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SELF-IPIEREST AND SOCIAL CONTROL:
UITLANDEEt RUlX OF JOHANNESBURG, 1900-1901
by
Diana R. MacLaren
... ...
Good government
[means] equal rights and no
, a f a i r f i e l d and no favour. (1)
privilege
A. MacFarlane, Chairman,
Fordsburg Branch, South
African League.
A t the end of May 1900 the B r i t i s h axmy moved into Johannesburg and Commandant
F. E. T. Krause handed over the reins of government to Col. Colin MacKenzie, the new
Military Governor of the Witwatersrand. But MacKenzie could not r u l e alone, and his
superior, Lord Roberts, had previously agreed with High Commissioner Milner that
MacKenzie would have access t o c i v i l i a n advisers who, being Randites f o r the most
past, could offer t o his administration t h e i r knowledge of local affairs. So, up
from the coast and the Orange Free State came h i s advisers: i n t e r a l i a ,
W. F. Monypenny, previously editor of the jingoist Johannesburg-;
Douglas
Forster, past President of the Transvaal Branch of the South African League (SAL);
Samuel Evans, an Eckstein & CO employee and informal adviser t o Milner; and
W. Wybergh, another past President of the SAL and an ex-employee of Consolidated
Gold Fields.
These men and the others who served MacKenzie as c i v i l i a n aides had been
active i n Rand p o l i t i c s previous t o the w a r and had led the agitation f o r reform
both p o l i t i c a l and economic which had resulted i n war. Many had l i n k s with the
minbg industry, e i t h e r a s employees of large firms or a s suppliers of machinery,
while the r e s t were i n business o r were professional men, generally lawyers. It was
these men who, along with J. P. Fitzpatrick, had engineered the unrest, who
formulated petitions, organized demonstrations and who channelled t o Milner the grist
f o r his p o l i t i c a l m i l l . Their goal had been t o transform the South African Republic
and especially the Rand, t o create a government sympathetic t o industrial capitalism
and t o eliminate elements which inhibited i t s development. Working with Milner, they
t r i e d t o convince the B r i t i s h parliament and public that the Uitlander (foreign)
population a t Johannesburg was a unified community struggling under the weight of
corruption, tyranny and inefficiency. They had been successful and when wax
approached they were amongst the f i r s t to flee, especially when i t was rumoured that
waxrants f o r t h e i r a r r e s t had been issued by the Boer government. I n the months
between the outbreak of w a r and the f a l l of Johannesburg, i.e. between mid-October
1899 and the end of May 1900, they had been active a t the coast managing Uitlander
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ref'ugee a f f a i r s , leading the "sheep without a shepherd" (2), t o use WyberghrS phrase,
and working i n and out of the administration a s advisers, news correspondents, army
r e c r u i t e r s and even spies.
Now they were called back t o the Rand. It would be many months before the
mass of Uitlanders would be allowed to return, but i n the meantime the population of
the Rand (some 80,000 people along the length of the reef, half of whom were white
and about half of the whites l i v i n g i n Johannesburg i t s e l f ) ( 3 ) had t o be governed.
This entailed pacifying them keeping them sober, quiet and out of mischief
as
well a s furnishing provisions: food, clothes and f u e l , and work when possible. Yet
the Uitlander advisers did not confine themselves t o these immediate tasks but s e t
upon a course of creating on the Rand t h e i r ideal community.
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While Milner was anxious t o see Johannesburg restored a s a place of
business, he was also very keen t o ensure t h a t the Rand administration got off "in
the r i g h t directionf'. (4) Since the new regime was i n an embryonic stage, he f e l t
t h a t i t would be easy t o give i t " a t w i s t i n a wrong direction". (5) I n other words,
even though MacKenziefs m i l i t a r y administration was t o be provisional, it could s t i l l
s e t i n t o motion policies which would influence the l a t e r direction of Rand a f f a i r s .
Hence Milner, i n an attempt t o keep t h i s from happening, ordered t h a t no major changes
were t o be i n i t i a t e d i n this period and wanted men appointed t o MacKenziers government
who would serve only a s caretakers.
