No. 32604 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Transcription
No. 32604 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
No. 32604 SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL) BETWEEN : ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC APPELLANT (Respondent) AND : THE CANADIAN OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, in substitution for the Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais. RESPONDENT (Appellants) AND : HONORABLE PIERRE LORTIE, judge of the Court of Quebec INTERVENER (Mis en cause) AND : COMMISSION DE PROTECTION DU TERRITOIRE AGRICOLE DU QUÉBEC, TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DU QUÉBEC (section du territoire et de l’environnement), VILLE DE SHAWINIGAN, WILLIAM BARBER, LOUISE BARBER, RUSTY BARBER, LOUISE SOKOLIK, MICHEL SOKOLIK, BERTHE DUCASSE, JOCELYNE GALARDO, CHANTALE TRÉPANIER, et BRUCE SHOOR INTERVENERS (Mis en cause) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW-BRUNSWICK ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH-COLUMBIA INTERVENERS AND : RESPONDENT’S FACTUM (RULE 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada) Me Pierre J. Beauchamp PATERAS & IEZZONI 500 Place d’Armes Bureau 2314 Montréal (Quebec) H2Y 2W2 Tel. 514-284-0860 Fax : 514-843-7990 [email protected] Marie-France Major LANG MICHENER LLP 300-50 O’Connor St. Ottawa, ON, K1P 6L2 Tel. 613-232-7171 Ext :131 Fax: 613-231-3191 [email protected] Counsel for RESPONDENT/Appellants Agent for RESPONDENT/Appellants Dan Cornell CORNELL, MORTLOCK & SILLBERG 272 Kent Street West Lindsay, Ontario K9V 4S5 Tel: 705-324-4312 Fax: 705-324-7525 [email protected] Counsel for RESPONDENT/Appellants Me Alain Gingras Me Sébastien Rochette MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE CHAMBERLAND, GAGNON (Justice – Québec) 300, boul. Jean-Lesage, bureau 1.03 Québec (Québec) G1K 8K6 Tel. : 418 649-3524 Fax : 418 646-1656 [email protected] Counsel for APPELLANT/Respondent Me Pierre Landry NOËL & ASSOCIÉS, S.E.N.C. 111, rue Champlain Gatineau (Québec) J8X 3R1 Tel. : 819 771-7393 Fax : 819 771-5397 [email protected] Agent for APPELLANT/Respondent L’honorable Pierre Lortie, J.C.Q. PALAIS DE JUSTICE DE CHICOUTIMI 227, rue Racine Est, 1er étage Chicoutimi (Québec) G7H 7B4 Tel. : 418 696-6751 Fax : 418 698-3798 INTERVENER/Mis-en-cause Me Louise Mousseau CARDINAL, LANDRY 25, boul. Lafayette, 3e étage Longueuil (Québec) J4K 5C7 Tel. : 450 442-7100 Fax : 450 651-2258 [email protected] Me Pierre Landry NOËL & ASSOCIÉS, S.E.N.C. 111, rue Champlain Gatineau (Québec) J8X 3R1 Tel. : 819 771-7393 Fax : 819 771-5397 [email protected] Counsel for INTERVENER/Mis en cause, Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec Agent for INTERVENER/Mis en cause, Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec Me Jacques Lemieux MOREL, LEMIEUX Édifice Lomer-Gouin 575, rue St-Amable, 5e étage Québec (Québec) G1R 5R4 Tel. : 418 643-0355 Fax : 418 643-6989 [email protected] Counsel for INTERVENER Tribunal administratif du Québec Me Annie Pagé Me Benoît Lussier PAGÉ LUSSIER 55, Avenue de l’Hotel-de-Ville C.P. 400 Shawinigan (Québec) G9N 6V3 Tel.: 819-536-7211 Fax: 819-536-0882 Me Richard Gaudreau BERGERON, GAUDREAU, LAPORTE 167 rue Notre-Dame-de l’île Gatineau (Québec) J8X 3T3 Tel. : 819-770-7928 Fax:. 819-770-1424 Counsel for INTERVENER Ville de Shawinigan Agent for INTERVENER Ville de Shawinigan Me Pierre Bordeleau LAMBERT THERRIEN BORDELEAU SOUCY 303, 7e Rue Shawinigan (Québec) G9N 1C6 Tel. : 819 536-2455 Fax : 819 536-2339 [email protected] Counsel for INTERVENERS /Mis en cause, William Barber, Louise Barber, Rusty Barber, Louise Sokolik, Michel Sokolik, Berthe Ducasse, Jocelyne Galardo, Chantale Trépanier, et Bruce Shoor Attorney General of Canada INTERVENER Christopher M. Rupar JUSTICE CANADA Édifice Banque du Canada 1212-234, rue Wellington, Tour Est Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0H8 Tel. : 613-941-2351 Fax : 613-954-1920 [email protected] Agent for INTERVENER, Attorney General of Canada Attorney General of Ontario INTERVENER Robert C. Houston BURKE-ROBERTSON 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa (Ontario) K2P 0A2 Tel.: 613-236-9665 Fax : 613-235-4430 [email protected] Agent for INTERVENER Attorney General of Ontario Attorney General of New-Brunswick INTERVENER Brian A. Crane Q.C. GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street Box 466 Station D Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 1C3 Tel.: 613-233-1781 Fax: 613-563-9869 [email protected] Agent for INTERVENER, Attorney General of New-Brunswick Attorney General of British-Columbia IINTERVENER Robert E. Houston Q.C. BURKE-ROBERTSON 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa (Ontario) K2P 0A2 Tel.: 613-236-9665 Fax; 613-235-4430 [email protected] Agent for INTERVENER, Attorney General of British-Columbia TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PART I : STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................... 1 Overview ......................................................................................... 1 Facts ............................................................................................... 1 PART II : QUESTIONS IN ISSUE................................................................... 3 PART III : ARGUMENT.................................................................................... 4 Federal jurisdiction over aeronautics............................................... 5 Definitions of “aerodrome” and “airport” .......................................... 8 Federal regulation ........................................................................... 9 The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity ................................... 12 Uniformity of the Canadian jurisprudence ..................................... 16 This Court ..................................................................................... 16 Quebec ......................................................................................... 18 Ontario .......................................................................................... 19 Alberta........................................................................................... 20 British-Columbia............................................................................ 22 The impact of the Johannesson decision on Canadian jurisprudence ................................................................ 22 The doctrine of double-aspect....................................................... 23 Paramountcy ................................................................................. 34 PART IV : ORDER SOUGHT CONCERNING COSTS .................................. 38 PART V : ORDER SOUGHT......................................................................... 39 PART VI : TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................ 40 PART VII : STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ................................................ 44 ANNEX I: JUDGMENT GRANTING SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES MOTION FOR 1 PART I : STATEMENT OF FACTS Overview 1. The question that arises on this appeal is whether the Minister of Transport alone, under the auspices of the Aeronautics Act, R.S. 1985, c. A-2 holds the authority to allow or prohibit the construction and operation of an aerodrome within the province of Quebec, when these activities would not be permitted by the provincial legislation in place, to wit An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1. 2. Respondent submits that the Quebec Court of Appeal judgment must be upheld as it correctly reaffirms the general principle that if the effect of a provincial law would be to affect a vital part of a federally-regulated enterprise, then the provincial law, although otherwise valid, will not apply to the federally-regulated enterprise. 3. Furthermore, the application of the double-aspect doctrine proposed by Appellant has no bearing on the facts of this case. The subject-matter in question does not have a double-aspect, one federal, one provincial where the relative importance of each piece of legislation (the Aeronautics Act, R.S. 1985, c. A-2 and An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1), are of roughly equal importance. 4. In fact, the application of s. 26 of An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1 has the effect of intruding into the exclusive sphere of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics and of preventing the former Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais, from carrying on their activities which are otherwise permitted and controlled by federal legislation and regulations. Facts 2 5. In 1998, Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais, cleared part of a wooded lot they owned and built a grass runway and a hangar adjacent to it for the parking, assembly and maintenance of aircraft. 6. Their airfield is an aerodrome governed by Subpart I – Aerodromes, of Part III – Aerodromes, Airports and Heliports of the Canadian Aviation Regulations, which applies to all aerodromes except airports. – Aeronautics Act, R.S. 1985, c. A-2, s. 3(1). – Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, s. 301. 7. Their airfield is shown on the VFR navigation chart for the region and appears in the Canada Flight Supplement and as such, is integrated into the national aeronautical navigation system used by pilots across Canada. – Canada Flight Supplement, Nav Canada, effective 0901Z 25 September 2009. p. B476 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 6) – Montreal VFR Navigation Chart. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 29) 8. The Respondent further refers the Court to the statement of facts outlined in Part I of Appellant’s Factum as well as to the summary done by the Honourable Justice Vézina J.A. in the judgment of the Court of Appeal which is the subject of the present appeal. (Appellant’s Record, Vol. 1, p. 82-83). 9. Finally, on June 10th, 2009, Justice Abella, ruling on the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association’s motion to add or substitute a party and to be granted an extension of time to July 3rd 2009 to file its Factum and Book of Authorities, granted the Applicant the status of Respondent in substitution to the Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais and the requested extension of time. – Judgment granting Motion for substitution of responding parties and for an extension of time to file its Factum and Book of Authorities to July 3rd 2009 (Justice Abella) June 10th, 2009. (ANNEX I ) 3 PART II: QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 10. The questions in issue in the present appeal are those stated by the Honourable Chief Justice on February 2nd 2009: 11. Is the Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q., c. P-41.1, constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to an aerodrome operated by the Respondents? 