal
allows for the fact that every base was bombed, and after all nobody wants a
medal for being bombed.
The only possible exception to that rule could be Malta ; after all there
are no rules without exceptions !
Yours truly,
W. D.
COASTAL COMMAND-A
LEAD TO THE WAVERERS.
SIR,-To give a new slant to the old chestnut " Should Coastal Command
Belong to the Royal Navy or to the R.A.F.? " calls for more imagination than I
can muster, but looking back through THENAVALREVIEWfrom November '51
1
360
CORRESPONDENCE.
onwards, I find that there are three or four arguments that have not been mentioned or emphasized. Every fair-minded person must grant that this problem
is not absolutely a clear case of black and white, but of varying shades of grey ;
that there are pros and cons on both sides.
My first point, a psychological one, is this : Is not this state of parental
uncertainty an incentive in itself for the R.A.F. to do their maritime job well ?
(And in this respect is it not true that Coastal Command has, in fact, been up to
strength when other R.A.F. Commands have not ?)
My second point is : Supposing that the present situation has been
weighed in the balance and found wanting, is now the time to change, knowing
the difficulties we went through in taking over the F.A.A. from the R.A.F. so
shortly before World War I1 ? Would it not be better to wait until the new
Russian peace protestations are proved by deed as well as by word ?
My third point (on the naval side) is this : Although " A.H.T.F."
has dealt neatly with one of the R.A.F.'s flexibility claims by ironically
comparing the Shackleton with the Delta bomber, is there not also the broader
aspect of the case ? If Coastal Command were part of naval aviation, the
numerical balance between carrier-borne and shore-based maritime aircraft
would be dictated exclusively by conditions and circumstances of fighting
efficiency rather than by inter-Service rivalry. Increases and reductions within
one Service are easier than increases and reductions imposed by joint direction
affecting more than one. A lack of balance exists now. Where, for example,
are the long-range maritime shore-based fighters and strike wings that did so
well under the R.A.F. in the latter part of the war ? Our camer-borne squadrons
could not on their own cope with the present strength of Russian naval aircraft
and surface raiders. At the best of times, for weather and other reasons, both
carrier-borne and shore-based aircraft are necessary, and the present lack of
the latter for this particular purpose should not have developed if our maritime air forces had been under undivided naval control, as it is in the United
States.
We have, of course, to draw the line somewhere. We cannot expect all
aircraft used for maritime purposes to be under the Admiralty, nor even all
those used for the defence of our sea communications, as some people have
absent-mindedly suggested. For example, offensive action by air mining in
enemy waters and strategic bombing against ships and shipyards in enemy
harbours must remain the responsibility of Bomber Command, as convoy
defence against enemy strike and mining aircraft in our own coastal waters
must remain that of Fighter Command. Here the R.A.F. can justifiably
shout " flexibility ".
These then are the onlypoints or new emphases I can add to all the long list
of arguments already discussed in THENAVAL
REVIEW
by " Spud ", " Scorpio ",
" A.H.T.F.", " R.B. ", " Pierrot " andothers.
What is the final answer, when all the claims and counterclaims have been
examined ? There are three schools of thought : (1) That the R.N. arguments heavily outweigh those of the R.A.F. " A.H.T.F. " is of this school,
has explained why, and has shown broadly speaking, how the turnover might
be effected. (2) That the R.A.F. arguments heavily outweigh those of the
R.N. This, to " A.H.T.F.'s " mind, is the unimaginative or overimaginative
school. (3) That the R.N. and R.A.F. arguments are more or less equally
1 See THENAVALREVIEW,
May, 1951 and May, 1952.
361
CORRESPONDENCE.
divided. This is the inconclusive school ; or so they think, because the
conclusion can still be found. How ? You start with six premises :(1) that World War I11 is a distinct possibility, not immediately,
but within the next seven years ;
(2) that to do away with the three armed Services and have only one
single Service is ruled out by considerations of morale and specialization ;
(3) that Seversky is right, at long last, in dismissing quick victory
through overwhelming weight of strategic bombing alone ;
(4) that " if sea power cannot of itself win wars, sea power decides
whether wars are won or lost " ;
(5) that sea power depends very largely: on maritime air power ; and
(6) that naval aviation (i.e. one half of our maritime air power) is
not to-day the force it should be in the Royal Navy.
You then, in fairness to the R.A.F. add a seventh :
that whether wars are won or lost also depends on the air defence
of the country against strategic bombing.
Now consider Coastal Command (i.e., the other half of our maritime air
power) with regard to this last premise and again with regard to the fourth.
Which does it affect more ? Quite obviously the fourth. In that case Coastal
Command must belong to the Service primarily responsible for our sea power.
Is this a fair way to produce a conclusion for the third school of thought ?
Or is it merely an oblique way of putting over yet another Navy argument ?
To my way of thinking it is more in the nature of a chairman's casting vote.
Yours truly,
PLUS
~2 C H A N G E . . .
S1R,-Many people dislike these verbal innovations such as finalize,
channelize, etc., so dear to the modern beaurocrat. What then shall be said
of :" I ran down close inshore. . . having signalized to the ship to
follow "
and again :" I signalized to them to anchor as convenient."
The quotations are from the Diary of Admiral the Hon. George Grey,
written in 1836 when in command of H.M.S. Cleopatra. The Admiralty
362
CORRESPONDENCE.
Librarian tells me that " signalize " was apparently not uncommonly used
between the 1820's and the 1870's. One wonders what would be said of its use
in a Report of Proceedings to-day.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,