But the Uitlander reformers did not propose t o l e t such an opportunity
escape them: f o r y e a s they had thought of l i t t l e e l s e but how best t o administer
the Rand. Given the power conferred by martial law, they intended t o u t i l i z e it t o
give Rand a f f a i r s " a t w i s t " i n t h e i r direction. It i s t h e i r actions and the motives
behind them, as well a s the reaction of Milner and his Secretary, G. V. Fiddes (who now
served a s Robertst P o l i t i c a l Secretary i n the ~ r a n s v a a l ) ,which concern us here. To
f a c i l i t a t e the discussion of some of the policies implemented by the MacKenzie
administration it i s b e s t t o categorize them. To be reviewed w i l l be the decisions
regarding the importation of food, the resumption of control over private property,
the location of the T r a n s d c a p i t a l , and,finally, the regulation of the resident
Rand population. Each issue demonstrates different aspects of the i n t e r e s t s and
motives of the administration and the varied use made of the war-time opportunity t o
mould post-war relations.
The newspaper e d i t o r Monypenny took the post of Director of C i v i l Supplies,
a job complicated by the disruption of t r a i n s by De Wet and his men on the veld, by
the confiscation of l o c a l l y produced fresh meat by the m, and by the poorly stocked
l o c d shops. The l a t t e r w a s the r e s u l t of Johannesburg merchants having had a
d i f f i c u l t time importing items and because there had been extensive commandeering by
Boer o f f i c i a l s and looting by d e s t i t u t e people during the f i r s t seven months of w a r .
While the B r i t i s h army was responsible f o r feeding i t s own men a s well a s the burgher
population, Monypenny had t o provide f o r a l l other c i v i l i a n s , including the black
workers attached t o the Imperial Military Railww. When M d e n z i e had entered the
Rand the army was already desperately short of supplies, and by midJune no more than
a fortnight's provisions f o r c i v i l i a n s w a s on hand. ( 6 ) Shortages begat crime, with
railway workers and Africans l i v i n g on the compounds of the now i d l e mines turning t o
t h e f t a s a means of obtaining firewood and food. The administration feared t h a t white
men, also d e s t i t u t e and without work o r r e l i e f aid, would turn t o larceny i n order t o
survive. (7)
But Monypenny was not solely concerned with feeding the people; he also
sought t o ensure t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t i s h merchants, f o r the most part i n e x i l e
a t the coast, were protected and that the foreign merchants s t i l l i n Johannesburg did
not benefit from any resumption of trade. P a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t a s t e f u l t o the exiled
merchants was the f a c t t h a t prices s e t by the military, which were up t o three times
the normal (i.e. pre-war) l e v e l , generated high p r o f i t s f o r the exclusive benefit of
resident merchants. While a l l foreign merchants were held i n contempt, the Germans
and the Jews on the Rand were singled out a s the worst offenders: the men who had
aided the enemy but now reaped the reward of B r i t i s h r u l e and Rand restoration. (8)
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One of Monypennyts first moves to restrict the-businessof non-British
merchants was his attempt to withdraw their trading licences and thereby close their
shops. Fiddes, who overturned this regulation, explained to the Military Governor
that merchants had a right to sell to whomever they chose and foreign merchants could
not be interfered with solely because they had traded with the Boers. (9) Not long
afterwards Monypenny was asked to devise a scheme whereby goods would be stockpiled
at Johannesburg in order that the Uitlander refugees could begin to return home.
Monypenny, while doing as he was asked, created a system which ensured that the
interests of the absentee merchants were protected. Goods, he decided, would be
purchased at the coast and sent by train to the Rand where they would be held until
a full 6000 tons of supplies were accumulated. Though owned by individual merchants,
these supplies would be held by the Director of Civil Supplies until the Uitlander
traders were in residence, this being done to "secure fair play to the refugee
merchant, and allow all merchants to start business simultaneously1'. (10)
This scheme also assisted Uitlanders because the 6000 tons of supplies were
funnelled through the colonial ports in order to by-pass the foreign merchants at
Louren~oMarques who had previously stockpiled goods there in the belief that the
Johannesburg-Lourenr;~
Marques railway would be the first to reopen. (11) Further,
the merchants at Johannesburg found it difficult to remit money to the coast with
which to purchase a share of the 6000 tons. On the other hand, the loyalist merchants
at the coast faced no such problems: needless to say, the administration took great
pleasure in this state of affairs. Although this scheme collapsed when the return
of the Uitlander refugees was postponed in October 1900, food remained a weapon in
the arsenal of the Rand administration.