12. Is the Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q., c. P-41.1, constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal legislative paramountcy, having regard to the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 and the Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433. 13. Respondent respectfully submits that the first constitutional questions should receive an affirmative answer, in which case it is not necessary to decide on the second question. However, if this court were to find that interjurisdictional immunity does not apply to the facts of this case, then we submit that the second question should receive an affirmative answer. 14. The Court of Appeal of Quebec was justified in law in applying the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 15. The subject-matter of aeronautics and aviation including aerodromes falls within the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada. 16. The federal jurisdiction extends to those things in the air and on the ground that are essential for “aerial navigation” or “air transportation” to take place. 4 17. Airports and aerodromes are an integral and vital part of aeronautics and aerial navigation and cannot be severed from that subject-matter so as to fall under a different legislative jurisdiction. 18. Thus, to decide whether to build an airfield and where to build it constitute matters of exclusive federal concern and decisions of this type are not subject to provincial or municipal regulation or permission. 19. The regulation of airport and aerodrome location does not present a double aspect precluding the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to the facts of this case. 20. If this Court were to find that the principles of interjurisdictional immunity should not be applied to the facts of this case, then An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q., c. P-41.1 would still be inoperative by virtue of federal paramountcy in that abiding by the provincial order prohibiting the esTablishment of an aerodrome within the agricultural zone creates an operational conflict and frustrates the federal legislative intent expressed in the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 and the Canadian Aviation Regulations. PART III: ARGUMENT 21. The federal jurisdiction over aeronautics including the regulation of aerodromes and airports with regard to provincial and municipal zoning power has been settled law over the last fifty years, ever since the decision rendered by this Court in Johannesson et al. v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et al. [1952] 1 S.R.C. 292, which clearly esTablished the exclusive federal jurisdiction over aerodromes and which ruled as ultra vires a provincial act and a municipal by-law passed thereunder which prohibited the construction and operation of an unlicensed aerodrome within the Municipality of West St. Paul. 5 – Johannesson et al. v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et al. [1952] 1 S.R.C. 292 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 22. This issue has given rise to different interpretations as to which constitutional doctrine should be applied in deciding on the applicability of provincial and municipal zoning legislation prohibiting or affecting the construction and location of such aerodromes and airports. 23. Since Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has been applied to cases of this nature. – Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 2) 24. The aviation cases are therefore well within the bounds newly elaborated by this Court with regard to this doctrine, and are “situations already covered by precedent”. – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 54, 77. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) – British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc [2007] 2 R.C.S. 86, para. 23, 64. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 3) Federal jurisdiction over aeronautics 25. The subject matter of aeronautics and aviation including aerodromes falls within the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada. – Re Aerial Navigation A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario et al. [1932] A.C. 54 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 15) – Johannesson et al. v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et al. supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) – Re Orangeville Airport Ltd and Town of Caledon et al. (1976) 11 O.R. (2d) 546 (Ont. C.A) (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 11) 6 – Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, [1979] 1 S.C.R 754 (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 5) – Venchiarutti v. Longhurst (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th) 554; 8 O.R. (3d) 422 (Ont. C.A.) (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 14) – Air Canada v. Ontario, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 1) – Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Mississauga (City) (2000), 192 D.L.R. (4th) 443 (Ont. C.A.), 2000 CanLII 16948 (ON C.A.); leave to appeal refused, [2001] 1 S.C.R. ix (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 8) 26. The Appellant at the very least, acknowledges that aeronautics does fall within the exclusive authority of the government of Canada, but disagrees as to whether this exclusive authority encompasses the location of aerodromes which are not certified and therefore not “airports” within the definition of the Aeronautics Act, R.S. 1985, c. A-2 and the Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433. 27. However, the Courts have never held this distinction to be relevant in determining whether this matter was within the exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics. 28. For example, the decision to build an airport and the location of an airport have been held to be matters of exclusive federal concern. In Construction Montcalm (supra at p.770-774), this Court stated that: The construction of an airport is not in every respect an integral part of aeronautics. Much depends on what is meant by the words “construction”. To decide whether to build an airport and where to build it involves aspects of airport construction which undoubtedly constitute matters of exclusive federal concern: the Johannesson case. This is why decisions of this type are not subject to municipal regulation or permission: the Johannesson case; City of Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co.; the result in Ottawa v. Shore and Horwitz Construction Co. can also be justified on this ground. Similarly, the design of a future airport, its dimensions, the materials to be incorporated into the other the various buildings, runways and structures, and other similar specifications are, from a legislative point of view(…) matters of federal concern. The reason is that decisions made on these subjects will be permanently reflected in the structure of the finished product and are such as to have a direct effect upon its operational qualities and, therefore, upon its suiTability for the purpose of aeronautics.( Emphasis added) – Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, supra. (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 5, pp.40-41 ) 7 29. In stating this principle, this Court cited with approval the decision in Johannesson dealing with an unlicensed aerodrome built to receive and maintain small aircraft on the shores of the Red River while dealing with questions relating to the construction of the Mirabel International airport. 30. Federal jurisdiction extends to those things in the air and on the ground that are essential for “aerial navigation” or “air transportation” to take place. Airports and aerodromes are an integral part of the subject matter of aeronautics. The federal jurisdiction encompasses purely local (intra-provincial) aeronautics as well as where, within the Canadian territory, aeronautic activity may be carried out. This includes the carriage of passengers, all the administration related to such activity, the landing, parking and reception of aircraft as well as of the pilots and their passengers. – Johannesson v. rural Municipality of West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) – Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Corporation of the City of Mississauga, supra (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 8) – Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. I, 5th ed. (Loose leaf), Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson Carswell, 2007, p. 22-24 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 34) 31. In Greater Toronto Airports Authority, supra, the Authority in question and Nav Canada commenced a redevelopment project of Toronto’s Pearson Airport which is located within the corporate limits of the City of Mississauga. The City argued that the Ontario Building Code Act and the Ontario Building Code applied to all new buildings constructed at the airport as part of the redevelopment and sought to impose development charges pursuant to a by-law passed under the Ontario Development Charges Act. The buildings to be constructed included an air traffic control tower, a new terminal, temporary facilities for tenants relocated during construction and an upgraded utilities and airport support system, all clearly integral to the operation of the airport. 8 32. The Ontario Court of Appeal held, relying on Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) (supra), that the federal jurisdiction over aeronautics includes more than aerial navigation in the strict sense; it includes the construction of airport buildings and the operation of airports. Indeed, the Court stated that: A long line of cases, including several decision (sic) of this court, has held uniformly that provincial and municipal planning and zoning legislation does not apply to airports. See Johannesson v. West St. Paul, supra; Re Orangeville Airport Ltd. v. Town of Caledon (1976), 11 O.R. (2d) 546 (C.A.); Re Walker v. Ontario (Minister of Housing) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 9 (C.A.); Venchiarutti v. Longhurst (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 422 (C.A.). (…) Therefore, the Building Code Act and the Development Charges Act stand on the same constitutional footing as provincial planning and zoning legislation. None of this legislation applies to the construction of airport buildings. If any confirmation of this proposition were needed, it comes from Construction Montcalm. (…) In Construction Montcalm, Beetz J. commented that the result in Horwitz Construction was also justified on the ground that the building of barracks “involves aspects of airport construction which undoubtedly constitute matters of exclusive federal concern … not subject to municipal regulation or permission” (at p. 770). In short, requiring a municipal building permit for the construction of an airport building affects a vital or integral part of an aeronautics undertaking. (Emphasis added) – Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Corporation of the City of Mississauga, supra, para. 51, 52, 53. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 8) Definitions of “aerodrome” and “airport” 33. The Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s.3(1) provides the following definition for “aerodrome”: “Aerodrome means: Any area of land, water (including the frozen surface thereof) or other supporting surface used or designed, prepared, equipped or set apart for use either in whole or in part for the arrival, departure, movement or servicing of aircraft and includes any buildings, installations and equipment situated thereon or associated therewith.” 9 – Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, as amended, s. 3(1) 34. An “Airport” is an aerodrome in respect of which a Canadian aviation document is in force. This is required where the aerodrome is located within the built-up area of a city or town or where there is scheduled passenger–carrying service and involves certification that such airport meets accepted safety standards. – Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, s. 302.01(1) – Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual (A.G.A., s. 2.3) (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 31) Federal regulation 35. The Parliament of Canada has enacted a comprehensive scheme of legislation and regulation to govern aeronautics: – Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2. – Canadian Aviation Regulations (“CARs”), SOR/96-433. – Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual (“TC AIM”), TP 14371 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 31) – Canada Flight Supplement (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 26) – Water Aerodrome Supplement (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 27) – Transport Canada Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices publications (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 25) – VFR Navigation Charts (VNC) (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 29) 36. The power to regulate the location, operation and activities at aerodromes rests with the Governor in Council and, as it relates to the matter at hand, this power is exercised by the Minister of Transport: “4.2 The Minister is responsible for the development and regulation of aeronautics and the supervision of all matters connected with aeronautics and, in the discharge of those responsibilities, the Minister may [...] […] (b) construct, maintain and operate aerodromes and esTablish and provide other facilities and services relating to aeronautics; 10 […] 4.9 The Governor in Council may make regulations respecting aeronautics and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, may make regulations respecting […] (e) activities at aerodromes and the location, inspection, certification, registration, licensing and operation of aerodromes; […] (l) the prohibition of the use of airspace or aerodromes;” (emphasis added) – Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, ss. 4.2 b) and 4.9 e) and l). 37. The grass airfield and hangar used by the Respondents constitute an aerodrome within the meaning of the Aeronautics Act, R.C.S. 1985, c. A-2. 38. There is a comprehensive regulatory regime for unregistered and registered aerodromes which includes the following: a. An aerodrome listed in the Canada Flight Supplement or the Canada Water Aerodrome Supplement can be designated Prior Permission Required (PPR) to indicate that the aerodrome operator’s permission is required prior to use. TC AIM Canada, AGA 2.2(a) b. Procedures for noise abatement. TC AIM Canada, AGA 4.1.2 CAR 601. 105 and 601.106. c. Aerodromes standards CAR 301.01 – General CAR 301.02 – Inspection CAR 301.03 – Registration and publication in CFS and WAS CAR 301.04 – Markers and markings CAR 301.05 – Warning Notices CAR 301.06 – Wind Direction Indicator CAR 301.07 – Lighting 11 CAR 301.08 – Prohibitions: – No vehicles or obstructions – Rules for towing an aircraft – Use of aircraft lights on the aerodrome manoeuvring area – Operation of a vessel in the area of a water area of an aerodrome – Remove or interfere with aerodrome markers – Control of birds and animals – Use of firearms within or into an aerodrome – Displaying false markers CAR 301.09 – Fire prevention – Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433. – Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual, TP14371 AGA, pp. 47-69 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 31) 39. In the case at bar, a runway that’s 1 000 meters long and a hangar adjacent to it, are facilities that are an integral and essential part of a functioning aerodrome. Indeed, in Air Canada v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario, this Court held that the provision of liquor on passenger flights was not an integral part of the airline’s undertaking, and thus the airline was subject to provincial liquor legislation. In determining what was integral to the federal aeronautics power, Judge Iacobucci stated as follows : This Court has defined the scope of the federal aeronautics power by reference to the physical act of flight. Aeronautics is: “The flight and period of flight from the time the machine clears the earth to the time it returns successfully to the earth and is resting securely on the ground.” Johannesson v. rural Municipality of West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292 at p.319, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609. Thus, the federal aeronautics jurisdiction encompasses not only the regulation of the operation of aircraft, but also the regulation of the operation of airports. Proceeding on this understanding, courts have held zoning laws that affect the location and design of airports to be constitutionally inapplicable.(Emphasis added) – Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581, paragraph 72 (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 1, pp. 3-4) 12 40. Thus, there is recent authority from this Court which dictates that both aerodromes and airports are vital and essential parts of aeronautics. It does not matter whether the airfield is licensed, registered, private or commercial. In both Air Canada and Construction Montcalm, this Court made no distinction between the small aerodrome in Johannesson and other types of airfields. This Court has interpreted the ratio from Johannesson broadly, and thus cases should not be distinguished on the basis of the aerodrome’s size, registration or ownership or whether they are water or land or used for commercial or private purposes. – Regional District of Comox-Strathcona v. Hansen et al, (2005) BCSC 220 (CanLII), para. 30 and 48 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 17) – Venchiarutti v. Longhurst, supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 20) – Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, p. 22-24. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 34) The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 41. Recently, this Court, in Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, examined the question of the distribution of powers. In this case, the Court had to decide whether the British Columbia Forest Appeals Commission had jurisdiction to decide the existence of aboriginal rights or title. Mr. Paul, a registered Indian, had argued that he had cut and was in possession of timber pursuant to his aboriginal rights. 42. Having first examined the pith and substance of the legislation and determined that the parties conceded that the Code in question was in its entirety valid provincial legislation, Justice Bastarache went on to discuss the doctrines of incidental effects and interjurisdictional immunity : 12. As a law of general application, the Code applies ex proprio vigore to Indians, to the extent that it does not touch on the “core of Indianness”[…] 13 13. In the classic federalism cases, the vires of legislation is challenged: Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), supra; Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, 2000 SCC 21. Here the question is the relationship between valid provincial legislation and matters under the federal competence to legislate under s. 91(24). (3) Incidental Effects 14. The doctrine of incidental effects holds that where there is a valid provincial law of general application, the provincial law applies if its effects upon matters within federal legislative competence are “merely incidental, irrelevant for constitutional purposes”: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 1, at p. 15-8, quoted in Global Securities, supra, at para. 22. See also General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at p. 670. In other words, as Iacobucci and Major JJ. put it in Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at para. 81, “it is constitutionally permissible for a validly enacted provincial statute of general application to affect matters coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament”. Since all relevant provisions of the Code are valid provincial legislation, it follows that by virtue of the doctrine of incidental effects, any impact of the Code upon aboriginals is irrelevant for classification purposes. It remains to be seen, however, whether the law’s application to specific factual contexts can be put in issue. (4) Interjurisdictional Immunity 15. The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is engaged when a provincial statute trenches, either in its entirety or in its application to specific factual contexts, upon a head of exclusive federal power. The doctrine provides that, where the general language of a provincial statute can be read to trench upon exclusive federal power in its application to specific factual contexts, the statute must be read down so as not to apply to those situations: Grail, supra, at para. 81. The doctrine has limited the application of a provincial statute to a matter of exclusive federal power in numerous contexts. (Emphasis added) – Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), supra, para 12, 13, 14, 15. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 13) 43. More recently, this court again reviewed the order of application of those principles in two fundamental cases, Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta [2007] 2 R.C.S.3 and British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc [2007] 2 R.C.S.86. 14 44. Reviewing the jurisprudence on the question of interjurisdictional immunity, the Court held that this review showed that although interjurisdictional immunity should be applied with restraint, it’s natural area of application is in relation to those heads of legislative authority that confer on Parliament power over enumerated federal things, people, works or undertakings. – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, supra, para. 67. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) 45. This Court, in that context, named aeronautics as such a federal activity, citing the Mississauga case and referring approvingly to the Johannesson, Re Orangeville Airport and Venchiarutti cases as examples of the application of this principle. The Mississauga case involved the development of the Toronto airport and held that a neighbouring municipality could not impose its land-use development controls and charges on the planned expansion of terminal facilities there: “Of course interprovincial and international carriers have a vital and essential interest in being able to land at an airport or having access to a safe harbour. Aircraft cannot remain aloft indefinitely awaiting planning permission from other levels of government. This activity does not lend itself to overlapping regulation. See Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), [1952] S.C.R. 292; Re Orangeville Airport Ltd. and Town of Caledon (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 610 (Ont. C.A.), and Venchiarutti v. Longhurst (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 422 (C.A.).” (Emphasis added) – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, supra, para. 54. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) 46. It’s interesting to note here that this Court again does not distinguish between the major international airport that is the Toronto airport, and the aerodrome composed of a small gravel strip on agricultural land of the Venchiarutti case. 47. In the present appeal, the Appellant presents to this Court the same argument that was raised and rejected by this Court in Johannesson v. West St. Paul 15 (Rural Municipality) (supra). Indeed, the attorneys then acting for the Attorney General of Manitoba had pleaded that : Assuming that the Dominion has jurisdiction over the subject of aeronautics generally by virtue of the “peace, order and good government” clause, the Province is not precluded from enacting s.92(1), since in pith and substance it is nothing more than a zoning regulation, within the legislative competence of the Province under 92(13), property and civil rights, or 92(16), matters of a local or private nature. (…) In any event until the Dominion invades this field a Province may continue to do so. (emphasis added) – Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), supra, pp. 299 - 300 301. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 48. On this question, then, Chief Justice Rinfret stated: I entertain no doubt that the decision of the Judicial Committee is in its pith and substance that the whole field of aerial transportation comes under the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament. (…) In those circumstances it would not matter that Parliament may not have occupied the field. (…) I fail however to see how it can be argued that the Dominion Parliament has not occupied the field. The Aeronautics Act, R.C.S. 1927, c. 3, as amended by c. 28 of the Statutes of 1944-45, c.9 of the Statutes of 1945, and c.23 of the statutes of 1950, makes it a duty of the Minister “to supervise all matters connected with aeronautics *** to prescribe aerial routes *** to prepare such regulations as may be considered necessary for the control or operation of aeronautics in Canada *** and for the control or operation of aircraft registered in Canada wherever such aircraft may be *** for the licensing of navigation and the regulation of all aerodromes and air-stations, etc.” Such regulations have been passed under the authority of the Aeronautics Act by P.C. 2129, part of which deals with the subject matter of airports and provides for the issuing of licences by the Minister. In the circumstances, the 16 dominion legislation occupies the field, or at least so much of it as would eliminate any provincial legislation, and, more particularly, that here in question. (emphasis added) – Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), supra, p. 303 (Rinfret, J.). (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) And also : The Judicial Committee having decided that legislation in relation to aeronautics is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion, it follows that the province cannot legislate in relation thereto, whether the precise subject matter of the provincial legislation has, or has not already been covered by the Dominion legislation. (emphasis added) – Johannesson c. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), supra, p. 318-319 (Estey, J.). (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 49. Although the Aeronautics Act has changed since the decision in Johanesson was rendered, the same argument applies today as the current legislation still grants the Minister all the same regulatory powers: – See the definitions of “aerodromes” and “airports” at section 3(1) of the Aeronautics Act, L.R.C. (1985), c. A-2, as well as section 4.9 e) which authorizes the Governor in Council to make regulations concerning “the location, inspection, registration, certification and operation of airports”, and s. 4.9 l) concerning the prohibition of the use of airspace or aerodromes. – See subsection 2 of Part III of Canadian Aviation Regulations, DORS/96-433, in relation to airport (s. 302.01 to 302.10), and subsection 5 of said part III in relation to heliports (s. 305.01 to 305.54), and s. 301.08 in relation to standards and prohibitions for aerodromes. Uniformity of the Canadian jurisprudence This Court 50. Since the Johannesson decision, this Court has always maintained that decisions relating to the question of whether to build an airport or aerodrome, and where to build it are at the core of the jurisdiction of the federal authority over aeronautics: 17 – Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Min. Wage Com., supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 6) – Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Board Control) , supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 1) 51. It is now settled law that the federal power to adopt laws concerning an essential part of a federal undertaking is exclusive and a provincial law which affects the core of a federal competence or impairs a vital or essential part of that undertaking is inapplicable: – Constitutional Law of Canada, Peter Hogg 5ed Supplement p. 15-33, 1534. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 34) – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, supra, para. 49 to 51. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) 52. And so, provincial zoning legislation which applies to the location and design of aerodromes and airports is constitutionally inapplicable and must be read down. – Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Board Control), supra, p. 609-610 (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 1, pp. 3-4). 53. The application of the interjurisdictional immunity principle in matters of aeronautics was clearly esTablished by this Court (Beetz J.) in the Bell Canada 1988 case. – Bell Canada v. Québec (C.S.S.T.), supra, pp. 840 - 844 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 2). 54. Thus, even though this Court now advocates a more restrained approach in the application of interjurisdictional immunity and has held that, in the examination of a constitutional question “it should, in general, be reserved for situations already covered by precedent”, Respondent submits that questions relating to the application of provincial laws or municipal by-laws of general application or specifically directed to aviation or aeronautic activity, are just such questions that 18 have been well settled by the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity for over fifty years. – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) 55. para. 77, 78, 54 This Court further endorsed the application of interjurisdictional immunity in matters of aeronautics in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., which was issued as the same time as the aforementioned Western Bank decision, and the approach of this Court was followed by Justice Vézina in the judgment a quo. Thus, the Quebec Court of Appeal sided with reason, with the jurisprudence of this Court as well as the rest of Canadian jurisprudence on this question. – British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., supra, para. 64 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 3) 56. The application and use of this doctrine in matters of aeronautics is uniform throughout Canada in the provinces where this question has been raised, and the judgment a quo simply confirms the state of the law in Quebec on this question. Quebec 57. Indeed, taking a fresh look at its former decision in the Berthier St-Louis et un autre c. Commission de protection du territoire agricole de Québec [1990] R.J.Q. 322, Justice Vézina of the Quebec Court of Appeal states: Cet arrêt ne peut plus tenir, compte tenu de la jurisprudence supérieure - et pan canadienne – relative à la compétence fédérale exclusive en matière d’aéronautique, incluant le site d’un aéroport comme l’a réitéré la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Air Canada c. Ontario (Régie des Alcools). 19 – Judgment of the Court of Appeal (hon. André Brossard, France Thibault and Paul Vézina), no. 200-09-005674-061, 4th of March 2008, para.68 : (Apppellant’s Record, vol. 1, p. 80). – Berthier St-Louis c. Commission de protection du territoire agricole de Québec [1990] R.J.Q. 322. (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 13) Ontario 58. The courts in Ontario have followed the Johannesson decision, endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in: Re Orangeville Airport Ltd. and Town of Caledon (supra), Venchiarutti v. Longhurst (supra) and Mississauga (City) v. Greater Toronto Airports Authority (supra), where the court stated: [39] The interjurisdictional immunity principle holds that “a basic minimum and unassailable content” must be assigned to each head of federal legislative power. Because federal legislative power is exclusive, provincial laws cannot affect that essential core. A provincial law, valid in most of its applications, must be read down not to apply to the core of the exclusive federal power. The application of this principle differs from the paramountcy doctrine in that it does not require conflicting or inconsistent federal legislation, or even the existence of federal legislation. (…) [48] Provincial or municipal laws that seek to regulate the physical structure of airports and airport buildings will affect a vital or integral part of an aeronautics undertaking. (…) [52] the Building Code Act and the Development Charges Act stand on the same constitutional footing as provincial planning and zoning legislation. None of this legislation applies to the construction of airport buildings. (Emphasis added) – Mississauga (City) v. Greater Toronto Airports Authority , supra, para. 39, 48 and 52. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 8) 20 59. This position has been endorsed by this Court in Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581, p. 610, referred to by the Honourable Justice Vézina in the judgment a quo: Ainsi, la compétence fédérale en matière d’aéronautique comprend non seulement la réglementation de l’exploitation d’un aéronef, mais également la réglementation de l’exploitation des aéroports. Compte tenu de cela, des tribunaux ont jugé que des lois sur le zonage qui touchaient l’emplacement et la conception d’aéroports étaient constitutionnellement inapplicables. – Judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, supra, para. 66: (Appellant’s Record, vol. I, p. 80) Alberta 60. In Taylor et al. v. Registrar of South Alberta Land Registration District et al. (June 16th 2005) 255 D.L.R. (4th) 457 (2 vs. 1) the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the application of a provincial law on condominiums and cancelled the registration of a Condominium Plan approved by Transport Canada. In doing so, the Court clearly recognized that with regard to the units (lots) designated as essential to the operation of the airport, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity applied. In this case, since only a part of the subdivision plan (8 units out of 82) was dedicated to aeronautic activity, and since by virtue of the provincial law, the plan could not be separated, the Court decided that the Condominium Plan submitted should follow the regular approval process required by the provincial law, which would not have been the case, had it been only a matter of the units and lots that concerned the operation of the airport: If the application of provincial laws will affect the essential core of the federally regulated enterprise, then the provincial laws must be read down as not to apply to the Condominium Plan. We are concerned here with the subdivision proposed by the Condominium Plan. It is readily apparent that the uses proposed for units 1 to 7 and unit 42 are vital components of an aeronautics operation. I will agree with the Chambers Judge that if the Condominium Plan comprised only those units, there would be no doubt that the subdivision would fall under exclusive 21 federal jurisdiction and provincial planning legislation could not apply to it. However, there is a question as to whether the creation of units 8 to 90 inclusive (excepting unit 42) by the Condominium Plan is vital and essential to AAL’s aeronautics operation. – Taylor et al. v. Registrar of South Alberta Land Registration District et al. (June 16th 2005) 255 D.L.R. (4th) 457, para. 37-38. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 19) 61. However, Hunt J.A. (dissenting) declared: What, then, is this case about? As argued by the parties, at its heart lies the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. In summary, this doctrine is engaged “when a provincial statute trenches, either in its entirety or in its application to specific factual contexts, upon a head of exclusive federal power” (Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, 2003 SCC 55, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 449, at para. 15). In such cases, the statute must be read down so as not to apply (Ibid). […] “The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine protects the essential core of federal power (Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at 497, 166 D.L.R. (4th) 193). Another way of posing the question of its applicability is whether the provincial legislation affects a federal service in one of its vital or essential aspects regarding its esTablishment, management or operation (Commission de transport de la Communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838 at 854, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 23). (Emphasis added) – Taylor et al. v. Registrar of South Alberta Land Registration District et al., supra, para. 102 et 105. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 19) 62. While stating that the absence of federal legislation on every detail of a subject under federal authority does not mean that the field is vacant, Hunt J.A. would have maintained the Condominium Plan approval by Transport Canada. Indeed, according to her, even the lots which were not directly related to the exploitation of the airport, which she had already judged as vital and essential to this activity, and therefore excluded from the application of the provincial law, were nonetheless an integral and essential part of the proposed aeronautics activity, 22 that is, the expansion of the airport, since they were essential as a means of providing financing (sale of the units) for the improvement of the airport. – Taylor et al. v. Registrar of South Alberta Land Registration District et al., supra, para. 129. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 19) British Columbia 63. This is also the state of the law in British Columbia, where the Supreme Court of that province, in the matter of Regional District of Comox-Strathcona v. Hansen et al., [2005] 7 W.W.R. 249 (B.C.S.C.), after considering the jurisprudence which had evolved since the case of Re The Queen in right of British Columbia and Van Gool (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C. C.A.), maintained the inapplicability of a municipal by-law, which prohibited the operation of an aerodrome in an agricultural (municipal) zone, citing as precedent Bell Canada v. Québec (C.S.S.T.) [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 and the Venchiarutti case (supra) of the Ontario court of Appeal. – Regional District of Comox-Strathcona v. Hansen et al., [2005] 7 W.W.R. 249 (B.C.S.C.) (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 17) – Re The Queen in right of British Columbia and Van Gool (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C. C.A.) (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 12) The impact of the Johannesson decision on Canadian jurisprudence 64. For the more than fifty years that it has stood, the Johannesson case has been directly or indirectly cited in many decisions of this Court and many lower courts. Johannesson has been the source of law in matters of aeronautics and the principles enunciated therein have been widely followed and applied. Thus, in Whitbread, Justice LaForest of this Court stated: 23 Once Canadian waters are conceived of as a single navigational network, it becomes clear that the activity of navigation is very akin to the activity of aeronautics, and it seems to me that the factual similarity should lead to similar constitutional treatment. In Johannesson v. Municipality West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R 292, this Court ruled that aeronautics was a distinct legislative matter that came within Parliament's power to make laws for the "peace, order and good government of Canada". This was because it was a matter that went "beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must from its inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole". – Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273, p. 1298. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 21) – See also: Corporation de la Municipalité de St-Denis de Brompton v. Filteau et al., [1986] R.J.Q. 2400, pp. 2402-2405. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 7) 65. Following Johannesson, Canadian jurisprudence has been unanimous in its application of the doctrine of interjuridictional immunity to federal jurisdiction over aeronautics and has never questioned it, whether it be in cases of direct application of provincial legislation or municipal regulation in matters of aeronautics (Mississauga, Air Canada, Re Orangeville) or questions of the application of provincial legislation of general application which would have the effect of impairing an essential or vital aspect at the core of the federal jurisdiction. (Bell Canada (1988), Venchiarutti, Mississauga, Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge) 66. With the exception of Van Gool, there is thus universal application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity throughout Canada in matters of aeronautics. – Re The Queen in Right of British Columbia and Van Gool, supra. (Appellant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 12) The doctrine of double aspect 67. The Attorney General of Quebec attempts to distinguish the present case from Johannesson, and the jurisprudence that followed it, by submitting that 24 Johannesson was merely concerned with a section of the Municipal Act of Manitoba, which specifically authorized municipalities to regulate aerodromes, as well as a municipal by-law adopted pursuant to this section, which prohibited the construction and operation of aerodromes and that such legislation should have been held valid under the double-aspect doctrine. 68. Interestingly, in 1951, the Attorney General of Manitoba pleaded, in the Johannesson case, that : Even assuming that licensing and regulation of commercial airports is incidental or ancillary to the legislative power of the Dominion under s.132; as licensing and regulation of airports, particularly with respect to location, clearly falls within s.92 the double aspect rule will apply and unless the Dominion has occupied the field, provincial legislation is competent. Under s.4 of the Aeronautics Act, regulations have been passed relating to airports, (See Part II of Air Regulations 1948), but the Dominion has not occupied the field in so far as location of airports is concerned. […] The licensing and regulatory provisions of the Regulations are merely to enforce compliance with those regulations which have been enacted to carry out treaty obligations and are not an occupation of the whole field to the exclusion of the Province. – Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality) (supra) p. 299-300 (Estey, J.). (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 69. The definition of the double aspect doctrine states that subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within s. 92 may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. – Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, p. 22-24. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 34) 70. The Attorney General of Manitoba, as in our case, claimed that the impugned section of the Municipal Act which dealt with location did not clash with Dominion legislation in respect to licensing and regulation. Indeed, since it had not been superseded by Dominion legislation, it was valid under the province’s legislative 25 powers under s. 92(13) Property and civil rights and s. 92(16) Matters of local interest. – Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), supra, p.299-300 (Estey, J.). (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 71. The Court rejected this point of view. Justice Kellock stated: It is no doubt true that legislation of the character involved in the provincial legislation regarded from the standpoint of use of property is normally legislation as to civil rights, but use of property for the purposes of an aerodrome, or the prohibition of such use cannot, in my opinion, be divorced from the subject matter of aeronautics or aerial navigation as a whole. If that be so, it can make no difference from the standpoint of a basis for legislative jurisdiction on the part of the province that Parliament may not have occupied the field. […] I think, therefore, that as the matters attempted to be dealt with by the provincial legislation here in question are matters inseparable from the field of aerial navigation, the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament extends thereto. The non-severability of the subject matter of “aerial navigation” is well illustrated by the existing Dominion legislation referred to below, and this legislation equally demonstrates that there is no room for the operation of the particular provincial legislation in any local or provincial sense.