Another problem facing the Uitlander advisers was how to deal with the
houses left vacant by departing Uitlanders which had been occupied by Boers and proBoers during the first seven months of war. Commandant Schutte, Ecause's predecessor
and chairman of the Johannesburg Rust en Orde Commission which governed the Rand
after 1899, followed a policy of installing Boer refugees and favoured Johannesburg
residents in empty Uitlander houses. (13) Complicating this matter for the new
British administration was the llKrugerProclamation" which had been announced at the
beginning of the war. In a move to protect his commandos, Kruger had proclaimed that,
as long as martial law was in force, residential property owners could not claim rent
from their tenants nor could banks c h g e interest on mortgages to their borrowers who
had used residential property as collateral. (14) Naturally, the "rent proclamation"
was abhorrent to rentiers, even though the more astute owners were well aware that
residential property could command little rent during the wax because departing
occupiers had actually begged people to live in their homes rent-free in order to
protect them from looters. (15)
In an attempt to re&n
control of private property, the MacKenzie regime
first ordered that no vacant liouses were to be occupied without the permission of
the mi1ita.q and that f'urniture could no longer be moved without the governmenttS
and the owner' S written consent. (16) Yet the problem remained: how to eject tenants
who claimed that the l1&uger Pr~clamation~~
meant that they neither had to move nor to
pay rent. Douglas Forster, MacKenziets Legal Adviser, sympathized with owners but
declared that, legally, nothing could be done. Forster wanted to protect the
rentiers' rights and to see the proclamation abrogated; until this could be done, he
rejected the idea of setting up a court to arbitrate between tenants and owners for
fear that it would give the proclamation and the tenants1 claims some standing in
law. Consequently, it was left to MacKenzie to solve the problem, and on the 6th
July he wrote to his Legal Adviser:
I propose to deal with all these house cases
individually on their merits. I shall, where
necessary, eject the occupier of a house, by
military escort, and let the ejected one obtain
his satisfaction afterwards by civil court if he
the more
likes. Please select and bring me
pressing cases. (17)
...
Fiddes soon entered the discussion and suggested t h a t a special Commission
be nominated t o determine the impact of the proclamation upon property relations i n
Johannesburg. MacKenzie appointed a "Rent Committee" but i t s membership was so
r e n t i e r s , land and mining company
overwhelmingly drawn from the propertied c l a s s
t h a t i t s very existence generated unrest among the Uitlander
o f f i c i a l s , etc.
refugees a t the coast, who feared t h a t t h e i r r i g h t s as absentee tenants were about
t o be infringed. Further, the Committee's membership fuelled the already vociferous
discontent amongst refugees concerning " c a p i t a l i s t i c appointments" made by MacKenzie
and Roberts. Consequently, Milner was forced t o s t a t e t h a t the Rent Committee was
only advisory and that no changes were contemplated with regard t o the "Rent
Proclamation". A s a r e s u l t the advisers a t Johannesburg were no closer to gaining
the l e g a l power t o expel unwanted tenants, and property r i g h t s continued t o be
violated. (18)
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While the men i n the MacKenzie administration sought t o make immediate
changes, they were a l s o concerned with long-range issues. Of most i n t e r e s t i n the
e a r l i e s t months of this period was t h e i r attempt t o get the s e a t of the new colonial
government moved from P r e t o r i a t o Johannesburg. It was a scheme i n i t i a t e d by these
men and was e x p l i c i t l y meant t o serve the i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h industrial and
business community i n the Transvaal. Because neither Milner nor Chamberlain would
sanction the move Milner a f r a i d t h a t t o do so would appear t o the anti-capitalist
the
c r i t i c s a s though his policy was dictated by an "extreme Uitlander clique" (19)
men a t Johannesburg attempted t o influence policy through the press.
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Monypenny, using his Times connection, made sure that the advisers'
position favouring removal of the c a p i t a l t o Johannesburg was presented i n London.
Soon, however, Milner asked Chamberlain t o give the Times' s t a f f an informal h i n t
t h a t t o continue t o publicize t h e i r cause would only play i n t o the hands of the
enemy. (20) Then MacKenzie 1 S advisers convinced the unsuspecting Roberts t o
approve the publication of the
which they planned t o use t o "educate" the
m i l i t a r y and t o champion the c a p i t a l issue. Milner, unwilling t o convey h i s r e a l
reasons t o Roberts, asked t h a t the permission be rescinded since it would be unfair
t o other publishers who had previously been denied permission t o reopen on the Rand.
Roberts complied, and the a g i t a t o r s G advisers were therefore denied t h e i r hearing.
Fiddes was deeply relieved, and wrote t o Milner: "I was only j u s t i n time to get
the thing right: i t was a close shave." (21)
m,
During t h i s controversy Fiddes and the Uitlanders i n Johannesburg had
continually locked horns. Not only had t h e i r actions angered h i m , but the High
Commissioner grew increasingly exasperated with t h e i r a t t i t u d e and behaviour. It was
during this a f f a i r t h a t Monypenny wasned Fiddes that, even i f every member of the
B r i t i s h cabinet wanted the c a p i t a l a t Pretoria, the men of Johannesburg "could and
would prevent itv1. To make matters worse, he then threatened: "the B r i t i s h
government could govern [the] Transvaal without [the] Dutch, but not without
Such t a l k caused Milner t o change his opinion of the
Johannesburg." (22)
Johannesburg advisers and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o do the task s e t before them. Where i n
l a t e June he was able t o forgive t h e i r enthusiasm
l ' i t i s only natural t h a t they
within weeks he was
should go i n f o r a b i t of a fling" (23), he counselled Fiddes
fed up with the " a t t i t u d e taken up by persons who seem t o think they can combine the
r o l e of government o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c a l agitators". (24) By July he thought them
"too b i g f o r t h e i r boots" and was increasingly concerned with t h e i r "High Jinksfl. (25)
Fiddes, closer t o the scene, just called them a "sad l o t of advisers" and informed
Milner that he saw h i s task a s convincing them that "Lord Roberts i s a t l e a s t
Suzerain of the Johannesburg Republic (and
I am h i s Grand vizier)". (26)
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...
Fiddes not only aggravated the advisers by h i s stance on the c a p i t a l and
newspaper issues but because, e a r l i e r , he had reversed some of t h e i r more aggressive
measures. For instance, when he d v e d i n the Transvaal he found t h a t the old
reformer H. C. Hull had i n i t i a t e d a regulation which levied f i n e s on burghers of
d i s t r i c t s where commando r a i d s took place. It also forced prominent burghers t o r i d e
i n goods trucks and vans up and down the railway l i n e s a s "hostages" i n order t o
assure t h a t the t r a i n s were not attacked. Reportedly, H u l l had rushed this through
i n order t o "make things hot" f o r Sammy Marks ( a powerful financier who had benefited
from the W g e r regime) and others t o whom the f'reformers had an antipathf'.
Fiddes,
a f t e r countermanding the order, noted t h a t it had not been a "military precaution,
but a weapon f o r private spite". (27)
Fiddes also took an i n t e r e s t i n the so-called "Star Chamber", a body
constituted, a s he put it, "to examine anyone on oath about anything". (28) After
Fiddes attempted t o " c l i p the w i n g s " of the body, he was urged by Monypenny and
Samuel Ehas t o permit i t t o continue i t s enquiries i n t o "acts of r a s c a l i t y
thieving, looting under the guise of commandeering and so forth" which occurred on
the Rand during the f i r s t seven months of the w a r . He consented h i t s continued
operation on the condition t h a t , f i r s t , no one was required t o incriminate himself
and, secondly, "no p o l i t i c a l vengeance i s
wreaked thereby". ( 2 9 ) But there i s
l i t t l e doubt t h a t these conditions did not r e s t r i c t the actions of the body, f o r
f i l e s are extant which demonstrate that MacKenzie's "Committee of Investigation"
was very concerned with pre-war events and antagonisms. (30)
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Without doubt, the boldest policy undertaken by the MacKenzie administration
was the one which sought t o eliminate undesirable elements from the Rand. The
"undesirable" category included a wide range of people, i n t e r a l i a r foreigners
(often but not exclusively Russian o r Polish ~ e w s ) ,the a l i e n d e s t i t u t e (most of the
B r i t i s h poor had been removed during the Boer administrative period), criminals of
a l l n a t i o n a l i t i e s a s well a s p o l i t i c a l enemies and labour agitators. Many people
were removed a s t r a i t o r s , some f o r t h e i r involvement i n a l'plot" t o overthrow the
MacKenzie regime. There were then,and there remain, doubts a s t o the existence of
the "plot" i n other than the minds of administrators. Further, while i t may have
been legitimate to remove disruptive elements from a sensitive area during time of
war
and foreigm consuls agreed with the B r i t i s h government that it was
i t i s now
c l e a r t h a t the deportations were not motivated solely by such concerns, but rather by
long~termgoals. Indeed, the e n t i r e Imperial administration from Milner downwards
took delight i n seeing the undesirables removed from the old Republics and especially
from the Rand.
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On the weekend of 13-14 July l 9 O O some 460 men were asrested i n
Johannesburg, and a l l but two
and these two were a mistake
were non-British, nonbur&er foreigners. Some were taken from t h e i r homes a s they prepaxed f o r bed and
were ordered t o stand with scant clothes i n the winter's night a i r . Others were
rounded up as they l e f t cafes, some a s they walked the s t r e e t s . A l l ended up i n
jail where they spent one o r two nights asking why they had been arrested, demanding
t o see t h e i r consuls, and receiving l i t t l e other than stony silence o r v e r b d abuse
from t h e i r guads. On the 15th - without being allowed t o c o l l e c t f r e s h clothing o r
t o secure t h e i r possessions most were boarded i n third-class compartments o r c a t t l e
trucks and sent by r a i l t o East London, where the majority were soon loaded on the
"Hawarden Castle" bound f o r Europe v i a the Cape. Most l e f t this ship, and others
which were t o follow, i n Holland, though a few of the deportees went on t o London
where they were met and t h e r e a f t e r watched by the police.