(Emphasis added) – Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality), supra, p.311-312 (Estey, J.). (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 72. In our case, it is not contested that the pith and substance of the challenged legislation is agriculture and its protection and enhancement: 1.1 The object of the agricultural land preservation regime esTablished by this Act is to secure a lasting territorial basis for the practice of agriculture, and to promote, in keeping with the concept of sustainable development, the preservation and development of agricultural activities and enterprises in the agricultural zones esTablished by the regime. 26 – An Act respecting the Preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1, s. 1.1. 73. This matter is well within s. 92(13), s. 92(16) and s. 95 of the Constitution Act of 1867. 74. This Court has found that when the features of a law or the federal and provincial characteristics of a law are roughly equal in importance, then the conclusion is that kind of law may be enacted by either parliament or a legislature. – Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, p. 22-24. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 34) 75. But there is no double aspect in our case, although the Appellant argues that there are two aspects to the question at bar: one being land use for the purpose of agriculture and another being land use for the purpose of aeronautics. In fact, there is only one aspect to the An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities (supra), that is the protection of agricultural lands for the promotion of agriculture within the province. 76. As the province cannot legislate on matters of aeronautics, it is the effect of the law that is challenged. 77. The subject matter under examination in this case is the prohibition of aerodromes within the designated agricultural zone. As the Attorney General of Canada pleaded in Johannesson: to ascertain the “matter” in relation to which legislation is enacted, regard must be had to the “pith and substance” or the “true nature and character” of the legislation. To determine this, regard is to be had to the effect and the object or purpose of the legislation. – Johannesson et al. v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et al. supra, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 10) 27 78. Since the effect of s. 26 of the Act (non-agricultural use prohibited) is to control and regulate the “surface of the earth” in the agricultural zone, and the “landing and taking off” of aircraft, it abrogates the rights and liberties of persons to use their property for aeronautic activity, and in that sense, it is directed at “aeronautics”. 79. What we are faced with is a situation of operational conflict where the purpose of the Aeronautics Act and the Canadian Aviation Regulations and the rights and obligations created thereunder in regard to jurisdiction over aerodromes and airports are in conflict with, and frustrated by, the application of the provincial statute. – British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc, supra, para 84. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 3) – Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, para 72. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 11) – Henri Brun, Droit constitutionnel, 4e éd., pp. 459-460. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 35) 80. Appellant reviews the federal legislation in relation to aerodromes and airports and admits that s. 26 of An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities could not apply to airports and heliports, as the regulation of aerodromes provided for under the Canadian Aviation Regulation (DORS/96-433) adopted pursuant to the Aeronautics Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2), is sufficiently precise to exclude the application of s. 26 of that statute with regard to aerodromes which constitute airports or heliports. 81. Appellant argues, however, that the Aeronautics Act and the Canadian Aviation Regulations are not precise enough to exclude the application of s. 26 to aerodromes such as the one operated by Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais. 82. Appellant submits that this Court should apply the double aspect doctrine to this case since it pleads that there is no conflict between the federal and provincial 28 legislation in place because the federal authority has not legislated or issued specific regulations with regard to what it calls “unregulated aerodromes”. There would, therefore, be no conflict of laws, no paramountcy and under the doctrine of double aspect, the application of s. 26 of the Act should not be invalidated. – (Appellant’s Factum, para. 23 - 26) 83. As stated above, this approach was already pleaded by the Attorney General of Manitoba in the Johannesson case (supra) and rejected by this Court. 84. Moreover, this approach fails to understand the legislative intent of the Aeronautics Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2), and the Canadian Aviation Regulations dealing with aerodromes, airports and heliports under Part III. 85. An airport is an aerodrome for which an airport certificate has been issued by the Minister. This certification is required for an aerodrome that is located within the built-up area of a city or town, a land aerodrome that is used for the purpose of scheduled air service for the transport of passengers and for any other aerodrome in respect of which the Minister “is of the opinion that meeting the requirements necessary for the issuance of an airport certificate would be in the public interest and would further the safe operation of the aerodrome. – Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, s. 302.01(1) 86. The public interest is always a consideration in the regulation of aerodrome and airport activity by the Minister. For example, in a recent case in the province of Quebec at Lac St-Augustin near Quebec City, the Minister of Transport intervened in the public interest when municipal and provincial concerns were raised with regard to aircraft operations at the lake and imposed conditions of operation on operators using the water aerodrome, which were then published in the Canada Water Aerodrome Supplement and the Canada Flight Supplement. 29 This is a perfect example in matters of aeronautics of the cooperative federalism which Justice Binnie speaks of in the Lafarge decision. – Marcel Filteau v. Aviation Roger Forgues (C.S.) REJB 1997-00093, p.114, and Jugement of Bernard Godbout J.C.S, dated 9 June 2003, p.3 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 12) – Canada Water Aerodrome Supplement, p. B173-B174 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 27) – Canada Flight Supplement, p. B739-B740 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 26) 87. The public interest is an essential factor in the issuance of an airport certificate and such a certificate will be required of any aerodrome operator where the minister deems it necessary “in the public interest”. 88. This approach is exemplified by the recent agreement (June 15th 2009) between the City of Shawinigan and Transport Canada on the certification and regulatory restrictions at the Lac à la Tortue water aerodrome following local residents complaints about aircraft noise levels in the conduct of sightseeing flights by air tour operators at the water aerodrome. 89. In this case, the Minister decided that a site specific operation manual would be developed and a noise advisory committee created to propose restrictions and procedures to reduce noise, subject to fines under the Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433. Accordingly, pursuant to s. 602.105 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations, Transport Canada imposed restrictions on the hours and days of operations of commercial sightseeing flights. – 90. <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/que/2009/09-q003e.htm> (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 33) Furthermore, since under s. 6.71(1) of the Aeronautics Act, the Minister may refuse to issue or amend a Canadian aviation document, such as an airport certificate, on the grounds, among others, that “the aerodrome does not meet the 30 qualifications or fulfill the conditions necessary for the issuance or amendment of the document, or that the public interest warrants the refusal, it is clear that only the Minister has the authority to authorize or prohibit the construction, location and operation of an aerodrome within Canada. This is so because, where the Minister deems it in the public interest, he may require at any time from the owner or operator of an aerodrome whether registered or unregistered, the application for the issuance of an airport certificate, thus changing at any time, in the public interest, an aerodrome into an airport or prohibiting the operation of an aerodrome. – Aeronautics Act, supra, s. 6.71 (1) a), b), c). 91. In such cases, where a certificate has been issued, according to Appellant’s position, s. 26 of An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities would not apply as Appellant’s position is that it does not apply to airports or heliports because of an incompatibility rendering inoperable the provincial enactment by virtue of the federal paramountcy doctrine. – (Appellant’s Factum, para. 58, p. 24) 92. However, the Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, also require that an airport, (i.e. an aerodrome for which a certificate has been issued) abide by a number of conditions and standards set out in the aerodrome standards and recommended practices publications of the Minister (Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 302.03(1)). If these standards and conditions are not met, the Minister may refuse to issue or renew such certificate (Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 6.71(1)). 93. In such a case, the airport may have to be closed. This would obviously be the case for an airport certificate required of an aerodrome located within a built-up area (Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR 96-433, s. 302.01(1)). But in the case 31 of an airport certified, for example, under s. 302.01(1)b) where the certification is required for a land aerodrome used by an air operator for the purpose of a scheduled air service for the transport of passengers, the airport operator may not be interested in maintaining the standards and conditions of his certificate as required by the Minister, when such an air service is terminated or interrupted. The maintenance of such standards, in the absence of an air operator, might easily be too onerous. Is this airport, which has now become a registered or unregistered aerodrome, suddenly subject to the provisions of s. 26 of An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1 if it is located in an agricultural zone? 94. And what if, after relinquishing its airport certificate to the Minister, the operator decides to reapply for certification of the aerodrome, for example, to allow the resumption of scheduled passenger air service. Does this then mean that in that circumstance, s. 26 of the Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1 would not apply? It becomes obvious that this is the very sort of situation of uncertainty and exercice of discretionary power into the core of a federal jurisdictional matter that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is meant to avoid. 