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I n theory, these men had been implicated i n a "plotn t o overthrow the
Johannesburg gaxrison while the majority of the soldiers were off duty and attending
a horse race (hence, the "Race Course Plot"). Also, i n theory, the men were i n
communication with a Boer commando some 12 miles away which was t o secure an
advantage a s a r e s u l t of the coup. (1n f a c t , according t o army records, some of the
Boers were captured i n the v i c i n i t y i n July and sentenced t o POW camps i n Ceylon.)(gl)
I n the following weeks some i n the administration were d i s s a t i s f i e d with these
arrests. Major O'Brien, President of the Military Tribunal a t Johannesburg, a t t e s t s
t o the paranoia of the D i s t r i c t Conrmissioner: even a f t e r the a s r e s t s he continued
t o hold a "very blue view of our position here and [was] f'ull of anaschist p l o t s f o r
clearing off a l l the high officials", a f e a r OfBrien did not shase. (32) MacKenzie
f e l t insecure because he thought t h a t the "plot" had i n p a r t been a r e s u l t of the
scascity and high cost of food and was well aware t h a t this was a s i t u a t i o n not
l i k e l y t o change. (33)
Deportations did not stop with these first few hundred. J u s t a week l a t e r
a second sweep of the c i t y gathered more foreign undesirables and they too were
loaded up and sent away. I n f a c t , contemporary estimates indicate t h a t there were
about 20 people expelled daily from Johannesburg a t the end of August 1900 and the
historian Spies s t a t e s t h a t over 4000 aliens were deported from the whole of southern
Africa before the end of 1900. (34) Deportation, then, became an important tool
with which t o eliminate from the new colonies people whom the administration thought
"undesirable".
Naturally, pro-Boers were a target, and throughout the w a r they were
forwarded from the Rand t o the Cape, much t o Milner's chagrin. (35) On the other
hand, Milner was delighted when some 1400 NSASM ( ~ e p u b l i c a nrailway) employees, w i t h
t h e i r families, were deported soon a f t e r the capture of Johannesburg. ( 3 6 ) The
criminal community was an obvious source of deportees, with people being expelled
f o r a variety of a c t i v i t i e s : from d i s t r i b u t i n g i l l i c i t liquor t o blacks t o chwging
prices above those s e t by Monypenny. (37) Others were deported f o r being without
the necessary papers, f o r having "no s e t t l e d occupation" o r simply because they
"were unable t o give a proper account of themselves". (38)
In August l901 deportation was put t o another use: the eviction from the
Rand of B r i t i s h miners who downed tools over wage rates. I n that month ninety-five
white men struck work on the May Consolidated Mine i n an attempt t o g e t t h e i r pay
raised above the maximum (5/- per day plus rations) s e t by the army and the Chamber
of Mines. After hearing of Kitchener's pronouncement t h a t "employees of the
Johannesburg minestt ought t o be a s ready a s other people i n the Empire t o "display
the necessary self-sacrifice
and patriotism", s i x t y of the ninety-five s t i l l
refused t o work. Police Commissioner Davies then warned them t h a t i f they did not
return t o work he would see them escorted over the border. Thirty-five miners t r i e d
t o c a l l his bluff and were accordingly marched t o the s t a t i o n and sent t o the coast
t o await the end of the w a r with the r e s t of the exiles. The explusion of s t r i k e r s
had the desired e f f e c t , f o r reports f i l e d a t the time noted t h a t "none of the
employees on the other [mining] properties w i l l r e s o r t t o the ill-advised course
adopted by the May [consolidated] workmen". (39)
But deportation w a s not confined t o people who, through t h e i r actions,
brought themselves t o the a t t e n t i o n of the authorities. Nor were war-related
concerns the sole reasons f o r expelling people. Rather, it was the i n t e n t of the
Transvaal and Johannesburg governments t o remove from the new colony people who could
hinder the development of the post-war i d e a l society. The powers conferred on the
administration by martial law enabled i t summarily t o e j e c t people who i n peace-time
would be more d i f f i c u l t t o remove. After several hundred deportations had taken
place, Fiddes explained the policy t o Milner:
...
i n the future i n t e r e s t s of the country we ought
t o c l e w out a l o t of the foreigners, and the actual
pretext f o r doing so i n many cases i s not easy t o
find. I n f a c t we must use the a r b i t r a r y w i l l of the
Militazy f o r the purpose, (40)
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While Milner concurred
"it i s of course most desirable t o get r i d of foreign r i f f raff" (41)
he w a s t o remain concerned with the potential diplomatic repercussions
of l a g s - s c a l e deportation and sought t o ensure that the expulsions appeared
legitimate and followed humane and formal principles.