95. In Commission de transport de la communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838, this Court held the Bus Transport regulations issued under the Quebec Transport Act inapplicable to a federal bus sightseeing transport service as it constituted a massive intrusion on a vital and essential aspect of the federal bus service: Section 17 of the Regulation leaves the list of operating conditions and restrictions attached to the permit open. If this is a discretionary power granted to the Commission -- which is possible under s. 5.1 of the Act, but which I do not have to decide here -- it seems quite clear that the appellant Commission cannot be subject to it without losing ultimate control over the substance of the service it provides under its mandate. 32 At another level, certain conditions for obtaining a permit set out by the government in s. 12 of the Regulation also affect vital aspects of the federal service. Under subs. (4), the Commission may refuse to issue a permit if it considers that the service provided does not fulfill the needs of the population of the territory to be served. This condition affects the fundamental decision to create a service and so impinges on its very existence, making the Commission des transports du Québec responsible for evaluating the need for the service in accordance with its view of the population's requirements. […] The Act itself contains certain provisions affecting the federal service in some of its essential aspects. We have seen that under s. 40, a permit holder must obtain authorization from the Commission des transports to alter the services it provides, otherwise it may have its permit changed, suspended or revoked by the Commission. […] There seem to be few limits on the discretion of the Commission des transports in authorizing a holder to alter the services provided, and in my opinion the appellant Commission's control over the substance of the service it offers is thereby affected. […] Accordingly, in my view, it is the permit system as a whole which cannot be applied to appellant commission. The consequence of applying the legislation on permits would be to make the setting up, substance and maintenance of the federal transport service subject to the largely discretionary control of the Commission des transports and the government, when these aspects are within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Regulation is therefore constitutionally inapplicable to the federal service, as are the provisions of the Act dealing with the permit system. (Emphasis added). – Commission de transport de la communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838 pp. 859-860 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 5) 96. In the same manner, the stated object of An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1 is to create a whole series of rules and conditions for the protection and preservation of agricultural lands and it vests discretionary power with the Commission de protection du territoire agricole to oversee its application. 97. The criteria considered in its decisions relate exclusively to the intent of the Act, as stated at s. 3, that is, to secure the preservation of the agricultural land of Quebec. 33 – 98. An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1, s. 62, 62.1. The Commission has no interest, no expertise and we submit no authority in matters of aeronautics and particularly in the esTablishment of regulations of airports and aerodromes within its territory. 99. Yet, since 1990, there have been at least 30 reported cases where the Commission exercised such authority in examining requests for the development, enhancement and construction of aerodromes. In seven cases it denied the right of the petitioners to operate such airfields within the designated agricultural zone. In other cases, it imposed restrictions and conditions on the development and operation of these airfields. In others, it actually permitted such uses. See for example: – Refused: CPTAQ No. 28020-197209, January 22nd 1993; CPTAQ No. 324254, February 26th 2002; CPTAQ No. 330373, May 2nd 2003; – Accepted with conditions: CPTAQ No. 309742, July 26th 1999; CPTAQ No. 202237, July 23rd 1993; CPTAQ No. 325021, September 16th 2002; – Accepted: CPTAQ No. 17070-191673, July 9th 1992; CPTAQ No. 54040223678, August 2nd 1995 and CPTAQ No. 54040-234566, April 9th 1996. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tabs 22-24) 100. To paraphrase the statement of this Court in National Battlefields Commission, supra, the consequences of applying this legislation would be to make the “setting up, substance and maintenance” of an aerodrome or airport subject to the discretionary control of the Commission de protection du territoire agricole when these aspects are within exclusive federal jurisdiction. 101. The Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, supra, is therefore constitutionally inapplicable to Respondent’s aerodrome. 102. This Court has specified that such intrusions must be of the nature of an impairment to the core of the subject matter under federal jurisdiction. 34 103. Aerodromes and airports are at the core of the federal jurisdiction over aeronautics and s. 26 which prohibits the location, installation and operation of an airfield within the agricultural zone of the Province of Quebec cannot be reconciled with the federal power over aeronautics and, as such, must be ruled inapplicable to the aeronautic activities of the Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais. Paramountcy 104. In the event that this Court were to find the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity not applicable to the facts of this case, then the Court should still hold s. 26 inoperative due to the doctrine of paramountcy. 105. The Appellant submits that the federal legislation in relation to aerodromes is simply permissive and not exhaustive, such that to avoid a legislative “vacuum” the application of the provincial law should not be inhibited or rendered inoperative by virtue of the federal paramountcy doctrine. 106. In fact, the Aeronautics Act creates an implicit right to operate aerodromes and the Minister of Transport is the only authority with the power to prohibit such installation and operation. – Aeronautics Act, supra, s. 4.9 e) and l) – Canadian Aviation Regulations, s. 301.08 Prohibitions 107. As previously discussed, the conflict of application is obvious as the use of s. 26 of the Act by the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec has put the Respondents and others in a position where they are unable to comply with the federal and provincial provisions due to the conflict which exists between such legislation. 108. For example, in Richard Marcotte v. Commission de protection du territoire agricole et al., the Commission has issued an order prohibiting the Petitioner, 35 Richard Marcotte, from using the aerodrome he had built on his field notwithstanding the fact that he had the support of the municipal and regional authority as well as the support of both members of Parliament and the Legislature for the development of a regional aerodrome. Mr. Richard Marcotte has challenged this order with the Tribunal administrative du Québec on constitutional grounds and this case is awaiting this Court’s decision in the present appeal before proceeding. – Richard Marcotte v. Commission de protection du territoire agricole et al., STEQ 139771-079 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 18) 109. Therefore, in such cases, from the point of view of Respondents, Bernard Laferrière and Sylvie Gervais, and others subjected to such authority by the Commission, there is clear operational conflict with the federal jurisdiction over aeronautics. 110. The intrusion by the Commission de protection du territoire agricole into an exclusive federal sphere goes far beyond an incidental and ancillary effect, it has a fundamental effect, and as this Court held in Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453: In short, a legislative intention to intrude into an exclusive federal sphere is neither necessary nor sufficient to scrutinize the applicability of provincial law. It is the fact of intrusion, and not the intention to intrude, which is determinative for division of powers purposes. – Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, para. 45 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 9) 111. In the case at bar, there need not be a provincial intention to intrude into the exclusive federal sphere of aeronautics and to conflict with the standards and requirements for aerodromes and airports esTablished by the Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433 in order to render the provincial law inapplicable and inoperative. It is sufficient that the effect of provincial legislation is to do so. – Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, supra, para. 39 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 9) 36 112. In a matter of changes to the common law, this Court has stated that there needs to be a significant problem and an urgent reason for fundamental doctrines to be changed: There are sound reasons supporting this judicial reluctance to dramatically recast esTablished rules of law. The court may not be in the best position to assess the deficiencies of the existing law, much less problems which may be associated with the changes it might make. The court has before it a single case; major changes in the law should be predicated on a wider view of how the rule will operate in the broad generality of cases. Moreover, the court may not be in a position to appreciate fully the economic and policy issues underlying the choice it is asked to make. – R v. Salituro, [1991] 3. S.C.R. 654, p.668 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 14) 113. Respondent is not unmindful of the statement of this Court that: To attain these objectives, a certain degree of predicTability with regard to the division of powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures is essential. For this reason, the powers of each of these levels of government were enumerated in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or provided for elsewhere in that Act. As is true of any other part of our Constitution — this “living tree” as it is described in the famous image from Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), at p. 136 — the interpretation of these powers and of how they interrelate must evolve and must be tailored to