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Roberts and Fiddes had not l e t such considerations stop MacKenzie and h i s
advisers. I n e a r l y July the l a t t e r sought Robertsfs approval t o deport a l l "four
i.e., men who had acquired burgher r i g h t s since the Jameson Raid.
year burghers"
He explained his reasoning t o h i s superior:
i f carried out here this measure
would r i d [the] town of some two thousand Peruvian and other low c l a s s ~ews[,] i n
f a c t a l l the criminal class." (42) Roberts and Fiddes, r a t h e r than r e j e c t such
duplicity, sought t o carry i t even further. Fiddes responded t o MacKenziefs request:
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[ ~ o b e r t s ]considers t h a t no action should be taken
against the Jewish population a s a c l a s s nor indeed
need the word 'Jew' be mentioned. But there i s no
doubt t h a t the 'Peruvians' are a wholly objectionable
element, and the more of them that can be sent down
the better. It i s a matter f o r the Military and
wherever you have reasonable grounds f o r suspicion
against individuals they should be deported and
severely dealt with i f they return without a permit.
This measure, and possibly deportation under the head
of 'military exigencies' ought t o r i d us of a
considerable portion. (43)
Hence, the Johannesburg administration w a s encouraged t o u t i l i z e i t s power
t o remove people who, before the w a r , had allegedly contributed t o the corruption,
inefficiency and crime about which the reformers had complained. I n the following
weeks and months the MacKenzie regime was t o concoct a variety of excuses which would
j u s t i f y the expulsion of "objectionable" people.
A s previously mentioned, food remained a weapon i n the hands of the
administration and i n December l9OO i t was used t o remove people from the Rand. I n
t h a t month MacKenzie proclaimed t h a t only burghers, foreign consuls and members of
the Rand Rifles, a l o c a l guards' u n i t whose membership was confined t o B r i t i s h men,
would be permitted t o buy food from government stores. The r e s t of the population
i.e., foreigners
was faced with the alternatives of starvation o r exile. Kitchener
defended the action by s t a t i n g t h a t the food shortages which made such a system
necessary had resulted from "foreign Jew ringleaders
buying up all [the] supplies
p r o f i t when [the] railway failed". (44) But the foreign consuls
t o make a large
put pressure on Kitchener and he was forced to modify the MacKenzie regulation so
t h a t the 'lprivilege" of buying food was extended t o people whose consuls would ensure
they were " f i t and proper persons t o enjoy it". S t i l l Kitchener would not be
defeated, and he quietly warned consuls t h a t they should not abuse t h e i r power by
granting too many c e r t i f i c a t e s , f o r i f they did i t would debar them from any l a t e r
"representations". None the l e s s , Fiddes expressed doubts a s t o the effectiveness of
the revised proclamation and feared t h a t the consuls would not comply with Kitchener's
directive, thereby rendering the "object of the Proclamation nugatory". (45)
-
...
-
...
Other examples of p o l i c i e s designed t o mould Rand society could be mentioned
but they would only demonstrate h r t h e r the extent t o which the Uitlander advisers and
the military were willing t o go i n an attempt t o achieve t h e i r goals. But s t i l l the
question remains: What were t h e i r goals? Clearly they were complex and were rooted
i n the i n t e r e s t s of the administrators and t h e i r perception of what was b e s t f o r the
Rand and Johannesburg. The policies reflected t h e i r xenophobic p r o c l i v i t i e s and were
generated a s much by the w a r as by t h e i r desire t o r i d themselves of business
competitors and the "dangerous classes". The attempt t o remove criminals is, of
course, understandable, especially i f viewed i n r e l a t i o n t o pre-war Rand society w i t h
i t s extensive i l l i c i t liquor trade, t h e f t and police corruption. The "Peruvians" ( a
euphemism f o r East European Jews) were blamed f o r most of the crime and were therefore
a prime target of the w a r and post-war regimes.
The policies were not solely reactive, but sought t o achieve a positive end.