the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian society. It is also important to note that the fundamental principles of our constitutional order, which include federalism, continue to guide the definition and application of the powers as well as their interplay. Thus, the very functioning of Canada’s federal system must continually be reassessed in light of the fundamental values it was designed to serve. As the final arbiters of the division of powers, the courts have developed certain constitutional doctrines, which, like the interpretations of the powers to which they apply, are based on the guiding principles of our constitutional order. The constitutional doctrines permit an appropriate balance to be struck in the recognition and management of the ineviTable overlaps in rules made at the two levels of legislative power, while recognizing the need to preserve sufficient predicTability in the operation of the division of powers. The doctrines must also be designed to reconcile the legitimate diversity of regional experimentation with the need for national unity. Finally, they must 37 include a recognition that the task of maintaining the balance of powers in practice falls primarily to governments, and constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called “co-operative federalism” (Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, at para. 162; Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, 2005 SCC 56, at para. 10. (Emphasis added) – Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 22-24. (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 4) 114. The Canadian Civil Aircraft Register maintained by Transport Canada shows the following as of January, 2009: Private Aircraft Commercial Aircraft State Total 23,041 4,275 109 27,425 – Canadian Civil Aircraft Register, (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 28) 115. As of 2004, there were 330 airports and 774 registered aerodromes for a total of 1 104 registered airfields. It is estimated that there are in excess of 2 000 unregistered aerodromes. – Northamerican Transportation Statistics DaTabase (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 30) – Transport Canada Regional and Small Airport Study, p.8 (Respondent’s Book of Authorities, Tab 32) 116. From these statistics, it is evident that the vast majority of aeronautic activity in this country comprises small aerodromes, yet the Appellant pleads that such activity is not part of the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics. 117. These activities include medevac services, search and rescue, flight training, forest fire spotting/fighting, business and commercial travel, crop spraying, aircraft repair and maintenance, sightseeing and charter operations, aerial photography, aircraft storage, gliding and air shows. 38 118. This would mean that instead of one aviation regulator, there will be ten provinces, three territories and thousands of municipalities that have no particular expertise in this highly specialized area regulating such activity. 119. Some potential problems and areas of conflict include provincial vs. federal building codes, application of municipal noise by-laws, specifications for fuel hoses and systems, fire prevention/fighting requirements and snow and ice removal from runways and taxiways which could affect aviation safety. 120. All this, without the oversight authority and expertise developed over seventy five years of application by the federal government. 121. For all the above reasons, Respondent, The Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, submits that there are no compelling or urgent reasons to disturb more than fifty years of settled caselaw in Canada. PART IV: ORDER CONCERNING COSTS 122. The Respondent submits that costs be awarded to it and that no costs be awarded against it in the event that this Court grants this appeal. 123. Former Respondents Laferrière and Gervais, having ceased the operation of the aerodrome since 1997, have now disposed of their interest in the property where their airfield was located. – (Record of Applicant’s Motion for an order for the substitution or addition of COPA as a party) 124. Although successful at the Quebec Court of Appeal on their constitutional claim, they had seen this case be appealed to this Court and had therefore not been able to operate said airfield. 125. Respondent COPA has had to “carry the fight” and has incurred substantial cost in this matter. 126. Since this case deals essentially with a jurisdictional conflict which should have been carried out in this forum by the Attorney General of Canada and the 39 Attorney General of Quebec, it would be highly unfair that Respondent be assigned costs against it if this appeal is successful. PART V – ORDER SOUGHT 127. Respondent, the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, prays the Court to: – Dismiss the present appeal; – Answer the first constitutional question in the affirmative, in which case it is not necessary to answer the second question. – In the alternative, if this court were to find that interjurisdictional immunity does not apply to the facts of this case, then we submit that the second question should receive an affirmative answer. – Award costs to it and that no costs be awarded against it in the event that this Court grant this appeal. ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 25th day of June, 2009 __________________________ Pierre J. Beauchamp Counsel for Respondent COPA 40 PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Para. CASES Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581………………………………………………………………………………….. 25, 39, 40, 50, 52, 59 Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749……………………………………….…………….. 23, 53, 63, 65 Berthier St-Louis c. Commission de protection du territoire agricole de Québec [1990] R.J.Q. 322……………………………………………………….. 57 British Colombia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., 2007 S.C.C., 23…………………………………………………………………………………… 24, 43, 55, 79 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2007 CSC 22……………………………………………………………................................ 24, 43, 44, 45, 51, 54 Commission de transport de la communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838………………………………………………………………………………….. Construction Montcalm Inc. v. Minimum Wage Commission, [1979] 1 S.C.R 754………………………………………………………………………….. Corporation de la Municipalité de St-Denis de Brompton v. Filteau et al., [1986] R.J.Q. 2400……………………………………………………………….. 95 25, 28, 40 50 64 Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Mississauga (City) (2000), 192 D.L.R. (4th) 443 (Ont. C.A.), 2000 CanLII 16948 (ON C.A.); leave to appeal refused, [2001] 1 S.C.R. ix…….………………………………………………… 25, 30, 31, 32, 45, 58 65 Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453………………………………………………………………………………….. 110, 111 41 Johannesson et al. v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul et al. [1952] 1 S.R.C. 292…………………………………………………………………………. 21, 25, 30 40, 45, 47, 48, 50, 64, 65, 67, 68 70, 71, 77 83 Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113………………………………………………………………………………….. 79 Marcel Filteau v. Aviation Roger Forgues (C.S.) REJB 1997-00093, and Judgement of Bernard Godbout J.C.S, dated 9 June 2003………………………………………………………………………………… 86 Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585………………………………………………………………………………….. 41, 42 R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3. S.C.R. 654…...………………………………………… 112 Re Aerial Navigation A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario et al. [1932] A.C. 54……………………………………………………........................................... 25 Re Orangeville Airport Ltd and Town of Caledon et al. (1976) 11 O.R. (2d) 546 (Ont. C.A)…………………………………………………………………….. 25, 45, 58 65 Re The Queen in right of British Columbia and Van Gool (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C. C.A.)……………………………………………………………… 63, 66 Regional District of Comox-Strathcona v. Hansen et al., (2005) BCSC 220 (CanLII)…………………………………………………………………………….. 40, 63 Richard Marcotte v. Commission de protection du territoire agricole et al., STEQ 139771-079………………………………………………………………... 108 Taylor et al. v. Registrar of South Alberta Land Registration District et al., (June 16th 2005) 255 D.L.R. (4th) 457 (2 vs. 1).............................................. 60, 61, 62 Venchiarutti v. Longhurst (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th) 554; 8 O.R. (3d) 422 (Ont. C.A.)………………………………………………………………………………... Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273……………………………………. 25, 40, 45 58, 63, 65 64 42 Decisions of the Commission de protection du territoire et des activités agricoles : – Refused: CPTAQ No. 28020-197209, January 22nd 1993; CPTAQ No. 324254, February 26th 2002; CPTAQ No. 330373, May 2nd 2003;……………………………………………………………………… – Accepted with conditions: CPTAQ No. 202237, July 23rd 1993; CPTAQ No. 309742, July 26th 1999; CPTAQ No. 325021, September 16th 2002;…………………………………………………... – Accepted: CPTAQ No. 17070-191673, July 9th 1992; CPTAQ No. 54040-223678, August 2nd 1995 and CPTAQ No. 54040-234566, April 9th 1996…………………………………………………………….. 99 99 99 DOCUMENTS AerodromelStandardslandlRecommendedlPracticesl Publications…………………………………………………............................... 35 Canada Flight Supplement, Nav Canada, effective 0901Z 25 September 2009…………..……………………………………………………………………. 7, 35, 86 Canada Water Aerodrome Supplement, Nav Canada, effective 0901Z 12 March 2009………………………………………………………………………... 35, 86 Canadian Civil Aircraft Register, <http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/activepages/ccarcs/aspscripts/en/monthsuma irbycatresultprint.asp?month=1&year=2009>................................................ 114 Montreal VFR Navigation Charts……………................................................. 7, 35 Northamerican Transportation Statistics DaTabase, <http://nats.sct.gob.mx/nats/sys/Tables.jsp?i=3&id=24>...………………… … 115 Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual…………………………. 34, 35, 38 Transport Canada Regional and Small Airport Study, TP 14283B…………………………………………………..………………………… 115 Transport Canada News Release, The City of Shawinigan and Transport Canada agree on the management of the Lac-à-la-Tortue water aerodrome:d<http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/que/2009/09q003e.htm>………………..………………………………………………………. 89 43 DOCTRINE HOGG, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. I, 5th ed. (Loose leaf), Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson Carswell, 2007…………………………………………………….………………………….. BRUN, Henri, Droit constitutionnel, 4e éd, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais ……………………………………………………………………………………… 30, 40, 51 69, 74 79 44 PART VII – STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Loi sur l’aéronautique, L.R.C. (1985), ch. A-2 Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 Loi sur la Protection du territoire et des activités agricoles, L.R.Q. c. P-41.1 An Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities, R.S.Q. c. P-41.1 Règlement de l’aviation canadien, DORS/96-433 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433