I n f a c t , the goal was much the same a s t h a t sought by Milner: t o r e v i t a l i z e the Rand
economy and use i t t o generate the p o l i t i c a l and economic development of the B r i t i s h
Transvaal Colony. The attempt t o move the c a p i t a l i s just one example of this, f o r
the advisers sought t o place i t where i t could b e s t respond t o the needs of
i n d u s t r i a l capitalism.
Finally, the MacKenzie administration did give Rand a f f a i r s a "twist" ,and
post-war policies, such a s r e s t r i c t i n g the municipal franchise o r transferring nonwhites and undesirable whites from the c i t y centre, reflected the methods and g o d s
of these men. Further, many of the Uitlander reformers were t o move i n t o Colonial
and Union government posts and u t i l i z e the experience gained i n the war. The
p o l i c i e s they pursued there bore out the t r u t h of Wybergh's m a x i m :
of doing good work i s t o have more work given one t o do". (46)
"the l a s t reward
Notes
S t a r , 11 August 1899.
W. Wybergh t o J. P. Fitzpatrick, confidential, 1 3 December 1899, i n Fitzpatrick:
South African P o l i t i c i a n , selected papers 1888-1906 (A. H. Duminy and
W. R. Guest, eds) (Johannesburg, 1976), h e r e a f t e r c i t e d Fitzpatrick.
CO 417/296, Milner t o Chamberlain, confidential, 5 December 1900; Cape Times,
4 October 1900; Charles Richard OtBrien Diary, Vol. I, p. 120 (Rhodes House,
oxford), h e r e a f t e r c i t e d O'Brien.
Roberts t o Milner, 2 June 1900, i n Field Marshal Lord Roberts Correspondence,
MS letter-book, Vol. I1 (National Army ~useum), h e r e a f t e r c i t e d Roberts
Correspondence; Chamberlain t o Milner, secret, 10 February l9OO i n M s s Milner
Dep. 170 ( ~ o d l e i a n , 0xf ord) h e r e a f t e r c i t e d M s s Milner.
,
,
Milner t o Roberts, 25 May 1900 i n Letters from Milner, Roberts Correspondence.
Roberts t o Marquis of Landsdowne: secret, 30 May 1900, South African W a r ,
Vol I, and 19 June 1900, Home Letter-book, Vol 111, i n Roberts Correspondence.
MacKenzie t o Roberts, 21 J u l l9OO i n PSY 49 ( ~ i l e sof the P o l i t i c a l Secretary,
Transvaal Archives, Pretoria,
5.
J. P. F i t z p a t r i c k t o Sam Evans, 8 August 1900, i n Fitzpatrick;
XXIV, 410, 29 September 1900, p. 445.
African Review,
MacKenzie t o M. S. Chief, 18 August 1900, PSY 49, and Fiddes t o MacKenzie,
22 AUSS~ 1900, PSY 52.
MacKenzie t o Fiddes, 8 October 1900, PSY 49.
African Review, XXIV: 410, 29 September 1900, p. 457, and 214, 1 3 October 1900,
P. 52.
Fiddes t o MacKenzie, confidential ( d r a f t ) , 11 October 1900, PSY 52.
Standard and Diggers' News, 20 January 1900, and Report dated 20 March 1900 i n
Speciale P o l i t i e , Vol 591 i n Johannesburg Argief ( ~ r a n s v a a lArchives, ~ r e t o r i a ) .
Standard and Diggers' News, 26 October 1899.
For complaints, see, e.g., Standard and Diggers' News, 22 and 30 November 1899,
and Cape Times, 25 August 1900. For more a s t u t e observation, see CO 291/27,
Milner t o Chamberlain, 27 February 1901, with enclosure from J. A. Hamilton,
n. d.
Johannesbura Gazette,
5 and 21 June 1900.
MacKenzie t o Legal Adviser, 6 July 1900, LAJ 2. Also see Legal Adviser t o
MacKenzie, 6 J u l y 1900, LAJ 2, and Legal Adviser t o Mrs A. Badenhoop, 7 June
1900, LAJ 1 ( ~ i l e sof the Legal Adviser, Johannesburg, i n Transvaal Archives,
re t o r i a )
.
Fiddes t o MacKenzie, 27 J u l y 1900, PSY 52. For ref'ugee reaction and Milner's
assurance, see CO 417/293, Milner t o Chamberlain, 22 August 1900, with
enclosure, Carter t o Milner, 15 August 1900, and Cane Times, 20 August 1900.
CO 417/291, Milner t o Chamberlain, 6 July 1900. For t h e i r motives, see Samuel
Evans t o Fitzpatrick, private, 22 November 1899, F i t z p a t r i c k t o F. Eckstein,
26 May 1900, F i t z p a t r i c k t o Samuel Ebans, 10 J u l y l9OO and 18 J u l y 1900, i n
Fitzoatrick. Also see Fiddes t o Milner, 1 July 1900 i n M s s Milner, 230.
CO 417/291, Milner t o Chamberlain, 6 July 1900, and Chamberlain t o Milner
( d r a f t ) , 1 5 July 1900; Fitzpatrick t o Samuel Evans, private, 18 July 1900,
i n Fitzpatrick.
Fiddes t o Milner, confidential, 13 July 1900, Mss Milner, 230; Fiddes t o
Milner, 7 July 1900, and Milner t o Fiddes, 8 July 1900, i n W 119/469; Milner
t o Roberts, 12 July 1900, and Roberts t o Milner, 13 July 1900, i n DO 119/510.
DO 119/469, Fiddes t o Milner, 29 June 1900, and see Fitzpatrick t o J. Wernher,
4 July 1900, i n Fitzpatrick.
Milner t o Fiddes, private, 25 June 1900, M s s Milnes, 183.
Milner t o Fiddes, 4 July 1900, Mss Milner, 230.
DO 119/469, Milner t o Fiddes, 4 July 1900, and see Milner t o Fiddes, private,
25 June 1900.
Fiddes t o Milner, private,
5 August 1900, and 1 July 1900, i n M s s Milner, 230.
Fiddes t o Milner, 1 July 1900, Mss Milner, 230.
Ibid.
Fiddes t o Milner, confidential, 1 3 July 1900, Mss Milner, 230.
See, f o r instance, report concerning January 1899 "Amphitheatret1 meeting i n
PSY 73.
WO l08/303, "Transvaal L i s t Nos 3272-3499".
1901.
Also see London Times, 1 4 November
O'Brien, Vol 11, 23 July 1900.
n. 7 above.
Ca e Times, 27 August 1900; S. B. Spies, Methods of Barbarism? (cape Town,
&XT-164.
DO 119/469, Milner t o Fiddes, 13 August 1900. He was worried about the
influence they r&&t have on the Cape Dutch.
Milner t o Roberts, 25 June 1900, M s s Milner,
175.
For
deportation of Liquor "Ring" Nathanson, see PSY 52, MacKenzie t o Fiddes, 10
August 1900, and DO 119/517, Fairbridge, Arderne, and Lawton (~athanson's
attorneys) t o Milner, 11 September 1900, and enclosures.
LAJ 1/34, Memo dated 30 June 1900 f o r deportation of storekeepers.
HC 143, "Deportation of undesirable foreigners from the Transvaal i n 1900It,
with enclosure l e t t e r MacKenzie t o High C o d s s i o n e r , 7 September 1900, c i t i n g
report by Davies, 6 September 1900 ( ~ r a n s v dArchives, ~ r e t o r i a ) .
Cape Times, 20 A u g u s t 1901; f o r further information, see Transvaal Chamber of
Mines, Twelfth Report f o r the Years 1900 and 1901, pp. 56-61.
Fiddes t o Milner, private,
5 August 1900, Mss Milner, 230.
FO 2/416, CO to FO, 25 October 1900, with enclosure, Milner t o Chamberlain,
confidential, 3 October 1900, with enclosed Milner t o Fiddes, 12 August 1900.
WO 105/27, "Deportation of Netherlands Railway Ehploy6s, with Index", MacKenzie
t o Roberts, 3 July 1900. ( ~ a c ~ e n a i s
e not here r e f e r r i n g t o NZASM employees.)
Fiddes t o MacKenzie,
9 July 1900, PSY 52.
F0 2/531, CO to M), 29 Jarmary 1901, with enclosure, Milner t o Chamberlain,
confidential, 3 January 1901, with enclosed Kitchener t o Milner, 21 December
1900.
FO 2/531, CO t o FO, 29 January 1901, with enclosure, Milner t o Chamberlain,
confidential, 3 January 1901 with enclosed Fiddes t o Milner, confidential,
20 December 1900. Seemingly Fiddes's pessimism was unwarranted, f o r i n
January 1901 reports were f i l e d t h a t indicated another large-scale expulsion
was under way. See, f o r instance, African Review, XXIV, 426, 19 January 1901,
p. 85: "A general clearance i s being made by the authorities of undesirable
persons on the Rand
..."
Wybergh t o Forster, confidential, 26 February 1900, i n Douglas Forster Papers
(~ohannesburgPublic ~ i b r a r y )
.